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Category: Ukraine

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: President Lai presides over fourth meeting of Healthy Taiwan Promotion Committee

    Source: Republic of China Taiwan

    Details
    2025-02-27
    President Lai presides over third meeting of Healthy Taiwan Promotion Committee
    On the afternoon of February 27, President Lai Ching-te presided over the third meeting of the Healthy Taiwan Promotion Committee. In his opening statement, the president stated that the best strategies to care for citizens’ health are to increase physical activity, boost food literacy, and improve the domestic food environment, preventing chronic diseases from the front end. The president said that the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) has upgraded preventive health services for adults this year, lowering the age eligibility to 30. He expressed hope that public-private sector cooperation can help reduce the incidence of chronic diseases and their associated disability risks and achieve the goal of lowering the standardized mortality rate for chronic diseases related to the “three highs”(high blood pressure, high cholesterol, and high blood sugar) by one-third by 2030. With regard to the hospital congestion issue, President Lai noted that through local health departments, the government will strengthen the supervision and distribution of emergency room beds, boost the distribution of inpatient beds in medical centers, and enhance joint prevention mechanisms among regional hospitals to reduce the pressure on emergency departments. The president said that the government will continue to incentivize hospitals to hire more nursing personnel and will consider adjusting health insurance coverage to encourage more hospitals to participate in emergency and critical care so as to reduce the pressure on medical institutions. By taking a multi-channel approach, the president said, we hope to resolve the problems facing healthcare in Taiwan, provide the public with better care, and achieve our vision of a Healthy Taiwan. A translation of President Lai’s opening statement follows: Today is the third meeting of the Healthy Taiwan Promotion Committee. First, I would like to thank both deputy conveners, our advisors and committee members, and our friends online for their continuing concern about the planning and implementation of the Healthy Taiwan initiative.        At the last meeting, we heard a report on enhancing cancer prevention and treatment strategies. Guided by the Executive Yuan, the scope of government-funded major cancer screenings will be expanded starting this year, including expanding the age parameters and the categories eligible for screening. Treatment efforts will focus on genetic testing and precision medicine, and a fund will be established that provides diversified coverage for new cancer drugs. We hope to achieve our goal of reducing the standardized cancer mortality rate by one-third by 2030.  At today’s meeting, the MOHW will deliver progress reports on certain items listed in the second committee meeting, as well as chronic disease prevention and treatment initiatives under the Healthy Taiwan plan including the development of models for healthy living, obesity prevention and treatment, and the 888 Program for prevention and treatment of the “three highs.”Among the top ten causes of death in Taiwan, seven are related to chronic diseases, and five of those seven are related to “three highs” chronic diseases. Annual spending related to treating “three highs” chronic diseases is up to NT$170 billion, and has become a tremendous medical burden.  According to the World Health Organization, most non-communicable diseases are the result of four particular behaviors: tobacco use, physical inactivity, unhealthy diet, and the harmful use of alcohol. The results of the Nutrition and Health Survey in Taiwan show that most citizens are getting low or moderate amounts of physical activity, and have unbalanced diets that include excessive amounts of sugar and salt, and inadequate amounts of fruits, vegetables, and dairy products.  Therefore, the best strategies to care for the health of our citizens are to increase physical activity, boost food literacy, and improve the domestic food environment, preventing chronic diseases from the front end.  In a few minutes, the MOHW will give complete explanations for the various chronic disease prevention and treatment strategies, from building healthy lifestyles at the front end to preventing and treating obesity in the middle stage, making every effort to prevent citizens from symptoms of the “three highs.” Beginning this year, the MOHW has upgraded preventive health services for adults, lowering the age eligibility to 30. Among people who already suffer from the “three highs,” the 888 Program for the prevention and treatment of those diseases will identify a target group and then conduct interventions, making every effort to improve symptoms and avoid the development of chronic disease.  This kind of action strategy needs to be promoted simultaneously in the workplace, the community, on campus, and in the military. Only through public-private sector cooperation can we reduce the incidence of chronic diseases and their associated disability risks. We have also set a goal to lower the standardized mortality rate for chronic diseases related to the “three highs” by one-third by 2030. I hope that through the expertise of our advisors and committee members, we can provide discussions and suggestions from multiple perspectives to enable the government to propose health policies that meet citizens’ needs. The government will also actively address the hospital congestion issue that everyone is concerned about. The MOHW, in addition to taking preventive measures such as purchasing additional flu vaccines before the Lunar New Year, is addressing the emergency department congestion that occurred from the Lunar New Year until recently, and has formulated a short-term response strategy as well as middle and long-term directions for reforms as directed by Premier Cho Jung-tai (卓榮泰). Through local health departments, we will strengthen the supervision and distribution of emergency room beds. At the same time, we will continue to boost the distribution of inpatient beds in medical centers, and give full play to our emergency medicine network to enhance joint prevention mechanisms among regional hospitals and reduce the pressure on emergency departments. We will also enhance the public’s access to information about tiered healthcare, and implement a tiered treatment system to make better use of resources.  To address middle- and long-term human resource issues, we will continue to incentivize hospitals to hire more nursing personnel to lighten their burdens. We will also consider adjusting health insurance coverage to encourage more hospitals to participate in emergency and critical care. To respond to the challenges of an aging society, home healthcare, acute hospital care at home, Long-term Care 3.0, and post-acute care programs need to be promoted together to reduce the pressure on medical institutions.    By taking a multi-channel approach, we hope to resolve the problems facing healthcare in Taiwan, provide the public with better care, and achieve our vision of a Healthy Taiwan. So let us keep working hard together. Thank you. Following his statement, President Lai heard a report on the progress of certain items listed in the second committee meeting from Minister of Health and Welfare Chiu Tai-yuan (邱泰源), who is also the committee’s executive secretary, and a report on chronic disease prevention and treatment initiatives under the Healthy Taiwan plan including the development of models for healthy living, obesity prevention and treatment, and the 888 Program for prevention and treatment of the “three highs” from Deputy Minister of Health and Welfare Chou Jih-haw (周志浩). Afterward, President Lai exchanged views with the committee members regarding the content of the reports.

    Details
    2024-11-28
    President Lai presides over second meeting of Healthy Taiwan Promotion Committee
    On the afternoon of November 28, President Lai Ching-te presided over the second meeting of the Healthy Taiwan Promotion Committee. In his opening statement, the president said that we are implementing mental health support programs this year to provide more support for young and middle-aged people, pointing out that the policy has served over 20,000 people since it was implemented just over three months ago. In terms of bolstering mental health resilience, the president said we still have much to do, our government must lead by example, and the public and private sectors must work together, making every effort to ensure that no one is left behind. Noting that our goal is to reduce the standardized cancer mortality rate by one-third by the year 2030, President Lai stated that next year’s budget for cancer screening will be increased to NT$6.8 billion. He also stated that plans are in the works to establish a fund for new cancer drugs, adding that in the general budget we will allocate NT$5 billion, which will gradually rise to NT$10 billion. At the same time, he said, we are also actively promoting genetic testing and precision medicine. He expressed confidence that expanding preventive screening at the front end and providing advanced treatments at the back end will effectively fight cancer and improve the overall health of our citizens. A translation of President Lai’s opening statement follows: Today is the second meeting of the Healthy Taiwan Promotion Committee. First, I want to thank our two deputy conveners, our advisors and committee members, and our friends online for their enthusiastic participation. I also want to welcome Committee Member Chien Wen-jen (簡文仁), who was on leave for the previous meeting. I would also like to introduce three new committee members: Let’s welcome Committee Member Huang Chin-shun (黃金舜), president of the Federation of Taiwan Pharmacists Associations. During the pandemic, he led the nation’s pharmacists in promoting services including name-based distribution systems for masks and rapid-test kits and home delivery of medications. I am sure that he will be able to provide many valuable views regarding pharmaceutical safety and supply resilience.    Let’s also welcome Committee Member Ko Fu-yang (柯富揚). During his time as secretary-general of the National Union of Chinese Medical Doctors’ Association, he led the Chinese medicine community in the transition from experience-based medicine to evidence-based medicine, and promoted the modernization of traditional Chinese medicine. With his participation, the committee will be able to spur research and development in both modern and traditional medicine. Our third new committee member is Liao Mei-nan (廖美南), president of the Taiwan Nurses Association, who was unable to be here today. She has long been dedicated to raising the quality of nursing care and actively promoting a high-quality, friendly work environment for nurses. The committee will rely on her experience to strengthen the link between policy and practice in nursing care. I want to thank all the members of the committee once again for working together with the government. Since the last committee meeting, under the guidance of Minister without Portfolio Chen Shih-chung (陳時中), the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) has implemented various policies. At the beginning of October, for example, three major AI centers were set up to resolve three key AI application issues: implementation, certification, and reimbursement, helping advance Taiwan’s smart healthcare ecosystem. At today’s meeting, the MOHW will first deliver a report on the progress of certain items listed in the first committee meeting, followed by a joint report by the MOHW and Ministry of Education on bolstering public mental health resilience and a report by the MOHW on enhancing cancer prevention and treatment strategies.  The World Health Organization has affirmed that “there is no health without mental health.” In a fast-changing, fast-paced society, the government should invest more resources in the field of mental health to safeguard the people’s overall health. We are therefore implementing mental health support programs this year and expanding the range of eligibility, from 15 to 30, to 15 to 45 years old, to provide more support for young and middle-aged people. That policy has served over 20,000 people since it was implemented just over three months ago. In terms of bolstering mental health resilience, we still have much to do. From the workplace to the campus and every corner of society, our government must lead by example, and the public and private sectors must work together, making every effort to ensure that no one is left behind.    Aside from mental health, in view of cancer being the leading cause of death in Taiwan for 42 consecutive years, our goal is to reduce the standardized cancer mortality rate by one-third by the year 2030. And so we must expand screening and advance treatment. Last year, the government subsidized screenings for five types of cancer, providing a total of 4.87 million screenings and detecting 11,000 cases of cancer and 52,000 cases of precancerous conditions. We have allocated an additional NT$4 billion beginning next year, bringing the total budget for cancer screening to NT$6.8 billion, to expand the scope of cancer screening eligibility and services.  Plans are also in the works to establish a fund for new cancer drugs. In next year’s general budget, we will allocate NT$5 billion, which will gradually rise to NT$10 billion, to provide reimbursement funding for a variety of new cancer drugs and reduce the economic burden on patients. These new measures will be reported on in detail moments from now by the MOHW. At the same time, we are also actively promoting genetic testing and precision medicine. Next generation sequencing, for example, has already been included in National Health Insurance coverage, which will help provide patients with precise, individualized treatment strategies. I am confident that expanding preventive screening at the front end and providing advanced treatments at the back end will effectively fight cancer and improve the overall health of our citizens. Today’s meeting will help the government understand viewpoints from many perspectives so we can promote policies that more closely meet the public’s needs. Let’s keep working hard together. Thank you.  Following his statement, President Lai heard a report on the progress of certain items listed in the first committee meeting from deputy executive secretary and National Health Insurance Administration Director General Shih Chung-liang (石崇良), a joint report on bolstering public mental health resilience from Deputy Minister of Health and Welfare Lin Ching-yi (林靜儀) and Deputy Minister of Education Lin Teng-chiao (林騰蛟), and a report on enhancing cancer prevention and treatment strategies from Deputy Minister of Health and Welfare Chou Jih-haw (周志浩). Afterward, President Lai exchanged views with the committee members regarding the content of the reports.

    Details
    2024-08-22
    President Lai presides over first meeting of Healthy Taiwan Promotion Committee
    On the afternoon of August 22, President Lai Ching-te presided over the first meeting of the Healthy Taiwan Promotion Committee. As the committee’s convener, the president presented committee members with their letters of appointment, and explained that the Healthy Taiwan Promotion Committee is not just about promoting a Healthy Taiwan, but also achieving a Balanced Taiwan. The president stated that the committee spans various areas of expertise, and also considers the balance of Taiwan’s northern, central, southern, and eastern regions. The president expressed confidence that by soliciting a wide range of suggestions, engaging in diverse dialogue, and forging a consensus, the committee can help to realize health equality and further elevate the standard of medical care in Taiwan. President Lai indicated that next year, the Ministry of Health and Welfare’s total budget will be increased, along with expanded investment in medical treatment and care. In addition, he reported that the central government budget has also added a National Health Insurance (NHI) financial assistance program, which will help to enhance the work environments of healthcare professionals. The president stated that we will also launch the Healthy Taiwan Cultivation Plan to help rear talent and develop smart medicine. These budgets and programs, President Lai stated, reflect the government’s determination to create a Healthy Taiwan, and prove that “Healthy Taiwan” is not just a slogan, and has already been turned into concrete action. A translation of President Lai’s opening statement follows: At the end of my first month in office, I announced that the Presidential Office will establish three committees in response to three major global issues of nationwide concern: climate change, health promotion, and social resilience. These committees will consolidate forces from different sectors to strategize on national development. At the beginning of this month, we convened the first meeting of the National Climate Change Committee. Today, we convene the first meeting of the Healthy Taiwan Promotion Committee. I would like to thank the three deputy conveners and all advisors and committee members for making a commitment to the Healthy Taiwan Promotion Committee. I also want to thank our fellow citizens and friends joining us online to follow the committee’s proceedings. During my campaign, I was constantly thinking about what I could contribute to our people that is different from past presidents if I were fortunate enough to be elected. After a lot of thought, I felt that as a physician, I should utilize my professional background in health care and work together with people from all sectors of society to help create a Healthy Taiwan. Healthy Taiwan is our goal, and health is both a basic human right and a universal value. Health promotion not only involves the well-being of a nation’s people, but is also of great concern to humankind so that we may survive and thrive. Taiwan is a responsible member of the international community. Amid the challenges of the pandemic over the past few years, we have shared disease prevention supplies, technology, and experience with countries around the world, and have continued to contribute to the global public health system. Going forward, Taiwan must actively address critical health-related challenges, including cancer, transnational communicable diseases of unknown origin, antibiotic-resistant superbugs, a low birth rate, and an aging society. We are confident that, sharing countermeasures and experience with countries around the world, we can keep people healthy and make the nation stronger so that the world embraces Taiwan. I want to thank former Superintendent of National Cheng Kung University Hospital Chen Jyh-hong (陳志鴻), who is also a mentor of mine, for organizing five regional forums and a national forum for the Healthy Taiwan Promotion Alliance this past March and April. Over 1,200 healthcare professionals from all over the country attended the forums and shared their views. Premier Cho Jung-tai (卓榮泰), Vice Premier Cheng Li-chiun (鄭麗君), and I were also invited to attend the national forum and participate in full. I also want to thank the experts from various fields for their suggestions throughout this process, which became key reference points for promoting policies after we took office on May 20. The position paper on the table in front of you is a compilation of those valuable insights, which will be the foundation of our future actions. To implement the Healthy Taiwan initiative, we must also achieve a Balanced Taiwan. Therefore, the Healthy Taiwan Promotion Committee established today not only spans various areas of expertise, but also considers the balance of Taiwan’s northern, central, southern, and eastern regions to achieve nationwide health equality. I want to thank the nine advisors here with us today: Superintendent Wu Ming-shiang (吳明賢), Superintendent Chen Wei-ming (陳威明), Chairman Cherng Wen-jin (程文俊), President Chiu Kuan-ming (邱冠明), and Chairman Chang Hong-jen (張鴻仁) from northern Taiwan; Superintendent Chen Mu-kuan (陳穆寬) from central Taiwan; Superintendent Lin Sheng-che (林聖哲) and President Yu Ming-lung (余明隆) from southern Taiwan; and Superintendent Lin Shinn-zong (林欣榮) from eastern Taiwan. Your participation will give us a better understanding of viewpoints from around the country. The objective of Healthy Taiwan is to raise the population’s average life expectancy while simultaneously reducing time spent living with illness or disability, while also caring for physical, mental, and spiritual health. The 20 members of the committee are therefore drawn from a variety of fields of professional expertise. We have Superintendent Chen Shih-ann (陳適安) in the field of smart medicine, Vice-Superintendent Susan Shur-fen Gau (高淑芬) in pediatric psychiatry, medical and long-term care service integration specialist Superintendent Chan Ding-cheng (詹鼎正), and emerging infectious disease specialist Director Shen Ching-fen (沈靜芬). We have also invited Professor Tsai Sen-tien (蔡森田) to provide suggestions on optimizing healthcare services and health insurance sustainability, and invited President Chou Ching-ming (周慶明) and President Huang Cheng-kuo (黃振國) to continue promoting The Family Doctors’ Plan 2.0 and report on primary care issues. We have also recruited President Li Yi-heng (李貽恒), who put forward the 888 Program for prevention and treatment of the “three highs” (high blood pressure, high cholesterol, and high blood sugar) and kidney disease, pediatric health specialist President Ni Yen-hsuan (倪衍玄), women’s health care specialist Secretary-General Huang Jian-pei (黃建霈), and President Hung Te-jen (洪德仁), who is focused on community development. We also have Dean Shan Yan-shen (沈延盛) from the field of cancer prevention and treatment, psychiatric and mental health specialist Professor Su Kuan-pin (蘇冠賓), epidemiology expert and Emeritus Research Fellow Ho Mei-shang (何美鄉), and biomedicine and regenerative medicine specialist Professor Patrick Ching-ho Hsieh (謝清河). The committee also includes specialist in nutrition and health for all ages President Kuo Su-e (郭素娥), and expert in the promotion of physical activity and health Vice Chairman Chien Wen-jen (簡文仁). I also want to thank Chairman Lin De-wen (林德文) for participating as we work together to enhance the health and well-being of indigenous peoples. In addition, public sector participants include Minister of National Development Liu Chin-ching (劉鏡清) and Minister of Education Cheng Ying-yao (鄭英耀), as well as Minister of Health and Welfare Chiu Tai-yuan (邱泰源), who is serving as executive secretary, and NHI Administration Director General Shih Chung-liang (石崇良) serving as deputy executive secretary. Over 80 percent of the committee’s members are from the private sector, and I will take advantage of this opportunity to continue to combine the strengths of all stakeholders throughout society to promote a healthy lifestyle for one and all, and enhance medical care for all ages. At today’s first meeting of the committee, the Ministry of Health and Welfare will brief us on two topics: the first is the Healthy Taiwan vision plan, illustrating Taiwan’s current challenges and opportunities, as well as an action blueprint. The second issue is reform and optimization for NHI sustainability. Next year will mark the 30th anniversary of our NHI system. NHI is the pride of Taiwan, because health insurance can free citizens from the vicious cycle of poverty caused by illness, or illness caused by poverty. Since 2020, the NHI system has achieved a public satisfaction rate of over 90 percent. Next year, Taiwan will also become a “super-aged society,” which means that one of every five people will be a senior citizen 65 or older. Due to new pharmaceuticals of all kinds, the development of new technologies, and citizen expectations for an optimized medical practice environment, many aspects of health insurance operations will face an increasing number of challenges. The NHI system’s core values are health equality and mutual assistance for all. Better care for everyone, however, depends on sustainable NHI operations. We closely monitor NHI system point values, but also want to embody the greater values of the system. The government will continue to refine the budget system and management, rationally distribute medical resources and stabilize point values, and continue to optimize NHI finances to enhance the efficiency and quality of services. We also look forward to working with everyone to achieve sustainable NHI development, enhance health equality, and further elevate the standard of medical care in Taiwan. I also want to report that next year, the Ministry of Health and Welfare’s total budget will reach NT$370.2 billion, an increase of NT$31.8 billion over this year. The total budget is expected to allocate NT$60.7 billion to expand investment in medical treatment and care to create a Healthy Taiwan. The central government budget has also added an NHI financial assistance program that includes incentives for maintaining specified nurse-patient ratios across all three shifts and rotating night-shift nursing staff, and promoting smart information upgrades at medical facilities to enhance the work environments of healthcare professionals. We will also launch the Healthy Taiwan Cultivation Plan, investing funds to support medical institutions at all levels nationwide, rear talent, and develop smart medicine. Regarding the fund for new cancer drugs that many cancer patients care deeply about, in next year’s general budget we will allocate NT$5 billion for health insurance funding. In 2026, that figure is expected to reach NT$10 billion. We will also promote the fifth-stage national plan for cancer prevention and treatment, and beginning next year the budget for cancer screening will be increased by NT$4 billion, reaching NT$6.8 billion, to boost screening rates. I want everyone to know that these budgets and programs reflect the government’s determination to create a Healthy Taiwan. Since I took office, the government has created plans and programs to increase nursing staff levels and promote public mental health. We also launched an Acute Hospital Care at Home pilot project to provide integrated long-term and medical care services. Once again, I would like to thank everyone here today for participating, and thank our fellow citizens for their support. I also want our fellow citizens to know that Healthy Taiwan is not just a slogan, and has already been turned into concrete action. These are all concrete, substantive actions by a government team that has been in office for less than 100 days. I am confident that with the support and participation of our committee members and advisors, and through soliciting a wide range of suggestions, engaging in diverse dialogue, and forging a consensus, our actions to create a Healthy Taiwan will more closely align with society’s expectations, and we will move more quickly and steadily toward realizing our vision. Thank you. Following his statement, President Lai presented letters of appointment to the committee members, heard a report from Minister Chiu illustrating the Healthy Taiwan vision plan, and heard a report from Director General Shih on reform and optimization for NHI sustainability. Afterward, President Lai exchanged views with the committee members regarding the content of the two reports and the Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the Office of the President Healthy Taiwan Promotion Committee.

    Details
    2024-06-20
    President Lai attends opening of International Conference on Emergency Medicine 2024
    On the morning of June 20, President Lai Ching-te attended the opening ceremony of the International Conference on Emergency Medicine (ICEM) 2024. In remarks, President Lai stated that one goal of his administration is to create an even healthier Taiwan and that we will continue to strengthen our capabilities in medicine and public health to enhance health for all and help make the world a better place. The president emphasized that the global disease prevention network is something every country should be a part of, and that if any country is missing from this network, the rest of the world will be at a disadvantage. The president then asked for the participants’ support for Taiwan to participate in the World Health Organization so that we may contribute even more to the global public health system. A transcript of President Lai’s remarks follows: I would like to begin by welcoming all guests from overseas to Taiwan. ICEM is the world’s largest conference on emergency medicine. Over 2,500 experts and academics from home and abroad have gathered here for this year’s conference. This not only underlines the importance of emergency medicine, but is also a testament to global cooperation in medicine. This year also marks TSEM’s [Taiwan Society of Emergency Medicine] 30th anniversary. I would like to thank Chairperson Ng Chip-jin (黃集仁), President Hsu Chien-chin (許建清), and everyone who helped bring ICEM to Taiwan. This conference will help expand people-to-people diplomacy, showing Taiwan’s development and contributions in emergency medicine to the world. I am confident that everyone here shares my belief that health is a basic human right. And to ensure this right, emergency medical professionals are indispensable. Before entering politics, I myself worked as a clinician. I know well that emergency rooms are at the frontline of hospitals, and often the last hope for those who need lifesaving care. Especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, we all witnessed the rapid response and important support of emergency medical professionals, who gave their all for the health of others. I want to take this opportunity to express my utmost respect for your work. The theme of ICEM 2024 is Glocalization of Emergency Medicine: Global Wisdom and Local Solution. With that in mind, I hope that through clinical research, public health, smart tech, and other strategies, we can help reduce disparities in emergency medicine around the world. Here in Taiwan, we have made major progress in emergency medicine, from developing a cutting-edge trauma care system to implementing advanced strategies for disaster response. We are also committed to training highly skilled professionals in the field, as well as developing an advanced medical infrastructure. This conference will give Taiwan the opportunity to share our experience, and allow everyone to exchange best practices, engage in discussions, and promote the global development of emergency medicine. One goal of my administration is to create an even healthier Taiwan. We will continue to strengthen our capabilities in medicine and public health to enhance health for all and help make the world a better place. A healthier Taiwan also means a booming medical sector, and an even higher quality and diversity of medical services. Taiwan has had, and will continue to have, many medical accomplishments to share with the world. Today, all of you gather here to continue making global contributions through emergency medicine. The mission of IFEM [International Federation for Emergency Medicine] is to create a world where all people, in all countries, have access to high quality emergency medical care. On this point, the global disease prevention network is something every country should be a part of. If any country is missing from this network, the rest of the world will be at a disadvantage. I would like to ask for your support for Taiwan to participate in the World Health Organization, so that we may contribute even more to the global public health system. And as President Hsu Chien-chin has said, although the road is long, if we travel together, we can travel far. With this vision as our guide, alongside our friends from around the world, Taiwan will strive to achieve our common goals and realize quality healthcare for all. I wish ICEM 2024 great success, and all participants a rewarding experience. I also invite you to travel around Taiwan during your stay, and get to know our beautiful nation. Following his remarks, President Lai and the distinguished guests took part in the kick-off ceremony for the conference. IFEM President Ffion Davies was also in attendance at the event.

    Details
    2024-06-01
    President Lai meets WHA action team
    On the morning of June 1, President Lai Ching-te met with members of Taiwan’s World Health Assembly (WHA) action team. In remarks, President Lai stated that standing on the front lines, the team fought for the human right to health for both Taiwan and the world. He also thanked the international community for their support for Taiwan. The president said that Taiwan is an indispensable member of the international community when it comes to ensuring global health security. In addition, he said that one of the new government’s goals is to create a healthier Taiwan, as we want our people to live longer and healthier, and that we want to leverage Taiwan’s strengths in public health and medicine. He said we will continue to deepen our partnerships with other countries as we build an even more resilient global public health system, and that a healthy Taiwan will help make the world a better place. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: I would like to warmly welcome our partners from the WHA action team back from Geneva, and express my appreciation for your hard work and efforts. Standing on the front lines, you fought for the human right to health for both Taiwan and the world, and we thank you for giving it your all. Your flight only just arrived at 7 a.m., but I can see that everyone is still in high spirits. You have truly put in your heart for Taiwan, and once again, I thank you all. It is regrettable that at this year’s WHA, constrained by political factors, a proposal item for Taiwan to join as an observer was not included in the agenda yet again. However, the hard work of our WHA action team over the years has already borne fruit. Last year, the Ministry of Health and Welfare signed MOUs with the public health agencies of the Czech Republic, Canada, and the United Kingdom, and bilateral talks this year included discussion on substantive cooperation. The bilateral talks carried out by our action team in Geneva were not only more numerous this year, but also involved officials of even higher level. The team also held professional forums addressing important issues of the WHA in cooperation with various medical and health organizations. This is all proof of Taiwan’s contribution toward global public health and the human right to health. The steps we take for Taiwan to participate in world health affairs will not falter. Support for Taiwan from the international community grows stronger year by year. This year, 26 member states of the World Health Organization and the European Union, which is an observer, directly or indirectly voiced their support for Taiwan’s participation in the WHA. Their support reaffirms that Taiwan is an indispensable member of the international community when it comes to ensuring global health security. Health knows no borders. Health is a basic human right. One of the new government’s goals is to create a healthier Taiwan. We want our people to live longer and healthier. And we also want to leverage Taiwan’s strengths in public health and medicine, as we deepen our cooperation with other countries and work together to advance the health of humankind and global sustainable development. I want to thank the member states for their support for Taiwan. I also want to once again thank the members of the WHA action team and our many friends, both here and outside of Taiwan, for their hard work on this issue. Moving forward, we will continue to deepen our partnerships with other countries as we build an even more resilient global public health system. So just as democratic Taiwan continues to shine its light upon the world, a healthy Taiwan will help make the world a better place. On that note, let us keep working together toward these goals. After President Lai concluded his remarks, Minister of Health and Welfare Chiu Tai-yuan (邱泰源) presented a photo collage to show President Lai some of the highlights of the action team’s activities in Geneva.

    Details
    2025-05-20
    President Lai interviewed by Nippon Television and Yomiuri TV
    In a recent interview on Nippon Television’s news zero program, President Lai Ching-te responded to questions from host Mr. Sakurai Sho and Yomiuri TV Shanghai Bureau Chief Watanabe Masayo on topics including reflections on his first year in office, cross-strait relations, China’s military threats, Taiwan-United States relations, and Taiwan-Japan relations. The interview was broadcast on the evening of May 19. During the interview, President Lai stated that China intends to change the world’s rules-based international order, and that if Taiwan were invaded, global supply chains would be disrupted. Therefore, he said, Taiwan will strengthen its national defense, prevent war by preparing for war, and achieve the goal of peace. The president also noted that Taiwan’s purpose for developing drones is based on national security and industrial needs, and that Taiwan hopes to collaborate with Japan. He then reiterated that China’s threats are an international problem, and expressed hope to work together with the US, Japan, and others in the global democratic community to prevent China from starting a war. Following is the text of the questions and the president’s responses: Q: How do you feel as you are about to round out your first year in office? President Lai: When I was young, I was determined to practice medicine and save lives. When I left medicine to go into politics, I was determined to transform Taiwan. And when I was sworn in as president on May 20 last year, I was determined to strengthen the nation. Time flies, and it has already been a year. Although the process has been very challenging, I am deeply honored to be a part of it. I am also profoundly grateful to our citizens for allowing me the opportunity to give back to our country. The future will certainly be full of more challenges, but I will do everything I can to unite the people and continue strengthening the nation. That is how I am feeling now. Q: We are now coming up on the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, and over this period, we have often heard that conflict between Taiwan and the mainland is imminent. Do you personally believe that a cross-strait conflict could happen? President Lai: The international community is very much aware that China intends to replace the US and change the world’s rules-based international order, and annexing Taiwan is just the first step. So, as China’s military power grows stronger, some members of the international community are naturally on edge about whether a cross-strait conflict will break out. The international community must certainly do everything in its power to avoid a conflict in the Taiwan Strait; there is too great a cost. Besides causing direct disasters to both Taiwan and China, the impact on the global economy would be even greater, with estimated losses of US$10 trillion from war alone – that is roughly 10 percent of the global GDP. Additionally, 20 percent of global shipping passes through the Taiwan Strait and surrounding waters, so if a conflict breaks out in the strait, other countries including Japan and Korea would suffer a grave impact. For Japan and Korea, a quarter of external transit passes through the Taiwan Strait and surrounding waters, and a third of the various energy resources and minerals shipped back from other countries pass through said areas. If Taiwan were invaded, global supply chains would be disrupted, and therefore conflict in the Taiwan Strait must be avoided. Such a conflict is indeed avoidable. I am very thankful to Prime Minister of Japan Ishiba Shigeru and former Prime Ministers Abe Shinzo, Suga Yoshihide, and Kishida Fumio, as well as US President Donald Trump and former President Joe Biden, and the other G7 leaders, for continuing to emphasize at international venues that peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait are essential components for global security and prosperity. When everyone in the global democratic community works together, stacking up enough strength to make China’s objectives unattainable or to make the cost of invading Taiwan too high for it to bear, a conflict in the strait can naturally be avoided. Q: As you said, President Lai, maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is also very important for other countries. How can war be avoided? What sort of countermeasures is Taiwan prepared to take to prevent war? President Lai: As Mr. Sakurai mentioned earlier, we are coming up on the 80th anniversary of the end of WWII. There are many lessons we can take from that war. First is that peace is priceless, and war has no winners. From the tragedies of WWII, there are lessons that humanity should learn. We must pursue peace, and not start wars blindly, as that would be a major disaster for humanity. In other words, we must be determined to safeguard peace. The second lesson is that we cannot be complacent toward authoritarian powers. If you give them an inch, they will take a mile. They will keep growing, and eventually, not only will peace be unattainable, but war will be inevitable. The third lesson is why WWII ended: It ended because different groups joined together in solidarity. Taiwan, Japan, and the Indo-Pacific region are all directly subjected to China’s threats, so we hope to be able to join together in cooperation. This is why we proposed the Four Pillars of Peace action plan. First, we will strengthen our national defense. Second, we will strengthen economic resilience. Third is standing shoulder to shoulder with the democratic community to demonstrate the strength of deterrence. Fourth is that as long as China treats Taiwan with parity and dignity, Taiwan is willing to conduct exchanges and cooperate with China, and seek peace and mutual prosperity. These four pillars can help us avoid war and achieve peace. That is to say, Taiwan hopes to achieve peace through strength, prevent war by preparing for war, keeping war from happening and pursuing the goal of peace. Q: Regarding drones, everyone knows that recently, Taiwan has been actively researching, developing, and introducing drones. Why do you need to actively research, develop, and introduce new drones at this time? President Lai: This is for two purposes. The first is to meet national security needs. The second is to meet industrial development needs. Because Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines are all part of the first island chain, and we are all democratic nations, we cannot be like an authoritarian country like China, which has an unlimited national defense budget. In this kind of situation, island nations such as Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines should leverage their own technologies to develop national defense methods that are asymmetric and utilize unmanned vehicles. In particular, from the Russo-Ukrainian War, we see that Ukraine has successfully utilized unmanned vehicles to protect itself and prevent Russia from unlimited invasion. In other words, the Russo-Ukrainian War has already proven the importance of drones. Therefore, the first purpose of developing drones is based on national security needs. Second, the world has already entered the era of smart technology. Whether generative, agentic, or physical, AI will continue to develop. In the future, cars and ships will also evolve into unmanned vehicles and unmanned boats, and there will be unmanned factories. Drones will even be able to assist with postal deliveries, or services like Uber, Uber Eats, and foodpanda, or agricultural irrigation and pesticide spraying. Therefore, in the future era of comprehensive smart technology, developing unmanned vehicles is a necessity. Taiwan, based on industrial needs, is actively planning the development of drones and unmanned vehicles. I would like to take this opportunity to express Taiwan’s hope to collaborate with Japan in the unmanned vehicle industry. Just as we do in the semiconductor industry, where Japan has raw materials, equipment, and technology, and Taiwan has wafer manufacturing, our two countries can cooperate. Japan is a technological power, and Taiwan also has significant technological strengths. If Taiwan and Japan work together, we will not only be able to safeguard peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and security in the Indo-Pacific region, but it will also be very helpful for the industrial development of both countries. Q: The drones you just described probably include examples from the Russo-Ukrainian War. Taiwan and China are separated by the Taiwan Strait. Do our drones need to have cross-sea flight capabilities? President Lai: Taiwan does not intend to counterattack the mainland, and does not intend to invade any country. Taiwan’s drones are meant to protect our own nation and territory. Q: Former President Biden previously stated that US forces would assist Taiwan’s defense in the event of an attack. President Trump, however, has yet to clearly state that the US would help defend Taiwan. Do you think that in such an event, the US would help defend Taiwan? Or is Taiwan now trying to persuade the US? President Lai: Former President Biden and President Trump have answered questions from reporters. Although their responses were different, strong cooperation with Taiwan under the Biden administration has continued under the Trump administration; there has been no change. During President Trump’s first term, cooperation with Taiwan was broader and deeper compared to former President Barack Obama’s terms. After former President Biden took office, cooperation with Taiwan increased compared to President Trump’s first term. Now, during President Trump’s second term, cooperation with Taiwan is even greater than under former President Biden. Taiwan-US cooperation continues to grow stronger, and has not changed just because President Trump and former President Biden gave different responses to reporters. Furthermore, the Trump administration publicly stated that in the future, the US will shift its strategic focus from Europe to the Indo-Pacific. The US secretary of defense even publicly stated that the primary mission of the US is to prevent China from invading Taiwan, maintain stability in the Indo-Pacific, and thus maintain world peace. There is a saying in Taiwan that goes, “Help comes most to those who help themselves.” Before asking friends and allies for assistance in facing threats from China, Taiwan must first be determined and prepared to defend itself. This is Taiwan’s principle, and we are working in this direction, making all the necessary preparations to safeguard the nation. Q: I would like to ask you a question about Taiwan-Japan relations. After the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, you made an appeal to give Japan a great deal of assistance and care. In particular, you visited Sendai to offer condolences. Later, you also expressed condolences and concern after the earthquakes in Aomori and Kumamoto. What are your expectations for future Taiwan-Japan exchanges and development? President Lai: I come from Tainan, and my constituency is in Tainan. Tainan has very deep ties with Japan, and of course, Taiwan also has deep ties with Japan. However, among Taiwan’s 22 counties and cities, Tainan has the deepest relationship with Japan. I sincerely hope that both of you and your teams will have an opportunity to visit Tainan. I will introduce Tainan’s scenery, including architecture from the era of Japanese rule, Tainan’s cuisine, and unique aspects of Tainan society, and you can also see lifestyles and culture from the Showa era.  The Wushantou Reservoir in Tainan was completed by engineer Mr. Hatta Yoichi from Kanazawa, Japan and the team he led to Tainan after he graduated from then-Tokyo Imperial University. It has nearly a century of history and is still in use today. This reservoir, along with the 16,000-km-long Chianan Canal, transformed the 150,000-hectare Chianan Plain into Taiwan’s premier rice-growing area. It was that foundation in agriculture that enabled Taiwan to develop industry and the technology sector of today. The reservoir continues to supply water to Tainan Science Park. It is used by residents of Tainan, the agricultural sector, and industry, and even the technology sector in Xinshi Industrial Park, as well as Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. Because of this, the people of Tainan are deeply grateful for Mr. Hatta and very friendly toward the people of Japan. A major earthquake, the largest in 50 years, struck Tainan on February 6, 2016, resulting in significant casualties. As mayor of Tainan at the time, I was extremely grateful to then-Prime Minister Abe, who sent five Japanese officials to the disaster site in Tainan the day after the earthquake. They were very thoughtful and asked what kind of assistance we needed from the Japanese government. They offered to provide help based on what we needed. I was deeply moved, as former Prime Minister Abe showed such care, going beyond the formality of just sending supplies that we may or may not have actually needed. Instead, the officials asked what we needed and then provided assistance based on those needs, which really moved me. Similarly, when the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011 or the later Kumamoto earthquakes struck, the people of Tainan, under my leadership, naturally and dutifully expressed their support. Even earlier, when central Taiwan was hit by a major earthquake in 1999, Japan was the first country to deploy a rescue team to the disaster area. On February 6, 2018, after a major earthquake in Hualien, former Prime Minister Abe appeared in a video holding up a message of encouragement he had written in calligraphy saying “Remain strong, Taiwan.” All of Taiwan was deeply moved. Over the years, Taiwan and Japan have supported each other when earthquakes struck, and have forged bonds that are family-like, not just neighborly. This is truly valuable. In the future, I hope Taiwan and Japan can be like brothers, and that the peoples of Taiwan and Japan can treat one another like family. If Taiwan has a problem, then Japan has a problem; if Japan has a problem, then Taiwan has a problem. By caring for and helping each other, we can face various challenges and difficulties, and pursue a brighter future. Q: President Lai, you just used the phrase “If Taiwan has a problem, then Japan has a problem.” In the event that China attempts to invade Taiwan by force, what kind of response measures would you hope the US military and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces take? President Lai: As I just mentioned, annexing Taiwan is only China’s first step. Its ultimate objective is to change the rules-based international order. That being the case, China’s threats are an international problem. So, I would very much hope to work together with the US, Japan, and others in the global democratic community to prevent China from starting a war – prevention, after all, is more important than cure.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: V. Putin announced the creation of a buffer zone along the Russian-Ukrainian border

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Moscow, May 23 /Xinhua/ — A decision has been made to create a security buffer zone along the border between Russia and Ukraine. The Russian Armed Forces are currently solving this problem, actively suppressing enemy firing points. This was announced on Thursday by Russian President Vladimir Putin at an operational meeting with members of the government.

    As reported on the official Kremlin website, during the meeting the Russian president noted that “given the situation in the Kursk, Belgorod and Bryansk regions, it is necessary to launch work to restore and rebuild everything that was destroyed, to help people return to their native villages and settlements, where safety conditions allow it. In addition, it is necessary to restore all transport and other infrastructure, the stable operation of industrial and agricultural enterprises, and to support entrepreneurs and their teams.”

    “In this regard, I instruct the Ministry of Economic Development of Russia, together with colleagues from the Presidential Administration, to prepare, as soon as possible, a program for the comprehensive restoration of the affected areas of the Kursk, Belgorod, and Bryansk regions. This program must be provided with the necessary financial and material resources, and additional equipment and specialists must be involved, including from other subjects of the Federation,” V. Putin noted.

    The Russian President visited the Kursk region on May 20. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Allies review progress with NATO cyber defence pledge, identify next steps to increase cyber resilience

    Source: NATO

    On 20-21 May 2025, NATO Allies and several Partner nations met in Poland for NATO’s annual Cyber Defence Pledge Conference.

    Held at the Polish Cyber Command in Legionowo, the Conference brought together representatives from NATO member states as well as from Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iraq, Ireland, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Ukraine and the European Commission and the European External Action Service. Commander of the Polish Cyber Command Major General Karol Molenda and NATO’s Assistant Secretary General for Innovation, Hybrid and Cyber, Ambassador Jean-Charles Ellermann-Kingombe co-chaired the event.

    The NATO Cyber Defence Pledge Conference provides a unique platform for Allies and, since 2023, for a selected group of Partners to share experiences and exchange best practices in implementing NATO’s Cyber Defence Pledge, a mechanism that helps guide national efforts to boost the cyber defences of their networks and infrastructures.

    At the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius, Allies took further steps to enhance the Pledge, including new national goals to further strengthen national cyber defences.

    At the 2025 Conference, participants reflected on national progress made to achieve greater cyber maturity for critical infrastructure, particularly for the energy, transport, communications and water sectors. They explored best practices for stronger cooperation between public institutions and the private sector, at both the national and international levels. They addressed challenges to increasing cyber resilience and underlined the importance of leveraging innovation for cyber defence.   

    Looking ahead, participants agreed on the need to increase information exchange, in order to increase national and collective cyber resilience.

    MIL Security OSI –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – Parliament approves new tariffs on Russian and Belarussian agricultural goods

    Source: European Parliament

    MEPs backed increased tariffs on fertilisers and certain Russian and Belarusian agricultural goods on Thursday, seeking to reduce EU dependency on those imports.

    Plenary has endorsed the Commission proposal to increase by 50% EU tariffs on agricultural products from Russia and Belarus that were not yet subject to extra customs duties. The aim is to reduce EU dependence on the two countries still further. Products to be hit by the new tariffs include sugar, vinegar, flour and animal feed.

    The text also provides for a 6.5% tariff on fertilisers imported from Russia and Belarus, plus duties of between €40 and €45 per tonne for the 2025-2026 period. These tariffs will rise to €430 per tonne by 2028. Income from the sale of Russian and Belarussian fertilisers is considered to be contributing directly to the war against Ukraine.

    The proposed measures will reduce EU imports of the goods concerned significantly, whether they originate in the two countries or are exported directly or indirectly by them. It is expected that this will result in further diversification of EU fertiliser production, currently impacted by the low prices of imports.

    The legislation also tasks the Commission with monitoring price increases and any possible damage to the internal market or the EU agriculture sector, and with taking action to mitigate the impact.

    The regulation was adopted by 411 votes in favour and 100 against, with 78 abstentions.

    Quote

    The standing rapporteur for Russia Inese Vaidere (EPP, LV) said: “The regulation gradually increasing customs duties for products from Russia and Belarus will help to prevent Russia from using the EU market to finance its war machine. It is not acceptable that three years after Russia launched its full-scale war, the EU is still buying critical products in large volumes, in fact, these imports have risen significantly.

    The proposal will boost EU fertiliser production, which has taken a hit from cheap Russian imports, while giving farmers time to adjust.

    Importantly, the proposal also includes monitoring provisions enabling the Commission to follow the fertiliser market closely and take action if prices shoot up.”

    Next steps

    With approval in plenary, Parliament closed its first reading. The regulation must now be adopted formally by the Council and subsequently published in the Official Journal, before it can enter into force. For the remaining agricultural products (listed in Annex I of the proposal), the regulation will apply four weeks after the bill’s entry into force.

    Background

    Imports into the EU of urea and nitrogen-based fertilisers from Russia, already high in 2023, rose significantly in 2024. According to the Commission, imports of the fertilisers covered by this regulation reflect a situation of economic dependence on Russia. If left unchecked, the situation could harm EU food security and, in the case of fertilisers in particular, leave the Union vulnerable to possible coercive measures by Russia.

    It was to address these issues that the Commission presented its proposal to impose tariffs on fertilisers and certain agricultural products originating in Russia and Belarus, on 28 January 2025.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Press Briefing Transcript: Julie Kozack, Director, Communications Department, May 22, 2025

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    May 22, 2025

    SPEAKER:  Ms. Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department, IMF

    MS. KOZACK: Good morning, everyone and welcome to this IMF Press Briefing.  It is wonderful to see you all today on this rainy Washington morning, especially those of you here in person and of course also those of you joining us online.  My name is Julie Kozak.  I’m the Director of Communications at the IMF.  As usual, this press briefing will be embargoed until 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time in the United States.  And as usual, I will start with a few announcements and then I’ll take your questions in person on WebEx and via the Press Center.  

    So first, our Managing Director, Kristalina Georgieva, and our First Deputy Managing Director, Gita Gopinath, are currently attending the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting taking place in Canada right now.  Second, on May 29th through 30th, the Managing Director will travel to Dubrovnik, Croatia to attend a joint IMF Croatia National Bank Conference focused on promoting growth and resilience in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe.  The Managing Director will participate in the opening panel and will hold meetings with regional counterparts.  

    On June 2nd, the Managing Director will travel to Sofia, Bulgaria to attend the 30th Anniversary celebration of the National Trust Ecofund.  During her visit, she will also hold several bilateral meetings with the Bulgarian authorities.  

    Our Deputy Managing Director, Nigel Clarke, will travel to Paraguay, Brazil, and the Netherlands next month.  On June 6th, he will launch the IMF’s new regional training program for South America and Mexico, which will be hosted in Asuncion by the Central Bank of Paraguay.  From there, he will travel to Brasilia to deliver a keynote speech on June 10th during the Annual Meeting of the Caribbean Development Bank.  He will also then travel to the Netherlands on June 12th to 13th to participate in the 2025 Consultative Group to Assist the Poor Symposium and to meet with the Dutch authorities.  

    Our Deputy Managing Director, Kenji Okamura, will be in Japan from June 11th to 12th for the 10th Tokyo Fiscal Forum to discuss fiscal frameworks and GovTech in the Asia Pacific region.  

    And finally, on a kind of housekeeping or scheduling issue, the Article IV Consultation for the United States will be undertaken on a later timetable this year, with discussions to be held in November.  

    And with those rather extensive announcements, I will now open the floor to your questions.  For those connecting virtually, please turn on both your camera and microphone when speaking.  All right, let’s open up.  Daniel.

     

    QUESTIONER: Thanks for taking my question.  I just wonder if the IMF has any reaction to the passage of last night in the House of Representatives of the One Big, Beautiful bill.  And a related question, how concerned are you by the increase in yields on long-dated U.S. treasuries?  What do you think it says about the market’s view of U.S. debt going into the future and sort of any possible spillovers for IMF borrowers as well?  MS. KOZACK: On the first question, what I can say is we take note of the passing of the legislation in the House of Representatives earlier this morning.  What we will do is we will look to assess a final bill once it has passed through the Senate and also once it’s been enacted.  And, of course, we will have opportunities to share our assessment over time in the various products where we normally would convey our fulsome views.  

    On your second question, which was on the bond market.   What I can say there is that we know that the U.S. government bonds are a safe haven asset, and the U.S. dollar, of course, plays a key role as the world’s reserve currency.  The U.S. bond market plays a critical role, of course, in finance and in safe assets.  And this is underpinned by the liquidity and depth of the U.S. market and also the sound institutions in the U.S.  We don’t see any changes in those functions.  And, of course, what we can also say is that although there has been some volatility in markets, market functioning, including in the U.S. Treasury market, has so far been orderly.  

     

    QUESTIONER: My question is about Ukraine.  Two topics particularly.  So, the first one, when is the next review of the Ukraine’s EFF is going to be completed, and what amount of money would be disbursed to Kyiv?  And could you please outline the total sum that is remaining within the current program?  And the second part, it’s about debt level.  What is the IMF assessment of current Ukraine’s government debt level?  Is it stable?  Do you see any vulnerabilities and any risks for Ukraine?  Thank you.  

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Ukraine?  Does anyone online want to come in on Ukraine?  Okay, I don’t see anyone.  

    What I can say on Ukraine is that just two days ago, our Staff team started policy discussions with the Ukrainian authorities on the eighth review under the eff.  So, the team is on the ground now.  The discussions are taking place in Kiev and the team will provide an update on the progress at the end of the mission.

    In terms of the potential disbursement, I’m just looking here; that’s the seventh disbursement.  We will come back to you on the size of the disbursement, but it should show in the Staff report for the Seventh Review what would be expected for the Eighth Review.  And it would also show the remaining size of the program.  But we’ll come back to you bilaterally with those exact answers.  

    And what I can then say on the debt side is at the time of the Seventh Review under the program, we assessed debt, Ukraine’s debt to be sustainable on a forward-looking basis and as with every review that the team of course, will update its assessment as part of the eighth review discussion.  We’ll have more to say on the debt as the eighth review continues.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Just one more thing on Ukraine.  Does it make sense for them to consider using the euro as a defense currency for their currency, given the shifting geopolitical sense and what we are seeing with the dollar? MS. KOZACK: So right now, under the program, Ukraine has an inflation targeting regime, and that is where what the program is focused on, our program with Ukraine. So, they have an inflation targeting regime.  They are very much focused on ensuring the stability of that monetary policy regime that Ukraine has.  And, of course, that involves a floating exchange rate.  And I don’t have anything beyond that to say on the currency market.

     

    QUESTIONER: The agreement with the IMF established a target for the Central Bank Reserve to meet by June.  According to the technical projection, does the IMF believe Argentina will meet this target?  And if it’s not met, is it possible that we will grant a waiver in the future?

    MS. KOZACK: anything else on Argentina?  

    QUESTIONER: About Argentina, what is your assessment of the progress of the program agreed with Argentina more than a month after its announcement in last April?  

     

    QUESTIONER: The government is about to announce a measure to gain access to voluntarily, of course, but to the dollars that are “under the mattress”, as we call them, undeclared funds to probably meet these targets that Roman was asking about.  I was wondering if this measure has been discussed with the IMF.  And also, you mentioned Georgieva visiting Paraguay and Brazil, if you there’s any plan to visit Argentina as well?  

    QUESTIONER: President Milei is about to announce, you know, Minister Caputo, in a few minutes that there is a measure to use similar to attacks Amnesty.  Is the IMF concerned that this could violate its regulations against illicit financial flows? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, with respect to Argentina, on April 11th, I think, as you know, our Executive Board approved a new four-year EFF arrangement for Argentina.  It was for $20 billion.  It contained an initial disbursement of $12 billion.  And that the aim of that program is to support Argentina’s transition to the next phase of its stabilization program and reforms.  

    President Milei’s administration’s policies continued to deliver impressive results.  These include the rollout of the new FX regime, which has been smooth, a decline in monthly inflation to 2.8 percent in April, another fiscal surplus in April, and reaching a cumulative fiscal surplus of 0.6 percent of GDP for the year, and efforts to continue to open up the economy.  At the same time, the economy is now expanding, real wages are recovering, and poverty continues to fall in Argentina.  

    The Fund continues to support the authorities in their efforts to create a more stable and prosperous Argentina.  Our close engagement continues, including in the context of the upcoming discussions for the First Review of the program.  This First Review will allow us to assess progress and to consider policies to build on the strong momentum and to secure lasting stability and growth in Argentina.  And in this regard, there is a shared recognition with the authorities about the importance of strengthening external buffers and securing a timely re-access to international capital markets.  

    What I can say on the question about the announcements on that — the question on the undeclared assets.  All I can say right now is that we’re following developments very closely on this, and of course, the team will be ready to provide an assessment in due course.  

    On the second part of that question, I do want to also note, and this is included in our Staff report, that the authorities have committed to strengthening financial transparency and also to aligning Argentina’s AML CFT, the Anti-Money Laundering framework, with international standards, as well as to deregulating the economy to encourage its formalization.  So, any new measures, including those that may be aimed at encouraging the use of undeclared assets, should be, of course, consistent with these important commitments.  

    And on your question about Paraguay and Brazil, I just want to clarify that it is our Deputy Managing Director, Nigel Clarke, who will be traveling to Brazil and Paraguay, not the Managing Director.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Two questions on Syria.  With the U.S. and EU announcing the lifting of sanctions recently, how does this affect any sort of timeline with providing economic assistance?  And secondly, the Managing Director has said that the Fund has to first define data.  Can you just walk through what that entails?  

    MS. KOZACK: Can you just repeat what you said?  The Managing Director has said?

     

    QUESTIONER: The need to define data.  Just sort of a similar question.  I’m just wondering, following the World Bank statement last week about, you know, Syria now being eligible to borrow from the bank, what sort of discussions the Fund has had with the Syrian authorities since the end of the Spring Meetings and, you know, any update you can give us around possible discussions around an Article IV.  

     

    QUESTIONER: About the relationship and if there’s any missed planned virtual or on the ground? 

    MS. KOZACK: Let me step back and give a little bit of an overview on Syria. So, first, you know, we’re, of course, monitoring developments in Syria very closely.  Our Staff are preparing to support the international community’s efforts to help with Syria’s economic rehabilitation as conditions allow.  We have had useful discussions with the new Economic Team who took office in late March, including during the Spring Meetings.  And, of course, you will perhaps have seen the press release regarding the roundtable that was held during the Spring Meetings.  IMF Staff have already started to work to rebuild its understanding of the Syrian economy.  We’ve been doing this through interactions with the authorities and also through coordination with other IFIs. And just to remind everyone, our last Article IV with Syria was in 2009.  So, it’s been quite some time since we have had a substantive engagement with Syria.  Syria will need significant assistance to rebuild its economic institutions.  We stand ready to provide advice and targeted and well-prioritized technical assistance in our areas of expertise. I think this goes a little bit to your question on, like, what do we mean by defining data.  I think what the Managing Director was really referring to there is since it has been such a long time since we have had a substantive engagement with Syria, the last Article IV, as I said, was in 2009.  I think there, what she’s really referring to is the need to really work with the Syrian authorities to rebuild basic economic institutions, including the ability to produce economic statistics, right, so that we — so that we and the authorities and the international community of course, can conduct the necessary economic analysis so that we can best support the reconstruction and recovery efforts.  

    With respect to the lifting of sanctions, what I can say there is that, of course, the lifting of sanctions and the lifting of sanctions are a matter between member states of the IMF.  What we can say in serious cases that the lifting of sanctions could support Syria’s efforts to overcome its economic challenges and help advance its reconstruction and economic development.  Syria, of course, is an IMF member, and as we’ve just said, you know, we are, of course, engaged closely with the Syrians to explore how, within our mandate, we can best support them.  

     

    QUESTIONER: My question is on Russia.  In what ways is the IMF monitoring Russia’s economy under the current sanctions and conflict conditions, and have regular Article IV Consultations or other surveillance activities with Russia resumed to track its economic developments?  

    MS. KOZACK: What I can say with respect to Russia is that we are, our Staff, are analyzing data and economic indicators that are reported by the Russian authorities.  We are also looking at counterparty data that is provided to us by other countries, and this is particularly true for cross-border transactions, as well as data from third-party sources. So, this data collection using official and other sources does allow us to put together a picture of the Russian economy.  

    We did provide an assessment in the 2025 April WEO, the one that we just released about a month ago.  In this WEO, we assess Russia’s growth at — we expect Russia to grow at 1.5 percent in 2025, 0.9 percent in 2026, and we expect inflation to come down to 8.2 percent in 2025 and 4.4 percent in 2026.  And I don’t have a timetable for the Article IV at this time.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I’d like to ask about Deputy Management Director Okamura’s visits to Japan.  So, my question is, what economic topics will be on the agenda during his stay?  Could you tell me a bit more in detail?  

    MS. KOZACK: Deputy Managing Director Okamura will travel to Japan, as I said, from June 11th to 12th, and he will be attending the Tokyo Fiscal Forum.  So, this will be the 10th Tokyo Fiscal Forum.  It’s an annual conference that we co-host in Japan every year and the focus is on issues of fiscal policy. In this particular one, Deputy Managing Director Okamura will be discussing fiscal frameworks. It’s very important for all countries to have sound fiscal frameworks so they can implement sound fiscal policy.  He will also be discussing GovTech not only in Japan but in the Asia Pacific region.  And of course, GovTech is very important for countries because it’s a way of modernizing and making government both provision of services in some cases but also potentially collection of revenue more effective and more efficient.  So, those will be the focus of his discussions in Tokyo.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I have a question on the recent bailout package by IMF to Pakistan.  The Indian government has expressed a lot of displeasure with Pakistan planning to use this package to build — rebuild — areas that allegedly support cross-border terrorism.  Does the IMF have any assessment of this?  Secondly, I also have another question.  Could you please provide information on the majority vote that was received in approving this bailout package for Pakistan on May 9th?  If you can disclose the information.  

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Pakistan?  

     

    QUESTIONER: Just adding to that, do you have an update on the implications of the escalation of facilities in that border between Pakistan and India on both economies.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Thanks a lot.  I guess the only spin I would put on is generally what safeguards does the IMF have that its funds won’t be used for military or in support of military actions, not only there but as a general matter.  And I also, if you’re able to, there was some controversy about the termination of India’s Executive Director of the IMF, K.V. Subramanian.  Do you have any insight into–there are reports there–what it was about but what do you say it’s about?  Thanks a lot.  

    MS. KOZACK: With respect to the Indian Executive Director who had been at the Fund, all I can say on this is that the appointment of Executive Directors is a member for the — is a matter for the member country.  It’s not a matter for the Fund, and it’s completely up to the country authorities to determine who represents them at the Fund.  

    With respect to Pakistan and the conflict with India, I want to start here by first expressing our regrets and sympathies for the loss of life and for the human toll from the recent conflict.  We do hope for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.  

    Now, turning to some of the specific questions about the Board approval of Pakistan’s program, I’m going to step back a minute and provide a little bit of the chronology and timeframe.  The IMF Executive Board approved Pakistan’s EFF program in September of 2024.  And the First review at that time was planned for the first quarter of 2025.  And consistent with that timeline, on March 25th of 2025, the IMF Staff and the Pakistani authorities reached a Staff-Level Agreement on the First Review for the EFF.  That agreement, that Staff-Level Agreement, was then presented to our Executive Board, and our Executive Board completed the review on May 9th.  As a result of the completion of that review, Pakistan received the disbursement at that time.  

    What I want to emphasize here is that it is part of a standard procedure under programs that our Executive Board conducts periodic reviews of lending programs to assess their progress.  And they particularly look at whether the program is on track, whether the conditions under the program have been met, and whether any policy changes are needed to bring the program back on track.  And in the case of Pakistan, our Board found that Pakistan had indeed met all of the targets.  It had made progress on some of the reforms, and for that reason, the Board went ahead and approved the program.  

    With respect to the voting or the decision-making at our Board, we do not disclose that publicly.  In general, Fund Board decisions are taken by consensus, and in this case, there was a sufficient consensus at the Board to allow us to move forward or for the Board to decide to move forward and complete Pakistan’s review.  

    And with respect to the question on safeguards, I do want to make three points here.  The first is that IMF financing is provided to members for the purpose of resolving balance of payments problems.  

    In the case of Pakistan, and this is my second point, the EFF disbursements, all of the disbursements received under the EFF, are allocated to the reserves of the central bank.  So, those disbursements are at the central bank, and under the program, those resources are not part of budget financing.  They are not transferred to the government to support the budget. 

    And the third point is that the program provides additional safeguards through our conditionality.  And these include, for example, targets on the accumulation of international reserves.  It includes a zero target, meaning no lending from the central bank to the government.  And the program also includes substantial structural conditionality around improving fiscal management.  And these conditions are all available in the program documents if you wanted to do a deeper dive.  And, of course, any deviation from the established program conditions would impact future reviews under the Pakistan program.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I have a question on Egypt.  There is a mission in Egypt for the First Review of the EFF loan program.  So, can you please update us on the ongoing discussions, especially since the Prime Minister of Egypt announced yesterday that the program could be concluded in 2027 rather than 2026?  

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Egypt?  I have a question from the Press Center on Egypt, which I will read aloud.  The question is when will the Fifth Review currently underway with the Egyptian government be concluded, and when will the Executive Board approve this review?  And how much money will Egypt receive once the review is approved?  

    So, here’s what I can share on Egypt.  First, let me start here.  So first, I just want to say that the Fund remains committed to supporting Egypt in building its economic resilience and fostering higher private sector-led growth.  Egypt has made clear progress on its macroeconomic reform program, with notable improvements in inflation and foreign exchange reserves.  For the past few weeks, IMF Staff has had productive discussions with the Egyptian authorities on economic performance and policies under the EFF.  As Egypt’s macroeconomic stabilization is taking hold, efforts must now focus on accelerating and deepening reforms that will reduce the footprint of the state in the Egyptian economy, level the playing field, and improve the business environment.  Discussions will continue between the IMF and the Egyptian authorities on the remaining policies and reforms that could support the completion of the Fifth Review.  

     

    QUESTIONER: My question is about Sri Lanka.  Sri Lanka’s program is subject to IMF Board approval.  The review is subject to IMF Board approval, but we still haven’t got any word on when that would be.  Is there any delay in this?  And is this delay attributed to the pending electricity adjustments, tariff adjustments, that the Sri Lankan government has committed to?  

    MS. KOZACK: So just stepping back for a minute.  On April 25th, IMF Staff and the Sri Lankan authorities reached Staff-Level Agreement on the Fourth Review of Sri Lanka’s program under the EFF.  And once the review is approved by our Executive Board, Sri Lanka will have access to about $344 million in financing.  Completion of the review is subject to approval by the Executive Board, and we expect that Board meeting to take place in the coming weeks.  

    The precise timing of the Board meeting is contingent on two things.  The first is implementation of prior actions, and the main prior actions are relating to restoring electricity, cost recovery pricing and ensuring proper function of the automatic electricity price adjustment mechanism.  And the second contingency is completion of the Financing Assurances Review, which will focus on confirming multilateral partners, committed financing contributions to Sri Lanka and whether adequate progress has been made in debt restructuring.  So, in a nutshell, completion of the review is subject to approval by the Executive Board.  We expect the Board meeting to take place in the coming weeks.  And it’s contingent on the two matters that I just mentioned.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Thank you for having my questions on Ecuador.  Since the IMF is still completing the second review under the EFF program for Ecuador, do you think it’s going to be time to change the program, the goals, or maybe the amount of the program?  Because Ecuador is now facing different challenges compared to 2024.  The oil prices are falling, so that is going to affect the fiscal situation for Ecuador.  And also, I would like to know if Ecuador is still looking for a new program under the RSF.  And the last one, I would like to know if, do you think that Ecuador is going to need to make some important changes this year on oil subsidies and a tax reform?  I think, as I said, Ecuador now is facing some important challenges in the fiscal situation, so do you think it’s going to be possible because of, you know, all the social protests and all that kind of stuff?  Do you think it’s going to be possible to do that in Ecuador?  

     

    QUESTIONER: Is there a request, an official request, in place to modify the program?  And if there is, of course, details of the new one, you can share.  

    MS. KOZACK: And then I have one question online from the Press Center regarding Ecuador.  Is the sovereign negotiating new targets, given their fiscal position deteriorated compared to last year?  Our understanding is that $410 million was not dispersed under the First Review.?

    So let me share what I can on Ecuador.  So, right now, representatives from the IMF, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank are in Quito this week to meet with the authorities and discuss the strengthening of financial and technical support to the country.  As part of this tripartite visit, we have a new IMF Mission Chief who is participating, and she is also using that opportunity to have courtesy meetings with the authorities and to continue discussions and advance toward a Second Review under Ecuador’s EFF.  

    What else I can add, just as background, is that the Executive Board in December approved the First Review of Ecuador’s 48-month EFF.  About $500 million was disbursed after the approval of that Frist Review.  And at that time, the Executive Board also concluded the Article IV Consultation.

    I can also say that the authorities have made excellent progress in the implementation of their economic program under the EFF.  And regarding the precise timing of the Second Review, we will provide an update on the next steps in due course and when we’re able to do so.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Just a quick question on tariffs.  I’m just wondering if the IMF has a response to the U.S.-China deal that was struck in Geneva earlier this month.  You know, if the deal holds, I appreciate it’s a 90-day pause, but if the deal holds, how would you foresee that changing the Fund’s current economic forecast for the U.S. and China and for the global economy?  Thanks.  

    MS. KOZACK: As you noted, earlier in May, China and the U.S. announced a 90-day rollback of most of the bilateral tariffs imposed since April 2nd, and they established a mechanism to discuss economic and trade relations.  The two sides reduced their tariff from peak levels, leaving in place 10 percent additional tariffs.  So, the additional tariffs before this agreement were 125 percent.  Now, the additional tariff has agreed to be 10 percent, you know, for the 90 days.  This is obviously a positive step for the world’s two largest economies.

    What I can also add is that for the U.S., you may recall, during the Spring Meetings, we talked a lot about the overall effective tariff rate for the U.S.  At that time, we assessed it at 25.5 percent.  This announcement and the reduction in tariffs will bring the U.S. effective tariff rate down to a bit over 14 percent.  

    Now, with respect to the impact, what I can say is that the reduction in tariffs and the easing of tensions does provide some upside risk to our global growth forecast.  We will be updating that global growth forecast as part of our July WEO.  And so that will give us an opportunity to provide a full assessment.  All of this said, of course, the outlook, the global outlook in general does remain one of high uncertainty.  And so that uncertainty is still with us.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I have a broad question regarding the following – at the IMF World Bank Spring Meeting, the recent one,  the Treasury Secretary Bessent called for the IMF and the World Bank to refocus on their core mission on macroeconomic stability and development.  Did the IMF start any discussion on this topic with the U.S. administration?  And my second question, do you foresee any changes to your lending programs to take into account the views of the Trump Administration regarding issues like climate change and international development?  Thank you.  

    MS. KOZACK: What I can say on this is the U.S. is our largest shareholder, and we greatly value the voice of the United States.  We have a constructive engagement with the U.S. authorities, and we very much appreciate Secretary Bessent’s reiteration of the United States’ commitment to the Fund and to our role.  The IMF has a clearly defined mandate to support economic and financial stability globally.  Our Management Team and our entire Staff are focused exactly on this mandate, helping our 191 members tackle their economic challenges and their balance of payments risks.  

    What I can also add is that at the most recent Spring Meetings, the ones we just had in April, our membership identified two areas where they’ve asked the IMF to deepen our work.  And the first is on external imbalances, and the second is on our monitoring of the financial sector.  So they’re looking for us to really deepen our work in these two areas.  

    As far as taking that work forward, we will continue working with our Executive Board on these areas, as well as to carry out some important policy reviews.  And I think the Managing Director referred to these during the Spring Meetings.  The first is the Comprehensive Surveillance Review, which will set out our surveillance priorities for the next five years.  And the second is the review of program design and conditionality.  And that will carefully consider how our lending can best help countries address low growth challenges and durably resolve their balance of payments weaknesses.  

    I have a slight update for you on Ukraine, which says — so the eighth — so if we look at the documents that were published at the time of the Seventh Review program, the one that was approved by the Executive Board a little while ago, based on that, the Eighth Review disbursement would be about $520 million.  And, the discussions of the Eighth Review are ongoing, and any disbursement, as always, is subject to approval by our Executive Board. 

    And with that, I will bring this press briefing to a close.  So first, let me thank you all for your participation today.  As a reminder, the briefing is embargoed until 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time in the United States.  As always, a transcript will be made available later on IMF.org.  In case of any clarifications or additional queries, please do not hesitate to reach out to my colleagues at media@imf.org.  This concludes our press briefing, and I wish everyone a wonderful day.  I look forward to seeing you next time.  Thanks very much.

     

      

    *  *  *  *  *

     

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Meera Louis

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/22/tr-05222025-com-regular-press-briefing-may-22-2025

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Canada: G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors’ Communiqué

    Source: Government of Canada News

    Statement

    We began by reiterating our shared commitment to the G7. After 50 years of working together, transcending national differences and promoting global prosperity, the value of the G7 is clear.

    Banff, May 20-22, 2025

    1. We, the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, met on May 20-22, 2025 in Banff, Canada together with the Heads of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank Group (WBG), Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and Financial Stability Board (FSB). We were also joined by Ukrainian Finance Minister Sergii Marchenko and the President of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for parts of the meeting.
    2. We began by reiterating our shared commitment to the G7. After 50 years of working together, transcending national differences and promoting global prosperity, the value of the G7 is clear. We held a productive and frank exchange of views on the current global economic and financial situation, the risks and opportunities common to our countries, and ways to address them. This joint statement reflects the outcome of the discussion between G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors during the meeting.  

    Global Economy

    1. In the face of multiple complex global challenges, we are committed to pursuing our shared policy objectives. We agree that the G7 can leverage our strong economic relationships to advance our common goals. International organizations signaled at our last meeting that trade and economic policy uncertainty was high and weighing on global growth. We acknowledge that economic policy uncertainty has declined from its peak, and we will work together to achieve further progress. We also shared our concerns over unsustainable global macro imbalances.
    2. In this respect, we also underscore the need to address excessive imbalances and strengthen macro fundamentals, given potential global spillovers. We call on the IMF to continue to enhance its analysis of imbalances in both its bilateral and multilateral surveillance. We continue to engage with each other and with international partners to advance international cooperation and deliver prosperity.
    3. Strong and sustainable economic growth is the cornerstone of economic prosperity. We are committed to working together to achieve a balanced and growth-oriented macroeconomic policy mix that supports our economic security and resilience and ensures that all of our citizens can benefit from that growth. We are committed to maintaining well-functioning financial markets. We recognize that elevated uncertainty can have implications for the economy and for financial stability. We will continue to monitor and consult closely on these matters. Our central banks remain strongly committed to ensuring price stability, consistent with their respective mandates. We reaffirm our May 2017 exchange rate commitments.

    Economic Resilience and Security

    1. We recognize the need for a common understanding of how non-market policies and practices (NMPPs) aggravate imbalances, contribute to overcapacity, and impact the economic security of other countries. Building on our previous commitments and as guided by Leaders, we will contribute, as appropriate, to the monitoring of NMPPs, continuing to assess the distortions they cause in markets and their global spillovers. We agree on the importance of a level playing field and taking a broadly coordinated approach to address the harm caused by those who do not abide by the same rules and lack transparency.
    2. We call on international organizations to address data gaps and deepen our collective understanding of NMPPs and their domestic and global implications. We agree that joint analysis of market concentration and international supply chain resilience would be useful areas of future work. This analysis will inform our respective policy approaches, which will in part be shaped by our underlying industrial and consumer structures. Where appropriate and relevant, we will engage partners beyond the G7.
    3. We recognize a significant increase in international low-value shipments being sent to our economies in a decentralized manner, and the potential for this to overwhelm and take advantage of customs controls and duty and tax collection infrastructure. Collectively, we recognize the potential for illicit drug trafficking, the importation of counterfeit goods, the misclassification of merchandise, revenue leakage, inequity for our retailers, and significant environmental waste. We commit to exploring ways that our low-value importation systems could address these risks.

    Support for Ukraine

    1. We condemn Russia’s continued brutal war against Ukraine and commend the immense resilience from the Ukrainian people and economy. Ukraine has suffered significant destruction. The G7 remains committed to unwavering support for Ukraine in defending its territorial integrity and right to exist, and its freedom, sovereignty and independence toward a just and durable peace.
    2. We welcome ongoing efforts to achieve a ceasefire. If such a ceasefire is not agreed, we will continue to explore all possible options, including options to maximize pressure such as further ramping up sanctions. We reaffirm that, consistent with our respective legal systems, Russia’s sovereign assets in our jurisdictions will remain immobilized until Russia ends its aggression and pays for the damage it has caused to Ukraine.
    3. We agree that private sector mobilization will be important in the recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine, with costs estimated by the WBG at US$524 billion over the next decade. We collectively commit to help build investor confidence through bilateral and multilateral initiatives. To this end, in addition to the ongoing support through the MIGA SURE (Support for Ukraine’s Reconstruction and Economy) trust fund, we will work, including through the Ukraine Donor Platform, with the Government of Ukraine, international financial institutions (IFIs), and the insurance industry towards removing the blanket ban imposed on Ukraine as soon as possible. We will continue to coordinate support to promote the early recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine, including at the Ukraine Recovery Conference, which will take place in Rome on July 10-11, 2025. Further, we agree to work together with Ukraine to ensure that no countries or entities, or entities from those countries that financed or supplied the Russian war machine will be eligible to profit from Ukraine’s reconstruction.

    Bolstering Long-term Growth and Productivity

    1. We agree on the importance of pursuing public policies that spur innovation, raise productivity and promote greater labour force participation. In an environment of high public debt and increasing fiscal pressures, we also agree that raising long-term growth potential is essential to manage risks to fiscal sustainability and increase wages and living standards.
    2. We discussed and shared experiences on how best to pursue growth-enhancing policies in a fiscally prudent manner. We agree that structural reforms can help set the foundations for strong and sustainable economic growth. We recognize that specific growth policies need to be adapted to each country’s needs and circumstances. We agree that maintaining a stable and predictable macroeconomic environment is important for strong growth and productive long-term investment.

    Artificial Intelligence

    1. We deepened our understanding of prospects for AI to raise productivity growth, and of the policies needed to realize the benefits. We appreciate the framework provided by the OECD to better quantify and monitor AI-driven productivity gains. We recognized the benefits of AI for the financial sector and the need to monitor and assess potential risks to financial stability as AI adoption further increases.

    Financial Sector Issues

    1. We are committed to a strong, resilient and stable financial sector. We reiterate that a continued focus on financial stability and regulatory issues remains vital to ensure the effective functioning of the financial system. We noted our support for the important work of the FSB and Standard Setting Bodies. We focused on non-bank financial intermediaries, which play an increasingly important role in financing the real economy. Their activities can contribute to the efficiency of financial markets but can also pose risks to the global financial system. We discussed sources of potential risk, including those from liquidity mismatch, leverage and interconnectedness. We agree on the need to assess non-bank data availability, use and quality and to share knowledge and approaches to monitoring and assessing potential risks.
    2. Enhancing cross-border payments can have widespread benefits for citizens and economies worldwide. We remain committed to delivering cheaper, faster, more transparent and more accessible cross-border payments while maintaining their safety, resilience, and financial integrity. This includes supporting the implementation of the G20 Roadmap as well as appropriate future actions as necessary to meet these goals.
    3. Cyber risks threaten to disrupt global financial systems and the institutions that support them. To address the evolving cyber threat landscape, we will continue to take action to further strengthen our shared response capabilities and protocols in the event of a significant cyber incident. We look forward to the G7 Cyber Expert Group’s assessment of the risks and opportunities that AI presents for cybersecurity.
    4. The potential effects of quantum technologies on the global financial landscape are becoming increasingly visible. Our central banks will explore how we can identify, categorize and mitigate potential risks to data security and financial stability and promote economic resilience.

    Financial Crime Call to Action

    1. We remain steadfast in our commitment to tackling financial crime, including money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (AML/CFT/CPF). We endorse a “Financial Crime Call to Action” to spur further progress and collective efforts of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and its Global Network. By bringing together over 200 jurisdictions around the world, the FATF is the ultimate international standard setter, and we welcome its leadership in combatting financial crime since its creation by the G7 in 1989.
    2. Through strengthening our AML/CFT/CPF frameworks and enhanced international cooperation we will endeavor to stay abreast of emerging risks, understand the role of technology and deepen the responsible exchange of information to make it harder for criminals to access the financial system and evade detection.
    3. We recognize financial crime acts as a barrier to growth, development and stability, and support efforts to strengthen frameworks in lower capacity countries. We encourage the international community to join us in this Call to Action and strengthen our collective response to financial crime.

    Support for Developing Countries

    1. We reaffirm our commitment to the ongoing implementation of the World Bank-led Resilient and Inclusive Supply-Chain Enhancement (RISE) Partnership and recognize its progress toward better integrating low- and middle-income countries in the global supply chain of clean energy products, especially in Africa. We welcome the adoption of a country roadmap in Zambia. We encourage the World Bank to further advance this initiative, and we look forward to the launch of the first local and regional information platforms in Africa. We support the expansion of RISE’s activities to Latin America and the Caribbean, and a better integration of all segments of the critical mineral supply chain. We call on Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to strengthen collaboration on critical mineral supply chains amongst themselves and with other key stakeholders. We also highlighted linkages to G20 initiatives facilitating private sector development, such as the G20 Compact with Africa.
    2. We recognize that global crises, including health crises and natural disasters, pose significant challenges for all economies, with particularly severe impacts on vulnerable states, including small ones. We reaffirm the importance of strengthening support for these countries by facilitating domestic resource mobilization as well as the use and uptake of crisis preparedness and response tools, including Climate Resilient Debt Clauses and insurance, to help ease fiscal pressures. We encourage the IMF and MDBs to strengthen their focus on crisis prevention in order to reduce the incidence of crises materializing.
    3. We call on the international community to make efforts to support vulnerable countries facing debt challenges. We look forward to the G20 work on improving the implementation of the Common Framework for debt treatments in a predictable, timely, orderly, and coordinated manner. We also agree on the importance of advancing debt transparency to support sound economic governance and financial stability. We call on the international community to make efforts to support vulnerable countries whose debt is sustainable but face near-term liquidity challenges. We recognize the need for continued efforts with all partners, public and private, to enhance the availability and quality of debt data, including through the Data Sharing Exercise with the World Bank.
    4. We reaffirm our commitment to achieving more effective and impactful MDBs through reforms aiming to ensure that they work effectively as a system to address the most pressing global challenges, deliver on their core mandate, and use their resources as efficiently as possible, including by implementing the recommendations from the G20 Capital Adequacy Framework Review. We urge MDBs to continue to step up their efforts to mobilize private capital and enhance domestic resource mobilization in emerging markets and developing countries. We emphasize the importance of implementing quality-based procurement policies and procedures that promote efficiency, competition from the private sector, and transparency.

    G7 Financial Crime Call to Action

    The G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors remain steadfast in our commitment to tackling financial crime, including money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (AML/CFT/CPF).

    In 1989, the G7 created the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to “prevent the utilization of the banking system and financial institutions for the purpose of money laundering” and was soon joined by many other countries and jurisdictions which shared the same concerns and volunteered for a global effort against financial crime. Since its establishment, the FATF’s mandate and standards have expanded to include the combatting of financing of terrorism and the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The transnational nature of money laundering, malicious nature of its predicate crimes, and integrated nature of our economies necessitate a collective approach to combatting illicit finance. 2025 marks the 35-year anniversary of the FATF’s “40 Recommendations”, which were developed collectively by FATF members and are now being implemented in more than 200 jurisdictions worldwide thanks to the joint efforts of the FATF Global Network.

    The Intersection of Crime, Security, and Economic Prosperity

    Organized criminals, including cartels, are exploiting gaps in global AML safeguards to launder the profits of their criminal activities such as drug trafficking (including fentanyl and synthetic opioids), fraud, cybercrimes, and human smuggling that generate billions in illicit revenue annually. These crimes are not only having a devastating impact on our communities, but they are also impacting national security and economic integrity as profits are re-invested into vast criminal networks that seek to undermine the rule of law and destabilize our governments and economies.

    Financial crime is also harming global economic growth. The International Monetary Fund has found that illicit finance reduces productivity, widens inequality, inhibits legitimate investment and hinders an effective allocation of resources. The World Bank has found that financial crimes are a barrier to development sparking political instability, deterring private capital, undermining good governance and the rule of law, and generally eroding trust in governments and institutions. Illicit finance also robs treasuries of badly needed tax revenue at a time when so many economies around the world are facing historically high debt levels.

    The World Bank sees tackling illicit finance in low-capacity countries as vital to their development priorities and requiring sustained engagement. Strengthening AML/CFT/CPF capacity in developing and low-capacity countries would improve financial inclusion and further deprive international organized crime groups of opportunities to launder their illicit proceeds or finance terrorism.

    In this context, technically sound and effective AML/CFT/CPF frameworks contribute to safer communities, our collective security, and to stronger economies in the G7 and around the globe.  

    The Way Forward

    Under the Canadian G7 Presidency, Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors have taken stock of the fight we launched in 1989 and identified areas for further action. Today, we endorse the present Financial Crime Call to Action to strengthen global security, protect financial sector integrity, and foster economic growth and economic development.

    Strengthening our Frameworks

    • We re-commit to the founding principles of the FATF and will continue to actively support the organization.
      • The FATF is the ultimate AML/CFT/CPF standard setter that catalyzes improvements in members’ AML/CFT/CPF regimes. It is essential to maintain the FATF’s role at the centre of the global fight against illicit finance.
      • We commit to ensuring that the FATF remains a technical body that produces in-depth and impartial peer reviews and research that inform our ongoing understanding of risk.
    • We commit to improving the effectiveness of our respective AML/CFT/CPF regimes. The G7 must lead by example.
      • G7 financial systems remain the most interconnected in the world and continue to represent attractive targets for bad actors seeking to launder ill-gotten gains. The G7 will continue to improve our effectiveness in preventing the proceeds of crime from entering our financial sectors, detecting and disrupting money laundering threats, sanctioning criminals and depriving them of their illegitimate proceeds in a manner consistent with our domestic legal frameworks.
      • Shell companies are enablers for criminals to hide proceeds of crime and engage in illicit activities, such as large-scale tax and sanctions evasion. Ensuring that competent authorities, particularly law enforcement, have sufficient resources and tools to investigate and prosecute money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing involving shell companies is critical to fighting financial crime.
      • The procurement of dual use and military technology through circumvention of sanctions violates United Nations Security Council Resolutions and undermines global security. We commit to enhancing implementation of our targeted financial sanctions and ensuring they are the most effective in the world.

    Enhancing International Cooperation

    • We will stay abreast of emerging risks tied to money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing through research and the development of joint typologies and strategic intelligence.
      • We express our serious concerns that virtual asset thefts and scams, including by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, have reached unprecedented levels. These threats, as well as the methods used by criminals to launder their proceeds, must be better understood and addressed. This is necessary to raise awareness, enhance prevention, and mitigate money laundering as well as being critical to promoting responsible innovation in virtual assets and protecting virtual asset users in our jurisdictions. We will further research and exchange information such as typology work on emerging risks related to virtual assets, including from the perspectives of cybersecurity and AML/CFT/CPF, and take necessary measures.
      • We recognize that illicit actors will continue to take advantage of jurisdictional differences in approaches to countering sanctions evasion and the financing of proliferation. Therefore, we commit to work together to maintain an up-to-date and common understanding of relevant threats, vulnerabilities, and typologies to prevent and combat complex proliferation financing and sanctions evasion schemes.
    • We must break down silos and deepen the responsible exchange of information internationally to make it harder for criminals to access the financial system and evade detection.
      • Bad actors are exploiting silos within, and across, AML/CFT/CPF regimes to conceal their actions. In response, we will improve risk-based and secure information sharing internationally between our national competent authorities, and domestically amongst the private sector and between public and private sector partners, consistent with our domestic legal frameworks. Facilitating this type of information sharing supports G7 efforts to mitigate the negative impacts of fraud on our businesses and citizens and to combat illicit activities by transnational organized crime groups, including cartels.
      • Many of our financial institutions operate across G7 markets. We will encourage deeper cooperation between our regulators who supervise on a group-wide basis. We commit to ensuring that our AML/CFT/CPF supervision is risk-based, effective and focused on stopping financial crime. We will also ensure that sanctions for non-compliance are proportionate, dissuasive and effective.

    Addressing Financial Crime as a Barrier to Growth and Stability

    • We will support efforts to strengthen AML/CFT/CPF frameworks in lower capacity countries to foster growth and economic development.
      • This can be achieved through many channels, including bilateral and multilateral assistance and collaboration. This work will ensure the G7 together with other FATF members keep pace with evolving regional risks, and support asset recovery to further deprive criminals of illicit proceeds and reduce opportunities for money laundering.
      • The FATF and its Global Network of nine FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs), which bring together more than 200 jurisdictions and 20 observer international organizations, are at the heart of the global fight against financial crime. We reiterate our commitment to supporting the FSRBs in overseeing the consistent and effective implementation of the FATF standards worldwide, including in the next round of mutual evaluations.
    • We commit to supporting the effective implementation of AML/CFT/CPF measures that are risk-based and proportionate.
      • We recognize that a risk-based approach can promote economic development and financial inclusion by encouraging assessments of risk, identifying lower and higher risk scenarios, and implementing simplified AML/CFT/CPF measures in certain scenarios proportionate to the relevant risks. 
      • By implementing the revised FATF standards, we will facilitate legitimate funds continuing to move through the formal financial sector, promoting economic development and financial inclusion while mitigating unintended consequences.
    • We commit to exploring the role of technology in AML/CFT/CPF implementation.
      • We encourage adoption of new technologies that can more effectively detect, report and interdict illicit finance. This includes partnering with the private sector to understand how emerging technologies (including artificial intelligence) can be used to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of AML/CFT/CPF regimes. This should be consistent with our respective domestic legal frameworks and risk-based, while ensuring data protection and human rights.
      • We continue to support the FATF’s initiatives to accelerate global implementation of its standards on virtual assets and virtual asset service providers (VASPs) as well as its work on emerging risks, including those that arise from misuse of stablecoins and peer-to-peer transactions, offshore VASPs, and decentralized finance (DeFi) arrangements.
      • We are contributing to the FATF’s ongoing work to strengthen its Standards on Payment Transparency to adapt to changes in payment business models and messaging standards and to foster payment systems that are more transparent, inclusive, accessible, safe and secure, while enabling faster and cheaper transactions, including remittances. Consistent with this work, we also support the G20 Roadmap for Enhancing Cross-border Payments.

    Lastly, we commit to furthering this work under the French G7 Presidency in 2026, in coordination with all FATF members, and to report on the actions taken to implement the commitments in this Call to Action.

    We encourage all countries to join us in this Call to Action. The international community can, and must, strengthen our collective response to financial crime and its impact on communities, security, and prosperity.

    MIL OSI Canada News –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee on the Rights of the Child Praise Qatar’s Investments in Child Health and Education, Ask about the Age of Criminal Responsibility and Penalties for Child Offenders

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on the Rights of the Child today concluded its consideration of the fifth and sixth combined periodic reports of Qatar under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, with Committee Experts praising the State’s investments in child health and education, and raising questions about its efforts to raise the minimum age of criminal responsibility and prohibit the imposition of harsh penalties, including the death penalty and flagellation, on child offenders aged 16 years and over.

    Aissatou Alassane Sidikou, Committee Expert and Taskforce Coordinator for Qatar, commended Qatar’s efforts to invest in children’s health and education; implement its national development programme, which promoted sustainable development; establish its Ministry of Social Development and Family; and implement the Committee’s recommendations.

    Ms. Sidikou asked whether Qatar’s draft bill on children’s rights would increase the minimum age of criminal responsibility of children, which was currently one of the lowest in the world at seven years, and prohibit imprisonment, flagellation and forced labour for children, which was currently allowed from 16 years of age.  In Qatar, children could be sentenced to death. What measures were in place to strictly prohibit the application of the death penalty on children?

    Rosaria Correa, Committee Expert and Country Taskforce Member, said that despite the recommendations of various human rights mechanisms, the new nationality law did not allow Qatari women married to foreign citizens to pass on their nationality to their children. What steps had been taken to amend this law and other laws to allow Qatari women to pass on their nationality to their children?

    Introducing the report, Ahmad bin Hassan Al-Hammadi, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Qatar and head of the delegation, said that, over the reporting period, Qatar had worked to strengthen legislative and institutional measures to protect children’s rights in the fields of education, health, social protection and criminal justice. The Qatar National Vision 2030 and the State’s third national development strategy 2024-2030 included key measures addressing children’s rights, and promoted equality and non-discrimination of children.

    The delegation said Qatar had reduced sentences for cases where perpetrators of crimes were children.  Sanctions for children under 16 years did not include corporal punishment or flagellation.  The draft law on the rights of the child would increase the minimum age of criminal liability and define all persons less than 18 years old as children.  It would be adopted and published soon.

    The delegation also said the death penalty could be imposed on children aged 16 to 18, who were more aware of their actions, but judges could commute the sentence, considering the age of the child when the crime was committed.  No one aged 16 to 18 had been sentenced to death in Qatar.

    The Qatari Nationality Code addressed the issue of kinship, the delegation said.  Children of non-Qatari fathers were given the nationality of their father, but such children also had the ability to access Qatari nationality if they had permanent residence.  The State had made great strides in reducing statelessness.

    In closing remarks, Ms. Sidikou said many efforts had been made by the State for children, but challenges remained.  The Committee hoped that the dialogue would help to improve protections for children in Qatar.

    Mr. Al-Hammadi, in concluding remarks, thanked the Committee and all persons who contributed to the constructive dialogue.  Qatar was committed to cooperating with the Committee and to addressing the challenges and risks it faced concerning the rights of the child.  It had achieved great progress in human rights over the years through cooperation with human rights mechanisms.

    Sophie Kiladze, Committee Chair, said in concluding remarks that the information provided by the State party would help the Committee to assess the achievements made by Qatar and the challenges it faced.  The Committee would do its best to develop concluding observations that would strengthen the rights of children in Qatar to the extent possible.

    The delegation of Qatar consisted of representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Interior; Ministry of Public Health; Ministry of Social Development and Family; Ministry of Education and Higher Education; Ministry of Justice; Supreme Judiciary Council; Public Prosecution; National Group for Protection of Children from Abuse and Violence; and the Permanent Mission of Qatar to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Committee will issue the concluding observations on the report of Qatar at the end of its ninety-ninth session on 30 May. Those, and other documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, will be available on the session’s webpage.  Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, while webcasts of the public meetings can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public this afternoon at 3 p.m. to consider the combined fifth to seventh periodic reports of Brazil (CRC/C/BRA/5-7).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the fifth and sixth combined periodic reports of Qatar (CRC/C/QAT/5-6).

    Presentation of Report

    AHMAD BIN HASSAN AL-HAMMADI, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Qatar and head of the delegation, said that Qatar was firmly and permanently committed to the principles of the Convention. Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution emphasised the role of the family in protecting children from exploitation and neglect, and supporting their development.  The State had worked to strengthen legislative and institutional measures to protect children’s rights in the fields of education, health, social protection and criminal justice.

    The national report was the result of consultation and cooperation between the various national authorities, civil society and children.  The State had made great efforts to address and implement most of the previous recommendations made by the Committee, contributing to tangible progress in ensuring the rights of children.

    The Qatar National Vision 2030 and the State’s third national development strategy 2024-2030 included key measures addressing human rights issues in various fields, including children’s rights, and promoted equality and non-discrimination of children.  Over the reporting period, there had been extensive legislative amendments regarding the protection and promotion of children’s rights, most notably law 22 of 2021 regulating health care services, which included provisions promoting access to health care for all children, and the anti-cybercrime law, which criminalised sexual exploitation.  A draft law on children’s rights was also currently under review; it established effective mechanisms for the protection and development of children’s capacities and promoted the best interests of the child.

    The Ministry of Social Development and Family, established in 2021, was responsible for following up on childhood issues through specialised departments on family development, community welfare, and social protection.  The Qatar Foundation for Social Work had mechanisms for monitoring, follow-up and reporting on protection measures for child victims of violence, as well as awareness campaigns informing children of their rights and methods of reporting and seeking assistance.  The State had also established the National Planning Council, which was responsible for planning and implementing public policies related to children.  The Council of Ministers approved in April 2025 the establishment of the Digital Safety Committee for Children and Young People, and an awareness campaign on the safe use of technology would also be launched in June 2025.

    Efforts had continued to increase the enrolment rates of children, including children with disabilities, in compulsory education.  The overall enrolment rate was more than 97.5 per cent.  The State was encouraging girls to enrol in scientific disciplines; the percentage of girls in these disciplines had reached about 54 per cent at the secondary level.  New schools had also been established to provide technical and specialised education for both boys and girls.  The national education strategy 2024-2030 focused on improving the quality and inclusiveness of education, ensuring equal opportunities and enhancing governance. Five “peace schools” that received children of various nationalities, especially from countries in crisis, including children with disabilities, had been established.

    In the health sector, the national health strategy 2024-2030 was launched, which aimed to promote children’s health by preventing chronic diseases such as obesity and diabetes, and paying attention to oral health.  The State had established a system of child-friendly hospitals and general paediatric clinics.  The national team for child protection from violence and neglect received approximately 500 cases annually of suspected cases of child abuse and implemented preventive measures in response.  Effective countermeasures adopted during the COVID-19 pandemic contributed to Qatar having one of the lowest child mortality rates globally.

    Qatar’s Labour Code protected children from exploitation, prohibited their employment before reaching the legal age, and regulated the types of work that children could not do.  Moreover, the consumer protection law and the food control law promoted children’s rights as vulnerable consumers, while the Ministries of Health and Commerce were closely monitoring to ensure safe and healthy food for children.  The State had also launched plans to reduce and assess environmental pollution, especially in areas near schools and residential areas.

    The State had also paid attention to building the capacity of professionals working with children, such as judges, teachers, doctors and media professionals, through training programmes on the Convention delivered in cooperation with civil society.  Qatar was also studying the possibility of establishing a national children’s parliament and had established interactive platforms that allowed children to express their opinions and suggestions, especially when discussing policies that directly affected their lives.

    To protect children’s rights, Qatar was cooperating with United Nations agencies, including the United Nations Children’s Fund, which opened an office at the United Nations House in Doha in 2022. It was working to protect children in conflict areas in countries such as Syria, Palestine, Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan, Russia and Ukraine.  The Qatari Education Above All initiative had reached over 17 million children in more than 65 countries.  Qatar had provided humanitarian assistance, including food and health care, to children in Gaza.

    Qatar was fully committed to the implementation of the Convention and its two Optional Protocols, and the protection of children’s rights.  Achieving this goal required continuous reform efforts through measures that kept pace with emerging changes and challenges.

    Questions by Committee Experts 

    AISSATOU ALASSANE SIDIKOU, Committee Expert and Taskforce Coordinator for Qatar, commended Qatar’s efforts to invest in children’s health and education; implement its national development programme, which promoted sustainable development; establish its Ministry on the Rights of Children and Families; and implement the Committee’s recommendations. Why had the State party maintained its reservations to articles two and 14 of the Convention?  The provisions in article two of the Convention were much broader than those of articles 34 and 35 of the Constitution. 

    Why was there was no schedule for adoption of the draft bill on children’s rights, which had been considered by the State for over 15 years?  Would the bill increase the minimum age of criminal responsibility of children, which was currently at seven years, and prohibit imprisonment, flagellation and forced labour for children, which was currently allowed from 16 years of age?  Did the National Human Rights Commission and the National Planning Council have sufficient resources?  How did they coordinate to protect child rights?

    Qatar’s investments in health and education had increased in 2022 and 2024, but these amounts were still below global standards.  Would this be addressed?  Were funds allocated for children in the budget clearly outlined?  How did the State party ensure that resources were equitably assigned?  A national survey conducted in 2023 contained very little information on vulnerable children. What was being done to strengthen data collection on such children?

    Did migrant children have access to mechanisms to report violations of their rights?  How did the State party support access to remedies for child victims? Were there capacity building and awareness raising mechanisms on child rights for State officials, civil society, the media and the public?  Did the National Human Rights Commission’s monitoring mechanism follow up on the implementation of the Convention and receive complaints on violations of the rights of children, including from migrant children?  How did the State party monitor policies and programmes on children’s rights?  Were there regulations that promoted compliance with international standards on children’s rights in the private sector?

    Girls in Qatar continued to face multiple forms of discrimination due to traditional beliefs.  What actions had been taken to change these negative social norms?  Children with disabilities, children with unmarried or foreign parents, and the children of migrant workers were subject to widespread discrimination.  How did the State party ensure that all children had access to basic social services?  Was there a general law prohibiting all forms of discrimination?

    There were no guidelines for professionals on determining the best interests of the child.  Would these be developed?  How did the State party ensure that this principle was applied consistently in all legal procedures?  In Qatar, children could be sentenced to death.  What measures were in place to strictly prohibit the application of the death penalty on children?  How did the State party facilitate the participation of children in matters affecting them?

    Despite the recommendations of various human rights mechanisms, the new nationality law did not allow Qatari women married to foreign citizens to pass on their nationality to their children. What steps had been taken to amend this law and other laws to allow Qatari women to pass on their nationality to their children?

    ROSARIA CORREA, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, welcomed that the State party had taken several measures to address corporal punishment.  Had it assessed the impact that these measures had had on society? There was no law prohibiting corporal punishment.  What legislative efforts had been made to prohibit corporal punishment in all settings? Had studies into violent disciplining been carried out?  What measures had schools adopted to protect children?  How many child victims of violence had received remedies?  How was the State party monitoring child protection measures?  Did the draft bill on child rights address the child protection system?  Who was responsible for representing minors in the courts?

    How was the State party combatting the sale and trafficking of children domestically and internationally?  What was preventing the State from developing a law to ban child marriages?  How did the electronic monitoring system for convicted children work and how effective was it?  What social and psychological programmes were in place to protect the rights of children in conflict with the law and prevent their stigmatisation?

    TIMOTHY P.T. EKESA, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, welcomed the data on children with disabilities that the State party had collected in 2016.  There were concerns that the State party did not provide access to mainstream education to all children with disabilities, as many were enrolled in special schools.  Only a small percentage of schools had inclusive education programmes, and a medical model was used to determine whether children with disabilities were enrolled in special schools.  Many children with disabilities remained out of school due to denial of admission or the inability of their families to pay school fees.  Could the State party provide data on the number of children with disabilities enrolled in mainstream education?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said its reservations to articles two and 14 of the Convention were consistent with Islamic Sharia and public morals.  The draft law on the rights of the child would increase the minimum age of criminal liability.  It would be adopted and published soon.

    In 2016, a programme was set up to investigate cases of violations of children’s rights and provide protection and remedies to victims.  It dealt with between 500 and 600 cases a year, some 30 per cent of which involved violence and negligence.  The programme included awareness raising campaigns on children’s rights and on reporting mistreatment of children.  A confidential hotline had been set up for reporting violence; it received 300 calls a year, 60 per cent of which came from children.  A register for cases of child abuse had recorded some 3,000 cases in recent years, and the Qatari Care Centre had provided psychological care to more than 4,000 children.  A conference on combatting violence against children held in 2020 in Qatar was attended by around 2,000 people.

    Qatar monitored the impact of business activities on children, guided by the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.  The National Human Rights Committee monitored child labour but had not registered any cases. A regional conference had been held in Qatar that had called on businesses not to violate children’s rights in digital spaces.

    The Ministry of Social Affairs had signed a memorandum of understanding with the National Human Rights Committee on cooperation on protecting children’s rights.  This Committee was made up of eight representatives of civil society and five Government employees.  It reviewed legislation concerning children, visited schools to assess violations of children’s right to education, and conducted yearly awareness raising campaigns on the Convention.

    Qatari law did not permit marriages for boys under the age of 17 and girls under the age of 16.  Marriages under the age of 18 were permitted by judges only when there were exceptional circumstances.  A committee had been set up to review the Family Code; it was considering revising the legal minimum age of marriage.  It was very rare for families to allow their children to marry before the age of 18.

    Some six per cent of the national budget was allocated to education, and some 25 per cent of the Ministry of Social Affairs’ budget was allocated to programmes for children.  The State party had dispersed several million Qatari riyals for supporting vulnerable children and families.  A new centre for orphans was established in 2024.

    The Ministry of Education promoted gender equality at all stages of education.  Enrolment rates for boys and girls were equal at primary and secondary schools, and literacy rates were over 99 per cent in 2023.  The Ministry had launched awareness raising campaigns on human rights and non-discrimination.  Guidance was provided to teachers on preventing discrimination against children.  Qataris and non-Qataris received the same treatment in State schools and hospitals. Employers provided migrant workers with health insurance.

    The Qatari Nationality Code addressed the issue of kinship.  Children of non-Qatari fathers were given the nationality of their father, but such children also had the ability to access Qatari nationality if they had permanent residence.  The State had made great strides in reducing statelessness.

    Qatar had laws that enabled children to receive remedies such as compensation if they were victims of a crime. Specialised courts for crimes committed by children and cases of violence against children had been established, which could conduct hearings online.  There was also a witness protection programme for children. Courts had an interpretation and translation service that supported foreign children.  The State assigned lawyers to persons who could not afford them.

    All schools had student councils that allowed students to express their views on issues such as the environment, culture and education.  Cultural activities were organised for children.  Each school calculated its carbon footprint.

    Articles 21 and 68 of the Constitution incorporated the Convention into the legal order.  The State party had increased penalties for trafficking in persons when the victim was under 18 and reduced sentences for cases where perpetrators of crimes were children.  Sanctions for children under 16 years did not include corporal punishment, flagellation or the death penalty. 

    Articles permitting corporal punishment were removed from legislation after the adoption of the Convention. Persons, including parents, who used corporal punishment were held criminally liable.  Guidelines had been developed for parents on disciplining children without using corporal punishment and a centre that worked to educate parents on protecting children had been set up.  Corporal punishment in schools was banned in the 1990s. Inspectors conducted visits to schools to ensure that the rights of students were not violated. 

    The Prosecutor’s Office stepped in if there were conflicts of interest between parents and children.  Child psychologists were deployed to determine the best interests of the child.  Children’s confidentiality was protected in courts.

    The Ministry of Education attached great importance to inclusive education.  Curricula were adapted for children with disabilities and protocols had been adopted for children with autism.  There were programmes for vocational training for children with disabilities.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    ROSARIA CORREA, Committee Expert and Country Taskforce Member, said that Qatar had a set of measures to combat violence between children in schools.  Were there response measures and a recording mechanism for such violence? Some 83 per cent of children reportedly suffered from some form of harassment in primary school.

    What measures had been taken to ensure children could grow up in a pollution-free environment and access green spaces?  How did education programmes address climate change?  What impact was climate change having on Qatari children and how was the State working to mitigate its effects?  How was the State party encouraging children’s involvement in designing environmental policies?  How did the State party monitor children’s nutrition?

    How did the State party ensure that parents equally shared responsibilities concerning child-rearing? When parents divorced, the mother lost custody of her children in Qatar.  Were women who were victims of sexual exploitation criminalised in the Criminal Code?

    TIMOTHY P.T. EKESA, Committee Expert and Country Taskforce Member, said the national action plan on the inclusion of children with disabilities in schools had commendable objectives, but there was a lack of clarity on measures being implemented to achieve inclusion. Had the plan, which expired in 2023, been renewed?  Were there provisions in draft legislation on persons with disabilities that prohibited discrimination against children with disabilities in education?  The Committee had previously called on the State party to implement a national action plan on human rights education; had this been done?

    The Committee commended the State party’s high quality and widely accessible health care system and the launch of the national health strategy for 2023-2030.  Would children receive targeted attention under the strategy? There were reports of discrimination in access to health centres for non-Qatari citizens.  What measures were in place to address disparities in access to healthcare?  Qatar had one of the highest rates of adolescent obesity in the region.  How was the State party addressing this?  How was it promoting access to mental health for children and adolescents?

    BENOIT VAN KEIRSBILCK, Committee Expert and Country Taskforce Member, said that Qatar had not ratified the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Convention against Discrimination in Education.  Why was this?  Why did most Qatari families choose private schools, while non-Qataris typically attended public schools?  What was the State party doing to support education costs?  There were schools that supported children who had dropped out of school; how effective were they?  Was there an official sexual and reproductive health education programme in schools? What was being done to promote access to safe and inclusive spaces for play and recreation?

    The Committee was concerned that Qatar continued to detain migrant children and families.  In which detention centres were migrants placed? Were there plans to revise the policy of detaining migrant children?  Most migrant workers in Qatar were men.  Were there plans to revise family reunification rules to make it more accessible for workers with low wages?  Were there plans to regularise the children of migrants born in Qatar?

    Members of the Al-Ghufran clan had been deprived of their nationality many years ago. How many of these people still did not have Qatari nationality, and were there plans to resolve their situation? How did the State party ensure that migrant children could enrol in schools and how did it investigate complaints issued by domestic workers?  How many girls were working as domestic workers?  What programmes were in place that supported children in street situations? What results had been achieved by the law on trafficking in persons?  What measures had been implemented to prevent and prosecute cases of trafficking in children occurring during the 2022 World Cup?

    Qatar had one of the lowest minimum ages of criminal responsibility in the world, at seven years of age, and many legal protections for child offenders only applied for children under age 16.  How many children up to 18 years old were deprived of liberty and in what settings? Were they mixed with adults?  Were children in detention informed about the National Human Rights Committee’s complaints mechanism?  Did the State party intend to ratify the Safe Schools Declaration?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said corporal punishment against all persons was prohibited, including punishment of persons with disabilities.  There was no dedicated legislation on domestic violence, but there were legislative measures that covered domestic violence, and a court had been set up that specialised in domestic violence and temporary shelters, mandated to protect women and children who were victims of domestic violence.  In 2024, the State party organised workshops training for around 5,000 people on issues such as protecting children from violence and intimidation.  There were around 40,000 confirmed cases of domestic violence between 2024 and 2025.

    Initiatives had been adopted to minimise the impact of climate change on children, including adaption of infrastructure and measures to reduce carbon emissions and increase the use of renewable energy.  The State party had constructed 18 square kilometres of green zones in 2023 and an additional eight in 2024.  There was also a course within the school curriculum that focused on protecting the environment and living sustainably.  Schools celebrated a “sustainability week”.  Qatar had also taken measures to ensure the provision of good quality water.  It periodically monitored water and air quality in schools, kindergartens and public hospitals. 

    Qatar promoted children’s health through various measures.  Nine free health check-ups were provided to children up to age five.  The State party encouraged exclusive breastfeeding up to six months; there had been a sharp increase in breastfeeding rates over the past decade.  The State party had developed programmes to tackle the child obesity rate, which aimed to reduce this rate by 30 per cent by 2030.  School nutrition clinics provided specialised services to prevent childhood obesity and nutritional problems.  A 2022 law governed universal healthcare coverage.

    Sexual and reproductive health education and education on drug addiction were provided in schools from primary level, and there was also teaching on the protection of children from neglect, and online and sexual exploitation.  Children were instructed on how to find psychological assistance, and on alerting authorities about threats.

    Qatar promoted access to a healthy environment for children with disabilities.  It had beaches that had been adapted to ensure accessibility.  Various projects were being developed for children with disabilities up to 2030.  A single database covering all children with disabilities in the education system had been set up.  Qatar had over 5,300 pupils with disabilities in public and private schools.  Some 62 per cent of schools were inclusive. There were specialised training programmes for children with disabilities that supported them to become autonomous.

    Children with disabilities had access to specialised healthcare through 10 healthcare centres tailored to their needs, including four centres for children with autism.  The third national strategy 2024-2030 included measures for improving rehabilitation and diagnosis services for persons with disabilities. Social workers, family and community members were trained to care for children with disabilities and support their inclusion in society. 

    Qatari legislators sought to recognise children with disabilities as having legal capacity on par with others, and to promote their access to work, education and other rights.  The draft disability code had been developed and was now being deliberated by the Government.  Measures to exempt persons with disabilities from certain Government fees were being developed.  Legislators sought to promote access to complaints mechanisms for children with disabilities and their families.  The State funded legal aid services to support children in court, including children with disabilities.

    The draft child code defined all persons less than 18 years old as children.

    As part of the 2024-2030 development strategy, the State party had visited schools and engaged in dialogue with students, parents and teachers.  “Sustainability ambassadors” who promoted environmental protection were appointed in schools, and young people could contribute to the Shura Council. Many children had taken part in drafting the State party’s report.

    The State party was promoting awareness of human rights for children through social education courses and campaigns in schools, through which children learned about the Convention, gender equality, democracy, acceptance of others, cybersecurity, and preventing bullying.  Media campaigns on children’s rights were carried out and manuals and training programmes had been developed to inform teachers, social workers and other public officials about children’s rights.  The State party organised annual events to mark Children’s Day.

    Qatar was committed to protecting school establishments from attack.  It had signed the Safe Schools Declaration and participated in the Education for All initiative.  Qatar helped organise events on 9 September each year at United Nations offices in New York and Geneva to mark the International Day to Protect Education from Attack.

    Public schools applied international standards, including the international baccalaureate programme. Migrant parents could choose the school that their children attended and the language of instruction.  The State ensured the provision of free schooling to students coming from regions of armed conflict.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    BENOIT VAN KEIRSBILCK, Committee Expert and Country Taskforce Member, asked whether police provided sexual education in schools?  Was legal aid free for every child and accessible from the first stage of arrest? Did the State party criminally prosecute children who were addicted to drugs?

    TIMOTHY P.T. EKESA, Committee Expert and Country Taskforce Member, said Qatar generally prohibited abortion, only allowing it in three special cases.  There were severe penalties imposed on women who received unauthorised abortions.  How many unauthorised abortions had the State recorded over the reporting period?

    Another Committee Expert asked about the likelihood of approving the children’s act soon.  Would Qatar provide a complete definition of the child in this legislation?

    A Committee Expert asked about awareness raising campaigns in place to reduce the rate of child deaths from road accidents, which remained quite high in Qatar.  How was wastewater treated and what percentage of the population had access to potable water?

    One Committee Expert asked if Qatari children had access to contraception.  Were children who were the product of rape given Qatari nationality? Did national institutions take a gender specific approach?  Was free legal assistance provided to victims of domestic violence?

    A Committee Expert asked about the level of integration that the State party’s hotline had with law enforcement, health services and social services.  What services were provided to children of adults deprived of liberty, including adults on death row?

    SOPHIE KILADZE, Committee Chair, asked whether the State party had measures to reduce children’s screen time and a policy on artificial intelligence and its effects on children.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the 2015 law on the departure of migrants set up a mechanism for entering and exiting Qatar. It regulated the provision of housing, healthcare and education for migrants, as well as the conditions migrants needed to meet to obtain residence permits.  Migrants who did not meet these conditions were deported following the standard procedure.  Persons without identity documents who were accompanied by children, as well as stateless and unaccompanied children, were placed in a shelter while being processed. In 2024, there were 22 such detentions, and thus far there had been six detentions in 2025.  The State party worked with relevant embassies to support processing of these people.

    A directorate had been established that was mandated to prevent road accidents.

    Psychological support was provided to children whose parents had been sentenced to death.  The Criminal Procedural Code provided for two years of reprieve from detention for pregnant women, and when both parents were charged with the same crime, one parent was granted reprieve from detention to care for their children while the other parent was detained.

    The age of criminal liability started from seven years.  From ages seven to 16, judges could only impose sanctions requiring the child’s parents to obey certain commitments or send the child to rehabilitation programmes. The juvenile justice system was based on rehabilitation, not punishment.  Children aged 16 to 18 were more aware of their actions and thus had increased criminal liability.  The death penalty could be used on such children, but judges could commute the sentence, considering the age of the child when the crime was committed.  No one aged 16 to 18 had been sentenced to death in Qatar.

    Qatar had evacuated over 65,000 people from Afghanistan in 2021.  Qatar provided these people with housing and psychological support and facilitated their voluntary travel to other countries.  The State had also evacuated many children from Gaza to Qatar, providing them with free healthcare and education.

    Sexual education was provided by teachers and social workers, not police, in schools.  A national workshop had been set up to develop sexual education; psychologists were involved in this process.

    The State had a legal aid office with attorneys who provided children with free legal assistance and defended them in court.  The office also provided assistance in cases of domestic violence.

    Islamic Sharia was the source of laws in Qatar.  Criminal legislation on abortion was in line with Sharia.  In the State’s view, foetuses had the same rights as adults and benefited from legal protection.  Abortions could only take place if the pregnancy threatened the life of the mother.  Children who were the product of rape could access Qatari nationality.

    Qatar had created legislation combatting cybercrime, which punished all digital intimation and threats.  There were harsher sentences when the victim was a child or had a disability.  The State had also launched a platform that aimed to educate children and families on the safe use of digital technology and build children’s digital skills.  It had a national strategy on artificial intelligence and was committed to developing digital infrastructure that respected human rights. 

    Qatar had acceded to International Labour Organization Conventions 138 and 180 on child labour.  The State’s law on domestic workers protected such workers from exploitation.  The law banned hiring people under 18 years of age for domestic work.  Migrant workers needed to be 18 years of age or older. Domestic workers had the same rights as other workers, including regarding access to healthcare.  There was a Government Department that received complaints from domestic workers, which operated in 11 different languages.

    The State party respected the rights of migrant workers to live with their families.  These workers could bring their children to the State if they fulfilled a strict set of conditions.

    Qatar had criminalised all forms of trafficking of persons, including labour exploitation.  Penalties for trafficking were increased when the victim was a child.  There was a committee within the Ministry of Labour that was responsible for combatting trafficking in persons.  Qatari law was in line with the Optional Protocol on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography.

    The hotline for reporting violations of children’s rights was manned by psychologists, who assessed the urgency of the complaint and referred it to the relevant authorities.

    The Qatar Social Work Foundation worked to enhance family bonds and to prevent domestic violence.  It provided lectures for prospective parents and counselling and mediation services seeking to resolve family problems amicability. The Foundation worked to defend children’s rights in cases of divorce, providing them with psychological counselling. Legislation had been developed that ensured that custody could be provided to mothers in cases of divorce.

    Concluding Remarks 

    AISSATOU ALASSANE SIDIKOU, Committee Expert and Taskforce Coordinator, thanked the delegation for the interesting dialogue.  Many efforts had been made by the State for children, but challenges remained.  The Committee hoped that the dialogue would help to improve protections for children in Qatar.  Ms. Sidikou said she hoped that the members of the State party would carry all children in their hearts in their work.

    AHMAD BIN HASSAN AL-HAMMADI, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Qatar and head of the delegation, thanked the Committee and all persons who had contributed to the constructive dialogue, which was an important opportunity to promote the rights of the child and global peace.  The State party would use the Committee’s concluding observations to improve measures for children.  The Committee needed to consider the information provided by the State and its cultural specificities.  Qatar was committed to cooperating with the Committee and to addressing the challenges and risks it faced concerning the rights of the child.  It had achieved great progress in human rights over the years through cooperation with human rights mechanisms.

    SOPHIE KILADZE, Committee Chair, said that the information provided by the State party would help the Committee to assess the achievements made by Qatar and the challenges it faced. The Committee respected States’ cultural specificities, but violations of the Convention could not be justified in any circumstances.  The Committee would do its best to develop concluding observations that would strengthen the rights of children in Qatar to the extent possible.  It hoped that the State party would present further progress for children in its next dialogue with the Committee.

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CRC25.014E

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Economics: Meeting of 16-17 April 2025

    Source: European Central Bank

    Account of the monetary policy meeting of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank held in Frankfurt am Main on Wednesday and Thursday, 16-17 April 2025

    22 May 2025

    1. Review of financial, economic and monetary developments and policy options

    Financial market developments

    Ms Schnabel recalled that President Trump’s announcement on 2 April 2025 of unexpectedly high tariffs had sparked a sharp sell-off in global equity markets and in US bond markets, leading to a surge in financial market volatility. The severity of the tariffs and the manner in which they had been introduced had led to a breakdown of standard cross-market correlations, with a sell-off of US equities occurring at the same time as a sell-off of Treasuries in the context of a marked depreciation of the US dollar against major currencies.

    Movements in euro area risk-free rates reflected the opposing impacts of the historic German fiscal package and the global trade conflict. At the long end of the yield curve, the expected positive growth impulse from fiscal policy, as well as expectations of tighter monetary policy in the future, had been the dominant factors, pulling up nominal and real interest rates. At the short end of the yield curve, the decline in inflation compensation, driven mainly by falling inflation risk premia, had been larger than the rise in real yields, leading to a decline in nominal rates. These developments reflected both the negative fallout from tariffs and lower commodity prices. Investors expected the ECB to react to the evolving situation by lowering rates more than had previously been anticipated, but to start raising them again in the coming year. Amid the market turbulence, euro area bond markets had continued to function smoothly, and the bond supply had been absorbed well in the context of strong investor demand and well-functioning dealer intermediation. On the back of the sharp correction in stock prices and the marked appreciation of the euro exchange rate, financial conditions in the euro area had tightened, despite lower nominal short-term rates.

    Turning to market developments since the previous Governing Council meeting, President Trump’s announcement on 2 April 2025 had led the VIX volatility index to temporarily reach levels not seen since the COVID-19 pandemic. Within a few days the S&P 500 index had dropped by 12%, triggering sharp corrections in stock markets around the world, including in the euro area. Despite a rebound after the pausing of “reciprocal” tariffs on 9 April 2025, the US benchmark equity index had lost 8% in the year to date while euro area stock markets were almost back to the levels seen at the start of the year. Stocks in trade-sensitive US sectors had been hit much harder than other stocks, and they had also dropped by much more than their euro area counterparts.

    The market turbulence had spilled over to government bond markets, but the reaction had differed markedly between the euro area and the United States. US government bond yields had risen at the same time as the US equity sell-off, which was highly unusual because Treasury bonds normally benefited from safe-haven flows. US ten-year asset swap spreads had likewise risen sharply, which was also unusual. Meanwhile, Bund yields had declined and the spread between the Bund and overnight index swap (OIS) rates had narrowed substantially as German government bonds had continued to perform their role as a safe-haven asset.

    The risk-off sentiment had also affected the dynamics of the US dollar exchange rate, but this too had reacted differently from what would normally have been expected. In January 2025 the EUR/USD exchange rate had hit a low of 1.02, but the euro’s downward trend had been reversed around the time of the announcement in early March 2025 of the reform of the German debt brake, with a positive growth narrative for Europe emerging in light of higher defence and infrastructure spending. The euro exchange rate had received a second major boost after the 2 April tariff announcement in the United States. This strong upward move had not been driven, as was usually the case, by changes in the yield differential, which had moved in the opposite direction, but by US dollar weakness as investors had revised down their US growth expectations. Over recent weeks the US dollar had thus not benefited from the widespread risk-off mood.

    Recent developments had been reflected in global portfolio flows. The March 2025 round of the Bank of America Fund Manager Survey had recorded the strongest shift out of US equities on record, with 45% of managers reporting that they had reduced their positions. At the same time, a significant share of fund managers had reported that they had changed their positioning in favour of euro area equities. This marked a significant shift of perspectives away from US exceptionalism towards Europe being seen as the bright spot among major economies, given the expected fiscal boost in Germany and the pick-up in European defence spending.

    Dynamics in risk-free bond markets illustrated the opposing impacts of the German fiscal package and the tariff announcements over recent weeks. In the euro area, the overall increase in longer-term nominal interest rates had been driven by a rise in real rates, indicating that market participants viewed the German fiscal package as fostering long-term growth. Real rates had kept rising during the tariff tensions, as investors had continued to expect, on balance, an improved growth outlook for the euro area. By contrast, inflation compensation had decreased across the yield curve after increasing only briefly in response to the German fiscal package.

    Ms Schnabel then turned to the drivers of developments in euro area inflation compensation. On the one hand, bond market investors were pricing in higher inflation compensation owing to the expansionary German fiscal measures to be implemented over the next decade. On the other hand, concerns about the trade war had pulled inflation compensation lower, more than compensating for the impact of the German fiscal package on short to medium-term maturities. One important driver of the downward revision had been the sharp drop in oil prices in the wake of the tariff announcements and rising fears of a global recession.

    Market participants currently expected the ECB to implement a faster and deeper easing cycle towards a terminal rate of around 1.7% in May 2026. However, the ECB was expected to start raising rates again in 2026 in a J-curve pattern, with rate expectations picking up notably over longer horizons.

    In corporate bond markets, credit spreads had increased globally in response to the risk-off sentiment and the sharp sell-off in risk asset markets. However, the surge in US investment-grade corporate bond spreads had been more pronounced compared with developments in their euro area counterparts.

    Sovereign spreads had remained resilient over the past few weeks. The marked rise in the Bund yield after the announcement of the German fiscal package in March 2025 had not translated into an increase in sovereign spreads, which had even declined slightly at that time. The benign reaction of euro area government bond markets over recent weeks could be explained by expectations of positive economic spillovers from Germany to the rest of the euro area, possible prospects of increased European unity and, in the case of Italy, positive rating action.

    Government bond issuance in the euro area had continued to be absorbed well as investor demand had remained robust, with primary and secondary markets continuing to function smoothly. Higher volatility in government bond markets had not led to a meaningful deterioration in liquidity conditions, unlike in previous stress episodes. Hence, the turbulence in US Treasury markets had not had repercussions for the functioning of euro area sovereign bond markets.

    Ms Schnabel concluded by considering the implications of recent market developments for overall financial conditions. Since the March monetary policy meeting financial conditions had tightened, mainly owing to lower equity prices and a stronger nominal effective exchange rate of the euro, which had more than compensated for the easing impulse stemming from lower nominal short-term interest rates. Real rates had gradually shifted up across the yield curve. Overall, recent market developments might not only be a reflection of short-term market disturbances but also of a broader shift in global financial markets, with the euro area being one potential beneficiary.

    The global environment and economic and monetary developments in the euro area

    Starting with inflation in the euro area, Mr Lane stated that the disinflation process was well on track. Inflation had continued to develop as expected, with both headline inflation in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) and core inflation (HICP inflation excluding energy and food) declining in March. Headline inflation had declined to 2.2% in March, from 2.3% in February. Energy inflation had decreased to -1.0%, in part owing to a sharper than expected decline in oil prices, while food inflation had increased to 2.9% on the back of higher unprocessed food prices. Core inflation had declined to 2.4% in March, from 2.6% in February. While goods inflation remained stable at 0.6%, there had been a marked downward adjustment in services inflation, which had dropped to 3.5% in March from 3.7% in February, confirming the more muted repricing momentum in some services that had been expected.

    Most exclusion-based measures of underlying inflation had eased further in March. The Persistent and Common Component of Inflation (PCCI), which had the best predictive power for future headline inflation, had decreased to 2.2% in March from 2.3% in February. Domestic inflation was unchanged in March after declining to 3.9% in February, down from 4.0% in January. The differential between domestic inflation and services inflation reflected the significant deceleration of inflation in the traded services segment seen in the recent data.

    Wage growth was moderating. The annual growth rate of compensation per employee had declined to 4.1% in the fourth quarter of 2024, down from 4.5% in the third quarter and below the March 2025 projection of 4.3%. Negotiated wage growth had also come in at 4.1% in the fourth quarter of 2024. According to the April round of the Corporate Telephone Survey, leading non-financial corporations in the euro area had reduced their wage growth expectations for 2025 to 3.0%, down from 3.6% in the previous survey round. Respondents to the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises had marked down their wage growth expectations for the next 12 months to 3.0%, from 3.3% in the last survey round. Looking ahead, the ECB wage tracker also pointed to a substantial decrease in annual growth of negotiated wages between 2024 and 2025, with one-off payments becoming a less dominant component of salary increases. Wage expectations reported in the Survey of Professional Forecasters and the Consensus Economics survey also signalled an easing of labour cost growth in 2025 compared with last year (between 0.7 and 1.0 percentage point), which was broadly in line with the March projections.

    Looking ahead, inflation was expected to hover close to the inflation target of 2% for the remainder of the year. Core inflation, and in particular services inflation, was expected to decline until mid-2025 as the effects from lagged repricing faded out, wage pressures receded, and past monetary policy tightening continued to feed through. Surveys confirmed this overall picture, while longer-term inflation expectations had remained well anchored around the 2% target. At the same time, market participants had markedly revised down their expectations for inflation over shorter horizons, with the one-year forward inflation-linked swap rates one year ahead, two years ahead and four years ahead declining by around 20 basis points to 1.6%, 1.7% and 1.9% respectively.

    Global growth was expected to have maintained its momentum in the first quarter of the year, with the global composite output Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) released on 3 April averaging 52.0. The manufacturing PMI had been recovering and stood above the threshold indicating expansion, while the services PMI had lost some momentum in advanced economies. However, global growth was likely to be negatively affected by the US-initiated increases in tariffs and the resulting financial market turmoil, which had come against the backdrop of already elevated geopolitical tensions.

    Triggered by concerns about global demand, oil and gas prices, along with other commodity prices, had declined sharply since 2 April. Compared with the assumption for the March projections, Brent crude oil prices were now approximately 10% lower in US dollar terms and 18.3% lower in euro terms. Gas prices stood 37% below the value embedded in the March projections. The euro had strengthened over recent weeks as investor sentiment had proven more resilient towards the euro area than towards other economies, with the EUR/USD exchange rate up 9.6% and the nominal effective exchange rate up 5.5% compared with the assumptions for the March projections.

    Euro area economic growth had slowed to 0.2%, quarter on quarter, in the fourth quarter of 2024, down from 0.4% in the third quarter. This figure was 0.1 percentage points higher than had been foreseen in the March projections. As projected, growth had been entirely driven by domestic demand. The economy was also likely to have grown in the first quarter of the year, and manufacturing had shown signs of stabilisation. The initial tariff announcements by the United States in early 2025 had so far seemed not to have materially dampened economic sentiment and might even have led to some frontloading of trade. However, some more recent surveys indicated a decline in sentiment. These included the latest Consumer Expectations Survey, the ZEW Indicator of Economic Sentiment and the Sentix Economic index.

    The labour market remained resilient. The unemployment rate had edged down to 6.1% in February. At the same time, labour demand was cooling. The job vacancy rate had remained unchanged at 2.5% in the fourth quarter of 2024 and now stood 0.8 percentage points below its peak in the second quarter of 2022. Total job postings and new postings were 16% and 26% lower respectively compared with a year ago. Additionally, fewer firms had reported that labour was a limiting factor for production. The employment PMI had remained broadly neutral in March at 50.4, pointing to stable employment conditions in the first quarter of 2025.

    Fiscal policies were identified as another potential source of resilience. Newly announced government measures were expected to have a relatively limited impact on the fiscal stance of the euro area compared with the assessment included in the March projections. But the scope for infrastructure investment and climate transition investment, as well as spending on defence in the largest euro area economy, had been substantially increased as a result of the loosening of the German debt brake, together with enhanced flexibility for greater spending on defence across euro area countries as a result of EU initiatives.

    The economic outlook was clouded by exceptional uncertainty, however. Downside risks to economic growth had increased. The major escalation in global trade tensions and the associated uncertainty were likely to lower euro area growth by dampening exports and investment. Deteriorating financial market sentiment could lead to tighter financing conditions and increased risk aversion, and could make firms and households less willing to invest and consume. Geopolitical tensions, such as Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine and the tragic conflict in the Middle East, also remained a major source of uncertainty. At the same time, an increase in defence and infrastructure spending would add to growth.

    Increasing global trade disruptions were adding more uncertainty to the outlook for euro area inflation. Falling global energy prices and the appreciation of the euro could put further downward pressure on inflation. This could be reinforced by lower demand for euro area exports owing to higher tariffs and by a re-routing of exports into the euro area from countries with overcapacity. Adverse financial market reactions to the trade tensions could weigh on domestic demand and thereby also lead to lower inflation. By contrast, a fragmentation of global supply chains could raise inflation by pushing up import prices. A boost in defence and infrastructure spending could also raise inflation over the medium term. Extreme weather events, and the unfolding climate crisis more broadly, could drive up food prices by more than expected.

    Turning to the monetary and financial analysis, risk-free interest rates had declined in response to the escalating trade tensions. However, the risk-free ten-year OIS rate was about 20 basis points higher than at the cut-off date for the March projections. Bank bond spreads had increased by nearly 30 basis points. Credit spreads had increased by 23 basis points for investment-grade corporate bonds and by as much as 95 basis points for the high-yield segment. The Eurostoxx index had fallen by around 4.8% since the cut-off date for the March projections, while indicators of market volatility had increased.

    The latest information on the availability and cost of credit for the broader economy predated the market tensions but continued to indicate a gradual normalisation in credit conditions, though with some mixed evidence. The interest rate on new loans to firms had declined by 15 basis points in February, to 4.1%, which was about 120 basis points below its October 2023 peak. However, interest rates on new mortgages had increased by 8 basis points in February, to 3.3%, which was around 70 basis points below their November 2023 peak. Loan growth was picking up at a moderate pace. Annual growth in bank lending to firms had increased to 2.2% in February, from 2.0% in January, amid marked month-on-month volatility. Corporate debt issuance had been weak in February, but the annual growth rate had stabilised at 3.2%. Lending to households had edged up further to 1.5% on an annual basis in February, from 1.3% in January, led by mortgages. According to the latest bank lending survey for the euro area, which had been conducted between 10 and 25 March 2025, credit standards had tightened slightly further for loans to firms and consumer credit in the first quarter, while there had been an easing of credit standards for mortgages. This evidence resonated with the results of the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises, which also showed almost unchanged availability of bank loans to firms in the first quarter, owing to concerns about the economic outlook and borrower creditworthiness, compounded by high uncertainty.

    Monetary policy considerations and policy options

    In summary, the incoming data confirmed that the disinflation process remained well on track. Both headline and core inflation in March had come in as expected. In particular, the projected drop in services inflation in March had been confirmed in the data and underpinned confidence in the underlying downward trajectory. The more forward-looking indicators of underlying inflation remained consistent with inflation settling at around the target in a sustained manner, with domestic inflation also coming down on the back of lower labour cost growth, which was decelerating somewhat faster than had been expected. The euro area economy had been building up some resilience against global shocks, but the outlook for growth had deteriorated materially owing to rising trade tensions. Increased uncertainty was likely to reduce confidence among households and firms, and the adverse and volatile market response to the recent trade tensions was likely to have a tightening impact on financing conditions and thereby further weigh on the euro area economic outlook.

    Based on this assessment, Mr Lane proposed lowering the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. In particular, lowering the deposit facility rate – the rate through which the Governing Council steered the monetary policy stance – was rooted in its updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. A further cut at the present meeting was important in ensuring that inflation stabilised at the target in a sustainable manner, while also avoiding the possibility that external adverse shocks to the economic outlook could be exacerbated by too high a level of the policy rate.

    Looking ahead, it remained more important than ever to maintain agility in adjusting the stance as appropriate on a meeting-by-meeting basis and to not pre-commit to any particular rate path.

    2. Governing Council’s discussion and monetary policy decisions

    Economic, monetary and financial analyses

    Regarding global conditions, members stressed that the outlook for global growth was highly uncertain. In reaction to the frequent – and often contradictory – tariff announcements and retaliation over the last few weeks, the International Monetary Fund was currently revising its World Economic Outlook. Since the Governing Council’s last monetary policy meeting the euro had appreciated by 4.2% in nominal effective terms and by 6.4% against the US dollar, driven by market expectations of a narrowing growth differential between the euro area and the United States and possibly by a broad-based investor reassessment of the risk attached to exposures to the United States. Energy and food commodity prices had also declined sharply owing to growth concerns as the trade war intensified. The combined effect of a weakening dollar and declining oil and gas prices meant that, in euro terms, oil prices had fallen by 18.3% and gas prices by 37% since the March Governing Council meeting. Macroeconomic data did not yet reflect fully the ongoing trade war, which would only show through more clearly in the data during the second quarter of 2025. The composite output PMI for global activity excluding the euro area had remained broadly stable in March.

    Global trade was expected to slow significantly. This reflected lower imports primarily from the United States, China, Mexico and Canada – all countries with sizeable reciprocal trade relations. In the first quarter trade had still been strong owing to a rebound at the beginning of the year, in part driven by a frontloading of imports in anticipation of future tariffs. However, high-frequency and more timely data (based on vessel movements) had already started weakening, in particular for US imports. Private sector forecasts for US growth in 2025 had started trending down in the run-up to the 2 April tariff announcement. However, that event, together with the deterioration in financial conditions that followed, had led to a further downward revision to US GDP growth prospects for this year, as the high uncertainty around US policies was expected to hold back investment and economic activity. In this context the impact of the confidence channel was regarded as particularly important. While most economists had assumed that with higher tariffs and a trade war the US dollar would appreciate, the latest developments pointed to adverse confidence effects and the self-defeating nature of tariffs weakening the dollar. Private sector forecasts for Chinese growth in 2025 had also been revised down since early April, as the contribution from net exports – a key source of support for Chinese growth in 2024 – was expected to decline significantly this year. The Chinese Government’s announcement of additional fiscal support to boost consumption was seen as likely to only partially offset the loss of international trade.

    In general, protectionism and policy unpredictability were seen as the ultimate sources of distress. This raised the question of whether the impact of these factors could unwind when the policy approach that had generated them might reverse. Indeed, the view was expressed that mutually beneficial trade agreements could be reached, leading to a much more benign outcome. At the same time, it was argued that, first, a complete unwinding of the 2 April tariff policy announcement was unlikely and, second, even in the event of a complete policy turnaround, it was questionable whether the world economy could return to its previous status quo.

    The recent strong appreciation of the euro was largely explained by portfolio rebalancing due to growing concerns among investors about US economic policies and the risks that these posed to large exposures to the United States. Overall, the current state of the world economy was not regarded as being at an equilibrium, and it might take several years before the global economy reached a new equilibrium. For a long time the world had been in a configuration centred on the United States running large current account deficits, with optimistic consumers, high private sector investment rates and a large fiscal deficit.

    Looking ahead, two polar scenarios could be seen. One was a stabilisation of the situation, whereby the US current account deficit was structural and largely financed by capital inflows. In this situation, the ongoing portfolio rebalancing across currencies would eventually reverse in favour of the United States, leading to a renewed real appreciation of the US dollar, partly driven by relative price adjustments. However, recent events had eroded trust in the US system, and it was challenging to envisage how it might be restored.

    The other possible direction that the global order could take was a continuation of current rebalancing trends. Such a situation could lead temporarily to much higher US inflation as a result of the combined effects of tariffs and a potentially weaker exchange rate. More generally, the new equilibrium could entail high tariffs, an increase in home bias – for trade balance or security reasons – and a more fragmented world. This more fragmented environment was likely to be characterised by stronger inflationary pressures. In addition, the move to a new equilibrium would involve costly adjustment dynamics, as firms, households and governments would have to re-optimise in light of the new constellation, but also owing to the high levels of uncertainty in the transition period. In the meantime, the erosion of confidence in the US economy and in the global order of international trade and finance was expected to result in a higher global cost structure arising from protectionist policies and a higher risk premium arising from unpredictability. An intermediate scenario was also possible, in which the euro would become increasingly attractive, thus expanding its international role as a reserve currency.

    Overall, even if it was known with certainty where the new equilibrium lay, there would still be major adjustment dynamics along the way. In addition, as global supply chains had been shaped over the years to best adapt to the old equilibrium, they would need to adjust to the new one, with a likely loss of market value for those firms that had been most engaged in the old global order. Throughout this process there would be path dependence in the dynamics of the economy.

    With regard to economic activity in the euro area, members concurred that the economic outlook was clouded by exceptional uncertainty. Euro area exporters faced new barriers to trade, although the scope and nature of those barriers remained unclear. Disruptions to international commerce, financial market tensions and geopolitical uncertainty were weighing on business investment. As consumers became more cautious about the future, they might hold back from spending, thus delaying further the more robust consumption-led recovery that the staff projections had been foreseeing for a number of projection rounds.

    At the same time, the euro area economy had been building up some resilience against the global shocks. Domestic demand had contributed significantly to euro area growth in the fourth quarter of 2024, with business investment and private consumption growing robustly in spite of the already high uncertainty. The manufacturing output PMI had risen above 50 in March for the first time in two years, while the services business activity PMI had remained in expansionary territory, with relatively solid industrial production numbers confirming information from the soft indicators. While the trade conflict was a significant drag on foreign demand, the expected fiscal spending would counter some of those effects. The economy was likely to have grown in the first quarter of the year, and manufacturing had shown signs of stabilisation. Unemployment had fallen to 6.1% in February, its lowest level since the launch of the euro. Looking ahead, a strong labour market, higher real incomes and the impact of an easier monetary policy stance should underpin spending.

    For the near term, it was argued that the likely slump in trade and the surge in uncertainty were hitting the euro area at a critical juncture, when the recovery was still weak and fragile. It was seen as becoming increasingly clear that the impact of the trade shock might be very strong in terms of activity in the United States, with potentially substantial spillovers to the euro area. Even with the additional spending on defence and infrastructure, it was likely that, on balance, euro area growth would be worse in 2025 than previously expected. Incorporating the impact from the most recent escalation of trade tensions, potential retaliatory measures from the EU and the financial market turbulence of recent weeks could weaken activity in 2025 significantly. As a result, it was suggested that the probability of a recession over the next four quarters in the euro area and the United States had increased measurably.

    However, it was also argued that, while complicated, the situation still had upside potential. First, the strong market reaction might impose some discipline on the US Administration. Second, there was room for mutually beneficial trade agreements which would de-escalate the severity of the tariff increase threatened in the 2 April announcement. Regarding the fallout for growth, the ultimate effects of the new trade frictions would crucially depend on the substitutability of items imported by the United States. The bulk of exports from the euro area to the United States comprised pharmaceuticals, machinery, vehicles and chemicals, and these were highly differentiated products which were difficult to substitute away from in the short run. This rigidity would limit the drag on the euro area’s foreign demand. Moreover, the almost prohibitive tariffs between China and the United States were seen as likely to redirect demand towards euro area firms.

    A further factor that could attenuate the repercussions of trade frictions and uncertainty was the announcement of the German fiscal package and the step-up in European defence spending, which would raise domestic demand. This new factor was seen as unmitigated good news, as it would help to revive the European growth narrative and foster confidence in the euro area. What mattered was not only the direct effects of fiscal spending on demand and activity, but also the expected crowding-in of private investment in anticipation of the future fiscal stimulus. In the Corporate Telephone Survey, firms were already reporting that they were planning to enhance capacity in view of the defence and infrastructure initiatives. The Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises also pointed to greater optimism among firms on investment. Construction was set to recover further. It was therefore argued that the negative impact of tariffs could be seen as more or less the same size as the positive impact coming from the fiscal expansion in Germany. Of course, the time profiles of the impacts of the two major shocks – tariff increases and fiscal stimulus – were different. In the short term the negative effects on demand would dominate, as additional investment in defence and infrastructure would take time to come on stream and support growth.

    At the same time, the view was expressed that even in the medium term defence spending would not be a clear game changer, because it would not only materialise with a delay, but would likely lift euro area GDP growth by at most a couple of tenths of a percentage point. In any case, the fiscal stimulus was still uncertain in terms of its scale and modalities of implementation. In this context, it was noted that the reaction of the markets to the fiscal announcement from Germany suggested that the euro area economy was likely to respond to the new fiscal impulse with an increase in GDP and only a very mild increase in inflation. This demonstrated that the euro area economy was not seen as constrained by structural problems.

    Overall, members assessed that downside risks to economic growth had increased. The major escalation in global trade tensions and associated uncertainties would likely lower euro area growth by dampening exports, and it might drag down investment and consumption. Deteriorating financial market sentiment could lead to tighter financing conditions, increase risk aversion and make firms and households less willing to invest and consume. Geopolitical tensions, such as Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine and the tragic conflict in the Middle East, also remained a major source of uncertainty. At the same time, an increase in defence and infrastructure spending would add to growth.

    In view of all the uncertainties surrounding the outlook, the view was expressed that for the coming meetings of the Governing Council it was important to develop alternative scenarios. These should factor in the prevailing very high level of uncertainty and assist in identifying the relevant channels and quantifying the impact on growth, jobs and inflation. In addition to scenario analysis, it was important to use high-frequency and unconventional sources of information to better understand the direction the economy was taking. There was also a need to broaden the set of indicators to be monitored, given the challenges in interpreting some of the standard statistics which were influenced and distorted by special factors such as the frontloading of orders and the associated build-up of inventories.

    A silver lining in the turbulent situation that Europe was facing was a strong impetus for European policymakers to swiftly implement the structural reforms set out in the reports by Mario Draghi and Enrico Letta. If effective, such concrete action had the potential to become a major tailwind for the euro area economy in the future, amplifying the stimulating effect of the additional fiscal spending that was planned in Germany. At the same time, it was cautioned that, to reap all the benefits from reform, Europe had to act quickly and on an ambitious scale.

    The important policy initiatives that had been launched at the national and EU levels to increase defence spending and infrastructure investment could be expected to bolster manufacturing, which was also reflected in recent surveys. In the present geopolitical environment, it was even more urgent for fiscal and structural policies to make the euro area economy more productive, competitive and resilient. The European Commission’s Competitiveness Compass provided a concrete roadmap for action, and its proposals, including on simplification, should be swiftly adopted. This included completing the savings and investment union, following a clear and ambitious timetable, which should help savers benefit from more opportunities to invest and improve firms’ access to finance, especially risk capital. It was also important to rapidly establish the legislative framework to prepare the ground for the potential introduction of a digital euro. Governments should ensure sustainable public finances in line with the EU’s economic governance framework and prioritise essential growth-enhancing structural reforms and strategic investment.

    With regard to price developments, members concurred with the assessment presented by Mr Lane. In spite of all remaining uncertainties, the recent inflation data releases had been broadly in line with the March ECB staff projections, with respect to both headline and core inflation. This suggested that inflation was on course for the 2% target, with long-term inflation expectations also remaining well anchored. Taking the February and March inflation data together, there was now much more confidence that the baseline scenario for inflation in the March projections was materialising. This held even without the appreciation of the euro or the decline in oil prices and commodity prices that had taken place since the finalisation of the projections.

    Looking ahead, it was argued that inflation would likely be lower in 2025 than foreseen in the March projections if the exchange rate and energy prices remained around their current levels. Recent market-based measures of inflation expectations also indicated that inflation might be falling faster than previously assumed. Inflation fixings now implied that investors expected inflation (excluding tobacco) to remain just below 2% in 2025 and to decline to around 1.2% in early 2026, before returning to around 1.6% by mid-2026. This signalled that risks to price stability might now be tilted to the downside, especially in the near term. The latest information also suggested that wage growth was moderating at a slightly faster pace than previously expected. Over a longer horizon, the tighter financial conditions, including the appreciation of the euro, the sharp drop in oil and gas prices and the headwinds from weaker economic activity, were seen as important new factors dampening inflation. There was now a risk that inflation could fall well below 2% at least over the remainder of the current year. Trade diversion and price concessions by Chinese exporters could also compound the ongoing depreciation of the renminbi and exert further downward effects on inflation, if not countered by measures by the European Commission. If there were to be retaliation against the tariffs imposed on US imports from the euro area, the direct inflationary impact could be counterbalanced by other factors, including the exchange rate, weaker raw material prices or possibly tighter financial conditions. Over the short term, the countervailing effects from increased fiscal spending were, moreover, unlikely to offset the further disinflationary pressures emanating from the international environment.

    At the same time, it was underlined that upside risks had not vanished. The rising momentum that had been detected in the PCCI indicators of underlying inflation warranted monitoring to confirm whether this increase was temporary and related to repricing early in the year in line with previous seasonal patterns. Although market-based measures of inflation compensation had fallen significantly, owing to lower inflation risk premia, genuine inflation expectations had been revised to a much lesser extent, and analysts’ inflation expectations were mostly well above inflation fixings. It also had to be considered that the likely re-flattening of the Phillips curve, which reflected among other things less frequent price adjustments, implied that meaningful downward deviations of inflation from target were unlikely in the absence of a deep and protracted recession. But such an event had a low probability in light of the expected fiscal impulse. In addition, the precise impact of the stronger euro was uncertain, especially given that one of the reasons behind the appreciation was a positive confidence shock as Europe offered stability in turbulent times. Moreover, successful trade negotiations and the resolution of trade disputes could give a boost to energy prices, changing the inflation picture very quickly. Finally, while the newly announced fiscal stimulus was unlikely to cause inflationary pressure over the short term in view of the underutilised capacities, the economy was likely to bump up against capacity constraints over the medium term, especially in the labour market. Indeed, inflation expectations reported in the Consumer Expectations Survey, the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises and the Survey of Professional Forecasters remained tilted to the upside over longer horizons. It was argued that, taken as a whole, the current environment posed some downside risks to inflation over the short run, but notable upside risks over the medium term. If retaliation against US tariffs affected products that were hard to substitute, such as intermediate goods, the inflationary impact could be sizeable and persistent as higher input costs from tariffs would be gradually passed on to consumers. This could more than offset the disinflationary pressure from reduced foreign demand. The closely interconnected global trade system implied that tariffs might be passed along entire supply chains. The need to absorb tariffs in profit margins at a time when these were already squeezed because of high wage growth would increase the probability and strength of the pass-through. Upside risks to inflation over the medium term were seen to hold especially in a scenario in which the trade war led to a permanently more fragmented global economy, owing to a less efficient allocation of resources, more fragile supply chains and less elastic global supply.

    Overall, increasing global trade disruptions were adding more uncertainty to the outlook for euro area inflation. Falling global energy prices and an appreciation of the euro could put further downward pressure on inflation. This could be reinforced by lower demand for euro area exports owing to higher tariffs and by a re-routing of exports into the euro area from countries with overcapacity. Adverse financial market reactions to the trade tensions could weigh on domestic demand and thereby also lead to lower inflation. By contrast, a fragmentation of global supply chains could increase inflation by pushing up import prices. A boost in defence and infrastructure spending could also lift inflation over the medium term. Extreme weather events, and the unfolding climate crisis more broadly, could drive up food prices by more than expected.

    Turning to the monetary and financial analysis, members highlighted that the period since the 5-6 March meeting had been characterised by exceptional financial market volatility. This had led to some financial data indicating sizeable daily moves that were several standard deviations away from their mean. Risk-free interest rates had declined since the March meeting in response to the escalating trade tensions, although long-term risk-free rates were still higher than at the cut-off date for the March staff projections. Equity prices had fallen amid high volatility and corporate bond spreads had widened around the globe. Partly in response to the turmoil, financial markets were now fully pricing in the expectation of a 25 basis point rate cut at the current meeting.

    The euro had strengthened considerably over recent weeks as investor sentiment proved more resilient towards the euro area than towards other economies. While the appreciation of the euro had been sizeable, since the inception of the euro the bilateral EUR/USD exchange rate had fluctuated in a relatively wide band, with the rate currently somewhere in the middle of the range. The recent adjustment across asset prices was atypical, as the financial market turbulence had come together with a rebalancing of international portfolios away from US assets towards exposures to other regions, such as the euro area. One explanation, which was supported by the coincidental weakening of the US dollar and by some initial market intelligence, was that domestic and foreign investors had moved out of US assets, possibly reflecting a loss of confidence in US fiscal and trade policies.

    Turning to broader financing conditions, the latest official statistics on corporate borrowing, which predated the market tensions, continued to indicate that past interest rate cuts had made it less expensive for firms to borrow. The average interest rate on new loans to firms had declined to 4.1% in February, from 4.3% in January. The cost to firms of issuing market-based debt had declined to 3.5% in February but there had been some upward pressure more recently. Moreover, growth in lending to firms had picked up again in February, to 2.2%, while debt securities issuance by firms had grown at an unchanged rate of 3.2%. At the same time, credit standards for business loans had tightened slightly again in the first quarter of 2025, as reported in the April round of the bank lending survey. This was mainly because banks were becoming more concerned about the economic risks faced by their customers. Demand for loans to firms had decreased slightly in the first quarter, after a modest recovery in previous quarters.

    The average rate on new mortgages, at 3.3% in February, had risen on the back of earlier increases in longer-term market rates. Mortgage lending had continued to strengthen in February, albeit at a still subdued annual rate of 1.5%, as banks had eased their credit standards and households’ demand for loans had continued to increase strongly.

    Monetary policy stance and policy considerations

    Turning to the monetary policy stance, members assessed the data that had become available since the last monetary policy meeting in accordance with the three main elements that the Governing Council had communicated in 2023 as shaping its reaction function. These comprised (i) the implications of the incoming economic and financial data for the inflation outlook, (ii) the dynamics of underlying inflation, and (iii) the strength of monetary policy transmission.

    Starting with the inflation outlook, members widely agreed that the latest data, including the HICP inflation figures for February and March and recent outturns for services inflation, provided further evidence that the disinflationary process was well on track. They thus expressed increased confidence that inflation would return to target in line with the March baseline projections.

    However, the March baseline projections had not incorporated the latest US policy announcements, which had increased downside risks to growth and inflation over the short term. The most recent forces at play, such as the negative demand shock linked to the tariff proposals and the related pervasive uncertainty, the appreciation of the euro and the decline in oil and gas prices, would further dampen the inflation outlook in the near term.

    Over the medium term the picture for inflation remained more mixed, as the effects of fiscal spending, retaliatory tariffs and the disruption of value chains might point in different directions, with each shock having an impact on growth and inflation with a different time profile. It was pointed out that the inflationary effects of tariffs might outweigh the disinflationary pressure from reduced foreign demand over the medium term, especially if the European Union retaliated by imposing tariffs on products that were not easily substitutable, such as intermediate goods. As a result, firms might suffer from rising input costs that would, over time, be passed on to consumers as the erosion of profit margins made cost absorption difficult. If this occurred at the same time as the support to economic activity from fiscal policy kicked in, there would be a significant risk of higher inflation. Overall, it was too early to draw firm conclusions at a time when many trade policy options were still on the table.

    Turning to underlying inflation, members concurred that most indicators were pointing to a sustained return of inflation to the 2% medium-term target. Wage growth had been slowing further – slightly faster than expected. In view of the high uncertainty, companies were also likely to be cautious about accepting high wage demands. Domestic inflation had remained unchanged, after falling slightly in February. This suggested that inflation had been quite stubborn despite the marked decline in services inflation, although progress had also been seen in this indicator when looking back over the past six months. The PCCI, which had the best leading indicator properties for inflation and still showed rising momentum, warranted further monitoring.

    Finally, incoming data confirmed that the transmission of monetary tightening remained largely as intended. Bank credit growth was overall on a gradual, slow recovery path, although from quite subdued levels. Nevertheless, it was increasing somewhat more strongly than had previously been expected for both non-financial corporations and households. There had been an easing of credit standards and strong demand for housing loans, which could foreshadow a pick-up in construction activity. At the same time, market-based indicators pointed to a tightening of financial conditions and, despite recent interest rate cuts, the latest round of the bank lending survey pointed to tighter credit standards for both firms and consumer credit. This was due to anticipated higher default risks against a background of weaker growth. Moreover, uncertainty had been very high and, in the presence of high uncertainty, the response of intermediaries to lower risk-free rates and, more generally, the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, were seen as more sluggish.

    Monetary policy decisions and communication

    Against this background, all members agreed with the proposal by Mr Lane to lower the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. In particular, lowering the deposit facility rate – the rate through which the Governing Council steered the monetary policy stance – was justified by the updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. Members expressed increased confidence that inflation would return to target over the medium term and that the fight against the inflation shock was nearly over.

    Some members indicated that, before the US tariff announcement on 2 April, they had considered a pause to rate cuts at the current meeting to be appropriate, preferring to wait for the next round of projections for greater clarity on the medium-term inflation outlook. These members attached a higher probability to the possibility that the trade shock would be inflationary beyond the short term, in view of the destructive effects of breaking up global value chains. While the inflationary effects of the proposed tariffs might differ for the United States and Europe, the pandemic experience had shown that, despite different weights attached to demand versus supply factors, in the end inflation developments in the two economies had been quite synchronous, and the same might occur again this time. Overall, this pointed to upside risks to inflation in the medium to long term that counterbalanced the downside risks stemming from weaker economic activity. However, recent events had convinced these members that cutting interest rates at the current meeting provided some insurance against negative outcomes and avoided contributing to additional uncertainty in times of financial market volatility. In addition, a cut at the present meeting could be seen as frontloading a possible cut at the June meeting, which underlined the need to retain full optionality for the upcoming meetings.

    At the same time, it was felt that the tariff tensions did not seem to come with the inflationary effects that many members had previously associated with such an event, at least not over the short to medium-term horizons. In part, this was because the euro was seemingly turning into more of a safe-haven currency and was subject to revaluation pressures. Disinflationary forces were thus likely to dominate in the short term. In addition, the growth outlook had weakened, with tariffs, related uncertainty and geopolitical tensions acting as a drag. In this regard, it was argued that a 25 basis point rate cut would lean against the substantial risks to growth in the short term and the tightening of financial conditions that had resulted from the tariff events, without the risk of fuelling inflation further down the line.

    In these turbulent times, members stressed the need to be a beacon of stability, thus instilling confidence and not causing more surprises in an already volatile environment, which might amplify market turbulence. This spoke in favour of a 25 basis point cut.

    A standard 25 basis point rate reduction was seen as consistent with the fact that, while very uncertain, the range of potential outcomes from the current situation still entailed some upside risks to inflation for the euro area economy. On the one hand, countervailing forces that would bring the US Administration to change course could eventually emerge. One such force had been the observed outflows from the US Treasuries market, which might have contributed to the 90-day pause applied to most US tariffs. On the other hand, there had been – and could be further – mitigating factors in the euro area. These included a more growth-supportive fiscal outlook as well as an opportunity to make swift progress on other European policy initiatives. Another factor potentially protecting against more adverse scenarios could be a stronger commitment by the Chinese Government to domestic demand-led growth in China. In addition, a possible structural increase in international demand for the euro, while entailing downside risks to inflation, was also a symptom of a largely positive development, namely a shift into European assets. A portfolio shift could lower long-term interest rates in the euro area and lead to cheaper financing for planned investment projects. Finally, the appreciation of the euro would further reduce the price of energy imports in euro terms, which could counterbalance some of the negative effects of the tariffs and the exchange rate on energy-intensive exporters.

    These arguments notwithstanding, a few members noted that they could have felt comfortable with a 50 basis point rate cut. These members attached more weight to the change in the balance of risks since the Governing Council’s March meeting, pointing out that downside risks to growth had increased and, even in the event of a relatively mild trade conflict, uncertainty was already discouraging consumption and investment. In this context, they emphasised that downside risks to inflation had clearly increased. The same members also argued that a larger interest rate cut could have offset more of the recent tightening of financial conditions, including higher corporate bond spreads and lower equity prices, which had weakened the transmission of past monetary policy decisions. In this respect it was argued that surprising the markets should not be excluded, and it was recalled that there had been previous cases in which the Governing Council had not shied away from surprises when appropriate.

    At the same time, it was argued that the optimal monetary policy response depended on the outcome of tariff negotiations, including the scope of the tariffs and the extent of potential retaliation, and on how tariffs fed through global supply chains. The view was also expressed that a forward-looking central bank should only act forcefully to the tariff shock if it expected a sharp deterioration in labour market conditions or an unanchoring of inflation expectations to the downside. However, the initial conditions, featuring a still resilient labour market and elevated momentum in underlying inflation and services inflation, made such a scenario unlikely. Moreover, the economy was coming out of a high-inflation period with consumers’ and firms’ inflation expectations one year ahead still standing at almost 3%. In such a situation, an unanchoring of inflation expectations to the downside was highly unlikely, while the higher than expected food and services inflation in March and rising momentum in services underlined the continued need to monitor inflation developments. If the decline in economic activity turned out to be short-lived, an accommodative response of monetary policy might, given transmission lags, exert its peak impact when the economy was already recovering and inflation was rising, and would therefore be misguided. It could also coincide with when fiscal policy was starting to boost domestic demand, although anticipation channels could lead to some of the impact of infrastructure and defence spending on inflation being smoothed out and dampened in the medium term. Finally, it was argued that cutting interest rates further could no longer be justified by the intention to return to neutral territory since, by various measures, monetary policy was no longer restrictive. Bank lending was recovering, domestic demand was expanding and the level of interest rates was contributing measurably to demand for all types of loan, as shown in the most recent bank lending survey.

    Looking ahead, members stressed that maintaining a data-dependent approach with full optionality at every meeting was warranted more than ever in view of the high uncertainty. Keeping a cautious approach and a firm commitment to price stability had contributed to the success so far, with inflation back on track despite unprecedented challenges. However, agility might be required in the present environment, with the need for the Governing Council to be ready to react quickly if necessary.

    Turning to communication aspects, members noted that it was time to remove the phrase “our monetary policy is becoming meaningfully less restrictive” from the monetary policy statement. Reference to a restrictive policy stance, in various formulations, had proven useful over past phases in which inflation had still been high, providing a clear message that monetary policy was contributing to disinflation. Such a signal was no longer needed. In the present conditions, dropping the sentence avoided the perception that the neutral level of interest rates was the end point of the current cycle, which was not necessarily the case. However, dropping the sentence did not imply that monetary policy had necessarily left restrictive territory. At the current juncture, there was no need to take a stand on whether monetary policy was still restrictive, already neutral or even moving into accommodative territory. Such a categorisation, especially in the current turbulent context, was very hard to provide. Instead, the change in wording was seen as consistent with an approach that was not guided by interest rate benchmarks but by the need to always determine the policy stance that was appropriate. In other words, policy would be set so as to provide the strongest assurance that inflation would be anchored sustainably at the medium-term target, given the set of initial conditions and the shocks that the Governing Council had to tackle at any given time.

    Members reiterated that the Governing Council remained determined to ensure that inflation would stabilise sustainably at its 2% medium-term target. Its interest rate decisions would continue to be based on its assessment of the inflation outlook in light of the incoming economic and financial data, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. While noting that markets were functioning in an orderly manner, it was seen as helpful to reiterate that the Governing Council stood ready to adjust all instruments within the ECB’s mandate to ensure that inflation stabilised sustainably at the medium-term target and to preserve the smooth functioning of monetary policy transmission.

    Taking into account the foregoing discussion among the members, upon a proposal by the President, the Governing Council took the monetary policy decisions as set out in the monetary policy press release. The members of the Governing Council subsequently finalised the monetary policy statement, which the President and the Vice-President would, as usual, deliver at the press conference following the Governing Council meeting.

    Monetary policy statement

    Monetary policy statement for the press conference of 17 April 2025

    Press release

    Monetary policy decisions

    Meeting of the ECB’s Governing Council, 16-17 April 2025

    Members

    • Ms Lagarde, President
    • Mr de Guindos, Vice-President
    • Mr Centeno*
    • Mr Cipollone
    • Mr Demarco, temporarily replacing Mr Scicluna*
    • Mr Dolenc, Deputy Governor of Banka Slovenije
    • Mr Elderson
    • Mr Escrivá
    • Mr Holzmann*
    • Mr Kazāks
    • Mr Kažimír
    • Mr Knot*
    • Mr Lane
    • Mr Makhlouf
    • Mr Müller
    • Mr Nagel
    • Mr Panetta
    • Mr Patsalides
    • Mr Rehn
    • Mr Reinesch*
    • Ms Schnabel
    • Mr Šimkus
    • Mr Stournaras
    • Mr Villeroy de Galhau
    • Mr Vujčić
    • Mr Wunsch

    * Members not holding a voting right in April 2025 under Article 10.2 of the ESCB Statute.

    Other attendees

    • Mr Dombrovskis, Commissioner**
    • Ms Senkovic, Secretary, Director General Secretariat
    • Mr Rostagno, Secretary for monetary policy, Director General Monetary Policy
    • Mr Winkler, Deputy Secretary for monetary policy, Senior Adviser, DG Monetary Policy

    ** In accordance with Article 284 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

    Accompanying persons

    • Mr Arpa
    • Ms Bénassy-Quéré
    • Mr Debrun
    • Mr Gavilán
    • Mr Kaasik
    • Mr Kelly
    • Mr Koukoularides
    • Mr Kroes
    • Mr Lünnemann
    • Ms Mauderer
    • Mr Martin
    • Mr Nicoletti Altimari
    • Mr Novo
    • Mr Rutkaste
    • Ms Schembri
    • Mr Šiaudinis
    • Mr Šošić
    • Mr Välimäki
    • Ms Žumer Šujica

    Other ECB staff

    • Mr Proissl, Director General Communications
    • Mr Straub, Counsellor to the President
    • Ms Rahmouni-Rousseau, Director General Market Operations
    • Mr Arce, Director General Economics
    • Mr Sousa, Deputy Director General Economics

    Release of the next monetary policy account foreseen on 3 July 2025.

    MIL OSI Economics –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Economics: Press Briefing Transcript: Julie Kozack, Director, Communications Department, May 22, 2025

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    May 22, 2025

    SPEAKER:  Ms. Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department, IMF

    MS. KOZACK: Good morning, everyone and welcome to this IMF Press Briefing.  It is wonderful to see you all today on this rainy Washington morning, especially those of you here in person and of course also those of you joining us online.  My name is Julie Kozak.  I’m the Director of Communications at the IMF.  As usual, this press briefing will be embargoed until 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time in the United States.  And as usual, I will start with a few announcements and then I’ll take your questions in person on WebEx and via the Press Center.  

    So first, our Managing Director, Kristalina Georgieva, and our First Deputy Managing Director, Gita Gopinath, are currently attending the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting taking place in Canada right now.  Second, on May 29th through 30th, the Managing Director will travel to Dubrovnik, Croatia to attend a joint IMF Croatia National Bank Conference focused on promoting growth and resilience in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe.  The Managing Director will participate in the opening panel and will hold meetings with regional counterparts.  

    On June 2nd, the Managing Director will travel to Sofia, Bulgaria to attend the 30th Anniversary celebration of the National Trust Ecofund.  During her visit, she will also hold several bilateral meetings with the Bulgarian authorities.  

    Our Deputy Managing Director, Nigel Clarke, will travel to Paraguay, Brazil, and the Netherlands next month.  On June 6th, he will launch the IMF’s new regional training program for South America and Mexico, which will be hosted in Asuncion by the Central Bank of Paraguay.  From there, he will travel to Brasilia to deliver a keynote speech on June 10th during the Annual Meeting of the Caribbean Development Bank.  He will also then travel to the Netherlands on June 12th to 13th to participate in the 2025 Consultative Group to Assist the Poor Symposium and to meet with the Dutch authorities.  

    Our Deputy Managing Director, Kenji Okamura, will be in Japan from June 11th to 12th for the 10th Tokyo Fiscal Forum to discuss fiscal frameworks and GovTech in the Asia Pacific region.  

    And finally, on a kind of housekeeping or scheduling issue, the Article IV Consultation for the United States will be undertaken on a later timetable this year, with discussions to be held in November.  

    And with those rather extensive announcements, I will now open the floor to your questions.  For those connecting virtually, please turn on both your camera and microphone when speaking.  All right, let’s open up.  Daniel.

     

    QUESTIONER: Thanks for taking my question.  I just wonder if the IMF has any reaction to the passage of last night in the House of Representatives of the One Big, Beautiful bill.  And a related question, how concerned are you by the increase in yields on long-dated U.S. treasuries?  What do you think it says about the market’s view of U.S. debt going into the future and sort of any possible spillovers for IMF borrowers as well?  MS. KOZACK: On the first question, what I can say is we take note of the passing of the legislation in the House of Representatives earlier this morning.  What we will do is we will look to assess a final bill once it has passed through the Senate and also once it’s been enacted.  And, of course, we will have opportunities to share our assessment over time in the various products where we normally would convey our fulsome views.  

    On your second question, which was on the bond market.   What I can say there is that we know that the U.S. government bonds are a safe haven asset, and the U.S. dollar, of course, plays a key role as the world’s reserve currency.  The U.S. bond market plays a critical role, of course, in finance and in safe assets.  And this is underpinned by the liquidity and depth of the U.S. market and also the sound institutions in the U.S.  We don’t see any changes in those functions.  And, of course, what we can also say is that although there has been some volatility in markets, market functioning, including in the U.S. Treasury market, has so far been orderly.  

     

    QUESTIONER: My question is about Ukraine.  Two topics particularly.  So, the first one, when is the next review of the Ukraine’s EFF is going to be completed, and what amount of money would be disbursed to Kyiv?  And could you please outline the total sum that is remaining within the current program?  And the second part, it’s about debt level.  What is the IMF assessment of current Ukraine’s government debt level?  Is it stable?  Do you see any vulnerabilities and any risks for Ukraine?  Thank you.  

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Ukraine?  Does anyone online want to come in on Ukraine?  Okay, I don’t see anyone.  

    What I can say on Ukraine is that just two days ago, our Staff team started policy discussions with the Ukrainian authorities on the eighth review under the eff.  So, the team is on the ground now.  The discussions are taking place in Kiev and the team will provide an update on the progress at the end of the mission.

    In terms of the potential disbursement, I’m just looking here; that’s the seventh disbursement.  We will come back to you on the size of the disbursement, but it should show in the Staff report for the Seventh Review what would be expected for the Eighth Review.  And it would also show the remaining size of the program.  But we’ll come back to you bilaterally with those exact answers.  

    And what I can then say on the debt side is at the time of the Seventh Review under the program, we assessed debt, Ukraine’s debt to be sustainable on a forward-looking basis and as with every review that the team of course, will update its assessment as part of the eighth review discussion.  We’ll have more to say on the debt as the eighth review continues.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Just one more thing on Ukraine.  Does it make sense for them to consider using the euro as a defense currency for their currency, given the shifting geopolitical sense and what we are seeing with the dollar? MS. KOZACK: So right now, under the program, Ukraine has an inflation targeting regime, and that is where what the program is focused on, our program with Ukraine. So, they have an inflation targeting regime.  They are very much focused on ensuring the stability of that monetary policy regime that Ukraine has.  And, of course, that involves a floating exchange rate.  And I don’t have anything beyond that to say on the currency market.

     

    QUESTIONER: The agreement with the IMF established a target for the Central Bank Reserve to meet by June.  According to the technical projection, does the IMF believe Argentina will meet this target?  And if it’s not met, is it possible that we will grant a waiver in the future?

    MS. KOZACK: anything else on Argentina?  

    QUESTIONER: About Argentina, what is your assessment of the progress of the program agreed with Argentina more than a month after its announcement in last April?  

     

    QUESTIONER: The government is about to announce a measure to gain access to voluntarily, of course, but to the dollars that are “under the mattress”, as we call them, undeclared funds to probably meet these targets that Roman was asking about.  I was wondering if this measure has been discussed with the IMF.  And also, you mentioned Georgieva visiting Paraguay and Brazil, if you there’s any plan to visit Argentina as well?  

    QUESTIONER: President Milei is about to announce, you know, Minister Caputo, in a few minutes that there is a measure to use similar to attacks Amnesty.  Is the IMF concerned that this could violate its regulations against illicit financial flows? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, with respect to Argentina, on April 11th, I think, as you know, our Executive Board approved a new four-year EFF arrangement for Argentina.  It was for $20 billion.  It contained an initial disbursement of $12 billion.  And that the aim of that program is to support Argentina’s transition to the next phase of its stabilization program and reforms.  

    President Milei’s administration’s policies continued to deliver impressive results.  These include the rollout of the new FX regime, which has been smooth, a decline in monthly inflation to 2.8 percent in April, another fiscal surplus in April, and reaching a cumulative fiscal surplus of 0.6 percent of GDP for the year, and efforts to continue to open up the economy.  At the same time, the economy is now expanding, real wages are recovering, and poverty continues to fall in Argentina.  

    The Fund continues to support the authorities in their efforts to create a more stable and prosperous Argentina.  Our close engagement continues, including in the context of the upcoming discussions for the First Review of the program.  This First Review will allow us to assess progress and to consider policies to build on the strong momentum and to secure lasting stability and growth in Argentina.  And in this regard, there is a shared recognition with the authorities about the importance of strengthening external buffers and securing a timely re-access to international capital markets.  

    What I can say on the question about the announcements on that — the question on the undeclared assets.  All I can say right now is that we’re following developments very closely on this, and of course, the team will be ready to provide an assessment in due course.  

    On the second part of that question, I do want to also note, and this is included in our Staff report, that the authorities have committed to strengthening financial transparency and also to aligning Argentina’s AML CFT, the Anti-Money Laundering framework, with international standards, as well as to deregulating the economy to encourage its formalization.  So, any new measures, including those that may be aimed at encouraging the use of undeclared assets, should be, of course, consistent with these important commitments.  

    And on your question about Paraguay and Brazil, I just want to clarify that it is our Deputy Managing Director, Nigel Clarke, who will be traveling to Brazil and Paraguay, not the Managing Director.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Two questions on Syria.  With the U.S. and EU announcing the lifting of sanctions recently, how does this affect any sort of timeline with providing economic assistance?  And secondly, the Managing Director has said that the Fund has to first define data.  Can you just walk through what that entails?  

    MS. KOZACK: Can you just repeat what you said?  The Managing Director has said?

     

    QUESTIONER: The need to define data.  Just sort of a similar question.  I’m just wondering, following the World Bank statement last week about, you know, Syria now being eligible to borrow from the bank, what sort of discussions the Fund has had with the Syrian authorities since the end of the Spring Meetings and, you know, any update you can give us around possible discussions around an Article IV.  

     

    QUESTIONER: About the relationship and if there’s any missed planned virtual or on the ground? 

    MS. KOZACK: Let me step back and give a little bit of an overview on Syria. So, first, you know, we’re, of course, monitoring developments in Syria very closely.  Our Staff are preparing to support the international community’s efforts to help with Syria’s economic rehabilitation as conditions allow.  We have had useful discussions with the new Economic Team who took office in late March, including during the Spring Meetings.  And, of course, you will perhaps have seen the press release regarding the roundtable that was held during the Spring Meetings.  IMF Staff have already started to work to rebuild its understanding of the Syrian economy.  We’ve been doing this through interactions with the authorities and also through coordination with other IFIs. And just to remind everyone, our last Article IV with Syria was in 2009.  So, it’s been quite some time since we have had a substantive engagement with Syria.  Syria will need significant assistance to rebuild its economic institutions.  We stand ready to provide advice and targeted and well-prioritized technical assistance in our areas of expertise. I think this goes a little bit to your question on, like, what do we mean by defining data.  I think what the Managing Director was really referring to there is since it has been such a long time since we have had a substantive engagement with Syria, the last Article IV, as I said, was in 2009.  I think there, what she’s really referring to is the need to really work with the Syrian authorities to rebuild basic economic institutions, including the ability to produce economic statistics, right, so that we — so that we and the authorities and the international community of course, can conduct the necessary economic analysis so that we can best support the reconstruction and recovery efforts.  

    With respect to the lifting of sanctions, what I can say there is that, of course, the lifting of sanctions and the lifting of sanctions are a matter between member states of the IMF.  What we can say in serious cases that the lifting of sanctions could support Syria’s efforts to overcome its economic challenges and help advance its reconstruction and economic development.  Syria, of course, is an IMF member, and as we’ve just said, you know, we are, of course, engaged closely with the Syrians to explore how, within our mandate, we can best support them.  

     

    QUESTIONER: My question is on Russia.  In what ways is the IMF monitoring Russia’s economy under the current sanctions and conflict conditions, and have regular Article IV Consultations or other surveillance activities with Russia resumed to track its economic developments?  

    MS. KOZACK: What I can say with respect to Russia is that we are, our Staff, are analyzing data and economic indicators that are reported by the Russian authorities.  We are also looking at counterparty data that is provided to us by other countries, and this is particularly true for cross-border transactions, as well as data from third-party sources. So, this data collection using official and other sources does allow us to put together a picture of the Russian economy.  

    We did provide an assessment in the 2025 April WEO, the one that we just released about a month ago.  In this WEO, we assess Russia’s growth at — we expect Russia to grow at 1.5 percent in 2025, 0.9 percent in 2026, and we expect inflation to come down to 8.2 percent in 2025 and 4.4 percent in 2026.  And I don’t have a timetable for the Article IV at this time.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I’d like to ask about Deputy Management Director Okamura’s visits to Japan.  So, my question is, what economic topics will be on the agenda during his stay?  Could you tell me a bit more in detail?  

    MS. KOZACK: Deputy Managing Director Okamura will travel to Japan, as I said, from June 11th to 12th, and he will be attending the Tokyo Fiscal Forum.  So, this will be the 10th Tokyo Fiscal Forum.  It’s an annual conference that we co-host in Japan every year and the focus is on issues of fiscal policy. In this particular one, Deputy Managing Director Okamura will be discussing fiscal frameworks. It’s very important for all countries to have sound fiscal frameworks so they can implement sound fiscal policy.  He will also be discussing GovTech not only in Japan but in the Asia Pacific region.  And of course, GovTech is very important for countries because it’s a way of modernizing and making government both provision of services in some cases but also potentially collection of revenue more effective and more efficient.  So, those will be the focus of his discussions in Tokyo.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I have a question on the recent bailout package by IMF to Pakistan.  The Indian government has expressed a lot of displeasure with Pakistan planning to use this package to build — rebuild — areas that allegedly support cross-border terrorism.  Does the IMF have any assessment of this?  Secondly, I also have another question.  Could you please provide information on the majority vote that was received in approving this bailout package for Pakistan on May 9th?  If you can disclose the information.  

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Pakistan?  

     

    QUESTIONER: Just adding to that, do you have an update on the implications of the escalation of facilities in that border between Pakistan and India on both economies.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Thanks a lot.  I guess the only spin I would put on is generally what safeguards does the IMF have that its funds won’t be used for military or in support of military actions, not only there but as a general matter.  And I also, if you’re able to, there was some controversy about the termination of India’s Executive Director of the IMF, K.V. Subramanian.  Do you have any insight into–there are reports there–what it was about but what do you say it’s about?  Thanks a lot.  

    MS. KOZACK: With respect to the Indian Executive Director who had been at the Fund, all I can say on this is that the appointment of Executive Directors is a member for the — is a matter for the member country.  It’s not a matter for the Fund, and it’s completely up to the country authorities to determine who represents them at the Fund.  

    With respect to Pakistan and the conflict with India, I want to start here by first expressing our regrets and sympathies for the loss of life and for the human toll from the recent conflict.  We do hope for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.  

    Now, turning to some of the specific questions about the Board approval of Pakistan’s program, I’m going to step back a minute and provide a little bit of the chronology and timeframe.  The IMF Executive Board approved Pakistan’s EFF program in September of 2024.  And the First review at that time was planned for the first quarter of 2025.  And consistent with that timeline, on March 25th of 2025, the IMF Staff and the Pakistani authorities reached a Staff-Level Agreement on the First Review for the EFF.  That agreement, that Staff-Level Agreement, was then presented to our Executive Board, and our Executive Board completed the review on May 9th.  As a result of the completion of that review, Pakistan received the disbursement at that time.  

    What I want to emphasize here is that it is part of a standard procedure under programs that our Executive Board conducts periodic reviews of lending programs to assess their progress.  And they particularly look at whether the program is on track, whether the conditions under the program have been met, and whether any policy changes are needed to bring the program back on track.  And in the case of Pakistan, our Board found that Pakistan had indeed met all of the targets.  It had made progress on some of the reforms, and for that reason, the Board went ahead and approved the program.  

    With respect to the voting or the decision-making at our Board, we do not disclose that publicly.  In general, Fund Board decisions are taken by consensus, and in this case, there was a sufficient consensus at the Board to allow us to move forward or for the Board to decide to move forward and complete Pakistan’s review.  

    And with respect to the question on safeguards, I do want to make three points here.  The first is that IMF financing is provided to members for the purpose of resolving balance of payments problems.  

    In the case of Pakistan, and this is my second point, the EFF disbursements, all of the disbursements received under the EFF, are allocated to the reserves of the central bank.  So, those disbursements are at the central bank, and under the program, those resources are not part of budget financing.  They are not transferred to the government to support the budget. 

    And the third point is that the program provides additional safeguards through our conditionality.  And these include, for example, targets on the accumulation of international reserves.  It includes a zero target, meaning no lending from the central bank to the government.  And the program also includes substantial structural conditionality around improving fiscal management.  And these conditions are all available in the program documents if you wanted to do a deeper dive.  And, of course, any deviation from the established program conditions would impact future reviews under the Pakistan program.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I have a question on Egypt.  There is a mission in Egypt for the First Review of the EFF loan program.  So, can you please update us on the ongoing discussions, especially since the Prime Minister of Egypt announced yesterday that the program could be concluded in 2027 rather than 2026?  

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Egypt?  I have a question from the Press Center on Egypt, which I will read aloud.  The question is when will the Fifth Review currently underway with the Egyptian government be concluded, and when will the Executive Board approve this review?  And how much money will Egypt receive once the review is approved?  

    So, here’s what I can share on Egypt.  First, let me start here.  So first, I just want to say that the Fund remains committed to supporting Egypt in building its economic resilience and fostering higher private sector-led growth.  Egypt has made clear progress on its macroeconomic reform program, with notable improvements in inflation and foreign exchange reserves.  For the past few weeks, IMF Staff has had productive discussions with the Egyptian authorities on economic performance and policies under the EFF.  As Egypt’s macroeconomic stabilization is taking hold, efforts must now focus on accelerating and deepening reforms that will reduce the footprint of the state in the Egyptian economy, level the playing field, and improve the business environment.  Discussions will continue between the IMF and the Egyptian authorities on the remaining policies and reforms that could support the completion of the Fifth Review.  

     

    QUESTIONER: My question is about Sri Lanka.  Sri Lanka’s program is subject to IMF Board approval.  The review is subject to IMF Board approval, but we still haven’t got any word on when that would be.  Is there any delay in this?  And is this delay attributed to the pending electricity adjustments, tariff adjustments, that the Sri Lankan government has committed to?  

    MS. KOZACK: So just stepping back for a minute.  On April 25th, IMF Staff and the Sri Lankan authorities reached Staff-Level Agreement on the Fourth Review of Sri Lanka’s program under the EFF.  And once the review is approved by our Executive Board, Sri Lanka will have access to about $344 million in financing.  Completion of the review is subject to approval by the Executive Board, and we expect that Board meeting to take place in the coming weeks.  

    The precise timing of the Board meeting is contingent on two things.  The first is implementation of prior actions, and the main prior actions are relating to restoring electricity, cost recovery pricing and ensuring proper function of the automatic electricity price adjustment mechanism.  And the second contingency is completion of the Financing Assurances Review, which will focus on confirming multilateral partners, committed financing contributions to Sri Lanka and whether adequate progress has been made in debt restructuring.  So, in a nutshell, completion of the review is subject to approval by the Executive Board.  We expect the Board meeting to take place in the coming weeks.  And it’s contingent on the two matters that I just mentioned.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Thank you for having my questions on Ecuador.  Since the IMF is still completing the second review under the EFF program for Ecuador, do you think it’s going to be time to change the program, the goals, or maybe the amount of the program?  Because Ecuador is now facing different challenges compared to 2024.  The oil prices are falling, so that is going to affect the fiscal situation for Ecuador.  And also, I would like to know if Ecuador is still looking for a new program under the RSF.  And the last one, I would like to know if, do you think that Ecuador is going to need to make some important changes this year on oil subsidies and a tax reform?  I think, as I said, Ecuador now is facing some important challenges in the fiscal situation, so do you think it’s going to be possible because of, you know, all the social protests and all that kind of stuff?  Do you think it’s going to be possible to do that in Ecuador?  

     

    QUESTIONER: Is there a request, an official request, in place to modify the program?  And if there is, of course, details of the new one, you can share.  

    MS. KOZACK: And then I have one question online from the Press Center regarding Ecuador.  Is the sovereign negotiating new targets, given their fiscal position deteriorated compared to last year?  Our understanding is that $410 million was not dispersed under the First Review.?

    So let me share what I can on Ecuador.  So, right now, representatives from the IMF, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank are in Quito this week to meet with the authorities and discuss the strengthening of financial and technical support to the country.  As part of this tripartite visit, we have a new IMF Mission Chief who is participating, and she is also using that opportunity to have courtesy meetings with the authorities and to continue discussions and advance toward a Second Review under Ecuador’s EFF.  

    What else I can add, just as background, is that the Executive Board in December approved the First Review of Ecuador’s 48-month EFF.  About $500 million was disbursed after the approval of that Frist Review.  And at that time, the Executive Board also concluded the Article IV Consultation.

    I can also say that the authorities have made excellent progress in the implementation of their economic program under the EFF.  And regarding the precise timing of the Second Review, we will provide an update on the next steps in due course and when we’re able to do so.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Just a quick question on tariffs.  I’m just wondering if the IMF has a response to the U.S.-China deal that was struck in Geneva earlier this month.  You know, if the deal holds, I appreciate it’s a 90-day pause, but if the deal holds, how would you foresee that changing the Fund’s current economic forecast for the U.S. and China and for the global economy?  Thanks.  

    MS. KOZACK: As you noted, earlier in May, China and the U.S. announced a 90-day rollback of most of the bilateral tariffs imposed since April 2nd, and they established a mechanism to discuss economic and trade relations.  The two sides reduced their tariff from peak levels, leaving in place 10 percent additional tariffs.  So, the additional tariffs before this agreement were 125 percent.  Now, the additional tariff has agreed to be 10 percent, you know, for the 90 days.  This is obviously a positive step for the world’s two largest economies.

    What I can also add is that for the U.S., you may recall, during the Spring Meetings, we talked a lot about the overall effective tariff rate for the U.S.  At that time, we assessed it at 25.5 percent.  This announcement and the reduction in tariffs will bring the U.S. effective tariff rate down to a bit over 14 percent.  

    Now, with respect to the impact, what I can say is that the reduction in tariffs and the easing of tensions does provide some upside risk to our global growth forecast.  We will be updating that global growth forecast as part of our July WEO.  And so that will give us an opportunity to provide a full assessment.  All of this said, of course, the outlook, the global outlook in general does remain one of high uncertainty.  And so that uncertainty is still with us.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I have a broad question regarding the following – at the IMF World Bank Spring Meeting, the recent one,  the Treasury Secretary Bessent called for the IMF and the World Bank to refocus on their core mission on macroeconomic stability and development.  Did the IMF start any discussion on this topic with the U.S. administration?  And my second question, do you foresee any changes to your lending programs to take into account the views of the Trump Administration regarding issues like climate change and international development?  Thank you.  

    MS. KOZACK: What I can say on this is the U.S. is our largest shareholder, and we greatly value the voice of the United States.  We have a constructive engagement with the U.S. authorities, and we very much appreciate Secretary Bessent’s reiteration of the United States’ commitment to the Fund and to our role.  The IMF has a clearly defined mandate to support economic and financial stability globally.  Our Management Team and our entire Staff are focused exactly on this mandate, helping our 191 members tackle their economic challenges and their balance of payments risks.  

    What I can also add is that at the most recent Spring Meetings, the ones we just had in April, our membership identified two areas where they’ve asked the IMF to deepen our work.  And the first is on external imbalances, and the second is on our monitoring of the financial sector.  So they’re looking for us to really deepen our work in these two areas.  

    As far as taking that work forward, we will continue working with our Executive Board on these areas, as well as to carry out some important policy reviews.  And I think the Managing Director referred to these during the Spring Meetings.  The first is the Comprehensive Surveillance Review, which will set out our surveillance priorities for the next five years.  And the second is the review of program design and conditionality.  And that will carefully consider how our lending can best help countries address low growth challenges and durably resolve their balance of payments weaknesses.  

    I have a slight update for you on Ukraine, which says — so the eighth — so if we look at the documents that were published at the time of the Seventh Review program, the one that was approved by the Executive Board a little while ago, based on that, the Eighth Review disbursement would be about $520 million.  And, the discussions of the Eighth Review are ongoing, and any disbursement, as always, is subject to approval by our Executive Board. 

    And with that, I will bring this press briefing to a close.  So first, let me thank you all for your participation today.  As a reminder, the briefing is embargoed until 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time in the United States.  As always, a transcript will be made available later on IMF.org.  In case of any clarifications or additional queries, please do not hesitate to reach out to my colleagues at media@imf.org.  This concludes our press briefing, and I wish everyone a wonderful day.  I look forward to seeing you next time.  Thanks very much.

     

      

    *  *  *  *  *

     

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Meera Louis

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    MIL OSI Economics –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: ESET participates in operation to disrupt the infrastructure of Danabot infostealer

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    • ESET Research has been tracking Danabot’s activity since 2018 as part of a global effort that resulted in a major disruption of the malware’s infrastructure.
    • While primarily developed as an infostealer, Danabot also has been used to distribute additional malware, including ransomware.
    • Danabot’s authors promote their toolset through underground forums and offer various rental options to potential affiliates.
    • This ESET Research analysis covers the features used in the latest versions of the malware, the authors’ business model, and an overview of the toolset offered to affiliates.
    • Poland, Italy, Spain and Turkey are historically one of the most targeted countries by Danabot.

    PRAGUE and BRATISLAVA, Czech Republic, May 22, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — ESET has participated in a major infrastructure disruption of the notorious infostealer, Danabot, by the US Department of Justice, the FBI, and US Department of Defense’s Defense Criminal Investigative Service. U.S. agencies were working closely with Germany’s Bundeskriminalamt, the Netherlands’ National Police, and the Australian Federal Police. ESET took part in the effort alongside Amazon, CrowdStrike, Flashpoint, Google, Intel471, PayPal, Proofpoint, Team Cymru and Zscaler. ESET Research, which has been tracking Danabot since 2018, contributed assistance that included providing technical analysis of the malware and its backend infrastructure, as well as identifying Danabot’s C&C servers. During that period, ESET analyzed various Danabot campaigns all over the world, with Poland, Italy, Spain and Turkey historically being one of the most targeted countries. The joint takedown effort also led to the identification of individuals responsible for Danabot development, sales, administration, and more.

    “Since Danabot has been largely disrupted, we are using this opportunity to share our insights into the workings of this malware-as-a-service operation, covering the features used in the latest versions of the malware, the authors’ business model, and an overview of the toolset offered to affiliates. Apart from exfiltrating sensitive data, we have observed that Danabot is also used to deliver further malware, which can include ransomware, to an already compromised system,” says ESET researcher Tomáš Procházka, who investigated Danabot.

    The authors of Danabot operate as a single group, offering their tool for rental to potential affiliates, who subsequently employ it for their malicious purposes by establishing and managing their own botnets. Danabot’s authors have developed a vast variety of features to assist customers with their malevolent motives. The most prominent features offered by Danabot include: the ability to steal various data from browsers, mail clients, FTP clients, and other popular software; keylogging and screen recording; real-time remote control of the victims’ systems; file grabbing; support for Zeus-like webinjects and form grabbing; and arbitrary payload upload and execution. Besides utilizing its stealing capabilities, ESET Research has observed a variety of payloads being distributed via Danabot over the years. Furthermore, ESET has encountered instances of Danabot being used to download ransomware onto already compromised systems.

    In addition to typical cybercrime, Danabot has also been used in less conventional activities such as utilizing compromised machines for launching DDoS attacks… for example, a DDoS attack against Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense soon after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

    Throughout its existence, according to ESET monitoring, Danabot has been a tool of choice for many cybercriminals and each of them has used different means of distribution. Danabot’s developers even partnered with the authors of several malware cryptors and loaders, and offered special pricing for a distribution bundle to their customers, helping them with the process. Recently, out of all distribution mechanisms ESET observed, the misuse of Google Ads to display seemingly relevant, but actually malicious, websites among the sponsored links in Google search results stands out as one of the most prominent methods to lure victims into downloading Danabot. The most popular ploy is packing the malware with legitimate software and offering such a package through bogus software sites or websites falsely promising users to help them find unclaimed funds. The latest addition to these social engineering techniques are deceptive websites offering solutions for fabricated computer issues, whose only purpose is to lure victims into execution of a malicious command secretly inserted into the user’s clipboard.

    The typical toolset provided by Danabot’s authors to their affiliates includes an administration panel application, a backconnect tool for real-time control of bots, and a proxy server application that relays the communications between the bots and the actual C&C server. Affiliates can choose from various options to generate new Danabot builds, and it’s their responsibility to distribute these builds through their own campaigns.

    “It remains to be seen whether Danabot can recover from the takedown. The blow will, however, surely be felt, since law enforcement managed to unmask several individuals involved in the malware’s operations,” concludes Procházka.

    For technical overview of Danabot and insight into its operation, check out ESET Research blogpost: “Danabot: Analyzing a fallen empire” on WeLiveSecurity.com. Make sure to follow ESET Research on Twitter (today known as X), BlueSky, and Mastodon for the latest news from ESET Research.

    Worldwide Danabot detections as seen in ESET telemetry since 2018

    About ESET

    ESET® provides cutting-edge digital security to prevent attacks before they happen. By combining the power of AI and human expertise, ESET stays ahead of emerging global cyberthreats, both known and unknown— securing businesses, critical infrastructure, and individuals. Whether it’s endpoint, cloud, or mobile protection, our AI-native, cloud-first solutions and services remain highly effective and easy to use. ESET technology includes robust detection and response, ultra-secure encryption, and multifactor authentication. With 24/7 real-time defense and strong local support, we keep users safe and businesses running without interruption. The ever-evolving digital landscape demands a progressive approach to security: ESET is committed to world-class research and powerful threat intelligence, backed by R&D centers and a strong global partner network. For more information, visit www.eset.com or follow our social media, podcasts and blogs.

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/2306cbf1-1ef7-4040-8c12-ca8be3cc6689

    The MIL Network –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Golden Dome: An aerospace engineer explains the proposed nationwide missile defense system

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Iain Boyd, Director of the Center for National Security Initiatives and Professor of Aerospace Engineering Sciences, University of Colorado Boulder

    Posters that President Donald Trump used to announce Golden Dome depict missile defense as a shield. AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein

    President Donald Trump announced a plan to build a missile defense system, called the Golden Dome, on May 20, 2025. The system is intended to protect the United States from ballistic, cruise and hypersonic missiles, and missiles launched from space.

    Trump is calling for the current budget to allocate US$25 billion to launch the initiative, which the government projected will cost $175 billion. He said Golden Dome will be fully operational before the end of his term in three years and will provide close to 100% protection.

    The Conversation U.S. asked Iain Boyd, an aerospace engineer and director of the Center for National Security Initiatives at the University of Colorado Boulder, about the Golden Dome plan and the feasibility of Trump’s claims. Boyd receives funding for research unrelated to Golden Dome from defense contractor Lockheed Martin.

    Why does the United States need a missile shield?

    Several countries, including China, Russia, North Korea and Iran, have been developing missiles over the past few years that challenge the United States’ current missile defense systems.

    These weapons include updated ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, and new hypersonic missiles. They have been specifically developed to counter America’s highly advanced missile defense systems such as the Patriot and the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System.

    For example, the new hypersonic missiles are very high speed, operate in a region of the atmosphere where nothing else flies and are maneuverable. All of these aspects combined create a new challenge that requires a new, updated defensive approach.

    Russia has fired hypersonic missiles against Ukraine in the ongoing conflict. China parades its new hypersonic missiles in Tiananmen Square.

    So it’s reasonable to think that, to ensure the protection of its homeland and to aid its allies, the U.S. may need a new missile defense capability.

    Ukrainian forces are using the U.S.-made Patriot missile defense system against Russian ballistic missiles.

    What are the components of a national missile defense system?

    Such a defense system requires a global array of geographically distributed sensors that cover all phases of all missile trajectories.

    First, it is essential for the system to detect the missile threats as early as possible after launch, so some of the sensors must be located close to regions where adversaries may fire them, such as by China, Russia, North Korea and Iran. Then, it has to track the missiles along their trajectories as they travel hundreds or thousands of miles.

    These requirements are met by deploying a variety of sensors on a number of different platforms on the ground, at sea, in the air and in space. Interceptors are placed in locations that protect vital U.S. assets and usually aim to engage threats during the middle portion of the trajectory between launch and the terminal dive.

    The U.S. already has a broad array of sensors and interceptors in place around the world and in space primarily to protect the U.S. and its allies from ballistic missiles. The sensors would need to be expanded, including with more space-based sensors, to detect new missiles such as hypersonic missiles. The interceptors would need to be enhanced to enable them to address hypersonic weapons and other missiles and warheads that can maneuver.

    Does this technology exist?

    Intercepting hypersonic missiles specifically involves several steps.

    First, as explained above, a hostile missile must be detected and identified as a threat. Second, the threat must be tracked along all of its trajectory due to the ability of hypersonic missiles to maneuver. Third, an interceptor missile must be able to follow the threat and get close enough to it to disable or destroy it.

    The main new challenge here is the ability to track the hypersonic missile continuously. This requires new types of sensors to detect hypersonic vehicles and new sensor platforms that are able to provide a complete picture of the hypersonic trajectory. As described, Golden Dome would use the sensors in a layered approach in which they are installed on a variety of platforms in multiple domains, including ground, sea, air and space.

    These various platforms would need to have different types of sensors that are specifically designed to track hypersonic threats in different phases of their flight paths. These defensive systems will also be designed to address weapons fired from space. Much of the infrastructure will be multipurpose and able to defend against a variety of missile types.

    In terms of time frame for deployment, it is important to note that Golden Dome will build from the long legacy of existing U.S. missile defense systems. Another important aspect of Golden Dome is that some of the new capabilities have been under active development for years. In some ways, Golden Dome represents the commitment to actually deploy systems for which considerable progress has already been made.

    Is near 100% protection a realistic claim?

    Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system has been described as the most effective system of its kind anywhere in the world.

    But even Iron Dome is not 100% effective, and it has also been overwhelmed on occasion by Hamas and others who fire very large numbers of inexpensive missiles and rockets at it. So it is unlikely that any missile defense system will ever provide 100% protection.

    The more important goal here is to achieve deterrence, similar to the stalemate in the Cold War with the Soviet Union that was based on nuclear weapons. All of the new weapons that Golden Dome will defend against are very expensive. The U.S. is trying to change the calculus in an opponent’s thinking to the point where they will consider it not worth shooting their precious high-value missiles at the U.S. when they know there is a high probability of them not reaching their targets.

    CBS News covered President Donald Trump’s announcement.

    Is three years a feasible time frame?

    That seems to me like a very aggressive timeline, but with multiple countries now operating hypersonic missiles, there is a real sense of urgency.

    Existing missile defense systems on the ground, at sea and in the air can be expanded to include new, more capable sensors. Satellite systems are beginning to be put in place for the space layer. Sensors have been developed to track the new missile threats.

    Putting all of this highly complex system together, however, is likely to take more than three years. At the same time, if the U.S. fully commits to Golden Dome, a significant amount of progress can be made in this time.

    What does the president’s funding request tell you?

    President Trump is requesting a total budget for all defense spending of about $1 trillion in 2026. So, $25 billion to launch Golden Dome would represent only 2.5% of the total requested defense budget.

    Of course, that is still a lot of money, and a lot of other programs will need to be terminated to make it possible. But it is certainly financially achievable.

    How will Golden Dome differ from Iron Dome?

    Similar to Iron Dome, Golden Dome will consist of sensors and interceptor missiles but will be deployed over a much wider geographical region and for defense against a broader variety of threats in comparison with Iron Dome.

    A second-generation Golden Dome system in the future would likely use directed energy weapons such as high-energy lasers and high-power microwaves to destroy missiles. This approach would significantly increase the number of shots that defenders can take against ballistic, cruise and hypersonic missiles.

    Iain Boyd receives funding from the U.S. Department of Defense and Lockheed-Martin Corporation, a defense contractor that sells missile defense systems and could potentially benefit from the implementation of Golden Dome.

    – ref. Golden Dome: An aerospace engineer explains the proposed nationwide missile defense system – https://theconversation.com/golden-dome-an-aerospace-engineer-explains-the-proposed-nationwide-missile-defense-system-257408

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Russia is labelling Oscar Jenkins a ‘mercenary’, not a prisoner of war. What’s the difference – and why does this matter?

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Shannon Bosch, Associate Professor (Law), Edith Cowan University

    Oscar Jenkins, a 33-year-old former teacher from Melbourne, was one of many foreigners who responded to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s call in 2022 for volunteers to join Ukraine’s armed forces to help repel Russia’s invasion.

    In early 2024, Jenkins joined Ukraine’s International Legion of Territorial Defence, which has attracted some 20,000 fighters from 50 countries since the war began. He had no previous military experience, but this wasn’t a requirement to join.

    In December, Jenkins was captured by Russian forces in Russian-occupied eastern Ukraine and accused of serving as a “mercenary” in Ukraine’s 66th Mechanised Brigade’s 402nd Rifle Battalion. He was tried in a Russian court and sentenced on May 16 to 13 years imprisonment in a maximum-security penal colony.

    When a foreigner volunteers to fight in a war, their legal status under international law can be complicated.

    Are they a soldier with the full authorisation of one of the warring parties to engage in hostilities? Or are they an illegal mercenary?

    And what happens if they are captured?

    Why legal status matters

    The answers to these questions have very real importance to the thousands of foreigners who have joined Ukraine’s International Legion since 2022.

    Russian authorities have classified all of Ukraine’s foreigner fighters as “mercenaries”. They’ve used this label to deny foreign fighters the status of “prisoner of war” (POW), with the requisite protections that come along with that under international humanitarian law.

    While foreigners are permitted under international law to enlist in the armed forces of a state for political or moral reasons, mercenaries have historically been outlawed due to their sole motivation being financial gain.

    International humanitarian law (the rules that govern war) define mercenaries as individuals who are not nationals or residents of a state engaged in war and are recruited to fight outside that state’s official armed forces.

    They are motivated solely by private gain (like money or promises of reward), often well in excess of what the traditional armed forces are paid. Mercenaries are essentially professional soldiers who sell their services to a state without any real ties to that country.

    Once a fighter is classified as a “mercenary”, they lose all the legal protections that are traditionally afforded lawful combatants.

    This includes prisoner of war status if they are captured and immunity from prosecution for fighting in a conflict. Prisoners of war are also entitled to humane treatment and access to food and medical care. And they cannot be subjected to sham trials or torture.

    According to my research, many of the foreign nationals who joined the International Legion were motivated by a desire to defend Ukraine against Russia’s aggression. They were sworn into Ukraine’s armed forces and paid the same as a Ukrainian soldier of equal rank.

    Once enlisted in the armed forces, they were immediately exempt from “mercenary” status, irrespective of their motivation for joining.

    As such, these foreign fighters should be entitled to the full range of protections guaranteed to members of Ukraine’s armed forces under the Geneva Conventions.

    Labelling lawful foreign members of the Ukrainian armed forces as “mercenaries”, and denying them their protections, is an abuse of international law.

    How can Australia protect its nationals?

    If an Australian enlists in Ukraine’s armed forces and is captured by Russian forces, there is a limited toolkit the Australian government can use to help him or her. However, it is not powerless.

    Through its embassy in Moscow, Australia can request access to detainees to assess their welfare while in prison. Russia can, however, decline this access. Details of a detainee’s capture may also be withheld.

    Australia can also apply diplomatic pressure to ensure humane treatment of prisoners and their full POW rights.

    This can be done by working with international bodies, such as the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention or organisations like the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), which can request access to detainees.

    It appears the government is already doing some of these things. According to Foreign Minister Penny Wong, the government has been working with Ukraine and the ICRC to advocate for Jenkins’ welfare and release, and providing consular support to Jenkins’ family.

    Australia also has an obligation to warn its citizens they will likely face severe consequences if they travel to Ukraine to fight and are captured by Russian forces, given Russia’s misuse of the “mercenary” label.

    Through back-channel negotiations, Australia could also push Ukraine or its allies to include Australians being held by Russia in future prisoner swaps.

    In January of this year, Ukraine and Russia carried out such an exchange of 470 prisoners from both nations. And in talks last week in Turkey, both sides agreed to release another 1,000 prisoners on each side.

    Such exchanges have involved foreign fighters in the past. In 2022, 10 foreign citizens were included in a prisoner swap, including five Britons, two Americans, a Croatian, a Swede and a Moroccan. Several of them had been convicted of being mercenaries and sentenced to death after a Russian sham trial.

    There is no guarantee Jenkins would qualify for such an exchange, however, if Russia continues to classify him as a mercenary.

    Shannon Bosch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Russia is labelling Oscar Jenkins a ‘mercenary’, not a prisoner of war. What’s the difference – and why does this matter? – https://theconversation.com/russia-is-labelling-oscar-jenkins-a-mercenary-not-a-prisoner-of-war-whats-the-difference-and-why-does-this-matter-256996

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: Trump’s conversation with European leaders triggers controversy

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    What U.S. President Donald Trump told European leaders after his two-hour phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin has triggered controversy.

    Three days after the high-stake talks for Trump, The Wall Street Journal reported Thursday, citing senior European officials familiar with the conversation, that Trump told European leaders that Putin “isn’t ready to end the Ukraine war because he thinks he is winning.”

    The White House denied this account immediately. Karoline Leavitt, the White House press secretary, said that Trump “did say he believes Putin is winning the war, but he never said ‘Putin isn’t ready to end the war’.”

    During the call, Trump said several times that “he believes Putin wants peace and wants the war to be over,” Leavitt noted.

    Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov also dismissed the WSJ report, saying Russia was only aware of what was said during the phone call between the two leaders on Monday.

    “Look, we know what Trump told Putin. We don’t know what Trump told the Europeans after that phone call. We know the official statement by President Trump,” Peskov said.

    According to Trump, the afterward call’s participants included Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.

    The controversy came as European officials accused Trump of handing Putin a win after their phone call since he suggested abandoning being a mediator in ending the war and refused to impose fresh sanctions on Russia.

    “Several European officials said the message they took from the call was that they should not expect the United States to join them any time soon in piling additional financial pressure onto Mr. Putin,” The New York Times said in a analysis published Thursday.

    “The disagreement between the Americans and the Europeans over support for Ukraine will likely come to a head over two nearly back-to-back summits: the Group of 7 in Canada in mid-June and the NATO summit a week later in The Hague,” the report added. 

    MIL OSI China News –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: FRO – First Quarter 2025 Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    FRONTLINE PLC REPORTS RESULTS FOR THE FIRST QUARTER ENDED MARCH 31, 2025

    Frontline plc (the “Company”, “Frontline,” “we,” “us,” or “our”), today reported unaudited results for the three months ended March 31, 2025:

    Highlights 

    • Profit of $33.3 million, or $0.15 per share for the first quarter of 2025.
    • Adjusted profit of $40.4 million, or $0.18 per share for the first quarter of 2025.
    • Declared a cash dividend of $0.18 per share for the first quarter of 2025.
    • Reported revenues of $427.9 million for the first quarter of 2025.
    • Achieved average daily spot time charter equivalent earnings (“TCEs”)1 for VLCCs, Suezmax tankers and LR2/Aframax tankers in the first quarter of $37,200, $31,200 and $22,300 per day, respectively.
    • Entered into three senior secured credit facilities in February 2025 for a total amount of up to $239.0 million to refinance the outstanding debt on three VLCCs and one Suezmax tanker maturing in 2025 and, in addition, provide revolving credit capacity in a total amount of up to $91.9 million.
    • Entered into one senior secured term loan facility in April 2025 in an amount of up to $1,286.5 million to refinance the outstanding debt on 24 VLCCs approximately three and a half years prior to maturity to reduce the margin.

    Lars H. Barstad, Chief Executive Officer of Frontline Management AS, commented:

    “The first quarter of 2025 came in line with the previous quarter, somewhat muted relative to the economic and political backdrop during the period. In times of uncertainty, it’s comforting to operate in an industry that maintains business as usual, transporting oil and products around the world at a steady pace. Utilization on the larger ships has improved during the quarter and with continued pressure and enforcement on sanctioned trades, we have seen healthy developments in activity across the segments that Frontline deploys. Fleet growth remains slow, and ordering has again stalled, continuing to support the long-term fundamental story for tankers, where Frontline is ideally positioned with its cost-focused business model and spot-exposed, modern fleet.”

    Inger M. Klemp, Chief Financial Officer of Frontline Management AS, added:

    “Through our refinancings in 2025, we have further strengthened our strong liquidity, leaving the Company with no meaningful debt maturities until 2030, and further reduced our borrowing costs and cash breakeven rates. We continue to focus on maintaining our competitive cost structure, breakeven levels and solid balance sheet to ensure that we are well positioned to generate significant cash flow and create value for our shareholders.”

    Average daily TCEs and estimated cash breakeven rates

    ($ per day) Spot TCE Spot TCE currently contracted % Covered Estimated average daily cash breakeven rates for the next 12 months
      Q1 2025 Q4 2024 2024 Q2 2025  
    VLCC 37,200 35,900 43,400 56,400 68% 29,700
    Suezmax 31,200 33,300 41,400 44,900 69% 24,300 
    LR2 / Aframax 22,300 26,100 42,300 36,100 66% 23,300

    We expect the spot TCEs for the full second quarter of 2025 to be lower than the spot TCEs currently contracted, due to the impact of ballast days during the second quarter of 2025. See Appendix 1 for further details.

    The Board of Directors
    Frontline plc
    Limassol, Cyprus
    May 22, 2025

    Ola Lorentzon – Chairman and Director
    John Fredriksen – Director
    James O’Shaughnessy – Director
    Steen Jakobsen – Director
    Cato Stonex – Director
    Ørjan Svanevik – Director
    Dr. Maria Papakokkinou – Director

    Questions should be directed to:

    Lars H. Barstad: Chief Executive Officer, Frontline Management AS
    +47 23 11 40 00

    Inger M. Klemp: Chief Financial Officer, Frontline Management AS
    +47 23 11 40 00

    Forward-Looking Statements

    Matters discussed in this report may constitute forward-looking statements. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 provides safe harbor protections for forward-looking statements, which include statements concerning plans, objectives, goals, strategies, future events or performance, and underlying assumptions and other statements, which are other than statements of historical facts.

    Frontline plc and its subsidiaries, or the Company, desires to take advantage of the safe harbor provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and is including this cautionary statement in connection with this safe harbor legislation. This report and any other written or oral statements made by us or on our behalf may include forward-looking statements, which reflect our current views with respect to future events and financial performance and are not intended to give any assurance as to future results. When used in this document, the words “believe,” “anticipate,” “intend,” “estimate,” “forecast,” “project,” “plan,” “potential,” “will,” “may,” “should,” “expect” and similar expressions, terms or phrases may identify forward-looking statements.

    The forward-looking statements in this report are based upon various assumptions, including without limitation, management’s examination of historical operating trends, data contained in our records and data available from third parties. Although we believe that these assumptions were reasonable when made, because these assumptions are inherently subject to significant uncertainties and contingencies which are difficult or impossible to predict and are beyond our control, we cannot assure you that we will achieve or accomplish these expectations, beliefs or projections. We undertake no obligation to update any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.

    In addition to these important factors and matters discussed elsewhere herein, important factors that, in our view, could cause actual results to differ materially from those discussed in the forward-looking statements include:

    • the strength of world economies;
    • fluctuations in currencies and interest rates, including inflationary pressures and central bank policies intended to combat overall inflation and high interest rates and foreign exchange rates;
    • the impact that any discontinuance, modification or other reform or the establishment of alternative reference rates have on the Company’s floating interest rate debt instruments;
    • general market conditions, including fluctuations in charter hire rates and vessel values;
    • changes in the supply and demand for vessels comparable to ours and the number of newbuildings under construction;
    • the highly cyclical nature of the industry that we operate in;
    • the loss of a large customer or significant business relationship;
    • changes in worldwide oil production and consumption and storage;
    • changes in the Company’s operating expenses, including bunker prices, dry docking, crew costs and insurance costs;
    • planned, pending or recent acquisitions, business strategy and expected capital spending or operating expenses, including dry docking, surveys and upgrades;
    • risks associated with any future vessel construction;
    • our expectations regarding the availability of vessel acquisitions and our ability to complete vessel acquisition transactions as planned;
    • our ability to successfully compete for and enter into new time charters or other employment arrangements for our existing vessels after our current time charters expire and our ability to earn income in the spot market;
    • availability of financing and refinancing, our ability to obtain financing and comply with the restrictions and other covenants in our financing arrangements;
    • availability of skilled crew members and other employees and the related labor costs;
    • work stoppages or other labor disruptions by our employees or the employees of other companies in related industries;
    • compliance with governmental, tax, environmental and safety regulation, any non-compliance with U.S. or European Union regulations;
    • the impact of increasing scrutiny and changing expectations from investors, lenders and other market participants with respect to our Environmental, Social and Governance policies;
    • Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 or other applicable regulations relating to bribery;
    • general economic conditions and conditions in the oil industry;
    • effects of new products and new technology in our industry, including the potential for technological innovation to reduce the value of our vessels and charter income derived therefrom;
    • new environmental regulations and restrictions, whether at a global level stipulated by the International Maritime Organization, and/or imposed by regional or national authorities such as the European Union or individual countries;
    • vessel breakdowns and instances of off-hire;
    • the impact of an interruption in or failure of our information technology and communications systems, including the impact of cyber-attacks upon our ability to operate;
    • risks associated with potential cybersecurity or other privacy threats and data security breaches;
    • potential conflicts of interest involving members of our Board of Directors and senior management;
    • the failure of counter parties to fully perform their contracts with us;
    • changes in credit risk with respect to our counterparties on contracts;
    • our dependence on key personnel and our ability to attract, retain and motivate key employees;
    • adequacy of insurance coverage;
    • our ability to obtain indemnities from customers;
    • changes in laws, treaties or regulations;
    • the volatility of the price of our ordinary shares;
    • our incorporation under the laws of Cyprus and the different rights to relief that may be available compared to other countries, including the United States;
    • changes in governmental rules and regulations or actions taken by regulatory authorities;
    • government requisition of our vessels during a period of war or emergency;
    • potential liability from pending or future litigation and potential costs due to environmental damage and vessel collisions;
    • the arrest of our vessels by maritime claimants;
    • general domestic and international political conditions or events, including “trade wars”;
    • any further changes in U.S. trade policy that could trigger retaliatory actions by the affected countries;
    • potential disruption of shipping routes due to accidents, environmental factors, political events, public health threats, international hostilities including the war between Russia and Ukraine and possible cessation of such war, the conflict between Israel and Hamas and related conflicts in the Middle East, the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, acts by terrorists or acts of piracy on ocean-going vessels;
    • the impact of restriction on trade, including the imposition of tariffs, port fees and other import restrictions by the United States on its trading partners and the imposition of retaliatory tariffs by China and the EU on the United States, and potential further protectionist measures and/or further retaliatory actions by others, including the imposition of tariffs or penalties on vessels calling in key export and import ports such as the United States, EU and/or China;
    • the length and severity of epidemics and pandemics and their impact on the demand for seaborne transportation of crude oil and refined products;
    • the impact of port or canal congestion;
    • business disruptions due to adverse weather, natural disasters or other disasters outside our control; and
    • other important factors described from time to time in the reports filed by the Company with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

    We caution readers of this report not to place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements, which speak only as of their dates. These forward-looking statements are no guarantee of our future performance, and actual results and future developments may vary materially from those projected in the forward-looking statements.

    This information is subject to the disclosure requirements pursuant to Section 5-12 the Norwegian Securities Trading Act.


    1 This press release describes Time Charter Equivalent earnings and related per day amounts and spot TCE currently contracted, which are not measures prepared in accordance with IFRS (“non-GAAP”). See Appendix 1 for a full description of the measures and reconciliation to the nearest IFRS measure.

    Attachment

    • 1st Quarter 2025 Results

    The MIL Network –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Matt Jukes takes on role as Deputy Commissioner

    Source: United Kingdom London Metropolitan Police

    Matt Jukes has been confirmed as the Met’s new permanent Deputy Commissioner.

    Assistant Commissioner Jukes is currently acting in the role since the retirement of Dame Lynne Owens earlier this month.

    He will now formally step into the substantive role of Deputy Commissioner on Monday, 26 May.

    Acting Deputy Commissioner Jukes said: “I am honoured to be appointed as Deputy Commissioner. I’ve had the privilege of serving communities across the UK throughout my career, including here in London since 2020.

    “I have seen the incredible difference local policing can make to communities, and in recent years, the progress we’ve made in ensuring the Met is an organisation our people and London can be proud of. I’ve seen first-hand the efforts of tens of thousands of dedicated officers and staff, all working day and night to continue building the public’s confidence in us.

    “We have much more still to do, but I am looking forward to building on the work of my brave colleagues across the Met and building on the legacy of my predecessor Dame Lynne, who was pivotal in driving forward our mission of reform.”

    Commissioner Sir Mark Rowley said: “I am delighted Matt has been formally appointed as Deputy Commissioner.

    “He is an exceptional leader with a wealth of experience from his time across South Yorkshire, South Wales and of course here in the Met as head of National Counter Terrorism Policing.

    “He has lived the realities of neighbourhood policing right through to some of the most complex counter-terror issues we’ve faced in decades. He has a proven track record of reducing crime and increasing confidence in communities right across the UK. His skills and experience will be pivotal in our ongoing work to reform our service to London.

    “Matt is held in incredibly high esteem by all those who have already worked alongside him. I look forward to seeing how he shapes this role and continues to build on the legacy left by Dame Lynne.”

    The Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, said: “I know how determined Matt Jukes is to help deliver a New Met for London, build on the progress we have achieved tackling crime in the capital and improve the confidence and trust London’s communities have in the police.

    “His experience as an officer, detective and across a variety of senior roles will be invaluable as the Met continues to reform, modernise and improve the service it delivers. I’m looking forward to working with him and keeping the momentum of change going to deliver a safer London for all.”

    Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention Dame Diana Johnson said: “The role of Deputy Commissioner is one of the most demanding and important in policing, so I am delighted that Matt has been appointed to take on that challenge.

    “I also want to thank Matt for his vision and leadership as head of CT Policing since 2021.

    “Matt’s experience, leadership and dedication to duty, which he has demonstrated throughout his career, proves he is the right person to help lead the charge in reducing crime, restoring confidence in policing and making our streets safer.

    “His skills, track record of delivery and understanding of what’s needed to protect the public and keep communities safe, will be indispensable when it comes to policing the capital.”

    After Dame Lynne announced her intention to retire in February, a process to recruit her successor was launched. That process concluded, with AC Jukes recommended as the successful candidate.

    As is standard procedure, Home Secretary and Royal Household approval of that recommendation was required and has now been received.

    Bio

    Deputy Commissioner Jukes joined policing in 1995 as a constable with South Yorkshire Police.

    From patrolling Sheffield’s East End, he worked as a detective, and in a variety of other roles, working his way up to the position of Chief Superintendent, Borough Commander.

    He joined South Wales Police in 2010 as an Assistant Chief Constable leading on Specialist Crime and served as Deputy Chief Constable before being appointed Chief Constable in January 2018. He was awarded the Queen’s Policing Medal in that year’s Honours.

    He held the post until November 2020 when he joined the Met as Assistant Commissioner, leading and overseeing transformation programmes, moving to the post of Head of UK Counter Terrorism Policing and the Met’s Assistant Commissioner for Specialist Operations (ACSO) in July 2021. This continued a longstanding focus on intelligence and security, that began with a first role in counter terrorism in 2001 and saw him perform the role of counter-terrorism Commander in a number of significant operations.

    As ACSO and Head of CTP, his responsibilities included countering threats from domestic and international terrorism and the protection of the Royal Family, Ministers and Parliament. He oversaw the CTP investigation and response to the murder of Sir David Amess MP and contributed to security at the funeral of HM The Queen and HM The King’s Coronation. Most recently, he led responses to the recent conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East.

    As the national lead on security policing, he oversaw a four-fold increase in operations emanating from espionage, foreign interference and war crimes over almost four years.

    This 30-year career has been split between periods in specialist areas of policing, and others at the heart of local policing, delivering for communities and supporting frontline colleagues, including a focus on their wellbeing. He is a former Chair, and now Vice Chair, of Police Sport UK, and a Patron of the Police Roll of Honour Trust.

    He became acting Deputy Commissioner in May 2025.

    MIL Security OSI –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: This Council should use the tools at its disposal to press parties to conflict to protect civilians: UK statement at the UN Security Council

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    Speech

    This Council should use the tools at its disposal to press parties to conflict to protect civilians: UK statement at the UN Security Council

    Statement by Ambassador James Kariuki, UK Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, at the UN Security Council meeting on the protection of civilians in armed conflict.

    The Secretary-General’s report is a chilling reflection of our collective failure to protect civilians around the world.

    Famine has returned to Sudan. Thousands of women and children have been killed in Gaza, and hostages are still held by Hamas following the appalling October 7 attacks. Civilian infrastructure has been further damaged in Ukraine.

    It does not need to be this way.

    This Council, and the international community, have the tools to protect civilians; we have an urgent duty to use them.

    President, I will focus on three points.

    First, in recent days, we have heard powerful accounts from senior UN officials of the gaps between the obligations of parties to conflict under international humanitarian law and their implementation. 

    These gaps are where harms to civilians arise every day in conflicts on this Council’s agenda. But they are also where dangerous precedents are set, which risk fostering impunity. 

    This Council should use the tools at its disposal to press all parties to conflict to comply with their obligations under International Humanitarian Law and applicable International Human Rights Law. 

    Indiscriminate attacks and direct attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure need to stop.

    There must also be an end to impunity. 

    The United Kingdom will continue to stand behind the International Criminal Court as the court of last resort for the most serious crimes of international concern.

    Second, as we have heard, 2024 was the deadliest year on record for humanitarian workers. We call for the full implementation of resolution 2730 on the protection of humanitarian personnel, premises and assets. And we underscore the vital importance of ensuring safe and unhindered humanitarian access.

    Third, we need to ensure the UN can play its critical part in supporting the protection of civilians, especially through peace operations. 

    Peacekeepers must be properly trained and equipped to fulfil protection mandates, and those mandates must be respected by parties to conflict.

    President, the United Kingdom is taking practical steps to advance the protection of civilians, including through ICRC’s Global IHL initiative.

    And this month we published a practitioner’s handbook to support IHL compliance and better tackle conflict and hunger.

    In conclusion, the UK remains fully committed to working with international partners, including in this Council, to uphold our shared obligations to the protection of civilians and to bring an end to impunity.

    Updates to this page

    Published 22 May 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Golden Dome: what Trump should learn from Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ missile defence system plan

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Matthew Powell, Teaching Fellow in Strategic and Air Power Studies, University of Portsmouth

    Donald Trump has unveiled plans for a new “next-generation” missile defence system which he says will by “capable even of intercepting missiles launched from the other side of the world, or launched from space”. The US president says “Golden Dome”, which is reportedly partly inspired by Israel’s Iron Dome system that protects the country from missile attacks, will be operational by the end of his current four-year term of office.

    But critics say that it’s much harder to design a defence system to protect a land mass the size of the United States. This is particularly the case in an era characterised by the threat from hypersonic missiles, such as those used by Russia against Ukraine, as well as attacks from space.

    Ever since the first aerial attacks on civilian populations, there have been increasing calls to provide systems that can defend and destroy the potential for an adversary to attack people, governments and infrastructure.

    This developed from relatively basic defence systems, such as those employed by the UK from 1917 to protect London and the south-east of England from attack during the first world war, which developed further to provide a relatively large degree of protection during the Battle of Britain in the summer and autumn of 1940.


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    During the cold war, which followed the dropping of atomic bombs on Japan in 1945, research accelerated globally into ways of providing greater protection against nuclear attack. The most eye-catching of these ideas was the announcement by Ronald Reagan in 1983 of plans to develop a massive (and hugely expensive) land and space-based missile defence system.

    The project, officially called the Strategic Defence Initiative quickly became known colloquially – if slightly mockingly – as “Star Wars”.

    The concept behind the missile defence system was that it would provide a way of effectively making nuclear weapons obsolete. Through the application of a defensive system that incorporated both land and space-based missiles, it was believed that any nuclear warhead fired would be destroyed before it was able to re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere.

    This would not only prevent intercontinental ballistic missiles from striking their intended target, but their destruction so high above the Earth would mean that they would not pose a threat in terms of nuclear radiation and fallout.

    It’s important to note that what was announced by Reagan in March 1983 was not about the development, construction or application of an actual defensive system. It was about funding research into the technologies that would be required for such a system.

    Reagan claimed this was a move to create a more peaceful world by making nuclear weapons effectively obsolete. But it was certainly not seen this way in Moscow.

    It was also something of a half truth. The move should be seen within the wider context of cold war relations and developments. The Reagan administration was seeking to bring the Soviet Union to the negotiating table to discuss reductions in strategic weapons.

    By developing a defensive system that would make strategic nuclear weapons almost obsolete, it was hoped this would force the hand of the Soviets and effectively compel them to agree to talks.

    The ‘Star Wars’ era: Ronald Reagan hoped his planned missile defence system would force the USSR to the negotiating table. He was right.
    Yuryi Abramochkin/RIA Novosti archive., CC BY

    But at the same time, as far as the decision-makers in the Kremlin were concerned, such a system – if developed and deployed – would give the United States a colossal strategic advantage. By the mid-1980s, it was highly unlikely that the Soviets could ever afford the investment in research and development and production capabilities to design their own system. This would mean that the Soviet Union was now highly vulnerable to a nuclear attack, while the US would be protected.

    This would place the United States in a similar position to that which it had enjoyed between 1945 and 1949, when it was the only nation that had the ability launch nuclear weapons. The theory of mutually assured destruction would fall almost overnight, meaning that the US had very little to fear from launching a nuclear attack, as any Soviet response would be futile.

    Given the potential for nuclear blackmail by the all-powerful US, it might cause the Kremlin to consider launching a pre-emptive strike against the US before such a system could be developed or implemented. Rather than making the world a safer place and diminishing the place of nuclear weapons, the world would become more dangerous.

    Pie in the sky?

    The Strategic Defence Initiative never really got off the ground. The initial mockery from large parts of the public of the US hid many real challenges to the development of such a defensive system. The research and development aspect alone came with a very large price tag. This was largely out of step with Reagan’s ideas about small government and limited public spending.

    In order to fund such a programme, money would have to be diverted from other domestic and social programmes, such as health and education. Despite the cold war context, this may well have risked unrest and protest from large swaths of the US population.

    The new technologies that were supposed to be developed as a part of this initiative were untested. It became evident that the only real way to test the efficacy and capability would be to expose the world to a nuclear attack and hope that the theoretical concepts that had been developed actually worked in practice.

    The Soviet Union also found ways of countering the potential developments that may emerge from the Strategic Defence Initiative, making the system almost redundant before it had begun.

    Proposed defence systems, like the Strategic Defence Initiative or the Golden Dome, can appear to be a panacea to defensive worries caused by heavily armed adversaries. Announcements about their development can cause global headlines and speculation about what this means for relations between nations and the international system.

    Take a step back from the US president’s hype, however, and it’s clear that Golden Dome will be hugely expensive and challenging to operate. Moreover it will require significant capabilities that do not yet exist and have yet to be tested operationally.

    Matthew Powell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Golden Dome: what Trump should learn from Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ missile defence system plan – https://theconversation.com/golden-dome-what-trump-should-learn-from-reagans-star-wars-missile-defence-system-plan-257372

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Meeting with the Prime Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria

    Source: Government of Italy (English)

    The President of the Council of Ministers, Giorgia Meloni, received the Prime Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria, Rossen Jeliazkov, at Palazzo Chigi today.

    The meeting provided an opportunity to acknowledge the common will to deepen bilateral relations in strategic sectors such as infrastructure and transport, energy, interconnections and defence.

    During the discussion, a broad alignment of views between Rome and Sofia also emerged on the main European issues, starting with cohesion policy, enlargement and the pursuit of innovative solutions to irregular migration.

    With regard to the major issues in international politics, the two leaders focused on the conflict in Ukraine, confirming their support for the ongoing efforts to reach a just and lasting peace.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: 22 May 2025 Note for Media Seventy-eighth World Health Assembly – Daily update: 22 May 2025

    Source: World Health Organisation

    Health progress despite financial challenges 

    Thursday’s Committee B noted the Results Report 2024, and the financing and implementation of the Programme budget 2024–2025. Member States commended the transparency, and the level of detail provided. At the same time, Member States noted with concern that while some important achievements have been realized, progress is insufficient in reaching the SDG targets. In addition, Member States also advocated for more equitable funding across the Organization. The committee approved decision 78/17 Add.1 and 78/17 Add.2. 

    Delegates welcomed WHO’s Investment Round (IR), which will fund the Organization’s Fourteenth General Programme of Work – 2025–2028 (GPW 14) – its global health strategy for the next four years that has the potential to save 40 million lives if fully funded.  By April 2025, pledges of US$ 1.7 billion had been received. During the Health Assembly at least an additional US $210 million was committed, with further amounts expected. Since the start of the Investment Round, 62 pledges have been made by Member States, with a further 20 pledges by philanthropic organizations. Of the 62 pledgers, 35 had not previously provided voluntary contributions to WHO. 

    The pledges not only assure more sustainable financing but show global solidarity in the face of unprecedented challenges. The committee called for increased efforts to secure predictable, resilient and flexible funding.

    Related Documents:

    •  A78/17 Results report 2024 and financial report and audited financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2024
    • A78/17 Add.1 Draft decision: Results report 2024 (Programme budget 2024–2025: performance assessment) and Financial report and audited financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2024
    • A78/17 Add.2 Draft decision: Partial and temporary suspension of Financial Regulation VIII, 8.2
    • A78/18 Audited Financial Statements for the year ended
    • A78/36 Results report 2024 (Programme budget 2024–2025: performance assessment) and Financial report and audited financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2024
    • A78/INF./3 Voluntary contributions by fund and by contributor, 2024
    •  A78/19 Financing and implementation of the Programme budget 2024–2025
    • A78/20 Financing and implementation of the Programme budget 2024–2025: Reporting on operational efficiencies
    • A78/INF./4 Financing and implementation of the Programme budget 2024–2025 WHO presence in countries, territories and areas
    • A78/21 Sustainable financing: WHO investment round
    • A78/37 Proposed programme budget 2026–2027 – Sustainable financing: WHO investment round (Report of the Programme, Budget and Administration Committee of the Executive Board to the Seventy-eighth World Health Assembly)

    Strengthening health emergency preparedness and response

    On 21–22 May 2025, the World Health Assembly discussed WHO’s work in health emergencies. Over the last year, WHO responded to 51 graded emergencies across 89 countries and territories, including global outbreaks of cholera and mpox – a public health emergency of international concern – as well as multiple humanitarian crises. Working with over 900 partners across 28 health clusters, WHO helped provide health assistance for 72 million people in humanitarian settings. Nearly 60% of new emergencies were climate-related, highlighting the growing health impacts of climate change.

    Member States noted the WHO Director-General’s report on the implementation of the health emergency prevention, preparedness, response and resilience (HEPR) framework. The report outlined progress made in the key areas of collaborative disease surveillance, community protection, safe and scalable care, access to medical countermeasures and emergency coordination, and stressed that insufficient and unpredictable funding poses a significant risk to health systems worldwide.

    Delegates noted the report of the Independent Oversight and Advisory Committee (IOAC) for WHO’s Health Emergencies Programme. The report presents several recommendations to the Director-General aimed at strengthening WHO’s work in emergencies. The chair of the IOAC commended WHO’s leadership – particularly that of Dr Mike Ryan, the outgoing Executive Director of the Health Emergencies Programme, for his pivotal role and contributions to global health.

    The Director-General also reported on Universal Health and Preparedness Review (UHPR) to the Assembly, a unique process for Member States to assess their health emergency preparedness. UHPR was launched in November 2020 as a voluntary, country-led mechanism, in response to early lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic.

    Related documents:  

    • A78/13 WHO’s work in health emergencies
    • A78/12 Health emergencies preparedness and response: The Independent Oversight and Advisory Committee for the WHO Health Emergencies Programme
    • A78/9 Strengthening the global architecture for health emergency prevention, preparedness, response and resilience
    • A78/4 Consolidated report by the Director-General (including UHPR)

    International Health Regulations remain a cornerstone of global health security

    Member States noted the Director-General’s report on progress made in implementing the International Health Regulations (2005), which outline the rights and obligations of countries in managing public health events and emergencies that have the potential to cross borders.

    In 2024, WHO assessed over 1.2 million raw signals related to public health risks, identifying and verifying 429 events with potential or actual international public health implications.

    All countries but one provided their self-assessment report to the Assembly. Numerous joint external evaluations, after- and intra-action reviews, and training were conducted to strengthen preparedness and response capacities. 

    Member States recommended to the Assembly the adoption of a decision for the Director-General to notify Palestine of the International Health Regulations (2005). This is a step prior to Palestine expressing interest in becoming a States Party to the Regulations. This follows the resolution approved during the World Health Assembly last year on aligning the participation of Palestine in WHO with its participation in the United Nations.

    The Assembly also noted the Standing Recommendations issued by the Director-General on COVID-19 (valid until April 2026) and mpox (valid until August 2025).

    At last year’s World Health Assembly, Member States adopted historic amendments to the Regulations, drawing on lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic. The amendments are expected to come into force in September 2025.

    Related documents:

    • A78/11 Implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005)
    • A78/A/CONF./4 Notifying the International Health Regulations (2005) to Palestine
    • Resolution WHA77.15 (2024): Aligning the participation of Palestine in the World Health Organization with its participation in the United Nations
    • A78/INF./6 Implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005) Extension of the standing recommendations for mpox
    • A78/INF./7 Implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005) Extension of the standing recommendations for COVID-19

    Member States urge research into public health and social measures to control outbreaks and pandemics

    Member States approved a decision related to public health and social measures, urging the strengthening of the research base on these interventions. Public health and social measures are nonpharmaceutical interventions used to reduce the spread of an infectious disease and lower hospitalizations and death. Examples include screening for diseases, personal hygiene measures and changing the way people gather or travel. These measures played an important role in buying time for countries to develop and distribute treatments, diagnostics and vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic, but the evidence base on the effectiveness of these measures remains limited.

    Related documents:

    WHO’s response to health needs in Ukraine and refugee-hosting countries

    Delegates noted the Director-General’s report on the implementation of a resolution on WHO’s response to the health emergency triggered by the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine. In 2024, WHO reached an estimated 4.7 million people with health support in Ukraine and more than 400 000 refugees in neighbouring countries. WHO delivered over US$ 32.5 million worth of medicines, medical equipment and supplies to health facilities across Ukraine, and over US$ 4.9 million worth of supplies and equipment to refugee-hosting countries. Since 24 February 2022, a total of 2254 attacks on health care have been verified, resulting in 710 injuries and 208 deaths.

    Member States voted on related decisions. The draft decision proposed by Ukraine and other countries to continue, among other things, to restore and strengthen Ukraine’s health-care system was approved. Suggested amendments to the draft decision proposed by the Russian Federation and other countries were rejected.

    Related documents:

    • A78/14 Implementation of resolution WHA75.11 (2022) 
    • A78/A/CONF./3 Health emergency in Ukraine and refugee-receiving and -hosting countries, stemming from the Russian Federation’s aggression
    • A78/A/CONF./3 Add.1 Amendments proposed by Belarus, China, Nicaragua and the Russian Federation
    • A78/A/CONF./3 Add.2 Financial and administrative implications for the Secretariat of decisions proposed for adoption by the Health Assembly

    Health conditions in the occupied Palestinian territory, including east Jerusalem

    Delegates noted the Director-General’s report on the current health conditions in the occupied Palestinian territory, with the Gaza Strip facing an unprecedented humanitarian crisis, with widespread displacement, destruction and death. The health system has been severely degraded by attacks, critical shortages of medicines, supplies and fuel, and restricted access. The report stated that between 1 January 2024 and 28 February 2025, 376 attacks on health care were reported in the Gaza Strip, resulting in 286 deaths and 591 injuries.

    The health crisis in the West Bank has worsened since January 2025, with escalating violence and stricter restrictions on movement impeding access to health care.

    WHO’s response has focused on providing essential health services, public health surveillance, disease prevention and control, provision of supplies and logistics, and partner coordination. The report stressed the need for an immediate ceasefire, the release of all hostages, unrestricted humanitarian access and protection of health.

    Member States noted the report and commended WHO’s efforts towards the continuity of health services under difficult conditions. Delegates approved an accompanying resolution.

    Related documents:

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Ukraine: it’s clear right now there are no serious plans for peace

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate Editor

    When it comes to the sincerity, or otherwise, of Vladimir Putin’s apparent willingness to talk peace with Ukraine, the Russian leader has given us plenty of hints. He may insist he wants to see a deal done and an end to the killing. But his insistence that any agreement would have to address the “root causes” of the war is a clear indication that he hasn’t rowed back from his original maximalist war aims. To whit: no Nato membership, a Kremlin-friendly government in Kyiv, ownership of Crimea and control – preferably annexation – of the four provinces of Ukraine presently under Russian occupation.

    Meanwhile his great ally Dmitry Medvedev continues to insist that there are at present no Ukrainian officials who legitimately qualify as partners for negotiation. The Russian national security council secretary claims that Ukraine is a “failed state” whose leaders’ lack of legitimacy, meanwhile, raise “serious questions” about who Russia can conclude any agreement with.

    So when Donald Trump said this week after a two-hour chat with Putin that Russia and Ukraine would “immediately start negotiations” toward a ceasefire, it’s not clear who he thought the Russian president was planning to talk to if, as Putin and his cronies insist, Zelensky and his team are not legitimate. And, from what he had to say about his recent phone call with Putin, it appears that Trump has his eyes more on the sorts of deals that might be done with Russia once this is all cleared up.

    As he posted on his Truth Social platform after talking with Putin: “Russia wants to do largescale [sic] TRADE with the United States when this catastrophic ‘bloodbath’ is over, and I agree. There is a tremendous opportunity for Russia to create massive amounts of jobs and wealth. Its potential is UNLIMITED.”

    Accordingly, he has backed away from his previous willingness to join Europe in imposing fresh sanctions on Russia. Meanwhile Russia continues to hammer Ukraine both on the battlefield and via ever larger drone and missiles attacks against its civilian population.


    Sign up to receive our weekly World Affairs Briefing newsletter from The Conversation UK. Every Thursday we’ll bring you expert analysis of the big stories in international relations.


    The real clue to Trump’s attitude, writes Stefan Wolff, is the order of phone calls on Monday. Before settling down to talk with Putin, the US president put in a call to the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky. Reporting back on the call, Zelensky said he had urged Trump that he mustn’t make any decisions about Ukraine “without us”. Having subsequently spoken at length with Putin, Trump emerged saying in his Truth Social post that Russia and Ukraine will “immediately start negotiations” towards a ceasefire and an end to the war.

    The state of the conflict in Ukraine, May 21 2025.
    Institute for the Study of War

    But Wolff, professor of international security at the University of Birmingham who has written regularly here about the conflict, believes that the fact that Trump added the conditions for peace “will be negotiated between the two parties, as it can only be” suggests he is indeed planning to abandon his peacemaking ambitions. The whole deal was taking far longer than the 24 hours he boasted of during the election campaign last year.

    Where this leaves Europe is unclear, writes Wolff. If it can no longer rely on Washington as a security partner (and the signs aren’t good), then this will require a substantial rethink. Indeed there are signs, with the UK’s recent agreement over security and defence, that minds are increasingly focused on a more self-reliant future. In turn, this has implications for US security. If Europe is compelled to rethink its security relationship with the US it could cut both ways as Washington pivots to face an increasingly aggressive China.




    Read more:
    After another call with Putin, it looks like Trump has abandoned efforts to mediate peace in Ukraine


    Of course, it should have been clear to all concerned not to take Putin at face value over his apparent willingness to talk peace with Zelensky when he failed to turn up to talks in Istanbul at the end of last week. As Natasha Lindstaedt writes here, none of the main players attended the talks, despite plans for Putin, Zelensky and Trump to all meet face-to-face.

    Lindstaedt, an expert in international relations at the University of Essex, describes what for all the world seemed like a bizarre game of bluff – certainly as far as Putin and Trump are concerned. All three leaders had promised to be there, but in the end they all sent intermediaries with the result that nothing of any consequence was agreed. Trump’s aides insisted that if Putin attended he would be there. Then the US president said the reason that Putin hadn’t turned up was because he knew Trump wasn’t going to be there.

    “It’s certainly hard to take peace talks seriously when there is an awkward back-and-forth just about who is going to attend,” Lindstaedt concludes. “And while Trump thinks peace is only possible through bilateral meetings between himself and Putin, it’s clear he can’t even influence Putin to show up to peace talks that the Russian president himself suggested.”




    Read more:
    Putin is testing how far he can push Trump by not turning up for Istanbul talks


    Pie in the sky?

    The US president, meanwhile, has announced plans for an ambitious missile defence system to be called “Golden Dome”. It’s a next-generation system, says Trump, “capable even of intercepting missiles launched from the other side of the world, or launched from space”.

    The plan, for which US$25 billion (£18.6 billion) has been set aside in the US president’s “one big beautiful bill”, presently before the US Congress, calls for a network of surveillance satellites complemented by a separate fleet of offensive satellites that would shoot down offensive missiles soon after lift-off. Trump has estimated this will cost US$175 billion and will be completed by the end of his current four-year term. But other estimates are that it will be much more expensive and take far longer to complete.

    “There has never been anything like this”, the US president said. And indeed there hasn’t, writes Matthew Powell, an expert in air power from the University of Portsmouth. In fact, Powell is deeply sceptical that the technology to enable such an ambitious defence system exists at present. He points to Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, which became known by critics, with their tongues in their cheeks, as “Star Wars”, which never really got any further than the drawing board.

    It did, however, have the effect of signalling to the Kremlin and the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, that the sky would be the limit in terms of US willingness to push the boundaries of defence spending. Powell believes it significantly changed the calculations when it came to the feasibility of continuing the nuclear arms race and may have been responsible for the end of the cold war.




    Read more:
    Golden Dome: what Trump should learn from Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ missile defence system plan


    Incidentally, the US president’s funding bill scraped through the House of Representatives with 215 votes for and 214 against. In addition to setting aside funds for Golden Dome, the bill, which in its current form adds trillions of dollars to the US debt, has been described by Democrat critics as a “tax scam”. A statement from Democrat leaders said: “This fight is just beginning, and House Democrats will continue to use every tool at our disposal to ensure that the GOP Tax Scam is buried deep in the ground, never to rise again.”

    But how much stomach do the Democrats have for the fight? They’ve had a pretty terrible few months since the election. Their approval rating in March was at 29%, the worst since polling began in 1992. Fernando Pizarro, a lecturer in journalism at City St Georges, University of London, who has several Emmys under his belt for his work on US politics, has cast his eye over some of the leading Democrats who he thinks will spearhead the opposition to the Republicans over the next few years and identifies a few players who could vie for the presidential nomination in 2028.




    Read more:
    The top Democrats leading the fight against Trump’s agenda


    Gaza: situation increasingly desperate

    Meanwhile, after 11 weeks of Israeli blockade of aid to the people of Gaza, limited deliveries have now recommenced in the face of pressure from both the US and increasingly outspoken interventions from the likes of the UK, France and Canada.

    But despite reports that up to 100 trucks are now being allowed into the Gaza Strip, human rights agencies and aid organisations have said that there is a desperate threat of widespread starvation unless the amount of food, fuel and medicine getting through increases exponentially. And fast.

    There is talk of a US-administered programme, the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF), which could be up and running by the end of May and could accelerate the delivery of vital supplies to the civilian population while ensuring it does not does not get into the hands of militants or black marketeers.

    But this scheme has its critics, write Sarah Schiffling and Liz Breen, experts in humanitarian logistics and health service operations at Hanken School of Economics and the University of Bradford respectively. They point to a number of flaws, including the plan to concentrate the secure distribution points in southern and central Gaza, forcing large numbers of people to travel considerable distances for supplies.

    The GHF plan also calls for aid distribution to be coordinated with the Israel Defense Forces, which humanitarian organisations says is a “humanitarian cover for a military strategy of control and dispossession”.

    Schiffling and Breen point out that humanitarian organisations have 160,000 pallets of supplies and almost 9,000 aid trucks ready to be dispatched across the border “as soon as Israel allows it”. Whether Israel will allow it is, of course, another question entirely.




    Read more:
    Israel allows a ‘limited’ amount of aid back into Gaza, where the humanitarian situation is desperate


    World Affairs Briefing from The Conversation UK is available as a weekly email newsletter. Click here to get updates directly in your inbox.


    – ref. Ukraine: it’s clear right now there are no serious plans for peace – https://theconversation.com/ukraine-its-clear-right-now-there-are-no-serious-plans-for-peace-257388

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Canada: Prime Minister Carney speaks with Prime Minister of Poland Donald Tusk

    Source: Government of Canada – Prime Minister

    Today, the Prime Minister, Mark Carney, spoke with the Prime Minister of Poland, Donald Tusk.

    Prime Minister Tusk congratulated Prime Minister Carney on his election. The prime ministers discussed shared priorities, including Euro-Atlantic security, co-operation within NATO, and support for a just and lasting peace in Ukraine.

    The leaders emphasized deepening bilateral and commercial ties between Canada and Poland, and agreed to remain in close contact.

    Associated Link

    MIL OSI Canada News –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Canada: G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors conclude productive meeting in Banff

    Source: Government of Canada News (2)

    May 22, 2025 – Banff, Alberta – Department of Finance Canada

    Today, G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors concluded their meeting in Banff, Alberta, which is part of Canada’s 2025 G7 Presidency. The Honourable François-Philippe Champagne, Minister of Finance and National Revenue, and Tiff Macklem, Governor of the Bank of Canada, co-chaired the meeting.

    Ministers and Governors reached agreement on a communiqué which emphasized, above all, the the importance of G7 unity in the face of complex global challenges. In advance of the Leaders’ Summit next month in Kananaskis, Alberta, the meeting included a productive and frank exchange on the global economy, unsustainable global imbalances, and ways to promote growth and productivity.

    Ministers and Governors agreed to:

    • a G7 Financial Crime Call to Action to spur further concrete progress in tackling financial crime, including money laundering and terrorist financing. Canada will contribute $4.8 million in new technical assistance to developing economies so they can contribute to this effort;
    • support the expansion of the World Bank-led Resilient and Inclusive Supply-Chain Enhancement (RISE) Partnership to strengthen the integration of developing countries into critical minerals supply chains. Canada will contribute $20 million to support the expansion of the RISE Partnership, including in Latin America and the Caribbean;
    • address risks stemming from the large increase in low-value shipments imported into G7 markets; and
    • continued unwavering support to Ukraine, an agreement to continue to explore all possible options to hold Russia to account, including further ramping up sanctions, as well as efforts to foster private sector participation in the recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine.

    Canada is a stable, reliable, and innovative partner with a wealth of natural resources and expertise. Through our G7 Presidency, we will shape the global agenda – working with allies and partners to grow our economies, defend Canadians’ interests, and address the most pressing global challenges.

    MIL OSI Canada News –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Modification of customs duties applicable to imports of certain goods originating in or exported from the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus – P10_TA(2025)0109 – Thursday, 22 May 2025 – Brussels

    Source: European Parliament

    THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

    Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 207(2) thereof,

    Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

    After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

    Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure(1),

    Whereas:

    (1)  The Union’s imports of urea and nitrogen-based fertilisers from the Russian Federation in 2023 were significant, at 3,6 million tonnes, and increased considerably in 2024 by comparison with 2023. The level of the Union’s imports from the Russian Federation of the agricultural goods covered by this Regulation (the ‘agricultural goods concerned’) is relatively low for most of those goods, but could increase significantly if the current trading conditions persist.

    (2)  The Union’s imports of the fertilisers covered by this Regulation (the ‘fertilisers concerned’) currently reflect a situation of economic dependence on the Russian Federation. Moreover, the imports of the agricultural goods concerned could create a similar and additional economic dependence on the Russian Federation, which should in the present circumstances be prevented and reduced in order to protect the Union’s market and to safeguard the Union’s food security.

    (3)  The Union’s erga omnes common customs duties are the most-favoured-nation tariffs currently applied to imports of the agricultural goods concerned and fertilisers concerned (the ‘goods concerned’). Those tariffs vary greatly at present. Depending on the goods concerned, some tariffs are either set at zero or set very low, while other tariffs are so high that no trade takes place.

    (4)  Continued imports of the goods concerned from the Russian Federation under the current conditions could make the Union vulnerable to coercive actions by the Russian Federation. In particular, a potential increase in imports of the goods concerned from the Russian Federation could disrupt the Union’s market and negatively impact the Union’s producers. It is therefore necessary to take appropriate tariff measures in order to address the Union’s current and potential economic dependence on imports of the goods concerned from the Russian Federation. That should be done by ending the current situation where the goods concerned enter the Union’s market on terms that are as favourable as those applied to goods of other origins that receive most-favoured-nation treatment.

    (5)  At present, imports of the fertilisers concerned from the Russian Federation are already increasing and could increase further and quickly if additional Russian production is re-oriented towards the Union. Such potential increased imports from the Russian Federation would disrupt the Union’s market for the fertilisers concerned and harm the Union’s producers of nitrogen fertilisers, who are already facing difficulties in competing with imports from the Russian Federation because gas prices in the Union remain high. The long-term survival of the Union’s nitrogen fertiliser industry is of crucial importance for the Union’s food security because the Union’s agricultural sector needs the fertilisers concerned in order to produce food. Addressing the growing dependence on imports of the fertilisers concerned from the Russian Federation and preserving the viability of an autonomous Union nitrogen fertiliser industry is therefore vital to ensuring and maintaining the Union’s food security. In order to prevent future dependence on imports of agricultural goods from the Russian Federation, it is also necessary to adjust the tariff levels for the agricultural goods concerned.

    (6)  Tariff measures should also be taken in respect of the Republic of Belarus in order to prevent potential imports to the Union from the Russian Federation being diverted through the Republic of Belarus, given the Republic of Belarus’s close political and economic ties with the Russian Federation. Such diversion of potential imports could happen if the Union’s tariffs on imports of the goods concerned from the Republic of Belarus were to remain unchanged. Imports of the goods concerned that originate in or are exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus to the Union should therefore be subject to higher customs duties than imports from other third countries.

    (7)  Imports from the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus should not benefit from any lower tariffs under the Union’s tariff rate quotas on the basis of most-favoured-nation treatment. The reduced rates set out in the Union’s tariff rate quotas for the goods listed in the Annexes to this Regulation should therefore not apply to goods originating in or exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation or the Republic of Belarus to the Union.

    (8)  The envisaged increase in customs duties is not expected to affect global food security negatively because the increase in tariffs applies only to imports into the Union and does not affect the goods concerned if they are only transiting through the Union’s territory to third countries of final destination. On the contrary, the envisaged increase in Union import duties could increase the exports of the goods concerned to third countries and increase the availability of supplies in those third countries.

    (9)  At the same time, fertilisers play a significant role for food security as well as for the financial stability of farmers in the Union. It is therefore necessary to ensure predictable and sufficient access to fertilisers, at affordable price levels for farmers in the Union, which should in turn contribute to the stabilisation of agricultural markets. During a transitional period, the proposed measure would stimulate stepping-up production in the Union and allow for the reinforcement of alternative sources of supply from other international partners, minimising the risk that fertiliser prices for farmers in the Union increase substantially. To that end, the Commission should closely monitor the evolution of fertiliser prices on the Union’s market. If fertiliser prices increase substantially, the Commission should assess the situation and take all appropriate actions to remedy such price increase.

    (10)  The envisaged increase in customs duties is consistent with the Union’s external action in other areas, as set out in Article 21(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The state of relations between the Union and the Russian Federation has greatly deteriorated in recent years and particularly since 2022. That deterioration of relations is due to the Russian Federation’s blatant disregard for international law and, in particular, its unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine. Since July 2014, the Union has progressively imposed restrictive measures on trade with the Russian Federation in response to the Russian Federation’s actions against Ukraine.

    (11)  The Russian Federation is a member of the World Trade Organization (‘WTO’). However, the Union is currently allowed, by virtue of the exceptions that apply under the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (‘WTO Agreement’), and in particular Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (security exceptions), to disregard the obligation to accord to goods imported from the Russian Federation most-favoured-nation treatment, and it is not prevented from imposing import duties higher than those contained in the Union’s schedule of tariff commitments on trade in goods, if the Union considers such measures to be necessary in order to protect the Union’s essential security interests.

    (12)  Relations between the Union and the Republic of Belarus have also deteriorated in recent years due to the Republic of Belarus’s disregard for international law, fundamental freedoms and human rights, as well as its support for the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Since October 2020, the Union has progressively imposed restrictive measures on trade with the Republic of Belarus.

    (13)  The Republic of Belarus is not a member of the WTO. The Union is therefore not obliged, by virtue of the WTO Agreement, to accord to goods from the Republic of Belarus most-favoured-nation treatment and other treatment in line with that Agreement. In addition, existing trade agreements between the Union and the Republic of Belarus allow actions justified on the basis of applicable exception clauses, in particular security exceptions.

    (14)  In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation as regards the laying down of arrangements for the monitoring of import volumes, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council(2).

    (15)  In accordance with the principle of proportionality, it is necessary and appropriate to lay down rules increasing tariffs on the goods concerned with immediate effect, firstly in order to achieve the basic objective of ensuring that the goods concerned that originate in or are exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus do not disturb the Union’s market for the goods concerned and, secondly, in order to implement the Common Commercial Policy and to reduce the Union’s imports of the goods concerned from the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus in response to concerns that such imports could negatively affect the Union’s internal market and impair the Union’s food security. This Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives pursued in accordance with Article 5(4) TEU.

    (16)  In order to prevent further economic dependence of the Union on imports of the goods concerned from the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus, this Regulation should enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,

    HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

    Article 1

    1.  Goods classified under the Combined Nomenclature (CN) codes listed in Annex I that are imported into the Union and that originate in or are exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation or the Republic of Belarus shall be subject to an additional 50 % ad valorem customs duty that is to apply on top of the applicable Common Customs Tariff rate. Such goods originating in or exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation or the Republic of Belarus shall not be eligible for lower import duties for limited quantities (tariff rate quotas) where those duties apply pursuant to the Union’s obligations under the WTO Agreement or where tariff rate quotas are opened by the Union on another basis.

    2.  Goods classified under the CN codes listed in Annex II that are imported into the Union and that originate in or are exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation or the Republic of Belarus shall be subject to a customs duty as follows:

    (a)  with regard to the goods falling under CN code 3102:

    (i)  6,5 % ad valorem + 40 EUR/tonne from 1 July 2025 until 30 June 2026;

    (ii)  6,5 % ad valorem + 60 EUR/tonne from 1 July 2026 until 30 June 2027;

    (iii)  6,5 % ad valorem + 80 EUR/tonne from 1 July 2027 until 30 June 2028;

    (iv)  6,5 % ad valorem + 315 EUR/tonne from 1 July 2028;

    (b)  with regard to the goods falling under CN codes 3105 20, 3105 30, 3105 40, 3105 51, 3105 59 and 3105 90:

    (i)  6,5 % ad valorem + 45 EUR/tonne from 1 July 2025 until 30 June 2026;

    (ii)  6,5 % ad valorem + 70 EUR/tonne from 1 July 2026 until 30 June 2027;

    (iii)  6,5 % ad valorem + 95 EUR/tonne from 1 July 2027 until 30 June 2028;

    (iv)  6,5 % ad valorem + 430 EUR/tonne from 1 July 2028.

    3.  Notwithstanding paragraph 2, if cumulative import volumes of goods listed in point (a) or point (b) of that paragraph reach the following thresholds, the Commission shall, within 21 days, impose a duty at the level set out in point (a)(iv) or point (b)(iv), respectively, of that paragraph, for the remaining imports of those goods in the given period:

    (a)  2,7 million tonnes from 1 July 2025 until 30 June 2026;

    (b)  1,8 million tonnes from 1 July 2026 until 30 June 2027;

    (c)  0,9 million tonnes from 1 July 2027 until 30 June 2028.

    4.  The Commission may adopt implementing acts laying down the arrangements for monitoring the import volumes set out in paragraph 3 of this Article. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 3(2).

    Article 2

    1.  The Commission shall monitor prices applicable in the Union of the goods listed in Annex II for a period of four years from … [the date of entry into force of this Regulation].

    2.  In the event that the price levels of the goods listed in Annex II substantially exceed the 2024 price levels during the period referred to in paragraph 1, the Commission shall assess the situation and take all appropriate actions to remedy such price increase. Such actions may include, where appropriate, a proposal for the temporary suspension of tariffs for those goods imported from and originating in countries other than the Russian Federation or the Republic of Belarus.

    Article 3

    1.  The Commission shall be assisted by the Customs Code Committee established by Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(3). That committee shall be a committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.

    2.  Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply.

    Article 4

    This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

    In respect of the goods listed in Annex I, this Regulation shall apply from … [four weeks from the date of entry into force of this Regulation].

    This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

    Done at …,

    For the European Parliament For the Council

    The President The President

    ANNEX I

    List of goods referred to in Article 1(1)

    CN code

    Description

    01

    Live animals

    02

    Meat and edible meat offal

    04

    Dairy produce; birds’ eggs; natural honey; edible products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included

    05

    Products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included

    06

    Live trees and other plants; bulbs, roots and the like; cut flowers and ornamental foliage

    Ex 07

    Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers, except:

    0713 10 peas (Pisum sativum)

    0713 20 chickpeas (garbanzos)

    08

    Edible fruits and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or melons

    09

    Coffee, tea, maté and spices

    1004

    Oats

    1006

    Rice

    1008 60

    Triticale

    Ex 11

    Products of the milling industry; malt; starches; inulin; wheat gluten, except CN code 1106 10 00

    1209

    Seeds, fruits and spores, of a kind used for sowing

    1210

    Hop cones, fresh or dried, whether or not ground, powdered or in the form of pellets; lupulin

    1211

    Plants and parts of plants (including seeds and fruits), of a kind used primarily in perfumery, in pharmacy or for insecticidal, fungicidal or similar purposes, fresh, chilled, frozen or dried, whether or not cut, crushed or powdered

    1212

    Locust beans, seaweeds and other algae, sugar beet and sugar cane, fresh, chilled, frozen or dried, whether or not ground; fruit stones and kernels and other vegetable products (including unroasted chicory roots of the variety Cichorium intybus sativum), of a kind used primarily for human consumption, not elsewhere specified or included

    1213

    Cereal straw and husks, unprepared, whether or not chopped, ground, pressed or in the form of pellets

    1214

    Swedes, mangolds, fodder roots, hay, lucerne (alfalfa), clover, sainfoin, forage kale, lupines, vetches and similar forage products, whether or not in the form of pellets

    13

    Lac; gums, resins and other vegetable saps and extracts

    1401

    Vegetable materials of a kind used primarily for plaiting (e.g. bamboos, rattans, reeds, rushes, osier, raffia, cleaned, bleached or dyed cereal straw, and lime bark)

    1404 20

    Cotton linters

    1501

    Pig fat (including lard) and poultry fat, other than that falling under headings 0209 or 1503

    1502

    Fats of bovine animals, sheep or goats, other than those falling under heading 1503

    1503

    Lard stearin, lard oil, oleostearin, oleo-oil and tallow oil, not emulsified or mixed or otherwise prepared

    1505

    Wool grease and fatty substances derived therefrom (including lanolin)

    1506

    Other animal fats and oils and their fractions, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified

    1509

    Olive oil and its fractions, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified

    1510

    Other oils and their fractions, obtained solely from olives, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified, including blends of these oils or fractions with oils or fractions falling under heading 1509

    1511

    Palm oil and its fractions, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified

    1513

    Coconut (copra), palm kernel or babassu oil and fractions thereof, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified

    1515 30

    Castor oil and its fractions

    1515 50

    Sesame oil and its fractions

    1515 60

    Microbial fats and oils and their fractions

    1515 90 11

    Tung oil; jojoba and oiticica oils; myrtle and japan wax; their fractions

    1515 90 21

    Crude tobacco-seed oil and its fractions, for technical or industrial uses other than the manufacture of foodstuffs for human consumption

    1515 90 29

    Crude tobacco-seed oil and its fractions, excluding for technical or industrial uses other than the manufacture of foodstuffs for human consumption

    1515 90 31

    Tobacco-seed oil and its fractions other than crude, for technical or industrial uses other than the manufacture of foodstuffs for human consumption

    1515 90 39

    Tobacco-seed oil and its fractions other than crude, excluding for technical or industrial uses other than the manufacture of foodstuffs for human consumption

    1516 10

    Animal fats and oils and their fractions

    1516 20 10

    Hydrogenated castor oil, so-called ‘opal-wax’

    1516 30

    Microbials fats and oils and their fractions

    1517

    Margarine, edible mixtures or preparations of animal, vegetable or microbial fats or oils or of fractions of different fats or oils of Chapter 15, other than edible fats or oils or their fractions falling under heading 1516

    1518 00 10

    Linoxyn

    1520

    Glycerol, crude; glycerol waters and glycerol lyes

    1521

    Vegetable waxes (other than triglycerides), beeswax, other insect waxes and spermaceti, whether or not refined or coloured

    1522

    Degras; residues resulting from the treatment of fatty substances or animal or vegetable waxes

    1601

    Sausages and similar products of meat, meat offal, blood or insects; food preparations based on these products

    1602

    Other prepared or preserved meat, meat offal, blood or insects

    17

    Sugars and sugar confectionery

    18

    Cocoa and cocoa preparations

    19

    Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk; pastrycooks’ products

    20

    Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other parts of plants

    21

    Miscellaneous edible preparations

    22

    Beverages, spirits and vinegar

    2301 10

    Flours, meals and pellets, of meat or offal, unfit for human consumption; greaves

    2302 10

    Bran, sharps and other residues of maize (corn), whether or not in the form of pellets, derived from sifting, milling or other working

    2302 40 02

    Bran, sharps and other residues of rice, whether or not in the form of pellets, derived from sifting, milling or other working, with starch content not exceeding 35 %

    2302 40 08

    Bran, sharps and other residues of rice, whether or not in the form of pellets, derived from sifting, milling or other working, other than with starch content not exceeding 35 %

    2302 50

    Bran, sharps and other residues of leguminous plants, whether or not in the form of pellets, derived from sifting, milling or other working

    2306 90 11

    Oilcake and other solid residues, whether or not ground or in the form of pellets, resulting from the extraction of olive oil, containing 3 % or less by weight of olive oil

    2306 90 19

    Oilcake and other solid residues, whether or not ground or in the form of pellets, resulting from the extraction of olive oil, containing more than 3 % by weight of olive oil

    2307

    Wine lees; argol

    2308 00 11

    Grape marc, whether or not in the form of pellets, of a kind used in animal feeding, not elsewhere specified or included, having a total alcoholic strength by mass not exceeding 4,3 % mas and a dry matter content not less than 40 % by weight

    2308 00 19

    Grape marc, whether or not in the form of pellets, of a kind used in animal feeding, not elsewhere specified or included, other than having a total alcoholic strength by mass not exceeding 4,3 % mas and a dry matter content not less than 40 % by weight

    2308 00 40

    Acorns and horse-chestnuts; pomace or marc of fruit, other than grapes, whether or not in the form of pellets, of a kind used for animal feeding, not elsewhere specified or included

    2309 10

    Dog or cat food, put up for retail sale

    2309 90 10

    Fish or marine mammal solubles, of a kind used in animal feeding

    2309 90 33

    Preparations, including premixes, of a kind used in animal feeding, containing glucose, glucose syrup, maltodextrine or maltodextrine syrup of subheadings 1702 30 50, 1702 30 90, 1702 40 90, 1702 90 50 and 2106 90 55 but containing no starch or containing 10 % or less by weight of starch and containing not less than 10 % but less than 50 % by weight of milk products

    2309 90 35

    Preparations, including premixes, of a kind used in animal feeding, containing glucose, glucose syrup, maltodextrine or maltodextrine syrup of subheadings 1702 30 50, 1702 30 90, 1702 40 90, 1702 90 50 and 2106 90 55 but containing no starch or containing 10 % or less by weight of starch and containing not less than 50 % but less than 75 % by weight of milk products

    2309 90 39

    Preparations, including premixes, of a kind used in animal feeding, containing glucose, glucose syrup, maltodextrine or maltodextrine syrup of subheadings 1702 30 50, 1702 30 90, 1702 40 90, 1702 90 50 and 2106 90 55 but containing no starch or containing 10 % or less by weight of starch and containing not less than 75 % by weight of milk products

    2309 90 43

    Preparations, including premixes, of a kind used in animal feeding, containing glucose, glucose syrup, maltodextrine or maltodextrine syrup of subheadings 1702 30 50, 1702 30 90, 1702 40 90, 1702 90 50 and 2106 90 55 and containing more than 10 % but not more than 30 % by weight of starch and containing not less than 10 % but less than 50 % by weight of milk products

    2309 90 49

    Preparations, including premixes, of a kind used in animal feeding, containing glucose, glucose syrup, maltodextrine or maltodextrine syrup of subheadings 1702 30 50, 1702 30 90, 1702 40 90, 1702 90 50 and 2106 90 55 and containing more than 10 % but not more than 30 % by weight of starch and containing not less than 50 % by weight of milk products

    2309 90 53

    Preparations, including premixes, of a kind used in animal feeding, containing glucose, glucose syrup, maltodextrine or maltodextrine syrup of subheadings 1702 30 50, 1702 30 90, 1702 40 90, 1702 90 50 and 2106 90 55 and containing more than 30 % by weight of starch and containing not less than 10 % but less than 50 % by weight of milk products

    2309 90 59

    Preparations, including premixes, of a kind used in animal feeding, containing glucose, glucose syrup, maltodextrine or maltodextrine syrup of subheadings 1702 30 50, 1702 30 90, 1702 40 90, 1702 90 50 and 2106 90 55 and containing more than 30 % by weight of starch and containing not less than 50 % by weight of milk products

    2309 90 70

    Preparations, including premixes, of a kind used in animal feeding, containing no starch, glucose, glucose syrup, maltodextrine or maltodextrine syrup but containing milk products

    24

    Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes; products, whether or not containing nicotine, intended for inhalation without combustion; other nicotine containing products intended for the intake of nicotine into the human body

    2905 43

    Mannitol

    2905 44

    D-glucitol (sorbitol)

    3301

    Essential oils (terpeneless or not), including concretes and absolutes; resinoids; extracted oleoresins; concentrates of essential oils in fats, in fixed oils, in waxes or the like, obtained by enfleurage or maceration; terpenic by-products of the deterpenation of essential oils; aqueous distillates and aqueous solutions of essential oils

    3501

    Casein, caseinates and other casein derivatives; casein glues

    3502

    Albumins (including concentrates of two or more whey proteins, containing by weight more than 80 % whey proteins, calculated on the dry matter), albuminates and other albumin derivatives

    3503

    Gelatin (including gelatin in rectangular (including square) sheets, whether or not surface-worked or coloured, and gelatin derivatives; isinglass; other glues of animal origin, excluding casein glues of heading 3501

    3504

    Peptones and their derivatives; other protein substances and their derivatives, not elsewhere specified or included; hide powder, whether or not chromed

    3505

    Dextrins and other modified starches (e.g. pregelatinised or esterified starches); glues based on starches, dextrins or other modified starches

    3809 10

    Finishing agents, dye carriers to accelerate the dyeing or fixing of dyestuffs and other products and preparations (e.g. dressings and mordants), of a kind used in the textile, paper, leather or like industries, not elsewhere specified or included, with a basis of amylaceous substances

    3824 60

    Sorbitol other than that of subheading 2905 44

    4101

    Raw hides and skins of bovine (including buffalo) or equine animals (fresh, or salted, dried, limed, pickled or otherwise preserved, but not tanned, parchment-dressed or further prepared), whether or not dehaired or split

    4102

    Raw skins of sheep or lambs (fresh, or salted, dried, limed, pickled or otherwise preserved, but not tanned, parchment-dressed or further prepared), whether or not with wool on or split, other than those excluded by note 1(c) to Chapter 41

    4103

    Other raw hides and skins (fresh, or salted, dried, limed, pickled or otherwise preserved, but not tanned, parchment-dressed or further prepared), whether or not dehaired or split, other than those excluded by note 1(b) or note 1(c) to Chapter 41

    4301

    Raw fur skins (including heads, tails, paws and other pieces or cuttings, suitable for furriers’ use), other than raw hides and skins of heading 4101, 4102 or 4103

    5001

    Silkworm cocoons suitable for reeling

    5002

    Raw silk (not thrown)

    5003

    Silk waste (including cocoons unsuitable for reeling, yarn waste and garneted stock)

    5101

    Wool, not carded or combed

    5102

    Fine or coarse animal hair, not carded or combed

    5103

    Waste of wool or of fine or coarse animal hair, including yarn waste but excluding garneted stock

    5201

    Cotton, not carded or combed

    5202

    Cotton waste (including yarn waste and garneted stock)

    5203

    Cotton, carded or combed

    5301

    Flax, raw or processed but not spun; flax tow and waste (including yarn waste and garneted stock)

    5302

    True hemp (Cannabis sativa L.), raw or processed, but not spun; tow and waste of true hemp (including yarn waste and garneted stock)

    ANNEX II

    List of goods referred to in Article 1(2)

    CN code

    Description

    3102

    Mineral or chemical fertilisers, nitrogenous

    Ex 3105

    Mineral or chemical fertilisers containing two or three of the fertilising elements nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium; other fertilisers; goods of Chapter 31 in tablets or similar forms or in packages of a gross weight not exceeding 10 kg, except:

    3105 10 00 – Goods of Chapter 31 in tablets or similar forms or in packages of a gross weight not exceeding 10 kg

    3105 60 00 – Mineral or chemical fertilisers containing the two fertilising elements phosphorus and potassium

    (1) Position of the European Parliament of 22 May 2025.
    (2) Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2011/182/oj).
    (3) Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code (OJ L 269, 10.10.2013, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/952/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Securing the EU’s external borders in the context of new migration flows – E-000996/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission recognises the challenges faced by Member States at EU external borders in managing migration flows. The Commission will continue to provide financial assistance through the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (BMVI) established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1148[1], and operational support via the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), as set out in Regulation (EU) 2019/1896[2].

    The Commission adopted a decision to provide an additional EUR 3 billion to support Member States with the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum and to host refugees from Ukraine[3].

    Frontex’s deployment of personnel and equipment to vulnerable regions will be enhanced, subject to the available budget as well as Member State agreement and cooperation.

    The Commission is committed to strengthening Frontex’s capacity. Plans to increase logistical, financial, and operational support are under review, with a focus on ensuring adequate resources for border management. The Commission will work closely with Member States to assess needs and allocate resources effectively.

    Well-managed integration of migrants is part of the Pact on Asylum and Migration[4] and is important for its success. In the framework of the action plan on integration and inclusion[5], the Commission provides financial support to Member States on migrants’ integration under EU funds, such as Asylum Migration and Integration Funds[6] and the European Social Fund+[7], and promotes exchanges of good practices.

    • [1] Regulation (EU) 2021/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing, as part of the Integrated Border Management Fund, the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy, OJ L 251, 15.7.2021, p. 48-93, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1148/oj.
    • [2] Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, OJ L 295, 14.11.2019, p. 1-131, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/1896/oj.
    • [3] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1176.
    • [4] https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en.
    • [5] Action plan on integration and inclusion 2021-2027 | European Website on Integration, https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/legal-migration-resettlement-and-integration/integration/action-plan-integration-and-inclusion_en.
    • [6] Regulation (EU) 2021/1147 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, OJ L 251, 15.7.2021, p. 1-47, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1147/oj.
    • [7] Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013, OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 21-59, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1057/oj.
    Last updated: 22 May 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: A decade after the release of ‘The Martian’ and a decade out from the world it envisions, a planetary scientist checks in on real-life Mars exploration

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Ari Koeppel, Postdoctoral Scientist in Earth and Planetary Science, Dartmouth College

    ‘The Martian’ protagonist Mark Watney contemplates his ordeal. 20th Century Fox

    Andy Weir’s bestselling story “The Martian” predicts that by 2035 NASA will have landed humans on Mars three times, perfected return-to-Earth flight systems and collaborated with the China National Space Administration. We are now 10 years past the Hollywood adaptation’s 2015 release and 10 years shy of its fictional timeline. At this midpoint, Mars exploration looks a bit different than how it was portrayed in “The Martian,” with both more discoveries and more controversy.

    As a planetary geologist who works with NASA missions to study Mars, I follow exploration science and policy closely. In 2010, the U.S. National Space Policy set goals for human missions to Mars in the 2030s. But in 2017, the White House Space Policy Directive 1 shifted NASA’s focus toward returning first to the Moon under what would become the Artemis program.

    Although concepts for crewed missions to Mars have gained popularity, NASA’s actual plans for landing humans on Mars remain fragile. Notably, over the last 10 years, it has been robotic, rather than crewed, missions that have propelled discovery and the human imagination forward.

    NASA’s 2023 Moon to Mars Strategy and Objectives Development document lays out the steps the agency was shooting for at the time, to go first to the Moon, and from there to Mars.
    NASA

    Robotic discoveries

    Since 2015, satellites and rovers have reshaped scientists’ understanding of Mars. They have revealed countless insights into how its climate has changed over time.

    As Earth’s neighbor, climate shifts on Mars also reflect solar system processes affecting Earth at a time when life was first taking hold. Thus, Mars has become a focal point for investigating the age old questions of “where do we come from?” and “are we alone?”

    The Opportunity, Curiosity and Perseverance rovers have driven dozens of miles studying layered rock formations that serve as a record of Mars’ past. By studying sedimentary layers – rock formations stacked like layers of a cake – planetary geologists have pieced together a vivid tale of environmental change that dwarfs what Earth is currently experiencing.

    Mars was once a world of erupting volcanoes, glaciers, lakes and flowing rivers – an environment not unlike early Earth. Then its core cooled, its magnetic field faltered and its atmosphere drifted away. The planet’s exposed surface has retained signs of those processes ever since in the form of landscape patterns, sequences of layered sediment and mineral mixtures.

    Layered sedimentary rocks exposed within the craters of Arabia Terra, Mars, recording ancient surface processes. Photo from the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter High Resolution Imaging Science Experiment.
    NASA/JPL/University of Arizona

    Arabia Terra

    One focus of scientific investigation over the last 10 years is particularly relevant to the setting of “The Martian” but fails to receive mention in the story. To reach his best chance of survival, protagonist Mark Watney, played by Matt Damon, must cross a vast, dusty and crater-pocked region of Mars known as Arabia Terra.

    In 2022 and 2023, I, along with colleagues at Northern Arizona University and Johns Hopkins University, published detailed analyses of the layered materials there using imagery from the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter and Mars Odyssey satellites.

    By using infrared imagery and measuring the dimensions of surface features, we linked multiple layered deposits to the same episodes of formation and learned more about the widespread crumbling nature of the terrain seen there today. Because water tends to cement rock tightly together, that loose material indicates that around 3.5 billion years ago, that area had a drying climate.

    To make the discussions about this area easier, we even worked with the International Astronomical Union to name a few previously unnamed craters that were mentioned in the story. For example, one that Watney would have driven right by is now named Kozova Crater, after a town in Ukraine.

    More to explore

    Despite rapid advances in Mars science, many unknowns remain. Scientists still aren’t sure of the precise ages, atmospheric conditions and possible signatures of life associated with each of the different rock types observed on the surface.

    For instance, the Perseverance rover recently drilled into and analyzed a unique set of rocks hosting organic – that is, carbon-based – compounds. Organic compounds serve as the building blocks of life, but more detailed analysis is required to determine whether these specific rocks once hosted microbial life.

    The in-development Mars Sample Return mission aims to address these basic outstanding questions by delivering the first-ever unaltered fragments of another world to Earth. The Perseverance rover is already caching rock and soil samples, including ones hosting organic compounds, in sealed tubes. A future lander will then need to pick up and launch the caches back to Earth.

    Sampling Mars rocks could tell scientists more about the red planet’s past, and whether it could have hosted life.

    Once home, researchers can examine these materials with instruments orders of magnitude more sensitive than anything that could be flown on a spacecraft. Scientists stand to learn far more about the habitability, geologic history and presence of any signs of life on Mars through the sample return campaign than by sending humans to the surface.

    This perspective is why NASA, the European Space Agency and others have invested some US$30 billion in robotic Mars exploration since the 1960s. The payoff has been staggering: That work has triggered rapid technological advances in robotics, telecommunications and materials science. For example, Mars mission technology has led to better sutures for heart surgery and cars that can drive themselves.

    It has also bolstered the status of NASA and the U.S. as bastions of modern exploration and technology; and it has inspired millions of students to take an interest in scientific fields.

    A selfie from NASA’s Perseverance Mars rover with the Ingenuity helicopter, taken with the rover’s extendable arm on April 6, 2021.
    NASA/JPL-Caltech/MSSS

    Calling the red planet home?

    Colonizing Mars has a seductive appeal. It’s hard not to cheer for the indomitable human spirit while watching Watney battle dust storms, oxygen shortages and food scarcity over 140 million miles from rescue.

    Much of the momentum toward colonizing Mars is now tied to SpaceX and its CEO Elon Musk, whose stated mission to make humanity a “multi-planetary species” has become a sort of rallying cry. But while Mars colonization is romantic on paper, it is extremely difficult to actually carry out, and many critics have questioned the viability of a Mars habitation as a refuge far from Earth.

    Now, with NASA potentially facing a nearly 50% reduction to its science budget, the U.S. risks dissolving its planetary science and robotic operations portfolio altogether, including sample return.

    Nonetheless, President Donald Trump and Musk have pushed for human space exploration to somehow continue to progress, despite those proposed cuts – effectively sidelining the robotic, science-driven programs that have underpinned all of Mars exploration to date.

    Yet, it is these programs that have yielded humanity’s richest insights into the red planet and given both scientists and storytellers like Andy Weir the foundation to imagine what it must be like to stand on Mars’ surface at all.

    Ari Koeppel receives funding from NASA.

    – ref. A decade after the release of ‘The Martian’ and a decade out from the world it envisions, a planetary scientist checks in on real-life Mars exploration – https://theconversation.com/a-decade-after-the-release-of-the-martian-and-a-decade-out-from-the-world-it-envisions-a-planetary-scientist-checks-in-on-real-life-mars-exploration-255752

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: EU Fact Sheets – General principles of EU industrial policy – 21-05-2025

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU’s industrial policy aims to make European industry more competitive so that it can maintain its role as a driver of sustainable growth and employment in Europe. The digital transition and the transition towards a carbon-neutral economy have led to the adoption of various strategies to ensure better framework conditions for EU industry. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine have sparked new reflections on economic recovery, reconstruction and building resilience.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    May 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: 80 arrests and more than 37,700 cultural goods seized in major art trafficking bust

    Source: Interpol (news and events)

    22 May 2025

    Europol, INTERPOL and the World Customs Organization (WCO) supported investigators from 23 countries in the fight against criminals who exploit humanity’s cultural heritage

    LYON, France – The ninth edition of Operation Pandora, an international operation targeting the trafficking of cultural goods, has led to 80 arrests and the seizure of 37,727 items including archaeological pieces, artworks, coins and musical instruments.

    Codenamed Pandora IX and carried out throughout 2024, the operation involved law enforcement and customs authorities from 23 countries. It was coordinated by Spain (Guardia Civil), with operational support from Europol, INTERPOL and the WCO through its Regional Intelligence Liaison Office for Eastern and Central Europe. 

    Authorities also confiscated 69 metal detectors and 23 tools commonly used for illegal excavations, underlining the persistent threat of looting to cultural sites.

    In total, 258 cases were reported by the participating countries. Many investigations are still ongoing, with further arrests and seizures expected.

    Operational highlights

    The Italian Carabinieri Command for the Protection of Cultural Heritage (TPC) in coordination with the Italian Customs and Monopolies agency (ADM) seized a painting attributed to renowned artist Jannis Kounellis during a joint border operation. Upon inspection, it was determined to be inauthentic. Had it been genuine, its estimated value would have been around EUR 100,000. In a separate investigation, the Carabinieri TPC seized more than 300 items, including coins, metal and ceramic fragments such as arrowheads and spearheads dating back to the Roman and Punic periods. These artifacts were being offered for sale on e-commerce platforms and were discovered in a private apartment.

    Two icons of Saint Seraphim of Sarov were discovered by Ukraine Customs.

    Both icons of Saint Seraphim were found in the luggage of a passenger travelling by bus during a control at the border with Poland.

    One of 36 coins found by Ukraine Customs while controlling a private vehicle at the border with Poland.

    The Spanish Guardia Civil dismantled a criminal group involved in archaeological looting

    Spanish Guardia Civil: During the operation authorities recovered 2,500 archaeological items, primarily Roman coins

    Italian Customs and Monopolies agency (ADM) seized a painting attributed to artist Jannis Kounellis, which turned out to be inauthentic.

    The Carabinieri TPC seized more than 300 items, including coins, metal and ceramic fragments.

    Since its launch in 2016, Operation Pandora has become a key global initiative to protect cultural heritage from illicit trafficking.

    The Spanish Guardia Civil dismantled a criminal group involved in archaeological looting in the province of Cáceres. Six individuals were arrested, and three others are under investigation. During the operation authorities recovered 2,500 archaeological items, primarily Roman coins minted in the Celtiberian city of Tamusia. These artifacts had been looted from protected archaeological sites in the province of Caceres using metal detectors and were being sold illegally through social media platforms.

    Also in Spain, the Guardia Civil intercepted a passenger attempting to fly from Palma de Mallorca to Germany carrying 55 ancient coins and a ring. A subsequent investigation led to an indictment for crimes against cultural heritage and plundering underwater wrecks and archaeological sites. In total, 64 objects of historical value and 1,576 ancient coins were confiscated.

    In Greece, the Department of Cultural Heritage and Antiquities of Athens recovered five Byzantine icons. Acting on intelligence and using special investigative techniques, including an undercover officer, three individuals were arrested while attempting to sell the icons for EUR 70,000.

    Ukrainian customs authorities seized 87 cultural goods that were being illegally transported out of the country to Poland, Moldova and Romania.

    Cyber patrols uncover additional cases

    In addition to on-the-ground actions, dedicated cyber patrols were carried out during the operation to identify potential illicit online sales of cultural property. These virtual investigations led to the opening of new cases, demonstrating how digital platforms are quickly becoming a channel of choice by traffickers to market and sell looted artefacts. A total of 4,298 cultural goods were seized as a result of the cyber patrols.

    Built on international cooperation

    Operation Pandora IX was carried out in the framework of the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT). Europol facilitated the exchange of information and provided analytical and operational support to the national investigations. Furthermore, one cyber patrol week was hosted by Europol.

    INTERPOL coordinated cross-border actions and offered tools such as its Stolen Works of Art database and on the ground ID-Art mobile application.

    The WCO’s secure communication tool, CENcomm, was made available to all participants while its Regional Intelligence Liaison Office for Eastern and Central Europe compiled, refined and shared information provided by Customs administrations

    Since its launch in 2016, Operation Pandora has become a key global initiative to protect cultural heritage from illicit trafficking.

    Participating countries in Pandora IX (2024):

    Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Spain, Ukraine, United States.

    Participating agencies:

    Europol, INTERPOL, World Customs Organization

    MIL Security OSI –

    May 23, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: Keith Rankin on the War in Sudan

    Analysis by Keith Rankin.

    Keith Rankin, trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

    On 11 April 2025, AP noted that the two-year-old Civil War in Sudan is regarded by the United Nations as “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis”, though it is grossly underreported (see Wake up: The Worst Humanitarian Crisis on Earth is in Sudan, by Shirley Martey Hargis and Mike Sexton, Third Way [2024]).

    Even Pope Leo XIV failed to mention ‘Sudan’ on Sunday when he denounced the conflicts in Gaza, Ukraine, and Myanmar (refer Pope Leo calls for peace in Gaza, Myanmar and Ukraine at the end of his inaugural mass, Africa News 18 May 2025).

    Al Jazeera’s The Stream (20 May) posed this social media post: “Trying to raise awareness about Sudan is like talking into a void. Nobody seems to care about the starving children or the innocent people being brutally executed by the RSF on a daily basis”.

    The young man, Elbashir Idris, political analyst, speaking from Cardiff, claimed: “There’s an international conspiracy done by the global order that seems to be working together against the Sudanese people”.

    What Sudan means to me, and that the conflict should mean to New Zealand

    I have not been to Israel, Gaza, Ukraine, or Myanmar; though I have been close to Gaza; Port Said (and other places in Egypt, during the week in September 1978 when Pope Jean-Paul I mysteriously died). And I enjoyed two days in Khartoum and Omdurman the following week.

    Sudan represents a special memory to me. It’s an assertive place. Khartoum, on the confluence of the Blue Nile and the White Nile, was the site of one of the most spectacular defeats of the British Empire, in 1884/85. I still remember the epic 1966 movie Khartoum, starring Charlton Heston and Lawrence Olivier.

    That 1880s’ stoush – reminiscent of the 2021 defeat of the United States by the Taliban – could have been New Zealand’s first involvement in a foreign imperial war. The conservative government in New Zealand – headed by Harry Atkinson – refused the request from the United Kingdom for military support; contrast the subsequent adventure into South Africa in 1899 under the Liberal Government of Richard Seddon.

    Al Jazeera reported just today (20 May 2025, Sudan time) that the new Battle of Khartoum (2023–2025) has resolved with a victory to the Sudanese Armed Forces over the rebel Rapid Support Forces. (The Wikipedia article is premature, calling the present Battle of Khartoum over on 26 March 2025.) The Sudan Civil War remains far from over, however.

    One reason why the west has paid so little attention to this conflict is almost certainly a racism-tainted view; that it’s just a civil war in ‘black Africa’, that the rest of the world can leave well-alone. But this view is not true, because the present Sudan Civil War is an international ‘proxy war’; fuelled by extra-national powers – regional if not global.

    Before the Civil War started, there was a successful military coup, in October 2021. Sudanese politics have always been convoluted, as is true in reality for most countries. Sudan had struggled for decades with a humanitarian crisis in its west – Darfur – with attacks on civilian communities by the mysterious Janjaweed which had links to Libya in the time of Muammar Gaddafi. The Janjaweed has now largely morphed into the Rapid Support Forces, and it’s an open contention that they are heavily backed by the United Arab Emirates; that is, the RSF – the force which appears to be mainly responsible for the humanitarian disaster – is an alleged proxy of the UAE. And the RSF have a lot of very sophisticated military kit; armaments which are clearly foreign-sourced and foreign-funded.

    Where is the journalism examining the role of the United Arab Emirates in this most brutal of wars; this war happening in front of our eyes but which we do not see? This is an important question for New Zealand, because the UAE is a particularly important commercial ally of New Zealand.

    Al Jazeera’s Inside Story (15 April 2025) noted: “In March, the army-led government filed a case in the International Criminal Court against the United Arab Emirates”. Conspiracy or not, there is certainly a massive missing narrative. Is this cognitive void simple racism on the part of The West (and maybe some others)? Or is it part of a wider problem of geopolitical smoke and mirrors? Or are New Zealand and its associates mesmerised, like a possum (or rabbit) in the headlights or an ostrich with its head firmly buried in the sand?

    (Chris Hipkins, New Zealand’s Leader of the Opposition, deployed a little casual racism in Parliament yesterday [20 May 2025] – twice in the one speech – referring to “tinpot dictatorships and banana republics“. Is the United Arab Emirates a ‘tinpot dictatorship’? Would he call the President of the Philippines a ‘banana republican’?)

    *******

    Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    May 22, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Peace talks between Russia and Ukraine may take place next week in the Vatican – Finnish President

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    HELSINKI, May 22 (Xinhua) — Technical-level talks involving Russia and Ukraine could take place in the Vatican as early as next week, Finnish President Alexander Stubb said in an interview with Yle TV on Wednesday.

    According to him, the talks will most likely involve representatives from the United States and European countries. The potential meeting is a positive step toward broader international participation in efforts to end the conflict in Ukraine, A. Stubb noted.

    “It is very likely that next week, for example, in the Vatican, a technical meeting will take place with the participation of Ukrainians, Russians, Americans and Europeans,” the president said.

    The Finnish leader emphasized the growing role of European countries in the peace process. “We are entering a phase where Europe will also be involved – and this is what we hoped for from the beginning,” he said.

    On Monday, US President Donald Trump held telephone talks with several European leaders, including A. Stubb. The head of the White House shared details of an earlier conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin and discussed with his interlocutors the ongoing negotiations, a potential ceasefire and steps to establish lasting peace in Ukraine. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    May 22, 2025
  • Trump confronts South Africa’s Ramaphosa with false claims of white genocide

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    U.S. President Donald Trump confronted South African President Cyril Ramaphosa on Wednesday with explosive false claims of white genocide and land seizures during a tense White House meeting that was reminiscent of his February ambush of Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelenskiy.

    South Africa has one of the highest murder rates in the world, but the overwhelming majority of victims are Black.

    Ramaphosa had hoped to use Wednesday’s meeting to reset his country’s relationship with the U.S., after Trump canceled much-needed aid to South Africa, offered refuge to white minority Afrikaners, expelled the country’s ambassador and criticized its genocide court case against Israel.

    The South African president arrived prepared for an aggressive reception, bringing popular white South African golfers as part of his delegation and saying he wanted to discuss trade. The U.S. is South Africa’s second-biggest trading partner, and the country is facing a 30% tariff under Trump’s currently suspended raft of import taxes.

    But in a carefully choreographed Oval Office onslaught, Trump pounced, moving quickly to a list of concerns about the treatment of white South Africans, which he punctuated by playing a video and leafing through a stack of printed news articles that he said proved his allegations.

    With the lights turned down at Trump’s request, the video – played on a television that is not normally set up in the Oval Office – showed white crosses, which Trump asserted were the graves of white people, and opposition leaders making incendiary speeches. Trump suggested one of them, Julius Malema, should be arrested.

    The video was made in September 2020 during a protest after two people were killed on their farm a week earlier. The crosses did not mark actual graves. An organizer of the protest told South Africa’s public broadcaster at the time that they represented farmers who had been killed over the years.

    “We have many people that feel they’re being persecuted, and they’re coming to the United States,” Trump said. “So we take from many … locations, if we feel there’s persecution or genocide going on,” he added, referring specifically to white farmers.

    “People are fleeing South Africa for their own safety. Their land is being confiscated, and in many cases, they’re being killed,” the president added, echoing a once-fringe conspiracy theory that has circulated in global far-right chat rooms for at least a decade with the vocal support of Trump’s ally, South African-born Elon Musk, who was in the Oval Office during the meeting.

    South Africa, which endured centuries of draconian discrimination against Black people during colonialism and apartheid before becoming a multi-party democracy in 1994 under Nelson Mandela, rejects Trump’s allegations.

    A new land reform law, aimed at redressing the injustices of apartheid, allows for expropriations without compensation when in the public interest, for example if land is lying fallow. No such expropriation has taken place, and any order can be challenged in court.

    South African police recorded 26,232 murders nationwide in 2024, with 44 linked to farming communities. Eight of those victims were farmers.

    Ramaphosa, sitting in a chair next to Trump and remaining poised, pushed back against his claims.

    “If there was Afrikaner farmer genocide, I can bet you, these three gentlemen would not be here,” Ramaphosa said, referring to golfers Ernie Els and Retief Goosen and billionaire Johann Rupert, all white, who were present in the room.

    That did not satisfy Trump.

    “We have thousands of stories talking about it, and we have documentaries, we have news stories,” Trump said. “It has to be responded to.”

    ‘THERE IS JUST NO GENOCIDE’

    Ramaphosa mostly sat expressionless during the video presentation, occasionally craning his neck to look at the screen. He said he had not seen the material before and that he would like to find out the location.

    Trump then displayed printed copies of articles that he said showed white South Africans who had been killed, saying “death, death” as he flipped through them, eventually handing them to his counterpart.

    Ramaphosa said there was crime in South Africa, and the majority of victims were Black. Trump cut him off and said: “The farmers are not Black.”

    Ramaphosa responded: “These are concerns we are willing to talk to you about.”

    The South African president cited Mandela’s example as a peacemaker, but that did not move the U.S. president, whose political base includes white nationalists. The myth of white genocide in South Africa has become a rallying point for the far right in the United States and elsewhere.

    “I will say: apartheid, terrible,” Trump noted. “This is sort of the opposite of apartheid.”

    The extraordinary exchange, three months after Trump and Vice President JD Vance upbraided Ukraine’s Zelenskiy inside the same Oval Office, could prompt foreign leaders to think twice about accepting Trump’s invitations and risk public embarrassment.

    Unlike Zelenskiy, who sparred with Trump and ended up leaving early, the South African leader kept his calm, praising Trump’s decor – the president has outfitted the Oval Office with gold accessories – and saying he looked forward to handing over the presidency of the Group of 20 next year.

    Trump declined to say whether he would attend the G20 meeting in South Africa in November.

    Later in the meeting, Rupert, the business tycoon, stepped in to back up Ramaphosa, saying that crime was a problem across the board and many Black people were dying too.

    Following the meeting, Ramaphosa sought to focus on trade, telling reporters the two countries had agreed to discuss critical minerals in South Africa. His trade minister said the government had submitted a trade and investment proposal that included buying liquefied natural gas from the U.S.

    But the president also flatly denied Trump’s allegations about a wave of racial violence against white farmers.

    “There is just no genocide in South Africa,” he said.

    (Reuters)

    May 22, 2025
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