Category: Ukraine

  • MIL-OSI USA: Tillis Leads Resolution Calling on NATO Members to Meet Defense Spending Commitments for Leadership Roles

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for North Carolina Thom Tillis

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, Senators Thom Tillis (R-NC), Jim Justice (R-WV), John Cornyn (R-TX), Tim Sheehy (R-MT), Mike Lee (R-UT), Steve Daines (R-MT), and Shelley Moore Capito (R-WV) introduced a resolution that expressed the view that, to maintain leadership roles within NATO and continue receiving benefits from NATO, Allies must now, at a bare minimum, meet the current required commitment with an eye towards likely increases in burden sharing to come. 

    In 2006, NATO Defense Ministers agreed to commit at least two percent of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to defense spending to ensure the Alliance’s military readiness. This resolution asserts that countries not meeting this goal should be excluded from holding leadership positions within NATO or hosting significant NATO events, including summits or foreign ministers’ meetings. Additionally, it calls for members to either meet the two percent commitment or have a plan to do so by the NATO Summit in The Hague in June 2025.

    “Given the increased aggression from Russia in Ukraine, provocations from China, and other rising threats, it is crucial that our partner nations not only meet but exceed the current defense spending goals,” said Senator Tillis. “The existing two percent commitment is the bare minimum necessary. We must aim for higher targets, such as the proposed five percent from President Trump, to bolster and strengthen NATO.”

    “Conflicts in Europe and the Middle East and tensions in the Indo-Pacific threaten our global stability and security,” said Senator Cornyn. “It’s critical for NATO nations to honor their commitments to spend two percent of their GDP on national defense, ensuring military readiness within the NATO alliance.”

    “Thanks to President Trump’s leadership, many of our European allies are finally pulling their weight when it comes to defense spending,” said Senator Daines. “However, the world remains dangerous and it’s time for the remaining European countries to step up. Raising defense spending is an important part of deterrence and the time to act is now.”  

    Full text of the resolution is available HERE.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: New industry bonus opens to support good jobs and low carbon manufacturing factories

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    Industrial heartlands and coastal areas will receive a major economic boost as the government backs renewable energy firms investing in industrial communities.

    • Government launches new investment to support clean energy manufacturing, and highly skilled jobs in industrial towns and cities
    • offshore wind developers can now bid for financial support if they drive investment in UK’s most deprived regions, build low carbon factories, or support net zero supply chains
    • the bonus will kickstart growth and support good jobs – delivering the mission to become a clean energy superpower through the government’s Plan for Change

    Industrial heartlands and coastal areas will receive a major economic boost as the government backs renewable energy firms investing in industrial communities – backing good jobs through the government’s Plan for Change

    The application window has opened for the Clean Industry Bonus, which provides financial support for offshore wind developers, on the condition they prioritise their investment in areas that need it most, including traditional oil and gas communities – supporting highly skilled jobs such as engineers, electricians or welders.

    The support also rewards developers who build more sustainable low carbon factories, offshore wind blades, cables and ports to reduce industrial emissions across the clean energy supply chain.

    By encouraging developers to use less polluting suppliers, the bonus will help tackle the climate crisis while also addressing supply chain blockages in renewable technologies driven by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – supporting industry on the transition to clean, secure, homegrown energy that Britain controls.

    The UK produces more offshore wind than any other European country, making it the backbone for plans to deliver a clean power system by 2030 and become a clean energy superpower. This bonus will help accelerate the drive for clean power – incentivising developers to build the infrastructure the country needs to end reliance on unstable fossil fuel markets and help keep energy bills down for good.   

    Since July, the government has seen £34.8 billion of private investment into UK’s clean energy industries. In November, the government launched its carbon capture and storage industry supporting 4,000 jobs in the North West and Teesside. ScottishPower awarded a £1 billion turbine contract for its East Anglia TWO offshore windfarm to Siemens Gamesa, including blade production at its Hull blade factory – the company employ over 1,300 people in Humberside.

    Energy Secretary Ed Miliband said:   

    We are backing our proud manufacturing, coastal and oil and gas communities with good jobs, skills and private sector investment – delivering on the government’s Plan for Change.

    This is our clean energy superpower mission in action, kickstarting growth, delivering energy security and transforming towns and cities as part of the transition – from the ports of Nigg and Leith to the manufacturing hubs of Blyth and Hull. 

    Steve Foxley, Chief Executive of the Offshore Renewable Energy (ORE) Catapult, said: 

    This news is an important signal from government to industry of intent to grow our offshore wind sector in a way that benefits both our climate and our economy, supporting expansive regional job creation and bolstering national energy security.  

    Alongside innovating to develop next-generation technologies, delivering the right levels of future deployment and fulfilling the ambitions of the Industrial Growth Plan for offshore wind, it will drive up confidence in our ability to secure the clean investments we need in the years to come.

    Dan McGrail, CEO of RenewableUK, said:  

    The offshore wind industry already employs over 34,000 people in the UK, but there’s an opportunity to treble this number by the end of the decade if we grow the sector’s supply chain. Government initiatives like the Clean Industry Bonus, coupled with industry initiatives to support innovation and the upcoming Industrial Strategy, could drive hundreds of millions of pounds of private investment into new manufacturing. 

    Whilst we’re right to focus on securing investment in manufacturing new turbine foundations, blades and cables, we shouldn’t forget that there are also thousands of jobs in the construction and maintenance of wind farms too. You can go to places across the country like Grimsby and Great Yarmouth and Buckie on the Moray Firth and see boats full of engineers ensuring our wind farms operate at maximum efficiency. 

    Dhara Vyas, Energy UK, Chief Executive, said:  

    Offshore wind is set to become the backbone of a decarbonised power system. To build an industry that is resilient to supply chain challenges, we need a framework that supports sustainable deployment, while fostering investment in the UK’s industrial heartlands. 

    The Clean Industry Bonus will help to unlock economic growth, create job opportunities, and maintain the UK’s position as a global leader in offshore wind. 

    Alongside the development of a broader industrial strategy, the Clean Industry Bonus will play an important role in strengthening the Contracts for Difference mechanism. Clarity will be critical in ensuring we can deliver Allocation Round 7, which is likely to be the single most important auction to achieving the Clean Power goal.

    The UK is already home to the world’s first floating offshore wind farm and has the highest deployment of offshore wind in Europe. As a result, the UK’s offshore wind industry is supporting thousands of highly skilled jobs across the country. 

    This latest boost for renewable developers comes after the government delivered the most successful renewables auction round in history last year, securing contracts for Europe’s largest and second largest offshore wind farm projects. 

    The bonus will come with an initial £27 million per gigawatt of offshore wind projects. That means if developers commit to 7-8 GW of offshore wind, up to £200 million of funding could be made available. 

    Funding will be allocated competitively with the results announced by the Energy Secretary in the summer.

    Notes to editors

    The Clean Industry Bonus will apply to all offshore wind projects bidding for funding through this year’s renewable energy auction, Allocation Round 7 of the Contracts for Difference scheme, which is the main mechanism for securing clean energy infrastructure for Britain. September’s auction secured 5 GW for offshore wind, enough to power the equivalent of around 8 million homes.

    The funding will come through the government’s Contract for Difference mechanism. The scheme is designed to protect billpayers from high costs with the lowest price bids successful, ensuring value for money.

    Updates to this page

    Published 13 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Japan’s Expertise in International Assistance: Leveraging Experiences Gained in Southeast Asia to Aid Ukraine -The Shared Future of Asia and Japan

    Source: Japan Connect

    Diplomacy / InternationalAsia & Pacific

    In 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. The Russian military has continuously been launching missiles and artillery attacks on civilian facilities, causing great damage to the lives of the Ukrainian people. Japan is offering various assistance through public and private endeavors to rebuild lives, drawing on experiences gained through providing aid to countries in Southeast Asia.

    One such example is a water supply aid project. As part of the government’s gratuitous recovery assistance, Japan is sending mobile water purification systems and ready-to-assemble water supply tanks to Ukraine’s cities where water supply networks were destroyed.

    As part of this initiative, Nihon Genryo Co., Ltd., a manufacturer of water treatment systems headquartered in Kawasaki, Kanagawa Prefecture, delivered four Mobile Siphon Tanks, a mobile water purification system, to Ukraine’s capital Kyiv and the southern port city Odesa. The system, developed by Nihon Genryo, does not require filter replacements, which were necessary in previous water purification systems. The company also invited water supply technicians in Kyiv to Japan and conducted training on water purification technology.

    Nihon Genryo has been deeply involved in Southeast Asia. In 1982, it delivered fully automatic dust scrapers to the Bangkhen Water Treatment Plant in Bangkok, Thailand, to help remove impurities and provide safe, treated water. It also delivered Mobile Siphon Tanks to cities in Laos and Vietnam as part of Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) and is training local staff on how to use them. In Laos, the company carried out emergency water supply operations during flood disasters in 2013 and 2020. In the Philippines, it provided drinking water to regions without access to a water supply by using river water. It also carried out emergency water supply operations at the request of the Japanese government in the wake of disasters such as Super Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 and Super Typhoon Rai in 2021. In this way, the company gained extensive experience assisting the lives and lifestyles of people in Southeast Asia, which is now being leveraged to help Ukraine, halfway across the globe in Europe.

    In addition to water supply assistance, Japan also has international experience in providing aid to people with disabilities. Since Russia’s invasion, over 300,000 Ukrainian troops and civilians have become disabled as a result of injuries. However, medical equipment is growing outdated due to a shortage of funds, and providing assistance is an urgent matter. Japan provided rehabilitation equipment and welfare vehicles to 11 facilities in Kyiv Oblast through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). In December 2024, a commemorative ceremony was held in Kyiv. Ruslan Kravchenko, the governor of Kyiv Oblast, expressed his gratitude, saying, “We thank the Japanese government and its people for their extensive support. This will allow us to greatly improve the conditions for people with disabilities.”

    Japan has also been committed to providing aid to people with disabilities in Southeast Asia. Gratuitous financial assistance was offered to Indonesia, for example, by providing mobile rehabilitation equipment in 1989 and taking part in a project to construct a vocational rehabilitation center for people with disabilities in 1995. In addition to dispatching Japanese specialists and Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCVs) to countries like Thailand and the Philippines, Japan also invites trainees from various countries to Japan through JICA initiatives to help raise rehabilitation standards for people with disabilities.

    Removing landmines is another urgent issue that must be addressed in Ukraine. It is believed that the Russian military may have planted mines in an area of up to 150,000 square kilometers, which amounts to over a fourth of the country’s land. The Japanese government has been engaged in mine clearance efforts in Cambodia for many years. Drawing on this experience, it is offering comprehensive support to Ukraine by providing resources developed by Japanese companies, such as mine detectors, mine removers and systems using artificial intelligence (AI) to identify areas where mines have been planted, in addition to training on how to prevent injuries and offering aid to victims.

    Japan is also working on assisting Ukrainian soldiers and civilians who survived mines but lost their limbs.

    Instalimb, Inc. is a startup company headquartered in Tokyo that utilizes digital technology to create prosthetic legs. The company uses a special scanner to capture the shape of a patient’s leg and creates a 3D-printed prosthetic based on data designed by a prosthetist using software.
    The CEO of the company, Yutaka Tokushima, said in an interview with the Japanese broadcasting network TBS Television, “One (of the merits) is that we can create prosthetics very quickly. Where it usually takes a month, we can do it in a day (at the quickest) and significantly lower the cost. Another merit is that one professional prosthetist can make many prosthetics.” 
    Prosthetic legs cost around 400,000 yen in Japan, but Tokushima says the company can reduce it to one-tenth of that amount.
    Instalimb has its roots in the Philippines. After working at a computer-related company and as a designer of industrial products, Tokushima joined the JOCV program under JICA and was posted to the Philippines in 2012. 
    Later, with support from JICA and the Philippine government, he established a laboratory equipped with a 3D printer and laser cutter for industrial development. After he learned that many people in the Philippines needed prosthetic legs as a result of diabetes, he took on the challenge of developing high-performance yet affordable prosthetics. Over the course of four years, he developed a technology that specialized in creating prosthetic legs using 3D printing. These prosthetics are now available to people in the Philippines who cannot afford conventional ones.

    As he works on creating prosthetics in Ukraine, Tokushima says, “Many people want to recover and rebuild their lives, but they can’t work because they don’t have access to prosthetic legs. So I want to give them hope, first and foremost. Our current mission is to provide prosthetics to each and every person who needs them as we aim for the ultimate goal of helping all the people of Ukraine regain their bright future.” A Japanese company, born in the Philippines, is now striving to help the wounded people of Ukraine.

    Japan is offering aid to Ukraine in a diverse range of fields including infrastructure, education, agriculture, economy, machinery and culture—and much of this expertise comes from the experience Japan gained in Southeast Asia.

    By Akio Yaita
    Journalist. Graduated from the Faculty of Letters at Keio University. After completing his doctorate at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, he worked as a correspondent for the Sankei Shimbun in Beijing and as Taipei bureau chief. Author or co-author of many books.

    *The stories and materials above are provided by JIJI.com or AFPBBNews. Feel free to feature these stories in your own media.

    About “Japan Connect”
    Bringing you the latest stories about Japan.
    This new service is provided by AFPBB News, which AFP launched in 2007.

    MIL OSI – Submitted News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cortez Masto Votes Against Tulsi Gabbard to be Director of National Intelligence

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Nevada Cortez Masto

    Washington, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Catherine Cortez Masto voted against the confirmation of Tulsi Gabbard to be the Director of National Intelligence. She also spoke on the Senate floor before the vote to discuss her opposition to Ms. Gabbard, highlighting her repeated justifications of Putin’s illegal war in Ukraine and her statements casting doubt on the U.S. intelligence community’s assessments of the brutal Assad regime in Syria.
    “There should be absolutely no question about the trustworthiness or the judgement of our Director of National Intelligence,” said Senator Cortez Masto on the Senate floor. “The Director of National Intelligence should not sympathize with autocrats, blame our allies for wars of aggression, or parrot Kremlin talking points…I pledge to help keep Nevadans safe by opposing Ms. Gabbard’s confirmation.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senator Wicker Appointed Chairman of the U.S. Helsinki Commission for the 119th Congress

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Mississippi Roger Wicker
    WASHINGTON — The Presiding Officer, on behalf of the Vice President, last week announced the appointment of U.S. Senator Roger Wicker, R-Miss., as chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the U.S. Helsinki Commission, for the 119th Congress.
    “I am honored to be named chairman of the Helsinki Commission. European security is always good for the United States. For nearly fifty years, the Helsinki Commission has protected human rights, advanced democracy, and increased economic cooperation across the globe,” said Senator Wicker. “Today’s challenges are no less urgent. I look forward to working on a bicameral, bipartisan basis to seek a just end to Russia’s war on Ukraine, a stronger NATO alliance, and an international order that serves our national interest.”
    Senator Wicker assumes the chairmanship at a pivotal moment for transatlantic security. Russia is waging the largest land war in Europe since World War II, threatening not only Ukraine’s future and independence, but also the security and sovereignty of U.S. allies and partners in Europe. In the South Caucasus, Armenia and Azerbaijan have a generational opportunity to reach a durable peace agreement after decades of violence and upheaval. Meanwhile, the republic of Georgia’s democracy stands at a crossroads as the Georgian Dream party attempts to drag the country towards Russia and away from their chosen path of Euro-Atlantic integration. As we approach the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the broader Western Balkans region must chart a way through the dangers of violent division and toward greater alignment and integration with Western institutions. At this historic juncture, the United States has an opportunity to pursue policies that promote regional stability and strengthen the rules-based international order so that it continues to safeguard American security and prosperity.
    Senator Roger Wicker has served on the U.S. Helsinki Commission since 2009, where he has consistently championed democratic values, the rule of law, and peace and security in the OSCE region. He served as a Vice President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA) from 2017 to 2024. From November 2014 to July 2017, Senator Wicker chaired the OSCE PA Committee on Political Affairs and Security, where his work centered on sustaining constructive security dialogue among all participating states and ensuring compliance with international commitments.
    Senator Wicker is currently the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and serves as a member of the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy Congressional Board of Visitors. He has also served as Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
    Senator Wicker served on active duty in the U.S. Air Force and then joined the Air Force Reserve. He retired from the Reserve in 2004 with the rank of lieutenant colonel.
    A native of Pontotoc, Mississippi, Senator Wicker received his B.A. and law degrees from the University of Mississippi. He is married to the former Gayle Long of Tupelo. They have three children and eight grandchildren.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Munich Security Conference: Amnesty’s Secretary General calls on states to resist attacks on human rights protections

    Source: Amnesty International –

    Amnesty International’s Secretary General Agnès Callamard will be attending the Munich Security Conference from 14 to 16 February, where she will be available for interview and will call on world leaders and senior officials to resolutely come together to resist attacks on human rights and the global multilateral architecture and avoid further harm to human rights protections and the rules-based order.

    “The past 12 months have laid bare precisely how hellish the world can be when states don’t apply universal standards and insist that international law and multilateral decisions do not apply to their actions. Consider Israel’s genocide against Palestinians in Gaza, Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine, the conflict still raging in Sudan, the worsening catastrophe in Myanmar, and the recent uptick in fighting in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” Agnès Callamard said.

    “Following the long overdue ceasefire in Gaza and the transition of power in Syria, the question turns to how lasting peace and justice can be achieved in such contexts. States must commit their full support to bodies like the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court in their efforts to uphold the law, as failure to hold perpetrators accountable will only embolden other aggressors and fuel further cycles of violence and destruction.

    The past 12 months have laid bare precisely how hellish the world can be when states don’t apply universal standards and insist that international law and multilateral decisions do not apply to their actions.

    Agnès Callamard, Amnesty International’s Secretary General

    “In these precarious times, humanity can ill afford further breakdowns in the international order. We do not need more instability, division or turmoil; we do not need more attacks on human rights values and further undermining of our already fragile commitments to address climate change. We need sustainable, future-focused solutions. The multilateral system may be failing us, but the answer is not to abandon it to the abyss. The answer is to strengthen and reform it, grounding it in a common vision so it can make good on its promise of global stability and universal human rights protections. The Munich Security Conference presents a timely opportunity for world leaders to begin to address these challenges and pave the way for a future free of the harrowing conflicts that blight today’s world.”

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI Europe: JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia – RC-B10-0106/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Rasa Juknevičienė, Michael Gahler, Andrzej Halicki, Sebastião Bugalho, David McAllister, Željana Zovko, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Antonio López‑Istúriz White, Wouter Beke, Krzysztof Brejza, Daniel Caspary, Andrey Kovatchev, Miriam Lexmann, Reinhold Lopatka, Ana Miguel Pedro, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba, Alice Teodorescu Måwe, Inese Vaidere, Michał Wawrykiewicz
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Tobias Cremer
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Adam Bielan, Rihards Kols, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Mariusz Kamiński, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Veronika Vrecionová, Ondřej Krutílek, Michał Dworczyk, Roberts Zīle, Marlena Maląg, Ivaylo Valchev, Alexandr Vondra, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Assita Kanko
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Urmas Paet, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Helmut Brandstätter, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Engin Eroglu, Bernard Guetta, Karin Karlsbro, Michał Kobosko, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan‑Christoph Oetjen, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Eugen Tomac, Hilde Vautmans, Sophie Wilmès, Dainius Žalimas
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Reinier Van Lanschot
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    European Parliament resolution on the further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia

    (2025/2522(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia, in particular that of 28 November 2024 on Georgia’s worsening democratic crisis following the recent parliamentary elections and alleged electoral fraud[1],

     having regard to Georgia’s status as an EU candidate country, granted by the European Council at its summit of 14 and 15 December 2023,

     having regard to Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution, which demands the implementation of all possible measures to guarantee Georgia’s complete integration into the EU and NATO,

     having regard to the final report of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on the parliamentary elections held in Georgia on 26 October 2024,

     having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the democratic backsliding in Georgia has dramatically accelerated since the parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024, which were deeply flawed and marked by grave irregularities, and failed to meet international democratic standards and Georgia’s OSCE commitments; whereas these elections violated the democratic norms and standards set for free and fair elections, failing to reflect the will of the people and rendering the resulting ‘parliament’, and subsequently the ‘president’, devoid of any democratic legitimacy; whereas from the very beginning of its activity, the current Georgian parliament has operated as a one-party (Georgian Dream) organ, which is incompatible with the essence of pluralistic parliamentary democracy;

    B. whereas Article 2 of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement[2] concerns the general principles of the agreement, which include democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms;

    C. whereas Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution states that the constitutional bodies must take all measures within the scope of their competences to ensure the full integration of Georgia into the European Union;

    D. whereas the President of Georgia, Salome Zourabichvili, publicly condemned the parliamentary elections as rigged, declared that she would not recognise them and called for an international investigation; whereas the current Georgian regime, led by the Georgian Dream party and its founder, Bidzina Ivanishvili, has orchestrated an unconstitutional usurpation of power, systematically dismantling democratic institutions, undermining judicial independence and eroding fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, thereby deepening Georgia’s political and constitutional crisis;

    E. whereas Georgia has officially held the status of EU candidate country since December 2023; whereas on 28 November 2024, Irakli Kobakhidze announced that Georgia would delay initiating accession talks with the EU and reject its financial assistance until the end of 2028, disregarding the country’s constitutional commitment to European integration and effectively undermining Georgia’s sovereign Euro-Atlantic aspirations;

    F. whereas on 28 November 2024, peaceful mass anti-government protests began across the country, demanding new, free and fair elections, an end to political violence and repression, and the return of the country to its European path; whereas the protests have been taking place without interruption for over 75 days;

    G. whereas on 14 December 2024, the de facto parliament held a ‘presidential election’ with a single candidate from the Georgian Dream party, former footballer Mikheil Kavelashvili, elected with 224 out of 225 votes cast;

    H. whereas Georgia’s self-appointed authorities have plunged the country into a fully fledged constitutional and political crisis, as well as a human rights and democracy crisis; whereas this has been marked by the brutal repression of peaceful protesters, political opponents and media representatives, with judges, prosecutors and police officers actively fabricating politically motivated administrative and criminal charges against protesters, journalists and opposition figures detained during peaceful anti-government demonstrations; whereas, as of December 2024, more than 460 people have been arrested or punished since the protests began, with this number growing by the day;

    I. whereas riot police deliberately lacking force identification numbers have forcefully dispersed protesters with tear gas and water cannons; whereas numerous journalists have reported being targeted and beaten, and having their equipment destroyed and personal items stolen; whereas dozens of protesters have been brutally assaulted, and several hundred people have been arrested; whereas Georgia’s Public Defender has revealed that 80 % of those detained reported experiencing violence and inhumane treatment at the hands of law enforcement officers; whereas despite international condemnation, the illegitimate Georgian Government has awarded medals to officials involved in the crackdown;

    J. whereas independent media outlets, including TV Formula, TV Mtavari and TV Pirveli, face severe operational and financial constraints due to the regime’s interference, while dozens of media representatives are being subjected to various forms of intense physical and psychological pressure; whereas numerous violent attacks on journalists have been documented, including the severe beatings of Aleksandre Keshelashvili, Maka Chikhladze and Giorgi Shetsiruli, and the harassment of detained journalist Saba Kevkhishvili; whereas on 12 January 2025, the Georgian authorities arrested journalist Mzia Amaghlobeli, who has been in pre-trial detention since then and is on hunger strike in solidarity with all political prisoners in Georgia; whereas she faces between four and seven years in prison;

    K. whereas, on the night of 14 January 2025, Giorgi Gakharia, opposition leader of the For Georgia party and former Prime Minister, and Zviad Koridze, journalist and Transparency International activist, were physically assaulted by Georgian Dream officials in separate incidents at the same venue in Batumi;

    L. whereas on 2 February 2025, Nika Melia, a leader of the pro-European Akhali party, and Gigi Ugulava, the former mayor of Tbilisi, were arrested during the anti-government protests and subjected to physical violence in detention; whereas on 12 January 2025, Elene Khoshtaria, leader of the Droa political movement, was detained in Batumi;

    M. whereas the de facto Georgian authorities have used disproportionate force and excessive violence against peaceful protesters and resorted to arbitrary mass arrests to thwart dissent; whereas independent human rights organisations have reported the systemic mistreatment of detainees, including torture; whereas to date, not a single law enforcement official involved in the brutal crackdowns, arbitrary arrests and mistreatment has been brought to justice;

    N. whereas the self-appointed authorities introduced new draconian legislation that came into force on 30 December 2024 and amended the Criminal Code, the Code of Administrative Offences and the Law on Assemblies and Manifestations, imposing further arbitrary restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, introducing, among other things, hefty fines for putting up protest slogans and posters, and granting police the power to detain individuals ‘preventively’ for 48 hours on suspicion of planning to violate the rules governing public assembly; whereas on 3 February 2025, the Georgian Dream party unveiled further draft legislation designed to tighten control, ramping up penalties for a variety of offences directly targeting protestors, critics and political dissent, such as harsher punishments for ‘insulting officials’, the criminalisation of road blocks and an increase in the duration of administrative detention from 15 to 60 days;

    O. whereas on 27 January 2025, the Council decided to suspend parts of the EU-Georgia visa facilitation agreement for Georgian diplomats and officials, but failed to impose individual sanctions in response to the continued crackdown; whereas the Hungarian and Slovak Governments have been consistently blocking impactful EU-wide sanctions, preventing the remaining 25 Member States (EU-25) from effectively introducing sanctions against the self-appointed Georgian authorities;

    P. whereas several Member States, including Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and Czechia, have imposed bilateral sanctions on some Georgian politicians, judges and other officials responsible for the brutal crackdown on protesters, violations of human rights and abuse of the rule of law; whereas in December 2024, the United States sanctioned Bidzina Ivanishvili, alongside Georgia’s ‘Minister of Internal Affairs’ Vakhtang Gomelauri and Deputy Head of the Special Tasks Department Mirza Kezevadze, for their involvement in brutal crackdowns on media representatives, opposition figures and protesters; whereas the UK and Ukraine have imposed similar sanctions on high-level Georgian officials; whereas Ivanishvili, through hastily adopted laws tailored to his personal situation, is moving his offshore assets to Georgia in anticipation of further sanctions;

    Q. whereas on 29 January 2025, Georgian Dream announced that it would withdraw its delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) after it demanded new, genuinely democratic parliamentary elections, the release of political prisoners and accountability for perpetrators of violence; whereas UN experts have condemned the pattern of repression and human rights violations in Georgia, while the OSCE has called this suppression a serious breach of the right to freedom of assembly;

    R. whereas the ruling Georgian Dream party convened the new parliament in violation of the country’s constitution, resulting in a boycott of parliament by the opposition; whereas on 5 February 2025, the self-appointed ‘parliament’ voted to approve the early termination of the mandates of 49 out of 61 members of parliament, representing the Coalition for Change, Strong Georgia and the United National Movement, in order to strip them of their immunity and facilitate their arrest and prosecution; whereas the same ‘parliament’ established a commission to punish former ruling party United National Movement;

    S. whereas a growing number of civil servants have been dismissed after speaking out against the halting of Georgia’s EU accession process; whereas Georgian Dream has amended laws on public service, simplifying procedures to dismiss public servants, several of whom have been dismissed for participating in protests, in a clear attempt to silence critical voices;

    1. Condemns the Georgian Dream ‘authorities’ and urges them to immediately cease the violent repression of peaceful protesters, political opponents and media representatives; underlines that Georgia’s self-appointed authorities are currently violating fundamental freedoms, basic human rights and the core international obligations of the country, thereby undermining decades of democratic reforms driven by the country’s political class and civil society; considers Georgia as a state captured by the illegitimate Georgian Dream regime; expresses deep regret over the fact that the ruling Georgian Dream party has abandoned its path towards European integration and NATO membership; recalls that the ongoing democratic backsliding and adoption of anti-democratic laws has effectively suspended Georgia’s EU integration process; reiterates its unwavering support for the Georgian people’s legitimate European aspirations and their wish to live in a prosperous and democratic country;

    2. Does not recognise the self-proclaimed authorities of the Georgian Dream party established following the rigged election of 26 October 2024, which was neither free nor fair, was held in violation of democratic norms and standards, and did not reflect the will of the people of Georgia; underlines that the extensive electoral fraud has undermined the integrity of the election process, cast doubt on the legitimacy of the result and eroded public trust, both domestically and internationally, in any new government;

    3. Calls for the EU and its Member States, as well as national parliaments and interparliamentary institutions, not to recognise the legitimacy of the Georgian Dream one-party parliament and their appointed president; calls, therefore, on the international community to join the boycott of the self-proclaimed Georgian authorities;

    4. Continues to recognise Salome Zourabichvili as the legitimate President of Georgia and representative of the Georgian people; praises her efforts to peacefully steer the country back towards a democratic and European path of development; calls on the President of the European Council to invite President Zourabichvili to represent Georgia at an upcoming European Council meeting and at the next European Political Community summit;

    5. Underlines that the settlement of the current political and constitutional crisis in Georgia can only be achieved by way of new parliamentary elections; demands that new elections take place in Georgia within the next few months in an improved electoral environment, overseen by an independent and impartial election administration and monitored through diligent international observation to guarantee a genuinely fair, free and transparent process; encourages the Member States and EU officials to firmly demand new elections and to make any future engagement explicitly conditional on setting a new date for parliamentary elections and establishing a mechanism to ensure they are free and fair;

    6. Calls on the Council and the Member States, particularly the EU-25 on a bilateral and coordinated basis, to impose immediate and targeted personal sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili, his family and his companies, and to freeze all his assets within the EU for his role in the deterioration of the political process in Georgia, enabling democratic backsliding and acting against the country’s constitutionally declared interests of Euro-Atlantic integration; calls on the French Government to strip Bidzina Ivanishvili of the Legion of Honour and impose individual sanctions on him; welcomes, in this regard, the sanctions imposed bilaterally by Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Czechia, as well as those already imposed by the US and the UK;

    7. Calls for the EU and its Member States, in particular the EU-25 on a bilateral and coordinated basis, to impose personal sanctions on the officials and political leaders in Georgia responsible for democratic backsliding, electoral fraud, human rights violations and the persecution of political opponents and activists, including Irakli Kobakhidze, Shalva Papuashvili, Vakhtang Gomelauri, Mayor of Tbilisi and Secretary General of the ruling Georgian Dream party Kakha Kaladze, and Chair of the Georgian Dream party Irakli Garibashvili; calls for them to extend these sanctions to judges, including those of the Constitutional Court of Georgia who are passing politically motivated sentences, and representatives of the law enforcement services, as well as to financial enablers tacitly or openly supporting the regime and the owners of regime-aligned media outlets, including TV Imedi, Pos TV and Rustavi 2 TV, for their role in spreading disinformation and seeking to manipulate public discourse in order to sustain the current ruling party’s authoritarian rule;

    8. Calls on the Council and the Member States to impose sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili’s network of enablers, elite entourage, corrupt financial operatives, propagandists and those facilitating the repressive state apparatus, including, among others, Ekaterine Khvedelidze, Uta Ivanishvili, Tsotne Ivanishvili, Bera Ivanishvili, Gvantsa Ivanishvili, Alexander Ivanishvili, Shmagi Kobakhidze, Ucha Mamatsashvili, Natia Turnava, Ivane Chkhartishvili, Sulkhan Papashvili, Giorgi Kapanadze, Tornike Rizhvadze, Ilia Tsulaia, Kakha Bekauri, Lasha Natsvlishvili, Vasil Maglaperidze, Grigol Liluashvili, Mikheil Chinchaladze, Levan Murusidze, Irakli Rukhadze, Tinatin Berdzenishvili, Tamaz Gaiashvili, Anton Obolashvili and Gocha Enukidze;

    9. Maintains the view that the measures taken so far by the EU in response to the flagrant democratic backsliding and reneging on previous commitments does not yet fully reflect the severity of the situation in Georgia and the latest developments; welcomes the Council’s decision to suspend visa-free travel for Georgian diplomats and officials, but considers it as only a first step, which must be followed by tougher measures; deplores the obstruction by the Hungarian and Slovak Governments of the Council decisions on introducing sanctions against individuals responsible for democratic backsliding in Georgia;

    10. Emphasises that respect for fundamental rights is vital to the EU’s visa liberalisation benchmarks; reiterates its call on the Commission and the Council to review Georgia’s visa-free status, with the possibility of suspension if it is considered that EU standards on democratic governance and freedoms are not being upheld;

    11. Strongly condemns the brutal violence and repression used by Georgia’s ruling regime against peaceful protesters since 28 November 2024; calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners and those detained during the anti-government protests; demands the release of journalist Mzia Amaghlobeli, who has been on hunger strike for over four weeks now because of her unjust detention and risks facing critical, irreversible and life-threatening consequences; denounces the assault and beating of former Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia, resulting in his hospitalisation, followed by the arrest on 2 February 2025 of political leaders including Nika Melia and Gigi Ugulava, as a shocking escalation of state-orchestrated violence by Georgian Dream and its allies against peaceful demonstrators and political opponents; reminds of the detention of Elene Khoshtaria on 12 January 2025 in Batumi; 

    12. Reiterates its solidarity with the people of Georgia and its vibrant civil society in fighting for their legitimate democratic rights and for a European future for their country; urges the Georgian Government to reverse its current political course and return to implementing the will of the Georgian people for continued democratic reforms that would reopen the prospect of future EU membership;

    13. Strongly condemns the enactment of draconian legislation that imposes unjustified restrictions on freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly, and demands the annulment of such recently adopted repressive legislation; urges the Georgian authorities to immediately and unconditionally release all individuals detained for peacefully exercising their fundamental rights to freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly, and to ensure prompt, thorough and impartial investigations into all allegations of unlawful and disproportionate use of force by the law enforcement agencies; considers that the Georgian justice system has been weaponised to stifle dissent, instil fear and silence free speech;

    14. Calls for the ‘Georgian authorities’ to take immediate action to ensure the safety and freedom of journalists and to investigate all instances of violence and misconduct by law enforcement agencies; emphasises the importance of fostering a democratic environment where media, civil society and the opposition can operate freely without fear of retaliation or censorship;

    15. Demands an independent, transparent and impartial investigation into police brutality and the excessive use of force against peaceful demonstrators; calls for those responsible for human rights violations, including law enforcement and government officials ordering acts of repression, to be held fully accountable before the law;

    16. Denounces the launch of an investigation by the Prosecutor’s Office on 8 February 2025 into non-governmental organisations accused of aggravated sabotage, attempted sabotage and assisting foreign and foreign-controlled organisations in hostile activities aimed at undermining the state interests of Georgia, for which they could receive multiple-year sentences; views this action as further escalation of repression by the regime, misuse of the judicial system and accelerated democratic backsliding;

    17. Condemns the broader campaign of attacks by the Georgian authorities vilifying civil society organisations and reputable international donors that support democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights in Georgia;

    18. Denounces the termination by Georgian Dream of the mandates of 49 opposition members of parliament as a sign of further democratic backsliding, and considers this the latest move in Georgian Dream’s attack on political pluralism in the country;

    19. Welcomes PACE’s decision to challenge the credentials of Georgia’s parliamentary delegation due to democratic backsliding and human rights abuses; supports PACE’s call for Georgia to immediately initiate an inclusive process involving all political and social actors, including the ruling party, the opposition and civil society, to urgently address the deficiencies and shortcomings noted during the recent parliamentary elections and to create an electoral environment conducive to new, genuinely democratic elections to be announced in the coming months;

    20. Notes that Georgia, once a front runner for Euro-Atlantic integration, is undergoing an accelerated process of democratic backsliding, in a seemingly deliberate attempt to demonstrate that the will of the Georgian people no longer determines the country’s future, which could result in the country taking the Belarussian path of political development, transitioning from the current authoritarian state to a dictatorial regime;

    21. Deplores the decision of Irakli Kobakhidze to suspend accession talks and reject EU funding until the end of 2028; recalls that all polls consistently show the overwhelming support of the Georgian population for a Euro-Atlantic future; expresses strong support for the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the Georgian people;

    22. Calls for an immediate and comprehensive audit of EU policy towards Georgia due to the democratic backsliding; calls on the Commission to review the EU-Georgia Association Agreement in the light of the self-declared Georgian authorities’ breach of the general principles, as laid down in Article 2, namely respect for democratic principles, the rule of law and fundamental freedoms; points out that non-fulfilment of obligations may result in the conditional suspension of economic cooperation and privileges afforded by the Agreement;

    23. Welcomes the Commission’s decision to cease all budgetary support to the Georgian authorities and to suspend the initiation of any future investment projects; encourages the Commission to terminate all financial support for ongoing projects; calls for a moratorium on all investment projects in the field of connectivity; calls on the Commission to start identifying economic sectors of relevance to the oligarchic interests that support and sustain the current authoritarian rule, with a view to a potential future decision about restrictive measures or economic sanctions; calls on the Commission to start identifying connectivity projects that support and sustain the current authoritarian rule and to consider their suspension until a rerun of the parliamentary elections;

    24. Condemns the climate of intimidation and polarisation fuelled by statements by Georgian Government representatives and political leaders, as well as by attacks against political pluralism, including through disturbing cases of intimidation and violence against the Georgian democratic political forces and repeated threats to ban opposition parties, to arrest their leaders and even ordinary supporters, and to silence dissent; underlines that anything but the full restoration of Georgia’s democratic standards will entail a further deterioration of EU-Georgia relations, make any move towards EU accession impossible and result in additional sanctions;

    25. Calls on the Commission to swiftly redirect the frozen EUR 120 million originally intended as support for the Georgian authorities to enhance the EU’s support for Georgia’s civil society, in particular the non-governmental sector and independent media, which are increasingly coming under undue pressure from the ruling political party and the authorities, as well as to support programmes supporting democratic resilience and electoral integrity; calls for the EU’s funding mechanisms to be adjusted to take into account the needs that arise in a more hostile and anti-democratic environment; highlights the urgency of the need to support civil society in the light of growing repression and the suspension of activities of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and therefore urges the Commission to ramp up support without delay;

    26. Expresses deep concern about the increasing Russian influence in the country and about the Georgian Dream government’s actions in pursuing a policy of rapprochement and collaboration with Russia, in spite of its creeping occupation of Georgian territory; deplores, in this regard, the growing anti-Western and hostile rhetoric of the Georgian Dream party’s representatives towards Georgia’s strategic Western partners, including the EU, and its MEPs and officials, and Georgian Dream’s promotion of Russian disinformation and manipulation;

    27. Strongly reiterates its urgent demand for the immediate release of former President Mikheil Saakashvili on humanitarian grounds, specifically for the purpose of seeking medical treatment abroad; emphasises that the self-appointed authorities bear full and undeniable responsibility for the life, health, safety and well-being of former President Mikheil Saakashvili and must be held fully accountable for any harm that befalls him;

    28. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the self-appointed authorities of Georgia.

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – Debate with Mr O’Flaherty, Commissioner for Human Rights, Council of Europe – Subcommittee on Human Rights

    Source: European Parliament

    Elected in 2024, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Michael O’Flaherty will hold his first debate with DROI Members on 18 February, from 15.00 to 16.00. This exchange is part of DROI’s round of initial contacts with its main institutional counterparts on the human rights’ international stage. Topics such as the war in Ukraine and the fight against impunity, respect for human rights in the context of asylum and migration and attacks to the Rule of Law in Europe will be discussed.

    Mr O’Flaherty is a long-standing human rights advocate and lawyer, who has been heard in Parliament on several occasion under his previous responsibilities as Director of the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (2015-2023). He is the fifth Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe. The Commissioner’s mandate lasts for six years and is non-renewable.

    The Commissioner for Human Rights is an independent and impartial non-judicial institution established in 1999 by the Council of Europe to promote awareness of and respect for human rights in the 46 Council of Europe member states. Laid out in Resolution (99) 50 on the Council of Europe, the Commissioner’s mandate crosses DROI responsibilities and is a major inter-institutional interlocutor to the subcommittee.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Commission measures to uphold journalists’ rights and protect journalists and publications threatened by the Russian Federation – E-002264/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    As stated in its reply to Written Question P-001987/2024, the EU firmly condemns Russia’s ongoing intimidation, harassment and killing of European journalists and other media workers who report from its war of aggression against Ukraine.

    This also includes the use of politically motivated arrest warrants issued by Russia against international journalists reporting from war zones and frontlines[1].

    The EU has consistently condemned Russia’s attempts to obstruct the work of European and other journalists and has regularly addressed these issues in multilateral fora like the United Nations and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe where Russia is present.

    The EU will remain steadfast in its commitment to protect media freedom and the safety of journalists around the world and in war zones.

    The Commission will ensure the effective application of the European Media Freedom Act[2] and the anti-SLAPP Directive[3]. It will also monitor Member States’ actions to put in practice the recommendation[4] on the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists and the recommendation[5] on protecting journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings to safeguard the independence of media and journalists and will continue assessing all relevant developments related to media freedom and pluralism in all Member States, including Romania, under the annual Rule of Law Report[6].

    • [1] Further detailed guidance on extradition to third states and a summary of the relevant case law of the Court of Justice in this respect can be found in the Guidelines on Extradition to Third States of June 2022, see Commission Notice — Guidelines on Extradition to Third States, Official Journal of the European Union, (2022/C 223/01).
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202401083
    • [3] Directive — EU — 2024/1069 — EN — EUR-Lex.
    • [4] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/recommendation-protection-safety-and-empowerment-journalists
    • [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A138%3ATOC
    • [6] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/rule-law/annual-rule-law-cycle_en
    Last updated: 12 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Ukraine’s ban on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate – E-001881/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Constitution of Ukraine, as well as related legislation, provides for the right to freedom of religion and belief, as stipulated in the European Convention on Human Rights[1] and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union[2].

    The Commission has taken note of Ukrainian Parliament’s adoption on 20 August 2024 of the law of Ukraine ‘On the protection of the constitutional order in the field of activities of religious organisations’, which prohibits the activities of religious organisations affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine, on the grounds of national security and prevention of foreign interference from Russia.

    The right to freedom of religion and belief is an integral part of the fundamental rights chapter in Ukraine’s accession process. In the Enlargement report issued on 30 October 2024[3], the Commission assessed that in general Ukrainian authorities protect this freedom, and that incidents of hate speech and intimidation based on religion are rare. No infringements of religious rights were reported in government-controlled territories of Ukraine.

    The Commission will continue closely monitoring the application of the right to freedom of religion and belief in Ukraine and report on this as appropriate.

    • [1] https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/convention_eng
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT OJEU C 326 of 26.10.2012.
    • [3] SWD(2024) 699 final.
    Last updated: 12 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Durbin Condemns Tulsi Gabbard’s Nomination To Serve As Director Of National Intelligence

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Illinois Dick Durbin
    February 12, 2025
    WASHINGTON – In a speech on the Senate floor, U.S. Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-IL) outlined his serious concerns with Tulsi Gabbard, President Trump’s nominee to be the Director of National Intelligence ahead of her confirmation vote. Durbin began his remarks by highlighting the history of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which was established after the September 11th terrorist attacks.
    “[September 11 led to the creation] of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which oversees the 18 intelligence agencies that span the CIA, Defense Department, State Department, Energy Department, and others. It is now essential to modern safety in America. But yet, the President—Donald Trump—has selected a person who has little or no experience to lead this critical part of America’s security apparatus: her name is Tulsi Gabbard,” Durbin said.
    “During President Trump’s first term, he made clear his fondness for certain leaders of the world that are controversial such as Viktor Orban of Hungary, Vladimir Putin of Russia, and Kim Jong Un of North Korea. So, he ends up picking a person to run America’s intelligence network who shares similarly terrible judgment on critical security matters. Tulsi Gabbard is infamous fordefending despots and other autocratic leaders in the world—including Vladimir Putin and Bashar al-Assad—and traitors to the United States such as Edward Snowden. And her fondness for these oppressive, anti-democratic regimes does not go unreciprocated—they know her [and] they like her,” Durbin continued.  
    Durbin then highlighted examples on the floor of the anti-democratic regimes who are cheering for Ms. Gabbard’s confirmation—including hosts of Russian media who believe her nomination will “dismantle America,” and some on Russian state channels have even referred to her as their “girlfriend.” Russian state TV also called her a Russian “comrade” in President Trump’s emerging cabinet. A pro-Putin propagandist Vladimir Soloviev once called Gabbard “our friend.”  Later, when asked if she was “some sort of Russian agent?” Soloviev replied: “yes.” In a profile in a Russian state newspaper, it said of Gabbard’s nomination: “The C.I.A. and the F.B.I. are trembling,” noting that Ukrainians consider her “an agent of the Russian state.”
    “Imagine that. The person tapped to head America’s intelligence community—being called a puppet of an adversary’s country by that very same country. It seems too ridiculous to be true. But I’m sorry to say it is. To merely join America’s intelligence community—never mind lead it—candidates must go through vigorous background checks and earn security clearances… If Tulsi Gabbard was applying for an entry-level position, her relationship with Russia would disqualify her for the job. Why, then, would we trust her to [head the entire intelligence network] given the examples that abound of Tulsi Gabbard proving publicly, shamelessly, and carelessly her sympathies for nations that undermine U.S. interests and security. That is unexplainable and irresponsible,” Durbin continued.
    “Our allies depend on us as much as we depend on their security and to share critical intelligence. Now, they are looking at us in disbelief that we would let someone like Tusli Gabbard with such an appalling record anywhere near the leadership of the intelligence community. Intelligence professionals from Canada and the United Kingdom—which are members of the critical Five Eyes intelligence alliance along with the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand—have expressed concern about even working with her if she is in charge. In order to keep Americans safe throughout the world, we need to have the trust of our allies,” Durbin said.
    Durbin then spoke about the impacts Ms. Gabbard’s confirmation would have on supporting our Ukrainian ally and their defense against Russia. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion, Gabbard has taken Russia’s side—claiming ‘Russia had legitimate security concerns,’ and blaming NATO, one of our most significant security alliances.
    “Let me be clear: Supporting democracies has not historically been a partisan matter,” Durbin continued. “For example, contrast Tulsi Gabbard’s nonsense with former President Ronald Reagan’s clear-eyed understanding of the danger of the communist Russian empire. Nearly 40 years ago, he stood at the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin and famously challenged the Soviet Union to ‘tear down this wall.’ Reagan understood the true nature and threat of the Russians. And we have all seen the horrific costs of Russia’s war in Ukraine and increasing attacks against NATO allies.” 
    “Is there a deal to be made to end this war? Perhaps. But doing so must be with the best intelligence available—a clear eye about who we are negotiating with and long-term guarantees of the security of Ukraine, of Europe, and the transatlantic alliance. One would think that any American president navigating such difficult waters would want a top official to serve as the head of National Intelligence. Tulsi Gabbard fails that test,” Durbin said.
    Durbin concluded, “Tulsi Gabbard would not be qualified for an entry-level position within our intelligence community. And she is not qualified to lead it. Period. Some of the President’s cabinet nominees are hard to imagine because they are so unqualified. But for the position of DNI—putting someone unqualified in charge is not funny at all. It is life or death dangerous.”
    Video of Durbin’s remarks on the Senate floor is available here.
    Audio of Durbin’s remarks on the Senate floor is available here.
    Footage of Durbin’s remarks on the Senate floor is available here for TV Stations.
    -30-

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth Holds Media Availability in Stuttgart, Germany

    Source: United States Department of Defense

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: How’s it going everybody? Sir. Good to see you. It’s been a great day, really. Any day we can spend with the troops from the very early morning of PT with some high speed guys and gals to two COCOMs that are right in the front lines of advancing American interests. Proud to be here today.

    Just an impressive display of what Americans are doing in far flung places for the American people, so proud to be here for sure. I think we have a local — where’s our local reporter? I’d like to go first to our local.

    Q: Thank you so much. So —

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Where are you from?

    Q: I’m from Suddeutsche Zeitung. That’s the second biggest newspaper in Germany.

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Well, it’s my favorite now.

    Q: And you are visiting Africom as one of your first points in your duty. Does that mean that the American strategic aims in Africa are going to change?

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Well, I think it’s a reflection of the importance of that command as well as EUCOM. We spent this morning at EUCOM, as well; made sense to come to both if we’re here in Germany.

    But it’s also a reflection that, you know, the PRC’s intentions are pernicious, not just in their part of the world, but also in South America and on the African continent. And America’s posture there along with allies and partners is going to matter about contesting that space. So, it certainly remains a priority.

    You saw the strike in Somalia on February 1st. That — as we talked to the command, that’s a reflection also of pushing decision authority down, untying the hands of war fighters who in the previous administration made multiple requests and were often denied for that kind of kinetic action, or the decision had to be made at the White House when it should be made at the four star level or at the Secretary of Defense level more quickly based on the ability to degrade the enemy.

    So, this is a very important part of the world for us. The President feels that way, as well, and we’re honored to be here. Thank you.

    Q: Mr. Secretary, are you planning to cut the number of American forces in Europe, shift to the Pacific and focus on China?

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: There are no plans right now in the making to cut anything.

    There is an understanding that we’re going to review force posture across the world, right. President Trump’s planning assumptions are different in many ways, or at least strategic assumptions than Joe Biden’s were. We certainly don’t want to plan on the back of the withdrawal from Afghanistan and what happened on October 7th and the war that was unleashed in Ukraine.

    You have to manage and mitigate those things by coming alongside your friends in Israel, ensuring their defense and peacefully resolving the conflict in Ukraine. But those shouldn’t define how we orient and with hopefully a rapid peace deal in Ukraine, which the President is committed to delivering, we can then review force posture and encourage as we’re going to — you’re going to see tomorrow in Ukraine and — or at the Ukraine Contact Group and the NATO ministerial, we’re going to have straight talk with our friends.

    This kind of urgency of this moment requires friends talking to friends about capabilities, about leadership, about stepping up, about burden sharing and the incentives to say the European continent deserves to be free from any aggression.

    But it ought be those in the neighborhood, investing the most in that collective — individual and collective defense. That’s common sense. As the President talks a lot about, common sense is you defend your neighborhood and the Americans will come alongside you in helping in that defense. If and when that happens, and I believe it will because of President Trump, most NATO countries are already close to 2 percent.

    We believe that needs to be higher. The president has said 5 percent. I think he’s right. That’s a reflection of a need to invest on the continent. If and when that happens through investments in the defense industrial base, as well, then yes, America as the leader of the free world defending American interests is going to need to make sure we’re focused properly on the Communist Chinese and their ambitions in the Indo-Pacific, and as I mentioned before, around the world.

    So, we would be remiss in not reviewing force posture everywhere, but it would be the wrong planning assumption to say, oh, America is abandoning something or America is leaving. No, America is smart to observe, plan, prioritize and project power where we need to deter conflict. We don’t want conflict with China.

    We don’t want — the President has ran on being a peace president, and he’s delivered that. But being strong, peace through strength is how you deter that, and we want to posture for that just like we believe the Europeans alongside our support need to on the continent, as well.

    Q: Is China the biggest threat to the United States?

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Well, right now, the biggest threat was securing our own border, which we are addressing rapidly. And I’m proud of what NORTHCOM has done and the Defense Department has done is shifting there. You don’t have a country if you don’t have borders, as the President has pointed out. And we’ve been defending other people’s borders for a long time; time to defend ours. So we’re sealing that border. We continue to do that. But as far as external threats, there’s just no doubt the communist Chinese ambitions are robust. Their view of the world is quite different than ours. And whoever carries that mantle is going to set the tone for the 21st century.

    UNKNOWN: Christine —

    Q: You made the point to do PT with tenth group this morning on very little sleep. Why was it so important for you to do this? And tell us about the workout?

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: I did do PT with the troops this morning. Listen, it’s not that long ago that I was right there with them. I probably — no offense, General — I probably connect more with those guys than I do with four-star Generals. But now I get the chance of working with four stars and others who are committed to the troops.

    But when I can get down, do push ups and deadlifts with the troops, and just hear from them, what’s working, what isn’t, how do you see your mission set, I love that. So there was never a doubt. even though we got in at 2:00 in the morning, that we were getting up a couple hours later to go do PT. It’s a reminder that — you guys — the press in Washington might think I’m young, but in military terms, I’m old.

    And that showed this morning with these young guys who ran circles around me in that parking lot.

    UNKNOWN: We’ll [Inaudible] then Zach.

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Go ahead.

    Q: Thanks for doing this. Uh, you mentioned earlier that President Trump wants, uh, NATO countries to spend 5 percent of their GDP on defense. Do you think the US should also spend 5 percent of its GDP on defense?

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Well, I think the US needs to spend more than the Biden administration was willing to, who historically underinvested in the capabilities of our military. So the president is committed, as he was in the first term, to rebuilding America’s military by investing. And you’re going to see that in the conversations on Capitol Hill.

    We’ve already been intimately involved with the folks on HASC and SASC and appropriations, talking about the capabilities we’re going to need, not just next year and the year after that or for the next four years, but for power projection going forward and then the reforms needed to make sure that every dollar goes further.

    Now at a minimum, we should not go below 3 percent. That’s a view I know the President shares. But as far as going forward in that, those are decisions he will make based on my consultations with him. Listen, any defense secretary would be lying if they said they didn’t want more. You always want more.

    But we live in fiscally constrained times where we need to be responsible with taxpayer dollars. We’re $37 trillion in debt. That’s a national security liability, as well. So, we’re going to work with Capitol Hill. The President is going to lead the way on making sure the troops have the resources they need and that we truly rebuild our military just like President Trump did in the first term.

    Q: And President Biden — President Biden vowed against sending US troops into Ukraine. Would you be open to sending US troops into Ukraine to track weapons shipments?

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: We are not sending US troops to Ukraine.

    Q: You talked about wanting to welcome Elon Musk and DOGE into the Pentagon potentially in the next few weeks. Do you expect him to start unilaterally cutting programs and contracts the way he’s done at USAID and other agencies? And are there any limits or supervision you’d want to place on his team, given his conflicts of interest [Inaudible]?

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Well, we’ve been in touch with — I’ve been in touch with Elon Musk, who’s a great patriot, interested in advancing the America First agenda, knows that President Trump got 77 million votes and a mandate from the American people. And part of that is bringing actual businesslike efficiency to government; hence, what DOGE is doing.

    Uh, we’ve been talking to them, in partnership with them. And as I said on social media, we welcome DOGE to the Pentagon, and I hope to welcome Elon to the Pentagon very soon and his team, working in collaboration with us. There are waste, redundancies and headcounts in headquarters that need to be addressed.

    There’s just no doubt. Look at a lot of the climate programs that have been pursued at the Defense Department. The Defense Department is not in the business of climate change, solving the global thermostat. We’re in the business of deterring and winning wars. So, things like that we want to look for to find efficiencies and many others – the way we acquire weapons, system procurement.

    There’s plenty of places where we want the keen eye of DOGE, but we’ll do it in coordination. We’re not going to do things that are to the detriment of American operational or tactical capabilities. There’s just — President Trump is committed to delivering the best possible military. The Defense Department is not USAID. USAID has got a lot of problems that I talked about with the troops, pursuing globalist agendas that don’t have a connection to America First.

    That’s not the Defense Department, but we’re also not perfect, either. So where we can find billions of dollars — and he’s right to say billions — inside the Defense Department, every dollar we save there is a dollar that goes to warfighters, and that’s good for the American people.

    Q: [Inaudible] Mr. Secretary, Since we’re here at AFRICOM, I have a question about Africa. Now when you served, you fought jihadists in the Middle East, and there’s a lot of jihadists in Africa, whether it’s ISIS, al-Qaida, al-Shabab, go on and on. How do you plan to handle that threat?

    I’m not saying put troops on the ground in Africa to fight them, but are you concerned that there could be some sort of cell that might be plotting attacks against other parts of the world, trying to recruit soldiers because it’s Africa with a growing population? How concerned are you about the jihadist threat in Africa today?

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Definitely concerned. I mean, anybody of our — anybody of my generation that served in Iraq and Afghanistan or have been a part of post-9-11 understands the threat of global jihad, especially the desire to export that against our allies in Europe or Israel or certainly the United States of America. So the counterterrorism threat focused on those who would seek to do us harm is of the highest priority, which is why you saw what AFRICOM did so well in that strike in Somalia.

    Where we see those growing, plotting or planning with increased capabilities we will strike. And that pertains to Islamist organizations all across the continent. But it also — we have to work with partners and allies. I mean, foreign internal defense and security force assistance — I was with Green Berets this morning.

    You know, we think of Green Berets in the context of post-9-11, right – kicking down doors, and they’re really good at that. But what they’re best at is doing security force assistance and foreign internal defense where they work with local security forces to build up their capabilities so that it’s indigenous forces fighting Islamists because they want to secure their country, as well.

    And AFRICOM is very directly committed to doing that. That’s a mission very much worth resourcing. I mean Africa is very much the front lines of a fight from Islamists. You’ve got Christian populations that are under siege in Africa and have been ignored for far too long and American interests there. It matters a great deal. And Islamists — we’re not going to allow them to maintain a foothold, especially to try to strike at America.

    UNKNOWN: We’re going to finish up with two questions from these two [Inaudible].

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Ok. One more here and then here.

    Q: John Barrowman, Stars and Stripes. Also related to AFRICOM and Somalia, during the end of President Trump’s first term, he elected to pull forces out of Somalia and switched to more of a rotational concept.

    President Biden sent troops back in there on a full time basis. What’s your vision going forward for Somalia? Do you want to maintain troops there continuously, or are you looking more towards pulling them back?

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Well, I mean, I’m going to listen to the commanders on the ground, first and foremost, as is the President.

    And he’s charged me with, hey, give me your best advice, but also keep your ear to the ground of what’s most effective. But he’s also been very clear that we’re not trying to have American boots all over the globe. Where we can do counterterrorism effectively over the horizon, that’s the preference. But we’ll review the force posture there and with the generals doing the heavy lifting and take it into consideration, no doubt.

    But thankfully, we have the intelligence capabilities to do the kind of strike that we saw, and we believe we can do more of that.

    UNKNOWN: Last question.

    Q: So — so you renamed the name of Fort Liberty into Fort Bragg, and you honored the private first class who lost his life while liberating Germany. What does that mean for the US forces?

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Well, first, it means Bragg is back. It means the legacy of an institution that generations of Americans have mobilized through and served at is back.

    I mean, it’s a shame what was done to vets, service members, their families who were born there, deployed out of there, lived there, gave there — I was with airborne troops here, some of which spent 25 years at Fort Bragg and never called it Fort Liberty because it wasn’t Fort Liberty, it’s Fort Bragg.

    And so I was honored to be able to put my signature on that. By the way, with the support of the President of the United States who set the tone on this and said, I want Fort Bragg back.

    And we’re honored to support a private first class who received a Purple Heart and the Silver Star at the battle of the bulge. We’re honoring a private first class and I’m proud that we have a Marine corporal as the vice president of the United States too. Junior enlisted have never seen better days. But it’s about that legacy.

    It’s about the connection to the community, to those who served. And we’re not, as the President has said and I’ve said as well, we’re not done there. There are other bases that have been renamed that erodes that very same legacy. There’s a reason I said Bragg and Benning when I walked into the Pentagon on day one.

    But it’s not just Bragg and Benning. There are a lot of other service members that have connections and we’re going to do our best to restore it. It’s an honor to do so. Thank you all for your time. Appreciate it. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: McConnell Comments on Gabbard Nomination

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Kentucky Mitch McConnell
    Washington, D.C. – U.S. Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY), Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, issued the following statement today on the nomination of Tulsi Gabbard to serve as Director of National Intelligence:
    “The Senate’s power of advice and consent is not an option; it is an obligation, and one we cannot pretend to misunderstand. When a nominee’s record proves them unworthy of the highest public trust, and when their command of relevant policy falls short of the requirements of their office, the Senate should withhold its consent.
    “The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) is a key participant in the process that informs every major national security decision the President makes. The ODNI wields significant authority over how the intelligence community allocates its resources, conducts its collection and analysis, and manages the classification and declassification of our nation’s most sensitive secrets. In my assessment, Tulsi Gabbard failed to demonstrate that she is prepared to assume this tremendous national trust.
    “The nation should not have to worry that the intelligence assessments the President receives are tainted by a Director of National Intelligence with a history of alarming lapses in judgment.
    “Edward Snowden’s treasonous betrayal of the United States and its most sensitive lawful intelligence activities endangered sources, methods, and lives. Japan is among America’s closest treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific, and the risk of conflict in the region is the product of Chinese aggression, not western ‘threat inflation’. Russia’s escalation of its unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine threatens American interests and is solely the responsibility of Vladimir Putin.
    “Entrusting the coordination of the intelligence community to someone who struggles to acknowledge these facts is an unnecessary risk. So is empowering a DNI who only acknowledged the value of critical intelligence collection authorities when her nomination appeared to be in jeopardy.
    “Beginning today, the brave men and women of America’s intelligence community will turn to Director Gabbard for principled leadership and sounder judgment in the service of America’s interests and national security. I join all of them in hoping that she rises to the immense responsibilities of her office.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Ahead of Gabbard confirmation vote, Senator Coons tells colleagues ‘we cannot’ trust her to be Director of National Intelligence in speech on Senate floor

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Delaware Christopher Coons
    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator Chris Coons (D-Del.), the ranking member on the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, delivered remarks on the Senate floor yesterday opposing President Donald Trump’s nominee Tulsi Gabbard to be the Director of National Intelligence. Gabbard was confirmed with solely Republican votes this morning.
    In his speech, Senator Coons highlighted how Gabbard’s confirmation poses a significant threat to the trust that is the foundation of our national security. He also raised significant concerns about Gabbard’s troubling past statements and actions undermining U.S. foreign policy. From defending whistleblower Edward Snowden, to blaming the U.S. and NATO for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, to defending recently deposed Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad—Senator Coons pointed out these actions make America less safe and are directly opposed to the efforts of our intelligence services. Gabbard has also become a favorite with Russian state media for her habit of spewing pro-Kremlin talking points.
    “Our nation faces massive threats that are growing day by day,” Senator Coons said on the floor. “Our nation is facing threats around the world from North Korea and Iran, from China and from Russia, and we need an intelligence service equipped to respond to these challenges. Can we trust Tulsi Gabbard to lead our intelligence services and to respond to these threats? I cannot, we cannot, and we should not.”
    At a time when the United States faces an increasingly hostile world and threats from Russia, China, Iran, and other adversaries, Senator Coons believes our nation needs intelligence leadership that protects and strengthens American interests. Gabbard has shown she is not up to this role, and the Senate should have rejected her nomination.
    A video and transcript of Senator Coons’ comments are available below.
    WATCH HERE.
    SENATOR COONS: Mr. President, trust––trust is at the very center of our national security. The trust that we share with allies and partners around the world, the trust that the American people have in us and in our armed services and in our intelligence services, the trust that vital allies have that causes them to share with us information about threats, challenges, opportunities—that’s the very foundation of our national security, and today I rise to warn my colleagues about the risks to our national security posed by the nomination of Tulsi Gabbard to be the Director of National Intelligence.
    As the Ranking Member of the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, I have a significant involvement in our nation’s intelligence apparatus, and over the course of the confirmation hearings and the debate here on the floor about former Congresswoman Gabbard, I’ve concluded that she has an alarming record, revealed more fully in her confirmation hearings, but also in a review of her speeches, her travels, her positions as a Democrat, as a Congresswoman, as a candidate for president, as a supporter for President Trump. 
    She has gone quite a distance. She has defended Edward Snowden. Snowden is widely viewed by folks in our intelligence community, our national security apparatus, our armed forces, and many here as a traitor who betrayed some of the most important secrets that are critical to keeping the United States secure. She would not in her confirmation hearings answer the question: is Edward Snowden a traitor?
    Ms. Gabbard bemoaned the rise of [Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham] in Syria, which recently overthrew the brutal dictator Bashar al-Assad, without mentioning the fall of Assad. She mentioned how tragic it was that HTS overran Damascus, without mentioning the side benefit of the fall of a brutal dictator, and in her confirmation hearings repeatedly dodged questions about FISA and section 702, key tools for our intelligence community. All of this is in keeping with a long-standing record as an apologist for authoritarians and even enemies of the United States. She has repeatedly blamed the United States and NATO for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
    I will tell you as someone who is about to go to the Munich Security Conference this weekend with a broad and bipartisan delegation from this body and from the House, I will never forget being at the Munich Security Conference just before Russia invaded Ukraine, broad spectrum.
    They had been in Eastern Ukraine for years. They had occupied Crimea and then launched a war into the eastern part of Ukraine. It was days after the Munich Security Conference in February of 2022, that tens of thousands of Russian troops, whole divisions, poured over the line in a broad-spectrum invasion that included brutality against civilians, bombardment of the entire nation, ultimately—cruel acts of violence against women and children, fully documented in the press and courts around the world. And yet, Ms. Gabbard blamed the United States and NATO for provoking this invasion by Russia of a sovereign nation––a nation where the United States, in writing, guaranteed its sovereignty in the 1994 agreement that led to them giving up their nuclear weapons. 
    Ms. Gabbard visited Syria and met with Bashar al-Assad for several days in 2017 and relied on pro-Assad sources to cast doubt on the use of chemical weapons against his own people. She has a history of repeating pro-Kremlin talking points and is a favorite on Russian state media. She appears frequently because she frequently is attacking the United States in Russian state media.
    Mr. President, this body will all too soon take up the confirmation of Tulsi Gabbard. We should not proceed. We should not vote for her. Our nation—our nation faces massive threats that are growing day by day. Our nation is facing threats around the world from North Korea and Iran, from China and from Russia, and we need an intelligence service equipped to respond to these challenges. Can we trust Tulsi Gabbard to lead our intelligence services and to respond to these threats? I cannot, we cannot, and we should not. This body should not vote to confirm Tulsi Gabbard as the next Director of National Intelligence. Thank you.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: The UN must play a vital role in stabilising and rebuilding Syria: UK statement at the UN Security Council

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    Statement by Ambassador Barbara Woodward, UK Permanent Representative to the UN, at the UN Security Council meeting on Syria.

    I will make three points today.

    First, a little over two months have passed since the interim authorities took control of Damascus, offering hope for a brighter future and a more peaceful future for the Syrian people. 

    We are encouraged by efforts made in the weeks since and we welcome the interim authorities’ pledges to form an inclusive transitional government, leading to free and fair elections.

    We welcome the engagement between the Special Envoy, his office and the interim authorities and his plans to return to Damascus shortly. 

    As the Special Envoy has said, Syria’s political transition cannot afford to fail.

    As Syrians take the next steps towards a political process, we expect to see appointments to the transitional government and the recently announced Legislative Council and the Preparatory Committee which represent the diversity of Syrian society.

    We hope there will be a clear process and timeline for this next phase of the transition, which respects the rights and safety of all Syrians.

    Second, we have been clear, as others have too, that Syrians should chart their own future and that a political process should be Syrian-owned and Syrian-led.

    However, as Special Envoy Pederson and ASG Msuya both reminded us, it is essential that the international community step in and support as the challenges are vast and humanitarian needs acute.

    It is imperative that the UN, alongside the international community, plays a vital role in supporting Syrians to stabilise and then rebuild their country. 

    The deep scars and the damage of over a decade of conflict cannot be healed in a matter of months.

    Last week the UK, working with the World Food Programme, committed over $3.7 million to the ‘Grain from Ukraine’ initiative which will enable Ukraine to support the most vulnerable Syrians and alleviate suffering.

    So we endorse the Special Envoy’s call that we must also take this opportunity to scale up early recovery and sustainable programming to enable Syrians to feed themselves, to keep the lights on, to create jobs and build a better future.

    Finally, we welcome the visit to Damascus of the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons on 8 February.

    This marks a positive step forward.

    We must use this window of opportunity and the work to support the OPCW and Syria to declare and destroy Assad’s remaining chemical weapons programme, for a more stable and secure Syria.

    Updates to this page

    Published 12 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI USA: Opening Remarks by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at Ukraine Defense Contact Group (As Delivered)

    Source: United States Department of Defense

    Good afternoon, friends.

    Thank you, Secretary Healy for your leadership, both in hosting and now leading the UDCG. 

    This is my first Ukraine Defense Contact Group. And I’m honored to join all of you today.  

    And I appreciate the opportunity to share President Trump’s approach to the war in Ukraine.

    We are at, as you said Mr. Secretary, a critical moment. As the war approaches its third anniversary, our message is clear: The bloodshed must stop.  And this war must end.

    President Trump has been clear with the American people – and with many of your leaders – that stopping the fighting and reaching an enduring peace is a top priority.

    He intends to end this war by diplomacy and bringing both Russia and Ukraine to the table. And the U.S. Department of Defense will help achieve this goal. 

    We will only end this devastating war – and establish a durable peace – by coupling allied strength with a realistic assessment of the battlefield.

    We want, like you, a sovereign and prosperous Ukraine. But we must start by recognizing that returning to Ukraine’s pre-2014 borders is an unrealistic objective.  

    Chasing this illusionary goal will only prolong the war and cause more suffering.  

    A durable peace for Ukraine must include robust security guarantees to ensure that the war will not begin again.  

    This must not be Minsk 3.0. 

    That said, the United States does not believe that NATO membership for Ukraine is a realistic outcome of a negotiated settlement. 

    Instead any security guarantee must be backed by capable European and non-European troops. 

    If these troops are deployed as peacekeepers to Ukraine at any point, they should be deployed as part of a non-NATO mission. And they should not covered under Article 5.  There also must be robust international oversight of the line of contact.

    To be clear, as part of any security guarantee, there will not be U.S. troops deployed to Ukraine. 

    To further enable effective diplomacy and drive down energy prices that fund the Russian war machine, President Trump is unleashing American energy production and encouraging other nations to do the same. Lower energy prices coupled with more effective enforcement of energy sanctions will help bring Russia to the table. 

    Safeguarding European security must be an imperative for European members of NATO. As part of this Europe must provide the overwhelming share of future lethal and nonlethal aid to Ukraine.

    Members of this Contact Group must meet the moment.  

    This means:  Donating more ammunition and equipment. Leveraging comparative advantages.  Expanding your defense industrial base. And importantly, leveling with your citizens about the threat facing Europe.

    Part of this is speaking frankly with your people about how this threat can only be met by spending more on defense.  

    2% is not enough; President Trump has called for 5%, and I agree.

    Increasing your commitment to your own security is a down payment for the future. A down payment as you said Mr. Secretary of peace through strength.

    We’re also here today to directly and unambiguously express that stark strategic realities prevent the United States of America from being primarily focused on the security of Europe.

    The United States faces consequential threats to our homeland.  We must – and we are – focusing on security of our own borders.

    We also face a peer competitor in the Communist Chinese with the capability and intent to threaten our homeland and core national interests in the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. is prioritizing deterring war with China in the Pacific, recognizing the reality of scarcity, and making the resourcing tradeoffs to ensure deterrence does not fail. 

    Deterrence cannot fail, for all of our sakes.

    As the United States prioritizes its attention to these threats, European allies must lead from the front. 

    Together, we can establish a division of labor that maximizes our comparative advantages in Europe and Pacific respectively.

    In my first weeks as Secretary of Defense, under President Trump’s leadership, we’ve seen promising signs that Europe sees this threat, understands what needs to be done, and is stepping up to the task.

    For example, Sweden recently announced its largest ever assistance package. We applaud them for committing $1.2 billion in ammunition and other needed materiel.

    Poland is spending 5% of GDP on defense already, which is a model for the continent.

    And 14 countries are co-leading Capability Coalitions. These groups are doing great work to coordinate Europe’s contributions of lethal assistance across eight key capability areas.

    These are first steps. More must still be done.  

    We ask each of your countries to step up on fulfilling the commitments that you have made.  

    And we challenge your countries, and your citizens, to double down and re-commit yourselves not only to Ukraine’s immediate security needs, but to Europe’s long-term defense and deterrence goals. 

    Our transatlantic alliance has endured for decades. And we fully expect that it will be sustained for generations to come. But this won’t just happen.  

    It will require our European allies to step into the arena and take ownership of conventional security on the continent.  

    The United States remains committed to the NATO alliance and to the defense partnership with Europe. Full stop.   

    But the United States will no longer tolerate an imbalanced relationship which encourages dependency.  Rather, our relationship will prioritize empowering Europe to own responsibility for its own security. 

    Honesty will be our policy going forward – but only in the spirit of solidarity.   

    President Trump looks forward to working together, to continuing this frank discussion amongst friends, and to achieve peace through strength – together.

    Thank you.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: First EU-Central Asia summit to take place on 3-4 April 2025

    Source: Council of the European Union

    The first EU-Central Asia Summit will take place in Samarkand, Uzbekistan on 3-4 April. The European Council President Costa and the European Commission President von der Leyen will discuss with the leaders of the five Central Asian countries how to intensify bilateral engagement and enhance cooperation between the two regions. They will also address the current geopolitical challenges facing the region, namely Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the ongoing developments in Afghanistan.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Trump White House’s disengagement from HIV/AIDS response could have lethal consequences

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Yolaine Frossard de Saugy, PhD Candidate, International Relations, McGill University

    With the endless stream of announcements, reversals, measures and countermeasures coming from the new administration of United States President Donald Trump, it has become difficult to make sense of what is just noise or opening negotiation offers and what constitutes actual policy change.

    Unfortunately, in the case of the global response against HIV/AIDS, it seems the attacks go beyond bluster.

    The methods used in the fight against HIV/AIDS have long been disputed, but overall commitment to the response was one of the few deeply bipartisan endeavours left, until now. Undercutting this decades-long consensus would mean endangering millions of lives.

    U.S. role in global HIV/AIDS response

    As a PhD candidate in international relations working on the politics of the response to HIV/AIDS, I am very aware of the central role that the U.S. has played in building and sustaining a global response to the epidemic in the past 25 years.

    The U.S. is the largest provider of funds for HIV/AIDS programs worldwide. It does so mainly through the bilateral President’s Emergency Program for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) as well as through its contribution to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. Overall U.S. funding for global AIDS reached $7 billion in 2020, 2021 and 2022. PEPFAR alone is estimated to provide treatment to 20 million people.

    The U.S. is also a fundamental participant in HIV/AIDS research, including through the work of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH), as well as USAID.

    All of this involvement has already been dangerously jeopardized by the actions taken by the White House since Trump took office for his second term.

    Many activities of the CDC and NIH have been halted. Funding for PEPFAR was caught in the freeze on foreign aid announced in January. Though an exemption was later made and the order has since been blocked by a federal judge, it has already forced recipients of aid to lay off personnel and close clinics and programs in places like Kenya and South Africa.

    USAID, the primary implementer of bilateral HIV/AIDS funds, is at risk of being dismantled.

    Current changes

    The chaos wrought by these measures has impacted the response to HIV/AIDS in deep ways, even if they may be contested or reversed by the courts and Congress.

    The uncertainty in itself is damaging for programs that need reliable funding and long-term planning, not to mention the clinical trials that have been brutally interrupted. What’s more, there are indications the Trump administration and other Republicans have abandoned the longstanding commitment to the response itself, which may lead to irreparable damage.

    American involvement in the global response to HIV/AIDS has long been shaped by domestic politics. Most notably, PEPFAR’s first rounds of funding were deeply constrained by the views of George W. Bush’s evangelical constituency, including in its focus on abstinence as prevention and denial of funding for sex workers.

    But the overall commitment to fighting HIV/AIDS had enjoyed bipartisan support for over two decades. Even during the first Trump administration, the U.S. maintained its involvement, though this was also due to Congress’s resistance to the White House’s attempts at reducing funding.

    There are indications that things might be different this time. Entire pages on HIV/AIDS have disappeared from government websites.

    The Heritage Foundation, the conservative think-tank behind the potential blueprint for Trump’s government known as Project 2025, has referred to HIV/AIDS as a lifestyle disease, like tobacco consumption. This language is reminiscent of the 1980s playbook of opponents on AIDS action and negates both the nature of the epidemic and the realities of those who live with the virus, casting doubts on the need to engage meaningfully with the response.

    Most ominously, the last reauthorization of PEPFAR in 2024 was limited to one year instead of the customary five, as some Republican representatives sought to end it altogether. This means the entire program is to be re-examined this March with no guarantee of how the debates will unfold, especially in the current climate.




    Read more:
    As the United States disavows the World Health Organization, Canada must double down on its support


    Ultimately most will depend on Congress, including the amount pledged by the U.S. to the Global Fund at its replenishment conference sometime this year.

    Its decisions will be the real test of the depth of change on this matter, though everything that has unfolded so far hints at a far-reaching shattering of the consensus. If conservative Republicans maintain their pressure on PEPFAR, the program could be significantly diminished, and it is unlikely that a White House that withdrew from the World Health Organization on day one will act decisively to save it or insist on a sustained contribution to the Global Fund.

    Consequences of U.S. disengagement

    The consequences of a U.S. retreat from the global response to HIV/AIDS would be immense.

    In the short-term, millions of people would lose access to the treatment they depend on for their survival. In the long term, shrinking American funding would undermine health systems around the world and risk the resurgence of the pandemic and the rise of resistant virus strains.

    This would jeopardize 40 years of progress, returning us to a time when AIDS was considered a key security risk and threat to development.

    Even if funding is maintained, all of this shows that for the next few years the U.S. is unlikely to be reliable. This means others will have to take up the leadership to ensure the worst-case scenario is avoided.

    Among these, Canada could have a crucial role to play. It has long been a key entity in its own right — the seventh largest contributor to the Global Fund — though Ottawa has remained discreet in this area so far. Washington’s withdrawal from the field may force it to step into a more visible role and contribute to reframe Canada’s international involvement.

    Yolaine Frossard de Saugy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Trump White House’s disengagement from HIV/AIDS response could have lethal consequences – https://theconversation.com/trump-white-houses-disengagement-from-hiv-aids-response-could-have-lethal-consequences-249261

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Strengthening transatlantic partnerships and securing Canada’s AI advantage

    Source: Government of Canada – Prime Minister

    Working together, Canada and its transatlantic partners have created good-paying jobs for our peoples, strengthened our economies, and advanced progress on key priorities, including climate change and international security. With increasing geopolitical instability and economic disruptions, including proposed U.S. tariffs, it is critical to accelerate these partnerships, now and into the future.

    The Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau, today concluded a successful visit to Paris, France, and to Brussels, Belgium, where he strengthened Canada’s ties with transatlantic partners and made progress on shared priorities, including artificial intelligence (AI).

    In Paris, the Prime Minister participated in the AI Action Summit, co-chaired by France and India, where he engaged with business and policy leaders on how we unlock opportunities and growth for Canadians. As part of our 2025 G7 Presidency, the Prime Minister underlined Canada’s commitment to responsibly power, adopt, and share AI. This includes helping partners access clean and reliable energy to power AI, finding ways to leverage AI and build more reliable energy grids, supporting small and medium-sized businesses’ use of AI to improve their productivity, and sharing the AI revolution with the world so our prosperity remains inclusive.

    At the Summit, Prime Minister Trudeau signed a joint Leaders’ Declaration on inclusive and sustainable AI, which reinforces Canada’s approach to AI development and ensures it aligns with human rights, public interest, and environmental protection. The Prime Minister also met with over a dozen CEOs and leading AI business leaders to position Canada as an ideal partner for innovation and investment while helping deepen Canada’s commercial relations with its partners across the U.S. and the European Union (EU).

    While in Paris, the Prime Minister also chaired a roundtable on infrastructure and energy requirements for AI and participated in the closing ceremony of a ministerial meeting of the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence, of which Canada is a founding member.

    In Brussels, Prime Minister Trudeau took part in a Canada-EU Leaders’ Meeting with the President of the European Council, António Costa, and the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen. The leaders reaffirmed the strong ties between Canada and the EU and discussed the progress made in recent years for the benefit of people on both sides of the Atlantic. This includes a strengthened trade relationship under the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), which continues to create significant opportunities for businesses and good-paying jobs for workers in Canada and the EU. They also discussed the imposition of U.S. tariffs as well as Canada and the EU’s responses.

    At the meeting, the leaders reaffirmed their commitment to building on the Canada-EU relationship and continuing to deliver results on a range of shared priorities. This includes promoting global economic security and stability, strengthening bilateral and global trade and investment – including in response to expected tariffs by the U.S. – defending the rule of law, advancing defence and security co-operation, and supporting Ukraine. They also discussed developments in the Middle East, including in Gaza and Syria, stressing the importance of an inclusive Syrian-led political governance structure.

    While in Brussels, the Prime Minister also met with the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Mark Rutte. He reaffirmed Canada’s commitment to working with NATO Allies to strengthen Euro-Atlantic security and continue supporting Ukraine in the face of Russia’s unjustifiable war of aggression. He also highlighted Canada’s contributions to NATO’s collective defence efforts across Europe, including through Operation REASSURANCE.

    Shared challenges require shared solutions. By working together, we can make the world safer, create good-paying jobs for our peoples, harness the potential of the greatest innovations, and ensure that growth is inclusive. As a leader in AI and a steadfast member of the NATO Alliance, and as part of our G7 Presidency this year, Canada is taking action to create a better, safer, and more prosperous world.

    Quote

    “During my trip to Paris and Brussels, I had one message – if you’re looking for a strong, reliable, and trustworthy partner, Canada is it. We’re advancing progress on AI, strengthening our defence alliances, creating good-paying jobs, and making sure businesses, innovators, and partners choose Canada.”

    Quick Facts

    • This was Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s 11th official visit to France.
    • Held on February 10 and 11, 2025, the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Action Summit in Paris was the third global summit of its kind. It followed the AI Seoul Summit, which Prime Minister Trudeau attended virtually last year, and the AI Safety Summit that was hosted by the UK in 2023.
    • Entitled “Inclusive and Sustainable AI for People and the Planet”, the AI Action Summit joint Leaders’ Declaration is focused on the inclusive governance of AI that reflects the public interest, human rights, the environment, and the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It also highlights the need for inclusive dialogue and co-operation on AI governance and alignment with ongoing governance efforts by the UN Global Digital Compact, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the network of safety institutes.
    • Launched in 2020, the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (GPAI) supports the development and use of AI based on human rights, inclusion, diversity, innovation, and economic growth, while seeking to advance the UN SDGs. As a founding member of the GPAI, Canada is working closely with international partners to ensure that AI is developed and used responsibly to the benefit of all citizens.
    • Canada was the first country in the world to introduce a national AI strategy. Since 2016, the Government of Canada has announced over $4.4 billion to support AI and digital research infrastructure, including $2.4 billion announced in Budget 2024 to scale-up AI compute infrastructure, support AI adoption programs, and launch an AI Safety Institute.
    • In November 2024, the Government of Canada launched the Canadian Artificial Intelligence Safety Institute to bolster Canada’s capacity to address AI safety risks, further positioning the country as a leader in the safe and responsible development and adoption of AI technologies.
    • Last year, Canada and France signed the Canada-France Declaration on Artificial Intelligence, reiterating our countries’ commitment to the responsible, safe use of AI that respects human rights and democratic values.
    • In 2024, France was Canada’s third-largest merchandise export market in the European Union (EU) and its 10th-largest trading partner globally, with two-way merchandise trade totalling $14.1 billion.
    • During his visit to France, the Prime Minister also met with the President of France, Emmanuel Macron.
    • This was Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s sixth official visit to Belgium.
    • With its 27 Member States, the EU is Canada’s second-largest destination for merchandise exports, after the United States of America. In 2024, two-way merchandise trade between Canada and the EU reached a total of $119 billion.
    • The Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) was signed in 2016 and has been provisionally applied since 2017. Since 2016, bilateral merchandise trade between Canada and the EU has grown by 58 per cent.
    • Canada is a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Alliance is a cornerstone of Canadian security and defence policy and an important platform for Canada’s contributions to international peace and security.

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Canada-European Union Leaders’ Meeting

    Source: Council of the European Union

    European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen met with Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in Brussels to discuss the importance of Canada-EU relationship, including trade, economic security, and global stability. They emphasized cooperation in tackling current global challenges, reiterating their full support for Ukraine, and promoting a rules-based international order.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: UK leads major Ukraine Summit and announces £150 million firepower package

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    Defence leaders from across the world have gathered in Brussels today as the UK convenes a major Ukraine summit at NATO HQ.

    • UK convenes the 26th Ukraine Defence Contact Group in Brussels today – the first time the meeting has been chaired by a European nation – supporting UK and European security, a foundation of the Government’s Plan for Change. 

    • Defence Secretary confirms landmark half a million rounds of artillery ammunition – worth more than £1 billion – has now been provided to Ukraine by the UK 

    • New £150 million firepower package of military aid including drones, tanks and air defence systems will give Ukrainian soldiers fighting Russia the equipment they need.  

    Defence leaders from across the world have gathered in Brussels today as the UK convenes a major Ukraine summit at NATO HQ, demonstrating the UK’s leadership and unwavering military support for Ukraine in its fight against Putin’s illegal invasion.  

    Over 50 allies and partners, including Ukraine, the US, Japan and Australia, met for the 26th Ukraine Defence Contact Group, chaired by Defence Secretary John Healey, the first time for any European nation. 

    Opening the meeting, the Defence Secretary announced a new £150m military support package to support Ukrainian troops fighting Russia on the frontline, part of the UK’s unprecedented £3 billion annual pledge to Ukraine. 

    This year, the UK’s total commitment has reached its highest ever level, standing at £4.5 billion, ensuring Ukraine can achieve peace through strength and underscoring the new 100 Year Partnership between the UK and Ukraine. 

    Chairing the meeting, Defence Secretary John Healey said:   

    2025 is the critical year for the war in Ukraine. Ukrainians continue to fight with huge courage – military and civilians alike, and their bravery – fused with our support – has proved a lethal combination. 

    Speaking as a European Defence Minister, we know our responsibilities. We are doing more of the heavy lifting and sharing more of the burden. 

    While Russia is weakened, it remains undeniably dangerous.  We must step up further – and secure peace through strength – together.

    Speaking at today’s meeting, where he was joined by Ukrainian Defence Minster Rustem Umerov, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius,  French Minister of the Armed Forces Sébastien Lecornu and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, Defence Secretary Healey confirmed that the UK has sent a landmark 500,000 rounds of ammunition to Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion, worth over £1 billion.  

    The Defence Secretary also confirmed that the UK is on track to provide more than 10,000 drones to Ukraine in a single year, with final deliveries due next month.  

    Today’s £150 million package includes thousands of drones, dozens of battle tanks and armoured vehicles and air defence systems.   

    More than 50 armoured and protective vehicles, including modernised T-72 tanks will be deployed to Ukraine by the end of spring, building on the thousands of pieces of equipment the UK has already given to Ukraine.   

    The air defence equipment will support more than 100 Ukrainian air defence teams, and has a 90% success rate of shooting down kamikaze drones, protecting Ukrainian critical national infrastructure including electricity sites frequently targeted by Russia. Announced by the Prime Minister Keir Starmer in Kyiv last month, the UK and Denmark are also providing fifteen Gravehawks to Ukraine.  

    Today’s package also includes major new maintenance contracts to support in-country repairs to critical kit – helping keep Ukraine’s tanks and artillery in the fight and bringing broken equipment back into use.  

    The Government is clear that the security of the UK starts in Ukraine and is therefore committed to Ukraine’s long-term security as a foundation for the government’s Plan for Change.  

    As part of today’s announcement, thousands of pieces of military equipment the UK has already donated to Ukraine will be repaired and better maintained through contracts worth around £60 million.  

    In a boost the UK’s economy, this includes a multi-million-pound contract with UK defence firm Babcock, who will train Ukrainian personnel to maintain and repair crucial equipment such as Challenger 2 tanks, self-propelled artillery, and combat reconnaissance vehicles inside Ukraine. Through this agreement, equipment can be serviced and returned to the front line quicker.  

    UK defence giant BAE Systems has also been awarded a £14 million contract, funded by Sweden and procured through the UK-administered International Fund for Ukraine, to repair Archer artillery systems. Working with Lancashire-based firm AMS, repairs of the Swedish-gifted Archer systems will be carried out in Ukraine with Ukrainian soldiers given technical training so they can maintain equipment for years to come.  

    Today’s announcement comes ahead of tomorrow’s NATO Defence Ministerial meeting, where Defence Secretary Healey will set out that in this critical year, nations must step up and back Ukraine with the resources they need to achieve long-term peace in the face of Russian aggression.

    Updates to this page

    Published 12 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Prime Minister Justin Trudeau meets with Secretary General of NATO Mark Rutte

    Source: Government of Canada – Prime Minister

    Today, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau met with the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Mark Rutte. He was joined by the Minister of National Defence, Bill Blair.

    The leaders underscored the importance of unity amongst NATO Allies in responding to global security challenges, strengthening maritime and arctic security co-operation, and addressing regional instability. They also reaffirmed NATO’s role in ensuring global stability.

    Prime Minister Trudeau and Secretary General Rutte reiterated their unwavering support for Ukraine as it continues to defend itself against Russia’s illegal and unjustifiable invasion. The leaders discussed NATO’s role in supporting Ukraine’s defence and underscored the importance of maintaining pressure on Russia. They emphasized that there can be no sustainable peace in Europe without security for Ukraine and that any peaceful outcome to the dispute must involve Ukraine.

    The Prime Minister and the Secretary General emphasized their commitment to NATO’s core mission of collective defence and stability. They also agreed on the importance of adapting to current and future security challenges amid rising uncertainty in the international order. Prime Minister Trudeau reaffirmed Canada’s commitment to strengthening the Alliance and increasing defence spending.

    The leaders agreed to remain in close contact.

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    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Canada-European Union Leaders’ Meeting

    Source: Government of Canada – Prime Minister

    The Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau, the President of the European Council, António Costa, and the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, met in Brussels, Belgium, on February 12, 2025. They highlighted the close relationship between Canada and the European Union (EU), which is underpinned by a Strategic Partnership Agreement and a Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). The leaders discussed the importance of working together to promote global economic security and stability. They highlighted the strong trade and investment relationship between Canada and the EU, and agreed on the importance of renewing efforts to advance and diversify trade.

    They emphasized the importance of Canada-EU co-operation – including in the context of Canada’s G7 Presidency – to address current opportunities and challenges in a complex, competitive, and unpredictable world.

    Together, Canada and the EU will continue supporting an inclusive, rules-based multilateral system anchored in the principles of the United Nations Charter, and uphold the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inviolability of borders as fundamental tenets of international law.

    In the run-up to the three-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the leaders reaffirmed their unwavering support for Ukraine as it continues to resist Russia’s unjustifiable war of aggression. They spoke about developments in the Middle East, particularly in Gaza and Syria. They welcomed last month’s ceasefire and hostage release agreement between Israel and Hamas, calling on all parties to implement it, and underscored their commitment to a two-state solution. They also stressed the importance of an inclusive Syrian-led political governance structure.

    The leaders discussed global trade, including expected tariffs by the United States. They also discussed other shared priorities and agreed to remain in close touch.

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI: Surfshark releases annual company report for 2024

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Surfshark Annual Wrap-up 2024 highlights another year of Surfshark’s growth and impact. In 2024, Surfshark increased product offerings, social responsibility efforts, and global outreach.

    “At Surfshark, we’re dedicated to building the most beloved security products people can rely on. Our mission is to deliver a service that earns trust and provides genuine value. We’ve recognized that our strength lies in creating a seamless user experience and outstanding service — which every team member contributes to. Especially in uncertain times, we aim to offer stability through convenient, accessible multi-product solutions that simplify online security and remove the worry of staying protected,” says Vytautas Kaziukonis, CEO at Surfshark. 

    “In 2024, we landed among the top 50 in the Financial Times 1000: Europe’s Fastest Growing Companies list. This achievement is not just about rapid growth but also about maintaining balanced, long-term, and stable development,” adds V.Kaziukonis.

    Technical Advancements in 2024

    In 2024, Surfshark focused on enhancing the quality of its services to better meet the needs of users. The technical team introduced several new features to ensure stronger privacy and security for everyone. One of the standout innovations was Alternative Number, a unique feature designed to protect users’ phone numbers online. Additionally, Surfshark expanded support for Apple TV, enabling seamless privacy protection across more devices. To further empower users, Surfshark introduced a free Data Leak Checker, allowing individuals to assess the safety of their personal information at no cost.

    Incogni’s Milestones and Expansion

    Incogni, Surfshark’s data removal product, had a remarkable year. In 2024, Surfshark acquired Ironwall to expand its offerings for individuals concerned about data protection. Ironwall specializes in online privacy protection for public servants and businesses, with a focus on judges, law enforcement, healthcare professionals, and financial institutions. Additionally, Incogni underwent a rebranding, giving it a fresh new look while staying true to its mission of protecting digital privacy in a clear and effective manner.

    Research Initiatives and Cybersecurity Awareness

    Surfshark’s research team had a productive year, rolling out impactful studies and initiatives aimed at raising awareness about cybersecurity. One major launch was the Smart Homes Privacy Checker, a tool that allows users to assess the privacy risks associated with their smart home devices.

    Surfshark also continued to track and report on the state of global internet freedom with the Internet Shutdown Tracker. Additionally, the Global Data Breach Statistics report provided insights into the increasing number of data breaches worldwide, helping promote better online safety practices.

    Commitment to Social Responsibility

    Surfshark’s dedication to corporate social responsibility remained strong in 2024. The company deepened its partnerships with trusted NGOs and nonprofits, such as the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) and Open Rights Group (ORG), to advance digital rights and internet freedom.

    A major highlight was the launch of Surfshark’s first-ever Impact Report, showcasing its Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) efforts. This included the use of renewable energy, carbon emission mapping, and contributions to causes such as aid for Ukraine and marine conservation efforts.

    Additionally, Surfshark continued its Emergency VPN initiative, providing free VPN access to over 300 journalists, NGO workers, and activists facing internet censorship and surveillance.

    Read the full report here: surfshark.com/media/Surfshark_Annual_Wrap-Up_2024.pdf 

    NOTES TO EDITORS

    Surfshark is a cybersecurity company focused on developing humanized privacy and security solutions. The Surfshark One suite includes one of the very few VPNs audited by independent security experts, an officially certified antivirus, a private search tool, and a data leak alert system. Surfshark is recognized as the Tech Advisor’s Editor’s Choice for 2024. For a closer look at Surfshark in 2024, check our annual wrap-up. For more research projects, visit our research hub at: surfshark.com/research

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  • MIL-OSI Africa: Donald Trump’s war on global governance: lessons from the past on how to fight back

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Danny Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria

    US president Donald Trump’s recent actions seem designed to reassert American power and demonstrate that it is still the dominant global power and is capable of bullying weaker nations into following America’s lead.

    He has shown contempt for international collaboration by withdrawing from the UN climate negotiations and the World Health Organization. His officials have also indicated that they will not participate in upcoming G20 meetings because he does not like the policies of South Africa, the G20 president for 2025.

    In addition, he’s shown a lack of concern for international solidarity by halting US aid programmes and by undermining efforts to keep businesses honest. He has demonstrated his contempt for allies by imposing tariffs on their exports.

    These actions demand a response from the rest of the international community that mitigates the risk to the well-being of people and planet and the effective management of global affairs.

    My research on global economic governance suggests that history can offer some guidance on how to shape an effective response.

    Such a response should be based on a realistic assessment of the configuration of global forces. It should seek to build tactical coalitions between state and non-state actors in both the global south and the global north who can agree on clear and limited objectives.

    The following three historical lessons help explain this point.

    Cautionary lessons

    The first lesson is about the dangers of being overoptimistic in assessing the potential for change.

    In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the US was confronting defeat in the war in Vietnam, high inflation and domestic unrest, including the assassination of leading politicians and the murder of protesting students.

    The US was also losing confidence in its ability to sustain the international monetary order it had established at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944.

    In addition, the countries of the global south were calling for a new international economic order that was more responsive to their needs. Given the concerns about the political and economic situation in the US and the relative strength of the Soviet bloc at the time, this seemed a realistic demand.

    In August 1971, President Richard Nixon, without any international consultations, launched what became known as the Nixon Shock. He broke the link between gold and the US dollar, thereby ending the international monetary system established in 1944. He also imposed a 10% surcharge on all imports into the US.

    When America’s European allies protested and sought to create a reformed version of the old monetary order, US treasury secretary John Connolly informed them that the dollar was

    our currency but your problem.

    Over the course of the 1970s, US allies in western Europe, Asia and all countries that participated in the old Bretton Woods system were forced to accept what the US preferred: a market-based international monetary system in which the US dollar became the dominant currency.

    The US, along with its allies in the global north, also defeated the calls for a new international economic order and imposed their neo-liberal economic order on the world.

    The second cautionary lesson highlights the importance of building robust tactical coalitions. In 1969, the International Monetary Fund member states agreed to authorise the IMF to create special drawing rights, the IMF’s unique reserve asset. At the time, many IMF developing country member states advocated establishing a link between development and the special drawing rights. This would enable those countries most in need of additional resources to access more than their proportionate share of special drawing rights to fund their development.

    All developing countries supported this demand. But they couldn’t agree on how to do it. The rich countries were able to exploit these differences and defeat the proposed link between the special drawing rights and development. As a result, the special drawing rights are now distributed to all IMF member states according to their quotas in the IMF. This means that most allocations go to the rich countries who do not need them and have no obligation to share them with developing countries.

    A third lesson arises from the successful Jubilee 2000 campaign to forgive the debts of low-income developing countries experiencing debt crises. This campaign, supported by a secretariat in the United Kingdom, eventually involved:

    • civil society organisations and activists in 40 countries

    • a petition signed by 21 million people

    • governments in both creditor and debtor countries.

    These efforts resulted in the cancellation of the debts of 35 developing countries. These debts, totalling about US$100 billion, were owed primarily to bilateral and multilateral official creditors.

    They were also a demonstration of the political power that can be generated by the combined actions of civil society organisations and governments in both rich and poor countries. They can force the most powerful and wealthy institutions and individuals in the world to accept actions that, while requiring them to make affordable sacrifices, benefit low-income countries and potentially poor communities within those states.

    What conclusions should be drawn?

    We shouldn’t under-estimate the power of the US or the determination of the MAGA movement to use that power. However, their power is not absolute. It is constrained by the relative decline in US power as countries such as China and India gain economic and political strength. In addition, there are now mechanisms for international cooperation, such as the G20, where states can coordinate their actions and gain tactical victories that are meaningful to people and planet.

    But gaining such victories will require the following:

    Firstly, the formation of tactical coalitions that include states from both the global south and the global north. If these states cooperate around limited and shared objectives they can counter the vested interests around the world that support Trump’s objectives.

    Secondly, a special kind of public-private partnership in which states and non-state actors set aside their differences and agree to cooperate to achieve limited shared objectives. Neither states alone nor civil society groups alone were able to defeat the vested interests that opposed debt relief in the late 1990s. Working together they were able to defeat powerful creditor interests and gain debt relief for the poorest states.

    Thirdly, this special partnership will only be possible if there’s general agreement on both the diagnosis of the problem and on the general contours of the solution. This was the case with the debt issue in the 1990s.

    There are good candidates for such collaborative actions. For example, many states and non-state actors agree that international financial institutions need to be reformed and made more responsive to the needs of those member states that actually use their services but lack voice and vote in their governance. The institutions also need to be more accountable to those affected by their policies and practices. They also agree that large corporations and financial institutions should pay their fair share of taxes and should be environmentally and socially responsible.

    The urgency of the challenges facing the global community demands that the world begin countering Trump as soon as possible. South Africa as the current chair of the G20 has a special responsibility to ensure that this year the G20, together with its engagement groups, acts creatively and responsibly in relation to people and planet.

    – Donald Trump’s war on global governance: lessons from the past on how to fight back
    – https://theconversation.com/donald-trumps-war-on-global-governance-lessons-from-the-past-on-how-to-fight-back-249666

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Global: Donald Trump’s war on global governance: lessons from the past on how to fight back

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Danny Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria

    US president Donald Trump’s recent actions seem designed to reassert American power and demonstrate that it is still the dominant global power and is capable of bullying weaker nations into following America’s lead.

    He has shown contempt for international collaboration by withdrawing from the UN climate negotiations and the World Health Organization. His officials have also indicated that they will not participate in upcoming G20 meetings because he does not like the policies of South Africa, the G20 president for 2025.

    In addition, he’s shown a lack of concern for international solidarity by halting US aid programmes and by undermining efforts to keep businesses honest. He has demonstrated his contempt for allies by imposing tariffs on their exports.

    These actions demand a response from the rest of the international community that mitigates the risk to the well-being of people and planet and the effective management of global affairs.

    My research on global economic governance suggests that history can offer some guidance on how to shape an effective response.

    Such a response should be based on a realistic assessment of the configuration of global forces. It should seek to build tactical coalitions between state and non-state actors in both the global south and the global north who can agree on clear and limited objectives.

    The following three historical lessons help explain this point.

    Cautionary lessons

    The first lesson is about the dangers of being overoptimistic in assessing the potential for change.

    In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the US was confronting defeat in the war in Vietnam, high inflation and domestic unrest, including the assassination of leading politicians and the murder of protesting students.

    The US was also losing confidence in its ability to sustain the international monetary order it had established at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944.

    In addition, the countries of the global south were calling for a new international economic order that was more responsive to their needs. Given the concerns about the political and economic situation in the US and the relative strength of the Soviet bloc at the time, this seemed a realistic demand.

    In August 1971, President Richard Nixon, without any international consultations, launched what became known as the Nixon Shock. He broke the link between gold and the US dollar, thereby ending the international monetary system established in 1944. He also imposed a 10% surcharge on all imports into the US.

    When America’s European allies protested and sought to create a reformed version of the old monetary order, US treasury secretary John Connolly informed them that the dollar was

    our currency but your problem.

    Over the course of the 1970s, US allies in western Europe, Asia and all countries that participated in the old Bretton Woods system were forced to accept what the US preferred: a market-based international monetary system in which the US dollar became the dominant currency.

    The US, along with its allies in the global north, also defeated the calls for a new international economic order and imposed their neo-liberal economic order on the world.

    The second cautionary lesson highlights the importance of building robust tactical coalitions. In 1969, the International Monetary Fund member states agreed to authorise the IMF to create special drawing rights, the IMF’s unique reserve asset. At the time, many IMF developing country member states advocated establishing a link between development and the special drawing rights. This would enable those countries most in need of additional resources to access more than their proportionate share of special drawing rights to fund their development.

    All developing countries supported this demand. But they couldn’t agree on how to do it. The rich countries were able to exploit these differences and defeat the proposed link between the special drawing rights and development. As a result, the special drawing rights are now distributed to all IMF member states according to their quotas in the IMF. This means that most allocations go to the rich countries who do not need them and have no obligation to share them with developing countries.

    A third lesson arises from the successful Jubilee 2000 campaign to forgive the debts of low-income developing countries experiencing debt crises. This campaign, supported by a secretariat in the United Kingdom, eventually involved:

    • civil society organisations and activists in 40 countries

    • a petition signed by 21 million people

    • governments in both creditor and debtor countries.

    These efforts resulted in the cancellation of the debts of 35 developing countries. These debts, totalling about US$100 billion, were owed primarily to bilateral and multilateral official creditors.

    They were also a demonstration of the political power that can be generated by the combined actions of civil society organisations and governments in both rich and poor countries. They can force the most powerful and wealthy institutions and individuals in the world to accept actions that, while requiring them to make affordable sacrifices, benefit low-income countries and potentially poor communities within those states.

    What conclusions should be drawn?

    We shouldn’t under-estimate the power of the US or the determination of the MAGA movement to use that power. However, their power is not absolute. It is constrained by the relative decline in US power as countries such as China and India gain economic and political strength. In addition, there are now mechanisms for international cooperation, such as the G20, where states can coordinate their actions and gain tactical victories that are meaningful to people and planet.

    But gaining such victories will require the following:

    Firstly, the formation of tactical coalitions that include states from both the global south and the global north. If these states cooperate around limited and shared objectives they can counter the vested interests around the world that support Trump’s objectives.

    Secondly, a special kind of public-private partnership in which states and non-state actors set aside their differences and agree to cooperate to achieve limited shared objectives. Neither states alone nor civil society groups alone were able to defeat the vested interests that opposed debt relief in the late 1990s. Working together they were able to defeat powerful creditor interests and gain debt relief for the poorest states.

    Thirdly, this special partnership will only be possible if there’s general agreement on both the diagnosis of the problem and on the general contours of the solution. This was the case with the debt issue in the 1990s.

    There are good candidates for such collaborative actions. For example, many states and non-state actors agree that international financial institutions need to be reformed and made more responsive to the needs of those member states that actually use their services but lack voice and vote in their governance. The institutions also need to be more accountable to those affected by their policies and practices. They also agree that large corporations and financial institutions should pay their fair share of taxes and should be environmentally and socially responsible.

    The urgency of the challenges facing the global community demands that the world begin countering Trump as soon as possible. South Africa as the current chair of the G20 has a special responsibility to ensure that this year the G20, together with its engagement groups, acts creatively and responsibly in relation to people and planet.

    Danny Bradlow, in addition to his position at the University of Pretoria, is an advisor to the South African Institute of International Affairs on G20 issues and is a co-chair of the T20 Taskforce on the Financing of Sustainable Development.

    ref. Donald Trump’s war on global governance: lessons from the past on how to fight back – https://theconversation.com/donald-trumps-war-on-global-governance-lessons-from-the-past-on-how-to-fight-back-249666

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: India – France Joint Statement on the visit of Shri Narendra Modi, Hon’ble Prime Minister of India to France

    Source: Government of India

    Posted On: 12 FEB 2025 3:22PM by PIB Delhi

    At the invitation of the President of the French Republic, H.E. Mr. Emmanuel Macron, the Prime Minister of India, Shri Narendra Modi, paid a visit to France on 10-12 February 2025. On 10 and 11 February 2025, France and India co-chaired the Artificial Intelligence Action Summit, gathering Heads of State and Government, leaders of international organizations, small and large enterprises, representatives of academia, non-governmental organizations, artists and members of civil society, in order to build on the important milestones reached during the Bletchley Park (November 2023) and Seoul (May 2024) summits. They underlined their commitment to take concrete actions to ensure that the global AI sector can drive beneficial social, economic and environmental outcomes in the public interest. Prime Minister Modi congratulated President Macron on France’s successful organization of AI Action Summit. France welcomed India’s hosting of the next AI Summit.

    This was Prime Minister Modi’s sixth visit to France, and follows President Macron’s visit to India in January 2024 as the Chief Guest for the 75th Republic Day of India. Prime Minister Modi and President Macron held bilateral discussions on the entire gamut of the exceptionally strong and multifaceted bilateral cooperation and on global and regional matters. Both leaders also went to Marseille where President Macron hosted a private dinner for Prime Minister Modi, reflecting the excellent relationship between the two leaders. They jointly inaugurated India’s Consulate General in Marseille. They also visited the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor facility.

    President Macron and Prime Minister Modi reaffirmed their shared vision for bilateral cooperation and international partnership, outlined in the Joint Statement issued following President Macron’s State Visit to India in January 2024 and in the Horizon 2047 Roadmap published during the visit of Prime Minister Modi to France in July 2023 as the Chief Guest of the Bastille Day Celebrations on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Strategic Partnership. They commended the progress achieved in their bilateral cooperation and committed to accelerating it further across its three pillars.

    The two leaders reiterated their call for reformed and effective multilateralism to sustain an equitable and peaceful international order, address pressing global challenges and prepare the world for emerging developments, including in the technological and economic domains. The two leaders stressed, in particular, the urgent need for the reform of the United Nations Security Council and agreed to coordinate closely in multilateral fora, including on UNSC matters. France reiterated its firm support for India’s permanent membership of the UNSC. The two leaders agreed to strengthen conversations on regulation of use of the veto in case of mass atrocities. They held extensive discussions on long-term global challenges and current international developments and agreed to intensify their global and regional engagement, including through multilateral initiatives and institutions.

    Acknowledging the paramount importance of advancing scientific knowledge, research and innovation, and recalling the long and enduring engagement between India and France in those areas, President Macron and Prime Minister Modi announced the grand inauguration of the India-France Year of Innovation in New Delhi in March 2026 by launching its Logo.

    Partnership for Security and Sovereignty

    Recalling the deep and longstanding defence cooperation between France and India as part of the Strategic Partnership, President Macron and Prime Minister Modi welcomed the continuation of the cooperation of air and maritime assets in line with the ambitious Defence Industrial Roadmap agreed in 2024. Both leaders commended progress in collaboration in construction of Scorpene submarines in India, including indigenization, and in particular the work carried out with a view to the integration of DRDO developed Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) into P75-Scorpene submarines and the analyses conducted regarding the possible integration of the Integrated Combat System (ICS) into the future P75-AS submarines. Both leaders welcomed the commissioning of the sixth and final submarine of the P75 Scorpene-class project, INS Vaghsheer, on 15 January 2025.Both sides welcomed the ongoing discussions in missiles, helicopter engines and jet engines. They also welcomed the excellent cooperation between the relevant entities in the Safran group and their Indian counterparts. Prime Minister Modi also invited the French Army to take a closer look at the Pinaka MBLR, emphasizing that an acquisition of this system by France would be another milestone in Indo-French defence ties. In addition, President Macron welcomed the decision to include India as an observer to the Eurodrone MALE programme managed by OCCAR, which is another step forward in the growing strength of our partnership in defence equipment programmes.

    Both leaders appreciated the regular conduct of military exercises in all domains including maritime exercises and joint patrolling by maritime patrol aircraft. They noted the recent visit of the French Carrier Strike Group Charles De Gaulle to India in January 2025, followed by the Indian Navy’s participation in the French multinational exercise La Perouse, and the future conduct of the Varuna exercise in March 2025.

    They welcomed the launch of FRIND-X (France-India Defence Startup Excellence) in Paris on 5-6 December 2024, involving the DGA and the Defence Innovation Agency, in line with the vision enshrined in HORIZON 2047 and the India-France Defence Industrial Roadmap. This collaborative platform brings together key stakeholders across both defence ecosystems, including defence startups, investors, incubators, accelerators, and academia, fostering a new era of defence innovation and partnership.

    In order to deepen the research and development partnerships in defence, both leaders stressed on the early launch of an R&D framework through a Technical Arrangement for cooperation in defence technologies between DGA and DRDO. Inaddition, both leaders welcomed the ongoing discussions between L’Office National d’Etudes et de Recherches Aérospatiales (ONERA) and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) to identify technologies for R&D partnerships. Further, India welcomes the participation of Indian students, alongside French students, in the challenge on distributed intelligencelaunched recently by Interdisciplinary Center for Defence and Security from the Institut Polytechnique de Parisand encourages organizing of more joint challenges in the future to evoke the interest of students in defence.

    Both leaders had a detailed conversation on international issues, including on the Middle-East and the war in Ukraine. They agreed to pursue their efforts to coordinate and remain closely engaged on a regular basis.

    The two leaders recalled the launch of the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) on the margins of the G20 Summit in Delhi in September 2023 and agreed to work together more closely on implementing the initiative. Both leaders stressed the importance of IMEC to foster connectivity, sustainable growth trajectories and access to clean energy across these regions. In this regard, they acknowledged the strategic location of Marseille in the Mediterranean Sea.

    They underlined the key importance of strengthening EU-India relations, in view of the upcoming India-EU summit at the earliest possible in New Delhi.

    They appreciated the growing cooperation in trilateral format with Australia and with the United Arab Emirates. They commended the joint military exercises that took place between France, India and the United Arab Emirates, as well as the participation of India, France and Australia in each others’ multilateral military exercises. At the invitation of the United Arab Emirates and India, France joined the Mangrove Alliance for Climate. They directed their concerned officials to work together with officials from the Governments of United Arab Emirates and Australia, towards identifying concrete projects of trilateral cooperation in the field of economy, innovation, health, renewable energy, education, culture, and the maritime domain, including under the IPOI and IORA as identified during the focal points meeting held virtually last year for both the trilateral dialogues.

    The two leaders underlined their common commitment to a free, open, inclusive, secure and peaceful Indo-Pacific region.

    They reiterated their desire to continue to deepen bilateral cooperation in the space sector. Taking note of the substantial contribution of the first two sessions of the India-France Strategic Space Dialogue to furthering this objective, they agreed to hold its third session in 2025. They commended the strength of the partnership between CNES and ISRO and supported the development of collaborations and synergies between their space industries.

    The two leaders reaffirmed their unequivocal condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, including cross-border terrorism. They called for the disruption of terrorism financing networks and safe havens. They further agreed that no country should provide safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts. The leaders also called for concerted action against all terrorists, including through designations of individuals affiliated with groups that are listed by the UN Security Council 1267 Sanctions Committee. The two sides emphasized the importance of upholding international standards on anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism, consistent with Financial Action Task Force recommendations. Both countries reiterated their commitment to work together in FATF, No Money For Terror (NMFT) and other multilateral platforms.

    They commended the cooperation between the National Security Guard (NSG) of India and the Groupe d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN) for agency-level cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism. The two leaders welcomed the outcomes of the counter-terrorism dialogue held in April 2024, reflecting the growing India – France counter-terrorism and intelligence cooperation. The two leaders also looked forward to the successful organization of Milipol 2025 in New Delhi.

    They welcomed the ongoing discussions to create a comprehensive framework for an enhanced bilateral cooperation in the civil aviation sector, which are at advanced stages.

    Prime Minister Modi and President Macron launched an India-France Roadmap on Artificial Intelligence (AI), rooted in the philosophical convergence in their approaches focusing on the development of safe, open, secure and trustworthy artificial intelligence. They welcomed the inclusion of Indian startups at the French Startup Incubator Station F. They also welcomed the expanded possibilities for using India’s real-time payment system – Unified Payments Interface (UPI) – in France. The two leaders reiterated the strategic significance of cyberspace and their wish to strengthen their coordination at the United Nations regarding the application of international law and the implementation of the framework for responsible State behaviour in cyberspace, as well as the need to address issues arising from the proliferation of malicious cyber tools and practices. They looked forward to the next India-France Strategic Cybersecurity and Cyberdiplomacy Dialogues to be held in 2025.

    Partnership for the Planet

    Prime Minister Modi and President Macron stressed that nuclear energy is an essential part of the energy mix for strengthening energy security and transitioning towards a low-carbon economy. Both leaders acknowledged the India-France civil nuclear ties and efforts in cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, notably in relation with the Jaitapur Nuclear Power Plant Project. They welcomed the first meeting of the Special Task Force on Civil Nuclear Energy, and welcomed the signing of a letter of intent on Small Modular Reactor (SMR) and Advanced Modular Reactor (AMR) and the Implementing Agreement between India’s GCNEP, DAE and France’s INSTN, CEA for cooperation in training and education of nuclear professionals.

    The two leaders reaffirmed their countries’ commitment to jointly address the environmental crises and challenges including climate change and promoting sustainable lifestyles. The leaders welcomed the renewal of bilateral cooperation in the field of environment between the Ministries of Environment. Both leaders reiterated their commitment to the principles established by the Paris Pact for People and the Planet for reform of the international financing system towards supporting vulnerable countries in addressing both the eradication of poverty and the preservation of the planet. Both leaders affirmed the significance of United Nations Oceans Conference (UNOC-3) as an important milestone in international efforts towards conservation and sustainable use of oceans. In the context of upcoming UNOC-3 to be held in Nice in June 2025, France and India recognize the importance of the Agreement on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity Beyond Areas of Natural Jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement), as one of the pillars of inclusive and holistic international ocean governance. Having already signed the treaty, they called for its entry into force at the earliest. Prime Minister Modi offered India’s support to France for UNOC-3 in June 2025.

    They lauded the launching of the India-France Indo-Pacific Triangular Development Cooperation, aiming to support climate- and SDG-focused projects from third countries in the Indo-Pacific region. The two leaders welcome the partnership between Proparco and the concerned Indian microfinance institutions for an equity agreement of 13 million Euros in the areas of financial inclusion and women empowerment. They also commended the strong and fruitful cooperation within the framework of the Franco Indian presidency of the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure and the International Solar Alliance.

    Noting the record level of bilateral trade in 2024, they acknowledged that there is vast untapped potential for trade and investment between the two countries. Both leaders highlighted the need to maintain strong confidence for companies investing in France and in India. They commended the numerous economic cooperation projects announced in 2024 in the field of urban development. They recalled the participation of India as guest of honor of the 7th Choose France Summit in Versailles in May 2024. The two leaders were delighted with the organization of the bilateral CEOs Forum in November 2024 and February 2025.

    The two leaders expressed their satisfaction with the unprecedented momentum initiated for cooperation between the two Ministries of Health, with the first mission in Paris of India’s Ministry for Health and Family Welfare last January. Digital health, anti-microbial resistance and exchange of health professionals have been identified as the main priorities for bilateral cooperation in 2025. The two leaders welcomed the signature of a Letter of Intent between PariSante Campus and the C-CAMP (Centre for Molecular Platforms), and the creation of the Indo-French Life Sciences Sister Innovation Hub.

    Partnership for the People

    Recalling the ambition underpinning the Letter of Intent signed on the occasion of Prime Minister Modi’s visit to France in July 2023, President Macron and Prime Minister Modi welcomed the signature of the Agreement between the National Museum in Delhi and France Muséums Développement in December 2024. This agreement paves the way for further collaboration as well as broader museum cooperation including training of Indian professionals. France offered to continue consultations on its participation in the development of the National Maritime Heritage Complex.

    To celebrate the 60th Anniversary of the signing of the first cultural agreement between India and France in 1966, both sides agreed to undertake multiple cultural exchanges and programs in the context of the Year of Innovation 2026 which is a cross-sectoral initiative that includes culture.

    Prime Minister Modi congratulated President Macron on the successful organization of the Paris Olympics and Paralympics 2024 and thanked President Macron’s willingness to share France’s experience and expertise regarding the organization and securing of major international sporting events in the context of India’s bid to host the Olympics and Paralympics Games in 2036.

    Both Leaders welcomed the launch of a regional edition of the Raisina Dialogue focusing on Mediterranean issues in Marseille in 2025, to foster high-level dialogue involving representatives of governments, industry leaders, experts on trade and connectivity issues and other relevant stakeholders with an aim to enhance trade and connectivity between the Mediterranean and the Indo-Pacific regions.

    Both leaders welcomed the successful launch in September 2024 of the International Classes Scheme under which Indian students are taught French as a foreign language, and methodology and academic contents in highly reputed French universities in France during one academic year, before entering their chosen curricula in France. It will create conducive conditions to increase student mobility and meet the target of 30,000 Indian students in France by 2030. In that regard, they welcomed the rising number of Indian students in France, with 2025 figures expected to reach an unprecedented 10,000.

    Both leaders also welcomed the operationalization of the Young Professionals Scheme (YPS) under India-France Migration and Mobility Partnership Agreement (MMPA) which will facilitate two way mobility of youth and professionals, further strengthening the bonds of friendship between people of India and France. Moreover, both leaders stressed on early conclusion of the Memorandum of Understanding to foster cooperation in the fields of skill development, vocational education and training which will create opportunities for both countries to strengthen cooperation in this field.

    To foster their dynamic and comprehensive Strategic Partnership, both countries committed to constantly deepen their long-term cooperation following the ambitions expressed in the bilateral Horizon 2047 Roadmap.

    ***

    MJPS/SR/SKS

    (Release ID: 2102247) Visitor Counter : 146

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Statement on Inclusive and Sustainable Artificial Intelligence for People and the Planet

    Source: Government of Canada – Prime Minister

    1. Participants from over 100 countries, including government leaders, international organisations, representatives of civil society, the private sector, and the academic and research communities gathered in Paris on February 10 and 11, 2025, to hold the AI Action Summit. Rapid development of AI technologies represents a major paradigm shift, impacting our citizens, and societies in many ways. In line with the Paris Pact for People and the Planet, and the principles that countries must have ownership of their transition strategies, we have identified priorities and launched concrete actions to advance the public interest and to bridge digital divides through accelerating progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Our actions are grounded in three main principles of science, solutions – focusing on open AI models in compliance with countries frameworks – and policy standards, in line with international frameworks.
    2. This Summit has highlighted the importance of reinforcing the diversity of the AI ecosystem. It has laid an open, multi-stakeholder and inclusive approach that will enable AI to be human rights based, human-centric, ethical, safe, secure and trustworthy while also stressing the need and urgency to narrow the inequalities and assist developing countries in artificial intelligence capacity-building so they can build AI capacities.
    3. Acknowledging existing multilateral initiatives on AI, including the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, the Global Digital Compact, the UNESCO Recommendation on Ethics of AI, the African Union Continental AI Strategy, and the works of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Council of Europe and European Union, the G7 including the Hiroshima AI Process and G20, we have affirmed the following main priorities: 
    • Promoting AI accessibility to reduce digital divides

    • Ensuring AI is open, inclusive, transparent, ethical, safe, secure and trustworthy, taking into account international frameworks for all 

    • Making innovation in AI thrive by enabling conditions for its development and avoiding market concentration driving industrial recovery and development

    • Encouraging AI deployment that positively shapes the future of work and labour markets and delivers opportunity for sustainable growth

    • Making AI sustainable for people and the planet

    • Reinforcing international cooperation to promote coordination in international governance

    To deliver on these priorities: 

    • Founding members have launched a major Public Interest AI Platform and Incubator, to support, amplify, decrease fragmentation between existing public and private initiatives on Public Interest AI and address digital divides. The Public interest AI Initiative will sustain and support digital public goods and technical assistance and capacity building projects in data, model development, openness and transparency, audit, compute, talent, financing and collaboration to support and co-create a trustworthy AI ecosystem advancing the public interest of all, for all and by all. 

    • We have discussed, at a Summit for the first time and in a multi-stakeholder format, issues related to AI and energy. This discussion has led to sharing knowledge to foster investments for sustainable AI systems (hardware, infrastructure, models), to promoting an international discussion on AI and environment, to welcoming an observatory on the energy impact of AI with the International Energy Agency, to showcasing energy-friendly AI innovation.
    • We recognize the need to enhance our shared knowledge on the impacts of AI in the job market, though the creation of network of Observatories, to better anticipate AI implications for workplaces, training and education and to use AI to foster productivity, skill development, quality and working conditions and social dialogue.
    1. We recognize the need for inclusive multistakeholder dialogues and cooperation on AI governance. We underline the need for a global reflection integrating inter alia questions of safety, sustainable development, innovation, respect of international laws including humanitarian law and human rights law and the protection of human rights, gender equality, linguistic diversity, protection of consumers and of intellectual property rights. We take notes of efforts and discussions related to international fora where AI governance is examined. As outlined in the Global Digital Compact adopted by the UN General Assembly, participants also reaffirmed their commitment to initiate a Global Dialogue on AI governance and the Independent International Scientific Panel on AI and to align on-going governance efforts, ensuring complementarity and avoiding duplication. 
    2. Harnessing the benefits of AI technologies to support our economies and societies depends on advancing Trust and Safety. We commend the role of the Bletchley Park AI Safety Summit and Seoul Summits that have been essential in progressing international cooperation on AI safety and we note the voluntary commitments launched there. We will keep addressing the risks of AI to information integrity and continue the work on AI transparency. 
    3. We look forward to next AI milestones such as the Kigali Summit, the 3rd Global Forum on the Ethics of AI hosted by Thailand and UNESCO, the 2025 World AI Conference and the AI for Good Global Summit 2025 to follow up on our commitments and continue to take concrete actions aligned with a sustainable and inclusive AI.

    Signatory countries: 

    1. Armenia
    2. Australia
    3. Austria
    4. Belgium
    5. Brazil
    6. Bulgaria
    7. Cambodia
    8. Canada
    9. Chile
    10. China
    11. Croatia
    12. Cyprus
    13. Czechia
    14. Denmark
    15. Djibouti
    16. Estonia
    17. Finland
    18. France
    19. Germany
    20. Greece
    21. Hungary
    22. India
    23. Indonesia
    24. Ireland
    25. Italy
    26. Japan
    27. Kazakhstan
    28. Kenya
    29. Latvia
    30. Lithuania
    31. Luxembourg
    32. Malta
    33. Mexico
    34. Monaco
    35. Morocco
    36. New Zealand
    37. Nigeria
    38. Norway
    39. Poland
    40. Portugal
    41. Romania
    42. Rwanda
    43. Senegal
    44. Serbia
    45. Singapore
    46. Slovakia
    47. Slovenia
    48. South Africa
    49. Republic of Korea
    50. Spain
    51. Sweden
    52. Switzerland
    53. Thailand
    54. Netherlands
    55. United Arab Emirates
    56. Ukraine
    57. Uruguay
    58. Vatican
    59. European Union
    60. African Union Commission

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI: Radware Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024 Financial Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Fourth Quarter 2024 Financial Results and Highlights

    • Revenue of $73 million, an increase of 12% yearoveryear
    • Non-GAAP diluted EPS of $0.27 vs. $0.13 in Q4 2023; GAAP diluted EPS of $0.06 vs. $(0.14) in Q4 2023

    Full Year 2024 Financial Results and Highlights

    • Revenue of $275 million, an increase of 5% year-over-year
    • Cloud ARR of $77.3 million, an increase of 19% year-over-year
    • Non-GAAP diluted EPS of $0.87 vs. $0.43 in 2023; GAAP diluted EPS of $0.14 vs. $(0.50) in 2023
    • Cash flow from operations of $71.6 million compared to $(3.5) million last year

    TEL AVIV, Israel, Feb. 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Radware® (NASDAQ: RDWR), a global leader in application security and delivery solutions for multi-cloud environments, today announced its consolidated financial results for the fourth quarter ended December 31, 2024.

    “We are pleased to report a strong finish to 2024, growing revenue 12% year-over-year and more than doubling non-GAAP EPS to $0.27 in the fourth quarter. Our full year results were driven by accelerated cloud ARR growth of 19%, the success of our DefensePro X DDoS protection refresh, and strong performance from our OEM partnerships,” said Roy Zisapel, Radware’s president and CEO. “Looking ahead, we plan to increase investment in and accelerate our cloud security growth by further expanding our market leading AI enabled security capabilities, opening new cloud security service centers and expanding our cloud channels. We are confident in our strategy, excited about the opportunities ahead, and believe in our ability to deliver long-term success.”

    Financial Highlights for the Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024

    Revenue for the fourth quarter and full year of 2024 totaled $73.0 million and $274.9 million, respectively:

    • Revenue in the Americas region was $32.8 million for the fourth quarter of 2024, an increase of 33% from $24.6 million in the fourth quarter of 2023. Revenue in the Americas region for the full year of 2024 was $117.7 million, an increase of 14% from $103.4 million in the full year of 2023.
    • Revenue in the Europe, Middle East, and Africa (“EMEA”) region was $23.3 million for the fourth quarter of 2024, a decrease of 6% from $24.9 million in the fourth quarter of 2023. Revenue in the Europe, Middle East, and Africa (“EMEA”) region for the full year of 2024 was $94.1 million, a decrease of 2% from $96.5 million in the full year of 2023.
    • Revenue in the Asia-Pacific (“APAC”) region was $16.9 million for the fourth quarter of 2024, an increase of 8% from $15.5 million in the fourth quarter of 2023. Revenue in the Asia-Pacific (“APAC”) region for the full year of 2024 was $63.1 million, an increase of 3% from $61.4 million in the full year of 2023.

    GAAP net income for the fourth quarter of 2024 was $2.5 million, or $0.06 per diluted share, compared to GAAP net loss of $5.9 million, or $(0.14) per diluted share, for the fourth quarter of 2023. GAAP net income for the full year of 2024 was $6.0 million, or $0.14 per diluted share, compared to GAAP net loss of $21.6 million, or $(0.50) per diluted share, for the full year of 2023.

    Non-GAAP net income for the fourth quarter of 2024 was $11.9 million, or $0.27 per diluted share, compared to non-GAAP net income of $5.5 million, or $0.13 per diluted share, for the fourth quarter of 2023. Non-GAAP net income for the full year of 2024 was $37.7 million, or $0.87 per diluted share, compared to non-GAAP net income of $18.9 million, or $0.43 per diluted share, for the full year of 2023.

    As of December 31, 2024, the Company had cash, cash equivalents, short-term and long-term bank deposits, and marketable securities of $419.7 million. Cash flow from operations was $12.7 million and $71.6 million in the fourth quarter and full year of 2024, respectively.

    Non-GAAP results are calculated excluding, as applicable, the impact of stock-based compensation expenses, amortization of intangible assets, litigation costs, acquisition costs, restructuring costs, exchange rate differences, net on balance sheet items included in financial income, net, and tax-related adjustments. A reconciliation of each of the Company’s non-GAAP measures to the most directly comparable GAAP measure is included at the end of this press release.

    Conference Call
    Radware management will host a call today, February 12, 2025, at 8:30 a.m. EST to discuss its fourth quarter and full year 2024 results and first quarter 2025 outlook. To participate on the call, please use the following numbers:
    U.S. participants call toll free: 1-877-704-4453
    International participants call: 1-201-389-0920

    A replay will be available for seven days, starting two hours after the end of the call, on telephone number 1-844-512-2921 (US toll-free) or 1-412-317-6671. Access ID 13750817.

    The call will be webcast live on the Company’s website at: http://www.radware.com/IR/. The webcast will remain available for replay during the next 12 months.

    Use of Non-GAAP Financial Information and Key Performance Indicators
    In addition to reporting financial results in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), Radware uses non-GAAP measures of gross profit, research and development expense, selling and marketing expense, general and administrative expense, total operating expenses, operating income, financial income, net, income before taxes on income, taxes on income, net income and diluted earnings per share, which are adjustments from results based on GAAP to exclude, as applicable, stock-based compensation expenses, amortization of intangible assets, litigation costs, acquisition costs, restructuring costs, exchange rate differences, net on balance sheet items included in financial income, net, and taxrelated adjustments. Management believes that exclusion of these charges allows for meaningful comparisons of operating results across past, present, and future periods. Radware’s management believes the non-GAAP financial measures provided in this release are useful to investors for the purpose of understanding and assessing Radware’s ongoing operations. The presentation of these non-GAAP financial measures is not intended to be considered in isolation or as a substitute for results prepared in accordance with GAAP. A reconciliation of each non-GAAP financial measure to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure is included with the financial information contained in this press release. Management uses both GAAP and non-GAAP financial measures in evaluating and operating the business and, as such, has determined that it is important to provide this information to investors.

    Annual recurring revenue (“ARR”) is a key performance indicator defined as the annualized value of booked orders for term-based cloud services, subscription licenses, and maintenance contracts that are in effect at the end of a reporting period. ARR should be viewed independently of revenue and deferred revenue and is not intended to be combined with or to replace either of those items. ARR is not a forecast of future revenue, which can be impacted by contract start and end dates and renewal rates and does not include revenue reported as perpetual license or professional services revenue in our consolidated statement of operations. We consider ARR a key performance indicator of the value of the recurring components of our business.

    Safe Harbor Statement

    This press release includes “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Any statements made herein that are not statements of historical fact, including statements about Radware’s plans, outlook, beliefs, or opinions, are forward-looking statements. Generally, forward-looking statements may be identified by words such as “believes,” “expects,” “anticipates,” “intends,” “estimates,” “plans,” and similar expressions or future or conditional verbs such as “will,” “should,” “would,” “may,” and “could.” Because such statements deal with future events, they are subject to various risks and uncertainties, and actual results, expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements, could differ materially from Radware’s current forecasts and estimates. Factors that could cause or contribute to such differences include, but are not limited to: the impact of global economic conditions, including as a result of the state of war declared in Israel in October 2023 and instability in the Middle East, the war in Ukraine, and the tensions between China and Taiwan; our dependence on independent distributors to sell our products; our ability to manage our anticipated growth effectively; a shortage of components or manufacturing capacity could cause a delay in our ability to fulfill orders or increase our manufacturing costs; our business may be affected by sanctions, export controls, and similar measures, targeting Russia and other countries and territories, as well as other responses to Russia’s military conflict in Ukraine, including indefinite suspension of operations in Russia and dealings with Russian entities by many multi-national businesses across a variety of industries; the ability of vendors to provide our hardware platforms and components for the manufacture of our products; our ability to attract, train, and retain highly qualified personnel; intense competition in the market for cyber security and application delivery solutions and in our industry in general, and changes in the competitive landscape; our ability to develop new solutions and enhance existing solutions; the impact to our reputation and business in the event of real or perceived shortcomings, defects, or vulnerabilities in our solutions, if our end-users experience security breaches, if our information technology systems and data, or those of our service providers and other contractors, are compromised by cyber-attackers or other malicious actors, or by a critical system failure; outages, interruptions, or delays in hosting services; the risks associated with our global operations, such as difficulties and costs of staffing and managing foreign operations, compliance costs arising from host country laws or regulations, partial or total expropriation, export duties and quotas, local tax exposure, economic or political instability, including as a result of insurrection, war, natural disasters, and major environmental, climate, or public health concerns, such as the COVID-19 pandemic; our net losses in the past two years and possibility we may incur losses in the future; a slowdown in the growth of the cyber security and application delivery solutions market or in the development of the market for our cloud-based solutions; long sales cycles for our solutions; risks and uncertainties relating to acquisitions or other investments; risks associated with doing business in countries with a history of corruption or with foreign governments; changes in foreign currency exchange rates; risks associated with undetected defects or errors in our products; our ability to protect our proprietary technology; intellectual property infringement claims made by fourth parties; laws, regulations, and industry standards affecting our business; compliance with open source and fourth-party licenses; and other factors and risks over which we may have little or no control. This list is intended to identify only certain of the principal factors that could cause actual results to differ. For a more detailed description of the risks and uncertainties affecting Radware, refer to Radware’s Annual Report on Form 20-F, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the other risk factors discussed from time to time by Radware in reports filed with, or furnished to, the SEC. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date on which they are made and, except as required by applicable law, Radware undertakes no commitment to revise or update any forward-looking statement in order to reflect events or circumstances after the date any such statement is made. Radware’s public filings are available from the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov or may be obtained on Radware’s website at www.radware.com.

    About Radware
    Radware® (NASDAQ: RDWR) is a global leader in application security and delivery solutions for multi-cloud environments. The company’s cloud application, infrastructure, and API security solutions use AI-driven algorithms for precise, hands-free, real-time protection from the most sophisticated web, application, and DDoS attacks, API abuse, and bad bots. Enterprises and carriers worldwide rely on Radware’s solutions to address evolving cybersecurity challenges and protect their brands and business operations while reducing costs. For more information, please visit the Radware website.

    Radware encourages you to join our community and follow us on: Facebook, LinkedIn, Radware Blog, X, YouTube, and Radware Mobile for iOS.

    ©2025 Radware Ltd. All rights reserved. Any Radware products and solutions mentioned in this press release are protected by trademarks, patents, and pending patent applications of Radware in the U.S. and other countries. For more details, please see: https://www.radware.com/LegalNotice/. All other trademarks and names are property of their respective owners.

    Radware believes the information in this document is accurate in all material respects as of its publication date. However, the information is provided without any express, statutory, or implied warranties and is subject to change without notice.

    The contents of any website or hyperlinks mentioned in this press release are for informational purposes and the contents thereof are not part of this press release.

    CONTACTS
    Investor Relations:
    Yisca Erez, +972-72-3917211, ir@radware.com

    Media Contact:
    Gerri Dyrek, gerri.dyrek@radware.com

    Radware Ltd.  
    Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets  
    (U.S. Dollars in thousands)  
             
      December 31,   December 31,  
      2024    2023   
      (Unaudited)   (Unaudited)  
    Assets        
             
    Current assets        
    Cash and cash equivalents 98,714   70,538  
    Marketable securities 72,994   86,372  
    Short-term bank deposits 104,073   173,678  
    Trade receivables, net 16,823   20,267  
    Other receivables and prepaid expenses 14,242   9,529  
    Inventories 14,030   15,544  
      320,876   375,928  
             
    Long-term investments        
    Marketable securities 29,523   33,131  
    Long-term bank deposits 114,354    
    Other assets 2,171   2,166  
      146,048   35,297  
             
             
    Property and equipment, net 15,632   18,221  
    Intangible assets, net 11,750   15,718  
    Other long-term assets 37,906   37,967  
    Operating lease right-of-use assets 18,456   20,777  
    Goodwill 68,008   68,008  
    Total assets 618,676   571,916  
             
    Liabilities and equity        
             
    Current liabilities        
    Trade payables 5,581   4,298  
    Deferred revenues 106,303   105,012  
    Operating lease liabilities 4,750   4,684  
    Other payables and accrued expenses 51,836   41,021  
      168,470   155,015  
             
    Long-term liabilities        
    Deferred revenues 64,708   60,499  
    Operating lease liabilities 13,519   16,020  
    Other long-term liabilities 14,904   17,108  
      93,131   93,627  
             
    Equity        
    Radware Ltd. equity        
    Share capital 754   742  
    Additional paid-in capital 555,154   529,209  
    Accumulated other comprehensive income 1,103   77  
    Treasury stock, at cost (366,588)   (365,749)  
    Retained earnings 125,850   119,812  
    Total Radware Ltd. shareholder’s equity 316,273   284,091  
             
    Non–controlling interest 40,802   39,183  
             
    Total equity 357,075   323,274  
             
    Total liabilities and equity 618,676   571,916  
             
    Radware Ltd.
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Income (Loss)
    (U.S Dollars in thousands, except share and per share data)
                     
        For the three months ended   For the twelve months ended
        December 31,   December 31,
        2024   2023   2024   2023
        (Unaudited)   (Unaudited)   (Unaudited)   (Unaudited)
                     
    Revenues   73,031   65,032     274,880     261,292  
    Cost of revenues   13,992   12,824     53,252     51,710  
    Gross profit   59,039   52,208     221,628     209,582  
                     
    Operating expenses, net:                
    Research and development, net   18,472   19,712     74,723     82,617  
    Selling and marketing   32,505   31,869     122,450     126,237  
    General and administrative   7,071   8,030     28,342     32,408  
    Total operating expenses, net   58,048   59,611     225,515     241,262  
                     
    Operating income (loss)   991   (7,403)     (3,887)     (31,680)  
    Financial income, net   3,570   3,239     16,552     13,927  
    Income (loss) before taxes on income   4,561   (4,164)     12,665     (17,753)  
    Taxes on income   2,109   1,686     6,627     3,837  
    Net income (loss)   2,452   (5,850)     6,038     (21,590)  
                     
       Basic net income (loss) per share attributed to Radware Ltd.’s shareholders   0.06   (0.14)     0.14     (0.50)  
                     
       Weighted average number of shares used to compute basic net income (loss) per share   42,238,469   41,806,042     41,982,851     42,871,770  
                     
       Diluted net income (loss) per share attributed to Radware Ltd.’s shareholders   0.06   (0.14)     0.14     (0.50)  
                     
       Weighted average number of shares used to compute diluted net income (loss) per share   43,725,803   41,806,042     43,362,906     42,871,770  
                           
      Radware Ltd.
      Reconciliation of GAAP to Non-GAAP Financial Information
      (U.S Dollars in thousands, except share and per share data)
                       
        For the three months ended   For the twelve months ended  
        December 31,   December 31,  
        2024   2023   2024   2023  
        (Unaudited)   (Unaudited)   (Unaudited)   (Unaudited)  
    GAAP gross profit 59,039   52,208   221,628   209,582  
      Share-based compensation 126   112   366   515  
      Amortization of intangible assets 992   992   3,968   3,968  
    Non-GAAP gross profit 60,157   53,312   225,962   214,065  
                       
    GAAP research and development, net 18,472   19,712   74,723   82,617  
      Share-based compensation 1,434   2,305   6,113   8,505  
    Non-GAAP Research and development, net 17,038   17,407   68,610   74,112  
                       
    GAAP selling and marketing 32,505   31,869   122,450   126,237  
      Share-based compensation 3,173   3,489   10,881   12,554  
      Restructuring costs   578     1,851  
    Non-GAAP selling and marketing 29,332   27,802   111,569   111,832  
                       
    GAAP general and administrative 7,071   8,030   28,342   32,408  
      Share-based compensation 2,187   2,965   8,667   12,448  
      Acquisition costs 130   359   701   1,128  
    Non-GAAP general and administrative 4,754   4,706   18,974   18,832  
                       
    GAAP total operating expenses, net 58,048   59,611   225,515   241,262  
      Share-based compensation 6,794   8,759   25,661   33,507  
      Acquisition costs 130   359   701   1,128  
      Restructuring costs   578     1,851  
    Non-GAAP total operating expenses, net 51,124   49,915   199,153   204,776  
                       
    GAAP operating income (loss) 991   (7,403)   (3,887)   (31,680)  
      Share-based compensation 6,920   8,871   26,027   34,022  
      Amortization of intangible assets 992   992   3,968   3,968  
      Acquisition costs 130   359   701   1,128  
      Restructuring costs   578     1,851  
    Non-GAAP operating income 9,033   3,397   26,809   9,289  
                       
    GAAP financial income, net 3,570   3,239   16,552   13,927  
      Exchange rate differences, net on balance sheet items included in financial income, net 1,463   563   1,232   (207)  
    Non-GAAP financial income, net 5,033   3,802   17,784   13,720  
                       
    GAAP income (loss) before taxes on income 4,561   (4,164)   12,665   (17,753)  
      Share-based compensation 6,920   8,871   26,027   34,022  
      Amortization of intangible assets 992   992   3,968   3,968  
      Acquisition costs 130   359   701   1,128  
      Restructuring costs   578     1,851  
      Exchange rate differences, net on balance sheet items included in financial income, net 1,463   563   1,232   (207)  
    Non-GAAP income before taxes on income 14,066   7,199   44,593   23,009  
                       
    GAAP taxes on income 2,109   1,686   6,627   3,837  
      Tax related adjustments 61   61   246   246  
    Non-GAAP taxes on income 2,170   1,747   6,873   4,083  
                       
    GAAP net income (loss) 2,452   (5,850)   6,038   (21,590)  
      Share-based compensation 6,920   8,871   26,027   34,022  
      Amortization of intangible assets 992   992   3,968   3,968  
      Acquisition costs 130   359   701   1,128  
      Restructuring costs   578     1,851  
      Exchange rate differences, net on balance sheet items included in financial income, net 1,463   563   1,232   (207)  
      Tax related adjustments (61)   (61)   (246)   (246)  
    Non-GAAP net income 11,896   5,452   37,720   18,926  
                       
    GAAP diluted net income (loss) per share 0.06   (0.14)   0.14   (0.50)  
      Share-based compensation 0.16   0.21   0.60   0.78  
      Amortization of intangible assets 0.02   0.02   0.09   0.09  
      Acquisition costs 0.00   0.01   0.02   0.03  
      Restructuring costs 0.00   0.02   0.00   0.04  
      Exchange rate differences, net on balance sheet items included in financial income, net 0.03   0.01   0.03   0.00  
      Tax related adjustments (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
    Non-GAAP diluted net earnings per share 0.27   0.13   0.87   0.43  
                       
                       
    Weighted average number of shares used to compute non-GAAP diluted net earnings per share 43,725,803   42,462,751   43,362,906   43,655,555  
    Radware Ltd.
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Cash Flow
    (U.S. Dollars in thousands)
                     
        For the three months ended   For the twelve months ended
        December 31,   December 31,
        2024   2023   2024   2023
        (Unaudited)   (Unaudited)   (Unaudited)   (Unaudited)
    Cash flow from operating activities:                
                     
    Net income (loss)   2,452   (5,850)   6,038   (21,590)
    Adjustments to reconcile net income (loss) to net cash provided by operating activities:                
    Depreciation and amortization   2,918   3,028   11,836   12,244
    Share-based compensation   6,920   8,871   26,027   34,022
    Amortization of premium, accretion of discounts and accrued interest on marketable securities, net   (190)   638   (417)   1,754
    Loss (income) related to securities, net     (1)     243
    Increase (decrease) in accrued interest on bank deposits   (1,279)   549   3,366   (3,265)
    Increase (decrease) in accrued severance pay, net   (151)   207   (45)   (299)
    Decrease (increase) in trade receivables, net   3,140   (7,895)   3,444   (2,515)
    Decrease (increase) in other receivables and prepaid expenses and other long-term assets   (1,252)   2,236   (97)   (305)
    Decrease (increase) in inventories   (487)   (2,550)   1,514   (4,116)
    Increase (decrease) in trade payables   (970)   (1,771)   1,283   (2,166)
    Increase (decrease) in deferred revenues   (4,829)   (3,856)   5,500   (14,951)
    Increase (decrease) in other payables and accrued expenses   6,222   9,383   13,274   (1,415)
    Operating lease liabilities, net   255   (336)   (114)   (1,141)
    Net cash provided by (used in) operating activities   12,749   2,653   71,609   (3,500)
                     
    Cash flows from investing activities:                
                     
    Purchase of property and equipment   (1,059)   (936)   (5,279)   (5,429)
    Proceeds from other long-term assets, net   41   (11)   81   66
    Proceeds from (investment in) bank deposits, net   (46,682)   29,686   (48,115)   81,031
    Investment in, redemption of and purchase of marketable securities ,net   23,249   16,764   18,793   17,111
    Investment in other deposits   (5,000)     (5,000)  
    Net cash provided by (used in) investing activities   (29,451)   45,503   (39,520)   92,779
                     
    Cash flows from financing activities:                
                     
    Proceeds from exercise of share options     63   3   371
    Repurchase of shares     (10,103)   (839)   (63,234)
    Payment of contingent consideration related to acquisition       (3,077)   (2,063)
    Net cash used in financing activities     (10,040)   (3,913)   (64,926)
                     
    Increase (decrease) in cash and cash equivalents   (16,702)   38,116   28,176   24,353
    Cash and cash equivalents at the beginning of the period   115,416   32,422   70,538   46,185
    Cash and cash equivalents at the end of the period   98,714   70,538   98,714   70,538
                     
      Radware Ltd.
      RECONCILIATION OF GAAP NET INCOME (LOSS) TO EBITDA AND ADJUSTED EBITDA (NON-GAAP)
      (U.S Dollars in thousands)
                     
        For the three months ended   For the twelve months ended
        December 31,   December 31,
        2024   2023   2024   2023
        (Unaudited)   (Unaudited)   (Unaudited)   (Unaudited)
    GAAP net income (loss) 2,452   (5,850)   6,038   (21,590)
      Exclude: Financial income, net (3,570)   (3,239)   (16,552)   (13,927)
      Exclude: Depreciation and amortization expense 2,918   3,028   11,836   12,244
      Exclude: Taxes on income 2,109   1,686   6,627   3,837
    EBITDA 3,909   (4,375)   7,949   (19,436)
                     
      Share-based compensation 6,920   8,871   26,027   34,022
      Restructuring costs   578     1,851
      Acquisition costs 130   359   701   1,128
    Adjusted EBITDA 10,959   5,433   34,677   17,565
                     
                     
        For the three months ended   For the twelve months ended
        December 31,   December 31,
        2024   2023   2024   2023
      Amortization of intangible assets 992   992   3,968   3,968
      Depreciation 1,926   2,036   7,868   8,276
        2,918   3,028   11,836   12,244
                     

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Support for reconstruction: Federal Council adopts 2025–28 country programme for Ukraine

    Source: Switzerland – Federal Council in English

    The 2025–28 country programme marks the start of a twelve-year federal support process for reconstruction, reform and sustainable development in Ukraine. At its meeting on 12 February, the Federal Council defined the priorities of the country programme, namely protection of the civilian population, peace, economic recovery and strengthening institutions. CHF 1.5 billion from the international cooperation budget has been earmarked up to 2028. Ambassador Jacques Gerber, the Federal Council’s delegate for Ukraine, is responsible for implementing the country programme.

    MIL OSI Europe News