Category: Ukraine

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: PM call with Taoiseach Martin of Ireland: 27 January 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    The Prime Minister spoke to the Taoiseach Micheál Martin this morning.

    The Prime Minister spoke to the Taoiseach Micheál Martin this morning to congratulate him on his election.

    The leaders agreed that the UK – Ireland relationship was going from strength to strength, and it was vital to continue that in such a volatile geopolitical context.

    Discussing devastating Storm Éowyn at the weekend, the leaders paid tribute to the work of first responders and engineers to restore electricity to thousands of homes. The Prime Minister said that he had also spoken to the First Minister and Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland and that the UK stood by to offer further support, as required.

    The Prime Minister also updated on his EU reset, and the leaders underscored the importance of a close and constructive relationship with the EU to boost prosperity and security.

    Looking ahead to the upcoming UK-Ireland summit, both agreed that the meeting would offer a chance to deepen collaboration across all areas of the bilateral relationship, including business, innovation, and energy.

    Turning to Ukraine, the Prime Minister reflected on his visit earlier this month and reiterated his view that it was vital to put Ukraine in the strongest possible position.

    The leaders also discussed Holocaust Memorial Day today. The Prime Minister said he had been deeply moved by his visit to Auschwitz earlier this month, and the leaders agreed the 80th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz-Birkenau was a poignant reminder on the need to defeat antisemitism and hatred. 

    They looked forward to meeting soon.

    Updates to this page

    Published 27 January 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-Evening Report: Caitlin Johnstone: Where does the aggression really begin?

    Report by Dr David Robie – Café Pacific.

    COMMENTARY: By Caitlin Johnstone

    New York prosecutors have charged Luigi Mangione with “murder as an act of terrorism” in his alleged shooting of health insurance CEO Brian Thompson earlier this month.

    This news comes out at the same time as a Haaretz report titled “‘No Civilians. Everyone’s a Terrorist’: IDF Soldiers Expose Arbitrary Killings and Rampant Lawlessness in Gaza’s Netzarim Corridor.

    The report contains testimony from Israeli troops that civilians are being murdered in Gaza and are then being retroactively designated as terrorists to justify their execution.

    “We’re killing civilians there who are then counted as terrorists,” a recently discharged officer told Haaretz.

    These two stories together say so much about the way the label “terrorist” is used under the US-centralised power umbrella.

    The guy who shot the health insurance CEO is a terrorist, but the people systematically slaughtering civilians in Gaza are not terrorists. The people fighting against those who are slaughtering the civilians are terrorists, and noncombatants are being categorized as belonging to this terrorist organisation in order to justify killing them. The al-Qaeda affiliates in Syria were terrorists, but now they’re a US puppet regime so soon they won’t be terrorists  —  but they need to be designated terrorists for a little while longer because the claim that Syria is crawling with terrorists is Israel’s justification for its recent land grabs there. The Uyghur militant group ETIM used to be a terrorist group, but now they’re not a terrorist group because they can be used to help carve up Syria and maybe fight China later on. The IRGC is a military wing of a sovereign nation, but it counts as a terrorist group because of vibes or something.

    Is that clear enough?

    Really the label “terrorist” is nothing more than a tool of imperial narrative control which gets moved around based on whether or not someone’s use of violence is deemed legitimate by the managers of the empire. Because Mangione’s alleged crime has ignited a public interest in class warfare, the label “terrorism” is being used to frame it as an especially heinous act of evil against an innocent member of the public.

    The empire’s favourite trick is to begin the historical record at the moment its enemies retaliate against its abuses. Oh no, a health insurance CEO was victimised by an evil act of terrorism. Oh no, Israel was just innocently minding its own business when it was viciously attacked by Hamas. Oh no, Iran attacked Israel completely out of the blue and now Israel must retaliate. Oh no, Russia just launched an entirely unprovoked war on Ukraine.

    Everything that led up to the unauthorised act of violence is erased from the record, because all of the violence, provocation and abuse which gave rise to the unauthorised act of violence were authorized by the empire. Authorised aggression doesn’t count as aggression.

    Whoever controls the narrative controls the world. If you control the narrative you can control not only when the historical record of violence begins but what kinds of violence qualify as violence. Killing people by depriving them of healthcare because denying healthcare services is how your company increases its profit margins? That’s not violence. Inflicting tyranny and abuse upon a deliberately marginalised ethnic group in an apartheid state? That’s not violence. Violence is when you respond to those forceful aggressions with forceful aggressions of your own.

    If we are to become a healthy society, we’re going to have to stop allowing some forms of violence, aggression and abuse to be redacted from the official records while others are listed and condemned. Those who care about truth and justice account for all forms of violence, aggression and abuse, not only those which inconvenience the rich and powerful.

    It is an act of aggression to do things which sicken and impoverish others in order to advance your own wealth.

    It is an act of aggression to pollute the biosphere we all depend on for survival in order to increase your profit margins.

    It is an act of aggression to use your wealth to manipulate your nation’s politics in ways which exacerbate inequality and injustice.

    It is an act of aggression to maintain an apartheid state which cannot exist without nonstop violence.

    It is an act of aggression to surround the earth with military bases and encircle nations which disobey your dictates.

    It is an act of aggression to try to rule the world using military violence, proxy conflicts, staged coups, threats, starvation sanctions, and financial and economic coercion.

    These are all acts of aggression, and any retaliation against them will never be an unprovoked attack. As we move into the future while these abuses exacerbate, it’s going to become very important to maintain an acute awareness of this.

    Caitlin Johnstone is an Australian independent journalist and poet. Her articles include The UN Torture Report On Assange Is An Indictment Of Our Entire Society. She publishes a website and Caitlin’s Newsletter. This article is republished with permission.

    This article was first published on Café Pacific.

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: 10,000 UK Armed Forces personnel deployed overseas to keep us safe this Christmas

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments 3

    The Defence Secretary visited British Army soldiers deployed in Estonia this Christmas to thank them for their service

    The Defence Secretary visited UK Armed Forces personnel deployed to Estonia to thank them for their vital service at Christmas.

    Some 10,000 sailors, marines, soldiers, and aviators will spend Christmas Day deployed overseas, sacrificing celebrations with their families and friends to keep the UK safe.

    The work of the UK Armed Forces continues over Christmas on 60 operations in 44 countries this, while hundreds more personnel are working to protect the UK’s skies, shores, and seas at home.

    There are 900 British personnel deployed in Estonia, ready to defend NATO’s eastern flank and working alongside French and Estonian forces to deter aggression and uphold stability in eastern Europe.

    The visit to Estonia by the Defence Secretary also highlighted the UK’s unwavering dedication to NATO and commitment to defending the alliance.

    Defence Secretary, John Healey MP, said: 

    In a world in which global insecurities are rising, we depend more and more on those who are willing to serve. And those who are willing to serve are supported by the families that stand with them and behind them.

    This Christmas, I pay special tribute to those 10,000 military personnel who are deployed overseas, many of them not seeing family and loved ones at this important time.

    It was an honour to spend time with some of those troops in Estonia, to serve them Christmas lunch and thank them for their commitment and professionalism. This week they will sacrifice what most of us take for granted, that special time with our families, to ensure that our nation is safe. 

    Our British deployment in Estonia demonstrates our unshakeable commitment to NATO and the security of Europe, keeping us secure at home and strong abroad. Our presence here is a powerful message to our allies and adversaries: the UK stands ready to defend its allies and uphold our shared values, all year round.

    The visit to Estonia provided an opportunity for the Defence Secretary to discuss Project ASGARD, which will help UK Armed Forces in the country utilise new and emerging tech to become more lethal and better able to defeat the enemy.

    It will harness developing technologies including artificial intelligence (AI), drones, and advanced sensors to help more quickly discover and process information and strike enemies on the battlefield, with priority work continuing on the programme in 2025.

    The UK’s relationship with Estonia is a cornerstone of NATO’s defence. British personnel stationed in Estonia form a vital part of the enhanced Forward Presence, ensuring a permanent presence along the alliance’s eastern flank.

    The visit comes as the UK has recently signed a defence roadmap with Estonia. The agreement will see the UK’s 4th Brigade Combat Team held at high readiness from 2025, ready to deploy at short notice to Estonia in times of crisis.

    It will also include the first overseas deployment of the UK’s cutting-edge Challenger 3 tanks and Boxer armoured vehicles, reinforcing NATO’s defensive capabilities along its eastern border.

    The British deployment at Tapa remains the UK’s largest permanent overseas deployment, and both countries are working together closer than ever, with the UK leading on the new DIAMOND initiative, which will improve NATO’s integrated air and missile defence by ensuring that the different air defence systems across the Alliance operate better and more jointly across Europe.

    Paying tribute to Armed Forces personnel on duty at Christmas, the Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin said:

    Thank you to all our Armed Forces personnel for your extraordinary hard work this year.

    From delivering the nuclear deterrent and policing NATO skies, to training Ukrainian recruits and protecting merchant shipping in the Red Sea, the Armed Forces have stepped up to deliver all that the nation asks of us.

    I am immensely grateful to those deployed away from home over the festive season and wish you all a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year.

    In the UK, Royal Air Force aviators at RAF Boulmer and NATS Swanwick are ready to scramble Typhoon aircraft from RAF Coningsby and RAF Lossiemouth to monitor any hostile aircraft which approach UK airspace.

    Behind the scenes and out of sight at the MOD’s digital HQ in Corsham, military cyber experts will remain vigilant this festive season, defending the UK against constant cyber threats every minute of every day.

    These dedicated professionals ensure the security of vital digital networks, guaranteeing that the systems that connect our people, places, and equipment run smoothly and securely.

    Royal Navy ships will also continue their work protecting the UK’s seas and coastline.

    Somewhere, deep in the ocean, a Royal Navy nuclear attack submarine continues to provide the nation’s nuclear deterrent in a patrol that has continued 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, for 55 years.

    And the Household Division of the British Army will continue to guard royal palaces in the nation’s capital throughout the Christmas period.

    In an address to the soldiers deployed at Tapa Army Base in Estonia, the Defence Secretary said:

    I wanted to say, above all, thank you. Thank you on behalf of all those back home who will never have the chance to say this to you for themselves. Thank you for your commitment to keeping our country safe.

    This is a really important deployment for us. What you’re doing here really matters. It matters for the security of Europe, and it matters to us all back home in Britain.

    You are making good on Britain’s unshakable commitment to NATO and to a safe and peaceful Europe. And that’s why we have this Operation CABRIT, the biggest commitment of British troops in another country.

    Here on the front line, we must also be on the cutting edge of new technologies and new combat techniques we must learn from Ukraine.

    We ask a lot of you all in the Armed Forces, not least the separation from your families and your friends and your loved ones. And at Christmas, that sense of separation can be especially strong.

    So thank you for your service. Thank you for your willingness to sacrifice what almost all of the rest of us take for granted. It’s an honour to be with you.

    Updates to this page

    Published 22 December 2024

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI China: Hungary’s industrial policy, future lie in electromobility: Orban

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban on Saturday underlined the country’s commitment to electromobility as a cornerstone of its industrial policy.

    At a year-end international press conference, Orban said Hungary’s industrial policy and future lie in electromobility. “For us, the defining issue of the next decade will be electromobility, and it’s not just about mobility but about electro-specifically,” he added.

    Orban said that from Hungary’s perspective, this direction is strategic and will remain unchanged.

    Noting that large battery factories will go online, Orban also mentioned the BYD plant in the southern Hungarian city of Szeged, which will become the first Chinese electric car factory in Europe to start operation.

    These are “pivotal developments for Hungary’s industrial future,” according to Orban.

    On the electric vehicle (EV) dispute between the European Union (EU) and China, Orban said that “it is a consequence of bad European policy, particularly affecting Germany.” Hungary is aligned with Germany on this matter, he noted.

    Orban qualified Hungary’s EU Council presidency as “successful,” which tackled major issues such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict and European competitiveness.

    The Hungarian prime minister also touched on EU-U.S. relations and the potential impact of Donald Trump’s presidency on global trade and Western policies. He urged the EU to adapt to a changing reality, including shifts in migration, family values, and economic policies. 

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Why EU cooperation is more important than ever

    Source: Government of Sweden

    Being an EU member has made Sweden stronger and wealthier. Through EU cooperation, we are better equipped today to meet the challenges and problems that our societies face. Continued support to Ukraine, criminality, competitiveness and the climate transition, sum up the Government’s priorities in its continued work in the EU.

    1. Continued support to Ukraine

    Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine will soon be entering its fourth year. Supporting Ukraine is the most important task of our generation. Russia’s actions are a threat to the security of Europe and the rules-based international order. The Russian regime is also attempting to undermine democracy in other European countries. This autumn, for instance, we saw, among other things, how Russia tried to affect the election outcome in Moldavia. It is clear that Europe needs to take greater responsibility for its own security. Individually and collectively.

    In Sweden, the Government is making record investments in civil and military defence. We have already reached the NATO target of spending at least two percent of GDP on defence. In the EU, we are pushing to systematically increase pressure on Russia, such as by imposing more and tougher sanctions, including against the Russian ‘shadow fleet’ and liquefied natural gas. We are also encouraging the Commission to present proposals on how to limit Russia’s influence within every political sphere, such as by imposing import tariffs on Russian goods. The Government is prepared to go further and use a larger amount of frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine. 

    Ukraine’s path to EU membership is crucial. In the coming months, the Government would like the EU to open accession negotiations with both Ukraine and Moldova, who have taken impressive steps towards reform. Despite Russia’s war and pressure.   

    2. Criminality

    Criminality is a growing problem throughout Europe. Some 70 per cent of gangs in the EU operate in at least three countries. In Sweden we are making life harder for criminals. The same kind of offensive is needed in the EU. The Government is advocating close cooperation to help confiscate criminals’ assets and status items, and to stop the transfer of crime proceeds to third countries. During Sweden’s Presidency of the EU, we started the work to give national police authorities better access to digital information. This work must continue. Europol, the EU’s cooperation body for law enforcement, needs to have a more prominent role.

    Combatting criminality includes having control over migration. 50 per cent of gang members are not EU citizens. The Government wants the Commission to present concrete proposals on how irregular migration can be curbed and also how to make the return of those whose asylum applications have been rejected more efficient, including through the use of ‘return hubs’.

    3. Competitiveness

    Many of Sweden’s and Europe’s priorities require a growing economy. Yet the EU is lagging behind globally. 90 per cent of the world’s economic growth is expected to happen outside the EU. We are in danger of falling behind in the global techrace. The EU needs a deeper and wider internal market, greater investment in research, a continued strong free trade agenda, increased access to capital, and an aggressive simplification agenda to address red tape.

    4. Climate

    Climate change is a global challenge. Fit for 55, the world’s most ambitious climate package was adopted during Sweden’s EU Presidency. Now the work continues. When the EU decides on a new climate goal for 2040, the Government will support the Commission’s proposal that emissions should be reduced by 90 per cent by then, compared to 1990. This requires that the EU’s climate transition is implemented in a realistic and sustainable way, hand in hand with the work on strengthening EU competitiveness. The Government is working to ensure that EU’s regulatory framework promotes active forestry and the use of renewable forest raw materials, a fossil-free and technology-neutral energy policy that includes nuclear power and a cost-effective climate policy that is broadly accepted in society.

    Central to the EU’s climate transition is that all member states achieve climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest. The Government will not accept that countries who reach the zero-emissions climate goal are forced to compensate for those countries that do not. 

    The Government is protecting Swedish interests. At home and in the EU, we are driving a determined reform agenda. We are implementing purposeful initiatives to get more Swedes into EU institutions, so that important perspectives are taken into account. We are cooperating with others to solve joint problems. We are taking responsibility during troubled times. 

    The war in Ukraine, criminality, competitiveness and the climate. These are crucial issues that show why EU cooperation, 30 years in, is more important than ever. 

    Jessica Rosencrantz, Minister of EU Affairs 

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Video: Ukraine: Winter of hardship and misery for civilians – Security Council Briefing | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Briefing by Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, on the Threats to international peace and security – Security Council, 9827th meeting.

    ———————————-

    Izumi Nakamitsu, the UN’s High Representative for Disarmament Affairs told the Security Council, “42 percent of casualties in Ukraine in November resulted from the use of long-range weapons launched by the Russian Federation, a significant increase from previous months.”

    She also provided the Security Council an overview of the human impact of the war in Ukraine, saying, “Between 24 February 2022 and 30 November 2024, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) recorded over 12,340 civilians killed and more than 27,836 civilians injured in Ukraine.”

    Nakamitsu also highlighted a notable surge in aerial bomb casualties. “According to the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine verified data, aerial bombs killed 341 civilians and injured 1,803 from 1 January through 30 November 2024,” she said. This marked “a threefold increase in fatalities and a sixfold increase in injuries from aerial bombs compared to 2023.”

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0n_lZXko4PE

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Australia: Reports of an Australian citizen detained by Russia

    Source: Australian Government – Minister of Foreign Affairs

    The Australian Government is making representations to the Russian Government.

    We urge the Russian Government to fully adhere to its obligations under international humanitarian law, including with respect to prisoners of war.

    Our immediate priority is understanding where Mr Jenkins is and confirming his wellbeing.

    We are providing consular support to Mr Jenkins’ family.

    I reiterate the Government’s clear advice to all Australians – do not travel to Ukraine.

    MIL OSI News

  • MIL-OSI China: Experts analyze China’s economic development potential

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Attendees take part in the Caijing Annual Dialogue 2024 in Beijing, Dec. 20, 2024. [Photo by Yang Chuanli/China.org.cn]

    The Caijing Annual Dialogue 2024, organized by Caijing Magazine, was held in Beijing on Dec. 20. Themed “The Power of Navigating Changes,” the event focused on topics such as expanding domestic demand and boosting China’s capital markets. 

    In the current international context, the Russia-Ukraine conflict remains unresolved, and geopolitical tensions in the Middle East continue to escalate. Notably, the re-election of Donald Trump has introduced new uncertainties to the global political and economic landscape, as well as to China-U.S. relations.

    Numerous experts gathered at the dialogue to analyze the opportunities present in the current economic climate. 

    Yao Jingyuan, a researcher at the Counsellors’ Office of the State Council, emphasized the critical importance of expanding domestic demand and leveraging China’s vast domestic market for economic development. He elaborated, “China possesses the world’s largest domestic demand market, which lays a solid foundation for sustained economic growth and strong support in addressing external challenges.”

    Zhang Bin, deputy director of the Institute of World Economics and Politics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, highlighted the importance of comprehensively expanding domestic demand. He noted the enormous potential for investments aimed at improving people’s livelihoods and enhancing their quality of life.

    The current overcapacity in manufacturing reflects a need for quality improvement rather than just surplus quantity, Zhang said, and therefore public investment should be focused more toward public service projects. For instance, there are substantial gaps in infrastructure related to culture, entertainment, health care services and sports facilities, which are critical to people’s quality of life, he said. Meanwhile, although the financial sector holds a significant share of GDP, it still falls short in supporting small- and medium-sized enterprises and high-risk services, which are areas that require improvements in service supply.

    Professor Li Daokui, dean of the Academic Center for Chinese Economic Practice and Thinking at Tsinghua University, made an optimistic forecast of an “economic temperature rise” for China’s economy in 2025. He pointed out three main aspects where China’s economy holds immense potential. First, the country’s demographic advantage brings enormous market potential. Second, the national savings rate at 40% is among the highest globally, providing a stable source of funding for the investments needed for economic growth, making it one of the key drivers of sustained economic development. Third, the research and development capabilities in applied research are robust. 

    Although some countries have advantages in original achievements, Li explained that China, with its substantial number of engineering and technical graduates — 4.4 million annually, more than the total of similar talent in other countries — demonstrates strong competitiveness in the application and transformation of technological innovations, driving high-quality economic development.

    Li also emphasized that China’s economic policy will clearly focus on restoring growth rates and initiating a new growth cycle in 2025. He said, “We scholars should take on the responsibility to collaboratively strive in 2025 to promote stronger, faster and more effective policy adjustments, enabling the economic climate to swiftly shift from cold to warm, with expectations for continuous economic growth in 2026 and 2027.”

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EU summit discusses EU’s role in the world

    Source: European Union 2

    EU leaders gathered in Brussels to talk over the EU’s role in the world. Their focus was on Ukraine and on the situation in the Middle East, following the fall of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime. They also exchanged on the situation in Moldova and Georgia, as well as on the latest progress on enlargement.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Security: 2024: Eurojust year in review

    Source: Eurojust

    Here are a few highlights:

    Deepening Cooperation with Latin America

    Organised crime groups are increasingly operating on a global scale, which means efforts for cooperation with partner countries outside of the EU is a priority. With 68% of the most threatening criminal networks operate globally, and 36% of these networks engaged in drug trafficking, forging closer partnerships with countries who are frequent origin or transit points is critical.

    Over the course of the year, new Working Arrangements were signed between Eurojust and the Prosecution Services of Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama, and Peru. These arrangements strengthen cooperation in crime areas that affect both the EU and Latin American countries, such as drug and arms trafficking, money laundering and cybercrime.

    Launch of the European Judicial Organised Crime Network

    In September, we took another important step in the fight against organised crime with the launch of the European Judicial Organised Crime Network (EJOCN). The Network, which is hosted at Eurojust, aims to go beyond investigation-based collaboration to combat organised crime strategically. Specialised prosecutors from all EU Member States are brought together to focus on the horizontal issues that arise in the investigation and prosecution of high-risk criminal groups. This will allow them to tackle recurring legal challenges and identify new, practical opportunities for closer cooperation.

    The members benefit from Eurojust’s unique operational expertise in setting up joint investigation teams and using other judicial cooperation tools in cross-border criminal investigations. The first priority focus of the EJOCN is combatting drug-related organised crime connected to European ports and other logistic hubs.

    Supporting Accountability Efforts in Ukraine

    Documenting and prosecuting core international crimes is a long-term commitment and Eurojust remains resolute in our accountability efforts. Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, we have been at the forefront of supporting accountability for Russian crimes. In July, we marked one year since the launch of the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine. The ICPA’s independent prosecutors and investigators from different countries have been working together regularly at Eurojust, benefitting from the Agency’s dedicated team of legal experts and tailor-made technical, logistical and financial support. This has enabled them to exchange information and evidence quickly and efficiently, and coordinate a common investigative and prosecutorial strategy.

    This year also saw the joint investigation team on alleged core international crimes committed in Ukraine amend the JIT Agreement to enhance investigations on crimes of torture, ill-treatment and filtration.

    Hosting Partners in The Hague

    Our close partnership with national judicial authorities sits at the foundation of our Agency. Every year, we have thousands of prosecutors coming to Eurojust to discuss cases or participate in coordination centres or coordination meetings. In 2024, we were able to welcome many high level visitors, including the President of Slovenia, the Chairman of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Deputy Prime Minister of Moldova, Ministers of Justice and Interior from many EU Member States, and many others.

    These visits are opportunities to discuss ways to strengthen judicial cooperation, update national authorities on Eurojust’s work, and identify opportunities for closer collaboration.

    Welcoming our New Presidency

    2024 was also marked by a change in Eurojust’s leadership, with Mr Ladislav Hamran bidding the Agency farewell after serving 11 years in the Presidency – 7 as President and 4 as Vice-President. Austrian National Member Mr Michael Schmid was elected as his successor, with his 4-year tenure beginning in November. We also welcomed a new Vice-President, Spanish National Member Jose de la Mata, in December.

    With no equivalent worldwide, Eurojust continued to deliver remarkable results in 2024, enabling prosecutors and law enforcement authorities from the EU and beyond to bring perpetrators to justice.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Global: Times journalists deemed ‘legitimate military targets’ – how Russia muzzles criticism at home and abroad

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Precious Chatterje-Doody, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Studies, The Open University

    Russia’s former president and current deputy head of its security council, Dmitry Medvedev, has declared that the editors of the Times newspaper in the UK are now “legitimate military targets”.

    Medvedev, who is one of Vladimir Putin’s closest allies, was responding to the newspaper’s coverage of the recent assassination of Russia’s chemical weapons chief, Igor Kirillov, in Moscow on December 17. The paper’s leading article referred to his killing by an explosive device hidden in a scooter as a “legitimate act of defence by a threatened nation”.

    Medvedev took to Telegram to denounce the article, writing: “Those who carry out crimes against Russia … always have accomplices. They too are now legitimate military targets. This category could also include the miserable jackals from the Times who cowardly hid behind their editorial. That means the entire leadership of the publication.”

    The assassination of Kirillov, who was in charge of Russia’s chemical, biological and nuclear defence forces, came a day after he had been charged by Ukraine in absentia with war crimes over Russia’s use of chemical weapons in the ongoing war.

    Once seen as a liberal reformer when he temporarily took over Russia’s presidency between 2008 and 2012, Medvedev has since reinvented himself as a pro-war hawk who regularly makes outlandish or extreme statements on social media.

    In May 2023, following a drone attack on the Kremlin, Medvedev posted a message on Telegram saying there were “no options left other than the physical elimination of [the Ukrainian president] Zelenskyy and his clique”. The post prompted Ukraine’s foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, to respond in an interview that “Medvedev should drink less vodka before going on Telegram”.

    In his most recent outburst, Medvedev mirrored the rhetoric used in the Times editorial, claiming that by the same logic, all of Kyiv’s “accomplices” – whether decision-makers in Nato or journalists justifying Ukraine’s actions – are active participants in a war against Russia. This makes them “legitimate military targets” who need to “be careful” even in London, where “anything goes”.

    Part of a pattern

    Medvedev’s comments, while extreme, fall within a broader pattern of Russian officials using humour or courting controversy to justify their positions or ensure international press coverage. But they are also part of an escalation in Russian attacks on freedom of expression and the press.

    Prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s media environment was restricted. Opposition viewpoints could, however, still be accessed relatively easily from a range of sources, including the regional press, online outlets and the political blogosphere. But the Kremlin has gradually chipped away at these possibilities by increasing restrictions on independent media and social media users alike.

    These restrictions were ramped up even further following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Criticism of the armed forces and spreading what the Kremlin deems “false information” about the so-called “special military operation” were criminalised.

    Anti-war activists now routinely face conviction for justifying terrorism, and well-respected news outlets such as Ekho Moskvy have been forced to close. Journalists from Russia and abroad have been tried, convicted and incarcerated for allegedly violating these laws. They are often held in harsh conditions, in isolation and without access to adequate medical care.

    But it is not just journalists and activists within Russia who have come under threat from this increasingly authoritarian regime. As well as its military incursions into Georgia in 2008 and eastern Ukraine since 2014, Russian intelligence organisations have been blamed for a number of targeted provocations abroad in recent years. In the case of the 2018 Salisbury poisonings, these resulted in fatalities on British soil.

    Russian involvement is, of course, always denied. Kremlin propaganda uses a range of disinformation tactics to hide Russia’s culpability. With the Salisbury poisonings, this included an outlandish television interview on Russia’s RT network, where the main suspects claimed to be visiting health supplements salesmen. My research at the time showed that online audiences universally rejected their story, but incredulity over the interview overtook public anger.

    Contrasting values

    As my research has shown, extreme statements and conspiracy theories circulate rapidly and widely in today’s international media environment. With this in mind, it is common for the Kremlin and its proxies to mirror accusations back towards other parties and accuse them of hypocrisy.

    Taking questions from a US journalist in his end-of-year press conference and phone-in on December 19, Putin was asked about the “failure” of the special military operation in Ukraine. The reporter went on to describe Putin’s position as “weaker” than that of the incoming US president, Donald Trump.

    Putin insinuated that the very fact this US journalist was included in the event showed a better treatment by Russia of “esteemed” international journalists than Russian journalists receive from the US.

    This is patently untrue. Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich was imprisoned in Russia for 16 months on trumped-up espionage charges, after being detained in March 2023 while covering the effect of western sanctions on the Russian economy.

    Russia’s crackdown on freedom of speech and freedom of the press is precisely because authoritarian regimes recognise they are incredibly vulnerable to the free and open-ended enquiry that my co-authors and I have argued is so crucial to defend.

    As a spokesperson for the UK prime minister, Keir Starmer, noted in response to Medvedev’s latest comments: “A free press is a cornerstone of our democracy.”

    Precious Chatterje-Doody does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Times journalists deemed ‘legitimate military targets’ – how Russia muzzles criticism at home and abroad – https://theconversation.com/times-journalists-deemed-legitimate-military-targets-how-russia-muzzles-criticism-at-home-and-abroad-246361

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Security: Russian National Assisted Sanctioned Oligarch in Schemes to Employ an American Citizen to Launch and Operate Russian Television Network

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News

    Defendant Also Helped Oligarch Illegally Transfer a $10 Million U.S. Investment to Business Associate

    Damian Williams, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Menno Goedman, the Co-Director of Task Force KleptoCapture, and James E. Dennehy, the Assistant Director in Charge of the New York Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), announced today the unsealing of a Superseding Indictment charging ALEXEY KOMOV with conspiracy and violations of U.S. sanctions arising from his assistance to sanctioned Russian oligarch KONSTANTIN MALOFEYEV, who was previously charged in April 2022.  As alleged, KOMOV conspired with MALOFEYEV to recruit and employ an American citizen, Jack Hanick, who worked for MALOFEYEV in launching and operating a television network in Russia.  KOMOV also conspired with MALOFEYEV, Hanick, and others to illegally transfer a $10 million investment that MALOFEYEV had made in a U.S. bank to a business associate in Greece, in violation of the sanctions blocking MALOFEYEV’s assets from being transferred. 

    U.S. Attorney Damian Williams said: “As alleged, Alexey Komov facilitated the efforts of Konstantin Malofeyev – an oligarch closely tied to Russian aggression in Ukraine who has been determined by OFAC to have been one of the main sources of financing for the promotion of Russia-aligned separatist groups operating in the sovereign nation of Ukraine – to flout U.S. sanctions.  The unsealing today of the Indictment against Komov is yet another reminder that this Office will continue to hold those accountable that seek to undermine the United States’ national security goals.”

    KleptoCapture Co-Director Menno Goedman said: “The indictment alleges Alexey Komov played an essential role in a multi-faceted scheme to violate and evade U.S. sanctions imposed on a significant financier of Russian aggression in Ukraine.  Task Force KleptoCapture will continue to disrupt schemes perpetrated by Komov and other sanction evaders, whenever and wherever they may hide.”

    FBI Assistant Director in Charge James E. Dennehy said: “Alexey Komov, a Russian national, allegedly conspired with an American citizen and a sanctioned Russian oligarch to develop a Russian cable network to promote anti-Western propaganda. This alleged conspiracy violated laws designed to protect the national security of the United States and our allies. The FBI remains committed to apprehending foreign nationals who employ our citizens to satisfy their odious agenda.”

    According to the Indictment unsealed today in Manhattan federal court:[1]

    In 2014, the President issued Executive Order 13660, which declared a national emergency with respect to the situation in Ukraine.  To address this national emergency, the President blocked all property and interest in property that came within the U.S. or the possession or control of any U.S. person, of individuals determined by the Secretary of the Treasury to be responsible for or complicit in, or who engaged in, actions or policies that threatened the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine, or who materially assist, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological support for, or goods and services to, individuals or entities engaging in such activities.  Executive Order 13660, along with certain regulations issued pursuant to it (the “Ukraine-Related Sanctions Regulations”) prohibits, among other things, making or receiving any funds, goods, or services by, to, from, or for the benefit of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked.

    On December 19, 2014, the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) designated MALOFEYEV as a Specially Designated National (“SDN”) pursuant to Executive Order 13660.  OFAC’s designation of MALOFEYEV explained that he was one of the main sources of financing for Russians promoting separatism in Crimea, and has materially assisted, sponsored, and provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods and services to or in support of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic, a separatist organization in the Ukrainian region of Donetsk.

    As alleged in the Indictment, beginning in at least 2012, KOMOV assisted MALOFEYEV in recruiting and hiring a U.S. citizen named Jack Hanick to work on a new Russian cable television news network (the “Russian TV Network”) that MALOFEYEV was creating.  As part of KOMOV’s recruitment of Hanick, KOMOV travelled to Manhattan to meet with Hanick and subsequently introduced Hanick to MALOFEYEV in Russia.  With KOMOV’s knowledge, MALOFEYEV negotiated directly with Hanick regarding Hanick’s salary, payment for Hanick’s housing in Moscow, and Hanick’s Russian work visa.  MALOFEYEV paid Hanick through two separate Russian entities through the end of 2018.

    After OFAC designated MALOFEYEV as a SDN in December 2014, MALOFEYEV continued to employ Hanick on the Russian TV Network, with KOMOV’s assistance and input, and in violation of the Ukraine-Related Sanctions Regulations.  For example, prior to the launch of the Russian TV Network on the air in Russia in April 2015, KOMOV wrote an e-mail to MALOFEYEV, Hanick, and another employee, referencing their prior discussion with MALOFEYEV earlier that day and instructing Hanick to create two types of programs and allocate staff. KOMOV further wrote, “Hopefully Konstantin will be providing general direction and guidance for both projects. Looking forward to our long-term co-operation on those exciting endeavors!”  In turn, Hanick requested KOMOV to serve as a moderator for the first broadcast, writing “KM [i.e. MALOFEYEV] and I agree that we need you on this the first show on [the Russian TV Network]!!!”

    With KOMOV’s participation, MALOFEYEV also employed Hanick to assist MALOFEYEV in transferring a shell company that MALOFEYEV owned to a Greek associate of MALOFEYEV (the “Greek Business Associate”).  In 2014, MALOFEYEV, assisted by KOMOV, had used the shell company to make a $10 million investment in a Texas-based bank holding company (the “Texas Bank”).  KOMOV helped set up the deal, emailing a Texas-based attorney (“Individiual-1”), “I plan to come to the US with two of my close friends Konstantin Malofeev [sic] and [another individual] on Feb 4-9, 2014 . . . I’d like the three of us to meet with you to discuss our cooperation, and also joint investment projects (please propose attractive investment opportunities with reliable partners for $50-100 mln participation from our side)”. On or about March 25, 2014, KOMOV wrote to Individual-I, “Konstantin has confirmed today that he goes ahead with the 10 mln investment in the bank project.”

    Beginning in or about March 2015, with KOMOV’s assistance, MALOFEYEV began making plans to transfer ownership of the shell company to the Greek Business Associate, in violation of the Ukraine-Related Sanctions Regulations.  On or about March 4, 2015, KOMOV wrote to Individual-1, “I need to discuss with you several things: previous investment in the bank project (we want to consider selling it)”.  On or about March 17, 2015, KOMOV wrote to Individual-I about the Texas Bank interest, in part, “We want to keep it where it is now, only the owner from our side changes.”  Consistent with that plan, in or about May 2015, MALOFEYEV’s attorney drafted a Sale and Purchase Agreement that purported to transfer the shell company to the Greek Business Associate in exchange for one U.S. dollar.  In June 2015 MALOFEYEV had Hanick physically transport a copy of MALOFEYEV’s certificate of shares in the Texas Bank from Moscow to Athens to be given to the Greek Business Associate.  MALOFEYEV signed the Sale and Purchase Agreement in June 2015, but the agreement was fraudulently backdated to July 2014 to make it appear that the transfer had taken place prior to the imposition of U.S. sanctions.  MALOFEYEV’s attorney then falsely represented to the Texas Bank that the transfer had taken place in July 2014, even though MALOFEYEV and his attorney well knew that the transfer of the shell company was executed in June 2015.

    The U.S. seized and forfeited approximately $5.4 million in the property traceable to MALOFEYEV’s Texas Bank investment, which had been converted by the Texas Bank in 2016 to cash held in a blocked U.S. bank account.  In February 2023, the U.S. Attorney General authorized a transfer of these forfeited funds to the State Department to support Ukrainian veterans.

    MALOFEYEV, of Russia, is believed to be in Russia and remains at large.

    *                *                *

    KOMOV, 53, a Russian national, is charged with conspiracy to violate and substantive violation of International Emergency Economic Powers Act, each of which carry a maximum potential sentence of 20 years in prison.

    The maximum potential sentences in this case are prescribed by Congress and provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant will be determined by the judge.

    Mr. Williams praised the outstanding investigative work of the FBI and thanked the support and expertise of the Department of Justice’s National Security Division and Office of International Affairs in the conduct of this matter.

    The prosecution is being handled by the Office’s Illicit Finance and Money Laundering Unit.  Assistant U.S. Attorneys Vladislav Vainberg, Thane Rehn, Jessica Greenwood, and Trial Attorney Scott Claffee of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Section are in charge of the prosecution. 
     


    [1] The entirety of the text of the Indictment, and the description of the Indictment set forth herein, constitute only allegations, and every fact described should be treated as an allegation.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Video: Sudan/Egypt, Syria, Libya & other topics Daily Press Briefing | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    • Sudan.
    • Sudan/Egypt
    • Libya
    • Syria
    • OCHA/Türkiye
    • Israel/Yemen
    • Occupied Palestinian Territory
    • Security Council/Afternoon meeting
    • MONUSCO
    • Security Council
    • Central African Republic
    • Liberia
    • West and Central Africa
    • Ukraine
    • International Days

    Sudan
    The Secretary-General is outraged by the killing of three World Food Programme staff members in Sudan on 19 December, when the agency’s field office in Yabus, in Blue Nile State, was hit by aerial bombardment.  He sends his deepest condolences to the families of the victims and their WFP colleagues.   The Secretary-General condemns all attacks on UN and aid personnel and facilities. He calls for a thorough investigation.   Yesterday’s incident underscores the devastating toll that Sudan’s brutal conflict is having on millions of people in need and the humanitarians trying to reach them with life-saving assistance.  2024 is the deadliest year on record for aid workers in Sudan. Just last month, in November, a colleague from OCHA was killed in El-Fasher. Yet despite significant threats to their personal safety, our colleagues continue to do all they can to provide vital support wherever it is needed.  The Secretary-General calls on the parties to adhere to their obligations to protect civilians, including aid personnel, as well as humanitarian premises and supplies. Attacks must not be directed against them and all feasible precautions must be taken to avoid harming them.   After more than 20 months of conflict in Sudan, the Secretary-General once again stresses the need for an immediate ceasefire. The United Nations will continue to back international mediation efforts and work with all relevant stakeholders to help bring an end to the war. For her part, Cindy McCain, WFP’s Executive Director, said that we are urgently working to establish the circumstances around this appalling incident. She also demanded a thorough investigation and for the perpetrators to be held accountable. Yesterday at the Security Council, Edem Wosornu, Director of Operations at OCHA, spoke about the staggering humanitarian crisis in the Sudan. She also reminded Council members that in 2024, humanitarian organizations faced significant funding gaps and called on donors to provide the $4.2 billion humanitarians need to support nearly 21 million people inside Sudan next year.
    Sudan/Egypt
    The Emergency Relief Coordinator, Tom Fletcher, has allocated $6 million from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) to address the humanitarian needs of refugees fleeing conflict in Sudan to Egypt, in support of the ongoing response there. The conflict in Sudan has created the world’s fastest-growing displacement crisis. Of the more than 3 million people who have sought protection across Sudan’s borders since April of last year, some 1.2 million are being hosted by Egypt – more than in any other country – according to recent data from the Egyptian Government. This influx of new arrivals has placed additional strain on host communities in Egypt, stretching public services and resources. The funding from CERF will help support people’s most urgent needs including food, water, shelter, cash assistance and protection services.

    Full Highlights:
    https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/ossg/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=20%20December%202024

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lvlnbuezom8

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Setting up a special committee on the European Democracy Shield, and defining its responsibilities, numerical strength and term of office – P10_TA(2024)0065 – Wednesday, 18 December 2024 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the proposal from the Conference of Presidents,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication on the European democracy action plan (COM(2020)0790),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act)(1) and Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act)(2),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2021 on Europe’s Media in the Digital Decade: an Action Plan to Support Recovery and Transformation(3),

    –  having regard to the 2022 Code of Practice on Disinformation,

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law(4),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC(5),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (European Media Freedom Act)(6),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1069 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’)(7),

    –  having regard to the March 2021 EU toolbox of risk mitigating measures on the cybersecurity of 5G networks,

    –  having regard to the Communication from the Commission on Defence of Democracy (COM(2023)0630),

    –  having regard to the Commission proposal of 12 December 2023 for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing harmonised requirements in the internal market on transparency of interest representation carried out on behalf of third countries and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 (COM(2023)0637),

    –  having regard to the Commission recommendations on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the Union and enhancing the European nature and efficient conduct of the elections to the European Parliament (C(2023)8626) and on promoting the engagement and effective participation of citizens and civil society organisations in public policy-making processes (C(2023)8627),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 9 March 2022 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation(8) (INGE 1),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation(9) (INGE2),

    –  having regard to its recommendation of 15 June 2023 to the Council and the Commission following the investigation of alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware(10),

    –  having regard to the report of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’, authored by Sauli Niinistö, former President of the Republic of Finland, in his capacity as Special Adviser to the President of the European Commission,

    –  having regard to Rule 213 of its Rules of Procedure,

    A.  whereas foreign interference constitutes a serious violation of the universal values and principles on which the Union is founded, such as human dignity, freedom, equality, solidarity, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law; whereas evidence shows that malicious and authoritarian foreign state actors and malicious non-state actors are using information manipulation and other tactics to interfere in democratic processes in the Union; whereas such attacks mislead and deceive citizens and affect their voting behaviour, amplify divisive debates, divide, polarise, and exploit the vulnerabilities of societies, promote hate speech, worsen the situation of vulnerable groups which are more likely to become victims of disinformation, distort the integrity of democratic elections and referendums, cast suspicion on national governments, public authorities, the democratic order and the rule of law and have the goal of destabilising European democracy; whereas this has become a question of internal security and safety of Union society as a whole;

    B.  whereas a campaign of disinformation of an unparalleled malice and magnitude with the purpose of deceiving both domestic citizens and the international community of States as a whole has continuously been carried out by Russia for many years, with particular intensity since the eve of and during its war of aggression against Ukraine which started on 24 February 2022; whereas there is a need for continuous support and close cooperation with Ukraine and Moldova in that regard, but also the pro-European forces in Georgia and the countries of the Western Balkans, which all face strong Russian interference into their process of convergence with the Union, leveraging the possibilities of mutual exchange of information and best practices;

    C.  whereas attempts by state actors from third countries and malicious non-state actors to interfere in the functioning of democracy in the Union and its Member States, and put pressure on the values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union by means of malicious interference, are part of a wider disruptive trend experienced by democracies worldwide;

    D.  whereas malicious actors continue to seek to interfere in electoral processes and take advantage of the openness and pluralism of our societies, and to attack democratic processes and the resilience of the Union and its Member States;

    E.  whereas malign autocratic actors are increasingly conducting disinformation campaigns against the work of the Union delegations; whereas this is a clear attempt to hinder the Union’s strategic communication abroad;

    F.  whereas, before 8 October 2024, the EU and its Member States did not have a specific regime of sanctions relating to foreign interference and disinformation campaigns orchestrated by malicious state actors from third countries, meaning that such actors were in a position to safely assume that their destabilisation campaigns against the Union will face no consequences;

    G.  whereas there is a lack of a common definition and understanding of this phenomenon and many gaps and loopholes remain in current legislation and policies at Union and national level intended to detect, prevent and counter foreign interference;

    H.  whereas foreign interference, disinformation, and numerous attacks on and threats against democracy are expected to continue in ever-greater numbers and more sophisticated ways;

    I.  whereas Parliament’s previous recommendations to counter malign foreign interference operations in the democratic processes of the Union have contributed to an overall Union understanding and to a greater awareness of the issue;

    J.  whereas the hearings and work of the INGE 1 and INGE 2 special committees have contributed to public recognition and the contextualisation of these issues, and have successfully framed the Union debate on foreign interference in democratic processes and disinformation;

    K.  whereas there is a need for global, multilateral cooperation and support among like-minded partners, including between parliamentarians, in dealing with foreign malicious interference and disinformation; whereas democracies have developed advanced skills and counter-strategies in dealing with those threats and attacks;

    L.  whereas addressing foreign interference, disinformation and threats against democracy requires a multifaceted approach in order to foster critical thinking and media and information literacy, and promoting civic engagement and democracy education;

    M.  whereas hybrid threats and attacks may lead to full-scale and cross-sectoral crises with detrimental effects on safety and security, the well-being of citizens and the functioning of society and economy as a whole, constituting a key challenge to the Union’s internal affairs; whereas that new reality requires a more robust approach to Union crisis management and civilian and defence preparedness, building strategic foresight and anticipation and strengthening early warning, detection, analysis and operational coordination capabilities;

    1.  Decides to set up a special committee named ‘special committee on the European Democracy Shield’ and that it shall carry out, in cooperation and consultation with the competent standing committees where their powers and responsibilities under Annex VI of the Rules of Procedure are concerned, the following responsibilities:

       (a) to assess relevant existing and planned legislation and policies to further detect possible loopholes, gaps and overlaps that could be exploited for malicious interference in democratic processes, including as regards the following matters:
       (i) policies, legislative proposals and structures to be established under the European Democracy Shield, and already established under the European Democracy Action Plan, as well as relevant instruments under the Strategic Compass such as the EU Hybrid Toolbox;
       (ii) opportunities of cooperation among Union agencies and national authorities in the area of justice and home affairs, including for the purposes of information sharing, intelligence and advance detection mechanisms;
       (iii) policies and recommendations outlined in the report of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’;
       (iv) policies contributing to Union democratic processes, democratic resilience through situational awareness, media and information literacy, media pluralism and independent journalism, the promotion of civic engagement, education, critical thinking and citizens’ awareness and participation;
       (v) democratic resilience against home-grown hybrid threats and attacks and malign interference;
       (vi) interference using online platforms, in particular by evaluating, in-depth, the responsibility and effects that very large online platforms have on democracy and democratic processes in the Union;
       (vii) impact of interference on critical infrastructure and strategic sectors, including foreign investment and ownership of property located in the Union;
       (viii) hybrid threats and attacks, including but not limited to: cyberattacks including on military and non-military targets, human-made text and audiovisual content, as well as AI-generated content and ‘deepfakes’ used for the purpose of foreign interference and disinformation, interference in political institutions, economic influence or coercion, interference through global actors via elite capture, national diasporas, universities and cultural events, covert funding of political activities by malicious foreign actors and donors, foreign information manipulation and interference actions targeting Union action abroad and the exploitation of artificially created migration flows through an increased role of state actors;
       (ix) policies ensuring a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union and resilience against cyberattacks, where related to democratic processes;
       (x) the role of malicious state and non-state actors, their modus operandi and financing, as well as physical sabotage perpetrated by them;
       (xi) the impact of interference on the rights of minorities and other discriminated groups;
       (xii) deterrence, attribution and collective countermeasures, including sanctions;
       (xiii) neighbourhood and global cooperation, and multilateralism;
       (xiv) interference by Union-based actors both within the Union and in third countries;
       (xv) policies and measures to preserve the fairness and integrity of elections, and to strengthen democratic checks and balances;
       (b) to develop, in close cooperation with the competent standing committees, suggestions and proposals on how to further remedy these gaps in order to foster the Union’s resilience towards hybrid threats and attacks, including foreign information manipulation and interference, and on how to improve the Union’s legal and institutional framework;
       (c) to assess the activities of the Commission and the European External Action Service regarding the fight against foreign information manipulation and interference and hybrid threats and attacks;
       (d) to counter information campaigns and strategic communication of malign third countries, including those through domestic Union actors and organisations, that harm the goals of the Union and that are created to influence Union public opinion;
       (e) to follow up, where relevant, on the implementation of the reports of the INGE 1 and INGE 2 special committees;
       (f) to contribute to overall institutional resilience against foreign interference, hybrid threats, attacks and disinformation;
       (g) to maintain relations with other Union institutions and bodies, Member States authorities, other international organisations and interparliamentary assemblies, civil society as well as state and non-state partners in relevant third countries for matters falling under its responsibility, in order to reinforce Union action against hybrid threats and attacks and internal and foreign information manipulation and interference; to engage particularly with state and non-state partners in Ukraine and Moldova and the pro-European partners in Georgia as well as the countries from the Western Balkans; to counter manipulated narratives coming from Russia, given the critical and continuous danger Russia poses to the stability and security in the whole of the Union;

    2.  Decides that, whenever the special committee work includes the hearing of evidence of a confidential nature, testimonies involving personal data, or exchanges of views or hearings with authorities and bodies on confidential information, including scientific studies or parts thereof granted confidentiality status under Article 63 of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council(11), the meetings shall be held in camera; decides further that witnesses and experts shall have the right to make a statement or provide testimony in camera;

    3.  Decides that the list of people invited to public meetings, the list of those who attend them and the minutes of such meetings, shall be made public;

    4.  Decides that confidential documents that have been received by the special committee shall be assessed in accordance with the procedure set out in Rule 227 of its Rules of Procedure, decides further that such information shall be used exclusively for the purposes of drawing up the final report of the special committee;

    5.  Decides that the special committee shall have 33 members;

    6.  Decides that the term of office of the special committee shall be 12 months and that that term of office shall start running from the date of its constituent meeting;

    7.  Decides that the special committee may present to Parliament a mid-term report; decides further that it shall present to Parliament at the latest during the part-session of January 2026 a final report focusing on the matters set out in paragraph 1 and containing factual findings and recommendations concerning the measures and initiatives to be taken, without prejudice to the competences of the standing committees in accordance with Annex VI to its Rules of Procedure; stresses that the recommendations of the special committee shall be taken into consideration by the competent standing committees in their work.

    (1) OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj.
    (2) OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj.
    (3) OJ C 184, 5.5.2022, p. 71.
    (4) OJ L 305, 26.11.2019, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/1937/oj.
    (5) OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 164, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2557/oj.
    (6) OJ L, 2024/1083, 17.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1083/oj.
    (7) OJ L, 2024/1069, 16.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1069/oj.
    (8) OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 61.
    (9) OJ C, C/2023/1226, 21.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1226/oj.
    (10) OJ C, C/2024/494, 23.1.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/494/oj.
    (11) Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC (OJ L 309, 24.11.2009, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2009/1107/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EIB Group donates €300 000 to NGOs helping communities affected by flooding in Spain

    Source: European Investment Bank

    • The EIB Group – through the EIB Institute, the group’s philanthropic and social impact arm – will donate €300 000 to the NGOs Save the Children, SOS Children’s Villages and Casa Caridad to support communities affected by flash flooding in Spain.
    • The funds will be used to provide psychosocial support, create suitable conditions for children’s schooling and restore housing to a liveable state.
    • This donation comes in addition to an initial financial package of €900 million launched by the EIB Group in November to support recovery and reconstruction in the affected areas.
    • The EIB Group will channel an additional 400 million through financial institutions to support SMEs and mid-caps affected by the floods.

    The EIB Institute, the philanthropic and social impact arm of the European Investment Bank Group (EIB Group), has announced a donation of €300 000 to support communities affected by the flash flooding that devastated parts of Spain on 30 October and in the first few days of November. The donation will be channelled through the NGOs Save the Children Spain, SOS Children’s Villages and Casa Caridad.

    The floods have left many communities in urgent need of help. This donation by the EIB Institute will lend critical support for residents to restore decent living conditions. With the funds, Save the Children Spain will provide psychosocial support and create adequate learning conditions for children, SOS Children’s Villages will give communities administrative assistance and help them meet essential needs, and Casa Caridad will help families restore their homes.

    The EIB Group is thus continuing to increase its support for recovery and reconstruction in the parts of eastern and south-eastern Spain hardest hit by the storms. This includes a €900 million initial response package announced by the group on 6 November to reschedule and accelerate planned disbursements and thereby facilitate the reconstruction of critical infrastructure to be carried out by regional authorities and public bodies in the affected areas, as was also done following the floods in Central Europe in September.

    The EIB has also launched operations to channel approximately €400 million through financial institutions to support SMEs and mid-caps affected by the floods, with a first agreement with Banco Sabadell.

    “The EIB Group has been quick to mobilise to support recovery efforts in the aftermath of the devastating floods in Spain. Today, we supplement our lending with this donation from the EIB Institute, as a sign of our solidarity and commitment to helping the hardest hit communities,” said EIB President Nadia Calviño.

    “The EIB Institute has a long track record of responding to humanitarian crises with swift, impactful support. Over the past decade, we have consistently prioritised providing aid to the most vulnerable, such as children, single-parent and large families, elderly people, people with disabilities and those suffering from malnourishment. Our donations have reached countless individuals, providing critical aid and building resilience in communities around the world. Our mission is to bring hope and relief to those in need, wherever they may be,” said EIB Institute Director Shiva Dustdar.

    The EIB Institute regularly grants aid in response to crises and natural disasters, and donates IT equipment from the EIB. In 2023, EIB donations through the EIB Institute helped populations affected by the war in Ukraine, the earthquake in Türkiye and Syria and the flooding in Slovenia, among other events.

    Background information

    European Investment Bank

    The EIB is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by the Member States. It finances investments that pursue EU policy objectives. EIB projects bolster competitiveness, drive innovation, promote sustainable development, enhance social and territorial cohesion, and support a just and swift transition to climate neutrality.

    The EIB Group, consisting of the European Investment Bank and the European Investment Fund, reported total financing signatures in Spain of €11.4 billion in 2023, approximately €6.8 billion of which went to climate action and environmental sustainability projects. Overall, the EIB Group signed €88 billion in new financing in 2023.

    The EIB Institute was set up within the EIB Group to foster thought-leadership and impact initiatives with European stakeholders and the public at large.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: At a Glance – Plenary round-up – December 2024 – 20-12-2024

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Union’s external relations topped the agenda for the December 2024 plenary session, with several debates on statements by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and Vice-President of the European Commission, Kaja Kallas, attending the plenary for the first time in her new capacity. These included the toppling of the Syrian regime and its consequences; Russia’s disinformation activities and fraudulent justification of its war against Ukraine; the use of rape as a weapon of war (e.g. in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan). The day after Kallas’s remarks on the crackdown on peaceful pro-European demonstrators in Georgia, Salome Zourabichvili, President of Georgia, addressed Members in a formal sitting. Other debates on Commission statements covered, inter alia: the situation in Mayotte following the recent devastating cyclone; a European innovation act; harassment and cyber-violence against female politicians in EU candidate and neighbouring countries; a shared vision for sustainable European tourism; promoting social dialogue and the right to strike; tackling abusive subcontracting; the need to ensure swift action and transparency on public-sector corruption allegations; urgent EU action to preserve nature and biodiversity; and the Commission’s plans to revise outstanding proposals on animal welfare in its 2025 work plan. Members also debated ahead of the European Council meeting of 19 December 2024 and set out their expectations ahead of the EU-Western Balkans Summit that took place the previous day. Parliament created two new standing committees, upgrading the former sub-committees on Public Health, and on Security and Defence; and set up two special committees: on the European Democracy Shield, and the Housing Crisis.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: IMF Executive Board Completes the Sixth Review of the Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility for Ukraine

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    December 20, 2024

    • The IMF Board today completed the Sixth Review of the Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) for Ukraine, enabling a disbursement of about US$1.1 billion (SDR 834.9 million) to Ukraine, which will be channeled by the authorities for budget support.
    • Ukraine’s economy remains resilient, and performance remains strong under the EFF despite challenging conditions. The authorities met all end-September quantitative performance criteria and structural benchmarks.
    • Sustained reform momentum, progress at domestic revenue mobilization, and timely disbursement of external support are necessary to safeguard macroeconomic stability, restore fiscal and debt sustainability, and improve governance.

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) today completed the Sixth Review of the EFF, enabling the authorities to draw US$1.1 billion (SDR 834.9 million), which will be channeled by the authorities for budget support. This will bring the total disbursements under the IMF-supported program to US$9.8 billion.

    Ukraine’s 48-month EFF, with access of SDR 11.6 billion (equivalent to US$15.5 billion, or about 577 percent of quota), was approved on March 31, 2023, and forms part of a US$148 billion support package for Ukraine. The authorities’ IMF-supported program helps anchor policies that sustain fiscal, external, and macro-financial stability at a time of exceptionally high uncertainty. The EFF aims to support the economic recovery, enhance governance, and strengthen institutions with the aim of promoting long-term growth in the context of reconstruction and Ukraine’s path to EU accession.

    Ukraine’s performance under its program remains strong. All end-September and continuous quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets were met. The authorities have also completed a prior action on the enactment of the package of tax measures, have met all end-October structural benchmarks due by the Sixth Review and three of the end-December benchmarks.  

    Economic growth in 2024 has been upgraded given better than expected resilience to the energy shocks. However, a slowdown is expected in 2025 due to an increasingly tight labor market, the impact of Russian attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure, and continued uncertainty about the war. Inflation has risen recently, mainly due to food prices, while inflation expectations remain well anchored. Adequate reserves have been sustained by continued sizeable external support. Overall, the outlook remains subject to exceptionally high uncertainty.

    Following the Executive Board discussion on Ukraine, Ms. Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director of the IMF, issued the following statement[1]:

    “Russia’s war in Ukraine continues to take a devastating social and economic toll on Ukraine. Despite the war, macroeconomic stability is being preserved through skillful policymaking by the Ukrainian authorities as well as substantial external support. The economy has remained resilient, reflecting the continued adaptability of households and firms, although risks are tilted to the downside due to headwinds from attacks on energy infrastructure and a tight labor market. Preparedness and contingency planning are key to enable appropriate policy action should risks materialize.

    The program remains fully financed with a cumulative external financing envelope of US$148 billion in the baseline and US$177 billion in the downside over the 4-year program period, including commitments from the G7’s Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration Loans for Ukraine (ERA) initiative. Full, timely and predictable external support—on terms consistent with debt sustainability—remains essential to maintaining full program financing and safeguarding stability.

    A tax package and 2025 Budget in line with the program baseline have been enacted, but there are few remaining buffers and strict budget execution will be key. Continued progress at domestic revenue mobilization is imperative for Ukraine to meet its high priority spending needs and to restore fiscal sustainability. Strong implementation of the National Revenue Strategy and customs reform will help raise further revenues, improve compliance, combat evasion, and support EU accession.

    After completing the Eurobond exchange in August, the authorities are now focusing on reaching agreement with other holders of external commercial claims, including GDP warrants, in line with their strategy. A swift agreement in line with the program’s debt sustainability objectives would reduce fiscal risks and create space for critical spending needs.

    Inflation has accelerated more than expected in recent months, and the recent tightening of monetary policy was appropriate; the NBU should stand ready to take further action should inflation expectations deteriorate. Allowing exchange rate flexibility will help strengthen the resilience of the economy to external shocks while safeguarding reserves.

    The financial sector remains stable, but vigilance is needed given heightened risks. Progress on strengthening bank resolution and risk-based supervision, stress-testing frameworks and contingency planning should be sustained.

    Reform momentum in anticorruption and governance needs to be sustained. In particular, the authorities need to advance the creation of a new court for high public disputes, and amend the criminal procedure code.”

    Table 1. Ukraine: Selected Economic and Social Indicators, 2021–27

    2021

     

    2022

     

    2023

    2024

    2025

    2026

    2027

    Act.

    Act.

    Act.

    Proj.

    Proj.

    Proj.

    Proj.

    Real economy (percent change, unless otherwise indicated)

    Nominal GDP (billions of Ukrainian hryvnias) 1/

    5,451

     

    5,239

     

    6,538

    7,629

    8,680

    9,874

    10,937

    Real GDP 1/

    3.4

     

    -28.8

     

    5.3

    4.0

    2.5-3.5

    5.3

    4.5

    Contributions:

                     

    Domestic demand

    12.9

     

    -22.9

     

    13.9

    6.5

    4.9

    4.5

    4.2

    Private consumption

    4.7

     

    -16.8

     

    5.5

    3.3

    3.2

    3.8

    3.5

    Public consumption

    0.1

     

    12.5

     

    2.6

    -0.1

    -1.1

    -2.5

    -1.9

    Investment

    8.1

     

    -18.6

     

    5.8

    3.3

    2.9

    3.2

    2.6

    Net exports

    -9.5

     

    -5.9

     

    -8.6

    -2.5

    -2.4

    0.8

    0.3

    GDP deflator

    24.8

     

    34.9

     

    18.5

    12.2

    11.0

    8.0

    6.0

    Unemployment rate (ILO definition; period average, percent)

    9.8

     

    24.5

     

    19.1

    13.3

    11.8

    10.2

    9.4

    Consumer prices (period average)

    9.4

     

    20.2

     

    12.9

    6.2

    10.3

    7.7

    5.0

    Consumer prices (end of period)

    10.0

     

    26.6

     

    5.1

    10.0

    7.5

    6.6

    5.0

    Nominal wages (average)

    20.8

     

    1.0

     

    20.1

    19.1

    18.9

    14.1

    10.5

    Real wages (average)

    10.5

     

    -16.0

     

    6.4

    12.1

    7.8

    6.0

    5.3

    Savings (percent of GDP)

    12.5

     

    17.0

     

    9.8

    8.5

    2.9

    9.1

    15.2

    Private

    12.7

     

    30.2

     

    24.6

    24.1

    17.9

    14.7

    13.6

    Public

    -0.2

     

    -13.1

     

    -14.8

    -15.6

    -14.9

    -5.6

    1.5

    Investment (percent of GDP)

    14.5

     

    12.1

     

    15.1

    16.9

    17.5

    19.3

    20.4

    Private

    10.7

     

    9.6

     

    10.4

    13.6

    13.6

    15.0

    15.3

    Public

    3.8

     

    2.5

     

    4.8

    3.4

    4.0

    4.3

    5.1

                     

    General Government (percent of GDP)

                     

    Fiscal balance 2/

    -4.0

     

    -15.6

     

    -19.6

    -18.9

    -18.9

    -9.9

    -3.6

    Fiscal balance, excl. grants 2/

    -4.0

     

    -24.8

     

    -26.1

    -24.3

    -19.7

    -10.1

    -4.6

    External financing (net)

    2.4

     

    10.7

     

    16.5

    14.8

    18.0

    8.9

    1.4

    Domestic financing (net), of which:

    1.6

     

    5.0

     

    3.1

    4.1

    0.9

    1.0

    2.2

    NBU

    -0.3

     

    7.3

     

    -0.2

    -0.2

    -0.2

    -0.1

    -0.1

    Commercial banks

    1.5

     

    -1.5

     

    2.5

    4.1

    1.0

    0.9

    2.2

    Public and publicly-guaranteed debt

    48.9

     

    77.7

     

    82.3

    92.2

    104.3

    105.8

    101.8

                     

    Money and credit (end of period, percent change)

                     

    Base money

    11.2

     

    19.6

     

    23.3

    15.0

    17.2

    12.0

    10.1

    Broad money

    12.0

     

    20.8

     

    23.0

    16.7

    14.4

    12.1

    10.1

    Credit to nongovernment

    8.4

     

    -3.1

     

    -0.5

    11.6

    12.9

    21.0

    17.6

                     

    Balance of payments (percent of GDP)

                     

    Current account balance

    -1.9

     

    4.9

     

    -5.4

    -8.4

    -14.6

    -10.1

    -5.3

    Foreign direct investment

    3.8

     

    0.1

     

    2.5

    2.5

    2.4

    4.1

    5.2

    Gross reserves (end of period, billions of U.S. dollars)

    30.9

     

    28.5

     

    40.5

    42.3

    43.3

    47.9

    50.1

    Months of next year’s imports of goods and services

    4.5

     

    3.8

     

    5.3

    5.3

    5.4

    5.8

    5.9

    Percent of short-term debt (remaining maturity)

    67.5

     

    64.3

     

    87.1

    102.7

    99.8

    112.3

    116.0

    Percent of the IMF composite metric (float)

    104.4

     

    103.6

     

    124.1

    112.0

    100.5

    100.2

    102.0

    Goods exports (annual volume change in percent)

    35.3

     

    -44.7

     

    -15.8

    15.5

    1.6

    16.7

    10.6

    Goods imports (annual volume change in percent)

    16.9

     

    -23.6

     

    21.7

    9.3

    6.9

    8.9

    9.4

    Goods terms of trade (percent change)

    -8.4

     

    -11.6

     

    3.6

    0.3

    -1.9

    1.2

    1.4

                     

    Exchange rate

                     

    Hryvnia per U.S. dollar (end of period)

    27.3

     

    36.6

     

    38.0

    Hryvnia per U.S. dollar (period average)

    27.3

     

    32.3

     

    36.6

    Real effective rate (deflator-based, percent change)

    8.8

     

    30.5

     

    -2.0

    Memorandum items:

    Per capita GDP / Population (2017): US$2,640 / 44.8 million

    Literacy / Poverty rate (2022 est 3/): 100 percent / 25 percent

    Sources: Ukrainian authorities; World Bank, World Development Indicators; and IMF staff estimates.

    1/ GDP is compiled as per SNA 2008 and excludes territories that are or were in direct combat zones and temporarily occupied by Russia (consistent with   the TMU).

    2/ The general government includes the central and local governments and the social funds.

    3/ Based on World Bank estimates.

                                     

    [1] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summing up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Camila Perez

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Completes the Sixth Review of the Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility for Ukraine

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    December 20, 2024

    • The IMF Board today completed the Sixth Review of the Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) for Ukraine, enabling a disbursement of about US$1.1 billion (SDR 834.9 million) to Ukraine, which will be channeled by the authorities for budget support.
    • Ukraine’s economy remains resilient, and performance remains strong under the EFF despite challenging conditions. The authorities met all end-September quantitative performance criteria and structural benchmarks.
    • Sustained reform momentum, progress at domestic revenue mobilization, and timely disbursement of external support are necessary to safeguard macroeconomic stability, restore fiscal and debt sustainability, and improve governance.

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) today completed the Sixth Review of the EFF, enabling the authorities to draw US$1.1 billion (SDR 834.9 million), which will be channeled by the authorities for budget support. This will bring the total disbursements under the IMF-supported program to US$9.8 billion.

    Ukraine’s 48-month EFF, with access of SDR 11.6 billion (equivalent to US$15.5 billion, or about 577 percent of quota), was approved on March 31, 2023, and forms part of a US$148 billion support package for Ukraine. The authorities’ IMF-supported program helps anchor policies that sustain fiscal, external, and macro-financial stability at a time of exceptionally high uncertainty. The EFF aims to support the economic recovery, enhance governance, and strengthen institutions with the aim of promoting long-term growth in the context of reconstruction and Ukraine’s path to EU accession.

    Ukraine’s performance under its program remains strong. All end-September and continuous quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets were met. The authorities have also completed a prior action on the enactment of the package of tax measures, have met all end-October structural benchmarks due by the Sixth Review and three of the end-December benchmarks.  

    Economic growth in 2024 has been upgraded given better than expected resilience to the energy shocks. However, a slowdown is expected in 2025 due to an increasingly tight labor market, the impact of Russian attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure, and continued uncertainty about the war. Inflation has risen recently, mainly due to food prices, while inflation expectations remain well anchored. Adequate reserves have been sustained by continued sizeable external support. Overall, the outlook remains subject to exceptionally high uncertainty.

    Following the Executive Board discussion on Ukraine, Ms. Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director of the IMF, issued the following statement[1]:

    “Russia’s war in Ukraine continues to take a devastating social and economic toll on Ukraine. Despite the war, macroeconomic stability is being preserved through skillful policymaking by the Ukrainian authorities as well as substantial external support. The economy has remained resilient, reflecting the continued adaptability of households and firms, although risks are tilted to the downside due to headwinds from attacks on energy infrastructure and a tight labor market. Preparedness and contingency planning are key to enable appropriate policy action should risks materialize.

    The program remains fully financed with a cumulative external financing envelope of US$148 billion in the baseline and US$177 billion in the downside over the 4-year program period, including commitments from the G7’s Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration Loans for Ukraine (ERA) initiative. Full, timely and predictable external support—on terms consistent with debt sustainability—remains essential to maintaining full program financing and safeguarding stability.

    A tax package and 2025 Budget in line with the program baseline have been enacted, but there are few remaining buffers and strict budget execution will be key. Continued progress at domestic revenue mobilization is imperative for Ukraine to meet its high priority spending needs and to restore fiscal sustainability. Strong implementation of the National Revenue Strategy and customs reform will help raise further revenues, improve compliance, combat evasion, and support EU accession.

    After completing the Eurobond exchange in August, the authorities are now focusing on reaching agreement with other holders of external commercial claims, including GDP warrants, in line with their strategy. A swift agreement in line with the program’s debt sustainability objectives would reduce fiscal risks and create space for critical spending needs.

    Inflation has accelerated more than expected in recent months, and the recent tightening of monetary policy was appropriate; the NBU should stand ready to take further action should inflation expectations deteriorate. Allowing exchange rate flexibility will help strengthen the resilience of the economy to external shocks while safeguarding reserves.

    The financial sector remains stable, but vigilance is needed given heightened risks. Progress on strengthening bank resolution and risk-based supervision, stress-testing frameworks and contingency planning should be sustained.

    Reform momentum in anticorruption and governance needs to be sustained. In particular, the authorities need to advance the creation of a new court for high public disputes, and amend the criminal procedure code.”

    Table 1. Ukraine: Selected Economic and Social Indicators, 2021–27

    2021

     

    2022

     

    2023

    2024

    2025

    2026

    2027

    Act.

    Act.

    Act.

    Proj.

    Proj.

    Proj.

    Proj.

    Real economy (percent change, unless otherwise indicated)

    Nominal GDP (billions of Ukrainian hryvnias) 1/

    5,451

     

    5,239

     

    6,538

    7,629

    8,680

    9,874

    10,937

    Real GDP 1/

    3.4

     

    -28.8

     

    5.3

    4.0

    2.5-3.5

    5.3

    4.5

    Contributions:

                     

    Domestic demand

    12.9

     

    -22.9

     

    13.9

    6.5

    4.9

    4.5

    4.2

    Private consumption

    4.7

     

    -16.8

     

    5.5

    3.3

    3.2

    3.8

    3.5

    Public consumption

    0.1

     

    12.5

     

    2.6

    -0.1

    -1.1

    -2.5

    -1.9

    Investment

    8.1

     

    -18.6

     

    5.8

    3.3

    2.9

    3.2

    2.6

    Net exports

    -9.5

     

    -5.9

     

    -8.6

    -2.5

    -2.4

    0.8

    0.3

    GDP deflator

    24.8

     

    34.9

     

    18.5

    12.2

    11.0

    8.0

    6.0

    Unemployment rate (ILO definition; period average, percent)

    9.8

     

    24.5

     

    19.1

    13.3

    11.8

    10.2

    9.4

    Consumer prices (period average)

    9.4

     

    20.2

     

    12.9

    6.2

    10.3

    7.7

    5.0

    Consumer prices (end of period)

    10.0

     

    26.6

     

    5.1

    10.0

    7.5

    6.6

    5.0

    Nominal wages (average)

    20.8

     

    1.0

     

    20.1

    19.1

    18.9

    14.1

    10.5

    Real wages (average)

    10.5

     

    -16.0

     

    6.4

    12.1

    7.8

    6.0

    5.3

    Savings (percent of GDP)

    12.5

     

    17.0

     

    9.8

    8.5

    2.9

    9.1

    15.2

    Private

    12.7

     

    30.2

     

    24.6

    24.1

    17.9

    14.7

    13.6

    Public

    -0.2

     

    -13.1

     

    -14.8

    -15.6

    -14.9

    -5.6

    1.5

    Investment (percent of GDP)

    14.5

     

    12.1

     

    15.1

    16.9

    17.5

    19.3

    20.4

    Private

    10.7

     

    9.6

     

    10.4

    13.6

    13.6

    15.0

    15.3

    Public

    3.8

     

    2.5

     

    4.8

    3.4

    4.0

    4.3

    5.1

                     

    General Government (percent of GDP)

                     

    Fiscal balance 2/

    -4.0

     

    -15.6

     

    -19.6

    -18.9

    -18.9

    -9.9

    -3.6

    Fiscal balance, excl. grants 2/

    -4.0

     

    -24.8

     

    -26.1

    -24.3

    -19.7

    -10.1

    -4.6

    External financing (net)

    2.4

     

    10.7

     

    16.5

    14.8

    18.0

    8.9

    1.4

    Domestic financing (net), of which:

    1.6

     

    5.0

     

    3.1

    4.1

    0.9

    1.0

    2.2

    NBU

    -0.3

     

    7.3

     

    -0.2

    -0.2

    -0.2

    -0.1

    -0.1

    Commercial banks

    1.5

     

    -1.5

     

    2.5

    4.1

    1.0

    0.9

    2.2

    Public and publicly-guaranteed debt

    48.9

     

    77.7

     

    82.3

    92.2

    104.3

    105.8

    101.8

                     

    Money and credit (end of period, percent change)

                     

    Base money

    11.2

     

    19.6

     

    23.3

    15.0

    17.2

    12.0

    10.1

    Broad money

    12.0

     

    20.8

     

    23.0

    16.7

    14.4

    12.1

    10.1

    Credit to nongovernment

    8.4

     

    -3.1

     

    -0.5

    11.6

    12.9

    21.0

    17.6

                     

    Balance of payments (percent of GDP)

                     

    Current account balance

    -1.9

     

    4.9

     

    -5.4

    -8.4

    -14.6

    -10.1

    -5.3

    Foreign direct investment

    3.8

     

    0.1

     

    2.5

    2.5

    2.4

    4.1

    5.2

    Gross reserves (end of period, billions of U.S. dollars)

    30.9

     

    28.5

     

    40.5

    42.3

    43.3

    47.9

    50.1

    Months of next year’s imports of goods and services

    4.5

     

    3.8

     

    5.3

    5.3

    5.4

    5.8

    5.9

    Percent of short-term debt (remaining maturity)

    67.5

     

    64.3

     

    87.1

    102.7

    99.8

    112.3

    116.0

    Percent of the IMF composite metric (float)

    104.4

     

    103.6

     

    124.1

    112.0

    100.5

    100.2

    102.0

    Goods exports (annual volume change in percent)

    35.3

     

    -44.7

     

    -15.8

    15.5

    1.6

    16.7

    10.6

    Goods imports (annual volume change in percent)

    16.9

     

    -23.6

     

    21.7

    9.3

    6.9

    8.9

    9.4

    Goods terms of trade (percent change)

    -8.4

     

    -11.6

     

    3.6

    0.3

    -1.9

    1.2

    1.4

                     

    Exchange rate

                     

    Hryvnia per U.S. dollar (end of period)

    27.3

     

    36.6

     

    38.0

    Hryvnia per U.S. dollar (period average)

    27.3

     

    32.3

     

    36.6

    Real effective rate (deflator-based, percent change)

    8.8

     

    30.5

     

    -2.0

    Memorandum items:

    Per capita GDP / Population (2017): US$2,640 / 44.8 million

    Literacy / Poverty rate (2022 est 3/): 100 percent / 25 percent

    Sources: Ukrainian authorities; World Bank, World Development Indicators; and IMF staff estimates.

    1/ GDP is compiled as per SNA 2008 and excludes territories that are or were in direct combat zones and temporarily occupied by Russia (consistent with   the TMU).

    2/ The general government includes the central and local governments and the social funds.

    3/ Based on World Bank estimates.

                                     

    [1] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summing up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Camila Perez

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/12/20/pr-24493-ukraine-imf-completes-6th-rev-of-extended-arrangement-under-eff

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: UN Disarmament Chief Calls Out ‘Unacceptable Levels’ of Civilian Fatalities in Ukraine, as Security Council Debates Western Arms Supplies to Kyiv, Moscow’s Ongoing Attacks

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    Meeting again today to discuss Western arms supplies to Ukraine, the Security Council heard that civilians there continue to be killed and injured by a panoply of deadly munitions, while the organ’s members alternately urged a diplomatic end to the violence and condemned Moscow’s initial — and continued — aggression.

    “More than 1,000 days have passed since the Russian Federation’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, launched on 24 February 2022 in violation of the UN Charter and of international law,” observed Izumi Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs.  Since the Council last met on this topic on 31 October, the world has continued to witness “unacceptable levels” of civilian deaths and injuries, she noted, also spotlighting Moscow’s “systematic and deliberate” targeting of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.

    Transfers of arms and ammunition, and the provision of other forms of military assistance to Ukraine’s Armed Forces, have also continued, she said.  Additionally, there have been reports of States transferring — or planning to transfer — weapons and ammunition to the Russian Federation.  Further reports refer to an increase in military cooperation between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation, including troop deployment by the former into the latter’s Kursk region.

    “I urge all concerned to refrain from any steps that may lead to further spillover and intensification of the conflict, as well as any further harm to civilians,” she said, citing reports by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) of over 12,340 civilians killed — and more than 27,836 injured — between 24 February 2022 and 30 November 2024.  She also noted reports of cross-border strikes by Ukraine inside the Russian Federation – with some reportedly resulting in damage to civilian objects.

    Expressing particular concern over the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, the use and transfer of cluster munitions and recent announcements regarding the transfer of non-persistent anti-personnel landmines, she called on States to abide by their international obligations and become parties to disarmament treaties “as a matter of priority”.  Further, universal participation in arms-control instruments is essential to prevent the diversion of conventional arms and to regulate the international arms trade.

    Concluding, she reiterated the Secretary-General’s call for “a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in Ukraine, consistent with the UN Charter”.

    United States’ Speaker:  Permanent Council Member Violating UN Charter

    “This document has meaning,” stressed the representative of the United States, Council President for December, as he took the floor in his national capacity.  For 80 years — “through thick and thin”, he noted — the Council has worked to uphold the Charter’s principles and to oppose territorial conquest.  Now, today, one of the organ’s permanent members is openly, unashamedly violating the Charter, as well as Council resolutions — that it voted for — to prevent a rogue nation from acquiring nuclear weapons.

    He went on to detail Beijing’s continued supply of dual-use items to Moscow’s war-industrial base, stating that China “telegraphs tacit approval for Russia’s war” by doing so.  “Russia listens only to strength and action — something we collectively lacked when Russia invaded Crimea, and when it invaded Georgia before that,” he noted, adding:  “Appeasement didn’t work then, and it won’t work now.”  Therefore, the United States and its partners will continue supporting both Ukraine and the UN Charter.

    Russian Federation’s Speaker:  Ukraine ‘Gold Mine’ for Military-industrial Complex of ‘Anglo-Saxon Countries’

    Meanwhile, the representative of the Russian Federation said that there would have been no war “if the United States had not supported the coup d’état in Kyiv in 2014” and had not “made Ukraine into anti-Russia”.  Noting that Ukraine has become a “gold mine” for the military-industrial complex of “Anglo-Saxon countries”, he said that half of all weapons sales went to 41 United States corporations.  In 2023, the revenue of 100 major weapons manufacturers reached $632 billion, he added.

    “It would be naïve to think that these unprincipled traders will give up on their huge profits for the benefit of the helpless Ukrainians,” he emphasized.  Further, he said that the Pentagon had to admit that the whereabouts of more than half of the Javelin and Stinger missiles sent to Ukraine were unknown, highlighting the corruption that “accompanies Western supplies”.  He concluded:  “My advice to all of those who are hoping that military activities will stop:  don’t have any illusions about the real intent of the comedian Zelenskyy.  We never had them.”

    Ukraine’s Speaker:  Kyiv Strikes Legitimate Military Targets on Its Occupied Territory and in Russian Federation

    “Ukraine never wanted this war and — more than any country across the globe — Ukraine wants the war to end,” stressed that country’s representative.  Noting that the Russian Federation again prefaced today’s meeting “with air terror against Ukrainian cities”, he described Moscow’s behaviour as:  “A — plan a strike; B — call a Security Council meeting; C — carry out a strike; D — call a meeting to complain about Western weapons supplies”.  This correlation has been registered in at least 18 cases, he emphasized.

    Against this backdrop, Ukraine strikes legitimate military targets on its occupied territories and in the Russian Federation, he went on to say, stressing that “it is more than easy” for Moscow to stop the war it launched.  Instead, Russian Federation President Vladimir V. Putin called for a “high-tech duel” between his country and the West, in which Moscow would strike Kyiv with medium-range ballistic missiles while Western missile-defence systems would attempt to protect it.  “Yesterday’s revelations from Putin leave no room for doubt:  his regime must be neutralized as soon as possible,” he urged.

    Council Members Weigh In

    Throughout the meeting, several Council members also pointed out that it was Moscow who originated the war.  “It is quite clear that this conflict began with Russia’s invasion of a neighbouring country in violation of the UN Charter,” stressed the representative of the Republic of Korea.  “Today’s meeting on the issue of weapons transfers to Ukraine is irrelevant,” he added, underscoring:  “The world knows the difference between an aggressor and a victim.”  He also expressed concern over the future of the “illegal coalition” between Moscow and Pyongyang, which is internationalizing the conflict.

    Similarly, Japan’s representative — noting today’s “shamefully familiar topic” — underscored that “there is only one aggressor in this conflict”.  The Russian Federation launched this unprovoked war of aggression, and that country is the one systematically violating international law.  Also expressing concern over Moscow’s military cooperation with Pyongyang and Tehran, he stressed:  “We must focus on Russia’s violations of international law and not fall prey to its disinformation or malicious tactics.”

    Echoing that was France’s delegate, who said that today’s “umpteenth meeting” on arms transfers requested by the Russian Federation was merely “a smokescreen to mask” its treatment of Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence.  “There is one aggressor:  Russia,” he underscored.  Moscow can choose to cease its aggression at any time without harming its own security, but Ukraine’s right to defend itself includes striking Russian Federation military targets.

    “Every country has an inalienable right to defend itself in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter,” observed Slovenia’s representative, adding:  “By extension, every country has the right to procure the means to defend themselves.”  As others, he said that “it is worth pointing to the source of inconsistencies with international law during this war — it is Russia that illegally invaded Ukraine”.  Also expressing concern over the extent of mine use in Ukraine, he stressed that these weapons will “pose a threat to the civilian population for years to come”.

    Ukraine Most Mined Country in the World 

    On that, Guyana’s delegate observed that Ukraine is now considered “the most-mined country in the world”, as potentially 23 per cent of its land is at risk of contamination with likely clearing costs of over $34 billion.  Emphasizing that such weapons “have no place in our world”, she called on all States transferring weapons and ammunition into the conflict area to do so within the existing international legal framework — including Council resolutions – and with adequate controls in place to prevent their irregular transfer. 

    In that vein, Mozambique’s delegate called on weapons-exporting States to refrain from transferring arms where risks of human-rights violations or breaches of international humanitarian law exist.  Similarly, recipient States must ensure that the arms transferred are used in a manner consistent with applicable international legal instruments and are not diverted or transferred to other destinations.  Ecuador’s representative concurred, urging States to act responsibly at every stage of the chain of transfer to prevent the diversion or misuse of arms.

    Algeria’s representative, citing the use of modern medium- and long-range missiles in Ukrainian and Russian Federation territory, called on both parties to ensure that these weapons do not fall into the hands of criminals, terrorists or extremist groups — who often use such weapons against defenceless civilians.  Adding to that, the representative of Sierra Leone urged all parties to “refrain from further escalation in pursuit of the option of winning battles at all costs”.  For his part, the representative of Malta stressed:  “The people of Ukraine deserve better.  The people of Russia deserve better.  Both nations deserve a peaceful future.”

    “Weapons may help win a war, but cannot bring about lasting peace,” observed China’s representative, recalling that Beijing has called on the parties to cease hostilities and restore peace for the past three years.  “The United States is the only country that has chosen to turn a blind eye to China’s efforts,” he said, adding that one country’s security cannot be achieved at the expense of another’s.  He also expressed hope that the United States will abandon the “zero-sum mentality of the cold war”.

    Switzerland’s representative, meanwhile, noted that today’s meeting was one of approximately 70 so far dedicated to Ukraine.  “And, for the seventieth time, I repeat that Russia must immediately withdraw its troops from the entire territory of Ukraine,” she said, adding:  “This repetition is important, however; we cannot — and must not — normalize what has happened in Ukraine.”

    “This Christmas, I suggest the Russian delegation reads How Much Land Does a Man Need? by Leo Tolstoy,” said the representative of the United Kingdom.  Noting that this is a story about a man who — in his greed to acquire more and more land — exhausts himself and dies, he said that the man is then buried in a six-foot grave — “which is all the land he ends up with”.  “The moral is quite clear,” he observed, adding: “The Russians would do well to heed the wisdom of their forebears.”

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Tuberville Discusses Increasing Support for Ag Community in Confirmation Hearing with Brooke Rollins 

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Tommy Tuberville (Alabama)
    WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Senator Tommy Tuberville (R-AL) questioned Brooke Rollins, President Trump’s nominee to be Secretary of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) during her confirmation hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry (Ag). During the hearing, Senator Tuberville asked about Rollins’ plans to bolster global competitiveness of the American agriculture industry, improve federal forest management, and increase support for natural disaster assistance programs.
    As Alabama’s voice on the Senate Ag Committee, Senator Tuberville is committed to ensuring Alabama’s farmers, foresters, and producers have a seat at the table in the Trump administration.
    Excerpts from Senator Tuberville’s remarks can be found below, and his full remarks can be viewed on YouTube or Rumble.

    TUBERVILLE OPENING REMARKS
    TUBERVILLE: “Mrs. Rollins, who would have ever known? Thirty years ago, I’m a young coach at Texas A&M, and you’re Student Body President.”
    ROLLINS: “That’s true.”
    TUBERVILLE: “First time we ever met.”
    ROLLINS: “And we sat next to each other in lots of meetings. That’s exactly right.”
    TUBERVILLE: “And look where we’re at now, huh?”
    ROLLINS: “I know, I know. It’s an amazing thing.”
    TUBERVILLE: “Congratulations. Congratulations.”
    ROLLINS: “Thank you, sir. Thank you.”
    ON ROLLINS’ PLANS TO BOLSTER COMMODITY PRICES
    TUBERVILLE: “You’re going to be awesome. But I don’t want to sugar coat this because my farmers back home are hurting.”
    ROLLINS: “Yes sir.”
    TUBERVILLE: “We’re in trouble. Our farmers are in trouble. Small farmers [are] selling right and left. I’ve got a bill on the floor—actually I dropped it yesterday—about keeping foreign adversaries from buying our farmland. We’re selling it right and left. But I don’t blame them because they can’t make a profit.”
    ROLLINS: “Mhm.” 
    TUBERVILLE: “Row croppers in my state of Alabama are really getting killed. Cotton farmers last year—the input cost was about $400 an acre. They might of got a $100 an acre out of their crop last year. That’s the reason we had to do a supplemental right before Christmas. My phone was ringing off the wall. We have got to help our farmers, but they hate handouts. I’ll tell you that right now—they hate it because they want to do their own work. So I’m glad you understand that—being from Texas, you understand it.” 
    ROLLINS: “Yes sir. Yes sir.”
    TUBERVILLE: “It is a dire problem. And it’s not going to get fixed overnight. I’m looking forward to seeing who your team is going to be around you. […]
    So, we have to get input costs down. That’s not your job. Six, seven years ago, a cotton picker cost six or seven hundred thousand [dollars] in Alabama. Today, it’s $1.5 million.”
    ROLLINS: “Yes sir.”
    TUBERVILLE: “Fertilizer’s gone sky high after the Ukraine war. I mean, it’s embarrassing to where we’ve got. There’s a $45-billion-trade deficit in ag. $45 billion. And the only way that we can get commodity prices back up is handle that trade deficit though, that being said, we need dialogue. If confirmed, will you commit on doing dialogue with President Trump and the people around ag to get our farmers an opportunity to have a better price for their crop?”
    ROLLINS: “Yes, I will, Senator. I so look forward to that. I think one of the things I read recently that only 43% of our ag producers are net-income positive. That is unsustainable. We have to find a better way and it can’t come always through government subsidies. We’ve got to expand the market, we’ve got to figure out input costs. One of President Trump’s top priorities was food inflation. Well, this comes before food inflation because this itself will drive the cost of food down if we do our jobs and if we’re able to produce for our ag community the way that, Coach, I believe that we can working together.”
    TUBERVILLE: “Yeah, what we don’t want to happen is what’s happened to our drug industry. You know, we found in COVID, we look around [thinking] how do we keep people, get people healthy, and all the drugs are made in China. We’re going to end up in the same situation if we don’t wake up and smell the roses. It’s going to happen. Again, people are selling right and left and you can’t blame them. Our small farms are going to end up being corporations like the packing houses. We only got what, like three companies now that are meat packers—and one of them’s owned by China. We’re headed in a direction of unknowns, and it’s going to take leadership from your office back on the right track.”
    ON ROLLINS’ PLAN TO IMPROVE FEDERAL FORESTS
    TUBERVILLE: “Our forest industry in my state—$36 billion a year [in economic benefits]. With the USDA Forest Service under your purview, what priorities do you have for the health of our forests across the country? Not just in Alabama, but we have to continue that to make sure we have healthy wood because it is something that we’re very proud of.”
    ROLLINS: “I know that’s really important to Alabama and many of the other states that are represented here and across the United States Senate. My commitment is to hire an “A++” team. We’ve already announced our Undersecretary Mike Boren for this position. I have great faith in his leadership. He is a businessman, and I think bringing to the table—hopefully with a quick confirmation process from all of you—he will bring to the table a team that will take our great firefighters in the forest service and hopefully, realign and reorganize in a way that makes the forest service—including forest management—more productive, more efficient, more effective, so that we don’t have the issues that we’ve had in these last number of years and especially for our great producers in your state and other states.”
    TUBERVILLE: “Key word: forest management—[two key] words. We’ve got to manage our forests, do it the right way. The American people across the country that are not in this business don’t—they shouldn’t have to pay for the mistakes that we make.”
    ROLLINS: “Correct.”
    TUBERVILLE: “We’re broke. We’re $36 trillion in debt, and it’s getting worse every day. We’re printing $80,000 a second, by the way, and we can’t sustain that. [The] government is way too big.”
    ON GIVING SWIFT, FAIR, NATURAL DISASTER RELIEF TO FARMERS
    TUBERVILLE: “Disaster relief. Disaster relief. If we’ve had problems with tornadoes or floods or whatever in my state, it takes at least three years at times to get any kind of disaster relief. Three years. And you know as well as I do, farmers borrow money from banks for a crop, and those bankers are looking around going, ‘Where’s our money?’ ‘Well, we’re waiting for disaster relief.’ The bankers shouldn’t have to deal with that, nor should the farmers. But, I think there has to be a better plan for that at the end of the day. And again, I’m throwing all your problems out to you, probably don’t want to hear that, but we got a lot of problems that need to be fixed.”
    ROLLINS: “Well Senator—Coach—I believe that you and I have had a conversation with our Commander in Chief, and the fact that it is taking three years to get relief will be unacceptable to him. It is unacceptable to me, and I look forward to working with you to ensure that we do better—much much better than that.”
    TUBERVILLE: “Thank you. Good luck.”
    ROLLINS: “Thank you, sir. Thank you.”
    Senator Tommy Tuberville represents Alabama in the United States Senate and is a member of the Senate Armed Services, Agriculture, Veterans’ Affairs, HELP, and Aging Committees.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: Gran Tierra Energy Inc. Announces 2025 Guidance and Operations Update

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    • 2025 Capital Expenditure Budget of $240-280 Million and Expected 2025 Cash Flow1of $260-300 Million
    • 2025 Capital Program Includes 10-14 Development Wells and 6-8 High Impact Exploration Wells
    • Forecast 2025 Production of 47,000-53,000 BOEPD, Representing at the Midpoint, an Increase of 44% from 2024
    • Forecast 2025 Free Cash Flow2of $90 Million Before Exploration, $20 Million After Exploration in Base Case
    • Plan to Allocate Up To 50% of After Exploration Free Cash Flow to Share Buybacks
    • Achieved Total Company Production for 2024 of 34,710 BOEPD, an Increase of 6% from 2023

    CALGARY, Alberta, Jan. 23, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Gran Tierra Energy Inc. (“Gran Tierra” or the “Company”) (NYSE American:GTE)(TSX:GTE)(LSE:GTE) today announced its 2025 capital budget, production guidance and operational update. All dollar amounts are in United States dollars and all production volumes are on a working interest before royalties basis and are expressed in barrels of oil equivalent (“boe”) per day (“BOEPD”), unless otherwise stated.

    Message to Shareholders

    Gary Guidry, President and Chief Executive Officer of Gran Tierra, commented: “Following up on a strong 2024, which included a very successful exploration campaign and a new country entry into Canada, we are looking forward to our 2025 development and exploration program. Our 2025 budget, which is expected to be fully funded by Cash Flow1, takes a balanced, returns-focused approach to capital allocation while focusing on portfolio longevity. At the midpoint of the Base Case, our production guidance of 50,000 BOEPD represents an increase of 44% from the 34,710 BOEPD 2024 total company production achieved in 2024.

    We plan to focus on profitably growing reserves and production across our Colombian, Ecuadorian and Canadian assets, pursue high impact exploration throughout our portfolio, and invest in facility and infrastructure projects to maximize the long-term value of our assets. This year’s budget would fulfil our exploration commitments in Ecuador which were a result of obtaining the lands back in 2019. Since 2021 we have drilled 10 exploration wells, had 9 discoveries and shot 238 kilometers of 3D seismic in Ecuador. This year, we expect to drill four exploration wells in Ecuador and two to three wells to further appraise our exciting discoveries. We have also planned a very active capital program in the Suroriente block including drilling 5-7 wells, investing in a gas-to-power project, and significant facility investment to increase fluid handling due to increased production and water injection. We forecast spending approximately $60-$80 million in Suroriente, which would fulfil a material component of our $123 million commitment associated with obtaining the 20-year extension. In addition, we plan on drilling a further two to four high impact exploration wells in Colombia. The exploration program and Suroriente capital program represent approximately $135 million of this year’s capital program. After the fulfilment of commitments in 2025, we expect 2026 and beyond to be focused on exploiting our extensive asset base, including anticipated development of our recent discoveries, drilling on our extensive Canadian landholdings and optimizing our assets under waterflood.

    We believe Gran Tierra is strongly positioned with a low base decline, a robust portfolio of conventional and unconventional oil and gas assets, and a high-impact exploration program. As we continue to profitably advance our operational and financial goals, we remain deeply committed to the well-being of our employees and the communities where we operate, recognizing their essential role in our success.”

    Key Highlights:

    2025 Guidance:

    • Gran Tierra is forecasting the following ranges for the Company’s 2025 budget:
     2025 Budget Low Case Base Case High Case
     Brent Oil Price ($/bbl) 65.00 75.00 85.00
     WTI Oil Price ($/bbl) 61.00 71.00 81.00
     AECO Natural Gas Price ($CAD/thousand cubic feet) 2.00 2.50 3.50
     Production (BOEPD) 47,000-53,000 47,000-53,000 47,000-53,000
     Operating Netback3 ($ million) 330-370 430-470 510-550
     EBITDA4 ($ million) 300-340 380-420 460-500
     Cash Flow1 ($ million) 200-240 260-300 300-340
     Capital Expenditures ($ million) 200-240 240-280 240-280
     Free Cash Flow2 ($ million) 20 60
     Number of Development Wells (gross) 8-12 10-14 10-14
     Number of Exploration Wells (gross) 6 6-8 6-8
     Budgeted Costs Costs per BOE ($/boe)
     Lifting 12.00-14.00
     Workovers 1.50-2.50
     Transportation 1.00-2.00
     General and Administration 2.00-3.00
     Interest 4.00-4.50
     Current Tax 2.00-3.00

    * Budgeted royalties as a percentage of total revenue were approximately 19% in the base case

    • 2025 Base Capital Program: Building on a successful capital campaign in 2024, Gran Tierra plans to continue to execute on its strategy of delivering value by seeking to add new reserves, investing in facility and infrastructure projects to maximize recovery and minimize cost, and providing future growth through exploration. Gran Tierra forecasts spending approximately 55% of its capital program in Colombia, 30% in Ecuador, and 15% in Canada, respectively.
    Category Capital ($ million) Key Activities
    Colombia Development 105-120 Suroriente (47% W.I.): Drill 5-7 gross development wells;
    facility expansion, gas-to-power generation upgrades and
    social investment in the area
    Acordionero (100% W.I.): Investment facility expansion
    activities, gas-to-power generation upgrades and injector
    conversions
    Ecuador Development 35-45 Chanangue/Charapa (100% W.I.): Drill 2-3 appraisal wells
    Canada Development 35-45 Simonette (50% W.I.): Drill 5 gross development wells
    Nisku (100% W.I.): Drill 1 development well
    Exploration 65-70 Ecuador: Drill 4 exploration wells
    Colombia: Drill 2 to 4 exploration wells
     
    • Development: Gran Tierra expects to drill a total of 10 to 14 net development wells in its 2025 capital program, including: 
      • Suroriente: The Company plans to drill 5-7 gross development wells in the Cohembi oil field located in the Southern Putumayo Basin of Colombia. In addition to development drilling, Gran Tierra is also planning facility expansion, gas-to-power generation upgrades, and continued social investment in the area. With the planned investments in 2025, production and reserves are expected to significantly increase in 2026 and beyond.
      • Acordionero: The Company plans to focus on the optimization of the field through continued waterflood expansion activities, including facility expansions, workovers (ESP upsizes and injector conversions) and gas-to-power generation upgrades. These expenditures are expected to reduce unit costs while maintaining production by offsetting natural declines and increasing overall recovery. The Company is planning an active development drilling program in 2026.
      • Chanangue: The Company plans to continue its appraisal program on the highly prospective Arawana/Zabaleta productive trend in Ecuador by drilling 2-3 appraisal wells.
      • Simonette: Gran Tierra plans to drill 2.5 net wells at Simonette targeting two-layer co-development of the Lower and Middle Montney offering improved capital efficiency and lower proportionate infrastructure spending.
    • Exploration: Approximately 20-30% of the Company’s 2025 capital program is expected to be allocated to high impact exploration activities and the drilling of 6 to 8 exploration wells in Colombia and Ecuador in the Base and High Case. Gran Tierra’s 2025 exploration drilling is planned to follow up on the encouraging results from the Company’s 2024 exploration program while meeting all its Ecuador exploration commitments. The Company continues to focus its exploration program on short-cycle time, near-field prospects in proven basins with access to transportation infrastructure.
    • Fully Funded Capital Program Generating Free Cash Flow2: Gran Tierra’s mid-point Base Case 2025 capital budget of $260 million is expected to be fully funded from the Base Case 2025 mid-point Cash Flow1 forecast of $280 million, based on an assumed average $75.00/bbl Brent oil price, $71.00/bbl WTI oil price, and CAD$2.50/thousand cubic feet AECO natural gas price. Gran Tierra remains focused on generating Free Cash Flow2, ongoing net debt5 reduction and shareholder returns via share buybacks.
    • Share Buybacks: During 2025, Gran Tierra plans to allocate up to approximately 50% of its Free Cash Flow after exploration to share buybacks in the Base Case. During 2024, the Company repurchased approximately 6.7% of its outstanding shares.

    Gran Tierra’s Commitment to Go “Beyond Compliance” with Safe and Sustainable Operations

    • 2024 was the Company’s safest year in company history, with a total of 27.8 million person-hours without a Lost Time Injury (LTI), and a Total Recordable Case Frequency (TRCF) of 0.03, which places Gran Tierra within the top quartile in safety performance in the Americas.

    Operations Update

    • 2024 Production
      • Gran Tierra achieved total company average production in 2024 of approximately 34,710 BOEPD, an increase of 6% from 2023 and 13% from 2022.
    • Ecuador
      • Chanangue Block: Gran Tierra has completed its first horizontal well drilled in Ecuador, the Zabaleta Oeste well. The well drilled through 700 feet of pay in the Basal Tena formation and has yielded promising results, confirming the area’s potential for horizontal development. The well continues to clean-up and we anticipate the clean-up will take longer than what is expected for a vertical well. Encouragingly, the well encountered good porosity sands, validating our geologic and reservoir models and confirming the extent of the Basal Tena sands within the Chanangue Block.
      • Iguana Block: Following the drilling of the Zabaleta Oeste well, the rig is currently being mobilized over to the Iguana Block to drill the first exploration well of 2025.
    • Canada
      • Simonette: The development plan with our new Joint Venture partner, Logan Energy, has commenced with the first two wells being drilled. Both wells are planned to be stimulated by the end of the first quarter or the beginning of the second quarter of 2025.
      • Central: Gran Tierra has drilled a well in the Nisku play with a horizontal lateral length of over 3,000 meters; testing is planned to commence in February 2025.
      • Clearwater: Gran Tierra has drilled 5 new wells in the Clearwater at East Dawson and Walrus. The Clearwater program has confirmed the quality of our acreage in the Clearwater play. These wells are expected to come onstream in late January 2025.
    • Colombia
      • Suroriente Block: A rig is currently being mobilized to the Cohembi North pad, with first production expected by the end of the first quarter of 2025.

    1“Cash Flow” refers to line item “net cash provided by operating activities” under generally accepted accounting principles in the United States of America (“GAAP”).
    2“Free Cash Flow” is a non-GAAP measure and does not have a standardized meaning under GAAP. Free Cash Flow is defined as “net cash provided by operating activities” less capital expenditures. Refer to “Non-GAAP Measures” in this press release. Forecast 2025 free cash flow of $80 million “before exploration” is equal to the Base Case midpoint cash flow of $280 million less the Base Case midpoint total capital of $260 million, with Base Case midpoint exploration-only capital of approximately $70 million added back. Forecast 2025 Free Cash Flow of $20 million “after exploration” is equal to the Base Case midpoint cash flow of $280 million less the Base Case midpoint total capital of $260 million. Free Cash Flows in the table above are the midpoints of the ranges of cash flows less the midpoints of the ranges of total capital expenditures for each oil price scenario.
    3“Operating netback” is a non-GAAP measures and does not have standardized meaning under GAAP. Refer to “Non-GAAP Measures” in this press release.
    4Earnings before interest, taxes and depletion, depreciation and accretion (“EBITDA”) is a non-GAAP measure and does not have a standardized meaning under GAAP. Refer to “Non-GAAP Measures” in this press release.
    5Net debt is defined as GAAP total debt before deferred financing fees less cash.

    Contact Information

    For investor and media inquiries please contact:

    Gary Guidry
    President & Chief Executive Officer

    Ryan Ellson
    Executive Vice President & Chief Financial Officer

    +1-403-265-3221

    info@grantierra.com

    About Gran Tierra Energy Inc.

    Gran Tierra Energy Inc., together with its subsidiaries, is an independent international energy company currently focused on oil and natural gas exploration and production in Canada, Colombia and Ecuador. The Company is currently developing its existing portfolio of assets in Canada, Colombia and Ecuador and will continue to pursue additional new growth opportunities that would further strengthen the Company’s portfolio. The Company’s common stock trades on the NYSE American, the Toronto Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol GTE. Additional information concerning Gran Tierra is available at www.grantierra.com. Except to the extent expressly stated otherwise, information on the Company’s website or accessible from our website or any other website is not incorporated by reference into and should not be considered part of this press release. Investor inquiries may be directed to info@grantierra.com or (403) 265-3221.

    Gran Tierra’s filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) are available on the SEC website at http://www.sec.gov. The Company’s Canadian securities regulatory filings are available on SEDAR+ at http://www.sedarplus.ca and UK regulatory filings are available on the National Storage Mechanism website at https://data.fca.org.uk/#/nsm/nationalstoragemechanism.

    Forward-Looking Statements and Advisories

    This press release contains opinions, forecasts, projections, and other statements about future events or results that constitute forward-looking statements within the meaning of the United States Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and financial outlook and forward looking information within the meaning of applicable Canadian securities laws (collectively, “forward-looking statements, which can be identified by such terms as “expect”, “plan”, “can,” “will,” “should,” “guidance,” “forecast,” “signal,” “measures taken to” and “believes”, derivations thereof and similar terms identify forward-looking statements. Such forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, the Company’s capital budget amount and uses; the Company’s strategies related to exploration, drilling and operation activities; expectations regarding reservoir prospects and production amounts; future well results (including initial oil and natural gas production rates and productive capacity based on past performance); expected future net cash provided by operating activities (described in this press release as “cash flow”), free cash flow, operating netback, EBITDA and certain associated metrics; anticipated capital expenditures, including the location and impact of capital expenditures; operating and general and administrative costs; production guidance for 2025; and the Company’s expectations as to debt repayment, share repurchases and its positioning for 2025 and beyond. The forward-looking statements contained in this press release reflect several material factors and expectations and assumptions of Gran Tierra including, without limitation, that Gran Tierra will continue to conduct its operations in a manner consistent with its current expectations, the ability of Gran Tierra to successfully integrate the assets and operations of i3 Energy or realize the anticipated benefits and operating synergies expected from the acquisition of i3 Energy, the accuracy of testing and production results and seismic data, pricing and cost estimates (including with respect to commodity pricing and exchange rates), and the general continuance of current or, where applicable, assumed operational, regulatory and industry conditions in Canada, Colombia and Ecuador and areas of potential expansion, and the ability of Gran Tierra to execute its business and operational plans in the manner currently planned. Gran Tierra believes the material factors, expectations and assumptions reflected in the forward-looking statements are reasonable at this time, but no assurance can be given that these factors, expectations and assumptions will prove to be correct. 

    Among the important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those indicated by the forward-looking statements in this press release are: certain of Gran Tierra’s operations are located in South America and unexpected problems can arise due to guerilla activity, strikes, local blockades or protests; technical difficulties and operational difficulties may arise which impact the production, transport or sale of Gran Tierra’s products; other disruptions to local operations; global and regional changes in the demand, supply, prices, differentials or other market conditions affecting oil and gas, including inflation and changes resulting from a global health crisis, geopolitical events, including the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Gaza region, or from the imposition or lifting of crude oil production quotas or other actions that might be imposed by OPEC and other producing countries and resulting company or third-party actions in response to such changes; changes in commodity prices, including volatility or a prolonged decline in these prices relative to historical or future expected levels; the risk that current global economic and credit conditions may impact oil and natural gas prices and oil and natural gas consumption more than Gran Tierra currently predicts, which could cause Gran Tierra to further modify its strategy and capital spending program; prices and markets for oil and natural gas are unpredictable and volatile; the effect of hedges; the accuracy of productive capacity of any particular field; geographic, political and weather conditions can impact the production, transport or sale of Gran Tierra’s products; the ability of Gran Tierra to execute its business plan, which may include acquisitions, and realize expected benefits from current or future initiatives; the risk that unexpected delays and difficulties in developing currently owned properties may occur; the ability to replace reserves and production and develop and manage reserves on an economically viable basis; the accuracy of testing and production results and seismic data, pricing and cost estimates (including with respect to commodity pricing and exchange rates); the risk profile of planned exploration activities; the effects of drilling down-dip; the effects of waterflood and multi-stage fracture stimulation operations; the extent and effect of delivery disruptions, equipment performance and costs; actions by third parties; the timely receipt of regulatory or other required approvals for Gran Tierra’s operating activities; the failure of exploratory drilling to result in commercial wells; unexpected delays due to the limited availability of drilling equipment and personnel; volatility or declines in the trading price of Gran Tierra’s common stock or bonds; the risk that Gran Tierra does not receive the anticipated benefits of government programs, including government tax refunds; Gran Tierra’s ability to comply with financial covenants in its credit agreement and indentures and make borrowings under its credit agreement; and the risk factors detailed from time to time in Gran Tierra’s periodic reports filed with the SEC, including, without limitation, under the caption “Risk Factors” in Gran Tierra’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2023 filed on February 20, 2024 and its other filings with the SEC. These filings are available on the SEC’s website at http://www.sec.gov and on SEDAR at www.sedar.com. Guidance is uncertain, particularly when given over extended periods of time, and results may be materially different. Although the current capital spending program and long term strategy of Gran Tierra is based upon the current expectations of the management of Gran Tierra, should any one of a number of issues arise, Gran Tierra may find it necessary to alter its business strategy and/or capital spending program and there can be no assurance as at the date of this press release as to how those funds may be reallocated or strategy changed and how that would impact Gran Tierra’s results of operations and financing position. All forward-looking statements are made as of the date of this press release and the fact that this press release remains available does not constitute a representation by Gran Tierra that Gran Tierra believes these forward-looking statements continue to be true as of any subsequent date. Actual results may vary materially from the expected results expressed in forward-looking statements. Gran Tierra disclaims any intention or obligation to update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, except as expressly required by applicable law. Gran Tierra’s forward-looking statements are expressly qualified in their entirety by this cautionary statement.

    The estimates of future production, EBITDA, net cash provided by operating activities (described in this press release as “Cash Flow”), Free Cash Flow and operating netback may be considered to be future-oriented financial information or a financial outlook for the purposes of applicable Canadian securities laws. Financial outlook and future-oriented financial information contained in this press release about prospective financial performance, financial position or cash flows are provided to give the reader a better understanding of the potential future performance of the Company in certain areas and are based on assumptions about future events, including economic conditions and proposed courses of action, based on management’s assessment of the relevant information currently available, and to become available in the future. In particular, this press release contains projected operational and financial information for 2025. These projections contain forward-looking statements and are based on a number of material assumptions and factors set out above. Actual results may differ significantly from the projections presented herein. The actual results of Gran Tierra’s operations for any period could vary from the amounts set forth in these projections, and such variations may be material. See above for a discussion of the risks that could cause actual results to vary. The future-oriented financial information and financial outlooks contained in this press release have been approved by management as of the date of this press release. Readers are cautioned that any such financial outlook and future-oriented financial information contained herein should not be used for purposes other than those for which it is disclosed herein. The Company and its management believe that the prospective financial information has been prepared on a reasonable basis, reflecting management’s best estimates and judgments, and represent, to the best of management’s knowledge and opinion, the Company’s expected course of action. However, because this information is highly subjective, it should not be relied on as necessarily indicative of future results.

    Presentation of Oil and Gas Information

    This press release contains certain oil and gas metrics, including operating netback, which do not have standardized meanings or standard methods of calculation and therefore such measures may not be comparable to similar measures used by other companies and should not be used to make comparisons. Such metrics are calculated as described in this press release and have been included herein to provide readers with additional measures to evaluate the Company’s performance; however, such measures are not reliable indicators of the future performance of the Company and future performance may not compare to the performance in previous periods.

    References to a formation where evidence of hydrocarbons has been encountered is not necessarily an indicator that hydrocarbons will be recoverable in commercial quantities or in any estimated volume. Gran Tierra’s reported production is a mix of light crude oil and medium, heavy crude oil, tight oil, conventional natural gas, shale gas and natural gas liquids for which there is no precise breakdown since the Company’s sales volumes typically represent blends of more than one product type. Well test results should be considered as preliminary and not necessarily indicative of long-term performance or of ultimate recovery. Well log interpretations indicating oil and gas accumulations are not necessarily indicative of future production or ultimate recovery. If it is indicated that a pressure transient analysis or well-test interpretation has not been carried out, any data disclosed in that respect should be considered preliminary until such analysis has been completed. References to thickness of “oil pay” or of a formation where evidence of hydrocarbons has been encountered is not necessarily an indicator that hydrocarbons will be recoverable in commercial quantities or in any estimated volume.

    Boe’s have been converted on the basis of six thousand cubic feet (“Mcf”) natural gas to 1 bbl of oil. Boe’s may be misleading, particularly if used in isolation. A boe conversion ratio of 6 Mcf: 1 bbl is based on an energy equivalency conversion method primarily applicable at the burner tip and does not represent a value equivalency at the wellhead. In addition, given that the value ratio based on the current price of oil as compared with natural gas is significantly different from the energy equivalent of six to one, utilizing a boe conversion ratio of 6 Mcf: 1 bbl would be misleading as an indication of value.

    Non-GAAP Measures

    This press release includes forward-looking non-GAAP financial measures as further described herein. These non-GAAP measures do not have a standardized meaning under GAAP. Investors are cautioned that these measures should not be construed as an alternative to net income or loss or other measures of financial performance as determined in accordance with GAAP. Gran Tierra’s method of calculating these measures may differ from other companies and, accordingly, it may not be comparable to similar measures used by other companies. These non-GAAP financial measures are presented along with the corresponding GAAP measure so as to not imply that more emphasis should be placed on the non-GAAP measure.

    Gran Tierra is unable to provide forward-looking net income, net cash provided by operating activities, and oil and gas sales, the GAAP measures most directly comparable to the non-GAAP measures EBITDA, free cash flow and operating netback, respectively, due to the impracticality of quantifying certain components required by GAAP as a result of the inherent volatility in the value of certain financial instruments held by the Company and the inability to quantify the effectiveness of commodity price derivatives used to manage the variability in cash flows associated with the forecasted sale of its oil and natural gas production and changes in commodity prices.

    Operating netback as presented is defined as projected 2025 oil and gas sales less projected 2025 operating and transportation expenses. The most directly comparable GAAP measures are oil and gas sales and oil and gas sales price, respectively. Management believes that operating netback is useful supplemental measures for management and investors to analyze financial performance and provides an indication of the results generated by our principal business activities prior to the consideration of other income and expenses. Gran Tierra is unable to provide a quantitative reconciliation of either forward-looking operating netback to its most directly comparable forward-looking GAAP measure because management cannot reliably predict certain of the necessary components of such forward-looking GAAP measures.

    EBITDA as presented is defined as projected 2025 net income adjusted for DD&A expenses, interest expense and income tax expense or recovery. The most directly comparable GAAP measure is net income. Management uses this financial measure to analyze performance and income or loss generated by our principal business activities prior to the consideration of how non-cash items affect that income, and believes that this financial measure is also useful supplemental information for investors to analyze performance and our financial results. Gran Tierra is unable to provide a quantitative reconciliation of forward-looking EBITDA to its most directly comparable forward-looking GAAP measure because management cannot reliably predict certain of the necessary components of such forward-looking GAAP measure.

    Free cash flow as presented is defined as GAAP projected “net cash provided by operating activities” less projected 2025 capital spending. The most directly comparable GAAP measure is net cash provided by operating activities. Management believes that free cash flow is a useful supplemental measure for management and investors to in order to evaluate the financial sustainability of the Company’s business. Gran Tierra is unable to provide a quantitative reconciliation of forward-looking free cash flow to its most directly comparable forward-looking GAAP measure because management cannot reliably predict certain of the necessary components of such forward-looking GAAP measure.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Gran Tierra Energy Inc. Reports Robust Reserves Replacement and Record High Reserves

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    • Sixth Consecutive Year of 1P Total Reserves Growth Resulting in Highest Total Reserves in Company History
    • Delivered 702% 1P and 1,249% 2P Reserves Replacement Including Recent Acquisition
    • Total Liquids 1P and 2P Reserves Increased to 128 and 217 Million Barrels of Oil Equivalent with 1P and 2P Reserve Life Index increasing to 10 and 17 Years, Respectively
    • Added Total Reserves of 89 MMBOE 1P, 159 MMBOE 2P and 191 MMBOE 3P
    • Net Present Value Before Tax Discounted at 10% of $2.0 Billion (1P), $3.2 Billion (2P), and $4.5 Billion (3P)
    • Net Asset Value per Share of $35.24 Before Tax and $19.53 After Tax (1P), and $71.16 Before Tax and $41.05 After Tax (2P)
    • Strong Finding, Development & Acquisition Costs of $4.49 (1P), $2.52 (2P) and $2.10 (3P), Excluding Changes in Future Development Costs

    CALGARY, Alberta, Jan. 23, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Gran Tierra Energy Inc. (“Gran Tierra” or the “Company”) (NYSE American:GTE)(TSX:GTE)(LSE:GTE), an independent international energy company focused on oil and natural gas exploration and production in Canada, Colombia and Ecuador, today announced the Company’s 2024 year-end reserves as evaluated by the Company’s independent qualified reserves evaluator McDaniel & Associates Consultants Ltd. (“McDaniel”) in a report with an effective date of December 31, 2024 (the “GTE McDaniel Reserves Report”).

    All dollar amounts are in United States (“U.S.”) dollars and all reserves and production volumes are on a working interest before royalties (“WI”) basis (net). Reserves are expressed in barrels (“bbl”), bbl of oil equivalent (“boe”) or million boe (“MMBOE”), while production is expressed in boe per day (“BOEPD”), unless otherwise indicated. The following reserves categories are discussed in this press release: Proved Developed Producing (“PDP”), Proved (“1P”), 1P plus Probable (“2P”) and 2P plus Possible (“3P”).

    Gary Guidry, President and Chief Executive Officer of Gran Tierra, commented: “2024 was another strong year underpinned by multiple exploration discoveries in Ecuador, continued success in managing our Colombian assets, and our new country entry into Canada. The organic and inorganic portfolio growth creates a future runway of highly economic development opportunities in proven plays with access to infrastructure. Gran Tierra’s entry into Canada fits our corporate strategy of focusing on proven hydrocarbon basins which have access to established infrastructure and competitive fiscal regimes. Furthermore, with the addition of Canada, Gran Tierra is well positioned for long-term commodity cycles with approximately 20% of its production, 23% 1P reserves and 26% 2P reserves now attributed to conventional natural gas and shale gas.

    We continue to generate shareholder value through focusing on portfolio longevity and executing on our mandate of growing cash flow and reserves, while maintaining low decline rates through production, development and enhanced oil recovery techniques. Gran Tierra has assembled a diversified, high-quality asset base across multiple attractive jurisdictions and combined with our management team’s strong track record of accretive acquisitions and value creation, we look forward to a successful 2025.

    The success of 2024 is reflected in yet another year of over 100% reserve replacement on a Proved basis. Gran Tierra achieved strong 702% (1P), 1,249% (2P) and 1,500% (3P) reserves replacement through exploration success in Colombia and Ecuador and our entry into Canada. This success resulted in record highs for the Company’s year-end 1P, 2P and 3P oil and gas reserves.”

    *See the below tables for the definitions of net asset values per share.

    Highlights

    2024 Year-End Reserves and Values

    Before Tax (as of December 31, 2024) Units 1P 2P 3P
    Reserves MMBOE 167   293   385  
    Net Present Value at 10% Discount (“NPV10”) $ million 1,950   3,242   4,517  
    Net Debt1 $ million (682 ) (682 ) (682 )
    Net Asset Value (NPV10 less Net Debt) (“NAV”) $ million 1,268   2,560   3,835  
    Outstanding Shares million 35.97   35.97   35.97  
    NAV per Share $/share 35.24   71.16   106.62  
    After Tax (as of December 31, 2024) Units 1P 2P 3P
    Reserves MMBOE 167   293   385  
    NPV10 $ million 1,385   2,159   2,930  
    Net Debt1 $ million (682 ) (682 ) (682 )
    NAV $ million 703   1,477   2,248  
    Outstanding Shares million 35.97   35.97   35.97  
    NAV per Share $/share 19.53   41.05   62.48  

    1Based on estimated unaudited 2024 year-end Net Debt of $682 million comprised of Senior Notes of $787 million (gross) less cash and cash equivalents of $104 million, prepared in accordance with GAAP.

    • As of December 31, 2024, Gran Tierra achieved:
      • Before Tax NAV of $1.3 billion (1P), $2.6 billion (2P), and $3.8 billion (3P)
      • After Tax NAV of $0.7 billion (1P), $1.5 billion (2P), and $2.2 billion (3P)
      • Strong reserves replacement ratios* of:
        • 702% 1P, with 1P reserves additions of 89 MMBOE
        • 1,249% 2P, with 2P reserves additions of 159 MMBOE
        • 1,500% 3P, with 3P reserves additions of 191 MMBOE
      • Finding, development and acquisition costs (“FD&A”), including change in future development costs (“FDC”), on a per boe basis of $9.74 (1P), $8.11 (2P) and $6.92 (3P).
      • FD&A costs excluding change in FDC, on a per boe basis of $4.49 (1P), $2.52 (2P) and $2.10 (3P).
    • Canada now represents 46% of 1P and 51% of 2P reserves compared to Gran Tierra’s total reserves.
    • FDC are forecast by McDaniel to be $1,029 million for 1P reserves and $1,809 million for 2P reserves. Gran Tierra’s 2025 base case mid-point guidance for cash flow** of $280 million is equivalent to 27% of such 1P FDC and 15% of 2P FDC, which highlights the Company’s potential ability to fund future development capital. Increases in FDC relative to 2023 year-end reflect that the GTE McDaniel Reserves Report now assigns Gran Tierra 227 Proved Undeveloped future drilling locations (up from 95 at 2023 year-end) and 441 Proved plus Probable Undeveloped future drilling locations (up from 147 at 2023 year-end).

    *The reserve replacement ratios were calculated based on an annualized production figure based on November and December for Canada plus Colombia and Ecuador actual production, in each case, for the fourth quarter of 2024. The total production rate was 46,619 BOEPD.
    ** “Cash flow” refers to GAAP line item “net cash provided by operating activities”. Gran Tierra’s 2025 base case guidance is based on a forecast 2025 average Brent oil price of $75/bbl. See Gran Tierra’s press release dated January 23, 2025 for additional information regarding cash flow guidance referred to herein. This forecast price used in Gran Tierra’s forecast is lower than the 2025 McDaniel Brent price forecast.

    GTE McDaniel Reserves Report

    All reserves values, future net revenue and ancillary information contained in this press release have been prepared by McDaniel and calculated in compliance with Canadian National Instrument 51-101 – Standards of Disclosure for Oil and Gas Activities (“NI 51-101”) and the Canadian Oil and Gas Evaluation Handbook (“COGEH”) and derived from the GTE McDaniel Reserves Report, unless otherwise expressly stated.

    Future Net Revenue

    Future net revenue reflects McDaniel’s forecast of revenue estimated using forecast prices and costs, arising from the anticipated development and production of reserves, after the deduction of royalties, operating costs, development costs and abandonment and reclamation costs but before consideration of indirect costs such as administrative, overhead and other miscellaneous expenses. The estimate of future net revenue below does not necessarily represent fair market value.

    Consolidated Properties at December 31, 2024
    Proved (1P) Total Future Net Revenue ($ million)
    Forecast Prices and Costs
      Sales Revenue Total Royalties Operating Costs Future Development Capital Abandonment and Reclamation Costs Future Net Revenue Before Future Taxes Future Taxes Future Net Revenue After Future Taxes*
    2025-2029
    (5 Years)
    5,139 (981 ) (1,385 ) (1,025 ) (27 ) 1,721 (491 ) 1,230
    Remainder 3,617 (578 ) (1,549 ) (4 ) (377 ) 1,109 (370 ) 739
    Total (Undiscounted) 8,756 (1,559 ) (2,934 ) (1,029 ) (404 ) 2,830 (861 ) 1,969
    Total (Discounted @ 10%)           1,950 (565 ) 1,385
    Consolidated Properties at December 31, 2024
    Proved Plus Probable (2P) Total Future Net Revenue ($ million)
    Forecast Prices and Costs
    Years Sales Revenue Total Royalties Operating Costs Future Development Capital Abandonment and Reclamation Costs Future Net Revenue Before Future Taxes Future Taxes Future Net Revenue After Future Taxes*
    2025-2029
    (5 Years)
    6,620 (1,297 ) (1,583 ) (1,438 ) (25 ) 2,277 (791 ) 1,486
    Remainder 8,685 (1,529 ) (2,967 ) (371 ) (420 ) 3,398 (1,082 ) 2,316
    Total (Undiscounted) 15,305 (2,826 ) (4,550 ) (1,809 ) (445 ) 5,675 (1,873 ) 3,802
    Total (Discounted @ 10%)           3,242 (1,083 ) 2,159
    Consolidated Properties at December 31, 2024
    Proved Plus Probable Plus Possible (3P) Total Future Net Revenue ($ million)
    Forecast Prices and Costs
    Years Sales Revenue Total Royalties Operating Costs Future Development Capital Abandonment and Reclamation Costs Future Net Revenue Before Future Taxes Future Taxes Future Net Revenue After Future Taxes*
    2025-2029
    (5 Years)
    7,490 (1,467 ) (1,672 ) (1,563 ) (25 ) 2,763 (1,015 ) 1,748
    Remainder 13,422 (2,598 ) (4,106 ) (519 ) (439 ) 5,760 (1,907 ) 3,853
    Total (Undiscounted) 20,912 (4,065 ) (5,778 ) (2,082 ) (464 ) 8,523 (2,922 ) 5,601
    Total (Discounted @ 10%)           4,517 (1,587 ) 2,930

    *The after-tax future net revenue of the Company’s oil and gas properties reflects the tax burden on the properties on a stand-alone basis. It does not consider the corporate tax situation, or tax planning. It does not provide an estimate of the value at the Company level which may be significantly different. The Company’s financial statements, when available for the year ended December 31, 2024, should be consulted for information at the Company level.

    Total Company WI Reserves

    The following table summarizes Gran Tierra’s NI 51-101 and COGEH compliant reserves in aggregate for Colombia, Ecuador and Canada derived from the GTE McDaniel Reserves Report calculated using forecast oil and gas prices and costs.

      Light and Medium Crude Oil Heavy Crude Oil Tight Oil Conventional Natural Gas Shale Gas Natural Gas Liquids 2024 Year-End
    Reserves Category Mbbl* Mbbl* Mbbl* MMcf** MMcf** Mbbl* Mboe***
    Proved Developed Producing 25,539 20,631 329 123,192 2,302 14,464 81,877
    Proved Developed Non-Producing 1,864 1,256 18 5,769 47 746 4,852
    Proved Undeveloped 26,529 22,491 3,040 81,541 16,785 11,476 79,923
    Total Proved 53,932 44,378 3,387 210,502 19,134 26,686 166,652
    Total Probable 30,480 27,532 6,092 196,621 32,869 24,036 126,388
    Total Proved plus Probable 84,412 71,910 9,479 407,123 52,003 50,722 293,040
    Total Possible 27,606 29,916 2,848 99,333 14,506 12,317 91,659
    Total Proved plus Probable plus Possible 112,018 101,826 12,327 506,456 66,509 63,039 384,699

    *Mbbl (thousand bbl of oil).
    **MMcf (million cubic feet).
    ***Mboe (thousand boe).

    Net Present Value Summary

    Gran Tierra’s reserves were evaluated using the average of three independent qualified reserves evaluators’ commodity price forecasts at January 1, 2025 (McDaniel, Sproule and GLJ). See “Forecast Prices” for more information. It should not be assumed that the net present value of cash flow estimated by McDaniel represents the fair market value of Gran Tierra’s reserves.

    Total Company Discount Rate
    ($ millions) 0% 5% 10% 15% 20%
    Before Tax          
    Proved Developed Producing 1,288,263 1,269,021 1,143,703 1,032,260 941,153
    Proved Developed Non-Producing 119,025 98,908 84,070 72,745 63,864
    Proved Undeveloped 1,422,638 1,002,220 722,242 527,670 387,664
    Total Proved 2,829,926 2,370,149 1,950,015 1,632,675 1,392,681
    Total Probable 2,842,656 1,852,742 1,292,189 945,677 717,447
    Total Proved plus Probable 5,672,582 4,222,891 3,242,204 2,578,352 2,110,128
    Total Possible 2,848,360 1,835,802 1,274,763 931,210 706,630
    Total Proved plus Probable plus Possible 8,520,942 6,058,693 4,516,967 3,509,562 2,816,758
    After Tax          
    Proved Developed Producing 984,109 1,012,837 921,809 835,838 764,272
    Proved Developed Non-Producing 82,049 67,860 57,418 49,460 43,223
    Proved Undeveloped 902,725 603,616 405,947 269,984 173,307
    Total Proved 1,968,883 1,684,313 1,385,174 1,155,282 980,802
    Total Probable 1,831,204 1,148,223 773,804 548,846 404,333
    Total Proved plus Probable 3,800,087 2,832,536 2,158,978 1,704,128 1,385,135
    Total Possible 1,799,304 1,130,855 770,970 554,619 415,175
    Total Proved plus Probable plus Possible 5,599,391 3,963,391 2,929,948 2,258,747 1,800,310

    Reserve Life Index (Years)

      December 31, 2024*    
    Total Proved 10    
    Total Proved plus Probable 17    
    Total Proved plus Probable plus Possible 23    

    * Calculated using an annualized WI production figure based on November and December 2024 for Canada plus Colombia and Ecuador actual average WI production, in each case, for the fourth quarter of 2024. The total production rate was 46,619 BOEPD.

    Future Development Costs

    FDC reflects McDaniel’s best estimate of what it will cost to bring the Proved Undeveloped and Probable Undeveloped reserves on production. Changes in forecast FDC occur annually as a result of development activities, acquisition and disposition activities, and changes in capital cost estimates based on improvements in well design and performance, as well as changes in service costs. FDC for 2P reserves increased to $1,809 million at year-end 2024 from $923 million at year-end 2023. The increase in FDC in 2024 was predominantly attributed to the acquisition of i3 Energy plc in 2024.

    ($ millions) Total Proved Total Proved Plus Probable Total Proved Plus Probable Plus Possible
    2025 141 147 153
    2026 343 379 387
    2027 291 380 388
    2028 135 311 358
    2029 115 221 277
    Remainder 4 371 519
    Total (undiscounted) 1,029 1,809 2,082
    ($ millions) Proved Proved plus Probable Proved plus Probable plus Possible
    Acordionero 175 175 175
    Chaza Block (Costayaco & Moqueta) 138 163 163
    Suroriente 130 213 292
    Ecuador 212 331 428
    Canada – Central 179 378 378
    Canada – Simonette 106 238 238
    Other 89 311 408
    Total FDC Costs (undiscounted) 1,029 1,809 2,082

    Finding, Development and Acquisition Costs

    Reserves (Mboe)   Year Ended December 31, 2024
    Proved Developed Producing 81,877
    Total Proved   166,653
    Total Proved plus Probable   293,041
    Total Proved plus Probable plus Possible   384,700
    Capital Expenditures ($000s)  
    – including acquired properties 400,532

    Finding, Development and Acquisition Costs, Excluding FDC*

    Year Ended December 31, 2024
    Proved Developed Producing    
    Reserve Additions (Mboe)   50,933
    FD&A Costs ($/boe)   7.87

    Finding, Development and Acquisition Costs, Including FDC*

    Year Ended December 31, 2024
    Proved Developed Producing    
    Change in FDC ($000s)   18,319
    Reserve Additions (Mboe)   50,933
    FD&A Costs ($/boe)   8.23

    Finding, Development and Acquisition Costs, Excluding FDC*

    Year Ended December 31, 2024
    Total Proved    
    Reserve Additions (Mboe)   89,210
    FD&A Costs ($/boe)   4.49

    Finding, Development and Acquisition Costs, Including FDC*

    Year Ended December 31, 2024
    Total Proved    
    Change in FDC ($000s)   468,518
    Reserve Additions (Mboe)   89,210
    FD&A Costs ($/boe)   9.74

    Finding, Development and Acquisition Costs, Excluding FDC*

    Year Ended December 31, 2024
    Total Proved plus Probable    
    Reserve Additions (Mboe)   158,662
    FD&A Costs ($/boe)   2.52

    Finding, Development and Acquisition Costs, Including FDC*

    Year Ended December 31, 2024
    Total Proved plus Probable    
    Change in FDC ($000s)   886,720
    Reserve Additions (Mboe)   158,662
    FD&A Costs ($/boe)   8.11

    Finding, Development and Acquisition Costs, Excluding FDC*

    Year Ended December 31, 2024
    Total Proved plus Probable plus Possible  
    Reserve Additions (Mboe)   190,562
    FD&A Costs ($/boe)   2.10

    Finding, Development and Acquisition Costs, Including FDC*

    Year Ended December 31, 2024
    Total Proved plus Probable plus Possible  
    Change in FDC ($000s)   917,617
    Reserve Additions (Mboe)   190,562
    FD&A Costs ($/boe)   6.92

    *In all cases, the FD&A number is calculated by dividing the identified capital expenditures by the applicable reserves additions both before and after changes in FDC costs. Both FD&A costs take into account reserves revisions during the year on a per boe basis. The aggregate of the exploration and development costs incurred in the financial year and the changes during that year in estimated future development costs may not reflect the total FD&A costs related to reserves additions for that year.

    Forecast Prices

    The pricing assumptions used in estimating NI 51-101 and COGEH compliant reserves data disclosed above with respect to net present values of future net revenue are set forth below. The price forecasts are based on an average of three independent qualified reserves evaluators’ commodity price forecasts at January 1, 2025 (McDaniel, Sproule and GLJ). All three of these companies are independent qualified reserves evaluators and auditors pursuant to NI 51-101.

      Brent Crude Oil WTI Crude Oil Alberta AECO Gas Foreign Exchange Rate
    Year $US/bbl $US/bbl $CAD/MMBtu $US/$CAD
      January 1, 2025 January 1, 2025 January 1, 2025 January 1, 2025
    2025 $75.58 $71.58 $2.36 0.712
    2026 $78.51 $74.48 $3.33 0.728
    2027 $79.89 $75.81 $3.48 0.743
    2028 $81.82 $77.66 $3.69 0.743
    2029 $83.46 $79.22 $3.76 0.743

    Contact Information

    For investor and media inquiries please contact:

    Gary Guidry, Chief Executive Officer
    Ryan Ellson, Executive Vice President & Chief Financial Officer
    +1-403-265-3221
    info@grantierra.com

    About Gran Tierra Energy Inc.

    Gran Tierra Energy Inc., together with its subsidiaries, is an independent international energy company currently focused on oil and natural gas exploration and production in Canada, Colombia and Ecuador. The Company is currently developing its existing portfolio of assets in Canada, Colombia and Ecuador and will continue to pursue additional new growth opportunities that would further strengthen the Company’s portfolio. The Company’s common stock trades on the NYSE American, the Toronto Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol GTE. Additional information concerning Gran Tierra is available at www.grantierra.com. Except to the extent expressly stated otherwise, information on the Company’s website or accessible from our website or any other website is not incorporated by reference into and should not be considered part of this press release. Investor inquiries may be directed to info@grantierra.com or (403) 265-3221.

    Gran Tierra’s filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) are available on the SEC website at http://www.sec.gov. Gran Tierra’s Canadian securities regulatory filings are available on SEDAR+ at http://www.sedarplus.ca and UK regulatory filings are available on the National Storage Mechanism website at https://data.fca.org.uk/#/nsm/nationalstoragemechanism

    FORWARD LOOKING STATEMENTS ADVISORY

    This press release contains opinions, forecasts, projections, and other statements about future events or results that constitute forward-looking statements within the meaning of the United States Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and financial outlook and forward looking information within the meaning of applicable Canadian securities laws (collectively, “forward-looking statements”), which can be identified by such terms as “expect,” “plan,” “can,” “will,” “should,” “guidance,” “estimate,” “forecast,” “signal,” “progress” and “believes,” derivations thereof and similar terms identify forward-looking statements. Such forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, the Company’s expectations regarding its anticipated benefits of its recent acquisition of i3 Energy plc (“i3 Energy”), estimated quantities and net present values of reserves, capital program, and ability to fund the Company’s exploration program over a period of time, statements about the Company’s financial and performance targets and other forecasts or expectations regarding, or dependent on, the Company’s business outlook for 2025 and beyond, capital spending plans and any benefits of the changes in our capital program or expenditures, well performance, production, the restart of production and workover activity, future development costs, infrastructure schedules, waterflood impacts and plans, growth of referenced reserves, forecast prices, five-year expected oil sales and cash flow and net revenue, estimated recovery factors, liquidity and access to capital, the Company’s strategies and results thereof, the Company’s expectations regarding organic and inorganic growth opportunities, the Company’s operations including planned operations and developments, disruptions to operations and the decline in industry conditions, and expectations regarding environmental commitments.

    The forward-looking statements contained in this press release reflect several material factors and expectations and assumptions of Gran Tierra including, without limitation, that Gran Tierra will continue to conduct its operations in a manner consistent with its current expectations, the ability of Gran Tierra to successfully integrate the assets and operations of i3 Energy or realize the anticipated benefits and operating synergies expected from the acquisition of i3 Energy, the accuracy of testing and production results and seismic data, pricing and cost estimates (including with respect to commodity pricing and exchange rates), rig availability, the effects of drilling down-dip, the effects of waterflood and multi-stage fracture stimulation operations, the extent and effect of delivery disruptions, and the general continuance of current or, where applicable, assumed operational, regulatory and industry conditions in Canada, Colombia and Ecuador and areas of potential expansion, and the ability of Gran Tierra to execute its business and operational plans in the manner currently planned. Gran Tierra believes the material factors, expectations and assumptions reflected in the forward-looking statements are reasonable at this time, but no assurance can be given that these factors, expectations and assumptions will prove to be correct.

    Among the important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those indicated by the forward-looking statements in this press release are: certain of Gran Tierra’s operations are located in South America and unexpected problems can arise due to guerilla activity, strikes, local blockades or protests; technical difficulties and operational difficulties may arise which impact the production, transport or sale of Gran Tierra’s products; other disruptions to local operations; global and regional changes in the demand, supply, prices, differentials or other market conditions affecting oil and natural gas, including inflation and changes resulting from a global health crisis, geopolitical events, including the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Gaza region, or from the imposition or lifting of crude oil production quotas or other actions that might be imposed by OPEC and other producing countries and resulting company or third-party actions in response to such changes; changes in commodity prices, including volatility or a prolonged decline in these prices relative to historical or future expected levels; the risk that current global economic and credit conditions may impact oil and natural prices and oil and natural gas consumption more than Gran Tierra currently predicts, which could cause Gran Tierra to further modify its strategy and capital spending program; prices and markets for oil and natural gas are unpredictable and volatile; the effect of hedges, the accuracy of productive capacity of any particular field; geographic, political and weather conditions can impact the production, transport or sale of Gran Tierra’s products; the ability of Gran Tierra to execute its business plan, which may include acquisitions, and realize expected benefits from current or future initiatives; the risk that unexpected delays and difficulties in developing currently owned properties may occur; the ability to replace reserves and production and develop and manage reserves on an economically viable basis; the accuracy of testing and production results and seismic data, pricing and cost estimates (including with respect to commodity pricing and exchange rates); the risk profile of planned exploration activities; the effects of drilling down-dip; the effects of waterflood and multi-stage fracture stimulation operations; the extent and effect of delivery disruptions, equipment performance and costs; actions by third parties; the timely receipt of regulatory or other required approvals for Gran Tierra’s operating activities; the failure of exploratory drilling to result in commercial wells; unexpected delays due to the limited availability of drilling equipment and personnel; volatility or declines in the trading price of Gran Tierra’s common stock or bonds; the risk that Gran Tierra does not receive the anticipated benefits of government programs, including government tax refunds; Gran Tierra’s ability to comply with financial covenants in its credit agreement and indentures and make borrowings under its credit agreement; and the risk factors detailed from time to time in Gran Tierra’s periodic reports filed with the SEC, including, without limitation, under the caption “Risk Factors” in Gran Tierra’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2023 filed on February 20, 2024 and its other filings with the SEC. These filings are available on the SEC’s website at http://www.sec.gov and on SEDAR at www.sedar.com.

    Statements relating to “reserves” are also deemed to be forward-looking statements, as they involve the implied assessment, based on certain estimates and assumptions, including that the reserves described can be profitably produced in the future.

    Guidance is uncertain, particularly when given over extended periods of time, and results may be materially different. Although the current capital spending program and long term strategy of Gran Tierra is based upon the current expectations of the management of Gran Tierra, should any one of a number of issues arise, Gran Tierra may find it necessary to alter its business strategy and/or capital spending program and there can be no assurance as at the date of this press release as to how those funds may be reallocated or strategy changed and how that would impact Gran Tierra’s results of operations and financing position. All forward-looking statements are made as of the date of this press release and the fact that this press release remains available does not constitute a representation by Gran Tierra that Gran Tierra believes these forward-looking statements continue to be true as of any subsequent date. Actual results may vary materially from the expected results expressed in forward-looking statements. Gran Tierra disclaims any intention or obligation to update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, except as expressly required by applicable law. Gran Tierra’s forward-looking statements are expressly qualified in their entirety by this cautionary statement.

    The estimates of future net revenue, cash flow and certain expenses may be considered to be future-oriented financial information or a financial outlook for the purposes of applicable Canadian securities laws. Financial outlook and future-oriented financial information contained in this press release about prospective financial performance, financial position or cash flows are provided to give the reader a better understanding of the potential future performance of the Company in certain areas and are based on assumptions about future events, including economic conditions and proposed courses of action, based on management’s assessment of the relevant information currently available, and to become available in the future. In particular, this press release contains projected operational and financial information for 2025 2025 and for the next five years to allow readers to assess the Company’s ability to fund its programs. These projections contain forward-looking statements and are based on a number of material assumptions and factors set out above. Actual results may differ significantly from the projections presented herein. The actual results of Gran Tierra’s operations for any period could vary from the amounts set forth in these projections, and such variations may be material. See above for a discussion of the risks that could cause actual results to vary. The future-oriented financial information and financial outlooks contained in this press release have been approved by management as of the date of this press release. Readers are cautioned that any such financial outlook and future-oriented financial information contained herein should not be used for purposes other than those for which it is disclosed herein. The Company and its management believe that the prospective financial information has been prepared on a reasonable basis, reflecting management’s best estimates and judgments, and represent, to the best of management’s knowledge and opinion, the Company’s expected course of action. However, because this information is highly subjective, it should not be relied on as necessarily indicative of future results. See Gran Tierra’s press release dated January 23, 2025 for additional information regarding cash flow guidance referred to herein.

    Non-GAAP Measures

    This press release includes non-GAAP measures which do not have a standardized meaning under GAAP. Investors are cautioned that these measures should not be construed as alternatives to oil and natural gas sales, net income or loss or other measures of financial performance as determined in accordance with GAAP. Gran Tierra’s method of calculating these measures may differ from other companies and, accordingly, they may not be comparable to similar measures used by other companies.

    Net Debt as presented as at December 31, 2024 is comprised of $787 million (gross) of senior notes outstanding less cash and cash equivalents of $104 million, prepared in accordance with GAAP. Management believes that Net Debt is a useful supplemental measure for management and investors to in order to evaluate the financial sustainability of the Company’s business and leverage. The most directly comparable GAAP measure is total debt.

    Unaudited Financial Information

    Certain financial and operating results included in this press release, including debt, cash equivalents, capital expenditures, and production information, are based on unaudited estimated results. These estimated results are subject to change upon completion of the Company’s audited financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2024, and changes could be material. Gran Tierra anticipates filing its audited financial statements and related management’s discussion and analysis for the year ended December 31, 2024 on or before February 26, 2025.

    DISCLOSURE OF OIL AND GAS INFORMATION

    Boe’s have been converted on the basis of six thousand cubic feet (“Mcf”) natural gas to 1 bbl of oil. Boe’s may be misleading, particularly if used in isolation. A boe conversion ratio of 6 Mcf: 1 bbl is based on an energy equivalency conversion method primarily applicable at the burner tip and does not represent a value equivalency at the wellhead. In addition, given that the value ratio based on the current price of oil as compared with natural gas is significantly different from the energy equivalent of six to one, utilizing a boe conversion ratio of 6 Mcf: 1 bbl would be misleading as an indication of value.

    All reserves values, future net revenue and ancillary information contained in this press release have been prepared by McDaniel and are derived from the GTE McDaniel Reserves Report, unless otherwise expressly stated. Any reserves values or related information contained in this press release as of a date other than December 31, 2024 has an effective date of December 31 of the applicable year and is derived from a report prepared by Gran Tierra’s independent qualified reserves evaluator as of such date, and additional information regarding such estimate or information can be found in Gran Tierra’s applicable Statement of Reserves Data and Other Oil and Gas Information on Form 51-101F1 filed on SEDAR at www.sedar.com.

    Estimates of net present value and future net revenue contained herein do not necessarily represent fair market value. Estimates of reserves and future net revenue for individual properties may not reflect the same level of confidence as estimates of reserves and future net revenue for all properties, due to the effect of aggregation. There is no assurance that the forecast price and cost assumptions applied by McDaniel in evaluating Gran Tierra’s reserves and future net revenue will be attained and variances could be material.

    All evaluations of future net revenue contained in the GTE McDaniel Reserves Report are after the deduction of royalties, operating costs, development costs, production costs and abandonment and reclamation costs but before consideration of indirect costs such as administrative, overhead and other miscellaneous expenses. It should not be assumed that the estimates of future net revenues presented in this press release represent the fair market value of the reserves. There are numerous uncertainties inherent in estimating quantities of crude oil reserves and the future cash flows attributed to such reserves. The reserve and associated cash flow information set forth in the GTE McDaniel Reserves Report are estimates only and there is no guarantee that the estimated reserves will be recovered. Actual reserves may be greater than or less than the estimates provided therein.

    References to a formation where evidence of hydrocarbons has been encountered is not necessarily an indicator that hydrocarbons will be recoverable in commercial quantities or in any estimated volume. Gran Tierra’s reported production is a mix of light crude oil and medium, heavy crude oil, tight oil, conventional natural gas, shale gas and natural gas liquids for which there is no precise breakdown since the Company’s sales volumes typically represent blends of more than one product type. Drilling locations disclosed herein are derived from the GTE McDaniel Reserves Report and account for drilling locations that have associated Proved Undeveloped and Proved plus Probable Undeveloped reserves, as applicable. Well test results should be considered as preliminary and not necessarily indicative of long-term performance or of ultimate recovery. Well log interpretations indicating oil and gas accumulations are not necessarily indicative of future production or ultimate recovery. If it is indicated that a pressure transient analysis or well-test interpretation has not been carried out, any data disclosed in that respect should be considered preliminary until such analysis has been completed. References to thickness of “oil pay” or of a formation where evidence of hydrocarbons has been encountered is not necessarily an indicator that hydrocarbons will be recoverable in commercial quantities or in any estimated volume.

    Definitions

    Proved reserves are those reserves that can be estimated with a high degree of certainty to be recoverable. It is likely that the actual remaining quantities recovered will exceed the estimated proved reserves.

    Probable reserves are those additional reserves that are less certain to be recovered than proved reserves. It is equally likely that the actual remaining quantities recovered will be greater or less than the sum of the estimated proved plus probable reserves.

    Possible reserves are those additional reserves that are less certain to be recovered than Probable reserves. It is unlikely that the actual remaining quantities recovered will be greater or less than the sum of the estimated proved plus probable plus possible reserves. There is a 10% probability that the quantities actually recovered will equal or exceed the sum of Proved plus Probable plus Possible reserves.

    Developed producing reserves are those reserves that are expected to be recovered from completion intervals open at the time of the estimate. These reserves may be currently producing or, if shut-in, they must have previously been on production, and the date of resumption of production must be known with reasonable certainty.

    Developed non-producing reserves are those reserves that either have not been on production or have previously been on production but are shut-in and the date of resumption of production is unknown.

    Undeveloped reserves are those reserves expected to be recovered from known accumulations where a significant expenditure (e.g., when compared to the cost of drilling a well) is required to render them capable of production. They must fully meet the requirements of the reserves category (proved, probable, possible) to which they are assigned.

    Certain terms used in this press release but not defined are defined in NI 51-101, CSA Staff Notice 51-324 – Revised Glossary to NI 51-101, Standards of Disclosure for Oil and Gas Activities (“CSA Staff Notice 51-324”) and/or the COGEH and, unless the context otherwise requires, shall have the same meanings herein as in NI 51-101, CSA Staff Notice 51-324 and the COGEH, as the case may be.

    Oil and Gas Metrics

    This press release contains a number of oil and gas metrics, including NAV per share, FD&A costs, reserve life index and reserves replacement, which do not have standardized meanings or standard methods of calculation and therefore such measures may not be comparable to similar measures used by other companies and should not be used to make comparisons. Such metrics have been included herein to provide readers with additional measures to evaluate the Company’s performance; however, such measures are not reliable indicators of the future performance of the Company and future performance may not compare to the performance in previous periods.

    • NAV per share is calculated as NPV10 (before or after tax, as applicable) of the applicable reserves category minus estimated Net Debt, divided by the number of shares of Gran Tierra’s common stock issued and outstanding. Management uses NAV per share as a measure of the relative change of Gran Tierra’s net asset value over its outstanding common stock over a period of time.
    • FD&A costs are calculated as estimated exploration and development capital expenditures, including acquisitions and dispositions, divided by the applicable reserves additions both before and after changes in FDC costs. The calculation of FD&A costs incorporates the change in FDC required to bring proved undeveloped and developed reserves into production. The aggregate of the exploration and development costs incurred in the financial year and the changes during that year in estimated FDC may not reflect the total FD&A costs related to reserves additions for that year. Management uses FD&A costs per boe as a measure of its ability to execute its capital program and of its asset quality.
    • Reserve life index is calculated as reserves in the referenced category divided by the referenced estimated production. Management uses this measure to determine how long the booked reserves will last at current production rates if no further reserves were added.
    • Reserves replacement is calculated as reserves in the referenced category divided by estimated referenced production. Management uses this measure to determine the relative change of its reserve base over a period of time.

    Disclosure of Reserve Information and Cautionary Note to U.S. Investors

    Unless expressly stated otherwise, all estimates of proved, probable and possible reserves and related future net revenue disclosed in this press release have been prepared in accordance with NI 51-101. Estimates of reserves and future net revenue made in accordance with NI 51-101 will differ from corresponding estimates prepared in accordance with applicable SEC rules and disclosure requirements of the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”), and those differences may be material. NI 51-101, for example, requires disclosure of reserves and related future net revenue estimates based on forecast prices and costs, whereas SEC and FASB standards require that reserves and related future net revenue be estimated using average prices for the previous 12 months. In addition, NI 51-101 permits the presentation of reserves estimates on a “company gross” basis, representing Gran Tierra’s working interest share before deduction of royalties, whereas SEC and FASB standards require the presentation of net reserve estimates after the deduction of royalties and similar payments. There are also differences in the technical reserves estimation standards applicable under NI 51-101 and, pursuant thereto, the COGEH, and those applicable under SEC and FASB requirements.

    In addition to being a reporting issuer in certain Canadian jurisdictions, Gran Tierra is a registrant with the SEC and subject to domestic issuer reporting requirements under U.S. federal securities law, including with respect to the disclosure of reserves and other oil and gas information in accordance with U.S. federal securities law and applicable SEC rules and regulations (collectively, “SEC requirements”). Disclosure of such information in accordance with SEC requirements is included in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K and in other reports and materials filed with or furnished to the SEC and, as applicable, Canadian securities regulatory authorities. The SEC permits oil and gas companies that are subject to domestic issuer reporting requirements under U.S. federal securities law, in their filings with the SEC, to disclose only estimated proved, probable and possible reserves that meet the SEC’s definitions of such terms. Gran Tierra has disclosed estimated proved, probable and possible reserves in its filings with the SEC. In addition, Gran Tierra prepares its financial statements in accordance with United States generally accepted accounting principles, which require that the notes to its annual financial statements include supplementary disclosure in respect of the Company’s oil and gas activities, including estimates of its proved oil and gas reserves and a standardized measure of discounted future net cash flows relating to proved oil and gas reserve quantities. This supplementary financial statement disclosure is presented in accordance with FASB requirements, which align with corresponding SEC requirements concerning reserves estimation and reporting.

    Proved reserves are reserves which, by analysis of geoscience and engineering data, can be estimated with reasonable certainty to be economically producible from a given date forward from known reservoirs under existing economic conditions, operating methods, and government regulations prior to the time at which contracts providing the right to operate expires, unless evidence indicates that renewal is reasonably certain. Probable reserves are reserves that are less certain to be recovered than proved reserves but which, together with proved reserves, are as likely as not to be recovered. Estimates of probable reserves which may potentially be recoverable through additional drilling or recovery techniques are by nature more uncertain than estimates of proved reserves and accordingly are subject to substantially greater risk of not actually being realized by us. Possible reserves are reserves that are less certain to be recovered than probable reserves. Estimates of possible reserves are also inherently imprecise. Estimates of probable and possible reserves are also continually subject to revisions based on production history, results of additional exploration and development, price changes, and other factors.

    The Company believes that the presentation of NPV10 is useful to investors because it presents (i) relative monetary significance of its oil and natural gas properties regardless of tax structure and (ii) relative size and value of its reserves to other companies. The Company also uses this measure when assessing the potential return on investment related to its oil and natural gas properties. NPV10 and the standardized measure of discounted future net cash flows do not purport to present the fair value of the Company’s oil and gas reserves. The Company has not provided a reconciliation of NPV10 to the standardized measure of discounted future net cash flows because it is impracticable to do so.

    Investors are urged to consider closely the disclosures and risk factors in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K, Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q and in the other reports and filings with the SEC, available from the Company’s offices or website. These reports can also be obtained from the SEC website at www.sec.gov.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI China: Trump voices willingness to get along with China in Davos teleconference

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    U.S. President Donald Trump said his government looks forward to “doing very well with China and getting along with China” in virtual remarks to the World Economic Forum (WEF) Annual Meeting in Davos, Switzerland, on Thursday.

    Trump emphasized that the leaders of the United States and China are going to have a “very good relationship.”

    Addressing the ongoing situation in Ukraine, Trump acknowledged China’s role and expressed hope for cooperation. “Hopefully, we could work together and get that (armed conflict) stopped,” he said.

    In his message to global business leaders, Trump promised what would be “among the lowest taxes of any nation on Earth” for those who bring manufacturing operations to the United States, but still warned of tariffs for those who do not.

    Trump also voiced concerns over rising oil prices, adding that he would ask Saudi Arabia and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to bring down costs.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI USA: On Senate Floor, Shaheen Raises National Security Concerns with Nomination of Pete Hegseth to be Secretary of Defense, Announces She Will Vote Against His Confirmation

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New Hampshire Jeanne Shaheen

    (Washington, DC) – U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), a senior member of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), took to the Senate floor to outline her concerns for our national security ahead of the possible confirmation of Pete Hegseth as the next U.S. Secretary of Defense. Specifically, Shaheen addressed Hegseth’s inconsistencies on various foreign policy issues, including respect for the norms of armed conflict, support for our alliances like NATO and Putin’s war on Ukraine. At the conclusion of her remarks, Senator Shaheen announced she will vote against the Secretary of Defense nominee—the first time she’s done so since joining the U.S. Senate. You can watch the Senator’s full remarks here.

    Key quotes from Senator Shaheen:

    • “The almost three million men and women who serve our nation in uniform deserve a Secretary of Defense who will not needlessly throw them in harm’s way or seek to divide them with partisan politics.”
    • “Just as America’s national security interests are not to be trifled with, neither is our commitment to defending democracy and the international world order. And any inconsistency in our commitment to support our allies and partners, to support democracy around the world, to support the international world order is going to be seen and exploited by our adversaries.”
    • “And again, I think it’s very important that we stand by our ally Ukraine, because of the message it sends not just to the Russians and Vladimir Putin, but because of the message it sends to Xi in China, to the Iranians, to the North Koreans, to anyone who is an adversary of the United States. If they think we’re going to walk away from our allies, they’re going to do everything they can to divide us.”
    • “He [Mr. Hegseth] has a documented history of supporting individuals who have violated military and international law by committing war crimes […] I don’t think we can afford to entrust the safety and success of our men and women in uniform to a man who would himself disregard the laws of armed conflict and leave American credibility and moral authority in tatters on the world stage.”  
    • “I am very concerned that Mr. Hegseth lacks the consistency and the moral clarity to lead the most combat-credible military in the world […] Our men and women in uniform deserve better. And therefore, the first time since I was elected to represent the people of New Hampshire in the United States Senate, I plan to vote against this nominee for Secretary of Defense.”   

    Remarks as delivered can be found below:

    Mr. President, I come to the floor today to address some of my concerns about the qualifications of the President’s nominee to lead the Department of Defense, Mr. Pete Hegseth. 

    Like many of my colleagues on the Armed Services Committee, I left Mr. Hegseth’s hearing last week with a number of unanswered questions and some real concerns about his qualifications and abilities to serve in the role of Secretary of Defense. 

    Now, every single nominee for Secretary of Defense—from both Democrat and Republican administrations—have met with me and other members from both sides of the aisle on the committee before their confirmation hearings.  

    And I voted for every one of those nominees from both Democrat and Republican administrations: Secretaries Panetta, Hagel, Carter, Mattis, Esper and Austin.  

    I didn’t always agree with their views or their policies, but I felt that they had the qualifications and the temperament to be Secretary of Defense, so I supported their confirmations. 

    But Mr. Hegseth chose not to meet with me or any other Senate Democrats, except the Ranking Member, Jack Reed. And he broke with strong, longstanding tradition to ensure that our work on national security remains free from partisanship.

    And I think that’s the important point: we are stronger as Senators, as Congress, as a nation if we are acting together.

    The Committee unfortunately was not afforded the opportunity to ask a number of rounds of questions, and so there were a number of questions about his views, particularly regarding foreign policy and military policy that we did not get an answer to.

    I’ve become the Ranking Member on the Foreign Relations Committee, and so I’m very concerned about the role of the United States in the world.

    I think the American people expect transparency regarding Mr. Hegseth’s ability to stand by our allies and partners, to uphold international agreements, to abide by rules of engagement and the bottom line—support the men and women in the military in a way that not only keeps us safe, but protects them as well.

    The almost three million men and women who serve our nation in uniform deserve a Secretary of Defense who will not needlessly throw them in harm’s way or seek to divide them with partisan politics. 

    So, I’d like to address a few issues now that we were not able to get to at the hearing, because we were not able to ask more than one round of questions. And I want to start with the role alliances and that our allies and partners play in our own national security.

    I believe – and we’ve seen it many times since the start of this nation – that we are stronger and safer when we lead together with our allies. 

    And we’re fortunate, because we have strong allies and partners. We don’t see that coming from Vladimir Putin, from Xi in China, we don’t see it from the North Koreans or the Iranians, but the United States has strong allies who can stand with us.

    The most important security agreement we’ve had, I think any time in our nation’s history, is NATO.

    It is a critical, indispensable part of our national security, and yet, the President’s nominee for Secretary of Defense wrote in his book, American Crusade, that NATO is quote “a relic” and quote that it “should be scrapped.”

    Now since his nomination, Mr. Hegseth has tried to walk back his opposition to one of our key international alliances, to NATO. 

    In advance policy questions for the Committee, he calls NATO a quote, “vital U.S. interest” in defending Europe and American interests from Russia and Vladimir Putin. 

    This sudden reversal is welcome, because I think it’s very important that our Secretary of Defense understand how critical NATO is, and that it’s stronger now than it was any time since it was formed, probably. We now have 32 members of NATO.

    But Mr. Hegseth’s 11th hour conversion to understanding the importance of our allies and partners raises questions about what he really believes.

    We asked on our questions for the record about NATO, and we didn’t get much of a response.

    Now, if I had had the opportunity, I would have brought up Ukraine and Mr. Hegseth’s head-spinning contradictions on this matter.

    Just as America’s national security interests are not to be trifled with, neither is our commitment to defending democracy and the international world order. 

    And any inconsistency in our commitment to support our allies and partners, to support democracy around the world, to support the international world order, that is going to be seen and exploited by our adversaries. 

    So again, I’m puzzled about how we should think about Mr. Hegseth’s contradictory positions on a variety of national security and foreign policy issues.

    For example, he was critical of the Biden administration—as have many of us on both sides of the aisle been in this chamber—for not moving fast enough to aid Ukraine. But then question the wisdom of sending any U.S. assistance to Ukraine at all. 

    In 2022, Mr. Hegseth called Vladimir Putin a “war criminal” and called for faster U.S. aid to Ukraine. Now, he says the idea of Russia launching a nuclear war is “over-inflated” and plays down the severity of the conflict as merely Putin’s “give-me-my-shit-back war.”

    Well, I don’t think that our NATO allies, those in the Baltics and Poland and Eastern Europe, think Vladmir Putin’s nuclear ambitions are “over inflated.”

    They know the threat he poses to their countries and the world.

    And to be flippant about the threat of nuclear war, I think is beneath the office of the Secretary of Defense, who will have to engage with those partners on a regular basis. 

    Now, I agree with President Trump that the American people want to see a resolution to this years-long war. I’m sure that’s true of the Ukrainians as well.

    But Mr. Hegseth has not, either in his hearing nor in response to the questions that we submitted to him for the record, expanded on what the Department of Defense’s role should be with respect to Ukraine, even though we have already invested $66 billion in military assistance.

    And again, I think it’s very important that we stand by our ally Ukraine, because of the message it sends not just to the Russians and Vladimir Putin, but because of the message it sends to Xi in China, to the Iranians, to the North Koreans, to anyone who is an adversary of the United States.

    If they think we’re going to walk away from our allies, they’re going to do everything they can to divide us.

    Now, on Afghanistan, Mr. Hegseth has also been inconsistent on his views of the President’s foreign policy.

    Actually, he’s been inconsistent in general on the President’s foreign policies.

    In the lead up to the 2016 election, Mr. Hegseth was highly critical of then-candidate Trump’s foreign policy stances, particularly on Iraq and Afghanistan. 

    Mr. Hegseth called Mr. Trump, who was a candidate at the time, and I quote “all bluster, very little substance” and again quoting, “an armchair tough guy.” 

    He criticized then-candidate Trump in 2015 for advocating for the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan, but then he took the criticism back. 

    He sharply criticized the 2021 Afghanistan withdrawal, as did I, but he’s failed to publicly comment on President Trump’s 2020 deal with the Taliban, which is what set the date certain for withdrawal in 2021 that then the Biden administration was actually tied to.

    Now, I agree. I agree that that withdrawal was not what I wanted to see. I didn’t support it.

    But they were terms that President Trump, in his first term, set with the Taliban. 

    Terms that I thought gave away the store to the Taliban. Because there were no concessions from them, on what we were to get from the United States. The Government of Afghanistan was not at the table and now we’re seeing the fallout from that.  

    And I know that no one is watching for gaps in U.S. national security policy more closely than President Xi and the People’s Republic of China. 

    Now Mr. Hegseth identifies China as our peer competitor, something that I think all of us on the Armed Services Committee and probably everyone this chamber agree with.

    But if Mr. Hegseth is so concerned about China, then he should realize that nothing will encourage President Xi’s aggression more than seeing America abandon our allies and partners. 

    Mr. Hegseth sees China’s ambitions as, quote, “a fait accompli,” and yet, he does not seem to recognize that his own inconsistencies on all these foreign policy positions could contribute to this.

    A question I would like Mr. Hegseth to attempt to answer is: What message would it send to our adversaries if the U.S. ceases its support not just for Ukraine, but for the international rules and norms that underpin the global order?

    Now, I’m also concerned about that with respect to the conduct of conflict. In his book “The War on Warriors,” Mr. Hegseth argued, and again I’m quoting, “our boys should not fight by rules written by dignified men in mahogany rooms eighty years ago. America should fight by its own rules.”  

    Well, the rules that he’s talking about are the Geneva Conventions—which established bare minimum protections against violence, torture and inhumane treatments.

    And they don’t just protect those people we’re fighting on the battlefield, they protect American soldiers.

    During his hearing, he even doubled down to say, quote, “restrictive rules of engagement” have “made it more difficult to defeat our enemies,” and that it would be his priority, quote, “that lawyers aren’t getting in the way.”

    Unfortunately—and dangerously—this appears to be the few issues that Mr. Hegseth is consistent on. 

    He has a documented history of supporting individuals who have violated military and international law by committing war crimes.  

    These are individuals who were turned in not by our enemies, but by members of their own units who were convicted of crimes by military juries. Individuals for whom Mr. Hegseth lobbied to get pardons.  

    I don’t think we can afford to entrust the safety and success of our men and women in uniform to a man who would himself disregard the laws of armed conflict and leave American credibility and moral authority in tatters on the world stage.  

    Now, while embracing officers convicted of war crimes, Mr. Hegseth has stated it is his intent to review all general officers currently serving in the Department of Defense. 

    And when asked if he would remove the current chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Hegseth responded, on the record, that, quote, “all senior officers will be reviewed.”

    So, let’s just think about what that means – subjecting our general officers, in our military that is not politicized, to a political litmus test is not only unprecedented, it is dangerous. 

    It will convey to the American public that their leadership is political. 

    One of the most important roles of the Secretary of Defense is to seek out and consider open, honest and direct military advice from the senior officers in charge of our forces.  

    I don’t know how Mr. Hegseth expects to receive open and honest advice from his commanders when he is advocating for a purge of anyone who disagrees with him. 

      

    And I am also deeply troubled by the idea that Mr. Hegseth would act as a “yes man” himself, putting his own personal political interests above the wellbeing of our military men and women.

    At Mr. Hegseth’s confirmation hearing, when asked what he would do if he received orders from President Trump that he knew to be illegal or unconstitutional, Mr. Hegseth wouldn’t give a straight answer. All he could do was deny that President Trump was capable of giving an illegal order.

    And just for the record, to be clear: in his first term, President Trump did give an illegal order that then-Secretary Esper refused to follow. 

    And for that, Secretary Esper was fired by the President. 

    So, Mr. President, I am very concerned that Mr. Hegseth lacks the consistency and the moral clarity to lead the most combat-credible military in the world. 

    And I’m very disappointed that this body would put a nominee on the floor without the due process of advise-and-consent that the position of the Secretary of Defense deserves. 

    Our men and women in uniform deserve better. 

    And therefore, the first time since I was elected to represent the people of New Hampshire in the United States Senate, I plan to vote against this nominee for Secretary of Defense.  

    Thank you, I yield the floor.

    As the second-ranking Democrat on the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Shaheen is instrumental in helping to accomplish top national security objectives and enhancing New Hampshire’s role in support of America’s national defense. A member of the Committee since 2011, Shaheen has voted to confirm multiple nominees from both parties under multiple administrations. During his confirmation hearing, Shaheen questioned Hegseth about his support for women service members and the Shaheen-led Women, Peace and Security law. The bipartisan Women, Peace and Security Act, was signed into law by President Donald Trump, which Shaheen leads with Senator Shelley Moore Capito (R-WV), was signed into law in 2017 and requires the U.S. Government to strengthen the meaningful participation of women in conflict prevention and peace negotiations. 

    Senator Shaheen is the top Democrat on the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee and also serves on the U.S. Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs and Defense. In 2018, Shaheen re-established the bipartisan U.S. Senate NATO Observer Group with U.S. Senator Tillis (R-NC). Senator Shaheen believes that a strong and active United States is fundamental to securing our national interests at home and abroad. She also believes that U.S. global leadership is directly tied to the strength of our ideals, our alliances and our diplomacy, and she is constantly working to ensure our national security policies reflect our broader democratic values. 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Christine Lagarde: Central bank independence in an era of volatility

    Source: European Central Bank

    Lamfalussy Lecture by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, at the Lamfalussy Lectures Conference organised by the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, pre-recorded in Frankfurt am Main on 15 January 2025

    Budapest, 27 January 2025

    In his later years, Alexandre Lamfalussy was once asked what his fundamental motivation in life was. He recalled the experience of his turbulent youth, surrounded by the destruction caused by the Second World War.[1] “In the aftermath of the war,” Lamfalussy said, “I decided to serve the community in the rebuilding of Europe.”[2]

    He went on to do just that. A member of the Delors Committee and the first President of the European Monetary Institute, Lamfalussy helped pave the way for Europe’s monetary union and the establishment of the ECB.

    His generation had also been scarred by the difficulties of the “Great Inflation” in the 1970s.[3] And so Lamfalussy – alongside other architects of the euro[4] – ensured that the ECB would have sufficient powers to prevent a scenario where inflationary expectations once again became embedded in the economy.

    We can see proof of this today, as advanced economies emerge from the largest inflation shock in a generation.

    As in the 1970s, a series of shocks contributed to high and persistent inflation. But unlike the 1970s, inflation has since fallen relatively fast across advanced economies – and expectations have remained firmly anchored throughout.

    This hard-won progress has been in large part due to the independence of central banks, which has given them the ability to take difficult but necessary monetary policy decisions in pursuit of stable prices.

    The rise of central bank independence

    In the late twentieth century, central bank independence spread rapidly around the world.

    A strong social consensus about its benefits – emerging from the negative experience of the 1970s – sparked what Lamfalussy would later call a “sea change” in monetary policymaking.[5]

    By one account, over 80% of the world’s central banks became operationally independent by the turn of the millennium.[6] And price stability had been adopted as the primary objective of monetary policy frameworks across almost all advanced economies and many emerging market economies.[7]

    Moreover, independent central banks both contributed to – and benefited from – a period of low macroeconomic volatility.

    In their famous paper, Alesina and Summers found a positive relationship between the degree of independence of central banks and lower and less volatile inflation outcomes.[8] At the same time, substantial structural changes were afoot in the global economy, which also helped to reduce macroeconomic volatility – an era that soon came to be known as the Great Moderation.[9]

    Globalisation led to an enormous increase in both global labour supply and production capacity, which meant that prices and wages were often little affected even in the face of strong demand. And the oil crises of the 1970s had sparked a wave of change in global energy markets, resulting in a more elastic energy supply.

    The upshot of the Great Moderation was a virtuous circle.

    An environment of low macroeconomic volatility made it easier for independent central banks to deliver on their price stability mandates. That, in turn, solidified the social consensus in support of central bank independence and helped ensure its growing adoption around the world – further contributing to lowering levels of volatility.

    The era of volatility

    The end of the Great Moderation came suddenly and unexpectedly in 2008 with the arrival of the global financial crisis. And over the last years in particular, our world has changed dramatically.

    Indeed, the two forces that fostered the spread of central bank independence – a strong social consensus and growing pools of global supply – are now coming under increasing pressure.

    While recent research suggests that de jure central bank independence has never been more prevalent than it is today[10], there is no doubt that the de facto independence of central banks is being called into question in several parts of the world.

    One study examining 118 central banks in the 2010s shows that around 10% of them faced political pressure in an average year – even those central banks with a high degree of de jure independence.[11] Another paper finds that between 2018 and 2020 alone, de facto central bank independence deteriorated for almost half of those central banks in jurisdictions accounting for 75% of global GDP.[12]

    There is evidence to suggest that political influence on central bank decisions can also contribute substantially to macroeconomic volatility. For instance, persistent political pressure on a central bank has been found to affect the level and the volatility of exchange rates, bond yields and the risk premium.[13]

    At the same time, geopolitical tensions threaten to amplify volatility by increasing the frequency of shocks hitting the global economy.

    We have already seen the impact of geopolitical tensions play out in Europe. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, average output growth volatility in the euro area surged by 60% compared with before the global financial crisis, while average inflation volatility shot up by 280%.[14]

    An environment of heightened volatility could make the task of maintaining price stability more difficult to achieve.[15] This could raise concerns that independent central banks are failing to deliver on their mandates, which could undermine the social consensus and further amplify volatility in the economy.

    So, the question that comes to the fore is: will the current era of volatility turn the virtuous circle that facilitated the rise of central bank independence into a vicious circle that leads to it being undermined?

    The benefits of central bank independence in today’s world

    All things considered, I would argue that this is unlikely to happen.

    A volatile macroeconomic environment actually makes the benefits of central bank independence all the greater. We saw this during the recent inflation shock.

    In OECD countries, average annual inflation surged to 9.6% in 2022 as they faced a variety of shocks that compounded each other.[16] In response, independent central banks sharply increased policy rates.

    These actions led to a rapid decline and convergence in the respective inflation paths of major economies – despite all these economies facing different shocks. Moreover, inflation expectations have remained firmly anchored, suggesting that the public continues to have faith in independent central banks’ commitment to price stability over the long run.[17]

    In today’s world, central bank independence offers two key advantages.

    First, it acts as a headwind to volatility in these unpredictable times.

    As we emerge from a period of very high inflation, the issue of time inconsistency is more relevant than ever.[18] Compared with the pre-pandemic era of low inflation, central banks may need to contend with lower levels of rational inattention.[19]

    In this environment, credible policy regimes become even more important for maintaining trust in central banks. Research finds that higher trust in the ECB lowers inflation expectations on average and significantly reduces uncertainty about future inflation.[20]

    Second, central bank independence also contributes to regional strength in a world increasingly defined by geopolitical rivalries.

    Price stability provides the foundation upon which other strategic goals can be achieved. Regions with stable prices tend to have more efficient resource allocation and higher levels of competitiveness, and they attract greater levels of investment. At heart, strong economic institutions are the fundamental cause of long-run economic growth and development differences between regions.[21]

    Conclusion

    Lamfalussy once described the task of launching the euro as “navigating in uncharted waters”.[22] In an era of volatility, independent central banks now also find themselves in unfamiliar waters.

    While inflation has fallen sharply, central banks are still likely to face a more volatile macroeconomic environment compared with the Great Moderation.

    It therefore remains imperative that central banks have the independence to fully deliver on their price stability mandates.

    Thank you.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI: Microchip Technology Announces Financial Results for Second Quarter of Fiscal Year 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    • Net sales of $1.164 billion, down 6.2% sequentially and down 48.4% from the year ago quarter. The midpoint of our guidance provided on August 1, 2024 was net sales of $1.150 billion.
    • Revenue, gross profit and non-GAAP gross profit were positively impacted by a $13.3 million legal settlement. This settlement also positively impacted GAAP and non-GAAP EPS by $0.02 per diluted share.
    • On a GAAP basis: gross profit of 57.4%; operating income of $146.6 million and 12.6% of net sales; net income of $78.4 million; and EPS of $0.14 per diluted share. Our guidance provided on August 1, 2024 was for GAAP EPS of $0.10 to $0.14 per diluted share.
    • On a Non-GAAP basis: gross profit of 59.5%; operating income of $340.8 million and 29.3% of net sales; net income of $250.2 million; and EPS of $0.46 per diluted share. Our guidance provided on August 1, 2024 was for Non-GAAP EPS of $0.40 to $0.46 per diluted share.
    • Returned approximately $261.0 million to stockholders in the September quarter through dividends of $243.7 million and the repurchase of $17.3 million, or 0.2 million shares of our common stock, at an average price of $76.86 per share under our previously announced $4.0 billion stock buyback program. Cumulatively repurchased $2.444 billion, or 31.4 million shares, over the last twelve quarters.
    • Record quarterly dividend declared today for the December quarter of 45.5 cents per share, an increase of 3.6% from the year ago quarter.

    CHANDLER, Ariz., Nov. 05, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — (NASDAQ: MCHP) – Microchip Technology Incorporated, a leading provider of smart, connected, and secure embedded control solutions, today reported results for the three months ended September 30, 2024, as summarized in the table below.

      Three Months Ended September 30, 2024(1)
    Net sales $1,163.8      
      GAAP % Non-GAAP(2) %
    Gross profit $668.5 57.4% $692.9 59.5%
    Operating income $146.6 12.6% $340.8 29.3%
    Other expense $(55.1)   $(53.3)  
    Income tax provision $13.1   $37.3  
    Net income $78.4 6.7% $250.2 21.5%
    Net income per diluted share $0.14   $0.46  
             

    (1) In millions, except per share amounts and percentages of net sales.
    (2) See the “Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures” section of this release.

    Net sales for the second quarter of fiscal 2025 were $1.164 billion, down 48.4% from net sales of $2.254 billion in the prior year’s second fiscal quarter.

    GAAP net income for the second quarter of fiscal 2025 was $78.4 million, or $0.14 per diluted share, down from GAAP net income of $666.6 million, or $1.21 per diluted share, in the prior year’s second fiscal quarter. For the second quarters of fiscal 2025 and fiscal 2024, GAAP net income was adversely impacted by amortization of acquired intangible assets associated with our previous acquisitions.

    Non-GAAP net income for the second quarter of fiscal 2025 was $250.2 million, or $0.46 per diluted share, down from non-GAAP net income of $889.3 million, or $1.62 per diluted share, in the prior year’s second fiscal quarter. For the second quarters of fiscal 2025 and fiscal 2024, our non-GAAP results exclude the effect of share-based compensation, cybersecurity incident expenses, other manufacturing adjustments, expenses related to our acquisition activities (including intangible asset amortization, severance, and other restructuring costs, and legal and other general and administrative expenses associated with acquisitions including legal fees and expenses for litigation and investigations related to our Microsemi acquisition), professional services associated with certain legal matters, and losses on the settlement of debt. For the second quarters of fiscal 2025 and fiscal 2024, our non-GAAP income tax expense is presented based on projected cash taxes for the applicable fiscal year, excluding transition tax payments under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. A reconciliation of our non-GAAP and GAAP results is included in this press release.

    Microchip announced today that its Board of Directors declared a record quarterly cash dividend on its common stock of 45.5 cents per share, up 3.6% from the year ago quarter. The quarterly dividend is payable on December 6, 2024 to stockholders of record on November 22, 2024.

    “Our September quarter results were consistent with our guidance, as we continued to navigate through an inventory correction that’s occurring in the midst of macro weakness for many manufacturing businesses, accentuated by heightened weakness in our European business which is concentrated with Industrial and Automotive customers,” said Ganesh Moorthy, President and Chief Executive Officer. “The ‘green shoots’ we saw in recent quarters have progressed unevenly with essentially flat sequential bookings, normalized cancellation rates and much higher expedite requests, which we believe are all positive signs for a potential bottom formation despite limited visibility.”

    Eric Bjornholt, Microchip’s Chief Financial Officer, said, “Our September quarter results reflect continued customer destocking efforts and sluggish end-market demand. We are maintaining strong cost discipline and balance sheet management while taking actions to ensure operational readiness for the anticipated market recovery.”

    Rich Simoncic, Microchip’s Chief Operating Officer, said, “Our Total System Solutions approach is driving strong execution and seeing growing adoption in AI-accelerated servers in the data center markets. Our PCIe switches, SSD controllers, CXL solutions, and associated power and timing products are key to continuing to strengthen our data center portfolio. With our expanding capabilities, we believe we are well-positioned to capitalize on opportunities in this growth market.”

    Mr. Moorthy concluded, “For the December quarter, we expect net sales between $1.025 billion and $1.095 billion. While substantial inventory destocking has occurred, we continue to face macro uncertainties in what is historically our seasonally weakest quarter. Our design-in momentum continues to remain strong, driven by our Total System Solutions strategy and key market megatrends.”

    Third Quarter Fiscal Year 2025 Outlook:

    The following statements are based on current expectations. These statements are forward-looking, and actual results may differ materially.

      Microchip Consolidated Guidance
    Net Sales $1.025 to $1.095 billion    
      GAAP Non-GAAP Adjustments(1) Non-GAAP(1)
    Gross Profit 56.2% to 58.1% $8.4 to $9.4 million 57.0% to 59.0%
    Operating Expenses(2) 49.1% to 51.4% $170.0 to $174.0 million 33.2% to 34.8%
    Operating Income 4.8% to 9.1% $178.4 to $183.4 million 22.2% to 25.8%
    Other Expense, net $69.3 to $69.7 million ($0.2) to $0.2 million $69.5 million
    Income Tax Provision $1.0 to $13.0 million(3) $12.6 to $21.1 million $22.1 to $25.6 million(4)
    Net Income (loss) ($21.1) to $16.5 million $157.0 to $170.9 million $135.9 to $187.4 million
    Diluted Common Shares Outstanding Approximately 537.3 to 543.0 million shares   Approximately 543.0 million shares
    Earnings (Loss) per Diluted Share ($0.04) to $0.03 $0.29 to $0.32 $0.25 to $0.35
           
    (1)  See the “Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures” section of this release for information regarding our non-GAAP guidance.
    (2) We are not able to estimate the amount of certain Special Charges and Other, net that may be incurred during the quarter ending December 31, 2024. Therefore, our estimate of GAAP operating expenses excludes certain amounts that may be recognized as Special Charges and Other, net in the quarter ending December 31, 2024.
    (3) The forecast for GAAP tax expense excludes any unexpected tax events that may occur during the quarter, as these amounts cannot be forecasted.
    (4) Represents the expected cash tax rate for fiscal 2025, excluding any transition tax payments associated with the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.
       

    Capital expenditures for the quarter ending December 31, 2024 are expected to be about $20 million. Capital expenditures for all of fiscal 2025 are expected to be about $150 million. We are selectively adding capital equipment to maintain, grow and operate our internal manufacturing capabilities to support the expected growth of our business.

    Under the GAAP revenue recognition standard, we are required to recognize revenue when control of the product changes from us to a customer or distributor. We focus our sales and marketing efforts on creating demand for our products in the end markets we serve and not on moving inventory into our distribution network. We also manage our manufacturing and supply chain operations, including our distributor relationships, towards the goal of having our products available at the time and location the end customer desires.

    Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures:  Our non-GAAP adjustments, where applicable, include the effect of share-based compensation, cybersecurity incident expenses, other manufacturing adjustments, expenses related to our acquisition activities (including intangible asset amortization, severance, and other restructuring costs, and legal and other general and administrative expenses associated with acquisitions including legal fees and expenses for litigation and investigations related to our Microsemi acquisition), professional services associated with certain legal matters, and losses on the settlement of debt. For the second quarters of fiscal 2025 and fiscal 2024, our non-GAAP income tax expense is presented based on projected cash taxes for the fiscal year, excluding transition tax payments under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.

    We are required to estimate the cost of certain forms of share-based compensation, including employee stock options, restricted stock units, and our employee stock purchase plan, and to record a commensurate expense in our income statement. Share-based compensation expense is a non-cash expense that varies in amount from period to period and is affected by the price of our stock at the date of grant. The price of our stock is affected by market forces that are difficult to predict and are not within the control of management. Our other non-GAAP adjustments are either non-cash expenses, unusual or infrequent items, or other expenses related to transactions. Management excludes all of these items from its internal operating forecasts and models.

    We are using non-GAAP operating expenses in dollars, including non-GAAP research and development expenses and non-GAAP selling, general and administrative expenses, non-GAAP other expense, net, and non-GAAP income tax rate, which exclude the items noted above, as applicable, to permit additional analysis of our performance.

    Management believes these non-GAAP measures are useful to investors because they enhance the understanding of our historical financial performance and comparability between periods. Many of our investors have requested that we disclose this non-GAAP information because they believe it is useful in understanding our performance as it excludes non-cash and other charges that many investors feel may obscure our underlying operating results. Management uses non-GAAP measures to manage and assess the profitability of our business and for compensation purposes. We also use our non-GAAP results when developing and monitoring our budgets and spending. Our determination of these non-GAAP measures might not be the same as similarly titled measures used by other companies, and it should not be construed as a substitute for amounts determined in accordance with GAAP. There are limitations associated with using these non-GAAP measures, including that they exclude financial information that some may consider important in evaluating our performance. Management compensates for this by presenting information on both a GAAP and non-GAAP basis for investors and providing reconciliations of the GAAP and non-GAAP results.

    Generally, gross profit fluctuates over time, driven primarily by the mix of products sold and licensing revenue; variances in manufacturing yields; fixed cost absorption; wafer fab loading levels; costs of wafers from foundries; inventory reserves; pricing pressures in our non-proprietary product lines; and competitive and economic conditions. Operating expenses fluctuate over time, primarily due to net sales and profit levels.

    Diluted Common Shares Outstanding can vary for, among other things, the trading price of our common stock, the exercise of options or vesting of restricted stock units, the potential for incremental dilutive shares from our convertible debentures (additional information regarding our share count is available in the investor relations section of our website under the heading “Supplemental Financial Information”), and repurchases or issuances of shares of our common stock. The diluted common shares outstanding presented in the guidance table above assumes an average Microchip stock price in the December 2024 quarter between $75 and $85 per share (however, we make no prediction as to what our actual share price will be for such period or any other period and we cannot estimate what our stock option exercise activity will be during the quarter).

    MICROCHIP TECHNOLOGY INCORPORATED AND SUBSIDIARIES
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF INCOME
    (in millions, except per share amounts; unaudited)
     
      Three Months Ended September 30,   Six Months Ended September 30,
      2024   2023   2024   2023
    Net sales $ 1,163.8     $ 2,254.3     $ 2,405.1     $ 4,542.9  
    Cost of sales   495.3       726.9       999.7       1,457.1  
    Gross profit   668.5       1,527.4       1,405.4       3,085.8  
                   
    Research and development   240.7       292.6       482.4       591.1  
    Selling, general and administrative   157.0       196.6       307.5       400.2  
    Amortization of acquired intangible assets   122.7       151.4       245.7       302.9  
    Special charges and other, net   1.5       1.8       4.1       3.5  
    Operating expenses   521.9       642.4       1,039.7       1,297.7  
                   
    Operating income   146.6       885.0       365.7       1,788.1  
                   
    Other expense, net   (55.1 )     (51.4 )     (112.4 )     (106.2 )
    Income before income taxes   91.5       833.6       253.3       1,681.9  
    Income tax provision   13.1       167.0       45.6       348.9  
    Net income $ 78.4     $ 666.6     $ 207.7     $ 1,333.0  
                   
    Basic net income per common share $ 0.15     $ 1.23     $ 0.39     $ 2.45  
    Diluted net income per common share $ 0.14     $ 1.21     $ 0.38     $ 2.42  
                   
    Basic common shares outstanding   536.7       543.1       536.7       544.1  
    Diluted common shares outstanding   542.0       549.2       542.4       550.3  
                                   
    MICROCHIP TECHNOLOGY INCORPORATED AND SUBSIDIARIES
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
    (in millions; unaudited)
     
    ASSETS
      September 30,   March 31,
      2024   2024
    Cash and short-term investments $ 286.1   $ 319.7
    Accounts receivable, net   1,044.3     1,143.7
    Inventories   1,339.6     1,316.0
    Other current assets   235.5     233.6
    Total current assets   2,905.5     3,013.0
           
    Property, plant and equipment, net   1,171.2     1,194.6
    Other assets   11,545.6     11,665.6
    Total assets $ 15,622.3   $ 15,873.2
           
    LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY
           
    Accounts payable and accrued liabilities $ 1,339.4   $ 1,520.0
    Current portion of long-term debt   1,946.3     999.4
    Total current liabilities   3,285.7     2,519.4
           
    Long-term debt   4,476.6     5,000.4
    Long-term income tax payable   590.4     649.2
    Long-term deferred tax liability   29.8     28.8
    Other long-term liabilities   963.9     1,017.6
           
    Stockholders’ equity   6,275.9     6,657.8
    Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity $ 15,622.3   $ 15,873.2
               
    MICROCHIP TECHNOLOGY INCORPORATED AND SUBSIDIARIES
    RECONCILIATION OF GAAP TO NON-GAAP MEASURES
    (in millions, except per share amounts and percentages; unaudited)
     
    RECONCILIATION OF GAAP GROSS PROFIT TO NON-GAAP GROSS PROFIT
      Three Months Ended September 30,   Six Months Ended September 30,
      2024   2023   2024   2023
    Gross profit, as reported $ 668.5     $ 1,527.4     $ 1,405.4     $ 3,085.8  
    Share-based compensation expense   4.3       7.4       10.9       14.2  
    Cybersecurity incident expenses   20.1             20.1        
    Non-GAAP gross profit $ 692.9     $ 1,534.8     $ 1,436.4     $ 3,100.0  
    GAAP gross profit percentage   57.4 %     67.8 %     58.4 %     67.9 %
    Non-GAAP gross profit percentage   59.5 %     68.1 %     59.7 %     68.2 %
                                   
    RECONCILIATION OF GAAP RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENSES TO NON-GAAP RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENSES
      Three Months Ended September 30,   Six Months Ended September 30,
      2024   2023   2024   2023
    Research and development expenses, as reported $ 240.7     $ 292.6     $ 482.4     $ 591.1  
    Share-based compensation expense   (26.9 )     (23.7 )     (50.2 )     (46.6 )
    Other adjustments         (0.2 )           (0.4 )
    Non-GAAP research and development expenses $ 213.8     $ 268.7     $ 432.2     $ 544.1  
    GAAP research and development expenses as a percentage of net sales   20.7 %     13.0 %     20.1 %     13.0 %
    Non-GAAP research and development expenses as a percentage of net sales   18.4 %     11.9 %     18.0 %     12.0 %
                                   
    RECONCILIATION OF GAAP SELLING, GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES TO NON-GAAP SELLING, GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES
      Three Months Ended September 30,   Six Months Ended September 30,
      2024   2023   2024   2023
    Selling, general and administrative expenses, as reported $ 157.0     $ 196.6     $ 307.5     $ 400.2  
    Share-based compensation expense   (15.1 )     (14.3 )     (29.2 )     (29.1 )
    Cybersecurity incident expenses   (1.3 )           (1.3 )      
    Other adjustments   (2.1 )     (0.6 )     (3.4 )     0.5  
    Professional services associated with certain legal matters   (0.2 )     (0.3 )     (0.7 )     (0.8 )
    Non-GAAP selling, general and administrative expenses $ 138.3     $ 181.4     $ 272.9     $ 370.8  
    GAAP selling, general and administrative expenses as a percentage of net sales   13.5 %     8.7 %     12.8 %     8.8 %
    Non-GAAP selling, general and administrative expenses as a percentage of net sales   11.9 %     8.0 %     11.3 %     8.2 %
                                   
    RECONCILIATION OF GAAP OPERATING EXPENSES TO NON-GAAP OPERATING EXPENSES
      Three Months Ended September 30,   Six Months Ended September 30,
      2024   2023   2024   2023
    Operating expenses, as reported $ 521.9     $ 642.4     $ 1,039.7     $ 1,297.7  
    Share-based compensation expense   (42.0 )     (38.0 )     (79.4 )     (75.7 )
    Cybersecurity incident expenses   (1.3 )           (1.3 )      
    Other adjustments   (2.1 )     (0.8 )     (3.4 )     0.1  
    Professional services associated with certain legal matters   (0.2 )     (0.3 )     (0.7 )     (0.8 )
    Amortization of acquired intangible assets(1)   (122.7 )     (151.4 )     (245.7 )     (302.9 )
    Special charges and other, net   (1.5 )     (1.8 )     (4.1 )     (3.5 )
    Non-GAAP operating expenses $ 352.1     $ 450.1     $ 705.1     $ 914.9  
    GAAP operating expenses as a percentage of net sales   44.8 %     28.5 %     43.2 %     28.6 %
    Non-GAAP operating expenses as a percentage of net sales   30.3 %     20.0 %     29.3 %     20.1 %
                                   

    (1) Amortization of acquired intangible assets consists of core and developed technology and customer-related acquired intangible assets in connection with business combinations. Such charges are excluded for purposes of calculating certain non-GAAP measures.

    RECONCILIATION OF GAAP OPERATING INCOME TO NON-GAAP OPERATING INCOME
      Three Months Ended September 30,   Six Months Ended September 30,
      2024   2023   2024   2023
    Operating income, as reported $ 146.6     $ 885.0     $ 365.7     $ 1,788.1  
    Share-based compensation expense   46.3       45.4       90.3       89.9  
    Cybersecurity incident expenses   21.4             21.4        
    Other adjustments   2.1       0.8       3.4       (0.1 )
    Professional services associated with certain legal matters   0.2       0.3       0.7       0.8  
    Amortization of acquired intangible assets(1)   122.7       151.4       245.7       302.9  
    Special charges and other, net   1.5       1.8       4.1       3.5  
    Non-GAAP operating income $ 340.8     $ 1,084.7     $ 731.3     $ 2,185.1  
    GAAP operating income as a percentage of net sales   12.6 %     39.3 %     15.2 %     39.4 %
    Non-GAAP operating income as a percentage of net sales   29.3 %     48.1 %     30.4 %     48.1 %
                                   

    (1) Amortization of acquired intangible assets consists of core and developed technology and customer-related acquired intangible assets in connection with business combinations. Such charges are excluded for purposes of calculating certain non-GAAP measures. The use of acquired intangible assets contributed to our revenues earned during the periods presented.

    RECONCILIATION OF GAAP OTHER EXPENSE, NET TO NON-GAAP OTHER EXPENSE, NET
      Three Months Ended September 30,   Six Months Ended September 30,
      2024   2023   2024   2023
    Other expense, net, as reported $ (55.1 )   $ (51.4 )   $ (112.4 )   $ (106.2 )
    Loss on settlement of debt         3.1             12.2  
    Loss on available-for-sale investments   1.8             1.8        
    Non-GAAP other expense, net $ (53.3 )   $ (48.3 )   $ (110.6 )   $ (94.0 )
    GAAP other expense, net, as a percentage of net sales (4.7) %   (2.3) %   (4.7) %   (2.3) %
    Non-GAAP other expense, net, as a percentage of net sales (4.6) %   (2.1) %   (4.6) %   (2.1) %
                   
    RECONCILIATION OF GAAP INCOME TAX PROVISION TO NON-GAAP INCOME TAX PROVISION
      Three Months Ended September 30,   Six Months Ended September 30,
      2024   2023   2024   2023
    Income tax provision as reported $ 13.1     $ 167.0     $ 45.6     $ 348.9  
    Income tax rate, as reported   14.3 %     20.0 %     18.0 %     20.7 %
    Other non-GAAP tax adjustment   24.2       (19.9 )     35.0       (52.4 )
    Non-GAAP income tax provision $ 37.3     $ 147.1     $ 80.6     $ 296.5  
    Non-GAAP income tax rate   13.0 %     14.2 %     13.0 %     14.2 %
                                   
    RECONCILIATION OF GAAP NET INCOME AND GAAP DILUTED NET INCOME PER COMMON SHARE TO NON-GAAP NET INCOME AND NON-GAAP DILUTED NET INCOME PER COMMON SHARE
      Three Months Ended September 30,   Six Months Ended September 30,
      2024   2023   2024   2023
    Net income, as reported $ 78.4     $ 666.6     $ 207.7     $ 1,333.0  
    Share-based compensation expense   46.3       45.4       90.3       89.9  
    Cybersecurity incident expenses   21.4             21.4        
    Other adjustments   2.1       0.8       3.4       (0.1 )
    Professional services associated with certain legal matters   0.2       0.3       0.7       0.8  
    Amortization of acquired intangible assets   122.7       151.4       245.7       302.9  
    Special charges and other, net   1.5       1.8       4.1       3.5  
    Loss on settlement of debt         3.1             12.2  
    Loss on available-for-sale investments   1.8             1.8        
    Other non-GAAP tax adjustment   (24.2 )     19.9       (35.0 )     52.4  
    Non-GAAP net income $ 250.2     $ 889.3     $ 540.1     $ 1,794.6  
    GAAP net income as a percentage of net sales   6.7 %     29.6 %     8.6 %     29.3 %
    Non-GAAP net income as a percentage of net sales   21.5 %     39.4 %     22.5 %     39.5 %
    Diluted net income per common share, as reported $ 0.14     $ 1.21     $ 0.38     $ 2.42  
    Non-GAAP diluted net income per common share $ 0.46     $ 1.62     $ 1.00     $ 3.26  
    Diluted common shares outstanding, as reported   542.0       549.2       542.4       550.3  
    Diluted common shares outstanding non-GAAP   542.0       549.2       542.4       550.3  
                                   
    RECONCILIATION OF GAAP CASH FLOW FROM OPERATIONS TO FREE CASH FLOW
      Three Months Ended September 30,   Six Months Ended September 30,
      2024   2023   2024   2023
    GAAP cash flow from operations, as reported $ 43.6     $ 616.2     $ 420.7     $ 1,609.4  
    Capital expenditures   (20.8 )     (74.4 )     (93.7 )     (185.5 )
    Free cash flow $ 22.8     $ 541.8     $ 327.0     $ 1,423.9  
    GAAP cash flow from operations as a percentage of net sales   3.7 %     27.3 %     17.5 %     35.4 %
    Free cash flow as a percentage of net sales   2.0 %     24.0 %     13.6 %     31.3 %
                                   

    Microchip will host a conference call today, November 5, 2024 at 5:00 p.m. (Eastern Time) to discuss this release. This call will be simulcast over the Internet at www.microchip.com. The webcast will be available for replay until November 26, 2024.

    A telephonic replay of the conference call will be available at approximately 8:00 p.m. (Eastern Time) on November 5, 2024 and will remain available until 5:00 p.m. (Eastern Time) on November 26, 2024. Interested parties may listen to the replay by dialing 201-612-7415/877-660-6853 and entering access code 13747161.

    Cautionary Statement:

    The statements in this release relating to continuing to navigate through an inventory correction, macro weakness for many manufacturing businesses, heightened weakness in our European business, that the green shoots we saw in recent quarters have progressed unevenly, our belief that these are all positive signs for a potential bottom formation despite limited visibility, that we are maintaining strong cost discipline and balance sheet management while taking actions to ensure operational readiness for the anticipated market recovery, that our Total System Solutions approach is driving strong execution and seeing growing adoption in AI-accelerated servers in the data center markets, that our PCIe switches, SSD controllers, CXL solutions, and associated power and timing products are key to continuing to strengthen our data center portfolio, that we believe we are well-positioned to capitalize on opportunities in this growth market, that for the December quarter we expect net sales between $1.025 billion and $1.095 billion, that we continue to face macro uncertainties in what is historically our seasonally weakest quarter, that our design-in momentum continues to remain strong, driven by our Total System Solutions strategy and key market megatrends, our third quarter fiscal 2025 guidance for net sales and GAAP and non-GAAP gross profit, operating expenses, operating income, other expense, net, income tax provision, net income, diluted common shares outstanding, earnings per diluted share, capital expenditures for the December 2024 quarter and for all of fiscal 2025, selectively adding capital equipment to maintain, grow and operate our internal manufacturing capabilities to support the expected growth of our business, our belief that non-GAAP measures are useful to investors and our assumed average stock price in the December 2024 quarter are forward-looking statements made pursuant to the safe harbor provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. These statements involve risks and uncertainties that could cause our actual results to differ materially, including, but not limited to: any continued uncertainty, fluctuations or weakness in the U.S. and world economies (including China and Europe) due to changes in interest rates, high inflation or the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic (including lock-downs in China), actions taken or which may be taken by the Biden administration or the U.S. Congress, monetary policy, political, geopolitical, trade or other issues in the U.S. or internationally (including the military conflicts in Ukraine-Russia and the Middle East and the outcome of the U.S. elections in November), further changes in demand or market acceptance of our products and the products of our customers and our ability to respond to any increases or decreases in market demand or customer requests to reschedule or cancel orders; the mix of inventory we hold, our ability to satisfy any short-term orders from our inventory and our ability to effectively manage our inventory levels; the impact that the CHIPS Act will have on increasing manufacturing capacity in our industry by providing incentives for us, our competitors and foundries to build new wafer manufacturing facilities or expand existing facilities; the amount and timing of any incentives we may receive under the CHIPS Act, the impact of current and future changes in U.S. corporate tax laws (including the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 and the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017), foreign currency effects on our business; changes in utilization of our manufacturing capacity and our ability to effectively manage our production levels to meet any increases or decreases in market demand or any customer requests to reschedule or cancel orders; the impact of inflation on our business; competitive developments including pricing pressures; the level of orders that are received and can be shipped in a quarter; our ability to realize the expected benefits of our long-term supply assurance program; changes or fluctuations in customer order patterns and seasonality; our ability to effectively manage our supply of wafers from third party wafer foundries to meet any decreases or increases in our needs and the cost of such wafers, our ability to obtain additional capacity from our suppliers to increase production to meet any future increases in market demand; our ability to successfully integrate the operations and employees, retain key employees and customers and otherwise realize the expected synergies and benefits of our acquisitions; the impact of any future significant acquisitions or strategic transactions we may make; the costs and outcome of any current or future litigation or other matters involving our acquisitions (including the acquired business, intellectual property, customers, or other issues); the costs and outcome of any current or future tax audit or investigation regarding our business or our acquired businesses; fluctuations in our stock price and trading volume which could impact the number of shares we acquire under our share repurchase program and the timing of such repurchases; disruptions in our business or the businesses of our customers or suppliers due to natural disasters (including any floods in Thailand), terrorist activity, armed conflict, war, worldwide oil prices and supply, public health concerns or disruptions in the transportation system; and general economic, industry or political conditions in the United States or internationally.

    For a detailed discussion of these and other risk factors, please refer to Microchip’s filings on Forms 10-K and 10-Q. You can obtain copies of Forms 10-K and 10-Q and other relevant documents for free at Microchip’s website (www.microchip.com) or the SEC’s website (www.sec.gov) or from commercial document retrieval services.

    Stockholders of Microchip are cautioned not to place undue reliance on our forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date such statements are made. Microchip does not undertake any obligation to publicly update any forward-looking statements to reflect events, circumstances or new information after this November 5, 2024 press release, or to reflect the occurrence of unanticipated events.

    About Microchip:

    Microchip Technology Incorporated is a leading provider of smart, connected and secure embedded control solutions. Its easy-to-use development tools and comprehensive product portfolio enable customers to create optimal designs, which reduce risk while lowering total system cost and time to market. Our solutions serve approximately 116,000 customers across the industrial, automotive, consumer, aerospace and defense, communications and computing markets. Headquartered in Chandler, Arizona, Microchip offers outstanding technical support along with dependable delivery and quality. For more information, visit the Microchip website at www.microchip.com.

    Note: The Microchip name and logo are registered trademarks of Microchip Technology Incorporated in the U.S.A. and other countries. All other trademarks mentioned herein are the property of their respective companies.

    INVESTOR RELATIONS CONTACT:
    Sajid Daudi — Head of Investor Relations….. (480) 792-7385

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Australia: G7 and Partners Foreign Ministers Statement: 5 November 2024

    Source: Australian Government – Minister of Foreign Affairs

    We, the Foreign Ministers of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States and the High Representative of the European Union express our grave concerns regarding the deployment of DPRK troops to Russia, potentially for the use on the battlefield against Ukraine.

    Several thousands of DPRK troops have been deployed to Russia. The DPRK’s direct support for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, besides showing Russia’s desperate efforts to compensate its losses, would mark a dangerous expansion of the conflict, with serious consequences for European and Indo-Pacific peace and security. It would be a further breach of international law, including the most fundamental principles of the UN Charter.

    We condemn in the strongest possible terms the increasing military cooperation between the DPRK and Russia, including the DPRK’s export and Russia’s unlawful procurement of DPRK ballistic missiles in breach of multiple UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs), as well as Russia’s use of these missiles and munitions against Ukraine. DPRK soldiers receiving or providing any training or other assistance related to the use of ballistic missiles or arms is a direct violation of UN Security Council resolutions 1718, 1874 and 2270. We are also deeply concerned about the potential for any transfer of nuclear or ballistic missile-related technology from Russia to the DPRK in violation of the relevant UNSCRs. We urge the DPRK to stop providing assistance to Russia’s war of aggression.

    We reaffirm our unwavering commitment to support Ukraine as it defends its freedom, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. We are working with our international partners for a coordinated response to this new development.

    MIL OSI News

  • MIL-OSI: Alaris Equity Partners Income Trust Releases 2024 Third Quarter Financial Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION IN THE UNITED STATES.

    FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THIS RESTRICTION MAY CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF UNITED STATES SECURITIES LAW.

    TSX-AD.UN

    CALGARY, Alberta, Nov. 05, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Alaris Equity Partners Income Trust (together, as applicable, with its subsidiaries, “Alaris” or the “Trust“) is pleased to announce its results for the three and nine months ended September 30, 2024. The results are prepared in accordance with IFRS Accounting Standards as issued by the International Accounting Standards Board. All amounts below are in Canadian dollars unless otherwise noted.

    In January 2024, Alaris determined that it met the definition of an investment entity, as defined by IFRS 10, Consolidated financial statements. This change in status has fundamentally changed how Alaris prepares, presents and discusses its financial results relative to prior periods. IFRS requires that this change in accounting be made prospectively and as a result prior periods are not restated to reflect the change in Alaris’ investment entity status. Accordingly, the readers of this press release, Alaris’ third quarter interim MD&A and unaudited condensed consolidated interim financial statements should exercise significant caution in reviewing, considering, and drawing conclusions from period-to-period comparisons and changes, as the direct comparisons between dates or across periods can be inappropriate if not carefully considered in this context.

    Highlights:

    • For the three months ended September 30, 2024 Alaris generated $0.78 per unit of additional book value, improving this metric to $22.80;
    • For the three months ended September 30, 2024 the Trust, together with its wholly-owned subsidiaries (the “Acquisition Entities”), earned a total of $65.9 million of revenue, including, $65.4 million of Partner Distribution revenue net of foreign exchange, and $0.5 million of transaction fee income, which was ahead of previous guidance of $38.7 million, and compares to $47.2 million of Partner Revenue in Q3 2023, an increase of 40%;
      • Included in Partner Distribution revenue for the three months ended September 30, 2024, is $27.5 million of common Distributions, which included a one time distribution of US$5.1 million from Ohana Growth Partners LLC (“Ohana“) and US$14.7 million distribution from Fleet Advantage, LLC (“Fleet”). Common Distribution revenue for the nine months ended September 30, 2024 is $31.8 million, which for the second quarter in a row has outperformed the comparable period in the prior year by more than double. Alaris’ Run Rate Revenue (7) included in the outlook below has been increased to reflect overall higher expected annual common dividends from Partners of $19.4 million;
    • Alaris net distributable cash flow (6) for the nine months ended September 30, 2024 of $88.0 million or $1.93 per unit increased by 28%, from $68.6 million and $1.51 per unit in the nine months ended September 30, 2023 after adjusting the comparable period for non-recurring settlement and litigation costs that occurred in 2023;
    • The Actual Payout Ratio (2) for the Trust, based on Alaris net distributable cash flow (6) for the nine months ended September 30, 2024 was 53%;
    • The current weighted average combined Earnings Coverage Ratio (3) for Alaris’ Partners remains at approximately 1.5x with ten of nineteen Partners at 1.5x or above. In addition, eleven of our partners have either no debt or less than 1.0x Senior Debt to EBITDA on a trailing twelve-month basis;
    • During the quarter, the Trust, via the Acquisition Entities, invested approximately US$35 million into Ohana as a dividend recap in exchange for convertible preferred equity with a 14% yield fully paid-in-kind;
    • Subsequent to the quarter end, the Trust, via the Acquisition Entities, made a follow-on investment of US$10.0 million of additional preferred equity in Cresa LLC (“Cresa”), which has the same metrics as the initial preferred equity investment, bringing the total investment in Cresa to US$30.0 million. Following this transaction, the Trust has invested a total of approximately $139 million in the year.

    “In addition to highlighting the continued stability of Alaris’ portfolio and cash flow stream, the third quarter results continue to show the growing success and importance of our common equity portfolio. While some of this quarter’s common equity cash flow is non-recurring in nature, we are seeing more and more value from that strategy crystallizing into cash returns. Deployment activity is constructive for the end of the year and both interest rate cuts and US dollar strength provide us with tailwinds going into next year, ” said Steve King President and CEO.

    Results of Operations

    Note where the financial information for Q3 2024 is comparable to specific information from the prior period Q3 2023 condensed consolidated interim financial statements, amounts have been provided for comparative purposes. As noted above, users of this press release, interim management discussion and analysis and the unaudited condensed consolidated interim financial statements to which it relates should exercise significant caution in reviewing, considering and drawing conclusions from period-to-period comparisons and changes.

    Per Unit Results Three months ended Nine months ended
    Period ending September 30   2024   2023 % Change   2024   2023 % Change
    Partner related changes in net gain on Corporate Investment $ 2.16 $ 1.90 +13.7 % $ 4.11 $ 3.74 +9.9 %
    Adjusted EBITDA $ 1.98 $ 1.76 +12.5 % $ 3.62 $ 3.40 +6.5 %
    Alaris net distributable cashflow $ 0.72 $ 0.44 +63.6 % $ 1.93 $ 1.21 +59.5 %
    Adjusted earning per unit $ 1.37 $ 1.31 +4.6 % $ 2.35 $ 2.15 +9.3 %
    Weighted average basic units (000’s)   45,498   45,498     45,498   45,433  

    During the three months ended September 30, 2024, Partner related changes in net gain on Corporate Investments (5) per unit increased by 13.7% as compared to the three months ended September 30, 2023. During the current quarter common Partner Distribution revenue increased by more than 200%, primarily as a result of common Distributions received from Fleet of US$14.7 million, which was greater than their prior year Distribution of US$5.9 million, and a common Distribution received from Ohana of US$5.1 million, as compared to nil distribution received in Q3 2023. Partially offsetting this increase is a quarter over quarter decrease to the Net unrealized gain on partner investments of 16.3% to $33.0 million during the three months ended September 30, 2024. Q3 2024’s Net unrealized gain on Partner investments of $33.0 million is made up of notable increases to the fair value in Sono Bello, LLC (“Sono Bello“), Amur Financial Group Inc. (“Amur”), Fleet, Vehicle Leasing Holdings, LLC, dba D&M Leasing (“D&M”), and The Shipyard, LLC (“Shipyard”), which were partially offset by decreases to the fair value of Heritage Restoration, LLC (“Heritage”) and SCR Mining and Tunneling, LP (“SCR”). During the nine months ended September 30, 2024, Partner related changes in net gain on Corporate Investments (5) per unit increased by 9.9% as compared to the nine months ended September 30, 2023. This increase is reflective of increases in Partner Distribution revenue, partially offset by a lower net gain to the realized and unrealized fair value on Partner investments. Net realized gain on partner investments of $9.0 million and net unrealized gain of $32.4 million decreased in the nine months ended September 30, 2024 by 29.2% and 13.9%, respectively, as compared to the nine months ended September 30, 2023.

    For the three and nine months ended September 30, 2024, Adjusted EBITDA (1) per unit increased by 12.5% and 6.5%, respectively, as compared to the relative periods in 2023. Per unit increases are primarily due to higher Partner Distribution revenue. Partially offsetting these increases are decreases to the net realized and unrealized gain on Partner Investments relative to the comparable periods in 2023, and higher adjusted operating expenses; after non-reoccurring litigation and legal costs that were incurred in 2023 have been removed in the calculation Adjusted EBITDA (1).

    Alaris net distributable cashflow (6) provides a summary of third-party cash receipts, less operating cash outflows by the Trust in combination with the Acquisition Entities. Alaris net distributable cashflow (6) per unit increased by 63.6% in the three months ended September 30, 2024 and 59.5% in the nine months ended September 30, 2024, both as compared to the same periods in 2023. Period over period increases are due to the current periods higher common Distributions and lower cash taxes paid, all as compared to the relative periods in 2023. The nine months ended September 30, 2024 Alaris net distributable cashflow (6) is $88.0 million, after adjusting out non-recurring settlement and litigation costs of $13.7 million in the prior year, the nine months ended September 30, 2023 distributable cashflow amounts to $68.6 million, and results in an adjusted period over period increase of 28.3%.

    Adjusted earnings (10) per unit increased by 4.6% in the three months ended September 30, 2024 which is primarily driven by higher Partner related changes in net gain on Corporate Investments (5) as discussed above, and partially offset by higher total income tax expense in Q3 2024. The nine months ended September 30, 2024, Adjusted earnings (10) per unit increased by 9.3% which in addition to the changes listed for the three months ended September 30, 2024, is higher due to lower operating expenses during the nine months ended September 30, 2024 as compared to the prior year resulting from non-recurring litigation and legal costs incurred in 2023.

    Outlook

    During the three months ended September 30, 2024, the Trust, through its Acquisition Entities invested approximately $48 million, which was used to invest in convertible preferred units of Ohana. Subsequent to the quarter, Alaris invested an additional US$10.0 million into Cresa, bringing Alaris’ total investment in Cresa to US$30.0 million and as of the date of this MD&A the total invested during the year to approximately $139 million. These transactions are summarized in the outlook below, which includes Alaris’ Run Rate Revenue (7) for the next twelve months and is expected to be approximately $171 million. This includes current contracted amounts, an additional $1.2 million from LMS related to Distributions deferred in 2023 and an estimated $19.4 million of common dividends. In Q3 2024, the Trust together with its Acquisition Entities earned $65.9 million, $65.4 million in Partner Distributions net of foreign exchange and $0.5 million of third party transaction fee revenue, which was ahead of previous guidance of $38.7 million, primarily due to common distributions received from Fleet of $19.8 million, Ohana of $6.8 million and Amur of $0.5 million, as well as a higher realized foreign exchange rate on US denominated distributions. As with all common distributions, these distributions are not fixed or set in advance, but rather paid as declared and cashflow of partner permits. Alaris expects total revenue from its Partners in Q4 2024 of approximately $38.9 million.

    The Run Rate Cash Flow (8) table below outlines the Trust and its Acquisitions Entities combined expectation for Partners Distribution revenue, transaction fee revenue, general and administrative expenses, third party interest expense, tax expense and distributions to unitholders for the next twelve months. The Run Rate Cash Flow (8) is a forward looking supplementary financial measure and outlines the net cash from operating activities, less the distributions paid, that Alaris is expecting to generate over the next twelve months. The Trust’s method of calculating this measure may differ from the methods used by other issuers. Therefore, it may not be comparable to similar measures presented by other issuers.

    Run rate general and administrative expenses are currently estimated at $17.0 million and include all public company costs incurred by the Trust and its Acquisition Entities. The Trust’s Run Rate Payout Ratio (9) is expected to be within a range of 65% and 70% when including Run Rate Revenue (7), overhead expenses and its existing capital structure. The table below sets out our estimated Run Rate Cash Flow (8) as well as the after-tax impact of positive net investment, the impact of every 1% increase in Secure Overnight Financing Rate (“SOFR”) based on current outstanding USD debt and the impact of every $0.01 change in the USD to CAD exchange rate.

    Alaris’ financial statements and MD&A are available on SEDAR+ at www.sedarplus.ca and on our website at www.alarisequitypartners.com.

    Run Rate Cash Flow ($ thousands except per unit) Amount ($) $ / Unit
    Run Rate Revenue, Partner Distribution revenue $ 171,300   $ 3.77  
    General and administrative expenses   (17,000 )   (0.37 )
    Third party Interest and taxes     (57,100 )   (1.26 )
    Net cash from operating activities $ 97,200   $ 2.14  
    Distributions paid     (61,900 )   (1.36 )
    Run Rate Cash Flow   $ 35,300   $ 0.78  
           
    Other considerations (after taxes and interest):    
    New investments Every $50 million deployed @ 14%   +2,426     +0.05  
    Interest rates Every 1.0% increase in SOFR   -2,600     -0.06  
    USD to CAD Every $0.01 change of USD to CAD   +/- 900     +/- 0.02  


    Earnings Release Date and Conference Call Details

    Alaris management will host a conference call at 9am MT (11am ET), Wednesday, November 6, 2024 to discuss the financial results and outlook for the Trust.

    Participants must register for the call using this link: Q3 2024 Conference Call. Pre-register to receive the dial-in numbers and unique PIN to access the call seamlessly. It is recommended that you join 10 minutes prior to the event start (although you may register and dial in at any time during the call). Participants can access the webcast here: Q3 Webcast. A replay of the webcast will be available two hours after the call and archived on the same web page for six months. Participants can also find the link on our website, stored under the “Investors” section – “Presentations and Events”, at www.alarisequitypartners.com.

    An updated corporate presentation will be posted to the Trust’s website within 24 hours at www.alarisequitypartners.com.

    About the Trust:

    Alaris’ investment and investing activity refers to providing, through the Acquisition Entities, alternative equity to private companies (“Partners”) to meet their business and capital objectives, which includes management buyouts, dividend recapitalization, growth and acquisitions. Alaris achieves this by investing its unitholder capital, as well as debt, through the Acquisition Entities, in exchange for distributions, dividends or interest (collectively, “Distributions”) as well as capital appreciation on both preferred and common equity, with the principal objectives of generating predictable cash flows for distribution payments to its unitholders and growing net book value through returns from capital appreciation. Distributions, other than common equity Distributions, from the Partners are adjusted annually based on the percentage change of a “top-line” financial performance measure such as gross margin or same store sales and rank in priority to common equity position.

    Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures

    The terms Adjusted Earnings, components of Corporate investments, EBITDA, Adjusted EBITDA, Extended group net distributable cashflow, Earnings Coverage Ratio, Run Rate Payout Ratio, Actual Payout Ratio, Run Rate Revenue, Run Rate Cash Flow, and Per Unit amounts (collectively, the “Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures”) are financial measures used in this MD&A that are not standard measures under International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”) . The Trust’s method of calculating the Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures may differ from the methods used by other issuers. Therefore, the Trust’s Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures may not be comparable to similar measures presented by other issuers.

    (1) “Adjusted EBITDA” and “EBITDA”: are Non-GAAP financial measures and refer to earnings determined in accordance with IFRS, before depreciation and amortization, interest expense (finance costs) and income tax expense. EBITDA is used by management and many investors to determine the ability of an issuer to generate cash from operations. “Adjusted EBITDA” and “Adjusted EBITDA per unit”, which is a non-GAAP ratio that removes the impact from unrealized fluctuations in exchange rates and their impact on the Trust’s investments at fair value, as well as one time items and the impact of finance costs and taxes included within the net gain on Corporate Investments incurred by the Acquisition Entities and, on a per unit basis, is and the same amount divided by weighted average basic units outstanding. Management believes Adjusted EBITDA, EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA per unit are useful supplemental measures from which to determine the Trust’s ability to generate cash available for servicing its loans and borrowings, income taxes and distributions to unitholders. The Trust’s method of calculating these Non-GAAP financial measures may differ from the methods used by other issuers. Therefore, they may not be comparable to similar measures and ratios presented by other issuers.

      Three months ended September 30 Nine months ended September 30
    $ thousands except per unit amounts   2024   2023   % Change   2024     2023 % Change
    Earnings $ 51,027 $ 63,770     $ 156,475   $ 97,710  
    Depreciation and amortization   135   58       396     169  
    Finance costs   1,150   8,510       3,445     21,909  
    Total income tax expense   251   11,611       554     20,902  
    EBITDA $ 52,563 $ 83,949   -37.4 % $ 160,870   $ 140,690 +14.3 %
    Adjustments:            
    Gain on derecognition of previously consolidated entities $ $     $ (30,260 ) $  
    Foreign exchange   11,334   (3,947 )     (19,224 )   156  
    Sandbox litigation and legal costs     21           13,697  
    Finance costs, senior credit facility and convertible debentures   6,962         22,193      
    Acquisition Entities income tax expense – current   2,987         10,018      
    Acquisition Entities income tax expense – deferred   16,109         21,272      
    Adjusted EBITDA $ 89,955 $ 80,023   +12.4 % $ 164,869   $ 154,543 +6.7 %
    Adjusted EBITDA per unit $ 1.98 $ 1.76   +12.5 % $ 3.62   $ 3.40 +6.5 %

    (2) “Actual Payout Ratio” is a supplementary financial measure and refers to Alaris’ total distributions paid during the period (annually or quarterly) divided by the actual net cash from operating activities Alaris generated for the period. It represents the net cash from operating activities after distributions paid to unitholders available for either repayments of senior debt and/or to be used in investing activities.

    (3) “Earnings Coverage Ratio (“ECR”)” is a supplementary financial measure and refers to the EBITDA of a Partner divided by such Partner’s sum of debt servicing (interest and principal), unfunded capital expenditures and distributions to Alaris. Management believes the earnings coverage ratio is a useful metric in assessing our partners continued ability to make their contracted distributions.

    (4) “Net book value” and “net book value per unit” are Non-GAAP financial measures and represents the equity value of the company or total assts less total liabilities and the same amount divided by weighted average basic units outstanding. Net book value and net book value per unit are used by management to determine the growth in assets over the period net of amounts paid out to unitholders as distributions. Management believes net book value and net book value per unit are useful supplemental measures from which to compare the Trust’s growth period over period. The Trust’s method of calculating these Non-GAAP financial measures may differ from the methods used by other issuers. Therefore, they may not be comparable to similar measures presented by other issuers.

        30-Sep   30-Jun   31-Dec
    $ thousands except per unit amounts   2024   2024   2023
    Total Assets $ 1,130,415 $ 1,093,177 $ 1,474,894
    Total Liabilities $ 93,236 $ 91,556 $ 514,071
    Net book value $ 1,037,179 $ 1,001,621 $ 960,823
    Weighted average basic units (000’s)   45,498   45,498   45,498
    Net book value per unit $ 22.80 $ 22.01 $ 21.12


    (5) “
    Partner related changes in net gain on Corporate Investments The components of Corporate Investments are Non-GAAP financial measures and are presented for better comparability to prior year reporting. These amounts are reconciled to information from note 3 of the condensed consolidated interim financial statements below. The Trust’s method of calculating these Non-GAAP financial measures may differ from the methods used by other issuers. Therefore, they may not be comparable to similar measures presented by other issuers.

      Three months ended September 30 Nine months ended September 30
    $ thousands   2024   2023 % Change   2024   2023 % Change
    Partner Distribution revenue – Preferred, including realized foreign exchange Note 1 $ 37,895 $ 37,844 +0.1 % $ 113,936 $ 108,543 +5.0 %
    Partner Distribution revenue – Common $ 27,501 $ 8,815 +212.0 % $ 31,807 $ 10,903 +191.7 %
    Net realized gain from Partners investments $ 29 $ 167 -82.6 % $ 9,005 $ 12,716 -29.2 %
    Net unrealized gain on Partners investments $ 33,006 $ 39,428 -16.3 % $ 32,463 $ 37,688 -13.9 %
    Partner related changes in net gain on Corporate Investment $ 98,431 $ 86,254 +14.1 % $ 187,211 $ 169,850 +10.2 %
    Partner related changes in net gain on Corporate Investment per unit $ 2.16 $ 1.90 +13.7 % $ 4.11 $ 3.74 +9.9 %

    Note 1 – In Q2 2023, Partner Distribution revenue – Preferred, including realized foreign exchange and Partner Distribution revenue – Common were presented as one line on the face of the income statement titled “Revenues, including realized foreign exchange gain” in the amount of $36,853 for the three months ended and $73,541 for the six months ended. Prior period Partner Distribution revenue – Preferred, including realized foreign exchange for the three and six months ended June 30, 2024 above has been adjusted to exclude Sono Bello’s management fee income (Q2 2023 three months – $496, Q2 2023 six months ended – $753) for period over period comparability, which in 2024 is recognized in the Trust’s Management and advisory fee income.

    (6) “Alaris net distributable cashflow is a non-GAAP measure that refers to all sources of external revenue in both the Trust and the Acquisition Entities less all general and administrative expenses, third party interest expense and tax expense. Alaris net distributable cashflow is a useful metric for management and investors as it provides a summary of the total cash from operating activities that can be used to pay the Trust distribution, repay senior debt and/or be used for additional investment purposes. The Trust’s method of calculating this Non-GAAP measure may differ from the methods used by other issuers. Therefore, it may not be comparable to similar measures presented by other issuers. The 2023 comparatives are presented prior to the Trust’s change in status as a investment entity and have been aligned with the most comparative balance in the 2024 presentation.

      Three months ended September 30 Nine months ended September 30
    $ thousands except per unit amounts   2024     2023   % Change   2024     2023   % Change
    Partner Distribution revenue – Preferred, including realized foreign exchange $ 37,895   $ 37,844     $ 113,936   $ 108,543    
    Partner Distribution revenue – Common   27,501     8,815       31,807     10,903    
    Third party management and advisory fees   504     506       1,526     1,260    
                 
    Expenditures of the Trust:            
    General and administrative   (4,484 )   (3,087 )     (13,308 )   (23,476 )  
    Current income tax expense   (509 )         (1,345 )      
    Third party cash interest paid by the Trust   (2,031 )   (2,032 )     (4,062 )   (4,062 )  
                 
    Expenditures incurred by Acquisition Entities:            
    Operating costs and other   (1,087 )   (928 )     (2,846 )   (2,046 )  
    Transactions costs   (378 )   (1,693 )     (2,531 )   (3,204 )  
    Acquisition Entities income tax expense – current   (2,987 )   (6,954 )     (10,018 )   (13,156 )  
    Cash interest paid, senior credit facility and convertible debentures   (6,668 )   (6,329 )     (18,038 )   (12,586 )  
                 
    Alaris’ changes in net working capital   (14,922 )   (6,063 )     (7,106 )   (7,253 )  
    Alaris net distributable cashflow $ 32,834   $ 20,079   +63.5 % $ 88,015   $ 54,923   +60.3 %
    Alaris net distributable cashflow per unit $ 0.72   $ 0.44   +63.6 % $ 1.93   $ 1.21   +59.5 %

    (7) “Run Rate Revenue” is a supplementary financial measure and refers to Alaris’ total revenue expected to be generated over the next twelve months based on contracted distributions from current Partners, excluding any potential Partner redemptions, it also includes an estimate for common dividends or distributions based on past practices, where applicable. Run Rate Revenue is a useful metric as it provides an expectation for the amount of revenue Alaris can expect to generate in the next twelve months based on information known.

    (8) “Run Rate Cash Flow” is a Non-GAAP financial measure and outlines the net cash from operating activities, net of distributions paid, that Alaris is expecting to have after the next twelve months. This measure is comparable to net cash from operating activities less distributions paid, as outlined in Alaris’ consolidated statements of cash flows.

    (9) “Run Rate Payout Ratio” is a Non-GAAP financial ratio that refers to Alaris’ distributions per unit expected to be paid over the next twelve months divided by the net cash from operating activities per unit calculated in the Run Rate Cash Flow table. Run Rate Payout Ratio is a useful metric for Alaris to track and to outline as it provides a summary of the percentage of the net cash from operating activities that can be used to either repay senior debt during the next twelve months and/or be used for additional investment purposes. Run Rate Payout Ratio is comparable to Actual Payout Ratio as defined above.

    (10) “Adjusted Earnings” is a Non-GAAP financial measure and Non-GAAP Ratio and refer to earnings determined in accordance with IFRS, before impact of the one time gain on derecognition of previously consolidated entities and foreign exchange gain (loss) and the same amount divided by weighted average basic units outstanding. Adjusted earnings and Adjusted earnings per unit are used by management to determine earnings excluding fluctuations due to unrealized changes in exchange rates that impact earnings and specifically the fair value of Corporate investment. Management believes Adjusted earning and Adjusted earnings per unit are useful measures from which to compare the Trust’s earnings period over period. The Trust’s method of calculating these Non-GAAP financial measures and ratio may differ from the methods used by other issuers. Therefore, they may not be comparable to similar measures presented by other issuers.

      Three months ended September 30 Nine months ended September 30
    $ thousands except per unit amounts   2024   2023   % Change   2024     2023 % Change
    Earnings $ 51,027 $ 63,770     $ 156,475   $ 97,710  
    Add back: Foreign exchange (gain) loss $ 11,334 $ (3,947 )   $ (19,224 ) $ 156  
    Add back: Gain on derecognition of previously consolidated entities $   na     $ (30,260 ) na  
    Adjusted earnings $ 62,361 $ 59,823   +4.2 % $ 106,991   $ 97,866 +9.3 %
    Adjusted earning per unit $ 1.37 $ 1.31   +4.6 % $ 2.35   $ 2.15 +9.3 %
                                 

    (11) “Per Unit” values, other than earnings per unit, refer to the related financial statement caption as defined under IFRS or related term as defined herein, divided by the weighted average basic units outstanding for the period.

    The terms Net Book Value, Components of Corporate investments, EBITDA, Adjusted EBITDA, Alaris net distributable cashflow, Earnings Coverage Ratio, Run Rate Payout Ratio, Actual Payout Ratio, Run Rate Revenue, Run Rate Cash Flow and Per Unit amounts should only be used in conjunction with the Trust’s unaudited interim condensed consolidated financial statements, complete versions of which available on SEDAR+ at www.sedarplus.ca.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This news release contains forward-looking information and forward-looking statements (collectively, “forward-looking statements”) under applicable securities laws, including any applicable “safe harbor” provisions. Statements other than statements of historical fact contained in this news release are forward-looking statements, including, without limitation, management’s expectations, intentions and beliefs concerning the growth, results of operations, performance of the Trust and the Partners, the future financial position or results of the Trust, business strategy and plans and objectives of or involving the Trust or the Partners. Many of these statements can be identified by looking for words such as “believe”, “expects”, “will”, “intends”, “projects”, “anticipates”, “estimates”, “continues” or similar words or the negative thereof. In particular, this news release contains forward-looking statements regarding: the anticipated financial and operating performance of the Partners; the attractiveness of Alaris’ capital offering; the Trust’s Run Rate Payout Ratio, Run Rate Cash Flow, Run Rate Revenue and total revenue; the impact of recent new investments and follow-on investments; expectations regarding receipt (and amount of) any common equity distributions or dividends from Partners in which Alaris holds common equity, including the impact on the Trust’s net cash from operating activities, Run Rate Revenue, Run Rate Cash Flow and Run Rate Payout Ratio; the impact of future deployment; the Trust’s ability to deploy capital; the yield on the Trust’s investments and expected resets on Distributions; changes in SOFR and exchange rates; the impact of deferred Distributions and the timing of repayment there of; the Trust’s return on its investments; and Alaris’ expenses for 2024. To the extent any forward-looking statements herein constitute a financial outlook or future oriented financial information (collectively, “FOFI”), including estimates regarding revenues, Distributions from Partners (restarting full or partial Distributions and common equity distributions), Run Rate Payout Ratio, Run Rate Cash Flow, net cash from operating activities, expenses and impact of capital deployment, they were approved by management as of the date hereof and have been included to provide an understanding with respect to Alaris’ financial performance and are subject to the same risks and assumptions disclosed herein. There can be no assurance that the plans, intentions or expectations upon which these forward-looking statements are based will occur.

    By their nature, forward-looking statements require Alaris to make assumptions and are subject to inherent risks and uncertainties. Assumptions about the performance of the Canadian and U.S. economies over the next 24 months and how that will affect Alaris’ business and that of its Partners (including, without limitation, the impact of any global health crisis, like COVID-19, and global economic and political factors) are material factors considered by Alaris management when setting the outlook for Alaris. Key assumptions include, but are not limited to, assumptions that: the Russia/Ukraine conflict, conflicts in the Middle East, and other global economic pressures over the next twelve months will not materially impact Alaris, its Partners or the global economy; interest rates will not rise in a matter materially different from the prevailing market expectation over the next 12 months; global heath crises, like COVID-19 or variants thereof, will not impact the economy or our Partners operations in a material way in the next 12 months; the businesses of the majority of our Partners will continue to grow; more private companies will require access to alternative sources of capital; the businesses of new Partners and those of existing Partners will perform in line with Alaris’ expectations and diligence; and that Alaris will have the ability to raise required equity and/or debt financing on acceptable terms. Management of Alaris has also assumed that the Canadian and U.S. dollar trading pair will remain in a range of approximately plus or minus 15% of the current rate over the next 6 months. In determining expectations for economic growth, management of Alaris primarily considers historical economic data provided by the Canadian and U.S. governments and their agencies as well as prevailing economic conditions at the time of such determinations.

    There can be no assurance that the assumptions, plans, intentions or expectations upon which these forward-looking statements are based will occur. Forward-looking statements are subject to risks, uncertainties and assumptions and should not be read as guarantees or assurances of future performance. The actual results of the Trust and the Partners could materially differ from those anticipated in the forward-looking statements contained herein as a result of certain risk factors, including, but not limited to, the following: widespread health crises is, like COVID-19 (or its variants), other global economic factors (including, without limitation, the Russia/Ukraine conflict, conflicts in the Middle East, inflationary measures and global supply chain disruptions on the global economy, Trust and the Partners (including how many Partners will experience a slowdown of their business and the length of time of such slowdown)), the dependence of Alaris on the Partners, including any new investment structures; leverage and restrictive covenants under credit facilities; reliance on key personnel; failure to complete or realize the anticipated benefit of Alaris’ financing arrangements with the Partners; a failure to obtain required regulatory approvals on a timely basis or at all; changes in legislation and regulations and the interpretations thereof; risks relating to the Partners and their businesses, including, without limitation, a material change in the operations of a Partner or the industries they operate in; inability to close additional Partner contributions or collect proceeds from any redemptions in a timely fashion on anticipated terms, or at all; a failure to settle outstanding litigation on expected terms, or at all; a change in the ability of the Partners to continue to pay Alaris at expected Distribution levels or restart distributions (in full or in part); a failure to collect material deferred Distributions; a change in the unaudited information provided to the Trust; and a failure to realize the benefits of any concessions or relief measures provided by Alaris to any Partner or to successfully execute an exit strategy for a Partner where desired. Additional risks that may cause actual results to vary from those indicated are discussed under the heading “Risk Factors” and “Forward Looking Statements” in Alaris’ Management Discussion and Analysis and Annual Information Form for the year ended December 31, 2023, which is or will be (in the case of the AIF) filed under Alaris’ profile at www.sedarplus.ca and on its website at www.alarisequitypartners.com.

    Readers are cautioned that the assumptions used in the preparation of forward-looking statements, including FOFI, although considered reasonable at the time of preparation, based on information in Alaris’ possession as of the date hereof, may prove to be imprecise. In addition, there are a number of factors that could cause Alaris’ actual results, performance or achievement to differ materially from those expressed in, or implied by, forward looking statements and FOFI, or if any of them do so occur, what benefits the Trust will derive therefrom. As such, undue reliance should not be placed on any forward-looking statements, including FOFI.

    The Trust has included the forward-looking statements and FOFI in order to provide readers with a more complete perspective on Alaris’ future operations and such information may not be appropriate for other purposes. The forward-looking statements, including FOFI, contained herein are expressly qualified in their entirety by this cautionary statement. Alaris disclaims any intention or obligation to update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, except as required by law.

    For more information please contact:

    Investor Relations
    Alaris Equity Partners Income Trust
    403-260-1457
    ir@alarisequity.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Unlocking Transport Connectivity in the Caucasus and Central Asia

    Source: Asia Development Bank

    The geopolitical tensions and economic disruptions unleashed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 created new opportunities and challenges for transport corridors through the Caucasus and Central Asia. The transit complications through routes via the Russian Federation fostered renewed attention to the Middle Corridor and redirected trade flows through many countries of the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) region. However, infrastructural hurdles, supply chain difficulties, gaps in regional integration and connectivity, complex geographies, and high transport costs continue to limit CAREC countries’ ability to fully unlock the potential of a sustained increase in trade and development.

    Unlocking Transport Connectivity in the Caucasus and Central Asia addresses these constraints and explores ways to enhance the efficiency of transport through the Middle Corridor, offering significant economic benefits for the CAREC region. These benefits include boosting cross-border trade, gross domestic product, investment, and employment while reducing transportation costs. However, there are major barriers to infrastructural investment, including the availability and costs of long-term financing, high initial costs, investment shortfalls, high risks, and uncertain benefits.

    The book discusses key developments in transport and trade through the Middle Corridor, focusing on CAREC transport corridor growth, its trade and economic impacts, and the digital, regulatory, infrastructural, and logistical dynamics.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-Evening Report: Elon Musk’s flood of US election tweets may look chaotic. My data reveals an alarming strategy

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Timothy Graham, Associate Professor in Digital Media, Queensland University of Technology

    As voting booths in the United States close and the results of the presidential election trickle in, tech billionaire Elon Musk has been posting a flurry of tweets on his social media platform, X (formerly Twitter). So too has Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump.

    At first glance these tweets might appear chaotic and random. But if you take a closer look, you start to see an alarming strategy behind them – one that’s worth paying very close attention to in order to understand the inner workings of the campaign to return Trump to the White House.

    The strategy has two immediate aims. First, to overwhelm the information space and thereby manage attention. Second, to fuel the conspiracy theory that there is a coordinated campaign among Democrats, the media and big tech to steal this election.

    But it’s important to understand that the strategy on X is part of a master strategy of Trump’s campaign: a backup plan in case of a Trump loss, designed to encourage the public to participate in a grand re-wiring of reality via the meta-narrative of widespread voter fraud.

    Overwhelm the information space

    Musk has long been a prominent user of X, even before he became the owner, chief technology officer and executive chairman of the platform.

    But as I reported last week, since he endorsed Trump in July, engagement with his account has seen a sudden and anomalously large increase, raising suspicions as to whether he has tweaked the platform’s algorithms so his content reaches more people.

    This trend has continued in recent days.

    As well as posting on X, earlier today Musk also held a “freeform” live discussion on the platform about the election. It lasted for nearly one and a half hours. Around 1.3 million people tuned in. This is one of many live discussions he has hosted about the election over the past months, including notably with Trump.

    In an information war, everything is about attention management. Platforms are designed to maximise engagement and user attention above and beyond anything else. This core logic of social media is highly exploitable: who controls attention controls the narrative. In Australia, the “Vote No” campaign during last year’s referendum on Indigenous representation in government was a masterclass in attention management.

    By bombarding audiences, journalists, and other key stakeholders with a constant supply of allegations, rumours, conspiracy theories and unverifiable claims, Musk and the Trump campaign eat up all the oxygen of attention. When everyone is focussed on you and what you’re saying, they are distracted from what the other side is saying.

    And Musk and Trump want people to focus on the idea that the election is going to be stolen.

    Fuel the election fraud narrative

    From the beginning of the year, the narrative that the US presidential election is at risk of being defrauded has been steadily gaining steam. But in the past week leading up to election day, it has gone gangbusters.

    For example, starting on October 27, Trump started posting on X using the #TooBigtoRig hashtag. This refers to the idea that Trump will win the election by such a large margin that the result will be incontestable. Up to this point, the #TooBigToRig campaign was driven by Trump supporters. Now, Trump has officially joined – giving it the ultimate legitimacy.

    There has also been a dramatic spike over the last week in posts using similarly themed hashtags such as #ElectionFraud, #ElectionInterference, #VoterFraud and #StopTheSteal.

    Musk himself hasn’t been using these hashtags very much (although replies to him from other users are riddled with them). But he has been posting material that aligns with them. For example, earlier today he retweeted a post which claimed the electronic voting system in the US was insecure. Musk added: “Absolutely”.

    He has also falsely accused Google of encouraging Americans to vote for Democratic nominee Kamala Harris.

    And as some early results have started trickling in, Musk has posted about Trump’s odds of winning being nearly 70%.

    “The prophecy has been fulfilled,” Musk wrote.

    Participatory disinformation

    In many ways this has all the hallmarks of participatory disinformation. This concept, developed by computer scientist Kate Starbird and colleagues, explains how both ordinary people as well as politicians and influential actors become active participants in spreading false narratives.

    Unlike the top-down model of propaganda, participatory disinformation describes how grassroots activists and regular people – often with strong convictions and genuine intentions – contribute to spreading and evolving narratives that are not grounded in facts. It is a collaborative feedback loop involving both elite framing of issues and collective sensemaking and “evidence” gathering.

    Before war breaks out, there are clear signs of what’s about to unfold, even if a country publicly denies they are preparing for battle. Blood supplies, troops and weaponry are transported to the border in preparation for an invasion.

    The same thing is at play here, except the weapon is us.

    The flood of tweets by Musk and Trump, in particular, is setting the stage for a full-blown participatory disinformation campaign to undermine the election results.

    Timothy Graham receives funding from the Australian Research Council (ARC) for his Discovery Early Career Researcher Award, ‘Combatting Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour on Social Media’. He also receives ARC funding for the Discovery Project, ‘Understanding and combatting “Dark Political Communication”‘ (2024–2027).

    ref. Elon Musk’s flood of US election tweets may look chaotic. My data reveals an alarming strategy – https://theconversation.com/elon-musks-flood-of-us-election-tweets-may-look-chaotic-my-data-reveals-an-alarming-strategy-243021

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz