NewzIntel.com

    • Checkout Page
    • Contact Us
    • Default Redirect Page
    • Frontpage
    • Home-2
    • Home-3
    • Lost Password
    • Member Login
    • Member LogOut
    • Member TOS Page
    • My Account
    • NewzIntel Alert Control-Panel
    • NewzIntel Latest Reports
    • Post Views Counter
    • Privacy Policy
    • Public Individual Page
    • Register
    • Subscription Plan
    • Thank You Page

Category: Ukraine

  • MIL-OSI Banking: IT threat evolution in Q1 2025. Non-mobile statistics

    Source: Securelist – Kaspersky

    Headline: IT threat evolution in Q1 2025. Non-mobile statistics

    IT threat evolution in Q1 2025. Non-mobile statistics
    IT threat evolution in Q1 2025. Mobile statistics

    The statistics in this report are based on detection verdicts returned by Kaspersky products unless otherwise stated. The information was provided by Kaspersky users who consented to sharing statistical data.

    The quarter in numbers

    In Q1 2025:

    • Kaspersky products blocked more than 629 million attacks that originated with various online resources.
    • Web Anti-Virus detected 88 million unique links.
    • File Anti-Virus blocked more than 21 million malicious and potentially unwanted objects.
    • Nearly 12,000 new ransomware variants were detected.
    • More than 85,000 users experienced ransomware attacks.
    • RansomHub was involved in attacks on 11% of all ransomware victims whose data was published on data leak sites (DLSs). Slightly under 11% encountered the Akira and Clop ransomware.
    • Almost 315,000 users faced miners.

    Ransomware

    The quarter’s trends and highlights

    Law enforcement success

    Phobos Aetor, a joint international effort by law enforcement agencies from the United States, Great Britain, Germany, France and several other countries, resulted in the arrest of four suspected members of 8Base. They are accused of carrying out more than 1000 cyberattacks around the world with the help of the Phobos ransomware. The suspects were arrested in Thailand and charged with extorting more than $16 million dollars in Bitcoin. According to law enforcement officials, the multinational operation resulted in the seizure of more than 40 assets, including computers, phones, and cryptocurrency wallets. Additionally, law enforcement took down 27 servers linked to the cybercrime gang.

    An ongoing effort to combat LockBit led to the extradition of a suspected ransomware developer to the United States. Arrested in Israel last August, the suspect is accused of receiving more than $230,000 in cryptocurrency for his work with the group between June 2022 and February 2024.

    Vulnerabilities and attacks, BYOVD, and EDR bypassing

    The first quarter saw a series of vulnerabilities detected in Paragon Partition Manager. They were assigned the identifiers CVE-2025-0288, CVE-2025-0287, CVE-2025-0286, CVE-2025-0285, and CVE-2025-0289. According to researchers, ransomware gangs had been exploiting the vulnerabilities to gain Windows SYSTEM privileges during BYOVD (bring your own vulnerable driver) attacks.

    Akira exploited a vulnerability in a webcam to try and bypass endpoint detection and response (EDR) and encrypt files on the organization’s network over the SMB protocol. The attackers found that their Windows ransomware was being detected and blocked by the security solution. To bypass it, they found a vulnerable network webcam in the targeted organization that was running a Linux-based operating system and was not protected by EDR. The attackers were able to evade detection by compromising the webcam, mounting network drives of other machines, and running the Linux version of their ransomware on the camera.

    HellCat leveraged compromised Jira credentials to attack a series of companies, including Ascom, Jaguar Land Rover, and Affinitiv. According to researchers, the threat actors obtain credentials by infecting employees’ computers with Trojan stealers like Lumma.

    Other developments

    An unidentified source posted Matrix chat logs belonging to the Black Basta gang. The logs feature information about the gang’s attack techniques and vulnerabilities that it exploited. In addition, the logs contain details about the group’s internal structure and its members, as well as more than 367 unique ZoomInfo links that the attackers used to gather data on potential victims.

    BlackLock was compromised due to a vulnerability in the threat actor’s data leak site (DLS). Researchers who discovered the vulnerability gained access to confidential information about the group and its activities, including configuration files, login credentials, and the history of commands run on the server. DragonForce, a rival ransomware outfit, exploited the same security flaw to deface the DLS. They changed the site’s appearance, and made BlackLock’s internal chat logs and certain configuration files publicly available.

    The most prolific groups

    This section highlights the most prolific ransomware groups by number of victims that each added to their DLS during the reporting period. RansomHub, which stood out in 2024, remained the leader by number of new victims with 11.03%. Akira (10.89%) and Clop (10.69%) followed close behind.

    The number of the group’s victims according to its DLS as a percentage of all groups’ victims published on all the DLSs reviewed during the reporting period (download)

    Number of new modifications

    In the first quarter, Kaspersky solutions detected three new ransomware families and 11,733 new variants – almost four times more than in the fourth quarter of 2024. This is due to the large number of samples that our solutions categorized as belonging to the Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Gen family.

    New ransomware variants, Q1 2024 – Q1 2025 (download)

    Number of users attacked by ransomware Trojans

    The number of unique KSN users protected is 85,474.

    Number of unique users attacked by ransomware Trojans, Q1 2025 (download)

    Attack geography

    Top 10 countries and territories attacked by ransomware Trojans

    Country/territory* %**
    1 Oman 0.661
    2 Libya 0.643
    3 South Korea 0.631
    4 China 0.626
    5 Bangladesh 0.472
    6 Iraq 0.452
    7 Rwanda 0.443
    8 Pakistan 0.441
    9 Tajikistan 0.439
    10 Sri Lanka 0.419

    * Excluded are countries and territories with relatively few (under 50,000) Kaspersky product users.
    ** Unique users whose computers were attacked by ransomware Trojans as a percentage of all unique Kaspersky product users in the country/territory

    TOP 10 most common ransomware Trojan families

    Name Verdict* %**
    1 (generic verdict) Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Gen 25.10
    2 WannaCry Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Wanna 8.19
    3 (generic verdict) Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Encoder 6.70
    4 (generic verdict) Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crypren 6.65
    5 (generic verdict) Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Agent 3.95
    6 Cryakl/CryLock Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Cryakl 3.16
    7 LockBit Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Lockbit 3.15
    8 (generic verdict) Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Phny 2.90
    9 PolyRansom/VirLock Virus.Win32.PolyRansom / Trojan-Ransom.Win32.PolyRansom 2.73
    10 (generic verdict) Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crypmod 2.66

    * Unique Kaspersky product users attacked by the specific ransomware Trojan family as a percentage of all unique users attacked by this type of threat.

    Miners

    Number of new modifications

    In the first quarter of 2025, Kaspersky solutions detected 5,467 new miner variants.

    New miner variants, Q1 2025 (download)

    Number of users attacked by miners

    Miners were fairly active in the first quarter. During the reporting period, we detected miner attacks on the computers of 315,701 unique Kaspersky product users worldwide.

    Number of unique users attacked by miners, Q1 2025 (download)

    Attack geography

    Top 10 countries and territories attacked by miners

    Country/territory* %**
    1 Senegal 2.59
    2 Kazakhstan 1.36
    3 Panama 1.28
    4 Belarus 1.22
    5 Ethiopia 1.09
    6 Tajikistan 1.07
    7 Moldova 0.90
    8 Dominican Republic 0.86
    9 Kyrgyzstan 0.84
    10 Tanzania 0.82

    * Excluded are countries and territories with relatively few (under 50,000) Kaspersky product users.
    ** Unique users whose computers were attacked by miners as a percentage of all unique Kaspersky product users in the country/territory.

    Attacks on macOS

    The first quarter saw the discovery of a new Trojan loader for macOS. This is a Go-based variant of ReaderUpdate, which has previously appeared in Python, Crystal, Rust, and Nim versions. These loaders are typically used to download intrusive adware, but there is nothing stopping them from delivering any kind of Trojan.

    During the reporting period researchers identified new loaders from the Ferret malware family which were being distributed by attackers through fake online job interview invitations. These Trojans are believed to be part of an ongoing campaign that began in December 2022. The original members of the Ferret family date back to late 2024. Past versions of the loader delivered both a backdoor and a crypto stealer.

    Throughout the first quarter, various modifications of the Amos stealer were the most aggressively distributed Trojans. Amos is designed to steal user passwords, cryptocurrency wallet data, browser cookies, and documents. In this campaign, threat actors frequently modify their Trojan obfuscation techniques to evade detection, generating thousands of obfuscated files to overwhelm security solutions.

    TOP 20 threats to macOS

    (download)

    * Unique users who encountered this malware as a percentage of all attacked users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS.
    * Data for the previous quarter may differ slightly from previously published data due to certain verdicts being retrospectively revised.

    As usual, a significant share of the most common threats to macOS consists of potentially unwanted applications: adware, spyware tracking user activity, fake cleaners, and reverse proxies like NetTool. Amos Trojans, which we mentioned earlier, also gained popularity in the first quarter. Trojan.OSX.Agent.gen, which holds the third spot in the rankings, is a generic verdict that detects a wide variety of malware.

    Geography of threats to macOS

    TOP 10 countries and territories by share of attacked users

    Country/territory Q4 2024* Q1 2025*
    Spain 1.16% 1.02%
    France 1.52% 0.96%
    Hong Kong 1.21% 0.83%
    Singapore 0.32% 0.75%
    Mexico 0.85% 0.74%
    Germany 0.96% 0.74%
    Mainland China 0.73% 0.68%
    Brazil 0.66% 0.61%
    Russian Federation 0.50% 0.53%
    India 0.84% 0.51%

    * Unique users who encountered threats to macOS as a percentage of all unique Kaspersky product users in the country/territory.

    IoT threat statistics

    This section presents statistics on attacks targeting Kaspersky IoT honeypots. The geographic data on attack sources is based on the IP addresses of attacking devices.

    In the first quarter of 2025, the share of devices that attacked Kaspersky honeypots via the Telnet protocol increased again, following a decline at the end of 2024.

    Distribution of attacked services by number of unique IP addresses of attacking devices (download)

    The distribution of attacks across Telnet and SSH remained virtually unchanged compared to the fourth quarter of 2024.

    Distribution of attackers’ sessions in Kaspersky honeypots (download)

    TOP 10 threats delivered to IoT devices:

    Share of each threat uploaded to an infected device as a result of a successful attack in the total number of uploaded threats (download)

    A significant portion of the most widespread IoT threats continues to be made up of various Mirai DDoS botnet variants. BitCoinMiner also saw active distribution in the first quarter, accounting for 7.32% of detections. The number of attacks by the NyaDrop botnet (19.31%) decreased compared to the fourth quarter of 2024.

    Geography of attacks on IoT honeypots

    When looking at SSH attacks by country/territory, mainland China’s share has declined, while attacks coming from Brazil have seen a noticeable increase. There was also a slight uptick in attacks coming from the United States, Indonesia, Australia, and Vietnam.

    Country/territory Q4 2024 Q1 2025
    Mainland China 32.99% 20.52%
    India 19.13% 19.16%
    Russian Federation 9.46% 9.16%
    Brazil 2.18% 8.48%
    United States 4.90% 5.52%
    Indonesia 1.37% 3.99%
    Hong Kong 2.81% 3.46%
    Australia 1.31% 2.75%
    France 3.53% 2.54%
    Vietnam 1.41% 2.27%

    The share of Telnet attacks originating from China and India dropped, while Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia took a noticeably larger share.

    Country/territory Q4 2024 Q1 2025
    China 44.67% 39.82%
    India 33.79% 30.07%
    Brazil 2.62% 12.03%
    Russian Federation 6.52% 5.14%
    Pakistan 5.77% 3.99%
    Nigeria 0.50% 3.01%
    Indonesia 0.58% 2.25%
    United States 0.42% 0.68%
    Ukraine 0.79% 0.67%
    Sweden 0.42% 0.33%

    Attacks via web resources

    The statistics in this section are based on detection verdicts by Web Anti-Virus, which protects users when suspicious objects are downloaded from malicious or infected web pages. Cybercriminals create malicious pages on purpose. Websites that host user-created content, such as forums, as well as compromised legitimate sites, can become infected.

    Countries and territories that serve as sources of web-based attacks: the TOP 10

    This section contains a geographical distribution of sources of online attacks blocked by Kaspersky products: web pages that redirect to exploits, sites that host exploits and other malware, botnet C&C centers, and so on. Any unique host could be the source of one or more web-based attacks.
    To determine the geographical source of web-based attacks, domain names were matched against their actual IP addresses, and then the geographical location of a specific IP address (GeoIP) was established.

    In the first quarter of 2025, Kaspersky solutions blocked 629,211,451 attacks launched from online resources across the globe. Web Anti-Virus detected 88,389,361 unique URLs.

    Geographical distribution of sources of web-based attacks by country/territory, Q1 2025 (download)

    Countries and territories where users faced the greatest risk of online infection

    To assess the risk of online infection faced by PC users in various countries and territories, for each country or territory, we calculated the percentage of Kaspersky users on whose computers Web Anti-Virus was triggered during the reporting period. The resulting data reflects the aggressiveness of the environment in which computers operate in different countries and territories.

    These rankings only include attacks by malicious objects that belong in the Malware category. Our calculations do not include Web Anti-Virus detections of potentially dangerous or unwanted programs, such as RiskTool or adware.

    Country/territory* %**
    1 North Macedonia 10.17
    2 Albania 9.96
    3 Algeria 9.92
    4 Bangladesh 9.92
    5 Tunisia 9.80
    6 Slovakia 9.77
    7 Greece 9.66
    8 Serbia 9.44
    9 Tajikistan 9.28
    10 Turkey 9.10
    11 Peru 8.78
    12 Portugal 8.70
    13 Nepal 8.38
    14 Philippines 8.33
    15 Romania 8.26
    16 Sri Lanka 8.20
    17 Bulgaria 8.19
    18 Madagascar 8.14
    19 Hungary 8.12
    20 Egypt 8.12

    * Excluded are countries and territories with relatively few (under 10,000) Kaspersky product users.
    ** Unique users targeted by web-based Malware attacks as a percentage of all unique Kaspersky product users in the country/territory.

    On average during the quarter, 6.46% of users’ computers worldwide were subjected to at least one web-based Malware attack.

    Local threats

    Statistics on local infections of user computers are an important indicator. They include objects that penetrated the target computer by infecting files or removable media, or initially made their way onto the computer in non-transparent form. Examples of the latter are programs in complex installers and encrypted files.

    Data in this section is based on analyzing statistics produced by anti-virus scans of files on the hard drive at the moment they were created or accessed, and the results of scanning removable storage media. The statistics are based on detection verdicts from the OAS (on-access scan) and ODS (on-demand scan) modules of File Anti-Virus. The data includes detections of malicious programs located on user computers or removable media connected to the computers, such as flash drives, camera memory cards, phones, or external hard drives.

    In the first quarter of 2025, our File Anti-Virus detected 21,533,464 malicious and potentially unwanted objects.

    Countries and territories where users faced the highest risk of local infection

    For each country and territory, we calculated the percentage of Kaspersky product users on whose computers File Anti-Virus was triggered during the reporting period. These statistics reflect the level of personal computer infection in various countries and territories across the globe.

    The rankings only include attacks by malicious objects that belong in the Malware category. Our calculations do not include File Anti-Virus detections of potentially dangerous or unwanted programs, such as RiskTool or adware.

    Country/territory* %**
    1 Turkmenistan 47.41
    2 Tajikistan 37.23
    3 Afghanistan 36.92
    4 Yemen 35.80
    5 Cuba 32.08
    6 Uzbekistan 31.31
    7 Gabon 27.55
    8 Syria 26.50
    9 Vietnam 25.88
    10 Belarus 25.68
    11 Algeria 25.02
    12 Bangladesh 24.86
    13 Iraq 24.77
    14 Cameroon 24.28
    15 Burundi 24.28
    16 Tanzania 24.23
    17 Niger 24.01
    18 Madagascar 23.74
    19 Kyrgyzstan 23.73
    20 Nicaragua 23.72

    * Excluded are countries and territories with relatively few (under 10,000) Kaspersky product users.
    ** Unique users on whose computers local Malware threats were blocked, as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country/territory.

    On average worldwide, local Malware threats were recorded on 13.62% of users’ computers at least once during the quarter.

    MIL OSI Global Banks –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Economics: Olli Rehn: Europe at the crossroads – common defence, re-emerging economy?

    Source: Bank for International Settlements

    Presentation accompanying the speech

    Dear Friends of Bruegel and the Bank of Finland,

    It is a great pleasure to celebrate with you all today both the 20th anniversary of Bruegel and the 30th anniversary of Finland’s membership of the EU. It is indeed an honour to organise and hold this conference together with Bruegel and to celebrate Europe Day.

    The founders of Bruegel were truly visionary 20 years ago. They recognized a gap – a growing need for stronger economics-based analysis and research on the shaping of the European Union. Anchoring the think tank firmly with EU Member States was also a wise decision.

    I had the privilege and pleasure of being present – if not at Bruegel’s creation, then certainly at its institutional foundation – as economic policy advisor to Finland’s Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen. The Finnish Government, specifically the Ministry of Finance, decided to become a founding member institution. More recently, the Bank of Finland also joined the club, and we have made good use of Bruegel’s valuable work.

    Today, we all appreciate Bruegel for its diverse and independent research, which significantly enhances evidence-based and research-informed policymaking in Europe. Let me extend my warmest congratulations and wish you many more dynamic and productive years as Europe’s leading policy think tank.

    Dear Friends,

    Europe Day today marks the 75th anniversary of the Schuman Declaration, which laid out the foundation for European integration. In 1950 Europe was still recovering from the human and economic devastation of the Second World War.

    From the Finnish standpoint, the immediate post-war years were not a brilliant time to be a small nation. As Private Rahikainen put it in Väinö Linna’s The Unknown Soldier, in response to a minister’s idealistic speech after the armistice in September 1944:

     “To hell with their damned speeches. When your powder’s all gone, it’s better to keep your mouth shut than go spouting about the rights of small nations. A dog raises his hind leg on them.”

    The Schuman Declaration nevertheless turned the tide and became the starting point for Pax Europaea, the long period of relative peace with notably few conflicts between European countries.

    Indeed, an essential manifestation of Europe as a peace project is the EU’s 2012 Nobel Peace Prize. The European Union had, by then, “for over six decades contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe”.

    Slide 2: Outline of today’s talk

    I’d like to structure my remarks today under three themes. First, the seismic geopolitical shift which the world is currently witnessing. Second, the need for immediate investments in common defence to secure Europe’s peace. And third, revitalising the EU economy through advancements in innovation, trade and productivity.

    Slide 3: Power politics is overshadowing the world economy

    Let me start with the shifting geopolitical landscape, which presents the EU with significant new security challenges.

    The rules-based international order, on which Europe built its post-war recovery, is under strain. Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump have each, in their own way, challenged this order − pushing for a world where great powers claim their spheres of influence and where might is only right. Such a tri-polar world would not be a world of peace and prosperity.

    Since the Second World War, for good reason we have trusted that it is in the enlightened self-interest of the United States to stand as the security backstop for the Euro-Atlantic community. To my mind, as a long-time student of US foreign and security policy, this self-interest has clearly been rational from the standpoint of the United States’ own national security and its global strategic interests and influence. However, the US is now making decisions based on a very different type of rationality that involves strained relations with the European Union.

    I am aware that some are holding out hope that this is just temporary – that we’ll be back to ‘the old normal’ in a few years. Two points on that. First, I would not bet on it – there is no guarantee of a policy U-turn, as we may be witnessing a deeper political current in the US. And second, even more fundamentally, we must ask: can European security over the longer term be left at the mercy of the political winds in Pennsylvania’s rust belt and seven swing states? Or should Europe finally take substantially greater responsibility for its own security?

    In my view, the answer is clear, given the current and probable future defence environment: Europe must build its own credible common defence. Supporting Ukraine and reinforcing European defence is imperative for the security of the whole of Europe. Common defence is a crucial European public good. We need a strong, independent Europe, capable of defending itself as the European pillar of Nato.

    The COVID-era recovery fund and earlier crisis responses have shown that the EU is capable of solidarity. A similar level of unity and quick decision-making is now needed for defence.

    Many EU countries have already increased defence spending. Germany has committed to major investments. Not all EU states currently have the fiscal capacity to follow suit. That’s why Europe must build joint capabilities, interoperable forces − and, if necessary, common financing.

    Europe would also benefit from a broad and liquid market for safe assets, such as the US enjoys. Bonds issued by EU institutions have consistently drawn strong investor demand. The currently unpredictable nature of US economic policy only increases the demand for stable investment options. Europe should capitalise on that by developing genuine safe assets – another field calling for Bruegel’s continued active input.

    Moreover, I have been reading with great interest about the proposal for a European Defence Mechanism (EDM), which was launched by Bruegel last month. Such an intergovernmental organisation would apparently be modelled on the existing and well-tested template of the European Stability Mechanism. I see many merits in this proposal and would love to dive deeper into this – but I shall refrain from doing so, as I suppose that the panel will shortly be discussing the EDM more closely.

    Let me nevertheless comment that Bruegel’s proposal includes cooperation with the United Kingdom, which shares our values and has a strong military. Despite no longer being part of the EU, the UK remains a key partner in Europe’s security architecture. I should also add that we cannot afford to be held back by foot-dragging or by hostile Member States, such as Hungary, which might wish to hinder progress.

    This is why we must, as Bruegel has done, search for creative solutions, typically driven by coalitions of the capable and willing, to ensure that we move forward with our shared goals.

    At the same time, we must work for more effective European institutional arrangements that better serve the common good. These should include a significantly larger EU budget and more streamlined decision-making structures.

    This is also an opportunity to make Europe economically and financially stronger, as we need a liquid and large market of safe assets, as I alluded to earlier. Could European defence bonds provide such safe assets? A precondition for this would be that these bonds would be used to finance genuine European public goods and be backed by larger common revenues in the future.

    Solidarity and unity within the EU are reinforced by standing together, demonstrating our commitment to collective security and prosperity. Let us recall that the Treaty on European Union offers the legal basis for common defence in its Article 42. Involvement from us all is vital in maintaining a united front and ensuring a peaceful and prosperous Europe for future generations.

    Slide 4: Growth in the euro area has been picking up

    My third and final theme is the re-emerging European economy. Yes, re-emerging, even though it provides a mixed picture today.

    Recent data has shown signs of recovery in the euro area, but the outlook remains clouded by exceptional uncertainty due to President Trump’s trade war. Employment is solid in the euro area, and unemployment is low at 6.2%. Private consumption has benefited from stronger real incomes. Investments in Europe’s common defence and infrastructure will bolster manufacturing further and strengthen long-term growth. Europe will continue to build up resilience against global shocks.

    With disinflation on track and the growth outlook weakening, we decided at the European Central Bank’s Governing Council meeting on 17 April to lower interest rates. This was the seventh reduction since last summer.

    Given the pervasive uncertainty, the Governing Council is maintaining full freedom of action in monetary policy. We will adjust our rates to bring inflation to 2% in the medium term – just as our strategy tells us to do.

    Slide 5: Bank of Finland’s scenario calculation: A trade war would weaken growth worldwide

    The elevated uncertainty brings me to the significant risks in our economic outlook, especially trade protectionism.

    An extensive trade war would weaken economic output worldwide, and we have already seen major turbulence in the global stock markets.

    Calculations by the Bank of Finland show that if the US were to impose tariffs targeting all imports from EU countries and China – raising them by 25 percentage points – and the EU were to take equivalent counter measures, world GDP could decline by over 0.5% in both 2025 and 2026. The impact on the euro area economy could be slightly greater, with the estimated GDP effect ranging from 0.7% to 1.5% in the first year, depending on the increased uncertainty and the extent of counter measures taken. With all the usual caveats, these figures illustrate the seriousness of the threat posed by a full-scale trade war.

    Bank of Finland’s earlier calculations concerning the effects of the trade war on the Finnish economy are in line with these estimated effects on the euro area economy. While the model estimations come with uncertainty, they consistently speak to significantly negative outcomes for open economies such as Finland, as a result of trade war.

    In my view, in the face of US protectionism, the European Commission’s response has been justified and rational. The Commission has rightly suggested a zero-for-zero tariff agreement between the EU and the US. While Europe remains committed to constructive negotiations with the US, the Commission has been preparing proportionate countermeasures to reinforce our negotiating position, with the aim of reaching a solution that benefits everybody and avoids further damage to growth.

    Slide 6: Investment needed now in security and productivity

    “This is Europe’s moment” has become a slogan of the era. But to what extent is there substance to it?

    No doubt, President Trump’s policies are compromising the United States’ economic and institutional dominance, while Europe’s position is benefiting from its stability and certain political developments.

    Yet, the fact remains that the size of the US bypasses the European economy significantly in many dimensions, especially in factor productivity and therefore in growth. Will Europe adopt Mario Draghi’s recommendations to boost productivity? European industry must strengthen its technological capabilities. Cutting-edge research and innovation, and investment in areas like AI, will be crucial.

    Furthermore, Europe’s Savings and Investment Union needs to be advanced. The US has a larger and more unified internal capital market which benefits from scaling, a strong venture capital ecosystem, and fewer regulatory hurdles. The US dollar may remain the world’s leading reserve currency at the centre of the global financial system. But many investors are keen to diversify their portfolios to euro-denominated assets, which will also strengthen the international role of the euro.

    The price of energy is a considerable burden to European competitiveness. Unlike the US, the EU has no abundant fossil fuel supplies, so there is no other viable strategy for increasing our energy security than decarbonisation and the green transition. The green transition in energy is not just climate action – it’s a geopolitical investment. So is the digital euro and the broader effort to bolster the international role of the euro.

    Human capital and academic freedom are among Europe’s greatest assets. As these freedoms are eroded in the United States, Europe has a unique opportunity. In my view, the EU should rapidly create a special visa programme for top researchers seeking intellectual freedom without political pressure. We must highlight Europe’s universities where critical thinking is encouraged and academic liberty protected. This is an investment in Europe’s future prosperity and influence.

    Slide 7: Conclusions

    To conclude, today’s world is experiencing yet another major transition, as it was 30 years ago when the Cold War came to an end. But now, unfortunately, it is moving in reverse gear.

    Europe’s external security and its soft power depend now on strengthening its hard power, particularly in terms of coordinated defence solutions. Moreover, despite the current uncertain geopolitical environment, international cooperation remains essential in a highly interconnected world. We stand for it.

    At the same time, Europe must strengthen its economic foundation by finding ways to increase productivity and hence fulfil its true potential. At the ECB, we will contribute to this by ensuring price stability and financial stability, thus laying the foundation for Europe’s economic and social re-emergence and long-term resilience.

    In sum, this truly is Europe’s moment. We must defend our way of life – solving conflict and making progress through reason, dialogue and democracy.

    As Reinhold Niebuhr, the theologian and international relations theorist from our western neighbour, once said:

    “The sad duty of politics is to establish justice in a sinful world.”

    That is precisely Europe’s task now – more so than for decades.

    Thank you!

    MIL OSI Economics –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Video: European Union extends temporary protection for Ukrainians

    Source: European Commission (video statements)

    The European Commission has proposed extending temporary protection for Ukrainians in the EU until March 4, 2027. Announced on June 4, 2025, this proposal aims to provide legal certainty and maintain consistent protection standards across EU Member States for those fleeing Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

    Beyond extending protection, the Commission suggests measures to facilitate integration into host countries and support voluntary return to Ukraine. Initiatives include information hubs, exploratory visits, and coordinated transition programs. A Special Envoy will be appointed to ensure close collaboration with Member States and Ukrainian authorities.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QI3mAxd4APU

    MIL OSI Video –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: V. Putin and D. Trump held a telephone conversation

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Moscow, June 5 /Xinhua/ – Russian and US Presidents Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump held their fourth telephone conversation on Wednesday, TASS reported, citing the Russian leader’s aide Yuri Ushakov.

    “How did the conversation begin: naturally, with a discussion of the situation around Ukraine. Vladimir Putin spoke in detail about the results of the second round of direct Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in Istanbul,” the Kremlin spokesman said.

    “In addition to Ukraine, a whole range of international issues were discussed, I would say, with an emphasis on the somewhat stalemate in the negotiations between the US and Iran on the Iranian nuclear program,” he noted. According to Yu. Ushakov, D. Trump stated in a telephone conversation the need for assistance from Russia in the situation with the Iranian nuclear program.

    The two leaders also discussed the situation in the Middle East and the ongoing armed conflict between India and Pakistan. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 5, 2025
  • Putin tells Trump Russia has to respond to Ukrainian attacks

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Russian President Vladimir Putin told U.S. President Donald Trump on Wednesday that he would have to respond to Ukrainian drone attacks on Russia’s nuclear-capable bomber fleet, while also describing peace talks with Ukraine as “useful.”

    The war in Ukraine is intensifying after nearly four months of cajoling and threats to both Moscow and Kyiv from Trump, who says he wants peace after more than three years of the deadliest conflict in Europe since World War Two.

    After Ukraine bombed bridges and attacked Russia’s fleet of bombers deep in Siberia and Russia’s far north, Putin on Wednesday said he did not think Ukraine’s leaders wanted peace.

    Shortly after Putin discussed the attacks with top ministers in Moscow, Trump said he had spoken by telephone with Putin for one hour and 15 minutes, and that they had discussed the Ukrainian attacks and Iran.

    “We discussed the attack on Russia’s docked airplanes, by Ukraine, and also various other attacks that have been taking place by both sides. It was a good conversation, but not a conversation that will lead to immediate peace,” Trump said on social media.

    Russia has unleashed several massive aerial attacks on Ukraine over recent weeks.

    “President Putin did say, and very strongly, that he will have to respond to the recent attack on the airfields,” Trump said.

    A foreign policy aide to Putin, Yuri Ushakov, said the Russian leader told Trump on the call that ceasefire talks between Moscow and Kyiv have been productive, despite what he termed attempts by Ukraine to “disrupt” them.

    “Let me stress that our president described in detail the content of the talks and that these talks on the whole were useful,” Ushakov said.

    Memorandums outlining peace plans were exchanged and will be analysed, Ushakov said, “and we hope that afterwards the two sides will be able to continue their talks.”

    Ushakov confirmed the two presidents discussed other international issues, particularly the Middle East conflict and how Russia could help deal with Iran and its nuclear programme.

    On Iran, Trump said he believed Putin agreed with Washington that Iran “cannot have a nuclear weapon,” and accused Tehran of “slowwalking” decisions regarding the talks.

    Trump has been unusually silent on the Ukrainian attacks on the Russian bombers – one of the three pillars of Russia’s nuclear arsenal – though Moscow demanded that the United States and Britain restrain Ukraine.

    The Kremlin said Trump had told Putin that Washington was not informed in advance of the Ukrainian attacks. Trump’s Ukraine envoy said the risk of escalation from the war in Ukraine was “going way up” after the strikes.

    Russia and the United States are by far the world’s biggest nuclear powers: together they hold about 88% of all nuclear weapons.

    Each has three ways of nuclear attack – strategic bombers, land-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles – and any attack on any part of the “triad” is considered a grave escalation.

    WAR OR PEACE?

    In some of his most hawkish remarks in recent months on the outlook for peace, Putin on Wednesday said the bridge attacks had been directed against civilians and accused Ukrainian leadership of being a “terrorist organisation” supported by powers who were becoming “terrorist accomplices.”

    “The current Kyiv regime does not need peace at all,” Putin said at a meeting with senior officials. “What is there to talk about? How can we negotiate with those who rely on terror?”

    Ukraine has not commented on the bridge attacks. It denies it targets civilians, as does Russia, though civilians have been killed by both sides.

    Kyiv has similarly accused Moscow of not seriously wanting peace, citing as evidence Russian resistance to an immediate ceasefire. Russia says certain conditions must first be met.

    Putin, in his public remarks, did not mention the bomber attacks, which came just before Russia and Ukraine met for direct peace talks in Istanbul where Moscow set out what the United States has called “maximalist” aims.

    Before Putin spoke, other Russian officials said military options were “on the table” for its response to Ukrainian attacks deep inside Russia and accused the West of being involved in them.

    “We urge London and Washington to react in such a way as to stop further escalation,” Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov was quoted by the Interfax news agency as saying. Ryabkov oversees relations with the U.S. and arms control.

    British and U.S. officials have said they had no prior knowledge of the weekend attacks on Russian nuclear-capable long-range bombers. The White House has said Trump was not informed of Ukraine’s drone attack before it unfolded.

    (Reuters)

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Ukraine’s Security is our Security. Only a Just Peace Can Secure Ukraine’s Future: UK Statement to the OSCE

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments 3

    Speech

    Ukraine’s Security is our Security. Only a Just Peace Can Secure Ukraine’s Future: UK Statement to the OSCE

    UK Military Advisor, Lt Col Joby Rimmer, says that a sustained ceasefire is the quickest route to stop the killing. The UK supports ending the war in Ukraine through a just peace, while Russia obstructs progress.

    Thank you, Madam Chair. Last week, we discussed the Code of Conduct, including its stipulation that “In the event of armed conflict, they will seek to facilitate the effective cessation of hostilities and seek to create conditions favourable to the political solution of the conflict”.

    To that end, the UK shares President Trump’s desire to bring this war to an end, and will continue to work closely with the US, Ukraine and other international partners to secure a just and lasting peace.  We thank Türkiye for hosting talks in Istanbul, including earlier this week. This is a once in a generation moment for the collective security of our continent. Only a lasting peace in Ukraine that safeguards its sovereignty will deter President Putin from further aggression in the future.

    As we have noted each week, Ukraine continues to show its commitment to peace: Its constructive engagement with US peace efforts at every turn; agreement in principle to a full and unconditional ceasefire; sending a senior and empowered delegation to Istanbul; and President Zelenskyy’s readiness to meet President Putin face to face.

    Russia, on the other hand, has taken steps to obstruct the pathway to peace.  President Putin continues to reject a complete, unconditional and immediate 30-day ceasefire that President Zelenskyy endorsed nearly three months ago; refused to share his memorandum on terms for ending this illegal war in advance of Monday’s meeting; and rejected President Zelenskyy’s call for a direct meeting.

    We continue to call on Russia to agree a full and unconditional ceasefire to create the space for negotiations on a framework for a lasting peace.  A sustained ceasefire is the quickest route to stop the killing. Ukraine’s security is our security. UK support for Ukraine remains iron-clad, and our support will be sustained. Thank you, Madame Chair.

    Updates to this page

    Published 5 June 2025

    Invasion of Ukraine

    • UK visa support for Ukrainian nationals
    • Move to the UK if you’re coming from Ukraine
    • Homes for Ukraine: record your interest
    • Find out about the UK’s response

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: 18 countries elected to ECOSOC for three-year term

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    UNITED NATIONS, June 5 (Xinhua) — Eighteen countries, including China, were elected on Wednesday to three-year terms on the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the coordinating body for economic and social work of U.N. agencies and funds.

    UN General Assembly President Philemon Young announced the results after a secret ballot.

    The council included Burundi, Chad, Mozambique and Sierra Leone from Africa, China, India, Lebanon and Turkmenistan from Asia and the Pacific, Croatia, Russia and Ukraine from Eastern Europe, Ecuador, Peru and Saint Kitts and Nevis from Latin America and the Caribbean, and Australia, Finland, Norway and Turkey from Western Europe and other regions.

    These ECOSOC members are elected for a three-year term beginning on 1 January 2026.

    ECOSOC has 54 members. Its membership is renewed annually by a vote in the UN General Assembly. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: President Lai confers decoration on President Hilda C. Heine of Republic of the Marshall Islands, hosts state banquet  

    Source: Republic of China Taiwan

    Details
    2025-06-03
    President Lai and President Hilda C. Heine of Marshall Islands hold bilateral talks and witness signing of agreements
    On the morning of June 3, President Lai Ching-te, accompanied by Vice President Bi-khim Hsiao, held bilateral talks with President Hilda C. Heine of the Republic of the Marshall Islands at the Presidential Office following a welcome ceremony with military honors for her and her husband. The leaders also jointly witnessed the signing of a letter of intent for sports exchanges and a memorandum of understanding regarding the Presidents’ Scholarship Fund. President Lai then presided over a launch ceremony for a loan program to purchase aircraft. In remarks, President Lai thanked the government and the Nitijela (parliament) of the Marshall Islands for their longstanding support for Taiwan’s international participation and for voicing staunch support for Taiwan at numerous international venues. President Lai said that Taiwan looks forward to continuing to deepen its diplomatic partnership with the Marshall Islands and build an even closer cooperative relationship across a range of fields, engaging in mutual assistance for mutual benefits and helping each other achieve joint and prosperous development to yield even greater well-being for our peoples. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: I once again warmly welcome President Heine, First Gentleman Thomas Kijiner, Jr., and our guests to Taiwan. During my visit to the Marshall Islands last year, I said that Taiwan and the Marshall Islands are truly a family. When Vice President Hsiao and I took office last year, President Heine led a delegation to Taiwan. It is now one year since our inauguration, and I am delighted to see President Heine once again, just as if I were seeing family arrive from afar. Through my visit to the Marshall Islands, I gained a profound sense of the friendship between the peoples of our two nations, well-demonstrated by bilateral exchanges in such areas as healthcare, agriculture, and education. And it is thanks to President Heine’s longstanding support for Taiwan that our countries have been able to further advance collaboration on even more issues, including women’s empowerment and climate change. In recent years, the geopolitical and economic landscape has changed rapidly. We look forward to Taiwan and the Marshall Islands continuing to deepen our partnership and build an even closer cooperative relationship. In just a few moments, President Heine and I will witness the signing of several documents, including a memorandum of understanding and a letter of intent, to expand bilateral cooperation in such fields as sports, education, and transportation. Taiwan will take concrete action to work with the Marshall Islands and advance mutual prosperity and development, writing a new chapter in our diplomatic partnership. I would also like to take this opportunity to express gratitude to the government and Nitijela of the Marshall Islands. In recent years, the Nitijela has passed annual resolutions backing Taiwan’s international participation, and President Heine and Marshallese cabinet members have been some of the strongest advocates for Taiwan’s international participation, voicing staunch support for Taiwan at numerous international venues. Building on the pillars of democracy, peace, and prosperity, Taiwan will continue to work with the Marshall Islands and other like-minded countries to deepen our partnerships, engage in mutual assistance for mutual benefits, and help one another achieve joint and prosperous development. I have every confidence that the combined efforts of our two nations will yield even greater well-being for our peoples and see us make even more contributions to the world. President Heine then delivered remarks, and began by conveying warm greetings of iokwe from the people and government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands to the people and government of the Republic of China (Taiwan). She said she was deeply honored to be in Taiwan for an official visit, and extended appreciation to President Lai and his government for their gracious invitation and warm welcome. President Heine stated that this year marks 27 years of diplomatic ties between our two nations, and that they are proud of this enduring friendship. This special and enduring relationship, she said, is grounded in our shared Austronesian heritage, and strengthened by mutual respect for each other’s democratic systems and our steadfast commitment to the core values of freedom, justice, and the rule of law. President Heine stated that Taiwan’s continued support has been invaluable to the people and national development of the Marshall Islands, particularly in the areas of health, education, agriculture, and climate change. She also expressed deep appreciation to Taiwan for providing Marshallese students with opportunities to study in Taiwan, and for the care extended to Marshallese who travel here for medical treatment. President Heine also announced that she would be presenting a copy of a resolution by the people and government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands reiterating their appreciation for the support provided by the people and government of the Republic of China (Taiwan), and calling on the United Nations to take immediate action to resolve the inappropriate exclusion of Taiwan’s 23 million people from the UN system. She added that she looked forward to the bilateral discussions later that day, and to continuing the important work that both countries carry out together. After the bilateral talks, President Lai and President Heine witnessed the signing of a letter of intent regarding sports exchanges and a memorandum of understanding regarding the Presidents’ Scholarship Fund by Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) and Marshallese Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Kalani R. Kaneko. President Lai then presided over a launch ceremony for a loan program to purchase aircraft, marking the formal beginning of Taiwan-Marshall Islands air transport cooperation. The visiting delegation also included Council of Iroij Chairman Lanny Kabua, Minister of Finance David Paul, and Nitijela Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade Chair Joe Bejang. They were accompanied to the Presidential Office by Charge d’Affaires a.i. Anjanette Davis-Anjel of the Embassy of the Republic of the Marshall Islands.

    Details
    2025-06-03
    President Lai welcomes President Hilda C. Heine of Republic of the Marshall Islands with military honors  
    President Lai Ching-te welcomed President Hilda C. Heine of the Republic of the Marshall Islands and her husband on the morning of June 3 with full military honors. In remarks, President Lai thanked President Heine and the people and government of the Marshall Islands for demonstrating such high regard for our nations’ diplomatic ties. The president said that over our 27 years of diplomatic relations, our cooperation in healthcare, agriculture, fisheries, education and training, and climate change has yielded many positive results. And moving ahead, he said, Taiwan will continue to deepen collaboration across all domains for mutual prosperity and growth. The welcome ceremony began at 10:30 a.m. in the plaza fronting the Presidential Office. President Lai and President Heine each delivered remarks after a 21-gun salute, the playing of the two countries’ national anthems, and a review of the military honor guard. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: On behalf of the people and government of the Republic of China (Taiwan), it is a great pleasure to welcome President Heine, First Gentleman Thomas Kijiner, Jr., and their delegation with full military honors as they make this state visit to Taiwan. When I traveled to the Marshall Islands on a state visit last December, I was received with great warmth and courtesy. I once again thank President Heine and the people and government of the Marshall Islands for demonstrating such high regard for our nations’ diplomatic ties. Taiwan and the Marshall Islands share Austronesian cultural traditions, and we are like-minded friends. Throughout our 27 years of diplomatic relations, we have always engaged with each other in a spirit of reciprocal trust and mutual assistance. Our cooperation in healthcare, agriculture, fisheries, education and training, and climate change has yielded many positive results. This is President Heine’s first state visit to Taiwan since taking office for a second time. We look forward to engaging our esteemed guests in in-depth discussions on issues of common concern. And moving ahead, Taiwan will continue to deepen collaboration with the Marshall Islands across all domains for mutual prosperity and growth. In closing, I thank President Heine, First Gentleman Kijiner, and their entire delegation for visiting Taiwan. I wish you all a pleasant and successful trip.  A transcript of President Heine’s remarks follows: Your Excellency President Lai Ching-te, Vice President [Bi-khim] Hsiao, honorable members of the cabinet, ambassadors, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen: It is my pleasure to extend warm greetings of iokwe on behalf of the people and the government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands. I wish to also convey my appreciation to Your Excellency President Lai, for the hospitality and very warm welcome – kommol tata. This visit marks my seventh official state visit to this beautiful country. It’s a testament to my strong commitment to further deepening ties between the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Republic of China (Taiwan). During this visit, I look forward to engaging in meaningful discussions with Your Excellency President Lai to further strengthen the bilateral relationship between our two nations and our peoples.  For over a quarter-century, Taiwan has been a strong ally and friend to the Marshall Islands. Our partnership has thrived across many sectors, including education, healthcare, infrastructure, and economic development. Through Taiwan’s generous support and collaboration, we have made significant progress in improving the lives of our people, empowering our communities, and fostering sustainable growth. The Marshall Islands deeply values our partnership with Taiwan and appreciates Taiwan’s support over the years. Despite our small size and limited voice on the global stage, the Marshall Islands deeply cherishes our friendship with Taiwan, and to that end, I wish to reaffirm my government’s commitment to Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the United Nations system. Taiwan has consistently demonstrated its commitment to the principles of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. In light of current constraints in global affairs, it is now more urgent than ever that the international community of nations recognize the fundamental rights of the 23 million Taiwanese people and recognize Taiwan’s aspiration to engage fully in global affairs. It is with this in mind that I wish to reiterate to Your Excellency President Lai, the Taiwanese people, and the world that under my government, Marshall Islands will continue to acknowledge Taiwan’s contribution on the global stage and urge like-minded countries to advocate for Taiwan’s meaningful engagement in the international arena. In closing, may I once again extend our sincere appreciation to Your Excellency President Lai, the people and government of the Republic of China (Taiwan), for your warm welcome.  Also in attendance at the welcome ceremony were Charge d’Affaires a.i. Anjanette Davis-Anjel of the Embassy of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Dean of the Diplomatic Corps and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Ambassador Andrea Clare Bowman, and members of the foreign diplomatic corps in Taiwan.  

    Details
    2025-05-29
    President Lai attends 2025 Europe Day Dinner
    On the evening of May 29, President Lai Ching-te attended the 2025 Europe Day Dinner. In remarks, President Lai stated that Taiwan looks forward to further establishing institutionalized mechanisms with Europe for our trade and investment ties and hopes to take an innovative and diverse approach to sign an economic partnership agreement with the European Union, to provide a more transparent, stable, and predictable business environment for our enterprises. The president said that Taiwan will actively work alongside other democracies, including those in Europe, to jointly build resilient, promising non-red supply chains, and noted that Taiwan and Europe have endless potential for collaboration, whether it is in safeguarding freedom and democracy or advancing our economic and trade relationship. He expressed hope to further strengthen our partnership and work together toward global peace, stability, and prosperity. A transcript of President Lai’s remarks follows: Chairman [Henry] Chang (張瀚書), thank you for the invitation, and congratulations on your second term. I’m confident that under your leadership, the ECCT [European Chamber of Commerce Taiwan] will build even more bridges for cooperation between Taiwan and Europe. I would also like to thank EETO [European Economic and Trade Office] Head [Lutz] Güllner and all the European country representatives stationed in Taiwan. Your hard work over the years has helped deepen Taiwan-Europe relations and brought about such fruitful cooperation. Thank you. This year we celebrate the 75th anniversary of the Schuman Declaration. In 1950, then-French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed to create a European federation dedicated to preserving peace. The declaration symbolized a new flowering in the post-war era of democracy, unity, and cooperation. As we face the geopolitical challenges and drastic economic changes of today’s world, the Schuman Declaration still speaks to us profoundly. This year is also the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe. Moving forward, Taiwan will continue to advance cooperation with our democratic partners, and will join hands with Europe to build a partnership of even greater resilience and mutual trust. Europe is Taiwan’s third largest trading partner. It is also Taiwan’s largest source of foreign direct investment. Last year, bilateral trade between Taiwan and Europe totaled US$84.7 billion. This demonstrates our vibrant economic and trade ties and reflects the high levels of confidence our businesses have in each other’s markets and systems. We look forward to Taiwan and Europe further establishing institutionalized mechanisms for our trade and investment ties. And we hope to take an innovative and diverse approach to sign an economic partnership agreement with the EU, to provide a more transparent, stable, and predictable business environment for our enterprises. Today’s Taiwan has an internationally recognized democracy and a semiconductor industry vital to global security and prosperity. This enables us to play a key role in restructuring global democratic supply chains and the economic order. In particular, we see supply chains dominated by a new authoritarian bloc expanding their influence through non-market mechanisms, price subsidies, and monopolies on resources, as they seek global control of critical technologies and manufacturing capabilities. Their actions not only distort principles of market fairness, but also threaten the international community’s basic expectations for democracy, the rule of law, and corporate responsibility. In response, Taiwan will actively work alongside other democracies, including those in Europe, to jointly build resilient, promising non-red supply chains. We will also introduce an initiative on semiconductor supply chain partnerships for global democracies. This is more than a proposal for economic cooperation; it is an alliance of shared values and advanced technology. Security in the Taiwan Strait and regional peace and stability have always been issues of mutual interest for Taiwan and Europe. So here today, on behalf of all the people of Taiwan, I would like to thank the EU and European nations for continuing to take concrete actions in public support of peace and stability across the strait. Such actions are vital to regional security and prosperity. Taiwan will continue to bolster itself to achieve real peace through strength, and will work with democratic partners to safeguard freedom and democracy, thereby showing our determination for regional peace. At this critical time, Taiwan and Europe have endless potential for collaboration, whether it’s in safeguarding freedom and democracy or advancing our economic and trade relationship. I look forward to our joining hands at this strategic juncture to further strengthen our partnership and work together toward global peace, stability, and prosperity. Also in attendance at the event was British Office Taipei Representative Ruth Bradley-Jones.

    Details
    2025-05-28
    President Lai meets US delegation led by Senator Tammy Duckworth
    On the afternoon of May 28, President Lai Ching-te met with a delegation led by United States Senator Tammy Duckworth. In remarks, President Lai thanked the US Congress and government for their longstanding and bipartisan support for Taiwan. The president stated that Taiwan will continue to strengthen cooperation with the US and jointly safeguard regional peace and stability. He pointed out that the Taiwan government has already proposed a roadmap for deepening Taiwan-US trade ties and will encourage mutual investment between Taiwanese and US businesses. He then expressed hope of deepening Taiwan-US ties and creating more niches for both sides. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: I warmly welcome this delegation led by Senator Duckworth, a dear friend of Taiwan. Senator Duckworth previously visited in May last year to convey congratulations after the inauguration of myself and Vice President Bi-khim Hsiao. Your bipartisan delegation was the first group from the US Senate that I met with as president. Today, you are visiting just after the first anniversary of my taking office, demonstrating the staunch support of the US and our deep friendship. On behalf of the people of Taiwan, I extend my sincere appreciation and greetings. And I invite you to come back and visit next year, the year after that, and every year. Taiwan and the US share the values of democracy and the rule of law and believe in free and open markets. Both sides embrace a common goal of peace, stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. I thank the US Congress and government for their longstanding, bipartisan, and steadfast support for Taiwan. In 2021, to help Taiwan overcome the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic, Senator Duckworth made a special trip here to announce that the US government would be donating vaccines to Taiwan. In recent years, Senator Duckworth has also promoted the TAIWAN Security Act, STAND with Taiwan Act, and Taiwan and America Space Assistance Act in the US Congress, all of which have further deepened Taiwan-US cooperation and steadily advanced our ties. For this, I express my deepest appreciation. I want to emphasize that the people of Taiwan have an unyielding determination to protect their homeland and free and democratic way of life. Over the past year, the government and private sector have been working together to enhance Taiwan’s whole-of-society defense resilience. The government is committed to reforming national defense, and it has proposed prioritizing special budget allocations to ensure that our defense budget exceeds three percent of GDP. This will continue to bolster Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities. Moving forward, Taiwan will continue to strengthen cooperation with the US. In addition to jointly safeguarding regional peace and stability, we also aspire to deepen bilateral trade and economic ties. At the SelectUSA Investment Summit in Washington, DC, earlier this month, Taiwan’s delegation was once again the biggest delegation attending the event – proof positive of our close economic and trade cooperation. We have already proposed a roadmap for deepening Taiwan-US trade ties. We will narrow the trade imbalance through the procurement of energy and agricultural and other industrial products from the US. We will encourage mutual investment between Taiwanese and US businesses to stimulate industrial development on both sides, especially in such industries as national defense and shipbuilding. We therefore look forward to Congress passing the US-Taiwan Expedited Double-Tax Relief Act as soon as possible, as this would deepen Taiwan-US trade ties and create more niches for business. In closing, I once again thank Senator Duckworth for making the trip to Taiwan. Let us continue to work together to elevate Taiwan-US ties. I wish you a pleasant and successful visit. Senator Duckworth then delivered remarks, saying that she is happy to be back in Taiwan and that she wanted to make sure to come back just after President Lai’s one-year anniversary of taking office to show the dedication and the outstanding friendship that we have. She noted that because no matter who is in the White House, no matter which political party is in power in Washington, DC, she has always believed that if America wants to remain a leader on the global stage, it has to show up for friends like Taiwan.  Senator Duckworth mentioned that in the years that she has been coming to Taiwan since pre-COVID times, she has seen a remarkable increase in participation in its defense and the support of the Taiwanese people for defending the homeland. She then thanked Taiwan for making the commitment to its self-defense, and also for being a partner with other nations around the world.  The STAND with Taiwan Act, the senator noted, is so named because the US wants to stand side by side with Taiwan. Pointing out that Taiwan is an important leader in the Indo-Pacific and on the global stage, she reiterated that there is support on both sides of the aisle in Washington for Taiwanese democracy, and added that the people of Taiwan are showing that they are willing to shore up their own readiness. Senator Duckworth said that whether it is delivering vaccines to Taiwan or making sure that the US National Guard works with Taiwan’s reserve forces or even with its civilian emergency response teams, these are all important components to the ongoing partnership between our nations.  Senator Duckworth indicated that there are many great opportunities moving forward beyond our military cooperation with one another. Whether it is in chip manufacturing, agricultural investments, shipbuilding, or in the healthcare field, those investments in both nations will facilitate stability and development in both our nations. She said that is why she wants to continue the Taiwan-US relationship, underlining that they are in it for the long haul. The delegation was accompanied to the Presidential Office by American Institute in Taiwan Taipei Office Director Raymond Greene.

    Details
    2025-05-27
    President Lai meets delegation led by US House Natural Resources Committee Chair Bruce Westerman
    On the afternoon of May 27, President Lai Ching-te met with a delegation led by Chair of the Natural Resources Committee of the United States House of Representatives Bruce Westerman. In remarks, President Lai stated that Taiwan and the US enjoy close industrial exchanges and continue to explore new opportunities for investment and collaboration. The president said that Taiwan will continue to increase purchases from and together build non-red supply chains with the US, expressing hope that economic and trade relations grow even closer and that both work together to jointly safeguard peace and stability throughout the region. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: I am delighted to meet and exchange views with members of the US House Committee on Natural Resources today. Chair Westerman, the leader of this delegation, is an old friend of Taiwan. On behalf of the people of Taiwan, I extend a very warm welcome to the delegation. I also want to thank you all for your long-term close attention to Taiwan-related affairs and your strong support for Taiwan. Taiwan and the US enjoy close ties and share ideals and values. There is an excellent foundation for cooperation between us, particularly in such areas as energy, the economy and trade, agriculture and fisheries, environmental protection, and sustainable development. In recent years, Taiwan-US ties have grown closer and closer. The US has become Taiwan’s largest destination for overseas investment, accounting for over 40 percent of Taiwan’s outbound investment. Taiwan is also the seventh largest trading partner of the US and its seventh largest export market for agricultural products. The SelectUSA Investment Summit held in Washington, DC earlier this month was the largest in its history. Taiwan’s delegation, representing 138 enterprises, was once again the biggest delegation attending the event. This shows that Taiwan and the US enjoy close industrial exchanges and continue to explore new opportunities for investment and collaboration. Looking ahead, with the global landscape changing rapidly, Taiwan will continue to increase purchases from the US, including energy resources such as natural gas and petroleum, as well as agricultural products, industrial products, and even military procurement. This will not only help balance our bilateral trade, but also strengthen development for Taiwan in energy autonomy, resilience, the economy, and trade. Taiwan and the US are also well-matched in such areas as high tech and manufacturing. As the US pursues reindustrialization and aims to become a global hub for AI, Taiwan is willing to take part and play an even more important role. We will strengthen Taiwan-US industrial cooperation and together build non-red supply chains. In addition to bringing our economic and trade relations even closer, this will also allow Taiwanese industries to remain rooted in Taiwan while expanding their global presence, helping bolster the US, and marketing worldwide. As for military exchanges, we are grateful to the US government for continuing its military sales to Taiwan and backing our efforts to upgrade our self-defense capabilities. Taiwan will continue to work with the US to jointly safeguard peace and stability throughout the region. In closing, I thank our guests once again for making the long journey here, not only offering warm friendship, but also demonstrating the staunch bipartisan support for Taiwan in the US Congress. Chair Westerman then delivered remarks, saying that it is an honor for him and his colleagues to be in Taiwan to talk about the strong relationship between the US and Taiwan and how that relationship can continue to grow in the future. The chair pointed out that natural resources are foundational to any kind of economic development, whether it is energy, which is key to manufacturing, or whether it is mining, which provides rare earth elements and all the minerals and metals needed for manufacturing. He said that as for natural resources including fish, wildlife, or timber, all are foundational to any society, but this is especially so for agriculture, noting that the US produces a lot of food and fodder and is always looking for more friends to share that with. Chair Westerman indicated that they are excited about opportunities to work with Taiwan, adding that Taiwan’s investments in the US have been greatly appreciated. He said they also are excited about the talks with the Trump administration and the future going forward on how we can have a stronger trade relationship, a stronger bilateral relationship, and how we can work with each other to help both economies grow and prosper. Chair Westerman concluded his remarks by expressing thanks for the opportunity to visit, saying that they treasure Taiwan’s friendship and our long-term relationship, and are very excited to be able to discuss in more detail how our two countries can work together. The delegation also included US House Natural Resources Committee Representatives Sarah Elfreth, Harriet Hageman, Celeste Maloy, and Nick Begich. The delegation was accompanied to the Presidential Office by American Institute in Taiwan Taipei Office Director Raymond Greene.  

    Details
    2025-05-20
    President Lai interviewed by Nippon Television and Yomiuri TV
    In a recent interview on Nippon Television’s news zero program, President Lai Ching-te responded to questions from host Mr. Sakurai Sho and Yomiuri TV Shanghai Bureau Chief Watanabe Masayo on topics including reflections on his first year in office, cross-strait relations, China’s military threats, Taiwan-United States relations, and Taiwan-Japan relations. The interview was broadcast on the evening of May 19. During the interview, President Lai stated that China intends to change the world’s rules-based international order, and that if Taiwan were invaded, global supply chains would be disrupted. Therefore, he said, Taiwan will strengthen its national defense, prevent war by preparing for war, and achieve the goal of peace. The president also noted that Taiwan’s purpose for developing drones is based on national security and industrial needs, and that Taiwan hopes to collaborate with Japan. He then reiterated that China’s threats are an international problem, and expressed hope to work together with the US, Japan, and others in the global democratic community to prevent China from starting a war. Following is the text of the questions and the president’s responses: Q: How do you feel as you are about to round out your first year in office? President Lai: When I was young, I was determined to practice medicine and save lives. When I left medicine to go into politics, I was determined to transform Taiwan. And when I was sworn in as president on May 20 last year, I was determined to strengthen the nation. Time flies, and it has already been a year. Although the process has been very challenging, I am deeply honored to be a part of it. I am also profoundly grateful to our citizens for allowing me the opportunity to give back to our country. The future will certainly be full of more challenges, but I will do everything I can to unite the people and continue strengthening the nation. That is how I am feeling now. Q: We are now coming up on the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, and over this period, we have often heard that conflict between Taiwan and the mainland is imminent. Do you personally believe that a cross-strait conflict could happen? President Lai: The international community is very much aware that China intends to replace the US and change the world’s rules-based international order, and annexing Taiwan is just the first step. So, as China’s military power grows stronger, some members of the international community are naturally on edge about whether a cross-strait conflict will break out. The international community must certainly do everything in its power to avoid a conflict in the Taiwan Strait; there is too great a cost. Besides causing direct disasters to both Taiwan and China, the impact on the global economy would be even greater, with estimated losses of US$10 trillion from war alone – that is roughly 10 percent of the global GDP. Additionally, 20 percent of global shipping passes through the Taiwan Strait and surrounding waters, so if a conflict breaks out in the strait, other countries including Japan and Korea would suffer a grave impact. For Japan and Korea, a quarter of external transit passes through the Taiwan Strait and surrounding waters, and a third of the various energy resources and minerals shipped back from other countries pass through said areas. If Taiwan were invaded, global supply chains would be disrupted, and therefore conflict in the Taiwan Strait must be avoided. Such a conflict is indeed avoidable. I am very thankful to Prime Minister of Japan Ishiba Shigeru and former Prime Ministers Abe Shinzo, Suga Yoshihide, and Kishida Fumio, as well as US President Donald Trump and former President Joe Biden, and the other G7 leaders, for continuing to emphasize at international venues that peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait are essential components for global security and prosperity. When everyone in the global democratic community works together, stacking up enough strength to make China’s objectives unattainable or to make the cost of invading Taiwan too high for it to bear, a conflict in the strait can naturally be avoided. Q: As you said, President Lai, maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is also very important for other countries. How can war be avoided? What sort of countermeasures is Taiwan prepared to take to prevent war? President Lai: As Mr. Sakurai mentioned earlier, we are coming up on the 80th anniversary of the end of WWII. There are many lessons we can take from that war. First is that peace is priceless, and war has no winners. From the tragedies of WWII, there are lessons that humanity should learn. We must pursue peace, and not start wars blindly, as that would be a major disaster for humanity. In other words, we must be determined to safeguard peace. The second lesson is that we cannot be complacent toward authoritarian powers. If you give them an inch, they will take a mile. They will keep growing, and eventually, not only will peace be unattainable, but war will be inevitable. The third lesson is why WWII ended: It ended because different groups joined together in solidarity. Taiwan, Japan, and the Indo-Pacific region are all directly subjected to China’s threats, so we hope to be able to join together in cooperation. This is why we proposed the Four Pillars of Peace action plan. First, we will strengthen our national defense. Second, we will strengthen economic resilience. Third is standing shoulder to shoulder with the democratic community to demonstrate the strength of deterrence. Fourth is that as long as China treats Taiwan with parity and dignity, Taiwan is willing to conduct exchanges and cooperate with China, and seek peace and mutual prosperity. These four pillars can help us avoid war and achieve peace. That is to say, Taiwan hopes to achieve peace through strength, prevent war by preparing for war, keeping war from happening and pursuing the goal of peace. Q: Regarding drones, everyone knows that recently, Taiwan has been actively researching, developing, and introducing drones. Why do you need to actively research, develop, and introduce new drones at this time? President Lai: This is for two purposes. The first is to meet national security needs. The second is to meet industrial development needs. Because Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines are all part of the first island chain, and we are all democratic nations, we cannot be like an authoritarian country like China, which has an unlimited national defense budget. In this kind of situation, island nations such as Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines should leverage their own technologies to develop national defense methods that are asymmetric and utilize unmanned vehicles. In particular, from the Russo-Ukrainian War, we see that Ukraine has successfully utilized unmanned vehicles to protect itself and prevent Russia from unlimited invasion. In other words, the Russo-Ukrainian War has already proven the importance of drones. Therefore, the first purpose of developing drones is based on national security needs. Second, the world has already entered the era of smart technology. Whether generative, agentic, or physical, AI will continue to develop. In the future, cars and ships will also evolve into unmanned vehicles and unmanned boats, and there will be unmanned factories. Drones will even be able to assist with postal deliveries, or services like Uber, Uber Eats, and foodpanda, or agricultural irrigation and pesticide spraying. Therefore, in the future era of comprehensive smart technology, developing unmanned vehicles is a necessity. Taiwan, based on industrial needs, is actively planning the development of drones and unmanned vehicles. I would like to take this opportunity to express Taiwan’s hope to collaborate with Japan in the unmanned vehicle industry. Just as we do in the semiconductor industry, where Japan has raw materials, equipment, and technology, and Taiwan has wafer manufacturing, our two countries can cooperate. Japan is a technological power, and Taiwan also has significant technological strengths. If Taiwan and Japan work together, we will not only be able to safeguard peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and security in the Indo-Pacific region, but it will also be very helpful for the industrial development of both countries. Q: The drones you just described probably include examples from the Russo-Ukrainian War. Taiwan and China are separated by the Taiwan Strait. Do our drones need to have cross-sea flight capabilities? President Lai: Taiwan does not intend to counterattack the mainland, and does not intend to invade any country. Taiwan’s drones are meant to protect our own nation and territory. Q: Former President Biden previously stated that US forces would assist Taiwan’s defense in the event of an attack. President Trump, however, has yet to clearly state that the US would help defend Taiwan. Do you think that in such an event, the US would help defend Taiwan? Or is Taiwan now trying to persuade the US? President Lai: Former President Biden and President Trump have answered questions from reporters. Although their responses were different, strong cooperation with Taiwan under the Biden administration has continued under the Trump administration; there has been no change. During President Trump’s first term, cooperation with Taiwan was broader and deeper compared to former President Barack Obama’s terms. After former President Biden took office, cooperation with Taiwan increased compared to President Trump’s first term. Now, during President Trump’s second term, cooperation with Taiwan is even greater than under former President Biden. Taiwan-US cooperation continues to grow stronger, and has not changed just because President Trump and former President Biden gave different responses to reporters. Furthermore, the Trump administration publicly stated that in the future, the US will shift its strategic focus from Europe to the Indo-Pacific. The US secretary of defense even publicly stated that the primary mission of the US is to prevent China from invading Taiwan, maintain stability in the Indo-Pacific, and thus maintain world peace. There is a saying in Taiwan that goes, “Help comes most to those who help themselves.” Before asking friends and allies for assistance in facing threats from China, Taiwan must first be determined and prepared to defend itself. This is Taiwan’s principle, and we are working in this direction, making all the necessary preparations to safeguard the nation. Q: I would like to ask you a question about Taiwan-Japan relations. After the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, you made an appeal to give Japan a great deal of assistance and care. In particular, you visited Sendai to offer condolences. Later, you also expressed condolences and concern after the earthquakes in Aomori and Kumamoto. What are your expectations for future Taiwan-Japan exchanges and development? President Lai: I come from Tainan, and my constituency is in Tainan. Tainan has very deep ties with Japan, and of course, Taiwan also has deep ties with Japan. However, among Taiwan’s 22 counties and cities, Tainan has the deepest relationship with Japan. I sincerely hope that both of you and your teams will have an opportunity to visit Tainan. I will introduce Tainan’s scenery, including architecture from the era of Japanese rule, Tainan’s cuisine, and unique aspects of Tainan society, and you can also see lifestyles and culture from the Showa era.  The Wushantou Reservoir in Tainan was completed by engineer Mr. Hatta Yoichi from Kanazawa, Japan and the team he led to Tainan after he graduated from then-Tokyo Imperial University. It has nearly a century of history and is still in use today. This reservoir, along with the 16,000-km-long Chianan Canal, transformed the 150,000-hectare Chianan Plain into Taiwan’s premier rice-growing area. It was that foundation in agriculture that enabled Taiwan to develop industry and the technology sector of today. The reservoir continues to supply water to Tainan Science Park. It is used by residents of Tainan, the agricultural sector, and industry, and even the technology sector in Xinshi Industrial Park, as well as Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. Because of this, the people of Tainan are deeply grateful for Mr. Hatta and very friendly toward the people of Japan. A major earthquake, the largest in 50 years, struck Tainan on February 6, 2016, resulting in significant casualties. As mayor of Tainan at the time, I was extremely grateful to then-Prime Minister Abe, who sent five Japanese officials to the disaster site in Tainan the day after the earthquake. They were very thoughtful and asked what kind of assistance we needed from the Japanese government. They offered to provide help based on what we needed. I was deeply moved, as former Prime Minister Abe showed such care, going beyond the formality of just sending supplies that we may or may not have actually needed. Instead, the officials asked what we needed and then provided assistance based on those needs, which really moved me. Similarly, when the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011 or the later Kumamoto earthquakes struck, the people of Tainan, under my leadership, naturally and dutifully expressed their support. Even earlier, when central Taiwan was hit by a major earthquake in 1999, Japan was the first country to deploy a rescue team to the disaster area. On February 6, 2018, after a major earthquake in Hualien, former Prime Minister Abe appeared in a video holding up a message of encouragement he had written in calligraphy saying “Remain strong, Taiwan.” All of Taiwan was deeply moved. Over the years, Taiwan and Japan have supported each other when earthquakes struck, and have forged bonds that are family-like, not just neighborly. This is truly valuable. In the future, I hope Taiwan and Japan can be like brothers, and that the peoples of Taiwan and Japan can treat one another like family. If Taiwan has a problem, then Japan has a problem; if Japan has a problem, then Taiwan has a problem. By caring for and helping each other, we can face various challenges and difficulties, and pursue a brighter future. Q: President Lai, you just used the phrase “If Taiwan has a problem, then Japan has a problem.” In the event that China attempts to invade Taiwan by force, what kind of response measures would you hope the US military and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces take? President Lai: As I just mentioned, annexing Taiwan is only China’s first step. Its ultimate objective is to change the rules-based international order. That being the case, China’s threats are an international problem. So, I would very much hope to work together with the US, Japan, and others in the global democratic community to prevent China from starting a war – prevention, after all, is more important than cure.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

    June 5, 2025
  • In First White House Visit, Merz to Address Trade and Security with Trump

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Germany’s new chancellor, Friedrich Merz, will hold his first face-to-face talks with U.S. President Donald Trump on Thursday in a high stakes meeting in the Oval Office as Europe seeks to stave off looming U.S. tariffs and sustain U.S. backing for Ukraine.

    The 69-year-old conservative, who took the helm of Europe’s largest economy last month, is scheduled to join Trump for lunch and one-on-one talks that analysts say could set the tone for U.S.-German ties for years to come.

    Germany’s export-oriented economy stands more to lose from U.S. tariffs than others and the country is also the second largest military and financial backer of Ukraine in its defence against Russia’s invasion, after the United States.

    The meeting comes amid a broader fraying of the transatlantic relationship. Trump’s administration has, for example, intervened in domestic European politics in a break with past practice, aligning with right-wing political movements and challenging European policies on immigration and free speech.

    The encounter will be closely watched after some recent meetings in the Oval Office, with the leaders of Ukraine and South Africa, for example, turned tense when Trump ambushed them with false claims and accusations.

    Merz and his entourage have sought coaching from other leaders on how to deal with Trump to avoid conflict.

    The meeting comes just weeks before a critical summit of the NATO Western military alliance which is looking increasingly strained given Trump’s threats not to come to the aid of U.S. allies that do not up their spending on defence.

    Such threats are of particular concern to Germany, which has relied on U.S. nuclear deterrence for its security since the end of World War Two.

    Merz has already made some bold policy moves that he can highlight to appease Trump, analysts said. He has backed Trump’s demand to more than double NATO’s spending target to 5% of economic output, earning unprecedented praise last weekend from U.S. Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth.

    Merz, who has vowed a more assertive foreign policy, also coordinated a visit by European leaders to Kyiv just days after taking office, two European diplomat sources said.

    “This shows that Germany is willing to accept a greater responsibility for Ukraine and the European security order – these are all things that have been wished for in the United States over years and will be welcomed,” said Sudha David-Wilp of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

    “Germany is well-positioned to show that it can help the United States achieve its foreign policy goals.”

    The fact Merz was invited to stay in the Blair House guest quarters across from the White House is a positive signal, said analysts.

    KINDRED SPIRIT OR FOE?

    Merz and Trump could even find some common ground given their business backgrounds, their membership in right-of-centre political parties, their focus on fighting illegal immigration and their fondness for golf, said Steven Sokol, President and CEO of the American Council on Germany.

    They also both had run-ins with former German chancellor Angela Merkel – who once squeezed Merz out of top-level politics.

    Moreover Merz has described himself as “a convinced transatlanticist”, chairing the “Atlantic Bridge”, a non-profit fostering U.S.-German ties, for 10 years.

    “They might discover a kindred spirit,” Sokol said.

    Still, Trump was unpredictable, while Merz was impulsive, warned analysts, and there were huge frictions in the relationship.

    “The challenge that he could face is … if Trump says something is erroneous, do you correct him? Do you risk turning it into an argument?” said Jeffrey Rathke, a former U.S. diplomat and president of the American-German Institute at the Johns Hopkins University in Washington.

    “Or do you find a way to indicate that you see it differently, but not let it sidetrack the conversation.”

    U.S. administration officials remain upset that Merz criticized Trump shortly before the 2024 U.S. election, a source familiar with its thinking said.

    And, on the eve of his own election victory, Merz criticised the “ultimately outrageous” comments flowing from Washington during the campaign, comparing them to hostile interventions from Russia.

    Another possible landmine could be a recent German proposal for a levy on online platforms such as Alphabet’s Google GOOGL.O, and Meta’s Facebook META.O, especially given Trump’s close ties with the U.S. tech industry, he said.

    (Reuters) 

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: Jack Ball wins the Ramsay Art Prize among a who’s who of Australian young contemporary artists

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Catherine Speck, Emerita Professor, Art History and Curatorship, University of Adelaide

    Jack Ball with Heavy Grit in Ramsay Art Prize 2025, Art Gallery of South Australia, Adelaide. Photo: Saul Steed

    Jack Ball, a Sydney-based trans artist, was awarded the 2025 Ramsay Art Prize at the Art Gallery of South Australia for an immersive installation Heavy Grit.

    The inspiration for the photo-collage and sculptural artwork stems directly from the artist’s exploration of the Australian Queer Archives in Melbourne – especially the scrapbooks covering the closeted decades of the 1950s to 1970s – and the merging of the past with present.

    The grainy print surface of the photo-collage elements, drawing on newspaper clippings, are arranged as four semi-abstract fluid shapes.

    Collage allows Ball to layer archival material with his own photo practice, to cut, crop, resize and imply ambiguity and possibility in the blurred imagery.

    The collages sit beside small photographs placed behind textured stained glass that seem like peep shows into queer culture, and are emblematic of Heavy Grit’s tension between what is revealed and what is hidden.

    Installation view: Jack Ball, born Darramurragal/Sydney 1986, Heavy Grit, 2024, Boorloo/Perth, inkjet prints on hemp, cotton and metallic rag, textured coloured glass, beeswax, activated charcoal, copper pipe, second-hand and remnant fabrics, acrylic paints, sand, rope.
    Courtesy of the artist and AVA, Boorloo/Perth, photo: Saul Steed

    Beneath are sand-filled soft sculptures, all of which suggest intimacy, stolen moments, the bright lights of Oxford Street, queer dress culture and much more, set off by loose flourishes of orange framing the collage. There is a delicate play of surface, scale and medium in an expansive installation that requires close, but slow looking.

    The Ramsay Prize

    The A$100,000 prize, awarded every two years, is open to artists under 40.

    It is the nation’s richest art prize for that age category and is funded in perpetuity by the Ramsay Foundation, for artwork in any medium.

    It is visionary in intent and reflects donors Diana and James Ramsay’s aim “to support and encourage contemporary Australian artists to make their best work at a pivotal point in their career”. And it has done just that.

    It commenced in 2017. Vincent Namatjira, who was awarded the prize in 2019, proceeded to win the Archibald Prize. Kate Bohunnis (2021) and Ida Sophia (2023) attribute winning the Ramsay to being career changing.

    Strong work on show

    There is much strong work across a range of media areas on show in this year’s exhibition.

    Installation view: Ramsay Art Prize 2025 featuring Alfred Lowe’s You’ve been on my mind, sister, Art Gallery of South Australia, Adelaide.
    Photo: Saul Steed

    Arrernte artist Alfred Lowe’s ceramic sculptural figures are adorned with bright pink raffia skirts. But beneath the colour and whimsy and contrasting materials is an exploration of his conflicted First Nations world of Central Australia and its charged politics.

    Tom Polo’s brightly coloured abstract and gestural paintings of fragmented and exaggerated forms suggest human vulnerability and the fluidity of daily life.

    Installation view: Ramsay Art Prize 2025 featuring Tom Polo’s learning to leave (once, and again), Art Gallery of South Australia, Adelaide.
    Photo: Saul Steed

    Bridie Gillman’s evocative Pink room, pink womb painting is a double-sided triangular installation which references ideas of place and belonging.

    It was produced in response to staying in an 18th century bedroom with pink walls in Portugal. The dramatic colour changes she observed according to the light conjured up notions of a deep maternal presence. She invokes this in her changing shades of pink on the canvases and base, accompanied by a subtle soundscape by Reuben Schafer.

    Shireen Taweel’s meticulous suspended copper objects delve into matters astronomical, the contribution of a Persian polymath’s foundational work in trigonometry and the precision required to locate stars and other celestial bodies.

    She emulates that precision in her intriguing copper installation, Al-Tusi preferred to rely on perfect circles instead, as an instrument of astronomical observation. Her pierced motifs in the copper are informed by precise calculations.

    Installation view: Ramsay Art Prize 2025 featuring Jason Phu’s the deepest love in the deepest well of despair and Shireen Taweel’s Al-Tusi preferred to rely on perfect circles instead, Art Gallery of South Australia, Adelaide.
    Photo: Saul Steed

    Chinese-Australian artist Jason Phu draws on his cultural heritage in his large painting. Comic-like figures enact a narrative across time, as occurs in more serious Chinese Scroll paintings.

    Phu inverts the tradition, adds a vernacular touch, and oscillates between humour and grim despair. His central figure in red enacts the text above: “the deepest love, the deepest despair”.

    David Attwood’s whimsical kinetic sculptural assemblage featuring a motorised house cleaning sponge harks back to the wacky idea of a self-cleaning house, and touches on the gendered nature of housework.

    Liam Fleming was schooled in the refined precision and techniques of making production line glass. Here, his slumped glass sculptural work come from his “letting go” of this exactness.

    Installation view: Ramsay Art Prize 2025 featuring Liam Fleming’s Transitory Series, Art Gallery of South Australia, Adelaide.
    Photo: Saul Steed

    Greek-Australian queer artist and designer Jordon Gogos’ impressive large tapestry, Time Machine, is made from repurposed and recycled textiles, and explores memory and identity.

    His deft mix of chance and design – and extending the possibilities of fabric itself by layering, embroidering and felting – produces a compelling and playful piece.

    These are just eight of the artworks on show in which the experimentation, range, diversity and rich cultural mix point to a vibrant contemporary art scene.

    What’s left unsaid

    But of the 22 finalists – a veritable who’s who of the contemporary art scene – only one artist reflects on war in a world beset by conflict.

    Ukrainian-born Stanislava Pinchuk is currently Australia’s official war artist in Ukraine. Her moving image work, Theatre of war, focuses on three such “theatres”: the siege of Sarajevo, the war in Ukraine, and Homer’s account of the Trojan war in the Iliad.

    Installation view: Ramsay Art Prize 2025 featuring Stanislava Pinchuk’s The Theatre of War, Art Gallery of South Australia, Adelaide.
    Photo: Saul Steed

    But where is the bravery of earlier Ramsay entries such as Hoda Afshar’s moving photographic portraits of our courageous whistleblowers in Agonistes, shown in the Ramsay Art Prize exhibition of 2020?

    There were close to 600 entries this year, so it seems odd that no-one else was selected for the final cut whose work had overt political content such as the war in Gaza.

    The Ramsay Art Prize 2025 is at the Art Gallery of South Australia until August 31.

    Catherine Speck has received funding from the ARC to investigate Australian art exhibitions (with Joanna Mendelssohn, Catherine De Lorenzo and Alison Inglis).

    – ref. Jack Ball wins the Ramsay Art Prize among a who’s who of Australian young contemporary artists – https://theconversation.com/jack-ball-wins-the-ramsay-art-prize-among-a-whos-who-of-australian-young-contemporary-artists-257326

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: Ukraine, Russia to exchange 500 prisoners each this weekend: Zelensky

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced Wednesday that Ukraine and Russia have agreed to carry out a prisoner exchange under the “500-for-500” formula this weekend, the Ukrinform news agency reported.

    “The Russian side has informed us that this weekend it will be ready to hand over 500 individuals … Accordingly, we will be ready to exchange the same number of people,” Zelensky said after consultations between Kiev and Moscow regarding the swap.

    He noted that Ukraine has not yet received the lists of individuals to be exchanged.

    Ukraine and Russia have agreed on another major prisoner exchange during the second round of direct talks in Istanbul on Monday.

    The delegations held their previous negotiations on May 16, which resulted in a “1,000 for 1,000” prisoner exchange between the parties. 

    MIL OSI China News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: 18 states elected into UN Economic and Social Council for three-year term

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Philemon Yang (L), president of the UN General Assembly, presides over a meeting to elect members of the UN Economic and Social Council at the UN headquarters in New York, on June 4, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    Eighteen states, including China, were elected on Wednesday into the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the coordinating body for the economic and social work of UN agencies and funds, for a three-year term.

    Philemon Yang, president of the General Assembly, announced the results after voting by secret ballot in the assembly.

    Elected were Burundi, Chad, Mozambique, Sierra Leone from African states; China, India, Lebanon, Turkmenistan from Asia-Pacific states; Croatia, Russia, Ukraine from Eastern European states; Ecuador, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis from Latin America and Caribbean states; Australia, Finland, Norway, Türkiye from Western European and other states.

    They were elected for a three-year term beginning on Jan. 1, 2026.

    Russia failed to obtain the two-thirds majority needed for election in the first round of the voting. It won in a restrictive round against Belarus.

    In a by-election for rotation within the Western European and other states group, Germany was elected for a one-year term beginning on Jan. 1, 2026. It will replace Liechtenstein. The United States was elected for a two-year term beginning on Jan. 1, 2026. It will replace Italy.

    ECOSOC has 54 members, which are elected each year by the General Assembly for overlapping three-year terms. Seats on the council are allocated on the basis of geographical representation with 14 seats to African states, 11 to Asia-Pacific states, six to Eastern European states, 10 to Latin American and Caribbean states, and 13 to Western Europe and other states. 

    MIL OSI China News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: ER Report: A Roundup of Significant Articles on EveningReport.nz for June 5, 2025

    ER Report: Here is a summary of significant articles published on EveningReport.nz on June 5, 2025.

    Final counting shows polls understated Labor in 2025 election almost as much as they overstated it in 2019
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Adrian Beaumont, Election Analyst (Psephologist) at The Conversation; and Honorary Associate, School of Mathematics and Statistics, The University of Melbourne With almost all primary votes now counted to two-party preferred (as I explained on May 29), Labor has won the national two-party vote by a 55.3–44.7 margin,

    Resignation of PM’s press secretary highlights gaps in NZ law on covert recording and harassment
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Cassandra Mudgway, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Canterbury Getty Images The sudden resignation this week of one of Prime Minister Christopher Luxon’s senior press secretaries was politically embarrassing, but also raises questions about how New Zealand law operates in such cases. A Stuff investigation revealed the

    One year ago, Australia scrapped a key equity in STEM program. Where are we now?
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Maria Vieira, Lecturer, Education Futures, University of South Australia ThisIsEngineering/Pexels In June 2024, the Australian government ended the Women in STEM Ambassador program. The decision followed a report that urged a broader, intersectional approach to diversity in the fields of science, technology, engineering and maths (STEM). For

    The pursuit of eternal youth goes back centuries. Modern cosmetic surgery is turning it into a reality – for rich people
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Margaret Gibson, Associate Professor of Sociology, Griffith University The Conversation, CC BY-SA Kris Jenner’s “new” face sparked myriad headlines about how she can look so good at 69 years old. While she’s not confirmed what sort of procedures she’s undergone, speculation abounds. As a US reality TV

    Woodside’s North West Shelf approval is by no means a one-off. Here are 6 other giant gas projects to watch
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Samantha Hepburn, Professor, Deakin Law School, Deakin University GREG WOOD/AFP via Getty Images The federal government’s decision to extend the life of Woodside’s North West Shelf gas plant in Western Australia has been condemned as a climate disaster. The gas lobby claims more gas is needed to

    Unprecedented heat in the North Atlantic Ocean kickstarted Europe’s hellish 2023 summer. Now we know what caused it
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Matthew England, Scientia Professor and Deputy Director of the ARC Australian Centre for Excellence in Antarctic Science, UNSW Sydney Westend61/Getty Images In June 2023, a record-breaking marine heatwave swept across the North Atlantic Ocean, smashing previous temperature records. Soon after, deadly heatwaves broke out across large areas

    Bowel cancer rates are declining in people over 50. But why are they going up in younger adults?
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Suzanne Mahady, Associate Professor, Gastroenterologist & Clinical Epidemiologist, Monash University Thirdman/Pexels Bowel cancer is the fourth most common cancer in Australia, with more than 15,000 cases diagnosed annually. It’s also the second most common cause of cancer-related death. Recently, headlines have warned of an uptick in cases

    Australian kids BYO lunches to school. There is a healthier way to feed students
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Liesel Spencer, Associate Professor, School of Law, Western Sydney University Getty Images/ courtneyk Australian parents will be familiar with this school morning routine: hastily making sandwiches or squeezing leftovers into containers, grabbing a snack from the cupboard and a piece of fruit from the counter. This would

    Australia’s charity sector is growing – but many smaller charities are doing it tough
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Margaret Faulkner, Senior Marketing Scientist, Ehrenberg-Bass Institute, University of South Australia Revenue for Australia’s charity and not-for-profit sector has reached record highs, and total donations have grown. But the story isn’t the same everywhere, and some smaller charities may be struggling. That’s according to the latest edition

    Taylor Swift now owns all the music she has ever made: a copyright expert breaks it down
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Wellett Potter, Lecturer in Law, University of New England On Friday, Taylor Swift announced she now owns all the music she has ever made. This reported US$360 million acquisition includes all the master recordings to her first six albums, music videos, concert films, album art, photos and

    The secret to Ukraine’s battlefield successes against Russia – it knows wars are never won in the past
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Matthew Sussex, Associate Professor (Adj), Griffith Asia Institute; and Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University The iconoclastic American general Douglas Macarthur once said that “wars are never won in the past”. That sentiment certainly seemed to ring true following Ukraine’s recent audacious attack on

    Politics with Michelle Grattan: historian Emma Shortis warns against falling into Trump’s trade traps
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra Prime Minister Anthony Albanese is expected to have his first face-to-face meeting with US President Donald Trump this month, against a background of increased steel and aluminium tariffs and US pressure on Australia to boost its defence spending. How Australia

    Extreme weather events have slowed economic growth, adding to the case for another rate cut
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Stella Huangfu, Associate Professor, School of Economics, University of Sydney Australia’s economy slowed sharply in the March quarter, growing by just 0.2% as government spending slowed and extreme weather events dampened demand. That followed an increase of 0.6% in the previous quarter. The national accounts report from

    Young people who witness domestic violence are more likely to be victims of it. Here’s how we can help them
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Kristin Diemer, Associate Professor of Sociology, The University of Melbourne In our national discussions on domestic and family violence, much of the focus is rightly on the women experiencing the violence and how best to help them. But another vital, less acknowledged part of the puzzle is

    Gluten intolerance and coeliac disease can both cause nausea, bloating and pain. What’s the difference?
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Yasmine Probst, Professor, School of Medical, Indigenous and Health Sciences. Advanced Accredited Practising Dietitian, University of Wollongong fotodrobik/Shutterstock Around one in ten Australians say they follow a gluten-free diet. This means eliminating common foods – such as bread, pasta and noodles – that contain gluten, a protein

    How physicists used antimatter, supercomputers and giant magnets to solve a 20-year-old mystery
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Finn Stokes, Ramsay Fellow in Physics, University of Adelaide Cindy Arnold, Fermilab Physicists are always searching for new theories to improve our understanding of the universe and resolve big unanswered questions. But there’s a problem. How do you search for undiscovered forces or particles when you don’t

    Ahead of the Brisbane Olympics, it’s time for Australia to get serious about esports
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Craig McNulty, Senior Lecturer in Exercise Physiology, Queensland University of Technology Roman Kosolapov/Shutterstock Most of us have heard of esports but many don’t realise the fast-growing world of competitive video gaming features tournaments, university scholarships and billions of dollars in revenue. As we approach the 2032 Brisbane

    ER Report: A Roundup of Significant Articles on EveningReport.nz for June 4, 2025
    ER Report: Here is a summary of significant articles published on EveningReport.nz on June 4, 2025.

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Murkowski Secures Commitment from Secretary of Commerce to Convene Summit with Alaska’s Fishing Industry

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Alaska Lisa Murkowski
    06.04.25
    Washington, DC – U.S. Senator Lisa Murkowski, R-AK and a senior member of the Committee on Appropriations, today secured a commitment from U.S. Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick to convene a meeting with Alaska seafood stakeholders on trade issues with Russia and ways the administration can help bolster the industry.
    Speaking at hearing held by the Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies, Murkowski emphasized the importance of fair-trade practices for Alaska’s fishermen. Secretary Lutnick agreed with the Senator’s assessment, reinforcing that the administration’s trade policy “is to protect our fisherman, which are a key resource of the United States of America.” The Secretary committed to join the Senator in sitting down with leaders of the Alaska seafood industry to chart a path forward.
    Click here to watch the full exchange.
    The full transcript of Senator Murkowski’s conversation with Secretary Lutnick can be read below.
    TRANSCRIPT
    Murkowski: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, welcome. I’m glad to follow the Ranking Member as well as the Chairman of the committee in talking about fisheries. You know I’ll never disappoint you, when you come before the committee, we’re going to talk about fish, and I appreciate what you have shared with Senator Collins about the administration’s desire to protect our fisherman. We’re pleased with the executive order relating to American seafood competitiveness.
    I had an opportunity, just yesterday, to visit with one of our seafood industry leaders in the state of Alaska. I thought we were going to be talking about some of the tax provisions that are included in the reconciliation package, but he basically said if we can’t deal with trade issues when it comes to Alaska’s seafood, we are not even going to have to worry about the tax pieces because the trade implications are going to kill us. In Alaska, Russia has declared war on Alaska seafood and they have been very direct, and very open about it. They are using their dominance in the seafood market to help fund their war against Ukraine. And the effort is one that we are looking at, and needing to make sure, I mean really desperate to make sure, that the administration fully understands the implications of what is happening right now.
    We’ve got the largest federal fisheries in the nation, about sixty percent of America’s harvest by volume. Seafood processing is 70 percent of Alaska’s manufacturing employment. The Alaska seafood industry generates $6 billion in economic output for that state, it employs 48,000 people in Alaska. Right now, we have Secretary of the Interior, and the Secretary of Energy, and the Administrator of EPA up in the state, all focused on aspects of our resources. But the other great resource for our state is our fisheries, and they are in peril.
    I would ask for your commitment to sit down with leaders of the Alaska seafood industry, those important stakeholders, so that we can talk about a path forward on some of these issues that are really harming our industry right now. Can you give me that commitment, that we can work with your team to identify a time to do just that?
    Lutnick: Why don’t you organize it, and it would be my pleasure to come and do it together with you, so we can make sure every topic is on the table, and we address it. Because our trade policy is to protect our fisherman, which are a key resource of the United States of America. We are on it and we know about it, I know all about the Russian issues. They’ve been attacking us for years, this is nothing new, sadly. But let’s do it together and this administration is on your side and is on it.
    Murkowski: Excellent, I look forward to that, and we’ll be working with you on that.
    A couple more issues, there has been a lot of discussion about NOAA, and the budget cuts, as well as with the impact on the National Weather Service.
    We’ve been working with the Secretary of Transportation, Secretary Duffy, on aviation safety. We’re going to make some headway, there’s good support within the budget now to do that. But we have a connection here with the Department of Commerce, in that the Automated Surface Observing Systems, the ASOS systems as they are known, which provide for aviation safety, are managed by the National Weather Service. So, right now we’re looking at about a 40 percent staffing shortage. I’ve heard what you’ve said to other colleagues, about you know, you’re not cutting in key areas. I need to make sure that we are looking critically at the National Weather Service staffing in Alaska, to make sure that we are not compromising in any ways, the systems that are vital to transportation, commerce, and safety. We need them to stay operational, so if you can just commit to me that you’ll look at?
    Lutnick: That sounds sensible to me.
    Murkowski: Another one that works on the safety side, and again it ties into our extraordinary oil resources. We have to move that oil by ship out of Valdez, it has to go through Prince William Sound, and they rely on the National Data Buoy Center to manage, not only the buoys there in Prince William Sound, but over a thousand buoys that are operated by both domestic and international partners. Right now, we have a buoy, the Seal Rocks Weather Buoy, that’s right outside of Valdez. But the tankers can’t leave Valdez unless they get the wave height information from the buoy, the weather buoy that’s sitting out there, right? This buoy has been out of commission for months, and we’re told it’s due to funding for operation and maintenance in NOAA’s budget.
    Lutnick: It’s really old.
    Murkowski: It is old!
    Lutnick: It needs to be replaced! Oh my god, if I showed you what that looked like, you and I would hold our heads in our hands.
    Murkowski: We all look at them, and the problem it’s not just the buoy out there at Seal Rock, it is this system, this constellation, that is designed to be the information source, the protectorate for the safety. So, let’s work on this, but I highlight how….
    Lutnick: How to modernize it, we’ve got to.
    Murkowski: I highlight because we’ve got some work to do, but it all knits together. So, I’ve highlighted a couple of specific instances….
    Lutnick: I promise you, we are in it together. I promise I agree with you.
    Murkowski: I won’t make you go out there, if you’ll commit to me that we’re going to upgrade these systems. But in the meantime, we’re going to get them operational, so that we’re not compromising safety.
    Lutnick: Absolutely.
    Murkowski: I appreciate it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: The secret to Ukraine’s battlefield successes against Russia – it knows wars are never won in the past

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Matthew Sussex, Associate Professor (Adj), Griffith Asia Institute; and Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University

    The iconoclastic American general Douglas Macarthur once said that “wars are never won in the past”.

    That sentiment certainly seemed to ring true following Ukraine’s recent audacious attack on Russia’s strategic bomber fleet, using small, cheap drones housed in wooden pods and transported near Russian airfields in trucks.

    The synchronised operation targeted Russian Air Force planes as far away as Irkutsk – more than 5,000 kilometres from Ukraine. Early reports suggest around a third of Russia’s long-range bombers were either destroyed or badly damaged. Russian military bloggers have put the estimated losses lower, but agree the attack was catastrophic for the Russian Air Force, which has struggled to adapt to Ukrainian tactics.

    This particular attack was reportedly 18 months in the making. To keep it secret was an extraordinary feat. Notably, Kyiv did not inform the United States that the attack was in the offing. The Ukrainians judged – perhaps understandably – that sharing intelligence on their plans could have alerted the Kremlin in relatively short order.

    Ukraine’s success once again demonstrates that its armed forces and intelligence services are the modern masters of battlefield innovation and operational security.

    Finding new solutions

    Western military planners have been carefully studying Ukraine’s successes ever since its forces managed to blunt Russia’s initial onslaught deep into its territory in early 2022, and then launched a stunning counteroffensive that drove the Russian invaders back towards their original starting positions.

    There have been other lessons, too, about how the apparently weak can stand up to the strong. These include:

    • attacks on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s vanity project, the Kerch Bridge, linking the Russian mainland to occupied Crimea (the last assault occurred just days ago)

    • the relentless targeting of Russia’s oil and gas infrastructure with drones

    • attacks against targets in Moscow to remind the Russian populace about the war, and

    • its incursion into the Kursk region, which saw Ukrainian forces capture around 1,000 square kilometres of Russian territory.

    On each occasion, Western defence analysts have questioned the wisdom of Kyiv’s moves.

    Why invade Russia using your best troops when Moscow’s forces continue laying waste to cities in Ukraine?

    Why hit Russia’s energy infrastructure if it doesn’t markedly impede the battlefield mobility of Russian forces?

    And why attack symbolic targets like bridges when it could provoke Putin into dangerous “escalation”?

    The answer to this is the key to effective innovation during wartime. Ukraine’s defence and security planners have interpreted their missions – and their best possible outcomes – far more accurately than conventional wisdom would have thought.

    Above all, they have focused on winning the war they are in, rather than those of the past. This means:

    • using technological advancements to force the Russians to change their tactics

    • shaping the information environment to promote their narratives and keep vital Western aid flowing, and

    • deploying surprise attacks not just as ways to boost public morale, but also to impose disproportionate costs on the Russian state.

    The impact of Ukraine’s drone attack

    In doing so, Ukraine has had an eye for strategic effects. As the smaller nation reliant on international support, this has been the only logical choice.

    Putin has been prepared to commit a virtually inexhaustible supply of expendable cannon fodder to continue his country’s war ad infinitum. Russia has typically won its wars this way – by attrition – albeit at a tremendous human and material cost.

    That said, Ukraine’s most recent surprise attack does not change the overall contours of the war. The only person with the ability to end it is Putin himself.

    That’s why Ukraine is putting as much pressure as possible on his regime, as well as domestic and international perceptions of it. It is key to Ukraine’s theory of victory.

    This is also why the latest drone attack is so significant. Russia needs its long-range bomber fleet, not just to fire conventional cruise missiles at Ukrainian civilian and infrastructure targets, but as aerial delivery systems for its strategic nuclear arsenal.

    The destruction of even a small portion of Russia’s deterrence capability has the potential to affect its nuclear strategy. It has increasingly relied on this strategy to threaten the West.

    A second impact of the attack is psychological. The drone attacks are more likely to enrage Putin than bring him to the bargaining table. However, they reinforce to the Russian military that there are few places – even on its own soil – that its air force can act with operational impunity.

    The surprise attacks also provide a shot in the arm domestically, reminding Ukrainians they remain very much in the fight.

    Finally, the drone attacks send a signal to Western leaders. US President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance, for instance, have gone to great lengths to tell the world that Ukraine is weak and has “no cards”. This action shows Kyiv does indeed have some powerful cards to play.

    That may, of course, backfire: after all, Trump is acutely sensitive to being made to look a fool. He may look unkindly at resuming military aid to Ukraine after being shown up for saying Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky would be forced to capitulate without US support.

    But Trump’s own hubris has already done that for him. His regular claims that a peace deal is just weeks away have gone beyond wishful thinking and are now monotonous.

    Unsurprisingly, Trump’s reluctance to put anything approaching serious pressure on Putin has merely incentivised the Russian leader to string the process along.

    Indeed, Putin’s insistence on a maximalist victory, requiring Ukrainian demobilisation and disarmament without any security guarantees for Kyiv, is not diplomacy at all. It is merely the reiteration of the same unworkable demands he has made since even before Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

    However, Ukraine’s ability to smuggle drones undetected onto an opponent’s territory, and then unleash them all together, will pose headaches for Ukraine’s friends, as well as its enemies.

    That’s because it makes domestic intelligence and policing part of any effective defence posture. It is a contingency democracies will have to plan for, just as much as authoritarian regimes, who are also learning from Ukraine’s lessons.

    In other words, while the attack has shown up Russia’s domestic security services for failing to uncover the plan, Western security elites, as well as authoritarian ones, will now be wondering whether their own security apparatuses would be up to the job.

    The drone strikes will also likely lead to questions about how useful it is to invest in high-end and extraordinarily expensive weapons systems when they can be vulnerable. The Security Service of Ukraine estimates the damage cost Russia US$7 billion (A$10.9 billion). Ukraine’s drones, by comparison, cost a couple of thousand dollars each.

    At the very least, coming up with a suitable response to those challenges will require significant thought and effort. But as Ukraine has repeatedly shown us, you can’t win wars in the past.

    Matthew Sussex has received funding from the Australian Research Council, the Atlantic Council, the Fulbright Foundation, the Carnegie Foundation, the Lowy Institute and various Australian government departments and agencies.

    – ref. The secret to Ukraine’s battlefield successes against Russia – it knows wars are never won in the past – https://theconversation.com/the-secret-to-ukraines-battlefield-successes-against-russia-it-knows-wars-are-never-won-in-the-past-258172

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Getting away with it … sort of. How a dictator and a fugitive Nazi advanced international human rights law

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Olivera Simic, Associate Professor in Law, Griffith University

    Pinochet and Rauff? They were alike. Each had two faces. One gentle, the other hard. They were joined.

    And they both got away with it … Sort of.

    Philippe Sands loves to tell stories. A master of historical non-fiction, he has become known for his unique blend of deeply personal, legal and historical narratives, which weave together incredible coincidences with moving stories of human courage in the face of mass atrocities and horror.

    Sands is a leading practitioner of international law, a professor at University College London, an author, a playwright, and the recipient of numerous literary awards. He is also someone whose family was murdered in the vortex of the Holocaust in Ukraine.

    With his previous two books, East West Street: On the Origins of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity (2016) and The Ratline: Love, Lies and Justice on the Trail of a Nazi Fugitive (2020), he demonstrated his unique skill in presenting complex legal cases to avid readers.

    His latest book, 38 Londres Street: On Impunity, Pinochet in England and a Nazi in Patagonia, rounds out the trilogy.

    If it weren’t based on facts, one might think it was a brilliantly crafted thriller.


    Review: 38 Londres Street: On Impunity, Pinochet in England and a Nazi in Patagonia – Philippe Sands (Weidenfeld & Nicolson)


    38 Londres Street weaves together several narratives, but at its heart is the story of the legal attempts to end impunity for two accused criminals. One is Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. The other is Walther Rauff, a former SS officer who fled to South America and allegedly worked with Pinochet’s Secret Intelligence Service.

    Sands brings these two men into a single narrative to highlight the legal struggle against impunity for mass atrocities, though he never loses sight of the victims and their human stories of suffering, courage and persistence.

    These were people whose lives were abruptly and violently taken. Sands includes many of their names and tragic fates in his book. He informs his readers that the Cementerio Sara Braun in Punta Arenas, Chile, has a memorial bearing the names of Pinochet’s many victims. He clearly wants these individuals never to be forgotten.

    Universal jurisdiction and the Pinochet precedent

    The building at 38 Londres Street in Santiago was once a site of pain. At this secret interrogation centre, one of many across Santiago and the rest of Chile, Pinochet’s agents imprisoned, tortured, executed and disappeared tens of thousands of people deemed leftists, socialists, communists or “other undesirables”.

    Pinochet came to power on September 11, 1973, overthrowing the democratically elected socialist government of President Salvador Allende in a military coup. He would rule Chile with an iron fist until 1990.

    Chile’s youth became the targets of his murderous regime. Sands notes that most victims were between 21 and 30 years old. The majority of them were workers; the rest mainly comprised academics, professionals and students. The atrocities were committed with impunity.

    Like all dictators, Pinochet believed himself untouchable. But in October 1998, while visiting the UK, he was arrested in London. Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón was seeking Pinochet’s extradition to Spain in order to try him for human rights abuses.

    Garzón was acting under the then-controversial legal principle of universal jurisdiction, which allows courts in one country to prosecute grave human rights violations committed outside its borders, regardless of the nationality of the accused.

    Never before had a former head of state of one country been arrested by, and in another, for committing international crimes.

    Sands would become involved in one of the most famous cases in international law since the Nuremberg trials more than 50 years earlier. Pinochet’s lawyers offered him an opportunity to participate in the case, arguing for the former dictator’s immunity as a former head of state. His wife threatened to divorce him if he accepted.

    He declined the offer. Instead, Sands represented Human Rights Watch when the Pinochet case was considered by the Law Lords.

    Pinochet had been indicted for crimes against humanity and genocide. At issue was the question of whether Pinochet, as a former head of state, had immunity before the English courts for acts committed in another country while he was in office. Should there be a legal protection for former dictators?

    The proceedings in London were novel and remarkable, writes Sands, because this was an open legal question when Pinochet was arrested. His arrest raised an unprecedented issue: was there an exception to the rule of immunity for a former head of state when a crime in international law was involved? And did the exception apply before a national court, rather than an international one?


    Many believed Pinochet’s immunity should be lifted and extradition proceedings should go ahead, so that he could answer for the deaths of Spanish nationals and others. If that did not happen, it was argued, the travesty of justice would signal that any dictator could get away with genocide. As Sands writes, immunity and impunity often go hand in hand.

    In this landmark case, Pinochet was stripped of the immunity from prosecution he had enjoyed as a former president. He was ordered to stand trial on charges of human rights abuses.

    For the next 16 months, he remained in the UK, awaiting extradition to Spain. But it never happened. The initial judgement on immunity was quashed, due to concerns about possible bias of one of the judges. The case returned to square one. New hearings took place.

    In January 2000, the UK eventually decided not to proceed with extradition, claiming that Pinochet was too ill to stand trial and that “it would not be fair”. He was allowed to return to Chile as a free man, thanks to medical doctors rather than lawyers.

    Political leaders in Europe generally welcomed the ruling. Margaret Thatcher, former British prime minister and Pinochet’s longstanding ally, was adamant that the lengthy legal wrangle had been a waste of public money. Seemingly agitated, she said in front of the cameras:

    Senator Pinochet was a staunch friend of Britain throughout the Falklands War. His reward from this government was to be held prisoner for 16 months. In the meantime, his health has been broken, his reputation tarnished, and vast funds of public money have been squandered on a political vendetta.

    Subsequent attempts to prosecute Pinochet in Chile were unsuccessful. He died in 2006 at the age of 91, without ever being tried for the human rights abuses that occurred while he was in power. Retributive justice, in the end, was not served. But Pinochet’s case opened the gates for efforts to bring other former and serving heads of state to justice.

    Today, the 38 Londres Street serves as a place of national memory where visitors can walk through its halls and learn about its dark past.

    The Nazi who invented the gas chambers

    Running parallel with Pinochet’s story is that of Nazi fugitive Walther Rauff.

    Rauff invented the mobile gas chambers that were precursors to the gas chambers in Nazi concentration camps. At the end of the second world war, he escaped to South America, settling in Chile. Germany made numerous attempts to have Rauff extradited to face charges, but the Chilean government refused these demands. He spent his days in the backwaters of Patagonia, running a king-crab cannery business.

    Sands travels to Patagonia and meets people who remember Rauff, whose identity seems to have been common knowledge among his neighbours and co-workers: “everyone knew rumours and stories of his past”; they knew about “the gas vans” and that he “once killed many people”. But no one seemed to be bothered. They describe Rauff as “cultivated and kind”. To many of Sands’ interlocutors, the stories about Rauff “were long ago and far away”.

    While dealing with the failed attempts for his extradition, Rauff put his energies into “harvesting crabs, making sure the tins were packed tight, [and] managing the workers”. He continued to do so, enjoying the company of his dog Bobby, when Pinochet became Chile’s new leader.

    Pinochet was an old friend. Sands records that the two men met in the 1950s in Quito, Ecuador, where Rauff was staying, having fled an Italian prison camp at the end of the war. The men shared a contempt for communism and an affinity for German culture. Pinochet encouraged Rauff to move to Chile.

    Rauff delighted in Pinochet’s murderous regime. Sands tell us that Pinochet used Rauff’s “expertise” to help with the murder and disappearance of thousands of people. But the controversy over whether Rauff worked for the Chilean military, becoming “chief advisor” to its intelligence services, or perhaps even its “head”, remains unresolved. Definitive and provable evidence about the assistance Rauff may have given to Pinochet was never obtained.

    Holding dictators to account

    One of the many coincidences Sands stumbles upon is that Rauff lived in Punta Arenas in southern Chile on a street called “Jugoslavija”, named after the country where I was born, which disintegrated in the 1990s in a brutal civil war marked by mass atrocities and genocide.

    Former Yugoslavian and Serbian president Slobodan Milošević would become the first-ever serving head of state to be charged with international crimes and extradited to an international court.

    Milošević was extradited to The Hague in 2001 after he was indicted for war crimes committed in Kosovo and Croatia, and for genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina following an order from the Serbian government. His trial is widely hailed as a landmark moment in the development of international criminal law, though he died in his cell before his trial ended, dying “innocent” like his counterparts Pinochet and Rauff.

    Slobodan Milošević in The Hague, July 2001.
    Robert Goddyn, via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY

    In 38 Londres Street, Sands brings to light the behind-the-scenes struggles to hold Pinochet and Rauff accountable. The book explores the intricacies and politics of international law. Despite its bitter ending, Pinochet’s case remains one of the most far reaching and important in the field of human rights. It caused other countries to reflect on their own legal immunities.

    As a researcher and academic, I found the book significant because it also offers insight into what it takes to conduct such expansive archival and qualitative research. Over several years, “in between work and life”, Sands travels to different corners of the globe and speaks to informants from all walks of life, including descendants of the perpetrators. He visits the sites of the events he recounts, most of them places marked by pain. He seeks to see and feel a past that still lingers.

    His method requires stamina, passion and unwavering diligence. His strong commitment to neutrality, decency and impartiality makes him stand out not only as a highly skilled writer, but a survivor who continues to unpack and share the legacy of the Holocaust. There is much to respect and learn from in Sands’ account, not least about the intricacies of writing a compelling story.

    Holding dictators to account is hard. Pinochet and Rauff deprived victims of the retributive justice they needed and deserved. Yet justice and reparations have many different meanings. They can be symbolic too, and still profoundly meaningful to victims. As one of the survivors of Pinochet’s regime replied to Sands when asked whether he believed his case was one of total impunity: “Not quite total […] Dawson [an island detention camp] has been recognised as a site of national memory, a protected monument, and that means something.”

    Pinochet and Rauff were never convicted, but they were not free. Pinochet spent years under house arrest, bitter and devastated, unable to walk the streets. Rauff lived in constant fear of being arrested and extradited. They were both haunted. This, after all, may have brought some satisfaction to the victims.

    Sands was once asked: “Do you believe in justice?” He replied: “Sort of.” Sands comes to understand that justice is “uneven in its delivery”. He has learned “to tamper expectations”. Maybe we all need to learn that skill from him too. Ultimately, justice remains a work-in-progress, just like the process of learning from a dark past.

    Olivera Simic does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Getting away with it … sort of. How a dictator and a fugitive Nazi advanced international human rights law – https://theconversation.com/getting-away-with-it-sort-of-how-a-dictator-and-a-fugitive-nazi-advanced-international-human-rights-law-257241

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: Putin tells Trump Russia has to respond to Ukrainian attacks

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    U.S. President Donald Trump disclosed Wednesday that Russian President Vladimir Putin told him that Moscow would “have to respond” to the massive Ukrainian drone attacks on Russia’s strategic air bases days ago.

    Trump wrote in a post on his Truth Social account that he finished a phone call with Putin and discussed the attacks on June 1. It was the first time the U.S. president publicly talked about the operation that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky touted being directed by himself.

    “We discussed the attack on Russia’s docked airplanes, by Ukraine, and also various other attacks that have been taking place by both sides… President Putin did say, and very strongly, that he will have to respond to the recent attack on the airfields,” Trump wrote.

    He said the Wednesday call lasted approximately one hour and 15 minutes, noting “It was a good conversation, but not a conversation that will lead to immediate Peace.”

    MIL OSI China News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Descartes Announces Fiscal 2026 First Quarter Financial Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Record Services Revenues

    WATERLOO, Ontario and ATLANTA, June 04, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — The Descartes Systems Group Inc. (TSX:DSG) (Nasdaq:DSGX) announced its financial results for its fiscal 2026 first quarter (Q1FY26). All financial results referenced are in United States (US) currency and, unless otherwise indicated, are determined in accordance with US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).

    “Our first quarter of fiscal 2026 showed strong annual growth, consistent with our communicated plans,” said Edward J. Ryan, Descartes’ CEO. “This is a challenging and uncertain economic and trade environment for shippers, carriers and logistics services providers. They face challenges on how, when, or if, to react to changes in global trade relationships, tariffs, sanctions and economic forecasts. We continue to see strong interest in our domain expertise and our solutions to help companies navigate the complex trade landscape. We remain committed to growing our business with prudent investments and cost discipline to build the premier network and technology for logistics-intensive businesses.”

    Q1FY26 Financial Results
    As described in more detail below, key financial highlights for Descartes’ Q1FY26 included:

    • Revenues of $168.7 million, up 12% from $151.3 million in the first quarter of fiscal 2025 (Q1FY25) and up 1% from $167.5 million in the previous quarter (Q4FY25);
    • Revenues were comprised of services revenues of $156.6 million (93% of total revenues), professional services and other revenues of $11.8 million (7% of total revenues) and license revenues of $0.3 million (less than 1% of total revenues). Services revenues were up 14% from $137.8 million in Q1FY25 and consistent with $156.5 million in Q4FY25;
    • Cash provided by operating activities of $53.6 million, down from $63.7 million in Q1FY25 and down from $60.7 million in Q4FY25;
    • Income from operations of $46.2 million, up 9% from $42.4 million in Q1FY25 and down from $47.1 million in Q4FY25;
    • Net income of $36.2 million, up 4% from $34.7 million in Q1FY25 and down from $37.4 million in Q4FY25. Net income as a percentage of revenues was 21%, compared to 23% in Q1FY25 and 22% in Q4FY25;
    • Earnings per share on a diluted basis of $0.41, up 2% from $0.40 in Q1FY25 and down from $0.43 in Q4FY25; and
    • Adjusted EBITDA of $75.1 million, up 12% from $67.0 million in Q1FY25 and consistent with $75.0 million in Q4FY25. Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues was 45%, compared to 44% in Q1FY25 and 45% in Q4FY25.

    Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues are non-GAAP financial measures provided as a complement to financial results presented in accordance with GAAP. We define Adjusted EBITDA as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization, stock-based compensation (for which we include related fees and taxes) and other charges (for which we include restructuring charges, acquisition-related expenses, and contingent consideration incurred due to better-than-expected performance from acquisitions). These items are considered by management to be outside Descartes’ ongoing operational results. We define Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues as the quotient, expressed as a percentage, from dividing Adjusted EBITDA for a period by revenues for the corresponding period. A reconciliation of Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues to net income determined in accordance with GAAP is provided later in this release.

    The following table summarizes Descartes’ results in the categories specified below over the past 5 fiscal quarters (unaudited; dollar amounts, other than per share amounts, in millions):

      Q1
    FY26
    Q4
    FY25
    Q3
    FY25
    Q2
    FY25
    Q1
    FY25
    Revenues 168.7 167.5 168.8 163.4 151.3
    Services revenues 156.6 156.5 149.7 146.2 137.8
    Gross margin 76% 76% 74% 75% 77%
    Cash provided by operating activities 53.6 60.7 60.1 34.7 63.7
    Income from operations 46.2 47.1 45.8 45.9 42.4
    Net income 36.2 37.4 36.6 34.7 34.7
    Net income as a % of revenues 21% 22% 22% 21% 23%
    Earnings per diluted share 0.41 0.43 0.42 0.40 0.40
    Adjusted EBITDA 75.1 75.0 72.1 70.6 67.0
    Adjusted EBITDA as a % of revenues 45% 45% 43% 43% 44%
               

    Cash Position
    At April 30, 2025, Descartes had $176.4 million in cash. Cash decreased by $59.7 million in Q1FY26. The table set forth below provides a summary of cash flows for Q1FY26 in millions of dollars:

      Q1FY26
    Cash provided by operating activities 53.6
    Additions to property and equipment (1.9)
    Acquisitions of subsidiaries, net of cash acquired (112.3)
    Issuances of common shares, net of issuance costs 3.6
    Payment of withholding taxes on net share settlements (6.5)
    Effect of foreign exchange rate on cash 3.8
    Net change in cash (59.7)
    Cash, beginning of period 236.1
    Cash, end of period 176.4
       

    Acquisition of 3GTMS
    On March 24, 2025, Descartes acquired all of the shares of 3GTMS, a leading provider of transportation management solutions. The purchase price for the acquisition was approximately $112.7 million, net of cash acquired, which was funded from cash on hand.

    Cost Reduction Initiatives
    Considering the economic and global trade uncertainty many Descartes customers are facing, Descartes has undertaken cost reduction initiatives designed to reduce its cost base. The plan is designed to reduce Descartes’ global workforce by approximately 7% and eliminate various other operating expenses. As a result, Descartes expects to incur restructuring charges of approximately $4 million in the second quarter of fiscal 2026 (Q2FY26), which will also impact cash generated from operations in Q2FY26. Once completed, Descartes anticipates annualized cost savings of approximately $15 million.

    Management Update
    Descartes is pleased to announce the appointment of William Green as Executive Vice President, Global Sales. Mr. Green has served as Descartes’ Senior Vice President for North American Sales since August 2020. Mr. Green has previously held senior commercial roles at Salesforce, PROLIFIQ and CDC Software (now Aptean). “We’re excited for Bill to extend his leadership of our growth successes in North America to our global commercial operations,” said Mr. Ryan.

    Andrew Roszko, Descartes’ Chief Commercial Officer, will depart the company in Q2FY26 to pursue another opportunity. Mr. Roszko was appointed EVP Global Sales in February 2019 and appointed Chief Commercial Officer in June 2022. “Andrew has been a valuable contributor to Descartes’ commercial development. We wish him well in his future endeavors,” said Mr. Ryan.

    Conference Call
    Members of Descartes’ executive management team will host a conference call to discuss the company’s financial results at 5:30 p.m. ET on Wednesday, June 4. Designated numbers are +1 289 514 5100 for North America and +1 800 717 1738 for international, using conference ID 26605.

    The company will simultaneously conduct an audio webcast on the Descartes website at www.descartes.com/descartes/investor-relations. Phone conference dial-in or webcast login is required approximately 10 minutes beforehand.

    Replays of the conference call will be available until June 11, 2025, by dialing +1 289 819 1325 or Toll-Free for North America using +1 888 660 6264 with Playback Passcode: 26605#. An archived replay of the webcast will be available at www.descartes.com/descartes/investor-relations.

    About Descartes

    Descartes (Nasdaq:DSGX) (TSX:DSG) is the global leader in providing on-demand, software-as-a-service solutions focused on improving the productivity, security and sustainability of logistics-intensive businesses. Customers use our modular, software-as-a-service solutions to route, track and help improve the safety, performance and compliance of delivery resources; plan, allocate and execute shipments; rate, audit and pay transportation invoices; access global trade data; file customs and security documents for imports and exports; and complete numerous other logistics processes by participating in the world’s largest, collaborative multimodal logistics community. Our headquarters are in Waterloo, Ontario, Canada and we have offices and partners around the world. Learn more at www.descartes.com, and connect with us on LinkedIn and X (Twitter).

    Descartes Investor Contact
    Laurie McCauley                                                                     
    (519) 746-2969
    investor@descartes.com

    Cautionary Statement Regarding Forward-Looking Statements This release may contain forward-looking information within the meaning of applicable securities laws (“forward-looking statements”) that relates to Descartes’ expectations concerning future revenues and earnings, and our projections for any future reductions in expenses or growth in margins and generation of cash; our assessment of the potential impact of geopolitical events, such as the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine (the “Russia-Ukraine Conflict”), and between Israel and Hamas (“Israel-Hamas Conflict”), or other potentially catastrophic events, on our business, results of operations and financial condition; our assessment of the potential impact of tariffs, sanctions and other actions by individual countries on global trade and our business; continued growth and acquisitions including our assessment of any increased opportunity for our products and services as a result of trends in the logistics and supply chain industries; rate of profitable growth and Adjusted EBITDA margin operating range; demand for Descartes’ solutions; growth of Descartes’ Global Logistics Network (“GLN”); customer buying patterns; customer expectations of Descartes; development of the GLN and the benefits thereof to customers; and other matters. These forward-looking statements are based on certain assumptions including the following: global shipment volumes continuing at levels generally consistent with those experienced historically; the Russia-Ukraine Conflict and Israel-Hamas Conflict not having a material negative impact on shipment volumes or on the demand for the products and services of Descartes by its customers and the ability of those customers to continue to pay for those products and services; countries continuing to implement and enforce existing and additional customs and security regulations relating to the provision of electronic information for imports and exports; countries continuing to implement and enforce existing and additional trade restrictions and sanctioned party lists with respect to doing business with certain countries, organizations, entities and individuals; Descartes’ continued operation of a secure and reliable business network; the stability of general economic and market conditions, currency exchange rates, and interest rates; equity and debt markets continuing to provide Descartes with access to capital; Descartes’ continued ability to identify and source attractive and executable business combination opportunities; Descartes’ ability to develop solutions that keep pace with the continuing changes in technology, and our continued compliance with third party intellectual property rights. These assumptions may prove to be inaccurate. Such forward-looking statements involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors that may cause the actual results, performance or achievements of Descartes, or developments in Descartes’ business or industry, to differ materially from the anticipated results, performance or achievements or developments expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. Such factors include, but are not limited to, Descartes’ ability to successfully identify and execute on acquisitions and to integrate acquired businesses and assets, and to predict expenses associated with and revenues from acquisitions; the impact of network failures, information security breaches or other cyber-security threats; disruptions in the movement of freight and a decline in shipment volumes including as a result of the impact of current and future trade barriers, including tariffs, further protectionist measures and reactive countermeasure or contagious illness outbreaks; a deterioration of general economic conditions or instability in the financial markets accompanied by a decrease in spending by our customers; the ability to attract and retain key personnel and the ability to manage the departure of key personnel and the transition of our executive management team; changes in trade or transportation regulations that currently require customers to use services such as those offered by Descartes; changes in customer behaviour and expectations; Descartes’ ability to successfully design and develop enhancements to our products and solutions; departures of key customers; the impact of foreign currency exchange rates; Descartes’ ability to retain or obtain sufficient capital in addition to its debt facility to execute on its business strategy, including its acquisition strategy; disruptions in the movement of freight; the potential for future goodwill or intangible asset impairment as a result of other-than-temporary decreases in Descartes’ market capitalization; and other factors and assumptions discussed in the section entitled, “Certain Factors That May Affect Future Results” in documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Ontario Securities Commission and other securities commissions across Canada, including Descartes’ most recently filed Management’s Discussion and Analysis. If any such risks actually occur, they could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition or results of operations. In that case, the trading price of our common shares could decline, perhaps materially. Readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance upon any such forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date made. Forward-looking statements are provided for the purpose of providing information about management’s current expectations and plans relating to the future. Readers are cautioned that such information may not be appropriate for other purposes. We do not undertake or accept any obligation or undertaking to release publicly any updates or revisions to any forward-looking statements to reflect any change in our expectations or any change in events, conditions or circumstances on which any such statement is based, except as required by law.

    Reconciliation of Non-GAAP Financial Measures – Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues

    We prepare and release quarterly unaudited and annual audited financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP. We also disclose and discuss certain non-GAAP financial information, used to evaluate our performance, in this and other earnings releases and investor conference calls as a complement to results provided in accordance with GAAP. We believe that current shareholders and potential investors in our company use non-GAAP financial measures, such as Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues, in making investment decisions about our company and measuring our operational results.

    The term “Adjusted EBITDA” refers to a financial measure that we define as earnings before certain charges that management considers to be non-operating expenses and which consist of interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization, stock-based compensation (for which we include related fees and taxes) and other charges (for which we include restructuring charges, acquisition-related expenses, and contingent consideration incurred due to better-than-expected performance from acquisitions). Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues divides Adjusted EBITDA for a period by the revenues for the corresponding period and expresses the quotient as a percentage.

    Management considers these non-operating expenses to be outside the scope of Descartes’ ongoing operations and the related expenses are not used by management to measure operations. Accordingly, these expenses are excluded from Adjusted EBITDA, which we reference to both measure our operations and as a basis of comparison of our operations from period-to-period. Management believes that investors and financial analysts measure our business on the same basis, and we are providing the Adjusted EBITDA financial metric to assist in this evaluation and to provide a higher level of transparency into how we measure our own business. However, Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues are non-GAAP financial measures and may not be comparable to similarly titled measures reported by other companies. Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues should not be construed as a substitute for net income determined in accordance with GAAP or other non-GAAP measures that may be used by other companies, such as EBITDA. The use of Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues does have limitations. In particular, we have completed six acquisitions since the beginning of fiscal 2025 and may complete additional acquisitions in the future that will result in acquisition-related expenses and restructuring charges. As these acquisition-related expenses and restructuring charges may continue as we pursue our consolidation strategy, some investors may consider these charges and expenses as a recurring part of operations rather than expenses that are not part of operations.

    The table below reconciles Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues to net income reported in our unaudited Consolidated Statements of Operations for Q1FY26, Q4FY25, Q3FY25, Q2FY25, and Q1FY25, which we believe is the most directly comparable GAAP measure.

      Q1FY26 Q4FY25 Q3FY25 Q2FY25 Q1FY25
    Net income, as reported on Consolidated Statements of Operations 36.2 37.4 36.6 34.7 34.7
    Adjustments to reconcile to Adjusted EBITDA:          
    Interest expense 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
    Investment income (1.9) (1.9) (2.9) (2.7) (4.1)
    Income tax expense 11.7 11.4 11.9 13.6 11.5
    Depreciation expense 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4
    Amortization of intangible assets 19.1 19.4 17.5 17.4 15.0
    Stock-based compensation and related taxes 4.9 5.4 5.6 5.8 4.3
    Other charges 3.4 1.6 1.8 0.2 3.9
    Adjusted EBITDA 75.1 75.0 72.1 70.6 67.0
               
    Revenues 168.7 167.5 168.8 163.4 151.3
    Net income as % of revenues 21% 22% 22% 21% 23%
    Adjusted EBITDA as % of revenues 45% 45% 43% 43% 44%
               
    The Descartes Systems Group Inc.
    Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets
    (US dollars in thousands; US GAAP; Unaudited)
         
      April 30, January 31,
      2025 2025
    ASSETS    
    CURRENT ASSETS    
    Cash 176,411 236,138
    Accounts receivable (net)    
    Trade 60,456 53,953
    Other 15,646 16,931
    Prepaid expenses and other 43,100 45,544
      295,613 352,566
    OTHER LONG-TERM ASSETS 27,366 24,887
    PROPERTY AND EQUIPMENT, NET 13,944 12,481
    RIGHT-OF-USE ASSETS 7,721 7,623
    DEFERRED INCOME TAXES 4,867 3,802
    INTANGIBLE ASSETS, NET 368,122 321,270
    GOODWILL 992,257 924,755
      1,709,890 1,647,384
    LIABILITIES AND SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY    
    CURRENT LIABILITIES    
    Accounts payable 23,154 20,650
    Accrued liabilities 73,151 79,656
    Lease obligations 3,402 3,178
    Income taxes payable 9,535 9,313
    Deferred revenue 109,608 104,230
      218,850 217,027
    LEASE OBLIGATIONS 4,533 4,718
    DEFERRED REVENUE 2,196 978
    INCOME TAXES PAYABLE 6,540 5,531
    DEFERRED INCOME TAXES 25,834 34,127
      257,953 262,381
         
    SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY    
    Common shares – unlimited shares authorized; Shares issued and outstanding totaled 85,782,830 at April 30, 2025 (January 31, 2025 – 85,605,969) 574,816 568,339
    Additional paid-in capital 498,092 503,133
    Accumulated other comprehensive loss (21,243) (50,497)
    Retained earnings 400,272 364,028
      1,451,937 1,385,003
      1,709,890 1,647,384
         
    The Descartes Systems Group Inc.
    Consolidated Statements of Operations
    (US dollars in thousands, except per share and weighted average share amounts; US GAAP; Unaudited)
       
      Three Months Ended
      April 30, April 30,
      2025 2024
         
    REVENUES 168,739 151,348
    COST OF REVENUES (exclusive of amortization presented separately below) 39,747 35,413
    GROSS MARGIN 128,992 115,935
    EXPENSES    
    Sales and marketing 18,850 17,471
    Research and development 25,069 22,191
    General and administrative 16,312 14,948
    Other charges 3,449 3,918
    Amortization of intangible assets 19,114 15,024
      82,794 73,552
    INCOME FROM OPERATIONS 46,198 42,383
    INTEREST EXPENSE (236) (273)
    INVESTMENT INCOME 1,962 4,059
    INCOME BEFORE INCOME TAXES 47,924 46,169
    INCOME TAX EXPENSE (RECOVERY)    
    Current 12,251 12,318
    Deferred (571) (816)
      11,680 11,502
    NET INCOME 36,244 34,667
    EARNINGS PER SHARE    
    Basic 0.42 0.41
    Diluted 0.41 0.40
    WEIGHTED AVERAGE SHARES OUTSTANDING (thousands)    
    Basic 85,677 85,274
    Diluted 87,577 87,116
         
    The Descartes Systems Group Inc.
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows
    (US dollars in thousands; US GAAP; Unaudited)
       
      Three Months Ended
      April 30, April 30,
      2025 2024
    OPERATING ACTIVITIES    
    Net income 36,244 34,667
    Adjustments to reconcile net income to cash provided by operating activities:    
    Depreciation 1,450 1,358
    Amortization of intangible assets 19,114 15,024
    Stock-based compensation expense 4,366 3,769
    Other non-cash operating activities (34) 96
    Deferred tax recovery (571) (816)
    Changes in operating assets and liabilities (6,966) 9,643
    Cash provided by operating activities 53,603 63,741
    INVESTING ACTIVITIES    
    Additions to property and equipment (1,862) (1,764)
    Acquisition of subsidiaries, net of cash acquired (112,327) (139,973)
    Cash used in investing activities (114,189) (141,737)
    FINANCING ACTIVITIES    
    Payment of debt issuance costs (38) (38)
    Issuance of common shares for cash, net of issuance costs 3,558 4,231
    Payment of withholding taxes on net share settlements (6,487) (6,745)
    Cash used in financing activities (2,967) (2,552)
    Effect of foreign exchange rate changes on cash 3,826 (1,482)
    Decrease in cash (59,727) (82,030)
    Cash, beginning of period 236,138 320,952
    Cash, end of period 176,411 238,922
         

    The MIL Network –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Asia-Pacific countries do not welcome NATO participation in regional affairs – Chinese Foreign Ministry

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, June 4 (Xinhua) — Asia-Pacific countries do not welcome the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s involvement in the region, which certainly does not need an Asia-Pacific NATO, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian said at a regular briefing for journalists on Wednesday.

    Lin Jian made the remarks in response to remarks made by a European leader at the recent Shangri-La Dialogue, who linked the Taiwan issue to Ukraine, mentioned the so-called “Chinese threat” in the South China Sea, and hinted that NATO had reason to “be involved” in the Asia-Pacific region.

    A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said China firmly opposes the remarks, noting that Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory and that the Taiwan question is entirely China’s internal affairs.

    He said that the Taiwan question and the Ukrainian crisis are incomparable, and that China firmly opposes any remarks or actions aimed at confusing or distorting the essence of the Taiwan question. He called on relevant parties to firmly adhere to the one-China principle through practical actions and respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the PRC.

    “The current situation in the South China Sea is generally stable. There is no problem with the freedom of navigation and overflight that countries enjoy in accordance with the law,” Lin Jian said.

    He stressed that China has always advocated the proper resolution of maritime disputes and differences through negotiations and consultations with the countries directly concerned and on the basis of respect for historical facts.

    “Countries outside the region should respect the efforts made by regional countries to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea, instead of inciting differences and provoking conflicts,” Lin Jian added.

    He recalled that NATO, as a regional defense organization, has no right to go beyond the geographical boundaries and mandate defined by its founding treaty. China firmly opposes NATO’s attempts to “move east” into the Asia-Pacific region, escalate tensions and create confrontation in it, and undermine peace and stability in the region and the world.

    Stressing that Asia is the common home of China and other Asian countries, Lin Jian said it has maintained rapid growth in recent years and, through the joint efforts of countries in the region, has become an outpost of global growth and an oasis of peaceful development.

    China has always been committed to the principles of goodwill, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness in its diplomacy towards neighboring countries, resolutely opposes bloc confrontation and has never sought the so-called “sphere of influence,” the Chinese diplomat said.

    “Relevant parties should not make malicious guesses or sow discord among Asia-Pacific countries based on the Cold War mentality. Instead, they should do more to promote peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region,” the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman concluded. -0-

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on strengthening rural areas in the EU through cohesion policy – A10-0092/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on strengthening rural areas in the EU through cohesion policy

    (2024/2105(INI))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the Commission report of 27 March 2024 entitled ‘The long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas: key achievements and ways forward’ (COM(2024)0450),

    – having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on EU border regions: living labs of European integration[1],

    – having regard to its resolution of 8 May 2025 on the ninth report on economic and social cohesion[2],

    – having regard to the opinion of the European Committee of the Regions of 15 March 2023 on targets and tools for a smart rural Europe[3],

    – having regard to the opinion of the European Committee of the Regions of 1 December 2022 on enhancing Cohesion Policy support for regions with geographic and demographic handicaps  (Article 174 TFEU)[4],

    – having regard to Articles 39, 174, 175 and 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[5],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‘European Climate Law’)[6],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013[7],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013[8],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy[9],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/694 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Digital Europe Programme and repealing Decision (EU) 2015/2240[10],

    – having regard to the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 240/2014 of 7 January 2014 on the European code of conduct on partnership in the framework of the European Structural and Investment Funds[11],

    – having regard to Principle 20 of the European Pillar of Social Rights on access to essential services,

    – having regard to its resolution of 4 April 2017 on women and their roles in rural areas[12],

    – having regard to its resolution of 8 March 2022 on the role of cohesion policy in promoting innovative and smart transformation and regional ICT connectivity[13],

    – having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2022 on a long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas – towards stronger, connected, resilient and prosperous rural areas by 2040[14],

    – having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2023 on harnessing talent in Europe’s regions[15],

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 27 March 2024 on the 9th Cohesion Report (COM(2024)0149),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 30 June 2021 entitled ‘A long-term Vision for the EU’s Rural Areas – Towards stronger, connected, resilient and prosperous rural areas by 2040’ (COM(2021)0345),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 19 February 2025 entitled ‘A Vision for Agriculture and Food – Shaping together an attractive farming and agri-food sector for future generations (COM(2025)0075),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 3 May 2022 entitled ‘Putting people first, securing sustainable and inclusive growth, unlocking the potential of the EU’s outermost regions’ (COM(2022)0198),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 25 March 2021 on an action plan for the development of organic production (COM(2021)0141),

    – having regard to the Commission report of 17 June 2020 on the impact of demographic change (COM(2020)0241),

    – having regard to the Commission green paper of 27 January 2021 on ageing – fostering solidarity and responsibility between generations (COM(2021)0050),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘A Farm to Fork Strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system’ (COM(2020)0381),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 – Bringing nature back into our lives’ (COM(2020)0380),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 17 November 2021 entitled ‘EU Soil Strategy for 2030 – Reaping the benefits of healthy soils for people, food, nature and climate’ (COM(2021)0699),

    – having regard to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas, adopted by the Human Rights Council on 28 September 2018,

    – having regard to general recommendation No 34 (2016) of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the rights of rural women, adopted on 7 March 2016,

    – having regard to its resolution of 3 May 2022 on the EU action plan for organic agriculture[16],

    – having regard to the study commissioned by Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development entitled ‘The future of the European Farming Model: Socio-economic and territorial implications of the decline in the number of farms and farmers in the EU’, published by the Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies in April 2022,

    – having regard to its resolution of 24 March 2022 on the need for an urgent EU action plan to ensure food security inside and outside the EU in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine[17],

    – having regard to its resolution of 3 October 2018 on addressing the specific needs of rural, mountainous and remote areas[18],

    – having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2021 on the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing nature back into our lives[19],

    – having regard to the Commission report of August 2019 entitled ‘Evaluation of the impact of the CAP on generational renewal, local development and jobs in rural areas’[20],

    – having regard to the opinion of the European Committee of the Regions of 26 January 2022 entitled ‘A long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas’[21],

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 19 February 2025 entitled ‘How post-27 LEADER and CLLD programming could contribute to better implementation of the long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas’[22],

    – having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 23 March 2022 entitled ‘Long-term Vision for the EU’s Rural Areas’[23],

    – having regard to its resolution of 19 October 2023 on generational renewal in the EU farms of the future[24],

    – having regard to Enrico Letta’s report on the future of the single market, published in April 2024,

    – having regard to the study requested by Parliament’s Committee on Regional Development, entitled ‘EU Cohesion Policy in non-urban areas’, published by the Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies in September 2020,

    – having regard to the declaration on the future of rural areas and rural development policy in the European Union, adopted by the Rural Pact Coordination Group on 12 December 2024,

    – having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Regional Development (A10-0092/2025),

    A. whereas, currently, 137 million European citizens – nearly one in three – live in rural areas, which account for approximately 83 % of the EU’s territory; whereas one third of the population of rural areas lives in a border region; whereas 77 % of land used for farming (134 million hectares) and 79 % of forest (148 million hectares) are located in rural areas;

    B. whereas according to Eurostat, average income in rural areas is 87.5 % of average income in urban areas;

    C. whereas there are still disparities in cohesion policy funding between urban and rural areas, with urban areas receiving three times more cohesion funding than rural areas[25];

    D. whereas since 1991, in rural areas, the LEADER method, subsequently covered by the community-led local development policy instrument (CLLD) through local action groups (LAGs), has demonstrated that it can mobilise and empower local actors around innovative and tailored strategies;

    E. whereas rural areas are a cornerstone of the European economy, home to many ‘hidden European Champions’, and are integral to Europe’s cultural diversity; whereas they are essential for food production and security, serving as guardians of our landscapes, living rural heritage, social and cultural traditions; whereas they play a key role in promoting the strategic autonomy of the EU through the agricultural sector, which remains a strategic priority of the EU; whereas rural areas symbolise many of the aspects that make Europe attractive and liveable;

    F. whereas the promotion of minority languages can enhance awareness of local specificities, increasing the attractiveness of tourism and fostering economic activities linked to culture, education, craftsmanship and traditional products;

    G. whereas the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted a shift in perception among the public, who have recognised the potential of rural areas as a solution to the challenges arising from crises by providing a safer, more sustainable and reliable living environment;

    H. whereas cohesion policy funds alone cannot answer the increasing needs and challenges faced by rural areas in the EU; whereas greater synergies and complementarities with other EU policies, in particular with the common agricultural policy (CAP), must be ensured in order to maximise the impact of investments in rural areas, advancing the modernisation of agriculture and the development of essential services and infrastructure;

    I. whereas over 40 % of land in rural areas is used for agriculture yet sadly the contribution of agriculture, forestry and fisheries to rural regions has decreased, both in economic and employment terms, to 12 % of all jobs and 4 % of gross value added;

    J. whereas Parliament’s study on the future of the European farming model notes that the EU could lose 6.4 million farms by 2040, falling from 10.3 million in 2016 to 3.9 million;

    K. whereas, in accordance with Articles 174, 175 and 349 TFEU, the EU aims to reduce development gaps between the different regions and coordinate its policies, including using the European Structural and Investment Funds to achieve the objectives of economic, social and territorial cohesion, with a particular focus on rural areas;

    L. whereas all regions must remain eligible for funding in future cohesion policy, even strong regions facing significant transformation challenges;

    M. whereas regional actors have a deeper understanding of which projects should be prioritised for support through cohesion funds, ensuring that resources are allocated in a way that best meets the specific needs of their territories;

    N. whereas cohesion policy funds to rural areas should be further simplified with the objective of reducing administrative burdens, not only for the final beneficiaries but also for the relevant authorities, thereby also contributing to increased absorption rates;

    O. whereas rural areas in particular are facing demographic and structural challenges, such as ageing, population decline, brain drain, growing inequalities between men and women, disparities with urban areas, structural changes in the agricultural and forestry sectors, the consequences of natural disasters, the increase of energy and transport prices, a lack of services and infrastructure, in particular for vulnerable people and persons with disabilities, the impact of these challenges on income level and on the labour market, with a consequent higher unemployment rate, and a persistently large digital gap;

    P. whereas demographic challenges are particularly acute in the EU farming population, with the majority of farmers being over 50 years old;

    Q. whereas strengthening cohesion in rural areas requires the adoption of measures and initiatives aimed at supporting families, also by helping young people and parents in balancing family and professional life, thereby contributing to the sustainable development of those communities;

    R. whereas Europe’s rural areas and European farmers already play a crucial role in the climate transition, as they are the most affected by climate change both economically and socially, and whereas thanks to their efforts, some of the adverse impact of agriculture on the environment has been significantly reduced over the years; whereas the EU agricultural sector significantly reduced its greenhouse gas emissions by 24 % between 1990 and 2021 and it is responsible for 72 % of renewable energy production and holds 78 % of the untapped potential;

    S. whereas demographic changes do not affect all countries and regions equally, but have a greater impact on less developed regions, as they exacerbate existing territorial and social imbalances; whereas solutions must be found for regional imbalances and for the uneven pace of convergence between regions, some of which remain stuck in a development trap; whereas less developed regions require particular attention and support, as is the case with the EU’s rural areas and the outermost regions, due to their specific characteristics;

    T. whereas the overall percentage of the population living in rural areas has fallen significantly across the EU over the past 50 years, particularly as a result of ageing and emigration; whereas the highest percentage of people over the age of 65 is found in rural areas[26]; whereas estimates suggest that by 2033 the population of Europe’s rural areas will have shrunk by 30 million people compared with 1993;

    U. whereas the lack of or poor access to healthcare, water services, affordable housing, transport, digital infrastructure, education, financial services and recreational and cultural activities worsen the reputation of regions, and particularly rural, borderland, inland, cross-border, mountainous, insular and outermost regions, as places to live and work, especially for women, young people, ageing populations and minorities; whereas cross-border areas are particularly affected by the lack of regional connectivity in terms of transport and digital infrastructure; whereas rural areas are strongly affected by the lack of stable employment opportunities, which forces young people, in particular women, to migrate;

    V. whereas the availability and quality of water play a critical role in ensuring equitable, sustainable and productive rural livelihoods;

    W. whereas greater emphasis should be placed on preventive measures to strengthen the resilience of Europe’s rural areas to natural disasters; whereas an integrated approach to water resources management is essential both to prevent floods and to cope with droughts, in particular through a coherent use of EU funds;

    X. whereas rural areas, especially in eastern, southern and Mediterranean Europe, are the most directly affected by energy poverty and face specific challenges related to desertification, forest fires, climate change and its associated asymmetrical risks, water resource scarcity and weak infrastructure, which require a targeted approach within cohesion policy;

    Y. whereas rural areas are home to the majority of the EU’s biodiversity, yet protected habitats and species remain in poor conservation status and continue to decline due to climate change and the degradation of soil and water quality, with a negative impact on natural resources; whereas biodiversity loss has severe economic consequences for the agricultural sector and negatively affects the attractiveness of rural tourism;

    Z. whereas the clean energy transition, the diversification of the economy and the expansion of renewable energy sources present significant opportunities for rural and less developed regions, allowing them to leverage their natural resources and geographic advantages and to exploit their full potential for the future production of renewable energy;

    AA. whereas these areas bear the brunt of depopulation, and whereas it is mainly young people leaving them as a result of job shortages and dim career prospects, and this fuels the rural exodus, resulting in an increased share of older residents and a greater risk of social isolation;

    AB. whereas rural areas have the highest share (12.6 %) of young people aged 15-29[27] not in employment, education or training (NEETs);

    AC. whereas generational renewal is one of the nine key objectives of the CAP;

    AD. whereas farms, dairy farms, wine-growers and olive oil producers across Europe go out of business every day, and few farms like these are managed by farmers below the age of 35; whereas the ambitious goals of the green transition entail opportunities and also risks for economic, social and territorial cohesion, as well as for European agriculture;

    AE. whereas the way we produce food has shaped the landscapes that define Europe; whereas dynamic rural areas foster quality food production which in turn supports their economy; whereas reinvigorating these connections between food and territory and revitalising rural areas will be essential for the future of farming in Europe;

    AF. whereas a robust cohesion policy is essential to guaranteeing the effective application of the ‘right to stay’ principle in rural areas, which requires action on many levels, including by fostering economic stability and preventing depopulation; stresses that ensuring access to a basic set of public goods and services for all citizens, especially young people, regardless of where they live, is crucial; whereas it is necessary, to this end, to promote targeted investment in infrastructure, services, education, and innovation;

    1. Welcomes the Commission report of 27 March 2024 entitled ‘The long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas: key achievements and ways forward’ and agrees with its overarching objectives;

    2. Takes note of the four areas of action underpinning the rural vision and the 30 actions making up the EU rural action plan; calls on the Commission and the Member States to place its implementation at the top of the agenda;

    3. Stresses the key role rural areas have to play in shaping the economic models and the social and territorial organisation of the various Member States, particularly as the cradle of agricultural and food production, but also as custodians of an irreplaceable cultural and landscape heritage; notes, however, that their significance remains under-appreciated and inadequately funded; believes that the EU has a duty to push for a true revival and regeneration of these areas, going to extra lengths to endow our rural areas with the right tools to overcome the considerable long-term challenges they are facing and which are having an ever greater impact on regional competitiveness and social cohesion, in order to preserve European diversity and ensure that the Union’s progress does not come at the expense of rural areas and their populations;

    4. Considers it important to develop short supply chains and to promoting the use of labelling schemes to acknowledge the quality and variety of traditional products from rural areas; stresses that public canteens, such as school and hospital canteens, can play a significant role in the development of short agrifood supply chains;

    5. Recognises the key role of small and medium-sized towns as development centres in rural regions and calls on the Commission and the Member States to specifically strengthen their economic, social and infrastructural functions, revitalise city centres, better utilise synergies between rural areas and large metropolitan regions, and ensure more balanced territorial development;

    6. Stresses the urgent need for measures to combat poverty in rural areas by developing targeted strategies to improve social security, create economic opportunities, and support particularly vulnerable populations, in order to break the cycle of poverty;

    7. Stresses that rural areas are key players in mitigating the effects of climate change; emphasises the need for increased investment in research and innovation for rural areas, particularly in the fields of sustainable agriculture, renewable energy, digital transformation and innovative mobility solutions, to enhance the competitiveness and resilience of rural regions and create energy self-sufficiency and new employment opportunities; encourages the sustainable management of forests and the prevention of forest fires, also by promoting the use of biomass which is gathered without harm to forest ecosystems;

    8. Calls for the expansion of renewable energy in rural areas based on their potential to reduce energy costs with the involvement of civil society and local communities; emphasises the need for financial incentives, measures such as renewable energy communities and simplified administrative processes to boost regional energy independence and sustainability while avoiding negative impacts on food production, land availability and prices, as well as on social cohesion; calls for a dedicated financing mechanism for the installation of photovoltaic, wind and other renewable energy sources;

    9. Calls for increased support for the preservation, restoration and conversion of older buildings, including historical buildings, churches and other places of worship, sports halls and schools in rural areas to improve energy efficiency, sustainability and safety; urges investments in the modernisation of public infrastructure while preserving historical structures where possible; calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote targeted policies that support the renovation and energy-efficient retrofitting of rural housing, financial incentives for first-time rural homebuyers, in particular for young people and families, and the development of sustainable and affordable housing projects adapted to the needs of local communities that contribute to the attractiveness and revitalisation of these regions;

    10. Asks the Commission to assess and to implement Article 174, 175 and 349 TFEU in full to close the development gap among regions, including in relation to infrastructure, and to see to it that all EU policies not only apply the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle, but also that they follow a more assertive ‘promote cohesion’ approach wherever possible, particularly in rural areas and in areas particularly affected by industrial transition, demographic challenges and depopulation, and those at risk of depopulation, such as outermost regions, islands, border, cross-border and mountain regions;

    11. Calls on the Commission to devise a rural strategy for the post-2027 programming period; urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure the incorporation of a rural dimension in relevant policies and to make sure that the strategy promotes the economic and social development of rural areas and to allocate specific resources to the modernisation of agriculture, supporting rural small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and start-up and promoting short supply chains in order to make rural areas more connected, competitive, resilient and attractive to young people and investors, thereby ensuring balanced and sustainable development in the long term and enhancing the quality of life; stresses, in this regard, the importance of having a truly effective rural proofing mechanism at EU level so to assess the potential of all relevant policies and to mitigate any possible negative impacts they may have on rural areas;

    12. Stresses that in order to ensure the long-term prosperity of rural areas and support a strong agricultural sector to maintain this prosperity in rural areas, it is essential to strengthen the synergies between EU Structural and Investment Funds and Horizon Europe, the EU’s flagship research and innovation programme, and the CAP in the next multiannual financial framework (MFF);

    13. Calls on the Commission to present, by 2027, a report on the application of the rural proofing mechanism to policies and interventions at EU level, as well as the results obtained;

    14. Calls on the Commission to prioritise focused investments and policy measures to support the transition to a new generation of farmers in order to modernise EU agriculture and create more opportunities in rural areas;

    15. Highlights the crucial role of cohesion policy for the development of rural areas as a decentralised, powerful tool for economic and social development, allowing all regions to tackle these specific challenges of the Union; underlines in this regard that cohesion policy should continue to be a key pillar of the MFF post-2027, with an allocation that is maintained at a minimum threshold equivalent to the current MFF 2021-2027 levels, ensuring its fundamental role in reducing regional disparities and shaping a more resilient and competitive Europe that leaves no one behind; calls for the option of providing adequate resources for rural and mountainous areas to be explored in the next cohesion policy framework and complementing GDP at regional level with other indicators; recalls that the fundamental principles of cohesion policy, such as partnership, multi-level-governance, a place-based approach and shared management, must be respected in order to foster development and to meet the specific needs and challenges of rural areas with a particular focus on tools supporting sustainable growth and development and youth and female employment, including among victims of violence against women, and improving services and infrastructure;

    16. Believes that smart specialisation and economic diversification strategies could promote more opportunities in rural areas; emphasises, in particular, the key importance of integrating the concept of smart villages into cohesion policy and of explicitly supporting the development of smart villages, with flexible funding and an integrated approach, as an innovative tool for enhancing the quality of life and revitalising rural areas and services through digital and social innovation and initiatives such as the promotion of working spaces in order to attract workers, including remote workers, and to contribute to revitalising local economies;

    17. Encourages initiatives that promote economic and social sustainability, including support for rural entrepreneurship, rural tourism and new business models based on innovation and digitalisation;

    18. Calls on the Commission to ensure a strong and holistic focus on the development of rural areas in the future cohesion policy, in such a way that all policy initiatives are consistent with the goal of reducing territorial disparities; believes it is essential to devise long-term strategies to support rural areas, centred on the principles of cohesion and sustainability and providing the necessary tools to address demographic, social and economic challenges, in order to ensure that these areas do not become forgotten places, but rather key players in Europe’s future without needing to continually depend on extraordinary measures; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to support the significant development of rural areas in the future cohesion policy, and to commit to setting up local info points and offering a platform and financial support to enable Member States to exchange information and best practice on funding possibilities, with a view to providing local authorities with effective support and assisting with resource management and the implementation of development initiatives; emphasises, furthermore, that the effective participation of regional, local and rural authorities and a strong administrative capacity are crucial for the reduction of the excessive administrative burden and complex requirements for recipients and for the effective execution of cohesion policy funds; highlights that multi-funding still appears difficult in some countries and calls on the Commission to enhance complementarities between the EAFRD and cohesion policy funds;

    19. Stresses the need for an integrated European strategy for the revitalisation of rural areas, including through the development of bio-districts, recognising their potential to diversify the rural economy by targeting fiscal, economic and social measures to maintain the active population; also highlights the value of introducing incentives for the relocation of health, education and public administration professionals, as well as the importance of partnerships between local authorities and the private sector for the creation of new jobs;

    20. Underlines that expanding integrated territorial investment (ITI) plans and unlocking their full potential could establish them as a cornerstone for integrated regional, local, and rural development; emphasises that strengthening ITIs’ role in rural areas is essential to foster territorial cohesion, enhance connectivity and drive inclusive economic growth by supporting key sectors such as agriculture, rural SMEs, tourism and renewable energy; calls, furthermore, for greater flexibility in ITI implementation, increased financial allocations and reinforced synergies with other EU funding mechanisms, including LEADER and CLLD, key instruments for fostering bottom-up participatory rural development and for keeping and restoring living and thriving local rural economies, to maximise impact and actively involve regional and local authorities and civil society in line with the partnership principle;

    21. Suggests that all relevant Directorates-General of the Commission conduct a territorial impact assessment of their respective policies at least twice per programming period; believes that these evaluations would establish a more precise baseline and identify ways to integrate the characteristics of rural areas into EU policies more effectively;

    22. Calls on the Member States to make full use of all measures supporting rural, inland, mountainous, insular and outermost regions, as well as cross-border regions and regions at the EU’s external borders, including those bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine which are most affected by the war, to mitigate economic disruption and to secure their future and prosperity; welcomes the new BRIDGEforEU Regulation and asks the Member States to implement it, enhancing the cooperation between cross-border regions to enable economies of scale when providing basic services and infrastructure in the rural areas affected;

    23. Stresses the diversity of the EU’s rural areas, for which the long-term vision calls for solutions that are tailored to the needs and resources of rural areas while reinforcing long-term strategies for sustainable growth; underlines in this regard the need to fully involve local and regional authorities, which are best placed to identify current challenges and needs at the regional and local levels; highlights the importance of maintaining a decentralised model for the programming and implementation of cohesion policy based on the principle of partnership and multi-level governance and a place-based bottom-up approach; calls, therefore, for the strong involvement of regional and local authorities to ensure more direct access for local and regional authorities to cohesion policy funds, reducing bureaucratic complexity and shortening disbursement times, through more streamlined procedures, intuitive digital platforms and increased technical support for local beneficiaries; proposes encouraging the use of pre-financing and advance payment schemes for small projects in rural areas;

    24. Stresses that centralisation may lead to bureaucratic inefficiencies and delays in fund absorption, ultimately reducing the effectiveness of EU investments in rural development;

    25. Highlights that the management approach to rural areas’ development policies needs to be coordinated, integrated and multi-sectoral in its implementation and that reinforcing a multi-level approach in line with the subsidiarity principle is essential to ensure its success;

    26. Highlights that resilience is essential to enable authorities at local and regional levels to mitigate, adapt to and recover from sudden challenges, ensuring community well-being, security and long-term sustainability;

    27. Calls for an adequate share of cohesion policy funding to be allocated to the border regions and calls in this regard for the European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation (EGTCs) to be granted a higher degree of autonomy in selecting projects and using funds, in particular by designating EGTCs as managing authorities for Interreg programmes, strengthening their institutional and financial capacity; recommends furthermore that EGTCs be granted a more significant role in achieving policy objective 5, namely bringing Europe closer to its citizens;

    28. Underlines the need to strengthen democratic and political participation in rural areas by promoting active civic engagement and digital tools; calls on the Commission to support initiatives that foster local democratic processes to improve cohesion between urban and rural regions;

    29. Highlights the need for rural areas to be able to provide essential high-quality services of general interest to the public to improve their livelihood and to harness their strengths to achieve sustainable development, for which they should receive sufficient financial support; underlines, to that end, the need to provide equal access, in particular to vulnerable people and people with disabilities, to all healthcare services, transport and connectivity services, including innovative mobility solutions, specific plans for affordable housing, water services, education and training services, digital infrastructure, and other basic services such as postal and banking services, ensuring their accessibility and affordability in order to guarantee proper living conditions; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Member States to facilitate access to funding and tailored support measures for social economy initiatives that address local needs and contribute to regional development and, at the same time, to reinforce the financial support offered to rural SMEs, in particular through easing access to financial resources, cooperatives and local value chains that foster economic diversification;

    30. Stresses the strategic importance of water resources for rural areas and highlights the need to provide sufficient resources, under the cohesion policy and in rural development programmes, for maintaining and upgrading the water network; recommends, in particular, the inclusion of measures to combat leakage, improve the efficiency of supply systems and promote the sustainable use of water resources in rural areas;

    31. Regards it as essential to place greater emphasis on preventive measures to enhance the resilience of Europe’s rural areas in the face of natural disasters; believes that an integrated approach to managing water resources is paramount in order to simultaneously prevent floods and tackle drought – two growing threats in many rural regions – within both agriculture and the food sector; acknowledges that depending on the context, building dams and reservoirs or upgrading existing facilities is a priority, while striking a balance between built infrastructure and relatively low cost soft measures, not least because they can be a clean source of energy; notes that although cohesion policy already supports initiatives in this area, additional projects and increased investment are needed, in line with national and regional risk management strategies, to ensure that rural areas are better prepared for, and able to withstand, climate-related extreme weather events;

    32. Stresses the growing threat of climate risks such as natural disasters, desertification and water scarcity for many rural areas in Europe, particularly in southern Europe and in the Mediterranean basin; calls on the Commission to promote forward looking adaptation strategies at national, regional and local levels, including water management, resilient infrastructure and disaster preparedness, and calls for investments in innovative water infrastructure, such as the reuse of treated wastewater and smart irrigation systems, and the construction of reservoirs for rainwater harvesting;

    33. Notes that rural areas suffer from limited access to essential healthcare services, with a shortage of facilities and medical personnel, and therefore calls for improved access to quality healthcare, including mental health services;

    34. Calls on the Member States and local authorities to safeguard essential services that are vital to the development of rural areas by refraining from imposing economic constraints on healthcare in rural areas, as this would lead to the closure, or a fall in the number of, first-aid facilities and basic hospital structures, which should be strengthened;

    35. Calls on the Commission and Member States to develop a plan for mobile medical units and for telemedicine, the strengthening of medical services including medical spa services, community health nurses and digital health solutions and incentives for doctors working in rural and remote areas;

    36. Calls on the Commission to incorporate specific measures targeting areas identified as rural into its eHealth strategy, in order to provide local healthcare units with practical support for technological upgrades, and to promote the services such units offer; stresses that Member States should also be offered a screening programme targeting rural areas and that administrative support should also be put in place to assist with the drawing up of plans and prevention registers; calls on the Member States to take into account the particular characteristics of these areas and to encourage rural pharmacies to be set up, in order to specifically adapt pharmacy networks to a rural area, with coordination arrangements for medicines and medical devices supply, with the aim of streamlining and adapting the needs of healthcare units to the individual area; calls on the Member States to improve the provision of primary care and support services among these pharmacies termed ‘rural’;

    37. Highlights the key role that infrastructure development has to play in the economic and social growth of rural areas, given the need for transport systems, particularly public ones, with the capacity to improve connectivity and access to essential services, for energy networks, including renewables, and for suitable digital connectivity infrastructure; notes, in particular, that the quality of transport and digital connectivity should be improved so that people have easy access to labour, schools, hospitals, public services and job opportunities; underlines that road, rail and maritime transport links need to be developed or upgraded through EU co-funded programmes to reduce the isolation of rural areas, in particular from urban centres, narrowing the existing gap, and to facilitate sustainable mobility of people and goods; calls for a comprehensive strategy to improve mobility in rural areas, with a strong focus on sustainability, the expansion of charging infrastructure and the promotion of e-mobility; emphasises the need for targeted investments in public transport, shared mobility solutions and alternative transport models to ensure accessibility and connectivity for rural populations;

    38. Stresses that the digital divide between rural and urban areas remains significant, hindering equal opportunities for all residents; calls on the Commission and the Member States to accelerate investments in broadband connectivity, including 5G, better mobile coverage, high-speed internet networks, digital farming solutions and rural innovation hubs, ensuring that digital transformation benefits rural communities, while paying special attention to the regions less prepared for this transformation, including remote areas and outermost regions; stresses that these investments are crucial to enhancing productivity, supporting small farms’ entrepreneurship, facilitating remote working, accessing e-services and online teaching and ensuring that rural areas remain competitive in the digital age; stresses the need for digital literacy and vocational training initiatives to support the integration of digital technologies into the rural economy and to bridge the existing technological and economic divides;

    39. Stresses the importance and interconnectedness of military mobility, rural infrastructure development and regional security; underlines the overlap between the EU military mobility network and the Trans-European Transport Network;

    40. Calls for strategies to address vacant buildings and promote alternative housing concepts in rural areas, including affordable housing, renovation projects and intergenerational living; emphasises the need for incentives to repurpose empty properties, support community-driven housing initiatives and ensure sustainable, inclusive living spaces;

    41. Stresses the importance of promoting priority policies that support young people, as the main actors of the rural exodus, and calls on the Commission to ensure them an effective application of the ‘right to stay’ through targeted measures, designed to stem the demographic decline in rural areas and to encourage talented people to remain there; believes that individuals who wish to contribute to the development of their local communities should be provided with ample opportunities, and that it is therefore urgent to eliminate barriers and the significant disparities between young people in urban and rural areas in terms of access to high quality education, economic independence, social and political engagement, and intergenerational social interaction; calls for concrete measures and targeted funding programmes, including a brain drain action plan from the Commission, to support young people and young entrepreneurs, providing them with all the tools and resources they need to help them to access agricultural lands, jobs and business opportunities; notes that such measures should include improved access to public services, educational and cultural facilities, access to housing, low-interest loans and, with due regard to the principle of subsidiarity in fiscal matters, tax-related incentives to help young people build a stable future in line with their aspirations, without needing to abandon their place of origin, and creating incentives to settle down in or return to rural areas; considers it necessary, therefore, to promote measures to diversify the rural economy by harnessing local potential, including in areas outside agriculture and tourism, and to create quality jobs;

    42. Highlights the importance of boosting vocational education and training while also fostering youth-led initiatives and non-formal learning for young people to develop specific skills related to the economy of rural areas, as a tool for social cohesion and quality employment, with a view to combating depopulation in those areas;

    43. Highlights the key role of awareness raising and knowledge-sharing campaigns in advancing various education campaigns and programmes, and the importance of making them an integral part of school curricula; stresses the increasingly worrying data on early school leaving and to that end, calls on national and local authorities to reorganise their school systems to guarantee the right to education in their territories, bearing in mind the serious and objective difficulties they may face; calls on the Member States and local authorities, therefore, not to merge existing schools management structures in those areas;

    44. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to provide for new subsidised credit facilities that can support young entrepreneurs and women in their activities, including alternative forms of guarantees for access to credit; calls for financial support to empower young farmers, ensuring growth in rural economies;

    45. Welcomes the new EUR 3 billion loan financing package from the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group for agriculture, forestry and fisheries across Europe as a tangible initiative to close the funding gaps for SMEs in agriculture and the bio-economy and facilitate financing for young farmers and women; calls on the EIB Group to explore new forms of support to provide liquidity for actors along agricultural and rural value chains;

    46. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote local start-ups and incentive programmes for the return of young people and for the purchase and renovation of housing by young people in rural areas;

    47. Calls on the Commission to establish a European fund for youth entrepreneurship in rural areas, with a special focus on regions affected by high youth unemployment and brain drain; notes that this fund should support rural start-ups, innovative agriculture, sustainable tourism and digitalisation through dedicated financial instruments and tax incentives;

    48. Draws attention to the need for universal equal access to measures enabling everyone to develop the high-quality skills they need to achieve their professional goals, and to vocational and educational training; laments the fact that in rural areas, in many fields, the work of women is currently not rewarded with equal opportunities and conditions, as they often face extra challenges, including limited access to job opportunities, a lack of adequate measures to help them juggle work and family, and a shortage of childcare facilities; emphasises the need to foster an environment conducive to female employment, with support for all families, ensuring high quality early childhood education and care systems and parental support;

    49. Calls for increased support for women in rural areas, particularly through measures to improve access to employment, education, healthcare and social infrastructure, as well as protection from violence and violence prevention, to promote their economic and social participation; emphasises that targeted programmes should be created to support female entrepreneurs in rural regions in order to strengthen their economic independence;

    50. Stresses that support for women in rural areas is imperative for a variety of reasons, including promoting gender equality, fostering economic growth, advancing community development, reducing poverty and ensuring environmental sustainability; highlights that women play a multilevel role in rural development, as workers, farmers and business owners, and stresses that their importance in rural areas and local economies is often overlooked; stresses that special attention should be paid to women in rural areas when designing structural social support and regional development programmes; highlights that addressing these barriers is crucial for empowering women and unlocking their full potential in rural communities;

    51. Calls on the Member States and the Commission to boost awareness regarding existing and future EU funding possibilities for women entrepreneurs in rural areas and to make it easier for them to access financial support; encourages the Member States and regional and local authorities to make use of the existing EU structural and investment funds to promote women entrepreneurs;

    52. Calls for gender-equality employment policies and targeted measures to promote a better work-life balance in rural areas, including flexible working models, digital work opportunities, improved leisure and education offerings, and the promotion of community-based care and support structures for families;

    53. Urges the Commission to adopt measures to protect the family farming model that underpins the rural territory, is more environmentally friendly and guarantees food security in the EU; stresses the need for a EU system of incentives to limit the accumulation of agricultural land in private investment funds and the consequent increase in land prices; insists on the protection of small and medium-sized farms by strengthening the role of cooperatives and professional farmers in EU policies; furthermore, encourages the Member States to implement concrete measures to support these farms by simplifying access to credit, modernising rural infrastructure and giving impetus to agricultural cooperatives;

    54. Stresses the key role played by agriculture and the agri-food sector in food production, ensuring food security in the EU and job creation – a role worth championing since as it constitutes a mainstay of the local economy and is a key factor in ensuring sustainable land management, and also drives the growth and development of inland and rural areas, which often enjoy international recognition for their outstanding typical products; notes that it is necessary to help farmers innovate and diversify, while at the same time fostering farm competitiveness; believes that the transition to a more sustainable model requires a balanced approach, mindful of local specificities and the economic needs of rural communities, without imposing changes liable to hinder their long-term development; calls, in this regard, on the Commission and the Member States to take strong and targeted action by reducing excessive regulatory burdens and ensuring fair market conditions, to mitigate the decline in the number of farms and encourage generational renewal; calls for adequate support to promote food self-sufficiency and crop diversification; highlights in particular the specific structural challenges of the outermost regions and their rural areas;

    55. Urges the Commission and the Member States, in order to strengthen food security and ensure that European farmers do not face unfair competition from products that do not meet the same environmental, animal welfare and food security standards, to enforce strict equivalence of production standards for agricultural products imported into the EU and calls  on the Commission, in this regard, to ensure that trade agreements uphold European agricultural standards and ensure a level playing field for EU farmers;

    56. Acknowledges that the ambitious goals of the green transition entail opportunities as well as risks for EU agriculture; emphasises that the number of farms in the EU decreased between 2005 and 2020 by about 37 % and calls on the Commission and the Member States, in this regard, to take action to mitigate the decline in the number of farms and support their revenues and competitiveness, in order to stem the desertion of these areas and encourage generational renewal;

    57. Points to the need to simplify administrative procedures for accessing EU funds by reducing red tape for farmers and small rural businesses and improving coordination between the institutional levels involved in the management of funds in order to ensure that resources are provided more efficiently and in a more timely manner;

    58. Points also to the need to provide these areas, as well as businesses and farm and forest holders, with sufficient financial support, including support for the purchase and maintenance of equipment, with a view to increasing European competitiveness;

    59. Is fully aware that rural areas play a key role in the green and digital transitions; underlines that the transitions have to be implemented gradually, along the lines of achievable goals; calls in this regard for EU funding to be better linked with environmental sustainability and biodiversity protection;

    60. Highlights the need to support rural communities in European regions that have been most adversely affected by the trade in or export of Ukrainian agricultural products;

    61. Points to the importance of compensatory measures for farmers and rural businesses to ensure that the ecological transition is fair and practical and does not lead to new socio-economic disparities; highlight that for this transition to be successful, the full involvement and collaboration of all stakeholders, in particular farmers and foresters, will be key;

    62. Highlights that promoting agriculture is a necessary component of any strategy for rural development, but that on its own it is not sufficient, as not all people in rural areas are employed in the agricultural sector or live in agricultural structures;

    63. Recognises that tourism is frequently a major source of income for rural, mountainous, insular and outermost regions, as well as in the Mediterranean region, with the potential to encourage job creation and entrepreneurship and to draw in growing numbers of visitors curious to discover their nature, traditions and cultural heritage through the unique experiences on offer; believes, for that reason, that tourism should be supported through investment in the rural economy, in synergy with the agricultural, fishing, food and cultural sectors, and that the EU should promote the co-existence and further development of these sectors;

    64. Highlights that rural and agro-tourism can be a complementary activity to agriculture, offering opportunities for diversifying farm incomes and benefiting the development of rural areas, and that resources should therefore be allocated to the development of tourism and HoReCa activities;

    65. Underlines the need to promote rural tourism in a way that is sustainable; highlights the importance of optimising the economic benefits of tourism for rural areas, while minimising the potential negative impacts on local communities and ecosystems;

    66. Emphasises the importance of protecting and promoting linguistic minorities in the rural areas of the EU, recognising them as an integral part of Europe’s cultural heritage and as a driver of regional development; therefore calls on the Commission and the Member States to allocate cohesion policy resources to support projects for linguistic promotion, training, cultural tourism and local entrepreneurship connected to the linguistic and cultural traditions of the regions;

    67. Urges the Commission and the Member States to boost tourism in rural and depopulated areas or areas at risk of depopulation, by financing initiatives that enhance historic villages and traditional local products and establishing new green paths and other nature trails, as well as a label recognising outstanding environments in rural and nature tourism along similar lines to the ‘blue flag’ awarded to beaches;

    68. Notes that in some Member States, municipalities play a crucial role as drivers of regional economic development, benefiting from substantial tax revenues generated by their local economies; highlights that these revenues can motivate municipalities to invest EU cohesion funds in increasing their future tax base, promoting long-term local economic growth and securing long-term tax revenues; to this end, calls on the Commission, with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity in fiscal matters, to initiate a dialogue on the potential benefits of sharing taxes on economic activities with municipalities;

    69. Insists that excessive bureaucracy should not prevent farmers from focusing on sustainable food production and rural economic development; calls on the Commission and the Member States to include a strong rural dimension in the future cohesion policy regulations and to promote better regulation as a matter of priority, in order to reduce administrative burdens and to take steps to ensure the competitiveness of rural businesses, particularly SMEs, cooperatives and citizen-led communities, and to promote easier and more efficient access to funds, cost reductions and simplified application and evaluation processes for EU funding, especially for small beneficiaries; reaffirms that optimising procedures, cutting red tape and enhancing transparency are vital to improving access to the available resources; calls on the Commission, therefore, to provide adequate advisory services and technical assistance to managing authorities, thereby also contributing to increased absorption rates;

    70. Calls for a more integrated approach between EU industrial and cohesion policies, ensuring that regional development strategies are aligned with industrial transition efforts, particularly in northern, sparsely populated areas;

    71. Emphasises the importance of SMEs in technological sectors for rural digitalisation and economic resilience; calls on the Commission to ensure that public measures support local businesses and foster proximity-based economies, avoiding criteria that may disadvantage smaller enterprises;

    72. Stresses the need for better alignment between existing territorial development instruments and Structural Funds, including initiatives such as Harnessing Talent and the Covenant of Mayors;

    73. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility – A10-0098/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility

    (2024/2085(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     

    – having regard to Article 175 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility[1] (RRF Regulation),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 February 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/241 as regards REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans and amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) 2021/1060 and (EU) 2021/1755, and Directive 2003/87/EC[2] (REPowerEU Regulation),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget[3] (Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765 of 29 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[4] (MFF Regulation),

    – having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources[5] (the IIA),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[6] (Financial Regulation),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241[7],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on the effective coordination of economic policies and on multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97[8],

    – having regard to its resolution of 23 June 2022 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility[9],

    – having regard to the Commission notice of 22 July 2024 entitled ‘Guidance on recovery and resilience plans’[10],

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 21 February 2024 on strengthening the EU through ambitious reforms and investments (COM(2024)0082),

    – having regard to the Commission’s third annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (COM(2024)0474),

    – having regard to the Court of Auditors’ (ECA) annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the budget for the 2023 financial year, together with the institutions’ replies,

    – having regard to special report 13/2024 of the ECA of 2 September 2024 entitled ‘Absorption of funds from the Recovery and Resilience Facility – Progressing with delays and risks remain regarding the completion of measures and therefore the achievement of RRF objectives’, special report 14/2024 of the ECA of 11 September 2024 entitled ‘Green transition – Unclear contribution from the Recovery and Resilience Facility’, and special report 22/2024 of the ECA of 21 October 2024 entitled ‘Double funding from the EU budget – Control systems lack essential elements to mitigate the increased risk resulting from the RRF model of financing not linked to costs’,

    – having regard to the study of December 2023 supporting the mid-term Evaluation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility,

    – having regard to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) 2024 annual report published on 3 March 2025,

    – having regard to the report of September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (Draghi report),

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 8 October 2024 entitled ‘Mid-term review of the post-COVID European recovery plan (Recovery and Resilience Facility)’[11],

    – having regard to the information published on the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard (RRF Scoreboard),

    – having regard to the Commission staff working document of 20 November 2024 entitled ‘NGEU Green Bonds Allocation and Impact report 2024’ (SWD(2024)0275),

    – having regard to its in-house research, in-depth analysis and briefings related to the implementation of the RRF[12],

    – having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation in Hungary and frozen EU funds[13],

    – having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

    – having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety and the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    – having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs under Rule 59 of the Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0098/2025),

     

    A. whereas the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) was created to make European economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and better prepared in the light of unprecedented crises in 2019 and 2022, by supporting Member States in financing strategic investments and in implementing reforms;

    B. whereas reforms and investments under the RRF help to make the EU more resilient and less dependent by diversifying key supply chains and thereby strengthening the strategic autonomy of the EU; whereas reforms and investments under the RRF also generate European added value;

    C. whereas the RRF, as well as other EU funds, such as the European instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency, has helped to protect labour markets from the risk of long-term damage caused by the double economic shock of the pandemic and the energy crisis;

    D. whereas RRF expenditure falls outside the ceilings of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) and borrowing proceeds constitute external assigned revenue; whereas Parliament regrets that they do not form part of the budgetary procedure; whereas based on the Financial Regulation’s principle of transparency, citizens should know how and for what purpose funds are spent by the EU;

    E. whereas, due to the lack of progress in introducing new own resources in the EU and the need to ensure the sustainability of the EU’s repayment plan, a clear and reliable long-term funding strategy is essential to meet repayment obligations without forcing difficult trade-offs in the EU budget that could undermine future investments and policy priorities; whereas further discussions and concrete financial solutions will be necessary to secure the long-term viability of the EU’s debt repayment plan;

    F. whereas the borrowing costs for NextGenerationEU (NGEU) have to be borne by the EU budget and the actual costs exceed the 2020 projections by far as a result of the high interest rates; whereas the total costs for NGEU capital interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget; whereas Parliament has insisted that the refinancing costs be placed over and above the MFF ceilings; whereas a three-step ‘cascade mechanism’ including a new special EURI instrument was introduced during the 2024 MFF revision to cover the significant cost overruns resulting from NGEU borrowing linked to major changes in the market conditions; whereas an agreement was reached during the 2025 budgetary procedure to follow an annual 50/50 benchmark, namely to finance the overrun costs in equal shares by the special EURI instrument de-commitment compartment and the Flexibility Instrument;

    G. whereas the bonds issued to finance the RRF are to be repaid in a manner that ensures the steady and predictable reduction of liabilities, by 2058 at the latest; whereas the Council has yet to adopt the adjusted basket of new own resources proposed by the Commission, which raises concerns about the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU;

    H. whereas the social dimension is a key aspect of the RRF, contributing to upward economic and social convergence, restoring and promoting sustainable growth and fostering the creation of high-quality employment;

    I. whereas the RRF should contribute to financing measures to strengthen the Member States’ resilience to climate disasters, among other things, and enhance climate adaptation; whereas the Member States should conduct proper impact assessments for measures and should share best practice on the implementation of the ‘do no significant harm’ (DNSH) principle;

    J. whereas the RRF plays an important role in supporting investments and reforms in sustainable mobility, smart transport infrastructure, alternative fuels and digital mobility solutions, thus enhancing connectivity and efficiency across the EU; whereas it is regrettable that only a few Member States chose to use the RRF to support investments, particularly in high-speed railway and waterway infrastructure, aimed at developing European corridors, despite the encouragement of cross-border and multi-country projects; whereas it is crucial to increase investments in transport infrastructure, particularly in underserved regions, to improve connectivity, support regional cohesion and contribute to the green transition;

    K. whereas by 31 December 2024, Member States had submitted 95 payment requests and the level of RRF disbursements including pre-financing stood at EUR 197.46 billion in grants (55 % of the total grants envelope) and EUR 108.68 billion in loans (37 % of the total loans envelope); whereas three Member States have already received their fifth payment, while one Member State has not received any RRF funding; whereas all Member States have revised their national recovery and resilience plans (NRRP) at least once; whereas 28 % of milestones and targets have been satisfactorily fulfilled and the Commission has made use of the possibility to partially suspend payments where some milestones and targets linked to a payment request were not found to be satisfactorily fulfilled; whereas delays in the execution of planned reforms and investments, particularly in social infrastructure and public services, could lead to the underutilisation of available resources, thereby reducing the expected impact on economic growth, employment and social cohesion;

    L. whereas the ECA has revealed various shortcomings of the RRF, in particular in relation to its design, its transparency and reporting, the risk of double funding and the implementation of twin transition measures;

    M. whereas robust audit and control systems are crucial to protect the financial interests of the EU throughout the life cycle of the RRF; whereas the milestones commonly known as ‘super milestones’, in particular related to the rule of law, had to be fulfilled prior to any RRF disbursements;

    N. whereas the RRF Regulation refers to the RRF’s ‘performance-based nature’ but does not define ‘performance’; whereas RRF performance should be linked to sound financial management principles and should measure how well an EU-funded action, project or programme has met its objectives and provided value for money;

    O. whereas effective democratic control and parliamentary scrutiny over the implementation of the RRF require the full involvement of Parliament and the consideration of all its recommendations at all stages;

    P. whereas the Commission has to provide an independent ex post evaluation report on the implementation of the RRF by 31 December 2028, consisting of an assessment of the extent to which the objectives have been achieved, of the efficiency of the use of resources and of the European added value, as well as a global assessment of the RRF, and containing information on its impact in the long term;

    Q. whereas the purpose of this report is to monitor the implementation of the RRF, in accordance with Parliament’s role as laid down in the RRF Regulation, by pointing to the benefits and shortcomings of the RRF, while drawing on the lessons learnt during its implementation;

    Strengthening Europe’s social and economic resilience

     

    1. Highlights the fact that the RRF is an unprecedented instrument of solidarity in the light of two unprecedented crises and a cornerstone of the NGEU instrument, ending in 2026; emphasises the importance of drawing lessons from its implementation for the upcoming MFF, including as regards transparency, reporting and coherent measurement of deliverables; highlights the stabilising effect of the RRF for Member States at a time of great economic uncertainty, as it mitigates negative economic and social consequences and supports governments by contributing to the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, by promoting economic recovery and competitiveness, boosting resilience and innovation, and by supporting the green and digital transitions;

    2. Highlights the important role of the RRF in preventing the fragmentation of the internal market and the further deepening of macroeconomic divergence, in fostering social and territorial cohesion by providing macroeconomic stabilisation, and in offering assurance to the financial markets by improving investor confidence in turbulent times, thereby lowering yield spreads;

    3. Welcomes the fact that the RRF is a one-off instrument providing additional fiscal space that has contributed to the prevention of considerable economic and social divergences between Member States with diverse fiscal space; highlights the Commission finding that the RRF has led to a sustained increase in investments across the EU and that the Commission expects the RRF to have a lasting impact across the EU beyond 2026, given its synergies with other EU funds; is, however, concerned that the RRF expiration in 2026 poses a significant risk of a substantial decline in public investment in common European priorities;

    4. Recalls that the MFF and RRF combined amount to almost EUR 2 trillion for the 2021-2027 programming period, but points to the fact that the high inflation rates and the associated increases in the cost of goods and services have decreased the current value of European spending agreed in nominal terms;

    5. Takes note of the Commission’s projection in 2024 concerning the potential of NGEU’s impact on the EU’s real gross domestic product (GDP) by 2026, which is significantly lower than its simulation in 2020 (1.4 % compared with 2.3 %), due in part to adverse economic and geopolitical conditions, and of the estimation that NGEU could lead to a sizeable, short-run increase in EU employment by up to 0.8 %; notes that the  long-term benefits of the RRF on GDP will likely exceed the budgetary commitments undertaken by up to three to six times , depending on the productivity effects of RRF investment and the diligent implementation of reforms and investments;

    6. Highlights the difficulty of quantifying the precise social and economic impact of the RRF, as it takes time for the impact of reforms and investments to become clear; stresses the need for further independent evaluations to assess the effective impact of reforms and investments and for further improvements of the underlying methodology; notes the Commission’s finding that approximately half of the expected increase in public investment between 2019 and 2025 is related to investment financed by the EU budget, particularly by the RRF, but notes that some investments have not yet delivered measurable impact;

    7. Notes that the RRF has incentivised the implementation of some reforms included in the country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester through the inclusion of such reforms in the NRRPs; underlines that there has been a qualitative leap forward in terms of monitoring RRF implementation; recalls that the RRF Scoreboard is used to monitor the progress made towards achieving milestones and targets, as well as compliance with horizontal principles, and in particular the six pillars, namely the green transition, the digital transformation, smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (including economic cohesion, jobs, productivity, competitiveness, research, development and innovation, and a well-functioning internal market with strong small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)), social and territorial cohesion, health, economic, social and institutional resilience with the aim of, inter alia, increasing crisis preparedness and crisis response capacity, and policies for the next generation, children and young people, such as education and skills; highlights that the overall uptake of country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester remains low and has even dropped;

    8. Highlights that in the context of the new economic governance framework, the set of reforms and investments underpinning an extension of the adjustment period should be consistent with the commitments included in the approved NRRPs during the period of operation of the RRF and the Partnership Agreement under the Common Provisions Regulation[14]; observes that the five Member States that requested an extension of the adjustment period by 31 December 2024 relied partly on the reforms and investments already approved under the RRF to justify the extension; takes note of the fact that most Member States have included information on whether the reforms and investments listed in the medium-term fiscal-structural plans are linked to the RRF;

    9. Welcomes the fact that the RRF provides support for both reforms and investments in the Member States, but notes with concern that the short timeframe for the remaining RRF implementation poses challenges to the completion of key reforms and large-scale investments that are to be finalised towards the end of the RRF and to the timely fulfilment of the 70 % of milestones and targets that are still pending;

    10. Recalls that RRF expenditure should not substitute recurring national budgetary expenditure, unless duly justified, and should respect the principle of additionality of EU funding; insists that the firm, sustainable and verifiable implementation of non-recurrence, together with the targeting of clearly defined European objectives of reforms and investments, is key to ensure additionality and the long-lasting effect of additional European funds; recalls the need to uphold this principle and appeals against the crowding out or replacement of cohesion policy by the RRF or other temporary instruments, as cohesion policy remains essential for long-term sustainable territorial cohesion and convergence;

    11. Highlights that prioritising RRF implementation, the lack of administrative capacity in many Member States and challenges posed by global supply chains have contributed to the delayed implementation of cohesion policy; calls on the Commission, in this context, to provide a comprehensive assessment of the RRF’s impact on other financial instruments and public investments, technical support, and the administrative and absorption capacities of the Member States;

    12. Recalls that, in reaction to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the REPowerEU revision contributes to Europe’s energy security by reducing its dependence on fossil fuels, diversifying its energy supplies, investing in European resources and infrastructure, tackling energy poverty and investing in energy savings and efficiency in all sectors, including transport; emphasises that through REPowerEU, an additional EUR 20 billion in grants was made available in 2023, including EUR 8 billion generated from the front-loading of Emissions Trading System allowances and EUR 12 billion from the Innovation Fund; highlights Parliament’s successes in negotiations, in particular on the provisions on replenishing the Innovation Fund, the 30 % funding target for cross-border projects, the focus of investments on tackling energy poverty for vulnerable households, SMEs and micro-enterprises, and the flexible use of unspent cohesion funds from the 2014-2020 MFF and of up to 7.5 % of national allocations under the 2021-2027 MFF;

    13. Recalls its call to focus RRF interventions on measures with European added value and therefore regrets the shortage of viable cross-border or multi-country measures, including high-speed railway and sustainable mobility infrastructure projects for dual use that are essential for completing the TEN-T network, and the related risk of re-nationalising funding; notes that the broad scope of the RRF objectives has contributed to this by allowing a wide variety of nationally focused projects to fall within its remit;

    14. Highlights the modification of Article 27 of the RRF Regulation through REPowerEU, which significantly strengthened the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of the RRF by encouraging the Member States to amend their NRRPs to add RepowerEU chapters, including a spending target of at least 30 % for such measures in order to guarantee the EU’s energy autonomy; is concerned by the broad interpretation adopted by the Commission, which allows any reduction in (national) energy demand to make a case for a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    15. Welcomes the possibility of using RRF funding to contribute to the objectives of the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP) by supporting investments in critical technologies in the EU in order to boost its industrial competitiveness; notes that no Member State has made use of the possibility to include in its NRRP an additional cash contribution to STEP objectives via the Member State compartment of InvestEU; recalls that Member States can still amend their national plans in that regard; expects the revision processes to be efficient, streamlined and simple, especially considering the final deadline of 2026, the current geopolitical context and the need to invest in European defence capabilities;

    16. Recalls the application of the DNSH principle for all reforms and investments supported by the RRF, with a targeted derogation under REPowerEU for energy infrastructure and facilities needed to meet immediate security of supply needs; encourages the Commission to assess the feasibility of a more uniform interpretation of the DNSH principle between the RRF and the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities, while taking into account the specificities of the RRF as a public expenditure programme;

    Financial aspects of the RRF

     

    17. Stresses that the RRF is the first major performance-based instrument at EU level which is exclusively based on financing not linked to costs (FNLC); recalls that Article 8 of the RRF Regulation stipulates that the RRF must be implemented by the Commission in direct management in accordance with the relevant rules adopted pursuant to Article 322 TFEU, in particular the Financial Regulation and the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation; regrets that the Council did not agree to insert specific rules in the Financial Regulation to address the risks of this delivery model, such as double funding; considers that the rules of the Financial Regulation should be fully applicable to future instruments based on FNLC, including as regards fines, penalties and sanctions;

    18. Notes that only 13 Member States have requested loans and that EUR 92 billion of the EUR 385.8 billion available will remain unused since this amount was not committed by the deadline of 31 December 2023; takes note of the fact that loans were attractive for Member States that faced higher borrowing costs on the financial markets or that sought to compensate for a reduction in RRF grants; points out that some Member States have made limited use of RRF loans, either due to strong fiscal positions or administrative considerations; calls on the Commission to analyse the reasons for the low uptake in some Member States and to consider these findings when designing future EU financial instruments; notes with concern that national financial instruments to implement the NRRPs have not been sufficiently publicised, leading to limited awareness and uptake by potential beneficiaries; considers that a political discussion is needed on the use of unspent funds in the light of tight public budgets and urgent EU strategic priorities; calls for an assessment of how and under which conditions unused RRF funds could be redirected to boost Europe’s competitiveness, resilience, defence, and social, economic and territorial cohesion, particularly through investments in digital and green technologies aligned with the RRF’s original purpose;

    19. Recalls the legal obligation to ensure full repayment of NGEU expenditure by 31 December 2058 at the latest; reminds the Council and the Commission of their legal commitment under the interinstitutional agreement concluded in 2020 to ensure a viable path to refinancing NGEU debt, including through sufficient proceeds from new own resources introduced after 2021 without any undue reduction in programme expenditure or investment instruments under the MFF; deplores the lack of progress made in this regard, which raises concerns regarding the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU, and urges the Council to adopt new own resources without delay and as a matter of urgency; urges the Commission, furthermore, to continue efforts to identify additional genuine new own resources beyond the IIA and linked to EU policies, in order to cover the high spending needs associated with the funding of new priorities and the repayment of NGEU debt;

    20. Notes with concern the Commission’s estimation that the total cost for NGEU capital interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget ; recalls that recourse to special instruments had to be made in the last three budgetary procedures to cover EURI instrument costs; highlights that the significant increase in financing costs puts pressure on the future EU budget and limits the capacity to respond to future challenges;

    21. Takes note of the Commission’s target to fund up to 30 % of NGEU costs by issuing greens bonds; notes that by 31 December 2024 the Commission had issued European green bonds amounting to EUR 68.2 billion;

    Design and implementation of NRRPs

     

    22. Notes that 47 % of the available RRF funds had been disbursed by 31 December 2024, with grants reaching 55 % and loans 37 %, which has resulted in a high proportion of measures still to be completed in 2025 and 2026; is concerned, however, about the ECA’s finding that only 50 % of disbursed funds had reached final beneficiaries in 15 out of 22 Member States by October 2023; calls on the Commission to take the recommendations of the ECA duly into account in order to improve the functioning of any future performance-based instruments similar to the RRF, in particular in the context of a more targeted MFF;

    23. Welcomes the fact that all Member States have surpassed the targets for the green (37 %) and the digital transitions (20 %), with average expenditure towards climate and digital objectives of the RRF as a whole standing at 42 % and 26 % respectively; notes that the ECA has cast doubt on how the implementation of RRF measures has contributed to the green transition and has recommended improvements to the methodologies used to estimate the impact of climate-related measures; highlights the fact that the same methodological deficiencies exist across all pillars of the RRF;

    24. Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on social objectives, with Member States planning to spend around EUR 163 billion; underlines that such spending must be result-oriented, ensuring measurable economic and/or social benefits; stresses the need to accelerate investments in the development of rural, peripheral and outermost, isolated and remote areas, and in the fields of affordable housing, social protection and the integration of vulnerable groups, and youth employment, where expenditure is lagging behind; calls for an in-depth evaluation by the Commission, under the RRF Scoreboard, of the projects and reforms related to education and young people implemented by Member States under the RRF; regrets the delayed implementation of health objectives observed in certain Member States, given that the instrument should also improve the accessibility and capacity of health systems, and of key social infrastructure investments, including early childhood education and care facilities; stresses that these delays, in some cases linked to shifting budgetary priorities and revised national implementation timelines, risk undermining the achievement of the RRF’s social cohesion objectives;

    25. Reiterates its negotiating position to include targets for education (10 %) and for cultural activities (2 %); encourages the Commission’s effort to evaluate these targets as a benchmark in its assessment of education policy in NRRPs, through the RRF Scoreboard;

    26. Observes that a large majority of NRRPs include a specific section explaining how the plan addresses gender-related concerns and challenges; is concerned, however, that some NRRPs do not include an explanation of how the measures in the NRRP are expected to contribute to gender equality and equal opportunities for all and calls on the Member States concerned to add such explanations without delay;

    27. Stresses the importance of reforms focusing on labour market fragmentation, fostering quality working conditions, addressing wage level inequalities, ensuring decent living conditions, and strengthening social dialogue, social protection and the social economy;

    28. Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on the digital transformation objective, with EUR 166 billion allocated to corresponding plans; welcomes the contributions made under the smart, sustainable and inclusive growth pillar, in particular to competitiveness and support for SMEs; notes the need for an acceleration of investments in transnational cooperation, support for competitive enterprises leading innovation projects, and regulatory changes for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, which are lagging behind;

    29. Stresses that the success of EU investments depends on well-functioning capital markets; calls on the Member States to ensure a more effective and timely disbursement of funds, particularly for SMEs and young entrepreneurs, to streamline application procedures with a view to enhancing accessibility and to implement specific measures to provide targeted support to help them play a more prominent role in the process of smart and inclusive growth;

    30. Is concerned that the achievement of milestones and targets lags behind the indicative timetable provided in the NRRPs, and that the pace of progress is uneven across Member States; regrets the time lag between the fulfilment of milestones and targets and the implementation of projects; highlights that the RRF will only achieve its long-term and short-term potential if the reform and investment components, respectively, are properly implemented; welcomes the fact that, following a slow start, RRF implementation has picked up since the second half of 2023 but significant delays affecting key reforms and investments still persist and have been attributed to various factors, including the revisions linked to the inclusion of REPowerEU, mounting inflation, the insufficient administrative capacity of Member States, in particular the smaller Member States, uncertainties regarding specific RRF implementation rules, high energy costs, supply shortages and an underestimation of the time needed to implement measures; notes that the postponement of key implementation deadlines by some governments to 2026 raises concerns about the capacity of some Member States to fully absorb the allocated funds within the set timeframe of the RRF; stresses the importance of maintaining a realistic and effective implementation schedule to prevent the risk of incomplete projects and missed opportunities for structural improvements; calls on the Commission to ensure that administrative bottlenecks are urgently addressed;

    31. Recalls the modification of the RRF Regulation through the inclusion of the REPowerEU chapter; stresses the importance of the REPowerEU chapters in NRRPs and calls on the Member States to prioritise mature projects and implement their NRRPs more quickly, both in terms of reforms and investments, and, where necessary, to adjust NRRPs in line with the RRF’s objectives, without undermining the overall balance and level of ambition of the NRRPs, in order to respond to challenges stemming from geopolitical events and to tackle current realities on the ground;

    32. Highlights the fact that the RRF could have helped to mitigate the effects of the current EU-wide housing crisis; regrets that some Member States did not make use of this opportunity and stresses the importance for the Member States to accelerate investments in availability and affordability of housing;

    33. Highlights the role of ‘super milestones’ in protecting the EU’s financial interests against rule of law deficiencies and in ensuring the full implementation of the requirements under Article 22 of the RRF Regulation; welcomes the fact that all but one Member State have satisfactorily fulfilled their ‘super milestones’; recalls that the Commission must recover any pre-financing that has not been netted against regular payment requests by the end of the RRF;

    34. Notes the high administrative burden and complexity brought by the RRF; stresses the considerable efforts required at national level to implement the RRF in parallel with structural funds; notes that between 2021 and 2024 the demand-driven Technical Support Instrument supported more than 500 RRF-related reforms in the Member States, directly or indirectly related to the preparation, amendment, revision and implementation of the NRRPs; takes note of the Commission guidance of July 2024 with simplifications and clarifications to streamline RRF implementation but expects the Commission to act swiftly on its promise to cut the administrative burden by 25 %; urges the Commission to give clear and targeted technical support to the Member States, allowing them to develop efficient administrative capacity to implement the milestones and targets; calls on the Commission to decrease the level of complexity of EU public procurement rules which apply to higher-value contracts;

    35. Expresses concern over the complexity of application procedures for RRF funding, particularly for SMEs and non-governmental organisations, which require external consultancy services even for small grants; emphasises that such bureaucratic obstacles contradict the original objectives of the RRF, which aimed to provide rapid and direct financial support; calls for an urgent simplification of application and reporting requirements, particularly for smaller beneficiaries, to maximise the absorption and impact of funds and to assist with their contribution to the green and digital transitions;

    36. Believes that implementation delays underscore the risk that measures for which RRF funding has been paid will not be completed by the 2026 payment deadline; welcomes the Commission’s statement at the Recovery and Resilience Dialogue (RRD) of 16 September 2024 that it will not reimburse non-implemented projects; considers it a shortcoming that RRF funds paid for milestones and targets assessed as fulfilled cannot be recovered if related measures are not eventually completed; encourages the Commission to take into account the ECA’s recommendations related to this and to assess, in cooperation with the Member States, the measures most at risk of not being completed by 31 August 2026; stresses the importance of monitoring these measures, facilitating timely follow-up and working towards solutions to overcome delays;

    37. Notes with concern that the remaining implementation timeframe of the RRF is too short for the implementation of many innovative projects; further notes that innovative projects, by definition, are more difficult to plan and more likely to encounter obstacles during implementation, making them unsuited to the RRF’s strict deadlines; urges the Commission to create future programmes that are flexible enough to give proper answers in changing circumstances and that at the same time guarantee a certain degree of predictability;

    38. Notes that some milestones and targets may be no longer achievable because of objective circumstances; stresses that any NRRP revisions should be made in accordance with the RRF Regulation, including the applicable deadlines, and should not entail backtracking on reforms, commitments or lower quality projects but should maintain the overall ambition and the efficiency of public spending;

    39. Is concerned about the Commission’s uneven assessment of NRRPs, which has led to double standards in the application of the Regulation; is further concerned about the uneven and different definition of milestones and targets from one NRRP to the other, as consistently reported by the ECA;

    40. Highlights that the duration of the Commission’s assessment of payment requests by Member States differs considerably among the Member States and stresses the need for more transparency from the Commission; urges the Commission to accelerate its assessments and to ensure the equal treatment of the Member States; highlights the need to ensure a level playing field across the EU for measures and indicators that are used to assess all RRF projects;

    41. Urges the Member States to increase their efforts to address administrative bottlenecks and provide sufficient administrative capacity to accelerate RRF implementation in view of the 2026 deadline and to avoid concentrating RRF projects in more developed regions and capitals by enabling RRF funds to flow into projects in the most vulnerable regions, thereby serving the RRF’s objective to enhance the EU’s social, territorial and economic cohesion; emphasises the importance of fair regional distribution within the NRRPs while ensuring that RRF funds are allocated based on economic and social impact, feasibility and long-term benefits;

    42. Calls for an 18-month extension of mature RRF projects through an amendment of the RRF Regulation by co-decision, if needed; emphasises that the envisaged extension of projects will be conducted by the Commission based on objective, clear and fair benchmarks; welcomes the possibility of establishing a targeted and performance-based prioritisation and transfer system after the 2026 deadline in order to allow for the finalisation of ongoing projects through other funding schemes, including the European Investment Fund and a possible new European competitiveness fund; urges the Commission to present a strategy to address the huge demand for public investment beyond 2026 without compromising budgetary resources in other critical areas;

    43. Calls for an evaluation of how this framework could enable targeted investments in EU defence supply chains, strategic stockpiles and defence innovation, ensuring alignment with broader European security objectives;

    44. Is concerned that some Member States might choose to forego parts of the amounts or entire amounts associated with their last payment request, thus avoiding the fulfilment of the last milestones and targets;

    Transparency, monitoring and control

     

    45. Takes note of the fact that the Commission had planned to conduct 112 RRF audits in all Member States in 2024; reminds the Commission of its obligation, in accordance with Article 24(3) of the RRF Regulation, to recover funding in case of incorrect disbursements or reversals of measures;

    46. Notes that the Commission relies on its own methodologies when calculating partial payments and suspensions of funds; regrets that these methodologies were only developed two years after the start of the RRF implementation and without the consultation of Parliament;

    47. Welcomes the extensive work of the ECA in relation to the RRF and deems it important to thoroughly assess its findings, in particular its findings that milestones and targets are often rather vague and output-oriented and are therefore not fit to measure results and impacts, and its findings regarding the risks of double funding resulting from overlaps with other policies; notes that the Commission has accepted many but not all of the ECA’s recommendations; stresses that weaknesses in financial controls, as highlighted by the ECA, must be urgently addressed to prevent double funding, cost inefficiencies, and mismanagement of EU funds; calls for enhanced transparency and for the full consideration of the ECA’s recommendations without adding unnecessary administrative burden;

    48. Notes that the ECA’s audits revealed several cases in which funding had been disbursed but the requirements related to the fulfilment of corresponding milestones and targets had not been adequately met; further notes that the Commission framework for assessing the ‘satisfactory fulfilment’ of the relevant milestones and targets contains discretionary elements, such as ‘minimal deviation from a requirement’ or ‘proportional delays’, and that the methodology for the determination of partial payments does not provide an explanation for the values chosen as coefficients, thereby leaving room for interpretation; asks the Commission to provide Parliament with further clarification;

    49. Insists that, as a rule, measures already included in other national plans benefiting from EU funding (e.g. cohesion, agriculture, etc.) should not be included in NRRPs, even if they do not incur any costs; urges the Commission to remain vigilant and proactive in identifying any potential situation of double funding in particular in regard to the different implementation models of the RRF and other EU funding instruments;

    50. Regrets the lack of a proper RRF audit trail and the persistent lack of transparency despite the bi-annual reporting requirement for Member States on the 100 largest final recipients, which was introduced into REPowerEU upon Parliament’s request; regrets the delays in reporting by some Member States and the limited informative value of the information provided, which ultimately prevents compliance checks by the Commission or the ECA; reiterates its call for the lists of the largest final recipients for each Member State to be regularly updated and published on the RRF Scoreboard and to include information on the economic operators involved, including contractors and sub-contractors, and their beneficial owners, and not simply ministries or other government bodies or state companies; further regrets that the current definition of ‘final recipient’ leaves room for interpretation, resulting in different final beneficiaries for similar measures among Member States; calls on the Commission, in this context, to ensure a common understanding of what constitutes a ‘final recipient’ so that this can be applied consistently;

    51. Is concerned about persistent weaknesses in national reporting and control mechanisms, due in part to absorption pressure affecting the capacity to detect ineligible expenditure and due to the complexity of the audit and control procedures, which created uncertainty in the Member States and an overload of administrative procedures; calls on the Commission to provide assurance on whether Member States’ control systems function adequately and to check the compliance of RRF-funded investment projects with EU and national rules; calls for payments to be reduced and, where appropriate, amounts to be recovered in accordance with Article 22 of the RRF Regulation, should weaknesses persist in the national control systems; regrets the reliance on manual cross-checks and self-declarations by recipients of EU funds in the absence of interoperable IT tools and harmonised standards, despite the existence of tools such as the Early Detection and Exclusion System and ARACHNE, whose use is currently not mandatory, thereby risking that expenditure is declared twice; recalls, in this regard, the reluctance of the Member States to make progress in developing the relevant IT tools in a timely manner;

    52. Shares the view of the ECA that the FNLC model does not preclude reporting on actual costs; notes that having clear insights on costs also facilitates the work of control and oversight bodies, as well as the EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), and enables enhanced public scrutiny;

    53. Reiterates the role of the RRF Scoreboard in providing information for citizens on the overall progress in the implementation of NRRPs; underlines the importance of the Scoreboard in strengthening transparency and calls on the Commission to increase the level of transparency and data visualisation in the Scoreboard;

    54. Recalls that the reporting on the progress of implementation in the RRF Scoreboard is based on information provided by the Member States on a bi-annual basis;

    55. Highlights the important role of the EPPO and OLAF in protecting the EU’s financial interests; welcomes the fact that EPPO investigations into RRF-related fraud and corruption cases have led to several arrests, indictments and seizures of RRF funds; recalls that the EPPO was handling 307 active cases related to the RRF in 2024, corresponding to about 17 % of all expenditure fraud investigations and causing an estimated damage to the EU’s financial interests of EUR 2.8 billion; expects the number of investigations to grow as RRF implementation advances; calls on the Commission to look into the management declarations of the Member States in terms of their reporting of detected fraud and the remedial measures taken;

    Role of the European Parliament

     

    56. Reiterates the importance of Parliament’s role in scrutinising and monitoring the implementation of the RRF and in holding the Commission accountable; highlights Parliament’s input provided through various channels, in particular through various plenary debates, parliamentary resolutions, bi-monthly RRD meetings with the responsible Commissioners, over 30 meetings of the standing working group on the scrutiny of the RRF, numerous parliamentary questions, the annual discharge procedure of the Commission and the regular flow of information and ad hoc requests for information from the Commission; regrets that the model of using milestones and targets to trigger disbursement was not accompanied by adequate budgetary control mechanisms, resulting in a diminished role for Parliament compared to its scrutiny of MFF spending;

    57. Recalls Parliament’s rights as laid down in Article 25 of the RRF Regulation, in particular the right to simultaneously receive from the Commission information that it transmits to the Council or any of its preparatory bodies in the context of the RRF Regulation or its implementation, as well as an overview of its preliminary findings concerning the satisfactory fulfilment of the relevant milestones and targets included in the NRRPs; encourages the sharing of relevant outcomes of discussions held in Council preparatory bodies with the competent parliamentary committees;

    58. Recalls further the right of Parliament’s competent committees to invite the Commission to provide information on the state of play of the assessment of the NRRPs in the context of the RRD meetings;

    59. Regrets the fact that Parliament has no role in the design of NRRPs and is not consulted on payment requests; criticises furthermore the fact that Parliament has not been provided with a clear and traceable overview of the implementation status of projects and payments; expects to be informed about the context of NRRP revisions in order to make its own assessment of the revisions and to have an enhanced role in possible future instruments based on the RRF experience;

    Stakeholder involvement

    60. Regrets the insufficient involvement of local and regional authorities (LRAs), civil society organisations, social partners, national parliaments and other relevant stakeholders in the design, revision or implementation of NRRPs leading to worse policy outcomes, as well as limited ownership; regrets that in the design and implementation of the NRRPs, some Member States have clearly favoured some LRAs or stakeholders to the detriment of others; recalls that the participation of LRAs, national authorities and those responsible for developing these policies is crucial for the success of the RRF, as stated in Article 28 of the RRF Regulation; recalls that Parliament supported a binding provision in the RRF to establish a multilevel dialogue to engage relevant stakeholders and discuss the preparation and implementation of NRRPs with them, with a clear consultation period; calls, therefore, for the maximum possible stakeholder involvement in the implementation of NRRPs, in accordance with the national legal framework and based on clear and transparent principles;

    61. Reiterates the need for regular interaction between national coordinating authorities and national stakeholders involved in the monitoring of the implementation of the NRRPs, in line with the principle of transparency and accountability; stresses that more regular and public communication from the national coordinating authorities is needed to ensure that updated information about the progress of the implementation of NRRPs is made available;

    62. Stresses that decisions should be made at the level that is most appropriate; is convinced that the application of the partnership principle and a stronger involvement of LRAs could make project implementation more efficient, reduce disparities within Member States and result in more and better quality measures with a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    63. Believes that valuable lessons can be drawn from the RRF to be reflected in the design of performance-based instruments in the next MFF, in particular in the light of the EU’s competitiveness and simplification agendas;

    Lessons for the future

    64. Believes that the combination of reforms and investments has proved successful but that a clearer link is needed between the two; highlights the importance of aligning any funding with the objectives of the instrument and disbursing it in line with the progress made towards them; insists that the level of ambition of NRRPs should not be lowered but should be commensurate with the RRF timeline to ensure their successful implementation;

    65. Is convinced, as highlighted by the Draghi report, that boosting EU competitiveness, decarbonising the EU’s economy and making it more circular and resource-efficient, as well as closing the skills gap, creating quality jobs and enhancing the EU’s innovation capacity, will be central priorities beyond 2026; is concerned that a sizeable funding gap will arise after the RRF ceases to operate at the end of 2026, notably for public investment in common European priorities, since financial resources from national budgets vary significantly among Member States; highlights the need to use the lessons learned from the RRF to better leverage public and private investments with a view to addressing the financing gap in European objectives and transitions, which the Draghi report estimates at over EUR 800 billion annually, while ensuring seamless continuity of investments in common European goods;

    66. Welcomes the enhanced use of financial instruments made possible by the option to channel RRF funds towards the Member States’ compartment of InvestEU;

    67. Urges the Commission to apply the lessons learned and the ECA’s observations, and to ensure that future performance-based instruments are well-targeted, aligned with the aim of financing European public goods and prioritising the addressing of clearly defined strategic challenges, economic sustainability and competitiveness; calls for it to be ensured that all future instruments are designed to measure not only inputs or short-term outputs and progress but also results in terms of long-term impacts backed by outcomes;

    68. Calls on the Commission to conduct an independent evaluation and to report on the RRF impact on private investments at aggregate EU level, in particular on its potential crowding-out effect on private investments and its determinants; calls further for objective and clear analyses from the Commission on how the implementation of reforms and investments within the NRRPs affects the economies of the individual Member States, with special regard to smart, sustainable and inclusive growth; urges the Commission to take the lessons learned from these analyses and from the ECA’s observations on the RRF implementation into account when drawing up its proposals for the next programming period;

    69. Underlines that all EU-funded investments and reforms should be coordinated and coherent with strategic planning at national level and should focus on projects with a clear European added value; underlines the need for a spending target for cross-border and multi-country investments; calls on the Commission to develop a credible methodology to assess the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of EU funded projects;

    70. Highlights that meaningful social and territorial dialogues with a high level of involvement of LRAs, social partners, civil society organisations and national parliaments within the national legal framework are essential for national ownership, successful implementation and democratic accountability; expresses concern over the insufficient involvement of all relevant stakeholders in the implementation and oversight of RRF-funded initiatives; stresses in particular that regions and city councils cannot be mere recipients of decisions, without being given the opportunity to have a say on reforms and investments that truly transform their territories;

    71. Believes that it is essential to adopt differentiated strategies that recognise the cultural diversity of the various regions and enhance their economic and social cohesion instead of applying a homogeneous or one-size-fits-all approach that could be to the detriment of the less developed regions; calls, therefore, for dialogues with stakeholders to be strengthened and more diligently employed as they could inspire future initiatives and mechanisms in the EU and its Member States;

    72. Underlines the requirement of the RRF Regulation to publicly display information about the origin of funding for projects funded by the EU to ensure buy-in from European citizens;

    73. Highlights that the RRD meetings have been an important tool in enhancing transparency and accountability, which are crucial for the optimal implementation of the RRF;

    74. Reiterates that further efforts are required to improve the transparency and traceability of the use of EU funds; stresses the need to ensure that data that is relevant for performance measurement is available and that information on performance is presented in a better and more transparent manner; stresses that the feedback mechanism between performance information and programme design or adjustment should be enhanced;

    75. Considers that better training and capacity-building across all regions and authorities involved, in particular at national level, could have accelerated the RRF’s implementation and enabled the implementing authorities to better adapt to the performance-based nature of the RRF; considers that the Commission could have assisted Member States more at the planning stage and provided earlier implementation guidance, in particular with a view to strengthening their audit and control systems and the cross-border dimension of the RRF;

    76. Highlights the importance of mitigating the risk of double funding; suggests the deployment of an integrated and interoperable IT and data mining system and the development of clear standards for datasets to be applied across Member States, with a view to allowing comprehensive and automated expenditure tracking; calls for improved coordination mechanisms that define clear responsibilities among the bodies involved in the implementation of the various EU and national programmes, while avoiding unnecessary bureaucratic complexity and ensuring an efficient allocation of funds; encourages the integration of advanced data analytics and AI tools to enhance performance tracking, evaluation and reporting to alleviate manual workload and to streamline reporting processes; underlines that such progress can only happen if there is also operational support to digitalise administrations;

    77. Strongly urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure that any type of EU FNLC or EU funding that is performance based complies with EU and national rules, ultimately protecting the financial interests of the EU; reiterates the accountability and responsibility of the Commission and the Member States to ensure the legality and the regularity of EU funding, as well as the respect of sound financial management principles;

    78. Considers that the role of Parliament in the monitoring of the RRF should be further enhanced;

    79. Calls for future performance-based instruments to have a single audit trail to trace budget contributions to the projects funded; underlines the need for project-level auditing to mitigate reputational risks in the eyes of the general public and to facilitate the recovery of funds in case measures are reversed; underlines the need to reduce administrative bottlenecks and burden;

    80. Demands that any possible future performance-based programmes make clearer links between the milestones and targets and the actual projects being implemented; stresses that there should be less of a delay between the fulfilment of milestones and the implementation of projects;

    81. Reiterates its call for an open platform which contains data on all projects, final recipients and the regional distribution of funding, thereby facilitating auditing and democratic oversight;

    82. Stresses that any possible future budgetary decisions on EU borrowing should respect the unity of the budget and Parliament’s role as part of the budgetary authority; highlights the risks of cost overruns for the repayment of debt, resulting inter alia from volatile interest rates; deems it important to ensure from the outset that sufficient funding is available to cover these costs without presenting a detriment to other programmes or political priorities;

    83. Invites the Commission and the Member States to closely assess and learn from instruments and tools such as the RRF, in order to maximise the efficiency and impact of EU funding, investments and reforms, streamline policy objectives, improve the collaboration of the institutions and stakeholders at national and European level, and increase national ownership;

    84. Notes the declared intention of the Commission to draw on the RRF experience when designing its proposals for the post-2027 EU funding programmes, due later this year; acknowledges that the independent ex post evaluation will come too late to feed into the process leading up to the next programming period, but expects the Commission and the co-legislators to take due account of the lessons learned from the RRF and of the recommendations of relevant stakeholders, in particular LRA, civil society organisations and social partners; believes that, as the EU plans for future economic resilience, there is also a need to further mobilise private investment, strengthen capital markets and ensure that public spending remains fiscally responsible and strategically targeted to make the EU more resilient and sovereign in an ever more conflictual geopolitical context;

    85. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Strategic importance of the Central Communication Port for military mobility and EU security – E-002096/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002096/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Michał Dworczyk (ECR)

    With work on updating the Action Plan on Military Mobility and the preparation of a new Multiannual Financial Framework ongoing, I would like to draw the Commission’s attention to the strategic importance of the Central Communication Port – a multimodal project designed as an element of dual-use infrastructure, which is vital both for civilian transport and for the rapid deployment of allied forces in crisis situations. The Central Communication Port is of transnational importance and is able to play a key role in ensuring the EU’s security, especially in light of its location on NATO’s eastern flank and the geopolitical situation following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Although the project has been significantly scaled back, fortunately, thanks to public pressure, it has not been completely abandoned, and there is still a possibility of adapting it to its original objectives.

    In light of the above:

    • 1.Does the Commission deem the Central Communication Port project to be important for military mobility and EU security, and will the Commission classify the project as a strategic infrastructure element in the updated Action Plan on Military Mobility?
    • 2.Does the Commission consider the Central Communication Port project to be eligible for support under the Connecting Europe Facility, in particular in the area of dual-use transport infrastructure?
    • 3.Is the Commission considering recognising the Central Communication Port as a project of common interest (PCI) or granting it EU support, given its importance for the EU’s resilience and preparedness in terms of military transport, as well as its ability to respond to threats on the eastern flank?

    Submitted: 26.5.2025

    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Commission White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030 – P-001284/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030[1] focuses on how the Union could best support Member States in filling their most urgent and critical conventional capability gaps.

    In this regard, it proposes actions and instruments to financially support Member States (in particular through the coordinated activation of the National escape clause under the Stability and Growth Pact, and the proposed new instrument Security Action for Europe — SAFE), increase the EU defence industrial readiness, including through simplification efforts, or work more closely with Ukraine and other partners.

    The Commission kindly notes that the questions submitted go beyond the scope of the White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030. They also fall outside the competences of the Commission. It is the prerogative of Member States to decide upon mobilisation of their armed forces, regardless of the framework in which to deploy them (North Atlantic Treaty Oganisation, EU, United Nations, coalition, national, etc.).

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025JC0120.
    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – A Europe ready for war by 2030 – P-001202/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The deterioration of the security context requires Member States to rapidly invest in defence, with a major impact on public finances. This exceptional situation, beyond Member State control, justifies Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)[1] as a legal basis, allowing the Council to adopt measures in crisis situations. Security Action for Europe (SAFE) is a new specific and temporary instrument in the form of a regulation.

    The role of the European Parliament is pivotal, and the Commissioner for Defence and Space is committed to regularly engage with the European Parliament.

    Defence is a Member States’ prerogative. The Commission has the economic and regulatory means to support them.

    SAFE loans are not expenditure arising from Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) operations with military or defence implications pursuant to Article 41(2) of the Treaty on European Union[2]. These loans are provided on the basis of Article 122 of the TFEU.

    The allocation of the EUR 150 billion loans to Member States for common procurements will be demand driven.

    Member States wishing to receive loans will have to submit a Defence Industry Investment Plan to the Commission. The plan will need to include the loan size and pre-financing, a description of the activities, expenditures and measures for which the loan is requested, and, where relevant, the foreseen benefits for Ukraine.

    Member States will report every six months on the progress. Where the Commission concludes that the report is unsatisfactory, the payment of all or part of the loan shall be suspended.

    The Commission will provide an annual report on the use of financial assistance to the European Parliament and the Council.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX%3A12008E122%3AEN%3AHTML.
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2008/art_41/oj/eng.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Al Jazeera – E-001439/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    To date, the EU has imposed restrictive measures in the broadcasting sector in the form of the broadcast or dissemination restrictions only in clearly defined circumstances, most notably in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, as set out in Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP[1] and Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014[2] concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine.

    The restrictions on the broadcasting and dissemination of content of certain media outlets (designated entities), including those under the control of the Russian Federation in this sanctions regime are justified by the designated outlets’ essential and instrumental role in systematically spreading disinformation and propaganda campaigns in support of that war of aggression, and by their permanent direct or indirect control by the leadership of the Russian Federation as justified in the relevant statement of reasons.

    Under the Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 any proposal to consider restrictive measures against a media outlet would need to be assessed in light of such criteria, namely substantial evidence of systemically spreading disinformation and propaganda and a demonstrable link to Russian state control.

    Any potential restrictive measures on media outlets operating within the jurisdiction of the EU would fall under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and require unanimous agreement by the Council.

    • [1] OJ L 229, 31.7.2014, p. 13-17.
    • [2] OJ L 229, 31.7.2014, p. 1-11.
    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Decisions on terrorist attacks in Kursk and Bryansk regions of the Russian Federation were made in Ukraine at the political level — Russian President

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Moscow, June 4 /Xinhua/ — The decisions on terrorist attacks in the Kursk and Bryansk regions of the Russian Federation were made in Ukraine at the political level, Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Wednesday.

    “The blowing up of railway tracks in the Bryansk and Kursk regions is, of course, a terrorist act. The decisions to commit such crimes were, of course, made in Ukraine at the political level,” V. Putin noted during a meeting with members of the government. The Russian President emphasized that what happened in Bryansk was a targeted attack on civilians aimed at disrupting the negotiation process.

    According to the Russian leader, Kiev’s “illegitimate regime is degenerating into a terrorist organization, and its sponsors are becoming accomplices of terrorists.” Ukraine “is trying to intimidate Russia with terrorist attacks” because “it is suffering huge losses and retreating along the entire front line,” the head of state said.

    V. Putin noted that Moscow is not surprised by Kyiv’s refusal to agree to a truce for humanitarian reasons for 2-3 days. According to him, “the Kyiv regime does not need peace at all,” since it would mean the loss of power.

    “Peace means the loss of power. And power for this regime, apparently, is more important than peace and the lives of people, whom they do not consider people at all,” the Russian president pointed out. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: V. Zelensky called the Russian memorandum with the terms of the ceasefire an ultimatum

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    KYIV, June 4 (Xinhua) — The document listing the terms of the ceasefire that Russia handed over to Ukraine on June 2 is not a memorandum of understanding, but an ultimatum, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said at a briefing on Wednesday, Interfax-Ukraine reported.

    According to him, in the memorandum, Moscow set out demands in an ultimatum form, the fulfillment of which is obviously impossible. First of all, we are talking about Russia’s territorial claims. V. Zelensky emphasized that these claims contradict the UN Charter, the Constitution of Ukraine and “common sense.”

    The Ukrainian leader added that the demand for the country’s neutrality is also unfulfillable.

    On June 2, the second round of peace talks between Ukraine and Russia since 2022 took place in Istanbul. At this meeting, Kyiv received a memorandum from Moscow on the terms of a ceasefire. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: G7 Foreign Ministers Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity

    Source: United States Department of State (3)

    Office of the Spokesperson

    G7 Foreign Ministers Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity

    Media Note

    March 14, 2025

    The text of the following statement was released by the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union.

    Begin Text:

    1. We, the Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, reaffirm the G7’s steadfast commitment to contribute towards a free, open, and secure maritime domain based on the rule of law that strengthens international security, fosters economic prosperity, and ensures the sustainable use of marine resources.
    2. Maritime security and prosperity are fundamental to global stability, economic resilience, and the well-being of all nations, and the conservation and sustainable use of ocean ecosystems is essential to all life on Earth. Over 80% of global trade is transported by sea, and 97% of global data flows through submarine cables. Disruptions to maritime routes pose a direct threat to international food security, critical minerals, energy security, global supply chains, and economic stability. We express deep concern over the growing risks to maritime security, including strategic contestation, threats to freedom of navigation and overflight, and illicit shipping activities. State behaviour in these areas has increased the risk of conflict and environmental damage, and imperils all nations’ prosperity and living standards, especially for the world’s poorest.
    3. We recognize the role of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the legal framework for governing all activities in the oceans and the seas.
    4. We recall the G7 Statements on Maritime Security adopted in Lübeck (2015) and Hiroshima (2016). We welcome related work presently underway through other G7 ministerial tracks and working groups, on a range of issues including securing undersea cable networks and combating abandoned fishing gear. We welcome, as well, G7 work relating to transnational organized crime and terrorism that touches on the maritime domain, including in relation to piracy and armed robbery at sea, trafficking in persons, and strengthening the maritime law enforcement capabilities of coastal states. We acknowledge the importance of regional maritime security frameworks, to support coastal states to address collectively threats to their maritime security. We welcome existing initiatives, such as the G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea (G7++ FoGG, that Canada chairs this year), which has been, the primary forum for dialogue among G7 members and partners on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.

    Emerging Threat on Safe Seas and Freedom of Navigation and Overflight

    1. Enhancing Stability: We underscore the importance of freedom of navigation and overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the high seas and the exclusive economic zones as well as to the related rights and freedoms in other maritime zones, including the rights of innocent passage, transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage, as provided for under international law. We share a growing concern at recent, unjustifiable efforts to restrict such freedom and to expand jurisdiction through use of force and other forms of coercion, including across the Taiwan Strait, and in the South China Sea, the Red Sea, and the Black Sea. We condemn China’s illicit, provocative, coercive and dangerous actions that seek unilaterally to alter the status quo in such a way as to risk undermining the stability of regions, including through land reclamations, and building of outposts, as well as their use for military purpose. In areas pending final delimitation, we underline the importance of coastal states refraining from unilateral actions that cause permanent physical change to the marine environment insofar as such actions jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement, as well as the importance of making every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature, in those areas. We condemn, as well, dangerous vessel maneuvers, the indiscriminate attacks against commercial vessels and other maritime actions that undermine maritime order based on the rule of law and international law. We reiterate that the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on 12 July 2016 is a significant milestone, which is legally binding upon the parties to those proceedings and a useful basis for peacefully resolving disputes between the parties. We reaffirm that our basic policies on Taiwan remain unchanged and emphasize the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as indispensable to international security and prosperity. We welcome the resumption of exports from Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. Freedom of navigation for commercial shipping in the Black Sea must be upheld.
    2. Attempts to Change the Status Quo by Force: We oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo, in particular by force or coercion including in the East and South China Seas. We undertake to implement means through which to track systematically and report on attempts to change the status quo by force and by the establishment of new geographical facts, including through coercive and dangerous actions on the oceans and seas that might threaten regional and international peace and security.
    3. Protecting Critical Maritime and Undersea Infrastructure: We are seized of the fact that vital energy and telecommunications infrastructure under the oceans and seas connects our economies and is vital to our prosperity. We recall the G7 Joint Statement on Cable Connectivity for Secure and Resilient Digital Communications Networks (2024) and the New York Joint Statement on the Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables in a Globally Digitalized World (2024). We share a growing concern that undersea communications cables, subsea interconnectors and other critical undersea infrastructure have been subject to critical damage through sabotage, poor seamanship or irresponsible behaviour which have resulted in potential internet or energy disruption in affected regions, delays in global data transmission, or compromised sensitive communications. We will enhance our cooperation with industry mitigate risks, reduce bottlenecks to operational tasks while strengthening repair capacities in order to improve the overall resilience of critical undersea and maritime infrastructure. In this respect, we welcome the EU Action Plan on Cable Security adopted in February 2025 by the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
    4. Maritime Crime: Maritime crime, including piracy, armed robbery at sea, maritime arms trafficking and sanctions evasion, human trafficking, illegal drug trafficking and Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, continues to impede maritime security, freedom of navigation, and our economy and prosperity. We have been working together to tackle these maritime crimes, but maritime illegal activities have extended into new areas, to become an urgent issue to be addressed. We welcome the G7 Action Plan to combat migrant smuggling adopted under Italy’s 2024 G7 Presidency.
    5. Protecting Freedom of Trade: In the past year, indiscriminate Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have endangered maritime security of vessels and their crews, disturbed international trade, and exposed neighboring countries to environmental hazards. Enabled by Iran’s military, financial, and intelligence support, these illegal attacks have also contributed to increased tension in the Middle East and Yemen, with severe repercussions on the intra-Yemeni peace process. The vessel “Galaxy Leader” seized by the Houthis must be released immediately. We appreciate the efforts of all those countries that have engaged to ensure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, protecting crucial shipping lanes and helping to restore regular flows of trade through the Suez Canal connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In this regard, we commend the efforts of EU’s maritime operation “Aspides” and U.S.-led operation “Prosperity Guardian”.

    Safe Shipping and Supply Chain Security

    1. Curtailing Unsafe and Illicit Shipping Practices: The rise of unsafe and illicit shipping practices, including fraudulent registration and registries, poses a significant threat to global trade and environmental sustainability. We are concerned that unsafe and illicit shipping imposes heavy costs on industry, governments and citizens. Russia’s ability to earn revenue has been sustained through its extensive effort to circumvent the G7+ oil price cap policy through its shadow fleet of often older, underinsured, and poorly maintained ships that routinely disable their automatic identification systems or engage in “spoofing” to avoid detection and circumvent international safety, environmental, and liability rules and standards. North Korea continues to pursue its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and evade sanctions, particularly through its illicit maritime activities, including prohibited ship to-ship transfers of petroleum and other UN-banned commodities. Through G7 coordination, we have exposed North Korea uses of “dark” vessels – those that engage in illicit activity – to circumvent United Nations Security Council mandated sanctions. Russia and North Korea are strengthening their economic relations including through maritime routes, such as the reported transfer of petroleum products from Russia to North Korea Unregulated, “dark” vessels undertake IUU fishing, destroying marine habitats and depleting fish stocks, with negative impacts for biodiversity and food security. Unregulated, inadequately insured “dark” vessels also pose a high risk of maritime accidents, including in fragile ecosystems such as the Arctic and Antarctic. We commit to strengthen our coordination, amongst the G7 and with other partners, to prevent the use of unregistered or fraudulently registered, uninsured and substandard vessels engaged in sanctions evasion, arms transfers, illegal fishing and illicit trade. We encourage relevant International Organizations to improve maritime domain awareness by expanding satellite-based vessel tracking and establishing comprehensive data records of the movement of individual ships and of ship-to-ship transfers, as a means of identifying and tracking illicit maritime activities. We are also committed to capacity building of the countries in the region in law enforcement and Maritime Domain Awareness.
    2. Shadow Fleet Task Force: We invite members of the Nordic-Baltic 8 (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden), and possibly others, to join participating G7 members in a Shadow Fleet Task Force to enhance monitoring and detection and to otherwise constrain the use of shadow fleets engaged in illegal, unsafe or environmentally perilous activities, building on the work of others active in this area. The Task Force will constitute a response by the participating States to the call by the International Maritime Organization in its Resolution A.1192(33) of 6 December 2023 for Members States and all relevant stakeholders to promote actions to prevent illegal operations in the maritime sector by shadow fleets and their flag states, including illegal operations for the purposes of circumventing sanctions, evading compliance with safety or environmental regulations, avoiding insurance costs, or engaging in other illegal activities.
    3. Enhancing Maritime Supply Chain Resilience and Energy and Food Security: Maritime supply chains will continue to underpin the global economy, but these face a variety of threats, both present and future, stemming from both geopolitical tensions and environmental factors. Maritime disruptions raise consumer costs, increase transit times, and can reduce demand in importing countries, which in turn means lower revenues and diminished competitiveness for producers in exporting countries. Such vulnerabilities in maritime transport can undermine energy and food security, particularly for developing nations reliant on stable shipping routes, including Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs). We welcome maritime initiatives involving and supported by G7 partners intended to promote energy and food security, such as the Grain from Ukraine scheme, and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. We invite cooperation with the African Union (pursuant to Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050) and other relevant International Organizations to identify best practices for enhancing maritime supply chain resilience and for safeguarding energy and food security, including in times of geopolitical crisis.
    4. Promoting Safe and Resilient Ports and Strategic Waterways: Port ownership and operational control matter to national security, as foreign control or influence over critical port infrastructure can create vulnerabilities in trade, in defense and security, and in economic stability. Port resilience is also crucial to economic stability and global trade and yet ports face growing risks from environmental degradation, extreme weather events and geopolitical conflicts. Strengthening port security and modernizing infrastructure are essential to maintaining safe and efficient maritime trade. Ensuring that the ownership and management of strategic waterways and key maritime choke points are not vulnerable to undue influence by potential adversaries is also essential to national security. We underscore the importance of scrutiny of ownership structures and port management and resilience within our own national jurisdictions, including with regard to Information and Communications Technology (ICT) systems, to ensure that adversaries do not gain leverage over supply chains, military operations, or the flow of strategic resources. We will work with partners and with relevant International Organizations to encourage robust cybersecurity standards for port ICT infrastructure, to increase resilience against malicious cyber incidents on maritime logistical networks, to reduce monopolistic power over key supply chain nodes, to promote secure and transparent port ownership, to limit unsolicited or undue foreign influence over critical infrastructures and strategic waterways, and to otherwise encourage greater focus on such potential vulnerabilities.
    5. Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) at sea poses a significant hazard to the marine environment, to the safety of fishermen and other users of the maritime space, and to various marine economic activities. We commit to enhancing diplomatic efforts and to exchanging best practices among national authorities, relevant international and regional organizations, and relevant industry sectors to accelerate the clean-up of UXO from the seas and ocean.

    Sustainable Stewardship of Maritime Resources

    1. Strengthen Enforcement Against IUU Fishing: IUU fishing is a major contributor to declining fish stocks and to marine habitat destruction. It may account for a third of all fishing activity worldwide, at a cost to the global economy of more than US$23 billion per year and with negative consequences for fisheries as an enduring economic asset, including for developing countries. We welcome the Canadian-led Dark Vessel Detection System in Ecuador, Peru, Costa Rica, the Philippines, and members of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and would see value in replicating the model to support other partners whose fisheries are under threat from IUU fishing. We recognize that data sharing and transparency play a key role in this fight by exposing bad actors and that technological advances can support a robust Monitoring, Control and Surveillance and enforcement landscape. We encourage further progress in addressing IUU fishing, working with and through relevant International Organizations to establish and strengthen rules to sustainably manage fish stocks on the high seas and to improve the enforcement of these measures, including through the further development of detection technologies, aircraft patrols and high seas boarding and inspection of vessels, building upon the 2022 G7 Ocean Deal.
    2. We welcome the Third UN Ocean Conference, in Nice, France, from 9 to 13 June 2025.

    PARTNERSHIPS

    1. This G7 Maritime Security and Prosperity Declaration provides a framework for cooperation with non-G7 Partners, including countries hosting major ports, large merchant fleets, or extensive flag registries as well as relevant regional and International Organizations, such as the International Maritime Organization and ASEAN. We would welcome robust cooperation with Partners to take forward the goals set out in this Declaration, consistent with the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, under the efforts of the G7 countries, including a free, open, prosperous and secure Indo-Pacific region, to build a free and open maritime order based on the rule of law, and of commitment to the sustainable development of the world’s maritime spaces.
    2. We welcome the cooperation on Coast Guard Functions, including the Global Coast Guard Forum hosted by Italy in 2025, as well as the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, which could also support the objectives of this Declaration.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Secretary Rubio’s Meeting with Danish Foreign Minister Rasmussen

    Source: United States Department of State (3)

    Office of the Spokesperson

    Secretary Rubio’s Meeting with Danish Foreign Minister Rasmussen

    Readout

    April 3, 2025

    The below is attributable to Spokesperson Tammy Bruce:

    Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Danish Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen today in Brussels. Secretary Rubio reaffirmed the strong relationship between the United States and the Kingdom of Denmark. They discussed shared priorities including increasing NATO defense spending and burden sharing, and addressing the threats to the Alliance, including those posed by Russia and China. They also reviewed ongoing coordination to enhance stability and security in Europe and to secure an enduring peace in Ukraine.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Secretary of State Marco Rubio with Scott Jennings on SiriusXM Patriot

    Source: United States Department of State (3)

    Marco Rubio, Secretary of State

    Washington, D.C.

    Secretary of State Marco Rubio with Scott Jennings on SiriusXM Patriot

    Interview

    February 10, 2025

    QUESTION:  Scott Jennings sitting here on SiriusXM Patriot 125, normally the David Webb Show.  I am guest hosting for Mr. Webb today, and it is our honor to welcome to the airwaves this morning the Secretary of State of the United States Marco Rubio, former senator from Florida, and now, thanks to President Trump, the United States Secretary of State. 

    Mr. Secretary, welcome to the show. 

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  Hey, thanks for having me. 

    QUESTION:  I appreciate you being on this morning.  You’re on the move.  You have just returned from your first foreign trip.  You went to Panama, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic.  I want to jump right in this morning and just ask how was the trip, what did we accomplish, and what’s the disposition in those countries towards the United States now that we have a new administration?

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  I think the disposition is very positive.  I think these are countries that want to be aligned with the United States.  That’s why we picked them.  They also happen to be countries that are on the migratory route, on the drug routes, and face tremendous challenges because of that.  These are the places people cross in order to come to the U.S., so each of them are very different. 

    Like in the case of Panama, obviously we have an issue with the canal and foreign influence over it, and so we raised that.  And I think we’re going to make a couple of announcements.  We saw the – Panama pulled out of the Belt and Road Initiative with China, which is the first country in the Western Hemisphere to actually pull out of that.  And I think we’ll hear more things.  They’ve got to work through their own processes there, but I think we’ll see even more in the days to come.  So, it’s very positive. 

    Costa Rica is an advanced economy.  They’re doing very well, of course, but they do have some challenges where drug rings are running through there, and so we partner with them to stop that.  But that’s a very pro-American government, and we wanted to interact with them.  They’re very good partners and, also, have been very strong at standing up to the Chinese Communist Party’s influence in the region, and so that’s been great. 

    And then moved on to El Salvador.  We have a great partner there in Nayib Bukele.  I’ve known him for a long time, and he made a very generous offer.  I don’t know if it can happen because of our own laws, but he offered to not only take in gang members that are illegally in the country but also any Americans who are in our jails – almost like outsourcing.  So, it was an interesting offer from him.  But he’s a great pro-American leader and, again, someone that has been very popular in his country by the way.  He’s like 90 percent approval rating. 

    Guatemala is a country that obviously is right on the border with Mexico.  They struggle with the migration.  They’re a source country, but they’re also a transit country for drugs and people.  And so, they’re trying to – they’re doing the best they can with their limited resources, and we’re helping them to stop the drugs and the migration.  But they’ve also – they’re going to almost double the number of deportation flights they’re going to take, and they’re also going to accept third-country people, people from other countries that are not from Guatemala, as part of this process, and then from there move them on to the – their nation of origin. 

    And then we finished in the Dominican Republic, which really the biggest challenge they face there are two-fold.  The one is what’s happening right across their border with Haiti, which they’re deporting people back to Haiti every day.  That – we can’t really visit Haiti right now, but that’s as close as we could get.  And so, we wanted to talk about that from there, and that’s important because that also poses a threat to the United States that there’s a mass migration event.  And it’s just a horrifying situation with these gangs taking over Port-au-Prince or large parts of it. 

    And then they’re also a great partner stopping drugs.  A lot of drug rings are – bring – try to bring drugs into the Dominican Republic because from there, over the Mona Passage, they get to Puerto Rico.  And once you get into Puerto Rico, you’re in the U.S.  There’s no more customs after that.  There’s no more border protection after that.  So, it’s something we’re going to work with them on. 

    So, it’s a good start to the trip, and then we finished off on Friday going to Southern Command, which is the Pentagon’s command for the whole region, and talked through some of these issues with them and the partnerships they have in the region.  So, it’s a good way to start my – I guess my second – end my second week as Secretary of State.

    QUESTION:  Yeah, most folks when they start a new job in the second week are still looking for the bathroom, and here you are in all these other countries.  It’s a really good way to get going.

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  Yeah, well, we’re still looking for the bathrooms but – finding out where everything is at in the building, but it was important to get out there and visit these countries early. 

    QUESTION:  So, you raised an issue that I think Donald Trump, President Trump, deserves a lot of credit for tackling immediately, and that is the concept of the United States combatting Chinese influence in this region, in this hemisphere.  And obviously, this has been an issue with Panama and the Panama Canal, but it’s really an issue everywhere.  Can you talk a little bit about this?  Is this one of your principal missions to make sure that the United States, and not China, is the dominant superpower at a minimum in this region and in the world?

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  Yeah, look, China is a rich, powerful country and that’s what they’re going to be.  Like that’s not going to change, right?  They’ve got over a billion people.  They’ve got a big economy, second-largest economy in the world.  I mean, and we’re going to be competing with them for the rest of the century and beyond.  And I think the story of the 21st century is going to be about what happened between the U.S. and China. 

    What we can’t allow is for that to come at our expense.  What we can’t allow is an imbalance, a dangerous imbalance, to build up where they’re more powerful than we are, and then – or we become dependent on them.  And that danger is already there that we’ve become dependent on them for supply chains, for manufacturing, economically, all these sorts of things.

    So, what’s happened in part of the region is that they swoop in.  And look, they’re doing what I would do.  If I was in charge of China, I would do exactly what they’re doing.  But I have to – I I’m not in charge of China.  I run the State Department for the United States and I’m an American citizen, so I’ve got to do what’s good for America.  That’s what President Trump is for.  And that includes not getting run out of the Western Hemisphere, not waking up one day and finding out that China has more influence over our neighboring countries than we do, that China has more presence in our neighboring countries than we do.  That’s – it’s – geography is real and it’s right on top of us, and these are countries that are our neighbors, and we just – we can’t live in a world in which they have more influence and more presence than we do in the countries closest to us.

    QUESTION:  So, on the prospect of American influence in the world – and I wholeheartedly agree with you about our need to stand up to China – a lot of people are wondering about the reorientation of American soft power in the world.  Obviously, President Trump and his administration and working with you have made some dramatic shifts in the way we distribute foreign aid and the bureaucracy, the USAID bureaucracy, which you are now also simultaneously in charge of. 

    I think there’s a lot of misinformation out there and a lot of political attacks out there of people trying to score points.  I just kind of want to set the record straight here about what we’re doing.  And we’ve eliminated some bureaucracy, but you’re in charge of American soft power and you’re in charge of our influence around the world.  Can you kind of give us an idea of how this is going to work, and why the American people should be reassured that American influence is going to be top of mind for your State Department?

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  Well, first of all, we’re not walking away from foreign aid.  We will be involved in foreign aid.  I believe that foreign aid done right is good for the country, but it has to be done right.  Now, the idea that somehow we spend between $40 and $60 billion on foreign aid and all that money is well spent or on things that make sense is absurd.  There’s a lot of it that isn’t.  And so the goal is very simple:  Go through all of our foreign aid – a lot of it is through USAID, some of it is through State Department; identify the foreign aid that makes sense, the foreign aid that actually supports our country and that supports our national interests, and continue to do that; and then get rid of the ones that are a waste of money, or in some cases or run counter to our foreign – to our national interest and to our interests around the world.  And that’s what we’re going through right now. 

    The problem is that this foreign aid industrial complex has built up of NGOs and all kinds of groups that benefit from these programs, and argue that you can’t get rid of a single one of them; if you cut any of them, if you even ask questions about them, you’re undermining American soft power.  So, this is not – despite some of these reports, this is not about walking away from foreign aid.  This is about doing the aid that makes sense and getting rid of the aid that does not make sense.  That’s it.  That’s what this is about.

    So we were in Guatemala, right?  And they have a program where we help them to improve their police department so they can stop and identify fentanyl before it gets into America.  That’s foreign aid we’re going to support.  In fact, I issued a waiver so we can continue that program.  There are other things that we’re not going to do.  We shouldn’t be sponsoring LGBTQ operas.  I don’t know how that foreign – furthers the national interest. 

    And this is taxpayer money.  Look, if someone wants to pay for that stuff, you’re more than happy to go out, go ahead.  It’s legal.  Go out and raise all the money, private-sector money, and spend it on that.  But we shouldn’t be spending taxpayer money or using American Government agencies to sponsor things that make absolutely no sense.  So, we put a pause on all foreign aid, and now we’re going through it project by project.  We’re going to get rid of the ones that don’t make sense, and we’re going to keep or even build on the ones that do make sense. 

    QUESTION:  So, the things that make sense in your mind – fighting drugs, fighting illegal immigration.  What about lifesaving issues?  There’s been a lot of back and forth in the media about things that we do from a humanitarian perspective that are lifesaving medical-type programming, particularly in Africa with PEPFAR and malaria and such.  How do you view those things?

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  I’m a supporter of PEPFAR.  I have been in Congress.  I am now as Secretary of State.  It’s a program we want to continue.  Obviously, we’re going to have questions about it.  Look, if PEPFAR is working well, it’s a program that should be getting smaller over time, not bigger, right?  Because you’re preventing HIV, you’re preventing the spread of HIV, and so people aren’t testing positive because their viral load gets down, they’re not passing it on to their children. 

    So ideally, it’s a program that over time shrinks, not expands, because less and less people are getting HIV or are transmitting it to their children.  That was always the goal was an AIDS-free generation, so no child was born with HIV.  And – but it’s a program I’ve supported, and we want to continue to do it.  And things like are people going to starve to death, are we going to have a famine?  Is it going to destabilize a country in a way that would be negative to our national interest and open the door for radical jihadists or others to take advantage?  We’re going to continue to do those.  But the problem is that the definition of humanitarian has expanded beyond that – to all kinds of other things that do not make sense.  That doesn’t mean they’re bad ideas.  Someone should do it.  It just shouldn’t be the American taxpayer. 

    So that’s the kind of things that we’re going through right now and identifying.  And by the way, we issued a waiver which allowed all these lifesaving programs to continue.  And obviously, there’s – any time you have a pause or some hiccups about how to restart the payment programs, but all that’s going to get taken care of here very quickly, and those programs will continue.  We’re not walking away from foreign aid.  We are walking away from foreign aid that’s dumb, that’s stupid, that wastes American taxpayer money.  We’re just not going to continue to do those.

    QUESTION:  I think that what you’re doing is long overdue.  This whole bureaucracy existed, and it really existed with very little political oversight.  And really all that the Trump Administration, at your direction, is doing is making sure that whatever money we spend somehow helps the national interest.  And I think every American taxpayer wants the money we spend to help the national interest.  And Trump and you, Mr. Secretary, on the right side of what I think is an 80-20 issue here.  And so, you see this amazing disconnect in the media, people fussing about this. 

    But some of these projects that you’ve identified are patently ridiculous.  And so, by moving this into your office and by taking personal political oversight over it, not only are you saving us money, but you’re just aligning our spending with what’s in direct interest of the United States foreign policy under the direction of the President of the United States.  I mean, that’s the point of elections.  That’s the point of having a government, not to let unelected bureaucrats determine our national direction but to let our political leadership do it.

    Mr. Secretary, in the time that we have, I want to move ahead.  You’re about to embark on your second foreign trip.  You’re going to the Munich Security Conference, and then you’re going to the Middle East.  I think you’re going to Israel, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia – obviously a hot spot or region.  What is your mission here?  What are we trying to accomplish in the Middle East?  What’s your message at the Munich Security Conference later this week?

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  Well, in Munich, I think it’s just to reaffirm to everybody – even though it’s located in Europe – obviously, that’s where the forum is – it’s not just about Europe.  People from all – leaders from all over the world go that conference.  But the top of mind for everyone is going to be war in Ukraine, and the President has been very clear.  President Trump has been clear that the war in Ukraine needs to end.  There’s a – he’s going to sort of begin to lay out a broad path forward, and he wants that war to end.  It’d be in the interest of everybody for that war to end, and so obviously we’ll be discussing that with foreign ministers and other leaders there. 

    And then in the Middle East, beyond just the – what we know has happened with – after October 7th, there’s some potentially exciting opportunities to really change the dynamic in that region, and that’s the things we want to talk about.  We’ve seen in Lebanon where a new government is now in place and Hizballah has been – I mean, imagine a region where you have a stable Lebanese government and Hizballah is no longer controlling the southern part of Lebanon and threatening Israel every day.  Imagine potentially – we’ve got to wait and see, right? – but a Syria no longer under Assad, no longer with Iranian or Russian influence, no longer with ISIS, sort of no longer a security threat to Isreal.  Imagine a region where Israel now feels secure because of what’s happened in Lebanon and in Syria that they can enter into a peace deal with Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf kingdoms; a Sunni-Israeli peace deal akin to the Camp David Accords with Egypt and the peace with Jordan.  Suddenly you have a very different region where all kinds of things that were not possible before are now possible. 

    And that’s the opportunity that we hope to explore and see if it’s possible.  We have an obligation to explore, at the end.  I mean, President Trump has made very clear that part of his agenda is promoting peace in the world; and if there’s a chance to create conditions for peace, that’s certainly something we’re going to do our best to try to foster and be a part of. 

    QUESTION:  I want to ask you briefly about the hostage deal that was in place as Biden was exiting and President Trump was coming in.  Obviously, a few hostages have been released.  Some of the video of the hostages is, frankly, horrific.  What they had done to them in captivity at the hands of Hamas is nothing short of barbaric.  I saw that President Trump last night on the way to the Super Bowl made a comment about this and said he’s seen some of these abductees coming out.  He said, “They look like Holocaust survivors.  I know there’s an agreement that Hamas releases a little every week, but I don’t know how long I’ll continue to endure this.  My patience is running out.”

    Is this something you’re going to discuss when you’re in the Middle East?  Are we – is our patience running thin here, and are these hostages being more mistreated than we could have even imagined before?

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  Well, I don’t think there’s any coincidence in the schedule that they’re being released where they obviously released the ones, they thought were in the best condition first, then over time you’re starting to see the impact of this.  But I also think it’s very revealing of who Hamas is and what Hamas is. 

    You look at these images of what they – first of all, the humiliation that they have to go through.  Just put aside for a moment the horrifying conditions they were kept and the horrifying things that happened to some of those hostages, on top of the fact that these were innocent civilians.  I mean, none of these were soldiers.  These are not combatants.  These are just people that were abducted for purposes of being used as leverage.  And they’re getting, what, 200 certified killers in exchange for one innocent hostage.  But it reveals who Hamas is.

    Look at these humiliation, they put them through before they’re released, where they do these big public displays of force.  Do any of those Hamas fighters look like they’ve been skipping meals?  Do any of those Hamas fighters that you see look like they’ve been suffering over the last year and a half?  Clearly, these people are – the ones suffering are the people from Gaza, but not them.  And then the conditions they’re held in.  So, it’s incredibly revealing about what we’re dealing with.  This is an evil organization.  Hamas is evil.  It’s pure evil.  These are monsters.  These are savages.  That’s a group that needs to be eradicated. 

    And let me tell you, if they still are the dominant power in Gaza when all this is done, there is not going to peace in the Middle East, as long as a group like Hamas physically controls territory and is the most dominant power in Gaza or anywhere in the Middle East.  And I hope people can see who these people actually are, in the condition of these hostages – not just the conditions that they’re in when they’re released, but what they have to endure on the way out.

    QUESTION:  You raise the issue of Gaza, and before you go, obviously President Trump made some news on this last week.  And it strikes me that what you’re executing is a realistic foreign policy.  I mean, we’re in the common-sense doctrine era of the United States, which people are saying thank goodness, finally.

    On Gaza, on the idea of a two-state solution, is this no longer the policy of the United States?  It seems to me that you all are injecting realism into this situation and that most of the people the Israelis have had to deal with over time simply don’t want peace, and we’ve been trying to put a square peg in a round hole here.

    What is our policy?  That people that run Gaza eventually are going to have to accept peace? And that’s not what – that’s just not been the disposition of the folks we’ve been dealing with heretofore.

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  Well, the big challenge for this whole two-state solution has not been Isreal. It’s been:  Who’s going to govern that second state?  Who’s going to be in charge of it?  If the people in charge of it are Hamas or Hizballah or anybody like that, these are groups that – whose goal is the destruction of the Jewish state.

    So, I don’t know how you’re going to have peace if you’re turning over territory to a group whose stated purpose is the destruction of the Jewish state.  Why would any country in the world agree to create a second state on their border that is governed by armed elements who kidnap babies and murder babies and rape teenage girls and abduct innocents and whose stated goal and purpose for existing is the – is your destruction?  Who would agree to that?  So that’s the fundamental challenge.

    On the broader challenge of Gaza, the President’s just pointed to the obvious.  I mean, Gaza is a place that, in addition to all the damage it suffered in the war – Hamas hides in the tunnels.  It’s the civilians who they hide behind and underneath that have suffered the consequences of this.  But that’s a place where there’s all kinds of unexploded munitions and bombs that Hamas has, that’s been used in the conflict.  Someone’s got to go in – for anybody to be able to live there, someone’s got to – you’ve got to clean it up.  You’ve got to clean all that out of there even before you begin the process of removing rubble and debris and rebuilding housing, like permanent structures.  Who’s going to do that? 

    And right now, the only one who’s stood up and said I’m willing to help do it is Donald Trump.  All these other leaders, they’re going to have to step up.  If they’ve got a better idea, then now is the time.  Now is the time for the other governments and other powers in the region, some of these very rich countries, to basically say, okay, we’ll do it.  We’re going to pay for this; we’re going to step forward; we’re going to be the ones that take charge.  None of them is offering to do it.  And I think that you can’t go around claiming that you’re a fighter for, an advocate for the Palestinian people, but you’re not willing to do anything to help rebuild Gaza.  And so far, we haven’t seen a lot of – they’ve all – they’ll all tell you what they’re not for.  But we’re still waiting for more countries to step forward and say here’s what we’re willing to do.  And right now, they’ve not been willing to do anything and – or at least anything concrete.

    So that’s a challenge that President Trump’s put out there.  And it’s outside the box, but that’s what he always is.  I mean, he is going to state the obvious.  It’s the one thing about Donald Trump – he doesn’t hide behind silly, traditional lies and things of that nature.  He’s going to put out blunt truth.  And the blunt truth is that the Middle East has, for too long, been a region of places all of whom love to talk but don’t want to do.  So, it’s time – if they don’t like Donald Trump’s plan, then it’s time for these countries in the region to step forward and offer their solution. 

    QUESTION:  Well, I think under President Trump’s leadership, under your leadership, we’re living in a common-sense era, we’re in an aspirational era, and we’re in a realistic era.  And I think the American people are grateful for it.  You have had an amazing run already, just in the first few weeks of being in office.  You had an amazing first foreign trip.  You’ve got one coming up this week.

    The foreign affairs wins of the Trump Administration are already piling up, with Mexico agreeing to send troops to their border; Canada playing ball on their border issues; Colombia accepting the repatriation flights; Panama ending its Belt and Road Initiative deal with China; the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon.  We’ve taken out an ISIS leader in Somalia.  You guys are off to an amazing start.  And I think that’s why Donald Trump has a high approval rating right now, and why people are so grateful that you accepted this job as U.S. Secretary of State.

    Secretary Rubio, thanks for being with us on SiriusXM Patriot today. 

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  Thanks for having me on.

    QUESTION:  All right.  Safe travels.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 5, 2025
←Previous Page
1 … 47 48 49 50 51 … 174
Next Page→
NewzIntel.com

NewzIntel.com

MIL Open Source Intelligence

  • Blog
  • About
  • FAQs
  • Authors
  • Events
  • Shop
  • Patterns
  • Themes

Twenty Twenty-Five

Designed with WordPress