Category: Ukraine

MIL-OSI: Baker Hughes Company Announces Third-Quarter 2024 Results

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Third-quarter highlights

Orders of $6.7 billion, including $2.9 billion of IET orders.
RPO of $33.4 billion, including record IET RPO of $30.2 billion.
Revenue of $6.9 billion, up 4% year-over-year.
Attributable net income of $766 million.
GAAP diluted EPS of $0.77 and adjusted diluted EPS* of $0.67.
Adjusted EBITDA* of $1,208 million, up 23% year-over-year.
Cash flows from operating activities of $1,010 million and free cash flow* of $754 million.
Returns to shareholders of $361 million, including $152 million of share repurchases.

HOUSTON and LONDON, Oct. 22, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Baker Hughes Company (Nasdaq: BKR) (“Baker Hughes” or the “Company”) announced results today for the third quarter of 2024.

“We delivered another quarter of record EBITDA, highlighted by exceptional operational performance across both segments. Our margins continue to improve at an accelerated pace, with total company EBITDA margins increasing to 17.5%. This marks the highest margin quarter since the company was formed. On the back of our solid third-quarter results and stable outlook, we remain confident in achieving our full-year EBITDA guidance midpoint,” said Lorenzo Simonelli, Baker Hughes Chairman and Chief Executive Officer.

“Orders remain at solid levels, with IET orders of $2.9 billion marking the eighth consecutive quarter at or above these levels. IET continued to demonstrate strong order momentum for gas infrastructure and FPSOs, booking the largest ever ICL compressor award from Dubai Petroleum Establishment for the Margham Gas storage facility and two FPSO awards with separate offshore operators.”

“Overall, our segments continue to make strong progress on their journey toward 20% EBITDA margins, with both segments achieving high-teen margins during the quarter. Our operational discipline and rigor continue to gain traction.”

“We are also benefiting from the life-cycle attributes of our service offerings and the breadth of our portfolio. With significant recurring IET service revenue, strong production-levered businesses, untapped market opportunities, and improved cost structure, we are becoming less cyclical and capable of generating more durable earnings and free cash flow across cycles.”

“We are successfully executing our strategy, and this is a testament to the strength of our people and the culture we are building,” concluded Simonelli.

* Non-GAAP measure. See reconciliations in the section titled “Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial Measures.”

	Three Months Ended						Variance
(in millions except per share amounts)	September 30, 2024		June 30, 2024		September 30, 2023		Sequential	Year-over-year
Orders	$	6,676	$	7,526	$	8,512	(11%)	(22%)
Revenue		6,908		7,139		6,641	(3%)	4%
Net income attributable to Baker Hughes		766		579		518	32%	48%
Adjusted net income attributable to Baker Hughes*		666		568		427	17%	56%
Operating income		930		833		714	12%	30%
Adjusted operating income*		930		847		716	10%	30%
Adjusted EBITDA*		1,208		1,130		983	7%	23%
Diluted earnings per share (EPS)		0.77		0.58		0.51	33%	51%
Adjusted diluted EPS*		0.67		0.57		0.42	18%	59%
Cash flow from operating activities		1,010		348		811	F	25%
Free cash flow*		754		106		592	F	27%

* Non-GAAP measure. See reconciliations in the section titled “Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial Measures.”

“F” is used when variance is above 100%. Additionally, “U” is used when variance is below (100)%.

Certain columns and rows in our tables and financial statements may not sum up due to the use of rounded numbers.

Quarter Highlights

Industrial & Energy Technology (“IET”) experienced a strong quarter for its Integrated Compressor Line (“ICL”) technology. In its largest ICL award to-date, and booked under Climate Technology Solutions (“CTS”), Baker Hughes will supply 10 units to Dubai Petroleum Establishment for the Margham Gas storage facility. These ICL units will support gas infrastructure, providing stability to Dubai’s energy supply by strengthening the system’s ability to switch between natural gas and solar power.

IET’s Gas Technology Equipment (“GTE”) was also awarded a significant contract to supply advanced compression solutions to Saipem for TotalEnergies’ all-electric Kaminho Floating Production Storage and Offloading (“FPSO”) project in Angola. Baker Hughes’ centrifugal BCL compressor and ICL technology were selected because of the capability to minimize greenhouse emissions and eliminate routine flaring by reinjecting associated gas into the reservoir for storage. Separately, IET was selected to provide electric motor-driven process compressors for an FPSO project in Latin America.

IET’s Gas Technology Services (“GTS”) secured a multi-decade agreement for an LNG facility in the Middle East. The scope encompasses extensive maintenance services and digital solutions, leveraging Baker Hughes’ iCenter™ Remote Monitoring and Diagnostics capabilities.

Oilfield Services & Equipment (“OFSE”) strengthened the Company’s relationship with Petrobras, receiving contracts to supply 43 miles of flexible pipe systems in Brazil’s Santos Basin. A significant portion of these risers and flowlines will be manufactured in-country at Baker Hughes’ Niteroi plant. The contracts, awarded through an open tender, include multi-year service agreements to support maintenance activities through the life of the project and demonstrate Baker Hughes’ dedication to providing equipment and services critical to help Petrobras achieve its strategic plan to expand operations.

In OFSE, mature assets solutions (“MAS”) delivered a strong order quarter, illustrating confidence in the Company’s full range of workflows and solutions to accelerate production and total recovery. OFSE won a MAS award to supply Santos Energy’s strategic and historic Cooper Basin Development in Australia with drilling fluids and wireline services, marking Baker Hughes’ return to the basin. Additionally, OFSE signed a multi-year contract extension with a customer in the Middle East for completions and well intervention.

Baker Hughes saw increased adoption of Leucipa™, the Company’s intelligent automated field production digital solution. A major global operator expanded the use of Leucipa across multiple fields in the Permian Basin, enabling the customer to optimize production through real-time field orchestration to generate lower-carbon, short-cycle barrels. Additionally, a new strategic collaboration was established early in the fourth quarter with Repsol, a major customer of Leucipa, to develop and deploy next-generation artificial intelligence capabilities for this digital solution. The companies will share knowledge and expertise to optimize and enhance production across Repsol’s global portfolio while creating new commercial opportunities for Baker Hughes.

Baker Hughes continues to innovate new digital technologies to support customers on their decarbonization journey. The Company launched CarbonEdge™, powered by Cordant™, an end-to-end, risk-based digital solution that delivers precise, real-time data and alerts on carbon dioxide (CO₂) flows across CCUS infrastructure from subsurface to surface. This solution enables operators to mitigate risk, improve decision-making, enhance operational efficiency, and simplify regulatory reporting across the entire project lifecycle.

Consolidated Revenue and Operating Income by Reporting Segment

(in millions)	Three Months Ended									Variance
	September 30, 2024			June 30, 2024			September 30, 2023			Sequential	Year-over-year
Oilfield Services & Equipment	$	3,963		$	4,011		$	3,951		(1%)	—%
Industrial & Energy Technology		2,945			3,128			2,691		(6%)	9%
Segment revenue		6,908			7,139			6,641		(3%)	4%

Oilfield Services & Equipment		547			493			465		11%	18%
Industrial & Energy Technology		474			442			346		7%	37%
Corporate⁽¹⁾		(91	)		(88	)		(95	)	(3%)	4%
Restructuring, impairment & other		—			(14	)		(2	)	F	F
Operating income		930			833			714		12%	30%
Adjusted operating income*		930			847			716		10%	30%
Depreciation & amortization		278			283			267		(2%)	4%
Adjusted EBITDA*	$	1,208		$	1,130		$	983		7%	23%

* Non-GAAP measure. See reconciliations in the section titled “Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial Measures.”

“F” is used when variance is above 100%. Additionally, “U” is used when variance is below (100)%.

⁽¹⁾Corporate costs are primarily reported in “Selling, general and administrative” in the condensed consolidated statements of income (loss).

Revenue for the quarter was $6,908 million, a decrease of 3% sequentially and an increase of 4% year-over-year. The increase in revenue year-over-year was driven by IET.

The Company’s total book-to-bill ratio in the quarter was 1.0; the IET book-to-bill ratio in the quarter was also 1.0.

Operating income as determined in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America (“GAAP”), for the third quarter of 2024 was $930 million. Operating income increased $97 million sequentially and increased $216 million year-over-year.

Adjusted operating income (a non-GAAP financial measure) for the third quarter of 2024 was $930 million. There were no adjustments to operating income in the third quarter. A list of the adjusting items and associated reconciliation from GAAP has been provided in Table 1a in the section titled “Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial Measures.” Adjusted operating income for the third quarter of 2024 was up 10% sequentially and up 30% year-over-year.

Depreciation and amortization for the third quarter of 2024 was $278 million.

Adjusted EBITDA (a non-GAAP financial measure) for the third quarter of 2024 was $1,208 million. There were no adjustments to EBITDA in the third quarter. See Table 1b in the section titled “Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial Measures.” Adjusted EBITDA for the third quarter was up 7% sequentially and up 23% year-over-year.

The sequential increase in adjusted operating income and adjusted EBITDA was driven by higher pricing in both segments and structural cost-out initiatives, partially offset by lower volume in both segments. The year-over-year increase in adjusted operating income and adjusted EBITDA was driven by higher pricing in both segments, higher volume in IET, and structural cost-out initiatives, partially offset by cost inflation in IET and unfavorable business mix in both segments.

Other Financial Items

Remaining Performance Obligations (“RPO”) in the third quarter ended at $33.4 billion, a decrease of $0.1 billion from the second quarter of 2024. OFSE RPO was $3.2 billion, down 5% sequentially, while IET RPO was $30.2 billion, up $44 million sequentially. Within IET RPO, GTE RPO was $11.9 billion and GTS RPO was $14.8 billion.

Income tax expense in the third quarter of 2024 was $235 million.

Other non-operating income in the third quarter of 2024 was $134 million. Included in other non-operating income were net mark-to-market gains in fair value for certain equity investments of $99 million.

GAAP diluted earnings per share was $0.77. Adjusted diluted earnings per share (a non-GAAP financial measure) was $0.67. Excluded from adjusted diluted earnings per share were all items listed in Table 1c in the section titled “Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial Measures.”

Cash flow from operating activities was $1,010 million for the third quarter of 2024. Free cash flow (a non-GAAP financial measure) for the quarter was $754 million. A reconciliation from GAAP has been provided in Table 1d in the section titled “Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial Measures.”

Capital expenditures, net of proceeds from disposal of assets, were $256 million for the third quarter of 2024, of which $182 million for OFSE and $62 million for IET.

Results by Reporting Segment

The following segment discussions and variance explanations are intended to reflect management’s view of the relevant comparisons of financial results on a sequential or year-over-year basis, depending on the business dynamics of the reporting segments.

Oilfield Services & Equipment

(in millions)	Three Months Ended									Variance
Segment results	September 30, 2024			June 30, 2024			September 30, 2023			Sequential	Year-over-year
Orders	$	3,807		$	4,068		$	4,178		(6%)	(9%)
Revenue	$	3,963		$	4,011		$	3,951		(1%)	—%
Operating income	$	547		$	493		$	465		11%	18%
Operating margin		13.8	%		12.3	%		11.8	%	1.5pts	2pts
Depreciation & amortization	$	218		$	223		$	206		(2%)	6%
EBITDA*	$	765		$	716		$	670		7%	14%
EBITDA margin*		19.3	%		17.8	%		17.0	%	1.5pts	2.3pts

(in millions)	Three Months Ended						Variance
Revenue by Product Line	September 30, 2024		June 30, 2024		September 30, 2023		Sequential	Year-over-year
Well Construction	$	1,050	$	1,090	$	1,128	(4%)	(7%)
Completions, Intervention & Measurements		1,009		1,118		1,085	(10%)	(7%)
Production Solutions		983		958		967	3%	2%
Subsea & Surface Pressure Systems		921		845		770	9%	20%
Total Revenue	$	3,963	$	4,011	$	3,951	(1%)	—%

(in millions)	Three Months Ended						Variance
Revenue by Geographic Region	September 30, 2024		June 30, 2024		September 30, 2023		Sequential	Year-over-year
North America	$	971	$	1,023	$	1,064	(5%)	(9%)
Latin America		648		663		695	(2%)	(7%)
Europe/CIS/Sub-Saharan Africa		933		827		695	13%	34%
Middle East/Asia		1,411		1,498		1,497	(6%)	(6%)
Total Revenue	$	3,963	$	4,011	$	3,951	(1%)	—%

North America	$	971	$	1,023	$	1,064	(5%)	(9%)
International		2,992		2,988		2,887	—%	4%

* Non-GAAP measure. See reconciliations in the section titled “Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial Measures.” EBITDA margin is defined as EBITDA divided by revenue.

OFSE orders of $3,807 million for the third quarter decreased by $261 million sequentially. Subsea and Surface Pressure Systems orders were $776 million, down 13% sequentially, and down 23% year-over-year.

OFSE revenue of $3,963 million for the third quarter was down 1% sequentially, and up $12 million year-over-year.

North America revenue was $971 million, down 5% sequentially. International revenue was $2,992 million, an increase of $4 million sequentially, driven by growth in Europe/CIS/Sub-Saharan Africa regions partially offset by decline in Middle East/Asia.

Segment operating income for the third quarter was $547 million, an increase of $54 million, or 11%, sequentially. Segment EBITDA for the third quarter was $765 million, an increase of $49 million, or 7% sequentially. The sequential increase in segment operating income and EBITDA was driven by positive price and productivity, partially offset by pressure from negative business mix and lower volume.

Industrial & Energy Technology

(in millions)	Three Months Ended									Variance
Segment results	September 30, 2024			June 30, 2024			September 30, 2023			Sequential	Year-over-year
Orders	$	2,868		$	3,458		$	4,334		(17%)	(34%)
Revenue	$	2,945		$	3,128		$	2,691		(6%)	9%
Operating income	$	474		$	442		$	346		7%	37%
Operating margin		16.1	%		14.1	%		12.9	%	2pts	3.2pts
Depreciation & amortization	$	54		$	55		$	57		(2%)	(6%)
EBITDA*	$	528		$	497		$	403		6%	31%
EBITDA margin*		17.9	%		15.9	%		15.0	%	2pts	2.9pts

(in millions)	Three Months Ended						Variance
Orders by Product Line	September 30, 2024		June 30, 2024		September 30, 2023		Sequential	Year-over-year
Gas Technology Equipment	$	1,088	$	1,493	$	2,813	(27%)	(61%)
Gas Technology Services		778		769		724	1%	7%
Total Gas Technology		1,866		2,261		3,537	(17%)	(47%)
Industrial Products		494		524		477	(6%)	4%
Industrial Solutions		293		281		271	4%	8%
Total Industrial Technology		787		805		748	(2%)	5%
Climate Technology Solutions		215		392		49	(45%)	F
Total Orders	$	2,868	$	3,458	$	4,334	(17%)	(34%)

(in millions)	Three Months Ended						Variance
Revenue by Product Line	September 30, 2024		June 30, 2024		September 30, 2023		Sequential	Year-over-year
Gas Technology Equipment	$	1,281	$	1,539	$	1,227	(17%)	4%
Gas Technology Services		697		691		637	1%	9%
Total Gas Technology		1,978		2,230		1,865	(11%)	6%
Industrial Products		520		509		520	2%	—%
Industrial Solutions		257		262		243	(2%)	6%
Total Industrial Technology		777		770		763	1%	2%
Climate Technology Solutions		191		128		63	49%	F
Total Revenue	$	2,945	$	3,128	$	2,691	(6%)	9%

* Non-GAAP measure. See reconciliations in the section titled “Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial Measures.” EBITDA margin is defined as EBITDA divided by revenue.

“F” is used when variance is above 100%. Additionally, “U” is used when variance is below (100)%.

IET orders of $2,868 million for the third quarter decreased by $1,465 million, or 34% year-over-year. The decrease was driven primarily by GTE orders which were down $1,725 million or 61% year-over-year.

IET revenue of $2,945 million for the quarter increased $254 million, or 9% year-over-year. The increase was driven primarily by Climate Technology Solutions, up favorably year-over-year, and by Gas Technology, up 6% year-over-year.

Segment operating income for the quarter was $474 million, up 37% year-over-year. Segment EBITDA for the quarter was $528 million, up $125 million, or 31% year-over-year. The year-over-year increase in segment operating income and EBITDA was primarily driven by higher volume, pricing and productivity, partially offset by cost inflation.

Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial Measures

Management provides non-GAAP financial measures because it believes such measures are widely accepted financial indicators used by investors and analysts to analyze and compare companies on the basis of operating performance (including adjusted operating income; EBITDA; EBITDA margin; adjusted EBITDA; adjusted net income attributable to Baker Hughes; and adjusted diluted earnings per share) and liquidity (free cash flow) and that these measures may be used by investors to make informed investment decisions. Management believes that the exclusion of certain identified items from several key operating performance measures enables us to evaluate our operations more effectively, to identify underlying trends in the business, and to establish operational goals for certain management compensation purposes. Management also believes that free cash flow is an important supplemental measure of our cash performance but should not be considered as a measure of residual cash flow available for discretionary purposes, or as an alternative to cash flow from operating activities presented in accordance with GAAP.

Table 1a. Reconciliation of GAAP and Adjusted Operating Income

	Three Months Ended
(in millions)	September 30, 2024		June 30, 2024		September 30, 2023
Operating income (GAAP)	$	930	$	833	$	714
Restructuring, impairment & other		—		14		2
Total operating income adjustments		—		14		2
Adjusted operating income (non-GAAP)	$	930	$	847	$	716

Table 1a reconciles operating income, which is the directly comparable financial result determined in accordance with GAAP, to adjusted operating income. Adjusted operating income excludes the impact of certain identified items.

Table 1b. Reconciliation of Net Income Attributable to Baker Hughes to EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA

	Three Months Ended
(in millions)	September 30, 2024			June 30, 2024			September 30, 2023
Net income attributable to Baker Hughes (GAAP)	$	766		$	579		$	518
Net income attributable to noncontrolling interests		8			2			6
Provision for income taxes		235			243			235
Interest expense, net		55			47			49
Other non-operating income, net		(134	)		(38	)		(94	)
Operating income (GAAP)		930			833			714

Depreciation & amortization		278			283			267
EBITDA (non-GAAP)		1,208			1,116			981
Total operating income adjustments⁽¹⁾		—			14			2
Adjusted EBITDA (non-GAAP)	$	1,208		$	1,130		$	983

⁽¹⁾See Table 1a for the identified adjustments to operating income.

Table 1b reconciles net income attributable to Baker Hughes, which is the directly comparable financial result determined in accordance with GAAP, to EBITDA. Adjusted EBITDA excludes the impact of certain identified items.

Table 1c. Reconciliation of Net Income Attributable to Baker Hughes to Adjusted Net Income Attributable to Baker Hughes

	Three Months Ended
(in millions, except per share amounts)	September 30, 2024			June 30, 2024			September 30, 2023
Net income attributable to Baker Hughes (GAAP)	$	766		$	579		$	518
Total operating income adjustments⁽¹⁾		—			14			2
Other adjustments (non-operating)⁽²⁾		(99	)		(19	)		(95	)
Tax adjustments⁽³⁾		(1	)		(6	)		2
Total adjustments, net of income tax		(100	)		(11	)		(91	)
Less: adjustments attributable to noncontrolling interests		—			—			—
Adjustments attributable to Baker Hughes		(100	)		(11	)		(91	)
Adjusted net income attributable to Baker Hughes (non-GAAP)	$	666		$	568		$	427


Denominator:
Weighted-average shares of Class A common stock outstanding diluted		999			1,001			1,017
Adjusted earnings per share – diluted (non-GAAP)	$	0.67		$	0.57		$	0.42

⁽¹⁾See Table 1a for the identified adjustments to operating income.

⁽²⁾All periods primarily reflect the net gain or loss on changes in fair value for certain equity investments.

⁽³⁾All periods reflect the tax associated with the other operating and non-operating adjustments.

Table 1c reconciles net income attributable to Baker Hughes, which is the directly comparable financial result determined in accordance with GAAP, to adjusted net income attributable to Baker Hughes. Adjusted net income attributable to Baker Hughes excludes the impact of certain identified items.

Table 1d. Reconciliation of Net Cash Flows From Operating Activities to Free Cash Flow

	Three Months Ended
(in millions)	September 30, 2024			June 30, 2024			September 30, 2023
Net cash flows from operating activities (GAAP)	$	1,010		$	348		$	811
Add: cash used for capital expenditures, net of proceeds from disposal of assets		(256	)		(242	)		(219	)
Free cash flow (non-GAAP)	$	754		$	106		$	592

Table 1d reconciles net cash flows from operating activities, which is the directly comparable financial result determined in accordance with GAAP, to free cash flow. Free cash flow is defined as net cash flows from operating activities less expenditures for capital assets plus proceeds from disposal of assets.

Financial Tables (GAAP)

Condensed Consolidated Statements of Income (Loss)

(Unaudited)

	Three Months Ended September 30,						Nine Months Ended September 30,
(In millions, except per share amounts)		2024			2023			2024			2023
Revenue	$	6,908		$	6,641		$	20,465		$	18,671
Costs and expenses:
Cost of revenue		5,366			5,298			16,155			14,867
Selling, general and administrative		612			627			1,873			1,977
Restructuring, impairment and other		—			2			21			161
Total costs and expenses		5,978			5,927			18,049			17,005
Operating income		930			714			2,416			1,666
Other non-operating income, net		134			94			200			638
Interest expense, net		(55	)		(49	)		(143	)		(171	)
Income before income taxes		1,009			759			2,473			2,133
Provision for income taxes		(235	)		(235	)		(656	)		(614	)
Net income		774			524			1,817			1,519
Less: Net income attributable to noncontrolling interests		8			6			17			16
Net income attributable to Baker Hughes Company	$	766		$	518		$	1,800		$	1,503

Per share amounts:
Basic income per Class A common stock	$	0.77		$	0.51		$	1.81		$	1.49
Diluted income per Class A common stock	$	0.77		$	0.51		$	1.80		$	1.48

Weighted average shares:
Class A basic		993			1,009			996			1,010
Class A diluted		999			1,017			1,001			1,016

Cash dividend per Class A common stock	$	0.21		$	0.20		$	0.63		$	0.58

Condensed Consolidated Statements of Financial Position

(Unaudited)

(In millions)	September 30, 2024		December 31, 2023
ASSETS
Current Assets:
Cash and cash equivalents	$	2,664	$	2,646
Current receivables, net		6,920		7,075
Inventories, net		5,254		5,094
All other current assets		1,730		1,486
Total current assets		16,568		16,301
Property, plant and equipment, less accumulated depreciation		5,150		4,893
Goodwill		6,167		6,137
Other intangible assets, net		3,995		4,093
Contract and other deferred assets		1,904		1,756
All other assets		3,746		3,765
Total assets	$	37,530	$	36,945
LIABILITIES AND EQUITY
Current Liabilities:
Accounts payable	$	4,431	$	4,471
Short-term and current portion of long-term debt		52		148
Progress collections and deferred income		5,685		5,542
All other current liabilities		2,622		2,830
Total current liabilities		12,790		12,991
Long-term debt		5,984		5,872
Liabilities for pensions and other postretirement benefits		991		978
All other liabilities		1,422		1,585
Equity		16,343		15,519
Total liabilities and equity	$	37,530	$	36,945

Outstanding Baker Hughes Company shares:
Class A common stock		989		998

Condensed Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows

(Unaudited)

	Three Months Ended September 30,			Nine Months Ended September 30,
(In millions)		2024			2024			2023
Cash flows from operating activities:
Net income	$	774		$	1,817		$	1,519
Adjustments to reconcile net income to net cash flows from operating activities:
Depreciation and amortization		278			844			813
Stock-based compensation cost		53			154			148
Gain on equity securities		(99	)		(171	)		(639	)
Provision for deferred income taxes		2			35			68
Other asset impairments		—			—			43
Working capital		(21	)		(57	)		19
Other operating items, net		23			(480	)		159
Net cash flows provided by operating activities		1,010			2,142			2,130
Cash flows from investing activities:
Expenditures for capital assets		(300	)		(925	)		(868	)
Proceeds from disposal of assets		44			145			150
Proceeds from sale of equity securities		—			21			372
Proceeds from business dispositions		—			—			293
Net cash paid for acquisitions		—			—			(301	)
Other investing items, net		(13	)		(40	)		(149	)
Net cash flows used in investing activities		(269	)		(799	)		(503	)
Cash flows from financing activities:
Repayment of long-term debt		(9	)		(134	)		—
Dividends paid		(209	)		(628	)		(586	)
Repurchase of Class A common stock		(152	)		(476	)		(219	)
Other financing items, net		6			(55	)		(56	)
Net cash flows used in financing activities		(364	)		(1,293	)		(861	)
Effect of currency exchange rate changes on cash and cash equivalents		3			(32	)		(53	)
Increase in cash and cash equivalents		380			18			713
Cash and cash equivalents, beginning of period		2,284			2,646			2,488
Cash and cash equivalents, end of period	$	2,664		$	2,664		$	3,201
Supplemental cash flows disclosures:
Income taxes paid, net of refunds	$	397		$	733		$	463
Interest paid	$	49		$	199		$	205

Supplemental Financial Information

Supplemental financial information can be found on the Company’s website at: investors.bakerhughes.com in the Financial Information section under Quarterly Results.

Conference Call and Webcast

The Company has scheduled an investor conference call to discuss management’s outlook and the results reported in today’s earnings announcement. The call will begin at 9:30 a.m. Eastern time, 8:30 a.m. Central time on Wednesday, October 23, 2024, the content of which is not part of this earnings release. The conference call will be broadcast live via a webcast and can be accessed by visiting the Events and Presentations page on the Company’s website at: investors.bakerhughes.com. An archived version of the webcast will be available on the website for one month following the webcast.

Forward-Looking Statements

This news release (and oral statements made regarding the subjects of this release) may contain forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, (each a “forward-looking statement”). Forward-looking statements concern future circumstances and results and other statements that are not historical facts and are sometimes identified by the words “may,” “will,” “should,” “potential,” “intend,” “expect,” “would,” “seek,” “anticipate,” “estimate,” “overestimate,” “underestimate,” “believe,” “could,” “project,” “predict,” “continue,” “target”, “goal” or other similar words or expressions. There are many risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from our forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements are also affected by the risk factors described in the Company’s annual report on Form 10-K for the annual period ended December 31, 2023 and those set forth from time to time in other filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). The documents are available through the Company’s website at: http://www.investors.bakerhughes.com or through the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering and Analysis Retrieval system at: http://www.sec.gov. We undertake no obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statement, except as required by law. Readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance on any of these forward-looking statements.

Our expectations regarding our business outlook and business plans; the business plans of our customers; oil and natural gas market conditions; cost and availability of resources; economic, legal and regulatory conditions, and other matters are only our forecasts regarding these matters.

These forward-looking statements, including forecasts, may be substantially different from actual results, which are affected by many risks, along with the following risk factors and the timing of any of these risk factors:

Economic and political conditions – the impact of worldwide economic conditions and rising inflation; the effect that declines in credit availability may have on worldwide economic growth and demand for hydrocarbons; foreign currency exchange fluctuations and changes in the capital markets in locations where we operate; and the impact of government disruptions and sanctions.
Orders and RPO – our ability to execute on orders and RPO in accordance with agreed specifications, terms and conditions and convert those orders and RPO to revenue and cash.
Oil and gas market conditions – the level of petroleum industry exploration, development and production expenditures; the price of, volatility in pricing of, and the demand for crude oil and natural gas; drilling activity; drilling permits for and regulation of the shelf and the deepwater drilling; excess productive capacity; crude and product inventories; liquefied natural gas supply and demand; seasonal and other adverse weather conditions that affect the demand for energy; severe weather conditions, such as tornadoes and hurricanes, that affect exploration and production activities; Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (“OPEC”) policy and the adherence by OPEC nations to their OPEC production quotas.
Terrorism and geopolitical risks – war, military action, terrorist activities or extended periods of international conflict, particularly involving any petroleum-producing or consuming regions, including Russia and Ukraine; and the recent conflict in the Middle East; labor disruptions, civil unrest or security conditions where we operate; potentially burdensome taxation, expropriation of assets by governmental action; cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents or attacks; epidemic outbreaks.

About Baker Hughes:

Baker Hughes (Nasdaq: BKR) is an energy technology company that provides solutions for energy and industrial customers worldwide. Built on a century of experience and conducting business in over 120 countries, our innovative technologies and services are taking energy forward – making it safer, cleaner and more efficient for people and the planet. Visit us at bakerhughes.com

For more information, please contact:

Investor Relations

Chase Mulvehill
+1 346-297-2561
investor.relations@bakerhughes.com

Media Relations

Adrienne Lynch
+1 713-906-8407
adrienne.lynch@bakerhughes.com

The MIL Network –

January 24, 2025

MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Landmark UK-Germany defence agreement to strengthen our security and prosperity
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

A landmark defence agreement will be signed by Defence Secretary John Healey MP and German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius in London today in a major moment for NATO, and European security and prosperity. It is the first-of-its-kind agreement between the UK and Germany on defence.
Defence Secretary John Healey MP and German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius will sign the landmark Trinity House Agreement today (Wednesday 23 October), bringing the two nations closer together than ever before.

Agreement will boost the economy, investment, and jobs, paving the way for a new artillery gun barrel factory to open in the UK.

German aircraft will operate from Scotland as part of the agreement, bolstering European security.

The signing of the Trinity House Agreement marks a fundamental shift in the UK’s relations with Germany and for European security. This agreement between Europe’s two biggest defence spenders will strengthen national security and economic growth in the face of growing Russian aggression and increasing threats.

The new partnership will help drive investment into the UK – with the agreement paving the way for a new artillery gun barrel factory to be opened in the UK, supporting more than 400 jobs and nearly half a billion-pounds boost to the British economy. The opening of the Rheinmetall factory will see the UK manufacture artillery gun barrels for the first time in 10 years, using British steel produced by Sheffield Forgemasters.

The deal will see the UK and Germany work together systemically for years to come on a range of ground-breaking defence projects and across all domains (air, land, sea, space and cyber). This includes working jointly to rapidly develop brand-new extended deep strike weapons that can travel further with more precision than current systems, including Storm Shadow.

It will bring the two nation’s defence industries closer than ever, including a long-term commitment to manufacturing Boxer armoured vehicles, supporting skilled jobs across the UK. The deal also aims to support and expanded complex weapons development in the UK, laying a path for Sting Ray Torpedoes procurement.

The Trinity House Agreement includes:

New long-range strike weapons – working jointly to rapidly develop a new system that can fire even further and be more precise in its targeting than any current system.

New boost for British industry – a new large calibre gun manufacturing facility in the UK, supporting more than 400 jobs, and planned to use British steel, bringing nearly half a billion-pound economic boost to the UK over 10 years.

New cooperation to strengthen the Eastern Flank – the armies training and exercising more together, using the front as a catalyst for developing new ways of fighting.

Land Industrial Cooperation – cooperation on Boxer armed vehicles and kickstarting collaboration of land-based drones.

Protecting critical underwater infrastructure – working together to protect the vital cables in the seabed on the North Sea. This includes exploring new offboard undersea surveillance capabilities to improve detection of adversary activity.

German planes in Scotland – German P8 aircraft will periodically operate out of Lossiemouth to help protect the North Atlantic.

New drones – working towards drones that could operate alongside our fighter jets, as well as drones that can be used by other military force.

Exploration and development of new Maritime Uncrewed Air System capabilities.

New Ukraine support – new joint work to enable German Sea King helicopters to be armed with modern missile systems as well as work on capability coalitions.

Joint work with partners to integrate air defence systems to better protect European air space against the threat of long-range missiles, building on work agreed at the NATO Defence Ministers meeting just last week.

The agreement is a key example of the Government delivering on its commitment to reset relations with European allies and bolster national security. It will be signed less than 100 days after the Defence Secretary visited Berlin to kick off negotiations in July and is the first pillar in a wider UK-Germany treaty pledged by Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Chancellor Olaf Scholz in August.

Defence Secretary John Healey MP said:

The Trinity House Agreement is a milestone moment in our relationship with Germany and a major strengthening of Europe’s security.

It secures unprecedented levels of new cooperation with the German Armed Forces and industry, bringing benefits to our shared security and prosperity, protecting our shared values and boosting our defence industrial bases.

This landmark agreement delivers on the Government’s manifesto commitment to strike a new defence relationship with Germany – less than four months since winning the election in July – and we will build on this new cooperation in the months and years ahead.

I pay tribute to our negotiating teams who have worked hard at pace to deliver this.

German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius said:

The UK and Germany are moving closer together. With projects across the air, land, sea, and cyber domains, we will jointly increase our defence capabilities, thereby strengthening the European pillar within NATO. We can only strengthen our ability to act together. This is why our cooperation projects are open to other partners.

We must not take security in Europe for granted. Russia is waging war against Ukraine, it is increasing its weapons production immensely and has repeatedly launched hybrid attacks on our partners in Eastern Europe.

With the Trinity House Agreement, we are showing that the NATO Allies have recognised what these times require and are determined to improve their deterrence and defence capabilities. As it lays the foundation for future projects, the Trinity House Agreement is an important contribution to this. It is particularly important to me that we cooperate even more closely to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank and to close critical capability gaps, for instance in the field of long-range strike weapons.

Armin Papperger, CEO and Chairman of Rheinmetall AG commented that:

Rheinmetall’s investment in the gun hall reflects a forward-looking approach to innovation, collaboration, and national defence. It ensures the UK remains a leader in developing and manufacturing defence technologies that safeguard both national and global security.

Gary Nutter, Chief Executive Officer at Sheffield Forgemasters, said:

I am delighted to confirm that Sheffield Forgemasters will reinstate gun barrels manufacture after a 20-year hiatus, to supply large-calibre gun-barrels to Germany’s Rheinmetall AG, servicing UK defence contracts and exports.

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Published 22 October 2024
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Australia: G20 meetings in the United States
Source: Australian Treasurer

I will join key economic ministers and central bank governors from the world’s most significant economies at the G20, International Monetary Fund and World Bank annual meetings over the coming days in Washington DC.

Australia is not immune from the volatility and vulnerability which characterises the global economy.

The risk of further escalation in the Middle East threatens a resurgence in oil prices and casts a dark shadow over the global outlook.

Conflict in the Middle East compounds the pressures already coming at us from the war in Ukraine, the slowdown in China, persistent global inflation, tepid global growth and sharp movements on stock markets.

There is always a premium on responsible economic management and engagement but especially now, with all this uncertainty around the world.

This is a really critical time to confer with colleagues and counterparts.

There will be in‑depth discussions on the global economy, the energy transformation, economic security and reform of our multilateral institutions.

This will include meetings with:
- New Japanese Finance Minister Katsonobu Kato, who I will meet for the first time;
- US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, for our sixth bilateral;
- Chair of the US Federal Reserve Jerome Powell;
- Director of President Biden’s National Economic Council Lael Brainard;
- South Korean Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy Choi Sang‑Mok; and
- Canadian Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland.
I will participate in discussions as part of the G20 Taskforce on a Global Mobilisation Against Climate Change. Our focus will be on attracting the capital we need to create new jobs and opportunities in the transformation to cleaner and cheaper energy.

I’ll also have an opportunity to be briefed on Australia’s interests in the United States by Ambassador Kevin Rudd.

Responsible economic management is a defining feature of the Albanese Labor Government in these uncertain times.

Our Budget surpluses aren’t an end in themselves, they help in the fight against inflation, provide room for our priorities and they help build buffers against some of this global volatility.

Getting inflation down, helping with the cost of living, repairing the Budget and reforming our economy are the essential components of our strategy and we are making welcome progress.

In a little over two years we have halved inflation, created a million new jobs, got real wages growing again, provided tax relief to every taxpayer, delivered the first back‑to‑back surpluses in two decades, avoided $150 billion of inherited debt and saved tens of billions of dollars in interest costs.

These meetings will provide important perspectives on the global outlook and allow us to make further progress at home and with our key international partners.

MIL OSI News –
January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Prime Minister warns Russian threat to global stability is accelerating as Putin ramps up attacks on Black Sea
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

Russia has stepped up attacks on Ukrainian port infrastructure in the Black Sea, delaying vital aid from reaching Palestinians, and stopping crucial grain supplies from being delivered to the global south.
Grain ships collateral damage in the Black Sea as Russian risk appetite increases, UK intelligence shows.

Prime Minister calls out Russia’s actions, saying the Black Sea strikes underscore that Putin is willing to risk anything in attempts to force Ukraine into submission.

UK and Norway at the forefront of protecting the corridor, funding cutting edge maritime capabilities for Ukraine to ensure grain can reach the global south.

Russia has stepped up attacks on Ukrainian port infrastructure in the Black Sea, delaying vital aid from reaching Palestinians, and stopping crucial grain supplies from being delivered to the global south.

The acceleration in attacks coincides with harvest season in Ukraine, a country which remains a major supplier of agricultural produce, crucial for global food security.

Putin’s almost 1000-day conflict in Ukraine has reduced supplies for some of the world’s most in need and helped drive up food and fuel prices across the globe.

Now, UK intelligence shows that there has been a noticeable increase in Russian risk appetite when conducting strikes on port infrastructure, with grain ships becoming collateral damage in Russia’s campaign.

Those strikes are believed to have delayed the MV SHUI SPIRIT from departing Ukraine while carrying vegetable oil destined for the World Food Programme in Palestine.

It has also hit ships loaded with grain destined for Egypt, two vessels carrying corn – which Ukraine is the second biggest supplier to China of – and World Food Programme shipments bound for southern Africa.

Prime Minister Keir Starmer said:

“Russia’s indiscriminate strikes on ports in the Black Sea underscore that Putin is willing to gamble on global food security in his attempts to force Ukraine into submission.

‘’In doing so, he is harming millions of vulnerable people across Africa, Asia and the Middle East, to try and gain the upper hand in his barbaric war.

“In recent weeks, we have seen reporting that the Kremlin has been forced to turn to North Korea to provide troops to fuel its self-destructing war machine, an embarrassing and desperate act, and now they are intensifying attacks on areas of Ukraine that support the global south with much-needed food.

“Russia has no respect for the norms and laws that govern our international system. Not only was their illegal invasion a blatant attack on the principles of the UN Charter, but the way they have executed their war in Ukraine shows no respect for human life, or the consequences of their invasion across the world.”

According to Defence Intelligence, between 05 – 14 October 2024, at least four merchant vessels have been struck by Russian munitions.

These include:

1.       05 October 2024 – Yuzhny port – MV PARESA (St Kitts and Nevis flagged) was almost certainly the target of the strike that damaged it. Following the attack, the Russian MoD released a video of what they say shows the vessel unloading containerised cargo which they likely perceive to be weapons.

2.       07 October 2024 – Odesa port – MV OPTIMA (Palau flagged). There is a realistic possibility that the vessel was collateral damage as a result of a strike on port infrastructure and was not the direct target of the attack. MV OPTIMA was also likely further damaged in a strike on port infrastructure on 15 October 2024.

3.       08 October 2024 – Chronomorsk port MV SHUI SPIRIT (Panama flagged).Ukraine’s Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food Vitalii Koval stated the MV SHUI SPIRIT was carrying sunflower oil as part of a UN shipment. However, the vessel was a containerised cargo carrier and noting the earlier strike on MV OPTIMA, there is a realistic possibility that this vessel was also the target of the strike as opposed to collateral damage.

4.       14 October 2024 – Odesa port – NS MOON (Belize flagged) was likely damaged in strikes on port infrastructure. The vessel was likely collateral damage in strikes on port infrastructure.

The announcement comes as this government announces a further £2.26 billion for Ukraine as part of the UK’s contribution to the G7 Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) Loans to Ukraine scheme.

Through the scheme, $50 billion from G7 countries will be delivered to Ukraine for its military, budget and reconstruction needs. The loan will be repaid using the extraordinary profits on immobilised Russian sovereign assets.

The UK has been at the forefront of work to protect the maritime corridor in the Black Sea. The Maritime Capability Coalition – led by the UK and Norway – is focused on delivering a future naval fighting force for Ukraine and has been instrumental in helping to equip Ukraine’s navy with items such as uncrewed surface vessels, better known as maritime drones, which will protect the corridor.

The UK is donating an additional £120 million toward the Maritime Capability Coalition and is seeking partners to co-fund delivery of hundreds more maritime drones (aerial and uncrewed boats), as well as surveillance radars to protect the Grain Corridor.

And together, the UK and Norway are seeking a further £100 million to co-fund hundreds more.

Recent gifting packages have provided dozens of amphibious all-terrain vehicles and raiding craft, hundreds of anti-ship missiles for coastal defence and river operations, and hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition to accompany the machine guns we have provided.

Russia’s brutal and indiscriminate attacks have not been limited to the Black Sea, Putin’s forces have also been targeting civilian infrastructure in Ukraine throughout this year, aiming to make life intolerable for the Ukrainian people, especially as the country heads into winter.

They have attacked thousands of civilian targets, including hospitals and energy infrastructure.

Open-source intelligence shows there has been 1,522 attacks on Ukraine’s health care system since February 2022, 774 attacks damaged or destroyed hospitals and clinics, and 234 health workers have been killed.

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Published 22 October 2024
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Press release: Prime Minister warns Russian threat to global stability is accelerating as Putin ramps up attacks on Black Sea
Source: United Kingdom – Prime Minister’s Office 10 Downing Street

Russia has stepped up attacks on Ukrainian port infrastructure in the Black Sea, delaying vital aid from reaching Palestinians, and stopping crucial grain supplies from being delivered to the global south.
Grain ships collateral damage in the Black Sea as Russian risk appetite increases, UK intelligence shows.

Prime Minister calls out Russia’s actions, saying the Black Sea strikes underscore that Putin is willing to risk anything in attempts to force Ukraine into submission.

UK and Norway at the forefront of protecting the corridor, funding cutting edge maritime capabilities for Ukraine to ensure grain can reach the global south.

Russia has stepped up attacks on Ukrainian port infrastructure in the Black Sea, delaying vital aid from reaching Palestinians, and stopping crucial grain supplies from being delivered to the global south.

The acceleration in attacks coincides with harvest season in Ukraine, a country which remains a major supplier of agricultural produce, crucial for global food security.

Putin’s almost 1000-day conflict in Ukraine has reduced supplies for some of the world’s most in need and helped drive up food and fuel prices across the globe.

Now, UK intelligence shows that there has been a noticeable increase in Russian risk appetite when conducting strikes on port infrastructure, with grain ships becoming collateral damage in Russia’s campaign.

Those strikes are believed to have delayed the MV SHUI SPIRIT from departing Ukraine while carrying vegetable oil destined for the World Food Programme in Palestine.

It has also hit ships loaded with grain destined for Egypt, two vessels carrying corn – which Ukraine is the second biggest supplier to China of – and World Food Programme shipments bound for southern Africa.

Prime Minister Keir Starmer said:

“Russia’s indiscriminate strikes on ports in the Black Sea underscore that Putin is willing to gamble on global food security in his attempts to force Ukraine into submission.

‘’In doing so, he is harming millions of vulnerable people across Africa, Asia and the Middle East, to try and gain the upper hand in his barbaric war.

“In recent weeks, we have seen reporting that the Kremlin has been forced to turn to North Korea to provide troops to fuel its self-destructing war machine, an embarrassing and desperate act, and now they are intensifying attacks on areas of Ukraine that support the global south with much-needed food.

“Russia has no respect for the norms and laws that govern our international system. Not only was their illegal invasion a blatant attack on the principles of the UN Charter, but the way they have executed their war in Ukraine shows no respect for human life, or the consequences of their invasion across the world.”

According to Defence Intelligence, between 05 – 14 October 2024, at least four merchant vessels have been struck by Russian munitions.

These include:

1.       05 October 2024 – Yuzhny port – MV PARESA (St Kitts and Nevis flagged) was almost certainly the target of the strike that damaged it. Following the attack, the Russian MoD released a video of what they say shows the vessel unloading containerised cargo which they likely perceive to be weapons.

2.       07 October 2024 – Odesa port – MV OPTIMA (Palau flagged). There is a realistic possibility that the vessel was collateral damage as a result of a strike on port infrastructure and was not the direct target of the attack. MV OPTIMA was also likely further damaged in a strike on port infrastructure on 15 October 2024.

3.       08 October 2024 – Chronomorsk port MV SHUI SPIRIT (Panama flagged).Ukraine’s Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food Vitalii Koval stated the MV SHUI SPIRIT was carrying sunflower oil as part of a UN shipment. However, the vessel was a containerised cargo carrier and noting the earlier strike on MV OPTIMA, there is a realistic possibility that this vessel was also the target of the strike as opposed to collateral damage.

4.       14 October 2024 – Odesa port – NS MOON (Belize flagged) was likely damaged in strikes on port infrastructure. The vessel was likely collateral damage in strikes on port infrastructure.

The announcement comes as this government announces a further £2.26 billion for Ukraine as part of the UK’s contribution to the G7 Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) Loans to Ukraine scheme.

Through the scheme, $50 billion from G7 countries will be delivered to Ukraine for its military, budget and reconstruction needs. The loan will be repaid using the extraordinary profits on immobilised Russian sovereign assets.

The UK has been at the forefront of work to protect the maritime corridor in the Black Sea. The Maritime Capability Coalition – led by the UK and Norway – is focused on delivering a future naval fighting force for Ukraine and has been instrumental in helping to equip Ukraine’s navy with items such as uncrewed surface vessels, better known as maritime drones, which will protect the corridor.

The UK is donating an additional £120 million toward the Maritime Capability Coalition and is seeking partners to co-fund delivery of hundreds more maritime drones (aerial and uncrewed boats), as well as surveillance radars to protect the Grain Corridor.

And together, the UK and Norway are seeking a further £100 million to co-fund hundreds more.

Recent gifting packages have provided dozens of amphibious all-terrain vehicles and raiding craft, hundreds of anti-ship missiles for coastal defence and river operations, and hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition to accompany the machine guns we have provided.

Russia’s brutal and indiscriminate attacks have not been limited to the Black Sea, Putin’s forces have also been targeting civilian infrastructure in Ukraine throughout this year, aiming to make life intolerable for the Ukrainian people, especially as the country heads into winter.

They have attacked thousands of civilian targets, including hospitals and energy infrastructure.

Open-source intelligence shows there has been 1,522 attacks on Ukraine’s health care system since February 2022, 774 attacks damaged or destroyed hospitals and clinics, and 234 health workers have been killed.

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Published 22 October 2024
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Representatives Auchincloss, Doggett Lead Bipartisan Letter Calling on Biden Administration to Strengthen Russian Oil Sanctions and Question Exception Approval

Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Jake Auchincloss (Massachusetts, 4)

October 21, 2024

Washington, D.C.— U.S. Representatives Jake Auchincloss (D-MA-04) and Lloyd Doggett (D-TX-37) led a bipartisan effort calling on the Biden Administration to pursue more vigorous Russian oil sanctions and questioning an exception granted to a U.S.-based company, Schlumberger (SLB), operating in Russia. Since Vladimir Putin’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in 2022, SLB has exported nearly $18 billion of equipment to Russia. The bipartisan group of lawmakers is questioning U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken as to why the Biden Administration has permitted SLB to aid Russia’s oil exports and fund Putin’s war economy.

In the letter the members stated, “It is alarming that SLB, an American company, is still free to help Russia produce and export its oil to fund the war chest of an authoritarian regime. Its investment in the Russian energy sector is so harmful that Ukraine’s National Agency on Corruption Prevention justifiably added SLB to an “international sponsor of war” blacklist. We and our G7 allies can hold SLB accountable for its complicity in Russian war crimes while still preserving stability in the global oil market. We look forward to your prompt answers to our specific questions, as well as the requested documents. We strongly urge further action to effectively restrict Putin’s profits and aid in Ukraine’s defense.”

“While Ukrainians fight and die on the front lines of freedom, a U.S. oil company is supporting the enemy,” said Rep. Auchincloss. “Oil is the lifeblood of the Russian war economy, which is why the West must stand united in tightening and enforcing oil sanctions. That begins by holding SLB and its collaborators accountable for evading allied sanctions, profiteering from pain, and fueling Putin’s ability to wage war.”

“My name is on the first sanctions legislation to become law shortly after the Russian invasion,” said Rep. Doggett. “Implementation of that and similar legislation by our allies has not prevented Putin from earning billions from oil exports. And unfortunately, North Korea and Iran are not the only places providing him help. By permitting his exports and permitting continued American company investments in Russia, Americans, and our European allies, are essentially funding both sides of this war. While well aware of concerns about the price of gasoline at the pump, we must stop oiling the Putin war machine to win this war, secure a just peace, and reparations.”

Additional signers include Representatives Sheila Cherfilus-McCormick (D-FL-20), Marcy Kaptur (D-OH-9), Josh Gottheimer (D-NJ-05), Barbara Lee (D-CA-12), Wiley Nickel (D-NC-13), Jared Huffman (D-CA-02), Dan Goldman (D-NY-10), Danny K. Davis (D-IL-07), Jim Costa (D-CA-21), Sean Casten (D-IL-06), Steve Cohen (D-TN-09), Adam B. Schiff (D-CA-30), Susan Wild (D-PA-07), Joe Wilson (R-SC-02), Henry C. “Hank” Johnson, Jr. (D-GA-04), Thomas R. Suozzi (D-NY-03), Brad Sherman (D-CA-32), Zoe Lofgren (D-CA-18), Nikema Williams (D-GA-05),Gerald E. Connolly (D-VA-11), Mark Pocan (D-WI-02), Madeleine Dean (D-PA-04), Jamie Raskin (D-MD-08), Earl Blumenauer (D-OR-03), Seth Magaziner (D-RI-02), Chris Deluzio (D-PA-17), Patrick Ryan (D-NY-18), Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ-04), Bonnie Watson Coleman (D-NJ-12), Salud Carbajal (D-CA-24), Raúl M. Grijalva (D-AZ-07), Don Bacon (R-NE-02), Juan Vargas (D-CA-52), Jerrold Nadler (D-NY-12), Ann McLane Kuster (D-NH-02), Emanuel Cleaver II (D-MO-05), Frank Pallone Jr. (D-NJ-06), Paul D. Tonko (D-NY-20), Adriano Espaillat (D-NY-13), Ted W. Lieu (D-CA-36), John B. Larson (D-CT-01), Mike Quigley (D-IL-05), Jill Tokuda (D-HI-01), Kweisi Mfume (D-MD-07), David J. Trone (D-MD-06), Seth Moulton (D-MA-06), Brian Fitzpatrick (R-PA-01), Stephen F. Lynch (D-MA-08), Bennie G. Thompson (D-MS-02) and Ro Khanna (D-CA-17).

The letter in full can be found here.

MIL OSI USA News –

January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI USA News: FACT SHEET: U.S. Achievements in the Global Fight Against Corruption
Source: The White House

Corruption poses a grave and enduring threat to U.S. national interests and those of our partners. When officials abuse their entrusted power for personal or political gain, the interests of authoritarians and corrupt actors win – at the expense of citizens, honest businesses, and healthy societies. As the Biden-Harris Administration took office, this longstanding challenge had metastasized. In some countries, oligarchs were teaming up with foreign kleptocrats to warp policy and procurement decisions in exchange for kickbacks – with no accountability. Corrupt officials were laundering stolen assets through the U.S. and global financial systems, while local investigators were ill-equipped to follow the money. Reformers in countries saddled with corruption had scarce public resources to actually address development needs. The Biden-Harris Administration tacked these challenges starting Day One, to ensure democracy delivers and corrupt actors are held to account.

The first National Security Study Memorandum of the Biden-Harris Administration established countering corruption as a “core U.S. national security interest,” leading to the issuance in December 2021 of the first United States Strategy on Countering Corruption. Since then, the United States has taken action at home and around the world to curb illicit finance, hold corrupt actors accountable, forge multilateral partnerships, and equip frontline leaders to take on transnational corruption. The result has been historic progress in protecting the U.S. financial system from money-laundering, including in the residential real estate sector, while enhancing corporate transparency. This Administration has mobilized record levels of foreign assistance dedicated to anti-corruption, including $339 million in Fiscal Year 2023 alone – almost double the yearly average during the previous four years. This new assistance has unlocked support for anti-corruption institutions, leveled the playing field for law-abiding businesses, enabled journalists to team up across borders, and more. Expanded law enforcement cooperation and capacity-building have generated convictions of corrupt actors as well as the seizure, forfeiture, and return of criminal proceeds, while new anti-corruption offices at the Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) energized diplomatic and stakeholder engagement. The United States imposed sanctions on more than 500 individuals and entities for corruption and related activities, and established – for the first time in any jurisdiction globally – a new visa restriction for those who enable corrupt activity.

U.S. progress on anti-corruption has produced concrete benefits for the American people and stakeholders around the world – enhancing prosperity, economic security, safety, and democracy, as outlined below. To bolster and sustain this work, the U.S. government has also modernized its approach to addressing corruption as a cross-cutting priority. Today, Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economics Daleep Singh will highlight the benefits of this work to American businesses and workers at a White House anti-corruption roundtable with leaders from 15 major U.S. companies.

Advancing economic opportunity abroad
- Improving the business enabling environment: U.S. assistance advanced governments’ capacity to prevent, detect, investigate, and prosecute corruption, while encouraging anti-bribery compliance. State expanded its Fiscal Transparency Innovation Fund – to help willing partners improve budget transparency – while holding countries to account for progress in its Fiscal Transparency Report. In the past two years alone, a newly expanded State-Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) program facilitated U.S. collaboration with foreign counterparts on more than 50 transnational corruption and money laundering cases with a U.S. nexus. In coordination with State, experienced legal advisors from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) assisted foreign justice partners around the world in investigating and prosecuting corruption and money laundering cases, and recovering assets. And DOJ’s Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative, in partnership with the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security, has recovered more than $1.7 billion and returned or assisted in returning more than $1.6 billion for the benefit of the people harmed by the corruption.
- Enforcing our bans on foreign bribery and money-laundering – and pressing other countries to do the same: To enable honest companies to compete overseas, the United States upheld its commitments under the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention by enforcing its foreign bribery and related laws and working with partners to monitor other countries’ progress in implementing the Convention, which celebrated its 25th anniversary in 2024. Since the start of the Administration, DOJ has imposed more than $3.5 billion in total monetary sanctions under the Foreign Corruption Practices Act (FCPA) in 16 corporate resolutions, and announced charges against more than 70 individuals. For instance, this April the former Comptroller General of Ecuador was convicted of money laundering relating to his receipt of over $10 million in bribes from, among others, the Brazil-based construction conglomerate Odebrecht S.A. The Securities and Exchange Commission continued civil enforcement of the FCPA, with approximately $1 billion in total monetary sanctions in 22 corporate resolutions, spanning conduct in 24 countries, since the start of the Administration. DOJ is also enforcing the recently enacted Foreign Extortion Prevention Act, which criminalizes demands for bribes by foreign officials from U.S. companies and others. In addition, this August DOJ announced a new Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program to uncover and prosecute corporate crime – with a particular focus on foreign and domestic corruption, as well as violations by financial institutions of their obligations to take steps to detect and deter money laundering.
- Seizing windows of opportunity: U.S. assistance has become more agile via the establishment of USAID’s Anti-Corruption Response Fund (providing flexible support to countries experiencing new opportunities or backsliding), the State-DOJ Global Anti-Corruption Rapid Response Fund (providing assistance and case mentoring to foreign partners on short notice), and USAID’s Democracy Delivers initiative (which has marshalled $500 million in funding from the United States and others to help reformers deliver, including on their anti-corruption commitments). These innovations, informed by USAID’s Dekleptification Guide, are enabling the U.S. government to more nimbly pivot toward environments where local momentum can be bolstered by outside assistance.
- Bolstering integrity in high-risk sectors: In April 2024, the United States and its partners launched the Blue Dot Network – a mechanism to certify infrastructure projects that have met global standards for quality and sustainability, including transparency in procurement and provisions to limit opportunities for corruption. The United States also supported the launch of PROTECT, a collective action project to address corruption risk in the supply chain for critical minerals.
- Strengthening corruption safeguards in the Indo-Pacific: In June, the United States and thirteen other partners held a signing ceremony, after concluding eight rounds of negotiations in record time, for the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) Fair Economy Agreement. The Agreement aims to create a more transparent, predictable trade and investment environment across IPEF partners’ markets, including through binding obligations to prevent and combat corruption. The Department of Commerce (Commerce) and State are accelerating implementation by offering new anti-corruption technical assistance to IPEF partners, including workshops on procurement corruption.
- Dialoguing with the private sector: In 2021, State launched the Galvanizing the Private Sector as Partners in Combatting Corruption initiative, which connects companies and governments to strengthen business integrity and encourage governance reform. Commerce’s International Trade Administration organized the 2024 forum of the Business Ethics for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Small and Medium Enterprises Initiative – the world’s largest public-private partnership on ethical business conduct – at which stakeholders formalized policy recommendations on business integrity in public procurement.
Protecting the U.S. financial system from abuse
- Expanding corporate transparency: To deter kleptocrats and criminals from laundering money through anonymous shell companies, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) operationalized a new filing system for certain companies operating in the United States to report their beneficial owners – the real people who own or control them – pursuant to the bipartisan Corporate Transparency Act. Treasury held hundreds of outreach events across all states and territories, reaching thousands of stakeholders, to enable companies to quickly and easily comply with this reporting requirement.
- Closing loopholes for money-laundering: Treasury finalized rules to close two major loopholes in the U.S. financial system: (1) to increase transparency in the U.S. residential real estate sector, to ensure that law-abiding homebuyers are not disadvantaged by individuals laundering their ill-gotten gains, and (2) to safeguard the investment adviser industry from illicit finance. Treasury also proposed a rule to modernize financial institutions’ anti-money-laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) programs, to make them more effective and risk-based. Together, these rulemakings represent historic advances for the U.S. AML/CFT regime, in line with international standards, that will help the United States urge other countries to undertake similar reforms to curb illicit finance. The Biden-Harris Administration has also called on Congress to close even more loopholes that facilitate money-laundering by passing the ENABLERS Act.
- Blocking assets and denying entry to corrupt actors: Since the start of the Administration, Treasury has designated more than 500 individuals and entities for corruption and related activities, across six continents. That includes blocking the assets of 20 individuals and 48 companies in Fiscal Year 2024 for corruption in Afghanistan, Guatemala, Guyana, Paraguay, Western Balkans, and Zimbabwe. In tandem, State publicly issued corruption-related visa restrictions for 76 foreign officials and family members in Fiscal Year 2024, and 292 over the course of the Administration. These actions have protected the U.S. financial system from corrupt actors and promoted accountability in domestic jurisdictions. For example, just one week after the U.S. issuance of a public visa restriction on former Director of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) Intelligence Services Osman Mehmedagic for significant corruption, he was arrested by BiH authorities for abuse of office.
- Taking aim at enablers of corruption: In December 2023, President Biden issued an historic Presidential Proclamation establishing a visa restriction for those who facilitate and enable significant corruption and their immediate family members. This new visa restriction complements existing commitments to use sanction and law enforcement capabilities to target private enablers of public corruption. Earlier this year, the FBI and DOJ secured a guilty plea and a criminal penalty of $661 million from Gunvor – one of the largest commodities trading firms in the world – for facilitating bribery of Ecuadorian officials and laundering those bribes through U.S. banks. In addition, USAID launched new activities to incentivize integrity within professions that serve as gatekeepers to the international financial system.
- Upholding international standards: The United States has helped lead efforts to expand anti-corruption work at the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), including improving assessment tools, mitigating risks associated with “golden passport” programs, and highlighting how non-financial sectors can be abused by corrupt actors.
Keeping America and our partners safe
- Addressing corruption risk in the security sector: Security sector corruption can divert essential supplies, empower malign actors, threaten the safety of U.S. service members, and undermine U.S. military missions writ large. In the past year, the Department of Defense (DOD) incorporated corruption risk into its security cooperation planning – subjecting certain proposals to further scrutiny and identifying risk mitigation measures as needed. State also created new resources to weigh corruption risk as part of security sector assistance decision-making. In addition, State’s Global Defense Reform Program and DOD’s institutional capacity building programs advanced more transparent, accountable, and professional defense institutions. DOD continued running a training course on combatting corruption for partner military commanders and civilian leaders.
- Tackling organized crime and corruption: Transnational criminal organizations often rely on corruption to enable their criminal activities and evade accountability – which fuels narcotrafficking into the United States, human smuggling, cybercrimes, and more. The U.S. government is deploying anti-corruption tools to target criminal networks and their financial enablers, in line with the 2023 White House Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime.
- Standing up to Russia’s aggression: The United States has adapted to address the wartime needs of Ukraine’s anti-corruption stakeholders, as they close off a key vector for Russian dominance and advance Ukraine’s democratic future. In 2023, Ukrainian anti-corruption investigators and prosecutors achieved an 80 percent increase in prosecutions and a 50 percent increase in convictions, plus opened cases against high-ranking officials including the former head of the Ukrainian Supreme Court. With U.S. support, Ukraine has advanced significant reforms on asset disclosure, launched a whistleblower portal, strengthened the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, and enhanced transparency and integrity in reconstruction.
- Securing a greener future: The United States has integrated an anti-corruption lens across sectors, with particular emphasis on addressing corruption vulnerabilities that threaten a secure, just energy transition for all. This includes USAID support to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), increased mining transparency in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia, and innovations that address transnational corruption in green energy mineral supply chains across 15 countries.
- Protecting global health: Corruption curtails the ability of states to respond to pandemics and undercuts access to basic healthcare. USAID is tackling this challenge by releasing cutting-edge guidance on anti-corruption in the health sector and launching integrated programming. For example, in Liberia the United States is working with the government to curb theft of pharmaceuticals through civil society monitoring, law enforcement trainings, and public awareness campaigns.
- Addressing the root causes of migration: Combating corruption is a core component of improving conditions in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras – so people do not feel compelled to leave their homes, in line with the U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America. Recent U.S. actions have included training up to 27,000 justice sector stakeholders in those countries to more effectively address corruption.
Defending democracy by rooting out corruption
- Tackling electoral corruption: When candidates can be bankrolled by foreign adversaries and institutions captured by kleptocrats, citizens lose faith in their governments—or even in democracy itself. In response, USAID has launched new programs to bolster electoral integrity, strengthen independent media, and increase the transparency of political finance in high-risk locations.
- Lifting up civil society and independent media: The U.S. government has substantially expanded support to frontline activists and journalists, including through the Global Anti-Corruption Consortium. In addition, a new State Department initiative is training hundreds of journalists in transnational corruption investigations, while USAID’s new investigative journalist networks in Asia and Southern Africa are building capacity to track corruption across sectors and across borders. The Secretary of State established a new award for Anti-Corruption Champions, which has honored dozens of courageous civil society leaders and embattled reformers. In 2022, the United States also hosted the largest regular gathering of civil society activists fighting corruption – the International Anti-Corruption Conference – in Washington, DC, with keynote remarks from APNSA Jake Sullivan.
- Protecting sovereignty: Authoritarian actors like Russia and the PRC use bribery to interfere in the policy, procurement, debt, and electoral processes of other countries – undermining both sovereignty and democracy. The United States is standing up to this tactic by building the resilience of frontline actors to detect and deflect foreign-backed strategic corruption, educating partners about the kleptocrats’ playbook, harnessing sanction tools to deter threats, and increasing collaboration between practitioners working on anti-corruption and those addressing foreign malign influence – both within the USG and with likeminded partners. For example, in June the United States joined with Canada and the UK to expose Russia’s use of corruption and covert financing, among other tactics, to undermine democratic processes in Moldova.
- Restoring trust in American democracy: The Biden-Harris Administration has established the strongest ethics standards of any U.S. presidency. On his first day in office, the President signed an Executive Order requiring administration officials to take a stringent ethics pledge, which extends lobbying bans, limits shadow lobbying, and makes ethics waivers more transparent. The Administration also restored longstanding democratic norms by protecting DOJ cases from political interference, releasing the President’s and Vice-President’s taxes, and voluntarily disclosing White House visitor logs. And in the last year, the Office of Government Ethics finalized rules updating the standards for ethical conduct and legal expense funds for executive branch employees.
- Protecting American democracy from malign finance: Just as we defend democracy around the world, the U.S. government is working to keep American democracy safe from foreign adversaries. Actions to curb money laundering in the United States can help reduce the ability of foreign and domestic actors to make illegal campaign contributions and evade U.S. election laws. President Biden has called on Congress to go even further by passing the DISCLOSE Act, which would curb the ability of foreign entities and special interests to use dark money loopholes to influence our elections.
- Revitalizing participation in the Open Government Partnership (OGP): The United States rejoined the Steering Committee of OGP – a platform for civil society and governments to forge joint commitments and learn from each other– and provided assistance for OGP’s work on anti-corruption. Domestically, the United States has turbocharged OGP implementation by creating the U.S. Open Government Secretariat at the General Services Administration, an Open Government Federal Advisory Committee, an Interagency Community of Practice – spanning federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, and engaged with hundreds of stakeholders to exchange lessons and expand transparency, accountability, and public participation. The United States also launched the first-ever Request for Information to feed into the 6^th U.S. OGP National Action Plan and announced development of a toolkit to help federal agencies more meaningfully engage with the public.
Modernizing and coordinating U.S. government efforts to fight corruption
- Institutionalizing anti-corruption as an enduring priority: Over the past four years, Departments and Agencies have made substantial organizational improvements to elevate corruption concerns. For example:
  - The State Department’s new Office of the Coordinator on Global Anti-Corruption leads the integration of anti-corruption priorities into bilateral and other policy processes, conducts targeted diplomatic engagements, and drives strategic planning, including through the Department’s senior-level Anti-Corruption Policy Board. In the past year, the Office jumpstarted implementation of the Combating Global Corruption Act and completed an analysis of anti-corruption assistance to inform future State Department decision-making.
  - USAID’s new Anti-Corruption Center, within the newly established Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance, serves as a hub of technical expertise and thought leadership – driving the integration of corruption considerations across USAID’s portfolio, supporting USAID Missions in developing localized approaches, managing a suite of programming focused on transnational corruption, and using its convening power and policy insights to forge strategic partnerships. Since 2022, USAID has released its first-ever Anti-Corruption Policy, which outlines a cross-sectoral approach to constraining opportunities for corruption, raising the costs of corruption, and incentivizing integrity – plus a host of tools to drive uptake across USAID.
  - FBI’s International Corruption Unit expanded an agreement with the State Department to deploy six regional anti-corruption advisors to strategic locations around the world, where they organize regional working groups with local law enforcement officials, provide case-base mentorship, and facilitate coordination with the International Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre.
Expanded interagency capacity has been complemented by the National Security Council’s establishment of a dedicated Director for Anti-Corruption position, for the first time, to ensure whole-of-government coordination and advance anti-corruption within key policy processes.
- Leading in multilateral fora: The United States has regained its leadership role in the international bodies that shape anti-corruption norms globally and can sustain momentum across time. In particular, the United States stepped into the presidency of the UN Convention against Corruption Conference of States Parties (UNCAC COSP), proudly hosting in December 2023 thousands of stakeholders in Atlanta, Georgia, led by the U.S. Representative to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield. As part of its commitment to championing the role of non-governmental actors in the fight against corruption, the United States facilitated record civil society participation in UNCAC working group meetings, hosted the first UNCAC Private Sector Forum, and supported inclusive implementation of UNCAC commitments in Latin America, East Africa, and Southeast Asia. The United States also participated in several peer reviews of our own anti-corruption practices over the last three years, and proudly made these results public. Alongside these multilateral fora, we convened the Global Forum on Asset Recovery action series to accelerate practitioner cooperation across the United States, Algeria, Honduras, Iraq, Moldova, Nigeria, Seychelles, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and Zambia.
- Understanding corruption dynamics: The Intelligence Community developed and disseminated new resources to bolster intelligence prioritization, collection and analysis on corrupt actors and their networks. USAID commissioned research on topics like countering corruption through social and behavioral change and State initiated an interagency anti-corruption learning agenda and a small grants program to support it.
- Deepening external partnerships: The United States convened a series of coordination meetings with other bilateral donors and philanthropies in order to harmonize our anti-corruption approaches and galvanized anti-corruption resources across the donor community through the Integrity for Development campaign. USAID’s Countering Transnational Corruption Grand Challenge for Development brought together technologists, businesses, activists, and others to collaboratively address concrete corruption challenges.
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MIL OSI USA News –
January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI USA News: Remarks by President Biden and First Lady Jill Biden at an Italian American Heritage Month Reception

Source: The White House

5:54 P.M. EDT

THE FIRST LADY: Thank you. (Applause.)

Thank you, Alexa. And I’m excited to see your generation forging new connections to our past and shining such a bright light into our future.

And I’m also grateful to the National Italian American Foundation. (Applause.) John, Robert, you’ve all — you’ve helped so many people experience our heritage in Italy and preserve it here in the United States. So, thank you.

Buonasera, everyone. (Laughter.)

AUDIENCE: Buonasera!

THE FIRST LADY: And welcome to the White House.

When I was a little girl, I learned what it means to be Italian American in my grandparents’ tiny, well-worn kitchen — and not only because there were ribbons of pasta — homemade pasta and sauce bubbling over on the stove.

No, the most important lesson that I learned in their kitchen was that, when you’re Italian American, there’s always room for one more chair at the table — (applause) — enough bread toast to feed one more guest, enough space in our hearts for another friend to become like family.

And even when times are hard, there’s —

THE PRESIDENT: Looking at me. (Laughter.)

THE FIRST LADY: There’s always enough time to — (the president makes the sign of the cross) — (laughter) — enjoy the pleasures of life together.

My grandparents also taught me to never waste an opportunity to invite more people to the table and make a difference together. So, I knew I had to bring those values of love, abundance, and service to the White House as the first Italian American first lady. (Applause.)

That’s why I’ve used this platform to give more women a seat at the table in discussions about their own health — (applause) — to hear from military families about how we can support them, to uplift community college students.

And I’ve had the opportunity to bring so many more people inside the historic walls of the White House by creating new educational experiences that allow more Americans to immerse themselves in this house, the People’s House; by using these rooms to celebrate the young people who are changing our world; by honoring the immigrants who helped build this country; and tonight — (applause) — thank you — and tonight, gathering with this community — my community — to celebrate our culture. (Laughter.)

So, it’s been the honor of my life to serve as first lady. And during my time here, I’ve often thought of my great-grandparents leaving everything they knew behind to chase the promise of America. And then, when they arrived on Ellis Island to take their first strides into a new life, I don’t think that they could ever have imagined that a group of hundreds of Italian Americans — coming together in the White House.

When our roots run deep, there’s no limit to how high we can reach. So, tonight, I hope that you feel the power of our ancestors’ values beating inside of us as we carry their legacy forward; that you feel home — you feel at home, eat good food, and end up with a little something sweet together, as a family. (Laughter.)

Now, it’s my pleasure to introduce a man who’s always felt at home — (laughs) — with Italian Americans. (Applause.) In fact, Joe first met my family at a big cookout at my grandparents’ house in Hammonton, New Jersey.

So, I was pretty nervous, you know, about Joe coming to meet my family. But as soon as Joe pulled up into the driveway — and you kn- — you can picture this — my tiny grandmom bolted out of the house, bounded down the porch steps, in her housecoat and her apron, and she gave Joe this huge hug, as if she’d known him his entire life. And before he could even get a plate, Joe was greeted not as a stranger but as family.

Over the years, I’ve seen the Italian American community extend the same joyful love and support to Joe. You mean so much to him. (Laughs.)

So, please welcome — I don’t know why I’m getting so emotional — your president, my husband, Joe. (Applause.)

THE PRESIDENT: Welcome to the White House. (Applause.)   My name is Joe Biden, and I’m Jill Biden’s husband. (Laughter and applause.)

Now, I may be Irish, but I’m not stupid. (Laughter.) I married Dominic Giacoppa’s granddaughter.

And five years ago, I want you to know, I received the Sons of Italy Man of the Year award. To the best of my knowledge, I’m the only non-Italian ever to receive that award. (Laughter and applause.) There was a large crowd when I received that award. It was down by the train station.

You know, I said I — I moved from an Irish Catholic neighborhood in Scranton to an Italian Catholic neighborhood in Claymont, Delaware. And I went from a — where — a place where you ended like Finnegan and Murphy and all that, down if your name didn’t lend — end in “O,” you’re in real trouble. (Laughter.)

I was one of the few guys whose name didn’t end in “O.” I’d look out there and look at all my friends. You know, I accepted the award and named some of the guys I grew up with next door: Sonny Daramo, whose mom would say, “Joey, it’s not sauce; it’s gravy, Joey. It’s gravy, Joey.” (Laughter and applause.) Oh, you think I’m kidding. I’m not. (Laughter.)

No, Anzilotti, De- — Sabatino, Buchini, Bifferato, Ceni, Congialdi, Deluterio, Monaco — no, you think I’m kidding — Tancr- —

By the way, after I talked about it, I looked down at that crowd and said, “You know…” — thinking about it, I said, “I deserve this damn award.” (Laughter.) “With that many Italian friends, man, I deserve that award.” (Laughter.)

Thank you, Alexa, for being here and sharing your pride in your family and your heritage.

Look, and it’s great to see so many friends from the National Italian American Foundation, you know, the Sons and Daughters of Italy, and so many other Italian American leaders and organization from all across the country.

You know, I can honestly say I wouldn’t be president without you. I wouldn’t be president without the Italian American community.

Now, what she didn’t say is we do have something in common. I’m Catherine Eugenia Finnegan — Irish Catholics background. You guys, a lot of you are Catholics, you know. (Laughter.) I know you don’t admit it as much, but there — (laughter).

This month is about celebrating the extraordinary contributions and proud, proud herita- — heritage of Italian Americans to our nation. And it’s kind of endless.

For some of our families, your story is America’s story. It stretches back generations. For others, it just started. No matter when these st- — stories of immigrants who left everything behind to travel across the ocean in pursuit of the American dream just for a shot — just a simple shot. You and your ancestors worked hard to help build this country and build the middle class.

People like my college friend, the late Congressman Bill Pascrell — he’s been — Bill, Jr. is here. Where — where are you, Bill? (Applause.) There you are.

I used to kid his dad all the time. I said, “You know, Delaware may be the second-smallest state in the Union, but we own the Delaware River up to the highwater mark in New Jersey.”   (Laughter.) There was actually a Supreme Court case about that. Anyway. (Laughter.)

But he represented New Jersey, and his son represents the House of Representatives. And Bill did it for 27 years, when he passed away this summer. He was the grandson of Italian immigrants, a giant in the community, and a devoted patriot to the nation. You got good blood, kid, as my dad would say. (Applause.)

He was a part of a proud, proud heritage of Italian Americans who enrich every part of American life: entrepreneurs, educators, scientists, chefs, diplomats, doctors, servicemembers, veterans, athletes, actors, artists, and so much more. There’s nothing the Italian community is not engaged in — I mean, virtually nothing. There’s noth- — no community you don’t excel in.

But I also know it wasn’t always easy. Many of your ancestors faced horrific discrimination, like my ancestors faced horrific discrimination, when they first came to our shores. Yet, even in the face of — Italian Americans proved that they had the resilient spirit and a devotion to family and community, an unshakeable faith in the promise of a better tomorrow.

You know, my dad used to have an expression. He’d say, “Joey, family is the beginning, the middle, and the end — the beginning, the middle, and the end.” It’s a faith that has carried through to today, both at home and abroad.

Italian Americans are central to our nation’s deep friendship and strategic partnership with Italy. I’ve — I’ve worked out a really good relationship with the Italians. I’m — well, Ital- — I better have done that but at home. (Laughter.) But all kidding aside, with th- — with Italy. What a magnificent country.

You know, and — anyway, I won’t get started. But — (laughter) — you know, the bond between our countries is founded on a shared principle and shared commitments, including the shared support for the brave people of Ukraine as they defend themselves against Russia’s illegal (inaudible). (Applause.)

I might add, they have a female leader. (Applause.) I wish Sonny Daramo were here to hear that. (Laughter.)

In addition, Italy’s remarkable stewardship with the presidency of the G7 this year, as well as Italy’s long-standing contributions to transatlantic security through NATO — look, and their strong leadership in the European Union — it underscores how important Italy’s role is on the global stage, not just, you know, for America but for the world.

You know, let me close with this. You know, Michelangelo famously said he “saw an angel in the marble, and I carved until I set it free.” “I saw an angel in the marble, and I carved until I set it free.” To me, that’s the essence of what Italian Americans have done to our country for our entire history. You’ve carved until you set us free. I’m — I’m being dead- — deadly earnest.

We’re all reminded that when Jill and I had the honor to host one of the greatest singers of all time, in my view, Andrea Bocelli, here at the White House for Christmas in our first year in office, he performed with his son and his daughter as if they were a choir of herald angels. They were incredible. You know, with their God-given talent, the Bocelli family moved our hearts, pierced our souls — and I mean this sincerely — I have all of the music on my — and they embodied the spirit and beauty of all that connects us as people. A powerful reminder that America’s story depends on — not on any one of us but on — not on some of us but all of us.

It’s a story I see in all of you, working tirelessly — tirelessly to help realize the promise of America — and I mean it — for all Americans. Not a joke. Because some of you have been on the short end of the stick like my family growing up had been.

This is what the Italian American Heritage Month is all about. It’s about celebrating and connecting, feeling the pride in heritage and community, remembering who the hell we are.

We’re the United States of America, and there’s nothing beyond our capacity when we do it together — nothing, nothing, nothing. (Applause.) No, I really mean it.

So, thank you. Thank you, thank you, thank you.

And I want to tell you, you know what made me mo- — the — probably one of the most famous guys in my family — the whole family? Not being president. I took her to a beautiful little island off of Sicily. (Laughter.) And she keeps saying, “I’m going back.” (Laughter.)

THE FIRST LADY: Soon!

THE PRESIDENT: “With — with or without you.” (Laughter.)

So, folks, all kidding aside, thank you. You’re an incredible community. (Applause.)

THE FIRST LADY: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: You’re an essential part of my life.

Thank you, thank you, thank you. (Applause.) Enjoy the day.

God bless you all. And may God protect our troops.

Thank you. (Applause.) All right.

6:07 P.M. EDT

MIL OSI USA News –

January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI USA News: Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan En Route Berlin, Germany

Source: The White House

2:15 P.M. EDT

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: Okay. So, I’m just going to get straight to it.

As you can see, I have the national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, here to talk to us about the trip but also the latest in the Middle East.

Jake, the floor is yours.

MR. SULLIVAN: So, I don’t know if you guys have heard because of the lack of Wi-Fi back here, but the IDF has confirmed the death of Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader, and I’ll come to that in just a moment.

But let me start by laying out what we hope to achieve over the course of the next 24 hours in Berlin. This is the president’s first visit to Berlin as president, and he did not want his time in office to go by without going to the capital of one of — one of our most important partners and allies.

Germany is a core Ally in NATO, a core partner in the G7. They’ve been a core player in the Allied response to Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine. And the president is looking forward to having the opportunity to talk to the chancellor and other German officials about where we go from here in Ukraine; about developments in the Middle East, in Iran, Lebanon, Gaza, Israel; about how we align our respective approaches on the PRC; about how we align our industrial and innovation strategies; about artificial intelligence and the clean energy transition.

He will also have the opportunity to meet with the prime minister of the UK and president of France. The four leaders — Germany, France, UK, U.S. — will sit together to particularly focus on two issues.

One, the war in Ukraine and the pathway ahead, particularly in light of the fact that they’ve all had the opportunity to engage in person with President Zelenskyy over the course of the last few weeks and heard from him about where he sees things going. So, this is an opportunity to consult on that.

And then, second, to talk about the ongoing and fast-moving developments across the Middle East region.

The president will see President Steinmeier. He’ll spend one-on-one time with Chancellor Scholz. He’ll spend time with his delegation — with Chancellor Scholz and his delegation.

And then, of course, there’ll be this meeting among the four leaders in the afternoon, and there’ll be an opportunity for press statements with the chancellor and the president.

So, that’s the plan for tomorrow.

Of course, this comes against the backdrop of a pretty significant — very significant day in the Middle East, and that is that Yahya Sinwar has been taken off the battlefield. This is a murderous terrorist responsible for the worst massacre of Jews since the Holocaust. He has a lot of blood on his hands — Israeli blood, American blood, Palestinian blood — and the world is better now that he’s gone.

President Biden has just put out a written statement sharing his thoughts and reactions to the death of Sinwar, and he looks forward to the opportunity soon, perhaps very shortly, to speak to Prime Minister Netanyahu to congratulate the IDF and the brave Israeli soldiers and security professionals who carried out the operation that killed Sinwar but also to talk about the way forward, because Sinwar was a massive obstacle to peace and the day after in Gaza. And now that that obstacle has been removed, President Biden looks forward to talking to Prime Minister Netanyahu about how we secure the return of the hostages, an end to the war, and a move to the day after in Gaza — a Gaza where Hamas is no longer in power or control.

So they’ll have the opportunity to have an initial conversation about that, but this truly is an opportunity we need to seize together to bring about a better day for the people of Gaza, the people of Israel, the people of the whole region. And the United States is committed to doing everything in our power to help contribute to that.

Last thing I will say is that from shortly after October 7th, President Biden dispatched special operations personnel and intelligence professionals to Israel to work side by side with their Israeli counterparts in the hunt for Hamas leaders, including Sinwar, and it was with American intelligence help that many of these leaders, including Sinwar, were hunted and tracked, were flushed out of their hiding places, and put on the run. And, ultimately, this is a credit to the IDF for taking out Sinwar over the course of the last hours and days, but we’re proud of the support that the United States has given to the IDF all along the way.

So, with that, I’d be happy to take your questions.

Q    Jake —

Q    Can you say anything — well, go ahead. I’m sorry.

Q    Jake, thanks so much for doing this. You kind of implied that Sinwar had been an obstacle to hostage release and ceasefire. How big an obstacle is that? And does this give you additional hope now of a ceasefire and possibly a hostage release? How should we process this?

MR. SULLIVAN: I didn’t just imply it; I stated it explicitly.

At various points along the way, Sinwar was more interested in causing mayhem and chaos and death than in actually trying to achieve a ceasefire and hostage deal. And we repeatedly saw moments where it was him, in particular, who stood in the way of making progress towards a ceasefire and hostage deal. Now, there were other obstacles too along the way, but he was certainly a critical one.

And, yes, I think his removal from the battlefield does present an opportunity to find a way forward that gets the hostages home, brings the war to an end, brings us to a day after. That’s something we’re going to have to talk about with our Israeli counterparts.

Of course, there are still other Hamas actors who need to be brought to justice, and there are hostages, including Americans, being held by terrorists. We’re going to have to deal with all of that, but we believe there is a renewed opportunity right now that we would like to seize.

Yeah.

Q    Do you assess this as being the cutting off of the head of the Hydra, or what — what’s your assessment of Hamas’ capabilities from now on? Is there going to be a mop up? And what — what would you recommend the Israelis do?

MR. SULLIVAN: Sinwar was a critical figure operationally, militarily, and politically for Hamas. He had, in fact, consolidated control of both the political and military wing under his singular leadership in — in recent weeks and months. And so, this is a very significant event.

But what exactly it means for the future of Hamas as an organization, it’s early days yet. We will have to see.

What we do know is that the broad military structure, the battalions of Hamas have been systematically dismantled. We do know that Hamas does not pose the kind of threat to Israel that it posed on October 7th or anything close to it. We also know that there are still Hamas terrorists wielding guns and holding hostages and harboring a desire to continue to attack Israel and attack others.

And so, we’re going to have to sort through all of that. But this is an incredibly significant blow to Hamas. It is the removal of someone who, as I said, was unique in the consolidation of the control of the Hamas apparatus under his command. And now we will have to work to ensure that his death actually does deal the kind of long-term blow to Hamas that all of us would like to see.

Q    Can you give —

Q    Do you get the sense that Netanyahu is done now, that he’s — he’s reached his objectives? You just laid out the decimation of Hamas —

MR. SULLIVAN: No, his critical objective that — has not been reached. That objective is the return of the hostages, including American hostages. So, from the United States’ perspective, we now need to work with Israel, with Qatar and Egypt, with others — and this is something we’ll discuss with our European partners as well — to secure the release of those hostages. We’d like to see that happen.

Q    You referenced U.S. intel. To what extent did that play a role in this particular operation?

MR. SULLIVAN: This operation was an IDF operation. I’m not here to overclaim or — or try to take credits for something where the credit belongs to them.

But the Americans — the special operations personnel, the intelligence professionals — they also deserve our thanks for the work that they did alongside the IDF over the course of many months to help create the kind of counterterrorism pressure in Gaza that put a lot of these guys on the run. And Sinwar was plainly on the run (inaudible).

Q    Earlier this — earlier this week, Secretary Blinken and Secretary Austin sent letters to their counterparts threatening legal action if the humanitari- — humanitarian situation in Gaza doesn’t improve. Can you give us a sense of what that legal option would be and if there are any deadlines or specific actions that the president will raise with Prime Minister Netanyahu about that today?

MR. SULLIVAN: The letter speaks for itself. I think a lot of the headlines were breathless and overblown. We have had an ongoing dialogue with Israel for months now about improving the humanitarian situation. We have had previous communications that looked quite similar and that generated positive momentum towards opening crossings and getting more aid in. We’ve had, actually, constructive back-and-forth with our Israeli counterparts over the last few days in response to our requests, and we expect that we’ll see progress on the ground.

One thing that has unfolded this week is — is the reopening of some of the crossings that had been closed in the north and trucks going in. We need to see that sustained and expanded as we go forward, among the other requests in that letter.

But I’d — and I’d — just the other point I would make here is that it’s — it was a private diplomatic communication. It was a serious, substantive laydown. It’s part of our ongoing work and partnership with Israel. And having it all out there in the open, leaked in the way that it was, I think, was highly unfortunate. And I’ll leave it at that.

Q    Can you give us a sense of what the president will say in this conversation with Netanyahu? Will he push for an accelerated timeline for a ceasefire? Will he say, you

know, kind of, “Now you achieved the main direct- — main objective and we should move forward on — on other things,” or push for humanitarian aid?

MR. SULLIVAN: I’m going to let the president speak to the prime minister before I preview what he’s going to say in the press on the record, but we’ll try to give you a good sense of both what the president is thinking and what he’s communicating to the prime minister at the appropriate time.

Q    To — to what extent do you think this success with Sinwar might embolden Netanyahu when it comes to retaliating against Iran? Or do you see them as totally unrelated? And what are your conversations right now with them in terms of restraint — or whatever you want to call it — when the president has thoughts about what the target should be when they hit back?

MR. SULLIVAN: We’ve had very constructive communications with the Israelis about how they’re thinking about responding to the attack on October 1st. Those conversations will continue.

I can’t speculate as to the psychology of the prime minister based on what happened today. What I can say is that the logic of deterrence, the logic of a response to a salvo of 200 ballistic missiles — nothing in the Middle East is unrelated, but that is a distinct logic from the killing of Sinwar today.

Q    Jake, going back to the trip. What message will President Biden give his fellow leaders about America’s place in the world, given the uncertainty around our upcoming election?

MR. SULLIVAN: Say that again.

Q    What reassurance will President Biden give his fellow leaders about America’s place in the world, given the uncertainty about our upcoming presidential election?

MR. SULLIVAN: What President Biden can do is what he’s done for four years, which is lay out his vision of America’s place in the world and point the way forward based on what he thinks are in America’s national security interests and in the interests of our close allies.

Beyond that, he can’t speak for anyone else and doesn’t intend to.

Q    Is there any —

Q    Does this change your calculus on whether Israel can come to the table on a ceasefire by the end of the year?

MR. SULLIVAN: I’m sorry?

Q    Your calculus on whether a ceasefire could be reached by the end of the year.

MR. SULLIVAN: I have long since given up on making predictions or drawing timelines. All I can say is that we see an opportunity now that we want to seize to try to secure the release of the hostages, and we’re going to work at that as rapidly as we possibly can.

Q    Give- — given the situation, would the president reconsider possibly holding a press conference during his time in Berlin? It would be good to hear from him firsthand on how he thinks about this and the situation in Ukraine.

MR. SULLIVAN: I will note for the record there are heads nodding. (Laughter.) I’ll also note for the record that that is a really fascinating way to bring the press into the middle of a world historical event. So — (laughter) — and I’ll leave it at that.

Q    I’ll follow up on that. The president talks about democracy as being a key part of his administration, of his vision for America that you just referenced. Why would he not take questions from the press at what was originally going to be a state visit to Germany? I don’t understand.

MR. SULLIVAN: It’s fascinating how you guys can — (laughs) — make this the story.

Q    It’s not the story. It’s just a question.

MR. SULLVIAN: I mean, honestly, I think invoking democracy and suggesting that President Biden is somehow insufficiently committed to it because of the structure of his press engagement on one day in Germany is a bit ludicrous.

Q    I can ask a Germany question. So, a lot of the moves that President Biden has made both domestically and internationally have been characterized as “Trump-proofing” the — the, you know, U.S. government for a future Trump presidency.

How do you feel about that characterization? I’m talking about moves like bringing NATO under — forgive me, it’s too complicated to explain, but you know what I’m talking about.

So, do you think he’s Trump-proofing?

MR. SULLIVAN: I — I don’t like characterizations like that because they’re inherently political.

Q    So, what is he doing, then?

MR. SULLIVAN: What the president is trying to do is to make our commitment to Ukraine sustainable and institutionalized for the long term. And every other ally agreed that that was the responsible thing to do.

The la- —

Q    (Inaudible) necessarily reduced U.S. role, is that the idea?

MR. SULLIVAN: Not at all. The basic logic was what the president laid out at the Washington Summit this summer, which is the communiqué said Ukraine’s place, Ukraine’s future, is in NATO. There is work to do to get from here to there, including reforms and security conditions being met.

So, the question is, how do you build a bridge from where we are now to Ukraine’s eventual membership in NATO? And the answer to that question was the set of deliverables in Washington, including the institutionalization of the security support apparatus for Ukraine. That is what we were trying to accomplish, and that’s what we believe we did accomplish.

Q    Jake, on Iran. Can you confirm and elaborate on reporting that President Biden directed the NSC to warn Iran that any attempt on President Trump’s life would be seen as an act of war?

MR. SULLIVAN: I will tell you that President Biden has taken this issue with the utmost seriousness. He asked to be updated on it regularly. He gives us direction for how to respond to it regularly and in a very serious and consequential way. We are following his directives and implementing them. And I’m not going to get into specifics on what that looks like.

Q    Jake, what about these reports that President Trump and President Putin have had seven conversations? Are you worried about this? Are you worried about any sort of backdoor conversations President Trump is having with leaders?

MR. SULLIVAN: I do not know if that’s true or not, but obviously that would raise red flags if it were true.

Q    Another one on — since you just said Putin. There’s been reporting in Germany that Chancellor Scholz said he would be open to speaking with President Putin ahead of the G20 if asked — sort of various ways he said it. Have you guys talked about this? Has he told President Biden about this? Do you think this would be a good idea to do a leader-level conversation with President Putin at this time?

MR. SULLIVAN: That has not come up between the chancellor and the president. You know, I was just in Germany at the end of last week with my German counterpart. That — the question of a call to Putin didn’t come up. So, I think that’s a question better put to the chancellor.

Q    The official who briefed us yesterday about the Germany trip on the — on the phone mentioned that the Ramstein meeting would be rescheduled. Does that mean the president will be going back to Ramstein at some point, or what — what did that mean?

MR. SULLIVAN: We will hold a leaders-level Ramstein meeting virtually in November.

Q    One more. On the frozen assets deal — the Russian frozen assets. What’s the progress on that there? I assume this comes up in the conversations. Is there a plan B if the EU doesn’t figure out a sanctions regime?

MR. SULLIVAN: I’m feeling very good about the progress that we’ve made on the G7 commitment to mobilize $50 billion from the proceeds of the Russian sovereign assets by the end of the year. We intend to meet that commitment, and we intend to make a contribution — the United States. The EU, obviously, has announced that it’s prepared to make a contribution. So are other partners. So, from my perspective, at this point, everything is on track.

Q    Is there any update on when the president might talk to President Xi?

MR. SULLIVAN: No.

Thank you, guys.

Q    Thank you.

Q    Who you — wait, who are you rooting for in the playoffs, World Series?

MR. SULLIVAN: I’m a Minnesota Twins fan, so I can’t root for the Guardians, but I definitely can’t root for the Yankees.

I don’t know.

Q    What about the Dodgers and Mets?

MR. SULLIVAN: Yeah, I’m watching, but actually I don’t — I’ve not clearly determined who I’d prefer to win. But, yeah, Dodgers or Mets.

Q    Can you swing back and talk to us off the record later?

MR. SULLIVAN: Sure.

Q    Great.

Q    Thanks.

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: I don’t know. Is there any real thing — anything else to discuss? Let me t- —

Q    The only thing I would say is we disagree with the suggestion that democracy and speaking — and taking questions from the press is “ludicrous.”

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: All right. Noted.

Q    I would argue that our stories allow the president to have a relationship with the world, not just with other leaders, and the ability to talk openly will help that.

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: All right. Noted. Noted.

Let’s move on.

So, just want to talk about an announcement. This is domestic, obviously, going to go to the — to that space. I just wanted to touch on an announcement very quickly.

And so, today, the Biden-Harris administration announced an additional $4.5 billion in student debt cancelation for over 60,000 public service workers, bringing the total number of public — of public service workers who have had their student debt canceled under the Biden-Harris administration to over 1 million people.

One such example is Kelly, a kindergarten teacher in Rhode Island, who had been paying off her student loans for a decade. After the student let her know that her debt had been canceled, she tol- — after the president, pardon me — she told us that after 12 years of marriage, she might be able to take the honeymoon she never had.

The president — the president’s administration made it a priority to fix the Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program. Prior to our administration, only 7,000 public service workers had received relief since the program was established in 2007.

Thanks to the work of the Biden-Harris administration, as of today, 1 million teachers, nurses, firefighters, service members, first resp- — responders, and — and more who — who pursued careers in public service have gotten the relief they deserve.

The relief brings the total loan forgiveness approved by the Biden-Harris administration — administration to over $175 billion for nearly 5 million Americans. And while — meanwhile, our Republicans elected officials have repeatedly attempted to block student debt relief.

President Biden and Vice President Harris remain committed to making education affordable for all Americans.

With that, what else do you guys have for me?

Q    I have a question.

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: Sure.

Q    Did President Biden talk to Vice President Harris ahead of this trip to see if she had any message for the world leaders or to get her input on what the situation should be going forward?

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: As you know, the president and the vice president talk regularly. I don’t have a specific call to — to read out, but I think you can see the last almost four years of the — what we’ve been able to do, what the president has been able to do on the world stage, certainly has been in partnership with the vice president. I know that she supports his trip and everything that he’s — he’s trying to do tomorrow in the — in the short trip that we have in — in Germany.

I just don’t have anything to read out as a call specifically on this trip.

Q    Is the president or the administration facing pressure from allies to get something done after the election but before he is out of office? There’s been some talks that Zelenskyy — you know, whether that’s accelerating a push for Ukraine into NATO or — or other funding things for Ukraine?

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: Well, you’re talking about the victory plan. Certainly, I’m going to let the Ukr- — Ukrainians speak to their victory plan as it relates to that question about NATO.

Look, I think — I think what you have seen from this president, from this administration — obviously, including the vice president — is how much we have stand behind — next to, if you will — with Ukrainians and how they’re trying to beat back the aggression that we’ve seen from Russia. And you have not just seen us standing there. You’ve seen this president take action, and — which is why you see NATO much stronger than it was, and that’s why you see 50 countries have gotten behind Ukraine. And you heard us — you heard us lay out yesterday an additional assistance package that we have provided to Ukrainians.

And so, we’re going to have to continue — we’re going to continue having conversations with the Ukrainians on what they need on the battlefield and how else we can be helpful to them.

As it relates to their victory plan — as it relates to what’s next, I’m certainly going to let the Ukrainians speak directly about that.

Obviously, the president has had a conversation with the president, President Zelenskyy, on that plan. I just don’t have anything beyond that, and I’m not — certainly, I’m not going to get into hypotheticals from here.

Q    The president at the funeral yesterday had a — what looked like a spirited conversation with former President Obama. Did you talk to him about what they discussed?

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: No, it’s been kind of busy the last couple hours on the plane, as you can imagine.

Look, I’ll — I’ll say this. The president really very much looked — appreciated being there at the — at the funeral of Ethel Kennedy, who he saw as someone who was incredible and had a — was an incredible force, obviously, in her life, during her — her years. And what he wanted to do is — was to lift up — lift her up and speak to her accomplishment and what she meant to him — not just to him but to her family and to the country. So, he appreciated doing that.

And we have said many times the president and — and president — and former President Biden [Obama] — they have a very close relationship. They’ve had one for a long time, obviously, as he served as his vice president.

I don’t have anything else to — to share on that. I have not had this conversation with the president. Obviously, we’ve been pretty busy these past couple of hours on the plane.

Q    Do you know if the president was able to watch any of the Fox News interview that Vice President Harris did? And does —

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: Yes, he —

Q    — did he talk to you about how — how she did?

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: Yeah, he was able to — to catch that. And he saw her performance, her interview as strong. And I think what you saw and what — and this is what he believes — is that you saw why Americans and people want to see her continuing to fight for them. And that’s what he saw last night. That’s what we all saw — many of us saw. So, I think she was strong and incredibly impressive in that interview.

Q    Karine, does the president believe that his vice president would be a markedly different leader?

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: I mean, look, he talked about this on Tuesday when he was in Philly, and he — and I talked a little bit about this as well, just reit- — really reiterating what the president shared, which is that, look, she’s going to be essentially her own person, right? She is going to have her own direction, her own view of how to move forward.

And he did that, right? He was loyal to President Obama when he was vice president, but he cut his own path. And so, that’s what he expects from the vice president to do.

So, nothing — nothing new. That’s what he expects her to do — to have her own path, to have — to build on — certainly, to build on the economic successes that we have seen and continuing the — the work that we’ve been able to do.

But she’s going to cut her own path. He was very clear about that a couple days ago.

Q    Karine —

Q    But on student loans — you talked about the PSLF 1 million, a huge achievement for those borrowers — what’s your message for the other 40 million-plus borrowers who’ve been caught up in a lot of legal limbo over the past three years?

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: Look, I’ll — I’ll say this. You know, I’m not going to speak to the legal — the legal components of this. There are legal matters that are happening, so they are ongoing. So, I’m not going to speak to that.

But I think what you can take away from what this president has — trying to do, when Republicans have continued to block him, in promising to give Americans a little bit of breathing room, to make sure that Americans who have — borrows [borrowers] who have loans and — and are squeezed by those loans are not able to, you know, buy a home, start a family.

The president was very attuned to that and very clear that he wanted to give them an opportunity — an opportunity to really, you know, be able to — to start that life that they wanted. And so, he’s been trying to do that, even though he’s been blocked and — and Republicans have gotten in the way.

I think you can see over the past — certainly, the past six months, the president continuing to try to take actions to — to make sure he kept his commitment to Americans who, again, need a little bit of breathing room.

So, I’m not going to speak to the legal matter, but I think this announcement today shows his commitment to public service workers, right? I talked about firefighters, nurses. I talked about police officers, who put so much on the line, who give so much for — for everybody, for folks who need their assistance and their help, and wanted to give them that opportunity to really be able to — to move on economically in what they want to accomplish for themselves and for their family.

All right. Anything else?

Q    On the —

Q    So —

Q    Sorry. Go ahead.

Q    Sorry.

Now going back to the funeral for a minute. Did he speak with Speaker Emeritus Pelosi? And also, she was not seen at the Italian American celebration, when she’s been front and center in the past. Was she not invited?

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: I — I don’t have anything to share with you on that. I didn’t talk to the president about that at all. But what you saw — obviously, you saw the president and the former president, Pres- — President Obama, connect, have a moment together. The president m- — very much looked forward to that. I just don’t have anything on Nancy Pelosi.

Q    Just —

Q    I noticed he didn’t recognize her when he recognized the other two presidents at the funeral.

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: Well, he wanted it — I can say this. He wanted it to be, you know — to — to be very focused on the family. He wanted it to be, you know, brief and — and very poignant. And that’s what his focus was yesterday on his remarks.

Q    On the trip. Obviously, this is a abbreviated agenda from, you know, the Ramstein summit —

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: Yeah.

Q    — and other things.

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: Yeah.

Q    But can you explain to us, what’s the reason that it’s so short? Why do we have to get out of Germany at 4:00 p.m. tomorrow? Is there a reason on the German chancellor’s schedule why we have to —

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: So, I mean —

Q    Regardless of the press conference, there was also talk about maybe doing a Holocaust memorial situation. What’s —

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: No, I totally understand what — totally — as you — let’s step back for a second.

The reason that the president had to postpone his trip was because Hurricane Milton was coming, and it was — it was forecast to be a historical hurricane, and the president wanted to be in the States to deal with the response and what was needed, certainly, by the impacted region, for what folks on the ground really needed.

And so, that’s why we postponed the trip. We said that we wanted to certainly get that back on the books. We were able to do it — to your point, a truncated version, but it is a robust schedule. And we were able to work with the Germans and to be able to get done what we can on this trip.

I mean, the president has a busy schedule. He does. There’s a lot going on in the next couple days, couple weeks.

Q    But he has to get back to the States for something in particular —

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: I mean, we’ll —

Q    — that we don’t know about?

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: We’re certainly going to share with you what the — his — the next couple of days of his schedule is going to look like. But he wanted to — and I said this yesterday in the briefing room. He wanted to thank the chancellor for his partnership, for his leadership as well with Ukraine. Outside of the U.S., U- — the U- — German is the second — have provided the second-most resources, assistance to Ukrainians.

And so, he wanted to be, you know, thankful to him. And so, that’s what you’re seeing on this trip. He wanted to make this happen. He asked his team to make this trip happen.

And so, look, we have a busy schedule. We got a lot going on in next couple of days, next couple of weeks. And so, we tried to fit this in, and this is what we were able to do in working with the German government as well to make this happen.

Q    Does the president, as the election hits its final two weeks, expect to get more aggressive in outreach and participation? Is that maybe what you’re referencing, or what’s his thinking on that?

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: So, you know I can’t speak to political trips or any- —

Q    But if —

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: But wa- —

Q    — you could speak on his schedule.

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: Well, I — I’m just — want to get that out of there. And so, look, the president is certainly looking at — looking forward to being out there and supporting the vice president.

I just want to be super mindful. But he will — you’ll see him — you’ll see him hit the road. You’ll see him hit the road, for sure.

That’s all I got.

All right. Thanks, everybody. Sorry my voice is a little hoarse.

Q    Thanks, Karine.

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: Thanks, everybody.

2:45 P.M. EDT

MIL OSI USA News –

January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI USA News: Readout of the Meeting of President Macron of France, Chancellor Scholz of Germany, Prime Minister Starmer of the United Kingdom, and President Biden of the United States

Source: The White House

President Emmanuel Macron of France, Chancellor Olaf Scholz of Germany, Prime Minister Keir Starmer of the United Kingdom, and President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. of the United States met today in Berlin, Germany.

The leaders condemned Russia’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine, discussed their plans to provide Ukraine with additional security, economic, and humanitarian assistance – including leveraging the extraordinary revenues of immobilized Russian sovereign assets, as decided at the G7 Summit –, discussed President Zelenskyy’s Victory Plan, and reiterated their resolve to continue supporting Ukraine in its efforts to secure a just and lasting peace, based on international law, including the United Nations Charter, and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The leaders also discussed events in the Middle East, in particular the implications of the death of Yahya Sinwar, who bears responsibility for the bloodshed of the October 7th terrorist attack, the immediate necessity to bring the hostages home to their families, ending the war in Gaza, and ensuring humanitarian aid reaches civilians. The leaders also reiterated their condemnation of Iran’s escalatory attack on Israel and coordinated on efforts to hold Iran accountable and prevent further escalation. They discussed the situation in Lebanon and agreed on the need to work towards full implementation of UNSCR 1701 and a diplomatic resolution that allows civilians on both sides of the Blue Line to return safely home.

###

MIL OSI USA News –

January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI USA News: Statement from White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre on the Visit of Prime Minister Robert Golob of the Republic of Slovenia

Source: The White House

On October 22, President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. will host Prime Minister Robert Golob of the Republic of Slovenia for a bilateral meeting at the White House. This will be their first meeting at the White House and follows conversations that helped pave the way for the largest prisoner swap since the Cold War. The leaders will have an in-depth discussion on a range of issues of mutual interest, including energy security and cooperation, a shared approach to the Western Balkans, continued robust support to Ukraine in its defense against Russian aggression, and events in the Middle East. President Biden will underscore our appreciation for Prime Minister Golob’s leadership to bring home Americans unjustly detained by Russia and our continued cooperation on a host of other global issues.

###

MIL OSI USA News –

January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI China: Ukrainian president, US defense secretary meet

Source: China State Council Information Office 3

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and visiting U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin discussed defense issues during their meeting on Monday, according to the presidential press service.

The talks touched upon Ukraine’s request to use long-range weapons to attack military targets inside Russia.

Zelensky and Austin also addressed increasing the production of attack drones, cruise missiles, artillery shells and air defense equipment.

Austin announced a new U.S. military assistance package for Ukraine worth 400 million U.S. dollars, which includes ammunition, military equipment and weapons.

Since February 2022, the United States has provided 64.1 billion dollars in military aid to Ukraine, according to the fact sheet release by the U.S. Department of State in October this year.

MIL OSI China News –

January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: German Chancellor Sholz to Visit Türkiye

Source: Republic of Turkey

Chancellor Olaf Scholz of Germany will pay a working visit to Türkiye on October 18-19, 2024 at the invitation of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
During the talks to be held in Istanbul on October 19 Saturday, the bilateral relations between Türkiye and Germany will be reviewed thoroughly and potential steps that would further improve the cooperation between the two countries will be addressed.
The views on the current regional and global matters, particularly the Türkiye-European Union relations, Israel’s attacks on Gaza, the occupied Palestinian territories and Lebanon, the developments in Ukraine as well as the Türkiye-Germany bilateral relations, will be exchanged at the talks as well.
Respectfully announced to the public.

MIL OSI Europe News –

January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Translation: 04/10/2024 Undersecretary of State Jakub Wiśniewski met with a delegation from the EU Council of Ministers.

MIL ASI Translation. Region: Polish/Europe –

Fuente: Gobierno de Polonia en poleco.

Undersecretary of State Jakub Wiśniewski met with a delegation from the EU’s Home Rule 04/10/2024On October 3, 2024, a meeting was held at the headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between Undersecretary of State Jakub Wiśniewski and a delegation from the EU’s Home Rule 04/10/2024, led by President Susan Danger. Amcham a la UE is a business organization that brings together over 160 American companies operating on the European market.

During the meeting, issues related to the upcoming Polish presidency of the Council of the European Union were raised. The deputy head of Polish diplomacy emphasized that the Polish presidency will be held at a difficult time, at a time when the war in Ukraine significantly affects the stability and security of not only Poland, but the whole of Europe. Undersecretary of State Jakub Wiśniewski also noted that the Polish presidency coincides with the beginning of a new institutional cycle of the European Union, which means cooperation with the new European Parliament and the new European Commission. The meeting was also an opportunity to exchange opinions on the need to take action to improve the competitiveness of the EU and support the innovation of European companies. Both sides emphasized the ties between Poland and the United States, including the growing trend of trade between our countries. In 2023, our countries achieved a record trade turnover of almost 28 million USD. It was pointed out that Poland has become one of the most attractive destinations under the so-called friendshoring process, which includes investments in allied countries. Issues relating to energy, new technologies and intellectual property were also discussed.

Photo: Sebastian Indra/Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Photos (3)

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January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Translation: 04/10/2024 19th OTAN Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

MIL ASI Translation. Region: Polish/Europe –

Fuente: Gobierno de Polonia en poleco.

19th OTAN Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction04/10/2024This year’s Conference was opened by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Robert Kupiecki and Acting Assistant to the NATO Secretary General for Political and Security Policy Javier Colomina.

The two-day OTAN Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), held on October 3 and 4 in Warsaw, was attended by the US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and Security Affairs, Bonnie Jenkins, and the UN Secretary General’s High Representative for Disarmament, Izumi Nakamitsu (who is also Deputy Secretary General). The main topic of the meeting was an assessment of the current state of the non-proliferation regime of weapons of mass destruction, which is under pressure from states trying to undermine the international order. The Russian aggression in Ukraine has a particularly negative impact on the regime’s condition. The analysis of threats and ways to counter them in the context of Russia’s actions was an important thread of the meeting. The event was attended by over 100 participants from over 40 countries, including NATO member states, associated countries and invited partner countries and international organizations. On the sidelines of the conference, a panel discussion on arms control and deterrence was held, organized by the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM). The event was broadcast on social media.***The annual NATO Conferences on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) have been organized continuously by NATO since 2004. They are co-hosted by NATO allies. The meetings offer the opportunity for informal discussions on WMD threats by senior state representatives and experts. The 19th Conference is being held for the second time in Poland. The first time was co-hosted by Polonia in December 2009.

Photos (3)

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January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Translation: 17/10/2024 The International Monetary Fund positively assesses the Polish economy

MIL ASI Translation. Region: Polish/Europe –

Fuente: Gobierno de Polonia en poleco.

On Wednesday, October 17, 2024, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed its mission in Poland, presenting the conclusions and recommendations resulting from the annual economic review. After reviewing the country’s current economic situation and plans for economic, fiscal and monetary policy, the Fund’s experts positively assessed the state of the Polish economy. The mission took place on October 8-17, 2024 under Article IV of the IMF’s Statute. The International Monetary Fund positively assessed the state of the Polish economy. According to the Fund’s experts, Poland’s prospects have improved compared to last year, despite the difficult economic conditions in Europe and the ongoing war in Ukraine. According to the Minister of Finance, Andrzej Domański, the International Monetary Fund’s assessment confirms the stability and resilience of the Polish economy to global challenges. The report shows that Poland’s growth prospects are supported by the unblocked European Union funds, which, combined with a moderate level of debt, significant foreign exchange reserves and solid financial sector buffers, contributes to the economy’s recovery. Risks related to the geopolitical situation and the slowdown in Europe are effectively mitigated, providing grounds for optimism for the future.

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EDITOR’S NOTE: This article is a translation. Apologies should the grammar and/or sentence structure not be perfect.

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January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI: EBC Financial Group Expands Partnership with DiNapoli’s Leading Indicators, Revealing Key Strategies for Navigating Black Swan Events

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

TAIPEI, Taiwan, Oct. 22, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — EBC Financial Group (EBC), in partnership with DiNapoli Experts, is proud to host ‘Harnessing the Power of DiNapoli Indicators to Conquer Black Swan Events,’ an exclusive gathering that brought together financial experts, traders, investors, and economic strategists to explore key strategies for navigating volatile markets. This event, part of EBC’s broader commitment to thought leadership in finance, offered critical insights not only for traders but for those seeking a deeper understanding of global financial trends, including the impacts of geopolitical tensions, inflation, and the evolving role of technology in market prediction.

Operating across global financial hubs such as London, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Singapore, and Sydney, EBC Financial Group is regulated by major international bodies, including the UK’s FCA, CIMA in the Cayman Islands, and ASIC in Australia. These credentials underscore the Group’s mission to deliver sound, ethical, and transparent financial services across key markets.

With markets facing challenges from geopolitical instability, rising inflation, and shifting monetary policies, EBC’s commitment to investor empowerment and education stands firm. The discussions provided participants with exclusive insights into managing risk and seizing opportunities in global markets, and attendees engaged with some of the industry’s top experts, gaining hands-on insights into critical factors influencing today’s global markets.

Building on the momentum from the successful signing ceremony in Thailand, where EBC Financial Group solidified its partnership with DiNapoli’s Leading Indicators, the Taiwan event marks a key milestone in EBC’s ongoing mission. Through this collaboration, EBC is empowering traders with advanced tools to navigate Black Swan events.

Global Instabilities Threaten Market Stability: Insights from David Barrett
David Barrett, CEO of EBC Financial Group (UK) Ltd, issued a stark warning about the growing economic fragility facing global markets. Speaking to an audience of financial professionals, Barrett highlighted that the Federal Reserve’s recent rate cuts have unsettled bond markets, exposing deep vulnerabilities in the global financial system. While the U.S. equity market has enjoyed a brief rally, Germany’s economic downturn threatens to spiral into a wider Eurozone crisis, Barrett explained.

Barrett emphasised that the risks extend far beyond economics. Geopolitical conflicts—from the ongoing war in Ukraine to instability in the Middle East—are now global flashpoints, disrupting energy supplies and pushing commodity markets toward dangerous levels of volatility. According to Barrett, this combination of factors could drag the global economy into deeper, more unpredictable volatility, leaving even experienced investors facing unprecedented uncertainty.

As part of the Group’s mission to help investors navigate these turbulent markets, Barrett reiterated EBC’s focus on providing cutting-edge trading tools and educational initiatives. EBC’s partnership with DiNapoli Indicators is instrumental in equipping traders with the tools necessary to interpret market movements, especially in unpredictable environments. By combining advanced predictive tools like DiNapoli Indicators with real-time market analysis, EBC is ensuring that traders are not only informed but prepared to respond to global financial shifts.

EBC’s expansion into emerging markets and its commitment to establishing regulated entities in new jurisdictions also reflect the Group’s dedication to offering clients access to global trading opportunities. With its rapidly growing footprint, EBC continues to lead with integrity and transparency, providing traders worldwide with the tools to manage risk effectively.

As the U.S. presidential election approaches, Barrett warned that this divisive political battle could be another major destabilising factor for markets, as investors brace for shifting economic policies and potential political upheaval.

“We are not just seeing market volatility; we are looking at a perfect storm where geopolitical tensions, inflation, and monetary policies are converging like never before,” Barrett cautioned. He urged investors and traders to take urgent action, adapting to this new reality with precision, foresight, and advanced tools like DiNapoli Indicators to help navigate through the uncertainty. Without this, Barrett stated, market participants risk being left behind in a financial environment that demands data-driven decision-making and the ability to manage complex risks.

Capturing Trading Opportunities: Jason Zeng on DiNapoli Indicators
At the event, Jason Zeng, General Manager of Fibonacci Investment Consulting, LLC, presented the critical role that DiNapoli Indicators play in helping investors identify key market retracement points and timing trades effectively. Zeng, a long-standing expert in DiNapoli-Levels trading, explained how these indicators are not just tools for predicting price movements, but vital systems for managing risk and profitability in highly volatile markets.

Zeng focused on how the Fibonacci-based DiNapoli Levels have been successfully applied to forecast market retracements in a range of asset classes, including equities, commodities, and currencies. He cited recent examples where DiNapoli Indicators enabled traders to accurately pinpoint entry and exit points, even in the face of significant market fluctuations caused by geopolitical instability and central bank policy shifts.

“Traders who rely on these indicators can enhance their risk management and improve trade execution,” Zeng said. He highlighted the use of real-world case studies, showing how DiNapoli’s approach has repeatedly outperformed traditional technical analysis by offering actionable insights during times of heightened uncertainty.

Zeng stressed that in today’s fast-moving financial markets, timing is everything, and DiNapoli Indicators offer the precision necessary to navigate the complexities of modern trading environments. According to Zeng, these indicators are essential for traders and financial professionals aiming to capture opportunities while minimising exposure to unpredictable market swings.

As EBC continues to expand its operations across emerging markets, it remains committed to providing global traders with tailored tools and educational resources, ensuring that they are equipped to navigate both local and international market dynamics.

Capital Markets Under Pressure: Dr. Hua-Shen Pan on Geopolitical Risks and Economic Countermeasures
Dr. Hua-Shen Pan, an esteemed economic analyst and columnist, delivered a pointed examination of the global geopolitical risks that are currently shaping capital flows and investment strategies. Addressing the audience, Dr. Pan highlighted how geopolitical volatility has become a primary driver of market instability, overshadowing traditional economic indicators.

Dr. Pan drew attention to China’s economic trajectory, which he identified as a critical factor influencing the global financial system. As the Chinese government introduces new stimulus measures, the global financial community is watching closely to gauge the effectiveness of these policies in stabilising the world’s second-largest economy.

He further explained how geopolitical flashpoints, including the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and instability in the Middle East, are exacerbating energy price shocks and complicating efforts by central banks to control inflation. Dr. Pan highlighted the growing disconnect between economic fundamentals and market reactions, pointing out that traditional models of economic forecasting are struggling to account for the disruptive influence of geopolitical events.

Dr. Pan argued that while geopolitical tensions will continue to be a source of market volatility, investors must adapt by focusing on risk management and long-term strategies that account for unpredictable economic shifts. He highlighted the importance of understanding how global policy responses—from Federal Reserve actions to China’s economic policy—will shape the investment landscape in the years to come.

“Markets are no longer simply reacting to economic data,” Dr. Pan observed. “We are now in an era where geopolitical conflicts are driving capital decisions, and this requires a new strategic approach.”

Navigating Post-Fed Market Reactions: Joseph AuXano’s Key Insights
Joseph AuXano, Director of the DiNapoli Online Course (DAP), addressed one of the most pressing concerns for market participants—the aftermath of Federal Reserve rate cuts and their impact on market dynamics. AuXano demonstrated how DiNapoli Indicators can be used to accurately assess market reactions following Fed decisions, offering traders a powerful tool to anticipate volatility and make informed decisions.

Through a detailed analysis of recent FOMC meetings, AuXano illustrated how major stocks, including Tesla and Nvidia, responded to rate cuts. He demonstrated how the MACD Predictor and DiNapoli Expansion tools provide crucial early signals, enabling traders to identify high-probability trades by spotting key support and resistance levels in advance.

AuXano emphasised the importance of using multi-timeframe analysis, highlighting that relying solely on short-term trends leaves traders vulnerable to unpredictable market swings. By incorporating the DiNapoli Indicators, investors are better equipped to navigate both short-term fluctuations and long-term trends.

“After each Fed decision, markets are often thrown into chaos, with unpredictable movements. But by using these tools, traders can stay one step ahead, reading market signals more effectively,” AuXano explained.

He added, “Today’s economic forum has provided valuable insights into the various factors impacting markets, reading the markets by observing how price interacts with DiNapoli Indicators gives traders and investors an additional edge when seeking to navigate market volatility. It’s about staying disciplined and structured, especially in today’s economic and political climate, where interest rate changes and central bank policies play a key role.”

Mitigating Algorithmic Trading Risks: Insights from Rich Wang
Rich Wang, CTO of Provider Space, delved into the growing reliance on algorithmic trading and the risks that come with automated systems in today’s financial markets. Wang’s presentation centred on the need for robust risk management strategies that ensure consistent profitability, even as markets become increasingly volatile.

Wang highlighted the advantages and dangers of algorithmic trading, explaining that while automation can enhance trading efficiency and speed, it also exposes traders to greater risk if not properly managed. He shared real-world examples of how market volatility can trigger automated systems to make rapid, high-stakes trades that can spiral into significant losses without adequate safeguards in place.

Wang stressed the importance of incorporating stop-loss mechanisms and conducting thorough backtesting of algorithms to prevent systems from failing during market disruptions. He underscored that risk management needs to evolve alongside trading technology, particularly as markets become more sensitive to geopolitical events and central bank policy shifts.

“Automation can give traders an edge, but only when combined with solid risk management frameworks,” Wang said. He demonstrated how the latest risk mitigation strategies can be integrated into automated trading systems, allowing traders to maintain control and reduce their exposure to sudden market shocks.

Wrapping Up the Event
The event provided a wealth of strategic insights, equipping market participants with the tools and knowledge necessary to navigate today’s volatile financial landscape. From geopolitical risks to algorithmic trading and Fed rate-cut reactions, the symposium underscored the importance of using advanced technical indicators, like DiNapoli Levels, to manage risk and seize market opportunities.

As the global economic outlook remains uncertain, EBC Financial Group continues to lead the conversation around financial resilience, offering investors and traders the necessary foresight to adapt to these evolving challenges.

For more information, high-resolution images, or speaker materials, please contact:

Media Contact:
Angela Wu
Global Public Relations (Taiwan)
angela.wu@ebc.com

Chyna Elvina
Global Public Relations Manager (APAC, LATAM)
chyna.elvina@ebc.com

Douglas Chew
Global Public Relations Lead
douglas.chew@ebc.com

About EBC Financial Group
Founded in the esteemed financial district of London, EBC Financial Group (EBC) is renowned for its comprehensive suite of services that includes financial brokerage, asset management, and comprehensive investment solutions. EBC has quickly established its position as a global brokerage firm, with an extensive presence in key financial hubs such as London, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Singapore, Sydney, the Cayman Islands, and across emerging markets in Latin America, Southeast Asia, Africa, and India. EBC caters to a diverse clientele of retail, professional, and institutional investors worldwide.

Recognised by multiple awards, EBC prides itself on adhering to the leading levels of ethical standards and international regulation. EBC Financial Group’s subsidiaries are regulated and licensed in their local jurisdictions. EBC Financial Group (UK) Limited is regulated by the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), EBC Financial Group (Cayman) Limited is regulated by the Cayman Islands Monetary Authority (CIMA), EBC Financial Group (Australia) Pty Ltd, and EBC Asset Management Pty Ltd are regulated by Australia’s Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC).

At the core of EBC Group are seasoned professionals with over 30 years of profound experience in major financial institutions, having adeptly navigated through significant economic cycles from the Plaza Accord to the 2015 Swiss franc crisis. EBC champions a culture where integrity, respect, and client asset security are paramount, ensuring that every investor engagement is treated with the utmost seriousness it deserves.

EBC is the Official Foreign Exchange Partner of FC Barcelona, offering specialised services in regions such as Asia, LATAM, the Middle East, Africa, and Oceania. EBC is also a partner of United to Beat Malaria, a campaign of the United Nations Foundation, aiming to improve global health outcomes. Starting February 2024, EBC supports the ‘What Economists Really Do’ public engagement series by Oxford University’s Department of Economics, demystifying economics, and its application to major societal challenges to enhance public understanding and dialogue.

https://www.ebc.com/

Photos accompanying this announcement are available at:
https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/564383fa-f7de-4825-8a3d-d644cd768c51
https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/fd1d9d72-b653-4979-ba30-f35bb4ed4402
https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/f89d66ee-0f78-44df-8b49-fe8f8d96d3aa

The MIL Network –

January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: NATO Secretary General joins meeting of G7 Defence Ministers in Naples

Source: NATO

On Saturday (19 October) NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte joined a meeting of G7 Defence Ministers in Naples, Italy to discuss how to further increase support to Ukraine, ramp up defence industrial production, and more. It was the first G7 meeting for Mr Rutte in his role as Secretary General and the first time the G7 convened a dedicated meeting in Defence Ministers format.

The Secretary General highlighted the value of cooperation between G7 and NATO, given the complex nature of the challenges to shared security. On Ukraine, he underscored how ensuring that Ukraine has what it needs to prevail is critical to security and stability well beyond the region. As Ministers discussed defence industrial production, Mr Rutte noted the importance of working together – across the Alliance and beyond – to not only increase and speed up production but that these efforts are better aligned by working to NATO standards. The Secretary General also outlined how NATO is doing more to build its partnerships, not only in the Indo-Pacific but also in NATO’s southern neighbourhood – another area on which G7 discussions focused.

The meeting in Naples comes on the heels of the NATO Defence Ministers’ Meeting in Brussels this week, where Allies agreed on a range of initiatives related to improving deterrence and defence, ensuring enduring support for Ukraine, and doing more with partners in the Indo-Pacific as well as the EU.

MIL Security OSI –

January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Canada: Joint Declaration by G7 Defence Ministers to reaffirm common determination to address security challenges
Source: Government of Canada News

We, the G7 Defense Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, with the participation of the NATO Secretary General, have gathered in Naples to reaffirm our enduring unity and common determination to address, in a cohesive and concrete manner, security challenges, at a time in history marked by great instability.
October 19, 2024 – Naples, Italy – National Defence / Canadian Armed Forces

Preamble

We, the G7 Defense Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, with the participation of the NATO Secretary General, have gathered in Naples to reaffirm our enduring unity and common determination to address, in a cohesive and concrete manner, security challenges, at a time in history marked by great instability.

In this spirit, we strongly reaffirm our commitment to promote respect for the United Nations Charter, to implement tangible measures to help safeguard peace and security, and to oppose any action aimed at undermining the free and open rules-based international order.

We:
- reiterate our unwavering support for Ukraine, which has for nearly three years defended itself against Russia’s brutal and full-scale illegal war of aggression. We condemn Russia, which has put in place a posture of confrontation and destabilization on a global scale, also resorting to hybrid warfare and the irresponsible use of nuclear rhetoric;
- believe that the G7, along with other international partners, can play a key role in the process of achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in line with international law, with respect for Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. This cannot be done without continuing to work to achieve the widest possible international support for Ukraine, fostering a renewed sense of trust, based upon the inclusion of like-minded countries;
- commit to identifying cooperative solutions to address the growing need for defense industries to be able to sustain a high pace of production, work on building and strengthening resilient and reliable defense industry, including on issues related to supply needed for Defense;
- recognize the need for a more cooperative approach in defense-related research and development, also in terms of sharing and leveraging expertise and knowledge, while fostering a safe environment to prevent malign access, in order to maintain competitive advantage, including in the field of emerging and disruptive technologies;
- acknowledge the relevance of finding effective solutions to ensure the extended sustainability of military operations and proper regeneration of forces;
- are also committed to containing and countering information manipulation and the spread of misinformation and disinformation;
- condemn Hamas’ brutal terrorist attack on Israel on October 7^th, 2023, which has unleashed a spiral of violence that threatens the entire Middle Eastern region;
- are united in supporting the need for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza, the release of all hostages, a significant and sustained increase in the flow of humanitarian assistance throughout Gaza and a sustainable pathway to a two-state solution;
- are concerned by the latest events in Lebanon and the risk of further escalation. We express concern over all threats to UNIFIL’s security. The protection of peacekeepers is incumbent upon all parties to a conflict. We also reaffirm the importance of supporting UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces in their role of ensuring the stability and security of Lebanon.
- condemn the attacks perpetrated by the Houthis against maritime shipping transiting the area including the Red Sea, Bab el Mandeb Strait and Gulf of Aden, reaffirming the right to preserve freedom of navigation, protect shipping lanes and defend ships and personnel, in accordance with international law and UNSCRs 2722 and 2739;
- condemn Iran’s direct military attack against Israel on 13 April and 1 October, 2024, and call on Iran to refrain from providing support to Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis and other non-state actors, and taking further actions that could destabilize the region and trigger an uncontrolled process of escalation;
- express our concerns about strategies pursued by some state actors towards Africa, including predatory economic practices, and disinformation, that create instability;
- reaffirm our commitment to the strengthening of the stability and security of African countries, stressing the importance of an integrated approach, through practical and coordinated actions with African partners in the field of peace, security and defense, notably in the areas of capacity building, security and defense sectors reform, as well as interoperability. In this sense, we look forward to bilateral and multilateral partners’ initiatives on the “southern neighborhood”, including EU and NATO activities;
- recognize that climate change is a defining challenge with a profound impact on our security that can aggravate demographic, economic, and political challenges to peace and stability worldwide, and especially in the most vulnerable countries;
- reaffirm that the multilateral system, with the United Nations and its Charter at the center, must be strengthened. We are committed to take the necessary actions adopted at the UN Summit of the Future and to continue to support and adapt UN Peace Operations as a critical tool to maintain international peace and security;
- reaffirm our commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific, whose crucial role in global prosperity and security we recognize, and our commitment to fostering our security and defense partnerships with Indo-Pacific countries;
- reaffirm that maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is indispensable to international security and prosperity;
- express our serious concern about the situation in the East and South China Seas and reiterate our strong opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion, including in the maritime and air domains;
- express our deep concern at China’s support to Russia, which is enabling Russia to maintain its illegal war in Ukraine and has significant and broad security implications, as well as the strengthening of military cooperation between China and Russia;
- condemn the continued development of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, in direct violation of relevant UNSCRs, and express our concern about its increasing military cooperation with Russia.
Support to Ukraine

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, we, the G7 with NATO, have played a central role in supporting Ukraine’s right to self-defense in order to counter Russia’s aggression, to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine, reaffirming the primacy of international law, including the UN Charter and the principle of the inviolability of national sovereignty.

We reaffirm our unwavering support for the freedom, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine for as long as it takes.

We continue to condemn in the strongest possible terms Russia’s blatant breach of international law, including the UN Charter, its repeated and deliberate attacks against civilian and critical infrastructures, the use of actions of hybrid warfare, as well as Russia’s irresponsible nuclear rhetoric.

We believe that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is posing a threat to international security, the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and the rules-based international order.

We support Ukraine’s right to self-defense and reaffirm our commitment to Ukraine’s long-term security, including by implementing bilateral security commitments and arrangements based on the G7 “Joint Declaration in support of Ukraine” signed in the margins of the NATO Vilnius Summit, bilateral security agreements and arrangements signed with Ukraine, and the Ukraine Compact endorsed in the margins of the NATO Washington Summit.

We therefore reaffirm the importance of synergy and coherence between the support provided by NATO, the EU and on a bilateral or multilateral basis. In this regard, we support the mechanism of enhanced political consultations between Ukraine and the Alliance established with the NATO-Ukraine Council. We support the assistance initiatives of the EU and NATO, including the military support through the European Peace Facility, the EU Military Assistance Mission for Ukraine, negotiations for Ukraine’s accession to the European Union, and the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine. We also support the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, including the work of its Capability Coalitions, and recall the launch of the Ukraine Compact at the NATO Washington Summit. We welcome initiatives aimed at supporting Ukrainian defense industry and innovation, which are instrumental to enable Ukraine’s self-defense.

We underscore our intent to continue to provide assistance to Ukraine, including military assistance in the short and long term. We support Ukraine on its irreversible path to full Euro-Atlantic integration, including NATO membership.

We consider it imperative to continue supporting the education and training needs of the Ukrainian Defense and Security Forces in the short and long term, given the need for force regeneration and reconstitution. We welcome NATO’s and EU’s respective efforts through NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine and EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine, which will provide support also to the long-term development and reform of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, including military assistance. In coherence with Apulia G7 Leaders’ Communiqué, Extraordinary Revenues stemming from immobilized Russian sovereign assets, held in the EU and other relevant jurisdictions, will be used for supporting Ukraine, including military, budgetary and reconstruction assistance in the short and long term, as consistent with G7 members’ respective legal systems.

We consider it a priority to work now to find solutions to create a Ukrainian military interoperable with supporting member states and NATO, capable of defending Ukraine now and deterring further attacks in the future. This process must be based on coordinated and sustained actions across relevant state and international actors.

We reiterate that our ultimate goal remains a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in accordance with international law, as set out in the UN Charter and its principles, that ensures respect for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Middle East

We express our concern about the escalation in the Middle East.

We reiterate our firm condemnation of the brutal terrorist attacks perpetrated by Hamas on 7 October 2023. We call for an immediate ceasefire and the prompt release of all hostages. This attack has triggered a spiral of violence, also involving Israel and Hezbollah, deeply affecting civilians. A dangerous cycle of attacks and retaliation risks fueling uncontrollable escalation in the Middle East, which is in no one’s interest. We encourage all parties to engage constructively to de-escalate current tensions and emphasize the importance for all parties to act in accordance with international law, including international humanitarian law. We reiterate the absolute need for the civilian population to be protected and that there must be full, rapid, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access, as a matter of absolute priority.

The conflict in the Gaza and the dramatic humanitarian crisis have highlighted the need to start a political process necessary to avoid further military escalation and achieve a stable and lasting security situation. We therefore reaffirm the need to continue working towards a lasting ceasefire in Gaza, a stable security situation, and an increased and unimpeded flow of humanitarian aid to the innocent civilian population.

We welcome UNSCR 2735 and reaffirm our commitment to support a political process towards achieving a two-state solution, as the only option for ensuring the long-term peaceful coexistence of Israelis and Palestinians, addressing both Israel’s legitimate security needs, alongside a sovereign, viable and democratic Palestinian state.

We commend initiatives to train and advise Palestinian Authority security forces, and support the broader reform of the security and judiciary building on the positive experience of successful capacity building initiatives, including those for the Palestinian Civil Police, an improvement for the Palestinian people.

We reaffirm the need to identify, with other partners, within the framework of the relevant international organizations, viable solutions for post-conflict stabilization, governance and security, and in this regard we stand ready to support, when security conditions permit, post-war initiatives aimed at stabilizing the region.

We support the restoration of security and stability on the Lebanon-Israel border, including the protection of local populations.

We are concerned by the latest events in Lebanon and the risk of further escalation. We reiterate our call for a full cessation of hostilities consistent with the full implementation of UNSCR 1701 and a diplomatic solution to the fighting, recognizing the fundamental stabilizing role of the Lebanese Armed Forces and reaffirming the essential role of UNIFIL. We express concern over all threats to UNIFIL’s security. The protection of peacekeepers is incumbent upon all parties to a conflict.

We unequivocally condemn Iran’s ballistic missiles large-scale attacks against Israel and emphasize the importance for all parties to act in accordance with international law, including international humanitarian law.

We unequivocally reiterate commitment to the security of Israel.

We express our deep concern at the intensification of military cooperation between Iran and Russia, including in the supply of ballistic missiles, UAVs, military equipment and sensitive technology, aimed at circumventing the sanctions regime.

We are committed to maintaining freedom of navigation, protecting sea-lanes and defending seafarers and ships from attacks by Houthis in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea and Gulf of Aden, in line with the UNSCR 2722. We call on the Houthis to immediately cease their escalatory measures that increase regional instability, and immediately release the vessel “Galaxy Leader” and its crew. We welcome the significant contributions of the G7 to maritime security initiatives in the region.

We also believe it is crucial to prevent the conflict from spreading across the region. We call on all parties to avert an all-out war, a situation that would irreversibly destabilize the entire region and project further tension and instability around the world.

Africa

We believe that the African continent and the G7 share great potential for partnership and shared objectives, aware that the complex balances and the combined effects of growing demographics and climate change imply the need for an ongoing and shared development agenda.

We express our commitment to support the governments of African countries in setting the conditions that form the basis of sustained security, stability, and prosperity.

We recognize the significant impact several state and non-state actors have had on the economy and security of Africa. However, some aspects of this unbalanced influence have led to poor environmental, social and governance standards, supply chain dominance, debt unsustainability and labor and transparency concerns. The G7 endorses fair defense and economic partnerships that are mutually beneficial and equitable, through cooperation with African countries and its regional organizations.

We will continue our commitment to supporting peace, prosperity and stability in Africa, including within the EU integrated approach, combining different foreign policy tools, including civilian and military Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations. Moreover, we welcome the assistance measures provided to African partners under the European Peace Facility, as a critical enabler of African ownership by strengthening the capacity of African Armed Forces and supporting African-led peace support operations. We see training, interoperability, the development of common protocols, the exchange of personnel and NATO’s Defence and related Security Capacity Building activities as effective tools for creating the right conditions for fostering security.

Indo-Pacific

We affirm our commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific, based on the rule of law and upholding the principle of the peaceful resolution of disputes without resorting to the threat or use of force. The region is central to global growth, geopolitical developments and military balance.

The importance of the Indo-Pacific goes beyond the economic dimension alone, with many developed and developing countries having direct interests in promoting peace, security and prosperity in the region, including through defense and security partnerships. We seek constructive and stable relations with China and recognize the importance of direct and candid engagement to express concerns and manage differences, particularly with regards to international peace and security.

We express our serious concern about the situation in the South and East China Seas, and as stated in the Apulia G7 Leaders’ Communiqué, we reiterate our strong opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion.

There is no legal basis for China’s expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea, and we are strongly opposed to China’s repeated obstruction of freedom of navigation, militarization of disputed features and coercive and intimidating activities, as well as the dangerous use of Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels in the South China Sea.

We reaffirm the universal and unified character of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and reaffirm its important role in setting out as the legal framework that governs activities in the oceans and the seas. We also reiterate that the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on July 12, 2016, is legally binding upon the parties to those proceedings.

We reaffirm that maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is indispensable to international security and prosperity. We are concerned about provocative actions, particularly the recent People’s Liberation Army military drills around Taiwan. There is no change in the basic positions of the G7 members on Taiwan, including stated one China policies. We call for a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.

We express our deep concern at China’s increasing support to Russia’s war economy, and call on China to cease the transfer of dual-use materials, including weapons components and equipment that are substantial inputs for Russia’s defense sector which are enabling Russia to maintain its illegal war in Ukraine. We express our concern about destabilizing actions resulting from the strengthening military cooperation between China and Russia.

We condemn North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. We reiterate our call for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. We also condemn the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, including North Korea’s export and Russia’s procurement of North Korean ballistic missiles in direct violation of relevant UNSCRs, as well as Russia’s use of these missiles against Ukraine. We are concerned about the potential for any transfer of nuclear or ballistic missile-related technology to North Korea, which also violates relevant UNSCRs.

In this sense, acknowledging the relevance of the stability of the Indo-Pacific region to global dynamics, we are committed to coordinating our respective security and defense presence in the area, aimed at ensuring that regional security is preserved in accordance with international law.

We are committed to continue the dialogue with all partners in the region, as well as exploring increased participation in regional exercises and further operational cooperation in the region to deal with growing regional security challenges.

Defense readiness

We recognize these interconnected security challenges and acknowledge the need to respond decisively, including by continuing to strengthen the defense industry, encouraging robust engagement and industrial cooperation with partners. We welcome complementary initiatives launched in NATO and the EU.

We recognize the importance of ensuring reliable, predictable and stable access to finance for defense industries, acknowledging the specificities of the defense sector, fully taking into account sustainable finance policies, regulations, reporting and standards. We envisage greater cooperation, coordination and synergy aimed at a strong, responsive, secure, competitive and resilient defense industrial capacity and production. We will work on exploring multinational cooperation on efficient procurement, and aggregating demand to improve efficiencies. We consider it of paramount importance to keep our military edge through the responsible research and development and prompt adoption of new technologies, especially those in the emerging and disruptive technologies domain.

We highlight the relevance of an in-depth dialogue among G7 members on the challenges and opportunities for industrial resilience, work on building and strengthening resilient and reliable defense industry, including on issues related to supply needed for Defense.

We will continue working to improve interoperability, building upon the shared standards already in place.

We recognize the need to reduce heavy reliance on fossil fuels, and minimize and mitigate emissions, sharing best practices on energy transition, in order to preserve interoperability, protecting military effectiveness, and manage risks and vulnerabilities.

We acknowledge the need to share best practices about how to ensure buy-in and involvement from society, also to generate a credible and skilled workforce as a pillar of deterrence and defense. We recognize the importance of continuing to discuss and share each G7 member’s efforts to strengthen defense readiness.

Conclusions

We, the G7 Defense Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, with the participation of the NATO Secretary General, reaffirm our commitment, enduring unity and shared determination to address international security challenges together, in cooperation with international organizations and partners who share our respect for, and commitment to, the rules-based international order and international law, including the UN Charter.
MIL OSI Canada News –
January 24, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: Indonesia’s new president, Prabowo Subianto, finds democracy ‘very tiring’. Are darker days ahead for the country?

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Tim Lindsey, Malcolm Smith Professor of Asian Law and Director of the Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam and Society, The University of Melbourne

Former General Prabowo Subianto will be sworn in as Indonesia’s eighth president today. Twenty-five years ago he was a pariah, and for good reason.

He faced accusations of human rights abuses in Papua and East Timor, and in 1998, special forces troops under his command had abducted democracy activists in Jakarta, 13 of whom have never been seen again. Those who did return had been tortured.

The students had been calling for the resignation of President Soeharto, Prabowo’s father-in-law, who finally stepped down in May 1998 after widespread rioting that many believe Prabowo helped engineer. Then, backed by troops under his command, Prabowo tried to storm the presidential palace, gun in hand, to threaten the new president, BJ Habibie.

Prabowo never went on trial for the disappearances of the activists, though he was banned from travelling to the United States for two decades.

And his cherished military career quickly ended – he was dismissed from the army for “misinterpreting orders”. Disgraced, and seen as embodying the violence and repression of Soeharto’s regime, Prabowo went into voluntary exile in Jordan. It seemed he had no future in the democratic Reformasi (reformation) system that began to emerge from the ruins of the repressive New Order.

But Prabowo was far from finished. His rehabilitation and extraordinary climb to the presidency may now signal the end of Indonesia’s fragile, aspirational liberal democracy and a return to the New Order model.

The end of Reformasi?

It is clear enough that Prabowo has no enthusiasm for democracy. He has said, for example, that it “very, very tiring” and “very, very messy and costly”.

Gerindra, the political party he founded and leads, even has, as its number one mission statement, a return to the Constitution “as stipulated on 18 August 1945”. This is the authoritarian original version of the Constitution that Soeharto relied on to rule. It did not guarantee human rights or a separation of powers, and it gave huge power to the president, who was not elected and had no term limit.

This Constitution was amended after Soeharto fell to bring in a liberal, democratic model. So, a return to the original 1945 Constitution would in itself likely end Indonesia’s hard-won, if troubled, democracy.

But Prabowo may not need to go this far to enjoy the sweeping power his former father-in-law exercised. Many of the elements of the New Order are already in place. Much of the work of dismantling Indonesia’s liberal democracy has already been done by the outgoing president, Joko Widodo (Jokowi), whose son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, is now Prabowo’s vice president.

For example, a key pillar of the New Order was “dual function”, a doctrine that allowed serving military members to take civilian posts, allowing them to dominate the government. This was abolished after Soeharto fell.

But amendments to the civil service law passed last October again allow active members of the army and police to occupy civilian positions. Proposed amendments to the Indonesian National Army (TNI) Law now being debated could expand this. When questioned about the army’s return to civilian life, the armed forces commander welcomed the changes, saying the army would not be exercising a “dual function” but a “multi-function”.

Likewise, under Soeharto, repressive laws tightly restricted press freedom. Now, a controversial new criminal code that comes into force in 2026 will reinstate prohibitions on criticising the government that the Constitutional Court had previously struck out. A proposed new Broadcasting Law would also ban “broadcasting investigative journalism content”.

Under the New Order, civil society activism was also harshly restricted. In the last ten years under Jokowi, there has been a steady escalation of defamation actions and threats against government critics. And a law passed in 2017 allows the government to dissolve non-governmental organisations without any judicial process. Already, three NGOs have been banned.

Many activists now speak openly of their fear of being targeted and intimidated by government trolls or even the intelligence agencies. Others fear Prabowo will use his links to Muslim civil society organisations to pressure or delegitimise other groups he sees as critics.

Read more:
Journalists in Indonesia are being killed, threatened and jailed. A new draft law could make things even worse

Keeping the elites happy

Prabowo is also following in the footsteps of Soeharto and Jokowi by building a massive coalition in the national legislature, the DPR. More than 80% of members are already on board, with only one party holding out.

Prabowo will also expand his cabinet, allowing him to award places to supporters and co-opt others, including members of civil society. This will further weaken the opposition.

This kind of government of elite “unity” makes politics opaque. Political fights take place behind the scenes, resolved by power plays and deals before measures go to a vote. It would make the national legislature not much more than a rubber stamp, as it was under Soeharto.

This assumes Prabowo can manage Indonesia’s powerful political bosses – especially the feuding former presidents Megawati Soekarnoputri and Jokowi. Together, they now control the two biggest parties in the legislature (PDI-P and Golkar, respectively).

The still hugely popular Jokowi backed his former bitter enemy Prabowo in the February elections because he saw this as a way to maintain influence after he left office. But Prabowo will be reluctant to share real power with anyone for long. His relationship with Jokowi is likely to be one the biggest challenges to his rule.

Dealing with an obstructive court

One of the few remaining obstacles to Prabowo acquiring the sort of dictatorial powers Soeharto exercised is the Constitutional Court, which has the power to strike out laws. Prabowo will not want a non-compliant and obstructive (that is, independent) Constitutional Court. Already politicians are openly discussing the need to “assess its performance”.

If the legislature passes laws to weaken the court, the court could just strike them out, as it has done in the past.

But the court was established by the amendments to the original 1945 Constitution. This means that if government cannot pass laws to weaken the court, stack the court or intimidate independent judges, a return to the 1945 Constitution could be used to eliminate it.

Prabowo would need to feel his rule is secure and that he has the rock-solid support of the elites before doing this, but it is certainly possible. Returning to the original Constitution would simply require a two-thirds vote in the MPR, Indonesia’s highest representative assembly.

Bold promises on the economy

Soeharto’s system was based on a Faustian bargain that allowed him to rule corruptly and oppressively in return for high economic growth and development that lifted millions out of poverty.

Prabowo is likely to adopt the same approach. He campaigned on an annual GDP growth target of 8%, a rate reached under Soeharto, but never by subsequent governments. Jokowi also placed great emphasis on development (infrastructure in particular), but never got much above 5% growth per year.

Many are optimistic about the economy under the new president. Prabowo’s father was a prominent economist and a finance minister. Prabowo has also asked Jokowi’s highly-regarded finance minister, Sri Mulyani, to stay in her role.

However, Prabowo comes to office with some enormously expensive commitments that would make Sri Mulyani’s job extremely difficult. These include his free school lunches program (upwards of US$30 billion, or A$45 billion), which Sri Mulyani has publicly questioned, and Jokowi’s signature new capital city, Nusantara, currently under construction. (The initial phase alone will cost at least US$35 billion, or A$52 billion).

Moreover, Prabowo’s main priority will be to keep the elites happy and maintain his enormous coalition. His supporters and allies – including his brother, tycoon Hashim Djojohadikusumo who has funded his political career – will all demand access to concessions and lucrative appointments for their cronies to make good the vast amounts spent on the February elections. Rational economic policy-making will therefore be highly constrained.

Foreign investment has always been the key to high growth in Indonesia, but despite the constant rhetoric about Indonesia being open for business, it will undoubtedly remain protectionist in practice under Prabowo. That will likely make the 8% GDP annual growth target impossible.

More active foreign relations

Prabowo, who was educated overseas and speaks English fluently, feels comfortable on the global stage. He will want a more prominent place in world affairs for his country, reflecting its vast size and new status as a middle-income country.

As Jokowi’s defence minister, he was active internationally, even attempting to broker a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine. And, to his obvious delight, countries like the US that had previously denied him entry have congratulated him on his victory.

Prabowo’s main foreign affairs challenge will be the same as his predecessor’s: managing the difficult relationship with China.

Indonesians are deeply suspicious of China, an attitude driven by a potent mixture of deeply rooted racist attitudes, fear of communism and anxiety about China’s hegemonic ambitions. However, Indonesia is a major recipient of Belt and Road investments and the elite rely heavily on Chinese trade and investment.

Like Jokowi, Prabowo will have to manage this difficult balance.

Back to the future

Indonesian civil society leaders are already talking about the new administration as “New Order Volume II” or “neo-New Order”, and it is easy to see why. All the signs point to a continuation under Prabowo of the process begun under Jokowi: a slide towards something that looks much more like Soeharto’s system than the liberal democracy reformers tried to construct 25 years ago.

There is nothing in Prabowo’s past or his campaign promises to suggest otherwise. Perhaps the only question is how quickly it happens and how far he will go.

Tim Lindsey receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

– ref. Indonesia’s new president, Prabowo Subianto, finds democracy ‘very tiring’. Are darker days ahead for the country? – https://theconversation.com/indonesias-new-president-prabowo-subianto-finds-democracy-very-tiring-are-darker-days-ahead-for-the-country-241256

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Canada: Minister Blair concludes successful visit to Europe for North Atlantic Treaty Organization and G7 Defence Ministers’ Meetings
Source: Government of Canada News (2)

Today, the Honourable Bill Blair, Minister of National Defence, concluded a successful visit to Europe where he participated in a meeting of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Defence Ministers as well as the first-ever G7 Defence Ministers’ Meeting (DMM).

October 20, 2024 – Naples, Italy – National Defence / Canadian Armed Forces

Today, the Honourable Bill Blair, Minister of National Defence, concluded a successful visit to Europe where he participated in a meeting of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Defence Ministers as well as the first-ever G7 Defence Ministers’ Meeting (DMM).

During the NATO DMM meeting from October 17 to 18, hosted by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, Minister Blair announced a commitment of over $60 million in military assistance to Ukraine. This package includes the procurement of small arms and ammunition from Canadian industry, Canadian-made personal protective equipment and military uniforms for 30,000 women Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) soldiers and $5 million towards the Drone Capability Coalition Common Fund. The Minister also announced that Canada has joined the IT Coalition, with an initial contribution of $2 million, that will enable us to enhance our ongoing support and leadership in the realm of cyber capabilities.

As NATO defence ministers gathered in Brussels, Belgium, Allies discussed how best to promote defence measures across the Euro-Atlantic, Middle East and Indo-Pacific (IP) regions, and reaffirmed their ongoing support to Ukraine, with an emphasis on the implementation of deliverables outlined at the NATO Summit in Washington in July. Minister Blair reinforced Canada’s unwavering resolve to help Ukraine defend itself against Russian aggression as well as Canada’s contribution to NATO’s defence through the continued growth of the Canadian-led brigade in Latvia.

During a meeting with IP and European Union partners, ministers exchanged views on the security dynamics in both regions, especially in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine. This was an opportunity for Minister Blair to reiterate Canada’s long-held views on building stronger ties and enhanced cooperation between NATO and its IP partners – including Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea, also known as the IP4. This was the first NATO meeting to include IP4 partners.

Minister Blair signed a Letter of Intent for the NATO NORTHLINK Initiative, which commits 13 Allies to open initial discussions to harmonize requirements for space-based satellite communications. This will allow Canada to better shape this project to meet its own interests and preserve the possibility of future benefits for Canadian industry.

While in Brussels, the Minister also participated in several side events, including a Defence Ministers Meeting of the Global Coalition Against Daesh. Minister Blair also hosted a Northern Defence Dialogue (NDD) with Arctic Allies, including Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. At the NDD, ministers reaffirmed their shared commitment to enhanced collaboration on Arctic and Euro-Atlantic security and defence, and discussed Arctic capabilities, emerging threats and geopolitical challenges.

From October 18 to 19, Minister Blair participated in the inaugural G7 Defence Ministers’ Meeting in Naples, Italy. Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening collaboration to address current and future security challenges at a time marked by increasing global instability. Minister Blair underlined Canada’s continued commitment to working closely with G7 partners on shared priorities including military and practical assistance for Ukraine, the cessation of hostilities and peace in the Middle East, countering information manipulation and the spread of misinformation and disinformation, and economic security and resilience.

G7 defence ministers issued a joint declaration which reiterated unwavering support for Ukraine, expressed concern about the escalation of violence in the Middle East and called on all parties to avert war, and committed to a free and open IP region, based on the rule of law and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Ministers further committed to finding effective solutions to the sustainability of military operations and regeneration of forces to bolster deterrence and defence. They underscored their ongoing support for African countries to set the foundation for sustained security, stability, and prosperity.

During this important moment for Euro-Atlantic, Middle Eastern and IP security, Canada continues to work closely with NATO Allies and G7 Partners to ensure the protection of the one billion citizens that NATO protects, including all Canadians.
- NATO is a cornerstone of Canada’s international security policy. Canada steadfastly supports NATO’s principle of collective defence and is providing direct support to NATO missions and operations.
- Current Canadian contributions to NATO include:
  
  leading the NATO Multinational Battlegroup in Latvia as it scales up to a combat- capable brigade with up to 2,200 Canadian troops;
  
  deploying ships on a persistent basis to the NATO’s Standing Naval Forces – including His Majesty’s Canadian Ship Charlottetown to lead Standing NATO Maritime Group 2;
  
  continuing to support training and capacity building efforts in the Middle East under Operation IMPACT, including through NATO Mission Iraq; and
  
  deploying personnel to Kosovo under Operation KOBOLD.
- At the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Leaders’ Summit in July, Prime Minister Trudeau and Minister Blair announced that Canada expects to reach NATO’s target of spending 2% of GDP on defence by 2032.
- The G7 is a forum designed for frank and open discussion between leaders, ministers and policymakers. As a member of the G7, Canada plays a leading role on the international stage and advances domestic and international priorities.
- Canada assumes the Presidency of the G7 in 2025, and will host the Leaders’ Summit in Kananaskis, Alberta. Canada will continue to work with G7 partners on common priorities such as building stable economies, fighting climate change, and managing rapidly evolving technologies.
- Since February 2022, Canada has committed over $19.5 billion in assistance to Ukraine, including $4.5 billion in military assistance. This includes Leopard 2 main battle tanks, armoured combat support vehicles, anti-tank weapons, small arms, and M777 howitzers and associated ammunition.
- Canada is currently a member of the Ukraine Defence Capability Group’s (UDCG) Armour, Air Force, Drone, and IT capability coalition.
- Canada is allocating up to $389 million to enhance F-16 pilot training through the Ukraine Defense Contact Group Air Force Capability Coalition. This commitment will support training for pilots in Ukraine’s Armed Forces as well as provide critical equipment to support Ukraine’s safe operation of F-16s.
- Canada further contributes to Euro-Atlantic security through our support to Ukraine. Operation UNIFIER is the Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAF) military training and capacity building mission in support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). Since 2015, the CAF has trained more than 43,000 members of the AFU under Operation UNIFIER. Approximately 330 CAF members are deployed under Operation UNIFIER in various roles, including to provide and coordinate training, and to facilitate and deliver military donations to Ukraine in coordination with Allies.
Simon Lafortune
Press Secretary and Communications Advisor
Office of the Minister of National Defence
Phone: 343-549-0778
Email: simon.lafortune2@forces.gc.ca

Media Relations
Department of National Defence
Phone: 613-904-3333
Email: mlo-blm@forces.gc.ca

MIL OSI Canada News –
January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Statement from Deputy Press Secretary Sabrina Singh on Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III’s Visit to Ukraine

Source: United States Department of Defense

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III arrived in Ukraine today to meet with Ukrainian leaders and reiterate the support of the United States for Ukraine’s fight for freedom. This is the Secretary’s fourth visit to Ukraine as Secretary of Defense.

During his engagements, the Secretary will meet with Ukrainian leadership and underscore the U.S. commitment to providing Ukraine with the security assistance it needs to defend itself from Russian aggression on the battlefield.

At the conclusion of his visit, the Secretary will deliver a speech that will highlight how Ukraine has skillfully fought back against Putin’s war of choice, U.S. commitment to ensuring Ukraine’s armed forces have the battlefield capabilities they need, and why Ukraine’s fight matters for U.S. security.

Since April 2022, the Secretary has convened the Ukraine Defense Contact Group on a near monthly basis—a coalition of some 50 countries from around the globe determined to help Ukraine fight against Putin’s aggression. And together, the nations of the UDCG have provided billions of dollars of security assistance for Ukraine—and helped pave the way to build the future force and the industrial base that will enable Ukraine to deter Russian aggression into the future.

MIL OSI USA News –

January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Strong Bilateral Defense Relationship Reaffirmed with Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff

Source: Government of Iceland

The challenging security environment, cooperation in the Arctic, and bilateral defense cooperation between Iceland and the United States were among the topics discussed during a recent meeting between Foreign Minister Þórdís Kolbrún Reykfjörð Gylfadóttir and General Charles Q. Brown Jr., U.S. Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff.

“We had a good conversation about the development of the security environment and the challenges we face today, both military and from various hybrid threats,” said Minister Gylfadóttir. “The meeting provided a great opportunity to discuss cooperation between the two countries and the security and defense challenges we face today, in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the growing tension in international relations. Iceland and the United States have been strengthening their cooperation in recent years, focusing on surveillance and reconnaissance in the North Atlantic and the Arctic, which also enhances the security of all NATO Allies. ”

General Brown visited Iceland to attend a meeting of the Chiefs of Defence from the seven Arctic countries, which Iceland hosted on 9 October. The discussions at the meeting covered security developments and challenges related to climate change, increased shipping, and military activities in the Arctic.

“It was an honor to be hosted by our Icelandic partners for the Arctic Chiefs of Defense Conference,” said U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Charles Q Brown Jr. “The Arctic is going to be a factor, not only today, but more so probably 10 to 15 years from now. Our active and unified cooperation as Arctic NATO Nations is critical as we posture for current and future security challenges to promote a prosperous and secure Arctic.”

General Brown also met with Director General Jónas G. Allansson, Iceland‘s Chief of Defence, visited the security zone in Keflavík, and was introduced to the operations of the US Navy hosted by Iceland there.

MIL OSI Europe News –

January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Turkey attempts to broker power between east and west as it bids to join Brics

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Bulent Gökay, Professor of International Relations, Keele University

In a significant diplomatic manoeuvre that may have far-reaching implications for the international system of alliances, Turkey has submitted a formal request to join Brics, the group of emerging-market economies, signalling its intent to diversify its partnerships beyond the west.

The Brics grouping, named after Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, comprises some of the world’s largest economies. Earlier this year, it welcomed four new members: Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia and Egypt. Although Saudi Arabia has been invited to join, the official process is yet to take place. Often viewed as an alternative to western-led organisations such as the EU, G7 and Nato, Brics signifies a significant shift in global power dynamics.

Ankara’s decision could be a strategy to strengthen relations with non-western powers as the global economy’s centre continues to shift away from the west, but is also about chasing more trade with Brics members.

Announced ahead of the Brics summit starting on October 22, Turkey’s application has raised questions about the broader implications for its role within Nato. If accepted, Turkey would be the first Nato member of Brics. However, this is not to say that Turkey is entirely turning away from the west. Turkey’s institutional ties with the western world run deep. At most, this move signals Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s intention to increase the government’s flexibility in its foreign relations.

Erdoğan said on September 1 that this move shows Ankara’s aims to cultivate ties with all sides simultaneously to “become a strong, prosperous, prestigious and effective country if it improves its relations with the east and the west simultaneously”.

Turkey’s acceptance into the group could be discussed during the upcoming 16th Brics summit, in Kazan, Russia. Malaysia, Thailand and Azerbaijan are among other countries expecting to join.

Between east and west

Turkey’s balancing act between east and west is not a recent phenomenon but a continuation of its policies since the end of the cold war, and is in line with its geographical position at the edge of Europe and Asia.

This strategy has been central to Turkey’s intricate, at times conflicting, approach to international relations and remains pertinent in an increasingly complex world. The shift from a unipolar world – the idea that the world is dominated by one super power – to one with more global powers has led all governments to reassess their foreign policies, and Ankara is no different.

Turkey’s longstanding commitment to Nato makes it highly unlikely that its willingness to join the Brics group signifies a move away from its western allies. Since 2016, Turkey has strengthened its economic, political, and military ties with Russia and China, and its recent application to the Brics group reflects this trend. According to some experts in Turkish foreign policy, while this development may raise concerns in western capitals, there is no pressing reason for the west to be alarmed about Turkey making concessions to Russia or acting independently of Nato.

Map of the Black Sea region.
Shutterstock

There are two incentives driving Turkey’s application. According to Sinan Ülgen, director of the Istanbul-based Centre for Economic and Foreign Policy Studies: “The first is Turkey’s aspiration to enhance its strategic autonomy in foreign policy which essentially involves improving ties with non-western powers like Russia and China in a way to balance the relationship with the west. The second is the accumulated frustrations over the relationship with the west. For example, the EU has not even been able to decide on the start of negotiations on the updating of the customs union, its trade deal with Turkey that dates back to 1996.”

Read more:
Bottled up in the Black Sea: Russia is having a dreadful naval war, hindering its great power ambitions

Control of the Black Sea

Turkey has been keen on joining the Brics group since 2018. Putin, during a meeting with Turkish foreign minister Hakan Fidan in Moscow in June this year, welcomed Ankara’s interest and promised that Moscow “will support this desire to be together with the countries of this alliance [Brics], to be together, closer, to solve common problems”.

Since the war in Ukraine, Russia has been making extra efforts to gain the support of more countries. Turkey holds a particular significance in this effort due to its strategic location, and its control of the Black Sea straits, an essential trade route for both Ukraine and Russia. The Black Sea has played an important part in the Ukraine war, and Turkey has been part of an alliance that has stymied Russia’s attempts to fully control the waters, and allowed Ukraine to continue to use the waters.

The Montreux Convention regulates maritime traffic through the Turkish Straits. The convention distinguishes between Black Sea and non-Black Sea powers, acknowledging specific advantages for the former, which includes Ukraine and Russia.

In March 2022, Erdoğan indicated that the convention allows Turkey to restrict the passage of naval vessels belonging to warring parties. Putin may be hoping that with Turkey on board as a Brics ally he may be able to persuade Ankara to give him more leeway. Currently Russia’s inability to control the Black Sea and cargo ships within it are seriously weakening its ability to constrain Ukraine’s economy.

Turkey anticipates that Brics membership will enhance its geopolitical standing and expand its economic influence, especially in non-western markets. Most importantly, leveraging its geopolitical position to influence global affairs and pursuing a more balanced and diversified foreign policy.

It is evident that Turkey aims to maintain its connections with the west while also desiring the flexibility to engage with other regions. It is highly improbable that this would lead to a significant overhaul of Turkey’s ties with western countries. It may, however, cause concern among fellow Nato members about how much they can rely on Turkey in the future.

Bulent Gökay does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Turkey attempts to broker power between east and west as it bids to join Brics – https://theconversation.com/turkey-attempts-to-broker-power-between-east-and-west-as-it-bids-to-join-brics-238383

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: The gas crisis is not over yet

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Michael Bradshaw, Professor of Global Energy, Warwick Business School, University of Warwick

Oleksandr Filatov/Shutterstock

Policy and luck have bought Europe a reprieve from the heights gas prices reached between the winters of 2022 and 2023, but prices are climbing again and the global gas market remains precariously balanced.

Rising tensions in the Middle East could upend it. If conflict spills into the Persian Gulf, it could disrupt shipments of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Qatar that equal 20% of global exports.

We believe this winter will be the final act of the gas crisis. Here’s what we should expect.

Dangerously underprepared

The case for Britain to rapidly phase out natural gas in heating and power generation is overwhelming. It would unburden household bills of expensive gas imports and leave the country less vulnerable to energy supply crunches, while also cutting carbon emissions. Doing so will take time: as of today, the UK relies on gas for 37% of all energy consumption.

British households in particular are perilously exposed to gas prices. Directly, because four-fifths of households use gas for space heating. Indirectly, because in the UK, electricity prices are set by the price of gas-fired generation. After a decade of failed home insulation and energy-efficiency policies, the UK still has some of the draughtiest homes in Europe. It simply takes more energy to heat British homes, which lose heat three times faster than European neighbours.

Since the beginning of the recent crisis, the UK government has done little to change these facts. The end of the winter fuel payment to pensioners adds fresh concern. The Energy Crisis Commission recently found that the UK remains “dangerously underprepared” for a repeat of the gas price explosion of 2022-23.

All told, the UK cannot be oblivious to developments in the global gas market.

A crisis in the making

Resurgent gas demand after the lifting of COVID restrictions led to a quadrupling of UK gas prices in 2021. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Vladimir Putin throttled pipeline gas exports to Europe.

Europe turned to its greatest source of flexible gas supply: seaborne LNG. A price war for cargoes followed. The spending power of European economies pulled shipments away from low-income countries in Asia, such as Pakistan and Bangladesh, which caused crippling blackouts and a pivot to coal-fired generation.

Energy bills for an average household in the UK hit £4,279 in January 2023. The government protected consumers from the very worst at a cost of £51 billion in 2022-23, but the average household lost 8% of its budget to energy costs in 2022, rising to 18% for the poorest tenth of households. Roughly 2 million households on pre-payment meters were being cut off from their energy supply at least once a month at the height of the crisis.

Clement winters, moderate gas demand in Asia and successful measures to curb European gas demand saw UK gas prices fall from mid-2023. But they are still relatively high – at 48% above the average in the three years before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

One more winter

Could things get worse? Back in 2022, experts spoke of a “three-winter crisis” because significant new LNG export capacity (primarily in the US and Qatar) wasn’t expected until 2025. That has held true, and supply and demand in the global LNG market remains taut.

Several disturbances could destabilise this balance. The International Energy Agency expects that over 2024, global growth in gas demand will exceed the rate of growth in new LNG supply. Attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea by the Houthi militia in Yemen, in response to Israel’s invasion of Gaza, have rerouted LNG shipping routes. Cargoes that would have passed through the Suez Canal must now take the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope.

At the end of 2024, a major five-year agreement governing the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine will expire, and there is no prospect of renewal. Russian gas supplies to Europe will fall by around 5% of the EU’s total gas imports, or 65% of all gas imports into Austria, Hungary and Slovakia.

While Europe has been saved by mild winters over the last two years, this luck could break in 2024-25 according to some forecasts. Temperature – and the demand it creates for heating – will probably decide winter gas prices in Europe.

Geopolitical blowback

How might the worst-case scenario of conflict in the Persian Gulf happen?

LNG is shipped by sea on large tankers.
Wojciech Wrzesien/Shutterstock

Israel’s escalating military assaults on Hezbollah since September 17 have coincided with a 17% rise in UK gas prices. After Iran’s missile and drone strikes against Israel on October 1, European gas prices hit a new high for the year. This saw three LNG tankers destined for Asia change course mid-journey and head for Europe.

Israel has vowed retribution for the Iranian strike. Having obliterated Gaza and decapitated Hezbollah’s leadership, and with resolute material support from the US, Israel may now see Iran as vulnerable.

A severe response by Israel, targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities or oil infrastructure, would further up the ante. Wishing to avoid direct conflict, Iran could decide to target not Israel, but the flow of oil and gas through the Strait of Hormuz on which its western backers depend. Qatari LNG shipments through the strait account for 20% of global supply on their own.

Any interruption would also block Iran’s oil exports, afflict Iran’s friends as much as its foes, and kill Iran’s current reconciliation with the Gulf states. It is unlikely, but one would hope that the warning signs in the global gas market would remind western decision-makers that the conflict in the Middle East can continue to blow back on them.

Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?

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Michael Bradshaw receives funding from the UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC) that is funded by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) and the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), part of UK Research and Innovation (UKRI). He also advises the government, thinktanks and companies on energy matters.

Louis Fletcher receives funding from the UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC), which is funded by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) and the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), part of UK Research and Innovation (UKRI).

– ref. The gas crisis is not over yet – https://theconversation.com/the-gas-crisis-is-not-over-yet-241538

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: United States Announces Significant New Military Assistance for Ukraine

Source: United States Department of State (3)

Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State

United States Announces Significant New Military Assistance for Ukraine

Press Statement

October 21, 2024

The United States is providing another significant package of urgently needed weapons and equipment to our Ukrainian partners as they defend against Russia’s ongoing attacks. This additional assistance, provided under previously exercised Presidential Drawdown Authority from Department of Defense stocks, is valued at $400 million. It includes Munitions for HIMARS; 155mm and 105mm artillery ammunition; Mortars; M113 armored vehicle; Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missiles; Javelin missiles; AT-4 rockets; Satellite communications support; Ammunition for crew-served weapons; Small arms, grenades, and training equipment; Demolitions equipment and munitions; and Spare parts, ancillary equipment, services, training, and transportation.

The United States is committed to supporting Ukraine with the equipment it needs to strengthen its position on the battlefield, defend against the Kremlin’s brutal aggression, and secure a just and lasting peace. As President Biden has made clear, the United States and the international coalition we have assembled will continue to stand with Ukraine.

MIL OSI USA News –

January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Under Secretary Zeya’s Meetings in Kyiv, Ukraine
Source: United States Department of State (3)

Office of the Spokesperson

Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Uzra Zeya traveled to Kyiv, Ukraine, on October 18, 2024.

While in Kyiv, Under Secretary Zeya underscored unwavering U.S. solidarity to Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration and Minister of Justice Olha Stefanishyna, Minister of Veterans Affairs Natalia Kalmykova, leadership of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine and Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, Chief Justice of the High Anti-Corruption Court of Ukraine, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Oleksiy Sergeyev, and First Deputy Chief of the National Police Maksym Tsutskeridze. She also met with investigative journalists, humanitarian workers, veterans, and internally displaced persons, including youth. Throughout her engagements, she emphasized the United States’ steadfast commitment to helping Ukraine prevail; strengthening its democratic resilience; securing its Euro-Atlantic future; holding Russia accountable for its atrocities and advancing comprehensive justice for the Ukrainian people; and sustaining U.S. humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable.

In addition, the Under Secretary spoke at the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine’s 10th anniversary ceremony, commending Ukraine’s tremendous anti-corruption gains and resolve to build upon them, amid Russia’s ongoing war of aggression.

During her trip, Under Secretary Zeya announced three new initiatives to help the Ukrainian people win the war and win the future:
- The State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs launched a $5 million grant, in partnership with the Institute for War & Peace Reporting, to increase governmental transparency and accountability by supporting civil society organizations and investigative journalists making essential contributions in the fight against corruption. It will also seek to enhance collaboration between civil society and Ukraine’s independent anti-corruption institutions.
- The State Department Office of Global Criminal Justice awarded $2 million to the International Organization for Migration to support reparative justice for Ukrainians. The initiative will help government policy makers and civil society develop domestic reparations mechanisms for direct compensation and support to victims and survivors of Russia’s crimes, laying the groundwork for Ukrainians to unlock justice at the earliest opportunity.
- The State Department Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations awarded $2 million to UN Women for a new partnership to advance Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) in Ukraine. With this funding, UN Women will support Ukraine’s institutions to implement the National Action Plan on WPS and advance women’s leadership, ownership, and participation in conflict response and recovery at all levels.
Upon departing Kyiv, Under Secretary Zeya stated, “Today I was profoundly moved to meet dedicated Ukrainian government partners determined to strengthen their nation’s democratic resilience, anti-corruption champions advancing a more prosperous, democratic future, and Ukrainian veterans and non-governmental leaders helping their fellow citizens regain dignity, justice and safety in the face of Russia’s ongoing brutal aggression. Vladimir Putin underestimated the strength and tenacity of Ukraine and its people to resist this naked aggression, and the resolve of the United States, Europe, and international partners to support them. Today Ukraine remains proud, strong, and free, and the United States will continue to do everything in our power to keep it so.”

For further information, please follow @UnderSecStateJ on X and @UnderSecStateJ on LinkedIn.

MIL OSI USA News –
January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Targeting Russian Attack Drone Production Used in War Against Ukraine

Source: United States Department of State (3)

Matthew Miller, Department Spokesperson

The United States is today imposing sanctions on three entities and one individual involved in the development and production of Russia’s Garpiya series long-range attack unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), which has been deployed in Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine.  The Garpiya, designed and produced in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in collaboration with Russian defense firms, has been used to destroy critical infrastructure and has resulted in mass casualties.

These sanctions targets were involved in the development and production of military equipment for a U.S.-sanctioned Russian defense firm for use by the Russian military in Ukraine.  While the United States previously imposed sanctions on PRC entities providing critical inputs to Russia’s military-industrial base, these are the first U.S. sanctions imposed on PRC entities directly developing and producing complete weapons systems in partnership with Russian firms.

Today’s action is part of our continued effort to disrupt attempts by PRC-based and Russia-based entities and individuals to support Russia’s acquisition of advanced weapons technology and components.  We will continue to impose costs on those who provide support to Russia’s military-industrial base.

The Department of the Treasury sanctions actions were taken pursuant to Executive Order (“E.O.”) 14024  “Blocking Property With Respect To Specified Harmful Foreign Activities of the Government of the Russian Federation.” For more information on these actions, please see the Department of the Treasury’s press release .

MIL OSI USA News –

January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Under Secretary Zeya Travels to Ukraine, Poland, and the United Kingdom

Source: United States Department of State (3)

Office of the Spokesperson

Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Uzra Zeya will travel to Ukraine, Poland, and the United Kingdom from October 18-22, 2024.

In Ukraine, Under Secretary Zeya will reaffirm steadfast U.S. commitment to robust civilian security and humanitarian support, and strengthening Ukraine’s democratic resilience in the face of Russia’s continued brutal aggression. In her engagements with government, humanitarian, and civil society leaders, she will emphasize continued partnership on anti-corruption and rule of law reforms, a strong civil society and independent media, and advancing victim- and survivor-centered justice and accountability for Ukrainians.

In Poland, the Under Secretary will meet with vulnerable Ukrainian refugees forced to flee Russia’s war against Ukraine and with valued humanitarian partners who provide direct support to them. She will also visit a coordination center for Ukraine-bound support.

In the United Kingdom, Under Secretary Zeya will further U.S.-U.K. cooperation on pressing global challenges. She will meet with senior government officials, civil society, and members of Parliament to strengthen partnerships on humanitarian cooperation and human rights, including protections for survivors of trafficking in persons and LGBTQI+ individuals.

For further information, please follow @UnderSecStateJ on X and @UnderSecStateJ on LinkedIn.

MIL OSI USA News –

January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Defence Secretary oral statement on war in Ukraine – 22 October 2024
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

Defence Secretary John Healey, provided an update to the House of Commons on the war in Ukraine.
Location:

House of Commons

Delivered on:

22 October 2024

Mr Speaker, I have just returned from three days of intense defence diplomacy.

First, at the NATO Defence Ministers meeting in Brussels where we welcomed President Zelenskyy and then, at the G7 Defence Ministers meeting in Naples where we had important updates from the battlefield, agreed this is a critical point in the conflict and stressed the need to step up and speed up support for Ukraine.

The G7 joint declaration strongly condemned Putin’s illegal invasion and reinforced our unwavering support for Ukraine. It also rightly stated:

“Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is posing a threat to international security, the purposes and principles of the United Nations, and the rules-based international order.”

This is what’s at stake for us all. And if President Putin prevails in Ukraine, he will not stop at Ukraine. And if big nations redraw international boundaries by force, the sovereignty and security of all nations is undermined.

That’s why the UK support, alongside allies, is so important. Military, economic, industrial, diplomatic.

But I can tell the House, Mr Speaker, I have returned to the UK knowing that NATO is united for Ukraine. The G7 is united for Ukraine. Just as the UK is united for Ukraine.

And our job now is to turn these talks into action, which is exactly what we are doing as a government. So, the Chancellor and I are today are announcing that the UK will provide an additional £2.26bn to Ukraine

This is new money, new money which will be delivered under the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration Loans to Ukraine scheme. That’s part of the $50 billion loan package from G7 countries to support Ukraine’s military, budget, and reconstruction needs.

Loans, Mr Speaker, which will be repaid using the profits generated from immobilised Russian sovereign assets. Profits on frozen Russian money, supporting Ukraine’s fight against Putin. Turning the proceeds of Putin’s corrupt regime against that regime and putting it in the hands of Ukrainians.

And Mr Speaker, I want to be clear: Today’s new money is additional to the £3bn a year of military support this Government has committed to Ukraine each year for as long as it takes.

In addition to the £3.5bn Defence Industrial Support Treaty which I signed with Defence Minister Umerov in July, money that will be used by Ukraine to procure military equipment from British companies, boosting our British jobs and our British industry. And extra to the additional artillery, air defences, ammunition, and missiles we have announced in the first four months of this new Government.

Ukraine is a first order priority for me as Defence Secretary, it’s a first order priority for this Government. We will continue to step up support. We will continue to lead. We will stand with Ukraine as long as it takes.

Mr Speaker, today is now day 973 since Putin launched his full scale, illegal invasion of Ukraine. 973 days during which Ukrainians have been fighting with great courage – civilians and military alike. And there have been important battlefield developments in recent weeks. When I last updated the House, Ukrainian forces were one month into their remarkable offensive in Kursk.

Three months on, they continue to hold Russian territory and Ukraine’s strategic surprise has put Putin under pressure, forcing the diversion of some Russian troops and equipment.

And despite the increase in brutal Russian counter attacks and aerial bombardments, they have so far failed to dislodge that Ukrainian incursion. And it’s not just in Kursk where Ukraine is fighting back.

Ukrainian forces have launched long range attacks into Russian territory on military targets which are directly supporting Putin’s illegal invasion.

In September, Ukraine used long range drones to attack four ammunition storage facilities. These strikes successfully destroyed thousands of tonnes of ammunition.

Both the defensive thrust into Kursk, and the strategic defensive strikes into Russia, have had an impact on the battlefield.

Russia’s advance towards Pokrovsk in the East – Putin’s main line of effort – has been slowed. Russian losses continue to rise. Since the start of the conflict, Russia has likely suffered 675,000 casualties.

In September, the average casualty rate each date of Russians on the battlefield of Ukraine was 1271 – a record high and two and a half times the level this time last year.

And on equipment, Mr Speaker, they have now lost 3,400 tanks, 8,500 armoured vehicles and 26 Russian vessels in the Black Sea fleet have been destroyed or damaged.

But despite the incredible resilience Ukrainian forces have shown, they remain under great pressure from Russian forces across multiple fronts, and Russian troops continue to advance and continue to attack Ukraine infrastructure. Targeting the important port of Odessa and striking energy infrastructure.

So as we head into winter, Mr Speaker, Ukraine’s energy generation capacity has been reduced by up to two thirds of that of pre-war levels. Russian industry remains on a war footing. Russian artillery is outfiring Ukraine by at least 3 to 1, and Russia is also conscripting this year an additional 400,000 troops.

Defence will now account for 32%, one third of the total government budget in Russia next year.

And, Mr Speaker, in a concerning new development, it is now highly likely that the transfer and deployment of hundreds of combat troops from North Korea to Russia has begun. North Korean soldiers supporting Russia’s war of aggression on European soil – it is as shocking as it is desperate.

North Korea already sends significant munitions and arms to Russia in direct violation of multiple UN resolutions. And this developing military cooperation between Russia and DPRK has serious security implications for Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

It represents a wider growing alliance of aggression which NATO and the G7 nations must confront.

Mr Speaker, despite this dangerous development, Ukraine remains determined to fight on their frontline in the East and holding the territory in Kursk. President Zelensky will also continue to seek support for his Victory Plan, and we want to see this Plan succeed. We stand ready to work closely with the Ukrainians and with allies to make it succeed.

Mr Speaker, as we approach 1000 days of this war, this conflict is now at a really critical moment. And that’s why the UK continues to step up support for Ukraine.

Ukrainians are fighting to regain their sovereign territory, but they are also fighting to protect the peace, the democracy and the security for the rest of us in Europe.

Updates to this page

Published 22 October 2024

Invasion of Ukraine

UK visa support for Ukrainian nationals

Move to the UK if you’re coming from Ukraine

Homes for Ukraine: record your interest

Find out about the UK’s response
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
January 24, 2025

Category: Ukraine

Defence Secretary John Healey MP said:

German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius said:

Armin Papperger, CEO and Chairman of Rheinmetall AG commented that:

Gary Nutter, Chief Executive Officer at Sheffield Forgemasters, said:

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Preamble

Support to Ukraine

Middle East

Africa

Indo-Pacific

Defense readiness

Conclusions

The end of Reformasi?

Keeping the elites happy

Dealing with an obstructive court

Bold promises on the economy

More active foreign relations

Back to the future

Between east and west

Control of the Black Sea

Dangerously underprepared

A crisis in the making

One more winter

Geopolitical blowback

Updates to this page

Invasion of Ukraine