Category: Ukraine

MIL-OSI New Zealand: Activist News – No humanitarian visas for Palestinians victims of genocide but plenty of rest and recreation for Israeli soldiers involved in genocide – PSNA

Source: Palestine Solidarity Network Aotearoa (PSNA)

Nationwide rallies this weekend will be calling for the government to suspend entry to New Zealand from soldiers in the Israeli Defence Forces.

“New Zealand should not be providing rest and recreation for Israeli soldiers fresh from the genocide in Gaza”, says PSNA National Chair John Minto. “We wouldn’t allow Russian soldiers to come here for rest and recreation from the invasion of Ukraine so why would we accept soldiers from the genocidal, apartheid state of Israel?”

As well as the working holiday visa, since 2019 Israelis can enter New Zealand for three months without needing a visa at all. This visa-waiver is used by Israeli soldiers for “rest and recreation” from the genocide in Gaza.

Israeli Defence Forces actions have resulted in at least 47,000 Palestinians killed – 70% of whom are women and children.

The International Court of Justice has declared Israeli actions a “plausible genocide” Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch have used the terms genocide and extermination which the latest report from United Nations Special Rapporteur, Francesca Albanese, is entitled “Genocide as colonial erasure”.

Meanwhile the International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Israeli Defence minister Yoav Gallant for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

All these red flags for genocide have been visible for months but the government is still giving the green light to those involved in war crimes to enter New Zealand.

PSNA has written to the government again in December asking for the suspension of travel to New Zealand for all Israeli soldiers and reservists.

New Zealand has signed the Genocide convention which requires us to prevent and punish the crime of genocide. The government is complicit with its silence.

It’s long past the time for the government to step up.

John Minto

National Chair

Palestine Solidarity Network Aotearoa

MIL OSI New Zealand News –

MIL-OSI USA: In Senate Floor Speech, Murray Lays Out Case Against Controversial DoD Nominee Pete Hegseth, Slams Him for Refusal to Meet Prior to Confirmation Vote

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Washington State Patty Murray
ICYMI: Murray, Duckworth Lead Senators in Introducing Resolution Recognizing the Service of Women in Combat
ICYMI: Senator Murray Statement on Pete Hegseth Canceling Meeting with Her, Refusal to Meet Ahead of Probable Confirmation Vote
Murray: “Our military uniforms do not say Democrat. They do not say Republican. They just don’t. You cannot be an effective commander if your people don’t trust you. But how are troops supposed to trust you to keep them safe in combat if you think half the nation is the enemy?”
***VIDEO of Senator Murray’s floor speech HERE***
Washington, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Patty Murray (D-WA), Vice Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee, took to the Senate floor to lay out her strong opposition to Pete Hegseth’s nomination to lead the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). Murray articulated the many grave concerns she has with Mr. Hegseth’s qualifications, positions, and his character—and slammed him for refusing to meet with her before his confirmation vote.
On Saturday, Murray called out Hegseth for refusing to meet with her until after his confirmation vote, and today on the Senate floor, she reiterated that every nominee should be willing to meet with senators to answer basic questions about how they would approach their role if confirmed, calling it: “beneath the dignity of the role he aspires to for Mr. Hegseth to refuse to meet one-on-one with most Democrats.”
“I mean, if Mr. Hegseth is afraid of me, how is he going to stand up to China? Meeting with members on both sides isn’t just some formality—if you are confirmed, it is part of the job,” Murray said.
“Let’s be perfectly clear about the stakes here—we are talking about who we will put in command of the most powerful military in the world. There is nothing on Mr. Hegseth’s resume that remotely suggests he has the experience for the role,” Murray continued. “I have a deep appreciation for his service to our country—I do. But let’s not kid ourselves here. I don’t see how being a Fox TV host prepares you to lead three million servicemembers and civilians. I don’t see how bankrupting a veterans’ nonprofit through wasteful spending qualifies you to manage a budget of nearly $900 billion dollars. Moreover, we really truly have no sense of what his understanding of military policy is or what his strategic priorities would be.”
Murray pointed out that, because senators had had to spend so much time at Mr. Hegseth’s confirmation hearing asking him basic questions about his questionable character and fitness—questions Republicans refused to ask—they had little time to ask him about how he would do his job.
“How does he plan to reduce costs and development times for key military capabilities that are critical to our national security? How would he invest in our defense industrial base and public shipyards, like the one in my home state in Washington? How does he view the pacing threat in the Indo-Pacific and how would he work with our partners and allies to prepare for a potential conflict? Does he have any thoughts on that at all?,” Murray asked. “This is just not a serious candidate who has thoughtful positions on the challenges we face.”
“You know what position he is serious about? What he has stated over and over again? ‘I’m straight up just saying we should not have women in combat roles.’ He said that last November,” Murray said on the Senate floor. “He has also made clear he has little regard for the Geneva Conventions. Now maybe this is a bit old fashioned of me, but I think we should have a Secretary of Defense who is firmly against war crimes. Not one who has spoken in favor of torture like water boarding, in favor of people convicted of war crimes, and questioned whether we should follow the Geneva Conventions.”
“And let’s not forget—in addition to having no real qualifications, and many alarming positions, Mr. Hegseth also has many red flags that raise serious concerns about his character and conduct… There is no world where we should have a predator running the Department of Defense that is responsible for the wellbeing of millions of women and men in uniform.”
Murray concluded by saying, there is no world where the person in charge of the U.S. military should see his fellow Americans as the enemy. In Hegseth’s book American Crusade, published in 2020, Hegseth wrote: “The other side, the left, is not our friend. We are not esteemed colleagues, nor mere political opponents. We are foes. Either we win or they win. We agree on nothing else.”“How are troops supposed to trust you to keep them safe in combat if you think half the nation is the enemy? How are Muslim servicemembers supposed to trust you if you think their religion is a threat to the country? How are women servicemembers supposed to trust you if you think they should be at home?,” Murray asked on the Senate floor.
“I don’t have an answer to that. Maybe Mr. Hegseth doesn’t either—maybe that is why he won’t meet with me. And then again, maybe it’s because he thinks I’m his foe because I’m a Democrat, or maybe he doesn’t think I should have a say in the military issues because I’m a woman. But I do have a say—and I say someone like Mr. Hegseth is grossly unqualified to take on one of the most important jobs in the world,” Murray said.
As the top Democrat on the Senate Appropriations Committee, Senator Murray helps author and negotiate defense spending each year. In Fiscal Year 2024, Murray prioritized investments in our servicemembers and military families, including by delivering on a 5.2% pay raise for servicemembers, expanding child care services, increasing funding for sexual assault prevention services, and boosting mental health and suicide prevention resources. Senator Murray also played a leading role in negotiating and delivering on a comprehensive national security supplemental in April of 2024 to extend aid to Ukraine, provide badly needed humanitarian relief, and support key partners in the Indo Pacific while deterring aggression by the Chinese government.
Senator Murray’s full remarks, as delivered on the Senate floor today, are below and video is HERE:
“Mr. President. I realize some Republicans were hoping we would cut this process short, but I have no problem coming to the floor, and having a lengthy discussion about Mr. Hegseth’s nomination to be Defense Secretary.
“I am eager to talk about it. The only person who doesn’t seem to want to talk about the Hegseth nomination is actually Mr. Hegseth himself! Because, Mr. President, I have been trying for weeks to schedule a meeting with Mr. Hegseth prior to his confirmation vote.
“I genuinely want a chance to ask him directly about my concerns with his character and fitness, yes, but also about the serious challenges facing our nation—whether it’s competition with China or aggression from Russia.
“As Vice Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee, I help write the bill that funds the Defense Department—every year. And that bill only passes with bipartisan support. I don’t think it’s asking a lot to be able to meet with the person nominated to lead that department.
“I’ve had the opportunity to meet with ten of President Trump’s Cabinet nominees, and I look forward to meeting with more before they are confirmed by the Senate. Conducting these meetings is the absolute bare minimum given the role of each Senator and the constituents they represent.
“But Mr. Hegseth refused to meet with me and has refused to meet with many of my Democratic colleagues.
“I think most Americans would agree you shouldn’t get the job if you decide you can just skip the job interview. Every nominee—every nominee—should be willing to meet with Senators, regardless of their party, to answer basic questions about how they would approach their role if confirmed.
“It’s honestly beneath the dignity of the role he aspires to for Mr. Hegseth to refuse to meet one-on-one with most Democrats.
“What is he afraid of? Are the questions we have to ask really that hard? I mean, if Mr. Hegseth is afraid of me, how is he going to stand up to China?
“Meeting with members on both sides isn’t just some formality—if you are confirmed, it is part of the job. So this is a serious concern, and one of many concerns I have with Mr. Hegseth’s qualifications, his positions, and his character.
“Let’s be perfectly clear about the stakes here—we are talking about who we will put in command of the most powerful military in the world. There is nothing on Mr. Hegseth’s resume that remotely suggests he has the experience for that role.
“I have a deep appreciation for his service to our country—I do. But let’s not kid ourselves here.
“I don’t see how being a Fox TV host prepares you to lead three million servicemembers and civilians. I don’t see how bankrupting a veterans’ nonprofit through wasteful spending qualifies you to manage a budget of nearly $900 billion dollars.
“Moreover, we really truly have no sense of what his understanding of military policy is, or what his strategic priorities would be. Now thanks to Senator Duckworth, we know that he is someone who can’t name a single country in ASEAN—I mean, that ignorance is alarming.
“Senators had just seven minutes during his confirmation hearing to ask questions—many asked the questions we knew our Republican colleagues would not, regarding Hegseth’s questionable character and fitness. Important questions, absolutely!
“But because we had to spend so much time understanding if he even could do this job at the most basic level—we had precious little time to ask him about how he would do his job!
“How would Pete Hegseth ensure our servicemembers and their families have the resources they need at home and abroad? How does he plan to reduce costs and development times for key military capabilities that are critical to our national security? How would he invest in our defense industrial base and public shipyards, like the one in my home state of Washington?
“How does he view the pacing threat in the Indo-Pacific, and how would he work with our partners and allies to prepare for a potential conflict? Does he have any thoughts on that at all?
“This is just not a serious candidate who has thoughtful positions on the challenges that we face.
“You know what position he is serious about? What he has stated over and over again?
“And I quote: ‘I’m straight up just saying we should not have women in combat roles.’ He said that last November. Or, ‘we need moms. But not in the military, especially in combat units.’
“Now that is infuriating, and disqualifying—I don’t have to try very hard to imagine how that kind of condescending attitude will go over with our women in uniform.
“And after decades of comments like this denigrating the role of women in the military in ways that simply do not square with reality, Mr. Hegseth’s recent about-face on this topic is just not convincing.
“He has also made clear he has little regard for the Geneva Conventions. Now, maybe this is a bit old fashioned of me, but I think we should have a Secretary of Defense who is firmly against war crimes. Not one who has spoken in favor of torture like waterboarding, in favor of people convicted of war crimes, and questioned whether we should follow the Geneva Conventions.
“And let’s not forget—in addition to having no real qualifications, and many alarming positions, Mr. Hegseth also has many red flags that raise serious concerns about his character and his conduct.
“There is the report that he and his management team pursued women on his staff. There is the report that he took his employees to a strip club and got drunk. There is the report he got drunk in uniform, and had to be carried out of a strip club. There is the report he chanted ‘kill all Muslims’ while he was drunk.
“And beyond reporting, there are the police records backing up the account of a woman who told a nurse she may have been drugged and then raped by Pete Hegseth.
“Now, we couldn’t hear from that woman because Mr. Hegseth reached a financial settlement and he has now threatened to sue her for speaking out. And we almost didn’t hear about that incident at all since he didn’t even disclose it when he was vetted!
“But there are other people we have heard from. We know his mother once wrote to her son, directly criticizing him as an abuser of women. We know his former sister-in-law, in a signed affidavit, has shared she saw Mr. Hegseth drink to excess, and understood his ex-wife feared for her safety with him.
“And we know that same ex-wife told the FBI, ‘he drinks more than he doesn’t.’ That is an awful lot of smoke for us to be ignoring the fire.
“There is absolutely no world where someone who has a history of running up debts at nonprofits should be responsible for overseeing half of our discretionary spending.
“There is no world where someone with a history of failing to address his irresponsible alcohol use should be given one of the most stressful jobs imaginable, and should be making life and death decisions on a daily and an hourly basis.
“There is no world where we should have a predator running the Department of Defense that is responsible for the wellbeing of millions of women and men in uniform. I don’t get how that is complicated.
“Mr. President, let me just end on this: there is no world where the person in charge of our military should see his fellow Americans as the enemy.
“But Mr. Hegseth has made clear that is his view. Regarding Democrats and Republicans, he has written, and this is him: ‘The other side, the left, is not our friend. We are not esteemed colleagues, nor mere political opponents. We are foes. Either we win or they win. We agree on nothing else.’
“That is an especially dark view of our country. Our military uniforms do not say Democrat. They do not say Republican. They just don’t.
“Mr. President, you cannot be an effective commander if your people don’t trust you. But how are troops supposed to trust you to keep them safe in combat if you think half the nation is the enemy?
“How are Muslim servicemembers supposed to trust you if you think their religion is a threat to our country? How are women servicemembers supposed to trust you if you think they should be at home?
“I don’t have an answer to that. Maybe Mr. Hegseth doesn’t either—maybe that’s why he won’t meet with me. And then again, maybe it’s because he thinks I’m his foe because I’m a Democrat. Or maybe he doesn’t think I should have a say in the military issues because I’m a woman.
“But Mr. President, I do have a say—and I say someone like Mr. Hegseth is grossly unqualified to take on one of the most important jobs in the world.
“And I will be voting against him. And I urge my Republican colleagues to seriously consider the message it will send to confirm someone for Secretary of Defense who has failed, time and again, to meet the most basic standards of conduct our women and men in uniform are required to live up to.”

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gUwQzZluwFM

MIL-OSI Video: Gaza: Children Deserve Security, Education, & Hope – Humanitarian UN Official | United Nations

Source: United Nations (Video News)

The Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Tom Fletcher today (23 Jan) told the Security Council that “the children of Gaza are not collateral damage” and are “as deserving as children everywhere of security, education and hope.”

Before today’s meeting on the situation of children in the occupied Palestinian territory began, Russian Ambassador Vasily Nebenzya asked for the floor. Nebenzya said, “the refusal” of UNICEF’s Head Catherine Russell to brief today’s Council session, was “a flagrant step which deserves our most serious censure.”

The Russian Ambassador said Russell, “during the US presidency of the Security Council, came to brief us at the drop of a hat at a disgraceful, politicized briefing about the so-called children’s aspects of the situation in Ukraine, on the 4th of December of last year.” Adding, “it would appear that for UNICEF, children in Gaza are less important than children in Ukraine.”

United States Ambassador Dorothy Shea also requested the floor and said, “the idea that the United States is responsible for the terrible suffering there is, just unacceptable to us, and we reject it, in its totality.”

Fletcher told the Council that children in Gaza, “have been killed, starved and frozen to death. They have been maimed, orphaned, separated from their family. Conservative estimates indicate that over 17,000 children are without their families in Gaza. Some died before their first breath, perishing with their mothers in childbirth. An estimated 150,000 pregnant women and new mothers are in desperate need of health services. Children have lost their schools and their education.”

He said children in Gaza “tell us that the world was not there for them throughout this war. We must be there for them now.”

Palestinian author Bisan Nateel, who writes children books, told the Council, “we have always been waiting for the moment when the Security Council would announce a ceasefire to end all these massacres and violations against the Palestinians in Gaza. Today, I hope. To live the ceasefire and for all our children to go back to their schools and for us to go back to our normal life when we used to go to our schools, to work, when we used to play, plant, work. The natural act of life, just to live.”

Palestinian Ambassador Riyad Mansour called upon the international community “to enable UNWRA to reopen its schools in the Gaza Strip, and to equip it to welcome thousands of children to resume formal education. And to reach every young boy and girl evenly and safely.”

For his part, Israeli Ambassador Danny Danon said, “it is Hamas, not Israel, that has turned Gaza into a war zone. It is Hamas, not Israel, that uses children as human shields. It is Hamas, not Israel, that places its terror infrastructure in schools, hospitals and civilian neighbourhoods. But time and time again, this Council chooses to ignore these facts.”

The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that large volumes of humanitarian aid continue to enter Gaza through the Erez and Zikim crossings in the north and Kerem Shalom crossing in the south.

Inside Gaza, OCHA says that aid cargo and humanitarian personnel are moving into areas that were previously hard to reach.

MIL OSI Video –

MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine – P10_TA(2025)0006 – Thursday, 23 January 2025 – Strasbourg

Source: European Parliament

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on historical remembrance,

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,

– having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),

– having regard to the Geneva Conventions,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas on 24 February 2022, the Russian regime declared the start of a ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine based on false claims that it needed to protect civilians;

B. whereas, in fact, since 24 February 2022 the Russian Federation has been waging an unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, in continuation of previous aggressions since 2014, and continues to persistently violate the principles of the UN Charter through its aggressive actions against the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine and to blatantly and grossly violate international humanitarian law, as established by the Geneva Conventions of 1949, in particular through the massive use of targeted attacks against the civilian population, residential areas and civilian infrastructure;

C. whereas the UN General Assembly, in its resolution of 2 March 2022, immediately qualified Russia’s war against Ukraine as an act of aggression in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and, in its resolution of 14 November 2022, it recognised the need to hold the Russian Federation accountable for its war of aggression, as well as legally and financially responsible for its internationally wrongful acts, and that Russia should pay reparations for the injuries and damage caused;

D. whereas Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is not an isolated act but a continuation of its imperialistic policy, which has included a war against Chechnya and military aggression against Georgia in 2008, and the occupation of Crimea and the start of a war in the Donbas in 2014;

E. whereas the start of Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against neighbouring Ukraine was preceded by several public declarations by the president of the Russian Federation seeking to justify its use of force by means of historical revisionism, false claims and illegitimate demands for the recognition of its exclusive interests in Ukraine and other neighbouring countries;

F. whereas the Russian regime has been making widespread use of disinformation, including based on distorted historical arguments, and foreign information manipulation and interference in an attempt to justify its crime of aggression, to incite the Russian population to support its illegal regime and illegal war of aggression against neighbouring Ukraine, to interfere in the democratic processes of other countries and to reduce support among their populations for continued international assistance and support for Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression; whereas the Russian regime denies Ukraine’s distinct national identity, falsely claiming it as part of the Russian world (‘Russkiy mir’), a narrative rooted in imperialistic ideology; whereas Russia is demolishing Holodomor memorials and restoring demolished monuments to Lenin in the occupied territories of Ukraine;

G. whereas Russia has not only failed to acknowledge the unforgivable initial role of the Soviet Union in the early stages of World War II, for example through the 1939 Treaty of Non-Aggression between Nazi Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) and its secrets protocols, commonly referred to as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, in which both totalitarian regimes conspired to divide Europe into exclusive spheres of influence, and failed to assume its responsibility for the many atrocities and mass crimes committed in territories occupied by the Soviet Union, but the current Russian regime has also instrumentalised history and created a cult of ‘victory’ around World War II to ideologically mobilise citizens and manipulate them into supporting an illegal war of aggression;

H. whereas Russia has developed a growing disinformation campaign of historical revisionism for the purpose of denying Ukraine its national identity, statehood and very existence, and with the aim of justifying its claims to exclusive spheres of influence, which is reminiscent of how the Soviet Union agreed with Nazi Germany to invade and occupy parts of Poland and Romania as well as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact; whereas today, Russia poses a particular threat to Poland and the Baltic States and their sovereignty through this type of historical revisionism;

I. whereas Victory Day, celebrated annually on 9 May, has been turned by the current Russian regime into a tool of war propaganda in Russia, by exploiting the narrative of the ‘liberation of Europe from Nazism’ and thus ignoring the subsequent Soviet occupation of the Baltic States and the subjugation of central Europe; whereas this narrative of liberation from Nazism is being used today in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

J. whereas in some Member States, communist symbols, as well as the symbols of the ongoing Russian aggression, are prohibited by law; whereas since 2009, 23 August has been commemorated across the EU as the European Day of Remembrance for Victims of all Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes; whereas since 2003, Parliament has held an annual commemoration for the victims of mass Soviet deportations;

1. Reiterates its condemnation, in the strongest possible terms, of Russia’s unprovoked, illegal and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine; calls on Russia to immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine and to completely and unconditionally withdraw all forces, proxies and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine, to end its forced deportations of Ukrainian civilians and to release all detained and deported Ukrainians, particularly children;

2. Rejects the various claims made by the Russian regime as futile attempts to justify an illegal war of aggression that constitutes a blatant violation of the UN Charter and of the responsibility of the Russian Federation as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to maintain peace and stability and that was immediately recognised as such by the other permanent members of the UN Security Council, along with an overwhelming majority of the UN General Assembly; recalls that no consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military, historic or otherwise, may serve as a justification for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine;

3. Condemns the Russian regime’s systematic falsification and use of distorted historical arguments, such as those related to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, in its attempt to manipulate Russian public opinion into supporting criminal actions such as the illegal war of aggression against neighbouring Ukraine, to undermine international support and assistance for Ukraine and to erase Ukraine’s distinct cultural and historical identity; denounces Russia’s claim that it is entitled to zones of exclusive interest at the expense of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states as incompatible with international law;

4. Condemns the Russian Federation’s failure to establish accountability for Soviet crimes and its deliberate obstruction of historical research by denying access to and closing Soviet archives, as well as the fact that it has enacted legislation criminalising the truthful portrayal of Soviet and Russian crimes and persecuted civil society organisations investigating Soviet crimes, and has glorified Stalinist totalitarianism and re-created its methods; maintains that impunity and the lack of factually accurate historical and public debate and education has contributed to the current Russian regime’s ability to revive imperialist policies and instrumentalise history for its criminal purposes; condemns the persecution of civil society organisations investigating Soviet crimes or the crimes of the current regime, including the liquidation of International Memorial, the Memorial Human Rights Defence Centre, and the Moscow Helsinki Group, as well as the forced closure of the Sakharov Centre;

5. Recalls that the deliberate attacks of the Russian Federation on the civilian population of Ukraine, the destruction of civilian infrastructure, the use of torture, sexual violence and rape as weapons of war, the deportation of thousands of Ukrainian citizens to the territory of the Russian Federation, the forced transfer and adoption of Ukrainian children, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights constitute war crimes for which all perpetrators must be held accountable;

6. Reiterates, therefore, its full support for the ongoing investigation by the Prosecutor of the ICC into the situation in Ukraine based on alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide; welcomes Ukraine’s formal accession to the ICC as of 1 January 2025 as an important contribution to international efforts to establish accountability for serious international crimes; calls for the EU to make further diplomatic efforts to encourage the ratification of the Rome Statute and all its amendments globally;

7. Furthermore also reiterates its call for the establishment of a special tribunal to investigate and prosecute the crime of aggression committed by the leadership of the Russian Federation against Ukraine; reiterates its call on the Commission, the Council and the European External Action Service to provide all political, financial and practical support necessary for the establishment of a special tribunal; expresses its full support for the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression in Ukraine, based in The Hague and supporting the ongoing efforts of the Joint Investigation Team, as a first concrete step towards the establishment of the special tribunal;

8. Calls strongly for the EU and its Member States to further increase and coordinate their efforts, including with like-minded partners, to promptly and rigorously counter Russian disinformation and foreign information manipulation and interference in order to protect the integrity of their democratic processes and strengthen the resilience of European societies, inter alia by actively promoting media literacy and by supporting quality media and professional journalism, in particular investigative journalism that uncovers Russian propaganda, its methods and networks, and by supporting research into new hybrid influence technologies;

9. Calls for the EU to expand its sanctions against Russian media outlets conducting disinformation and information manipulation campaigns supporting and justifying Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and calls on the Member States to swiftly and thoroughly implement these sanctions and to dedicate sufficient resources to effectively addressing this hybrid warfare; calls for the EU and the Member States to step up their support for the independent Russian media in exile in order to enable diverse voices in the Russian-language media;

10. Expresses deep concern about the recent announcements from social media companies’ leadership concerning relaxing their rules on fact-checking and moderation and how this will further enable Russia’s disinformation campaign around the world; calls on the Commission and the Member States to strictly enforce the Digital Services Act in response to these announcements by Meta and earlier by X, including as an important part of the fight against Russian disinformation;

11. Calls on EU citizens to critically evaluate information by questioning its origins and intentions, particularly when it pertains to narratives linked to Russia, and to crosscheck facts using diverse and reliable sources to resist attempts at manipulation by foreign malign actors;

12. Condemns Moscow’s exploitation of Orthodox religion for geopolitical purposes, notably through the instrumentalisation of the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) as a tool to influence and exert control over Orthodox populations in Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Serbia and other countries;

13. Responds to the statement of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of 2 May 2023 on the ideology of ‘Ruscism’ by condemning the nationalist imperialist ideology, policy and practices of the current Russian regime; stresses the incompatibility of this ideology and policy and these practices with international law and European values;

14. Believes that Russia’s attempts to misrepresent, revise and distort the history of Ukraine undermine the collective memory and identity of Europe as a whole and represent a threat to historical truth, democratic values and peace in Europe; calls on the Member States, therefore, to invest more in education on and research into the common history of Europe and European remembrance, and to support projects that promote a better understanding of the impact of the division of Europe during the Cold War; expresses its support for the building of a pan-European memorial in Brussels for the victims of the 20th century totalitarian regimes; regrets the continued use of symbols of totalitarian regimes in public spaces and calls for an EU-wide ban on the use of both Nazi and Soviet communist symbols as well as symbols of Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine;

15. Expresses its wish for the EU and its Member States to promote better knowledge and understanding of the human suffering of Europeans inflicted by the Soviet regime during the 20th century; in this respect, calls for remembrance and respect for the victims of Soviet crimes, such as the mass deportations, including of the Crimean Tatar people and from the Baltic countries, the Gulag system, the Holodomor, massacres such as the Katyn massacre, and the Upper Silesian tragedy;

16. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the President, Government and Parliament of Ukraine, and the Russian institutions.

MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – The EU’s new bilateral security and defence partnerships – 24-01-2025

Source: European Parliament

The Strategic Compass, adopted by the 27 EU Member States in March 2022 – only weeks after the onset of Russia’s unjustified and unprovoked aggression on Ukraine –emphasised the need for robust partnerships, for the EU to be able to achieve its objectives in the area of security and defence. Alongside ‘acting’ (operations), ‘securing’ (resilience) and ‘investing’, ‘partnering’ is one of the four main pillars of the Compass. The document itself outlines specific targets and deadlines to measure progress in this area. While the EU has partnered with other security and defence actors (essentially states and international organisations) in the past, a new model of tailored security and defence partnership was launched shortly after the adoption of the Compass, as a reinforced framework for enhanced partnership. To date, the EU has signed six such partnerships – with (by date of signature) Norway, Moldova, South Korea, Japan, Albania and North Macedonia, and more are envisaged. While the partnerships vary in content, depending on the assessed mutual interests of the EU and each individual partner, some ten areas of cooperation are common to all six. The European Parliament has highlighted the significance of the Strategic Compass’s partnership dimension and, in particular, the value of security and defence dialogues with partners from the Western Balkans, the Eastern Partnership, as well as with key partners in strategic maritime areas such as the Southern Neighbourhood and the Indo-Pacific. Parliament has underlined that cooperation with countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, Ukraine, Georgia, the Western Balkans, Japan, Australia and certain African countries serves as a key element of the common security and defence policy. In 2023, it called for deeper military and defence cooperation with Japan and South Korea, and for closer cooperation with partners in Latin America and the Caribbean.

MIL-OSI Europe: Debates – Thursday, 23 January 2025 – Strasbourg – Revised edition

Source: European Parliament

Verbatim report of proceedings

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Thursday, 23 January 2025 – Strasbourg

1.	Opening of the sitting
2.	Combating Desertification: 16th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP16) of the United Nations Convention (debate)
3.	Resumption of the sitting
4.	Cryptocurrencies – need for global standards (debate)
5.	Resumption of the sitting
6.	Composition of new committees
7.	Composition of committees and delegations
8.	Voting time
	8.1.	Case of Jean-Jacques Wondo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (RC-B10-0069/2025, B10-0065/2025, B10-0069/2025, B10-0070/2025, B10-0072/2025, B10-0078/2025, B10-0081/2025, B10-0084/2025) (vote)
	8.2.	Systematic repression of human rights in Iran, notably the cases of Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi, and the taking of EU citizens as hostages (RC-B10-0066/2025, B10-0063/2025, B10-0066/2025, B10-0067/2025, B10-0073/2025, B10-0082/2025, B10-0085/2025, B10-0086/2025) (vote)
	8.3.	Case of Boualem Sansal in Algeria (RC-B10-0087/2025, B10-0087/2025, B10-0088/2025, B10-0089/2025, B10-0090/2025, B10-0091/2025, B10-0092/2025, B10-0093/2025) (vote)
	8.4.	Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (RC-B10-0074/2025, B10-0074/2025, B10-0075/2025, B10-0076/2025, B10-0077/2025, B10-0079/2025) (vote)
	8.5.	Situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025 (RC-B10-0064/2025, B10-0064/2025, B10-0068/2025, B10-0071/2025, B10-0080/2025, B10-0083/2025) (vote)
9.	Resumption of the sitting
10.	Approval of the minutes of the previous sitting
11.	Major interpellations (debate)
12.	Explanations of votes
13.	Approval of the minutes of the sitting and forwarding of texts adopted
14.	Dates of forthcoming sittings
15.	Closure of the sitting
16.	Adjournment of the session

PRÉSIDENCE: YOUNOUS OMARJEE
Vice-Président

1. Opening of the sitting

(La séance est ouverte à 09h01)

2. Combating Desertification: 16th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP16) of the United Nations Convention (debate)

Jessika Roswall, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, honourable Members, healthy soils are fundamental for our collective future. Without rich and fertile soils, we have no food and many farmers have their livelihoods affected. We must pay more attention to combating land degradation and enhancing drought resilience for our economy and for our security.

Europe is not immune to these issues. One of our key political priorities for the coming mandate, the new water resilience strategy, comes from the realisation that our European and global waters are under unsustainable pressure. At the same time, our Joint Research Centre Soil Observatory notes that at least 62 % of EU soils are affected by degradation.

Droughts have substantial impacts on nearly all regions of the EU. This is why I travelled to Riyadh for the opening of the desertification COP16 on my first day as European Commissioner. I wanted to send a strong signal of the EU’s clear commitment to multilateralism and to cooperation with international partners on our key environmental challenges.

The desertification COP followed the two meetings of the climate and biodiversity COPs. The day before it started, countries failed to agree on a global treaty on plastic pollution. On desertification, despite the EU’s strong engagement, we reached a mixed result in Riyadh. Parties were not able to reach a compromise on the main topic on the agenda – an instrument to address droughts. It is disappointing that we cannot bridge our differences and reach consensus on such critical issues.

We were also disappointed in the outcome on gender and civil society organisations. The participation of these organisations increases transparency and democratic accountability. Their contribution is essential. However, some countries increasingly challenge the role and contributions of civil society organisations.

Finally, we were disappointed that the parties were reluctant to embrace synergies across the three Rio Conventions on desertification, climate and biodiversity.

However, we did also make progress on several fronts, and every bit of multilateral success is worth celebrating. We reached an agreement on establishing the Science-Policy Interface as a permanent body. We also adopted decisions on land tenure, on migration related to desertification, land degradation and droughts, and on avoiding, reducing and reversing degradation on agricultural land. It was the first time in the history of the Convention that agricultural land degradation was addressed. We must look at sustainable agricultural practices and healthy land together.

Finally, after a 10‑year freeze, the parties agreed to increase the core budget of the Convention. This is an important step to ensure that global challenges like desertification, drought and water scarcity are properly addressed in the multilateral agenda.

The EU is contributing to the concrete implementation of the Convention, particularly through our continued support for the Great Green Wall, an inspiring UNCCD flagship initiative that the EU is proud to champion. Building on this commitment, the EU has launched the second phase of the UN World Restoration Flagship, Regreening Africa, which is a key contribution to the Green Wall Initiative.

Honourable Members, the EU and its Member States will need to step up efforts to protect our values and implement international commitments in the UNCCD and within the EU. In this regard, I am happy to report that the Commission is responding to the commitments of the European Court of Auditors by developing a methodology to assess land degradation and certification for the EU. This will require careful preparation and strategic alliances. We need to address land use, climate change, biodiversity loss, water scarcity and pollution in a coherent manner.

Honourable Members, these are reflections from my first ever COP, and I am convinced that this COP on desertification needs to be more central. We also cannot look at the outcome of Riyadh without acknowledging that international negotiations have become more difficult, more complex and interconnected when the world is facing several ecological crises. Biodiversity, climate, food, water and energy challenges are all interconnected with land use.

I’m now looking forward to hearing your views.

Carmen Crespo Díaz, en nombre del Grupo PPE. – Señor presidente, señora comisaria, gracias por el empuje al tema del agua desde la nueva Comisión. Creemos que es fundamental. Yo soy de una tierra desértica, al lado del desierto de Europa de Tabernas, y allí se demuestra con la huerta de Europa —porque el 80 % del producto de frutas y hortalizas se exporta desde allí —que es posible abordar esta cuestión. ¿Por qué? Porque hay veinte veces menor huella hídrica en todos los productos agroalimentarios.

Ese es el gran milagro: que para las infraestructuras hidráulicas se utilicen los fondos Next Generation, el Banco Europeo de Inversiones y se creen infraestructuras donde la ciencia, con todo lo que se está investigando, permita. Creo en estos momentos que es fundamental prestar atención a todas las fuentes hídricas: todas son necesarias, algunas en prevención y otras adecuadas a las cuestiones agrarias. Creo que es importantísima la economía circular, y las aguas residuales nos dan una oportunidad en Europa de tener agua regenerada, que incluso podemos inyectar a nuestra hucha del futuro, que son, en este caso, todas las aguas subterráneas.

Por ello, creo que se puede hacer, que tenemos la obligación de hacerlo y que, además, en este momento, los países como España, como el mío, deberían trabajar en estas infraestructuras hidráulicas de prevención —también adaptadas a lo que es el tema agrario— y, por supuesto, bajar los impuestos, el IVA de los alimentos, que la rebaja no se ha prorrogado en este momento en ese decreto trampa que ayer llevaron al Congreso de los Diputados. Creo que es fundamental la seguridad alimentaria y, para conseguirla, tenemos que trabajar en las infraestructuras hidráulicas, como la nueva Comisión y la nueva comisaria están haciendo en este momento en Europa.

Marta Temido, em nome do Grupo S&D. – Senhor Presidente, Senhora Comissária, Caros Colegas, a desertificação e a degradação dos solos, tal como as alterações climáticas, são uma realidade que põe em causa os direitos humanos mais básicos, como o direito à alimentação ou o direito ao acesso à água limpa e segura. Atingem, em especial, as comunidades mais vulneráveis, as mulheres, as crianças, os povos indígenas, mas, potencialmente, vão atingir-nos a todos.

E a COP 16, que decorreu em Riade no passado mês de dezembro, reforçou a urgência do combate a estes fenómenos, através da intensificação da colaboração internacional e de uma abordagem integrada. A União Europeia reafirmou o seu compromisso com a meta global de neutralidade da degradação da terra e o empenho em atingir este objetivo até 2030, através de incentivos aos Estados-Membros para que adotem políticas que favoreçam a restauração das terras e a implementação de práticas agrícolas sustentáveis.

Por isso, a União Europeia tem de continuar a incentivar a adoção destas práticas agrícolas regenerativas, que respeitem os ecossistemas naturais e contribuam para a restauração de solos degradados, e deve bater-se pela implementação da Lei do Restauro da Natureza. Mas a inclusão da sociedade civil e do setor privado neste combate são essenciais, e isso exige iniciativas de apoio.

Quero referir, aqui, uma iniciativa da sociedade civil do meu país, Portugal, que exemplifica bem esta luta que precisamos de levar a cabo com ela. E é a iniciativa Pró-Montado Alentejo, um projeto que visa promover a construção de uma barreira florestal ativa na região sul de Portugal, baseada no montado de sobreiro e azinheira, com o objetivo de mitigar os efeitos das alterações climáticas, combater a desertificação, proteger a diversidade e, enfim, combater o despovoamento.

Julien Leonardelli, au nom du groupe PfE. – Monsieur le Président, la COP16 a été, sans aucun doute, la plus grande réunion d’États à ce jour sur le sujet de la désertification. Elle se tenait à Riyad, ce qui a permis aux participants de constater à quel point ce problème bouleverse des puissances régionales qui reposaient autrefois sur l’agriculture, comme l’Éthiopie ou l’Égypte. Ce véritable fléau est aujourd’hui à nos portes. On l’observe déjà en Grèce, en Italie, mais aussi dans ma région au sud de la France, en Occitanie, où l’eau courante des habitants est désormais rationnée en été, lors des canicules, où les agriculteurs ne peuvent pas toujours arroser leurs cultures et où les feux de forêt se font de plus en plus fréquents.

Aujourd’hui, le temps n’est plus aux belles intentions et aux fausses promesses, mais au changement. Les Européens touchés par l’artificialisation des sols et la sécheresse méritent mieux que les ânonnements suffisants de ceux qui se tiennent dans des tours de verre et de béton. Pour répondre à ce défi, il faut privilégier les circuits courts, réduire le libre-échange débridé qui pollue notre air et nos océans et se tourner vers l’innovation et la recherche, à l’image des pays du Golfe. Ne restons pas spectateurs, soyons les acteurs de notre salut avant qu’il ne soit trop tard.

Francesco Ventola, a nome del gruppo ECR. – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, dal rapporto COP16 la desertificazione e la siccità rappresentano non solo emergenze ambientali, ma anche minacce sociali ed economiche per intere regioni.

I dati forniti sottolineano che oltre il 40 % delle terre globali è degradato e che la siccità provoca perdite economiche annuali che superano i 300 miliardi. In Italia, questo si traduce in una crisi che colpisce soprattutto il comparto agricolo.

Si rende sempre più necessaria e indispensabile la realizzazione di infrastrutture che ottimizzino il sistema di raccolta, conservazione e distribuzione della risorsa acqua. È necessario investire in impianti di riuso delle acque reflue. Nessuna goccia deve essere dispersa: non ce lo possiamo permettere.

Non possiamo più accettare false politiche ambientali ideologizzate, che bloccano sui territori la realizzazione di progetti innovativi e realmente sostenibili. Bisogna intraprendere tutte le strade che la scienza e la tecnologia ci offrono per fronteggiare il rischio desertificazione.

Cari colleghi, non limitiamoci solo a parlare dei problemi: agiamo per risolverli e facciamolo con determinazione, per il bene dei nostri territori, dell’Europa e delle generazioni future.

Martin Hojsík, za skupinu Renew. – Vážený pán predsedajúci, vážená pani komisárka, vážené kolegyne, vážení kolegovia, aj keď sa takpovediac symbolicky konferencia dohody OSN o dezertifikácii konala v Saudskej Arábii uprostred púšte, nie je to téma, ktorá sa týka len Arabského polostrova a Afriky. Je to téma, ktorá sa veľmi bytostne týka aj nás v Európe. Dezertifikácia je každodenným problémom na Cypre, v Španielsku, v Taliansku, ale aj uprostred Európy. U nás doma na Slovensku každým rokom vidíme väčší a väčší podiel pôdy, ktorú už farmári nedokážu obhospodarovať, ktorá sa nám stráca takpovediac priamo pred očami, pretože sa vysušuje. O tom je dezertifikácia. Sucho a nedostatok vody sa stali fenoménom našej doby a keď prídu, tak prídu ako záplavy. Klimatická kríza sa mení na klimatickú katastrofu. Ničíme biodiverzitu a meníme krajinu v púšť. V niektorých častiach Slovenska farmári prišli až o 40 % svojich výnosov kvôli dezertifikácii. Taký obrovský to je problém. Preto ako spravodajca Európskeho parlamentu pre zákon o pôde, naozaj vás chcem vyzvať, aby ste ho podporili. Dúfam, že sa nám spolu s Komisiou a Radou podarí dosiahnuť čoskoro v trialógu dohodu. Základom je mať kvalitné informácie. V Rijáde sa dohodla medzinárodná platforma. V Európe takú nemáme, zákon o pôde ju vie poskytnúť.

Pär Holmgren, för Verts/ALE gruppen. – Herr talman! Kommissionär Roswall! Klimatförändringarna handlar verkligen inte bara om att det blir varmare på planeten, utan ett mycket större hot i stora delar av världen är förändringarna i nederbördsklimatet. Det blir mer nederbörd, kraftigare nederbörd på de platser där vi redan har mycket vatten. Men framför allt, i det här sammanhang som vi diskuterar nu, på många platser, inte minst där vi har en stor del av mänskligheten, där vi har en stor del av jordbruk och matproduktion, blir det nu sakta men säkert torrare.

Det är ett enormt stort akut hot mot oss och vår matproduktion. Det här gäller inte bara andra delar av världen, det gäller här hemma i Europa också. Vi ser delar av framför allt Sydeuropa, hur skördar av till exempel majs och vete redan har sjunkit med storleksordningen 60 %.

Vi vet också att det torrare klimatet, det torrare, lokala och regionala klimatet, medför en massa riskkonsekvenser. Till exempel de förskräckliga översvämningar som vi såg i Valencia senast förvärrades så mycket av att marken där först hade blivit så torr och hård att den inte kunde ta emot vatten.

Som kommissionär Roswall konstaterade: På COP16, visst i vissa steg, i vissa sammanhang tog vi steg framåt, men som ofta i sådana här sammanhang var det lite blandade resultat. Det största problemet är att vi återigen misslyckades med att få ett bindande globalt ramverk när det gäller att bekämpa torka.

Hade ansvariga politiker redan i slutet på 1900‑talet tagit hänsyn till den forskning som fanns då hade vi förhoppningsvis inte varit där vi är nu. Men nu är vi där vi är, och det innebär att vi, inte minst här i EU, måste höja ambitionerna, både när det gäller att minska utsläppen och arbeta ännu mer aktivt med klimatanpassning.

Catarina Martins, em nome do Grupo The Left. – Senhor Presidente, nos próximos 25 anos, três em cada quatro pessoas será afetada pela seca a nível mundial. É uma catástrofe e está aqui. A Europa está a aquecer mais rápido do que o resto do mundo e a seca prolongada chegou décadas antes do que estava previsto.

Por isso mesmo, e apesar do veto dos Estados Unidos e do Japão a um acordo para um regime global de resiliência à seca, a União Europeia não pode desistir desse objetivo e deve agir a todos os níveis.

Venho de um país, Portugal, onde a agricultura superintensiva condena boa parte da população alentejana e algarvia, incluindo os pequenos agricultores, a uma vida sem água. O que produzem não alimenta essas populações nem deixa riqueza no país. Tudo é exportado, incluindo os lucros. Por lá, ficam só os solos degradados.

Por isso, bem sei que esta não é a luta da ecologia contra a agricultura, é a das nossas vidas, incluindo a produção alimentar, contra a voragem das multinacionais do agronegócio. E por isso, Senhora Comissária, vai ser mesmo preciso coragem para enfrentar alguns dos mais poderosos interesses económicos.

Zsuzsanna Borvendég, a ESN képviselőcsoport nevében. – Tisztelt Elnök Úr! Magyarország termőföldjei az emberi tevékenység miatt száradnak ki. A Kárpát-medence természetes vízháztartása elegendő vizet biztosítana, ha a tájnak megfelelő módon gazdálkodnánk.

De ma mindent a profitéhség határoz meg, amely kizsákmányolja a környezetet. Ártereink helyén zöldhasút termő szántóföldek vannak. Hagyjuk, hogy a folyók átvágtassanak az országon, ahelyett, hogy átitatnák a talajt az éltető vízzel.

Az uniós döntéshozatal a klímaválság kapcsán a levegő összetételére fókuszál, és erre hivatkozva betarthatatlan emissziós szabályokat alkot, de az ennek érdekében használt új technológiák a talaj és a talajvizek elszennyeződését fokozzák.

Magyarországon az aszállyal párhuzamosan az akkumulátorgyárak vízszennyező hatásával is számolni kell, vagyis nálunk is a gazdasági lobbik írják felül a környezetvédelmet.

A Föld egy komplex rendszer, amely komplex válaszokat igényel, nem lehet kiragadni egyes problémákat. Ha valós megoldásokat akarunk, akkor a lokalitás felé kell mozdulnunk, és uniós forrásokból is a helyi sajátosságoknak megfelelő természetközeli megoldásokat kell támogatnunk.

Christine Schneider (PPE). – Herr Präsident, Frau Kommissarin, meine sehr geehrten Damen und Herren! Wüstenbildung ist eine globale Herausforderung, und Europa ist immer stärker betroffen. Unsere Ernährungssicherheit, die wir lange für selbstverständlich hielten, ist bedroht. Eine Lösung kann nur mit und nicht gegen unsere Landwirtinnen und Landwirte gefunden werden. Was passiert, wenn wir über ihre Köpfe hinweg entscheiden, das haben die letzten Jahre gezeigt. Bauernproteste sind zwischenzeitlich vor diesem Haus zum Alltag geworden. Daher mein dringender Appell: Beziehen Sie von Anfang an den Berufsstand mit ein, insbesondere bei der angekündigten Water Resilience Strategy.

Drei Aspekte möchte ich hervorheben: Wir brauchen erstens ein intelligentes Wassermanagement. Nutzen wir die künstliche Intelligenz, um Wasserressourcen effizient zu verteilen. Setzen wir auf Wiederverwendung von Grauwasser und Abwasser, und bauen wir wassersparende Infrastruktur aus. So können wir Wasser nachhaltig zwischen den Regionen und Sektoren nutzen. Zweitens: dürreresistentes Saatgut. Es ist unverzichtbar, um Erträge selbst unter extremen Klimabedingungen zu sichern. Dazu brauchen wir neue Züchtungstechnologien, und die Blockade im Rat muss beendet werden. Drittens: Innovative Bewässerungslösungen, Tröpfchen- und Präzisionsbewässerung nutzen Sensorendaten, setzen Wasser ganz gezielt ein und vermeiden dadurch Verluste. Diese Technologien müssen wir stärker fördern, um unsere Landwirtschaft noch effizienter und nachhaltiger zu machen.

Kurz zusammengefasst: Wenn wir Ernährungssicherheit wollen, brauchen wir neue Technologien und innovative Lösungen in enger Zusammenarbeit mit unseren internationalen Partnern, mit unseren Landwirten, aber auch mit uns Verbraucherinnen und Verbrauchern.

Σάκης Αρναούτογλου (S&D). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, η Γη μας, πηγή ζωής για αιώνες, αντιμετωπίζει τον κίνδυνο να μετατραπεί σε πηγή αφανισμού. Οφείλουμε να αποτρέψουμε τη μετατροπή εύφορων περιοχών σε ερημωμένα τοπία. Όταν το έδαφος καταστρέφεται, διακυβεύεται το μέλλον της ανθρωπότητας. Η ζωή δεν μπορεί να ευδοκιμήσει σε καμένη γη. Η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση καλείται να αναλάβει ηγετικό ρόλο, διακηρύσσοντας την ανάγκη για ορθολογική διαχείριση των φυσικών πόρων και τερματισμό επιτέλους της αδράνειας. Η συνέχιση της παρούσας πορείας θα οδηγήσει στη συγκομιδή των συνεπειών της αδιαφορίας μας και όχι των καρπών της γης. Προτείνω τη σύναψη ενός Συμφώνου για Ζωντανή Γη, μια συμφωνία που θα προβλέπει την αντιστάθμιση κάθε χαμένης έκτασης με την αναγέννηση διπλάσιας έκτασης μέσω βιώσιμων επενδύσεων. Μια τέτοια πρωτοβουλία θα μπορούσε να αποτελέσει ένα νέο παγκόσμιο πρότυπο για τη βιώσιμη διαχείριση των εδαφών. Δεν πρόκειται για μια ουτοπική ιδέα, αλλά για μια επιτακτική ανάγκη. Παρά τις προσπάθειες για την προστασία του πλανήτη, παρατηρούμε την εστίαση ορισμένων στην εξερεύνηση διαστημικών προορισμών, παραβλέποντας την ανάγκη για άμεση δράση στη Γη. Φαίνεται να προκρίνεται η κατάκτηση ενός απομακρυσμένου κόκκινου πλανήτη εις βάρος της διαφύλαξης του πράσινου πλανήτη μας. Επιπλέον, διαπιστώνεται η ενίσχυση ρητορικών που αμφισβητούν την κρισιμότητα της κατάστασης, υποβαθμίζοντας τις περιβαλλοντικές προκλήσεις σε πολιτικά παιχνίδια. Η φύση μάς απευθύνει επείγουσα έκκληση. Ας την αφουγκραστούμε, πριν η σιωπή της γίνει πιο εκκωφαντική από οποιαδήποτε φωνή. Ο χρόνος για δράση είναι τώρα. Και σε όσους αναζητούν καταφύγιο σε άλλους πλανήτες, ας τους υπενθυμίσουμε ότι εκεί οι συνθήκες είναι ήδη ερημικές και θα έρθει η ερημοποίηση και στον πλανήτη μας, αν αυτό επιζητούν.

Mireia Borrás Pabón (PfE). – Señor presidente, señora comisaria, señorías, voy a ser muy clara: la CP16 ha sido otro espectáculo bochornoso de hipocresía, con líderes mundiales que vuelan en sus jets privados a Arabia Saudí; un país, por cierto, que incumple el 75 % de las restricciones medioambientales que ustedes desde aquí, desde Bruselas, imponen sin piedad a nuestros agricultores. Sí, aquellos mismos que evitan la desertificación del territorio. ¿Y qué resultados hemos obtenido? Ninguno, ningún compromiso vinculante.

Nos enfrentamos a un gran problema, señora comisaria: casi el 70 % de las tierras agrícolas mediterráneas están en riesgo de desertificación y solo en España —en mi país— dos millones de hectáreas ya están clasificadas como desérticas. ¿Y qué hace la Comisión al respecto? Lo de siempre: culpabilizar al cambio climático. Pero ¿se han planteado, por un momento, que el principal problema fuera, por ejemplo, la falta de inversión en infraestructuras hídricas? En Europa se pierden millones de toneladas de agua de riego debido a infraestructuras hídricas que están tremendamente anticuadas.

Miremos a Israel —un país que tiene recursos hídricos muy escasos y condiciones casi desérticas—, que ha revolucionado su agricultura con tecnología muy avanzada; mientras ellos aumentan su productividad un 30 %, aquí en Europa nuestros agricultores se ven obligados a abandonar sus tierras. Desde Vox ya seguimos en esta línea y propusimos un plan: un gran Plan Hidrológico Nacional para garantizar el agua y cohesionar el territorio. ¿Y qué es lo que votó toda la izquierda en bloque? Un no rotundo. ¿Y qué es lo que votó el Partido Popular? Pues se abstuvo, como siempre, cuando le gustan nuestras iniciativas, pero tienen complejo en admitirlo.

Miremos ahora a Jaén: Marmolejo, Arjona, Lopera. ¿Les suenan, señores del PP? Son lugares de España donde el Partido Popular está expropiando tierras cultivadas con olivos para construir masivamente plantas fotovoltaicas. ¿Les preocupa de verdad la desertificación, señores del PP? 100 000 olivos a la basura, en nombre de la sostenibilidad. Empezamos a pensar que ustedes prefieren el aceite de Marruecos al aceite de Jaén, pero lo cierto es que no me extrañaría ver dentro de muy poco tanto al Partido Popular como a la izquierda manifestándose juntos en contra de sus propias políticas, esta vez no en apoyo de las nucleares, sino en su falsa solidaridad con los agricultores de Jaén, tan falsa como la sostenibilidad que defienden.

Laurence Trochu (ECR). – Monsieur le Président, Madame la Commissaire, mes chers collègues, face aux enjeux climatiques, il est triste de voir que les solutions idéologiques prennent trop souvent le pas sur le bon sens. La question de la désertification n’y fait pas exception et les réponses apportées à ce problème, que personne ne nie d’ailleurs, sont souvent illusoires. À ce titre, l’opposition féroce et même, parfois, violente des écologistes français à des solutions de bon sens telles que les mégabassines, qui stockent le surplus d’eau de l’hiver pour le réutiliser l’été, est un exemple éloquent.

Alors, plutôt que de voir en l’homme uniquement un prédateur-pollueur, l’homme doit être la solution, par l’innovation, le progrès technique et la recherche. La désertification ne peut être combattue par une écologie punitive et normative à outrance, ruineuse pour notre compétitivité, comme l’a d’ailleurs souligné le rapport Draghi.

Nos agriculteurs, qui ont façonné nos paysages, sont las d’être désignés comme les principaux responsables et d’être écrasés de normes. Dernier artefact idéologique, le changement climatique est aussi utilisé comme prétexte pour justifier une immigration de masse venue du Sud dont plus personne ne veut. Alors, chers collègues, pour relever le défi du climat, sortons enfin de l’idéologie.

Billy Kelleher (Renew). – Mr President, as I stand here, my home country of Ireland is preparing to be battered by one of the strongest storms in decades. And if you look at the weather forecasts across Europe, there’s rain in many areas. So it’s a concept that is very hard to understand when we sometimes speak about desertification.

But, in reality, the scale of this problem – the desertification – should be everyone’s concern. It affects the land of homes to 1.5 billion people. The UN estimates that 135 million people have already been displaced due to desertification, and this could rise to 700 million by 2050. This land is also important agricultural land, and the UN estimates that 40 % of agricultural land has already been degraded.

The consequences are far-reaching: humanitarian, migration, environmental problems, food and water security, political stability or political instability, for global security, for trade and supply chains there are significant challenges. And each of these consequences will have an impact also on Europe and the daily lives of our citizens.

We cannot reverse the problems in the very short term, but we have to plan and we must make real collective efforts to halt its spread and to address its long-term implications. So while I welcome the commitments at the COP16 of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, especially regarding the financial commitments from both the public and private sector, we do need to ensure that we make a common effort to bring forward the challenges regarding drought and the protocols with regard to tackling the same.

If we are going to halt this runaway train, we need to have a common, coherent plan for tackling drought and that involves governments, businesses, local people, scientists and engineers.

Kai Tegethoff (Verts/ALE). – Mr President, the summer of 2024 is the hottest on record in the EU and globally. Thirteen Member States, meaning almost 50 % of the Member States of the EU, are affected by desertification and almost 25 % of the territory is sensitive to desertification. Still, while the EU promotes the leadership role globally, we are not prepared ourselves.

The desertification COP16 failed to agree on a global drought framework, and the Commission promised to present a water resilience strategy already a year ago. I hope this will come very soon.

And Commissioner Roswall, in your introduction, in your first sentence you said that we need to focus on helping farmers, and in the second sentence it was ‘focus on economy’. I think what we really need in that water resilience strategy is water saving targets. We need to improve efficiency and reuse of water. We need to protect and restore our water supplies and the whole catchment area.

And then at the same time, considering the wildfires and the flooding that we deal with here every single plenary session, we have to make sure that this water resilience strategy is accompanied and embedded into a real European climate adaptation law.

João Oliveira (The Left). – Senhor Presidente, o problema da desertificação é um problema ambiental ou climático, mas é essencialmente um problema da relação do ser humano com a natureza, é um problema humano, social e económico.

As conclusões da COP16 contêm muitos dos elementos relevantes para o debate sobre o combate à desertificação, mas revelam também as muitas dificuldades que é preciso ainda superar.

Há muito por fazer para que haja verdadeiramente soluções, relativamente ao uso e à gestão eficientes da água e dos recursos hídricos, relativamente à ocupação e ordenamento equilibrado do território, relativamente à promoção de práticas produtivas sustentáveis, equilibradas, seja na agricultura, na pecuária, na silvicultura. Há muito por fazer no investimento público que é preciso nos territórios rurais, para travar o abandono da população e a consequente desertificação do território.

Permitam-me trazer, aqui, um aspeto que é relevante em Portugal, que é o montado de sobreiros e azinheiras, que é característico do meu país. O montado não é apenas um conjunto de árvores que retêm carbono e resistem melhor aos incêndios. O montado é um sistema agrosilvopastoril que tem de ser encarado como tal em todas as suas dimensões, não apenas pelo valor ambiental, mas pelo enorme valor social que tem, porque cria emprego, fixa as populações, permite práticas produtivas sustentáveis e equilibradas, garante um adequado ordenamento do território na compatibilização da sua utilização para fins produtivos, mas também tem preocupações ambientais.

Este é um exemplo do investimento que precisamos de fazer em áreas e em recursos que, sendo naturais de cada país, naturalmente permitem uma resposta mais eficaz ao combate à desertificação.

Daniel Buda (PPE). – Domnule președinte, doamnă comisară, doamnelor și domnilor colegi, deșertificarea este o realitate care nu poate fi contestată, iar la COP 16 s-a subliniat acest lucru. Potrivit datelor oficiale, deșertificarea generează costuri globale de peste 300 de miliarde de euro și afectează mai mult de 1,5 miliarde de oameni, crescând presiunile migraționiste și alimentând războaiele pentru resurse.

Uniunea pierde anual 74 de miliarde de euro din cauza degradării terenurilor, iar lipsa acțiunii va reduce randamentele culturilor cu cel puțin 10 % până în 2050, generând o penurie, atât pentru apă, cât și pentru alimente. România, țara mea, se confruntă din plin cu aceste fenomene. Avem nevoie urgent de acțiuni curajoase, care nu doar să prevină acest fenomen, ci chiar să-l inverseze pe termen lung.

Pentru a ne proteja securitatea alimentară, trebuie să investim în tehnologii și soluții inovatoare, precum noile tehnici genomice în gestionarea durabilă a apei și dezvoltarea unor sisteme inteligente de irigații la prețuri accesibile pentru toți fermierii, și subliniez acest lucru: la prețuri accesibile pentru toți fermierii.

În același timp, se impune utilizarea eficientă a apelor uzate, mai ales în jurul marilor centre urbane, și investiții serioase în ceea ce înseamnă desalinizarea apei marine, toate acestea trebuind să devină o prioritate strategică și o obligație față de cetățenii noștri.

Investițiile din sectorul privat trebuie încurajate, iar Comisia trebuie să se asigure că statele membre utilizează eficient și rapid banii pentru împăduriri și perdele forestiere. Europa are la dispoziție soluții, însă fără investiții direcționate și finanțare adecvată, nu va putea face față acestor provocări.

Stimați colegi, alegerea este a noastră: să acționăm acum sau generațiile viitoare vor suporta consecințele imobilismului nostru destructibil.

Maria Grapini (S&D). – Domnule președinte, doamnă comisară, stimați colegi, sigur, dezbatem o problemă foarte importantă, păcat că sunt așa de puțini membri ai Parlamentului European în sală. Așa cum s-a declarat și aici, cum a fost și în declarația Convenției, se degradează anual terenul. S-a ajuns la 70 % din terenuri care au fost transformate din starea lor naturală.

Secetele cauzează pagube și costuri și daune, peste 300 de miliarde pe an. Unde merg aceste daune și pagube? Evident, la fermieri și, până la urmă, la cetățeni. Doar în perioada 2015-2019, circa 100 de milioane de hectare de terenuri sănătoase și productive au fost degradate anual, amenințând evident, securitatea alimentară a globului, precum și disponibilitatea apei.

Ce trebuie făcut, doamnă comisară? Ne-ați relatat ce a fost la Convenție și că nu s-a ajuns la compromisuri importante. Eu cred că Uniunea Europeană trebuie să fie preocupată mai ales de ce se întâmplă în Uniunea Europeană, sigur, și global. Eu cred că trebuie să îmbunătățim instrumentele politice naționale și europene pentru abordarea productivă de gestionare a secetei. Aici avem foarte mult de făcut. Este nevoie de alocarea de bugete pentru finanțarea restaurării terenurilor, creșterea rezistenței la secetă, prin cercetare și inovare.

Comisia Europeană trebuie să aibă un plan de acțiuni la nivelul Uniunii Europene care să combată degradarea terenurilor în colaborare cu statele membre. Și mai trebuie făcut ceva, doamnă comisară: politicile Uniunii Europene, ale Comisiei, nu trebuie să se anuleze ca la algebră – plus și minus – sunt mii de hectare acum, cu parcuri fotovoltaice, terenuri care nu mai sunt recuperate zeci de ani.

Trebuie să vedem cum corelăm politica energetică cu această politică de protejare a terenurilor și cred foarte mult că este nevoie să vă gândiți, în principal, la cum să nu creăm presiune asupra fermierilor din Uniunea Europeană, asupra cetățenilor din Uniunea Europeană, atât timp cât în restul globului, Statele Unite, Japonia și celelalte state, nu au votat la această Convenție.

Mathilde Androuët (PfE). – Monsieur le Président, à l’issue de la COP16 consacrée à la désertification qui a eu lieu à Riyad, 12 milliards ont été sécurisés d’ici 2030 pour améliorer les terres, dont dix proviennent de la Banque islamique de développement. Dans un rassemblement international, les pétromonarchies sont donc venues au secours des déserts de sable, déserts où parfois on construit, en dépit de tout souci environnemental et économique, des pistes de ski.

Voilà, une fois de plus, la démonstration qu’aux problèmes environnementaux, qui sont des problèmes localisés, on ne peut avoir de réponse globalisée. Les COP sont des rassemblements de déblocage ou de création de fonds financiers, aucunement des lieux de réflexion et d’apport de solutions environnementales. Aussi, sur le problème majeur de la désertification et de l’assèchement des sols, ayons une vision et des solutions locales. La gestion de l’eau est une question sensible et différente d’un pays à l’autre et, parfois, d’une région à l’autre dans un seul et même pays. L’an passé, dans le nord de la France, les cultures ont souffert de trop de pluies, soit l’inverse exact des Pyrénées orientales, en manque d’eau permanent.

Si vous vous refusez au traitement local pour n’opérer qu’à l’échelle européenne, prenons des problèmes communs. En Bulgarie comme en Guadeloupe, 60 % de l’eau est perdue tant les infrastructures sont vétustes et fuyardes. De même, encouragez le reboisement, le replantage des haies pour favoriser la captation de l’eau par les sols. Bref, appuyez-vous sur ceux qui connaissent le mieux leur environnement, à savoir les paysans, plutôt que sur les financiers des pétromonarchies pour régler nos problèmes d’eau et de désertification en Europe. À problème local, solution nationale.

Marie Toussaint (Verts/ALE). – Monsieur le Président, la désertification, c’est l’autre nom de l’injustice climatique et de la vulnérabilité. C’est d’ailleurs peut-être parce qu’elle a d’abord touché les pays les plus pauvres que les pays les plus riches n’y ont, pendant si longtemps, prêté que si peu d’attention. La désertification est aujourd’hui sur nous. La Corse et les parties les plus pauvres de la Méditerranée, Perpignan et ses quartiers parmi les plus précaires de France, ou encore la dévastée Mayotte, n’ont plus d’eau. En Guadeloupe, l’érosion côtière frappe, puisant dans l’assèchement des terres. Quand dans le Massif central, ce sont évidemment les petits paysans qui souffrent le plus et qui n’ont pas les moyens d’acheter du foin pour leurs élevages lorsque celui-ci vient à manquer.

Au fond, la désertification continue dans l’indifférence, parce qu’elle frappe d’abord et de manière évidente les plus vulnérables. Mais ne soyons pas naïfs: nous réaliserons bientôt que la désertification est notre affaire à tous. Espérons qu’alors il ne sera pas trop tard. En Afrique, c’est déjà 16 % du PIB qui s’est évaporé du fait de la désertification.

Madame la Commissaire, nous ne sommes pas impuissants, ici, sur le territoire européen, pour un enjeu qui est bien un enjeu planétaire. La désertification est liée au dérèglement climatique et aux énergies fossiles. Alors sortons-en, et plus vite qu’aujourd’hui. Elle est aussi liée à l’agriculture intensive et à la déforestation que nous pouvons, que nous devons combattre. Alors agissons! Il n’y a plus de temps à perdre.

Valentina Palmisano (The Left). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, non è necessario guardare al Sahara per comprendere la desertificazione: i deserti si trovano ormai dietro casa. Sempre più spesso, immagini surreali, e allo stesso tempo drammatiche, mostrano paesaggi trasformati, fiumi ridotti a sentieri e laghi completamente prosciugati.

Il 40 % del suolo del Sud Italia è già a rischio, come tanti paesi del Mediterraneo. In questo modo, stiamo trasformando paesaggi millenari.

E questo non è soltanto il risultato del cambiamento climatico, ma anche di pratiche agricole non sostenibili, che hanno impoverito il nostro suolo. Ecco, il nostro approccio deve cambiare, privilegiando la qualità delle produzioni e la rigenerazione del suolo.

Il degrado non è inevitabile, per fortuna: possiamo invertire la rotta. Servono però incentivi per modelli agricoli basati sulla qualità e sulla rigenerazione del suolo. La politica deve smettere di finanziare pratiche obsolete e supportare invece l’innovazione.

Colleghi, la desertificazione, infatti, non è soltanto una sfida tecnica, ma è anche una questione di giustizia verso i nostri territori e soprattutto verso le generazioni future.

Il mio monito è che non sia la COP17 a salvare il suolo europeo, ma il nostro impegno concreto, oggi.

Salvatore De Meo (PPE). – Signor Presidente, signora Commissaria, onorevoli colleghi, la desertificazione è una delle sfide più urgenti del nostro tempo, aggravata dal cambiamento climatico e dalle attività dell’uomo.

Non è solo una crisi ambientale, ma un problema sociale ed economico che minaccia la biodiversità, la sicurezza alimentare e la stabilità delle nostre comunità, alimentando tensioni e migrazioni forzate.

Pensate che, ogni anno, 12 milioni di ettari vengono degradati, mettendo a rischio la sopravvivenza di oltre un miliardo di persone. Questo dato ci allarma e ci ricorda che la desertificazione, insieme alla crescente scarsità dell’acqua, richiede risposte immediate, coordinate e ambiziose.

La COP16 è stata un’occasione per riflettere sulle nostre responsabilità, perché l’Unione europea manca di un’azione comune adeguata e le risorse dedicate sono ancora troppo limitate rispetto alla portata degli interventi.

Dobbiamo impegnarci e sostenere lo sviluppo di politiche sostenibili, promuovendo pratiche agricole rigenerative e resilienti, un uso responsabile delle risorse idriche e l’innovazione tecnologica per ripristinare gli ambienti degradati.

La cooperazione internazionale, inoltre, è importante perché nessun paese può affrontare da solo questa battaglia. La desertificazione non conosce confini e le sue conseguenze si ripercuotono su scala globale. Solo lavorando insieme possiamo affrontare la complessità di questa sfida. Ciò significa condividere conoscenze, tecnologie e risorse, oltre a costruire – come si sta facendo – partenariati solidi tra governi, organizzazioni internazionali, società civile e settore privato.

Combattere la desertificazione significa investire nel futuro, nella nostra diversità, nella sicurezza alimentare e nella stabilità delle generazioni future.

Thomas Bajada (S&D). – Mr President, desertification is not a story from far, far away. Its serious implications have long been affecting the Mediterranean region due to its unique ecosystems, economic dependencies and limited natural resources.

In southern Spain, over-irrigation has led to soil erosion. In Crete, aquifers have been overexploited, leading to salinisation. In the neighbouring Sahel region, desertification has displaced millions of people, increasing migratory pressures towards Europe. And in Malta, increased pressure on desalinisation plants raised energy consumption and costs, which are passed on to households and businesses.

Today this is not a story only for southern Europeans. It is also a story shared with other Europeans from temperate and humid climates like Bulgaria. In fact, last year 45 % of the EU’s territory faced drought, threatening food production and water security.

Desertification is about humanity, our dependence on water for survival, and our need for water security and food security. Therefore, our response must be people-centred. The fight against desertification demands global cooperation, but it also starts at home in this very House. We need to dramatically increase our political commitment to water – we need to preserve our lands, help our nature to recover and conserve our water. And, dear Commissioner, we need to act now, with an ambitious European water resilience strategy before it is too late.

As rapporteur of the Parliament’s initiative, I call for decisive action to protect our people and resources and build a sustainable future of a liveable world for future generations to come.

France Jamet (PfE). – Monsieur le Président, la désertification est une menace importante, mais il en est une dont on ne parle pas assez, c’est la désertification de nos fonds marins. Déplorer l’acidification de nos océans, le réchauffement des eaux ou la hausse du niveau de la mer ne suffit pas. Il faut aussi dénoncer les causes de ce désastre. En France, par exemple, dans le Morbihan, on les trouve dans la construction stérilisante de parcs éoliens offshores ou dans les ravages de bateaux-usines sans-frontiéristes. Deux activités nocives, deux activités pourtant encouragées par l’Union européenne, qui témoignent de l’hypocrisie générale, voire de l’imposture pseudo-écologiste sur la préservation et la pérennité de nos écosystèmes.

Depuis quinze ans, on constate la dégradation alarmante de nos océans, qui menace nos richesses maritimes, les métiers qui en dépendent, au premier rang desquels nos pêcheurs, et nos ressources alimentaires. Cet équilibre si fragile, aggravé par la pollution terrestre qui se déverse dans nos mers, a aussi un impact sur nos climats et sur la désertification terrestre. La pluie salvatrice qu’attendent nos agriculteurs et les populations touchées par la sécheresse, cette pluie salvatrice ne tombe pas du ciel, elle vient de nos océans.

Alors tous ces vœux pieux et autres déclarations d’intention ne résoudront rien si nous ne remettons pas en cause l’écosystème mondialiste que vous avez mis en place, basé sur un libre-échangisme dérégulé au détriment d’un localisme raisonné et national.

Vicent Marzà Ibáñez (Verts/ALE). – Señor presidente, en los últimos diez años, la superficie desertificada en la península ibérica se ha multiplicado por veintitrés. Es especialmente preocupante en el sur de Alicante, en la Vega Baja, un territorio de transición, precisamente donde la presión urbanística es salvaje, donde la presión del sobreturismo es salvaje, y donde ahora ya no ocurre de forma aislada que se corte el agua, sino que ya es de forma recurrente. Y no solo se corta en verano, también en otros periodos del año. Ni pasa solo con el agua destinada a la gente y, por lo tanto, con el agua de boca, sino también con la que usan los agricultores.

En el mismo territorio también ya hay una lucha que se va viviendo en toda Europa, que es por la privatización del agua. Tenemos cada vez menos agua y cada vez está gestionada por menos manos y mirando siempre hacia el negocio. Por eso, hacen falta de una vez por todas políticas valientes que custodien el territorio, que nos adapten al cambio climático y que protejan a la ciudadanía, por ejemplo, ante situaciones como la dana que hemos vivido en Valencia. Y hace falta que el agua sea gestionada de forma pública para que sea un derecho garantizado para el conjunto de la ciudadanía.

(El orador acepta responder a una pregunta formulada con arreglo al procedimiento de la «tarjeta azul»)

João Oliveira (The Left), Pergunta segundo o procedimento «cartão azul». – Senhor Deputado, o Governo de Portugal avançou recentemente com uma lei chamada Lei dos Solos, que tem como objetivo permitir a construção em solos onde até hoje essa construção não era permitida. Esta decisão, naturalmente, favorece a especulação imobiliária, mas cria também problemas de desordenamento do território.

O senhor deputado vem da região de Valência — onde ainda recentemente houve uma tragédia, na sequência de umas cheias —, por isso, queria colocar-lhe uma questão precisamente a partir da sua experiência.

Considerando a experiência na região de Valência, decisões como esta do Governo português, de desordenamento do território e de favorecimento da especulação imobiliária, permitem a solução de algum problema, por exemplo, o problema da habitação — que é o pretexto que o Governo português utiliza —, ou o combate à desertificação dos territórios? Ou, pelo contrário, opções destas de desordenamento do território agravam ainda mais as consequências de catástrofes naturais, como aquelas que atingiram a região de Valência?

Vicent Marzà Ibáñez (Verts/ALE), respuesta de «tarjeta azul». – Sí, señor diputado Oliveira, la presión urbanística y la urbanización salvaje de hoy son las víctimas del mañana. Lo hemos visto en nuestra tierra con la dana: se ha construido donde no se podía construir, porque se ha visto que el territorio solo era un espacio de especulación y no para que la gente tuviera garantizado su espacio vital y se protegieran sus vidas.

La gente ha muerto por estar, entre otras cosas, urbanizando territorios que no se pueden urbanizar. Ha habido una dana que ha llegado con esa cantidad de agua brutal porque estaba absolutamente todo cimentado, porque la tierra no ha podido acoger toda el agua también. Por eso es tan importante que se combatan esas iniciativas como la del Gobierno portugués que usted dice, porque urbanizar, insisto, de forma salvaje es crear víctimas en el futuro.

Sebastian Everding (The Left). – Herr Präsident, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! „Wälder gehen den Völkern voran, die Wüsten folgen ihnen“. Das sagte schon im 17. Jahrhundert der französische Schriftsteller Chateaubriand. Der Klimawandel und der massive Einsatz von Düngemitteln verstärken die Bodenerosion und auch das Artensterben. Grundwasserentnahmen für Bergbautätigkeiten, die industrielle Massentierhaltung und die Bewässerung in der Landwirtschaft entziehen Wäldern das Grundwasser, das dringend für die Regeneration in Dürrezeiten benötigt wird. Sie tragen zur Bodenversandung bei, schädigen das Ökosystem und trocknen CO2-Senken wie Moore aus. Hier muss dringend durch mehr Schutzzonen und mehr Entnahmeeinschränkungen gehandelt werden.

Ein weiteres Mittel gegen Wüstenbildung könnte ein stärkerer Fokus auf die Agroforstwirtschaft sein. Dürren bedrohen bereits jetzt die Lebensgrundlage von rund 1,8 Milliarden Menschen weltweit und bringen gefährdete Gemeinschaften immer weiter an den Rand des Abgrundes. Darüber hinaus kosten sie 300 Milliarden US‑Dollar pro Jahr und bedrohen wichtige Wirtschaftssektoren wie die Landwirtschaft, Energie und Wasser. Liebe Frau Kommissarin, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen, wie bei allen anderen Aspekten des Klimawandels gilt auch hier: Es ist weitaus günstiger, jetzt zu handeln, als später zu versuchen, die Folgen zu kompensieren.

(Der Redner ist damit einverstanden, auf eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“ zu antworten.)

Gabriella Gerzsenyi (PPE). – Tisztelt Elnök Úr! A teve helyes állat, de nem szeretnénk közlekedési eszközként használni. Az éghajlatváltozás miatt az elsivatagosodás Magyarországon is egyre nagyobb probléma. Duna-Tisza közi homokhátság hazánk területének mintegy 10%-a, most már az ENSZ szerint hivatalosan is félsivatag.

Ez a kormányzati tétlenségnek a szimbóluma. Csökkennek a terméshozamok, megnehezül a megélhetés, homokviharok előfordulnak, tavak száradnak ki és élőhelyek szűnnek meg. S nem csak környezeti, hanem társadalmi és gazdasági válság is, hiszen veszélyben az élelmiszer-ellátás és elnéptelenedik a vidék.

Már két évtizede tudományos tanulmány és program készült a problémára. Az akkori kormány elfogadta, a Fidesz-kormány azonban tudatosan figyelmen kívül hagyja a szakértők figyelmeztetéseit, elhanyagolja a vízgazdálkodást, a talajvédelmet, ellenben százmilliárdokat költ presztízsberuházásokra, például stadionokra.

A megoldás kulcsa az uniós, nemzeti és a helyi összefogás. Úgy véljük, hogy európai szinten átfogó stratégiára van szükség a fenntartható földhasználat és a vízvisszatartó technológiák támogatására.

A Tisza Magyarország legnépszerűbb pártja. Kormányra kerülésünk után vissza fogjuk állítani az önálló környezetvédelmi minisztériumot. Kiemelten foglalkozni fogunk a talajvédelemmel, vízgazdálkodással, európai forrásokat irányítunk az érintett közösségekhez, és támogatni fogjuk a gazdákat ebben a küzdelemben is.

César Luena (S&D). – Señor presidente, señorías, es un debate en un contexto bastante difícil, porque tenemos al nuevo inquilino de la Casa Blanca y su negacionismo, y un Grupo PPE retardista, ya lo siento. El discurso de ayer del señor Tusk nos lleva por esos senderos peligrosos.

Presento dos ideas que son como dos evidencias. El suelo es un recurso no renovable, es importante no olvidarlo. ¿Saben cuánto han aumentado las sequías en los últimos 25 años? Un 30 %. Y, en este contexto, señora comisaria, ¿qué puede hacer la Unión? Le digo que defender las políticas verdes —al paso que vamos— va a ser algo casi contracultural. Pues mire, en primer lugar, una evaluación de riesgo de desertificación y degradación de las tierras, como sugirió el Tribunal de Cuentas Europeo en el año 2018. No sabemos nada de ese informe. La Ley de vigilancia del suelo, por favor, se lo pido a sus colegas del Grupo PPE, porque la están rebajando y rebajando, como todas las normativas medioambientales. Podemos declararnos como región en riesgo de desertificación en el marco de la Convención de las Naciones Unidas. Para eso no tenemos que esperar a ninguna cumbre internacional, eso podemos hacerlo ya nosotros. Y, sobre todo, presente una estrategia específica de desertificación, como le ha dicho este Parlamento.

Fíjese: hasta cuatro grandes medidas podemos hacer nosotros solos —la Unión Europea— y dar ejemplo en el mundo. Pero claro, hay demasiado retardismo en la derecha. No caiga en eso, señora comisaria, hay muchos Grupos que la vamos a apoyar.

(El orador acepta responder a una pregunta formulada con arreglo al procedimiento de la «tarjeta azul»)

César Luena (S&D), respuesta de «tarjeta azul». – Estaba mirando, señor presidente, por si era alguien de la extrema derecha, porque no hubiera aceptado nunca nada, ni tarjeta azul ni verde.

Mire, todo lo relacionado con los fondos europeos, a pesar de su Grupo y de su política en España, lo estamos sacando adelante bien. Y no quiero recordar aquí lo que han intentado ustedes hacer con la vicepresidenta primera, Teresa Ribera. Es decir, que a pesar de que ustedes aquí estén en contra de todo y siempre estén poniendo obstáculos y problemas, nosotros estamos aplicando muy bien los fondos NextGenerationEU en España y lo seguiremos haciendo. Solo le pido una cosa: está bien que me haga esa pregunta, pero después, en España, ayuden, que siempre están en contra de todo.

Jutta Paulus (Verts/ALE). – Herr Präsident, Frau Kommissarin, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Als ich ein Kind war, war Wüste die Sahara oder die Gobi. Ferne, beeindruckende Orte, beschrieben in den Romanen von Karl May oder den Schilderungen von Sven Hedin. Und heute, nur wenige Jahrzehnte später, sehen wir Wüstenbildung in Spanien, in Portugal, in Italien, in Griechenland, in Ungarn, in Bulgarien. Wer sich da wundert, hat die Wissenschaft ignoriert oder den Einflüsterern der fossilen Industrie geglaubt. Die haben Milliarden investiert, um Zweifel zu säen – Zweifel an den Erkenntnissen, die Exxon selbst schon in den 70ern ermittelt hatte, um sie dann in den Giftschrank zu legen und öffentlich die Wissenschaft zu diskreditieren.

Die Leugner sitzen auch in diesem Haus bei den Rechten, den noch Rechteren und den noch noch Rechteren, und bei der Welt‑Wüsten‑Konferenz haben wir leider auch keine großen Fortschritte gemacht, denn auch hier sitzen ja die Petrostaaten mit am Tisch. Deshalb: Europa muss handeln. Wir brauchen ein Klimaanpassungsgesetz, das naturbasierte Lösungen in den Mittelpunkt stellt, und eine glaubwürdige Unterstützung für die Länder, die am stärksten betroffen sind.

(Die Rednerin ist damit einverstanden, auf eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“ zu antworten.)

Jutta Paulus (Verts/ALE), Antwort auf eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“. – Vielen Dank, Frau Kollegin, für die Frage. Es ist mir ein Rätsel, wo Sie Ihre Anschuldigungen und Informationen hernehmen, denn wir sind ja durchaus die Partei, die für eine bäuerliche, kleinbäuerliche, familienzentrierte Landwirtschaft eintritt, die für eine nachhaltige Landwirtschaft eintritt, die im Einklang mit dem steht, was uns die Wissenschaft empfiehlt.

Da brauchen Sie bloß mal in die Berichte unserer eigenen Agentur zu schauen – die Europäische Umweltagentur ist eine Agentur dieser Europäischen Union. Da sitzen hochmögende Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler, die sich seit Jahren und Jahrzehnten mit diesen Fragen beschäftigen. Und das, was wir in unseren Programmen, in unseren Vorschlägen aufgreifen, entspricht dem, was diese Wissenschaft uns vorschlägt, denn wir stehen auf dem Boden der Wissenschaft und nicht auf dem Boden der Lobbyinteressen, die hier leider ihre Papiere verbreiten.

Borja Giménez Larraz (PPE). – Señor presidente, el agua es vida y el agua es desarrollo. Hoy vemos como la desertificación avanza. La falta de agua se ha convertido en una amenaza, especialmente para los países y las regiones del sur de Europa. Aunque algunos somos más vulnerables, este desafío nos afecta a todos. Hablamos del acceso a un bien básico. Hablamos de un recurso fundamental para la agricultura y para la ganadería, para la industria, para crear empleo y fijar la población.

La Unión Europea debe implicarse de lleno en el impulso de un pacto europeo del agua que establezca medidas integrales para garantizar una gestión sostenible y eficiente de los recursos hídricos. Y ese pacto hay que dotarlo de fondos: necesitamos fondos para construir y modernizar infraestructuras hidráulicas, como embalses y presas que permitan regular cauces y gestionar periodos de sequía de forma más eficaz. Necesitamos fondos para mejorar y modernizar los sistemas de regadío. Todo ello acompañado de políticas de gestión eficiente del agua. Y hay que actuar con urgencia.

En España, en mi región, Aragón, que tiene zonas profundamente áridas y desérticas, el Parlamento autonómico aprobó por unanimidad en 1992 el llamado Pacto del Agua, un acuerdo que reivindica las obras hidráulicas necesarias para garantizar las necesidades presentes y futuras de la comunidad. Pues bien, en estos treinta años hemos avanzado muy poco: tenemos más de treinta obras pendientes. Sabemos desde hace décadas qué es lo que queremos, lo que necesitamos, pero la falta de voluntad y fondos lo ha dejado en el olvido. Ante la inacción del Gobierno de España, la Unión Europea debe adoptar un papel activo. Debe contribuir a financiar estas obras. Hoy ya no es una opción: es una obligación.

Camilla Laureti (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, la desertificazione va affrontata a livello globale, perché mette a rischio biodiversità, risorse idriche e sicurezza alimentare e fa tremare la giustizia sociale.

Spaventa pensare che, anche a causa degli effetti della desertificazione e della siccità, entro il 2050 oltre 200 milioni di persone potrebbero essere costrette a migrare.

Lo vediamo anche in Europa: il Sud soffre sempre di più per siccità e carenza di acqua. In Italia abbiamo intere regioni che restano per lunghi periodi senz’acqua, anche a causa di una scorretta gestione della risorsa idrica. L’acqua – il nostro bene più prezioso – non è una merce, ma è un diritto, e dobbiamo incentivarne conservazione e riuso e lavorare sulle reti idriche.

Dobbiamo proteggere e ripristinare i nostri suoli, favorire con finanziamenti ad hoc e risorse il passaggio da metodi di coltivazione intensivi a pratiche agricole sostenibili. Se perdiamo i nostri suoli, perdiamo il pianeta.

La desertificazione l’abbiamo vista arrivare e porta anche, e soprattutto, la nostra impronta: per questo, dobbiamo smettere di far finta che non esista e dobbiamo agire sin da ora.

Marco Falcone (PPE). – Signor Presidente, signora Commissaria, onorevoli colleghi, in un momento in cui larga parte del continente fronteggia l’inverno, potrebbe apparire fuori contesto parlare di desertificazione e carenza idrica. Eppure, questo dovrebbe essere l’atteggiamento che qui in Europa dovremmo tutti avere: occuparci per tempo di questa enorme sfida, di questa enorme emergenza, prima che sia troppo tardi.

E ve lo dice chi arriva qua a Strasburgo da una delle due più importanti isole del Mediterraneo, la Sicilia, e rappresenta due delle più importanti isole – assieme alla Sicilia, anche la Sardegna – entrambe fortemente a rischio. Si immagina che più del 50 % del territorio delle due regioni, addirittura entro i prossimi trent’anni, potrebbe essere a rischio desertificazione.

Certo, il cambiamento climatico è un fattore decisivo. Purtroppo, però, la lotta alla desertificazione non può essere affidata solo alle misure collegate in qualche modo al Green Deal. Anzi, questo grande contenitore potrebbe diventare un luogo in cui tutto si perde, e già la Corte dei conti europea, nel 2018, aveva invitato l’Unione europea ad avere una visione completa e a porre in essere dei programmi di pianificazione.

Ecco perché noi del Partito Popolare Europeo siamo per la difesa del territorio, certamente, e riteniamo che le isole debbano essere guardate con grande attenzione. Come? Tramite un serio programma di investimenti e, se vogliamo, di infrastrutture, non solo di transizione energetica.

L’Europa deve avere il coraggio di varare un grande piano di stanziamenti strutturali per la lotta all’avanzare del deserto.

(L’oratore accetta di rispondere a una domanda “cartellino blu”)

Marco Falcone (PPE), risposta a una domanda “cartellino blu”. – Noi del Partito Popolare Europeo guardiamo a un approccio molto pragmatico. Certamente, la transizione ecologica diventa per noi il faro, ma al contempo riteniamo che un serio programma di investimenti debba essere calibrato alle esigenze del territorio. Non dobbiamo eccedere in un senso, ma nemmeno in un altro.

Certamente, gli interventi in agricoltura, gli interventi tecnologici e, se vogliamo, anche un serio piano di investimenti, soprattutto in condutture idriche di adduzione e, se vogliamo, di approvvigionamento, possono rappresentare certamente una soluzione.

Lo dico per la Sicilia – io provengo dalla Sicilia – dove l’acqua non manca, ma mancano le infrastrutture. Per cui, grazie per il suo input.

Leire Pajín (S&D). – Señor presidente, señorías, se ha dicho aquí reiteradamente, nos enfrentamos a una crisis aparentemente silenciosa, pero profundamente devastadora: la desertificación, la pérdida de suelos fértiles y de recursos hídricos. De nuevo, es una crisis global que nos afecta a todos, también en Europa, especialmente en el Mediterráneo, en países como España, en regiones como Alicante.

Hasta el 40 % de las tierras del mundo —casi la mitad— están degradadas. Esto supone una amenaza a la biodiversidad, pero también a la seguridad alimentaria. Las cifras lo dejan bien claro: el 90 % de la población mundial pasa hambre; es decir, más de 700 millones de personas, por no hablar de los cientos de miles de desplazados y de refugiados por la desertificación y por el cambio climático.

El derecho a la alimentación es fundamental. Señorías, no podemos estar hablando aquí de las sequías y de la desertificación, pero luego intentar retrasar y retardar las normas que protegen contra la degradación de los suelos o que protegen la biodiversidad. No podemos hablar aquí de las cifras, pero después querer ser más laxos con las leyes que luchan contra eso.

Por eso, señorías, como dijo el Tribunal de Cuentas, como dijo Naciones Unidas y como ha dicho el Consejo, necesitamos un plan ambicioso, transversal, que se coordine con otras Convenciones de las Naciones Unidas, con presupuesto y con objetivos, sin más demora.

Manuela Ripa (PPE). – Herr Präsident! Die Wüstenbildung ist eines der drängendsten Probleme unserer Zeit – nicht nur etwa in Afrika oder in Asien, auch in Europa. 13 EU‑Länder in Süd‑, Mittel‑ und Osteuropa sind nach eigenen Angaben bereits betroffen. Auch in anderen Teilen Europas schreitet die Austrocknung von Böden voran. Zukünftig könnten auch hier Wüsten entstehen. Dass es dringenden Handlungsbedarf gibt, dieses Bewusstsein war nicht ausreichend vorhanden bei der COP16 in Riad. Auch in der EU wird definitiv nicht genügend getan. Probleme sind voranschreitende Bodenversiegelung, Entwaldung, zu intensive Landnutzung, falsche Bewirtschaftung. Der Klimawandel mit Dürren und Starkregenereignissen beschleunigt zudem noch den Verlust fruchtbarer Böden.

Daher ist es von entscheidender Bedeutung, dass wir in Europa neben einer effektiven Wasserstrategie das EU‑Bodengesetz verabschieden – als erster wichtiger Schritt hin zu mehr Bodenschutz und gegen Wüstenbildung. Bei der Wüstenbildung ist es wie beim Klimawandel. Es ist viel kostengünstiger und einfacher, jetzt Gegenmaßnahmen zu ergreifen, als die Dinge umzukehren, wenn der Schaden schon eingetreten ist. Denn dann ist es zu spät.

Jean-Marc Germain (S&D). – Monsieur le Président, mes chers collègues, Bakou, Cali, Riyad, les différentes COP se suivent et se ressemblent. Elles sont toujours utiles par leur existence même, mais jamais à la hauteur: 40 % des sols seraient dégradés dans le monde et 75 % de la population mondiale en sera affectée d’ici à 2050, 75 %. On le sait, les plus vulnérables en sont les premières victimes.

Appelons un chat un chat: cette COP fut une déception. Et si l’Europe a fait preuve de volontarisme sur la promotion de la résilience à la sécheresse, son rôle a été plus ambigu: en s’opposant à un protocole juridiquement contraignant sur la sécheresse, en portant insuffisamment les pratiques agricoles durables et par une contribution financière insuffisante. Le Partenariat mondial de résilience à la sécheresse et ses 12 milliards de promesses a le mérite d’exister. Mais c’est une goutte d’eau, si je puis dire, par rapport aux 2 500 milliards nécessaires pour restaurer le milliard d’hectares de terres dégradées.

Alors que Donald Trump vient de sortir de l’accord sur le climat, faisons preuve de leadership. Allons en Mongolie pour la COP17 avec des propositions et des aides concrètes, faute de quoi la planète et les générations futures ne nous le pardonneront pas.

Dan-Ştefan Motreanu (PPE). – Doamnă comisară, domnule președinte, stimați colegi, deșertificarea afectează deja 13 state membre, iar seceta cauzează pierderi de 9 miliarde de euro anual. Doar în România, 400 de mii de hectare sunt afectate de deșertificare. Adoptarea Regulamentului privind restaurarea naturii impune statelor membre să refacă 20 % din terenurile degradate până în 2030.

Din păcate, regulamentul nu a fost însoțit de alocări bugetare suplimentare. Drept urmare, solicit Comisiei Europene ca în următorul exercițiu financiar să abordeze această insuficiență și să pună fonduri concrete la dispoziția țărilor din Uniune.

Totodată, pentru menținerea securității alimentare, este esențial să sporim investițiile în dezvoltarea sistemelor de irigații inteligente, utilizarea apelor urbane reziduale tratate, captarea apei pluviale și construirea de rezervoare.

În plus, rezultatele cercetării privind desalinizarea apei marine din programul Orizont Europa trebuie să fie accesibile statelor membre pentru implementarea acestor tehnologii moderne la costuri reduse.

Stefano Bonaccini (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, siccità, incendi e pratiche produttive che minano la fertilità dei suoli stanno innalzando il rischio di desertificazione anche qui in Europa, dove 13 paesi, tra cui il mio e altri sei nel bacino del Mediterraneo in particolare, sono colpiti da questo fenomeno.

A rimetterci sono produzione e sicurezza alimentare, tessuto sociale ed economico delle aree colpite, e i nostri agricoltori, prime vittime dei cambiamenti climatici che qualcuno, addirittura ancora oggi, nega.

L’Unione europea deve essere protagonista in questa sfida a livello globale, diffondendo nei paesi più a rischio buone pratiche – ad esempio, irrigazione di precisione o depurazione e riuso agricolo delle acque reflue – e con un piano europeo per le acque, e per l’acqua, che con più risorse per le politiche di sviluppo regionale e rurale – confido per delega nel Commissario Fitto – sostenga e semplifichi investimenti per una maggiore capacità di accumulo – dighe invasi, bacini e reti di distribuzione più efficienti – e autorizzi nuove colture che necessitano di meno acqua.

Il prossimo bilancio pluriennale, allora, deve diventare l’occasione per migliorare alcune politiche dell’Unione e sostenere con i fatti, e non le parole, cittadini e imprese nel contrasto al cambiamento climatico.

Ştefan Muşoiu (S&D). – Domnule președinte, doamnă comisară, dragi colegi, la nivelul Uniunii, deșertificarea afectează 8 % din teritoriu, așa cum au precizat și colegii mei antevorbitori. Zonele cele mai prejudiciate însă sunt cele din Europa Centrală, de Sud și de Est. Și țara mea, România, suferă din cauza acestui proces nesănătos al naturii. 40 % din suprafața sa agricolă este în pericol să se transforme în dune de nisip.

De aceea, nu trebuie să permitem ca acest neajuns major să devină o amenințare la adresa siguranței alimentare a generațiilor viitoare de europeni. Acest fenomen grav trebuie decelerat prin strategii comunitare concrete și ferme.

Trebuie să avem în vedere că micii fermieri din toate aceste zone de pe continent, afectate de deșertificare, sunt și ei în pericol. Nu au cum să se lupte singuri împotriva naturii și trebuie să le venim în ajutor. Au nevoie de susținere financiară europeană care să dubleze eforturile mai mari sau mai mici ale guvernelor naționale. Mizez pe înțelepciunea noastră comună și pe o reacție mai bine conturată a Comisiei pentru frânarea acestui fenomen natural periculos.

Interventions à la demande

Hélder Sousa Silva (PPE). – Senhor Presidente, Senhora Comissária, a desertificação é um desafio crescente que se coloca à União Europeia, especialmente nos Estados-Membros do Sul e, particularmente, próximos do Mediterrâneo.

A falta de água, a exaustão dos solos e as alterações climáticas são, hoje, uma dura realidade nalgumas zonas da União e, além disso, assistimos também ao despovoamento de algumas regiões do interior por falta de atratividade e de competitividade.

Portugal enfrenta cumulativamente estes dois problemas. As regiões do Alentejo e do Algarve evidenciam uma brutal falta de água, quer para agricultura, quer para consumo humano. E as regiões próximas da fronteira com Espanha sofrem de despovoamento.

Em resultado destas duas situações, assistimos a fluxos migratórios do interior para o litoral, das zonas rurais para as zonas urbanas, que são verdadeiros problemas. Por isso, considero que o próximo quadro financeiro plurianual deve responder à desertificação e ao despovoamento e, assim, resolver o problema de coesão territorial que enfrentamos na nossa União.

Seán Kelly (PPE). – (Níor phioc an micreafón suas tús na hóráide) … labhairt ar an ábhar tábhachtach seo, gaineamhlú an domhain.

And depending on who you’re listening to, between 20 % and 40 % of land is threatened with desertification, particularly in places like the Sahel, Gobi Desert, South America. I think it’s good that the European Union are now emphasising that deforestation, in particular, has to end in any free trade deals we’ll be doing.

Within Europe, we will be shortly discussing the next CAP and, obviously, protection of the soil, nature restoration are going to be key in that. And I would make one suggestion: give every farmer in Europe a minimum of 50 trees native to their own area to set on their farm. This would help to restore nature, protect the soils and be a small step to end desertification.

Bímis ag dul ar aghaidh de réir a chéile, mar de réir a chéile a dhéantar na caisleáin.

(Fin des interventions à la demande)

Jessika Roswall, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, honourable Members, your interventions show how important it is for the EU to continue tackling the interconnected challenges of droughts, land use, climate change, biodiversity loss and water scarcity together for our economy, our security and our livelihoods. They show that we are not ignoring the difficulties we face in the current geopolitical climate. And as many of you have also mentioned, we are all affected.

I just also want to say – and this is to César Luena – that the Commission is not ignoring this. And I just want to repeat one thing that I said in my first remark: the Commission is responding to the recommendation of the European Court of Auditors by developing a methodology to assess land degradation and desertification for the EU.

Although we didn’t leave Riyadh with all our desired outcomes, we should still acknowledge and build on the important progress that was made. So now we need to keep up the momentum. We need to accelerate implementation at national and international levels, and continue our work to agree on the outstanding COP16 decisions, especially on droughts.

Many of you have underlined the importance of water and the need to make progress on strengthening our water resilience, so I also want to say – as I said earlier, and I know you know – that the Commission has made it a priority to present a new strategy on this.

I know Parliament is already making progress on its reports on this. I thank you today for your input, and I look forward to close dialogue with you, with your rapporteur, Thomas Bajada, and all of you on this important topic, and of course, on continuing fighting desertification.

(La séance est suspendue quelques instants)

IN THE CHAIR: CHRISTEL SCHALDEMOSE
Vice-President

3. Resumption of the sitting

(The sitting resumed at 10:29)

4. Cryptocurrencies – need for global standards (debate)

Magnus Brunner, Member of the Commission. – Madam President, honourable Members, first of all, sorry I’m a couple of minutes late – I was in the office, actually, but I didn’t make it here on time, I’m sorry about that. Also, thank you for the opportunity to contribute to this debate on the need to agree on global policy standards for crypto. As you may well know, these standards, of course, do exist and have been agreed in international fora. Let me give you a brief overview of how they came about and where the EU stands in their implementation.

International regulatory and policy organisations have been working on international crypto standards for a number of years now. Early on, there was an international understanding that crypto markets are global markets and are largely unregulated and pose, of course, also risks that need to be addressed. And then in 2023 the G20 unveiled the crypto-asset policy implementation roadmap, which reflected the policy and regulatory responses developed primarily by the International Monetary Fund, the Financial Stability Board and standard-setting bodies covering specific areas of finance such as the International Organization of Securities Commissions on investor protection, or also the Financial Action Task Force on anti-money laundering.

The core of these international standards on crypto are the FSB recommendations on crypto-asset markets and activities, and recommendations for global stablecoin arrangements. The European Union is the first major jurisdiction to have reflected those standards in law. We have done this by adopting the regulation on markets in crypto-assets (MiCA), which has now started to apply, and we have also amended other legislation such as the Anti-Money Laundering Directive and also the Transfer of Funds Regulation.

We are strongly committed to ensuring the global implementation of international standards. We regularly advocate this in the relevant international fora in which we as a European Union participate.

Implementation of international standards of course is necessary, not only to ensure a minimum level of policy and regulatory convergence internationally, but also to ensure that jurisdictions follow a sensible common denominator in addressing the risks also posed by the crypto markets. This is particularly important in crypto markets, which are global in nature, of course – yes, everyone knows that, with crypto exchanges and platforms operating across borders and assets also moving on open networks that are widely accessible.

The adoption of international crypto standards has so far been incremental. Indeed, jurisdictions have made progress also in implementing the policy and also the regulatory responses developed by, as I said, the IMF, the FSB and the standard‑setting bodies. Almost all FSB jurisdictions have plans to develop new – or at least revise existing – regulatory frameworks for crypto.

Information gathered at the international level suggests that the majority of FSB member jurisdictions expect to achieve alignment with the FSB framework by this year, by 2025. And this is of course very good news. We will continue to support relevant international organisations to ensure that the momentum we have now in implementing international standards on crypto is maintained. And we stand, of course, ready to work with jurisdictions that wish to benefit from our experience with MiCA. This includes the US. The US has been heavily involved in defining, together with other partners, the international standards on crypto, and I’m convinced that the new administration is fully aware of the fact that a robust policy response to crypto requires also an international effort.

We therefore look forward, of course, to continuing working with the US authorities as they consider their policy approach to crypto assets and related service providers, and we would view it as a positive development if the US were to make progress on crypto‑specific legislation that would provide greater legal clarity on the treatment of crypto assets and related service providers, while at the same time also addressing the risks we are facing. And we believe existing international standards should form the basis of any crypto framework, including, of course, the one in the US, not least because they ensure international convergence in this area and contribute to a level playing field.

Our experience in the European Union has shown that ensuring legal clarity is the right way to support innovation in these markets, while mitigating, on the other hand, of course, also the risks we are facing. Developments in the crypto market since the adoption of MiCA have only strengthened the case for legal clarity. Whatever approach the US ultimately takes, we do hope it will ensure that innovation flourishes while allowing, of course, on the other hand, also bad actors to be weeded out.

Markus Ferber, im Namen der PPE-Fraktion. – Frau Präsidentin, Herr Kommissar, liebe Kolleginnen, liebe Kollegen! Diverse Kryptowährungen, allen voran Bitcoin, haben in den vergangenen Tagen Rekordkurse erklommen. Der Grund ist klar: Die neue Administration in den Vereinigten Staaten ist diese Woche ins Amt gekommen, und sie wird sehr viel kryptofreundlicher sein als die Vorgängerverwaltung. Der neue US-Präsident spricht gar davon, eine strategische Bitcoin-Reserve aufzubauen und die USA zum Krypto-Mekka der Welt machen zu wollen. Dass Donald Trump es wohl ernst meint, sieht man auch daran, dass er selbst einen eigenen Meme Coin aufgelegt hat, der wohl nur ein Ziel hat: seinen Reichtum noch etwas zu vergrößern. Ich glaube, die Anleger werden nichts davon haben.

Unabhängig davon, wie man zu Kryptowährungen steht, unterstreicht diese Entwicklung ein grundsätzliches Problem: Obwohl Kryptowährungen ein globales Phänomen sind, haben wir keinen internationalen Ordnungsrahmen. Ein Regierungswechsel in den USA führt deshalb sehr schnell dazu, dass sich die Marktlage rapide verändert und da auch der Verbraucherschutz, auch für europäische Anleger, massiv unter die Räder kommt. In anderen Teilen des Finanzmarkts, vom Bankensektor bis zum Clearing, haben wir uns aus guten Gründen auf internationale Standards verständigt. Die haben wir im Kryptosektor bisher nicht, und das rächt sich jetzt auch.

In der Europäischen Union sind wir mit der Verordnung über Märkte für Krypto-Assets, der MiCAR, weltweit Vorreiter. Wir haben in der EU ein glaubwürdiges Regelwerk geschaffen, das den Wildwest-Auswüchsen wie in den USA einen Riegel vorschiebt und gleichzeitig Vorhersehbarkeit und Planbarkeit für alle Marktteilnehmer schafft. Es gäbe also bereits eine Blaupause für internationale Mindeststandards. Deswegen, lieber Herr Kommissar, sollten wir von dieser Blaupause Gebrauch machen und auf internationale Lösungen hinwirken. Dass das nicht einfach ist, ist klar. Aber wenn wir nicht anfangen, werden wir es nie schaffen.

Jonás Fernández, en nombre del Grupo S&D. – Señora presidenta, señor comisario, sin duda, yo creo que todos podríamos convenir en la necesidad de esas normas internacionales para el mercado de las cripto. Así he entendido las palabras de la Comisión apelando a la necesidad de fijar esos estándares mínimos.

Pero, ciertamente, viendo lo que estamos viendo al otro lado del Atlántico, yo creo que deberíamos empezar a reconsiderar los buenos propósitos y empezar a trabajar más para proteger Europa, en un tiempo en que Donald Trump e incluso su mujer emiten su propia moneda —como decía mi colega Markus Ferber— en los días previos a tomar posesión, mostrando poco respeto, en mi opinión, por la propia institucionalidad. Deberíamos recibir el mensaje en Europa, y yo creo que el mensaje que tenemos que recibir es que no podemos contar con la Administración estadounidense en los próximos años para llegar a ningún tipo de acuerdo mínimo sobre criptomonedas.

Por lo tanto, en vez de apelar a los buenos propósitos en los que llevamos empeñados años, deberíamos tener una posición mucho más asertiva y ser conscientes de que ese escenario va a ser casi imposible y que, por lo tanto, tenemos que aplicar el Reglamento MiCA —claro que hay que aplicar el Reglamento MiCA—, pero tenemos que también proteger a nuestro sector financiero, a nuestros bancos y a nuestros seguros de posibles impactos de inestabilidad financiera derivada de las cripto más allá de Europa. Y debemos también acelerar la negociación para tener un euro digital en Europa que permita ofrecer una respuesta propia a las necesidades, al parecer, de algunos inversores.

Marlena Maląg, w imieniu grupy ECR. – Szanowni Państwo. Unia Europejska dzięki wprowadzeniu przepisów MICA stała się globalnym pionierem w regulacji rynku kryptoaktywów, wyzwalając je tak naprawdę z szarej strefy. Należy docenić fakt, że regulacja MICA wprowadza obowiązek raportowania, zapewnia mechanizmy kontroli wewnętrznej oraz wymaga separacji aktywów klienta od aktywów dostawców usług kryptowalutowych. To podstawy, które zapewniają większą przejrzystość, bezpieczeństwo inwestorów. Co ważne, zabezpieczone są także interesy państw członkowskich spoza strefy euro.

Kryptowaluty, jak wiemy, nie mają granic. Musimy sobie jednak jasno powiedzieć, że różnice między krajami znacząco obniżają atrakcyjność tego rynku i spowalniają jego rozwój. Dlatego konieczne jest wypracowanie globalnych standardów regulacyjnych. Unia Europejska, choć jest liderem w tej dziedzinie, musi uważać, by nie przyjąć jak zwykle zbyt restrykcyjnego podejścia, które mogłoby wepchnąć innowacje, inwestycje w bardziej elastyczne rynki spoza Unii Europejskiej.

Jeszcze niedawno kryptowaluty ożywiały marzenia części inwestorów o infrastrukturze finansowej niezależnej od banków centralnych. Dziś te marzenia nieco osłabły. Ale kryptowaluty są i będą trwałym elementem globalnej gospodarki. Naszym zadaniem jest traktowanie kryptowalut jako narzędzi finansowych, które wymagają odpowiedniej regulacji, ale bliskich rynkom tradycyjnym, takich regulacji, które zapewnią bezpieczeństwo inwestorom, nie tłumiąc jednocześnie innowacji. Nie możemy przespać tej rewolucji. Przyszłość rynku kryptowalut wymaga równowagi między ochroną interesów klienta a umożliwieniem przede wszystkim dalszego rozwoju.

Stéphanie Yon-Courtin, au nom du groupe Renew. – Madame la Présidente, Monsieur le Commissaire, aux États-Unis, Donald Trump se rêve en président de la crypto. Résultat, la cryptosphère s’enflamme, une cryptomonnaie créée à son effigie et une autre dédiée à Melania, le bitcoin qui s’envole et la démission du président de l’Autorité des marchés financiers américains. Pendant ce chaos, en Europe, nous avons fait un choix différent: réguler pour protéger.

Avec le règlement MiCA, nous avons posé les bases d’un marché des cryptomonnaies sécurisé, imposant des mesures solides contre le blanchiment d’argent et contre le financement du terrorisme, comme par exemple la vérification des identités et le signalement des activités suspectes. Car oui, les cryptomonnaies ont des avantages. Elles offrent de nouvelles opportunités d’investissement, encouragent les plus jeunes à venir investir, et permettent un soutien vital face à des systèmes corrompus ou en zone de guerre, comme pour la diaspora ukrainienne.

Mais elles ne doivent pas devenir une jungle mondiale au service des fraudeurs et des criminels. À ceux qui, en Europe, flirtent avec les leaders américains du bitcoin: savez-vous que leur véritable objectif est de contourner nos devises officielles, à commencer par l’euro, et de saboter notre système monétaire en Europe? Drôles de souverainistes. Comme pour l’intelligence artificielle ou la taxation minimale, l’Europe doit pousser pour un cadre mondial. Les cryptomonnaies ne doivent pas devenir un eldorado pour les tricheurs, mais un outil au service de tous les investisseurs 2.0.

Monsieur le Commissaire, agissez maintenant pour adopter au plus vite des normes mondiales minimales. Il y va de la souveraineté de l’Europe, de celle de l’euro et de la protection de nos concitoyens européens.

Rasmus Andresen, im Namen der Verts/ALE-Fraktion. – Frau Präsidentin! Seit knapp einer Woche gibt es den Trump Meme Coin – ökonomisch wertlos und für Trump‑Fans vor allem eine emotionale Bindung zu ihrem großen Idol. Der TrumpCoin ist eine Betrugsmaschine, das zum Teil auch ausländische Geld geht in die Kassen der Trump‑Familie. Während Ex‑US‑Präsident Jimmy Carter Ende der 70er-Jahre noch seine Erdnussfarm verkaufen musste, als er gewählt wurde, betrügt Trump auf der ganzen Linie. Aber der TrumpCoin ist vor allem auch eine Symbolik für eine andere US‑Politik im Bereich der Kryptowährungsregulierung, und das sollte uns Sorgen machen. Wir sollten hier ganz klar feststellen, dass Anlagen in Kryptos mit hohen Risiken verbunden sind und dass wir auch wissen, dass das Geldwäscherisiko bei Kryptowährungen deutlich höher ist als in anderen Bereichen.

Der Mehrwert, der durch Kryptowährungen geschaffen wird, ist fraglich. US‑Präsident Trump öffnet mit blinder Deregulierung und auch, indem er Krypto‑Ultras in wichtige Finanzämter in seiner Administration befördert, der Privatisierung des Währungssystems Tür und Tor. Lassen Sie mich ganz klar sagen: Das darf nicht der europäische Weg sein. Ich bin froh, dass eigentlich aus den großen Fraktionen fast alle Redner auch Skepsis zum Ausdruck gebracht haben und deutlich gemacht haben, dass wir auf der einen Seite internationale Standards brauchen – ja –, aber dass wir nicht den Kurs einschlagen sollten, den die Trump‑Administration hier auf den Weg bringt.

Pasquale Tridico, a nome del gruppo The Left. – Signora Presidente, signor Commissario, onorevoli colleghi, mentre negli Stati Uniti, con l’insediamento di Trump, il Bitcoin raggiunge valori storici e persino una moneta meme di Trump guadagna miliardi di capitalizzazione, in Europa il dibattito sulle valute digitali resta fermo, specialmente per quanto riguarda l’euro digitale.

L’euro digitale emesso dalla Banca centrale europea rappresenterebbe una risposta pubblica, sicura e indipendente, a sostegno della nostra autonomia strategica ed economica rispetto alle criptovalute, che, a causa della loro volatilità e della mancanza di regolamentazione, non possono offrire un metodo di pagamento stabile.

Questo progetto, però, rimane bloccato per alcuni paesi che mettono il veto e gruppi politici. Noi, invece, sosteniamo con forza l’introduzione di questo strumento, perché garantirebbe l’indipendenza strategica dell’Europa dai colossi stranieri, principalmente americani, che monopolizzano i pagamenti elettronici, permetterebbe la costruzione di un’infrastruttura europea per i pagamenti digitali, ridurrebbe i costi di transazione per consumatori e venditori e, inoltre, aumenterebbe la stabilità finanziaria.

L’euro digitale rappresenterebbe anche una risposta cruciale nella lotta all’evasione, che ogni anno priva il welfare europeo di 824 miliardi di euro di gettito fiscale.

Commissario, Le chiediamo un passo in avanti rispetto all’euro digitale.

René Aust, im Namen der ESN-Fraktion. – Frau Präsidentin! In den vergangenen Jahren sind weltweit die staatlichen Möglichkeiten gewachsen, uns Bürger zu überwachen. Der Wunsch, sich gegen diese Überwachung zu schützen, wächst jedoch ebenso. Darum erleben Kryptowährungen wie Bitcoin einen solchen Aufschwung. Während der Coronazeit haben wir beispielsweise in Kanada erleben müssen, wie unliebsamen Regierungskritikern die Konten gesperrt wurden. Manche Betroffene hatten nach diesen Kontoschließungen nicht einmal mehr die Möglichkeit, ihre Mieten zu bezahlen. Kryptowährungen schützen durch Verschlüsselungstechnologien unsere Bürger vor übergriffigen Staaten. Gut so!

Darüber hinaus wollen wir, dass unser Geld sicher ist vor staatlicher Manipulation. Immer mehr Gelddruckerei durch Zentralbanken entwertet das Geld weltweit. Der Euro hat seit dem Jahr 2001 um mehr als ein Drittel seiner Kaufkraft verloren. Darum wollen viele Bürger eine manipulationssichere Währung. Auch das versprechen Kryptowährungen. Im Übrigen: Wenn hier gerade davon gesprochen wird, dass Terrorfinanzierung und Drogenfinanzierung durch Bitcoin begangen wird: 90 Prozent aller Terrorfinanzierungen finden nach wie vor durch Dollar oder Euro statt. Wir setzen uns für die Souveränität unserer Nationen ein, aber genauso setzen wir uns ein für die Souveränität unserer Bürger. Wir trauen ihnen zu, für sich selber zu entscheiden. Darum wollen wir Neuerungen wie Bitcoin und Co. auch weiterhin zulassen, und zwar so, dass nicht Politiker, die keine Ahnung von diesen Dingen haben, darin rummanipulieren. Die neue Trump‑Regierung macht es vor: keine Angst vor Innovation, sondern die Chancen ergreifen. Technologieoffenheit also auch im Finanzbereich.

Regina Doherty (PPE). – Madam President, colleagues, we have spent the last few months since I’ve been here intensively talking about the importance of innovation, and it is clear that, despite all of the risks it entails, crypto stems from a desire to innovate and operate outside traditional norms and structures.

In general, legislators and regulators should focus on creating the conditions for innovation and sectors to thrive. But in this case, there’s vital issues of trust, consumer protection and there is obviously the serious potential for financial crime that still exists.

And yet, on the other side of the Atlantic, we hear the promises of the new administration of the sector, even as the President’s own meme coins were launched and then crashed and lost half their value in the space of one weekend.

I think there are serious questions that have to be asked about a situation where the most powerful politician and one of the richest men in the world can self‑enrich himself through a scheme while purporting to be in charge of the regulators of that particular innovation? And while these questions go unaddressed, the cryptocurrency industry will continue to face serious pushback by some of us in this Chamber and outside.

The EU’s legal framework for the sector seeks to promote innovation while tackling market abuse and the very large elements of criminality, and its full implementation has literally only just begun, it’s in its infancy. So, I hope that when we eventually come to review and have an international standard, that our efforts will be used for that global standard.

Eero Heinäluoma (S&D). – Madam President, despite the hurray mood in parts of the crypto world since the election of Trump, it’s important to look at the facts. I see at least three reasons to remain concerned about this bubble.

Firstly, despite all the measures adopted, crypto seems to remain the favourite tool for sanctions evaders and gangsters, including cocaine cartels, North Korean hackers, Iranian and Russian spies and fentanyl smugglers. If we want to tackle these problems seriously, let’s hit them where it hurts. Secondly, as well outlined by the ECB, the recent rise in Bitcoin value benefits mainly a happy few at the expense of the many. From an investor protection perspective, this is far from optimal. Finally, in times of high energy prices and energy scarcity, investing in infrastructure to mine bitcoins is wasting energy.

Therefore, it is good to have this debate. We indeed need global standards for crypto to tackle these challenges, and the EU should take the lead as MiCA and the AML package can give some inspiration. But we should go further and we need a MiCA 2 to close remaining regulatory loopholes, for example, around NFTs and decentralised finance applications. We count, therefore, on this new commission to pick up this role and push this agenda forward.

Aleksandar Nikolic (PfE). – Madame la Présidente, comme avec Internet, le cloud et l’IA, nous sommes une fois encore à la charrette des grandes puissances sur la cryptomonnaie. 10 % des Européens détiendraient des cryptomonnaies. En France, ils seraient déjà 12 %, soit plus de 8 millions de Français. Et cela continue d’augmenter.

Et vous? Votre premier réflexe, c’est d’avoir peur. Ce n’est pas de savoir comment investir dans cette nouvelle technologie, la fameuse chaîne de blocs, mais comment la réguler, comment taxer les profits de monsieur Tout-le-Monde et comment la contrôler. Car au fond, c’est ça qui vous terrifie dans le monde de la crypto: il échappe aux technocrates. Quand il y a une nouvelle technologie, immédiatement vous en avez peur et vous voulez la réguler.

Nous, on se demande comment s’y adapter et comment en tirer profit. Nos préoccupations sont: pourquoi l’Europe n’innove plus et comment utiliser ces technologies pour booster notre compétitivité. Plutôt que de taxer, favorisons l’investissement dans l’industrie européenne et l’économie réelle, incitons les détenteurs de crypto à transformer les plus-values en actions dans des entreprises innovantes, faisant en sorte que les futurs Nakamoto ou Musk soient européens et créent des technologies de rupture sur notre sol. Soyons enfin un continent d’avenir. Oui, il faut rendre la crypto utile et pour cela, il faut se débarrasser des technos inutiles.

Guillaume Peltier (ECR). – Madame la Présidente, partout, le socialisme mène à la ruine. Il y eut, certes, l’URSS, Cuba, l’Angola ou le Brésil qui se réveillèrent pauvres comme jamais. Mais aujourd’hui, c’est l’Europe que les gauches tentent d’asservir. Pas un jour qui ne passe sans que les politiciens de gauche n’inventent, en France ou ailleurs, une nouvelle norme, une nouvelle taxe, une nouvelle contrainte. Pas un jour qui ne passe sans que les vieilles gauches sur ces bancs ne hurlent contre le mérite, l’effort, le succès, le travail. Alors, je le dis à tous ces politiciens: laissez-nous tranquilles. Quand laisserez-vous respirer les entrepreneurs et les originaux de tout poil dont vous sabordez le talent?

Le pénible babil technocratique de ce débat sur les cryptomonnaies est le symptôme d’une Europe en dormition, épuisée par la fièvre socialiste. Dépassée et déclassée, voilà l’Europe que vous proposez au monde, transformant la terre de Jacques Cœur en mouroir de l’esprit d’entreprise. Pire: à l’heure où le monde entier fait le choix de la liberté avec Donald Trump, Elon Musk ou Javier Milei, vous voulez nous contraindre à la relégation. Pourtant, l’histoire est têtue. En connaissez-vous beaucoup des gens de gauche qui, à la chute du mur de Berlin, se sont enfuis à l’Est? Le monde entier s’éveille et vous, la gauche, vous voulez continuer à dormir de vos vieilles lunes ou, pire, vous ronflez de vos impôts fatigués. Alors écoutez bien: nous ne voulons plus de vous, nous ne voulons plus être ni taxés ni spoliés, nous voulons être libres!

Gilles Boyer (Renew). – Madame la Présidente, Monsieur le Commissaire, les cryptomonnaies gagnent d’évidence en popularité. Elles fonctionnent en dehors de toute législation financière et dans l’anonymat le plus total. Comme tout instrument de spéculation, elles feront la fortune des uns et l’infortune des autres, sans jamais contribuer à l’économie réelle. Mais n’oublions pas, et c’est notre rôle, que c’est avant tout à la puissance publique d’organiser la circulation des monnaies en s’adaptant aux nouveaux usages et de garantir la stabilité et l’utilisation de l’euro.

C’est le sens du projet d’euro numérique, un équivalent à l’argent liquide dans un portefeuille numérique, émis et garanti par la Banque centrale européenne, à l’inverse des cryptomonnaies. Ce sera un moyen de paiement gratuit, sécurisé, accepté partout en Europe, même dans les zones sans connexion Internet et avec, dans certains cas, un niveau d’anonymat similaire à l’argent liquide. L’euro numérique permettra à l’Union européenne de préserver et de renforcer sa souveraineté monétaire dans un secteur des paiements de plus en plus numérisé. Les colégislateurs doivent s’y atteler sans tarder, au premier rang desquels notre Parlement.

Catarina Martins (The Left). – Senhora Presidente, todas as épocas tiveram as suas bolhas e fraudes financeiras. Hoje, são as criptomoedas, uma burla disfarçada de investimento, que gera uma montanha de poluição sem produzir um alfinete.

Sem surpresa e sem escrúpulos, Trump acaba de anunciar a criação da sua própria criptomoeda, que será regida pelas regras que o próprio criará como presidente dos Estados Unidos. Como em qualquer esquema de pirâmide, só os criadores, como Trump, sairão sempre cheios de dinheiro, mas, neste caso, dinheiro real, euros, dólares. Os incautos e deslumbrados vão perder tudo.

Senhor Comissário, ao permitir as criptomoedas a pretexto da regulação, as instituições europeias estão a normalizar a burla, contribuindo para enganar cidadãos e, ao permitir aos bancos a constituição de carteiras de criptoativos, estão a criar um mecanismo crescente de contágio aos mercados, ignorando até os avisos do FMI. Na crise do Silicon Valley Bank, já tivemos um cheiro deste mecanismo.

Sejamos claros: regular as criptomoedas tem de ser proibir as criptomoedas, impedir os bancos de as comprar, proteger as pessoas da burla, evitar a próxima crise financeira.

Kateřina Konečná (NI). – Paní předsedající, vážený pane komisaři, vážené kolegyně, vážení kolegové, kryptoměny s sebou nesou příslib inovací, ale také celou řadu rizik. Miliony lidí v nich vidí příležitost, ale bohužel je zde i mnoho těch, kteří kvůli podvodům a nejasným pravidlům již přišli o své celoživotní úspory. A to vyžaduje od států a jejich institucí velkou opatrnost. Kryptoměny nelze apriori odmítat. Přináší nové možnosti v oblasti financí, nezávislosti i v investicích. Nicméně je nezbytné, aby jejich rozvoj byl ukotven v jasných principech. Jedním z těch klíčových je i právo občanů platit hotově, což považuji za základní svobodu, kterou musíme chránit. Nové metody oběhu finančních prostředků nemohou vést k zániku těch stávajících, které slouží právě jako pojistka celého systému. Kryptoměny a blockchain mohou ohrozit například prudký vývoj kvantových počítačů. Na toto všechno musíme být připraveni. Proto vyzývám k vytvoření globálních standardů, které zajistí ochranu uživatelů, jejich případné odškodnění v případě podvodů, transparentnost trhu, pravidla zdanění a zároveň respekt k finančním právům občanů.

Kinga Kollár (PPE). – Tisztelt Elnök Asszony! Világszinten növekedik a kriptoeszközökbe való befektetések volumene. Ugyanakkor az nem kérdés, hogy ez a befektetési forma különösen kockázatos. Ezért az ilyen termékekkel való kereskedéshez nagyfokú pénzügyi jártasság és tudatosság szükséges.

Legyünk reálisak! Egy OECD-jelentés szerint a befektetők kevesebb, mint fele érti a kamatos kamat számítását, így azt gondolom, jól tettük, hogy Európa megfelelő időben a szabályozás mellett tette le voksát, és globális standardokért harcol.

Hiszen jól tudjuk a kétezres évekből, hogy a pénzügyi válságok nem állnak meg a határokon. Az áttekintő szabályozást az is indokolja, hogy a kriptoeszközök a feketegazdaság valutájaként is funkcionálnak.

Ugyanakkor a túlszabályozást is el kell kerülnünk, mert az sem elfogadható, hogy a szabályozás akadályozza az európai innovációt, és ezáltal az európai vállalkozások lemaradnak a globális piacokon.

Versenyképesség, prudencia, fogyasztóvédelem és a magas standardok globális kiterjesztése. Ez az irány, amit követnünk kell, de még inkább a pénzügyi ismeretek és tudatosság növelésére van szükség, mert ez a kulcs ahhoz, hogy az európai állampolgárok jó befektetési döntéseket hozzanak, és ezáltal növeljék vagyonukat, Európa vagyonát.

Aurore Lalucq (S&D). – Madame la Présidente, Monsieur le Commissaire, chers collègues, parce que sans régulation, le marché des crypto-actifs, ce ne sont pas des monnaies, ce ne sont pas des technologies, ce sont des actifs financiers. Ce serait fait d’arnaques, de financements, de pratiques illicites en tout genre, dont celle du financement de groupes terroristes tels que Daesh. Nous avons choisi de les réglementer dans un climat hostile, violent, toxique, fait de menaces et de cyber-harcèlement.

Il est donc cocasse de voir aujourd’hui que ceux-là mêmes qui nous harcelaient à l’époque et hurlaient qu’ils allaient partir aux États-Unis à cause de nous, se plaignent des pratiques actuelles de l’administration de Donald Trump, lequel a déstabilisé le marché avec le lancement de son «coin». Ils sont en train d’expérimenter ce qu’est la loi du plus fort quand elle ne leur est pas favorable. Donc oui, évidemment, comme nous l’avons toujours dit, il nous faut des réglementations au niveau international. Il faut aussi protéger la nôtre, se renforcer sur la question de la stabilité financière, mais surtout, par pitié, ne perdons pas trop de temps avec ce débat. On sait ce qu’il faut faire dans le domaine des cryptomonnaies. En revanche, on doit avancer en ce qui concerne l’euro numérique et la création de nos propres «big tech».

Mathilde Androuët (PfE). – Madame la Présidente, l’essor des cryptomonnaies est un défi majeur pour nos États et pour l’Union européenne. Ces systèmes alternatifs, échappant souvent au contrôle des banques centrales, ne doivent pas compromettre un principe fondamental: la souveraineté monétaire des nations. La monnaie est un attribut régalien indispensable pour garantir la stabilité économique et protéger nos concitoyens.

Pourtant, pendant que l’Europe s’interroge, d’autres pays avancent à grands pas. Les États-Unis, par exemple, ne se contentent pas d’encadrer ces nouvelles technologies; ils les soutiennent, les développent et les utilisent comme un levier d’influence stratégique à l’échelle mondiale. De leur côté, la Chine et d’autres puissances investissent massivement pour asseoir leur domination numérique.

Face à cela, l’Europe ne peut rester figée dans une culture de la surréglementation. Certes, il est essentiel de garantir un cadre sûr, transparent et respectueux de nos valeurs. Mais réglementer sans agir, c’est accepter de subir. Nous devons changer de paradigme. Investissons dans les technologies numériques comme la chaîne de blocs, soutenons les entreprises innovantes et encourageons l’émergence de solutions européennes compétitives. Il en va de notre souveraineté économique et monétaire.

Nous ne pouvons pas laisser des acteurs extérieurs imposer leurs règles, dicter leurs normes et nous asservir à des technologies qu’ils contrôlent seuls. Soyons ambitieux, bâtissons une Europe qui ose, qui innove et qui s’affirme comme un leader mondial. Oui, l’avenir de notre souveraineté ne s’écrira pas dans l’attentisme; l’Europe doit être forte, visionnaire et audacieuse.

Adrian-George Axinia (ECR). – Doamnă președintă, un aforism care a devenit celebru în ultimii ani este că regulile fizicii se aplică indiferent dacă noi credem sau nu în ele. Parafrazând și luând în considerare propunerea de reglementare Markets in Crypto Assets (MiCA) putem spune că aceste monede virtuale vor exista, indiferent dacă Uniunea Europeană sau orice alt stat membru crede că sunt bune sau încearcă să le controleze total. Ceea ce nu înțelege Comisia Europeană, ține de rațiunea de a exista a acestor criptomonede.

Li se aplică logica unei monede bazate pe încredere, a cetățenilor sau a piețelor. Or, apariția acestor monede virtuale este mai degrabă rezultatul neîncrederii în modul de funcționare a economiei și al sistemelor politico-administrative complexe. Mulți se refugiază în cripto pentru a-și proteja valoarea proprietății în fața inflației, a turbulențelor financiare și economice, dar și ca tentativă de ocolire a unui sistem Big Brother care vrea să știe la secundă ce face fiecare cetățean cu banii.

În forma actuală, Markets in Crypto Assets va eșua tocmai din dorința prea mare de a intra în intimitatea oamenilor și de a verifica și controla fluxurile financiare. Exact cum s-a întâmplat și cu tentativa de interzicere sau limitare a plăților cash.

Abordarea propusă de Comisie este deci mai aproape de China, unde tranzacțiile cripto sunt interzise, decât de un sistem financiar deschis spre inovație. Inclusiv în această privință, Bruxelles-ul ar avea de învățat de la noua administrație de la Washington.

Cynthia Ní Mhurchú (Renew). – A Uachtaráin, criptea-airgeadraí. Forbairt mhór teicneolaíochta, gan dabht, le deiseanna dearfacha ar nós córas airgeadais níos ionchuimsithí, idirbhearta trasteorann níos tapúla agus féidearthachtaí réabhlóideacha trí theicneolaíocht bhlocshlabhra. Níor chóir dúinn san Eoraip neamhaird a dhéanamh de chriptea. Ach, ná ligimis orainn go mbeidh sé seo brea éasca.

Tá fíordhúshlán ag baint leis na deiseanna seo. Guagacht praghsanna, gníomhaíochtaí mídhleathacha agus easpa cosaintí láidre do thomhaltóirí. Ábhair imní dhlisteanacha iad seo a éilíonn freagairt láidir shoiléir, ach, ag an am céanna, níor cheart dúinn rialú iomarcach a dhéanamh ar bhonn eagla na heagla. Má dhéanaimid nuálaíocht a thachtadh, tá an baol ann go gcaillfimid an borradh díreach céanna a d’fhéadfadh ceannaire domhanda a dhéanamh den Eoraip sa gheilleagar digiteach.

Seachas sin, caithfidh ár gcur chuige a bheith cliste, ag féachaint chun tosaigh agus réidh le lúbadh mar a oireann. Tá rialacha ag teastáil a chuireann trédhearcacht chun cinn, mar shampla cosaintí láidre i gcoinne sciúradh airgid agus cosaintí do thomhaltóirí. Ar an gcaoi chéanna, ní mór dúinn an nuálaíocht a chothú trí oibriú le nuálaithe príobháideacha, trí chreataí solúbtha a chruthú. I ndeireadh na dála, tá deis ar leith ag an Eoraip anseo le criptea. Ba chóir dúinn an deis a thapú.

Giuseppe Antoci (The Left). – Signora Presidente, signor Commissario Brunner, onorevoli colleghi, Europol ci segnala un incremento nell’uso criminale delle criptovalute nel riciclaggio di denaro e per la richiesta dei riscatti dopo gli attacchi informatici. La blockchain facilita trasferimenti rapidi di capitali a livello globale, offrendo ai criminali un vantaggio significativo.

Nel campo della cibercriminalità emergono tecniche avanzatissime, che richiedono competenze elevate degli investigatori. Tali competenze necessitano di personale adeguatamente formato.

Inoltre, cresce l’uso di criptovalute ancorate al valore delle materie prime, apprezzate dai capi criminali per la loro stabilità e facile comprensione.

La mancanza di strumenti adeguati per il tracciamento delle criptovalute in alcuni Stati membri sta facendo aumentare le richieste di supporto investigativo a Europol.

Di fronte a queste sfide – e conoscendo la Sua grande sensibilità – è essenziale un impegno coordinato per sviluppare standard globali e condivisi, al fine di combattere efficacemente l’uso illegale di questa tecnologia.

Marcin Sypniewski (ESN). – Pani Przewodnicząca! Noblista Fryderyk von Hayek powiedział, że nie ma odpowiedzi, dlaczego monopol na emisję pieniądza jest taki niezbędny w dzisiejszym świecie. I gdy po kryzysie w 2008 roku chroniliście banki przed upadkiem, do którego pośrednio doprowadziliście, to programista czy grupa programistów, znani jako Satoshi Nakamoto, powiedzieli „dość”. Powiedzieli dość pokusie nadużycia, z której korzystają rządy i banki, dość psucia pieniądza przez jego emisję, dość fałszywemu pieniądzowi. I w ten sposób powstał bitcoin. Jest to najlepszy kandydat do stania się pieniądzem. Jest rzadki, podzielny, trudny do podrobienia, a przede wszystkim nie uznaje nad sobą dyktatów rządów i banków. Jest też antykruchy. I wszystkie te zakusy, żeby go ograniczyć, tylko go wzmacniają. I patrząc na te wszystkie proponowane ograniczenia, wiem chyba, jaka jest odpowiedź na pytanie Hayeka. Powiedział on, że najgorszym monopolem w rękach rządów jest monopol na pieniądz. I te dążenia do ograniczenia kryptowalut wynikają z tego, że są to niepaństwowe środki wymiany, które wygrywają z inwigilowanym, przeregulowanym pieniądzem dekretowym. Pamiętajmy o tym, że pieniądz powinien służyć ludziom, a nie – elitom.

Luis-Vicențiu Lazarus (NI). – Doamnă președintă, stimați colegi, România a fost teatrul unor operațiuni financiare absolut tragice pentru poporul român în anii 90. Scheme Ponzi implementate de tipi care erau manipulați de servicii secrete și politicieni au reușit să devalizeze buzunarele poporului român.

Ulterior, sigur, societatea a evoluat. În 2001 au apărut avioanele care au dărâmat blocurile gemene și, sigur, a început războiul împotriva terorismului. În 2008 a apărut Bitcoin pe fondul crizei din America, criză ce s-a transferat și în Europa, desigur, și ulterior criptomonedele au luat avânt.

V-ați gândit, poate, că acest imbold al statelor împotriva cetățeanului de a bloca deținerea cash-ului a favorizat acest avânt al criptomonedelor? Și acum, noi vrem să reglementăm. A apărut acest regulament MiCA ce reglementează anumite lucruri, dar nu reușește să facă o diferență între oamenii care au rea-voință de la început și oamenii care într-adevăr vor să facă proiecte serioase în criptomonede.

Lídia Pereira (PPE). – Senhora Presidente, mais do que exportar legislação, a Europa tem de exportar inovação. Mas vamos ser claros: não fomos pioneiros na tecnologia que suporta os criptoativos e devíamos ter sido, mas para criar o regulamento, obrigações e burocracias, aí não perdemos tempo.

É evidente que os criptoativos precisam de um quadro legal. São um ativo financeiro, por isso, há mínimos de transparência e, muito importante, de proteção do investidor. Mas é também evidente que essas leis têm de garantir segurança e previsibilidade para quem quer inovar e investir.

Se aqui na Europa não estamos a garantir nem uma coisa nem outra, como vamos defender uma regulação global? Primeiro, temos de garantir que o regulamento de mercado de criptoativos é bem implementado. Segundo, temos de apoiar a inovação em blockchain com a consciência de que é uma tecnologia que não se esgota em criptomoedas, mas que pode e deve ser aplicada noutras áreas. Terceiro, temos de perceber que criptomoedas são hoje ativos financeiros como qualquer outro.

Tentar uma regulação global tem impacto na concorrência livre, na dinâmica do mercado e na liberdade financeira das pessoas. Não podemos viver num faroeste financeiro, quando falamos de criptomoedas, mas também não podemos aprisionar novos projetos, novas ideias e novos investimentos que criam emprego e oportunidades.

Este já não é o tempo de desconfiar de tudo quanto é novo, é o tempo de confiar naqueles que inovam, que investem, que fazem futuro no presente.

Nikos Papandreou (S&D). – Madam President, Commissioner, from this discussion I think the answer is staring us in the face.

We have two distinct philosophies, one on one side of the Atlantic and one on the other side. The US is a free market, let it bloom, let’s have the $TRUMP coin and then we regulate. Ours is let’s regulate and see what happens.

What’s happening now is, besides the criminal activities with crypto, it’s also used by poor people in countries with inflation. So they put it into crypto, a very unsafe coin, and then turn it back into their currency.

What we need to do is to create the Spinelli coin, which is the digital euro, and to have our own digital crypto competing so that we can impose international standards with safe asset from Europe.

We will not be able to regulate the huge space from the rest of the world, unless we have our own digital coin that people will trust in, not only in Europe but internationally. MiCA helps on that. The way we will impose international standards and MiCA is by having our own innovation and our own Europe.

(The speaker agreed to take a blue-card question)

Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă (NI), întrebare adresată conform procedurii „cartonașului albastru”. – Ați vorbit de regulamentul MiCA. Aici avem o regulă în care se menționează că ofertanții sau persoanele care solicită admiterea la tranzacționare cu criptoactive, altele decât jetoanele de referință la active și jetoanele de bani electronici, trebuie să fie persoane juridice, să publice o carte albă, iar următoarea regulă este: să acționați cinstit, corect și profesional. Puteți să-mi spuneți, vă rog frumos – și în calitate de avocat, vă întreb – cum veți ajunge la concluzia că persoana respectivă acționează cinstit, corect și profesional, înainte de a fi în calitatea lor de ofertanți sau persoanele care solicită admiterea la tranzacționare?

Angéline Furet (PfE). – Madame la Présidente, la chaîne de blocs et les cryptomonnaies sont nées d’une idée simple: redonner le contrôle aux individus, renforcer la transparence et garantir un accès équitable à des systèmes ouverts. Décentralisation, transparence et sécurité sont donc les valeurs fondamentales de cette révolution. Mais aujourd’hui, la chaîne de blocs va bien au-delà des transactions financières. Elle révolutionne la gestion des données, la traçabilité et la confiance numérique en transcendant les frontières et en appelant à une coopération mondiale. Cependant, avec cet immense potentiel viennent aussi des défis: fraudes, inégalités d’accès et manque de réglementations claires.

C’est donc ici que réside notre responsabilité collective. Il faut bâtir des normes mondiales, non pas pour étouffer l’innovation, mais pour l’encadrer et l’amplifier. Ces normes doivent donc 1) sécuriser les utilisateurs; 2) préserver la décentralisation; 3) favoriser un cadre propice à l’innovation.

L’Europe, avec des initiatives comme le règlement MiCA, a démontré qu’une réglementation, bien que partielle, est envisageable. Elle doit donc maintenant agir comme un pont pour initier un dialogue mondial. La chaîne de blocs est une chance unique de construire des systèmes plus justes et équitables. Ensemble, nous pouvons orienter cette révolution vers un avenir plus ouvert et prospère.

Ondřej Krutílek (ECR). – Vážená paní předsedající, vážený pane komisaři, ke kryptoměnám musíme přistupovat konstruktivně. Od loňského roku platí nařízení MiCA a já věřím, že jeho zavádění do praxe probíhá bez větších problémů.

V Česku se díky našemu poslanci Jiřímu Havránkové podařilo prosadit jak automatické právo na zřízení bankovního účtu pro kryptopodnikatele, tak osvobození od daně při prodeji kryptoměn po třech letech. Myslím si, že tímto přístupem by se mohly inspirovat i další evropské státy. Naopak nápady typu zdanění nerealizovaných zisků z kryptoměn, které slyšíme z některých zemí, bych opravdu nedoporučoval.

Američané mají k regulaci kryptoměn odlišný přístup, a tak se domnívám, že dosažení globálních standardů minimálně v tuhle chvíli nepřichází v úvahu. I proto bychom měli být opatrní s jakoukoli další možnou regulací od nás z Evropské unie. Důležité je, aby přehnaná regulace a nepředvídatelné právní prostředí nemotivovaly startupy a další firmy k úprku z Evropy.

Pokud se bavíme o blockchainu, je to technologie budoucnosti, která nabízí řadu praktických aplikací. Příští týden v úterý pořádám v Bruselu akci, na kterou bych vás chtěl všechny pozvat. Bude na ní mimo jiné představen i projekt Českého vysokého učení technického a půjde o inovativní blockchainovou platformu pro decentralizované vydávání dluhopisů pro malé a střední podniky. Tak se stavte.

Adnan Dibrani (S&D). – Fru talman! Kommissionär! Kryptovaluta, som en gång varit väldigt nischat, har snabbt fått genomslag i hela världen. Det är också en digital revolution som öppnat upp nya möjligheter inom andra sektorer.

Det finns en stor potential i blockchain‑tekniken som kan innebära vinster för till exempel offentlig sektor, för mer robusta och effektiva system. Just nu undersöks därhemma till exempel hur vi ska använda den här tekniken inom vården, för att kunna säkrare hantera och dela personlig hälsodata.

Det är viktigt att vi främjar ny teknik när den kommer, men samtidigt är det viktigt att den nya tekniken har en viss kontroll. Teknik får inte användas för att skada konsumenter, för terrorismfinansiering, för penningtvätt och så vidare. Här har EU gått före och reglerat krypto. Men krypto existerar på global nivå och därav behöver vi standarder på global nivå, så att vi kan dra nytta av potentialen, inte hämma den, och se till så att tekniken används på rätt sätt och inte används av suspekta nationer för att skada konsumenter och våra system som vi håller så kärt.

Diego Solier (NI). – Señora presidente, señor comisario, el Reglamento MiCA, aunque presentado como un avance hacia la regulación de los criptoactivos, representa una amenaza directa a los derechos de los ciudadanos.

Bajo el pretexto de proteger al consumidor y garantizar la estabilidad financiera, este marco podría socavar la privacidad, la libertad financiera y la innovación. Imponer estándares globales en un sistema creado para ser descentralizado es, literalmente, ponerle puertas al campo.

Medidas como la recopilación masiva de datos personales, requisitos de capital inalcanzables para start-ups y la prohibición de ciertos criptoactivos no solo ahogan la innovación, sino que limitan la libertad de elección de los ciudadanos. Además, la vigilancia y la supervisión excesiva abren la puerta a un control digital sin precedentes.

Mi pregunta es clara: ¿estamos regulando para proteger al ciudadano o para reforzar el control de los grandes poderes económicos y políticos sobre sus vidas? No podemos permitir que este Reglamento traicione la esencia de las criptomonedas: descentralización, autonomía y libertad.

Andrey Kovatchev (PPE). – Madam President, Commissioner, dear colleagues, the European tech sector faces challenges that create a perception of stagnation compared to dynamic regions like South‑East Asia and the US. The EU is a global pioneer in the introduction of regulations such as the MiCA, with the aim to protect customers, but without hamper the growth. Yes, we need global standards, and the EU must be in the lead of this introduction. But also, we need to wake up.

Talent migration is a big concern, with 90 % of the EU tech workers willing to relocate to the US for better salaries and funding opportunities. To reclaim the position of Europe, we need innovation‑friendly policies, including clear regulatory frameworks and sandbox environments for start-ups that will promote prosperity and growth.

The rapid development of cryptocurrency markets highlights the urgent need to educate people on how to navigate the evolving landscape responsibly. Without proper knowledge, individuals and businesses risk falling victim to scams, fraud, financial crimes or malign global players. Europe needs to act now and act fast, if we are serious about our fostering competitiveness, and to act together with the responsible crypto community and not in a war with them.

Are we ready to take bold decisions to ensure our success or will we risk again being left behind as others seize opportunities which we hesitate to explore? Commission and Council and colleagues, we need to act now.

Waldemar Buda (ECR). – Doregulować, przeregulować i zabić. Taka jest regulacja i takie są działania Unii Europejskiej w wielu sprawach. Tak było z przedsiębiorcami, tak było z rolnikami. I teraz dokładnie tak samo podchodzimy do blockchain i kryptowalut. Za chwilę się okaże, że cały świat na tym zarabia, cały świat się rozwija, a my nie traktujemy tego jako szansy, tylko traktujemy to jako zagrożenie. Dzisiaj największe aktywa w kryptowalutach mają Chiny i Stany Zjednoczone, a Europa zastanawia się, jak to ograniczyć? Jak to zwalczyć? Za chwilę miliard osób na świecie będzie miało kryptowaluty.

W Polsce 12% osób w wieku produkcyjnym ma już kryptowaluty. Ja się więc bardziej boję tego, że wy będziecie doregulowywać niż że nie będziecie robić nic, bo to pewnie zabije ten rynek i inni będą na tym zarabiać. Oczywiście nieprawidłowości trzeba ścigać, ale rozsądnie. Dzisiaj jak w Polsce się próbuje to uregulować, to lobbyści obsiedli urzędy i instytucje i ciężko cokolwiek zrobić. I ci, co mają na tym zarobić, i tak zarobią. A zwykli ludzie niestety nie mogą inwestować i się w tej sprawie rozwijać.

Caterina Chinnici (PPE). – Signor Presidente, signor Commissario Brunner, onorevoli colleghi, “follow the money”: è questo il metodo per contrastare davvero la criminalità organizzata, come l’esperienza investigativa e giudiziaria italiana ci insegna da oltre quarant’anni. E “focus on the money” è oggi il motto della Procura europea nel solco di quell’insegnamento.

Quando il denaro si fa virtuale, le sfide per le autorità di regolamentazione e di contrasto si complicano, mentre invece si moltiplicano le opportunità per le organizzazioni criminali: decentralizzazione, anonimato, bassa tracciabilità, scarsità di controlli, possibilità di effettuare rapidi trasferimenti di denaro transfrontalieri e di creare catene complesse di transazioni sono solo alcune delle ragioni che rendono criptovalute e blockchain strumenti sempre più utili per la criminalità organizzata transnazionale e per le organizzazioni terroristiche globali.

In criptovalute si pagano i traffici di droga, armi ed esseri umani e, attraverso le operazioni che le criptovalute consentono, i capitali illeciti vengono riciclati e reinvestiti agevolmente nell’economia legale.

Per questo, è necessario regolamentare il fenomeno. Certo, con il regolamento sui mercati delle cripto‑attività, le norme sui trasferimenti di cripto‑attività e le nuove norme su antiriciclaggio e confisca abbiamo iniziato a farlo, però l’Unione deve continuare a sostenere l’adozione di regole uniformi e standard globali, per impedire alle organizzazioni criminali di sfruttare a proprio vantaggio lacune e differenze normative, arginare il jurisdiction shopping e, così, contrastare davvero il crimine economico e finanziario.

Seán Kelly (PPE). – Madam President, digital and cryptocurrencies present an important opportunity for Europe, provided we establish the necessary safeguards. We must strike the right balance between regulating to enhance consumer protection and promote financial stability, while ensuring we do not hinder innovation or impede the financial inclusion that cryptocurrencies can offer.

The MiCA Regulation demonstrates Europe’s willingness to lead in establishing best-in-class regulatory frameworks. Recent events, such as the collapse of the FTX in November 2022, have shown why proper standards are essential to protect our citizens from irresponsible, and even fraudulent, market behaviour.

However, the new Trump administration’s pro-crypto stance provides an opportunity for us to reflect. We hear from the crypto industry that the US is now becoming a more attractive jurisdiction than the EU, with its regulatory approach expected to be looser than ours. On this I make two points.

One: here in Europe we must approach this industry with the same competitiveness lens we apply to all sectors. It is vital to monitor the impact of our regulations and remain adaptable enough to amend them if needed, ensuring we maintain the right balance.

Two: those in the crypto industry eyeing Trump’s America with enthusiasm might reflect on the Trump coin debacle before this week’s inauguration. Be careful what you wish for!

Ultimately, the cross-border and decentralised nature of cryptocurrencies demands international cooperation to address clear regulatory gaps, as was stated by the Commissioner and my colleague Markus Ferber. So let us collaborate closely with our global partners to establish clear and enforceable global standards.

Catch-the-eye procedure

Niels Geuking (PPE). – Frau Präsidentin, Herr Kommissar! Die ursprüngliche Idee von Kryptowährungen, ein globales und dezentrales Finanzsystem aufzubauen, hatte schon ihren Reiz und war leicht faszinierend, aber selbst der Bitcoin ist heute eine Riesenmogelpackung: 60 Prozent aller Bitcoins werden gerade mal von weniger als 18 000 Adressen verwahrt. Wo ist da der dezentrale Gedanke geblieben?

Auf dem Kryptomarkt insgesamt herrscht dann auch eine Wildwest-Mentalität. Die Meme Coins sind Betrug mit Ansage. Vom Hawk Tuah Girl bis zum TrumpCoin – es mangelt schlicht und ergreifend überall an Substanz. Am Ende versucht dann jeder, jemand Dümmeren zu finden, der bereit ist, mehr zu bezahlen, als man selbst investiert hat. Es ist ein Spiel mit Verlierern und ein modernes Beispiel der Tulpenmanie, getrieben von Profitgier und Dummheit. 2021 sagte Trump selbst noch, Kryptowährungen seien eine potenzielle Katastrophe, gar Betrug – zumindest, bis er selbst einen Deal machen konnte. Weltweit durchsetzbare Regeln ohne die USA? Schwierig. Dabei braucht es sie, und zwar vor allem für die Technologie und den Fortschritt brauchen wir die globalen Standards. Zur Not …

(Die Präsidentin entzieht dem Redner das Wort.)

Maria Grapini (S&D). – Doamnă președintă, domnule comisar, de teama evaziunii nu trebuie să ne opunem inovației. Sigur, criptomonedele sunt rezultatul unei inovații. Ați spus foarte bine, avem regulament, avem directivă, ne gândim la standarde internaționale, pentru că da, nu suntem singuri pe lume, avem o piață globală.

Problema este că, din punctul meu de vedere, nu trebuie să obstrucționăm cetățenii în a-și folosi veniturile, nu trebuie să obstrucționăm întreprinderile să investească așa cum doresc, ci trebuie să avem reguli pe care să le respecte.

Ați spus, domnule comisar, între altele, că doriți să scoateți actorii dăunători. Trebuie să vedeți și cum, trebuie să spuneți ce măsuri, trebuie foarte multă transparență. Nu știu dacă aveți o statistică în Uniunea Europeană, în statele membre: Câte cazuri avem de evaziune, de înșelătorii prin criptomonede?

Dar trebuie făcute aceste lucruri și cred că trebuie să rămânem cu această inovație – criptomonede – și în Uniunea Europeană, însă cu o reglementare și o supraveghere corectă.

(Președinta a retras cuvântul vorbitoarei)

Alexander Jungbluth (ESN). – Frau Präsidentin! Ich glaube, diese heutige Debatte hat wieder gezeigt, dass es unterschiedliche Menschenbilder gibt, die in diesem Parlament hier vertreten werden. Und eigentlich werden hier in diesem Haus immer Debatten darüber geführt, dass man Dinge regulieren muss, Dinge steuern muss. Freie Meinungen werden über den DSA eingeschränkt, und bei den Kryptowährungen ist es auch das Ziel, das möglichst an die kurze Leine zu legen.

Ich glaube, wir sollten hier an dieser Stelle mal feststellen, dass unser Menschenbild ist, dass wir freie, mündige Bürger haben. Und freie, mündige Bürger sind auch in der Lage, sich eine freie Währung zu suchen. Und aus dem Grund, glaube ich, sind Kryptowährungen genau das Mittel, sich gegen staatliche Repressionen zu wehren, sich abzukoppeln von Staaten und einer Europäischen Union, die immer übergriffiger werden.

Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis (S&D). – Gerbiama pirmininke, komisare G. Braunai, labai malonu pasveikinti ir labai tikrai geras sumanymas ir teisinga linkme. Čia vienas kolega kalbėjo apie Dievo laiminimą, tai jam priminsiu, kad Dievas ne tik laimino, bet davė Dekalogą ir davė virš trijų šimtų įsakų ir įsakymų. Taigi, reguliavimas prasidėjo nuo Dievo. Tai visiems linkiu to nepamiršti. Toliau, antras dalykas, noriu atkreipti dėmesį – taip, godumas, spekuliacijos, pinigų plovimas, visos šitos bėdos yra didžiulės. Prisiminkite, kas atsitiko su finansų krize, kai griuvo didieji bankai. Tuomet su privačiais lėktuvais važiavo gelbėtis pas ką? Pas vyriausybes. Kai įvyko didžiulės krizės jau su kripto bankais vėl gi buvo tas pats. Todėl išties tie, kurie per daug kalbate apie laisvę, atminkit vieną, kai būna skaudžios pasekmės, tuomet ir tenka ieškoti pagalbos ne kitur, o valstybėse ir reguliuojamuose bankuose.

(posėdžio pirmininkė iš kalbėtojo atima žodį)

Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă (NI). – Am văzut că vă deranjează foarte mult că Donald Trump și-a făcut propriul Bitcoin. Bravo lui! De ce nu faceți și dumneavoastră? Dumneavoastră sunteți cu băncile, băncile opresive! Ca avocat, am văzut cum băncile și-au bătut joc de clienții lor, i-au lăsat fără case, fără pământuri, fără nimic, oameni care s-au sinucis din cauza băncilor – cămătari legali.

În acest context, bitcoinul – vreți și pe acesta să îl monopolizați, să îi faceți regulamente, oricum, extrem de proaste, pentru că niciodată nu o să puteți să garantați că o persoană sau o companie acționează cinstit, corect și profesional. În fapt, nicio companie nu poate acționa cinstit, corect și profesional din cauza impozitelor voastre.

Mi-aduc aminte, statul român, ca să mă oprească, în „plandemie”, să mai lupt împotriva măștii și a vaccinării, mi-au blocat toate conturile și mi-au luat toți banii din bănci și mi-au dat 30 000 de euro amendă. Așa, ca să fiu controlată, să nu mai am cu ce să-mi cresc copiii. Bitcoinul este libertate și …

(Președinta a retras cuvântul vorbitoarei)

(End of catch-the-eye procedure)

Magnus Brunner, Member of the Commission. – Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, what an interesting discussion and God bless Europe, I would say. I would like to conclude maybe this discussion by saying that we, of course, remain strong supporters of international standards for crypto. These represent a common set of principles around which jurisdictions around the world can converge.

These standards ensure, at the end, an appropriate policy framework for crypto markets allowing innovation – yes, that is very important – to take place while ensuring that risks are appropriately mitigated. And with this EU MiCA Regulation all of you and most of you were talking about, Europe is the first major jurisdiction to achieve compliance also with international crypto standards.

However, the Commission is well aware that our efforts alone, or even a partial international effort, cannot ensure that the risks posed by these global crypto markets are adequately addressed, and it is therefore crucial that the adoption of international crypto standards continues to grow.

The US, that was mentioned as well as a key partner, of course, in promoting the adoption of international standards. We therefore do hope that the new administration will act as a catalyst for further progress in bringing regulatory clarity to crypto asset markets in the United States. And we would expect that any new policy and regulatory developments in the US fully, of course, reflect international standards.

Thanks again for the discussion and for giving the Commission also the opportunity to participate in this very important exchange.

(The sitting was suspended at 11:48)

IN THE CHAIR: SABINE VERHEYEN
Vice-President

5. Resumption of the sitting

(The sitting resumed at 11:59)

6. Composition of new committees

President. – Following the creation of the standing committees on security and defence and public health, and the special committees on the European Democracy Shield and on the housing crisis in the European Union, the political groups and the non-attached Members have notified the President of appointments to these new standing and special committees as of 23 January 2025.

The list of the committees’ members will be published online and in the minutes.

7. Composition of committees and delegations

President. – Sorry. We have clear rules on what are points of order. Some colleagues are very generous when there are actual accidents or things that are happening. But sorry, we have to stick to the points of order, because on Monday we have the one-minute speeches so you can make your position on special issues you want to raise.

But we are here exactly for points of order. And that is what I exercise, clearly to the Rules. And there is no discussion about what has happened yesterday or the week after, or 20 weeks before or later. Sorry, we have clear order to rule it like it is.

(Applause)

8. Voting time

President. – The next item is the vote.

8.1. Case of Jean-Jacques Wondo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (RC-B10-0069/2025, B10-0065/2025, B10-0069/2025, B10-0070/2025, B10-0072/2025, B10-0078/2025, B10-0081/2025, B10-0084/2025) (vote)

President. – The first vote is on the joint motion for a resolution tabled by five groups on the case of Jean-Jacques Wondo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see minutes, item 8.1).

8.2. Systematic repression of human rights in Iran, notably the cases of Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi, and the taking of EU citizens as hostages (RC-B10-0066/2025, B10-0063/2025, B10-0066/2025, B10-0067/2025, B10-0073/2025, B10-0082/2025, B10-0085/2025, B10-0086/2025) (vote)

President. – The next vote is on the joint motion for a resolution tabled by five groups on the systematic repression of human rights in Iran, notably the cases of Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi, and the taking of EU citizens as hostages (see minutes, item 8.2).

8.3. Case of Boualem Sansal in Algeria (RC-B10-0087/2025, B10-0087/2025, B10-0088/2025, B10-0089/2025, B10-0090/2025, B10-0091/2025, B10-0092/2025, B10-0093/2025) (vote)

President. – The next vote is on the joint motion for a resolution tabled by five groups on the case of Boualem Sansal in Algeria (see minutes, item 8.3).

8.4. Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (RC-B10-0074/2025, B10-0074/2025, B10-0075/2025, B10-0076/2025, B10-0077/2025, B10-0079/2025) (vote)

President. – The next vote is on the joint motion for a resolution tabled by five groups on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (see minutes, item 8.4).

9. Resumption of the sitting

(Sēde tika atsākta plkst. 15:00.)

10. Approval of the minutes of the previous sitting

Priekšsēdētājs. – Ir pieejams vakardienas sēdes protokols un pieņemtie teksti. Vai ir kādas piezīmes? Protokols ir apstiprināts.

11. Major interpellations (debate)

Priekšsēdētājs. – Nākamais darba kārtības punkts ir debates par plašu interpelāciju, uz kuru jāatbild rakstiski un kurai seko debates, un kuru ECR vārdā iesniedza Charlie Weimers, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Kristoffer Storm, Jaak Madison, Carlo Fidanza, Adam Bielan, Alexandr Vondra, Patryk Jaki, Johan Van Overtveldt, Roberts Zīle, Emmanouil Fragkos, Georgiana Teodorescu, Geadis Geadi, Marion Maréchal, Ivaylo Valchev, Kosma Złotowski, Mariusz Kamiński, Maciej Wąsik, Dick Erixon, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Beatrice Timgren, Nicolas Bay, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Ondřej Krutílek, Guillaume Peltier, Michał Dworczyk, Laurence Trochu, Şerban-Dimitrie Sturdza, Tobiasz Bocheński un Gheorghe Piperea Komisijai par ES finansējumu fiziskiem robežu aizsardzības elementiem, piemēram, sienām, žogiem vai citām barjerām, pie ES ārējām robežām (G-001002/2024).

Jaak Madison, author. – Mr President, first of all, we are pretty many Members here on the last day of the week.

First of all, in September, on September 20, 30 Members of the Parliament, so pretty many, have addressed written questions to the Commission. Unfortunately, we haven’t got any answer in six weeks. So, c’est la vie, and the result is that we have to discuss the question here.

And I’m even more happy that on this very important topic, we can ask directly from the new Commissioner from Austria, who understands probably very well about the consequences of the illegal migration, about security, about the defence questions.

The question was about the EU funds and is there any kind of consideration in the European Commission to finance also the projects to protect our external borders physically? For example, in February 2023, the European Council implored the Commission to immediately mobilise substantial EU funds and means in order to help countries bolster their border protection capabilities and infrastructure.

Commission President von der Leyen has said that the EU will act to strengthen our external borders, specifically by providing an integrated package of mobile and stationary infrastructure from cars to cameras, from watchtowers to electronic surveillance.

Unfortunately, we understand very well that it’s not enough to fight against, for example, the hybrid attacks by Russia, where they are using thousands of people as a weapon against Finland, against Poland, Lithuania, maybe next day to Estonia. And if those people are used by Russia’s hybrid attack, how can we stop to move them to Germany, to Austria, to the inside of the European Union, thanks to the Schengen free movement that we have?.

That is why we had only two concrete questions: why has the Commission not yet recognised the reality on the ground at the EU’s external borders and moved to lift its anachronistic moratorium on EU funding for physical border barriers?

And secondly, considering the ongoing hostile activities at the eastern border and the Member States have taken to constructing border barriers to counter the instrumentation of migrants, will the Commission change its approach and support Member States’ external border barrier projects financially via the EU budget?

Magnus Brunner, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, honourable Members, thank you, first of all, for bringing this very important topic to the agenda this afternoon. Let me start by saying that I fully agree with the imperative of reinforced management of our external borders. It must be, of course, us and not the smugglers who decide who comes to our European Union and under what circumstances. This is all the more imperative given precisely the hybrid threats you mentioned. Our response must be as united as it is resolute.

Coming from a ministry of finance for the last three years, allow me to start my intervention with some figures. In 2024, we saw a 38 % drop in irregular arrivals compared with the previous year. So it’s 239 000 compared with 386 000. And this includes a sharp 78 % drop on the Western Balkan route and 59 % fall on the central Mediterranean route. And that’s stated, as you mentioned, by President von der Leyen in her latest letter also to the European Council. This is the result of the EU’s active engagement with our partner countries, and it is working. We see that and we must continue to pursue these efforts.

But, as you rightly mentioned, in parallel, we are very much aware that some regions are still under pressure, of course. In particular, there was a threefold increase in irregular crossings at the eastern border, in part as a result, as you mentioned, of the instrumentalisation of migrants by Russia and Belarus in their attempt to destabilise the European Union and undermine also our security. As a response, last month, the Commission issued a communication on countering hybrid threats from the weaponisation of migration and also strengthening security at the EU’s external borders. The Commission recognised that Member States can take proportionate, on the one hand, and also temporary measures to address the threat posed by both Russia and Belarus.

Member States have the responsibility, of course, also to maintain law and order and safeguard national security. That’s pretty obvious. But they do so with the support of the European Union and also its budget on a European Union level. Those Member States bordering Russia and Belarus have recently received additional funding of EUR 170 million to enhance border surveillance altogether.

This is just part of the broader picture of EU budgetary support to border management. All EU funding for border management has more than tripled over the past three multiannual financial frameworks (the famous MFF), with up to 7.7 billion allocated for border management and also visa instrument in the current 2021 to 2027 period. With these funds, the European Union is building one of the most advanced border management systems in the world and the largest share of this amount – that’s EUR 4.3 billion – is allocated directly to Member States under their national programmes.

Also the EU’s decentralised agencies – Frontex, eu-LISA, the EUAA, of course, the asylum agency – they also play a key role when it comes to border management, and their budget for the current period amounts to EUR 9.8 billion. In the future, the strengthening of Frontex with increased operational capabilities, including a tripling of its standing corps, will also further contribute to supporting the Member States – because that’s what Frontex is here for – in addressing the challenges at the external borders.

I would therefore argue that not only has the Commission recognised the reality on the ground, but it is actively also supporting enhanced border management with substantial means, actually. I would also underline that this remains a key priority for me and for the Commission in general. And we are committed to continuing to strengthen the EU’s external borders and supporting the Member States, of course, both operationally and financially, to boost border surveillance.

I am also very keenly aware, however, that budgets are limited, and the EU budget, of course, is no exception here. It is essential to make the most of every single euro, channelling it to where it is most effective at the end of the day and has the biggest impact, of course. Given these considerations, the Commission has so far focused funding, where the needs are the most urgent and where European money can have a real added value. This has included financing for mobile and stationary units, for border surveillance systems and equipment, for refurbishment of border crossing points, new installations for IT systems, plus also, of course, the maintenance of the equipment. All this increases situational awareness on border control capabilities, which are, of course, crucial for effective border protection, combined, as I said before, with continued support and also continued deployment by Frontex.

That is the picture of today: EU funding is available to Member States to provide well‑equipped and also modern infrastructure for a very high level of security at the European external borders and to help also combat irregular migration. These things must go hand in hand. On top of this, Member States can decide, of course, themselves to finance structures such as fences, for instance, themselves, while always ensuring, of course, respect for fundamental rights.

Now, the next step – and this is very important what I’m going to say now – going forward, Mr Madison, and following the trend also observed in the last years, it is clear that the overall needs for border management must be reassessed as part of the preparation of the next multiannual financial framework. This process is currently underway and should of course not be pre-empted. We will, of course, take into account the border management needs we have for the next months and years to come, which must be considered in a holistic manner for the different needs, priorities and resources available, whilst always ensuring that measures are, of course, proportionate and also respect fundamental rights.

The views of the European Parliament in preparation of that process are, of course, incredibly important. At the same time, constant engagement is necessary to achieve results on external border management, and the European Union will continue to deepen these comprehensive and strategic relations that it is building with key countries of origin, but also key countries of transit, including migration in the spectrum of key interests covered by these agreements.

Lena Düpont, on behalf of the PPE Group. – Mr President, Commissioner, I’d like to address the topic of today on two levels: on a procedural one and on a content one.

On the procedure, as a representative of this House, of course, I also need to underline the request towards the Commission to respect the timelines and, of course, to adhere to the timelines. There’s a reason why we set timelines for the answering of the questions, and I think that we can do more actually also to work together to come closer again in that sense.

On content, as it is mainly about instrumentalism – where, by the way, the ECR had the rapporteurship in the previous term – I think the question here at stake does not necessarily reflect the dynamic in the policy field. The Commission, the Commission President, they are in close debate with the Member States concerned. There are proposals on the table, both with financial support and additional money, but also in the adaptation of the policy response.

As a general remark, Europe is the strongest when we act together and we, as the EPP, will make sure to do so further down the road. And while I say that some here in the House need to accept that there is a thing such instrumentalism – that it is part of hybrid attacks, and it needs to be seen in the geopolitical context – other parts here in the House also need to accept that as well, because the very same reason why we are speaking about this cynical, state-sponsored and state-accepted smuggling business is Moscow and Minsk attacking – trying to pressure – the European Union.

So at least actors, some here in the House, want to align closer with. I would call that cognitive dissonance, but solve that out on your own. Rest assured that we, as the EPP, will go forward working on a common solution as a European Union that is strong and proud of its roots and values.

Ana Catarina Mendes, em nome do Grupo S&D. – Senhor Presidente, Senhor Comissário, Caros Colegas, fiquei muito preocupada com o final da sua intervenção, Senhor Comissário, permita-me partilhar isto consigo.

Em 2021, quando se aumentou a verba para o Fundo de Gestão Integrada das Fronteiras, a Senhora Presidente da Comissão afirmou — e cito — «a União Europeia não financiará nem muros, nem arame, nem cercas». O Senhor Comissário terminou a sua intervenção a dizer: «vamos aumentar o financiamento para as cercas».

E queria dizer-lhe, em nome dos Socialistas e Democratas, que estamos totalmente de acordo que é preciso gerir as nossas fronteiras, mas gerir as nossas fronteiras não significa violação dos direitos humanos, como temos assistido frequentemente.

Por isso, as verbas que foram atribuídas — mais verbas —, para as fronteiras, para este fundo, não podem ser para as câmaras de vigilância, para as cercas, para os muros, porque isso é ao arrepio daquilo que tem sido a política de migrações da União Europeia ao longo dos anos.

E, por isso, Senhor Comissário, aquilo que lhe queria dizer é que tenha em conta os dados que aqui referiu, que eu, ontem, referi na minha outra intervenção, e que são verdade: em 2024, houve um decréscimo da imigração irregular em 38 %.

Isso significa, Senhor Comissário, que nós temos de continuar a estar atentos à implementação do Pacto das Migrações e ter uma visão humanista daquilo que é a imigração. Nós não vamos parar a imigração com a mão, como não paramos o vento com as mãos, é impossível. Os fluxos migratórios existem desde sempre.

A Frontex tem sido, muitas vezes, acusada de violar direitos fundamentais e, recentemente, a plataforma para a cooperação sobre cidadãos não documentados alertou para a violação sistemática, nas fronteiras, dos direitos humanos destes cidadãos, por isso, aquilo que lhe peço é que continue a ser o guardião dos tratados e a tratar as pessoas com dignidade.

András László, on behalf of the PfE Group. – Mr President, EU countries want border walls and other barriers against illegal immigration, and the EU should pay for it. The majority of European leaders demanded that the European Commission immediately mobilise substantial funding for this. This was two years ago and Ursula von der Leyen did nothing.

What did the Commission do instead? They sued Hungary for defending the EU’s external borders. For not allowing illegal entry into the EU, Hungary received a EUR 200 million fine. In addition, they demand that we pay a fine of EUR 1 million for each and every day that we refuse to give up our efforts to keep illegal migrants out of the EU.

European citizens don’t want a Christmas like in Magdeburg. They don’t want a New Year’s Eve like in Brussels or Cologne. Europeans want tough border protection on the outer borders of the European Union. The radical ideology of Brussels elites about open borders is a failure. It goes against the will of EU governments, it goes against the will of European citizens and it goes against common sense.

Ultimately, European citizens pay the highest price for it. In 10 years, Hungary has already spent EUR 2 billion to defend the EU’s borders on the south. In the east, several countries are now spending vast resources to keep illegal immigrants out.

Pay for the fence in Hungary; pay for the fence in Finland; pay for the fence in Poland and all other countries that defend our external borders. This was the demand of the European governments so that European citizens won’t have to pay with their blood.

Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, w imieniu grupy ECR. – Panie Przewodniczący! Szanowni Państwo, od czerwca 2021 roku Polska, Łotwa i Litwa doświadczają kryzysu na swojej granicy z Białorusią, gdzie dziesiątki tysięcy migrantów i osób ubiegających się o azyl, głównie z Afryki i Bliskiego Wschodu, próbowały przedostać się i próbują przedostać się do Unii Europejskiej przy wsparciu władz białoruskich. Od 2023 roku dołączyła tutaj również Finlandia. Już bezpośrednio Rosja, bez pomocy swojego pomocnika, jakim jest Łukaszenka, tak samo próbuje wepchnąć na terytorium Unii Europejskiej nielegalnych imigrantów.

Tymczasem nowe rozporządzenie kryzysowe, które jest częścią Paktu o Azylu i Migracji, odnosi się do problemu instrumentalizacji migracji jedynie z perspektywy prawa azylowego i jedynie poprzez zapewnienie bardzo ograniczonego katalogu odstępstw od obowiązujących przepisów, które mają być stosowane przez państwa członkowskie zaatakowane w ten hybrydowy sposób. Oczekujemy jednak, jako Europejczycy od Unii Europejskiej bardziej asertywnych rozwiązań, skupiających się przede wszystkim na bezpieczeństwie obywateli Unii Europejskiej. Rozwiązania takie powinny obejmować wzmocnienie infrastruktury granicznej, budowę barier fizycznych i modernizację systemu granic, współpracę organów ścigania i odpowiednie wsparcie Europolu i Frontexu z wykorzystaniem również narzędzi współpracy międzynarodowej, w tym skutecznej współpracy z państwami trzecimi w zakresie powrotów i umów o readmisji.

Szanowni Państwo, chciałbym przypomnieć też o sytuacji, która miała miejsce, kiedy ta hybrydowa wojna Putina się rozpoczęła. Byliśmy świadkami w tej Izbie festiwalu hipokryzji i wystąpień zgoła kabaretowych. Przedstawiciele nie tylko lewicy, ale również PPE atakowali w sposób grubiański i skrajnie niemądry ówczesny rząd polski, rząd Prawa i Sprawiedliwości za budowę muru na granicy polsko- białoruskiej i za ochronę granicy zewnętrznej Unii Europejskiej. Ba, nawet został zdymisjonowany ówczesny szef Frontexu, za to tylko, że wsparł ówczesne działania rządu polskiego. Nie kto inny, jak ówczesny lider PPE, sam Donald Tusk, grzmiał, że migranci zwiezieni przez Łukaszenkę to biedni ludzie, których należy wpuścić, bo przybywają oni tutaj w poszukiwaniu lepszego życia.

Europosłowie Platformy Obywatelskiej, którzy dzisiaj zasiadają w tej Izbie, pajacowali na granicy, atakując werbalnie funkcjonariuszy polskiej Straży Granicznej, policji czy wojska. A dzisiaj jesteśmy świadkami cudu. Nie kto inny, a ten sam Donald Tusk wczoraj z tego miejsca mówi, że najważniejsze jest bezpieczeństwo i wzywa do ochrony granic zewnętrznych.

Szanowni Państwo, jego kolega, pan Max Weber z tego miejsca gratuluje Tuskowi odsunięcie Prawa i Sprawiedliwości od władzy i wysyła premiera Jarosława Kaczyńskiego na emeryturę. Panie Weber, gdyby nie premier Jarosław Kaczyński, którego siła i wola polityczna powstrzymała ten nielegalny proceder, to te setki tysięcy migrantów miałby Pan dzisiaj w Berlinie, w Monachium i w innych miastach niemieckich. Jeżeli ktoś ma iść na emeryturę to Pan, Ursula von der Leyen i zabierzcie Tuska, dzięki Wam ma już wysoką emeryturę europejską.

Fabienne Keller, au nom du groupe Renew. – Monsieur le Président, cher Roberts Zīle, Monsieur le Commissaire Magnus Brunner, nous avons eu ce débat de très nombreuses fois et, en dépit d’arguments logiques, factuels, et de statistiques démontrant que construire des murs aux frontières non seulement ne marche pas, mais que ce n’est pas non plus dans notre ADN européen, nous y voilà encore.

Contrairement à ce qu’aime prétendre l’extrême droite, il ne suffit pas de construire des murs à nos frontières pour régler la question de l’immigration illégale. Bien sûr que nous devons protéger nos frontières, nous organiser pour les faire respecter, comme vous l’avez expliqué, Monsieur le Commissaire; nous nous y employons. Mais la meilleure gestion de la migration et la meilleure protection de nos frontières, elle passe aussi par l’application de ce pacte, qui n’est pas encore en œuvre. En effet, un volet majeur de la mise en œuvre du pacte est consacré à cette protection des frontières.

Cela passe par la création de procédures accélérées aux frontières, d’un filtrage rigoureux, d’une base de données sur l’asile et la migration et de moyens budgétaires supplémentaires. Le pacte comprend également un volet de coopération avec les États tiers afin de prévenir les départs irréguliers, de lutter contre le trafic des migrants, de coopérer en matière de réadmission et de promouvoir des voies d’accès légales. Ce sont ces mesures novatrices que nous devons financer avec le budget européen.

Ce budget doit être utilisé pour rassembler. Il doit être mis au service des citoyens et de la solidarité. Le budget européen, chers collègues, doit construire des ponts, pas des murs.

Mélissa Camara, au nom du groupe Verts/ALE. – Monsieur le Président, Monsieur le Commissaire, chers collègues, barrières, barbelés, divisions. Là est l’obsession d’une partie de la classe politique européenne. Partout où des États ont dressé des murs, ils n’ont semé que souffrance et désespoir. Aujourd’hui, une soixantaine de murs parsèment le globe de cicatrices de béton. Depuis une vingtaine d’années, les barrières physiques se multiplient aux frontières de l’Union européenne, en Hongrie, en Espagne, en Grèce, en Bulgarie. Ce sont désormais 13 % des frontières terrestres de l’Union européenne qui sont clôturées.

Les murs, donc, comme seule perspective politique, partout. Regardez ce mur entre les États-Unis et le Mexique érigé sous Bush, toujours plus haut sous Trump, plus de 1 000 kilomètres d’acier et de méfiance. Ce mur que, chaque année, des centaines de milliers de personnes cherchent à franchir, poussées par l’espoir d’une vie meilleure. Et ici, en Europe, c’est la même histoire. Ceuta et Melilla, par exemple. Une porte close, des regards détournés. Ces barrières ne résolvent rien. Elles brisent des vies, elles éteignent les rêves et tuent. Souvenons-nous du 24 juin 2022 à Melilla: le gaz lacrymogène, les balles en caoutchouc, des migrants piégés entre les clôtures, blessés, abandonnés, sans soins… 23 vies fauchées. Et combien d’autres en Europe?

Les murs n’arrêtent pas les pas. Ils allongent les routes. Ils poussent les exilés vers des chemins plus périlleux où l’ombre de la traite les guette. Les murs ne stoppent pas non plus les catastrophes humanitaires et climatiques, les guerres, les persécutions qui ont lieu partout dans le monde. Je l’ai dit hier dans une autre intervention et je souhaite le rappeler aujourd’hui: personne ne quitte son pays, ses repères, sa famille et ses proches par choix. Les murs ne protègent pas, ils séparent, ils creusent des fossés entre les peuples. Ils nourrissent la peur et la haine.

Puisque les murs ne suffisent pas, désormais, des caméras, des drones de surveillance et tout un arsenal numérique sont déployés aux frontières de l’Europe. Mais les gens continueront d’essayer. Leur permettre de franchir les frontières n’est ici qu’une question d’humanité et de solidarité.

Cette Europe forteresse n’est pas la mienne. Mon Europe est celle d’un accueil digne et inconditionnel, celle des droits humains et de l’égalité. Jamais nous n’accepterons la surenchère des moyens sécuritaires contre les personnes exilées, comme la droite et l’extrême droite de ce Parlement le réclament. Des milliards qui partent en fumée chaque année, pour quelle protection? Pour quel résultat, sinon la mort et le désespoir? Cessons enfin l’apathie morale. L’Europe doit choisir l’humanité, la solidarité, les ponts et refuser les murs.

Christine Anderson, im Namen der ESN-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident! Europa wird angegriffen – nicht durch Panzer oder Raketen, sondern durch den Migrantenansturm auf unsere Grenzen, der als Waffe gegen uns eingesetzt wird. Und das funktioniert, weil wir uns von linken Spinnern haben einreden lassen, Pushbacks seien illegal. Pushbacks – also das konsequente Zurückweisen von Migranten an den Grenzen – sind aber das effektivste Mittel, um illegale Grenzübertritte zu verhindern und diesen Angriff auf unsere Heimatländer abzuwehren.

Dass wir sie nicht nutzen dürfen, verdanken wir einer massiven Lobbyarbeit von Pro-Migrations-NGOs, finanziert von exzentrischen Milliardären, die sich als moralische Instanz aufspielen. Tatsächlich aber gefährdet deren Agenda nicht nur die Sicherheit Europas, sondern Europa an sich. Jedes souveräne Land hat das Recht, ja, die Pflicht, seine Grenzen zu schützen. Die Behauptung, dass dies rechtswidrig sei, ist eine dreiste Lüge, die Europa jeder Möglichkeit der Selbstverteidigung beraubt.

Und natürlich brauchen wir physische Barrieren an den Außengrenzen – sie wirken, sie schützen, sind legal und legitim. Diese Zäune und Mauern sind nichts anderes als ein in Stacheldraht und Beton gegossener Pushback. Also bauen wir sie endlich, diese physischen Barrieren, und schützen wir endlich unsere Heimatländer und unsere Bürger.

Auch Sie, Herr Kommissar Brunner, sollten doch inzwischen zur Kenntnis genommen haben, dass die politische Landschaft im Wandel ist. Ihre christdemokratische Partei wird bald Juniorpartner der FPÖ sein. Sie werden Ihren Kurs ohnehin ändern müssen. Warum nicht jetzt? Und wenn nicht jetzt, wann dann?

Aber die nächsten Wahlen werden ohnehin zeigen, dass die Bürger keine Parteien mehr wählen werden, die sich weigern, die Grenzen zu schützen. Sie werden keine Parteien mehr wählen, die die Sicherheit der eigenen Bürger auf dem Altar imaginärer Rechte und Ansprüche von Millionen von rückständigen Masseninvasoren opfern und – mehr noch – sie ihnen erbarmungslos zum Fraß vorwerfen.

Kommen Sie endlich zur Besinnung. Handeln Sie – und zwar entschieden und jetzt!

Murielle Laurent (S&D). – Monsieur le Président, Monsieur le Commissaire, chers collègues, «structures physiques de protection des frontières», il s’agit là du titre de ce débat. Ce n’est en réalité que du verbiage politiquement correct pour parler de murs, de barrières, de barbelés. Cette sémantique nous renvoie à une période bien sombre de notre histoire.

La Communauté européenne a été bâtie sur un idéal de paix, d’union et d’ouverture. Notre but n’est pas d’ériger des murs, mais de les faire tomber, comme ce fut le cas le 9 novembre 1989 avec la chute du mur de Berlin. Financer de telles infrastructures serait une insulte à la construction européenne. Plutôt que de construire des murs, nous devrions consacrer notre budget à défendre la démocratie, menacée par les populistes et non par les migrants. Comme je l’ai dit hier, ici même, lors du débat sur les liens entre la criminalité et la migration: il n’y a qu’en assumant une migration positive, en mettant en place des voies légales de migration et en engageant des partenariats sérieux avec les autres pays que nous pourrons y parvenir. Non, ce ne sont pas des idioties, c’est du bon sens. Le respect des droits fondamentaux, c’est du bon sens.

France Jamet (PfE). – Monsieur le Président, 30 000 personnes. 30 000 personnes sont mortes en tentant de traverser la Méditerranée, à la poursuite d’un eldorado fictif, à la poursuite d’un eldorado que vous leur avez vendu. Ces morts tragiques, elles ne sont pas à mettre sur le compte de la lutte contre l’immigration illégale, mais sur celui de votre idéologie sans-frontiériste, des pompes aspirantes que vous avez mises en place et de votre mansuétude vis-à-vis des réseaux mafieux de passeurs. On voit d’ailleurs à Mayotte, sur notre sol, aujourd’hui, le résultat de cette politique du laissez-faire.

Alors c’est vrai, construire des infrastructures pour stopper cette pression migratoire, qui pèse sur nos comptes publics, notre économie et la sécurité de nos compatriotes, ne sera pas suffisant sans un arsenal juridique et la volonté politique. Pour cela, il faut d’abord avoir le courage de dire: «Sachez que si vous entrez illégalement sur notre territoire, ce sera l’expulsion et le retour.»

Brīvais mikrofons

Bogdan Rzońca (ECR). – Panie Przewodniczący! Chciałem zabrać głos, żeby oddać hołd 21 letniemu Mateuszowi Sitkowi. Polski żołnierz, 21 letni żołnierz, został zabity przez bandytów na granicy polsko-białoruskiej. Zabity, zamordowany. I chcę o tym tu powiedzieć, bo wtedy, kiedy my, Polacy, broniliśmy granicy Unii Europejskiej, kiedy Putin i Łukaszenka wpychał uchodźców do Polski, prowadząc wojnę hybrydową, wy świetnie tu bawiliście się w Parlamencie Europejskim na fałszywym filmie polskiej reżyserki, która ośmieszała polską policję, polskich żołnierzy, tych wszystkich, którzy bronili granicy Unii Europejskiej.

Musicie się za to wstydzić. Będę wam o tym zawsze przypominał, dlatego że dzisiaj oczywiście ta debata jest ważna, cieszę się, że komisarz przyjął takie, a nie inne stanowisko, ale wołaliśmy o te pieniądze na granicy, o to bezpieczeństwo w poprzednich latach i się nie udawało. A wczoraj oklaskiwaliście Donalda Tuska, który tutaj, w Brukseli, powiedział tak: To, co robi polski rząd Prawa i Sprawiedliwości, to szpetna propaganda. A myśmy po prostu zwyczajnie bronili granicy Unii Europejskiej. (przewodniczący odebrał mówcy głos)

(Przewodniczący przerwał mówcy)

Siegbert Frank Droese (ESN). – Herr Präsident! Ich hatte selber die Gelegenheit, als Bundestagsabgeordneter die litauische Außengrenze, die bulgarische Außengrenze zu besuchen, und es gab immer Kritik an den Finanzierungsmöglichkeiten durch die EU, dass eben zu viel humanitäre Maßnahmen gefördert wurden, aber kein robuster Grenzschutz. Insofern sind die Ausführungen von Politkommissar Brunner ein kleiner Fortschritt.

Alleine mir fehlt der Glaube an den Willen. Wir brauchen den Willen zur Festung Europa. Wir brauchen einen, wenn Sie so wollen, neuen Eisernen Vorhang an den Außengrenzen Europas. Aber wir brauchen auch im Inneren Europas Ordnung. Wir werden daher nicht umhin kommen, Millionen von Straftätern und illegalen Migranten auszuweisen. Also wir brauchen millionenfache Remigration innerhalb Europas.

Und das ist leider in Ihren Worten, Herr Politkommissar Brunner, überhaupt nicht vorgekommen. Solange dieses Thema nicht zentral als Aufgabe von Ihnen angesehen wird, kann ich leider Ihren schönen Worten keinen Glauben schenken.

(Brīvā mikrofona uzstāšanos beigas.)

Magnus Brunner, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, honourable Members, thank you very much, first of all, for your interventions.

Border protection, I think we all agree, is a shared responsibility. We know the dimension of the challenge, definitely. And we will continue to dedicate also massive resources to meet it in cooperation, of course, with national authorities, with the EU agencies dealing with the topic, and with partner countries of origin and also of transit, as I said in my former statement.

EU funds will have a strong role to play in this, and the preparation of the next MFF will be the moment to reassess the needs for border management and how these can be better addressed, whilst always ensuring – and this is also very important – that measures are proportionate and of course respect fundamental rights.

I stand ready to engage with you on this in the weeks to come. I think that is very important. And I stand, of course, also ready to listen to you all.

President. – Thank you very much, Commissioner.

The debate is closed.

12. Explanations of votes

Priekšsēdētājs. – Nākamais darba kārtības punkts bija paredzēts balsojumu skaidrojumi, bet tā kā neviens balsojuma skaidrojums nav saņemts, tad pāreju pie šīs sēdes nobeiguma.

13. Approval of the minutes of the sitting and forwarding of texts adopted

Priekšsēdētājs. – Šīs sēdes protokols tiks iesniegts Parlamentam apstiprināšanai nākamās sēdes sākumā.

Ja nav iebildumu, šodienas sēdē pieņemtās rezolūcijas nosūtīšu tajās norādītajām personām un struktūrām.

14. Dates of forthcoming sittings

Priekšsēdētājs. – Nākamā sesija notiks 2025. gada 29. janvārī Briselē.

15. Closure of the sitting

(Sēde tika slēgta plkst. 15:41.)

16. Adjournment of the session

Priekšsēdētājs. – Eiropas Parlamenta sesiju pasludinu par pārtrauktu.

http://almis.labor.state.ak.us/

MIL-OSI: Northrim BanCorp Earns $10.9 Million, or $1.95 Per Diluted Share, in Fourth Quarter 2024, and $37.0 Million, or $6.62 Per Diluted Share, for the Year Ended December 31, 2024

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

ANCHORAGE, Alaska, Jan. 24, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Northrim BanCorp, Inc. (NASDAQ:NRIM) (“Northrim” or the “Company”) today reported net income of $10.9 million, or $1.95 per diluted share, in the fourth quarter of 2024, compared to $8.8 million, or $1.57 per diluted share, in the third quarter of 2024, and $6.6 million, or $1.19 per diluted share, in the fourth quarter a year ago. The increase in the fourth quarter of 2024 compared to the third quarter of 2024 is primarily due to an increase in purchased receivable income due to the Company’s acquisition of Sallyport Commercial Finance, LLC (“Sallyport”), which was completed on October 31, 2024. Sallyport and its direct and indirect subsidiaries provide services and products related to factoring and asset-based lending in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Additionally, in the fourth quarter of 2024 the Company had an increase in mortgage banking income, primarily as a result of an increase in the fair value of a mortgage servicing portfolio that the Company purchased from another financial institution in the fourth quarter. The increase profitability in the fourth quarter of 2024 as compared to the same quarter of the prior year was largely driven by an increase in mortgage banking income and higher net interest income, as well as an increase in purchased receivable income as noted above, which was only partially offset by higher other operating expenses and an increase in the provision for credit losses.

Net income for the full year of 2024 increased 46% to $37.0 million, or $6.62 per diluted share, compared to $25.4 million, or $4.49 per diluted share, for the full year of 2023. Increased net interest income resulting from loan and deposit growth supported 2024 earnings in the Community Banking segment but were offset by increases in other operating expenses, primarily in salaries and other personnel expense as the Company continued to expand its branch network into new markets in Alaska. An increase in mortgage originations and an increase in the fair value of mortgage servicing rights resulted in net income of $4.4 million in the Home Mortgage Lending segment in 2024 compared to a $2.5 million loss in 2023.

Dividends per share in the fourth quarter of 2024 remained consistent with the third quarter of 2024 at $0.62 per share and increased from $0.60 per share in the fourth quarter of 2023.

“Northrim reported record core earnings in 2024 and record earnings per share in the fourth quarter,” said Mike Huston, Northrim’s President and Chief Executive Officer. “We are pleased with our results as we continue to focus on profitable growth. In the last five years Northrim’s deposit market share in Alaska has increased from 11% to 16%, loans and deposits have increased by almost 100%, and net interest income has increased by 60%.”

“2024 results were also supported by an improvement in mortgage banking income,” continued Mr. Huston. “We believe the acquisition of Sallyport in the fourth quarter will further diversify fee income and provide attractive risk-adjusted returns to Northrim shareholders.”

Fourth Quarter 2024 Highlights:

Net interest income in the fourth quarter of 2024 increased 7% to $30.8 million compared to $28.8 million in the third quarter of 2024 and increased 15% compared to $26.7 million in the fourth quarter of 2023.
Net interest margin on a tax equivalent basis (“NIMTE”)^* was 4.47% for the fourth quarter of 2024, a 12-basis point increase from the third quarter of 2024 and a 35-basis point increase compared to the fourth quarter of 2023.
Return on average assets (“ROAA”) was 1.43% and return on average equity (“ROAE”) was 16.32% for the fourth quarter of 2024.
Portfolio loans were $2.13 billion at December 31, 2024, up 6% from the preceding quarter and up 19% from a year ago, primarily due to new customer relationships, expanding market share, and to retaining certain mortgage loans originated by Residential Mortgage, a subsidiary of Northrim Bank (the “Bank”), in the loan portfolio.
Total deposits were $2.68 billion at December 31, 2024, up 2% from the preceding quarter, and up 8% from $2.49 billion a year ago. Noninterest bearing demand deposits represented 27% of total deposits at December 31, 2024, down from 29% at September 30, 2024 and 31% at December 31, 2023.
Total assets at December 31, 2024 exceeded $3 billion for the first time.
The average cost of interest-bearing deposits was 2.15% in the fourth quarter of 2024, down from 2.24% in the third quarter of 2024 and up from 2.00% in the fourth quarter a year ago.
Acquired Sallyport for approximately $53.9 million (approximately $47.9 million in cash and $6 million in an earn-out payable over 3 years) on October 31, 2024.


Financial Highlights	Three Months Ended
(Dollars in thousands, except per share data)	December 31, 2024		September 30, 2024		June 30, 2024		March 31, 2024		December 31, 2023
Total assets	$3,041,869		$2,963,392		$2,821,668		$2,759,560		$2,807,497
Total portfolio loans	$2,129,263		$2,007,565		$1,875,907		$1,811,135		$1,789,497
Total deposits	$2,680,189		$2,625,567		$2,463,806		$2,434,083		$2,485,055
Total shareholders’ equity	$267,116		$260,050		$247,200		$239,327		$234,718
Net income	$10,927		$8,825		$9,020		$8,199		$6,613
Diluted earnings per share	$1.95		$1.57		$1.62		$1.48		$1.19
Return on average assets	1.43	%	1.22	%	1.31	%	1.19	%	0.93	%
Return on average shareholders’ equity	16.32	%	13.69	%	14.84	%	13.84	%	11.36	%
NIM	4.41	%	4.29	%	4.24	%	4.16	%	4.06	%
NIMTE^*	4.47	%	4.35	%	4.30	%	4.22	%	4.12	%
Efficiency ratio	66.96	%	66.11	%	68.78	%	68.93	%	72.21	%
Total shareholders’ equity/total assets	8.78	%	8.78	%	8.76	%	8.67	%	8.36	%
Tangible common equity/tangible assets^*	7.23	%	8.28	%	8.24	%	8.14	%	7.84	%
Book value per share	$48.41		$47.27		$44.93		$43.52		$42.57
Tangible book value per share^*	$39.17		$44.36		$42.03		$40.61		$39.68
Dividends per share	$0.62		$0.62		$0.61		$0.61		$0.60
Common shares outstanding	5,518,210		5,501,943		5,501,562		5,499,578		5,513,459

^* References to NIMTE, tangible book value per share, and tangible common equity to tangible common assets, (all of which exclude intangible assets) represent non-GAAP financial measures. Management has presented these non-GAAP measurements in this earnings release, because it believes these measures are useful to investors. Please refer to the end of this release for reconciliations of these non-GAAP financial measures to GAAP financial measures.

Alaska Economic Update
(Note: sources for information in this section are listed on page 13.)

The Alaska Department of Labor (“DOL”) has reported Alaska’s seasonally adjusted unemployment rate in November 2024 was 4.6% compared to the U.S. rate of 4.2%. The total number of payroll jobs in Alaska, not including uniformed military, increased 2.4% or 7,700 jobs between November 2023 and November 2024.

According to the DOL, Construction had the largest growth in new jobs in Alaska through November compared to the prior year. The Construction sector added 2,100 positions for a year over year growth rate of 12.7% in November 2024. The larger Health Care sector grew by 1,500 jobs for an annual growth rate of 3.7%. The Oil & Gas sector increased by 9.2% or 700 new direct jobs. Transportation, Warehousing and Utilities added 1,000 jobs for a 4.5% growth rate. Professional and Business Services increased 700 jobs year over year through November 2024, up 2.5%.

The Government sector grew by 1,200 jobs for 1.5% growth, adding 100 Federal jobs, 800 State and 300 Local government positions in Alaska over the same period. Declining sectors between November 2023 and November 2024 were Manufacturing (primarily seafood processing) shrinking 500 jobs (-6.6%), Information, down 100 jobs (-2.2%), and Retail lost 100 jobs (-0.3%).

Alaska’s Gross State Product (“GSP”) in the third quarter of 2024, exceeded $70 billion for the first time, and is estimated to be $70.1 billion in current dollars, according to the Federal Bureau of Economic Analysis (“BEA”). Alaska’s inflation adjusted “real” GSP increased 6.5% in 2023, placing Alaska fifth best of all 50 states. In the third quarter of 2024 Alaska GSP increased at an annualized rate of 2.2%, compared to the average U.S. growth rate of 3.1%. Alaska’s real GSP improvement in the third quarter of 2024 was primarily caused by growth in the Health Care, Trade, Transportation and Warehousing sectors.

The BEA also calculated Alaska’s seasonally adjusted personal income at $55.7 billion in the third quarter of 2024. This was an annualized improvement in the third quarter of 3.3% for Alaska, compared to the national average of 3.2%. Alaska enjoyed an annual personal income improvement of 3.8% in 2023. The $445 million increase in personal income in the third quarter in Alaska came from a $310 million increase in net earnings from wages, $145 million growth in government transfer receipts (which grew in all 50 states), and a $10 million decrease in investment income.

The monthly average price of Alaska North Slope (“ANS”) crude oil was at an annual high of $89.05 in April 2024 and most recently averaged $72.50 in November 2024. The Alaska Department of Revenue (“DOR”) calculated ANS crude oil production was 461 thousand barrels per day (“bpd”) in Alaska’s fiscal year ending June 30, 2024 and is projected to increase to 467 thousand bpd in Alaska’s fiscal year 2025. The DOR expects production to continue to grow rapidly to 657 thousand bpd by fiscal year 2034. This is primarily a result of new production coming on-line in and around the NPR-A region west of Prudhoe Bay. A partnership between Santos and Repsol is constructing the new Pikka field and ConocoPhillips is reportedly developing the large new Willow field. There are also a number of smaller new fields in Alaska’s North Slope that are contributing to the State of Alaska’s production growth estimates.

According to the Alaska Multiple Listing Services, the average sales price of a single family home in Anchorage rose 6.2% in 2024 to $509,994, following a 5.2% increase in 2023. This was the seventh consecutive year of price increases.

The average sales price for single family homes in the Matanuska Susitna Borough rose 3.9% in 2024 to $412,907, after increasing 4% in 2023. This continues a trend of average price increases for more than a decade in the region. These two markets represent where the vast majority of the Bank’s residential lending activity occurs.

The Alaska Multiple Listing Services reported a 3.4% increase in the number of units sold in Anchorage when comparing 2024 to 2023. There was virtually no change in the number of homes sold in the Matanuska Susitna Borough, with only four fewer homes sold in 2024 than in 2023 or 0.2%.

Northrim Bank sponsors the Alaskanomics blog to provide news, analysis, and commentary on Alaska’s economy. Join the conversation at Alaskanomics.com, or for more information on the Alaska economy, visit: http://www.northrim.com and click on the “Business Banking” link and then click “Learn.” Information from our website is not incorporated into, and does not form, a part of this earnings release.

Review of Income Statement

Consolidated Income Statement

In the fourth quarter of 2024, Northrim generated a ROAA of 1.43% and a ROAE of 16.32%, compared to 1.22% and 13.69%, respectively, in the third quarter of 2024 and 0.93% and 11.36%, respectively, in the fourth quarter a year ago. For the year 2024, Northrim generated a ROAA of 1.29% and a ROAE of 14.70%, compared to 0.94% and 11.17% for 2023.

Net Interest Income/Net Interest Margin

Net interest income increased 7% to $30.8 million in the fourth quarter of 2024 compared to $28.8 million in the third quarter of 2024 and increased 15% compared to $26.7 million in the fourth quarter of 2023. Interest expense on deposits increased to $10.6 million in the fourth quarter compared to $10.1 million in the third quarter of 2024 and $8.7 million in the fourth quarter of 2023.

NIMTE^* was 4.47% in the fourth quarter of 2024 compared to 4.35% in the preceding quarter and 4.12% in the fourth quarter a year ago. NIMTE^* increased 12 basis points in the fourth quarter of 2024 compared to the prior quarter and 35 basis points compared to the fourth quarter of 2023 primarily due to a favorable change in the mix of earning-assets towards higher loan balances as a percentage of total earning-assets, higher earning-assets, and higher yields on those assets which were only partially offset by an increase in costs on interest-bearing deposits. The weighted average interest rate for new loans booked in the fourth quarter of 2024 was 7.23% compared to 7.24% in the third quarter of 2024 and 7.74% in the fourth quarter a year ago. The yield on the investment portfolio increased to 2.84% from 2.80% in the third quarter of 2024 and increased from 2.48% in the fourth quarter of 2023. “We are beginning to see improvements in our net interest margin as a result of lower deposit costs from the recent Fed interest rate cuts, in addition to the benefit of new loan volume and loan repricing driving our net interest margin to 4.47% for the fourth quarter,” said Jed Ballard, Chief Financial Officer. Northrim’s NIMTE^* continues to remain above the peer average of 3.16% posted by the S&P U.S. Small Cap Bank Index with total market capitalization between $250 million and $1 billion as of September 30, 2024.

Provision for Credit Losses

Northrim recorded a provision for credit losses of $1.2 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, which includes a $125,000 provision for credit losses on purchased receivables, $107,000 benefit to the provision for credit losses on unfunded commitments, and a provision for credit losses on loans of $1.2 million. This compares to a provision for credit losses of $2.1 million in the third quarter of 2024, and a provision for credit losses of $885,000 in the fourth quarter a year ago. The $1.2 million provision for credit losses in the fourth quarter of 2024 is largely attributable to increases in loan and purchased receivable balances.

Nonperforming loans, net of government guarantees, increased during the quarter to $7.5 million at December 31, 2024, compared to $5.0 million at both September 30, 2024 and December 31, 2023.

The allowance for credit losses was 292% of nonperforming loans, net of government guarantees, at the end of the fourth quarter of 2024, compared to 394% three months earlier and 345% a year ago.

Other Operating Income

In addition to home mortgage lending, Northrim has interests in other businesses that complement its core community banking activities, including purchased receivables financing and wealth management. Other operating income contributed $13.0 million, or 30% of total fourth quarter 2024 revenues, as compared to $11.6 million, or 29% of revenues in the third quarter of 2024, and $6.5 million, or 20% of revenues in the fourth quarter of 2023. The increase in other operating income in the fourth quarter of 2024 as compared to the preceding quarter and the fourth quarter of 2023 is largely the result of higher purchased receivable income due to the acquisition of Sallyport. Additionally, other operating income in the fourth quarter of 2024 as compared to the fourth quarter a year ago increased due to an increase in mortgage banking income arising from higher volume of mortgage activity and an increase in the value of mortgage servicing rights. The changes in mortgage banking are discussed further in the Home Mortgage Lending section below.

Other Operating Expenses

Operating expenses were $29.4 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, compared to $26.7 million in the third quarter of 2024, and $24.0 million in the fourth quarter of 2023. The increase in other operating expenses in the fourth quarter of 2024 compared to the third quarter of 2024 and the fourth quarter a year ago is primarily due to an increase in salaries and other personnel expense, as well as increases in professional fees from one-time deal costs associated with the acquisition of Sallyport and insurance expense due to higher FDIC insurance costs due to the Company’s asset and net income growth.

Income Tax Provision

In the fourth quarter of 2024, Northrim recorded $2.4 million in state and federal income tax expense for an effective tax rate of 17.8%, compared to $2.8 million, or 24.2% in the third quarter of 2024 and $1.7 million, or 20.7% in the fourth quarter a year ago. For the year, Northrim recorded $10.0 million in state and federal income tax expense in 2024 for an effective tax rate of 21.3%, compared to $6.2 million, or 19.7% in 2023. The decrease in the tax rate in the fourth quarter of 2024 as compared to the third quarter of 2024 and the fourth quarter a year ago is primarily the result of increased tax benefits related to the Company’s investment in low income housing tax credits and the purchase of renewable energy tax credits.

Community Banking

In the most recent deposit market share data from the FDIC, Northrim’s deposit market share in Alaska increased to 15.66% of Alaska’s total deposits as of June 30, 2024 compared to 15.04% of Alaska’s total deposits as of June 30, 2023. This represents 62 basis points of growth in market share percentage for Northrim during that period while, according to the FDIC, the total deposits in Alaska were up 2.3% during the same period. Northrim opened a branch in Kodiak in the first quarter of 2023, a loan production office in Homer in the second quarter of 2023, a permanent branch in Nome in the third quarter of 2023, and a branch in Homer in the first quarter of 2024. See below for further discussion regarding the Company’s deposit movement for the quarter.

Northrim is committed to meeting the needs of the diverse communities in which it operates. As a testament to that support, the Bank has branches in four regions of Alaska identified by the Federal Reserve as “distressed or underserved non-metropolitan middle-income geographies”.

Net interest income in the Community Banking segment totaled $27.6 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, compared to $25.9 million in the third quarter of 2024 and $24.2 million in the fourth quarter of 2023. Net interest income increased in the fourth quarter of 2024 as compared to the third quarter of 2024 and the fourth quarter a year ago mostly due to increased interest income on loans that was only partially offset by higher interest expense on deposits.

The following table provides highlights of the Community Banking segment of Northrim:


	Three Months Ended
(Dollars in thousands, except per share data)	December 31, 2024	September 30, 2024	June 30, 2024		March 31, 2024	December 31, 2023
Net interest income	$27,643	$25,928	$24,318		$24,215	$24,221
Provision (benefit) for credit losses	771	1,492	(184	)	197	885
Other operating income	2,535	3,507	2,450		2,468	2,741
Other operating expense	19,116	18,723	18,068		17,177	18,158
Income before provision for income taxes	10,291	9,220	8,884		9,309	7,919
Provision for income taxes	1,474	2,133	1,786		1,966	1,604
Net income Community Banking segment	$8,817	$7,087	$7,098		$7,343	$6,315
Weighted average shares outstanding, diluted	5,597,889	5,583,055	5,558,580		5,554,930	5,578,491
Diluted earnings per share	$1.58	$1.26	$1.27		$1.32	$1.14

	Year Ended
(Dollars in thousands, except per share data)	December 31, 2024	December 31, 2023
Net interest income	$102,104	$95,555
Provision for credit losses	2,276	3,842
Other operating income	10,960	9,130
Other operating expense	73,085	69,253
Income before provision for income taxes	37,703	31,590
Provision for income taxes	7,359	6,175
Net income Community Banking segment	$30,344	$25,415
Weighted average shares outstanding, diluted	5,583,983	5,661,460
Diluted earnings per share	$5.43	$4.49

Home Mortgage Lending

During the fourth quarter of 2024, mortgage loans funded for sale decreased to $162.5 million, of which 89% was for home purchases, compared to $210.0 million and 94% of loans funded for home purchases in the third quarter of 2024, and increased as compared to $79.7 million, of which 96% was for home purchases in the fourth quarter of 2023.

During the fourth quarter of 2024, the Bank purchased Residential Mortgage-originated mortgage loans to hold on the Bank’s balance sheet of $23.4 million of which roughly two-thirds were jumbos and one-third were mortgages for second homes, with a weighted average interest rate of 6.30%, down from $38.1 million and 6.59% in the third quarter of 2024, and down from $27.1 million and 7.05% in the fourth quarter of 2023. Mortgage loans funded for investment has increased net interest income in the Home Mortgage Lending segment. Net interest income contributed $3.3 million to total revenue in the fourth quarter of 2024, up from $2.9 million in the prior quarter, and up from $2.3 million in the fourth quarter a year ago.

The Arizona, Colorado, and the Pacific Northwest mortgage expansion markets were responsible for 19% of Residential Mortgage’s $186 million total production in the fourth quarter of 2024, 20% of the $248 million total production in the third quarter of 2024, and 11% of the $107 million in total production in the fourth quarter of 2023.

The net change in fair value of mortgage servicing rights increased mortgage banking income by $873,000 during the fourth quarter of 2024 compared to a decrease of $968,000 for the third quarter of 2024 and a decrease of $1.0 million for the fourth quarter of 2023. In the fourth quarter of 2024, the Bank purchased an Alaska Housing Finance Corporation (AHFC) servicing portfolio from another financial institution for $2.3 million. At December 31, 2024, this servicing portfolio was valued at $3.1 million resulting in a $750,000 increase in fair value. Mortgage servicing revenue increased to $2.8 million in the fourth quarter of 2024 from $2.6 million in the prior quarter and increased from $2.2 million in the fourth quarter of 2023 due to an increase in production of AHFC mortgages, which contribute to servicing revenues at origination. In the fourth quarter of 2024, the Company’s mortgage servicing portfolio increased to $294.1 million, which includes the purchase of the AHFC servicing portfolio of $235.6 million, $86.3 million in new mortgage loans, net of amortization and payoffs of $27.8 million as compared to a net increase of $64.8 million in the third quarter of 2024 and $62.4 million in the fourth quarter of 2023.

As of December 31, 2024, Northrim serviced 6,378 loans in its $1.46 billion home mortgage servicing portfolio, a 25% increase compared to the $1.17 billion serviced as of the end of the third quarter of 2024, and a 40% increase from the $1.04 billion serviced a year ago.

The following table provides highlights of the Home Mortgage Lending segment of Northrim:


	Three Months Ended
(Dollars in thousands, except per share data)	December 31, 2024		September 30, 2024		June 30, 2024		March 31, 2024		December 31, 2023
Mortgage loan commitments	$32,299		$77,591		$88,006		$56,208		$22,926

Mortgage loans funded for sale	$162,530		$209,960		$152,339		$84,324		$79,742
Mortgage loans funded for investment	23,380		38,087		29,175		17,403		27,114
Total mortgage loans funded	$185,910		$248,047		$181,514		$101,727		$106,856
Mortgage loan refinances to total fundings	11	%	6	%	6	%	4	%	4	%
Mortgage loans serviced for others	$1,460,720		$1,166,585		$1,101,800		$1,060,007		$1,044,516

Net realized gains on mortgage loans sold	$3,747		$5,079		$3,188		$1,980		$1,462
Change in fair value of mortgage loan commitments, net	(665	)	60		391		386		(296	)
Total production revenue	3,082		5,139		3,579		2,366		1,166
Mortgage servicing revenue	2,847		2,583		2,164		1,561		2,180
Change in fair value of mortgage servicing rights:
Due to changes in model inputs of assumptions¹	1,372		(566	)	239		289		(707	)
Other²	(499	)	(402	)	(320	)	(314	)	(301	)
Total mortgage servicing revenue, net	3,720		1,615		2,083		1,536		1,172
Other mortgage banking revenue	238		293		222		129		99
Total mortgage banking income	$7,040		$7,047		$5,884		$4,031		$2,437

Net interest income	$3,280		$2,941		$2,775		$2,232		$2,276
Provision (benefit) for credit losses	305		571		64		(48	)	—
Mortgage banking income	7,040		7,047		5,884		4,031		2,437
Other operating expense	7,198		7,643		6,697		6,086		5,477
Income before provision for income taxes	2,817		1,774		1,898		225		(764	)
Provision for income taxes	842		497		532		63		(215	)
Net (loss) income Home Mortgage Lending segment	$1,975		$1,277		$1,366		$162		($549	)

Weighted average shares outstanding, diluted	5,597,889		5,583,055		5,558,580		5,554,930		5,769,415
Diluted (loss) earnings per share	$0.35		$0.23		$0.25		$0.03		($0.10	)
¹Principally reflects changes in discount rates and prepayment speed assumptions, which are primarily affected by changes in interest rates.
²Represents changes due to collection/realization of expected cash flows over time.


	Year Ended
(Dollars in thousands, except per share data)	December 31, 2024		December 31, 2023
Mortgage loans funded for sale	$609,153		$376,154
Mortgage loans funded for investment	108,045		146,258
Total mortgage loans funded	$717,198		$522,412
Mortgage loan refinances to total fundings	7	%	4	%

Net realized gains on mortgage loans sold	$13,994		$7,828
Change in fair value of mortgage loan commitments, net	172		(102	)
Total production revenue	14,166		7,726
Mortgage servicing revenue	9,155		7,368
Change in fair value of mortgage servicing rights:
Due to changes in model inputs of assumptions¹	1,334		(922	)
Other²	(1,535	)	(1,765	)
Total mortgage servicing revenue, net	8,954		4,681
Other mortgage banking revenue	882		356
Total mortgage banking income	$24,002		$12,763

Net interest income	$11,228		$7,298
Provision for credit losses	892		—
Mortgage banking income	24,002		12,763
Other operating expense	27,624		23,497
Income before provision for income taxes	6,714		(3,436	)
Provision for income taxes	1,934		(943	)
Net (loss) income Home Mortgage Lending segment	$4,780		($2,493	)

Weighted average shares outstanding, diluted	5,583,983		5,661,460
Diluted (loss) earnings per share	$0.86		($0.44	)
¹Principally reflects changes in discount rates and prepayment speed assumptions, which are primarily affected by changes in interest rates.
²Represents changes due to collection/realization of expected cash flows over time.

Specialty Finance

On October 31, 2024, the Company completed the acquisition of Sallyport Commercial Finance, LLC in an all cash transaction valued at approximately $53.9 million. Sallyport Commercial Finance, LLC is a leading provider of factoring, asset based lending and alternative working capital solutions to small and medium sized enterprises in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The Company determined that a new Specialty Finance segment was appropriate for the Company upon the completion of the acquisition. The Specialty Finance segment also includes Northrim Funding Services, a division of Northrim Bank that has offered factoring solutions to small businesses since 2004. The composition of revenues for the Specialty Finance segment are primarily purchased receivable income, but also include interest income and other fee income.

The acquisition of Sallyport included $1.13 million in one-time deal related costs which are reflected in other operating expenses for the fourth quarter and full year of 2024 in the tables below. Total pre-tax income for Sallyport for two months of operations, excluding transaction costs was $945,000.

The following table provides highlights of the Specialty Finance segment of Northrim:


	Three Months Ended
(Dollars in thousands, except per share data)	December 31, 2024		September 30, 2024	June 30, 2024	March 31, 2024	December 31, 2023
Purchased receivable income	$3,526		$1,033	$1,243	$1,345	$1,307
Other operating income	(68	)	—	—	—	—
Interest income	407		158	170	212	235
Total revenue	3,865		1,191	1,413	1,557	1,542
Provision for credit losses	125		—	—	—	—
Other operating expense	3,063		362	429	374	358
Interest expense	489		185	210	212	—
Total expense	3,677		547	639	586	358
Income before provision for income taxes	188		644	774	971	1,184
Provision for income taxes	53		183	218	276	337
Net income Specialty Finance segment	$135		$461	$556	$695	$847
Weighted average shares outstanding, diluted	5,597,889		5,583,055	5,558,580	5,554,930	5,578,491
Diluted earnings per share	$0.02		$0.08	$0.10	$0.13	$0.15

	Year Ended
(Dollars in thousands, except per share data)	December 31, 2024		December 31, 2023
Purchased receivable income	$7,147		$4,482
Other operating income	(68	)	—
Interest income	947		403
Total revenue	8,026		4,885
Provision for credit losses	125		—
Other operating expense	4,228		1,431
Interest expense	1,096		—
Total expense	5,449		1,431
Income before provision for income taxes	2,577		3,454
Provision for income taxes	730		982
Net income Specialty Finance segment	$1,847		$2,472
Weighted average shares outstanding, diluted	5,583,983		5,661,460
Diluted earnings per share	$0.33		$0.44

Balance Sheet Review

Northrim’s total assets were $3.04 billion at December 31, 2024, up 3% from the preceding quarter and up 8% from a year ago. Northrim’s loan-to-deposit ratio was 79% at December 31, 2024, up from 76% at September 30, 2024, and 72% at December 31, 2023.

At December 31, 2024, our liquid assets and investments and loans maturing within one year were $1.01 billion and our funds available for borrowing under our existing lines of credit were $566.8 million. Given these sources of liquidity and our expectations for customer demands for cash and for our operating cash needs, we believe our sources of liquidity to be sufficient for the foreseeable future.

Average interest-earning assets were $2.79 billion in the fourth quarter of 2024, up 4% from $2.67 billion in the third quarter of 2024 and up 7% from $2.61 billion in the fourth quarter a year ago. The average yield on interest-earning assets was 6.02% in the fourth quarter of 2024, up from 5.92% in the preceding quarter and 5.51% in the fourth quarter a year ago.

Average investment securities decreased to $565.8 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, compared to $619.0 million in the third quarter of 2024 and $690.7 million in the fourth quarter a year ago. The average net tax equivalent yield on the securities portfolio was 2.84% for the fourth quarter of 2024, up from 2.80% in the preceding quarter and up from 2.48% in the year ago quarter. The average estimated duration of the investment portfolio at December 31, 2024, was approximately 2.4 years down from approximately 2.8 years a year ago. As of December 31, 2024, $79.0 million of available for sale securities are scheduled to mature in the next six months, $55.8 million are scheduled to mature in six months to one year, and $189.3 million are scheduled to mature in the following year, representing a total of $324.0 million or 12% of earning assets that are scheduled to mature in the next 24 months.

Total unrealized losses, net of tax, on available for sale securities increased by $678,000 in the fourth quarter of 2024 as compared to the prior quarter, and decreased by $9.1 million compared to the fourth quarter of 2023, resulting in a total unrealized loss of $8.3 million at December 31, 2024 compared to $7.6 million at September 30, 2024 and $17.4 million a year ago. The average maturity of the available for sale securities with the majority of the unrealized loss is 1.5 years at the end of 2024. Total unrealized losses on held to maturity securities were $1.0 million at December 31, 2024, compared to $2.1 million at September 30, 2024, and $3.3 million a year ago.

Average interest bearing deposits in other banks increased to $72.2 million in the fourth quarter from $28.4 million in the third quarter of 2024 due to higher deposit balances and maturing portfolio investments. Average interest bearing deposits in other banks decreased in the fourth quarter of this year compared to $126.2 million in the fourth quarter of 2023 as cash was used to fund the growing loan portfolio.

Portfolio loans were $2.13 billion at December 31, 2024, up 6% from the preceding quarter and up 19% from a year ago. Portfolio loans, excluding consumer mortgage loans, were $1.86 million at December 31, 2024, up 6% or $99.9 million from $1.76 billion in the preceding quarter and up 14% from a year ago. This increase was diversified throughout the loan portfolio including commercial real estate nonowner-occupied and multi-family loans increasing by $35.1 million, construction loans increasing by $28.7 million, commercial loans increasing $24.9 million, and commercial real estate owner-occupied loans increasing $7.2 million from the preceding quarter. Average portfolio loans in the fourth quarter of 2024 were $2.07 billion, which was up 7% from the preceding quarter and up 18% from a year ago. Yields on average portfolio loans in the fourth quarter of 2024 increased slightly to 6.93% from 6.91% in the third quarter of 2024 and increased from 6.55% in the fourth quarter of 2023. The increase in the yield on portfolio loans in the fourth quarter of 2024 compared to the third quarter of 2024 and the fourth quarter a year ago is primarily due to loan repricing due to the increases in interest rates and new loans booked at higher rates due to changes in the interest rate environment. The yield on new portfolio loans, excluding consumer mortgage loans, was 7.40% in the fourth quarter of 2024 as compared to 7.43% in the third quarter of 2024 and 8.07% in the fourth quarter of 2023.

Alaskans continue to account for substantially all of Northrim’s deposit base. Total deposits were $2.68 billion at December 31, 2024, up 2% from $2.63 billion at September 30, 2024, and up 8% from $2.49 billion a year ago. “Our bankers are working hard to continue to bring over new relationships to the Bank, which is helping to magnify normal increases in deposit balances from our customers’ business cycles,” said Ballard. At December 31, 2024, 73% of total deposits were held in business accounts and 27% of deposit balances were held in consumer accounts. Northrim had approximately 34,000 deposit customers with an average balance of $61,000 as of December 31, 2024. Northrim had 26 customers with balances over $10 million as of December 31, 2024, which accounted for $612.9 million, or 24%, of total deposits. Demand deposits decreased by 8% from the prior quarter and decreased 6% year-over-year to $706.2 million at December 31, 2024. Demand deposits decreased to 27% of total deposits at December 31, 2024 compared to 29% at September 30, 2024 and 31% of total deposits at December 31, 2023. Average interest-bearing deposits were up 9% to $1.95 billion with an average cost of 2.15% in the fourth quarter of 2024, compared to $1.80 billion and an average cost of 2.24% in the third quarter of 2024, and up 13% compared to $1.72 billion and an average cost of 2.00% in the fourth quarter of 2023. Uninsured deposits totaled $1.08 billion or 40% of total deposits as of December 31, 2024 compared to $1.1 billion or 46% of total deposits as of December 31, 2022. As interest rates continued to increase in 2022, Northrim has taken a proactive, targeted approach to increase deposit rates.

Shareholders’ equity was $267.1 million, or $48.41 book value per share, at December 31, 2024, compared to $260.1 million, or $47.27 book value per share, at September 30, 2024 and $234.7 million, or $42.57 book value per share, a year ago. Tangible book value per share^* was $39.17 at December 31, 2024, compared to $44.36 at September 30, 2024, and $39.68 per share a year ago. The increase in shareholders’ equity in the fourth quarter of 2024 as compared to the third quarter of 2024 was largely the result of earnings of $10.9 million which was partially offset by dividends paid of $3.4 million and a decrease in the fair value of the available for sale securities portfolio, which decreased $678,000, net of tax. The Company did not purchase any shares of common stock in the fourth quarter of 2024 and had 110,000 shares remaining under the current share repurchase program as of December 31, 2024. Tangible common equity to tangible assets^* was 7.23% as of December 31, 2024, compared to 8.28% as of September 30, 2024 and 7.84% as of December 31, 2023. The decrease in tangible common equity to tangible assets* was primarily due to $35.0 million of Goodwill booked as part of the acquisition of Sallyport. Northrim continues to maintain capital levels in excess of the requirements to be categorized as “well-capitalized” with Tier 1 Capital to Risk Adjusted Assets of 9.76% at December 31, 2024, compared to 11.53% at September 30, 2024, and 11.43% at December 31, 2023.

Asset Quality

Northrim believes it has a consistent lending approach throughout the economic cycles, which emphasizes appropriate loan-to-value ratios, adequate debt coverage ratios, and competent management.

Nonperforming assets (“NPAs”) net of government guarantees were $11.6 million at December 31, 2024, up from $5.3 million at September 30, 2024 and from $5.8 million a year ago. Of the NPAs at December 31, 2024, $3.0 million, or 26% are nonaccrual loans related to three commercial relationships, $2.8 million, or 24% is related to a Sallyport nonaccrual loan, and $3.3 million, or 28% is related to one purchased receivable relationship.

Net adversely classified loans were $9.6 million at December 31, 2024, as compared to $6.5 million at September 30, 2024, and $7.1 million a year ago. Adversely classified loans are loans that Northrim has classified as substandard, doubtful, and loss, net of government guarantees. Net loan recoveries were $51,000 in the fourth quarter of 2024, compared to net loan recoveries of $96,000 in the third quarter of 2024, and net loan charge-offs of $96,000 in the fourth quarter of 2023.

Northrim had $138.0 million, or 6% of total portfolio loans, in the Healthcare sector; $117.0 million, or 5% of portfolio loans, in the Tourism sector; $104.3 million, or 5% in the Accommodations sector; $87.4 million, or 4% in Retail loans; $84.6 million, or 4% of portfolio loans, in the Aviation (non-tourism) sector; $76.5 million, or 4% in the Fishing sector; and $55.1 million, or 3% in the Restaurants and Breweries sector as of December 31, 2024.

Northrim estimates that $99.7 million, or approximately 5% of portfolio loans, had direct exposure to the oil and gas industry in Alaska, as of December 31, 2024, and $1.6 million of these loans are adversely classified. As of December 31, 2024, Northrim has an additional $45.8 million in unfunded commitments to companies with direct exposure to the oil and gas industry in Alaska, and none of these unfunded commitments are considered to be adversely classified loans. Northrim defines direct exposure to the oil and gas sector as loans to borrowers that provide oilfield services and other companies that have been identified as significantly reliant upon activity in Alaska related to the oil and gas industry, such as lodging, equipment rental, transportation and other logistics services specific to this industry.

About Northrim BanCorp

Northrim BanCorp, Inc. is the parent company of Northrim Bank, an Alaska-based community bank with 20 branches throughout the state and differentiates itself with its detailed knowledge of Alaska’s economy and its “Customer First Service” philosophy. The Bank has two wholly-owned subsidiaries, Sallyport Commercial Finance, LLC, a specialty finance company and Residential Mortgage Holding Company, LLC, a regional home mortgage company. Pacific Wealth Advisors, LLC is an affiliated company.

http://www.northrim.com

Forward-Looking Statement
This release may contain “forward-looking statements” as that term is defined for purposes of Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. These statements are, in effect, management’s attempt to predict future events, and thus are subject to various risks and uncertainties. Readers should not place undue reliance on forward-looking statements, which reflect management’s views only as of the date hereof. All statements, other than statements of historical fact, regarding our financial position, business strategy, management’s plans and objectives for future operations are forward-looking statements. When used in this report, the words “anticipate,” “believe,” “estimate,” “expect,” and “intend” and words or phrases of similar meaning, as they relate to Northrim and its management are intended to help identify forward-looking statements. Although we believe that management’s expectations as reflected in forward-looking statements are reasonable, we cannot assure readers that those expectations will prove to be correct. Forward-looking statements, are subject to various risks and uncertainties that may cause our actual results to differ materially and adversely from our expectations as indicated in the forward-looking statements. These risks and uncertainties include: descriptions of Northrim’s and Sallyport’s financial condition, results of operations, asset based lending volumes, asset and credit quality trends and profitability and statements about the expected financial benefits and other effects of the acquisition of Sallyport by Northrim Bank; expected cost savings, synergies and other financial benefits from the acquisition of Sallyport by Northrim Bank might not be realized within the expected time frames and costs or difficulties relating to integration matters might be greater than expected; the ability of Northrim and Sallyport to execute their respective business plans; potential further increases in interest rates; the value of securities held in our investment portfolio; the impact of the results of government initiatives on the regulatory landscape, natural resource extraction industries, and capital markets; the impact of declines in the value of commercial and residential real estate markets, high unemployment rates, inflationary pressures and slowdowns in economic growth; changes in banking regulation or actions by bank regulators; inflation, supply-chain constraints, and potential geopolitical instability, including the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East; financial stress on borrowers (consumers and businesses) as a result of higher rates or an uncertain economic environment; the general condition of, and changes in, the Alaska economy; our ability to maintain or expand our market share or net interest margin; the sufficiency of our provision for credit losses and the accuracy of the assumptions or estimates used in preparing our financial statements, including those related to current expected credit losses accounting guidance; our ability to maintain asset quality; our ability to implement our marketing and growth strategies; our ability to identify and address cyber-security risks, including security breaches, “denial of service attacks,” “hacking,” and identity theft; disease outbreaks; and our ability to execute our business plan. Further, actual results may be affected by competition on price and other factors with other financial institutions; customer acceptance of new products and services; the regulatory environment in which we operate; and general trends in the local, regional and national banking industry and economy. In addition, there are risks inherent in the banking industry relating to collectability of loans and changes in interest rates. Many of these risks, as well as other risks that may have a material adverse impact on our operations and business, are identified in the “Risk Factors” section of our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2023, and from time to time are disclosed in our other filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. However, you should be aware that these factors are not an exhaustive list, and you should not assume these are the only factors that may cause our actual results to differ from our expectations. These forward-looking statements are made only as of the date of this release, and Northrim does not undertake any obligation to release revisions to these forward-looking statements to reflect events or conditions after the date of this release.

References:

https://www.bea.gov/

http://www.tax.alaska.gov/programs/oil/prevailing/ans.aspx

http://www.tax.state.ak.us/

http://www.mba.org

https://www.alaskarealestate.com/MLSMember/RealEstateStatistics.aspx

https://www.capitaliq.spglobal.com/web/client?auth=inherit&overridecdc=1&#markets/indexFinancials


Income Statement
(Dollars in thousands, except per share data)	Three Months Ended					Year-to-date
(Unaudited)	December 31,		September 30,	December 31,		December 31,		December 31,
	2024		2024	2023		2024		2023
Interest Income:
Interest and fees on loans	$37,059		$34,863	$29,508		$134,739		$108,612
Interest on investments	3,844		4,164	4,677		16,838		18,695
Interest on deposits in banks	883		389	1,743		2,342		4,644
Total interest income	41,786		39,416	35,928		153,919		131,951
Interest Expense:
Interest expense on deposits	10,568		10,123	8,676		39,347		26,511
Interest expense on borrowings	377		451	520		1,389		2,184
Total interest expense	10,945		10,574	9,196		40,736		28,695
Net interest income	30,841		28,842	26,732		113,183		103,256

Provision for credit losses	1,201		2,063	885		3,293		3,842
Net interest income after provision for
loan losses	29,640		26,779	25,847		109,890		99,414

Other Operating Income:
Mortgage banking income	7,040		7,047	2,437		24,002		12,763
Purchased receivable income	3,526		1,033	1,307		7,146		4,482
Bankcard fees	1,148		1,196	946		4,366		3,862
Service charges on deposit accounts	622		605	532		2,348		2,044
Gain on sale of securities	112		—	—		112		—
Unrealized gain (loss) on marketable equity securities	(364	)	576	565		465		120
Other income	949		1,130	698		3,602		3,104
Total other operating income	13,033		11,587	6,485		42,041		26,375

Other Operating Expense:
Salaries and other personnel expense	18,254		17,549	15,417		67,847		61,741
Data processing expense	3,108		2,618	2,500		10,986		9,821
Occupancy expense	1,893		1,911	1,783		7,609		7,394
Professional and outside services	1,967		903	802		4,351		3,128
Marketing expense	965		860	933		3,028		2,929
Insurance expense	894		596	675		2,961		2,519
OREO expense, net rental income and gains on sale	2		2	(28	)	(385	)	(794	)
Intangible asset amortization expense	—		—	6		—		17
Other operating expense	2,294		2,289	1,905		8,540		7,426
Total other operating expense	29,377		26,728	23,993		104,937		94,181

Income before provision for income taxes	13,296		11,638	8,339		46,994		31,608
Provision for income taxes	2,369		2,813	1,726		10,023		6,214
Net income	$10,927		$8,825	$6,613		$36,971		$25,394

Basic EPS	$1.99		$1.60	$1.19		$6.72		$4.53
Diluted EPS	$1.95		$1.57	$1.19		$6.62		$4.49
Weighted average common shares outstanding, basic	5,509,078		5,501,943	5,513,041		5,502,797		5,601,471
Weighted average shares outstanding, diluted	5,597,889		5,583,055	5,578,491		5,583,983		5,661,460

Balance Sheet
(Dollars in thousands)
(Unaudited)	December 31,		September 30,		December 31,
	2024		2024		2023

Assets:
Cash and due from banks	$42,101		$42,805		$27,457
Interest bearing deposits in other banks	20,635		60,071		91,073
Investment securities available for sale, at fair value	478,617		545,210		637,936
Investment securities held to maturity	36,750		36,750		36,750
Marketable equity securities, at fair value	8,719		12,957		13,153
Investment in Federal Home Loan Bank stock	5,331		4,318		2,980
Loans held for sale	59,957		97,937		31,974
Portfolio loans	2,129,263		2,007,565		1,789,497
Allowance for credit losses, loans	(22,020	)	(19,528	)	(17,270	)
Net portfolio loans	2,107,243		1,988,037		1,772,227
Purchased receivables, net	74,078		23,564		36,842
Mortgage servicing rights, at fair value	26,439		21,570		19,564
Premises and equipment, net	37,757		39,625		40,693
Operating lease right-of-use assets	7,455		7,616		9,092
Goodwill and intangible assets	50,968		15,967		15,967
Other assets	85,819		66,965		71,789
Total assets	$3,041,869		$2,963,392		$2,807,497

Liabilities:
Demand deposits	$706,225		$763,595		$749,683
Interest-bearing demand	1,108,404		979,238		927,291
Savings deposits	250,900		245,043		255,338
Money market deposits	196,290		201,821		221,492
Time deposits	418,370		435,870		331,251
Total deposits	2,680,189		2,625,567		2,485,055
Other borrowings	23,045		13,354		13,675
Junior subordinated debentures	10,310		10,310		10,310
Operating lease liabilities	7,487		7,635		9,092
Other liabilities	53,722		46,476		54,647
Total liabilities	2,774,753		2,703,342		2,572,779

Shareholders’ Equity:
Total shareholders’ equity	267,116		260,050		234,718
Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity	$3,041,869		$2,963,392		$2,807,497

Additional Financial Information
(Dollars in thousands)
(Unaudited)

Composition of Portfolio Loans
	December 31, 2024				September 30, 2024				June 30, 2024				March 31, 2024				December 31, 2023
	Balance		% of total		Balance		% of total		Balance		% of total		Balance		% of total		Balance		% of total
Commercial loans	$518,148		24	%	$492,414		24	%	$495,781		26	%	$475,220		26	%	$486,057		27	%
Commercial real estate:
Owner occupied properties	420,060		20	%	412,827		20	%	383,832		20	%	372,507		20	%	368,357		20	%
Nonowner occupied and multifamily properties	619,431		29	%	584,302		31	%	551,130		30	%	529,904		30	%	519,115		30	%
Residential real estate:
1-4 family properties secured by first liens	270,535		13	%	248,514		12	%	222,026		12	%	218,552		12	%	203,534		11	%
1-4 family properties secured by junior liens & revolving secured by first liens	48,857		2	%	45,262		2	%	41,258		2	%	35,460		2	%	33,783		2	%
1-4 family construction	39,789		2	%	39,794		2	%	29,510		2	%	27,751		2	%	31,239		2	%
Construction loans	214,068		10	%	185,362		9	%	154,009		8	%	153,537		8	%	149,788		8	%
Consumer loans	7,562		—	%	7,836		—	%	6,679		—	%	6,444		—	%	6,180		—	%
Subtotal	2,138,450				2,016,311				1,884,225				1,819,375				1,798,053
Unearned loan fees, net	(9,187	)			(8,746	)			(8,318	)			(8,240	)			(8,556	)
Total portfolio loans	$2,129,263				$2,007,565				$1,875,907				$1,811,135				$1,789,497

Composition of Deposits
	December 31, 2024			September 30, 2024			June 30, 2024			March 31, 2024			December 31, 2023
	Balance	% of total		Balance	% of total		Balance	% of total		Balance	% of total		Balance	% of total
Demand deposits	$706,225	27	%	$763,595	29	%	$704,471	29	%	$714,244	29	%	$749,683	31	%
Interest-bearing demand	1,108,404	41	%	979,238	37	%	906,010	36	%	889,581	37	%	927,291	37	%
Savings deposits	250,900	9	%	245,043	9	%	238,156	10	%	246,902	10	%	255,338	10	%
Money market deposits	196,290	7	%	204,821	8	%	195,159	8	%	209,785	9	%	221,492	9	%
Time deposits	418,370	16	%	435,870	17	%	420,010	17	%	373,571	15	%	331,251	13	%
Total deposits	$2,680,189			$2,628,567			$2,463,806			$2,434,083			$2,485,055

Additional Financial Information
(Dollars in thousands)
(Unaudited)

Asset Quality		December 31,		September 30,		December 31,
		2024		2024		2023
	Nonaccrual loans	$7,516		$4,944		$6,069
	Loans 90 days past due and accruing	17		17		—
	Total nonperforming loans	7,533		4,961		6,069
	Nonperforming loans guaranteed by government	—		—		(1,067	)
	Net nonperforming loans	7,533		4,961		5,002
	Repossessed assets	297		297		—
	Nonperforming purchased receivables	3,768		—		808
	Net nonperforming assets	$11,598		$5,258		$5,810
	Nonperforming loans, net of government guarantees / portfolio loans	0.35	%	0.25	%	0.28	%
	Nonperforming loans, net of government guarantees / portfolio loans, net of government guarantees	0.38	%	0.26	%	0.30	%
	Nonperforming assets, net of government guarantees / total assets	0.38	%	0.18	%	0.21	%
	Nonperforming assets, net of government guarantees / total assets net of government guarantees	0.40	%	0.19	%	0.21	%

	Adversely classified loans, net of government guarantees	$9,636		$6,503		$7,057
	Special mention loans, net of government guarantees	$19,769		$9,641		$6,580
	Loans 30-89 days past due and accruing, net of government guarantees / portfolio loans	0.03	%	0.08	%	0.03	%
	Loans 30-89 days past due and accruing, net of government guarantees / portfolio loans, net of government guarantees	0.03	%	0.09	%	0.03	%

	Allowance for credit losses – loans / portfolio loans	1.03	%	0.97	%	0.97	%
	Allowance for credit losses – loans / portfolio loans, net of government guarantees	1.10	%	1.04	%	1.02	%
	Allowance for credit losses – loans / nonperforming loans, net of government guarantees	292	%	394	%	345	%

	Allowance for credit losses – purchased receivables / purchased receivables	4.69	%	—	%	—	%
	Allowance for credit losses – purchased receivables / nonperforming purchased receivables	97	%	—	%	—	%

	Gross loan charge-offs for the quarter	$149		$15		$281
	Gross loan recoveries for the quarter	($200	)	($111	)	($185	)
	Net loan (recoveries) charge-offs for the quarter	($51	)	($96	)	$96
	Net loan (recoveries) charge-offs year-to-date	($215	)	($164	)	($38	)
	Net loan (recoveries) charge-offs for the quarter / average loans, for the quarter	0.00	%	0.00	%	0.01	%
	Net loan (recoveries) charge-offs year-to-date / average loans, year-to-date annualized	(0.01	)%	(0.01	)%	0.00	%

Additional Financial Information
(Dollars in thousands)
(Unaudited)

Average Balances, Yields, and Rates
	Three Months Ended
	December 31, 2024				September 30, 2024				December 31, 2023
			Average				Average				Average
	Average		Tax Equivalent		Average		Tax Equivalent		Average		Tax Equivalent
	Balance		Yield/Rate		Balance		Yield/Rate		Balance		Yield/Rate
Assets
Interest bearing deposits in other banks	$72,212		4.72	%	$28,409		5.28	%	$126,174		5.40	%
Portfolio investments	565,785		2.84	%	619,012		2.80	%	690,659		2.48	%
Loans held for sale	83,304		5.97	%	93,689		6.20	%	45,732		6.55	%
Portfolio loans	2,066,216		6.93	%	1,933,181		6.91	%	1,749,732		6.55	%
Total interest-earning assets	2,787,517		6.02	%	2,674,291		5.92	%	2,612,297		5.51	%
Nonearning assets	251,364				196,266				214,934
Total assets	$3,038,881				$2,870,557				$2,827,231

Liabilities and Shareholders’ Equity
Interest-bearing deposits	$1,954,495		2.15	%	$1,796,107		2.24	%	$1,724,409		2.00	%
Borrowings	29,251		3.95	%	43,555		4.07	%	47,964		4.25	%
Total interest-bearing liabilities	1,983,746		2.18	%	1,839,662		2.29	%	1,772,373		2.06	%

Noninterest-bearing demand deposits	738,911				722,000				760,566
Other liabilities	49,815				52,387				63,321
Shareholders’ equity	266,409				256,508				230,971
Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity	$3,038,881				$2,870,557				$2,827,231
Net spread			3.84	%			3.63	%			3.45	%
NIM			4.41	%			4.29	%			4.06	%
NIMTE^*			4.47	%			4.35	%			4.12	%
Cost of funds			1.59	%			1.64	%			1.44	%
Average portfolio loans to average interest-earning assets	74.12	%			72.29	%			66.98	%
Average portfolio loans to average total deposits	76.71	%			76.77	%			70.41	%
Average non-interest deposits to average total deposits	27.43	%			28.67	%			30.61	%
Average interest-earning assets to average interest-bearing liabilities	140.52	%			145.37	%			147.39	%

Additional Financial Information
(Dollars in thousands)
(Unaudited)

Average Balances, Yields, and Rates
	Year-to-date
	December 31, 2024				December 31, 2023
			Average				Average
	Average		Tax Equivalent		Average		Tax Equivalent
	Balance		Yield/Rate		Balance		Yield/Rate
Assets
Interest bearing deposits in other banks	$44,913		5.09	%	$91,161		5.02	%
Portfolio investments	623,756		2.82	%	715,367		2.43	%
Loans held for sale	68,790		6.08	%	41,769		6.19	%
Portfolio loans	1,910,156		6.87	%	1,643,943		6.49	%
Total interest-earning assets	2,647,615		5.86	%	2,492,240		5.36	%
Nonearning assets	213,397				198,107
Total assets	$2,861,012				$2,690,347

Liabilities and Shareholders’ Equity
Interest-bearing deposits	$1,802,286		2.18	%	$1,614,386		1.64	%
Borrowings	33,799		3.81	%	51,038		4.24	%
Total interest-bearing liabilities	1,836,085		2.21	%	1,665,424		1.72	%

Noninterest-bearing demand deposits	718,163				749,859
Other liabilities	55,265				47,820
Shareholders’ equity	251,499				227,244
Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity	$2,861,012				$2,690,347
Net spread			3.65	%			3.64	%
NIM			4.28	%			4.14	%
NIMTE^*			4.33	%			4.21	%
Cost of funds			1.59	%			1.19	%
Average portfolio loans to average interest-earning assets	72.15	%			65.96	%
Average portfolio loans to average total deposits	75.79	%			69.53	%
Average non-interest deposits to average total deposits	28.49	%			31.72	%
Average interest-earning assets to average interest-bearing liabilities	144.20	%			149.65	%

Additional Financial Information
(Dollars in thousands, except per share data)
(Unaudited)

Capital Data (At quarter end)
	December 31, 2024		September 30, 2024		December 31, 2023
Book value per share	$48.41		$47.27		$42.57
Tangible book value per share^*	$39.17		$44.36		$39.68
Total shareholders’ equity/Total assets	8.78	%	8.78	%	8.36	%
Tangible common equity/Tangible assets^*	7.23	%	8.28	%	7.84	%
Tier 1 capital / Risk adjusted assets	9.76	%	11.53	%	11.43	%
Total capital / Risk adjusted assets	10.94	%	12.50	%	12.35	%
Tier 1 capital / Average assets	7.68	%	9.08	%	8.72	%
Common shares outstanding	5,518,210		5,501,943		5,513,459
Unrealized gain on AFS debt securities, net of income taxes	($8,295	)	($7,617	)	($17,415	)
Unrealized (loss) on derivatives and hedging activities, net of income taxes	$1,272		$863		$978

Profitability Ratios
	December 31, 2024		September 30, 2024		June 30, 2024		March 31, 2024		December 31, 2023
For the quarter:
NIM	4.41	%	4.29	%	4.24	%	4.16	%	4.06	%
NIMTE^*	4.47	%	4.35	%	4.30	%	4.22	%	4.12	%
Efficiency ratio	66.96	%	66.11	%	68.78	%	68.93	%	72.21	%
Return on average assets	1.43	%	1.22	%	1.31	%	1.19	%	0.93	%
Return on average equity	16.32	%	13.69	%	14.84	%	13.84	%	11.36	%

	December 31, 2024		December 31, 2023
Year-to-date:
NIM	4.28	%	4.14	%
NIMTE^*	4.33	%	4.21	%
Efficiency ratio	67.60	%	72.64	%
Return on average assets	1.29	%	0.94	%
Return on average equity	14.70	%	11.17	%

*Non-GAAP Financial Measures
(Dollars and shares in thousands, except per share data)
(Unaudited)

Non-GAAP financial measures have inherent limitations, are not required to be uniformly applied, and are not audited. Although we believe these non-GAAP financial measures are frequently used by stakeholders in the evaluation of the Company, they have limitations as analytical tools and should not be considered in isolation or as a substitute for analysis of results as reported under GAAP.

Net interest margin on a tax equivalent basis

Net interest margin on a tax equivalent basis (“NIMTE”) is a non-GAAP performance measurement in which interest income on non-taxable investments and loans is presented on a tax equivalent basis using a combined federal and state statutory rate of 28.43% in both 2023 and 2022. The most comparable GAAP measure is net interest margin and the following table sets forth the reconciliation of NIMTE to net interest margin.


	Three Months Ended
	December 31, 2024		September 30, 2024		June 30, 2024		March 31, 2024		December 31, 2023
Net interest income	$30,841		$28,842		$27,053		$26,447		$26,732
Divided by average interest-bearing assets	2,787,517		2,674,291		2,568,266		2,558,558		2,612,297
Net interest margin (“NIM”)²	4.41	%	4.29	%	4.24	%	4.16	%	4.06	%

Net interest income	$30,841		$28,842		$27,053		$26,447		$26,732
Plus: reduction in tax expense related to tax-exempt interest income	379		385		378		379		374
	$31,220		$29,227		$27,431		$26,826		$27,106
Divided by average interest-bearing assets	2,787,517		2,674,291		2,568,266		2,558,558		2,612,297
NIMTE²	4.47	%	4.35	%	4.30	%	4.22	%	4.12	%

	Year-to-date
	December 31, 2024		December 31, 2023
Net interest income	$113,183		$103,256
Divided by average interest-bearing assets	2,647,615		2,492,240
Net interest margin (“NIM”)³	4.28	%	4.14	%

Net interest income	$113,183		$103,256
Plus: reduction in tax expense related to tax-exempt interest income	1,521		1,576
	$114,704		$104,832
Divided by average interest-bearing assets	2,647,615		2,492,240
NIMTE³	4.33	%	4.21	%

²Calculated using actual days in the quarter divided by 366 for the quarters ended in 2024 and 365 for the quarters ended in 2023, respectively.

³Calculated using actual days in the year divided by 366 for year-to-date period in 2024 and 365 for year-to-date period in 2023, respectively.

*Non-GAAP Financial Measures

(Dollars and shares in thousands, except per share data)
(Unaudited)

Tangible Book Value

Tangible book value is a non-GAAP measure defined as shareholders’ equity, less intangible assets, divided by common shares outstanding. The most comparable GAAP measure is book value per share and the following table sets forth the reconciliation of tangible book value per share and book value per share.


	December 31, 2024	September 30, 2024	June 30, 2024	March 31, 2024	December 31, 2023

Total shareholders’ equity	$267,116	$260,050	$247,200	$239,327	$234,718
Divided by common shares outstanding	5,518	5,502	5,502	5,500	5,513
Book value per share	$48.41	$47.26	$44.93	$43.52	$42.57

	December 31, 2024	September 30, 2024	June 30, 2024	March 31, 2024	December 31, 2023

Total shareholders’ equity	$267,116	$260,050	$247,200	$239,327	$234,718
Less: goodwill and intangible assets	50,968	15,967	15,967	15,967	15,967
	$216,148	$244,083	$231,233	$223,360	$218,751
Divided by common shares outstanding	5,518	5,502	5,502	5,500	5,513
Tangible book value per share	$39.17	$44.36	$43.52	$40.61	$39.68

Tangible Common Equity to Tangible Assets

Tangible common equity to tangible assets is a non-GAAP ratio that represents total equity less goodwill and intangible assets divided by total assets less goodwill and intangible assets. The most comparable GAAP measure of shareholders’ equity to total assets is calculated by dividing total shareholders’ equity by total assets and the following table sets forth the reconciliation of tangible common equity to tangible assets and shareholders’ equity to total assets.


Northrim BanCorp, Inc.	December 31, 2024		September 30, 2024		June 30, 2024		March 31, 2024		December 31, 2023

Total shareholders’ equity	$267,116		$260,050		$247,200		$239,327		$234,718
Total assets	3,041,869		2,963,392		2,821,668		2,759,560		2,807,497
Total shareholders’ equity to total assets	8.78	%	8.78	%	8.76	%	8.67	%	8.36	%

Northrim BanCorp, Inc.	December 31, 2024		September 30, 2024		June 30, 2024		March 31, 2024		December 31, 2023
Total shareholders’ equity	$267,116		$260,050		$247,200		$239,327		$234,718
Less: goodwill and other intangible assets, net	50,968		15,967		15,967		15,967		15,967
Tangible common shareholders’ equity	$216,148		$244,083		$231,233		$223,360		$218,751

Total assets	$3,041,869		$2,963,392		$2,821,668		$2,759,560		$2,807,497
Less: goodwill and other intangible assets, net	50,968		15,967		15,967		15,967		15,967
Tangible assets	$2,990,901		$2,947,425		$2,805,701		$2,743,593		$2,791,530
Tangible common equity ratio	7.23	%	8.28	%	8.24	%	8.14	%	7.84	%

Note Transmitted on GlobeNewswire on January 24, 2025, at 12:15 pm Alaska Standard Time.


Contact:	Mike Huston, President, CEO, and COO
	(907) 261-8750
	Jed Ballard, Chief Financial Officer
	(907) 261-3539

MIL-OSI Europe: Minutes – Thursday, 23 January 2025 – Strasbourg – Final edition

Source: European Parliament

PV-10-2025-01-23

EN

iPlPv_Sit

Minutes

Thursday, 23 January 2025 – Strasbourg

Abbreviations and symbols

+	adopted
–	rejected
↓	lapsed
W	withdrawn
RCV	roll-call votes
EV	electronic vote
SEC	secret ballot
split	split vote
sep	separate vote
am	amendment
CA	compromise amendment
CP	corresponding part
D	deleting amendment
=	identical amendments
§	paragraph

IN THE CHAIR: Younous OMARJEE
Vice-President

1. Opening of the sitting

The sitting opened at 09:01.

2. Combating Desertification: 16th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP16) of the United Nations Convention (debate)

Commission statement: Combating Desertification: 16th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP16) of the United Nations Convention (2025/3018(RSP))

Jessika Roswall (Member of the Commission) made the statement.

The following spoke: Carmen Crespo Díaz, on behalf of the PPE Group, Marta Temido, on behalf of the S&D Group, Julien Leonardelli, on behalf of the PfE Group, Francesco Ventola, on behalf of the ECR Group, Martin Hojsík, on behalf of the Renew Group, Pär Holmgren, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Catarina Martins, on behalf of The Left Group, Zsuzsanna Borvendég, on behalf of the ESN Group, Christine Schneider, Sakis Arnaoutoglou, Mireia Borrás Pabón, Laurence Trochu, Billy Kelleher, Kai Tegethoff, João Oliveira, Daniel Buda, Maria Grapini, Mathilde Androuët, Marie Toussaint, Valentina Palmisano, Salvatore De Meo, Thomas Bajada, France Jamet, Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, who also answered a blue-card question from João Oliveira, Sebastian Everding, who also answered a blue-card question from Sander Smit, Gabriella Gerzsenyi, César Luena, who also answered a blue-card question from Carmen Crespo Díaz, Jutta Paulus, who also answered a blue-card question from Maria Grapini, Nikolas Farantouris, Borja Giménez Larraz, Camilla Laureti, Marco Falcone, who also answered a blue-card question from Kai Tegethoff, Leire Pajín, Manuela Ripa, Jean-Marc Germain, Dan-Ştefan Motreanu, Stefano Bonaccini and Ştefan Muşoiu.

The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Grzegorz Braun, Hélder Sousa Silva and Seán Kelly.

The following spoke: Jessika Roswall.

The debate closed.

(The sitting was suspended for a few moments.)

IN THE CHAIR: Christel SCHALDEMOSE
Vice-President

3. Resumption of the sitting

The sitting resumed at 10:29.

4. Cryptocurrencies – need for global standards (debate)

Commission statement: Cryptocurrencies – need for global standards (2025/2514(RSP))

Magnus Brunner (Member of the Commission) made the statement.

The following spoke: Markus Ferber, on behalf of the PPE Group, Jonás Fernández, on behalf of the S&D Group, Pierre Pimpie, on behalf of the PfE Group, Marlena Maląg, on behalf of the ECR Group, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin, on behalf of the Renew Group, Rasmus Andresen, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group (the President reminded the speaker of the rules on conduct), Pasquale Tridico, on behalf of The Left Group, René Aust, on behalf of the ESN Group, Regina Doherty, Eero Heinäluoma, Aleksandar Nikolic, Guillaume Peltier, Gilles Boyer, Damian Boeselager, Catarina Martins, Stanislav Stoyanov, Kateřina Konečná, Kinga Kollár, Aurore Lalucq, Mathilde Androuët, Adrian-George Axinia, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Giuseppe Antoci, Marcin Sypniewski, Luis-Vicențiu Lazarus, Lídia Pereira (the President provided some clarifications on the blue-card procedure), Nikos Papandreou, who also answered a blue-card question from Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă, Angéline Furet, Ondřej Krutílek, Michalis Hadjipantela, Adnan Dibrani, Diego Solier, Andrey Kovatchev, Waldemar Buda, Caterina Chinnici and Seán Kelly.

The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Niels Geuking, Maria Grapini, Alexander Jungbluth, Grzegorz Braun, Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis and Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă.

The following spoke: Magnus Brunner.

The debate closed.

(The sitting was suspended at 11:48.)

IN THE CHAIR: Sabine VERHEYEN
Vice-President

5. Resumption of the sitting

The sitting resumed at 11:59.

6. Composition of new committees

Following the creation of the standing committees on security and defence and on public health, and the creation of the special committees on the European Democracy Shield and on the housing crisis in the European Union, the President had received nominations for membership of these new standing and special committees from the political groups and the non-attached Members, in accordance with Rules 212 and 213.

The decisions took effect as of that day.

The lists of Members nominated to form these committees are annexed to these minutes (minutes of 23.1.2025 Annex 1).

7. Composition of committees and delegations

The Renew Group and non-attached Members had notified the President of the following decisions changing the composition of committees:

– ITRE Committee: Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez to replace Barry Andrews, Elena Yoncheva

– REGI Committee: Elsi Katainen

– LIBE Committee: Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle

– PETI Committee: Cynthia Ní Mhurchú and Eugen Tomac were no longer members, Taner Kabilov

The decisions took effect as of that day.

⁂

The following spoke: Jordan Bardella, Carlo Fidanza and Patryk Jaki on points of order (the President cut off the speakers as their remarks did not constitute points of order).

8. Voting time

For detailed results of the votes, see also ‘Results of votes’ and ‘Results of roll-call votes’.

8.2. Systematic repression of human rights in Iran, notably the cases of Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi, and the taking of EU citizens as hostages (vote)

Motions for resolutions RC-B10-0066/2025 (minutes of 23.1.2025, item I), B10-0063/2025, B10-0066/2025, B10-0067/2025, B10-0073/2025, B10-0082/2025, B10-0085/2025 and B10-0086/2025 (minutes of 22.1.2025, item 1) (2025/2511(RSP))

The debate had taken place on 22 January 2025 (minutes of 22.1.2025, item 16.2).

(Majority of the votes cast)

JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

Adopted (P10_TA(2025)0004)

(Motions for resolutions B10-0063/2025 and B10-0067/2025 fell.)

Detailed voting results

9. Resumption of the sitting

The sitting resumed at 15:00.

10. Approval of the minutes of the previous sitting

The minutes of the previous sitting were approved.

11. Major interpellations (debate)

Major interpellation for written answer with debate (G-001002/2024) submitted by Charlie Weimers, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Kristoffer Storm, Jaak Madison, Carlo Fidanza, Adam Bielan, Alexandr Vondra, Patryk Jaki, Johan Van Overtveldt, Roberts Zīle, Emmanouil Fragkos, Georgiana Teodorescu, Geadis Geadi, Marion Maréchal, Ivaylo Valchev, Kosma Złotowski, Mariusz Kamiński, Maciej Wąsik, Dick Erixon, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Beatrice Timgren, Nicolas Bay, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Ondřej Krutílek, Guillaume Peltier, Michał Dworczyk, Laurence Trochu, Şerban-Dimitrie Sturdza, Tobiasz Bocheński, Gheorghe Piperea, on behalf of the ECR Group, to the Commission: EU funding of physical border protection structures such as walls, fences or other barriers at the external border (B10-0001/2025)

Jaak Madison moved the major interpellation.

Magnus Brunner (Member of the Commission) answered the major interpellation.

The following spoke: Lena Düpont, on behalf of the PPE Group, Ana Catarina Mendes, on behalf of the S&D Group, András László, on behalf of the PfE Group, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, on behalf of the ECR Group, Fabienne Keller, on behalf of the Renew Group, Mélissa Camara, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Christine Anderson, on behalf of the ESN Group, Fredis Beleris, Murielle Laurent, France Jamet and Riho Terras.

The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Kinga Kollár, Bogdan Rzońca and Siegbert Frank Droese.

The following spoke: Magnus Brunner.

The debate closed.

12. Explanations of vote

Written explanations of vote

Explanations of vote submitted in writing under Rule 201 appear on the Members’ pages on Parliament’s website.

13. Approval of the minutes of the sitting and forwarding of texts adopted

In accordance with Rule 208(3), the minutes of the sitting would be put to the House for approval at the beginning of the afternoon of the sitting on Monday, 10 February 2025.

With Parliament’s agreement, the texts adopted during the part-session would be forwarded to their respective addressees without delay.

14. Dates of forthcoming sittings

The next sitting would be held on 29 January 2025.

15. Closure of the sitting

The sitting closed at 15:41.

16. Adjournment of the session

The session of the European Parliament was adjourned.

Alessandro Chiocchetti	Roberta Metsola
Secretary-General	President

LIST OF DOCUMENTS SERVING AS A BASIS FOR THE DEBATES AND DECISIONS OF PARLIAMENT

I. Motions for resolutions tabled

Case of Jean-Jacques Wondo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Joint motion for a resolution tabled under Rule 150(5) and Rule 136(4):

on the case of Jean-Jacques Wondo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2025/2510(RSP)) (RC-B10-0069/2025)
(replacing motions for resolutions B10-0069/2025, B10-0072/2025, B10-0078/2025, B10-0081/2025 and B10-0084/2025)
Sebastião Bugalho, Wouter Beke, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Michael Gahler, Luděk Niedermayer, Christophe Gomart, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Danuše Nerudová, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Jessica Polfjärd, Tomáš Zdechovský, Andrey Kovatchev, Inese Vaidere
on behalf of the PPE Group
Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Elio Di Rupo
on behalf of the S&D Group
Waldemar Tomaszewski, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Sebastian Tynkkynen
on behalf of the ECR Group
Bernard Guetta, Petras Auštrevičius, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar
on behalf of the Renew Group
Catarina Vieira
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Systematic repression of human rights in Iran, notably the cases of Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi, and the taking of EU citizens as hostages

Joint motion for a resolution tabled under Rule 150(5) and Rule 136(4):

on the systematic repression of human rights in Iran, notably the cases of Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi, and the taking of EU citizens as hostages (2025/2511(RSP)) (RC-B10-0066/2025)
(replacing motions for resolutions B10-0066/2025, B10-0073/2025, B10-0082/2025, B10-0085/2025 and B10-0086/2025)
Sebastião Bugalho, Tomáš Zdechovský, Loucas Fourlas, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, David McAllister, Michael Gahler, Željana Zovko, Christophe Gomart, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Javier Zarzalejos, Luděk Niedermayer, Wouter Beke, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Jessica Polfjärd, Danuše Nerudová, Andrey Kovatchev, Inese Vaidere
on behalf of the PPE Group
Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Evin Incir, Chloé Ridel, Daniel Attard, Alessandra Moretti
on behalf of the S&D Group
Rihards Kols, Mariusz Kamiński, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Carlo Fidanza, Reinis Pozņaks, Aurelijus Veryga, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Alberico Gambino, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Dick Erixon, Beatrice Timgren, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Alexandr Vondra, Marion Maréchal, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Carlo Ciccioli, Charlie Weimers
on behalf of the ECR Group
Petras Auštrevičius, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Bart Groothuis, Bernard Guetta, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Sophie Wilmès, Lucia Yar
on behalf of the Renew Group
Hannah Neumann
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Per Clausen, Hanna Gedin, Jonas Sjöstedt

Case of Boualem Sansal in Algeria

Joint motion for a resolution tabled under Rule 150(5) and Rule 136(4):

on the case of Boualem Sansal in Algeria (2025/2512(RSP)) (RC-B10-0087/2025)
(replacing motions for resolutions B10-0087/2025, B10-0089/2025, B10-0091/2025, B10-0092/2025 and B10-0093/2025)
Sebastião Bugalho, Christophe Gomart, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Michael Gahler, Luděk Niedermayer, Wouter Beke, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Jessica Polfjärd, Tomáš Zdechovský, Andrey Kovatchev, Inese Vaidere
on behalf of the PPE Group
Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Marta Temido
on behalf of the S&D Group
Adam Bielan, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Alexandr Vondra, Marion Maréchal, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Małgorzata Gosiewska
on behalf of the ECR Group
Helmut Brandstätter, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Bernard Guetta, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Urmas Paet, Lucia Yar
on behalf of the Renew Group
Leoluca Orlando
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine

Motions for resolutions tabled under Rule 136(2) to wind up the debate:

on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (2024/2988(RSP)) (B10-0074/2025)
Yannis Maniatis, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Thijs Reuten, Raphaël Glucksmann
on behalf of the S&D Group

on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (2024/2988(RSP)) (B10-0075/2025)
Rasa Juknevičienė, Michael Gahler, Andrzej Halicki, Sebastião Bugalho, David McAllister, Siegfried Mureşan, Željana Zovko, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Mika Aaltola, Krzysztof Brejza, Daniel Caspary, Sandra Kalniete, Seán Kelly, Ondřej Kolář, Łukasz Kohut, Andrey Kovatchev, Miriam Lexmann, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Ana Miguel Pedro, Paulius Saudargas, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba, Alice Teodorescu Måwe, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Matej Tonin, Pekka Toveri, Inese Vaidere, Milan Zver
on behalf of the PPE Group

on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (2024/2988(RSP)) (B10-0076/2025)
Sergey Lagodinsky, Hannah Neumann, Markéta Gregorová, Mārtiņš Staķis, Maria Ohisalo, Virginijus Sinkevičius, Villy Søvndal, Nicolae Ştefănuță, Reinier Van Lanschot
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (2024/2988(RSP)) (B10-0077/2025)
Bernard Guetta, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Olivier Chastel, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Michał Kobosko, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Eugen Tomac, Hilde Vautmans, Sophie Wilmès, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas
on behalf of the Renew Group

on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (2024/2988(RSP)) (B10-0079/2025)
Adam Bielan, Mariusz Kamiński, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Rihards Kols, Ondřej Krutílek, Jaak Madison, Ivaylo Valchev, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Veronika Vrecionová, Roberts Zīle, Aurelijus Veryga, Maciej Wąsik, Michał Dworczyk, Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Alexandr Vondra
on behalf of the ECR Group

Joint motion for a resolution tabled under Rule 136(2) and (4):

on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (2024/2988(RSP)) (RC-B10-0074/2025)
(replacing motions for resolutions B10-0074/2025, B10-0075/2025, B10-0076/2025, B10-0077/2025 and B10-0079/2025)
Rasa Juknevičienė, Michael Gahler, Andrzej Halicki, Sebastião Bugalho, David McAllister, Siegfried Mureşan, Željana Zovko, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Mika Aaltola, Krzysztof Brejza, Daniel Caspary, Sandra Kalniete, Seán Kelly, Ondřej Kolář, Łukasz Kohut, Andrey Kovatchev, Miriam Lexmann, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Ana Miguel Pedro, Paulius Saudargas, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba, Alice Teodorescu Måwe, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Matej Tonin, Pekka Toveri, Inese Vaidere, Milan Zver
on behalf of the PPE Group
Yannis Maniatis, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Thijs Reuten, Raphaël Glucksmann
on behalf of the S&D Group
Adam Bielan, Rihards Kols, Reinis Pozņaks, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Roberts Zīle, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Jaak Madison, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Cristian Terheş, Maciej Wąsik, Ivaylo Valchev, Aurelijus Veryga, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński
on behalf of the ECR Group
Bernard Guetta, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Karin Karlsbro, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Michał Kobosko, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Eugen Tomac, Hilde Vautmans, Sophie Wilmès, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas
on behalf of the Renew Group
Sergey Lagodinsky
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025

Motions for resolutions tabled under Rule 136(2) to wind up the debate:

on the situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025 (2025/2519(RSP)) (B10-0064/2025)
Gabriel Mato, Sebastião Bugalho, Davor Ivo Stier
on behalf of the PPE Group

on the situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025 (2025/2519(RSP)) (B10-0068/2025)
Jorge Buxadé Villalba, Hermann Tertsch, Jorge Martín Frías, Silvia Sardone, Nikola Bartůšek, Susanna Ceccardi, Roberto Vannacci, António Tânger Corrêa, Enikő Győri
on behalf of the PfE Group

on the situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025 (2025/2519(RSP)) (B10-0071/2025)
Leire Pajín
on behalf of the S&D Group
Catarina Vieira, Ville Niinistö, Nicolae Ştefănuță
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

on the situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025 (2025/2519(RSP)) (B10-0080/2025)
Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Helmut Brandstätter, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Valérie Devaux, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Ana Vasconcelos, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar
on behalf of the Renew Group

on the situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025 (2025/2519(RSP)) (B10-0083/2025)
Carlo Fidanza, Adam Bielan, Mariusz Kamiński, Alberico Gambino, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Diego Solier, Rihards Kols, Ondřej Krutílek, Jaak Madison, Nora Junco García, Şerban-Dimitrie Sturdza, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Veronika Vrecionová, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Alexandr Vondra
on behalf of the ECR Group

Joint motion for a resolution tabled under Rule 150(5) and Rule 136(4):

on the situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025 (2025/2519(RSP)) (RC-B10-0064/2025)
(replacing motions for resolutions B10-0064/2025, B10-0080/2025 and B10-0083/2025)
Gabriel Mato, Sebastião Bugalho, Davor Ivo Stier, Francisco José Millán Mon
on behalf of the PPE Group
Carlo Fidanza, Adam Bielan, Mariusz Kamiński, Ivaylo Valchev, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Rihards Kols, Alexandr Vondra, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Alberico Gambino, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński
on behalf of the ECR Group
Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Petras Auštrevičius, Dan Barna, Helmut Brandstätter, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Ana Vasconcelos, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar
on behalf of the Renew Group

II. Decisions to draw up own-initiative reports

Decisions to draw up own-initiative reports (Rule 55)

(Following the Conference of Presidents’ decision of 15 January 2025)

AFCO Committee

– Reform of the European Electoral Act – hurdles to ratification and implementation in the Member States (2025/2028(INI))

– Institutional aspects of the Report on the future of European Competitiveness (Draghi Report) (2025/2013(INI))

– Stock-taking of the European elections 2024 (2025/2012(INI))

AFET Committee

– 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Ukraine (2025/2026(INI))

– 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Moldova (2025/2025(INI))

– 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Georgia (2025/2024(INI))

– 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Türkiye (2025/2023(INI))

– 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Serbia (2025/2022(INI))

– 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on North Macedonia (2025/2021(INI))

– 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Montenegro (2025/2020(INI))

– 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Kosovo (2025/2019(INI))

– 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina (2025/2018(INI))

– 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Albania (2025/2017(INI))

DEVE Committee

– Financing for development – ahead of the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development in Seville (2025/2004(INI))

– Implementation and delivery of the Sustainable Development Goals in view of the 2025 High-Level Political Forum (2025/2014(INI))
(opinion: FEMM)

IMCO Committee

– Implementation and streamlining of EU internal market rules to strengthen the single market (2025/2009(INI))

ITRE Committee

– Future of the EU biotechnology and biomanufacturing sector: leveraging research, boosting innovation and enhancing competitiveness (2025/2008(INI))

– European technological sovereignty and digital infrastructure (2025/2007(INI))

– Electricity grids: the backbone of the EU energy system (2025/2006(INI))

JURI Committee

– Monitoring the application of European Union law in 2023 and 2024 (2025/2016(INI))
(opinion: PETI)

– European Union regulatory fitness and subsidiarity and proportionality – report on Better Law-Making covering 2023 and 2024 (2025/2015(INI))

PECH Committee

– Fisheries management approaches for safeguarding sensitive species, tackling invasive species and benefiting local economies (2025/2011(INI))

– The role of social, economic and environmental standards in safeguarding fair competition for all aquatic food products and improving food security (2025/2010(INI))

PETI Committee

– Deliberations of the Committee on Petitions in 2023 (2025/2027(INI))

(Following the Conference of Presidents’ decision of 19 December 2024)

– The multiannual plan for the Baltic Sea and ways forward (2024/2127(INI))

– The impact of the implementation of the Maritime Spatial Planning Directive 2014/89/EU on fisheries in selected fishing areas and sea basins (2024/2126(INI))

– Decarbonisation and modernisation of EU fisheries, and the development and deployment of fishing gear (2024/2123(INI))

AGRI Committee

– The position of farmers in the agri-food value chain (2024/2122(INI))

ECON Committee

– The role of simple tax rules and tax fragmentation in European competitiveness (2024/2118(INI))

– A coherent tax framework for the EU’s financial sector (2024/2117(INI))

– Facilitating the financing of investments and reforms to boost European competitiveness and creating a Capital Markets Union (Draghi Report) (2024/2116(INI))
(opinion: BUDG)

FEMM Committee

– Gender Equality Strategy 2025 (2024/2125(INI))
(opinion: LIBE)

– Women’s entrepreneurship in rural and island areas and outermost regions (2024/2124(INI))
(opinion: AGRI)

IMCO Committee

– A new legislative framework for products that is fit for the digital and sustainable transition (2024/2119(INI))

REGI Committee

– The role of cohesion policy in supporting the just transition (2024/2121(INI))
(opinion: EMPL)

– The role of cohesion policy investment in resolving the current housing crisis (2024/2120(INI))
(opinion: EMPL)

III. Consent procedure

Reports with a motion for a non-legislative resolution (consent procedure) (Rule 107(5))

(Following notification by the Conference of Committee Chairs on 15 January 2025)

AFET Committee

– Interim report in view of the consent procedure on the Agreement establishing an association between the EU and the Principality of Andorra and the Republic of San Marino (2024/0101R(NLE) – 2024/0101(NLE))
(opinion: ECON, IMCO)

IV. Petitions

Petitions Nos 1427-24 to 1518-24 had been entered in the register on 17 January 2025 and had been forwarded to the committee responsible, in accordance with Rule 232(9) and (10).

The President had, on 17 January 2025, forwarded to the committee responsible, in accordance with Rule 232(15), petitions addressed to the European Parliament by natural or legal persons who were not citizens of the European Union and who did not reside, or have their registered office, in a Member State.

V. Documents received

The following documents had been received from Members:

– Mathilde Androuët, Gerolf Annemans, Jordan Bardella, Nikola Bartůšek, Rachel Blom, Barbara Bonte, Paolo Borchia, Mireia Borrás Pabón, Irmhild Boßdorf, Jaroslav Bžoch, Klara Dostalova, Marieke Ehlers, Dick Erixon, Tomasz Froelich, Petras Gražulis, Branko Grims, Catherine Griset, Enikő Győri, Roman Haider, Fernand Kartheiser, Ondřej Knotek, Vilis Krištopans, Julien Leonardelli, Jorge Martín Frías, Milan Mazurek, Tiago Moreira de Sá, Jana Nagyová, Hans Neuhoff, Julie Rechagneux, Dominik Tarczyński, Hermann Tertsch, Isabella Tovaglieri, António Tânger Corrêa, Milan Uhrík, Tom Vandendriessche, Harald Vilimsky, Ewa Zajączkowska-Hernik and Auke Zijlstra. Motion for a resolution on Dismantling Overregulation and Government Encroachment: reclaiming competitiveness and innovation in the European Union (B10-0214/2024)
referred to committee responsible: JURI
opinion: ITRE

– Pekka Toveri and Sebastian Tynkkynen. Motion for a resolution on restricting the ability of passenger and cargo traffic to enter European Union airspace from Russia (B10-0220/2024)
referred to committee responsible: TRAN
opinion: AFET

– Matthieu Valet. Motion for a resolution on EU policy on Syrian refugees following the overthrow of the Bashar al-Assad regime (B10-0237/2024)
referred to committee responsible: LIBE

– Christine Anderson, Anja Arndt, René Aust, Arno Bausemer, Zsuzsanna Borvendég, Markus Buchheit, Petr Bystron, Elisabeth Dieringer, Siegbert Frank Droese, Marc Jongen, Mary Khan, Sarah Knafo, Maximilian Krah and Jaroslava Pokorná Jermanová. Motion for a resolution on financial and organisational support for Member States to repatriate Syrian nationals (B10-0238/2024)
referred to committee responsible: LIBE

ATTENDANCE REGISTER

Present:

Aaltola Mika, Abadía Jover Maravillas, Adamowicz Magdalena, Aftias Georgios, Agirregoitia Martínez Oihane, Agius Peter, Agius Saliba Alex, Allione Grégory, Al-Sahlani Abir, Anadiotis Nikolaos, Anderson Christine, Andersson Li, Andresen Rasmus, Andrews Barry, Andriukaitis Vytenis Povilas, Androuët Mathilde, Angel Marc, Annemans Gerolf, Antoci Giuseppe, Arias Echeverría Pablo, Arimont Pascal, Arłukowicz Bartosz, Arnaoutoglou Sakis, Arndt Anja, Arvanitis Konstantinos, Asens Llodrà Jaume, Assis Francisco, Attard Daniel, Aubry Manon, Auštrevičius Petras, Axinia Adrian-George, Azmani Malik, Bajada Thomas, Baljeu Jeannette, Ballarín Cereza Laura, Bardella Jordan, Barley Katarina, Barna Dan, Barrena Arza Pernando, Bartulica Stephen Nikola, Bartůšek Nikola, Bausemer Arno, Bay Nicolas, Bay Christophe, Beke Wouter, Beleris Fredis, Bellamy François-Xavier, Benea Adrian-Dragoş, Benifei Brando, Benjumea Benjumea Isabel, Beňová Monika, Berendsen Tom, Berger Stefan, Berg Sibylle, Berlato Sergio, Bernhuber Alexander, Biedroń Robert, Bielan Adam, Bischoff Gabriele, Blaha Ľuboš, Blinkevičiūtė Vilija, Blom Rachel, Bloss Michael, Bocheński Tobiasz, Boeselager Damian, Bogdan Ioan-Rareş, Bonaccini Stefano, Bonte Barbara, Borchia Paolo, Borrás Pabón Mireia, Borvendég Zsuzsanna, Borzan Biljana, Bosanac Gordan, Bosse Stine, Botenga Marc, Boyer Gilles, Boylan Lynn, Brandstätter Helmut, Brasier-Clain Marie-Luce, Braun Grzegorz, Brejza Krzysztof, Bricmont Saskia, Brnjac Nikolina, Brudziński Joachim Stanisław, Bryłka Anna, Buczek Tomasz, Buda Daniel, Buda Waldemar, Budka Borys, Bugalho Sebastião, Buła Andrzej, Burkhardt Delara, Buxadé Villalba Jorge, Bžoch Jaroslav, Camara Mélissa, Canfin Pascal, Carberry Nina, Casa David, Caspary Daniel, Cassart Benoit, Castillo Laurent, del Castillo Vera Pilar, Cavazzini Anna, Cavedagna Stefano, Ceccardi Susanna, Cepeda José, Ceulemans Estelle, Chahim Mohammed, Chaibi Leila, Chastel Olivier, Chinnici Caterina, Christensen Asger, Ciccioli Carlo, Cifrová Ostrihoňová Veronika, Ciriani Alessandro, Cisint Anna Maria, Clausen Per, Clergeau Christophe, Cormand David, Corrado Annalisa, Costanzo Vivien, Cotrim De Figueiredo João, Cowen Barry, Cremer Tobias, Crespo Díaz Carmen, Cristea Andi, Cunha Paulo, Danielsson Johan, Dauchy Marie, Dávid Dóra, David Ivan, Decaro Antonio, de la Hoz Quintano Raúl, Della Valle Danilo, Deloge Valérie, De Masi Fabio, De Meo Salvatore, Demirel Özlem, Deutsch Tamás, Devaux Valérie, Dibrani Adnan, Diepeveen Ton, Dieringer Elisabeth, Dîncu Vasile, Di Rupo Elio, Doherty Regina, Doleschal Christian, Dömötör Csaba, Do Nascimento Cabral Paulo, Donazzan Elena, Dorfmann Herbert, Dostál Ondřej, Droese Siegbert Frank, Düpont Lena, Ecke Matthias, Ehler Christian, Ehlers Marieke, Eriksson Sofie, Erixon Dick, Eroglu Engin, Everding Sebastian, Ezcurra Almansa Alma, Falcone Marco, Farantouris Nikolas, Farreng Laurence, Farský Jan, Ferber Markus, Fernández Jonás, Fidanza Carlo, Fiocchi Pietro, Firmenich Ruth, Fita Claire, Fourlas Loucas, Fourreau Emma, Fragkos Emmanouil, Freund Daniel, Frigout Anne-Sophie, Fritzon Heléne, Froelich Tomasz, Fuglsang Niels, Furet Angéline, Furore Mario, Gahler Michael, Galán Estrella, Gálvez Lina, Gambino Alberico, García Hermida-Van Der Walle Raquel, Garraud Jean-Paul, Gasiuk-Pihowicz Kamila, Geadi Geadis, Gedin Hanna, Geese Alexandra, Geier Jens, Geisel Thomas, Gemma Chiara, Georgiou Giorgos, Gerbrandy Gerben-Jan, Germain Jean-Marc, Gerzsenyi Gabriella, Geuking Niels, Gieseke Jens, Giménez Larraz Borja, Girauta Vidal Juan Carlos, Glavak Sunčana, Glück Andreas, Glucksmann Raphaël, Goerens Charles, Gomart Christophe, Gomes Isilda, Gómez López Sandra, Gonçalves Bruno, Gonçalves Sérgio, González Pons Esteban, Gori Giorgio, Gosiewska Małgorzata, Gotink Dirk, Gozi Sandro, Grapini Maria, Gražulis Petras, Grims Branko, Griset Catherine, Gronkiewicz-Waltz Hanna, Groothuis Bart, Grossmann Elisabeth, Grudler Christophe, Gualmini Elisabetta, Guarda Cristina, Guetta Bernard, Guzenina Maria, Hadjipantela Michalis, Hahn Svenja, Haider Roman, Halicki Andrzej, Hassan Rima, Häusling Martin, Hava Mircea-Gheorghe, Hazekamp Anja, Heide Hannes, Heinäluoma Eero, Henriksson Anna-Maja, Herbst Niclas, Herranz García Esther, Hetman Krzysztof, Hohlmeier Monika, Hojsík Martin, Holmgren Pär, Hölvényi György, Homs Ginel Alicia, Humberto Sérgio, Ijabs Ivars, Imart Céline, Incir Evin, Inselvini Paolo, Iovanovici Şoşoacă Diana, Jalloul Muro Hana, Jamet France, Jerković Romana, Jongen Marc, Joński Dariusz, Joron Virginie, Jouvet Pierre, Joveva Irena, Juknevičienė Rasa, Junco García Nora, Jungbluth Alexander, Kabilov Taner, Kalfon François, Kaljurand Marina, Kalniete Sandra, Kamiński Mariusz, Kanev Radan, Karlsbro Karin, Kartheiser Fernand, Karvašová Ľubica, Katainen Elsi, Kefalogiannis Emmanouil, Kelleher Billy, Keller Fabienne, Kelly Seán, Kemp Martine, Kennes Rudi, Khan Mary, Kobosko Michał, Köhler Stefan, Kohut Łukasz, Kokalari Arba, Kolář Ondřej, Kollár Kinga, Kols Rihards, Konečná Kateřina, Kopacz Ewa, Körner Moritz, Kountoura Elena, Kovatchev Andrey, Krah Maximilian, Krištopans Vilis, Kruis Sebastian, Krutílek Ondřej, Kubín Tomáš, Kuhnke Alice, Kulja András Tivadar, Kulmuni Katri, Kyllönen Merja, Kyuchyuk Ilhan, Lagodinsky Sergey, Lakos Eszter, Lalucq Aurore, Lange Bernd, Langensiepen Katrin, Laššáková Judita, László András, Laurent Murielle, Laureti Camilla, Laykova Rada, Lazarov Ilia, Lazarus Luis-Vicențiu, Le Callennec Isabelle, Leggeri Fabrice, Lenaers Jeroen, Leonardelli Julien, Lewandowski Janusz, Lexmann Miriam, Liese Peter, Lins Norbert, Loiseau Nathalie, Løkkegaard Morten, Lopatka Reinhold, López Javi, López Aguilar Juan Fernando, López-Istúriz White Antonio, Lövin Isabella, Luena César, Łukacijewska Elżbieta Katarzyna, Lupo Giuseppe, McAllister David, Madison Jaak, Magoni Lara, Maij Marit, Maląg Marlena, Manda Claudiu, Mandl Lukas, Maniatis Yannis, Mantovani Mario, Maran Pierfrancesco, Marczułajtis-Walczak Jagna, Mariani Thierry, Marino Ignazio Roberto, Martín Frías Jorge, Martins Catarina, Martusciello Fulvio, Marzà Ibáñez Vicent, Matthieu Sara, Mavrides Costas, Mayer Georg, Mazurek Milan, Mažylis Liudas, McNamara Michael, Mebarek Nora, Mehnert Alexandra, Meleti Eleonora, Mendes Ana Catarina, Mendia Idoia, Mertens Verena, Mesure Marina, Metsola Roberta, Metz Tilly, Mikser Sven, Millán Mon Francisco José, Miranda Paz Ana, Molnár Csaba, Montero Irene, Montserrat Dolors, Morace Carolina, Moreira de Sá Tiago, Moreno Sánchez Javier, Moretti Alessandra, Motreanu Dan-Ştefan, Mularczyk Arkadiusz, Müller Piotr, Mullooly Ciaran, Mureşan Siegfried, Muşoiu Ştefan, Nagyová Jana, Navarrete Rojas Fernando, Negrescu Victor, Nemec Matjaž, Nerudová Danuše, Nesci Denis, Neuhoff Hans, Neumann Hannah, Nevado del Campo Elena, Niebler Angelika, Niedermayer Luděk, Niinistö Ville, Nikolic Aleksandar, Ní Mhurchú Cynthia, Noichl Maria, Nordqvist Rasmus, Novakov Andrey, Nykiel Mirosława, Obajtek Daniel, Ódor Ľudovít, Oetjen Jan-Christoph, Ohisalo Maria, Oliveira João, Olivier Philippe, Omarjee Younous, Ondruš Branislav, Ó Ríordáin Aodhán, Ozdoba Jacek, Paet Urmas, Pajín Leire, Palmisano Valentina, Papadakis Kostas, Papandreou Nikos, Pappas Nikos, Pascual de la Parte Nicolás, Pedro Ana Miguel, Pedulla’ Gaetano, Pellerin-Carlin Thomas, Peltier Guillaume, Penkova Tsvetelina, Pennelle Gilles, Pereira Lídia, Peter-Hansen Kira Marie, Petrov Hristo, Picaro Michele, Picula Tonino, Piera Pascale, Pimpie Pierre, Piperea Gheorghe, de la Pisa Carrión Margarita, Pokorná Jermanová Jaroslava, Polato Daniele, Polfjärd Jessica, Popescu Virgil-Daniel, Pozņaks Reinis, Princi Giusi, Protas Jacek, Pürner Friedrich, Rackete Carola, Radev Emil, Radtke Dennis, Rafowicz Emma, Ratas Jüri, Rechagneux Julie, Regner Evelyn, Repasi René, Repp Sabrina, Ressler Karlo, Reuten Thijs, Riba i Giner Diana, Ricci Matteo, Riehl Nela, Ripa Manuela, Rodrigues André, Ros Sempere Marcos, Roth Neveďalová Katarína, Rougé André, Ruissen Bert-Jan, Ruotolo Sandro, Rzońca Bogdan, Saeidi Arash, Salini Massimiliano, Salis Ilaria, Salla Aura, Sánchez Amor Nacho, Sanchez Julien, Sancho Murillo Elena, Saramo Jussi, Sardone Silvia, Šarec Marjan, Sargiacomo Eric, Satouri Mounir, Saudargas Paulius, Sbai Majdouline, Sberna Antonella, Schaldemose Christel, Schaller-Baross Ernő, Schenk Oliver, Scheuring-Wielgus Joanna, Schieder Andreas, Schilling Lena, Schneider Christine, Schwab Andreas, Scuderi Benedetta, Seekatz Ralf, Sell Alexander, Serrano Sierra Rosa, Serra Sánchez Isabel, Sienkiewicz Bartłomiej, Simon Sven, Singer Christine, Sinkevičius Virginijus, Sippel Birgit, Sjöstedt Jonas, Śmiszek Krzysztof, Smith Anthony, Smit Sander, Sokol Tomislav, Solier Diego, Sommen Liesbet, Sonneborn Martin, Sorel Malika, Sousa Silva Hélder, Søvndal Villy, Squarta Marco, Staķis Mārtiņš, Stancanelli Raffaele, Stier Davor Ivo, Stöteler Sebastiaan, Stoyanov Stanislav, Strack-Zimmermann Marie-Agnes, Strada Cecilia, Streit Joachim, Strik Tineke, Strolenberg Anna, Stürgkh Anna, Sypniewski Marcin, Szczerba Michał, Szekeres Pál, Szydło Beata, Tamburrano Dario, Tânger Corrêa António, Tarquinio Marco, Târziu Claudiu-Richard, Tavares Carla, Tegethoff Kai, Temido Marta, Teodorescu Georgiana, Teodorescu Måwe Alice, Ter Laak Ingeborg, Terras Riho, Thionnet Pierre-Romain, Timgren Beatrice, Tinagli Irene, Tobback Bruno, Tobé Tomas, Tolassy Rody, Tomašič Zala, Tomc Romana, Tonin Matej, Toom Jana, Topo Raffaele, Torselli Francesco, Tosi Flavio, Toussaint Marie, Toveri Pekka, Tridico Pasquale, Trochu Laurence, Tsiodras Dimitris, Tudose Mihai, Tynkkynen Sebastian, Uhrík Milan, Ušakovs Nils, Vaidere Inese, Valchev Ivaylo, Vălean Adina, Valet Matthieu, Van Brempt Kathleen, Van Brug Anouk, van den Berg Brigitte, Vandendriessche Tom, Van Dijck Kris, Van Lanschot Reinier, Van Leeuwen Jessika, Vannacci Roberto, Van Overtveldt Johan, Van Sparrentak Kim, Varaut Alexandre, Vasconcelos Ana, Vasile-Voiculescu Vlad, Vautmans Hilde, Vedrenne Marie-Pierre, Ventola Francesco, Verheyen Sabine, Verougstraete Yvan, Veryga Aurelijus, Vieira Catarina, Vigenin Kristian, Vilimsky Harald, Vincze Loránt, Vind Marianne, Vistisen Anders, Vivaldini Mariateresa, Volgin Petar, von der Schulenburg Michael, Vondra Alexandr, Voss Axel, Vozemberg-Vrionidi Elissavet, Vrecionová Veronika, Vázquez Lázara Adrián, Waitz Thomas, Walsmann Marion, Warborn Jörgen, Warnke Jan-Peter, Wąsik Maciej, Wawrykiewicz Michał, Wcisło Marta, Wechsler Andrea, Werbrouck Séverine, Wiesner Emma, Wiezik Michal, Wilmès Sophie, Winkler Iuliu, Winzig Angelika, Wiseler-Lima Isabel, Wiśniewska Jadwiga, Wölken Tiemo, Wolters Lara, Yar Lucia, Yon-Courtin Stéphanie, Zacharia Maria, Zajączkowska-Hernik Ewa, Zalewska Anna, Žalimas Dainius, Zan Alessandro, Zarzalejos Javier, Zdechovský Tomáš, Zdrojewski Bogdan Andrzej, Zijlstra Auke, Zīle Roberts, Zingaretti Nicola, Złotowski Kosma, Zoido Álvarez Juan Ignacio, Zovko Željana, Zver Milan

Excused:

Sidl Günther

ANNEX 1 – Composition of new committees

C01A SEDE

[ 20/01/2025 – ]

Комисия по сигурност и отбрана

Comisión de Seguridad y Defensa

Výbor pro bezpečnost a obranu

Udvalget om Sikkerhed og Forsvar

Ausschuss für Sicherheit und Verteidigung

Julgeoleku- ja kaitsekomisjon

Επιτροπή Ασφάλειας και Άμυνας

Committee on Security and Defence

Commission de la sécurité et de la défense

An Coiste um Shlándáil agus Cosaint

Odbor za sigurnost i obranu

Commissione per la sicurezza e la difesa

Drošības un aizsardzības komiteja

Saugumo ir gynybos komitetas

ssBiztonság- és Védelempolitikai Bizottság

Kumitat għas-Sigurtà u d-Difiża

Commissie veiligheid en defensie

Komisja Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony

Comissão da Segurança e da Defesa

Comisia pentru securitate și apărare

Výbor pre bezpečnosť a obranu

Odbor za varnost in obrambo

Turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikan valiokunta

Utskottet för säkerhet och försvar

(43 members)

PPE (11)

BEKE Wouter

DE MEO Salvatore

GOMART Christophe

HERBST Niclas

MEIMARAKIS Vangelis

NOVAKOV Andrey

PASCUAL DE LA PARTE Nicolás

SZCZERBA Michał

TEODORESCU MÅWE Alice

TERRAS Riho

TOVERI Pekka

S&D (8)

CREMER Tobias

DI RUPO Elio

GLUCKSMANN Raphaël

LÓPEZ Javi

MAVRIDES Costas

MENDES Ana Catarina

MIKSER Sven

TUDOSE Mihai

PfE (5)

HÖLVÉNYI György

POKORNÁ JERMANOVÁ Jaroslava

STÖTELER Sebastiaan

THIONNET Pierre-Romain

VANNACCI Roberto

ECR (5)

DONAZZAN Elena

DWORCZYK Michał

GAMBINO Alberico

POZŅAKS Reinis

VONDRA Alexandr

Renew (5)

AUŠTREVIČIUS Petras

LOISEAU Nathalie

ŠAREC Marjan

STRACK-ZIMMERMANN Marie-Agnes

YAR Lucia

Verts/ALE (3)

NEUMANN Hannah

STAĶIS Mārtiņš

VAN LANSCHOT Reinier

The Left (3)

BOTENGA Marc

DEMIREL Özlem

KYLLÖNEN Merja

ESN (1)

NEUHOFF Hans

NI (2)

PAPADAKIS Kostas

VON DER SCHULENBURG Michael

C08A SANT

[ 20/01/2025 – ]

Комисия по обществено здраве

Comisión de Salud Pública

Výbor pro veřejné zdraví

Udvalget om Folkesundhed

Ausschuss für öffentliche Gesundheit

Rahvatervishoiu komisjon

Επιτροπή Δημόσιας Υγείας

Committee on Public Health

Commission de la santé publique

An Coiste um Shláinte Phoiblí

Odbor za javno zdravlje

Commissione per la sanità pubblica

Sabiedrības veselības komiteja

Visuomenės sveikatos komitetas

Közegészségügyi Bizottság

Kumitat għas-Saħħa Pubblika

Commissie volksgezondheid

Komisja Zdrowia Publicznego

Comissão da Saúde Pública

Comisia pentru sănătate publică

Výbor pre verejné zdravie

Odbor za javno zdravje

Kansanterveyden valiokunta

Utskottet för folkhälsa

(43 members)

PPE (11)

ARŁUKOWICZ Bartosz

CASTILLO Laurent

HADJIPANTELA Michalis

JARUBAS Adam

KULJA András Tivadar

LIESE Peter

MORATTI Letizia

NEVADO DEL CAMPO Elena

POLFJÄRD Jessica

SCHENK Oliver

SOKOL Tomislav

S&D (8)

ANDRIUKAITIS Vytenis Povilas

CLERGEAU Christophe

GONZÁLEZ CASARES Nicolás

JERKOVIĆ Romana

MORETTI Alessandra

NEGRESCU Victor

PAPANDREOU Nikos

WÖLKEN Tiemo

PfE (5)

BRASIER-CLAIN Marie-Luce

DE LA PISA CARRIÓN Margarita

FERENC Viktória

HAUSER Gerald

KNOTEK Ondřej

ECR (5)

BUDA Waldemar

FRAGKOS Emmanouil

PICARO Michele

RAZZA Ruggero

TROCHU Laurence

Renew (5)

BOSSE Stine

CANFIN Pascal

CHASTEL Olivier

CIFROVÁ OSTRIHOŇOVÁ Veronika

VASILE-VOICULESCU Vlad

Verts/ALE (3)

HÄUSLING Martin

MARINO Ignazio Roberto

METZ Tilly

The Left (3)

MARTINS Catarina

PALMISANO Valentina

TAMBURRANO Dario

ESN (1)

ANDERSON Christine

NI (2)

BEŇOVÁ Monika

DOSTÁL Ondřej

CS01 EUDS

[ 20/01/2025 – ]

Специална комисия относно европейския щит за демокрацията

Comisión Especial sobre el Escudo Europeo de la Democracia

Zvláštní výbor pro Evropský štít pro demokracii

Det Særlige Udvalg om Det Europæiske Demokratiskjold

Sonderausschuss für den Europäischen Schutzschild für die Demokratie

Euroopa demokraatia kaitse erikomisjon

Ειδική Επιτροπή για την Ευρωπαϊκή Ασπίδα Δημοκρατίας

Special committee on the European Democracy Shield

Commission spéciale sur le bouclier européen de la démocratie

An Coiste Speisialta um an Sciath Eorpach don Daonlathas

Posebni odbor za europski štit za zaštitu demokracije

Commissione speciale sullo scudo europeo per la democrazia

Īpašā komiteja attiecībā uz Eiropas demokrātijas vairogu

Specialusis komitetas Europos demokratijos skydo klausimais

Az európai demokráciapajzzsal foglalkozó különbizottság

Kumitat Speċjali dwar it-Tarka Ewropea għad-Demokrazija

Bijzondere Commissie inzake een schild voor de Europese democratie

Komisja Specjalna ds. Europejskiej Tarczy Demokracji

Comissão Especial sobre o Escudo Europeu da Democracia

Comisia specială pentru Scutul democrației europene

Osobitný výbor pre európsky štít na obranu demokracie

Posebni odbor za evropski ščit za demokracijo

Eurooppalaista demokratian kilpeä käsittelevä erityisvaliokunta

Särskilda utskottet för det europeiska demokratiförsvaret

(33 members)

PPE (9)

AALTOLA Mika

BOGDAN Ioan-Rareş

DÜPONT Lena

KALNIETE Sandra

MARTUSCIELLO Fulvio

SIENKIEWICZ Bartłomiej

TOBÉ Tomas

ZDECHOVSKÝ Tomáš

ZOIDO ÁLVAREZ Juan Ignacio

S&D (6)

DÎNCU Vasile

MENDES Ana Catarina

MOLNÁR Csaba

PICIERNO Pina

SCHALDEMOSE Christel

VAN BREMPT Kathleen

PfE (4)

BŽOCH Jaroslav

LEGGERI Fabrice

SCHALLER-BAROSS Ernő

TÂNGER CORRÊA António

ECR (4)

CAVEDAGNA Stefano

KANKO Assita

SZYDŁO Beata

TERHEŞ Cristian

Renew (4)

BRANDSTÄTTER Helmut

GROOTHUIS Bart

LOISEAU Nathalie

WILMÈS Sophie

Verts/ALE (2)

GEESE Alexandra

VAN SPARRENTAK Kim

The Left (2)

ARVANITIS Konstantinos

DELLA VALLE Danilo

ESN (1)

ANDERSON Christine

NI (1)

PANAYIOTOU Fidias

CS02 HOUS

[ 20/01/2025 – ]

Специална комисия относно жилищната криза в Европейския съюз

Comisión Especial sobre la Crisis de la Vivienda en la Unión Europea

Zvláštní výbor pro krizi v oblasti bydlení v Evropské unii

Det Særlige Udvalg om Boligkrisen i Den Europæiske Union

Sonderausschuss zur Wohnraumkrise in der Europäischen Union

Euroopa Liidu eluasemekriisi erikomisjon

Ειδική Επιτροπή για τη στεγαστική κρίση στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση

Special committee on the Housing Crisis in the European Union

Commission spéciale sur la crise du logement dans l’Union européenne

An Coiste Speisialta um an nGéarchéim Tithíochta san Aontas Eorpach

Posebni odbor za stambenu krizu u Europskoj uniji

Commissione speciale sulla crisi degli alloggi nell’Unione europea

Īpašā komiteja mājokļu krīzes risināšanai Eiropas Savienībā

Specialusis komitetas būsto krizės Europos Sąjungoje klausimais

Az Európai Unióban tapasztalható lakhatási válsággal foglalkozó különbizottság

Kumitat Speċjali dwar il-Kriżi tal-Akkomodazzjoni fl-Unjoni Ewropea

Bijzondere Commissie inzake de huisvestingscrisis in de Europese Unie

Komisja Specjalna ds. Kryzysu Mieszkaniowego w Unii Europejskiej

Comissão Especial sobre a Crise de Habitação na União Europeia

Comisia specială pentru criza locuințelor în Uniunea Europeană

Osobitný výbor pre krízu bývania v Európskej únii

Posebni odbor za stanovanjsko krizo v Evropski uniji

Asuntokriisiä Euroopan unionissa käsittelevä erityisvaliokunta

Särskilda utskottet för bostadskrisen i Europeiska unionen

(33 members)

PPE (9)

BUGALHO Sebastião

CASA David

DOHERTY Regina

EZCURRA ALMANSA Alma

FALCONE Marco

FERBER Markus

GOTINK Dirk

LE CALLENNEC Isabelle

MARCZUŁAJTIS-WALCZAK Jagna

S&D (6)

BISCHOFF Gabriele

GOMES Isilda

HOMS GINEL Alicia

MEBAREK Nora

SCHIEDER Andreas

TINAGLI Irene

PfE (4)

BLOM Rachel

DOSTALOVA Klara

HÖLVÉNYI György

RECHAGNEUX Julie

ECR (4)

JUNCO GARCÍA Nora

MAGONI Lara

SBERNA Antonella

TEODORESCU Georgiana

Renew (4)

HOJSÍK Martin

MULLOOLY Ciaran

TOOM Jana

VAN DEN BERG Brigitte

Verts/ALE (2)

MARZÀ IBÁÑEZ Vicent

OHISALO Maria

The Left (2)

CHAIBI Leila

MONTERO Irene

ESN (1)

BOSSDORF Irmhild

NI (1)

ZACHARIA Maria

MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Need for actions to address the continued oppression and fake elections in Belarus – P10_TA(2025)0002 – Wednesday, 22 January 2025 – Strasbourg

Source: European Parliament

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Belarus,

– having regard to the Council conclusions on Belarus of 12 October 2020 and 19 February 2024 and to the European Council conclusions on Belarus of 21 and 22 October 2021,

– having regard to the statements by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 August 2024 on the release of a number of political prisoners, and of 26 February 2024 on the parliamentary and local elections, and to the statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU of 8 August 2023 on the third anniversary of the fraudulent presidential elections,

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Charter, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other international human rights instruments to which Belarus is a party,

– having regard to the report of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) of 25 March 2024 on the situation of human rights in Belarus in the run-up to the 2020 presidential election and in its aftermath,

– having regard to the resolution of the General Conference of the International Labour Organization (ILO) of 12 June 2023 concerning the measures recommended by the Governing Body under article 33 of the ILO Constitution on the subject of Belarus,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the 30-year authoritarian rule of Aliaksandr Lukashenka in Belarus has been characterised by systematic repression of political opponents and dissent, including the enforced disappearance of Lukashenka’s critics; whereas since the fraudulent presidential election of August 2020, the illegitimate Lukashenka regime, with Russian support, has systematically repressed political activists, civil society, human rights defenders, lawyers, journalists, artists, religious leaders, trade unionists and other groups in Belarus and abroad, arbitrarily detaining tens of thousands of people;

B. whereas following the fraudulent 2020 presidential election and the subsequent brutal crackdown, the EU and many of its democratic partners did not recognise the results of the elections or Aliaksandr Lukashenka as legitimate leader and President of Belarus;

C. whereas according to the Human Rights Centre ‘Viasna’, over 1 250 political prisoners remain detained in Belarus in conditions that put their lives at risk, and many of these prisoners are in fragile health; whereas several political prisoners have died in custody, four of them in 2024 alone; whereas political prisoners face torture, denial of medical care, restricted access to visits from lawyers and family members, and solitary confinement; whereas since the summer of 2020, 3 697 people have been recognised as political prisoners; whereas in 2024 alone, over 8 800 cases of politically motivated persecution were documented, including arrests, detentions, dismissals and other forms of repression targeting political prisoners, their families and lawyers, activists, journalists, priests, doctors, returning Belarusians and others;

D. whereas multiple international organisations, including the OHCHR, have documented systematic human rights violations in Belarus, including torture, arbitrary detentions, imprisonment or other forms of severe deprivation of physical liberty, enforced disappearances, persecution on political grounds and suppression of freedoms, which amount to crimes against humanity under international law; whereas in September 2024, Lithuania referred the situation in Belarus to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate certain crimes against humanity committed by the Lukashenka regime;

E. whereas the illegitimate Belarusian regime plans to hold sham presidential elections on 26 January 2025, with Lukashenka seeking a seventh term; whereas Belarus’ Central Election Commission has registered Lukashenka and four other pro forma ‘candidates’; whereas the current presidential election campaign is being conducted in an environment of severe repression which fails to meet even the minimum standards for democratic elections; whereas democratic candidates are barred from participating, media freedom is heavily restricted, voters face intimidation, and the absence of independent election observation further undermines the legitimacy of the electoral process;

F. whereas both the parliamentary and local elections held on 25 February 2024 and the upcoming sham presidential election scheduled for 26 January 2025 exemplify the regime’s disregard for democratic norms as elections in Belarus are tightly controlled, with all candidates pre-approved by authorities, democratic parties eliminated and voters offered no real choice; whereas the election campaign has been marked by the detention of individuals involved in the 2020 presidential campaigns of other candidates and a clear readiness to harshly suppress dissent;

G. whereas according to the Human Rights Centre ‘Viasna’, at least 360 people were detained between July and September 2024, and many democratic leaders, including Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Ales Bialiatski, Maria Kalesnikava, Viktar Babaryka, Pavel Seviarynets, Siarhei Tsikhanouski, Mikalai Statkevich and others remain imprisoned; whereas at least eight political prisoners are currently detained incommunicado;

H. whereas the Lukashenka regime has stepped up pressure on the staff of Western diplomatic missions accredited in Belarus as well as other foreigners; whereas Mikalai Khila, a local member of staff of the EU delegation to Belarus, was apprehended by the Belarusian KGB in front of the EU delegation office, held in pre-trial detention from April 2024 and sentenced, in December 2024, to four years of imprisonment; whereas he has been listed as a political prisoner by the Human Rights Centre ‘Viasna’; whereas two Japanese citizens were recently detained on trumped-up charges of ‘agent activities’;

I. whereas Lukashenka pardoned over 200 political prisoners in 2024 in an attempt to lift some Western sanctions; whereas political arrests continue despite these pardons, with at least 1 721 individuals convicted on political charges in 2024 alone;

J. whereas the Federation of Trade Unions of Belarus has long been embedded in the Lukashenka regime’s government structure and is thought to play a significant role in organising the falsification of election results;

K. whereas the Belarusian regime employs anti-extremism laws to obstruct media outlets, whereby most independent media have been labelled as ‘extremist’, with at least 45 media representatives detained, around 400 in exile and others facing harassment and mistreatment; whereas independent media, such as Belsat TV, Charter 97, Nexta, Radio Racyja, Radio Svaboda, Nasha Niva and others, play a crucial role in providing essential information and serving as a platform for democratic voices; whereas the Belarusian authorities employ surveillance, online censorship and disinformation, escalating digital authoritarianism and undermining the prospects for free and fair elections in 2025; whereas Belarusian propagandists regularly spread disinformation about EU Member States and their officials and suppress access to information;

L. whereas more than 500 000 Belarusians have been forced to flee the country since 2020, with some continuing to face persecution from the Lukashenka regime, including through trials in absentia, threats from the security forces and pressure on relatives, confiscation of property and other restrictions;

M. whereas under Lukashenka, more than 250 people sentenced to death have been executed; whereas Belarus remains the only country in Europe and Central Asia to retain the death penalty, with its scope expanded in 2022 to include vaguely defined acts of terrorism and in 2023 to include ‘treason against the state’;

N. whereas repressive measures in Belarus have increasingly targeted religious freedom, with the recent adoption of the law on freedom of conscience and religious organisations posing a serious threat to the rights and existence of religious communities; whereas this crackdown has also targeted religious leaders, as seen in the recent sentencing of Catholic priest Reverend Henrykh Akalatovich to 11 years in prison on fabricated high treason charges, the first such case against Catholic clergy in Belarus;

O. whereas the Lukashenka regime has proven to be instrumental to Putin by providing Russian forces with access to Belarusian territory from which to mount the full-scale invasion of Ukraine; whereas the Lukashenka regime commits crimes against Ukrainian children, including hosting re-education camps for political indoctrination and militarisation; whereas it assists attempts by Russia and others to destabilise the EU and undermine European aspirations among the EU’s neighbours, notably by weaponising migration at the EU’s borders and legitimising Bidzina Ivanishvili’s autocratic regime in Georgia;

P. whereas the EU has imposed targeted sanctions on Belarus in response to the fraudulent 2020 elections, systematic human rights violations, and Belarus’s complicity in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including trade restrictions and sanctions on 287 individuals, among them Lukashenka, and 39 entities;

Q. whereas the Lukashenka regime, with Russian assistance, circumvents some of these sanctions through preferential market access and the use of Russian infrastructure; whereas reports indicate that BelAZ, a sanctioned Belarusian producer of trucks, circumvents sanctions by disassembling trucks in Belarus and shipping the parts to the EU for reassembly under different brand names;

1. Reiterates its non-recognition of the election of Aliaksandr Lukashenka to the post of President of Belarus; considers the current regime in Belarus to be illegitimate, illegal and criminal; reaffirms its unwavering support for the Belarusian people in their pursuit of democracy, freedom and human rights;

2. Denounces the lack of freedom, fairness and transparency ahead of the so called presidential elections in Belarus and calls for the EU, its Member States and the international community to categorically reject the upcoming elections in Belarus and the run-up campaign as a sham, as they do not meet minimum international standards for democratic elections; calls for the EU, its Member States and the international community to continue not to recognise the legitimacy of Aliaksandr Lukashenka as president after 26 January 2025, and calls for free and fair elections to be held in Belarus;

3. Deplores the ongoing grave violations of human rights and democratic principles in Belarus, which have further intensified in the run-up to the so-called presidential elections; condemns the systematic repression in Belarus, which includes arbitrary arrests, torture, harassment, ill-treatment of detainees, persistent impunity and a structural lack of respect for due process and fair trials; reiterates its demand for the immediate and unconditional release of all individuals detained in Belarus for their political views, alongside compensation and the restoration of their rights; demands an end to the repression of political opponents and the Belarusian public;

4. Reiterates its calls on the Belarusian authorities to respect detainees’ rights, provide medical care and grant access to lawyers, families, and international organisations;

5. Expresses grave concern about the situation of political prisoners, including Maria Kalesnikava, Siarhei Tsikhanouski, Ales Bialiatski, Mikalai Statkevich, Mikalai Khila, Valiantsin Stefanovich, Maksim Znak, Viktar Babaryka, Ihar Losik, Andrzej Poczobut, Palina Sharenda-Panasiuk, Uladzimir Matskevich, Marfa Rabkova, Uladzimir Labkovich, Aliaksandr Yarashuk, Volha Brytsikava, Aliaksandr Kapshul, Yana Pinchuk, Mikalai Bankou, Andrei Navitski, Henrykh Akalatovich, Uladzimir Kniha Dmitry Kuchuk, Pavel Seviarynets and others, many of whom are facing severe health issues without access to proper medical care, and are enduring isolation, ill treatment and torture;

6. Considers the arrest and sentencing on politically motivated charges of Mikalai Khila, a local staff member of the EU Delegation in Minsk, a breach of diplomatic practices towards the EU; calls for the EU and its Member States to swiftly develop a credible response;

7. Commends the resilience of Belarusian civil society and democratic forces; reiterates its solidarity with the people of Belarus and its support for their legitimate aspirations for a democratic and European future; expresses solidarity with Belarusian democratic forces and civil society organisations in their efforts to establish a sovereign, democratic and prosperous Belarus; remains committed to working with democratic forces, civil society and independent media to the benefit of the people of Belarus;

8. Calls for the EU and its Member States to continue to investigate human rights abuses in Belarus and to support accountability measures, including through universal jurisdiction; calls for the EU and its Member States to investigate, on the basis of universal jurisdiction, the crimes against humanity committed by the Lukashenka regime in Belarus and on EU territory and, following Lithuania’s example, to refer the situation in Belarus to the International Criminal Court for investigation to the extent possible, and to consider the establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute the crimes of the Lukashenka regime; calls on the Member States to allow Belarusian lawyers expelled by the regime to practise on EU territory in order to provide legal assistance to persecuted Belarusians;

9. Highlights the invaluable work carried out by human rights defenders and civil society representatives in Belarus in monitoring, documenting and reporting the grave human rights violations and crimes against humanity that are taking place in the country, in order to ensure subsequent accountability and justice for the victims;

10. Reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to support political prisoners and their families, including by demanding proof of political prisoners’ whereabouts, requesting their release, simplifying the procedures for those fleeing Belarus to obtain visas and identity documents, and providing rehabilitation and other types of support; calls on the EU Delegation and the Member State embassies in Belarus to continue observing and monitoring the trials of all political prisoners;

11. Stresses the importance of protecting exiled Belarusians from persecution by the Lukashenka regime, and of granting them opportunities to legally stay and work in the EU; calls for the EU and its Member States to raise the issue of abuse of international arrest warrants within Interpol and calls on the countries concerned not to extradite Belarusian citizens who have fled the regime and will face persecution upon their return to Belarus;

12. Deplores the fact that repressive measures in Belarus have expanded to include attacks on religious freedom, through the adoption of the law on freedom of conscience and religious organisations, which grossly violates the fundamental right to freedom of religion, conscience and belief; urges the Lukashenka regime to immediately halt the persecution of religious communities and churches;

13. Calls for the continuation of EU support for Belarusian democratic forces, led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya; reiterates the need to support Belarusian democratic forces, civil society, students, journalists, leaders of trade unions, exiled professionals and others by providing them with visas, scholarships, grants and networking opportunities; encourages the representatives of the democratic forces of Belarus to maintain and promote unity;

14. Denounces the Lukashenka regime’s complicity in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and condemns its deliberate subordination of Belarus to Russia in a so-called union state encompassing political, geopolitical, economic, military and cultural spheres; reiterates the need to contribute to strengthening Belarusian national identity and the Belarusian language, and to combat the distortion and manipulation of Belarusian history by the Lukashenka regime as well as by the Kremlin and its proxies;

15. Urges the EU and its international partners to broaden and strengthen sanctions against individuals and entities responsible for the repression in Belarus and for Belarus’s participation in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, while closing sanctions loopholes and addressing the main sources of income financing the regime, such as exports of potash and other fertilisers; calls for the EU to sanction Belarusian entities and individuals responsible for the forced labour of political prisoners, as well as the goods produced using such forced labour;

16. Urges the EU and international partners to immediately identify, freeze, and find legal pathways for seizing assets of the Belarusian leadership and related Belarusian entities involved in the Russian war effort, as well as assets of entities and individuals leading Lukashenka’s so-called election campaign, including the Federation of Trade Unions of Belarus, such as Yury Sianko, Hanna Varfalameyeva and Valery Kursevich; calls on EU and Western companies to cease their activities in Belarus;

17. Calls for the EU and its Member States to continue raising the situation in Belarus in all relevant international organisations, in particular the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the UN and its specialised bodies and the ILO, with the aim of enhancing international scrutiny of the human rights violations and international action on the situation in Belarus; calls on the Member States to ensure continued documentation and accountability for international crimes committed by the Lukashenka regime, strengthen the OHCHR’s examination of the human rights situation in Belarus by providing full support to the UN Group of Independent Experts on the Human Rights Situation in Belarus and by preserving the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus to monitor ongoing human rights violations;

18. Denounces the illegal transfer of several thousand children, including orphans, from Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine to so-called recreational camps in Belarus, where they are subjected to Russification and indoctrination; strongly condemns the involvement of the Belarus Red Cross in the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children;

19. Strongly condemns the Lukashenka regime’s weaponisation and instrumentalisation of migration to destabilise neighbouring EU Member States through orchestrated irregular flows, violating human rights, exploiting vulnerable individuals and threatening regional stability; calls for the EU and its Member States to work on a coordinated response to counter this hybrid threat while protecting EU external borders and protecting the rights and safety of vulnerable individuals;

20. Urges Belarus to commute all death sentences, impose a moratorium on capital punishment and move towards its permanent abolition;

21. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the relevant EU institutions, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Government of Japan, representatives of the Belarusian democratic forces and the Belarusian de facto authorities.

MIL-OSI Economics: Trade dynamics under geopolitical risk | Discussion paper 03/2025: Makram Khalil, David Osten, Felix Strobel

Source: Bundesbank

Non-technical summary

Research Question

In recent years, geopolitical tensions and associated risks have risen around the world. Global geopolitical risk surged after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. At that time, geopolitical risk spiked particularly for Russia and its neighbouring countries. In addition, geopolitical risk rose sharply in China and Taiwan in recent years, due to the geopolitical rivalry between the US and China and mounting tensions around the political status of Taiwan. As some of these countries are important exporters in the global trade and production network, the question arises to which extent rising geopolitical tensions disrupt trade flows.

Contribution

In this paper, we use detailed customs data in a panel spanning 20 years to investigate the role of the import channel for the transmission of geopolitical risk in trading partner countries. Particularly, we take the perspectives of the US and the euro area and study the effects of trading-partner geopolitical risk on import volumes and import prices.

Results

We find that trading-partner geopolitical risk shocks lower import volumes and raise import prices. The decline in imports is particularly strong when geopolitical risk shocks hit countries that exhibit a greater geopolitical distance to the US and the euro area, or when geopolitical risk shocks hit countries that are under US sanctions. Thus, increasing geopolitical risk triggers dynamics that may be conducive to a fragmentation of global trade. A case in point are large effects of geopolitical risk shocks in China. We find that US and euro area imports from non-Chinese trading partners are also affected by such shocks, which also owes to US dollar and global oil price movements as well as trading-partner value chain linkages with China.

MIL OSI Economics –

MIL-OSI: Marquette National Corporation Increases Quarterly Dividend 10.7 Percent and Announces a Common Stock Repurchase Program

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

CHICAGO, Jan. 24, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Marquette National Corporation (OTCQX: MNAT) today announced that its Board of Directors declared a cash dividend of $0.31 per share, an increase of 10.7% from the previous quarter dividend rate. The dividend will be payable on April 1, 2025 to shareholders of record on March 14, 2025. As of December 31, 2024, Marquette had 4,367,477 shares issued and outstanding.

The Company also announced that its Board of Directors authorized the repurchase of up to $1,000,000 of its outstanding common stock at prevailing market prices through open market or negotiated transactions. The repurchase program is authorized to last through December 31, 2025.

Marquette National Corporation is a diversified bank holding company with total assets of $2.2 billion. The Company’s banking subsidiary, Marquette Bank, is a full-service, community bank that serves the financial needs of communities in Chicagoland, offering an extensive line of financial solutions, including retail banking, real estate lending, trust, insurance, investments, wealth management and business banking to consumers and commercial customers. Marquette Bank has 20 branches located in: Chicago, Bolingbrook, Bridgeview, Evergreen Park, Hickory Hills, Lemont, New Lenox, Oak Forest, Oak Lawn, Orland Park, Summit and Tinley Park, Illinois. For more information visit: https://emarquettebank.com

Special Note Concerning Forward-Looking Statements
This document contains, and future oral and written statements of the Company and its management may contain, forward-looking statements with respect to the financial condition, results of operations, plans, objectives, future performance and business of the Company. Forward-looking statements, which may be based upon beliefs, expectations and assumptions of the Company’s management and on information currently available to management, are generally identifiable by the use of words such as “believe,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “plan,” “intend,” “estimate,” “may,” “will,” “would,” “could,” “should” or other similar expressions. A number of factors, many of which are beyond the ability of the Company to control or predict, could cause actual results to differ materially from those in its forward-looking statements. These factors include, among others, the following: (i) the strength of the local, state, national and international economies (including the effects of inflationary pressures and supply chain constraints); (ii) the economic impact of any future terrorist threats and attacks, widespread disease or pandemics, acts of war or other threats thereof (including the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Russian invasion of Ukraine), or other adverse external events that could cause economic deterioration or instability in credit markets, and the response of the local, state and national governments to any such adverse external events; (iii) changes in accounting policies and practices, as may be adopted by state and federal regulatory agencies, the Financial Accounting Standards Board or the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board; (iv) changes in local, state and federal laws, regulations and governmental policies concerning the Company’s general business as a result of the upcoming 2024 presidential election or any changes in response to failures of other banks; (v) changes in interest rates and prepayment rates of the Company’s assets (including the impact of the significant rate increases by the Federal Reserve since 2022); (vi) increased competition in the financial services sector (including from non-bank competitors such as credit unions and “fintech” companies) and the inability to attract new customers; (vii) changes in technology and the ability to develop and maintain secure and reliable electronic systems; (viii) the loss of key executives or employees; (ix) changes in consumer spending; (x) unexpected outcomes of existing or new litigation involving the Company; (xi) the economic impact of exceptional weather occurrences such as tornadoes, floods and blizzards; (xii) fluctuations in the value of securities held in our securities portfolio; (xiii) concentrations within our loan portfolio, large loans to certain borrowers, and large deposits from certain clients; (xiv) the concentration of large deposits from certain clients who have balances above current Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insurance limits and may withdraw deposits to diversity their exposure; (xv) the level of non-performing assets on our balance sheets; (xvi) interruptions involving our information technology and communications systems or third-party servicers; (xvii) breaches or failures of our information security controls or cybersecurity-related incidents, and (xviii) the ability of the Company to manage the risks associated with the foregoing as well as anticipated.. These risks and uncertainties should be considered in evaluating forward-looking statements and undue reliance should not be placed on such statements. Additionally, all statements in this document, including forward-looking statements, speak only as of the date they are made, and the Company undertakes no obligation to update any statement in light of new information or future events.

MIL-OSI Europe: G7 Leaders’ Statement on Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) Loans

Source: Government of Italy (English)

25 Ottobre 2024

At the initiative of the President of the Council of Ministers, Giorgia Meloni, the G7 Leaders have adopted a statement announcing that they have reached an agreement to provide a total of approximately $50 billion in loans to Ukraine, backed by the profits deriving from frozen Russian sovereign assets. This important result confirms the commitment undertaken by the G7 Leaders during the Summit held at Borgo Egnazia, in Italy’s Apulia Region, in June.

MIL-OSI Canada: G7 Finance Ministers’ Statement on Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) Loan Initiative

Source: Government of Canada News

G7 Finance Ministers’ Statement on Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) Loan Initiative

Washington, DC, 25 October 2024

We, the G7 Finance Ministers, met in Washington, DC earlier today and were joined by Ukraine’s Finance Minister Sergii Marchenko.

In line with the mandate we were given by G7 Leaders at the Apulia Summit in June, we are glad to announce our agreement on the operationalisation of the ERA Loan initiative for the benefit of Ukraine. We recall the G7 Leaders’ pledge that, consistent with all applicable laws and our respective legal systems, Russia’s sovereign assets will remain immobilized until Russia ends its aggression and pays for the damage it has caused to Ukraine. We will stand by Ukraine for as long as it takes.

Today we approved the principles and technical features of the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) Loan initiative for the benefit of Ukraine that was announced by G7 Leaders at the Apulia Summit in June.

The ERA Loan initiative will disburse approximately USD 50 billion (EUR 45 billion) for the benefit of Ukraine. Principal and interest will be repaid by extraordinary revenues stemming from the immobilisation of Russian sovereign assets (RSA) held in European Union (EU) jurisdictions, and possibly in other G7 countries, in line with our respective legal systems and international law, and by any other voluntary contributions.

The ERA Loan initiative will comprise bilateral loans from G7 members. Today’s G7 approval of the principles and technical features will ensure consistency and coordination between constituent loans, while providing sufficient flexibility to account for the legal and institutional specificities of each lender.

The distribution of the flow of extraordinary revenues stemming from Russian sovereign assets to repay ERA lenders will be managed via the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism (ULCM) that was recently agreed by EU co-legislators. The distribution to repay G7 lenders will be proportional to the committed principal amount of each bilateral loan.

Each bilateral loan will enter into force no later than 30 June 2025. Bilateral loans will be fully disbursed to the benefit of Ukraine between 1 December 2024 and 31 December 2027, in instalments that will reflect Ukraine’s urgent financing needs. The support from ERA loans is in addition to other sources of official support, including the EU Ukraine Facility and the IMF Extended Fund Facility. The loan proceeds will be disbursed through multiple channels. These include, but are not limited to, a Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) loan from the EU, the IMF’s Multi-Donor Administered Account for Ukraine, and the new Financial Intermediary Fund for Ukraine at the World Bank.

G7 members commit to closely cooperate to ensure coordination and consistency between constituent bilateral loans throughout the entire life of the ERA Loan initiative for the benefit of Ukraine.

The term sheet with the key technical features of the ERA Loan initiative will be published in the coming days.

MIL-OSI Canada: Statement by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance on the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration Loan Mechanism and Russian Sovereign Assets

Source: Government of Canada News

Statement by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance on the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration Loan Mechanism and Russian Sovereign Assets

October 25, 2024 – Washington, D.C., United States of America

Today, G7 Finance Ministers announced a final agreement on the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration Loan Mechanism, which leverages frozen Russian Central Bank assets to ensure Ukraine’s victory and reconstruction from Russia’s illegal invasion.

Following this announcement, the Honourable Chrystia Freeland, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, issued the following statement:

“At the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Canada and our allies took the unprecedented step of immobilizing close to C$381 billion (US$280 billion) in Russian sovereign assets, depleting Putin’s war chest. Within the G7, all countries have agreed that Russian sovereign assets will remain immobilized until Russia pays for the damage it continues to inflict on Ukraine.

“Today, the G7 reached a final agreement to support Ukraine in its brave fight with an additional C$68 billion (US$50 billion), backed by future interest that will be accrued on frozen Russian assets. Canada was the first country to advocate for using these assets to support Ukraine, and we are proud to be providing the largest per capita contribution: C$5 billion (US$3.7 billion).

“Canada’s firm position has always been that Russia, the aggressor, must pay for the destruction it has caused. It cannot be the sole duty of democracies and their citizens or of the brave people of Ukraine to pay for Putin’s war of aggression. Today’s announcement is historic because it accomplishes this; it guarantees frozen Russian Central Bank assets will be used to support the people of Ukraine.”

MIL-OSI Canada: G7 Leaders’ Statement on Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) Loans

Source: Government of Canada – Prime Minister

Today, we, the Leaders of the Group of Seven (G7), have reached a consensus on how to deliver approximately US$50 billion in Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) loans to Ukraine.

These loans will be serviced and repaid by future flows of extraordinary revenues stemming from the immobilization of Russian Sovereign Assets, in line with G7 respective legal systems and international law. The loan proceeds will be disbursed through multiple channels to support Ukraine’s budgetary, military and reconstruction assistance, as consistent with all applicable law and G7 members’ respective legal systems. Our aim is to begin disbursing the funds by the end of the year.

We express our utmost appreciation for the timely implementation of this historic G7 Leaders’ decision by the Finance Ministers, who have agreed on a technical solution ensuring consistency, coordination, fair distribution of lending, and solidarity among all G7 partners. We are particularly grateful to the European Union and its Member States for their constructive engagement towards this remarkable result.

Today’s announcement confirms that the G7 fulfills the commitment they made in June at the Apulia G7 Leaders’ Summit. Russian illegal and unprovoked aggression has caused untold harm to the people of Ukraine and to global peace and security. We will not tire in our resolve to give Ukraine the support it needs to prevail. Russia must end its illegal war of aggression and pay for the damage it has caused to Ukraine in line with international law.

The G7 remains steadfast in its solidarity to support Ukraine’s fight for freedom, and its recovery and reconstruction. With the large amount of financing from the ERA loans to meet its pressing need, we have once again made clear our unwavering commitment to stand by Ukraine for as long as it takes. Time is not on President Putin’s side.

MIL-OSI USA News: G7 Leaders’ Statement on Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) Loans

Source: The White House

Today, we, the Leaders of the Group of Seven (G7), have reached a consensus on how to deliver approximately $50 billion in Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) loans to Ukraine.

These loans will be serviced and repaid by future flows of extraordinary revenues stemming from the immobilization of Russian Sovereign Assets, in line with G7 respective legal systems and international law. The loan proceeds will be disbursed through multiple channels to support Ukraine’s budgetary, military and reconstruction assistance, as consistent with all applicable law and G7 members’ respective legal systems. Our aim is to begin disbursing the funds by the end of the year.

We express our utmost appreciation for the timely implementation of this historic G7 Leaders’ decision by the Finance Ministers, who have agreed on a technical solution ensuring consistency, coordination, fair distribution of lending, and solidarity among all G7 partners. We are particularly grateful to the European Union and its Member States for their constructive engagement towards this remarkable result.

Today’s announcement confirms that the G7 fulfills the commitment they made in June at the Apulia G7 Leaders’ Summit. Russian illegal and unprovoked aggression has caused untold harm to the people of Ukraine and to global peace and security. We will not tire in our resolve to give Ukraine the support it needs to prevail. Russia must end its illegal war of aggression and pay for the damage it has caused to Ukraine in line with international law.

The G7 remains steadfast in its solidarity to support Ukraine’s fight for freedom, and its recovery and reconstruction. With the large amount of financing from the ERA loans to meet its pressing need, we have once again made clear our unwavering commitment to stand by Ukraine for as long as it takes. Time is not on President Putin’s side.

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MIL-OSI Economics: AI-powered drone swarms transform industries beyond defense, reveals GlobalData’s Technology Foresights

Source: GlobalData

AI-powered drone swarms transform industries beyond defense, reveals GlobalData’s Technology Foresights

Posted in Disruptor

While drone swarms have been an area of technological development for many years, their practical applications have only recently gained significant momentum, particularly following increased attention during the Russia-Ukraine war, as reflected in Google search trends. The rapid advancement in AI technologies has further accelerated drone swarm control capabilities, enabling the integration of computer vision algorithms and geospatial data to recognize patterns and automate previously impossible operations. This evolution has led to drone swarms finding diverse applications across multiple industries, earning recognition as a high-impact innovation, according to Technology Foresights, an innovation intelligence platform by GlobalData, a leading data and analytics company.

The latest advancement in drone swarm technology significantly enhances operational efficiency by eliminating the traditional requirement of one operator per drone. This breakthrough achieves advanced autonomy through onboard intelligent agents, developed using human-in-loop and trustworthy AI systems. These agents can independently assess their surroundings, exchange target data with other drones, and make mission-priority decisions without requiring constant communication with the control station. This innovation addresses a critical weakness in swarm-based warfare systems, where electronic warfare tactics frequently overwhelm communication systems and disrupt the data connection between drones and their control stations.

Sourabh Nyalkalkar, Practice Head of Innovation Products at GlobalData, comments: “In an era marked by escalating geopolitical tensions, drone warfare has emerged as a pivotal element in modern military operations, with armed forces globally embracing unmanned aerial vehicles for a diverse range of tactical and reconnaissance missions. In a significant development, defense industry major Thales recently showcased a full-scale demonstration of drone swarm deployment, featuring multiple autonomy levels that significantly reduce operator cognitive burden. The company’s expertise in this domain has not gone unnoticed, as Thales has been recognized as one of the leaders in drone swarm control innovation, according to Technology Foresights.”

In response to the current geopolitical climate and growing military demand for advanced drone capabilities, drone swarm control technology is expected to experience significant growth. Patent analysis reveals that over 50% of technology patents in this field have been granted within the past three years, with major corporations holding the majority share.

Though smaller in proportion, startup-owned patents are rapidly increasing, accompanied by growing investment activity in the sector. Recent developments highlight this trend, as demonstrated by Ukrainian startup Swarmer securing $2.7mn in funding for the development and commercialization of its AI-based swarm control technology, Styx, while another US-based startup, EchelonAI, entered into M&A with Skyfire.

Nyalkalkar continues: “The innovation landscape in drone swarm control technologies extends well beyond the defense sector, with significant developments emerging from the communications and networking industry. Telecommunication companies are rapidly adopting drone swarms for various applications, including network optimization, infrastructure monitoring, and emergency coverage deployment in critical areas.”

The technology’s development ecosystem is diverse and competitive, with over 100 companies actively innovating in this space. While defense industry leaders like Thales, RTX, Northrop Grumman, and BAE Systems continue to advance military applications, specialized drone manufacturers such as SZ DJI, Skydio, and Tevel are making significant contributions.

Additionally, major telecommunications players including Qualcomm, Ericsson, Verizon, and AT&T are developing their own drone swarm solutions, while geospatial solution providers like Here and Geofrenzy are expanding the technology’s capabilities.

Nyalkalkar concludes: “The rapid advancement of AI technology has catalyzed unprecedented growth in drone swarm applications across diverse sectors. Retail and logistics giants such as Amazon, Walmart, and UPS are developing autonomous master-slave drone networks for last-mile delivery, while agritech companies such as Nileworks are creating innovative solutions for crop monitoring.

“As drone swarm control technologies continue to evolve beyond traditional entertainment and light shows, this dynamic field promises exciting developments and transformative applications across multiple industries in the coming years.”

MIL OSI Economics –

MIL-OSI Europe: Commission welcomes the consensus reached by G7 partners to collectively provide €45 billion in financial assistance to Ukraine

Source: European Commission – Justice

European Commission Press release Washington, DC, 26 Oct 2024 The Commission welcomes the consensus reached by the EU and G7 partners to collectively provide loans for €45 billion to support Ukraine’s urgent needs, facilitated by the EU’s creation of the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism.

MIL-OSI Canada: Minister Hussen announces support for financial stability in developing countries at the 2024 Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group

Source: Government of Canada News

News release

October 26, 2024 – Washington, D.C. – Global Affairs Canada

Financial inclusion gives people a fair chance to succeed. However, with the rising cost of living, regional conflicts, and natural disasters caused by climate change, financial pressures have impacted everyday life, especially for the world’s most vulnerable.

Yesterday, the Honourable Ahmed Hussen, Minister of International Development concluded his participation at the 2024 Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group (WBG) in Washington. While there, he announced a $20 million contribution to the Toronto Centre over five years.

Canada’s investment will expand the reach of the Toronto Centre’s tailored training to financial regulators in developing countries, including for women. Women continue to be less likely than men to have access to financial institutions, or even have their own bank account. Gender inclusive training can help break the cycle of gender-based poverty – changing lives and increasing women’s participation in the economy. The project focuses on Sub-Saharan Africa, the Indo-Pacific region and special assistance to Ukraine.

Minister Hussen also engaged with global partners, World Bank management and other key stakeholders, committed to working with Canada to improve accessing to finance for those who need it most, especially women, a priority under Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy. The World Bank Group is an important partner in funding development projects that help increase financial stability, making it easier for people to access financial services, and providing support in times of crisis.

Quotes

“Canada is proud to continue our partnership with the Toronto Centre. This Canadian powerhouse has a long track record of strengthening financial systems through their training and expertise. What this means is that more women and girls will get access to stable financial resources, unlocking the door to reaching their full potential. Together, Canada and the Toronto Centre will continue to build a more inclusive financial sector around the world.”

– Ahmed Hussen, Minister of International Development

“We are deeply grateful to Global Affairs Canada for their continued support since our inception in 1998. This timely funding renewal strengthens our ability to build capacity in emerging markets and developing economies in line with the sustainable development goals to spur financial resilience and inclusion, mobilize domestic resources, and alleviate poverty. Our foundational institution-building work strengthens financial regulatory environments, fostering sustainable growth and building global confidence.”

– Babak Abbaszadeh, President and CEO, Toronto Centre

Quick facts

Canada is a founding member of the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund and is represented at their Boards by Canada’s Minister of Finance.
The WBG is Canada’s largest development partner institution. Since 1945, we have worked together in every major area of development and in boosting shared prosperity through inclusive, sustainable economic growth and development.
The Annual Meetings for the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank is an opportunity for the global community to come together and advance a range of issues related to poverty reduction and international economic development, while advancing the Sustainable Development Goals.
In June 2024, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced that Canada would purchase $274 million (US$200 million) in hybrid capital from the World Bank’s International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). This innovative financing mechanism provides additional capacity for the Bank to provide loans to developing countries, with a leverage factor of 6.5 times. This means up to $1.8 billion in additional lending is available to help developing countries meet the SDGs – from improving education and health to reducing food insecurity and carbon footprints.
Canada is a founding member of the Toronto Centre and together, they have built a partnership that dates back to 1998.
The Toronto Centre has hosted regular side events within the IMF and World Bank Annual and Spring meetings.
Since inception in 1998, Toronto Centre has enhanced the capacity of more than 28,000 financial supervisors from 190 countries and territories to build more stable, resilient, and inclusive financial systems.

Associated links

Contacts

Olivia Batten
Press Secretary
Office of the Minister of International Development
Olivia.Batten@international.gc.ca

Media Relations Office
Global Affairs Canada
media@international.gc.ca
Follow us on X (Twitter): @CanadaDev
Like us on Facebook: Canada’s international development – Global Affairs Canada
Follow us on Instagram: @canadadev

MIL-OSI: Trustco Reports Third Quarter 2024 Net Income of $12.9 Million; Skillful Application of Strong Fundamentals Produce Solid Results

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Executive Snapshot:

Average Loan portfolio continues to grow:
- On average, total loans were up $127.0 million or 2.6% for the third quarter 2024 compared to the third quarter 2023

Continued solid financial results:
- Key metrics for third quarter 2024:
  - Net income of $12.9 million versus $12.6 million for the second quarter 2024
  - Net interest income of $38.7 million, up from $37.8 million compared to the second quarter of 2024
  - Return on average equity (ROAE) of 7.74% versus 7.76% for the second quarter 2024
Capital continues to grow:
- Consolidated equity to assets increased 6.2% to 10.95% as of September 30, 2024 from 10.31% as of September 30, 2023
- Book value per share as of September 30, 2024 was $35.19, up from $34.46 compared to June 30, 2024

GLENVILLE, N.Y., Oct. 21, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) —

TrustCo Bank Corp NY (TrustCo, NASDAQ: TRST) today announced third quarter 2024 net income of $12.9 million or $0.68 diluted earnings per share, compared to net income of $14.7 million or $0.77 diluted earnings per share for the third quarter 2023; and net income of $37.6 million or $1.97 diluted earnings per share for the nine months ended September 30, 2024, compared to net income of $48.9 million or $2.57 diluted earnings per share for the nine months ended September 30, 2023. Average loans increased $127.0 million or 2.6% for the third quarter 2024 over the same period in 2023. TrustCo was able to increase the balances of home equity lines of credit (HECLs) outstanding through an aggressive campaign to encourage existing customers to utilize their HECLs in place of the higher rates on other products. The objective was to meet customer needs and encourage increased utilization through existing HECLs.

Overview

Chairman, President, and CEO, Robert J. McCormick said “Hard, consistent work on the fundamentals of banking once again have served the Trustco Bank team well and enabled us to post strong results under challenging circumstances. Our bankers posted one modest success after another – which accumulated into solid performance. We continued to hold the line on demand accounts and capitalized on strong customer relationships which enabled us to direct the flow into competitively-priced CDs, rather than to non-bank investment products. Not having to purchase expensive deposits or pay excessive rates, helped keep interest expense down, contributing to increased net interest income. We have continued to sell home equity products at favorable rates where origination of purchase mortgages lagged due to lack of sales volume. We booked these new loans at higher interest rates, also boosting net interest margin. Once again, loans reached a new all-time high. All of these efforts by our team resulted in net income of $12.9 million for the quarter.”

Details

Average loans were up $127.0 million or 2.6% in the third quarter 2024 over the same period in 2023. Average residential loans and home equity lines of credit, our primary lending focus, were up $50.4 million, or 1.2%, and $60.0 million, or 18.7%, respectively, in the third quarter 2024 over the same period in 2023. Average commercial loans also increased $18.1 million, or 6.9%, in the third quarter 2024 over the same period in 2023. Average deposits were up $15.3 million, or 0.3% for the third quarter 2024 over the same period in 2023. We believe the increase in time deposits compared to the prior year continues to reflect the desire of customers to have additional funds in the safety and security offered by TrustCo’s long history of conservative banking, while earning a competitive interest rate. As we move forward, the objective is to encourage customers to retain these additional funds in the expanded product offerings of Trustco Bank (the “Bank”) through aggressive marketing and product differentiation.

Net interest income was $38.7 million for the third quarter 2024, an increase of $883 thousand, or 2.3%, compared to the prior quarter, driven by loan growth at higher interest rates and lower cost of deposits, partially offset by lower investment earnings and a decrease in interest on federal funds sold and other short-term investments. The net interest margin for the third quarter 2024 was 2.61%, up 8 basis points from 2.53% in the second quarter of 2024. The yield on interest earnings assets increased to 4.11%, up 5 basis points from 4.06% in the second quarter of 2024. The cost of interest bearing liabilities decreased to 1.94% in the third quarter 2024 from 1.97% in the second quarter 2024. The Bank has seen success in retaining deposits while lowering the rates on time deposits, and still being competitive in the markets it serves. The Federal Reserve’s decision regarding whether to cut or hold rates in upcoming meetings will have an effect on the Bank’s ability to continue to manage deposit costs. Further reductions should help margin expansion in future quarters. Non-interest expense decreased $259 thousand over the prior quarter as a result of the Bank’s ongoing efforts to control expenses.

Asset quality remains strong and has been consistent over the past twelve months. The Company recorded a provision for credit losses of $500 thousand in the third quarter of 2024, which is the result of a provision for credit losses on loans of $400 thousand, and provision for credit losses on unfunded commitments of $100 thousand. The ratio of allowance for credit losses on loans to total loans was 0.99% and 0.95% as of September 30, 2024 and 2023, respectively. The allowance for credit losses on loans was $50.0 million at September 30, 2024, compared to $47.2 million at September 30, 2023. Nonperforming loans (NPLs) were $19.4 million at September 30, 2024, compared to $17.9 million at September 30, 2023. NPLs were 0.38% and 0.36% of total loans at September 30, 2024 and 2023, respectively. The coverage ratio, or allowance for credit losses on loans to NPLs, was 256.9% at September 30, 2024, compared to 264.2% at September 30, 2023. Nonperforming assets (NPAs) were $21.9 million at September 30, 2024, compared to $19.1 million at September 30, 2023.

At September 30, 2024, our equity to asset ratio was 10.95%, compared to 10.31% at September 30, 2023. Book value per share at September 30, 2024 was $35.19, up 7.3% compared to $32.80 a year earlier.

A conference call to discuss third quarter 2024 results will be held at 9:00 a.m. Eastern Time on October 22, 2024. Those wishing to participate in the call may dial toll-free for the United States at 1-833-470-1428, and for Canada at 1-833-950-0062, Access code 034120. A replay of the call will be available for thirty days by dialing toll-free for the United States at 1-866-813-9403, Access code 285814. The call will also be audio webcast at https://events.q4inc.com/attendee/854762065, and will be available for one year.

About TrustCo Bank Corp NY

TrustCo Bank Corp NY is a $6.1 billion savings and loan holding company and through its subsidiary, Trustco Bank, operated 138 offices in New York, New Jersey, Vermont, Massachusetts, and Florida at September 30, 2024.

In addition, the Bank’s Wealth Management Department offers a full range of investment services, retirement planning and trust and estate administration services. The common shares of TrustCo are traded on the NASDAQ Global Select Market under the symbol TRST.

Forward-Looking Statements

All statements in this news release that are not historical are forward-looking statements within the meaning of the “safe harbor” provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Forward-looking statements can be identified by words such as “anticipate,” “intend,” “plan,” “goal,” “seek,” “believe,” “project,” “estimate,” “expect,” “strategy,” “future,” “likely,” “may,” “should,” “will” and similar references to future development, results or periods. Examples of forward-looking statements include, among others, statements we make regarding our expectations for our future performance, including our expectations regarding the effects of the economic environment on our financial results, our ability to retain customers and the amount of customers’ business, including deposit balances, with us, the impact of the Federal Reserve’s actions regarding interest rates, and the growth of loans and deposits throughout our branch network. Forward-looking statements are based on management’s current expectations as well as certain assumptions and estimates made by, and information available to, management at the time the statements are made. Such forward-looking statements are subject to factors and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially for TrustCo from the views, beliefs and projections expressed in such statements, and many of the risks and uncertainties are heightened by or may, in the future, be heightened by volatility in financial markets and macroeconomic or geopolitical concerns related to inflation, continued elevated interest rates and ongoing armed conflicts (including the Russia/Ukraine conflict and the conflict in Israel and surrounding areas). TrustCo wishes to caution readers not to place undue reliance on any such forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date made. The following important factors, among others, in some cases have affected and in the future could affect TrustCo’s actual results and could cause TrustCo’s actual financial performance to differ materially from that expressed in any forward-looking statement: future changes in interest rates; ongoing inflationary pressures and continued elevated prices; exposure to credit risk in our lending activities; our increasing commercial loan portfolio; the sufficiency of our allowance for credit losses on loans to cover actual loan losses; our ability to meet the cash flow requirements of our depositors or borrowers or meet our operating cash needs to fund corporate expansion and other activities; claims and litigation pertaining to fiduciary responsibility and lender liability; our dependency upon the services of the management team; our disclosure controls and procedures’ ability to prevent or detect errors or acts of fraud; the adequacy of our business continuity and disaster recovery plans; the effectiveness of our risk management framework; the impact of any expansion by us into new lines of business or new products and services; the impact of severe weather events and climate change on us and the communities we serve, including societal responses to climate change; increasing scrutiny and evolving expectations from customers, regulators, investors, and other stakeholders with respect to our environmental, social and governance practices; the chance of a prolonged economic downturn, especially one affecting our geographic market area; instability in global economic conditions and geopolitical matters, as well as volatility in financial markets; the soundness of other financial institutions; U.S. government shutdowns, credit rating downgrades, or failure to increase the debt ceiling; fluctuations in the trust wealth management fees we receive as a result of investment performance; the impact of regulatory capital rules on our growth; changes in laws and regulations, including changes in cybersecurity or privacy regulations; restrictions on data collection and use; our compliance with the USA PATRIOT Act, Bank Secrecy Act, and other laws and regulations that could result in material fines or sanctions; changes in tax laws; limitations on our ability to pay dividends; TrustCo Realty Corp.’s ability to qualify as a real estate investment trust; changes in accounting standards; competition within our market areas; consumers and businesses’ use of non-banks to complete financial transactions; our reliance on third-party service providers; the impact of data breaches and cyber-attacks; the impact of a failure in or breach of our operational or security systems or infrastructure, or those of third parties; the impact of an unauthorized disclosure of sensitive or confidential client or customer information; the impact of interruptions in the effective operation of our computer systems; the impact of anti-takeover provisions in our organizational documents; the impact of the manner in which we allocate capital; and other risks and uncertainties under the heading “Risk Factors” in our most recent annual report on Form 10-K and, if any, in our subsequent quarterly reports on Form 10-Q or other securities filings. The forward-looking statements contained in this news release represent TrustCo management’s judgment as of the date of this news release. TrustCo disclaims, however, any intent or obligation to update forward-looking statements, either as a result of future developments, new information or otherwise, except as may be required by law.


TRUSTCO BANK CORP NY
GLENVILLE, NY

FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS

(dollars in thousands, except per share data)
(Unaudited)
		Three months ended
		9/30/2024				6/30/2024				9/30/2023
Summary of operations
Net interest income		$	38,671			$	37,788			$	42,221
Provision for credit losses			500				500				100
Net gains on equity securities			23				1,360				–
Noninterest income, excluding net gains on equity securities			4,908				4,291				4,574
Noninterest expense			26,200				26,459				27,460
Net income			12,875				12,551				14,680

Per share
Net income per share:
– Basic		$	0.68			$	0.66			$	0.77
– Diluted			0.68				0.66				0.77
Cash dividends			0.36				0.36				0.36
Book value at period end			35.19				34.46				32.80
Market price at period end			33.07				28.77				27.29

At period end
Full time equivalent employees			735				753				764
Full service banking offices			138				138				143

Performance ratios
Return on average assets			0.84		%		0.82		%		0.96		%
Return on average equity			7.74				7.76				9.32
Efficiency ratio (1)			59.65				62.84				58.33
Net interest spread			2.17				2.09				2.55
Net interest margin			2.61				2.53				2.85
Dividend payout ratio			53.16				54.57				46.65

Capital ratios at period end
Consolidated equity to assets			10.95		%		10.73		%		10.31		%
Consolidated tangible equity to tangible assets (2)			10.94		%		10.72		%		10.30		%

Asset quality analysis at period end
Nonperforming loans to total loans			0.38		%		0.38		%		0.36		%
Nonperforming assets to total assets			0.36				0.35				0.31
Allowance for credit losses on loans to total loans			0.99				0.99				0.95
Coverage ratio (3)		2.6x				2.6x				2.6x


(1) Non-GAAP measure; calculated as noninterest expense (excluding ORE expense) divided by taxable equivalent net interest income plus noninterest income (excluding net gains on equity securities). See Non-GAAP Financial Measures Reconciliation.
(2) Non-GAAP measure; calculated as total shareholders’ equity less $553 of intangible assets divided by total assets less $553 of intangible assets. See Non-GAAP Financial Measures Reconciliation.
(3) Calculated as allowance for credit losses on loans divided by total nonperforming loans.


FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS, Continued

(dollars in thousands, except per share data)
(Unaudited)
		Nine Months Ended
		09/30/24				09/30/23
Summary of operations
Net interest income	$		113,037				133,238
Provision (Credit) for credit losses			1,600				(100	)
Net gains on equity securities			1,383				–
Noninterest income, excluding net gains on equity securities			14,042				13,841
Noninterest expense			77,562				82,466
Net income			37,552				48,798

Per share
Net income per share:
– Basic	$		1.97				2.57
– Diluted			1.97				2.57
Cash dividends			1.08				1.08
Book value at period end			35.19				32.80
Market price at period end			33.07				27.29

Performance ratios
Return on average assets			0.82		%		1.08
Return on average equity			7.68				10.57
Efficiency ratio (1)			60.80				55.70
Net interest spread			2.08				2.78
Net interest margin			2.52				3.01
Dividend payout ratio			54.70				42.11

(1) Non-GAAP measure; calculated as noninterest expense (excluding ORE expense) divided by taxable equivalent net interest income plus noninterest income (excluding net gains on equity securities). See Non-GAAP Financial Measures Reconciliation.


CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF INCOME

(dollars in thousands, except per share data)
(Unaudited)
		Three months ended
		9/30/2024				6/30/2024				3/31/2024				12/31/2023			9/30/2023
Interest and dividend income:
Interest and fees on loans		$	52,112			$	50,660			$	49,804			$	49,201		$	47,921
Interest and dividends on securities available for sale:
U. S. government sponsored enterprises			718				909				906				750			672
State and political subdivisions			–				1				–				1			–
Mortgage-backed securities and collateralized mortgage
obligations – residential			1,397				1,451				1,494				1,533			1,485
Corporate bonds			361				362				476				477			473
Small Business Administration – guaranteed
participation securities			90				94				100				102			107
Other securities			2				2				3				3			2
Total interest and dividends on securities available for sale			2,568				2,819				2,979				2,866			2,739

Interest on held to maturity securities:
Mortgage-backed securities and collateralized mortgage
obligations – residential			62				65				68				70			73
Total interest on held to maturity securities			62				65				68				70			73

Federal Home Loan Bank stock			153				147				152				149			131

Interest on federal funds sold and other short-term investments			6,174				6,894				6,750				6,354			6,688
Total interest income			61,069				60,585				59,753				58,640			57,552

Interest expense:
Interest on deposits:
Interest-bearing checking			311				288				240				165			102
Savings			770				675				712				707			639
Money market deposit accounts			2,154				2,228				2,342				2,500			2,384
Time deposits			18,969				19,400				19,677				16,460			11,962
Interest on short-term borrowings			194				206				204				201			244
Total interest expense			22,398				22,797				23,175				20,033			15,331

Net interest income			38,671				37,788				36,578				38,607			42,221

Less: Provision for credit losses			500				500				600				1,350			100
Net interest income after provision for credit losses			38,171				37,288				35,978				37,257			42,121

Noninterest income:
Trustco Financial Services income			2,044				1,609				1,816				1,612			1,627
Fees for services to customers			2,482				2,399				2,745				2,563			2,590
Net gains on equity securities			23				1,360				–				–			–
Other			382				283				282				299			357
Total noninterest income			4,931				5,651				4,843				4,474			4,574

Noninterest expenses:
Salaries and employee benefits			12,134				12,520				11,427				12,444			12,393
Net occupancy expense			4,271				4,375				4,611				4,209			4,358
Equipment expense			1,757				1,990				1,738				1,852			1,923
Professional services			1,863				1,570				1,460				1,561			1,717
Outsourced services			2,551				2,755				2,501				2,532			2,720
Advertising expense			339				466				408				384			586
FDIC and other insurance			1,112				797				1,094				1,085			1,078
Other real estate expense (income), net			204				16				74				(12	)		163
Other			1,969				1,970				1,590				4,776			2,522
Total noninterest expenses			26,200				26,459				24,903				28,831			27,460

Income before taxes			16,902				16,480				15,918				12,900			19,235
Income taxes			4,027				3,929				3,792				3,052			4,555

Net income		$	12,875			$	12,551			$	12,126			$	9,848		$	14,680

Net income per common share:
– Basic		$	0.68			$	0.66			$	0.64			$	0.52		$	0.77

– Diluted			0.68				0.66				0.64				0.52			0.77

Average basic shares (in thousands)			19,010				19,022				19,024				19,024			19,024
Average diluted shares (in thousands)			19,036				19,033				19,032				19,026			19,024



CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF INCOME, Continued

(dollars in thousands, except per share data)
(Unaudited)
		Nine Months Ended
		09/30/24				09/30/23
Interest and dividend income:
Interest and fees on loans	$		152,576				138,255
Interest and dividends on securities available for sale:
U. S. government sponsored enterprises			2,533				2,055
State and political subdivisions			1				1
Mortgage-backed securities and collateralized mortgage
obligations – residential			4,342				4,613
Corporate bonds			1,199				1,510
Small Business Administration – guaranteed
participation securities			284				335
Other securities			7				7
Total interest and dividends on securities available for sale			8,366				8,521

Interest on held to maturity securities:
Mortgage-backed securities-residential			195				226
Total interest on held to maturity securities			195				226

Federal Home Loan Bank stock			452				351

Interest on federal funds sold and other short-term investments			19,818				20,213
Total interest income			181,407				167,566

Interest expense:
Interest on deposits:
Interest-bearing checking			839				217
Savings			2,157				1,824
Money market deposit accounts			6,724				4,954
Time deposits			58,046				26,525
Interest on short-term borrowings			604				808
Total interest expense			68,370				34,328

Net interest income			113,037				133,238

Less: Provision (Credit) for credit losses			1,600				(100	)
Net interest income after provision (credit) for credit losses			111,437				133,338

Noninterest income:
Trustco Financial Services income			5,469				4,813
Fees for services to customers			7,626				8,085
Net gains on equity securities			1,383				–
Other			947				943
Total noninterest income			15,425				13,841

Noninterest expenses:
Salaries and employee benefits			36,081				38,798
Net occupancy expense			13,257				13,218
Equipment expense			5,485				5,758
Professional services			4,893				4,684
Outsourced services			7,807				7,507
Advertising expense			1,213				1,494
FDIC and other insurance			3,003				3,215
Other real estate expense, net			294				536
Other			5,529				7,256
Total noninterest expenses			77,562				82,466

Income before taxes			49,300				64,713
Income taxes			11,748				15,915

Net income	$		37,552				48,798

Net income per common share:
– Basic	$		1.97				2.57

– Diluted			1.97				2.57

Average basic shares (in thousands)			19,019				19,024
Average diluted shares (in thousands)			19,034				19,024




CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF FINANCIAL CONDITION

(dollars in thousands)
(Unaudited)
		9/30/2024				6/30/2024				3/31/2024				12/31/2023			9/30/2023
ASSETS:

Cash and due from banks		$	49,659			$	42,193			$	44,868			$	49,274		$	45,940
Federal funds sold and other short term investments			473,306				493,920				564,815				528,730			461,321
Total cash and cash equivalents			522,965				536,113				609,683				578,004			507,261

Securities available for sale:
U. S. government sponsored enterprises			90,588				106,796				128,854				118,668			121,474
States and political subdivisions			26				26				26				26			34
Mortgage-backed securities and collateralized mortgage
obligations – residential			222,841				218,311				227,078				237,677			233,719
Small Business Administration – guaranteed
participation securities			15,171				15,592				16,260				17,186			17,316
Corporate bonds			54,327				53,764				53,341				78,052			76,935
Other securities			701				688				682				680			657
Total securities available for sale			383,654				395,177				426,241				452,289			450,135

Held to maturity securities:
Mortgage-backed securities and collateralized mortgage
obligations-residential			5,636				5,921				6,206				6,458			6,724
Total held to maturity securities			5,636				5,921				6,206				6,458			6,724

Federal Reserve Bank and Federal Home Loan Bank stock			6,507				6,507				6,203				6,203			6,203

Loans:
Commercial			280,261				282,441				279,092				273,515			268,642
Residential mortgage loans			4,382,674				4,370,640				4,354,369				4,365,063			4,343,006
Home equity line of credit			393,418				370,063				355,879				347,415			332,028
Installment loans			14,503				15,168				16,166				16,886			16,605
Loans, net of deferred net costs			5,070,856				5,038,312				5,005,506				5,002,879			4,960,281

Less: Allowance for credit losses on loans			49,950				49,772				49,220				48,578			47,226
Net loans			5,020,906				4,988,540				4,956,286				4,954,301			4,913,055

Bank premises and equipment, net			33,324				33,466				33,423				34,007			32,135
Operating lease right-of-use assets			37,958				38,376				39,647				40,542			41,475
Other assets			98,730				102,544				101,881				96,387			97,310

Total assets		$	6,109,680			$	6,106,644			$	6,179,570			$	6,168,191		$	6,054,298

LIABILITIES:
Deposits:
Demand		$	753,878			$	745,227			$	742,997			$	754,532		$	773,293
Interest-bearing checking			988,527				1,029,606				1,020,136				1,015,213			1,033,898
Savings accounts			1,092,038				1,144,427				1,155,517				1,179,241			1,235,658
Money market deposit accounts			477,113				517,445				532,611				565,767			610,012
Time deposits			1,952,635				1,840,262				1,903,908				1,836,024			1,581,504
Total deposits			5,264,191				5,276,967				5,355,169				5,350,777			5,234,365

Short-term borrowings			91,450				89,720				94,374				88,990			103,110
Operating lease liabilities			41,469				42,026				43,438				44,471			45,418
Accrued expenses and other liabilities			43,549				42,763				37,399				38,668			47,479

Total liabilities			5,440,659				5,451,476				5,530,380				5,522,906			5,430,372

SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY:
Capital stock			20,058				20,058				20,058				20,058			20,058
Surplus			257,644				257,490				257,335				257,181			257,078
Undivided profits			442,079				436,048				430,346				425,069			422,082
Accumulated other comprehensive loss, net of tax			(6,600	)			(14,268	)			(14,763	)			(13,237	)		(31,506	)
Treasury stock at cost			(44,160	)			(44,160	)			(43,786	)			(43,786	)		(43,786	)

Total shareholders’ equity			669,021				655,168				649,190				645,285			623,926

Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity		$	6,109,680			$	6,106,644			$	6,179,570			$	6,168,191		$	6,054,298

Outstanding shares (in thousands)			19,010				19,010				19,024				19,024			19,024


NONPERFORMING ASSETS

(dollars in thousands)
(Unaudited)
	9/30/2024			6/30/2024			3/31/2024			12/31/2023			9/30/2023
Nonperforming Assets

New York and other states*
Loans in nonaccrual status:
Commercial	$	466		$	741		$	532		$	536		$	540
Real estate mortgage – 1 to 4 family		15,320			14,992			14,359			14,375			14,633
Installment		163			131			149			151			93
Total non-accrual loans		15,949			15,864			15,040			15,062			15,266
Other nonperforming real estate mortgages – 1 to 4 family		–			–			–			3			5
Total nonperforming loans		15,949			15,864			15,040			15,065			15,271
Other real estate owned		2,503			2,334			2,334			194			1,185
Total nonperforming assets	$	18,452		$	18,198		$	17,374		$	15,259		$	16,456

Florida
Loans in nonaccrual status:
Commercial	$	314		$	314		$	314		$	314		$	314
Real estate mortgage – 1 to 4 family		3,176			2,985			2,921			2,272			2,228
Installment		5			22			–			15			65
Total non-accrual loans		3,495			3,321			3,235			2,601			2,607
Other nonperforming real estate mortgages – 1 to 4 family		–			–			–			–			–
Total nonperforming loans		3,495			3,321			3,235			2,601			2,607
Other real estate owned		–			–			–			–			–
Total nonperforming assets	$	3,495		$	3,321		$	3,235		$	2,601		$	2,607

Total
Loans in nonaccrual status:
Commercial	$	780		$	1,055		$	846		$	850		$	854
Real estate mortgage – 1 to 4 family		18,496			17,977			17,280			16,647			16,861
Installment		168			153			149			166			158
Total non-accrual loans		19,444			19,185			18,275			17,663			17,873
Other nonperforming real estate mortgages – 1 to 4 family		–			–			–			3			5
Total nonperforming loans		19,444			19,185			18,275			17,666			17,878
Other real estate owned		2,503			2,334			2,334			194			1,185
Total nonperforming assets	$	21,947		$	21,519		$	20,609		$	17,860		$	19,063


Quarterly Net (Recoveries) Chargeoffs

New York and other states*
Commercial	$	65		$	–		$	–		$	–		$	–
Real estate mortgage – 1 to 4 family		104			(74	)		(78	)		219			(26	)
Installment		11			(2	)		36			23			14
Total net (recoveries) chargeoffs	$	180		$	(76	)	$	(42	)	$	242		$	(12	)

Florida
Commercial	$	–		$	–		$	–		$	–		$	–
Real estate mortgage – 1 to 4 family		–			17			–			–			–
Installment		42			7			–			6			–
Total net (recoveries) chargeoffs	$	42		$	24		$	–		$	6		$	–

Total
Commercial	$	65		$	–		$	–		$	–		$	–
Real estate mortgage – 1 to 4 family		104			(57	)		(78	)		219			(26	)
Installment		53			5			36			29			14
Total net (recoveries) chargeoffs	$	222		$	(52	)	$	(42	)	$	248		$	(12	)


Asset Quality Ratios

Total nonperforming loans (1)	$	19,444		$	19,185		$	18,275		$	17,666		$	17,878
Total nonperforming assets (1)		21,947			21,519			20,609			17,860			19,063
Total net (recoveries) chargeoffs (2)		222			(52	)		(42	)		248			(12	)

Allowance for credit losses on loans (1)		49,950			49,772			49,220			48,578			47,226

Nonperforming loans to total loans		0.38	%		0.38	%		0.37	%		0.35	%		0.36	%
Nonperforming assets to total assets		0.36	%		0.35	%		0.33	%		0.29	%		0.31	%
Allowance for credit losses on loans to total loans		0.99	%		0.99	%		0.98	%		0.97	%		0.95	%
Coverage ratio (1)		256.9	%		259.4	%		269.3	%		275.0	%		264.2	%
Annualized net (recoveries) chargeoffs to average loans (2)		0.02	%		0.00	%		0.00	%		0.02	%		0.00	%
Allowance for credit losses on loans to annualized net chargeoffs (2)	56.3x			N/A			N/A			49.0x			N/A

* Includes New York, New Jersey, Vermont and Massachusetts.
(1) At period-end
(2) For the three-month period ended


DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY –
INTEREST RATES AND INTEREST DIFFERENTIAL

(dollars in thousands)
(Unaudited)		Three months ended								Three months ended
		September 30, 2024								September 30, 2023
		Average			Interest		Average			Average			Interest		Average
		Balance					Rate			Balance					Rate
Assets

Securities available for sale:
U. S. government sponsored enterprises		$	95,073		$	718	3.02	%		$	119,406		$	672	2.25	%
Mortgage backed securities and collateralized mortgage
obligations – residential			241,792			1,397	2.29				269,535			1,485	2.19
State and political subdivisions			26			–	6.75				34			–	6.74
Corporate bonds			55,041			361	2.63				80,331			473	2.36
Small Business Administration – guaranteed
participation securities			16,663			90	2.15				19,801			107	2.15
Other			701			2	1.14				686			2	1.17

Total securities available for sale			409,296			2,568	2.51				489,793			2,739	2.24

Federal funds sold and other short-term Investments			465,922			6,174	5.27				494,597			6,688	5.37

Held to maturity securities:
Mortgage backed securities and collateralized mortgage
obligations – residential			5,779			62	4.29				6,877			73	4.22

Total held to maturity securities			5,779			62	4.29				6,877			73	4.22

Federal Home Loan Bank stock			6,507			153	9.41				6,203			131	8.45

Commercial loans			279,199			3,807	5.45				261,061			3,398	5.21
Residential mortgage loans			4,375,641			41,811	3.82				4,325,219			39,321	3.64
Home equity lines of credit			380,422			6,245	6.53				320,446			4,946	6.12
Installment loans			14,443			249	6.87				15,959			256	6.37

Loans, net of unearned income			5,049,705			52,112	4.12				4,922,685			47,921	3.89

Total interest earning assets			5,937,209		$	61,069	4.11				5,920,155		$	57,552	3.88

Allowance for credit losses on loans			(49,973	)							(47,077	)
Cash & non-interest earning assets			187,166								172,523


Total assets		$	6,074,402							$	6,045,601


Liabilities and shareholders’ equity

Deposits:
Interest bearing checking accounts		$	1,000,333		$	311	0.12	%		$	1,050,313		$	102	0.04	%
Money market accounts			499,408			2,154	1.72				625,031			2,384	1.51
Savings			1,122,673			770	0.27				1,282,641			639	0.20
Time deposits			1,880,021			18,969	4.01				1,494,402			11,962	3.18

Total interest bearing deposits			4,502,435			22,204	1.96				4,452,387			15,087	1.34
Short-term borrowings			87,677			194	0.88				110,018			244	0.88

Total interest bearing liabilities			4,590,112		$	22,398	1.94				4,562,405		$	15,331	1.33

Demand deposits			742,164								776,885
Other liabilities			80,502								81,411
Shareholders’ equity			661,624								624,900

Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity		$	6,074,402							$	6,045,601

Net interest income, GAAP and non-GAAP tax equivalent (1)					$	38,671							$	42,221

Net interest spread, GAAP and non-GAAP tax equivalent (1)							2.17	%							2.55	%


Net interest margin (net interest income to
total interest earning assets), GAAP and non-GAAP tax equivalent (1)							2.61	%							2.85	%

Tax equivalent adjustment (1)						–								–


Net interest income					$	38,671							$	42,221

(1) Tax equivalent adjustment to a measure results in a non-GAAP financial measure. See Non-GAAP Financial Measures Reconciliation.



DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY –
INTEREST RATES AND INTEREST DIFFERENTIAL, Continued

(dollars in thousands)
(Unaudited)		Nine Months Ended								Nine Months Ended
		September 30, 2024								September 30, 2023
		Average			Interest		Average			Average			Interest		Average
		Balance					Rate			Balance					Rate
Assets

Securities available for sale:
U. S. government sponsored enterprises	$		111,570			2,533	3.03	%	$		120,243			2,055	2.28	%
Mortgage backed securities and collateralized mortgage
obligations – residential			250,343			4,342	2.31				278,252			4,613	2.21
State and political subdivisions			26			1	6.80				34			1	6.74
Corporate bonds			61,221			1,199	2.61				83,732			1,510	2.41
Small Business Administration – guaranteed
participation securities			17,438			284	2.17				20,876			335	2.14
Other			697			7	1.34				686			7	1.02

Total securities available for sale			441,295			8,366	2.53				503,823			8,521	1.69

Federal funds sold and other short-term Investments			489,934			19,818	5.40				540,570			20,213	5.00

Held to maturity securities:
Mortgage backed securities and collateralized mortgage
obligations – residential			6,053			195	4.29				7,205			226	4.18

Total held to maturity securities			6,053			195	4.29				7,205			226	4.18

Federal Home Loan Bank stock			6,350			452	9.49				5,957			351	5.89

Commercial loans			278,981			11,232	5.37				249,738			9,716	5.19
Residential mortgage loans			4,364,821			123,046	3.76				4,269,494			114,227	3.57
Home equity lines of credit			365,932			17,522	6.40				305,075			13,598	5.96
Installment loans			15,319			776	6.76				15,015			714	6.35

Loans, net of unearned income			5,025,053			152,576	4.05				4,839,322			138,255	3.81

Total interest earning assets			5,968,685			181,407	4.05				5,896,877			167,566	3.79

Allowance for credit losses on loans			(49,419	)							(46,812	)
Cash & non-interest earning assets			187,963								173,521


Total assets	$		6,107,229						$		6,023,586


Liabilities and shareholders’ equity

Deposits:
Interest bearing checking accounts	$		999,839			839	0.11	%	$		1,088,859			217	0.03	%
Money market accounts			522,636			6,724	1.72				613,119			4,954	1.08
Savings			1,142,313			2,157	0.25				1,363,052			1,824	0.18
Time deposits			1,881,027			58,046	4.12				1,343,762			26,525	2.64

Total interest bearing deposits			4,545,815			67,766	1.99				4,408,792			33,520	1.02
Short-term borrowings			91,551			604	0.88				121,911			808	0.89

Total interest bearing liabilities			4,637,366			68,370	1.97				4,530,703			34,328	1.01

Demand deposits			734,604								793,890
Other liabilities			82,233								81,771
Shareholders’ equity			653,026								617,224

Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity	$		6,107,229						$		6,023,588

Net interest income, GAAP and non-GAAP tax equivalent (1)						113,037								133,238

Net interest spread, GAAP and non-GAAP tax equivalent (1)							2.08	%							2.78	%


Net interest margin (net interest income to
total interest earning assets), GAAP and non-GAAP tax equivalent (1)							2.52	%							3.01	%

Tax equivalent adjustment (1)						–								–


Net interest income						113,037								133,238

(1) Tax equivalent adjustment to a measure results in a non-GAAP financial measure. See Non-GAAP Financial Measures Reconciliation.

Non-GAAP Financial Measures Reconciliation

Tangible book value per share is a non-GAAP financial measure derived from GAAP-based amounts. We calculate tangible book value by excluding the balance of intangible assets from total shareholders’ equity divided by shares outstanding. We believe that this is consistent with the treatment by bank regulatory agencies, which exclude intangible assets from the calculation of risk-based capital ratios. Additionally, we believe that this measure is important to many investors in the marketplace who are interested in relative changes from period to period in equity exclusive of changes in intangible assets.

Tangible equity as a percentage of tangible assets at period end is a non-GAAP financial measure derived from GAAP-based amounts. We calculate tangible equity and tangible assets by excluding the balance of intangible assets from total shareholders’ equity and total assets, respectively. We calculate tangible equity as a percentage of tangible assets at period end by dividing tangible equity by tangible assets at period end. We believe that this is consistent with the treatment by bank regulatory agencies, which exclude intangible assets from the calculation of risk-based capital ratios. Additionally, we believe that this measure is important to many investors in the marketplace who are interested in relative changes from period to period in equity and total assets, each exclusive of changes in intangible assets.

Net interest income is commonly presented on a taxable equivalent basis. That is, to the extent that some component of the institution’s net interest income will be exempt from taxation (e.g., was received by the institution as a result of its holdings of state or municipal obligations), an amount equal to the tax benefit derived from that component is added back to the net interest income total. Management considers this adjustment helpful to investors in comparing one financial institution’s net interest income (pre- tax) to that of another institution, as each will have a different proportion of tax-exempt items in their portfolios. Moreover, net interest income is itself a component of another financial measure commonly used by financial institutions, net interest margin, which is the ratio of net interest income to average interest earning assets. Additionally, management and many financial institutions also present net interest spread, which is the average yield on interest earning assets minus the average rate paid on interest bearing liabilities. For purposes of these measures as well, taxable equivalent net interest income is generally used by financial institutions, again to provide investors with a better basis of comparison from institution to institution. We calculate taxable equivalent net interest margin by dividing net interest income, adjusted to include the benefit of non-taxable interest income, by average interest earning assets. We calculate taxable equivalent net interest spread as the difference between average yield on interest earning assets, adjusted to include the benefit of non-taxable interest income, and the average rate paid on interest bearing liabilities.

The efficiency ratio is a non-GAAP measure of expense control relative to revenue from net interest income and non-interest fee income. We calculate the efficiency ratio by dividing total noninterest expenses as determined under GAAP, excluding other real estate expense, net, by net interest income (fully taxable equivalent) and total noninterest income as determined under GAAP, excluding net gains on equity securities. We believe that this provides a reasonable measure of primary banking expenses relative to primary banking revenue. Additionally, we believe this measure is important to investors looking for a measure of efficiency in our productivity measured by the amount of revenue generated for each dollar spent.

We believe that these non-GAAP financial measures provide information that is important to investors and that is useful in understanding our financial results. Our management internally assesses our performance based, in part, on these measures. However, these non-GAAP financial measures are supplemental and not a substitute for an analysis based on GAAP measures. As other companies may use different calculations for these measures, this presentation may not be comparable to other similarly titled measures reported by other companies. A reconciliation of the non-GAAP measures of tangible equity as a percentage of tangible assets, and efficiency ratio to the most directly comparable GAAP measures is set forth below. We have not presented a reconciliation of taxable equivalent net interest income, taxable equivalent net interest margin or taxable equivalent net interest spread to the most directly comparable GAAP measure, as there was no difference between the taxable equivalent measure and comparable GAAP measure for any period presented in this release.


NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES RECONCILIATION

(dollars in thousands)
(Unaudited)
	9/30/2024			6/30/2024			9/30/2023
Tangible Book Value Per Share

Equity (GAAP)	$	669,021		$	655,168		$	623,926
Less: Intangible assets		553			553			553
Tangible equity (Non-GAAP)	$	668,468		$	654,615		$	623,373

Shares outstanding		19,010			19,010			19,024
Tangible book value per share		35.16			34.44			32.77
Book value per share		35.19			34.46			32.80

Tangible Equity to Tangible Assets
Total Assets (GAAP)	$	6,109,680		$	6,106,644		$	6,054,298
Less: Intangible assets		553			553			553
Tangible assets (Non-GAAP)	$	6,109,127		$	6,106,091		$	6,053,745

Tangible Equity to Tangible Assets (Non-GAAP)		10.94	%		10.72	%		10.30	%
Equity to Assets (GAAP)		10.95	%		10.73	%		10.31	%

	Three months ended									Nine Months Ended
Efficiency Ratio	9/30/2024			6/30/2024			9/30/2023			9/30/2024			9/30/2023

Net interest income (GAAP)	$	38,671		$	37,788		$	42,221		$	113,037		$	133,238
Taxable equivalent adjustment		–			–			–			–			–
Net interest income (fully taxable equivalent) (Non-GAAP)		38,671			37,788			42,221			113,037			133,238
Non-interest income (GAAP)		4,931			5,651			4,574			15,425			13,841
Less: Net gains on equity securities		23			1,360			–			1,383			–
Revenue used for efficiency ratio (Non-GAAP)	$	43,579		$	42,079		$	46,795		$	127,079		$	147,079

Total noninterest expense (GAAP)	$	26,200		$	26,459		$	27,460		$	77,562		$	82,466
Less: Other real estate expense, net		204			16			163			294			536
Expense used for efficiency ratio (Non-GAAP)	$	25,996		$	26,443		$	27,297		$	77,268		$	81,930

Efficiency Ratio		59.65	%		62.84	%		58.33	%		60.80	%		55.70	%


Subsidiary:	Trustco Bank

Contact:	Robert Leonard Executive Vice President (518) 381-3693

MIL-OSI: RBB Bancorp Reports Third Quarter 2024 Earnings and Declares Quarterly Cash Dividend of $0.16 Per Common Share

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

LOS ANGELES, Oct. 21, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — RBB Bancorp (NASDAQ:RBB) and its subsidiaries, Royal Business Bank (the “Bank”) and RBB Asset Management Company (“RAM”), collectively referred to herein as “the Company,” announced financial results for the quarter ended September 30, 2024.

Third Quarter 2024 Highlights

Net income totaled $7.0 million, or $ 0.39 diluted earnings per share
Return on average assets of 0.72%, compared to 0.76% for the quarter ended June 30, 2024
Net interest margin of 2.68% compared to 2.67% for the quarter ended June 30, 2024
Repurchased 508,275 shares of common stock for $11.0 million during the quarter ended September 30, 2024, and completed the authorized program
Book value and tangible book value per share(1) increased to $28.81 and $24.64 at September 30, 2024, up from $28.12 and $24.06 at June 30, 2024

The Company reported net income of $7.0 million, or $ 0.39 diluted earnings per share, for the quarter ended September 30, 2024, compared to net income of $7.2 million, or $ 0.39 diluted earnings per share, for the quarter ended June 30, 2024.

“Loans increased at a 6% annualized rate in the third quarter as our work to expand lending and deposit relationships began to deliver results,” said David Morris, Chief Executive Officer of RBB Bancorp. “Net interest margin increased slightly, and we are optimistic that it will continue to expand from here. We continue to work through our non-performing loans and believe we will be able to resolve the majority of them by mid-2025.”

“The team has done an excellent job building on the Bank’s reputation as one of the premier Asian-centric financial institutions,” said Christina Kao, Chair of the Board of Directors. “Returning the Bank to growth has been a priority for the Board of Directors as we believe it will enhance long-term shareholder value.”

(1) Reconciliations of the non–U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”) measures included at the end of this press release.

Net Interest Income and Net Interest Margin

Net interest income was $24.5 million for the third quarter of 2024, compared to $24.0 million for the second quarter of 2024. The $580,000 increase was due to an increase in interest income of $1.5 million offset by an increase in interest expense of $959,000. The increase in interest income was due mostly to higher interest income on loans held for investment (“HFI”) of $2.0 million, partially offset by lower interest income on investment securities of $504,000. The increase in loan interest income was mostly due to higher average loans HFI of $54.4 million combined with a 9 basis point increase in the HFI loan yield. The decrease in investment income was attributed to lower average balances and a lower portfolio yield as proceeds from maturing short-term commercial paper were invested into loans and interest-earning cash. The increase in interest expense was due to higher average interest-bearing deposits of $42.3 million in the third quarter of 2024.

Net interest margin (“NIM”) was 2.68% for the third quarter of 2024, an increase of 1 basis point from 2.67% for the second quarter of 2024. The increase was due to a 5 basis point increase in the yield on average interest-earning assets, partially offset by a 3 basis point increase in the overall cost of funds. The yield on average interest-earning assets increased to 5.94% for the third quarter of 2024 from 5.89% for the second quarter of 2024 due mainly to a 9 basis point increase in the yield on average loans HFI to 6.13% for the third quarter of 2024. The increase in the loan yield was largely attributed to nonaccrual loan activity in the current and prior quarter, including both the recapture of interest income for fully paid off nonaccrual loans and reversals of interest income for loans migrating to nonaccrual status. Such activity increased the third quarter loan yield by 1 basis point and decreased the second quarter loan yield by 7 basis points. Average loans represented 84% of average interest-earning assets in the third quarter of 2024, unchanged from the second quarter of 2024.

The overall cost of funds increased to 3.57% in the third quarter of 2024 from 3.54% in the second quarter of 2024 due to a higher average cost of interest-bearing deposits in the third quarter of 2024 as compared to the second quarter of 2024. The overall funding mix remained relatively unchanged from the second quarter of 2024 as the ratio of average noninterest-bearing deposits to average total funding sources remained relatively unchanged at 16% for the third and second quarters of 2024. The all-in spot rate for total deposits was 3.53% at September 30, 2024.

Provision for Credit Losses

The Company recorded a provision for credit losses of $3.3 million for the third quarter of 2024 compared to $557,000 for the second quarter of 2024. The third quarter provision took into consideration factors including changes in the loan portfolio mix, higher specific reserves, the outlook for economic conditions and market interest rates, and credit quality metrics, including higher nonperforming, special mention and substandard loans at the end of the third quarter of 2024 as compared to the end of the second quarter of 2024.

Noninterest Income

Noninterest income for the third quarter of 2024 was $5.7 million, an increase of $2.3 million from $3.5 million for the second quarter of 2024. This increase was mostly due to a $2.8 million recovery of a fully charged off loan, which had been acquired in a bank acquisition (included in other income), partially offset by lower net gain on other real estate owned (“OREO”) of $292,000.

Noninterest Expense

Noninterest expense for the third quarter of 2024 was $17.4 million, an increase of $297,000 from $17.1 million for the second quarter of 2024. This increase was due to higher salaries and employee benefits expense of $475,000 due in part to higher loan production and higher other expenses of $304,000 due to higher loan related expense. These increases were partially offset by lower insurance and regulatory assessments of $323,000 and lower legal and professional expenses of $302,000, the latter being due to reimbursed legal costs from nonaccrual loan payoffs. The annualized noninterest expenses to average assets ratio was 1.78% for the third quarter of 2024, down from 1.79% for the second quarter of 2024. The efficiency ratio was 57.51% for the third quarter of 2024, down from 62.38% for the second quarter of 2024 due mostly to higher noninterest income.

Income Taxes

The effective tax rate was 26.9% for the third quarter of 2024 and 25.9% for the second quarter of 2024. The effective tax rate for 2024 is estimated to range between 26.0% and 28.0%.

Balance Sheet

At September 30, 2024, total assets were $4.0 billion, a $122.3 million increase compared to June 30, 2024, and a $78.9 million decrease compared to September 30, 2023.

Loan and Securities Portfolio

Loans HFI totaled $3.1 billion as of September 30, 2024, an increase of $44.2 million compared to June 30, 2024 and a $29.1 million decrease compared to September 30, 2023. The increase from June 30, 2024 was primarily due to a $62.5 million increase in commercial real estate (“CRE”) loans, a $5.6 million increase in single-family residential (“SFR”) mortgages and a $2.2 million increase in commercial and industrial (“C&I”) loans, partially offset by a $22.3 million decrease in construction and land development (“C&D”) loans and a $2.2 million decrease in Small Business Administration (“SBA”) loans. The loan to deposit ratio was 98.6% at September 30, 2024, compared to 99.4% at June 30, 2024 and 97.6% at September 30, 2023.

As of September 30, 2024, available-for-sale securities totaled $305.7 million, a decrease of $19.9 million from June 30, 2024. As of September 30, 2024, net unrealized losses totaled $23.2 million, a $6.9 million decrease due to decreases in market interest rates, when compared to net unrealized losses as of June 30, 2024.

Deposits

Total deposits were $3.1 billion as of September 30, 2024, a $68.6 million increase compared to June 30, 2024 and a $61.9 million decrease compared to September 30, 2023. The increase during the third quarter of 2024 was due to an increase in interest-bearing deposits, while noninterest-bearing deposits remained relatively stable at $543.6 million as of September 30, 2024 compared to $543.0 million as of June 30, 2024. The increase in interest-bearing deposits included an increase in time deposits of $49.6 million and an increase in non-maturity deposits of $18.3 million. The increase in time deposits included a $26.6 million increase in wholesale deposits (brokered deposits, collateralized State of California certificates of deposit and deposits acquired through internet listing services). Wholesale deposits totaled $147.3 million at September 30, 2024, and $120.7 million at June 30, 2024. Noninterest-bearing deposits represented 17.6% of total deposits at September 30, 2024 compared to 18.0% at June 30, 2024.

Credit Quality

Nonperforming assets totaled $60.7 million, or 1.52% of total assets, at September 30, 2024, compared to $54.6 million, or 1.41% of total assets, at June 30, 2024. The $6.1 million increase in nonperforming assets was mostly due to two loans that migrated to nonaccrual totaling $13.3 million and consisted of a C&D loan and a CRE loan, offset by $6.1 million in payoffs with no losses and $1.2 million in partial charge-offs of nonaccrual loans.

Special mention loans totaled $77.5 million, or 2.51% of total loans, at September 30, 2024, compared to $19.5 million, or 0.64% of total loans, at June 30, 2024. The $58.0 million increase was primarily due to one $43.6 million C&D loan for a completed hotel construction project, CRE loans totaling $25.2 million and C&I loans totaling $1.2 million. The increase was partially offset by one $11.7 million C&D loan, which migrated from special mention to substandard during the third quarter of 2024. All special mention loans, including the $11.7 million C&D loan which migrated to substandard rating, are all paying current.

Substandard loans totaled $79.8 million, or 2.58% of total loans, at September 30, 2024, compared to $63.1 million, or 2.07% of total loans, at June 30, 2024. The $16.8 million increase was primarily due to downgrades of two C&D loans totaling $21.7 million and one $3.3 million CRE loan, offset by loan payoffs of $6.7 million and charge-offs of $1.2 million. Of the substandard loans at September 30, 2024, there are $19.2 million which are paying current.

30-89 day delinquent loans, excluding nonperforming loans, decreased $645,000 to $10.6 million as of September 30, 2024, compared to $11.3 million as of June 30, 2024. The decrease in past due loans was mostly due to 12 loans totaling $4.7 million that returned to current status and other decreases totaling $784,000, partially offset by new delinquent loans totaling $4.9 million, of which $4.1 million were 30 days past due.

As of September 30, 2024, the allowance for credit losses totaled $44.5 million and was comprised of an allowance for loan losses of $43.7 million and a reserve for unfunded commitments of $779,000 (included in “Accrued interest and other liabilities”). This compares to the allowance for credit losses of $42.4 million comprised of an allowance for loan losses of $41.7 million and a reserve for unfunded commitments of $624,000 at June 30, 2024. The $2.1 million increase in the allowance for credit losses for the third quarter of 2024 was due to a $3.3 million provision for credit losses, including higher specific reserves of $2.5 million, offset by net charge-offs of $1.2 million. The increase in specific reserves and charge-offs in the third quarter of 2024 was primarily due to a decrease in the estimated fair value of collateral dependent loans, including estimated selling costs. Charge-offs in the third quarter of 2024 were related to one C&D loan and one CRE loan, which were written-down to their estimated fair value. The allowance for loan losses as a percentage of loans HFI was 1.41% at September 30, 2024, compared to 1.37% at June 30, 2024. The allowance for loan losses as a percentage of nonperforming loans was 72% at September 30, 2024, a decrease from 76% at June 30, 2024. The decrease in the allowance for loan losses as a percentage of nonperforming loans was due in part to an increase in individually evaluated loans, which required no allowance for loan losses.

	For the Three Months Ended September 30, 2024								For the Nine Months Ended September 30, 2024
*(dollars in thousands)*	Allowance for loan losses			Reserve for unfunded loan commitments		Allowance for credit losses			Allowance for loan losses			Reserve for unfunded loan commitments		Allowance for credit losses
Beginning balance	$	41,741		$	624	$	42,365		$	41,903		$	640	$	42,543
Provision for credit losses		3,145			155		3,300			3,718			139		3,857
Less loans charged-off		(1,210	)		—		(1,210	)		(1,991	)		—		(1,991	)
Recoveries on loans charged-off		9			—		9			55			—		55
Ending balance	$	43,685		$	779	$	44,464		$	43,685		$	779	$	44,464

Shareholders’ Equity

At September 30, 2024, total shareholders’ equity was $509.7 million, a $1.6 million decrease compared to June 30, 2024, and a $7.2 million increase compared to September 30, 2023. The decrease in shareholders’ equity for the third quarter of 2024 was due to common stock repurchases of $11.0 million and common stock cash dividends paid of $2.9 million, offset by net income of $7.0 million, lower net unrealized loss on available-for-sale securities of $4.8 million and equity compensation activity of $528,000. Book value per share and tangible book value per share⁽¹⁾increased to $28.81 and $24.64 at September 30, 2024, up from $28.12 and $24.06 at June 30, 2024.

On February 29, 2024, the Board of Directors authorized the repurchase of up to 1,000,000 shares of common stock. The repurchase program permitted shares to be repurchased in open market or private transactions, through block trades, and pursuant to any trading plan that may be adopted in accordance with Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Rules 10b5-1 and 10b-8. The Company repurchased 508,275 shares at a weighted average share price of $21.53 during the third quarter of 2024 and completed the authorized program.

Dividend Announcement

The Board of Directors has declared a common stock cash dividend of $0.16 per common share, payable on November 12, 2024 to shareholders of record on October 31, 2024.

	Contact: Lynn Hopkins, Chief Financial Officer
	(213) 716-8066
	lhopkins@rbbusa.com

(1) Reconciliations of the non–U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”) measures included at the end of this press release.

Corporate Overview

RBB Bancorp is a community-based financial holding company headquartered in Los Angeles, California. As of September 30, 2024, the Company had total assets of $4.0 billion. Its wholly-owned subsidiary, Royal Business Bank, is a full service commercial bank, which provides consumer and business banking services predominately to the Asian-centric communities in Los Angeles County, Orange County, and Ventura County in California, in Las Vegas, Nevada, in Brooklyn, Queens, and Manhattan in New York, in Edison, New Jersey, in the Chicago neighborhoods of Chinatown and Bridgeport, Illinois, and on Oahu, Hawaii. Bank services include remote deposit, E-banking, mobile banking, commercial and investor real estate loans, business loans and lines of credit, commercial and industrial loans, SBA 7A and 504 loans, 1-4 single family residential loans, trade finance, a full range of depository account products and wealth management services. The Bank has nine branches in Los Angeles County, two branches in Ventura County, one branch in Orange County, California, one branch in Las Vegas, Nevada, three branches and one loan operation center in Brooklyn, three branches in Queens, one branch in Manhattan in New York, one branch in Edison, New Jersey, two branches in Chicago, Illinois, and one branch in Honolulu, Hawaii. The Company’s administrative and lending center is located at 1055 Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles, California 90017, and its operations center is located at 7025 Orangethorpe Ave., Buena Park, California 90621. The Company’s website address is www.royalbusinessbankusa.com.

Conference Call

Management will hold a conference call at 11:00 a.m. Pacific time/2:00 p.m. Eastern time on Tuesday, October 22, 2024, to discuss the Company’s third quarter 2024 financial results.

To listen to the conference call, please dial 1-888-506-0062 or 1-973-528-0011, the Participant ID code is 392446, conference ID RBBQ324. A replay of the call will be made available at 1-877-481-4010 or 1-919-882-2331, the passcode is 51366, approximately one hour after the conclusion of the call and will remain available through November 5, 2024.

The conference call will also be simultaneously webcast over the Internet; please visit our Royal Business Bank website at http://www.royalbusinessbankusa.com and click on the “Investors” tab to access the call from the site. This webcast will be recorded and available for replay on our website approximately two hours after the conclusion of the conference call.

Disclosure

This press release contains certain non-GAAP financial disclosures for tangible common equity and tangible assets and adjusted earnings. The Company uses certain non-GAAP financial measures to provide meaningful supplemental information regarding the Company’s operational performance and to enhance investors’ overall understanding of such financial performance. Please refer to the tables at the end of this release for a presentation of performance ratios in accordance with GAAP and a reconciliation of the non-GAAP financial measures to the GAAP financial measures.

Safe Harbor

Certain matters set forth herein (including the exhibits hereto) constitute forward-looking statements relating to the Company’s current business plans and expectations and our future financial position and operating results. These forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results, performance and/or achievements to differ materially from those projected. These risks and uncertainties include, but are not limited to, the effectiveness of the Company’s internal control over financial reporting and disclosure controls and procedures; the potential for additional material weaknesses in the Company’s internal controls over financial reporting or other potential control deficiencies of which the Company is not currently aware or which have not been detected; business and economic conditions generally and in the financial services industry, nationally and within our current and future geographic markets, including the tight labor market, ineffective management of the United States (“U.S.”) federal budget or debt or turbulence or uncertainly in domestic or foreign financial markets; the strength of the U.S. economy in general and the strength of the local economies in which we conduct operations; adverse developments in the banking industry highlighted by high-profile bank failures and the potential impact of such developments on customer confidence, liquidity and regulatory responses to these developments; our ability to attract and retain deposits and access other sources of liquidity; possible additional provisions for credit losses and charge-offs; credit risks of lending activities and deterioration in asset or credit quality; extensive laws and regulations and supervision that we are subject to, including potential supervisory action by bank supervisory authorities; increased costs of compliance and other risks associated with changes in regulation, including any amendments to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act; compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act and other money laundering statutes and regulations; potential goodwill impairment; liquidity risk; failure to comply with debt covenants; fluctuations in interest rates; risks associated with acquisitions and the expansion of our business into new markets; inflation and deflation; real estate market conditions and the value of real estate collateral; the effects of having concentrations in our loan portfolio, including commercial real estate and the risks of geographic and industry concentrations; environmental liabilities; our ability to compete with larger competitors; our ability to retain key personnel; successful management of reputational risk; severe weather, natural disasters, earthquakes, fires; or other adverse external events could harm our business; geopolitical conditions, including acts or threats of terrorism, actions taken by the U.S. or other governments in response to acts or threats of terrorism and/or military conflicts, including the conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, in the Middle East, and increasing tensions between China and Taiwan, which could impact business and economic conditions in the U.S. and abroad; public health crises and pandemics, and their effects on the economic and business environments in which we operate, including our credit quality and business operations, as well as the impact on general economic and financial market conditions; general economic or business conditions in Asia, and other regions where the Bank has operations; failures, interruptions, or security breaches of our information systems; climate change, including any enhanced regulatory, compliance, credit and reputational risks and costs; cybersecurity threats and the cost of defending against them; our ability to adapt our systems to the expanding use of technology in banking; risk management processes and strategies; adverse results in legal proceedings; the impact of regulatory enforcement actions, if any; certain provisions in our charter and bylaws that may affect acquisition of the Company; changes in tax laws and regulations; the impact of governmental efforts to restructure the U.S. financial regulatory system; the impact of future or recent changes in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) insurance assessment rate and the rules and regulations related to the calculation of the FDIC insurance assessments; the effect of changes in accounting policies and practices or accounting standards, as may be adopted from time-to-time by bank regulatory agencies, the SEC, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, the Financial Accounting Standards Board or other accounting standards setters, including Accounting Standards Update 2016-13 (Topic 326, “Measurement of Current Losses on Financial Instruments, commonly referenced as the Current Expected Credit Losses Model, which changed how we estimate credit losses and may further increase the required level of our allowance for credit losses in future periods; market disruption and volatility; fluctuations in the Company’s stock price; restrictions on dividends and other distributions by laws and regulations and by our regulators and our capital structure; issuances of preferred stock; our ability to raise additional capital, if needed, and the potential resulting dilution of interests of holders of our common stock; the soundness of other financial institutions; our ongoing relations with our various federal and state regulators, including the SEC, FDIC, FRB and California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation; our success at managing the risks involved in the foregoing items and all other factors set forth in the Company’s public reports, including its Annual Report as filed under Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2023, and particularly the discussion of risk factors within that document. The Company does not undertake, and specifically disclaims any obligation, to update any forward-looking statements to reflect occurrences or unanticipated events or circumstances after the date of such statements except as required by law. Any statements about future operating results, such as those concerning accretion and dilution to the Company’s earnings or shareholders, are for illustrative purposes only, are not forecasts, and actual results may differ.

RBB BANCORP AND SUBSIDIARIES CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS (Unaudited) (Dollars in thousands)
	September 30,			June 30,			March 31,			December 31,			September 30,
	2024			2024			2024			2023			2023
Assets
Cash and due from banks	$	26,388		$	23,313		$	21,887		$	22,671		$	23,809
Interest-earning deposits with financial institutions		323,002			229,456			247,356			408,702			306,982
Cash and Cash Equivalents		349,390			252,769			269,243			431,373			330,791
Interest-earning time deposits with financial institutions		600			600			600			600			600
Investment securities available for sale		305,666			325,582			335,194			318,961			354,378
Investment securities held to maturity		5,195			5,200			5,204			5,209			5,214
Mortgage loans held for sale		812			3,146			3,903			1,911			62
Loans held for investment		3,091,896			3,047,712			3,027,361			3,031,861			3,120,952
Allowance for loan losses		(43,685	)		(41,741	)		(41,688	)		(41,903	)		(42,430	)
Net loans held for investment		3,048,211			3,005,971			2,985,673			2,989,958			3,078,522
Premises and equipment, net		24,839			25,049			25,363			25,684			26,134
Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) stock		15,000			15,000			15,000			15,000			15,000
Cash surrender value of bank owned life insurance		59,889			59,486			59,101			58,719			58,346
Goodwill		71,498			71,498			71,498			71,498			71,498
Servicing assets		7,256			7,545			7,794			8,110			8,439
Core deposit intangibles		2,194			2,394			2,594			2,795			3,010
Right-of-use assets		29,283			30,530			31,231			29,803			29,949
Accrued interest and other assets		70,644			63,416			65,608			66,404			87,411
Total assets	$	3,990,477		$	3,868,186		$	3,878,006		$	4,026,025		$	4,069,354
Liabilities and shareholders’ equity
Deposits:
Noninterest-bearing demand	$	543,623		$	542,971		$	539,517		$	539,621		$	572,393
Savings, NOW and money market accounts		666,089			647,770			642,840			632,729			608,020
Time deposits, $250,000 and under		1,052,462			1,014,189			1,083,898			1,190,821			1,237,831
Time deposits, greater than $250,000		830,010			818,675			762,074			811,589			735,828
Total deposits		3,092,184			3,023,605			3,028,329			3,174,760			3,154,072
FHLB advances		200,000			150,000			150,000			150,000			150,000
Long-term debt, net of issuance costs		119,433			119,338			119,243			119,147			174,019
Subordinated debentures		15,102			15,047			14,993			14,938			14,884
Lease liabilities – operating leases		30,880			32,087			32,690			31,191			31,265
Accrued interest and other liabilities		23,150			16,818			18,765			24,729			42,603
Total liabilities		3,480,749			3,356,895			3,364,020			3,514,765			3,566,843
Shareholders’ equity:
Common Stock		259,280			266,160			271,645			271,925			277,462
Additional paid-in capital		3,520			3,456			3,348			3,623			3,579
Retained Earnings		262,946			262,518			259,903			255,152			247,159
Non-controlling interest		72			72			72			72			72
Accumulated other comprehensive loss, net		(16,090	)		(20,915	)		(20,982	)		(19,512	)		(25,761	)
Total shareholders’ equity		509,728			511,291			513,986			511,260			502,511
Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity	$	3,990,477		$	3,868,186		$	3,878,006		$	4,026,025		$	4,069,354

RBB BANCORP AND SUBSIDIARIES CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF INCOME (Unaudited) *(In thousands, except share and per share data)*
	For the Three Months Ended						For the Nine Months Ended
	September 30, 2024		June 30, 2024		September 30, 2023		September 30, 2024		September 30, 2023
Interest and dividend income:
Interest and fees on loans	$	47,326	$	45,320	$	47,617	$	138,193	$	148,369
Interest on interest-earning deposits		3,388		3,353		3,193		11,781		6,096
Interest on investment securities		3,127		3,631		4,211		10,369		10,321
Dividend income on FHLB stock		326		327		290		984		814
Interest on federal funds sold and other		258		255		252		779		716
Total interest and dividend income		54,425		52,886		55,563		162,106		166,316
Interest expense:
Interest on savings deposits, NOW and money market accounts		5,193		4,953		3,106		14,624		8,180
Interest on time deposits		22,553		21,850		21,849		67,725		54,424
Interest on long-term debt and subordinated debentures		1,681		1,679		2,579		5,039		7,668
Interest on other borrowed funds		453		439		440		1,331		2,428
Total interest expense		29,880		28,921		27,974		88,719		72,700
Net interest income before provision for credit losses		24,545		23,965		27,589		73,387		93,616
Provision for credit losses		3,300		557		1,399		3,857		3,793
Net interest income after provision for credit losses		21,245		23,408		26,190		69,530		89,823
Noninterest income:
Service charges and fees		1,071		1,064		1,057		3,127		3,200
Gain on sale of loans		447		451		212		1,210		258
Loan servicing fees, net of amortization		605		579		623		1,773		1,959
Increase in cash surrender value of life insurance		402		385		356		1,169		1,036
Gain on OREO		—		292		190		1,016		190
Other income		3,221		717		332		4,311		982
Total noninterest income		5,746		3,488		2,770		12,606		7,625
Noninterest expense:
Salaries and employee benefits		10,008		9,533		9,744		29,468		28,935
Occupancy and equipment expenses		2,518		2,439		2,414		7,400		7,242
Data processing		1,472		1,466		1,315		4,358		3,969
Legal and professional		958		1,260		1,022		3,098		6,907
Office expenses		348		352		437		1,056		1,163
Marketing and business promotion		252		189		340		613		892
Insurance and regulatory assessments		658		981		730		2,621		2,043
Core deposit premium		200		201		236		602		708
Other expenses		1,007		703		638		2,298		2,445
Total noninterest expense		17,421		17,124		16,876		51,514		54,304
Income before income taxes		9,570		9,772		12,084		30,622		43,144
Income tax expense		2,571		2,527		3,611		8,342		12,752
Net income	$	6,999	$	7,245	$	8,473	$	22,280	$	30,392

Net income per share
Basic	$	0.39	$	0.39	$	0.45	$	1.22	$	1.60
Diluted	$	0.39	$	0.39	$	0.45	$	1.22	$	1.60
Cash Dividends declared per common share	$	0.16	$	0.16	$	0.16	$	0.48	$	0.48
Weighted-average common shares outstanding
Basic		17,812,791		18,375,970		18,995,303		18,261,702		18,991,579
Diluted		17,885,359		18,406,897		18,997,304		18,313,086		19,013,838

RBB BANCORP AND SUBSIDIARIES AVERAGE BALANCE SHEET AND NET INTEREST INCOME (Unaudited)
	For the Three Months Ended
	September 30, 2024							June 30, 2024							September 30, 2023
*(tax-equivalent basis, dollars in thousands)*	Average Balance		Interest & Fees		Yield / Rate			Average Balance		Interest & Fees		Yield / Rate			Average Balance		Interest & Fees		Yield / Rate
Interest-earning assets
Cash and cash equivalents⁽¹⁾	$	260,205	$	3,646		5.57	%	$	255,973	$	3,608		5.67	%	$	270,484	$	3,445		5.05	%
FHLB Stock		15,000		326		8.65	%		15,000		327		8.77	%		15,000		290		7.67	%
Securities
Available for sale⁽²⁾		298,948		3,105		4.13	%		318,240		3,608		4.56	%		369,459		4,187		4.50	%
Held to maturity⁽²⁾		5,198		46		3.52	%		5,203		46		3.56	%		5,385		48		3.54	%
Mortgage loans held for sale		1,165		23		7.85	%		3,032		57		7.56	%		739		13		6.98	%
Loans held for investment:⁽³⁾
Real estate		2,888,528		43,495		5.99	%		2,828,339		41,590		5.91	%		2,968,246		43,583		5.83	%
Commercial		179,885		3,808		8.42	%		185,679		3,673		7.96	%		187,140		4,021		8.52	%
Total loans held for investment		3,068,413		47,303		6.13	%		3,014,018		45,263		6.04	%		3,155,386		47,604		5.99	%
Total interest-earning assets		3,648,929	$	54,449		5.94	%		3,611,466	$	52,909		5.89	%		3,816,453	$	55,587		5.78	%
Total noninterest-earning assets		242,059							240,016							250,083
Total average assets	$	3,890,988						$	3,851,482						$	4,066,536

Interest-bearing liabilities
NOW		55,757		277		1.98	%	$	56,081	$	276		1.98	%	$	55,325	$	201		1.44	%
Money Market		439,936		4,093		3.70	%		431,559		3,877		3.61	%		403,300		2,656		2.61	%
Saving deposits		164,515		823		1.99	%		164,913		800		1.95	%		123,709		249		0.80	%
Time deposits, $250,000 and under		1,037,365		12,312		4.72	%		1,049,666		12,360		4.74	%		1,285,320		14,090		4.35	%
Time deposits, greater than $250,000		819,207		10,241		4.97	%		772,255		9,490		4.94	%		717,026		7,759		4.29	%
Total interest-bearing deposits		2,516,780		27,746		4.39	%		2,474,474		26,803		4.36	%		2,584,680		24,955		3.83	%
FHLB advances		150,543		453		1.20	%		150,000		439		1.18	%		150,000		440		1.16	%
Long-term debt		119,370		1,295		4.32	%		119,275		1,296		4.37	%		173,923		2,194		5.00	%
Subordinated debentures		15,066		386		10.19	%		15,011		383		10.26	%		14,848		385		10.29	%
Total interest-bearing liabilities		2,801,759		29,880		4.24	%		2,758,760		28,921		4.22	%		2,923,451		27,974		3.80	%
Noninterest-bearing liabilities
Noninterest-bearing deposits		528,081							529,450							571,371
Other noninterest-bearing liabilities		52,428							51,087							67,282
Total noninterest-bearing liabilities		580,509							580,537							638,653
Shareholders’ equity		508,720							512,185							504,432
Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity	$	3,890,988						$	3,851,482						$	4,066,536
Net interest income / interest rate spreads			$	24,569		1.70	%			$	23,988		1.67	%			$	27,613		1.98	%
Net interest margin						2.68	%						2.67	%						2.87	%

Total cost of deposits	$	3,044,861	$	27,746		3.63	%	$	3,003,924	$	26,803		3.59	%	$	3,156,051	$	24,955		3.14	%
Total cost of funds	$	3,329,840	$	29,880		3.57	%	$	3,288,210	$	28,921		3.54	%	$	3,494,822	$	27,974		3.18	%

_________________
(1) Includes income and average balances for interest-earning time deposits and other miscellaneous interest-earning assets.
(2) Interest income and average rates for tax-exempt securities are presented on a tax-equivalent basis.
(3) Average loan balances include nonaccrual loans. Interest income on loans includes the effects of discount accretion and net deferred loan origination fees and costs accounted for as yield adjustments.

RBB BANCORP AND SUBSIDIARIES AVERAGE BALANCE SHEET AND NET INTEREST INCOME (Unaudited)
	For the Nine Months Ended
	September 30, 2024							September 30, 2023
*(tax-equivalent basis, dollars in thousands)*	Average Balance		Interest & Fees		Yield / Rate			Average Balance		Interest & Fees		Yield / Rate
Interest-earning assets
Cash and cash equivalents⁽¹⁾	$	293,597	$	12,560		5.71	%	$	177,393	$	6,812		5.13	%
FHLB Stock		15,000		984		8.76	%		15,000		814		7.26	%
Securities
Available for sale⁽²⁾		312,352		10,302		4.41	%		332,007		10,245		4.13	%
Held to maturity⁽²⁾		5,203		140		3.59	%		5,610		151		3.60	%
Mortgage loans held for sale		1,802		105		7.78	%		295		16		7.25	%
Loans held for investment:⁽³⁾
Real estate		2,851,625		126,852		5.94	%		3,041,393		134,791		5.93	%
Commercial		181,716		11,236		8.26	%		214,618		13,562		8.45	%
Total loans held for investment		3,033,341		138,088		6.08	%		3,256,011		148,353		6.09	%
Total interest-earning assets		3,661,295	$	162,179		5.92	%		3,786,316	$	166,391		5.88	%
Total noninterest-earning assets		242,802							244,822
Total average assets	$	3,904,097						$	4,031,138

Interest-bearing liabilities
NOW	$	56,924		851		2.00	%	$	59,476	$	511		1.15	%
Money Market		427,884		11,496		3.59	%		431,299		7,315		2.27	%
Saving deposits		162,207		2,277		1.88	%		118,550		354		0.40	%
Time deposits, $250,000 and under		1,087,501		38,476		4.73	%		1,141,290		33,905		3.97	%
Time deposits, greater than $250,000		792,310		29,249		4.93	%		729,699		20,519		3.76	%
Total interest-bearing deposits		2,526,826		82,349		4.35	%		2,480,314		62,604		3.37	%
FHLB advances		150,182		1,331		1.18	%		179,707		2,428		1.81	%
Long-term debt		119,276		3,886		4.35	%		173,780		6,584		5.07	%
Subordinated debentures		15,012		1,153		10.26	%		14,794		1,084		9.80	%
Total interest-bearing liabilities		2,811,296		88,719		4.22	%		2,848,595		72,700		3.41	%
Noninterest-bearing liabilities
Noninterest-bearing deposits		528,624							624,781
Other noninterest-bearing liabilities		52,955							58,786
Total noninterest-bearing liabilities		581,579							683,567
Shareholders’ equity		511,222							498,976
Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity	$	3,904,097						$	4,031,138
Net interest income / interest rate spreads			$	73,460		1.70	%			$	93,691		2.47	%
Net interest margin						2.68	%						3.31	%

Total cost of deposits	$	3,055,450	$	82,349		3.60	%	$	3,105,095	$	62,604		2.70	%
Total cost of funds	$	3,339,920	$	88,719		3.55	%	$	3,473,376	$	72,700		2.80	%

_______________
(1) Includes income and average balances for interest-earning time deposits and other miscellaneous interest-earning assets.
(2) Interest income and average rates for tax-exempt securities are presented on a tax-equivalent basis.
(3) Average loan balances include nonaccrual loans. Interest income on loans includes the effects of discount accretion and net deferred loan origination fees and costs accounted for as yield adjustments.

RBB BANCORP AND SUBSIDIARIES SELECTED FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS (Unaudited)
	At or for the Three Months Ended									At or for the Nine Months Ended September 30,
	September 30,			June 30,			September 30,
		2024		2024			2023			2024			2023
Per share data (common stock)
Book value	$	28.81		$	28.12		$	26.45		$	28.81		$	26.45
Tangible book value⁽¹⁾	$	24.64		$	24.06		$	22.53		$	24.64		$	22.53
Performance ratios
Return on average assets, annualized		0.72	%		0.76	%		0.83	%		0.76	%		1.01	%
Return on average shareholders’ equity, annualized		5.47	%		5.69	%		6.66	%		5.82	%		8.14	%
Return on average tangible common equity, annualized⁽¹⁾		6.40	%		6.65	%		7.82	%		6.81	%		9.58	%
Noninterest income to average assets, annualized		0.59	%		0.36	%		0.27	%		0.43	%		0.25	%
Noninterest expense to average assets, annualized		1.78	%		1.79	%		1.65	%		1.76	%		1.80	%
Yield on average earning assets		5.94	%		5.89	%		5.78	%		5.92	%		5.88	%
Yield on average loans		6.13	%		6.04	%		5.99	%		6.08	%		6.09	%
Cost of average total deposits⁽²⁾		3.63	%		3.59	%		3.14	%		3.60	%		2.70	%
Cost of average interest-bearing deposits		4.39	%		4.36	%		3.83	%		4.35	%		3.37	%
Cost of average interest-bearing liabilities		4.24	%		4.22	%		3.80	%		4.22	%		3.41	%
Net interest spread		1.70	%		1.67	%		1.98	%		1.70	%		2.47	%
Net interest margin		2.68	%		2.67	%		2.87	%		2.68	%		3.31	%
Efficiency ratio⁽³⁾		57.51	%		62.38	%		55.59	%		59.90	%		53.64	%
Common stock dividend payout ratio		41.03	%		41.03	%		35.56	%		39.34	%		30.00	%

____________________

(1) Non-GAAP measure. See Non–GAAP reconciliations set forth at the end of this press release.
(2) Total deposits include non-interest bearing deposits and interest-bearing deposits.
(3) Ratio calculated by dividing noninterest expense by the sum of net interest income before provision for credit losses and noninterest income.

RBB BANCORP AND SUBSIDIARIES SELECTED FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS (Unaudited) *(Dollars in thousands)*
	At or for the quarter ended
	September 30,			June 30,			September 30,
	2024			2024			2023
Credit Quality Data:
Special mention loans	$	77,501		$	19,520		$	31,212
Special mention loans to total loans		2.51	%		0.64	%		1.00	%
Substandard loans	$	79,831		$	63,076		$	71,401
Substandard loans to total loans		2.58	%		2.07	%		2.29	%
Loans 30-89 days past due, excluding nonperforming loans	$	10,625		$	11,270		$	19,662
Loans 30-89 days past due, excluding nonperforming loans, to total loans		0.34	%		0.37	%		0.63	%
Nonperforming loans	$	60,662		$	54,589		$	40,146
OREO		—			—			284
Nonperforming assets	$	60,662		$	54,589		$	40,430
Nonperforming loans to total loans		1.96	%		1.79	%		1.29	%
Nonperforming assets to total assets		1.52	%		1.41	%		0.99	%

Allowance for loan losses	$	43,685		$	41,741		$	42,430
Allowance for loan losses to total loans		1.41	%		1.37	%		1.36	%
Allowance for loan losses to nonperforming loans		72.01	%		76.46	%		105.69	%
Net charge-offs	$	1,201		$	551		$	2,206
Net charge-offs to average loans		0.16	%		0.07	%		0.28	%

Capital ratios⁽¹⁾
Tangible common equity to tangible assets⁽²⁾		11.13	%		11.53	%		10.71	%
Tier 1 leverage ratio		12.19	%		12.48	%		11.68	%
Tier 1 common capital to risk-weighted assets		18.16	%		18.89	%		17.65	%
Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets		18.74	%		19.50	%		18.22	%
Total capital to risk-weighted assets		24.79	%		25.67	%		26.24	%

______________
(1) September 30, 2024 capital ratios are preliminary.
(2) Non-GAAP measure. See Non-GAAP reconciliations set forth at the end of this press release.

RBB BANCORP AND SUBSIDIARIES SELECTED FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS (Unaudited)
Loan Portfolio Detail	As of September 30, 2024					As of June 30, 2024					As of September 30, 2023
*(dollars in thousands)*	$			%		$				%	$				%
Loans:
Commercial and industrial	$	128,861		4.2	%	$	126,649		4.2	%	$	127,655		4.1	%
SBA		48,089		1.6	%		50,323		1.7	%		50,420		1.6	%
Construction and land development		180,196		5.8	%		202,459		6.6	%		259,778		8.3	%
Commercial real estate ⁽¹⁾		1,252,682		40.5	%		1,190,207		39.1	%		1,164,210		37.3	%
Single-family residential mortgages		1,473,396		47.7	%		1,467,802		48.2	%		1,505,307		48.2	%
Other loans		8,672		0.2	%		10,272		0.2	%		13,582		0.5	%
Total loans ⁽²⁾	$	3,091,896		100.0	%	$	3,047,712		100.0	%	$	3,120,952		100.0	%
Allowance for loan losses		(43,685	)				(41,741	)				(42,430	)
Total loans, net	$	3,048,211				$	3,005,971				$	3,078,522

_______________
(1) Includes non-farm and non-residential loans, multi-family residential loans and non-owner occupied single family residential loans.
(2) Net of discounts and deferred fees and costs of $467, $645, and $383 as of September 30, 2024, June 30, 2024, and September 30, 2023, respectively.

Deposits	As of September 30, 2024				As of June 30, 2024				As of September 30, 2023
*(dollars in thousands)*	$		%		$			%	$			%
Deposits:
Noninterest-bearing demand	$	543,623	17.6	%	$	542,971	18.0	%	$	572,393	18.1	%
Savings, NOW and money market accounts		666,089	21.5	%		647,770	21.4	%		608,020	19.3	%
Time deposits, $250,000 and under		926,877	30.0	%		921,712	30.5	%		848,868	26.9	%
Time deposits, greater than $250,000		808,304	26.1	%		790,478	26.1	%		687,365	21.8	%
Wholesale deposits⁽¹⁾		147,291	4.8	%		120,674	4.0	%		437,426	13.9	%
Total deposits	$	3,092,184	100.0	%	$	3,023,605	100.0	%	$	3,154,072	100.0	%

___________________
(1) Includes brokered deposits, collateralized deposits from the State of California, and deposits acquired through internet listing services.

Non-GAAP Reconciliations

Tangible Book Value Reconciliations

Tangible book value per share is a non-GAAP disclosure. Management measures tangible book value per share to assess the Company’s capital strength and business performance and believes this is helpful to investors as additional tools for further understanding our performance. The following is a reconciliation of tangible book value to the Company shareholders’ equity computed in accordance with GAAP, as well as a calculation of tangible book value per share as of September 30, 2024, June 30, 2024, and September 30, 2023.


*(dollars in thousands, except share and per share data)*	September 30, 2024			June 30, 2024			September 30, 2023
Tangible common equity:
Total shareholders’ equity	$	509,728		$	511,291		$	502,511
Adjustments
Goodwill		(71,498	)		(71,498	)		(71,498	)
Core deposit intangible		(2,194	)		(2,394	)		(3,010	)
Tangible common equity	$	436,036		$	437,399		$	428,003
Tangible assets:
Total assets-GAAP	$	3,990,477		$	3,868,186		$	4,069,354
Adjustments
Goodwill		(71,498	)		(71,498	)		(71,498	)
Core deposit intangible		(2,194	)		(2,394	)		(3,010	)
Tangible assets	$	3,916,785		$	3,794,294		$	3,994,846
Common shares outstanding		17,693,416			18,182,154			18,995,303
Common equity to assets ratio		12.77	%		13.22	%		12.35	%
Tangible common equity to tangible assets ratio		11.13	%		11.53	%		10.71	%
Book value per share	$	28.81		$	28.12		$	26.45
Tangible book value per share	$	24.64		$	24.06		$	22.53

Return on Average Tangible Common Equity

Management measures return on average tangible common equity (“ROATCE”) to assess the Company’s capital strength and business performance and believes this is helpful to investors as an additional tool for further understanding our performance. Tangible equity excludes goodwill and other intangible assets (excluding mortgage servicing rights), and is reviewed by banking and financial institution regulators when assessing a financial institution’s capital adequacy. This non-GAAP financial measure should not be considered a substitute for operating results determined in accordance with GAAP and may not be comparable to other similarly titled measures used by other companies. The following table reconciles ROATCE to its most comparable GAAP measure:

	Three Months Ended									Nine Months Ended September 30,
*(dollars in thousands)*	September 30, 2024			June 30, 2024			September 30, 2023			2024			2023
Net income available to common shareholders	$	6,999		$	7,245		$	8,473		$	22,280		$	30,392
Average shareholders’ equity		508,720			512,185			504,432			511,222			498,976
Adjustments:
Average goodwill		(71,498	)		(71,498	)		(71,498	)		(71,498	)		(71,498	)
Average core deposit intangible		(2,326	)		(2,525	)		(3,165	)		(2,525	)		(3,398	)
Adjusted average tangible common equity	$	434,896		$	438,162		$	429,769		$	437,199		$	424,080
Return on average common equity		5.47	%		5.69	%		6.66	%		5.82	%		8.14	%
Return on average tangible common equity		6.40	%		6.65	%		7.82	%		6.81	%		9.58	%

MIL-OSI USA: Remarks by Vice President Harris and Liz Cheney at a Campaign Event | Malvern, PA

US Senate News:

Source: The White House
People’s LightMalvern, Pennsylvania
11:54 A.M. EDT
     THE VICE PRESIDENT: Let’s get to it.
     MS. LONGWELL: Let’s do it. Let’s do it.
     THE VICE PRESIDENT: Good morning, everyone.
     AUDIENCE: Good morning.
     AUDIENCE MEMBER: Happy birthday!
     MS. LONGWELL: Oh, happy belated birthday. (Applause.) Oh, yeah.
THE VICE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Thank you. I appreciate that. Thank you.
     MS. LONGWELL: Audience members showing me up — that’s tough. (Laughter.)
Okay. So, I’ve got to start with the thing that brings us here today, because I’ve got to say it is unusual for somebody who was as high up in the Republican leadership as Liz Cheney was to be out here campaigning with the Democratic nominee for president.
And so, maybe — why don’t both of you tell us, but you start: You’ve actually marshaled unprecedented support from Republicans in this election. Why do you think that is?
THE VICE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Sarah. Thank you for being here and for your work. And the congresswoman, thank you.
I — I have said before and it must be repeated each time: There are moments in the history of our country which challenge us, each of us, to really decide do we stand for those things that we talk about, including, in particular, country over party. And you have been extraordinarily courageous in the way that you have done that. And I thank you for that. (Applause.)
So, you know, I have in my career now — whether it was as the elected district attorney, elected attorney general, and then elected United States senator, and, of course, now vice president — I’ve counted that I have taken the oath of office six times. And for the elected leaders here, we know it is an oath that one must take sincerely and unequivocally, which is an oath, among other things, to support and defend the Constitution of the United States and to understand what those principles represent and what they require of the individual who holds the office and the public trust.
And let’s not undervalue that point as well. It is not about the individual. It is not about what is in their personal interests. It is about what is for and in the spirit of the public good.
And this is a moment in this election that presents a real contrast among how I, as one of the two nominees, and my opponent, the former president, think of that duty. And it is a duty, by the way. There are certain things in our lives that we have the choice if we feel like it — (laughter) — and then there are certain things that are just fundamentally a duty, like to raise our children. Things of that nature. It is a duty to take seriously that oath and do it for the sake of the public good and in the public trust.
And I think that at this moment, with the choice that the American people have in this election in — in two weeks and one day, this election is presenting — for the first time, probably, in certainly recent history — a very clear choice and difference between the two nominees. And I think that is what, as much as anything, is bringing us, as Americans, together, who are understanding that we cannot, with such fundamental stakes being presented, afford to be mired in ideological differences without really staking our claim to the most fundamental ideals upon which our country stands.
MS. LONGWELL: Thank you. And, you know, Congresswoman Cheney, it’s a — sort of the same question to you. But I got to ask: You know, it’s one thing for Republicans to sign a letter. You know, we’ve seen that she has — Vice President Harris has been endorsed by 200 Republicans in the national security space, all kinds of people from George W. Bush’s administration. There’s been a lot of people — they’ll sign letters and maybe they’ll go on T.V., they’ll release a statement. I was just with Republican Congressman Charlie Dent — former Republican congressman here from the state. He voted for you in his early voting.
But you are out here campaigning. You are out here holding events. So, talk about why it’s been so important to you to be as involved as you are in getting Vice President Harris elected.
MS. CHENEY: Well, thank you so much, Sarah, for the question. And — and it’s an honor to be here today with you, Madam Vice President.
     You know — (applause) —
THE VICE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
MS. CHENEY: — for me, every — every single thing in — in my experience and in my background has — has played a part in my decision to endorse Vice President Harris.
And, you know, that — that begins with the fact that I’m a conservative, and I know that the most conservative of all conservative principles is being faithful to the Constitution. And you have to choose, in this race, between someone who has been faithful to the Constitution, who will be faithful, and Donald Trump, who it’s not just us predicting how he will act. We watched what he did after the last election. We watched what he did on January 6th.
And so, coming to this as someone who’s been a lifelong Republican, a lifelong conservative, also as someone who spent — I spent time working overseas before I was elected to Congress, and I’ve — I’ve spent time working in countries where people aren’t free and where people are struggling for their freedom, and I know how — how quickly democracies can unravel.
And I know that, as Americans, we can become accustomed to thinking, “Well, we don’t have to worry about that here.” But I tell you, again, as someone who has seen firsthand how quickly it can happen, that that is what’s on the ballot. That’s absolutely what’s on the ballot.
I also — I come to this decision as a mother. I have five children. And there was a moment right after January 6th when my husband and I were having dinner with our two youngest, our two sons, and I looked across the table at my — my young sons, and I thought to myself, “You know, in the aftermath of the attack on the Capitol, are they going to grow up in a country where we don’t have to worry about the peaceful transfer of power? Are they going to grow up in a country where that is guaranteed?”
And — and I believe that every one of us in this election has a duty and an obligation to do what we know is right for the country, and that’s to support Vice President Harris. So, I’m very honored to be here and to do that. (Applause.)
     THE VICE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
You know, if I can just echo the congresswoman’s point. So, I’ve now, as vice president, met over 150 world leaders — presidents, prime ministers, chancellors, and kings — many of them multiple times, to the point we’re on a first-name basis. And the last few times that I’ve seen them in the relative eve of this election, they are very concerned, our allies. Because, as you know, when we walk in those rooms around the world representing the United States of America, we have traditionally been able to walk in those rooms chin up, shoulders back, with the self-appointed and earned authority to talk about the importance of democracies and rule of law.
But as all the role models here know, as a role model, people watch what you do to see if it lines up with what you say. People around the world are watching this.
And I — I tell you, sometimes I do fret a bit about whether we, as Americans, truly understand how important we are to the world. I hope everyone does really understand that we represent something — imperfect though we certainly are; flawed though we may be — we represent, in terms of our ideals, the — the basis of our Constitution, we represent a gold standard.
And when we have someone who has been president, who wants to be president again, who is saying he would be dictator on day one, would weaponize our Department of Justice — one of the principles of our democracy is that we say we have a justice system that is blind, that is not punitive against one’s enemies, they are watching.
So, this is about direct impact on the American people, and it most certainly will impact people around the world.
MS. LONGWELL: You know, I’m so glad you brought that up. And I — I — as a follow-up, I would just ask Congressman Cheney too. We live in a dangerous time. I mean, I think Americans are watching what’s happening overseas in Ukraine, in Israel. Republicans — we used to be the party that would be on the side of our democratic allies like Ukraine.
Talk to me a little bit and all of us about why, from a foreign policy standpoint, you find yourself able to endorse Democrats, who w- — wouldn’t — it didn’t used to be that way.
MS. CHENEY: Well, it — it’s not just able to endorse them. But — but if you look at the numbers of the most senior officials who served Donald Trump — his own vice president; national security advisors; his chief of staff; you know, the — the leading generals who served him — who’ve all said he’s unfit, and people really need to stop and think about how completely unprecedented that is.
And the — the idea — when people sort of say, “Well, we might, you know, be tempted, for some reason or another, to vote for Donald Trump” — if the issue is foreign policy, I would just ask everyone: Think about how dangerous and damaging it is to have someone who’s totally erratic — totally erratic, completely unstable — someone who has aligned himself with, who idolizes tyrants. He idolizes tyrants.
You know, the — the — again, the choice here, with respect to national security policy, is a man who has proven — he has absolutely proven that he will not stand up, he won’t defend this nation with respect to our own Constitution and rule of law, and Vice President Harris, who has been clear in terms of support for Ukraine, in terms of recognizing and understanding across the board that America cannot maintain our own freedom and security if we walk away from our allies around the world.
And our adversaries know that they can play Donald Trump. They absolutely know that they can play him. And we simply can’t afford to take that risk.
So, as someone who has spent a career on national security issues — again, this was not at all a difficult choice for me — the — the choice here is absolutely clear in terms of the necessity of supporting Vice President Harris.
THE VICE PRESIDENT: And — and if I may emphasize, part of the backbone of our national security is our military. And let’s please not overlook how someone who wants to be commander in chief and was has talked about our servicemen and women; has talked about an American hero like John McCain, who was a prisoner of war — said he didn’t respect him, didn’t like him because he got caught; has talked about our service members as — as though they are less than the most courageous of us.
Those who put on the uniform, who represent the United States of America, who are willing to die for the sake of everything we stand for, and he calls them “suckers” and “losers.” These things cannot be overlooked.
And — and I have said many times publicly, and I’ll say it again: In many, many ways, Donald Trump is an unserious man, but the consequences of him being president of the United States are brutally serious. There are things that he says that will be the subject of skits and laughter and jokes, but words have meaning coming from someone who aspires to stand behind the seal of the president of the United States. These are the things that are at stake.
     MS. LONGWELL: Couldn’t agree more.
So, I do want to ask you another question, though, before we go to the audience. You know, you talk a lot about a new way forward. You talk about turning the page. What’s on the next page? Talk to us about a —
THE VICE PRESIDENT: You want a preview.
MS. LONGWELL: Yeah. Give me — a spoiler alert. You know? (Laughter.) Just —
THE VICE PRESIDENT: Right.
MS. LONGWELL: — tell us — tell us what’s — what’s in the rest of the chapter.
THE VICE PRESIDENT: Well, first of all, I will say that it — it is a metaphor that is meant to also describe my intention to embark on a new generation of leadership. And needless to say, mine will not be a continuation of the Biden administration. I bring to it my own ideas, my own experiences.
But it is also about moving past what, frankly, I think has been the last decade of — of the American discourse being influenced by Donald Trump in a way that has had the effect of suggesting we, as Americans, should point the finger at one another, in a way that has been using the power of the presidency to demean and to divide us.
I think people are exhausted with that, rightly. And it, frankly, does not lead to the strength of our nation to tell the American people that we must be suspicious of one another, distrust one another.
You know, yesterday, I — I did a couple of church services, and there’s a — we — many people here know the — the parable of the Good Samaritan. And there is an essence — a piece of that, in my own words, that really requires us, I think, to see in the face of a — of a stranger, to see a neighbor. Right? That spirit. And I think we need to get back to that.
The spirit of the American people is such that, you know, we are an ambitious people. We are aspirational. We have dreams. And that is productive.
It is not productive of us to be a nation of people who are pointing fingers at one another, who don’t understand that the vast majority of us have so much more in common than what separates us.
So, that’s what I mean about turning the page. And then a new generation of leadership about being ambitious, about all we have yet to do.
Part of my economic policy — I refer to it as an opportunity economy — is about investing in American industries while leaving none of our traditional, wonderful industries behind; repurposing and retooling the factories that have led to America’s success in industry, while at the same time redefining how we are thinking about which worker has the experience and skill to do the — the job and is qualified and understanding we shouldn’t be falling into a trap that suggests only those with a college degree have the skill or the experience to do the job. So, let’s look at how we redefine and perhaps even reorder.
And, in fact, I’m going to start with federal jobs, and then I’m going to challenge the private sector to do the same. Let’s look at which of those jobs would benefit from a skilled, experienced worker who perhaps went through an apprenticeship program — not a four-year college, but still had a four-year degree, in essence.
     So, these are the kinds of things that are about seeing the opportunity of this moment and investing in it.
     I’ll tell you — and I know this is a controversial topic for many of us — I love Gen Z. (Laughter.) Because we have Gen Zs in our lives. We have kids who are Gen Zs. It can be complicated, I know. I love Gen Z.
     These young leaders are so — they’re clear-eyed. You know, they’ve only known the climate crisis. They’ve only known active shooter drills. I mean, we had fire drills. Not — not our kids, right?
     But they also — they’re — they’re so wonderfully impatient — (laughter) — ri- — no, really, that’s good. That’s good. They are ready to get in there. Let’s invest in them. Let —
     So, for example, one of my — one piece of my opportunity economy is we got to deal with the reality of where we are right now. The American dream, for previous generations, was something that people could kind of count on. Not so much anymore, in terms of homeownership. We have a housing shortage in America. We have a supply shortage.
     So, part of my plan is, hey, let’s be clear-eyed about this moment. Let’s invest in the future. And as a — a devout public servant, I also know the limitations of government. I want to work with the private sector. I have, in my career. The skills, the breadth, the depth of — of value in those active partnerships benefit us all.
     So, part of my plan for housing is to actively partner with building developers, with homebuilders to create tax credits to increase the supply of housing in America. My estimate is — I think we can actually do it — by 3 million by the end of my first term.
     Part of my approach that is about a new generation, potentially, of leadership and certainly a different approach: Most of my career was not spent in Washington, D.C. I say that with pride. (Laughter.)
     In that, you know, most of my career was spent as a prosecutor, but I — making decisions that had a direct impact on people’s lives. You know, I learned at a very young age, as a prosecutor, that the things that I would do with the swipe of my pen could result in someone having their liberty or not.
     When I was attorney general of California — which is, you know, by estimates, the fifth-largest economy in the world — I was acutely aware the words I spoke could move markets.
     I like getting things done. And part of my approach, which is, I think, about a new generation of leadership, is: Let’s cut through the red tape. Let’s cut through the bureaucracy while still knowing the virtues of the work that we can do in the public sector, be it public education, public health, public safety.
     MS. LONGWELL: This is a perfect segue into our first audience question, which is going to come from Alexandra Miller from Delaware County. Main section, right — right there.
     Hi, Alexandra.
     Q    Hello. Hello, Madam Vice President and Representative Cheney.
     MS. CHENEY: Hi there.
     THE VICE PRESIDENT: Hi.
     Q    Thank you for taking my question today. My name is Alex. I have a 7-year-old son and a wonderful 72-year-old mother who is suffering from dementia and requires full-time care.
     My son is in second grade, my mother is in a nursing home, and I work full time. The costs of childcare and of eldercare are staggering. But simultaneously, professionals that help care for both our children and our elders are generally underpaid, which makes it difficult for them to support their own families and do the jobs that they need to do.
     How do you propose to help bridge this gap, making both child- and eldercare more affordable for hardworking families and also retaining and attracting quality talent for this — these essential jobs?
     THE VICE PRESIDENT: So, first of all, you’re dealing with a lot. You’re dealing with a lot, and I just wish you strength and support. You are a part of what we call the “sandwich generation,” which are those parents and children who are right in the middle. They are taking care of their young children and taking care of their parents as they age. And it’s a lot.
     And so, I actually plan to address this in a substantial way because I actually bring a personal experience to it as well. I took care of my mother when she was sick, and that work is the work of trying to cook something that they feel like eating — right? — trying to figure out which clothes will not irritate their skin and help them put on a sweater. It’s about trying to figure out how you can say something that brings a smile to their face or makes them laugh. It’s about dignity.
     Meanwhile, you have a second-grader. You’re trying to teach that kid how to read — (laughter) — spending time with them, reminding them they are special and can be anything.
     And in the middle of all of that, if you are working or just to have a minute to breathe, it’s a lot. It’s a lot.
     So, what — the way that this plays out for many people is — is one of just a couple of ways. One, if you have the good fortune of having enough extra money, you can hire somebody to come in. And then, exactly as you said, you — knowing what you just shared with us about yourself — would pay them the value of their work. Or someone in this position would have to basically spend down all their savings so they could qualify for Medicaid, which means they pretty much have to get rid of everything. Or they have to quit their job, which means one less income in their household.
     And this is a matter — this issue, for me, is a matter of dignity — yours, your parents, and the well-being of your child and you being able to do what you naturally want to do, and which — and the thing that we should value in our society, which is someone like you who is taking on the duty and the responsibility of all of that.
     So, my plan is that instead of those scenarios I just mapped out, we will restructure it so that Medicare covers the cost of in-home health care for your parent so that they can be at home — (applause) — and you can then have the assistance with someone who can help prepare that meal, help them get dressed, and you can still give that baby of yours all the love that they deserve. And you can have sanity in the process. And everyone can have dignity.
     And so, this is — this is my approach, which is let’s just look at this as an — let’s just come at it from common sense, by the way. It’s just common sense. And what makes — what is a — a commonsense, practical approach to doing this, because when you are able to be productive, we all benefit, by the way. When that child is able to have a parent who is able to help them with their reading and remind that child that they are special, we are all going to benefit from that.
     So, thank you for raising the subject. (Applause.) And you take care of yourself.
     MS. LONGWELL: Okay. Next we’re going to call on Ashley Scott, speaking of Gen Z — although I guess I shouldn’t assume I know what generation she’s from, but she is a student from Bucks County. Hi.
     Q    Hi, Vice President Harris and Congresswoman Cheney. My name is Ashley Scott. I’m from Bucks County, Pennsylvania, and I am Gen Z. I’m 22 years old. (Laughter.)
     MS. LONGWELL: Nailed it.
     THE VICE PRESIDENT: Good for you. (Laughs.)
     Q    So, thank you for that compliment. But yeah, my question is about maternal health. Specifically, in the United States, maternal mortality is devastating. The rates are terrible. And I was wondering if you have a plan to combat the crisis.
     THE VICE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Ashley, and thank you for being here and your voice. It’s a big issue. So, we have the very, I think, shameful distinction of — of any wealthy nation having one of, if not the highest, rate of maternal mortality.
     And I’ve studied this issue. I worked on it was on — when I was in the United States Senate and as vice president. And the fact is that 90 percent of them are preventable, which tells us we can do something about it, right?
     And it is an issue — so, Black women are three to four times more likely to die in connection with childbirth; Native women are, like, twice as likely; rural women, one and a half times as likely.
     One of the common threads that you will see in those demographic populations is a lack of appropriate prenatal care and then care during the term of their pregnancy and then postpartum care. And we know that when that care is available, they are having a healthier and, by the way, happier experience. And the long-term impact to all of us as a society, much less to that family, is immense.
     And so, the work that we have been doing and the work I intend to do going forward is to address that, right? So, for example, in rural America, the — the way that the system has been structured — the health care system has been structured is a lot of those hospitals and clinics have had to close because of the way we — we reimburse based on population size. And as people are leaving rural America, then the hospitals and the clinics can’t afford the overhead.
     I’m oversimplifying but just to make the point. So, we need to address that in terms of how we’re structuring, how we create incentives and — and give the resources to those health care facilities, be they clinics or hospitals.
     The other piece that we have to do is really just talk more about the issue around also how, in the health care system, we are treating women and are we taking women seriously when they talk about their health care concerns.
     So, again, personal experience, my mother had two goals in her life: to raise her two daughters, my sister and I, and to end breast cancer. My mother was a breast cancer researcher. And she was so passionate about women’s health care, and I remember it as a young girl and throughout my life.
     And we still have a lot of work to do to make sure that when she walks into that clinic, that doctor’s office, that hospital, that when — that she’s taken seriously. And — and that’s also about what we do in terms of training within the profession. It’s also about what we do in terms of public education to get information to women so that they know that they are not just complaining and they should not suppress or subordinate what their concerns might be about themselves because they’re taking care of everybody else.
     So, there’s a lot of work to do. And, of course, there’s a connection between this and what we need to do since the Dobbs decision came down, when we are looking at — I’ve met with a lot of, in particular, OB-GYNs who are concerned that there are kids going through — excuse me, young people going through their medical school who are now feeling deterred from engaging in reproductive health work.
     And reproductive health work is vast. It is not only about abortion; it is about a whole array of care. And we want to make sure that we’re not creating disincentives for people to go into that very, very important profession.
     And then we also want to make sure that we are, in the whole issue of reproductive care, not suggesting to women or the people who love them that they should be judged, because there is that also when you’re talking about reproductive care, where women sometimes are made to feel or do feel embarrassed to talk about their needs as it relates to their reproductive health.
     And then, of course, I feel very strongly the government should not be telling any woman what to do with her body. (Applause.) (Laughs.) And when Congress passes a law reinstating the reproductive freedoms of women, I will gladly and proudly sign it into law, because I strongly believe one does not have to give up or abandon their own faith or beliefs to agree that — not the government telling her what to do. If she chooses, she will consult with her priest, her pastor, her rabbi, her imam, but not the government.
     We’ve seen too much harm — real harm — happen to women and the people who love them around our country since that decision came down, including women who have died. And I don’t think that most people who — before the Dobbs decision came down — who had strong opinions about this — I don’t think most people intended that the harm that we’ve seen would have actually happened.
     MS. CHENEY: Can I add to this just to — because I — I think it’s such an important point. And I think there are many of us around the country who have been pro-life but who have watched what’s going on in our states since the Dobbs decision and have watched state legislatures put in place laws that are resulting in women not getting the care they need.
     And so, I think this — this is not an issue that we’re seeing break down across party lines —
     THE VICE PRESIDENT: Right.
     MS. CHENEY: — but I think we’re seeing people come together to say what has happened to women, when women are facing situations where they can’t get the care they need — where in places like Texas, for example, the attorney general is talking about suing — is suing to get access to women’s medical records — that’s not sustainable for us as — as a country, and — and it has to change. (Applause.)
     THE VICE PRESIDENT: Yeah. Yeah.
     MS. LONGWELL: So, as we come close to time here, I want to ask you both kind of a final question. You know, I — I watch the — the conversation in the country and the way that the media covers this election, and it’s often about the race: Who’s up in a poll? Who’s down in a poll? And I — I don’t always feel like we’re talking about the stakes enough.
     And Liz Cheney would not be here if she didn’t think that the stakes were very high. And frankly, the Republicans wouldn’t be so angry at you if they didn’t think you were an effective surrogate as somebody speaking about the stakes. (Applause.)
     THE VICE PRESIDENT: Some Republicans. Some Republicans.
     MS. LONGWELL: Some Republicans. Some Republicans. #NotAllRepublicans. (Laughter.)
     THE VICE PRESIDENT: Because I’ve seen a lot of Republicans — just I’ve seen it and I know it happens — who thank her constantly.
     MS. LONGWELL: I — I know it.
     THE VICE PRESIDENT: Yeah. Yeah.
     MS. LONGWELL: I know it.
     MS. CHENEY: They’re going to vote the right way on November 5th.
     MS. LONGWELL: That’s right.
     MS. CHENEY: They might not think public about it, but — but they’ll do what — what they know is right. (Applause.)
     THE VICE PRESIDENT: Yeah. I agree. I agree. I agree.
     MS. LONGWELL: But just to close and — and maybe starting with you, Congresswoman, so you can have the last word. Talk to me and all of us about the stakes. Many people in the room here are undecided voters. What’s — what’s kind of the last pitch that you would make about why this election is so important and why you believe they should vote for the vice president here?
     MS. CHENEY: Well, I think that in this election, and especially here in Pennsylvania, we have the opportunity to tell the whole world who we are. And we have the chance to say, you know, we’re — we’re going to reject cruelty. We’re going to reject the kind of vile vitriol that we’ve seen from Donald Trump. We’re going to reject the misogyny that we’ve seen from Donald Trump and J.D. Vance. (Applause.)
     THE VICE PRESIDENT: Right.
     MS. CHENEY: And we have the chance in this race to elect somebody who you know is going to defend the rule of law. You know Vice President Harris is going to defend our Constitution.
     We have the chance to remind people that we are a good country. We are a good and honorable people. We are a great nation.
     And — and in this race, we have the opportunity to vote for and support somebody you can count on.
     We’re not always going to agree, but I know Vice President Harris will always do what she believes is right for this country. She has a sincere heart, and that’s why I’m honored to be here and supporting her in this race. (Applause.)
     THE VICE PRESIDENT: I mean, I — exactly. The — listen, so, in my career as a prosecutor — you’ve heard me say this — I — I never, ever asked a victim or a witness, “Are you a Republican or a Democrat?” Never. It wouldn’t have even occurred to me to ask them. I did, every time, ask, “Are you okay?”
     And I — you know, and I feel very strongly that — for example, in — on the issue of partisanship, yes, we’re going to have disagreements, but I actively invite good ideas from wherever they come. That’s why I’m going to have a Republican in my Cabinet, by the way — (applause) — because I want good ideas.
     And, by the way, I know it is in our best interest as a nation, in our — the interest of our strength and our future as a nation. We need a healthy two-party system. We need a healthy two-party system. (Applause.)
     We need to be able to have these good, intense debates about issues that are grounded in fact. (Laughter.) How about that?
     MS. CHENEY: Imagine.
.
     THE VICE PRESIDENT: Let’s start there. (Laughs.) (Applause.)
     Wow. Can you believe that’s an applause line? (Laughter.)
     Oy. But, you know, it’s — (laughter) — it’s —
     We have in our grasp in these next 13 days — 13 days, we are — or 15 days, excuse me. I — I’m just jumping ahead. (Laughter.) In these next 15 days, we have in our grasp the ability to determine the course of our country.
     You know, every election, we’ve said, “This is the one.” This is the one. This truly is the one.
     I mean, to the congresswoman’s point, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff referred to Donald Trump as being “fascist to the core.” And no one would ever accuse the former chairman of being partisan in any way. The people who know him best — from the former chief of staff; Defense secretaries, two of them; national security advisor to the former vice president.
     And so, we have in — in our grasp — because we still have a democracy. As the saying goes, as long as we hold on to it, we still have a democracy, which means in a democracy — and here’s the beauty of it — we each have the power to make a decision about the future of our country through our vote.
     And my request, then, of each of you who have spent time out of your busy lives to be here — and I thank you for that — is please just help us get the word out to your neighbors and friends and family members to just remind them of what is at stake and this conversation.
     I ask for your vote. I ask for their votes. And I promise to be a president for all Americans. I promise and pledge that. (Applause.)
     MS. LONGWELL: All right, everyone. Congresswoman Cheney and Vice President Kamala Harris. Thank you so much.
     Yes, let’s give them another round of applause. That was wonderful. (Applause.)
     Thank you so much.
     THE VICE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Thank you.
     MS. LONGWELL: Thank you. (Applause.)

MIL-OSI USA: Deputy Administrator Isobel Coleman on Building Nutritional Resilience in Food Security

Source: USAID

DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR ISOBEL COLEMAN: Thank you, Ambassador [Jeff] Prescott for hosting me and this discussion here today.

It’s a great opportunity to renew our commitment to prioritizing nutrition ahead of the next Nutrition for Growth Summit in Paris next year.

Over just the past five years, we’ve faced a number of disruptions to global food security: A global pandemic, increasing climate-related disasters, and global food crises exacerbated by Russia’s unprovoked war on Ukraine.

Currently, there are 56 active conflicts in the world, the highest number since World War II. Because of this, as we all know, even though humanitarian needs are rising, there are still not nearly enough resources available to meet global needs.

Worldwide, most recent estimates indicate that well over 700 million people are undernourished, lacking adequate food to live healthy, active lives.

It is estimated that a staggering 45 million children under the age of five are experiencing acute malnutrition at any given time, and every year, up to two million of these children die as a result.

Malnutrition devastates every aspect of a child’s body. Those who survive experience lasting consequences, robbing them of the ability to live, think, create, and thrive because of lack of access to basic, life-sustaining nutrition.

The United States remains committed to addressing malnutrition in all its forms.

With the scale of child wasting today, we need to make sure that as many children as possible can be reached.

So, we all know we need to get even smarter and more strategic about the way we do this work.

Fortunately, one year ago WHO released new guidelines for child wasting prevention and management which have helped us do just that, providing a helpful framework to update our efforts to combat malnutrition and making us more effective in our work.

For example, the guidelines emphasize the importance of strengthening coordination between WFP and UNICEF for more effective prevention and treatment of moderately wasted children and severely wasted children.

In addition, the guidelines highlight the necessity of prevention programming in addition to treatment – to prevent children from becoming wasted in the first place.

This is not only the most humane approach, but the most strategic and the most cost-effective.

Without appropriate prevention, we know the billions spent today on treatment will continue in perpetuity.

And recognizing the critical role that community healthcare workers already play in meeting local needs, the guidelines empower community health workers with proper training to treat wasting and malnutrition at home – resulting in fewer trips to clinics, and fewer expensive, in-patient stays at government facilities.

The new guidelines also enable us to be more nimble, allowing severely malnourished children who are quickly improving to gradually consume less Ready-to-Use Therapeutic Food as they recover, which nutritionists agree is beneficial to a child’s long-term health.

This allows us to channel this powerful resource to the children who need it the most.

USAID has been focused on implementing the guidelines’ recommendations in order to reach more children – and we’ve been working hand-in-hand with WFP and UNICEF to develop and implement a joint strategy for phasing in these guidelines in priority humanitarian contexts.

Just last month, USAID provided $100 million to each partner to support those efforts.

The WHO guidelines brought attention to the growing evidence base of nutrition research and helped to identify where we have gaps in evidence still to be filled.

Last week, I announced USAID’s first policy paper on Cost-Effectiveness because we have learned from the global body of impact evaluation evidence that there are some programs that deliver extraordinary returns.

I committed the agency to infusing rigorous evidence more broadly and deeply across all our programming to maximize our “impact per dollar.”

Today, I am pleased to announce that USAID will host an evidence summit on wasting research in December of this year, which will bring together researchers to discuss the latest findings from nutrition experts and to identify gaps in evidence in order to shape future research.

Following the evidence sometimes requires shifting some of our investments in activities that are demonstrably “good”, because the evidence shows we could make greater progress toward the same objectives through other approaches.

It’s hard to stop a program that is doing some good, but that’s exactly what we need to do when we know we could achieve even more by working in a different way.

This kind of evidence-driven collaboration is an important step toward determining and implementing the most cost-effective malnutrition programming – which we at USAID view as a paramount priority and a moral obligation as we seek to create the greatest impact possible with each dollar we spend.

In closing, I want to thank Special Envoy [Brieuc] Pont for his steadfast leadership in preparing for the next Nutrition for Growth Summit in France next year. The U.S. government is a proud member of the Troika, which brings together hosts of Nutrition for Growth past, present, and future together with the Governments of Japan and France.

In 2021, USAID was proud to put forward a commitment focused on prevention and treatment of childhood wasting.

Going into 2025, we strongly believe this will be a critical opportunity for the entire global nutrition community to recommit to both evidence and action.

MIL-OSI USA: Shaheen, Ricketts, Tillis, Durbin Congratulate Moldova on a Successful Referendum Election

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for New Hampshire Jeanne Shaheen
(Washington, DC) – U.S. Senators Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) and Pete Ricketts (R-NE), Chair and Ranking Member of the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Europe and Regional Security Cooperation, along with U.S. Senators Thom Tillis (R-NC) and Dick Durbin (D-IL), Co-Chair of the U.S. Senate Ukraine Caucus, issued the following joint statement in response to reports of a successful referendum in Moldova, which constitutionally affirms its EU membership aspirations:
“Following reports of a successful referendum election, we applaud the people of Moldova for enshrining into their constitution a commitment to a more democratic, European future—a rebuke of Moscow’s attempt at malign influence in the country.
“As the people of Moldova reaffirm their goal of European Union membership, we are clear-eyed that achieving it will be no small feat. In its thirty-three years of independence, Moldova has repeatedly contended with Russian attempts to retain influence, whether through Moscow’s military presence in Transnistria, inside Moldova’s internationally recognized borders, or through rampant mis- and disinformation campaigns. Moldova has also grappled with significant ripple effects from Russia’s full-scale invasion of its neighbor, Ukraine, including disruptions in its energy supply, significant inflation and an unprecedented influx of refugees – to which the Moldovan people responded with generosity.
“We also welcome the initial results from the presidential contest and an encouraging preliminary statement from the OSCE’s observation mission which described the elections as ‘well-managed’. We hope that the upcoming run-off elections, to be held on November 3, will also be conducted in the same manner and look forward to working with Moldova’s government as it continues strive toward Western integration.”
Earlier this year, Shaheen led a Congressional delegation to Moldova with U.S. Senator Chris Murphy (D-CT). Shaheen and Murphy hosted a roundtable with civil society groups and free media organizations to discuss the threat that disinformation poses to its democracy and the nation’s efforts to combat Russian campaigns that have threatened to undermine Moldovan elections. The delegation also met with Moldova’s Prime Minister Dorin Recean and President Maia Sandu. Durbin met with Moldovan President Maia Sandu in Chicago last year.

MIL-OSI United Kingdom: UK strengthens national security and bolsters Ukraine’s war chest with £2.26 billion military loan

Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

Ukraine will receive further funding to purchase essential military equipment to defend itself against Russia’s illegal invasion, as the Chancellor today announces that the Government will loan a further £2.26 billion in new money to Ukraine.

UK announces £2.26 billion loan to Ukraine backed by profits from sanctioned Russian sovereign assets
Forms Britain’s contribution to the $50 billion loan announced at the G7 Leaders’ Summit in June
New money for Ukraine will bolster equipment on the frontline

The new £2.26 billion is the UK’s contribution to the G7 Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) Loans to Ukraine scheme, in which $50 billion from G7 countries will be delivered to Ukraine for its military, budget and reconstruction needs. The loan will be repaid using the extraordinary profits on immobilised Russian sovereign assets.

The Chancellor Rachel Reeves made the announcement alongside Defence Secretary John Healey while visiting Ukrainian personnel who are being trained in the UK. More than 45,000 personnel have been trained in the UK under Operation INTERFLEX and the scheme has been extended to at least the end of 2025.

The UK’s £2.26 billion loan is earmarked as budgetary support for Ukraine’s military spending, enabling the Ukrainians to invest in key equipment to support their efforts against Russia, such as air defence, artillery and wider equipment support. It comes on top of the UK’s existing £3 billion a year military aid for Ukraine, which the Prime Minister re-committed to within his first week in office.

The UK has sent around 400 different capabilities to Ukraine, with Defence Secretary John Healey MP recently announcing that the UK will supply 650 Lightweight Multirole Missile systems to Ukraine to boost the country’s air defences.

Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves, said:

Our support for Ukraine and her men and women in their fight for freedom from Putin’s aggression is unwavering and will remain so for as long as it takes.

This new money is in Britain’s national interest because the frontline of our defence – the defence of our democracy and shared values – is in the Ukrainian trenches. A safe and secure Ukraine is a safe and secure United Kingdom.

The $50 billion G7 ERA scheme was first announced at the G7 Leaders’ Summit in Apulia, Italy, in June this year. Russia’s obligation under international law to pay for the damage it has caused to Ukraine is clear and this G7 agreement is an important step to ensuring this happens. Today the UK has announced its contribution to the scheme and will introduce domestic legislation in the coming weeks to enable the transfer of the new funds to Ukraine as quickly as possible.

The loan is on top of the £12.8 billion already committed in military, economic and humanitarian support to Ukraine.

The funding comes alongside the UK and international partners introducing the largest and most severe package of sanctions ever imposed on a major economy. Without this, Russia would have over $400 billion more for its war machine – enough to fund its illegal invasion for a further four years. The war is having an economic and human cost for Russia; it is soaking up 40% of Russia’s annual budget and last month the country suffered its highest rate of daily casualties since the war began.

The loan announcement comes ahead of the Chancellor’s attendance of the International Monetary Fund Annual Meetings in Washington D.C. later this week, at which she will underline on the international stage that the UK and its partners stand united and will not let aggressors like Putin succeed. Earlier this month Prime Minister Keir Starmer hosted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Downing Street to discuss his victory plan for Ukraine.

Defence Secretary John Healey, said:

By using the money generated from these sanctioned Russian assets, we can help turn the tables on Putin’s war machine. This urgent funding will directly support Ukraine’s defence using the proceeds from assets that had helped fuel Putin’s aggression.

The UK is stepping up our support to Ukraine, speeding up supplies of vital equipment and boosting our defence industries. We will stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes.

Published 22 October 2024

MIL OSI United Kingdom –

MIL-OSI United Kingdom: ROK-UK Joint Statement on DPRK-Russia Cooperation

Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

Joint statement between the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs of the United Kingdom David Lammy and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea Cho Tae-yul.

We condemn in the strongest terms the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)’s continued unlawful arms transfers and the reported deployment of its troops to the Russian Federation to support Russia’s unlawful war of aggression in Ukraine. Such cooperation between Russia and the DPRK is not only in violation of multiple UNSC resolutions, but also prolongs the suffering of the Ukrainian people and threatens global security, including those in the ROK and the UK, and demonstrates the desperation of the DPRK and Russia. We are committed to providing the support Ukraine requires to secure a just and lasting peace.

We are closely monitoring what Russia provides to the DPRK in return for its provision of arms and military personnel, including Russia’s possible provision of materials and technology to the DPRK in support of Pyongyang’s military objectives. We are also deeply concerned about the possibility for any transfer of nuclear or ballistic missile-related technology to the DPRK, which would jeopardize the international non-proliferation efforts and threaten peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and across the globe. We take note that the security of the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic are more closely intertwined than ever, and commit ourselves to closely monitoring the situation and actively pursuing necessary measures together with the international community to deter further unlawful, reckless and destabilising behaviour.

Published 22 October 2024

MIL OSI United Kingdom –

MIL-OSI China: Ukrainian president, US defense secretary meet on defense issues

Source: China State Council Information Office

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and visiting U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin discussed defense issues during their meeting on Monday, according to the presidential press service.

The talks touched upon Ukraine’s request to use long-range weapons to attack military targets inside Russia.

Zelensky and Austin also addressed increasing the production of attack drones, cruise missiles, artillery shells and air defense equipment.

Austin announced a new U.S. military assistance package for Ukraine worth 400 million U.S. dollars, which includes ammunition, military equipment and weapons.

Since February 2022, the United States has provided 64.1 billion dollars in military aid to Ukraine, according to the fact sheet release by the U.S. Department of State in October this year.

MIL OSI China News –

MIL-OSI New Zealand: Slovak Republic

Source: New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade – Safe Travel

Reviewed: 18 November 2022, 08:21 NZDT
Still current at: 22 October 2024

Related news features

If you are planning international travel at this time, please read our COVID-19 related travel advice here, alongside our destination specific travel advice below.

We advise New Zealanders to exercise increased caution in the Slovak Republic (level 2 of 4).

Slovak Republic

Widespread military action is underway in neighbouring Ukraine. You should not attempt to cross into Ukraine from the Slovak Republic. If you have arrived in the Slovak Republic from Ukraine and are in need of consular assistance, contact the New Zealand Embassy in Austria which is accredited to Hungary at nzviennaconsular@aon.at or on +43 1 505 3021, or phone the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs 24/7 Consular emergency line on +64 99 20 20 20 (outside of New Zealand).

Terrorism
Terrorist groups, individuals returning to Europe from areas of conflict, and individuals adhering to various forms of extremist ideologies, continue to make threats to conduct attacks across Europe. Groups adhering to various ideologies have conducted attacks in the past.

New Zealanders in the Slovak Republic are advised to keep themselves informed of potential risks to safety and security by monitoring the media and other local information sources. We recommend following any instructions issued by the local authorities and exercising vigilance in public places.

Crime
Petty crime such as bag snatching, passport theft and pickpocketingoccurs and is more common in tourist areas, in larger cities and in and around transport hubs, particularly in Bratislava. Thieves often work together, sometimes involving children, and may distract victims and rob them while their attention is diverted. We advise New Zealanders to be alert to their surroundings at all times and take steps to safeguard and secure their personal belongings.

Car thefts and break-ins also occur. Do not leave belongings in view in your car, make sure it is locked and be wary of others offering help. Criminals sometimes puncture tyres when they are stopped and proceed to follow the vehicle to offer ‘help’ and then rob the target while they are distracted.

Some clubs and restaurants overcharge. Always ask to see the menu and price list before ordering drinks or food, and check your bill carefully before paying. Avoid disputes about overcharging, as they can lead to violence.

There have been incidents of drink spiking followed by robbery and assault reported in the Slovak Republic. Extra care should be taken to ensure your food and drink is never left unattended. We recommend against accepting drinks from strangers or recent acquaintances.

Civil unrest
Protests and demonstrations occur on occasion in the Slovak Republic and may disrupt local public services and transport. New Zealanders are advised to avoid all demonstrations, protests and large public gatherings as even those intended as peaceful have the potential to turn violent with little warning. Follow any advice from local authorities.

General travel advice
You should carry a photocopy of your passport or another form of identification at all times.

Penalties for possession, use or trafficking of illegal drugs are severe and can include lengthy imprisonment.

Same-sex relationships are legal but public displays of affection may be frowned upon or attract unwanted attention.

New Zealanders travelling or living in the Slovak Republic should have a comprehensive travel insurance policy in place.

New Zealanders in the Slovak Republic are encouraged to register their details with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

Travel tips

The New Zealand Embassy Vienna, Austria is accredited to Slovak Republic

Street Address The ICON Vienna, Tower 24, Level 15, Suite 15.02, Wiedner Gürtel 13, 1100 Vienna, Austria Telephone +43 1 505 3021 Email nzconsular-vienna@mfat.net Web Site http://www.mfat.govt.nz/austria Hours Mon-Fri 0900-1200 and from 1400-1600 Note Notarial Services (by appointment only): 0900-1200 Monday & Friday; 1230-1400 Wednesday

New Zealand Honorary Consulate Bratislava, Slovak Republic

Street Address Dvořákovo nábrežie 10, 811 02 Bratislava, Slovak Republic Telephone + 421 2 5941 8211 Email nzconsulate-slovakia@nzconsulate.sk

See our regional advice for Europe

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MIL OSI New Zealand News –

MIL-Evening Report: What’s at stake in elections in Georgia and Moldova this week: a stark choice between Russia and the West

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Adam Simpson, Senior Lecturer, International Studies, University of South Australia

Two former Soviet republics have important elections this week that will likely be pivotal in their respective journeys toward tighter integration with the West against the backdrop of rising Russian influence and the Ukraine war.

What happens in Georgia and Moldova is being closely watched across the European Union and Moscow. Russia has invested heavily in trying to influence the outcomes of both elections. If it succeeds, this will be a cause of significant concern in other ex-Soviet states, as well as the West.

Moldova takes a tentative step towards the EU

On Sunday, Moldovans voted in the first round of their presidential election. A referendum was also on the ballot to amend the country’s Constitution to include an aspiration to join the EU.

Pre-election polls had suggested the referendum would easily pass and the popular pro-EU president, Maia Sandu, would be re-elected.

However, Russia launched a significant “propaganda blitz” ahead of the vote, including credible allegations of widespread vote buying, to undermine the electoral process.

Sandu won the first round comfortably, with over 42% of the vote, though not by enough to avoid a run-off on November 3. The country’s pro-Russia parties are now likely to coalesce behind the second-place candidate in an attempt to oust her.

The referendum, however, teetered on the edge of failure before narrowly passing by the tightest of margins.

Though Moldova’s negotiations with the EU were certain to continue under Sandu regardless of the outcome, the result was nonetheless concerning. It demonstrates the strength of Russia’s influence operations to destabilise a nation seen as key to security on the eastern boundaries of the EU and NATO.

Moldova has a 1,200-kilometre border with Ukraine in the east and borders Romania, an EU and NATO member, in the west.

Polling suggests a majority of Moldovans condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but a significant minority retain pro-Russian views.

Russia also has a history of interference in Moldova’s sovereignty.

Moldova declared independence in 1991 during the dissolution of the Soviet Union but Transnistria, a small part of the country along the border with Ukraine, was taken over by separatists in a military operation backed by Russian troops.

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe formally recognised Transnistria as Moldovan territory still occupied by Russia.

What’s at stake in Georgia?

On the day of Moldova’s vote, tens of thousands of pro-EU supporters staged a demonstration in Tblisi, Georgia’s capital, calling for their country to choose a pro-EU path in their own election

The Georgian Dream party has been in power since 2012 and while it remains nominally pro-EU, it has gradually shifted towards a more pro-Russia stance.

The Georgian Dream-dominated legislature recently passed an antidemocratic, Putinesque law that requires groups receiving at least 20% of their funding from overseas to register as “agents of foreign influence”. And earlier this month, it passed a sweeping anti-LGBTQ+ bill that bans same-sex marriages, adoption by same-sex couples and changing one’s gender on identity documents.

The EU suspended Georgia’s accession process after the foreign agents law was passed and has recently cancelled €121 million (A$196 million) in funding due to “democratic backsliding”. This month, the European Parliament also overwhelmingly adopted a resolution calling for a freeze on EU funding to Georgia until its undemocratic laws are repealed.

The opposition parties are now working together to try to remove Georgian Dream from power, support the re-election of the current pro-EU president and return the country to the road of rapid integration with the EU.

Polls show support for joining the EU remains very high at nearly 80%. However, as the Moldovan election demonstrates, this may not necessarily be reflected in the vote on election day.

Russian interference

Russia has long meddled in its southern neighbour. After an invasion of Georgia in 2008, Russian troops supported two pro-Russian breakaway republics, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as they had done in Transnistria.

Russia has now established military bases in both regions, as well as a new naval base in Abkhazia to serve as a permanent base for parts of Russia’s Black Sea fleet.

These incursions set the stage for Russia’s invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014. As the post-Soviet Baltic states have argued, the lack of an adequate response from the West to these invasions set the stage for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Georgians are understandably concerned that Russia may invade their country again. Polls suggest two-thirds of people support joining NATO.

There are concerns that Saturday’s election could also be tainted. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe issued a declaration earlier this month, saying there are “alarming reports” indicating the Russian-backed Georgian Dream party might be “preparing to steal” the election.

The report accused the ruling party of a “massive intimidation campaign” against opposition candidates and their supporters, including physical attacks. It also said the Central Election Commission has apparently been brought under the control of Georgian Dream.

The opposition and civil society groups claimed electoral fraud after the 2020 elections, which resulted in mass protests and a political crisis when the opposition boycotted parliament.

Why these elections matter

These elections in Georgia and Moldova are crucial for reinforcing democratic rights in vulnerable former Soviet states. Any outcome that shifts their trajectory towards Russia will likely result in increased repression of both minorities, including the LGTBQ+ community, and the political opposition.

Wins by pro-Russian candidates and parties – legitimate or otherwise – will also drive greater military and economic integration with Russia. Despite popular support in both countries for joining NATO, wins by Russian-backed candidates will likewise undermine support for Ukraine in its war with Russia.

While it looks like pro-EU results might have squeaked through in Moldova, the elections in Georgia are potentially more hazardous for European relations.

The stakes in both elections could not be higher.

Adam Simpson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. What’s at stake in elections in Georgia and Moldova this week: a stark choice between Russia and the West – https://theconversation.com/whats-at-stake-in-elections-in-georgia-and-moldova-this-week-a-stark-choice-between-russia-and-the-west-240675

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –