Category: Ukraine

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: BLOOMBERG PHILANTHROPIES NAMES 50 GLOBAL FINALISTS IN 2025 MAYORS CHALLENGE Including Lower Hutt

    Source: Bloomberg Philanthropies

    Finalists from 33 countries will receive $50,000 and support to test breakthrough ideas for improving life in cities – In January 2026, 25 winning cities will receive $1 million each to bring their idea to life.

    New York, NY – (June 25, 2025) – Bloomberg Philanthropies today announced the 50 finalists of its latest Mayors Challenge, a competition to spur local government innovation that improves lives in cities around the world. The sixth Challenge elevates municipalities that have proposed the boldest ideas to bolster essential municipal services.

    From Boise to Belfast, Ansan to Addis Ababa, Toronto to Taipei, the 50 finalists, selected from more than 630 applications, hail from 33 countries and represent over 80 million residents. Their ideas aim to increase public transit ridership, lower household energy costs, expand urban green space, speed service response, strengthen sanitation, improve youth safety, safeguard water supply, and more.

    Each finalist city will receive $50,000 to prototype their idea. They will also participate in Bloomberg Philanthropies’ Ideas Camp in July to hone and test their concepts with feedback from experts and fellow peers. In January 2026, the 25 city halls with the most promising ideas will each be awarded $1 million and operational assistance to bring their proposals to life.

    “Local government is where people meet policy—and where government improves lives and builds trust,” said James Anderson, who leads the Government Innovation program at Bloomberg Philanthropies. “That’s why municipal innovation isn’t about grand gestures—it’s about solving hard problems under pressure, often with imperfect tools and finite resources. These Mayors Challenge finalists stand out because they’re not just thinking creatively—they’re designing solutions that reckon with the complexity of implementation and the urgency of their residents’ needs. Their proposals reflect a new standard for public sector achievement: ambitious, yes, but also grounded, disciplined, and ripe for real impact.”

    The 630 ideas submitted to the Mayors Challenge reflect some of the greatest public service challenges facing cities today—as well as the creativity that animates local governments across the globe. A third of U.S. and Canada applicants, for example, devised solutions addressing housing and shelter. Nearly half of the applicants from Africa proposed upgrades to waste collection and management. One out of five applicants from the Asia-Pacific region focused on cleaner water, air, and infrastructure, and 22 percent of European applicants sought ways to reduce poverty or enhance social inclusion.

    The 50 finalist ideas were selected for their originality, potential for impact, and credible vision for delivery. Artificial intelligence was featured in the plans of a number of finalists, including South Bend, Indiana, which envisioned a cutting-edge 311 system that anticipates complaints for non-emergency issues, such as potholes, allowing officials to address problems before a resident report. More analog innovations also rose to the top: In Yonkers, New York, city officials proposed a powerful new hyper-local civic brigade to help older neighbors age happily and healthfully in place.

    The 50 finalist cities are:

    • Abha, Saudi Arabia
    • Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
    • Ansan, South Korea
    • As-Salt, Jordan
    • Barcelona, Spain
    • Beaverton, U.S
    • Beira, Mozambique
    • Belfast, United Kingdom
    • Benin City, Nigeria
    • Boise, U.S.
    • Boston, U.S.
    • Budapest, Hungary
    • Cap-Haïtien, Haiti
    • Cape Town, South Africa
    • Cartagena, Colombia
    • Cauayan, Philippines
    • Choma, Zambia
    • Cuenca, Ecuador
    • Detroit, U.S.
    • Fez, Morocco
    • Fukuoka, Japan
    • Ghaziabad, India
    • Ghent, Belgium
    • Greater Visakhapatnam Municipal Corporation, India
    • Helsinki, Finland
    • Honolulu, U.S.
    • Kanifing, Gambia
    • Kyiv, Ukraine
    • Lafayette, U.S.
    • Lower Hutt, New Zealand
    • Maceió, Brazil
    • Marseille, France
    • Medellín, Colombia
    • Mexico City, Mexico
    • Naga, Philippines
    • Ndola, Zambia
    • Netanya, Israel
    • Nouakchott, Mauritania
    • Pasig, Philippines
    • Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
    • San Francisco, U.S.
    • Seattle, U.S.
    • Seoul, South Korea
    • Sialkot, Pakistan
    • South Bend, U.S.
    • Surabaya, Indonesia
    • Taipei, Taiwan
    • Toronto, Canada
    • Turku, Finland
    • Yonkers, U.S.

    In this round of the Bloomberg Philanthropies Mayors Challenge, more funding will be distributed and more cities will be assisted than in the previous five Challenges which each selected between five to 15 winners. 

    “Local government and mayors’ offices are the beating heart of innovation and change in our urban environments,” said Professor Lesley Lokko OBE, Founder and Chair of the African Futures Institute and 2025 Mayors Challenge advisory committee member. “It has been an honour to join Bloomberg Philanthropies’ advisory committee for the organization’s sixth Mayors Challenge, an initiative dedicated to empowering and supporting city makers around the world. I look forward to working with these 50 finalists as they advance in this extraordinary competition—strengthening their ideas which each represent the inventiveness citizens everywhere should expect from their governments—and the future of what municipal delivery has the power and potential to be.”

    “For more than a decade, Bloomberg Philanthropies has provided unprecedented support to drive local government innovation in cities across the country and around the world,” said Admiral Michael G. Mullen, President & CEO of MGM Consulting and 2025 Mayors Challenge advisory committee member. “The organization’s sixth Mayors Challenge will invest in the future of urban delivery from the ground floor of communities—and I am thrilled to join its advisory committee and work with these finalist cities on accelerating their ideas – from safeguarding water supply to carving out community spaces to integrating AI to improve student routes, and more.”

    The new Mayors Challenge builds on more than 10 years of work led by Bloomberg Philanthropies to discover, nurture, and drive innovation in cities. The awards to date across five previous rounds of competition have provided 38 winning cities with funding and technical assistance to realize their ideas for addressing civic issues. By supporting the replication of the most successful winning ideas, Bloomberg Philanthropies has expanded the impact of the Mayors Challenge to 337 other cities globally, reaching over 100 million residents around the world.

    “Bloomberg Philanthropies has provided invaluable support for cities to develop and implement innovative solutions that improve the lives of residents in ways they can feel,” said Mayor Mike Duggan of Detroit, Michigan. “Detroit is honored to be among the 50 municipalities selected from over 630 applications for the organization’s Mayors Challenge. As a finalist, we will work with renowned experts and peers to advance our proposal to create a powerful, single entry that connects currently scattered information – such as inspection dates, taxes, and utilities – on all 400,000 Detroit properties to revolutionize how owners can access this vital information, as well as how our city plans and provides its most essential services.”

    “Seoul is honored to be selected as one of the 50 finalists for the Bloomberg Philanthropies Mayors Challenge competition,” said Mayor Oh Se-hoon of Seoul, South Korea. “As a finalist, we will further our proposal to launch powerful educational campaigns and new support systems that will protect youth safety and prevent online child exploitation through the development of an AI-based mobile app that detects risks and alerts parents – while working alongside other cities to set a new standard for the future of urban policy.”

    “City halls deliver the most fundamental public services—from reliable public transport to affordable housing, clean water, sustainable environments, emergency response, and more,” said Mayor Gergely Karácsony of Budapest, Hungary. “Recognizing their potential and reach, the Bloomberg Philanthropies Mayors Challenge rewards and equips those with the most inventive ideas to lead transformations of the essential programs their communities rely on. We are honored that Budapest is one of the 50 finalists selected to further our idea to build a city-run food processing plant that can turn surplus fruits and vegetables from local markets into nutritious meals for schools and senior homes.”

    “It is an honor to be selected as a finalist for the Bloomberg Philanthropies Mayors Challenge,” said Mayor Sunita Dayal of Ghaziabad, India. “As we pursue our idea to improve our environment alongside bolstering our workforce – converting organic waste into white rooftop paint and compost to cool homes, green parks, and lower emissions while providing new job opportunities – we have a unique opportunity to incubate innovation that will move our communities forward.” 

    “Thank you to Bloomberg Philanthropies for seeing our vision to improve the quality of life for seniors across our city,” said Mayor Mike Spano of Yonkers, New York. “We are honored to be among 50 finalists selected for the prestigious global Mayors Challenge competition. As a finalist, we will look to create a fully sustainable model for community engagement – marshaling public and private partners as well as residents and students – coupled with innovative technology and tools to enable many more to age safely and gracefully in place.” 

    With the expansion of the Bloomberg Cities Idea Exchange, future Mayors Challenge-winning ideas and other locally led solutions supported by Bloomberg Philanthropies will have new potential to scale—serving as models and catalysts for how governments solve problems across the globe. 

    To learn more about the 50 finalist proposals, visit mayorschallenge.bloomberg.org

    About Bloomberg Philanthropies:
    Bloomberg Philanthropies invests in 700 cities and 150 countries around the world to ensure better, longer lives for the greatest number of people. The organization focuses on creating lasting change in five key areas: the Arts, Education, Environment, Government Innovation, and Public Health. Bloomberg Philanthropies encompasses all of Michael R. Bloomberg’s giving, including his foundation, corporate, and personal philanthropy as well as Bloomberg Associates, a philanthropic consultancy that advises cities around the world. In 2024, Bloomberg Philanthropies distributed $3.7 billion. For more information, please visit bloomberg.org,

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI: Electronic Health Records (EHR) Market Valued at USD 33.45 Billion in 2024, Set to Grow at 4.59% CAGR Through 2032 | AnalystView Market Insights

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    San Francisco, USA, June 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — The Electronic Health Records (EHR) market was valued at USD 33,451.20 million in 2024 and is projected to grow at a CAGR of 4.59% from 2025 to 2032. This growth is driven by the global shift toward digital healthcare infrastructure, government mandates for record standardization, and the rising demand for efficient patient data management across hospitals, clinics, and ambulatory care centers. EHR systems are digital versions of a patient’s paper chart, offering real-time, patient-centered records that make information instantly and securely available to authorized users. They are critical for improving coordination between care providers, minimizing medical errors, and enhancing overall clinical outcomes.

    Government initiatives worldwide are playing a key role in promoting EHR adoption. Programs such as the U.S. HITECH Act, the EU’s digital health transformation goals, and India’s Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission are pushing healthcare providers toward digitization. At the same time, the rise of value-based care, telehealth, and mobile health applications has increased the need for interoperable and cloud-based EHR systems. The market is witnessing significant technological advancements, including integration with AI, predictive analytics, and mobile platforms, which enable better clinical decision-making and patient engagement. However, challenges such as high implementation costs, data privacy concerns, and interoperability issues between different systems remain key hurdles, particularly in emerging markets.

    North America dominates the global EHR market, backed by strong digital infrastructure and initiatives like the U.S. HITECH Act, which allocated over $35 billion to promote EHR adoption. Meanwhile, Asia-Pacific is emerging as the fastest-growing region, fueled by rising healthcare investments—India’s health budget rose 13% in 2023—and national digitization drives like China’s “Healthy China 2030.” Supportive policies, growing urbanization, and expanding patient volumes are accelerating EHR integration across the region, attracting global players and investors alike.

    Unlock in-depth insights and forecasts – Get your FREE sample report of the EHR market today: https://analystviewmarketinsights.com/request_sample/AV4020

    Key Players- Detailed Competitive Insights

    • Cerner Corporation
    • GE Healthcare
    • Veradigm LLC
    • Epic Systems Corporation
    • eClinicalWorks
    • Greenway Health, LLC
    • NextGen Healthcare, Inc.
    • Medical Information Technology, Inc.
    • CPSI
    • AdvancedMD, Inc.
    • Allscripts Healthcare Solutions
    • MEDHOST
    • Athenahealth
    • McKesson Corporation
    • Siemens Healthineers
    • Oracle Corporation

    Market Dynamics

    Drivers

    1. Government Mandates and Incentives: Many countries are accelerating Electronic Health Records (EHR) adoption through targeted policies. In the U.S., CMS’s Promoting Interoperability Program ties Medicare reimbursements to EHR usage. Germany’s Hospital Future Act allocated €4.3 billion for digital upgrades, while Australia’s My Health Record achieved over 90% population coverage. India’s Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission aims to create a unified health ID system, promoting seamless data exchange. These initiatives are driving global healthcare digitalization and fostering integrated patient care systems.
    2. Rising Demand for Streamlined Healthcare Delivery: For example, Mayo Clinic uses integrated EHRs to reduce duplication, streamline workflows, and access real-time patient data—cutting documentation time and improving care coordination across departments and specialties. 
    3. Growth in Telehealth and Remote Monitoring: The global shift toward telemedicine post-COVID-19 has increased the need for centralized digital records that can be accessed remotely. This trend is pushing both public and private healthcare providers to invest in cloud-based and interoperable EHR systems.
    4. Data-Driven Decision Making in Healthcare: As data becomes a core asset in personalized medicine and value-based care models, EHRs serve as critical repositories of patient history, lab reports, medications, and imaging data.

    Challenges

    • High Implementation and Maintenance Costs: The cost of deploying EHR software, training staff, and maintaining IT infrastructure can be prohibitive for small healthcare facilities, especially in developing nations.
    • Interoperability and Data Security Concerns: Although EHRs are designed to improve information sharing, achieving true interoperability across different systems remains a challenge. Moreover, the sensitive nature of health data makes security and compliance with data protection regulations (like HIPAA and GDPR) a critical issue.

    Opportunities

    • Integration with AI and analytics in EHRs enables predictive insights—such as Mount Sinai Hospital using AI models within EHRs to identify sepsis risk early, improving response time and patient outcomes. This innovation is driving demand for intelligent, data-driven systems.
    • Mobile and Cloud-Based EHRs: The adoption of mobile health apps and cloud platforms enables real-time access to health data, especially beneficial in rural and underserved regions.

    Regional Insights

    North America

    North America holds 42.50% of the global EHR market, driven by the U.S.’s early adoption and digital health funding. Epic Systems powers major hospital networks like Kaiser Permanente, while Canada’s Infoway initiative accelerates EHR integration, ensuring secure, interoperable data across provinces.

    Europe

    Europe is a mature yet fragmented market for EHRs. Countries like Germany, the UK, and the Netherlands are progressing well in EHR integration, while others lag due to privacy concerns and inconsistent digital policies. The EU’s push toward unified health records under the European Health Data Space initiative could streamline EHR adoption across member states.

    Asia-Pacific

    The Asia-Pacific region is projected to witness the fastest growth during the forecast period. Rapid urbanization, increased healthcare spending, and the digitalization efforts in countries like India, China, and Australia are major contributors. Government-backed programs such as India’s Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission and China’s Smart Healthcare initiative are significantly driving EHR deployment.

    Latin America & Middle East

    Both regions are gradually embracing EHR systems. Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have initiated digital health reforms. However, budget constraints and a lack of infrastructure remain key barriers. International partnerships and private investments are expected to unlock growth potential in these markets.

    TABLE OF CONTENT

    1. Electronic Health Records Market Overview
    1.1. Study Scope
    1.2. Market Estimation Years
    2. Executive Summary
    2.1. Market Snippet
    2.1.1. Electronic Health Records Market Snippet By Product
    2.1.2. Electronic Health Records Market Snippet By Type
    2.1.3. Electronic Health Records Market Snippet By Business Model
    2.1.4. Electronic Health Records Market Snippet By Application
    2.1.5. Electronic Health Records Market Snippet By End Use
    2.1.6. Electronic Health Records Market Snippet by Country
    2.1.7. Electronic Health Records Market Snippet by Region
    2.2. Competitive Insights
    3. Electronic Health Records Key Market Trends
    3.1. Electronic Health Records Market Drivers
    3.1.1. Impact Analysis of Market Drivers
    3.2. Electronic Health Records Market Restraints
    3.2.1. Impact Analysis of Market Restraints
    3.3. Electronic Health Records Market Opportunities
    3.4. Electronic Health Records Market Future Trends
    4. Electronic Health Records Industry Study
    4.1. PEST Analysis
    4.2. Porter’s Five Forces Analysis
    4.3. Growth Prospect Mapping
    4.4. Regulatory Framework Analysis
    5. Electronic Health Records Market: Impact of Escalating Geopolitical Tensions
    5.1. Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic
    5.2. Impact of Russia-Ukraine War
    5.3. Impact of Middle East Conflicts
    6. Electronic Health Records Market Landscape
    6.1. Electronic Health Records Market Share Analysis, 2024
    6.2. Breakdown Data, by Key Manufacturer
    6.2.1. Established Players’ Analysis
    6.2.2. Emerging Players’ Analysis
    7. Electronic Health Records Market – By Product
    7.1. Overview
    7.1.1. Segment Share Analysis, By Product, 2024 & 2032 (%)
    7.1.2. On-premises
    7.1.3. Web & Cloud-Based EHR
    8. Electronic Health Records Market – By Type
    8.1. Overview
    8.1.1. Segment Share Analysis, By Type, 2024 & 2032 (%)
    8.1.2. Acute
    8.1.3. Outpatient
    8.1.4. Post Acute
    9. Electronic Health Records Market – By Business Model
    9.1. Overview
    9.1.1. Segment Share Analysis, By Business Model, 2024 & 2032 (%)
    9.1.2. Licensed Software
    9.1.3. Technology Resale
    9.1.4. Subscriptions
    9.1.5. Professional Services
    9.1.6. Others
    10. Electronic Health Records Market – By Application
    10.1. Overview
    10.1.1. Segment Share Analysis, By Application, 2024 & 2032 (%)
    10.1.2. Cardiology
    10.1.3. Neurology
    10.1.4. Radiology ………

    Reasons to Invest in the EHR Market

    1. Essential Role in Modern Healthcare Systems
      EHRs are no longer optional but a fundamental part of modern healthcare. As hospitals strive to improve patient care, safety, and efficiency, EHRs serve as a backbone for digital health ecosystems.
    2. Regulatory Push and Compliance Standards
      Investment in compliant EHR systems helps healthcare providers align with stringent data protection laws while avoiding penalties and securing patient trust.
    3. Increasing Healthcare Expenditure
      Globally, healthcare budgets are expanding. A significant portion is being directed toward digital infrastructure, making EHR vendors prime beneficiaries of government and institutional funding.
    4. Rising Adoption of Cloud and AI Technologies
      EHR vendors integrating cloud capabilities and AI features offer enhanced scalability, analytics, and patient engagement. These smart EHRs are more future-proof and attractive to investors.
    5. Long-Term Cost Benefits for Healthcare Providers
      Despite initial costs, EHR systems lead to long-term savings by reducing administrative workload, avoiding duplication of tests, and minimizing errors.

    Future Outlook

    The Electronic Health Records (EHR) market is poised for a tech-driven evolution, with AI integration, cloud-based platforms, and interoperability leading the way. By 2032, real-time data exchange, as seen in the U.K.’s NHS Federated Data Platform and India’s Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission, will become standard.

    Growing cybersecurity investments and patient-centric innovations are redefining EHR functionality. With global healthcare systems embracing value-based care, the market is set for intelligent, adaptive, and patient-connected growth worldwide.

    Discover the Full Study : https://analystviewmarketinsights.com/reports/report-highlight-electronic-health-records-market

    Explore More Research Titles in the Healthcare Category by AnalystView Market Insights:

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – Outlook for the European Council meeting on 26-27 June 2025 – 25-06-2025

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Council meeting on 26-27 June has a full agenda. One year into the new institutional cycle, global affairs have grown tense and unpredictable. Although a discussion on the Middle East was not originally envisaged for the June European Council meeting, the rapidly developing situation in the region will require the EU leaders’ attention. EU leaders are also expected to discuss Ukraine, European defence and security, the EU in the world, competitiveness, migration, Moldova, the Western Balkans, internal security and EU preparedness. Some further items, such as the rules-based international order, may also feature on the agenda. The discussion on internal reforms in the context of enlargement, envisaged in the Leaders’ Agenda for June, seems to have been postponed to a later date. Despite a full agenda, in his invitation letter European Council President António Costa stressed his intention to keep the meeting to one day.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – EU cooperation with OCCRP in the context of USAID termination – E-002383/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002383/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Petr Bystron (ESN)

    The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) is an influential globalist propaganda network, established in 2007, which maintains close ties with the United States and in the past received substantial funding from the US Agency for International Development (USAID). According to investigative reports, between 2014 and 2023, OCCRP received approximately USD 1.1 million from the EU, in addition to funding from several individual European countries. This non-transparent and politically biased organisation uses the so-called ‘fight against corruption’ as a pretext for undermining democratic principles and discrediting critical views on various issues such as the war in Ukraine, US foreign policy or the actions of the Commission.

    Therefore, we would like to ask the Commission:

    • 1.How much funding has the Commission and its agencies provided to the OCCRP annually since 2020?
    • 2.How does the Commission justify its partnership with a foreign-funded, politically biased organisation that undermines democratic debate under the pretext of anti-corruption efforts?
    • 3.When does the Commission intend to terminate its cooperation with or financial support of OCCRP in light of the recent termination of USAID funding by US President Donald Trump?

    Submitted: 12.6.2025

    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2024 – A10-0112/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2024

    (2024/2053(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union,

     having regard to Articles 15, 126, 174, 175, 177, 208, 209, 271, 308 and 309 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and to Protocol (No 5) on the Statute of the European Investment Bank (EIB),

     having regard to Articles 41 to 43 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

     having regard to the EIB Group Activity Report 2024 of 30 January 2025 entitled ‘Priorities for prosperity’,

     having regard to the EIB Investment Report 2024/2025 of 5 March 2025 entitled ‘Innovation, integration and simplification in Europe’,

     having regard to the EIB Group 2024-2027 Strategic Roadmap of 21 June 2024,

     having regard to the EIB Group Operational Plan 2024-2026 of 9 February 2024 and to the EIB Group Operational Plan 2025-2027 of 30 January 2025,

     having regard to the G20 commissioned review of Multilateral Development Banks’ capital adequacy frameworks (the CAF Review),

     having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2025/504 of 11 March 2025 amending Protocol No 5 on the Statute of the European Investment Bank[1],

     having regard to the EIB Board’s decision of 21 March 2025,

     having regard to the EIB Cohesion Orientation 2021-2027 of 13 October 2021,

     having regard to the launch of the EIB’s European Tech Champions Initiative (ETCI) on 13 February 2023,

     having regard to the EIB Group’s third annual report on EIB Group activities in EU cohesion regions of 15 July 2024,

     having regard to the EIB Environmental and Social Standards of 2 February 2022,

     having regard to the EIB Group 2023 Climate Bank Roadmap Progress Report of 25 July 2024,

     having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights,

     having regard to the ‘Main outcomes from EIB Group analysis and stakeholder consultation’, presented at the EIB seminar on housing on 18 July 2024,

     having regard to the EIB press release of 6 March 2025 entitled ‘European Commission and EIB group lay foundations for a new pan-European investment platform for affordable and sustainable housing’,

     having regard to the letter by EIB President Nadia Calviño to the EU leaders of 4 March 2025,

     having regard to the EIB Group Security and Defence Industry Action Plan presented at the Economic and Financial Affairs Council meeting in Luxembourg on 12 April 2024,

     having regard to the EIB’s updated list of eligibility, excluded activities and excluded sectors of 14 July 2022,

     having regard to the EIB Global Impact Report 2023/2024 of 13 June 2024,

     having regard to the Tripartite Agreement between the European Commission, the European Court of Auditors and the European Investment Bank, signed on 11 November 2021,

     having regard to the EIB Group Complaints Mechanism Procedures of 13 November 2018,

     having regard to the document entitled ‘Diversity, Equity and Inclusion at the EIB Group’ of 14 October 2024,

     having regard to the study of the European Parliamentary Research Service entitled ‘Increasing European added value in an age of global challenges – Mapping the cost of non-Europe (2022-2032)’, published in February 2023,

     having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 December 2021 entitled ‘The Global Gateway’ (JOIN(2021)0030),

     having regard to the study by the European Commission published on 11 January 2024 entitled ‘Access to equity financing for European defence SMEs’[2] ,

     having regard to the report of 17 April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

     having regard to the report of 25 April 2024 by Christian Noyer entitled ‘Developing European capital markets to finance the future’,

     having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

     having regard to the report of 30 October 2024 by Sauli Niinistö entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘Commission work programme 2025’ (COM(2025)0045),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘The road to the next multiannual financial framework’ (COM(2025)0046),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘Action Plan for Affordable Energy: Unlocking the true value of our Energy Union to secure affordable, efficient and clean energy for all Europeans’ (COM(2025)0079),

     having regard to the press statement by the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, on the defence package (Rearm Europe plan) of 4 March 2025,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Savings and Investments Union – A Strategy to Foster Citizens’ Wealth and Economic Competitiveness in the EU’ (COM(2025)0124),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility[3],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 establishing the InvestEU Programme and amending Regulation (EU) 2015/1017[4],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009[5],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1056 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the Just Transition Fund[6],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1229 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 July 2021 on the public sector loan facility under the Just Transition Mechanism[7],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform[8],

     having regard to the Commission proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2025 amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements (COM(2025)0084),

     having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence[9],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Budgets,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0112/2025),

    A. whereas the EIB Group includes the EIB and the European Investment Fund (EIF); whereas the EIB, entirely owned by the Member States, is the largest multilateral financial institution in the world, operating in international capital markets and offering competitive terms to clients on favourable conditions in order to contribute to the achievement of the EU’s objectives and support EU  policies and projects both within and outside the EU, in accordance with Article 309 TFEU; whereas the EIF is owned by the EIB (59.8 %), by the EU (29.7 %) and by financial institutions (10.5 %) from the Member States, the United Kingdom and Türkiye;

    B. whereas the EIB Group has a balance sheet of close to EUR 600 billion; whereas the EIB Group states that its total investment reached a record level of EUR 88.8 billion in 2024, of which EUR 50.7 billion related to climate and the environment, EUR 16.2 billion to SMEs and mid-caps, EUR 14.4 billion to digitalisation and technological innovation and EUR 1 billion to enhancing Europe’s security and defence; whereas the EIB’s gearing ratio has been increased to 290 %, providing additional room for the EIB to invest and support the achievement of the EU’s objectives and support EU policies; whereas the EIB Group’s total investment is expected to increase to EUR 95 billion in 2025;

    C. whereas the EIB maintains solid financial fundamentals and has a ‘triple A’ rating, a cornerstone of its financial credibility and lending capacity, which is essential to preserve investor confidence and ensure low borrowing costs;

    D. whereas the EIB supports EU policies and projects and is the main implementing partner to leverage the mandates and guarantees of the EU’s budget and thus to mobilise large-scale public and private investment; whereas the EIB states that approximately 90 % of its annual investment is committed to projects within the EU and 10 % deployed in investments outside the EU;

    E. whereas the EIF, as part of the EIB Group, is an entity specialised in supporting the EU’s policy objectives, including in the areas of entrepreneurship, job creation and economic cohesion, and plays a key role in supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by enhancing their access to financial markets, from venture capital to micro-finance; highlights the fact that the EIB Group supports companies at all stages of development;

    F. whereas as of June 2024, InvestEU is estimated to have mobilised around EUR 280 billion in additional investments, of which EUR 201 billion originated from the private sector; whereas the InvestEU envelope is almost depleted;

    G. whereas the latest reports on the future of the EU call for the EU’s competitiveness and productivity to be strengthened, emphasise the vital role of market integration and underscore the need to accelerate both public and private investment to build a stronger, more secure, autonomous and fair Europe;

    H. whereas the Draghi report on European competitiveness assesses the combined additional investment needs in Europe at EUR 750-800 billion per year by 2030; whereas the EIB Group plays a crucial role in helping bridge the gap both through its own lending capacity and by ‘crowding in’ private capital to finance these investment needs;

    I. whereas according to the Draghi report, EU companies spend less on research and innovation (R&I) than their US counterparts and Europe persistently fails to translate R&I into commercialisation, particularly in sectors like biotech, artificial intelligence and renewable energy, in the context of the EU’s lack of scale and incomplete single market, banking union and capital markets union; whereas the Draghi report highlights a 30 % EU-US productivity gap in 2023 and points to Europe’s missing out on the digital revolution – driven by the internet and the associated productivity gains – as a key factor, noting that only four of the world’s top 50 tech companies are European;

    J. whereas the Letta report estimates that EUR 300 billion of European savings are not invested in Europe, but mainly in the United States, due to the lack of an integrated capital markets union (CMU); whereas the President of the European Central Bank estimates that companies in the EU could raise approximately an additional EUR 470 billion a year in funding from the capital markets if the CMU were completed[10]; whereas the European Parliamentary Research Service estimates the potential benefits of a more fully integrated and more effectively regulated EU financial market of up to EUR 159 billion per year in the long run as well as the benefit of further progress in the integration of the EU banking sector of up to EUR 114 billion per year;

    K. whereas the EIB’s operations should contribute to achieving climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest, in line with the Paris Agreement and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and support the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights; whereas the EIB has branded itself the EU’s climate bank in view of the investments needed to deliver the fair green transition; whereas the Commission estimates that the EU needs to increase its annual investments in energy, industrial innovation and scale-up, and transport systems by around EUR 480 billion compared to the previous decade[11];

    L. whereas in the light of the current geopolitical context, the development of the European defence technological and industrial base plays an increasingly important role within the internal market; whereas the Commission’s white paper on the future of European defence identifies that an additional EUR 800 billion investment is needed in the defence sector over a four-year period; whereas the EIB announced that it would double its funding for security and defence from EUR 1 billion in 2024 to EUR 2 billion in 2025, while safeguarding its ‘triple A’ credit rating status;

    M. whereas housing prices in the EU rose by an average of 48 % between 2015 and 2023, and the housing crisis affects nearly all of Europe, increasingly impacting the middle class and not just the most vulnerable; whereas EIB data indicates a yearly need to build 1.5 million new homes and renovate five million more, requiring EUR 300-400 billion in annual investment; whereas the housing sector is of general interest but faces reduced public investment, which makes continued EIB investment crucial for this sector; whereas the EIB’s new action plan envisages investment of EUR 10 billion over the next two years;

    N. whereas the EIB Global lending arm, which was launched in 2022, is of key importance in terms of Europe’s position in the world; whereas EIB Global is expected to facilitate at least one third of the EUR 300 billion in investment that the Global Gateway sets out to generate by the end of 2027;

    O. whereas Parliament has repeatedly called for the conclusion of an interinstitutional agreement between Parliament and the EIB; whereas Parliament has signed agreements with various EU bodies; whereas Parliament and the EIB share a long history of intensive cooperation, including (non-)legislative interactions and dialogue;

    General remarks

    1. Appreciates the EIB’s readiness to adapt to changing EU policy requirements, while respecting its long-term objectives; welcomes the EIB Group 2024-2027 Strategic Roadmap, which reflects the EU’s political priorities; points out that the eight priority areas set out in the strategic roadmap are: the EIB’s role as the climate bank, digitalisation and deployment of new technologies, security and defence industry, modern cohesion policy, agriculture and the bioeconomy, Europe’s social infrastructure, high impact investments outside the EU, and the capital markets union;

    2. Highlights the strong call for the EIB to play an even greater role in closing Europe’s investment gap, which Mario Draghi estimated at EUR 800 billion, of which EUR 450 billion is needed for the energy transition alone; calls on the Commission and the EIB to fully leverage the EIB’s potential to provide financial support for the EU’s common priorities and to fulfil its crucial role in driving the necessary investment for fair and inclusive sustainable growth, while maximising innovation gains in key EU policy areas; calls for the EIB Group’s contribution to be further strengthened in the next multiannual financial framework (MFF), particularly through financial instruments and budgetary guarantees that have proven highly effective in advancing key EU policy objectives; urges the Member States to provide sufficient funding for this purpose by assigning mandates to the EIB and through a possible capital increase, thus enabling the EIB to mobilise investments that truly meet pan-European needs and strengthen the EU’s relevance as a global player; recalls that the new Commission has set itself the goal of being an ‘investment Commission’;

    3. Stresses that the EIB’s ‘triple A’ rating is essential and a key asset that must be maintained; urges all relevant actors to protect and guarantee this rating when adapting the EIB’s lending policy and mandate; underlines that the rating is based, among other factors, on its solid capital position, excellent asset quality and performance, the creditworthiness of the Member States as its ultimate guarantors, and the fact that the EIB has been responsive to EU policy objectives; notes that, with a solid ‘triple A’ rating and a strong risk management framework, the EIB Group has the financial strength required to steadily increase its annual investments; highlights the fact that the EIB’s rating and financial position also allow it to ensure favourable financing conditions in funding public interest projects compared to private commercial banks, ensuring certainty and cost effectiveness, and allow it to absorb potential fluctuations in returns, retain investor confidence and contain borrowing costs; underlines that the EIB should further leverage its privileged status to take greater risks in funding European public goods and strategic investments; takes note of the decision of the EIB Board of Governors to increase the EIB’s gearing ratio limit from 250 % to 290 %; stresses that the EIB should adequately calibrate its intervention to ensure that it does not crowd out private investment;

    4. Notes that the EIB investment volume relative to GDP among European countries ranges from 0.1 %[12] to 1.4 % for 2024; calls on the EIB Group to ensure a more balanced geographical distribution of investments aiming to maximise its impact across all EU regions to promote cohesive and inclusive growth throughout the EU, with particular attention on under-represented and less developed areas; calls on the EIB to keep focusing on investment plans aimed at closing the gap between the more developed EU regions and island areas, inland areas, the outermost regions, economically depressed areas and all areas of the EU at a disadvantage owing to natural factors;

    5. Stresses the need to simplify, streamline, optimise and consolidate current and future EIB processes and mandates to enhance synergies, effectiveness and efficiency; suggests the development and introduction of a single rule book, with a uniform set of financial rules, to function as a unified framework across multiple EU programmes and simplify implementation for partners, which will contribute to enhancing the EIB’s operations;

    6. Stresses the importance of reducing the administrative burden and reporting costs as well as simplifying procedures for EIB-financed projects, in particular for SMEs and smaller-scale innovation-driven initiatives; underlines that a more streamlined process could increase the EIB’s impact and responsiveness; welcomes, in this regard, the establishment of one-stop shops to offer coordinated financial support and technical guidance;

    7. Acknowledges the EIB’s commitment to reforms to shorten time-to-market, with a target of a 30 % reduction by the end of 2024 and a 50 % reduction over the 2024-2026 period; notes that the implementation of these reforms is being accelerated to reduce bureaucracy, enhance synergies within the Group, to automate and streamline internal procedures and improve cost efficiency; calls on the Commission and the EIB to further assess how to speed up the EIB’s time-to-market as well as to simplify financing mandates without compromising auditing standards or transparency; calls on the EIB to intensify its efforts in the digitalisation of its operations;

    Closing the investment gap and fostering competitiveness

    8. Emphasises the important role of the EIB Group as a pan-European and international investment body in mobilising both public and private financing for EU priorities and supporting Member States in financing essential and strategic investments and EU policy goals;

    9. Recalls, however, that the EIB’s operations are by nature limited and can only play a supporting role in addressing the significant investment gap; reiterates that a more integrated economic and monetary union and strengthened economic architecture and effective coordination would support the EIB’s operations; calls, therefore, for swift and substantial progress regarding the capital markets union, particularly through concrete steps on the recently launched savings and investments union, the completion of the banking union, as well as, where appropriate, the establishment of EU-level investment instruments and tools designed to minimise the cost for EU taxpayers and maximise efficiency in the provision of European public goods;

    10. Affirms that more integrated capital markets and a deeper single market are also essential foundations for the EIB’s operations; welcomes the EIB’s strategic roadmap, which places the capital markets union high on its agenda; considers that a adequately completed savings and investments union will bring benefits to consumers and SMEs alike by providing high-yield investment opportunities in the real economy, and will ultimately strengthen the venture capital market, which is considered riskier than other forms of investment, by facilitating access to more diversified funding sources; emphasises that relevant European public actors should contribute to the savings and investments union and welcomes the EIB’s willingness to launch pilot projects and other concrete initiatives in this area;

    11. Calls on the Commission and the EIB Group to enhance efforts to deliver on the agenda for the Competitiveness Compass and the savings and investments union by mobilising private capital for productive investments, supporting innovation throughout companies’ life cycles, venture capital financing and more high-risk equity financing for start-ups and scale-ups; underlines that higher-risk instruments such as equity and venture debt must be used with clear risk frameworks and measurable performance indicators; encourages the EIB to expand financing for women-owned businesses;

    12. Recognises the central role of SMEs, as the backbone of the European economy, in driving economic growth, fostering innovation, creating employment and promoting territorial cohesion; recalls, in this regard, that the EU’s 24 million SMEs account for 99 % of all businesses, provide around two-thirds of all jobs and generate over 50 % of the total value added that is produced by EU businesses; underlines that supporting SMEs is a key objective for the EIB Group and that greater access to credit, the creation of tailored financial instruments, and targeted investments in SMEs can have a widespread positive impact by contributing to the Union’s economic resilience, the competitiveness of local production chains, and the digital and sustainable transitions in regional economies;

    13. Encourages the EIB to maintain and strengthen its role in facilitating access to finance for SMEs and start-ups, which frequently encounter obstacles when seeking funding from traditional financial institutions, providing targeted financing to ensure sufficient resources to grow and prosper; points out that SMEs continue to face challenges owing to high interest rates and raw materials and energy costs;

    14. Welcomes the EIF’s role in financing start-ups and scale-ups in Europe, including through its activities in the European venture capital market; stresses that EIF instruments must remain easily accessible for smaller applicants, and calls on the EIF to streamline its application procedures accordingly; calls for an increase in the budget of the EIF dedicated to the EU venture capital ecosystem, in line with the Draghi report recommendation; calls also for the introduction of first-loss guarantees and convertible instruments targeted at start-ups and scale-ups;

    15. Highlights the role of the EIB Group as a major contributor to developing the European venture capital and private equity ecosystem, but notes that further work is needed to support European innovation to provide start-ups with more opportunities to scale up and access funding throughout their life cycle; notes that, although a share of private investment already flows through venture capital funds, it remains insufficient and is unevenly distributed across Member States; underlines that a capital markets union could help address this imbalance and improve access to finance across Member States;

    16. Stresses that de-risking instruments and budgetary guarantees provided by the EU have proven to be powerful tools; considers that de-risking should continue effectively, particularly for investments in innovative and strategic sectors; is concerned that, according to the interim evaluation of the InvestEU programme, envelopes for many financial products may run out by the end of 2025 without budgetary reinforcements; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s proposal of 26 February 2025 to provide additional funding to InvestEU; calls for a balanced geographical distribution of financing under InvestEU, particularly with respect to smaller Member States;

    17. Recalls that EU budgetary guarantees are underpinned by taxpayer funds and that defaults on EIB-backed projects could directly impact the EU budget;

    18. Welcomes the continued expansion of the EIB’s network of European promotional banks and other international financial institutions to help to further leverage public and private investment, and to ensure broad geographical and sectoral coverage; recalls that InvestEU is 75 % implemented by the EIB; calls for the financial instrument component of the Competitiveness Fund to make use of the expertise of national promotional banks and institutions (NPBIs), particularly their knowledge of local and regional actors; in that context, calls for the blending of instruments between the EIB and NPBIs to be explored further, ensuring that such instruments do not compromise the funds already dedicated to NPBIs;

    19. Asks the EIB to increase its concessional loans to local and national financial intermediaries, including to credit guarantee consortia, microfinance institutions, ethical banks and collective guarantee structures working to facilitate access to credit for SMEs, with a particular focus on rural areas, inland and island areas, the outermost regions, and areas undergoing economic and environmental transitions;

    Consolidating the EIB’s role as the EU’s climate bank

    20. Acknowledges the EIB’s role as a climate bank and its alignment with the EU sustainable finance framework, including the integration, where applicable, of taxonomy criteria[13], supporting the transition by providing financing in sustainable and clean technologies and backing the Union’s efforts to decarbonise the EU economy; recalls that the EIB’s financial flows must be consistent with the EU’s goal of climate neutrality by 2050 and climate objectives for 2030; notes that all corporate clients of EIB financing are contractually required to publish a credible Paris alignment strategy (‘decarbonisation plans’)[14];

    21. Welcomes the EIB’s climate and environmental investments, which totalled EUR 50.7 billion in 2024, exceeding the target of channelling at least 50 % of total financing into climate action and environmental sustainability; calls on the EIB to uphold its high level of ambition, while emphasising that this commitment enhances the Union’s competitiveness, energy security and industrial resilience;

    22. Recalls that the green transition must be inclusive, fair and competitive, and that green investments must be viable; expects the EIB, therefore, to leverage its lending, financial instruments, technical assistance and advisory services to support citizens and businesses that face socio-economic challenges deriving from their efforts to achieve climate neutrality by 2050; stresses the need to support industrial restructuring, workforce reskilling, and the creation of new employment opportunities in affected regions; invites the EIB to support projects delivering affordable access to renewable energy, housing and public services, community-led initiatives and small projects with a particular focus on fighting energy poverty as a priority;

    23. Welcomes the EIB’s investments in renewable energy, energy efficiency, interconnectors, and electricity grids and storage, including its support for REPowerEU; underlines the importance of focusing on projects with high economic impact and measurable climate benefits; calls on the EIB to play a role in mobilising private capital for grid investments in support of lower energy prices; acknowledges, in particular, the increased investment in emerging technologies for industrial electrification and decarbonisation, recognising their role in supporting the transition to climate neutrality by reducing emissions from hard-to-abate industrial sectors, while expressing concern about their potential impact on the water supply in certain regions;

    24. Stresses the importance of addressing high energy costs in the EU to enhance the competitiveness of European companies; points out that a stable energy supply at competitive prices is one of the foundations of a successful industrial policy; calls on the EIB Group to especially support SMEs facing energy-related cost pressures, including through targeted financing and advisory services to improve energy efficiency and resilience; calls on the EIB to continue to support energy-intensive industries, in order to ensure that this highly strategic sector is in a position to successfully manage the energy transition;

    25. Notes that, in a world full of uncertainty, investments should be focused on the EU’s preparedness to face shocks; stresses the need for increased investment in climate adaptation and resilience; encourages further research and development, including of innovative technologies, for climate preparedness; calls for access to finance for SMEs in innovative green technologies to be enhanced; recalls that clean technology strengthens EU sovereignty and is essential for competitiveness, yet faces even greater funding challenges due to the green premium compared to incumbent technologies; highlights the Draghi report’s call for more public guarantee and counter-guarantee schemes to cover the investment risks of clean technology manufacturing projects;

    26. Recalls that the EIB was the first issuer of green bonds and is now the largest multi-currency issuer of green bonds; welcomes the fact that on 2 April 2025 the EIB issued its first Climate Awareness Bond aligned with the EU Green Bond Standard Regulation[15]; highlights the key role of the EIB in developing the green-bond market, providing financing solutions to sustainable companies; calls on the Commission and the EIB Group to maintain the EU’s leadership in green and digital bonds;

    27. Recalls the EIB’s commitment to the Convention on Biological Diversity and the post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework and supports the EIB’s investments in biodiversity protection and the preservation of natural resources; welcomes the EIB and European Environment Agency agreement to deepen their collaboration on biodiversity and climate actions; emphasises that, in order to achieve the long-term benefits of restoration, conservation and protection of biodiversity and nature, attractive financing schemes should be made available to potential beneficiaries to engage in such practices on a voluntary basis;

    Financing peace, security and defence

    28. Welcomes the EIB’s proactive approach in the area of security and defence; highlights the fact that investment in this sector doubled in 2024 to EUR 1 billion, with the EIB’s 2025 plan set to double it again to a record EUR 2 billion; stresses that greater EIB investment in the defence sector can encourage commercial banks’ investment in the sector; notes, however, that these amounts represent less than 1.1 % of EIB investments for  2024 (EUR 88.8 billion), and 2.2 % of its financing objectives for 2025 (EUR 95 billion) and emphasises that they can only play a complementary role in addressing the estimated EUR 33.6 billion to EUR 48 billion in new financing required by 2030 for defence companies to meet the increase in orders expected under the ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030 plan; stresses that European-level funding is essential to meet the significant funding needs of Member States; underlines that any future structural European defence funding must be designed with clear conditions set and strong oversight, drawing on lessons learned from existing instruments;

    29. Supports the EIB’s continued and strengthened role in bolstering Europe’s security through targeted investments in both defence and civilian infrastructure, and stresses the need to concentrate strategic investments in projects delivering European added value and in dual-use technologies that contribute to both civilian and defence objectives, in line with the EU’s overarching goals of fostering innovation and enhancing the Union’s security and resilience; stresses that effective defence innovation depends on close collaboration between academia, research institutions and private industry, and encourages the EIB to act as a catalyst in structuring long-term public-private partnerships through targeted financial instruments;

    30. Welcomes the EIB’s plan to revise its operational framework, establishing a dedicated transversal public policy goal to enhance Europe’s peace and security, backed by ambitious financial and capital allocation[16]; supports, therefore, the EIB Board decision of 21 March 2025 to integrate the EIB’s 2022 Strategic European Security Initiative (SESI) into a permanent, cross-cutting public policy objective, complementing the existing public policy goals; underlines, however, that any activities in the field of defence must be subject to appropriate financial parameters, regular risk assessment and transparent oversight and must be accompanied by strong risk management procedures;

    31. Welcomes the joint initiative of the Commission and the EIB Group to set up, via its subsidiary EIF, a fund of funds called the Defence Equity Facility, with a budget of EUR 175 million between 2024 and 2027, to support private investment in European SMEs developing innovative dual-use defence technologies, and to help address the equity financing needs of companies in the EU’s defence technological and industrial base, estimated at between EUR 6.8 billion and EUR 20 billion by 2030, to meet the increase in orders anticipated under the ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030 plan;

    32. Acknowledges the EIB Board decision of 21 March 2025 to broaden the EIB Group’s eligibility criteria for security and defence investments, limiting excluded activities, in accordance with the proposals approved by EU leaders at the European Council on 6 March 2025, as well as the approval of the EIB Group Security and Defence Action Plan in May 2024, aimed at enhancing support for the EU’s security and defence industry; notes that, under that plan, the EIB Group provides financing to SMEs and innovative start-ups operating in the security and defence sector in line with the dual-use principle, maintaining the requirement of ‘credible civil use’ while discontinuing the revenue test;

    33. Takes note of the EIB Board decision of 21 March 2025 that there will be no fixed ceiling for security and defence investments, with funding amounts to be determined annually in the EIB Group Operational Plan; asks the EIB to clarify the potential implications of that decision for other policy areas and the overall operations of the EIB;

    34. Suggests that the EIB should continuously reflect on and evaluate its role, as well as the scope of eligible investments, in contributing to Europe’s peace and security as outlined in the Commission’s white paper on the future of European defence, particularly in the light of the pressing need to scale up the European defence sector and ensure long-term security and strategic autonomy; warns that any adjustment to the EIB Group’s eligibility criteria or funding to align with new priorities must safeguard the Group’s financial position and ensure effective financing of other strategic EU priorities;

    Addressing challenges in social infrastructure, cohesion policy and housing

    35. Welcomes the EIB’s core strategic priorities to reinforce Europe’s social infrastructure and a modern cohesion policy for inclusive and sustainable growth across Europe; appreciates that in its Cohesion Orientation 2021-2027, the EIB committed to dedicating at least 40 % of its total financing in the EU between 2022 and 2024 to projects in cohesion regions, and that in 2024, such financing accounted for 48 % of total EU lending; calls on the EIB to continue to support infrastructure development, including investments in railways, healthcare and social infrastructure, which are crucial for social and economic cohesion, resilience and inclusive growth; underlines that, amid the geopolitical and economic uncertainties, the EIB can provide long-term solutions to address the cost of living crisis;

    36. Highlights the crucial role of skills development in driving long-term sustainable growth, employment and competitiveness in the EU; underlines that financing initiatives aimed at boosting human capital not only foster innovation and productivity and address labour market needs, but also strengthen social cohesion and economic resilience; calls on the EIB to step up investments in education, training, upskilling and reskilling, and health, in close coordination and cooperation with Member State initiatives in those areas, aiming to complement and enhance their impact;

    37. Welcomes the EIB’s commitment to addressing the challenge of the double market failure in the housing sector, including the insufficient provision of affordable and energy-efficient housing, as well as the market failure to increase the energy efficiency of the existing housing stock; notes the differences between Member States in both policies and the magnitude of the aforementioned market failures;

    38. Welcomes the EIB’s ‘Action Plan for Affordable and Sustainable Housing’ with planned investments of EUR 10 billion over the next two years; draws attention to the outcome of the EIB Group analysis and stakeholder meeting, which highlighted an estimated annual public and private investment gap of EUR 300 billion to 400 billion needed to build 1.5 million new housing units and to renovate 5 million additional units annually; encourages the EIB to mobilise even more funding for affordable housing projects throughout the Member States; invites the EIB to focus on sustainable urban development by ensuring that the EU’s housing and infrastructure needs are met for a stronger, sustainable, more cohesive and prosperous Europe, including investments in recovering existing infrastructure, with a focus on supporting urban regeneration projects and projects converting old or abandoned buildings into modern social housing;

    39. Calls on the EIB to take into account the differentiated burden of housing costs on different income groups and family structures, especially as some low-income groups are at risk of marginalisation; encourages the EIB to collaborate with other European public investment banks, local public financial institutions, local governments, and cooperative and social housing companies to finance housing solutions for vulnerable and low-income groups; welcomes the EIB’s intention to increase its focus on R&I in the area of housing;

    40. Calls on the EIB to scale up financial support through the deployment of standardised off-the-shelf financial products in energy and building renovation; highlights the fact that the EIB’s ‘originate-to-distribute’ model, channelling the savings of institutional investors, is an innovative model that could contribute to the integration of EU capital markets;

    41. Welcomes the EIB’s intention to expand financial and advisory support for affordable housing, especially for younger generations; encourages close synergy and exchange with the Commission, municipalities and local authorities, cooperative housing providers, housing associations and the construction sector, exchanging best practice and promoting pan-European cooperation; invites the EIB to support projects delivering affordable access to renewable energy, housing and public services, community-led initiatives and small projects with a particular focus on fighting energy poverty;

    42. Welcomes the EIB Group’s inclusion of agriculture and bioeconomy among its key priorities; underlines that agriculture is a key driver of growth and development in rural areas and that enhancing support and fostering innovation for this vital sector play a significant role in ensuring food security; highlights the financial challenges faced by farmers, particularly young farmers, noting that farmers and enterprises in this sector experience lower success rates when applying for financing; calls on the EIB Group to increase its involvement in the agricultural sector by improving access to funding;

    43. Calls on the EIB to intensify its efforts to promote youth employment, particularly by supporting projects and programmes that foster youth entrepreneurship, access to employment, vocational training and innovation, in order to contribute to fairer and more inclusive territorial development and to help curb brain drain, especially in the EU’s island regions and economically disadvantaged areas;

    Promoting the digital transformation and new technologies

    44. Calls on the EIB to strengthen financing for the EU’s open strategic autonomy in the digital field and to promote research, support the development of European digital infrastructure, foster new and disruptive technologies such as AI and quantum computing, and enable the growth of digital start-ups; underlines the importance of bridging digital divides, both within the EU and globally, to ensure inclusive access to digital infrastructure and services; highlights the importance of aligning EIB digital investments with EU strategic priorities such as the Digital Decade targets, including connectivity, digital skills and the digital transformation of businesses;

    45. Supports the EIF’s expansion of the European Tech Champions Initiative (ETCI) to attract private capital to scale up innovative start-ups into successful global leaders, ensuring that European-founded companies and technologies remain in the EU through the late growth stage; highlights the need for the deployment of the current ETCI to be accelerated in order to keep up with the pace of innovation and start-ups; calls, furthermore, for the successful experience of the ETCI to be built on to develop other similar initiatives to continue supporting the digital transition and other strategic sectors, and encourages the EIF to explore setting up a second generation of this initiative as well as to explore the possibility of investing in funds of funds;

    46. Underlines that institutional investors in Europe could play a bigger role in supporting venture capital, especially for scale-ups; urges the EIB Group therefore to create an European Tech Forum, bringing together the venture capital ecosystem, to engage institutional investors following the model of the Tibi initiative[17]; calls on the EIB to offer opportunities for such investors to build their expertise and opt in to co-investment schemes between the EIF and institutional investors, on transparent and pre-agreed terms;

    47. Highlights the fact that the Clean Industrial Deal aims to develop a TechEU programme with the EIB; stresses the importance of ensuring that this fund has a specific allocation target for start-ups and scale-ups;

    48. Calls on the EIB to support the strengthening of cybersecurity capabilities in the EU, in order to make Europe more resilient while enhancing existing cooperation between the Member States and in order to protect critical entities and essential services;

    49. Highlights the fact that the security of supply of critical raw materials (CRMs) is crucial for the green and digital transitions, the defence sector and the EU industrial base in general; recalls the role played by the EIB in the EU Raw Materials Alliance and the Union’s aim of becoming more autonomous as regards the CRM supply; emphasises the importance of a circular economy approach to CRMs, in order to reduce the EU’s dependence on non-EU countries and boost its strategic autonomy; calls, therefore, on the EIB to invest more in the CRM sector to enhance resilience in raw materials with a particular focus on the recycling of secondary raw materials;

    50. Calls on the EIB to support the technological transformation of European companies, as well as the development of digital skills among employees and entrepreneurs;

    EIB neighbourhood and Global Gateway

    51. Welcomes the EIB’s vital support for Ukraine in the light of Russia’s full-scale, unjustified and illegal war of aggression; calls for an increase in EU budget guarantees to allow the EIB to continue to deliver and strengthen public and private sector operations in Ukraine, supporting Ukraine’s immediate economic challenges, but also envisaging the reconstruction of the country over the medium to long term;

    52. Emphasises that, to decrease dependence on non-EU countries, the deployment of resilient European-controlled infrastructure, among others in the domains of satellite communications, energy and logistics, is essential;

    53. Stresses the important role that the EIB plays in supporting Members States and countries outside the EU, particularly candidate countries, in obtaining access to risk capital markets, thus expanding investment opportunities;

    54. Stresses that, as part of the EU’s external action toolbox, the Global Gateway is crucial for Europe’s global position and aims to promote the rules-based multilateral system, sustainable development, democracy, human rights, gender equality and the rule of law; welcomes the EIB’s role, as the EU’s leading development bank, in this regard; recalls the importance of predictable guarantees from the EU budget to enable the EIB to continue delivering operations outside the EU;

    55. Calls for enhanced transparency and disclosure practices in line with other multinational development banks, along with the establishment of an independent complaints mechanism that can effectively address and remedy grievances; underlines the need for effective mechanisms to ensure the participation of, and accountability to, communities affected by EIB-financed projects to ensure that Global Gateway projects are responsive to local needs, are gender-sensitive and deliver meaningful developmental results; emphasises the importance of public participation, in particular in the EIB’s planning, appraisal and monitoring processes for CRMs, including the Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) of Indigenous communities, as provided for in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples;

    56. Reiterates its call for EIB Global to focus blending operations on areas where they can add value to the local economy while avoiding the crowding out of private capital and to ensure that blended finance is not used for essential public services, particularly health, education and social protection; recalls that EU development policy goals, and in particular the goal of enhancing affordable access to healthcare, should guide EIB investments in the field, to ensure better health outcomes for all, and in particular for women;

    57. Expects the EIB’s global activities to also respond swiftly to evolving realities and urgent needs; highlights the gap in development aid financing resulting from the US aid freeze and the reduction of funding towards the Global South; calls for concrete initiatives to prevent humanitarian or health crises, to support pan-African trade, infrastructure and regional integration, and strengthen ties with Europe; welcomes EIB Global’s intention to scale up higher-risk operations, enabled by the mandate of the Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-Global Europe);

    58. Expresses concern over reports that some EU-funded projects outside the EU, including under the Global Gateway, are being built by Chinese companies, with Chinese firms at times winning more EIB-funded contracts than EU firms; urges the Commission to ensure a level playing field by working with the EIB to boost European company participation; recommends procurement practices that prioritise best price/quality ratio over lowest price to promote fair competition and align with EU values;

    59. Welcomes the efforts of the EIB, together with nine other multilateral development banks, to strengthen their collaboration in advancing progress towards the SDGs; calls on the EIB to continue cooperating with other bilateral and multilateral institutions to develop and apply common methodologies for development impact analysis, with a view to ensuring long-term positive impacts and added value;

    60. Welcomes the EIB’s announcement to step up support for sectors such as water supplies, small businesses, renewable energy and energy efficiency, as well as to further reinforce partnerships within Europe and globally, including with private actors, to deliver maximum impact on the ground;

    Governance: accountability and transparency

    61. Stresses that the EIB’s growing role should be accompanied by greater democratic accountability and transparency; including more timely publication of project-related documents; reiterates its call for an interinstitutional agreement between Parliament and the EIB to formalise and enhance their existing cooperation, including through regular structured dialogue, improved Parliament access to EIB documents and data, and the possibility for Parliament to submit questions for written answers to the EIB, as already provided for the European Central Bank; in this context, asks the EIB to provide Parliament with a clear, simplified overview of EU budget contributions to its balance sheet, off-balance sheet, and profit and loss account;

    62. Highlights the importance of the EIB ensuring full transparency and traceability of projects funded, including more detailed information, to enable proper oversight by all relevant stakeholders, including civil society organisations, rather than solely by the ministries responsible; recalls that all recipients of EU funding have a general obligation to acknowledge its origin and ensure the visibility of any EU funding received; calls on the EIB Group to ensure that the final recipients comply with the visibility conditions of the EU’s financial support;

    63. Invites the EIB to boost the participation of European companies in procurement processes launched for projects financed by the EIB; encourages the EIB to advise borrowers to prioritise eligibility of European companies in order to strengthen European competitiveness;

    64. Underlines the importance of the EIB Group’s upholding the highest standards in preventing all forms of fraud, tax evasion, tax avoidance, money laundering and the financing of terrorism; notes that safeguarding the integrity of the EIB Group’s financing is essential to ensure public trust and the effective use of resources; takes note of the inquiries completed by the European Ombudsman and ongoing investigations by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the European Anti-Fraud Office, and expects full clarity and appropriate follow-up, including any necessary consequences;

    65. Reiterates its call for the EIB to consider aligning the division of labour within the Management Committee with recommendations from EU institutions, to help mitigate potential conflicts of interest;

    66. Welcomes the 2024 framework for the recognition of trade unions at the European Investment Bank;

    67. Welcomes the EIB’s principles of diversity, equity and inclusion, including the target of at least 40 % of management positions being held by women by the end of 2026; calls for a geographically balanced representation of EU nationalities among staff;

    68. Highlights the need to strengthen the EIB’s human rights policies, including the establishment of a clear and effective human rights due diligence framework and strategy; stresses that environmental and social impact assessments should be carried out by independent experts, and that independent verification mechanisms should be introduced to oversee the self-monitoring and self-reporting conducted by EIB clients;

    °

    ° °

    69. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the European Investment Bank.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Georgia – A10-0110/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Georgia

     

    (2025/2024(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Georgia 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0697),

     having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part[1],

     having regard to Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution, which requires that all possible measures be taken to ensure Georgia’s full integration into the EU and NATO,

     having regard to the final report of 20 December 2024 of the election observation mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on the parliamentary elections held in Georgia on 26 October 2024,–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 June 2024 on Georgia and of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0110/2025),

    A. whereas in December 2023, the European Council granted Georgia candidate status on the understanding that the relevant nine steps set out in the Commission recommendation of 8 November 2023 and primarily relating to reforms in the areas of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights would be taken;

    B. whereas the situation in Georgia has deteriorated significantly since the publication of the 2024 Commission report on the country on 30 October 2024, particularly as a result of the actions of the Georgian Government;

    C. whereas Georgia has been experiencing democratic backsliding in recent years and in particular since the parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024, which failed to meet international democratic standards and comply with Georgia’s OSCE commitments, and resulted in an illegitimate parliament composed of only one political party, Georgian Dream; whereas Russia has systematically interfered in democratic processes in Georgia; whereas the fraudulent elections included voter intimidation, vote buying and harassment of election observers;

    D. whereas on 28 November 2024, Irakli Kobakhidze announced that Georgia would delay initiating accession talks with the EU and reject its financial assistance until the end of 2028, disregarding the country’s constitutional commitment to European integration and effectively undermining Georgia’s sovereign Euro-Atlantic aspirations, which have the strong support of the Georgian people;

    E. whereas concerns over the direction in which the country is heading and the decision to pause the efforts to start accession negotiations sparked large-scale protests across the country, with protesters demanding new, free and fair elections, the return of the country to its European path, an end to political violence and repression, investigations into and accountability for the serious human rights violations committed against protesters by law enforcement agencies, and the release of political prisoners; whereas protests have been taking place every day without interruption since 28 November 2024; whereas pro-EU protests have significantly increased across Georgia in 2025, with tens of thousands of citizens demonstrating against the government’s perceived shift away from EU integration; whereas these self-organised and spontaneous protests involving all segments of Georgian society underscore the Georgian people’s strong commitment to European values and democratic governance;

    F. whereas in response to the peaceful protests, the Georgian authorities began an unprecedented violent crackdown on demonstrations, accompanied by the unlawful use of force, torture and other ill-treatment by the de facto authorities; whereas since November 2024, at least 62 people have been criminally charged in connection with their participation in pro-European protests and 54 remain in pre-trial detention; whereas more than 500 people have been detained under administrative procedures, some 300 of whom have reportedly been subjected to torture or other forms of inhuman and degrading treatment and at least 157 of whom have suffered visible signs of serious physical injury;

     

    G. whereas the de facto Georgian Dream authorities systematically subject civil society and independent media to pressure, legal restrictions and physical violence; whereas at least 138 incidents of media freedom violations have been documented in the context of pro-European protests or related events since November 2024, and a total of 174 media professionals have been the target of state repression; whereas at least 30 reporters have suffered repeated violations, including physical assaults, damage to professional equipment, administrative fines, criminal charges and judicial harassment; whereas journalist Mzia Amaglobeli is currently in pre-trial detention on trumped-up charges;

     

    H. whereas the Georgian authorities have been restructuring or eliminating structures within the Georgian civil service responsible for pro-European reforms and dismissing professionals and civil servants en masse, in particular those who have criticised government policies, expressed pro-European views and condemned violence against peaceful demonstrators;

     

    I. whereas the illegitimate Georgian parliament has established the Temporary Parliamentary Investigative Commission on the Activities of the Regime and Political Figures of 2003-2012, which was the period when President Mikheil Saakashvili was at the helm and paving the way for Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions; whereas this commission is a tool for the further persecution of political opponents, especially leaders of opposition movements; whereas on 22 May 2025, Zurab ‘Girchi’ Japaridze, the leader of the Girchi – More Freedom party and one of the leaders of the Coalition for Change, was arrested for refusing to appear before this politically motivated commission created and controlled by Georgian Dream, whose long-term ambition is to eradicate political opposition in Georgia; whereas on 29 May 2025, Nika Melia, another leader of the Coalition for Change, was arrested one day before he was due to appear in court for refusing to appear before the Temporary Parliamentary Investigative Commission;

     

    J. whereas, in order to maintain and further increase its grip on power, the ruling Georgian Dream party has unilaterally and without consultation adopted changes to the municipal electoral system for the elections to the city councils in October 2025; whereas the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe has recommended repealing these changes and the leaders of the main opposition parties have announced that their parties will not participate in those elections; whereas reforms to the formation process of the Central Election Commission further compromise election integrity, limit citizen participation and restrict the ability of observers and media to effectively monitor the electoral process;

     

    K. whereas despite progress towards a more equal and inclusive society, deep-rooted inequalities and stereotypes persist, resulting in high levels of gender-based violence, severe restrictions for persons with disabilities and violence and harassment against the LGBTI community; whereas due to insecurity at home, many LGBTI people choose to flee the country; whereas Georgia’s legal definition of rape does not comply with the standards set in the Istanbul Convention;

    Suspension of Georgia’s EU integration

    1. Reiterates its solidarity with the Georgian people and its unwavering support for their legitimate European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations and wish to live in a prosperous and democratic country, as expressed in mass protests that continue despite brutal crackdowns by the authorities; remains ready to assist the Georgian people in achieving these goals; strongly condemns the violent repression, arbitrary and politically motivated detention without sufficient legal grounds and the reported systemic torture of peaceful protesters, civil society actors, political opponents and media representatives; demands that the Georgian authorities refrain from using force, respect the freedoms of assembly and of expression and annul the recently adopted draconian legislation aimed at stifling popular protests, notably through extortionate fines; expresses its particular concern regarding the growing number of political prisoners and reiterates its call for the immediate and unconditional release of all of them; calls for all acts of violence to be effectively and credibly investigated and for those responsible to be held accountable; expresses concern about the lack of independence within the judiciary, with high-placed judges with links to the Georgian Dream overseeing politically motivated court proceedings against peaceful protesters and government critics;

    2. Expresses deep regret over the fact that the ruling Georgian Dream party failed to use the historic opportunity granted to Georgia, as a candidate country, to progress on its European integration path, noting that European integration continues to be supported by an overwhelming majority of the population; recalls that candidate status was granted to Georgia with the benefit of the doubt, despite the already concerning trajectory of the Georgian Dream government’s actions, which were increasingly at odds with European values and democratic principles; underlines that Georgia under Georgian Dream’s rule has not moved forward, and has in fact even regressed, on the key provisions of the nine steps indicated by the Commission, despite the authorities’ claims to the contrary; stresses that Georgia’s EU integration process has effectively been suspended as a result of the continued democratic backsliding in the country and the rigged October 2024 parliamentary elections amounting to a clear turning point towards an authoritarian regime, the ensuing illicit capture of the state institutions and democratic safeguards, and the adoption of a series of anti-democratic legislative acts that run counter to the values and principles upon which the EU is founded; concurs with the European Council’s conclusions of 27 June 2024 that a failure to reverse the current course of action jeopardises Georgia’s EU path and urges the Georgian Dream to return to the course of democratic reforms and Euro-Atlantic integration;

    3. Deplores the dismissal of approximately 700 civil servants since December 2024 due to their participation in or support for pro-European protests; stresses that such retaliation erodes public trust in democratic institutions, violates freedom of expression and association, and contributes to the deepening authoritarian tendencies of the current regime; calls on the Georgian authorities to abide by labour law standards and to allow civil servants to register a trade union in order to protect them from the unjustified restriction of their labour rights; expresses its concern about the growing politicisation of civil service appointments, and calls for a repeal of the amendments to the Law on Public Service adopted in December 2024 that remove the competition rule for the appointment of civil servants and instead grant direct appointment powers to the heads of public institutions; reiterates that these amendments constitute worrying backsliding from the successful public service reform that was implemented by Georgia under the EU-Georgian Association Agreement and calls for their repeal; 4.  Stresses the need for an immediate and comprehensive audit of the EU’s policy towards Georgia given the ongoing democratic backsliding and the increasingly repressive political and legislative environment that constitutes a regression for many of Georgia’s democratic achievements and successful EU reforms, fundamentally weakens democratic institutions and further consolidates power in the hands of the ruling party; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to review the implementation of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement in the light of the blatant breach of Georgia’s obligations regarding the general principles laid down in Article 2, namely respect for democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms; reiterates that non-fulfilment of these obligations may result in the conditional suspension of economic cooperation and the privileges afforded by the Agreement;

    5. Deplores the fact that high-level ruling party officials, members of parliament and government-affiliated media regularly spread manipulative narratives, disinformation and conspiracy theories about the EU, its Member States, leaders and politicians, as well as European integration; stresses that the ruling party’s regime continues its purposefully deceitful and ambiguous discourse, fuelling the false belief among parts of the Georgian public that it remains in favour of European integration; regrets the fact that the media and information environment is being suppressed and dominated by TV and media outlets supported by Georgian Dream, which spread false narratives about EU integration, thereby emulating and playing into Russian-inspired propaganda and facilitating polarisation in society;

     

    6. Underlines the responsibility of Bidzina Ivanishvili and other officials and political leaders, including Irakli Kobakhidze, Shalva Papuashvili, Vakhtang Gomelauri, Mayor of Tbilisi and Georgian Dream Secretary General Kakha Kaladze, and the former Georgian Dream chair Irakli Garibashvili, for the deterioration of the political process in Georgia by enabling democratic backsliding resulting in the autocratic consolidation of power and by acting against the country’s constitutional objective of Euro-Atlantic integration; calls, therefore, for immediate and targeted personal sanctions to be imposed against Bidzina Ivanishvili, his family members and his companies and calls for the EU, in cooperation with other jurisdictions, in particular the United Kingdom, to freeze his financial assets; deplores the obstruction by the Hungarian and Slovak Governments of the Council decisions on the imposition of sanctions against individuals responsible for democratic backsliding in Georgia; condemns the unilateral actions by the Hungarian Government seeking to legitimise Georgian Dream;

     

    Continued backsliding on democracy and the rule of law and the autocratic consolidation of power

     

    7. Reiterates its position that the settlement of the current political and constitutional crisis in Georgia can only be achieved by way of new parliamentary elections, which should be held in the next few months in an improved electoral environment, overseen by an independent and impartial election administration and monitored through diligent international and independent domestic observation to guarantee a genuinely fair, free and transparent process that would reflect the true will of the people;

    8. Stresses that it does not recognise the self-proclaimed authorities established by the Georgian Dream party following the rigged parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024 and that it considers Georgia to be a state captured by the illegitimate Georgian Dream regime; consequentially rejects any decisions taken by the body that has taken control of the country, such as the rushed adoption of amendments to the Code on Administrative Offences, the Criminal Code and the Law on Assemblies and Manifestations; regrets the fact that the parliament of Georgia is a one-party parliament formed on the basis of fraudulent elections, which is incompatible with a pluralistic parliamentary democracy and the standards expected from an EU candidate country; welcomes the rejection of Georgian Dream’s credentials in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Georgian delegation;

    9. Deplores the continued attempts by the ruling Georgian Dream party to persecute political opponents, including through their illegal arrest and detention, threats and physical attacks; reiterates its calls for an end to politically motivated hostilities, an improvement to the political environment and the building of trust and cross-party dialogue;

     

    10. Condemns the unlawful prosecution of political opponents by the investigative committee of the de facto Georgian parliament under the leadership of the Georgian Dream party, which disproportionately targets the actions of the government that ended its mandate more than twelve years ago; highlights the political nature of the ‘investigation’, noting that the Georgian Dream party has been in power since 2012 but launched the investigative committee in parallel with its attempts to ban genuine opposition parties; notes with concern the statements by the chair of the investigative committee, Tea Tsulukiani, spreading Russian narratives; strongly condemns the arrest of Zurab ‘Girchi’ Japaridze and Nika Melia, and the threats to arrest  other politicians, and considers these individuals to be political prisoners;

     

    11. Expresses deep concern over recent declarations by leaders of the ruling Georgian Dream party indicating their intention to declare opposition parties – primarily the United National Movement – unconstitutional; recalls that the United National Movement played a pivotal role in initiating and advancing Georgia’s European integration process; notes the parallels between the conduct of the Georgian Dream de facto authorities and the current Kremlin regime, which cemented its rule by outlawing opposition parties; condemns the draft amendment to the Organic Law on Political Associations of Citizens and to the Law on the Constitutional Court adopted on 13 May 2025, which would empower the Constitutional Court to effectively and arbitrarily ban all opposition parties;

     

    12. Strongly reiterates its demand for the immediate release of former President Mikheil Saakashvili on humanitarian grounds for the purpose of seeking the necessary medical treatment abroad; emphasises that the Georgian authorities bear full responsibility for his health and well-being and must be held accountable for any harm that befalls him; calls, furthermore, on the Georgian Dream authorities to ensure that Members of the European Parliament are granted unhindered access to Mikheil Saakashvili;

     

    13. Underlines that the policy of non-recognition of the legitimacy of the one-party parliament and the president appointed by it should continue until there is a tangible change in the political course of Georgia and new free and fair parliamentary elections are held; calls for the EU’s and the Member States’ representatives and members of parliament to refrain from meetings with representatives of the regime, starting with the current de facto president; continues to recognise Salome Zourabichvili as the legitimate President of Georgia and representative of the Georgian people; praises her efforts to peacefully steer the country back towards a democratic and European path of development;

     

    14. Points out that the upcoming municipal elections in autumn 2025 present yet another test for the resilience of Georgia’s democracy and political pluralism; calls on the opposition to seize the opportunity presented by these elections to reflect the unity of the Georgian people in favour of democracy and the rule of law, as already demonstrated in the peaceful protests against the manipulation of the parliamentary elections and repression; calls for the municipal elections to be held in an improved electoral environment, overseen by an independent and impartial election administration and monitored through diligent international observation to guarantee a genuinely fair, free and transparent process;

     

    15. Is deeply concerned, in this context, by the further deterioration of the electoral system and the overall democratic environment ahead of the municipal elections, in particular the fast-tracked adoption of new amendments to Georgia’s Organic Law and to the Election Code in December 2024 that undermine the principle of equal suffrage and aim to solidify the ruling party’s dominance at all levels of governance; recalls that these amendments have been criticised by the Venice Commission and calls for them to be repealed; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to consider imposing additional individual sanctions against Georgian officials if the upcoming municipal elections fail to meet the criteria for fair and free elections;

     

    16. Strongly condemns the continuing and deliberate destruction of the environment for Georgia’s vibrant civil society, with the adoption of several pieces of restrictive Russian-style legislation, including on the transparency of foreign influence, threats, and stigmatisation by the authorities; strongly denounces the new legislative initiative that requires the registration of all civil society organisation grants with the government and that obliges foreign donors to obtain executive approval to disburse grants to local organisations; regrets the recent decision by the authorities to freeze the bank accounts of crowdfunding initiatives and campaigns in support of political prisoners and their families; calls on the authorities to immediately cease the intimidation, threats, politically motivated prosecutions and physical assaults against civil society representatives, political leaders, civil activists, journalists and media workers in Georgia; condemns the arbitrary and unjustified refusal of several European journalists’ entry to Georgia;

    17. Condemns the recent adoption, without due public consultation, of legislation that enables further political persecution, limits the right of assembly, and further shrinks the space for civil society, independent media and the opposition to operate freely, including the Russian-style foreign agent law, the amendments to the Law on Public Service, the amendments to the Law on Grants, the Foreign Agents Registration Act, as well as new restrictive amendments to the Broadcasting Law; calls for the Georgian authorities to repeal these legislative changes; stresses that Georgian Dream’s political conduct, including its strategic alignment with the Russian Federation and the accelerated adoption of tools characteristic of authoritarian regimes, mirrors such developments within Russia itself;

     

    18. Commends the work of Georgia’s civil society in the past months, providing free legal aid, documenting serious human rights violations and taking the lead on domestic and international litigation to seek justice and accountability against a background of continued attacks, the criminalisation of civic space, and disinformation campaigns against the work of civil society;

     

    19. Stresses the urgent need to support Georgia’s civil society and independent media in the light of the growing repression and the suspension of the activities of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and therefore asks the Commission to increase financial support and disburse it without any further delay; calls for the EU’s funding mechanisms to be adjusted to take into account the needs that arise in a more hostile and anti-democratic environment and for funds to be reallocated to directly support civil society organisations, independent media and human rights defenders; stresses further, in this regard, that the Member States should be ready to receive and support Georgian civil society organisations and independent media outlets so that they can continue their work in exile;

     

    20. Stresses that beyond Georgian Dream’s rejection of Georgia’s EU integration, it rejects more generally international human rights law and democratic standards, while speedily moving along the negative trajectory previously witnessed in Russia; is deeply concerned, specifically, that this will have further trickle-down effects on the rights and well-being of women, minorities, migrants, persons with disabilities, LGBTI people, people living below the poverty line, and other vulnerable or at-risk groups; strongly condemns the adoption of anti-LGBTI legislation by the Georgian parliament in October 2024, which mirrors authoritarian, Russian-style policies and violates the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and calls for it to be repealed; calls for the reinstatement of gender quotas that were abolished by the parliament of Georgia in April 2024; calls on the EU Member States, when assessing asylum applications, to adequately take into account the fact that Georgia now has one of the most repressive anti-LGBTI laws in Europe; is concerned about the lack of protection of ethnic and religious minorities in Georgia;

     

    21. Reiterates that the measures taken by the EU so far in response to the flagrant democratic backsliding and reneging on previous commitments do not reflect the severity of the situation in Georgia and its consequences across the region; regrets the lack of proactive measures taken and the generally limited and delayed reaction by the Council and the Commission; stresses that the absence of unanimity among the Member States should not prevent those willing to take appropriate and effective measures from doing so; calls on the EU’s leadership to urgently rally like-minded Member States to take coordinated action and thereby surmount the political obstacles to adopting EU-wide sanctions;

    22. Calls for the EU and its Member States to introduce, on a bilateral and coordinated basis, personal sanctions against key Georgian Dream political leaders, officials and the regime’s enablers in the administration, business, media, justice system, law enforcement agencies and the electoral commission who are responsible for democratic backsliding, electoral fraud, human rights violations and the persecution of political opponents and activists; further calls for sanctions to extend to mid- and lower-level public officials responsible for implementing repressive measures against the regime’s opponents and to maintain them until Georgian democracy is adequately restored; welcomes the imposition of bilateral sanctions by Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Czechia, Germany and Poland, as well as by like-minded partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Ukraine, and invites other EU Member States to follow suit; calls for the consideration of further restrictive measures, such as SWIFT cut-off or sectoral sanctions, aimed at cutting off the financial flows and sources of income of the Georgian Dream regime;

     

    23. Welcomes the Council’s decision to suspend visa-free travel for Georgian diplomats and officials as a first step in response to the persistent negative developments in Georgia; reiterates its call on the Commission and the Council to review Georgia’s visa-free status, with the possibility of suspending it if the relevant benchmarks and standards on democratic governance and freedoms are not met because of the ruling party’s actions; stresses that Georgian Dream is fully responsible for any consequences stemming from the possible suspension of the visa-free regime for Georgian citizens; stresses the importance of visa-free travel for Georgian civil society actors, human rights activists and journalists, among others, both for travelling to the EU to inform European actors of developments in Georgia, but also for enabling them to quickly leave the country, as many face political persecution by the authorities;

    Alignment on foreign policy matters

    24. Deplores the fact that Georgian Dream is undoing decades of progress towards democracy, the rule of law and Euro-Atlantic integration and is alienating its allies, which had supported it throughout the process; regrets that Georgia has made no progress on implementing the EU’s recommendations on foreign, security and defence policy and that the level of Georgia’s alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) remains remarkably low, at 49 %, demonstrating its lack of commitment to European integration; emphasises that progress in the EU accession process requires full alignment with the EU’s CFSP, in line with the expectations for all candidate countries; regrets the fact that Georgia does not participate in the EU’s crisis management missions and operations under the common security and defence policy; regrets the fact that misalignment of Georgia’s foreign policy is leading to self-isolation and that Georgian Dream’s repressive regime is worsening the instability in the South Caucasus region and the Black Sea;

    25. Notes that Georgia, under the current government, is moving in a direction that puts it at risk of becoming a Russian vassal state like Belarus; regrets the fact that, at a time when the democratic world is standing in strong support of Ukraine against the Russian Federation’s unprovoked war of aggression, the current Georgian authorities are increasingly aligning themselves with Kremlin policies and rhetoric, thereby contributing to historical revisionism; notes that Georgia has not aligned with the vast majority of sanctions against Russia, Belarus and Iran, but has claimed that it has cooperated with the EU to prevent sanctions circumvention; expresses its concern, however, over reports alleging Georgia’s role in facilitating the evasion of EU sanctions against Russia; calls, therefore, on the Commission to conduct a thorough investigation into such allegations;

     

    26. Notes also with concern the recent strategic turn by the Georgian Dream government towards China and its increasing cooperation with Iran; notes the Georgian Dream’s public support for Chinese geostrategic initiatives and strengthened bilateral economic relations, including the award of the Anaklia deep-sea port construction project to a Chinese-led consortium; emphasises that such a move contradicts Georgia’s stated commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration; underscores that the Anaklia project now risks becoming a vehicle for increasing Chinese political, financial and economic leverage in the region, thereby further distancing Georgia from its strategic partners in the West; calls, in this regard, on the Commission and the Member States to review and, if necessary, suspend or redirect funding for regional connectivity projects; expresses serious concern about Georgia’s increased multifaceted cooperation with Teheran, which can lead to Georgia’s further isolation;

     

    27. Warns that Georgia’s ongoing turn towards authoritarianism and increasing alignment with Russia constitutes a growing threat to European security, particularly in view of Georgia’s strategic location and access to the Black Sea, which is critical to Russia projecting power in the region; underlines that the ruling Georgian Dream party’s strategy may be replicated elsewhere as a playbook for hybrid state capture; is concerned about regional repercussions and warns that the credibility of European action in the wider South Caucasus is at stake, especially in anticipation of the forthcoming EU Black Sea strategy;

     

    28. Is deeply concerned about Georgian Dream’s collaboration, rapprochement and ideological convergence with Russia and other authoritarian regimes, despite Russia’s creeping occupation of Georgia’s territory; denounces Georgian Dream’s promotion of and participation in Russian disinformation and manipulation, including the weaponisation of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine as a propaganda tool, which are at odds with the undiminished and extraordinarily high public support for the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration; regrets the lack of cooperation with the EU in the fight against foreign information manipulation and interference;

    29. Reiterates its strongest condemnation of Russia’s ongoing occupation of Georgia’s regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the continued ‘borderisation’ process, which constitutes a violation of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; urges the Georgian government to maintain a clear and consistent position on Russian aggression and calls for the EU to remain actively engaged in conflict resolution, human rights monitoring and support for affected communities;

    30. Recommends the reinforcement of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) with increased resources and a broader mandate to monitor foreign interference and border destabilisation; urges the Member States to ensure adequate funding and personnel for the EUMM to respond to the current political and security crisis;

    31. Notes that support from the European Peace Facility, worth EUR 30 million, was rightfully suspended in 2024 in response to the democratic backsliding in Georgia and that no support is planned for 2025; highlights that this suspension will have detrimental consequences on the national stability and security of Georgia; reiterates that any future financial support can only be authorised with the stipulation that the self-declared Georgian regime step down and fair and impartial elections be held;

     

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    ° °

    32. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the President of Georgia Salome Zourabichvili and the self-appointed authorities of Georgia.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT containing a motion for a non-legislative resolution on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part – A10-0111/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT NON-LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part

    (10724/22 – C10‑0057/2024 – 2022/0184M(NLE))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part (10724/22),

     having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council on 27 June 2024 in accordance with Articles 207 and 209, in conjunction with Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a), and Article 218(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C10‑0057/2024),

     having regard to the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part[1] (EPCA),

     having regard to the Joint Roadmap for Deepening Ties between the EU and Central Asia of 23 October 2023,

     having regard to the joint communication by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 15 May 2019 entitled ‘The EU and Central Asia: New Opportunities for a Stronger Partnership’ (JOIN(2019)0009),

     having regard to the Commission’s assessment reports on the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) with Kyrgyzstan,

     having regard to the first EU-Central Asia summit on 4 April 2025,

     having regard to the 11th High-Level Political and Security Dialogue between the European Union and the countries of Central Asia, held in Brussels on 5 June 2024,

     having regard to the joint press statement of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, Sadyr Zhaparov, and the then President of the European Council, Charles Michel, published on 3 June 2023,

     having regard to the 14th Human Rights Dialogue, held in Bishkek on 25 June 2024,

     having regard to the 19th meeting of the EU-Kyrgyzstan Cooperation Council, held in Brussels on 15 November 2022,

     having regard to the opinions of the Venice Commission on recent legal amendments abridging the freedom of the press and hampering the work of non-governmental organisations in Kyrgyzstan,

     having regard to reports on Kyrgyzstan published by human rights organisations, such as the 2022, 2023 and 2024 annual world reports by Human Rights Watch,

     

     having regard to the International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) briefing on the protection of fundamental freedoms and civic space in Kyrgyzstan, published in February 2025,

     having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on the EU strategy on Central Asia[2],

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Kyrgyzstan, notably that of 19 December 2024 on the human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan, in particular the case of Temirlan Sultanbekov[3],

     having regard to the visit of the delegation of its Subcommittee on Human Rights to Kyrgyzstan from 25 to27 February 2025,

     having regard to the statement by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, following his official visit to Kyrgyzstan from 19 to 20 March 2025,

     having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

     having regard to its legislative resolution of […] on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part,

     having regard to Rule 107(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0111/2025),

    A. whereas Kyrgyzstan occupies an important position in Central Asia, a region of increasing geopolitical significance that the EU has recognised as a key partner with which it engaged in structured dialogue at the first EU-Central Asia summit;

    B. whereas the EU and Kyrgyzstan have been partners since the country gained independence in 1991, and have established a comprehensive legal framework for their cooperation through the EU-Kyrgyzstan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, signed in 1999;

    C. whereas the EU and Kyrgyzstan have recently agreed to deepen their partnership by signing an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA), which represents a modern and ambitious framework for strengthening dialogue and cooperation in key areas such as trade and investment, sustainable development and connectivity, research and innovation, education, the environment and climate change, as well as the rule of law, human rights and civil society;

     

    D. whereas the EPCA could also facilitate stronger cooperation on foreign and security policy, including conflict prevention and crisis management, risk reduction, cybersecurity, regional stability, disarmament, non-proliferation, arms control and arms export control;

     

    E. whereas the EPCA, which enhances the existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1999, was signed on 25 June 2024; whereas the EPCA requires Parliament’s consent for it to enter into force;

    F. whereas Kyrgyzstan has benefited from unilateral and preferential access to the EU market through the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) since 2016; whereas Kyrgyzstan has acceded to 27 international conventions related to labour and human rights, environmental and climate protection, and good governance in order to be able to benefit from this scheme;

     

    G. whereas the EU has allocated EUR 98 million to support governance and digital transformation, human development and a green and climate-resilient economy in Kyrgyzstan over the 2021-2027 period, aligning with the National Development Strategy of the Kyrgyz Republic;

     

    H. whereas the EU has allocated EUR 12 million to enhance the quality of legislation and increase the efficiency, independence, professionalism and capacities of the judiciary and services of the justice sector in Kyrgyzstan, thereby signalling its willingness to invest in stable growth that is consistent with the rule of law; whereas concerns over the independence of the judiciary persist, with politically motivated cases that target individuals critical of the government; whereas the 2021 reform of the Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic has reintroduced the heavily criticised 1997 version of the Code, which gives greater power to law enforcement while reducing citizens’ rights;

     

    I. whereas the EPCA stipulates that the EU and Kyrgyzstan shall cooperate to strengthen civil society and its role in the economic, social and political development of an open democratic society;

     

    J. whereas Kyrgyzstan ranks 100th in the 2025 Global Terrorism Index of the Institute for Economics and Peace, and has been classified as a country with ‘no impact’ of terrorism;

     

    K. whereas, despite the Government of Kyrgyzstan repeatedly expressing its commitment to the principles of democracy and respect for human rights and the rule of law, human rights organisations have called attention to democratic backsliding and hardening authoritarian practices and persecution of civil society organisations in Kyrgyzstan in recent years, including during the negotiation of the EPCA and since its signing, with Transparency International and Freedom House finding that Kyrgyzstan has turned from a bastion of democracy with a vibrant civil society to a consolidated authoritarian regime that uses its justice system to target critics and whose authorities further undermine the balance of power and the system of checks and balances;

    L. whereas Kyrgyzstan ranks 146 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index; whereas, at President Japarov’s initiative, the law on public procurement was amended to allow state-owned enterprises to circumvent tendering procedures; whereas there is no proper oversight of public spending due to a lack of access to such information; whereas state funds and national resources are used by the ruling elites to consolidate their power, silence dissent and resist reform;

     

    M. whereas human rights defender, investigative journalist and founder of the Temirov Live media outlet, Bolot Temirov, has been stripped of his Kyrgyz citizenship and forced to leave the country in retaliation for his work investigating widespread corruption; whereas at least 11 of his colleagues were arrested in January 2024, including Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, Azamat Ishenbekov, Aike Beishekeyeva and Aktilek Kaparov;

     

    N. whereas in March 2025, independent journalist and activist Kanyshai Mamyrkulova was arrested and remains in detention in retaliation for her social media posts critical of the government;

     

    O. whereas Kyrgyz Government propaganda has used false narratives to discredit independent media in the eyes of society and to portray them as ‘enemies of the people’ and ‘slaves of the West’;

     

    P. whereas in recent years, democratic standards and human rights have deteriorated alarmingly in Kyrgyzstan; whereas Kyrgyzstan has fallen from 72nd to 144th place in the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index; whereas it ranks as the country that has had the sharpest decline in press freedom leading up to 2025;

     

    Q. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities seek to shut down Aprel TV; whereas, as stated by the Committee to Protect Journalists, the prosecutors’ filing indicates that the authorities seek to shut down the media outlet on the basis of allegations that the outlet’s critical reporting portrays the authorities ‘in an unfavourable light’ and ‘undermines the authority of the government’;

     

    R. whereas Parliament expressed its concern about the persecution of opposition parties and independent media in its resolutions of 13 July 2023[4] and of 19 December 2024; whereas the persecution of members of the Social Democrats party (SDK) persists, despite repeated calls to ensure free and fair elections; whereas the leader of the SDK, Temirlan Sultanbekov, and two other members, Irina Karamushkina and Roza Turksever, remain in detention; whereas there is cause for concern about Temirlan Sultanbekov’s medical condition following his prolonged hunger strike;

    S. whereas the Russian-style ‘foreign representatives’ law, adopted by the Kyrgyz Parliament in March 2024, which requires non-profits that receive funding from abroad and engage in broadly defined political activity to register as ‘foreign representatives’, discriminates against and stigmatises journalists, human rights activists and other non-profit workers and subjects them to intrusive oversight, burdensome reporting requirements and excessive fines; whereas this law mimics repressive legislation in other authoritarian regimes and can be considered a precursor to further attempts to suppress independent civil society and media;

    T. whereas the crackdown on human rights has targeted LGBTIQ+ people in particular; whereas Kyrgyzstan’s new legislative landscape, along with the broader political shift and repression, has effectively decimated the work of LGBTIQ+ rights organisations and activists, with key organisations completely shut down; whereas on 14 August 2023, Kyrgyzstan enacted discriminatory provisions against the LGBTIQ+ community under the pretext of protecting minors from ‘harmful information’; whereas the anti-discrimination bill recently considered by the Kyrgyzstan Supreme Council failed to include sexual orientation and gender identity as protected categories;

     

    U. whereas the law adopted on 6 October 2023 giving the President of Kyrgyzstan the power to overturn rulings of the Constitutional Court if they conflict with his own interpretation of ‘moral values’ fundamentally weakens the separation of powers – a foundational element of the rule of law – and constitutes a hollowing out of judicial independence in Kyrgyzstan;

    V. whereas Kyrgyzstan is increasingly investing in the promotion of gender equality and women’s empowerment, particularly through key national frameworks such as the National Strategy on Gender Equality until 2030; whereas Kyrgyzstan still faces high rates of domestic violence, over 20 % of marriages in Kyrgyzstan occur through ‘ala kachuu’ (bride kidnapping) and women hold only 22 % of parliamentary seats despite existing gender quotas; whereas, on average, women earn 25 % less than men, as they are predominantly employed in low-paying sectors such as education, healthcare and social services;

     

    W. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities have engaged in actions that limit freedom of speech in the country and have arrested, put in long pre-trial detention or imprisoned journalists, bloggers, poets and regular social media users for criticising the country’s leadership or the situation in the country, and have also closed down an award-winning investigative media outlet;

     

    X. whereas Kyrgyzstan ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2014; whereas tentative steps have been taken towards improving accessibility for persons with disabilities and introducing the concept of inclusive education, though challenges remain, in particular concerning the institutionalisation of persons with disabilities;

     

    Y. whereas the law on ‘false information’, enacted on 24 August 2021, has been used to target independent media and individuals critical of the government; whereas on 10 April 2025, the Supreme Council of Kyrgyzstan approved amendments to the law that provide for administrative sanctions for the dissemination of ‘false information’ on social media;

     

    Z. whereas the Supreme Council of Kyrgyzstan is currently considering the re-criminalisation of the possession of ‘extremist’ materials, which has previously been misused against peaceful religious practitioners, and which, on account of the bill’s vague wording, could be used to silence legitimate political speech;

     

    AA. whereas two new laws on freedom of religion came into force on 1 January 2025; whereas these laws maintain the ban on all unregistered exercise of freedom of religion or belief and make it impossible for communities with fewer than 500 adult members to gain legal status;

     

    AB. whereas the negligence of the Kyrgyz law enforcement authorities in response to a campaign of intimidation and harassment has forced journalists and human rights workers to flee the country;

     

    AC. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities have silenced, arrested, detained and extradited refugees fleeing Russia for protesting against the war in Ukraine, contravening Kyrgyzstan’s obligation under the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees not to return people to countries where their life or freedom is under threat on account of their political views, or where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being subjected to serious human rights violations such as torture or other forms of cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment;

     

    AD. whereas the Presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed a border demarcation agreement on 13 March 2025, which legally recognises the borders between the two countries and allows for the development of interstate roads and energy infrastructure, contributing to regional stability and opportunities for enhanced cross-border cooperation on energy, transport and trade; whereas the border agreement itself has not been made public or open to public consultations;

    AE. whereas the leaders of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed the Khujand Declaration of Eternal Friendship on 31 March 2025;

     

    AF. whereas the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, has drawn attention to the concerning signs of democratic backsliding in Kyrgyzstan in recent years, with particular emphasis on the increasing restrictions on civil society and independent journalism;

     

    AG. whereas Central Asia has yet to create horizontal regional frameworks free from the dominance of external actors pursuing their own geopolitical gains;

     

    AH. whereas Kyrgyzstan has historically close and intertwined relations with Russia, with both being members of the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Commonwealth of Independent States; whereas in October 2023, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin in Bishkek during Putin’s first foreign trip since the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant against him; whereas Kyrgyzstan, along with other Central Asian countries, has become a transit point for circumventing sanctions imposed on Russia for its war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas exports of advanced technology and dual-use items to Kyrgyzstan – which are then exported to Russia – have significantly increased; whereas Kyrgyzstan has either abstained from voting or sided with Russia on votes on numerous UN resolutions on human rights and, in particular, on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

     

    AI. whereas OJSC Keremet Bank, based in Kyrgyzstan, was involved in a sanctions evasion scheme with Russian state-owned defence bank Promsvyazbank Public Joint-Stock Company (PSB), where it facilitated cross-border transfers on behalf of PSB; whereas in 2024, the Kyrgyz Ministry of Finance sold a controlling stake in Keremet Bank to a Russian oligarch with ties to the Russian Government; whereas the United States has imposed sanctions on Keremet Bank;

     

    EU-Kyrgyzstan EPCA

    1. Despite the shared interests in strengthening the EU-Kyrgyzstan important political and trade relations, is concerned by the deteriorating situation of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the context of the completion of negotiations and the signing of the EPCA; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities, in this context, to respect and uphold fundamental freedoms, in particular media freedom and freedom of expression, and to foster an environment of cooperation and involvement of civil society and local communities in public consultations and decision-making processes; underlines the importance of Parliament’s close involvement in monitoring the implementation of all parts of the EPCA; calls for an effective evaluation by both parties to the agreement, to be conducted within three years, of the implementation of its essential elements, with clear human rights benchmarks and time frames; calls on the Commission to present to Parliament the outcome of such evaluations; expects that, given the recent backsliding on these fronts and ahead of the EPCA vote in the European Parliament and its subsequent implementation, the Kyrgyz Government will take some concrete steps towards addressing the pressing concerns outlined in this report, such as releasing political prisoners and repealing recently adopted repressive legislation; considers that a negative assessment of the implementation of these essential elements could lead to Article 316 of the EPCA being triggered;

    EU-Kyrgyzstan relations

    2. Welcomes the long-standing and strategic relations between the EU and Kyrgyzstan, as well as the increasing cooperation and exchanges; recalls that Kyrgyzstan is the EU’s third-largest trading partner in Central Asia; reiterates its commitment to work together with the country and with its partners in Central Asia to ensure peace, security, stability, prosperity, democracy and sustainable development;

    3. Welcomes the outcomes of the first EU-Central Asia summit held in Samarkand on 4 April 2025; welcomes their commitment to regional and global stability, to the promotion and protection of the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to addressing climate action, connectivity and education; notes also the 20th EU-Central Asia Ministerial meeting held in Ashgabat on 27 March 2025;

     

    4. Highlights the need for cooperation in promoting green initiatives based on a sustainable market economy, private sector innovation, and long-term environmental stewardship, early warning systems for natural disasters, low-carbon development and the transition to renewable energy sources; highlights Kyrgyzstan’s initiatives to promote the mountain agenda on global platforms, including the preservation of mountain ecosystems, the protection of the environment  and the development of sustainable tourism and mountain communities; stresses that investments in Kyrgyzstan’s green energy goals would significantly contribute to reducing the country’s regional energy dependence and to tackling environmental challenges; commends the Kyrgyz Republic’s involvement in the Team Europe Initiative on Water, Energy and Climate Change;

    5. Supports Kyrgyzstan’s efforts towards sustainable development, aligning its initiatives with the country’s National Development strategy for 2018-2040, alongside the EU’s Global Gateway strategy and the EU strategy for Central Asia; recalls that the EU-Kyrgyzpartnership prioritises governance and digital transformation in order to enhance transparency and efficiency in public administration;

     

    6. Welcomes Team Europe initiatives seeking to build a green and climate-resilient economy in order to address environmental challenges and promote sustainable growth; highlights the recent signing of the agreement between the Kyrgyz Ministry of Finance and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which will strengthen the Kyrgyz Climate-Resilient Water Services Programme;

     

    7. Calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to continue promoting joint cooperation initiatives in strategic areas such as energy infrastructure, in particular the hydropower sector, sustainable development and culture, while also building on the positive experiences of the Member States already active in the region;

     

    8. Highlights the importance of enhancing cooperation on critical raw materials, which have been identified as strategically important for ensuring secure, sustainable and diversified supply chains; takes note of the endorsement of the EU-Central Asia Joint Declaration of Intent on Critical Raw Materials at the first EU-Central Asia summit, and of Kyrgyzstan’s proposal to establish a partnership with the EU for the development of critical raw materials;

     

    9. Notes that the Erasmus+ programme has been instrumental in facilitating academic exchanges; welcomes the EU’s support for digitalisation and education in the country, and calls for the creation of a programme for the exchange of entrepreneurs in the field of digital transformation and the green transition; stresses the importance of fostering convergence and coordinated reforms in higher education, such as by aligning the Kyrgyz National Qualifications Framework with the European Qualifications Framework; highlights the need to foster academic and cultural exchanges between Kyrgyzstan and the EU Member States and the active involvement of Kyrgyz young people in non-formal education and civil society programmes; underlines the importance of strengthening academic and vocational exchanges, building on the 2024 education agreement;

     

    10. Welcomes the EU’s increased support for young people, gender equality and human rights in Kyrgyzstan, with the aim of empowering youth and women’s organisations, strengthening the country’s Ombudsman’s Office and enhancing the capabilities of its National Centre for the Prevention of Torture; expresses serious concern about attempts to dissolve the National Centre for the Prevention of Torture;

     

    11. Recalls that the EU has already allocated EUR 12 million to support the reform of Kyrgyzstan’s judicial system, confirming the EU’s commitment to the country’s institutional development; stresses the importance of continuing to invest in institution building, transparency and the independence of the judiciary;

     

    12. Expresses its concern, in view of the widespread corruption in Kyrgyzstan, about the transparent and efficient use of the EUR 98 million in EU assistance for the 2021-2027 period; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to publish detailed reports on the use of EU funds and to strengthen cooperation with international anti-fraud bodies, such as the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), in order to uphold global fund management standards and implement robust anti-fraud measures that protect the EU’s financial interests; calls on the Commission and other relevant EU institutions to ensure the highest possible level of oversight of the use of EU funds and to consider allocating additional resources to strengthen the financial and operational capacity of Kyrgyz agencies involved in their management;

     

    13. Stresses the importance of enhanced information exchange on terrorist threats, full compliance with international counterterrorism financing standards and the implementation of robust measures to prevent the acquisition, transfer and use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials for terrorist purposes;

     

    14. Underlines the importance of engaging all relevant stakeholders, facilitating cooperation between competent agencies and bringing national laws in line with international transparency standards in order to investigate financial crimes and promote good corporate governance; urges the Kyrgyz authorities to step up their efforts in eradicating corruption and not to use the fight against it as an excuse for cracking down on civil society and government critics;

     

    15. Calls on the Kyrgyz Republic to review its technical regulations and strengthen collaboration on standards, metrology, market surveillance, accreditation and conformity assessment procedures to facilitate mutual market access, deepen bilateral trade with the EU and ensure fair treatment of investors; urges Kyrgyzstan to avoid restrictive measures that could disadvantage EU investors;

     

    Regional cooperation and global challenges

    16. Considers Central Asia to be a region of strategic interest for the EU in terms of security, connectivity, energy diversification, conflict resolution and the defence of the multilateral, rules-based international order, especially in a historical moment marked by profound geopolitical change; encourages the EU to intensify its engagement with Central Asia on political, economic and security matters in line with the values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law that underpin EU external action; highlights that any further EU cooperation with Central Asian countries cannot be achieved at the expense of these values; emphasises the need for increased dialogue and collaboration on foreign and security policy issues, including cybersecurity, regional stability, crisis management, disarmament and arms control, in line with the principles of international law and the UN Charter;

    17. Underlines that the EU and Central Asia are facing profound global and regional geopolitical shifts and challenges; stresses, in this regard, the need to work towards long-term, structured and mutually beneficial cooperation on matters of common interest; strongly encourages the EU to intensify its engagement with Central Asia, given the region’s geostrategic importance, and to promote a strategic partnership with Central Asian countries by expanding cooperation at political and economic level; welcomes the increased high-level contact between the EU and Central Asia;

    18. Highlights the growing momentous challenges to multilateralism and a rules-based order for both the EU and the Kyrgyz Republic, such as Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; notes, with concern, the neutral stance of Kyrgyzstan and other countries in the region towards the conflict, and encourages the Kyrgyz authorities to uphold international norms and contribute to regional efforts to safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity; notes Russia’s influence in the region despite efforts by Central Asian countries to diversify their foreign relations; regrets that Kyrgyzstan has not condemned Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine;

    19. Deplores the active role of Kyrgyz companies and banks, such as Keremet Bank, in helping Russia to evade sanctions and obtain technology and dual-use goods for its war effort against Ukraine; urges the Kyrgyz authorities to take further measures to stop the transit of sanctioned goods to Russia through Kyrgyz territory, such as enforcing stricter licensing requirements and conducting due diligence on companies involved in the trade of dual-use goods; highlights that failure to address the export of dual-use technologies could lead to secondary sanctions; calls on the Commission to assess the current level of sanctions evasion by Russia with the help of actors in Central Asian countries, and to propose concrete solutions for addressing this; recommends the establishment of a working group focused on monitoring and tracking the trade of dual-use goods;

     

    20. Regrets that, despite its stated commitment to respect democratic principles, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as agreed in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, Kyrgyzstan does not align its positions with those of democratic countries, in particular the EU Member States, when voting at the UN General Assembly;

     

    21. Deplores the fact that the Turkish Cypriot secessionist entity was granted observer status by the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) and was present at the OTS summit in Bishkek; reiterates that, as part of the Joint Declaration following the first EU-Central Asia summit in Samarkand, the Central Asian states, including the Kyrgyz Republic, are committed to the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions – 541 (1983) and 550 (1984);

     

    22. Recognises the need to strengthen relations to foster deeper, closer and values-based cooperation in facing common threats and achieving shared goals worldwide;

    23. Welcomes initiatives aimed at strengthening the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor and takes note of the Coordination Platform for the Corridor;

    24. Highlights the EU’s role as an important donor of aid to the region; stresses the need to increase the EU’s efforts in its support for development cooperation in Central Asia, in particular in Kyrgyzstan under the newly signed EPCA;

     

    25. Welcomes the border agreement reached between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and its recent ratification; urges both parties to take the necessary steps to implement the agreement, including by triggering consultations with the local populations, and to adopt measures to strengthen cross-border cooperation and support the border communities that have been hit hardest by the recent cross-border conflict; welcomes the EU’s financial support for the construction of facilities in the Sughd region of Tajikistan, which borders Kyrgyzstan; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to investigate the serious crimes, documented by independent observers, that took place during the September 2022 armed conflict and to hold those responsible to account;

    26. Welcomes the first trilateral summit bringing together Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan without mediation by external actors; welcomes Central Asian aspirations to strengthen their regional ties and set up a horizontal cooperation architecture in the region without the assertive involvement of external powers;

     

    Human rights, democracy and the rule of law

    27. Stresses that respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law strengthens stability, sustainable development and security, as they establish legal certainty, predictability and strong institutions; recalls that strong democratic legal frameworks and institutions foster innovation, trade, investments and economic expansion, while ensuring inclusive development and equal access to social and economic rights, and reducing social inequalities, and are indispensable in building resilient societies capable of resisting authoritarian influence and external destabilisation;

    28. Encourages Kyrgyzstan to enact comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation that includes sexual orientation, gender, disability and ethnicity as protected categories; stresses that the protection of minorities in Kyrgyzstan requires a multifaceted strategy that addresses the root causes of discrimination, including existing obstacles in accessing justice;

     

    29. Welcomes the legislative acts to enhance protection against domestic, sexual and gender-based violence; calls on the Kyrgyz Government to ensure that the law is consistently enforced and perpetrators are formally charged with the relevant crimes, and to maintain efforts towards eliminating gender-based and domestic violence;

     

    30. Is concerned about the entry into force of new legislation restricting freedom of religion or belief in Kyrgyzstan, as it increases state surveillance and control over religious groups by creating a state registry for religious entities and buildings, introduces fines for wearing certain religious attire, such as the niqab, in state institutions and public places, and increases oversight of religious education; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure freedom of religion or belief is protected in the country, in line with international human rights standards and commitments under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

     

    31. Encourages the Kyrgyz Government to develop a national action plan for human rights with the involvement of civil society, in line with the recommendations made by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights;

     

    32. Calls on the Kyrgyz Government to unconditionally release all wrongfully imprisoned or detained journalists, bloggers and activists, including Kanyshai Mamyrkulova and those affiliated with Temirov Live, such as Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, and Aike Beishekeyeva and Aktilek Kaparov, and to drop all charges against them, as well as to restore Bolot Temirov’s citizenship and refrain from other unlawful practices; condemns the sentencing in October 2024 of journalists Azamat Ishenbekov and Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, from the Temirov Live platform known for its investigations into corruption, to five and six years in prison respectively; highlights the opinion of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention recognising the detention of Temirov Live’s journalists as arbitrary; welcomes the pardoning of journalist and Temirov Live employee Azamat Ishenbekov, and of activist Zarina Torokulova, who were convicted on charges of ‘inciting mass unrest’;

    33. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to ensure adherence to the principles of free and fair elections by safeguarding the rights to contest and campaign, while maintaining administrative neutrality towards all political parties throughout the current election cycle, in line with international standards; strongly condemns the Kyrgyz Government’s campaign of intimidation and legal persecution against opposition parties, particularly the SDK, which was removed by the Kyrgyz authorities from the November 2024 local elections in Bishkek; notes that discussions on electoral reform have taken place in the Kyrgyz Parliament;

     

     

    34. Strongly deplores the detention of Temirlan Sultanbekov, Irina Karamushkina and Roza Turksever on 13 November 2024, and calls on the Kyrgyz Government to urgently end their politically motivated prosecution by dropping all restrictions imposed on their respective sentences; condemns the fact that the proceedings against them have been marred by dubious practices, a lack of legal protections since the start and the violation of their right to due process; recalls that an audio recording of unknown origin, serving as the primary evidence and lacking judicial authorisation, is what initiated the investigation; laments that their trials have been held in a closed-door format without any audio or video recordings; denounces the fact that the conditions for their release on probation are disproportionate and violate their right to participate in public affairs;

    35. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to refrain from pursuing politically motivated prosecutions or exerting undue pressure on political opposition and dissenting voices, such as the SDK; emphasises that political pluralism is a necessary component of any modern democracy and must be respected to maintain long-term legitimacy and stability;

     

    36. Urges the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure the right to peaceful assembly by lifting the ban on protests in Bishkek city centre, which was initiated in response to a request from the Russian embassy to end anti-war protests outside its premises in 2022;

     

    37. Welcomes the acquittal of Klara Sooronkulova, Gulnara Dzhurabayeva, Asya Sasykbayeva and other members of the Committee for the Protection of the Kempir-Abad Water Reservoir; urges the Kyrgyz Government to drop its appeal of the decision of the court of first instance, and bring the politically motivated prosecution to an end;

    38. Strongly condemns, and urges the Kyrgyz authorities to end, the recent crackdown on civil society and to foster an environment of cooperation, with the involvement of civil society and local communities in public consultations and decision-making processes; deplores, in particular, the politically motivated detention of human rights activist Rita Karasartova, and calls for her urgent release; deplores further the seizure of the house of imprisoned human rights activist Kanyshai Mamyrkulova; expresses its admiration for Kyrgyz civil society and independent media which, despite the persecution and at great personal risk, remains one of the most vibrant civil societies in Central Asia;

     

    39. Calls on the EU Member States and the EU institutions to support Kyrgyz civil society organisations, human rights defenders and lawyers, LGBTIQ+ and environmental activists, independent media and bloggers, to express their grave concern over the deterioration of human rights in the country in all their exchanges with the authorities of Kyrgyzstan, and to reassess the country’s GSP+ benefits and adopt appropriate measures, including sanctions under the EU’s global human rights sanctions regime (‘EU Magnitsky Act’) as a last resort, if Kyrgyzstan continues to disregard its commitments to international conventions;

     

    40. Deplores several recent cases of individuals critical of the Kyrgyz Government living outside of Kyrgyzstan facing the threat of extradition to Kyrgyzstan, where they risk politically motivated arrest, imprisonment and torture in retaliation for their criticism; denounces the case of exiled activist Tilekmat Kurenov who was recently extradited from the United Arab Emirates to Kyrgyzstan, where he had previously been subjected to politically motivated imprisonment, torture and threats because of his activism;

     

    41. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to revoke the Russian-style ‘foreign representatives’ law, which severely impairs the ability of civil society to carry out legitimate public interest work and operate without undue interference and harassment while ensuring a safe working environment, and which contradicts Kyrgyzstan’s international obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its commitments as an EU partner under the EPCA; urges the Commission to ensure that the EU’s programmes and initiatives are not compromised by the proposed laws, which may limit freedom of expression and curtail the activities of non-governmental organisations;

    42. Urges Kyrgyzstan to respect and protect media freedom and pluralism, which are fundamental conditions for democracy, refraining from forcibly closing independent media outlets, as in the case of Kloop, or levelling unsubstantiated allegations against them due to their investigative and critical reporting; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to allow independent media professionals to carry out their work, to guarantee journalists and reporters will not face retaliatory persecution for their professional activities, including investigative journalism, and to provide adequate protection to reporters that might be harassed for their reporting; calls on the Commission and the EU Member States to ensure the continued operation of the Kyrgyz Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty service;

    43. Calls on the EEAS and the EU Delegation in Kyrgyzstan to conduct active public diplomacy and address false narratives spread by the Kyrgyz authorities, in particular those that misrepresent EU values and policies with the aim of discrediting independent media and civil society; urges EU and Member State diplomats in Kyrgyzstan to attend politically motivated trials and to provide support to the unjustly persecuted individuals and their families;

     

    44. Condemns the Kyrgyz authorities’ attempts to shut down Aprel TV by revoking its broadcasting license and terminating its social media operations on the basis of an investigation by Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security; laments these actions in a context of shuttering media outlets on illegitimate grounds;

     

    45. Expresses concern about the re-criminalisation of libel and insult laws and calls on the Kyrgyz Government not to abuse these provisions to target journalists and legitimate political opposition; invites the authorities to review this legislation in accordance with the Venice Commission’s recommendations;

     

    46. Urges the Kyrgyz authorities to revoke the law on ‘false information’ and the law prohibiting ‘LGBT propaganda’, which contravene Kyrgyzstan’s obligations under international law and have been systematically used to silence critical voices, including journalists and civil society actors; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure that the mass media law is fully in line with international standards and does not result in violations of the freedoms of media or expression;

    47. Calls on the Kyrgyz Government to protect journalists, non-governmental organisation workers and activists from intimidation and harassment, including those facing death threats and other threats to their safety while in prison, and calls on the EU Delegation to closely monitor such threats and report regularly on the situation of at-risk individuals; deplores the government raids, blocking of news sites and prosecution of journalists and bloggers; condemns the court’s closure of the organisation behind the Kloop investigative platform over its alleged ‘negative’ coverage; regrets President Japarov’s call for the Kyrgyz Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to be shut down, accusing the Kyrgyz service of spreading misinformation;

    48. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to refrain from criminalising the possession of ‘extremist’ materials, as human rights watchdogs have warned that this could lead to the further deterioration of freedom of speech in Kyrgyzstan, given the potential for abuse of the law, and to maintain clear legal safeguards to prevent the misuse of laws that penalise public incitements of extremist activity; urges Kyrgyzstan’s Supreme Council to uphold the right to freedom of expression and recalls that countering ‘false information’ cannot lead to a crackdown on independent media, the opposition and others critical of the government;

    49. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to strengthen the rule of law, separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary in line with international standards, to establish processes to measure judicial performance, improve public oversight and increase transparency within the judiciary, and to enhance the engagement of the judiciary with civil society and other branches of government; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to step up their efforts in guaranteeing equal access to justice, the right to a fair trial and the fulfilment of the right to due process;

     

    50. Is concerned by the high number of pre-trial detention cases, which has been highlighted by the Kyrgyz Ombudsperson Dzhamilia Dzhamanbaeva, and echoes the Ombudsperson’s call on Kyrgyz law enforcement and judiciary bodies to adhere to international standards, including the UN Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures;

     

    51. Notes the penitentiary system reforms carried out in recent years, mainly comprising the development of probation, the digitalisation of different processes and the introduction of alternative preventive measures; regrets, however, cases of mistreatment of prisoners and encourages the Kyrgyz authorities to take all necessary steps to ensure that prisoners do not experience inhuman or degrading treatment or conditions, and receive adequate healthcare in safe and secure conditions;

     

    52. Underlines the need to develop new legislation in the field of administrative law and justice, including the reform of public administration and alternative dispute resolution, and to strengthen the professional capacities of public administration and judiciary representatives, which could be partly achieved by adopting e-governance systems;

     

    53. Asks the Kyrgyz authorities to uphold the independence of the legal profession and ensure that lawyers are not subjected to interference or harassment as a result of fulfilling their professional duties, including the defence of their clients in politically sensitive cases;

     

    54. Commends Kyrgyzstan’s participation in the Central Asia Rule of Law Programme, which supported national efforts to prevent and fight corruption and money laundering, and raised awareness about human rights standards among legal professionals, among other matters;

     

    55. Notes the return of the controversial Land Code to the Kyrgyz Parliament by President Japarov, following public protests against it;

     

    °

    ° °

    56. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of the Kyrgyz Republic.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina – A10-0108/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina

    (2025/2018(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina initialled in Dayton on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 (the Dayton Peace Agreement),

     having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the other part[1], which entered into force on 1 June 2015,

     having regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application for EU membership, submitted on 15 February 2016,

     having regard to the Commission opinion of 29 May 2019 on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2019)0261),

     having regard to the European Council conclusions of 15 December 2022 granting EU candidate country status to Bosnia and Herzegovina,

     having regard to the European Council conclusions of 22 March 2024 on opening accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)[2],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans[3],

     having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

     having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 6 May 2020, 13 December 2023 and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

     having regard to the Berlin Process, launched on 28 August 2014,

     having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2021/1923 of 4 November 2021 on an Assistance Measure under the European Peace Facility to support capacity building for the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina[4],

     having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2022/2353 of 1 December 2022 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to strengthen the capacities of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina[5],

     having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0691),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 12 March 2024 entitled ‘Report on progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina – March 2024’ (COM(2024)0129),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0691),

     having regard to the Commission’s overview and country assessments of 31 May 2023 and of 13 June 2024 of the Economic Reform Programme of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

     having regard to the fifth EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Council of 19 July 2023 and the seventh EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Committee meeting of 19 September 2024,

     having regard to the outcomes of the third, fourth, fifth and sixth meetings of the EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 30 and 31 October 2023, 13 and 14 March 2024, 30 October 2024 and 12 and 13 March 2025 respectively,

     having regard to the expert report of 5 December 2019 on rule of law issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

     having regard to the European Council’s political agreement of 12 June 2022 on a on principles for ensuring a functional Bosnia and Herzegovina that advances on the European path,

     having regard to the 63rd, 64th, 65th and 66th reports of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General of the UN of 9 May 2023, 2 November 2023, 15 May 2024, 1 November 2024 respectively,

     having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2757 (2024) of 1 November 2024, which extends the mandate of the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) until 2 November 2025,

     having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 78/282 of 23 May 2024, designating 11 July as the International Day of Reflection and Commemoration of the 1995 Genocide in Srebrenica,

     having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), ratified by Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 March 1992, and to its three Optional Protocols, namely: the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, ratified on 10 October 2003; the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, ratified on 4 September 2001, and the Optional Protocol on a Communications Procedure, ratified on 19 October 2018,

     having regard to the UNESCO resolutions on the right of education in the mother tongue, the UNESCO Convention of 17 October 2003 for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, as well as the UNESCO Convention of 20 October 2005 on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions,

     having regard to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

     having regard to the amended Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina imposed by the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina on 26 March 2024,

     having regard to the visits of the Vice-President of the European Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Kaja Kallas and of NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte to Bosnia and Herzegovina in March and April 2025,

     having regard to the statement of the President of the European Council António Costa to the political leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 2025,

     having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement[6],

     having regard to its report of 17 January 2024 on the ‘Role of preventive diplomacy in tackling frozen conflicts around the world – missed opportunity or change for the future?’[7],

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Bosnia and Herzegovina,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0108/2025),

    A. whereas enlargement is one of the EU’s most effective foreign policy instruments and a geostrategic investment in peace, democracy, stability, security and prosperity on the European continent, and remains of crucial importance, particularly in the context of rapid major geopolitical shifts and growing competition with authoritarian regimes;

    B. whereas each country is judged on its own merits in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, including full respect for democracy, the rule of law and fundamental EU values, human rights, minority rights and media freedoms;

    C. whereas the EU remains the main political and economic partner of the Western Balkan countries; whereas the EU continues to be largest trade and investment partner of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), accounting for the majority of its foreign trade flows and playing a central role in its economic integration process;

    D. whereas Bosnia and Herzegovina is a candidate country and the clear majority of its citizens aspires to Euro-Atlantic integration for sustainable peace, democracy and prosperity; whereas 2025 marks the 30th anniversary of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which continues to form the foundation of BiH’s institutional set-up and that was intended as a safeguard for the equality of its three constituent peoples;

    E. whereas public support remains fragile owing to anti-EU narratives promoted by illiberal actors from the region and beyond;

    F. whereas the Dayton Peace Agreement despite its shortcomings, has fostered peace and the subsequent stabilisation in BiH by creating the key institutions that enabled the country to progress along the path of EU and NATO integration;

    G. whereas 30 years after the end of the war, BiH remains dysfunctional and finds itself again in a deep political and security crisis, with attempts at secession, and a high degree of corruption;

    H. whereas the EU strongly supports the territorial integrity and sovereignty of BiH and will not accept any attempts to undermine it; whereas the Strategic Compass stated that as a matter of security and stability it is of a particular interest to support the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of BiH;

    I. whereas the President of the Republika Srpska (RS) entity, Milorad Dodik, and politicians from the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) have initiated unconstitutional actions to nullify state laws within the RS entity and attacked the key institutions of the state, namely the Office of the High Representative, the BiH Constitutional Court, and the judiciary; whereas the authorities of the RS entity participated in the ‘All-Serb Assembly’ held on 8 June 2024 in Belgrade under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’; whereas a process of forming a new pro-EU majority has been initiated;

    J. whereas EUFOR Althea is an EU CSDP mission helping BiH to maintain a stable and secure environment in the country and is supporting the armed forces’ efforts to align with NATO standards, while serving as a deterrent against any foreign threats;

    K. whereas BiH’s EU path is increasingly targeted by malign foreign actors, notably the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, which exploit ethnic divisions and institutional fragility to obstruct reforms, undermine the constitutional order and erode public trust in the EU; whereas Russian state-controlled media, including Sputnik Serbia and RT Balkan, continue to operate in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in the RS entity, spreading disinformation and pro-Kremlin narratives in violation of EU sanctions on Russian propaganda outlets;

    L. whereas BiH is a multi-ethnic state in whose territory different religious and ethnic groups have lived for centuries, demonstrating that peoples with different views can coexist in an environment of tolerance and mutual respect; whereas linguistic and cultural diversity is one of the fundamental principles of the European Union, as enshrined in Articles 21 and 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights;

    M. whereas, for the 2022 general elections, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) Election Observation Mission concluded that the electoral process remained vulnerable to external interference, including the misuse of administrative resources and biased media coverage influenced by foreign-backed platforms, and called for enhanced protections against disinformation, transparency in campaign finance, and safeguards for journalists and civil society;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1. Reaffirms its support for BiH’s EU accession through a merit-based process based on the Copenhagen criteria, grounded in unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and equality among its citizens;

    2. Welcomes the European Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with BiH in the context of the changed geopolitical reality following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; welcomes the adoption of several key laws in the run-up to this decision, but regrets that the positive reform dynamic has stalled, and notes the inadequate implementation and enforcement of the adopted laws; regrets that the legislative process has been marred by a lack of transparency and limited access for key stakeholders; notes the recent adoption of the Laws on Border Control and on Personal Data Protection and calls for their thorough implementation; calls for preparations to establish the institutional and financial basis for this enlargement to ensure sustainable EU integration;

    3. Urges BiH’s legitimate political leaders at all levels to take all relevant steps set out in the Commission’s recommendation of 12 October 2022, in full respect for proper democratic, transparent and inclusive procedures within the competent institutions, with a view to the negotiating framework being adopted by the Council once these conditions are met, and to step up the efforts to deliver on the 14 key priorities set out by the Commission in 2019; calls on all political actors to uphold BiH’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity and to refrain from all divisive rhetoric and acts, including secessionist rhetoric and acts, incitement to ethnic, religious and racial intolerance, denial of genocide and other war crimes, and the glorification of war crimes and their perpetrators;

    4. Reiterates that BiH’s accession process needs to be rooted in functioning democratic institutions, the rule of law, the fight against corruption and organised crime, as well as respect for fundamental rights and non-discrimination for all citizens, including constituent peoples, regardless of ethnic, religious or other affiliations;

    5. Strongly condemns the repeated use of inflammatory rhetoric and the adoption of secessionist laws and policies by Milorad Dodik, President of the RS entity, the SNSD party, and the Assembly of the RS entity, including the celebration of the so-called ‘Day of Republika Srpska’ and the Day of the State of the Republic of Serbia; emphasises that such actions undermine BiH’s constitutional order, territorial integrity and sovereignty, and are incompatible with its EU accession process and undermine the Dayton Peace Agreement;

    6. Urges all the Member States – and calls for their unity – as well as he European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission, to act more decisively to respond to these direct threats to European security and reiterates its call for targeted sanctions against all destabilising actors, notably Milorad Dodik, as well as other high-ranking RS entity and Serbian officials providing political and material support for secessionist policies; calls on all Member States to ensure that such sanctions can be adopted by the Council and to impose them bilaterally or in concert with other Member States if their adoption in the Council is not possible; condemns the Hungarian Government’s role in blocking sanctions; endorses the statements made by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on 10 March 2025 in Sarajevo and by VP/HR Kaja Kallas on 8 April in Sarajevo and calls for stability in the country to be safeguarded; believes that high-level EU officials should not engage with actors undermining the constitutional order of BiH in order not to harm the credibility of the EU in supporting BiH state institutions and welcomes the travel bans imposed on high-ranking RS individuals by some Member States;

    7. Takes note of the ruling of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the case of Milorad Dodik on 26 February 2025 and is highly alarmed by the escalating tensions and actions he has since led, including unprecedented attacks on BiH institutions and intimidation of opposition in the RS; deplores the support given to such policies by Russian and Serbian authorities, and calls upon all internal, regional and international actors to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of BiH; calls for the international isolation of Milorad Dodik; condemns the recent decision of the RS entity’s government to declare a senior German foreign ministry official as persona non grata; notes with concern that Interpol refused to issue a Red Notice for an international warrant and calls on EUFOR to provide concrete support to the BiH authorities to put an end to the continued efforts to undermine the country’s legal and political stability, and to demonstrate the EU’s and EUFOR’s commitment and ability to uphold peace, enforce the rule of law, and maintain the integrity of legal institutions;

    8. Deplores that Milorad Dodik’s policies and actions, including frequent blockades of State-level bodies and decision-making and the hollowing out of the BiH institutions necessary for the technical work on alignment with the EU acquis, are a major factor in BiH’s troubled EU accession path and a clear violation of the 12 June 2022 political agreement; welcomes the work of the competent BiH institutions and calls on them to follow due procedures and to execute and implement all decisions in full respect for the rule of law; urges all political actors, notably in the RS entity, to reject all secessionist steps undermining of the country’s unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security; urges the RS National Assembly to ensure that its Official Gazette reflects the decisions of the BiH Constitutional Court regarding RS legislation, which has been found to undermine the constitutional order and been taken out of effect;

    9. Urges the Commission, in close cooperation with the Member States and international partners, including the Office of the High Representative, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe, to take stock of the lessons learned over the past 15 years of European engagement in BiH and to recalibrate its strategy accordingly, with a renewed focus on delivering tangible progress and reforms that accelerate the country’s path toward EU membership, thereby reaffirming the EU’s unwavering commitment to the full integration of BiH into the Union;

    10. Welcomes BiH’s formal full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, including restrictive measures in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and urges the effective implementation of these measures; welcomes BiH’s continued participation in EU crisis management missions and operations; condemns the pro-Russian stance of the RS entity’s leadership and its frequent meetings with Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials; expresses serious concerns about the security risks posed by these ties; urges the EU to investigate the use of the RS entity as a gateway for Russian intelligence operations and hybrid attacks on EU Member States; calls for support to BiH in countering disinformation campaigns originating from Russia as part of a joint effort against hybrid threats; strongly supports BiH’s sustained aspirations towards Euro-Atlantic integration and NATO membership and calls on all political actors to take concrete political action to achieve them;

    11. Reiterates its support for the Office of the High Representative and EUFOR Operation Althea in overseeing the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in accordance with their mandates based on political neutrality and full respect for the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, until the country has fulfilled the ‘5+2 agenda’ and its international supervision ends; welcomes the renewal of the mandate of EUFOR Operation Althea; regrets that BiH is still heavily reliant on the mandate of the Office of the High Representative, and the presence of EUFOR Althea, but acknowledges and values it as a crucial institution in safeguarding not only peace, but also the bare functioning of the country;

    12. Recalls that EUFOR Operation Althea plays a key role in safeguarding the security, territorial integrity, stability, sovereignty and political independence of BiH, while ensuring that local stakeholders act in accordance with these fundamental principles as outlined in the Dayton Peace Agreement and UN Security Council resolutions; urges EUFOR to communicate this mandate unequivocally to the citizens of BiH as a confidence-building measure;

    13. Further welcomes the Council’s decision on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility worth EUR 10 million to the benefit of the Armed Forces of BiH (AFBiH) and the Cooperation and Training Contract for 2023 between the AFBiH and EUFOR; calls on the Council and VP/HR to enable all eligible Member States to participate in the EU peacekeeping missions, such as EUFOR’s Operation Althea in BiH; calls on the BiH authorities, NATO and EUFOR Althea to launch a reform process of the BiH armed forces;

    14. Remains concerned by malign foreign interference and disinformation campaigns by foreign actors in BiH, notably Russia and China, as well as their transmission through local media and political structures, particularly by the RS entity; expresses grave concern over Kremlin support for secessionist rhetoric, attempts to delegitimise state institutions, and interference in judicial and electoral matters; highlights recent Russian efforts at the UN Security Council to defend unconstitutional actions by RS entity authorities;

    15. Calls for further steps, inter alia aligning BiH legislation with the EU acquis, and EU support to effectively counter malign foreign interference and disinformation campaigns; calls on the EEAS and the EU Delegation to BiH to intensify efforts in promoting the benefits of closer integration and to invest in communication campaigns to fight anti-democratic narratives and other forms of foreign influence;

    16. Deplores the participation of RS entity authorities in the ‘All-Serb Assembly’ held on 8 June 2024 in Belgrade under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’ and rejects its declaration which undermines the sovereignty of BiH and other Western Balkan countries and fails to promote good neighbourly relations; condemns Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic’s interference in the affairs of BiH, including by expressing support for the illegitimate actions of Milorad Dodik and organising the Russia-backed ‘All-Serb Assembly’ which undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of BiH;

    17. Condemns the increase in Iran’s malign influence in the country and in the Western Balkans, which poses a threat to security for the EU and its Member States;

    18. Welcomes BiH’s renewed and sustained engagement in the EU-BiH Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee in fulfilment of one of the 14 key priorities set out by the Commission;

    19. Urges the BiH authorities to reform the coordination mechanism for EU matters, which has proved to be ineffective and inefficient in addressing EU integration-related tasks; calls on the authorities to submit a national programme for the adoption of the EU acquis (NPAA) in accordance with the Commission’s comments and to ensure coordinated alignment with the EU acquis throughout the country; highlights the need to establish an operational negotiating structure following the European Council’s decision to commence accession negotiations, including nomination of a negotiation team and a chief negotiator who is fully authorised to present the country’s position;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    20. Regrets the fact that political actors have still not enacted the necessary changes to the constitution and the electoral law to align them with the European Convention on Human Rights and to implement relevant rulings of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Court of Human Rights to eliminate all forms of inequality and discrimination in the electoral process and ensure non-discrimination, protection of fundamental rights, and equality for all BiH citizens to ‘move from Dayton to Brussels’; reiterates that failing to implement these rulings is incompatible with EU values and BiH’s EU integration; stresses the need for all constitutional and electoral reform processes to be inclusive, based on comprehensive consultations with citizens, civil society and independent experts and all relevant stakeholders in the country, and in line with European standards and principles; reiterates that any electoral reform must not deepen or cement ethnic division;

    21. Regrets that the BiH authorities have not been able to unite society or to create a just and functional system in the country, but rather have largely contributed to deepening divisions; calls on the EU and its Member States to initiate a transparent and inclusive reform process that would enable a sustainable transformation of the Dayton Peace Agreement into a constitution, fully in line with European standards and principles, with a view to ensuring a functional, accountable, representative, and popularly legitimate governance system, to overcome ethno-nationalistic divisions and achieve sustainable progress on the path towards the EU;

    22. Notes the changes made to the Election Law by the High Representative in March 2024 that introduced important integrity standards and confidence-building measures, aiming to restore voters’ trust in the overall election process; calls on the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH to urgently address all outstanding recommendations of the OSCE/ODIHR, of the Venice Commission and of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) especially on matters regarding election administration, the conduct of polling and counting, campaigning and campaign finance, explicit prohibition of indirect buying of votes, election dispute resolution, countering disinformation and foreign interference, increasing protection of journalists and sanctioning the misuse of administrative resources;

    23. Welcomes the fact that the local elections of 6 October 2024 were competitive and effectively managed; regrets that they were held in an environment lacking social and political cohesion;

    24. Strongly condemns the RS entity’s actions undermining BiH’s constitutional order and the competences of state bodies, and its obstructionism towards the Constitutional Court of BiH; condemns all illegal actions that conflict with the constitutional framework and calls on all political actors in BiH to pursue a pro-European approach;

    25. Notes the limited progress on justice reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in relation to the independence, professionalism, efficiency and accountability of the judicial system; calls for urgent measures to accelerate reforms in these areas, ensuring full alignment with EU standards and strengthening the capacity of the judiciary to effectively serve justice and uphold the rule of law;

    26. Remains seriously concerned about corruption, notably high-level corruption, in BiH, which is a structural problem deeply embedded in the country’s highly complex governance system, and urges the relevant authorities to take a more decisive, coordinated, transparent and proactive stance in fighting it, including by improving anti-corruption legislation fully in line with international standards and recommendations and ensuring the effective implementation of laws, such as those on preventing conflicts of interest and protecting whistleblowers; encourages BiH to engage in structured cooperation and exchange of best practices with Member States; welcomes the Anti-Corruption Strategy 2024-2028 and the adoption of the action plan for its implementation, as well as ongoing international cooperation efforts;

    27. Regrets that the laws on public procurement, conflict of interest and the High Judicial Council are still not in line with European standards and urges the adoption of a new law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC) in accordance with the recommendations of the Venice Commission; calls for the establishment of an independently functioning Asset Declarations Department within the HJPC, and advocates for the impartial and effective prosecution of high-level corruption cases;

    28. Stresses the need to strengthen the system for managing conflicts of interest among individuals holding top executive functions, in particular by ensuring that statements of interests are subject to regular and substantive verification; underlines that all individuals holding top executive functions, whether elected or appointed, should be subject to uniform disclosure obligations, and that all such declarations should systematically be made public and easily accessible online, in the interest of transparency and public accountability;

    29. Urges BiH to step up the fight against organised crime; is deeply concerned by vulnerabilities to criminal infiltration in the political, legal and economic systems; commends the BiH authorities for signing a Cooperation Agreement on Eurojust on 24 October 2024 to increase the efficiency of investigations and prosecution in the fields of organised crime, terrorism, trafficking in human beings, cybercrime and other criminal activities;

    30. Stresses that cooperation with the EU in the fight against drugs trafficking must be improved; calls for BiH to appoint a correspondent agent as part of its cooperation with the European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA);

    31. Welcomes the new Law on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Terrorism Financing and urges BiH to strengthen measures in this area, including the adoption of the necessary by-laws required for the effective implementation of the law, with particular attention to effective enforcement and monitoring; stresses, in particular, the need to fully align the anti-terrorism legislation with the EU acquis and international law; calls for the establishment of stricter sanctions for terrorism offences;

    32. Welcomes the adoption of BiH’s Law on Border Control aimed at improving compliance with European standards, and calls for full alignment with the EU’s visa policy as part of a controlled migration policy; stresses that BiH must uphold security at its borders and cooperate with Frontex and neighbouring countries to prevent irregular migration while ensuring sufficient access to asylum procedures for those eligible for international protection;

    33. Stresses the need to ensure that the appointment of senior police officials, particularly in the Border Police and the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), is based on merit and conducted through open, standardised and transparent selection procedures;

    34. Recalls the need for a professional and depoliticised civil service; welcomes the steps taken in public administration reform; calls for the administrative burden in public administration to be reduced; calls on the BiH authorities to improve public authorities’ responsiveness to information requests;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    35. Strongly condemns discrimination, violence and hate speech against all minorities; calls for the effective prosecution of such incidents; urges BiH to promote and safeguard the human rights, non-discrimination and protection of all minorities; calls for enhanced implementation of anti-discrimination mechanisms in BiH, with a particular focus on combating intolerance, hate speech and all forms of inequality; calls on the authorities to improve access to social, housing, education and healthcare services for all minorities and vulnerable groups; emphasises the importance of protecting the cultural and linguistic expression of all minorities in BiH;

    36. Expresses deep concern over the sharp increase in violence – including emerging forms of digital violence – against women, children, seniors and other vulnerable groups, including the LGBTIQ community; urges the BiH authorities to align their policies, legislation and practices on combating sexual and digital violence against women and girls with Council of Europe standards, particularly the Istanbul Convention, relevant ECtHR case law and the EU acquis; calls for targeted support to key institutions, for training professionals to provide victims with effective support, and for increased public awareness and institutional capacity to prevent and combat all forms of gender-based violence; stresses the key role of women’s associations in reaching out to the most vulnerable; calls on BiH to establish an official centralised data collection system on femicide; welcomes the 9 April 2025 decision of the government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) to include femicide in the criminal code and calls on the Parliament to urgently approve this new law;

    37. Regrets that the 2023-2027 gender action plan has so far lacked funding and monitoring; calls for an increase in the public and political participation of women in BiH; recognises the additional barriers and discrimination faced by women from ethnic minorities, particularly in accessing services;

    38. Condemns the RS entity’s adoption of legislative amendments that have removed gender identity as a protected characteristic, and those that no longer guarantee protection for children of diverse sexual orientations and gender identities;

    39. Calls on the relevant BiH authorities to develop and adopt the pending national action plan on the protection of the rights of the child; stresses that poverty and social exclusion affect a high percentage of children in the country, especially children from vulnerable groups, including Roma, children with disabilities, children in conflict with the law, and children on the move; recalls that BiH must uphold its international commitments so that no child is left behind;

    40. Emphasises the importance of inclusive and quality education, including the right to education in the mother tongue, and inter alia the importance of systematically reforming divisive curricula that seriously hamper internal mobility and limit critical thinking skills; reiterates its call for an end to the segregation practice of the ‘two schools under one roof’ system, which hampers social cohesion and equal opportunities, and stresses the need to favour reconciliation and integration and protect the right of every national community, including minorities, to their culture, language and identity; calls for the adoption of a common curriculum in history textbooks based on court-established facts related to the war as a means of avoiding historical revisionism and encourages the EU to support this initiative;

    41. Calls on BiH to guarantee the freedoms of assembly, association and expression, enabling the inclusion of civil society in policymaking; calls on the authorities to ensure meaningful, systematic and inclusive public consultation processes; condemns the RS entity’s reintroduction of a Russian-style law on ‘foreign agents’ and urges the authorities to repeal it; condemns the RS entity authorities’ use of criminalised defamation laws as a tool to stifle freedom of expression and calls for restoring criminalised defamation solely to the domain of civil law to prevent its misuse in restricting freedom of expression; calls on the Commission to attach strict conditionality to the revocation of these laws;

    42. Encourages the BiH Council of Ministers to adopt the Strategy for the Development of an Enabling Environment for Civil Society, ensuring that it unequivocally focuses on improving the legislative framework and securing more substantial and transparent funding for CSOs; calls for stronger protection of human rights defenders in BiH, including women activists, journalists and NGOs;

    43. Stresses the key importance of independent media and of respecting freedom of expression standards; calls on BiH to ensure the financial sustainability, emphasising the urgent financial crisis of the state-level public broadcaster BHRT, and political independence of public broadcasters and the Communications Regulatory Agency of BiH; calls on BiH to adopt legislation on media ownership transparency and public funding of the media; urges the state to accelerate the adoption of the Law on Electronic Communications, in line with the Digital Services Act[8] (DSA) and the new EU Media Freedom Act[9]; calls for ensuring pluralism in public media throughout the territory of BiH, including equal representation of all minorities; notes the appointment of the Public Broadcaster Board in FBiH after 12 years of blockages and calls on it to ensure impartial and objective information;

    44. Is strongly concerned by Russian propaganda in the RS entity’s public broadcaster and deplores the broadcasting of the RT (formerly Russia Today) channel, in violation of EU sanctions;

    45. Condemns the political pressure, attacks, intimidation, threats, demeaning remarks and strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) against journalists and media workers, especially by high-level politicians or their proxy organisations, and by foreign-aligned actors; regrets the lack of progress in guaranteeing freedom of expression and in amending the criminal laws to strengthen the protection of journalists from threats and attacks, in line with EU requirements, and calls on the authorities to adopt laws that effectively protect journalists, NGOs, human rights defenders, environmental activists and other stakeholders against SLAPPs; stresses the importance of ensuring appropriate judicial follow-up in cases of threats and violence against journalists;

    46. Urges BiH to ensure and effectively enforce relevant laws on general human rights; urges BiH to prosecute discriminatory crimes;

    47. Recalls the need for solidarity-based and fair migration and asylum management that combines upholding human rights with effective border control; calls on the EU to help BiH to take full responsibility for the management of reception centres, which are often at the border with the EU, to ensure sufficient reception conditions, and to guarantee access to effective and feasible asylum procedures in full respect for international law and human rights; is concerned about reports of insufficient reception conditions in the EU-funded centre in Lipa; stresses the need to increase transparency and democratic scrutiny in the allocation and implementation of EU funds in the field of migration; welcomes BiH’s upgraded status agreement with the Frontex and calls for its prompt signature; recalls that any eventual agreement with this agency should fully respect fundamental rights and international standards; urges BiH to step up its efforts against cross-border crime, especially human trafficking;

    Reconciliation, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations

    48. Recalls that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation are essential elements of the EU enlargement process;

    49. Stresses the importance of reconciliation in BiH and urges all authorities to actively promote and guarantee access to truth, justice and inclusive redress, including the adoption of a state-level law establishing minimum rights for wartime victims across the country, and the promotion of a women’s culture of remembrance; recognises that accountability as well as mutual respect among individuals and communities, and the promotion of mutual understanding, particularly among young people, can have a positive effect towards reconciliation; urges the BiH authorities to adopt a national transitional justice strategy; calls for further efforts to address the issue of missing persons; urges the Commission to invest additional efforts in promoting, supporting and facilitating reconciliation processes in BiH;

    50. Calls on the authorities of BiH to accelerate the prosecution of war crimes in accordance with the Revised State Strategy for Prosecuting War Crimes; highlights the importance of enhanced regional cooperation through the extradition of suspects, as well as cooperation between judicial authorities and exchange in all relevant formal aspects aimed at prosecution; encourages BiH authorities to align their legislation to ensure that all victims of war crimes have equal access to rights and protections;

    51. Recognises the extremely important role played by the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP), including by ensuring the institutional capacity, supporting families and providing evidence to Courts; urges the EU to ensure that the ICMP has access to sufficient funding to continue its activities;

    52. Reiterates its call for additional measures and concrete programmes to be implemented with regard to the sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons, access to healthcare and employment, social protection and education, and for full respect of all their rights to compensation for non-returnable property;

    53. Deplores all forms of historical revisionism, genocide denial, irredentism, glorification of war crimes and criminals, and contestation of facts or the independence and impartiality of international and domestic tribunals, especially by political leaders;

    54. Is concerned about the adoption of the ‘Declaration on the Protection of National and Political Rights and the Common Future of the Serbian People’ which is in violation of several aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement and undermines BiH’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity; notes that the ideas of Srpski Svet are incompatible with aspirations to join the EU; calls on Serbia to be constructively committed to the stability and territorial integrity of BiH and actively support BiH’s accession path;

    55. Emphasises the importance of preventive diplomacy in Bosnia and Herzegovina; calls on the EEAS to strengthen skills development among staff to improve the EU’s understanding of the local historical, cultural and religious contexts, as emphasised in the report on the role of preventive diplomacy adopted by Parliament in January 2024;

    56. Welcomes the UN General Assembly’s decision to designate 11 July as the International Day of Reflection and Commemoration of the 1995 Genocide in Srebrenica; calls on the authorities to ensure the security of the Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial Centre; emphasises that the Memorial Centre has had to temporarily close as a result of security concerns;

    57. Emphasises that regional cooperation via the common regional market is a beneficial attribution to promoting economic growth; calls on BiH to swiftly ratify all regional mobility agreements under the Berlin Process and to further strengthen economic cooperation through this market, in line with the objectives of EU enlargement;

    Socio-economic reforms

    58. Welcomes the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which includes the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, envisaging an indicative allocation for more than EUR 1 billion for BiH; regrets that BiH remains the only country in the Western Balkans that has not adopted a reform agenda; urges the Council of ministers and the cantons of BiH to unblock the adoption of its reform agenda without further delay in order to avoid its funding allocation being distributed among the other Western Balkan countries, and to establish a robust mechanism for transparent, inclusive and timely monitoring of its implementation; emphasises the need to prioritise key areas such as public administration, the rule of law, anti-corruption, decarbonisation, digitalisation, connectivity and human capital development, while also addressing social challenges; believes that embracing the opportunities of the Growth Plan would enhance BiH’s economy; calls on the Commission to explore ways of cooperating with willing and committed regional authorities, making more flexible use of the Reform and Growth Facility;

    59. Recalls that EU funding for projects in the RS entity should remain frozen until the reversal of democratic backsliding by the RS entity and until full alignment with the CFSP;

    60. Encourages BiH to make best use of all EU financial support; calls on the Commission to continue providing financial and technical support for BiH’s EU integration based on clearly defined conditionality and rigorous monitoring of spending and results, in line with the EU objectives of efficient and accountable budget management; believes that EU funds should better support the democratic reforms of the country; in that context, calls for the relevant EU funding to be reprogrammed to redirect more funds towards supporting technical assistance in absorbing the funds, judiciary reforms and anti-corruption measures; calls, furthermore, for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for fruitful cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in order to ensure that the EPPO can effectively exercise its competences in accession countries; encourages BiH to swiftly conclude bilateral working arrangements with the EPPO;

    61. Regrets that sustainable improvement and progress in this area is also hindered by the governance structure and a lack of country-wide strategies in all areas and on all levels; calls for the swift appointment of an IPA III coordinator and calls for better absorption of IPA III funds in BiH, including at local and regional levels; calls for the capacity of local and regional authorities to implement socio-economic reforms and manage projects co-financed from EU funds to be strengthened, in order to increase absorption and reduce regional inequalities;

    62. Urges BiH to prioritise measures aimed at improving competitiveness and the business environment, while improving economic and social cohesion, including progress towards the European Pillar of Social Rights, boosting economic diversification, promoting the digital and green transitions, addressing the informal economy and tackling unemployment;

    63. Expresses concern at the extremely negative demographic trends in the country, prompted in particular by the large number of young people leaving, and stresses the importance of the urgent adoption of additional measures to address this challenge; calls for a focus on youth as the driving force for EU integration in the country; calls on BiH to finalise and adopt the Youth Guarantee to improve access to employment, education, training and apprenticeships for young people, address high youth unemployment and skills mismatches and to promote social inclusion;

    64. Encourages EU institutions to work with civil society and experts to develop avenues to make health and social protections flexible and portable, to ensure equality and mobility within BiH;

    65. Welcomes the calls for the prompt integration of all Western Balkans into the EU’s Digital Single Market before actual EU membership, which would crucially benefit the creation of safe digital environment;

    Energy, the environment, biodiversity, sustainable development and connectivity

    66. Encourages BiH to accelerate the diversification of energy sources, particularly regarding ending its gas dependence on Russia; urges BiH to enhance energy security and efficiency by strengthening its electricity transmission and distribution grids, coupling with the European market and transitioning to renewables, particularly to solar and wind, while ensuring meaningful public consultations and effective environmental safeguards;

    67. Urges BiH to adopt its long-overdue national energy and climate plan and implement countrywide environmental protection strategies, including by legally protecting its candidate Emerald sites, improving the adequacy of its Emerald network, and ensuring the full implementation of the Habitats Directive[10], the Birds Directive[11] and the Water Framework Directive[12], while improving the quality and transparency of environmental investments; reiterates the need for effective air and water quality protection and improvement, and for effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for breaches of environmental law; notes that progress in the area of environmental and climate protection as well as alignment with the EU standards has remained low, and therefore urges BiH’s authorities to ensure greater alignment with EU standards and policy objectives on climate protection and energy in line with the 2020 Green Agenda and the Paris Agreement;

    68. Calls on the BiH authorities to reduce transboundary air pollution, especially in the case of Bosanski Brod oil refinery; recalls that BiH is a signatory party of the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo, 1991) and is bound by its obligations;

    69. Underlines the need to improve ex ante comprehensive strategic environmental assessments with the meaningful involvement of local communities, civil society organisations and independent experts; highlights the need to increase the transparency of procedures for infrastructure projects across eco-sensitive sectors; stresses the importance of increasing environmental mainstreaming across sectoral policies;

    70. Urges the country to implement measures to protect the biodiversity and ecologic integrity of rivers in line with the Espoo Convention;

    71. Expresses deep concern about the harmful impact of mining activities, including those conducted by foreign companies, on the environment in BiH and the health of its citizens; calls on all mining entities operating in BiH to fully comply with national legislation and to prioritise environmental protection and public health;

    72. Stresses the urgent need for the FBiH to adopt a fair, modern and expert-driven law on forests; further calls for stronger protection of forests and rivers through improved inspection oversight and the creation of a stringent legal framework in line with environmental and systemic standards; calls for the abolition of the provision in the relevant regulation in the FBiH that permits the release of waste water into rivers with minimal oversight, thereby posing a significant threat to public health and the environment;

    73.  Calls upon BiH to urgently finalise and adopt the legal designation of Livanjsko Polje as a Category V Protected Landscape, ensure appropriate monitoring;

    74. Stands in solidarity with BiH and all victims of the devastating floods and landslides of 3-4 October 2024; calls on the Federation of BiH authorities to increase support for those affected and ensure that any shortcomings in law enforcement and forest management that may have exacerbated the disaster are addressed;

    °

    ° °

    75. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the Presidency, Council of Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the governments and parliaments of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republika Srpska entity and the Brčko District, and the Office of the High Representative.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Albania – A10-0106/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Albania

    (2025/2017(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Albania, of the other part[1],

     having regard to Albania’s application for EU membership, submitted on 24 April 2009,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)[2],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans[3],

     having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Albania 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0690),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report’ (COM(2024)0800), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Albania’ (SWD(2024)0828),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Albania 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0690),

     having regard to the Reform Agenda of Albania submitted under the EU’s Reform and Growth Facility, as approved by the Commission on 23 October 2024,

     having regard to the final report of 29 September 2023 by the Election Observation Mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on Albania’s local elections of 14 May 2023,

     having regard to the final report of 26 July 2021 by the Election Observation Mission of the OSCE/ODIHR on Albania’s parliamentary elections of 25 April 2021,

     having regard to the Joint Opinion of the Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR of 11 December 2020 on the amendments to the Albanian constitution of 30 July 2020 and the amendments to Albania’s electoral code of 5 October 2020,

     having regard to the Sofia Declaration adopted at the EU-Western Balkans summit of 17 May 2018, and the Sofia Priority Agenda annexed thereto,

     having regard to the Zagreb Declaration adopted at the EU-Western Balkans summit of 6 May 2020,

     having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits held in Brussels on 13 December 2023 and 18 December 2024,

     having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

     having regard to Reporters Without Borders’ 2024 World Press Freedom Index,

     having regard to Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index,

     having regard to the 2024 Global Gender Gap Report of the World Economic Forum,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Albania,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0106/2025),

     

    A. whereas enlargement is the most effective EU foreign policy instrument and a geostrategic investment in long-term peace, democracy, stability and security throughout the continent;

    B. whereas the EU remains the main political and economic partner of the Western Balkan countries; whereas the EU continues to be by far Albania’s biggest trade and investment partner and its largest provider of financial assistance;

    C. whereas enlargement is a merit-based process based on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; whereas Albania’s EU accession depends on lasting, in-depth and irreversible reforms across fundamental areas, starting with the rule of law and the functioning of democratic institutions;

    D. whereas Albania has been an EU candidate country since 2014, began accession negotiations in July 2022 and successfully completed the screening process in November 2023;

    E. whereas Albania opened negotiations on ‘Cluster 1: Fundamentals’ on 15 October 2024 and on ‘Cluster 6: External Relations’ on 17 December 2024;

    F. whereas Albania is a reliable foreign policy partner and is fully aligned with the EU’s common foreign and security policy;

    G. whereas Albania has been a target of foreign malign influence campaigns aiming to sow discord, provoke tensions and violence and destabilise the whole region, including Russian disinformation and election meddling, as well as questionable investments from non-EU actors such as China; whereas Russian and Iranian cyber attacks against Albania in 2022 and 2023 disrupted critical government functions, illustrating the hybrid threat environment Albania faces as it progresses toward EU integration;

    H. whereas electoral shortcomings and serious vulnerabilities persist in Albania’s electoral system; whereas the OSCE/ODIHR recommendations to further improve the conduct of elections in Albania have not yet been fully addressed;

    I. whereas Albania participates in EU common security and defence policy missions and operations, including in EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

    J. whereas protection of national and ethnic minorities is crucial for aspiring EU Member States; whereas the implementing legislation on free self-identification and the use of minority languages has been adopted in Albania;

    K. whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine highlights the critical importance of EU enlargement for ensuring security and stability on our continent;

    1. Welcomes Albania’s unwavering commitment to EU integration, reflecting consensus among all political parties, both governmental and opposition, and overwhelming support among citizens, and commends its consistent full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy and promotion of the rules-based international order, including its categorical response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine through its alignment with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus; acknowledges the country’s active role in the region and in regional initiatives;

    2. Welcomes Albania’s ambition of closing accession negotiations by the end of 2027 and the swift progress made in recent years, notably the opening of two clusters of negotiating chapters in 2024; recalls that candidate countries undergo in-depth transformations to fulfil membership criteria during accession negotiations, which last as long as it takes to implement the necessary reforms; stresses the need to strengthen the transparency, accountability and inclusiveness of the accession process, including its parliamentary dimension; cautions against any actions that could undermine the system of checks and balances;

    3. Notes that the pace of EU accession is determined by the candidate country’s progress on aligning with the EU acquis, its track record on implementing it and the due functioning of all the country’s institutions, and is grounded in the rule of law, good governance and fundamental rights; urges Albania to accelerate reforms to strengthen the rule of law and economic growth, counter corruption and organised crime, prevent human trafficking, ensure the protection of fundamental rights and make progress in the areas of freedom of expression, freedom of information and media pluralism and independence;

    4. Welcomes the EU’s new Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, which will provide EUR 922 million in grants and loans to Albania when it meets the conditions set out in its ambitious Reform Agenda;

    5. Takes note of Albania’s adoption of the National Plan for European Integration 2024-2026; welcomes the fact that Albania has established the bodies in charge of the integration process; calls for greater efforts to increase transparency and engage in public communication on EU integration;

    6. Welcomes the decision to open the European Parliament’s antenna office for the Western Balkans in Tirana; notes that the office will serve as a key contact point between the European Parliament and national parliaments, civil society and local partners from across the Western Balkans region; 

    7. Welcomes the involvement of 18 Albanian participants in the Enlargement Candidate Members initiative launched by the European Economic and Social Committee, which aims to foster closer ties with candidate countries and facilitate their gradual integration into the EU;

    Democratic institutions, media and civil society

    8. Insists on the importance of constructive political debate and orderly parliamentary conduct as key aspects of democratic governance; reaffirms the joint responsibility of Albania’s political forces to strengthen constructive and inclusive political dialogue and overcome ongoing high political polarisation in the country; deplores the continued confrontations and inflammatory rhetoric by politicians from all parties and the clashes between the ruling majority and the opposition; underlines the need to foster a political culture based on mutual respect and adherence to democratic norms, ensuring that political competition does not undermine institutional stability, and to demonstrate full respect for the role of parliamentarism, by putting an end to political attacks; calls for genuine dialogue to promote political stability and progress, emphasising the need for cross-party consensus on the EU integration agenda and the meaningful involvement of civil society; emphasises the need for more effective parliamentary oversight and improved functioning of institutions;

    9. Recognises the growing threat of foreign malign influence and hybrid interference in Albania’s democratic institutions; highlights that Kremlin-aligned narratives have sought to erode public confidence in democratic institutions and promote anti-Western sentiment; calls on Albania to enhance institutional resilience against covert political funding, media manipulation and cyber threats that directly impact its EU accession process; calls for the EU institutions to closely monitor Albania’s exposure to foreign malign influence;

    10. Welcomes Albania’s blocking of  Russian disinformation domains but stresses the need for a coordinated EU-Albania disinformation response mechanism, modelled on the EUvsDisinfo platform, to rapidly debunk and counteract Kremlin narratives; advocates for increased regional cooperation among Western Balkan countries to share best practice and develop joint strategies in combating disinformation and foreign interference; warns of the increasing footprint of Chinese state-backed media in Albania;

    11. Emphasises the Albanian Parliament’s duty to respect the rulings of the Constitutional Court without delay; stresses the fundamental and irreplaceable role of parliament in safeguarding checks and balances; calls on Albania to ensure genuine democratic accountability and stronger, more transparent governance;

    12. Takes note of the July 2024 amendments to Albania’s electoral code, which enable out-of-country voting by the Albanian diaspora and introduce partially open candidate lists; takes note of the parliamentary elections of 11 May 2025 and underlines that, based on the preliminary conclusions of the OSCE/ODIHR, the elections were competitive and professionally conducted but took place in a highly polarised environment and contestants did not enjoy a level playing field; expresses concern that the ruling party benefited from the widespread use of administrative resources; calls on all parties to demonstrate political will for a comprehensive and inclusive electoral reform to implement all recommendations from the OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission fully and in a timely manner, including those on the electoral and party financing framework;

    13. Regrets that the environment for free media and independent journalists has been declining in recent years; notes with concern that media independence and pluralism in Albania continue to be affected by high market concentration, the overlap of business and political interests, lack of transparency of funding and ownership, intimidation and precarious working conditions for journalists; notes that, according to the 2024 Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index, Albania ranks 99th, reflecting ongoing issues related to media ownership concentration, political interference and threats against journalists; highlights that the lack of transparency in media financing and ownership structures increases the risk of editorial bias and foreign propaganda penetration and undermines public trust in journalism; calls on the Albanian authorities to ensure media ownership transparency and enforce a policy of zero tolerance for the intimidation of journalists; calls on the Albanian Government to support independent fact-checking platforms as a means to ensure public access to accurate information and to uphold the integrity of the information space;

    14. Recalls that any revision of media laws should be in line with the Venice Commission recommendations and should take place in a transparent and inclusive manner in consultation with media organisations, with the aim of improving media freedom and self-regulation; welcomes the Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists launched by the Council of Europe, together with the EU and a network of prominent press freedom organisations; regrets  that there has been no progress in aligning the legislative framework with the EU acquis and EU standards, including the European Media Freedom Act[4]; recalls the need to strengthen investigative journalism, fact-checking and media literacy and to tackle hate speech, disinformation and fake news; expresses concern over enduring inflammatory anti-media rhetoric, including by high-level politicians, public officials and other public figures, which fuels the culture of intimidation; strongly condemns the increasing verbal attacks against journalists reporting on rule of law and corruption matters, as well as misogynistic online harassment targeting women journalists, smear campaigns, violence and rioting, and calls for the final convictions of the attackers to be ensured; regrets that the criminal code does not provide protection to journalists against threats and violence, calls on the authorities to adopt a legal framework that efficiently protects journalists, human rights defenders, environmental activists and other stakeholders against the concerning increase of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), to decriminalise defamation and to respect the role of independent journalism as a crucial check on power and to engage with the media in a manner that upholds democratic principles;

    15. Recalls the responsibility of national and local authorities to improve transparency, accountability and inclusiveness by conducting meaningful and regular public stakeholder consultations; notes with concern that the Albanian Parliament’s implementation of the legal framework for public consultations remains predominantly formal; stresses the need for greater transparency regarding public data and key legislative projects; insists that the financial resources, administrative capacity and fiscal autonomy of local authorities should be improved;

    16. Welcomes Albania’s vibrant and constructive civil society, which plays a crucial and positive role in the reform process; welcomes the improvement of electoral monitoring and the increasing participation of civil society in overseeing the democratic process; underlines that civil society is vital in fostering democracy and pluralism and promoting good governance and social progress; encourages the Albanian Government to bolster the role of civil society, including women’s rights organisations, in the EU accession process, from an early stage and in a transparent legislative process; regrets that civil society organisations operate in a challenging environment and receive limited public funding; insists that the groundwork for an effective VAT exemption system be laid in compliance with the commitments taken by Albania under the EU-Albania Cooperation Agreement and the IPA III; urges the authorities to speed up the drafting of the 2024-2027 roadmap for the government policy towards a more enabling environment for civil society development and to closely monitor the implementation of this roadmap;

    17. Welcomes the establishment of the new position of Minister of State for Public Administration and Anti-Corruption and underlines the importance of its effectiveness and of delivering public administration and anti-corruption reforms; remains concerned, however, that there has been limited progress in public administration reform; insists that the Albanian authorities effectively implement provisions on merit-based recruitment and review the effectiveness of the current monitoring structures for the new public administration and anti-corruption reforms; underlines the need to foster a culture of accountability, non-partisan access to public information and scrutiny of public institutions, including with regard to the implementation of the Reform Agenda; notes that public entities need to improve their compliance with transparency requirements and their responsiveness to information requests;

    18. Regrets that limited progress has been made in aligning the legal framework for procurement with the EU acquis; expresses concern over the newly introduced temporary exemptions in public procurement law; calls on the Albanian authorities to improve competitive procurement procedures in line with the EU acquis;

    19. Welcomes the progress made by Albania in improving data transmission to Eurostat;

    Fundamental rights

    20. Notes that Albania’s legal framework for gender-based violence is not yet fully aligned with the Istanbul Convention; expresses serious concern that violence against women remains a pressing issue, with the number of femicides remaining high; welcomes the establishment of a femicide watch by the Ombudsperson; urges the enhancement of support services for victims, particularly healthcare, shelter funding, free legal aid, and victim reintegration and rehabilitation; stresses the need for increased financial and institutional support to be given to prevention programmes, public awareness campaigns, and specialised training for law enforcement and judicial authorities to ensure a victim-centred approach;

    21. Expresses concern about persistent shortcomings, such as non-alignment or partial alignment with the EU acquis, regarding persons with disabilities and gender equality; recognises the need for Albania to fully align its legal framework on gender-based violence with the Istanbul Convention; notes that, according to the World Economic Forum’s 2024 Global Gender Gap Report, Albania has fallen six places to rank 23rd globally, indicating a widening gender gap; expresses serious concern that violence against women remains a pressing issue, with the number of femicides remaining high; calls for the full and effective implementation of existing legislation, including stricter enforcement of protective measures and enhanced judicial responsiveness to gender-based violence cases, as highlighted in the European Commission’s 2024 report on Albania;

    22. Welcomes the adoption of a new and better-financed national action plan for LGBTI+ persons; regrets, however, that there has been no progress in initiating the necessary legislation in this field and calls on the authorities to adopt the necessary legislation on the recognition of gender identity and sex characteristics, as well as on same-sex partnerships/marriages; deplores the fact that LGBTI+ persons continue to face threats and derogatory media campaigns, with public institutions failing to provide adequate protection; notes that women living in rural and remote areas, Roma and Egyptian women and LGBTI+ individuals continue to face limited access to primary healthcare; urges public institutions to demonstrate strong commitment to protecting LGBTI+ rights and to act decisively against discriminatory and hateful language towards the LGBTI+ community;

    23. Welcomes the adoption of the pending implementing legislation on the rights of persons belonging to minorities, specifically on self-identification and the use of minority languages, and underscores that these by-laws have to be fully and effectively implemented in order to render the exercise of minority and education rights feasible in practice; calls on the authorities to increase the capacity of the State Committee on National Minorities; expresses concern over persistent issues of discrimination and social exclusion affecting minority groups in Albania; calls on the Albanian Government to fully respect and protect human rights, including the rights of minorities, and to ensure that all allegations of human rights abuses, including hate speech, are promptly and thoroughly investigated; urges the Albanian authorities to enhance institutional mechanisms to prevent discrimination and ensure the meaningful political participation of all communities, in line with the recommendations of the Commission’s 2024 report on Albania; calls on Albania to protect and promote the cultural heritage, languages and traditions of its national minorities; calls on Albania to provide education for national minorities in minority languages and to ensure adequate access to state primary, secondary and higher education for all of its citizens; 

     

    24. Recalls that Albania should safeguard the right to property, in particular, by making decisive progress on first registration and compensation, improving the transparency of the state cadastre and the quality of the property register cadastral data, and ensuring that the right to a fair trial and the right to effective remedy are respected in cases of expropriation and removal of properties;

    25. Calls for increased investment in the modernisation of the education system, ensuring its quality and inclusiveness; calls on Albania to implement measures to foster opportunities in employment and education for persons with disabilities;

    26. Commends the successful 2024 census held in an atmosphere of trust and transparency and its results; believes that Albania should serve as a positive model for conducting a population census in the region;

    27. Welcomes the adoption of the law on personal data protection, aimed at full alignment with the EU acquis; commends the Albanian authorities for the adoption of the implementing legislation on the procedure and fair compensation for the use of orphan works and the database of copyright works, but expresses serious concern about the handling of personal data and weaknesses in IT systems; calls on the Albanian authorities to strengthen safeguards against data breaches, enhance prevention and public awareness, and improve institutional capacity in order to effectively implement the new Law on Personal Data Protection; calls on Albania to further collaborate with the EU Intellectual Property Office;

    28. Recognises the closer cooperation between Albania and the EU in managing migration flows and border control processes, in particular through the new national strategy on migration for 2024‑2026 and cooperation with Frontex; takes note of the Italy-Albania Memorandum of Understanding;

    Rule of law

    29. Commends the progress Albania has achieved in the implementation of the justice reforms aimed at strengthening the independence, transparency and accountability of the judiciary, including on the vetting process, completed at first instance; welcomes the new reform process ‘Good governance, rule of law and anti-corruption for Albania 2030’ launched by the Albanian Parliament; stresses that any initiative to strengthen governance, rule of law and anti-corruption efforts must be built on inclusivity, transparency and collaboration;

    30. Expresses concern about continued political interference with and pressure on the judicial system; notes with concern  shortcomings in the merit-based appointments of non-magistrate members of the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecution Council and their integrity;

    31. Calls for urgent steps to ensure judicial independence and institutional integrity;

    32. Highlights that Albania ranked 80th in Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, indicating the need for substantial progress in combating high-level corruption and ensuring judicial independence; underscores the key work of Albania’s Special Anti-Corruption and Organised Crime Structure (SPAK) in building up a track record of investigating, prosecuting and convicting in high-level corruption cases as well as cases involving the protection of the EU’s financial interests; stresses the importance of ensuring the full independence of anti-corruption institutions and encourages the strengthening of their operational and investigative capacity; welcomes high-level corruption investigations and proceedings; stresses that increasing the number of final convictions of high-level officials remains an important priority;  urges all actors to refrain from any actions that undermine the work of independent institutions such as SPAK; expresses its regret at the environment of intimidation that the judiciary operates in, and at instances of undue pressure that it endures, which pose a serious threat to judicial independence; expresses concern that the lack of institutional support for magistrates facing threats weakens public trust and seriously jeopardises the rule of law and Albania’s EU integration process;

    33. Notes the challenges concerning the quality and efficiency of the justice system, including the high number of judicial vacancies, insufficient court staff, the quality of initial and continuous judicial training, the consistency of case-law and the lack of a modern integrated case management system; notes that budget allocations are insufficient, particularly for the court component; underlines that reducing the backlog of unprocessed files in the judicial system should remain a priority; welcomes, however, the fact that the Constitutional Court of Albania has improved its efficiency by reducing its backlog and continues to uphold institutional checks and balances;

    34. Welcomes the adoption of national legislation to align with the EU acquis on anti-money laundering; notes the need to establish a strong asset recovery office and to improve vetting procedures and the processes for investigating, prosecuting and obtaining convictions in high-level corruption cases, including through the seizure and final confiscation of criminal assets;

    35. Calls on Albania to continue aligning its legal framework, and notably the criminal code, with the EU acquis on the fight against organised crime and the trade in drugs and firearms, as well as combating cybercrime, extremism and terrorist threats; notes the appointment of additional prosecutors to the Special Prosecution Office as well as the establishment of a financial investigation unit; commends Albania’s participation in joint operations and cooperation under the European multidisciplinary platform against criminal threats (EMPACT) on drug trafficking, money laundering and cybercrime; further acknowledges the intensified cooperation with EUROPOL, EUROJUST, FRONTEX, INTERPOL and the CARIN Network in fighting organised crime and dismantling transnational crime networks; encourages Albania to strengthen its mechanisms for sharing intelligence with EU agencies to enhance regional stability; calls for sustained efforts to align Albania’s security policies with EU strategies, fostering a more integrated and resilient regional security framework; calls on Albania to strengthen the fight against human trafficking in cooperation with the Member States and EU agencies; stresses the need to counter the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, as Albania remains both a destination and a transit country; welcomes the adoption of a new strategy for the protection of victims of crime; emphasises the importance of continuous training for migration control personnel to ensure the effective implementation of European regulations and a stronger response to human trafficking networks;

    36. Encourages the European External Action Service and the Commission to further help boost Albania’s resilience against hybrid threats in the area of cyber security, information manipulation and protection of critical infrastructure; calls on Albania to assess the risks associated with foreign direct investment and to screen such investment, particularly in strategic sectors such as energy, mining and telecommunications, in order to avoid economic dependencies and debt traps and protect national interests, enhance security and ensure consistency with EU standards;

    37. Calls for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the accession countries with a view to facilitating close cooperation and the prosecution of misuse of EU funds; welcomes the fact that Albania has concluded a bilateral working arrangement with the EPPO;

    Socio-economic reforms

    38. Welcomes Albania’s engagement in implementing the EU’s Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, encompassing EU single market integration, regional economic integration, fundamental reforms and increased financial support;

    39. Reiterates the importance of improving the public infrastructure within the Western Balkan countries and developing connections with EU Member States; recalls the potential of the economic and investment plan for the Western Balkans to enhance regional connectivity through rail and road infrastructure; in that respect, urges the authorities in all countries to complete Corridor VIII connecting Albania, North Macedonia and Bulgaria; recalls the importance of improving flight connections between the Western Balkan countries and with the EU Member States;

    40. Welcomes Albania’s Reform Agenda addressing the business environment, human capital, digitalisation, energy and the green transition, fundamental rights and the rule of law; welcomes, furthermore, Albania’s participation in the EU’s Digital Europe programme; welcomes the fact that Albania has been ranked as a regional leader in public administration and digital public procurement by the Support for Improvement in Governance and Management programme, run by the EU and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development;

    41. Encourages the Albanian authorities to reduce the risk of poverty and social exclusion by further improving access to education and housing, as well as social and healthcare services, especially for disadvantaged populations and minority groups, including Roma and Egyptians; calls for the implementation of Albania’s National Social Protection Strategy 2024-2030 and National Employment and Skills Strategy 2023-2030; calls on Albania to adopt further measures to fight against youth unemployment and calls on the Albanian authorities to effectively implement the National Agenda for the Rights of the Child by providing assistance to children facing exclusion and poverty;

    42. Commends the Albanian authorities for the adoption of legislative acts to reform higher education and for the implementation of the National Strategy for Education 2021-2026; calls on Albania to expand media literacy as a core subject in school curricula while ensuring that teachers receive dedicated training and modern resources to deliver high-quality programmes; encourages collaboration with EU educational initiatives and regional networks such as the Western Balkans Media Literacy Observatory to implement best practices in critical thinking and digital literacy education;

    43. Welcomes the progress made by Albania in concluding bilateral agreements with EU Member States on social security and in its preparations to enable the connection of its employment services system to EURES, the European network of employment services;

    44. Welcomes the fact that Albania joined the Single Euro Payments Area in November 2024, which reduces costs for citizens and businesses and will contribute to Albania’s further integration into the single market; commends the Albanian authorities on the alignment with the EU acquis on payments (Payment Accounts Directive[5]) and on their actions that have resulted in Albania’s removal from the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force; recognises Albania’s efforts to improve economic competitiveness and calls on the government to continue with structural reforms to foster a more attractive business environment in line with EU standards; regrets that the inefficiency in public administration, an excessive regulatory framework, corruption and large informal economy undermines the business environment and impedes competition;

    45. Commends the improvement of Albania’s fiscal performance; calls on the Albanian authorities to further enhance fiscal risk analysis by strengthening the relevant Ministry of Finance department; calls for greater transparency and accountability of state-owned enterprises through annual financial reports; calls on Albania to strengthen its public internal financial control and to ensure that the recommendations of the Supreme Audit Institution (ALSAI) are implemented;

    46. Welcomes the further alignment of legislation with the EU acquis on private pension funds, bank recovery and the resolution framework; calls on Albania to complete its alignment with the EU acquis on insurance, capital markets, securities markets, investment funds and financial market infrastructures;

    47. Welcomes the agreement reached at the Tirana Summit on reduced roaming costs; in this respect, calls on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to work towards achieving the agreed targets of substantially reducing roaming charges for data and further reducing prices for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU to levels close to domestic prices by 2027; welcomes the implementation of the first phase of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    48. Is concerned about the lack of progress in company law legislation in Albania; calls on the Albanian authorities to complete the alignment of company law legislation with the EU acquis;

    Environment, biodiversity, energy and transport, sustainable tourism

    49. Stresses that more efforts are needed for Albania to align with the EU acquis on the environment; calls for its alignment with the EU’s Environmental Impact Assessment[6] and Strategic Environmental Assessment[7] directives; underlines the need to strengthen the fight against environmental crime;

    50. Highlights the need for transparent and inclusive public consultations in line with the Aarhus Convention, ensuring the active involvement of local communities, NGOs and scientific institutions in environmental decision-making processes, especially on projects with large environmental and socio-economic repercussions; warns that the lack of proper stakeholder engagement undermines governance standards and Albania’s compliance with its obligations under the EU acquis; expresses concern about the economic and environmental impact of non-competitive foreign-funded development projects;

    51. Recalls that substantial efforts are needed for Albania to achieve the goals relating to climate protection, energy efficiency, diversification and greening of energy supply and transport; notes that air and water quality and waste management remain particularly challenging issues for the country; urges the central government and local authorities to step up their efforts to improve air quality and reduce potentially lethal pollution; urges the Albanian Government to prioritise the implementation of climate adaptation strategies, the development of renewable energy sources and the modernisation of the country’s waste management system to meet EU standards and support sustainable economic growth; encourages the Albanian authorities to strengthen measures and investments to expand the public transport and railway systems;

    52. Firmly believes that environmental protection and sustainable tourism development must go hand in hand; welcomes the establishment of the first wild river national park in Europe, the Vjosa Wild River National Park, and calls for sufficient resources to be allocated to its protection; calls on the authorities to fully respect the national park’s ecological integrity and to reconsider infrastructure projects, notably the water abstraction project on the Shushica river, in line with international biodiversity conservation standards and best practice to ensure that the park’s biodiversity, habitats and ecological functions remain intact; reiterates its concern over the construction of the Vlora airport in the Vjosa-Narta Protected Area, in violation of national and international biodiversity protection norms, and calls on the Commission to address the issue in chapter 27 of the accession negotiations; calls on the Albanian authorities to adopt the implementing legislation for the Law on Cultural Heritage and Museums;

    53. Expresses serious concern regarding recent amendments to Albania’s Law on Protected Areas that allow large infrastructure and tourism projects in ecologically sensitive zones; calls for these legislative amendments to be reversed with a view to ensuring full and strict compliance with national and international legal frameworks and conservation standards and addressing marine waste pollution affecting neighbouring countries;

    54. Calls on the Albanian authorities to designate and effectively manage key protected areas for the survival of critically endangered species, in particular the Balkan lynx, including through comprehensive biodiversity monitoring programmes, and to implement and strictly enforce anti-poaching legislation; urges Albania to abandon the plans for the Skavica hydropower plant on the Black Drin river, given its severe ecological, social and cultural impacts, including the displacement of local communities;

    Regional cooperation and foreign policy

    55. Welcomes the Security and Defence Partnership between the EU and Albania, adopted on 19 November 2024, which establishes a platform for enhanced dialogue and cooperation on security and defence issues and represents a significant step forward; stresses the importance of ensuring that this partnership translates into concrete actions, including joint training initiatives, shared intelligence capabilities and enhanced border security measures to address regional and global security challenges; underlines the need for deeper security cooperation within the Western Balkans, fostering closer coordination among regional partners to combat organised crime, cyber threats, and hybrid challenges; calls for strengthened EU support for regional security initiatives that enhance stability and resilience across the Western Balkans; acknowledges that this partnership represents a significant step forward in strengthening Albania’s role as a reliable security partner of the EU; further emphasises that the partnership will, among other things, facilitate joint initiatives and capacity-building efforts, thereby contributing to a more resilient and integrated security architecture in the Western Balkans;

    56. Welcomes the adoption of the national security strategy in 2024 to further fight hybrid threats and the new law on cybersecurity; welcomes the joint declaration signed by Albania, Kosovo and Croatia, which aims to improve cooperation and strengthen defence potential, while providing full support for Euro-Atlantic and regional defence integration;

    57. Commends Albania’s full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, including its support for EU sanctions against third countries, and its positive contribution to common security and defence policy missions, particularly EUFOR Althea, which underlines the country’s commitment to contributing to regional and international security and stability, and welcomes Albania’s participation in operations led by the EU and by NATO, and its collaboration with Europol and Interpol; calls for its further participation in EU-led crisis management operations and common security and defence policy missions such as the maritime security operation EUNAVFOR Aspides; recognises the strategic importance of the Adriatic-Ionian region for European security and economic stability; calls on Albania to enhance its maritime security capabilities in coordination with the EU and NATO;

    58. Welcomes the Albanian Government’s continued efforts in promoting good neighbourly relations; recalls, in this respect, the importance of Albania’s undertaking to resolve any border disputes in conformity with the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes and in accordance with the UN Charter and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, including, if necessary, by following the judgments of the International Court of Justice; welcomes Albania’s active contribution to the Berlin Process; further encourages sustained and constructive engagement in regional cooperation initiatives, in line with EU values and enlargement objectives, as it contributes to peace, security and stability in the Western Balkans; cautions against any actions, such as the Open Balkans initiative, that could undermine the common regional market or deviate from the Berlin Process, to the extent that they create obstacles to EU integration and cohesion, potentially jeopardising Albania’s progress toward deeper regional and European integration;

    59. Welcomes the ratification by Albania of bilateral agreements on the coordination of social security systems with Croatia, Montenegro and Bulgaria;

    60. Emphasises Albania’s constructive role in promoting stability and cooperation in the Western Balkans, particularly through bilateral dialogue with neighbouring countries and its engagement in regional organisations;

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    ° °

    61. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, to the Council, to the Commission, to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, to the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Albania.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Djibouti: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 25, 2025

    A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

    The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.

    Washington, DC: Djibouti has been navigating regional tensions well, with robust growth, moderate inflation, and recovering reserves. In response to global uncertainties and domestic debt challenges, the authorities plan significant fiscal consolidation, including leveraging state-owned enterprises (SOE) dividends meaningfully, and advancing creditor dialogue. The authorities remain dedicated to investing in human capital and creating favorable investment conditions for job creation.  

    Djibouti’s economic resilience and contribution to regional stability 

    Djibouti helps maintain regional stability by supporting maritime security and facilitating humanitarian responses during crises. Djibouti’s GDP per capita has effectively doubled over the past decade thanks to significant investments that have contributed to the modernization of the economy. However, declining government revenues and increasing debt service have placed considerable strain on public finances, leading to unsustainable levels of public debt and diminishing reserves. Growth has not created enough jobs in the formal sector, while fiscal space to finance development needs is limited.

    The authorities are leveraging Djibouti’s growth resilience to advance fiscal consolidation and rebuild reserves. Growth is expected to have exceeded 6.5 percent in 2024 due to increased transshipments amid Red Sea tensions, while moderate international food and energy prices kept inflation in check. The government deficit was reduced from 3.5 percent of GDP in 2023 to 2.6 percent in 2024 following a brief period of fiscal overruns and deficit monetization, and reserves have begun to recover partially offsetting the decline observed since late 2023, though they remain below the monetary base. 

    The outlook is positive but subject to risks in an uncertain global context. Growth is projected to remain dynamic at around 6 percent this year and to continue over the medium term, albeit at a slower pace. Ethiopia’s robust economy is expected to boost Djibouti’s port activities; however, fiscal consolidation and the phasing out of large-scale investments may temper growth. Key risks include regional conflicts potentially increasing migration and affecting social stability amid a constrained fiscal space, and trade policy shifts that could depreciate the dollar and Djibouti franc, enhancing service exports but also raising inflation. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that Djibouti has successfully navigated several shocks over the past few years, including COVID-19, the 2022 Tigray crisis, the Ukraine war, and the 2024 Red Sea maritime disruptions.

    Leveraging resilience for fiscal sustainability and rebuilding reserves  

    In the face of high global and regional uncertainty, Djibouti needs to quickly strengthen its economic resilience by restoring debt sustainability, safeguarding the currency board, and fostering inclusive growth. To this end, the authorities intend to strengthen fiscal consolidation and enhance financial transparency and governance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to unlock sustainable and meaningful dividend contributions to the national budget, restore reserves, and encourage private sector growth while protecting vulnerable populations.  

    Durable fiscal consolidation is essential for restoring debt sustainability. The substantial fiscal adjustment frontloaded in the 2025 budget and the balanced budget target for 2026 onward are welcome steps. To sustain progress, it is essential that all governmental entities endorse annual fiscal targets that align with a medium-term fiscal consolidation strategy. Success depends on robust expenditure management via the diligent operationalization of the recently approved Public Financial Management Reform Strategy and Action Plan 2024–27. Furthermore, a comprehensive fiscal roadmap should continue to broaden the tax base by enhancing VAT and capital income taxation, rationalizing tax exemptions included in the investment code and the Free Zones regime, and finalizing the digitization of tax agencies. The effective establishment of the tax policy unit remains a priority for accurately assessing tax bases and enhancing tax reform efficiency. Operationalizing the recently created large taxpayer office will also bolster compliance and revenue collection.

    As Djibouti negotiates new terms for debt liabilities with creditors, well-managed and profitable SOEs can significantly aid national fiscal consolidation and restore reserves at the Central Bank of Djibouti (CBD), particularly following the dissolution of the Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF). Building on ongoing efforts to improve SOE transparency and governance, it will be critical for the Executive Secretariat in charge of the State Portfolio (SEPE) to collect all SOEs’ financial statements and monitor their performance. Swiftly implementing the Code of Good Governance is also essential for establishing a more transparent dividend policy tied to SOE performance, thereby mobilizing dividends more consistently and meaningfully for the budget, improving SOE efficiency and services, and appropriately right-size them. Additionally, fiscal transparency can be strengthened by discontinuing financial settlement practices for clearing government arrears with SOEs, and by improving coordination among the Ministry of Budget, line ministries, and SEPE for more effective budget risk management.

    Alongside fiscal consolidation, completing ongoing debt negotiations and addressing outstanding arrears with external partners are critical for debt sustainability. Equally important is implementing binding limits on borrowing for the central government, SOEs, including their participation in public-private partnerships, and ensuring these are enforced by the Public Sector Debt Committee. 

    The mission is encouraged by the recent recovery in reserves and urges continued progress. To strengthen the currency board, the authorities plan to amend the CBD law to enhance its autonomy, which will help sustain reserves, exchange rate, and inflation stability. They also plan to introduce reserve requirements as a prudential tool, with implementation expected to follow a phased approach. Additionally, under MENAFATF’s enhanced monitoring, Djibouti is reforming its AML/CFT framework, improving the business climate, and enhancing oversight of the banking sector due to its significant offshore component and rising government exposure. To facilitate policy making, the authorities are leveraging technical assistance provided by the IMF to enhance their coverage and quality of statistics relevant to surveillance, with a focus on national accounts, the fiscal and external sectors.

    Advancing inclusivity through private sector development and employment creation  

    The government aims to foster economic growth and social equity. They aim to improve the existing targeting of the current fuel subsidy scheme. In order to create a more effective and equitable social protection system and reduce budget exposure to international energy prices, the authorities should gradually replace the current subsidy system with the strengthening of targeted cash transfers to the most vulnerable households, relying on the national social register. To attract investments and create jobs, they are enhancing access to education and job training under the 2021–35 education master plan. They aim to diversify the economy in sectors such as logistics and connectivity, tourism, agribusiness, and fisheries. To enable economic diversification, it is essential to develop a comprehensive roadmap with specific actions aimed at enhancing access to finance, streamlining administrative procedures, and expanding reliable and affordable internet services and electricity, including through increased bill collection, technical efficiency, and the adoption of cost-efficient renewable energy. These initiatives will enhance Djibouti’s business environment, which is already supported by a stable macroeconomic climate, a currency board, ports infrastructure, and connectivity to Ethiopia’s large market, all aligning with the objectives of Djibouti Vision 2035.

     “The mission team expresses deep appreciation to the Djiboutian authorities and other counterparts for their warm hospitality, excellent cooperation and candid discussions, and looks forward to continuing close engagement.” 

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Wafa Amr

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/25/djibouti-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2025-article-iv-mission

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senator Marshall: The Reconciliation Bill Will Give Us More Prosperity and Security

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Kansas Roger Marshall

    Senator Marshall Joins Newsmax to Discuss the Iran and Israel Conflict and the Reconciliation Package in the Senate.
    Washington – On Tuesday night, U.S. Senator Roger Marshall, M.D. (R-Kansas), joined Ed Henry on Newsmax’s The Briefing to discuss the President’s handling of the Iran and Israel conflict, the President’s push for peace worldwide, and what the Senate is doing to pass the reconciliation package. 

    Click HERE or on the image above to watch Senator Marshall’s full remarks.
    On CNN’s Iran Aftermath Report
    “I think it’s more lies from fake news. But you know, the proof will be in the pudding, and we’ll see what the pictures are in a week or two. I think it would take a year just to remove the rubble to get to where this facility once was. I just can’t imagine. …14 bombs we dropped, these were all a direct strike, the likes of which we’ve never seen. These are 30,000 pounds each – I’m going to bet on the United States Air Force. They know what they’re doing. It was a direct strike. I bet we got our mission done. We’ll wait for the final pictures here.”
    On President Trump being the ‘Peace President’:
    “President Trump is the most transparent President in history. This morning, we knew exactly where he was. He didn’t have to send an aide to go tell Bibi to knock it off – he told him in front of the whole world, and that’s who President Trump is.
    “I think that the regime in Iran is more worried about regime change than they are about nuclear weapons in the future. I think that’s what their big fear is. They’re trying to save face as well. And here’s President Trump offering another olive branch. He wants peace. He cares about the Iranian people who have been tortured and murdered by their government for decades as well. So, I think it’s another master class in negotiations by President Trump.
    “Look, we’re tired of the killing. That’s all I can say, we’re tired of the killing here. We’re tired of the killing in Gaza. We’re tired of the killing in Ukraine. President Trump wants to end all that, and when that happens, the economy, the world economy, will improve if we can get all these wars back under control.”
    On Democrats’ hypocrisy on foreign precision strikes:
    “And this is what I was talking about earlier, going from Trump obsession to Trump psychosis. And this is what you have, that they are dissociated from truth, from reality. The President has a constitutional duty to protect this nation. Iran was one week away from having a nuclear warhead – they had enough 60% enriched uranium to build 10 atomic bombs. The President had a duty to protect us. That’s what he did.
    “You pointed this out early, the hypocrisy of Obama, who did similar things. Clinton did similar things. President Nixon, of course, as well. So, this is psychosis. Thank God for President Trump that this is not phasing him, it’s not slowing him down. He’s going to do the right thing. I even saw some polling recently, 90% of Republicans support how President Trump has handled all this – I think he’s growing stronger, more popular. The United States is respected more. This is what peace through strength looks like.”
    On the next steps in the reconciliation process:
    “Like you said, President Trump’s done his job. Now it’s time for us to do our job. This bill is not perfect, but it’s going to prevent the largest tax increase for hard-working, middle-income families in the history of our country. It’s going to build 2000 miles of barrier. It’s going to give us border security funding for four years – we’re going to run out of funding very soon to secure the border. It’s going to give our military pay raises, make the military stronger for the next four years as well.
    “You know, some things that people aren’t talking about out there that I think are very important… this is going to defund Planned Parenthood. It’s going to allow us to purchase short-barreled rifles again. It’s going to give more flexibility with 529 education plans and with Pell Grants as well. … There are so many good things in this. It’s going to increase your Child Tax Credits to $2200 – If we don’t do this, it would be $1,000. So, there are so many great things in this bill. It’s going to be a rising tide that floats all boats. It’s going to give us more prosperity and security. We don’t have a choice – we need to get it done.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Djibouti: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    Download logo

    Djibouti has been navigating regional tensions well, with robust growth, moderate inflation, and recovering reserves. In response to global uncertainties and domestic debt challenges, the authorities plan significant fiscal consolidation, including leveraging state-owned enterprises (SOE) dividends meaningfully, and advancing creditor dialogue. The authorities remain dedicated to investing in human capital and creating favorable investment conditions for job creation.  

    Djibouti’s economic resilience and contribution to regional stability 

    Djibouti helps maintain regional stability by supporting maritime security and facilitating humanitarian responses during crises. Djibouti’s GDP per capita has effectively doubled over the past decade thanks to significant investments that have contributed to the modernization of the economy. However, declining government revenues and increasing debt service have placed considerable strain on public finances, leading to unsustainable levels of public debt and diminishing reserves. Growth has not created enough jobs in the formal sector, while fiscal space to finance development needs is limited.

    The authorities are leveraging Djibouti’s growth resilience to advance fiscal consolidation and rebuild reserves. Growth is expected to have exceeded 6.5 percent in 2024 due to increased transshipments amid Red Sea tensions, while moderate international food and energy prices kept inflation in check. The government deficit was reduced from 3.5 percent of GDP in 2023 to 2.6 percent in 2024 following a brief period of fiscal overruns and deficit monetization, and reserves have begun to recover partially offsetting the decline observed since late 2023, though they remain below the monetary base. 

    The outlook is positive but subject to risks in an uncertain global context. Growth is projected to remain dynamic at around 6 percent this year and to continue over the medium term, albeit at a slower pace. Ethiopia’s robust economy is expected to boost Djibouti’s port activities; however, fiscal consolidation and the phasing out of large-scale investments may temper growth. Key risks include regional conflicts potentially increasing migration and affecting social stability amid a constrained fiscal space, and trade policy shifts that could depreciate the dollar and Djibouti franc, enhancing service exports but also raising inflation. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that Djibouti has successfully navigated several shocks over the past few years, including COVID-19, the 2022 Tigray crisis, the Ukraine war, and the 2024 Red Sea maritime disruptions.

    Leveraging resilience for fiscal sustainability and rebuilding reserves  

    In the face of high global and regional uncertainty, Djibouti needs to quickly strengthen its economic resilience by restoring debt sustainability, safeguarding the currency board, and fostering inclusive growth. To this end, the authorities intend to strengthen fiscal consolidation and enhance financial transparency and governance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to unlock sustainable and meaningful dividend contributions to the national budget, restore reserves, and encourage private sector growth while protecting vulnerable populations.  

    Durable fiscal consolidation is essential for restoring debt sustainability. The substantial fiscal adjustment frontloaded in the 2025 budget and the balanced budget target for 2026 onward are welcome steps. To sustain progress, it is essential that all governmental entities endorse annual fiscal targets that align with a medium-term fiscal consolidation strategy. Success depends on robust expenditure management via the diligent operationalization of the recently approved Public Financial Management Reform Strategy and Action Plan 2024–27. Furthermore, a comprehensive fiscal roadmap should continue to broaden the tax base by enhancing VAT and capital income taxation, rationalizing tax exemptions included in the investment code and the Free Zones regime, and finalizing the digitization of tax agencies. The effective establishment of the tax policy unit remains a priority for accurately assessing tax bases and enhancing tax reform efficiency. Operationalizing the recently created large taxpayer office will also bolster compliance and revenue collection.

    As Djibouti negotiates new terms for debt liabilities with creditors, well-managed and profitable SOEs can significantly aid national fiscal consolidation and restore reserves at the Central Bank of Djibouti (CBD), particularly following the dissolution of the Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF). Building on ongoing efforts to improve SOE transparency and governance, it will be critical for the Executive Secretariat in charge of the State Portfolio (SEPE) to collect all SOEs’ financial statements and monitor their performance. Swiftly implementing the Code of Good Governance is also essential for establishing a more transparent dividend policy tied to SOE performance, thereby mobilizing dividends more consistently and meaningfully for the budget, improving SOE efficiency and services, and appropriately right-size them. Additionally, fiscal transparency can be strengthened by discontinuing financial settlement practices for clearing government arrears with SOEs, and by improving coordination among the Ministry of Budget, line ministries, and SEPE for more effective budget risk management.

    Alongside fiscal consolidation, completing ongoing debt negotiations and addressing outstanding arrears with external partners are critical for debt sustainability. Equally important is implementing binding limits on borrowing for the central government, SOEs, including their participation in public-private partnerships, and ensuring these are enforced by the Public Sector Debt Committee. 

    The mission is encouraged by the recent recovery in reserves and urges continued progress. To strengthen the currency board, the authorities plan to amend the CBD law to enhance its autonomy, which will help sustain reserves, exchange rate, and inflation stability. They also plan to introduce reserve requirements as a prudential tool, with implementation expected to follow a phased approach. Additionally, under MENAFATF’s enhanced monitoring, Djibouti is reforming its AML/CFT framework, improving the business climate, and enhancing oversight of the banking sector due to its significant offshore component and rising government exposure. To facilitate policy making, the authorities are leveraging technical assistance provided by the IMF to enhance their coverage and quality of statistics relevant to surveillance, with a focus on national accounts, the fiscal and external sectors.

    Advancing inclusivity through private sector development and employment creation  

    The government aims to foster economic growth and social equity. They aim to improve the existing targeting of the current fuel subsidy scheme. In order to create a more effective and equitable social protection system and reduce budget exposure to international energy prices, the authorities should gradually replace the current subsidy system with the strengthening of targeted cash transfers to the most vulnerable households, relying on the national social register. To attract investments and create jobs, they are enhancing access to education and job training under the 2021–35 education master plan. They aim to diversify the economy in sectors such as logistics and connectivity, tourism, agribusiness, and fisheries. To enable economic diversification, it is essential to develop a comprehensive roadmap with specific actions aimed at enhancing access to finance, streamlining administrative procedures, and expanding reliable and affordable internet services and electricity, including through increased bill collection, technical efficiency, and the adoption of cost-efficient renewable energy. These initiatives will enhance Djibouti’s business environment, which is already supported by a stable macroeconomic climate, a currency board, ports infrastructure, and connectivity to Ethiopia’s large market, all aligning with the objectives of Djibouti Vision 2035.

     “The mission team expresses deep appreciation to the Djiboutian authorities and other counterparts for their warm hospitality, excellent cooperation and candid discussions, and looks forward to continuing close engagement.” 

    – on behalf of International Monetary Fund (IMF).

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Global: Will Trump’s high-risk Iran strategy pay dividends at home if the peace deal holds?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor in the Department of Government, University of Essex

    During Donald Trump’s first term, he made clear that he wanted his foreign policy to be as unpredictable as possible, stating: “I don’t want them to know what I’m thinking.”

    With the US’s recent attack on Iran, Trump certainly kept everyone in suspense. While US enemies may not have known what Trump was thinking, the problem was neither did US allies nor US legislators. Trump apparently did not bother to inform his own vice-president, J.D. Vance, when he had made the decision.

    Trump has portrayed this as a strength, that he is the only one capable of getting certain things done in foreign policy because his unpredictability and risk-taking behaviour gives him more leverage.

    But thus far he has had fewer successes than wins with this approach. His dalliance with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Trump’s first term only resulted in the acceleration of North Korea’s nuclear programme.

    His great relationship with Vladimir Putin has so far led to no concessions from Moscow regarding the war in Ukraine, even causing Trump to effectively give up trying to resolve that crisis, at least for now.


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    In Trump’s second term his Maga base has been a bit more divided than in his first. On the issue of tariffs, key Republican senators begged him to backpedal with concerns that the new tariffs would be catastrophic for the US economy – one of the issues that propelled him to victory. Yet he went ahead with the tariffs anyway, as some members of his base were in support.

    With the Middle East crisis, Trump supporters appeared to be mostly against the US getting involved in a foreign conflict, with “no more wars” being a common slogan on the campaign trail.

    In the lead up to the US strikes, key leaders in the Maga movement criticised the idea of the US getting involved in the conflict. Right-wing podcaster Tucker Carlson told hawkish Senator Ted Cruz that he should know far more about the regime that the senator wanted to topple. Former Trump strategist Steve Bannon and Representative Marjorie Taylor Green were also calling for the US to stay out of the conflict.

    Before the attacks, a YouGov poll showed that 60% of Americans did not want the US to get involved in the conflict, which has since increased to 80%. However when asked more specifically about support for US strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, as many as 94% of Maga Republicans gave their approval.

    Trump announces that the US has carried out air strikes on Iran.

    Is there voter backing?

    Trump also believes he can sell the strikes on Iranian nuclear sites as a huge win, making good on his promise to eradicate Iran’s nuclear programme. The US intelligence community is saying otherwise, but Trump has rejected this.

    Trump took an early victory lap, claiming that Iran’s nuclear programme had been “completely destroyed”. It was arguably comparable to George W. Bush’s “mission accomplished” announcement in May 2003, after Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq was ousted by US-led forces. Bush’s approval ratings were as high as 70% in the immediate aftermath, but had plunged by 40 points by 2008 after five years of fighting the Iraqi insurgency that emerged in Hussein’s absence.

    Trump seems to be revelling in taking more risks and being more unpredictable. As he has become increasingly bold in his second term, he has been more willing to test the loyalty of his base when they don’t agree with his instincts. Though the isolationist wing of Maga has been critical, Trump assumes that his base will unite and rally around him.

    Trump was more careful to not betray his base in his first term. Trump had ordered strikes on Iran in 2019, but backed down at the last minute. But now he has gone so far as to suggest the door may be open to regime change in Tehran.

    With the ceasefire now in place (at least in theory), Trump is heralding his action as a huge win. Iran has backed down after a limited attack on its nuclear facilities.

    Just weeks ago, the US seemed less relevant in the Middle East, and more likely to follow Israel’s instructions than the other way around. With Trump’s confidence growing, it is now Trump that is telling Israel that he is not happy.

    For Trump the risks involved were huge. There may appear to be the potential for some short-term domestic political gains if the ceasefire holds. But Trump may not have thought through the long-term implications of his decision on stability in the Middle East more generally, or what voters will think about his foreign policy gambles when the next election rolls around.

    Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Will Trump’s high-risk Iran strategy pay dividends at home if the peace deal holds? – https://theconversation.com/will-trumps-high-risk-iran-strategy-pay-dividends-at-home-if-the-peace-deal-holds-259736

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Will Trump’s high-risk Iran strategy pay dividends at home if the peace deal holds?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor in the Department of Government, University of Essex

    During Donald Trump’s first term, he made clear that he wanted his foreign policy to be as unpredictable as possible, stating: “I don’t want them to know what I’m thinking.”

    With the US’s recent attack on Iran, Trump certainly kept everyone in suspense. While US enemies may not have known what Trump was thinking, the problem was neither did US allies nor US legislators. Trump apparently did not bother to inform his own vice-president, J.D. Vance, when he had made the decision.

    Trump has portrayed this as a strength, that he is the only one capable of getting certain things done in foreign policy because his unpredictability and risk-taking behaviour gives him more leverage.

    But thus far he has had fewer successes than wins with this approach. His dalliance with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Trump’s first term only resulted in the acceleration of North Korea’s nuclear programme.

    His great relationship with Vladimir Putin has so far led to no concessions from Moscow regarding the war in Ukraine, even causing Trump to effectively give up trying to resolve that crisis, at least for now.


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    In Trump’s second term his Maga base has been a bit more divided than in his first. On the issue of tariffs, key Republican senators begged him to backpedal with concerns that the new tariffs would be catastrophic for the US economy – one of the issues that propelled him to victory. Yet he went ahead with the tariffs anyway, as some members of his base were in support.

    With the Middle East crisis, Trump supporters appeared to be mostly against the US getting involved in a foreign conflict, with “no more wars” being a common slogan on the campaign trail.

    In the lead up to the US strikes, key leaders in the Maga movement criticised the idea of the US getting involved in the conflict. Right-wing podcaster Tucker Carlson told hawkish Senator Ted Cruz that he should know far more about the regime that the senator wanted to topple. Former Trump strategist Steve Bannon and Representative Marjorie Taylor Green were also calling for the US to stay out of the conflict.

    Before the attacks, a YouGov poll showed that 60% of Americans did not want the US to get involved in the conflict, which has since increased to 80%. However when asked more specifically about support for US strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, as many as 94% of Maga Republicans gave their approval.

    Trump announces that the US has carried out air strikes on Iran.

    Is there voter backing?

    Trump also believes he can sell the strikes on Iranian nuclear sites as a huge win, making good on his promise to eradicate Iran’s nuclear programme. The US intelligence community is saying otherwise, but Trump has rejected this.

    Trump took an early victory lap, claiming that Iran’s nuclear programme had been “completely destroyed”. It was arguably comparable to George W. Bush’s “mission accomplished” announcement in May 2003, after Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq was ousted by US-led forces. Bush’s approval ratings were as high as 70% in the immediate aftermath, but had plunged by 40 points by 2008 after five years of fighting the Iraqi insurgency that emerged in Hussein’s absence.

    Trump seems to be revelling in taking more risks and being more unpredictable. As he has become increasingly bold in his second term, he has been more willing to test the loyalty of his base when they don’t agree with his instincts. Though the isolationist wing of Maga has been critical, Trump assumes that his base will unite and rally around him.

    Trump was more careful to not betray his base in his first term. Trump had ordered strikes on Iran in 2019, but backed down at the last minute. But now he has gone so far as to suggest the door may be open to regime change in Tehran.

    With the ceasefire now in place (at least in theory), Trump is heralding his action as a huge win. Iran has backed down after a limited attack on its nuclear facilities.

    Just weeks ago, the US seemed less relevant in the Middle East, and more likely to follow Israel’s instructions than the other way around. With Trump’s confidence growing, it is now Trump that is telling Israel that he is not happy.

    For Trump the risks involved were huge. There may appear to be the potential for some short-term domestic political gains if the ceasefire holds. But Trump may not have thought through the long-term implications of his decision on stability in the Middle East more generally, or what voters will think about his foreign policy gambles when the next election rolls around.

    Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Will Trump’s high-risk Iran strategy pay dividends at home if the peace deal holds? – https://theconversation.com/will-trumps-high-risk-iran-strategy-pay-dividends-at-home-if-the-peace-deal-holds-259736

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Bombing Iran: has the UN charter failed?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Caleb H. Wheeler, Senior Lecturer in Law, Cardiff University

    The recent US attack on Iran’s nuclear sites has prompted renewed questions about whether the UN charter’s prohibition on the use of force is meaningful.

    Considered one of the keystones of international law, article 2(4) of the charter specifically forbids member states from using force – or threatening to do so – against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state, or “in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”.

    A significant amount of commentary exists about what the prohibition entails. This tries to clarify ambiguities around the terms “force”, “threats of force”, “territorial integrity” and “political independence”. Although no absolute consensus has been reached, it is commonly thought that member states are prohibited from launching armed attacks against other states, or threatening to do so, unless acting in self-defence or with the authorisation of the UN security council.

    Other exceptions have been suggested. These include use of force as part of a larger humanitarian intervention operation. There’s also a question of whether it’s permissible when a state is rescuing its nationals abroad. But the legality of either of these situations is contentious and remains unsettled.


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    Early in its existence, the UN made concerted efforts to protect and respect article 2(4) and to comply with its provisions. In 1950, the security council authorised UN member states to provide South Korea with the assistance necessary to repel the armed attack launched by North Korea, triggering the increased internationalisation of the Korean war.

    While article 2(4) was not explicitly mentioned in resolution 83, it was alluded to through repeated references to North Korea’s “armed attack” against South Korea. As such, it can be interpreted as an effort by the security council to use its authority to address a violation of article 2(4), even if it did not clearly frame it in those terms.

    The security council also authorised member states in 2011 to take all necessary measures to protect civilians in Libya. Unfortunately, it quickly became apparent that the member states may have exceeded their authority in Libya and carried out acts that could themselves be construed as violations of the UN charter.

    Rather than just protecting civilians, as the security council resolution instructed, legal experts were concerned they had effectively intervened in a civil war. Any possible violations went unpunished by the security council.

    Security council actions taken with regard to Korea were, in many ways, the high watermark for the prohibition of the use of force, given the scale of the conflict. There are two reasons for that. First, a significant proportion of the wars taking place after 1945 have been domestic and not subject to the provisions of article 2(4). The prohibition specifically applies to a member state’s international relations so is not inapplicable when a member state attacks a group within its own borders.

    Second, the UN has failed to address many of the acts occurring after 1945 that might fall under the provisions of article 2(4). The reason for this inaction lies primarily in the flawed structure on which the UN is built.

    Chapter VII of the charter makes the security council responsible for addressing acts of aggression that would constitute uses of force under article 2(4). But it has repeatedly failed to fill that role, allowing states to commit these acts without meaningful response.

    The UN veto problem

    UN security council decisions can only be enacted when at least nine members vote in favour. This must also include the affirmative vote or abstention of all five of the permanent members: the US, Russia, China, the UK and France. This essentially gives each of the permanent members the right to veto security council resolutions.

    Permanent members have commonly used the threat of their veto in their own political interests. This can be seen in a variety of instances, most notably the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Both situations clearly involved uses of force prohibited by article 2(4), and in both situations the security council was prevented from acting by some of its permanent members.

    This inaction is consistent with the UN’s failure to address many other acts that might fall under the provisions of article 2(4), including US involvement in south-east Asia in the 1960s and the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s.

    The security council’s failure to adequately perform its role has caused some to try and find a workaround. The Council of Europe, disappointed at the lack of accountability for Russia’s acts of aggression against Ukraine, has entered into an agreement with Ukraine to establish a special tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine.

    In the special tribunal’s draft statute, an act of aggression is defined to almost exactly mirror the type of conduct that would constitute a use of force under the UN charter.

    Bombing Iran

    Which brings us to the current situation in Iran. There is little question that the US violated article 2(4) when it bombed Iranian nuclear sites in Fordo, Natanz and Isfahan on the evening of Saturday June 21. This is a clear use of force against the territory of another state.

    But even if the attacks themselves were not enough to establish a violation, they were also accompanied by US president Donald Trump’s suggestion that a regime change in Iran might be appropriate. These comments, coming immediately after the initial attack, could be construed as a threat of further force against Iran’s political independence should such a change not occur.

    Under the UN charter, such threats and uses of force should elicit a response from the security council. But just as with Iraq in 2003 and Ukraine in 2022, none will probably be forthcoming as the US will block any efforts to hold it to account.

    But equally chilling is the lack of condemnation of the US actions by its allies. German chancellor Friedrich Merz saw “no reason to criticise” the bombings, and Nato secretary general Mark Rutte insisted that the bombings did not violate international law.

    As the respected Dutch scholar of international law André Nollkaemper suggests, this refusal to condemn a clear violation of the prohibition of the use of force creates a real danger that the bar for when a state can legally use force will be lowered.

    Should that be allowed to happen it could further hollow out the prohibition, effectively making it less likely that states will be held to account for violating international law. Further, it could also lead to the return of a world where “might makes right”. This would undo more than a century of legal evolution.

    Caleb H. Wheeler does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Bombing Iran: has the UN charter failed? – https://theconversation.com/bombing-iran-has-the-un-charter-failed-259751

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Russia: V. Zelensky met with D. Trump on the sidelines of the NATO summit

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    KYIV, June 25 /Xinhua/ — Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US President Donald Trump on the sidelines of the NATO summit in The Hague /Netherlands/ on Wednesday, the Ukrainian leader’s Telegram channel reported.

    V. Zelensky noted that “all truly significant issues” were raised at the meeting. In particular, according to him, the parties discussed ways to establish peace in Ukraine and protect Ukrainian citizens from Russian attacks.

    V. Zelensky stressed that Ukraine appreciates the attention of the United States and its readiness to help end the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Meeting with the leaders of France, Germany, Poland and the United Kingdom, the NATO Secretary General and the President of Ukraine

    Source: Government of Italy (English)

    25 Giugno 2025

    Following the NATO Summit in The Hague, the President of the Council of Ministers, Giorgia Meloni, had a meeting today with the leaders of France, Germany, Poland and the United Kingdom, together with the NATO Secretary General and the President of Ukraine. 

    The meeting provided an opportunity for an in-depth discussion on the ongoing efforts and support for the action being taken by the United States in favour of a ceasefire, for a negotiation process that can lead to a just and lasting peace in Ukraine. Russia needs to demonstrate that it wants to seriously commit to talks, unlike what it has done so far. 

    The leaders went on to reaffirm that they would continue to support Ukraine and its self-defence and defence industry, also in light of Russia’s brutal attacks against civilians, and that they would keep pressure on Russia through new sanctions.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Record 769 arrests and USD 65 million in illicit pharmaceuticals seized in global bust

    Source: Interpol (news and events)

    25 June 2025

    Operation reveals growing demand for semaglutides and peptides as ‘lifestyle enhancers’

    SINGAPORE – An INTERPOL-coordinated operation across 90 countries has resulted in the seizure of 50.4 million doses of illicit pharmaceuticals worth USD 65 million, highlighting the alarming scale of the global trade in unapproved and counterfeit medicines.

    Operation Pangea XVII, which took place from December 2024 to May 2025, saw the arrest of 769 suspects and the dismantling of 123 criminal groups worldwide.

    The seizures and arrests are the largest in the operation’s 17-year history.

    Nervous system agents, including psychostimulants, anti-anxiety drugs, and medications for Parkinson’s disease, topped the list as the most seized product type, with erectile dysfunction medicines, the second highest.

    Other commonly seized product types include anabolic steroids, anti-diabetic medicines, anti-smoking products, dermatological agents, health supplements, herbal products and psychotherapeutic agents.

    David Caunter, Director pro tempore of Organized and Emerging Crime at INTERPOL, said:

    “Fake and unapproved medications are a serious risk to public health. They can include dangerous or illegal ingredients potentially resulting in severe illness, or even death.

    “The rapid growth of online platforms has made it easier for these unsafe drugs to reach people as well as opening new opportunities for criminal networks to exploit.

    “Working together through Operation Pangea, countries are taking action to protect people’s health and keep healthcare systems safe.”

    Ethiopian authorities discovered illicit pharmaceuticals hidden inside a container.

    Seizures of anti-diabetic medication in Northern Ireland, United Kingdom.

    Customs inspection at Kuala Lumpur International Airport, Malaysia.

    Inspection at a warehouse in Malaysia.

    Illicit pharmaceuticals seized in Türkiye.

    Illicit pharmaceuticals seized in Malaysia.

     

    Growing demand for anti-diabetic medications and peptide supplements

    The operation revealed growing demand for anti-diabetic drugs and peptide supplements, driven by increasing self-medication, among other factors.

    This trend is being driven by the widespread promotion and availability of these medicines across social media and online marketplaces, creating lucrative and relatively low-risk opportunities for criminal networks selling low-quality or counterfeit products.

    Data from participating countries indicate increasing circulation of illicit anti-diabetic medicines globally due to their off-label weight loss effects, with unapproved and potentially fake drugs seized in the Asia-Pacific, Europe and North America.

    Estimates suggest that a single semaglutide pen may sell for several hundred US dollars on the secondary market.

    The seizures corroborate recent alerts from the World Health Organization and various national health regulatory agencies warning of emerging risks associated with GLP-1-related injectable drugs.

    Operation Pangea XVII revealed another emerging trend – growing demand for peptide supplements for their perceived cosmetic and performance-enhancing benefits, especially in high-income countries across Europe, North America and Oceania.

    These supplements, such as BPC-157, ipamorelin, and melanotan, remain unapproved in many regions due to potential health risks and the lack of sufficient human trials, and until recently, seizures of such peptide-based biologically active substances were rare.

    Ethiopian authorities discovered illicit pharmaceuticals hidden inside a container.

    Illicit pharmaceuticals seized in Argentina.

    Unapproved pregabalin medicines seized in Northern Ireland, United Kingdom.

    Suspected counterfeit tramadol and other medicines seized in Gabon.

    Illicit pharmaceuticals found in a clandestine clinic in Mozambique.

    Illicit erectile dysfunction medicines seized in Bulgaria.

    Operational highlights

    In total, law enforcement agencies worldwide launched 1,728 investigations and issued 847 search warrants targeting criminal networks engaged in the illicit distribution of pharmaceutical products.

    93 per cent of the illicit pharmaceuticals seized lacked regulatory approvals from national health authorities.

    Such products may contain counterfeit, substandard or falsified substances which have not been identified.

    The remaining seven per cent were confirmed as either counterfeit, diverted, or misbranded products.

    Australia recorded the largest seizures globally, with psychostimulants such as modafinil and armodafinil being the most common category seized nationally. This was followed by anti-smoking pouches and erectile dysfunction medicines.

    Professor Tony Lawler, Head of Australia’s Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) said:

    “During this operation, the TGA assessed over 9,500 imports referred by the Australian Border Force and facilitated the seizure of over 5.2 million units of unlawfully imported therapeutic goods, including products that were found to be substandard or falsified.

    This operational partnership represents a significant disruption of dangerous medicines from entering our community, and diversion of profits from those that would usually benefit from the illegal sale and supply.”

    Large seizures of various illicit pharmaceuticals were similarly reported in Canada, Ireland, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States, among other countries. 

    Operation Pangea XVII also saw the shutdown of approximately 13,000 criminal-linked websites, social media pages, channels, and bots used to market and sell illegal or falsified medicines.

    Malaysia removed the greatest number of online listings (7,000), followed by Russia, Ireland, Singapore and Iran. The five countries collectively accounted for 96 per cent of all listings taken down.

    In Burkina Faso, 816,000 tablets including analgesics and anti-inflammatories were discovered hidden in vehicles.

    In Mexico, authorities intercepted 27,000 clonazepam tablets and 20,000 alprazolam tablets passing through a courier facility in Tijuana.

    In Portugal, anabolic steroids were discovered in eight prisons across the country, unveiling evidence of a criminal network smuggling illicit substances into correctional facilities.

    Notes to Editor

    Operation Pangea is an annual INTERPOL operation targeting the online sale of illicit pharmaceuticals. The 17th edition of the operation marked a departure from previous iterations with enforcement action taking place over six months instead of the traditional one week. This extended duration allowed for a more comprehensive and sustained effort to disrupt criminal networks.

    Additional support was provided by national health regulatory agencies, Europol, the International Narcotics Control Board, the Pharmaceutical Security Institute, the Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the Universal Postal Union, the World Customs Organization and the World Health Organization.

    The following countries participated in Operation Pangea XVII: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Curacao, Cyprus, Czech Rep., Democratic Rep. of Congo, Denmark, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Greece, Guyana, Hong Kong (China), India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Kuwait, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Northern Ireland (United Kingdom), Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Palestine, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rep San Marino, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, South Africa, Singapore, Slovakia, Spain, Sri Lanka, St Lucia, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: The United Kingdom is deeply concerned about the worsening situation for children in conflicts around the world: UK statement at the UN Security Council

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    Speech

    The United Kingdom is deeply concerned about the worsening situation for children in conflicts around the world: UK statement at the UN Security Council

    Statement by Ambassador James Kariuki, UK Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, at the UN Security Council meeting on children and armed conflict.

    The UK remains committed to supporting Syrians as they rebuild after years of suffering, with an inclusive transition that reflects a wide range of voices, including those of Syria’s youth. 

    I will make three points today.

    First, the United Kingdom is deeply concerned about the worsening situation for children in conflicts around the world. 

    The Secretary-General’s report highlights a shocking 25% increase in grave violations against children in the past year. 

    We call on all parties to armed conflict to immediately end and prevent grave violations against children. Perpetrators need to be held to account.

    We also echo the Secretary-General’s call for all listed parties to engage with the United Nations to develop and implement action plans to end and prevent grave violations. 

    Second, as we’ve heard today, cases of rape and other forms of sexual violence against children have increased by over a third in the past year. 

    In Sudan, children as young as one are reportedly subject to sexual violence.

    The United Kingdom unequivocally condemns sexual violence against children and has championed the rights of child survivors and rallied global action through the Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative.

    Third, in too many conflicts, children are bearing the brunt of violence.

    The conflict in the Occupied Palestinian Territories is having a catastrophic impact on children, with thousands killed and maimed as a result of Israeli military action. 

    Palestinians, desperate to feed their families, have been killed as they try to reach the few aid sites permitted by Israel. 

    This is unacceptable. 

    We call on Israel to abide by its obligations under international humanitarian law to protect children and urgently lift restrictions to enable aid to enter Gaza at scale. 

    Israeli children have also suffered as a result of Hamas’ despicable crimes, with children killed and taken hostage on 7 October. 

    The UK repeats its call for an immediate ceasefire and the release of all remaining hostages.

    And Russia continues to kill and maim children and attack schools and hospitals in its illegal war in Ukraine. 

    We call on Russia to cease this unprovoked war and return forcibly deported children to Ukraine. 

    President, the United Kingdom remains steadfast in its commitment to the Children and Armed Conflict mandate and ending grave violations against children. 

    We need to do more to protect children. They are the next generation of leaders and peacebuilders. They are our future.

    Updates to this page

    Published 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: PM meeting with President Erdoğan of Türkiye: 25 June 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    Press release

    PM meeting with President Erdoğan of Türkiye: 25 June 2025

    The Prime Minister spoke with the President of Türkiye Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in The Hague earlier this afternoon.

    The Prime Minister spoke with the President of Türkiye Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in The Hague earlier this afternoon.

    The leaders began by discussing the perilous situation in the Middle East. The leaders welcomed the ceasefire between Israel and Iran and agreed that negotiations must lead to the next vital step forward. 

    Discussing the conflict in Gaza, the leaders agreed that there needed to be an urgent acceleration of aid and an end to the intolerable situation.

    Turning to the situation in Ukraine, the Prime Minister thanked President Erdoğan for his support to the Coalition of the Willing planning and thanked him for Türkiye’s role in peace talks.

    The leaders also welcomed the strengthening military cooperation between the two countries, and agreed on the importance of making progress in free trade agreement talks.

    Updates to this page

    Published 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • Trump signals willingness to send Ukraine more Patriot missiles after meeting Zelenskiy

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    U.S. President Donald Trump indicated he would consider supplying Ukraine with more of the Patriot air-defence missiles Kyiv relies on to defend itself from mounting Russian strikes, after meeting his Ukrainian counterpart on Wednesday.

    Both leaders said the 50-minute meeting on the sidelines of a NATO summit in The Hague was a positive step in a war now in its fourth year, and which Trump described as “more difficult than other wars”.

    Trump, during a press conference, said the weapons are “very hard to get” but that “we are going to see if we can make some of them available.”

    The U.S. leader also left open the possibility of providing more military aid to Kyiv, which has struggled to fend off grinding Russian advances on the battlefield in recent months.

    Trump had previously shown no signs of resuming the donations of weaponry to Ukraine against Russia’s invasion that his predecessor Joe Biden had instituted.

    Zelenskiy described the meeting as “long and substantive”, saying it covered “all the truly important issues”.

    “We discussed how to achieve a ceasefire and a real peace,” he wrote on X. “We spoke about how to protect our people.”

    Trump added that he would speak to Vladimir Putin again soon, saying the Russian president “really has to end that war”.

    Zelenskiy has worked to rebuild relations with Washington after a disastrous White House meeting in February with Trump, whose overtures to Russia in recent months have concerned officials in Kyiv.

    (Reuters)

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Our support to Ukraine remains unwavering: UK statement to the OSCE

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    Our support to Ukraine remains unwavering: UK statement to the OSCE

    Speaking at the Annual Security Review Conference, Head of Security Policy Department, Jason Rheinberg, outlines why the UK remains committed to the OSCE and its principles.

    Thank you, Mr Chair. I am pleased to be here at the OSCE, particularly on the fiftieth anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act. Then, just as now, the Organisation and the Decalogue are foundation stones of strategic stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

    Let me begin by reiterating the United Kingdom’s unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.

    Russia’s full-scale invasion, now in its fourth year, remains the most serious threat to European security in decades. It is a blatant violation of the UN Charter and the core principles of this Organization – principles that every singe one of us has committed to uphold.

    Despite the immense human and economic toll, Ukraine continues to resist. And I salute their bravery. Ukraine has also shown it is committed to peace: Ukraine has agreed to a full, unconditional ceasefire, as proposed by the US. Russia has failed to agree to the same and has instead ramped up its attacks on civilians in Ukraine – including yesterday’s ballistic missile strikes on the Dnipro region, which killed at least 20 civilians and injured nearly 300 others. Hitting nurseries, apartment blocks and bakeries, as we heard earlier today from the Ukrainian First Deputy Foreign Minister.

    Here in Vienna, the UK continues – week in, week out – to hold Russia to account at the Permanent Council and Forum for Security Cooperation. We challenge the lies used to justify this illegal war and expose the brutality with which it is being waged.

    As Chair of the Security Committee, the UK has also continued the good practice of using meetings to support Ukraine and its neighbours in dealing with the impacts of this war. Our workplan covers policing, border security, child protection and empowerment, critical infrastructure and cyber resilience. And it serves as a platform for sharing perspectives, best practice, and establishing a common security picture.

    And listening to the interventions of our distinguished colleagues from Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, we call on Russia to withdraw all of its forces from the internationally recognised territory of both States.

    Meanwhile, we are also responding to a broader and increasingly complex threat landscape. Many of the transnational threats we face are intensifying:

    Malign hybrid activities – including information manipulation – are intensifying.

    Cyber threats, in some cases enabled by AI, are targeting critical national infrastructure.

    Organised criminals – more sophisticated than ever – are smuggling drugs, weapons, cultural property, and people across borders.

    And the threat from terrorism and violent extremism has not diminished. The Islamic State Khorasan Province is growing in strength. At the same time, extreme right-wing groups are proliferating in online spaces.

    Three key themes permeate these challenges: they highlight the wide-ranging impact of emerging technologies; they do not respect borders; and they demand a coordinated, and cross-dimensional response.

    Mr Chair, the OSCE’s comprehensive approach to security has therefore never been more relevant. We must remain vigilant to the full spectrum of threats facing our region; of which, Russia’s illegal war against Ukraine remains the most urgent and serious.

    Our Leaders mandated the OSCE to continue politico-military dialogue even in the hardest of times because they saw – and see – it is essential to manage risk, reduce misunderstanding and avoid miscalculation for the benefit of all our citizens. The OSCE has an extensive acquis and toolkit to do this work. But it relies on political will to be effective.

    The UK has that will. We remain committed to the OSCE and to the principles that underpin it. We believe in the potential of this Organization to do much more to support peace, security, and cooperation. We need the will of all States to be able to do that.

    And we are looking forward to continuing these conversations at the Helsinki Plus 50 forum later this summer. Thank you.

    Updates to this page

    Published 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Climate Innovation Forum 2025: keynote speech by Ed Miliband

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments 2

    Speech

    Climate Innovation Forum 2025: keynote speech by Ed Miliband

    Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero, Ed Miliband, speaks at the Climate Innovation Forum during London Climate Action Week.

    Thank you, Mark so much for that introduction. 

    And I want to thank Climate Action for hosting us here. 

    And I’m really excited to be part of London Climate Action Week this year – this is the biggest yet.  

    700 events. 

    Nearly 50,000 attendees. 

    Governments, cities, civil society, businesses, investors and trade unions from all around the world, particularly those from overseas you are so welcome to be here.  

    And the Climate Innovation Forum, I’m told is the headline event of the week – the Superbowl of LCAW – and I’m delighted to follow the star-studded cast of speakers you’ve heard from this morning. 

    And I know you have many more ahead of you this afternoon, which I think makes me the half-time show – they tried for Beyonce but they couldn’t get her so they ended up with me. 

    The argument I want to make today is this: 

    First, in the UK we are doubling down on climate action because it is the right choice for today’s generations as well as those of the future. 

    Climate action is how we protect our way of life and make people better off today with energy security, lower bills, good jobs and economic growth.   

    Second, despite the challenges, we should be determined not defeatist about the future.  

    Many countries are acting on this crisis because they recognise the opportunities it presents, as well as the gravity of the threat. 

    Third, to keep making progress on the road to COP30 and beyond we need to build the global coalition for climate action. 

    That means the actions and voices of the people in this room – the people delivering this transition – really really matter.  

    This is a fight for the future involving civil society, trade unions, businesses, and the public at large. 

    And we intend to win it. 

    So first, just to say something about the UK, the starting point for our government here is our mission to make Britain a clean energy superpower by delivering clean power, a clean energy system, by 2030 and accelerating to net zero across the economy.  

    Our Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer says this mission is in our government’s DNA. 

    And why does he say that? 

    Because we know the urgency of the threat to our way of life. 

    In the last decade we’ve had the 10 hottest years on record globally. 

    We should be clear what this means here and around the world: 

    Floods, heatwaves, droughts, and wildfires. 

    Over the last week in this country, we’ve seen much hotter weather than was normal a few decades ago as many of you will have experienced.  

    Communities across the UK are already facing the consequences of flooding, including last year.  

    And we have seen thousands of heat-related deaths in recent summers. 

    So the urgency of the climate imperative is clearer than ever. 

    But that urgency is not the only reason to act. 

    It has now been matched by the urgency of an energy security and bills imperative. 

    Here in the UK, family finances, business finances and the public finances were hit after Russia invaded Ukraine and fossil fuel prices rocketed. And we’ve seen in recent weeks that instability globally breeds instability in the energy markets here at home.  

    So ours as a government is a hard-headed determination to get off the rollercoaster of fossil fuel markets with cheaper, clean, homegrown energy that we control. This is an essential part of the argument to make for climate action and energy security that’s not just true for Britain, it’s true for many countries around the world.  

    And that’s not the only argument you can make.  

    There is also a once in a generation opportunity to create a new generation of good, well-paid jobs with strong trade unions and give existing industries a long-term future. 

    And in the UK if you’ll allow me again, it is an incredibly exciting time – we recently had our Spending Review which set spending budgets for the coming three years. Our Chancellor Rachel Reeves showed her commitment with the most significant investment in homegrown clean energy in the UK’s history. 

    We’ve got the biggest nuclear building programme in a generation. 

    With Sizewell C on the Suffolk coast. 

    Small Modular Reactors with Rolls Royce. 

    On the site of an old coal-fired power station, a new prototype nuclear fusion plant at West Burton in Nottinghamshire.   

    Britain’s carbon capture industry, I know there’ll be people here from the carbon capture industry, in Scotland and Humberside, alongside Teesside and the North West. 

    A new regional hydrogen network for transport, storage, industry and power.  

    Our new publicly owned energy company Great British Energy supporting clean energy supply chains from offshore wind to cable manufacturing.  

    A Warm Homes Plan upgrading millions of homes across Britain – delivering jobs as we cut bills and emissions. 

    And investing in tree planting, peatlands and nature recovery across our countryside and towns. 

    And the reason I say this is that this is relevant not just to the UK but also to people here from other parts of the world.  

    Place by place. 

    Town by town. 

    City by city. 

    This is the sound of the jobs of the future arriving. 

    This is how we as a government intend to win the argument for the clean energy revolution. 

    And together with you we will make it happen. 

    The second point I want to make is that, while our ambition is to lead at home it is also in our national interest to lead globally. 

    The UK is less than 1% of annual emissions. 

    But for this government, this is not an excuse for inaction but an imperative to work with other countries.  

    The UK passed the world leading Climate Change Act in 2008 when I was last Energy Secretary and now nearly 60 countries across the world have similar legislation. 

    That is the power, I believe, of example.  

    And I say to everyone in this room it’s time, if I can say this gently, to talk about the progress we have made together as a world as well as how far we have to travel. 

    Of course, we should be deeply alarmed about the scale of the climate crisis. 

    And we must acknowledge that we are way off track from where we need to be as a world. 

    But we should not be defeatist because look at the progress we have already made. 

    And the reason I say this, and I’ll talk about the progress in a minute, is because the challenge we face is no longer just responding to people who deny the problem of the climate crisis or the people wanting to delay action, but also those who say:  

    “There’s no point in acting because people have been talking about this for decades and nothing ever seems to change.” 

    We have a duty to explain the reasons for hope not despair. 

    And let me just give you some examples of why I think we can do that. Ahead of the Paris Agreement in 2015, the projections were for up to 4 degrees of warming. Actually, in 2010, up to 5 degrees.  

    Today, these estimates are no longer credible because the world has moved. 

    In 2015 when the Paris Agreement was negotiated no major economy had a net zero target, now 80% of global GDP is covered by net zero commitments. 

    At the time of Paris the majority of energy investment was in fossil fuels, last year over $2 trillion was invested in clean energy – twice as much as fossil fuels.  

    That is the progress we have made. 

    And I say this very directly, if we don’t talk about that progress, nobody else is going to – we have a duty to do so. 

    But we know how much further we have to travel. So as a country, the UK is determined to lead with the power of example again.  

    COP30 is now less than five months away and we haven’t got a moment to waste.  

    Every organisation represented in this room has a role to play. 

    Governments in providing direction and leadership. 

    Businesses in driving action in the real economy. 

    Investors in helping unlock the finance we need. 

    Trade unions and civil society in holding us all to account. And that’s a really important role.  

    A whole economy effort. 

    Working together across borders. 

    Global North and Global South. 

    And I pledge the UK will play our part. 

    That is why the Prime Minister announced an ambitious, 1.5 aligned NDC of 81% reductions by 2035 at COP29 last year. 

    That is why we are helping to scale climate finance, including through our Global Clean Power Alliance. 

    And today here at the Guildhall I can announce another step forward. 

    We will take the next steps on implementing our manifesto commitment on mandatory 1.5 degrees-aligned transition plans for major companies and financial institutions.  

    Today we are launching consultations on how transition planning and sustainability reporting can ensure public and private investors drive our country and the world towards climate and clean energy. For those of you who don’t work in this space, this is incredibly important. If we can get private finance driving in the right direction, not just in the UK, across the world including the Global South, we can make a real difference.  

    And I believe, speaking from the City of London, it is time to mobilise the City of London, secure its place, which it already has, as the sustainable finance capital of the world and drive private investment into clean energy. 

    The right thing for Britain and the right thing to do for the world. 

    Let me just end with this: 

    We obviously live in uncertain and unstable times. 

    All of us in this room are very aware of the challenge to the agenda we are talking about today. 

    But I want to end by saying to everyone here today, every one of whom can make a difference, we don’t just have a choice we have a duty to choose hope over despair. 

    There are many people in our country and our world who see the climate and nature crisis affecting their lives but have no power in their hands to make a difference. All of us in this building have the power in our different ways to make a difference.  

    Pessimism is a luxury we cannot afford.  

    To despair, to step back, to lose confidence would be to let down the people who depend on us—today and in future generations. 

    Despair and defeatism will not create a single job or protect a single person from the effects of the climate crisis. 

    And turning our back on action would not only be a betrayal of future generations but today’s generations too. 

    Now there are those in Britain who would turn their backs on the opportunities of the clean energy transition and what it can do for energy security, good jobs and doing the right thing by future generations. 

    The UK government, I pledge to you, will face down these defenders of a failed status quo in our country and merchants of misinformation. 

    And the way we will do this is show how together we can ensure better lives for people today and protect future generations. 

    Governments, civil society, businesses, trade unions. 

    This is the coalition, all of you, that gives me the greatest cause for hope about the future. 

    I thank you so much for being in London. And I look forward to working with you in the months and years ahead to do great things for our country and great things for the world. 

    Thank you so much.

    Updates to this page

    Published 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI USA: Kennedy mocks Putin for abandoning Iran: “With friends like Russia, who needs enemies?”

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator John Kennedy (Louisiana)

    Watch Kennedy’s comments here.
    WASHINGTON – Sen. John Kennedy (R-La.) delivered the following remarks on the Senate floor:
    “Where is Russia? Where is President Putin? I ask that question in light of what’s been happening over the past week in Iran. Where’s Russia? Where’s President Putin? You couldn’t find either one of them with a search party. Dog the Bounty Hunter, all of a sudden, couldn’t find President Putin. All of a sudden even Google can’t find Russia. 
    “I thought Iran and Russia were peeps. I thought they were best friends. I mean, for decades, Iran and Russia have had a partnership where they have attacked everyone in the freedom-loving West. They’re best buds. 
    “Now, I know Iran has a relationship with China, but that’s more transactional. China just likes to buy Iran’s cheap oil. With Russia and Iran, it was supposed to be a deeper, more meaningful relationship. And this isn’t something new. This has been a partnership for decades.
    “I remember when Putin invaded Ukraine, one of the first allies he turned to was Iran, and Iran sent Russia ammunition. And Iran sent Russia artillery shells. And Iran sent Russia drones. And Iran has sent Russia drones, and ammunition, and artillery shells every single day of the war.
    “So, where’s Russia? It hasn’t been a good week for Iran. Where’s Russia?
    “On Monday of this week, Iran’s top diplomat met with President Putin and asked for help. Do you know what President Putin said he would provide? Nothing. Zero. Zilch. Nada. Some kind of friend.
    “You know, it’s not the first time that we’ve seen President Putin’s true colors. It’s happened before. You would think that Iran would learn. The month after Iran through Hamas attacked Israel back in October of 2023, Iran immediately asked Moscow to supply Iran with—because Iran knew what was coming and so did Hamas— they knew retribution was coming from Israel.
    “Iran asked Moscow for jet fighters, for attack helicopters, air defense systems, and training jets. And Iran was sure that their buddy, Putin, would be there. Putin sent them a few jets and said go away, don’t bother me. And then not long ago, when Israel took out the better part of Iran’s air defense system, its golden dome—wasn’t exactly golden, it was more like tin—but the Israelis took it out. Iran asked Russia and said, look, we have to rearm. We’re naked and alone here. We need more air defense missiles to shoot down the Israeli planes. President Putin said go away. Don’t bother me. What a friend.
    “President Putin has done it to other countries. Russia has had alliances not just with Iran through the years. I’ll give you a couple of examples. Armenia. Armenia and Russia were best buds, two peas in a pod. But when Armenia got into a war with Azerbaijan, once again you couldn’t find Russia with a search party. 
    “Iran and Russia worked together to prop up Assad in Syria. Remember that? When the people of Syria were revolting against Assad, who had blood under his fingernails. Do you know who kept him afloat? Iran, yes, but especially Russia. And then Assad got in trouble, and that’s when he really needed Russia. He went to Mr. Putin and said help me, help me, and Mr. Putin said no. You’re on your own. You can come to my country where they can’t get to you, but that’s it. Too bad. I don’t need you anymore. 
    “A lot’s going on with respect to the Middle East right now, but I hope the world notices what kind of friend Russia is. I hope other countries that Russia has alliances with and that Russia is assiduously courting to be a ‘partnership’ notice how Russia reacts to their friends. 
    “Where’s Russia? Where’s Putin? All of a sudden you can’t find him. Now I’m delighted with that. I’m just delighted. But this was very, very predictable. With friends like Russia—I say this to every country in the world that might be thinking about partnering with Russia. With friends like Russia, who needs enemies?”
    Watch Kennedy’s speech here.  

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: PM wraps up Europe visit at NATO Summit

    Source: New Zealand Government

    Prime Minister Christopher Luxon has attended the NATO Summit in the Hague, alongside other world leaders.

    “The Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions face many of the same security challenges. That’s why it’s important New Zealand is at the table at NATO for these critical discussions with likeminded partners,” Mr Luxon says.

    “We can see the links between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific in North Korea’s support of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and Russia’s technical expertise that can help North Korea develop its nuclear programme.

    “Alongside NATO and its members, New Zealand is committed to the rules-based international system, and democratic values and norms.”

    During the summit, Mr Luxon held one-on-one talks with a number of leaders and met with NATO alongside the other members of the Indo-Pacific Four – Australia, the Republic of Korea and Japan.

    Mr Luxon returns to New Zealand on Friday 27 June. 

    Indo-Pacific Four Partners and NATO Joint Statement attached

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI Global: What happens next in US-Iran relations will be informed by the two countries’ shared history

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Gregory F. Treverton, Professor of Practice in International Relations, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

    Iranians protest the U.S. attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities in Tehran on June 22, 2025. Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto via Getty Images

    The Trump administration’s decision to bomb Iran dramatically marks the now nearly half-century of hostility between the United States and Iran, which began in 1979 with Iran’s takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the taking of 52 diplomatic hostages.

    It remains uncertain whether the Iran-Israel ceasefire will hold, given President Donald Trump’s seemingly impulsive policy decisions and an Israeli leader who critics say pursues war to stay in power.

    Additional unpredictability can be seen in a weakened Iran government that is unpopular with its own people but must also bet that standing up to the U.S. and Israel will induce its people to rally around the flag, even if they don’t like who holds that flag.

    As a U.S. international relations scholar, I think whatever comes next will be well informed by what has already happened in U.S.-Iran history. That includes an offer from Trump – who considers himself the consummate negotiator – to Iran to return to the negotiating table.

    The shah’s last visit to Washington

    The opening bracket in modern U.S.-Iran relations was the 1979 Islamic Revolution that overthrew Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi,“ whom a CIA covert action had restored to leadership a quarter-century earlier.

    As a young National Security Council staffer, I stood on the South Lawn of the White House as the shah’s helicopter landed in 1977 for a state visit to his close ally, the United States.

    The episode was perhaps a metaphor for the two countries’ relationship. I stood next to a colleague who had written for President Jimmy Carter remarks that included fulsome praise of the shah, but his crack to me was: “You’ll recognize the shah. He’s the one with blood under his fingernails.” Beneath a formal alliance, there was a good deal of cynicism on the U.S. part about the shah’s repressive regime and use of secret police to suppress opposition.

    Pro- and anti-shah protesters were demonstrating at the bottom of the Ellipse, the park south of the White House grounds. The U.S. Park Police, understandably but unwisely, sought to separate them with tear gas, which then wafted over the proceedings on the South Lawn.

    The Shah of Iran wipes tear gas from his eyes as President Jimmy Carter speaks on the South Lawn of the White House on Nov. 15, 1977.
    AP Photo

    The impact of the hostage crisis

    It’s impossible to overstate the effect of the 1979 hostage crisis, when Iranian students seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, holding 62 American hostages for 444 days.

    The Carter administration negotiated the Algiers Accords, which led to the release of the hostages in January 1981. There have been persistent accounts, none ever fully validated, that the incoming Reagan administration dealt with Iran to delay the release until after the new president’s inauguration.

    The crisis not only cost Carter his job, but it also cast an enduring shadow over the U.S.-Iran relationship, compounding Americans’ difficulty in understanding a regime that was not only theocratic but Muslim.

    The 1980s witnessed a whipsaw of relations.

    From 1980 to 1988, as Iran and Iraq fought a bloody war to a stalemate, the U.S. saw the power of both countries contained, but it did provide intelligence and logistical support to Iraq.

    Then came the Iran-Contra Affair of 1985 to 1987. It was the Reagan administration’s most serious scandal, in which White House officials illegally sold sanctioned arms to Iran and secretly diverted the proceeds to the Nicaraguan Contras. In a moment straight out of comic opera, National Security Council aides brought a goodwill chocolate cake to Tehran during a secret diplomatic mission in May 1986.

    Unidentified U.S. hostages arrive on Jan. 21, 1981, at Rhein-Main U.S. Air Force base in Frankfurt, West Germany, one day after their release from Iran.
    AP Photo

    In 1988, a U.S. ship struck an Iranian mine in the Persian Gulf. The U.S. retaliated by destroying oil platforms and damaging Iranian ships in “Operation Praying Mantis,” and tragically – and mistakenly – shot down Iran Air Flight 655, killing 290 civilians.

    The 1990s and 2000s again displayed the limits of the relationship.

    In 1995, President Bill Clinton imposed an oil and trade embargo against Iran, and Congress passed the Iran–Libya Sanctions Act in 1996, which imposed economic sanctions on companies doing business with Iran and Libya.

    In 1998, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami called for a “dialogue of civilizations,” prompting cautious U.S. signals of engagement.

    Then, in 2002, President George W. Bush labeled Iran part of the “axis of evil,” a sharp rhetorical escalation. For its part, Iran alleged U.S. drone incursions and covert operations. Limited diplomatic back channels emerged, but to no outcome.

    In 2009, President Barack Obama reached out to Tehran amid post-election unrest in Iran, but two years later Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, a crucial route for oil shipments to the West.

    In 2015, the two countries were party to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, with Iran agreeing to limit its nuclear program under international oversight.

    Two years later, though, President Trump withdrew from the nuclear deal and reimposed sweeping sanctions in a “maximum pressure” campaign.

    In 2019 and 2020, a series of tit-for-tat escalations culminated in the Jan. 3, 2020, U.S. drone strike that assassinated senior Iranian General Qassem Soleimani. Iran retaliated with missile strikes on U.S. bases in the region.

    U.S. sanctions continued in the Biden administration as Iran pursued deeper ties with Russia, China and nonstate proxies, especially Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen.

    What lessons?

    What can be learned from this tangled history?

    First, that negotiations are possible between the two countries, but they are neither easy nor likely to produce more than limited outcomes. Indeed, high-level indirect talks mediated by Oman began in April 2025, though they were in suspension when the U.S. bombers struck.

    Second, despite the Iran regime’s unpopularity, regime change in Iran is unlikely. Assassinating Ayatollah Ali Khameini would likely abet the “rally ‘round the flag” effect, as did the assassination of Soleimani.

    Third, Iran has been careful in its responses even to Israeli aggression but especially in engaging the U.S. in military conflict, a caution the American B-2 bombings on June 21 can only underscore.

    Iran had to retaliate, so the attack on the U.S. base in Qatar came as no surprise. But Iran was careful in retaliating, even notifying the U.S. in advance.

    The dropping of U.S. bombs, followed by Iran’s careful retaliation, was the opportunity for Trump to make an offer Iran couldn’t refuse.

    Gregory F. Treverton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. What happens next in US-Iran relations will be informed by the two countries’ shared history – https://theconversation.com/what-happens-next-in-us-iran-relations-will-be-informed-by-the-two-countries-shared-history-259607

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Prime Minister Carney meets with Prime Minister of New Zealand Christopher Luxon

    Source: Government of Canada – Prime Minister

    Today, the Prime Minister, Mark Carney, met with the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Christopher Luxon, on the margins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in The Hague, the Netherlands.

    The leaders discussed strengthening collaboration between the NATO Alliance and its Indo-Pacific partners to address shared challenges.

    Prime Minister Carney shared Canada’s plan to rebuild, rearm, and reinvest in the Canadian Armed Forces – meeting the NATO 2 per cent target this year and accelerating defence investments in the years ahead. The leaders explored opportunities to deepen collaboration through Canada’s new defence procurement strategy and New Zealand’s Defence Capability Plan.

    They reaffirmed their shared commitment to global security and their support for a just and lasting peace in Ukraine.

    Prime Minister Carney spoke about efforts in Canada to make housing more affordable and remove barriers to internal trade. The leaders also discussed deepening trade and commercial ties between Canada and New Zealand, including through the CPTPP.

    The prime ministers agreed to remain in close contact.

    Associated Link

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Moody’s fully acquires ICR Chile, solidifying its leading position in key Latin American markets

    Source: Moody’s

    Headline: Moody’s fully acquires ICR Chile, solidifying its leading position in key Latin American markets

    Moody’s fully acquires ICR Chile, solidifying its leading position in key Latin American markets

    Moody’s Corporation (NYSE:MCO) announced today that it has fully acquired ICR Chile (ICR), a leading provider of domestic credit ratings in Chile. The transaction follows Moody’s 2019 acquisition of a minority stake in ICR and will further strengthen its presence in Latin America’s domestic credit markets.

    Following the transaction, ICR will continue issuing domestic ratings in Chile under its own rating process and methodologies. In the following months, ICR will be fully integrated into Moody’s Local, a group of leading credit rating agencies in Latin America.

    “Today’s acquisition builds on our successful partnership with ICR and underscores our commitment to Chile’s growing debt capital market,” said Martin Fernandez-Romero, Managing Director of Moody’s Local. “Bringing ICR into Moody’s Local will enhance our ability to provide high quality credit ratings, research, and analytical services to market participants, while contributing to greater transparency in Latin America.”

    Founded in 2005, ICR is renowned for its high-quality analyses and the expertise of its analytical teams. It provides ratings across a diverse range of sectors, including corporates, financial institutions, insurers, structured finance vehicles, funds, and project finance. Since Moody’s initial investment, ICR has gained market growth, driven by its in-depth credit analyses and the expansion of its coverage within Chile’s domestic ratings market.

    The terms of the transaction were not disclosed, and it will not have a material impact on Moody’s 2025 financial results.

    About Moody’s Local
    Moody’s Local is a group of domestic rating agencies covering 13 Latin America’s domestic financial markets. Moody’s Local provides domestic credit ratings, research and risk analyses to market professionals with methodologies and seasoned analysts that capture the unique risks and dynamics of each market. Learn more at moodyslocal.com.

    About Moody’s Corporation
    In a world shaped by increasingly interconnected risks, Moody’s (NYSE: MCO) data, insights, and innovative technologies help customers develop a holistic view of their world and unlock opportunities. With a rich history of experience in global markets and a diverse workforce of approximately 16,000 across more than 40 countries, Moody’s gives customers the comprehensive perspective needed to act with confidence and thrive. Learn more at moodys.com.

    “Safe Harbor” statement under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995

    Certain statements included in this release are forward-looking statements and are based on future expectations, plans and prospects for Moody’s business and operations that involve a number of risks and uncertainties. Such statements involve estimates, projections, goals, forecasts, assumptions and uncertainties that could cause actual results or outcomes to differ materially from those contemplated, expressed, projected, anticipated or implied in the forward-looking statements. The forward-looking statements and other information in this document are made as of the date hereof, and Moody’s undertakes no obligation (nor does it intend) to publicly supplement, update or revise such statements on a going-forward basis, whether as a result of subsequent developments, changed expectations or otherwise, except as required by applicable law or regulation. In connection with the “safe harbor” provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Moody’s is identifying certain factors that could cause actual results to differ, perhaps materially, from those indicated by these forward-looking statements. Those factors, risks and uncertainties include, but are not limited to: the uncertain effects of U.S. and foreign government actions affecting international trade and economic policy, including changes and volatility in tariffs and trade policies and retaliatory actions, on credit markets, customers and customer retention, and demand for our products and services; the impact of general economic conditions (including significant government debt and deficit levels, and inflation or recessions and related monetary policy actions by governments in response thereto) on worldwide credit markets and on economic activity, including on the level of merger and acquisition activity, and their effects on the volume of debt and other securities issued in domestic and/or global capital markets; the uncertain effects of U.S. and foreign government initiatives and monetary policy to respond to the current economic climate, including instability of financial institutions, credit quality concerns, and other potential impacts of volatility in financial and credit markets; the impact of geopolitical events and actions, such as the Russia-Ukraine military conflict and military conflict in the Middle East, and of tensions and disputes in political and global relations, on volatility in world financial markets, on general economic conditions and GDP in the U.S. and worldwide and on Moody’s own operations and personnel; other matters that could affect the volume of debt and other securities issued in domestic and/or global capital markets, including regulation, increased utilization of technologies that have the potential to intensify competition and accelerate disruption and disintermediation in the financial services industry, as well as the number of issuances of securities without ratings or securities which are rated or evaluated by non-traditional parties; the level of merger and acquisition activity in the U.S. and abroad; the impact of MIS’s withdrawal of its credit ratings on countries or entities within countries and of Moody’s no longer conducting commercial operations in countries where political instability warrants such actions; concerns in the marketplace affecting our credibility or otherwise affecting market perceptions of the integrity or utility of independent credit agency ratings; the introduction or development of competing and/or emerging technologies and products; pricing pressure from competitors and/or customers; the level of success of new product development and global expansion; the impact of regulation as an NRSRO, the potential for new U.S., state and local legislation and regulations; the potential for increased competition and regulation in the jurisdictions in which we operate, including the EU; exposure to litigation related to our rating opinions, as well as any other litigation, government and regulatory proceedings, investigations and inquiries to which Moody’s may be subject from time to time; provisions in U.S. legislation modifying the pleading standards and EU regulations modifying the liability standards applicable to CRAs in a manner adverse to CRAs; provisions of EU regulations imposing additional procedural and substantive requirements on the pricing of services and the expansion of supervisory remit to include non-EU ratings used for regulatory purposes; uncertainty regarding the future relationship between the U.S. and China; the possible loss of key employees and the impact of the global labor environment; failures or malfunctions of our operations and infrastructure; any vulnerabilities to cyber threats or other cybersecurity concerns; the timing and effectiveness of our restructuring programs; currency and foreign exchange volatility; the outcome of any review by tax authorities of Moody’s global tax planning initiatives; exposure to potential criminal sanctions or civil remedies if Moody’s fails to comply with foreign and U.S. laws and regulations that are applicable in the jurisdictions in which Moody’s operates, including data protection and privacy laws, sanctions laws, anti-corruption laws, and local laws prohibiting corrupt payments to government officials; the impact of mergers, acquisitions, or other business combinations and the ability of Moody’s to successfully integrate acquired businesses; the level of future cash flows; the levels of capital investments; and a decline in the demand for credit risk management tools by financial institutions, corporate or government entities. These factors, risks and uncertainties as well as other risks and uncertainties that could cause Moody’s actual results to differ materially from those contemplated, expressed, projected, anticipated or implied in the forward-looking statements are described in greater detail under “Risk Factors” in Part I, Item 1A of Moody’s annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2024, and in other filings made by the Company from time to time with the SEC or in materials incorporated herein or therein. Stockholders and investors are cautioned that the occurrence of any of these factors, risks and uncertainties may cause the Company’s actual results to differ materially from those contemplated, expressed, projected, anticipated or implied in the forward-looking statements, which could have a material and adverse effect on the Company’s business, results of operations and financial condition. New factors may emerge from time to time, and it is not possible for the Company to predict new factors, nor can the Company assess the potential effect of any new factors on it. Forward-looking and other statements in this document may also address our corporate responsibility progress, plans, and goals (including sustainability and environmental matters), and the inclusion of such statements is not an indication that these contents are necessarily material to investors or required to be disclosed in the Company’s filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. In addition, historical, current, and forward-looking sustainability-related statements may be based on standards for measuring progress that are still developing, internal controls and processes that continue to evolve, and assumptions that are subject to change in the future.

    Source: Moody’s Corporation Investor Relations

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Norway calls for G20 Sherpa meeting to address ongoing global conflict

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    Norway calls for G20 Sherpa meeting to address ongoing global conflict

    Henrik Harboe of Norway has highlighted the crucial role of the third Sherpa meeting in addressing international crises, including the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, as well as the broader tensions in the Middle East. 

    “We are halfway through this year, only five months away from the summit in November, so we have a lot of work to formulate, what are the G20 recommendations to deal with all these international crises and the big issues around development and economic stability in the world,” he told SAnews

    The third Sherpa meeting of the G20 kicked off on Wednesday morning at the Sun City Resort in the North West. 

    “We’ll have a round [of discussions] about the G20’s role in the world in general. That’s very important. But then go straight into the geopolitical tensions. And then, of course, this being a group with a lot of different countries and different perspectives. 

    “But I think we’ll touch upon Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the horrible crisis in Gaza as a result of Israel’s response to the terrorist attack. And then, of course, the recent developments in the broader Middle East, with both Israel and the US bombing of Iran,” he explained.

    The Director of Development Policy at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has expressed deep concern about recent developments. 

    He noted that these events involve multiple violations of international law and the United Nations (UN) Charter.

    “I mean, G20 is actually not about geopolitics, but we cannot avoid discussing geopolitical issues.”

    In his opening remarks, Zane Dangor, the Director-General of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation and South Africa’s G20 Sherpa, announced that the Foreign Ministers will have in-depth discussions on global geopolitical issues. 

    These discussions will focus on international law and mutual accountability, while emphasising the importance of prioritising substantive matters.

    In December last year, South Africa welcomed Norway as a G20 guest country during its Presidency. 

    In an interview with SAnews, Harboe, a Norwegian Sherpa, said South Africa was poised to make history as the first African nation to host the G20 Leaders’ Summit. 

    According to Harboe, the G20 focuses on sustainable development and a stable global economy to ensure growth for all countries.

    As the first Presidency in Africa, Harboe believes they will use their position to highlight critical issues such as energy security, essential minerals, and sustainable development.

    “All these issues are extremely important for Africa. So, we are very happy to see that and strongly support South Africa’s priority on these issues.” 

    The official is of the view that South Africa serves as a microcosm of global challenges, making its perspective crucial. 

    “South Africa has a huge poverty problem, job creation problem, inequality, and these are exactly the issues. 

    “So, I think what we discussed around the G20 table is relevant for the world and developing countries, but also very much for Africa, and South Africa. South Africa’s own experience is extremely relevant for this broader discussion. I always encourage South African colleagues to talk about the challenges here.” 

    He mentioned that he had attended a Just Energy Transition programme. He said while South Africa’s energy situation is challenging, it also serves as a valuable example for the world on how to conduct an energy transition in a fair manner while also creating job opportunities for young people.

    On a lighter note, he told the SAnews that he had a wonderful stay in Sun City since his arrival. 

    “I always love South Africa. It’s fantastic. Since I’m from Norway, the cold weather, I don’t mind, the fresh morning like today was just nice. The only problem this morning was a monkey, taking my bread on the breakfast table,” he said, with a chuckle. – SAnews.gov.za

    Gabisile

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Moscow and Kyiv will choose dates for continuing contacts after the implementation of previously reached agreements in Istanbul is completed – D. Peskov

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Moscow, June 25 /Xinhua/ — The dates for the continuation of talks between Russia and Ukraine will be determined after the completion of the implementation of the agreements previously reached in Istanbul. Moscow and Kyiv are not exchanging opinions on the draft memorandums while the process of implementing existing humanitarian agreements is underway, Russian presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov told reporters.

    “No. At the moment, the implementation of those humanitarian agreements that were reached during the second round is being completed,” he said.

    The spokesman added that after that it would be time to “decide on dates for the continuation.”

    Earlier, D. Peskov said that a new round of negotiations with Kiev would take place after June 22, and specific dates are being worked out. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News