Category: Ukraine

MIL-OSI: Golar LNG Limited Interim results for the period ended March 31, 2025

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Highlights and subsequent events

Golar LNG Limited (“Golar” or “the Company”) reports Q1 2025 net income attributable to Golar of $8 million, Adjusted EBITDA¹ of $41 million and Total Golar Cash¹ of $678 million.

Concluded the 20-year charter of FLNG Hilli for Southern Energy S.A. (“SESA”) in Argentina.

Signed definitive agreements for a 20-year charter for the MKII FLNG to SESA. Combined with the FLNG Hilli charter, the project will be for 5.95 mtpa of nameplate capacity – one of the world’s largest FLNG development projects.

FLNG Gimi in final stages of commissioning on the GTA field, Commercial Operations Date (“COD”) expected within Q2.

MKII FLNG conversion vessel Fuji LNG arrived at the shipyard for conversion works, conversion project on schedule for Q4 2027 delivery.

FLNG Hilli maintained market-leading operational track record and delivered its 132^nd LNG cargo since contract start-up.

Sold minority shareholding in Avenir LNG Limited.

Completed exit from LNG shipping segment with sale of Golar Arctic.

Declared dividend of $0.25 per share for the quarter.

Progressed FLNG growth opportunities with commercial leads, shipyard availability and long lead equipment timing.

FLNG Hilli: Maintained leading operational track record with 132 cargoes offloaded to date and over 9 million tons of LNG produced since operations commenced.

Final Investment Decision (“FID”) for the 20-year redeployment of FLNG Hilli to Southern Energy in Argentina concluded (further details provided in the SESA charter agreements section). A dedicated team has progressed detailed work on Hilli’s re-deployment scope, vessel upgrade and transit to her new location.

Following the conclusion of FLNG Hilli’s re-deployment contract, we will initiate discussions for debt optimization that reflects the strong earnings visibility for the FLNG unit.

FLNG Gimi: In January 2025, the bp operated FPSO provided feedgas from the GTA field allowing for full commissioning to commence, triggering the final upward adjustment to the commissioning rate under the commercial reset agreed in August 2024. First LNG was achieved in February and in April 2025, FLNG Gimi completed the offload of its first full LNG cargo. This introduced Mauritania and Senegal as LNG exporters to the international gas market and triggered the final pre-COD milestone bonus payment to Golar under the terms of the commercial reset. COD, which remains on schedule for Q2 2025, triggers the start of the 20-year Lease and Operate Agreement that unlocks the equivalent of around $3 billion of Adjusted EBITDA backlog¹ (Golar’s share) and recognition of contractual payments comprised of capital and operating elements in both the balance sheet and income statement.

As of May 2025, Golar has invoiced $195.9 million of pre-COD fees under the commercial reset arrangements, with this amount currently recognized on the balance sheet.

On March 20, 2025, a $1.2 billion debt facility to refinance FLNG Gimi was signed with a consortium of leading Chinese leasing companies. The contemplated sale and leaseback facility features a tenor of 12 years and a 17-year amortization profile. Upon closing and repayment of the existing debt facility, Gimi MS Corporation is expected to generate net proceeds of approximately $530 million. This amount includes the release of existing interest rate swaps. Golar stands to benefit from 70% of these proceeds, equivalent to approximately $371 million. The transaction remains subject to customary closing conditions and third party stakeholder approvals. Golar has also progressed a rating process to further evaluate debt optimization alternatives for the vessel during the quarter.

MKII FLNG 3.5 MTPA conversion: Conversion work on the $2.2 billion MKII FLNG is proceeding to schedule. The conversion vessel Fuji LNG entered CIMC’s Yantai yard in February 2025 and in April the vessel was successfully separated into forward and aft sections. A mid-ship section housing the liquefaction unit will be inserted between and attached to the refurbished forward and aft sections later in the conversion process. Fabrication of the topsides for the mid-ship section is also underway. As of March 31, 2025, Golar has spent $0.7 billion on the MKII FLNG conversion, all of which is equity funded. The MKII FLNG is expected to be delivered in Q4 2027.

With a definitive agreement that contemplates a 2H 2025 FID now secured, Golar will consider alternatives for asset level MKII FLNG financing.

Southern Energy charter agreements: On May 2, 2025, Golar announced a FID for the 20-year charter of FLNG Hilli. The vessel will be chartered to SESA offshore Argentina. Golar and SESA also signed definitive agreements for a 20-year charter of the MKII FLNG. The MKII FLNG charter remains subject to FID and the same regulatory approvals as those granted to the FLNG Hilli project, expected within 2025.

Key commercial terms for the respective 20-year charter agreements include:

FLNG Hilli (nameplate capacity of 2.45mtpa): Expected contract start-up in 2027, expected Adjusted EBITDA¹ to Golar of $285 million per year, plus a commodity linked tariff component of 25% of Free on Board (“FOB”) prices in excess of $8/MMBtu; and,

MKII FLNG (nameplate capacity of 3.5mtpa): Expected contract start-up in 2028, expected Adjusted EBITDA¹ to Golar of $400 million per year, plus a commodity linked tariff component of 25% of FOB prices in excess of $8/MMBtu.

The two FLNG agreements are expected to add $13.7 billion in Adjusted EBITDA backlog¹ to Golar over 20 years, before inflationary adjustments (30% of U.S. CPI from year 6) to the charter hire, and before the commodity linked tariff upside. Where achieved FOB prices exceed the $8/MMBtu reference price, Golar will receive 25% of the excess amount (this reference price is subject to the same 30% US CPI adjustment from year 6). The commodity linked element in the FLNG charter provides an upside of $70 million per year to Golar for every $ 1/MMBtu the achieved FOB price is higher than the USD 8/MMBtu reference price. The upside calculation is based on monthly achieved FOB prices.

While the commodity linked tariff component is upside oriented, the Company has also agreed to a mechanism where the charter hire can be partially reduced for FOB prices below $7.5/MMBtu, down to a floor of $6/MMBtu. Under this mechanism, the maximum accumulated discount over the life of both contracts has a cap of $210 million, and any outstanding discounted charter hire amounts will be recovered through additional upside sharing if FOB prices return to levels above $7.5/MMBtu. Golar is not exposed to further downside in the commodity linked FLNG charter mechanism. The upside calculation is based on monthly achieved FOB prices, whilst the downside adjustment is based on annual average achieved FOB prices. The downside mechanism is based on annual average achieved FOB prices.

SESA, a company formed to export Argentinian LNG, is owned by a consortium of leading Argentinian gas producers including Pan American Energy (30%), YPF (25%), Pampa Energia (20%), Harbour Energy (15%) and Golar (10%). The four gas producers have committed to supply their pro-rata share of natural gas to the FLNGs under Gas Sales Agreements at a fixed price per MMBtu. Golar’s 10% shareholding in SESA provides additional commodity exposure. The 10% equity stake equates to approximately $28 million in annual additional commodity exposure to Golar for every $1/MMBtu change in achieved FOB prices versus SESA’s cash break even.

With the combination of the fixed charter hire with 30% of U.S. CPI inflation from year 6, operating expenses pass through, 25% commodity exposure in the FLNG tariff for FOB prices above $8/MMBtu and Golar’s 10% shareholding in SESA, Golar believes it has secured a highly attractive risk-reward in the SESA charters. For every $1 FOB price above $8/MMBtu, Golar’s total commodity upside is approximately $100 million, versus approximately $28 million in downside for every $1/MMBtu that realized FOB prices are below SESA’s cash break even.

Located offshore in close proximity of each other in Rio Negro’s Gulf of San Matias, the FLNG’s will monetize gas from the Vaca Muerta formation, the world’s second largest shale gas resource, located onshore in Argentina’s Neuquen province. FLNG Hilli will initially utilize spare volumes from the existing pipeline network. SESA intends to facilitate the construction of a dedicated pipeline from Vaca Muerta to the Gulf of San Matias to supply gas to the FLNGs and the project expects to benefit from significant operational efficiencies and synergies from two FLNGs in the same area.

The charters are also subject to strong legal and regulatory protections including:

both charter agreements are subject to English Law with dispute resolution pursuant to ICC arbitration in Paris, France;

hire and other payments under both contracts are fully paid in U.S. dollars;

SESA has obtained Argentina’s first ever 30-year non-interruptible LNG export license for FLNG Hilli, providing security of exports, necessary for the significant upstream and midstream investments, as well as securing offtake contracts; and

MKII FLNG is expected to obtain a similar term export license within 2025.

FLNG Hilli has been approved for adherence to the Large Investments Incentive Scheme (“RIGI”), as a Long-Term Strategic Export project. The RIGI was implemented by the current administration of President Milei to incentivize large investments in Argentina. Under the RIGI, there are incentives and protections granted to the project company (SESA), with Golar benefiting as an international asset provider and investor, mostly notably:

guaranteed legal certainty and regulatory stability for the duration of the project, covering taxes, customs, duties, and foreign exchange controls;

any new national, provincial, or municipal taxes or restrictions would not apply to RIGI projects beyond those existing when the project was approved; and

freedom to repatriate profits, dividends, and capital including exemption from potential Central Bank restrictions on access to foreign exchange for repatriation purposes.

If Argentina breaches the RIGI framework (e.g. by purporting to change the regime unilaterally), the beneficiary of the RIGI status can:

bring legal action against the National or Provincial Government (as applicable) under ICC arbitration, or elect to challenge the revocation through administrative channels; and

challenge the constitutionality of enacted law which breaches the RIGI protections.

Business development: Detailed discussions for FLNG opportunities continue. With limited yard capacity for FLNG delivery before the 2030s, and with the current Golar fleet committed, we see firming demand for the remaining available 2020s deliveries. Progress is being made on FLNG projects ranging from MKI, MKII and MKIII FLNG developments. We target FLNG opportunities with competitive wellhead gas to secure attractive base tariff and commodity upside participation. We are also in commercial negotiations with potential charterers seeking equity participation in the FLNG to align project stakeholders.

On the back of the recent commitments for the existing fleet and with ongoing detailed commercial discussions, we are working with shipyards and topside equipment providers to firm-up prices and schedules for potential ordering of additional unit(s) within 2025. Any growth initiatives are planned to be funded with recycled liquidity from debt optimization of the existing FLNG fleet on the back of their long term charters.

Corporate/Other: Operating revenues and costs under corporate and other items are comprised of two FSRU operate and maintain agreements in respect of the LNG Croatia and Italis LNG together with the Golar Arctic up to her point of sale in March 2025, for $24 million, and the Fuji LNG, up to the point she entered CIMC’s yard in February 2025 for FLNG conversion.

In February 2025, Golar also closed the sale of its non-core 23.4% interest in Avenir LNG Limited, for $39 million.

Shares and dividends: As of March 31, 2025, 104.7 million shares are issued and outstanding. Golar’s Board of Directors approved a total Q1 2025 dividend of $0.25 per share to be paid on or around June 10, 2025. The record date will be June 3, 2025.

Financial Summary

(in thousands of $)	Q1 2025	Q1 2024	% Change	Q4 2024	% Change
Net income	12,939	66,495	(81)%	15,037	(14)%
Net income attributable to Golar LNG Ltd	8,197	55,220	(85)%	4,494	82%
Total operating revenues	62,502	64,959	(4)%	65,917	(5)%
Adjusted EBITDA ¹	40,936	63,587	(36)%	59,168	(31)%
Golar’s share of Contractual Debt ¹	1,494,615	1,209,407	24%	1,515,357	(1)%

Financial Review

Business Performance:

	2025	2024
(in thousands of $)	Jan-Mar	Oct-Dec	Jan-Mar
Net income	12,939	15,037	66,495
Income taxes	179	(504)	138
Net income before income taxes	13,118	14,533	66,633
Depreciation and amortization	12,638	13,642	12,476
Impairment of long-term assets	—	22,933	—
Unrealized loss/(gain) on oil and gas derivative instruments	25,001	14,269	(2,148)
Other non-operating loss	—	7,000	—
Interest income	(8,699)	(9,866)	(10,026)
Loss/(gain) on derivative instruments, net	6,795	(8,711)	(6,202)
Other financial items, net	2,292	1,153	2,640
Net (income)/loss from equity method investments	(10,209)	4,215	214
Adjusted EBITDA ¹	40,936	59,168	63,587

	2025			2024
	Jan-Mar			Oct-Dec
(in thousands of $)	FLNG	Corporate and other	Total	FLNG	Corporate and other	Total
Total operating revenues	55,688	6,814	62,502	56,396	9,521	65,917
Vessel operating expenses	(18,785)	(9,685)	(28,470)	(19,788)	(8,121)	(27,909)
Voyage, charterhire & commission expenses	—	—	—	—	(446)	(446)
Administrative expenses	(588)	(8,999)	(9,587)	(264)	(7,241)	(7,505)
Project development expenses	(2,351)	(968)	(3,319)	(3,624)	(1,236)	(4,860)
Realized gain on oil and gas derivative instruments ⁽²⁾	21,213	—	21,213	33,502	—	33,502
Other operating income	—	(1,403)	(1,403)	469	—	469
Adjusted EBITDA ¹	55,177	(14,241)	40,936	66,691	(7,523)	59,168

(2) The line item “Realized and unrealized (loss)/gain on oil and gas derivative instruments” in the Unaudited Consolidated Statements of Operations relates to income from the Hilli Liquefaction Tolling Agreement (“LTA”) and the natural gas derivative which is split into: “Realized gain on oil and gas derivative instruments” and “Unrealized (loss)/gain on oil and gas derivative instruments”.

	2024
	Jan-Mar
(in thousands of $)	FLNG	Corporate and other	Total
Total operating revenues	56,368	8,591	64,959
Vessel operating expenses	(18,784)	(7,078)	(25,862)
Voyage, charterhire & commission expenses	—	(1,770)	(1,770)
Administrative expenses	(471)	(6,604)	(7,075)
Project development expenses/(income)	(1,085)	273	(812)
Realized gain on oil and gas derivative instruments	34,147	—	34,147
Adjusted EBITDA ¹	70,175	(6,588)	63,587

Golar reports today Q1 2025 net income of $13 million, before non-controlling interests, inclusive of $32 million of non-cash items¹, comprised of:

TTF and Brent oil unrealized mark-to-market (“MTM”) losses of $25 million; and

A $7 million MTM loss on interest rate swaps.

The Brent oil linked component of FLNG Hilli’s fees generates additional annual cash of approximately $3.1 million for every dollar increase in Brent Crude prices between $60 per barrel and the contractual ceiling. Billing of this component is based on a three-month look-back at average Brent Crude prices. During Q1 2025, we recognized a total of $21 million of realized gains on FLNG Hilli’s oil and gas derivative instruments, comprised of a:

$12 million realized gain on the Brent oil linked derivative instrument; and

$9 million realized gain in respect of fees for the TTF linked production.

We also recognized $25 million of non-cash losses in relation to FLNG Hilli’s oil and gas derivative assets, with corresponding changes in the fair value in its constituent parts recognized on our unaudited consolidated statement of operations as follows:

$13 million loss on the Brent oil linked derivative asset; and

$12 million loss on the TTF linked natural gas derivative asset.

Balance Sheet and Liquidity:

As of March 31, 2025, Total Golar Cash¹ was $678 million, comprised of $522 million of cash and cash equivalents and $156 million of restricted cash.

Golar’s share of Contractual Debt¹ as of March 31, 2025 is $1,495 million. Deducting Total Golar Cash¹ of $678 million from Golar’s share of Contractual Debt¹ leaves a net debt position of $817 million.

Assets under development amounts to $2.5 billion, comprised of $1.8 billion in respect of FLNG Gimi and $0.7 billion in respect of the MKII FLNG. The carrying value of LNG carrier Fuji LNG, previously included under Vessels and equipment, net in Q4 2024 was transferred to Assets under development in Q1 2025.

Non-GAAP measures

In addition to disclosing financial results in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (US GAAP), this earnings release and the associated investor presentation contains references to the non-GAAP financial measures which are included in the table below. We believe these non-GAAP financial measures provide investors with useful supplemental information about the financial performance of our business, enable comparison of financial results between periods where certain items may vary independent of business performance, and allow for greater transparency with respect to key metrics used by management in operating our business and measuring our performance.

This report also contains certain forward-looking non-GAAP measures for which we are unable to provide a reconciliation to the most comparable GAAP financial measures because certain information needed to reconcile those non-GAAP measures to the most comparable GAAP financial measures is dependent on future events some of which are outside of our control, such as oil and gas prices and exchange rates, as such items may be significant. Non-GAAP measures in respect of future events which cannot be reconciled to the most comparable GAAP financial measure are calculated in a manner which is consistent with the accounting policies applied to Golar’s unaudited consolidated financial statements.

These non-GAAP financial measures should not be considered a substitute for, or superior to, financial measures and financial results calculated in accordance with GAAP. Non-GAAP measures are not uniformly defined by all companies and may not be comparable with similarly titled measures and disclosures used by other companies. The reconciliations as at March 31, 2025 and for the three months ended March 31, 2025, from these results should be carefully evaluated.

Non-GAAP measure	Closest equivalent US GAAP measure	Adjustments to reconcile to primary financial statements prepared under US GAAP	Rationale for adjustments
Performance measures
*Adjusted EBITDA*	Net income/(loss)	+/- Income taxes + Depreciation and amortization + Impairment of long-lived assets +/- Unrealized (gain)/loss on oil and gas derivative instruments +/- Other non-operating (income)/losses +/- Net financial (income)/expense +/- Net (income)/losses from equity method investments +/- Net loss/(income) from discontinued operations	Increases the comparability of total business performance from period to period and against the performance of other companies by excluding the results of our equity investments, removing the impact of unrealized movements on embedded derivatives, depreciation, impairment charge, financing costs, tax items and discontinued operations.
*Distributable Adjusted EBITDA*	Net income/(loss)	+/- Income taxes + Depreciation and amortization + Impairment of long-lived assets +/- Unrealized (gain)/loss on oil and gas derivative instruments +/- Other non-operating (income)/losses +/- Net financial (income)/expense +/- Net (income)/losses from equity method investments +/- Net loss/(income) from discontinued operations – Amortization of deferred commissioning period revenue – Amortization of Day 1 gains – Accrued overproduction revenue + Overproduction revenue received – Accrued underutilization adjustment	Increases the comparability of our operational FLNG Hilli from period to period and against the performance of other companies by removing the non-distributable income of FLNG Hilli, project development costs, the operating costs of the Gandria (prior to her disposal) and FLNG Gimi.
Liquidity measures
*Contractual debt ¹*	Total debt (current and non-current), net of deferred finance charges	+/-Variable Interest Entity (“VIE”) consolidation adjustments +/-Deferred finance charges	During the year, we consolidate a lessor VIE for our Hilli sale and leaseback facility. This means that on consolidation, our contractual debt is eliminated and replaced with the lessor VIE debt. Contractual debt represents our debt obligations under our various financing arrangements before consolidating the lessor VIE. The measure enables investors and users of our financial statements to assess our liquidity, identify the split of our debt (current and non-current) based on our underlying contractual obligations and aid comparability with our competitors.
*Adjusted net debt*	Adjusted net debt based on GAAP measures: -Total debt (current and non-current), net of deferred finance charges – Cash and cash equivalents – Restricted cash and short-term deposits (current and non-current) – Other current assets (Receivable from TTF linked commodity swap derivatives)	Total debt (current and non-current), net of: +Deferred finance charges +Cash and cash equivalents +Restricted cash and short-term deposits (current and non-current) +/-VIE consolidation adjustments +Receivable from TTF linked commodity swap derivatives	The measure enables investors and users of our financial statements to assess our liquidity based on our underlying contractual obligations and aids comparability with our competitors.
*Total Golar Cash*	Golar cash based on GAAP measures: + Cash and cash equivalents + Restricted cash and short-term deposits (current and non-current)	-VIE restricted cash and short-term deposits	We consolidate a lessor VIE for our sale and leaseback facility. This means that on consolidation, we include restricted cash held by the lessor VIE. Total Golar Cash represents our cash and cash equivalents and restricted cash and short-term deposits (current and non-current) before consolidating the lessor VIE. Management believe that this measure enables investors and users of our financial statements to assess our liquidity and aids comparability with our competitors.

(1) Please refer to reconciliation below for Golar’s share of contractual debt

Adjusted EBITDA backlog (also referred to as “earnings backlog”): This is a non-GAAP financial measure and represents the share of contracted fee income for executed contracts or definitive agreements less forecasted operating expenses for these contracts/agreements. Adjusted EBITDA backlog should not be considered as an alternative to net income / (loss) or any other measure of our financial performance calculated in accordance with U.S. GAAP.

Non-cash items: Non-cash items comprised of impairment of long-lived assets, release of prior year contract underutilization liability, MTM movements on our TTF and Brent oil linked derivatives, listed equity securities and interest rate swaps (“IRS”) which relate to the unrealized component of the gains/(losses) on oil and gas derivative instruments, unrealized MTM (losses)/gains on investment in listed equity securities and gains on derivative instruments, net, in our unaudited consolidated statement of operations.

Abbreviations used:

FLNG: Floating Liquefaction Natural Gas vessel
FSRU: Floating Storage and Regasification Unit
MKII FLNG: Mark II FLNG
FPSO: Floating Production, Storage and Offloading unit

MMBtu: Million British Thermal Units
mtpa: Million Tons Per Annum

Reconciliations – Liquidity Measures

Total Golar Cash

(in thousands of $)	March 31, 2025	December 31, 2024	March 31, 2024
Cash and cash equivalents	521,434	566,384	547,868
Restricted cash and short-term deposits (current and non-current)	172,879	150,198	92,159
Less: VIE restricted cash and short-term deposits	(16,745)	(17,472)	(17,933)
Total Golar Cash	677,568	699,110	622,094

Contractual Debt and Adjusted Net Debt

(in thousands of $)	March 31, 2025	December 31, 2024	March 31, 2024
Total debt (current and non-current) net of deferred finance charges	1,418,816	1,452,255	1,195,063
VIE consolidation adjustments	251,728	241,666	213,042
Deferred finance charges	20,946	22,686	22,337
Total Contractual Debt	1,691,490	1,716,607	1,430,442
Less: Keppel’s and B&V’s share of the FLNG Hilli contractual debt	—	—	(32,035)
Less: Keppel’s share of the Gimi debt	(196,875)	(201,250)	(189,000)
Golar’s share of Contractual Debt	1,494,615	1,515,357	1,209,407

Please see Appendix A for a capital repayment profile for Golar’s Contractual Debt.

Forward Looking Statements

This press release contains forward-looking statements (as defined in Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended) which reflects management’s current expectations, estimates and projections about its operations. All statements, other than statements of historical facts, that address activities and events that will, should, could or may occur in the future are forward-looking statements. Words such as “if,” “subject to,” “believe,” “assuming,” “anticipate,” “intend,” “estimate,” “forecast,” “project,” “plan,” “potential,” “will,” “may,” “should,” “expect,” “could,” “would,” “predict,” “propose,” “continue,” or the negative of these terms and similar expressions are intended to identify such forward-looking statements. These statements are not guarantees of future performance and are based upon various assumptions, many of which are based, in turn, upon further assumptions, including without limitation, management’s examination of historical operating trends, data contained in our records and other data available from third parties. Although we believe that these assumptions were reasonable when made, because these assumptions are inherently subject to significant uncertainties and contingencies which are difficult or impossible to predict and are beyond our control, we cannot assure you that we will achieve or accomplish these expectations, beliefs or projections. Therefore, actual outcomes and results may differ materially from what is expressed or forecasted in such forward-looking statements. You should not place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date of this press release. Unless legally required, Golar undertakes no obligation to update publicly any forward-looking statements whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise. Other important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking statements include but are not limited to:

our ability and that of our counterparty to meet our respective obligations under the 20-year lease and operate agreement (the “LOA”) with BP Mauritania Investments Limited, a subsidiary of BP p.l.c. (“bp”), entered into in connection with the Greater Tortue Ahmeyim Project (the “GTA Project”), including the commissioning and start-up of various project infrastructure. Delays to FLNG commissioning works and the start of operations for our FLNG Gimi (“FLNG Gimi”) could result in incremental costs to both parties to the LOA;

our ability to meet our obligations under our commercial agreements, including the liquefaction tolling agreement (the “LTA”) entered into in connection with the FLNG Hilli Episeyo (“FLNG Hilli”);

our ability to meet our obligations to SESA in connection with the recently signed agreement to deploy FLNG Hilli in Argentina, and SESA’s ability to meet its obligations to us;

our ability to meet our obligations to SESA in connection with the recently signed definitive agreement to deploy our FLNG in conversion, MKII FLNG in Argentina, including reaching a final investment decision, and SESA’s ability to meet its obligations to us;

our ability to obtain additional financing or refinance existing debt on acceptable terms or at all including the satisfaction of the conditions precedent to the consummation of the FLNG Gimi sale leaseback transaction;

global economic trends, competition, and geopolitical risks, including U.S. government actions, trade tensions or conflicts such as between the U.S. and China, related sanctions, a potential Russia-Ukraine peace settlement and its potential impact on liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) supply and demand;

a material decline or prolonged weakness in tolling rates for FLNGs;

failure of shipyards to comply with schedules, performance specifications or agreed prices;

failure of our contract counterparties to comply with their agreements with us or other key project stakeholders;

an increase in tax liabilities in the jurisdictions where we are currently operating, have previously operated, or expect to operate;

continuing volatility in the global financial markets, including commodity prices, foreign exchange rates and interest rates and global trade policy, particularly the recent imposition of tariffs by the U.S. government;

changes in general domestic and international political conditions, particularly where we operate, or where we seek to operate;

changes in our ability to retrofit vessels as FLNGs, including the availability of vessels to purchase and in the time it takes to build new vessels or convert existing vessels;

continuing uncertainty resulting from potential future claims from our counterparties of purported force majeure under contractual arrangements, including our future projects and other contracts to which we are a party;

our ability to close potential future transactions in relation to equity interests in our vessels or to monetize our remaining equity method investments on a timely basis or at all;

increases in operating costs as a result of inflation or trade policy, including salaries and wages, insurance, crew provisions, repairs and maintenance, spares and redeployment related modification costs;

claims made or losses incurred in connection with our continuing obligations with regard to New Fortress Energy Inc. (“NFE”), Energos Infrastructure Holdings Finance LLC (“Energos”), Cool Company Ltd (“CoolCo”), and Snam S.p.A. (“Snam”);

the ability of NFE, Energos, CoolCo, and Snam to meet their respective obligations to us, including indemnification obligations;

changes to rules and regulations applicable to FLNGs or other parts of the natural gas and LNG supply chain;

rules on climate-related disclosures promulgated by the European Union, including but not limited to disclosure of certain climate-related risks and financial impacts, as well as greenhouse gas emissions;

actions taken by regulatory authorities that may prohibit the access of FLNGs to various ports and locations; and

other factors listed from time to time in registration statements, reports or other materials that we have filed with or furnished to the Commission, including our annual report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2024, filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on March 27, 2025 (the “2024 Annual Report”).

As a result, you are cautioned not to rely on any forward-looking statements. Actual results may differ materially from those expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. The Company undertakes no obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise unless required by law.

Responsibility Statement

We confirm that, to the best of our knowledge, the unaudited consolidated financial statements for the three months ended March 31, 2025, which have been prepared in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States give a true and fair view of Golar’s unaudited consolidated assets, liabilities, financial position and results of operations. To the best of our knowledge, the report for the three months ended March 31, 2025, includes a fair review of important events that have occurred during the period and their impact on the unaudited consolidated financial statements, the principal risks and uncertainties and major related party transactions.

May 27, 2025
The Board of Directors
Golar LNG Limited
Hamilton, Bermuda
Investor Questions: +44 207 063 7900
Karl Fredrik Staubo – CEO
Eduardo Maranhão – CFO

Stuart Buchanan – Head of Investor Relations

Tor Olav Trøim (Chairman of the Board)
Benoît de la Fouchardiere (Director)
Carl Steen (Director)
Dan Rabun (Director)
Lori Wheeler Naess (Director)
Mi Hong Yoon (Director)
Niels Stolt-Nielsen (Director)

This information is subject to the disclosure requirements pursuant to Section 5-12 the Norwegian Securities Trading Act

The MIL Network –

May 27, 2025

I don’t know what’s wrong with him: Trump says he is not happy with Putin for bombing Ukraine

Source: Government of India

Source: Government of India (4)

U.S. President Donald Trump on Sunday expressed deep unhappiness at Russia’s weekend bombing of Ukraine, saying of Russian President Vladimir Putin, “I’m not happy with Putin.”

“I don’t know what’s wrong with him. What the hell happened to him? Right? He’s killing a lot of people. I’m not happy about that,” Trump told reporters at the airport in Morristown, New Jersey, as he prepared to return to Washington.

Trump spoke in reaction to a Russian barrage of 367 drones and missiles at Ukrainian cities overnight on Sunday, including the capital Kyiv, in the largest aerial attack of the war so far, killing at least 12 people and injuring dozens more.

Trump has been trying to get both sides to agree to a ceasefire in the three-year-old war in Ukraine and he spoke for more than two hours with Putin last week.

He raised the possibility of imposing more sanctions on Russia in response to the ongoing attacks.

“Always gotten along with him, but he’s sending rockets into cities and killing people, and I don’t like it at all,” Trump said.

(Reuters)

May 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Russia: D. Trump made tough statements against V. Putin and V. Zelensky

Translation. Region: Russian Federal

Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

LOS ANGELES, May 26 (Xinhua) — U.S. President Donald Trump on Sunday made harsh remarks about both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

“I’m not happy with what V. Putin is doing,” Trump told reporters before flying from Morristown, N.J., to Washington. “I don’t know what the hell happened to V. Putin.”

“I’ve known him for a long time, I’ve always gotten along with him, but he’s sending missiles to cities and killing people, and I don’t like that at all. Fine. We’re talking, and he’s shooting missiles at Kyiv and other cities. I don’t like that at all,” he added.

D. Trump made the comments after Russia and Ukraine launched massive missile and drone strikes against each other on Sunday.

Later on Sunday evening, D. Trump wrote on the social network Truth Social that V. Putin “has completely lost his mind!”

In response to statements made by V. Zelensky earlier on Sunday criticizing the US silence on the latest Russian attacks, D. Trump said that V. Zelensky “is not doing his country any good by speaking the way he does.”

“Everything he says is problematic, I don’t like it, and it better stop,” D. Trump said about V. Zelensky. According to him, the Ukrainian side should not blame him, since “this is a war of V. Zelensky, V. Putin and J. Biden, not D. Trump.” –0–

MIL OSI Russia News –

May 27, 2025
An ode to the fourth-largest economy of the world

Source: Government of India

Source: Government of India (4)

In May 2025, India stands as the fourth-largest economy in the world, surpassing Japan and trailing only the United States of America, China, and Germany.

With a Gross Domestic Product of over four trillion dollars, the economic might of the nation is now evident to the world. In the last decade, India’s GDP has more than doubled. To put things in perspective, it took India more than 65 years to reach its first two trillion dollars, and only eleven years to add the next two.

The economic upliftment of rural India has been integral to this leap. For decades, the countryside was plagued by issues of food, shelter, and clothing. However, in the last eleven years, these challenges have been addressed through precise and people-centric policymaking.

While an array of welfare programmes tells a compelling story, the simplest policy moves have been most effective. For instance, the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Anna Yojana has ensured an additional quota of foodgrains for more than 80 crore people. Before the Narendra Modi government took office, surplus foodgrains in government coffers were under contention, yet the previous government was unwilling to distribute them to those in need.

Beyond welfare, this has had a significant economic impact. People in villages now have more disposable income, which they are using to buy consumer durables, processed foods, and foods with higher nutritional value. Aspirations are changing, and the success of the Mudra Yojana is a testament to this shift. No longer a liability, rural India is now an asset for a rising nation.

Urban pockets are evolving as well. With every trillion dollars added to the economy, consumer demand is transforming. Earlier this month, Lego, one of the world’s largest toymakers, opened its first store in India in Gurugram, Haryana. Apple, the world’s leading technology company, is now embedded in urban markets, increasing its manufacturing volume and value within India.

But India’s manufacturing story is not just about Apple; it encompasses millions of young and old entrepreneurs shifting to local production, moving beyond the role of traders. Near the Haryana border, in Delhi’s North-West district, lies Bawana, an example of this significant shift. The Prime Minister’s larger message of ‘Make in India, Make for India, and Make for the World’ has resonated with entrepreneurs here, who are leading the change.

The greatest supplement to India’s growth over the last decade has been infrastructure. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has shown an unprecedented commitment to infrastructure development, rivaling Franklin D. Roosevelt in the 1930s.

India’s infrastructure push over the last decade has been the most ambitious in any democracy in the past century. A simple litmus test is that every individual within a 50-kilometer radius can vouch for redevelopment and numerous greenfield infrastructure projects.

These projects are empowering people in every state, enabling access to greater economic and employment opportunities. Projects like the Dedicated Freight Corridors, dormant under the previous government, are now instrumental in reducing export costs and enhancing the ease of doing business.

In the northeastern part of the country, projects are opening new avenues for tourism and the regional economy. In the Himalayas, strategic infrastructure initiatives, from Arunachal Pradesh to Ladakh, are strengthening military capabilities.

The government’s intent toward infrastructure is validated by its annual capital expenditure commitment. In recent years, the Centre has committed over Rs. 50 lakh crore to infrastructure development. This also serves as evidence of the government’s fiscal management, which has navigated the pandemic, the global supply chain crisis, and the Russia-Ukraine war. The focus has been on creating long-term assets to fuel economic growth.

The dual impact of welfare and infrastructure is fostering a generation of job creators. These are citizens, born in the late 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s, who are not seeking employment but creating it.

This new generation is further empowered by the digitisation of the economy and the pan-India market it has opened. These include digital creators as well. Employing anywhere from two to two hundred professionals, these entrepreneurs are transforming the dynamics of the Indian job market.

This is what makes India the largest free market in the world. Beyond geopolitical dynamics, the economic might of India’s market size cannot be underestimated. India’s market access alone can cripple foreign powers, as seen in 2020 when the government banned TikTok and in 2025 when it sent a stern message to Pakistan through Operation Sindoor. The world needs India more than India needs the world. That is the power of 140 crore people.

India’s rise to the third-largest economy is certain and will occur before 2029. Then begins a long journey toward becoming one of the world’s most important economic centres, driven by its market and demography. If the last decade was about cementing the size of the economy, the next will witness sharp and steep progress in microeconomic fundamentals, from per capita income to changing expenditure dynamics.

From being among the ‘Fragile Five’ in 2013, India has come a long way by 2025, ranking among the top five. The comeback has been remarkable, and the country retains the momentum to surge further ahead. In 2015, it was the story of an economy struggling to find its footing. In 2025, it is about an economy ready to rise like an albatross, and by 2035, the story will be of a ten-trillion-dollar economy, reclaiming its civilisational position in a brave new world.

(Tushar Gupta is a Delhi-based journalist and a political commentator)

May 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Extension of the EU-Ukraine trade agreement – E-001263/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament
The Commission does not intend to propose the prolongation of the current Autonomous Trade Measures Regulation[1] providing duty free and quota free imports for Ukraine.

Instead, the Commission is pursuing consultations with Ukraine to review the reciprocal tariff liberalisation under the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement[2] in accordance with Article 29 of that Agreement.

This review will lead to a well-balanced solution that will allow for reciprocal trade between the EU and Ukraine in agricultural goods, while at the same time protecting EU farmers and addressing interests flagged by some Member States and Members of the European Parliament.

Furthermore, the Commission is proposing that the negotiated solution would also include a safeguard clause that would be triggered to prevent any adverse impacts of trade flows on the EU market, including one Member State.

As mandated by Article 4(2) of the Autonomous Trade Measures Regulation, the Commission monitors on a regular basis the impact of the Autonomous Trade Measures adopted by the European Parliament and the Council.

The monitoring report is shared with the European Parliament and with the Member States. So far, this monitoring has not shown any adverse effect on the EU market or the market of one or several Member States.

The Commission is regularly consulting Member States on this issue. The views of the Member States, as well as the European Parliament and relevant stakeholders, feed into the Commission’s decision-making process.

The Commission is not in a position to share the specific feedback received from Member States since it is not the author of such documents.

[1] OJ L, 2024/1392, 29.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1392/oj.

[2] http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2014/295/oj.
Last updated: 26 May 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
May 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: The NATO International Military Staff hosts the EU Military Staff for the 23rd IMS-EUMS Directors General Conference

Source: NATO

Brussels, NATO HQ, 23 May – The Director General of the NATO International Military Staff (DGIMS), Lieutenant General Janusz Adamczak, welcomed the Director General of the European Union Military Staff (DGEUMS), Lieutenant General Michiel van der Laan, to NATO HQ, for the biannual IMS-EUMS Directors General Conference.

The day’s discussions focused on the practical ways IMS and EUMS are collaborating, including about how NATO can support the EUMS in enhancing EU military exercises, as well as on the implementation of the EU White Paper for the European Defence Readiness 2030.

The meeting came at a time when close cooperation between both international organisations becomes increasingly essential. Numerous key focus areas included Ukraine, military mobility, space, capability development, medical cooperation, digital transformation and cyber defence. Both organisations engaged to work more closely together to help strengthen defence-industrial cooperation.

Lieutenant General Adamczak opened up the talks by highlighting that “this conference remains a crucial driver for the cooperation between our staffs and a key part of the larger effort to enhance the NATO-EU cooperation.” During his remarks, he stressed the need for unity against common security threats, stating that “our two organizations, each equipped with unique strengths and perspectives, offer a potent force multiplier in confronting these contemporary challenges.”

Following, Lieutenant General van der Laan used the floor to highlight that these biannual talks are a “testament to our enduring partnership, grounded in shared values, mutual respect, and a commitment to effective synergies in the work of both staff’s.” Both Directors agreed that the vision of NATO-EU cooperation should result in tangible outcomes, which “will enhance the security and defence of EU Members and NATO Allies,” DGEUMS said.

Both Directors General underlined the need to keep up and possibly strengthen the cooperation in support of Ukraine, drawing from additional opportunities provided by the implementation of the EU White Paper for the European Defence Readiness 2030. After a full day of practical discussions, the two Director Generals closed out the biannual conference, with DGEUMS stating, “by leveraging the full spectrum of our capabilities, we can build a more resilient and responsive security architecture that responds quickly to imposing threats.”

On his side, DGIMS closed his last IMS-EUMS Directors General Conference, by recognizing that “we are living in a time of rapid and sometimes unpredictable changes. So, we must constantly work in a flexible manner, being ready to improve and adapt together to the new challenges.”

The next IMS-EUMS DGs Conference will be hosted by the EUMS, and is scheduled to take place on 21 November 2025.

MIL Security OSI –

May 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Telephone conversation with the Prime Minister of Japan

Source: Government of Italy (English)

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26 Maggio 2025

The President of the Council of Ministers, Giorgia Meloni, had a telephone conversation today with the Prime Minister of Japan, Shigeru Ishiba.

The conversation highlighted the shared satisfaction with the path undertaken to constantly strengthen bilateral relations. In this context, President Meloni confirmed her intention to pay an official visit to Japan in the coming months in order to further deepen the fruitful dialogue between Rome and Tokyo and, while there, to also visit the Italian pavilion at the Osaka Expo.

The two leaders also discussed the main international issues, including the war in Ukraine, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific, agreeing to remain in close contact ahead of the upcoming G7 Summit in Kananaskis.

MIL OSI Europe News –

May 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Russia: The head of the Russian Foreign Ministry confirmed preparations for the second round of Russian-Ukrainian talks, but the dates and venue have not yet been determined

Translation. Region: Russian Federal

Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian –

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

Moscow, May 23 /Xinhua/ — The second round of talks between Russia and Ukraine on peaceful settlement will take place, but the dates and venue have not yet been determined, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on Friday, speaking at a conference in Moscow.

“Yes, we are for negotiations. Yes, there will be a second round. They /Ukrainian authorities/ have confirmed this. This is already a positive development,” TASS quotes him as saying.

As S. Lavrov stated, the dates and venue of the second round of negotiations with the Ukrainian side have not yet been determined. According to him, the main task now is to prepare a peace treaty with Ukraine, which will ensure long-term peace.

“The most important task now is to prepare a peace treaty that will be reliable and will ensure a long-term, sustainable, fair peace without creating security threats to anyone, in this case we are interested in the Russian Federation, without any attempts to infringe on the rights of Russians and Russian-speakers in violation of the UN Charter, which prohibits discrimination on religious and linguistic grounds,” said the head of the Russian diplomatic mission.

S. Lavrov reported that the Russian side’s work on the memorandum on the peace treaty is already at an advanced stage. “The work is underway. I don’t know about that /Ukrainian/ side, but our work is already at an advanced stage, and in any case we will hand over this memorandum to the Ukrainians,” the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry noted. –0–

MIL OSI Russia News –

May 27, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Cook, A View on Financial Stability

Source: US State of New York Federal Reserve

Thank you, Alessandra, for organizing us today, and thanks to you, Veronica Guerrieri, and Marina Azzimonti for initiating this effort seven years ago. I am honored to be with so many friends in macroeconomics at the 2025 Women in Macro Conference. I still read, recommend, and cite your work and am grateful to New York University and the University of Chicago for supporting this conference and this research.1
How has the arc of mainstream macroeconomic research become more closely integrated with issues related to financial stability? This question is what I would like to discuss today. I applaud the advances in incorporating financial stability into macroeconomic models, which have significantly enhanced our understanding of financial market functioning and its effect on the economy. It is a topic that holds special importance to me as a macroeconomist who has worked at the intersection of macroeconomics and finance since my dissertation and as the chair of the Federal Reserve Board’s Committee on Financial Stability. I would like to then offer my assessment of the stability of the U.S. financial system.
Financial stability supports the objectives assigned to the Federal Reserve, including full employment and stable prices, a safe and sound banking system, and an efficient payments system. A financial system is considered stable when banks, other lenders, and financial markets are able to provide households, communities, and businesses with the financing they need to invest, grow, and participate in a well-functioning economy—and can do so even when hit by adverse events, or “shocks.”2 Financial instability, by contrast, arises when vulnerabilities—such as asset bubbles, excessive leverage, liquidity mismatches, or interconnected exposures—can build up to such an extent that they can amplify different shocks and threaten the core functions of the system and the functioning of the broader economy.
Macroeconomic Research and Financial StabilityThe idea that supply creates its own demand, or Say’s law, was the prevailing economic orthodoxy of the 1800s. As a result, the core content of macroeconomics as a separate discipline did not exist. Prolonged periods of involuntary unemployment were considered to be impossible. Money and credit were thought to act as a “veil” with no real effects, so money was seen as neutral and banks and other financial intermediaries as essentially passive, despite what we now know.
The Great Depression fundamentally put an end to this comforting orthodoxy and prompted decades of work to better understand the causes of, and policy responses to, economic fluctuations. For the first time, financial factors took center stage in economic theory. Directly responding to the failures of economic theory exposed by the Depression, John Maynard Keynes introduced the concept of a “liquidity trap,” in which fear pushes the demand for money so high that the usual corrective measures become ineffective.3 Friedrich Hayek and the Austrian school of economics emphasized the role of unsustainable credit booms, noting that booms in “malinvestment” would lead to fundamental mismatches that would need to be addressed.4 Despite the early focus on panics, credit booms, and extreme dynamics, macroeconomic research evolved in a way that de-emphasized the role of the financial system, likely reflecting technical limitations and, more broadly, the need to develop policy frameworks for the post–World War II economy where the Great Depression seemed less relevant. Modeling financial crises requires addressing complex nonlinear dynamics, feedback loops, and discontinuities, like defaults and bank runs. All of these were analytically intractable and computationally unmanageable with the tools available at the time.
As a result, the macroeconomic framework that originated from the ideas of Keynes generally assumed stable and frictionless financial markets. The IS-LM, or Investment-Saving Liquidity Preference-Money Supply framework, which describes how the goods market and the money market interact to determine aggregate output and interest rates in the economy, emerged as the central analytical tool for understanding short-run output and interest rate dynamics.5
However, the neoclassical synthesis was not without its critics. Joan Robinson argued that capital accumulation and investment behavior were inherently volatile and criticized the prevailing framework for overlooking important sources of instability.6 Milton Friedman’s work challenged the Keynesian paradigm by highlighting the importance of monetary policy and the destabilizing effects of monetary mismanagement.7 Even as the rational expectations revolution in macro ushered in explicit modeling of micro foundations and dynamic optimization, financial intermediaries, credit frictions, and the potential for systemic crises remained largely absent. Neoclassical growth models prioritized capital accumulation and technological progress as drivers of long-run growth, and real business cycle models emphasized productivity shocks as drivers of fluctuations in employment and growth.8
Two papers familiar to many of you here and published in 1983 were instrumental in bringing financial stability considerations back into macroeconomic research. Douglas Diamond and Philip Dybvig showed how banks’ role in providing liquidity makes them vulnerable to runs, while Ben Bernanke demonstrated how bank failures deepened the Great Depression.9 These contributions, which were recognized with a Nobel Prize in 2022, have helped pave the way for researchers wishing to explore both directions of the relationship between financial fragility and macroeconomic outcomes. In parallel, Hyman Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis advanced a dynamic view of systemic risk, emphasizing how periods of sustained economic and financial stability tend to encourage excessive leverage and risk-taking—culminating in what we now call a “Minsky moment.” This phenomenon is when a rapid unwinding of financial positions triggers broader economic distress.10
Ultimately, it took the Global Financial Crisis to bring home just how deeply the financial system and macroeconomic dynamics are intertwined, as evidenced by the explosion of research on financial stability and financial frictions. Models incorporating financial intermediaries, leverage cycles, and endogenous risk became more central to macroeconomic analysis, while empirical work confirmed the critical role of credit booms in preceding financial crises.11
Over the past few years, macroeconomic research, to which some of you have contributed, continued to incorporate important financial stability aspects, ranging from endogenous leverage and bank runs to models studying the effects of monetary policy in the presence of heterogenous banks.12 Much of this research is also being done at the Fed, and it has informed our current work in the area. I thought it would be helpful to describe some of that work to you.
Monitoring Financial StabilityCentral banks around the world routinely monitor the financial system for risks, because financial crises can lead to severe recessions. A cornerstone of the Fed’s work in this area is our framework for monitoring and assessing vulnerabilities. The most recent version of our semiannual Financial Stability Report (FSR) was released last month.13 Our framework distinguishes between two fundamental elements: shocks and vulnerabilities.14 Shocks are adverse events that by their nature are difficult to predict and, unfortunately, are all too frequent. Recent examples include the pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank, and many geopolitical events that still warrant headlines. Vulnerabilities, which are aspects of the financial system that would amplify stress, tend to build up over time and can be identified and assessed. We monitor vulnerabilities in four key categories: asset valuation pressures, household and business borrowing, financial-sector leverage, and liquidity and maturity transformation, or funding risks. Policies to build resilience in the financial system are appropriately targeted at reducing vulnerabilities, because they do not require foreknowledge of any particular shocks.
The financial cycle is recognized as being lower in frequency than the business cycle, with vulnerabilities building over years and typically only to be crystallizing in a short-lived stress event—the classic dynamic of going up by the stairs but down by the elevator.15 Further, as I mentioned earlier, vulnerabilities often build during prolonged expansions as, for example, investor optimism leads to greater tolerance of risk, excess borrowing, and increased leverage. The realization of stress and associated contraction can put these forces into reverse, resulting in decreased vulnerabilities. But the economic and human costs of such an adjustment can be significant.
Financial Stability AssessmentOur most recent FSR reflects data and information generally available as of April 11, a point when financial market volatility and risk-off sentiment were elevated, with, for example, the S&P 500 having fallen more than 10 percent from its prior peak. Nonetheless, the report echoes many of the themes that we had been highlighting for the previous couple of years. I will discuss our most recent report in the context of some of those themes and illustrate a few lessons from the April volatility.
Let me start with one theme that is quite encouraging. Generally, businesses and household finances are in solid shape. Most households are able to service their debt, and overall household debt relative to GDP has declined over the past five years. While we are seeing some stress among low-to-moderate-income borrowers and those with subprime credit scores, the risks posed by overall household borrowing remain moderate. Stable balance sheets and solid income have supported the ability of most nonfinancial businesses to service their debt. At the same time, smaller and riskier businesses—which tend to have lower debt service capacity, measured by the interest coverage ratio—are sensitive to income shocks.
Most households are able to service their debt, and overall household debt relative to GDP has declined over the past five years. While vulnerabilities posed by overall household borrowing remain moderate, we are seeing some signs of stress among borrowers with subprime credit scores, which include many low- and moderate-income households. For instance, auto and credit card delinquency rates for borrowers with subprime credit scores increased substantially in 2022 and 2023 and are at or near their highest levels since the financial crisis. More generally, a sufficiently large income shock could strain the debt-servicing capacity of a broader group of households and push up delinquency and default rates, resulting in more substantial losses for lenders.
Asset prices have fluctuated significantly over the past several years. Although we do look at asset prices, we tend to focus more on “valuations pressures,” which essentially measure how much prices differ from a variety of benchmarks. For instance, we care whether prices, relative to measures of risk, appear to be out of step with historical experience. In such circumstances, the potential price declines—should risk appetite revert to historical averages—would be larger than normal. Additionally, when the compensation for risk is low, borrowing or leverage could also increase and put further upward pressure on valuations. Coming into the April volatility, valuation pressures were elevated, consistent with the strong economy.
Allow me to discuss our view of valuation pressures in property markets and come back shortly to the imprint of the April volatility on stock and bond prices. The significant rise in house prices during and after the pandemic has slowed substantially over the past couple of years, but price-to-rent ratios and model-based valuation measures are around the record levels last seen in 2005. Two key differences are that lax underwriting standards do not appear to have driven the increase in house prices and owners’ equity appears to be more solid, using both price- and model-based measures.
We also noted that commercial real estate (CRE) valuations had been elevated going into 2022 but declined significantly through the period of higher interest rates and deteriorating CRE fundamentals. Prices and fundamentals appear to have moderated, and valuations are closer to historical norms. Given the significant volume of CRE that is maturing and will need to be refinanced, I am continuing to watch this market closely.
Let me now turn to financial system leverage and funding risks. Capital in the banking system continues to be at historically high levels. However, as you no doubt remember, the intersection of interest rate and liquidity risks played a prominent role in the March 2023 banking-sector stress. High reliance on funding from uninsured deposits was a key vulnerability among some of the most affected banks, including those that failed. When higher interest rates resulted in substantial unrealized losses, we observed rapid outflows of uninsured deposits from a handful of banks. In the April FSR, we describe how over the past couple of years, the share of uninsured deposits relative to total bank funding has decreased for most banks, especially for those that previously relied heavily on uninsured deposits. This outcome is a welcome signal. However, sizable exposure to fixed-rate assets remains, suggesting ongoing exposure to interest rate risk.
Since 2019, our FSRs have noted another development in markets—a decline in market liquidity. “Market liquidity” refers to the cost of quickly buying or selling a desired quantity of a security and being able to do so without having a significant effect on the market price. During periods of asset-price volatility, it is not surprising that liquidity often declines, so we consider whether market liquidity measures are low given the level of volatility. As discussed in previous FSRs, some evidence indicates that a number of measures of liquidity have shifted down over time, particularly in Treasury markets, where volatility has also been relatively high.16 We have done a lot of work, as have others, to analyze the causes and what lower liquidity in normal times may imply for market functioning during periods of severe stress. One area we are exploring is broker-dealers’ intermediation capacity, which has been affected by a number of factors, including elevated Treasury issuance and increased client demand for secured financing—which is typically collateralized by Treasury securities.
With that backdrop, let me now turn to last month’s events. The details of the tariff announcements in early April were unexpected. Corporate earnings calls and our own broad-based market outreach suggest three areas of concern among businesses and market participants: One, significantly heightened uncertainty, two, an increased risk of a slowdown in economic activity, and three, prospects for higher inflation. With subsequent announcements some of this uncertainty has ebbed. Nonetheless, the episode offers some insights relevant for financial stability.
Asset prices fell sharply, particularly in equities, but also in corporate bond and other securities markets. By the second week of April, major stock indices had declined almost 20 percent from their mid-February peaks, with over half of the declines coming in a seven-day period in early April. The Chicago Board Options Exchange’s Volatility Index, the VIX, was extremely elevated through this period, closing at levels not seen since the onset of the pandemic. Some of the decline in equity prices likely reflected a change in the economic outlook, but investor risk appetite likely fell as well, although this is harder to assess because data on changes in earnings expectations arrive with a lag. As we have flagged in previous FSRs, large asset-price declines, whatever the cause, can trigger margin spirals and other feedback loops that are self-reinforcing, if there is excessive leverage or liquidity mismatches in the system.
Highly leveraged investors, including some large hedge funds, have rapidly unwound positions during past bouts of market volatility. While such dynamics likely contributed to some of the price declines in early April, the overall volumes appear limited. As Roberto Perli, the manager of the Federal Open Market Committee’s System Open Market Account, noted in a recent speech, while there is evidence of some unwinding of the swap spread trade, it was orderly. He said there is no evidence of an unwinding of the cash-futures basis trade, a large and highly leveraged trade that exploits small differences in the prices of Treasury securities and Treasury futures contracts. This stability likely owes in part to the resilience of funding markets through this episode.17
Large asset-price declines also prompt outflows from open-end mutual funds. Some funds specialize in relatively illiquid assets, such as high-yield corporate bonds or leveraged loans. This is another potential vulnerability we have tracked over time, because a large redemption wave can overwhelm these funds’ cash reserves, leading to fire-sale dynamics in the underlying markets. And redemptions from some funds were quite large in April, particularly given that, in contrast with previous episodes, the general level of interest rates did not fall. Nonetheless, funds were able to handle these redemptions without contributing to stress in corporate debt markets.
Treasury markets also continued to function in an orderly fashion throughout the episode. To be sure, market depth and other liquidity measures decreased from already low levels, but the decline was in line with what would be anticipated, given the elevated volatility in markets. This outcome is in contrast to what we saw in March 2020, when trading became much more difficult than would have been expected, given the level of volatility because of the broad market dysfunction that characterized the onset of the pandemic.
The episode provided a real-life example of the large asset-price declines and sudden bursts of volatility that can result from shocks when asset valuations are stretched, as well as the importance of stable and resilient funding markets in absorbing shocks. The experience will surely help us hone our ongoing assessment of financial system vulnerabilities and areas of resilience.
ConclusionI would like to conclude my remarks with a few examples of research areas that I think would be interesting and helpful to me and, perhaps, to other policymakers.
First, I understand the difficulty of developing macroeconomic models in which financial risk is endogenously determined by leverage and liquidity mismatch rather than a reliance on exogenous risk shocks. But I hope that the prospect of making highly impactful policy-relevant contributions will induce researchers to dig in on this topic.
Second, episodes of strain in U.S. Treasury markets over the past several years illustrate the importance of nonbank financial intermediaries, a term that encompasses hedge funds, mutual funds, life insurers, finance companies, and money market funds. This is particularly true in the U.S., where credit is provided by a combination of banks and nonbanks that are often connected through counterparty relationships or common exposure. It would be helpful to have deeper insights into the potential macroeconomic consequences of the shifting interaction between banks and nonbanks.
Third, relatedly, efforts to incorporate private credit and private equity into macroeconomic models could spur important lines of research. Layered leverage in intermediation chains involving private equity, private credit funds, banks, and businesses can transmit and amplify real-economy shocks to different parts of the financial sector. In addition, private equity and private credit are macro-relevant sectors that can transmit shocks to the real economy.
I understand that it is easy to throw out a research wish list and walk away, leaving the substantial modeling and operational challenges to others. But I do think it is worth developing new tools and approaches for better characterizing our evolving macro-financial reality. I hope some of you and your graduate students will take up the challenge.
Thank you again for the opportunity to join you today.

1. The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee. Return to text
2. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2024), Financial Stability Report (Washington: Board of Governors, April). Return to text
3. See John Maynard Keynes (1936), The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (London: Macmillan). Return to text
4. See Friedrich A. Hayek (1931), Prices and Production (London: George Routledge & Sons). Return to text
5. See J. R. Hicks (1937), “Mr. Keynes and the ‘Classics’; A Suggested Interpretation,” Econometrica, vol. 5 (April), pp. 147–59; and Franco Modigliani (1944), “Liquidity Preference and the Theory of Interest and Money,” Econometrica, vol. 12 (January), pp. 45–88. Return to text
6. See Joan Robinson (1956), The Accumulation of Capital (London: Macmillan). Return to text
7. See Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz (1963), A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press). Return to text
8. See Robert M. Solow (1956), “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 70 (February), pp. 65–94; and Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott (1982), “Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations,” Econometrica, vol. 50 (November), pp. 1345–70. Return to text
9. See Douglas W. Diamond and Philip H. Dybvig (1983), “Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 91 (June), pp. 401–19; Ben S. Bernanke (1983), “Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression,” American Economic Review, vol. 73 (June), pp. 257–76; and Ben S. Bernanke, Mark Gertler, and Simon Gilchrist (1983), “The Financial Accelerator in a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework,” in John B. Taylor and Michael Woodford, eds., vol. 1: Handbook of Macroeconomics (Amsterdam: Elsevier), pp. 1341–93. Return to text
10. See Hyman P. Minsky (1982), Can “It” Happen Again? Essays on Instability and Finance (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe).  Return to text
11. See, for example, Mark Gertler and Nobuhiro Kiyotaki (2010), “Financial Intermediation and Credit Policy in Business Cycle Analysis” in Benjamin M. Friedman and Michael Woodford, eds., vol. 3: Handbook of Monetary Economics (Amsterdam: Elsevier), pp. 547–99; Markus K. Brunnermeier and Yuliy Sannikov (2014), “A Macroeconomic Model with a Financial Sector,” American Economic Review, vol. 104 (February), pp. 379–421; Mark Gertler and Simon Gilchrist (2018), “What Happened: Financial Factors in the Great Recession,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 32 (Summer), pp. 3–30; Òscar Jordà, Moritz Schularick, and Alan M. Taylor (2013), “When Credit Bites Back,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 45 (December), pp. 3–28; Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2009), This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press). Return to text
12. See, for example, Mark Gertler, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, and Andrea Prestipino (2020), “A Macroeconomic Model with Financial Panics,” Review of Economic Studies, vol. 87 (January), pp. 240–88; and Marco Bellifemine, Rustam Jamilov, and Tommaso Monacelli (2022), “Monetary Policy with Heterogeneous Banks,” CEPR Discussion Paper No. 17129 (Washington: Center for Economic and Policy Research, March 22). Return to text
13. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2025), Financial Stability Report (PDF) (Washington: Board of Governors, April). Return to text
14. Details of the approach are outlined in the framework developed by Tobias Adrian, Daniel Covitz, and Nellie Liang (2013), “Financial Stability Monitoring (PDF),” staff report no. 601 (New York: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, February; revised June 2014). Return to text
15. See Claudio Borio (2014), “The Financial Cycle and Macroeconomics: What Have We Learnt?” Journal of Banking & Finance, vol. 45 (August), pp. 182–98. Return to text
16. See, for example, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2023), Financial Stability Report (PDF) (Washington: Board of Governors, May); and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2024), Financial Stability Report (PDF) (Washington: Board of Governors, November). Return to text
17. See Roberto Perli (2025), “Recent Developments in Treasury Market Liquidity and Funding Conditions,” speech delivered at the 8th Short-Term Funding Markets Conference, sponsored by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, May 9. Return to text

MIL OSI USA News –

May 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Russia is facing fresh sanctions, but Putin is used to dealing with a struggling economy

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Yerzhan Tokbolat, Lecturer in Finance, Queen’s University Belfast

The UK and the EU have agreed to hit Russia with a raft of new economic sanctions after hopes of a ceasefire with Ukraine came to nothing. One French minister commented that it is time to “suffocate” the Russian economy.

Since the country’s fullscale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, that economy has certainly suffered. Sanctions on Russia have already led to a depreciation of the rouble, high inflation, very high interest rates and a stagnating economy.

But it remains unclear what effect any new measures will have. And Vladimir Putin has a history of riding out economic hardship.

When he became president of Russia just over 25 years ago, the country’s economy was in dire straits. Attempts by his predecessors Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin to build a more open and capitalist system had not worked well for most Russian citizens.

Instead, a rapid wave of privatisations, which reformers hoped would build strong institutions, had mostly benefited a small group of oligarchs who exploited a weak and corrupt state to seize key oil, gas and mineral assets.

Those oligarchs resisted legal reform, moved wealth abroad, failed to invest in the domestic economy, and gradually gained control of major corporations and media, expanding their political influence. By 1995, nearly half of Russians were living in poverty.

The 1998 crisis worsened the situation, as a global recession and falling commodity prices led to fiscal imbalances and doubts about Russia’s ability to service its debt and uphold the fixed exchange rate. The central bank raised interest rates to 150% to try and stabilise the rouble, but this failed.

It eventually allowed the rouble to float, and the currency lost about two-thirds of its value. When he came to power in 2000, Putin was then confronted with the challenge of rebuilding the Russian economy.

Luckily for him, between 2000 and 2008, an oil and gas boom drove GDP growth, increasing incomes, and allowing for early repayment of national debts. Putin – and national pride – received a boost.

Rising energy revenues helped stabilise the economy and enabled the state to tighten its grip on the energy sector. By 2006, Gazprom accounted for 20% of government tax revenue.

Putin then shifted his focus to Europe. With German support, the Nord Stream pipeline was completed in 2011, enabling direct gas exports to western Europe while bypassing Ukraine. This increased European dependence on Russian energy.

But Putin’s oil and gas-driven economic model struggled to sustain growth, and by 2013, his approval ratings had fallen to their lowest point since 2000.

The annexation of Crimea in 2014, along with a very expensive Winter Olympics in the Black Sea resort city of Sochi, temporarily boosted his popularity.

Running on empty

However, these accomplishments did little to address Russia’s core economic problems, particularly its failure to build a diversified economy.

By 2018, Russia’s economy was again stagnant, with a weak currency and declining living standards, and Putin’s popularity fell in part due to unpopular budget-saving reforms, including raising the retirement age.

There was widespread doubt about Putin’s model of lasting prosperity, which relied on state-led growth, but was marked by instability, resource dependence and growing geopolitical ambition.

In this light, Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 appeared to be a familiar tactic to boost support. Indeed, his approval jumped to 83% after invading Ukraine, matching levels seen after the 2014 Crimea annexation. His ratings have remained high since, with recent polls still showing approval levels above 80%.

But the Russian economy will still be a worry. Sustaining a “war economy”, where manufacturing and investment are focused on conflict cannot go on forever, particularly as the manufacturing product is being rapidly depleted as the Russian military uses it the field. And reliance on commodities has amplified the impact of sanctions, hitting key banks and energy firms such as Gazprom and Rosneft.

Meanwhile, the US has significantly expanded its presence in Europe’s energy market, supplying nearly 50% of the EU’s liquid natural gas imports after tripling exports between 2021 and 2023.

Major Russian pipeline projects such as Nord Stream 2 and Power of Siberia 2 remain in limbo. And the decline in oil prices in April 2025, the biggest since November 2021, poses further risks.

If a ceasefire is agreed, a pause in the war could offer Russia the chance to regroup and recover economically. Sanctions are often temporary, and global demand for oil and gas remains strong. Some countries may re-engage in trade.

But future economic stagnation could once again fuel aggression. Unless Russia undertakes structural reforms and redefines its role in the global economy by reducing reliance on resource exports and engaging more constructively with global markets, the cycle of confrontation may repeat itself, with far-reaching global consequences.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Russia is facing fresh sanctions, but Putin is used to dealing with a struggling economy – https://theconversation.com/russia-is-facing-fresh-sanctions-but-putin-is-used-to-dealing-with-a-struggling-economy-255732

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

May 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: History shows that Donald Trump is making a serious error in appeasing Vladimir Putin

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Tim Luckhurst, Principal of South College, Durham University

The policy of appeasement – strategic concessions to an aggressor that are designed to avoid war – is generally most closely associated in the UK with the Conservative leader Neville Chamberlain, prime minister between May 1937 and May 1940.

When Chamberlain moved into 10 Downing Street, Adolf Hitler’s willingness to ignore international agreements was already apparent, having broken the Versailles treaty with a massive expansion of Germany’s armed forces, the occupation of the Rhineland.

Faced with the prospect of Germany moving on Czechoslovakia, Chamberlain continued to work to appease Hitler by agreeing to territorial concessions in his favour. He believed that by appeasing the Führer, Europe could avoid war and save lives.

Chamberlain’s failure, and the subsequent outbreak of the second world war after Germany’s invasion of Poland in September 1939, are recognised as evidence that the appeasement of expansionist nationalists always fails. Such leaders will simply take all that is offered and demand more.

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There are parallels with the relationship between the current US president, Donald Trump, and the Russian president, Vladimir Putin. Trump and his senior officials have also repeatedly suggested that Ukraine should secure a peace deal by acquiescing to Putin’s demands, including for sovereign Ukrainian territory and assurances that Ukraine won’t be allowed to join Nato.

This makes it seem as if Trump believes that peace can be achieved by appeasing Putin. Like Chamberlain at Munich, Trump has suggested offering the sovereign territory of an independent nation to appease a bully.

Trump is not the first American president to make this mistake. Franklin D. Roosevelt, who served between March 1933 and April 1945, also tried to appease Hitler. The historian Frederick W. Marks III notes that “the keynote of his approach … beginning in 1933 was appeasement”.

Before he was inaugurated, Roosevelt sought to persuade Sir Ronald Lindsay, the British ambassador to the US between 1930 and 1939, that Poland should be persuaded to concede the Polish Corridor to Germany. When German troops seized the Rhineland, Roosevelt’s White House made no protest.

Between 1935 and 1937, Roosevelt made speeches condemning autocracy – but his actions did not match his words. In 1938, he appointed the appeaser Joseph Kennedy as US ambassador to the UK. Kennedy assured the German ambassador in London that he “sympathised not only with Germany’s racial policy but also with her economic goals”.

In Berlin, the US ambassador, Hugh Wilson, insisted that defence of Czechoslovakia’s borders would be unrealistic. The Czechs should surrender the Sudetenland to Germany. Roosevelt continued his efforts to arrange a compromise peace when German forces seized Poland in September 1939.

Echoes of the past

The parallels continue. Confronted by Russia’s invasion of its democratic neighbour and relentless attacks on Ukrainian towns and cities, Trump’s response, shortly after taking office, was to bully the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, and negotiate directly with Russia. This approach signally failed and the killing continued and even intensified.

Now, following his two-hour conversation with Putin on Monday, Trump has abandoned his insistence on an unconditional 30-day ceasefire. He now insists that the war is not his to fix. The US will step back. It is another hard blow to Ukrainian hopes for negotiation and compromise.

Read more:
After another call with Putin, it looks like Trump has abandoned efforts to mediate peace in Ukraine

To a much greater extent than Roosevelt, Trump appears to treat weakness as evidence of moral inadequacy. In a recent essay, Ivan Mikloš, the former deputy prime minister of Slovakia who has advised successive Ukrainian governments in various capacities, writes of what he sees as Trump’s “affinity for the Kremlin boss”. Miklos believes that Trump admires Putin, and concludes that:

President Putin, of course, sees that Mr Trump has a soft spot for him. This does not deter him in his maximalist demands, it encourages him even more.

The US president’s treatment of Zelensky in the Oval Office at the end of February, and repeated statements since, suggest he lacks the patience for diplomacy – a concern that has been widely reported. Trump is said to admire Putin because the Russian president exercises power with minimal restraint.

Meanwhile, Zelensky must plead for the military and financial support he requires to continue fighting a foe with a population four times larger.

Lessons from history

There is scant evidence that Trump pays attention to history. He should, because for Putin, history is central to strategy. A graduate of law who studied at Leningrad State University, graduating in 1975, Putin appears to have embraced an idealist version of his homeland as it operated in his youth as the Soviet Union – under the hardline leadership of Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko.

That Soviet Union included all of the territory of modern Ukraine. Putin aspires to recapture it. His vision is a Russia restored to a status comparable to that of the Soviet Union during the cold war years of his youth.

Trump appears to forget that throughout the cold war, the Soviet Union’s powerful armed forces and ideological hostility to democracy cost the US an average of 3.6% of its GDP in defence spending each year. It’s one thing for Trump to demand that the European members of Nato must increase their defence budgets. It’s another to imagine that Nato can immediately provide a reliable deterrent to Russian aggression without US involvement.

Trump’s newly appointed defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, suggested at a meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group in Brussels in February that the US would reorientate its security policy away from Europe, saying Europe must “take ownership of conventional security on the continent”.

This is essential, Hegseth said, because China is the real threat, and the US lacks the military resources to face in two directions simultaneously. It was a confession of weakness that places both America and Europe at increased risk.

The philosopher George Santayana is credited with the warning: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”. Chamberlain’s version of appeasement failed to prevent Adolf Hitler’s aggression in the 20th century. Trump’s version appears equally incapable of deterring Vladimir Putin’s territorial ambitions in the 21st.

Tim Luckhurst has received funding from News UK and Ireland Ltd. He is a fellow of the Royal Society of Arts and a member of the Society of Editors and the Free Speech Union

– ref. History shows that Donald Trump is making a serious error in appeasing Vladimir Putin – https://theconversation.com/history-shows-that-donald-trump-is-making-a-serious-error-in-appeasing-vladimir-putin-257252

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

May 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Russia: Large-scale prisoner exchange between Russia and Ukraine to continue in coming days — Russian Defense Ministry

Translation. Region: Russian Federal

Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

Moscow, May 23 /Xinhua/ — A large-scale prisoner exchange between Russia and Ukraine is planned to continue in the coming days, the Russian Defense Ministry reported on Friday.

“The large-scale exchange initiated by the Russian side is planned to continue in the coming days,” TASS quotes the military department’s statement as saying.

As part of the agreement reached by the delegations of Russia and Ukraine at the talks in Istanbul on May 16 on the exchange of prisoners according to the formula “one thousand for one thousand people”, 270 Russian servicemen and 120 civilians, including civilians from the Kursk region, were returned from Ukrainian captivity. In response, Russia handed over 270 prisoners of war of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and 120 civilians.

The Russian Defense Ministry stated that the returned Russian military and civilians are currently in the Republic of Belarus, where they are receiving the necessary psychological and medical assistance. “All of them will be delivered to Russia for treatment and rehabilitation in medical institutions,” the department said. –0–

MIL OSI Russia News –

May 27, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Q&A: Ukraine Update

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Iowa Chuck Grassley
Q: Why did you write to Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth about Ukraine?
A: As a Pentagon watchdog, I’ve dedicated decades of congressional oversight to track taxpayer dollars appropriated for national defense, including military dollars assigned to help our allies. From government purchase cards to $10,000 toilet seat lids and sloppy accounting that allowed a years-long $103 million embezzlement scheme, I keep my nose to the grindstone to root out wasteful spending, mismanagement and defense contractor fraud that run rampant at the Pentagon, no matter who’s in the White House. Under seven administrations, I’ve worked in the U.S. Senate to fix lax financial controls, including my bipartisan bill that would require the Department of Defense (DoD) to pass a full, independent audit. Astonishingly, the Pentagon is the only federal agency that’s been unable to earn a clean opinion on its audit, despite federal law requiring all federal agencies to conduct annual audits since 1990.
At my annual 99 county meetings, Iowans have shared concerns about the amount of federal spending in support of Ukraine. Since the war started in 2022, Congress has appropriated $175 billion to help Ukraine defend itself from the Russian invasion, support allies in the region and to help avoid World War III. While I strongly support pushing back against Russian aggression, I’m also a relentless taskmaster to ensure scarce taxpayer dollars aren’t squandered once they leave the federal treasury. That’s why I’m asking Defense Secretary Hegseth to account for payments made with money Congress appropriated in national security supplemental bills. While the Pentagon does not send any money to Ukraine, it has received significant funds to replace military stocks delivered to Ukraine and to conduct a range of activities to help Ukraine and our European NATO allies in the region defend themselves. The Pentagon must ensure taxpayer dollars are accounted for and used as Congress intended, but the same problems with poor accounting systems at DoD were evident with the funds from the national security supplemental bills. Last October, the DoD Office of Inspector General (IG) published a report examining how the Pentagon expended the money for Ukraine. Its audit raised alarm bells, and I’ve asked the Secretary of Defense to track down the money trail left behind by the Biden administration. Specifically, the IG’s report revealed that of the 479 disbursements it reviewed, DoD didn’t provide documentation to support the accuracy of 323 transactions. We’re not talking peanuts and cracker jacks. The amount of undocumented expenditures exceeds $1 billion. Without supporting documentation, we don’t know how that money was used. What’s more, as federal auditors conducted the investigation, the Biden administration flunked fundamental fiscal stewardship responsibilities. According to the DoD’s watchdog, the audit team’s requests for information faced noncooperation and insufficient responses, allegedly providing insufficient responses to 52 requests and no response to 14 requests to document where the dollars went. I’m not ever going to let up on my efforts to improve the Pentagon’s financial controls. Protecting taxpayer dollars and strengthening military readiness, including U.S. strategic stockpiles, are too important to allow the Pentagon to go unchecked.
Q: How are you standing up to Putin on behalf of innocent Ukrainian children?
A: It’s been more three years since Russia started its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, the deadliest conflict in Europe since World War II. The senseless killing of civilians and casualties on the battlefield have led to needless human suffering and geopolitical ramifications around the world. One of the war’s atrocities has far-reaching consequences for Ukrainian society. Russia has abducted tens of thousands of Ukrainian children through unlawful deportations and forced transfers to Russify them. The goal is to erase from memory the children’s Ukrainian names, language and identity. What’s more, the State Department’s 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report found Russia recruits or uses child soldiers, has state-sponsored policy or pattern of human trafficking and is among the worst hubs for human trafficking in the world. In March, I called upon Secretary of State Marco Rubio to continue supporting investigations that are seeking to unravel the whereabouts of these innocent children and bring them back home. As President Trump leads efforts to secure a peace agreement to end the war, I’m leading a bipartisan resolution in the U.S. Senate that calls for the return of kidnapped Ukrainian children before any final peace agreement is reached. It condemns Russia’s abduction and forcible transfer of innocent young children to brainwash them and wipe away their heritage. The mass kidnapping of Ukrainian children by the Russian regime is yet another example of Vladimir Putin’s diabolical mission to restore the former Soviet empire. History shows this is a page out of his KGB-playbook when Stalin’s Soviet regime sent women and children from the Baltic countries to Siberia. The United States ought to demand the innocent children of Ukraine are returned before any agreement to end the war is reached so the Russians cannot use them as bargaining chips.

MIL OSI USA News –

May 27, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Deliberations of the Committee on Petitions in 2023 – P10_TA(2025)0114 – Thursday, 22 May 2025 – Brussels

Source: European Parliament

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on the outcome of the Committee on Petitions’ deliberations,

– having regard to Articles 10 and 11 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

– having regard to Articles 20, 24 and 227 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on the right of EU citizens and residents to bring their concerns to the attention of Parliament,

– having regard to Article 228 TFEU on the role and functions of the European Ombudsman,

– having regard to Article 44 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union concerning the right to petition the European Parliament,

– having regard to the provisions of the TFEU relating to the infringement procedure and, in particular, to Articles 258 and 260 thereof,

– having regard to the concluding observations of the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities of 21 March 2025 on the combined second and third periodic reports of the European Union,

– having regard to Rules 55 and 233(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Petitions (A10-0063/2025),

A. whereas the purpose of the annual report on the outcome of the Committee on Petitions’ deliberations is to present an analysis of the petitions received in 2023 and of relations with other institutions, as well as to present an accurate picture of the objectives achieved in 2023;

B. whereas in 2023, Parliament received 1 452 petitions, which represents an increase of 16,2 % compared to the 1 217 petitions submitted in 2022 and of 4,0 % compared to the 1 392 petitions registered in 2021; whereas the total amount of petitions received continues to be significantly lower than the peak reached in 2013 and 2014, when Parliament received 2 891 and 2 715 petitions, respectively;

C. whereas in 2023, the number of users supporting one or more petitions on Parliament’s Petitions Web Portal was 26 331, which represents a considerable increase compared to the 22 441 users recorded in 2022 (both numbers are considerably lower than the 209 272 supporters recorded in 2021); whereas the number of clicks in support of petitions also increased slightly in 2023, reaching a total of 29 287 (compared with 27 927 in 2022 and 217 876 in 2021);

D. whereas however, the overall number of petitions remains modest in relation to the total population of the EU, revealing that efforts still need to be stepped up to increase citizens’ awareness of their right to petition and the possible usefulness of petitions as a means of drawing the attention of the institutions and the Member States to matters that affect and concern citizens directly; whereas in exercising the right to petition, citizens expect the EU institutions to provide added value in finding a solution to their problems;

E. whereas the criteria for the admissibility of petitions are laid down in Article 227 TFEU and Rule 232(1) of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, which require that petitions must be submitted by an EU citizen or by a natural or legal person who is resident or has a registered office in a Member State and is directly affected by matters falling within the EU’s fields of activity;

F. whereas of the 1 452 petitions submitted in 2023, 429 were declared inadmissible and 13 were withdrawn; whereas the high percentage (29,55 %) of inadmissible petitions in 2023 confirms that there is still a widespread lack of clarity about the scope of the EU’s areas of responsibility; whereas in order to reduce the number of inadmissible petitions, efforts still need to be made to clarify further the scope of the EU’s fields of activity;

G. whereas the Committee on Petitions (PETI) played a significant role in combating discrimination against Romanian and Bulgarian citizens during the period in which their countries had not yet joined the Schengen area; whereas PETI made a key contribution in advocating equal treatment and addressing the unjustified barriers faced by these citizens; whereas the starting point was Petition 0004/2023, submitted by Răzvan Eugen Nicolescu on behalf of the ‘Asociația pentru Energie Curată și Combaterea Schimbărilor Climatice’, as well as the subsequent plenary resolution on accession to the Schengen area, adopted under Rule 227(2) of the Rules of Procedure(1);

H. whereas the right to petition Parliament is a fundamental right of EU citizens, offering both citizens and residents an open, democratic and transparent mechanism to address their elected representatives directly; whereas this essential tool empowers citizens to actively and effectively participate in the life of the Union; whereas through petitions, EU citizens can complain about failures to implement EU law and help detect breaches of EU law;

I. whereas Parliament is the only EU institution directly elected by EU citizens; whereas the right to petition the European Parliament is one of the fundamental rights of EU citizens and residents and it allows them to address their elected representatives directly; whereas many persons with disabilities lack equal access to information and communication due to the limited availability of accessible formats and due to the fact that national sign languages are not recognised as part of the EU’s multilingualism; whereas Parliament has long been at the forefront of the development of the petitions process internationally and has the most open, democratic and transparent petitions process in Europe, allowing petitioners to participate actively and effectively in its activities, whereas in exercising the right to petitions, citizens expect the EU institutions provide added value, cooperating with the Commission and Member State authorities, in solving their problems;

J. whereas the information submitted by petitioners in their petitions and during committee meetings, along with the Commission’s assessments and the replies from the Member States and other bodies, also provide valuable input for the work of other parliamentary committees, given that admissible petitions are forwarded to the relevant committee for an opinion or for information; whereas, therefore, petitions can also play a role in the legislative process, providing concrete feedback on the impact of EU policies and enabling policies to address emerging needs;

K. whereas the activities of the Committee on Petitions are based on the input provided by petitioners, enabling Parliament to enhance its responsiveness to complaints and concerns relating to respect for fundamental EU rights and compliance with EU legislation in the Member States; whereas petitions are therefore a useful source of information on instances of misapplication or breaches of EU law, enabling an assessment of the application of EU law and its impact on the rights of EU citizens and residents; whereas in 2023 fundamental rights were one of the three most important concerns of all petitioners; whereas, in the context of the structured dialogue with the Commission, the Committee on Petitions called on the Commission to fight discrimination in the European Union, including through initiatives to guarantee equal rights and to strengthen measures against all forms of discrimination, including those based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, disability, age, religion or belief and sexual orientation;

L. whereas according to Article 17 TEU the Commission should ensure the correct application of the Treaties and of measures adopted pursuant to them; whereas the Commission’s strategic approach to addressing issues raised in petitions must be fully consistent with the Treaties in order to ensure the most effective follow-up of petitions, aiming at guaranteeing full and timely protection of citizens’ rights arising from EU law;

M. whereas each petition must be considered and examined carefully, efficiently, impartially, fairly and transparently, in line with the standards set in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union on the Right to good administration; whereas all petitioners have the right to receive a reply informing them about the decision on admissibility and follow-up actions taken by the committee within a reasonable period of time, in their own language or in the language used in the petition; whereas timely and effective responses by the Commission and Member States to the issues raised in the petitions, along with solutions for redress, where appropriate, contribute to strengthening the trust citizens place in the Union and its policies;

N. whereas the Committee on Petitions attaches the utmost importance to the examination and public discussion of petitions at its meetings; whereas petitioners have the right to present their petitions and frequently take the floor in the discussion, thereby actively contributing to the work of the committee; whereas in 2023, the Committee on Petitions held 10 committee meetings, at which 191 petitions were discussed with 114 petitioners present and actively participating by taking the floor;

O. whereas the main subjects of concern raised in petitions submitted in 2023 related to the environment, fundamental rights, personal matters and justice;

P. whereas when adopting its meeting agenda, the Committee on Petitions pays attention to petitions and topics with a high degree of relevance for discussion at EU level and to the need to maintain a balanced geographical coverage of topics according to the petitions received;

Q. whereas 82,4 % of the petitions received in 2023 were submitted via Parliament’s Petitions Web Portal, which is a slight increase compared to 2022 (79,05 %), thus reconfirming it as by far the most used channel for citizens to submit petitions to Parliament;

R. whereas in February 2023, the Petitions Web Portal was revamped and relaunched to align it with current expectations and make it easier for residents of the Member States to exercise their right to submit petitions to Parliament; whereas the updated Petitions Portal 2.0 integrated seamlessly with Parliament’s web publishing tool, enabling faster and simpler content updates and new features (including seven ‘Quick Start Guides’ that provide clear, step-by-step instructions for submitting, tracking and supporting petitions); whereas a new search engine powered by elastic search technology enhanced the user experience by delivering more accurate results efficiently leading to the new portal’s prioritising a truly citizen-centred approach; whereas during 2023 all petitions were prepared and published in a timely manner, within a few days of their adoption, and all internal and external requests for support on the use and content of the Petitions Portal were replied to successfully, in a timely manner and in all languages;

S. Whereas in 2023, the Committee on Petitions (PETI) held four fact-finding visits, during which Members travelled to Romania to examine the management and the protection of the brown bear population and illegal logging, to Donegal (Ireland) to investigate the use of defective mica blocks in construction in Ireland and to Catalonia (Spain) to assess in situ the language immersion model in Catalonia; whereas PETI members were also part of a joint delegation from the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and PETI that travelled to New York to attend the 16th session of the Conference of States Parties to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD COSP);

T. whereas under Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, the Committee on Petitions is also responsible for relations with the European Ombudsman, who investigates complaints about maladministration within the institutions and bodies of the EU; whereas the previous European Ombudsman, Emily O’Reilly, presented her annual report for 2022 to the Committee on Petitions at its meeting of 27 June 2023;

U. whereas the Committee on Petitions is a member of the European Network of Ombudsmen, which also includes the European Ombudsman, national and regional ombudsmen and similar bodies in the Member States, the candidate countries and other European Economic Area countries, and which aims to promote the exchange of information about EU law and policy, and to share best practice;

1. Emphasises Committee on Petition’s fundamental role in protecting and promoting the rights of EU citizens and residents by ensuring that petitioners’ concerns and complaints are examined in a timely, effective and appropriate manner and that petitioners are informed about the actions taken and progress made on their petitions; recalls that all petitions are treated through an open, democratic and transparent petition process;

2. Commends the essential work done by the Committee on Petitions on the petitions concerning the Akamas Peninsula, the most biodiverse area in Cyprus, which has for decades experienced repeated systemic violations of the Habitats Directive(2) and the Birds Directive(3), in an overall context of a lack of effective and legally binding measures to protect this area and in view of recent plans brought forward by the Cypriot competent authorities, with devastating effects on the area’s very fragile natural ecosystems, in violation of EU environmental legislation; underlines that, following the Committee on Petitions’ work on this matter, on 13 March 2024 the Commission decided to bring Cyprus before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for the Cypriot authorities’ failure to comply with the Habitats Directive; regrets that in the time that has passed since that decision – over one year – the Commission has not submitted a file to the CJEU, and has thus failed to officially start legal proceedings;

3. Underlines the key work performed by the Committee on Petitions on the protection of workers’ rights against discrimination and the abuse of fixed-term contracts in the public sector in Italy; appreciates that the Commission took into due account the very sound legal documents provided by the petitioners, which were carefully assessed in various meetings of the Committee on Petitions, when it decided to bring Italy before the CJEU for failing to end the abusive use of fixed-term contracts and discriminatory employment conditions, in breach of Council Directive 1999/70/EC;

4. Commends the PETI Committee for considering Petition 1168/2023, submitted by Mihai Igna on behalf of the Association ‘Together We Bring Prosperity’, which calls for the restitution of Romania’s national treasure and historical archives currently held in Russia; emphasises the profound historical significance of this debate for all Member States that have been historically impacted by Russia’s acts of looting, particularly in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine, as it highlights the broader challenges related to cultural preservation and safeguarding national heritage during times of geopolitical conflict; stresses that the PETI Committee’s engagement with this issue demonstrates its commitment to upholding the rights of EU citizens and Member States, and protecting Romania’s historical legacy and supporting its legitimate claims on the international stage; recalls the subsequent plenary resolution concerning the return of Romanian national treasure illegally appropriated by Russia(4);

5. Reiterates the importance of a continuous public debate on the EU’s fields of activity in order to ensure that citizens are properly informed about the scope of the Union’s competences and the different levels of decision-making; calls for an EU-wide enhanced structured information and communication campaign to be carried out without additional cost (i.e., by using the current resources of the European Parliament Liaison Offices) in all EU official languages in collaboration with national and regional ombudsmen, NGOs, and educational institutions to increase awareness of petition rights among citizens from all Member States, particularly addressing rural and disadvantaged communities and marginalised groups, as well as remote islands and regions; proposes an expansion of outreach efforts free from additional costs through social media and local community events; emphasises the need for broader public awareness and awareness-raising campaigns, through the active involvement of communications services, to help increase citizens’ knowledge about their right to petition, as well as the scope of the EU’s responsibilities and the competences of the Committee on Petitions, with a view to reducing the number of inadmissible petitions and enhancing citizen engagement in the decision-making process; recommends improving the digital accessibility of the Petitions Portal, including through adaptations for people with disabilities and higher quality translations into all official EU languages; recommends exploring the potential of the existing IT tools in order to increase citizens’ support on the portal, including through redirecting options to relevant complaint mechanisms;

6. Recalls the European dimension of the Committee on Petitions, which can be addressed by citizens from all 27 Member States on issues that fall within the scope of the EU Treaties and EU law; believes that the Committee has a special responsibility to uphold this European dimension and to demonstrate the added value of European unity and integration to citizens; underlines that the European dimension must be based on solidarity, the promotion of social and economic rights, the protection of minority languages and cultures, and the active fight against climate change;

7. Points out that petitions constitute a unique opportunity for Parliament and the other EU institutions to directly connect with EU citizens and maintain a regular dialogue with them, particularly in cases where they are affected by the misapplication or breach of EU law; stresses the need for enhanced cooperation between the EU institutions and national, regional and local authorities on inquiries regarding the implementation of, and compliance with, EU law; believes that such cooperation is crucial to address and resolve citizens’ concerns over the application of EU law and that it contributes to strengthening the democratic legitimacy and accountability of the Union; calls, therefore, for the participation of Member States’ representatives in committee meetings and for timely and detailed responses to requests for clarification or information sent by the Committee on Petitions to national authorities; notes the increase in the number of petitions received in 2023 addressing structural disparities, including in remuneration and retirement income among population groups; calls for these concerns to be systematically analysed and addressed through coordinated action with the relevant committees and the Commission; further calls for enhanced protection and support for individuals exposed to abuse or exclusion who face obstacles in accessing appropriate support mechanisms and justice;

8. Recalls that petitions contribute considerably to the exercise of the Commission’s role as the guardian of the Treaties by providing citizens with an additional tool to report alleged breaches of EU law; stresses that constructive cooperation between the Committee on Petitions and the Commission through timely and detailed answers from the Commission, which are based on thorough examinations of the issues raised in petitions, is essential to ensure the successful treatment of petitions;

9. Reiterates its call on the Commission to provide legal clarifications on the key criteria underpinning its strategic approach to enforcing EU law and to regularly update the Committee on Petitions on developments in infringement proceedings and to ensure that the Committee on Petitions gets access to the all relevant documents on EU Pilot and infringement procedures and legislative initiatives that were launched based on petitions received; is of the opinion that increased transparency and regular feedback on the handling of ongoing infringement procedures by the Commission would be beneficial for the Committee’s follow-up of open petitions; welcomes the recent Commission initiative to include petitions in the search system of the infringement register of the Commission; stresses that it is important for the Commission to conduct timely investigations into petitions, highlighting violations of rights affecting a large number of citizens and residents within the EU and to consult, where appropriate, the relevant national ombudsman; expresses its concerns about the way the Commission is handling some infringement procedures launched against Member States, including those related to issues raised in many petitions; encourages the Commission to put in place all necessary measures to improve transparency and effectiveness of its management of infringement procedures, which can be perceived as opaque by citizens;

10. Calls on the Commission to assess whether the national authorities are taking the necessary measures to respond to citizens’ concerns, as expressed in their petitions, where cases of failure to comply with EU law occur, and to launch infringement procedures where necessary; emphasises that timely and proactive action by the Commission in cases of breaches of EU law is crucial to prevent such breaches, which could undermine citizens’ trust in European institutions, becoming systemic in nature;

11. Recalls that freedom of expression is a fundamental pillar of European democracy; condemns any attempt to censor, marginalise or intimidate citizens or their elected representatives on the basis of their political opinions; stresses also that respect for the results of elections, at national and European level, is essential for maintaining citizens’ trust in the democratic process;

12. Emphasises the need for enhanced and more active cooperation between Member States and the Committee on petitions in order to unblock those petitions requiring prompt responses and reactions from the national authorities; recalls that the delayed responses of the Member States could have an impact on the timely resolution of issues raised by citizens and negative consequences for the solution of breaches of Union law; notes that the Member States should guarantee responses to petitions within the three-month deadline requested; stresses that improved coordination and dialogue would facilitate a more efficient handling of citizens’ concerns, prevent unnecessary delays and strengthen the effectiveness of the petition process;

13. Notes with concern that the recommendations issued by the Committee on Petitions in its report of 19 March 2024, following its mission to Catalonia, have not yet been fully implemented by the relevant educational authorities, particularly those concerning the protection of linguistic rights for all students and their families; expresses deep regret over the tensions encountered by members of the Committee during their visit to Barcelona from 18 to 20 December 2023, and calls for respectful dialogue and cooperation among all stakeholders to ensure that democratic institutions can carry out their mandates in a climate of mutual respect and understanding;

14. Strongly condemns the harassment and intimidation to which the official members of the Delegation of the Committee on Petitions were subjected during their fact-finding visit to Barcelona from 18 to 20 December 2023, with the aim of assessing in situ the language immersion model in Catalonia, its effects on families moving to and residing in the Autonomous Community, as well as on multilingualism and non-discrimination and the principle of the rule of law;

15. Regrets that the competent education authorities in the region have not implemented the recommendations issued by the Committee on Petitions in its report of 19 March 2024 following the mission, aimed at protecting the linguistic rights of students and their families;

16. Recalls that the e-Petition database is an essential internal tool that allows the members of the Committee on Petitions to access all necessary information in order to follow up on the state of play of each petition and to be able to make informed decisions on the treatment of the petitions; notes that the e-Petition database also plays an important role in communication with petitioners;

17. Recalls the Commission’s commitment to create an interinstitutional IT tool, together with Parliament, with which to share information and documents on all follow-up actions taken on petitions, such as infringement procedures, legislative proposals or replies by national authorities, thus enhancing the transparency and efficiency of the treatment of petitions, which, in a wider context, would contribute to increasing citizens’ trust in the EU institutions and the European project;

18. Recalls that cooperation with other committees in Parliament is essential for the comprehensive treatment of petitions, paying particular attention to petitions on gender equality, family diversity, environmental justice and the linguistic rights of minorities; notes that in 2023, 34 requests for opinion (corresponding to 31 petitions) and 223 requests for information were sent to other committees; notes that of the 34 opinions requested, only 25 answers were received by the end of 2023 (in 14 cases an opinion was provided, while in 10 cases the committee decided not to draft an opinion and on four occasions no official decision has been communicated); recalls that petitioners are informed of decisions to request opinions from other committees for the treatment of their petitions; underlines that parliamentary committees should step up their efforts to actively contribute to the examination of petitions by providing their expertise so as to enable Parliament to respond more swiftly and comprehensively to citizens’ concerns;

19. Believes that the petitions network is a useful tool for facilitating the follow-up of petitions in parliamentary and legislative work; trusts that regular meetings of the petitions network are crucial in order to ensure more visibility for the Committee on Petition’s activities and a better understanding of its work and mission, as well as to strengthen cooperation with the other parliamentary committees;

20. Underlines that the Committee on Petitions expressed its position on important issues raised in petitions by adopting its report on the outcome of the Committee on Petitions’ deliberations during 2022(5);

21. Highlights a slight decrease in the number of petitions submitted on external relations issues compared to 2022; notes that this could be explained by the new geopolitical context in 2023 and in particular a decrease in the number of petitions on the war in Ukraine and a significant increase in petitions dealing with the new conflicts in the Middle East; notes that the Committee on Petitions took account of citizens’ concerns about sanctions, security, conflict resolution, visa policy, progress of EU candidate countries, among other issues, putting on its agenda a number of petitions dealing in particular with questions related to the situation of refugees, in particular of children and on the situation of Venezuelan refugees in the EU; acknowledges the efforts of the committees already actively addressing these issues and emphasises that the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs should take note of these petitions in their deliberations;

22. Takes note that health, which was one of the main areas of concern for petitioners in 2022, appeared to continue to play an important role in 2023; notes, in particular, that the Committee on Petitions examined and discussed petitions on the ban on chemicals and heavy metals in children’s toys, on support for healthy and environmentally friendly food systems and lifestyles and on the implementation of EU regulations on added sugars in foods intended for infants and young children;

23. Draws attention to the significant number of petitions submitted and discussed in relation to citizens’ concerns over the reintroduction of border checks between some Member States raising the problematic aspect of limitation of the free movement of persons within the EU and other aspects such as the strengths and the weaknesses of the extension of the Schengen area; recalls that Member States may reintroduce internal border controls(6) in the event of a serious threat to public policy or internal security, or under exceptional circumstances threatening the overall functioning of the Schengen area; appreciates the significant role played by the Committee on Petitions, in particular the host of activities carried out, the adoption in committee of a short motion for a resolution on the accession to the Schengen area on 27 June 2023 and the related Parliament resolution, to strongly support the enlargement of the Schengen area to include Romania and Bulgaria the organisation of the public hearing on Schengen Borders on 18 July 2023 in association with the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs; welcomes the unanimous decision by the Council for the full membership of both countries of the Schengen area as of 1 January 2025 allowing the full exercise of the fundamental freedoms of the EU Single Market; emphasises that preventing Member States from joining the Schengen area despite fulfilling all necessary requirements was a discriminatory decision that lacked legal justification and severely affected many EU citizens;

24. Takes note of the sudden increase in petitions of Spanish origin in the second half of 2023 concerning the risks to the rule of law in Spain as a result of the Spanish Government’s intention to adopt an Amnesty Law contrary to constitutional and European law; deplores the attacks on the rule of law and the separation of powers carried out by the Spanish Government;

25. Underlines the work of the Committee on Petitions in connection with petitions relating to common rules on a single standard for hand luggage dimensions, highlighting citizens’ concerns about the inconvenience and discomfort caused by inconsistent rules on airline carry-on luggage and the resulting hidden costs; emphasises its call for compliance with a relevant European Court of Justice ruling in the context of the revision of EU air services legislation; points, in this regard, to the short motion for a resolution on standardised dimensions for carry-on luggage adopted by the Committee on Petitions on 20 September 2023 followed by the adoption of a resolution by single vote of the European Parliament on 4 October 2023; welcomes the fact that in November 2023 the Commission put forward a review of the passenger rights framework and a series of proposals designed to improve the experience of passengers and travellers, including the requirement of a limited number of common sizes and weights to reduce the confusion; notes with regret that passengers with disabilities are still facing too many barriers while travelling, especially in case of multimodal journeys; regrets that the public transport systems of many Member States do not comply with the requirements of United Nations Convention on the Rights for Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD);

26. Notes that environmental issues remained an area of serious concern for petitioners in 2023 with more than 21 % of petitions dedicated to environmental issues; regrets that some of these petitions allege incorrect implementation of EU legislation by the Member States, with some Member States already facing infringement procedures for the breach of EU environmental laws; notes that numerous petitions describe complaints about air quality, noise pollution, waste management/treatment, the deterioration of natural ecosystems and violation of the Habitats Directive in different Member States; highlights the public hearing on the state of implementation of the Habitats Directive organised on 24 May 2023; notes the work the Committee on Petitions continued to carry out in 2023 on the impact of climate change in different fields, not only in the environmental area, but also in the use of land, putting a number of petitions received on these topics on the agenda; points to the workshop on the impact of climate change on social security and the most vulnerable groups organised on 22 March 2023 and also to the presentation of the study on compensation for victims of climate change disasters on 18 July 2023;

27. Draws attention to the workshop organised by the Committee on Petitions on 25 January 2023 on transparency of pricing and reimbursement of medicinal products, which discussed transparency from the perspectives of patients and consumers, producers of medicinal products, and academic research; notes that the discussions focused on research and development costs of companies and information available on the prices paid for medicines, underlining the importance of transparency on these issues;

28. Stresses the importance of delivering on EU citizens’ expectations regarding the protection of the environment and urges the Commission, together with the Member States, to ensure the correct implementation of EU legislation in the environmental field, in particular in the field of illegal logging; points to the petitions on environmental issues, which reflect a growing public concern about the implications of climate change, requiring consistent enforcement of the existing EU environmental legislation by both the Commission and the Member States; stresses that addressing EU citizens’ expectations regarding the protection of the environment should be considered as important as taking into account the economic realities of each Member State; underlines that excessive regulations have a negative impact on emerging economies; highlights, therefore, that each Member State should be allowed to make decisions about its transition process and that environmental legislation should not hinder economic competitiveness;

29. Acknowledges the positive effects of the fact-finding visit to Romania from 15 to 18 May 2023 on the management and protection of the brown bear population; notes with regret, however, that there are still too many fatal accidents caused by brown bears in connection with humans and livestock, making further monitoring and cooperation with the national authorities necessary; underlines that the protection of human lives and security should always be the priority;

30. Following the fact-finding visit to Romania, stresses the need for a balance between wildlife protection and the citizens’ safety; underlines that each Member State should be allowed to take measures, including population control of the species, in order to prevent threats to the lives and property of its citizens;

31. Stresses the commitment of the Committee on Petitions to protect the rights of persons with disabilities; recalls the annual workshop of held by the Committee on Petitions on 29 November 2023 on the rights of persons with disabilities; recalls that its first part focused on how persons with disabilities dealt with the recent crises (energy costs, war, high inflation, etc.) and how EU measures helped to overcome these obstacles while the second part addressed the issue of how the European institutions have built inclusive communication with citizens with disabilities; also highlights, in this context, the adoption by the Committee of an opinion in the form of a letter on establishing the European Disability Card and the European Parking Card for persons with disabilities on 29 November 2023; stresses that access to social security benefits for persons with disabilities falls under national responsibility and social coordination schemes, and that disputes should also be addressed through and respected by the judicial mechanisms in place and their competencies via the obligation of the exhausting of legal remedies, rather than through direct intervention by the Commission, in respect of the principle of subsidiarity; underlines as well in this context the imperative need for a full and consistent transposition of the European Accessibility Act and calls on the Member States to avoid further delays that hinder the rights of persons with disabilities; recalls that the Accessibility Act aims at improving the life of at least 87 million persons with disabilities, facilitating their access to, inter alia, public transport, banking services, computers, TVs, e-books and online shops;

32. Stresses the important contribution made by the Committee on Petitions to the protection of the rights of persons with disabilities, as revealed by its treatment of a number of petitions on this sensitive topic; acknowledges, in this context, the efforts of Parliament’s services and notes that not just the best technical but the most accessible solution for deaf citizens must be found in order to communicate with them in their own mother tongue, in national sign languages; requests the modification of the Rules of Procedures in close cooperation with the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) in order to eliminate the mandatory exclusively written communication with citizens who are sign language users, deaf or hard of hearing so that, upon their request, they can use their sign language during the procedure; also highlights, in this context, the adoption by the Committee of an opinion in the form of a letter on establishing the European Disability Card and the European Parking Card for persons with disabilities on 29 November 2023;

33. Underlines, furthermore, the specific protection role played by the Committee on Petitions within the EU in the framework of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities through its capacity to hear petitions and highlights the committee’s important ongoing work on petitions concerning disability-related issues; while noting a slight decrease in the number of petitions on disability in 2023 compared to 2022, stresses that the number nearly doubled compared to 2021; further points out that discrimination and access to public transport and employment, continue to be major challenges faced by persons with disabilities and emphasises the Committee’s special attention to the request for the European Disability Statute to recognise the rights of people with autism; welcomes the adoption of a short motion for a resolution on harmonising the rights of autistic people, emphasising the need to improve access to diagnosis, healthcare, education, employment, accessibility and provision of reasonable accommodation, legal capacity and lifelong community support including as regards culture and sport; draws attention, furthermore, to the particular role of the Committee on Petitions in safeguarding the rights of children and their parents, acknowledging numerous petitions received on children’s rights, which require special attention and action; recalls, in this context the provisions of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, in particular the Article 24 thereof on the rights of the child, to allow every child to maintain a personal relationship and direct contact with both of his/her parents, unless that is contrary to the child’s interests; reiterates as well the risk that families with autistic children are being targeted by offers of unproven, potentially harmful and illegal therapies and interventions which may amount to serious physical abuse of children;

34. Recalls the fact that relations with the European Ombudsman represent one of the responsibilities conferred on the Committee on Petitions by Parliament’s Rules of Procedure; welcomes Parliament’s constructive cooperation with the European Ombudsman, with whom the Committee on Petitions shares the objectives of ensuring the transparency, professionalism and integrity of the EU institutions vis-à-vis European citizens, as well as its involvement in the European Network of Ombudsmen; stresses the need to step up cooperation with the European Ombudsman in order to ensure a swift, impartial and transparent response to citizens’ complaints about any administrative malfunctioning within the EU institutions;

35. Underlines the key work performed by the Committee on Petitions on the protection of workers’ rights; underlines that several petitions received in this area were followed up by further actions such as the debate on the use of fixed-term contracts, as well as that on the European citizens’ initiative-turned petition ‘Good Clothes, Fair Pay’ focusing on the harmful situation of workers in the global garment and footwear industry, or the Parliamentary Question for Oral Answer on the Working conditions of teachers in the European Union, also having as its basis a petition received on this subject; reiterates the importance of ensuring fair working conditions and greater protection of workers in the EU, calling on the Member States and the Commission to effectively address concerns raised in petitions related to labour rights and trade unions;

36. Recalls the European Parliament study on Homelessness in the EU which was commissioned by the Committee on Petitions and presented at its meeting in November 2023; notes that this study made an important contribution on this pressing social and economic challenge, which represents one of the most severe forms of societal exclusion, highlighting the need for a public policy change towards preventing homelessness in the first place, inter alia by providing secure and affordable housing; recalls that illegal squatting cannot be considered a solution to homelessness, as the right to property is enshrined in Article 17 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; underlines that Member States should seek real solutions rather than promoting illegal squatting, as housing policy falls under the exclusive competence of the Member States;

37. Acknowledges the European Ombudsman’s regular contributions to the work of the Committee on Petitions throughout the year; firmly believes that the Union’s institutions, bodies and agencies must ensure consistent and effective follow-up to the recommendations of the Ombudsman;

38. Stresses that European citizens’ initiatives (ECIs) represent an important instrument for active citizenship and public participation; welcomes the discussion in some meetings of unsuccessful ECIs, which were sometimes subsequently reformulated as petitions, giving citizens the opportunity to present their ideas and hold a constructive debate, while contributing to their participation in the EU’s democratic processes; takes note of the significant number of new ECIs registered by the Commission in 2023, which shows that citizens are seizing the opportunity to use participatory instruments to have a say in policy and lawmaking processes; calls on the Commission to better engage with citizens and give adequate follow-up to successful ECIs; welcomes the important effort put in place to organise, in association with other committees, four public hearings on successful ECIs, which allowed the organisers to present the initiative’s objectives and engage with Members of the European Parliament and representatives of the European Commission; underlines that the Commission’s commitment to responding to valid ECIs is essential to maintaining citizens’ trust in the ECI as the most significant instrument of participatory democracy;

39. Urges the Commission to give due consideration to the parliamentary resolutions adopted on European Citizens’ Initiatives (ECIs) and to enhance its engagement with citizens, particularly by ensuring appropriate and effective follow-up to successful ECIs, thereby reinforcing the democratic process and ensuring that citizens’ voices are adequately reflected in EU policymaking;

40. Underlines that the Petitions Web Portal is an essential tool for ensuring a smooth, efficient and transparent petitions process; welcomes, in this regard, the improvements to data protection and security features that have made the portal more user-friendly and secure for citizens; stresses that efforts to make the portal more accessible must be continued, including making it more accessible for sign-language users and persons with disabilities; notes that the Petitions Web Portal has been one of the European Parliament’s most visited websites, thus serving as a first point of contact with Parliament for many EU citizens;

41. Recalls the European dimension of the Committee on Petitions, which can be addressed by citizens from all 27 Member States on issues that fall within the scope of the Union’s activities; believes that the Committee has a special responsibility to uphold this European dimension and to demonstrate the added value of European unity and integration to citizens and continue addressing issues related to violations of EU law, as well as loopholes and shortcomings in the provisions of existing EU law; believes that timely avoidance of petitions with clear national competences along with comprehensive explanations and instructions about alternative courses of action, where appropriate, could contribute to a constructive approach and an enhanced citizens engagement considers, in this context, that the European Parliament should increase its efforts to promote the role and work of its Committee on Petitions and raise awareness among all EU citizens of the possibility to address a petition to the European Parliament; recalls that due to the limited time allotted to committee meetings, most petitions are treated through written procedure; recalls, in this context, that all petitions received, including those in the area of international affairs, should be handled with the necessary transparency and impartiality; is of the opinion that the selection of petitions for discussion in committee should reflect a geographical and political balance of submissions received; believes, moreover, that geographical balance should also be sought when organising the committee’s fact-finding visits, yearly and over the course of each legislative term;

42. Welcomes the adoption of the short motion for a resolution on the creation of a European Capital of Local Trade(7) at the plenary session of January 2023; underlines that this achievement is an excellent result for the Committee on Petitions, noting that this project has been successfully included as a preparatory action in the 2024 budget, with a total budget of EUR 3 million; recalls that the project to create a European Capital of Small Retail (ECSR) was officially presented by the Commission in Barcelona in December 2023;

43. Instructs its President to forward this resolution and the report of the Committee on Petitions to the Council, the Commission, the European Ombudsman, and the governments and parliaments of the Member States, their petitions committees and their national ombudsmen or similar competent bodies.

(1)	OJ C, C/2024/3999, 17.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/3999/oj.
(2)	Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1992/43/oj).
(3)	Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds (OJ L 20, 26.1.2010, p. 7, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/147/oj).
(4)	OJ C, C/2024/6559, 12.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6559/oj.
(5)	Adopted by Parliament as its resolution of 23 November 2023 on the outcome of the Committee on Petitions’ deliberations during 2022 (OJ C, C/2024/4220, 24.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4220/oj).
(6)	Articles 25 to 30 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (OJ L 77, 23.3.2016, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/399/oj).
(7)	OJ C 214, 16.6.2023, p. 2.

MIL OSI Europe News –

May 27, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: Debates – Thursday, 22 May 2025 – Brussels – Revised edition

Source: European Parliament

Verbatim report of proceedings

253k

688k

Thursday, 22 May 2025 – Brussels

PRESIDENZA: ANTONELLA SBERNA
Vicepresidente

1. Opening of the sitting

(La seduta è aperta alle 09:00)

2. Choose Europe for Science (debate)

Ekaterina Zaharieva, Member of the Commission. – Madam President, honourable Members, thank you for the opportunity to present our Choose Europe for Science initiative.

As President von der Leyen stated in the Sorbonne in Paris a few weeks ago, Europe is determined to start a new age of invention and ingenuity. We are making a clear choice to place research and innovation at the heart of our societies and economies. Europe is choosing science.

Today, this choice is more urgent than ever. Science is a source of prosperity, but it is also fundamental to our sovereignty and economic security, our resilience, democracy and leading role on the global stage. For example, scientific leadership in AI or quantum is directly linked to the ability of protecting our society and our values. We need talent to progress in those crucial technology domains.

Countries understand this. Global research and development has recently surpassed EUR 2.5 trillion per year. At the same time, we also see science exploited for political ends, and academic freedom is under pressure.

Last month, we had the opportunity to discuss developments on the other side of the Atlantic. Their universities, and fields like vaccine science and climate research, are being targeted by funding cuts.

But it is not only in the United States. Elsewhere in the globe, scientists are instrumentalised, at best, and openly attacked, at worst. In conflict zones, schools and universities are not spared. In Ukraine, Putin’s war has physically damaged over 1 400 science-related buildings, constituting 30 % of all research institutions, and displaced 20 % of the country’s researchers.

In this context, Europe must do more than hold its ground. We must become the best place in the globe to do research, the place our young people choose for their careers, and the place global talent comes to help us tackle global challenges.

This is the ambition of Choose Europe for Science. It builds on four dimensions. First: scientific freedom. Europe must remain the global leader in free and open research. We need a research and innovation union where knowledge flows as freely as goods, services and capital. This is why we commit to protecting freedom of scientific research through law with the new European Research Area Act. This is in line with the European Parliament’s resolution of January 2024 on protecting the freedom of scientific research.

Second: funding. Horizon Europe is already the largest international research programme. It is a global magnet that received applicants from 194 countries, with 90 countries associated and more wanting in.

In addition, earlier this month, President von der Leyen announced a EUR 500 million package for the programming period 2025–2027. It will include a new seven-year super grant under the European Research Council. We will support the brightest researchers regardless of their origin.

We are also expanding our Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions with a new pilot starting in October. It will build on the attractive conditions offered by Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions, with longer contracts and more secure professional perspectives to support excellent early-career scientists choosing Europe.

For established researchers, we are doubling the top-up funding for grantees moving in Europe. We also work with Member States to reach our 3 % GDP target for R&D by 2030.

Furthermore, the European Regional Development Fund is spending around EUR 35 billion to increase research and innovation capacity across the Union. This will help reduce the innovation divide by strengthening regional R&I ecosystems. Member States and regions are improving their innovation performance and cohesion, and thus retain their talents and attract new ones. Under the next Framework Programme, we will put forward ambitious proposals on research and innovation funding.

Third: fast-tracking innovation. We must ensure our excellent research can be translated into breakthrough innovation, so that our citizens can benefit from science. Horizon Europe beneficiaries already submitted over 600 patent applications, and we are going further. Next week I will present Europe’s first start-up and scale-up strategy. Retaining and attracting talent will be a crucial dimension of this strategy. Next year we will table a new European Innovation Act, further simplifying and accelerating the path to market.

Finally: global talent. If you want the best minds to choose Europe, we need to make it easier for them to come and live here. We are working to make the legal framework for researchers more effective, and to speed up entry to the EU. At the same time, we will strengthen our EURAXESS platform, which already links global researchers with thousands of opportunities across the EU.

Honourable Members, to achieve this ambition, we also need mobilisation at national level. In the past weeks, we have witnessed our Member States opening their doors to talent, from the Welcome to Poland initiative and Choose France for Science, to Estonia’s Mobilitas 3.0 or Czechia’s Junior Star, and many more.

Here we need a true Team Europe approach to maximise our efforts. As the European Commission, we stand ready to promote this coordinated approach, including through enhanced public communication, starting from tomorrow’s Competitiveness Council. I wish to thank the Polish Presidency for its leadership on this subject.

To conclude, the aim of Choose Europe for Science is clear: to make Europe the leading destination for researchers on Earth. We can achieve this together as a Union with the active commitment from the Member States and, of course, with the crucial support of this House. The European Parliament has long championed scientific excellence and academic freedom. Your leadership has paved the way to our action today. So thank you very much and I look forward to working together.

Christian Ehler, on behalf of the PPE Group. – Madam President, Commissioner, ladies and gentlemen, I think Choose Europe for Science, the initiative announced by President von der Leyen, is an important signal for Europe and the world, but luckily it had been accompanied also by a press conference where the President had been announcing that there will be a stand‑alone research programme, which necessarily is the base for that ambition.

I think we should also emphasise that this is not that we want to attract the most talented in the world, it is that we stand in also for the freedom of science. Much smaller programmes, like the programme for researchers at risk, are an expression for that stand-in. Yes, we want to be attractive for the world, but we also are the safe haven for researchers, women researchers in Afghanistan, researchers under pressure in other parts of the world – we are the safe haven for them. So it’s both: our expression for excellence or ambition for excellence, but also our expression for standing in for the freedom of science.

Basically, we all know that it’s just going to work if we have a strong research programme. We can appeal to the world, but if we do not have a higher ambition in terms of research, it’s not going to be attractive. What we need is, simply put, more money. The last programme had been designed for a budget of EUR 120 billion and we ended up with EUR 80 billion. So, research budgets are in constraints and that is in complete opposition to what our formulated ambition had been – that at least 3 % of the GDP of Europe should be allocated to research and innovation.

So in a way, ambitions should follow also with the political courage to prioritise research and innovation in Europe. If I may conclude: now that the Commission and even the President have fully recognised the importance of science for the future of Europe, we also expect the Commission’s proposal for FP10 to be a Commission which also chooses science for Europe.

Giorgio Gori, a nome del gruppo S&D. – Signora Presidente, signora Commissaria, onorevoli colleghi, negli ultimi mesi l’amministrazione Trump ha attaccato l’autonomia del sistema educativo e universitario degli Stati Uniti, ha ridotto i finanziamenti agli atenei e limitato la libertà accademica. Queste scelte indeboliscono l’attrattività degli Stati Uniti per ricercatori e talenti globali. La rivista Nature ha rilevato che le domande di lavoro all’estero degli scienziati statunitensi sono cresciute del 32% tra gennaio e marzo 2025 rispetto all’anno precedente.

La Commissione europea ha colto questa opportunità annunciando un piano da 500 milioni di euro, per il periodo 25-27, volto ad attrarre ricercatori internazionali. Tra le misure previste, una super sovvenzione di sette anni gestita dal Consiglio europeo della ricerca che offre stabilità e incentivi raddoppiati per chi si trasferisce in Europa. Questa iniziativa è un passo nella giusta direzione per rafforzare la posizione dell’Europa nella ricerca scientifica globale.

Tuttavia, è essenziale fare di più. Negli ultimi venti anni l’Europa ha perso molto terreno rispetto ad altre regioni del mondo – su tutte Cina e Stati Uniti – riguardo alla capacità di attrarre investimenti per la ricerca e di coltivare talenti e progetti nei settori dell’innovazione più avanzata. E questa è una delle cause del declino della competitività europea.

Non basta, quindi, l’iniziativa della Commissione: gli Stati membri vanno spinti a costruire un quadro legislativo in grado di valorizzare e sostenere stabilmente la capacità dei ricercatori, di quelli che sono emigrati e vogliamo che tornino, di quelli che vogliamo attrarre e, soprattutto, di quelli che sono rimasti ma che vivono e lavorano in condizioni di precarietà.

Vanno aumentati i finanziamenti nazionali e i salari dei ricercatori, vanno progettati percorsi di carriera solidi e trasparenti e per chi sceglie di venire in Europa vanno semplificate le procedure di visto. Solo così la ricerca potrà fiorire in Europa, diventando motore di innovazione e di ricerca.

Catherine Griset, au nom du groupe PfE. – Madame la Présidente, chers collègues, à la Sorbonne, haut lieu de la culture française, Emmanuel Macron et Ursula von der Leyen ont organisé une mise en scène européiste: faire passer des activistes américains pour des martyrs de la liberté académique. Soyons clairs: ces chercheurs ne sont pas persécutés, ils sont sanctionnés pour avoir transformé les universités en foyer idéologique, où la science cède la place à la propagande.

Alors qu’on leur déroule le tapis rouge, que devient la recherche en Europe? Elle est noyée sous des financements pour des projets sur le genre, la race ou la déconstruction. Erasmus+ subventionne même des universités islamistes. «Horizon Europe» est devenu un guichet pour l’idéologie. Quant à la Hongrie, elle est exclue, non pour des raisons scientifiques, mais parce qu’elle ose penser autrement. Voilà la liberté académique selon Bruxelles: un outil politique.

Comme si cela ne suffisait pas, on efface désormais la France, jusque dans sa propre langue. Pour cette opération de communication, le français a été remplacé par un «globish» fade et sans racine. Les identités sont gommées, les cultures sont nivelées et l’Europe est standardisée à coups de slogans creux. C’est plus qu’un renoncement, c’est une soumission culturelle assumée. Cette opération n’a rien de scientifique: il s’agit d’un plan de rééducation idéologique et nous la combattrons.

Piotr Müller, w imieniu grupy ECR. – Pani Przewodnicząca! Widzimy na świecie w tej chwili wyścig nauki w różnych miejscach, w różnych dyscyplinach, ale przede wszystkim w takich obszarach, jak sztuczna inteligencja, rozwój energetyki, biotechnologii, najnowszych technologii informatycznych. W tych obszarach Unia Europejska powinna poczynić wszystko, aby stanąć w tym wyścigu jak równy z równym, w szczególności w kontekście konkurencji ze Stanami Zjednoczonymi czy z Chinami.

Jest to tylko możliwe wtedy, gdy faktycznie środki finansowe skoncentrujemy na tych najważniejszych obszarach i faktycznie na nich się skupimy. Z racji tego, że oczywiste jest, że zasoby podatkowe, zasoby finansowe, którymi dysponuje Unia Europejska i państwa członkowskie, są ograniczone, musimy podjąć taką decyzję. I musimy też odważnie powiedzieć, że wydatkowanie środków finansowych na lewicowe, ideologiczne badania jest po prostu stratą środków finansowych. Jest stratą nadziei na postęp nauki w takich obszarach, o których przed chwilą powiedziałem. I dzisiaj odważnie lewica musi wybrać, czy chcecie, aby finansować wasze lewicowe pomysły, badania na temat tego, czy jest 30 czy 35 płci, czy chcecie, żeby Europa podążała w wyścigu w zakresie rozwoju sztucznej inteligencji, energetyki czy innych obszarów, które przełożą się na jakość życia obywateli.

Szanowni Państwo, to nie jest kwestia dyskusji o wolności nauki, bo każdy może prowadzić badania naukowe, jakie sobie chce. Może decydować o tym samodzielnie. To jest decyzja o tym, gdzie idą pieniądze podatników. A pieniądze podatników powinny iść tam, gdzie efekty przełożą się na lepsze życie obywateli.

Valérie Hayer, au nom du groupe Renew. – Madame la Présidente, Madame la Commissaire, chers collègues, «le réchauffement climatique est un canular inventé par les Chinois pour nuire à l’industrie américaine», «le bruit des éoliennes cause le cancer», «le pacte vert pour l’Europe est un manifeste communiste», «un désinfectant est plus efficace qu’un vaccin contre la COVID-19», «l’huile de foie de morue réduit la mortalité liée à la rougeole», «les professeurs sont l’ennemi, nous devons attaquer agressivement les universités». Ces déclarations sont l’œuvre de Donald Trump et de son administration qui ont fait de la science et des scientifiques des ennemis de l’Amérique.

Mes chers collègues, ce n’est pas seulement aux États-Unis, mais partout dans le monde où les extrêmes progressent, que la liberté scientifique est menacée. L’initiative «Choose Europe for Science» promeut cette liberté scientifique. Elle vise à renforcer l’attractivité des carrières scientifiques en Europe. Elle veut accélérer l’innovation en facilitant le passage de la recherche fondamentale au marché.

Madame la Commissaire, le groupe Renew Europe soutient pleinement cette initiative. Il est à vos côtés pour faire de l’Europe ce pôle d’attraction pour la science. Il est à vos côtés pour défendre notre identité, celle d’une démocratie européenne qui nous protège de tout obscurantisme. Alors travaillons ensemble pour octroyer davantage de moyens aux scientifiques européens et étrangers et pour faciliter le retour des chercheurs européens expatriés.

Je le dis aux scientifiques du monde entier: entendez cet appel et choisissez l’Europe pour continuer à travailler. Des financements, un environnement favorable, des facilités administratives, la mobilisation d’un budget de 500 millions d’EUR, ainsi que le soutien inconditionnel à la liberté et à l’excellence scientifique sont là pour vous. L’Europe est généreuse, car elle a besoin des scientifiques.

Chers collègues, sans recherche, sans innovation, nous ne parviendrons pas à répondre à l’enjeu de notre compétitivité. C’est l’une des conditions pour faire de l’Union européenne une puissance politique pleine et entière. L’équation est posée. Alors avançons.

Anna Strolenberg, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group. – Madam President, the plan to attract scientists to Europe is called Choose Europe. But what does it mean to choose Europe? It means to choose academic freedom, to choose a continent that still believes in climate change – and thank God for that – it means to choose diversity being a strength instead of a weakness.

Choosing Europe also means long and difficult visa procedures. It also means having your diplomas recognised in one country, but not in the other. To choose Europe means to talk about researchers and professors that we want, but sometimes forgetting about the nurses, truckers and caregivers that we need.

Choose Europe also means that sometimes we don’t use our full workforce potential because refugees and women don’t always find a job. I want the best talent to come to Europe, but I also want the best for talent in Europe, and I believe we can do both if we invest in the people here and if we see labour migration as an opportunity.

So why don’t we train the people in Ljubljana but also look for them in Lagos? Why don’t we help women in Düsseldorf to find a job, but also look for them in Delhi? Why don’t we pay our professors and teachers in Saint-Étienne a fair wage, but also look for them in San Francisco?

I would say, let’s not ask why people would choose Europe, but let’s ask ourselves, how can we make Europe the destination of choice for all talent?

Ilaria Salis, a nome del gruppo The Left. – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, mentre negli Stati Uniti di Trump la libertà accademica è apertamente sotto attacco, anche in Europa non possiamo dormire sonni tranquilli. L’abbiamo visto nella repressione delle sacrosante proteste contro il genocidio a Gaza e contro l’occupazione coloniale della Palestina: studenti e ricercatori manganellati, conferenze annullate e accuse infondate e pretestuose di antisemitismo. È un segnale grave, gravissimo.

L’iniziativa Choose Europe for Science è importante e la sostengo: l’Europa dovrebbe sempre essere un rifugio, un luogo di libertà, cooperazione e speranza. Sarebbe bello – aggiungo – se lo fosse anche per migranti e richiedenti asilo, che fanno altri lavori e provengono da altre parti del mondo; ma non lo è.

Apriamo le porte solo alle eccellenze, come se il sapere non fosse sempre frutto di un lavoro collettivo, spesso invisibile e quasi sempre sottopagato. È una visione miope, che tradisce un’idea elitaria della conoscenza: l’idea capitalistica. L’Università va difesa nella sua interezza, come comunità, come luogo di sviluppo condiviso e non come vetrina di merito individuale.

In Italia chi fa ricerca è spesso un lavoratore povero, intrappolato in una precarietà cronica, costretto a una mobilità imposta, con conseguenze materiali e psicologiche devastanti. I posti di lavoro sono pochi, le prospettive pesanti, spesso solo all’estero. L’Università non si costruisce selezionando pochi eccellenti ma garantendo a tutte e tutti l’accesso al sapere.

Pertanto servono politiche pubbliche ambiziose, inclusive, di massa. Servono veri investimenti nella ricerca, perché la produzione di sapere è il miglior valore aggiunto che possiamo generare, non solo sul piano economico ma, soprattutto, sul piano culturale, sociale e democratico.

Marc Jongen, im Namen der ESN-Fraktion. – Frau Präsidentin! Choose Europe for Science. Warum sollten junge Wissenschaftler das tun? Doch nur, wenn sie sich zum Komplizen der politischen Lebenslüge unserer Eliten machen, dass Europa noch immer für Exzellenz, für akademische Freiheit und für Wohlstand steht. Die traurige Wahrheit ist doch: Es gibt heute Hexenjagden gegen kritische Wissenschaftler in ganz Europa, die nicht hundertprozentig dem linksliberalen Mainstream folgen, wie vor Kurzem gegen den jungen Historiker Hasselhorn in Deutschland. Lesen Sie das mal nach, Herr Brandstätter! Und Frau von der Leyen hat es in Paris in ihrer Rede Anfang Mai ja gesagt: Diversity is the lifeblood of science. Trump räumt gerade in den USA mit ideologischen Diversitätsprogrammen auf. Und wer deshalb von dort flüchtet, der ist sicher kein exzellenter Forscher, sondern Ideologe, den wir nicht noch mit teuren Programmen nach Europa locken sollten. Wir müssen aufhören, Agendawissenschaften wie Gender, Critical Race usw. in Europa zu fördern, und endlich auch einen freien Diskurs in der Klimaforschung zulassen. Nur dann werden wir wieder Exzellenz herstellen, und dann werden auch die pathetischen Worte von Macron und von der Leyen an der Sorbonne, die ja sehr schön waren, aber leider heuchlerisch, wieder der Wahrheit entsprechen.

Letizia Moratti (PPE). – Signora Presidente, signor Commissario, onorevoli colleghi, la scienza è uno degli strumenti più potenti che abbiamo per migliorare la vita dei nostri cittadini. È grazie agli studi, alle ricerche, alle competenze e alle eccellenze del nostro continente se oggi possiamo contare su terapie innovative contro il cancro o su vaccini che hanno sconfitto la poliomelite e la pandemia da COVID-19.

L’intelligenza artificiale sta aprendo nuove frontiere: potenzia la ricerca, accelera le scoperte e rende le nostre industrie più competitive a livello globale. La scienza dunque non è astratta: è concreta, genera soluzioni, crea futuro.

Eppure in Europa il trasferimento tecnologico rimane una delle nostre maggiori debolezze. Abbiamo ottimi ricercatori, ma non sempre riusciamo a trasformare la ricerca in valore sociale ed economico. Gli investimenti pubblici in ricerca nell’Unione europea – fondamentali investimenti che vanno potenziati – sono pari al 2,2 percento del PIL, mentre negli USA sfiorano il 3,5 percento. Anche gli investimenti privati sono ancora troppo bassi: solo l’1,5 percento del PIL contro il 2,2 percento degli Stati Uniti.

Dobbiamo agire per colmare questi gap. Serve facilitare la ricerca di spin-off e start-up universitarie, promuovere partnership pubblico-privato, creare un ecosistema favorevole che attragga investimenti, acceleri il trasferimento tecnologico e quindi attragga i migliori ricercatori.

L’Unione europea deve essere protagonista nell’affermare una scienza libera che non solo scopre ma costruisce per il bene dei propri cittadini. E questo significa anche sostenere con forza la sua applicazione industriale ed economica: è una sfida che dobbiamo vincere.

Lina Gálvez (S&D). – Señora presidenta, señora comisaria, en un momento en el que, por un lado, Europa necesita mejorar su competitividad, pero, por el otro, la libertad académica y la ciencia están siendo también cuestionadas en otros lugares del mundo, la iniciativa Elige Europa para la ciencia es más importante que nunca.

Europa debe posicionarse como refugio para las y los investigadores que buscan desarrollar sus ideas en un entorno de libertad y de respeto por la diversidad, por el pensamiento crítico que inspira el propio método científico, y Elige Europa para la ciencia es un paso en la dirección correcta, pero debe ser un proyecto verdaderamente europeo para evitar crear desigualdades. No podemos permitir que esta medida beneficie solo a algunos territorios: esa no es la Europa que queremos.

Queremos que Europa sea un lugar donde puedan investigar en libertad y abordar los desafíos globales, donde puedan colaborar con personas expertas de todo el mundo y donde se puedan aprovechar bien las oportunidades de financiación. Y para eso debemos garantizar, principalmente, dos cosas: primero, un presupuesto fuerte, y segundo, un programa europeo de ciencia e innovación autónomo. Afortunadamente, la presidenta de la Comisión el otro día anunció que así sería.

Tenemos que convencernos de que, sin ciencia, no hay ni competitividad, ni democracia, ni proyecto europeo.

Annamária Vicsek (PfE). – Elnök Asszony! A kutatás és innováció kulcsfontosságú Európa versenyképességének megőrzésében, ezért üdvözlendő a Bizottság célkitűzése, hogy megállítsa, sőt visszafordítsa az agyelszívást. A válassza Európát, válassza a tudományt elnevezésű kezdeményezésben viszont egy súlyos ellentmondást láthatunk. Miközben Brüsszel tengerentúli kutatókat csábít, addig egyes uniós kutatókat kizár a közös programokból. A magyar kutatók már három éve nem férnek hozzá a Horizon Europe forrásaihoz. Nem tudományos vagy adminisztratív hibák miatt, hanem politikai okokból.

Az Európai Bizottság a magyar kutatói közösség kizárásával akarja büntetni a magyar kormányt, pedig ezzel pont azt fogja eredményezni, amit elvileg meg akarna akadályozni, az agyelszívást. A magyar kutatók ma nemcsak az uniós, hanem már harmadik országbeli kollégáikkal szemben is hátrányban vannak. Ez a kirekesztés nemcsak igazságtalan, hanem Európa versenyképességét is gyengíti. A kiváló magyar kutatók megérdemlik, hogy az egységes kutatási térséghez tartozzanak.

Marion Maréchal (ECR). – Madame la Présidente, chers collègues, Emmanuel Macron et Ursula von der Leyen se sont livrés à la Sorbonne à un drôle de numéro: les voilà donc ardents défenseurs d’une recherche académique libre et indépendante contre l’obscurantisme de l’administration Trump.

Pour l’occasion, le président français n’a pas eu honte de proposer 100 millions d’euros pour attirer les chercheurs américains, alors que dans le même temps, le budget français dévolu à l’enseignement supérieur et à la recherche s’est vu retirer 1 milliard d’euros en 2025.

Pendant que les États-Unis consacrent plus de 3,5 % de leur PIB à la recherche et au développement, l’UE, elle, peine à dépasser les 2,2 %. L’Europe, en effet, peine à garder ses chercheurs, puisque, depuis 2010, le taux de départ des docteurs européens vers les États-Unis est d’environ 20 %.

Alors, avant de vouloir faire venir les chercheurs américains anti-Trump en Europe, commençons déjà par comprendre et faire en sorte de garder nos propres chercheurs en Europe grâce à une rémunération et à des crédits dignes de ce nom.

Profitons-en aussi pour nous interroger sur les orientations budgétaires de la recherche publique dans nos pays qui, en France par exemple, avec le CNRS, est devenu le paradis des sciences molles pour militants woke au détriment de la recherche scientifique qui, elle, crée de la richesse et de l’emploi.

Christophe Grudler (Renew). – Madame la Présidente, Madame la Commissaire, fin mars, nous alertions déjà sur la situation aux États-Unis: coupes budgétaires massives, recul des libertés académiques, licenciements. Aujourd’hui, ses scientifiques cherchent un refuge. L’Europe a donc une opportunité unique: devenir le nouvel eldorado de la science libre.

À cet égard, je salue l’initiative «Choose Europe» et l’annonce d’une enveloppe de 500 millions d’euros jusqu’en 2027, mais soyons clairs: les 22 millions d’euros du programme pilote, via l’action Marie Curie, ne suffiront pas. Ce programme pilote doit ouvrir la voie, oui, mais l’ouvrir vite, avec des procédures d’accueil simplifiées, une sélection rapide des projets et des perspectives de long terme pour celles et ceux qui veulent reconstruire ici leur avenir scientifique.

Par ailleurs, l’excellence scientifique n’est pas incompatible avec l’agenda stratégique de l’Union, bien au contraire. Les projets portés dans ce cadre peuvent, par leurs résultats, contribuer aux priorités de l’Union, du climat à la santé en passant par les technologies critiques et de rupture.

Enfin, j’en appelle à toutes les universités, académies et centres de recherche européens: rejoignez le mouvement, ouvrez vos portes.

Vladimir Prebilič (Verts/ALE). – Gospa predsedujoča! Spoštovane kolegice in kolegi! Kot profesor iz prve roke poznam preobrazbo na moč znanosti, ki mora biti svobodna, odprta za sodelovanje in ima intelektualno dostojanstvo.

V času, ko so ogrožene akademske svoboščine v Združenih državah Amerike in drugje, kjer so dejstva spolitizirana, akademiki pa utišani, mora Evropa dajati zgled. Biti moramo upanje za tiste, ki iščejo resnico in ne nadzora. Za tiste, ki iščejo sodelovanje in ne cenzure. Zato moramo odpreti vrata svetu z novimi programi, kot so Erasmus+ za Indijo in Afriko, ter vzpostaviti nova partnerstva s tretjimi državami.

To niso le programi mednarodne izmenjave, ampak so lahko tudi rešilni čoln za tiste, ki so danes ogroženi na Harvardu, Columbiji in drugje. Evropa mora sprejeti bistre ume iz vsega sveta. Naj jasno povem, če verjamete v svobodno misel in dostojanstvo znanja, potem izberite Evropo za znanost.

Catarina Martins (The Left). – Senhora Presidente, Senhora Comissária, este debate é um desfile de horrores.

Um grupo da extrema-direita chega e defende cortar o financiamento a universidades que se posicionam contra o genocídio na Palestina. Logo a seguir, outro dos grupos da extrema-direita vem defender cortes na investigação científica sobre mulheres. Como se não chegasse, vem o terceiro grupo de extrema-direita deste Parlamento e propõe adotar o conceito fascista de ciência: só se investiga o que lhes der razão.

A questão da liberdade académica não é um problema só nos Estados Unidos, onde a administração de Donald Trump está a perseguir as universidades e os cientistas. A interferência e a ameaça contra as universidades, o desrespeito completo pela autonomia, a falta de conhecimento — onde sobram racismo, misoginia e homofobia, elevados a critérios da ciência, que se pode ou não produzir —, também já estão na Hungria. Já está à espreita em tantos países europeus. E não foi, afinal, o que ouvimos aqui hoje?

A iniciativa Escolhe a Europa para a Ciência tem o objetivo de atrair cientistas de outras partes do mundo para fazer ciência na Europa. E é bom que a Europa o queira fazer, que se queira abrir ao mundo e que perceba que a ciência é fundamental.

Mas olhemos para o que está a acontecer: orçamento para a ciência insuficiente, xenofobia no centro da política de imigração e, mais, com a cobertura crescente que populares e liberais dão à extrema-direita um pouco por toda a Europa, quem acolherá os investigadores americanos, europeus, seja onde for, quando a perseguição, aqui, também se tornar a regra?

Zsuzsanna Borvendég (ESN). – Elnök Asszony! A kutatás-fejlesztés erősítése a versenyképesség egyik kulcsa, de a célok kijelölése tagállami hatáskör. Központosítással durva aránytalanságok állhatnak elő, és komoly problémák léphetnek fel. Már a bolognai folyamat is színvonalesést eredményezett az egyetemeken, de figyelmeztető jel az is, hogy a Covid-diktatúra idején boszorkányüldözést folytattak azon tudósok ellen, akik megkérdőjelezték a WHO diktátumait.

A tudományos szabadság nem tűri a politikai és ideológiai nyomásgyakorlást, ezért káros, hogy a tervezet eleve kiemeli a zöld átállást, a gender-tanokat, és kiemelt figyelmet fordít az ukrán kutatókra, ezzel kvázi meghatározva a támogatás politikai feltételeit. A mobilitás túlhangsúlyozásával az európai kutatók hátrányba kerülhetnek a harmadik országból érkezőkkel szemben. Vagyis rejtetten a migrációt segíti a tervezet, ráadásul nehezíti a kutatók visszatérését saját hazájukba, ezzel az Unión belüli agyelszívást fokozzák, ami a kevésbé gazdag tagállamokat súlyosan érinti.

Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă (NI). – Doamnă președintă, da, vorbim despre cercetare. Este foarte frumos, aveți intenții foarte bune, vă gândiți la bani, vă gândiți să aduceți cei mai buni cercetători din Statele Unite ale Americii, ăia de care America nu mai are nevoie, dar nu vă uitați la cercetătorii din Europa și, bineînțeles, fiind româncă, vreau să-mi laud cercetătorii din România: cercetători care au pus bazele Institutului de la Măgurele de Fizică Atomică, pe care îl lăsați în paragină; cercetători care au pus bazele celui mai important institut, „Cantacuzino” – datorită căruia n-am mai fi avut nevoie de vaccinuri COVID cu cercetări pe care nu știu pentru cine le-ați făcut, poate pentru Auschwitz, pentru că au omorât și omoară și acum, nu știu ce cercetători au fost – Institut „Cantacuzino” care nu mai există, iar cercetătorii au fost puși să se ducă la adunat de legume prin țările dumneavoastră; Institutul de Geriatrie „Ana Aslan”, cea care a inventat elixirul tinereții.

Nu faceți absolut nimic pentru Europa. Vă bateți joc! Aduceți doar vaccinuri care au efecte secundare și omoară oameni. Ideologii de gen, asta este cercetarea europeană. Când veți învăța să respectați Europa și cercetătorii europeni, atunci veți avea excelență.

Angelika Niebler (PPE). – Frau Präsidentin, Frau Kommissarin, liebe Kolleginnen, liebe Kollegen! Europa ist ein hervorragender Standort für Wissenschaftler aus der ganzen Welt. Die Freiheit der Lehre, der Forschung, der Wissenschaft ist für uns in Europa ein ganz hohes Gut. Dafür zu werben und Anreize zu setzen, dass Talente nach Europa kommen, ist genau das Richtige. Ich begrüße das neue Förderprogramm für Spitzenforschung, Spitzenforscher und internationale Talente. Ich begrüße diese Superfinanzhilfe für den Europäischen Forschungsrat. Ich begrüße die bessere finanzielle Ausstattung für Marie-Curie-Stipendien. Das alles, meine lieben Kolleginnen und Kollegen, sind doch hervorragende Initiativen, und sie helfen auch, eben unseren Standort noch weiter attraktiv zu machen.

Woran wir wirklich noch arbeiten müssen, ist, dass wir hier auch die Rahmenbedingungen für die Talente, die nach Europa kommen, erleichtern. Ich höre aus der Wissenschaftscommunity, dass es immer noch Riesenprobleme in den Mitgliedstaaten bei der Erteilung von Visa gibt, dass es beim Start schwierig ist – auch in dieser neuen Umgebung. Das ist jetzt nicht in erster Linie Aufgabe der Kommission, aber vielleicht kann man doch auch darauf hinwirken, dass die Talente, die zu uns nach Europa kommen wollen, sich hier auch wirklich willkommen fühlen. Und das beginnt damit, dass wir bei der Visaerteilung Erleichterungen schaffen.

Sofie Eriksson (S&D). – Fru talman! Det vi ser i USA just nu är ett systematiskt sönderfall, en demokrati som monteras ner bit för bit, en president som föraktar rättsstaten, som underminerar vetenskapen, som bara verkar bry sig om att berika sig själv och andra superrika, som gärna vill hålla folkflertalet utan utbildning och förnekar dem utbildning eftersom att vi vet att en bildad befolkning kommer att ifrågasätta auktoriteter.

Men vi hör ju samma rop här i denna sal här i dag från extremhögern som hånar vetenskap, som förnekar klimatförändringarna, som vill bygga makten på rädsla och förakt. Det duger inte.

Därför måste Europa svara, inte med tystnad utan med mod. Det är nu som vi måste ta ställning. Vi ska vara den självklara platsen i världen där kunskapen får andas, där sanningen inte är till salu. Därför är det här initiativet från kommissionen viktigt. Men det behövs mer än ord. Det krävs handling, det krävs förnuft. För låt det nu inte bli så att vi skrumpnar till torra, bruna, orangea och sura apelsiner, utan låt oss vara stolta i Europa där vetenskapen alltid har en plats.

Jana Nagyová (PfE). – Paní předsedající, paní komisařko, bylo nebylo, Evropa kdysi bývala centrem pokroku, místem, kam lidé upírali oči v naději na lepší budoucnost. Ta doba je však pryč. Svým přesvědčením, že jsme ti nejlepší, svou nabubřelostí a byrokracií jsme nechali mnoho mozků a vynálezů utéct do třetích zemí. Problémy jsou nad slunce jasné, odliv mozků, o třetinu nižší výdaje na výzkum a vývoj a jen čtvrtina registrovaných patentů ve srovnání s USA a Čínou. Uvádění inovací na trh podle reálné situace je ještě horší. Není divu. Zásadním krokem pro Evropu je totiž splnění úkolu, který zde zůstává nedokončený již téměř sedmdesát let od doby Římských smluv, a to je realizace čtyř svobod. Roztříštěnost trhů stojí Evropu každý rok přes 200 miliard EUR a přitom my hledáme nové finanční zdroje. Máme je na talíři.

Člověk však musí věřit, že bude lépe. Proto věřím, že poslední kroky Evropské komise, a to je program Choose Europe for Science a příslib samostatného programu Horizont přinesou své ovoce. Jen doufám, že přístup do něj bude nastaven tak, aby i menší státy měly reálnou šanci z toho čerpat. Jinak bude platit „Poslední zhasíná“.

Diego Solier (NI). – Señora presidenta, señora comisaria, hay dos cosas raras de ver: una patera yendo hacia un país comunista y un investigador pensando en quedarse en Europa. Europa quiere ser el hogar de la ciencia, pero para eso tiene que ser un lugar donde vivir, trabajar y crear no sea un deporte de riesgo.

Somos un continente con democracias sólidas: sanidad, educación, movilidad… Sí, pero ¿puede un joven e investigador pagar un piso en Ámsterdam, Múnich o Madrid con un contrato de tres años? Financiamos ciencia con Horizonte Europa, pero llenamos a los investigadores de papeles y formularios. Los científicos pasan más tiempo acreditando que investigando.

Además, no podemos permitir que nuestros investigadores vivan en la precariedad. Necesitamos más vínculos con las empresas, más empleabilidad y más sinergias. Si queremos que elijan Europa, hagamos de Europa una elección real, no una apuesta inestable. La ciencia necesita libertad, continuidad y estabilidad. Sin ciencia no hay Europa.

Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez (Renew). – Señora presidenta, estamos en un momento en el que presidentes de distintos Estados son invitados a la Casa Blanca con intención de ser ridiculizados, se dispara contra diplomáticos y civiles de todos los bandos cuando se quiere presionar ante violaciones de derechos humanos y actuaciones inhumanas y la plutocracia y extremismos ganan terreno, limitando libertades fundamentales y pensamientos críticos. Hagamos de Euskadi y de Europa un espacio de oportunidad para quienes quieran mejorar sus condiciones de vida desde el respeto a los valores europeos y un lugar de desarrollo profesional para quienes quieran sumar sus capacidades investigadoras a las nuestras y nos ayuden a reducir dependencias a partir de la innovación y el desarrollo. De eso va el programa Elige Europa para la ciencia.

En este nuevo tablero geopolítico, el liderazgo científico e innovador proporciona una ventaja competitiva cada vez mayor. Y eso, en el medio y en el largo plazo, se traduce en nuevos y mejores puestos de trabajo, más autonomía estratégica y menos desigualdades.

Por lo tanto, en una Euskadi que siempre ha apostado por la investigación y el desarrollo, por la libertad científica y el fomento del talento, esperamos que esos más de 1 250 millones de euros sirvan para hacer crecer nuestro espacio de oportunidad y nuestro país.

Anthony Smith (The Left). – Madame la Présidente, Madame la Commissaire, c’est formidable, formidablement hypocrite! Mme von der Leyen et M. Macron s’érigent en défenseurs des libertés académiques et politiques en octroyant l’accueil aux scientifiques étasuniens, par exemple, persécutés pour leur engagement en faveur de la Palestine.

Ce sont les mêmes qui, ici, s’enlisent dans des circonvolutions pour ne pas dénoncer le génocide en cours à Gaza. Les mêmes qui, ici, frappent d’anathème les militants et les étudiants dénonçant les massacres de Tsahal; les mêmes qui, ici, accusent d’antisémitisme toute personne critiquant le gouvernement d’extrême droite de M. Netanyahou.

Depuis que M. Macron est au pouvoir, le budget de l’enseignement supérieur par étudiant a baissé de 15 % en France. Une destruction méthodique de l’université publique a lieu sous nos yeux. Les universités ne parviennent plus à boucler leur budget et la précarisation des personnels et des étudiants atteint des niveaux records.

Assez de cette hypocrisie et de ces plans de communication obscènes! Nous défendrons toujours les libertés politiques et académiques et les moyens nécessaires à leur expression, tout comme nous défendrons toujours l’accueil des réfugiés, peu importe leur origine.

Hélder Sousa Silva (PPE). – Senhora Presidente, Senhora Comissária, caros colegas, só teremos uma Europa desenvolvida, próspera e soberana se colocarmos a ciência e a inovação no centro do nosso projeto comum. A iniciativa Escolhe a Europa para a Ciência é um passo crucial nessa direção.

Pela primeira vez, os investigadores terão não só financiamento robusto e direto da União Europeia, mas também a garantia de contratos prolongados por parte das instituições e a necessária continuidade da carreira científica.

Além disso, com a exigência de cofinanciamento que esta iniciativa impõe, devemos garantir que todas as instituições sediadas em regiões com menos recursos possam realmente participar sem deixar ninguém para trás.

Mas precisamos de sonhar mais alto. Precisamos de garantir que esta iniciativa posiciona a União Europeia como líder global em ciência e inovação, oferecendo um ambiente de investigação aberto, bem financiado, coeso e com forte ligação ao setor empresarial. É muito importante que tal aconteça.

(O orador aceita responder a uma pergunta «cartão azul»)

Bruno Gonçalves (S&D). – Dear President, colleagues, Commissioner, o futuro da indústria e da competitividade europeia não se constrói com salários baixos nem com desregulação sem limites; constrói-se com uma estratégia para a inovação, estratégia que nos faltou.

A iniciativa Chose Europe, agora apresentada, acrescenta 500 milhões EUR, que permitem valorizar os nossos jovens qualificados e novos centros de investigação. Mas o aumento de financiamento abre também portas ao recrutamento dos melhores cientistas que já não estão na Europa.

Falo daqueles que, nos Estados Unidos e noutros países, sofreram cortes no apoio ao seu trabalho e que sentem a ciência ameaçada por parte dos mesmos que em Gaza ameaçam crianças, mas que no mundo ameaçam a verdade.

Esta é uma oportunidade única para reinventar a Europa como líder de uma nova era do conhecimento na descarbonização, na inteligência artificial ou nas biotecnologias de saúde. Mas, sejamos claros, o futuro não vai esperar por nós. E é por isso que, mais do que é importante apresentar, é urgente fazer. Essa deve ser razão suficiente para que o Velho Continente volte a ser o mais iluminado.

(O orador aceita responder a uma pergunta «cartão azul»)

João Oliveira (The Left), Pergunta segundo o procedimento «cartão azul». – Senhor Deputado Bruno Gonçalves, quero fazer-lhe duas perguntas.

Primeiro, como é que Portugal sai da situação de dependência dos países mais fortes, das grandes potências da União Europeia, no acesso aos fundos para a ciência? A União Europeia acaba de anunciar um conjunto de medidas com grandes fundos associados. Portugal continua sempre numa posição de dependência, porque, para aceder a esses fundos, as nossas unidades de ciência e de investigação precisam sempre de encontrar alguma espécie de consórcio com unidades de países mais importantes, mais fortes, para conseguir aceder aos fundos.

A segunda pergunta é esta: como é que o PS resolve a contradição do seu discurso e do seu posicionamento, defendendo, por um lado, o investimento na ciência e na investigação, mas, por outro lado, estando de acordo com todas as restrições e condicionamentos orçamentais que a União Europeia nos impõe, nomeadamente através do Pacto de Estabilidade?

Precisamos de fazer o investimento em ciência e tecnologia, e isso não é compatível com a aceitação das restrições orçamentais que a União Europeia nos impõe.

Bruno Gonçalves (S&D), Resposta segundo o procedimento «cartão azul». – Se eu pudesse responder com uma venda, eu diria que esta intervenção vem de um partido profundamente europeísta, preocupado com a Europa e com a forma como os fundos europeus são alocados ao nosso país. Não é o caso.

E, portanto, responderei sendo de um partido profundamente europeísta, de um partido que criou, em Portugal, a Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, de um partido que aprofundou a integração europeia também no conhecimento, e que já na última legislatura — não na última legislatura do governo AD, mas do governo do Partido Socialista — criou clusters em Portugal que não só permitiram aceder a mais fundos, mas permitiram aceder a mais fundos entre empresas e universidades portuguesas.

E, portanto, essa visão cética sobre a Europa é algo que caracteriza bem a bancada de onde o senhor deputado vem, mas não é algo que seja refletido nos dados públicos, que nos demonstram que, hoje, temos pessoas mais qualificadas, mais inovação — e muito mais do que tínhamos antes da integração europeia.

Kris Van Dijck (ECR). – Voorzitter, mevrouw de commissaris, ik ben blij dat het besef er is dat investeringen in onderzoek en innovatie een absolute noodzaak zijn voor ons concurrentievermogen. Ik ben ook trots dat Vlaanderen hierin een koploper is en zelfs de ambitie uitspreekt om van 3,5 % naar 5 % van het bbp te evolueren.

Het gemiddelde in de Europese Unie ligt nu rond de 2,2 % en dat is ruim onvoldoende. Onze productiviteit lijdt hieronder. Zo kunnen we de wereldwijde concurrentie niet aangaan en dreigen we aan welvaart in te boeten. Dus goed dat de Commissie actie onderneemt. Maar sta me toe, mevrouw de commissaris, drie belangrijke kanttekeningen te maken:

1) laat fundamenteel onderzoek niet vallen. Dat brengt het Europese concurrentievermogen op lange termijn immers in gevaar;

2) behoud de zeer waardevolle bottom-upbenadering in het Marie Curie-programma. Hierin is politieke sturing niet wenselijk;

3) let op met het reguleren van academische vrijheid, want het enige kader ter bescherming van de academische vrijheid is net dat er geen kader is.

Conclusie: kiezen voor onderzoek en innovatie is kiezen voor de toekomst.

Jüri Ratas (PPE). – Austatud president! Head ametikaaslased, komisjon. Toetan tugevalt ideed, et teadus peab olema Euroopa poliitika keskmes, kui me tahame tagada meie tulevikku ja konkurentsivõimet. Teadus on nagu voolav jõgi, mis toidab kogu meie ühiskonda, meie majandust ja meie tulevikku. Kui me ei hoolitse selle jõe eest, siis ta kuivab ja koos sellega takerdub ka meie edasiminek. Me ei saa lubada, et see teema jääb Euroopa Liidus vaid tühjaks hüüdlauseks. Peame kiiresti jõudma tegudeni. Euroopa teadus on tähtis meie konkurentsivõime, julgeoleku ja heaolu jaoks. Euroopast peab saama teaduse liider. Peame olema innovatsiooni esirinnas ja toetama ka teiste riikide teadlasi Euroopas tegutsemas. Tean seda ka Eesti kogemusest. Meie teaduse maastik on maailmatasemel, kuid meie teadlased, ülikoolid ja teadusasutused vajavad kindlamat tuge, suuremaid investeeringuid, et nad saaksid jätkata Euroopas tipptasemel lahenduste väljatöötamist ja viiksid siin oma unistused ellu. Ma tänan!

Elena Sancho Murillo (S&D). – Señora presidenta, señora comisaria, la ciencia y la innovación son nuestro presente y nuestro futuro y, por eso, Elige Europa para la ciencia debe ser la hoja de ruta para afrontar los retos de los próximos años.

¿Qué hubiera sido de nuestra historia sin Marie Curie, la española Margarita Salas, Charles Darwin o Grace Hopper? Os aseguro que la historia tal y como la conocemos no hubiera sucedido. Continuemos rompiendo barreras en defensa de la ciencia y de la tecnología y rompiendo, además, techos de cristal para que las mujeres también seamos líderes y estemos presentes en esta transformación de la innovación y de la ciencia.

El desarrollo en I+D, la tecnología, la inteligencia artificial y la digitalización deben reforzarse como herramientas de avance, de libertad, de seguridad y de competitividad europea frente a las amenazas de los oligarcas estadounidenses como Donald Trump o Elon Musk.

Elige Europa para la ciencia debe ser el compromiso por el liderazgo de Europa en innovación para que nuestros jóvenes elijan venir y quedarse en Europa. La inversión anunciada son buenas noticias, pero debemos seguir siendo ambiciosos. Debemos seguir atrayendo talento a Europa a través de más inversión y buenas condiciones laborales. Si queremos el avance científico de Europa, debemos estar del lado de los científicos y científicas.

Eszter Lakos (PPE). – Elnök Asszony! Európa vezet a tudományos publikációk számában és a nemzetközi együttműködésekben, de a globális versenyképességhez innovatívabb, befogadóbb tudományos ökoszisztémákra van szükségünk. Olyanokra, amelyek bevonzzák a legbrilliánsabb elméket. Először is vonzó hellyé kell válnunk a legjobb kutatók számára. Ez kiszámítható, hosszútávú finanszírozást, külön keretprogramot, világos és vonzó karrierutakat, jó munka-magánélet egyensúlyt jelent, különösen a nőknek és a fiatal kutatóknak, valamint egy olyan kutatási kultúrát, amely a kiválóságra, a nyitottságra és a bizalomra épül.

Nem feledkezhetünk meg a kutatási innovációs szakadék csökkentéséről sem. Erős európai kutatási térséget kell kiépítenünk, kiváló infrastruktúrákkal, amelyek minden régiót és tagállamot bevonnak, beleértve Magyarországot is, amely a jövőben, amikor majd mi, a Tisza leszünk kormányon, visszaadjuk az Akadémia szabadságát, és majd ismét élénk tudományos ökoszisztémává válhat, ahol a tehetség valóban kibontakozhat. Európának erősítenie kell tudományos szuverenitását, nem csak a csúcstechnológiába kell befektetnie, hanem az azt létrehozó emberekbe is.

Procedura “catch-the-eye”

Liudas Mažylis (PPE). – Pirmininke, komisare, kolegos. Dabartinė JAV administracija ruošiasi nurėžti finansavimą nuo, pavyzdžiui, NASA, nuo Ligų kontrolės, prevencijos centro. Būdamas mokslininkas, žinau, per kokius sunkiai įveikiamus biurokratinius brūzgynus tenka brautis formuojant, pavyzdžiui, sveikatos duomenų registrus. Tokių duomenų nepalaikant, ta unikali sukaupta globali vertybė nueina niekais. Tad Komisijos pirmininkės pasiūlytas pusės milijardo paketas apskritai yra laiku ir vietoj. Tai turi aprėpti mokslininkus iš įvairių trečiųjų valstybių, įskaitant, pavyzdžiui, Ukrainą. Tiesa, septynerių metų „super grantai“ gali kelti nelygybės pavojų tarp jau egzistuojančių ir dar tik besiformuojančių kompetencijos centrų. Tačiau džiugina požiūris į jaunus mokslininkus ir jog nepamirštama parama jiems. Dar pridurčiau apie būtinybę į finansavimą įtraukti dvigubos paskirties tyrimus. Dėkoju.

Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis (S&D). – Madam President, Commissioner, you know very well, Manuel Heitor’s report – align, act, accelerate. The report is based on the Letta Report proposing a fifth freedom, but a fifth freedom for research and development requires infrastructure and an ecosystem at pan-European, supranational level.

And of course, Draghi mentioned the necessity to build a research and innovation union. A union requires a lot of effort and a whole-of-Commission approach and a whole-of-government approach. We are just proposing to establish a pilot project using European reference networks, using artificial intelligence fabrics, using a health data space, using biobanks and one million genomics to build an ecosystem and a reduction in the area of rare diseases, rare cancers and low prevalence diseases.

It would be a good example to have pan-European infrastructure. I will send you our proposals.

IN THE CHAIR: VICTOR NEGRESCU
Vice-President

Helmut Brandstätter (Renew). – Mr President, some right-wing colleagues told us that Trump wants to chase away just the ‘woke’ scientists. That’s wrong. I have here the editorial of The Lancet, a well-known publication of science. What they’re writing is that Elon Musk’s department slashed federal budgets and awards, interrupting investigations into paediatric cancer, diabetes, HIV, prematurely ending at least 113 clinical trials and withholding funds from more than 200 universities. PhD projects have been cancelled, graduate admissions rescinded and infrastructure investment foregone. The visas of foreign-born American students and faculty have been revoked.

So that’s the situation. In the United States, they can’t work freely anymore. So please, Commissioner, go there, get them. We really have to do something. They have great talent and they should come to Europe.

One more thing: yesterday, we had a conference about the mental health of the children of Ukraine. They are refugees – 20 000 of them were stolen and brought to Russia. They need a lot for mental health. Please think about them as well. Let’s do something for them.

João Oliveira (The Left). – Senhor Presidente, Senhora Comissária Zaharieva, o desenvolvimento científico e tecnológico é um aspeto absolutamente essencial para o desenvolvimento de qualquer país. E as assimetrias e as desigualdades de desenvolvimento entre os países da União Europeia são um problema grave, que tem de ser combatido — e, por isso, é absolutamente essencial que as opções da União Europeia em matéria de ciência e tecnologia deem um contributo decisivo para esbater, para eliminar essas diferenças e essas desigualdades de desenvolvimento entre cada país.

Mas as opções que têm sido feitas são exatamente no sentido contrário. Não apenas nas políticas económicas, que determinam, para alguns países, melhores condições de desenvolvimento científico e tecnológico e de incorporação da ciência e da tecnologia na sua atividade produtiva, mas também porque, no acesso aos fundos, as condições de acesso entre países não são iguais, e os países menos desenvolvidos têm mais dificuldades em aceder aos fundos da União Europeia para poderem garantir melhores condições para o desenvolvimento científico e tecnológico.

Os países menos desenvolvidos têm mais dificuldades também em fazer o investimento com os seus próprios recursos orçamentais, porque as limitações e os condicionamentos da União Europeia pesam mais.

É preciso inverter essas opções para garantir que haja verdadeiramente coesão dentro da União Europeia.

Lukas Sieper (NI). – Herr Präsident, liebe Kollegen! Ich bin Ihnen sehr dankbar für diese Debatte, die mir erneut vor Augen geführt hat, was der Unterschied zwischen Politikern und Wissenschaftlern ist. Ich denke, Choose Europe for Science ist eine sehr wichtige Initiative, die aber nicht genug auf das eigentliche Ziel eingeht, das wir damit verfolgen. Jeder weiß, dass es dabei am Ende des Tages um die Einführung einer fünften Grundfreiheit geht: der Wissenschaftsfreiheit. Aber das sollte in diesem Programm ausdrücklich erwähnt werden. Wir sollten in der Lage sein, mit unserer Wissenschaftsfreiheit Visionen für die Zukunft zu schaffen, und nicht nur kleinteilig das Jetzt zu regeln. Und das Gleiche gilt auch im Kleineren. Es ist richtig und wichtig, was im Einzelnen hinsichtlich der Anerkennung von Forschungsabschlüssen und der Erleichterungen für Visa darin steht. Aber wir gucken zu wenig auf diejenigen, die noch keine Forscher sind, nämlich diejenigen, die jetzt gerade in der Schule sind. Wir brauchen europaweit harmonisierte Schulfächer, wie zum Beispiel Digitalkompetenz und Medien, damit jene, die in Zukunft in Europa exzellent forschen können, dafür alle nötigen Kompetenzen mitbringen.

(End of catch-the-eye procedure)

Ekaterina Zaharieva, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, honourable Members, I’m really grateful for your intervention. I felt really broad support for the Choose Europe for Science initiative, which confirms that uniting us is one of the most powerful attitudes that science has. It goes beyond the national and party borders and I think that’s precisely why Europe’s research is open to all of those who share our values.

Today, already 42 % of our young doctoral and postdoctoral researchers that we support through Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions come from outside the EU and 80 % of our publications that we fund through Horizon Europe are open access. I think that we have to be proud of our European model that we have for research. In Europe, science is free. In Europe, we celebrate both questions and our diverse academic traditions. In Europe, people are at the centre of scientific research and we should be proud of that.

I heard a lot of you who said we have to improve the conditions of European researchers who are already here and that we have to create a true union of science and research. This was actually one of my number one priorities. In the five minutes at the beginning, I unfortunately wasn’t able to present the full package of Choose Europe for Science, but I can reassure you that we are working on everything that you mentioned, like improving career development, improving conditions for scientists in Europe, visa facilitation – we worked with Commissioner Brunner and with the Member States on that – and all the other questions that were raised and proposals that I heard today.

I want to share with you one concrete number: now, with only 5 % of the world’s population, Europe is already home to one fourth of scientists in the world. In a decade, the number of European researchers will have grown by 45 %, which is significant. That means that young people choose science and choose to become scientists despite disinformation and science scepticism on the rise. They embrace science and for those young people who choose science, we are obliged to continue to do our best for Europe to remain the best place to do science in the world. I am committed and I rely on your support to work to achieve this.

President. – Thank you, Commissioner Zaharieva, for your statement and your involvement.

The debate is closed.

3. Deliberations of the Committee on Petitions in 2023 (debate)

Peter Agius, deputising for the rapporteur. – Mr President, the Committee of Petitions is about giving a voice to citizens. It is the committee of the citizens. Through us, citizens can put pressure on the Commission, on the Member States to make sure that from laws we pass to rights.

Because after all, this is what citizens really care about. They do not care about laws; they care about rights reaching them and their families. During the year 2023, the Committee of Petitions received 1 452 petitions representing a 16 % increase over previous years, but we believe there is room for much more. We believe there should be much more awareness about this important tool for citizens.

The main topics of the petitions were the environment, internal market and fundamental rights. We received, for instance, many petitions on the Data Protection Regulation and its breaches in various Member States. We received petitions on the rule of law and democracy and a lot of petitions on environmental concerns. In fact, it’s fair to say that there is no Petitions Committee hearing without matters on environmental protection discussed in the committee, including wildlife conservation, forest policy and breaches to the Habitats Directive.

We received many petitions also in the area of health, and this clearly shows that citizens want more out of Europe in this area. And in many discussions we had in the committee, it is with pride that I say that a lot of our discussions lead to changes, lead to implementation, lead to enforcement, lead to investigations. Of course, we need more of this. We need the Commission to dedicate even more resources to following up, to responding to petitions and to implementation.

In 2023 we organised also four public hearings, some jointly with other committees, and these covered a wide range of petition-driven issues, including the Schengen border concerns, the impact of climate change on social security and vulnerable groups. The committee and the Commission maintain a very solid ongoing cooperation and we need, as we said, more involved Commission services and dedication to responding to petition concerns.

Nixtieq nagħlaq bil-messaġġ bil-Malti billi nenfasizza r-rabta ċara li hemm bejn id-drittijiet tagħna bħala ċittadini Ewropej u ż-żmien li ndumu biex neħduhom id-drittijiet. Bl-Ingliż ngħidu Justice delayed is justice denied. U hawn nieħu eżempju minn Malta, l-elettorat tiegħi. F’Malta suppost għandna standards Ewropej għal baħar nadif imma tiltaqa’ ma’ familji bit-tfal, jgħidulek: “Jien ma nistax ingawdi l-bajja għax hemm id-drenaġġ ħiereġ fil-bajja”. Fil-fatt, meta tara l-istorja tara li l-Kummissjoni Ewropea ilha għaxar snin tibgħat l-ittri. Is-sena l-oħra kellna sentenza tal-qorti li fl-aħħar qalet li għandna bżonn ninfurzaw il-liġi Ewropea. Però, sadanittant, dawk it-tfal saru adulti u ma gawdewiex il-bajja. Ejja nagħmluha aktar, kollha kemm aħna, biex niffukaw fuq l-implimentazzjoni. Għax wara kollox l-implimentazzjoni twassal għad-drittijiet.

Aħna fil-kumitat tal-petizzjonijiet ser nagħmlu l-biċċa tagħna billi nagħtu l-vuċi liċ-ċittadini li ħafna drabi m’għandhomx triq oħra ħlief li jiġu quddiemna. Għalhekk nagħlaq billi nirringrazzja lill-kollegi tal-gruppi politiċi kollha u anki MEPs bla grupp, tal-ħidma dedikata immens f’dan il kumitat u nħares ‘il quddiem għal djalogu interessanti llum u vot b’saħħtu u koerenti għar-riżoluzzjoni li għandna quddiemna.

Glenn Micallef, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, honourable Members, on behalf of the Commission, I would like to welcome Mr Falcă’s report, which offers a comprehensive overview of the activities of the Committee on Petitions in 2023.

As Mr Agius has just said, petitions are an effective channel for direct contact and open dialogue on problems affecting the daily lives of Europeans.

As mentioned by Commissioner Šefčovič last week in the structured dialogue with your committee, the Commission remains committed to providing timely and pertinent contributions to the European Parliament’s response to these concerns.

A clear signal of this commitment is that, throughout 2023, Commission representatives were present at all meetings of the Committee on Petitions, including at the highest political level. For example, Vice‑President Šefčovič was with you in February 2023 for a structured dialogue in accordance with the Framework Agreement on relations between our two institutions, and Commissioner Dalli took part in the annual workshop on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in November 2023.

According to your report, in 2023, you sent us 557 new petitions for opinion. In total, we provided on 984 petitions. The Commission continues to deploy the resources necessary to ensure that all petitions you send are properly addressed.

Looking at the petitions received in 2023, the main topics raised were the environment, the economy and fundamental rights. These concerns remain valid today and broadly align with the priorities of this Commission, as outlined in President von der Leyen’s political guidelines and reflected in the 2025 Commission Work Programme adopted earlier this year, which focuses on bold action to bolster our security, prosperity and democracy.

I would like to reiterate our commitment on addressing petitions that raise concerns on the implementation of EU law – a core priority under this mandate, and something crucial to maintaining the credibility of the EU institutions.

In February, we adopted a communication on implementation and simplification, setting out our vision for fast and visible improvements for Europeans and European businesses.

When it comes to the enforcement of EU law, the Commission takes action where necessary, using the infringement procedure. But the infringement procedure is not designed to offer concrete solutions for individuals or ensure individual redress. Rather, it is aimed at addressing systemic problems affecting a large amount of people, often across Member States.

Petitioners pointing to the incorrect application of EU law in individual cases would benefit more from the mechanisms available at national level, such as the national courts, regulatory bodies or ombudsman. If the problem has a cross‑border dimension, the Solvit network may offer quick and flexible remedies.

We have heard your calls for more transparency and better information‑sharing with regard to the Commission’s enforcement actions. We publish decisions on every step of an infringement procedure on the Europol webpage.

In the current version of the Infringement Register, the public can search for cases, with a link to the petition portal of Parliament. Tools such as this make it easier to track the progress of specific infringements, and to verify if there is any petition linked to any ongoing investigations.

The petitions portal now also links to the Infringement Register, allowing those who intend to file a petition to check whether an infringement procedure is already in progress.

In addition, the Commission has recently published a new Europol webpage to give user‑friendly information on infringement cases, the transposition of directives and EU pilot dialogues.

Finally, I want to commend your committee for your work on the European Citizens’ initiatives, in particular for advocating to increase the impact of European Citizens’ initiatives and for contributing to the organisation of public hearings for successful initiatives.

Several legislative acts in recent years have been triggered by successful European Citizens’ Initiatives, such as the revised Drinking Water Directive, the Regulation on the Transparency and Sustainability of EU Risk Assessment in the Food Chain and the Nature Restoration Law.

The next public hearing will be on the successful European Citizens’ Initiative on Cohesion Policy for the equality of the regions and the sustainability of regional cultures.

Rosa Estaràs Ferragut, en nombre del Grupo PPE. – Señor presidente, señor comisario, la labor central de la Comisión de Peticiones es defender los derechos fundamentales de los ciudadanos, protegerlos y hacer un seguimiento de sus peticiones para que puedan participar activamente en la vida de la Unión Europea.

El examen de esta Comisión de Peticiones de 2023 se ha hecho con eficacia, atención, imparcialidad, equidad y transparencia. Los ciudadanos han enviado peticiones sobre muchos temas, como ha comentado el ponente, pero me gustaría referirme especialmente a la preocupación sobre la situación del Estado de Derecho en España: se han presentado más de cuarenta peticiones sobre este tema, básicamente por los ataques a los jueces, las colonizaciones de las instituciones y la reducción de las penas por delitos de corrupción.

Entre las misiones realizadas, me gustaría destacar las de Irlanda, Rumanía y España y, más concretamente, esta última, de la que debo resaltar y lamentar los ataques y tensiones que allí se vivieron. Yo estuve presente y nos insultaron diciendo: «Fuera, fascistas, de estos barrios. No metan las narices donde no les llaman». Creo que esta no debe ser la actitud.

También me preocupa que no se haga un seguimiento de las recomendaciones que formulamos, pues lo hacemos para poder proteger los derechos de los ciudadanos. Por último, quiero poner en valor el trabajo tan magnífico que se ha hecho desde esta comisión.

Sandra Gómez López, en nombre del Grupo S&D. – Señor presidente, desde el Grupo S&D lamentamos profundamente el resultado de la votación en la Comisión de Peticiones. A pesar del trabajo constructivo que realizamos con el ponente y de los compromisos alcanzados con los grupos proeuropeos, seguramente por influencia y por imposición del Partido Popular español ‑que es quien realmente politiza y manosea esta comisión‑, la Comisión de Peticiones decidió romper el consenso y aliarse con la extrema derecha, dejando un informe que poco viene a reflejar los verdaderos intereses y preocupaciones de la ciudadanía.

Lo siento por el ponente, pero lo importante de este informe –de este debate– ni siquiera son las enmiendas o el informe, es la estrategia de la Comisión de Peticiones, sobre todo en el año 2023, que ha consistido en politizarla, utilizarla y manosearla para la propia agenda del Partido Popular. Y, realmente, peticiones que sí que son importantes y son de la ciudadanía nunca fueron atendidas o, como estamos viendo, son vetadas por intereses políticos, como es el caso de una petición gallega o de una sobre la DANA en Valencia, en donde su ciudadanía –las víctimas– ha podido verse antes con Úrsula von der Leyen o con Roberta Metsola que comparecer en la Comisión de Peticiones.

Yo le quiero hacer una pregunta al resto de delegaciones del Partido Popular o de Patriots. ¿Van a seguir consintiendo que una delegación concreta utilice una comisión, que debería atender a la ciudadanía, pero que se ha convertido una especie de sucursal del Congreso de los Diputados? ¿Están utilizando recursos del Parlamento Europeo para hacer oposición a un Gobierno de un Estado miembro?

Nosotros no vamos a aceptar que una comisión, que debería ser un verdadero instrumento de participación ciudadana, sea una mera fábrica de confrontación política, una pantalla de propaganda, y que se haya convertido en eso, además, exactamente en el año 2023, bajo la presidencia del Partido Popular Español y de Dolors Montserrat. Nosotros no vamos a ser cómplices y, por lo tanto, no vamos a permitir que se destruya lo que tanto costó construir: una Europa al servicio de la ciudadanía y no de sus partidos.

Pál Szekeres, a PfE képviselőcsoport nevében. – Elnök Úr! Először is szeretném megköszönni azt a munkát, amit a Petíciós Bizottság végzett a 2023-as esztendőben az uniós polgárok hangjának meghallgatásáért. A jelentés számos fontos témát tár fel az alapvető joguktól kezdve a környezetvédelemig. De engedjék meg, hogy egy területre külön felhívjam a figyelmet, a fogyatékossággal élő személyek jogainak védelmére, és ezen belül különösen a jelnyelv használatának előmozdítására.

Üdvözlöm, hogy a szakbizottság elismerte, hogy a kommunikáció nem luxus, hanem alapjog. Ezért nagyon fontos, hogy szorgalmazzuk a Parlament eljárási szabályzatának módosítását annak érdekében, hogy a siket polgárok tudjanak a saját anyanyelvükön, a nemzeti jelnyelven kommunikálni. Ez nem csupán technikai kérdés, hanem kötelezettség is, amelyet az ENSZ fogyatékossággal élő személyek jogairól szóló egyezménye is aláír és deklarálja. Én üdvözlöm a pozitív lépéseket, és felszólítom a kollégákat, hogy ne engedjék, hogy az eredmények kirakatintézkedésekké silányuljanak, és nagyon fontosnak tartom, hogy továbbra is támogassuk az európai polgárokat, hogy petíciókat tudjanak benyújtani, hogy tudjuk, hogy mi a véleményük a munkánkról.

Jana Toom, on behalf of the Renew Group. – Mr President, Commissioner, dear colleagues, the work of the Committee of Petitions is unfortunately often underestimated, which I consider a big mistake, because we are the first – if not the only – direct channel for Europeans to address their concerns and seek solutions.

This report very well reflects these expectations, as well as our ability to meet them. This ability, to be honest, is pretty limited. While citizens are very well aware of their rights, they are not so well aware, for instance, of Article 51 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, which clearly states that the charter is obligatory to follow only if Member States implement European law, which leaves a huge gap between the rights and values we promote and the real life of our citizens, which in turn leads to disappointment and Euroscepticism.

There are two ways: we leave this as it is and wait for the next crisis to force us to open the Treaties and remove these and other obstacles, or we find courage to put political pressure on our governments and not only promote, but truly defend the rights of Europeans are entitled to exercise – at least on paper.

Ana Miranda Paz, em nome do Grupo Verts/ALE. – Senhor Presidente, Senhor Comissário, com este relatório, os grupos à direita e a extrema-direita deste Parlamento conseguiram silenciar e minar o importante trabalho realizado pela Comissão das Petições, em 2023, sobre temas ambientais e climáticos e sobre direitos das pessoas. A Comissão das Petições é, para mim, como deputada europeia, das mais importantes deste Parlamento Europeu.

Mas não fizeram só isso, também usaram esta comissão para tratar de assuntos da exclusiva responsabilidade dos Estados-Membros — nomeadamente do Estado espanhol —, com acusações infundadas, gerando um ambiente de pouco consenso e levando a que a maioria das alterações do nosso grupo fossem rejeitadas sempre por questões ideológicas — como sempre fazem e continuam a fazer.

Um dos aspetos mais censuráveis é a atitude do Partido Popular espanhol desde que as maiorias parlamentares mudaram. Antes, era capaz de pactuar com os grupos progressistas deste Parlamento e, agora, prefere alinhar-se com a extrema-direita para bloquear qualquer iniciativa interessante e construtiva proposta pelos outros grupos parlamentares, ignorando, assim, a cidadania europeia. Tal como as petições que, no ano passado, foram apresentadas contra a empresa de macrocelulose Altri — um projeto que trouxe à rua mais de 100 mil pessoas —, não lhes importa.

Por isso, Senhor Relator, tenham este aspeto em conta, porque temos de mudar as coisas na Comissão das Petições e temos de fazer um trabalho que seja de todos os grupos, conjuntamente, e não trabalho sectário e manipulado, como fez o Partido Popular espanhol, manipulando também esta Comissão das Petições.

Marcin Sypniewski, w imieniu grupy ESN. – Szanowny Panie Przewodniczący! Zalewacie nas codziennie tysiącami stron raportów i analiz, a tak naprawdę macie duży problem z transparentnością. W sprawie tajnych SMS-owych negocjacji szefowej Komisji Europejskiej z Pfizerem sprawa musiała trafić do sądu. Były tu ukrywane ustalenia na miliardy euro. I co? Jest wyrok Trybunału Sprawiedliwości, i co z tego? Żadnych konsekwencji.

Podobnie w sprawie popularnych polskich pasów bezpieczeństwa dla dzieci, Smart Kids Belt, które zostały zaorane przez regulacje unijne. Tu też sąd stwierdził, że Komisja prowadziła kontakty z konkurentami i to wykończyło polską firmę. I żadnych konsekwencji. Posłowie nie mają też dostępu do ważnych dokumentów i ustaleń. Jaka to jest transparentność? Tylko w teorii. I te instytucje tak naprawdę działają tylko dla elit, a nie dla ludzi. I to widać w tych petycjach, które rozpatrujemy.

Od siedmiu lat nie możecie znieść zmiany czasu, ale gdy trzeba wydać kolejne miliardy euro, gdy trzeba załatwić kolejną zapomogę dla Ukrainy, to działamy ekspresowo i bez namysłu. To małe sprawy, ważne dla ludzi powinny być załatwiane ekspresowo, a ważne sprawy dotyczące wielomiliardowych wydatków powinny być rozpatrywane rozważnie i z namysłem.

Maria Walsh (PPE). – Mr President, I speak today on behalf of the communities in Donegal and Mayo – places where families are living in homes that are literally falling apart around them. These houses were built with defective concrete blocks containing too much mica and pyrite, causing serious structural damage, emotional and financial strain for many, many people.

In 2023, I joined colleagues from the Petitions Committee on its fact-finding mission to Donegal, a powerful moment that helped bring much-needed European attention to this crisis. The Parliament visit was built on years of local advocacy and resulted in clear, practical recommendations: first being faster access to a scheme that is fit for purpose, less red tape, stronger support for families, including mental health services, and accountability, with assurances that this would never happen again.

We must properly enforce rules on construction materials and hold those to account and prevent this from ever happening again. We must ensure colleagues in the Irish Government and this Parliament deliver on those recommendations to strengthen the protections for everyone’s future.

Catch-the-eye procedure

Elena Nevado del Campo (PPE). – Señor presidente, son los ciudadanos los que se dirigen al Parlamento, por lo tanto, les pido que no les insulten.

El Partido Socialista español pretende instrumentalizar hasta el Parlamento Europeo. Confunde su forma de hacer con el derecho de los españoles a trasladar sus preocupaciones a este Parlamento y su preocupación por los permanentes atentados al Estado de Derecho que estamos padeciendo. Porque los españoles, en 2023, fueron los ciudadanos que más peticiones presentaron a esta comisión. Esto es la consecuencia del asalto de nuestro Gobierno al CIS, el ataque a los jueces y a los tribunales, la colonización de las empresas y el uso de la Fiscalía, del Tribunal Constitucional y del Banco de España. Es la consecuencia de casos como el caso Koldo, el del hermano del presidente, la amnistía por los condenados por el procés, el derecho a protestar por la imputación de la mujer del presidente y un largo etcétera. Eso es lo que debe preocuparnos. La Comisión de Peticiones está para responder a estos problemas. No les insulten.

Petras Gražulis (ESN). – Pirmininkaujantis, gerbiamas Komisare. Kai kartą šiandien Lietuvoj renkama peticija Europos Parlamentui, nes buvusi, buvusi, dabar esantys valdžioje, socialdemokratai, dalyvaudami rinkiminėje kampanijoje, pasipriešino tuometinei valdžiai ir sakė, kad mokesčių nekels. Tame tarpe nekilnojamo turto, gyventojų pajamų mokesčių ir kitų. Atėję į valdžią, jie šiandien po pateikimo priėmė mokesčių pakėlimą. Žmonės piktinasi apgauti. Vieną kalbą prieš rinkimus, o po rinkimus atlieka visai kitus veiksmus. Žmonės mato, kaip švaistomas visuomeninis turtas, kaip plečiasi biurokratija. Tai nustatinėja net ir Valstybės kontrolė, tačiau nesiima veiksmų, apiplėšinėja žmones. Aš tikiuosi, kad ir Europos Komisija, ir Europos peticijų komitetas atsižvelgs ir rimtai nagrinės šimtus tūkstančių surinktų Lietuvos piliečių parašų.

Μαρία Ζαχαρία (NI). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, η Επιτροπή Αναφορών αποτελεί το βασικό θεσμικό βήμα μέσω του οποίου οι Ευρωπαίοι πολίτες εκφράζουν τις αγωνίες, τις ανησυχίες και τα προβλήματά τους. Ο ρόλος μας είναι ξεκάθαρος: να υπερασπιζόμαστε και να προωθούμε τα δικαιώματά τους χωρίς εκπτώσεις. Είναι απογοητευτικό ότι μια δεξιά-ακροδεξιά συμμαχία εντός της επιτροπής δρα για να κλείνει αναφορές που ενοχλούν τις δεξιές κυβερνήσεις. Επίσης, είναι απογοητευτικό το γεγονός ότι η πλειοψηφία των κρατών μελών επιλέγει συστηματικά να μην απαντά στα ερωτήματα που τους τίθενται από αυτήν την επιτροπή. Η λογοδοσία προς τους πολίτες δεν μπορεί να είναι επιλεκτική. Πρέπει να είναι καθολική και χωρίς υπεκφυγές. Γι’ αυτόν ακριβώς τον λόγο, είχα προτείνει, τουλάχιστον, την εφαρμογή της διαδικασίας «name and shame» για εκείνα τα κράτη μέλη που αρνούνται να συνεργαστούν, να απαντήσουν και να λογοδοτήσουν. Δυστυχώς, τα περισσότερα μέλη των πολιτικών Ομάδων επέλεξαν να προστατεύσουν τις κυβερνήσεις τους. Εμείς, ωστόσο, θα επιμένουμε, θα συνεχίσουμε να διεκδικούμε ονομαστική λογοδοσία για την υπεράσπιση των δικαιωμάτων των απλών ανθρώπων.

Λευτέρης Νικολάου-Αλαβάνος (NI). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, θέλουμε να καταγγείλουμε την απόφαση του Ευρωκοινοβουλίου και της Επιτροπής Αναφορών να κλείσουν χωρίς συζήτηση αναφορά των αντιστασιακών ελληνικών οργανώσεων για τις γερμανικές επανορθώσεις, με τον προκλητικό ισχυρισμό ότι δεν εμπίπτει στις αρμοδιότητες της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης. Όμως οι αποζημιώσεις για τα εγκλήματα των Ναζί, το αναγκαστικό κατοχικό δάνειο, την κλοπή αρχαιολογικών θησαυρών καθορίζονται από διεθνείς συμβάσεις που δεσμεύουν δύο κράτη μέλη. Η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση θεωρεί αρμοδιότητά της να παρεμβαίνει σε κάθε διεθνές ζήτημα, σε ιμπεριαλιστικούς πολέμους σε κάθε γωνιά του πλανήτη· να στηρίζει τη γενοκτονία του παλαιστινιακού λαού από το Ισραήλ· από τη Ρωσία, πριν καν τελειώσει ο πόλεμος στην Ουκρανία, απαιτεί επανορθώσεις. Στο θέμα των γερμανικών αποζημιώσεων, όμως, κάνουν τους αναρμόδιους. Η στάση της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, της κυβέρνησης της Νέας Δημοκρατίας και των προηγούμενων, που δεν διεκδικούν για να μη διαταραχθούν οι σχέσεις με τη Γερμανία, είναι πρόκληση απέναντι στον ελληνικό λαό, την ηρωική αντίστασή του και τις βαριές θυσίες του στην πάλη κατά του φασισμού. Συνεχίζουμε τον αγώνα ώστε οι κυβερνήσεις της Γερμανίας, της Ελλάδας και η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση να τοποθετηθούν επίσημα απέναντι στις δίκαιες απαιτήσεις του ελληνικού λαού για τις γερμανικές πολεμικές αποζημιώσεις.

(End of catch-the-eye procedure)

(The sitting was suspended at 10:45)

PRESIDENZA: PINA PICIERNO
Vicepresidente

5. Voting time

(Per i risultati delle votazioni e altri dettagli che le riguardano: vedasi processo verbale)

5.1. Amending Regulation (EU) No 228/2013 as regards additional assistance and further flexibility to outermost regions affected by severe natural disasters and in the context of cyclone Chido devastating Mayotte (vote)

Presidente. – Iniziamo con la richiesta di decisione d’urgenza presentata dalla Commissione AGRI per quanto riguarda l’assistenza integrativa e l’ulteriore flessibilità per le regioni ultraperiferiche colpite da gravi calamità naturali e nel contesto delle devastazioni provocate a Mayotte dal ciclone Chido (cfr. punto 5.1 del processo verbale).

5.2. Amending Regulation (EU) 2023/956 as regards simplifying and strengthening the carbon border adjustment mechanism (A10-0085/2025 – Antonio Decaro) (vote)

– Dopo la votazione:

(Il Parlamento accoglie la richiesta di rinvio in commissione)

5.3. Modification of customs duties applicable to imports of certain goods originating in or exported from the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus (A10-0087/2025 – Inese Vaidere) (vote)

– Prima della votazione:

Inese Vaidere, rapporteur. – Madam President, dear colleagues, many agricultural producers have become increasingly dependent on Russian fertiliser imports. The dependency on Russian gas is being replaced with a new dependency on Russian fertiliser.

In addition, it has had a negative impact on the European fertiliser industry. Instead of a ban on importing Russian fertilisers as we, the European Parliament already called for in September, the Commission proposed to gradually, over a period of three years, increase import duties for fertilisers and agricultural goods from Russia and Belarus.

This will give the farming sector time to adjust and the fertiliser industry time to boost their production. Additionally, European producers will benefit from increased tariffs on other agricultural goods imported from Russia and Belarus. To prevent that these tariff measures have a negative effect on the agricultural sector, we have asked the Commission to provide a statement about their action plan.

Dear colleagues, I urge you to adopt this proposal without any amendments. This way, we will be able to ensure that this regulation enters into force, as foreseen, by 1 July this year. Every delayed day will mean lost lives in Ukraine.

Of course, this proposal is a compromise and it’s never the case that compromises make everyone happy. Can you name a law that everyone is 100 % happy with?

The Council has already confirmed their readiness to adopt this regulation without any amendments. I sincerely thank the Members who were able to set aside their particular interests for a while to agree on the overarching goal at the forefront. We need to stop financing Russia’s war in Ukraine. War is right next to our external borders. Stopping it is needed for our safety.

Glenn Micallef, Member of the Commission. – Madam President, honourable Members, the European Commission would like to make the following declaration.

The Union’s food security depends on the continuous existence of the autonomous Union’s nitrogen‑based fertiliser production industry that can supply the European Union market. The present level of imports from the Russian Federation, competing unfairly in the EU market due to gas price differences, is undermining the EU industry.

At the same time, it is essential to ensure that Union farmers have predictable, sufficient and affordable access to nitrogen‑based fertilisers as this is indispensable to the stabilisation of the EU agricultural markets. Article 2 of the Regulation provides that the Commission shall monitor prices applicable in the Union of the goods listed in Annex II during four years from the application of this Regulation.

The Commission recalls that it already publishes regularly data reflecting the price evolution of fertilisers. Trends shown by this data set are discussed during the EU Fertilisers Market Observatory meetings.

On this basis, the Commission will continue the monitoring of the prices of nitrogen‑based fertilisers subject to this Regulation and will make the information about the results of this monitoring available to the Member States on a regular monthly basis through a consolidated document published on the website of the Commission.

The Commission notes that the Regulation provides for the suspension of tariffs for concerned fertiliser products imported from origins other than the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus, as one of the potential appropriate actions in case of a substantial surge in fertiliser prices. The Commission commits to take such action if this case arises.

Already in 2022, the Commission proposed, and the Council accepted, a temporary suspension of common customs tariffs on some nitrogen‑based fertilisers from countries other than Russia and Belarus due to a significant price increase in the Union market.

Furthermore, the Commission recalls that since the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, it adopted measures to support European farmers in all Member States whenever it was considered necessary. The Commission recognises the need to take fully into account the competitiveness of the EU fertilisers industry in the future actions implementing the Clean Industrial Deal.

5.4. Granting equivalence to Moldova and Ukraine for field inspections and seed production (A10-0043/2025 – Veronika Vrecionová) (vote)

Presidente. – Procediamo ora con la relazione dell’onorevole Vrecionová sulla concessione alla Moldova e all’Ucraina dell’equivalenza delle ispezioni in campo e la produzione di sementi (cfr. punto 5.4 del processo verbale).

5.5. Amendments to the Capital Requirements Regulation as regards securities financing transactions under the net stable funding ratio (vote)

Presidente. – Passiamo ora alla proposta sulle modifiche al regolamento (UE) n. 575/2013 relativo ai requisiti prudenziali per quanto riguarda i requisiti per le operazioni di finanziamento tramite titoli nell’ambito del coefficiente netto di finanziamento stabile (cfr. punto 5.5 del processo verbale).

5.6. Euratom Research and Training Programme for the period 2026-2027 complementing Horizon Europe (A10-0083/2025 – Borys Budka) (vote)

Presidente. – Passiamo ora alla relazione dell’onorevole Budka sul programma di ricerca e formazione di Euratom per il periodo 2026-2027 che integra Orizzonte Europa (cfr. punto 5.6 del processo verbale).

5.7. Partial renewal of Members of the Court of Auditors – HR nominee (A10-0088/2025 – Ondřej Knotek) (vote)

Presidente. – Passiamo ora alla relazione dell’onorevole Knotek sul rinnovo parziale dei membri della Corte dei conti – Candidata HR (cfr. punto 5.7 del processo verbale).

5.8. Deliberations of the Committee on Petitions in 2023 (A10-0063/2025 – Gheorghe Falcă) (vote)

– dopo la votazione sull’emendamento 42:

Fabienne Keller (Renew). – Madame la Présidente, chers collègues, je souhaite vous proposer un amendement oral au rapport annuel sur lequel nous votons actuellement. L’amendement est ajouté à la fin du paragraphe 35 et est formulé comme suit. Je vais le lire en anglais.

‘Urges, in that sense, the European Commission, in due respect of the spirit of the ECI – the European Citizens’ Initiative procedure – to provide adequate, concrete and effective follow‑up to ECIs related to fundamental rights of citizens, such as the one calling for a binding legal ban on conversion practices targeting LGBTIQ+ citizens in the EU and the ECI ‘My voice, my choice’.’

Chers collègues, cet amendement est nécessaire, à l’heure où les droits des communautés LGBT et les droits des femmes sont menacés partout en Europe. Avec mon groupe Renew Europe et avec beaucoup d’entre vous, je l’espère, nous sommes engagés en faveur de la défense de ces droits inscrits dans la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne et nous apporterons notre soutien aux communautés LGBT lors de la Pride de Budapest le 28 juin prochain.

(Il Parlamento non accetta di porre in votazione l’emendamento orale)

(Con questo si conclude il turno di votazioni)

(La seduta è sospesa per pochi istanti)

6. Resumption of the sitting

(La seduta è ripresa alle 11.42)

7. Explanations of vote

Presidente. – L’ordine del giorno reca le dichiarazioni di voto.

7.1. Amending Regulation (EU) 2023/956 as regards simplifying and strengthening the carbon border adjustment mechanism (A10-0085/2025 – Antonio Decaro)

Jadwiga Wiśniewska (ECR). – Pani Przewodnicząca! Zagłosowałam za przyjęciem rozporządzenia upraszczającego i wzmacniającego mechanizm CBAM. Uważam, że to krok w dobrym kierunku. Uproszczenia zaproponowane są odpowiedzią na realne problemy związane z implementacją CBAM. CBAM ma chronić unijny przemysł obciążony restrykcyjną polityką klimatyczną poprzez nałożenie opłat na import towarów takich jak: stal, cement, aluminium, wodór czy nawozy z państw trzecich.

Niestety pierwotne przepisy okazały się zbyt skomplikowane. Objęły nawet mikroprzedsiębiorstwa importujące niewielkie ilości towarów. Dlatego propozycję, by wyłączyć z systemu tak zwanych importerów okazjonalnych, czyli tych, którzy sprowadzają do Unii mniej niż 50 ton rocznie, uważam za rozsądne i proporcjonalne rozwiązanie, zmniejszające obciążenia biurokratyczne dla MŚP i niezakłócające unijnej konkurencji.

Niemniej mechanizm CBAM wciąż wymaga dopracowania. Kluczowe wyzwania to zapewnienie wiarygodności danych dotyczących emisyjności produktów z państw trzecich oraz zapobieganie obchodzeniu przepisów. Co więcej, CBAM nie może być jedyną odpowiedzią na problemy przemysłu. Potrzebne są komplementarne działania, w tym powrót do bezpłatnych uprawnień emisyjnych i dalsze wsparcie dla firm dotkniętych wysokimi kosztami energii.

Presidente. – Non c’è la possibilità di intervenire su quella relazione.

8. Approval of the minutes of the part-session and forwarding of texts adopted

Presidente. – Il processo verbale della seduta odierna e di quella di ieri sarà sottoposta all’approvazione del Parlamento all’inizio della prossima seduta. Se non vi sono obiezioni, procederò alla trasmissione immediata delle risoluzioni approvate nella seduta odierna ai loro destinatari.

9. Dates of the next part-session

Presidente. – La prossima tornata si svolgerà dal 16 al 19 giugno 2025 a Strasburgo.

10. Closure of the sitting

(La seduta è tolta alle 11.46)

11. Adjournment of the session

Presidente. – Dichiaro interrotta la sessione del Parlamento europeo.

MIL OSI Europe News –

May 27, 2025

MIL-OSI Canada: Prime Minister Carney speaks with Prime Minister of Norway Jonas Gahr Støre

Source: Government of Canada – Prime Minister

Today, the Prime Minister, Mark Carney, spoke with the Prime Minister of Norway, Jonas Gahr Støre.

Prime Minister Støre congratulated Prime Minister Carney on his election. The prime ministers discussed deepening trade, commercial, and defence partnerships, including on transatlantic and Arctic security. They also reaffirmed their support for a just and lasting peace in Ukraine that respects its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The leaders agreed to remain in close contact.

Associated Link

MIL OSI Canada News –

May 27, 2025

MIL-OSI: Solitron Devices, Inc. Announces Fiscal 2025 Fourth Quarter and Fiscal Year 2025 Results

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

WEST PALM BEACH, Fla., May 23, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Solitron Devices, Inc. (OTC Pink: SODI) (“Solitron” or the “Company”) is pleased to announce fiscal 2025 fourth quarter and fiscal year 2025 results.

FISCAL 2025 FOURTH QUARTER HIGHLIGHTS –

Net sales decreased 22% to approximately $3.13 million in the fiscal 2025 fourth quarter versus $4.00 million in the fiscal 2024 fourth quarter.
Net bookings increased 301% to $8.92 million in the fiscal 2025 fourth quarter versus $2.23 million in the fiscal 2024 fourth quarter.
Backlog increased 62% to $18.11 million at the end of the fiscal 2025 fourth quarter as compared to $11.21 million at the end of the fiscal 2024 fourth quarter.
Net loss was ($0.37) million, or ($0.18) per share, for the fiscal 2025 fourth quarter versus net income of $5.80 million, or $2.78 per share, for the fiscal 2024 fourth quarter.

FISCAL YEAR 2025 HIGHLIGHTS –

Net sales increased 10% to approximately $14.05 million in fiscal year 2025 versus $12.76 million in fiscal year 2024.
Net bookings increased 62% to $20.76 million in fiscal year 2025 versus $12.84 million in fiscal year 2024.
Backlog increased 62% to $18.11 million at the end of fiscal year 2025 versus $11.21 million as the end of fiscal year 2024.
Net income decreased to $0.82 million, or $0.39 per share, in fiscal year 2025 versus $5.80 million, or $2.78 per share, in fiscal year 2024. Fiscal year 2024 net income benefited from two non-recurring events – a $2.24 million bargain purchase gain related to the acquisition of Micro Engineering, Inc. (MEI) and an income tax benefit of $3.02 million based on the release of the Company’s deferred tax valuation.

Fiscal year 2025 results include a full year of financial information for MEI, while fiscal year 2024 only contain two full quarters of MEI’s financials based on the acquisition date of September 1, 2023. MEI contributed $6.08 million in revenue in fiscal year 2025.

On a positive note, the Company had substantial bookings in the last two quarters from contracts related to the two largest defense programs we supply to. These programs typically order every 12-18 months, so we expect bookings to lag sales for next few quarters. We continue to see positive comments related to future production levels for both the AMRAAM and HIMARS programs. The CEO of RTX recently stated that AMRAAM production was scheduled to double in calendar year 2025 as compared to calendar year 2024 levels. HIMARS continues to perform well in Ukraine, and we have seen reports of possible production increases as well. Lockheed was just awarded a follow-on contract only a few months after the previous award, which should lead to a supplemental order within the next few quarters. Foreign demand for both systems is strong. Foreign sales are typically included as part of normal production orders for both programs.

On a negative note, revenue was down in the fourth quarter due to the lag time between receipt of orders and production. In the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2025, revenue was $3.13 million. We expect soft revenues in the first quarter of fiscal year 2026, ending May 31, 2025, and for sales to pick up at the end of the fiscal second quarter, before reaching a steadier level in the fiscal third quarter.

We continue to see increased interest in new product development, including silicon carbide. We have developed various prototypes for testing by potential customers and continue to be optimistic about creating additional revenue sources.

SOLITRON DEVICES, INC. CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS FOR THE THREE MONTHS AND FISCAL YEAR ENDED FEBRUARY 28, 2025, AND FEBRUARY 29, 2024 (in thousands except for share and per share amounts)

	For The Three Months Ended			For The Three Months Ended			For The Fiscal Year Ended			For The Fiscal Year Ended
	February 28, 2025			February 29, 2024			February 28, 2025			February 29, 2024
	unaudited			unaudited
Net sales	$	3,131		$	4,004		$	14,049		$	12,757
Cost of sales	2,554			2,778			10,057			8,950

Gross profit	577			1,226			3,992			3,807

Selling, general and administrative expenses	748			858			2,994			2,873

Operating income (loss)	(171		)	368			998			934

Other income (loss)
Interest income	–			4			6			29
Interest expense	(73		)	(69		)	(272		)	(177		)
Dividend income	30			2			70			29
Realized gain (loss) on investments	80			–			127			332
Unrealized gain (loss) on investments	(62		)	166			65			(579		)
Bargain purchase gain	–			2,236			–			2,236
Other expense	–			(46		)	–			(27		)
Total other income (loss)	(25		)	2,293			(4		)	1,843

Net income (loss) before income tax	(196		)	2,661			994			2,777
Income tax (expense) benefit	(178		)	3,024			(178		)	3,024

Net income (loss)	$	(374	)	$	5,685		$	816		$	5,801

Net income (loss) per common share – basic and diluted	$	(0.18	)	$	2.73		$	0.39		$	2.78

Weighted average shares outstanding – basic and diluted	2,082,553			2,083,436			2,082,553			2,083,436

SOLITRON DEVICES, INC. CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AS OF FEBRUARY 28, 2025, AND FEBRUARY 29, 2024 (in thousands, except for share and per share amounts)

	February 28, 2025			February 29, 2024

ASSETS
CURRENT ASSETS
Cash and cash equivalents	$	4,099		$	2,217
Marketable securities		919			904
Accounts receivable		2,129			2,826
Inventories, net		3,440			4,132
Prepaid expenses and other current assets		132			532
TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS		10,719			10,611

Property, plant and equipment, net		8,635			7,356
Finance lease, right of use asset		–			1,715
Intangible assets		2,905			3,114
Deferred tax asset		1,622			1,837
Other assets		555			107
TOTAL ASSETS	$	24,436		$	24,740

LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY
CURRENT LIABILITIES
Accounts payable	$	439		$	439
Customer deposits		118			539
Accrued contingent consideration, current		570			465
Finance lease liability		–			1,750
Mortgage loan, current portion		152			111
Accrued expenses and other current liabilities		846			1,080
TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES		2,125			4,384

Accrued contingent consideration, non-current		663			751
Mortgage loan, net of current portion		3,765			2,537
TOTAL LIABILITIES		6,553			7,672

STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY
Preferred stock, $.01 par value, authorized 500,000 shares, none issued		–			–
Common stock, $.01 par value, authorized 10,000,000 shares, 2,082,553 shares outstanding, net of 487,827 treasury shares at February 28, 2025 and 2,083,436 shares outstanding, net of 487,827 treasury shares at February 29, 2024, respectively		21			21
Additional paid-in capital		1,834			1,834
Retained earnings		17,440			16,625
Less treasury stock		(1,412	)		(1,412	)
TOTAL STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY		17,883			17,068
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY	$	24,436		$	24,740

The unaudited financial information disclosed in this press release for the three months ended February 28, 2025, is based on management’s review of operations for that period and the information available to the Company as of the date of this press release. The Company’s results included herein have been prepared by, and are the responsibility of, the Company’s management. The Company’s independent auditors have audited the Company’s results for the fiscal year ending February 28, 2025. The financial results presented herein should not be considered a substitute for the information filed or to be filed with the SEC in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K and Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the respective periods once such reports become available.

About Solitron Devices, Inc.
Solitron Devices, Inc., a Delaware corporation, designs, develops, manufactures, and markets solid state semiconductor components and related devices primarily for the military and aerospace markets. The Company manufactures a large variety of bipolar and metal oxide semiconductor (“MOS”) power transistors, power and control hybrids, junction and power MOS field effect transistors (“Power MOSFETS”), and other related products. Most of the Company’s products are custom made pursuant to contracts with customers whose end products are sold to the United States government. Other products, such as Joint Army/Navy (“JAN”) transistors, diodes, and Standard Military Drawings voltage regulators, are sold as standard or catalog items.

Effective September 1, 2023, Solitron closed its acquisition of Micro Engineering Inc. (MEI) based in Apopka, Florida. MEI specializes in solving design layout and manufacturing challenges while maximizing efficiency and keeping flexibility to meet unique customer needs. Since 1980 the MEI team has been dedicated to overcoming obstacles to provide cost efficient and rapid results. MEI specializes in low to mid volume projects that require engineering dedication, quality systems and efficient manufacturing.

Forward-Looking Statements
This press release contains forward-looking statements regarding future events and the future performance of Solitron Devices, Inc. that involve risks and uncertainties that could materially affect actual results, including statements regarding the Company’s expectations regarding future performance and trends, including production levels, government spending, backlog and delivery timelines, new product development, our efforts and performance following our acquisition of MEI, and potential future revenue and trends with respect thereto from each of the foregoing. Factors that could cause actual results to vary from current expectations and forward-looking statements contained in this press release include, but are not limited to, the risks and uncertainties arising from potential adverse developments or changes in government budgetary spending and policy including with respect to the war in Ukraine, which may among other factors be affected by the possibility of reduced government spending on programs in which we participate, inflation, elevated interest rates, adverse trends in the economy and the possibility of a recession the likelihood of which appears to have increased based on recent economic data, the possibility that management’s estimates and assumptions regarding bookings, sales and other metrics prove to be incorrect; the timing and size of orders from our clients, our delivery schedules and our liquidity and cash position; our ability to make the appropriate adjustments to our cost structure; our ability to properly account for inventory in the future; the demand for our products and potential loss of, or reduction of business from, substantial clients our dependence on government contracts, which are subject to termination, price renegotiations and regulatory compliance and which may among other factors be adversely affected by the factors described elsewhere herein, our ability to continue to integrate MEI in an efficient and effective manner, and the possibility that such acquisition or any other acquisition or strategic transaction we may pursue does not yield the results or benefits desired or anticipated. Descriptions of other risk factors and uncertainties are contained in the Company’s Securities and Exchange Commission filings, including its most recent Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended February 28, 2025.

Tim Eriksen
Chief Executive Officer
(561) 848-4311
Corporate@solitrondevices.com

The MIL Network –

May 27, 2025

MIL-OSI United Kingdom: British firepower deployed on NATO’s eastern flank in show of force
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

Press release

British firepower deployed on NATO’s eastern flank in show of force

UK shores up NATO’s eastern flank with deployment to Finland.
Credit: Finnish Defence Forces

Hundreds of UK military personnel deployed to NATO’s eastern flank to add critical firepower to a major NATO exercise in Northern Finland.

Exercise Northern Strike will see the UK Armed Forces join thousands of personnel from Finland and Sweden, NATO’s two newest Allies. The show of force and firepower reinforces the Alliance’s readiness, capability, and commitment to defend every inch of NATO territory. This is the latest demonstration of strong collaboration between the UK and our international partners as set out in the government’s Plan for Change.

New British Army AH64E Apache attack helicopters will fire Hellfire missiles and 30mm guns simulating close support to allied combat forces on the ground, including British Army infantry units.

Bringing their cutting-edge rocket systems to the battlefield, The British Army’s 3rd Regiment Royal Horse Artillery will fire their Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) throughout and put their troops to the test during a field training exercise. MLRS has been proven in battle in the war in Ukraine and this will be the first time the British Army fire the system on European soil alongside AH64E Apache helicopters.

Minister for the Armed Forces, Luke Pollard MP, said :

Exercise Northern Strike demonstrates our unshakeable commitment to NATO and highlights the key capabilities the UK brings to the Alliance. This government’s commitment to increasing defence spending to 2.5% of GDP from April 2027 ensures the UK’s strength and leadership.

From the skies over Poland, to the northern reaches of Finland, the UK is standing shoulder to shoulder with our allies in leading the way in defending NATO’s eastern flank. Working with our international partners is at the core of this government’s Plan for Change.

Deepening partnerships with key Allies across the exercise is a key part of this Government’s NATO first policy, to ensure the UK is secure at home and strong abroad. Strengthening NATO by showcasing our capabilities and increasing interoperability assures our allies and deters our adversaries.

Exercise Northern Strike is part of a wider operation to secure NATO’s eastern flank; Operation RAZOREDGE. RAZOREDGE is made up of 13 exercises involving 13 NATO allies across 6 countries. The UK has contributed assets across air, land and sea with over 6,000 UK personnel taking part alongside 16,500 allied troops.

Operated by 4 Regiment, Army Air Corps, the Apache Helicopters also support jobs across the country at the Army Aviation Centre in Hampshire and Suffolk. UK industry also plays a key role with 75 British companies, including 33 SMEs also contributing a range of critical components to the aircraft.

Keeping the country safe is the Government’s first priority, and an integral part of its Plan for Change. The work of the Royal Navy, British Army, and Royal Air Force, is critical to the security and stability of the UK, supporting all of the Government’s five missions in its plan.

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Published 24 May 2025
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
May 27, 2025
MIL-OSI China: Xi says China ready to work with Germany to open new chapter in all-round strategic partnership

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

Xi says China ready to work with Germany to open new chapter in all-round strategic partnership

BEIJING, May 23 — Chinese President Xi Jinping said Friday that China is ready to work with Germany to open a new chapter in their all-round strategic partnership, to steer China-EU relations toward new progress and to make new contributions to the stable growth of the world economy.

Speaking to German Chancellor Friedrich Merz over phone, Xi once again congratulated him on assuming office. He pointed out that as the world undergoes accelerated changes unseen in a century and the international landscape is marked by transformation and turbulence, the strategic and global significance of China-Germany and China-EU relations has become even more prominent.

A sound and stable China-Germany relationship serves both countries’ interests, and meets the expectations of various sectors in China and Europe, the Chinese president added.

China and Germany have developed their bilateral relations based on mutual respect, seeking common ground while shelving differences, and win-win cooperation, Xi stressed, calling on both sides to maintain and carry forward this fine tradition.

First, Xi called for consolidating political mutual trust. He said China views Germany as a partner, welcomes Germany’s development and prosperity, and is willing to maintain close high-level exchanges with Germany, respect each other’s core interests and consolidate the political foundation of bilateral relations.

Second, Xi urged the two sides to enhance the resilience of their ties. He said both sides should not only continue to expand the existing cooperation in traditional fields such as automobiles, mechanical manufacturing and chemical industry, but seek more collaboration in cutting-edge fields such as artificial intelligence and quantum technology, and strengthen exchanges and cooperation in areas including climate change and green development, contributing the wisdom and solutions of China and Germany to global sustainable development.

Third, Xi noted that bilateral cooperation should continue to gather momentum. He said that China is willing to share with Germany development opportunities brought by its high-level opening-up, adding that China hopes Germany will offer more policy support and facilitation for two-way investment, and provide a fair, transparent and non-discriminatory business environment for Chinese enterprises.

Xi pointed out that facts have fully proven that partnership is the proper positioning of China-Germany and China-EU relations, and a stable and predictable policy environment is essential to ensuring bilateral cooperation.

As major countries, he added, both sides share a common responsibility. Noting that this year marks the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and the EU, Xi said that the two sides should jointly review the successful experience in the development of China-EU relations and send a positive signal in support of multilateralism and free trade, as well as deepening openness and mutually beneficial cooperation.

For his part, Merz said that China is one of the world’s most important countries, and Germany-China relations have seen sound development, with deepened cooperation yielding fruitful results.

Bilateral cooperation is particularly significant in the current international landscape as both China and Germany are the world’s major economies, the German chancellor added.

The new German government adheres to the one-China policy, and is willing to push for greater progress in their strategic partnership in a constructive and practical manner, he said.

Germany expects to conduct closer exchanges and cooperation with China in various areas, uphold opening-up and mutual benefit, boost fair trade, safeguard world peace and jointly tackle climate change and other global challenges, Merz said.

A healthy and steady development of EU-China relations is in the interest of both sides, and Germany is willing to play an active part in this regard, he said.

The two leaders also exchanged views on the Ukraine crisis.

MIL OSI China News –

May 27, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Granting equivalence to Moldova and Ukraine for field inspections and seed production – P10_TA(2025)0110 – Thursday, 22 May 2025 – Brussels

Source: European Parliament

(Text with EEA relevance)

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 43(2) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee(1),

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure(2),

Whereas:

(1) Council Decision 2003/17/EC(3) provides that, under certain conditions, field inspections carried out on certain seed-producing crops in the third countries listed in Annex I to that Decision are to be considered equivalent to field inspections carried out in accordance with Union law and that, under certain conditions, seed of certain species produced in those third countries is to be considered equivalent to seed complying with Union law.

(2) In 2022, the Republic of Moldova submitted a request to the Commission for the granting of equivalence to its system of field inspections of seed-producing fodder plant crops and to fodder plant seed produced and certified in the Republic of Moldova.

(3) The Commission examined the relevant legislation of the Republic of Moldova. It also carried out, in 2016, an audit of the system of official controls and of certification of cereal, vegetable and oil and fibre plant seed in the Republic of Moldova and published its findings in a report. Following the receipt of additional documentation from the Republic of Moldova, the Commission considered that all recommendations made in the audit report had been addressed in a satisfactory manner. On the basis of the audit and the additional documentation, the Commission has concluded that the national authorities responsible for the implementation of seed certification in the Republic of Moldova are competent, have adequate facilities in place and operate appropriately. Those authorities are also responsible for field inspections of seed-producing fodder plant crops and for the certification of fodder plant seed.

(4) On the basis of the examination of the legislation of the Republic of Moldova and of the audit, the Commission has concluded that the field inspections of seed-producing fodder plant crops and the sampling, testing and official post-control of fodder plant seed in the Republic of Moldova are carried out appropriately and satisfy the requirements set out in Annex II to Decision 2003/17/EC and in Council Directive 66/401/EEC(4).

(5) In 2022, Ukraine submitted a request to the Commission for the granting of equivalence to its system of field inspections of seed-producing beet (Beta vulgaris), sunflower (Helianthus annuus) and swede rape (Brassica napus) crops and to the beet, sunflower and swede rape seed produced and certified in Ukraine.

(6) In 2023, Ukraine submitted a request to the Commission for the granting of equivalence to its system of field inspections of seed-producing soya bean (Glycine max) crops, and to the soya bean seed produced and certified in Ukraine.

(7) The Commission examined the relevant legislation of Ukraine. It also carried out, in 2015, an audit of the system of official controls and of certification of cereal seed in Ukraine and published its findings in a report. Following the receipt of additional documentation from Ukraine, the Commission considered that all recommendations made in the audit report had been addressed in a satisfactory manner. On the basis of the audit and the additional documentation, the Commission has concluded that the national authorities responsible for the implementation of seed certification in Ukraine are competent, have adequate facilities in place and operate appropriately. Those authorities are also responsible for the field inspections of seed-producing beet, sunflower, swede rape and soya bean crops, and for the certification of beet, sunflower, swede rape and soya bean seed.

(8) On the basis of the examination of the legislation of Ukraine and of the audit, the Commission has concluded that the field inspections of seed-producing beet, sunflower, swede rape and soya bean crops and the sampling, testing and official post-control of beet, sunflower, swede rape and soya bean seed in Ukraine are carried out appropriately and satisfy the requirements set out in Annex II to Decision 2003/17/EC and in Council Directives 2002/54/EC(5) and 2002/57/EC(6).

(9) The Republic of Moldova has been admitted, as regards fodder plants, to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Schemes for the Varietal Certification or the Control of Seed Moving in International Trade (´OECD Seed Schemes´).

(10) Ukraine has been admitted, as regards beet, sunflower, swede rape and soya bean, to the OECD Seed Schemes.

(11) The Republic of Moldova and Ukraine have seed laboratories accredited by the International Seed Testing Association. That fact provides additional assurance as to the quality of the inspections and of the seed produced in those countries and their compliance with Union law.

(12) It is therefore appropriate to grant equivalence as regards field inspections carried out in respect of seed-producing fodder plant crops in the Republic of Moldova, and as regards the fodder plant seed produced in the Republic of Moldova and officially certified by its authorities.

(13) It is also appropriate to grant equivalence as regards field inspections carried out in respect of seed-producing beet, sunflower, swede rape and soya bean crops in Ukraine, and as regards the seed of beet, sunflower, swede rape and soya bean produced in Ukraine and officially certified by its authorities.

(14) Decision 2003/17/EC should be therefore amended accordingly,

HAVE ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Amendments to Decision 2003/17/EC

Annex I to Decision 2003/17/EC is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2

Entry into force

This Decision shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Article 3

Addressees

This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

Done at …,

For the European Parliament For the Council

The President The President

ANNEX

In Annex I to Decision 2003/17/EC, the table is amended as follows:

(1) the entry ‘MD’ is replaced by the following:

‘MD

National Agency for Food Safety (ANSA)

str. Mihail Kogălniceanu 63,

MD-2009, CHIŞINĂU

66/401/EEC

66/402/EEC

2002/55/EC

2002/57/EC’

;

(2) the entry ‘UA’ is replaced by the following:

‘UA

Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine

Khreshchatyk str. 24, 01001 KYIV

66/402/EEC

2002/54/EC

2002/57/EC – only in respect of Brassica napus, Glycine max and Helianthus annuus’

(1)	OJ C, C/2024/3386, 31.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/3386/oj.
(2)	Position of the European Parliament of 22 May 2025.
(3)	Council Decision 2003/17/EC of 16 December 2002 on the equivalence of field inspections carried out in third countries on seed-producing crops and on the equivalence of seed produced in third countries (OJ L 8, 14.1.2003, p. 10, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2003/17(1)/oj).
(4)	Council Directive 66/401/EEC of 14 June 1966 on the marketing of fodder plant seed (OJ 125, 11.7.1966, p. 2298/66, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1966/401/oj).
(5)	Council Directive 2002/54/EC of 13 June 2002 on the marketing of beet seed (OJ L 193, 20.7.2002, p. 12, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2002/54/oj).
(6)	Council Directive 2002/57/EC of 13 June 2002 on the marketing of seed of oil and fibre plants (OJ L 193, 20.7.2002, p. 74, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2002/57/oj).

MIL OSI Europe News –

May 27, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: Minutes – Thursday, 22 May 2025 – Brussels – Final edition

Source: European Parliament

PV-10-2025-05-22

iPlPv_Sit

Minutes

Thursday, 22 May 2025 – Brussels

Abbreviations and symbols

+	adopted
–	rejected
↓	lapsed
W	withdrawn
RCV	roll-call votes
EV	electronic vote
SEC	secret ballot
split	split vote
sep	separate vote
am	amendment
CA	compromise amendment
CP	corresponding part
D	deleting amendment
=	identical amendments
§	paragraph

IN THE CHAIR: Antonella SBERNA
Vice-President

1. Opening of the sitting

The sitting opened at 09:00.

2. Choose Europe for Science (debate)

Council and Commission statements: Choose Europe for Science (2025/2713(RSP))

Ekaterina Zaharieva (Member of the Commission) made the statement on behalf of the Commission.

The following spoke: Christian Ehler, on behalf of the PPE Group, Giorgio Gori, on behalf of the S&D Group, Catherine Griset, on behalf of the PfE Group, Piotr Müller, on behalf of the ECR Group, Valérie Hayer, on behalf of the Renew Group, Anna Strolenberg, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Ilaria Salis, on behalf of The Left Group, Marc Jongen, on behalf of the ESN Group, Letizia Moratti, Lina Gálvez, Annamária Vicsek, Marion Maréchal, Christophe Grudler, Vladimir Prebilič, Catarina Martins, Zsuzsanna Borvendég, Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă, Angelika Niebler, Sofie Eriksson, Jana Nagyová, Diego Solier, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Anthony Smith, Hélder Sousa Silva, who also answered a blue-card question from João Oliveira, Bruno Gonçalves, who also answered a blue-card question from João Oliveira, Kris Van Dijck, Jüri Ratas, Elena Sancho Murillo and Eszter Lakos.

The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Liudas Mažylis, Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis and Sebastian Tynkkynen.

IN THE CHAIR: Victor NEGRESCU
Vice-President

The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Helmut Brandstätter, João Oliveira and Lukas Sieper.

The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva.

The debate closed.

3. Deliberations of the Committee on Petitions in 2023 (debate)

Report on the deliberations of the Committee on Petitions in 2023 [2025/2027(INI)] – Committee on Petitions. Rapporteur: Gheorghe Falcă (A10-0063/2025)

Peter Agius (deputising for the rapporteur) introduced the report.

The following spoke: Glenn Micallef (Member of the Commission).

The following spoke: Rosa Estaràs Ferragut, on behalf of the PPE Group, Sandra Gómez López, on behalf of the S&D Group, Pál Szekeres, on behalf of the PfE Group, Kosma Złotowski, on behalf of the ECR Group, Jana Toom, on behalf of the Renew Group, Ana Miranda Paz, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Marcin Sypniewski, on behalf of the ESN Group, Maria Walsh and Mireia Borrás Pabón.

The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Elena Nevado del Campo, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Petras Gražulis, Maria Zacharia and Lefteris Nikolaou-Alavanos.

The following spoke: Glenn Micallef and Peter Agius.

The debate closed.

Vote: 22 May 2025.

(The sitting was suspended at 10:45.)

IN THE CHAIR: Pina PICIERNO
Vice-President

4. Resumption of the sitting

The sitting resumed at 11:01.

⁂

The following spoke: Patryk Jaki.

5. Voting time

For detailed results of the votes, see also ‘Results of votes’ and ‘Results of roll-call votes’.

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 228/2013 as regards additional assistance and further flexibility to outermost regions affected by severe natural disasters and in the context of cyclone Chido devastating Mayotte (COM(2025)0190 – C10-0071/2025 – 2025/0104(COD)) – Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development

REQUEST FOR AN URGENT DECISION by the AGRI Committee (Rule 170(6))

Approved

Vote: at a later part-session.

Detailed voting results

5.2. Amending Regulation (EU) 2023/956 as regards simplifying and strengthening the carbon border adjustment mechanism ***I (vote)

Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2023/956 as regards simplifying and strengthening the carbon border adjustment mechanism [COM(2025)0087 – C10-0035/2025 – 2025/0039(COD)] – Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety. Rapporteur: Antonio Decaro (A10-0085/2025)

The debate had taken place on 21 May 2025 (minutes of 21.5.2025, item 15).

(Majority of the votes cast)

COMMISSION PROPOSAL and AMENDMENTS

Approved (P10_TA(2025)0108)

REQUEST FOR REFERRAL BACK TO COMMITTEE

Approved

The following had spoken:

Antonio Decaro (rapporteur), after the vote on the Commission proposal, to request that the matter be referred back to the committee responsible, for interinstitutional negotiations in accordance with Rule 60(4).

Detailed voting results

5.3. Modification of customs duties applicable to imports of certain goods originating in or exported from the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus ***I (vote)

Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the modification of customs duties applicable to imports of certain goods originating in or exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus [COM(2025)0034 – C10-0006/2025 – 2025/0021(COD)] – Committee on International Trade. Rapporteur: Inese Vaidere (A10-0087/2025)

(Majority of the votes cast)

COMMISSION PROPOSAL and AMENDMENTS

Approved (P10_TA(2025)0109)

Parliament’s first reading thus closed.

The following had spoken:

– Before the vote, Inese Vaidere (rapporteur), to make a statement on the basis of Rule 165(4).

– Before the vote, Glenn Micallef (Member of the Commission), to make a statement.

Detailed voting results

5.4. Granting equivalence to Moldova and Ukraine for field inspections and seed production ***I (vote)

Report on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Decision 2003/17/EC as regards the equivalence of field inspections carried out in the Republic of Moldova on fodder plant seed-producing crops and on the equivalence of fodder plant seed produced in the Republic of Moldova, and as regards the equivalence of field inspections carried out in Ukraine on beet seed-producing crops and oil plant seed-producing crops and on the equivalence of beet seed and oil plant seed produced in Ukraine [COM(2024)0052 – C9-0026/2024 – 2024/0027(COD)] – Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development. Rapporteur: Veronika Vrecionová (A10-0043/2025)

(Majority of the votes cast)

PROPOSAL TO REJECT THE COMMISSION PROPOSAL

Rejected

COMMISSION PROPOSAL and AMENDMENTS

Approved (P10_TA(2025)0110)

Parliament’s first reading thus closed.

Detailed voting results

5.5. Amendments to the Capital Requirements Regulation as regards securities financing transactions under the net stable funding ratio ***I (vote)

Amendments to Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions as regards requirements for securities financing transactions under the net stable funding ratio (COM(2025)0146 – C10-0059/2025 – 2025/0077(COD)) – Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

(Majority of the votes cast)

PROPOSAL TO REJECT THE COMMISSION PROPOSAL

Rejected

COMMISSION PROPOSAL and AMENDMENTS

Approved (P10_TA(2025)0111)

Parliament’s first reading thus closed.

Detailed voting results

5.6. Euratom Research and Training Programme for the period 2026-2027 complementing Horizon Europe * (vote)

Report on the proposal for a Council regulation establishing the Research and Training Programme of the European Atomic Energy Community for the period 2026-2027 complementing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation and repealing Council Regulation (Euratom) 2021/765 [COM(2025)0060 – C10-0052/2025 – 2025/0035(NLE)] – Committee on Industry, Research and Energy. Rapporteur: Borys Budka (A10-0083/2025)

(Majority of the votes cast)

COMMISSION PROPOSAL TO THE COUNCIL

Approved by single vote (P10_TA(2025)0112)

Detailed voting results

5.7. Partial renewal of Members of the Court of Auditors – HR nominee (vote)

Report on the nomination of Ivana Maletić as a Member of the Court of Auditors [06874/2025 – C10-0049/2025 – 2025/0802(NLE)] – Committee on Budgetary Control. Rapporteur: Ondřej Knotek (A10-0088/2025)

(Majority of the votes cast)
(Secret ballot (Rule 133(3)))

APPOINTMENT OF IVANA MALETIĆ

Approved (P10_TA(2025)0113)

The list of Members voting is annexed to these minutes (minutes of 22.5.2025 Annex 1).

Detailed voting results

5.8. Deliberations of the Committee on Petitions in 2023 (vote)

Report on the deliberations of the Committee on Petitions in 2023 [2025/2027(INI)] – Committee on Petitions. Rapporteur: Gheorghe Falcă (A10-0063/2025)

(Majority of the votes cast)

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

Adopted (P10_TA(2025)0114)

The following had spoken:

Fabienne Keller, to move an oral amendment to paragraph 35. Parliament had not agreed to put the oral amendment to the vote as more than 39 Members had opposed it.

Detailed voting results

(The sitting was suspended for a few moments.)

6. Resumption of the sitting

The sitting resumed at 11:42.

7. Explanations of vote

7.1. Amending Regulation (EU) 2023/956 as regards simplifying and strengthening the carbon border adjustment mechanism (A10-0085/2025 – Antonio Decaro) (oral explanations of vote)

Jadwiga Wiśniewska

7.2. Written explanations of vote

Explanations of vote submitted in writing under Rule 201 appear on the Members’ pages on Parliament’s website.

8. Approval of the minutes of the part-session and forwarding of texts adopted

In accordance with Rule 208(3), the minutes of that day’s sitting and those of the previous day’s sitting would be put to the House for approval at the start of the next sitting.

With Parliament’s agreement, the texts adopted during the part-session would be forwarded to their respective addressees without delay.

9. Dates of the next part-session

The next part-session would be held from 16 June 2025 to 19 June 2025.

10. Closure of the sitting

The sitting closed at 11:46.

11. Adjournment of the session

The session of the European Parliament was adjourned.

Alessandro Chiocchetti	Roberta Metsola
Secretary-General	President

LIST OF DOCUMENTS SERVING AS A BASIS FOR THE DEBATES AND DECISIONS OF PARLIAMENT

I. Transfers of appropriations and budgetary decisions

In accordance with Article 29 of the Financial Regulation, the Committee on Budgets had decided to approve transfer of appropriations INF1/2025 – Section VI – European Economic and Social Committee.

In accordance with Article 29 of the Financial Regulation, the Committee on Budgets had decided to approve transfer of appropriations No 2/2025 – Section IX – European Data Protection Supervisor.

In accordance with Article 31(6) of the Financial Regulation, the Committee on Budgets had decided to approve the Commission’s transfer of appropriations DEC 05/2025 – Section III – Commission.

In accordance with Article 31(6) of the Financial Regulation, the Council of the European Union had decided to approve the Commission’s transfer of appropriations DEC 05/2025 – Section III – Commission.

ATTENDANCE REGISTER

Present:

Abadía Jover Maravillas, Adamowicz Magdalena, Aftias Georgios, Agirregoitia Martínez Oihane, Agius Saliba Alex, Allione Grégory, Al-Sahlani Abir, Anadiotis Nikolaos, Anderson Christine, Andersson Li, Andrews Barry, Andriukaitis Vytenis Povilas, Androuët Mathilde, Angel Marc, Annemans Gerolf, Antoci Giuseppe, Arias Echeverría Pablo, Arimont Pascal, Arłukowicz Bartosz, Arnaoutoglou Sakis, Arndt Anja, Arvanitis Konstantinos, Asens Llodrà Jaume, Assis Francisco, Aubry Manon, Auštrevičius Petras, Azmani Malik, Bajada Thomas, Ballarín Cereza Laura, Bardella Jordan, Barley Katarina, Barrena Arza Pernando, Bartulica Stephen Nikola, Bartůšek Nikola, Bay Nicolas, Bay Christophe, Beleris Fredis, Bellamy François-Xavier, Benea Dragoş, Benifei Brando, Beňová Monika, Berendsen Tom, Berger Stefan, Berlato Sergio, Bernhuber Alexander, Biedroń Robert, Bielan Adam, Bischoff Gabriele, Blinkevičiūtė Vilija, Blom Rachel, Bloss Michael, Bocheński Tobiasz, Bogdan Ioan-Rareş, Bonaccini Stefano, Bonte Barbara, Borchia Paolo, Borrás Pabón Mireia, Borvendég Zsuzsanna, Boßdorf Irmhild, Bosse Stine, Botenga Marc, Boyer Gilles, Brandstätter Helmut, Brasier-Clain Marie-Luce, Brejza Krzysztof, Brudziński Joachim Stanisław, Bryłka Anna, Buchheit Markus, Buczek Tomasz, Buda Daniel, Buda Waldemar, Budka Borys, Bugalho Sebastião, Buła Andrzej, Bullmann Udo, Camara Mélissa, Canfin Pascal, Carberry Nina, Carême Damien, Casa David, Caspary Daniel, Cassart Benoit, Cavazzini Anna, Ceulemans Estelle, Chahim Mohammed, Chaibi Leila, Chastel Olivier, Chinnici Caterina, Christensen Asger, Ciccioli Carlo, Cifrová Ostrihoňová Veronika, Clausen Per, Corrado Annalisa, Costanzo Vivien, Cotrim De Figueiredo João, Cremer Tobias, Crespo Díaz Carmen, Cristea Andi, Crosetto Giovanni, Cunha Paulo, Dahl Henrik, Danielsson Johan, Dauchy Marie, Dávid Dóra, David Ivan, Decaro Antonio, de la Hoz Quintano Raúl, Della Valle Danilo, Deloge Valérie, De Masi Fabio, De Meo Salvatore, Demirel Özlem, Dibrani Adnan, Diepeveen Ton, Dieringer Elisabeth, Di Rupo Elio, Disdier Mélanie, Dobrev Klára, Doleschal Christian, Dömötör Csaba, Do Nascimento Cabral Paulo, Donazzan Elena, Dorfmann Herbert, Dostalova Klara, Dostál Ondřej, Droese Siegbert Frank, Düpont Lena, Dworczyk Michał, Ecke Matthias, Ehler Christian, Eriksson Sofie, Erixon Dick, Estaràs Ferragut Rosa, Everding Sebastian, Ezcurra Almansa Alma, Falcă Gheorghe, Farantouris Nikolas, Farreng Laurence, Farský Jan, Ferber Markus, Ferenc Viktória, Fidanza Carlo, Fiocchi Pietro, Firmenich Ruth, Flanagan Luke Ming, Fourlas Loucas, Fourreau Emma, Fragkos Emmanouil, Freund Daniel, Frigout Anne-Sophie, Fritzon Heléne, Froelich Tomasz, Fuglsang Niels, Funchion Kathleen, Furet Angéline, Gahler Michael, Gál Kinga, Galán Estrella, Gálvez Lina, Gambino Alberico, García Hermida-Van Der Walle Raquel, Geadi Geadis, Gedin Hanna, Geese Alexandra, Geier Jens, Geisel Thomas, Gemma Chiara, Georgiou Giorgos, Gerbrandy Gerben-Jan, Germain Jean-Marc, Gerzsenyi Gabriella, Gieseke Jens, Giménez Larraz Borja, Glück Andreas, Goerens Charles, Gomart Christophe, Gomes Isilda, Gómez López Sandra, Gonçalves Bruno, Gonçalves Sérgio, González Casares Nicolás, González Pons Esteban, Gori Giorgio, Gosiewska Małgorzata, Gotink Dirk, Gozi Sandro, Gregorová Markéta, Grims Branko, Griset Catherine, Groothuis Bart, Grossmann Elisabeth, Grudler Christophe, Gualmini Elisabetta, Guetta Bernard, Győri Enikő, Gyürk András, Hadjipantela Michalis, Hahn Svenja, Haider Roman, Halicki Andrzej, Hansen Niels Flemming, Hassan Rima, Hauser Gerald, Häusling Martin, Hava Mircea-Gheorghe, Heide Hannes, Heinäluoma Eero, Henriksson Anna-Maja, Herbst Niclas, Herranz García Esther, Hetman Krzysztof, Hojsík Martin, Holmgren Pär, Homs Ginel Alicia, Humberto Sérgio, Ijabs Ivars, Imart Céline, Incir Evin, Inselvini Paolo, Iovanovici Şoşoacă Diana, Jalloul Muro Hana, Jamet France, Jarubas Adam, Jerković Romana, Jongen Marc, Joński Dariusz, Joron Virginie, Joveva Irena, Juknevičienė Rasa, Junco García Nora, Jungbluth Alexander, Kabilov Taner, Kalfon François, Kaljurand Marina, Kalniete Sandra, Kamiński Mariusz, Kanev Radan, Kanko Assita, Karlsbro Karin, Kartheiser Fernand, Karvašová Ľubica, Katainen Elsi, Kefalogiannis Emmanouil, Kelleher Billy, Keller Fabienne, Kelly Seán, Kennes Rudi, Khan Mary, Kircher Sophia, Knafo Sarah, Knotek Ondřej, Kobosko Michał, Köhler Stefan, Kohut Łukasz, Kokalari Arba, Kolář Ondřej, Kols Rihards, Konečná Kateřina, Kopacz Ewa, Kovařík Ondřej, Kovatchev Andrey, Krištopans Vilis, Krutílek Ondřej, Kubín Tomáš, Kuhnke Alice, Kulmuni Katri, Kyllönen Merja, Kyuchyuk Ilhan, Lagodinsky Sergey, Lakos Eszter, Lalucq Aurore, Langensiepen Katrin, Laššáková Judita, László András, Laureti Camilla, Laykova Rada, Lazarov Ilia, Lazarus Luis-Vicențiu, Lenaers Jeroen, Liese Peter, Lins Norbert, Løkkegaard Morten, Lopatka Reinhold, López Javi, López Aguilar Juan Fernando, López-Istúriz White Antonio, Lövin Isabella, Lucano Mimmo, Luena César, Łukacijewska Elżbieta Katarzyna, Lupo Giuseppe, McAllister David, Maestre Cristina, Magoni Lara, Maij Marit, Maląg Marlena, Manda Claudiu, Mandl Lukas, Maniatis Yannis, Mantovani Mario, Maran Pierfrancesco, Marczułajtis-Walczak Jagna, Maréchal Marion, Mariani Thierry, Marino Ignazio Roberto, Marquardt Erik, Martín Frías Jorge, Martins Catarina, Martusciello Fulvio, Marzà Ibáñez Vicent, Mato Gabriel, Matthieu Sara, Mavrides Costas, Maydell Eva, Mayer Georg, Mazurek Milan, Mažylis Liudas, McNamara Michael, Mebarek Nora, Meleti Eleonora, Mendia Idoia, Mertens Verena, Mesure Marina, Metsola Roberta, Metz Tilly, Mikser Sven, Millán Mon Francisco José, Minchev Nikola, Miranda Paz Ana, Molnár Csaba, Montero Irene, Montserrat Dolors, Morace Carolina, Morano Nadine, Moratti Letizia, Moreira de Sá Tiago, Moreno Sánchez Javier, Moretti Alessandra, Motreanu Dan-Ştefan, Mularczyk Arkadiusz, Müller Piotr, Mureşan Siegfried, Muşoiu Ştefan, Nagyová Jana, Navarrete Rojas Fernando, Negrescu Victor, Nerudová Danuše, Nesci Denis, Neuhoff Hans, Neumann Hannah, Nevado del Campo Elena, Niebler Angelika, Niedermayer Luděk, Niinistö Ville, Nikolaou-Alavanos Lefteris, Nikolic Aleksandar, Ní Mhurchú Cynthia, Noichl Maria, Nordqvist Rasmus, Novakov Andrey, Nykiel Mirosława, Ódor Ľudovít, Oetjen Jan-Christoph, Oliveira João, Olivier Philippe, Omarjee Younous, Ondruš Branislav, Ozdoba Jacek, Paet Urmas, Pajín Leire, Palmisano Valentina, Papadakis Kostas, Papandreou Nikos, Pascual de la Parte Nicolás, Patriciello Aldo, Paulus Jutta, Pedro Ana Miguel, Pedulla’ Gaetano, Pellerin-Carlin Thomas, Peltier Guillaume, Penkova Tsvetelina, Pennelle Gilles, Pereira Lídia, Pérez Alvise, Peter-Hansen Kira Marie, Picaro Michele, Picierno Pina, Picula Tonino, Piera Pascale, Pietikäinen Sirpa, Pimpie Pierre, de la Pisa Carrión Margarita, Polato Daniele, Polfjärd Jessica, Pozņaks Reinis, Prebilič Vladimir, Princi Giusi, Protas Jacek, Pürner Friedrich, Rackete Carola, Radev Emil, Radtke Dennis, Rafowicz Emma, Ratas Jüri, Razza Ruggero, Rechagneux Julie, Regner Evelyn, Repasi René, Repp Sabrina, Ressler Karlo, Reuten Thijs, Riba i Giner Diana, Ridel Chloé, Riehl Nela, Ripa Manuela, Rodrigues André, Ros Sempere Marcos, Roth Neveďalová Katarína, Rougé André, Ruissen Bert-Jan, Rzońca Bogdan, Saeidi Arash, Salini Massimiliano, Salis Ilaria, Salla Aura, Sánchez Amor Nacho, Sanchez Julien, Sancho Murillo Elena, Saramo Jussi, Sardone Silvia, Šarec Marjan, Sargiacomo Eric, Satouri Mounir, Saudargas Paulius, Sberna Antonella, Schaldemose Christel, Schaller-Baross Ernő, Scheuring-Wielgus Joanna, Schieder Andreas, Schilling Lena, Schnurrbusch Volker, Schwab Andreas, Seekatz Ralf, Sell Alexander, Serrano Sierra Rosa, Sidl Günther, Sieper Lukas, Singer Christine, Sinkevičius Virginijus, Sippel Birgit, Sjöstedt Jonas, Śmiszek Krzysztof, Smith Anthony, Smit Sander, Sokol Tomislav, Solier Diego, Solís Pérez Susana, Sommen Liesbet, Sorel Malika, Sousa Silva Hélder, Søvndal Villy, Squarta Marco, Stancanelli Raffaele, Steger Petra, Stier Davor Ivo, Storm Kristoffer, Stoyanov Stanislav, Strada Cecilia, Streit Joachim, Strik Tineke, Strolenberg Anna, Sturdza Şerban Dimitrie, Stürgkh Anna, Sypniewski Marcin, Szekeres Pál, Szydło Beata, Tamburrano Dario, Tânger Corrêa António, Tarquinio Marco, Târziu Claudiu-Richard, Tavares Carla, Tegethoff Kai, Temido Marta, Teodorescu Georgiana, Terheş Cristian, Ter Laak Ingeborg, Terras Riho, Tertsch Hermann, Thionnet Pierre-Romain, Timgren Beatrice, Tinagli Irene, Tobback Bruno, Tobé Tomas, Tolassy Rody, Tomašič Zala, Tomaszewski Waldemar, Tomc Romana, Tonin Matej, Toom Jana, Toussaint Marie, Tovaglieri Isabella, Toveri Pekka, Tridico Pasquale, Trochu Laurence, Tsiodras Dimitris, Tudose Mihai, Tynkkynen Sebastian, Uhrík Milan, Ušakovs Nils, Vaidere Inese, Valchev Ivaylo, Vălean Adina, Valet Matthieu, Van Brempt Kathleen, Van Brug Anouk, Vandendriessche Tom, Van Dijck Kris, Van Leeuwen Jessika, Vannacci Roberto, Van Sparrentak Kim, Varaut Alexandre, Vasconcelos Ana, Vautmans Hilde, Vedrenne Marie-Pierre, Ventola Francesco, Verougstraete Yvan, Veryga Aurelijus, Vicsek Annamária, Vieira Catarina, Vigenin Kristian, Vilimsky Harald, Vincze Loránt, Vistisen Anders, Vivaldini Mariateresa, Volgin Petar, von der Schulenburg Michael, Vondra Alexandr, Voss Axel, Vrecionová Veronika, Vázquez Lázara Adrián, Waitz Thomas, Walsh Maria, Walsmann Marion, Warborn Jörgen, Warnke Jan-Peter, Wąsik Maciej, Wawrykiewicz Michał, Wcisło Marta, Weimers Charlie, Werbrouck Séverine, Wiesner Emma, Wiezik Michal, Winkler Iuliu, Winzig Angelika, Wiseler-Lima Isabel, Wiśniewska Jadwiga, Yar Lucia, Yon-Courtin Stéphanie, Zacharia Maria, Zajączkowska-Hernik Ewa, Zalewska Anna, Žalimas Dainius, Zan Alessandro, Zarzalejos Javier, Zdechovský Tomáš, Zdrojewski Bogdan Andrzej, Zijlstra Auke, Złotowski Kosma, Zoido Álvarez Juan Ignacio, Zver Milan

Excused:

Berg Sibylle, Burkhardt Delara, Hazekamp Anja

ANNEX 1 – Partial renewal of Members of the Court of Auditors – HR nominee

MEMBERS VOTING IN THE SECRET BALLOT

ECR:
Bartulica, Bay Nicolas, Berlato, Bielan, Bocheński, Brudziński, Cavedagna, Ciccioli, Ciriani, Crosetto, Donazzan, Dworczyk, Erixon, Fidanza, Fiocchi, Gambino, Geadi, Gemma, Gosiewska, Inselvini, Jaki, Junco García, Kamiński, Kanko, Kartheiser, Kols, Krutílek, Magoni, Maląg, Mantovani, Maréchal, Mularczyk, Müller, Nesci, Ozdoba, Peltier, Picaro, Polato, Pozņaks, Razza, Ruissen, Rzońca, Sberna, Solier, Squarta, Storm, Sturdza, Szydło, Târziu, Teodorescu, Terheş,Timgren, Tomaszewski, Torselli, Trochu, Tynkkynen, Valchev, Van Dijck, Ventola, Veryga, Vivaldini, Vondra, Vrecionová, Wąsik, Weimers, Wiśniewska, Zalewska, Złotowski

ESN:
Anderson, Arndt, Aust, Borvendég, Boßdorf, Buchheit, David, Droese, Froelich, Gražulis, Jongen, Jungbluth, Knafo, Laykova, Mazurek, Neuhoff, Schnurrbusch, Sell, Stoyanov, Sypniewski, Tyszka, Uhrík, Volgin, Zajączkowska-Hernik

NI:
Beňová, Braun, De Masi, Dostál, Firmenich, Iovanovici Şoşoacă, Kabilov, Konečná, Laššáková, Lazarus, Nikolaou-Alavanos, Ondruš, Panayiotou, Papadakis, Pérez, Pürner, Roth Neveďalová, Sieper, Sorel, von der Schulenburg, Warnke, Yoncheva, Zacharia

PPE:
Abadía Jover, Adamowicz, Aftias, Agius, Arias Echeverría, Arimont, Arłukowicz, Beleris, Bellamy, Bentele, Berendsen, Berger, Bernhuber, Bogdan, Brejza, Buda Daniel, Budka, Bugalho, Buła, Carberry, Casa, Caspary, Chinnici, Crespo Díaz, Cunha, Dahl, Dávid, de la Hoz Quintano, De Meo, Doherty, Doleschal, Do Nascimento Cabral, Dorfmann, Düpont, Ehler, Estaràs Ferragut, Ezcurra Almansa, Falcă, Falcone, Farský, Ferber, Gahler, Gasiuk-Pihowicz, Gerzsenyi, Geuking, Gieseke, Giménez Larraz, Gomart, González Pons, Gotink, Grims, Hadjipantela, Halicki, Hansen, Hava, Herbst, Herranz García, Hetman, Hohlmeier, Humberto, Imart, Jarubas, Joński, Juknevičienė, Kalniete, Kanev, Kefalogiannis, Kelly, Kircher, Köhler, Kohut, Kokalari, Kolář, Kopacz, Kovatchev, Kulja, Lakos, Lazarov, Lenaers, Liese, Lins, Lopatka, López-Istúriz White, Łukacijewska, McAllister, Mandl, Marczułajtis-Walczak, Mato, Maydell, Mažylis, Mertens, Millán Mon, Morano, Moratti, Motreanu, Mureşan, Navarrete Rojas, Nerudová, Nevado del Campo, Niebler, Niedermayer, Novakov, Nykiel, Pascual de la Parte, Pedro, Pereira, Pietikäinen, Polfjärd, Princi, Protas, Radev, Radtke, Ratas, Ressler, Ripa, Salini, Saudargas, Schneider, Schwab, Seekatz, Sienkiewicz, Smit, Sokol, Solís Pérez, Sommen, Sousa Silva, Stier, Szczerba, Ter Laak, Terras, Tobé, Tomašič, Tomc, Tonin, Toveri, Tsiodras, Vaidere, Vălean, Van Leeuwen, Vincze, Voss, Vázquez Lázara, Walsh, Walsmann, Warborn, Wawrykiewicz, Wcisło, Weber, Winkler, Winzig, Wiseler-Lima, Zdechovský, Zdrojewski, Zoido Álvarez, Zver

PfE:
Androuët, Annemans, Bardella, Bartůšek, Bay Christophe, Blom, Bonte, Borchia, Borrás Pabón, Brasier-Clain, Bryłka, Buczek, Ceccardi, Dauchy, Deloge, Diepeveen, Dieringer, Disdier, Dömötör, Dostalova, Ferenc, Frigout, Furet, Gál, Girauta Vidal, Griset, Győri, Gyürk, Haider, Hauser, Jamet, Joron, Knotek, Kovařík, Krištopans, Kubín, László, Leonardelli, Mariani, Martín Frías, Mayer, Moreira de Sá, Nagyová, Nikolic, Olivier, Patriciello, Pennelle, Piera, Pimpie, de la Pisa Carrión, Rechagneux, Rougé, Sanchez, Sardone, Schaller-Baross, Steger, Szekeres, Tânger Corrêa, Tertsch, Thionnet, Tolassy, Tovaglieri, Valet, Vandendriessche, Vannacci, Varaut, Vicsek, Vilimsky, Vistisen, Werbrouck, Zijlstra

Renew:
Agirregoitia Martínez, Allione, Al-Sahlani, Andrews, Auštrevičius, Azmani, Bosse, Boyer, Brandstätter, Canfin, Cassart, Chastel, Christensen, Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Cotrim De Figueiredo, Cowen, Devaux, Farreng, García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Gerbrandy, Glück, Goerens, Gozi, Groothuis, Grudler, Guetta, Hahn, Hayer, Henriksson, Hojsík, Ijabs, Joveva, Karlsbro, Karvašová, Katainen, Kelleher, Keller, Kulmuni, Kyuchyuk, Løkkegaard, McNamara, Minchev, Ní Mhurchú, Ódor, Oetjen, Paet, Šarec, Singer, Streit, Stürgkh, Toom, Van Brug, van den Berg, Vasconcelos, Vautmans, Vedrenne, Verougstraete, Wiesner, Wiezik, Wilmès, Yar, Yon-Courtin, Žalimas

S&D:
Agius Saliba, Andriukaitis, Angel, Assis, Bajada, Ballarín Cereza, Barley, Benea, Benifei, Biedroń, Bischoff, Blinkevičiūtė, Bonaccini, Bullmann, Ceulemans, Chahim, Corrado, Costanzo, Cremer, Cristea, Danielsson, Decaro, Dibrani, Di Rupo, Dobrev, Ecke, Eriksson, Fernández, Fritzon, Fuglsang, Gálvez, García Pérez, Geier, Germain, Glucksmann, Gomes, Gómez López, Gonçalves Bruno, Gonçalves Sérgio, González Casares, Gori, Grossmann, Gualmini, Heide, Heinäluoma, Homs Ginel, Incir, Jalloul Muro, Jerković, Kalfon, Kaljurand, Lalucq, Laureti, López, López Aguilar, Luena, Lupo, Maestre, Maij, Manda, Maniatis, Maran, Mebarek, Mendes, Mendia, Mikser, Molnár, Moreno Sánchez, Moretti, Muşoiu, Negrescu, Noichl, Pajín, Papandreou, Pellerin-Carlin, Penkova, Picula, Rafowicz, Regner, Repasi, Repp, Reuten, Ridel, Rodrigues, Ros Sempere, Sánchez Amor, Sancho Murillo, Sargiacomo, Schaldemose, Scheuring-Wielgus, Schieder, Serrano Sierra, Sidl, Sippel, Śmiszek, Strada, Tarquinio, Tavares, Temido, Tinagli, Tobback, Tudose, Ušakovs, Van Brempt, Vigenin, Zan

The Left:
Andersson, Antoci, Arvanitis, Aubry, Barrena Arza, Botenga, Boylan, Carême, Chaibi, Clausen, Della Valle, Demirel, Everding, Farantouris, Flanagan, Fourreau, Galán, Gedin, Hassan, Kennes, Lucano, Martins, Mesure, Montero, Morace, Oliveira, Omarjee, Palmisano, Pedulla’, Rackete, Saeidi, Salis, Schirdewan, Sjöstedt, Smith, Tamburrano, Tridico

Verts/ALE:
Andresen, Asens Llodrà, Bloss, Camara, Cavazzini, Cormand, Eickhout, Freund, Geese, Gregorová, Häusling, Holmgren, Kuhnke, Lagodinsky, Langensiepen, Lövin, Marino, Marquardt, Marzà Ibáñez, Matthieu, Metz, Miranda Paz, Neumann, Niinistö, Nordqvist, Orlando, Paulus, Peter-Hansen, Prebilič, Riba i Giner, Riehl, Satouri, Sbai, Schilling, Scuderi, Sinkevičius, Søvndal, Strik, Strolenberg, Tegethoff, Toussaint, Van Sparrentak, Vieira, Waitz

MIL OSI Europe News –

May 27, 2025

MIL-OSI Security: Uzbekistan Man Extradited From Ukraine and Arraigned on Charges of Stealing Millions of Dollars in Cryptocurrency

Source: US FBI

Buffalo, N.Y.-U.S. Attorney Trini E. Ross announced that Nikita Andreevich Sklyuev a/k/a Valeriy Dorojkin, 37, of Uzbekistan, was extradited from Ukraine and arraigned today on an indictment charging him with wire fraud and fraudulent use of unauthorized access device. The charges carry a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison and a $250,000 fine.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Douglas A. C. Penrose, who is handling the case, stated that according to the indictment, in June 2018, Sklyuev submitted a computer software application, “EOSIO Wallet Explorer,” to Apple to be sold through the Apple App Store. The EOSIO Wallet Explorer purported to be a cryptocurrency wallet, but was in fact a malicious computer software application designed to steal the cryptocurrency user’s private key, thereby giving Sklyuev access to the user’s cryptocurrency funds. In September 2018, an individual in the Western District of New York (Victim) purchased the EOSIO Wallet Explorer application and then installed it on his iPhone. Once the Victim entered his private key following the installation, Sklyuev had unauthorized access to the Victim’s cryptocurrency wallet, which contained approximately 2,092,395.5356 EOS cryptocurrency, which at the time was valued at approximately $11.8 million dollars. On September 25, 2018, Sklyuev changed the private key to the Victim’s wallet, which resulted in the Victim losing all control and access to his wallet. In February 2019, Sklyuev transferred the EOS cryptocurrency from the Victim’s wallet to numerous other online wallets that were under his control.

Sklyuev was arraigned this morning before U.S. Magistrate Judge Jeremiah J. McCarthy and is being held pending a detention hearing on July 3, 2024. Today’s arraignment follows the successful June 20, 2024, extradition of Sklyuev from Ukraine. The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs worked with Romanian and Ukrainian authorities to secure his arrest and extradition.

The indictment is the result of an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, under the direction of Special Agent-in-Charge Matthew Miraglia and the U.S. Marshals Service, under the direction of Marshal Charles Salina.

The fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime is merely an accusation and the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.

# # # #

MIL Security OSI –

May 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Russia’s invasion united different parts of Ukraine against a common enemy – 3 years on, that unanimity still holds

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Ben Horne, Assistant Professor in the School of Information Sciences, University of Tennessee

Russian aggression has united Ukrainians around the flag. Omer Messinger/Getty Images

When Russia invaded Ukraine in the spring of 2022, President Vladimir Putin incorrectly assumed it would be a swift takeover.

In fact, three years on, negotiators from both countries are tentatively exploring the idea of a negotiated way out of a largely stalemated conflict.

So what did the Kremlin’s initial assessment get wrong? Aside from underestimating the vulnerabilities of Russia’s military, analysts have suggested that Moscow also miscalculated the support Russia would receive from Ukrainians in the country’s east who have close ethnic ties to Russia.

Our recently published study on Ukrainian sentiment toward Russia before and after the invasion backs up that assertion. It demonstrates that even those Ukrainians who had close ties to Russia based on ethnicity, language, religion or location dramatically changed allegiances immediately following the invasion. For example, just prior to the invasion of 2022, native Russian speakers in Ukraine’s east tended to blame the West for tensions with Russia. But immediately after the invasion, they blamed Moscow in roughly the same numbers as non-Russian-speaking Ukrainians.

Moreover, this shift was not just a short-lived reaction. Three years after the invasion, we followed up on our survey and found that Ukrainians still blame Russia for tensions to a degree that was never so unanimous before 2022.

A natural experiment

Our study is part of a larger project exploring how effective Russian propaganda has been at influencing Russian-speaking adults in certain former Soviet states. Our inaugural survey was launched in the fall of 2020, while the question regarding tensions between Ukraine and Russia was first posed in February 2022, immediately prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Surveys were completed by over 1,000 Russian-speaking people in Ukraine − excluding Crimea and the breakaway Donbas region for security reasons − and in Belarus. While the spring surveys in Ukraine were conducted in person, the others were done by telephone due to the political situation in each country.

Belarus was chosen because it shares a similar historical, linguistic and ethnic background to Ukraine, but the two nations have diverged in their geopolitical paths. Shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Belarus, like Ukraine, forged ahead in attempting to build democratic systems. But after Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko came to power in 1994, the country become an authoritarian state with a high dependence on Russia for political and economic support.

In broad terms, Ukraine has had an opposite trajectory. Relations between Ukraine and Russia fluctuated over the initial years of independence. But since the Maidan revolution of November 2013 to February 2014, a staunch pro-Western leadership has emerged.

Still, certain segments of the population in Ukraine continued to hold affinities toward Russia – most notably, the Russian-speaking older generation in the country’s east.

Our surveys provide a kind of natural experiment looking at the impact of a Russian invasion on previous pro-Russian public sentiment.

Ukraine serves as the “treatment” group and Belarus as a “quasi-control” group, with the distinguishing factor being a Russian invasion. The questions we asked: “Who do you think is responsible for the worsening tensions between Russia and Ukraine?” and “In general, how do Russian policies affect your country?”

Ukrainian, American and Russian delegates meet for peace talks on May 16, 2025, in Istanbul, Turkey.
Arda Kucukkaya/Turkish Foreign Ministry via Getty Images

Converging blame

We found that in Ukraine, but not in Belarus, geopolitical views were sharply unified by the experience of the invasion. On one level, this is not surprising – after all, the people of a country being invaded would be expected to hold some degree of resentment to the invading army.

But what we found most interesting is that this effect in Ukraine massively overrode the split among various identities before the invasion. This was most prominent in people’s perceptions of who was to blame for rising tensions.

Prior to the invasion, 69.7% of respondents in Ukraine overall blamed Russia for the tensions between the two countries, with 30.3% blaming NATO, Ukraine or the U.S. By August 2022, 97.3% of respondents in Ukraine blamed Russia for the tensions, with only 2.7% blaming NATO, Ukraine or the U.S.

By comparison, in the neighboring country of Belarus, 15.5% of respondents blamed Russia for the tensions prior to the invasion, and only 21.9% of respondents blamed Russia for the tensions after the invasion.

This near unanimity in Ukraine masks the massive shifts you see when broken down for demographic differences. For example, blame varied widely across regions of Ukraine before the invasion but converged after the invasion. Prior to the invasion, only 36.0% of respondents in the east of Ukraine and 51.4% of respondents in the south of Ukraine blamed Russia for the tensions. After the invasion, over 96% of respondents in both regions blamed Russia.

A similar effect can be seen across other demographic differences. Only 30.6% of Catholics in Ukraine blamed Russia for the tensions prior to the invasion, while 83.0% blamed Russia later on.

What were once stratified opinions before the invasion became uniform afterward.

To check that this trend was not just an immediate post-invasion blip, we conducted the surveys again in September 2024 and February 2025. The overall proportion of Ukrainians who blamed Russia for the tensions remained high, with 85.7% and 84.5%, respectively. And again, these results held across the various demographic breakdowns.

In February 2025, the most recent survey, 77.2% of respondents in the east of Ukraine and 83.0% of respondents in the south blamed Russia. Catholics across Ukraine continued to blame Russia, with 90.7% in September 2024 and 90.6% in February 2025. Overall, there has been a small drop in the percentages of those blaming Russia – with war fatigue a possible reason.

Consequences for peace

Our findings suggest that in times of collective threat, divisions within a society tend to fade as people come together to face a common enemy.

And that could have huge consequences now, as various parties, including the U.S., look at peace proposals to end the Russia-Ukraine war. Among the options being explored is a scenario in which the current front lines are frozen.

This would entail recognizing the Russian-occupied territory of Crimea and the separatist regions of Donetsk and Luhansk as part of Russia. But it would also effectively relinquish Ukraine’s southeastern provinces of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia to Russia.

While our surveys cannot speak to how this will go down among the people of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk, the study did include Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. And our findings show that the sense of Ukrainian identity strengthened even among Russian-speaking people in those areas.

Ben Horne has received funding from the Office of Naval Research through the Minerva Research Initiative (Grant: N000142012618).

Catherine Luther has received funding from the Office of Naval Research through the Minerva Research Initiative (Grant: N000142012618).

R. Alexander Bentley has received funding from the Office of Naval Research through the Minerva Research Initiative (Grant: N000142012618)

– ref. Russia’s invasion united different parts of Ukraine against a common enemy – 3 years on, that unanimity still holds – https://theconversation.com/russias-invasion-united-different-parts-of-ukraine-against-a-common-enemy-3-years-on-that-unanimity-still-holds-255092

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

May 27, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Largest Ukraine trade mission boosts UK defence partnerships
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

Press release

Largest Ukraine trade mission boosts UK defence partnerships

Largest multinational Ukraine trade mission boosts defence partnerships for British business
The UK led its largest-ever trade mission to Ukraine, with 51 defence companies taking part.

The mission brought together UK industry and likeminded European nations to secure contracts and boost high-skilled jobs across the UK.

Trade missions help strengthen national security, the foundation of the Plan for Change, and open up opportunities for our world class defence sector.

A record 51 UK and international companies joined the fifth UK-Ukraine trade mission in Kyiv this week, making it the largest British-led trade delegation to Ukraine to date.

Participating companies from across the defence economy specialising in areas like uncrewed systems and military goods are securing contracts which will boost high-skilled jobs in regions across the country, supporting the government’s Plan for Change.

This week’s mission brought together leading UK defence firms to deepen cooperation with Ukrainian industry and partners from Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland and Latvia. This collaboration is vital in demonstrating a united multinational industrial front with European allies, scaling up support for Ukraine’s defence needs and strengthening supply chain resilience with international partners.

This latest mission is a significant step in the UK’s 100 Year Partnership with Ukraine, reinforcing the UK’s long-term support for Ukraine’s defence, security and recovery and drawing on the collective industrial capacity and capability of European allies.

Defence is a key growth sector in the Government’s upcoming modern Industrial Strategy and a prime example of how Government and industry can work together to aid our allies and boost UK security.

Lord Coaker, Defence Minister said:

Working with the Netherlands, Norway, and Ukraine we’re building resilient supply chains, putting Ukraine in the strongest possible position to achieve a just and lasting peace for years to come.

The UK is continuing to lead the way on support for Ukraine, from military support to leading the Ukraine Defence Contact Group where since the UK took the chair nearly £23bn has been pledged in military support for Ukraine.

Kevin Craven, CEO of ADS said:

It is a privilege for industry to lead the UK in engagement both within Ukraine and with our Ukrainian counterparts. Indeed, this week’s trade mission – the most multinational of its kind to date – has been nothing but inspiring.

The UK defence industry’s support to Ukraine is unwavering and stands ready to increase production capacity, develop innovative new capabilities, and build a resilient ecosystem.

Continued collaboration, both with our government counterparts and international allies, is pivotal as illegal Russian aggression continues to intensify. We will continue to deepen our industrial ties and fulfil our moral duty to the Ukrainian people.

Marte Gerhardsen, Norwegian State Secretary said:

European allies needs to stand together with Ukraine for as long as it takes. We work closely with Ukraine the UK and other European countries. The Russian aggression against Ukraine continues, and the need to rapidly strengthen Ukrainian and European defence capabilities are apparent.

The security situation demands that we innovate and adapt. We need to ensure that our industries can meet the growing demands from our governments and armed forces.

One of the purposes of the visit is to facilitate the establishment of projects and collaborations by more Norwegian companies in Ukraine. I am pleased to see how Norwegian companies work with Ukrainian partners to scale up productions.

The mission follows the new UK-EU Security & Defence Partnership that was agreed on Monday, which could lead to significant opportunities for the UK’s world-leading defence industries, generating more high-skilled jobs across all regions of the UK.

By joining forces with our European partners, the UK is strengthening its own defence industry while contributing directly to Ukraine’s long-term resilience.

Background:

JEF nations represented on this mission include: Norway, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, and Latvia

DBT and MOD working closely together through the cross-government Task Force HIRST to drive increases in UK, Ukrainian and allies’ industrial capacity to support the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as domestic military resilience. It has recently secured a £1.6bn deal for air defence missiles for Ukraine.

The UK is fully committed to working with allies to step up support to ensure Ukraine remains in the strongest possible position, which is why £4.5 billion of military support will be provided this year – more than ever before.

Defence already supports 434,000 jobs and is an engine for growth. The Government’s new Defence Industrial Strategy will make sure national security and a high-growth economy are aligned and delivering on our promise to crack down on waste and boost Britain’s defence industry.

This week’s mission builds on the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) Oslo Summit held earlier this month, highlighting the UK’s growing cooperation with European partners on defence and security.

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Updates to this page

Published 23 May 2025
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
May 27, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: International Day of Solidarity with Political Prisoners in Belarus: Joint Statement to the OSCE, May 2025
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

Speech

International Day of Solidarity with Political Prisoners in Belarus: Joint Statement to the OSCE, May 2025

UK and 37 other countries call for immediate and unconditional release of political prisoners in Belarus.
I am delivering this statement on behalf of the following participating States, who are members of the Informal Group of Friends of Democratic Belarus: Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and my own country Poland.

The following participating States are also joining this statement: Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Liechtenstein, Malta, Moldova, North Macedonia, San Marino and Switzerland.

Since the death of political prisoner and activist Vitold Ashurak in prison on 21 May 2021, we mark the International Day of Solidarity with Political Prisoners in Belarus annually.

Since May 2021, at least seven more political prisoners have died in the regime’s captivity: Mikalai Klimovich, Ales Pushkin, Vadzim Khrasko, Ihar Lednik, Aliaksandr Kulinich, Dmitry Schletgauer and Valiantsin Shtermer. They were unjustly persecuted for their political opinions, and failed to receive adequate medical attention and care.

In June last year, a group of 38 participating states invoked the Vienna Human Dimension mechanism and questioned many individual cases related to prisoners’ dignity, access to medication and medical care, to legal counsel of their own choosing, to effective remedies and a fair legal trial, as well as contacts with their families. The Belarus authorities did not bring any meaningful response to these questions nor has Belarus made progress on the recommendations of either the 2020 or 2023 Moscow Mechanism reports.

Some of those prisoners have since then been released, after completion of their sentences or through pardons, however the arbitrary detention of citizens for exercising their human rights persists. As of May 15, 2025, VIASNA estimates that there were 1189 political prisoners in Belarus. Many of them have serious health issues, disabilities, are over the age of 60, and are suffering from mental disorders. Many of them are subjected to torture and ill-treatment, including deprivation of necessary medical assistance. The UN Committee against Torture reported that torture in these prisons is systemic, habitual, widespread and deliberate with a pattern of impunity for perpetrators.

This is the day to remember them all. A day to reiterate our call for the Belarusian authorities:

to stop repressing individuals for exercising their rights to freedom of expression, to freedom of association and to peaceful assembly;

to release all political prisoners immediately and unconditionally, and to ensure their rehabilitation.

This is also the day to express our solidarity with relatives and friends of political prisoners, who are subject to political and administrative repression in Belarus and in exile, as part of a wider brutal crackdown on opposition figures, human rights defenders, civil society representatives, journalists and other media actors, and other citizens who dare voice any opposition or dissent.

In the face of this disregard of OSCE principles and commitments by the Belarusian authorities, we will continue to support the Belarusian people’s aspiration for a free, democratic and independent Belarus.

Updates to this page

Published 23 May 2025
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
May 27, 2025
Russia and Ukraine start prisoner exchange, but not yet completed

Source: Government of India

Source: Government of India (4)

Russia and Ukraine began a major prisoner swap on Friday that was agreed on at their first direct talks in more than three years, a Ukrainian military source said on Friday.

U.S. President Donald Trump said the prisoner exchange had already been completed but Kyiv and Moscow did not confirm this and the military source said the swap was still under way.

Russia and Ukraine each agreed at two hours of talks in Istanbul last week to swap 1,000 prisoners, but failed to agree to a ceasefire proposed by Trump. Previous prisoner swaps have been mediated by the United Arab Emirates.

The prisoner swap was the only concrete step towards peace the two sides agreed at their talks in Istanbul.

“Congratulations to both sides on this negotiation. This could lead to something big???,” Trump said in a post on Truth Social.

Hundreds of thousands of soldiers on both sides are believed to have been wounded or killed in Europe’s deadliest war since World War Two, although neither side publishes accurate casualty figures. Tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilians have also died as Russian forces have besieged and bombarded Ukrainian cities.

Ukraine says it is ready for a 30-day ceasefire immediately, but Russia, which launched the war by invading its neighbour in 2022 and now occupies about a fifth of Ukraine, says it will not pause its assaults until conditions are met first. A member of the Ukrainian delegation called those conditions “non-starters”.

Trump, who has shifted U.S. policy from supporting Ukraine towards accepting some of Russia’s account of the war, had said he could tighten sanctions on Russia if Moscow blocked a peace deal. But after speaking to Putin on Monday he decided to take no action for now.

Moscow says it is ready for peace talks while the fighting goes on, and wants to discuss what it calls the war’s “root causes”, including its demands Ukraine cede more territory, and be disarmed and barred from military alliances with the West. Kyiv says that is tantamount to surrender and would leave it defenceless in the face of future Russian attacks.

(Reuters)

May 27, 2025

MIL-OSI: Imperial Petroleum Inc. Reports First Quarter 2025 Financial and Operating Results

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

ATHENS, Greece, May 23, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — IMPERIAL PETROLEUM INC. (NASDAQ: IMPP; the “Company”), a ship-owning company providing petroleum products, crude oil and dry bulk seaborne transportation services, announced today its unaudited financial and operating results for the first quarter ended March 31, 2025.

OPERATIONAL AND FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS

Fleet operational utilization of 83.8% in Q1 25’ versus 86% in Q4 24’ and 80.6% in Q1 24’.
About 47% of fleet calendar days were dedicated to time charter activity while 53% to spot activity.
Delivery of the dry bulk carrier, Supra Pasha (2012 built) on April 26th 2025; the remaining six contracted dry bulk carriers will be delivered by June 2025.
Revenues of $32.1 million in Q1 25’ compared to $41.2 million in Q1 24’- a 22.1% decline as market rates were stronger during Q1 24’.
Net income of $11.3 million in Q1 25’ versus $16.7 million in Q1 24’, corresponding to an EPS, basic of $0.32.
EBITDA¹ of $14.7 million for Q1 25’.
Revenues and net income increased by $5.9 million (or 22.5%) and $7.4 million (or 189.7%), respectively, in Q1 25’ compared to Q4 24’.
Cash and cash equivalents including time deposits of $227.4 million as of March 31, 2025 which is 167.5% higher than our current market capitalization of about $85 million.
Recurring profitability and debt free capital structure facilitate robust cash flow generation.

First Quarter 2025 Results:

Revenues for the three months ended March 31, 2025 amounted to $32.1 million, a decrease of $9.1 million, or 22.1%, compared to revenues of $41.2 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024, primarily due to a decrease in the spot market tanker rates. During the three months ended March 31, 2024 average spot rates for product and suezmax tankers were 26.9% and 24.2% higher than average spot rates during the three months ended March 31, 2025.
Voyage expenses and vessels’ operating expenses for the three months ended March 31, 2025 were $10.5 million and $7.1 million, respectively, compared to $13.5 million and $6.0 million, respectively, for the three months ended March 31, 2024. The $3.0 million decrease in voyage expenses is mainly attributed to increased time charter activity leading to a decline in spot days by 16.1%. The decline in spot days along with the decrease in the Suez Canal transits compared to the same period of last year, led to decreased bunker consumption by 21.2% and lower port expenses by 30.8%. The $1.1 million increase in vessels’ operating expenses is primarily due to the increased size of our fleet by an average of 2.1 vessels between the two periods.
Drydocking costs for the three months ended March 31, 2025 and 2024 were nil and $0.6 million, respectively. This decrease is due to the fact that during the three months ended March 31, 2025, no vessel underwent drydocking whereas during the three months ended March 31, 2024 our aframax tanker commenced its drydocking which was concluded within April 2024.
General and administrative costs for both the three months ended March 31, 2025 and 2024 were $1.2 million.
Depreciation for the three months ended March 31, 2025 and 2024 was $5.0 million and $4.0 million, respectively. The change is attributable to the increase in the average number of vessels in our fleet.
Management fees for the three months ended March 31, 2025 and 2024 were $0.5 million and $0.4 million, respectively. The change is attributable to the increase in the average number of vessels in our fleet.
Interest and finance costs for the three months ended March 31, 2025 and 2024 were $0.6 million and $0.002 million, respectively. The $0.6 million of costs for the three months ended March 31, 2025 relate mainly to accrued interest expense – related party in connection with the $14.0 million and $24.0 million part of the acquisition prices of our bulk carriers, Neptulus and Clean Imperial, respectively. These balances were completely settled in April 2025. For accounting purposes, the outstanding balances payable on the two vessels were required to be allocated between principal and imputed interest, despite the fact that no interest was contractually charged by the sellers. The total amounts ultimately paid remained consistent with the originally agreed purchase prices.
Interest income for the three months ended March 31, 2025 was $2.2 million as compared to $1.0 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024. The $1.2 million increase is mainly attributed to a higher amount of funds placed under time deposits.
Interest income – related party for the three months ended March 31, 2025 was nil as compared to $0.8 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024. The decrease is mainly attributed to the $0.8 million of accrued interest income – related party for the three months ended March 31, 2024 in connection with the $38.7 million of the sale price of the Aframax tanker Afrapearl II (ex. Stealth Berana). The balance was collected in July 2024, thus the balance for the three months ended March 31, 2025 was nil.
Foreign exchange (loss)/gain for the three months ended March 31, 2025 was a gain of $1.7 million as compared to a loss of $0.8 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024. The $1.7 million foreign exchange gain for the three months ended March 31, 2025, is mainly attributed the strengthening of the euro currency against the dollar at the end of the three months ended March 31, 2025 when compared to the respective currency values at the end of year 2024.
As a result of the above, for the three months ended March 31, 2025, the Company reported net income of $11.3 million, compared to net income of $16.7 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024. Dividends paid on Series A Preferred Shares amounted to $0.4 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025. The weighted average number of shares of common stock outstanding, basic, for the three months ended March 31, 2025 was 32.9 million. Earnings per share, basic and diluted, for the three months ended March 31, 2025 amounted to $0.32 and $0.30, respectively, compared to earnings per share, basic and diluted, of $0.56 and $0.50, respectively, for the three months ended March 31, 2024.
Adjusted net income¹ was $12.2 million corresponding to an Adjusted EPS¹, basic of $0.34 for the three months ended March 31, 2025 compared to an Adjusted net income of $17.5 million corresponding to an Adjusted EPS, basic, of $0.59 for the same period of last year.
EBITDA¹ for the three months ended March 31, 2025 amounted to $14.7 million, while Adjusted EBITDA¹ for the three months ended March 31, 2025 amounted to $15.6 million.
An average of 11.90 vessels were owned by the Company during the three months ended March 31, 2025 compared to 9.84 vessels for the same period of 2024.

¹ EBITDA, Adjusted EBITDA, Adjusted Net Income and Adjusted EPS are non-GAAP measures. Refer to the reconciliation of these measures to the most directly comparable financial measure in accordance with GAAP set forth later in this release. Reconciliations of Adjusted Net Income, EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA to Net Income are set forth below.

Fleet Employment Table

As of May 23, 2025, the profile and deployment of our fleet is the following:


Name	Year Built	Country Built	Vessel Size (dwt)	Vessel Type	Employment Status	Expiration of Charter(1)
*Tankers*
Magic Wand	2008	Korea	47,000	MR product tanker	Time Charter	October 2025
Clean Thrasher	2008	Korea	47,000	MR product tanker	Time Charter	May 2025
Clean Sanctuary (ex. Falcon Maryam)	2009	Korea	46,000	MR product tanker	Spot
Clean Nirvana	2008	Korea	50,000	MR product tanker	Spot
Clean Justice	2011	Japan	46,000	MR product tanker	Time Charter	September 2027
Aquadisiac	2008	Korea	51,000	MR product tanker	Spot
Clean Imperial	2009	Korea	40,000	MR product tanker	Time Charter	January 2026
Suez Enchanted	2007	Korea	160,000	Suezmax tanker	Spot
Suez Protopia	2008	Korea	160,000	Suezmax tanker	Spot
*Drybulk Carriers(2)*
Eco Wildfire	2013	Japan	33,000	Handysize drybulk	Time Charter	May 2025
Glorieuse	2012	Japan	38,000	Handysize drybulk	Time Charter	June 2025
Neptulus	2012	Japan	33,000	Handysize drybulk	Time Charter	June 2025
Supra Pasha	2012	Japan	56,000	Supramax drybulk	Spot
Fleet Total			807,000 dwt

(1) (2)	Earliest date charters could expire. We have contracted to acquire six Japanese built drybulk carriers, aggregating approximately 387,000 dwt, which are expected to be delivered to us by June 2025.

CEO Harry Vafias Commented

Another year commenced with a positive momentum for Imperial Petroleum. We are happy as we consider the $11.3 million of net income generated in Q1 25’ a very good result given the eventful but softish market. This is a busy period for our Company but at the same time exciting as we are taking on delivery of another six drybulk vessels. Within the short life of Imperial Petroleum, we are expanding our fleet from four vessels to nineteen by the second quarter of 2025; our goal of growing fast and transforming a small company to medium sized was achieved. We feel confident that the diversified quality non- Chinese fleet we have created will pay off. Imperial Petroleum enjoys fast growth, recurring profits, zero bank debt and liquidity as of March 31, 2025 in excess of $220 million and as per our view ticks all the boxes that define a successful operation.

Conference Call details:

On May 23, 2025 at 10:00 am ET, the company’s management will host a conference call to discuss the results and the company’s operations and outlook.

Online Registration:

Conference call participants should pre-register using the below link to receive the dial-in numbers and a personal PIN, which are required to access the conference call.

https://register-conf.media-server.com/register/BIaef045aa9f5b46a7b5e8eb48c2e56115

Slides and audio webcast:

There will also be a live and then archived webcast of the conference call, through the IMPERIAL PETROLEUM INC. website (www.ImperialPetro.com). Participants to the live webcast should register on the website approximately 10 minutes prior to the start of the webcast.

About IMPERIAL PETROLEUM INC.

IMPERIAL PETROLEUM INC. is a ship-owning company providing petroleum products, crude oil and drybulk seaborne transportation services. The Company owns a total of thirteen vessels on the water – seven M.R. product tankers, two suezmax tankers and four handysize drybulk carriers – with a total capacity of 807,000 deadweight tons (dwt), and has contracted to acquire an additional six drybulk carriers of 387,000 dwt aggregate capacity. Following these deliveries, the Company’s fleet will count a total of 19 vessels with an aggregate capacity of 1.2 million dwt. IMPERIAL PETROLEUM INC.’s shares of common stock and 8.75% Series A Cumulative Redeemable Perpetual Preferred Stock are listed on the Nasdaq Capital Market and trade under the symbols “IMPP” and “IMPPP,” respectively.

Forward-Looking Statements

Matters discussed in this release may constitute forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements reflect our current views with respect to future events and financial performance and may include statements concerning plans, objectives, goals, strategies, future events or performance, and underlying assumptions and other statements, which are other than statements of historical facts. The forward-looking statements in this release are based upon various assumptions, many of which are based, in turn, upon further assumptions, including without limitation, management’s examination of historical operating trends, data contained in our records and other data available from third parties. Although IMPERIAL PETROLEUM INC. believes that these assumptions were reasonable when made, because these assumptions are inherently subject to significant uncertainties and contingencies which are difficult or impossible to predict and are beyond our control, IMPERIAL PETROLEUM INC. cannot assure you that it will achieve or accomplish these expectations, beliefs or projections. Important factors that, in our view, could cause actual results to differ materially from those discussed in the forward-looking statements include the strength of world economies and currencies, geopolitical conditions, including any trade disruptions resulting from tariffs and other protectionist measures imposed by the United States or other countries, general market conditions, including changes in charter hire rates and vessel values, charter counterparty performance, changes in demand that may affect attitudes of time charterers to scheduled and unscheduled drydockings, changes in IMPERIAL PETROLEUM INC’s operating expenses, including bunker prices, drydocking and insurance costs, ability to obtain financing and comply with covenants in our financing arrangements, actions taken by regulatory authorities, potential liability from pending or future litigation, domestic and international political conditions, the conflict in Ukraine and related sanctions, the conflicts in the Middle East, potential disruption of shipping routes due to ongoing attacks by Houthis in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden or accidents and political events or acts by terrorists.

Risks and uncertainties are further described in reports filed by IMPERIAL PETROLEUM INC. with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

Fleet List and Fleet Deployment
For information on our fleet and further information:
Visit our website at www.ImperialPetro.com

Company Contact:
Fenia Sakellaris
IMPERIAL PETROLEUM INC.
E-mail: info@ImperialPetro.com

Fleet Data:
The following key indicators highlight the Company’s operating performance during the three month periods ended March 31, 2024 and 2025.

FLEET DATA	Q1 2024	Q1 2025
Average number of vessels (1)	9.84	11.90
Period end number of owned vessels in fleet	11	12
Total calendar days for fleet (2)	895	1,071
Total voyage days for fleet (3)	878	1,067
Fleet utilization (4)	98.1%	99.6%
Total charter days for fleet (5)	207	504
Total spot market days for fleet (6)	671	563
Fleet operational utilization (7)	80.6%	83.8%

1) Average number of vessels is the number of owned vessels that constituted our fleet for the relevant period, as measured by the sum of the number of days each vessel was a part of our fleet during the period divided by the number of calendar days in that period.
2) Total calendar days for fleet are the total days the vessels we operated were in our possession for the relevant period including off-hire days associated with major repairs, drydockings or special or intermediate surveys.
3) Total voyage days for fleet reflect the total days the vessels we operated were in our possession for the relevant period net of off-hire days associated with major repairs, drydockings or special or intermediate surveys.
4) Fleet utilization is the percentage of time that our vessels were available for revenue generating voyage days, and is determined by dividing voyage days by fleet calendar days for the relevant period.
5) Total charter days for fleet are the number of voyage days the vessels operated on time or bareboat charters for the relevant period.
6) Total spot market charter days for fleet are the number of voyage days the vessels operated on spot market charters for the relevant period.
7) Fleet operational utilization is the percentage of time that our vessels generated revenue, and is determined by dividing voyage days excluding idle days by fleet calendar days for the relevant period.

Reconciliation of Adjusted Net Income, EBITDA, adjusted EBITDA and adjusted EPS:

Adjusted net income represents net income before share based compensation. EBITDA represents net income before interest and finance costs, interest income and depreciation. Adjusted EBITDA represents net income before interest and finance costs, interest income, depreciation and share based compensation.
Adjusted EPS represents Adjusted net income attributable to common shareholders divided by the weighted average number of shares. EBITDA, adjusted EBITDA, adjusted net income and adjusted EPS are not recognized measurements under U.S. GAAP. Our calculation of EBITDA, adjusted EBITDA, adjusted net income and adjusted EPS may not be comparable to that reported by other companies in the shipping or other industries. In evaluating Adjusted EBITDA, Adjusted net income and Adjusted EPS, you should be aware that in the future we may incur expenses that are the same as or similar to some of the adjustments in this presentation.

EBITDA, adjusted EBITDA, adjusted net income and adjusted EPS are included herein because they are a basis, upon which we and our investors assess our financial performance. They allow us to present our performance from period to period on a comparable basis and provide investors with a means of better evaluating and understanding our operating performance.

(Expressed in United States Dollars, except number of shares)	Third Quarter Ended March 31st,
	2024	2025
Net Income – Adjusted Net Income
Net income	16,654,604	11,290,986
Plus share based compensation	858,810	889,076
Adjusted Net Income	17,513,414	12,180,062

Net income – EBITDA
Net income	16,654,604	11,290,986
Plus interest and finance costs	2,430	606,383
Less interest income	(1,785,878)	(2,184,394)
Plus depreciation	4,027,061	5,002,837
EBITDA	18,898,217	14,715,812

Net income – Adjusted EBITDA
Net income	16,654,604	11,290,986
Plus share based compensation	858,810	889,076
Plus interest and finance costs	2,430	606,383
Less interest income	(1,785,878)	(2,184,394)
Plus depreciation	4,027,061	5,002,837
Adjusted EBITDA	19,757,027	15,604,888

EPS
Numerator
Net income	16,654,604	11,290,986
Less: Cumulative dividends on preferred shares	(435,246)	(435,246)
Less: Undistributed earnings allocated to non-vested shares	(856,950)	(453,265)
Net income attributable to common shareholders, basic	15,362,408	10,402,475
Denominator
Weighted average number of shares	27,613,661	32,944,925
EPS – Basic	0.56	0.32

Adjusted EPS
Numerator
Adjusted net income	17,513,414	12,180,062
Less: Cumulative dividends on preferred shares	(435,246)	(435,246)
Less: Undistributed earnings allocated to non-vested shares	(902,326)	(490,387)
Adjusted net income attributable to common shareholders, basic	16,175,842	11,254,429

Denominator
Weighted average number of shares	27,613,661	32,944,925
Adjusted EPS, Basic	0.59	0.34

Imperial Petroleum Inc.
Unaudited Consolidated Statements of Income
(Expressed in United States Dollars, except for number of shares)

		Quarters Ended March 31,
		2024	2025

Revenues
	Revenues	41,203,281	32,091,626

Expenses
	Voyage expenses	12,963,607	10,054,114
	Voyage expenses – related party	514,414	401,753
	Vessels’ operating expenses	5,951,561	7,021,928
	Vessels’ operating expenses – related party	82,000	98,500
	Drydocking costs	625,457	—
	Management fees – related party	393,800	471,240
	General and administrative expenses	1,207,168	1,217,977
	Depreciation	4,027,061	5,002,837
Total expenses		25,765,068	24,268,349

Income from operations		15,438,213	7,823,277

Other (expenses)/income
	Interest and finance costs	(2,430)	(3,607)
	Interest expense – related party	—	(602,776)
	Interest income	1,035,261	2,184,394
	Interest income – related party	750,617	—
	Dividend income from related party	189,583	187,500
	Foreign exchange (loss)/gain	(756,640)	1,702,198
Other income, net		1,216,391	3,467,709

Net Income		16,654,604	11,290,986

Earnings per share
– Basic		0.56	0.32
– Diluted		0.50	0.30

Weighted average number of shares
-Basic		27,613,661	32,944,925
-Diluted		30,951,012	34,258,803

Imperial Petroleum Inc.
Unaudited Consolidated Balance Sheets
(Expressed in United States Dollars)

		December 31,	March 31,
		2024	2025

Assets
Current assets
	Cash and cash equivalents	67,783,531	126,520,450
	Time deposits	138,948,481	100,900,500
	Trade and other receivables	13,456,083	8,772,549
	Other current assets	652,769	67,374
	Inventories	7,306,356	6,705,115
	Advances and prepayments	250,562	209,858
Total current assets		228,397,782	243,175,846

Non current assets
	Operating lease right-of-use asset	78,761	60,239
	Vessels, net	208,230,018	227,015,031
	Investment in related party	12,798,500	12,794,333
Total non current assets		221,107,279	239,869,603
Total assets		449,505,061	483,045,449

Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity
Current liabilities
	Trade accounts payable	5,243,872	5,923,098
	Payable to related parties	18,725,514	39,232,604
	Accrued liabilities	3,370,020	3,604,467
	Operating lease liability, current portion	1,419,226	60,239
	Deferred income	78,761	1,812,557
Total current liabilities		28,837,393	50,632,965

Total liabilities		28,837,393	50,632,965

Commitments and contingencies

Stockholders’ equity
	Common stock	382,755	386,671
	Preferred Stock, Series A	7,959	7,959
	Preferred Stock, Series B	160	160
	Treasury stock	(8,390,225)	(8,390,225)
	Additional paid-in capital	282,642,357	283,527,517
	Retained earnings	146,024,662	156,880,402
Total stockholders’ equity		420,667,668	432,412,484
Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity		449,505,061	483,045,449

Imperial Petroleum Inc.
Unaudited Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows
(Expressed in United States Dollars

		Three Month Periods Ended March 31,
		2024	2025

Cash flows from operating activities
	Net income for the period	16,654,604	11,290,986

Adjustments to reconcile net income to net cash
provided by operating activities:
	Depreciation	4,027,061	5,002,837
	Non – cash lease expense	17,550	18,522
	Share based compensation	858,810	889,076
	Unrealized foreign exchange loss/(gain) on time deposits	799,150	(358,420)
	Dividend income from related party	(189,583)	—

Changes in operating assets and liabilities:
	(Increase)/decrease in
	Trade and other receivables	(3,249,129)	4,683,534
	Other current assets	(532,029)	585,395
	Inventories	(574,256)	601,241
	Changes in operating lease liabilities	(17,550)	(18,522)
	Advances and prepayments	(45,536)	40,704
	Due from related parties	(879,732)	4,167
	Increase/(decrease) in
	Trade accounts payable	(1,100,028)	679,226
	Due to related parties	2,839,227	(3,369,040)
	Accrued liabilities	903,784	234,447
	Deferred income	(869,166)	393,331
Net cash provided by operating activities		18,643,177	20,677,484

Cash flows from investing activities
	Dividends income received	191,667	—
	Acquisition and improvement of vessels	(72,257,190)	(4,350)
	Increase in bank time deposits	(31,695,420)	(57,958,390)
	Maturity of bank time deposits	31,368,080	96,364,791
Net cash (used in)/provided by investing activities		(72,392,863)	38,402,051

Cash flows from financing activities
	Stock issuance costs	(2,504,498)	—
	Dividends paid on preferred shares	(341,947)	(342,616)
Net cash used in financing activities		(2,846,445)	(342,616)

Net (decrease)/increase in cash and cash equivalents		(56,596,131)	58,736,919
Cash and cash equivalents at beginning of period		91,927,512	67,783,531
Cash and cash equivalents at end of period		35,331,381	126,520,450
Cash breakdown
	Cash and cash equivalents	35,331,381	126,520,450
Total cash and cash equivalents shown in the statements of cash flows		35,331,381	126,520,450

The MIL Network –

May 27, 2025

MIL-OSI Economics: Taiwan commits to multi-layered defense modernization amid heightened regional tensions, observes GlobalData

Source: GlobalData

Taiwan commits to multi-layered defense modernization amid heightened regional tensions, observes GlobalData

Posted in Aerospace, Defense & Security

Taiwan is undertaking a comprehensive, multi-layered defense modernization effort, driven by rising security threats and the imperative to deter potential aggression from China. With defense spending projected to reach $23.5 billion in 2030, Taiwan is prioritizing advanced air, naval, and unmanned systems, while also strengthening logistics and support infrastructure to enhance resilience and sustain prolonged military operations, says GlobalData, a leading data and analytics company.

GlobalData’s latest report, “Taiwan Defense Market Size and Trends, Budget Allocation, Regulations, Key Acquisitions, Competitive Landscape and Forecast, 2025-30,”Australia Defense Market Size and Trends, Budget Allocation, Regulations, Key Acquisitions, Competitive Landscape and Forecast, 2022-27’ reveals that the country’s cumulative defense spending is anticipated to reach $112.2 billion during 2026-30, out of which the acquisition budget share is estimated to be approximately average 14.7%, amounting to $16.5 billion.

Abhijit Apsingikar, Aerospace & Defense Analyst at GlobalData, comments: “Persistent Chinese incursions into territorial waters and airspace, along with the constant threat of a potential naval amphibious invasion, have compelled Taiwan to make substantial investments in strengthening its overall defense posture.”

Against this backdrop, Taiwan placed a contract to procure 66 new F-16 Block 70/72 aircraft in 2020 and first of the new aircraft were delivered in March 2025. The country has also completed modernizing its existing fleet of 139 F-16 A/B multirole aircraft to F-16 Block 70/72 standard as a part of the first phase of Peace Phoenix Rising program, last of which was delivered in December 2023. Taiwan is also in the process of reinforcing its sea denial capabilities by investing in Hai Kun-class submarines, while also investing in acquisition of Harpoon Coastal Defense System.

Over the period 2020-25, Taiwan sanctioned a large defense investment fund disbursed over multiple years. The key focus of these investments was directed towards strengthening the defense infrastructure and to revitalize defense R&D capabilities within the country, with its Navy being a key beneficiary. Taiwan is also in the process of building a new 2,500-ton light frigate to bolster its naval defense capabilities.

Apsingikar continues: “The ongoing Russo-Ukraine war offers a template for Taiwan to adopt proven methods for defending against a stronger adversary by deploying unmanned platforms such as unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned ground vehicles, unmanned surface vessels and unmanned underwater vehicles. These platforms can assist Taiwan to compensate for its relatively smaller military strength and combat potential”

Although Taiwan’s defense RDT&E spending is modest with a budgetary allocation of $530 million for 2025, its anticipated to be directed mainly towards R&D in automated unmanned systems. For instance, Taiwan is developing Huilong uncrewed underwater vehicle (UUV), the Endeavor Manta Unmanned Surface Vessel, and Tu-40 Fixed Wing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.

Apsingikar concludes: “Taiwan is strategically focused on building a resilient and multi-layered defense posture. The emphasis is not only on acquiring advanced platforms but also on investing in robust logistics, maintenance, and support infrastructure. This integrated approach is critical to sustaining prolonged defense operations and delaying potential aggression long enough to enable allied intervention. By learning from modern conflict scenarios, Taiwan is prioritizing asymmetric warfare capabilities, particularly unmanned systems and sea denial strategies, to offset its numerical disadvantage and enhance its deterrence credibility in the region.”

MIL OSI Economics –

May 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Russia: A Changed Global Landscape: Policy Priorities in CESEE
Source: IMF – News in Russian

Speech by Alfred Kammer, Director, European Department of the IMF — Slovenia

May 23, 2025

It is a great pleasure to be with you in Ljubljana.

Let me begin by setting the stage for what I hope will be an insightful discussion on policy options in the presence of geoeconomic shocks and uncertainty.

I will focus on Central, Eastern and Southeastern European (CESEE) countries.

After a respectable recovery last year, we downgraded growth for 2025 and 2026 across Europe

Heightened uncertainty and trade policy volatility have been the main factors. And the latest data releases from Q1 2025 are so far in line with our forecast.

The downgrade for the CESEE region^{^[1]} has been more sizeable than for advanced Europe: from over 3 percent in 2025 and 2026 to 2.4 and 2.7 percent respectively.

The larger impact is primarily due to a comparatively larger manufacturing sector. The growth revision would have been even larger if not for the German infrastructure package and an acceleration of Europe wide-defense spending

Inflation in CESEE countries meanwhile is coming down somewhat faster. But, as the chart shows, inflation rates will remain above targets for some time. Persistent services inflation and lagged effects of still high wage growth are key drivers – a point I will return to later as a risk to competitiveness.

In my remarks today, I will address two points: (i) how the changing global landscape is affecting CESEE countries and (ii) what the key policy priorities are.

Let me give a summary of my key points
- What do we know so far about the effects of trade disputes including via trade diversion?
In a nutshell, the impact across the CESEE regions varies widely. Some of the most US-tariff-exposed countries, namely Hungary and Slovak Republic and to a lesser extent the Czech Republic, are in the constituency.

The tariffs between the US and China have just been lowered from very extreme levels, but they remain high and could increase again. Economic spillovers could be large for some specific sectors, even though our preliminary assessment is that the trade diversion effects should be manageable overall.
- What can policymakers do to navigate a more uncertain and volatile period?
Primarily, changes are permanent. Businesses and households will need to adapt to these. A principle-based approach can help lessen the impact.
- First, maintain trade openness as much as possible. Protectionism will hurt inward investment, lower investment further and bring down productivity and income growth.
- Second, stay the course on sound macroeconomic policies. In times of uncertainty, markets will scrutinize fundamentals. Durable policies can limit increases in risk premia. This means that central banks should remain cautious on monetary normalization and governments need to keep an eye on fiscal sustainability.
- Third, generate growth through traditional means: domestic structural reforms. The size of untapped gains from domestic structural reforms is surprisingly large.
- The question here is how the CESEE region can overcome political constraints. In my final observation I will discuss how the EU budget can play a catalyzing role.
I will highlight two channels:
- Direct exposure to US tariffs
- Potential effects of trade diversion from US-China trade dispute
The CESEE region’s integration into global value-chains and trade linkages creates exposure to shifting trade dynamics.

The EU has sizable direct trade linkages with China and the US (LHS), and linkages by individual CESEE countries to the US are substantial.

Exposures are especially large in the Slovak Republic and Hungary. Exports to the US (primarily cars, car parts, batteries, and in the case of Hungary electronics) account for about 3 per cent of GDP in 2024.

Czechia and Hungary have also large export positions to the US via smartphones and computers exports. For the time being, tariffs on these items have been exempted per the announcement made on April 11.

Any increase in tariffs would have substantial dampening effects on growth.

Indirect effects via supply chains will also become important tailwinds. In a 2024 IMF study, we show that an increase in EV imports from China could have significant GDP effects in the range of 1-1½ percent over 5 years via the supply chains in CESEE countries heavily reliant on the automotive sector. A slowdown in Germany’s automotive sector has about a 5-10 times larger impact in percent of GDP in Slovakia and Hungary given their larger share of the sector relative to Germany.

If US-China trade tensions persist, multiple channels of trade diversion could come into play.

EU imports from China could increase, U.S. companies could try to find new export destinations including in Europe, and European firms could seek to find new export opportunities in the U.S. and China as a result of high China-U.S. tariffs.

Finally, competition on third-country markets could increase as countries look for new export markets. CESEE countries could be innocent bystanders. For instance, Turkish businesses could experience increased competition in third markets reducing margin or market shares.

We have estimated the potential size of trade diversion from China using a partial equilibrium approach.

Our preliminary estimates from April 8 tariff announcements[2] for the EU are for higher imports from China of around 0.25 percent of EU GDP in the near term.[3] The estimates are similar to ECB estimates discussed in their latest economic Bulletin. The 90-day rollback of most bilateral tariffs imposed since April 2 announced by the US and China on May 12 implies lower numbers, but better to be prepared for the worst.

Trade diversion would also affect inflation. Increased import competition would likely lower final prices. Headline inflation could be reduced by 20 basis points in 2026.

The economic effects for consumers and producers are likely mixed. Lower final goods prices would benefit consumers. Similarly, lower imported intermediates could also benefit European firms by reducing input costs. But trade diversion means also a rise in competition and in specific sectors such as consumer electronics or transportation equipment, adjustment effects could be large.

With all that said, the aggregate size of trade diversion effects appears manageable, although the impact could be large in individual countries and sectors.

Let me turn to policy priorities.

Let me now say a few words on what the CESEE region can do in the face of tariffs.
- First, Europe—and everyone—needs more trade, not less. The EU as well as CESEE should continue its open trade policy and expand its network of trade agreements.
- Second, we must accept that the global trade regime has changed. This means that any support to mitigate tariff or trade diversion effects should remain temporary, and targeted.
Support measures cannot substitute for differences in the underlying fundamentals. In particular, the recent appreciation of CESEE currencies in unit-labor-cost adjusted terms is a concern.

What can policymakers do in the short term?

In the current global environment, navigating uncertainty is crucial.

In the short run, governments should aim to retain macroeconomic stability through credible and sustainable macroeconomic policies and build resilience.

Starting with monetary policy, central banks need to remain focused on durably reaching price stability targets.
- In several large CESEE countries—including Hungary—inflation is slowing, but is still above targets.
- Central banks should ease cautiously. We advise caution because core inflation in the CESEE region remains higher than hoped for, and inflation expectations are more responsive to current inflation levels.
Still high wage growth requires close attention. Increases have outpaced productivity and are contributing to higher inflation persistency. High labor costs also pose a risk to CESEE’s competitiveness.

Our fiscal advice remains broadly unchanged. For many countries, rebuilding fiscal buffers is still a priority.
- The challenge is how to manage rising long-term spending pressures from aging, healthcare, climate, and now higher defense spending.
- Some countries can accommodate temporary increases in priority spending while keeping debt sustainability in mind.
- But for many CESEE countries the space is limited. This means they will have to undertake smart adjustments: (i) make public services more efficient and programs better targeted; (ii) reallocate spending priorities away from low priority areas, (iii) and boost fiscal revenues. In many cases, this can be done without raising tax rates by closing loopholes and more efficient administration.
We continue to have concerns about Europe’s medium-term outlook: growth is low and there are rising spending needs:
- Labor supply is dwindling because of aging.
- Investment has been slowing.
- And Europe’s productivity growth has been very low over the last two decades.
This makes meeting fiscal pressures increasingly difficult.
- Spending needs are expected to rise significantly over the next decades, for advanced economies by 5¾ percentage points and emerging economies by 8 percentage points of GDP.
- In the CESEE region, energy-related investments needs are urgent and very large.
- And across the region, defense spending is on the rise.
This brings us to my final point which is how CESEE countries could generate medium-term growth.

Domestic structural reforms, while often overlooked, provide a large untapped source of European growth potential.
- In a forthcoming study, we find that comprehensive national reforms could raise real GDP levels by about 5 percent in advanced economies and between 6.6 and 9.3 percent in the CESEE region.
- These are sizeable gains and could be an important growth antidote to the poisonous effects of uncertainty and volatile policy disputes.
These reforms would remove inefficiencies at home and complement the earlier discussed EU-wide reforms. Specifically:
- Domestic labor market and skill-upgrading reforms top the priority list in terms of their macroeconomic
- Fiscal-structural reforms and lower cost of business regulations would provide another substantial impetus.
- Reducing corruption and inefficiencies through governance reforms is particularly important in several CESEE countries.
Successful implementation of these reforms will require political will, and in some cases, also capacity building.

Overcoming the reform inertia is “the challenge” of Europe.

Let me conclude with a few observations on how to overcome this obstacle.

We think the EU budget could play a catalyzing role. Recent initiatives—such as the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)—have made important strides in strengthening policy performance. The next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2028-2034 should build on this momentum, further embedding a performance-based approach, especially in areas where current incentives are weak, but outcomes depend heavily on effective effort.

This is particularly relevant for pre-allocated funds tied to national plans, where member states design and implement policies. In such cases, stronger performance incentives can help ensure that investments yield meaningful results.

To maximize the impact of EU financing, the budget could reward projects that complement EU-level objectives—for example, national reforms like streamlining permitting processes for local distribution networks that connect with cross-border energy infrastructure.

At the same time, policy coherence across all levels of government is essential. While the EU budget can offer strategic direction and alignment incentives, successful implementation ultimately depends on ownership at national, regional, and local levels. The EU budget can set incentives, but decisions need to be made at home.

Let me conclude here …

…and leave with a slide on our key messages.

I now look forward to hearing from you. Thank you!

[1] Excluding Belarus, Russia, Türkiye and Ukraine.

[2] “April 8 tariffs” refers to the tariff increases between the US and China announced just before the 90-day pause on April 9.

[3] This figure decreases to 0.09 percent with the May-12 tariffs

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https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/22/sp052325-ak-a-changed-global-landscape-policy-priorities-in-cesee

MIL OSI
MIL OSI Russia News –
May 27, 2025
Taliban in talks with Russia, China for trade transactions in local currencies

Source: Government of India

Source: Government of India (4)

The Taliban administration is in advanced talks with Russia for banks from both sanctions-hit economies to settle trade transactions worth hundreds of millions of dollars in their local currencies, Afghanistan’s acting commerce minister said.

The Afghan government has made similar proposals to China, the minister, Haji Nooruddin Azizi, told Reuters on Thursday. Some discussions have been held with the Chinese embassy in Kabul, he said.

The proposal with Russia, Azizi said, was being worked on by technical teams from the two countries. The move comes as Moscow focuses on using national currencies to shift reliance away from the dollar and as Afghanistan faces a stark drop in the U.S. currency entering the country due to aid cuts.

“We are currently engaged in specialised discussions on this matter, considering the regional and global economic perspectives, sanctions, and the challenges Afghanistan is currently facing, as well as those Russia is dealing with. Technical discussions are underway,” Azizi said in an interview at his office in Kabul.

The Chinese foreign ministry and the Russian central bank did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

Azizi added that annual bilateral trade between Russia and Afghanistan was currently around $300 million and that was likely to grow substantially as the two sides boost investment. His administration expected Afghanistan to buy more petroleum products and plastics from Russia, he said.

“I am confident that this is a very good option…we can use this option for benefit and interests of our people and our country,’ Azizi said.

“We want to take steps in this area with China as well,” he said, adding Afghanistan had around $1 billion in trade with China each year. “A working team composed of members from the (Afghan) Ministry of Commerce and the Chinese embassy which is an authorized body representing China in economic programmes has been formed, and talks are ongoing.”

Afghanistan’s financial sector has been largely cut off from the global banking system due to sanctions placed on some leaders of the ruling Taliban, which took over the country in 2021 as foreign forces withdrew.

Rivalry with China and fallout from Russia’s war in Ukraine have put the dollar’s status as the world’s dominant currency under fresh scrutiny in recent years.

In December, Russian President Vladimir Putin questioned the need to hold state reserves in foreign currencies since they could easily be confiscated for political reasons, saying that domestic investment of such reserves was more attractive.

The dollar has had a lock on commodity trading, allowing Washington to hinder market access for producer nations from Russia to Venezuela and Iran.

Afghanistan since 2022 has imported gas, oil and wheat from Russia, the first major economic deal after the Taliban returned to power facing international isolation following 20 years of war against U.S.-led forces.

Billions of dollars in cuts to aid to Afghanistan, accelerated this year by the United States, have meant far fewer dollars, which are flown in cash for humanitarian operations, are entering the country.

Development agencies and economists say the Afghani currency has so far remained relatively stable but may face challenges in future.

Azizi said that the stability of the currency and his administration’s efforts to boost international investment including with the Afghan diaspora, would prevent a shortage of U.S. dollars in the country.

(Reuters)

May 27, 2025

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