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Category: Ukraine

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the old challenges and new commercial practices in the internal market – B10-0246/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Anna Cavazzini
    on behalf of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection

    B10‑0246/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the old challenges and new commercial practices in the internal market

    (2025/2542(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2023 on the 30th anniversary of the single market: celebrating achievements and looking towards future developments[1],

    – having regard to the report by Enrico Letta of 17 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a Market’ (the Letta report),

    – having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (the Draghi report),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘the 2025 Annual Single Market and Competitiveness Report’ (COM(2025)0026),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘A simpler and faster Europe: Communication on implementation and simplification (COM(2025)0047),

    – having regard to the question to the Commission on the old challenges and new commercial practices in the internal market (O-000012/2025 – B10‑0264/2025),

    – having regard to Rules 142(5) and 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the European Union’s ability to compete and prosper in the global economy is vital, especially amid the current geopolitical challenges and climate and other environmental crises; whereas its current, medium and long-term competitiveness relies on a fully integrated and efficient single market that allows European businesses to innovate and prosper and prioritises the reduction of administrative burdens;

    B. whereas the single market, comprising nearly 450 million citizens and 23 million businesses, generates a gross domestic product (GDP) of EUR 17 trillion, positioning the EU among the world’s three largest economies and contributing approximately one-sixth of global economic output;

    C. whereas the Draghi report demonstrated that compliance costs resulting from various pieces of legislation remain very high for European companies, therefore hindering European innovation capacity;

    D. whereas it remains crucial to improve the functioning of the single market by addressing persisting fragmentation through common, harmonised EU policies, more efficient implementation and enforcement, and the simplification of EU rules; whereas reducing administrative burdens and costs, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), can help foster innovation and support European businesses; whereas unlocking the full potential of the single market requires overcoming persistent barriers to the free movement of goods and services;

    E. whereas the rapid expansion of digital platforms and e-commerce has introduced new market dynamics and whereas evolving trends in global e-commerce are exerting additional pressure on customs controls, market surveillance and consumer protection authorities;

    F. whereas geopolitical shifts and global economic transformations are reshaping supply chains, requiring the EU to adapt its single market policies; whereas the EU has set the highest standards for product safety and consumer protection, both offline and online;

    G. whereas attention has been drawn to a growing number of cases reported across the EU in which goods and services offer reduced quantity or quality, despite stable or rising prices;

    Old and enduring challenges

    1. Reaffirms that the single market has been a cornerstone of European economic integration, enabling the free movement of goods, services, capital and people; stresses, however, that there are long-standing and emerging challenges that necessitate ambitious reforms without harming European competitiveness or imposing unnecessary administrative burdens on companies; calls on the Commission and the Member States to accelerate efforts towards implementing these reforms and to eliminate remaining unjustified obstacles to the free movement of goods and services, while ensuring a high level of consumer protection;

    2. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to maintain strong consumer protection while also providing for competition rules that are innovation-friendly, future-proof and proportionate; emphasises the need to ensure legal certainty and consistency and minimise regulatory complexity and fragmentation, which could disproportionately affect SMEs, start-ups and scale-ups;

    3. Calls on the Commission to ensure that future legislative initiatives are consistently guided by the strategic priorities outlined in its communications and competitiveness strategy;

    4. Underscores that, as demonstrated by the Letta and Draghi reports, there is still untapped potential in the services sector; calls for further action in this sector to address the significant obstacles that persist, starting from setting ambitious targets in the upcoming single market strategy; notes that services account for three quarters of EU GDP, represent two thirds of employment and create 9 out of 10 new jobs in the EU economy; notes also, however, that services are still the least developed segment of the EU single market;

    5. Welcomes the proposal for a regulation on a public interface connected to the Internal Market Information System for the declaration of posting of workers and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 (COM/2024/531), which should lead to simplification and strengthened enforcement; notes also that digitalisation could significantly reduce administrative burdens for cross-border services and ensure better access for businesses and consumers; calls, in this regard, for a single declaration portal and the digitalisation of A1 forms for cross-border services;

    6. Stresses the importance of the effective recognition of professional qualifications and the removal of unjustified barriers to the free movement of professionals in order to make EU professional services globally competitive in future decades; encourages the Commission to remain vigilant in pursuing infringement procedures where Member States do not comply with EU legislation on the recognition of qualifications;

    7. Stresses that single market rules should safeguard access to public services and preserve consumer rights as well as other overriding reasons of public interest; adds that any assessment to evaluate restrictions in the single market for services should include qualitative criteria;

    8. Notes the role that EU public procurement can play in overcoming barriers to market entry, supporting sustainable and resilient industrial ecosystems, high quality jobs and value creation in the EU;

    9. Acknowledges that the new legislative framework (NLF) has contributed to consistency in EU product legislation and that since its adoption, the industry sector, supply chains and products have experienced important transformations in the light of the digital and green transition, but also changes in market dynamics; notes that the 2022 evaluation of the NLF identified critical challenges, such as potential foreign influence, illegal practices, inadequacies in addressing digitalisation and the circular economy, and potential updates to obligations and definitions for certain economic operators to reflect new market realities;

    10. Stresses that addressing these issues and making the NLF future-proof is essential to ensure coherence, reduce costs and ensure free movement of goods; calls, therefore, for an update to the NLF in order to streamline product rules, promote digitalisation and simplify compliance and market surveillance procedures; considers that the NLF should promote the use of Digital Product Passports as a means of demonstrating product conformity and complying with information requirements;

    11. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to simplify EU rules and make them easier to implement, and to significantly reduce administrative burdens, in particular for SMEs, which play a vital role in sustaining local communities and economies; stresses the importance of ensuring legal certainty and consistency for businesses, as well as predictability for long-term investments, which are essential to boost competitiveness, innovation and resilience and to deliver fast and meaningful improvements for consumers and businesses; calls, furthermore, on the Member States to prevent actions that could compromise the level playing field in the internal market;

    12. Recognises that inconsistent and fragmented enforcement of EU laws across the Member States continues to distort competition and undermine the single market’s integrity; adds that primary responsibility for enforcement of EU rules lies with the Member States; invites the Commission to make full use of its enforcement powers; calls for improved monitoring and enforcement mechanisms at EU level, such as harmonised rules on minimum levels of checks, harmonised methodologies to conduct these checks and joint inspections, in order to ensure the uniform application of EU law and, where applicable, swift redress for consumers;

    13. Stresses the importance of maintaining a competitive and dynamic economic environment by safeguarding consumers’ rights and enforcing digital competition rules to address unfair business practices that distort market conditions; calls, furthermore, on the Member States to increase the capacity of market surveillance authorities and customs authorities to ensure effective enforcement of single market rules, particularly in respect of e-commerce and imports from non-EU countries;

    14. Recalls that territorial supply constraints in the retail and wholesale segments fragment the single market, limit consumer choice and contribute to significant price disparities across the Union, particularly affecting the prices of basic consumer goods; highlights that while competition law penalises some of these practices effectively, many fall outside its scope; calls, therefore, on the Commission to propose measures to address the issue, including stronger enforcement against anti-competitive distribution agreements, in order to safeguard fair competition, thereby ensuring the integrity of the single market;

    15. Calls on the Commission to investigate the causes for the differentiated levels of the inflation of basic goods and consumer price increases observed in some EU Member States;

    16. Considers that the single market is a key tool in times of crisis if the Member States can act in a coordinated way; considers that the recently adopted Internal Market Emergency and Resilience Act[2] will be crucial to ensure coordination in order to prevent shortages and ensure the smooth functioning of the single market, including the free movement of essential goods and services throughout the EU;

    17. Calls on the Commission to empower consumers to easily exercise their passenger rights by establishing national enforcement bodies, which should be granted harmonised investigation and enforcement powers and which should be able to efficiently process individual complaints and related fines;

    18. Highlights that e-commerce measures targeting geo-blocking, notably the Geoblocking Regulation[3], have been successful in creating a framework for a less fragmented single market and enhancing consumer choice for online shopping; notes with concern that the implementation of the regulation has been inadequate;

    19. Notes that the European Accessibility Act[4] will become applicable across all EU Member States as of 28 June 2025; stresses the importance of its full and effective implementation by the Member States in order to ensure the harmonisation of accessibility requirements for products and services, thereby guaranteeing their accessibility to persons with disabilities across the EU internal market;

    Emerging commercial practices

    20. Highlights that the rapid expansion of digital platforms and e-commerce has introduced new market dynamics and has created advanced opportunities and challenges and risks for users; acknowledges that the Digital Markets Act[5] (DMA) and the Digital Services Act[6] (DSA) constitute key legislative instruments ensuring fair competition, contestability and fairness in digital platforms, while also fostering consumer protection and a safer, more trustworthy and more transparent digital environment in the digital economy; calls for proper enforcement of the EU’s new technology legislation to ensure genuine, autonomous and informed consumer choice, protection and fair competition;

    21. Considers it essential to ensure the effective implementation and enforcement of these two legislative acts and urges the Commission to conclude its ongoing investigations in the framework of the DSA and the DMA;

    22. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act[7] maintains a risk-based, innovation-friendly approach, ensuring that compliance requirements are proportionate to the actual risks posed by AI applications while respecting the need to ensure a high level of protection of health, safety and fundamental rights;

    23. Welcomes the Commission’s ‘digital fairness’ fitness check of consumer law and the upcoming public consultation; underlines that some issues remain unaddressed concerning the protection of consumers online, leading to an imbalance between consumers and traders within the digital economy; calls on the Commission to address these issues in the upcoming Digital Fairness Act; believes that digital addiction, online gambling, protection of minors online and persuasive technologies used by online actors, such as targeted advertising, influencer advertising and dark patterns, should fall under the Digital Fairness Act, which should close legal loopholes and be consistent with current legal instruments in order to better protect consumers online, taking into account the need to avoid unnecessary regulatory burdens;

    24. Notes that evolving trends in global e-commerce and supply chain restructuring are placing greater pressure on customs controls, market surveillance and consumer protection authorities; highlights that the volume of unsafe and illicit products sold on e-commerce platforms, in particular from non-EU countries, has been increasing in recent years; highlights the significance of Digital Product Passports in these processes; calls, therefore, for a reinforced market surveillance framework and a revision of the Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation[8] and calls on the Council to swiftly adopt its position in order to enable the adoption of the revised Union Customs Code and the establishment of an EU customs authority in 2026;

    25. Calls on the Member States to allocate sufficient technical, human and financial resources to national authorities; calls on the Member States and the Commission to ensure sufficient funds and expertise to strengthen customs authorities and market surveillance across the Union and to intensify joint activities and EU testing;

    26. Emphasises the need to strengthen consumer protection in both online and offline markets, ensuring transparency in advertising and pricing, especially concerning dynamic pricing, ensuring fair business practices and stronger safeguards against fraud to foster consumer trust in cross-border commerce and the highest level of protection;

    27. Stresses that attention has increasingly been drawn to instances where goods and services offer less in terms of quantity or quality while prices remain the same or increase; calls on the Commission to assess the scale and underlying causes of such practices and to explore appropriate measures to enhance transparency and consumer awareness;

    28. Underlines that environmental sustainability and fair-trade considerations are increasingly shaping commercial practices by playing an important role in consumers’ purchasing decisions and consequently driving businesses towards sustainability; adds that transparency and information for consumers on environmental aspects as well as on socially-responsible and ethical production processes allow consumers to adopt sustainable consumption patterns;

    29. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to maintain their level of ambition in this regard and work further on EU-wide labelling schemes; recalls that the objective of the Green Claims Directive is to establish a tool to protect consumers against greenwashing by establishing requirements for substantiation and verification;

    30. Highlights the need to further combat misleading advertising and greenwashing and to strengthen the second-hand market; notes, however, that restrictive sustainability rules may have a negative impact on European competitiveness;

    31. Highlights that some growing trends in e-commerce raise concerns with regard to goods from non-EU countries not fulfilling EU safety and sustainability requirements, thus negatively impacting SMEs in the EU; welcomes the Commission communication on ‘A comprehensive EU toolbox for safe and sustainable e-commerce’ and asks the Commission to swiftly implement the recommendations contained therein;

    32. Emphasises that harmonised technical standards are essential for the free movement of goods within the single market, ensuring product safety, quality and performance across the Member States; highlights that standards must reflect the interests, policy objectives and values of the Union by taking into account the views of all stakeholders; adds that the recent Court of Justice of the European Union ruling[9] acknowledges the added value of harmonised standards that form part of EU law because of their legal effects and establishes that they should be made freely accessible; underlines the need to improve the agility of the standardisation framework, particularly for emerging green and digital value chains, and to help industry to maintain competitive positions in key technology markets;

    33. Considers that the EU must increase its efforts to set up a new mechanism with the Member States and national standardisation bodies to share information, coordinate and strengthen the European approach to international standardisation activities; calls for swift action to update the EU standardisation framework in order to speed up the standardisation process to ensure the rapid publication of harmonised standards that grant presumption of conformity and are aligned with international standards to support global trade while encouraging greater industry participation, particularly from SMEs;

    34. Stresses the need to reinforce the external dimension of the single market to safeguard the EU’s strategic autonomy and global influence and welcomes the gradual integration of EU candidate countries to the single market with a view to their future EU membership; emphasises that the EU’s high regulatory standards can serve as a global benchmark and must be effectively enforced to ensure a level playing field for European businesses; calls on the Commission to intensify regulatory dialogues and political cooperation with other relevant non-EU countries in order to identify common challenges and try to build joint actions, especially concerning e-commerce, digital rules and consumers;

    35. Reiterates its call for innovative, complementary and flexible interaction between the ongoing work on the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement currently in force and the accession negotiation process, thus allowing for Ukraine’s gradual integration into the EU single market and sectoral programmes;

    Conclusions

    36. Recognises that geopolitical tensions, climate change, challenges to EU competitiveness and economic disparities pose significant risks to the integrity of the single market; calls for a robust, coordinated and strategic policy response to strengthen the single market;

    37. Calls for the continued evolution of the single market to address both remaining unjustified barriers and emerging commercial challenges; takes the view that eliminating regulatory fragmentation, promoting simplification, significantly reducing administrative burdens, enhancing enforcement and ensuring resilient supply chains are critical to maintaining the EU’s competitive edge and fair market conditions and enhancing the single market; underlines the importance of consulting all relevant stakeholders in these processes;

    38. Emphasises the importance of digital transformation, the circular economy and adaptability to global economic shifts in securing the EU’s long-term economic dynamism;

    39. Reiterates that strengthening the internal and external dimensions of the single market is essential for preserving the EU’s strategic autonomy and competitiveness;

    40. Urges the Commission, therefore, to reflect the foregoing in the forthcoming new single market strategy, scheduled for June 2025, in the 2030 consumer agenda, scheduled for the end of 2025, and in the Digital Fairness Act, scheduled for 2026;

    °

    ° °

    41. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    May 3, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – World Press Freedom Day 3 May: defending media freedom to safeguard democracy

    Source: European Parliament

    European Parliament President Roberta Metsola, Vice-President Sabine Verheyen and Culture and Education Committee Chair Nela Riehl stress the vital role of independent journalism.

    President Roberta Metsola said: “A free press is the best shield for democracy. Journalists must be free to report without fear of censorship, intimidation, or retaliation. The European Parliament will always defend and stand up for media and press freedom – not only on World Press Freedom Day, but every day.”

    Sabine Verheyen (EPP, DE), Vice-President of the European Parliament and chair of the Working Group on the implementation of the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) said:

    “On World Press Freedom Day, we reaffirm our commitment to one of the fundamental pillars of democracy: media freedom. Free, independent, and diverse journalism is essential to any democratic society. However, it remains under threat – even within some EU member states – and without it, democracy cannot function. The European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), passed in April 2024, is vital in addressing these challenges. It sends a strong message about the need to protect media diversity and journalistic independence across Europe. Media is more than just an industry – it shapes political discourse, drives cultural development, fosters social inclusion, and safeguards fundamental rights.

    “The EMFA represents a historic milestone for the EU: for the first time, a comprehensive European law is in place to uphold press freedom and media pluralism. We have made significant legislative progress in shielding journalists from political interference and economic pressure. But these protections now need to be actively enforced.

    “The EMFA is already taking effect. The first provisions have officially entered into force, with the next set to follow this month. By August 2025, the most significant parts of the law will come into effect, marking a major step in strengthening media freedom across the EU. However, the real impact of the EMFA depends on its implementation. That is why we are already monitoring the process closely to ensure that member states do not delay its enforcement. Press freedom cannot wait – we must act upon these commitments.

    “On this World Press Freedom Day, we have to remember the importance of standing firm in defending media freedom. Troubling global trends remind us that indifference is not an option. Even in Europe, we must remain vigilant in upholding our democratic values. Press freedom is the backbone of democracy – defending it means protecting our freedoms and the values we hold dear.”

    Nela Riehl (Greens, DE), Chair of the Committee on Culture and Education, said: “An independent press sector is an essential pillar of our democracy. We need a free press to hold our decision makers accountable, advance social change, and keep citizens informed. I am concerned about the drastic increase in young people’s exposure to news from unverified sources on social media. Quality journalism is competing with algorithms on social media platforms for our attention. To minimise the spread of harmful disinformation, the EU is now starting to regulate digital platforms, but we also need to improve media literacy, make sure people have access to accurate information, and provide education on media consumption.

    “This should be a high priority for civic education, with clear targets as we work towards improved democratic resilience across Europe. As a committee, we are pushing these challenges up the European education agenda, and we welcome the first steps in this direction under the Commission’s “Union of Skills” initiative.

    “My recent visit to Ukraine reminded me of the power of citizens to counter threats to democracy. When the manipulation of information is weaponised, strengthening and protecting people – namely independent journalists, reporters, media professionals, and volunteers – is a matter of security as well. Accordingly, this World Press Freedom Day, we also emphasise the need to make work environments safe for the independent press, with liveable working conditions, a supportive European infrastructure, and protection from persecution.”

    The chairs of the Civil Liberties Committee, the Human Rights Subcommittee and the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield are also issuing a statement to mark the World Press Freedom Day. You can read it here (available soon).


    How Parliament strengthens media freedom

    In early 2024, Parliament and Council adopted new rules to protect freedom of media and the independence of journalists in the EU. The provisions of the Media Freedom Act (EMFA) will become fully applicable in EU member states as of 8 August 2025.

    These provisions should ensure transparency of media outlet ownership and of allocation of state advertising, strengthen public media independence, and secure robust protection for journalists and their sources. To ensure visibility and pluralism, digital platforms will be prevented from arbitrarily deleting or restricting independent media content.

    A directive to protect journalists and civil society activists against strategic lawsuits seeking to silence critical voices must be transposed into national law in all EU member states by 7 May 2026.

    Every year, the European Parliament rewards outstanding journalism that promotes or defends the core principles and values of the European Union, such as human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law, and human rights. The fifth edition of the Daphne Caruana Galizia Prize for Journalism will be launched later this month.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    May 3, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Perfect storm of tech bros, foreign interference and disinformation is an urgent threat to press freedom

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Tom Felle, Associate Professor of Journalism, University of Galway

    Media freedom has long been essential to healthy democracy. It is the oxygen that fuels informed debate, exposes corruption and holds power to account. But around the world, that freedom is under sustained attack.

    The actions of populist political elites, tech billionaires and foreign disinformation campaigns are reinforcing one another. This is weakening independent journalism and reshaping the global public sphere.

    This convergence was on full display at US president Donald Trump’s 2025 inauguration. The presence of Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos and Mark Zuckerberg signalled that the tech elite are no longer simply disruptors. They are increasingly aligned with populist politics, a project openly hostile to independent journalism and democratic accountability.

    Nowhere is this clearer than on X (formerly Twitter). Musk’s takeover has transformed the platform into a breeding ground for conspiracy theories and misinformation, while systematically undermining the credibility of established media outlets. Meta’s decision to abandon factchecking political content in the US also marks a dangerous retreat from even the minimal efforts once made to curb disinformation.

    At its core, journalism’s role is simple but essential: to inform the public and hold power to account. Independent media – outlets free from government, political, or corporate control – are essential to democracy. They play a critical role in exposing corruption, amplifying marginalised voices, scrutinising government decisions and challenging abuses of power.

    When media organisations are weakened, this essential accountability collapses – allowing governments, politicians and corporations to operate unchecked. Minorities and vulnerable groups suffer most when no one is left to shine a light on abuse or discrimination. Human rights violations go unreported. Misinformation and rumour fill the void.

    That is precisely what is happening, not just in fragile states but in established democracies. Populist leaders have attacked journalists as enemies of the people and smeared media outlets that challenge them.

    Donald Trump infamously branded critical coverage as “fake news”. Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro vilified journalists who investigated corruption and environmental crimes. Hungary’s Viktor Orbán has systematically dismantled media independence. Slovakia’s Robert Fico called journalists “bloodthirsty bastards” and “possessed by the devil”.

    These leaders know that controlling the narrative is key to holding power. Discrediting the media is the first step.

    One of the clearest recent examples is the Trump administration’s shuttering of Voice of America (VOA). This move to silence a broadcaster that had promoted press freedom for over 80 years has been celebrated by authoritarian regimes. China’s state media mocked VOA as “discarded like a dirty rag”.

    Foreign threats

    What makes this moment uniquely dangerous is that these political attacks are now supercharged by technology platforms retreating from accountability, and exploited by hostile foreign powers.

    The latest European External Action Service (EEAS) Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threat Report paints a stark picture of how disinformation is used as a strategic weapon to weaken democracies from within.

    In 2024, the EEAS – the diplomatic service of the European Union – detected
    record levels of foreign manipulation, particularly from Russia and China. The EEAS recorded more than 500 coordinated manipulation campaigns targeting 90 countries.

    These included AI-generated deepfake videos impersonating European politicians, such as a fabricated video of Moldova’s president endorsing a pro-Russian party.

    Bot networks were deployed to amplify false narratives about migration and inflation, distorting online discourse and inflaming social divisions. Impersonation tactics cloning legitimate news websites like Le Monde and German media were used to disseminate pro-Kremlin disinformation. All these efforts were aimed at undermining trust in democratic institutions, inflaming social divisions and creating confusion.


    Want more politics coverage from academic experts? Every week, we bring you informed analysis of developments in government and fact check the claims being made.

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    Disinformation has become a standard geopolitical weapon, often used as a precursor to military or economic action. In the lead-up to its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia conducted a sustained disinformation campaign. Fabricated videos and false flag operations portrayed Ukraine as the aggressor to justify military action.

    Similarly, during the 2020-21 border clashes with India, China spread disinformation downplaying its military build-up while casting India as the instigator.

    Russia has also used disinformation to pursue economic goals, notably by spreading falsehoods about European renewable energy and gas supply stability, to influence energy policy and sow public doubt about the EU’s energy independence strategy.

    While this happens, platforms like Meta and X are retreating from content moderation and fact-checking. The result is a perfect storm where domestic populism, platform failure and foreign manipulation reinforce one another. Platforms like X have become the key battleground, accounting for 88% of detected disinformation activity.

    What’s at stake – and what must change

    As these threats grow, the traditional media model is collapsing. Advertising revenue – once the lifeblood of newspapers, radio, and television – has shifted almost entirely to digital platforms. Local newsrooms are closing, while investigative journalism is increasingly rare, expensive and risky.

    In the UK, more than 320 local papers have closed since 2009. Titles like the Evening Standard ended daily print in 2024 due to plummeting ad revenues. Across Europe, rising news deserts and newsroom cuts are weakening media’s democratic role.

    In the US, things are even worse – 3,200 newspapers have closed since 2005. More than half of all counties now have little or no local news coverage.

    As social media platforms abandon even basic content moderation, they create vast, ungoverned digital spaces where bad actors dominate the conversation.

    Into this gap flood social media influencers, partisan outlets and state-backed propaganda. The result is a fractured, polarised information ecosystem. Facts struggle to compete with viral misinformation and coordinated disinformation campaigns.

    News consumers must navigate a sea of misinformation and propaganda.
    Olezzo/Shutterstock

    In the end, it is citizens who pay the price, bombarded by propaganda and adrift in a sea of misinformation. This is not just a media problem, it is a fundamental threat to democracy itself. Without independent journalism, there is no one left to ask difficult questions, expose wrongdoing or defend the public interest.

    Protecting media freedom must now be treated as a democratic priority, as essential as free and fair elections or an independent judiciary. Governments need to regulate tech platforms effectively, enforcing transparency over algorithms and bringing in meaningful protections against disinformation.

    Public investment in journalism is critical to ensure the press can survive and hold power to account. Democracies must coordinate efforts to counter foreign information manipulation, and protect journalists facing harassment and threats from authoritarian regimes.

    The future of democratic accountability now depends on whether governments, regulators and the media can reclaim this space before it is lost entirely. Above all, this means recognising that journalism is not a luxury or a relic. It is a vital public good.

    Tom Felle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Perfect storm of tech bros, foreign interference and disinformation is an urgent threat to press freedom – https://theconversation.com/perfect-storm-of-tech-bros-foreign-interference-and-disinformation-is-an-urgent-threat-to-press-freedom-252986

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    May 3, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Welch Statement for World Press Freedom Day

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Peter Welch (D-Vermont)
    WASHINGTON, D.C.—U.S. Senator Peter Welch (D-Vt.), Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, released the following statement ahead of World Press Freedom Day, which is celebrated annually on May 3: 
    “A free press is essential, both here in America and internationally. It is vital that journalists are protected—not impeded, silenced, or threatened. 
    “The Trump White House has shown nothing but distain for the constitutionally-protected press, abusing the immense powers of the Executive by obstructing the media at all costs. President Trump has entered frivolous legal battles with press outlets he disagrees with. His administration has threatened and sought to block federal funding, including for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, PBS, NPR, the U.S. Agency for Global Media, and the Voice of America, among others. The FCC and the Department of Justice, pressured by President Trump, have targeted reporters. Freedom of the press is under attack in America.  
    “Reporters and members of the press are also targeted abroad, where many have been imprisoned, assaulted, and killed. This year alone, 15 journalists and media workers have been killed while reporting, 13 of them in Palestine, and one in Ukraine. Last year was the deadliest ever, with at least 124 killed, 82 of whom died in Palestine. 
    “On World Press Freedom Day I honor Dylan Collins, a Vermonter and talented video journalist for the AFP news agency. Dylan was attacked and wounded by Israeli Defense Forces while reporting in Southern Lebanon. Five of his colleagues were also hurt, and a fellow journalist traveling with him died. The Vermont Delegation met with Dylan after the attack by the IDF, and demanded the Department of State and the Department of Justice conduct credible and thorough investigations into the attack, which we believe violated U.S. and international law. To date, the U.S. government has failed to investigate this deplorable attack on an American journalist. I am committed to demanding accountability for Dylan and his colleagues. 
    “Freedom of the press is enshrined in the First Amendment. It is an essential part of our nation’s DNA. On World Press Freedom Day and every day, I will stand up for the safety and freedom of journalists—here in America and around the world.” 

    MIL OSI USA News –

    May 3, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Video: U.S.-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund

    Source: United States of America – Department of State (video statements)

    The U.S.-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund will drive economic growth, providing a solid foundation for Ukraine’s recovery from the war. This economic partnership marks a significant milestone in U.S.-Ukraine relations.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HiYKzMOD0r4

    MIL OSI Video –

    May 3, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: The Atlantic Council hosted French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Jean-Noël Barrot on Europe and the new world order.

    Source: France-Diplomatie – Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development

    Frederick Kempe: Good afternoon to those joining us in our headquarters, our relatively new global headquarters here in Washington today. Good evening to those watching online from Europe and the globe, to everyone joining us from throughout the world. My name is Frederick Kempe. I’m President and CEO of the Atlantic Council, and I’m delighted to welcome you to Atlantic Council Front Days. This is our premier platform for global leaders. And it’s an honor to host today the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, Jean-Noël Barrot. Today’s discussion turns our attention to one of the most enduring and consequential bilateral relationships in U.S. history.

    In the nearly two and a half centuries since France became the first country to formalize diplomatic relations with the newly born United States. Next year, Mr. Minister, is the anniversary of the revolution here. France became the first country to formalize diplomatic relations with the newly born United States. Since that time, this pillar of the transatlantic relationship has seen moments of triumph and moments of trial. From Lafayette and Washington to the beaches of Normandy, the United States, and France have forged partnership unlike any other based on common values in history. However, this relationship goes beyond just sentiment. At each major inflection point in recent history, our countries have stood together, not just because of friendship, but because of shared interests. And now, facing a war on European soil, basing an unfolding trade war, potentially rapidly evolving technological disruptions, and more, the United States and France must consider how to recalibrate and perhaps how to reinvent its partnership and the broader Atlantic alliance with it in order to achieve our common goals of security, prosperity, and freedom.

    As we think through how best to address these challenges, we are delighted to welcome Minister Barrot for today’s event and on the occasion of his first visit to the United States in his current role. The Minister has held numerous positions in the French government, including most recently Minister Delegate for Europe and then Minister Delegate for Digital Affairs, making him well-placed to share the French perspective on the political dynamics at the EU level as well as critical issues of digital and tech policy, and it may help in these times also to be a policy. Minister, welcome to the Atlantic Council. Before we begin let me just say to our audience that we will be taking questions. First, the Minister will make some opening comments Then I will join him on the stage and ask a few questions and then turn to the audience for questions. For those in person, we’ll have a microphone to pass around. For those online, please go to askac.org, askac.org to send your question in virtually. Minister Barrot, it’s always a pleasure to have someone speak at the end of meetings in Washington instead of the beginning of the meetings in Washington. So we look very much forward to your attention.

    Jean-Noël Barrot : Thank you very much, Mr. President. Hello, everyone. One week from now, on May 8th, we mark an important anniversary, the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe. This was the starting point of an extraordinary endeavor, a formidable building, a building of rule-based international order, a building of multilateralism. Who was the architect of this formidable building? Well, the architect of this building were the United States of America. They did not do this out of charity. They did this as out of enlightened self-interest. They collected substantial dividends from multilateralism throughout the eight decades that have just passed by. The dividends of multilateralism. Think about security. Thanks to the nonproliferation treaty, we collectively have avoided a raise to the nuclear bomb that would have caused so much instability and raised the cost of defense for all our countries.

    NATO has allowed the US, alongside its European partners, to ensure security in the North Atlantic, but also to offer major investment opportunities for its defense industry. Think about trade. WTO has allowed the US economy to grow, has allowed US services to thrive, digital services, financial services around the world. Think about currency. The Bretton Woods framework has made the dollar a global reserve currency. What does it mean to be a global reserve currency? It means that everyone wants to hold it. So that the yields on your treasury bonds are the lowest on earth. And even more than that, when there is a crisis, even when there is a crisis in the US, people rush to buy your treasury bonds, and the cost of borrowing goes down. This exorbitant privilege, as a French president coined it, is part of the dividends of multilateralism that the US brought to the world and that they also benefited from.

    This formidable building, the building of multilateralism, was designed 80 years ago for a unipolar world, where a benevolent hegemon, the United States of America, was the guarantor of rule-based international order. A world in which US leadership was unchallenged, untested. But eight years later, indeed, the world has changed. It has become multipolar, US leadership is challenged, And sometimes multilateralism seems powerless or unfit for power. And therefore, and gradually, a temptation arises for the US to perhaps let go of multilateralism, quit multilateralism, to pull back, to restrain it. This is our choice that belongs to the American people. But this would be a major shift, a major shift for the US, who would not be able to collect the dividends of multilateralism any longer, a major shift for the world, because the multilateralism will survive whether or not the US quits multilateralism. And so someone will fill the void starting with China, which was already getting ready to step up and to become the new hegemon of this new era of multilateralism, in the case where the US would decide to let them play this role.

    Now there is another route, there is an alternative route. Rather than quitting multilateralism, reshaping it, adjusting it, making it fit for the 21st century. The first step, and this is a difficult step, is accepting to share the power. in order not to lose it altogether. This means reforming the UN and its Security Council, reforming the financial infrastructure to make space for big emerging countries and share the burden with them, but also hold them responsible because they have part of the burden to share in handling the global issues and challenges. The second step when building multilateral for a multipolar world is to be ready to build coalitions of the willing to overcome obstruction in multilateral forum like the UN Security Council when they arise. It’s not because something won’t happen at the UN, at the IMF, or the World Bank, that you cannot design a coalition of the willing with willing and able countries in order to overcome this obstruction. This is the new era of multilateralism. This is the route that Europe is willing to take and that Europe is hoping to take alongside the United States of America.

    One week from now, we’ll celebrate another anniversary, not on May 8th, but on May 9th, the 75th anniversary of the birth of Europe. On May 9th of 1950, my distant predecessor, Robert Schuman, woke up in a country, France, that was five years past World War II, where tensions were rising with the neighbor and rival, Germany. Germany was recovering from the war faster than France was. And so what was the tendency in Paris on that day, in that year? Well, the tendency was protectionism, was raising tariffs, raising barriers to prevent Germans from thriving and fully recovered. And so Robert Schuman, as he was heading to the Council of Ministers, he had this crazy idea in mind to put in common steel and coal across France and Germany, swimming against the tide to favor cooperation over confrontation. At the Council of Ministers, he barely mentioned his initiative for his prime minister not to prevent him from announcing it. And at 6 p.m., in a one-minute and 30-second speech, he made this unilateral offer to create the European steel and coal community and make the foundation of a multilateral, cooperative European Union. So you see, when times are hard, and when the tendency is to restrain, pull back, raise barriers, Those visionary men that brought us prosperity and that brought us peace in the European continent, they swung against the tide and offered innovative models for cooperation. So let us find inspiration in the great work of these visionary people. Thank you very much.

    Frederick Kempe : I feel that was a very important statement and I’m gonna start with that. You see by the audience and standing room only that there was a lot of interest in this conversation and what you had to say : 75th anniversary of the birth of Europe, the 80th anniversary of the E.A., all next weekend, we’re calling attention to that. And it seemed really to be a call to your American allies and to the current administration to stay the course on multilateralism and transatlantic engagement, et cetera. So, A, do you intend to do that? And it’s no accident that no one in this audience who’s following the news, everyone knows that there are doubts right now in the transatlantic stream. Not all of them do I share, but I just wonder if you could give us a little bit more of the context of your statement.

    Jean-Noël Barrot : Well, we deeply care about the world-based international model of multilateralism. So I spent two days in New York at the Security Council as we were wrapping up our presence. You know, 15 members of the Security Council, they get one month’s presidency every 15 months. And so we try and make the most of your months-long presence. And to give you a sense of what our commitment is, I am, we are very committed to the three fundamental missions of the United Nations, peace and security, human rights, sustainable development. That’s why we had three bottom security meetings, Ukraine, Middle East, but also non-proliferation, in a closed-door Security Council meeting that was on proliferation. that was first convened in 15 years, or last convened in 15 years, 15 years ago. On human rights, we brought together, mentioning coalitions of the wing, international humanitarian law is under attack, let’s say. And we brought together countries from all around the world, east, south, west, and north, in a coalition of the willing to support politically and better implement in practice the rules of international humanitarian law. And then third, on sustainable development, we took this opportunity to bring together the countries that are the most committed, like we are, to the preservation of oceans, 40 days ahead of the third United Nations Conference on Oceans that will take place in Nice, south of France, and that is aimed to be the equivalent for ocean as what the Paris Accord has been for carbon emissions. So we’re very ambitious with this event as many countries as possible to rally some of the key deliverables of these countries. And so I decided I would spend some time at the UN talking about that.

    So we think this is the right way to go, adjusting multilateralism to make it more efficient in the multi-border world that we’re living in. And I hear that the new leadership in the US is considering what its course of action is going to be. And I think amongst friends that are actually oldest friends, we owe each other an honest discussion on what we see our common interest to be. And I think that was the sense of my introductory remarks. Thank you so much.

    Frederick Kempe : And I think you’ve seen a signal of commitment today, I think, toward the United Nations with the nomination of National Security Advisor Mike Walz to be the UN ambassador, so also an interesting piece of news. Speaking of news, you have had meetings here. We do have media, French, US, other here, and I wonder whether you could tell us your perspective on what do you take away from the conversations, Secretary Rubio, others, anything specific that we can take away from that? And then in that context, as you’re looking at what your greatest challenges are, what were the priorities in your conversations with U.S. leadership?

    Jean-Noël Barrot : Well, I mentioned the 9th of May and 75th anniversary of this declaration by Robert Truman. This year will be Ukraine, because I think a very important, significant chunk of our future, and I’m not talking about the future of Europeans only, depends on how this war of aggression is going to end. So we’ll be with my fellow European ministers of foreign affairs there to express our support to Ukraine and our willingness for this war to end in accordance with the UN Charter international rule. So that was clearly an important topic that I discussed with the US leadership at the State Department as well as Capitol Hill. But we also discussed Middle East, where France and the US have been leading the efforts to put an end to the war that was basically destroying Lebanon eight months ago. We managed to broker a ceasefire five months ago to monitor the ceasefire through a joint mechanism. We managed to bring the conditions for the end of the political crisis with the election of President Joseph Aoun. that then appointed the government, that is now at work trying to implement reforms that are long due in Lebanon. And we want to do the same thing, same food for cooperation in Syria, where this, after overturning the dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad, there is an opportunity to build a strong sovereign country that will be a source of stability rather than instability for the region. I cannot let aside Gaza and the Israel-Palestinian conflict, where again, we converge on the necessity to bring back stability and peace to the region. We have praised the Arab accord logic, and we’re working in the same direction, bringing peace to the region. Muslim and Arabic countries in the region and Israel towards security architecture that would ensure the security of all peace and stability. We also discussed Africa, where the U.S. made a breakthrough in handling or in sort of moving towards a cessation of hostilities in the Great Lakes regions in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo, where the second worst humanitarian crisis is happening right now. This is good. And after they were received or they were hosted by the Department of State, a few days ago, the DRC and Rwanda gathered in Qatar with France and with the United States. So as you can see, some of the major, major issues, major crises. France and the U.S. are working together in order to find the right solution. Sometimes it isn’t we. Sometimes we don’t start from the same point, but look at Lebanon. It’s because of our complementarity, because of different history in the region, because of the different nature of our partnership, relationship, friendship with the stakeholders of that crisis that we were able.

    Frederick Kempe : Thank you for that answer. Let’s start with Ukraine. News yesterday about critical minerals deal with Ukraine almost more interested in the political side of this than the economic side of this. Talking to Ukrainian officials over the last few months, they’ve been concerned that the U.S. gone more from being an actual partner of Ukraine in trying to counter Russian threat and the Russian attack, and more of an arbitrator, more of a moderator. This critical mineral deal, if you read the language of it, suggests a little bit of a change of direction. And I just wonder, and that is an area where France and the U.S. have not always been entirely singing from the same song sheet. What did you hear during your trip there? How do you assess this new agreement and its political meaning?

    Jean-Noël Barrot : Well, I think it’s a very good agreement. I think it’s a very good agreement for Ukraine and also for the U.S. But I also think that it tells us something very important about what’s happening right now. Let’s go back to the Oval Office when President Zelensky was there. What was the expectation by President Trump with respect to Ukraine? Well, actually, there were two expectations. Ceasefire and sign of a new deal. Since then, on March 9, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine accepted a comprehensive ceasefire. And yesterday night, they agreed to a mineral deal with the United States of America. They’ve done their part of the job. They’ve walked their part of the talk. But in the meantime, we haven’t seen Vladimir Putin send any signal, any sign of his willingness to comply with the requests of President Trump, to the very contrary. So let’s face it, right now, the main obstacle to peace is Vladimir Putin. So what I found very interesting in my meetings here in Washington is the efforts, the commendable efforts by Senator Lindsey Graham, who put together a massive package of sanctions that he collected bipartisan support for, with almost 70 senators now signing the bill which is aimed at threatening Russia into accepting a ceasefire, or else those sanctions will apply. And here again, we agree that we will try to coordinate because we, Europeans, are in the process of putting together the 17th sanction package that we are going to try, on substance and timing, to coordinate with Senator Graham’s own package. That was, perhaps, a bit of a long answer. But in summary, it’s good news that this deal was struck. It’s good news that the US, and I heard Secretary Besant express what he had in mind, the US was considering deep economic cooperation with Ukraine. It goes in the right direction. It’s the right course that they should, that should be taken.

    Frederick Kempe : And Secretary Bessent also said this is meant to be a signal to Putin. You see this as well.

    Jean-Noël Barrot : Yeah, put together this deal. The package by Lindsey Graham, who last time I checked is not a political adversary of President Trump, as well as the pressure that Europe is building up on Russia. And you get, the sense of the variant, it’s now basically Putin’s fault if we don’t yet have a ceasefire in the world.

    Frederick Kempe : So in recent discussions with US envoy Steve Witkoff, what divergences existed between France and the United States? And how do you hope to close those divergences? I guess part of this has to do with European troops, American backstop, but it also gets to the conditions behind a peace deal.

    Jean-Noël Barrot : If Ukraine was to capitulate, this would have long-lasting, wide-ranging consequences for the entire world. because it would basically replace rule-based international order by the law of the strongest. It would create massive incentives for countries around the world that that have border issues with their neighbors to consider that they can invade, that they can use military threats or force to obtain territorial concessions. This would be major, and this would be very costly for all of us, at least for responsible powers like the US and France that tend to get involved when there are issues around the world. When we would see issues exploding all around, it would be a major threat. In addition to that, should Ukraine capitulate after Ukraine has agreed to let go of its nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees. This will send the signal that the only ultimate security guarantee is the possession of nuclear weapons. And there we have a nuclear proliferation crisis, which again raises global instability at levels that we haven’t seen for the past 80 years, and will increase the cost massively of security in the US, security in Europe. And I think this view is shared between the U.S. and France. But of course, there is one difference between the perspective of the U.S. and the European perspective of this crisis, which is that our own security is at stake because we are neighbors of Russia or because we don’t want to be neighbors of this Russia that is now spending 40% of its budget on its military spending, 10% of its GDP, that just conscribed 160,000 additional soldiers, the largest conscription in 14 years. I’ve heard many, many times Russia say that they don’t want NATO at their borders. Well, we don’t want this Russia at our borders either. And that’s why we are so serious about what’s happening and about how the war will end. And that’s why we’ve been insisting so much about the security guarantees. And I think our message went through. And I think the US are counting on us to build the security arrangements such that when the peace deal is struck, that we can provide those security arrangements in order for the peace to be lasting and durable. But I think it’s well understood, and I’ve heard President Trump, but also officials from the US, clearly saying that of course they want this peace to be lasting, and of course this means that there is security guarantee.

    Frederick Kempe : And can it work without an American backstop where you’re getting closer to a conversation about that? Or, alternatively, is this critical minerals deal a security guarantee in a different form?

    Jean-Noël Barrot : So you should put things in two perspectives. We have been supporters of the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine. Namely, we said that we were open to extend an invitation, a NATO invitation to Ukraine. We understand that NATO members, not all NATO members, agree with our view, so we have to find an alternative path. The sense of this coalition of the able of the willing that France and the UK has been putting together in order to design those security arrangements. This is ongoing work. This starts with making the Ukrainian army strong enough to be able to deter any further aggression by Russia, but it also very likely means some form of military capacity as a second layer of sanction or guarantee. When those detailed discussions will have been wrapped up, they’re currently ongoing, it will appear whether or not and how much any contribution or backstop by the US is needed. It’s possible that it is needed. Why? Well, because as far as Europeans are concerned, we’ve been working. We’ve been working and planning for our defense. It’s a little bit different for France, the UK, and Poland. But for the rest of European armies, we’ve been working within NATO. So if you’re going to work on a security arrangement outside of NATO framework, then at some point, you might need some kind of NATO-like enablers or make items that are going to make sure that the security arrangements are robust. But that being said, in the same way, do we understand that the US have decided that they will likely reduce their commitment to. We also understand that they are counting on us to bear the burden of providing the security arrangements. But we also need to be honest with them once we’ve done our homework. If there are pieces of these security arrangements that cannot be found outside of US contribution, we’ll just be honest.

    Frederick Kempe : Thank you so much. The one thing you didn’t mention in your opening comments is you didn’t talk about tariffs. You knew I was going to say that. And I wondered if it came up at all in your discussions. And also, I wonder if you could talk a little bit about what this 90-day pause gives a potential for an agreement. What sort of agreement can you imagine, or what is the direction of agreement with the European Union and the United States? How concerned are you about the tariffs driving a more lasting wedge across the Atlantic?

    Jean-Noël Barrot : Well, the good thing when you’re a foreign minister or an FF minister from France is that you’re not in France working tariffs. That being said, you’re allowed to have your own view on things. And indeed, as an economist, I have to say, otherwise I would be a traitor to my profession, that tariffs are not a good idea. President Trump wants to bring jobs back to America, and this is a perfectly legitimate ambition. In fact, we have the same in Europe. We want to bring jobs back to Europe. But tariffs are probably not the best way to achieve this objective. Tariffs are a tax on our economy. It’s a tax on the middle class. And it will make us Europeans, as well as Americans, poor. We do have research on what happened during the last trade war, the 2018 trade war. What happened? Well, the effect on the economy on this side of the Atlantic was limited. It’s basically a $7 billion loss, $7 billion loss on the economy. That’s not big. But it led to a massive transfer from the US consumer, middle class, of $50 billion. So the loss for the US consumer of $50 billion transferred to producers, $9 billion, to the government, $35 billion. And the rest is what’s lost for the US economy. So it’s a mild loss. But it’s a massive transfer from the US consumers to the US government. That’s what happened last time around. And those numbers are small because the trade war at the time was very big. Multiply this by 10. And you’ll get the kind of effects that you’re going to see on European economies, U.S. economies, and so on. So our hope is to reach the same type of outcome that we got the last time around. The U.S. retaliated, we retaliated, and then at some point we suspended those who lifted those tariffs. It was not the same administration that did it, but still, those tariffs were lifted. And I really hope that we get to this objective because, again, we’re very closely intertwined economies, so we have a lot to lose, but we have major rivals, adversaries, competitors that are going to benefit massively from this framework if we sort of choose confrontation over cooperation.

    Frederick Kempe : So let me ask one more follow-up there, and then I’ll go to the audience. On the tariffs, didn’t you raise this issue when you were here, when you are the foreign minister, but it is a political as well as an economic issue. And did you get any indications of what direction ?

    Jean-Noël Barrot : Well, the good thing about being Marco Rubio is that you’re not in charge of terrorists either. But when we met in NATO, I told him that if there was only one positive aspect of those tariffs, is that by lowering GDPs, it would allow us to reach our NATO targets.

    First question from an author and journalist : We see re-entering a phase, a new intensive phase of big power rivalry with the United States retreating from security commitments in Europe, Russian military militarizing its society and having designs on other neighbors besides Ukraine and China seeking economic domination of the world. President Macron has spoken often about the need for Europe to achieve greater strategic autonomy. Do you think Europe should seek to constitute a fourth bloc, even at the risk of putting greater space with its principal ally, the United States? And a quick follow-up, you spoke about the need to share power in a multilateral context. In terms of UN Security Council reform, is France prepared to fold its seat into the European Union presence, or would you also agree to the idea of expanding the Security Council to have 10 to 12 nations? Thank you.

    Jean-Noël Barrot : So you mentioned Russia. You mentioned the four months. That was your first question. I wouldn’t go Russia a block. Russia has a GDP that is 20 times smaller than the EU. I wouldn’t call that a block. Russia is a big country geographically. It is one of the winning nations of the Second World War. So, there are a number of consequences coming with that, including the permanent seat of the Security Council. But I wouldn’t call Russia a block. And we don’t see ourselves, when we speak about strategic autonomy, we don’t see ourselves as entering into a logic of blocks or spheres of influence and stuff like that. We remain committed to multilateralism, rule-based international world order, balance. The only thing is that in a more brutal world, if you want to be heard and be respected, when you’re upholding the values that Europe and the EU upholding, freedom, democracy, free speech and so on, you’re going to need to be much stronger, much less dependent on other regions. And so we see our strategic autonomy as a way to defend the model, which is an open model, which is a balanced model, which is a multilateral model of governance for the world. And we see a lot of appetite for this approach, because since those trade wars started, we cannot count the number of countries that are knocking at EU’s door to strike a trade deal or even to become a candidate. And it’s not only Iceland and Norway that seem to be interested. I heard that on this side of the Atlantic, there are people considering. And you know that there is one geographical criteria. But I just want to mention that even though it’s a very, very, very, very tiny island in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, no one lives there. I think it’s like 20 meters long. But this island is split between Canada and Denmark, which gives Canada an actual border with the European Union. And the second question is about… I went quickly because I was told that we should not be long in the introduction of those conversations, but I really think that if we want to adjust those institutions, Security Council and so on, To the new era, we need to accept that others have grown over the past 18 years and they need to be represented, but they also need to take their responsibility. Some of them are no longer developing countries. They are actual major economies, major powers. So they should have a seat at the table, but they should also behave as major powers. So what’s our position? Our position is a permanent seat of the Security Council for India, Germany, Japan, Brazil, and two African countries with all associated priorities. This is what we want for the reform of the Security Council. But we also want the same kind of thing to happen with international financial institutions. And this is the spirit of what President Macron has called the Paris Act, or the Act for the People and the Planet, where the ideal is reform. No country in the south should have to choose between fighting against poverty and fighting against climate change. So it should be more balanced, more equal, equitable funding for southern countries. But those emerging countries from the South that are now developed economies should also bear their responsibilities with respect to the least developed countries, the poorest countries. Because right now, some of them are sort of bunching with the least advanced countries sort of take their responsibility with respect to the poor countries. So that’s the spirit in which we’re pushing. And in fact, I had a meeting dedicated to security council reform on Monday in New York with some of the African countries that were working on it.

    Frederick Kempe : Thank you for that good answer. While we’re open, we’ve got a lot of questions now. I saw this gentleman first. and then we’ll go, I’ll figure it out, we’ll figure it out. Anyone here that wants to, there we go, that’s what I’m gonna do next. There we go, please.

    Second question : In context with President Macron’s call to Prime Minister Modi of India in solidarity after the terror attack in Palgakush, India, do you see a justifiable response by India against this attack as another roadblock to ensuring the India-Middle East Corridor gets off the ground. Of course, it was set back after the Israel-Hamas war. And did that conversation come up in your discussion with Secretary Rubio today? And if not, then what do we need to do collectively as the international community to make sure this gets off the ground?

    Jean-Noël Barrot : Thank you, so President Macron has been in touch with Prime Minister Modi, I have been in touch two times with my fellow foreign minister from India. We expressed solidarity. We hope tensions not to escalate and I heard Secretary Rubio call Pakistan to formally recognize the terrorist nature of this attack and to condemn it in the strongest possible way. And I would happily join this call to Pakistan to recognize the terrorist nature of what happened. And we’ll keep in touch with Marco Rubio, but also with my fellow minister David Lamb from Great Britain, UK, and my Indian colleague, in order to ensure or to try and avoid procrastination in the region.

    Third question : Good afternoon, journalist from the French newspaper Le Monde. I have two questions, the first one regarding security guarantees for Ukraine. For months, France supported the idea of the deployment of some international monitoring force in Ukraine, but with a very strong American security guarantees. The Trump administration doesn’t seem to see eye to eye on this. They’re not inclined to offer any sort of serious security guarantees, so what’s the plan B? Have you given up on this two-fold idea or not? And the second question regarding Iran, there are currently very important discussions between the Trump administration directly and indirect with the Iranian representatives. For a very long time, France was in favor of putting on the table as well with Iran the ballistic issue. It doesn’t seem the case at all right now. The Trump administration is basically considering a sort of GCPOA revisited or maybe an interim agreement. So what’s your view exactly on the current discussions? Thank you.

    Jean-Noël Barrot : So on the first question, let me just clarify, because I think it’s important that everyone gets this right. There are two things. First, there is a ceasefire, and a ceasefire needs to be monitored. And the coalition of the able and willing put together by France and the UK have been working on proposals so that at the minute the ceasefire is broken, that the US have in their hands, because there will be that sort of origins of the ceasefire, solutions for this ceasefire to be monitored. And this might involve some European capacity just to check what’s happening in the line of contact and to be able to attribute violations. So that’s one thing. But the ceasefire is only one step towards what’s our end goal, which is a full-fledged peace treaty or peace agreement. This peace agreement that the Ukrainians and Russians will be discussing, but that was President Trump’s intuition, this discussion cannot happen while the war is happening in Ukraine. That’s why he did a ceasefire for the discussion. It will end up with discussions on territories and a discussion on security. And with the same question of the coalition of willing, we’re working on this second piece, which is security guarantee. But security guarantee has nothing to do with monitoring the ceasefire. Security guarantee is deterrence against any further aggression. How do you do that? As I was saying earlier, the first layer is to porcupine the Ukrainian army for it to be deterrent enough for anyone to try and invade. But then you probably have other layers, so military capacity deployed in Ukraine or around Ukraine, and that’s what we’re working on, and when the moment is right, we get to the Americans and ask them or tell them what is it we need for this security guarantee. And we’re working on this, and we’re confident, and again, as I was saying, I’ve heard President Trump in several occasions speak in a way that shows that he understands the importance of the security terms. And then on Iran, a very important topic that I should have mentioned in response to your first question, Mr. President, because this is a topic in which we’ve been coordinating with Marco Rubio from day one. We are supporting, encouraging the discussion that the U.S. opened with Iran. Why? Because Iran is posing a major threat to our security interests. Because we France, Marseille are within reach. And because our partners, close partners, in the region are also within reach. So we are very serious about this question. But we believe that there is no other route, no other path, and a diplomatic path to solve this issue. That there is no military solution to this issue and that any form of military attempt to solve this issue will have very large costs that we would not like to bear. So, in order for this discussion to be as successful as possible, we’ve been coordinating with the US on a substance and timing. substance because our teams have been working for the last few months ahead from the expiration of the GCP area, the nuclear agreement that was struck 10 years ago and that is expiring in the fall. So we were getting ready for this expiration a clear idea of indeed what might be a robust and protected field for us, and this would include indeed some of the ballistic components, but also the regional activities components. And the substance is sort of at the disposal of U.S. negotiators because it’s for free and there is no copyright. But we’re also coordinated on timing because we will not hesitate to reapply all the sanctions that we lifted in 10 years ago when GCPOA was struck. In the case where the IAEA confirms that Iran has violated its obligations under GCPOA, and if it happens that by the summer we will have a protected frontier that is sufficiently protected of our security interests.

    Frederick Kempe : So this has got to be the last question. I really apologize to others, but I saw that gentleman’s hand approach right through the middle. So, no, no. Yes, thank you. Yes. Thank you.

    Last question from a student from Sciences Po : I’d like to know what’s your opinion what’s your take on how france will balance its relationship with the U.S. and at the same time with China in light of the fact that France needs new partners and also in light of the fact that President Trump openly asked European leaders to direct ties with the PRC. Thank you.

    Frederick Kempe : And since this is the last question, let me add to it on the terror front because You know, in your conversations here, and you’ve spoken before about the relationship between the European Union and China on the trade front, does this terror policy drive Europe more into the hands of trade and economic relationships with China? And if you believe that, have you said that to your interlocutors here watching during your visit?

    Jean-Noël Barrot : I mean, it’s obvious, no? Whether you want it or not, look at one and read economic research. The numbers I quoted earlier are from a paper in the Portal Reform of Economics called the Returns to Protection. It’s the last paper on the 2018 trade war, last economic paper, research paper. But anyway, I will tell you that what happened last time is that during the 2018 trade war, it’s not like suddenly factories moved from one country to another. It was a reshuffling of international trade. So you’re going to see a lot of reshuffling. You mentioned, or you recall what I said, on China and filling the void. Listen to Chinese officials’ speeches now. And again, we take all of this with lots of grains of salt, but my colleague, Wang Li, now in all his speeches, he’s saying how much he cares about multilateralism. And I’m sure… No, seriously. And he will, I mean, I’m pretty sure that they will consider filling the void at the World Health Organization. I’m pretty sure that they will, anytime they will see some pullback, they will try to step in. Because they have two, there are two possible strategies. Either the U.S. are there, filling the void, then they will try to build sort of formats outside of the established formats that we’ve seen them do or they will see U.S. pull back and they will try fill the void. Now, what’s our relationship with China? As far as Europe is concerned. Again, we’re lucid. We’re not blind. And so we think there can be a trade agenda with China. So that’s some of the issues that we’ve are sold, which is not quite the case now. We’ve also had our trade war with China these past few years, with us sanctioning Chinese EVs and then sanctioning European cognac and armagnac. So this is dear to our hearts. And of course, it’s going to be difficult to engage into a natural trade agenda until those sort of contentious issues are solved. Then we can. But of course, our discussion cannot only touch upon trade. And when China is supporting Russia’s war on Russia, when China is on the side of DPRK, on the side of Iran, proliferating countries that are threatening this non-proliferation treaty and sort of the global stability, it’s difficult to build trust. If China was to establish a sort of trusted relationship with European countries, it will have to show also that it takes our security interests into account. Otherwise, it might be challenging.

    Frederick Kempe : Thank you. Do you have your answer? Yes, Fred, thank you. So, look, this, Minister Barrot, on behalf of the audience, on behalf of the Atlantic Council, thank you for three things. First of all, for your visit to the United States, a very timely visit, a very crucial moment. Second of all, for taking so much time with us at the Atlantic Council and talking so frankly and clearly in your opening statement and in this fascinating engagement, and then most of all for our enduring alliance. Thank you so much.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    May 3, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: When presidents try to make peace: What Trump could learn from Teddy Roosevelt, Carter, Clinton and his own first term

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Andrew E. Busch, Professor and Associate Director, Institute of American Civics, University of Tennessee

    U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, center, introduces Russian and Japanese delegates during negotiations at the Portsmouth Peace Conference in Kittery, Maine, in August 1905. Hulton Archive/Getty Images

    Throughout his 2024 campaign for the presidency, Donald Trump made diplomatic resolution of the Ukraine-Russia war a major priority, suggesting that he could bring peace within “24 hours.” Even before Trump resumed office in January 2025, as president-elect he named envoys and held preliminary discussions with a variety of leaders.

    Since Trump returned to the White House, he has talked with Russian leader Vladimir Putin, met twice with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and made frequent public comments on the war.

    How does Trump’s mediation effort stack up historically? I’m a scholar of the presidency, and while we don’t yet know the outcome of the Trump-led negotiations, we do know one thing: He’s not conducting them in the ways presidents – including Trump himself – have conducted them in the past.

    President Donald Trump erupted at Volodymyr Zelenskyy during a meeting on Feb. 28, 2025, angrily sending the Ukrainian leader out of the White House because he was ‘not ready’ for peace with Russia.
    Saul Loeb/AFP via Getty Images

    Some worked, others didn’t

    There are several examples of presidents who attempted to play a mediating role in foreign conflicts.

    Theodore Roosevelt: Roosevelt won a Nobel Peace Prize for his contributions to ending the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War, fought over control of Manchuria and Sakhalin Island. Roosevelt had been asked to mediate by Japan, and Russia agreed. In many ways, this episode marked the beginning of the role of the U.S. president as a world leader.

    Jimmy Carter: Carter’s greatest presidential success arguably came in the Camp David Accords, the framework for peace negotiated in 1978 between Israel and Egypt after decades of conflict. Carter did not win a Nobel Prize for his accomplishment, but Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin did.

    Bill Clinton: Clinton made two ambitious attempts to broker peace between old adversaries. One ended in success, the other in failure.

    Clinton’s envoy, former U.S. Sen. George Mitchell, mediated an accord between the British government, the Republic of Ireland and the warring factions in Northern Ireland that was signed on Good Friday 1998.

    On the other hand, one of Clinton’s greatest frustrations was a failed attempt to arrange peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Clinton blamed the failure on Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat walking away from a deal in 2000. Instead, peace efforts were supplanted by a Palestinian uprising that killed an estimated 1,053 Israeli civilians by early 2005.

    Dealing with a third situation – the wars set off by the disintegration of Yugoslavia– the Clinton administration also obtained an agreement over Bosnia in the 1995 Dayton Accords when the parties were sufficiently exhausted.

    Donald Trump: In his first presidency, Trump himself brokered the September 2000 Abraham Accords that established formal diplomatic relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco. The accords, brought about largely through negotiations led by Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, had strategic aims of putting greater pressure for peace on the Palestinians and strengthening a common front against Iran. (The Oct. 7, 2023, attacks on Israel by Hamas may have been an attempt to stop subsequent efforts to extend the Abraham Accords to Saudi Arabia.)

    Although all of these examples involved presidential leadership and involvement, they did not follow a single model.

    How they did it

    Former President Bill Clinton bows as he meets former U.S. Sen. George Mitchell, who spearheaded peace negotiations on behalf of Clinton that led to the end of 30 years of conflict in Northern Ireland.
    Liam McBurney/PA Images via Getty Images

    Roosevelt never attended the peace negotiations over the Russo-Japanese War in Portsmouth, but he actively offered proposals through intermediaries before and during the conference. The final stages of negotiation were held on his yacht, the Mayflower.

    Carter’s breakthrough came when he engaged in intense personal diplomacy at Camp David, where he, Sadat and Begin were sequestered for 13 days. To complete the deal, Carter had to shuffle back and forth between the principals and at one point had to make a frantic appeal to Sadat not to leave.

    Clinton’s unsuccessful efforts to broker an agreement between Arafat and a succession of Israeli prime ministers extended over the duration of his two-term presidency and frequently involved personal meetings and exchanges.

    On the other hand, Clinton’s involvement in the Northern Ireland resolution did not primarily come in the form of personal diplomacy at the end of the process. Rather, he set the conditions for a settlement earlier when he approved a visa for Irish Republican leader Gerry Adams to enter the U.S., against the wishes of Britain and Clinton’s own advisers.

    When Clinton went to Belfast for a Christmas tree lighting in 1995, he brought together Catholic leaders committed to the unification of Ireland and Protestant leaders loyal to Britain. First lady Hillary Clinton also contributed by meeting with Irish women’s organizations on both sides.

    In contrast, in the Dayton process Clinton was later portrayed by chief negotiator Richard Holbrooke as essentially disengaged.

    Not like the others

    Although each mediation effort was unique, there were some commonalities.

    First, where sensitive issues of land possession were involved, many of the negotiations benefited from privacy in the process.

    Second, successful mediations came most often when the U.S. was neutral, such as in the Portsmouth negotiations, or friendly toward both parties to some degree, such as with the Camp David, Good Friday and Abraham negotiations. Dayton was the exception in that the U.S. had become quite hostile toward the Serbs.

    In Ukraine, Trump is attempting to mediate a conflict in which, until now, the U.S. has been firmly and materially supportive of one side against the other. And he is attempting to do it by publicly making, so far, proposals that were destined to be toxic to the Ukrainian public.

    Trump appears to be violating the first rule above – no public negotiations over land – in order to chase compliance with the second, which is no mediation without neutrality. By, among other things, publicly offering proposals that the Ukrainians see as one-sided against them, Trump has largely erased the image of the U.S. as pro-Ukraine.

    This is a highly controversial and risky strategy that has damaged relations with U.S. allies and cost the U.S. moral capital in pursuit of an uncertain peace.

    Whatever success Trump ultimately achieves, it is little surprise that the effort, which has been pursued over a period of six months so far, has been more difficult than he anticipated.

    Andrew E. Busch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. When presidents try to make peace: What Trump could learn from Teddy Roosevelt, Carter, Clinton and his own first term – https://theconversation.com/when-presidents-try-to-make-peace-what-trump-could-learn-from-teddy-roosevelt-carter-clinton-and-his-own-first-term-255550

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    May 3, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: World Press Freedom Day: European Parliament reaffirms commitment to defend media freedom

    Source: European Union 2

    European Parliament President Roberta Metsola, Vice-President Sabine Verheyen and Culture and Education Committee Chair Nela Riehl stress the vital role of independent journalism.

    President Roberta Metsola said: “A free press is the best shield for democracy. Journalists must be free to report without fear of censorship, intimidation, or retaliation. The European Parliament will always defend and stand up for media and press freedom – not only on World Press Freedom Day, but every day.”

    Sabine Verheyen (EPP, DE), Vice-President of the European Parliament and chair of the Working Group on the implementation of the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) said:

    “On World Press Freedom Day, we reaffirm our commitment to one of the fundamental pillars of democracy: media freedom. Free, independent, and diverse journalism is essential to any democratic society. However, it remains under threat – even within some EU member states – and without it, democracy cannot function. The European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), passed in April 2024, is vital in addressing these challenges. It sends a strong message about the need to protect media diversity and journalistic independence across Europe. Media is more than just an industry – it shapes political discourse, drives cultural development, fosters social inclusion, and safeguards fundamental rights.

    “The EMFA represents a historic milestone for the EU: for the first time, a comprehensive European law is in place to uphold press freedom and media pluralism. We have made significant legislative progress in shielding journalists from political interference and economic pressure. But these protections now need to be actively enforced.

    “The EMFA is already taking effect. The first provisions have officially entered into force, with the next set to follow this month. By August 2025, the most significant parts of the law will come into effect, marking a major step in strengthening media freedom across the EU. However, the real impact of the EMFA depends on its implementation. That is why we are already monitoring the process closely to ensure that member states do not delay its enforcement. Press freedom cannot wait – we must act upon these commitments.

    “On this World Press Freedom Day, we have to remember the importance of standing firm in defending media freedom. Troubling global trends remind us that indifference is not an option. Even in Europe, we must remain vigilant in upholding our democratic values. Press freedom is the backbone of democracy – defending it means protecting our freedoms and the values we hold dear.”

    Nela Riehl (Greens, DE), Chair of the Committee on Culture and Education, said: “An independent press sector is an essential pillar of our democracy. We need a free press to hold our decision makers accountable, advance social change, and keep citizens informed. I am concerned about the drastic increase in young people’s exposure to news from unverified sources on social media. Quality journalism is competing with algorithms on social media platforms for our attention. To minimise the spread of harmful disinformation, the EU is now starting to regulate digital platforms, but we also need to improve media literacy, make sure people have access to accurate information, and provide education on media consumption.

    “This should be a high priority for civic education, with clear targets as we work towards improved democratic resilience across Europe. As a committee, we are pushing these challenges up the European education agenda, and we welcome the first steps in this direction under the Commission’s “Union of Skills” initiative.

    “My recent visit to Ukraine reminded me of the power of citizens to counter threats to democracy. When the manipulation of information is weaponised, strengthening and protecting people – namely independent journalists, reporters, media professionals, and volunteers – is a matter of security as well. Accordingly, this World Press Freedom Day, we also emphasise the need to make work environments safe for the independent press, with liveable working conditions, a supportive European infrastructure, and protection from persecution.”

    The chairs of the Civil Liberties Committee, the Human Rights Subcommittee and the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield are also issuing a statement to mark the World Press Freedom Day. You can read it here (available soon).


    How Parliament strengthens media freedom

    In early 2024, Parliament and Council adopted new rules to protect freedom of media and the independence of journalists in the EU. The provisions of the Media Freedom Act (EMFA) will become fully applicable in EU member states as of 8 August 2025.

    These provisions should ensure transparency of media outlet ownership and of allocation of state advertising, strengthen public media independence, and secure robust protection for journalists and their sources. To ensure visibility and pluralism, digital platforms will be prevented from arbitrarily deleting or restricting independent media content.

    A directive to protect journalists and civil society activists against strategic lawsuits seeking to silence critical voices must be transposed into national law in all EU member states by 7 May 2026.

    Every year, the European Parliament rewards outstanding journalism that promotes or defends the core principles and values of the European Union, such as human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law, and human rights. The fifth edition of the Daphne Caruana Galizia Prize for Journalism will be launched later this month.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    May 3, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Building Climate Resilience: OSCE Chairpersonship Event in Vienna

    Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – OSCE

    Headline: Building Climate Resilience: OSCE Chairpersonship Event in Vienna

    VIENNA, 2 May 2025 – Over 140 participants from OSCE Participating States, Partners for Co-operation, OSCE Institutions, civil society, and international organizations gathered in Vienna for the “Resilient Together in a Changing Climate” Chairpersonship Event, organized under Finland’s 2025 OSCE Chairpersonship on 28 to 29 April 2025.
    The event addressed the interconnected challenges of climate change, energy security, biodiversity protection, and political stability, emphasizing the need for comprehensive, inclusive approaches to enhance resilience across the OSCE area.
    Opening the event, Vesa Häkkinen, Chairperson of the OSCE Permanent Council and Permanent Representative of Finland to the OSCE, said, “The OSCE has been proactive in addressing the implications of environmental degradation, energy security, and climate change as part of its comprehensive concept for security.” In recognition of this year’s 50-year anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, he added that “respect for the OSCE’s core principles must remain the basis of all action”.
    In her keynote, Special Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office on Climate and Security Kerstin Stendahl underlined: “In today’s turbulent world, the concept of the triple planetary crisis is evolving into that of a polycrisis, which includes other elements of discord such as wars, financial crises, social inequalities, and technological disruptions.”
    Bakyt Dzhusupov, Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, focused on the need for resilient energy systems: “Developing climate-resilient energy systems that are adaptive, efficient, and innovative is essential — not only to confront rising challenges but also to advance secure, equitable, and reliable energy access for all.”
    Throughout the sessions, participants shared practical approaches to building resilience, discussed future scenarios for climate-related risks, and highlighted the importance of joint efforts across sectors and borders. The war against Ukraine featured in all sessions, with the Deputy Minister of Energy of Ukraine also appearing as high-level speaker.
    A field visit on 29 April offered participants the opportunity to observe local initiatives integrating renewable energy generation with biodiversity protection, underscoring the importance of addressing both energy development and ecosystem preservation in the context of climate resilience.
    Organized with the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, the event reflects Finland’s 2025 Chairpersonship priorities to enhance security through a whole-of-society approach to environmental challenges, climate change, and sustainable development.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    May 3, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Marex Group plc Announces Pricing of U.S.$500 Million Senior Notes Offering

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NEW YORK, May 02, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Marex Group plc (Nasdaq: MRX) (“Marex”), the diversified global financial services platform, announced the pricing on May 1, 2025 of a public offering (the “Offering”) of U.S.$500 million aggregate principal amount of its 5.829% Senior Notes due 2028 (the “Notes”). The Notes will be issued at a price to the public equal to 100.000% of the principal amount thereof and will be senior unsecured obligations of Marex.

    The Offering is expected to close on or about May 8, 2025, subject to the satisfaction of customary closing conditions. Marex intends to use the net proceeds from the Offering for working capital, to fund incremental growth and for other general corporate purposes.

    Ian Lowitt, CEO of Marex, commented:

    “This successful debt issuance further diversifies our sources of funding and enables the continued expansion of our business, bolstering our liquidity so we can support our clients. We are pleased to have seen very strong investor interest for these notes, demonstrating continued confidence in our client-driven business model, prudent approach to capital and our liquidity profile.”

    Barclays, Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC and Jefferies are acting as joint book-runners for the Offering.

    The Offering is being made pursuant to Marex’s existing effective shelf registration statement on Form F-3 filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”). The Offering will be made only by means of a preliminary prospectus supplement and its accompanying base prospectus. You may obtain copies of these documents for free by visiting the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov or by calling Barclays Capital Inc. toll-free at (888) 603-5847, Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC toll-free at (866) 471-2526 or Jefferies LLC toll-free at (877) 877-0696.

    This press release does not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy the Notes or any other security, and shall not constitute an offer, solicitation or sale in any jurisdiction in which such offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful.

    Forward looking statements

    This release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. All statements contained in this release that do not relate to matters of historical fact should be considered forward-looking statements, including the expected closing date of the Offering. In some cases, these forward-looking statements can be identified by words or phrases such as “may,” “will,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “aim,” “estimate,” “intend,” “plan,” “believe,” “potential,” “continue,” “is/are likely to” or other similar expressions. These forward-looking statements are subject to risks, uncertainties and assumptions, some of which are beyond our control. In addition, these forward-looking statements reflect our current views with respect to future events and are not a guarantee of future performance. Actual outcomes may differ materially from the information contained in the forward-looking statements as a result of a number of factors, including, without limitation: subdued commodity market activity or pricing levels; the effects of geopolitical events, terrorism and wars, such as the effect of Russia’s military action in Ukraine or the on-going conflicts in the Middle East, on market volatility, global macroeconomic conditions and commodity prices; changes in interest rate levels; the risk of our clients and their related financial institutions defaulting on their obligations to us; regulatory, reputational and financial risks as a result of our international operations; software or systems failure, loss or disruption of data or data security failures; an inability to adequately hedge our positions and limitations on our ability to modify contracts and the contractual protections that may be available to us in OTC derivatives transactions; market volatility, reputational risk and regulatory uncertainty related to commodity markets, equities, fixed income, foreign exchange; the impact of climate change and the transition to a lower carbon economy on supply chains and the size of the market for certain of our energy products; the impact of changes in judgments, estimates and assumptions made by management in the application of our accounting policies on our reported financial condition and results of operations; lack of sufficient financial liquidity; if we fail to comply with applicable law and regulation, we may be subject to enforcement or other action, forced to cease providing certain services or obliged to change the scope or nature of our operations; significant costs, including adverse impacts on our business, financial condition and results of operations, and expenses associated with compliance with relevant regulations; and if we fail to remediate the material weaknesses we identified in our internal control over financial reporting or prevent the occurrence of material weaknesses in the future, the accuracy and timing of our financial statements may be impacted, which could result in material misstatements in our financial statements or failure to meet our reporting obligations and subject us to potential delisting, regulatory investments or civil or criminal sanctions, and other risks discussed under the caption “Risk Factors” in our preliminary prospectus supplement for the Offering and its accompanying base prospectus filed with the SEC, and our other reports filed with the SEC.

    The forward-looking statements made in this release relate only to events or information as of the date on which the statements are made in this release. Except as required by law, we undertake no obligation to update or revise publicly any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, after the date on which the statements are made or to reflect the occurrence of unanticipated events.

    Enquiries please contact:

    Marex:
    Nicola Ratchford / Adam Strachan
    +44 778 654 8889 / +1 914 200 2508 | nratchford@marex.com/ astrachan@marex.com

    FTI Consulting US / UK
    +1 (919) 609-9423 / +44 (0) 7776 111 222 | marex@fticonsulting.com

    The MIL Network –

    May 3, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: International operation uncovers large scale scheme laundering hundreds of millions of euros

    Source: Eurojust

    The suspect is the son of a prominent entrepreneur in Ukraine, who owned a defence company. Following the Russian invasion, profits began to decline, and the owners are suspected of having illegally sold their majority stake to representatives of a foreign state.

    To hide the illegal profits gained from the sale, the owner’s son bought properties, in several countries including France and Monaco. He is believed to have subsequently laundered hundreds of millions of euros in profits.

    In France alone, he is suspected of having laundered over EUR 57 million between 2010 and 2023. He also laundered profits from illegal arms sales by his father, the owner of the defence company. Soon after opening a money laundering investigation, the French authorities froze the suspects’ assets worth EUR 57 million with the intention of returning them to Ukraine.

    Investigations continued in the framework of a joint investigation team (JIT) set up at Eurojust, facilitating the judicial cooperation between the three countries. French, Ukrainian and Monegasque authorities worked together with support from Eurojust to establish a judicial strategy and exchange information on the illegal activities.

    Their collaboration resulted in the arrest of the son in Monaco on 28 April. The French, Ukrainian and Monegasque authorities are currently questioning him as part of the JIT. During the operation, several documents of value to the investigation were discovered in Monaco. The owner of the defence company is already on trial in Ukraine for crimes against national security and is now suspected of money laundering as well.

    The following authorities carried out the operations:

    • France: JUNALCO (National Jurisdiction against Organised Crime); Public Prosecution Office Paris; ONAF (National Office against Fraud)
    • Ukraine: Prosecutor General’s Office; Security Service of Ukraine
    • Monaco: Prosecutor General’s Office of Monaco; Directorate of Public Safety

    MIL Security OSI –

    May 2, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Donald Trump has cast a long shadow over the Australian election. Will it prove decisive?

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Emma Shortis, Adjunct Senior Fellow, School of Global, Urban and Social Studies, RMIT University

    Donald Trump is everywhere, inescapable. His return to power in the United States was always going to have some impact on the Australian federal election. The question was how disruptive he would be.

    The answer is very – but not in the ways we might have thought.

    As soon as Trump was elected president, the political debate in Australia focused on whether Prime Minister Anthony Albanese or Opposition Leader Peter Dutton would be best suited to managing him – and keeping the US-Australia security alliance intact.

    Initially, at least, this conversation was predictable.

    The Coalition looked set to continue an ideological alignment with Trumpism that had flourished under the prime ministership of Scott Morrison. Dutton prosecuted the argument that given his party’s experience with the first Trump administration, it would be better placed than Labor to handle the second.

    Albanese, meanwhile, appeared caught off guard by Trump’s victory and timid in his response.

    But as has become all too clear, the second Trump administration is radically different from the first. That has rattled the right of Australian politics and worked to Labor’s advantage.

    A turning point at the White House

    In January, the Coalition announced that NT Senator Jacinta Nampijinpa Price had been appointed shadow minister for government efficiency – a direct importation of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) being led by Elon Musk in the US.

    In a barely disguised imitation of the Trump administration’s attacks on “diversity, equity and inclusion” (DEI) measures, members of the Coalition, including Price, singled out Welcome to Country ceremonies as evidence of the kind of “wasteful” spending it would cut.

    When the Coalition seemed to be riding high in the polls, Dutton, too, nodded at “wokeism” and singled out young white men feeling “disenfranchised”.

    Soon after, however, this began to change. The first few weeks of Trump’s second term were marked by a cascade of executive actions targeting trans people, climate action and immigration. Trump and his new appointees began the process of radically reshaping the United States and its role in the world.

    In February, polling by the independent think tank The Australia Institute found Australians saw Trump as a bigger threat to world peace than Russian President Vladimir Putin or Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

    And then Volodymyr Zelensky went to the White House.

    The Ukrainian president was humiliated in an Oval Office meeting with Trump and Vice President JD Vance, laying bare how the administration was willing to treat the leader of an ally devastated by a war it hadn’t started.

    Trump’s territorial threats towards Canada and Greenland, in addition to his dismissive statements about European allies, shattered the long-held assumptions about the US as a force for stability in the world.

    MAGA ideology isn’t ‘pick and choose’

    After this incident, Dutton was careful to distance himself from Trump’s abandonment of Ukraine. He even went so far as to say that leadership might require “standing up to your friends and to those traditional allies because our views have diverged”.

    Similarly, influential Coalition powerbroker Peta Credlin wrote in The Australian:

    it’s hard to see America made great again if the Trump administration’s message to the world is that the strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must.

    Therein lies the bind for the Coalition – an ideological alignment with “Make America Great Again” cannot be fully reconciled with a nationalism that puts Australian interests first.

    MAGA ideology is all-or-nothing, not pick-and-choose.

    During the election campaign, the Coalition attempted to walk the path of “pick-and-choose”. And Labor quite successfully used this against them. Assertions the opposition leader was nothing but a “Temu Trump”, or “DOGE-y Dutton”, stuck because they had at least a ring of truth to them.

    The opposition’s pledge to dramatically reduce the size of the public service, for example, was clearly linked to Musk’s efforts at DOGE to take a chainsaw to the public service in the US. This idea has been deeply unpopular with Australian voters, and the Coalition has faced innumerable questions about it.

    For all the talk of “shared values” and how essential the US alliance is to Australian security, this campaign shows that Australia is not like America.

    Most Australians concerned about Trump’s impact

    When Trump’s tariffs arrived on “Liberation Day” in early April, both leaders claimed they were best placed to negotiate.

    Albanese insisted Australia had got one of the best results in the world, while Dutton asserted, without evidence, that he would be able to negotiate a better one.

    More broadly, the Trump tariffs have contributed to a growing sense of unease in the electorate.

    A recent YouGov poll found that 66% of Australians no longer believe the US can be relied on for defence and security. According to Paul Smith, the director of YouGov, this is a “fundamental change of worldview”.

    In the same poll, 71% of Australians also said they were either concerned or very concerned Trump’s policies would make Australia worse off.

    While neither party has signalled it would make a fundamental shift in Australia’s alliance with the US if elected, that doesn’t mean changes aren’t possible.

    Independents and minor parties may well play a significant role in the formation of the next government. Some, like Zoe Daniel and Jacqui Lambie, are increasingly vocal about the risks the Trump administration poses to Australia.

    A limit to Trumpism’s appeal

    As election day approaches, many of the assumptions driving conventional Australian political thinking are under pressure.

    Labor’s recovery in the polls, and the Liberals’ election win in Canada, suggest assumptions about the dangers of incumbency might have been misplaced. The dissatisfaction with incumbent governments last year may have had more to do with unresponsive political parties and systems.

    There’s evidence emerging, instead, that in more responsive democracies with robust institutions like Australia and Canada, Trumpism does not have great appeal.

    The idea that “kindness is not a weakness” may yet prove to be a winning political strategy.

    Emma Shortis is Director of International and Security Affairs at The Australia Institute, an independent think tank.

    – ref. Donald Trump has cast a long shadow over the Australian election. Will it prove decisive? – https://theconversation.com/donald-trump-has-cast-a-long-shadow-over-the-australian-election-will-it-prove-decisive-255422

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    May 2, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Radware Launches New Cloud Security Service Centers in India and Kenya

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    MAHWAH, N.J., May 02, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Radware® (NASDAQ: RDWR), a global leader in application security and delivery solutions for multi-cloud environments, announced the launch of new cloud security service centers in Chennai and Mumbai, India, and Nairobi, Kenya. Today, Radware supports a network of more than 50 cloud security service centers worldwide with a mitigation capacity up to 15Tbps.

    Radware’s global network of data centers mitigates attacks closest to their point of origin. This helps organizations improve application response times for in-region traffic and reduce mitigation response times against a variety of attacks, including denial-of-service attacks, web application attacks, malicious bot traffic, and attacks on APIs. It also helps them keep data within their borders to meet strict data privacy regulations.

    According to Radware’s 2025 Global Threat Analysis Report, Web DDoS attacks, which appear as high intensity, Layer 7 application attacks, surged globally 550%, while web application and API attacks rose 41% between 2023 and 2024.

    “Our ongoing investments in our security network continue to play an important role in our cloud security growth strategy,” said Haim Zelikovsky, vice president of cloud security services for Radware. “Cloud innovation is central to our mission in providing customers industry-leading cyber protection, reliability, and availability at a time when cyber threats are not only increasing in frequency and magnitude but also sophistication.”

    Radware has received numerous awards for its DDoS mitigation, application and API protection, web application firewall, and bot detection and management solutions. Industry analysts such as Aite-Novarica Group, Forrester, Gartner, GigaOm, IDC, KuppingerCole and QKS Group continue to recognize Radware as a market leader in cyber security.

    About Radware
    Radware® (NASDAQ: RDWR) is a global leader in application security and delivery solutions for multi-cloud environments. The company’s cloud application, infrastructure, and API security solutions use AI-driven algorithms for precise, hands-free, real-time protection from the most sophisticated web, application, and DDoS attacks, API abuse, and bad bots. Enterprises and carriers worldwide rely on Radware’s solutions to address evolving cybersecurity challenges and protect their brands and business operations while reducing costs. For more information, please visit the Radware website.

    Radware encourages you to join our community and follow us on: Facebook, LinkedIn, Radware Blog, X, and YouTube.

    ©2025 Radware Ltd. All rights reserved. Any Radware products and solutions mentioned in this press release are protected by trademarks, patents, and pending patent applications of Radware in the U.S. and other countries. For more details, please see: https://www.radware.com/LegalNotice/. All other trademarks and names are property of their respective owners.

    Radware believes the information in this document is accurate in all material respects as of its publication date. However, the information is provided without any express, statutory, or implied warranties and is subject to change without notice.

    The contents of any website or hyperlinks mentioned in this press release are for informational purposes and the contents thereof are not part of this press release.

    Safe Harbor Statement
    This press release includes “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Any statements made herein that are not statements of historical fact, including statements about Radware’s plans, outlook, beliefs, or opinions, are forward-looking statements. Generally, forward-looking statements may be identified by words such as “believes,” “expects,” “anticipates,” “intends,” “estimates,” “plans,” and similar expressions or future or conditional verbs such as “will,” “should,” “would,” “may,” and “could.” For example, when we say in this press release that cyber threats are not only increasing in frequency and magnitude but also sophistication, we are using forward-looking statements. Because such statements deal with future events, they are subject to various risks and uncertainties, and actual results, expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements, could differ materially from Radware’s current forecasts and estimates. Factors that could cause or contribute to such differences include, but are not limited to: the impact of global economic conditions, including as a result of the state of war declared in Israel in October 2023 and instability in the Middle East, the war in Ukraine, tensions between China and Taiwan, financial and credit market fluctuations (including elevated interest rates), impacts from tariffs or other trade restrictions, inflation, and the potential for regional or global recessions; our dependence on independent distributors to sell our products; our ability to manage our anticipated growth effectively; our business may be affected by sanctions, export controls, and similar measures, targeting Russia and other countries and territories, as well as other responses to Russia’s military conflict in Ukraine, including indefinite suspension of operations in Russia and dealings with Russian entities by many multi-national businesses across a variety of industries; the ability of vendors to provide our hardware platforms and components for the manufacture of our products; our ability to attract, train, and retain highly qualified personnel; intense competition in the market for cybersecurity and application delivery solutions and in our industry in general, and changes in the competitive landscape; our ability to develop new solutions and enhance existing solutions; the impact to our reputation and business in the event of real or perceived shortcomings, defects, or vulnerabilities in our solutions, if our end-users experience security breaches, or if our information technology systems and data, or those of our service providers and other contractors, are compromised by cyber-attackers or other malicious actors or by a critical system failure; our use of AI technologies that present regulatory, litigation, and reputational risks; risks related to the fact that our products must interoperate with operating systems, software applications and hardware that are developed by others;  outages, interruptions, or delays in hosting services; the risks associated with our global operations, such as difficulties and costs of staffing and managing foreign operations, compliance costs arising from host country laws or regulations, partial or total expropriation, export duties and quotas, local tax exposure, economic or political instability, including as a result of insurrection, war, natural disasters, and major environmental, climate, or public health concerns; our net losses in the past and the possibility that we may incur losses in the future; a slowdown in the growth of the cybersecurity and application delivery solutions market or in the development of the market for our cloud-based solutions; long sales cycles for our solutions; risks and uncertainties relating to acquisitions or other investments; risks associated with doing business in countries with a history of corruption or with foreign governments; changes in foreign currency exchange rates; risks associated with undetected defects or errors in our products; our ability to protect our proprietary technology; intellectual property infringement claims made by third parties; laws, regulations, and industry standards affecting our business; compliance with open source and third-party licenses; complications with the design or implementation of our new enterprise resource planning (“ERP”) system; our reliance on information technology systems; our ESG disclosures and initiatives; and other factors and risks over which we may have little or no control. This list is intended to identify only certain of the principal factors that could cause actual results to differ. For a more detailed description of the risks and uncertainties affecting Radware, refer to Radware’s Annual Report on Form 20-F, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the other risk factors discussed from time to time by Radware in reports filed with, or furnished to, the SEC. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date on which they are made and, except as required by applicable law, Radware undertakes no commitment to revise or update any forward-looking statement in order to reflect events or circumstances after the date any such statement is made. Radware’s public filings are available from the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov or may be obtained on Radware’s website at www.radware.com.

    Media Contact:
    Gerri Dyrek
    Radware
    Gerri.Dyrek@radware.com

    The MIL Network –

    May 2, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Prime Minister hails game changing UK-made RAF drones

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    Press release

    Prime Minister hails game changing UK-made RAF drones

    Hundreds of highly skilled jobs are being supported by the RAF’s new cutting-edge UK made drones.

    • New British-made ‘StormShroud’ drones are at the cutting edge of defence combat air, taking advantage of learnings from countering Putin’s illegal war in Ukraine
    • Brand new tech supports hundreds of jobs and shows investment in UK defence is driving economic growth, making communities better off, and bolstering national security by delivering on the Plan for Change
    • Getting from the factory to the frontline at an unprecedented pace, the drones will fly alongside crewed aircraft as part of crucial RAF frontline missions, to knock out enemy air defences
    • Tekever, who manufacture the drones, announce a further £400 million investment in the UK

    Hundreds of highly skilled jobs are being supported by the RAF’s new cutting-edge UK made drones, known as ‘StormShroud’, which come into operation today (Friday 2 May), as the Prime Minister further bolsters UK national security. 

    It is the latest boost to the UK’s defence capabilities as the armed forces reap the benefits from Ukraine’s battlefield experience, and comes as the UK continues to play a leading role in peace negotiations, including building momentum in talks between leaders in Rome last weekend. The UK is also driving forward Coalition of the Willing planning as well as accelerating UK-Ukrainian defence industrial cooperation.

    The StormShroud drone is a groundbreaking first-of-its-kind drone that will make the RAF’s world-class combat aircraft more survivable and more lethal. The drones offer a step change in capability by using a high-tech BriteStorm signal jammer to disrupt enemy radar at long ranges, protecting our aircraft and pilots. In revolutionary new tactics, the drones support aircraft like Typhoon and F35 Lightning, by confusing enemy radars and allowing combat aircraft to attack targets unseen. This means for the first time, the RAF will benefit from high-end electronic warfare without needing crew to man it, freeing them up for other vital frontline missions.  

    The RAF is investing an initial £19 million into the cutting-edge drones, which are made in the UK and directly support 200 highly skilled engineering jobs at multiple UK locations already from West Wales to Somerset, with further opportunities expected in future. StormShroud is just the first of a family of next-generation drones – known as Autonomous Collaborative Platforms (ACPs) – being delivered to the RAF.

    The Tekever AR3 and AR5 have had extensive use on the frontline fighting Putin’s illegal war, racking up more than 10,000 hours of flight for Ukraine’s forces. The RAF is taking the next step by integrating best-in-class signal scrambling technology into the drones to boost the UK’s defences at home, as the Prime Minister steps up UK defence capabilities to counter complex threats in the face of global instability. 

    In a further vote of confidence in Britain’s defence industry, British-Portuguese tech company Tekever, who manufacture the drones in the UK, plan to invest a further £400 million over the next 5 years across the UK and create up to 1,000 more highly skilled jobs. 

    The Prime Minister will visit to a Leonardo UK site in the South East today to see first-hand the expertise that goes into manufacturing the drones, and meeting the staff involved in delivering it, including many engineering apprentices representing the next generation of British defence industry excellence.

    As well as stepping up to protect our interests on the world stage, this government’s commitment to increase defence spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2027 means more secure, well-paid jobs for a generation that’s proud to keep our country safe. 

    Just last week, the Carrier Strike Group launched its eight-month deployment and will join exercises, operations and visits with 30 countries across the Mediterranean, Middle East, south-east Asia, Japan and Australia – led by the Royal Navy’s largest and most powerful aircraft carrier, HMS Prince of Wales. The deployment sends a powerful message that the UK and its allies stand ready to protect vital trade routes in the Indo-Pacific region.

    Prime Minister Keir Starmer said: 

    Investment in our defence is an investment in this country’s future.  Putting money behind our Armed Forces and defence industry is safeguarding our economic and national security by putting money back in the pockets of hard-working British people and protecting them for generations to come.

    Together with our allies, this government is taking the bold action needed to stand up to Putin and ruthlessly protect UK and European security, which is vital for us to deliver our Plan for Change and improve lives of working people up and down the country. 

    It is a privilege to meet and learn from the young minds driving innovation in defence technology, and we will continue to invest in the industries of the future to deliver security and opportunity for the British people through our Plan for Change.

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    Published 2 May 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    May 2, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Shell Plc 1st Quarter 2025 Unaudited Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

                                 
    SHELL PLC
    1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS
           
                                             
     
    SUMMARY OF UNAUDITED RESULTS
    Quarters $ million    
    Q1 2025 Q4 2024 Q1 2024 %¹   Reference      
    4,780    928    7,358    +415 Income/(loss) attributable to Shell plc shareholders        
    5,577    3,661    7,734    +52 Adjusted Earnings A      
    15,250    14,281    18,711    +7 Adjusted EBITDA A      
    9,281    13,162    13,330    -29 Cash flow from operating activities        
    (3,959)   (4,431)   (3,528)     Cash flow from investing activities        
    5,322    8,731    9,802      Free cash flow G      
    4,175    6,924    4,493      Cash capital expenditure C      
    8,575    9,401    8,997    -9 Operating expenses F      
    8,453    9,138    9,054    -7 Underlying operating expenses F      
    10.4% 11.3% 12.0%   ROACE D      
    76,511    77,078    79,931      Total debt E      
    41,521    38,809    40,513      Net debt E      
    18.7% 17.7% 17.7%   Gearing E      
    2,838    2,815    2,911    +1 Oil and gas production available for sale (thousand boe/d)        
    0.79    0.15    1.14 +427 Basic earnings per share ($)        
    0.92    0.60    1.20    +53 Adjusted Earnings per share ($) B      
    0.3580    0.3580    0.3440    — Dividend per share ($)        

    1.Q1 on Q4 change

    Quarter Analysis1

    Income attributable to Shell plc shareholders, compared with the fourth quarter 2024, reflected lower exploration well write-offs, lower operating expenses and higher Products margins.

    First quarter 2025 income attributable to Shell plc shareholders also included a charge of $0.5 billion related to the UK Energy Profits Levy and impairment charges. These items are included in identified items amounting to a net loss of $0.8 billion in the quarter. This compares with identified items in the fourth quarter 2024 which amounted to a net loss of $2.8 billion.

    Adjusted Earnings and Adjusted EBITDA2 were driven by the same factors as income attributable to Shell plc shareholders and adjusted for the above identified items.

    Cash flow from operating activities for the first quarter 2025 was $9.3 billion and primarily driven by Adjusted EBITDA, partly offset by tax payments of $2.9 billion and working capital outflows of $2.7 billion. The working capital outflows mainly reflected accounts receivable and payable movements.

    Cash flow from investing activities for the first quarter 2025 was an outflow of $4.0 billion, and included cash capital expenditure of $4.2 billion, and net other investing cash outflows of $0.9 billion which included the drawdowns on loan facilities provided at completion of the sale of The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited (SPDC) in Nigeria, partly offset by divestment proceeds of $0.6 billion.

    Net debt and Gearing: At the end of the first quarter 2025, net debt was $41.5 billion, compared with $38.8 billion at the end of the fourth quarter 2024. This reflects free cash flow of $5.3 billion, which included working capital outflows of $2.7 billion, more than offset by share buybacks of $3.3 billion, cash dividends paid to Shell plc shareholders of $2.2 billion, lease additions of $1.3 billion including those related to the Pavilion Energy Pte. Ltd. acquisition and interest payments of $0.8 billion. Gearing was 18.7% at the end of the first quarter 2025, compared with 17.7% at the end of the fourth quarter 2024, mainly driven by higher net debt.


    SHELL PLC
    1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

    Shareholder distributions

    Total shareholder distributions in the quarter amounted to $5.5 billion comprising repurchases of shares of $3.3 billion and cash dividends paid to Shell plc shareholders of $2.2 billion. Dividends declared to Shell plc shareholders for the first quarter 2025 amount to $0.3580 per share. Shell has now completed $3.5 billion of share buybacks announced in the fourth quarter 2024 results announcement. Today, Shell announces a share buyback programme of $3.5 billion which is expected to be completed by the second quarter 2025 results announcement.

    This Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report, together with supplementary financial and operational disclosure for this quarter, is available at www.shell.com/investors 3.

    1.All earnings amounts are shown post-tax, unless stated otherwise.

    2.Adjusted EBITDA is without interest, taxation, exploration well write-offs and depreciation, depletion and amortisation (DD&A) expenses.

    3.Not incorporated by reference.

    PORTFOLIO DEVELOPMENTS

    Integrated Gas

    In March 2025, we completed the previously announced acquisition of 100% of the shares in Pavilion Energy Pte. Ltd. (Pavilion Energy). Pavilion Energy, headquartered in Singapore, operates a global LNG trading business with contracted supply volume of approximately 6.5 million tonnes per annum (mtpa).

    Upstream

    In January 2025, we announced the start of production at the Shell-operated Whale floating production facility in the Gulf of America. The Whale development is owned by Shell (60%, operator) and Chevron U.S.A. Inc. (40%).

    In February 2025, we announced production restart at the Penguins field in the UK North Sea with a modern floating, production, storage and offloading (FPSO) facility (Shell 50%, operator; NEO Energy 50%). The previous export route for this field was via the Brent Charlie platform, which ceased production in 2021 and is being decommissioned.

    In February 2025, we signed an agreement to acquire a 15.96% working interest from ConocoPhillips Company in the Shell-operated Ursa platform in the Gulf of America. The transaction completed on May 1, 2025 which increases Shell’s working interest in the Ursa platform from 45.3884% to 61.3484%.

    In March 2025, we completed the sale of SPDC to Renaissance, as announced in January 2024.

    In March 2025, we announced the Final Investment Decision (FID) for Gato do Mato, a deep-water project in the pre-salt area of the Santos Basin, offshore Brazil. The Gato do Mato Consortium includes Shell (operator, 50%), Ecopetrol (30%), TotalEnergies (20%) and Pré-Sal Petróleo S.A. (PPSA) acting as the manager of the production sharing contract (PSC).

    Chemicals and Products

    In January 2025, CNOOC and Shell Petrochemicals Company Limited (CSPC), a 50:50 joint venture between Shell and CNOOC Petrochemicals Investment Ltd, took an FID to expand its petrochemical complex in Daya Bay, Huizhou, south China.

    In April 2025, we completed the previously announced sale of our Energy and Chemicals Park in Singapore to CAPGC Pte. Ltd. (CAPGC), a joint venture between Chandra Asri Capital Pte. Ltd. and Glencore Asian Holdings Pte. Ltd.

    In April 2025, we agreed to sell our 16.125% interest in Colonial Enterprises, Inc. (“Colonial”) to Colossus AcquireCo LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Brookfield Infrastructure Partners L.P. and its institutional partners (collectively, “Brookfield”), for $1.45 billion. The transaction is subject to regulatory approvals and is expected to close in the fourth quarter of 2025.

    Renewables and Energy Solutions

    In January 2025, we completed the previously announced acquisition of a 100% equity stake in RISEC Holdings, LLC, which owns a 609-megawatt (MW) two-unit combined-cycle gas turbine power plant in Rhode Island, USA.

             Page 2


    SHELL PLC
    1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

    PERFORMANCE BY SEGMENT

                                             
                       
    INTEGRATED GAS        
    Quarters $ million                
    Q1 2025 Q4 2024 Q1 2024 %¹   Reference      
    2,789    1,744    2,761    +60 Income/(loss) for the period        
    306    (421)   (919)     Of which: Identified items A      
    2,483    2,165    3,680    +15 Adjusted Earnings A      
    4,735    4,568    6,136    +4 Adjusted EBITDA A      
    3,463    4,391    4,712    -21 Cash flow from operating activities A      
    1,116    1,337    1,041      Cash capital expenditure C      
    126    116    137    +9 Liquids production available for sale (thousand b/d)        
    4,644    4,574    4,954    +2 Natural gas production available for sale (million scf/d)        
    927    905    992    +2 Total production available for sale (thousand boe/d)        
    6.60    7.06    7.58    -6 LNG liquefaction volumes (million tonnes)        
    16.49    15.50    16.87    +6 LNG sales volumes (million tonnes)        

    1.Q1 on Q4 change

    Integrated Gas includes liquefied natural gas (LNG), conversion of natural gas into gas-to-liquids (GTL) fuels and other products. It includes natural gas and liquids exploration and extraction, and the operation of the upstream and midstream infrastructure necessary to deliver these to market. Integrated Gas also includes the marketing, trading and optimisation of LNG.

    Quarter Analysis1

    Income/(loss) for the period was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings and includes identified items.

    Adjusted Earnings, compared with the fourth quarter 2024, reflected lower exploration well write-offs ($277 million), partly offset by lower LNG liquefaction volumes (decrease of $68 million). The net effect of contributions from trading and optimisation and realised prices was in line with the fourth quarter 2024 despite higher unfavourable (non-cash) impact of expiring hedging contracts.

    Identified items in the first quarter 2025 included favourable movements of $362 million due to the fair value accounting of commodity derivatives, that as part of Shell’s normal business are entered into as hedges for mitigation of economic exposures on future purchases, sales and inventory. These favourable movements compare with the fourth quarter 2024 which included impairment charges of $339 million and a loss of $96 million related to sale of assets, partly offset by favourable movements of $109 million due to the fair value accounting of commodity derivatives.

    Adjusted EBITDA2 was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings.

    Cash flow from operating activities for the quarter was primarily driven by Adjusted EBITDA, and net cash inflows related to derivatives of $542 million, partly offset by tax payments of $773 million and working capital outflows of $687 million.

    Total oil and gas production, compared with the fourth quarter 2024, increased by 2% mainly due to lower planned maintenance in Pearl GTL (Qatar), partly offset by unplanned maintenance and weather constraints in Australia. LNG liquefaction volumes decreased by 6% mainly due to unplanned maintenance and weather constraints in Australia.

    1.All earnings amounts are shown post-tax, unless stated otherwise.

    2.Adjusted EBITDA is without interest, taxation, exploration well write-offs and DD&A expenses.

             Page 3


    SHELL PLC
    1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

                                             
                       
    UPSTREAM          
    Quarters $ million                
    Q1 2025 Q4 2024 Q1 2024 %¹   Reference      
    2,080    1,031    2,272    +102 Income/(loss) for the period        
    (257)   (651)   339      Of which: Identified items A      
    2,337    1,682    1,933    +39 Adjusted Earnings A      
    7,387    7,676    7,888    -4 Adjusted EBITDA A      
    3,945    4,509    5,727    -13 Cash flow from operating activities A      
    1,923    2,076    2,010      Cash capital expenditure C      
    1,335    1,332    1,331    — Liquids production available for sale (thousand b/d)        
    3,020    3,056    3,136    -1 Natural gas production available for sale (million scf/d)        
    1,855    1,859    1,872    — Total production available for sale (thousand boe/d)        

    1.Q1 on Q4 change

    The Upstream segment includes exploration and extraction of crude oil, natural gas and natural gas liquids. It also markets and transports oil and gas, and operates the infrastructure necessary to deliver them to the market.

    Quarter Analysis1

    Income/(loss) for the period was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings and includes identified items.

    Adjusted Earnings, compared with the fourth quarter 2024, reflected lower exploration well write-offs ($346 million), lower depreciation, depletion and amortisation expenses (decrease of $330 million), lower operating expenses ($194 million) and comparative favourable tax movements ($179 million), partly offset by lower volumes (decrease of $359 million).

    Identified items in the first quarter 2025 included a charge of $509 million related to the UK Energy Profits Levy, partly offset by gains of $159 million from disposal of assets and gains of $95 million related to the impact of the strengthening Brazilian real on a deferred tax position. These charges and favourable movements compare with the fourth quarter 2024 which included a loss of $161 million related to the impact of the weakening Brazilian real on a deferred tax position, and impairment charges of $152 million.

    Adjusted EBITDA2 was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings.

    Cash flow from operating activities for the first quarter 2025 was primarily driven by Adjusted EBITDA, partly offset by tax payments of $1,999 million and working capital outflows of $913 million.

    Total production, compared with the fourth quarter 2024, decreased mainly due to the SPDC divestment, largely offset by new oil production.

    1.All earnings amounts are shown post-tax, unless stated otherwise.

    2.Adjusted EBITDA is without interest, taxation, exploration well write-offs and DD&A expenses.

             Page 4


    SHELL PLC
    1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

                                             
                       
    MARKETING        
    Quarters $ million                
    Q1 2025 Q4 2024 Q1 2024 %¹   Reference      
    814    103    896    +688 Income/(loss) for the period        
    (49)   (736)   (7)     Of which: Identified items A      
    900    839    781    +7 Adjusted Earnings A      
    1,869    1,709    1,686    +9 Adjusted EBITDA A      
    1,907    1,363    1,319    +40 Cash flow from operating activities A      
    256    811    465      Cash capital expenditure C      
    2,674    2,795    2,763    -4 Marketing sales volumes (thousand b/d)        

    1.Q1 on Q4 change

    The Marketing segment comprises the Mobility, Lubricants, and Sectors and Decarbonisation businesses. The Mobility business operates Shell’s retail network including electric vehicle charging services and the Wholesale commercial fuels business which provides fuels for transport, industry and heating. The Lubricants business produces, markets and sells lubricants for road transport, and machinery used in manufacturing, mining, power generation, agriculture and construction. The Sectors and Decarbonisation business sells fuels, speciality products and services including low-carbon energy solutions to a broad range of commercial customers including the aviation, marine, and agricultural sectors.

    Quarter Analysis1

    Income/(loss) for the period was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings and includes identified items.

    Adjusted Earnings, compared with the fourth quarter 2024, reflected lower operating expenses (decrease of $69 million), and higher Marketing margins (increase of $54 million) mainly due to higher Lubricants unit margins and seasonal impact of higher volumes partly offset by lower Mobility margins due to seasonal impact of lower volumes and lower Sectors and Decarbonisation margins. These net gains were partly offset by unfavourable tax movements ($109 million).

    Identified items in the first quarter 2025 included net losses of $61 million related to sale of assets. These losses compare with the fourth quarter 2024 which included impairment charges of $458 million, and net losses of $247 million related to sale of assets.

    Adjusted EBITDA2 was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings.

    Cash flow from operating activities for the first quarter 2025 was primarily driven by Adjusted EBITDA, inflows relating to the timing impact of payments related to emission certificates and biofuel programmes of $540 million, and dividends (net of profits) from joint ventures and associates of $203 million. These inflows were partly offset by working capital outflows of $344 million and tax payments of $174 million.

    Marketing sales volumes (comprising hydrocarbon sales), compared with the fourth quarter 2024, decreased mainly due to seasonality.

    1.All earnings amounts are shown post-tax, unless stated otherwise.

    2.Adjusted EBITDA is without interest, taxation, exploration well write-offs and DD&A expenses.

             Page 5


    SHELL PLC
    1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

                                             
                       
    CHEMICALS AND PRODUCTS        
    Quarters $ million                
    Q1 2025 Q4 2024 Q1 2024 %¹   Reference      
    (77)   (276)   1,311    +72 Income/(loss) for the period        
    (581)   (99)   (458)     Of which: Identified items A      
    449    (229)   1,615    +296 Adjusted Earnings A      
    1,410    475    2,826    +197 Adjusted EBITDA A      
    130    2,032    (349)   -94 Cash flow from operating activities A      
    458    1,392    500      Cash capital expenditure C      
    1,362    1,215    1,430    +12 Refinery processing intake (thousand b/d)        
    2,813    2,926    2,883    -4 Chemicals sales volumes (thousand tonnes)        

    1.Q1 on Q4 change

    The Chemicals and Products segment includes chemicals manufacturing plants with their own marketing network, and refineries which turn crude oil and other feedstocks into a range of oil products which are moved and marketed around the world for domestic, industrial and transport use. The segment also includes the pipeline business, trading and optimisation of crude oil, oil products and petrochemicals, and Oil Sands activities (the extraction of bitumen from mined oil sands and its conversion into synthetic crude oil).

    Quarter Analysis1

    Income/(loss) for the period was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings and includes identified items.

    Adjusted Earnings, compared with the fourth quarter 2024, reflected higher Products margins (increase of $546 million) mainly driven by higher margins from trading and optimisation and higher refining margins. Adjusted Earnings also reflected higher Chemicals margins (increase of $115 million). In addition, the first quarter 2025 reflected lower operating expenses (decrease of $134 million). These net gains were partly offset by comparative unfavourable tax movements ($96 million).

    In the first quarter 2025, Chemicals had negative Adjusted Earnings of $137 million and Products had positive Adjusted Earnings of $586 million.

    Identified items in the first quarter 2025 included impairment charges of $277 million, and unfavourable movements of $202 million due to the fair value accounting of commodity derivatives, that as part of Shell’s normal business are entered into as hedges for mitigation of economic exposures on future purchases, sales and inventory. These charges and unfavourable movements compare with the fourth quarter 2024 which included impairment charges of $224 million, partly offset by favourable deferred tax movements of $114 million..

    Adjusted EBITDA2 was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings.

    Cash flow from operating activities for the first quarter 2025 was primarily driven by Adjusted EBITDA, and inflows relating to the timing impact of payments relating to emission certificates and biofuel programmes of $125 million. These inflows were partly offset by working capital outflows of $1,081 million, and net cash outflows relating to commodity derivatives of $508 million.

    Chemicals manufacturing plant utilisation was 81% compared with 75% in the fourth quarter 2024, mainly due to lower planned and unplanned maintenance.

    Refinery utilisation was 85% compared with 76% in the fourth quarter 2024, mainly due to lower planned maintenance.

    1.All earnings amounts are shown post-tax, unless stated otherwise.

    2.Adjusted EBITDA is without interest, taxation, exploration well write-offs and DD&A expenses.

             Page 6


    SHELL PLC
    1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

                                             
                       
    RENEWABLES AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS        
    Quarters $ million                
    Q1 2025 Q4 2024 Q1 2024 %¹   Reference      
    (247)   (1,226)   553    +80 Income/(loss) for the period        
    (205)   (914)   390      Of which: Identified items A      
    (42)   (311)   163    +87 Adjusted Earnings A      
    111    (123)   267    +190 Adjusted EBITDA A      
    367    850    2,466    -57 Cash flow from operating activities A      
    403    1,277    438      Cash capital expenditure C      
    76    76    77    +1 External power sales (terawatt hours)2        
    184    165    190    +12 Sales of pipeline gas to end-use customers (terawatt hours)3        

    1.Q1 on Q4 change

    2.Physical power sales to third parties; excluding financial trades and physical trade with brokers, investors, financial institutions, trading platforms, and wholesale traders.

    3.Physical natural gas sales to third parties; excluding financial trades and physical trade with brokers, investors, financial institutions, trading platforms, and wholesale traders. Excluding sales of natural gas by other segments and LNG sales.

    Renewables and Energy Solutions includes activities such as renewable power generation, the marketing and trading and optimisation of power and pipeline gas, as well as carbon credits, and digitally enabled customer solutions. It also includes the production and marketing of hydrogen, development of commercial carbon capture and storage hubs, investment in nature-based projects that avoid or reduce carbon emissions, and Shell Ventures, which invests in companies that work to accelerate the energy and mobility transformation.

    Quarter Analysis1

    Income/(loss) for the period was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings and includes identified items.

    Adjusted Earnings, compared with the fourth quarter 2024, reflected higher margins (increase of $99 million) mainly due to higher trading and optimisation in the Americas as a result of higher seasonal demand and volatility, lower operating expenses (decrease of $90 million) and comparative favourable tax movements ($89 million). Most Renewables and Energy Solutions activities were loss-making in the first quarter 2025, which was partly offset by positive Adjusted Earnings from trading and optimisation.

    Identified items in the first quarter 2025 included a charge of $143 million related to the disposal of assets. These charges compare with the fourth quarter 2024 which included impairment charges of $996 million mainly relating to renewable generation assets in North America, partly offset by favourable movements of $50 million due to the fair value accounting of commodity derivatives, that as part of Shell’s normal business are entered into as hedges for mitigation of economic exposures on future purchases, sales and inventory.

    Adjusted EBITDA2 was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings.

    Cash flow from operating activities for the first quarter 2025 was primarily driven by net cash inflows relating to working capital of $380 million and Adjusted EBITDA, partially offset by outflows related to derivatives of $169 million.

    1.All earnings amounts are shown post-tax, unless stated otherwise.

    2.Adjusted EBITDA is without interest, taxation, exploration well write-offs and DD&A expenses.

    Additional Growth Measures

                                             
    Quarters      
    Q1 2025 Q4 2024 Q1 2024 %¹          
            Renewable power generation capacity (gigawatt):        
    3.5    3.4    3.2    +4 – In operation2        
    4.0    4.0    3.5    -1 – Under construction and/or committed for sale3        

    1.Q1 on Q4 change

    2.Shell’s equity share of renewable generation capacity post commercial operation date. It excludes Shell’s equity share of associates where information cannot be obtained.

    3.Shell’s equity share of renewable generation capacity under construction and/or committed for sale under long-term offtake agreements (PPA). It excludes Shell’s equity share of associates where information cannot be obtained.

             Page 7


    SHELL PLC
    1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

                                     
                 
    CORPORATE      
    Quarters $ million          
    Q1 2025 Q4 2024 Q1 2024   Reference    
    (483)   (335)   (354)   Income/(loss) for the period      
    (26)   45    14    Of which: Identified items A    
    (457)   (380)   (368)   Adjusted Earnings A    
    (261)   (24)   (92)   Adjusted EBITDA A    
    (531)   16    (545)   Cash flow from operating activities A    

    The Corporate segment covers the non-operating activities supporting Shell. It comprises Shell’s holdings and treasury organisation, headquarters and central functions, self-insurance activities and centrally managed longer-term innovation portfolio. All finance expense, income and related taxes are included in Corporate Adjusted Earnings rather than in the earnings of business segments.

    Quarter Analysis1

    Income/(loss) for the period was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings and includes identified items.

    Adjusted Earnings, compared with the fourth quarter 2024, reflected unfavourable currency exchange rate effects, partly offset by lower operating expenses.

    Adjusted EBITDA2 was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings.

    1.All earnings amounts are shown post-tax, unless stated otherwise.

    2.Adjusted EBITDA is without interest, taxation, exploration well write-offs and DD&A expenses.

             Page 8


    SHELL PLC
    1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

    OUTLOOK FOR THE SECOND QUARTER 2025

    Full year 2024 cash capital expenditure was $21 billion. Our cash capital expenditure range for the full year 2025 is expected to be within $20 – $22 billion.

    Integrated Gas production is expected to be approximately 890 – 950 thousand boe/d. LNG liquefaction volumes are expected to be approximately 6.3 – 6.9 million tonnes. Second quarter 2025 outlook reflects scheduled maintenance across the portfolio.

    Upstream production is expected to be approximately 1,560 – 1,760 thousand boe/d. Production outlook reflects the SPDC divestment in March 2025 and the scheduled maintenance across the portfolio.

    Marketing sales volumes are expected to be approximately 2,600 – 3,100 thousand b/d.

    Refinery utilisation is expected to be approximately 87% – 95%. Chemicals manufacturing plant utilisation is expected to be approximately 74% – 82%. Second quarter 2025 utilisation outlook reflects the sale of the Energy and Chemicals Park in Singapore which was completed in April 2025.

    Corporate Adjusted Earnings1 were a net expense of $457 million for the first quarter 2025. Corporate Adjusted Earnings are expected to be a net expense of approximately $400 – $600 million in the second quarter 2025.

    1.For the definition of Adjusted Earnings and the most comparable GAAP measure see reference A.

    FORTHCOMING EVENTS

               
     
    Date Event
    May 20, 2025 Annual General Meeting
    July 31, 2025 Second quarter 2025 results and dividends
    October 30, 2025 Third quarter 2025 results and dividends

             Page 9


    SHELL PLC
    1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

    UNAUDITED CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED INTERIM FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

                               
     
    CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF INCOME    
    Quarters $ million  
    Q1 2025 Q4 2024 Q1 2024      
    69,234    66,281    72,478    Revenue1    
    615    (156)   1,318    Share of profit/(loss) of joint ventures and associates    
    302    683    907    Interest and other income/(expenses)2    
    70,152    66,807    74,703    Total revenue and other income/(expenses)    
    45,849    43,610    46,867    Purchases    
    5,549    5,839    5,810    Production and manufacturing expenses    
    2,840    3,231    2,975    Selling, distribution and administrative expenses    
    185    331    212    Research and development    
    210    861    750    Exploration    
    5,441    7,520    5,881    Depreciation, depletion and amortisation2    
    1,120    1,213    1,164    Interest expense    
    61,194    62,605    63,659    Total expenditure    
    8,959    4,205    11,044    Income/(loss) before taxation    
    4,083    3,164    3,604    Taxation charge/(credit)2    
    4,875    1,041    7,439    Income/(loss) for the period    
    95    113    82    Income/(loss) attributable to non-controlling interest    
    4,780    928    7,358    Income/(loss) attributable to Shell plc shareholders    
    0.79    0.15    1.14    Basic earnings per share ($)3    
    0.79    0.15    1.13    Diluted earnings per share ($)3    

    1.See Note 2 “Segment information”.

    2.See Note 7 “Other notes to the unaudited Condensed Consolidated Interim Financial Statements”.

    3.See Note 3 “Earnings per share”.

                               
                 
    CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF COMPREHENSIVE INCOME    
    Quarters $ million        
    Q1 2025 Q4 2024 Q1 2024      
    4,875    1,041    7,439    Income/(loss) for the period    
          Other comprehensive income/(loss) net of tax:    
          Items that may be reclassified to income in later periods:    
    1,711    (4,899)   (1,995)   – Currency translation differences1    
    6    (11)   (6)   – Debt instruments remeasurements    
    (25)   224    53    – Cash flow hedging gains/(losses)    
    (42)   (50)   (14)   – Deferred cost of hedging    
    74    (91)   (12)   – Share of other comprehensive income/(loss) of joint ventures and associates    
    1,723    (4,827)   (1,974)   Total    
          Items that are not reclassified to income in later periods:    
    306    239    439    – Retirement benefits remeasurements    
    (16)   (50)   78    – Equity instruments remeasurements    
    (36)   46    10    – Share of other comprehensive income/(loss) of joint ventures and associates    
    254    235    528    Total    
    1,977    (4,592)   (1,445)   Other comprehensive income/(loss) for the period    
    6,852    (3,552)   5,994    Comprehensive income/(loss) for the period    
    105    50    56    Comprehensive income/(loss) attributable to non-controlling interest    
    6,748    (3,602)   5,937    Comprehensive income/(loss) attributable to Shell plc shareholders    

    1.See Note 7 “Other notes to the unaudited Condensed Consolidated Interim Financial Statements”.

             Page 10


    SHELL PLC
    1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

                     
     
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET
    $ million    
      March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024
    Assets    
    Non-current assets    
    Goodwill 16,072    16,032   
    Other intangible assets1 11,365    9,480   
    Property, plant and equipment 183,712    185,219   
    Joint ventures and associates 24,236    23,445   
    Investments in securities 2,284    2,255   
    Deferred tax 6,989    6,857   
    Retirement benefits 10,266    10,003   
    Trade and other receivables 7,269    6,018   
    Derivative financial instruments² 400    374   
      262,593    259,683   
    Current assets    
    Inventories 22,984    23,426   
    Trade and other receivables 48,247    45,860   
    Derivative financial instruments² 8,941    9,673   
    Cash and cash equivalents 35,601    39,110   
      115,773    118,069   
    Assets classified as held for sale1 10,881    9,857   
      126,654    127,926   
    Total assets 389,248    387,609   
    Liabilities    
    Non-current liabilities    
    Debt 65,120    65,448   
    Trade and other payables 5,487    3,290   
    Derivative financial instruments² 1,565    2,185   
    Deferred tax 13,257    13,505   
    Retirement benefits 6,756    6,752   
    Decommissioning and other provisions 20,313    21,227   
      112,498    112,407   
    Current liabilities    
    Debt 11,391    11,630   
    Trade and other payables 60,870    60,693   
    Derivative financial instruments² 6,371    7,391   
    Income taxes payable 4,343    4,648   
    Decommissioning and other provisions 5,104    4,469   
      88,079    88,831   
    Liabilities directly associated with assets classified as held for sale1 8,001    6,203   
      96,080    95,034   
    Total liabilities 208,578    207,441   
    Equity attributable to Shell plc shareholders 178,813    178,307   
    Non-controlling interest 1,856    1,861   
    Total equity 180,670    180,168   
    Total liabilities and equity 389,248    387,609   

    1.    See Note 7 “Other notes to the unaudited Condensed Consolidated Interim Financial Statements”.

    2.    See Note 6 “Derivative financial instruments and debt excluding lease liabilities”.

             Page 11


    SHELL PLC
    1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

                                                         
     
    CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN EQUITY
      Equity attributable to Shell plc shareholders      
    $ million Share capital1 Shares held in trust Other reserves² Retained earnings Total Non-controlling interest   Total equity
    At January 1, 2025 510    (803)   19,766    158,834    178,307    1,861      180,168   
    Comprehensive income/(loss) for the period —    —    1,967    4,780    6,748    105      6,852   
    Transfer from other comprehensive income —    —    11    (11)   —    —      —   
    Dividends³ —    —    —    (2,179)   (2,179)   (86)     (2,265)  
    Repurchases of shares4 (8)   —    8    (3,513)   (3,513)   —      (3,513)  
    Share-based compensation —    500    (663)   (405)   (567)   —      (567)  
    Other changes —    —    —    23    22    (24)     (2)  
    At March 31, 2025 502    (304)   21,090    157,527    178,813    1,856      180,670   
    At January 1, 2024 544    (997)   21,145    165,915    186,607    1,755      188,362   
    Comprehensive income/(loss) for the period —    —    (1,420)   7,358    5,937    56      5,994   
    Transfer from other comprehensive income —    —    138    (138)   —    —      —   
    Dividends3 —    —    —    (2,210)   (2,210)   (68)     (2,278)  
    Repurchases of shares4 (7)   —    7    (3,502)   (3,502)   —      (3,502)  
    Share-based compensation —    543    (426)   (392)   (275)   —      (275)  
    Other changes —    —    —    8    8    (4)     4   
    At March 31, 2024 537    (455)   19,445    167,038    186,565    1,739      188,304   

    1.    See Note 4 “Share capital”.

    2.    See Note 5 “Other reserves”.

    3.    The amount charged to retained earnings is based on prevailing exchange rates on payment date.

    4.     Includes shares committed to repurchase under an irrevocable contract and repurchases subject to settlement at the end of the quarter.

             Page 12


    SHELL PLC
    1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

                                     
     
    CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF CASH FLOWS    
    Quarters $ million  
    Q1 2025   Q4 2024 Q1 2024      
    8,959      4,205    11,044    Income before taxation for the period    
            Adjustment for:    
    636      665    576    – Interest expense (net)    
    5,441      7,520    5,881    – Depreciation, depletion and amortisation1    
    28      649    554    – Exploration well write-offs    
    127      288    (10)   – Net (gains)/losses on sale and revaluation of non-current assets and businesses    
    (615)     156    (1,318)   – Share of (profit)/loss of joint ventures and associates    
    523      1,241    738    – Dividends received from joint ventures and associates    
    854      131    (608)   – (Increase)/decrease in inventories    
    (2,610)     751    (195)   – (Increase)/decrease in current receivables    
    (907)     1,524    (1,949)   – Increase/(decrease) in current payables    
    (244)     111    1,386    – Derivative financial instruments    
    (100)     (58)   (61)   – Retirement benefits    
    (480)     (256)   (600)   – Decommissioning and other provisions    
    570      (856)   509    – Other1    
    (2,900)     (2,910)   (2,616)   Tax paid    
    9,281      13,162    13,330    Cash flow from operating activities    
    (3,748)     (6,486)   (3,980)      Capital expenditure    
    (413)     (421)   (500)      Investments in joint ventures and associates    
    (15)     (17)   (13)      Investments in equity securities    
    (4,175)     (6,924)   (4,493)   Cash capital expenditure    
    559      493    323    Proceeds from sale of property, plant and equipment and businesses    
    33      305    133    Proceeds from joint ventures and associates from sale, capital reduction and repayment of long-term loans    
    5      6    569    Proceeds from sale of equity securities    
    508      581    577    Interest received    
    506      1,762    857    Other investing cash inflows    
    (1,394)     (655)   (1,494)   Other investing cash outflows1    
    (3,959)     (4,431)   (3,528)   Cash flow from investing activities    
    80      65    (107)   Net increase/(decrease) in debt with maturity period within three months    
            Other debt:    
    139      (13)   167    – New borrowings    
    (2,514)     (2,664)   (1,532)   – Repayments    
    (846)     (1,379)   (911)   Interest paid    
    326      (833)   (297)   Derivative financial instruments    
    (25)     (10)   (4)   Change in non-controlling interest    
            Cash dividends paid to:    
    (2,179)     (2,114)   (2,210)   – Shell plc shareholders    
    (86)     (53)   (68)   – Non-controlling interest    
    (3,311)     (3,579)   (2,824)   Repurchases of shares    
    (768)     (309)   (462)   Shares held in trust: net sales/(purchases) and dividends received    
    (9,183)     (10,889)   (8,248)   Cash flow from financing activities    
    353      (985)   (379)   Effects of exchange rate changes on cash and cash equivalents    
    (3,509)     (3,142)   1,175    Increase/(decrease) in cash and cash equivalents    
    39,110      42,252    38,774    Cash and cash equivalents at beginning of period    
    35,601      39,110    39,949    Cash and cash equivalents at end of period    

    1.See Note 7 “Other notes to the unaudited Condensed Consolidated Interim Financial Statements”.

             Page 13


    SHELL PLC
    1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

    NOTES TO THE UNAUDITED CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED INTERIM FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

    1. Basis of preparation

    These unaudited Condensed Consolidated Interim Financial Statements of Shell plc (“the Company”) and its subsidiaries (collectively referred to as “Shell”) have been prepared in accordance with IAS 34 Interim Financial Reporting as issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (“IASB”) and adopted by the UK, and on the basis of the same accounting principles as those used in the Company’s Annual Report and Accounts (pages 240 to 312) for the year ended December 31, 2024, as filed with the Registrar of Companies for England and Wales and as filed with the Autoriteit Financiële Markten (the Netherlands) and Form 20-F (pages 223 to 296) for the year ended December 31, 2024, as filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, and should be read in conjunction with these filings.

    The financial information presented in the unaudited Condensed Consolidated Interim Financial Statements does not constitute statutory accounts within the meaning of section 434(3) of the Companies Act 2006 (“the Act”). Statutory accounts for the year ended December 31, 2024, were published in Shell’s Annual Report and Accounts, a copy of which was delivered to the Registrar of Companies for England and Wales. The auditor’s report on those accounts was unqualified, did not include a reference to any matters to which the auditor drew attention by way of emphasis without qualifying the report and did not contain a statement under sections 498(2) or 498(3) of the Act.

    Key accounting considerations, significant judgements and estimates

    Future commodity price assumptions and management’s view on the future development of refining and chemicals margins represent a significant estimate and were subject to change in 2024. These assumptions continue to apply for impairment testing purposes in the first quarter 2025. As per the normal process outlined in the 2024 Annual Report and Accounts and Form 20-F, these assumptions are subject to review later this year.

    The discount rates applied for impairment testing and the discount rate applied to provisions are reviewed on a regular basis. Both discount rates applied in the first quarter 2025 remain unchanged compared with 2024.

    2. Segment information

    With effect from January 1, 2025, segment earnings are presented on an Adjusted Earnings basis (Adjusted Earnings), which is the earnings measure used by the Chief Executive Officer, who serves as the Chief Operating Decision Maker, for the purposes of making decisions about allocating resources and assessing performance. This aligns with Shell’s focus on performance, discipline and simplification.

    The Adjusted Earnings measure is presented on a current cost of supplies (CCS) basis and aims to facilitate a comparative understanding of Shell’s financial performance from period to period by removing the effects of oil price changes on inventory carrying amounts and removing the effects of identified items. Identified items are in some cases driven by external factors and may, either individually or collectively, hinder the comparative understanding of Shell’s financial results from period to period.

    The segment earnings measure used until December 31, 2024 was CCS earnings. The difference between CCS earnings and Adjusted Earnings are the identified items. Comparative periods are presented below on an Adjusted Earnings basis.

             Page 14


    SHELL PLC
    1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

                               
     
    REVENUE AND ADJUSTED EARNINGS BY SEGMENT    
    Quarters $ million  
    Q1 2025 Q4 2024 Q1 2024      
          Third-party revenue    
    9,602    9,294    9,195    Integrated Gas    
    1,510    1,652    1,759    Upstream    
    27,083    27,524    30,041    Marketing    
    21,610    19,992    23,735    Chemicals and Products    
    9,417    7,808    7,737    Renewables and Energy Solutions    
    12    10    11    Corporate    
    69,234    66,281    72,478    Total third-party revenue1    
          Inter-segment revenue    
    2,675    2,024    2,404    Integrated Gas    
    9,854    9,931    10,287    Upstream    
    1,849    984    1,355    Marketing    
    8,255    8,656    10,312    Chemicals and Products    
    1,164    1,879    1,005    Renewables and Energy Solutions    
    —    —    —    Corporate    
          Adjusted Earnings    
    2,483    2,165    3,680    Integrated Gas    
    2,337    1,682    1,933    Upstream    
    900    839    781    Marketing    
    449    (229)   1,615    Chemicals and Products    
    (42)   (311)   163    Renewables and Energy Solutions    
    (457)   (380)   (368)   Corporate    
    5,670    3,766    7,804    Total Adjusted Earnings2    
    5,577    3,661    7,734    Adjusted Earnings attributable to Shell plc shareholders    
    94    106    70    Adjusted Earnings attributable to non-controlling interest    

    1.Includes revenue from sources other than from contracts with customers, which mainly comprises the impact of fair value accounting of commodity derivatives.

    2.See Reconciliation of income for the period to Adjusted Earnings below.

             Page 15


    SHELL PLC
    1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

    Cash capital expenditure is a measure used by the Chief Executive Officer for the purposes of making decisions about allocating resources and assessing performance.

                               
     
    CASH CAPITAL EXPENDITURE BY SEGMENT
    Quarters $ million  
    Q1 2025 Q4 2024 Q1 2024      
          Capital expenditure    
    943    1,123    858    Integrated Gas    
    1,727    2,205    1,766    Upstream    
    252    798    427    Marketing    
    451    1,121    474    Chemicals and Products    
    358    1,214    421    Renewables and Energy Solutions    
    17    25    34    Corporate    
    3,748    6,486    3,980    Total capital expenditure    
          Add: Investments in joint ventures and associates    
    174    214    184    Integrated Gas    
    197    (117)   244    Upstream    
    4    13    38    Marketing    
    7    271    26    Chemicals and Products    
    30    36    8    Renewables and Energy Solutions    
    1    4    —    Corporate    
    413    421    500    Total investments in joint ventures and associates    
          Add: Investments in equity securities    
    —    —    —    Integrated Gas    
    —    (11)   —    Upstream    
    —    —    —    Marketing    
    —    —    —    Chemicals and Products    
    14    28    10    Renewables and Energy Solutions    
    —    —    3    Corporate    
    15    17    13    Total investments in equity securities    
          Cash capital expenditure    
    1,116    1,337    1,041    Integrated Gas    
    1,923    2,076    2,010    Upstream    
    256    811    465    Marketing    
    458    1,392    500    Chemicals and Products    
    403    1,277    438    Renewables and Energy Solutions    
    19    30    37    Corporate    
    4,175    6,924    4,493    Total Cash capital expenditure    

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    SHELL PLC
    1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

                               
                 
    RECONCILIATION OF INCOME FOR THE PERIOD TO ADJUSTED EARNINGS    
    Quarters $ million        
    Q1 2025 Q4 2024 Q1 2024      
    4,780    928    7,358    Income/(loss) attributable to Shell plc shareholders    
    95    113    82    Income/(loss) attributable to non-controlling interest    
    4,875    1,041    7,439    Income/(loss) for the period    
    (15)   (75)   (360)   Add: Current cost of supplies adjustment before taxation    
    (2)   23    84    Add: Tax on current cost of supplies adjustment    
    (510) (3,008) (1,244) Less: Identified items adjustment before taxation    
    301 (230) (604) Add: Tax on identified items adjustment    
    5,670    3,766    7,804    Adjusted Earnings    
    5,577    3,661    7,734    Adjusted Earnings attributable to Shell plc shareholders    
    94    106    70    Adjusted Earnings attributable to non-controlling interest    

    Identified items

    The objective of identified items is to remove material impacts on net income/loss arising from transactions which are generally uncontrollable and unusual (infrequent or non-recurring) in nature or giving rise to a mismatch between accounting and economic results, or certain transactions that are generally excluded from underlying results in the industry.

    Identified items comprise: divestment gains and losses, impairments and impairment reversals, redundancy and restructuring, fair value accounting of commodity derivatives and certain gas contracts that gives rise to a mismatch between accounting and economic results, the impact of exchange rate movements and inflationary adjustments on certain deferred tax balances, and other items.

                                                   
     
    Q1 2025 $ million
      Total Integrated Gas Upstream Marketing Chemicals and Products Renewables and Energy Solutions Corporate
    Identified items included in Income/(loss) before taxation              
    Divestment gains/(losses) (106) (1) 154 (57) (15) (187) —
    Impairment reversals/(impairments) (341) — (21) 10 (293) (38) —
    Redundancy and restructuring (44) (1) (15) (9) (13) (9) 4
    Fair value accounting of commodity derivatives and certain gas contracts1 194 420 (1) 12 (258) 20 —
    Other2 (212) (70) 4 — (101) (46) —
    Total identified items included in Income/(loss) before taxation (510) 348 121 (44) (679) (260) 4
    Less: Total identified items included in Taxation charge/(credit) 301 43 378 4 (99) (54) 29
    Identified items included in Income/(loss) for the period              
    Divestment gains/(losses) (208) — 8 (61) (12) (143) —
    Impairment reversals/(impairments) (317) — (15) 6 (277) (31) —
    Redundancy and restructuring (24) (1) (5) (1) (12) (7) 2
    Fair value accounting of commodity derivatives and certain gas contracts1 187 362 — 7 (202) 20 —
    Impact of exchange rate movements and inflationary adjustments on tax balances3 108 4 132 — — — (28)
    Other2 (558) (59) (377) — (77) (45) —
    Impact on Adjusted Earnings (811) 306 (257) (49) (581) (205) (26)
    Impact on Adjusted Earnings attributable to non-controlling interest — — — — — — —
    Impact on Adjusted Earnings attributable to Shell plc shareholders (811) 306 (257) (49) (581) (205) (26)

    1.Fair value accounting of commodity derivatives and certain gas contracts: In the ordinary course of business, Shell enters into contracts to supply or purchase oil and gas products, as well as power and environmental products. Shell also enters into contracts for tolling, pipeline and storage capacity. Derivative contracts are entered into for mitigation of resulting economic exposures (generally price exposure) and these derivative contracts are carried at period-end

             Page 17


    SHELL PLC
    1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

    market price (fair value), with movements in fair value recognised in income for the period. Supply and purchase contracts entered into for operational purposes, as well as contracts for tolling, pipeline and storage capacity, are, by contrast, recognised when the transaction occurs; furthermore, inventory is carried at historical cost or net realisable value, whichever is lower. As a consequence, accounting mismatches occur because: (a) the supply or purchase transaction is recognised in a different period; or (b) the inventory is measured on a different basis. In addition, certain contracts are, due to pricing or delivery conditions, deemed to contain embedded derivatives or written options and are also required to be carried at fair value even though they are entered into for operational purposes. The accounting impacts are reported as identified items.

    2.Other identified items represent other credits or charges that based on Shell management’s assessment hinder the comparative understanding of Shell’s financial results from period to period.

    3.Impact of exchange rate movements and inflationary adjustments on tax balances represents the impact on tax balances of exchange rate movements and inflationary adjustments arising on: (a) the conversion to dollars of the local currency tax base of non-monetary assets and liabilities, as well as recognised tax losses (this primarily impacts the Integrated Gas and Upstream segments); and (b) the conversion of dollar-denominated inter-segment loans to local currency, leading to taxable exchange rate gains or losses (this primarily impacts the Corporate segment).

                                                   
     
    Q4 2024 $ million
      Total Integrated Gas Upstream Marketing Chemicals and Products Renewables and Energy Solutions Corporate
    Identified items included in Income/(loss) before taxation              
    Divestment gains/(losses) (288) (99) (66) (216) 42 51 —
    Impairment reversals/(impairments) (2,554) (523) (183) (493) (288) (1,065) (1)
    Redundancy and restructuring (175) (27) (62) (70) (5) (11) (1)
    Fair value accounting of commodity derivatives and certain gas contracts1 209 136 (14) 58 (38) 67 —
    Other1 (200) — (165) (33) (2) — —
    Total identified items included in Income/(loss) before taxation (3,008) (514) (491) (753) (291) (958) (2)
    Less: Total identified items included in Taxation charge/(credit) (230) (92) 160 (17) (191) (43) (47)
    Identified items included in Income/(loss) for the period              
    Divestment gains/(losses) (321) (96) (51) (247) 33 40 —
    Impairment reversals/(impairments) (2,170) (339) (152) (458) (224) (996) (1)
    Redundancy and restructuring (115) (16) (34) (52) (3) (8) (1)
    Fair value accounting of commodity derivatives and certain gas contracts1 184 109 (4) 46 (17) 50 —
    Impact of exchange rate movements and inflationary adjustments on tax balances1 (210) (57) (199) — — — 46
    Other1 (147) (22) (212) (25) 113 — —
    Impact on Adjusted Earnings (2,778) (421) (651) (736) (99) (914) 45
    Impact on Adjusted Earnings attributable to non-controlling interest — — — — — — —
    Impact on Adjusted Earnings attributable to Shell plc shareholders (2,778) (421) (651) (736) (99) (914) 45

    1.For a detailed description, see the corresponding footnotes to the Q1 2025 identified items table above.

             Page 18


    SHELL PLC
    1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

                                                   
     
    Q1 2024 $ million
      Total Integrated Gas Upstream Marketing Chemicals and Products Renewables and Energy Solutions Corporate
    Identified items included in Income/(loss) before taxation              
    Divestment gains/(losses) 10 (3) 27 (15) (9) 10 —
    Impairment reversals/(impairments) (227) (8) (96) (4) (178) 59 —
    Redundancy and restructuring (74) (1) (13) (20) (18) (15) (6)
    Fair value accounting of commodity derivatives and certain gas contracts1 (1,079) (1,068) (2) 6 (416) 400 —
    Other1 126 4 38 23 45 16 —
    Total identified items included in Income/(loss) before taxation (1,244) (1,075) (46) (11) (575) 469 (6)
    Less: Total identified items included in Taxation charge/(credit) (604) (157) (385) (4) (118) 80 (20)
    Identified items included in Income/(loss) for the period              
    Divestment gains/(losses) (4) (2) 10 (11) (7) 6 —
    Impairment reversals/(impairments) (186) (5) (102) (3) (152) 77 —
    Redundancy and restructuring (53) (1) (9) (15) (14) (11) (4)
    Fair value accounting of commodity derivatives and certain gas contracts1 (896) (887) — 5 (319) 306 —
    Impact of exchange rate movements and inflationary adjustments on tax balances1 403 (27) 412 — — — 18
    Other1 95 3 28 17 34 12 —
    Impact on Adjusted Earnings (641) (919) 339 (7) (458) 390 14
    Impact on Adjusted Earnings attributable to non-controlling interest — — — — — — —
    Impact on Adjusted Earnings attributable to Shell plc shareholders (641) (919) 339 (7) (458) 390 14

    1.For a detailed description, see the corresponding footnotes to the Q1 2025 identified items table above.

    The identified items categories above may include after-tax impacts of identified items of joint ventures and associates which are fully reported within “Share of profit/(loss) of joint ventures and associates” in the Consolidated Statement of Income, and fully reported as identified items included in Income/(loss) before taxation in the table above. Identified items related to subsidiaries are consolidated and reported across appropriate lines of the Consolidated Statement of Income.

    3. Earnings per share

                               
     
    EARNINGS PER SHARE
    Quarters    
    Q1 2025 Q4 2024 Q1 2024      
    4,780    928    7,358    Income/(loss) attributable to Shell plc shareholders ($ million)    
               
          Weighted average number of shares used as the basis for determining:    
    6,033.5    6,148.4    6,440.1    Basic earnings per share (million)    
    6,087.8    6,213.9    6,504.3    Diluted earnings per share (million)    

             Page 19


    SHELL PLC
    1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

    4. Share capital

                             
     
    ISSUED AND FULLY PAID ORDINARY SHARES OF €0.07 EACH
      Number of shares   Nominal value
    ($ million)
    At January 1, 2025 6,115,031,158      510     
    Repurchases of shares (98,948,766)     (8)    
    At March 31, 2025 6,016,082,392      502     
    At January 1, 2024 6,524,109,049      544     
    Repurchases of shares (88,893,999)     (7)    
    At March 31, 2024 6,435,215,050      537     

    At Shell plc’s Annual General Meeting on May 21, 2024, the Board was authorised to allot ordinary shares in Shell plc, and to grant rights to subscribe for, or to convert, any security into ordinary shares in Shell plc, up to an aggregate nominal amount of approximately €150 million (representing approximately 2,147 million ordinary shares of €0.07 each), and to list such shares or rights on any stock exchange. This authority expires at the earlier of the close of business on August 20, 2025, or the end of the Annual General Meeting to be held in 2025, unless previously renewed, revoked or varied by Shell plc in a general meeting.

    5. Other reserves

                                             
     
    OTHER RESERVES
    $ million Merger reserve Share premium reserve Capital redemption reserve Share plan reserve Accumulated other comprehensive income Total
    At January 1, 2025 37,298    154    270    1,417    (19,373)   19,766   
    Other comprehensive income/(loss) attributable to Shell plc shareholders —    —    —    —    1,967    1,967   
    Transfer from other comprehensive income —    —    —    —    11    11   
    Repurchases of shares —    —    8    —    —    8   
    Share-based compensation —    —    —    (663)   —    (663)  
    At March 31, 2025 37,298    154    279    754    (17,394)   21,090   
    At January 1, 2024 37,298    154    236    1,308    (17,851)   21,145   
    Other comprehensive income/(loss) attributable to Shell plc shareholders —    —    —    —    (1,420)   (1,420)  
    Transfer from other comprehensive income —    —    —    —    138    138   
    Repurchases of shares —    —    7    —    —    7   
    Share-based compensation —    —    —    (426)   —    (426)  
    At March 31, 2024 37,298    154    244    882    (19,132)   19,445   

    The merger reserve and share premium reserve were established as a consequence of Shell plc (formerly Royal Dutch Shell plc) becoming the single parent company of Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and The “Shell” Transport and Trading Company, p.l.c., now The Shell Transport and Trading Company Limited, in 2005. The merger reserve increased in 2016 following the issuance of shares for the acquisition of BG Group plc. The capital redemption reserve was established in connection with repurchases of shares of Shell plc. The share plan reserve is in respect of equity-settled share-based compensation plans.

    6. Derivative financial instruments and debt excluding lease liabilities

    As disclosed in the Consolidated Financial Statements for the year ended December 31, 2024, presented in the Annual Report and Accounts and Form 20-F for that year, Shell is exposed to the risks of changes in fair value of its financial assets and liabilities. The fair values of the financial assets and liabilities are defined as the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date. Methods and assumptions used to estimate the fair values at March 31, 2025, are consistent with those used in the year ended December 31, 2024, though the carrying amounts of derivative financial instruments have changed since that date.

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    SHELL PLC
    1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

    The movement of the derivative financial instruments between December 31, 2024 and March 31, 2025 is a decrease of $732 million for the current assets and a decrease of $1,020 million for the current liabilities.

    The table below provides the comparison of the fair value with the carrying amount of debt excluding lease liabilities, disclosed in accordance with IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures.

                     
     
    DEBT EXCLUDING LEASE LIABILITIES
    $ million March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024
    Carrying amount1 48,023    48,376   
    Fair value2 44,240    44,119   

    1.    Shell issued no debt under the US shelf or under the Euro medium-term note programmes during the first quarter 2025.

    2.     Mainly determined from the prices quoted for these securities.

    7. Other notes to the unaudited Condensed Consolidated Interim Financial Statements

    Consolidated Statement of Income

    Interest and other income

                               
     
    Quarters $ million  
    Q1 2025 Q4 2024 Q1 2024      
    302    683    907    Interest and other income/(expenses)    
          Of which:    
    481    548    588    Interest income    
    1    25    23    Dividend income (from investments in equity securities)    
    (127)   (288)   10    Net gains/(losses) on sales and revaluation of non-current assets and businesses    
    (137)   267    66    Net foreign exchange gains/(losses) on financing activities    
    85    131    219    Other    

    Depreciation, depletion and amortisation

                               
     
    Quarters $ million  
    Q1 2025 Q4 2024 Q1 2024      
    5,441    7,520    5,881    Depreciation, depletion and amortisation    
          Of which:    
    5,130 5,829 5,654 Depreciation    
    311 1,797 382 Impairments    
    (1) (106) (154) Impairment reversals    

    Impairments recognised in the first quarter 2025 of $311 million pre-tax ($287 million post-tax) principally relate to Chemicals and Products.

    Impairments recognised in the fourth quarter 2024 of $2,659 million pre-tax ($2,245 million post-tax), of which $1,797 million recognised in depreciation, depletion and amortisation and $863 million recognised in share of profit of joint ventures and associates, mainly relate to Renewables and Energy Solutions ($1,068 million pre-tax; $1,000 million post-tax), Integrated Gas ($532 million pre-tax; $345 million post-tax), Marketing ($495 million pre-tax; $459 million post-tax), Chemicals and Products ($315 million pre-tax; $247 million post-tax) and Upstream ($248 million pre-tax; $194 million post-tax).

    Impairments recognised in the first quarter 2024 of $382 million pre-tax ($332 million post-tax) include smaller

    impairments in various segments.

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    1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

    Taxation charge/credit

                               
     
    Quarters $ million  
    Q1 2025 Q4 2024 Q1 2024      
    4,083    3,164    3,604    Taxation charge/(credit)    
          Of which:    
    4,024 3,125 3,525 Income tax excluding Pillar Two income tax    
    59 39 79 Income tax related to Pillar Two income tax    

    As required by IAS 12 Income Taxes, Shell has applied the exception to recognising and disclosing information about deferred tax assets and liabilities related to Pillar Two income taxes.

    Consolidated Statement of Comprehensive Income

    Currency translation differences

                               
     
    Quarters $ million  
    Q1 2025 Q4 2024 Q1 2024      
    1,711    (4,899)   (1,995)   Currency translation differences    
          Of which:    
    1,618 (5,028) (1,983) Recognised in Other comprehensive income    
    92 129 (12) (Gain)/loss reclassified to profit or loss    

    Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheet

    Other intangible assets

                       
       
    $ million      
      March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024  
    Other intangible assets 11,365    9,480     
           

    The increase in other intangible assets as at March 31, 2025 compared with December 31, 2024 is mainly related to initial recognition at fair value of favourable LNG, gas offtake and sales contracts. These were recognised following completion of the acquisition of Pavilion Energy Pte. Ltd. during the first quarter 2025. The fair value of unfavourable LNG, gas offtake and sales contracts acquired was recognised under trade and other payables.

    Assets classified as held for sale

                       
       
    $ million      
      March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024  
    Assets classified as held for sale 10,881    9,857     
    Liabilities directly associated with assets classified as held for sale 8,001    6,203     

    Assets classified as held for sale and associated liabilities at March 31, 2025 principally relate to Shell’s UK offshore oil and gas assets in Upstream, mining interests in Canada and an energy and chemicals park in Singapore, both in Chemicals and Products. Upon completion of the sale, Shell’s UK offshore assets will be derecognised in exchange for a 50% interest in a newly formed joint venture.

    The major classes of assets and liabilities classified as held for sale at March 31, 2025, are Property, plant and equipment ($8,866 million; December 31, 2024: $8,283 million), Inventories ($1,003 million; December 31, 2024: $1,180 million), Decommissioning and other provisions ($3,228 million; December 31, 2024: $3,053 million), deferred tax liabilities ($2,823 million; December 31, 2024: $2,042 million), Trade and other payables ($1,000 million; December 31, 2024: $484 million) and Debt ($839 million; December 31, 2024: $624 million).

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    SHELL PLC
    1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

    Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows

    Cash flow from operating activities – Other

                               
     
    Quarters $ million  
    Q1 2025 Q4 2024 Q1 2024      
    570    (856)   509    Other    

    ‘Cash flow from operating activities – Other’ for the first quarter 2025 includes $652 million of net inflows (fourth quarter 2024: $1,447 million net outflows; first quarter 2024: $188 million net inflows) due to the timing of payments relating to emission certificates and biofuel programmes in Europe and North America and $255 million in relation to reversal of currency exchange gains on Cash and cash equivalents (fourth quarter 2024: $672 million losses; first quarter 2024: $253 million losses).

    Cash flow from investing activities – Other investing cash outflows

                               
     
    Quarters $ million  
    Q1 2025 Q4 2024 Q1 2024      
    (1,394)   (655)   (1,494)   Other investing cash outflows    

    ‘Cash flow from investing activities – Other investing cash outflows’ for the first quarter 2025 includes $818 million secured term loans provided to The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited (SPDC) upon completion of the sale of SPDC. The first quarter 2024 includes $645 million of debt securities acquired in the Corporate segment.

    8. Reconciliation of Operating expenses and Total Debt

                               
     
    RECONCILIATION OF OPERATING EXPENSES    
    Quarters $ million  
    Q1 2025 Q4 2024 Q1 2024      
    5,549    5,839    5,810    Production and manufacturing expenses    
    2,840    3,231    2,975    Selling, distribution and administrative expenses    
    185    331    212    Research and development    
    8,575    9,401    8,997    Operating expenses    
                               
                 
    RECONCILIATION OF TOTAL DEBT    
    March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024 March 31, 2024 $ million    
    11,391    11,630    11,046    Current debt    
    65,120    65,448    68,886    Non-current debt    
    76,511    77,078    79,931    Total debt    

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    ALTERNATIVE PERFORMANCE (NON-GAAP) MEASURES

    A.Adjusted Earnings, Adjusted earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation (“Adjusted EBITDA”) and Cash flow from operating activities

    The “Adjusted Earnings” measure aims to facilitate a comparative understanding of Shell’s financial performance from period to period by removing the effects of oil price changes on inventory carrying amounts and removing the effects of identified items. These items are in some cases driven by external factors and may, either individually or collectively, hinder the comparative understanding of Shell’s financial results from period to period. This measure excludes earnings attributable to non-controlling interest when presenting the total Shell Group result but includes these items when presenting individual segment Adjusted Earnings as set out in the table below.

    We define “Adjusted EBITDA” as “Income/(loss) for the period” adjusted for current cost of supplies; identified items; tax charge/(credit); depreciation, amortisation and depletion; exploration well write-offs and net interest expense. All items include the non-controlling interest component. Management uses this measure to evaluate Shell’s performance in the period and over time.

                                                   
     
    Q1 2025 $ million
      Total Integrated Gas Upstream Marketing Chemicals and Products Renewables and Energy Solutions Corporate
    Income/(loss) for the period 4,875 2,789 2,080 814 (77) (247) (483)
    Add: Current cost of supplies adjustment before taxation (15)     52 (67)    
    Add: Tax on current cost of supplies adjustment (2)     (14) 12    
    Less: Identified items (811) 306 (257) (49) (581) (205) (26)
    Less: Income/(loss) attributable to non-controlling interest 95            
    Less: Current cost of supplies adjustment attributable to non-controlling interest (1)            
    Add: Identified items attributable to non-controlling interest —            
    Adjusted Earnings 5,577            
    Add: Non-controlling interest 94            
    Adjusted Earnings plus non-controlling interest 5,670 2,483 2,337 900 449 (42) (457)
    Add: Taxation charge/(credit) excluding tax impact of identified items 3,784 803 2,619 391 99 63 (191)
    Add: Depreciation, depletion and amortisation excluding impairments 5,130 1,404 2,213 566 852 90 6
    Add: Exploration well write-offs 28 — 29        
    Add: Interest expense excluding identified items 1,119 51 200 12 14 2 841
    Less: Interest income 481 4 11 — 4 2 461
    Adjusted EBITDA 15,250 4,735 7,387 1,869 1,410 111 (261)
    Less: Current cost of supplies adjustment before taxation (15)     52 (67)    
    Joint ventures and associates (dividends received less profit) (178) (286) (159) 203 54 10 —
    Derivative financial instruments (38) 542 14 10 (508) (169) 73
    Taxation paid (2,900) (773) (1,999) (174) 63 52 (68)
    Other (206) (68) (386) 396 125 (17) (257)
    (Increase)/decrease in working capital (2,663) (687) (913) (344) (1,081) 380 (19)
    Cash flow from operating activities 9,281 3,463 3,945 1,907 130 367 (531)

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    Q4 2024 $ million
      Total Integrated Gas Upstream Marketing Chemicals and Products Renewables and Energy Solutions Corporate
    Income/(loss) for the period 1,041 1,744 1,031 103 (276) (1,226) (335)
    Add: Current cost of supplies adjustment before taxation (75)     (2) (73)    
    Add: Tax on current cost of supplies adjustment 23     2 21    
    Less: Identified items (2,778) (421) (651) (736) (99) (914) 45
    Less: Income/(loss) attributable to non-controlling interest 113            
    Less: Current cost of supplies adjustment attributable to non-controlling interest (7)            
    Add: Identified items attributable to non-controlling interest —            
    Adjusted Earnings 3,661            
    Add: Non-controlling interest 106            
    Adjusted Earnings plus non-controlling interest 3,766 2,165 1,682 839 (229) (311) (380)
    Add: Taxation charge/(credit) excluding tax impact of identified items 3,371 635 2,618 266 (198) 97 (46)
    Add: Depreciation, depletion and amortisation excluding impairments 5,829 1,440 2,803 587 896 96 8
    Add: Exploration well write-offs 649 277 372 — — — —
    Add: Interest expense excluding identified items 1,213 54 201 17 16 2 923
    Less: Interest income 548 3 — — 10 7 529
    Adjusted EBITDA 14,281 4,568 7,676 1,709 475 (123) (24)
    Less: Current cost of supplies adjustment before taxation (75)     (2) (73)    
    Joint ventures and associates (dividends received less profit) 451 110 (22) 172 139 51 —
    Derivative financial instruments 319 120 (28) (8) 230 533 (527)
    Taxation paid (2,910) (635) (2,019) (130) 36 (41) (120)
    Other (1,461) 114 (486) (1,227) (313) 77 375
    (Increase)/decrease in working capital 2,407 114 (611) 845 1,394 353 312
    Cash flow from operating activities 13,162 4,391 4,509 1,363 2,032 850 16
                                                   
     
    Q1 2024 $ million
      Total Integrated Gas Upstream Marketing Chemicals and Products Renewables and Energy Solutions Corporate
    Income/(loss) for the period 7,439 2,761 2,272 896 1,311 553 (354)
    Add: Current cost of supplies adjustment before taxation (360)     (153) (207)    
    Add: Tax on current cost of supplies adjustment 84     30 54    
    Less: Identified items (641) (919) 339 (7) (458) 390 14
    Less: Income/(loss) attributable to non-controlling interest 82            
    Less: Current cost of supplies adjustment attributable to non-controlling interest (12)            
    Add: Identified items attributable to non-controlling interest —            
    Adjusted Earnings 7,734            
    Add: Non-controlling interest 70            
    Adjusted Earnings plus non-controlling interest 7,804 3,680 1,933 781 1,615 163 (368)
    Add: Taxation charge/(credit) excluding tax impact of identified items 4,124 996 2,522 358 338 — (91)
    Add: Depreciation, depletion and amortisation excluding impairments 5,654 1,410 2,727 535 870 106 6
    Add: Exploration well write-offs 554 8 546 — — — —
    Add: Interest expense excluding identified items 1,163 42 169 12 17 1 922
    Less: Interest income 588 — 10 — 14 4 560
    Adjusted EBITDA 18,711 6,136 7,888 1,686 2,826 267 (92)
    Less: Current cost of supplies adjustment before taxation (360)     (153) (207)    
    Joint ventures and associates (dividends received less profit) (582) (197) (546) 93 56 13 —
    Derivative financial instruments 306 (1,080) (3) (39) (402) 1,978 (149)
    Taxation paid (2,616) (467) (1,802) (175) (19) (244) 91
    Other (97) 45 (231) 393 (378) (30) 104
    (Increase)/decrease in working capital (2,752) 275 421 (792) (2,639) 481 (499)
    Cash flow from operating activities 13,330 4,712 5,727 1,319 (349) 2,466 (545)

    Identified items

    The objective of identified items is to remove material impacts on net income/loss arising from transactions which are generally uncontrollable and unusual (infrequent or non-recurring) in nature or giving rise to a mismatch between accounting and economic results, or certain transactions that are generally excluded from underlying results in the industry.

             Page 25


    SHELL PLC
    1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

    Identified items comprise: divestment gains and losses, impairments and impairment reversals, redundancy and restructuring, fair value accounting of commodity derivatives and certain gas contracts that gives rise to a mismatch between accounting and economic results, the impact of exchange rate movements and inflationary adjustments on certain deferred tax balances, and other items.

    See Note 2 “Segment information” for details.

    B.    Adjusted Earnings per share

    Adjusted Earnings per share is calculated as Adjusted Earnings (see Reference A), divided by the weighted average number of shares used as the basis for basic earnings per share (see Note 3).

    C.    Cash capital expenditure

    Cash capital expenditure represents cash spent on maintaining and developing assets as well as on investments in the period. Management regularly monitors this measure as a key lever to delivering sustainable cash flows. Cash capital expenditure is the sum of the following lines from the Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows: Capital expenditure, Investments in joint ventures and associates and Investments in equity securities.

    See Note 2 “Segment information” for the reconciliation of cash capital expenditure.

    D.    Capital employed and Return on average capital employed

    Return on average capital employed (“ROACE”) measures the efficiency of Shell’s utilisation of the capital that it employs.

    The measure refers to Capital employed which consists of total equity, current debt, and non-current debt reduced by cash and cash equivalents.

    In this calculation, the sum of Adjusted Earnings (see Reference A) plus non-controlling interest (NCI) excluding identified items for the current and previous three quarters, adjusted for after-tax interest expense and after-tax interest income, is expressed as a percentage of the average capital employed excluding cash and cash equivalents for the same period.

                           
     
    $ million Quarters
      Q1 2025 Q4 2024 Q1 2024
    Current debt 11,046 9,931 9,044
    Non-current debt 68,886 71,610 76,098
    Total equity 188,304 188,362 195,530
    Less: Cash and cash equivalents (39,949) (38,774) (42,074)
    Capital employed – opening 228,286 231,128 238,598
    Current debt 11,391 11,630 11,046
    Non-current debt 65,120 65,448 68,886
    Total equity 180,670 180,168 188,304
    Less: Cash and cash equivalents (35,601) (39,110) (39,949)
    Capital employed – closing 221,580 218,134 228,286
    Capital employed – average 224,933 224,630 233,442

             Page 26


    SHELL PLC
    1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

                           
     
    $ million Quarters
      Q1 2025 Q4 2024 Q1 2024
    Adjusted Earnings – current and previous three quarters (Reference A) 21,558 23,716 26,338
    Add: Income/(loss) attributable to NCI – current and previous three quarters 441 427 295
    Add: Current cost of supplies adjustment attributable to NCI – current and previous three quarters 25 14 (24)
    Less: Identified items attributable to NCI (Reference A) – current and previous three quarters 18 18 (11)
    Adjusted Earnings plus NCI excluding identified items – current and previous three quarters 22,005 24,139 26,620
    Add: Interest expense after tax – current and previous three quarters 2,639 2,701 2,718
    Less: Interest income after tax on cash and cash equivalents – current and previous three quarters 1,329 1,389 1,368
    Adjusted Earnings plus NCI excluding identified items before interest expense and interest income – current and previous three quarters 23,315 25,452 27,971
    Capital employed – average 224,933 224,630 233,442
    ROACE on an Adjusted Earnings plus NCI basis 10.4% 11.3% 12.0%

    E.    Net debt and gearing

    Net debt is defined as the sum of current and non-current debt, less cash and cash equivalents, adjusted for the fair value of derivative financial instruments used to hedge foreign exchange and interest rate risk relating to debt, and associated collateral balances. Management considers this adjustment useful because it reduces the volatility of net debt caused by fluctuations in foreign exchange and interest rates, and eliminates the potential impact of related collateral payments or receipts. Debt-related derivative financial instruments are a subset of the derivative financial instrument assets and liabilities presented on the balance sheet. Collateral balances are reported under “Trade and other receivables” or “Trade and other payables” as appropriate.

    Gearing is a measure of Shell’s capital structure and is defined as net debt (total debt less cash and cash equivalents) as a percentage of total capital (net debt plus total equity).

                           
     
    $ million  
      March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024 March 31, 2024
    Current debt 11,391    11,630    11,046   
    Non-current debt 65,120    65,448    68,886   
    Total debt 76,511    77,078    79,931   
    Of which: Lease liabilities 28,488    28,702    26,885   
    Add: Debt-related derivative financial instruments: net liability/(asset) 1,905    2,469    1,888   
    Add: Collateral on debt-related derivatives: net liability/(asset) (1,295)   (1,628)   (1,357)  
    Less: Cash and cash equivalents (35,601)   (39,110)   (39,949)  
    Net debt 41,521    38,809    40,513   
    Total equity 180,670    180,168    188,304   
    Total capital 222,190    218,974    228,817   
    Gearing 18.7  % 17.7  % 17.7  %

    F.    Operating expenses and Underlying operating expenses

    Operating expenses

    Operating expenses is a measure of Shell’s cost management performance, comprising the following items from the Consolidated Statement of Income: production and manufacturing expenses; selling, distribution and administrative expenses; and research and development expenses.

             Page 27


    SHELL PLC
    1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

                                                   
     
    Q1 2025 $ million
      Total Integrated Gas Upstream Marketing Chemicals and Products Renewables and Energy Solutions Corporate
    Production and manufacturing expenses 5,549 947 2,139 349 1,621 486 8
    Selling, distribution and administrative expenses 2,840 38 42 2,053 442 153 111
    Research and development 185 22 32 42 25 21 43
    Operating expenses 8,575 1,006 2,213 2,444 2,088 661 162
                                                   
     
    Q4 2024 $ million
      Total Integrated Gas Upstream Marketing Chemicals and Products Renewables and Energy Solutions Corporate
    Production and manufacturing expenses 5,839 982 2,470 270 1,632 480 5
    Selling, distribution and administrative expenses 3,231 39 96 2,258 471 241 126
    Research and development 331 40 69 73 46 37 66
    Operating expenses 9,401 1,061 2,635 2,602 2,149 757 196
                                                   
     
    Q1 2024 $ million
      Total Integrated Gas Upstream Marketing Chemicals and Products Renewables and Energy Solutions Corporate
    Production and manufacturing expenses 5,810 956 2,269 366 1,634 579 5
    Selling, distribution and administrative expenses 2,975 62 58 2,188 420 158 89
    Research and development 212 26 58 34 34 12 49
    Operating expenses 8,997 1,044 2,385 2,587 2,088 749 144

    Underlying operating expenses

    Underlying operating expenses is a measure aimed at facilitating a comparative understanding of performance from period to period by removing the effects of identified items, which, either individually or collectively, can cause volatility, in some cases driven by external factors.

                               
         
    Quarters $ million  
    Q1 2025 Q4 2024 Q1 2024      
    8,575    9,401    8,997    Operating expenses    
    (44)   (174)   (73)   Redundancy and restructuring (charges)/reversal    
    (101)   (88)   —    (Provisions)/reversal    
    23    —    130    Other    
    (121)   (262)   57    Total identified items    
    8,453    9,138    9,054    Underlying operating expenses    

    G.    Free cash flow and Organic free cash flow

    Free cash flow is used to evaluate cash available for financing activities, including dividend payments and debt servicing, after investment in maintaining and growing the business. It is defined as the sum of “Cash flow from operating activities” and “Cash flow from investing activities”.

    Cash flows from acquisition and divestment activities are removed from Free cash flow to arrive at the Organic free cash flow, a measure used by management to evaluate the generation of free cash flow without these activities.

             Page 28


    SHELL PLC
    1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

                               
     
    Quarters $ million  
    Q1 2025 Q4 2024 Q1 2024      
    9,281    13,162    13,330    Cash flow from operating activities    
    (3,959)   (4,431)   (3,528)   Cash flow from investing activities    
    5,322    8,731    9,802    Free cash flow    
    597    805    1,025    Less: Divestment proceeds (Reference I)    
    45    1    —    Add: Tax paid on divestments (reported under “Other investing cash outflows”)    
    130    525    62    Add: Cash outflows related to inorganic capital expenditure1    
    4,899    8,453    8,839    Organic free cash flow2    

    1.Cash outflows related to inorganic capital expenditure includes portfolio actions which expand Shell’s activities through acquisitions and restructuring activities as reported in capital expenditure lines in the Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows.

    2.Free cash flow less divestment proceeds, adding back outflows related to inorganic expenditure.

    H.    Cash flow from operating activities excluding working capital movements

    Working capital movements are defined as the sum of the following items in the Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows: (i) (increase)/decrease in inventories, (ii) (increase)/decrease in current receivables, and (iii) increase/(decrease) in current payables.

    Cash flow from operating activities excluding working capital movements is a measure used by Shell to analyse its operating cash generation over time excluding the timing effects of changes in inventories and operating receivables and payables from period to period.

                               
     
    Quarters $ million  
    Q1 2025 Q4 2024 Q1 2024      
    9,281    13,162    13,330    Cash flow from operating activities    
    854    131    (608)   (Increase)/decrease in inventories    
    (2,610)   751    (195)   (Increase)/decrease in current receivables    
    (907)   1,524    (1,949)   Increase/(decrease) in current payables    
    (2,663)   2,407    (2,752)   (Increase)/decrease in working capital    
    11,944    10,755    16,082    Cash flow from operating activities excluding working capital movements    

    I.    Divestment proceeds

    Divestment proceeds represent cash received from divestment activities in the period. Management regularly monitors this measure as a key lever to deliver free cash flow.

                               
     
    Quarters $ million  
    Q1 2025 Q4 2024 Q1 2024      
    559    493 323 Proceeds from sale of property, plant and equipment and businesses    
    33    305 133 Proceeds from joint ventures and associates from sale, capital reduction and repayment of long-term loans    
    5    6 569 Proceeds from sale of equity securities    
    597    805 1,025 Divestment proceeds    

             Page 29


    SHELL PLC
    1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

    CAUTIONARY STATEMENT

    All amounts shown throughout this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report are unaudited. All peak production figures in Portfolio Developments are quoted at 100% expected production. The numbers presented throughout this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report may not sum precisely to the totals provided and percentages may not precisely reflect the absolute figures, due to rounding.

    The companies in which Shell plc directly and indirectly owns investments are separate legal entities. In this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report, “Shell”, “Shell Group” and “Group” are sometimes used for convenience to reference Shell plc and its subsidiaries in general. Likewise, the words “we”, “us” and “our” are also used to refer to Shell plc and its subsidiaries in general or to those who work for them. These terms are also used where no useful purpose is served by identifying the particular entity or entities. ‘‘Subsidiaries’’, “Shell subsidiaries” and “Shell companies” as used in this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report, refer to entities over which Shell plc either directly or indirectly has control. The terms “joint venture”, “joint operations”, “joint arrangements”, and “associates” may also be used to refer to a commercial arrangement in which Shell has a direct or indirect ownership interest with one or more parties. The term “Shell interest” is used for convenience to indicate the direct and/or indirect ownership interest held by Shell in an entity or unincorporated joint arrangement, after exclusion of all third-party interest.

    Forward-Looking statements

    This Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report contains forward-looking statements (within the meaning of the U.S. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995) concerning the financial condition, results of operations and businesses of Shell. All statements other than statements of historical fact are, or may be deemed to be, forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are statements of future expectations that are based on management’s current expectations and assumptions and involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results, performance or events to differ materially from those expressed or implied in these statements. Forward-looking statements include, among other things, statements concerning the potential exposure of Shell to market risks and statements expressing management’s expectations, beliefs, estimates, forecasts, projections and assumptions. These forward-looking statements are identified by their use of terms and phrases such as “aim”; “ambition”; ‘‘anticipate’’; “aspire”, “aspiration”, ‘‘believe’’; “commit”; “commitment”; ‘‘could’’; “desire”; ‘‘estimate’’; ‘‘expect’’; ‘‘goals’’; ‘‘intend’’; ‘‘may’’; “milestones”; ‘‘objectives’’; ‘‘outlook’’; ‘‘plan’’; ‘‘probably’’; ‘‘project’’; ‘‘risks’’; “schedule”; ‘‘seek’’; ‘‘should’’; ‘‘target’’; “vision”; ‘‘will’’; “would” and similar terms and phrases. There are a number of factors that could affect the future operations of Shell and could cause those results to differ materially from those expressed in the forward-looking statements included in this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report, including (without limitation): (a) price fluctuations in crude oil and natural gas; (b) changes in demand for Shell’s products; (c) currency fluctuations; (d) drilling and production results; (e) reserves estimates; (f) loss of market share and industry competition; (g) environmental and physical risks, including climate change; (h) risks associated with the identification of suitable potential acquisition properties and targets, and successful negotiation and completion of such transactions; (i) the risk of doing business in developing countries and countries subject to international sanctions; (j) legislative, judicial, fiscal and regulatory developments including tariffs and regulatory measures addressing climate change; (k) economic and financial market conditions in various countries and regions; (l) political risks, including the risks of expropriation and renegotiation of the terms of contracts with governmental entities, delays or advancements in the approval of projects and delays in the reimbursement for shared costs; (m) risks associated with the impact of pandemics, regional conflicts, such as the Russia-Ukraine war and the conflict in the Middle East, and a significant cyber security, data privacy or IT incident; (n) the pace of the energy transition; and (o) changes in trading conditions. No assurance is provided that future dividend payments will match or exceed previous dividend payments. All forward-looking statements contained in this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report are expressly qualified in their entirety by the cautionary statements contained or referred to in this section. Readers should not place undue reliance on forward-looking statements. Additional risk factors that may affect future results are contained in Shell plc’s Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2024 (available at www.shell.com/investors/news-and-filings/sec-filings.html and www.sec.gov). These risk factors also expressly qualify all forward-looking statements contained in this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report and should be considered by the reader. Each forward-looking statement speaks only as of the date of this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report, May 2, 2025. Neither Shell plc nor any of its subsidiaries undertake any obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statement as a result of new information, future events or other information. In light of these risks, results could differ materially from those stated, implied or inferred from the forward-looking statements contained in this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report.

    Shell’s net carbon intensity

    Also, in this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report we may refer to Shell’s “net carbon intensity” (NCI), which includes Shell’s carbon emissions from the production of our energy products, our suppliers’ carbon emissions in supplying energy for that production and our customers’ carbon emissions associated with their use of the energy products we sell. Shell’s NCI also includes the emissions associated with the production and use of energy products produced by others which Shell purchases for resale. Shell only controls its own emissions. The use of the terms Shell’s “net carbon intensity” or NCI is for convenience only and not intended to suggest these emissions are those of Shell plc or its subsidiaries.

    Shell’s net-zero emissions target

    Shell’s operating plan and outlook are forecasted for a three-year period and ten-year period, respectively, and are updated every year. They reflect the current economic environment and what we can reasonably expect to see over the next three and ten years. Accordingly, the outlook reflects our Scope 1, Scope 2 and NCI targets over the next ten years. However, Shell’s operating plan and outlook cannot reflect our 2050 net-zero emissions target, as this target is outside our planning period. Such future operating plans and outlooks could include changes to our portfolio, efficiency improvements and the use of carbon capture and storage and carbon credits. In the future, as society moves towards net-zero emissions, we expect Shell’s operating plans and outlooks to reflect this movement. However, if society is not net zero in 2050, as of today, there would be significant risk that Shell may not meet this target.

    Forward-Looking non-GAAP measures

    This Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report may contain certain forward-looking non-GAAP measures such as cash capital expenditure and Adjusted Earnings. We are unable to provide a reconciliation of these forward-looking non-GAAP measures to the most comparable GAAP financial measures because certain information needed to reconcile those non-GAAP measures to the most comparable GAAP financial measures is dependent on future events some of which are outside the control of Shell, such as oil and gas prices, interest rates and exchange rates. Moreover, estimating such GAAP measures with the required precision necessary to provide a meaningful reconciliation is extremely difficult and could not be accomplished without unreasonable effort. Non-GAAP measures in respect of future periods which cannot be reconciled to the most comparable GAAP financial measure are calculated in a manner which is consistent with the accounting policies applied in Shell plc’s consolidated financial statements.

    The contents of websites referred to in this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report do not form part of this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report.

    We may have used certain terms, such as resources, in this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report that the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) strictly prohibits us from including in our filings with the SEC. Investors are urged to consider closely the disclosure in our Form 20-F, File No 1-32575, available on the SEC website www.sec.gov.

             Page 30


    SHELL PLC
    1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

    This announcement contains inside information.

    May 2, 2025

         
    The information in this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report reflects the unaudited consolidated financial position and results of Shell plc. Company No. 4366849, Registered Office: Shell Centre, London, SE1 7NA, England, UK.

    Contacts:

    – Sean Ashley, Company Secretary

    – Media: International +44 (0) 207 934 5550; U.S. and Canada: https://www.shell.us/about-us/news-and-insights/media/submit-an-inquiry.html

    LEI number of Shell plc: 21380068P1DRHMJ8KU70

    Classification: Inside Information

             Page 31

    The MIL Network –

    May 2, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Shell plc publishes first quarter 2025 press release

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    London, May 2, 2025

    “Shell delivered another solid set of results in the first quarter of 2025. We further strengthened our leading LNG business by completing the acquisition of Pavilion Energy, and high-graded our portfolio with the completion of the Nigeria onshore and the Singapore Energy and Chemicals Park divestments.

    Our strong performance and resilient balance sheet give us the confidence to commence another $3.5 billion of buybacks for the next three months, consistent with the strategic direction we set out at our Capital Markets Day in March.”

    Shell plc Chief Executive Officer, Wael Sawan


     

    SOLID RESULTS; RESILIENT BALANCE SHEET; CONSISTENT DISTRIBUTIONS

    • Q1 2025 Adjusted Earnings1 of $5.6 billion reflect strong performance across the business. CFFO excluding working capital was $11.9 billion for the quarter. Working capital outflow was $2.7 billion in Q1 2025.
    • Strengthened LNG trading and optimisation capabilities with the Pavilion Energy acquisition and high-graded the portfolio with the completion of the divestments of the Singapore Energy and Chemicals Park2, and SPDC3 in Nigeria.
    • Disciplined capital allocation, with 2025 cash capex outlook of $20 – 22 billion.
    • Commencing another $3.5 billion share buyback programme for the next 3 months, making this the 14th consecutive quarter of at least $3 billion in buybacks. Total shareholder distributions paid over the last 4 quarters were 45% of CFFO, consistent with the 40 – 50% of CFFO through the cycle distribution target announced at Capital Markets Day 2025.
    • Resilient balance sheet with gearing (including leases) of 19%.
    $ million1 Adj. Earnings Adj. EBITDA CFFO Cash capex
    Integrated Gas 2,483 4,735 3,463 1,116
    Upstream 2,337 7,387 3,945 1,923
    Marketing 900 1,869 1,907 256
    Chemicals & Products4 449 1,410 130 458
    Renewables & Energy Solutions (42) 111 367 403
    Corporate (457) (261) (531) 19
    Less: Non-controlling interest (NCI) 94      
    Shell Q1 2025 5,577 15,250 9,281 4,175
    Q4 2024 3,661 14,281 13,162 6,924

    1Income/(loss) attributable to shareholders for Q1 2025 is $4.8 billion. Reconciliation of non-GAAP measures can be found in the unaudited results, available at www.shell.com/investors.
    2 Completed on April 1, 2025.
    3The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited.
    4Chemicals & Products Adjusted Earnings at a subsegment level are as follows: Chemicals $(0.1) billion and Products $0.6 billion.


     

    • CFFO excluding working capital is $11.9 billion in Q1 2025 and reflects tax payments of $2.9 billion. Working capital outflow is $2.7 billion, consistent with outflows as we have seen in the first quarters of recent years.
    • Net debt of $41.5 billion includes the lease additions related to the Pavilion Energy acquisition as well as a drawdown on the loan facilities provided at the completion of the sale of SPDC in Nigeria.
    $ billion1 Q1 2024 Q2 2024 Q3 2024 Q4 2024 Q1 2025
    Working capital (2.8) (0.3) 2.7 2.4 (2.7)
    Divestment proceeds 1.0 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.6
    Free cash flow 9.8 10.2 10.8 8.7 5.3
    Net debt 40.5 38.3 35.2 38.8 41.5

    1 Reconciliation of non-GAAP measures can be found in the unaudited results, available at www.shell.com/investors.


     

    Q1 2025 FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE DRIVERS

    INTEGRATED GAS

    Key data Q4 2024 Q1 2025 Q2 2025 outlook
    Realised liquids price ($/bbl) 63 64 —
    Realised gas price ($/thousand scf) 8.1 7.4 —
    Production (kboe/d) 905 927 890 – 950
    LNG liquefaction volumes (MT) 7.1 6.6 6.3 – 6.9
    LNG sales volumes (MT) 15.5 16.5 —
    • Adjusted Earnings were higher than in Q4 2024, reflecting lower exploration well write-offs. Trading and optimisation results were in line with Q4 2024, despite higher unfavourable (non-cash) impact from expiring hedging contracts.
    • Q2 2025 production and liquefaction outlook reflects higher scheduled maintenance across the portfolio.

    UPSTREAM

    Key data Q4 2024 Q1 2025 Q2 2025 outlook
    Realised liquids price ($/bbl) 71 71 —
    Realised gas price ($/thousand scf) 7.0 7.4 —
    Liquids production (kboe/d) 1,332 1,335 —
    Gas production (million scf/d) 3,056 3,020 —
    Total production (kboe/d) 1,859 1,855 1,560 – 1,760
    • Adjusted Earnings were higher than in Q4 2024, reflecting lower depreciation following year-end reserves updates and lower well write-offs, partially offset by lower sales volumes.
    • Q2 2025 production outlook reflects scheduled maintenance and the completed sale of SPDC in March 2025.

    MARKETING

    Key data Q4 2024 Q1 2025 Q2 2025 outlook
    Marketing sales volumes (kb/d) 2,795 2,674 2,600 – 3,100
    Mobility (kb/d) 2,041 1,964 —
    Lubricants (kb/d) 77 87 —
    Sectors & Decarbonisation (kb/d) 678 623 —
    • Adjusted Earnings were higher than in Q4 2024, supported by seasonally stronger margins in Lubricants.

    CHEMICALS & PRODUCTS

    Key data Q4 2024 Q1 2025 Q2 2025 outlook1
    Refinery processing intake (kb/d) 1,215 1,362 —
    Chemicals sales volumes (kT) 2,926 2,813 —
    Refinery utilisation (%) 76 85 87 – 95
    Chemicals manufacturing plant utilisation (%) 75 81 74 – 82
    Global indicative refining margin ($/bbl) 5.5 6.2 —
    Global indicative chemical margin ($/t) 138 126 —

    1Following the Singapore Energy and Chemicals Park divestment, IRM, ICM and associated sensitivities have been updated for Q2 2025; see the guidance tab of the Quarterly Databook, available at www.shell.com/investors.

    • Trading and optimisation results were significantly higher than in Q4 2024 and in line with contributions in Q2 and Q3 of 2024, while the Chemicals results continued to be impacted by a weak margin environment.
    • Q2 2025 outlook reflects the completed sale of the Energy and Chemicals Park in Singapore.

    RENEWABLES & ENERGY SOLUTIONS

    Key data Q4 2024 Q1 2025
    External power sales (TWh) 76 76
    Sales of pipeline gas to end-use customers (TWh) 165 184
    Renewables power generation capacity (GW)* 7.4 7.5
    • in operation (GW)
    3.4 3.5
    • under construction and/or committed for sale (GW)
    4.0 4.0

    *Excludes Shell’s equity share of associates where information cannot be obtained.

    • Adjusted Earnings were higher than in Q4 2024, with higher seasonal demand and volatility driving higher trading and optimisation, particularly in the Americas.

    Renewables and Energy Solutions includes activities such as renewable power generation, the marketing and trading and optimisation of power and pipeline gas, as well as carbon credits, and digitally enabled customer solutions. It also includes the production and marketing of hydrogen, development of commercial carbon capture and storage hubs, investment in nature-based projects that avoid or reduce carbon emissions, and Shell Ventures, which invests in companies that work to accelerate the energy and mobility transformation.

    CORPORATE

    Key data Q4 2024 Q1 2025 Q2 2025 outlook
    Adjusted Earnings ($ billion) (0.4) (0.5) (0.6) – (0.4)

    UPCOMING INVESTOR EVENTS

    May 20, 2025 Annual General Meeting
    July 31, 2025 Second quarter 2025 results and dividends
    October 30, 2025 Third quarter 2025 results and dividends


     

    USEFUL LINKS

    Results materials Q1 2025
    Quarterly Databook Q1 2025
    Webcast registration Q1 2025
    Dividend announcement Q1 2025
    Capital Markets Day 2025 materials


     

    ALTERNATIVE PERFORMANCE (NON-GAAP) MEASURES
    This announcement includes certain measures that are calculated and presented on the basis of methodologies other than in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) such as IFRS, including Adjusted Earnings, Adjusted EBITDA, CFFO excluding working capital movements, free cash flow, Divestment proceeds and Net debt. This information, along with comparable GAAP measures, is useful to investors because it provides a basis for measuring Shell plc’s operating performance and ability to retire debt and invest in new business opportunities. Shell plc’s management uses these financial measures, along with the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures, in evaluating the business performance.

    This announcement may contain certain forward-looking non-GAAP measures such as Adjusted Earnings and divestments. We are unable to provide a reconciliation of these forward-looking non-GAAP measures to the most comparable GAAP financial measures because certain information needed to reconcile the non-GAAP measures to the most comparable GAAP financial measures is dependent on future events some of which are outside the control of the company, such as oil and gas prices, interest rates and exchange rates. Moreover, estimating such GAAP measures with the required precision necessary to provide a meaningful reconciliation is extremely difficult and could not be accomplished without unreasonable effort. Non-GAAP measures in respect of future periods which cannot be reconciled to the most comparable GAAP financial measure are estimated in a manner which is consistent with the accounting policies applied in Shell plc’s consolidated financial statements.

    CAUTIONARY STATEMENT
    The companies in which Shell plc directly and indirectly owns investments are separate legal entities. In this announcement, “Shell”, “Shell Group” and “Group” are sometimes used for convenience to reference Shell plc and its subsidiaries in general. Likewise, the words “we”, “us” and “our” are also used to refer to Shell plc and its subsidiaries in general or to those who work for them. These terms are also used where no useful purpose is served by identifying the particular entity or entities. “Subsidiaries”, “Shell subsidiaries” and “Shell companies” as used in this announcement refer to entities over which Shell plc either directly or indirectly has control. The terms “joint venture”, “joint operations”, “joint arrangements”, and “associates” may also be used to refer to a commercial arrangement in which Shell has a direct or indirect ownership interest with one or more parties. The term “Shell interest” is used for convenience to indicate the direct and/or indirect ownership interest held by Shell in an entity or unincorporated joint arrangement, after exclusion of all third-party interest.

    This announcement contains forward-looking statements (within the meaning of the U.S. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995) concerning the financial condition, results of operations and businesses of Shell. All statements other than statements of historical fact are, or may be deemed to be, forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are statements of future expectations that are based on management’s current expectations and assumptions and involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results, performance or events to differ materially from those expressed or implied in these statements. Forward-looking statements include, among other things, statements concerning the potential exposure of Shell to market risks and statements expressing management’s expectations, beliefs, estimates, forecasts, projections and assumptions. These forward-looking statements are identified by their use of terms and phrases such as “aim”; “ambition”; “anticipate”; “aspire”; “aspiration”; ‘‘believe’’; “commit”; “commitment”; ‘‘could’’; “desire”; ‘‘estimate’’; ‘‘expect’’; ‘‘goals’’; ‘‘intend’’; ‘‘may’’; “milestones”; ‘‘objectives’’; ‘‘outlook’’; ‘‘plan’’; ‘‘probably’’; ‘‘project’’; ‘‘risks’’; “schedule”; ‘‘seek’’; ‘‘should’’; ‘‘target’’; “vision”; ‘‘will’’; “would” and similar terms and phrases. There are a number of factors that could affect the future operations of Shell and could cause those results to differ materially from those expressed in the forward-looking statements included in this announcement, including (without limitation): (a) price fluctuations in crude oil and natural gas; (b) changes in demand for Shell’s products; (c) currency fluctuations; (d) drilling and production results; (e) reserves estimates; (f) loss of market share and industry competition; (g) environmental and physical risks, including climate change; (h) risks associated with the identification of suitable potential acquisition properties and targets, and successful negotiation and completion of such transactions; (i) the risk of doing business in developing countries and countries subject to international sanctions; (j) legislative, judicial, fiscal and regulatory developments including tariffs and regulatory measures addressing climate change; (k) economic and financial market conditions in various countries and regions; (l) political risks, including the risks of expropriation and renegotiation of the terms of contracts with governmental entities, delays or advancements in the approval of projects and delays in the reimbursement for shared costs; (m) risks associated with the impact of pandemics, regional conflicts, such as the Russia-Ukraine war and the conflict in the Middle East, and a significant cyber security, data privacy or IT incident; (n) the pace of the energy transition; and (o) changes in trading conditions. No assurance is provided that future dividend payments will match or exceed previous dividend payments. All forward-looking statements contained in this announcement are expressly qualified in their entirety by the cautionary statements contained or referred to in this section. Readers should not place undue reliance on forward-looking statements. Additional risk factors that may affect future results are contained in Shell plc’s Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2024 (available at www.shell.com/investors/news-and-filings/sec-filings.html and www.sec.gov). These risk factors also expressly qualify all forward-looking statements contained in this announcement and should be considered by the reader. Each forward-looking statement speaks only as of the date of this announcement, May 2, 2025. Neither Shell plc nor any of its subsidiaries undertake any obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statement as a result of new information, future events or other information. In light of these risks, results could differ materially from those stated, implied or inferred from the forward-looking statements contained in this announcement.
    All amounts shown throughout this announcement are unaudited. The numbers presented throughout this announcement may not sum precisely to the totals provided and percentages may not precisely reflect the absolute figures, due to rounding.
    Shell’s Net Carbon Intensity
    Also, in this  announcement, we may refer to Shell’s “net carbon intensity” (NCI), which includes Shell’s carbon emissions from the production of our energy products, our suppliers’ carbon emissions in supplying energy for that production and our customers’ carbon emissions associated with their use of the energy products we sell. Shell’s NCI also includes the emissions associated with the production and use of energy products produced by others which Shell purchases for resale. Shell only controls its own emissions. The use of the terms Shell’s “net carbon intensity” or NCI is for convenience only and not intended to suggest these emissions are those of Shell plc or its subsidiaries.

    Shell’s Net-Zero Emissions Target
    Shell’s operating plan and outlook are forecasted for a three-year period and ten-year period, respectively, and are updated every year. They reflect the current economic environment and what we can reasonably expect to see over the next three and ten years. Accordingly, the outlook reflects our Scope 1, Scope 2 and NCI targets over the next ten years. However, Shell’s operating plan and outlook cannot reflect our 2050 net-zero emissions target, as this target is outside our planning period. Such future operating plans and outlooks could include changes to our portfolio, efficiency improvements and the use of carbon capture and storage and carbon credits. In the future, as society moves towards net-zero emissions, we expect Shell’s operating plans and outlooks to reflect this movement. However, if society is not net zero in 2050, as of today, there would be significant risk that Shell may not meet this target.

    The content of websites referred to in this announcement does not form part of this announcement.

    We may have used certain terms, such as resources, in this announcement that the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) strictly prohibits us from including in our filings with the SEC. Investors are urged to consider closely the disclosure in our Form 20-F, File No 1-32575, available on the SEC website www.sec.gov.

    The financial information presented in this announcement does not constitute statutory accounts within the meaning of section 434(3) of the Companies Act 2006 (“the Act”). Statutory accounts for the year ended December 31, 2024 were published in Shell’s Annual Report and Accounts, a copy of which was delivered to the Registrar of Companies for England and Wales. The auditor’s report on those accounts was unqualified, did not include a reference to any matters to which the auditor drew attention by way of emphasis without qualifying the report and did not contain a statement under sections 498(2) or 498(3) of the Act.

    The information in this announcement does not constitute the unaudited condensed consolidated financial statements which are contained in Shell’s first quarter 2025 unaudited results available on www.shell.com/investors.

    CONTACTS

    • Media: International +44 207 934 5550; U.S. and Canada: Contact form

    The MIL Network –

    May 2, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Shell plc First Quarter 2025 Interim Dividend

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    London, May 2, 2025 − The Board of Shell plc (the “Company”) (XLON: SHEL, XNYS: SHEL, XAMS: SHELL) today announced an interim dividend in respect of the first quarter of 2025 of US$ 0.358 per ordinary share.

    Details relating to the first quarter 2025 interim dividend

    Per ordinary share
    (GB00BP6MXD84)
    Q1 2025
    Shell Shares (US$) 0.358

    Shareholders will be able to elect to receive their dividends in US dollars, euros or pounds sterling.

    An alternative ‘Electronic Election Entitlement’ (‘EEE’) process is available in CREST for dividends with options elections.

    Absent any valid election to the contrary, persons holding their ordinary shares through Euroclear Nederland will receive their dividends in euros.

    Absent any valid election to the contrary, shareholders (both holding in certificated and uncertificated form (CREST members)) and persons holding their shares through the Shell Corporate Nominee will receive their dividends in pounds sterling.

    The pound sterling and euro equivalent dividend payments will be announced on June 9, 2025.

    Per ADS
    (US7802593050)
    Q1 2025
    Shell ADSs (US$) 0.716

    Cash dividends on American Depositary Shares (“ADSs”) will be paid, by default, in US dollars.

    Each ADS represents two ordinary shares. ADSs are evidenced by an American Depositary Receipt (“ADR”) certificate. In many cases the terms ADR and ADS are used interchangeably.

    Dividend timetable for the first quarter 2025 interim dividend

    Event Date
    Announcement date May 2, 2025
    Ex- Dividend Date for ADSs May 16, 2025
    Ex- Dividend Date for ordinary shares May 15, 2025
    Record date May 16, 2025
    Closing of currency election date (see Note below) June 2, 2025
    Pound sterling and euro equivalents announcement date June 9, 2025
    Payment date June 23, 2025

    Note

    A different currency election date may apply to shareholders holding shares in a securities account with a bank or financial institution ultimately holding through Euroclear Nederland. This may also apply to other shareholders who do not hold their shares either directly on the Register of Members or in the corporate sponsored nominee arrangement. Shareholders can contact their broker, financial intermediary, bank or financial institution for the election deadline that applies.

    Taxation – cash dividends

    If you are uncertain as to the tax treatment of any dividends you should consult your tax advisor.

    Dividend Reinvestment Programmes (“DRIP”)

    The following organisations offer Dividend Reinvestment Plans (“DRIPs”) which enable the Company’s shareholders to elect to have their dividend payments used to purchase the Company’s shares:

    • Equiniti Financial Services Limited (“EFSL”), for those holding shares (a) directly on the register as certificate holder or as CREST Member and (b) via the Shell Corporate Nominee;
    • ABN-AMRO NV (“ABN”) for Financial Intermediaries holding shares via Euroclear Nederland;
    • JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“JPM”) for holders of ADSs; and
    • Other DRIPs may also be available from the intermediary through which investors hold their shares and ADSs.

    These DRIP offerors provide their DRIPs fully on their account and not on behalf of the Company. Interested parties should contact the relevant DRIP offeror directly.

    More information can be found at https://www.shell.com/drip

    To be eligible to participate in the DRIPs for the next dividend, shareholders must make a valid dividend reinvestment election before the published date for the close of elections. 

    Enquiries
    Media: International +44 (0) 207 934 5550; U.S. and Canada: https://www.shell.us/about-us/news-and-insights/media/submit-an-inquiry.html

    Cautionary Note

    The companies in which Shell plc directly and indirectly owns investments are separate legal entities. In this announcement “Shell”, “Shell Group” and “Group” are sometimes used for convenience to reference Shell plc and its subsidiaries in general. Likewise, the words “we”, “us” and “our” are also used to refer to Shell plc and its subsidiaries in general or to those who work for them. These terms are also used where no useful purpose is served by identifying the particular entity or entities. ‘‘Subsidiaries’’, “Shell subsidiaries” and “Shell companies” as used in this announcement refer to entities over which Shell plc either directly or indirectly has control. The terms “joint venture”, “joint operations”, “joint arrangements”, and “associates” may also be used to refer to a commercial arrangement in which Shell has a direct or indirect ownership interest with one or more parties.  The term “Shell interest” is used for convenience to indicate the direct and/or indirect ownership interest held by Shell in an entity or unincorporated joint arrangement, after exclusion of all third-party interest.

    Forward-Looking statements

    This announcement contains forward-looking statements (within the meaning of the U.S. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995) concerning the financial condition, results of operations and businesses of Shell. All statements other than statements of historical fact are, or may be deemed to be, forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are statements of future expectations that are based on management’s current expectations and assumptions and involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results, performance or events to differ materially from those expressed or implied in these statements. Forward-looking statements include, among other things, statements concerning the potential exposure of Shell to market risks and statements expressing management’s expectations, beliefs, estimates, forecasts, projections and assumptions. These forward-looking statements are identified by their use of terms and phrases such as “aim”; “ambition”; ‘‘anticipate’’;  “aspire”; “aspiration”; ‘‘believe’’; “commit”; “commitment”; ‘‘could’’; “desire”; ‘‘estimate’’; ‘‘expect’’; ‘‘goals’’; ‘‘intend’’; ‘‘may’’; “milestones”; ‘‘objectives’’; ‘‘outlook’’; ‘‘plan’’; ‘‘probably’’; ‘‘project’’; ‘‘risks’’; “schedule”; ‘‘seek’’; ‘‘should’’; ‘‘target’’; “vision”; ‘‘will’’; “would” and similar terms and phrases. There are a number of factors that could affect the future operations of Shell and could cause those results to differ materially from those expressed in the forward-looking statements included in this announcement, including (without limitation): (a) price fluctuations in crude oil and natural gas; (b) changes in demand for Shell’s products; (c) currency fluctuations; (d) drilling and production results; (e) reserves estimates; (f) loss of market share and industry competition; (g) environmental and physical risks, including climate change; (h) risks associated with the identification of suitable potential acquisition properties and targets, and successful negotiation and completion of such transactions; (i) the risk of doing business in developing countries and countries subject to international sanctions; (j) legislative, judicial, fiscal and regulatory developments including tariffs and regulatory measures addressing climate change; (k) economic and financial market conditions in various countries and regions; (l) political risks, including the risks of expropriation and renegotiation of the terms of contracts with governmental entities, delays or advancements in the approval of projects and delays in the reimbursement for shared costs; (m) risks associated with the impact of pandemics, regional conflicts, such as the Russia-Ukraine war and the conflict in the Middle East, and a significant cyber security, data privacy or IT incident; (n) the pace of the energy transition; and (o) changes in trading conditions. No assurance is provided that future dividend payments will match or exceed previous dividend payments. All forward-looking statements contained in this announcement are expressly qualified in their entirety by the cautionary statements contained or referred to in this section. Readers should not place undue reliance on forward-looking statements. Additional risk factors that may affect future results are contained in Shell plc’s Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2024 (available at www.shell.com/investors/news-and-filings/sec-filings.html and www.sec.gov). These risk factors also expressly qualify all forward-looking statements contained in this announcement and should be considered by the reader.  Each forward-looking statement speaks only as of the date of this announcement, May 2, 2025. Neither Shell plc nor any of its subsidiaries undertake any obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statement as a result of new information, future events or other information. In light of these risks, results could differ materially from those stated, implied or inferred from the forward-looking statements contained in this announcement.

    Shell’s net carbon intensity

    Also, in this announcement we may refer to Shell’s “net carbon intensity” (NCI), which includes Shell’s carbon emissions from the production of our energy products, our suppliers’ carbon emissions in supplying energy for that production and our customers’ carbon emissions associated with their use of the energy products we sell. Shell’s NCI also includes the emissions associated with the production and use of energy products produced by others which Shell purchases for resale. Shell only controls its own emissions. The use of the terms Shell’s “net carbon intensity” or NCI is for convenience only and not intended to suggest these emissions are those of Shell plc or its subsidiaries.

    Shell’s net-zero emissions target

    Shell’s operating plan and outlook are forecasted for a three-year period and ten-year period, respectively, and are updated every year. They reflect the current economic environment and what we can reasonably expect to see over the next three and ten years. Accordingly, the outlook reflects our Scope 1, Scope 2 and NCI targets over the next ten years. However, Shell’s operating plan and outlook cannot reflect our 2050 net-zero emissions target, as this target is outside our planning period. Such future operating plans and outlooks could include changes to our portfolio, efficiency improvements and the use of carbon capture and storage and carbon credits. In the future, as society moves towards net-zero emissions, we expect Shell’s operating plans and outlooks to reflect this movement. However, if society is not net zero in 2050, as of today, there would be significant risk that Shell may not meet this target.

    Forward-Looking non-GAAP measures

    This announcement may contain certain forward-looking non-GAAP measures such as adjusted earnings and divestments. We are unable to provide a reconciliation of these forward-looking non-GAAP measures to the most comparable GAAP financial measures because certain information needed to reconcile those non-GAAP measures to the most comparable GAAP financial measures is dependent on future events some of which are outside the control of Shell, such as oil and gas prices, interest rates and exchange rates. Moreover, estimating such GAAP measures with the required precision necessary to provide a meaningful reconciliation is extremely difficult and could not be accomplished without unreasonable effort. Non-GAAP measures in respect of future periods which cannot be reconciled to the most comparable GAAP financial measure are calculated in a manner which is consistent with the accounting policies applied in Shell plc’s consolidated financial statements.

    The contents of websites referred to in this announcement do not form part of this announcement.

    We may have used certain terms, such as resources, in this announcement that the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) strictly prohibits us from including in our filings with the SEC.  Investors are urged to consider closely the disclosure in our Form 20-F, File No 1-32575, available on the SEC website www.sec.gov.

    LEI number of Shell plc: 21380068P1DRHMJ8KU70
    Classification: Additional regulated information required to be disclosed under the laws of the United Kingdom

    The MIL Network –

    May 2, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Minister for Finance in talks about latest report on Russia’s economy

    Source: Government of Sweden

    Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine continues with unabated intensity, bringing serious consequences for civilians. Russian propaganda continues to spread the false narrative of a strong and resilient economy. On behalf of the Swedish Government, the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) drafted a report in late 2024 concerning economic developments in Russia. The report highlighted the unreliability of Russian statistics, and that the country’s economy is not performing as well as its statistics suggest. SITE has now published a follow-up report, and Minister for Finance Elisabeth Svantesson has met with Director of SITE Torbjörn Becker to discuss the Russian economy and the report’s conclusions.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    May 2, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: ING posts 1Q2025 net result of €1,455 million, with strong growth in customer balances and fee income

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    ING posts 1Q2025 net result of €1,455 million, with strong growth in customer balances and fee income

     
    1Q2025 profit before tax of €2,124 million with a CET1 ratio of 13.6%
    • Strong increase in fee income, driven especially by an increase in investment products
    • Total income was resilient, supported by an excellent growth in deposits and a continued increase in mortgage volumes, as well as strong results in Financial Markets
    • Operating expenses excluding regulatory costs slightly lower quarter-on-quarter
    • We continue to move our capital towards our target level and announce a €2.0 billion share buyback
     

    CEO statement
    “While the geopolitical and macroeconomic circumstances remain uncertain, we believe there is an opportunity for Europe to collectively drive competitiveness and resilience through simplification of regulations and investments in infrastructure, technology and defence,” said Steven van Rijswijk, CEO of ING Group. “As one of the largest and most geographically diversified European banks, we are well-positioned to play a key role in supporting this growth while navigating volatility. During these times, we are staying particularly close to our clients to understand their concerns and banking needs. Our scale, strong performance and robust capital ratios enable us to provide our customers with the support required to manage uncertainties, mitigate risks and capture opportunities.

    “During the first quarter of 2025, we have delivered continued commercial growth, driven by excellent growth in deposits and higher mortgage volumes. Total income has increased, supported by resilient commercial net interest income and a strong increase in fee income. Expenses have decreased slightly quarter-on-quarter and the increase year-on-year was in line with our guidance, reflecting the impact of inflation and client acquisition expenses. Risk costs were €313 million and below our through-the-cycle-average, reflecting the quality of our loan portfolio.

    “In Retail Banking, our mobile primary customer base has grown by 174,000 customers this quarter, mainly attributable to Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Poland. We have attracted €17 billion in retail core deposits, primarily in Germany. And we have increased core lending by €9 billion, of which €6 billion is in residential mortgages, particularly in the Netherlands and Germany, and nearly €2 billion in Business Banking. Across our markets, we have seen 125,000 mortgage applications during this quarter, up 20% year-on-year. Retail fee income has risen 18% year-on-year, primarily driven by growth in the number of investment product customers, higher assets under management and an increase in customer trading activity.

    “In Wholesale Banking, total income was stable, with strong results in Financial Markets as we have supported our clients during the turbulent market conditions. This turbulence has also led to muted lending volumes. Fee income in Wholesale Banking has increased quarter-on-quarter, mainly driven by higher fees from Global Capital Markets and Trade Finance. Moreover, we have continued to invest in front office growth, our digital customer experience and the scalability of our systems.

    “We continue to support clients in their sustainability transition by launching innovative services or by entering into partnerships. In Wholesale Banking, we have increased sustainable volume mobilised to €30 billion, a 23% increase versus last year. In Spain, we have launched a service that helps retail customers get insights into their CO2e emissions and provides tips on how to reduce their environmental footprint. In Australia, ING has become the first bank to participate in a new digital energy ratings programme that provides our customers with free energy ratings of their homes and identifies potential sustainability improvements.

    “We continue to converge our CET1 ratio to our target level while taking the ongoing geopolitical and macroeconomic uncertainty into account. In that light, today we announce a share buyback programme of €2.0 billion.

    “We’re pleased with our first-quarter performance and are confident in our ability to deliver value to our stakeholders in the current macroeconomic turbulence. We are well on track to meet our 2027 targets and I would like to thank our employees across the world for their contributions to these strong results and their commitment to serving our customers.”

     
    Further information
    All publications related to ING’s 1Q 2025 results can be found at the quarterly results page on ING.com. For more on investor information, go to www.ing.com/investors.

    A short ING ON AIR video with CEO Steven van Rijswijk discussing our 1Q 2025 results is available on Youtube.
    For further information on ING, please visit www.ing.com. Frequent news updates can be found in the Newsroom or via the @ING_news feed on X. Photos of ING operations, buildings and its executives are available for download at Flickr.

     
    Investor conference call and webcast
    Steven van Rijswijk, Tanate Phutrakul and Ljiljana Čortan will discuss the results in an Investor conference call on 2 May 2025 at 9:00 a.m. CET. Members of the investment community can join the conference call at +31 20 708 5074 (NL), or +44 330 551 0202 (UK) (registration required via invitation) and via live audio webcast at www.ing.com.
     
    Investor enquiries
    E: investor.relations@ing.com

    Press enquiries
    T: +31 20 576 5000
    E: media.relations@ing.com

     
    ING Profile
    ING is a global financial institution with a strong European base, offering banking services through its operating company ING Bank. The purpose of ING Bank is: empowering people to stay a step ahead in life and in business. ING Bank’s more than 60,000 employees offer retail and wholesale banking services to customers in over 100 countries.

    ING Group shares are listed on the exchanges of Amsterdam (INGA NA, INGA.AS), Brussels and on the New York Stock Exchange (ADRs: ING US, ING.N).

    ING aims to put sustainability at the heart of what we do. Our policies and actions are assessed by independent research and ratings providers, which give updates on them annually. ING’s ESG rating by MSCI was reconfirmed by MSCI as ‘AA’ in August 2024 for the fifth year. As of December 2023, in Sustainalytics’ view, ING’s management of ESG material risk is ‘Strong’. Our current ESG Risk Rating, is 17.2 (Low Risk). ING Group shares are also included in major sustainability and ESG index products of leading providers. Here are some examples: Euronext, STOXX, Morningstar and FTSE Russell.

    Important legal information
    Elements of this press release contain or may contain information about ING Groep N.V. and/ or ING Bank N.V. within the meaning of Article 7(1) to (4) of EU Regulation No 596/2014 (‘Market Abuse Regulation’).

    ING Group’s annual accounts are prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards as adopted by the European Union (‘IFRS- EU’). In preparing the financial information in this document, except as described otherwise, the same accounting principles are applied as in the 2024 ING Group consolidated annual accounts. All figures in this document are unaudited. Small differences are possible in the tables due to rounding.

    Certain of the statements contained herein are not historical facts, including, without limitation, certain statements made of future expectations and other forward-looking statements that are based on management’s current views and assumptions and involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results, performance or events to differ materially from those expressed or implied in such statements. Actual results, performance or events may differ materially from those in such statements due to a number of factors, including, without limitation: (1) changes in general economic conditions and customer behaviour, in particular economic conditions in ING’s core markets, including changes affecting currency exchange rates and the regional and global economic impact of the invasion of Russia into Ukraine and related international response measures (2) changes affecting interest rate levels (3) any default of a major market participant and related market disruption (4) changes in performance of financial markets, including in Europe and developing markets (5) fiscal uncertainty in Europe and the United States (6) discontinuation of or changes in ‘benchmark’ indices (7) inflation and deflation in our principal markets (8) changes in conditions in the credit and capital markets generally, including changes in borrower and counterparty creditworthiness (9) failures of banks falling under the scope of state compensation schemes (10) noncompliance with or changes in laws and regulations, including those concerning financial services, financial economic crimes and tax laws, and the interpretation and application thereof (11) geopolitical risks, political instabilities and policies and actions of governmental and regulatory authorities, including in connection with the invasion of Russia into Ukraine and the related international response measures (12) legal and regulatory risks in certain countries with less developed legal and regulatory frameworks (13) prudential supervision and regulations, including in relation to stress tests and regulatory restrictions on dividends and distributions (also among members of the group) (14) ING’s ability to meet minimum capital and other prudential regulatory requirements (15) changes in regulation of US commodities and derivatives businesses of ING and its customers (16) application of bank recovery and resolution regimes, including write down and conversion powers in relation to our securities (17) outcome of current and future litigation, enforcement proceedings, investigations or other regulatory actions, including claims by customers or stakeholders who feel misled or treated unfairly, and other conduct issues (18) changes in tax laws and regulations and risks of non-compliance or investigation in connection with tax laws, including FATCA (19) operational and IT risks, such as system disruptions or failures, breaches of security, cyber-attacks, human error, changes in operational practices or inadequate controls including in respect of third parties with which we do business and including any risks as a result of incomplete, inaccurate, or otherwise flawed outputs from the algorithms and data sets utilized in artificial intelligence (20) risks and challenges related to cybercrime including the effects of cyberattacks and changes in legislation and regulation related to cybersecurity and data privacy, including such risks and challenges as a consequence of the use of emerging technologies, such as advanced forms of artificial intelligence and quantum computing (21) changes in general competitive factors, including ability to increase or maintain market share (22) inability to protect our intellectual property and infringement claims by third parties (23) inability of counterparties to meet financial obligations or ability to enforce rights against such counterparties (24) changes in credit ratings (25) business, operational, regulatory, reputation, transition and other risks and challenges in connection with climate change, diversity, equity and inclusion and other ESG-related matters, including data gathering and reporting and also including managing the conflicting laws and requirements of governments, regulators and authorities with respect to these topics (26) inability to attract and retain key personnel (27) future liabilities under defined benefit retirement plans (28) failure to manage business risks, including in connection with use of models, use of derivatives, or maintaining appropriate policies and guidelines (29) changes in capital and credit markets, including interbank funding, as well as customer deposits, which provide the liquidity and capital required to fund our operations, and (30) the other risks and uncertainties detailed in the most recent annual report of ING Groep N.V. (including the Risk Factors contained therein) and ING’s more recent disclosures, including press releases, which are available on www.ING.com.

    This document may contain ESG-related material that has been prepared by ING on the basis of publicly available information, internally developed data and other third-party sources believed to be reliable. ING has not sought to independently verify information obtained from public and third-party sources and makes no representations or warranties as to accuracy, completeness, reasonableness or reliability of such information.

    Materiality, as used in the context of ESG, is distinct from, and should not be confused with, such term as defined in the Market Abuse Regulation or as defined for Securities and Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) reporting purposes. Any issues identified as material for purposes of ESG in this document are therefore not necessarily material as defined in the Market Abuse Regulation or for SEC reporting purposes. In addition, there is currently no single, globally recognized set of accepted definitions in assessing whether activities are “green” or “sustainable.” Without limiting any of the statements contained herein, we make no representation or warranty as to whether any of our securities constitutes a green or sustainable security or conforms to present or future investor expectations or objectives for green or sustainable investing. For information on characteristics of a security, use of proceeds, a description of applicable project(s) and/or any other relevant information, please reference the offering documents for such security.

    This document may contain inactive textual addresses to internet websites operated by us and third parties. Reference to such websites is made for information purposes only, and information found at such websites is not incorporated by reference into this document. ING does not make any representation or warranty with respect to the accuracy or completeness of, or take any responsibility for, any information found at any websites operated by third parties. ING specifically disclaims any liability with respect to any information found at websites operated by third parties. ING cannot guarantee that websites operated by third parties remain available following the publication of this document, or that any information found at such websites will not change following the filing of this document. Many of those factors are beyond ING’s control.

    Any forward-looking statements made by or on behalf of ING speak only as of the date they are made, and ING assumes no obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information or for any other reason.

    This document does not constitute an offer to sell, or a solicitation of an offer to purchase, any securities in the United States or any other jurisdiction.

    Attachment

    • Full ING 1Q2025 Results Press Release (PDF)

    The MIL Network –

    May 2, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: ING completes share buyback and announces new programme of up to €2.0 billion

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    ING completes share buyback and announces new programme of up to €2.0 billion

    ING announced today that it has completed the share buyback programme announced on 31 October 2024. The total number of ordinary shares repurchased under the programme is 125,848,305 at an average price of €15.84 for a total consideration of €1,993,571,438.95.

    During the last week of the programme, from 28 April 2025 up to and including 30 April 2025, in total 6,872,040 shares were purchased. These shares were repurchased at an average price of €17.12 for a total amount of €117,683,132.31.

    Today ING announced a new share buyback programme under which it plans to repurchase ordinary shares of ING Groep N.V. for a maximum total amount of € 2.0 billion. The purpose of the programme is to converge our CET1 ratio towards our target.

    ING Group’s CET1 ratio was 13.6% at the end of the first quarter of 2025, which is well above the prevailing CET1 ratio requirement of 10.76%. The share buyback programme will have an impact of approximately 59 bps on our CET1 ratio. The programme will commence on 2 May 2025 and is expected to end no later than 27 October 2025.

    The ECB has approved the programme, which will be executed in compliance with the Market Abuse Regulation and within the limitations of the existing authority to acquire a maximum of 20% of the issued shares, as granted by the general meeting of shareholders on 22 April 2025. ING has entered into a non-discretionary arrangement with a financial intermediary to conduct the buyback.

    For detailed information on the daily repurchased shares, individual share purchase transactions and weekly reports, see the ING website at www.ing.com/Investor-relations/Share-information/Share-buyback-programme.htm.

    Note for editors
    For further information on ING, please visit www.ing.com. Frequent news updates can be found in the Newsroom. Photos of ING operations, buildings and its executives are available for download at Flickr.

    Press enquiries   Investor enquiries
    Raymond Vermeulen   ING Group Investor Relations
    +31 20 576 5000   +31 20 576 6396
    Raymond.Vermeulen@ing.com   Investor.Relations@ing.com

    ING PROFILE

    ING is a global financial institution with a strong European base, offering banking services through its operating company ING Bank. The purpose of ING Bank is: empowering people to stay a step ahead in life and in business. ING Bank’s more than 60,000 employees offer retail and wholesale banking services to customers in over 100 countries.

    ING Group shares are listed on the exchanges of Amsterdam (INGA NA, INGA.AS), Brussels and on the New York Stock Exchange (ADRs: ING US, ING.N).

    ING aims to put sustainability at the heart of what we do. Our policies and actions are assessed by independent research and ratings providers, which give updates on them annually. ING’s ESG rating by MSCI was reconfirmed by MSCI as ‘AA’ in August 2024 for the fifth year. As of December 2023, in Sustainalytics’ view, ING’s management of ESG material risk is ‘Strong’. Our current ESG Risk Rating, is 17.2 (Low Risk). ING Group shares are also included in major sustainability and ESG index products of leading providers. Here are some examples: Euronext, STOXX, Morningstar and FTSE Russell. Society is transitioning to a low-carbon economy. So are our clients, and so is ING. We finance a lot of sustainable activities, but we still finance more that’s not. Follow our progress on ing.com/climate.

    IMPORTANT LEGAL INFORMATION

    Elements of this press release contain or may contain information about ING Groep N.V. and/ or ING Bank N.V. within the meaning of Article 7(1) to (4) of EU Regulation No 596/2014 (‘Market Abuse Regulation’).

    ING Group’s annual accounts are prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards as adopted by the European Union (‘IFRS- EU’). In preparing the financial information in this document, except as described otherwise, the same accounting principles are applied as in the 2024 ING Group consolidated annual accounts. All figures in this document are unaudited. Small differences are possible in the tables due to rounding.

    Certain of the statements contained herein are not historical facts, including, without limitation, certain statements made of future expectations and other forward-looking statements that are based on management’s current views and assumptions and involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results, performance or events to differ materially from those expressed or implied in such statements. Actual results, performance or events may differ materially from those in such statements due to a number of factors, including, without limitation: (1) changes in general economic conditions and customer behaviour, in particular economic conditions in ING’s core markets, including changes affecting currency exchange rates and the regional and global economic impact of the invasion of Russia into Ukraine and related international response measures (2) changes affecting interest rate levels (3) any default of a major market participant and related market disruption (4) changes in performance of financial markets, including in Europe and developing markets (5) fiscal uncertainty in Europe and the United States (6) discontinuation of or changes in ‘benchmark’ indices (7) inflation and deflation in our principal markets (8) changes in conditions in the credit and capital markets generally, including changes in borrower and counterparty creditworthiness (9) failures of banks falling under the scope of state compensation schemes (10) non- compliance with or changes in laws and regulations, including those concerning financial services, financial economic crimes and tax laws, and the interpretation and application thereof (11) geopolitical risks, political instabilities and policies and actions of governmental and regulatory authorities, including in connection with the invasion of Russia into Ukraine and the related international response measures (12) legal and regulatory risks in certain countries with less developed legal and regulatory frameworks (13) prudential supervision and regulations, including in relation to stress tests and regulatory restrictions on dividends and distributions (also among members of the group) (14) ING’s ability to meet minimum capital and other prudential regulatory requirements (15) changes in regulation of US commodities and derivatives businesses of ING and its customers (16) application of bank recovery and resolution regimes, including write down and conversion powers in relation to our securities (17) outcome of current and future litigation, enforcement proceedings, investigations or other regulatory actions, including claims by customers or stakeholders who feel misled or treated unfairly, and other conduct issues (18) changes in tax laws and regulations and risks of non-compliance or investigation in connection with tax laws, including FATCA (19) operational and IT risks, such as system disruptions or failures, breaches of security, cyber-attacks, human error, changes in operational practices or inadequate controls including in respect of third parties with which we do business and including any risks as a result of incomplete, inaccurate, or otherwise flawed outputs from the algorithms and data sets utilized in artificial intelligence (20) risks and challenges related to cybercrime including the effects of cyberattacks and changes in legislation and regulation related to cybersecurity and data privacy, including such risks and challenges as a consequence of the use of emerging technologies, such as advanced forms of artificial intelligence and quantum computing (21) changes in general competitive factors, including ability to increase or maintain market share (22) inability to protect our intellectual property and infringement claims by third parties (23) inability of counterparties to meet financial obligations or ability to enforce rights against such counterparties (24) changes in credit ratings (25) business, operational, regulatory, reputation, transition and other risks and challenges in connection with climate change, diversity, equity and inclusion and other ESG-related matters, including data gathering and reporting and also including managing the conflicting laws and requirements of governments, regulators and authorities with respect to these topics (26) inability to attract and retain key personnel (27) future liabilities under defined benefit retirement plans (28) failure to manage business risks, including in connection with use of models, use of derivatives, or maintaining appropriate policies and guidelines (29) changes in capital and credit markets, including interbank funding, as well as customer deposits, which provide the liquidity and capital required to fund our operations, and (30) the other risks and uncertainties detailed in the most recent annual report of ING Groep N.V. (including the Risk Factors contained therein) and ING’s more recent disclosures, including press releases, which are available on www.ING.com.

    This document may contain ESG-related material that has been prepared by ING on the basis of publicly available information, internally developed data and other third-party sources believed to be reliable. ING has not sought to independently verify information obtained from public and third-party sources and makes no representations or warranties as to accuracy, completeness, reasonableness or reliability of such information.

    Materiality, as used in the context of ESG, is distinct from, and should not be confused with, such term as defined in the Market Abuse Regulation or as defined for Securities and Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) reporting purposes. Any issues identified as material for purposes of ESG in this document are therefore not necessarily material as defined in the Market Abuse Regulation or for SEC reporting purposes. In addition, there is currently no single, globally recognized set of accepted definitions in assessing whether activities are “green” or “sustainable.” Without limiting any of the statements contained herein, we make no representation or warranty as to whether any of our securities constitutes a green or sustainable security or conforms to present or future investor expectations or objectives for green or sustainable investing. For information on characteristics of a security, use of proceeds, a description of applicable project(s) and/or any other relevant information, please reference the offering documents for such security.

    This document may contain inactive textual addresses to internet websites operated by us and third parties. Reference to such websites is made for information purposes only, and information found at such websites is not incorporated by reference into this document. ING does not make any representation or warranty with respect to the accuracy or completeness of, or take any responsibility for, any information found at any websites operated by third parties. ING specifically disclaims any liability with respect to any information found at websites operated by third parties. ING cannot guarantee that websites operated by third parties remain available following the publication of this document, or that any information found at such websites will not change following the filing of this document. Many of those factors are beyond ING’s control.

    Any forward-looking statements made by or on behalf of ING speak only as of the date they are made, and ING assumes no obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information or for any other reason.

    This document does not constitute an offer to sell, or a solicitation of an offer to purchase, any securities in the United States or any other jurisdiction.

    Attachment

    • ING completes share buyback and announces new programme of up to €2.0 billion

    The MIL Network –

    May 2, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: Keith Rankin Analysis – The Great World War 1914-1945: Germany, Russia, Ukraine

    Analysis by Keith Rankin.

    Keith Rankin, trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

    On Anzac Day we remembered World War One and World War Two, or at least the peripheral little bits of those imperial wars that New Zealand was involved in. There was and is little context given to how New Zealand got involved with such far-away wars which need never have become world wars. There were the usual cliches about ‘our’ young men, invading the Ottoman Empire, somehow fighting for freedom and democracy; and, through making ‘supreme sacrifices’, establishing the invaders’ national identities. There was very little context about what these anti-German and anti-Japanese wars were really about, and on why we thought anybody could possibly benefit from Aotearoa New Zealand contributing in its own small way to their escalation.

    The Great World War 1914-1945

    If we step back, we can see that there was really only one very big war; best dubbed as The Great World War 1914-1945 (the GWW, which itself morphed into another in 1945, The Cold War 1945-1990).

    The Great World War is really the 1914 to 1945 Russo-German War, embedded in a wider state of conflict that might be called The Great Imperial War.

    The subsequent Cold War, essentially the ‘great hegemonic war’, reframed world war; from 1945 it was between the United States imperium and the Communist powers of Russia and China; it was a ‘proxy war’ rather than a passive-aggressive ‘cold war’. The years 1991 to 2021 may prove to have been an intermission, just as 1919 to 1939 was an intermission in the Great World War; and noting that, in the GWW, Russia and Germany became ‘Communist’ and ‘Nazi’ during that intermission. The most important early ‘hot’ conflict in the Cold War was the Korean War, a deadly proxy conflict – at its core between the ‘Anti-Communist’ United States and ‘Communist’ China – ending as a ‘score-draw’; an armistice in 1953 which took the hostile parties back to an almost identical position as to where they started in 1950. For the second phase of the Great Hegemonic War, the ‘Communist’ factor was waned; the prevailing ideology in the west in 2025 is a distorted form of self-congratulatory ‘democratic imperialism’, not unlike the prevailing ideology in the west in 1914.

    By looking at 1914 to 1945 in this way, as a single albeit complex conflict, we can more easily see that the essence of the struggle was a conflict between the waxing German and Russian Empires; and that the central prizes of that conflict were the Russian imperial territories of Ukraine and the Caucasus, and the waning Ottoman Empire: food, oil and sea-access in the strategic pivot of central Eurasia.

    All (except one) of the world’s ‘great’ empires of the early twentieth century became involved: the waxing empires of Germany, Russia, Japan, and the United States of America; and the waning empires of United Kingdom, France, Ottoman Türkiye, Austria-Hungary and Netherlands. And the would-be empire of Italy. (The exception was the empire of Portugal, a neutral party; in 1898 the United States had acquired Spain’s remnant empire.)

    The Result of the Great World War

    Wikipedia has page entries for every war ever fought in reality or mythology. And the Wikipedia format likes to give a binary result, as if a war was a series of football matches with a grand finale. Winners and losers. It’s not like that in reality: most wars formally end in an armistice; albeit an armistice in which one party – one nation or coalition of nations – has an advantage and is largely able to dictate terms.

    The core war within the Great World War was the Russo-German War, which ended in 1945 with a victory to Russia; then Rusia was the imperium of the ‘Communist’ Soviet Union. The victor of the wider Great Imperial War was the United States; Imperator Americanus inherited a beaten-up world, much as Emperor Augustus inherited the Roman Empire in 27 BCE after about two decades of strife between warring would-be overlords.

    The Great World War began in 1914, essentially as the Third Balkan War. The reasons this local war expanded from a part of the world politically and geographically distant from the British Empire – the empire of which New Zealand understood itself to be an integral part – related to a contested set of quasi-scientific socio-economic and supremacist utopias (which will only be addressed here in passing), and to a basic reality that an expansionist western ‘civilisation’ was confronting diminished returns.

    Possibly the most important and least understood year of the whole GWW was 1918. The context here is that Russia – Germany’s new great foe, the Russian Empire – had been defeated late in 1917, following both a successful democratic revolution (the February Revolution) and a German-facilitated ‘Communist’ ‘Bolshevik’ coup d’etat (the October Revolution). The formality of Russian defeat – the Brest-Litovsk Treaty – was signed by Leon Trotsky in March 1918. The problem for Germany was that there was still an unresolved western front, there was a British naval blockade of Germany, and that the United States had been persuaded in 1917 to enter the war as an Entente  power. Nevertheless, in March 1918, the Germans were winning on the western front having already settled the more-important eastern front; but Germany had no thought-through exit strategy. They were in no position to occupy Belgium, let alone France.

    After the trench warfare stalemate that had characterised the western front for more than three years, it was Germany that broke through in the winter of 1917/18; indeed, Germany advanced to just-about big-gun-firing distance from Paris. The western powers were in a state of panic, as Germany redeployed soldiers from the eastern front to the west.

    The United States had entered the war in France, but their soldiers were green and initially of little help against battle-hardened Germans. But the American soldiers, without realising the significance, had brought with them a secret weapon, influenza. (The deadly strain of influenza in 1918 – popularly known as the Spanish Flu – was almost certainly a hybrid of the Kansas strain and an Asian strain already in France.) The tide of the war only turned against Germany in August 1918, mainly due to economic limitations but also due in some part to soldiers getting very sick. The sickness had a bigger military impact on Germany, given that Germany’s soldiers (including one A. Hitler) were more hardened fighters than the Americans.

    Germany went from winners to losers only in the last three months, from August to November 1918; it was like a basketball game in which defeat was snatched from the jaws of victory (or vice versa, from a western viewpoint!). But they were never losers in the absolute sense that they later were, in 1945. On 11 November 1918, Germany settled for an armistice in which they were on the back foot. It was not an absolute defeat, and should never have been seen as such. Nevertheless, that sensible armistice came to be treated by the Entente Powers (especially France, the United Kingdom and the United States) as an absolute victory; Germany, victor over Russia, was subsequently treated with great and unnecessary humiliation, creating the seeds for a resumption of the Great World War. Part of that humiliation was the stripping of the territories in the incipient Soviet Union that had been won by Germany (especially the loss of Ukraine); another important part was the imposition of a ‘Polish Corridor’, through Eastern Germany to the Baltic Sea at the then-German city of Danzig, physically dividing Germany.

    A third humiliation was a set of reparations that were imposed using similar mercantilist logic to that which is upsetting the world economic order today; Germany was supposed to pay France in particular huge amounts of gold, but the only way Germany could acquire that gold was for Germany to run a trade surplus and for the Entente Powers to run trade deficits. But the ‘victorious’ powers wanted to run trade surpluses, not trade deficits; they wanted Germany to increase its debt to the west while claiming that they wanted Germany to pay off its debt to the west.

    (Today, the United States wants its Treasury to accumulate treasure in the same way that it and France sought to do in the 1920s, not realising that the countries they want to extract ‘modern treasure’ from – China and the European Union – can only get that treasure if they run trade surpluses. The great ‘modern treasure’ mine is actually in Washington, not in Eurasia.)

    One result of all this mercantilism imposed upon the 1920s’ world order by the liberal Entente powers was the Great Depression; that was probably the number-one catalyst towards the resumption of the Great World War in 1939 and the Russo-German War in 1941. This ‘liberal mercantilism’ was the first of the pseudo-scientific utopias to fail. Other aggravating factors were the intensification of the contradictions of the other two ‘scientific utopias’: the unachievable ‘Communist’ experiment in Russia, and the exacerbation of the supremacist eugenics which was widely subscribed to throughout Europe and which reached their apotheosis in Hitler’s Germany.

    A defeated Russia played no part in the formal hostilities of the GWW in 1918. Likewise, when the Great World War resumed in 1939, Russia appeared to be on the sideline; though that’s another story. The true nature of the resumed GWW – known as World War Two in the west – became apparent in June 1941. The war continued for nearly four terrible years, with Soviet Russia prevailing over Nazi Germany in 1945, with some help from the western powers. Russia will celebrate Victory Day in a few days on 9 May; the end of the Russo-German War, though the Great World War continued until 15 August of that year. As regards the result of the Russo-German War, the western Entente powers were kingmakers rather than kings.

    Overall, freedom and democracy were casualties of the GWW, not outcomes. By 1950, there were many more unfree people in the world, and few (India notwithstanding) who were more free than they had been in 1913. Indians’ post-GWW freedoms came at a huge cost in damaged and lost lives. And they were freedoms from Britain, not freedoms fought for by Britain.

    Ukraine

    Chief among the territories won-and-lost by Germany was Ukraine. Considered in its entirety, Ukraine was the number-one prize and the number-one battleground of the Great World War.

    The territory of Ukraine had been occupied by Germany for five years: 1918, and 1941 to 1944. In 1918, Germany lost Ukraine because of events on the western front; in 1945 the Soviet Union recovered Ukraine on the battlefield. Soviet Russia was helped by three imperial nations throughout the active phases of the GWW; by the British, the French, and the Americans. Otherwise, Germany – the Prussian Empire – would have almost certainly prevailed in its quest for Ukraine, and the oilfields around the Caspian Sea (and possibly the so-called ‘Middle East’, though that may have been permanently lost to Germany in 1918).

    With Ukraine once again being centre-stage in geopolitics – the contested ground between conflicting quasi-academic narratives – the world may be set for a resumption of both the Cold War (especially in its mercantilist Sino-American guise) and the Russo-German war. Together, these have the makings of ‘World War Three’; especially if we add in the Levantine conflict, the present supremacist conflict in the ‘Middle East’.

    In the geopolitics of early 2025, the ‘elephant in the room’ is Friedrich Merz, who will (eventually!) become Chancellor of Germany on 6 May. Merz is a military hawk, who has already shown all the signs that he would like to take the Ukraine War to Russia (ref. Berlin Briefing, DW, 24 April 2015), and elite public opinion in Germany seems to be staunchly ‘pro-Ukraine’. In the event of a new global Great Depression – or the Geoeconomic Chaos Crisis that seems to be starting – could Merz become the new Führer, a ‘willing’ militarist leader of the Fourth Reich? At age 69 he’s a young man compared to Donald Trump, and he looks to be fighting fit. Germany has many of the same issues today that it had in 1910 and in 1930; a people seeking to re-flex their nationalist muscles while severely constrained, within their German and EU boundaries, in terms of natural resources. Will Merz try to shore up (and militarize) the flagging European Union, much as Trump has been trying (unsuccessfully to be sure) to unite the whole of the Americas under his triumphalist banner? (Q. How do you get to run a small superpower? A. Get yourself a large superpower, and wait.) The battle for Ukraine may have a while to run yet; possibly as a European ‘civil’ war, a new Russo-German War.

    Anzac Day

    My sense is that if there’s one thing that Aotearoa’s post-2023 leadership are even more attracted to than fiscal austerity, then that’s a good geopolitical scrap. We start to see war as glorious rather than ugly. We bring out all the false clichés and narratives, we extoll the likes of Winston Churchill, we self-suppress the inconvenient truth that war is a nasty, nasty, nasty business; indeed, we self-suppress this truth even when we see war’s brutality – or could see it if we choose to watch Freeview Channel 20 – unfolding every day.

    Now that the 80th anniversary of the Great World War has nearly passed, Anzac Day risks becoming a day of martial geo-nationalism, and not a day of remembrance.

    Anzac Day has already become a day of highly selective remembrance; probably it always was. I visited Würzburg (the German firebombed city that suffered more than any other on a per capita basis) in 1974, and I visited West and East Berlin (via Checkpoint Charlie) that same year. I visited Arras in 1975, near to where my father’s first cousin died in November 1918. I visited Derry and Belfast in 1976, cities in a then-active civil war zone. I visited the magnificently-sited Khartoum in 1978, now the capital-centre of the world’s most complicit and under-narrated tragedy. I visited Cassino in 1984, the 40th anniversary of the battles that pointlessly took so many lives, including Kiwi lives such as that of my mother’s first cousin. I visited Dandong and Seoul in 2008, gaining a first-hand insight into the Korean War, including a walk on the American-destroyed bridge and an oversight of the North Korean city of Sinuiju. (And I visited Port Arthur – Lüshun – key site and sight of the Russia-Japan War of 1905, with its natural harbour and its extant Russian train station.)

    And in 2014, on the day after Anzac Day, I visited Nagasaki, site of the first plutonium bomb ever dropped over a city; and, that same month, I visited Ginza and Asakusa in Tokyo, rebuilt sites of the worst example every of a conventional fire holocaust; 100,000 mostly civilian deaths in one March night eighty years ago. (I was also lucky to get to walk through unbombed streets to the northwest of Ueno Park, getting a sense of what the neighbourhoods of Asakusa were once like.)

    Lest we forget. Mostly, we have forgotten. (Including the worst of The Holocaust. Who commemorates Treblinka today? Or Minsk? Only Poland and Russia and Belarus.)

    Our amnesia extends to one place New Zealanders fought in. This week Al Jazeera has done a series of news vignettes and a longer documentary, to remember the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Vietnam War. This anniversary has not been prominent in New Zealand’s Anzac Day media-scape. (RNZ did run a Reuters-syndicated website-only story on 30 April: Vietnamese celebrate 50 years since end of Vietnam War. And, to its credit, TV3 News ran an overseas-sourced story yesterday, not a story about New Zealand’s largely-forgotten participation.) By-and-large, the still-living anti-Vietnam-War generation is now silent, apparently forgetful.

    When martial narratives are not sufficiently contested, then wars – big wars – happen, almost by accident. That’s how the Great World War began in the first place.

    *******

    Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    May 2, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Reed Condemns Secretary Hegseth’s Dysfunctional Management of the Pentagon

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Rhode Island Jack Reed
    WASHINGTON, DC – Over the past 100 days, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s tenure at the Pentagon has been marked by sweeping ideological purges, scandals, and the unjustified firings of senior military leaders.
    On Thursday, U.S. Senator Jack Reed (D-RI), Ranking Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, spoke on the Senate floor to address Secretary Hegseth’s damaging misconduct and the long-term consequences for the U.S. military.
    A video of Senator Reed’s remarks may be viewed here.
    A transcript of Senator Reed’s floor speech follows:
    REED:  Mr. President, I rise to discuss my concern about the chaos that is roiling the Department of Defense.  Sunday will mark the 100th day of Pete Hegseth serving as Secretary of Defense.  During his confirmation hearing, Mr. Hegseth said, quote, “[President Trump] wants a Pentagon laser focused on warfighting, lethality, meritocracy, standards and readiness.  That’s it.  That is my job.”  Well, Mr. President, Secretary Hegseth is failing the mission President Trump gave him.  His actions over the past 100 days have done nothing but distract the Pentagon and undermine its warfighting, lethality, meritocracy, standards, and readiness. 
    In his first 100 days, Secretary Hegseth has terminated or weakened programs and processes that are the bedrock upon which the military recruits personnel and trains servicemembers to go into battle.  For example, in February, the Secretary announced his plan to slash the civilian workforce by 5 to 8 percent, terminate probationary workers, and institute a hiring freeze.  These severe measures have only meant more work for the remaining employees, and more costly work for military officers and contractors to cover the gaps, or simply not carry out missions.
    The Secretary has also launched a number of efforts to eliminate diversity and inclusion programs, which have led to more limited recruiting efforts, attempts to separate honorably serving transgender servicemembers, dissolving social clubs at the military academies, banning and removing books from the Naval Academy, and inspiring walkouts by students at DOD schools abroad over book bans and curriculum changes. I joined the Army in 1967 and served on active duty for 12 years, and the idea that dependent children of military personnel, in DOD schools, would protest the Secretary of Defense, to me was inconceivable, but it’s happened.  This shows, I think, great anxiety in the ranks of our military personnel all across the globe.
    The Secretary is also failing his duty to lead the Department by example.  On March 24, Mr. Hegseth demonstrated a severe lack of judgment when he texted classified military intelligence on the unclassified and unsecure Signal app to at least two group chats, including one with his wife, brother, and personal lawyer.  That information, if intercepted by an adversary, would endanger the lives of our servicemembers deployed downrange.  The Secretary also installed a “dirty line” – an unsecure internet connection – in his Pentagon office so he could more easily send texts and personal emails.  Such actions violate the laws and protocols that every other military servicemember is required to follow.  The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General is conducting an investigation of Mr. Hegseth’s mishandling of classified information, and I look forward to its findings.
    Just hours ago, we learned of press reports that National Security Adviser Mike Waltz may be fired this week because of his own actions around the Signal incident.  If true, I welcome the message of accountability that it would send.  Mr. Waltz made a significant mistake in adding a reporter to a sensitive Signal chat, and his failure of judgment could have had serious national security consequences.  I respect that he took responsibility for his mistake.  In contrast, Secretary Hegseth has refused to take responsibility for his own misconduct, which in my view was far more egregious than Mr. Waltz’s.
    Indeed, the fallout from this incident has further eroded the already dismal credibility that the Secretary brought to the Pentagon.  The Secretary’s inner circle of hand-picked advisers have nearly all resigned or been fired.  His chief of staff was dismissed amid allegations of incompetence and unsettling personal behavior.  Three of his senior policy advisors were fired for allegedly leaking sensitive information, which they all staunchly deny.  And his top spokesman resigned after losing confidence in the Secretary, writing, quote, “The building is in disarray under Hegseth’s leadership,” and, quote, “The last month has been a full-blown meltdown at the Pentagon — and it’s becoming a real problem for the administration.”  This chain of events is extraordinary and underscores the concerns I raised at Secretary Hegseth’s nomination hearing.  He does not possess the temperament nor the management skills needed to lead the Pentagon. 
    There have been multiple news reports that Secretary Hegseth spends much of his day focused on perceived leaks and that he has become paranoid, lashing out at aides and senior military leaders, convinced that they are undermining him.  He has threatened his top military advisors, including then-acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Grady and Joint Chiefs Director General Sims, with polygraph tests in order to prove that these distinguished military leaders are not liars.
    The Secretary’s office should be leading the Pentagon, allowing the rest of the Department to be laser-focused on their missions.  But again, President Trump and Secretary Hegseth have made that very difficult due to the internal disarray they have created by firing key military leaders.
    These firings include the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander of Cyber Command, the U.S. Military Representative to NATO, the Vice Chief of the Air Force, the Secretary of Defense Senior Military Aide, and the top uniformed lawyers, or Judge Advocates General, of each of the military services.  As I’ve said before, if you want to break the law, you start by getting rid of the lawyers.
    These are not minor positions.  They are vital to the Department’s mission, and when left unfilled, the military loses focus and missions are compromised.   These officers were fired without a plan to replace them, which is crippling our military’s effectiveness during a perilous time.  More importantly, these officers were fired without explanation, which leads to the worst possible outcome for a military force – fear throughout the ranks that one should not speak up, should not refuse an illegal order, and should not call out abuse nor question decisions. 
    General and flag officers are charged with providing their unbiased “best military advice” to the civilian leaders of the Department of Defense. Servicemembers are expected to give candid feedback to their leaders and peers, and commanders expect troops to give them the facts, straight and true, because lives are on the line.  Similarly, Congress expects candor from senior officers to provide their best judgment — without fear of retribution — for both the security of our country, and that of the 2 million servicemembers who put themselves in harm’s way.
    But firing officers as a political litmus test poisons this military ethos.  It sends an immediate signal to troops that providing their unbiased best military advice might have career-ending consequences.
    I will take a brief moment to discuss the officers who have been dismissed.
    General CQ Brown
    General CQ Brown served as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was fired, without explanation, not even halfway into his four-year term.  He was visiting our troops on the southern border when he was abruptly dismissed by the President without even the courtesy of a warning.  General Brown served our nation honorably for more than four decades and led the Joint Chiefs with dedication and skill.  The Senate approved his nomination by a vote of 83-11.  To date, the Trump Administration has given no justification for his dismissal. 
    Seven full weeks passed without a confirmed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.  General Dan Caine has now been confirmed and is working hard to get up to speed.  Given what happened to his predecessor, General Caine must realize that in addition to his duties as the Chairman, he must also deal with the political intrigue consuming the Pentagon.  I hope that General Caine will always provide his best military advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense, even if that advice not what they would want to hear.
    Admiral Lisa Franchetti
    Secretary Hegseth also dismissed Admiral Lisa Franchetti, who served as the 33rd Chief of Naval Operations.  She was the first woman to lead the Navy, and the first to serve on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    Admiral Franchetti served in leadership roles at every level throughout the Navy, both ashore and at sea, and with postings around the globe.  She was a trailblazer, team builder, and inspiration to many.  The Senate approved her nomination by a vote of 95-1.  Again, the Trump Administration has given no justification for her dismissal. 
    To date, the Administration has not nominated a new Chief of Naval Operations.  It has been two months since Admiral Franchetti was dismissed, and the Navy remains without a Senate-confirmed Chief of Naval Operations at a time when the service is involved in the most combat operations since World War II in the Red Sea.
    General Timothy Haugh
    General Timothy Haugh served as the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command and Director of the National Security Agency.  As the commander of Cyber Command, General Haugh led the most formidable cyber warfighting force in the world, responsible for detecting, deterring, and overseeing cyber operations against America’s adversaries – particularly China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and various terrorist organizations.  General Haugh had a distinguished 34-year career within Air Force cyber and intelligence organizations, including multiple command assignments. 
    I am extremely concerned that press reports indicate that Laura Loomer, a fringe conspiracy theorist, convinced President Trump to dismiss General Haugh and fire a slew of expert staff on the National Security Council for no discernible reason.   Now, when a conspiracy theorist can get into the President’s office and convince him to fire an officer of General Haugh’s caliber – and others on the National Security Council – there’s not only something wrong with that individual, there’s something wrong with the President who would listen to them without consulting others.
    The Senate unanimously confirmed General Haugh to his post in December 2023, and, once again, the Trump Administration has given no explanation for his dismissal.  The Trump Administration has not selected a new CYBERCOM commander, and it’s unclear if there is any sense of urgency to fill this position.  Secretary Hegseth has given a priceless gift to China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea by purging leadership from one of our most vital national security commands.
    Vice Admiral Shoshana Chatfield
    Vice Admiral Shoshana Chatfield served as the United States Military Representative to NATO, the first woman to hold this position.  She held a vital leadership role within the alliance, particularly as it related to coordinating international support to Ukraine.  Admiral Chatfield was among the finest military officers our nation had to offer, with a 38-year career as a Navy helicopter pilot, foreign policy expert, and preeminent military educator, including as President of the Naval War College. 
    The Senate unanimously confirmed Vice Admiral Chatfield to her post in December 2023.  The Trump Administration has given no justification for her dismissal, and has not nominated any replacement to this critical posting at NATO.
    General James Slife
    General James Slife was the U.S. Air Force Vice Chief of Staff – the second highest ranking officer in the Air Force.  He spent most of his 36-year career as a special operations helicopter pilot.  He deployed many times around the world and flew countless combat missions in perilous conditions.  General Slife risked his life repeatedly for our nation and led his fellow special operators and Airmen with distinction. 
    The Senate unanimously confirmed General Slife to his post in December 2023.  The Trump Administration has given no explanation for his dismissal, nor nominated any officer to help lead the Air Force. 
    Lieutenant General Jennifer Short
    Lieutenant General Jennifer Short was the first female Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.  She advised the Secretary and served as the representative for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, coordinating policy and operations across the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and with the U.S. interagency.  A command pilot with more than 1,800 flight hours, including more than 430 combat hours in the A-10, she flew in operations Southern Watch, Iraqi Freedom, and Enduring Freedom, and commanded Airmen at the squadron, wing, major command, and combatant command levels.
    The Senate unanimously confirmed her to her post.  The Trump Administration has given no explanation for her dismissal. 
    Judge Advocates General
    Finally, I am deeply concerned by Secretary Hegseth’s dismissal of the Judge Advocates General of the military services.  These officers, known as “TJAGs,” are the most senior uniformed lawyers in the military. 
    These officers each served more than 30 years in uniform as military lawyers.  They were strictly apolitical and held fundamental roles ensuring that balanced, legal counsel was part of every military policy discussion.  These officers provided legal oversight that spanned military justice, operational law, administrative compliance, government ethics, and U.S. adherence to the Law of Armed Conflict. 
    These unprecedented firings, along with the firings of the Inspectors General, should alarm everyone about the commitment of the President, and the Secretary of Defense, to the rule of law for the military, and also within the United States and across the world. 
    Mr. President, the Defense Department is one of the most complex institutions in the world, with a budget of nearly $900 billion and a workforce of nearly 3 million military and civilian personnel.  It is an organization that requires strong leadership, stability, predictability, and trust.  These qualities are critical because we ask the Department’s men and women to risk their lives every day in service of their country.  Mr. President, those men and women who gave their lives, and all those who still serving at this moment, deserve the best.  They deserve a leader who is as laser focused on readiness, lethality and the mission as they are.  Not someone who treats his position as Secretary as a performative exercise complete with a Twitter feed dominated with workout videos. 
    Our servicemembers deserve better.  They deserve someone who is focused on them, not focused on himself.   If Secretary Hegseth does not improve his job performance, the conditions at the Pentagon will continue to deteriorate and something worse is bound to happen.  I hope Secretary Hegseth takes note. 
    I yield the floor.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    May 2, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Gran Tierra Energy Inc. Reports First Quarter 2025 Results, Record Production and Continued Exploration Success

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    • Achieved Record Total Company Average Quarterly Production of 46,647 boepd
    • Ecuador Exploration Success Continues with Additional Oil Discoveries in Iguana Block
    • Solid Balance Sheet, Exited the Quarter with $77 Million in Cash Following Active Capital Campaign, Paid Down $27 Million of Debt
    • Additional Liquidity Secured with Signing of New $75 Million Credit Facility

    CALGARY, Alberta, May 01, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Gran Tierra Energy Inc. (“Gran Tierra” or the “Company”) (NYSE American:GTE)(TSX:GTE)(LSE:GTE) announced the Company’s financial and operating results for the quarter ended March 31, 2025 (“the Quarter”) and provided an operational update. All dollar amounts are in United States (“U.S.”) dollars and all reserves and production volumes are on an average working interest before royalties (“WI”) basis unless otherwise indicated. Production is expressed in barrels (“bbl”) of oil equivalent (“boe”) per day (“boepd” or “boe/d”) and are based on WI sales before royalties. For per boe amounts based on net after royalty (“NAR”) production, see Gran Tierra’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q filed May 1, 2025.

    Message to Shareholders

    Gary Guidry, President and Chief Executive Officer of Gran Tierra, commented: “Our first quarter performance reflects strong operational execution and disciplined financial management. Our front-loaded 2025 capital program, which had up to five rigs active during the quarter, delivered record drilling times and cost efficiencies across our key assets. We continue to generate returns through our share buyback program and ongoing debt reduction. Lowering leverage remains a key priority as we focus on projects which deliver quick cycle returns and maintain flexibility to invest in high-return opportunities across our portfolio. Our focused exploration efforts also continue to deliver successful results, reinforcing the quality of our assets and long-term strategy to create value. With current production of approximately 48,400(2) boe/d and a strong hedge position for the remainder of the year we are well positioned to generate value while remaining resilient amid commodity price volatility.”

    Operational Update:

    • Ecuador
      • Gran Tierra has successfully drilled two additional oil discoveries in Ecuador, the Iguana B1 and Iguana B2 wells on the Iguana Block. The combined wells have an average oil production rate over 30 days of ~1,684 bopd from the U-Sand formation (with a less than 1% watercut), an average API of 28° and 520 standard cubic foot per stock tank barrel of gas-to-oil ratio. The Iguana B1 well was drilled and completed in record time and under budget, establishing a new pace-setting well in Gran Tierra’s Ecuador exploration campaign.
      • The drilling rig has been stacked on the Iguana pad, pending mobilization to the new Conejo pad on the Charapa Block, to resume exploration drilling during the third quarter of 2025.
    • Colombia
      • Gran Tierra successfully drilled the first three of five wells from the Cohembi North Pad during the Quarter. All wells were under budget and drilled 60% faster than the previous operator. These wells represent the Company’s first drilling operations as operator, with the remaining two wells expected to be drilled during the second quarter of 2025. Upon completion of the program, the rig will move to the Costayaco Pad to commence a three well development program during the second quarter of 2025.
      • By the end of the Quarter, the civil, electrical and mechanical field works at Cohembi reached 100% mechanical completion. This project was initiated to facilitate the processing of new production from the Cohembi North Pad at the Cohembi Central Processing Facility.
      • Optimization of the Acordionero field is ongoing through waterflood expansion, which includes facility enhancements, electrical submersible pump upsizing, injector conversions and upgrades to gas-to-power generation. These initiatives are focused on reducing unit costs, offsetting natural declines and improving overall recovery factors. The field continues to perform strongly, with average production of 13,824 boepd in the Quarter. This represents a two percent increase from the fourth quarter of 2024, despite no wells being drilled since the first quarter of 2024. Current production (April 1 – 30, 2025) is approximately 14,500 boepd, a 5% increase from the first quarter of 2025 average, reflecting the strong reservoir response to the execution of our first quarter waterflood management optimization program. The Company continues to see significant development potential at Acordionero and is planning another drilling program of eight to ten wells in 2026 targeting high oil saturation, unswept infill locations.
    • Canada
      • Gran Tierra and its joint venture partner, Logan Energy Corp., successfully drilled and completed two Lower Montney wells at Simonette. These two wells were brought on stream from the 16-13-61-1W6 (“16-13”) pad and completed with a similar optimized Lower Montney completion design as the 13-13-61-1W6 offset well drilled in 2022. After 21 days since being placed on production, the average gross production per well was 674 bbl/d oil, 13 bbl/d NGLs and 767 Mcf/d of gas (814 boe/d at 84% liquids), Gran Tierra has a 50% Working Interest and the wells continue to clean-up. This early production performance surpasses the prior offset well by 80% for the same time period and are exceeding their budgeted type curves. After 21 days since being placed on production, the average gross production per well was 674 bbl/d oil, 13 bbl/d NGLs and 767 Mcf/d of gas (814 boe/d at 84% liquids). Gran Tierra has a 50% Working Interest and the wells continue to clean-up. This early production performance surpasses the prior offset well by 80% for the same time period and are exceeding their budgeted type curves.
      • Gran Tierra successfully acquired 21 sections of prospective land in Central Alberta along the Nisku fairway in March 2025, which adds over 50 potential drilling opportunities to its drilling inventory.
      • At Clearwater, Gran Tierra participated in the successful drilling of two gross (0.5 net) wells during the Quarter, and both wells are estimated to be on stream imminently. The first well drilled was a 4-legged injector to support a water flood pilot in the Marten Hills block, potentially increasing reserves based off nearby analogue waterflood results. The second well (non-op), with 14 legs, was drilled in the Seal block to test the productivity of heavy oil in the Bluesky formation.

    Key Highlights of the Quarter:

    • Production: Gran Tierra’s total average WI production was 46,647 boepd, which was 14% higher than fourth quarter 2024 (“the Prior Quarter”) and 45% higher than the first quarter of 2024. Higher production during the Quarter was due to the Company recognizing three full months of production from Canada and positive exploration well results in Ecuador.
    • Net Income: Gran Tierra incurred a net loss of $19 million, compared to a net loss of $34 million in the Prior Quarter and a net loss of nil in the first quarter of 2024.
    • Adjusted EBITDA(1): Adjusted EBITDA(1) was $85 million compared to $76 million in the Prior Quarter and $95 million in the first quarter of 2024. Twelve-month trailing Net Debt(1) to Adjusted EBITDA(1) was 1.9 times (only accounts for five months of Canadian operations Adjusted EBITDA) and the Company continues to have a long-term target ratio of 1.0 times.
    • Net Cash Provided by Operating Activities: Net Cash Provided by Operating Activities was $73 million ($2.05 per share), up 175% from the Prior Quarter and up 20% from the first quarter of 2024.
    • Funds Flow from Operations(1): Funds flow from operations(1) was $55 million ($1.55 per share), up 25% from the Prior Quarter and down 26% from the first quarter of 2024 as a result of lower oil prices.
    • Cash and Debt: As of March 31, 2025, the Company had a cash balance of $77 million, total debt of $760 million and net debt(1) of $683 million. During the Quarter, the Company repaid at maturity the remaining principal of its 6.25% Senior Notes due in 2025 in an amount of $25 million and repurchased $2 million of its 9.5% Senior Notes due in 2029.
    • Liquidity: In addition to the $77 million cash on hand as of March 31, 2025, the Company currently has approximately $110 million in undrawn credit and lending facilities. The Company has a revolving credit facility agreement in Canada with a borrowing base of C$100.0 million with available commitment of C$50.0 million and is available until October 31, 2025 with a repayment date of October 31, 2026, which may be extended by further periods of up to 364 days, subject to lender approval. On April 16, 2025, the Company announced an additional $75 million reserve-based lending facility in Colombia with a final maturity date in 36 months from the closing date.
    • Share Buybacks: Gran Tierra repurchased 453,050 shares of common stock during the Quarter. From January 1, 2023, to April 29, 2025, the Company repurchased approximately 5.2 million shares, or 15% of shares issued and outstanding on January 1, 2023.

    Additional Key Financial Metrics:

    • Capital Expenditures: Capital expenditures of $95 million were higher than the $79 million in the Prior Quarter and higher than $55 million in the first quarter of 2024 as a result of the addition of the Canadian development program, an active Ecuador exploration program and development activities in the Cohembi field in Colombia during the Quarter. During the Quarter, the Company had three rigs active in Canada, one in Ecuador and one in Colombia. Currently, the Company has one rig active in Colombia.
    • Oil Sales: Gran Tierra generated oil sales of $171 million, up 8% from the first quarter of 2024 as a result of 45% higher sales volumes due to higher production and the tightening of the Castilla, Vasconia and Oriente oil differentials which offset lower Brent pricing. Oil sales increased 16% from the Prior Quarter primarily due to 17% higher sales volumes, a 1% increase in Brent price and lower Castilla, Oriente, and Vasconia oil differentials.
    • South American Quality and Transportation Discounts: The Company’s quality and transportation discounts in South America per bbl were lower during the Quarter at $11.58, compared to $13.94 in the Prior Quarter and $15.36 in the first quarter of 2024. The Castilla oil differential per bbl tightened to $5.34, down from $8.33 in the Prior Quarter and $8.82 in the first quarter of 2024 (Castilla is the benchmark for the Company’s Middle Magdalena Valley Basin oil production). The Vasconia differential per bbl tightened to $2.27, down from $5.02 in the Prior Quarter, and $5.05 in the first quarter of 2024. The Ecuadorian benchmark, Oriente, per bbl was $7.65, down from $9.40 in the Prior Quarter and $8.02 one year ago. The current(2) differentials are approximately $4.94 per bbl for Castilla, $1.87 per bbl for Vasconia, and $7.26 per bbl for Oriente.
    • Operating Expenses: On a per boe basis, operating expenses decreased by 3% when compared to the first quarter of 2024 and the Prior Quarter. Operating expenses increased by 11% to $67 million, compared to the Prior Quarter and increased by 39% from $48 million compared to the first quarter of 2024, primarily due to new Canadian operations and increases in production volumes in Ecuador. The increase in total operating costs is commensurate with the 45% increase in production.
    • Transportation Expenses: The Company’s transportation expenses increased by 62% to $7 million, compared to the Prior Quarter’s transportation expenses of $4 million, and increased by 51% compared to the first quarter of 2024. Transportation expenses were higher due to new Canadian operations and higher sales volumes transported in Ecuador during the Quarter.
    • Operating Netback(1)(3): The Company’s operating netback(1)(3) was $22.70 per boe, up 2% from the Prior Quarter and down 36% from the first quarter of 2024 because of of the addition of the Canadian assets and approximately 50 of Canadian production tied to AECO gas pricing.
    • General and Administrative (“G&A”) Expenses: G&A expenses before stock-based compensation were $2.86 per boe, up from $2.75 per boe in the Prior Quarter due to increased audit fees relating to the acquisition of the Canadian assets, a full quarter of Canadian salaries and increased IT expenses. G&A expenses before stock-based compensation were down from $3.65 per boe, compared to the first quarter of 2024 as a result of higher sales volumes in the Quarter.
    • Cash Netback(1): Cash netback(1) per boe increased to $13.04, compared to $11.90 in the Prior Quarter primarily as a result of transaction costs of $1.20 per boe incurred in the Prior Quarter as a result of the acquisition of the Canadian operations. Compared to one year ago, cash netback(1) per boe decreased by $12.09 from $25.13 per boe as a result of lower operating netback primarily due to lower realized price.

    Gran Tierra Reconfirms Previously Disclosed 2025 Consolidated Guidance and Provides Country Breakdown:

    2025 Budget Low Case Base Case High Case
    Brent Oil Price ($/bbl) 65.00 75.00 85.00
    WTI Oil Price ($/bbl) 61.00 71.00 81.00
    AECO Natural Gas Price ($CAD/thousand cubic feet) 2.00 2.50 3.50
    Production (boepd) 47,000-53,000 47,000-53,000 47,000-53,000
    Operating Netback1,3($ million) 330-370 430-470 510-550
    EBITDA1($ million) 300-340 380-420 460-500
    Cash Flow1($ million) 200-240 260-300 300-340
    Capital Expenditures ($ million) 200-240 240-280 240-280
    Free Cash Flow1($ million) – 20 60
    Number of Development Wells (gross) 8-12 10-14 10-14
    Number of Exploration Wells (gross) 6 6-8 6-8
    Budgeted Costs Costs per boe ($/boe)
    Lifting 12.00-14.00
    Workovers 1.50-2.50
    Transportation 1.00-2.00
    General and Administration 2.00-3.00
    Interest 4.00-4.50
    Current Tax 2.00-3.00
    2025 Budget by Country – Base Case Canada Colombia Ecuador
    Production (kboepd) 18 – 19* 25 – 27 4 – 7
           
    Per Barrel ($/boe)      
    Realized Price 22 – 24 51 – 53 43 – 45
    Operating and Transportation Expense 10 – 12 19 – 21 12 – 14
    Operating Netback 10 – 14 30 – 34 29 – 33

    *Canada’s production is comprised of approximately 50% natural gas, 21% oil and 29% natural gas liquids (“NGL”)

    Financial and Operational Highlights (all amounts in $000s, except per share and boe amounts)

    Consolidated Financial Data Three Months Ended March 31,   Three Months
    Ended
    December 31,
      2025 2024   2024
             
    Net Income (Loss) $(19,280) $(78)   $(34,210)
    Per Share – Basic and Diluted $(0.54) $—   $(1.00)
             
    Oil, Natural Gas and NGL Sales $170,533 $157,577   $147,290
    Operating Expenses (67,354) (48,466)   (60,770)
    Transportation Expenses (6,911) (4,584)   (4,279)
    Operating Netback(1)(3) $96,268 $104,527   $82,241
             
    G&A Expenses Before Stock-Based Compensation $12,143 $10,782   $10,191
    G&A Stock-Based Compensation (Recovery) Expense (517) 3,361   3,331
    G&A Expenses, Including Stock Based Compensation $11,626 $14,143   $13,522
             
    Adjusted EBITDA(1) $85,162 $94,792   $76,168
             
    EBITDA(1) $79,710 $91,891   $65,247
             
    Net Cash Provided by Operating Activities $73,230 $60,827   $26,607
             
    Funds Flow from Operations(1) $55,344 $74,307   $44,129
             
    Capital Expenditures $94,727 $55,331   $78,579
             
    Free Cash Flow(1) $(39,383) $18,976   $(34,450)
             
    Average Daily Production (boe/d)        
    WI Production Before Royalties 46,647 32,242   41,009
    Royalties (8,084) (6,397)   (7,327)
    Production NAR 38,563 25,845   33,682
    Decrease (Increase) in Inventory 461 235   (712)
    Sales 39,024 26,080   32,970
    Royalties, % of WI Production Before Royalties 17% 20%   18%
             
    Cash Netback ($/boe)(1)        
    Average Realized Price before Royalties 48.55 66.40   48.56
    Royalties (8.33) (13.08)   (8.83)
    Average Realized Price 40.22 53.32   39.73
    Transportation Expenses (1.63) (1.55)   (1.15)
    Average Realized Price Net of Transportation Expenses 38.59 51.77   38.58
    Operating Expenses (15.89) (16.40)   (16.39)
    Operating Netback(1)(3) 22.70 35.37   22.19
    G&A Expenses Before Stock-Based Compensation (2.86) (3.65)   (2.75)
    Transaction Costs — —   (1.20)
    Realized Foreign Exchange Gain (Loss) (0.51) (0.49)   0.07
    Cash settlement on derivative instruments 0.10 —   0.30
    Interest Expense, Excluding Amortization of Debt Issuance Costs (4.58) (5.12)   (5.40)
    Interest Income 0.10 0.23   0.34
    Other Gain — —   0.40
    Net Lease Payments 0.04 0.12   0.07
    Current Income Tax Expense (1.95) (1.33)   (2.12)
    Cash Netback(1) $13.04 $25.13   $11.90
             
    Share Information (000s)        
    Common Stock Outstanding, End of Period 35,524 31,401   35,972
    Weighted Average Number of Shares of Common Stock Outstanding – Basic and Diluted 35,777 31,813   34,333
    South American Operational Information Three Months Ended March 31,   Three Months
    Ended
    December 31,
      2025 2024   2024
    Operating Netback(1)(3)        
    Oil Sales $138,671 $157,577   $128,335
    Operating Expenses (50,827) (48,466)   (51,121)
    Transportation Expenses (4,304) (4,584)   (3,607)
    Operating Netback(1)(3) $83,540 $104,527   $73,607
             
    Average Daily Production (boe/d)        
    WI Production Before Royalties 29,686 32,242   29,695
    Royalties (5,844) (6,397)   (5,761)
    Production NAR 23,842 25,845   23,934
    Decrease (Increase) in Inventory 461 235   (712)
    Sales 24,303 26,080   23,222
    Royalties, % of WI Production Before Royalties 20% 20%   19%
             
    Operating Netback ($/boe)(1)(3)        
    Brent $74.98 $81.76   $74.01
    Quality and Transportation Discount (11.58) (15.36)   (13.94)
    Royalties (12.29) (13.08)   (11.94)
    Average Realized Price 51.11 53.32   48.13
    Transportation Expenses (1.59) (1.55)   (1.35)
    Average Realized Price Net of Transportation Expenses 49.52 51.77   46.78
    Operating Expenses (18.73) (16.40)   (19.17)
    Operating Netback(1)(3) $30.79 $35.37   $27.61
    Canadian Operational Information(4) Three Months Ended March 31,   Three Months
    Ended
    December 31,
      2025 2024   2024
    Operating Netback(1)(3)        
    Oil Sales $21,269 $—   $14,832
    Natural Gas Sales 7,561 —   3,546
    NGL Sales 7,997 —   4,193
    Royalties (4,966) —   (3,616)
    Oil, Natural Gas and NGL Sales After Royalties $31,862 $—   $18,955
    Operating Expenses (16,527) —   (9,649)
    Transportation Expenses (2,607) —   (672)
    Operating Netback(1)(3) $12,728 $—   $8,634
             
    Average Daily Production        
    Crude Oil (bbl/d) 3,623 —   2,461
    Natural Gas (mcf/d) 49,860 —   32,814
    NGLs (bbl/d) 5,029 —   3,383
    WI Production Before Royalties (boe/d) 16,961 —   11,314
    Royalties (boe/d) (2,240) —   (1,566)
    Production NAR (boe/d) 14,721 —   9,748
    Sales (boe/d) 14,721 —   9,748
    Royalties, % of WI Production Before Royalties 13% —%   14%
             
    Benchmark Prices        
    West Texas Intermediate ($/bbl) 71.47 77.01   70.42
    AECO Natural Gas Price (C$/GJ) 2.05 1.70   1.56
             
    Average Realized Price        
    Crude Oil ($/bbl) 65.23 —   65.50
    Natural Gas ($/mcf) 1.69 —   1.17
    NGLs ($/bbl) 17.67 —   13.47
             
    Operating Netback ($/boe)(1)(3)        
    Average Realized Price $24.12 $—   $21.69
    Royalties (3.25) —   (3.47)
    Transportation Expenses (1.71) —   (0.65)
    Operating Expenses (10.83) —   (9.27)
    Operating Netback(1)(3) $8.33 $—   $8.30

    (1)Funds flow from operations, operating netback, net debt, cash netback, earnings before interest, taxes and depletion, depreciation and accretion (“DD&A”) (“EBITDA”) and EBITDA adjusted for non-cash lease expense, lease payments, foreign exchange gains or losses, stock-based compensation expense, other gains or losses, transaction costs and financial instruments gains or losses (“Adjusted EBITDA”), cash flow and free cash flow are non-GAAP measures and do not have standardized meanings under generally accepted accounting principles in the United States of America (“GAAP”). Cash flow refers to funds flow from operations. Free cash flow refers to funds flow from operations less capital expenditures. Refer to “Non-GAAP Measures” in this press release for descriptions of these non-GAAP measures and, where applicable, reconciliations to the most directly comparable measures calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP.
    (2) Gran Tierra’s second quarter-to-date 2025 total average differentials and average production are for the period from April 1 to April 30, 2025.
    (3) Operating netback as presented is defined as oil sales less operating and transportation expenses. See the table titled Financial and Operational Highlights above for the components of consolidated operating netback and corresponding reconciliation.
    (4) Gran Tierra entered Canada with the acquisition of i3 Energy which closed October 31, 2024, therefore no comparative data is provided for the corresponding period of 2024.

    Conference Call Information:

    Gran Tierra will host its first quarter 2025 results conference call on Friday, May 2, 2025, at 9:00 a.m. Mountain Time, 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time. Interested parties may access the conference call by registering at the following link: https://register-conf.media-server.com/register/BI0f6a1e0b01bd474992543eb3e6d51c71. The call will also be available via webcast at www.grantierra.com.

    2024 Sustainability Report:

    Gran Tierra has published its 2024 Sustainability Report and is available on the Company website at www.grantierra.com/esg.

    Corporate Presentation:

    Gran Tierra’s Corporate Presentation has been updated and is available on the Company website at www.grantierra.com.

    Contact Information

    For investor and media inquiries please contact:

    Gary Guidry
    President & Chief Executive Officer

    Ryan Ellson
    Executive Vice President & Chief Financial Officer

    +1-403-265-3221

    info@grantierra.com

    About Gran Tierra Energy Inc.
    Gran Tierra Energy Inc. together with its subsidiaries is an independent international energy company currently focused on oil and natural gas exploration and production in Canada, Colombia and Ecuador. The Company is currently developing its existing portfolio of assets in Canada, Colombia and Ecuador and will continue to pursue additional new growth opportunities that would further strengthen the Company’s portfolio. The Company’s common stock trades on the NYSE American, the Toronto Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol GTE. Additional information concerning Gran Tierra is available at www.grantierra.com. Except to the extent expressly stated otherwise, information on the Company’s website or accessible from our website or any other website is not incorporated by reference into and should not be considered part of this press release. Investor inquiries may be directed to info@grantierra.com or (403) 265-3221.

    Gran Tierra’s Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) filings are available on the SEC website at http://www.sec.gov. The Company’s Canadian securities regulatory filings are available on SEDAR+ at http://www.sedarplus.ca and UK regulatory filings are available on the National Storage Mechanism website at https://data.fca.org.uk/#/nsm/nationalstoragemechanism.

    Forward Looking Statements and Legal Advisories:
    This press release contains opinions, forecasts, projections, and other statements about future events or results that constitute forward-looking statements within the meaning of the United States Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and financial outlook and forward looking information within the meaning of applicable Canadian securities laws (collectively, “forward-looking statements”). All statements other than statements of historical facts included in this press release regarding our business strategy, plans and objectives of our management for future operations, capital spending plans and benefits of the changes in our capital program or expenditures, our liquidity and financial condition, and those statements preceded by, followed by or that otherwise include the words “expect,” “plan,” “can,” “will,” “should,” “guidance,” “forecast,” “budget,” “estimate,” “signal,” “progress” and “believes,” derivations thereof and similar terms identify forward-looking statements. In particular, but without limiting the foregoing, this press release contains forward-looking statements regarding: the Company’s leverage ratio target, the Company’s plans regarding strategic investments, acquisitions, including the anticipated benefits and operating synergies expected from the acquisition of i3 Energy, and growth, the Company’s drilling program and capital expenditures and the Company’s expectations of commodity prices, including future gas pricing in Canada, exploration and production trends and its positioning for 2024. The forward-looking statements contained in this press release reflect several material factors and expectations and assumptions of Gran Tierra including, without limitation, that Gran Tierra will continue to conduct its operations in a manner consistent with its current expectations, pricing and cost estimates (including with respect to commodity pricing and exchange rates), the ability of Gran Tierra to successfully integrate the assets and operations of i3 Energy or realize the anticipated benefits and operating synergies expected from the acquisition of i3 Energy, the general continuance of assumed operational, regulatory and industry conditions in Canada, Colombia and Ecuador, and the ability of Gran Tierra to execute its business and operational plans in the manner currently planned.

    Among the important factors that could cause our actual results to differ materially from the forward-looking statements in this press release include, but are not limited to: certain of our operations are located in South America and unexpected problems can arise due to guerilla activity, strikes, local blockades or protests; technical difficulties and operational difficulties may arise which impact the production, transport or sale of our products; other disruptions to local operations; global health events; global and regional changes in the demand, supply, prices, differentials or other market conditions affecting oil and gas, including inflation and changes resulting from actual or anticipated tariffs and trade policies, global health crises, geopolitical events, including the conflicts in Ukraine and the Gaza region, or from the imposition or lifting of crude oil production quotas or other actions that might be imposed by OPEC and other producing countries and the resulting company or third-party actions in response to such changes; changes in commodity prices, including volatility or a prolonged decline in these prices relative to historical or future expected levels; the risk that current global economic and credit conditions may impact oil prices and oil consumption more than we currently predict, which could cause further modification of our strategy and capital spending program; prices and markets for oil and natural gas are unpredictable and volatile; the effect of hedges; the accuracy of productive capacity of any particular field; geographic, political and weather conditions can impact the production, transport or sale of our products; our ability to execute our business plan, which may include acquisitions, and realize expected benefits from current or future initiatives; the risk that unexpected delays and difficulties in developing currently owned properties may occur; the ability to replace reserves and production and develop and manage reserves on an economically viable basis; the accuracy of testing and production results and seismic data, pricing and cost estimates (including with respect to commodity pricing and exchange rates); the risk profile of planned exploration activities; the effects of drilling down-dip; the effects of waterflood and multi-stage fracture stimulation operations; the extent and effect of delivery disruptions, equipment performance and costs; actions by third parties; the timely receipt of regulatory or other required approvals for our operating activities; the failure of exploratory drilling to result in commercial wells; unexpected delays due to the limited availability of drilling equipment and personnel; volatility or declines in the trading price of our common stock or bonds; the risk that we do not receive the anticipated benefits of government programs, including government tax refunds; our ability to access debt or equity capital markets from time to time to raise additional capital, increase liquidity, fund acquisitions or refinance debt; our ability to comply with financial covenants in our indentures and make borrowings under our credit agreements; and the risk factors detailed from time to time in Gran Tierra’s periodic reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, including, without limitation, under the caption “Risk Factors” in Gran Tierra’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2024 filed February 20, 2024 and its other filings with the SEC. These filings are available on the SEC website at http://www.sec.gov and on SEDAR+ at www.sedarplus.ca.

    The forward-looking statements contained in this press release are based on certain assumptions made by Gran Tierra based on management’s experience and other factors believed to be appropriate. Gran Tierra believes these assumptions to be reasonable at this time, but the forward-looking statements are subject to risk and uncertainties, many of which are beyond Gran Tierra’s control, which may cause actual results to differ materially from those implied or expressed by the forward looking statements. The risk that the assumptions on which the 2024 outlook are based prove incorrect may increase the later the period to which the outlook relates. All forward-looking statements are made as of the date of this press release and the fact that this press release remains available does not constitute a representation by Gran Tierra that Gran Tierra believes these forward-looking statements continue to be true as of any subsequent date. Actual results may vary materially from the expected results expressed in forward-looking statements. Gran Tierra disclaims any intention or obligation to update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, except as expressly required by applicable law. In addition, historical, current and forward-looking sustainability-related statements may be based on standards for measuring progress that are still developing, internal controls and processes that continue to evolve, and assumptions that are subject to change in the future.

    The estimates of future production (aggregate and per country), EBITDA, net cash provided by operating activities (described in this press release as “cash flow”), free cash flow, certain prices and expenses (aggregate and per country) and operating netback (aggregate and per country) may be considered to be future-oriented financial information or a financial outlook for the purposes of applicable Canadian securities laws. Financial outlook and future-oriented financial information contained in this press release about prospective financial performance, financial position or cash flows are provided to give the reader a better understanding of the potential future performance of the Company in certain areas and are based on assumptions about future events, including economic conditions and proposed courses of action, based on management’s assessment of the relevant information currently available, and to become available in the future. In particular, this press release contains projected operational and financial information for 2025. These projections contain forward-looking statements and are based on a number of material assumptions and factors set out above. Actual results may differ significantly from the projections presented herein. The actual results of Gran Tierra’s operations for any period could vary from the amounts set forth in these projections, and such variations may be material. See above for a discussion of the risks that could cause actual results to vary. The future-oriented financial information and financial outlooks contained in this press release have been approved by management as of the date of this press release. Readers are cautioned that any such financial outlook and future-oriented financial information contained herein should not be used for purposes other than those for which it is disclosed herein. The Company and its management believe that the prospective financial information has been prepared on a reasonable basis, reflecting management’s best estimates and judgments, and represent, to the best of management’s knowledge and opinion, the Company’s expected course of action. However, because this information is highly subjective, it should not be relied on as necessarily indicative of future results.

    Non-GAAP Measures

    This press release includes non-GAAP financial measures as further described herein. These non-GAAP measures do not have a standardized meaning under GAAP. Investors are cautioned that these measures should not be construed as alternatives to net income or loss, cash flow from operating activities or other measures of financial performance as determined in accordance with GAAP. Gran Tierra’s method of calculating these measures may differ from other companies and, accordingly, they may not be comparable to similar measures used by other companies. Each non-GAAP financial measure is presented along with the corresponding GAAP measure so as to not imply that more emphasis should be placed on the non-GAAP measure.

    Operating netback, as presented, is defined as oil sales less operating and transportation expenses. See the table entitled Financial and Operational Highlights above for the components of consolidated operating netback and corresponding reconciliation.

    Cash netback as presented is defined as net income or loss adjusted for DD&A expenses, deferred tax expense or recovery, stock-based compensation expense or recovery, amortization of debt issuance costs, non-cash lease expense, lease payments, unrealized foreign exchange gain or loss, other gain or loss and unrealized derivative instruments loss. Management believes that operating netback and cash netback are useful supplemental measures for investors to analyze financial performance and provide an indication of the results generated by Gran Tierra’s principal business activities prior to the consideration of other income and expenses. A reconciliation from net income or loss to cash netback is as follows:

      Three Months Ended March 31,   Three Months
    Ended
    December 31,
    Cash Netback – (Non-GAAP) Measure ($000s)   2025     2024       2024  
    Net Loss $ (19,280 ) $ (78 )   $ (34,210 )
    Adjustments to reconcile net loss to cash netback        
    DD&A expenses   72,202     56,150       63,406  
    Deferred tax (recovery) expense   (4,712 )   13,479       4,444  
    Stock-based compensation (recovery) expense   (517 )   3,361       3,331  
    Amortization of debt issuance costs   3,833     3,306       3,743  
    Non-cash lease expense   1,736     1,413       1,759  
    Lease payments   (1,567 )   (1,058 )     (1,495 )
    Unrealized foreign exchange loss (gain)   1,687     (2,266 )     (223 )
    Other loss   52     —       —  
    Unrealized derivative instrument loss   1,910     —       3,374  
    Cash netback $ 55,344   $ 74,307     $ 44,129  

    EBITDA, as presented, is defined as net income or loss adjusted for DD&A expenses, interest expense and income tax expense or recovery. Adjusted EBITDA, as presented, is defined as EBITDA adjusted for non-cash lease expense, lease payments, foreign exchange gain or loss, stock-based compensation expense, transaction costs, other gain or loss and unrealized derivative instruments loss. Management uses this supplemental measure to analyze performance and income generated by our principal business activities prior to the consideration of how non-cash items affect that income, and believes that this financial measure is useful supplemental information for investors to analyze our performance and our financial results. A reconciliation from net income or loss to EBITDA and adjusted EBITDA is as follows:

      Three Months Ended March 31,   Three Months
    Ended
    December 31,
    EBITDA – (Non-GAAP) Measure ($000s)   2025     2024       2024  
    Net Loss $ (19,280 ) $ (78 )   $ (34,210 )
    Adjustments to reconcile net loss to EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA        
    DD&A expenses   72,202     56,150       63,406  
    Interest expense   23,235     18,424       23,752  
    Income tax expense   3,553     17,395       12,299  
    EBITDA $ 79,710   $ 91,891     $ 65,247  
    Non-cash lease expense   1,736     1,413       1,759  
    Lease payments   (1,567 )   (1,058 )     (1,495 )
    Foreign exchange loss (gain)   3,838     (815 )     (496 )
    Stock-based compensation expense   (517 )   3,361       3,331  
    Transaction costs   —     —       4,448  
    Other loss   52     —       —  
    Unrealized derivative instrument loss   1,910     —       3,374  
    Adjusted EBITDA $ 85,162   $ 94,792     $ 76,168  

    Funds flow from operations, as presented, is defined as net income or loss adjusted for DD&A expenses, deferred tax expense or recovery, stock-based compensation expense, amortization of debt issuance costs, non-cash lease expense, lease payments, unrealized foreign exchange gain, other gain or loss and unrealized gain or loss on derivative instruments. Management uses this financial measure to analyze performance and income or loss generated by our principal business activities prior to the consideration of how non-cash items affect that income or loss, and believes that this financial measure is also useful supplemental information for investors to analyze performance and our financial results. Free cash flow, as presented, is defined as funds flow from operations adjusted for capital expenditures. Management uses this financial measure to analyze cash flow generated by our principal business activities after capital requirements and believes that this financial measure is also useful supplemental information for investors to analyze performance and our financial results. A reconciliation from net income or loss to both funds flow from operations and free cash flow is as follows:

      Three Months Ended March 31,   Three Months
    Ended
    December 31,
    Funds Flow From Operations –
    (Non-GAAP) Measure ($000s)
      2025     2024       2024  
    Net Loss $ (19,280 ) $ (78 )   $ (34,210 )
    Adjustments to reconcile net loss to funds flow from operations        
    DD&A expenses   72,202     56,150       63,406  
    Deferred tax (recovery) expense   (4,712 )   13,479       4,444  
    Stock-based compensation (recovery) expense   (517 )   3,361       3,331  
    Amortization of debt issuance costs   3,833     3,306       3,743  
    Non-cash lease expense   1,736     1,413       1,759  
    Lease payments   (1,567 )   (1,058 )     (1,495 )
    Unrealized foreign exchange loss (gain)   1,687     (2,266 )     (223 )
    Other loss   52     —       —  
    Unrealized derivative instrument loss   1,910     —       3,374  
    Funds flow from operations $ 55,344   $ 74,307     $ 44,129  
    Capital expenditures $ 94,727   $ 55,331     $ 78,579  
    Free cash flow $ (39,383 ) $ 18,976     $ (34,450 )

    Net debt as of March 31, 2025, was $683 million, calculated using the sum of the aggregate principal amount of 7.75% Senior Notes, and 9.50% Senior Notes outstanding, excluding deferred financing fees, totaling $760 million, less cash and cash equivalents of $77 million.

    Presentation of Oil and Gas Information

    Boes have been converted on the basis of six thousand cubic feet (“Mcf”) natural gas to 1 boe of oil. Boes may be misleading, particularly if used in isolation. A boe conversion ratio of 6 Mcf: 1 boe is based on an energy equivalency conversion method primarily applicable at the burner tip and does not represent a value equivalency at the wellhead. In addition, given that the value ratio based on the current price of oil as compared with natural gas is significantly different from the energy equivalent of six to one, utilizing a boe conversion ratio of 6 Mcf: 1 boe would be misleading as an indication of value.

    References to a formation where evidence of hydrocarbons has been encountered is not necessarily an indicator that hydrocarbons will be recoverable in commercial quantities or in any estimated volume. Gran Tierra’s reported production is a mix of light crude oil and medium heavy crude oil, tight oil, conventional natural gas, shale gas and natural gas liquids for which there is no precise breakdown since the Company’s sales volumes typically represent blends of more than one product type. Well test results should be considered as preliminary and not necessarily indicative of long-term performance or of ultimate recovery. Well log interpretations indicating oil and gas accumulations are not necessarily indicative of future production or ultimate recovery. If it is indicated that a pressure transient analysis or well-test interpretation has not been carried out, any data disclosed in that respect should be considered preliminary until such analysis has been completed. References to thickness of “oil pay” or of a formation where evidence of hydrocarbons has been encountered is not necessarily an indicator that hydrocarbons will be recoverable in commercial quantities or in any estimated volume.

    This press release contains certain oil and gas metrics, including operating netback and cash netback, which do not have standardized meanings or standard methods of calculation and therefore such measures may not be comparable to similar measures used by other companies and should not be used to make comparisons. These metrics are calculated as described in this press release and management believes that they are useful supplemental measures for the reasons described in this press release.

    Such metrics have been included herein to provide readers with additional measures to evaluate the Company’s performance; however, such measures are not reliable indicators of the future performance of the Company and future performance may not compare to the performance in previous periods.

    References in this press release to “potential drilling opportunities” are references to unbooked locations for which there are no reserves or resources attributed by any of the Company’s qualified reserves auditors or evaluators but which the Company internally estimates can be drilled based on current land holdings, industry practice regarding well density, and internal review of geologic, geophysical, seismic, engineering, production and resources information. There is no certainty that the Company will drill any particular locations, or that drilling activity on any locations will result in additional reserves, resources or production. Locations on which the Company in fact drills wells will ultimately depend upon the availability of capital, regulatory approvals, seasonal restrictions, commodity prices, costs, actual drilling results, additional reservoir information and other factors. There is a higher level of risk associated with locations that are potential drilling opportunities and not “booked” locations to which any qualified reserves evaluator or auditor may have attributed reserves or resources. The Company generally has less information about reservoir characteristics associated with locations that are potential drilling opportunities and, accordingly, there is greater uncertainty whether wells will ultimately be drilled in such locations and, if drilled, whether they will result in additional reserves, resources or production.

    The MIL Network –

    May 2, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Fairfax India Holdings Corporation First Quarter Financial Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION TO U.S. NEWS WIRE SERVICES OR DISSEMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES

    (Note:   All dollar amounts in this press release are expressed in U.S. dollars except as otherwise noted. The financial results are derived from unaudited financial statements prepared using the recognition and measurement requirements of International Financial Reporting Standards as issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (“IFRS®Accounting Standards”), except as otherwise noted. This press release contains certain non-GAAP and other financial measures, including book value per share and cash and marketable securities, that do not have a prescribed meaning under IFRS Accounting Standards and may not be comparable to similar financial measures presented by other issuers. See “Glossary of non-GAAP and other financial measures” at the end of this press release for further details.)
         

    TORONTO, May 01, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Fairfax India Holdings Corporation (TSX: FIH.U) announces a net loss of $211.2 million ($1.57 net loss per diluted share) in the first quarter of 2025, compared to a net loss of $293.5 million in the first quarter of 2024 ($2.17 net loss per diluted share). The company’s book value per share decreased 7.4% to $19.41 at March 31, 2025 from $20.96 at December 31, 2024, primarily due to unrealized losses recorded on the company’s publicly listed investments.

    Highlights for the first quarter of 2025 included the following:

    • The company recorded a net change in unrealized losses on investments of $222.9 million, principally from decreases in the fair values of the company’s publicly listed investments in IIFL Capital (formerly IIFL Securities) ($106.8 million), IIFL Finance ($64.5 million), Fairchem Organics ($28.1 million), 5paisa ($10.0 million) and CSB Bank ($9.9 million), and private company investment in Sanmar ($19.2 million) (primarily due to a decrease in the publicly traded share price of its subsidiary, Chemplast), partially offset by an increase in the fair value of the company’s private company investment in Seven Islands ($18.7 million).
    • On February 20, 2025 the company completed its previously announced investment of an additional 10.0% equity interest in Bangalore International Airport Limited (“BIAL”) for a purchase price of $255.0 million. In accordance with the agreement with Siemens Project Ventures GmbH (“Siemens”), the company paid an initial installment on the closing date and recognized a payable for securities purchased of $170.9 million, representing the second and third installments to be paid in the third quarters of 2025 and 2026, respectively.
    • In February 2025, the company also increased the borrowing limit of its revolving credit facility from

    $175.0 million to $250.0 million, including the use of letters of credit. The company issued a letter of credit for $170.9 million in favour of Siemens equal to the deferred purchase price for the additional 10.0% equity interest in BIAL. The increased borrowing limit and Siemens letter of credit will be reduced over a period of approximately eighteen months in accordance with the terms of the amended credit agreement and letter of credit.

    Fairfax India is in strong financial health, with cash and marketable securities at March 31, 2025 of $113.0 million and $79.2 million available under its revolving credit facility.

    There were 134.8 million and 135.4 million weighted average common shares outstanding during the first quarters of 2025 and 2024, respectively. At March 31, 2025 there were 104,839,462 subordinate voting shares and 30,000,000 multiple voting shares outstanding.

    Unaudited balance sheets, earnings (loss) and comprehensive income (loss) information follow and form part of this press release. Fairfax India’s detailed first quarter report can be accessed at its website www.fairfaxindia.ca.

    Fairfax India Holdings Corporation is an investment holding company whose objective is to achieve long term capital appreciation, while preserving capital, by investing in public and private equity securities and debt instruments in India and Indian businesses or other businesses with customers, suppliers or business primarily conducted in, or dependent on, India.

    For further information, contact: John Varnell, Vice President, Corporate Affairs
      (416) 367-4755
    Information on            
    CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS            
    as at March 31, 2025 and December 31, 2024            
    (unaudited – US$ thousands)            
      March 31, 2025
      December 31, 2024
     
    Assets    
    Cash and cash equivalents   21,616     59,322  
    Bonds   114,823     180,507  
    Common stocks   3,419,382     3,381,206  
    Total cash and investments   3,555,821     3,621,035  
                 
    Interest and dividends receivable   5,093     8,849  
    Income taxes refundable   175     174  
    Other assets   844     722  
    Total assets   3,561,933     3,630,780  
         
    Liabilities    
    Accounts payable and accrued liabilities   1,106     1,300  
    Accrued interest expense   2,736     8,611  
    Income taxes payable   1,547     5,379  
    Payable to related parties   9,434     10,099  
    Payable for securities purchased   170,850     —  
    Deferred income taxes   129,973     149,780  
    Borrowings   498,479     498,349  
    Total liabilities   814,125     673,518  
         
    Equity    
    Common shareholders’ equity   2,617,071     2,826,495  
    Non-controlling interests   130,737     130,767  
    Total equity   2,747,808     2,957,262  
        3,561,933     3,630,780  
                 
    Book value per share $       19.41   $ 20.96  
             
    Information on        
    CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF EARNINGS (LOSS)        
    for the three months ended March 31, 2025 and 2024        
    (unaudited – US$ thousands except per share amounts)        
      First quarter
      2025   2024  
    Income        
    Interest 3,196   5,038  
    Dividends 2,998   7,049  
    Net realized gains on investments 616   116,924  
    Net change in unrealized losses on investments (222,862 ) (410,927 )
    Net foreign exchange gains (losses) 3,245   (376 )
      (212,807 ) (282,292 )
    Expenses        
    Investment and advisory fees 9,399   9,484  
    General and administration expenses 1,648   2,536  
    Interest expense 6,755   6,380  
      17,802   18,400  
             
    Loss before income taxes (230,609 ) (300,692 )
    Recovery of income taxes (19,142 ) (7,483 )
    Net loss (211,467 ) (293,209 )
             
    Attributable to:        
    Shareholders of Fairfax India (211,224 ) (293,504 )
    Non-controlling interests (243 ) 295  
      (211,467 ) (293,209 )
                 
    Net loss per basic and diluted share $         (1.57 ) $    (2.17 )
    Shares outstanding (weighted average) 134,839,462   135,365,933  
             
             
             
    Information on        
    CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF COMPREHENSIVE INCOME (LOSS)        
    for the three months ended March 31, 2025 and 2024        
    (unaudited – US$ thousands)        
      First quarter
      2025   2024  
    Net loss (211,467 ) (293,209 )
    Other comprehensive income (loss), net of income taxes        
    Item that may be subsequently reclassified to net earnings (loss)        
    Unrealized foreign currency translation gains (losses), net of income taxes of nil (2024 – nil) 2,046   (5,708 )
    Comprehensive loss (209,421 ) (298,917 )
             
    Attributable to:        
    Shareholders of Fairfax India (209,391 ) (298,926 )
    Non-controlling interests (30 ) 9  
      (209,421 ) (298,917 )

    This press release may contain forward-looking statements within the meaning of applicable securities legislation. Forward-looking statements may relate to the company’s or an Indian Investment’s future outlook and anticipated events or results and may include statements regarding the financial position, business strategy, growth strategy, budgets, operations, financial results, taxes, dividends, plans and objectives of the company. Particularly, statements regarding future results, performance, achievements, prospects or opportunities of the company, an Indian Investment, or the Indian market are forward-looking statements. In some cases, forward-looking statements can be identified by the use of forward-looking terminology such as “plans”, “expects” or “does not expect”, “is expected”, “budget”, “scheduled”, “estimates”, “forecasts”, “intends”, “anticipates” or “does not anticipate” or “believes”, or variations of such words and phrases or state that certain actions, events or results “may”, “could”, “would”, “might”, “will” or “will be taken”, “occur” or “be achieved”.

    Forward-looking statements are based on our opinions and estimates as of the date of this press release, and they are subject to known and unknown risks, uncertainties, assumptions and other factors that may cause the actual results, level of activity, performance or achievements to be materially different from those expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements, including but not limited to the following factors: oil price risk; geographic concentration of investments; potential lack of diversification; foreign currency fluctuation; volatility of the Indian securities markets; investments may be made in foreign private businesses where information is unreliable or unavailable; valuation methodologies involve subjective judgments; financial market fluctuations; pace of completing investments; minority investments; reliance on key personnel and risks associated with the Investment Advisory Agreement; disruption of the company’s information technology systems could significantly affect the company’s business; lawsuits; use of leverage; significant ownership by Fairfax may adversely affect the market price of the subordinate voting shares; trading price of subordinate voting shares relative to book value per share risk; weather risk; taxation risks; emerging markets; legal, tax and regulatory risks; MLI; economic risk; reliance on trading partners; and economic disruptions from conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East and the development of other geopolitical events and economic disruptions worldwide. Additional risks and uncertainties are described in the company’s annual information form dated March 7, 2025 which is available on SEDAR+ at www.sedarplus.ca and on the company’s website at www.fairfaxindia.ca. These factors and assumptions are not intended to represent a complete list of the factors and assumptions that could affect the company. These factors and assumptions, however, should be considered carefully.

    Although the company has attempted to identify important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those contained in forward-looking statements, there may be other factors that cause results not to be as anticipated, estimated or intended. There can be no assurance that such statements will prove to be accurate, as actual results and future events could differ materially from those anticipated in such statements. Accordingly, readers should not place undue reliance on forward-looking statements. The company does not undertake to update any forward-looking statements contained herein, except as required by applicable securities laws.

    GLOSSARY OF NON-GAAP AND OTHER FINANCIAL MEASURES
    Management analyzes and assesses the financial position of the consolidated company in various ways. Certain of the measures included in this press release, which have been used consistently and disclosed regularly in the company’s Annual Reports and interim financial reporting, do not have a prescribed meaning under IFRS Accounting Standards and may not be comparable to similar measures presented by other companies. Those measures are described below.

    Book value per share – The company considers book value per share a key performance measure in evaluating its objective of long term capital appreciation, while preserving capital. This measure is also closely monitored as it is used to calculate the performance fee, if any, to Fairfax Financial Holdings Limited. This measure is calculated by the company as common shareholders’ equity divided by the number of common shares outstanding.

    Cash and marketable securities – This measure is calculated by the company as the sum of cash, cash equivalents, short term investments and Government of India bonds. The company uses this measure to monitor short term liquidity risk.

    The MIL Network –

    May 2, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Monolithic Power Systems Earnings Commentary for the Quarter Ended March 31, 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    KIRKLAND, Wash., May 01, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — MPS will report its results after the market closes on May 1, 2025 and host a question-and-answer webinar at 2:00 p.m. PT / 5:00 p.m. ET. The live event will be held via a Zoom webcast, which can be accessed at https://mpsic.zoom.us/j/92570889542.

    Q1 2025 Financial Summary  (Unaudited)
      GAAP
      Q1’25
      Q4’24
      Q1’24
        QoQ Change YoY Change
    Revenue ($k) $ 637,554   $ 621,665   457,885     Up 2.6% Up 39.2%
    Gross Margin 55.4%   55.4%   55.1%     Flat Up 0.3 pts
    Opex ($k) $ 184,471   $ 181,101   156,954     Up 1.9% Up 17.5%
    Operating Margin 26.5%   26.3%   20.9%     Up 0.2 pts Up 5.6 pts
    Net income ($k) $ 133,791   $ 1,449,363   92,541     Down 90.8% Up 44.6%
    Diluted EPS $ 2.79   $ 29.88   1.89     Down 90.7% Up 47.6%
      Non-GAAP
      Q1’25
      Q4’24
      Q1’24
        QoQ Change YoY Change
    Revenue ($k) $ 637,554   $ 621,665   $ 457,885     Up 2.6% Up 39.2%
    Gross Margin 55.7%   55.8%   55.7%     Down 0.1 pts Flat
    Opex ($k) $ 133,526   $ 126,117   $ 103,426     Up 5.9% Up 29.1%
    Operating Margin 34.7%   35.5%   33.1%     Down 0.8 pts Up 1.6 pts
    Net income ($k) $ 193,813   $ 198,401   $ 137,492     Down 2.3% Up 41.0%
    Diluted EPS $ 4.04   $ 4.09   $ 2.81     Down 1.2% Up 43.8%
    Tax Rate 15.0%   12.5%   12.5%     Up 2.5 pts Up 2.5 pts
    Revenue by End Market
     
        Revenue   YoY Change   % of Revenue
    End Market ($M)   Q1’25
    Q1’24   $   %     Q1’25   Q1’24  
    Storage & Computing   $ 188.5 $ 106.1   $ 82.4   77.7%     29.6 %  23.2 % 
    Automotive   144.9 87.1   57.8   66.4%     22.7   19.0  
    Enterprise Data   132.9 149.7   (16.8 )  (11.2% )    20.8   32.7  
    Communications   71.8 46.7   25.1   53.7%     11.3   10.2  
    Consumer   56.9 38.1   18.8   49.3%     8.9   8.3  
    Industrial   42.6 30.2   12.4   41.1%     6.7   6.6  
    Total   $ 637.6 $ 457.9   $ 179.7   39.2%     100 %  100 % 
                               

    Ongoing Business Conditions

    In Q1 2025, MPS achieved record quarterly revenue of $637.6 million, slightly higher than revenue in the fourth quarter of 2024 and 39.2% higher than revenue in the first quarter of 2024.

    Our performance during the quarter reflected the continued strength of our diversified market strategy and a continued trend of the ordering patterns we saw at the end of 2024.

    Q1 2025 highlights include:

    • At our March 20th investor day, we showcased MPS innovation across a range of areas including new opportunities in Robotics, Automotive, Data Center, Building Automation, Medical, and Audio.
    • In Q1, Storage and Computing segment revenue increased 38% quarter-over-quarter on strong demand for both memory and notebook solutions.
    • We continue to win designs across all major Enterprise Data customers with revenue ramps expected in the second half of this year.
    • Finally, Q1 ’25 Automotive revenue increased 13% from Q4’24, the third consecutive quarter of sequential double-digit growth.

    MPS continues to focus on innovation, solving our customers’ most challenging problems, and maintaining the highest level of quality. We continue to invest in new technology, expand into new markets, and to diversify our end-market applications and global supply chain. This will allow us to capture future growth opportunities, maintain supply stability, and swiftly adapt to market changes as they occur.

    “Our proven, long-term growth strategy remains intact as we continue our transformation from being a chip-only, semiconductor supplier to a full service, silicon-based solutions provider,” said Michael Hsing, CEO and founder of MPS.

    Q1’25 Revenue Results

    MPS reported first quarter revenue of $637.6 million, slightly higher than the fourth quarter of 2024 and 39.2% higher than the first quarter of 2024. Compared with the fourth quarter of 2024, sales in Storage & Computing, Automotive, Communication and Industrial improved sequentially.

    First quarter 2025 Storage and Computing revenue of $188.5 million increased 38.1% from the fourth quarter of 2024. The sequential increase was primarily driven by higher sales of power solutions for storage and notebooks. First quarter 2025 Storage and Computing revenue was up 77.7% year over year. Storage and Computing revenue represented 29.6% of MPS’s first quarter 2025 revenue compared with 22.0% in the fourth quarter of 2024.

    First quarter Automotive revenue of $144.9 million increased 12.9% from the fourth quarter of 2024 primarily from higher sales in ADAS, body electronics, and infotainment power solutions. First quarter 2025 Automotive revenue was up 66.4% year over year. Automotive revenue represented 22.7% of MPS’s first quarter 2025 revenue compared with 20.6% in the fourth quarter of 2024.

    First quarter 2025 Communications revenue of $71.8 million was up 12.3% from the fourth quarter of 2025 primarily on higher sales into networking and optical solutions. First quarter 2025 Communications revenue was up 53.7% year over year. Communications sales represented 11.3% of our total first quarter 2025 revenue compared with 10.3% in the fourth quarter of 2024.

    First quarter 2025 Industrial revenue of $42.6 million increased 4.3% from the fourth quarter of 2024 primarily due to higher sales for industrial meters. First quarter 2025 Industrial revenue was up 41.1% year over year. Industrial revenue represented 6.7% of our total first quarter 2025 revenue compared with 6.6% in the fourth quarter of 2024.

    First quarter Consumer revenue of $56.9 million decreased 0.6% from the fourth quarter of 2024 primarily from lower sales in gaming partially offset by higher sales for TV solutions. First quarter 2025 Consumer revenue was up 49.3% year over year. Consumer revenue represented 8.9% of MPS’s first quarter 2025 revenue compared with 9.2% in the fourth quarter of 2024.

    In our Enterprise Data market, first quarter 2025 revenue of $132.9 million decreased 31.8% from the fourth quarter of 2024. First quarter 2025 Enterprise Data revenue was down 11.2% year over year. Enterprise Data revenue represented 20.8% of MPS’s first quarter 2025 revenue compared with 31.3% in the fourth quarter of 2024.

    Q1’25 Gross Margin & Operating Income

    GAAP gross margin was 55.4%, flat to the fourth quarter of 2024. Our GAAP operating income was $168.8 million compared to $163.3 million reported in the fourth quarter of 2024.

    Non-GAAP gross margin for the first quarter of 2025 was 55.7%, down 0.1 percentage points compared to the fourth quarter of 2024. Our non-GAAP operating income was $221.5 million compared to $220.7 million reported in the fourth quarter of 2024.

    Q1’25 Operating Expenses

    Our GAAP operating expenses were $184.5 million in the first quarter of 2025 compared with $181.1 million in the fourth quarter of 2024.

    Our Non-GAAP operating expenses were $133.5 million, up from $126.1 million in the fourth quarter of 2024.

    The differences between non-GAAP operating expenses and GAAP operating expenses for the quarters discussed here are primarily stock-based compensation and related expenses and deferred compensation plan income.

    Total stock-based compensation and related expenses, including approximately $1.7 million charged to cost of goods sold, was $53.8 million compared with $56.3 million recorded in the fourth quarter of 2024.

    The Bottom Line

    First quarter 2025 GAAP net income was $133.8 million or $2.79 per fully diluted share, compared with $1.4 billion or $29.88 per share in the fourth quarter of 2024. Fourth quarter 2024 GAAP net income and EPS included the recognition of a tax benefit granted to a foreign subsidiary.

    First quarter 2025 non-GAAP net income was $193.8 million or $4.04 per fully diluted share, compared with $198.4 million or $4.09 per fully diluted share in the fourth quarter of 2024.

    The first quarter 2025 non-GAAP tax rate increased to 15% from 12.5% in the fourth quarter of 2024.

    There were 48.0 million fully diluted shares outstanding at the end of the first quarter of 2025.

    Balance Sheet and Cash Flow

    Cash, cash equivalents and short-term investments were $1,026.7 million at the end of the first quarter of 2025 compared to $862.9 million at the end of the fourth quarter of 2024. For the first quarter of 2025, MPS generated operating cash flow of $256.4 million compared with the fourth quarter of 2024 operating cash flow of $167.7 million.

    Accounts receivable at the end of the first quarter of 2025 were $214.9 million, representing 31 days of sales outstanding, which was 6 days higher than the 25 days reported at the end of the fourth quarter of 2024.

    Our internal inventories at the end of the first quarter of 2025 were $454.8 million, up from $419.6 million at the end of the fourth quarter of 2024. Days of inventory of 146 days at the end of the first quarter of 2025 was 8 days higher than at the end of the fourth quarter of 2024.

    We have carefully managed our internal inventories throughout the year, balancing the uncertainty in the market with being prepared to capture market upturns when they occur. Comparing current inventory levels using next quarter’s projected revenue, days of inventory at the end of the first quarter of 143 days was 9 days higher than at the end of the fourth quarter of 2024.

    Selected Balance Sheet and Inventory Data (Unaudited)
           
      Q1’25 Q4’24 Q1’24
    Cash, Cash Equivalents, and Short-Term Investments $ 1,026.7 M $ 862.9 M $ 1,286.4 M
    Operating Cash Flow $ 256.4 M $ 167.7 M $ 248.0 M
    Accounts Receivable $ 214.9 M $ 172.5 M $ 194.4 M
    Days of Sales Outstanding 31 Days 25 Days 39 Days
    Internal Inventories $ 454.8 M $ 419.6 M $ 396.0 M
    Days of Inventory (current quarter revenue) 146 Days 138 Days 175 Days
    Days of Inventory (next quarter revenue) 143 Days 134 Days 159 Days
           

    Q2’25 Business Outlook

    For the second quarter of 2025 ending June 30, we are forecasting:

    • Revenue in the range of $640 million to $660 million.
    • GAAP gross margin in the range of 54.9% to 55.5%.
    • Non-GAAP gross margin in the range of 55.2% to 55.8%, which excludes the impact from stock-based compensation and related expenses as well as the impact from amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets.
    • Total stock-based compensation and related expenses in the range of $58.3 million to $60.3 million including approximately $1.9 million that would be charged to cost of goods sold.
    • GAAP operating expenses between $189 million and $195 million.
    • Non-GAAP operating expenses in the range of $132.6 million to $136.6 million. This estimate excludes stock-based compensation and related expenses in the range of $56.4 million to $58.4 million.
    • Interest and other income in the range from $6.2 million to $6.6 million before foreign exchange gains or losses.
    • Non-GAAP tax rate of 15% for 2025.
    • Fully diluted shares outstanding in the range of 47.9 to 48.3 million shares.

    For further information, contact:

    Bernie Blegen
    Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
    Monolithic Power Systems, Inc.
    408-826-0777
    MPSInvestor.Relations@monolithicpower.com 

    Safe Harbor Statement

    This earnings commentary contains, and statements that will be made during the accompanying webinar will contain, forward-looking statements, as that term is defined in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, including under the “Q2’25 Business Outlook” section herein, our statement regarding our business focus, our statement regarding the expansion and diversification of our global supply chain and the quote from our CEO and founder, including, among other things, (i) projected revenue, GAAP and non-GAAP gross margin, GAAP and non-GAAP operating expenses, stock-based compensation and related expenses, amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets, other income before foreign exchange gains or losses, and fully diluted shares outstanding, (ii) our outlook for the second quarter of fiscal year 2025 and the near-term, medium-term and long-term prospects of MPS, including our ability to adapt to changing market conditions, performance against our business plan, our ability to grow despite the various challenges facing our business, our industry and the global economic environment, revenue growth in certain of our market segments, potential new business segments, our continued investment in research and development (“R&D”), expected revenue growth, customers’ acceptance of our new product offerings, the prospects of our new product development, our expectations regarding market and industry segment trends and prospects, and our projected expansion of capacity and the impact it may have on our business, (iii) our ability to penetrate new markets and expand our market share, (iv) the seasonality of our business, (v) our ability to reduce our expenses, and (vi) statements regarding the assumptions underlying or relating to any statement described in (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), or (v). These forward-looking statements are not historical facts or guarantees of future performance or events, are based on current expectations, estimates, beliefs, assumptions, goals, and objectives, and involve significant known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors that may cause actual results to be materially different from the results expressed by these statements. Readers of this earnings commentary and listeners to the accompanying conference call are cautioned not to place undue reliance on any forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date hereof. Factors that could cause actual results to differ include, but are not limited to, continued uncertainties in the global economy, including due to the Russia-Ukraine and Middle East conflicts, global tariffs and retaliatory measures, inflation, consumer sentiment and other factors; adverse events arising from orders or regulations of governmental entities, including such orders or regulations that impact our customers or suppliers, and adoption of new or amended accounting standards; adverse changes in laws and government regulations such as tariffs on imports of foreign goods, export regulations and export classifications, and tax laws or the interpretation of same, including in foreign countries where MPS has offices or operations; the effect of export controls, trade and economic sanctions regulations and other regulatory or contractual limitations on our ability to sell or develop our products in certain foreign markets, particularly in China; our ability to obtain governmental licenses and approvals for international trading activities or technology transfers, including export licenses; acceptance of, or demand for, our products, in particular the new products launched recently, being different than expected; our ability to increase market share in our targeted markets; difficulty in predicting or budgeting for future customer demand and channel inventories, expenses and financial contingencies (including as a result of any continuing impact from the Russia-Ukraine and Middle East conflicts); our ability to efficiently and effectively develop new products and receive a return on our R&D expense investment; our ability to attract new customers and retain existing customers; our ability to meet customer demand for our products due to constraints on our third-party suppliers’ ability to manufacture sufficient quantities of our products or otherwise; our ability to expand manufacturing capacity to support future growth; adverse changes in production and testing efficiency of our products; any political, cultural, military, regulatory, economic, foreign exchange and operational changes in China, where a significant portion of our manufacturing capacity comes from; any market disruptions or interruptions in our schedule of new product development releases; our ability to manage our inventory levels; adequate supply of our products from our third-party manufacturing partners; adverse changes or developments in the semiconductor industry generally, which is cyclical in nature, and our ability to adjust our operations to address such changes or developments; the ongoing consolidation of companies in the semiconductor industry; competition generally and the increasingly competitive nature of our industry; our ability to realize the anticipated benefits of companies and products that MPS acquires, and our ability to effectively and efficiently integrate these acquired companies and products into our operations; the risks, uncertainties and costs of litigation in which MPS is involved; the outcome of any upcoming trials, hearings, motions and appeals; the adverse impact on our financial performance if its tax and litigation provisions are inadequate; our ability to effectively manage our growth and attract and retain qualified personnel; the effect of epidemics and pandemics on the global economy and on our business; the risks associated with the financial market, economy, global tariffs and retaliatory measures, and geopolitical uncertainties, including the Russia-Ukraine and Middle East conflicts; and other important risk factors identified under the caption “Risk Factors” and elsewhere in our Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) filings, including, but not limited to, our Annual Report on Form 10-K filed with the SEC on March 3, 2025. MPS assumes no obligation to update the information in this earnings commentary or in the accompanying webinar.

    Non-GAAP Financial Measures

    This CFO Commentary contains references to certain non-GAAP financial measures. Non-GAAP net income, non-GAAP net income per share, non-GAAP gross margin, non-GAAP operating expenses, non-GAAP other income, net, non-GAAP operating income and non-GAAP income before income taxes differ from net income, net income per share, gross margin, operating expenses, other income, net, operating income and income before income taxes determined in accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”). Non-GAAP net income and non-GAAP net income per share exclude the effect of stock-based compensation and related expenses, which include stock-based compensation expense and employer payroll taxes in relation to the stock-based compensation, net deferred compensation plan expense (income), amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets and related tax effects. Non-GAAP gross margin excludes the effect of stock-based compensation and related expenses, amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets and deferred compensation plan expense (income). Non-GAAP operating expenses exclude the effect of stock-based compensation and related expenses, amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets and deferred compensation plan income (expense). Non-GAAP operating income excludes the effect of stock-based compensation and related expenses, amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets and deferred compensation plan expense (income). Non-GAAP other income, net excludes the effect of deferred compensation plan expense (income). Non-GAAP income before income taxes excludes the effect of stock-based compensation and related expenses, amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets and net deferred compensation plan expense (income). Projected non-GAAP gross margin excludes the effect of stock-based compensation and related expenses, and amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets. Projected non-GAAP operating expenses exclude the effect of stock-based compensation and related expenses. These non-GAAP financial measures are not prepared in accordance with GAAP and should not be considered as a substitute for, or superior to, measures of financial performance prepared in accordance with GAAP. A schedule reconciling non-GAAP financial measures is included at the end of this press release. MPS utilizes both GAAP and non-GAAP financial measures to assess what it believes to be its core operating performance and to evaluate and manage its internal business and assist in making financial operating decisions. MPS believes that the inclusion of non-GAAP financial measures, together with GAAP measures, provides investors with an alternative presentation useful to investors’ understanding of MPS’s core operating results and trends. Additionally, MPS believes that the inclusion of non-GAAP measures, together with GAAP measures, provides investors with an additional dimension of comparability to similar companies. However, investors should be aware that non-GAAP financial measures utilized by other companies are not likely to be comparable in most cases to the non-GAAP financial measures used by MPS. See the GAAP to Non-GAAP reconciliations in the tables set forth below.

    RECONCILIATION OF NET INCOME TO NON-GAAP NET INCOME
    (Unaudited, in thousands, except per share amounts)
     
        Three Months Ended March 31,
        2025   2024
    Net income   $ 133,791     $ 92,541  
                     
    Adjustments to reconcile net income to non-GAAP net income:                
    Stock-based compensation and related expenses     53,811       51,769  
    Amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets     320       291  
    Deferred compensation plan expense (income), net     (6 )     47  
    Tax effect     5,897       (7,156 )
    Non-GAAP net income   $ 193,813     $ 137,492  
                     
    Non-GAAP net income per share:                
    Basic   $ 4.05     $ 2.83  
    Diluted   $ 4.04     $ 2.81  
                     
    Shares used in the calculation of non-GAAP net income per share:                
    Basic     47,851       48,635  
    Diluted     48,006       48,928  
    RECONCILIATION OF GROSS MARGIN TO NON-GAAP GROSS MARGIN
    (Unaudited, in thousands)
        Three Months Ended March 31,
        2025   2024
    Gross profit   $ 353,230     $ 252,441  
    Gross margin     55.4 %     55.1 %
                     
    Adjustments to reconcile gross profit to non-GAAP gross profit:                
    Stock-based compensation and related expenses     1,706       1,900  
    Amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets     287       258  
    Deferred compensation plan expense (income)     (163 )     440  
    Non-GAAP gross profit   $ 355,060     $ 255,039  
    Non-GAAP gross margin     55.7 %     55.7 %
    RECONCILIATION OF OPERATING EXPENSES TO NON-GAAP OPERATING EXPENSES
    (Unaudited, in thousands)
     
        Three Months Ended March 31,
        2025   2024
    Total operating expenses   $ 184,471     $ 156,954  
                     
    Adjustments to reconcile total operating expenses to non-GAAP total operating expenses:                
    Stock-based compensation and related expenses     (52,105 )     (49,869 )
    Amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets     (33 )     (33 )
    Deferred compensation plan income (expense)     1,193       (3,626 )
    Non-GAAP operating expenses   $ 133,526     $ 103,426  
                     
    RECONCILIATION OF OPERATING INCOME TO NON-GAAP OPERATING INCOME
    (Unaudited, in thousands)
     
        Three Months Ended March 31,
        2025   2024
    Total operating income   $ 168,759     $ 95,487  
                     
    Adjustments to reconcile total operating income to non-GAAP total operating income:                
    Stock-based compensation and related expenses     53,811       51,769  
    Amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets     320       291  
    Deferred compensation plan expense (income)     (1,356 )     4,066  
    Non-GAAP operating income   $ 221,534     $ 151,613  
                     
    RECONCILIATION OF OTHER INCOME, NET, TO NON-GAAP OTHER INCOME, NET
    (Unaudited, in thousands)
     
        Three Months Ended March 31,
        2025   2024  
    Total other income, net   $ 5,131     $ 9,540  
                   
    Adjustments to reconcile other income, net to non-GAAP other income, net:              
    Deferred compensation plan expense (income)     1,350       (4,019 )
    Non-GAAP other income, net   $ 6,481     $ 5,521  
                     
    RECONCILIATION OF INCOME BEFORE INCOME TAXES TO NON-GAAP INCOME BEFORE INCOME TAXES
    (Unaudited, in thousands)
     
        Three Months Ended March 31,
        2025   2024
    Total income before income taxes   $ 173,890     $ 105,027
                   
    Adjustments to reconcile income before income taxes to non-GAAP income before income taxes:              
    Stock-based compensation and related expenses     53,811       51,769
    Amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets     320       291
    Deferred compensation plan expense (income), net     (6 )     47
    Non-GAAP income before income taxes   $ 228,015     $ 157,134
                   
    2025 SECOND QUARTER OUTLOOK
    RECONCILIATION OF GROSS MARGIN TO NON-GAAP GROSS MARGIN
    (Unaudited)
        Three Months Ending
    March 31, 2025
                     
        Low   High
    Gross margin     54.9 %     55.5 %
    Adjustment to reconcile gross margin to non-GAAP gross margin:                
    Stock-based compensation and other expenses     0.3 %     0.3 %
    Non-GAAP gross margin     55.2 %     55.8 %
                     
    RECONCILIATION OF OPERATING EXPENSES TO NON-GAAP OPERATING EXPENSES
    (Unaudited, in thousands)
        Three Months Ending
    March 31, 2025
                     
        Low   High
    Operating expenses   $ 189,000     $ 195,000  
    Adjustments to reconcile operating expenses to non-GAAP operating expenses:                
    Stock-based compensation and other expenses     (56,400 )     (58,400 )
    Non-GAAP operating expenses   $ 132,600     $ 136,600  
                     

    The MIL Network –

    May 2, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Viper Energy, Inc. Announces Closing of Drop Down Transaction

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    MIDLAND, Texas, May 01, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Viper Energy, Inc. (NASDAQ: VNOM) (“Viper” or the “Company”), a subsidiary of Diamondback Energy, Inc. (NASDAQ: FANG) (“Diamondback”), today announced that it and its operating subsidiary, Viper Energy Partners LLC (the “Operating Company”), have closed their previously announced acquisition of all of the equity interests in certain mineral and royalty interest-owning subsidiaries of Diamondback (the “Drop Down”). The total consideration for the Drop Down consisted of (i) $1.0 billion in cash and (ii) the issuance (the “Equity Issuance”) of 69,626,640 units representing limited liability company interests in the Operating Company and an equivalent number of shares of Viper’s Class B Common Stock, in each case, subject to transaction costs and certain customary post-closing adjustments.

    The mineral and royalty interests acquired by the Operating Company in the Drop Down represent approximately 22,847 net royalty acres in the Permian Basin, approximately 69% of which are currently operated by Diamondback. Viper funded the cash consideration for the Drop Down with (i) proceeds from its previously announced underwritten public offering of shares of its Class A Common Stock, completed on February 3, 2025, and (ii) borrowings under the Operating Company’s revolving credit facility. Immediately following the completion of the Drop Down, Diamondback beneficially owned approximately 53.7% of Viper’s outstanding voting common stock.

    The Drop Down was approved by Viper’s audit committee comprised of all independent directors and the full board of directors, in each case, on January 30, 2025, and by the majority of the Company’s stockholders, other than Diamondback and its subsidiaries, at the special meeting of the Company’s stockholders held on May 1, 2025 (the “Special Meeting”). At the Special Meeting, Viper’s stockholders also approved the Equity Issuance, as required under the rules of The Nasdaq Stock Market LLC.

    About Viper Energy, Inc.

    Viper is a corporation formed by Diamondback to own, acquire and exploit oil and natural gas properties in North America, with a focus on owning and acquiring mineral and royalty interests in oil-weighted basins, primarily the Permian Basin. For more information, please visit www.viperenergy.com.

    About Diamondback Energy, Inc.

    Diamondback is an independent oil and natural gas company headquartered in Midland, Texas focused on the acquisition, development, exploration and exploitation of unconventional, onshore oil and natural gas reserves primarily in the Permian Basin in West Texas. For more information, please visit www.diamondbackenergy.com.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This news release contains “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, which involve risks, uncertainties, and assumptions. All statements, other than statements of historical fact, including statements regarding Viper’s: future performance; business strategy; future operations; estimates and projections of operating income, losses, costs and expenses, returns, cash flow, and financial position; production levels on properties in which Viper has mineral and royalty interests, developmental activity by other operators; reserve estimates and Viper’s ability to replace or increase reserves; anticipated benefits or other effects of strategic transactions (including the Drop Down and other acquisitions or divestitures); and plans and objectives (including Diamondback’s plans for developing Viper’s acreage and Viper’s cash dividend policy and common stock repurchase program) are forward-looking statements. When used in this news release, the words “aim,” “anticipate,” “believe,” “continue,” “could,” “estimate,” “expect,” “forecast,” “future,” “guidance,” “intend,” “may,” “model,” “outlook,” “plan,” “positioned,” “potential,” “predict,” “project,” “seek,” “should,” “target,” “will,” “would,” and similar expressions (including the negative of such terms) as they relate to Viper are intended to identify forward-looking statements, although not all forward-looking statements contain such identifying words. Although Viper believes that the expectations and assumptions reflected in its forward-looking statements are reasonable as and when made, they involve risks and uncertainties that are difficult to predict and, in many cases, beyond its control. Accordingly, forward-looking statements are not guarantees of Viper’s future performance and the actual outcomes could differ materially from what Viper expressed in its forward-looking statements.

    Factors that could cause the outcomes to differ materially include (but are not limited to) the following: changes in supply and demand levels for oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids, and the resulting impact on the price for those commodities; the impact of public health crises, including epidemic or pandemic diseases, and any related company or government policies or actions; changes in U.S. energy, environmental, monetary and trade policies, including with respect to tariffs or other trade barriers, and any resulting trade tensions; actions taken by the members of OPEC and Russia affecting the production and pricing of oil, as well as other domestic and global political, economic, or diplomatic developments, including any impact of the ongoing war in Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas war on the global energy markets and geopolitical stability; instability in the financial sector; higher interest rates and their impact on the cost of capital; regional supply and demand factors, including delays, curtailment delays or interruptions of production on Viper’s mineral and royalty acreage, or governmental orders, rules or regulations that impose production limits on such acreage; federal and state legislative and regulatory initiatives relating to hydraulic fracturing, including the effect of existing and future laws and governmental regulations; physical and transition risks relating to climate change and the risks and other factors disclosed in Viper’s filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, including its Forms 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K, which can be obtained free of charge on the Securities and Exchange Commission’s web site at http://www.sec.gov.

    In light of these factors, the events anticipated by Viper’s forward-looking statements may not occur at the time anticipated or at all. Moreover, new risks emerge from time to time. Viper cannot predict all risks, nor can it assess the impact of all factors on its business or the extent to which any factor, or combination of factors, may cause actual results to differ materially from those anticipated by any forward-looking statements it may make. Accordingly, you should not place undue reliance on any forward-looking statements made in this news release. All forward-looking statements speak only as of the date of this news release or, if earlier, as of the date they were made. Viper does not intend to, and disclaims any obligation to, update or revise any forward-looking statements unless required by applicable law.

    Investor Contact:
    Chip Seale
    +1 432.247.6218
    cseale@viperenergy.com

    The MIL Network –

    May 2, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Monolithic Power Systems Announces Results for the First Quarter Ended March 31, 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    KIRKLAND, Wash., May 01, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Monolithic Power Systems, Inc. (“MPS”) (Nasdaq: MPWR), a fabless global company that provides high-performance, semiconductor-based power electronics solutions, today announced financial results for the quarter ended March 31, 2025.

    The financial results for the quarter ended March 31, 2025 were as follows:

    • Revenue was $637.6 million for the quarter ended March 31, 2025, a 2.6% increase from $621.7 million for the quarter ended December 31, 2024 and a 39.2% increase from $457.9 million for the quarter ended March 31, 2024.
    • GAAP gross margin was 55.4% for the quarter ended March 31, 2025, compared with 55.1% for the quarter ended March 31, 2024.
    • Non-GAAP gross margin (1) was 55.7% for the quarter ended March 31, 2025, excluding the impact of $1.7 million for stock-based compensation and related expenses, $0.3 million for amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets and $0.2 million for deferred compensation plan income, compared with 55.7% for the quarter ended March 31, 2024, excluding the impact of $1.9 million for stock-based compensation and related expenses, $0.4 million for deferred compensation plan expense and $0.3 million for amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets.
    • GAAP operating expenses were $184.5 million for the quarter ended March 31, 2025, compared with $157.0 million for the quarter ended March 31, 2024.
    • Non-GAAP operating expenses (1) were $133.5 million for the quarter ended March 31, 2025, excluding $52.1 million for stock-based compensation and related expenses and $1.2 million for deferred compensation plan income, compared with $103.4 million for the quarter ended March 31, 2024, excluding $49.9 million for stock-based compensation and related expenses and $3.6 million for deferred compensation plan expense.
    • GAAP operating income was $168.8 million for the quarter ended March 31, 2025, compared with $95.5 million for the quarter ended March 31, 2024.
    • Non-GAAP operating income (1) was $221.5 million for the quarter ended March 31, 2025, excluding $53.8 million for stock-based compensation and related expenses, $1.4 million for deferred compensation plan income and $0.3 million for amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets, compared with $151.6 million for the quarter ended March 31, 2024, excluding $51.8 million for stock-based compensation and related expenses, $4.1 million for deferred compensation plan expense and $0.3 million for amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets.
    • GAAP other income, net was $5.1 million for the quarter ended March 31, 2025, compared with $9.5 million for the quarter ended March 31, 2024.
    • Non-GAAP other income, net (1) was $6.5 million for the quarter ended March 31, 2025, excluding $1.4 million for deferred compensation plan expense, compared with $5.5 million for the quarter ended March 31, 2024, excluding $4.0 million for deferred compensation plan income.
    • GAAP income before income taxes was $173.9 million for the quarter ended March 31, 2025, compared with $105.0 million for the quarter ended March 31, 2024.
    • Non-GAAP income before income taxes (1) was $228.0 million for the quarter ended March 31, 2025, excluding $53.8 million for stock-based compensation and related expenses and $0.3 million for amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets, compared with $157.1 million for the quarter ended March 31, 2024, excluding $51.8 million for stock-based compensation and related expenses and $0.3 million for amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets.
    • GAAP net income was $133.8 million and $2.79 per diluted share for the quarter ended March 31, 2025. Comparatively, GAAP net income was $92.5 million and $1.89 per diluted share for the quarter ended March 31, 2024.
    • Non-GAAP net income (1) was $193.8 million and $4.04 per diluted share for the quarter ended March 31, 2025, excluding $53.8 million for stock-based compensation and related expenses, $0.3 million for amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets and $5.9 million for related tax effects, compared with $137.5 million and $2.81 per diluted share for the quarter ended March 31, 2024, excluding $51.8 million for stock-based compensation and related expenses, $0.3 million for amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets and $7.2 million for related tax effects.

    The following is a summary of revenue by end market (in thousands):

        Three Months Ended March 31,
    End Market   2025   2024
    Storage and Computing   $ 188,511   $ 106,121
    Automotive     144,904     87,092
    Enterprise Data     132,924     149,727
    Communications     71,671     46,645
    Consumer     56,947     38,074
    Industrial     42,597     30,226
    Total   $ 637,554   $ 457,885

    “Our proven, long-term growth strategy remains intact as we continue our transformation from being a chip-only, semiconductor supplier to a full service, silicon-based solutions provider,” said Michael Hsing, CEO and founder of MPS. 

    Business Outlook

    The following are MPS’s financial targets for the second quarter ending June 30, 2025:

    • Revenue in the range of $640.0 million to $660.0 million.
    • GAAP gross margin between 54.9% and 55.5%. Non-GAAP gross margin (1) between 55.2% and 55.8%, which excludes the impact from stock-based compensation and related expenses as well as the impact from amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets.
    • GAAP operating expenses between $189.0 million and $195.0 million. Non-GAAP operating expenses (1) between $132.6 million and $136.6 million, which excludes estimated stock-based compensation and related expenses in the range of $56.4 million to $58.4 million.
    • Total stock-based compensation and related expenses of $58.3 million to $60.3 million including approximately $1.9 million that would be charged to cost of goods sold.
    • Interest and other income in the range of $6.2 million to $6.6 million before foreign exchange gains or losses.
    • Non-GAAP tax rate of 15% for 2025.
    • Fully diluted shares outstanding between 47.9 million and 48.3 million.

    (1) Non-GAAP net income, non-GAAP net income per share, non-GAAP gross margin, non-GAAP operating expenses, non-GAAP operating income, non-GAAP other income, net and non-GAAP income before income taxes differ from net income, net income per share, gross margin, operating expenses, operating income, other income, net and income before income taxes determined in accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”). Non-GAAP net income and non-GAAP net income per share exclude the effect of stock-based compensation and related expenses, which include stock-based compensation expense and employer payroll taxes in relation to the stock-based compensation, net deferred compensation plan expense (income), amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets and related tax effects. Non-GAAP gross margin excludes the effect of stock-based compensation and related expenses, amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets and deferred compensation plan expense (income). Non-GAAP operating expenses exclude the effect of stock-based compensation and related expenses, amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets and deferred compensation plan income (expense). Non-GAAP operating income excludes the effect of stock-based compensation and related expenses, amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets and deferred compensation plan expense (income). Non-GAAP other income, net excludes the effect of deferred compensation plan expense (income). Non-GAAP income before income taxes excludes the effect of stock-based compensation and related expenses, amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets and net deferred compensation plan expense (income). Projected non-GAAP gross margin excludes the effect of stock-based compensation and related expenses, and amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets. Projected non-GAAP operating expenses exclude the effect of stock-based compensation and related expenses. These non-GAAP financial measures are not prepared in accordance with GAAP and should not be considered as a substitute for, or superior to, measures of financial performance prepared in accordance with GAAP. A schedule reconciling non-GAAP financial measures is included at the end of this press release. MPS utilizes both GAAP and non-GAAP financial measures to assess what it believes to be its core operating performance and to evaluate and manage its internal business and assist in making financial operating decisions. MPS believes that the inclusion of non-GAAP financial measures, together with GAAP measures, provides investors with an alternative presentation useful to investors’ understanding of MPS’s core operating results and trends. Additionally, MPS believes that the inclusion of non-GAAP measures, together with GAAP measures, provides investors with an additional dimension of comparability to similar companies. However, investors should be aware that non-GAAP financial measures utilized by other companies are not likely to be comparable in most cases to the non-GAAP financial measures used by MPS. See the GAAP to non-GAAP reconciliations in the tables set forth below.

    Earnings Commentary
    Earnings commentary on the results of operations for the quarter ended March 31, 2025 is available under the Investor Relations page on the MPS website.

    Earnings Webinar
    MPS plans to host a question-and-answer webinar covering its financial results at 2:00 p.m. PT / 5:00 p.m. ET, May 1, 2025. The live event will be held via a Zoom webcast, which can be accessed at: https://mpsic.zoom.us/j/92570889542. The Zoom webcast can also be accessed live over the phone by dialing (669) 444-9171; the webcast ID is 92570889542. A replay of the event will be archived and available for replay for one year under the Investor Relations page on the MPS website.

    Safe Harbor Statement
    This press release contains, and statements that will be made during the accompanying earnings webinar will contain, forward-looking statements, as that term is defined in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, including under the “Business Outlook” section and the quote from our CEO herein, including, among other things, (i) projected revenue, GAAP and non-GAAP gross margin, GAAP and non-GAAP operating expenses, stock-based compensation and related expenses, amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets, other income before foreign exchange gains or losses, and fully diluted shares outstanding, (ii) our outlook for the second quarter of fiscal year 2025 and the near-term, medium-term and long-term prospects of MPS, including our ability to adapt to changing market conditions, performance against our business plan, our ability to grow despite the various challenges facing our business, our industry and the global economic environment, revenue growth in certain of our market segments, potential new business segments, our continued investment in research and development (“R&D”), expected revenue growth, customers’ acceptance of our new product offerings, the prospects of our new product development, our expectations regarding market and industry segment trends and prospects, and our projected expansion of capacity and the impact it may have on our business, (iii) our ability to penetrate new markets and expand our market share, (iv) the seasonality of our business, (v) our ability to reduce our expenses, and (vi) statements regarding the assumptions underlying or relating to any statement described in (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), or (v). These forward-looking statements are not historical facts or guarantees of future performance or events, are based on current expectations, estimates, beliefs, assumptions, goals, and objectives, and involve significant known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors that may cause actual results to be materially different from the results expressed by these statements. Readers of this press release and listeners to the accompanying earnings webinar are cautioned not to place undue reliance on any forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date hereof. Factors that could cause actual results to differ include, but are not limited to, continued uncertainties in the global economy, including due to the Russia-Ukraine and Middle East conflicts, global tariffs and retaliatory measures, inflation, consumer sentiment and other factors; adverse events arising from orders or regulations of governmental entities, including such orders or regulations that impact our customers or suppliers, and adoption of new or amended accounting standards; adverse changes in laws and government regulations such as tariffs on imports of foreign goods, export regulations and export classifications, and tax laws or the interpretation of same, including in foreign countries where MPS has offices or operations; the effect of export controls, trade and economic sanctions regulations and other regulatory or contractual limitations on our ability to sell or develop our products in certain foreign markets, particularly in China; our ability to obtain governmental licenses and approvals for international trading activities or technology transfers, including export licenses; acceptance of, or demand for, our products, in particular the new products launched recently, being different than expected; our ability to increase market share in our targeted markets; difficulty in predicting or budgeting for future customer demand and channel inventories, expenses and financial contingencies (including as a result of any continuing impact from the Russia-Ukraine and Middle East conflicts); our ability to efficiently and effectively develop new products and receive a return on our R&D expense investment; our ability to attract new customers and retain existing customers; our ability to meet customer demand for our products due to constraints on our third-party suppliers’ ability to manufacture sufficient quantities of our products or otherwise; our ability to expand manufacturing capacity to support future growth; adverse changes in production and testing efficiency of our products; any political, cultural, military, regulatory, economic, foreign exchange and operational changes in China, where a significant portion of our manufacturing capacity comes from; any market disruptions or interruptions in our schedule of new product development releases; our ability to manage our inventory levels; adequate supply of our products from our third-party manufacturing partners; adverse changes or developments in the semiconductor industry generally, which is cyclical in nature, and our ability to adjust our operations to address such changes or developments; the ongoing consolidation of companies in the semiconductor industry; competition generally and the increasingly competitive nature of our industry; our ability to realize the anticipated benefits of companies and products that MPS acquires, and our ability to effectively and efficiently integrate these acquired companies and products into our operations; the risks, uncertainties and costs of litigation in which MPS is involved; the outcome of any upcoming trials, hearings, motions and appeals; the adverse impact on our financial performance if its tax and litigation provisions are inadequate; our ability to effectively manage our growth and attract and retain qualified personnel; the effect of epidemics and pandemics on the global economy and on our business; the risks associated with the financial market, economy, global tariffs and retaliatory measures, and geopolitical uncertainties, including the Russia-Ukraine and Middle East conflicts; and other important risk factors identified under the caption “Risk Factors” and elsewhere in our Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) filings, including, but not limited to, our Annual Report on Form 10-K filed with the SEC on March 3, 2025. MPS assumes no obligation to update the information in this press release or in the accompanying earnings webinar.

    About Monolithic Power Systems
    Monolithic Power Systems, Inc. (“MPS”) is a fabless global company that provides high-performance, semiconductor-based power electronics solutions. MPS’s mission is to reduce energy and material consumption to improve all aspects of quality of life. Founded in 1997 by our CEO Michael Hsing, MPS has three core strengths: deep system-level knowledge, strong semiconductor expertise, and innovative proprietary technologies in the areas of semiconductor processes, system integration, and packaging. These combined advantages enable MPS to deliver reliable, compact, and monolithic solutions that are highly energy-efficient, cost-effective, and environmentally responsible while providing a consistent return on investment to our stockholders. MPS can be contacted through its website at www.monolithicpower.com or its support offices around the world.

    Monolithic Power Systems, MPS, and the MPS logo are registered trademarks of Monolithic Power Systems, Inc. in the U.S. and trademarked in certain other countries. 

    Contact:
    Bernie Blegen
    Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
    Monolithic Power Systems, Inc.
    408-826-0777
    MPSInvestor.Relations@monolithicpower.com

    Monolithic Power Systems, Inc.
    Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets
    (Unaudited, in thousands, except par value)
        March 31,   December 31,
        2025   2024
    ASSETS                
    Current assets:                
    Cash and cash equivalents   $ 637,354     $ 691,816  
    Short-term investments     389,310       171,130  
    Accounts receivable, net     214,866       172,518  
    Inventories     454,793       419,611  
    Other current assets     92,063       109,978  
    Total current assets     1,788,386       1,565,053  
    Property and equipment, net     527,348       494,945  
    Acquisition-related intangible assets, net     9,651       9,938  
    Goodwill     25,944       25,944  
    Deferred tax assets, net     1,318,457       1,326,840  
    Other long-term assets     135,974       194,377  
    Total assets   $ 3,805,760     $ 3,617,097  
                     
    LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY                
    Current liabilities:                
    Accounts payable   $ 127,310     $ 102,526  
    Accrued compensation and related benefits     74,785       63,918  
    Other accrued liabilities     161,306       128,123  
    Total current liabilities     363,401       294,567  
    Income tax liabilities     69,535       65,193  
    Other long-term liabilities     105,814       111,570  
    Total liabilities     538,750       471,330  
    Commitments and contingencies                
    Stockholders’ equity:                
    Common stock and additional paid-in capital: $0.001 par value; shares authorized: 150,000; shares issued and outstanding: 47,877 and 47,823, respectively     764,959       706,817  
    Retained earnings     2,545,375       2,487,461  
    Accumulated other comprehensive loss     (43,324 )     (48,511 )
    Total stockholders’ equity     3,267,010       3,145,767  
    Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity   $ 3,805,760     $ 3,617,097  
    Monolithic Power Systems, Inc.
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Operations

    (Unaudited, in thousands, except per share amounts)
        Three Months Ended March 31,
        2025   2024
    Revenue   $ 637,554     $ 457,885  
    Cost of revenue     284,324       205,444  
    Gross profit     353,230       252,441  
    Operating expenses:                
    Research and development     92,227       75,990  
    Selling, general and administrative     92,244       80,964  
    Total operating expenses     184,471       156,954  
    Operating income     168,759       95,487  
    Other income, net     5,131       9,540  
    Income before income taxes     173,890       105,027  
    Income tax expense     40,099       12,486  
    Net income   $ 133,791     $ 92,541  
                     
    Net income per share:                
    Basic   $ 2.80     $ 1.90  
    Diluted   $ 2.79     $ 1.89  
    Weighted-average shares outstanding:                
    Basic     47,851       48,635  
    Diluted     48,006       48,928  
    RECONCILIATION OF NET INCOME TO NON-GAAP NET INCOME
    (Unaudited, in thousands, except per share amounts)
        Three Months Ended March 31,
        2025   2024
    Net income   $ 133,791     $ 92,541  
                     
    Adjustments to reconcile net income to non-GAAP net income:                
    Stock-based compensation and related expenses     53,811       51,769  
    Amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets     320       291  
    Deferred compensation plan expense (income), net     (6 )     47  
    Tax effect     5,897       (7,156 )
    Non-GAAP net income   $ 193,813     $ 137,492  
                     
    Non-GAAP net income per share:                
    Basic   $ 4.05     $ 2.83  
    Diluted   $ 4.04     $ 2.81  
                     
    Shares used in the calculation of non-GAAP net income per share:                
    Basic     47,851       48,635  
    Diluted     48,006       48,928  
    RECONCILIATION OF GROSS MARGIN TO NON-GAAP GROSS MARGIN
    (Unaudited, in thousands)
        Three Months Ended March 31,
        2025   2024
    Gross profit   $ 353,230     $ 252,441  
    Gross margin     55.4 %     55.1 %
                     
    Adjustments to reconcile gross profit to non-GAAP gross profit:                
    Stock-based compensation and related expenses     1,706       1,900  
    Amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets     287       258  
    Deferred compensation plan expense (income)     (163 )     440  
    Non-GAAP gross profit   $ 355,060     $ 255,039  
    Non-GAAP gross margin     55.7 %     55.7 %
    RECONCILIATION OF OPERATING EXPENSES TO NON-GAAP OPERATING EXPENSES
    (Unaudited, in thousands)
        Three Months Ended March 31,
        2025   2024
    Total operating expenses   $ 184,471     $ 156,954  
                     
    Adjustments to reconcile total operating expenses to non-GAAP total operating expenses:                
    Stock-based compensation and related expenses     (52,105 )     (49,869 )
    Amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets     (33 )     (33 )
    Deferred compensation plan income (expense)     1,193       (3,626 )
    Non-GAAP operating expenses   $ 133,526     $ 103,426  
    RECONCILIATION OF OPERATING INCOME TO NON-GAAP OPERATING INCOME
    (Unaudited, in thousands)
        Three Months Ended March 31,
        2025   2024
    Total operating income   $ 168,759     $ 95,487  
                     
    Adjustments to reconcile total operating income to non-GAAP total operating income:                
    Stock-based compensation and related expenses     53,811       51,769  
    Amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets     320       291  
    Deferred compensation plan expense (income)     (1,356 )     4,066  
    Non-GAAP operating income   $ 221,534     $ 151,613  
    RECONCILIATION OF OTHER INCOME, NET, TO NON-GAAP OTHER INCOME, NET
    (Unaudited, in thousands)
        Three Months Ended March 31,
        2025   2024
    Total other income, net   $ 5,131     $ 9,540  
                     
    Adjustments to reconcile other income, net to non-GAAP other income, net:                
    Deferred compensation plan expense (income)     1,350       (4,019 )
    Non-GAAP other income, net   $ 6,481     $ 5,521  
    RECONCILIATION OF INCOME BEFORE INCOME TAXES TO NON-GAAP INCOME BEFORE INCOME TAXES
    (Unaudited, in thousands)
        Three Months Ended March 31,
        2025   2024
    Total income before income taxes   $ 173,890     $ 105,027  
                     
    Adjustments to reconcile income before income taxes to non-GAAP income before income taxes:                
    Stock-based compensation and related expenses     53,811       51,769  
    Amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets     320       291  
    Deferred compensation plan expense (income), net     (6 )     47  
    Non-GAAP income before income taxes   $ 228,015     $ 157,134  
    2025 SECOND QUARTER OUTLOOK
    RECONCILIATION OF GROSS MARGIN TO NON-GAAP GROSS MARGIN
    (Unaudited)
        Three Months Ending
        June 30, 2025
        Low   High
    Gross margin     54.9 %     55.5 %
    Adjustment to reconcile gross margin to non-GAAP gross margin:                
    Stock-based compensation and other expenses     0.3 %     0.3 %
    Non-GAAP gross margin     55.2 %     55.8 %
    RECONCILIATION OF OPERATING EXPENSES TO NON-GAAP OPERATING EXPENSES
    (Unaudited, in thousands)
        Three Months Ending
        June 30, 2025
        Low   High
    Operating expenses   $ 189,000     $ 195,000  
    Adjustments to reconcile operating expenses to non-GAAP operating expenses:                
    Stock-based compensation and other expenses     (56,400 )     (58,400 )
    Non-GAAP operating expenses   $ 132,600     $ 136,600  

    The MIL Network –

    May 2, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Canada: Prime Minister Carney speaks with United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres

    Source: Government of Canada – Prime Minister

    Today, the Prime Minister, Mark Carney, spoke with the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), António Guterres.

    The Secretary-General congratulated the Prime Minister on his election. Prime Minister Carney emphasized Canada’s relationship and shared history with the UN, and Canada’s continued support of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. The leaders also discussed a wide range of issues, including UN reform, climate finance, the security and humanitarian crises in Haiti, and the war in Ukraine.

    The leaders agreed to strengthen this relationship and to stay in close contact.

    Associated Link

    MIL OSI Canada News –

    May 2, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: On 50th Anniversary of Vietnam War, Baldwin Leads Resolution Honoring 2025 International Day of Mine Awareness

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Wisconsin Tammy Baldwin

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Tammy Baldwin (D-WI) introduced a Senate resolution honoring April 4, 2025, as International Day of Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action and recognizing April 30, 2025, as the 50th anniversary of the end of the Vietnam War.

    “The Vietnam War left a lasting mark across Southeast Asia, and it’s our responsibility to continue working hand and hand with our allies to protect civilians from the legacy of this conflict,” said Senator Baldwin. “50 years after Americans withdrew from Vietnam, unexploded mines still kill and injure men, women, and children who had no part in this fight every year. I’m proud to recognize this anniversary and International Day of Mine Awareness to remember this critical work to protect innocent civilians continues well beyond the end date of the Vietnam War.”

    In 2005, the General Assembly of the United Nations declared that April 4 of each year shall be observed as the International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action. On April 30, 1975, North Vietnam captured Saigon, effectively ending the civil war. Vietnam remains one of the world’s most impacted countries with respect to uncleared mines and other unexploded ordnance (UXO). Since the war ended, 40,000 people have been killed by UXO and 60,000 injured. At least 25,000 people have been killed or injured by explosives in Laos, and at least 65,000 people in Cambodia since 1979.

    Senator Baldwin leads the bipartisan Legacies of War Recognition and Unexploded Ordnance Removal Act to remove landmines in Southeast Asia and support the establishment of victim support programs for those affected by remnants of war. The legislation also recognizes the contributions of the many communities and Diasporas from Southeast Asia who supported and defended the United States Armed Forces during the war in Vietnam.

    In addition to recognizing April 4, 2025 as the International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action and recognizes April 30, 2025 as the 50th anniversary of the end of the Vietnam War, the resolution also: 

    • reaffirms the leadership of the United States in eliminating landmines and unexploded ordnance;
    • acknowledges the global impacts of landmines and highlights the United States role in clearing landmines, cluster bombs, and other munitions;
    • recognizes the U.S. Servicemembers and the Southeast Asian Communities that supported them during the Vietnam War;
    • recognizes the ongoing humanitarian harm caused by unexploded ordnance remaining in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia;
    • recognizes additional humanitarian priorities caused by the use of landmines, cluster bombs, and munitions in Ukraine, the Middle East, and elsewhere;
    • affirms the Senate’s commitment to support international humanitarian efforts to eliminate landmines and unexploded ordnance;
    • calls upon the U.S. Government to continue providing funding necessary to support international humanitarian demining activities; and
    • reaffirms the goals of the International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action.

    “We at The HALO Trust are grateful for the leadership of Senator Tammy Baldwin in introducing a resolution to recognize International Mine Awareness Day. Demining programs provide life-saving support across the globe while making America safer, stronger, and more prosperous. This legislation is critical to reaffirming the U.S. commitment to demining and honors the tireless efforts of deminers who work every day to make communities safe,” said Chris Whatley, Executive Director, The HALO Trust (USA).

    “As the daughter of a surgeon who treated survivors of landmines and cluster munitions, I’ve seen the lasting impact of these weapons. I’m deeply grateful for Senator Baldwin’s resolution recognizing April 4, 2025, as the International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action. It honors the courage of survivors, deminers, and medical professionals—and reaffirms our duty to act. Thanks to strong U.S. leadership, we’ve made real progress but millions still live in fear. I urge continued U.S. leadership and funding to rid the world of these deadly legacies of war once and for all,” said Sera Koulabdara, CEO, Legacies of War and Co-Chair of the War Legacies Working Group.

    Full text of this resolution is available here.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    May 2, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Trump’s Ukraine mineral deal finally lands as US economy shivers

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Rachael Jolley, International Affairs Editor

    Donald Trump promised he could sort out a peace deal for the Ukraine war in 24 hours. It still hasn’t happened. Instead the US administration has taken 100 days just to sign a mineral deal with Ukraine.

    This agreement will give the US access to revenue from Ukrainian natural resources, including 100 major deposits of critical minerals. It also has huge symbolism. Ukrainians see it as a sign that the US is committed to staying involved in their country, and also as a warming of the relationship between Ukraine’s president and Trump. It will also be a signal to Russia that what hurts Ukraine could also hurt the US economy.

    Of course, White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt calls the deal “historic” and puts its brilliance down to Trump’s amazing negotiation skills.

    However, in the week that Trump celebrated 100 days in office, others would argue that Trump’s deal-making skills are nowhere near as astute as he thinks they are. That he gave Russia way too much room to manoeuvre in the early months of 2025 by leaning so clearly in Putin’s direction, allowing the Russian leader to think he could pretty much do anything he fancied and win as much of Ukraine as he desired.

    US and Ukraine sign a mineral deal.

    But US national security advisor Michael Waltz, who has announced he is standing down, has signalled that the balance may now be shifting, when he said the minerals deal was “a momentous step” and: “Russia needs to come to the table.”

    As Bridget Storrie from UCL’s Institute for Global Prosperity has pointed out, this deal was all about what the global super power was going to get as justification for its support in the war, rather than about how it could increase prosperity in a war-torn country.




    Read more:
    Ukraine minerals deal: the idea that natural resource extraction can build peace has been around for decades


    Andrew Gawthorpe, a lecturer in history and international studies at Leiden University, has looked at the details and believes Kyiv is getting more than many expected, and more than was on offer earlier in the year, when Trump fell out so publicly with Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, at a White House press conference. As part of the deal Ukraine will retain ownership of its natural resources. All profits are to be invested in Ukraine for ten years after the agreement comes into force. It also looks like Washington will contribute new military aid.




    Read more:
    US-Ukraine minerals deal looks better for Kyiv than expected – but Trump is an unpredictable partner


    Presidential power

    Trump’s first 100 days have been tumultuous, not just for the US, but for most of the world. His “liberation day” tariffs on international goods have turned existing economic balances and expectations upside down.

    Countries that have long seen themselves as confident allies of the US – Canada, Denmark and Germany, for instance – now see the landscape somewhat differently, given the high US tariffs that have landed on their doorsteps. No longer convinced of the strength of their relationship with the world’s superpower, many are rethinking both their economic plans and their alliances.

    Meanwhile, China, the main focus of Trump’s tariffs, can see opportunities opening up to forge stronger relationships with, and sales to, other countries also looking for new markets. China has not crumbled yet under the weight of 145% US tariffs. And China’s president, Xi Jinping, is showing no sign of blinking first and heading to Washington to negotiate as Trump was clearly expecting.

    Trump now swings daily from claiming he is negotiating with China and that their tariffs can come down, to stating that Beijing will cave. All that sound and fury sounds a good deal like wavering. And with US supermarket bosses warning of empty shelves around the corner, and US ports expecting traffic from China to significantly slow this month, as Nottingham University’s Chee Meng Tan sets out, there is every reason to expect Trump will cave and open negotiations before Xi Jinping does.




    Read more:
    China has identified how to fight back against Trump’s tariffs, and is not ready to back down


    Many nations now see the US as a far less trustworthy partner now than in the past. The most obvious of these is Canada, which just elected the leader of a party that was 20 percentage points behind in the polls in January and expected to be beaten badly not long ago. But when Trump decided that he wanted Canada as the 51st state, normality went out the window over its northern border.

    This week, newly elected Canadian prime minister Mark Carney said he would seek meetings with Trump with the “full knowledge that we have many, many other options than the United States”, promising to strengthen relations with “reliable partners” in Europe, Asia and elsewhere.

    “We are over the shock of America’s betrayal,” he said. He is ready to write a new foreign policy. He’s not the only one.


    Sign up to receive our weekly World Affairs Briefing newsletter from The Conversation UK. Every Thursday we’ll bring you expert analysis of the big stories in international relations.


    Two of the US’s firm friends for decades, South Korea and Taiwan, are now not so sure that they see Washington as a dependable ally, according to a report from research organisation the Brookings Institution. It saw a significant jump in the numbers of people who saw the US as untrustworthy from July 2024, to March 2025.

    This matters, as Steve Dunne, a political scientist at the University of Warwick points out, because without trust people and nations are likely not to honour their commitments. After the second world war, the western allies decided to create a series of international bodies to avert such a disaster happening again, and to encourage nations to follow a set of rules that would encourage democracy and trust in each other.

    In his first 100 days, says Dunne, Trump broke the compact of trust with countries that had a long alliance with the US, and that could have a deep impact on the trust that has existed for decades between western nations.




    Read more:
    Donald Trump’s first 100 days have badly damaged trust in America both economically and as an ally


    Global power reducing?

    Declining trust in the US could well reduce other forms of its global power. As well as financially and politically, in the post-war decades the US has influenced the world, by exporting its culture, its films, its television programmes and its ideas, as well as importing tourists to visit its national treasures, from Yosemite national park to New York City.

    In the past 100 days, international tourists are reported to be cancelling their bookings, partly worried about the welcome, or the lack of it, they may encounter at the border. Summer airline bookings from Canada (21%), Germany (17%) and the Netherlands (12%) to the US have fallen significantly for this year, although other countries such as UK show only a minor fall.

    Admittedly, Trump told voters that he wanted to put “America first”. However, at his inauguration, the president declared he wanted to make America the “most respected nation on earth”. That achievement is looking quite far off at the moment. In fact, in many countries it is going the other way.

    That international respect took a significant hit at one of the most remarkable moments of the past 100 days, when Trump proceeded to take Zelensky to task publicly for a range of offences including not being grateful enough for US support and not wearing a suit.

    So what has Trump achieved domestically in his first 100 days and how does that match up against the promises he made? Let’s look at some of the plans he set out in his inauguration speech.

    Trump said he wanted to increase US wealth. But current economic indicators are more than a bit shaky, with US stock markets falling and rising on a regular basis as they follow Trump’s on-and-off-again announcements on tariff negotiations with various countries. On April 30, the day after Trump’s big 100 days rally, stocks fell after data was released showing a contraction in the GDP of the US in the first quarter.

    But Trump has told his supporters that, in the long term, tariffs will work and manufacturing jobs will benefit. So far, Republican voters still believe in Trump’s policies on jobs and the economy, with 82% approving, according to a recent Economist/YouGov poll. Only 8% of Democrats and 32% of independent voters do though.

    Many of the big decisions we have seen playing out in the first 100 days – including the Elon Musk-led dismantling of some parts of government and Trump’s swing at driving down immigration – were detailed in the Project 2025 document, published the conservative think-tank the Heritage Foundation before the election, says Dafydd Townley of the University of Portsmouth. But it also hints at what may come next, including more legislation restricting American women’s access to abortion further.




    Read more:
    How Project 2025 became the blueprint for Donald Trump’s second term


    On January 20 Trump thought that Americans stood “on the verge of the four greatest years in American history”. For many Americans worried about their pensions, savings and the cost of groceries, the future is not looking so great right now. But for those who were sharp focused on cutting immigration, Trump may have made the great start they were hoping for.

    – ref. Trump’s Ukraine mineral deal finally lands as US economy shivers – https://theconversation.com/trumps-ukraine-mineral-deal-finally-lands-as-us-economy-shivers-255747

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    May 2, 2025
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