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Category: Ukraine

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: President Lai meets NBR delegation  

    Source: Republic of China Taiwan

    Details
    2025-04-28
    President Lai meets Japanese Diet Member and former Minister of State for Economic Security Takaichi Sanae
    On the afternoon of April 28, President Lai Ching-te met with a delegation led by Member of the Japanese House of Representatives and former Minister of State for Economic Security Takaichi Sanae. In remarks, President Lai thanked the government of Japan for repeatedly emphasizing the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait at important international venues. The president expressed hope that in the face of China’s continually expanding red supply chains, Taiwan and Japan can continue to cooperate closely in such fields as semiconductors, energy, and AI technology to create non-red supply chains that enhance economic resilience and industrial competitiveness for both sides, and jointly pave the way for further prosperity and growth in the Indo-Pacific region. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: First, I would like to extend a warm welcome to Representative Takaichi as she returns for another visit to Taiwan. I am also very happy to have Members of the House of Representatives Kikawada Hitoshi and Ozaki Masanao, and Member of the House of Councillors Sato Kei all gathered together here to engage in these very important exchanges. Our visitors will be taking part in many exchange activities during this trip. Earlier today at the Indo-Pacific Strategy Thinktank’s International Political and Economic Forum, Representative Takaichi delivered a speech in which she clearly demonstrated the great importance she places upon the friendship between Taiwan and Japan. For this I want to express my deepest appreciation to each of our guests. The peoples of Taiwan and Japan have a deep friendship and mutual trust. We have a shared commitment to the universal values of democracy, freedom, and respect for human rights, but beyond that, we both have striven to contribute to regional peace and stability. I also want to thank the government of Japan for repeatedly emphasizing the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait at important international venues. Tomorrow you will all make a trip to Kaohsiung to visit a bronze statue of former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, who once said, “If Taiwan has a problem, then Japan has a problem.” We will always remember the firm support and friendship he showed Taiwan. Since taking office last year, I have worked hard to improve Taiwan’s whole-of-society defense resilience and implement our Four Pillars of Peace action plan. By strengthening our national defense capabilities, building up economic security, demonstrating stable and principled cross-strait leadership, and deepening partnerships with democratic countries including Japan, we can together maintain peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and across the Taiwan Strait. At the same time, in the face of China’s continually expanding red supply chains, we hope that Taiwan and Japan, as important economic and trade partners, can continue to cooperate closely in such fields as semiconductors, energy, and AI technology to create non-red supply chains that further enhance economic resilience and industrial competitiveness for both sides. Going forward, Taiwan will work hard to play an important role in the international community and contribute its key strengths. I hope that, with the support of our guests, Taiwan can soon accede to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and sign an economic partnership agreement (EPA) with Japan so that we can jointly pave the way for further prosperity and growth in the Indo-Pacific region. Lastly, I thank each of you once again for taking concrete action to support Taiwan. I am confident that your visit will help deepen Taiwan-Japan ties and create even greater opportunities for cooperation. Let us all strive together to keep propelling Taiwan-Japan relations forward.  Representative Takaichi then delivered remarks, first thanking President Lai and Taiwanese political leaders for the warm hospitality they extended to the delegation, and mentioning that the visiting delegation members are all like-minded partners carrying on the legacy of former Prime Minister Abe. July 8 this year will mark the third anniversary of the passing of former Prime Minister Abe, she said, and when the former prime minister unfortunately passed away, President Lai, then serving as vice president, was among the first to come offer condolences, for which she expressed sincere admiration and gratitude. Representative Takaichi stated that Taiwan and Japan are island nations that face the same circumstances and problems, and that Japan’s trade activities rely heavily on ocean transport, so once a problem arises nearby that threatens maritime shipping lanes, it will be a matter of life and death for Japan. Taiwan and Japan are similar, as once a problem arises, both will face food and energy security issues, and supply chains may even be threatened, she said. Regarding Taiwan-Japan cooperation, Representative Takaichi stated that both sides must first protect and strengthen supply chain resilience. President Lai has previously said that he wants to turn Taiwan into an AI island, she said, and in semiconductors, Taiwan has the world’s leading technology. Representative Takaichi went on to say that Taiwan and Japan can collaborate in the fields of AI and semiconductors, quantum computing, and dual-use industries, as well as in areas such as drones and new energy technologies to build more resilient supply chains, so that if problems arise, we can maintain our current standard of living with peace of mind. Representative Takaichi indicated that cooperation in the defense sector is also crucial, and that by uniting like-minded countries including Taiwan, the United States, Japan, the Philippines, and Australia, and even countries in Europe, we can build a stronger network to jointly maintain our security guarantees. Representative Takaichi expressed hope that Taiwan and Japan will continue to strengthen substantive non-governmental relations, including personnel exchange visits and information sharing, so that we can jointly face and respond to crises when they arise. Regarding the hope to sign a Taiwan-Japan EPA that President Lai had mentioned earlier, she also expressed support and said she looks forward to upcoming exchanges and talks. The visiting delegation also included Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association Taipei Office Chief Representative Katayama Kazuyuki.

    Details
    2025-04-23
    President Lai delivers remarks at International Holocaust Remembrance Day event
    On the afternoon of April 23, President Lai Ching-te attended an International Holocaust Remembrance Day event and delivered remarks, in which he emphasized that peace is priceless, and war has no winners, while morality, democracy, and respect for human rights are powerful forces against violence and tyranny. The president stated that Taiwan will continue to expand cooperation with democratic partners and safeguard regional and global peace and stability, defending democracy, freedom, and human rights. He said we must never forget history, and must overcome our differences and join in solidarity to ensure that the next generations live in a world that is more just and more peaceful. Upon arriving at the event, President Lai heard a testimony from the granddaughter of a Holocaust survivor, followed by a rabbi’s recitation of the prayer “El Maleh Rachamim.” He then joined other distinguished guests in lighting candles in memory of the victims. A transcript of President Lai’s remarks follows: To begin, I want to thank the Israel Economic and Cultural Office (ISECO) in Taipei, German Institute Taipei, Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs for co-organizing this deeply significant memorial ceremony again this year. I also want to thank everyone for attending. We are here today to remember the victims of the Holocaust, express sympathy for the survivors, honor the brave individuals who protected the victims, and acknowledge all who were impacted by this atrocity. It was deeply moving to hear Ms. [Orly] Sela share the story of how her grandmother, Yehudit Biksz, escaped the Nazi regime. I want to thank her specially for traveling so far to attend this event. From the 1930s through World War II, the Nazi regime sought to exclude Jewish people from society. In their campaign, they perpetrated systematic genocide driven by their ideology. Policies and directives under the authoritarian Nazi regime resulted in the deaths of approximately 6 million Jews. Millions of others were persecuted, including Romani people, persons with disabilities, the gay community, and anyone who disagreed with Nazi ideology. It is one of the darkest chapters in human history. Many countries, including Taiwan, have enacted anti-massacre legislation, and observe a remembrance day each year. Those occasions help us remember the victims, preserve historical memory, and most importantly, reinforce our resolve to fight against hatred and discrimination. Twenty-three years ago, Chelujan (車路墘) Church in Tainan founded the Taiwan Holocaust Memorial Museum. It is the first Jewish museum in Taiwan, and the second Holocaust museum in Asia. Its founding mission urges us to forget hatred and love one another; put an end to war and advocate peace. Many of the exhibition items come from Jewish people, connecting Taiwan closer with Israel and helping Taiwanese better understand the experiences of Jewish people. In this way, we grow to more deeply cherish peace. When I was mayor of Tainan, I took part in an exhibition event at Chelujan Church. I was also invited by the Israeli government to join the International Mayors Conference in Israel, where I visited the World Holocaust Remembrance Center. I will never forget how deeply that experience moved me, and as a result, peace and human rights became even more important issues for me. These issues are valued by Taiwan and our friends and allies. They are also important links connecting Taiwan with the world. Peace is priceless, and war has no winners. We will continue to expand cooperation with democratic partners and safeguard regional and global peace and stability. We will also continue to make greater contributions and work with the international community to defend democracy, freedom, and human rights. This year also marks the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II. However, we still see wars raging around the world. We see a resurgence of authoritarian powers, which could severely impact global democracy, peace, and prosperous development. Today’s event allows for more than reflection on the past; it also serves as a warning for the future. We are reminded of the threats that hatred, prejudice, and extremism pose to humanity. But we are also reminded that morality, democracy, and respect for human rights are powerful forces against violence and tyranny. We must never forget history. We must overcome our differences and join in solidarity for a better future. Let’s work together to ensure that the next generations live in a world that is more just and more peaceful. Also in attendance at the event were Member of the Israeli Knesset (parliament) and Taiwan friendship group Chair Boaz Toporovsky, ISECO Representative Maya Yaron, and German Institute Taipei Deputy Director General Andreas Hofem.

    Details
    2025-04-23
    President Lai pays respects to Pope Francis  
    On the morning of April 23, President Lai Ching-te visited the Taipei Archdiocesan Curia to pay respects in a memorial ceremony for His Holiness Pope Francis. As officiant of the ceremony, President Lai burned incense and presented flowers, fruits, and wine to pay his respects to Pope Francis. At the direction of the master of ceremonies, the president then bowed three times in front of Pope Francis’s memorial portrait, conveying his grief and deep respect for the late pope. After hearing of Pope Francis’s passing on April 21, President Lai promptly requested the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to express sincere condolences from the people and government of Taiwan to the Vatican. The president also instructed Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) to convey condolences to the Holy See’s Apostolic Nunciature in Taiwan.  

    Details
    2025-04-23
    President Lai meets US CNAS NextGen fellows
    On the morning of April 23, President Lai Ching-te met with fellows from the Shawn Brimley Next Generation National Security Leaders Program (NextGen) run by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). In remarks, President Lai thanked the government of the United States for continuing its arms sales to Taiwan over the years, supporting Taiwan’s efforts to enhance its national defense capabilities and jointly maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. The president pointed out that we will promote our “Taiwan plus one” policy, that is, new arrangements for Taiwan plus the US, and form a “Taiwan investment in the US team” to expand investment and bring about even closer Taiwan-US trade cooperation, allowing us to reduce the trade deficit and generate development that benefits both sides. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: Ms. Michèle Flournoy, chair of the CNAS Board of Directors, is a good friend of Taiwan, and she has made major contributions to Taiwan-US relations through her long-time efforts on various aspects of our cooperation. I am happy to welcome Chair Flournoy, who is once again leading a NextGen Fellowship delegation to Taiwan. CNAS is a prominent think tank focusing on US national security and defense policy based in Washington, DC. Its NextGen Fellowship has fostered talented individuals in the fields of national security and foreign affairs. This year’s delegation is significantly larger than those of the past, demonstrating the increased importance that the next generation of US leaders attach to Taiwan. On behalf of the people of Taiwan, I extend my sincerest welcome to you all. The Taiwan Strait, an issue of importance for our guests, has become a global issue. There is a high degree of international consensus that peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait are indispensable elements in global security and prosperity. Facing military threats from China, Taiwan proposed the Four Pillars of Peace action plan. First, we are actively implementing military reforms, enhancing whole-of-society defense resilience, and working to increase our defense budget to more than 3 percent of GDP. Second, we are strengthening our economic resilience. As Taiwan’s economy must keep advancing, we can no longer put all our eggs in one basket. We are taking action to remain firmly rooted in Taiwan while expanding our global presence and marketing worldwide. In these efforts, we are already seeing results. Third, we are standing side-by-side with other democratic countries to demonstrate the strength of deterrence and achieve our goal of peace through strength. And fourth, Taiwan is willing, under the principles of parity and dignity, to conduct exchanges and cooperate with China towards achieving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. This April 10 marked the 46th anniversary of the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act. We thank the US government for continuing its arms sales to Taiwan over the years, supporting Taiwan’s efforts to enhance its national defense capabilities and jointly maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. We look forward to Taiwan and the US continuing to strengthen collaboration on the development of both our defense industries as well as the building of non-red supply chains. This will yield even more results and further deepen our economic and trade partnership. The US is now the main destination for outbound investment from Taiwan. Moving forward, we will promote our “Taiwan plus one” policy, that is, new arrangements for Taiwan plus the US. And our government will form a “Taiwan investment in the US team” to expand investment. We hope this will bring Taiwan-US economic and trade cooperation even closer and, through mutually beneficial assistance, allow us to generate development that benefits both our sides while reducing our trade deficit. In closing, thank you once again for visiting Taiwan. We hope your trip is fruitful and leaves you with a deep impression of Taiwan. We also hope that going forward you continue supporting Taiwan and advancing even greater development for Taiwan-US ties.  Chair Flournoy then delivered remarks, first thanking President Lai for making time to receive their delegation. Referring to President Lai’s earlier remarks, she said that it is quite an impressive group, as past members of this program have gone on to become members of the US Congress, leading government experts, and leaders in the think-tank world and in the private sector. She remarked that investing in this group is a wonderful privilege for her and that they appreciate President Lai’s agreeing to take the time to engage in exchange with them. Chair Flournoy emphasized that they are visiting Taiwan at a critical moment, when there is so much change and volatility in the geostrategic environment, a lot of uncertainty, and a lot of unpredictability. She stated that given our shared values, our shared passion for democracy and human rights, and our shared interests in peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, this is an important time for dialogue, collaboration, and looking for additional opportunities where we can work together towards regional peace and stability.

    Details
    2025-04-18
    President Lai meets US delegation from Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific
    On the afternoon of April 18, President Lai Ching-te met with a delegation led by Senator Pete Ricketts, chairman of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy. In remarks, President Lai said we hope to promote our Taiwan plus one policy, that is, new industrial arrangements for Taiwan plus the US, to leverage the strengths of both sides and reinforce our links in such areas as the economy, trade, and technological innovation. The president said that by deepening cooperation, Taiwan and the US will be better positioned to work together on building non-red supply chains. He said a more secure and sustainable economic and trade partnership will allow us to address the challenges posed by geopolitics, climate change, and the restructuring of global supply chains. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: I warmly welcome you all to Taiwan. I want to take this opportunity to especially thank Chairman Pete Ricketts and Ranking Member Chris Coons for their high regard and support for Taiwan. Chairman Ricketts has elected to visit Taiwan on his first overseas trip since taking up his new position in January. Ranking Member Coons made a dedicated trip to Taiwan in 2021 to announce a donation of COVID-19 vaccines on behalf of the US government. He also visited last May, soon after my inauguration, continuing to deepen Taiwan-US exchanges. Thanks to support from Chairman Ricketts and Ranking Member Coons, the US Congress has continued to introduce many concrete initiatives and resources to assist Taiwan through the National Defense Authorization Act and Consolidated Appropriations Act, bringing the Taiwan-US partnership even closer. For this, I want to again express my gratitude. There has long been bipartisan support in the US Congress for maintaining security in the Taiwan Strait. Faced with China’s persistent political and military intimidation, Taiwan will endeavor to reform national defense and enhance whole-of-society defense resilience. We will also make special budget allocations to ensure that our defense budget exceeds 3 percent of GDP, up from the current 2.5 percent, so as to enhance Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities. We look forward to Taiwan and the US continuing to work together to maintain peace and stability in the region. We will also promote our Taiwan plus one policy, that is, new industrial arrangements for Taiwan plus the US. We hope to leverage the strengths of both sides and reinforce our links in such areas as the economy, trade, and technological innovation, jointly promoting prosperity and development. We believe that by deepening cooperation through the Taiwan plus one policy, Taiwan and the US will be better positioned to work together on building non-red supply chains. A more secure and sustainable economic and trade partnership will allow us to address the challenges posed by geopolitics, climate change, and the restructuring of global supply chains. In closing, I wish Chairman Ricketts and Ranking Member Coons a smooth and successful visit. Chairman Ricketts then delivered remarks, first thanking President Lai for his hospitality. He said that he and his delegation have had a wonderful time meeting with government officials, industry representatives, and the team at the American Institute in Taiwan. Highlighting that Taiwan has long been a friend and partner of the US, he said their bipartisan delegation to Taiwan emphasizes long-time bipartisan support in the US Congress for Taiwan, and though administrations change, that bipartisan support remains. Chairman Ricketts stated that the US is committed to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and that they want to see peace across the Taiwan Strait. He also stated that the US opposes any unilateral change in the status of Taiwan and that they expect any differences between Taiwan and China to be resolved peacefully without coercion or the threat of force. To that end, he said, the US will continue to assist Taiwan in its self-defense and will also step up by bolstering its own defense capabilities, noting that there is broad consensus on this in the US Congress. Chairman Ricketts stated that they want to see Taiwan participate in international organizations and memberships where appropriate, and encourage Taiwan to reach out to current and past diplomatic allies to strengthen those bilateral relationships. He pointed out that the long economic relationship between the US and Taiwan is important for our as well as the entire world’s security and prosperity. He also noted that there are many opportunities for us to continue to grow the economic relationship that will help create more prosperity for our respective peoples and ensure that we are more secure in the world. Chairman Ricketts emphasized that they made this trip early on in the new US administration to work with Taiwan to develop three points: security, diplomatic relations, and the economy. He stated that in the face of rising aggression from communist China, the US will provide commensurate help to Taiwan in self-defense and that they will continue to provide the services and tools needed. In closing, Chairman Ricketts once again thanked President Lai for the hospitality and said he looks forward to dialogue on how we can continue these relationships. Ranking Member Coons then delivered remarks. Mentioning that their delegation also visited the Philippines on this trip, he said that there and in Taiwan, they have been focused on peace, stability, and security, and the ways for deepening and strengthening economic and security relations. He noted that 46 years ago, the US Senate passed the Taiwan Relations Act, adding that it was strongly bipartisan when enacted and that support for it is still strongly bipartisan today. Its core commitment, he said, is that the US will be engaged and will be a partner in ensuring that any dispute or challenge across the strait will be resolved peacefully, and that Taiwan will have the resources it needs for its self-defense. Ranking Member Coons said that between people, friendships are deepest and most enduring when they are based not just on interests but on values, and that the same is true between the US and Taiwan. Free press, free enterprise, free societies, democracy – these core shared values, he said, anchor our friendship and partnership, making them deeper. He remarked that they are grateful for the significant investment in the US being made by companies from Taiwan, but what anchors our partnership, in addition to these important investments and investments being made by Taiwan in its own security, are the values that mobilize our free-enterprise spirit and our commitment to free societies. In Europe in recent years, Ranking Member Coons said, an aggressive nation has tried to change boundaries and change history by force. He said that the US and dozens of countries committed to freedom have come to the aid of Ukraine to defend it, help it stabilize, and secure its future. So too in this region of the world, he added, the US and a bipartisan group in the US Senate are committed to stable, secure, peaceful relations and to deterring any unilateral effort to change the status quo by force. In closing, he said he is grateful for a chance to return to Taiwan after the pandemic and that he looks forward to our conversation, our partnership, and the important work we have in front of us. The delegation was accompanied to the Presidential Office by American Institute in Taiwan Taipei Office Director Raymond Greene.

    Details
    2025-04-06
    President Lai delivers remarks on US tariff policy response
    On April 6, President Lai Ching-te delivered recorded remarks regarding the impact of the 32 percent tariff that the United States government recently imposed on imports from Taiwan in the name of reciprocity. In his remarks, President Lai explained that the government will adopt five response strategies, including making every effort to improve reciprocal tariff rates through negotiations, adopting a support plan for affected domestic industries, adopting medium- and long-term economic development plans, forming new “Taiwan plus the US” arrangements, and launching industry listening tours. The president emphasized that as we face this latest challenge, the government and civil society will work hand in hand, and expressed hope that all parties, both ruling and opposition, will support the measures that the Executive Yuan will take to open up a broader path for Taiwan’s economy. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: My fellow citizens, good evening. The US government recently announced higher tariffs on countries around the world in the name of reciprocity, including imposing a 32 percent tariff on imports from Taiwan. This is bound to have a major impact on our nation. Various countries have already responded, and some have even adopted retaliatory measures. Tremendous changes in the global economy are expected. Taiwan is an export-led economy, and in facing future challenges there will inevitably be difficulties, so we must proceed carefully to turn danger into safety. During this time, I want to express gratitude to all sectors of society for providing valuable opinions, which the government regards highly, and will use as a reference to make policy decisions.  However, if we calmly and carefully analyze Taiwan’s trade with the US, we find that last year Taiwan’s exports to the US were valued at US$111.4 billion, accounting for 23.4 percent of total export value, with the other 75-plus percent of products sold worldwide to countries other than the US. Of products sold to the US, competitive ICT products and electronic components accounted for 65.4 percent. This shows that Taiwan’s economy does still have considerable resilience. As long as our response strategies are appropriate, and the public and private sectors join forces, we can reduce impacts. Please do not panic. To address the reciprocal tariffs by the US, Taiwan has no plans to adopt retaliatory tariffs. There will be no change in corporate investment commitments to the US, as long as they are consistent with national interests. But we must ensure the US clearly understands Taiwan’s contributions to US economic development. More importantly, we must actively seek to understand changes in the global economic situation, strengthen Taiwan-US industry cooperation, elevate the status of Taiwan industries in global supply chains, and with safeguarding the continued development of Taiwan’s economy as our goal, adopt the following five strategies to respond. Strategy one: Make every effort to improve reciprocal tariff rates through negotiations using the following five methods:  1. Taiwan has already formed a negotiation team led by Vice Premier Cheng Li-chiun (鄭麗君). The team includes members from the National Security Council, the Office of Trade Negotiations, and relevant Executive Yuan ministries and agencies, as well as academia and industry. Like the US-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement, negotiations on tariffs can start from Taiwan-US bilateral zero-tariff treatment. 2. To expand purchases from the US and thereby reduce the trade deficit, the Executive Yuan has already completed an inventory regarding large-scale procurement plans for agricultural, industrial, petroleum, and natural gas products, and the Ministry of National Defense has also proposed a military procurement list. All procurement plans will be actively pursued. 3. Expand investments in the US. Taiwan’s cumulative investment in the US already exceeds US$100 billion, creating approximately 400,000 jobs. In the future, in addition to increased investment in the US by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, other industries such as electronics, ICT, petrochemicals, and natural gas can all increase their US investments, deepening Taiwan-US industry cooperation. Taiwan’s government has helped form a “Taiwan investment in the US” team, and hopes that the US will reciprocate by forming a “US investment in Taiwan” team to bring about closer Taiwan-US trade cooperation, jointly creating a future economic golden age.  4. We must eliminate non-tariff barriers to trade. Non-tariff barriers are an indicator by which the US assesses whether a trading partner is trading fairly with the US. Therefore, we will proactively resolve longstanding non-tariff barriers so that negotiations can proceed more smoothly. 5. We must resolve two issues that have been matters of longstanding concern to the US. One regards high-tech export controls, and the other regards illegal transshipment of dumped goods, otherwise referred to as “origin washing.” Strategy two: We must adopt a plan for supporting our industries. For industries that will be affected by the tariffs, and especially traditional industries as well as micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises, we will provide timely and needed support and assistance. Premier Cho Jung-tai (卓榮泰) and his administrative team recently announced a package of 20 specific measures designed to address nine areas. Moving forward, the support we provide to different industries will depend on how they are affected by the tariffs, will take into account the particular features of each industry, and will help each industry innovate, upgrade, and transform. Strategy three: We must adopt medium- and long-term economic development plans. At this point in time, our government must simultaneously adopt new strategies for economic and industrial development. This is also the fundamental path to solutions for future economic challenges. The government will proactively cooperate with friends and allies, develop a diverse range of markets, and achieve closer integration of entities in the upper, middle, and lower reaches of industrial supply chains. This course of action will make Taiwan’s industrial ecosystem more complete, and will help Taiwanese industries upgrade and transform. We must also make good use of the competitive advantages we possess in such areas as semiconductor manufacturing, integrated chip design, ICT, and smart manufacturing to build Taiwan into an AI island, and promote relevant applications for food, clothing, housing, and transportation, as well as military, security and surveillance, next-generation communications, and the medical and health and wellness industries as we advance toward a smarter, more sustainable, and more prosperous new Taiwan. Strategy four: “Taiwan plus one,” i.e., new “Taiwan plus the US” arrangements: While staying firmly rooted in Taiwan, our enterprises are expanding their global presence and marketing worldwide. This has been our national economic development strategy, and the most important aspect is maintaining a solid base here in Taiwan. We absolutely must maintain a solid footing, and cannot allow the present strife to cause us to waver. Therefore, our government will incentivize investments, carry out deregulation, and continue to improve Taiwan’s investment climate by actively resolving problems involving access to water, electricity, land, human resources, and professional talent. This will enable corporations to stay in Taiwan and continue investing here. In addition, we must also help the overseas manufacturing facilities of offshore Taiwanese businesses to make necessary adjustments to support our “Taiwan plus one” policy, in that our national economic development strategy will be adjusted as follows: to stay firmly rooted in Taiwan while expanding our global presence, strengthening US ties, and marketing worldwide. We intend to make use of the new state of supply chains to strengthen cooperation between Taiwanese and US industries, and gain further access to US markets. Strategy five: Launch industry listening tours: All industrial firms, regardless of sector or size, will be affected to some degree once the US reciprocal tariffs go into effect. The administrative teams led by myself and Premier Cho will hear out industry concerns so that we can quickly resolve problems and make sure policies meet actual needs. My fellow citizens, over the past half-century and more, Taiwan has been through two energy crises, the Asian financial crisis, the global financial crisis, and pandemics. We have been able to not only withstand one test after another, but even turn crises into opportunities. The Taiwanese economy has emerged from these crises stronger and more resilient than ever. As we face this latest challenge, the government and civil society will work hand in hand, and I hope that all parties in the legislature, both ruling and opposition, will support the measures that the Executive Yuan will take to open up a broader path for Taiwan’s economy. Let us join together and give it our all. Thank you.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

    April 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Economics: Piero Cipollone: Navigating a fractured horizon: risks and policy options in a fragmenting world

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the conference on “Policy challenges in a fragmenting world: Global trade, exchange rates, and capital flow” organised by the Bank for International Settlements, the Bank of England, the ECB and the International Monetary Fund

    Frankfurt am Main, 29 April 2025

    I’m honoured to welcome you to this conference, jointly organised by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the Bank of England, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).[1]

    Today, we come together to discuss the urgent challenges posed by global fragmentation – a growing risk to our interconnected world. Earlier this month, the President of the United States announced tariff hikes, sending shockwaves through the global economy – a stark reminder that the fractures we face are no longer hypothetical, but real.

    This announcement is but the latest chapter in a series of four major shocks that have been reshaping our world in recent years.

    First, since 2018 the intensifying power struggle between the United States and China has led to tit-for-tat tariffs affecting nearly two-thirds of the trade between these two economic giants. Second, starting in 2020, the pandemic caused unprecedented disruptions to supply chains, which prompted a re-evaluation of the balance between global integration and resilience. Third, in 2022 Russia’s unjustified invasion of Ukraine not only triggered an energy crisis but also deepened a geopolitical divide that continues to have worldwide repercussions. And fourth, we are now facing the rising risk of economic fragmentation within the western bloc itself, as new trade barriers threaten long-standing international partnerships.

    The data paint a sobering picture. Geopolitical risk levels have surged to 50% above the post-global financial crisis average, and uncertainty surrounding trade policy has risen to more than eight times its average since 2021.[2] What we are experiencing is not merely a temporary disruption – it is a profound shift in how nations interact economically, financially and diplomatically. So, it does not come as a surprise that financial markets have experienced considerable volatility in recent weeks. It remains to be seen if, for markets to find a stable equilibrium, it will be enough to step back from the current international economic disorder towards a more stable, predictable and reliable trading system – a development that appears elusive in the short term. Against this backdrop, recent moves in exchange rates, bond yields and equities, suggest that US markets have not been playing their usual role as a safe haven in this particular episode of stress. This potentially has far-reaching longer-term implications for capital flows and the international financial system.

    Today I will focus on three key points. First, we are seeing increasing signs of fragmentation becoming visible across the economy and financial system. Second, the implications of this accelerating fragmentation could extend far beyond the immediate disruptions, with consequences for growth, stability and prosperity. Third, in this evolving economic landscape, central banks must adapt their approaches yet retain a steadfast focus on their core mandates, while striving to preserve international cooperation.

    The emerging reality of fragmentation

    Let me begin by addressing a common belief – still held by many until recently – that, despite rising geopolitical tensions, globalisation appears largely resilient. Headline figures in trade and cross-border investment, for example, do indeed appear to support this belief. In 2024 world trade expanded to a record USD 33 trillion – up 3.7% from 2023. Similarly, the global stock of foreign direct investment reached an unprecedented USD 41 trillion.[3] However, these surface-level indicators may not reflect the underlying realities, creating a misleading sense of stability when important changes are already underway. In reality, fragmentation is already happening in both the global economy and the financial system.

    Fragmentation of the real economy

    Fragmentation is most evident in rebalancing trade, driven by escalating geopolitical tensions. Take, for instance, the escalating US-China trade tensions that have been intensifying since 2018. Studies show the impact of geopolitical distance on trade has become notably negative. A doubling of geopolitical distance between countries – akin to moving from the position of Germany to that of India in relation to the United States – decreases bilateral trade flows by approximately 20%.[4]

    The series of shocks to the global economy in recent years have also contributed to this fragmentation. According to gravity model estimates, trade between geopolitically distant blocs has significantly declined. Trade between rivals is about 4% lower than it might have been without the heightened tensions post-2017, while trade between friends is approximately 6% higher.[5] Global value chains are being reconfigured as companies respond to these new realities. In 2023 surveys already indicated that only about a quarter of leading firms operating in the euro area[6] that sourced critical inputs from countries considered subject to elevated risk had not developed strategies to reduce their exposure.[7]

    However, these shifting trade patterns have not yet been reflected in overall global trade flows. Non-aligned countries have played a crucial role as intermediaries, or connectors, helping to sustain global trade levels even as direct trade between rival blocs declines.[8] But this stabilising influence is unlikely to endure as trade fragmentation deepens and geopolitical alliances continue to shift.

    The tariffs announced by the US Administration are far-reaching and affect a substantial share of global trade flows. The effects on the real economy are likely to be material. In its World Economic Outlook, published last week, the International Monetary Fund revised down global growth projections for 2025-26 by a cumulative 0.8 percentage points and global trade by a cumulative 2.3 percentage points.[9] This notably reflects a negative hit from tariffs that ranges between 0.4% to 1% of world GDP by 2027.[10] In particular, IMF growth projections for the United States have been revised down by a cumulative 1.3 percentage points in 2025-26. The cumulative impact on euro area growth is smaller, at 0.4 percentage points.

    Financial fragmentation

    The fragmentation we are witnessing in global trade is mirrored in the financial sector, where geopolitical tensions are also reshaping the landscape.

    In recent years, global foreign direct investment flows have increasingly aligned with geopolitical divides. Foreign direct investment in new ventures has plunged by nearly two-thirds between countries from different geopolitical blocs. However, strong intra-bloc investments have helped sustain overall foreign direct investment levels globally, masking some of the fragmentation occurring beneath the surface.[11]

    But, as with trade flows, this dynamic is unlikely to persist as geopolitical tensions grow within established economic blocs. For instance, increased geopolitical distance is shown to curtail cross-border lending. A two standard deviation rise in geopolitical distance – akin to moving from the position of France to that of Pakistan in relation to Germany – leads to a reduction of 3 percentage points in cross-border bank lending.[12]

    The impact of fragmentation in global financial infrastructure is perhaps even more revealing. Since 2014 correspondent banking relationships – crucial for facilitating trade flows across countries – have declined by 20%. While other factors – such as a wave of concentration in the banking industry, technological disruptions and profitability considerations – have played a role[13], the contribution of the geopolitical dimension can hardly be overstated. The repercussions of this decline can be profound. Research shows that when correspondent banking relationships are severed in a specific corridor, a firm’s likelihood of continuing to export between the two countries of that corridor falls by about 5 percentage points in the short term, and by about 20 percentage points after four years.[14]

    Contributing to this trend, countries such as China, Russia and Iran have launched multiple initiatives to develop alternatives to established networks such as SWIFT, raising the possibility of a fragmented global payment system.[15] Geopolitical alignment now exerts a stronger influence than trade relationships or technical standards in connecting payment systems between countries.[16] This poses risks of regional networks becoming more unstable, increased trade costs and settlement times, and reduced risk sharing across countries.

    Additionally, we are witnessing a noticeable shift away from traditional reserve currencies, with growing interest in holding gold. Central banks purchased more than 1,000 tonnes of gold in 2024, almost double the level of the previous decade, with China being the largest purchaser, at over 225 tonnes. At market valuations, the share of gold in global official reserves has increased, reaching 20% in 2024, while that of the US dollar has decreased. Survey data suggest that two-thirds of central banks invested in gold to diversify, 40% to protect against geopolitical risk and 18% because of the uncertainty over the future of the international monetary system.[17] There are further signs that geopolitical considerations increasingly influence decisions to invest in gold. The negative correlation of gold prices with real yields has broken down since 2022, a phenomenon we have also observed in recent weeks. This suggests that gold prices have been influenced by more than simply the use of gold to hedge against inflation. Moreover, countries geopolitically close to China and Russia have seen more pronounced increases in the share of gold in official foreign reserves since the last quarter of 2021.

    The looming consequences of fragmentation

    Accelerating fragmentation is resulting in the immediate disruptions we are now seeing, but this is likely to only be the beginning – potentially profound medium and long-term consequences for growth, stability and prosperity can be expected.

    Medium-term impacts

    The initial consequences of fragmentation are already evident in the form of increased uncertainty. In particular, trade policy uncertainty has led to a broader rise in global economic policy instability, which is stifling investment and dampening consumption. Our research suggests that the recent increase in trade policy uncertainty could reduce euro area business investment by 1.1% in the first year and real GDP growth by around 0.2 percentage points in 2025-26[18]. Consumer sentiment is also under strain, with the ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey revealing that rising geopolitical risks are leading to more pessimistic expectations, higher income uncertainty and ultimately a lower willingness to spend.[19] Moreover, ECB staff estimates suggest that the observed increase in financial market volatility might imply lower GDP growth of about 0.2 percentage points in 2025.

    Over the medium term, tariffs are set to have an unambiguously recessionary effect, both for countries imposing restrictions and those receiving them. The costs are particularly high when exchange rates fail to absorb tariff shocks, and some evidence suggests exchange rates have become less effective in this role.[20]

    The Eurosystem’s analysis of potential fragmentation scenarios suggests that such trade disruptions could turn out to be significant. In the case of a mild decoupling between the western (United States-centric) and the eastern (China-centric) bloc, where trade between East and West reverts to the level observed in the mid-1990s, global output could drop by close to 2%.[21] In the more extreme case of a severe decoupling – essentially a halt to trade flows – between the two blocs, global output could drop by up to 9%. Trade-dependent nations would bear the brunt of these trade shocks, with China potentially suffering losses of between 5% and 20%, and the EU seeing declines ranging from 2.4% to 9.5% in the mild and severe decoupling scenarios respectively. The analysis also shows that the United States would be more significantly affected if it imposed additional trade restrictions against western and neutral economies – with real GDP losses of almost 11% in the severe decoupling scenario – whereas EU losses would increase only slightly in such a case.[22]

    The inflationary effects of trade fragmentation are more uncertain. They depend mainly on the response of exchange rates, firms’ markups and wages. Moreover, they are not distributed equally. While higher import costs and the ensuing price pressures are likely to drive up inflation in the countries raising tariffs, the impact is more ambiguous in other countries as a result of the tariffs’ global recessionary effects, which push down demand and commodity prices, as well as of the possible dumping of exports from countries with overcapacity. The short to medium-term effects may even prove disinflationary for the euro area, where real rates have increased and the euro has appreciated following US tariff announcements.

    In fact, a key feature of most model-based assessments is that higher US tariffs lead to a depreciation of currencies against the US dollar, moderating the inflationary effect for the United States and amplifying it for other countries. But so far we have seen the opposite: the risk-off sentiment in response to US tariff announcements and economic policy uncertainty have led to capital flows away from the United States, depreciating the dollar and putting upward pressure on US bond yields. Conversely, the euro area benefited from safe haven flows, with the euro appreciating and nominal bond yields decreasing.

    Long-term structural changes

    The long-term consequences of economic fragmentation are inherently difficult to predict, but by drawing on historical examples and recognising emerging trends, it’s clear that we are on the verge of significant structural changes. Two areas stand out.

    The first one is structurally lower growth. On this point, international economic literature has reached an overwhelming consensus.[23] Quantitatively, point estimates might vary. For example, research of 151 countries spanning more than five decades of the 20th century reveals that higher tariffs have typically led to lower economic growth. This is largely due to key production factors – labour and capital – being redirected into less productive sectors.[24]

    However, data from the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a period which tariff supporters often look back to, seem to tell a different story. At that time, trade barriers across countries were high – the US effective tariff rate, for example, reached almost 60%, twice as high as after the 2 April tariffs. And sometimes countries imposing higher trade barriers enjoyed higher growth, which may provide motivation for current policymakers’ trade tariff policies. But these episodes need to be read in historical context. Before 1913, tariffs mostly shielded manufacturing, a high-productivity sector at the time, attracting labour from other, less productive sectors, like agriculture. Therefore, their negative effects were mitigated by the expansion of industries at the frontier of technological innovation. Moreover, the interwar years offer further nuance – the Smoot-Hawley tariffs of the 1930s had relatively limited direct effects on US growth, mainly because trade accounted for just 5% of the economy.

    But today’s tariffs are unlikely to replicate the positive effects seen in the 19th century. Instead, they risk creating the same inefficiencies observed in the course of the 20th century, by diverting resources from high-productivity sectors to lower-productivity ones. This contractionary effect could lead to persistently lower global growth rates. In fact, the abolition of trade barriers within the EU and the international efforts towards lower trade barriers in the second half of the 20th century were a direct response to the economic and political impact of protectionism,[25] which had played a key role in worsening and prolonging the Great Depression[26] and had contributed to the formation of competing blocs in the run-up to the Second World War.[27]

    The second long-term shift driven by fragmentation might be the gradual transition from a US-dominated, global system to a more multipolar one, where multiple currencies compete for reserve status. For example, if the long-term implications of higher tariffs materialise, notably in the form of higher inflation, slower growth and higher US debt, this could undermine confidence in the US dollar’s dominant role in international trade and finance.[28] Combined with a further disengagement from global geopolitical affairs and military alliances, this could, over time, undermine the “exorbitant privilege” enjoyed by the United States, resulting in higher interest rates domestically.[29]

    Moreover, as alternative payment systems gain traction, regional currencies may start to emerge as reserves within their respective blocs. This could be accompanied by the rise of competing payment systems, further fragmenting global financial flows and international trade. Such shifts would increase transaction costs and erode the capacity of countries to share risks on a global scale, making the world economy more fragmented and less efficient.

    The central bank’s role in a fragmented world

    So, as these tectonic shifts reshape the global economic landscape, central banks must adapt their approaches while remaining steadfast in their core mandates. The challenges posed by fragmentation require a delicate balance between confronting new realities and working to preserve the benefits of an integrated global economy. In order to navigate the present age of fragmentation, it is necessary to take action in four key areas.

    First, central banks must focus on understanding and monitoring fragmentation. Traditional macroeconomic models often assume seamless global integration and may not fully capture the dynamics of a fragmenting world. Enhanced analytical frameworks that incorporate geopolitical factors and how businesses adjust to these risks will be essential for accurate forecasting and effective policy formulation. The Eurosystem is reflecting on these issues.

    Second, monetary policy must adapt to the new nature of supply shocks generated by fragmentation. The effects of the greater frequency, size and more persistent nature of fragmentation-induced shocks and their incidence on prices require a careful calibration of our monetary responses. In this respect, our communication needs to acknowledge the uncertainty and trade-offs we face while giving a clear sense of how we will react depending on the incoming data. This can be done by making use of scenario analysis and providing clarity about our reaction function, as emphasised recently by President Lagarde.[30]

    Third, instead of building walls, we must forge unity. Even as political winds shift, central banks should strengthen international cooperation where possible. Through forums such as those provided by the BIS and the Financial Stability Board, we can keep open channels of cooperation that transcend borders. Our work on cross-border payments stands as proof of this commitment in line with the G20 Roadmap[31]. The ECB is pioneering a cross-currency settlement service through TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) – initially linking the euro, the Swedish krona and the Danish krone. We are exploring connections between TIPS and other fast-payment systems globally, both bilaterally and on the basis of a multilateral network such as the BIS’ Project Nexus.[32]

    And fourth, central banks must enhance their capacity to address financial stability risks arising from fragmentation. The potential for sudden stops in capital flows, payment disruptions and volatility in currency markets requires robust contingency planning and crisis management frameworks. Global financial interlinkages and spillovers highlight the importance of preserving and further reinforcing the global financial safety net so that we can swiftly and effectively address financial stress, which is more likely to emerge in a fragmenting world.[33]

    In fact, the lesson from the 1930s is that international coordination is key to avoiding protectionist snowball effects, where tit-for-tat trade barriers multiply as each country seeks to direct spending to merchandise produced at home rather than abroad.[34] In order to avoid this, the G20 countries committed to preserving open trade could call an international trade conference to avoid beggar-thy-neighbour policies[35] and instead agree on other measures, such as macroeconomic policies that can support the global economy in this period of uncertainty and contribute to reduce global imbalances.

    Let me finally emphasise that the current situation also has important implications for the euro area. If the EU upholds its status as a reliable partner that defends trade openness, investor protection, the rule of law and central bank independence, the euro has the potential to play the role of a global public good. This requires a deep, trusted market for internationally accepted euro debt securities. That is why policy efforts to integrate and deepen European capital markets must go hand in hand with efforts to issue European safe assets.[36]

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    As we stand at this crossroads of global fragmentation, we must confront an uncomfortable truth: we are drifting toward a fractured economic and financial landscape where trust is eroded and alliances are strained.

    Central banks now face a double challenge: to be an anchor of stability in turbulent economic waters while reimagining their role in a world where multiple economic blocs are forming. The question is not whether we adapt, but how we mitigate the costs of fragmentation without sacrificing the potential of global integration.

    Our greatest risk lies not in the shocks we anticipate, but in the alliances we neglect, the innovations we overlook and the common ground we fail to find. The future of global prosperity hinges on our ability to use fragmentation as a catalyst to reinvent the common good.

    MIL OSI Economics –

    April 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: President Lai meets Japanese Diet Member and former Minister of State for Economic Security Takaichi Sanae

    Source: Republic of China Taiwan

    Details
    2025-04-23
    President Lai delivers remarks at International Holocaust Remembrance Day event
    On the afternoon of April 23, President Lai Ching-te attended an International Holocaust Remembrance Day event and delivered remarks, in which he emphasized that peace is priceless, and war has no winners, while morality, democracy, and respect for human rights are powerful forces against violence and tyranny. The president stated that Taiwan will continue to expand cooperation with democratic partners and safeguard regional and global peace and stability, defending democracy, freedom, and human rights. He said we must never forget history, and must overcome our differences and join in solidarity to ensure that the next generations live in a world that is more just and more peaceful. Upon arriving at the event, President Lai heard a testimony from the granddaughter of a Holocaust survivor, followed by a rabbi’s recitation of the prayer “El Maleh Rachamim.” He then joined other distinguished guests in lighting candles in memory of the victims. A transcript of President Lai’s remarks follows: To begin, I want to thank the Israel Economic and Cultural Office (ISECO) in Taipei, German Institute Taipei, Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs for co-organizing this deeply significant memorial ceremony again this year. I also want to thank everyone for attending. We are here today to remember the victims of the Holocaust, express sympathy for the survivors, honor the brave individuals who protected the victims, and acknowledge all who were impacted by this atrocity. It was deeply moving to hear Ms. [Orly] Sela share the story of how her grandmother, Yehudit Biksz, escaped the Nazi regime. I want to thank her specially for traveling so far to attend this event. From the 1930s through World War II, the Nazi regime sought to exclude Jewish people from society. In their campaign, they perpetrated systematic genocide driven by their ideology. Policies and directives under the authoritarian Nazi regime resulted in the deaths of approximately 6 million Jews. Millions of others were persecuted, including Romani people, persons with disabilities, the gay community, and anyone who disagreed with Nazi ideology. It is one of the darkest chapters in human history. Many countries, including Taiwan, have enacted anti-massacre legislation, and observe a remembrance day each year. Those occasions help us remember the victims, preserve historical memory, and most importantly, reinforce our resolve to fight against hatred and discrimination. Twenty-three years ago, Chelujan (車路墘) Church in Tainan founded the Taiwan Holocaust Memorial Museum. It is the first Jewish museum in Taiwan, and the second Holocaust museum in Asia. Its founding mission urges us to forget hatred and love one another; put an end to war and advocate peace. Many of the exhibition items come from Jewish people, connecting Taiwan closer with Israel and helping Taiwanese better understand the experiences of Jewish people. In this way, we grow to more deeply cherish peace. When I was mayor of Tainan, I took part in an exhibition event at Chelujan Church. I was also invited by the Israeli government to join the International Mayors Conference in Israel, where I visited the World Holocaust Remembrance Center. I will never forget how deeply that experience moved me, and as a result, peace and human rights became even more important issues for me. These issues are valued by Taiwan and our friends and allies. They are also important links connecting Taiwan with the world. Peace is priceless, and war has no winners. We will continue to expand cooperation with democratic partners and safeguard regional and global peace and stability. We will also continue to make greater contributions and work with the international community to defend democracy, freedom, and human rights. This year also marks the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II. However, we still see wars raging around the world. We see a resurgence of authoritarian powers, which could severely impact global democracy, peace, and prosperous development. Today’s event allows for more than reflection on the past; it also serves as a warning for the future. We are reminded of the threats that hatred, prejudice, and extremism pose to humanity. But we are also reminded that morality, democracy, and respect for human rights are powerful forces against violence and tyranny. We must never forget history. We must overcome our differences and join in solidarity for a better future. Let’s work together to ensure that the next generations live in a world that is more just and more peaceful. Also in attendance at the event were Member of the Israeli Knesset (parliament) and Taiwan friendship group Chair Boaz Toporovsky, ISECO Representative Maya Yaron, and German Institute Taipei Deputy Director General Andreas Hofem.

    Details
    2025-04-23
    President Lai pays respects to Pope Francis  
    On the morning of April 23, President Lai Ching-te visited the Taipei Archdiocesan Curia to pay respects in a memorial ceremony for His Holiness Pope Francis. As officiant of the ceremony, President Lai burned incense and presented flowers, fruits, and wine to pay his respects to Pope Francis. At the direction of the master of ceremonies, the president then bowed three times in front of Pope Francis’s memorial portrait, conveying his grief and deep respect for the late pope. After hearing of Pope Francis’s passing on April 21, President Lai promptly requested the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to express sincere condolences from the people and government of Taiwan to the Vatican. The president also instructed Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) to convey condolences to the Holy See’s Apostolic Nunciature in Taiwan.  

    Details
    2025-04-23
    President Lai meets US CNAS NextGen fellows
    On the morning of April 23, President Lai Ching-te met with fellows from the Shawn Brimley Next Generation National Security Leaders Program (NextGen) run by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). In remarks, President Lai thanked the government of the United States for continuing its arms sales to Taiwan over the years, supporting Taiwan’s efforts to enhance its national defense capabilities and jointly maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. The president pointed out that we will promote our “Taiwan plus one” policy, that is, new arrangements for Taiwan plus the US, and form a “Taiwan investment in the US team” to expand investment and bring about even closer Taiwan-US trade cooperation, allowing us to reduce the trade deficit and generate development that benefits both sides. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: Ms. Michèle Flournoy, chair of the CNAS Board of Directors, is a good friend of Taiwan, and she has made major contributions to Taiwan-US relations through her long-time efforts on various aspects of our cooperation. I am happy to welcome Chair Flournoy, who is once again leading a NextGen Fellowship delegation to Taiwan. CNAS is a prominent think tank focusing on US national security and defense policy based in Washington, DC. Its NextGen Fellowship has fostered talented individuals in the fields of national security and foreign affairs. This year’s delegation is significantly larger than those of the past, demonstrating the increased importance that the next generation of US leaders attach to Taiwan. On behalf of the people of Taiwan, I extend my sincerest welcome to you all. The Taiwan Strait, an issue of importance for our guests, has become a global issue. There is a high degree of international consensus that peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait are indispensable elements in global security and prosperity. Facing military threats from China, Taiwan proposed the Four Pillars of Peace action plan. First, we are actively implementing military reforms, enhancing whole-of-society defense resilience, and working to increase our defense budget to more than 3 percent of GDP. Second, we are strengthening our economic resilience. As Taiwan’s economy must keep advancing, we can no longer put all our eggs in one basket. We are taking action to remain firmly rooted in Taiwan while expanding our global presence and marketing worldwide. In these efforts, we are already seeing results. Third, we are standing side-by-side with other democratic countries to demonstrate the strength of deterrence and achieve our goal of peace through strength. And fourth, Taiwan is willing, under the principles of parity and dignity, to conduct exchanges and cooperate with China towards achieving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. This April 10 marked the 46th anniversary of the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act. We thank the US government for continuing its arms sales to Taiwan over the years, supporting Taiwan’s efforts to enhance its national defense capabilities and jointly maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. We look forward to Taiwan and the US continuing to strengthen collaboration on the development of both our defense industries as well as the building of non-red supply chains. This will yield even more results and further deepen our economic and trade partnership. The US is now the main destination for outbound investment from Taiwan. Moving forward, we will promote our “Taiwan plus one” policy, that is, new arrangements for Taiwan plus the US. And our government will form a “Taiwan investment in the US team” to expand investment. We hope this will bring Taiwan-US economic and trade cooperation even closer and, through mutually beneficial assistance, allow us to generate development that benefits both our sides while reducing our trade deficit. In closing, thank you once again for visiting Taiwan. We hope your trip is fruitful and leaves you with a deep impression of Taiwan. We also hope that going forward you continue supporting Taiwan and advancing even greater development for Taiwan-US ties.  Chair Flournoy then delivered remarks, first thanking President Lai for making time to receive their delegation. Referring to President Lai’s earlier remarks, she said that it is quite an impressive group, as past members of this program have gone on to become members of the US Congress, leading government experts, and leaders in the think-tank world and in the private sector. She remarked that investing in this group is a wonderful privilege for her and that they appreciate President Lai’s agreeing to take the time to engage in exchange with them. Chair Flournoy emphasized that they are visiting Taiwan at a critical moment, when there is so much change and volatility in the geostrategic environment, a lot of uncertainty, and a lot of unpredictability. She stated that given our shared values, our shared passion for democracy and human rights, and our shared interests in peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, this is an important time for dialogue, collaboration, and looking for additional opportunities where we can work together towards regional peace and stability.

    Details
    2025-04-18
    President Lai meets US delegation from Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific
    On the afternoon of April 18, President Lai Ching-te met with a delegation led by Senator Pete Ricketts, chairman of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy. In remarks, President Lai said we hope to promote our Taiwan plus one policy, that is, new industrial arrangements for Taiwan plus the US, to leverage the strengths of both sides and reinforce our links in such areas as the economy, trade, and technological innovation. The president said that by deepening cooperation, Taiwan and the US will be better positioned to work together on building non-red supply chains. He said a more secure and sustainable economic and trade partnership will allow us to address the challenges posed by geopolitics, climate change, and the restructuring of global supply chains. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: I warmly welcome you all to Taiwan. I want to take this opportunity to especially thank Chairman Pete Ricketts and Ranking Member Chris Coons for their high regard and support for Taiwan. Chairman Ricketts has elected to visit Taiwan on his first overseas trip since taking up his new position in January. Ranking Member Coons made a dedicated trip to Taiwan in 2021 to announce a donation of COVID-19 vaccines on behalf of the US government. He also visited last May, soon after my inauguration, continuing to deepen Taiwan-US exchanges. Thanks to support from Chairman Ricketts and Ranking Member Coons, the US Congress has continued to introduce many concrete initiatives and resources to assist Taiwan through the National Defense Authorization Act and Consolidated Appropriations Act, bringing the Taiwan-US partnership even closer. For this, I want to again express my gratitude. There has long been bipartisan support in the US Congress for maintaining security in the Taiwan Strait. Faced with China’s persistent political and military intimidation, Taiwan will endeavor to reform national defense and enhance whole-of-society defense resilience. We will also make special budget allocations to ensure that our defense budget exceeds 3 percent of GDP, up from the current 2.5 percent, so as to enhance Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities. We look forward to Taiwan and the US continuing to work together to maintain peace and stability in the region. We will also promote our Taiwan plus one policy, that is, new industrial arrangements for Taiwan plus the US. We hope to leverage the strengths of both sides and reinforce our links in such areas as the economy, trade, and technological innovation, jointly promoting prosperity and development. We believe that by deepening cooperation through the Taiwan plus one policy, Taiwan and the US will be better positioned to work together on building non-red supply chains. A more secure and sustainable economic and trade partnership will allow us to address the challenges posed by geopolitics, climate change, and the restructuring of global supply chains. In closing, I wish Chairman Ricketts and Ranking Member Coons a smooth and successful visit. Chairman Ricketts then delivered remarks, first thanking President Lai for his hospitality. He said that he and his delegation have had a wonderful time meeting with government officials, industry representatives, and the team at the American Institute in Taiwan. Highlighting that Taiwan has long been a friend and partner of the US, he said their bipartisan delegation to Taiwan emphasizes long-time bipartisan support in the US Congress for Taiwan, and though administrations change, that bipartisan support remains. Chairman Ricketts stated that the US is committed to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and that they want to see peace across the Taiwan Strait. He also stated that the US opposes any unilateral change in the status of Taiwan and that they expect any differences between Taiwan and China to be resolved peacefully without coercion or the threat of force. To that end, he said, the US will continue to assist Taiwan in its self-defense and will also step up by bolstering its own defense capabilities, noting that there is broad consensus on this in the US Congress. Chairman Ricketts stated that they want to see Taiwan participate in international organizations and memberships where appropriate, and encourage Taiwan to reach out to current and past diplomatic allies to strengthen those bilateral relationships. He pointed out that the long economic relationship between the US and Taiwan is important for our as well as the entire world’s security and prosperity. He also noted that there are many opportunities for us to continue to grow the economic relationship that will help create more prosperity for our respective peoples and ensure that we are more secure in the world. Chairman Ricketts emphasized that they made this trip early on in the new US administration to work with Taiwan to develop three points: security, diplomatic relations, and the economy. He stated that in the face of rising aggression from communist China, the US will provide commensurate help to Taiwan in self-defense and that they will continue to provide the services and tools needed. In closing, Chairman Ricketts once again thanked President Lai for the hospitality and said he looks forward to dialogue on how we can continue these relationships. Ranking Member Coons then delivered remarks. Mentioning that their delegation also visited the Philippines on this trip, he said that there and in Taiwan, they have been focused on peace, stability, and security, and the ways for deepening and strengthening economic and security relations. He noted that 46 years ago, the US Senate passed the Taiwan Relations Act, adding that it was strongly bipartisan when enacted and that support for it is still strongly bipartisan today. Its core commitment, he said, is that the US will be engaged and will be a partner in ensuring that any dispute or challenge across the strait will be resolved peacefully, and that Taiwan will have the resources it needs for its self-defense. Ranking Member Coons said that between people, friendships are deepest and most enduring when they are based not just on interests but on values, and that the same is true between the US and Taiwan. Free press, free enterprise, free societies, democracy – these core shared values, he said, anchor our friendship and partnership, making them deeper. He remarked that they are grateful for the significant investment in the US being made by companies from Taiwan, but what anchors our partnership, in addition to these important investments and investments being made by Taiwan in its own security, are the values that mobilize our free-enterprise spirit and our commitment to free societies. In Europe in recent years, Ranking Member Coons said, an aggressive nation has tried to change boundaries and change history by force. He said that the US and dozens of countries committed to freedom have come to the aid of Ukraine to defend it, help it stabilize, and secure its future. So too in this region of the world, he added, the US and a bipartisan group in the US Senate are committed to stable, secure, peaceful relations and to deterring any unilateral effort to change the status quo by force. In closing, he said he is grateful for a chance to return to Taiwan after the pandemic and that he looks forward to our conversation, our partnership, and the important work we have in front of us. The delegation was accompanied to the Presidential Office by American Institute in Taiwan Taipei Office Director Raymond Greene.

    Details
    2025-04-17
    President Lai meets New Zealand delegation from All-Party Parliamentary Group on Taiwan  
    On the morning of April 17, President Lai Ching-te met with a delegation from New Zealand’s All-Party Parliamentary Group on Taiwan. In remarks, President Lai thanked the government of New Zealand for reiterating the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait on multiple occasions since last year. He also stated that this year, the Taiwan-New Zealand economic cooperation agreement (ANZTEC) is being implemented in its complete form. The president expressed hope that deeper collaboration in such fields as smart agriculture, food manufacturing, biomedicine, the digital economy, and clean energy, as well as exchanges among our indigenous peoples, will allow our economies and industries to continue evolving as they adapt to the challenges arising from global changes. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: I extend a warm welcome to all of our guests. New Zealand’s All-Party Parliamentary Group on Taiwan was established in 2023, marking a significant milestone in the deepening of Taiwan-New Zealand relations. I would like to thank Members of Parliament Stuart Smith and Tangi Utikere for leading this delegation, and thank all our guests for demonstrating support for Taiwan through action. We currently face a rapidly changing international landscape. Authoritarian regimes continue to converge and expand. Democracies must actively cooperate and jointly safeguard peace, stability, and the prosperous development of the Indo-Pacific region. Since last year, the government of New Zealand has on multiple occasions reiterated the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. On behalf of the people of Taiwan, I would like to express our sincere gratitude for these statements and demonstrations of support. This year, ANZTEC is being implemented in its complete form. We look forward to exploring even more diverse markets with New Zealand. Deeper collaboration in such fields as smart agriculture, food manufacturing, biomedicine, the digital economy, and clean energy, as well as exchanges among indigenous peoples, will allow our economies and industries to continue evolving as they adapt to the challenges arising from global changes. Taiwan and New Zealand share the universal values of democracy, freedom, and respect for human rights, and parliamentary diplomacy is a tradition practiced by democracies around the world. Looking ahead, our parliamentary exchanges and mutual visits are bound to become more frequent. This will enable us to explore even more opportunities for cooperation and further deepen and solidify the democratic partnership between Taiwan and New Zealand. Thank you once again for making the long journey to visit us. I wish you a fruitful and successful trip. I also hope that everyone can take time to see more of Taiwan, try our local cuisine, and learn more about our culture. I hope our guests will fall in love with Taiwan. MP Smith then delivered remarks, saying that it is a great pleasure and an honor to be received by President Lai. The MP, noting that President Lai already covered many of the points he planned to make, went on to say that New Zealand and Taiwan share many values. He indicated that both are trading nations that rely on easy access for imports and exports, and that is why freedom of navigation is so important. That is why New Zealand had a naval vessel sail through the Taiwan Strait, he said, to underline the importance of freedom of navigation and our mutual security. MP Smith said that they look forward to building stronger relationships and enhancing the trade between our two nations. He added that New Zealand has much to offer in the field of geothermal energy to assist Taiwan, and mentioned that New Zealand is third largest in terms of the number of rocket launchers for satellites, which could assist Taiwan with communications in the future. New Zealand has other products as well, he said, but looks for assistance from Taiwan’s technology and technological sector. Lastly, MP Smith stated that he looks forward to a long and prosperous relationship between Taiwan and New Zealand. MP Utikere then delivered remarks, indicating that like Taiwan, New Zealand is a nation that is surrounded by ocean, which means that they rely on strong partnerships with communities of interest all around the globe. He said that the all-party parliamentary friendship group that was established and that they are a part of goes a long way in ensuring that a secure relationship between our two parliaments can continue to prosper. The MP also thanked Taiwan’s Representative to New Zealand Joanne Ou (歐江安) and her team for their work, which has ensured the success of the delegation’s visit. He said that the delegation experienced meetings with ministers in Taiwan’s government, members of the legislature, and those from the non-government organization sector as well. He also said that they enjoyed the opportunity to visit Wulai, and that the strength of the connections between the indigenous peoples of Taiwan and the indigenous peoples of Aotearoa New Zealand is something that certainly landed with members of the delegation. MP Utikere noted that he will take up President Lai’s offer on experiencing more of Taiwan, and will spend a few extra days in Tainan, which he understands has a very special place in the president’s heart, adding that he looks forward to his time and experiences there. The MP concluded his remarks by saying that this will be a relationship that continues to go from strength to strength. After their remarks, the New Zealand delegation sang the Māori song “Tutira Mai Nga Iwi” to extend best wishes to Taiwan. Also in attendance at the meeting were New Zealand Members of Parliament Jamie Arbuckle, Greg Fleming, Hamish Campbell, Cameron Luxton, and Helen White.  

    Details
    2025-04-06
    President Lai delivers remarks on US tariff policy response
    On April 6, President Lai Ching-te delivered recorded remarks regarding the impact of the 32 percent tariff that the United States government recently imposed on imports from Taiwan in the name of reciprocity. In his remarks, President Lai explained that the government will adopt five response strategies, including making every effort to improve reciprocal tariff rates through negotiations, adopting a support plan for affected domestic industries, adopting medium- and long-term economic development plans, forming new “Taiwan plus the US” arrangements, and launching industry listening tours. The president emphasized that as we face this latest challenge, the government and civil society will work hand in hand, and expressed hope that all parties, both ruling and opposition, will support the measures that the Executive Yuan will take to open up a broader path for Taiwan’s economy. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: My fellow citizens, good evening. The US government recently announced higher tariffs on countries around the world in the name of reciprocity, including imposing a 32 percent tariff on imports from Taiwan. This is bound to have a major impact on our nation. Various countries have already responded, and some have even adopted retaliatory measures. Tremendous changes in the global economy are expected. Taiwan is an export-led economy, and in facing future challenges there will inevitably be difficulties, so we must proceed carefully to turn danger into safety. During this time, I want to express gratitude to all sectors of society for providing valuable opinions, which the government regards highly, and will use as a reference to make policy decisions.  However, if we calmly and carefully analyze Taiwan’s trade with the US, we find that last year Taiwan’s exports to the US were valued at US$111.4 billion, accounting for 23.4 percent of total export value, with the other 75-plus percent of products sold worldwide to countries other than the US. Of products sold to the US, competitive ICT products and electronic components accounted for 65.4 percent. This shows that Taiwan’s economy does still have considerable resilience. As long as our response strategies are appropriate, and the public and private sectors join forces, we can reduce impacts. Please do not panic. To address the reciprocal tariffs by the US, Taiwan has no plans to adopt retaliatory tariffs. There will be no change in corporate investment commitments to the US, as long as they are consistent with national interests. But we must ensure the US clearly understands Taiwan’s contributions to US economic development. More importantly, we must actively seek to understand changes in the global economic situation, strengthen Taiwan-US industry cooperation, elevate the status of Taiwan industries in global supply chains, and with safeguarding the continued development of Taiwan’s economy as our goal, adopt the following five strategies to respond. Strategy one: Make every effort to improve reciprocal tariff rates through negotiations using the following five methods:  1. Taiwan has already formed a negotiation team led by Vice Premier Cheng Li-chiun (鄭麗君). The team includes members from the National Security Council, the Office of Trade Negotiations, and relevant Executive Yuan ministries and agencies, as well as academia and industry. Like the US-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement, negotiations on tariffs can start from Taiwan-US bilateral zero-tariff treatment. 2. To expand purchases from the US and thereby reduce the trade deficit, the Executive Yuan has already completed an inventory regarding large-scale procurement plans for agricultural, industrial, petroleum, and natural gas products, and the Ministry of National Defense has also proposed a military procurement list. All procurement plans will be actively pursued. 3. Expand investments in the US. Taiwan’s cumulative investment in the US already exceeds US$100 billion, creating approximately 400,000 jobs. In the future, in addition to increased investment in the US by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, other industries such as electronics, ICT, petrochemicals, and natural gas can all increase their US investments, deepening Taiwan-US industry cooperation. Taiwan’s government has helped form a “Taiwan investment in the US” team, and hopes that the US will reciprocate by forming a “US investment in Taiwan” team to bring about closer Taiwan-US trade cooperation, jointly creating a future economic golden age.  4. We must eliminate non-tariff barriers to trade. Non-tariff barriers are an indicator by which the US assesses whether a trading partner is trading fairly with the US. Therefore, we will proactively resolve longstanding non-tariff barriers so that negotiations can proceed more smoothly. 5. We must resolve two issues that have been matters of longstanding concern to the US. One regards high-tech export controls, and the other regards illegal transshipment of dumped goods, otherwise referred to as “origin washing.” Strategy two: We must adopt a plan for supporting our industries. For industries that will be affected by the tariffs, and especially traditional industries as well as micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises, we will provide timely and needed support and assistance. Premier Cho Jung-tai (卓榮泰) and his administrative team recently announced a package of 20 specific measures designed to address nine areas. Moving forward, the support we provide to different industries will depend on how they are affected by the tariffs, will take into account the particular features of each industry, and will help each industry innovate, upgrade, and transform. Strategy three: We must adopt medium- and long-term economic development plans. At this point in time, our government must simultaneously adopt new strategies for economic and industrial development. This is also the fundamental path to solutions for future economic challenges. The government will proactively cooperate with friends and allies, develop a diverse range of markets, and achieve closer integration of entities in the upper, middle, and lower reaches of industrial supply chains. This course of action will make Taiwan’s industrial ecosystem more complete, and will help Taiwanese industries upgrade and transform. We must also make good use of the competitive advantages we possess in such areas as semiconductor manufacturing, integrated chip design, ICT, and smart manufacturing to build Taiwan into an AI island, and promote relevant applications for food, clothing, housing, and transportation, as well as military, security and surveillance, next-generation communications, and the medical and health and wellness industries as we advance toward a smarter, more sustainable, and more prosperous new Taiwan. Strategy four: “Taiwan plus one,” i.e., new “Taiwan plus the US” arrangements: While staying firmly rooted in Taiwan, our enterprises are expanding their global presence and marketing worldwide. This has been our national economic development strategy, and the most important aspect is maintaining a solid base here in Taiwan. We absolutely must maintain a solid footing, and cannot allow the present strife to cause us to waver. Therefore, our government will incentivize investments, carry out deregulation, and continue to improve Taiwan’s investment climate by actively resolving problems involving access to water, electricity, land, human resources, and professional talent. This will enable corporations to stay in Taiwan and continue investing here. In addition, we must also help the overseas manufacturing facilities of offshore Taiwanese businesses to make necessary adjustments to support our “Taiwan plus one” policy, in that our national economic development strategy will be adjusted as follows: to stay firmly rooted in Taiwan while expanding our global presence, strengthening US ties, and marketing worldwide. We intend to make use of the new state of supply chains to strengthen cooperation between Taiwanese and US industries, and gain further access to US markets. Strategy five: Launch industry listening tours: All industrial firms, regardless of sector or size, will be affected to some degree once the US reciprocal tariffs go into effect. The administrative teams led by myself and Premier Cho will hear out industry concerns so that we can quickly resolve problems and make sure policies meet actual needs. My fellow citizens, over the past half-century and more, Taiwan has been through two energy crises, the Asian financial crisis, the global financial crisis, and pandemics. We have been able to not only withstand one test after another, but even turn crises into opportunities. The Taiwanese economy has emerged from these crises stronger and more resilient than ever. As we face this latest challenge, the government and civil society will work hand in hand, and I hope that all parties in the legislature, both ruling and opposition, will support the measures that the Executive Yuan will take to open up a broader path for Taiwan’s economy. Let us join together and give it our all. Thank you.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

    April 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Piero Cipollone: Navigating a fractured horizon: risks and policy options in a fragmenting world

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the conference on “Policy challenges in a fragmenting world: Global trade, exchange rates, and capital flow” organised by the Bank for International Settlements, the Bank of England, the ECB and the International Monetary Fund

    Frankfurt am Main, 29 April 2025

    I’m honoured to welcome you to this conference, jointly organised by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the Bank of England, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).[1]

    Today, we come together to discuss the urgent challenges posed by global fragmentation – a growing risk to our interconnected world. Earlier this month, the President of the United States announced tariff hikes, sending shockwaves through the global economy – a stark reminder that the fractures we face are no longer hypothetical, but real.

    This announcement is but the latest chapter in a series of four major shocks that have been reshaping our world in recent years.

    First, since 2018 the intensifying power struggle between the United States and China has led to tit-for-tat tariffs affecting nearly two-thirds of the trade between these two economic giants. Second, starting in 2020, the pandemic caused unprecedented disruptions to supply chains, which prompted a re-evaluation of the balance between global integration and resilience. Third, in 2022 Russia’s unjustified invasion of Ukraine not only triggered an energy crisis but also deepened a geopolitical divide that continues to have worldwide repercussions. And fourth, we are now facing the rising risk of economic fragmentation within the western bloc itself, as new trade barriers threaten long-standing international partnerships.

    The data paint a sobering picture. Geopolitical risk levels have surged to 50% above the post-global financial crisis average, and uncertainty surrounding trade policy has risen to more than eight times its average since 2021.[2] What we are experiencing is not merely a temporary disruption – it is a profound shift in how nations interact economically, financially and diplomatically. So, it does not come as a surprise that financial markets have experienced considerable volatility in recent weeks. It remains to be seen if, for markets to find a stable equilibrium, it will be enough to step back from the current international economic disorder towards a more stable, predictable and reliable trading system – a development that appears elusive in the short term. Against this backdrop, recent moves in exchange rates, bond yields and equities, suggest that US markets have not been playing their usual role as a safe haven in this particular episode of stress. This potentially has far-reaching longer-term implications for capital flows and the international financial system.

    Today I will focus on three key points. First, we are seeing increasing signs of fragmentation becoming visible across the economy and financial system. Second, the implications of this accelerating fragmentation could extend far beyond the immediate disruptions, with consequences for growth, stability and prosperity. Third, in this evolving economic landscape, central banks must adapt their approaches yet retain a steadfast focus on their core mandates, while striving to preserve international cooperation.

    The emerging reality of fragmentation

    Let me begin by addressing a common belief – still held by many until recently – that, despite rising geopolitical tensions, globalisation appears largely resilient. Headline figures in trade and cross-border investment, for example, do indeed appear to support this belief. In 2024 world trade expanded to a record USD 33 trillion – up 3.7% from 2023. Similarly, the global stock of foreign direct investment reached an unprecedented USD 41 trillion.[3] However, these surface-level indicators may not reflect the underlying realities, creating a misleading sense of stability when important changes are already underway. In reality, fragmentation is already happening in both the global economy and the financial system.

    Fragmentation of the real economy

    Fragmentation is most evident in rebalancing trade, driven by escalating geopolitical tensions. Take, for instance, the escalating US-China trade tensions that have been intensifying since 2018. Studies show the impact of geopolitical distance on trade has become notably negative. A doubling of geopolitical distance between countries – akin to moving from the position of Germany to that of India in relation to the United States – decreases bilateral trade flows by approximately 20%.[4]

    The series of shocks to the global economy in recent years have also contributed to this fragmentation. According to gravity model estimates, trade between geopolitically distant blocs has significantly declined. Trade between rivals is about 4% lower than it might have been without the heightened tensions post-2017, while trade between friends is approximately 6% higher.[5] Global value chains are being reconfigured as companies respond to these new realities. In 2023 surveys already indicated that only about a quarter of leading firms operating in the euro area[6] that sourced critical inputs from countries considered subject to elevated risk had not developed strategies to reduce their exposure.[7]

    However, these shifting trade patterns have not yet been reflected in overall global trade flows. Non-aligned countries have played a crucial role as intermediaries, or connectors, helping to sustain global trade levels even as direct trade between rival blocs declines.[8] But this stabilising influence is unlikely to endure as trade fragmentation deepens and geopolitical alliances continue to shift.

    The tariffs announced by the US Administration are far-reaching and affect a substantial share of global trade flows. The effects on the real economy are likely to be material. In its World Economic Outlook, published last week, the International Monetary Fund revised down global growth projections for 2025-26 by a cumulative 0.8 percentage points and global trade by a cumulative 2.3 percentage points.[9] This notably reflects a negative hit from tariffs that ranges between 0.4% to 1% of world GDP by 2027.[10] In particular, IMF growth projections for the United States have been revised down by a cumulative 1.3 percentage points in 2025-26. The cumulative impact on euro area growth is smaller, at 0.4 percentage points.

    Financial fragmentation

    The fragmentation we are witnessing in global trade is mirrored in the financial sector, where geopolitical tensions are also reshaping the landscape.

    In recent years, global foreign direct investment flows have increasingly aligned with geopolitical divides. Foreign direct investment in new ventures has plunged by nearly two-thirds between countries from different geopolitical blocs. However, strong intra-bloc investments have helped sustain overall foreign direct investment levels globally, masking some of the fragmentation occurring beneath the surface.[11]

    But, as with trade flows, this dynamic is unlikely to persist as geopolitical tensions grow within established economic blocs. For instance, increased geopolitical distance is shown to curtail cross-border lending. A two standard deviation rise in geopolitical distance – akin to moving from the position of France to that of Pakistan in relation to Germany – leads to a reduction of 3 percentage points in cross-border bank lending.[12]

    The impact of fragmentation in global financial infrastructure is perhaps even more revealing. Since 2014 correspondent banking relationships – crucial for facilitating trade flows across countries – have declined by 20%. While other factors – such as a wave of concentration in the banking industry, technological disruptions and profitability considerations – have played a role[13], the contribution of the geopolitical dimension can hardly be overstated. The repercussions of this decline can be profound. Research shows that when correspondent banking relationships are severed in a specific corridor, a firm’s likelihood of continuing to export between the two countries of that corridor falls by about 5 percentage points in the short term, and by about 20 percentage points after four years.[14]

    Contributing to this trend, countries such as China, Russia and Iran have launched multiple initiatives to develop alternatives to established networks such as SWIFT, raising the possibility of a fragmented global payment system.[15] Geopolitical alignment now exerts a stronger influence than trade relationships or technical standards in connecting payment systems between countries.[16] This poses risks of regional networks becoming more unstable, increased trade costs and settlement times, and reduced risk sharing across countries.

    Additionally, we are witnessing a noticeable shift away from traditional reserve currencies, with growing interest in holding gold. Central banks purchased more than 1,000 tonnes of gold in 2024, almost double the level of the previous decade, with China being the largest purchaser, at over 225 tonnes. At market valuations, the share of gold in global official reserves has increased, reaching 20% in 2024, while that of the US dollar has decreased. Survey data suggest that two-thirds of central banks invested in gold to diversify, 40% to protect against geopolitical risk and 18% because of the uncertainty over the future of the international monetary system.[17] There are further signs that geopolitical considerations increasingly influence decisions to invest in gold. The negative correlation of gold prices with real yields has broken down since 2022, a phenomenon we have also observed in recent weeks. This suggests that gold prices have been influenced by more than simply the use of gold to hedge against inflation. Moreover, countries geopolitically close to China and Russia have seen more pronounced increases in the share of gold in official foreign reserves since the last quarter of 2021.

    The looming consequences of fragmentation

    Accelerating fragmentation is resulting in the immediate disruptions we are now seeing, but this is likely to only be the beginning – potentially profound medium and long-term consequences for growth, stability and prosperity can be expected.

    Medium-term impacts

    The initial consequences of fragmentation are already evident in the form of increased uncertainty. In particular, trade policy uncertainty has led to a broader rise in global economic policy instability, which is stifling investment and dampening consumption. Our research suggests that the recent increase in trade policy uncertainty could reduce euro area business investment by 1.1% in the first year and real GDP growth by around 0.2 percentage points in 2025-26[18]. Consumer sentiment is also under strain, with the ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey revealing that rising geopolitical risks are leading to more pessimistic expectations, higher income uncertainty and ultimately a lower willingness to spend.[19] Moreover, ECB staff estimates suggest that the observed increase in financial market volatility might imply lower GDP growth of about 0.2 percentage points in 2025.

    Over the medium term, tariffs are set to have an unambiguously recessionary effect, both for countries imposing restrictions and those receiving them. The costs are particularly high when exchange rates fail to absorb tariff shocks, and some evidence suggests exchange rates have become less effective in this role.[20]

    The Eurosystem’s analysis of potential fragmentation scenarios suggests that such trade disruptions could turn out to be significant. In the case of a mild decoupling between the western (United States-centric) and the eastern (China-centric) bloc, where trade between East and West reverts to the level observed in the mid-1990s, global output could drop by close to 2%.[21] In the more extreme case of a severe decoupling – essentially a halt to trade flows – between the two blocs, global output could drop by up to 9%. Trade-dependent nations would bear the brunt of these trade shocks, with China potentially suffering losses of between 5% and 20%, and the EU seeing declines ranging from 2.4% to 9.5% in the mild and severe decoupling scenarios respectively. The analysis also shows that the United States would be more significantly affected if it imposed additional trade restrictions against western and neutral economies – with real GDP losses of almost 11% in the severe decoupling scenario – whereas EU losses would increase only slightly in such a case.[22]

    The inflationary effects of trade fragmentation are more uncertain. They depend mainly on the response of exchange rates, firms’ markups and wages. Moreover, they are not distributed equally. While higher import costs and the ensuing price pressures are likely to drive up inflation in the countries raising tariffs, the impact is more ambiguous in other countries as a result of the tariffs’ global recessionary effects, which push down demand and commodity prices, as well as of the possible dumping of exports from countries with overcapacity. The short to medium-term effects may even prove disinflationary for the euro area, where real rates have increased and the euro has appreciated following US tariff announcements.

    In fact, a key feature of most model-based assessments is that higher US tariffs lead to a depreciation of currencies against the US dollar, moderating the inflationary effect for the United States and amplifying it for other countries. But so far we have seen the opposite: the risk-off sentiment in response to US tariff announcements and economic policy uncertainty have led to capital flows away from the United States, depreciating the dollar and putting upward pressure on US bond yields. Conversely, the euro area benefited from safe haven flows, with the euro appreciating and nominal bond yields decreasing.

    Long-term structural changes

    The long-term consequences of economic fragmentation are inherently difficult to predict, but by drawing on historical examples and recognising emerging trends, it’s clear that we are on the verge of significant structural changes. Two areas stand out.

    The first one is structurally lower growth. On this point, international economic literature has reached an overwhelming consensus.[23] Quantitatively, point estimates might vary. For example, research of 151 countries spanning more than five decades of the 20th century reveals that higher tariffs have typically led to lower economic growth. This is largely due to key production factors – labour and capital – being redirected into less productive sectors.[24]

    However, data from the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a period which tariff supporters often look back to, seem to tell a different story. At that time, trade barriers across countries were high – the US effective tariff rate, for example, reached almost 60%, twice as high as after the 2 April tariffs. And sometimes countries imposing higher trade barriers enjoyed higher growth, which may provide motivation for current policymakers’ trade tariff policies. But these episodes need to be read in historical context. Before 1913, tariffs mostly shielded manufacturing, a high-productivity sector at the time, attracting labour from other, less productive sectors, like agriculture. Therefore, their negative effects were mitigated by the expansion of industries at the frontier of technological innovation. Moreover, the interwar years offer further nuance – the Smoot-Hawley tariffs of the 1930s had relatively limited direct effects on US growth, mainly because trade accounted for just 5% of the economy.

    But today’s tariffs are unlikely to replicate the positive effects seen in the 19th century. Instead, they risk creating the same inefficiencies observed in the course of the 20th century, by diverting resources from high-productivity sectors to lower-productivity ones. This contractionary effect could lead to persistently lower global growth rates. In fact, the abolition of trade barriers within the EU and the international efforts towards lower trade barriers in the second half of the 20th century were a direct response to the economic and political impact of protectionism,[25] which had played a key role in worsening and prolonging the Great Depression[26] and had contributed to the formation of competing blocs in the run-up to the Second World War.[27]

    The second long-term shift driven by fragmentation might be the gradual transition from a US-dominated, global system to a more multipolar one, where multiple currencies compete for reserve status. For example, if the long-term implications of higher tariffs materialise, notably in the form of higher inflation, slower growth and higher US debt, this could undermine confidence in the US dollar’s dominant role in international trade and finance.[28] Combined with a further disengagement from global geopolitical affairs and military alliances, this could, over time, undermine the “exorbitant privilege” enjoyed by the United States, resulting in higher interest rates domestically.[29]

    Moreover, as alternative payment systems gain traction, regional currencies may start to emerge as reserves within their respective blocs. This could be accompanied by the rise of competing payment systems, further fragmenting global financial flows and international trade. Such shifts would increase transaction costs and erode the capacity of countries to share risks on a global scale, making the world economy more fragmented and less efficient.

    The central bank’s role in a fragmented world

    So, as these tectonic shifts reshape the global economic landscape, central banks must adapt their approaches while remaining steadfast in their core mandates. The challenges posed by fragmentation require a delicate balance between confronting new realities and working to preserve the benefits of an integrated global economy. In order to navigate the present age of fragmentation, it is necessary to take action in four key areas.

    First, central banks must focus on understanding and monitoring fragmentation. Traditional macroeconomic models often assume seamless global integration and may not fully capture the dynamics of a fragmenting world. Enhanced analytical frameworks that incorporate geopolitical factors and how businesses adjust to these risks will be essential for accurate forecasting and effective policy formulation. The Eurosystem is reflecting on these issues.

    Second, monetary policy must adapt to the new nature of supply shocks generated by fragmentation. The effects of the greater frequency, size and more persistent nature of fragmentation-induced shocks and their incidence on prices require a careful calibration of our monetary responses. In this respect, our communication needs to acknowledge the uncertainty and trade-offs we face while giving a clear sense of how we will react depending on the incoming data. This can be done by making use of scenario analysis and providing clarity about our reaction function, as emphasised recently by President Lagarde.[30]

    Third, instead of building walls, we must forge unity. Even as political winds shift, central banks should strengthen international cooperation where possible. Through forums such as those provided by the BIS and the Financial Stability Board, we can keep open channels of cooperation that transcend borders. Our work on cross-border payments stands as proof of this commitment in line with the G20 Roadmap[31]. The ECB is pioneering a cross-currency settlement service through TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) – initially linking the euro, the Swedish krona and the Danish krone. We are exploring connections between TIPS and other fast-payment systems globally, both bilaterally and on the basis of a multilateral network such as the BIS’ Project Nexus.[32]

    And fourth, central banks must enhance their capacity to address financial stability risks arising from fragmentation. The potential for sudden stops in capital flows, payment disruptions and volatility in currency markets requires robust contingency planning and crisis management frameworks. Global financial interlinkages and spillovers highlight the importance of preserving and further reinforcing the global financial safety net so that we can swiftly and effectively address financial stress, which is more likely to emerge in a fragmenting world.[33]

    In fact, the lesson from the 1930s is that international coordination is key to avoiding protectionist snowball effects, where tit-for-tat trade barriers multiply as each country seeks to direct spending to merchandise produced at home rather than abroad.[34] In order to avoid this, the G20 countries committed to preserving open trade could call an international trade conference to avoid beggar-thy-neighbour policies[35] and instead agree on other measures, such as macroeconomic policies that can support the global economy in this period of uncertainty and contribute to reduce global imbalances.

    Let me finally emphasise that the current situation also has important implications for the euro area. If the EU upholds its status as a reliable partner that defends trade openness, investor protection, the rule of law and central bank independence, the euro has the potential to play the role of a global public good. This requires a deep, trusted market for internationally accepted euro debt securities. That is why policy efforts to integrate and deepen European capital markets must go hand in hand with efforts to issue European safe assets.[36]

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    As we stand at this crossroads of global fragmentation, we must confront an uncomfortable truth: we are drifting toward a fractured economic and financial landscape where trust is eroded and alliances are strained.

    Central banks now face a double challenge: to be an anchor of stability in turbulent economic waters while reimagining their role in a world where multiple economic blocs are forming. The question is not whether we adapt, but how we mitigate the costs of fragmentation without sacrificing the potential of global integration.

    Our greatest risk lies not in the shocks we anticipate, but in the alliances we neglect, the innovations we overlook and the common ground we fail to find. The future of global prosperity hinges on our ability to use fragmentation as a catalyst to reinvent the common good.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: What Liberal Mark Carney’s election win in Canada means for Europe

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Katerina Sviderska, PhD Candidate in Slavonic Studies, University of Cambridge

    Just months ago, Canada’s Conservatives were leading the polls, surfing the wave of radical right ideas and rhetoric sweeping across the globe. But with the election victory of Mark Carney’s Liberal Party, Canada now stands out as a liberal anchor in a fractured West.

    This election may not only shape Canada’s domestic trajectory, but also carries significant implications for its international partnerships amid rising geopolitical uncertainty.

    As some European countries and the United States head towards isolationism, authoritarianism and turn to the East — even flirting with Russia — Canada’s continued Liberal leadership reinforces its position as a key ally for the European Union. Carney’s centrist and pro-EU attitude provides stability and relief for Europeans.

    From defence to trade and climate, Canada and the EU share deep economic and strategic ties. With a Liberal government, these connections will strengthen, offering both sides what they need the most: a reliable, like-minded partner at a time of transatlantic unpredictability.

    What does Carney’s victory mean specifically for the Canada-EU relationship?

    Trade as a strategic anchor

    Carney’s election offers new momentum for Canada-EU collaboration. His “blue liberalism” brings Canada ideologically closer to Europe’s current leadership — from Emmanuel Macron’s centrist France to the Christian Democratic Union-led coalition in Germany — providing fertile ground for pragmatic co-operation.

    Trade remains the foundation of the Canada-EU relationship, and both sides should aim to build on it. At the heart of this partnership is the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), which has increased EU-Canada trade by 65 per cent since 2017.

    European Council President António Costa has called the deal a success story providing clear proof “trade agreements are clearly better than trade tariffs.”

    As the U.S. speeds toward toward economic nationalism, CETA has become more than a commercial agreement — it’s a strategic anchor in the global liberal order. One of the Liberal government’s early priorities is likely to consolidate and strengthen CETA. In doing so, Canada can position itself as an ambitious partner, ready to seize new opportunities as European countries seek to reduce their reliance on the American market.

    Climate and energy: A balanced agenda

    Climate and energy, too, offer new opportunities for co-operation. Both Canada and the EU are navigating the tensions between pursuing ambitious decarbonization goals and managing economic and inflationary pressures. After scrapping Canada’s carbon tax on his first day in office, Carney has already hinted at a more pragmatic environmental stance.

    While pledging to maintain key climate policies — including the emissions cap on oil and gas — Carney’s government may recalibrate Canada’s approach to energy. This would mirror shifts among some European allies’ climate policies.

    This evolving transatlantic consensus — less about abandoning climate goals, more about making them economically viable — paves the way for closer co-operation based on a common goal: bolstering economic competitiveness while maintaining environmental credibility.

    Both Carney and the EU view the investment in new technologies as the path forward.

    As Europe accelerates its green agenda and implements new sustainability rules, only countries with strong environmental standards qualify as long-term partners. Canada, provided it stays the course on climate policies, is well-positioned to be a key partner in Europe’s green transition.

    Transatlantic defence co-operation

    Beyond trade and energy, defence co-operation between Canada and the EU is expected to surge. A key priority for the new Liberal government is to finally reach NATO’s benchmark of spending two per cent of gross domestic product on defence, a longstanding commitment that has eluded previous administrations.




    Read more:
    What does Donald Trump’s NATO posturing mean for Canada?


    This signal of rearmament reflects not only alignment with NATO expectations but also a broader understanding that liberal democracies must be prepared to defend themselves. Nowhere is this more pressing than in Ukraine, the epicentre of Europe’s geopolitical storm.

    Canada has been among the most reliable supporters of Ukraine since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, aligning itself with Europe’s most committed nations — France, Poland, the Baltics and, increasingly, Germany.

    But as threats evolve, the battlefield also extends beyond Ukraine’s frontlines. Hybrid attacks — cyber, disinformation campaigns and foreign interference in democratic processes — now wash up on all shores. Canada’s National Cyber Threat Assessment 2025–26 identifies state-sponsored cyber operations as one of the most serious threats to democratic stability, particularly from Russia and China.




    Read more:
    Foreign interference threats in Canada’s federal election are both old and new


    In strengthening its defence collaboration, Ottawa is hoping to get a seat in the fight against autocracies. The question is no longer whether to engage, but how to lead in this era of layered and compounding threats coming from rivals like Russia and China — and now from the U.S., a historical Canadian ally.

    Under Carney’s leadership, Canada is likely to pursue a pragmatic and globally engaged liberalism definitively aligned with Europe. As Canada and the EU are both looking for reliable allies to weather the storm, this renewed western alliance could solidify around Ottawa and Brussels — anchored in shared democratic values and pragmatic leadership.

    Katerina Sviderska receives funding from Fonds de Recherche du Québec and the Gates Cambridge Foundation.

    Leandre Benoit receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

    – ref. What Liberal Mark Carney’s election win in Canada means for Europe – https://theconversation.com/what-liberal-mark-carneys-election-win-in-canada-means-for-europe-254775

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    April 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: What Liberal Mark Carney’s projected election win in Canada means for Europe

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Katerina Sviderska, PhD Candidate in Slavonic Studies, University of Cambridge

    Just months ago, Canada’s Conservatives were leading the polls, surfing the wave of radical right ideas and rhetoric sweeping across the globe. But with the projected election victory of Mark Carney’s Liberal Party, Canada now stands out as a liberal anchor in a fractured West.

    This election may not only shape Canada’s domestic trajectory, but also carries significant implications for its international partnerships amid rising geopolitical uncertainty.

    As some European countries and the United States head towards isolationism, authoritarianism and turn to the East — even flirting with Russia — Canada’s continued Liberal leadership reinforces its position as a key ally for the European Union. Carney’s centrist and pro-EU attitude provides stability and relief for Europeans.

    From defence to trade and climate, Canada and the EU share deep economic and strategic ties. With a Liberal government, these connections will strengthen, offering both sides what they need the most: a reliable, like-minded partner at a time of transatlantic unpredictability.

    What does Carney’s victory mean specifically for the Canada-EU relationship?

    Trade as a strategic anchor

    Carney’s election offers new momentum for Canada-EU collaboration. His “blue liberalism” brings Canada ideologically closer to Europe’s current leadership — from Emmanuel Macron’s centrist France to the Christian Democratic Union-led coalition in Germany — providing fertile ground for pragmatic co-operation.

    Trade remains the foundation of the Canada-EU relationship, and both sides should aim to build on it. At the heart of this partnership is the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), which has increased EU-Canada trade by 65 per cent since 2017.

    European Council President António Costa has called the deal a success story providing clear proof “trade agreements are clearly better than trade tariffs.”

    As the U.S. speeds toward toward economic nationalism, CETA has become more than a commercial agreement — it’s a strategic anchor in the global liberal order. One of the Liberal government’s early priorities is likely to consolidate and strengthen CETA. In doing so, Canada can position itself as an ambitious partner, ready to seize new opportunities as European countries seek to reduce their reliance on the American market.

    Climate and energy: A balanced agenda

    Climate and energy, too, offer new opportunities for co-operation. Both Canada and the EU are navigating the tensions between pursuing ambitious decarbonization goals and managing economic and inflationary pressures. After scrapping Canada’s carbon tax on his first day in office, Carney has already hinted at a more pragmatic environmental stance.

    While pledging to maintain key climate policies — including the emissions cap on oil and gas — Carney’s government may recalibrate Canada’s approach to energy. This would mirror shifts among some European allies’ climate policies.

    This evolving transatlantic consensus — less about abandoning climate goals, more about making them economically viable — paves the way for closer co-operation based on a common goal: bolstering economic competitiveness while maintaining environmental credibility.

    Both Carney and the EU view the investment in new technologies as the path forward.

    As Europe accelerates its green agenda and implements new sustainability rules, only countries with strong environmental standards qualify as long-term partners. Canada, provided it stays the course on climate policies, is well-positioned to be a key partner in Europe’s green transition.

    Transatlantic defence co-operation

    Beyond trade and energy, defence co-operation between Canada and the EU is expected to surge. A key priority for the new Liberal government is to finally reach NATO’s benchmark of spending two per cent of gross domestic product on defence, a longstanding commitment that has eluded previous administrations.




    Read more:
    What does Donald Trump’s NATO posturing mean for Canada?


    This signal of rearmament reflects not only alignment with NATO expectations but also a broader understanding that liberal democracies must be prepared to defend themselves. Nowhere is this more pressing than in Ukraine, the epicentre of Europe’s geopolitical storm.

    Canada has been among the most reliable supporters of Ukraine since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, aligning itself with Europe’s most committed nations — France, Poland, the Baltics and, increasingly, Germany.

    But as threats evolve, the battlefield also extends beyond Ukraine’s frontlines. Hybrid attacks — cyber, disinformation campaigns and foreign interference in democratic processes — now wash up on all shores. Canada’s National Cyber Threat Assessment 2025–26 identifies state-sponsored cyber operations as one of the most serious threats to democratic stability, particularly from Russia and China.




    Read more:
    Foreign interference threats in Canada’s federal election are both old and new


    In strengthening its defence collaboration, Ottawa is hoping to get a seat in the fight against autocracies. The question is no longer whether to engage, but how to lead in this era of layered and compounding threats coming from rivals like Russia and China — and now from the U.S., a historical Canadian ally.

    Under Carney’s leadership, Canada is likely to pursue a pragmatic and globally engaged liberalism definitively aligned with Europe. As Canada and the EU are both looking for reliable allies to weather the storm, this renewed western alliance could solidify around Ottawa and Brussels — anchored in shared democratic values and pragmatic leadership.

    Katerina Sviderska receives funding from Fonds de Recherche du Québec and the Gates Cambridge Foundation.

    Leandre Benoit receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

    – ref. What Liberal Mark Carney’s projected election win in Canada means for Europe – https://theconversation.com/what-liberal-mark-carneys-projected-election-win-in-canada-means-for-europe-254775

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    April 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: What Liberal Mark Carney’s Canadian projected election win means for Europe

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Katerina Sviderska, PhD Candidate in Slavonic Studies, University of Cambridge

    Just months ago, Canada’s Conservatives were leading the polls, surfing the wave of radical right ideas and rhetoric sweeping across the globe. But with the projected election victory of Mark Carney’s Liberal Party, Canada now stands out as a liberal anchor in a fractured West.

    This election may not only shape Canada’s domestic trajectory, but also carries significant implications for its international partnerships amid rising geopolitical uncertainty.

    As some European countries and the United States head towards isolationism, authoritarianism and turn to the East — even flirting with Russia — Canada’s continued Liberal leadership reinforces its position as a key ally for the European Union. Carney’s centrist and pro-EU attitude provides stability and relief for Europeans.

    From defence to trade and climate, Canada and the EU share deep economic and strategic ties. With a Liberal government, these connections will strengthen, offering both sides what they need the most: a reliable, like-minded partner at a time of transatlantic unpredictability.

    What does Carney’s victory mean specifically for the Canada-EU relationship?

    Trade as a strategic anchor

    Carney’s election offers new momentum for Canada-EU collaboration. His “blue liberalism” brings Canada ideologically closer to Europe’s current leadership — from Emmanuel Macron’s centrist France to the Christian Democratic Union-led coalition in Germany — providing fertile ground for pragmatic co-operation.

    Trade remains the foundation of the Canada-EU relationship, and both sides should aim to build on it. At the heart of this partnership is the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), which has increased EU-Canada trade by 65 per cent since 2017.

    European Council President António Costa has called the deal a success story providing clear proof “trade agreements are clearly better than trade tariffs.”

    As the U.S. speeds toward toward economic nationalism, CETA has become more than a commercial agreement — it’s a strategic anchor in the global liberal order. One of the Liberal government’s early priorities is likely to consolidate and strengthen CETA. In doing so, Canada can position itself as an ambitious partner, ready to seize new opportunities as European countries seek to reduce their reliance on the American market.

    Climate and energy: A balanced agenda

    Climate and energy, too, offer new opportunities for co-operation. Both Canada and the EU are navigating the tensions between pursuing ambitious decarbonization goals and managing economic and inflationary pressures. After scrapping Canada’s carbon tax on his first day in office, Carney has already hinted at a more pragmatic environmental stance.

    While pledging to maintain key climate policies — including the emissions cap on oil and gas — Carney’s government may recalibrate Canada’s approach to energy. This would mirror shifts among some European allies’ climate policies.

    This evolving transatlantic consensus — less about abandoning climate goals, more about making them economically viable — paves the way for closer co-operation based on a common goal: bolstering economic competitiveness while maintaining environmental credibility.

    Both Carney and the EU view the investment in new technologies as the path forward.

    As Europe accelerates its green agenda and implements new sustainability rules, only countries with strong environmental standards qualify as long-term partners. Canada, provided it stays the course on climate policies, is well-positioned to be a key partner in Europe’s green transition.

    Transatlantic defence co-operation

    Beyond trade and energy, defence co-operation between Canada and the EU is expected to surge. A key priority for the new Liberal government is to finally reach NATO’s benchmark of spending two per cent of gross domestic product on defence, a longstanding commitment that has eluded previous administrations.




    Read more:
    What does Donald Trump’s NATO posturing mean for Canada?


    This signal of rearmament reflects not only alignment with NATO expectations but also a broader understanding that liberal democracies must be prepared to defend themselves. Nowhere is this more pressing than in Ukraine, the epicentre of Europe’s geopolitical storm.

    Canada has been among the most reliable supporters of Ukraine since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, aligning itself with Europe’s most committed nations — France, Poland, the Baltics and, increasingly, Germany.

    But as threats evolve, the battlefield also extends beyond Ukraine’s frontlines. Hybrid attacks — cyber, disinformation campaigns and foreign interference in democratic processes — now wash up on all shores. Canada’s National Cyber Threat Assessment 2025–26 identifies state-sponsored cyber operations as one of the most serious threats to democratic stability, particularly from Russia and China.




    Read more:
    Foreign interference threats in Canada’s federal election are both old and new


    In strengthening its defence collaboration, Ottawa is hoping to get a seat in the fight against autocracies. The question is no longer whether to engage, but how to lead in this era of layered and compounding threats coming from rivals like Russia and China — and now from the U.S., a historical Canadian ally.

    Under Carney’s leadership, Canada is likely to pursue a pragmatic and globally engaged liberalism definitively aligned with Europe. As Canada and the EU are both looking for reliable allies to weather the storm, this renewed western alliance could solidify around Ottawa and Brussels — anchored in shared democratic values and pragmatic leadership.

    Katerina Sviderska receives funding from Fonds de Recherche du Québec and the Gates Cambridge Foundation.

    Leandre Benoit receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

    – ref. What Liberal Mark Carney’s Canadian projected election win means for Europe – https://theconversation.com/what-liberal-mark-carneys-canadian-projected-election-win-means-for-europe-254775

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    April 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: What Liberal Mark Carney’s Canadian election win means for Europe

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Katerina Sviderska, PhD Candidate in Slavonic Studies, University of Cambridge

    Just months ago, Canada’s Conservatives were leading the polls, surfing the wave of radical right ideas and rhetoric sweeping across the globe. But with the election victory of Mark Carney’s Liberal Party, Canada now stands out as a liberal anchor in a fractured West.

    This election not only shapes Canada’s domestic trajectory, but also carries significant implications for its international partnerships amid rising geopolitical uncertainty.

    As some European countries and the United States head towards isolationism, authoritarianism and turn to the East — even flirting with Russia — Canada’s continued Liberal leadership reinforces its position as a key ally for the European Union. Carney’s centrist and pro-EU attitude provides stability and relief for Europeans.

    From defence to trade and climate, Canada and the EU share deep economic and strategic ties. With a Liberal government, these connections will strengthen, offering both sides what they need the most: a reliable, like-minded partner at a time of transatlantic unpredictability.

    What does Carney’s victory mean specifically for the Canada-EU relationship?

    Trade as a strategic anchor

    Carney’s election offers new momentum for Canada-EU collaboration. His “blue liberalism” brings Canada ideologically closer to Europe’s current leadership — from Emmanuel Macron’s centrist France to the Christian Democratic Union-led coalition in Germany — providing fertile ground for pragmatic co-operation.

    Trade remains the foundation of the Canada-EU relationship, and both sides should aim to build on it. At the heart of this partnership is the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), which has increased EU-Canada trade by 65 per cent since 2017.

    European Council President António Costa has called the deal a success story providing clear proof “trade agreements are clearly better than trade tariffs.”

    As the U.S. speeds toward toward economic nationalism, CETA has become more than a commercial agreement — it’s a strategic anchor in the global liberal order. One of the Liberal government’s early priorities is likely to consolidate and strengthen CETA. In doing so, Canada can position itself as an ambitious partner, ready to seize new opportunities as European countries seek to reduce their reliance on the American market.

    Climate and energy: A balanced agenda

    Climate and energy, too, offer new opportunities for co-operation. Both Canada and the EU are navigating the tensions between pursuing ambitious decarbonization goals and managing economic and inflationary pressures. After scrapping Canada’s carbon tax on his first day in office, Carney has already hinted at a more pragmatic environmental stance.

    While pledging to maintain key climate policies — including the emissions cap on oil and gas — Carney’s government may recalibrate Canada’s approach to energy. This would mirror shifts among some European allies’ climate policies.

    This evolving transatlantic consensus — less about abandoning climate goals, more about making them economically viable — paves the way for closer co-operation based on a common goal: bolstering economic competitiveness while maintaining environmental credibility.

    Both Carney and the EU view the investment in new technologies as the path forward.

    As Europe accelerates its green agenda and implements new sustainability rules, only countries with strong environmental standards qualify as long-term partners. Canada, provided it stays the course on climate policies, is well-positioned to be a key partner in Europe’s green transition.

    Transatlantic defence co-operation

    Beyond trade and energy, defence co-operation between Canada and the EU is expected to surge. A key priority for the new Liberal government is to finally reach NATO’s benchmark of spending two per cent of gross domestic product on defence, a longstanding commitment that has eluded previous administrations.




    Read more:
    What does Donald Trump’s NATO posturing mean for Canada?


    This signal of rearmament reflects not only alignment with NATO expectations but also a broader understanding that liberal democracies must be prepared to defend themselves. Nowhere is this more pressing than in Ukraine, the epicentre of Europe’s geopolitical storm.

    Canada has been among the most reliable supporters of Ukraine since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, aligning itself with Europe’s most committed nations — France, Poland, the Baltics and, increasingly, Germany.

    But as threats evolve, the battlefield also extends beyond Ukraine’s frontlines. Hybrid attacks — cyber, disinformation campaigns and foreign interference in democratic processes — now wash up on all shores. Canada’s National Cyber Threat Assessment 2025–26 identifies state-sponsored cyber operations as one of the most serious threats to democratic stability, particularly from Russia and China.




    Read more:
    Foreign interference threats in Canada’s federal election are both old and new


    In strengthening its defence collaboration, Ottawa is hoping to get a seat in the fight against autocracies. The question is no longer whether to engage, but how to lead in this era of layered and compounding threats coming from rivals like Russia and China — and now from the U.S., a historical Canadian ally.

    Under Carney’s leadership, Canada is likely to pursue a pragmatic and globally engaged liberalism definitively aligned with Europe. As Canada and the EU are both looking for reliable allies to weather the storm, this renewed western alliance could solidify around Ottawa and Brussels — anchored in shared democratic values and pragmatic leadership.

    Katerina Sviderska receives funding from Fonds de Recherche du Québec and the Gates Cambridge Foundation.

    Leandre Benoit receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

    – ref. What Liberal Mark Carney’s Canadian election win means for Europe – https://theconversation.com/what-liberal-mark-carneys-canadian-election-win-means-for-europe-254775

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    April 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: What Canada’s election of Mark Carney’s Liberals means for Europe

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Katerina Sviderska, PhD Candidate in Slavonic Studies, University of Cambridge

    Just months ago, Canada’s Conservatives were leading the polls, surfing the wave of radical right ideas and rhetoric sweeping across the globe. But with the election victory of Mark Carney’s Liberal Party, Canada now stands out as a liberal anchor in a fractured West.

    This election not only shapes Canada’s domestic trajectory, but also carries significant implications for its international partnerships amid rising geopolitical uncertainty.

    As some European countries and the United States head towards isolationism, authoritarianism and turn to the East — even flirting with Russia — Canada’s continued Liberal leadership reinforces its position as a key ally for the European Union. Carney’s centrist and pro-EU attitude provides stability and relief for Europeans.

    From defence to trade and climate, Canada and the EU share deep economic and strategic ties. With a Liberal government, these connections will strengthen, offering both sides what they need the most: a reliable, like-minded partner at a time of transatlantic unpredictability.

    What does Carney’s victory mean specifically for the Canada-EU relationship?

    Trade as a strategic anchor

    Carney’s election offers new momentum for Canada-EU collaboration. His “blue liberalism” brings Canada ideologically closer to Europe’s current leadership — from Emmanuel Macron’s centrist France to the Christian Democratic Union-led coalition in Germany — providing fertile ground for pragmatic co-operation.

    Trade remains the foundation of the Canada-EU relationship, and both sides should aim to build on it. At the heart of this partnership is the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), which has increased EU-Canada trade by 65 per cent since 2017.

    European Council President António Costa has called the deal a success story providing clear proof “trade agreements are clearly better than trade tariffs.”

    As the U.S. speeds toward toward economic nationalism, CETA has become more than a commercial agreement — it’s a strategic anchor in the global liberal order. One of the Liberal government’s early priorities is likely to consolidate and strengthen CETA. In doing so, Canada can position itself as an ambitious partner, ready to seize new opportunities as European countries seek to reduce their reliance on the American market.

    Climate and energy: A balanced agenda

    Climate and energy, too, offer new opportunities for co-operation. Both Canada and the EU are navigating the tensions between pursuing ambitious decarbonization goals and managing economic and inflationary pressures. After scrapping Canada’s carbon tax on his first day in office, Carney has already hinted at a more pragmatic environmental stance.

    While pledging to maintain key climate policies — including the emissions cap on oil and gas — Carney’s government may recalibrate Canada’s approach to energy. This would mirror shifts among some European allies’ climate policies.

    This evolving transatlantic consensus — less about abandoning climate goals, more about making them economically viable — paves the way for closer co-operation based on a common goal: bolstering economic competitiveness while maintaining environmental credibility.

    Both Carney and the EU view the investment in new technologies as the path forward.

    As Europe accelerates its green agenda and implements new sustainability rules, only countries with strong environmental standards qualify as long-term partners. Canada, provided it stays the course on climate policies, is well-positioned to be a key partner in Europe’s green transition.

    Transatlantic defence co-operation

    Beyond trade and energy, defence co-operation between Canada and the EU is expected to surge. A key priority for the new Liberal government is to finally reach NATO’s benchmark of spending two per cent of gross domestic product on defence, a longstanding commitment that has eluded previous administrations.




    Read more:
    What does Donald Trump’s NATO posturing mean for Canada?


    This signal of rearmament reflects not only alignment with NATO expectations but also a broader understanding that liberal democracies must be prepared to defend themselves. Nowhere is this more pressing than in Ukraine, the epicentre of Europe’s geopolitical storm.

    Canada has been among the most reliable supporters of Ukraine since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, aligning itself with Europe’s most committed nations — France, Poland, the Baltics and, increasingly, Germany.

    But as threats evolve, the battlefield also extends beyond Ukraine’s frontlines. Hybrid attacks — cyber, disinformation campaigns and foreign interference in democratic processes — now wash up on all shores. Canada’s National Cyber Threat Assessment 2025–26 identifies state-sponsored cyber operations as one of the most serious threats to democratic stability, particularly from Russia and China.




    Read more:
    Foreign interference threats in Canada’s federal election are both old and new


    In strengthening its defence collaboration, Ottawa is hoping to get a seat in the fight against autocracies. The question is no longer whether to engage, but how to lead in this era of layered and compounding threats coming from rivals like Russia and China — and now from the U.S., a historical Canadian ally.

    Under Carney’s leadership, Canada is likely to pursue a pragmatic and globally engaged liberalism definitively aligned with Europe. As Canada and the EU are both looking for reliable allies to weather the storm, this renewed western alliance could solidify around Ottawa and Brussels — anchored in shared democratic values and pragmatic leadership.

    Katerina Sviderska receives funding from Fonds de Recherche du Québec and the Gates Cambridge Foundation.

    Leandre Benoit receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

    – ref. What Canada’s election of Mark Carney’s Liberals means for Europe – https://theconversation.com/what-canadas-election-of-mark-carneys-liberals-means-for-europe-254775

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    April 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Hoyer Statement on Rep. Gerry Connolly

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Steny H Hoyer (MD-05)

    WASHINGTON, DC — Congressman Steny H. Hoyer (MD-05) issued the following statement after Congressman Gerry Connolly (VA-11) announced that he will not run for re-election in 2026:

    “From standing up for his constituents in Virginia’s Eleventh Congressional District to battling his cancer diagnosis, my dear friend Rep. Gerry Connolly has always been a fighter. I am deeply saddened to hear that his cancer has returned and that his extraordinary service in the House of Representatives will conclude at the end of the 119th Congress. I know that he will continue to fight his illness with the same courage, grit, and perseverance with which he tackles every challenge. 

    “Serving alongside Gerry these past 16 years has been a great privilege. One of Maryland’s neighbors across the Potomac, Gerry and I have worked together on numerous issues facing our region and our people. We have stood up for our federal workers, ensuring they receive the pay, benefits, fair treatment, and respect they deserve. That mission has never been more important than it is today, with the Trump Administration orchestrating an illegal purge of these patriots and trying to dismantle the vital services they provide to the American people every day. Throughout his time in Congress, Gerry has also been a crucial member and leader of the House Oversight Committee. He has held both Republican and Democratic administrations accountable and helped get Americans the answers they deserve. 

    “I also admire Gerry’s efforts to strengthen our NATO alliance, including as President of the alliance’s Parliamentary Assembly. I have been proud to work with him to reaffirm America’s commitment to our mutual defense obligations under Article V and to countering Russian aggression in Ukraine and beyond.

    “Gerry has earned the love and respect of so many here on Capitol Hill. I will miss his honesty, leadership, intellect, humor, and – crucially – his character. His departure at the end of the 119th will be a great loss for our Congress and country.”

    MIL OSI USA News –

    April 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Capital Bancorp, Inc. Announces Strong First Quarter Results and Successful IFH Conversion; Continued Strong Organic Loan and Deposit Growth; NIM and Fee Income Drives Robust Returns

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    First Quarter 2025 Highlights

    • Net Income of $13.9 million, or $0.82 per share, and return on average assets (“ROA”) of 1.75%
      • Core net income(1) of $14.9 million, or $0.88 per share, and core ROA(1) of 1.87%
    • Book value per common share of $22.19 at March 31, 2025, increased $0.87 compared to 4Q 2024, and increased $3.51 when compared to 1Q 2024.
      • Tangible Book Value Per Share(1) of $19.81, increased 3.7% (not annualized), or $0.71(2) as compared to 4Q 2024, and increased 6.0%, or $1.13 compared to 1Q 2024
    • Return on average equity (“ROE”) of 15.56%, and return on average tangible common equity (“ROTCE”)(1) of 17.57%
      • Core ROE(1) of 16.64%, and core ROTCE(1) of 18.77%
    • Gross Loans grew $48.2 million, or 7.4% (annualized), during 1Q 2025, and growth of $713.9 million year-over-year including $340.4 million from organic growth and $373.5 million from the IFH acquisition
    • Total Deposits grew $129.4 million, or 19.0% (annualized), from 4Q 2024. Year-over-year growth of $885.6 million includes $426.7 million from organic growth, and $459.0 million from the acquisition of IFH, or 44.2% from 1Q 2024
      • Customer Deposit growth of $154.6 million, or 25.8% (annualized) from 4Q 2024, and $738.5 million year-over-year, or 40.0% from 1Q 2024, including $445.0 million of organic growth, and $293.5 million from the acquisition of IFH
    • Net Interest Income increased $1.7 million, or 3.9% (not annualized), from 4Q 2024 due to balance sheet growth and purchase accounting accretion, and increased $11.0 million, or 31.5%, year-over-year, primarily driven by strong organic growth and the acquisition of IFH.
    • Net Interest Margin (“NIM”) of 6.05% increased 18 bps compared to 4Q 2024 and decreased 19 bps compared to 1Q 2024 due to the acquisition of commercial loans from IFH, diluting the impact from OpenSky™
      • Commercial Bank NIM(1) of 4.32% increased by 33 bps and 55 bps, compared to 4Q 2024 and 1Q 2024, respectively
      • Net purchase accounting accretion of $1.5 million for 1Q 2025, increased $0.8 million compared to 4Q 2024, accounting for 20 bps of both reported NIM and Commercial Bank NIM(1)
    • Fee Revenue (noninterest income) totaled $12.5 million, or 21.4% of total revenue for 1Q 2025, an increase of $0.6 million, from 4Q 2024 and $6.6 million, from 1Q 2024
    • The allowance for credit losses to total loans (“ACL Coverage Ratio”) equaled 1.81% at March 31, 2025 down 4 bps from 4Q 2024 and up 32 bps from 1Q 2024, primarily due to of the acquisition of IFH loans. The Commercial Bank ACL Coverage Ratio(1) equaled 1.67% at March 31, 2025, compared to 1.70% at December 31, 2024.
    • Cash Dividend of $0.10 per share declared by the Board of Directors

    ________________________
    (1) As used in this press release, core net income, core ROA, core ROE, ROTCE, core ROTCE, Commercial Bank NIM, Commercial Bank ACL Coverage Ratio, and Tangible Book Value are non–U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”) financial measures. These non-GAAP financial metrics exclude merger-related and other certain one-time non-reoccurring pre-tax adjustments and tax impacts of such adjustments. Reconciliations of these and other non–GAAP measures to their comparable GAAP measures are set forth in the Appendix at the end of this press release.
    (2) 4Q 2024 Tangible Book Value restated to $19.10 from previously reported amount of $18.77 due to exclusion of Loan Servicing Assets.

    ROCKVILLE, Md., April 28, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Capital Bancorp, Inc. (the “Company”) (NASDAQ: CBNK), the holding company for Capital Bank, N.A. (the “Bank”), today reported net income of $13.9 million, or $0.82 per diluted share, for 1Q 2025, compared to net income of $7.5 million, or $0.45 per diluted share, for 4Q 2024, and $6.6 million, or $0.47 per diluted share, for 1Q 2024. Core net income(3) for 1Q 2025 of $14.9 million, or $0.88 per diluted share, compared to $15.5 million, or $0.92 per diluted share in 4Q 2024.

    The Company also declared a cash dividend on its common stock of $0.10 per share. The dividend is payable on May 28, 2025 to shareholders of record on May 12, 2025.

    “The first quarter continues the momentum from 2024 and further demonstrates the value of the larger and more diversified franchise resulting from the acquisition of IFH,” said Ed Barry, CEO of the Company and the Bank. “I would like to thank Management and the teams across the organization for a successful integration of IFH in the first quarter. Our continued focused execution of our initiatives and growth objectives will build on a great start to 2025.”

    “Our record GAAP earnings per share for the quarter, increased net interest margin, solid loan and deposit growth, and superior return on tangible equity all confirm that we are on the right course for continued growth. We continue to benefit from our diversified earnings platform, both in terms of overall performance and risk mitigation,” said Steven J. Schwartz, Chairman of the Company. “That said, we intend to continue to monitor closely the possible impact on our businesses from emergent governmental policies, with a view towards insulating ourselves, to the extent we can, from the effects of such policies, including interest rate and price volatility and heightened economic uncertainty.”

    Reconciliation of GAAP Net Income to Core (Non-GAAP) Net Income
    The following table provides a reconciliation of the Company’s net income under GAAP to Core net income (non-GAAP) results excluding merger-related expenses and other one-time non-recurring transactions.

      First Quarter 2025   Fourth Quarter 2024
    (in thousands, except per share data) Income
    Before
    Income
    Taxes
      Income
    Tax
    Expense
      Net
    Income
      Diluted
    Earnings
    per
    Share
      Income
    Before
    Income
    Taxes
      Income
    Tax
    Expense
      Net
    Income
      Diluted
    Earnings
    per
    Share
    GAAP Net Income $ 18,297   $ 4,365   $ 13,932   $ 0.82   $ 10,776   $ 3,243   $ 7,533   $ 0.45
    Add: Merger-Related Expenses   1,266     302     964         2,615     464     2,151    
    Add: Non-recurring Equity and Debt Investment Write-Down   —     —     —         2,620     —     2,620    
    Add: Initial IFH ACL Provision   —     —     —         4,194     1,025     3,169    
    Core Net Income(1) $ 19,563   $ 4,667   $ 14,896   $ 0.88   $ 20,205   $ 4,732   $ 15,473   $ 0.92

    Note: The income tax expense reflects the non-deductibility of certain merger-related expenses.

    ________________________
    1 As used in this press release, core net income is a non-GAAP financial measure. This non-GAAP financial metric excludes merger-related and other certain one-time non-recurring pre-tax adjustments and tax impacts of such adjustments. Reconciliations of this and other non–GAAP measures to their comparable GAAP measures are set forth in the Appendix at the end of this press release.


    First Quarter 2025 Results

    Earnings Summary
    Net income of $13.9 million, or $0.82 per diluted share, compared to net income of $7.5 million, or $0.45 per diluted share, for 4Q 2024, and $6.6 million or $0.47 per diluted share, for 1Q 2024. 1Q 2025 core net income(4) of $14.9 million, or $0.88 per diluted share, compared to 4Q 2024 of $15.5 million, or $0.92 per diluted share.

    • Net interest income of $46.0 million increased $1.7 million, or 3.9% (not annualized), compared to 4Q 2024, and increased $11.0 million, or 31.5% year-over-year.
      • Interest income of $62.8 million increased $1.1 million, or 1.7% (not annualized), over 4Q 2024, and increased $14.4 million, or 29.8%, year-over-year. The increase quarter-over-quarter was driven by increases of $1.1 million from net purchase accounting accretion, $0.7 million from interest-bearing deposits held at other financial institutions, and $0.3 million from investments held for sale, partially offset by a decrease in loan interest income of $1.1 million due to rate and portfolio mix, while the increase year-over year was primarily driven by organic growth and the acquisition of IFH.
        • Interest income included $0.4 million from net purchase accounting accretion in 1Q 2025 compared to $0.7 million from net purchase accounting amortization in 4Q 2024. There was no related purchase accounting accretion or amortization during 1Q 2024.
      • Interest expense of $16.7 million decreased $0.7 million, or 3.8% (not annualized) compared to 4Q 2024, and increased $3.4 million, or 25.1%, year-over-year. The decrease quarter-over-quarter was primarily due to a decrease in borrowed funds partially offset by lower net purchase accounting accretion, and the increase year-over-year was driven by organic growth and the acquisition of IFH.
        • Interest expense included $1.1 million from net purchase accounting accretion in 1Q 2025 compared to $1.4 million from net purchase accounting accretion in 4Q 2024. There was no related purchase accounting accretion or amortization during 1Q 2024.
    • The provision for credit losses was $2.2 million, a decrease of $5.6 million from 4Q 2024. The decrease over the prior quarter was primarily driven by the recognition of the Initial IFH ACL Provision of $4.2 million in 4Q 2024, and a $2.0 million lower provision from the commercial loan portfolio partially offset by an additional $0.6 million from OpenSky™ provision in the current quarter. Net charge-offs totaled $2.4 million, or 0.38% of portfolio loans (annualized), including $2.3 million from OpenSky™ loans. By comparison net charge-offs for 4Q 2024 totaled $2.4 million, or 0.37% of portfolio loans (annualized), including $2.1 million from OpenSky™ loans. At March 31, 2025, the ACL Coverage Ratio was 1.81%, down 4 bps from the ratio of 1.85% at December 31, 2024, due to the payoff of certain purchase credit deteriorated (“PCD”) loans acquired from IFH, during the quarter. The provision for credit losses decreased $0.5 million, year-over-year (1Q 2024) primarily from lower commercial loan portfolio provision of $0.7 million, offset by slightly higher provision for OpenSky™ of $0.2 million, while the ACL Coverage Ratio increased 32 bps year-over-year driven by the acquisition of IFH.

    ________________________
    1 As used in this press release, core net income is a non-GAAP financial measure. This non-GAAP financial metric excludes merger-related and other certain one-time non-recurring pre-tax adjustments and tax impacts of such adjustments. Reconciliations of this and other non–GAAP measures to their comparable GAAP measures are set forth in the Appendix at the end of this press release.


    Earnings Summary (Continued)

    • Noninterest income of $12.5 million increased $0.6 million compared to 4Q 2024 and increased $6.6 million year-over-year primarily due to the contributions made by the businesses IFH brought to the merged entity. Core fee revenue(5) of $12.5 million decreased $2.0 million, as a result of $1.2 million lower government lending revenue, $0.8 million lower SBIC investment income, $0.5 million lower loan servicing, $0.4 million lower government loan servicing revenue (Windsor), offset by a loan termination fee of $0.7 million during 1Q 2025.
    • Noninterest expense of $38.1 million increased $0.5 million compared to 4Q 2024 and $8.6 million compared to 1Q 2024. Core noninterest expense(1) of $36.8 million increased $1.9 million compared to 4Q 2024 and $8.0 million compared to 1Q 2024. Core comparisons include:
      • Salaries and employee benefits expenses increased $1.6 million from 4Q 2024, primarily the result of $0.7 million lower deferred expenses related to loan production, $0.6 million from the seasonality of payroll related taxes, and $0.2 million in employee benefits.
      • Marketing expenses increased $0.7 million from 4Q 2024, primarily due to additional OpenSky™ advertising-related expenses due to seasonality.
      • Regulatory assessment expenses increased $0.4 million from 4Q 2024, primarily due to additional assessments from the acquisition of IFH.
      • Expense reduction of $0.8 million from 4Q 2024, includes $0.3 million from loan processing, $0.2 million from other operating, and $0.3 million from other areas.
      • Year-over-year expense growth of $8.6 million was primarily due to the acquisition of IFH.
      • Estimated total cost synergies resulting from the acquisition of IFH totaled $1.75 million in 1Q 2025, achieving the targeted savings earlier than anticipated.
    • Income tax expense of $4.4 million, or 23.9% of pre-tax income for 1Q 2025, increased $1.1 million from $3.2 million, or 30.1% of pre-tax income for 4Q 2024. The core effective income tax rate(1) for 1Q 2025 and 4Q 2024 would have been 23.7% and 22.6%, respectively.

    ________________________
    1 As used in this press release, core fee revenue, core noninterest expense, and core effective income tax rate are non-GAAP financial measures. These non-GAAP financial metrics exclude merger-related and other certain one-time non-recurring pre-tax adjustments and tax impacts of such adjustments. Reconciliations of these and other non–GAAP measures to their comparable GAAP measures are set forth in the Appendix at the end of this press release.


    Balance Sheet
    Total assets of $3.3 billion at March 31, 2025 increased $142.9 million, or 18.1% (annualized), from December 31, 2024. Total assets growth year-over-year of $1.0 billion, or 44.1%, included $559.4 million acquired with the IFH acquisition, net of purchase accounting, and $465.6 million of organic growth.

    • Cash and cash equivalents of $294.0 million at March 31, 2025 increased $88.7 million from December 31, 2024 due to portfolio growth, and increased $208.8 million year-over-year including $130.9 million from organic growth and $77.8 million from the acquisition of IFH.
    • Total portfolio loans of $2.68 billion at March 31, 2025 increased $48.2 million, or 7.4% (annualized), from December 31, 2024 and increased $713.9 million year-over-year including $373.5 million from the acquisition of IFH and $340.4 million of organic growth.
      • Compared to December 31, 2024, commercial and industrial loans increased $39.8 million and construction real estate loans increased $22.0 million, offset by a $9.1 million decrease in OpenSky™ loans and a $6.3 million decrease in commercial real estate loans.
      • Commercial and industrial loans, and owner-occupied commercial real estate loans totaled 37.9% of total portfolio loans at March 31, 2025, compared to 37.8% at December 31, 2024, and 29.6% at March 31, 2024.
    • Total deposits of $2.89 billion at March 31, 2025 increased $129.4 million, or 19.0% (annualized), from December 31, 2024, and increased $885.6 million, or 44.2% (annualized) from March 31, 2024. The increase quarter-over-quarter includes $95.7 million of growth in customer money market deposits, $57.6 million of growth in interest-bearing demand accounts, $1.3 million of noninterest-bearing deposits, and $0.7 million of customer time deposits, partially offset by a decrease in brokered time deposits of $25.2 million. The increase year-over-year is driven by $459.0 million from the acquisition of IFH and $426.7 million from organic growth.
      • Insured and protected deposits were approximately $2.0 billion as of March 31, 2025 representing 70.4% of the Company’s deposit portfolio.
      • Low-and-no interest bearing deposits of $1.1 billion, or 38.8% of deposits, increased $58.2 million, or 22.2% (annualized) from December 31, 2024, and increased $257.2 million, or 29.8% year-over-year, including $157.4 million of organic growth, and $91.5 million from the acquisition of IFH.
    • The average portfolio loans-to-deposit ratio was 95.15% for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to 99.27% from 4Q 2024, and 98.46% from 1Q 2024.
    • The investment securities portfolio continues to be classified as available-for-sale and had a fair market value of $213.5 million, or 6.4% of total assets, an effective duration of 3.0 years, with U.S. Treasury Securities representing 56% of the overall investment portfolio at March 31, 2025. The accumulated other comprehensive income (loss) on the investment securities portfolio decreased $2.3 million during the quarter to negative $9.2 million after-tax as of March 31, 2025, which represents 2.5% of total stockholders’ equity. The Company does not have a held-to-maturity investment securities portfolio.
    • Liquidity – The Company maintains stable and reliable sources of available borrowings, generally consistent with prior quarter. Sources of available borrowings at March 31, 2025 totaled $820.9 million, compared to $803.0 from 4Q 2024. During 1Q 2025 available collateralized lines of credit of $625.4 million, unsecured lines of credit with other banks of $76.0 million and unpledged investment securities available as collateral for potential additional borrowings of $119.5 million.
    • Capital Positions – As of March 31, 2025, the Company reported a Common Equity Tier-1 capital ratio of 13.33%, compared to 13.74% at December 31, 2024. At March 31, 2025, the Company and the Bank maintain regulatory capital ratios that exceed all capital adequacy requirements.

    Financial Metrics
    Net Interest Margin – Net interest margin of 6.05% for the three months ended March 31, 2025, increased 18 bps compared to the prior quarter, and decreased 19 bps year-over-year. Commercial Bank net interest margin(1), of 4.32% increased 33 bps compared to the prior quarter, and increased 55 bps year-over-year. Net purchase accounting accretion for 1Q 2025 was 20 bps for NIM and Commercial Bank NIM(1).

    • The average yield on interest earning assets of 8.24% increased 7 bps compared to the prior quarter, due to portfolio mix, and decreased 39 bps year-over-year primarily due to the acquisition of commercial loans diluting the impact from OpenSky™. The Commercial Bank Loan Yield(1) of 7.14% for 1Q 2025, increased 16 bps 4Q 2024, and increased 18 bps year-over-year.
    • The total cost of deposits of 2.42% for 1Q 2025 decreased 8 bps compared to the prior quarter due to rate and mix shift and decreased 22 bps year-over-year. The total cost of interest-bearing deposits decreased 9 bps quarter-over-quarter, and 54 bps year-over-year, to 3.37% for 1Q 2025 due to rate environment and product mix.
    • Net purchase accounting accretion of $1.5 million during 1Q 2025, increased $0.8 million from 4Q 2024. There was no related purchase accounting accretion or amortization during 1Q 2024.

    Efficiency Ratios – The efficiency ratio was 64.9% for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to 66.7% for the three months ended December 31, 2024 and 72.0% for the three months ended March 31, 2024. The core efficiency ratio(6) was 62.8%, for the three months ended March 31, 2025. The core efficiency ratio(1) was 59.3% for the three months ended December 31, 2024, and 70.2% for the three months ended March 31, 2024.

    Credit Metrics and Asset Quality – The ACL Coverage Ratio equaled 1.81% at March 31, 2025, a decrease of 4 bps from December 31, 2024, and an increase of 32 bps year-over-year driven by the acquisition of IFH.

    Nonperforming assets increased 27 bps to 1.21% of total assets at March 31, 2025 compared to December 31, 2024, and increased 59 bps year-over-year. Total nonaccrual loans at March 31, 2025 increased $10.2 million to $40.5 million compared to December 31, 2024, and increased $26.1 million year-over-year, mainly due to the acquisition of IFH. At March 31, 2025, special mention loans totaled $63.0 million, or 2.4% of total portfolio loans, compared to $60.0 million, or 2.3% of total portfolio loans, at December 31, 2024, and $27.5 million, or 1.4% of total portfolio loans, at March 31, 2024. At March 31, 2025, substandard loans totaled $45.7 million, or 1.7% of total portfolio loans, compared to $48.4 million, or 1.8% of total portfolio loans, at December 31, 2024 and $14.1 million, or 0.7% of total portfolio loans, at March 31, 2024.

    ________________________
    1 As used in this press release, Commercial Bank NIM, Commercial Bank Loan Yield, and core efficiency ratio are non-GAAP financial measures. These non-GAAP financial metrics exclude merger-related and other certain one-time non-recurring pre-tax adjustments and tax impacts of such adjustments. Reconciliations of these and other non–GAAP measures to their comparable GAAP measures are set forth in the Appendix at the end of this press release.

    Financial Metrics (Continued)
    Performance Ratios – ROA, ROE, ROTCE were 1.75%, 15.56%, and 17.57% respectively, for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to 0.96%, 8.50%, and 9.33%(1) respectively, for the three months ended December 31, 2024. For the three months ended March 31, 2024, ROA, ROE, and ROTCE were 1.15%, 10.19%, and 10.19%, respectively. As of March 31, 2024, the Company did not have goodwill or other intangible assets.

    • Core ROA(2), core ROE(2), and core ROTCE(2) for the three months ended March 31, 2025 were 1.87%, 16.64%, and 18.77% respectively. Core ROA(2), core ROE(2), and core ROTCE(2) for the three months ended December 31, 2024, were 1.97%, 17.46%, and 18.91%(1), respectively. Core ROA(2), core ROE(2), and core ROTCE(2) for the three months ended March 31, 2024 were 1.24%, 11.03%, and 11.03%, respectively.

    Book Value and Tangible Book Value – Book value per common share of $22.19 at March 31, 2025, increased $0.87 when compared to December 31, 2024, and increased $3.51 when compared to March 31, 2024. Tangible book value per common share(2) increased $0.71(3), or 3.7%, to $19.81 at March 31, 2025 when compared to December 31, 2024, and increased $1.13, or 6.0%, when compared to March 31, 2024. Tangible book value was impacted by the purchase accounting adjustments required as part of the IFH acquisition. Therefore, tangible book value per share(1) was equal to book value per share for periods prior to 4Q 2024.

    ____________
    1 Core ROTCE and core ROTCE for the three months ended December 31, 2024 were restated to 9.33% and 18.91%, respectively, from 9.47% and 19.19%, due to exclusion of Loan Servicing Assets.
    2 As used in this press release, core ROA, core ROE, ROTCE, core ROTCE, and Tangible Book Value are non-GAAP financial measures. These non-GAAP financial metrics exclude merger-related and other certain one-time non-recurring pre-tax adjustments and tax impacts of such adjustments. Reconciliations of these and other non–GAAP measures to their comparable GAAP measures are set forth in the Appendix at the end of this press release.
    3 4Q 2024 Tangible Book Value restated to $19.10 from previously reported amount of $18.77 due to exclusion of Loan Servicing Assets.


    Commercial Bank
    Continued Portfolio Loan Growth – Gross portfolio loans increased $55.6 million at March 31, 2025 compared to December 31, 2024, including $39.8 million of commercial and industrial loans, and $22.0 million of construction real estate loans. Historical gross portfolio loan balances are disclosed in the Composition of Loans table within the Historical Financial Highlights.

    Net Interest Income – Interest income of $48.2 million increased $2.1 million from the prior quarter, driven by loan growth and higher loan yields. Interest expense of $16.6 million decreased $0.6 million, resulting from a decrease in the average balance of borrowings in 1Q 2025.

    Credit Metrics – Nonperforming assets, comprised solely of nonaccrual loans, increased 27 bps to 1.21% of total assets at March 31, 2025 compared to December 31, 2024. Total nonaccrual loans at March 31, 2025 increased to $40.5 million compared to $30.2 million at December 31, 2024.

    Classified and Criticized Loans – At March 31, 2025, special mention loans totaled $63.0 million, or 2.4% of total portfolio loans, compared to $60.0 million, or 2.3% of total portfolio loans, at December 31, 2024. At March 31, 2025, substandard loans totaled $45.7 million, or 1.7% of total portfolio loans, compared to $48.4 million, or 1.8% of total portfolio loans, at December 31, 2024.

    OpenSky™
    Accounts – During 1Q 2025, the number of credit card accounts of 563.7 thousand increased by 11.2 thousand, or 2.0% (not annualized) from December 31, 2024, and increased 36.8 thousand, or 7.0% year-over-year.

    Loan and Deposit Balances – Loan balances, net of reserves, of $118.7 million at March 31, 2025 decreased by $9.1 million, or 28.7% (annualized), compared to December 31, 2024. Corresponding deposit balances of $168.8 million at March 31, 2025 increased $2.4 million, or 6.0% (annualized), compared to December 31, 2024. Gross unsecured loan balances of $39.0 million at March 31, 2025 decreased $3.4 million, or 32.9% (annualized), compared to $42.4 million at December 31, 2024, and increased $10.5 million year-over-year.

    Revenues – Total revenue of $18.2 million decreased $1.0 million from the prior quarter. Interest income of $14.4 million decreased $1.0 million from the prior quarter. Average OpenSky™ credit card loan balances, net of reserves and deferred fees of $118.7 million for 1Q 2025, decreased $2.3 million, or 1.9% (not annualized), compared to the prior quarter. Noninterest income of $3.7 million remained generally consistent compared to the prior quarter.

    Noninterest Expense – Total noninterest expense of $13.3 million decreased $0.7 million, primarily related to advertising related expenses due to seasonality.

    OpenSky™Credit – Portfolio credit metrics continue to be generally consistent with modeled expectations during 1Q 2025. The provision for credit losses of $1.8 million increased $0.6 million when compared to the prior quarter. OpenSky’s unsecured loan product continues to be offered exclusively to current and former secured card customers in order to retain customer who have successfully improved their credit profiles. Unsecured loans have been offered by OpenSky since the fourth quarter of 2021 and have performed according to management expectations over that time period.

    Capital Bank Home Loans
    Originations of loans held for sale totaled $65.8 million during 1Q 2025, with $54.1 million of mortgage loans sold resulting in a gain on sale of loans of $1.7 million, representing a 3.07% of gain on sale as a percentage of total loans sold. Originations of loans held for sale totaled $90.0 million during 4Q 2024, with $77.4 million of mortgage loans sold resulting in a gain on sale of loans of $1.9 million, representing a 2.45% of gain on sale as a percentage of total loans sold.

    Windsor Advantage
    Gross government loan servicing revenue totaled $4.6 million, including $1.0 million of Capital Bank related servicing fees, during 1Q 2025. Gross government loan servicing revenue totaled $4.6 million, including $0.9 million of Capital Bank related servicing fees, during 4Q 2024. Windsor’s total servicing portfolio was $2.6 billion at March 31, 2025, and $2.5 billion at December 31, 2024.

    COMPARATIVE FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS – Unaudited
                               
      Quarter Ended   1Q25 vs 4Q24   1Q25 vs 1Q24
    (in thousands, except per share data) March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
      $
    Change
      %
    Change
      $
    Change
      %
    Change
    Earnings Summary                          
    Interest income $ 62,760     $ 61,707     $ 48,369     $ 1,053     1.7 %   $ 14,391     29.8 %
    Interest expense   16,713       17,380       13,361       (667 )   (3.8 )%     3,352     25.1 %
    Net interest income   46,047       44,327       35,008       1,720     3.9 %     11,039     31.5 %
    Provision for credit losses   2,246       7,828       2,727       (5,582 )   (71.3 )%     (481 )   (17.6 )%
    Provision for credit losses on unfunded commitments   —       122       142       (122 )   (100.0 )%     (142 )   (100.0 )%
    Noninterest income   12,549       11,913       5,972       636     5.3 %     6,577     110.1 %
    Noninterest expense   38,053       37,514       29,487       539     1.4 %     8,566     29.1 %
    Income before income taxes   18,297       10,776       8,624       7,521     69.8 %     9,673     112.2 %
    Income tax expense   4,365       3,243       2,062       1,122     34.6 %     2,303     111.7 %
    Net income $ 13,932     $ 7,533     $ 6,562     $ 6,399     84.9 %   $ 7,370     112.3 %
                               
    Pre-tax pre-provision net revenue (“PPNR”) (1) $ 20,543     $ 18,726     $ 11,493     $ 1,817     9.7 %   $ 9,050     78.7 %
    Core PPNR(1) $ 21,809     $ 23,961     $ 12,205     $ (2,152 )   (9.0 )%   $ 9,604     78.7 %
                               
    Common Share Data                          
    Earnings per share – Basic $ 0.84     $ 0.45     $ 0.47     $ 0.39     86.7 %   $ 0.37     78.7 %
    Earnings per share – Diluted $ 0.82     $ 0.45     $ 0.47     $ 0.37     82.2 %   $ 0.35     74.5 %
    Core earnings per share – Diluted(1) $ 0.88     $ 0.92     $ 0.51     $ (0.04 )   (4.3 )%   $ 0.37     72.5 %
    Weighted average common shares – Basic   16,666       16,595       13,919                  
    Weighted average common shares – Diluted   16,925       16,729       13,919                  
                               
    Return Ratios                          
    Return on average assets (annualized)   1.75 %     0.96 %     1.15 %                
    Core return on average assets (annualized)(1)   1.87 %     1.97 %     1.24 %                
    Return on average equity (annualized)   15.56 %     8.50 %     10.19 %                
    Core return on average equity (annualized)(1)   16.64 %     17.46 %     11.03 %                
    Return on average tangible common equity (annualized)(1)   17.57 %     9.33 %     10.19 %                
    Core return on average tangible common equity (annualized)(1)   18.77 %     18.91 %     11.03 %                

    ______________
    (1) Refer to Appendix for reconciliation of non-GAAP measures.

    COMPARATIVE FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS – Unaudited (Continued)
                           
      Quarter Ended       Quarter Ended
      March 31,     December 31,   September 30,   June 30,
    (in thousands, except per share data)   2025     2024   % Change     2024     2024     2024
    Balance Sheet Highlights                      
    Assets $ 3,349,805   $ 2,324,238   44.1 %   $ 3,206,911   $ 2,560,788   $ 2,438,583
    Investment securities available-for-sale   213,452     202,254   5.5 %     223,630     208,700     207,917
    Mortgage loans held for sale   34,656     10,303   236.4 %     21,270     19,554     19,219
    Portfolio loans receivable (2)   2,678,406     1,964,525   36.3 %     2,630,163     2,107,522     2,021,588
    Allowance for credit losses   48,454     29,350   65.1 %     48,652     31,925     30,832
    Deposits   2,891,333     2,005,695   44.2 %     2,761,939     2,186,224     2,100,428
    FHLB borrowings   22,000     22,000   — %     22,000     52,000     32,000
    Other borrowed funds   12,062     12,062   — %     12,062     12,062     12,062
    Total stockholders’ equity   369,577     259,465   42.4 %     355,139     280,111     267,854
    Tangible common equity (1)   329,936     259,465   27.2 %     318,196     280,111     267,854
                           
    Common shares outstanding   16,657     13,890   19.9 %     16,663     13,918     13,910
    Book value per share $ 22.19   $ 18.68   18.8 %   $ 21.31   $ 20.13   $ 19.26
    Tangible book value per share (1) $ 19.81   $ 18.68   6.0 %   $ 19.10   $ 20.13   $ 19.26
    Dividends per share $ 0.10   $ 0.08   25.0 %   $ 0.10   $ 0.10   $ 0.08

    ______________
    (1) Refer to Appendix for reconciliation of non-GAAP measures.
    (2) Loans are reflected net of deferred fees and costs.

    Consolidated Statements of Income (Unaudited)
      Three Months Ended
    (in thousands) March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      September 30,
    2024
      June 30,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    Interest income                  
    Loans, including fees $ 58,691   $ 58,602     $ 50,047   $ 48,275   $ 45,991
    Investment securities available-for-sale   1,861     1,539       1,343     1,308     1,251
    Federal funds sold and other   2,208     1,566       1,220     1,032     1,127
    Total interest income   62,760     61,707       52,610     50,615     48,369
                       
    Interest expense                  
    Deposits   16,512     16,385       13,902     13,050     12,833
    Borrowed funds   201     995       354     508     528
    Total interest expense   16,713     17,380       14,256     13,558     13,361
                       
    Net interest income   46,047     44,327       38,354     37,057     35,008
    Provision for credit losses   2,246     7,828       3,748     3,417     2,727
    Provision for credit losses on unfunded commitments   —     122       17     104     142
    Net interest income after provision for credit losses   43,801     36,377       34,589     33,536     32,139
    Noninterest income                  
    Service charges on deposits   258     241       235     200     207
    Credit card fees   3,722     3,733       4,055     4,330     3,881
    Mortgage banking revenue   1,831     1,821       1,882     1,990     1,453
    Government lending revenue   1,096     2,301       —     —     —
    Government loan servicing revenue   3,568     3,993       —     —     —
    Loan servicing rights (government guaranteed)   472     1,013       —     —     —
    Non-recurring equity and debt investment write-down   —     (2,620 )     —     —     —
    Other income   1,602     1,431       463     370     431
    Total noninterest income   12,549     11,913       6,635     6,890     5,972
    Noninterest expenses                  
    Salaries and employee benefits   18,067     16,513       13,345     13,272     12,907
    Occupancy and equipment   2,910     2,976       1,791     1,864     1,613
    Professional fees   2,112     2,150       1,980     1,769     1,947
    Data processing   7,112     7,210       6,930     6,788     6,761
    Advertising   1,779     1,032       1,223     2,072     2,032
    Loan processing   743     969       615     476     371
    Foreclosed real estate expenses, net   1     —       1     —     1
    Merger-related expenses   1,266     2,615       520     83     712
    Operational losses   903     993       1,008     782     931
    Regulatory assessment expenses   889     484       427     553     473
    Other operating   2,271     2,572       1,885     1,834     1,739
    Total noninterest expenses   38,053     37,514       29,725     29,493     29,487
    Income before income taxes   18,297     10,776       11,499     10,933     8,624
    Income tax expense   4,365     3,243       2,827     2,728     2,062
    Net income $ 13,932   $ 7,533     $ 8,672   $ 8,205   $ 6,562
     
    Consolidated Balance Sheets
      (unaudited)   (audited)   (unaudited)   (unaudited)   (unaudited)
    (in thousands, except share data) March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      September 30,
    2024
      June 30,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    Assets                  
    Cash and due from banks $ 27,836     $ 25,433     $ 23,462     $ 19,294     $ 12,361  
    Interest-bearing deposits at other financial institutions   266,092       179,841       133,180       117,160       72,787  
    Federal funds sold   59       58       58       57       56  
    Total cash and cash equivalents   293,987       205,332       156,700       136,511       85,204  
    Investment securities available-for-sale   213,452       223,630       208,700       207,917       202,254  
    Restricted investments   7,031       4,479       5,895       4,930       4,441  
    Loans held for sale   34,656       21,270       19,554       19,219       10,303  
    Portfolio loans receivable, net of deferred fees and costs   2,678,406       2,630,163       2,107,522       2,021,588       1,964,525  
    Less allowance for credit losses   (48,454 )     (48,652 )     (31,925 )     (30,832 )     (29,350 )
    Total portfolio loans held for investment, net   2,629,952       2,581,511       2,075,597       1,990,756       1,935,175  
    Premises and equipment, net   15,085       15,525       5,959       5,551       4,500  
    Accrued interest receivable   19,458       16,664       12,468       12,162       12,258  
    Goodwill   24,085       21,126       —       —       —  
    Intangible assets   13,861       14,072       —       —       —  
    Core deposit intangibles   1,695       1,745       —       —       —  
    Loan servicing assets   2,244       5,511       —       —       —  
    Deferred tax asset   15,902       16,670       10,748       12,150       12,311  
    Bank owned life insurance   44,335       43,956       38,779       38,414       38,062  
    Other assets   34,062       35,420       26,388       10,973       19,730  
    Total assets $ 3,349,805     $ 3,206,911     $ 2,560,788     $ 2,438,583     $ 2,324,238  
                       
    Liabilities                  
    Deposits                  
    Noninterest-bearing $ 812,224     $ 810,928     $ 718,120     $ 684,574     $ 665,812  
    Interest-bearing   2,079,109       1,951,011       1,468,104       1,415,854       1,339,883  
    Total deposits   2,891,333       2,761,939       2,186,224       2,100,428       2,005,695  
    Federal Home Loan Bank advances   22,000       22,000       52,000       32,000       22,000  
    Other borrowed funds   12,062       12,062       12,062       12,062       12,062  
    Accrued interest payable   9,995       9,393       8,503       6,573       6,009  
    Other liabilities   44,838       46,378       21,888       19,666       19,007  
    Total liabilities   2,980,228       2,851,772       2,280,677       2,170,729       2,064,773  
                       
    Stockholders’ equity                  
    Common stock   167       167       139       139       139  
    Additional paid-in capital   128,692       128,598       55,585       55,005       54,229  
    Retained earnings   249,925       237,843       232,995       225,824       218,731  
    Accumulated other comprehensive loss   (9,207 )     (11,469 )     (8,608 )     (13,114 )     (13,634 )
    Total stockholders’ equity   369,577       355,139       280,111       267,854       259,465  
    Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity $ 3,349,805     $ 3,206,911     $ 2,560,788     $ 2,438,583     $ 2,324,238  

    The following tables show the average outstanding balance of each principal category of our assets, liabilities and stockholders’ equity, together with the average yields on our assets and the average costs of our liabilities for the periods indicated. Such yields and costs are calculated by dividing the annualized income or expense by the average daily balances of the corresponding assets or liabilities for the same period.

      Three Months Ended
    March 31, 2025
      Three Months Ended
    December 31, 2024
      Three Months Ended
    March 31, 2024
      Average
    Outstanding
    Balance
      Interest
    Income/
    Expense
      Average
    Yield/
    Rate(1)
      Average
    Outstanding
    Balance
      Interest
    Income/
    Expense
      Average
    Yield/
    Rate(1)
      Average
    Outstanding
    Balance
      Interest
    Income/
    Expense
      Average
    Yield/
    Rate(1)
      (in thousands)
    Assets                                  
    Interest earning assets:                                  
    Interest-bearing deposits $ 203,053   $ 2,138   4.27 %   $ 140,206   $ 1,446   4.10 %   $ 84,531   $ 1,049   4.99 %
    Federal funds sold   58     1   6.99       58     —   —       56     1   7.18  
    Investment securities available-for-sale   235,605     1,861   3.20       236,951     1,539   2.58       233,231     1,251   2.16  
    Restricted investments   5,761     69   4.86       7,292     120   6.55       4,601     77   6.73  
    Loans held for sale   9,356     238   10.32       25,614     193   3.00       4,872     83   6.85  
    Portfolio loans receivable(2)(3)   2,634,110     58,453   9.00       2,592,960     58,409   8.96       1,927,372     45,908   9.58  
    Total interest earning assets   3,087,943     62,760   8.24       3,003,081     61,707   8.17       2,254,663     48,369   8.63  
    Noninterest earning assets   134,021             117,026             44,571        
    Total assets $ 3,221,964           $ 3,120,107           $ 2,299,234        
                                       
    Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity                                  
    Interest-bearing liabilities:                                  
    Interest-bearing demand accounts $ 242,355     368   0.62     $ 257,446     424   0.66     $ 183,217     110   0.24  
    Savings   13,204     18   0.55       13,497     20   0.59       4,841     1   0.08  
    Money market accounts   869,978     7,399   3.45       763,526     7,131   3.72       682,414     7,136   4.21  
    Time deposits   859,729     8,727   4.12       847,618     8,810   4.13       449,963     5,586   4.99  
    Borrowed funds   34,062     201   2.39       97,116     995   4.08       58,963     528   3.60  
    Total interest-bearing liabilities   2,019,328     16,713   3.36       1,979,203     17,380   3.49       1,379,398     13,361   3.90  
    Noninterest-bearing liabilities:                                  
    Noninterest-bearing liabilities   56,503             58,460             23,820        
    Noninterest-bearing deposits   783,018             729,907             637,124        
    Stockholders’ equity   363,115             352,537             258,892        
    Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity $ 3,221,964           $ 3,120,107           $ 2,299,234        
                                       
    Net interest spread         4.88 %           4.68 %           4.73 %
    Net interest income     $ 46,047           $ 44,327           $ 35,008    
    Net interest margin(4)         6.05 %           5.87 %           6.24 %

    _______________
    (1)   Annualized.
    (2)   Includes nonaccrual loans.
    (3)   For the three months ended March 31, 2025, December 31, 2024, and March 31, 2024, collectively, Commercial Bank Loan Yield was 7.14%, 6.98% and 6.96%, respectively.
    (4)   For the three months ended March 31, 2025, December 31, 2024, and March 31, 2024, collectively, Commercial Bank Net Interest Margin was 4.32%, 3.99% and 3.77%, respectively.

    The Company’s reportable segments represent business units with discrete financial information whose results are regularly reviewed by management. The four segments include Commercial Banking, Capital Bank Home Loans (the Company’s mortgage loan division), OpenSky™ (the Company’s credit card division) and Windsor Advantage.

    Effective January 1, 2024, the Company allocated certain expenses previously recorded directly to the Commercial Bank segment to the other segments. These expenses are for shared services also consumed by OpenSky™, CBHL, and Windsor. The Company performs an allocation process based on several metrics the Company believes more accurately ascribe shared service overhead to each segment. The Company believes this reflects the cost of support for each segment that should be considered in assessing segment performance. Historical information has been recast to reflect financial information consistently with the 2024 presentation.

    The following schedule presents financial information for the periods indicated. Total assets are presented as of March 31, 2025, December 31, 2024, and March 31, 2024.

    Segments                    
    For the three months ended March 31, 2025        
    (in thousands)   Commercial
    Bank
      CBHL   OpenSky™   Windsor
    Advantage
      Consolidated
    Interest income   $ 48,164   $ 152     $ 14,444   $ —   $ 62,760
    Interest expense     16,649     64       —     —     16,713
    Net interest income     31,515     88       14,444     —     46,047
    Provision for credit losses     446     —       1,800     —     2,246
    Net interest income after provision     31,069     88       12,644     —     43,801
    Noninterest income     2,474     1,736       3,733     4,606     12,549
    Noninterest expense(1)     18,560     2,531       13,302     3,660     38,053
    Net income (loss) before taxes   $ 14,983   $ (707 )   $ 3,075   $ 946   $ 18,297
                         
    Total assets   $ 3,192,327   $ 14,092     $ 119,636   $ 23,750   $ 3,349,805
                         
    For the three months ended December 31, 2024        
    (in thousands)   Commercial
    Bank
      CBHL   OpenSky™   Windsor
    Advantage
      Consolidated
    Interest income   $ 46,061   $ 192     $ 15,454   $ —   $ 61,707
    Interest expense     17,249     131       —     —     17,380
    Net interest income     28,812     61       15,454     —     44,327
    Provision for credit losses     6,651     —       1,177     —     7,828
    Provision for credit losses on unfunded commitments     122     —       —     —     122
    Net interest income after provision     22,039     61       14,277     —     36,377
    Noninterest income     1,928     1,676       3,743     4,566     11,913
    Noninterest expense(1)     19,872     2,377       12,595     2,670     37,514
    Net income (loss) before taxes   $ 4,095   $ (640 )   $ 5,425   $ 1,896   $ 10,776
                         
    Total assets   $ 3,033,792   $ 21,691     $ 125,913   $ 25,515   $ 3,206,911
                         
    For the three months ended March 31, 2024        
    (in thousands)   Commercial
    Bank
      CBHL   OpenSky™   Windsor
    Advantage
      Consolidated
    Interest income   $ 33,365   $ 83     $ 14,921   $ —   $ 48,369
    Interest expense     13,320     41       —     —     13,361
    Net interest income     20,045     42       14,921     —     35,008
    Provision for credit losses     1,168     —       1,559     —     2,727
    Provision for credit losses on unfunded commitments     142     —       —     —     142
    Net interest income after provision     18,735     42       13,362     —     32,139
    Noninterest income     705     1,352       3,915     —     5,972
    Noninterest expense(1)     13,783     2,105       13,599     —     29,487
    Net income (loss) before taxes   $ 5,657   $ (711 )   $ 3,678   $ —   $ 8,624
                         
    Total assets   $ 2,208,135   $ 10,785     $ 105,318   $ —   $ 2,324,238

    ________________________
    (1)  Noninterest expense includes $6.4 million, $6.3 million, and $6.1 million in data processing expense in OpenSky’s™ segment for the three months ended March 31, 2025, December 31, 2024, and March 31, 2024, respectively.

    HISTORICAL FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS – Unaudited
        Quarter Ended
    (in thousands, except per share data)   March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      September 30,
    2024
      June 30,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    Earnings:                    
    Net income   $ 13,932     $ 7,533     $ 8,672     $ 8,205     $ 6,562  
    Earnings per common share, diluted     0.82       0.45       0.62       0.59       0.47  
    Net interest margin     6.05 %     5.87 %     6.41 %     6.46 %     6.24 %
    Commercial Bank net interest margin(2)     4.32 %     3.99 %     4.01 %     3.90 %     3.77 %
    Return on average assets(1)     1.75 %     0.96 %     1.42 %     1.40 %     1.15 %
    Return on average equity(1)     15.56 %     8.50 %     12.59 %     12.53 %     10.19 %
    Efficiency ratio     64.94 %     66.70 %     66.07 %     67.11 %     71.95 %
                         
    Balance Sheet:                    
    Total portfolio loans receivable, net deferred fees   $ 2,678,406     $ 2,630,163     $ 2,107,522     $ 2,021,588     $ 1,964,525  
    Total deposits     2,891,333       2,761,939       2,186,224       2,100,428       2,005,695  
    Total assets     3,349,805       3,206,911       2,560,788       2,438,583       2,324,238  
    Total stockholders’ equity     369,577       355,139       280,111       267,854       259,465  
    Total average portfolio loans receivable, net deferred fees     2,634,110       2,592,960       2,053,619       1,992,630       1,927,372  
    Total average deposits     2,768,284       2,611,994       2,091,294       2,010,736       1,957,559  
    Portfolio loans-to-deposit ratio (period-end balances)     92.64 %     95.23 %     96.40 %     96.25 %     97.95 %
    Portfolio loans-to-deposit ratio (average balances)     95.15 %     99.27 %     98.20 %     99.10 %     98.46 %
                         
    Asset Quality Ratios:                    
    Nonperforming assets to total assets     1.21 %     0.94 %     0.60 %     0.58 %     0.62 %
    Nonperforming loans to total loans     1.51 %     1.15 %     0.73 %     0.70 %     0.73 %
    Net charge-offs to average portfolio loans (1)     0.38 %     0.37 %     0.51 %     0.39 %     0.41 %
    Allowance for credit losses to total loans     1.81 %     1.85 %     1.51 %     1.53 %     1.49 %
    Allowance for credit losses to non-performing loans     119.73 %     160.88 %     206.50 %     219.40 %     204.37 %
                         
    Bank Capital Ratios:                    
    Total risk based capital ratio     13.00 %     12.79 %     13.76 %     14.51 %     14.36 %
    Tier-1 risk based capital ratio     11.75 %     11.54 %     12.50 %     13.25 %     13.10 %
    Leverage ratio     9.27 %     9.17 %     9.84 %     10.36 %     10.29 %
    Common Equity Tier-1 capital ratio     11.75 %     11.54 %     12.50 %     13.25 %     13.10 %
    Tangible common equity     8.66 %     9.31 %     9.12 %     9.53 %     9.66 %
    Holding Company Capital Ratios:                    
    Total risk based capital ratio     15.05 %     15.48 %     16.65 %     16.98 %     16.83 %
    Tier-1 risk based capital ratio     13.41 %     13.83 %     14.88 %     15.19 %     15.03 %
    Leverage ratio     10.68 %     11.07 %     11.85 %     11.93 %     11.87 %
    Common Equity Tier-1 capital ratio     13.33 %     13.74 %     14.78 %     15.08 %     14.92 %
    Tangible common equity     9.94 %     11.07 %     10.94 %     10.98 %     11.16 %

    _______________
    (1)   Annualized.
    (2)   Refer to Appendix for reconciliation of non-GAAP measures.

    HISTORICAL FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS – Unaudited (Continued)
        Quarter Ended
    (in thousands, except per share data)   March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      September 30,
    2024
      June 30,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    Composition of Loans:                    
    Commercial real estate, non owner-occupied   $ 484,399     $ 471,329     $ 403,487     $ 397,080     $ 377,224  
    Commercial real estate, owner-occupied     420,643       440,026       351,462       319,370       330,840  
    Residential real estate     693,597       688,552       623,684       601,312       577,112  
    Construction real estate     343,280       321,252       301,909       294,489       290,016  
    Commercial and industrial     594,331       554,550       271,811       255,686       254,577  
    Lender finance     23,165       28,574       29,546       33,294       13,484  
    Business equity lines of credit     3,468       3,090       2,663       2,989       14,768  
    Credit card, net of reserve(2)     118,709       127,766       127,098       122,217       111,898  
    Other consumer loans     2,200       2,089       2,045       1,930       738  
    Portfolio loans receivable   $ 2,683,792     $ 2,637,228     $ 2,113,705     $ 2,028,367     $ 1,970,657  
    Deferred origination fees, net     (5,386 )     (7,065 )     (6,183 )     (6,779 )     (6,132 )
    Portfolio loans receivable, net   $ 2,678,406     $ 2,630,163     $ 2,107,522     $ 2,021,588     $ 1,964,525  
                         
    Composition of Deposits:                    
    Noninterest-bearing   $ 812,224     $ 810,928     $ 718,120     $ 684,574     $ 665,812  
    Interest-bearing demand     296,455       238,881       266,493       266,070       193,963  
    Savings     12,819       13,488       3,763       4,270       4,525  
    Money markets     912,418       816,708       686,526       672,455       678,435  
    Customer time deposits     549,630       548,901       358,300       317,911       302,319  
    Brokered time deposits     307,787       333,033       153,022       155,148       160,641  
    Total deposits   $ 2,891,333     $ 2,761,939     $ 2,186,224     $ 2,100,428     $ 2,005,695  
                         
    Capital Bank Home Loan Metrics:                    
    Origination of loans held for sale   $ 65,815     $ 89,998     $ 74,690     $ 82,363     $ 52,080  
    Mortgage loans sold     54,144       77,399       67,296       66,417       40,377  
    Gain on sale of loans     1,664       1,897       1,644       1,732       1,238  
    Purchase volume as a % of originations     90.73 %     90.42 %     90.98 %     96.48 %     97.83 %
    Gain on sale as a % of loans sold(3)     3.07 %     2.45 %     2.44 %     2.61 %     3.07 %
    Mortgage commissions   $ 545     $ 620     $ 598     $ 582     $ 490  
                         
    OpenSky™Portfolio Metrics:                    
    Open customer accounts     563,718       552,566       548,952       537,734       526,950  
    Secured credit card loans, gross   $ 81,252     $ 87,226     $ 89,641     $ 90,961     $ 85,663  
    Unsecured credit card loans, gross     38,987       42,430       39,730       33,560       28,508  
    Noninterest secured credit card deposits     168,796       166,355       170,750       173,499       171,771  

    _______________
    (3)   Credit card loans are presented net of reserve for interest and fees.
    (4)   Gain on sale percentage is calculated as gain on sale of loans divided by mortgage loans sold.

    Appendix

    Reconciliation of Non-GAAP Measures

    The Company has presented the following non-GAAP (U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) financial measures because it believes that these measures provide useful and comparative information to assess trends in the Company’s results of operations and financial condition. Presentation of these non-GAAP financial measures is consistent with how the Company evaluates its performance internally and these non-GAAP financial measures are frequently used by securities analysts, investors and other interested parties in the evaluation of companies in the Company’s industry. Investors should recognize that the Company’s presentation of these non-GAAP financial measures might not be comparable to similarly-titled measures of other companies. These non-GAAP financial measures should not be considered a substitute for GAAP basis measures and the Company strongly encourages a review of its condensed consolidated financial statements in their entirety.

    Core Earnings Metrics Quarter Ended
    (in thousands, except per share data) March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      September 30,
    2024
      June 30,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
                       
    Net Income $ 13,932     $ 7,533     $ 8,672     $ 8,205     $ 6,562  
    Add: Merger-Related Expenses, net of tax   964       2,151       557       62       538  
    Add: Non-recurring equity and debt investment write-down   —       2,620       —       —       —  
    Add: IFH ACL Provision, net of tax   —       3,169       —       —       —  
    Core Net Income $ 14,896     $ 15,473     $ 9,229     $ 8,267     $ 7,100  
                       
    Weighted Average Common Shares – Diluted   16,925       16,729       13,951       13,895       13,919  
    Earnings per Share – Diluted $ 0.82     $ 0.45     $ 0.62     $ 0.59     $ 0.47  
    Core Earnings per Share – Diluted $ 0.88     $ 0.92     $ 0.66     $ 0.59     $ 0.51  
                       
    Average Assets $ 3,221,964     $ 3,120,107     $ 2,437,870     $ 2,353,868     $ 2,299,234  
    Return on Average Assets(1)   1.75 %     0.96 %     1.42 %     1.40 %     1.15 %
    Core Return on Average Assets(1)   1.87 %     1.97 %     1.51 %     1.41 %     1.24 %
                       
    Average Equity $ 363,115     $ 352,537     $ 274,087     $ 263,425     $ 258,892  
    Return on Average Equity(1)   15.56 %     8.50 %     12.59 %     12.53 %     10.19 %
    Core Return on Average Equity(1)   16.64 %     17.46 %     13.40 %     12.62 %     11.03 %
                       
    Net Interest Income (a) $ 46,047     $ 44,327     $ 38,354     $ 37,057     $ 35,008  
    Noninterest Income   12,549       11,913       6,635       6,890       5,972  
    Total Revenue $ 58,596     $ 56,240     $ 44,989     $ 43,947     $ 40,980  
    Noninterest Expense $ 38,053     $ 37,514     $ 29,725     $ 29,493     $ 29,487  
    Efficiency Ratio(2)   64.9 %     66.7 %     66.1 %     67.1 %     72.0 %
                       
    Noninterest Income $ 12,549     $ 11,913     $ 6,635     $ 6,890     $ 5,972  
    Add: Non-recurring equity and debt investment write-down   —       2,620       —       —       —  
    Core Fee Revenue (b) $ 12,549     $ 14,533     $ 6,635     $ 6,890     $ 5,972  
    Core Revenue (a) + (b) $ 58,596     $ 58,860     $ 44,989     $ 43,947     $ 40,980  
                       
    Noninterest Expense $ 38,053     $ 37,514     $ 29,725     $ 29,493     $ 29,487  
    Less: Merger-Related Expenses   1,266       2,615       520       83       712  
    Core Noninterest Expense $ 36,787     $ 34,899     $ 29,205     $ 29,410     $ 28,775  
    Core Efficiency Ratio(2)   62.8 %     59.3 %     64.9 %     66.9 %     70.2 %

    _______________
    (1)   Annualized.
    (2)   The efficiency ratio is calculated by dividing noninterest expense by total revenue (net interest income plus noninterest income).

    Commercial Bank Net Interest Margin Quarter Ended
    (in thousands) March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      September 30,
    2024
      June 30,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
                       
    Commercial Bank Net Interest Income $ 31,515     $ 28,812     $ 22,676     $ 21,223     $ 20,045  
    Average Interest Earning Assets   3,087,943       3,003,081       2,380,946       2,307,070       2,254,663  
    Less: Average Non-Commercial Bank Interest Earning Assets   128,278       133,401       129,906       119,801       116,197  
    Average Commercial Bank Interest Earning Assets $ 2,959,665     $ 2,869,680     $ 2,251,040     $ 2,187,269     $ 2,138,466  
    Commercial Bank Net Interest Margin   4.32 %     3.99 %     4.01 %     3.90 %     3.77 %
    Commercial Bank Portfolio Loans Receivable Yield Quarter Ended
    (in thousands) March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      September 30,
    2024
      June 30,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
                       
    Portfolio Loans Receivable Interest Income $ 58,453     $ 58,409     $ 49,886     $ 48,143     $ 45,908  
    Less: Credit Card Loan Income   14,148       15,022       15,137       15,205       14,457  
    Commercial Bank Portfolio Loans Receivable Interest Income $ 44,305     $ 43,387     $ 34,749     $ 32,938     $ 31,451  
    Average Portfolio Loans Receivable   2,634,110       2,592,960       2,053,619       1,992,630       1,927,372  
    Less: Average Credit Card Loans   118,723       120,993       119,458       111,288       110,483  
    Total Commercial Bank Average Portfolio Loans Receivable $ 2,515,387     $ 2,471,967     $ 1,934,161     $ 1,881,342     $ 1,816,889  
    Commercial Bank Portfolio Loans Receivable Yield   7.14 %     6.98 %     7.15 %     7.04 %     6.96 %
    Pre-tax, Pre-Provision Net Revenue (“PPNR”) Quarter Ended
    (in thousands) March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      September 30,
    2024
      June 30,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
                       
    Net Income $ 13,932   $ 7,533   $ 8,672   $ 8,205   $ 6,562
    Add: Income Tax Expense   4,365     3,243     2,827     2,728     2,062
    Add: Provision for Credit Losses   2,246     7,828     3,748     3,417     2,727
    Add: Provision for Credit Losses on Unfunded Commitments   —     122     17     104     142
    Pre-tax, Pre-Provision Net Revenue (“PPNR”) $ 20,543   $ 18,726   $ 15,264   $ 14,454   $ 11,493
    Core PPNR Quarter Ended
    (in thousands) March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      September 30,
    2024
      June 30,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
                       
    Net Income $ 13,932   $ 7,533   $ 8,672   $ 8,205   $ 6,562
    Add: Income Tax Expense   4,365     3,243     2,827     2,728     2,062
    Add: Provision for Credit Losses   2,246     7,828     3,748     3,417     2,727
    Add: Provision for Credit Losses on Unfunded Commitments   —     122     17     104     142
    Add: Merger-Related Expenses   1,266     2,615     520     83     712
    Add: Non-recurring equity and debt investment write-down   —     2,620     —     —     —
    Core PPNR $ 21,809   $ 23,961   $ 15,784   $ 14,537   $ 12,205
    Allowance for Credit Losses to Total Portfolio Loans Quarter Ended
    (in thousands) March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      September 30,
    2024
      June 30,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
                       
    Allowance for Credit Losses $ 48,454     $ 48,652     $ 31,925     $ 30,832     $ 29,350  
    Total Portfolio Loans   2,678,406       2,630,163       2,107,522       2,021,588       1,964,525  
    Allowance for Credit Losses to Total Portfolio Loans   1.81 %     1.85 %     1.51 %     1.53 %     1.49 %
    Commercial Bank Allowance for Credit Losses to Commercial Bank Portfolio Loans Quarter Ended
    (in thousands) March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      September 30,
    2024
      June 30,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
                       
    Allowance for Credit Losses $ 48,454     $ 48,652     $ 31,925     $ 30,832     $ 29,350  
    Less: Credit Card Allowance for Credit Losses   5,905       6,402       7,339       6,768       5,991  
    Commercial Bank Allowance for Credit Losses   42,549       42,250       24,586       24,064       23,359  
    Total Portfolio Loans   2,678,406       2,630,163       2,107,522       2,021,588       1,964,525  
    Less: Gross Credit Card Loans   115,991       122,928       121,718       116,180       106,572  
    Commercial Bank Portfolio Loans   2,562,415       2,507,235       1,985,804       1,905,408       1,857,953  
    Commercial Bank Allowance for Credit Losses to Total Portfolio Loans   1.67 %     1.70 %     1.24 %     1.26 %     1.26 %
    Nonperforming Assets to Total Assets Quarter Ended
    (in thousands) March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      September 30,
    2024
      June 30,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
                       
    Total Nonperforming Assets $ 40,471     $ 30,241     $ 15,460     $ 14,053     $ 14,361  
    Total Assets   3,349,805       3,206,911       2,560,788       2,438,583       2,324,238  
    Nonperforming Assets to Total Assets   1.21 %     0.94 %     0.60 %     0.58 %     0.62 %
    Nonperforming Loans to Total Portfolio Loans Quarter Ended
    (in thousands) March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      September 30,
    2024
      June 30,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
                       
    Total Nonperforming Loans $ 40,471     $ 30,241     $ 15,460     $ 14,053     $ 14,361  
    Total Portfolio Loans   2,678,406       2,630,163       2,107,522       2,021,588       1,964,525  
    Nonperforming Loans to Total Portfolio Loans   1.51 %     1.15 %     0.73 %     0.70 %     0.73 %
    Net Charge-Offs to Average Portfolio Loans Quarter Ended
    (in thousands) March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      September 30,
    2024
      June 30,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
                       
    Total Net Charge-Offs $ 2,444     $ 2,427     $ 2,655     $ 1,935     $ 1,987  
    Total Average Portfolio Loans   2,634,110       2,592,960       2,053,619       1,992,630       1,927,372  
    Net Charge-Offs to Average Portfolio Loans, Annualized   0.38 %     0.37 %     0.51 %     0.39 %     0.41 %
    Tangible Book Value per Share Quarter Ended
    (in thousands, except share and per share data) March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      September 30,
    2024
      June 30,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
                       
    Total Stockholders’ Equity $ 369,577   $ 355,139   $ 280,111   $ 267,854   $ 259,465
    Less: Preferred Equity   —     —     —     —     —
    Less: Intangible Assets   39,641     36,943     —     —     —
    Tangible Common Equity $ 329,936   $ 318,196   $ 280,111   $ 267,854   $ 259,465
    Period End Shares Outstanding   16,657,168     16,662,626     13,917,891     13,910,467     13,889,563
    Tangible Book Value per Share $ 19.81   $ 19.10   $ 20.13   $ 19.26   $ 18.68
    Return on Average Tangible Common Equity Quarter Ended
    (in thousands) March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      September 30,
    2024
      June 30,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
                       
    Net Income $ 13,932     $ 7,533     $ 8,672     $ 8,205     $ 6,562  
    Add: Intangible Amortization, Net of Tax   199       198       —       —       —  
    Net Tangible Income $ 14,131     $ 7,731     $ 8,672     $ 8,205     $ 6,562  
    Average Equity   363,115       352,537       274,087       263,425       258,892  
    Less: Average Intangible Assets   36,896       22,890       —       —       —  
    Net Average Tangible Common Equity $ 326,219     $ 329,647     $ 274,087     $ 263,425     $ 258,892  
    Return on Average Equity   15.56 %     8.50 %     12.59 %     12.53 %     10.19 %
    Return on Average Tangible Common Equity   17.57 %     9.33 %     12.59 %     12.53 %     10.19 %
    Core Return on Average Tangible Common Equity Quarter Ended
    (in thousands) March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      September 30,
    2024
      June 30,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
                       
    Net Income, as Adjusted $ 14,896     $ 15,473     $ 9,229     $ 8,267     $ 7,100  
    Add: Intangible Amortization, Net of Tax   199       198       —       —       —  
    Core Net Tangible Income $ 15,095     $ 15,671     $ 9,229     $ 8,267     $ 7,100  
    Core Return on Average Tangible Common Equity   18.77 %     18.91 %     13.40 %     12.62 %     11.03 %

    ABOUT CAPITAL BANCORP, INC.
    Capital Bancorp, Inc., Rockville, Maryland is a registered bank holding company incorporated under the laws of Maryland. Capital Bancorp has been providing financial services since 1999 and now operates bank branches in four locations in the Washington, D.C., Baltimore, other Maryland markets, one bank branch in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, one bank branch in Chicago, Illinois and one bank branch in Raleigh, North Carolina. Capital Bancorp had assets of approximately $3.3 billion at March 31, 2025 and its common stock is traded in the NASDAQ Global Market under the symbol “CBNK.” More information can be found at the Company’s website www.CapitalBankMD.com under its investor relations page.

    FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS
    This earnings release contains forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements reflect our current views with respect to, among other things, future events and our financial performance. Any statements about our management’s expectations, beliefs, plans, predictions, forecasts, objectives, assumptions or future events or performance are not historical facts and may be forward-looking. These statements are often, but not always, made through the use of words or phrases such as “anticipate,” “believes,” “can,” “could,” “may,” “predicts,” “potential,” “should,” “will,” “estimate,” “plans,” “projects,” “continuing,” “ongoing,” “expects,” “optimistic,” “intends” and similar words or phrases. Any or all of the forward-looking statements in this earnings release may turn out to be inaccurate. The inclusion of forward-looking information in this earnings release should not be regarded as a representation by us or any other person that the future plans, estimates or expectations contemplated by us will be achieved. We have based these forward-looking statements largely on our current expectations and projections about future events and financial trends that we believe may affect our financial condition, results of operations, business strategy and financial needs. Our actual results could differ materially from those anticipated in such forward-looking statements.  Accordingly, we caution you that any such forward-looking statements are not a guarantee of future performance and that actual results may prove to be materially different from the results expressed or implied by the forward-looking statements due to a number of factors. For details on some of the factors that could affect these expectations, see risk factors and other cautionary language included in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K and other periodic and current reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

    While there is no assurance that any list of risks and uncertainties or risk factors is complete, below are certain factors which could cause actual results to differ materially from those contained or implied in the forward-looking statements: changes in general economic, political, or industry conditions; geopolitical concerns, including the ongoing wars in Ukraine and in the Middle East; uncertainty in U.S. fiscal and monetary policy, including the interest rate policies of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; inflation/deflation, interest rate, market, and monetary fluctuations; volatility and disruptions in global capital and credit markets; competitive pressures on product pricing and services; success, impact, and timing of our business strategies, including market acceptance of any new products or services; the impact of changes in financial services policies, laws, and regulations, including those concerning taxes, banking, securities, and insurance, and the application thereof by regulatory bodies; cybersecurity threats and the cost of defending against them, including the costs of compliance with potential legislation to combat cybersecurity at a state, national, or global level; climate change, including any enhanced regulatory, compliance, credit and reputational risks and costs; the expected cost savings, synergies and other financial benefits from the acquisition of IFH or any other acquisition the Company has made or may make might not be realized within the expected time frames or at all; the effect of acquisitions we have made or may make, including, without limitation, the failure to achieve the expected revenue growth and/or expense savings from such acquisitions, and/or the failure to effectively integrate an acquisition target into our operations; and other factors that may affect our future results.

    These forward-looking statements are made as of the date of this communication, and the Company does not intend, and assumes no obligation, to update any forward-looking statement to reflect events or circumstances after the date on which the statement is made or to reflect the occurrence of unanticipated events or circumstances, except as required by law.

    FINANCIAL CONTACT: Dominic Canuso (301) 468-8848 x1403

    MEDIA CONTACT: Ed Barry (240) 283-1912

    WEB SITE: www.CapitalBankMD.com

    The MIL Network –

    April 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Russia must provide its response on Ukraine ceasefire

    Source: France-Diplomatie – Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development

    Excerpts from statements to the press by M. Emmanuel Macron, President of the Republic, from Madagascar (Antananarivo, April 24, 2025)

    (Check against delivery)

    (…)

    A few moments ago, in your speech here, you denounced “the mad armies that want to seize little bits of land”. However, a few minutes ago President Zelenskyy said the pressure on Russia isn’t strong enough, at a time when the United States is obviously preparing to recognize Crimea as Russian. Is peace getting further away today?

    THE PRESIDENT – First of all, I don’t want to speak for anyone. As you know, France’s position is steadfast. It won’t change. We’re in favour of the sovereignty of peoples and territorial integrity, respecting international law. Moreover, there are no double standards for France. That applies to Ukraine, it applies to the Middle East and it applies to the African continent. And I pride myself on that position.

    So we’ll continue to uphold the Ukrainian people’s right to live in peace on their territory and within their internationally-recognized borders. That’s why we’ve always condemned the Russian war of aggression.

    We’re at a moment when I hope peace can be built, and I want to pay tribute to the efforts made by US diplomacy. But I also want to remind you of the facts. There’s an aggressor, Russia, and an aggressee, Ukraine. A few weeks ago, under American impetus, President Zelenskyy made an incredible gesture. He said: “I agree to an unconditional ceasefire”.

    The only thing we have to ensure, the only thing – I repeated this to President Trump, to whom I spoke two days ago during the night – is for President Putin to finally stop lying. When President Putin talks to the US negotiators, he tells them: “I want peace.” When he talks to the whole planet, he says: “I personally want peace.” He continues to bomb Ukraine. He continues to kill people in Ukraine. There’s only one reply we’re waiting for. Does President Putin agree to an unconditional ceasefire? The Americans have proposed it, the Europeans support it, and President Zelenskyy has said yes. If President Putin says yes, the weapons fall silent tomorrow and lives are saved. The international community has just one thing to do, and America’s irritation should focus on only one person: President Putin. He must answer the question he’s asking him. Then we’ll be able to build a just, solid, lasting, robust peace – in other words, a peace that makes it possible to find territorial concessions and solid security guarantees.

    But as I speak, it’s not as if nothing had happened in the past few weeks. The Americans have proposed something, the Ukrainians have said yes, and we support it. Now Russia must provide its response. If Russia says, I’m not ready for a ceasefire, it will have lied to the US President, it will have lied to all those it told it wanted peace, and we’ll have to act accordingly. If it says yes, we’ll have a ceasefire tomorrow. (…)

    Are you going to speak to President Trump?

    THE PRESIDENT – I spoke to him 24 hours ago, the night before yesterday.

    Do you think he can modify his position? Or is he sticking with positions that are difficult to reconcile with those of the Europeans?

    THE PRESIDENT – He wants to find agreements, and I completely respect him. He wants a comprehensive peace agreement – he’s the negotiator too. But let me put things back in the right order. There can be no peace agreement if there isn’t already an agreement on what he’s got from President Zelenskyy, which was a huge step forward by President Zelenskyy.

    I say this very emphatically here: the first step, the one that – if I can put it like this – marks the beginning of everything, is the unconditional ceasefire that the Russians must accept.

    So, no freezing of the ceasefire line, of the current front line?

    THE PRESIDENT – But all the other issues are issues that come under a peace negotiation, which must subsequently be carried out, and they’ll take into account the military positions, the territorial issues and the security issues. But you can’t ask for this or that to be accepted while Russia continues bombing Kyiv. Put yourself in President Zelenskyy’s shoes: do you think he can make gestures of openness when his capital is currently being bombed? Let’s be reasonable. (…)

    When Donald Trump says that Ukraine lost Crimea years ago, is he wrong? Is he playing into Russia’s hands?

    THE PRESIDENT – No, he’s describing a factual situation. But is it our job to describe a factual situation? Since 2014, an army has conquered a territory, totally illegally, through violence and by killing people. That’s describing a factual situation, what he’s saying. Does that mean we should approve of it? No, in any case, not now. And it isn’t for us to do so, as I’ve always said, it’s up to Ukraine and its representatives to say that. So our collective job – which is what President Trump has committed to do – is to say “ceasefire”. (…)./.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: NXP Semiconductors Reports First Quarter 2025 Results, Announces Management Transition

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    EINDHOVEN, The Netherlands, April 28, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — NXP Semiconductors N.V. (NASDAQ: NXPI) today reported financial results for the first quarter, which ended March 30, 2025. “NXP delivered quarterly revenue of $2.84 billion, in-line with the midpoint of guidance. NXP’s first-quarter results and guidance for the second quarter underpin a cautious optimism that NXP continues to effectively navigate through a challenging set of market conditions. We are operating in a very uncertain environment influenced by tariffs with volatile direct and indirect effects. Considering these external factors, we are redoubling our efforts to manage what is in our direct control, enabling NXP to drive solid profitability and earnings,” said Kurt Sievers, NXP President and Chief Executive Officer.

    The company announced that Mr. Sievers has informed the Board of Directors of his intention to retire from NXP at the end of 2025. “Kurt has been a dynamic, visionary, and highly effective CEO of NXP since May 2020,” said Julie Southern, NXP’s Chair of the Board of Directors. “He has been instrumental in leading the definition and implementation of NXP’s strategy to be the leader in intelligent systems at the edge within the Automotive and Industrial & IoT end markets. After a successful 30-year career with NXP, we are saddened to see Kurt retire. We and the entire NXP community thank him for his leadership and wish him the absolute best in his retirement.”

    Following a comprehensive and thorough succession planning process, NXP’s Board of Directors announced that it has unanimously approved Mr. Rafael Sotomayor to succeed Mr. Sievers as President, effective April 28, 2025. Messrs. Sievers and Sotomayor will work closely to orchestrate a smooth leadership transition until October 28, 2025, when Mr. Sotomayor will assume the role of President and Chief Executive Officer. “Rafael has been an integral part of creating and shaping NXP’s strategy and enabling the company’s success. We are confident he is ideally suited to assume the role of President and CEO at NXP, and to execute the company’s vision for leadership in the intelligent systems at the edge within the Automotive and Industrial & IoT end markets,” said Ms. Southern.

    Mr. Sievers’ departure is a purely personal decision and is not related to any disagreement with the Board of Directors, or any issues relating to the strategic or financial performance of the company.

    Key Highlights for the First Quarter 2025:

    • Revenue was $2.84 billion, down 9 percent year-on-year;
    • GAAP gross margin was 55.0 percent, GAAP operating margin was 25.5 percent and GAAP diluted Net Income per Share was $1.92;
    • Non-GAAP gross margin was 56.1 percent, non-GAAP operating margin was 31.9 percent, and non-GAAP diluted Net Income per Share was $2.64;
    • Cash flow from operations was $565 million, with net capex investments of $138 million, resulting in non-GAAP free cash flow of $427 million;
    • Capital return during the quarter was $561 million, representing 131 percent of first quarter non-GAAP free cash flow. Share buybacks were $303 million and dividends paid during the quarter were $258 million. After the end of the first quarter, between March 31, 2025, and April 25, 2025, NXP executed via a 10b5-1 program additional share repurchases totaling $90 million;
    • On January 7, 2025, NXP announced the MCX L14x and MCX L25x, the first families in the ultra-low-power L Series of the MCX microcontroller portfolio. The MCX L series features a dual-core architecture with an independent ultra-low-power sense domain to enable challenging battery-limited applications, such as sensors for industrial monitoring, building management, and flow metering;
    • On January 8, 2025, Honeywell and NXP announced an expansion of its partnership that will accelerate aviation product development and chart the path for autonomous flight. The Honeywell Anthem cockpit is powered by NXP’s i.MX 8 applications processors to help improve operational efficiency, safety and unlock value for pilots and operators. This builds on the companies’ existing relationship, which is focused on helping optimize how building management systems sense and securely control energy consumption;
    • On January 15, 2025, NXP announced it has secured a €1 billion loan from the European Investment Bank (EIB) to advance the company’s RDI investments across its broad portfolio of semiconductor solutions. The €1 billion loan facility carries a weighted average interest rate of 4.54 percent when drawn in dollar denominated tranches, under the current market conditions and has a duration of six years;
    • On February 10, 2025, NXP announced the agreement to acquire Kinara Inc., an industry leader in high performance, energy-efficient and programmable discrete neural processing units (NPUs) to enable intelligence at the edge solutions. The all-cash transaction was valued at $307 million and is expected to close in the first half of 2025, subject to customary closing conditions, including regulatory clearances;
    • On March 11, 2025, NXP announced the new S32K5 family of automotive microcontrollers (MCU), the automotive industry’s first 16nm FinFET MCU with embedded magnetic RAM (MRAM). The S32K5 MCU family will extend the NXP CoreRide platform with pre-integrated zonal and electrification system solutions for scalable software-defined vehicle (SDV) architectures.

    Summary of Reported First Quarter 2025 ($ millions, unaudited) (1)

      Q1 2025 Q4 2024 Q1 2024 Q – Q Y – Y
    Total Revenue $ 2,835   $ 3,111   $ 3,126   -9 % -9 %
    GAAP Gross Profit $ 1,560   $ 1,678   $ 1,783   -7 % -13 %
    Gross Profit Adjustments (i) $ (31 ) $ (111 ) $ (35 )    
    Non-GAAP Gross Profit $ 1,591   $ 1,789   $ 1,818   -11 % -12 %
    GAAP Gross Margin   55.0 %   53.9 %   57.0 %    
    Non-GAAP Gross Margin   56.1 %   57.5 %   58.2 %    
    GAAP Operating Income (Loss) $ 723   $ 675   $ 856   7 % -16 %
    Operating Income Adjustments (i) $ (181 ) $ (390 ) $ (224 )    
    Non-GAAP Operating Income $ 904   $ 1,065   $ 1,080   -15 % -16 %
    GAAP Operating Margin   25.5 %   21.7 %   27.4 %    
    Non-GAAP Operating Margin   31.9 %   34.2 %   34.5 %    
    GAAP Net Income (Loss) attributable to Stockholders $ 490   $ 495   $ 639   -1 % -23 %
    Net Income Adjustments (i) $ (183 ) $ (322 ) $ (201 )    
    Non-GAAP Net Income (Loss) Attributable to Stockholders $ 673   $ 817   $ 840   -18 % -20 %
    GAAP diluted Net Income (Loss) per Share (ii) $ 1.92   $ 1.93   $ 2.47   — % -22 %
    Non-GAAP diluted Net Income (Loss) per Share (ii) $ 2.64   $ 3.18   $ 3.24   -17 % -19 %
    Additional information          
      Q1 2025 Q4 2024 Q1 2024 Q – Q Y – Y
    Automotive $ 1,674 $ 1,790 $ 1,804 -6 % -7 %
    Industrial & IoT $ 508 $ 516 $ 574 -2 % -11 %
    Mobile $ 338 $ 396 $ 349 -15 % -3 %
    Comm. Infra. & Other $ 315 $ 409 $ 399 -23 % -21 %
    DIO   169   151   144    
    DPO   62   65   65    
    DSO   34   30   26    
    Cash Conversion Cycle   141   116   105    
    Channel Inventory (weeks)   9   8   7    
    Gross Financial Leverage (iii) 2.4x 2.1x 1.9x    
    Net Financial Leverage (iv) 1.6x 1.5x 1.3x    
               
    1. Additional Information for the First Quarter 2025:
      1. For an explanation of GAAP to non-GAAP adjustments, please see “Non-GAAP Financial Measures”.
      2. Refer to Table 1 below for the weighted average number of diluted shares for the presented periods.
      3. Gross financial leverage is defined as gross debt divided by trailing twelve months adjusted EBITDA.
      4. Net financial leverage is defined as net debt divided by trailing twelve months adjusted EBITDA.
      5. Guidance for the Second Quarter 2025: ($ millions, except Per Share data) (1)

           
          GAAP   Reconciliation   non-GAAP
          Low   Mid   High       Low   Mid   High
        Total Revenue $2,800   $2,900   $3,000       $2,800   $2,900   $3,000
        Q-Q -1%   2%   6%       -1%   2%   6%
        Y-Y -10%   -7%   -4%       -10%   -7%   -4%
        Gross Profit $1,533   $1,604   $1,675   $(29)   $1,562   $1,633   $1,704
        Gross Margin 54.8%   55.3%   55.8%       55.8%   56.3%   56.8%
        Operating Income (loss) $680   $741   $802   $(182)   $862   $923   $984
        Operating Margin 24.3%   25.6%   26.7%       30.8%   31.8%   32.8%
        Financial Income (expense) $(100)   $(100)   $(100)   $(12)   $(88)   $(88)   $(88)
        Tax rate 18.5%-19.5%       17.0%-18.0%
        Equity-accounted investees $(8)   $(8)   $(8)   $(6)   $(2)   $(2)   $(2)
        Non-controlling interests $(9)   $(9)   $(9)       $(9)   $(9)   $(9)
        Shares – diluted 255.0   255.0   255.0       255.0   255.0   255.0
        Earnings Per Share – diluted $1.78   $1.97   $2.16       $2.46   $2.66   $2.86


        Note (1) Additional Information:

        1. GAAP Gross Profit is expected to include Purchase Price Accounting (“PPA”) effects, $(7) million; Share-based Compensation, $(15) million; Other Incidentals, $(7) million;
        2. GAAP Operating Income (loss) is expected to include PPA effects, $(33) million; Share-based Compensation, $(115) million; Restructuring and Other Incidentals, $(34) million;
        3. GAAP Financial Income (expense) is expected to include Other financial expense $(12) million;
        4. GAAP Results relating to equity-accounted investees is expected to include results relating to non-foundry equity-accounted investees $(6) million;
        5. GAAP diluted EPS is expected to include the adjustments noted above for PPA effects, Share-based Compensation, Restructuring and Other Incidentals in GAAP Operating Income (loss), the adjustment for Other financial expense, the adjustment for results relating to non-foundry equity-accounted investees and the adjustment on Tax due to the earlier mentioned adjustments.

        NXP has based the guidance included in this release on judgments and estimates that management believes are reasonable given its assessment of historical trends and other information reasonably available as of the date of this release. Please note, the guidance included in this release consists of predictions only, and is subject to a wide range of known and unknown risks and uncertainties, many of which are beyond NXP’s control. The guidance included in this release should not be regarded as representations by NXP that the estimated results will be achieved. Actual results may vary materially from the guidance we provide today. In relation to the use of non-GAAP financial information see the note regarding “Non-GAAP Financial Measures” below. For the factors, risks, and uncertainties to which judgments, estimates and forward-looking statements generally are subject see the note regarding “Forward-looking Statements.” We undertake no obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statements, including the guidance set forth herein, to reflect future events or circumstances.

        Non-GAAP Financial Measures

        In managing NXP’s business on a consolidated basis, management develops an annual operating plan, which is approved by our Board of Directors, using non-GAAP financial measures, that are not in accordance with, nor an alternative to, U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”). In measuring performance against this plan, management considers the actual or potential impacts on these non-GAAP financial measures from actions taken to reduce costs with the goal of increasing our gross margin and operating margin and when assessing appropriate levels of research and development efforts. In addition, management relies upon these non-GAAP financial measures when making decisions about product spending, administrative budgets, and other operating expenses. We believe that these non-GAAP financial measures, when coupled with the GAAP results and the reconciliations to corresponding GAAP financial measures, provide a more complete understanding of the Company’s results of operations and the factors and trends affecting NXP’s business. We believe that they enable investors to perform additional comparisons of our operating results, to assess our liquidity and capital position and to analyze financial performance excluding the effect of expenses unrelated to core operating performance, certain non-cash expenses and share-based compensation expense, which may obscure trends in NXP’s underlying performance. This information also enables investors to compare financial results between periods where certain items may vary independent of business performance, and allow for greater transparency with respect to key metrics used by management.

        These non-GAAP financial measures are provided in addition to, and not as a substitute for, or superior to, measures of financial performance prepared in accordance with GAAP. The presentation of these and other similar items in NXP’s non-GAAP financial results should not be interpreted as implying that these items are non-recurring, infrequent, or unusual. Reconciliations of these non-GAAP measures to the most comparable measures calculated in accordance with GAAP are provided in the financial statements portion of this release in a schedule entitled “Financial Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Results (unaudited).” Please refer to the NXP Historic Financial Model file found on the Financial Information page of the Investor Relations section of our website at https://investors.nxp.com for additional information related to our rationale for using these non-GAAP financial measures, as well as the impact of these measures on the presentation of NXP’s operations.

        In addition to providing financial information on a basis consistent with GAAP, NXP also provides the following selected financial measures on a non-GAAP basis: (i) Gross profit, (ii) Gross margin, (iii) Research and development, (iv) Selling, general and administrative, (v) Amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets, (vi) Other income, (vii) Operating income (loss), (viii) Operating margin, (ix) Financial Income (expense), (x) Income tax benefit (provision), (xi) Results relating to non-foundry equity-accounted investees, (xii) Net income (loss) attributable to stockholders, (xiii) Earnings per Share – Diluted, (xiv) EBITDA, adjusted EBITDA and trailing 12 month adjusted EBITDA, and (xv) free cash flow, trailing 12 month free cash flow and trailing 12 month free cash flow as a percent of Revenue. The non-GAAP information excludes, where applicable, the amortization of acquisition related intangible assets, the purchase accounting effect on inventory and property, plant and equipment, merger related costs (including integration costs), certain items related to divestitures, share-based compensation expense, restructuring and asset impairment charges, extinguishment of debt, foreign exchange gains and losses, income tax effect on adjustments described above and results from non-foundry equity-accounted investments.

        The difference in the benefit (provision) for income taxes between our GAAP and non-GAAP results relates to the income tax effects of the GAAP to non-GAAP adjustments that we make and the income tax effect of any discrete items that occur in the interim period. Discrete items primarily relate to unexpected tax events that may occur as these amounts cannot be forecasted (e.g., the impact of changes in tax law and/or rates, changes in estimates or resolved tax audits relating to prior year tax provisions, the excess or deficit tax effects on share-based compensation, etc.).

        Conference Call and Webcast Information

        The company will host a conference call with the financial community on Tuesday, April 29, 2025 at 8:00 a.m. U.S. Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) to review the first quarter 2025 results in detail.

        Interested parties may preregister to obtain a user-specific access code for the call here.

        The call will be webcast and can be accessed from the NXP Investor Relations website at www.nxp.com. A replay of the call will be available on the NXP Investor Relations website within 24 hours of the actual call.

        About NXP Semiconductors

        NXP Semiconductors N.V. (NASDAQ: NXPI) is the trusted partner for innovative solutions in the automotive, industrial & IoT, mobile, and communications infrastructure markets. NXP’s “Brighter Together” approach combines leading-edge technology with pioneering people to develop system solutions that make the connected world better, safer, and more secure. The company has operations in more than 30 countries and posted revenue of $2.84 billion in 2024. Find out more at www.nxp.com.

        Forward-looking Statements

        This document includes forward-looking statements which include statements regarding NXP’s business strategy, financial condition, results of operations, market data, as well as any other statements which are not historical facts. By their nature, forward-looking statements are subject to numerous factors, risks and uncertainties that could cause actual outcomes and results to be materially different from those projected. These factors, risks and uncertainties include the following: market demand and semiconductor industry conditions; our ability to successfully introduce new technologies and products; the demand for the goods into which NXP’s products are incorporated; trade disputes between the U.S. and China, potential increase of barriers to international trade and resulting disruptions to NXP’s established supply chains; the impact of government actions and regulations, including restrictions on the export of US-regulated products and technology; increasing and evolving cybersecurity threats and privacy risks, including theft of sensitive or confidential data; the ability to generate sufficient cash, raise sufficient capital or refinance corporate debt at or before maturity to meet both NXP’s debt service and research and development and capital investment requirements; our ability to accurately estimate demand and match our production capacity accordingly or obtain supplies from third-party producers to meet demand; our access to production capacity from third-party outsourcing partners, and any events that might affect their business or NXP’s relationship with them; our ability to secure adequate and timely supply of equipment and materials from suppliers; our ability to avoid operational problems and product defects and, if such issues were to arise, to correct them quickly; our ability to form strategic partnerships and joint ventures and to successfully cooperate with our alliance partners; our ability to win competitive bid selection processes; our ability to develop products for use in customers’ equipment and products; the ability to successfully hire and retain key management and senior product engineers; global hostilities, including the invasion of Ukraine by Russia and resulting regional instability, sanctions and any other retaliatory measures taken against Russia and the continued hostilities and the armed conflict in the Middle East, which could adversely impact the global supply chain, disrupt our operations or negatively impact the demand for our products in our primary end markets; the ability to maintain good relationships with NXP’s suppliers; and a change in tax laws could have an effect on our estimated effective tax rate. In addition, this document contains information concerning the semiconductor industry, our end markets and business generally, which is forward-looking in nature and is based on a variety of assumptions regarding the ways in which the semiconductor industry, our end markets and business will develop. NXP has based these assumptions on information currently available, if any one or more of these assumptions turn out to be incorrect, actual results may differ from those predicted. While NXP does not know what impact any such differences may have on its business, if there are such differences, its future results of operations and its financial condition could be materially adversely affected. Readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements, which speak to results only as of the date the statements were made. Except for any ongoing obligation to disclose material information as required by the United States federal securities laws, NXP does not have any intention or obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statements after we distribute this document, whether to reflect any future events or circumstances or otherwise. For a discussion of potential risks and uncertainties, please refer to the risk factors listed in our SEC filings. Copies of our SEC filings are available on our Investor Relations website, www.nxp.com/investor or from the SEC website, www.sec.gov.

        For further information, please contact:

        Investors:
        Jeff Palmer 
        jeff.palmer@nxp.com
        +1 408 205 0687
        Media:
        Paige Iven
        paige.iven@nxp.com
        +1 817 975 0602
           
        NXP-CORP


        NXP Semiconductors
        Table 1: Condensed consolidated statement of operations (unaudited)

        ($ in millions except share data) Three months ended
          March 30,
        2025
          December 31,
        2024
          March 31,
        2024
                   
        Revenue $ 2,835     $ 3,111     $ 3,126  
        Cost of revenue   (1,275 )     (1,433 )     (1,343 )
        Gross profit   1,560       1,678       1,783  
        Research and development   (547 )     (612 )     (564 )
        Selling, general and administrative   (281 )     (323 )     (306 )
        Amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets   (27 )     (28 )     (51 )
        Total operating expenses   (855 )     (963 )     (921 )
        Other income (expense)   18       (40 )     (6 )
        Operating income (loss)   723       675       856  
        Financial income (expense):          
        Other financial income (expense)   (92 )     (91 )     (70 )
        Income (loss) before income taxes   631       584       786  
        Benefit (provision) for income taxes   (130 )     (77 )     (141 )
        Results relating to equity-accounted investees   (4 )     (2 )     (1 )
        Net income (loss)   497       505       644  
        Less: Net income (loss) attributable to non-controlling interests   7       10       5  
        Net income (loss) attributable to stockholders   490       495       639  
                   
        Earnings per share data:          
        Net income (loss) per common share attributable to stockholders in $
        Basic $ 1.93     $ 1.95     $ 2.49  
        Diluted $ 1.92     $ 1.93     $ 2.47  
                   
        Weighted average number of shares of common stock outstanding during the period (in thousands):
        Basic   253,709       254,349       256,567  
        Diluted   255,018       256,628       258,954  
                   

        NXP Semiconductors
        Table 2: Condensed consolidated balance sheet (unaudited)

          ($ in millions) As of
            March 30,
        2025
          December 31,
        2024
          March 31,
        2024
        ASSETS          
        Current assets:          
          Cash and cash equivalents $         3,988           $         3,292           $         2,908        
          Short-term deposits           —                     —                     400        
          Accounts receivable, net           1,060                     1,032                     881        
          Inventories, net           2,350                     2,356                     2,102        
          Other current assets           627                     625                     603        
        Total current assets           8,025                     7,305                     6,894        
                     
        Non-current assets:          
          Deferred tax assets           1,284                     1,251                     1,048        
          Other non-current assets           1,942                     1,796                     1,290        
          Property, plant and equipment, net           3,210                     3,267                     3,304        
          Identified intangible assets, net           777                     836                     839        
          Goodwill           9,942                     9,930                     9,945        
        Total non-current assets           17,155                     17,080                     16,426        
                     
        Total assets           25,180                     24,385                     23,320        
                     
        LIABILITIES AND EQUITY          
        Current liabilities:          
          Accounts payable           863                     1,017                     954        
          Restructuring liabilities-current           75                     147                     68        
          Other current liabilities           1,412                     1,434                     1,906        
          Short-term debt           1,499                     500                     —        
        Total current liabilities           3,849                     3,098                     2,928        
                     
        Non-current liabilities:          
          Long-term debt           10,226                     10,354                     10,178        
          Restructuring liabilities           4                     10                     9        
          Other non-current liabilities           1,424                     1,392                     1,055        
        Total non-current liabilities           11,654                     11,756                     11,242        
                     
          Non-controlling interests           355                     348                     321        
          Stockholders’ equity           9,322                     9,183                     8,829        
        Total equity           9,677                     9,531                     9,150        
                   
        Total liabilities and equity           25,180                     24,385                     23,320        
                     

        NXP Semiconductors
        Table 3: Condensed consolidated statement of cash flows (unaudited)

        ($ in millions) Three months ended
          March 30,
        2025
          December 31,
        2024
          March 31,
        2024
        Cash flows from operating activities:          
        Net income (loss) $ 497     $ 505     $ 644  
        Adjustments to reconcile net income (loss) to net cash provided by (used for) operating activities:          
        Depreciation and amortization   209       259       235  
        Share-based compensation   127       117       115  
        Amortization of discount (premium) on debt, net   1       1       1  
        Amortization of debt issuance costs   1       2       2  
        Net (gain) loss on sale of assets   (22 )     (1 )     (2 )
        Results relating to equity-accounted investees   4       2       1  
        (Gain) loss on equity securities, net   6       6       2  
        Deferred tax expense (benefit)   (27 )     (145 )     (64 )
        Changes in operating assets and liabilities:          
        (Increase) decrease in receivables and other current assets   (29 )     (25 )     (25 )
        (Increase) decrease in inventories   6       (122 )     32  
        Increase (decrease) in accounts payable and other liabilities   (110 )     16       (102 )
        (Increase) decrease in other non-current assets   (106 )     (218 )     6  
        Exchange differences   4       (1 )     3  
        Other items   4       (5 )     3  
        Net cash provided by (used for) operating activities   565       391       851  
                   
        Cash flows from investing activities:          
        Purchase of identified intangible assets   (25 )     (36 )     (32 )
        Capital expenditures on property, plant and equipment   (139 )     (130 )     (226 )
        Insurance recoveries received for equipment damage   —       —       2  
        Proceeds from the disposals of property, plant and equipment   1       1       2  
        Advance payment from sale of property, plant and equipment   —       30       —  
        Proceeds of short-term deposits   —       400       9  
        Purchase of investments   (53 )     (67 )     (34 )
        Proceeds from the sale of investments   —       —       5  
        Net cash provided by (used for) investing activities   (216 )     198       (274 )
                   
        Cash flows from financing activities:          
        Repurchase of long-term debt   —       —       (1,000 )
        Proceeds from the issuance of long-term debt   370       670       —  
        Cash paid for debt issuance costs   —       (1 )     —  
        Proceeds from the issuance of commercial paper notes   646       —       —  
        Repayment of commercial paper notes   (146 )     —       —  
        Dividends paid to common stockholders   (258 )     (258 )     (261 )
        Proceeds from issuance of common stock through stock plans   37       3       37  
        Purchase of treasury shares and restricted stock unit withholdings   (303 )     (455 )     (303 )
        Other, net   (1 )     —       (1 )
        Net cash provided by (used for) financing activities   345       (41 )     (1,528 )
                   
        Effect of changes in exchange rates on cash positions   2       (4 )     (3 )
        Increase (decrease) in cash and cash equivalents   696       544       (954 )
        Cash and cash equivalents at beginning of period   3,292       2,748       3,862  
        Cash and cash equivalents at end of period   3,988       3,292       2,908  
                   
        Net cash paid during the period for:          
        Interest   41       92       38  
        Income taxes, net of refunds   96       280       198  
        Net gain (loss) on sale of assets:          
        Cash proceeds from the sale of assets   31       1       2  
        Book value of these assets   (9 )     —       —  
        Non-cash investing activities:          
        Non-cash capital expenditures   108       161       223  
                   

        NXP Semiconductors
        Table 4: Financial Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Results (unaudited)

        ($ in millions except share data) Three months ended
          March 30,
        2025
          December 31,
        2024
          March 31,
        2024
        GAAP Gross Profit $ 1,560     $ 1,678     $ 1,783  
        PPA Effects   (8 )     (11 )     (12 )
        Restructuring   (4 )     (21 )     (3 )
        Share-based compensation   (16 )     (15 )     (15 )
        Other incidentals   (3 )     (64 )     (5 )
        Non-GAAP Gross Profit $ 1,591     $ 1,789     $ 1,818  
        GAAP Gross margin   55.0 %     53.9 %     57.0 %
        Non-GAAP Gross margin   56.1 %     57.5 %     58.2 %
        GAAP Research and development $ (547 )   $ (612 )   $ (564 )
        Restructuring   (7 )     (50 )     (3 )
        Share-based compensation   (64 )     (60 )     (58 )
        Other incidentals   (1 )     (5 )     (1 )
        Non-GAAP Research and development $ (475 )   $ (497 )   $ (502 )
        GAAP Selling, general and administrative $ (281 )   $ (323 )   $ (306 )
        Restructuring   (3 )     (41 )     (1 )
        Share-based compensation   (47 )     (42 )     (42 )
        Other incidentals   (20 )     (12 )     (29 )
        Non-GAAP Selling, general and administrative $ (211 )   $ (228 )   $ (234 )
        GAAP Operating income (loss) $ 723     $ 675     $ 856  
        PPA effects   (40 )     (39 )     (63 )
        Restructuring   (14 )     (112 )     (7 )
        Share-based compensation   (127 )     (117 )     (115 )
        Other incidentals   —       (122 )     (39 )
        Non-GAAP Operating income (loss) $ 904     $ 1,065     $ 1,080  
        GAAP Operating margin   25.5 %     21.7 %     27.4 %
        Non-GAAP Operating margin   31.9 %     34.2 %     34.5 %
        GAAP Income tax benefit (provision) $ (130 )   $ (77 )   $ (141 )
        Income tax effect   13       87       30  
        Non-GAAP Income tax benefit (provision) $ (143 )   $ (164 )   $ (171 )
        GAAP Net income (loss) attributable to stockholders $ 490     $ 495     $ 639  
        PPA Effects   (40 )     (39 )     (63 )
        Restructuring   (14 )     (112 )     (7 )
        Share-based compensation   (127 )     (117 )     (115 )
        Other incidentals   —       (122 )     (39 )
        Other adjustments:          
        Adjustments to financial income (expense)   (12 )     (17 )     (6 )
        Income tax effect   13       87       30  
        Results relating to equity-accounted investees, excluding Foundry investees1   (3 )     (2 )     (1 )
        Non-GAAP Net income (loss) attributable to stockholders $ 673     $ 817     $ 840  
                   
                   
        Additional Information:          
        1. Refer to Table 7 below for further information regarding the results relating to equity-accounted investees.
                   
        GAAP net income (loss) per common share attributable to stockholders – diluted $ 1.92     $ 1.93     $ 2.47  
        PPA Effects   (0.16 )     (0.15 )     (0.24 )
        Restructuring   (0.05 )     (0.44 )     (0.03 )
        Share-based compensation   (0.50 )     (0.46 )     (0.44 )
        Other incidentals   —       (0.47 )     (0.15 )
        Other adjustments:          
        Adjustments to financial income (expense)   (0.05 )     (0.07 )     (0.02 )
        Income tax effect   0.05       0.34       0.11  
        Results relating to equity-accounted investees, excluding Foundry investees1   (0.01 )     —       —  
        Non-GAAP net income (loss) per common share attributable to stockholders – diluted $ 2.64     $ 3.18     $ 3.24  
                   
                   
        Additional Information:          
        1. Refer to Table 7 below for further information regarding the results relating to equity-accounted investees.

        NXP Semiconductors
        Table 5: Financial Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial income (expense) (unaudited)

          ($ in millions) Three months ended
            March 30,
        2025
          December 31,
        2024
          March 31,
        2024
        GAAP Financial income (expense) $ (92 )   $ (91 )   $ (70 )
          Foreign exchange loss   (3 )     3       (1 )
          Other financial expense   (9 )     (20 )     (5 )
        Non-GAAP Financial income (expense) $ (80 )   $ (74 )   $ (64 )
                     

        NXP Semiconductors
        Table 6: Financial Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Other income (expense) (unaudited)

          ($ in millions) Three months ended
            March 30,
        2025
          December 31,
        2024
          March 31,
        2024
        GAAP Other income (expense) $ 18     $ (40 )   $ (6 )
          PPA effects   (5 )     —       —  
          Other incidentals   24       (41 )     (4 )
        Non-GAAP Other income (expense) $ (1 )   $ 1     $ (2 )
                   

        NXP Semiconductors
        Table 7: Financial Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Results relating to equity-accounted investees (unaudited)

          ($ in millions) Three months ended
            March 30,
        2025
          December 31,
        2024
          March 31,
        2024
        GAAP Results relating to equity-accounted investees $ (4 )   $ (2 )   $ (1 )
          Results of equity-accounted investees, excluding Foundry investees1   (3 )     (2 )     (1 )
        Non-GAAP Results relating to equity-accounted investees $ (1 )   $ —     $ —  
                   
        Additional Information:
        1. We adjust our results relating to equity-accounted investees for those results from investments over which NXP has significant influence, but not control, and whose business activities are not related to the core operating performance of NXP. Our equity-investments in foundry partners are part of our long-term core operating performance and accordingly those results comprise the Non-GAAP Results relating to equity-accounted investees.


        NXP Semiconductors

        Table 8: Adjusted EBITDA and Free Cash Flow (unaudited)

        ($ in millions) Three months ended
          March 30,
        2025
          December 31,
        2024
          March 31,
        2024
        GAAP Net income (loss) $ 497     $ 505     $ 644  
        Reconciling items to EBITDA (Non-GAAP)          
        Financial (income) expense   92       91       70  
        (Benefit) provision for income taxes   130       77       141  
        Depreciation and impairment   143       190       145  
        Amortization   66       69       90  
        EBITDA (Non-GAAP) $ 928     $ 932     $ 1,090  
        Reconciling items to adjusted EBITDA (Non-GAAP)          
        Results of equity-accounted investees, excluding Foundry investees1   3       2       1  
        Purchase accounting effect on asset sale   5       —       —  
        Restructuring   14       112       7  
        Share-based compensation   127       117       115  
        Other incidental items2   (4 )     77       39  
        Adjusted EBITDA (Non-GAAP) $ 1,073     $ 1,240     $ 1,252  
        Trailing twelve month adjusted EBITDA (Non-GAAP) $ 4,885     $ 5,064     $ 5,395  
                   
        Additional Information:          
        1. Refer to Table 7 above for further information regarding the results relating to equity-accounted investees.
        2. Excluding from total other incidental items, charges included in depreciation, amortization or impairment reconciling items:
        – other incidental items   4       45       —  
                   
                   
                   
        ($ in millions) Three months ended
          March 30,
        2025
          December 31,
        2024
          March 31,
        2024
        Net cash provided by (used for) operating activities $ 565     $ 391     $ 851  
        Net capital expenditures on property, plant and equipment   (138 )     (99 )     (224 )
        Non-GAAP free cash flow $ 427     $ 292     $ 627  
        Trailing twelve month non-GAAP free cash flow $ 1,889     $ 2,089     $ 2,933  
        Trailing twelve month non-GAAP free cash flow as percent of Revenue   15 %     17 %     22 %
                   

      The MIL Network –

    April 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: RBB Bancorp Reports First Quarter 2025 Earnings

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    LOS ANGELES, April 28, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — RBB Bancorp (NASDAQ:RBB) and its subsidiaries, Royal Business Bank (the “Bank”) and RBB Asset Management Company (“RAM”), collectively referred to herein as the “Company,” announced financial results for the quarter ended March 31, 2025.

    First Quarter 2025 Highlights

    • Net income totaled $2.3 million, or $0.13 diluted earnings per share
    • Return on average assets of 0.24%, compared to 0.44% for the quarter ended December 31, 2024
    • Net interest margin expanded to 2.88%, up from 2.76% for the quarter ended December 31, 2024
    • Net loans held for investment growth of $89.8 million, or 12% annualized 
    • Nonperforming assets decreased $16.5 million, or 20.3%, to $64.6 million at March 31, 2025, down from $81.0 million at December 31, 2024
    • Book value and tangible book value per share(1) increased to $28.77 and $24.63 at March 31, 2025, up from $28.66 and $24.51 at December 31, 2024 

    The Company reported net income of $2.3 million, or $0.13 diluted earnings per share, for the quarter ended March 31, 2025, compared to net income of $4.4 million, or $0.25 diluted earnings per share, for the quarter ended December 31, 2024. First quarter of 2025 net income included $6.7 million in pre-tax provision for credit losses mostly related to reducing exposure to nonperforming loans, including higher specific reserves.

    “First quarter net income declined to $2.3 million, or 13 cents per share, as we took decisive action to address our nonperforming loans,” said David Morris, Chief Executive Officer of RBB Bancorp. “We reduced our net exposure to nonperforming loans to $51 million, including specific reserves, or 32% since year end. We remain focused on resolving our nonperforming loans as quickly as possible while minimizing the impact to earnings and capital and we think our actions in the first quarter reflect this.”

    “Our loan production was relatively strong during the first quarter driven by continued execution of our initiatives, which resulted in 12% annualized net loan growth. Our loan prospect pipeline continues to be healthy, and we anticipate loan growth to continue in the second quarter, albeit likely at a more moderate pace,” said Johnny Lee, President of RBB Bancorp and President and Chief Executive Officer of the Bank. “While the market environment is volatile, we have not observed significant signs of financial impact to our clients at this time.”

    (1 ) Reconciliations of the non–U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”) measures included at the end of this press release.

    Net Interest Income and Net Interest Margin

    Net interest income was $26.2 million for the first quarter of 2025, compared to $26.0 million for the fourth quarter of 2024. The $186,000 increase was due to a $2.4 million decrease in interest expense, offset by a $2.2 million decrease in interest income. The decrease in interest income was mostly due to the impact of fewer days in the quarter of $1.2 million and lower average excess liquidity (cash and cash equivalents and investment securities) of $1.5 million. The decrease in interest expense was mostly due to the impact of lower average funding rates of $1.5 million, fewer days in the quarter of $621,000 and lower average interest-bearing liabilities of $336,000. The $1.5 million attributed to lower average funding rates included $1.8 million due to a 29 basis point decrease in the average cost of interest-bearing deposits.

    The net interest margin (“NIM”) was 2.88% for the first quarter of 2025, an increase of 12 basis points from 2.76% for the fourth quarter of 2024. The NIM expansion was due to a 17 basis point decrease in the overall cost of funds, partially offset by a 3 basis point decrease in the yield on average interest-earning assets. The yield on average interest-earning assets decreased to 5.76% for the first quarter of 2025 from 5.79% for the fourth quarter of 2024 due mainly to a decrease in the yield on average cash and cash equivalents of 32 basis points and average loans of 2 basis points, partially offset by the benefit of a change in the mix in average-earning assets. Average loans represented 84% of average interest-earning assets in the first quarter of 2025, as compared to 82% in the fourth quarter of 2024.

    The average cost of funds decreased to 3.15% for the first quarter of 2025 from 3.32% for the fourth quarter of 2024, driven by a 29 basis point decrease in the average cost of interest-bearing deposits, partially offset by a 38 basis point increase in the average cost of borrowings. The average cost of interest-bearing deposits decreased to 3.77% for the first quarter of 2025 from 4.06% for the fourth quarter of 2024. During the first quarter of 2025, $150.0 million in Federal Home Loan Bank (“FHLB”) advances with an average cost of 1.18% matured and were largely replaced with $110.0 million in FHLB advances with various terms at an average rate of 3.88%. The overall funding mix for the first quarter of 2025 remained relatively unchanged from the fourth quarter of 2024 with total deposits representing 90% of the funding mix and average noninterest-bearing deposits representing 17% of average total deposits. The all-in average spot rate for total deposits was 3.06% at March 31, 2025.

    Provision for Credit Losses

    The provision for credit losses was $6.7 million for the first quarter of 2025 compared to $6.0 million for the fourth quarter of 2024. The first quarter of 2025 provision for credit losses was due to an increase in specific reserves of $2.8 million, net charge-offs of $2.6 million and an increase in general reserves of $1.3 million due mainly to net loan growth. The first quarter increase in specific reserves related mostly to two lending relationships. Net charge-offs included $1.4 million related to a bulk sale of $10.8 million in underperforming single-family residential (“SFR”) mortgage loans, of which $6.5 million were on nonaccrual at the end of the year, and $1.2 million related to an $8.8 million loan transferred to other real estate owned (“OREO”) and subsequently sold. Net charge-offs on an annualized basis represented 0.35% of average loans for the first quarter of 2025 compared to 0.26% for the fourth quarter of 2024. The first quarter provision also took into consideration factors such as changes in loan balances, the loan portfolio mix, the outlook for economic conditions and market interest rates, and changes in credit quality metrics, including changes in nonperforming loans, special mention and substandard loans during the period.

    Noninterest Income

    Noninterest income for the first quarter of 2025 was $2.3 million, a decrease of $434,000 from $2.7 million for the fourth quarter of 2024. This decrease was mostly due to the fourth quarter of 2024 including $258,000 of income from a Bank Enterprise Award grant (included in other income) and lower net gain on sale of loans as compared to the fourth quarter of 2024.

    Noninterest Expense

    Noninterest expense for the first quarter of 2025 was $18.5 million, an increase of $873,000 from $17.6 million for the fourth quarter of 2024. This increase was mostly due to higher salaries and employee benefits expense of $716,000 attributed to higher payroll taxes and annual pay increases, which are typically reflected in the first quarter of the year. The annualized noninterest expenses to average assets ratio was 1.90% for the first quarter of 2025, up from 1.76% for the fourth quarter of 2024. The efficiency ratio was 65.1% for the first quarter of 2025, up from 61.5% for the fourth quarter of 2024 due mostly to higher noninterest expense.

    Income Taxes

    The effective tax rate was 28.2% for the first quarter of 2025 and 13.3% for the fourth quarter of 2024. The increase in the effective tax rate for the first quarter was due in part to lower tax credits combined with higher estimated pre-tax net income for the full year of 2025 as compared to the prior quarter.2

    Balance Sheet

    At March 31, 2025, total assets were $4.0 billion, a $16.9 million increase compared to December 31, 2024, and a $131.4 million increase compared to March 31, 2024.

    Loan and Securities Portfolio

    Loans held for investment (“HFI”) totaled $3.1 billion as of March 31, 2025, an increase of $89.8 million, or 12% annualized, compared to December 31, 2024 and an increase of $115.7 million, or 3.8%, compared to March 31, 2024. The first quarter of 2025 net loan growth included $201 million in new production with an average yield of 6.77%. When loan sales, charge-offs, and foreclosures totaling $28.6 million are considered, the annualized first quarter net loan growth rate was 16%. The increase from December 31, 2024 was primarily due to a $51.8 million increase in SFR mortgage loans, a $44.0 million increase in commercial real estate (“CRE”) loans, a $6.0 million increase in commercial and industrial (“C&I”) loans and a $3.4 million increase in Small Business Administration (“SBA”) loans, partially offset by a $14.4 million decrease in construction and land development (“C&D”) loans. The loan to deposit ratio was 98.4% at March 31, 2025, compared to 97.5% at December 31, 2024 and 98.6% at March 31, 2024. 

    As of March 31, 2025, available for sale securities totaled $378.2 million, a decrease of $42.0 million from December 31, 2024, primarily related to the net decrease in short-term commercial paper of $41.4 million due to maturity and purchase activity during the first quarter of 2025. As of March 31, 2025, net unrealized losses totaled $25.0 million, a $4.2 million decrease, when compared to net unrealized losses of $29.2 million as of December 31, 2024.

    Deposits

    Total deposits were $3.1 billion as of March 31, 2025, an increase of $58.8 million, or 7.7% annualized, compared to December 31, 2024 and an increase of $114.3 million, or 3.8%, compared to March 31, 2024. The increase during the first quarter of 2025 was due to a $93.6 million increase in interest-bearing deposits, while noninterest-bearing deposits decreased $34.8 million. The increase in interest-bearing deposits included increases in non-maturity deposits of $58.2 million and time deposits of $35.5 million. Wholesale deposits totaled $158.5 million at March 31, 2025, and $147.5 million at December 31, 2024. Noninterest-bearing deposits totaled $528.2 million and represented 16.8% of total deposits at March 31, 2025 compared to $563.0 million and 18.3% at December 31, 2024.

    Credit Quality

    Nonperforming assets totaled $64.6 million, or 1.61% of total assets, at March 31, 2025, down from $81.0 million, or 2.03% of total assets, at December 31, 2024. The $16.5 million decrease in nonperforming assets was due to sales totaling $20.0 million and payoffs or paydowns of $1.8 million, partially offset by the addition of one $5.3 million CRE loan placed on nonaccrual status in the first quarter of 2025. Nonperforming assets included one $4.2 million OREO (included in “Accrued interest and other assets”) at March 31, 2025, which was a nonaccrual loan at December 31, 2024.

    Special mention loans totaled $64.3 million, or 2.05% of total loans, at March 31, 2025, down from $65.3 million, or 2.14% of total loans, at December 31, 2024. The $1.1 million decrease was primarily due to the upgrade of one $1.7 million CRE loan to a pass-rated loan, offset by the addition of one $578,000 C&I loan. All special mention loans are paying current.

    Substandard loans totaled $76.4 million at March 31, 2025, down from $100.3 million at December 31, 2024. This $24.0 million decrease was primarily due to loan sales totaling $11.7 million, transfers to OREO totaling $12.8 million, of which $8.8 million was subsequently sold during the first quarter of 2025, and payoffs and paydowns totaling $5.4 million, partially offset by the downgrade of two loans totaling $6.2 million. Of the total substandard loans at March 31, 2025, there were $16.0 million on accrual status.

    30-89 day delinquent loans, excluding nonperforming loans, totaled $5.9 million, or 0.19% of total loans, at March 31, 2025, down from $22.1 million, or 0.72% of total loans, at December 31, 2024. The $16.2 million decrease was mostly due to $16.3 million in loans returning to current status, $2.9 million in SFR mortgage loans included in the bulk sale of several underperforming SFR mortgage loans and $398,000 in paydowns and payoffs, offset by $3.5 million in new delinquent loans.3

    As of March 31, 2025, the allowance for credit losses totaled $52.6 million and was comprised of an allowance for loan losses of $51.9 million and a reserve for unfunded commitments of $629,000 (included in “Accrued interest and other liabilities”). This compares to the allowance for credit losses of $48.5 million, comprised of an allowance for loan losses of $47.7 million and a reserve for unfunded commitments of $729,000 at December 31, 2024. The $4.1 million increase in the allowance for credit losses for the first quarter of 2025 was due to a $6.7 million provision for credit losses offset by net charge-offs of $2.6 million. Net charge-offs included $1.4 million related to a bulk sale of $10.8 million in underperforming SFR mortgage loans, of which $6.5 million were on nonaccrual at the end of the year, and $1.2 million related to an $8.8 million loan transferred to OREO and subsequently sold. The allowance for loan losses as a percentage of loans HFI increased to 1.65% at March 31, 2025, compared to 1.56% at December 31, 2024, due to an increase in specific reserves. The allowance for loan losses as a percentage of nonperforming loans HFI was 86% at March 31, 2025, an increase from 68% at December 31, 2024. 

        For the Three Months Ended March 31, 2025  
    (dollars in thousands)   Allowance for
    loan losses
        Reserve for
    unfunded loan
    commitments
        Allowance for
    credit losses
     
    Beginning balance   $ 47,729     $ 729     $ 48,458  
    Provision for (reversal of) credit losses     6,846       (100 )     6,746  
    Less loans charged-off     (2,727 )     —       (2,727 )
    Recoveries on loans charged-off     84       —       84  
    Ending balance   $ 51,932     $ 629     $ 52,561  

    Shareholders’ Equity

    At March 31, 2025, total shareholders’ equity was $510.3 million, a $2.4 million increase compared to December 31, 2024, and a $3.7 million decrease compared to March 31, 2024. The increase in shareholders’ equity for the first quarter of 2025 was due to lower net unrealized losses on available for sale securities of $3.0 million, net income of $2.3 million and equity compensation activity of $43,000, offset by common stock cash dividends paid of $2.9 million. The decrease in shareholders’ equity for the last twelve months was due to common stock repurchases of $19.2 million and dividends paid of $11.6 million on common stock, offset by net income of $20.9 million, lower net unrealized losses on available for sale securities of $3.7 million, and equity compensation activity of $2.5 million. Book value per share and tangible book value per share(1) increased to $28.77 and $24.63 at March 31, 2025, up from $28.66 and $24.51 at December 31, 2024 and up from $27.67 and $23.68 at March 31, 2024.

    (1 ) Reconciliations of the non–U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”) measures included at the end of this press release.

    Corporate Overview

    RBB Bancorp is a community-based financial holding company headquartered in Los Angeles, California. As of March 31, 2025, the Company had total assets of $4.0 billion. Its wholly-owned subsidiary, Royal Business Bank, is a full service commercial bank, which provides consumer and business banking services predominately to the Asian-centric communities in Los Angeles County, Orange County, and Ventura County in California, in Las Vegas, Nevada, in Brooklyn, Queens, and Manhattan in New York, in Edison, New Jersey, in the Chicago neighborhoods of Chinatown and Bridgeport, Illinois, and on Oahu, Hawaii. Bank services include remote deposit, E-banking, mobile banking, commercial and investor real estate loans, business loans and lines of credit, commercial and industrial loans, SBA 7A and 504 loans, 1-4 single family residential loans, trade finance, a full range of depository account products and wealth management services. The Bank has nine branches in Los Angeles County, two branches in Ventura County, one branch in Orange County, California, one branch in Las Vegas, Nevada, three branches and one loan operation center in Brooklyn, three branches in Queens, one branch in Manhattan in New York, one branch in Edison, New Jersey, two branches in Chicago, Illinois, and one branch in Honolulu, Hawaii. The Company’s administrative and lending center is located at 1055 Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles, California 90017, and its operations center is located at 7025 Orangethorpe Ave., Buena Park, California 90621. The Company’s website address is www.royalbusinessbankusa.com.

    Conference Call

    Management will hold a conference call at 11:00 a.m. Pacific time/2:00 p.m. Eastern time on Tuesday, April 29, 2025, to discuss the Company’s first quarter 2025 financial results.

    To listen to the conference call, please dial 1-888-506-0062 or 1-973-528-0011, the Participant ID code is 534591, conference ID RBBQ125. A replay of the call will be made available at 1-877-481-4010 or 1-919-882-2331, the passcode is 52277, approximately one hour after the conclusion of the call and will remain available through May 13, 2025.

    The conference call will also be simultaneously webcast over the Internet; please visit our Royal Business Bank website at www.royalbusinessbankusa.com and click on the “Investors” tab to access the call from the site. This webcast will be recorded and available for replay on our website approximately two hours after the conclusion of the conference call.

    Disclosure

    This press release contains certain non-GAAP financial disclosures for tangible common equity and tangible assets and adjusted earnings. The Company uses certain non-GAAP financial measures to provide meaningful supplemental information regarding the Company’s operational performance and to enhance investors’ overall understanding of such financial performance. Please refer to the tables at the end of this release for a presentation of performance ratios in accordance with GAAP and a reconciliation of the non-GAAP financial measures to the GAAP financial measures.

    Safe Harbor

    Certain matters set forth herein (including the exhibits hereto) constitute forward-looking statements relating to the Company’s current business plans and expectations and our future financial position and operating results. These forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results, performance and/or achievements to differ materially from those projected. These risks and uncertainties include, but are not limited to, the effectiveness of the Company’s internal control over financial reporting and disclosure controls and procedures; the potential for additional material weaknesses in the Company’s internal controls over financial reporting or other potential control deficiencies of which the Company is not currently aware or which have not been detected; business and economic conditions generally and in the financial services industry, nationally and within our current and future geographic markets, including the tight labor market, ineffective management of the United States (“U.S.”) federal budget or debt or turbulence or uncertainly in domestic or foreign financial markets; the strength of the U.S. economy in general and the strength of the local economies in which we conduct operations; adverse developments in the banking industry highlighted by high-profile bank failures and the potential impact of such developments on customer confidence, liquidity and regulatory responses to these developments; possible additional provisions for credit losses and charge-offs; credit risks of lending activities and deterioration in asset or credit quality; extensive laws and regulations and supervision that we are subject to, including potential supervisory action by bank supervisory authorities; compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act and other money laundering statutes and regulations; potential goodwill impairment; liquidity risk; failure to comply with debt covenants; fluctuations in interest rates; risks associated with acquisitions and the expansion of our business into new markets; inflation and deflation; real estate market conditions and the value of real estate collateral; the effects of having concentrations in our loan portfolio, including commercial real estate and the risks of geographic and industry concentrations; environmental liabilities; our ability to compete with larger competitors; our ability to retain key personnel; successful management of reputational risk; severe weather, natural disasters, earthquakes, fires, including direct and indirect costs and impacts on clients, the Company and its employees from the January 2025 Los Angeles County wildfires; or other adverse external events could harm our business; geopolitical conditions, including acts or threats of terrorism, actions taken by the U.S. or other governments in response to acts or threats of terrorism and/or military conflicts, including the conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, in the Middle East, and increasing tensions between China and Taiwan, which could impact business and economic conditions in the U.S. and abroad; tariffs, trade policies, and related tensions, which could impact our clients, specific industry sectors, and/or broader economic conditions and financial market; public health crises and pandemics, and their effects on the economic and business environments in which we operate, including our credit quality and business operations, as well as the impact on general economic and financial market conditions; general economic or business conditions in Asia, and other regions where the Bank has operations; failures, interruptions, or security breaches of our information systems; climate change, including any enhanced regulatory, compliance, credit and reputational risks and costs; cybersecurity threats and the cost of defending against them; our ability to adapt our systems to the expanding use of technology in banking; risk management processes and strategies; adverse results in legal proceedings; the impact of regulatory enforcement actions, if any; certain provisions in our charter and bylaws that may affect acquisition of the Company; changes in tax laws and regulations; the impact of governmental efforts to restructure the U.S. financial regulatory system and increased costs of compliance and other risks associated with changes in regulation, including any amendments to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act; the impact of changes in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) insurance assessment rate and the rules and regulations related to the calculation of the FDIC insurance assessments; the effect of changes in accounting policies and practices or accounting standards, as may be adopted from time-to-time by bank regulatory agencies, the SEC, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, the Financial Accounting Standards Board or other accounting standards setters; fluctuations in the Company’s stock price; restrictions on dividends and other distributions by laws and regulations and by our regulators and our capital structure; our ability to raise additional capital, if needed, and the potential resulting dilution of interests of holders of our common stock; the soundness of other financial institutions; our ongoing relations with our various federal and state regulators, including the SEC, FDIC, FRB and California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation; our success at managing the risks involved in the foregoing items and all other factors set forth in the Company’s public reports, including its Annual Report as filed under Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2024, and particularly the discussion of risk factors within that document. The Company does not undertake, and specifically disclaims any obligation, to update any forward-looking statements to reflect occurrences or unanticipated events or circumstances after the date of such statements except as required by law. Any statements about future operating results, such as those concerning accretion and dilution to the Company’s earnings or shareholders, are for illustrative purposes only, are not forecasts, and actual results may differ.

    RBB BANCORP AND SUBSIDIARIES
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
    (Unaudited)
    (Dollars in thousands)
     
        March 31,     December 31,     September 30,     June 30,     March 31,  
        2025     2024     2024     2024     2024  
    Assets                                        
    Cash and due from banks   $ 25,315     $ 27,747     $ 26,388     $ 23,313     $ 21,887  
    Interest-earning deposits with financial institutions     213,508       229,998       323,002       229,456       247,356  
    Cash and cash equivalents     238,823       257,745       349,390       252,769       269,243  
    Interest-earning time deposits with financial institutions     600       600       600       600       600  
    Investment securities available for sale     378,188       420,190       305,666       325,582       335,194  
    Investment securities held to maturity     5,188       5,191       5,195       5,200       5,204  
    Loans held for sale     655       11,250       812       3,146       3,903  
    Loans held for investment     3,143,063       3,053,230       3,091,896       3,047,712       3,027,361  
    Allowance for loan losses     (51,932 )     (47,729 )     (43,685 )     (41,741 )     (41,688 )
    Net loans held for investment     3,091,131       3,005,501       3,048,211       3,005,971       2,985,673  
    Premises and equipment, net     24,308       24,601       24,839       25,049       25,363  
    Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) stock     15,000       15,000       15,000       15,000       15,000  
    Cash surrender value of bank owned life insurance     60,699       60,296       59,889       59,486       59,101  
    Goodwill     71,498       71,498       71,498       71,498       71,498  
    Servicing assets     6,766       6,985       7,256       7,545       7,794  
    Core deposit intangibles     1,839       2,011       2,194       2,394       2,594  
    Right-of-use assets     26,779       28,048       29,283       30,530       31,231  
    Accrued interest and other assets     87,926       83,561       70,644       63,416       65,608  
    Total assets   $ 4,009,400     $ 3,992,477     $ 3,990,477     $ 3,868,186     $ 3,878,006  
    Liabilities and shareholders’ equity                                        
    Deposits:                                        
    Noninterest-bearing demand   $ 528,205     $ 563,012     $ 543,623     $ 542,971     $ 539,517  
    Savings, NOW and money market accounts     721,216       663,034       666,089       647,770       642,840  
    Time deposits, $250,000 and under     1,000,106       1,007,452       1,052,462       1,014,189       1,083,898  
    Time deposits, greater than $250,000     893,101       850,291       830,010       818,675       762,074  
    Total deposits     3,142,628       3,083,789       3,092,184       3,023,605       3,028,329  
    FHLB advances     160,000       200,000       200,000       150,000       150,000  
    Long-term debt, net of issuance costs     119,624       119,529       119,433       119,338       119,243  
    Subordinated debentures     15,211       15,156       15,102       15,047       14,993  
    Lease liabilities – operating leases     28,483       29,705       30,880       32,087       32,690  
    Accrued interest and other liabilities     33,148       36,421       23,150       16,818       18,765  
    Total liabilities     3,499,094       3,484,600       3,480,749       3,356,895       3,364,020  
    Shareholders’ equity:                                        
    Common stock     260,284       259,957       259,280       266,160       271,645  
    Additional paid-in capital     3,360       3,645       3,520       3,456       3,348  
    Retained earnings     263,885       264,460       262,946       262,518       259,903  
    Non-controlling interest     72       72       72       72       72  
    Accumulated other comprehensive loss, net     (17,295 )     (20,257 )     (16,090 )     (20,915 )     (20,982 )
    Total shareholders’ equity     510,306       507,877       509,728       511,291       513,986  
    Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity   $ 4,009,400     $ 3,992,477     $ 3,990,477     $ 3,868,186     $ 3,878,006  
     
    RBB BANCORP AND SUBSIDIARIES
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF INCOME
    (Unaudited)
    (In thousands, except share and per share data) 
     
        For the Three Months Ended  
        March 31, 2025     December 31, 2024     March 31, 2024  
    Interest and dividend income:                        
    Interest and fees on loans   $ 45,621     $ 46,374     $ 45,547  
    Interest on interest-earning deposits     2,014       3,641       5,040  
    Interest on investment securities     4,136       3,962       3,611  
    Dividend income on FHLB stock     330       330       331  
    Interest on federal funds sold and other     235       248       266  
    Total interest and dividend income     52,336       54,555       54,795  
    Interest expense:                        
    Interest on savings deposits, NOW and money market accounts     4,468       4,671       4,478  
    Interest on time deposits     19,084       21,361       23,322  
    Interest on long-term debt and subordinated debentures     1,632       1,660       1,679  
    Interest on FHLB advances     989       886       439  
    Total interest expense     26,173       28,578       29,918  
    Net interest income before provision for credit losses     26,163       25,977       24,877  
    Provision for credit losses     6,746       6,000       —  
    Net interest income after provision for credit losses     19,417       19,977       24,877  
    Noninterest income:                        
    Service charges and fees     1,017       988       992  
    Gain on sale of loans     81       376       312  
    Loan servicing fees, net of amortization     588       492       589  
    Increase in cash surrender value of life insurance     403       407       382  
    Gain on OREO     —       —       724  
    Other income     206       466       373  
    Total noninterest income     2,295       2,729       3,372  
    Noninterest expense:                        
    Salaries and employee benefits     10,643       9,927       9,927  
    Occupancy and equipment expenses     2,407       2,403       2,443  
    Data processing     1,602       1,499       1,420  
    Legal and professional     1,515       1,355       880  
    Office expenses     408       399       356  
    Marketing and business promotion     197       251       172  
    Insurance and regulatory assessments     730       677       982  
    Core deposit premium     172       182       201  
    Other expenses     848       956       588  
    Total noninterest expense     18,522       17,649       16,969  
    Income before income taxes     3,190       5,057       11,280  
    Income tax expense     900       672       3,244  
    Net income   $ 2,290     $ 4,385     $ 8,036  
                             
    Net income per share                        
    Basic   $ 0.13     $ 0.25     $ 0.43  
    Diluted   $ 0.13     $ 0.25     $ 0.43  
    Cash dividends declared per common share   $ 0.16     $ 0.16     $ 0.16  
    Weighted-average common shares outstanding                        
    Basic     17,727,712       17,704,992       18,601,277  
    Diluted     17,770,588       17,796,840       18,666,683  
                             
    RBB BANCORP AND SUBSIDIARIES
    AVERAGE BALANCE SHEET AND NET INTEREST INCOME
    (Unaudited)
     
        For the Three Months Ended  
        March 31, 2025     December 31, 2024     March 31, 2024  
    (tax-equivalent basis,    Average     Interest     Yield /     Average     Interest     Yield /     Average     Interest     Yield /  
      dollars in thousands)   Balance     & Fees     Rate     Balance     & Fees     Rate     Balance     & Fees     Rate  
    Interest-earning assets                                                                        
    Cash and cash equivalents (1)   $ 194,236     $ 2,249       4.70 %   $ 308,455     $ 3,890       5.02 %   $ 364,979     $ 5,306       5.85 %
    FHLB Stock     15,000       330       8.92 %     15,000       330       8.75 %     15,000       331       8.88 %
    Securities                                                                        
    Available for sale (2)     390,178       4,113       4.28 %     361,253       3,939       4.34 %     320,015       3,589       4.51 %
    Held to maturity (2)     5,189       49       3.83 %     5,194       48       3.68 %     5,207       46       3.55 %
    Total loans (3)     3,079,224       45,621       6.01 %     3,059,786       46,374       6.03 %     3,018,423       45,547       6.07 %
    Total interest-earning assets     3,683,827     $ 52,362       5.76 %     3,749,688     $ 54,581       5.79 %     3,723,624     $ 54,819       5.92 %
    Total noninterest-earning assets     260,508                       244,609                       246,341                  
    Total average assets   $ 3,944,335                     $ 3,994,297                     $ 3,969,965                  
                                                                             
    Interest-bearing liabilities                                                                        
    NOW     61,222       321       2.13 %   $ 53,879     $ 254       1.88 %   $ 58,946     $ 298       2.03 %
    Money market     463,443       3,625       3.17 %     463,850       3,735       3.20 %     411,751       3,526       3.44 %
    Saving deposits     155,116       522       1.36 %     162,351       682       1.67 %     157,227       654       1.67 %
    Time deposits, $250,000 and under     989,622       10,046       4.12 %     1,034,946       11,583       4.45 %     1,175,804       13,805       4.72 %
    Time deposits, greater than $250,000     864,804       9,038       4.24 %     835,583       9,778       4.66 %     785,172       9,517       4.88 %
    Total interest-bearing deposits     2,534,207       23,552       3.77 %     2,550,609       26,032       4.06 %     2,588,900       27,800       4.32 %
    FHLB advances     176,833       989       2.27 %     200,000       886       1.76 %     150,000       439       1.18 %
    Long-term debt     119,562       1,295       4.39 %     119,466       1,295       4.31 %     119,180       1,295       4.37 %
    Subordinated debentures     15,175       337       9.01 %     15,121       365       9.60 %     14,957       384       10.33 %
    Total interest-bearing liabilities     2,845,777       26,173       3.73 %     2,885,196       28,578       3.94 %     2,873,037       29,918       4.19 %
    Noninterest-bearing liabilities                                                                        
    Noninterest-bearing deposits     520,145                       539,900                       528,346                  
    Other noninterest-bearing liabilities     66,151                       56,993                       55,795                  
    Total noninterest-bearing liabilities     586,296                       596,893                       584,141                  
    Shareholders’ equity     512,262                       512,208                       512,787                  
    Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity   $ 3,944,335                     $ 3,994,297                     $ 3,969,965                  
    Net interest income / interest rate spreads           $ 26,189       2.03 %           $ 26,003       1.85 %           $ 24,901       1.73 %
    Net interest margin                     2.88 %                     2.76 %                     2.69 %
                                                                             
    Total cost of deposits   $ 3,054,352     $ 23,552       3.13 %   $ 3,090,509     $ 26,032       3.35 %   $ 3,117,246     $ 27,800       3.59 %
    Total cost of funds   $ 3,365,922     $ 26,173       3.15 %   $ 3,425,096     $ 28,578       3.32 %   $ 3,401,383     $ 29,918       3.54 %
    (1 ) Includes income and average balances for interest-earning time deposits and other miscellaneous interest-earning assets.
    (2 ) Interest income and average rates for tax-exempt securities are presented on a tax-equivalent basis.
    (3 ) Average loan balances relate to loans held for investment and loans held for sale and include nonaccrual loans. Interest income on loans includes the effects of discount accretion and net deferred loan origination fees and costs accounted for as yield adjustments.
    RBB BANCORP AND SUBSIDIARIES
    SELECTED FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS
    (Unaudited)
     
        At or for the Three Months Ended  
        March 31,     December 31,     March 31,  
        2025     2024     2024  
    Per share data (common stock)                        
    Book value   $ 28.77     $ 28.66     $ 27.67  
    Tangible book value (1)   $ 24.63     $ 24.51     $ 23.68  
    Performance ratios                        
    Return on average assets, annualized     0.24 %     0.44 %     0.81 %
    Return on average shareholders’ equity, annualized     1.81 %     3.41 %     6.30 %
    Return on average tangible common equity, annualized (1)     2.12 %     3.98 %     7.37 %
    Noninterest income to average assets, annualized     0.24 %     0.27 %     0.34 %
    Noninterest expense to average assets, annualized     1.90 %     1.76 %     1.72 %
    Yield on average earning assets     5.76 %     5.79 %     5.92 %
    Yield on average loans     6.01 %     6.03 %     6.07 %
    Cost of average total deposits (2)     3.13 %     3.35 %     3.59 %
    Cost of average interest-bearing deposits     3.77 %     4.06 %     4.32 %
    Cost of average interest-bearing liabilities     3.73 %     3.94 %     4.19 %
    Net interest spread     2.03 %     1.85 %     1.73 %
    Net interest margin     2.88 %     2.76 %     2.69 %
    Efficiency ratio (3)     65.09 %     61.48 %     60.07 %
    Common stock dividend payout ratio     123.08 %     64.00 %     37.21 %
                             
    (1 ) Non-GAAP measure. See Non–GAAP reconciliations set forth at the end of this press release.
    (2 ) Total deposits include non-interest bearing deposits and interest-bearing deposits.
    (3 ) Ratio calculated by dividing noninterest expense by the sum of net interest income before provision for credit losses and noninterest income.
    RBB BANCORP AND SUBSIDIARIES
    SELECTED FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS
    (Unaudited)
    (Dollars in thousands)
     
        At or for the quarter ended  
        March 31,     December 31,     March 31,  
        2025     2024     2024  
    Credit Quality Data:                        
    Special mention loans   $ 64,279     $ 65,329     $ 20,580  
    Special mention loans to total loans     2.05 %     2.14 %     0.68 %
    Substandard loans HFI   $ 76,372     $ 89,141     $ 57,170  
    Substandard loans HFS   $ —     $ 11,195     $ —  
    Substandard loans HFI to total loans HFI     2.43 %     2.92 %     1.89 %
    Loans 30-89 days past due, excluding nonperforming loans   $ 5,927     $ 22,086     $ 20,950  
    Loans 30-89 days past due, excluding nonperforming loans, to total loans     0.19 %     0.72 %     0.69 %
    Nonperforming loans HFI   $ 60,380     $ 69,843     $ 35,935  
    Nonperforming loans HFS   $ —     $ 11,195     $ —  
    OREO   $ 4,170     $ —     $ 1,071  
    Nonperforming assets   $ 64,550     $ 81,038     $ 37,006  
    Nonperforming loans HFI to total loans HFI     1.92 %     2.29 %     1.19 %
    Nonperforming assets to total assets     1.61 %     2.03 %     0.95 %
                             
    Allowance for loan losses   $ 51,932     $ 47,729     $ 41,688  
    Allowance for loan losses to total loans HFI     1.65 %     1.56 %     1.38 %
    Allowance for loan losses to nonperforming loans HFI     86.01 %     68.34 %     116.01 %
    Net charge-offs   $ 2,643     $ 2,006     $ 184  
    Net charge-offs to average loans     0.35 %     0.26 %     0.02 %
                             
    Capital ratios (1)                        
    Tangible common equity to tangible assets (2)     11.10 %     11.08 %     11.56 %
    Tier 1 leverage ratio     12.07 %     11.92 %     12.16 %
    Tier 1 common capital to risk-weighted assets     17.87 %     17.94 %     19.10 %
    Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets     18.45 %     18.52 %     19.72 %
    Total capital to risk-weighted assets     24.41 %     24.49 %     25.91 %
    (1 ) March 31, 2025 capital ratios are preliminary.
    (2 ) Non-GAAP measure. See Non-GAAP reconciliations set forth at the end of this press release.
    RBB BANCORP AND SUBSIDIARIES
    SELECTED FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS
    (Unaudited)
     
    Loan Portfolio Detail   As of March 31, 2025   As of December 31, 2024     As of March 31, 2024  
    (dollars in thousands)   $   %   $     %     $     %  
    Loans:                                          
    Commercial and industrial   $ 135,538   4.3 %   $ 129,585       4.2 %   $ 121,441       4.0 %
    SBA     50,651   1.6 %     47,263       1.5 %     54,677       1.8 %
    Construction and land development     158,883   5.1 %     173,290       5.7 %     198,070       6.5 %
    Commercial real estate (1)     1,245,402   39.6 %     1,201,420       39.3 %     1,178,498       38.9 %
    Single-family residential mortgages     1,545,822   49.2 %     1,494,022       48.9 %     1,463,497       48.4 %
    Other loans     6,767   0.2 %     7,650       0.4 %     11,178       0.4 %
    Total loans (2)   $ 3,143,063   100.0 %   $ 3,053,230       100.0 %   $ 3,027,361       100.0 %
    Allowance for loan losses     (51,932 )       (47,729 )             (41,688 )        
    Total loans, net   $ 3,091,131       $ 3,005,501             $ 2,985,673          
    (1 ) Includes non-farm and non-residential loans, multi-family residential loans and non-owner occupied single family residential loans.
    (2 ) Net of discounts and deferred fees and costs of $808, $488, and $474 as of March 31, 2025, December 31, 2024, and March 31, 2024, respectively.
    Deposits   As of March 31, 2025   As of December 31, 2024     As of March 31, 2024  
    (dollars in thousands)   $   %   $     %     $     %  
    Deposits:                                          
    Noninterest-bearing demand   $ 528,205   16.8 %   $ 563,012       18.3 %   $ 539,517       17.8 %
    Savings, NOW and money market accounts     721,216   22.9 %     663,034       21.5 %     642,840       21.2 %
    Time deposits, $250,000 and under     863,962   27.5 %     882,438       28.6 %     901,738       29.8 %
    Time deposits, greater than $250,000     870,708   27.8 %     827,854       26.8 %     746,611       24.7 %
    Wholesale deposits (1)     158,537   5.0 %     147,451       4.8 %     197,623       6.5 %
    Total deposits   $ 3,142,628   100.0 %   $ 3,083,789       100.0 %   $ 3,028,329       100.0 %
    (1 ) Includes brokered deposits, collateralized deposits from the State of California, and deposits acquired through internet listing services.

    Non-GAAP Reconciliations

    Tangible Book Value Reconciliations

    Tangible book value per share is a non-GAAP disclosure. Management measures tangible book value per share to assess the Company’s capital strength and business performance and believes this is helpful to investors as additional tools for further understanding our performance. The following is a reconciliation of tangible book value to the Company shareholders’ equity computed in accordance with GAAP, as well as a calculation of tangible book value per share as of March 31, 2025, December 31, 2024, and March 31, 2024.

                           
    (dollars in thousands, except share and per share data)   March 31, 2025     December 31, 2024     March 31, 2024  
    Tangible common equity:                        
    Total shareholders’ equity   $ 510,306     $ 507,877     $ 513,986  
    Adjustments                        
    Goodwill     (71,498 )     (71,498 )     (71,498 )
    Core deposit intangible     (1,839 )     (2,011 )     (2,594 )
    Tangible common equity   $ 436,969     $ 434,368     $ 439,894  
    Tangible assets:                        
    Total assets-GAAP   $ 4,009,400     $ 3,992,477     $ 3,878,006  
    Adjustments                        
    Goodwill     (71,498 )     (71,498 )     (71,498 )
    Core deposit intangible     (1,839 )     (2,011 )     (2,594 )
    Tangible assets   $ 3,936,063     $ 3,918,968     $ 3,803,914  
    Common shares outstanding     17,738,628       17,720,416       18,578,132  
    Common equity to assets ratio     12.73 %     12.72 %     13.25 %
    Tangible common equity to tangible assets ratio     11.10 %     11.08 %     11.56 %
    Book value per share   $ 28.77     $ 28.66     $ 27.67  
    Tangible book value per share   $ 24.63     $ 24.51     $ 23.68  

    Return on Average Tangible Common Equity

    Management measures return on average tangible common equity (“ROATCE”) to assess the Company’s capital strength and business performance and believes this is helpful to investors as an additional tool for further understanding our performance. Tangible equity excludes goodwill and other intangible assets (excluding mortgage servicing rights) and is reviewed by banking and financial institution regulators when assessing a financial institution’s capital adequacy. This non-GAAP financial measure should not be considered a substitute for operating results determined in accordance with GAAP and may not be comparable to other similarly titled measures used by other companies. The following table reconciles ROATCE to its most comparable GAAP measure:

        Three Months Ended  
    (dollars in thousands)   March 31, 2025     December 31, 2024     March 31, 2024  
    Net income available to common shareholders   $ 2,290     $ 4,385     $ 8,036  
    Average shareholders’ equity     512,262       512,208       512,787  
    Adjustments:                        
    Average goodwill     (71,498 )     (71,498 )     (71,498 )
    Average core deposit intangible     (1,951 )     (2,129 )     (2,726 )
    Adjusted average tangible common equity   $ 438,813     $ 438,581     $ 438,563  
    Return on average common equity, annualized     1.81 %     3.41 %     6.30 %
    Return on average tangible common equity, annualized     2.12 %     3.98 %     7.37 %

    The MIL Network –

    April 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Juggling dynamite? At 100 days in office, Donald Trump is no Franklin D. Roosevelt

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Ronald W. Pruessen, Emeritus Professor of History, University of Toronto

    Watching United States President Donald Trump weave and chainsaw his way through the first 100 days of his second term in office, I’ve been reminded of what Anthony Eden, the United Kingdom’s foreign secretary in the 1930s and later its prime minister, once said about Franklin D. Roosevelt.

    FDR, Eden recalled in his memoirs, was “too like a conjurer, skilfully juggling balls of dynamite, whose nature he failed to understand.”

    The image fits the 47th president much better than the 32nd.

    The dynamite-wielding Trump

    Dynamite has certainly been exploding regularly since Trump took office in January. His actions include:

    • The firings (and sometimes re-hirings) of thousands of government employees.
    • The attack on government agencies doing work delegated by Congress.
    • Pardons for Jan. 6 rioters but deportations of asylum seekers and green card holders with no semblance of due process.
    • Campaigns against universities for their supposed dereliction in terms of antisemitism or extravagance in adhering to diversity, equity and inclusion principles, and towards law firms linked to earlier prosecutions of the now-resurrected president.
    • Cannonades of tariffs, tariff pauses and threats of re-imposition.



    Read more:
    How Project 2025 became the blueprint for Donald Trump’s second term


    For non-MAGA enthusiasts, it is easy to surmise — similar to Eden’s remarks on FDR — that Trump does not understand the potential damage of the dynamite he is not just juggling, but hurling.

    A case might be made that some lobs align with Trump’s personal penchant for retribution, or that the chainsaw is being wielded to make room in the federal budget for new tax cuts for the one per cent.

    But such calculations disregard deeply rooted American values like respect for the rule of law and the separation of powers.

    Trump’s actions could suggest a lust for mayhem apparently aimed at dismantling a century of efforts to shape a government that serves global security while also meeting the economic, social and health care needs of American citizens, including safety net provisions for senior citizens, children, farmers, veterans and others.

    Threats today, damage tomorrow

    His apparent fondness for dynamite is already having negative consequences, with seemingly little grasp of the likelihood of worse to come: today, he’s upending the lives of civil servants; tomorrow’s disruptions will likely include an attack on the services provided by agencies like the Social Security Administration and disruption of the flow of funds to many poor school districts.

    Today, the U.S. is struggling with a measles outbreak. But the personal beliefs of Health and Human Services Director Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., a notorious vaccination and public health skeptic, doesn’t bode well for a fight against a rapidly evolving avian flu threat on the near horizon.

    Today’s stock and bond market volatility creates the possibility of a trade war catastrophe and damage to economic stability as the U.S. appears poised to disregard its longtime status as the world economy’s “safe haven.”

    The current tensions in what were once ironclad partnerships with allies that include Canada, the European Union and Ukraine — along with the whiplash reversal of American-Russian dynamics — are reminiscent of the global disruption in the 1930s that featured the Great Depression and the eruption of the Second World War.

    How FDR coped with explosions around him

    If Eden’s image of FDR as a dangerous juggler of dynamite might also apply to Trump, it fails to capture the essential attributes of the 32nd president’s White House career. Eden’s ego seems to have undercut his appraisal of FDR — compounded by his own failure to understand the historical developments that profoundly weakened the British Empire and brought his own career to an end.

    There’s no question dynamite was exploding in 1933, the start of FDR’s 12 years in the White House. But the Depression and its evolving consequences, not FDR’s personal impulses and misconceptions, created a tinderbox decade.

    One of Roosevelt’s great strengths, in fact, was his ability to recognize the acute dangers emanating from a fearful cortege of flaming fuses. Another was his success in turning insights into meaningful actions.

    Roosevelt knew — far better than his predecessor, Herbert Hoover — that the onset of the Depression would require dramatic actions and fundamental reforms.

    His New Deal expanded the government’s role in stimulating the economy (for example, the Public Works Administration), regulation (the Securities Exchange Commission), social welfare initiatives (the Social Security program) and infrastructure development (for example, the Tennessee Valley Authority).

    The Depression wasn’t fully eradicated — that didn’t happen until after war broke out — but the lives of millions of Americans still improved significantly.

    Of equal importance, FDR’s creative thinking and government transformations created building blocks for further post-war reforms, including Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society efforts three decades later.




    Read more:
    The Great Society: the forgotten reform movement


    Roosevelt also knew that the devastation of the Depression and the unparalleled destruction of the Second World War required a transformation of the global arena. He believed technology — air power especially — had created an integrated world. In his January 1943 State of the Union address, he said:

    “Wars grow in size, in death and destruction, and in the inevitability of engulfing all nations, in inverse ratio to the shrinking size of the world as a result of the conquest of the air.”

    Sharing responsibilities

    FDR believed the world he worked to create would be safer and more prosperous because multilateral organizations would encourage greater emphasis on shared resources and responsibilities. The United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank took shape during FDR’s presidency — as did long-term plans for decolonization and human rights initiatives.

    Roosevelt knew too — better than many of his White House successors — that the U.S. needed to share leadership responsibilities. He believed emphatically in multilateralism, recognizing the limits of American resources and power, and the pragmatism of compromising with the priorities of others, whether they were powerful states or colonial peoples.

    His “Four Policemen” approach to maintaining peace — comprising the U.S., the U.K., the Soviet Union and China — would sometimes create unpalatable situations. He was criticized harshly, for example, for naively opening the door to Soviet domination of eastern Europe via the Yalta agreement. Nonetheless, FDR focused on efforts he believed would avert another destructive cataclysm.

    FDR was an imperfect leader in various ways — in not appreciating, for example, how global leadership could result in arrogance. He did, however, understand the explosive domestic and international developments of the 20th century and sought constructive solutions to grave challenges.

    Trump, on the contrary, is seemingly prioritizing destruction over construction. Propelled by a “move fast and break things” mantra, there’s little evidence that he understands its pain nor the damaging consequences of his impulses.

    Ronald W. Pruessen has received funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

    – ref. Juggling dynamite? At 100 days in office, Donald Trump is no Franklin D. Roosevelt – https://theconversation.com/juggling-dynamite-at-100-days-in-office-donald-trump-is-no-franklin-d-roosevelt-254773

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    April 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – Observers in the European Parliament – 28-04-2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Accession to the European Union is a long process, requiring not only legislative, administrative and economic adaptation to EU standards, but also a degree of adaptation to the working methods of the EU institutions. One of these new working methods candidate countries must navigate is how the European Parliament organises its activities, how members interact, and how to build alliances and dialogue among the various political families represented in Parliament. Parliament’s rules of procedure allow parliamentary representatives of candidate countries to experience all these aspects in person, in advance of accession. Once the accession procedure is nearing conclusion, i.e. once an accession treaty is signed, the parliament of the acceding country may be invited to appoint, from among its members, persons who will be granted observer status to the European Parliament. As they are not yet elected in European elections, these observers remain members of the acceding country’s parliament, but have the opportunity to participate, with some limitations, in parliamentary activities. For example, they cannot vote or fill any elected position within Parliament’s organisation. However, they can participate in the activities of the parliamentary group to which they are affiliated, and attend plenary sittings and committee meetings. Observers were appointed in the last three EU enlargements, and remained in office either until ad hoc European Elections were organised for the acceding country, i.e. outside the official electoral cycle (Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria), or until the end of the parliamentary term (2004 enlargement). The possibility for Ukraine to have observer members in the European Parliament, under the current rules, depends upon the progress on accession negotiations, which officially only opened in December 2023. Nevertheless, cooperation between the Verkhovna Rada, the Ukrainian parliament, and the European Parliament already takes place in other forms.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Plan to gradually reduce the EU’s dependence on Russian energy imports – P-000981/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Following the Russian military aggression against Ukraine as of 2022, the EU has acted firmly to cut its reliance on Russian energy.

    REPowerEU[1], adopted in May 2022, aiming to fast forward the clean transition, diversify supplies, and enhance EU energy resilience. The EU adopted sanctions to phase out Russian coal imports.

    Sanctions on Russian oil have also reduced imports from almost a third to 3% of total EU imports. In terms of gas, the EU reduced its Russian gas imports from over 45% in 2021, to 19% in 2024, replacing it with alternatives like liquefied natural gas from a number of international partners.

    With the end of Russian gas transit via Ukraine, beginning of 2025, the share could fall to 13% this year. However, Russian energy, particularly gas, remains in the EU energy mix.

    To address this, the Commission is working apace on a Roadmap to end Russian energy imports by fully implementing REPowerEU, which is in the Commission Work Programme for 2025.

    • [1] https://commission.europa.eu/publications/key-documents-repowereu_en
    Last updated: 28 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Missions – SANT mission to Kyiv, Ukraine – 14-04-2025 – Committee on Public Health

    Source: European Parliament

    EU Ukraine © Adobe Stock

    Committee on Public Health travelled to Ukraine on 14 and 15 April for talks with parliament representatives and healthcare leaders. The delegation was composed of five Members: Adam Jarubas (EPP, PL), SANT Chair, Tilly Metz (Greens/EFA, LU), SANT Vice-Chair, Vytenis Andriukaitis (S&D, LT), Nikos Papandreou (S&D, EL) and Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová (Renew, SK).

    The European Parliament delegation met Chairman Ruslan Stefanchuk, Mykhailo Radutskyi, Chair of the Committee on Public Health, and other members of the Verkhovna Rada, as well as healthcare leaders, including Maryna Slobodnichenko, Deputy Minister of Health. MEPs also witnessed first-hand the impressive care of soldiers injured in the Russian war of aggression.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Pressure to release a Russian spy and the Commission’s rule of law report – E-001534/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001534/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Mariusz Kamiński (ECR)

    The Commission’s rule of law report criticised the conservative Polish government for arresting dangerous Russian spy Pavel Rubtsov[1], which raises serious questions. Poland was clearly being pressured to release a Russian spy. In addition, this was an attack on the EU’s most anti-Putin government, which has been exceptionally active in supporting Ukraine in the war with Russia. Despite spending millions of euros on fact-checking and fighting disinformation, the Commission made no effort to verify the circumstances around Rubtsov’s arrest but simply, and disgracefully, played into Russia’s hands.

    The Commission handled the situation disgracefully, avoiding any responsibility and pinning the blame entirely on the Council of Europe’s platform[2]. However, following the spy exchange and the public welcome from Putin that backed up the Polish government’s position, the Council of Europe updated the information on the platform on 16 October. Other organisations also withdrew their false accusations[3]. By not withdrawing its disgraceful claims, the Commission is alone in stubbornly sticking to and promoting the lie. Commissioner McGrath’s stance was also significant – during an EUDS committee meeting he did not respond to questions on the matter.

    • 1.The Commission’s false accusations serve the interests of the Russian special services. It is the Commission’s responsibility to determine whether the accusations originated from them. Does the Commission intend to conduct an investigation and disclose who backed up these disgraceful claims?
    • 2.Does the Commission recognise that defending Rubtsov and attacking the Law and Justice government served the interests of the Russian special forces?
    • 3.Will the Commission continue to be the only institution compromising itself in this fashion, or will it apologise and update its 2023 report?

    Submitted: 15.4.2025

    • [1] The 2023 rule of law report criticised the Polish government for arresting Spanish left-wing journalist Pablo González. The case was supposed to be evidence of rule of law violations in Poland and restrictions on freedom of speech. However, Pablo González was actually Pavel Rubtsov, a dangerous Russian spy. In August 2024, Rubtsov was handed over to the Russians as part of a high-profile spy swap and was greeted by Putin at the airport.
    • [2] In response to a question I submitted, the Commission stated that it had supported Rubtsov based on information from the Council of Europe platform.
    • [3] Alert 87/2022 was deactivated and its content was updated. In addition, the Council of Europe stated that ‘the partner organisations decided to deactivate this alert on the Platform, concluding that the charges against Pablo González (Pavel Rubtsov), which led to his arrest in Poland, were not related to his journalistic activities.’ httpsfom.coe.int/en/alerte/detail/107637244.
    Last updated: 28 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Trump’s first 100 days: economic uncertainty spikes while the president’s approval ratings tank

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Steve Schifferes, Honorary Research Fellow, City Political Economy Research Centre, City St George’s, University of London

    When US president Donald Trump took office in January he inherited a strong economy, which was growing faster than those of many of its rivals. Nevertheless, he won the election in November on the back of strong voter dissatisfaction with the economy, especially the cost of living. This is the legacy of high inflation sparked first by COVID and then Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

    But Trump also won with his appeal to “left-behind” voters, especially working-class people in the US rust belt. This demographic has suffered a long-term decline in living standards as manufacturing jobs in traditional industries like car-making and steel have disappeared.

    Trump claimed during his campaign that high tariffs were the answer to most of America’s economic problems. He promised a revival in domestic manufacturing by blocking imports, while forcing foreign firms to shift production to the US. And there was also the promise of tax cuts paid for with the revenues raised from tariffs.

    But the erratic roll-out of his tariff policies have shattered business and consumer confidence. They have also tanked his poll ratings with respect to his management of the economy. And it is causing chaos to world trade and economic cooperation.



    How is Donald Trump’s presidency shaping up after 100 days? Here’s what the experts think. If you like what you see, sign up to receive our weekly World Affairs Briefing newsletter.


    The threat of higher prices for imported goods has made US consumers cautious. Businesses are facing the awesome task of rejigging global supply chains established over many decades, with no certainty over where they should invest.

    China was always the main target of Trump’s tariffs, but it is not clear who will win the battle. China has been preparing for this confrontation for years, shifting its exports to other countries and boosting domestic consumption.

    And blocking Chinese exports does not automatically mean that US industry will become more efficient and productive. This is especially true in the absence of any industrial policy and with massive cutbacks in federal support for business, including for research.

    Trouble ahead for Trump

    The dramatic swings in tariff policy are probably less a product of Trump’s deep strategic planning – “the art of the deal” – than a response to conflicting pressures from different factions of Trump’s supporters.

    What Trump probably did not anticipate was the negative reaction of financial markets to his April 2 announcement of massive global tariffs. The precipitous fall in the stock market (which arguably was overvalued already) has wiped US$4 trillion (£3 trillion) off the value of shares. This threatens the pensions of millions of US voters.

    Even more serious has been the reaction of the bond market. Trump’s plan for massive tax cuts for the rich, now being negotiated in Congress, could add nearly US$6 trillion to the already huge and growing stock of US government debt over the next decade. This strategy will only work if international bond holders are prepared to buy a lot more US Treasury bonds.

    But they are now fleeing that market, which is normally the bedrock of the international financial system. This has the effect of forcing up interest rates, both in the US and globally.

    The US president’s attack on the independence of the US central bank, the Federal Reserve, is further unsettling the markets. The Fed now has the unenviable task of trying both to stop a recession and prevent inflation getting out of hand.

    And the economic damage of Trump’s tariffs is having political consequences. The Democrats are now favoured to retake control of the House of Representatives in the 2026 mid-term elections.

    Targeting welfare may be a cut too far for many US voters.
    Christopher Penler/Shutterstock

    Trump’s popularity will suffer a further blow if Congress is forced to cut government spending even further to finance its tax cuts. One casualty could be Medicaid spending, which faces cuts of US$880 billion. Medicaid provides health insurance for 70 million people on low incomes or with disabilities. The cut has already been included in one version of the budget resolution.




    Read more:
    Trump thinks tariffs can bring back the glory days of US manufacturing. Here’s why he’s wrong


    Trump is now caught between his big business backers, who want to drastically reduce the role of the federal government but keep free trade, and his working-class supporters, who are hoping that his tariffs will restore manufacturing jobs.

    But this group would be deeply upset by cuts to major government programmes such as Medicare and social security, which many depend on for much of their income. These programmes make up a large portion of all government non-defence spending, and without major cuts it will be hard to find enough savings to fund tax reductions.

    With the International Monetary Fund now forecasting a 40% chance of recession in the US, the president’s economic ratings look unlikely to improve any time soon.

    Steve Schifferes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Trump’s first 100 days: economic uncertainty spikes while the president’s approval ratings tank – https://theconversation.com/trumps-first-100-days-economic-uncertainty-spikes-while-the-presidents-approval-ratings-tank-255449

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    April 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: The UK is working to tackle the root causes of displacement, including war, instability and repression: UK statement at the UN Security Council

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    The UK is working to tackle the root causes of displacement, including war, instability and repression: UK statement at the UN Security Council

    Statement by Ambassador James Kariuki, UK Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, at the UN Security Council briefing by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

    I want to start by underlining our wholehearted support for UNHCR and High Commissioner Grandi’s passionate leadership. You have steered the organisation through a decade of global change. 

    A decade of increasing conflict, climate shocks and instability.

    All these factors continue to push people from their homes, driving displacement ever higher. 

    In the world today, over 123 million people are forcibly displaced.

    In the face of such challenges, we must focus on solutions. 

    I will highlight three that are priority areas for the UK.  

    First, we will continue to do all we can to tackle the root causes of displacement, including war, instability, and repression. 

    We will work at all levels, including through this Council to protect the rules-based international system and promote peace. 

    We will work with international partners to tackle people smuggling and human trafficking, which exploits vulnerable people for financial gain. 

    Just this month, the UK led a successful Border-Security Summit, where we secured agreements between participating countries, to drive efforts to disrupt organised immigration crime and save lives.

    Second, we will seek solutions to regional and country-specific crises. 

    Many of which, from Ukraine to the Middle East, are the focus of this Council.

    This month, the UK hosted a conference on Sudan with humanitarian and political objectives, including support for an end to the conflict and easing the impact on the region and we were grateful for the participation of Commissioner Grandi along with other parts of the UN leadership.

    In Cox’s Bazar, we have funded UNHCR to support refugees’ access to healthcare, clean water and hygiene. 

    We will continue to advocate for safe, dignified and sustainable solutions for refugees, including at the UN Rohingya Conference in September.

    And third, we continue to push for innovative approaches to addressing displacement. 

    We support the High Commissioner’s Sustainable Responses Initiative, which supports refugee inclusion and self-reliance, and ownership of solutions by host countries. 

    We look forward to the Global Compact for Refugees meeting in December – a key moment to review progress on pledges we made in 2023, to deliver better outcomes for displaced people and host communities. 

    And we encourage others to join and sustain our collective efforts to achieve the Compact’s goals.

    In conclusion, President, to reverse the growing trend of displacement, we need to focus on solutions to the causes we have all discussed today.

    The UK is committed to working with UNHCR and other international partners and institutions to achieve this.

    Updates to this page

    Published 28 April 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    April 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Secretary General welcomes German Federal President to NATO to mark 70 years of Germany’s membership in the Alliance

    Source: NATO

    On Monday (28 April 2025), NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte welcomed the President of the Federal Republic of Germany Frank-Walter Steinmeier to NATO to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Federal Republic of Germany’s accession to NATO. Mr Steinmeier was accompanied by the Acting Minister of Defence Boris Pistorius.

    The Secretary General and the German Federal President laid a wreath together at the NATO headquarters in Brussels and held bilateral talks. Mr Rutte emphasised that a strong Germany matters for Europe’s security and for global stability, “with troops along the eastern part of the Alliance, jets patrolling the Baltic skies, and ships protecting key supply lines and critical infrastructure in the Baltic Sea. Germany is also the largest European contributor of military aid to Ukraine,” he said.

    This year Germany marks 70 years of membership in NATO, an anniversary that reflects its deep commitment to peace, security and international cooperation. Since becoming NATO’s 15th member in 1955, just a decade after the Second World War, Germany has undergone a remarkable transformation from a divided, war-torn nation to one of NATO’s leading members. It stands as a symbol of how former adversaries can become pillars of peace through shared values and collective defence. 

    Following the ceremony at the NATO headquarters, the German Federal President met with Philippe, King of the Belgians, at the Palace of Laeken.  

    MIL Security OSI –

    April 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: OSCE supports Ukraine in fighting illicit trafficking of firearms and explosives

    Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – OSCE

    Headline: OSCE supports Ukraine in fighting illicit trafficking of firearms and explosives

    Panellists at an expert roundtable on preventing and combating illicit trafficking of weapons, ammunition and explosives (WAE) in Ukraine, Kyiv, 25 April 2025. (OSCE) Photo details

    The OSCE, in partnership with Ukraine’s Ministry of Interior, convened an expert roundtable to discuss various aspects of preventing and combating illicit trafficking of weapons, ammunition and explosives (WAE) in Ukraine on 25 April.
    The roundtable focused on the development of Ukraine’s national control system over firearms, which is a permit-based system that streamlines proper storage and adherence to public carry restrictions of civilian firearms. More than 50 representatives of Ukrainian law enforcement sector, parliament and international organizations that provide subject matter support to Ukraine attended the event held in Kyiv.
    “Counteracting the illicit trafficking of weapons cannot be postponed to later – our joint actions today define safety and security of our communities tomorrow. Even during the war, we introduce systemic solutions for better tracing and thus control over firearms, which is a unique experience by itself,” said Ihor Klymenko, Ukraine’s Minister of Interior in his opening address.
    Reflecting on the threats illicit weapons currently pose in Ukraine, the participants shared their thoughts on appropriate response measures, such as improving national legislation on firearms, strengthening inter-agency co-ordination, implementing awareness raising campaigns, as well as enhancing capabilities of Ukraine’s law enforcement agencies in detection and investigation of illicit WAE. How to work closely with the Ukrainian society in curbing illicit circulation of firearms in the country was also discussed.
    “The recently launched mechanism for voluntary declaration of unregistered weapons and further digitalization of this process is a tangible step of the Ukrainian government towards reducing the risks of gun violence in Ukraine. Understanding deep trauma caused by the war and people’s natural desire of self-protection, it is important to build trustful relations between competent authorities and the population against illicit possession of firearms,” said Petr Mareš, the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairpersonship – Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine.
    The crucial role of the international support and synergy among all assistance providers on combating illicit WAE and affiliated threats in Ukraine was emphasized to ensure tailored address for Ukraine’s needs. Shawn DeCaluwe, Deputy Director of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre highlighted the OSCE’s role in providing training, specialized equipment and a platform for regular co-ordination among the organizations supporting Ukraine’s efforts in combating illicit WAE.
    The event was held as part of the OSCE extrabudgetary project “In support of strengthening the capacities of Ukrainian authorities in preventing and combating illicit trafficking of weapons, ammunition and explosives in all its aspects”, financed by the European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Slovakia and Poland.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Italy’s Meloni is positioning herself as bridge between EU and Trump – but will it work?

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Julia Khrebtan-Hörhager, Associate Professor of Critical Cultural & International Studies, Colorado State University

    Italy Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni looks to thread a divide. Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images

    Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni recently became the first European leader to visit the United States after President Donald Trump announced a new tariff regime on trading partners, including a 20% levy on imports from the European Union.

    While those tariffs are currently on hold, the ongoing threat of them being enacted provided a telling backdrop for Meloni’s mid-April 2025 visit.

    Controversial and often perceived by critics as calculating, Meloni has walked a tightrope between European Union solidarity and embracing far-right causes since becoming Italy’s prime minister in 2022. She was the only European leader to attend Trump’s inauguration in January 2025 and counts tech titan Elon Musk among her allies.

    In many ways, Meloni reflects Europe’s own identity crisis: a regional power with global ambition. Italy, after all, was a founding pillar of the European Union, hosting the signing of the Treaties of Rome in 1957 establishing the European common market. Yet, for decades, Italy has often stood just outside the core of EU influence, overshadowed by the Franco-German partnership.

    Still, when the moment is right, Italy knows how to wield its leverage, especially as a bridge between clashing camps in Brussels.

    In Washington, Meloni made her pitch to Trump: a tighter ideological alliance over shared disdain for “woke” politics, diversity, equity and inclusion agendas, and lax immigration. She offered a sweetener – more Italian investment in the U.S. as a sop to the transatlantic trade dispute. But she also reiterated her and the EU’s support for Ukraine, a direct contrast to Trump’s skepticism to continued U.S. support in Ukraine’s conflict with Russia.

    In so doing, Meloni has cast herself as someone who can serve both Brussels and Washington without burning bridges on either side. The gamble? That balancing act could backfire. Trump’s demands over trade and increased defense spending by NATO countries force Meloni to choose between appeasing Washington or staying in line with EU norms. Her overtures to Trump risk alienating key European allies who are wary of his disruptive politics.

    In trying to play both sides, she could end up isolated from both – undermining Italy’s credibility and influence on the world stage.

    Italy was a founder member of the European Union, but it is often a third wheel behind Germany and France.
    Simona Granati/Corbis/Corbis via Getty Images

    Meloni as a bridge

    The story of modern Italy has been one of playing off sides.

    During the Cold War, Italy walked a fine line between NATO commitments and accommodating a powerful domestic Communist Party.

    Italy was regularly governed by a series of often fraught center-right coalitions that were forced to navigate fractious politics and quid pro quo political violence between the far right and far left. The center-right Christian Democrats that dominated this period married conservatism at home with a strong pro-European outlook.

    In the first decades after the Cold War ended, Italy continued to carve out its own lane – pushing for leniency on issues like immigration and fiscal rules. The period saw Italy oscillate between pro-European integration and bouts of euroscepticism, with successive governments frequently challenging Brussels over budgetary constraints or border management.

    Meloni’s own rise is deeply rooted in the post-2015 tensions, when Italy – overwhelmed by the Mediterranean migrant crisis – felt abandoned by its European partners. Her party’s hard-line stance on immigration capitalized on public frustration. While she now presents herself as firmly pro-EU, it’s a version of Europe that aligns with her own vision: more secure borders, stronger national sovereignty and less technocratic interference.

    Ironically, as the bloc itself drifts rightward on migration, Meloni’s positions no longer seem so fringe – perhaps allowing her to embrace the EU pragmatically, even as she critiques it ideologically. Meloni’s own background and rise reflect this ambiguity and duality. Emerging from a political movement with fascist roots, she now presents herself as a passionate Europeanist and pacifist while maintaining right-wing positions on immigration and cultural issues.

    Meloni has governed in that fashion: cultivating ties with conservative heavyweights like Trump and right-wing European leaders, pushing back against Brussels on contentious policy issues, but also remaining firmly committed to the European project when it suits her. Especially when the economy is at stake.

    Meloni as pragmatic European

    Meloni’s strongly nationalist rhetoric and right-wing cultural views might appear at odds with the EU’s purpose, but her approach to the continent is highly pragmatic.

    While she regularly critiques EU bureaucracy at home, her government remains the largest recipient of EU recovery funds, securing €191.5 billion (US$218 billion) from the EU’s post-COVID recovery plan program. That critical cash infusion for an aging country with persistently sluggish growth comes with a commitment to enact a series of stringent fiscal reforms and austerity measures by 2026. In addition, Italy continues to benefit from long-standing cohesion and structural funds, particularly the economically struggling south,.

    Meanwhile, Meloni’s support for Ukraine helps her stand apart from pro-Russia voices in her coalition and strengthens Italy’s standing with NATO and the EU. It’s another strategic move that boosts her credibility both at home and abroad. Far from being a fringe player, Italy under Meloni is central to the EU’s narrative of unity, solidarity and survival.

    A spaghetti Western alliance?

    While Meloni reconciles her nationalist views vis-a-vis the supranationalist EU, she has also prioritized selling her idea of Italy on a bilateral basis.

    That has largely focused on a shrewd charm offensive in the U.S., particularly since the return of Trump, whose right-wing administration provides any easy fit for Meloni. She has attempted to play both Trump and Musk to Italy’s advantage, leveraging Rome’s geopolitical position to secure economic agreements and ease tensions wrought by Trump tariffs, which Meloni called “wrong.”

    Trump has been quick to praise her stance against “anti-woke” politics, while Meloni promises to help resolve trade issues and boost U.S. gas imports, all while keeping Italy at the forefront of negotiations. With Musk, she has attempted to position Italy as a key partner in tech and energy, navigating the global game with both finesse and ambition.

    Italy runs a substantial trade surplus with the U.S. and underspends on NATO defense – two things that typically trigger Trump’s criticism. Yet with Meloni, Trump has been full of admiration: “She’s taken Europe by storm,” he said in April, agreeing during their last meeting to meet again in Rome in the near future.

    Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, left, has expressed solidarity with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
    Thierry Monasse/Getty Images

    Meloni’s diplomatic ambitions extend beyond the U.S., including making moves in the Middle East, particularly with Saudi Arabia. By promoting Italy as a gateway to Europe, she is securing key investments in energy and infrastructure, while boosting Italian exports and increasing her diplomatic leverage. The fact that many in Europe, and indeed Italy, eye such overtures toward Saudi money with distaste, appears neither here nor there. After all, in Italy there has long been an attitude among leaders that “money does not smell” – or “pecunia non olet” as the locals say – a phrase that by legend was uttered by Emperor Vespasian while slapping a tax on public urinals.

    Will all roads lead to Rome?

    While Meloni’s approach of casting Italy as a bridge between the U.S. and Europe may yield some short-term diplomatic gains, it’s nonetheless a delicate path fraught with risk. Cozying up to Washington under Trump, whose policies – especially on trade – have engendered widespread outrage in Europe, risks ruffling feathers in Brussels. Indeed, while Trump praised Meloni’s leadership, and both sides talked trade with no urgency on tariffs, Europe watched warily.

    Trying to navigate between Trump’s protectionist leanings and the EU’s collective trade stance could leave Meloni unable to satisfy either side. Should Trump push for concessions – like shrinking Italy’s trade surplus with the U.S. or increasing defense spending – Meloni may find herself at odds with EU standards and alienating European partners. But leaning too far into EU alignment – and the bloc’s commitment to Ukraine – risks souring her ties with Trump’s camp, potentially weakening her influence across the Atlantic.

    In trying to please both Washington and Brussels, Meloni could end up with enemies on both fronts – and very few wins to show for it.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Italy’s Meloni is positioning herself as bridge between EU and Trump – but will it work? – https://theconversation.com/italys-meloni-is-positioning-herself-as-bridge-between-eu-and-trump-but-will-it-work-254955

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    April 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: 50 years later, Vietnam’s environment still bears the scars of war – and signals a dark future for Gaza and Ukraine

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Pamela McElwee, Professor of Human Ecology, Rutgers University

    During the Vietnam War, the U.S. bombed and defoliated vast areas of forest and protective mangroves. AP Photo

    When the Vietnam War finally ended on April 30, 1975, it left behind a landscape scarred with environmental damage. Vast stretches of coastal mangroves, once housing rich stocks of fish and birds, lay in ruins. Forests that had boasted hundreds of species were reduced to dried-out fragments, overgrown with invasive grasses.

    The term “ecocide” had been coined in the late 1960s to describe the U.S. military’s use of herbicides like Agent Orange and incendiary weapons like napalm to battle guerrilla forces that used jungles and marshes for cover.

    Fifty years later, Vietnam’s degraded ecosystems and dioxin-contaminated soils and waters still reflect the long-term ecological consequences of the war. Efforts to restore these damaged landscapes and even to assess the long-term harm have been limited.

    As an environmental scientist and anthropologist who has worked in Vietnam since the 1990s, I find the neglect and slow recovery efforts deeply troubling. Although the war spurred new international treaties aimed at protecting the environment during wartime, these efforts failed to compel post-war restoration for Vietnam. Current conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East show these laws and treaties still aren’t effective.

    Agent Orange and daisy cutters

    The U.S. first sent ground troops to Vietnam in March 1965 to support South Vietnam against revolutionary forces and North Vietnamese troops, but the war had been going on for years before then. To fight an elusive enemy operating clandestinely at night and from hideouts deep in swamps and jungles, the U.S. military turned to environmental modification technologies.

    The most well-known of these was Operation Ranch Hand, which sprayed at least 19 million gallons (75 million liters) of herbicides over approximately 6.4 million acres (2.6 million hectares), of South Vietnam. The chemicals fell on forests, and also on rivers, rice paddies and villages, exposing civilians and troops. More than half of that spraying involved the dioxin-contaminated defoliant Agent Orange.

    A U.S. Air Force C-123 flies low along a South Vietnamese highway spraying defoliants on dense jungle growth beside the road to eliminate ambush sites during the Vietnam War.
    AP Photo/Department of Defense

    Herbicides were used to strip the leaf cover from forests, increase visibility along transportation routes and destroy crops suspected of supplying guerrilla forces.

    As news of the damage from these tactics made it back to the U.S., scientists raised concerns about the campaign’s environmental impacts to President Lyndon Johnson, calling for a review of whether the U.S. was intentionally using chemical weapons. American military leaders’ position was that herbicides did not constitute chemical weapons under the Geneva Protocol, which the U.S. had yet to ratify.

    Scientific organizations also initiated studies within Vietnam during the war, finding widespread destruction of mangroves, economic losses of rubber and timber plantations, and harm to lakes and waterways.

    A photo at the War Remnants Museum in Ho Chi Minh City, historically known as Saigon, shows the damage at Cần Giờ mangrove forest. The mangrove forest was destroyed by herbicides, bombs and plows.
    Gary Todd/Flickr

    In 1969, evidence linked a chemical in Agent Orange, 2,4,5-T, to birth defects and stillbirths in mice because it contained TCDD, a particularly harmful dioxin. That led to a ban on domestic use and suspension of Agent Orange use by the military in April 1970, with the last mission flown in early 1971.

    Incendiary weapons and the clearing of forests also ravaged rich ecosystems in Vietnam.

    The U.S. Forest Service tested large-scale incineration of jungles by igniting barrels of fuel oil dropped from planes. Particularly feared by civilians was the use of napalm bombs, with more than 400,000 tons of the thickened petroleum used during the war. After these infernos, invasive grasses often took over in hardened, infertile soils.

    Fires from napalm and other incendiary weapons cleared stretches of forest, in some cases scorching the soil so badly that nothing would regrow.
    AP Photo

    “Rome Plows,” massive bulldozers with an armor-fortified cutting blade, could clear 1,000 acres a day. Enormous concussive bombs, known as “daisy cutters”, flattened forests and set off shock waves killing everything within a 3,000-foot (900-meter) radius, down to earthworms in the soil.

    The U.S. also engaged in weather modification through Project Popeye, a secret program from 1967 to 1972 that seeded clouds with silver iodide to prolong the monsoon season in an attempt to cut the flow of fighters and supplies coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail from North Vietnam. Congress eventually passed a bipartisan resolution in 1973 urging an international treaty to prohibit the use of weather modification as a weapon of war. That treaty came into effect in 1978.

    The U.S. military contended that all these tactics were operationally successful as a trade of trees for American lives.

    Despite Congress’ concerns, there was little scrutiny of the environmental impacts of U.S. military operations and technologies. Research sites were hard to access, and there was no regular environmental monitoring.

    Recovery efforts have been slow

    After the fall of Saigon to North Vietnamese troops on April 30, 1975, the U.S. imposed a trade and economic embargo on all of Vietnam, leaving the country both war-damaged and cash-strapped.

    Vietnamese scientists told me they cobbled together small-scale studies. One found a dramatic drop in bird and mammal diversity in forests. In the A Lưới valley of central Vietnam, 80% of forests subjected to herbicides had not recovered by the early 1980s. Biologists found only 24 bird and five mammal species in those areas, far below normal in unsprayed forests.

    Only a handful of ecosystem restoration projects were attempted, hampered by shoestring budgets. The most notable began in 1978, when foresters began hand-replanting mangroves at the mouth of the Saigon River in Cần Giờ forest, an area that had been completely denuded.

    Mangroves have been replanted in the Cần Giờ Biosphere Reserve near Ho Chi Minh City, but their restoration took decades.
    Tho Nau/Flickr, CC BY

    In inland areas, widespread tree-planting programs in the late 1980s and 1990s finally took root, but they focused on planting exotic trees like acacia, which did not restore the original diversity of the natural forests.

    Chemical cleanup is still underway

    For years, the U.S. also denied responsibility for Agent Orange cleanup, despite the recognition of dioxin-associated illnesses among U.S. veterans and testing that revealed continuing dioxin exposure among potentially tens of thousands of Vietnamese.

    The first remediation agreement between the two countries only occurred in 2006, after persistent advocacy by veterans, scientists and nongovernmental organizations led Congress to appropriate US$3 million for the remediation of the Da Nang airport.

    That project, completed in 2018, treated 150,000 cubic meters of dioxin-laden soil at an eventual cost of over $115 million, paid mostly by the U.S. Agency for International Development, or USAID. The cleanup required lakes to be drained and contaminated soil, which had seeped more than 9 feet (3 meters) deeper than expected, to be piled and heated to break down the dioxin molecules.

    Large amounts of Agent Orange had been stored at the Da Nang airport during the war and contaminated the soil with dioxin. The cleanup project, including heating contaminated soil to high temperatures, was completed in 2018.
    Richard Nyberg/USAID

    Another major hot spot is the heavily contaminated Biên Hoà airbase, where local residents continue to ingest high levels of dioxin through fish, chicken and ducks.

    Agent Orange barrels were stored at the base, which leaked large amounts of the toxin into soil and water, where it continues to accumulate in animal tissue as it moves up the food chain. Remediation began in 2019; however, further work is at risk with the Trump administration’s near elimination of USAID, leaving it unclear if there will be any American experts in Vietnam in charge of administering this complex project.

    Laws to prevent future ‘ecocide’ are complicated

    While Agent Orange’s health effects have understandably drawn scrutiny, its long-term ecological consequences have not been well studied.

    Current-day scientists have far more options than those 50 years ago, including satellite imagery, which is being used in Ukraine to identify fires, flooding and pollution. However, these tools cannot replace on-the-ground monitoring, which often is restricted or dangerous during wartime.

    The legal situation is similarly complex.

    In 1977, the Geneva Conventions governing conduct during wartime were revised to prohibit “widespread, long term, and severe damage to the natural environment.” A 1980 protocol restricted incendiary weapons. Yet oil fires set by Iraq during the Gulf War in 1991, and recent environmental damage in the Gaza Strip, Ukraine and Syria indicate the limits of relying on treaties when there are no strong mechanisms to ensure compliance.

    Remediation work to remove dioxin contamination was just getting started at the former Biên Hoà Air Base in Vietnam when USAID’s staff was dismantled in 2025.
    USAID Vietnam, CC BY-NC

    An international campaign currently underway calls for an amendment to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to add ecocide as a fifth prosecutable crime alongside genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression.

    Some countries have adopted their own ecocide laws. Vietnam was the first to legally state in its penal code that “Ecocide, destroying the natural environment, whether committed in time of peace or war, constitutes a crime against humanity.” Yet the law has resulted in no prosecutions, despite several large pollution cases.

    Both Russia and Ukraine also have ecocide laws, but these have not prevented harm or held anyone accountable for damage during the ongoing conflict.

    Lessons for the future

    The Vietnam War is a reminder that failure to address ecological consequences, both during war and after, will have long-term effects. What remains in short supply is the political will to ensure that these impacts are neither ignored nor repeated.

    Pamela McElwee receives funding from the Carnegie Corporation, National Science Foundation, and National Endowment for the Humanities.

    – ref. 50 years later, Vietnam’s environment still bears the scars of war – and signals a dark future for Gaza and Ukraine – https://theconversation.com/50-years-later-vietnams-environment-still-bears-the-scars-of-war-and-signals-a-dark-future-for-gaza-and-ukraine-254971

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    April 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Economics: Phillips 66 Files Investor Presentation Highlighting Proven Strategy, Board Strength and Path for Shareholder Value Creation

    Source: Phillips

    Outlines strong operational and financial performance driven by the Company’s transformative strategy
    Warns that Elliott’s high-risk proposals are misleading, based on flawed analysis and threaten long-term shareholder value
    Underscores the valuable skills and experiences Phillips 66’s Board and nominees have to drive shareholder value creation, superior to those of Elliott’s nominees

    HOUSTON–(BUSINESS WIRE)– Phillips 66 (NYSE:PSX) (the “Company”) today filed an investor presentation with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with its upcoming Annual Meeting of Shareholders on May 21, 2025.
    In conjunction with the presentation, Phillips 66 published two new videos that showcase the skills and experiences the Company’s two new Board nominees, A. Nigel Hearne and Howard Ungerleider, would bring to the Board and how they would approach driving shareholder value as a potential Board member of Phillips 66.
    The presentation and the videos are available at www.phillips66delivers.com.
    Highlights of the investor presentation include:
    Phillips 66’s proven strategy has driven, and will drive, outperformance for shareholders
    Since Mark Lashier became President and CEO in 2022, Phillips 66 has delivered total shareholder returns of 67%1, significantly outperforming the S&P 500 Energy Index by 45%1 and the Company’s synthetic proxy peer median2 by 42%1
    In under three years, Phillips 66 has taken significant action, including returning over $14 billion to shareholders through share repurchases and dividends, rationalization of Refining assets, $3.5 billion in non-core asset divestitures, and opportunistic Midstream expansion through the Pinnacle and EPIC NGL acquisitions3
    Reduced Refining Adjusted Controllable Costs from $6.98/bbl in 2022 to $5.90/bbl4 in 2024 with a clear plan in place to further reduce costs and achieve $5.50/bbl by 20275
    Phillips 66’s transformative strategy is in its early innings and has significant room to deliver further value. This proven strategy will continue to drive long-term competitiveness in Refining, grow the NGL value chain, maintain the Company’s advantaged position in Chemicals, optimize profitability across all assets, and deliver consistent, compelling returns
    Phillips 66 has delivered Refining profitability on par with peers on a like-for-like basis, while outperforming them in overall Refining cost improvements since 2022 6. The Company remains focused on cost improvements with a focus on further enhancing market capture.
    Compared to 2021, our projected Midstream Adjusted EBITDA (post EPIC NGL) has grown by $1.9 billion, driven by an incremental 18% Cash Return on Capital Invested7, with additional organic growth opportunities in the future
    CPChem’s global scale and feedstock advantages result in a self-funding joint venture with stable, growing distributions that is constructing two world-scale projects coming online in late 2026

    The Company’s integrated model creates consistent and compelling long-term value for shareholders
    Compared to the weighted proxy peer average, the Company’s integrated model delivers higher returns for shareholders and lower volatility across cycles
    Phillips 66’s integrated structure creates $500 million in annual operating synergies8, as the Midstream business ensures reliable supply and integrated logistics for refineries and CPChem, ultimately improving flow assurance, feedstock quality, blending efficiency, and market flexibility
    Since the spinoff in 2012, we have grown our dividend at a 15% CAGR.9 Our annual dividend paid has increased every year – a rare achievement in the energy sector, especially through economic and commodity cycles
    Elliott, which has notable conflicts of interest, is attempting to mislead shareholders while pushing a short-sighted agenda that introduces undue risk and threatens to disrupt long-term shareholder returns
    Elliott has demonstrated a pattern of inconsistent engagement with the Company, including prolonged periods of no engagement followed by public presentations with new demands, not allowing the Board to interview its nominees and seeking to replace Bob Pease – a director who was appointed in mutual agreement with Elliott10
    Misleading shareholders has been a core focus of Elliott’s campaign – twisting quotes from management, describing their annual resignation proposal as voluntary despite the plain language of the proposalrequiringresignation, mischaracterizing Phillips 66’s business and comparing our performance to peers who report their metrics differently
    Elliott’s proposals ignore action already taken by Phillips 66 to reduce Refining Adjusted Controllable Costs
    Elliott’s calls to separate the Midstream business and CPChem are not only misguided and risky, but are underpinned by speculative valuations, ignore potentially large tax leakages and are driven by comparisons to other situations that are not applicable to Phillips 66
    Elliott’s subsidiary, Amber Energy, is in pursuit of CITGO – a direct competitor of Phillips 66 in a core operational corridor – and is being led by the same portfolio managers who are driving its proxy campaign against Phillips 66 and actively trying to undermine our strategy.Elliott’s public solicitation materials do not clearly mention its pursuit of CITGO, or that multiple members of the Amber Energy leadership team have been directly involved in soliciting Phillips 66 shareholders
    Phillips 66’s highly skilled and refreshed Board is a group of change agents with a track record of value creation, while Elliott’s nominees pose a risk to shareholder value
    Phillips 66’s Board composition is closely aligned with the Company’s strategy. Of our continuing Directors and our nominees, six have refining experience, five have chemicals experience and five have midstream experience. Nearly everyone has experience in business transformations, several have expertise in finance and a number are experts in supply chains11
    The Board consistently and rigorously evaluates the portfolio and other alternatives with a clear focus on maximizing long-term shareholder value – and remains prepared to take decisive action to achieve that goal
    Our Directors and nominees have overseen more than $300 billion in “breakup” or major divestiture transactions12 and consistently evaluate the portfolio for value-creating opportunities
    With five new directors appointed within the past four years, the Board has a strong track record of regular refreshment
    Compared to Phillips 66’s nominees, Elliott’s nominees bring less relevant expertise and have redundant backgrounds. They also have conflicts of interests and close ties to Elliott and Amber Energy, who are actively pursuing one of our direct competitors, CITGO
    Phillips 66’s nominees are significantly superior to Elliott’s in every category. Our nominees have experiences that are directly relevant to the Company’s strategy and have notably stronger track records of creating value at publicly traded companies when compared to Elliott’s nominees
    Elliott has put forth illegal corporate governance demands, masked by misleading communications
    As you know, the Board is fully committed to declassifying in accordance with our governing documents such that each of our directors is up for election each year. Our last attempt to do so received approval from 73% of outstanding shares. We encourage shareholders to vote FOR management’s declassification proposal
    In contrast, Elliott is asking us to devise a “workaround” to declassify the Board in a de facto manner, without obtaining the required stockholder vote to do so. Our charter and by-laws do not give us that power. Put simply, if implemented, Elliott’s annual resignation proposal would contravene Delaware law, our company’s charter and by-laws and our Board’s fiduciary duties to shareholders. These facts are totally irreconcilable with Elliott’s purported interest in good corporate governance. The SEC has a process for companies to be able to exclude 14a-8 shareholder proposals that are illegal to implement, but the manner Elliott chose to proceed with avoided that review as Elliott submitted a proposal and solicited on its own proxy card
    Elliott itself clearly realizes that an annual resignation requirement is not legal to implement, so Elliott keeps misleadingly suggesting that what it is asking for is simply voluntary. However, the plain text of Elliott’s proposal specifically asks the Board to adopt a policyrequiringour directors to resign each year
    Implementing Elliott’s proposal would expose the Company to costly litigation and reputational risks and set a dangerous precedent for conveniently disregarding governing documents
    Your Vote Matters
    Phillips 66’s Board of Directors urges shareholders to use only the WHITE proxy card to vote:
    “FOR” all four of the candidates proposed by the Company and not Elliott’s four nominees;
    “FOR” management’s proposal to approve the declassification of the Board of Directors; and
    “AGAINST” Elliott’s proposal requiring annual director resignations, which implementing would violate Delaware law and put your Board at significant legal and reputational risk
    The Board strongly recommends that shareholders safeguard their investment in Phillips 66 by casting their vote as soon as possible, regardless of plans to attend the Annual Meeting virtually on May 21, 2025.
    Shareholders may receive materials from Elliott Management that say “gold proxy card” or “gold voting instructions” or similar. Phillips 66 recommends that shareholders DISCARD any Gold voting materials they may receive from Elliott. Shareholders may cancel out any vote made using a Gold proxy card by voting again TODAY using the Company’s WHITE proxy card. Only the latest-dated vote will count.
    About Phillips 66
    Phillips 66 (NYSE: PSX) is a leading integrated downstream energy provider that manufactures, transports and markets products that drive the global economy. The company’s portfolio includes Midstream, Chemicals, Refining, Marketing and Specialties, and Renewable Fuels businesses. Headquartered in Houston, Phillips 66 has employees around the globe who are committed to safely and reliably providing energy and improving lives while pursuing a lower-carbon future. For more information, visit phillips66.com or follow @Phillips66Co on LinkedIn.
    Forward-Looking Statements
    This news release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of the federal securities laws relating to Phillips 66’s operations, strategy and performance. Words such as “anticipated,” “committed,” “estimated,” “expected,” “planned,” “scheduled,” “targeted,” “believe,” “continue,” “intend,” “will,” “would,” “objective,” “goal,” “project,” “efforts,” “strategies,” and similar expressions that convey the prospective nature of events or outcomes generally indicate forward-looking statements. However, the absence of these words does not mean that a statement is not forward-looking. Forward-looking statements included in this news release are based on management’s expectations, estimates and projections as of the date they are made. These statements are not guarantees of future events or performance, and you should not unduly rely on them as they involve certain risks, uncertainties and assumptions that are difficult to predict. Therefore, actual outcomes and results may differ materially from what is expressed or forecast in such forward-looking statements. Factors that could cause actual results or events to differ materially from those described in the forward-looking statements include: changes in governmental policies or laws that relate to our operations, including regulations that seek to limit or restrict refining, marketing and midstream operations or regulate profits, pricing, or taxation of our products or feedstocks, or other regulations that restrict feedstock imports or product exports; our ability to timely obtain or maintain permits necessary for projects; fluctuations in NGL, crude oil, refined petroleum, renewable fuels and natural gas prices, and refining, marketing and petrochemical margins; the effects of any widespread public health crisis and its negative impact on commercial activity and demand for refined petroleum or renewable fuels products; changes to worldwide government policies relating to renewable fuels and greenhouse gas emissions that adversely affect programs including the renewable fuel standards program, low carbon fuel standards and tax credits for renewable fuels; potential liability from pending or future litigation; liability for remedial actions, including removal and reclamation obligations under existing or future environmental regulations; unexpected changes in costs for constructing, modifying or operating our facilities; our ability to successfully complete, or any material delay in the completion of, any asset disposition, acquisition, shutdown or conversion that we have announced or may pursue, including receipt of any necessary regulatory approvals or permits related thereto; unexpected difficulties in manufacturing, refining or transporting our products; the level and success of drilling and production volumes around our midstream assets; risks and uncertainties with respect to the actions of actual or potential competitive suppliers and transporters of refined petroleum products, renewable fuels or specialty products; lack of, or disruptions in, adequate and reliable transportation for our products; failure to complete construction of capital projects on time or within budget; our ability to comply with governmental regulations or make capital expenditures to maintain compliance with laws; limited access to capital or significantly higher cost of capital related to illiquidity or uncertainty in the domestic or international financial markets, which may also impact our ability to repurchase shares and declare and pay dividends; potential disruption of our operations due to accidents, weather events, including as a result of climate change, acts of terrorism or cyberattacks; general domestic and international economic and political developments, including armed hostilities (such as the Russia-Ukraine war), expropriation of assets, and other diplomatic developments; international monetary conditions and exchange controls; changes in estimates or projections used to assess fair value of intangible assets, goodwill and property and equipment and/or strategic decisions with respect to our asset portfolio that cause impairment charges; investments required, or reduced demand for products, as a result of environmental rules and regulations; changes in tax, environmental and other laws and regulations (including alternative energy mandates); political and societal concerns about climate change that could result in changes to our business or increase expenditures, including litigation-related expenses; the operation, financing and distribution decisions of equity affiliates we do not control; and other economic, business, competitive and/or regulatory factors affecting Phillips 66’s businesses generally as set forth in our filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Phillips 66 is under no obligation (and expressly disclaims any such obligation) to update or alter its forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.
    Additional Information
    On April 8, 2025, Phillips 66 filed a definitive proxy statement on Schedule 14A (the “Proxy Statement”) and accompanying WHITE proxy card with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) in connection with its 2025 Annual Meeting of Shareholders (the “2025 Annual Meeting”) and its solicitation of proxies for Phillips 66’s director nominees and for other matters to be voted on. This communication is not a substitute for the Proxy Statement or any other document that Phillips 66 has filed or may file with the SEC in connection with any solicitation by Phillips 66. PHILLIPS 66 SHAREHOLDERS ARE STRONGLY ENCOURAGED TO READ THE PROXY STATEMENT (AND ANY AMENDMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTS THERETO) AND ACCOMPANYING WHITE PROXY CARD AND ANY OTHER RELEVANT SOLICITATION MATERIALS FILED WITH THE SEC AS THEY CONTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION. Shareholders may obtain copies of the Proxy Statement, any amendments or supplements to the Proxy Statement and other documents (including the WHITE proxy card) filed by Phillips 66 with the SEC without charge from the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov. Copies of the documents filed by Phillips 66 with the SEC also may be obtained free of charge at Phillips 66’s investor relations website at https://investor.phillips66.com or upon written request sent to Phillips 66, 2331 CityWest Boulevard, Houston, TX 77042, Attention: Investor Relations.
    Certain Information Regarding Participants
    Phillips 66, its directors, its director nominees and certain of its executive officers and employees may be deemed to be participants in connection with the solicitation of proxies from Phillips 66 shareholders in connection with the matters to be considered at the 2025 Annual Meeting. Information regarding the names of such persons and their respective interests in Phillips 66, by securities holdings or otherwise, is available in the Proxy Statement, which was filed with the SEC on April 8, 2025, including in the sections captioned “Beneficial Ownership of Phillips 66 Securities” and “Appendix C: Supplemental Information Regarding Participants in the Solicitation.” To the extent that Phillips 66’s directors and executive officers who may be deemed to be participants in the solicitation have acquired or disposed of securities holdings since the applicable “as of” date disclosed in the Proxy Statement, such transactions have been or will be reflected on Statements of Changes in Ownership of Securities on Form 4 or Initial Statements of Beneficial Ownership of Securities on Form 3 filed with the SEC. These documents are or will be available free of charge at the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov.
    Use of Non-GAAP Financial Information
    Non-GAAP Measures—This news release includes non-GAAP financial measures, including, “adjusted EBITDA” and “refining adjusted controllable costs.” These are non-GAAP financial measures that are included to help facilitate comparisons of operating performance across periods and to help facilitate comparisons with other companies in our industry. Where applicable, these measures exclude items that do not reflect the core operating results of our businesses in the current period or other adjustments to reflect how management analyzes results. Reconciliations to, or further discussion of, the most comparable GAAP financial measures can be found within or at the end of the news release materials.
    This news release also includes forward-looking non-GAAP financial measure estimates such as, but not limited to “adjusted EBITDA” and “refining adjusted controllable costs” which, as used in certain places herein, are forward looking non-GAAP financial measures. These forward-looking estimates or targets depend on future levels of revenues and/or expenses, including amounts that could be attributable to non-controlling interests or related joint ventures, which are not reasonably estimable at this time. Accordingly, reconciliations of these forward-looking non-GAAP financial measures to the nearest GAAP financial measure cannot be provided without unreasonable effort. Below are definitions of these non-GAAP measures and identification of the most directly comparable GAAP measure.
    EBITDA is defined as estimated net income plus estimated net interest expense, income taxes, and depreciation and amortization. Adjusted EBITDA is defined as estimated EBITDA plus the proportional share of selected equity affiliates’ estimated net interest expense, income taxes, and depreciation and amortization less the portion of estimated adjusted EBITDA attributable to noncontrolling interests. Net income is the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure for the consolidated company and income before income taxes is the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure for operating segments. Refining adjusted controllable cost is the sum of operating and SG&A expenses forour Refining segment, plus our proportional share of operating and SG&A expenses of two refining equity affiliates that are reflected in equity earnings of affiliates. The per barrel amounts are based on total processed inputs, including our proportional share of processed inputs of an equity affiliate, for the respective period.
    References in this news release to shareholder distributions and returns to shareholders refer to the sum of dividends paid to Phillips 66 stockholders and proceeds used by Phillips 66 to repurchase shares of its common stock. References in this news release to “synergies” or “dis-synergies” are supported by management’s estimates and assumptions. These estimates are derived from the Company’s internal projections and other relevant data. However, because these synergies or dis-synergies are not calculated in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), they cannot be directly reconciled to GAAP measures. The Company believes that these non-GAAP measures provide valuable insight into optimization benefits but cautions that such synergies or dis-synergies may not be realized in full or at all.
    Basis of News release—Effective April 1, 2024, we changed the internal financial information reviewed by our chief executive officer to evaluate performance and allocate resources to our operating segments. This included changes in the composition of our operating segments, as well as measurement changes for certain activities between our operating segments. The primary effects of this realignment included establishment of a Renewable Fuels operating segment, which includes renewable fuels activities and assets historically reported in our Refining, Marketing and Specialties (M&S), and Midstream segments; change in method of allocating results for certain Gulf Coast distillate export activities from our M&S segment to our Refining segment; reclassification of certain crude oil and international clean products trading activities between our M&S segment and our Refining segment; and change in reporting of our investment in NOVONIX from our Midstream segment to Corporate and Other. Accordingly, prior period results have been recast for comparability.
    1. Source: FactSet; market data as of March 31, 2025. Shown since June 30, 2022, one day prior to Mark Lashier’s appointment as CEO.
    2. Calculated as the weighted average of Refining (CVI, DINO, DK, MPC, PBF, VLO), Midstream (OKE, TRGP, WMB), and Chemicals (DOW, LYB, WLK) Performance by Proxy Peers’ TSR based on the weighting of consensus NTM EBIDTA estimates for PSX’s segments.
    3. Source: Company filings.
    4. Excludes adjusted turnaround costs. Reconciliations of these non-GAAP financial measures to the most comparable GAAP financial measure can be found here.
    5. Excluding adjusted turnaround expense, post-ceasing of operations at Los Angeles refinery.
    6. For additional details, see Slide 16 of Investor Presentation.
    7. Incremental Adjusted Cash Return on Capital Invested since 2021 calculated as $1.9 B of incremental Adjusted EBITDA from 2021 to Projected Post-EPIC NGL in 2024 divided by $10.6 B of capital invested ($0.4 B of cash used in the DCP restructuring with Enbridge, $3.8 B of cash used in the DCP acquisition, proportionate share of DCP’s debt and preferred equity outstanding as of June 30, 2023 of $2.9 B, $0.6 B of cash used in Pinnacle acquisition, $2.2 B, net of cash acquired, $2.7 B of Midstream growth + sustaining capital excluding acquisitions from 2021-2024, less $2.2 B of cash received from asset sales). For additional details, see Slide 19 of Investor Presentation. Reconciliations of these non-GAAP financial measures to the most comparable GAAP financial measure can be found here.
    8. $50 MM attributable to CPChem and $450 MM attributable to Midstream operations.
    9. Dividend CAGR calculated from initial dividend of $0.20 per share in 3Q 2012 to $1.15 per share in 4Q 2024.
    10. See section titled “Background of the Solicitation” in the definitive proxy statement filed by Phillips 66 with the SEC for a detailed summary of our engagement with Elliott.
    11. Source: Company filings, public filings.
    12. Source: Deal Point Data, Reuters, FactSet, Financial Times, RBC Capital Markets.

    Source: Phillips 66

    MIL OSI Economics –

    April 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 as regards the role of gas storage for securing gas supplies ahead of the winter season – A10-0079/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 as regards the role of gas storage for securing gas supplies ahead of the winter season

    (COM(2025)0099 – C10‑0041/2025 – 2025/0051(COD))

    (Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2025)0099),

    – having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 194(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C10‑0041/2025),

    – having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 26 March 2025[1],

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of …[2],

    – having regard to Rule 60 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A10-0079/2025),

    1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

    2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

    3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

     

    Amendment  1

    AMENDMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT[*]

    to the Commission proposal

    ———————————————————

     

    REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

    Amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 as regards the role of gas storage for securing gas supplies ahead of the winter season

    THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

    Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 194(2) thereof,

    Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

    After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

    Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,

    Whereas:

    (1) Regulation (EU) 2022/1032 of the Parliament and of the Council[3] was adopted in reaction to the gas-supply crisis and unprecedented price increases caused by the escalation of the Russia’s ongoing unjustified and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine since February 2022, impelling the Union to act in a coordinated and comprehensive manner to avoid potential risks resulting from further gas-supply disruptions.

    (2) Regulation (EU) 2022/1032 amended Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 by introducing a temporary legal framework for measures regarding the filling level of underground storage facilities to strengthen the security of gas supply in the Union, in particular gas supplies to protected customers.

    (3) Gas-storage facilities provide for 30% of the Union’s gas consumption during the winter months, and well-filled underground gas-storage facilities as well as gas demand reduction contribute substantially to the security of gas supply by providing additional gas in the event of high demand or supply disruptions.

    (4) The laying down of a mandatory target to ensure that gas-storage facilities are 90% full by 1 November (filling target), with a series of intermediate targets for each Member State in February, May, July and September of the following year ▌(filling trajectory), proved to be fundamental during the energy crisis sparked by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and Russia’s weaponisation of its gas supplies in both: (i) weathering the gas-supply shortages; and (ii) reducing market uncertainties and price volatility.

    (5) Despite the substantial improvement of the gas market situation compared to the period 2022-2023 ▌, the European gas market remains tight and the geopolitical situation remains unclear. More intense competition for global LNG supplies can increase Member States exposure to price volatility. ▌In such situation, the role of gas storages remains paramount. ▌

    (6) Pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 the obligation of the Member States to follow an annual filling trajectory and to ensure that the filling target is achieved by 1 November of each year expires on 31 December 2025.

    (6a) Since 2022, the Union has substantially succeeded in making gas supplies more secure by increasing LNG imports from trustworthy global partners and is aiming to fully eliminate the Union’s reliance on Russian fossil fuels, building on the progress of REPowerEU. The Union has developed new regasification facilities and port terminals, while also establishing a liquid gas market that ensures strong resilience against potential disruptions in the remaining Russian pipeline supplies.

    (6b) The changed global political environment has to be taken into account with regard to the reliability of the gas suppliers and gas supplying countries.

    (7) In the light of the European success to derisk its gas import structure, the overall framework to meet the Union’s need for natural gas must strike a balance between energy security and the return to market-based principles. It must thus be flexible enough during the filling season to allow a swift reaction to constantly changing market conditions and in particular to take advantage of the best purchasing conditions in order to bring down gas prices in Europe. The filling target should therefore be lowered to 83 %

    (8) To enhance market stability and mitigate the risk of undue price volatility potentially triggered by intermediary filling targets, it is appropriate to provide increased flexibility for storage filling. Member States should therefore provide indicative filling plans on a yearly basis that could include where appropriate an indicative filling trajectory and should allow for storage filling in such a way that there is sufficient flexibility available for market participants throughout the year, taking into account Recommendation (2025)1481.

    (8a) Member States should have the possibility to deviate by up to four percentage points from the filling target in the case of unfavourable market conditions, relating, inter alia, to factors such as supply and demand and competition, or of trading activities hindering cost-effective storage filling, that significantly limit the ability to ensure that the gas storages are filled in accordance with this Regulation.

    (8b) Moreover, the Commission should be empowered to adopt delegated acts to amend for one filling season the level of the allowed deviation of four percentage points by increasing it by up to an additional four percentage points, in the case of persistent unfavourable market conditions.

    (8c) The cumulative effects of the flexibilities and derogations in this Regulation should not bring down the overall storage filling obligations under 75 %.

    (9) The Commission’s assessment of the current energy-security framework has confirmed the positive impact of the storage-filling requirements on the security of gas supply and those positive effects should be preserved beyond 2025. Extending these measures would not only contribute to the continued safeguarding of supply security, but would also constitute a key instrument in the Union’s efforts to eliminate its dependence on imports of gas originating in the Russian Federation.

    (9a) At the same time this Regulation should respond to current and future changes in the natural gas markets and contribute to the strategic objective of bringing down energy prices and facilitate the gradual return towards market-based mechanisms for storage refilling.

    (9b) In order to maintain the security of supply and the appropriate level of filling, the Commission should continuously monitor the market and explore ways that could help meet the filling target, for example using demand aggregation and joint purchasing mechanisms.

    (10) It is therefore necessary to extend by two years the relevant gas storage filling provisions that provide predictability and transparency as to the utilisation of gas-storage facilities across the Union while at the same time introducing some flexibility into this Regulation.

    (10a) In line with the Commission’s commitment to better regulation and simplification, and reflecting the overall improvement in the Union’s energy security framework, the monitoring of compliance with this Regulation should place greater trust in the Member States’ administrative capacities. The supervisory burden on the Commission should be reduced accordingly, with a shift towards lighter-touch reporting obligations and streamlined procedures. This approach reinforces the principle of subsidiarity, avoids unnecessary administrative complexity, and is consistent with the Commission’s simplification efforts as outlined in its Work Programme 2025.

    (10b) Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 should be revised by the Commission in due time and before 2027 to be adapted to the evolving energy landscape and to reflect the future needs for gas storage. Among other issues, any amendments should address the limitations of the current definition of “protected customers”, the prevention of speculation on the gas markets and speculative activities that artificially inflate prices, the role of energy efficiency measures leading to verifiable gas demand reduction and how this could be used for further flexibilities by Member States and consider the framework under an evolving energy mix that will have an increased role of alternative sources to gas such as renewable energy sources, hydrogen together with the role of energy efficiency.

    (11) Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 should therefore be amended accordingly,

    HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

    Article 1

    Amendment to Regulation (EU) 2017/1938

     

    ▌Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 is amended as follows:

    (1) in Article 2, point 27 is deleted;

    (2) Article 6a is amended as follows:

    (a) the title is replaced by the following: ‘Filling target’;

    (b) in paragraph 1, the first subparagraph is replaced by the following:

    ‘1. Subject to paragraphs 2 to 5, Member States shall meet the filling target of 83 % for the aggregated capacity of all underground gas storage facilities that are located on their territory and directly interconnected to a market area in their territory and for storage facilities listed in Annex Ib at any point in time between 1 October and 1 December each year.’;

    (c) the following paragraphs are inserted:

    ‘5a.  Notwithstanding paragraph 1 and without prejudice to the obligation of other Member States to fill the underground gas storage facilities concerned, Member States may decide to deviate by up to four percentage points, from the filling target set out in paragraph 1 for each Member State if market conditions are unfavourable for filling underground gas storage facilities.

    5b. In duly justified cases of persistent unfavourable market conditions, and provided that the security of supply of the Union and the Member States is not undermined, the Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 19 to amend this Regulation by increasing the allowed deviation for Member States, as laid down in paragraph 5a by up to 4 percentage points.

    In its assessment, the Commission shall in particular take into account the level of storage filling in the Member States, global gas supply, ENTSOG’s seasonal supply outlook, and indications of market manipulation. It may also take into consideration Member State measures, such as the deployment of gas demand-reduction measures for gas that achieve equivalent gas reductions during the following withdrawal season.

    5c. Member States referred to in paragraph 2 may under the same conditions as those provided for in paragraph 5a decide to deviate by up to 1,55 % below the volume set out in paragraph 2.

    5d. Before using any of the deviations provided for in paragraphs 5a and 5c, each Member State shall consult the Commission and provide without undue delay a justification for its decision. The Commission shall promptly inform the GCG about the cumulative effects of all deviations pursuant to paragraphs 5a and 5c and any directly affected Member States.’;

    (d) paragraph 6 and 7 are replaced by the following:

    ‘6. In order to meet the filling target, Member States shall take all necessary measures and strive to follow the filling plan defined in accordance to paragraph 7.

    7. Member States with underground gas storage facilities shall submit to the Commission in due time an indicative filling plan for the whole calendar year to reach the yearly gas storage filling target set in paragraph 1. The plan shall include technical information for the underground gas storage facilities on its territory and shall be directly interconnected to its market area in an aggregated form.’;

    (e) paragraph 8 is deleted;

    (f) paragraphs 10 and 11 are replaced by the following:

    ‘10. The competent authority of each Member State shall continuously monitor compliance with the filling target as set in the filling plan and shall report regularly and at least once per month to the Commission and the GCG. If it is foreseen that the target cannot be met, the competent authority shall, without delay, take effective measures to meet the target. Member States shall inform the Commission and the GCG of the measures taken.

    11. In the event of a substantial and sustained deviation by a Member State from the filling plan, which compromises the meeting of the filling target or in the event of a deviation from the filling target, the Commission shall, where appropriate, after consulting the GCG and the Member States concerned, issue a recommendation to that Member State or to the other Member States concerned regarding measures to be taken immediately to remedy the deviation or to minimize the impact on the security of supply, considering inter alia possible unfavourable market conditions. and specificities of Member States, such as the technical characteristics and size of the underground gas storage facilities in relation to the domestic gas consumption, the declining importance of the underground low calorific gas storage facilities for the security of gas supply, and existing LNG storage capacity.

    11a. When a Member State does not meet the filling target set in paragraph 1 thus endangering the security of supply of the Union, the Commission shall adopt an implementing act setting a filling plan for that Member State for the year after, based on the technical information provided by each Member State and taking into account the assessment of the GCG. That implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 18a(2). It shall be based on an assessment of the general security of gas supply situation and the development of gas demand and supply in the Union and individual Member States with the aim of safeguarding the security of gas supply.’;

    (3) Article 6b is amended as follows:

    (a) the title is replaced by the following: ‘Implementation of the filling target’;

    (b) in paragraph 1, the first subparagraph is replaced by the following:

    ‘1. Member States shall take all necessary measures to meet the filling target set pursuant to Article 6a. When ensuring that the filling target is met, Member States shall prioritise, where possible, market-based measures.’;

    (c) paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:

    ‘2. The measures taken by the Member States pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be limited to what is necessary to meet the filling target. They shall be clearly defined, transparent, proportionate, non-discriminatory and verifiable. They shall not unduly distort competition or the proper functioning of the internal market in gas, unduly increase energy costs or endanger the security of gas supply of other Member States or of the Union. Member States shall inform the Commission and the GCG of any such measures.’;

    (4) Article 6c is amended as follows:

    (a) in paragraph 1, first subparagraph is replaced by the following:

    ‘1. A Member State without underground gas storage facilities shall ensure that market participants within that Member State have in place arrangements with underground storage system operators or other market participants in Member States with underground gas storage facilities. Those arrangements shall provide for the use, by 1 December, of storage volumes corresponding to at least 15 % of the average annual gas consumption over the preceding five years of the Member State without underground gas storage facilities. However, where cross-border transmission capacity or other technical limitations prevent a Member State without underground gas storage facilities from fully using 15 % of those storage volumes, that Member State shall store only those volumes that are technically possible.’;

    (b) in paragraph 2, second subparagraph is replaced by the following:

    ‘Member States without underground gas storage facilities shall demonstrate that they comply with paragraph 1 and shall notify the Commission accordingly.’;

    (c) in paragraph 5, first subparagraph, point (a) is replaced by the following:

    ‘(a) ensure that by 1 December storage volumes correspond at least to the average usage of the storage capacity over the preceding five years, determined, inter alia, by taking into account the flows during withdrawal season over the preceding five years from the Member States where the storage facilities are located; or’;

    (d) paragraph 6 is replaced by the following:

    ‘6. Unless otherwise specified in Annex Ib, in the case of underground gas storage facilities located in one Member State that are not covered by paragraph 5 but that are directly connected to the market area of another Member State, that other Member State shall ensure that between 1 October and 1 December storage volumes correspond to at least the average of the storage capacity booked at the relevant cross-border point over the preceding five years.’;

    (5) Article 6d is amended as follows:

    (a) paragraphs 1 and 2 are replaced by the following:

    ‘1. Storage system operators shall report the filling level to the competent authority in each Member State where the underground gas storage facilities concerned are located and, if applicable, to an entity designated by that Member State (the ‘designated entity’) as set pursuant to Article 6a.

    2. The competent authority and, if applicable, the designated entity of each Member State shall monitor the filling levels of the underground gas storage facilities on their territory at the end of each month and report monthly the results to the Commission without any delay. The competent authority shall also include information on the share of gas originating in the Russian federation being stored in that Member State, where such information is available.

    The Commission may, where appropriate, invite the European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) to assist with such monitoring.’;

    (b) paragraphs 4 and 5 are replaced by the following:

    ‘4. The GCG shall assist the Commission in the monitoring of the filling ▌target, and shall develop guidance for the Commission on adequate measures to ensure better alignment in the event that Member States filling rates compromise the achievement of the filling target, or to ensure compliance with the filling target.

    4a. Where appropriate, the Commission shall implement measures helping Member States to meet the filling target, including measures to encourage participation in the demand aggregation and joint purchasing mechanism set up under Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 (‘AggregateEU’)* .

    5. Member States and, where appropriate, the Commission shall take the necessary measures to meet the filling target and to enforce upon market participants the storage obligations. These measures may include sufficiently deterrent sanctions and fines, such as adequate financial penalties.

    ___________________

    * Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 of 19 December 2022 enhancing solidarity through better coordination of gas purchases, reliable price benchmarks and exchanges of gas across borders (OJ L 335, 29.12.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2576/oj).’;

    (6) in Article 17a, paragraph 1, the following point is added:

    ‘(da) the information about the share of gas originating in the Russian federation stored in the EU storages, provided by Member States in accordance with Article 6d(2).’;

    (7) in Article 22, the fourth paragraph is replaced by the following:

    ‘Article 2, points (27) to (31), Articles 6a to 6d, Article 16(3), Article 17a, Article 18a, Article 20(4) and Annex Ib shall apply until 31 December 2027.’;

    (8) Annex Ia is deleted.

     

    Article 2

    Entry into force

    This Regulation shall enter into force and shall apply on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

    This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

    Done at Brussels,

    For the European Parliament

    The President

    For the Council

    The President

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 28, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – The official approval of Romanian as a language of instruction in schools in the Odesa region, and respect for the rights of the Romanian minority in Ukraine – P-001600/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-001600/2025/rev.1
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza (ECR)

    Ukraine, as an EU candidate country, has committed to reforms in the field of minority rights. However, the Romanian community in the Odesa region (124 475 people according to the 2001 census) is facing violations of the right to education in their mother tongue due to the unjustified use of the term ‘Moldovan language’ instead of ‘Romanian language’ in schools – a practice inherited from the Soviet era.

    Although the Government of Ukraine adopted a decision on 18 October 2023 (minutes no. 115), and the Ministry of Education and Science issued a statement on 16 November 2023, to correct this terminology, 10 schools in the Odesa region (subject to administrative litigation no. 640/8013/21 since 2021) are still required to use the incorrect term. This administrative and legal deadlock undermines trust in Ukraine’s accession process and contradicts EU standards regarding the protection of minorities.

    What measures will the Commission take to support the correct implementation of the Ukrainian Government’s decisions regarding the official recognition of the Romanian language in schools in the Odesa region?

    Submitted: 22.4.2025

    Last updated: 28 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 28, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – European Peace Facility – For Ukraine, but not only – 28-04-2025

    Source: European Parliament 2

    The European Peace Facility (EPF) was created in March 2021 as a funding instrument aimed at enhancing the EU’s ability to prevent conflicts, build and preserve peace, and strengthen international security and stability. The EPF rests on two pillars. The first is to fund EU military operations and missions under the common foreign and security policy. The second is to provide assistance to countries in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood, the Middle East and Africa to strengthen security in their respective regions. Following Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the EU started using the EPF to rapidly deliver military aid to Ukraine. This support was provided alongside continued assistance to the EU’s eastern neighbourhood, as well as to partners in the Middle East and Africa. The EPF has a total financial ceiling of more than €17 billion for the 2021-2027 period. As the facility is an off-budget instrument, EU Member States contribute directly to it, based on the gross national income key. Currently, the EPF lacks fresh resources to continue supfporting Ukraine in facing the war. Furthermore, since March 2023, Hungary has refused to mobilise EPF funds in military aid to Ukraine. In line with the sanctions imposed on Russia in 2022, Russian assets held in EU banks were frozen. In May 2024, the Council of the EU allocated 90 % of the ‘windfall’ (extraordinary) profits from these frozen assets to the EPF. A first transfer of €1.5 billion from these profits to Ukraine took place in mid-2024. A second payment, possibly amounting to €2 billion, is expected in spring 2025. Given Hungary’s veto, the EU is looking for more reliable ways to continue assistance to Ukraine than by means of the windfall profits from the Russian assets channelled through the EPF. On 24 October 2024, the EU created the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism (ULCM) and issued an exceptional macro-financial assistance loan of €18.1 billion, the EU’s part of an EU-G7 syndicated loan to Ukraine totalling €45 billion. Starting after March 2025, 95 % of the windfall profits from the Russian assets held in EU banks will be allocated to the EU budget and channelled through the ULCM to Ukraine. The remaining 5 % will be allocated to the EPF. Beyond Ukraine, for which the EPF-funded approved military support amounts to approximately €10.6 billion, the EPF has an available budget of €6.4 billion to fund, until 2027, both the common costs of EU military missions and operations abroad – including its military assistance mission in support of Ukraine – and assistance measures for the armed forces of partner countries.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 28, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Investments in stronger military defence, measures against hybrid threats and increased support to Ukraine

    Source: Government of Sweden

    SEK 25 billion to strengthen military defence; an additional SEK 16.5 billion to increased 2025 ‘Ukraine framework’; and a SEK 96 million package of targeted measures to counter hybrid threats. These are the proposals the Government will present in the forthcoming Spring Amending Budget. The Government and the Sweden Democrats have also agreed on a funding model to ensure that Sweden is able meet to a new, higher NATO spending target.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 28, 2025
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