NewzIntel.com

Category: Ukraine

  • MIL-OSI Global: Why Zelensky – not Trump – may have ‘won’ the US-Ukraine minerals deal

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Eve Warburton, Research Fellow, Department of Political and Social Change, and Director, Indonesia Institute, Australian National University

    Last week, the Trump administration signed a deal with Ukraine that gives it privileged access to Ukraine’s natural resources.

    Some news outlets described the deal as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky “caving” to US President Donald Trump’s demands.

    But we see the agreement as the result of clever bargaining on the part of Ukraine’s war-time president.

    So, what does the deal mean for Ukraine? And will this be help strengthen America’s mineral supply chains?

    Ukraine’s natural resource wealth

    Ukraine is home to 5% of the world’s critical mineral wealth, including 22 of the 34 minerals identified by the European Union as vital for defence, construction and high-tech manufacturing.

    However, there’s a big difference between resources (what’s in the ground) and reserves (what can be commercially exploited). Ukraine’s proven mineral reserves are limited.

    Further, Ukraine has an estimated mineral wealth of around US$14.8 trillion (A$23 trillion), but more than half of this is in territories currently occupied by Russia.

    What does the new deal mean for Ukraine?

    American support for overseas conflict is usually about securing US economic interests — often in the form of resource exploitation. From the Middle East to Asia, US interventions abroad have enabled access for American firms to other countries’ oil, gas and minerals.

    But the first iteration of the Ukraine mineral deal, which Zelensky rejected in February, had been an especially brazen resource grab by Trump’s government. It required Ukraine to cede sovereignty over its land and resources to one country (the US), in order to defend itself from attacks by another (Russia).

    These terms were highly exploitative of a country fighting against a years-long military occupation. In addition, they violated Ukraine’s constitution, which puts the ownership of Ukraine’s natural resources in the hands of the Ukrainian people. Were Zelensky to accept this, he would have faced a tremendous backlash from the public.

    In comparison, the new deal sounds like a strategic and (potentially) commercial win for Ukraine.

    First, this agreement is more just, and it’s aligned with Ukraine’s short- and medium-term interests. Zelenksy describes it as an “equal partnership” that will modernise Ukraine.

    Under the terms, Ukraine will set up a United States–Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund for foreign investments into the country’s economy, which will be jointly governed by both countries.

    Ukraine will contribute 50% of the income from royalties and licenses to develop critical minerals, oil and gas reserves, while the US can make its contributions in-kind, such as through military assistance or technology transfers.

    Ukraine maintains ownership over its natural resources and state enterprises. And the licensing agreements will not require substantial changes to the country’s laws, or disrupt its future integration with Europe.

    Importantly, there is no mention of retroactive debts for the US military assistance already received by Ukraine. This would have created a dangerous precedent, allowing other nations to seek to claim similar debts from Ukraine.

    Finally, the deal also signals the Trump administration’s commitment to “a free, sovereign and prosperous Ukraine” – albeit, still without any security guarantees.

    Profits may be a long time coming

    Unsurprisingly, the Trump administration and conservative media in the US are framing the deal as a win.

    For too long, Trump argues, Ukraine has enjoyed US taxpayer-funded military assistance, and such assistance now has a price tag. The administration has described the deal to Americans as a profit-making endeavour that can recoup monies spent defending Ukrainian interests.

    But in reality, profits are a long way off.

    The terms of the agreement clearly state the fund’s investment will be directed at new resource projects. Existing operations and state-owned projects will fall outside the terms of the agreement.

    Mining projects typically work within long time frames. The move from exploration to production is a slow, high-risk and enormously expensive process. It can often take over a decade.

    Add to this complexity the fact that some experts are sceptical Ukraine even has enormously valuable reserves. And to bring any promising deposits to market will require major investments.

    What’s perhaps more important

    It’s possible, however, that profits are a secondary calculation for the US. Boxing out China is likely to be as – if not more – important.

    Like other Western nations, the US is desperate to diversify its critical mineral supply chains.

    China controls not just a large proportion of the world’s known rare earths deposits, it also has a monopoly on the processing of most critical minerals used in green energy and defence technologies.

    The US fears China will weaponise its market dominance against strategic rivals. This is why Western governments increasingly make mineral supply chain resilience central to their foreign policy and defence strategies.

    Given Beijing’s closeness to Moscow and their deepening cooperation on natural resources, the US-Ukraine deal may prevent Russia — and, by extension, China — from accessing Ukrainian minerals. The terms of the agreement are explicit: “states and persons who have acted adversely towards Ukraine must not benefit from its reconstruction”.

    Finally, the performance of “the deal” matters just as much to Trump. Getting Zelensky to sign on the dotted line is progress in itself, plays well to Trump’s base at home, and puts pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin to come to the table.

    So, the deal is a win for Zelensky because it gives the US a stake in an independent Ukraine. But even if Ukraine’s critical mineral reserves turn out to be less valuable than expected, it may not matter to Trump.

    Eve Warburton receives funding from the Australian Research Council and the Westpac Scholars Trust.

    Olga Boichak is a director of the Foundation of Ukrainian Studies in Australia. She receives funding from the Australian Research Council and the Westpac Scholars Trust.

    – ref. Why Zelensky – not Trump – may have ‘won’ the US-Ukraine minerals deal – https://theconversation.com/why-zelensky-not-trump-may-have-won-the-us-ukraine-minerals-deal-255875

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI USA: House Foreign Affairs Committee Ranking Member Meeks Issues Statement on Ukraine Minerals Deal

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Gregory W Meeks (5th District of New York)

    Washington, D.C. – Representative Gregory W. Meeks, Ranking Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, today issued the following statement on the economic agreement signed by the United States and Ukraine.  

    “With the signing of Donald Trump’s extortion of Ukraine deal, even as Ukraine continues to defend itself from Russia’s illegal invasion, I hope the administration can now turn to the real roadblock for peace: Vladimir Putin. President Zelenskyy has shown time and again that he is willing to negotiate to work towards a sustainable peace; now is the time for Trump to put the pressure on Putin where it belongs.  

    “President Trump should work with Congress to put pressure on Putin and make clear that unless Russia is willing to make real concessions and engage in a peace process, the U.S. will work with its partners and allies to impose significant consequences. That includes holding Russia accountable for its war crimes, additional security support to Ukraine, increased sanctions on Russia, and funding Ukraine’s reconstruction by leveraging gains from Russia’s frozen assets. Both the comprehensive Ukraine assistance bill I introduced last month and the Graham-Blumenthal bill in the Senate are avenues through which the U.S. can make clear that Russia cannot simply wait out international support for Ukraine, and push Putin to the negotiating table.  

    “Unfortunately, Donald Trump has so far demonstrated nothing but weakness by capitulating to Putin every step of the way, with nothing to show for it in return, while fixating his attacks on Zelensky and Ukraine. It should be news to no one that Vladimir Putin is a bully and will only respond to strength, not groveling.” 

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Why Zelensky – not Trump – may have ‘won’ the US-Ukraine minerals deal

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Eve Warburton, Research Fellow, Department of Political and Social Change, and Director, Indonesia Institute, Australian National University

    Last week, the Trump administration signed a deal with Ukraine that gives it privileged access to Ukraine’s natural resources.

    Some news outlets described the deal as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky “caving” to US President Donald Trump’s demands.

    But we see the agreement as the result of clever bargaining on the part of Ukraine’s war-time president.

    So, what does the deal mean for Ukraine? And will this be help strengthen America’s mineral supply chains?

    Ukraine’s natural resource wealth

    Ukraine is home to 5% of the world’s critical mineral wealth, including 22 of the 34 minerals identified by the European Union as vital for defence, construction and high-tech manufacturing.

    However, there’s a big difference between resources (what’s in the ground) and reserves (what can be commercially exploited). Ukraine’s proven mineral reserves are limited.

    Further, Ukraine has an estimated mineral wealth of around US$14.8 trillion (A$23 trillion), but more than half of this is in territories currently occupied by Russia.

    What does the new deal mean for Ukraine?

    American support for overseas conflict is usually about securing US economic interests — often in the form of resource exploitation. From the Middle East to Asia, US interventions abroad have enabled access for American firms to other countries’ oil, gas and minerals.

    But the first iteration of the Ukraine mineral deal, which Zelensky rejected in February, had been an especially brazen resource grab by Trump’s government. It required Ukraine to cede sovereignty over its land and resources to one country (the US), in order to defend itself from attacks by another (Russia).

    These terms were highly exploitative of a country fighting against a years-long military occupation. In addition, they violated Ukraine’s constitution, which puts the ownership of Ukraine’s natural resources in the hands of the Ukrainian people. Were Zelensky to accept this, he would have faced a tremendous backlash from the public.

    In comparison, the new deal sounds like a strategic and (potentially) commercial win for Ukraine.

    First, this agreement is more just, and it’s aligned with Ukraine’s short- and medium-term interests. Zelenksy describes it as an “equal partnership” that will modernise Ukraine.

    Under the terms, Ukraine will set up a United States–Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund for foreign investments into the country’s economy, which will be jointly governed by both countries.

    Ukraine will contribute 50% of the income from royalties and licenses to develop critical minerals, oil and gas reserves, while the US can make its contributions in-kind, such as through military assistance or technology transfers.

    Ukraine maintains ownership over its natural resources and state enterprises. And the licensing agreements will not require substantial changes to the country’s laws, or disrupt its future integration with Europe.

    Importantly, there is no mention of retroactive debts for the US military assistance already received by Ukraine. This would have created a dangerous precedent, allowing other nations to seek to claim similar debts from Ukraine.

    Finally, the deal also signals the Trump administration’s commitment to “a free, sovereign and prosperous Ukraine” – albeit, still without any security guarantees.

    Profits may be a long time coming

    Unsurprisingly, the Trump administration and conservative media in the US are framing the deal as a win.

    For too long, Trump argues, Ukraine has enjoyed US taxpayer-funded military assistance, and such assistance now has a price tag. The administration has described the deal to Americans as a profit-making endeavour that can recoup monies spent defending Ukrainian interests.

    But in reality, profits are a long way off.

    The terms of the agreement clearly state the fund’s investment will be directed at new resource projects. Existing operations and state-owned projects will fall outside the terms of the agreement.

    Mining projects typically work within long time frames. The move from exploration to production is a slow, high-risk and enormously expensive process. It can often take over a decade.

    Add to this complexity the fact that some experts are sceptical Ukraine even has enormously valuable reserves. And to bring any promising deposits to market will require major investments.

    What’s perhaps more important

    It’s possible, however, that profits are a secondary calculation for the US. Boxing out China is likely to be as – if not more – important.

    Like other Western nations, the US is desperate to diversify its critical mineral supply chains.

    China controls not just a large proportion of the world’s known rare earths deposits, it also has a monopoly on the processing of most critical minerals used in green energy and defence technologies.

    The US fears China will weaponise its market dominance against strategic rivals. This is why Western governments increasingly make mineral supply chain resilience central to their foreign policy and defence strategies.

    Given Beijing’s closeness to Moscow and their deepening cooperation on natural resources, the US-Ukraine deal may prevent Russia — and, by extension, China — from accessing Ukrainian minerals. The terms of the agreement are explicit: “states and persons who have acted adversely towards Ukraine must not benefit from its reconstruction”.

    Finally, the performance of “the deal” matters just as much to Trump. Getting Zelensky to sign on the dotted line is progress in itself, plays well to Trump’s base at home, and puts pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin to come to the table.

    So, the deal is a win for Zelensky because it gives the US a stake in an independent Ukraine. But even if Ukraine’s critical mineral reserves turn out to be less valuable than expected, it may not matter to Trump.

    Eve Warburton receives funding from the Australian Research Council and the Westpac Scholars Trust.

    Olga Boichak is a director of the Foundation of Ukrainian Studies in Australia. She receives funding from the Australian Research Council and the Westpac Scholars Trust.

    – ref. Why Zelensky – not Trump – may have ‘won’ the US-Ukraine minerals deal – https://theconversation.com/why-zelensky-not-trump-may-have-won-the-us-ukraine-minerals-deal-255875

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Violation of EU sanctions against Solovyev by Italian news platforms – E-001677/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001677/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Pina Picierno (S&D)

    Vladimir Solovyev, a well-known Russian journalist and television presenter considered one of the Kremlin’s leading propagandists, was added to the European Union’s sanctions list on 23 February 2022. His assets were frozen and he was banned from entering Member States, including Italy, where his properties worth EUR 8 million were seized.

    In March 2025, his planned appearance on the programme ‘Lo Stato delle cose’ on Italian state television (Rai 3) was cancelled following a report.

    The Italian platform Byoblu, which has always been aligned with Russian narrative, continues to play a key role in spreading Kremlin propaganda, supporting the war of aggression against Ukraine and promoting narratives hostile to the EU and its democratic values, including attacks such as that by spokesperson Zakharova against President Mattarella. On 24 April 2025, that platform announced a new invitation to Solovyev.

    In light of the above, can the Commission answer the following:

    • 1.Is the Commission aware of the practice of two Italian media outlets issuing invitations to Solovyev, in breach of EU sanctions?
    • 2.What measures does it intend to take to ensure compliance and combat pro-Russian disinformation in the Union?

    Submitted: 25.4.2025

    Last updated: 5 May 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Fertilisers – E-000782/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the modification of customs duties applicable to imports of certain goods originating in or exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus[1] is designed to gradually phase out the EU’s dependence on Russian nitrogen-based fertilisers through a transitional approach.

    This involves measured annual customs duty increases on imports from Russia of such fertilisers over a period of three years, minimising the risk of potential price impacts.

    Its entry into force is dependent on the conclusion of the ordinary legislative procedure currently ongoing in the European Parliament and the Council.

    If the proposal is adopted in its current form, the Commission expects the measure to result in a gradual and orderly replacement of Russian nitrogen-based fertilisers with alternatives, including domestically produced ones, contributing to fair competition in the EU fertilisers market and supporting a stable, long term role of the EU fertilisers industry in ensuring the EU food security.

    For broader background, some fertilisers (potash) from Russia are currently subject to an import quota as part of the sanctions adopted following Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine[2].

    • [1] https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=COM(2025)34&lang=en
    • [2] Article 3(i) of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014R0833-20250225
    Last updated: 5 May 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Video: India/Pakistan & other topics – Daily Press Briefing | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon briefing by Farhan Haq, Deputy Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:

    – India/Pakistan
    – Secretary-General/Trip Announcement
    – Sudan
    – Sudan/Humanitarian
    – South Sudan
    – Gaza
    – Occupied Palestinian Territory
    – Lebanon
    – Ukraine
    – Senior Personnel Appointment – Cyprus
    – Cyprus
    – Portuguese Language Day

    INDIA/PAKISTAN 
    The Secretary-General spoke to reporters just an hour ago to say that, with tensions between India and Pakistan at their highest in years, he once again strongly condemns the attack in Pahalgam on 22 April and extends his condolences to the families of the victims. He said that those responsible must be brought to justice through transparent, credible, and lawful means. 
    The Secretary-General said that it is also essential – especially at this critical hour — to avoid a military confrontation that could easily spin out of control. Now is the time for maximum restraint and stepping back from the brink. 
    He once more offered his good offices to both governments in the service of peace.  

    SECRETARY-GENERAL/ TRIP ANNOUNCEMENT 
    The Secretary-General will be travelling to Copenhagen, in Denmark, tonight, where he will chair the biannual session of the UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, also known as the CEB, which brings together the heads of the UN system organizations. 
    The Secretary-General is scheduled to meet the Prime Minister of Denmark, Mette Frederiksen. He will also take part in a dinner, hosted by Their Majesties, the King and Queen of Denmark, in honour of the gathered leaders of the Chief Executives Board for Coordination.  
    The Secretary-General will also engage with UN staff based in Copenhagen, as well as with Danish media and he will have a number of meetings with UN senior officials, ahead of the CEB session.  
    During their biannual session, the Chief Executives Board Members will reflect on current world affairs as they affect and are related to the UN system. They will also engage in deliberations on ‘Adapting to New Realities: Leveraging the UN80 Initiative’ and ‘Upholding Respect for International Law’. 
    The Secretary-General will be back in New York on Friday evening. 

    Full Highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/ossg/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=05%20May%202025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=irQjqaS5q20

    MIL OSI Video –

  • MIL-OSI: RUA GOLD to Present at the Metals & Mining Virtual Investor Conference May 6th 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    VANCOUVER, British Columbia, May 05, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Rua Gold Inc. (TSXV: RUA, OTC: NZAUF, WKN: A40QYC) (“RUA GOLD” or the “Company“) announces that it will present live at the Metals & Mining Virtual Investor Conference hosted by VirtualInvestorConferences.com, on May 6th. The Company invites individual and institutional investors as well as advisors and analysts, to attend its real-time, interactive presentation online at VirtualInvestorConferences.com.

    This live, interactive online event will give existing shareholders and the investment community the opportunity to interact with the Company’s CEO, Robert Eckford in real time.

    DATE: May 6th
    TIME: 2:30PM EDT (11:30AM PDT)
    LINK: REGISTER HERE
    Available for 1×1 meetings: May 7th -13th

    This will be a live, interactive online event where investors are invited to ask the company questions in real-time. If attendees are not able to attend the event live on the day of the conference, an archived webcast will also be made available after the event.

    Recent Company highlights that will be discussed include:

    • Updates on the latest moves from the pro-mining New Zealand government;
    • Latest news from the aggressive drill program at the Reefton Goldfield; and
    • The outlook on upcoming catalysts across both the North and South Island Project.

    It is recommended that online investors pre-register and run the online system check to expedite participation and receive event updates.

    About Virtual Investor Conferences®

    Virtual Investor Conferences (VIC) is the leading proprietary investor conference series that provides an interactive forum for publicly traded companies to seamlessly present directly to investors.

    Providing a real-time investor engagement solution, VIC is specifically designed to offer companies more efficient investor access. Replicating the components of an on-site investor conference, VIC offers companies enhanced capabilities to connect with investors, schedule targeted one-on-one meetings and enhance their presentations with dynamic video content. Accelerating the next level of investor engagement, Virtual Investor Conferences delivers leading investor communications to a global network of retail and institutional investors.

    About RUA GOLD

    RUA GOLD is an exploration company, strategically focused on New Zealand. With decades of expertise, our team has successfully taken major discoveries into producing world-class mines across multiple continents. The team is now focused on maximizing the asset potential of RUA’s two highly prospective high-grade gold projects.

    The Company controls the Reefton Gold District as the dominant landholder in the Reefton Goldfield on New Zealand’s South Island with over 120,000 hectares of tenements, in a district that historically produced over 2 million ounces of gold grading between 9 and 50 grams per tonne.

    The Company’s Glamorgan Project solidifies RUA GOLD’s position as a leading high-grade gold explorer on New Zealand’s North Island. This highly prospective project is located within the North Islands’ Hauraki district, a region that has produced an impressive 15 million ounces of gold and 60 million ounces of silver. Glamorgan is adjacent to OceanaGold Corporation’s biggest gold mining project, WKP.

    For further information, please refer to the Company’s disclosure record on SEDAR+ at www.sedarplus.ca.

    RUA GOLD Contact

    Robert Eckford
    Chief Executive Officer
    Email: reckford@RUAGOLD.com
    Website: www.RUAGOLD.com

    This news release includes certain statements that may be deemed “forward-looking statements”. All statements in this new release, other than statements of historical facts, that address events or developments that the Company expects to occur, are forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are statements that are not historical facts and are generally, but not always, identified by the words “expects”, “plans”, “anticipates”, “believes”, “intends”, “estimates”, “projects”, “potential” and similar expressions, or that events or conditions “will”, “would”, “may”, “could” or “should” occur and specifically include statements regarding: the Company’s strategies, expectations, planned operations or future actions; and the effects and benefits of the Transaction. Although the Company believes the expectations expressed in such forward-looking statements are based on reasonable assumptions, such statements are not guarantees of future performance and actual results may differ materially from those in the forward-looking statements.

    Investors are cautioned that any such forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future performance and actual results or developments may differ materially from those projected in the forward-looking statements. A variety of inherent risks, uncertainties and factors, many of which are beyond the Company’s control, affect the operations, performance and results of the Company and its business, and could cause actual events or results to differ materially from estimated or anticipated events or results expressed or implied by forward looking statements. Some of these risks, uncertainties and factors include: general business, economic, competitive, political and social uncertainties; risks related to the effects of the Russia-Ukraine war; risks related to climate change; operational risks in exploration, delays or changes in plans with respect to exploration projects or capital expenditures; the actual results of current exploration activities; conclusions of economic evaluations; changes in project parameters as plans continue to be refined; changes in labour costs and other costs and expenses or equipment or processes to operate as anticipated, accidents, labour disputes and other risks of the mining industry, including but not limited to environmental hazards, flooding or unfavorable operating conditions and losses, insurrection or war, delays in obtaining governmental approvals or financing, and commodity prices. This list is not exhaustive of the factors that may affect any of the Company’s forward-looking statements and reference should also be made to the Company’s short form base shelf prospectus dated July 11, 2024, and the documents incorporated by reference therein, filed under its SEDAR+ profile at www.sedarplus.ca for a description of additional risk factors.

    Forward-looking statements are based on the beliefs, estimates and opinions of the Company’s management on the date the statements are made. Except as required by applicable securities laws, the Company undertakes no obligation to update these forward-looking statements in the event that management’s beliefs, estimates or opinions, or other factors, should change.

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: PM call with President Macron of France: 5 May 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    PM call with President Macron of France: 5 May 2025

    The Prime Minister spoke to France’s President Emmanuel Macron this evening.

    The Prime Minister spoke to France’s President Emmanuel Macron this evening.

    The Prime Minister began by reflecting on how privileged he felt to be part of the moving VE Day celebrations this week, including the commemorative events held today.

    Turning to the situation in Ukraine, the leaders discussed the need for Russia to commit to a 30-day ceasefire to ensure meaningful peace talks. Ukraine had proved it was willing and ready to come to the table and was the party of peace, the Prime Minister added.

    The leaders also looked ahead to the UK-France summit taking place later this year and agreed to step up ambition between the two countries across all areas, including defence and security and irregular migration. Both leaders underscored that more needed to be done to disrupt irregular migration upstream.

    They also agreed on the importance of a successful EU-UK summit in two weeks’ time.

    Discussing the situation in Gaza, both expressed their deep concern at recent developments and agreed a renewed peace process was required.

    The leaders looked forward to speaking again soon.

    Updates to this page

    Published 5 May 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI: Diamondback Energy, Inc. Announces First Quarter 2025 Financial and Operating Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    MIDLAND, Texas, May 05, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Diamondback Energy, Inc. (NASDAQ: FANG) (“Diamondback” or the “Company”) today announced financial and operating results for the first quarter ended March 31, 2025.

    FIRST QUARTER 2025 AND RECENT HIGHLIGHTS

    • Average oil production of 475.9 MBO/d (850.7 MBOE/d)
    • Net cash provided by operating activities of $2.4 billion; Operating Cash Flow Before Working Capital Changes (as defined and reconciled below) of $2.5 billion
    • Cash capital expenditures of $942 million
    • Free Cash Flow (as defined and reconciled below) of $1.5 billion; Adjusted Free Cash Flow (as defined and reconciled below) of $1.6 billion
    • Declared Q1 2025 base cash dividend of $1.00 per share payable on May 22, 2025; implies a 2.9% annualized yield based on May 2, 2025 closing share price of $136.81
    • Repurchased 3,656,044 shares of common stock in Q1 2025 for $575 million excluding excise tax (at a weighted average price of $157.15 per share); repurchased 1,965,180 shares of common stock to date in Q2 2025 for $255 million excluding excise tax (at a weighted average price of $129.71 per share)
    • Total Q1 2025 return of capital of $864 million; represents ~55% of Adjusted Free Cash Flow (as defined and reconciled below) from stock repurchases and the declared Q1 2025 base dividend
    • As previously announced, closed acquisition of certain subsidiaries of Double Eagle IV Midco, LLC (“Double Eagle”) on April 1st
    • Closed drop down transaction to Viper Energy, Inc. (“Viper”), a subsidiary of Diamondback, on May 1st

    UPDATED 2025 GUIDANCE HIGHLIGHTS

    As a result of recent commodity price volatility, Diamondback is reducing activity in order to prioritize free cash flow generation. The Company believes this revised plan enhances capital efficiency and provides flexibility to (i) cut additional capital if prices weaken further or (ii) resume its original 2025 plan if commodity prices strengthen.

    • Full year oil production of 480 – 495 MBO/d (857 – 900 MBOE/d)
    • Full year 2025 cash capital expenditures guidance of $3.4 – $3.8 billion
    • The Company expects to drill 385 – 435 gross (349 – 395 net) wells and complete between 475 – 550 gross (444 – 514 net) wells with an average lateral length of approximately 11,500 feet in 2025
    • Q2 2025 oil production guidance of 485 – 500 MBO/d (866 – 900 MBOE/d)
    • Q2 2025 cash capital expenditures guidance of $800 – $900 million
    • Implies full year 2025 oil production per million dollars of cash capital expenditures (“MBO per $MM of CAPEX”) of 49.4, ~10% better than the Company’s original full year 2025 guidance provided in February 2025

    OPERATIONS UPDATE

    The tables below provide a summary of operating activity for the first quarter of 2025.

    Total Activity (Gross Operated):          
      Number of Wells Drilled
    		   Number of Wells Completed
    Midland Basin                 124             116  
    Delaware Basin                 2             7  
    Total                 126             123  
    Total Activity (Net Operated):          
      Number of Wells Drilled
    		   Number of Wells Completed
    Midland Basin                 116             112  
    Delaware Basin                 2             7  
    Total                 118             119  
     

    During the first quarter of 2025, Diamondback drilled 124 gross wells in the Midland Basin and two gross wells in the Delaware Basin. The Company turned 116 operated wells to production in the Midland Basin and seven gross wells in the Delaware Basin, with an average lateral length of 11,978 feet. Operated completions during the first quarter consisted of 30 Wolfcamp A wells, 28 Lower Spraberry wells, 22 Wolfcamp B wells, 17 Jo Mill wells, eight Middle Spraberry wells, four Dean wells, four Barnett wells, three Third Bone Spring wells, three Wolfcamp D wells, two Second Bone Spring wells and two Upper Spraberry wells.

    FINANCIAL UPDATE

    Diamondback’s first quarter 2025 net income was $1.4 billion, or $4.83 per diluted share. Adjusted net income (as defined and reconciled below) for the first quarter was $1.3 billion, or $4.54 per diluted share.

    First quarter 2025 net cash provided by operating activities was $2.4 billion.

    During the first quarter of 2025, Diamondback spent $864 million on operated drilling and completions, $21 million on capital workovers and non-operated drilling and completions and $57 million on infrastructure, environmental and midstream, for total cash capital expenditures of $942 million.

    First quarter 2025 Consolidated Adjusted EBITDA (as defined and reconciled below) was $2.9 billion. Adjusted EBITDA net of non-controlling interest (as defined and reconciled below) for the first quarter was $2.8 billion.

    Diamondback’s first quarter 2025 Free Cash Flow (as defined and reconciled below) was $1.5 billion. Adjusted Free Cash Flow (as reconciled and defined below) for the first quarter was $1.6 billion.

    First quarter 2025 average unhedged realized prices were $70.95 per barrel of oil, $2.11 per Mcf of natural gas and $23.94 per barrel of natural gas liquids (“NGLs”), resulting in a total equivalent unhedged realized price of $47.77 per BOE.

    Diamondback’s cash operating costs for the first quarter of 2025 were $10.48 per BOE, including lease operating expenses (“LOE”) of $5.33 per BOE, cash general and administrative (“G&A”) expenses of $0.72 per BOE, production and ad valorem taxes of $2.98 per BOE and gathering, processing and transportation expenses of $1.45 per BOE.

    As of March 31, 2025, Diamondback had $1.3 billion in standalone cash and no borrowings outstanding under its revolving credit facility, with approximately $2.5 billion available for future borrowings under the facility and approximately $3.8 billion of total liquidity. As of March 31, 2025, the Company had consolidated total debt of $14.1 billion and consolidated net debt (as defined and reconciled below) of $12.3 billion, up from consolidated total debt of $13.2 billion and consolidated net debt of $13.0 billion as of December 31, 2024.

    DIVIDEND DECLARATIONS

    Diamondback announced today that the Company’s Board of Directors declared a base cash dividend of $1.00 per common share for the first quarter of 2025 payable on May 22, 2025 to stockholders of record at the close of business on May 15, 2025.

    Future base and variable dividends remain subject to review and approval at the discretion of the Company’s Board of Directors.

    COMMON STOCK REPURCHASE PROGRAM

    During the first quarter of 2025, Diamondback repurchased ~3.7 million shares of common stock at an average share price of $157.15 for a total cost of approximately $575 million, excluding excise tax. To date, Diamondback has repurchased ~30.2 million shares of common stock at an average share price of $137.55 for a total cost of approximately $4.2 billion and has approximately $1.8 billion remaining on its current share buyback authorization. Subject to factors discussed below, Diamondback intends to continue to purchase common stock under the common stock repurchase program opportunistically with cash on hand, free cash flow from operations and proceeds from potential liquidity events such as the sale of assets. This repurchase program has no time limit and may be suspended from time to time, modified, extended or discontinued by the Board at any time. Purchases under the repurchase program may be made from time to time in privately negotiated transactions, or in open market transactions in compliance with Rule 10b-18 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and will be subject to market conditions, applicable regulatory and legal requirements and other factors. Any common stock purchased as part of this program will be retired.

    FULL YEAR 2025 GUIDANCE

    Below is Diamondback’s updated guidance for the full year 2025, which includes second quarter production, cash tax and capital guidance. Given recent weakness in commodity prices, the Company is reducing its activity levels and lowering its capital budget to prioritize free cash generation. Diamondback will continue to closely monitor the macro environment and has flexibility to (i) cut additional capital if prices weaken further or (ii) resume its original 2025 plan if commodity prices strengthen.

      2025 Guidance 2025 Guidance
      Diamondback Energy, Inc. Viper Energy, Inc.
         
    2025 Net production – MBOE/d 857 – 900 (from 883 – 909) 74.5 – 79.0
    2025 Oil production – MBO/d 480 – 495 (from 485 – 498) 41.0 – 43.5
    Q2 2025 Oil production – MBO/d (total – MBOE/d) 485 – 500 (866 – 900) 40.0 – 43.0 (72.5 – 78.0)
         
    Unit costs ($/BOE)    
    Lease operating expenses, including workovers $5.65 – $6.05 (from $5.90 – $6.30)  
    G&A    
    Cash G&A $0.60 – $0.75 $0.80 – $1.00
    Non-cash equity-based compensation $0.25 – $0.35 $0.10 – $0.20
    DD&A $14.00 – $15.00 $15.50 – $16.50
    Interest expense (net of interest income) $0.40 – $0.65 (from $0.25 – $0.50) $2.00 – $2.50
    Gathering, processing and transportation $1.40 – $1.60 (from $1.20 – $1.40)  
         
    Production and ad valorem taxes (% of revenue) ~7% ~7%
    Corporate tax rate (% of pre-tax income) 23%  
    Cash tax rate (% of pre-tax income) 19% – 22% (from 17% – 20%) 21% – 23%
    Q2 2025 Cash taxes ($ – million)(1) $340 – $400 $10 – $15
         
    Capital Budget ($ – million)    
    Operated drilling and completion $2,780 – $3,090 (from $3,130 – $3,440)  
    Capital workovers, non-operated properties and science $280 – $320  
    Infrastructure, environmental and midstream(2) $340 – $390 (from $390 – $440)  
    2025 Total capital expenditures $3,400 – $3,800 (from $3,800 – $4,200)  
    Q2 2025 Capital expenditures $800 – $900  
         
    Gross horizontal wells drilled (net) 385 – 435 (349 – 395) (from 446 – 471 (406 – 428))  
    Gross horizontal wells completed (net) 475 – 550 (444 – 514) (from 557 – 592 (526 – 560))  
    Average lateral length (Ft.) ~11,500′  
    FY 2025 Midland Basin well costs per lateral foot $550 – $590 (from $555 – $605)  
    FY 2025 Delaware Basin well costs per lateral foot $860 – $910  
    Midland Basin completed net lateral feet (%) ~95%  
    Delaware Basin completed net lateral feet (%) ~5%  
    (1) Includes approximately $170 million of cash taxes related to the Viper dropdown transaction.
    (2) Includes approximately $60 million in estimated midstream capital expenditures for the full year 2025.
       


    CONFERENCE CALL

    Diamondback will host a conference call and webcast for investors and analysts to discuss its results for the first quarter of 2025 on Tuesday, May 6, 2025 at 8:00 a.m. CT. Access to the webcast, and replay which will be available following the call, may be found here. The live webcast of the earnings conference call will also be available via Diamondback’s website at www.diamondbackenergy.com under the “Investor Relations” section of the site.

    About Diamondback Energy, Inc.

    Diamondback is an independent oil and natural gas company headquartered in Midland, Texas focused on the acquisition, development, exploration and exploitation of unconventional, onshore oil and natural gas reserves primarily in the Permian Basin in West Texas. For more information, please visit www.diamondbackenergy.com.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This news release contains “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act and Section 21E of the Exchange Act, which involve risks, uncertainties, and assumptions. All statements, other than statements of historical fact, including statements regarding Diamondback’s: future performance; business strategy; future operations (including drilling plans and capital plans); estimates and projections of revenues, losses, costs, expenses, returns, cash flow, and financial position; reserve estimates and its ability to replace or increase reserves; anticipated benefits or other effects of strategic transactions (including the recently completed Endeavor merger, the recently completed Double Eagle acquisition and other acquisitions or divestitures); and plans and objectives of management (including plans for future cash flow from operations and for executing environmental strategies) are forward-looking statements. When used in this news release, the words “aim,” “anticipate,” “believe,” “continue,” “could,” “estimate,” “expect,” “forecast,” “future,” “guidance,” “intend,” “may,” “model,” “outlook,” “plan,” “positioned,” “potential,” “predict,” “project,” “seek,” “should,” “target,” “will,” “would,” and similar expressions (including the negative of such terms) as they relate to Diamondback are intended to identify forward-looking statements, although not all forward-looking statements contain such identifying words. Although Diamondback believes that the expectations and assumptions reflected in its forward-looking statements are reasonable as and when made, they involve risks and uncertainties that are difficult to predict and, in many cases, beyond Diamondback’s control. Accordingly, forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future performance and Diamondback’s actual outcomes could differ materially from what Diamondback has expressed in its forward-looking statements.

    Factors that could cause the outcomes to differ materially include (but are not limited to) the following: changes in supply and demand levels for oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids, and the resulting impact on the price for those commodities; the impact of public health crises, including epidemic or pandemic diseases and any related company or government policies or actions; changes in U.S. energy, environmental, monetary and trade policies, including with respect to tariffs or other trade barriers, and any resulting trade tensions; actions taken by the members of OPEC and Russia affecting the production and pricing of oil, as well as other domestic and global political, economic, or diplomatic developments, including any impact of the ongoing war in Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas war on the global energy markets and geopolitical stability; instability in the financial markets; inflationary pressures; higher interest rates and their impact on the cost of capital; regional supply and demand factors, including delays, curtailment delays or interruptions of production, or governmental orders, rules or regulations that impose production limits; federal and state legislative and regulatory initiatives relating to hydraulic fracturing, including the effect of existing and future laws and governmental regulations; physical and transition risks relating to climate change; those risks described in Item 1A of Diamondback’s Annual Report on Form 10-K, filed with the SEC on February 26, 2025, and those risks disclosed in its subsequent filings on Forms 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K, which can be obtained free of charge on the SEC’s website at http://www.sec.gov and Diamondback’s website at www.diamondbackenergy.com/investors.

    In light of these factors, the events anticipated by Diamondback’s forward-looking statements may not occur at the time anticipated or at all. Moreover, Diamondback operates in a very competitive and rapidly changing environment and new risks emerge from time to time. Diamondback cannot predict all risks, nor can it assess the impact of all factors on its business or the extent to which any factor, or combination of factors, may cause actual results to differ materially from those anticipated by any forward-looking statements it may make. Accordingly, you should not place undue reliance on any forward-looking statements. All forward-looking statements speak only as of the date of this letter or, if earlier, as of the date they were made. Diamondback does not intend to, and disclaims any obligation to, update or revise any forward-looking statements unless required by applicable law.

     
    Diamondback Energy, Inc.
    Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets
    (unaudited, in millions, except share amounts)
           
      March 31,   December 31,
       2025    2024
    Assets      
    Current assets:      
    Cash and cash equivalents ($560 million and $27 million related to Viper)         $         1,816     $         161  
    Restricted cash                   225               3  
    Accounts receivable:      
    Joint interest and other, net                   257               198  
    Oil and natural gas sales, net ($146 million and $149 million related to Viper)                    1,334               1,387  
    Inventories                   117               116  
    Derivative instruments                   267               168  
    Prepaid expenses and other current assets                   67               77  
    Total current assets                   4,083               2,110  
    Property and equipment:      
    Oil and natural gas properties, full cost method of accounting ($22,019 million and $22,666 million excluded from amortization at March 31, 2025 and December 31, 2024, respectively) ($6,097 million and $5,713 million related to Viper and $2,279 million and $2,180 million excluded from amortization related to Viper)                   83,727               82,240  
    Other property, equipment and land                   1,452               1,440  
    Accumulated depletion, depreciation, amortization and impairment ($1,148 million and $1,081 million related to Viper)                   (20,283 )             (19,208 )
    Property and equipment, net                   64,896               64,472  
    Funds held in escrow                   208               1  
    Equity method investments                   383               375  
    Derivative instruments                   61               2  
    Deferred income taxes, net ($249 million and $185 million related to Viper)                   235               173  
    Other assets                   200               159  
    Total assets         $         70,066     $         67,292  
    Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity      
    Current liabilities:      
    Accounts payable – trade         $         124     $         253  
    Accrued capital expenditures                   754               690  
    Current maturities of debt                   914               900  
    Other accrued liabilities                   761               1,020  
    Revenues and royalties payable                   1,575               1,491  
    Derivative instruments                   75               43  
    Income taxes payable                   550               414  
    Total current liabilities                   4,753               4,811  
    Long-term debt ($822 million and $1,083 million related to Viper)                   12,996               12,075  
    Derivative instruments                   93               106  
    Asset retirement obligations                   586               573  
    Deferred income taxes                   9,887               9,826  
    Other long-term liabilities                   8               39  
    Total liabilities                   28,323               27,430  
    Stockholders’ equity:      
    Common stock, $0.01 par value; 800,000,000 shares authorized; 287,287,926 and 290,984,373 shares issued and outstanding at March 31, 2025 and December 31, 2024, respectively                   3               3  
    Additional paid-in capital                   33,125               33,501  
    Retained earnings (accumulated deficit)                   5,352               4,238  
    Accumulated other comprehensive income (loss)                   (7 )             (6 )
    Total Diamondback Energy, Inc. stockholders’ equity                   38,473               37,736  
    Non-controlling interest                   3,270               2,126  
    Total equity                   41,743               39,862  
    Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity         $         70,066     $         67,292  
     
    Diamondback Energy, Inc.
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Operations
    (unaudited, $ in millions except per share data, shares in thousands)
           
      Three Months Ended March 31,
        2025       2024  
    Revenues:      
    Oil, natural gas and natural gas liquid sales         $         3,657     $         2,101  
    Sales of purchased oil                   374               116  
    Other operating income                   17               10  
    Total revenues                   4,048               2,227  
    Costs and expenses:      
    Lease operating expenses                   408               255  
    Production and ad valorem taxes                   228               119  
    Gathering, processing and transportation                   111               77  
    Purchased oil expense                   382               117  
    Depreciation, depletion, amortization and accretion                   1,097               469  
    General and administrative expenses                   73               46  
    Merger and integration expense                   37               12  
    Other operating expenses                   39               14  
    Total costs and expenses                   2,375               1,109  
    Income (loss) from operations                   1,673               1,118  
    Other income (expense):      
    Interest expense, net                   (40 )             (39 )
    Other income (expense), net                   27               (3 )
    Gain (loss) on derivative instruments, net                   226               (48 )
    Gain (loss) on extinguishment of debt                   —               2  
    Income (loss) from equity investments, net                   8               2  
    Total other income (expense), net                   221               (86 )
    Income (loss) before income taxes                   1,894               1,032  
    Provision for (benefit from) income taxes                   403               223  
    Net income (loss)                    1,491               809  
    Net income (loss) attributable to non-controlling interest                   86               41  
    Net income (loss) attributable to Diamondback Energy, Inc.         $         1,405     $         768  
           
    Earnings (loss) per common share:      
    Basic         $         4.83     $         4.28  
    Diluted         $         4.83     $         4.28  
    Weighted average common shares outstanding:      
    Basic           289,612       178,477  
    Diluted           289,612       178,477  
     
    Diamondback Energy, Inc.
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows
    (unaudited, in millions)
           
      Three Months Ended March 31,
        2025       2024  
    Cash flows from operating activities:      
    Net income (loss)          $         1,491     $         809  
    Adjustments to reconcile net income (loss) to net cash provided by (used in) operating activities:      
    Provision for (benefit from) deferred income taxes                   6               52  
    Depreciation, depletion, amortization and accretion                   1,097               469  
    (Gain) loss on extinguishment of debt                   —               (2 )
    (Gain) loss on derivative instruments, net                   (226 )             48  
    Cash received (paid) on settlement of derivative instruments                   85               (4 )
    (Income) loss from equity investment, net                   (8 )             (2 )
    Equity-based compensation expense                   18               14  
    Other                   24               16  
    Changes in operating assets and liabilities:              
    Accounts receivable                   (6 )             (95 )
    Income tax receivable                   3               12  
    Prepaid expenses and other current assets                   6               89  
    Accounts payable and accrued liabilities                   (374 )             (110 )
    Income taxes payable                   135               70  
    Revenues and royalties payable                   84               (35 )
    Other                   20               3  
    Net cash provided by (used in) operating activities                   2,355               1,334  
    Cash flows from investing activities:      
    Additions to oil and natural gas properties                   (942 )             (609 )
    Property acquisitions                   (750 )             (153 )
    Proceeds from sale of assets                   41               12  
    Other                   (2 )             (1 )
    Net cash provided by (used in) investing activities                   (1,653 )             (751 )
    Cash flows from financing activities:      
    Proceeds from borrowings under credit facilities                   2,277               90  
    Repayments under credit facilities                   (2,538 )             (80 )
    Proceeds from senior notes                   1,200               —  
    Repayment of senior notes                   —               (25 )
    Repurchased shares under buyback program                   (575 )             (42 )
    Proceeds from partial sale of investment in Viper Energy, Inc.                   —               451  
    Net proceeds from Viper’s issuance of common stock                   1,232               —  
    Dividends paid to stockholders                   (290 )             (548 )
    Dividends/distributions to non-controlling interest                   (95 )             (44 )
    Other                   (36 )             (71 )
    Net cash provided by (used in) financing activities                   1,175               (269 )
    Net increase (decrease) in cash and cash equivalents                   1,877               314  
    Cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash at beginning of period                   164               585  
    Cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash at end of period         $         2,041     $         899  
     
    Diamondback Energy, Inc.
    Selected Operating Data
    (unaudited)
               
      Three Months Ended
      March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024   March 31, 2024
    Production Data:          
    Oil (MBbls)                   42,835               43,785               24,874  
    Natural gas (MMcf)                   100,578               107,249               50,602  
    Natural gas liquids (MBbls)                   16,961               19,615               8,653  
    Combined volumes (MBOE)(1)                   76,559               81,275               41,961  
               
    Daily oil volumes (BO/d)                   475,944               475,924               273,341  
    Daily combined volumes (BOE/d)                   850,656               883,424               461,110  
               
    Average Prices:          
    Oil ($ per Bbl)         $         70.95     $         69.48     $         75.06  
    Natural gas ($ per Mcf)         $         2.11     $         0.48     $         0.99  
    Natural gas liquids ($ per Bbl)         $         23.94     $         19.27     $         21.26  
    Combined ($ per BOE)         $         47.77     $         42.71     $         50.07  
               
    Oil, hedged ($ per Bbl)(2)          $         70.06     $         68.72     $         74.13  
    Natural gas, hedged ($ per Mcf)(2)         $         3.34     $         0.82     $         1.36  
    Natural gas liquids, hedged ($ per Bbl)(2)         $         23.94     $         19.27     $         21.26  
    Average price, hedged ($ per BOE)(2)          $         48.89     $         42.76     $         49.97  
               
    Average Costs per BOE:          
    Lease operating expenses         $         5.33     $         5.67     $         6.08  
    Production and ad valorem taxes                   2.98               2.77               2.84  
    Gathering, processing and transportation expense                   1.45               1.17               1.84  
    General and administrative – cash component                   0.72               0.69               0.76  
    Total operating expense – cash         $         10.48     $         10.30     $         11.52  
               
    General and administrative – non-cash component         $         0.24     $         0.20     $         0.34  
    Depreciation, depletion, amortization and accretion         $         14.33     $         14.22     $         11.18  
    Interest expense, net         $         0.52     $         0.42     $         0.93  
    (1) Bbl equivalents are calculated using a conversion rate of six Mcf per one Bbl.
    (2) Hedged prices reflect the effect of our commodity derivative transactions on our average sales prices and include gains and losses on cash settlements for matured commodity derivatives, which we do not designate for hedge accounting. Hedged prices exclude gains or losses resulting from the early settlement of commodity derivative contracts.
       


    NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES

    ADJUSTED EBITDA

    Adjusted EBITDA is a supplemental non-GAAP financial measure that is used by management and external users of our financial statements, such as industry analysts, investors, lenders and rating agencies. The Company defines Adjusted EBITDA as net income (loss) attributable to Diamondback Energy, Inc., plus net income (loss) attributable to non-controlling interest (“net income (loss)”) before non-cash (gain) loss on derivative instruments, net, interest expense, net, depreciation, depletion, amortization and accretion, depreciation and interest expense related to equity method investments, (gain) loss on extinguishment of debt, if any, non-cash equity-based compensation expense, capitalized equity-based compensation expense, merger and integration expenses, other non-cash transactions and provision for (benefit from) income taxes, if any. Adjusted EBITDA is not a measure of net income as determined by United States generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”). Management believes Adjusted EBITDA is useful because the measure allows it to more effectively evaluate the Company’s operating performance and compare the results of its operations from period to period without regard to its financing methods or capital structure. The Company adds the items listed above to net income (loss) to determine Adjusted EBITDA because these amounts can vary substantially from company to company within its industry depending upon accounting methods and book values of assets, capital structures and the method by which the assets were acquired. Further, the Company excludes the effects of significant transactions that may affect earnings but are unpredictable in nature, timing and amount, although they may recur in different reporting periods. Adjusted EBITDA should not be considered as an alternative to, or more meaningful than, net income as determined in accordance with GAAP or as an indicator of the Company’s operating performance or liquidity. Certain items excluded from Adjusted EBITDA are significant components in understanding and assessing a company’s financial performance, such as a company’s cost of capital and tax structure, as well as the historic costs of depreciable assets. The Company’s computation of Adjusted EBITDA may not be comparable to other similarly titled measures of other companies or to such measure in our credit facility or any of our other contracts.

    The following tables present a reconciliation of the GAAP financial measure of net income (loss) attributable to Diamondback Energy, Inc. to the non-GAAP financial measure of Adjusted EBITDA:

    Diamondback Energy, Inc.
    Reconciliation of Net Income (Loss) to Adjusted EBITDA
    (unaudited, in millions)
               
      Three Months Ended
      March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024   March 31, 2024
    Net income (loss) attributable to Diamondback Energy, Inc.         $         1,405     $         1,074     $         768  
    Net income (loss) attributable to non-controlling interest                   86               216               41  
    Net income (loss)                   1,491               1,290               809  
    Non-cash (gain) loss on derivative instruments, net                   (141 )             (51 )             44  
    Interest expense, net                   40               34               39  
    Depreciation, depletion, amortization and accretion                   1,097               1,156               469  
    Depreciation and interest expense related to equity method investments                   21               30               23  
    (Gain) loss on extinguishment of debt                   —               —               (2 )
    Non-cash equity-based compensation expense                   23               24               21  
    Capitalized equity-based compensation expense                   (5 )             (8 )             (7 )
    Merger and integration expenses                   37               30               12  
    Other non-cash transactions                   (19 )             2               2  
    Provision for (benefit from) income taxes                   403               115               223  
    Consolidated Adjusted EBITDA                   2,947               2,622               1,633  
    Less: Adjustment for non-controlling interest                   146               118               86  
    Adjusted EBITDA attributable to Diamondback Energy, Inc.         $         2,801     $         2,504     $         1,547  
     


    ADJUSTED NET INCOME

    Adjusted net income is a non-GAAP financial measure equal to net income (loss) attributable to Diamondback Energy, Inc. plus net income (loss) attributable to non-controlling interest (“net income (loss)”) adjusted for non-cash (gain) loss on derivative instruments, net, (gain) loss on extinguishment of debt, if any, merger and integration expense, other non-cash transactions and related income tax adjustments, if any. The Company’s computation of adjusted net income may not be comparable to other similarly titled measures of other companies or to such measure in our credit facility or any of our other contracts. Management believes adjusted net income helps investors in the oil and natural gas industry to measure and compare the Company’s performance to other oil and natural gas companies by excluding from the calculation items that can vary significantly from company to company depending upon accounting methods, the book value of assets and other non-operational factors. Further, in order to allow investors to compare the Company’s performance across periods, the Company excludes the effects of significant transactions that may affect earnings but are unpredictable in nature, timing and amount, although they may recur in different reporting periods.

    The following table presents a reconciliation of the GAAP financial measure of net income (loss) attributable to Diamondback Energy, Inc. to the non-GAAP measure of adjusted net income:

    Diamondback Energy, Inc.
    Adjusted Net Income
    (unaudited, $ in millions except per share data, shares in thousands)
       
      Three Months Ended March 31, 2025
      Amounts   Amounts Per Diluted Share
    Net income (loss) attributable to Diamondback Energy, Inc.(1)         $         1,405     $         4.83  
    Net income (loss) attributable to non-controlling interest                   86               0.30  
    Net income (loss)(1)                    1,491               5.13  
    Non-cash (gain) loss on derivative instruments, net                   (141 )             (0.49 )
    Merger and integration expense                   37               0.13  
    Other non-cash transactions                   (19 )             (0.07 )
    Adjusted net income excluding above items(1)                   1,368               4.70  
    Income tax adjustment for above items                   26               0.09  
    Adjusted net income(1)                   1,394               4.79  
    Less: Adjusted net income attributable to non-controlling interest                   74               0.25  
    Adjusted net income attributable to Diamondback Energy, Inc.(1)         $         1,320     $         4.54  
           
    Weighted average common shares outstanding:      
    Basic                     289,612  
    Diluted                     289,612  
    (1) The Company’s earnings (loss) per diluted share amount has been computed using the two-class method in accordance with GAAP. The two-class method is an earnings allocation which reflects the respective ownership among holders of common stock and participating securities. Diluted earnings per share using the two-class method is calculated as (i) net income attributable to Diamondback Energy, Inc, (ii) less the reallocation of $6 million in earnings attributable to participating securities, (iii) divided by diluted weighted average common shares outstanding for the respective periods.
       


    OPERATING CASH FLOW BEFORE WORKING CAPITAL CHANGES AND FREE CASH FLOW

    Operating cash flow before working capital changes, which is a non-GAAP financial measure, represents net cash provided by operating activities as determined under GAAP without regard to changes in operating assets and liabilities. The Company believes operating cash flow before working capital changes is a useful measure of an oil and natural gas company’s ability to generate cash used to fund exploration, development and acquisition activities and service debt or pay dividends. The Company also uses this measure because changes in operating assets and liabilities relate to the timing of cash receipts and disbursements that the Company may not control and may not relate to the period in which the operating activities occurred. This allows the Company to compare its operating performance with that of other companies without regard to financing methods and capital structure.

    Free Cash Flow, which is a non-GAAP financial measure, is cash flow from operating activities before changes in working capital in excess of cash capital expenditures. The Company believes that Free Cash Flow is useful to investors as it provides measures to compare both cash flow from operating activities and additions to oil and natural gas properties across periods on a consistent basis as adjusted for non-recurring tax impacts from divestitures, merger and integration expenses, the early termination of derivative contracts and settlements of treasury locks. These measures should not be considered as an alternative to, or more meaningful than, net cash provided by operating activities as an indicator of operating performance. The Company’s computation of Free Cash Flow may not be comparable to other similarly titled measures of other companies. The Company uses Free Cash Flow to reduce debt, as well as return capital to stockholders as determined by the Board of Directors.

    The following tables present a reconciliation of the GAAP financial measure of net cash provided by operating activities to the non-GAAP measure of operating cash flow before working capital changes and to the non-GAAP measure of Free Cash Flow:

    Diamondback Energy, Inc.
    Operating Cash Flow Before Working Capital Changes and Free Cash Flow
    (unaudited, in millions)
     
      Three Months Ended
      March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024
    Net cash provided by operating activities         $         2,355     $         2,341  
    Less: Changes in cash due to changes in operating assets and liabilities:      
    Accounts receivable                   (6 )             (103 )
    Income tax receivable                   3               (3 )
    Prepaid expenses and other current assets                   6               (24 )
    Accounts payable and accrued liabilities                   (374 )             114  
    Income taxes payable                   135               138  
    Revenues and royalties payable                   84               59  
    Other                   20               (100 )
    Total working capital changes                   (132 )             81  
    Operating cash flow before working capital changes                   2,487               2,260  
    Additions to oil and natural gas properties                   (942 )             (933 )
    Total Cash CAPEX                   (942 )             (933 )
    Free Cash Flow                   1,545               1,327  
    Merger and integration expenses                   37               30  
    Treasury locks                   1               —  
    Adjusted Free Cash Flow         $         1,583     $         1,357  
     


    NET DEBT

    The Company defines the non-GAAP measure of net debt as total debt (excluding debt issuance costs, discounts, premiums and unamortized basis adjustments) less cash and cash equivalents. Net debt should not be considered an alternative to, or more meaningful than, total debt, the most directly comparable GAAP measure. Management uses net debt to determine the Company’s outstanding debt obligations that would not be readily satisfied by its cash and cash equivalents on hand. The Company believes this metric is useful to analysts and investors in determining the Company’s leverage position because the Company has the ability to, and may decide to, use a portion of its cash and cash equivalents to reduce debt.

    Diamondback Energy, Inc.
    Net Debt
    (unaudited, in millions)
                           
      March 31, 2025   Net Q1 Principal Borrowings/(Repayments)   December 31, 2024   September 30, 2024   June 30, 2024   March 31, 2024
      (in millions)
    Diamondback Energy, Inc.(1)         $         13,269     $         1,200     $         12,069     $         12,284     $         11,169     $         5,669  
    Viper Energy, Inc.(1)                   830               (261 )             1,091               830               1,007               1,103  
    Total debt                   14,099     $         939               13,160               13,114               12,176               6,772  
    Cash and cash equivalents                   (1,816 )                 (161 )             (370 )             (6,908 )             (896 )
    Net debt         $         12,283         $         12,999     $         12,744     $         5,268     $         5,876  
    (1) Excludes debt issuance costs, discounts, premiums and unamortized basis adjustments.
       


    DERIVATIVES

    As of May 2, 2025, the Company had the following outstanding consolidated derivative contracts, including derivative contracts at Viper Energy, Inc. The Company’s derivative contracts are based upon reported settlement prices on commodity exchanges, with crude oil derivative settlements based on New York Mercantile Exchange West Texas Intermediate pricing and Crude Oil Brent pricing and with natural gas derivative settlements based on the New York Mercantile Exchange Henry Hub pricing. When aggregating multiple contracts, the weighted average contract price is disclosed.

      Crude Oil (Bbls/day, $/Bbl)
      Q2 2025   Q3 2025   Q4 2025   Q1 2026
    Long Puts – Crude Brent Oil   50,000       36,000       21,000       4,000  
    Long Put Price ($/Bbl)   $58.30       $56.39       $55.00       $55.00  
    Deferred Premium ($/Bbl)   $-1.50       $-1.50       $-1.47       $-1.45  
    Long Puts – WTI (Magellan East Houston)   96,000       102,000       65,000       15,000  
    Long Put Price ($/Bbl)   $55.10       $54.75       $54.62       $55.00  
    Deferred Premium ($/Bbl)   $-1.59       $-1.61       $-1.63       $-1.66  
    Long Puts – WTI (Cushing)   152,000       146,000       86,000       25,000  
    Long Put Price ($/Bbl)   $55.53       $54.40       $53.98       $55.00  
    Deferred Premium ($/Bbl)   $-1.59       $-1.55       $-1.55       $-1.32  
    Basis Swaps – WTI (Midland)   71,000       76,000       76,000       —  
      $1.05       $1.05       $1.05       —  
    Roll Swaps – WTI   25,000       25,000       25,000       —  
      $0.93       $0.93       $0.93       —  
      Natural Gas (Mmbtu/day, $/Mmbtu)
      Q2 2025   Q3 2025   Q4 2025   FY 2026 FY 2027
    Costless Collars – Henry Hub   690,000       690,000       690,000       620,000     40,000  
    Floor Price ($/Mmbtu)   $2.49       $2.49       $2.49       $2.77     $3.00  
    Ceiling Price ($/Mmbtu)   $5.28       $5.28       $5.28       $6.33     $6.65  
    Natural Gas Basis Swaps – Waha Hub   610,000       610,000       610,000       460,000     240,000  
      $-0.88       $-0.88       $-0.88       $-1.62     $-1.48  
    Natural Gas Basis Swaps – Houston Ship Channel   13,407       20,000       20,000       40,000     —  
      $-0.49       $-0.49       $-0.49       $-0.37     —  

    Investor Contact:
    Adam Lawlis
    +1 432.221.7467
    alawlis@diamondbackenergy.com

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: Viper Energy, Inc., a Subsidiary of Diamondback Energy, Inc., Reports First Quarter 2025 Financial and Operating Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    MIDLAND, Texas, May 05, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Viper Energy, Inc., (NASDAQ:VNOM) (“Viper” or the “Company”), a subsidiary of Diamondback Energy, Inc. (NASDAQ:FANG) (“Diamondback”), today announced financial and operating results for the first quarter ended March 31, 2025.

    FIRST QUARTER HIGHLIGHTS

    • As previously announced, Q1 2025 average production of 31,311 bo/d (57,378 boe/d)
    • Q1 2025 consolidated net income (including non-controlling interest) of $153 million; net income attributable to Viper of $75 million, or $0.62 per Class A common share
    • Q1 2025 cash available for distribution to Viper’s Class A common shares (as defined and reconciled below) of $100 million, or $0.76 per Class A common share
    • Declared Q1 2025 base cash dividend of $0.30 per Class A common share; implies a 2.9% annualized yield based on the May 2, 2025, Class A common share closing price of $42.08
    • Declared Q1 2025 variable cash dividend of $0.27 per Class A common share; total base-plus-variable dividend of $0.57 per Class A common share implies a 5.4% annualized yield based on the May 2, 2025, Class A common share closing price of $42.08
    • Total Q1 2025 return of capital to Class A shareholders of $75 million, or $0.57 per Class A common share, represents 75% of cash available for distribution
    • 442 total gross (8.0 net 100% royalty interest) horizontal wells turned to production on Viper’s acreage during Q1 2025 with an average lateral length of 11,946 feet

    RECENT EVENTS AND FORWARD OUTLOOK

    • As previously announced, on May 1, 2025, closed the Drop Down transaction, whereby Viper Energy Partners LLC (“OpCo”), the Company’s operating subsidiary, acquired all of the equity interests of certain mineral and royalty subsidiaries of Diamondback for consideration of $1.0 billion of cash and 69.6 million limited liability company units of OpCo and an equivalent number of shares of the Company’s Class B common stock (the “Drop Down”)
    • Following the close of the Drop Down, Viper’s long-term issuer default rating was upgraded to BBB- by Fitch; represents second investment grade rating for Viper
    • As of May 2, 2025, during the second quarter of 2025, repurchased 239,374 shares of the Company’s Class A common stock for an aggregate purchase price of approximately $9 million, excluding excise tax (average price of $37.85 per Class A common share)
    • As of May 2, 2025, during the second quarter of 2025, repurchased approximately $36 million in aggregate principal amount of the Company’s 5.375% Senior Notes due 2027 (“2027 Notes”)
    • Initiating average daily production guidance for Q2 2025 of 40,000 to 43,000 bo/d (72,500 to 78,000 boe/d)
    • Maintaining average daily production for the balance of 2025, following the closing of the Drop Down, of 47,000 to 49,000 bo/d (85,000 to 88,000 boe/d), resulting in expected full year 2025 average daily production of 41,000 to 43,500 bo/d (74,500 to 79,000 boe/d)

    “As previously announced, we are excited the transformative Drop Down transaction between Viper and Diamondback has closed. As a result of the conservative financing of this transaction, as well as Viper’s continued strong financial and operating results, we expect leverage to remain below 1.0x even in a sustained $50 per barrel WTI environment. Given the strength of our balance sheet, we will look to use this period of volatility to our advantage where we can, as highlighted by the opportunistic share repurchases we have been able to make so far this quarter,” stated Kaes Van’t Hof, Chief Executive Officer of Viper.

    Mr. Van’t Hof continued, “Despite the potential for sustained weakness in commodity prices and reduced activity levels, we expect Viper’s production to remain durable and are maintaining our previous guidance for oil production for the balance of 2025, although we continue to monitor operator activity levels. The symbiotic relationship between Diamondback and Viper is highlighted during times like these where Diamondback continues to focus its development on wells where Viper owns high royalty interests, and therefore enhances Diamondback’s consolidated capital efficiency. Further, the roughly 45% of Viper’s current production that is operated by third parties is predominately exposed to well-capitalized operators in the best parts of the Permian Basin, led by Exxon operating almost half of our third party production.”

    FINANCIAL UPDATE

    As previously announced, Viper’s first quarter 2025 average unhedged realized prices were $71.33 per barrel of oil, $2.08 per Mcf of natural gas and $24.52 per barrel of natural gas liquids, resulting in a total equivalent realized price of $47.25/boe.

    As previously announced, Viper’s first quarter 2025 average hedged realized prices were $70.26 per barrel of oil, $3.74 per Mcf of natural gas and $24.52 per barrel of natural gas liquids, resulting in a total equivalent realized price of $48.99/boe.

    During the first quarter of 2025, the Company recorded total operating income of $245 million and consolidated net income (including non-controlling interest) of $153 million.

    As of March 31, 2025, the Company had a cash balance of $560 million and total long-term debt outstanding (excluding debt issuance costs, discounts and premiums) of $830 million, resulting in net debt (as defined and reconciled below) of $270 million. Viper’s outstanding long-term debt as of March 31, 2025 consisted of $430 million in aggregate principal amount of its 2027 Notes, $400 million in aggregate principal amount of its 7.375% Senior Notes due 2031 and no borrowings on its revolving credit facility, leaving $1.3 billion available for future borrowings and $1.9 billion of total liquidity.

    As of May 1, 2025, after giving effect to the closing of the Drop Down, Viper had roughly $255 million in borrowings on its revolving credit facility, leaving approximately $995 million available for future borrowings and a similar amount of total liquidity.

    As of May 2, 2025, during the second quarter of 2025, Viper had repurchased approximately $36 million in aggregate principal amount of the Company’s 2027 Notes.

    FIRST QUARTER 2025 CASH DIVIDEND & CAPITAL RETURN PROGRAM

    Viper announced today that the Company’s Board of Directors (the “Board”) declared a base cash dividend of $0.30 per Class A common share for the first quarter of 2025, payable on May 22, 2025 to Class A common shareholders of record at the close of business on May 15, 2025.

    The Board also declared a variable cash dividend of $0.27 per Class A common share for the first quarter of 2025, payable on May 22, 2025 to Class A common shareholders of record at the close of business on May 15, 2025.

    As of May 2, 2025, during the second quarter of 2025, Viper repurchased 239,374 shares of Class A common stock for an aggregate purchase price of approximately $9 million, excluding excise tax (average price of $37.85 per Class A common share). In total, since the initiation of Viper’s common stock repurchase program on November 9, 2020 through May 2, 2025, the Company has repurchased 13,683,957 shares of Class A common stock for an aggregate purchase price of approximately $325 million, reflecting an average price of $23.74 per Class A common share. Future base and variable cash dividends and stock repurchases are at the discretion of the Board and are subject to a number of factors discussed in Viper’s reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

    OPERATIONS UPDATE

    During the first quarter of 2025, Viper estimates that 442 gross (8.0 net 100% royalty interest) horizontal wells with an average royalty interest of 1.8% were turned to production on its acreage position with an average lateral length of 11,946 feet. Of these 442 gross wells, Diamondback is the operator of 108 gross wells, with an average royalty interest of 4.0%, and the remaining 334 gross wells, with an average royalty interest of 1.1%, are operated by third parties.

    As of March 31, 2025, Viper’s footprint of mineral and royalty interests was 37,573 net royalty acres on a historical basis and 60,725 net royalty acres on a pro forma basis, after giving effect to the Drop Down.

    Our gross well information as of May 1, 2025 is as follows, after giving effect to the Drop Down:

      Diamondback
    Operated    		   Third-Party
    Operated    		   Total
    Q1 2025 Horizontal wells turned to production(1)(2):          
    Gross wells 108   334   442  
    Net 100% royalty interest wells 4.3   3.7   8.0  
    Average percent net royalty interest 4.0%   1.1%   1.8%  
               
    Horizontal producing well count:          
    Gross wells 3,725   11,546   15,271  
    Net 100% royalty interest wells 235.0   165.0   400.0  
    Average percent net royalty interest 6.3%   1.4%   2.6%  
               
    Horizontal active development well count:          
    Gross wells 239   682   921  
    Net 100% royalty interest wells 13.0   10.4   23.4  
    Average percent net royalty interest 5.4%   1.5%   2.5%  
               
    Line of sight wells:          
    Gross wells 417   677   1,094  
    Net 100% royalty interest wells 27.1   8.9   36.0  
    Average percent net royalty interest 6.5%   1.3%   3.3%  

    (1) Represents wells turned to production on Viper’s standalone acreage position; does not give effect to the Drop Down.
    (2) Average lateral length of 11,946 feet.

    The 921 gross wells currently in the process of active development are those wells that have been spud and are expected to be turned to production within approximately the next six to eight months. Further in regard to the active development on Viper’s asset base, after giving effect to the Drop Down, there are currently 63 gross rigs operating on Viper’s acreage, 16 of which are operated by Diamondback. The 1,094 line-of-sight wells are those that are not currently in the process of active development, but for which Viper has reason to believe that they will be turned to production within approximately the next 15 to 18 months. The expected timing of these line-of-sight wells is based primarily on permitting by third-party operators or Diamondback’s current expected completion schedule. Existing permits or active development of Viper’s royalty acreage does not ensure that those wells will be turned to production.

    GUIDANCE UPDATE

    Below is Viper’s guidance for the full year 2025, as well as average production guidance for Q2 2025, which gives effect to the Drop Down. Given recent market volatility, Diamondback and our other operators are closely monitoring the macro environment and may review their operating plans for the remainder of 2025, and thus our production guidance could be subject to change.

       
      Viper Energy, Inc.
       
    Q2 2025 Net Production – Mbo/d 40.0 – 43.0
    Q2 2025 Net Production – Mboe/d 72.5 – 78.0
    Full Year 2025 Net Production – Mbo/d 41.0 – 43.5
    Full Year 2025 Net Production – Mboe/d 74.5 – 79.0
       
    Unit costs ($/boe)  
    Depletion $15.50 – $16.50
    Cash G&A $0.80 – $1.00
    Non-Cash Share-Based Compensation $0.10 – $0.20
    Net Interest Expense $2.00 – $2.50
       
    Production and Ad Valorem Taxes (% of Revenue) ~7%
    Cash Tax Rate (% of Pre-Tax Income Attributable to the Company)(1) 21% – 23%
    Q2 2025 Cash Taxes ($ – million)(2) $10 – $15

    (1) Pre-tax income attributable to the Company is reconciled below.
    (2) Attributable to the Company.


    CONFERENCE CALL

    Viper will host a conference call and webcast for investors and analysts to discuss its results for the first quarter of 2025 on Tuesday, May 6, 2025 at 10:00 a.m. CT. Access to the live audio-only webcast, and replay which will be available following the call, may be found here. The live webcast of the earnings conference call will also be available via Viper’s website at www.viperenergy.com under the “Investor Relations” section of the site.

    About Viper Energy, Inc.

    Viper is a corporation formed by Diamondback to own, acquire and exploit oil and natural gas properties in North America, with a focus on owning and acquiring mineral and royalty interests in oil-weighted basins, primarily the Permian Basin in West Texas. For more information, please visit www.viperenergy.com.

    About Diamondback Energy, Inc.

    Diamondback is an independent oil and natural gas company headquartered in Midland, Texas focused on the acquisition, development, exploration and exploitation of unconventional, onshore oil and natural gas reserves primarily in the Permian Basin in West Texas. For more information, please visit www.diamondbackenergy.com.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This news release contains “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, which involve risks, uncertainties, and assumptions. All statements, other than statements of historical fact, including statements regarding Viper’s: future performance; business strategy; future operations; estimates and projections of operating income, losses, costs and expenses, returns, cash flow, and financial position; production levels on properties in which Viper has mineral and royalty interests, developmental activity by other operators; reserve estimates and Viper’s ability to replace or increase reserves; anticipated benefits or other effects of strategic transactions (including the Drop Down and any other acquisitions or divestitures); and plans and objectives (including Diamondback’s plans for developing Viper’s acreage and Viper’s cash dividend policy and common stock repurchase program) are forward-looking statements. When used in this news release, the words “aim,” “anticipate,” “believe,” “continue,” “could,” “estimate,” “expect,” “forecast,” “future,” “guidance,” “intend,” “may,” “model,” “outlook,” “plan,” “positioned,” “potential,” “predict,” “project,” “seek,” “should,” “target,” “will,” “would,” and similar expressions (including the negative of such terms) as they relate to Viper are intended to identify forward-looking statements, although not all forward-looking statements contain such identifying words. Although Viper believes that the expectations and assumptions reflected in its forward-looking statements are reasonable as and when made, they involve risks and uncertainties that are difficult to predict and, in many cases, beyond its control. Accordingly, forward-looking statements are not guarantees of Viper’s future performance and the actual outcomes could differ materially from what Viper expressed in its forward-looking statements.

    Factors that could cause the outcomes to differ materially include (but are not limited to) the following: changes in supply and demand levels for oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids, and the resulting impact on the price for those commodities; the impact of public health crises, including epidemic or pandemic diseases, and any related company or government policies or actions; changes in U.S. energy, environmental, monetary and trade policies, including with respect to tariffs or other trade barriers, and any resulting trade tensions; actions taken by the members of OPEC and Russia affecting the production and pricing of oil, as well as other domestic and global political, economic, or diplomatic developments, including any impact of the ongoing war in Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas war on the global energy markets and geopolitical stability; instability in the financial sector; higher interest rates and their impact on the cost of capital; regional supply and demand factors, including delays, curtailment delays or interruptions of production on Viper’s mineral and royalty acreage, or governmental orders, rules or regulations that impose production limits on such acreage; federal and state legislative and regulatory initiatives relating to hydraulic fracturing, including the effect of existing and future laws and governmental regulations; physical and transition risks relating to climate change and the risks and other factors disclosed in Viper’s filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, including its Forms 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K, which can be obtained free of charge on the Securities and Exchange Commission’s web site at http://www.sec.gov.

    In light of these factors, the events anticipated by Viper’s forward-looking statements may not occur at the time anticipated or at all. Moreover, new risks emerge from time to time. Viper cannot predict all risks, nor can it assess the impact of all factors on its business or the extent to which any factor, or combination of factors, may cause actual results to differ materially from those anticipated by any forward-looking statements it may make. Accordingly, you should not place undue reliance on any forward-looking statements made in this news release. All forward-looking statements speak only as of the date of this news release or, if earlier, as of the date they were made. Viper does not intend to, and disclaims any obligation to, update or revise any forward-looking statements unless required by applicable law.

    Viper Energy, Inc.
    Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets
    (unaudited, in millions, except par values and share data)
           
      March 31,   December 31,
        2025       2024  
    Assets      
    Current assets:      
    Cash and cash equivalents $ 560     $ 27  
    Royalty income receivable (net of allowance for credit losses)   146       149  
    Royalty income receivable—related party   41       31  
    Income tax receivable   2       2  
    Derivative instruments   31       18  
    Prepaid expenses and other current assets   12       11  
         Total current assets   792       238  
    Property:      
    Oil and natural gas interests, full cost method of accounting ($2,279 and $2,180 excluded from depletion at March 31, 2025 and December 31, 2024, respectively)   6,097       5,713  
    Land   6       6  
    Accumulated depletion and impairment   (1,148 )     (1,081 )
         Property, net   4,955       4,638  
    Derivative instruments   12       —  
    Deferred income taxes (net of allowances)   249       185  
    Funds held in escrow   223       1  
    Other assets   7       7  
         Total assets $ 6,238     $ 5,069  
    Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity      
    Current liabilities:      
    Accounts payable—related party $ 2     $ 2  
    Accrued liabilities   66       43  
    Derivative instruments   5       2  
    Income taxes payable   18       2  
         Total current liabilities   91       49  
    Long-term debt, net   822       1,083  
    Derivative instruments   2       —  
    Other long-term liabilities   —       30  
         Total liabilities   915       1,162  
    Stockholders’ equity:      
    Class A Common Stock, $0.000001 par value: 1,000,000,000 shares authorized; 131,323,078 shares issued and outstanding as of March 31, 2025 and 102,977,142 shares issued and outstanding as of December 31, 2024   —       —  
    Class B Common Stock, $0.000001 par value: 1,000,000,000 shares authorized; 87,831,750 shares issued and outstanding as of March 31, 2025 and 85,431,453 shares issued and outstanding as of December 31, 2024   —       —  
    Additional paid-in capital   2,566       1,569  
    Retained earnings (accumulated deficit)   108       118  
         Total Viper Energy, Inc. stockholders’ equity   2,674       1,687  
    Non-controlling interest   2,649       2,220  
    Total equity   5,323       3,907  
         Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity $ 6,238     $ 5,069  
    Viper Energy, Inc.
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Operations
    (unaudited, in millions, except per share amounts, shares in thousands)
           
      Three Months Ended March 31,
        2025       2024  
    Operating income:      
    Oil income $ 201     $ 177  
    Natural gas income   15       7  
    Natural gas liquids income   28       21  
         Royalty income   244       205  
    Lease bonus income   1       —  
         Total operating income   245       205  
    Costs and expenses:      
    Production and ad valorem taxes   17       14  
    Depletion   67       47  
    General and administrative expenses—related party   4       2  
    General and administrative expenses   2       3  
         Total costs and expenses   90       66  
    Income (loss) from operations   155       139  
    Other income (expense):      
    Interest expense, net   (13 )     (20 )
    Gain (loss) on derivative instruments, net   32       (7 )
         Total other income (expense), net   19       (27 )
    Income (loss) before income taxes   174       112  
    Provision for (benefit from) income taxes   21       13  
    Net income (loss)   153       99  
    Net income (loss) attributable to non-controlling interest   78       56  
    Net income (loss) attributable to Viper Energy, Inc. $ 75     $ 43  
           
    Net income (loss) attributable to common shares:      
    Basic $ 0.62     $ 0.49  
    Diluted $ 0.62     $ 0.49  
    Weighted average number of common shares outstanding:      
    Basic   120,926       87,537  
    Diluted   121,030       87,629  
    Viper Energy, Inc.
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows
    (unaudited, in millions)
           
      Three Months Ended March 31,
        2025       2024  
    Cash flows from operating activities:      
    Net income (loss) $ 153     $ 99  
    Adjustments to reconcile net income (loss) to net cash provided by operating activities:      
         Provision for (benefit from) deferred income taxes   (1 )     (1 )
         Depletion   67       47  
         (Gain) loss on derivative instruments, net   (32 )     7  
         Net cash receipts (payments) on derivatives   9       (3 )
         Other   1       2  
    Changes in operating assets and liabilities:      
         Royalty income receivable   3       (23 )
         Royalty income receivable—related party   (10 )     (30 )
         Accounts payable and accrued liabilities   (4 )     5  
         Accounts payable—related party   —       (1 )
         Income taxes payable   15       12  
         Other   —       1  
              Net cash provided by (used in) operating activities   201       115  
    Cash flows from investing activities:      
    Acquisitions of oil and natural gas interests   (486 )     (21 )
    Proceeds from sale of oil and natural gas interests   —       1  
              Net cash provided by (used in) investing activities   (486 )     (20 )
    Cash flows from financing activities:      
    Proceeds from borrowings under credit facility   295       90  
    Repayment on credit facility   (556 )     (80 )
    Net proceeds from public offering   1,232       —  
    Dividends to stockholders   (85 )     (44 )
    Dividends to Diamondback   (59 )     (67 )
    Dividends to other non-controlling interest   (9 )     —  
              Net cash provided by (used in) financing activities   818       (101 )
    Net increase (decrease) in cash and cash equivalents   533       (6 )
    Cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash at beginning of period   27       26  
    Cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash at end of period $ 560     $ 20  
    Viper Energy, Inc.
    Selected Operating Data
    (unaudited)
               
      Three Months Ended
      March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024   March 31, 2024
    Production Data:          
    Oil (MBbls)   2,818     2,747     2,312
    Natural gas (MMcf)   7,221     7,236     5,589
    Natural gas liquids (MBbls)   1,142     1,209     954
    Combined volumes (Mboe)(1)   5,164     5,162     4,198
               
    Average daily oil volumes (bo/d)   31,311     29,859     25,407
    Average daily combined volumes (boe/d)   57,378     56,109     46,132
               
    Average sales prices:          
    Oil ($/Bbl) $ 71.33   $ 69.91   $ 76.61
    Natural gas ($/Mcf) $ 2.08   $ 0.84   $ 1.22
    Natural gas liquids ($/Bbl) $ 24.52   $ 22.15   $ 22.17
    Combined ($/boe)(2) $ 47.25   $ 43.56   $ 48.85
               
    Oil, hedged ($/Bbl)(3) $ 70.26   $ 69.00   $ 75.64
    Natural gas, hedged ($/Mcf)(3) $ 3.74   $ 1.05   $ 1.12
    Natural gas liquids ($/Bbl)(3) $ 24.52   $ 22.15   $ 22.17
    Combined price, hedged ($/boe)(3) $ 48.99   $ 43.38   $ 48.19
               
    Average Costs ($/boe):          
    Production and ad valorem taxes $ 3.29   $ 3.13   $ 3.43
    General and administrative – cash component   0.97     0.72     1.08
    Total operating expense – cash $ 4.26   $ 3.85   $ 4.51
               
    General and administrative – non-cash stock compensation expense $ 0.19   $ 0.16   $ 0.12
    Interest expense, net $ 2.52   $ 3.70   $ 4.67
    Depletion $ 12.97   $ 12.51   $ 11.18

    (1) Bbl equivalents are calculated using a conversion rate of six Mcf per one Bbl.
    (2) Realized price net of all deducts for gathering, transportation and processing.
    (3) Hedged prices reflect the impact of cash settlements of our matured commodity derivative transactions on our average sales prices.

    NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES

    Adjusted EBITDA is a supplemental non-GAAP (as defined below) financial measure that is used by management and external users of our financial statements, such as industry analysts, investors, lenders and rating agencies. Viper defines Adjusted EBITDA as net income (loss) attributable to the Company, plus net income (loss) attributable to non-controlling interest (“net income (loss)”) before interest expense, net, non-cash share-based compensation expense, depletion, non-cash (gain) loss on derivative instruments, (gain) loss on extinguishment of debt, if any, other non-cash operating expenses, if any, other non-recurring expenses, if any, and provision for (benefit from) income taxes. Adjusted EBITDA is not a measure of net income as determined by United States’ generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”). Management believes Adjusted EBITDA is useful because it allows them to more effectively evaluate Viper’s operating performance and compare the results of its operations from period to period without regard to its financing methods or capital structure. Adjusted EBITDA should not be considered as an alternative to, or more meaningful than, net income, royalty income, cash flow from operating activities or any other measure of financial performance or liquidity presented as determined in accordance with GAAP. Certain items excluded from Adjusted EBITDA are significant components in understanding and assessing a company’s financial performance, such as a company’s cost of capital and tax structure, as well as the historic costs of depreciable assets, none of which are components of Adjusted EBITDA.

    Viper defines cash available for distribution to the Company’s shareholders generally as an amount equal to its Adjusted EBITDA for the applicable quarter less cash needed for income taxes payable for the current period, debt service, contractual obligations, fixed charges and reserves for future operating or capital needs that the Board may deem appropriate, lease bonus income, net of tax, distribution equivalent rights payments, preferred dividends, and an adjustment for changes in ownership interests that occurred subsequent to the quarter, if any. Management believes cash available for distribution is useful because it allows them to more effectively evaluate Viper’s operating performance excluding the impact of non-cash financial items and short-term changes in working capital. Viper’s computations of Adjusted EBITDA and cash available for distribution may not be comparable to other similarly titled measures of other companies or to such measure in its credit facility or any of its other contracts. Viper further defines cash available for variable dividends as at least 75 percent of cash available for distribution less base dividends declared and repurchased shares as part of its share buyback program for the applicable quarter.

    The following tables present a reconciliation of the GAAP financial measure of net income (loss) to the non-GAAP financial measures of Adjusted EBITDA, cash available for distribution and cash available for variable dividends:

    Viper Energy, Inc.
    (unaudited, in millions, except per share data)
       
      Three Months Ended
    March 31, 2025
    Net income (loss) attributable to Viper Energy, Inc. $ 75  
    Net income (loss) attributable to non-controlling interest   78  
    Net income (loss)   153  
    Interest expense, net   13  
    Non-cash share-based compensation expense   1  
    Depletion   67  
    Non-cash (gain) loss on derivative instruments   (23 )
    Provision for (benefit from) income taxes   21  
    Consolidated Adjusted EBITDA   232  
    Less: Adjusted EBITDA attributable to non-controlling interest   99  
    Adjusted EBITDA attributable to Viper Energy, Inc. $ 133  
       
    Adjustments to reconcile Adjusted EBITDA to cash available for distribution:  
    Income taxes payable for the current period $ (23 )
    Debt service, contractual obligations, fixed charges and reserves   (9 )
    Lease bonus income, net of tax   (1 )
    Cash available for distribution to Viper Energy, Inc. shareholders $ 100  
      Three Months Ended March 31, 2025
      Amounts   Amounts Per
    Common Share
    Reconciliation to cash available for variable dividends:      
    Cash available for distribution to Viper Energy, Inc. shareholders $ 100   $ 0.76
           
    Return of Capital $ 75   $ 0.57
    Less:      
    Base dividend   39     0.30
    Cash available for variable dividends $ 36   $ 0.27
           
    Total approved base and variable dividend per share     $ 0.57
           
    Class A common stock outstanding       131,323

    The following table presents a reconciliation of the GAAP financial measure of income (loss) before income taxes to the non-GAAP financial measure of pre-tax income attributable to the Company. Management believes this measure is useful to investors given it provides the basis for income taxes payable by Viper, which is an adjustment to reconcile Adjusted EBITDA to cash available for distribution to holders of the Company’s Class A common stock.

    Viper Energy, Inc.
    Pre-tax income attributable to Viper Energy, Inc.
    (unaudited, in millions)
       
      Three Months Ended
    March 31, 2025
     
    Income (loss) before income taxes $ 174  
    Less: Net income (loss) attributable to non-controlling interest   78  
    Pre-tax income attributable to Viper Energy, Inc. $ 96  
       
    Income taxes payable for the current period $ 23  
    Effective cash tax rate attributable to Viper Energy, Inc.   24.0 %

    Adjusted net income (loss) is a non-GAAP financial measure equal to net income (loss) attributable to the Company plus net income (loss) attributable to non-controlling interest adjusted for non-cash (gain) loss on derivative instruments, net, (gain) loss on extinguishment of debt, if any, other non-cash operating expenses, if any, other non-recurring expenses, if any, and related income tax adjustments. The Company’s computation of adjusted net income may not be comparable to other similarly titled measures of other companies or to such measure in our credit facility or any of our other contracts. Management believes adjusted net income helps investors in the oil and natural gas industry to measure and compare the Company’s performance to other oil and natural gas companies by excluding from the calculation items that can vary significantly from company to company depending upon accounting methods, the book value of assets and other non-operational factors.

    The following table presents a reconciliation of the GAAP financial measure of net income (loss) attributable to the Company to the non-GAAP financial measure of adjusted net income (loss):

    Viper Energy, Inc.
    Adjusted Net Income (Loss)
    (unaudited, in millions, except per share data)
       
      Three Months Ended March 31, 2025
      Amounts   Amounts Per
    Diluted Share
    Net income (loss) attributable to Viper Energy, Inc. (1) $ 75     $ 0.62  
    Net income (loss) attributable to non-controlling interest   78       0.64  
    Net income (loss)(1)   153       1.26  
    Non-cash (gain) loss on derivative instruments, net   (23 )     (0.19 )
    Adjusted income excluding above items(1)   130       1.07  
    Income tax adjustment for above items   3       0.03  
    Adjusted net income (loss)(1)   133       1.10  
    Less: Adjusted net income (loss) attributed to non-controlling interests   68       0.56  
    Adjusted net income (loss) attributable to Viper Energy, Inc. (1) $ 65     $ 0.54  
           
    Weighted average Class A common shares outstanding:      
    Basic   120,926  
    Diluted   121,030  

    (1) The Company’s earnings (loss) per diluted share amount has been computed using the two-class method in accordance with GAAP. The two-class method is an earnings allocation which reflects the respective ownership among holders of Class A common shares and participating securities. Diluted earnings per share using the two-class method is calculated as (i) net income attributable to the Company, (ii) less any reallocation of earnings attributable to participating securities, and (iii) divided by diluted weighted average Class A common shares outstanding.


    RECONCILIATION OF LONG-TERM DEBT TO NET DEBT

    The Company defines the non-GAAP measure of net debt as debt (excluding debt issuance costs, discounts and premiums) less cash and cash equivalents. Net debt should not be considered an alternative to, or more meaningful than, total debt, the most directly comparable GAAP measure. Management uses net debt to determine the Company’s outstanding debt obligations that would not be readily satisfied by its cash and cash equivalents on hand. The Company believes this metric is useful to analysts and investors in determining the Company’s leverage position because the Company has the ability to, and may decide to, use a portion of its cash and cash equivalents to reduce debt.

      March 31, 2025   Net Q1
    Principal
    Borrowings/
    (Repayments)    		   December 31, 2024   September 30, 2024   June 30, 2024   March 31, 2024
      (in millions)
    Total long-term debt(1) $ 830     $ (261 )   $ 1,091     $ 831     $ 1,007     $ 1,103  
    Cash and cash equivalents   (560 )         (27 )     (169 )     (35 )     (20 )
    Net debt $ 270         $ 1,064     $ 662     $ 972     $ 1,083  

    (1) Excludes debt issuance costs, discounts & premiums.


    Derivatives

    As of the filing date, the Company had the following outstanding derivative contracts. The Company’s derivative contracts are based upon reported settlement prices on commodity exchanges, with crude oil derivative settlements based on New York Mercantile Exchange West Texas Intermediate pricing and Crude Oil Brent. When aggregating multiple contracts, the weighted average contract price is disclosed.

      Crude Oil (Bbls/day, $/Bbl)
      Q2 2025   Q3 2025   Q4 2025   FY 2026   FY 2027
    Deferred Premium Puts – WTI (Cushing)   20,000       18,000       —     —     —
    Strike $ 55.00     $ 55.00     $ —   $ —   $ —
    Premium $ (1.61 )   $ (1.60 )   $ —   $ —   $ —
      Natural Gas (Mmbtu/day, $/Mmbtu)
      Q2 2025   Q3 2025   Q4 2025   FY 2026   FY 2027
    Costless Collars – Henry Hub   60,000     60,000     60,000     60,000     —
    Floor $ 2.50   $ 2.50   $ 2.50   $ 2.75   $ —
    Ceiling $ 4.93   $ 4.93   $ 4.93   $ 6.64   $ —
      Natural Gas (Mmbtu/day, $/Mmbtu)
      Q2 2025   Q3 2025   Q4 2025   FY 2026   FY 2027
    Natural Gas Basis Swaps – Waha Hub   60,000       60,000       60,000       60,000       40,000  
    Swap Price $ (0.80 )   $ (0.80 )   $ (0.80 )   $ (1.50 )   $ (1.40 )

    Investor Contact:

    Chip Seale
    +1 432.247.6218
    cseale@viperenergy.com

    Source: Viper Energy, Inc.; Diamondback Energy, Inc.

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Global: National security advisers manage decision-making as advocates or honest brokers

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Gregory F. Treverton, Professor of Practice in International Relations, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

    Mike Waltz speaks with reporters in the press room at the White House on Feb. 20, 2025. AP Photo/Alex Brandon

    The removal of Mike Waltz as President Donald Trump’s national security adviser – formally the assistant to the president for national security affairs – raises the question of just what that position entails and also what it means that Marco Rubio will now act as secretary of state and national security adviser.

    The National Security Act of 1947 created the National Security Council to advise the president on matters of national security. It’s also tasked with integrating domestic, foreign and military policies.

    But the national security adviser position is neither enshrined in law nor accountable to Congress.

    I’m an economist and international relations scholar who has worked with three national security advisers − Zbigniew Brzezinski, Samuel “Sandy” Berger and Susan Rice.

    I’ve seen the job up close. The core of the national security adviser’s role is managing the national security decision-making process, as decisions on issues from Ukraine to Gaza to nuclear proliferation are made. It’s a coordinating role.

    Honest broker

    National security advisers set the timing and flow of policy analysis and recommendations to the National Security Council committees − first, the principals committee, which brings together the Cabinet secretaries with national security responsibilities from the State Department, Department of Defense, the CIA and others.

    While the principals committee typically rarely meets and virtually never with the president in the chair, not so the deputies committee. That committee brings together the Nos. 2 and 3 in the same departments.

    In my most recent stint in Washington as chair of the National Intelligence Council in the Obama administration, the deputies committee met almost every day, sometimes more than once. Its formal role is to tee up issues for decision by the principals and the president.

    National security advisers have the advantage of proximity to the president, with an office footsteps from the Oval, as it is known in Washington lingo. They also manage a relatively lean staff.

    In my time on the National Security Council staff in the Carter administration, it was perhaps 150 all told, including the watch officers in the White House Situation Room. In the Biden administration it was on the order of 350 staff.

    For us National Security Council staffers, if we disagreed with our counterparts at the State Department or the Defense Department, we could let the principals decide. We knew that we could get to Brzezinski faster, for example, than they could get to their Cabinet secretaries.

    National security adviser Susan Rice walks with Fang Changlong, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, in Beijing, in September 2014.
    AP Photo/Wang Zhao

    In Washington, proximity is opportunity. And, not surprisingly, national security advisers since McGeorge Bundy in the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson administrations have become central figures in the foreign policy arena. The have had to manage the balance between seeking to influence the president and remaining an honest broker.

    As Berger put it, “You have to be perceived by your colleagues as an honest representative of their viewpoint, or the system breaks down.”

    Managing the tension

    National security advisers have managed the tension in their roles in different ways. And two models of those roles have emerged.

    Henry Kissinger, who served Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, was a powerful strategist driving presidential policy, often bypassing traditional channels. He, like Secretary of State Marco Rubio will do, served a dual role from 1973 to 1975 as national security adviser and secretary of state. Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser who served George W. Bush, also later became secretary of state.

    Brent Scowcroft, who served both Ford and President George H. W. Bush, is the exemplar of the other model − an “honest broker” ensuring a fair, collegial policy process. He was the consummate insider: low-key, meticulous about process and influencing through quiet proximity. The Bush administration he served was also, as described by a friend, as collegial as the men’s locker room of an upscale country club. Still, while I never had the chance to work with him, he is my standard for the role of national security adviser.

    Waltz served too briefly to evaluate his record. It’s ironic that what seems to have done him in was the Signalgate scandal, in which Waltz added a journalist to a Signal group chat in which government officials discussed details about a planned U.S. military strike in Yemen.

    That was an example of Waltz’s coordinating role, bringing most of the relevant policy officials together to discuss an important issue. The purpose was right, but the means was extremely unwise.

    Henry Kissinger shakes hands with Chinese Premier Chou En-lai in Peking, China, in July 1971.
    AP Photo/White House

    Learning from the past

    Historically, the worst crisis of the National Security Council system ensued when it sought to conduct operations, not just organize them. That was the case in the Iran-Contra affair of the Reagan administration.

    Robert McFarlane took over as national security adviser in October 1983. A former Marine officer and deputy national security adviser, he was conscientious to a fault: In one meeting while he was consulting during the transition from President George H. W. Bush to President Bill Clinton, we asked him about work hours. He replied: “They’re not bad. I’m out of here by eight most nights, earlier on Sunday.”

    He was done in by Iran-Contra, a clandestine effort run by the National Security Council to trade arms to Iran − then under a U.S. arms embargo − in hopes of freeing American hostages, with proceeds diverted to fund the Nicaraguan Contras, despite a congressional ban on funding them. He pleaded guilty in 1988 to withholding information from Congress.

    It’s a telling lesson for Rubio and other Waltz successors as the national security adviser of the dangers of moving from honest broker and quiet advocate to operator − especially if the operation is contrary to public U.S. policy and perhaps against the law.

    This story is part of a series of profiles of Cabinet and high-level administration positions.

    Gregory F. Treverton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. National security advisers manage decision-making as advocates or honest brokers – https://theconversation.com/national-security-advisers-manage-decision-making-as-advocates-or-honest-brokers-255760

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – European main battle tank – E-001662/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001662/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Hilde Vautmans (Renew)

    The war in Ukraine has reasserted the importance of main battle tanks (MBTs) in modern warfare, highlighting the need for the European Union to develop a more unified and capable defence industry. With the variety of MBT models currently in use across Europe, military interoperability remains a challenge. Several European initiatives, such as the Main ARmoured Tank of Europe (MARTE) and Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) programmes, aim to create a common European MBT, but significant technological, political and industrial challenges remain.

    What actions is the Commission taking to overcome the industrial challenges of coordinating the efforts of various EU Member States and defence contractors, ensuring that competing national interests do not hinder the development of a common European main battle tank?

    Submitted: 24.4.2025

    Last updated: 5 May 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Submission of REPowerEU roadmap – E-001655/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001655/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Paulius Saudargas (PPE), Liudas Mažylis (PPE), Matej Tonin (PPE)

    In May 2022, in response to the disruption of global energy markets caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Commission proposed the REPowerEU Plan to phase out Russian fossil fuel imports by 2027.

    Three years on, the EU has successfully achieved many of the ambitious targets set out in the REPowerEU Plan and is now on the right path to completely eliminate Russian fossil fuels.

    The Commission has committed to submitting a roadmap towards ending Russian energy imports and ensuring the full implementation of the REPowerEU Plan, which will lay out the proposed measures to entirely phase out all supplies of Russian fossil fuel. According to the Commission’s work programme for this year, the roadmap towards ending Russian energy imports was meant to be submitted for Q1 2025.

    To ensure Europe’s energy security and sovereignty, the EU must fully end its remaining energy imports from Russia. However, the delay in submitting the REPowerEU roadmap, which will lay out the concrete measures to achieve this fundamental goal, raises concerns. We call on the Commission to maintain its determination and deliver the roadmap as soon as possible.

    Given this, we would like to ask:

    When does the Commission plan to submit the REPowerEU Roadmap?

    Submitted: 24.4.2025

    Last updated: 5 May 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Czech President and V. Zelensky discussed the situation in Ukraine and cooperation

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Xinhua | 05. 05. 2025

    Keywords: president of the czech republic, discussed, ukraine, cooperation, situation, prospects for peace talks, achieving lasting peace, possibilities for post-war reconstruction, aspirations of ukraine, within ukraine, development of the situation, country, parties, supports, pavel, fighters

    PRAGUE, May 5 (Xinhua) — Czech President Petr Pavel and visiting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky discussed the developments in Ukraine, prospects for peace talks and post-war reconstruction opportunities on Sunday.

    Speaking after the meeting, P. Pavel said that his country supports Ukraine’s desire to achieve lasting peace.

    The parties also discussed the creation of a Ukrainian-Czech school for training F-16 fighter pilots outside of Ukraine. –0–

    Source: Xinhua

    The Czech President and V. Zelensky discussed the situation in Ukraine and cooperation The Czech President and V. Zelensky discussed the situation in Ukraine and cooperation

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-Evening Report: After its landslide win, Labor should have courage and confidence on security – and our alliance with the US

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Joanne Wallis, Professor of International Security, University of Adelaide

    The re-election of the Albanese Labor government by such a wide margin should not mean “business as usual” for Australia’s security policy.

    The global uncertainty instigated by US President Donald Trump means Australia’s security landscape is very different today from when Labor was first elected in 2022, or even when its Defence Strategic Review was released in 2023.

    As we argue in our recent book, the Albanese government faces increasingly difficult questions.

    How can we maintain our crucial security alliance with the US while deepening partnerships with other countries that have reservations about US policy?

    And, given Trump’s recent actions, how much can we continue to rely on the United States and what are the potential costs of the alliance?

    With a massive parliamentary majority, the new government has an opportunity for bold thinking on national security. This is not the time for Australia to keep its head down – we need to face the rapidly changing world with our heads held high.



    Read more:
    Blaming Donald Trump for conservative losses in both Canada and Australia is being too kind to Peter Dutton

    Trump 2.0 is not the same as 1.0

    We do not advocate Australia step away from the US alliance. We are also realistic that decades of defence procurement mean Australia is heavily reliant on US defence materiel (and its subsequent sustainment) for our security.

    The deep interoperability between the Australian Defence Force and the US military is something alliance sceptics too readily gloss over: much Australian military capability cannot function without ongoing American support.

    At the same time, many alliance advocates underestimate the impact of the new challenges we face. Some assumed a continuity between the first and second Trump administrations. However, we are not convinced the lessons learned from Trump 1.0 are still valid.

    A key difference between Trump 1.0 and 2.0 is the effect of his move away from respecting international law.

    For example, the US has voted with Russia against UN Security Council resolutions condemning the Ukraine war, withdrawn from the Paris Climate Agreement and World Health Organization, and damaged relations with NATO allies, among many other actions.

    As a middle power, Australia has long relied on the “rules-based order” to advance its foreign and strategic policy interests.

    Even if “normal transmission” resumes under a new US president in 2029, we are concerned the Trump administration’s structural changes to the international order will not easily be wound back. American soft power has been decimated by cuts to the US State Department, USAID and international broadcasting services. This will also not be rebuilt quickly.

    A second difference is there are few “adults left in the room” in the Trump administration.

    The advisers who kept Trump in check during his first administration have been replaced by loyalists less likely to push back against his ideas and impulses. This includes his long-held grievance that allies have been exploiting the US.

    The Albanese government needs to think more deeply about how to hedge against dependence on the US. This means investing in relations with other partners, especially in Asia and the Pacific, and working with them to promote the laws, rules and norms that maintain stability and predictability in global affairs.

    An idealistic vision for the future

    We are also concerned that many in the national security community base their policy recommendations on the assumption that war between the US and China is inevitable, and such a conflict could draw in Australia as America’s ally.

    Rather, the Trump administration’s preference for “deals” opens the possibility the US and China might come to an arrangement that will affect US presence and leadership in our region.

    Australia may not be prepared for this. The new government must engage in more open discussion about how we would maintain our security if the US does pull back from the region or makes decisions Australians don’t support.

    As a start, we need to consider how Australia can better pursue self-reliance within the alliance structure. We need a range of strategic options in the future that don’t rely on an outdated image of the US as a reliable partner.

    This debate should be guided by what we call “pragmatic idealism”.

    Rather than accepting the way things are, the government and members of the national security community need to re-imagine how things can be.

    We argue the Albanese government should draw confidence from its thumping electoral win to articulate a politics of hope, opportunity and possibility for our future security. This needs to drown out the cynicism, passive acceptance and learned helplessness that often characterises Australian national security debates.

    We are conscious that being “idealistic” is often dismissed as impractical, naïve “wishful thinking”. But the new government needs to demonstrate to Australians it has the courage to face the diverse, interlinked and complex security challenges we face – potentially on our own. These extend to issues such as cyber attacks, transnational crime and climate change.

    Practical steps

    As a first step, the Albanese government urgently needs to commission an integrated National Security Strategy that considers all the tools of statecraft Australia can use to respond to these challenges.

    This means engaging more with partners in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. In particular, Australia should consider investing more heavily in information programs and public diplomacy as the US withdraws from this arena.

    The government must also engage better with the public and be more transparent about its security options and decisions.

    On AUKUS, for instance, the government must build its “social licence” from the public to sustain such a massive deal across generations. Australians need to be better informed about – and consulted on – the decisions they will ultimately pay for.

    This also includes being upfront with Australians about the need for greater defence spending in a tumultuous world.

    It is understandably tempting for the new Albanese government to continue a “small target” approach when it comes to the US. This has meant minimising domestic debate about the alliance that could undermine support for AUKUS and avoid risking the ire of a thin-skinned Trump.

    But the government needs the courage to ask difficult questions and imagine different futures.

    Joanne Wallis receives funding from the Australian Research Council, the Australian Department of Defence, and the government of South Australia. She is a Senior Nonresident Fellow of the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C.

    Rebecca Strating receives funding from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

    – ref. After its landslide win, Labor should have courage and confidence on security – and our alliance with the US – https://theconversation.com/after-its-landslide-win-labor-should-have-courage-and-confidence-on-security-and-our-alliance-with-the-us-255598

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Australia can no longer take a ‘business as usual’ approach to the US. On security, it’s time for courage and confidence

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Joanne Wallis, Professor of International Security, University of Adelaide

    The re-election of the Albanese Labor government by such a wide margin should not mean “business as usual” for Australia’s security policy.

    The global uncertainty instigated by US President Donald Trump means Australia’s security landscape is very different today from when Labor was first elected in 2022, or even when its Defence Strategic Review was released in 2023.

    As we argue in our recent book, the Albanese government faces increasingly difficult questions.

    How can we maintain our critical security alliance with the US while deepening partnerships with other countries that have reservations about US policy?

    And, given Trump’s recent actions, how much can we continue to rely on the United States and what are the potential costs of the alliance?

    With a massive parliamentary majority, the new government has an opportunity for bold thinking on national security. This is not the time for Australia to keep its head down – we need to face the rapidly changing world with our heads held high.



    Read more:
    Blaming Donald Trump for conservative losses in both Canada and Australia is being too kind to Peter Dutton

    Trump 2.0 is not the same as 1.0

    We do not advocate Australia step away from the US alliance. We are also realistic that decades of defence procurement mean Australia is heavily reliant on US defence materiel (and its subsequent sustainment) for our security.

    The deep interoperability between the Australian Defence Force and the US military is something alliance sceptics too readily gloss over: much Australian military capability cannot function without ongoing American support.

    At the same time, many alliance advocates underestimate the impact of the new challenges we face. Some assumed a continuity between the first and second Trump administrations. However, we are not convinced the lessons learned from Trump 1.0 are still valid.

    A key difference between Trump 1.0 and 2.0 is the effect of his move away from respecting international law.

    For example, the US has voted with Russia against UN Security Council resolutions condemning the Ukraine war, withdrawn from the Paris Climate Agreement and World Health Organization, and damaged relations with NATO allies, among many other actions.

    As a middle power, Australia has long relied on the “rules-based order” to advance its foreign and strategic policy interests.

    Even if “normal transmission” resumes under a new US president in 2029, we are concerned the Trump administration’s structural changes to the international order will not easily be wound back. American soft power has been decimated by cuts to the US State Department, USAID and international broadcasting services. This will also not be rebuilt quickly.

    A second difference is there are few “adults left in the room” in the Trump administration.

    The advisers who kept Trump in check during his first administration have been replaced by loyalists less likely to push back against his ideas and impulses. This includes his long-held grievance that allies have been exploiting the US.

    The Albanese government needs to think more deeply about how to hedge against dependence on the US. This means investing in relations with other partners, especially in Asia and the Pacific, and working with them to promote the laws, rules and norms that maintain stability and predictability in global affairs.

    An idealistic vision for the future

    We are also concerned that many in the national security community base their policy recommendations on the assumption that war between the US and China is inevitable, and such a conflict could draw in Australia as America’s ally.

    Rather, the Trump administration’s preference for “deals” opens the possibility the US and China might come to an arrangement that will affect US presence and leadership in our region.

    Australia may not be prepared for this. The new government must engage in more open discussion about how we would maintain our security if the US does pull back from the region or makes decisions Australians don’t support.

    As a start, we need to consider how Australia can better pursue self-reliance within the alliance structure. We need a range of strategic options in the future that don’t rely on an outdated image of the US as a reliable partner.

    This debate should be guided by what we call “pragmatic idealism”.

    Rather than accepting the way things are, the government and members of the national security community need to re-imagine how things can be.

    We argue the Albanese government should draw confidence from its thumping electoral win to articulate a politics of hope, opportunity and possibility for our future security. This needs to drown out the cynicism, passive acceptance and learned helplessness that often characterises Australian national security debates.

    We are conscious that being “idealistic” is often dismissed as impractical, naïve “wishful thinking”. But the new government needs to demonstrate to Australians it has the courage to face the diverse, interlinked and complex security challenges we face – potentially on our own. These extend to issues such as cyber attacks, transnational crime and climate change.

    Practical steps

    As a first step, the Albanese government urgently needs to commission an integrated National Security Strategy that considers all the tools of statecraft Australia can use to respond to these challenges.

    This means engaging more with partners in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. In particular, Australia should consider investing more heavily in information programs and public diplomacy as the US withdraws from this arena.

    The government must also engage better with the public and be more transparent about its security options and decisions.

    On AUKUS, for instance, the government must build its “social licence” from the public to sustain such a massive deal across generations. Australians need to be better informed about – and consulted on – the decisions they will ultimately pay for.

    This also includes being upfront with Australians about the need for greater defence spending in a tumultuous world.

    It is understandably tempting for the new Albanese government to continue a “small target” when it comes to the US. This has meant minimising domestic debate about the alliance that could undermine support for AUKUS and avoid risking the ire of a thin-skinned Trump.

    But the government needs the courage to ask difficult questions and imagine different futures.

    Joanne Wallis receives funding from the Australian Research Council, the Australian Department of Defence, and the government of South Australia. She is a Senior Nonresident Fellow of the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C.

    Rebecca Strating receives funding from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

    – ref. Australia can no longer take a ‘business as usual’ approach to the US. On security, it’s time for courage and confidence – https://theconversation.com/australia-can-no-longer-take-a-business-as-usual-approach-to-the-us-on-security-its-time-for-courage-and-confidence-255598

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI China: Xi Jinping: A visionary architect of world peace and development

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Chinese President Xi Jinping watches the military parade during the commemoration activities to mark the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War, in Beijing, capital of China, Sept. 3, 2015. (Xinhua/Lan Hongguang)

    In the stately Conference Building at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City, a 65-inch-tall resplendent bronze vessel gleams under soft light, its cloisonne enamel blazing in vibrant Chinese red.

    The “Zun of Peace,” presented by Chinese President Xi Jinping in September 2015 as a special gift for the United Nations’ 70th anniversary, is not merely a delicate artifact. It embodies the aspiration and conviction of the Chinese people to seek peace, development, cooperation and win-win outcomes, Xi said at its unveiling.

    A decade later, as the top Chinese leader travels to Moscow to celebrate the 80th anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War, his presence both carries the weight of history and reaffirms a vision of the future.

    Leading a nation always aspiring for peace and harmony in its long history and further strengthened by its battles against militarism, imperialism and fascism in its recent past, Xi commands a unique insight into the value of peace, and has steadfastly championed the building of a peaceful world, a cause of great urgency given the tensions and conflicts on the global landscape today.

    Chinese President Xi Jinping (R) attends a presentation ceremony on which the Chinese government gives the “Zun of Peace” to the United Nations as a gift in New York, the United States, Sept. 27, 2015. (Xinhua/Li Tao)

    ASPIRATION FOR PEACE

    Xi sees history as a mirror from which humanity should draw lessons to avoid repeating past calamities.

    This year marks the 80th anniversary of victory in what is commonly known in China as the World Anti-Fascist War or, more globally, as World War II. Almost every part of the world was involved, and more than 100 million were killed or wounded in what was described as the most destructive conflict in human history.

    The bravery and tremendous sacrifice of the Chinese people played a decisive role in defeating Fascist Japan and offered strategic support to the Allies on the European and Pacific battlefields.

    “History has told us to stay on high alert against war, which, like a demon and nightmare, would bring disaster and pain to the people,” Xi once said. “History has also told us to preserve peace with great care, as peace, like air and sunshine, is hardly noticed when people are benefiting from it, but none of us can live without it.”

    This historical observation features prominently in Xi’s unrelenting pursuit of peace. He has repeatedly reiterated China’s commitment to peaceful development, pledging that China will never seek hegemony, expansion or any sphere of influence, no matter how strong it may grow.

    During a 2014 visit to France, Xi reshaped Napoleon’s metaphor of China as a “sleeping lion” that would shake the world upon awakening. “Now China the lion has awakened. But it is a peaceful, amicable and civilized lion,” Xi said when illustrating the peaceful dimension of the Chinese Dream.

    Xi’s philosophy stems from the millennia-old Chinese culture. An avid reader of traditional Chinese classics, he once expounded how ancient Chinese wisdom views war and peace by quoting “The Art of War,” a Chinese classic written more than 2,000 years ago.

    The book’s key message “is that every effort should be made to prevent a war and great caution must be exercised when it comes to fighting a war,” Xi said when delivering a keynote speech in the UN Office at Geneva in 2017.

    Xi’s view on prudence in warfare is also reflected in his exchanges with foreign leaders and officials.

    “It has long been known that the real experts on military affairs do not want to employ military means to solve issues,” he quoted a Chinese aphorism when meeting with then U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis in Beijing in 2018.

    Chinese President Xi Jinping straightens the ribbon on a flower basket during a ceremony to present flower baskets to fallen heroes at Tian’anmen Square in Beijing, capital of China, Sept. 30, 2024. (Xinhua/Wang Ye)

    A clear manifestation of Xi’s reflection is to cherish history and honor heroes. “A nation of hope cannot be without heroes,” Xi once said. Every year since 2014, Xi has paid tribute to China’s fallen heroes on Martyrs’ Day, which falls on Sept. 30, a day ahead of the country’s National Day.

    In 2015, when China celebrated the 70th anniversary of its victory in World War II, Xi presented medals to Chinese veterans and representatives from Russia and other countries who assisted Chinese soldiers on the battlefields.

    Nikolai Chuikov, the grandson of Soviet General Marshal Vasily Chuikov, was among those who received a peace medal from Xi. “Of all the honors I have won, I hold the highest regard for the peace medal,” he said.

    Chinese President Xi Jinping (R, front) shakes hands with a Russian veteran in Moscow, Russia, on May 8, 2015. (Xinhua/Zhang Duo) 

    TORCH OF MULTILATERALISM

    Under Xi’s leadership, China has adhered to an independent foreign policy of peace, played an active role in UN peacekeeping missions, and solidified its friendships and partnerships with countries worldwide.

    As hegemonism and protectionism once again rear their ugly heads, the world is gripped by an increasingly intricate array of challenges and uncertainties. In Xi’s eyes, the only way out is to practice true multilateralism. He once compared multilateralism to a torch that can light up humanity’s way forward.

    The Chinese president has consistently urged the international community to safeguard the UN-centered international system forged in the aftermath of World War II and anchored by international law.

    “We must promote multilateralism, the core essence of which is that international affairs should be decided through consultation among all countries, rather than by one country or a few countries,” he said.

    This photo taken on Jan. 2, 2025 shows the 46th fleet of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy during a counter-terrorism and anti-piracy exercise.The fleet traveled over 160,000 nautical miles during its 339-day voyage, escorting ships during missions in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off Somalia. (Xinhua/Zhang Dayu)

    Xi, a staunch champion of true multilateralism, has guided China over the years in taking a proactive and constructive role in addressing regional and global hot-button issues.

    To end the Ukraine crisis at an early date, Xi has put forward a four-point proposal, emphasizing that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries should be respected; the purposes and principles of the UN Charter observed; the legitimate security concerns of all countries given due regard; and all efforts conducive to the peaceful settlement of the crisis supported.

    Under Xi’s leadership, China has conducted shuttle diplomacy and mediation efforts to promote peace talks and initiated the “Friends of Peace” group with Brazil and other Global South countries on the Ukraine crisis at the United Nations.

    Regarding the Middle East, the Chinese president has promoted peace and stability in the volatile region. With China’s mediation, Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed in March 2023 to restore diplomatic relations after a seven-year hiatus. In the lead-up to the negotiations, Xi talked separately with the leaders of both countries.

    During a phone call with Xi soon after the breakthrough was achieved, Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud applauded China’s increasingly important and constructive role in regional and international affairs.

    In face of the gathering gloom of conflict on the horizon, Xi has championed a transformative approach to collective security. In May 2014, he articulated a vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security for Asia. Eight years later, he presented the Global Security Initiative to the world.

    “We, as humanity, are living in an indivisible security community,” he said, advocating dialogue over confrontation, partnership over alliance, and win-win outcomes over zero-sum approaches.

    “GOLDEN KEY” OF DEVELOPMENT

    Lasting world peace remains one of humanity’s greatest aspirations. For Xi, peace and development are inseparable. He once observed that the tree of peace does not grow on barren land, and the fruit of development is not produced amid flames of war.

    In view of the interlocked relations, Xi insists that the “golden key” to a secure and stable future is to advance sustainable development.

    Since assuming China’s presidency, Xi has positioned development as a pillar of his vision of building a better future for humankind. The initiatives he has proposed in this regard, notably the Belt and Road Initiative and the Global Development Initiative, serve as bridges to foster common development through broader collaboration.

    China has provided development aid to over 160 countries, and Belt and Road cooperation has involved more than 150 countries. Under the Global Development Initiative, China has mobilized nearly 20 billion U.S. dollars of development funds and launched more than 1,100 projects, fueling growth and modernization drives in many countries, particularly developing ones.

    An aerial drone photo taken on March 4, 2024 shows trains running on the Lagos Rail Mass Transit Blue Line in Lagos, Nigeria. Undertaken by China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation in July 2010 and completed in Dec. 2022, the first phase of the Lagos Rail Mass Transit Blue Line corridor spans 13 km and covers five stations. (Xinhua/Han Xu)

    “China is sharing its development experience with other countries through its development initiatives, which have helped to promote common development,” said Straton Habyarimana, a Rwandan economic analyst.

    “Since these initiatives are people-centered, they address key challenges such as food insecurity and poverty” and have helped ease tensions among countries, he added.

    UPDATE OF WORLD ORDER

    Nestled by the Huangpu River in Shanghai, the New Development Bank was founded by five BRICS countries in 2014 to provide financing support for member countries to bolster transport infrastructure, clean energy and digital infrastructure.

    When Xi visited the bank a few days ago, he saw more than a mere financial institution. He described it as a “pioneering initiative for the unity and self-improvement of the Global South,” underscoring an enduring commitment to building a more just and equitable international order.

    This aerial photo taken on June 17, 2022 shows the headquarters building of the New Development Bank in east China’s Shanghai. (Xinhua/Fang Zhe)

    BRICS countries stand at the forefront of the Global South. Xi has personally pushed for the BRICS’ historic expansion in 2023 to create stronger unity among the Global South. The expansion, he said, would further strengthen the forces for world peace and development.

    Developing countries remain underrepresented in the global governance system, which the West has long dominated. China maintains that only when the rise of emerging markets and developing countries is reflected in the global governance system will global development be more balanced and global peace more firmly based.

    During the 2022 Group of 20 Summit in Bali, Indonesia, Xi vocally supported the African Union in joining the leading multilateral mechanism, making China the earliest and most vocal champion for amplifying Africa’s voice in global governance.

    Chinese President Xi Jinping walks to the venue of the 17th summit of the Group of 20 in Bali, Indonesia, Nov. 15, 2022. (Xinhua/Ju Peng)

    In recent years, Xi has proposed the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative and the Global Civilization Initiative as key global public goods to create a more just and equitable global governance system.

    Former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who received the “Zun of Peace” from the Chinese president on behalf of the United Nations 10 years ago, said China’s initiatives to promote global peace and development are inseparable from Xi’s foresight.

    “China is playing an increasingly important role on the world stage, and Xi has demonstrated proactive and crucial leadership,” Ban said. “He always believes that China can only do well when the world is doing well, and when China does well, the world will get even better.”

    In Xi’s own words, “every increase of China’s strength is an increase of the prospects of world peace.”

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Blaming Donald Trump for conservative losses in both Canada and Australia is being too kind to Peter Dutton

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By David Smith, Associate Professor in American Politics and Foreign Policy, US Studies Centre, University of Sydney

    Australia’s federal election, held less than a week after Canada’s, has produced a shockingly similar outcome. Commentators all over the world have pointed out the parallels.

    In both countries, centre-left governments looked like they were in serious trouble not long ago.

    On February 23, a Resolve Strategic poll found the Coalition leading Labor 55-45% on a two-party-preferred basis. An Angus Reid poll in December found voting intention for Canada’s Liberals dropping to just 16%, compared to 45% for the Conservatives.

    Yet, both governments are now celebrating historic victories. And in both countries, the conservative opposition leaders, Pierre Poilievre and Peter Dutton, lost their own seats.

    US President Donald Trump was undoubtedly a factor in both elections. Even Trump’s most ardent Australian fans admit the reversal of the Coalition’s fortunes in the polls seems to have been precipitated by Trump’s actions, particularly his chaotic tariff announcements and his White House humiliation of Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky.

    In Canada, Trump cheerfully presented himself as an existential threat to the country.

    But if anything, Labor’s landslide win in the Australian election on Saturday highlights just how poorly the Coalition fared under Dutton compared to Canada’s Conservatives. The Coalition bottomed out, while the Tories fared reasonably well in the face of difficult circumstances.

    A painful but respectable loss for Conservatives in Canada

    So, why the huge difference between the two parties? This is largely because of the differences between the Canadian and Australian electoral systems.

    Unlike Australia, Canada does not have preferential voting – a vote for one party is a vote against another. The Liberals’ rise in the polls came mostly at the expense of the left-wing New Democratic Party (NDP) rather than the Conservatives.

    Back in December, 21% of voters preferred the NDP, compared to 16% for Justin Trudeau’s deeply unpopular Liberals. But when Trudeau stepped down and Mark Carney became the party’s new leader, the threat posed by Trump unified centre-left Canadian voters behind the Liberals, who had the best chance of winning.

    This is the strategic voting that is necessary in winner-take-all systems. The NDP has never won the largest share of seats in a national election, and it never had a chance of winning this one.

    The NDP was left with seven seats in last week’s election and under 7% of the vote, losing their party status in parliament and their leader. This was the most significant “Trump effect” on the Canadian election.

    Canada’s Conservatives ended up with 41.3% of the vote. This was only a few points down from their December high of 45% in the Angus Reid poll. They also won the greatest share of the national vote by any centre-right party since 1988, and expanded their share of seats in the parliament.

    The Liberals, meanwhile, barely won the popular vote and fell three seats short of a majority.

    Poilievre was rightly criticised for failing to respond effectively to the challenge posed by Trump’s bullying, instead continuing to campaign as if the election were still a referendum on Trudeau.

    That may have cost him a victory that seemed certain months earlier, especially considering Carney made his campaign all about standing up to Trump.

    Yet, the Conservatives still performed well enough for Poilievre to retain his position as opposition leader despite losing his seat. Another Conservative sacrificed his own seat to let Poilievre back into parliament.

    Dutton’s mistakes were bigger

    It’s hard to imagine any member of Dutton’s party doing the same. Dutton handed Labor a staggeringly high two-party-preferred vote and (likely) the most seats it has ever had. Labor won 86 seats in 1987, while Anthony Albanese’s party will have at least 86, with the count continuing.

    Dutton’s campaign has been widely described as “shambolic”. But it wasn’t just the last five weeks that doomed the Coalition.

    From the moment he became leader, it was clear Dutton had little interest in winning back the former Liberal heartland seats that fell to Teal independents in 2022. Instead, he held out the promise the outer suburbs would become the new heartland.

    Following the patterns established by John Howard, Tony Abbott and Scott Morrison, he believed the loss of middle-class women, once the backbone of the Liberal vote, could be compensated by gains among working-class men.

    This was always a pipe dream, given the flimsiness of the culture war issues that have been Dutton’s preferred terrain. But it drove urban voters further away from the Liberal Party.

    The Liberals should have been alarmed that in state elections and byelections last year, they were making almost no gains in metropolitan seats, whether inner suburban or outer suburban.

    The Coalition should resist seeing Trump as a natural disaster over which they had no control. Dutton consciously positioned himself as part of the global populist right that Trump leads. Voters recognised this, even when Dutton half-heartedly tried to distance himself from Trump.

    Not all right-wing populists are the same. Poilievre and Dutton have their own brands of populism they have spent decades cultivating, as have other right-wing populists like Javier Milei in Argentina. But in the suffocating global environment created by Trump, there is limited room for brand differentiation. He is the unavoidable reference point of right-wing politics.

    Last November, many right-wing figures thought this would benefit them. One of them is now a spectacular political casualty.

    David Smith does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Blaming Donald Trump for conservative losses in both Canada and Australia is being too kind to Peter Dutton – https://theconversation.com/blaming-donald-trump-for-conservative-losses-in-both-canada-and-australia-is-being-too-kind-to-peter-dutton-255599

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Video: MAGA Minute, May 3, 2025

    Source: United States of America – The White House (video statements)

    JAM-PACKED MAGA WEEK!

    100 Days
    Mugshots on WH Lawn
    IBM, Walmart, Merck, Benz, Bel, & Pratt Invest
    Eagles
    Ukraine Mineral Deal
    EO: Roads + Cars
    Sanctuary Cities, NPR/PBS Cut
    VP Vance at Nucor
    WH Wire
    FLOTUS Melania Trump’s “Take It Down Act”

    Watch Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt’s MAGA Minute!

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rbdTP0LzkoY

    MIL OSI Video –

  • MIL-OSI Video: Ukraine: call for protection of civilians – OCHA briefing at the Security Council | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    For her part, senior OCHA official Joyce Msuya said that as the war continues, millions of lives are impacted daily, essential services are disrupted and humanitarian needs deepened.

    She highlighted, “Attacks on healthcare services and health facilities are crippling access to maternal care,” highlighting that pregnant women are now giving birth amid blackouts, medicine shortages and under attack, with a 12 per cent rise in birth complications reported by health workers.

    “For many expectant mothers, basic, life-saving care is simply no longer available,” Msuya said.

    The Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator emphasized once again, “Under international humanitarian law, civilians and civilian objects must be protected.”

    “This means that indiscriminate attacks are strictly prohibited. It also means that parties must take all feasible precautions to avoid civilian harm, whether they are launching attacks or defending against them,” Msuya stressed.

    The Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator also noted that underfunding is forcing critical programmes to scale down, even as the operational environment becomes more complex and dangerous.

    “Additional resources are needed now to save lives and sustain assistance,” she concluded.

    For his part, US Acting Alternate Representative John Kelley said, “Right now, Russia has a great opportunity to achieve adorable peace,” adding that “the burden for ending the war rests with Russia and with Ukraine.”

    He said, “It is up to the leaders of both these countries to decide whether peace is possible. If both sides are ready to end the war, the United States will fully support their path to a lasting peace.”

    The US Representative highlighted, “The benefits for Ukraine and Russia accepting the US proposal are immense. Their economies can begin to grow, their cities to rebuild, and their peoples to heal.”

    Conversely, Kelley said, “the risks that accompany more war are immeasurable. The harm would disproportionately fall on ordinary Ukrainians and Russian families, who overwhelmingly desire peace.”

    The US Representative urged both Ukraine and Russia to “accept peace, “we ask our fellow council members and all UN member states to support the path to peace,” he said.

    Russian Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia criticized that today’s meeting was “requested by a number of the most stubborn European sponsors of the Kyiv regime.”

    “This is a reflection of their fear of being sidelined in the context of the new US administration as it seeks to arrive at a long-term solution to the Ukrainian crisis. Hence the desire to thwart this process and to restore for Ukraine Zelensky’s image of a victim, which has been tarnished in recent months, in the light of the new facts that have surfaced,” the Russian Ambassador added.

    Ambassador Nebenzia also said that the Russian and US dialog is ongoing, “there will be discussions of a number of nuances for the future contours of the peace plan from the very start of the conflict,” he said.

    “We announced that we preferred diplomatic methods for the attainment of the goals of our special military operation. And this is why Russia remains focused on achieving a sustained, long-term solution that would eradicate the root causes of the conflict and to prevent that from occurring,” the Russian Ambassador emphasized.

    For her part, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Betsa Mariana reiterated, “Russia cannot be allowed to cherry pick the political convenient dates to announce a short lived ceasefire simply for PR purposes, or gain additional tactical advantages.”

    She said, “Ukraine is ready to support a just, comprehensive and lasting peace. And this is what we are constantly proposing for at least 30 days. And we reconfirm this proposal.”

    Foreign Minister Mariana stressed her country’s position on peace negotiations is “clear and consistent.”

    She said, “Ukraine wants peace like no one else. However, we cannot accept peace at any cost. We cannot accept peace at any price. Any future arrangement has to respect Ukraine’s redlines.”

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAD_Xa4R130

    MIL OSI Video –

  • MIL-OSI USA: President Trump Highlights Victories for Americans, Sets Path For Next 100 Days

    US Senate News:

    Source: The White House
    President Donald J. Trump, in an exclusive interview on Meet the Press, outlined the historic successes of his first 100 days — and charted the course for many more victories to come. President Trump sent a clear message: he will not relent in his mandate to secure our borders, rid our country of dangerous criminals, lower prices, end the globalist trade policies that have ripped off American workers and businesses for decades, and Make America Great Again.
    Here are the top moments you missed:
    On prices: “Prices are down on groceries. Prices are down for oil. Prices are down for all energy. Prices are down at tremendous numbers for gasoline.”
    On securing the border: “It’s really secure. When you say that, doesn’t it just sound good after being abused for years by an incompetent President?”
    On protecting Medicaid, Medicare, and Social Security: “We’re not cutting Medicaid, we’re not cutting Medicare, and we’re not cutting Social Security.”
    On deporting violent criminal illegal immigrants: “We have thousands of people … some of the worst, most dangerous on earth — and I was elected to get them the hell out of here, and the courts are holding me from doing it.”
    On tariffs: “Remember — there are no tariffs if you build your product here. It’s very easy. It’s very simple.”
    On the auto industry: “What about the car business? They’re going to make a fortune because of the tariffs. The head of the union, who was no fan of mine … He’s saying, ‘Wow, what Trump’s done for the automobile, I can’t believe it … We’ve been waiting 40 years for somebody to do what Trump is doing.’”
    On Iran: “I want Iran to be really successful, really great, really fantastic. The only thing they can’t have is a nuclear weapon … The Iranian people are incredible, I just don’t want them to have a nuclear weapon because the world will be destroyed.”
    On DOGE: “They found $160 billion worth of fraud, waste, and abuse. I think he’s done an amazing job. I think his people have done an incredible job … We’re not finished yet … He’s leaving behind some very brilliant people.”
    On the border emergency: “The big emergency right now is that we have thousands of people that we want to take out — and we have some judges that want everybody to go to court … We have millions of people. We’re going to have millions of court cases?”
    On trade: “We’re making a lot of money. We’re doing great. Again, we were losing more than $5 billion a day … We’re going to be at a point soon where we’re making money every day.”
    On peace in Ukraine: “I do believe we’re closer with one party and maybe not as close with the other … We’re talking tremendous hatred between these two men.”
    On China tariffs: “At some point I’m going to lower them because otherwise you could never do business with them — and they want to do business very much. Their economy is really doing badly. Their economy is collapsing.”

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: ICYMI: Pelosi at Reframe Festival on the Future of Democratic Leadership

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi Representing the 12th District of California

    Boston – Yesterday, Speaker Emerita Nancy Pelosi virtually joined PBS News Hour co-anchor and co-managing editor Geoff Bennett at the Reframe Festival in San Francisco to discuss the future of Democratic leadership. The conversation was presented by PBS News in partnership with Bay Area member station KQED.

    Click here to watch the full conversation.

    Read key quotes from the conversation below:

    On President Trump’s proposed Budget:

    Speaker Emerita Pelosi. The budget that the President put out that we just are reviewing now is one that is really a shame.

    A budget should be a statement of our national values. What is important to us as a nation should be reflected in that budget. It should be a budget of investing in our future for our children and the rest. And if you review the budget that the President put forth, he cuts education. Nothing brings more money to the Treasury than the education of the American people. Early childhood, K-12, higher education, post-grad, lifetime learning for our workers.

    The best dollar you can spend in the federal budget, I do believe, is basic biomedical research. The biblical power to cure, to save lives, to save funds for families who are confronted with illness and the rest. The list goes on and on. And why? Because he says he has to cut so that he can be fiscally sound—at the same time as he’s giving enormous tax cuts to the wealthiest people in our country.

    On Democrats choosing when to fight back:

    Speaker Emerita Pelosi. You have to prioritize carefully and make the distinction so the American people can see what impact this has on their lives—carefully prioritizing and at the same time show the narrative, again, with some specific issues, show the narrative thematically of what he is doing to our country. Again: disgraceful, shameful, un-American.

    So again, we always have this debate: whether we go for opportunity, security, all of those things or specific pieces of legislation—we do both.

    On Leader Hakeem Jeffries:

    Speaker Emerita Pelosi. Our Leader, Hakeem Jeffries, is a master of this: repetition. Prioritize and repeat. Repetition, repetition, repetition. He’s so eloquent, and he’s so forceful in getting the message across.

    And we know what is going to make things different too—by using different platforms. When I was Leader, we won in ’06, we won in ’18. But now we have different platforms—taking messages to platforms where people receive their information much more instantaneously. And he understands all of that. I’m so proud of his leadership.

    He has the unity of our Caucus, the brilliance, and the strategic thinking of a leader. And again, values that would be reflected in a budget put forth by the Democrats and Leader Jeffries.

    On a new generation of Democratic leadership:

    Speaker Emerita Pelosi. Well, I’m an advocate for it. I was very, very proud to step aside. I wish that we had been in the majority—we will be in about eighteen months. And the point is, when I became the Leader after Dick Gephardt, he very graciously—when I became Leader, he did not interfere. And I don’t interfere. It’s about a new generation of leadership, thinking differently, employing the different tools of communication that exist now, and again, having the unity of the Caucus to support what you’re doing—not only as Leader but the legislation that you would put forth.

    But we have to make sure the public knows what is in their interest—their kitchen table interest—the cost of health care and prescription drugs, the cost of education, the cost of housing, all of it.

    And compare where the Democrats are and where the Republicans are on all of it. And as I say, not only Hakeem, but the rest of the Leadership—Katherine Clark, Massachusetts, her state; Pete Aguilar from California; Ted Lieu from California—so many, all champions on messaging and champions for working families.

    On a Republican cuts to the American safety net:

    Speaker Emerita Pelosi. As far as Medicare, Social Security—they paid into this. It’s not an entitlement. This is their money. They paid into this for their whole working careers. And now they’re going to say, we’re going to cut this out because we need to save money so we can give tax cuts to the richest people in America?

    No. No, we’re not doing that.

    On repairing the damage President Trump is doing:

    Speaker Emerita Pelosi. This is what we did in ’18. The President said, he said in the very distinguished way as he’s used to speaking, ‘Obamacare sucks.’

    I hate to even quote him, but I hope my grandchildren aren’t listening. Obamacare doesn’t suck. It cures. It cures.

    We went out there. We had 10,000 events around the country of people telling their stories. They didn’t talk about politics or provisions of the bill. They talked about their stories:

    ‘My baby was born with a heart condition.’

    ‘My wife had breast cancer.’

    ‘My mother — this or that.’

    They told their stories and how that bill made a difference in their lives. Not only did we win the election, we won it with 40 seats—31 of them in Trump districts. People said to me afterward, ‘Aren’t you lucky that the Affordable Care Act—that health care—became such a central issue of the campaign?’

    I said, ‘No, we weren’t lucky. We made our own luck.’

    And that’s what we will do between now and the election.

    We will win the House. Hakeem will be the Speaker. He’ll be historic in his leadership—as well as the other members of the Leadership—and all of it because of the courage of our Members to take the tough votes to get the job done.

    On a potential peace deal in Ukraine:

    Speaker Emerita Pelosi. I have no idea what it is that Putin has on Trump—politically, personally, financially, whatever it happens to be—that he should be kowtowing to Putin over and over again, saying that the Ukrainians started the war.

    But forget about that. [Russia] came into this country. They raped the women. They did that in front of their children, in front of their parents.

    They kidnapped the children—tens of thousands of them—sent them to Russia, far reaches of Russia. They murdered people in front of their family members. And they’re supposed to get land for that? That’s not where I am.

    But I’m not the President of Ukraine. I respect whatever decision he makes. But for us to say Russia should get land in order to leave—after they’ve committed crimes against humanity? Crimes against humanity.

    I don’t think Putin can go anyplace without getting arrested for his crimes against humanity—at least Europe recognizes that. Others recognize that—even if Donald Trump thinks that’s okay.

    On her proudest accomplishment and legacy:

    Speaker Emerita Pelosi. Of course, the Affordable Care Act. Because this was directly, directly beneficial to America’s working families.

    And it’s about the national health care financial stability as well. But with all legislation, you want to do more. You don’t do more in terms of lowering the cost of prescription drugs.

    We did that in the IRA, but we can’t do it totally. We have to do it in stages, and I would like to do it all at once. But we have to get it passed in the Congress.

    What was the hardest thing? Well, I always knew we had the votes.

    # # #

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: SCHNEIDER STATEMENT ON NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Brad Schneider (D-IL)

    WASHINGTON – Rep. Brad Schneider, a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, issued the following statement in response to President Trump’s announcement that Secretary of State Marco Rubio will serve as interim National Security Advisor, in addition to his existing duties:

    “Americans depend on our Commander in Chief to ensure that our national security – and the safety of our troops and citizens around the world – is a top priority. It is astounding that the President appears to not take our national security seriously by diminishing the roles of the National Security Advisor and the Secretary of State into part-time positions. 

    “The President was right to fire Mike Waltz as National Security Advisor, but adding his responsibilities to Marco Rubio’s already heavy load as Secretary of State demonstrates a blatant disregard for the scale and seriousness of the global crises we face. There is a war in Ukraine, a genocide in Darfur, and a brewing conflict in Kashmir. American Edan Alexander is one of 59 hostages still held by Hamas, a year and a half after Hamas terrorists brutally attacked Israel on October 7, 2023. 

    “The job of the National Security Advisor is more than a full-time job. The same is true for the Secretary of State. No serious leader would believe one person can manage both – let alone amid multiple international emergencies. 

    “I wish we had a President that took his role as Commander in Chief seriously and chose people for their expertise rather than blind loyalty.”

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: PM call with Prime Minister Albanese of Australia: 4 May 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    Press release

    PM call with Prime Minister Albanese of Australia: 4 May 2025

    The Prime Minister spoke to the Prime Minister of Australia, Anthony Albanese.

    The Prime Minister spoke to the Prime Minister of Australia, Anthony Albanese, this morning.

    The Prime Minister began by congratulating the Australian leader on his historic election win yesterday.

    Australia and the UK has a strong and enduring friendship, and the Prime Minister said he looked forward to working with Prime Minister Albanese in the years to come, including through increased trade and economic security for working people in both countries.

    Discussing defence and security, including our shared support for Ukraine, the leaders also agreed to increase ambition on our joint submarine programme, AUKUS. The Prime Minister said he would ask his AUKUS Adviser, Sir Stephen Lovegrove, to travel to Australia in the coming weeks to discuss the programme further.

    The leaders agreed to stay in close touch.

    Updates to this page

    Published 4 May 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Blaming Donald Trump for conservative losses in both Canada and Australia is being too kind to Peter Dutton

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By David Smith, Associate Professor in American Politics and Foreign Policy, US Studies Centre, University of Sydney

    Australia’s federal election, held less than a week after Canada’s, has produced a shockingly similar outcome. Commentators all over the world have pointed out the parallels.

    In both countries, centre-left governments looked like they were in serious trouble not long ago.

    On February 23, a Resolve Strategic poll found the Coalition leading Labor 55-45% on a two-party-preferred basis. An Angus Reid poll in December found voting intention for Canada’s Liberals dropping to just 16%, compared to 45% for the Conservatives.

    Yet, both governments are now celebrating historic victories. And in both countries, the conservative opposition leaders, Pierre Poilievre and Peter Dutton, lost their own seats.

    US President Donald Trump was undoubtedly a factor in both elections. Even Trump’s most ardent Australian fans admit the reversal of the Coalition’s fortunes in the polls seems to have been precipitated by Trump’s actions, particularly his chaotic tariff announcements and his White House humiliation of Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky.

    In Canada, Trump cheerfully presented himself as an existential threat to the country.

    But if anything, Labor’s landslide win in the Australian election on Saturday highlights just how poorly the Coalition fared under Dutton compared to Canada’s Conservatives. The Coalition bottomed out, while the Tories fared reasonably well in the face of difficult circumstances.

    A painful but respectable loss for Conservatives in Canada

    So, why the huge difference between the two parties? This is largely because of the differences between the Canadian and Australian electoral systems.

    Unlike Australia, Canada does not have preferential voting – a vote for one party is a vote against another. The Liberals’ rise in the polls came mostly at the expense of the left-wing New Democratic Party (NDP) rather than the Conservatives.

    Back in December, 21% of voters preferred the NDP, compared to 16% for Justin Trudeau’s deeply unpopular Liberals. But when Trudeau stepped down and Mark Carney became the party’s new leader, the threat posed by Trump unified centre-left Canadian voters behind the Liberals, who had the best chance of winning.

    This is the strategic voting that is necessary in winner-take-all systems. The NDP has never won the largest share of seats in a national election, and it never had a chance of winning this one.

    The NDP was left with seven seats in last week’s election and under 7% of the vote, losing their party status in parliament and their leader. This was the most significant “Trump effect” on the Canadian election.

    Canada’s Conservatives ended up with 41.3% of the vote. This was only a few points down from their December high of 45% in the Angus Reid poll. They also won the greatest share of the national vote by any centre-right party since 1988, and expanded their share of seats in the parliament.

    The Liberals, meanwhile, barely won the popular vote and fell three seats short of a majority.

    Poilievre was rightly criticised for failing to respond effectively to the challenge posed by Trump’s bullying, instead continuing to campaign as if the election were still a referendum on Trudeau.

    That may have cost him a victory that seemed certain months earlier, especially considering Carney made his campaign all about standing up to Trump.

    Yet, the Conservatives still performed well enough for Poilievre to retain his position as opposition leader despite losing his seat. Another Conservative sacrificed his own seat to let Poilievre back into parliament.

    Dutton’s mistakes were bigger

    It’s hard to imagine any member of Dutton’s party doing the same. Dutton handed Labor a staggeringly high two-party-preferred vote and (likely) the most seats it has ever had. Labor won 86 seats in 1987, while Anthony Albanese’s party will have at least 86, with the count continuing.

    Dutton’s campaign has been widely described as “shambolic”. But it wasn’t just the last five weeks that doomed the Coalition.

    From the moment he became leader, it was clear Dutton had little interest in winning back the former Liberal heartland seats that fell to Teal independents in 2022. Instead, he held out the promise the outer suburbs would become the new heartland.

    Following the patterns established by John Howard, Tony Abbott and Scott Morrison, he believed the loss of middle-class women, once the backbone of the Liberal vote, could be compensated by gains among working-class men.

    This was always a pipe dream, given the flimsiness of the culture war issues that have been Dutton’s preferred terrain. But it drove urban voters further away from the Liberal Party.

    The Liberals should have been alarmed that in state elections and byelections last year, they were making almost no gains in metropolitan seats, whether inner suburban or outer suburban.

    The Coalition should resist seeing Trump as a natural disaster over which they had no control. Dutton consciously positioned himself as part of the global populist right that Trump leads. Voters recognised this, even when Dutton half-heartedly tried to distance himself from Trump.

    Not all right-wing populists are the same. Poilievre and Dutton have their own brands of populism they have spent decades cultivating, as have other right-wing populists like Javier Milei in Argentina. But in the suffocating global environment created by Trump, there is limited room for brand differentiation. He is the unavoidable reference point of right-wing politics.

    Last November, many right-wing figures thought this would benefit them. One of them is now a spectacular political casualty.

    David Smith does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Blaming Donald Trump for conservative losses in both Canada and Australia is being too kind to Peter Dutton – https://theconversation.com/blaming-donald-trump-for-conservative-losses-in-both-canada-and-australia-is-being-too-kind-to-peter-dutton-255599

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-Evening Report: ER Report: A Roundup of Significant Articles on EveningReport.nz for May 3, 2025

    ER Report: Here is a summary of significant articles published on EveningReport.nz on May 3, 2025.

    ‘Super antibodies’ for snake toxins: how a dangerous DIY experiment helped scientists make a new antivenom
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Christina N. Zdenek, Associate Researcher, The University of Queensland Scientists in the United States have created a new snake antivenom using the blood of a man who deliberately built up immunity to snakebites by injecting himself with many different kinds of venom more than 800 times over

    Human rights group calls for probe into attack on Freedom Flotilla ship
    Asia Pacific Report A human rights agency has called for an investigation into the drone attacks on the Gaza Freedom Flotilla aid ship Conscience with Israel suspected of being responsible. The Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor said in a statement that the deliberate targeting of a civilian aid ship in international waters was a “flagrant violation”

    RSF condemns Israeli targeting of Gaza journalists – then slandering them in death
    Pacific Media Watch After a year and a half of war, nearly 200 Palestinian journalists have been killed by the Israeli army — including at least 43 slain on the job. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) has brought multiple complaints before the International Criminal Court (ICC) and continues to tirelessly support Gazan journalists, working to halt

    Final polls give Labor a clear lead before the election
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Adrian Beaumont, Election Analyst (Psephologist) at The Conversation; and Honorary Associate, School of Mathematics and Statistics, The University of Melbourne With those who haven’t already cast a pre-poll vote ready to hit the polling places tomorrow, a final batch of polls give Labor a firm lead. The

    Culture wars and costings: election special podcast with Michelle Grattan and Amanda Dunn
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra As we roll into the dying hours of the election campaign, the polls are suggesting a Labor win, although it is not yet clear if it will be in minority or majority. Chief Political Correspondent Michelle Grattan and Politics Editor

    Keith Rankin Analysis – The Great World War 1914-1945: Germany, Russia, Ukraine
    Analysis by Keith Rankin. On Anzac Day we remembered World War One and World War Two, or at least the peripheral little bits of those imperial wars that New Zealand was involved in. There was and is little context given to how New Zealand got involved with such far-away wars which need never have become

    What is iNaturalist? The citizen science app playing an unlikely role in Erin Patterson’s mushroom murder trial
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Caitlyn Forster, Associate Lecturer, School of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Sydney Death cap mushrooms (_Amanita phalloides_) Jolanda Aalbers/Shutterstock The world has been gripped by the case of Australian woman Erin Patterson, who was charged with the murder of three people after allegedly serving them a

    Fake news and the election campaign – how worried should voters be?
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Andrea Carson, 2024 Oxford University visiting research fellow RIJS; Professor of Political Communication., La Trobe University shutterstock JRdes/Shutterstock The spread of electoral misinformation and disinformation is undermining democracies around the world. The World Economic Forum has identified the proliferation of false content as the leading short-term global

    The MMR vaccine doesn’t contain ‘aborted fetus debris’, as RFK Jr has claimed. Here’s the science
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Hassan Vally, Associate Professor, Epidemiology, Deakin University Robert F. Kennedy Jr, the United States’ top public health official, recently claimed some religious groups avoid the measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) vaccine because it contains “aborted fetus debris” and “DNA particles”. The US is facing its worst measles

    Scientists surprised to discover mayflies and shrimp making their bodies out of ancient gas
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Paul McInerney, Senior Research Scientist in Ecosystem Ecology, CSIRO The native shrimp _Paratya australiensis_ was among the species found to incorporate carbon from natural gas into their bodies in the Condamine River. Chris Van Wyk/Flickr, CC BY-NC-ND What’s the currency for all life on Earth? Carbon. Every

    Archibald Packing Room Prize goes to Abdul Abdullah for Jason Phu portrait, among broader set of bold and deeply personal works
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Joanna Mendelssohn, Honorary Senior Fellow, School of Culture and Communication. Editor in Chief, Design and Art of Australia Online, The University of Melbourne Winner Packing Room Prize 2025, Abdul Abdullah ‘No mountain high enough’, oil on linen, 162.4 x 136.7cm © the artist, image © Art Gallery

    New Zealand condemned for failing to make ICJ humanitarian case over Gaza genocide
    Asia Pacific Report The advocacy group Palestine Solidarity Network Aotearoa has condemned the New Zealand government fpr failing to make a humanitarian submission to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) hearings at The Hague this week into Israel blocking vital supplies entering Gaza. The ICJ’s ongoing investigation into Israeli genocide in the besieged enclave is

    The Liberals’ women problem may seem intractable, but here’s what they could learn from the Teals
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Phoebe Hayman, PhD Candidate and Casual Academic in Politics, La Trobe University The impression of the Liberal Party as out of touch with women persists in this year’s election. The party’s “women problem” was brought into sharp focus by the backlash to its now-abandoned policy to stop

    This NZ law aims to give people with criminal convictions a ‘clean slate’. It’s not working
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Alexander Plum, Senior Research Fellow, Auckland University of Technology Andrey_Popov/Shutterstock If you own a business, would you be willing to hire a person who has been convicted for a crime? Give them a chance when a background check shows they have a criminal record? The answers matter

    ER Report: A Roundup of Significant Articles on EveningReport.nz for May 2, 2025
    ER Report: Here is a summary of significant articles published on EveningReport.nz on May 2, 2025.

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senator Coons, Tillis introduce bipartisan resolution supporting Romania and Moldova amid Russian interference

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Delaware Christopher Coons
    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senators Chris Coons (D-Del.) and Thom Tillis (R-N.C.) introduced a resolution yesterday expressing support for Romania and Moldova as both countries work to combat Russian interference ahead of upcoming elections.
    The resolution commends Romania and Moldova for their steadfast commitment to strengthening democratic values, deepening their European integration, and their commitment to regional security in the face of sustained Russian pressure campaigns.
    “Romania and Moldova are critical U.S. partners that make substantial contributions to security and sovereignty across eastern Europe,” said Senator Coons. “Romania is one of our most important NATO allies and largest alliance contributors, while Moldova is steadfast in its commitment to joining the European Union. When I visited the region earlier this year, I saw clearly how both are facing intense coercion efforts from Russia, including the weaponization of energy flows and systemic election interference campaigns. This resolution makes clear that the United Stares stands against Putin’s attempts to meddle in their elections and upend their democracies while reiterating our support for their sustained partnerships.”
    “Romania and Moldova are key U.S. allies, with Moldova partnered with North Carolina through the State Partnership Program, at a pivotal moment for democracy in Eastern Europe,” said Senator Tillis. “As both nations confront efforts by Russia to erode democratic institutions and exert undue influence, the United States must reaffirm its commitment to their sovereignty and political independence. Strengthening these partnerships is vital to preserving democratic governance and regional stability.”
    Senator Coons recently visited Romania and Moldova as part of a congressional delegation, where he witnessed firsthand Russia’s ongoing interference—including election interference, disinformation campaigns, and the weaponization of energy supplies. Due to blatant election interference by Russia, Romania’s presidential election in November was annulled, and the election will be rerun this weekend. 
    The resolution applauds Romania’s role within NATO and as a member of the European Union, as well as its critical support to Ukraine since Russia’s unprovoked war. It also supports Moldova’s referendum to join the European Union and thanks the country for its ongoing assistance to Ukraine. 
    Specifically, the resolution:
    Calls on the U.S. government to deepen bilateral and multilateral engagements with Romania and Moldova in support of democracy and state sovereignty in eastern Europe
    Applauds the partnership between Romania and Moldova in the energy sector as a model of reducing reliance on Russian energy exports
    Supports Romania’s role in strengthening NATO and Moldova’s aspirations to join the European Union
    Condemns Russia’s coercion campaigns in democratic sovereign states, including Romania and Moldova
    Asks for greater international support ahead of Romania’s presidential election and Moldova’s parliamentary elections in 2025
    Senator Coons is a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
    You can read the resolution text here.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA News: WEEK 15 WINS: President Trump’s 100th Day Marked by More Success

    Source: The White House

    This week, President Donald J. Trump celebrated his 100th day in office — and set the course for the next 100 days of growth, prosperity, and success for the American people.

    Here is a non-comprehensive list of wins in week 15:

    • The economy added 177,000 new jobs in April, according to the latest jobs report — smashing expectations for another month as the workforce grows and businesses onshore jobs.
    • President Donald J. Trump’s relentless pursuit of manufacturing dominance spurred onshoring and additional U.S. investment.
      • Mercedes-Benz announced it will move production of another vehicle to its Tuscaloosa, Alabama, manufacturing facility.
      • AstraZeneca announced it will shift production of some medicines from Europe to the U.S.
      • Walmart expanded its support for American-made products.
      • IBM announced a $150 billion investment over the next five years in its U.S.-based growth and manufacturing operations.
      • Pratt Industries announced a $5 billion investment that will result in 5,000 new manufacturing jobs across several key industrial states.
      • Kimberly-Clark announced a $2 billion investment in its U.S. manufacturing sites, which will create 900 new jobs.
      • Corning announced it is expanding its Michigan manufacturing facility investment to $1.5 billion.
      • Merck & Co. announced a $1 billion investment to build a new state-of-the-art biologics manufacturing plant in Delaware, which will create at least 500 new jobs — part of the company’s commitment to invest more than $9 billion over the next four years.
        • “Since the advent of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Merck has allocated more than $12 billion to enhance our domestic manufacturing and research capabilities, with additional planned investments of more than $9 billion over the next four years.”
      • Amgen announced a $900 million investment in its Ohio-based manufacturing operation.
        • “Pro-growth policies like the @POTUS @WhiteHouse 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act helped make investments like this possible. Since enactment, Amgen has invested ~$5B in capital expenditures. This amounts to an additional downstream output to the U.S. economy of approximately $12B.”
      • The Bel Group announced a $350 million investment to expand its U.S.-based production, including at its South Dakota, Idaho and Wisconsin facilities — which will create 250 new jobs.
    • President Trump continued to secure our border and rid our communities of illegal immigrant criminals.
      • New York Post: Illegal border crossings remained near historic lows in April after President Trump’s crackdown
      • The Trump Administration directed an operation at an underground nightclub in Colorado “frequented by TdA and MS-13 terrorists” that resulted in 100 illegal immigrant arrests.
      • ICE arrested more than 1,000 illegal immigrants in Florida in just six days as part of Operation Tidal Wave.
      • Uzbekistan agreed to pay for and accept 131 illegal immigrants from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.
    • President Trump continued to pursue peace through strength around the world.
      • President Trump secured a historic agreement with Ukraine that gives the U.S. an economic stake in securing a free, peaceful, and sovereign future for Ukraine and allows for the long-term reconstruction and modernization of the country after Russia’s invasion.
      • President Trump announced secondary sanctions on any country or person who purchases Iranian oil.
      • President Trump secured the release of a wrongfully detained U.S. citizen in Belarus and a U.S. citizen imprisoned in Kuwait — for a total of 47 detained citizens abroad freed since President Trump took office.
      • The Trump Administration brokered a joint pledge for peace between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
      • The Department of the Treasury cracked down on vessels delivering oil derivatives to Houthi terrorists in Yemen.
      • The Department of the Treasury sanctioned six Iranian and Chinese firms linked to procuring missile propellant ingredients for the Iranian regime.
    • The Trump Administration forged ahead on its unprecedented effort to secure American energy dominance.
      • Woodside Energy Group financially approved a $17.5 billion liquefied natural gas (LNG) project.
      • The Environmental Protection Agency granted an emergency waiver that allows Americans to buy cheaper, higher-ethanol gasoline through the summer, which will save Americans money.
    • President Trump took a series of executive actions to improve Americans’ lives.
      • President Trump strengthened the ability of state and local law enforcement to pursue criminals and protect innocent Americans.
      • President Trump signed an executive order to protect Americans in so-called “sanctuary” jurisdictions from dangerous criminal illegal immigrants.
      • President Trump established the Religious Liberty Commission to safeguard and promote America’s founding principle of religious freedom.
      • President Trump incentivized American automobile production.
      • President Trump ordered that commercial truck drivers must be properly qualified and proficient in English.
      • President Trump ended the taxpayer subsidization of NPR and PBS.
    • President Trump unveiled his proposed budget, which would save taxpayers $163 billion in wasteful spending, gut the weaponized deep state, and provide historic increases for defense and border security.
    • President Trump launched the FEMA Review Council to help fix the broken disaster response system and return power to the states.
    • President Trump announced Selfridge Air National Guard Base in Michigan will soon be home to the new F-15EW Eagle II fighter jets.
    • President Trump renamed May 8 as “Victory Day for World War II” and November 11 as “Victory Day for World War I” in recognition of America’s role in winning the two wars.
    • The Department of Health and Human services released a comprehensive review of so-called “gender-affirming care,” finding no strong medical or scientific evidence exists to support the treatment’s irreversible effects.
    • The Trump Administration ended the Biden-era lawfare against South Dakota cattle ranchers who were wrongfully persecuted over a minor land dispute.
    • The Department of State designated Haitian gangs Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif as Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
    • The Department of Education launched a civil rights investigation into the New York Department of Education over its threat to withhold funding from the Massapequa School District if it does not eliminate its Native American mascot.
    • The Department of Education announced its finding that the University of Pennsylvania violated Title IX, notifying the institution that they have ten days to resolve the violations or risk a referral to the Department of Justice for enforcement proceedings.
    • The Department of Education and the Department of Health and Human Services announced investigations into Harvard University and the Harvard Law Review based on reports of race-based discrimination permeating the operations of the journal.
    • The Department of the Interior announced 42 new proposed hunting opportunities across 87,000 acres within the National Wildlife Refuge System and National Fish Hatchery System, which would more than triple the number of opportunities and quintuple the number of stations opened or expanded compared to the previous administration.
    • The Department of Energy announced it will lift a range of unnecessary regulations on certain indoor and outdoor gas products — expanding choice and lowering costs for consumers.
    • The Department of Transportation unveiled a new package of actions to further supercharge the air traffic controller workforce.
    • Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard added counter narcotics to the National Counter Terrorism Center in order to “focus intelligence and vetting resources against these terrorists who traffic deadly narcotics into the country.”
    • The Department of Justice arrested two individuals on charges of operating an international child exploitation enterprise.
    • The Department of Agriculture secured an agreement with Mexico for an immediate transfer of water from international reservoirs to Texas farmers and ranchers.
    • The White House Council on Environmental Quality established the Permitting Innovation Center to cut red tape and accelerate the environmental review process.
    • The National Institutes of Health announced it will publish studies it funds online for free to empower Americans’ own research and promote maximum transparency.
    • PepsiCo announced it will remove artificial ingredients from some popular food offerings by the end of the year following the Trump Administration’s push to end artificial food dyes.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Video: Press Freedom, Peacekeeping, Syria & other topics – Daily Press Briefing | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:
    – World Press Freedom Day
    – International Days
    – Secretary-General/Peacekeeping
    – Syria
    – Occupied Palestinian Territory
    – UNIFIL
    – Ukraine
    – Haiti
    – Myanmar
    – Somalia

    WORLD PRESS FREEDOM DAY
    Tomorrow is World Press Freedom Day. It is a constant reminder that free and independent journalism is an essential public good.
    In his message, the Secretary-General says that when journalists are unable to work, we all lose. Tragically, this is becoming more difficult every year.
    “We are seeing a sharp rise in the number of journalists killed in conflict areas — particularly in Gaza,” he said.
    And this year’s theme is “the Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Press Freedom” – The Secretary-General added that artificial intelligence can support freedom of expression — or stifle it.

    INTERNATIONAL DAYS
    Today is World Tuna Day. Tuna is rich in Omega-3, and it also contains minerals, proteins, and vitamin B12, among other advantages. Unfortunately, though, its popularity has led to overfishing in so many parts of the world.

    SECRETARY-GENERAL/PEACEKEEPING
    This morning, the Secretary-General took part in a dialogue with peacekeeping troop-contributing countries.
    This was a closed meeting, so we won’t be sharing the Secretary-General’s full remarks. But I can tell you that, as you can imagine, he thanked the troop-contributing countries.
    Peacekeeping is multilateralism in action, he said, a direct, collective and tangible commitment to peace.
    He added that peacekeeping is also a partnership that depends on global political support as well as on the ideas, insights and continued commitment of Member States in the face of a range of increasingly complex risks and challenges, financing for peacekeeping is one of those challenges.
    The Peacekeeping Ministerial in Berlin, in two weeks, the Secretary-General said, will be an opportunity to build on this important work.

    SYRIA
    The Secretary-General has been monitoring with alarm the reports of violence in the Druze-majority suburbs of Damascus and in the south of Syria, including reports of civilian casualties and assassination of local administration figures. He condemns all violence against civilians, including acts which could risk inflaming sectarian tensions.
    In this context, he also condemns Israel’s violation of Syria’s sovereignty, including the latest airstrike near the presidential palace in Damascus. It is essential that these attacks stop and that Israel respect Syria’s sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, and independence.
    The Secretary-General unequivocally calls on all concerned to cease all hostilities, exercise utmost restraint and avoid further escalation.
    He is encouraged by intra-Syrian efforts to de-escalate the violence and maintain security and stability.
    He takes note of the statement by interim President al-Sharaa, prioritizing “dialogue and cooperation within the framework of national unity,” and appeals to the interim authorities to transparently and openly investigate all violations.
    The Secretary-General further underscores that it is imperative to support a credible, orderly and inclusive political transition in Syria, in line with the key principles of resolution 2254 (2015).

    Full Highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=02%20May%202025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h7Qei4f4r4M

    MIL OSI Video –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Committee against Torture Concludes Eighty-Second Session

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee against Torture this morning closed its eighty-second session, after adopting concluding observations on the reports of Armenia, France, Mauritius, Monaco, Turkmenistan and Ukraine, which were reviewed during the session. The session was held from 7 April to 2 May.

    Claude Heller, Committee Chairperson, read out a summary of the concluding observations for each country reviewed this session under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment . The concluding observations will be available on the webpage of the session as of 1 p.m. this afternoon.

    Mr. Heller said that the Committee had still not been informed whether its next two sessions scheduled for 2025 would take place. Sixteen treaty body sessions were at stake, and the Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture had had to postpone four of its eight visits planned for 2025. As soon as more information became available, the Committee would announce the dates of its upcoming sessions and the country reviews planned for each session.

    Mr. Heller also noted that the sudden cessation of hybrid meetings would continue to negatively impact the work of the Committee members, civil society organizations, national human rights institutions, national preventive mechanisms and other stakeholders.

    In conclusion, he said that the Committee now came to the end of yet another session, held with professionalism, independence, and a constructive spirit to fully adhere to its mandate.

    Peter Vedel Kessing, Committee Rapporteur, presented the annual report, which covered the period from 11 May 2024 to 2 May 2025, including the eightieth session, which was held from 8 to 26 July 2024; the eighty-first session which was held from 28 October to 22 November 2024; and the eighty-second session which was held from 7 April to 2 May 2025.

    Documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties and the concluding observations of the Committee, will be available on the website of the session. Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, and webcasts of the public meetings can be found here.

    The dates and details of the next session of the Committee will be communicated at a later date.
     

    Statements

    PETER VEDEL KESSING, Committee Rapporteur, presented the Committee’s annual report, which covered the period from 11 May 2024 to 2 May 2025, including the eightieth session, which was held from 8 to 26 July 2024; the eighty-first session which was held from 28 October to 22 November 2024; and the eighty-second session which was held from 7 April to 2 May 2025.

    As of today, there were 175 States parties to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Since the adoption of the Committee’s previous annual report, Dominica had acceded to the Convention, on 5 December 2024. The Committee called upon all States that had not ratified the Convention to do so and called upon those that were already parties to accept all the procedures of the Convention in order to enable the Committee to fulfil all aspects of its mandate. As of today, there were 94 States parties to the Optional Protocol to the Convention. 

    The Committee held a joint meeting between the members of the Committee and the Chair of the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture. The Committee adopted a joint statement with the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture, and the Board of Trustees of the United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture to mark the United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, which was commemorated on 26 June.

    To mark the fortieth anniversary of the adoption of the Convention, the Committee, jointly with the other United Nations anti‑torture mechanisms held a high-level event in Geneva on 14 November 2024.

    The Committee expressed its appreciation to non-governmental organizations, with special thanks to the World Organization against Torture. The Committee requested that all multilingual hybrid meetings be maintained as a feature of an adequately resourced session and called upon States parties to support this request. 

    Concerning complaints under article 22 of the Convention, as of today, the

    the Committee had registered, since 1989, 1,260 complaints concerning 45 States parties. Of those, 449 complaints had been discontinued and 152 had been declared inadmissible. The Committee had adopted final decisions on the merits in 524 complaints and found violations of the Convention in 220 of them. Considering the adopted communications during the current session, some 133 complaints were pending consideration. All the Committee’s decisions could be found in the updated treaty body case law database, on the website of the Office of the High Commission for Human Rights, and in the Official Document System of the United Nations.

    At its eightieth session, the Committee adopted decisions on the merits in respect of 10 communications. The Committee further found two communications inadmissible and it discontinued the consideration of 19 complaints. At its eighty-first session, the Committee adopted decisions on the merits in respect of six communications. The Committee found three communications inadmissible and discontinued the consideration of 12 communications. At its eighty-second session, the Committee adopted decisions on the merits in 12 communications. It found 2 communications inadmissible and it discontinued the consideration of 12 cases. One communication was postponed.

    CLAUDE HELLER, Committee Chairperson, read out a summary of the concluding observations on the reports of the States parties that were reviewed during the session.

    Armenia

    Concerning Armenia, the Committee commended the State party on the adoption of its new Criminal Code, which established an expanded definition of torture, along with the adoption of a new Criminal Procedure Code, introducing a number of new procedural safeguards against torture and increasing the availability of non-custodial measures. The Committee recommended that Armenia ensure that the penalties for torture were commensurate with the gravity of the crime. It also recommended that the State party train prosecutors and judges on the use of non-custodial measures, provide sufficient material and financial resources for their application, and adopt the necessary regulations to ensure that they may be applied in practice.

    With regard to psychiatric and social care institutions, the Committee recommended that the State party guarantee sufficient legal and procedural safeguards for residents in psychiatric institutions and social care facilities, both in law and in practice. It also recommended that the State party reduce recourse to coercion in psychiatric settings, and ensure that physical or chemical means of restraint were used in accordance with domestic law and international standards. 

    France

    As for France, the Committee expressed its deep concern about the numerous allegations of excessive use of force, including lethal force, and ill-treatment by law enforcement officials, and was seriously concerned that such cases reportedly disproportionately affected members of certain minority groups, in particular persons of African descent, persons of Arab origin or Muslim religion, indigenous peoples and non-nationals. The Committee recommended that the State party ensure that all allegations of excessive use of force and ill-treatment were investigated promptly, thoroughly and impartially by an independent body, that those responsible were held accountable, and that victims or their families obtain adequate redress.

    The Committee recommended that France continue its efforts to improve living conditions in all places of deprivation of liberty and to reduce overcrowding in prisons and other places of detention. It also recommended that the State party ensure that all allegations of ill-treatment were thoroughly investigated, that alleged perpetrators were prosecuted and, if found guilty, sentenced to appropriate penalties, and that victims or their families received redress, including adequate compensation. It recommended that the State party improve the monitoring and control of violence among prisoners. The Committee recommended that the State party take all necessary measures to encourage the reporting of hate crimes motivated by racist, Islamophobic, anti-Semitic, xenophobic or homophobic prejudice, and to ensure that such crimes were thoroughly investigated, that perpetrators were prosecuted and punished, and that victims had access to effective remedies.

    Mauritius

    Concerning Mauritius, the Committee acknowledged the State party’s commitment to develop a code of practice for police officers and to strengthen their training to address those shortcomings. The Committee recommended that Mauritius strengthen its efforts to further ensure that the Independent Police Complaints Commission was properly resourced and equipped to carry out its functions, and guarantee that acts of torture and ill-treatment were promptly, impartially and effectively investigated and prosecuted, as appropriate. The Committee also asked the State party to take all appropriate measures to prevent acts of intimidation and reprisals against alleged victims, their legal representatives, and relatives.

    The Committee recommended that Mauritius ensure that all deaths in custody were promptly and impartially investigated by an independent entity, including through independent forensic examinations, with due regard to the Minnesota Protocol on the Investigation of Potentially Unlawful Death. Where appropriate, the Committee recommended that the corresponding sanctions be applied. It also asked the State party to compile and provide it with detailed information on all incidents of death in all places of detention, the causes, and the outcomes of the investigations.

    Monaco

    As for Monaco, the Committee voiced its concern about reports that the “maison d’arrêt de Monaco” and its facilities were structurally incompatible with their current purpose, as they remained unsuitable for prolonged deprivation of liberty. While it was aware of the State party’s land-use constraints, the Committee encouraged the State party to consider transferring prisoners to a new prison facility that better complied with international standards on deprivation of liberty and the prevention of ill-treatment. Meanwhile, it recommended that the State party continue its efforts to improve living conditions in the “maison d’arrêt de Monaco”, including by ensuring that persons in pretrial detention were allowed visits or telephone calls without specific authorisation from the judicial authorities.

    The Committee expressed its concern about reports of precarious working conditions affecting many migrant domestic workers and undeclared migrant workers, particularly in the construction, hotel and catering sectors, as well as on private yachts. The Committee recommended that the State party strengthen the capacity and resources of the labour inspectorate to enable it to monitor more effectively the situation of migrant workers, in particular domestic workers, including with regard to their recruitment and working conditions. It also recommended the State party to redouble its efforts to inform migrant workers, including undeclared workers, of their rights and the complaint mechanisms available to them, and facilitate their access to those mechanisms.

    Turkmenistan

    With regard to Turkmenistan, the Committee expressed grave concern about the persistent reports of widespread torture and ill-treatment of detainees in the State party. Despite the installation of audio-visual equipment in some detention facilities across the country, such measures appeared insufficient in preventing and curbing abuse. The Committee had further expressed serious concern about the lack of accountability, which reflected a worrying pattern of institutional impunity. The Committee urged the State party to adopt a zero-tolerance policy towards torture, including a clear public statement from the highest levels of Government, and to ensure that all allegations were promptly and independently investigated, perpetrators held accountable, and victims granted full redress.

    The Committee noted and welcomed the adoption of the Ombudsman Act and the recent “B” status accreditation of Turkmenistan’s Ombudsperson by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions. However, it expressed concern about the reported lack of independence and limited authority of the Ombudsperson’s office, particularly its failure to address serious and systemic human rights violations. The Committee recommended that the State party fully implement the recommendations of the Alliance’s Subcommittee on Accreditation and take all necessary steps to establish an independent national monitoring body capable of conducting unannounced visits to all places of detention, engaging with detainees in private, and responding effectively to allegations of abuse in line with the Paris Principles.

    Ukraine

    Concerning Ukraine, the Committee acknowledged the challenges faced by the State party in fully implementing its obligations under the Convention due to the full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation against it. It recalled, nevertheless, that the Convention was applicable in the State party’s entire territory and Ukraine should therefore take all possible steps to implement it.

    The Committee noted Ukraine’s commitment and measures taken to abide by international humanitarian law and international human rights law in the context of the ongoing armed conflict and occupation, but expressed concerns about reports indicating allegations of torture and ill-treatment, threats, humiliation, and other violations of Russian prisoners of war, allegedly committed by the Ukrainian armed forces and military police, as well as the inadequate recording and reporting of their visible injuries sustained by torture or ill-treatment, among other concerns. The Committee underscored that the prohibition of torture was non-derogable, that no exceptional circumstances whatsoever may be invoked as a justification of torture, and that the obligations stemming from this prohibition were not subject to reciprocity.

    The Committee also recommended that Ukraine ensure that all fundamental legal safeguards were guaranteed in practice for all detained persons from the outset of the deprivation of their liberty, including the right to request and receive a medical examination by an independent doctor, free of charge, or a doctor of their choice, that was conducted out of hearing and sight of police officers, unless the doctor concerned explicitly requested otherwise, as the access to an initial confidential medical examination did not appear to be routinely granted in Ukraine, and if it was granted, it was reportedly performed in the presence of a police officer.

    Other

    Mr. Heller said that during the session, the Committee also adopted lists of issues for Pakistan and Tajikistan and lists of issues prior to reporting for Antigua and Barbuda, Botswana, Iceland, Iraq, Kenya, Montenegro, State of Palestine and Uruguay.

    The Committee had still not been informed whether its next two sessions scheduled for 2025 would take place. Sixteen treaty body sessions were at stake, and the Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture had had to postpone four of its eight visits planned for 2025. As soon as more information became available, the Committee would announce the dates of its upcoming sessions and the country reviews planned for each session. Mr. Heller noted that the sudden cessation of hybrid meetings would continue to negatively impact the work of the Committee members, civil society organizations, national human rights institutions, national preventive mechanisms and other stakeholders.

    Concerning the individual complaints procedure, he said the Committee this session examined 26 individual complaints. Of the examined cases, two were deemed inadmissible. Additionally, 12 cases were decided on the merits: in one case the Committee found no violations, while in 11 cases the Committee determined there was a violation by the State party. Furthermore, the Committee adopted 12 discontinuance requests. 

    Mr. Heller read out the results of the work of the Committee Rapporteurs on follow-up to concluding observations, individual cases, and reprisals. A summary of the meeting that was held on these results can be found here.

    In conclusion, Mr. Heller said that the Committee now came to the end of yet another session, held with professionalism, independence, and a constructive spirit to fully adhere to its mandate.

    __________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CAT.009E

    MIL OSI United Nations News –