Category: Ukraine

  • MIL-OSI USA: Sherrill Presses Top Department of Defense Officials on Trump’s Dangerous Appeasement of Russian President Putin

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Mikie Sherrill (NJ-11)

    Watch Rep. Sherrill’s questioning here

    WASHINGTON, DC — Congresswoman Mikie Sherrill (NJ-11), former Navy helicopter aircraft commander and Russian policy officer, and member of the House Armed Services Committee, pressed Department of Defense leadership this week on Trump’s dangerous appeasement of Russian dictator Vladimir Putin. 

    “Right now, Donald Trump is abandoning our ally Ukraine and threatening to remove American troops stationed in Europe while Russian President Vladimir Putin is rebuilding and strengthening his own military. Allowing Russia’s military to grow unchecked will put the lives of American service members in danger, jeopardize America’s global supply chains, and risk America’s partnerships with our democratic allies and partners worldwide,” said Rep. Sherrill

    Sherrill has been at the forefront of House efforts to support Ukraine since the beginning of Putin’s brutal invasion. She spoke directly with Ukrainian President Zelenskyy in Kyiv and while representing the United States as part of a bipartisan Congressional Delegation to the Munich Security Conference. New Jersey is home to one of the largest Ukrainian-American populations in the country and Congresswoman Sherrill continues to work closely with community leaders to support Ukraine. 

    Congresswoman Sherrill is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and served in the Navy for almost 10 years as a helicopter pilot and Russian policy officer. As a Russian policy officer, she worked on implementing our nuclear treaty obligations and oversaw the relationship between the US Navy and Russian Federation Navy. She now serves on the House Armed Services Committee and the new House Select Committee on Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 

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    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Activities of Secretary-General in Belgium, 18-21 March

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    On Tuesday evening, 18 March, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres arrived in Brussels to meet with European Union leaders.

    On Wednesday, the Secretary-General had meetings with Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, as well as with Roberta Metsola, the President of the European Parliament. 

    In the evening, he attended a dinner organized by Antonio Costa, the President of the European Council, along with Ms. Von der Leyen and Kaja Kallas, the European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission.

    On Thursday, 20 March, at the invitation of the President of the European Council, Antonio Costa, the Secretary-General took part in a working lunch with the Heads of State and Government of the European Union at the opening of the European Council.  

    The Secretary-General and Mr. Costa spoke to the press as they entered the European Union building.  Mr. Guterres expressed his appreciation for the UN’s partnership with the European Union, reiterating that it is a fundamental pillar of the multilateral response to the challenges we face in peace and security, climate, sustainable development and human rights.

    Turning to the situation in Ukraine, the Secretary-General said any ceasefire is welcome because it saves lives, but he added that it is essential that a ceasefire paves the way for a just peace in Ukraine — a peace that respects the Charter of the United Nations, international law and Security Council resolutions, namely about the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

    The Secretary-General renewed his appeal for respect of the ceasefire in Gaza, for unimpeded humanitarian access to all areas of Gaza, and for the immediate and unconditional release of the hostages.

    Immediately after the working lunch, Mr. Guterres had a pull-aside meeting with the President of France, Emmanuel Macron.

    Later that afternoon, the Secretary-General sat down for a background briefing with a group of journalists assembled by the United Nations Regional Information Centre for Western Europe.

    On Friday morning, the universities KU Leuven and UC Louvain jointly awarded an honorary doctorate to the United Nations.  The Secretary-General received the honorary doctorate on behalf of the organization and, in his remarks, he said that by bestowing this honour, the universities are sending a message of support for the mission of the United Nations — a message of solidarity to all those working to make it real — and a message of inspiration for us to keep up the fight.  (See Press Release SG/SM/22596.)

    He said the Universities’ 600th anniversary coincides with a moment of reflection for the United Nations, which marks its own eightieth anniversary as an organization at the epicentre of multilateralism.

    Standing here in Europe, the Secretary-General added, we know this same commitment to multilateralism is the beating heart of the European Union — a powerful reminder of our shared responsibility to the world’s most vulnerable people and proof that isolationism is an illusion, never a solution.

    Turning to the situation in Gaza, the Secretary-General renewed his appeal for the ceasefire to be restored, for unimpeded humanitarian assistance to be reestablished and for the remaining hostages to be released immediately and unconditionally.

    Following the ceremony, the Secretary-General visited the university library and had an exchange with students.

    Upon returning to Brussels that afternoon, the Secretary-General had a meeting with the Prime Minister of Belgium, Bart De Wever.

    He left Brussels early in the evening.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: March proves deadly month for civilians in Ukraine

    Source: United Nations 4

    Human Rights

    More than three years on from the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ukrainian civilians continue to face the devastating consequences of war, with March 2025 proving to be another deadly month.

    “The near daily barrage of long-range drones killed and injured scores of civilians across the country last month, and disrupted life for millions more,” said the head of the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU), Danielle Bell, in the independent human rights team’s latest monthly update.  

    The mission was mandated by the UN human rights chief at the invitation of the Ukrainian Government in 2014, to help safeguard rights during the escalating conflict.  

    With at least 164 Ukrainians killed and 910 injured, March 2025 saw a 50 per cent spike in civilian casualties from the previous month. These numbers represent a 71 per cent increase in civilian casualties compared with March last year, says the latest HRMMU Protection of Civilians Report.

    Russian attacks on cities such as Dnipro, Kharkiv, and Sumy, combined with multiple munitions strikes on Dobropillia, exacerbated the high number of casualties in March.  

    Kryvyi Rih, located around 65 kilometers from the frontline, was one of the places most heavily affected, suffering five waves of Russian attacks which killed at least six civilians and injured 66.  

    Civilian buildings in the city – home town of Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy – including two hotels and a restaurant, were amongst the sites hit.  

    Some 29 medical and 50 educational facilities were damaged by Russian armed forces during last month, while two medical centres and six educational facilities were totally destroyed.  

    Hospitals enjoy special protection under international humanitarian law and should not be subjected to attack,” Ms. Bell said.

    Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited under international humanitarian law, said UN human rights chief, Volker Türk, emphasising that parties to a conflict ought to differentiate military from civilian infrastructures.  

    Hostilities continue  

    UN Human Rights in Ukraine noted that deadly attacks by Russian armed forces continued into April. “It’s an unimaginable horror,” said Mr. Türk, referring to an April 4 attack where a ballistic missile detonated over a playground, killing 19 civilians, including nine children.  

    Another wave of attacks in Eastern Ukraine caused damage to residential buildings and injured scores of civilians on Wednesday. Aid workers are currently on the ground assessing the needs of the affected population.  

    “Ukrainians deserve to live a normal life, free from violence,” said UN aid coordination office, OCHA, in Ukraine.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee against Torture Commend Monaco’s Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, Ask about Efforts to Revise Torture Laws and the Transfer of Prisoners to France

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee against Torture today concluded its consideration of the seventh periodic report of Monaco under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, with Committee Experts praising Monaco’s ratification of United Nations and European human rights treaties, while raising questions about efforts to bring legislation on torture in line with the Convention and the transfer of prisoners to France.

    Abderrazak Rouwane, Committee Vice-Chair and Country Co-Rapporteur, congratulated Monaco on having ratified a significant number of United Nations and Council of Europe human rights instruments. Why had the State party decided not to ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture?

    Mr. Rouwane asked about measures the State party had taken to harmonise national legislation on torture with the Convention.  The Committee was concerned about the statute of limitations on torture crimes, the lack of specific provisions in the Criminal Code imposing an absolute prohibition of torture, and the lack of clear mechanisms protecting subordinates from being forced to carry out unlawful orders.

    Erdogan Iscan, Committee Vice-Chair and Country Co-Rapporteur, said some inmates in Monaco continued to be transferred to French prisons, and the State 

    party lacked oversight of places of deprivation of liberty in France.  Would a formal legal procedure for recording prisoners’ consent to transfers be created?  Which State was responsible for ensuring legal safeguards for these prisoners?

    Introducing the report, Samuel Vuelta Simon, Secretary of State for Justice of Monaco, Director of Judicial Services and head of the delegation, said Monaco ensured that its legal framework was fully in line with its international commitments and that its texts were regularly adapted to better meet the requirements of the fight against torture and inhuman treatment.

    Mr. Vuelta Simon said the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure allowed for severe punishment for any act resembling torture or inhuman treatment.  Also, a legislative proposal currently being prepared would ensure that the crime of torture was imprescriptible and would also ensure the unenforceability of any hierarchical order invoked to justify it.

    The delegation said the Convention against Torture had been rendered executory by a sovereign ordinance.  It took precedence over domestic legislation. The State party was also considering domestic legislation that would define torture in line with the Convention.

    The delegation said an impact study on the Optional Protocol to the Convention had been carried out, and the State party was not closing the door on ratification.  However, it attached greater importance to the main international human rights instruments.  There was only one detention facility in Monaco, which was already reviewed by international monitoring mechanisms.

    The delegation also said that Monaco’s territory was only two square kilometres.  Its small size made it necessary to turn to France for assistance in managing prisoners.  Transfer requests to French prisons were made by detainees who were French citizens. The State party would consider formalising this procedure.  French authorities cooperated with transfer procedures and guaranteed detainees’ rights. There was no transfer of citizens of Monaco to foreign prisons.

    In closing remarks, Claude Heller, Committee Chair, said that the dialogue had been fruitful and frank.  The Committee would develop concluding observations based on the dialogue, which would aid the State in the implementation of the Convention.

    In his concluding remarks, Mr. Vuelta Simon said that Monaco was a small State that tried to do things properly, on the same level as larger countries.  Some issues had been raised in the dialogue that the State party could make rapid progress on to promote the well-being of human beings, including detainees.  Monaco hoped to demonstrate this progress in its next review with the Committee.

    The delegation of Monaco consisted of representatives from the Directorate of Public Safety; Department of External Relations and Cooperation; Directorate of Legal Affairs; Directorate of Judicial Services; and the Permanent Mission of Monaco to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Committee will issue concluding observations on the report of Monaco at the end of its eighty-second session on 2 May.  Those, and other documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, will be available on the session’s webpage.  Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, and webcasts of the public meetings can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public on Thursday, 10 April at 3 p.m. to continue its examination of the fifth periodic report of Mauritius (CAT/C/MUS/5).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the seventh periodic report of Monaco (CAT/C/MCO/7).

    Presentation of Report

    SAMUEL VUELTA SIMON, Secretary of State for Justice, Director of Judicial Services of Mexico and head of the delegation, said human dignity was an absolute value that the Principality of Monaco was committed to protecting with determination. Monaco was committed to constantly improving its mechanisms for preventing and protecting against torture and inhuman treatment.  Since the submission of its first report in 1994, Monaco had continued its efforts to strengthen its legal and institutional framework, which had led to significant progress, both in terms of legislation and the implementation of concrete measures to guarantee ever more effective protection against all forms of violence.

    Monaco ensured that the legal framework was fully in line with its international commitments and that its texts were regularly adapted to better meet the requirements of the fight against torture and inhuman treatment.  The Constitution explicitly guaranteed respect for human dignity and prohibited any cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.  This absolute prohibition was reinforced by several provisions of the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allowed for severe punishment for any act resembling torture or inhuman treatment. 

    The Principality had begun an in-depth study to incorporate into its domestic law a definition of torture that was fully in line with article one of the Convention. A legislative proposal currently being prepared would ensure that the crime of torture was imprescriptible.  It would also ensure the unenforceability of any hierarchical order invoked to justify it, and the absolute inadmissibility of evidence obtained under duress.  These measures would complement an already strict legal arsenal which severely punished acts of violence, especially when committed by a public official.

    Monaco also attached particular importance to supporting and providing reparation to victims. In 2023, it adopted an unprecedented compensation scheme for victims of serious crimes, including domestic violence and misdemeanours and crimes against minors, guaranteeing rapid and effective compensation to victims when the perpetrators were insolvent.  Courts had an obligation to inform victims of this possibility.

    In recent years, significant improvements had been made to Monaco’s prison to provide a more suitable living environment for inmates.  The renovation of the cells had made it possible to bring in more natural light, while a new exercise yard and an activity room had been set up.  A body scanner had recently been introduced to limit the use of body searches.  The visiting regime had been significantly improved, allowing inmates to benefit from three 90-minute visits per week, in addition to two daily 45-minute visits.

    The incarceration of minors remained an exceptional measure in Monaco.  Recent reforms had strengthened the juvenile justice system to promote the reintegration and well-being of young people in conflict with the law.  Anyone in police custody had the immediate right to information and the assistance of a lawyer, permanent judicial supervision, and audio-visual recording of interrogations, thus ensuring the transparency of proceedings.  Since 2022, the right to the assistance of a lawyer had been strengthened in the event of an extension of police custody. 

    The Monegasque Institute for the Training of the Judicial Professions, in collaboration with other specialised institutions, provided regular training to public security forces on international standards for the respect of fundamental rights. The public security forces were thus regularly made aware of good practices, particularly regarding the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty.

    Monaco ensured that respect for fundamental rights within its prison system was monitored. The Office of the High Commissioner for the Protection of Rights, Freedoms and Mediation played a key role in this system by providing detainees with direct access to report any allegations of ill-treatment.  Since the last review, a new right had been introduced allowing detainees to call the Office of the High Commissioner directly once a day, including when they were in a disciplinary cell.

    Monaco reaffirmed its total commitment to the fight against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment.  While there was still room for improvement, the legislative, judicial and institutional advances put in place in recent years had made it possible to considerably strengthen the prevention, control and punishment of abuses.  Monaco would continue its efforts with determination to ensure that respect for human dignity was never compromised.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    ABDERRAZAK ROUWANE, Committee Vice-Chair and Country Co-Rapporteur, expressed regret regarding the absence of civil society participants in the dialogue.  Why were they absent?  What measures had the State party taken to harmonise national legislation on torture with the Convention?  The Committee had called on the State party to do so in each of its last six reviews. Could the delegation give some examples of court cases that had referenced the Convention or other United Nations human rights treaties?  The Committee was concerned about the statute of limitations on torture crimes, the lack of specific provisions in the Criminal Code imposing an absolute prohibition of torture, and the lack of clear mechanisms protecting subordinates from being forced to carry out unlawful orders.

    What measures had been taken to ensure that detainees enjoyed all basic legal rights from the outset of deprivation of liberty?  The Committee had called on the State party to amend legislation that allowed police officers to prevent detainees from contacting a family member if such communication was considered detrimental to investigations.  Had this been done?  Did victims benefit from legal aid in cases involving allegations of torture or ill-treatment?

    What steps had been taken to promote the accreditation of the Office of the High Commissioner for the Protection of Rights, Freedoms and Mediation under the Paris Principles?  The Office did not have a specific mandate to protect against human rights violations, including torture and ill-treatment, and it did not have the competence to conduct investigations, publish studies or formulate opinions on draft legislation on its own initiative.  Could the delegation comment on this?  Why had the State party decided not to ratify the Optional Protocol and set up a national preventive mechanism against torture?

    The Committee congratulated Monaco on having ratified a significant number of human rights instruments within the framework of the United Nations system and the Council of Europe.  Would it ratify the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance and the Convention for the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families?

    The Committee noted positive amendments to the law on the status of the judiciary to strengthen the Supreme Council of the Judiciary, which had enabled the Council to take up disciplinary matters on its own.  However, the Council’s role in appointing judges had not been increased and its activity report was not made public.  The Director of Judicial Services, part of the executive, chaired the High Council and could appoint and suspend judges and magistrates directly.  The Prosecutor General and the magistrates of the Public Prosecutor’s Office were also under the direct authority of the Director. Was this not interference by the executive in the affairs of justice?  How would the State party ensure the full independence of the judiciary, including in matters related to appointment and disciplinary measures?

    Could the State party provide updated data on extraditions, asylum applications, and the number of appeals against asylum decisions?  The Committee noted that refugees enjoyed the rights provided for in the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees.  However, there was a lack of clarity regarding the asylum process and safeguards offered, and uncertainty surrounding the procedure for cooperation between the State party and the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons.  Would the State party implement a mechanism to follow up on asylum seekers’ cases with the Office?  What measures were in place to domesticate an asylum assessment procedure?  Could the State party provide information on extradition cases and requests made for mutual legal assistance related to international cases involving torture?

    A large number of foreigners living in neighbouring countries were working informally in Monaco and were at risk of trafficking.  How was the State party combatting trafficking in persons, raising awareness of the issue, and training the judiciary on it?  What measures were in place to strengthen the identification of trafficking victims?  What tools were available to public officials to guide the identification of child victims of trafficking?

    The Committee had previously called for the strengthening of training for the judiciary and prison officials on the Convention and the revised Istanbul Protocol of 2022.  What measures would the State party take to train officials who were in contact with persons deprived of liberty on the absolute prohibition of torture?  Were there any monitoring mechanisms in places of deprivation of liberty?

    ERDOGAN ISCAN, Committee Vice-Chair and Country Co-Rapporteur, commended the recent progress by the State presented in the opening statement.  The Committee noted that the remand prison of Monaco had recently been extended, its facilities upgraded, and the visit regime improved.  However, there were limits to the extent to which the prison could be expanded due to its location, and the prison reportedly remained unsuitable for prolonged detention due to its limited natural light and lack of space for activities.  What further steps would be taken to improve prison conditions?

    Some inmates continued to be transferred to French prisons, and the State party lacked oversight of places of deprivation of liberty in France.  There was no formalised legal procedure for recording prisoners’ consent and requests regarding transfers.  Would one be created?  How many Monegasque prisoners were currently serving sentences in French prisons? Which State was responsible for ensuring legal safeguards for these prisoners?  Did they have access to lawyers and could they maintain social connections in Monaco?  How would the State party ensure this right?  Which State conducted investigations in cases of complaints by these prisoners?  Had the State party considered expanding the capacity of its prison system to allow inmates to remain in Monaco?

    Did current legislation prohibit corporal punishment in all settings, including homes and educational institutions? Were awareness raising campaigns or training programmes on corporal punishment for parents and childcare professionals planned?  Minors under age 13 could not be detained but could be held in police custody for up to 24 hours in criminal cases.  Could the delegation provide data on minors in police custody?  Would the State party consider revising legislation to raise the minimum age of criminal responsibility to at least 14 years of age?

    Had the State party made progress in adopting legislation that provided full redress to victims of torture? Would it consider scaling up its support to the United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture, and had it updated legislation to ensure that statements obtained through torture were made null and void?

    The Committee noted with satisfaction measures taken by the State party to prevent and combat violence against women, including revision of the Criminal Code and awareness raising campaigns. What protection measures were in place for foreign women who were victims of violence, and what resources were devoted to programmes and measures to combat violence against women?

    Reportedly, conditions in closed psychiatric units in the Princess Grace Hospital were good, but improvements were needed regarding prolonged hospitalisation and treatment of minors and detainees requiring psychiatric care.  Was the State party addressing this?

    Another Committee Expert asked whether the Convention was directly applicable in Monaco.  How were potential conflicts between the Convention and domestic legislation resolved?

    One Committee Expert asked how many prisoners were serving in Monaco.  What happened to prisoners who did not consent to being transferred to French prisons?  Could the delegation clarify whether consent was needed to conduct transfers?

    A Committee Expert said domestic law on trafficking was sound, but the State party needed to strengthen the training of law enforcement officials, social workers, medical staff and the public on identifying victims of trafficking.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the Director of Judicial Services was also the Secretary of State for Justice, which, as a member of the judiciary, was not part of the executive branch of Government but fell under the authority of the Prince.  The judiciary was guaranteed security of tenure and independence.  The Secretary of State for Justice gave generalised guidance to the judiciary that was consistent with State policies, but prosecutors were free to speak independently in carrying out their work.

    Monaco’s territory was only two square kilometres.  Its small size made it necessary to turn to France for assistance for managing prisoners. There were only six prosecutors and 22 jurists who worked with legislators to develop legal texts.  Some 39,000 people lived in Monaco but only 9,000 had citizenship.

    The Supreme Council of the Judiciary was made up of two elected judges and five judges appointed by the Council itself.  Both the Secretary of State for Justice and the Supreme Council could take up cases of discipline of judges.  The Supreme Council selected candidates for judicial posts and had a special budget guaranteeing its independence.  Training was provided to newly appointed judges and prosecutors through French institutions; approximately two-thirds of judges had been seconded from France.  A draft law had been developed that would create a reserve pool of judges to strengthen the domestic availability of judges.

    Monaco had a dualist system.  The Prince signed and ratified international treaties, with authorisation by the National Council.  Sovereign ordinances were used to allow for international treaties to be directly invoked before national courts.  There were cases in which the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention of Human Rights had been invoked. The Constitution had the highest status in the domestic legal order, followed by international treaties, which took precedence over domestic legislation.

    The Constitution expressly prohibited torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.  Acts of torture committed in offences of sexual aggression, terrorism and abduction were considered to be aggravated crimes. Monaco’s judicial services had limited capacity, but aimed to establish a stand-alone offence of torture in line with article one of the Convention through a draft law that was currently before the legislature.  Serious crimes committed against minors had a statute of limitations of 30 years, which started when the victim reached the age of majority.  Monaco’s law imposed an absolute prohibition of torture; it was impossible to justify acts of torture in any circumstances.  Hierarchical superiors were held accountable for illegal orders to carry out acts of torture, as were agents who carried out such orders.  Subordinates who refused to obey illegal orders were not disciplined or considered to have committed a crime.

    There was one case of trafficking against a minor in which the court had referenced the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime in its ruling.  The scope of the criminalisation of trafficking had been broadened to address domestic trafficking cases that did not involve organised crime.  Trafficking that endangered victims’ lives, trafficking of minors, and trafficking by public officials or members of organised criminal groups were considered aggravating circumstances.

    Police custody was always recorded and was subject to court oversight; examining magistrates could end police custody at any point.  All persons in police custody were informed of the reasons of their detention and their rights, including the right to access a lawyer from the beginning of custody. All persons who earned less than 20,000 euros per year were entitled to free legal aid.  Detainees could request a medical examination at any point.  The State party intended to regulate the grounds under which the Prosecutor General could restrict detainees’ right to contact a relative.  Hearings were filmed and could be conducted in the presence of a legal counsel. Criminal investigative officers needed to record the time of detention and other details relating to the detention, including reasons for refusals of detainees’ rights.

    Minors under 13 could not be placed in police custody unless they committed an offence that carried a five-year prison sentence.  Hearings of minors needed to be conducted with a lawyer present.  Police custody of minors was typically 12 hours but could be extended to 24 hours in criminal cases with the permission of a judge.

    Legislation on the High Commissioner for the Protection of Rights and Mediation had been revised to bring the institution in line with the Paris Principles.  The law allowed the High Commissioner to carry out surveys and provide recommendations related to combatting discrimination, protecting human rights, and implementing international conventions.  It also strengthened the High Commissioner’s investigative powers and gave the body powers to defend the rights of the child. Steps had been taken to promote registration of the institution by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions.  Since 2022, detainees were able to contact the High Commissioner directly by telephone, in addition to through written communications.  Monaco had installed a body scanning machine in its prison after detainees’ complaints to the High Commissioner regarding body searches.

    Civil society in Monaco was very active. As there had been no demonstrated cases of torture in the State for almost a century, there were no non-governmental organizations working on the issue.  The High Commissioner’s mandate had recently been expanded and it was now recruiting staff to address its new functions.  In future, the High Commissioner could be able to participate in reviews by the Committee.

    Ratifying the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families and the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance was not a priority for the State.  The State party tried to align its legislation with international instruments before ratifying them, which caused delays in ratification.  There were no cases of enforced disappearance in Monaco. 

    An impact study on the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture had been carried out.  There was only one detention facility in Monaco, which was already reviewed by international monitoring mechanisms. There had been no complaints regarding ill-treatment or poor conditions.  Ratifying the Optional Protocol was not a top priority for the Government but could be done in future.  Monaco made voluntary contributions to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, but did not envisage providing contributions to the Voluntary Fund for the Victims of Torture.

    Refugees fell under ordinary law for entry and stay in Monaco.  They received 10-year residence permits.  The State currently hosted 23 refugees.  Monaco respected the principle of non-refoulement.  Asylum seekers whose claims were rejected were not immediately removed, unless they posed a threat to public safety.  The Government called on the relevant French authority to assess asylum claims.  Refusals of asylum claims were always explained and could be appealed before the relevant court.  The overseas diplomatic presence of Monaco in countries of origin for asylum seekers was limited.

    When the Ukraine conflict began in 2022, Monaco established a system providing temporary protection for Ukrainian citizens who had lived in Monaco prior to the establishment of the system. Currently, around 50 Ukrainians held the temporary protection permit, which allowed them to access health, education and other social services.  Many holders of this permit had since gained residency permits.

    The State party had not received any requests for mutual legal assistance or handled any international cases involving torture.  It had received one extradition request, which Monaco’s court of appeal rejected due to concerns about human rights protections.

    In 2020, two people were transferred to French prisons, while one person was transferred in 2023 and another in 2024; there were two requests in 2025 that were being assessed.  Transfer requests to France were typically made by French citizens.  All requests for prison transfers were made in writing by the detainees themselves. The State party would consider formalising this procedure.  There were no difficulties in transfers to France; French authorities cooperated with transfer procedures and guaranteed detainees’ rights.  Requests for transfers to other countries were considered based on respect for detainees’ rights.

    The national human rights institution received and investigated written complaints from detainees.  There was also an internal oversight body within the police force that could be called on by the judiciary to investigate police officers accused of human rights violations.  Complaints made to the Prosecutor-General triggered judicial proceedings.  Legal assistance was available for persons who filed for civil damages.  A compensation mechanism had been set up for victims of serious offences who could not be compensated by the perpetrator. Compensation covered damages and court costs.  State compensation could also be provided to persons who were placed in pre-trial detention before being released or acquitted.

    The State party had adopted a law on school bullying and harassment, and the Criminal Code prohibited and punished corporal punishment, including in school and family settings.  Teaching staff and other school staff underwent annual training on identifying and addressing harassment of children. Schools needed to implement awareness raising initiatives to combat harassment and bullying.

    Incarceration and pre-trial detention of children were last resort measures.  Judges could determine alternatives to prosecution of minor offenders, including provisional releases, reparation for victims, community service, and training within social health institutions.  Judges could also order minors to be placed in the Foyer d’Enfance, from which they were free to come and go.  In 2020, five minors were charged, of whom none were detained; in 2021, seven minors were charged and only one was placed in pre-trial detention for one month and 20 days; and in 2022, out of the 15 minors who were charged, only two were placed in pre-trial detention.

    The age of criminal responsibility in Monaco was 13 years.  None of the 15 minor offenders in 2022 were aged 13.  The State party would consider raising the age threshold and revising the legal status of minors in the country.

    Considerable progress had been made since 2020 in improving the detention facility.  The State had installed cells with better access to natural light, a games room, a new exercise yard, and air conditioning and heating facilities within cells.  Exercise and folding laundry were no longer mandatory, televisions did not need to be switched off at certain times, and the State no longer imposed solitary confinement on detainees.

    Women and child victims of violence were supported by the Directorate for Social Assistance.  A protocol for care of victims of domestic violence had been established.  Health care professionals were trained in caring for victims and managing perpetrators when they accompanied them.  Victims were provided with shelter in emergencies when they could not stay with friends or family.  They were entitled to medical care, psychological assistance, and legal advice.

    The employment service verified working conditions for migrant workers and the labour inspectorate carried out numerous checks to ensure that workers’ rights were being respected.  Officials held interviews with applicants for residence and work permits to detect risks of trafficking.  To date, 96 public officials had received training on identifying and treating victims of trafficking.

    Members of the judiciary were obliged to attend at least five days of training per year either locally or in France, which addressed human rights and international and European norms.  The State sought to ensure that the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights were incorporated in domestic legislation as soon as possible.

    Training of police officers lasted 10 months.  It stressed the rights of apprehended persons, including the right to be protected from violence, inhumane and degrading treatment.  All police officers had to abide by the code of professional ethnics and respect the dignity of persons.  They were trained on ethical means of restraint, bodily searches, the use of reasonable force, and the prohibition of torture.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    ABDERRAZAK ROUWANE, Committee Vice-Chair and Country Co-Rapporteur, said the Committee welcomed that there were no cases of torture in Monaco, but this could not be used as an excuse for not ratifying the Optional Protocol to the Convention.  Crimes needed to be legislated for regardless of their prevalence. A national preventive mechanism would be mandated to investigate all places of deprivation of liberty, including the psychiatric hospital and airports.  It would be fantastic if a European country could ratify the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families.  Many of the 63,000 workers in Monaco were migrant workers who needed legal protection.

    Could detainees from Monaco be transferred to French prisons?  When there were criminal prosecutions of perpetrators, were alleged victims entitled to legal assistance?  Did the State party intend to provide the Supreme Council of the Judiciary with further independence?

    ERDOGAN ISCAN, Committee Vice-Chair and Country Co-Rapporteur, said the dialogue had been constructive. Even if there was limited scope for implementing the Optional Protocol, ratification would set a positive example for other States.  Some 42 of the 46 members of the Council of Europe had ratified the Optional Protocol. Did the State party plan to remove its reservation to article 30 of the Convention.  Member States needed to continue to support the treaty body system in a sustainable manner.  What was Monaco’s position on this?

    Another Committee Expert asked whether Monaco had adopted measures addressing trade in equipment used to inflict pain and suffering.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the State party was not closing the door on ratifying the Optional Protocol; it was still considering the option.  However, it attached greater importance to the main international human rights instruments.  Impact assessment studies on these instruments took time due to the State’s limited resources.

    There were around 60,000 cross-border workers travelling from France or Italy to Monaco every day.  They were entitled to the rights embodied by Monaco’s labour laws.

    The Convention against Torture had been rendered executory by a sovereign ordinance.  It took precedence over domestic legislation.  The State party was also considering domestic legislation that would define torture in line with the Convention.

    Legal aid lasted from the beginning to the end of legal proceedings.

    There was no transfer of Monaco citizens to foreign prisons.  Transfers were only for foreign detainees who had requested a transfer back to their country of origin; such transfers were essentially humanitarian.

    The Supreme Council of the Judiciary promoted the independence of the judiciary.  It drew mostly on the French model.  The Secretary of State for Justice was responsible for appointing and promoting judges, but the Supreme Council approved appointments and promotions and could take up disciplinary cases on its own initiative.

    Concluding Remarks

    CLAUDE HELLER, Committee Chair, said that the dialogue had been fruitful and frank.  The Committee would develop concluding observations based on the dialogue, which would aid the State in the implementation of the Convention. The Committee did not judge States based on their size; it treated them all equally.

    SAMUEL VUELTA SIMON, Secretary of State for Justice of Monaco, Director of Judicial Services and head of the delegation, thanked the Committee for the dialogue.  Monaco was a small State that tried to do things properly, on the same level as larger countries, though staff numbers made this difficult.  The State tried to respond as best it could to its realities.  Monaco welcomed the Committee’s advice and relevant questions. Some issues had been raised that the State party could make rapid progress on to promote the well-being of human beings, including detainees.  Monaco hoped to demonstrate this progress in its next review with the Committee.

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CAT25.002E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Increased military spending in the EU: balance between strategic autonomy and NATO cooperation – E-000756/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU remains a project for peace. At a time when the EU is facing war in Ukraine, to prepare for current and future threats and challenges, the EU needs to assume greater responsibility for its own defence, enhance its defence readiness and safeguard its sovereignty.

    To do so, the EU and its Member States agree that defence spending will be regularly increased in real terms to match the collective ambition in defence.

    Today, the twenty-three Member States that are also North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Allies, all together are spending 2% of gross domestic product on defence.

    On 4 March 2025, the President of the Commission announced the ReArm Europe plan[1], which can generate up to EUR 800 billion in additional defence expenditure. The EU can support Member States in fulfilling their national and international commitments (including NATO’s).

    There is no competition: a stronger EU defence will make NATO stronger. Spending more, together and European on defence will allow a more effective, resilient and balanced approach to European security policy. It will enable those Member States in the Alliance, to act more effectively within NATO or autonomously, including within the EU.

    The ReArm Europe plan aims primarily at giving Member States more fiscal space for defence spending, through the activation of the National Escape Clause under the Stability and Growth Pact, providing EUR 150 billion in loans to Member States for defence investments (through a new instrument Security Action for Europe — SAFE), and mobilising private capital.

    By investing in the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, Member States can boost job creation, research, and technological innovation within Europe, thereby fostering competitiveness and economic growth.

    Efficient use of resources by enhancing cooperation and channelling the resources into commonly identified capability gaps can also help free up funds for other strategic priorities.

    • [1] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/sv/statement_25_673/STATEMENT_25_673_EN.pdf

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Video: Ukraine: Civilians are paying a devastating price for war – OCHA Briefing | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Briefing by Tom Fletcher, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, on Ukraine.

    —————————

    Following “a massive strike” in the Ukrainian city of Kryvyi Rih last Friday which resulted in multiple civilian casualties, and a series of attacks against civilian infrastructure United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator Tom Fletcher told the Security Council that “this brutal pattern of civilian death and destruction in populated areas must stop.”

    Fletcher told the Council that according to authorities, “18 civilians were killed, including nine children, and 75 others injured when a children’s playground and nearby residential area were hit,” and noted that in recent weeks “civilian infrastructure – including healthcare facilities, apartment blocks, schools and children’s playgrounds – have suffered extensive damage.”

    The humanitarian Chief said, “civilians are paying a devastating price for this horrendous war,” with at least 12,910 civilians killed, including 682 children, and almost 30,700 injured across Ukraine from 24 February 2022 to 31 March 2025.”

    The true toll, he said, “is likely far greater.”

    Fletcher welcomed the recent announcement of a ceasefire focused on energy infrastructure, as well as negotiations to ensure safe navigation in the Black Sea and said, “ultimately the best protection of civilians is that this war ends. Until it does, the negotiating priority – whether as part of a temporary pause or lasting agreement – must start from the protection and needs of civilians.”

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hu0VQhu1FLs

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EIB Group President Calviño and Ukrainian Prime Minister Shmyhal accelerate support to Ukraine with new projects restoring vital services

    Source: European Investment Bank

    EIB

    • Finance contracts have been signed for three new public sector projects worth €300 million under the European Union’s Ukraine Facility.
    • Today’s signing follows the guarantee agreement approved just a month ago with the European Commission unlocking €2 billion of EIB investments for Ukraine.
    • This new financing addresses the country’s urgent recovery needs for water facilities; district heating; and reconstruction of social infrastructure, such as schools, housing and hospitals.  
    • These agreements build on the €2.2 billion in emergency and recovery support that the EIB Group has already provided to Ukraine since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

    Today, EIB President Nadia Calviño, Vice-President Teresa Czerwińska and Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal met to accelerate support for Ukraine with the implementation of three new EIB projects worth €300 million. The meeting and signing took place at the headquarters of the European Commission in Brussels, with the participation of EU High Representative and European Commission Vice-President Kaja Kallas, Commissioners Marta Kos and Valdis Dombrovskis. The financing, signed today, is backed by guarantees under the EU’s Ukraine Facility and supports Ukraine’s recovery efforts, including the restoration of essential public infrastructure and services. It follows the guarantee agreement approved just month ago with the European Commission unlocking €2 billion of investments.

    These new projects build on the EIB Group’s numerous programmes across the country, reinforcing critical infrastructure such as heating and water to ensure the delivery of essential municipal services and support the functioning of the economy. Communities and households across Ukraine – particularly those affected by the destruction of key infrastructure such as the Kakhovka Dam – will benefit directly from these investments.

    As highlighted during President Calviño’s visit to Kyiv in February, this €300 million investment will help to rebuild social and municipal facilities affected by the war and to improve access to heating, water and sanitation. The package includes:

    • €100 million for the Ukraine Recovery III project
    • €100 million for the Ukraine Water Recovery project
    • €100 million for the Ukraine District Heating Ukreximbank project

    Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal said: “I am grateful to the European Investment Bank for its substantial support of the Ukrainian Government’s efforts to ensure the rapid recovery of our country. This is not only about rebuilding what has been destroyed, but also about creating modern, resilient, and energy-efficient infrastructure. Each of the projects launched today is an investment in the development of Ukrainian communities, the stability of our economy, and the secure European future of our nation.”

    EIB President Nadia Calviño said: “Just one month ago, we signed a guarantee agreement with the European Commission to unlock €2 billion of support under the EU’s Ukraine Facility. And already today, we have signed three new projects with the Ukrainian government: for water, district heating, and municipal infrastructure — for schools, hospitals, and housing for internally displaced people. This is Europe at its best, speeding up support to reinforce our collective security and strong partnerships.”

    “These investments will help ensure that schools, social housing, hospitals, heating, water and energy infrastructure continue to function for millions of Ukrainians despite the challenges of war. Together with our EU partners, we are working to deliver concrete support where it is needed most,” added EIB Vice-President Teresa Czerwińska, who oversees the Bank’s operations in Ukraine.

    European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos said: “The European Union’s support for Ukraine is a cornerstone of our broader approach to European security and resilience. By backing EIB investments through the Ukraine Facility, we are enabling the swift reconstruction of essential infrastructure, from schools and hospitals to energy. These efforts are not just about recovery; they are a strategic investment in a secure and democratic Ukraine on its EU path. Ukraine’s reconstruction is Europe’s responsibility, and part of our shared future.”

    European Commissioner for Economy and Productivity, Implementation and Simplification Valdis Dombrovskis said: “The European Commission and the EIB Group continue to work together to deliver crucial support to Ukraine and its people in the face of Russia’s brutal, full-scale invasion. Today’s agreements will provide a further €300 million in financing to address Ukraine’s urgent recovery and reconstruction needs. This includes repairing critical infrastructure and ensuring essential public services like water and heating are maintained. This sends a clear signal that the EU is delivering on its commitments to Ukraine and its people.”

    Rebuilding social infrastructure and essential services

    The €100 million Ukraine Recovery III project will help to rehabilitate critical social infrastructure in over 100 communities across Ukraine. It will provide access to essential services including healthcare, education, social housing, water supply, sewerage and heating.

    Improving access to safe water and sanitation

    The €100 million Ukraine Water Recovery project will provide financing to repair and modernise water supply and wastewater treatment systems damaged by the war. Many communities across Ukraine have experienced severe disruptions to their access to safe drinking water and sanitation. This investment will help restore and secure access to clean water and essential sanitation services, contributing to better living conditions and public health for millions of Ukrainians.

    Ensuring reliable district heating services in Ukraine

    The €100 million Ukraine District Heating Ukreximbank project will be implemented in cooperation with Ukreximbank, which will act as an intermediary bank for on-lending to local authorities. The project will help to restore and improve district heating infrastructure across Ukraine. Investments will focus on decentralised heat generation, renewable energy solutions, and energy efficiency in public buildings. The project will enable outdated or damaged heat generation facilities to be restored and protected quickly to guarantee the supply of critical services during the winter and to improve Ukraine’s energy security.

    “Ukreximbank’s ongoing partnership with the European Investment Bank, particularly through the Ukraine District Heating project, directly addresses the urgent need to boost energy efficiency in municipalities in order to lead them towards energy decentralisation and to enhance reliance on renewable energy sources. We are grateful for the EIB’s unwavering support for Ukraine and decades-long partnership with Ukreximbank in delivering large-scale social impact projects,” said Chairman of Ukreximbank’s Management Board Viktor Ponomarenko.

    Background information  

    The EIB in Ukraine 

    The EIB Group has supported Ukraine’s resilience, economy and recovery efforts since the first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion, with €2.2 billion already disbursed since 2022. The Bank continues to focus on securing Ukraine’s energy supply, restoring damaged infrastructure and maintaining essential public services across the country. Under a guarantee agreement signed with the European Commission, the EIB is set to invest at least €2 billion more in urgent recovery and reconstruction. This funding is part of the European Union’s €50 billion Ukraine Facility for 2024–2027 and is fully aligned with the priorities of the Ukrainian government.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Commerce and Industry Minister Shri Piyush Goyal chairs a meeting on the emerging trade scenario with Export Promotion Councils and Industry bodies

    Source: Government of India

    Commerce and Industry Minister Shri Piyush Goyal chairs a meeting on the emerging trade scenario with Export Promotion Councils and Industry bodies

    Meeting was called to deliberate on the opportunities arising out of the evolving scenarios

    Posted On: 09 APR 2025 7:55PM by PIB Delhi

    Union Minister of Commerce and Industry, Shri Piyush Goyal, today held discussions with the Export Promotion Councils and Industry Bodies in New Delhi in the light of the emerging trade scenario. The meeting was called to deliberate on the impact as well as opportunities arising out of the evolving and very dynamic scenarios and to apprise the industry and trade about the steps being taken by the Government.

    The Commerce and Industry Minister (CIM) complemented the exporters and the industry for achieving the highest ever export of above USD 820 Billion in the fiscal 2024-25 which is nearly 6% growth over previous fiscal year. In spite of multiple headwinds including the red sea crisis, Israel-Hamas conflict spilling over to Gulf region, continuation of Russia-Ukraine conflict and slow growth in some developed economies, the Minister lauded the Exporters for their resilience and efforts.

    During the meeting, CIM also apprised the exporters regarding discussions with the US for a mutually beneficial multi-sectoral Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA), which has been ongoing due to the foresight of Honb’le PM Modi who was one of the first global leaders to agree on the BTA in his meeting with President Trump in February 2025.

    The Commerce and Industry minister assured the exporters that the Government will work to provide a conducive environment to enable them to successfully navigate the recent changes in the global trade environment.

    The Commerce and Industry Minister assured that the country is working in a proactive manner and exploring solutions which are in the best interest of the nation. The team working on BTA is exploring the right mix and the right balance and he exhorted the exporters to not panic and look at the silver lining in the present scenario. He assured that the team is working with speed but not in undue haste to ensure the right outcome for the country.

    The CIM said that different countries are approaching the tariff imposition in a different manner. However, as far as India is concerned, there is a potential for increase in manufacturing, creation of additional jobs because it can attract big players in global supply chain as India has been able to establish itself as a trusted and reliable partner and with a predictable business friendly destination.

    Various Export Promotion Councils, representing a wide array of sectors, presented their views and outlook in light of the emerging challenges in global trade and requested the government to take proactive measures to support the export industry in these challenging times.

    The meeting was attended by Export Promotion Councils, Industry bodies and officials from Commerce and line ministries.

    ***

    Abhishek Dayal/ Ishita Biswas

    (Release ID: 2120565) Visitor Counter : 60

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Press freedom linked to greater financial stability, finds global study

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By George Kladakis, Lecturer in Finance, University of St Andrews

    Press freedom is widely considered to be a cornerstone of democracy. It brings accountability, transparency and access to reliable information.

    But beyond its democratic role, press freedom is also a vital part of a stable economy. Research has shown that it acts as a kind of financial watchdog, ensuring balance and accuracy.

    In doing so, an independent press strengthens the resilience of financial institutions. And our research suggests that higher levels of press freedom can also be linked to greater financial stability and lower “systemic risk” – where something bad happening at one company can trigger wider instability or even industry collapse – in the banking sector.

    Using data from 47 countries, we found that an independent press brings greater scrutiny of banking executives. Another benefit is a better flow of information around the financial markets, making the whole system more efficient.

    Countries with higher levels of press freedom are also more likely to foster corporate and political cultures that are free from the sort of corruption which could jeopardise the stability of the banking sector. All of these advantages are most pronounced during economic downturns or banking crises.

    And even outside times of crisis, we can see the positive effects by looking at basic financial indicators in countries with high and low press freedom levels. Countries with consistently high levels of press freedom such as Norway, Sweden or Estonia, for example, have far fewer non-performing (unrepaid) loans than countries with low levels of press freedom such as Pakistan, Greece or Russia.

    But a free press and a stable banking industry are by no means the norm.

    Recent data from the campaign group Reporters Without Borders highlights a worrying decline in media autonomy. It reports that 135 out of 180 countries now have press freedom levels classified as “problematic”, “difficult” or “very serious”.

    This trend extends to advanced economies such as Japan (70th, down from 68th in 2023), Italy (46th, down from 41st), and the US (55th, down from 45th).

    And it looks like the world’s largest economy could slip down the rankings even further. Although President Trump signed an executive order aimed at “restoring freedom of speech”, he has also explicitly threatened to revoke broadcast licenses, investigate critical media and jail journalists who protect confidential sources.

    In February 2025, White House officials even informed one US news agency that its journalists would be barred from entering the Oval Office until it stopped using the geographic term “Gulf of Mexico” instead of Trump’s preferred “Gulf of America”.

    But the Trump effect is not limited to the US. A recent aid freeze by his administration has cut billions in funding for independent media outlets across more than 30 countries, including Ukraine, Afghanistan and Iran.

    Press test

    Notable declines in press freedom have also been observed in politically volatile regions such as Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and central Asia, where authoritarian regimes continue to tighten their grip on the media.

    The survey from Reporters Without Borders suggests that governments across the world are failing to protect journalism, with a marked trend of declining press freedom.

    In 2014, 13% of countries enjoyed a “good” degree of press freedom, but this figure dropped to 7% by 2021 and then to just 4.4% in 2022. Conversely, the share of countries in the lowest classifications has risen dramatically. A decade ago, 8% were considered “difficult”, now that figure is 24%. The number of those with a “very serious” situation has gone from 8% to 17% in the same period.




    Read more:
    White House spat with AP over ‘Gulf of America’ ignites fears for press freedom in second Trump era


    Of course, there are outliers in the global picture. China, for example, has limited press freedom but a very stable banking sector that has been highly resilient to external shocks in the past. But the country is run by an authoritarian regime that helps to shield its banks from those kinds of risks.

    Elsewhere though, the decline in press freedom threatens not just democratic principles and political transparency, but also the operation of financial markets. Safeguarding that freedom is a critical basis of economic resilience and stability.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Press freedom linked to greater financial stability, finds global study – https://theconversation.com/press-freedom-linked-to-greater-financial-stability-finds-global-study-248207

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Security: Chair of the NATO Military Committee visits Albania

    Source: NATO

    On Wednesday 9th April, the Chair of the NATO Military Committee (CMC), Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, visited Albania and met with the highest political and military leadership. Admiral Cavo Dragone’s visit followed the 16th anniversary of the country joining the Alliance. He also delivered a lecture to the Defence Security College in Tirana.

    CMC met with the Chief of the General Staff of the Albanian Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Arben Kingji, where the discussions focused on Albania’s valuable contribution to Alliance’s shared security. CMC took the opportunity to praise Albania for “its steadfast contribution to NATO’s multinational forces in Latvia and Bulgaria, to NATO’s KFOR peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, and to NATO’s mission in Iraq.” CMC highlighted that Albania has continuously expanded its role within the Alliance, increased its contributions, and trained officers and NCOs capable of operating in multinational environments.

    Afterwards, Admiral Cavo Dragone met with Minister of Defence Pirro Vengu. CMC welcomed Albania’s efforts to invest more in defence and its continued support for Ukraine, including pledges of humanitarian and military aid.

    During his visit, the CMC met with President Bajram Begaj and Prime Minister Edi Rama. The conversations revolved around Albania’s commitment to invest more in defence, its engagement to promoting stability and cooperation across the Western Balkans; a region of strategic importance to NATO. Preparations for the upcoming NATO Summit in The Hague were also discussed.

    Speaking at the Defence Security College in Tirana, Admiral Cavo Dragone also thanked Albania for its politico-military role in NATO: “The Alliance needs leaders capable of taking difficult, but bold decisions in challenging times” and “Albania is no stranger to this kind of leadership.”

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI: SCOR successfully sponsors a new catastrophe bond, Atlas Capital DAC Series 2025-1

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Press release
    09 April 2025 – N° 07

    SCOR successfully sponsors a new catastrophe bond, Atlas Capital DAC Series 2025-1

    SCOR has successfully sponsored a new catastrophe bond (“cat bond”), Atlas Capital DAC Series 2025-1, which will provide the Group with multi-year risk transfer capacity of USD 240 million to protect itself against named storms in the US and the Caribbean, earthquakes in the US and Canada, and European windstorms. The risk period for Atlas Capital DAC Series 2025-1 will run from 1 June 2025 to 31 May 2028. The transaction has received the approval of the Irish regulatory authorities. The cat bond offering integrates ESG-related considerations to support investors’ due diligence.

    The cat bond was priced on 3 April 2025 with an interest spread of 7.25% and was issued on 9 April 2025. Atlas Capital DAC Series 2025-1 was well received and benefited from high investor demand. GC Securities1 acted as Sole Structuring Agent and Sole Bookrunner for the deal. Willkie Farr and Walkers advised SCOR as legal counsels.

    Atlas Capital DAC Series 2025-1 is an aggregate, index-based trigger cat bond issued by Atlas Capital DAC, a multi-arrangement special purpose vehicle approved in Ireland under Solvency II. This vehicle was created in 2023 for the Series 2023-1 cat bond issuance, and it may be utilized by the Group to sponsor cat bonds covering various perils in both L&H and P&C. The benefits of this vehicle were again visible this year, as it allowed for a fast and cost-effective issuance process. In particular, the transaction was offered to investors around two months in advance of the start of the risk period, allowing SCOR to benefit from the currently favorable conditions in the cat bond market.

    The size of the Series 2025-1 issuance is in line with the Group’s cat exposures and with its retrocession strategy under the Forward 2026 strategic plan, which identifies risk partnerships – including capital market solutions like cat bonds – as one of the Group’s levers for value creation.

    François de Varenne, Group CFO and Deputy CEO of SCOR, comments: SCOR is pleased to sponsor a new cat bond this year, securing multi-year protection against peak natural perils from the ILS market at favorable pricing conditions. SCOR has been a regular sponsor of cat bonds over the last 25 years, and we are delighted by the strong and continued investor demand, as cat bonds remain an integral part of our risk partnerships strategy under the Forward 2026 plan. We are also very pleased with the efficiency gains made by reusing Atlas Capital DAC for a third year.”

    *

    *            *

    SCOR, a leading global reinsurer

    As a leading global reinsurer, SCOR offers its clients a diversified and innovative range of reinsurance and insurance solutions and services to control and manage risk. Applying “The Art & Science of Risk”, SCOR uses its industry-recognized expertise and cutting-edge financial solutions to serve its clients and contribute to the welfare and resilience of society.

    The Group generated premiums of EUR 20.1 billion in 2024 and serves clients in more than 150 countries from its 37 offices worldwide.

    For more information, visit: www.scor.com

    Media Relations
    Alexandre Garcia
    media@scor.com

    Investor Relations

    Thomas Fossard
    InvestorRelations@scor.com

    Follow us on LinkedIn

     

    All content published by the SCOR group since January 1, 2024, is certified with Wiztrust. You can check the authenticity of this content at wiztrust.com.

    Forward-looking statements

    This press release may include forward-looking statements, assumptions, and information about SCOR’s financial condition, results, business, strategy, plans and objectives, including in relation to SCOR’s current or future projects.

    These statements are sometimes identified by the use of the future tense or conditional mode, or terms such as “estimate”, “believe”, “anticipate”, “expect”, “have the objective”, “intend to”, “plan”, “result in”, “should”, and other similar expressions.

    It should be noted that the achievement of these objectives, forward-looking statements, assumptions and information is dependent on circumstances and facts that arise in the future.

    No guarantee can be given regarding the achievement of these forward-looking statements, assumptions and information. These forward-looking statements, assumptions and information are not guarantees of future performance. Forward-looking statements, assumptions and information (including on objectives) may be impacted by known or unknown risks, identified or unidentified uncertainties and other factors that may significantly alter the future results, performance and accomplishments planned or expected by SCOR.

    In particular, it should be noted that the full impact of the inflation and geopolitical risks including but not limited to the Russian invasion and war in Ukraine on SCOR’s business and results cannot be accurately assessed.

    Therefore, any assessments, any assumptions and, more generally, any figures presented in this press release will necessarily be estimates based on evolving analyses, and encompass a wide range of theoretical hypotheses, which are highly evolutive.

    These points of attention on forward-looking statements are all the more essential that the adoption of IFRS 17, which is a new accounting standard, results in significant accounting changes for SCOR.

    Information regarding risks and uncertainties that may affect SCOR’s business is set forth in the 2024 Universal Registration Document filed on 20 March 2025, under number D.25-0124 with the French Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF) posted on SCOR’s website www.scor.com.

    In addition, such forward-looking statements, assumptions and information are not “profit forecasts” within the meaning of Article 1 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/980.

    SCOR has no intention and does not undertake to complete, update, revise or change these forward-looking statements, assumptions and information, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.

    Disclaimer

    This communication does not constitute or form part of any offer or invitation to sell or issue or any solicitation of any offer to purchase or subscribe for the securities mentioned herein in any jurisdiction. The securities mentioned herein have not been, and will not be, registered under the Securities Act, and may not be offered or sold in the United States except pursuant to an exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Act. Atlas Capital DAC and the securities mentioned are not and will not be registered under the U.S. Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended.

    Rule 144A offerings are offerings of securities conducted on a private placement basis for the purposes of the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”) and that limit initial distribution and secondary sales of the securities to entities that are Qualified Institutional Buyers as defined in Rule 144A under the Securities Act. The offering of securities in a Rule 144A offering does not require registration of the issuer or the securities with the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission.

    Catastrophe bond transactions provide sponsoring insurers and reinsurers protection against catastrophe risks through the release to the sponsor of a portion or the whole principal amount upon the occurrence of pre-defined events (namely triggers). Triggers can be determined in different ways: an industry loss trigger provides for payment once the losses to the industry generated by specific natural events (typically) are higher than a certain specified amount provided for in the terms of the transaction.


    1 GC Securities is a division of MMC Securities LLC, a US registered broker-dealer and member of FINRA/NFA/SIPC.

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Phillips 66 Sets the Record Straight on Gregory J. Goff’s Relationship with Elliott Management

    Source: Phillips

    HOUSTON–(BUSINESS WIRE)– Phillips 66 (NYSE:PSX) (the “Company”) today responded to a letter released by Gregory J. Goff to Phillips 66 Shareholders. The Board of Phillips 66 has issued the following statement:
    “Gregory Goff is clearly affiliated with Elliott Management. As of this morning, he remains featured as CEO of Amber Energy, an entity that Elliott has backed in its bid for Citgo, a Phillips 66 competitor. This important and obvious fact about a clear conflict of interest was never mentioned in Mr. Goff’s communication and is plainly misleading to shareholders. The notion he is an investor independent of Elliott is obviously false. This stunt reflects Elliott’s growing desperation to convince real investors to support its shortsighted, rushed breakup of Phillips 66. We will continue to engage with all investors on the facts and remain confident that those investors value the reliable $43 billion1 dollars of value we have returned through volatile market cycles.”
    About Phillips 66
    Phillips 66 (NYSE: PSX) is a leading integrated downstream energy provider that manufactures, transports and markets products that drive the global economy. The company’s portfolio includes Midstream, Chemicals, Refining, Marketing and Specialties, and Renewable Fuels businesses. Headquartered in Houston, Phillips 66 has employees around the globe who are committed to safely and reliably providing energy and improving lives while pursuing a lower-carbon future. For more information, visit phillips66.com or follow @Phillips66Co on LinkedIn.
    Forward-Looking Statements
    This news release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of the federal securities laws relating to Phillips 66’s operations, strategy and performance. Words such as “anticipated,” “committed,” “estimated,” “expected,” “planned,” “scheduled,” “targeted,” “believe,” “continue,” “intend,” “will,” “would,” “objective,” “goal,” “project,” “efforts,” “strategies” and similar expressions that convey the prospective nature of events or outcomes generally indicate forward-looking statements. However, the absence of these words does not mean that a statement is not forward-looking. Forward-looking statements included in this news release are based on management’s expectations, estimates and projections as of the date they are made. These statements are not guarantees of future events or performance, and you should not unduly rely on them as they involve certain risks, uncertainties and assumptions that are difficult to predict. Therefore, actual outcomes and results may differ materially from what is expressed or forecast in such forward-looking statements. 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    Source: Phillips 66

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Global: Iran and US to enter high-stakes nuclear negotiations – hampered by a lack of trust

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Ali Bilgic, Professor of International Relations and Middle East Politics, Loughborough University

    The announcement of planned talks between the US and Iran in Oman signifies a crucial development – especially given the history of distrust and animosity that has characterised their interactions.

    There remains a degree of confusion as to whether the negotiations over Iran’s development of a nuclear capacity will be direct or indirect. The US has said that its Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, will meet Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi. Donald Trump has publicly stated that Iran will be in “great danger” if the negotiations fail.

    Iran meanwhile has said that talks will be conducted through an intermediary. Araghchi commented that: “It is as much an opportunity as it is a test. The ball is in America’s court.”

    This seeming clash in messaging before the talks have even begun is not the greatest omen for their success, even with the threat of US or Israeli military action hovering over Iran. Representatives from Iran, China and Russia are reported to have met in Moscow on April 8.

    China’s foreign ministry released a statement reminding the world that it was the US “which unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA [the 2015 nuclear deal or joint comprehensive plan of action] and caused the current situation”. It stressed the need for Washington to “show political sincerity, act in the spirit of mutual respect, engage in dialogue and consultation, and stop the threat of force and maximum pressure”.

    This followed messaging from Washington which very much focused on the possibility of force and maximum pressure. Speaking to the press after meeting the Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Trump struck a very aggressive note, saying: “Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon and if the talks aren’t successful, I actually think it will be a very bad day for Iran if that’s the case.”

    The US president’s much discussed transactional approach to diplomacy – as represented at the talks by Witkoff, a former real-estate developer – is likely be pivotal to how negotiations proceed. Trump’s geopolitical ambitions in the Middle East focus on expanding the Abraham accords. These agreements focused on normalising relations between Israel and various Arab countries – including UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan.

    The signing of the accords in 2020 were seen as a key foreign policy achievement of Trump’s first administration, particularly in terms of America’s desire to counter Iran in the region.

    The US is now actively working to bring Saudi Arabia into the fold. In that respect, recognising that Riyadh’s participation would mark a transformative shift in regional geopolitics. Additionally, Trump aims to leverage trade agreements and major investment initiatives to create economic dependencies that encourage diplomatic normalisation.

    Iran, meanwhile, faces severe economic difficulties. The country’s economy is in a state of crisis, with high inflation, a depreciating currency and widespread poverty. These conditions have been worsened by international sanctions and domestic policy failures. As a result, Iran is in dire need of economic concessions, which could be a significant point of leverage for the US.

    Tehran’s geopolitical clout has weakened considerably over the past 18 months. Military setbacks in 2024 – including the loss of key allies and leaders in groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah – have diminished Iran’s ability to project power in its region.

    This weakened position will affect Iran’s negotiating stance. It could make it more likely that Iran’s negotiators might seek economic relief and diplomatic solutions rather than pursuing aggressive policies. But pressure from hardliners within Iran could push the country towards a more radical approach if concessions are not forthcoming.

    Rocky road ahead

    A major issue affecting the talks is the low level of trust between the two parties. The US’s involvement in the Gaza conflict – including Trump’s controversial proposal to clear Gaza of Palestinians to make way for possible redevelopment – has further strained relations. So has the recent US campaign against the Tehran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen.

    Further threats of this kind are likely to be seen by Iran as aggressive and coercive – and Trump’s latest rhetoric won’t have helped. This will inevitably undermine the prospects for trust between the parties.

    Iranian parliamentarians on the prospect of nuclear talks with the US.

    Iran’s scepticism is rooted in past experiences where promises of economic relief were not fulfilled. Trump’s withdrawal of the US from the 2015 nuclear deal in 2018 is a case in point. This perceived breach of trust has made Iran cautious about entering into new agreements without concrete assurances.

    The regional context adds another layer of complexity to the talks. American support for Israel’s actions in Gaza is likely to complicate matters. The populations of most Gulf states are fully supportive of Palestinian self-determination and are scandalised at the way the US president has seemingly given the green light to Israel’s breach of the ceasefire and resumption of hostilities.

    Iran’s internal politics are also likely to play an important role in shaping its approach to the negotiations. The country is experiencing significant political polarisation between the “hardliners”, spearheaded by the supreme leader Ali Khamenei, and the “reformists”, who are relatively more conciliatory towards the US and Europe. Following the surprise election of Masoud Pezeshkian, a reformist, last year, hopes that Iran would be open to negotiations with Washington quickly faltered when he realigned his position with Khamenei’s.

    In March 2025, he lost two important reformists in the cabinet, the economy minister, Abdolnaser Hemmati, and vice-president, Mohammad Javad Zarif, forced out by the hardliner-dominated parliament. This factional politicking will complicate Iran’s ability to present a unified front in negotiations — and this could represent significant leverage for the US. But it also strengthens hardliners to make demands that are unacceptable to the US.

    Ali Bilgic does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Iran and US to enter high-stakes nuclear negotiations – hampered by a lack of trust – https://theconversation.com/iran-and-us-to-enter-high-stakes-nuclear-negotiations-hampered-by-a-lack-of-trust-254106

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Hungary’s exit from the International Criminal Court is a sign of the times

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Michal Ovadek, Lecturer in European Institutions, Politics and Policy, UCL

    After deciding to flout an international arrest warrant against Benjamin Netanyahu, Hungary has become the first European country to announce plans to leave the International Criminal Court (ICC). This comes after president Viktor Orbán hosted Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, despite the ICC issuing an arrest warrant for him in relation to war crimes in Gaza.

    As a member of the ICC, Hungary is supposed to turn in anyone subject to such a warrant if they enter its territory. Instead, Orbán rolled out the red carpet.

    Following the visit, a senior government official confirmed Hungary’s intention to leave the court. It will be some time before we know if it will see through on the threat because it takes at least a year to leave once a formal written notification has been sent but the signal itself is a landmark moment.

    Hungary’s open repudiation of an important part of international law is further evidence of the tectonic shifts taking place in international relations.

    Throughout most of the 1990s and early 2000s, much of western foreign policy was focused on creating institutional mechanisms aimed at preserving the liberal international consensus that emerged at the end of the cold war. The creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the ICC were two of the most concrete manifestations of this ethos.

    Both represent attempts to bring legal and judicial formality to international politics. Unlike its two ad-hoc antecedents – the international criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda – the ICC is a permanent court of justice. It is tasked with overseeing the criminal trials of people accused of involvement in serious crimes, such as genocide.

    Even at the height of its popularity, the idea that international relations should be subject to more rules and enforcement by courts had its fair share of sceptics and detractors, especially among countries whose interests and power could be most severely curtailed by an effective international justice system.

    The US, Russia and Israel had originally signed but did not ratify the Rome statute underpinning the ICC – and subsequently withdrew their signatures – while China and India never even signed the treaty.

    European countries generally (and EU member states specifically) were always among the most supportive of the ICC. The continent has experience with perhaps the most important experiment in international criminal justice, the Nuremberg trials of Nazi crimes. This legacy has continued to feed European support for holding those responsible for aggression and atrocities to account by means of criminal justice.

    Countries like Hungary, emerging from behind the iron curtain in the 1990s, were no exception. There was no ideological or practical reason to oppose the creation of the ICC.

    If anything, countries hoping to join the EU saw it as beneficial to endorse the court. Other than Belarus and Azerbaijan, every European country has ratified the Rome statute, and none has left – until now.

    The rise of kleptocratic authoritarianism in Hungary means its exit from the ICC should not be particularly surprising. Inside the EU, Hungary has consistently acted as a Trojan horse for the interests of authoritarian governments, most notably Russia, China and Serbia.

    Its break with the values and principles that are supposed to be at the heart of the EU project goes substantially beyond support for international institutions and justice.

    Consensus crumbles

    But the broader international environment has also become less favourable to legalisation and judicialisation. Countries that previously feigned commitment to international law have become outright pariahs. The most obvious example is of course Russia, which is waging a war of aggression against Ukraine – a crime under the Rome statute.

    More importantly, though, the US is increasingly turning its back on international rules. It is dismantling many of the international institutions it worked hard to establish.

    Although Donald Trump might be wreaking the most havoc, the US already effectively pulled the plug on the WTO’s judicial appeals system under Barack Obama. Last year Joe Biden’s administration came close to imposing sanctions on the ICC for issuing an arrest warrant for Israeli officials, including Netanyahu.

    Taken together, these developments leave the EU and a handful of other countries increasingly isolated in backing the ICC and other elements of the so-called “rules-based international order”. And while Hungary’s exit deals yet another blow, it’s not clear how deeply committed other EU member states are either.

    Germany’s chancellor Friedrich Merz promised he would find a way to make it possible for Netanyahu to visit his country despite the outstanding ICC arrest warrant.

    Hungary’s open defiance of its obligation to arrest Netanyahu has placed it in company of countries that wear their noncompliance with international law as a badge of honour. The experience of one of them is particularly educational.

    When Omar Al-Bashir, the then president of Sudan, wanted for crimes against humanity, visited South Africa in June 2015, he was allowed to attend a summit and subsequently leave the country despite court orders to arrest him. Fast forward a decade and South Africa is spearheading the international legal campaign against Israel’s atrocities in Palestine.

    Netanyahu would almost certainly be arrested in South Africa today, as well as in a host of other African and Muslim countries which had vehemently protested the arrest warrant against Al-Bashir in the past. Effective international rules and enforcement require consistent and credible support from a broad coalition of states – the ICC is increasingly short on both.

    Michal Ovadek does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Hungary’s exit from the International Criminal Court is a sign of the times – https://theconversation.com/hungarys-exit-from-the-international-criminal-court-is-a-sign-of-the-times-254129

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI USA: Angola exported more liquefied natural gas to Europe and less to Asia in 2022 and 2023

    Source: US Energy Information Administration

    In-brief analysis

    April 9, 2025


    Angola exported more liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Europe and less to Asia in 2022 and 2023, according to estimates from the Statistical Review of World Energy, when Europe increased LNG imports to offset reduced natural gas imports by pipeline from Russia following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war.

    Prior to 2022, most of Angola’s LNG exports went to the Asia-Pacific region, primarily India. In 2023, however, Europe received 75% of Angola’s total 175 billion cubic feet (Bcf) of LNG exports; France and the United Kingdom were the largest recipients in Europe, taking about 32 Bcf and 28 Bcf, respectively, in 2023. The Asia-Pacific region received the remaining 25%, with India receiving the most at about 35 Bcf for the year.


    Most of the natural gas produced in Angola is associated gas produced at its offshore oil fields. However, a substantial amount of that natural gas is flared as a byproduct of oil operations or is reinjected into oil fields to increase oil recovery. Angola does not import any natural gas because it produces enough natural gas to meet domestic demand. The natural gas that Angola does not consume or flare domestically is exported in the form of LNG.

    Angola LNG Limited (ALNG) owns and operates Angola’s sole LNG export terminal in Soyo, which has a liquefaction capacity of 250 Bcf per year. The LNG facility produced its first cargo of LNG in 2013, but it subsequently shut down as a result of technical failures and did not restart operations until 2016. The LNG facility uses associated gas produced at Angola’s offshore fields as feedstock, and ALNG also plans to draw additional supplies from non-associated gas projects. One such project is the Northern Gas Complex, where operator Eni plans to begin production from the Quiluma and Maboquerio fields in 2026.

    The Northern Gas Complex is Angola’s first non-associated gas project, and Eni aims to develop two offshore platforms, an onshore natural gas-processing plant, and pipelines to transport natural gas from the two fields to the Angola LNG terminal in Soyo. The Northern Gas Complex is expected to reach peak production of about 141 Bcf per year.

    For more on Angola’s energy sector, please see the latest version of the Country Analysis Brief: Angola.

    Principal contributor: Eric Han

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Politics with Michelle Grattan: Hugh White on what the next PM should tell Trump and defending Australia – without the US

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra

    The Trump ascendancy has forced international economic issues and the future strategic outlook onto the Australian election agenda, even if they are at the margins.

    This campaign – while dominated by domestic issues, notably the cost of living – is being conducted against the background of an extraordinarily volatile external situation, with major implications for Australia’s future.

    To discuss these issues, we were joined on the podcast by Hugh White, Emeritus Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University. White is one of Australia’s foremost thinkers on defence policy, China and the region. His long career includes serving as an adviser to then federal defence minister Kim Beazley.

    White regards US President Donald Trump as a “revolutionary figure”:

    I think Trump is a genuinely revolutionary character, and not just his impact on American domestic politics and economics, I also think he has a huge impact on global strategic affairs. And the reason for that is that he does have a fundamentally different view of America’s place in the world than that of what we might call a Washington establishment.

    Donald Trump is really a kind of an old-fashioned isolationist. That is, he believes America’s strategic focus should be on the Western Hemisphere […] For example, in Ukraine he’s happy to see Russia assert itself as a great power in Eastern Europe. In Asia, I think, despite his reputation as a China hawk on economic issues, he doesn’t have any problem with China asserting itself as a great power in East Asia. He’s for these other great powers to dominate their backyards, just the way he wants America to dominate its backyard in the Western Hemisphere.

    Yet White doesn’t believe either Labor or the Coalition is taking defence seriously in this election.

    It’s not being treated as a real issue in the campaign, and that’s because both sides have determined that it won’t, and what underpins that is the absolutely rock-solid bipartisanship between the two of them on every significant issue. And I think that’s a very serious problem for Australia because at a time when our strategic circumstances are changing dramatically […] neither side has any inclination to have a serious conversation about what that means, why it’s happening, what we should be doing about it,

    A lot of the blame for that lies with the Labor Party, because it seems to me Labor’s political approach to the whole question of foreign affairs and defence for a very long time now has focused on minimising differences with the Coalition.

    While White agrees Australia needs new submarines, and quickly, he doesn’t think they should be nuclear-powered, as promised under AUKUS. He thinks we should leave AUKUS.

    We should have started building replacements for the [Collins-class submarine] around about 2010 or 2012. So we’re well over a decade late and I do think there’s a real risk that we’re going to lose our submarine capability altogether. But the way to solve that is not to push ahead spending billions and billions of dollars on a project which, even if it works, delivers the submarines we don’t need, and which is very unlikely to deliver any submarines at all.

    We’re past looking for a perfect submarine. We just need to get any submarine at all so we can keep some capability running and then once we have that running, we need to have a really focused programme. We need ministers to really tell Defence what to do, focus programmes to develop a follow on to the Collins-class design, because that’s the design we already know best in the world and to start building a new class of evolved Collins.

    After the May 3 election, when the next prime minister meets the US president to talk trade, defence and more, what should Anthony Albanese or Peter Dutton tell Trump? White says:

    Trump is very hard to handle. I don’t think there’s any magic formula that an Australian prime minister can utter, which makes Trump into either a more acceptable, economic partner for Australia or a more reliable strategic partner for Australia, because the forces that are driving America out of Asia are much bigger than Donald Trump.

    The most important thing an Australian political leader could say to Trump when he first meets him is, look, we understand where you’re coming from. We are happy to take responsibility for our own security. We don’t expect you to stay engaged in Asia to look after us in future. What we want you to do is to help us manage that transition as best we can and we’re prepared to pay for what we get.

    Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Politics with Michelle Grattan: Hugh White on what the next PM should tell Trump and defending Australia – without the US – https://theconversation.com/politics-with-michelle-grattan-hugh-white-on-what-the-next-pm-should-tell-trump-and-defending-australia-without-the-us-254197

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Global: How windfalls from commodity price booms come back to bite exporters

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Lotanna Emediegwu, Senior Lecturer in Economics, Manchester Metropolitan University

    Zhengzaishuru/Shutterstock

    When the wholesale prices of essential goods like food or oil suddenly rise, it can cause deep shifts in the economy that upend trade balances and hike inflation rates. This is known as a commodity price boom.

    The outbreak of war in Ukraine in February 2022 spurred European and US sanctions on Russian oil companies which restricted global oil supply. The ensuing shock hiked energy prices in the international market and meant that the price of Brent crude, a global benchmark for oil prices, reached US$122 (£95) a barrel on March 21 that year, its highest level since 2015.

    Price inflation has forced households in importing nations like the UK to pay a premium to fill up cars. It has also raised food prices, as the cost of shipping food to supermarkets and restaurants has increased, as well as utility bills.

    Meanwhile resource-rich exporter nations can make a killing and choose to use the additional revenue to subsidise energy for consumers, issue rebates, or increase funding for public services. Less evident, but no less significant however, are the environmental consequences of these booms.

    A study I published with colleagues showed that democratic nations in oil-rich regions, such as sub-Saharan Africa, are especially prone to increasing pollution when the oil price suddenly soars. This phenomenon stems from the need to ramp up production quickly, to capitalise on fleeting price hikes, which economies with less democratic oversight are able to bypass.

    These (ostensibly) democratic economies appear most attentive to market signals, and in their unbridled rush for quick economic gain, typically raise pollution as they extract and sell more. This is especially true with oil extraction, which produces pollutants linked to cancer.

    We investigated global commodity price booms using the commodity windfall index. This is a collection of prices that market analysts collate to track changes and detect booms as they develop. We measured the effect of price booms on the environment by analysing how air pollution changed in producer countries when the prices of commodities in the index changed.

    The index covers 40 commodities across energy, metals, food and beverages, and agricultural raw materials such as wheat. One is particularly damaging to the environment: oil production.

    The top five oil producers as of 2023 (the most recent year for which data exists) are developed nations: the US (22%), Saudi Arabia (11%), Russia (11%), Canada (6%), and China (5%). As global exporters, all benefit from windfalls caused by oil price spikes.

    Increasing commodity prices justify more intense exploration for new reserves. In the case of oil exploration, this involves seismic surveys, drilling and the use of heavy machinery which consumes lots of fossil energy and releases greenhouse gases like CO₂.

    Oil price surges could make democracies less green

    Among oil-producing and exporting economies, democratic nations are more likely to experience increased pollution during commodity windfalls, compared with autocratic regimes. We characterised democracies by the presence of competitive political participation and regular free and fair elections, among other qualities.

    This is because democratic nations are particularly prone to ramping up resource extraction during price booms. Political pressures drive this tendency, as governments seek to fund popular initiatives or bolster public services before elections. For example, in the US during the 2008 oil price spike, president George W. Bush advocated for increased domestic oil drilling and natural gas extraction with an aim to reduce energy prices and create jobs.

    Autocratic regimes might appear less urgent to exploit commodity windfalls. There are, after all, fewer electoral or public accountability considerations. However, one-party state China’s position as the world’s largest polluter is primarily due to its manufacturing base, not raw material extraction.

    The environmental consequences of commodity booms are a global issue that requires cooperation to solve.

    Developing regions like sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean will struggle to reduce emissions from extractive activities, as much economic growth here depends on it. The US$300 billion (£235 billion) annual climate funding pledge for developing countries, agreed at the most recent UN climate summit in Azerbaijan, is not enough to finance the creation of new industries.

    Advanced economies, which bear historical responsibility for the majority of global emissions, must take the lead in addressing this imbalance. This involves both reducing their emissions and providing substantial financial and technical support to resource-dependent nations. A failure to do so would perpetuate global inequalities, as developing nations are asked to sacrifice economic growth for environmental goals while industrialised countries continue to expand their economies.

    The challenge, then, is not just in managing the financial rewards of commodity booms, but in ensuring they do not come at an unsustainable environmental cost.

    Lotanna Emediegwu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. How windfalls from commodity price booms come back to bite exporters – https://theconversation.com/how-windfalls-from-commodity-price-booms-come-back-to-bite-exporters-244878

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Sounds of the Ukraine war: what these recordings of daily life reveal about the human and environmental costs

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Janine Natalya Clark, Professor of Transitional Justice and International Criminal Law, University of Birmingham

    A Kyiv resident describes it as her favourite morning sound. She is referring to the crisp, clear sound of a trumpet coming from a nearby street. The music is beautiful and soulful, played by a military veteran who sits in the same spot every weekend.

    “I am inspired by this strong person who not only plays but also brings a ray of hope to the whole district with his music,” the interviewee reflects.

    Existing research on war and sound has mainly focused on what J. Martin Daughtry, associate professor of ethnomusicology and sound studies at New York University, terms “the belliphonic” – meaning the spectrum of sounds produced by armed combat. Gunfire. Shellings. Explosions.

    In reality, what people hear and remember as the sounds of war are often far more diverse. When I asked a group of Ukrainians to make recordings of their local soundscapes, they captured a wide range of different sounds including the belliphonic – in particular, the increasingly “normal” sound of air raid sirens.

    Air raid siren.
    Ukrainian interviewee, CC BY784 KB (download)

    Yet they were also much more varied than I had expected – a school run; a walk in a winter forest; stridulating crickets; silence during curfew (typically from midnight to 5am); generators on the street; an end-of-project celebration; a rollerskating club.

    I also asked participants about their recordings, including how they felt when they listened back to them, as well as more general questions such as how their soundscapes had changed due to the war, and what sounds they missed. These recordings are featured in a recently launched online exhibit.

    As I have learnt from my research over the past seven months, sound can offer different – and distinctive – insights into experiences of war. It can elicit thoughts and information that might not arise from conversations and interviews alone.

    I had a particular reason for asking Ukrainians to make these soundscape recordings (more than 40 in total). Ecologists, bio-acousticians (scientists who study the creation, transmission and reception of sound) and others have used sound to analyse and monitor soil biodiversity, the healthiness of coral reefs and the impact of wildfires on birdsong.

    This fascinating area of research, however, remains neglected in war and armed conflict contexts. In particular, studies examining the environmental impacts of war – including the war in Ukraine – have overlooked the relevance of sound in terms of what it might tell us about the impact of conflict.

    In Ukraine, some of the areas that have suffered the greatest environmental damage are not accessible – or at least, not easily. They are saturated with landmines and other unexploded ordnance, occupied by Russian forces, or close to frontline areas.

    Russian air attacks on Kyiv in April 2025.

    My interviewees were not able to record the sounds of burning forests and steppes (grasslands); or of wild animals in Askania-Nova (Ukraine’s oldest nature reserve) fleeing in fear from low-flying enemy aircraft. All of the interviewees, moreover, were based in cities. Their recordings, however, illustrate some of the ways the war in Ukraine is affecting not just humans but the whole environment.

    In one of the recordings, made at night in the city of Zaporizhzhia in south-east Ukraine, there is the sound of explosions as Ukraine’s air-defence system shoots down Shahed drones. Neighbourhood dogs can be heard barking throughout the entire recording.

    Drone attack.
    Ukrainian interviewee, CC BY1.37 MB (download)

    In another recording, in the city of Dnipro in central Ukraine, dogs bark in response to the wailing sound of an air raid siren – and a large dog close-by lets out two prolonged howls.

    Howling dog.
    Ukrainian interviewee, CC BY1.41 MB (download)

    It is impossible to listen to these recordings without thinking about the animals and what they were experiencing and feeling.

    A zoologist shared with me a recording he made in 2013, a year before the start of the war in eastern Ukraine. The audio captures the chirping of a steppe marmot in Luhansk region. As the area is now under occupation, you might wonder when listening to it how the sounds of this steppe have changed as a consequence of the war.

    Attentiveness to sound has wider implications for justice, and in particular for transitional justice (how societies respond to the legacies of massive and serious human rights violations) – my area of research.

    Ukraine is investigating more than 200 cases of environmental war crimes which are alleged to have taken place during the current conflict. Of these, 14 are additionally being investigated as ecocide – a crime included in article 441 of Ukraine’s criminal code. One case relates to the destruction of the Kakhovka dam, in Kherson region, in June 2023.

    These legal developments can significantly contribute to addressing the neglect of nature and the environment in transitional justice – a field that remains strongly focused on humans.

    Sound is also highly relevant in this regard. As the barking dogs illustrate, it can powerfully capture ways that human and animal experiences of war are deeply entangled.

    Using sound as a way of actively monitoring different ecosystems over a period of time can also provide valuable information about changes occurring within them. This is important for understanding how these ecosystems have been harmed and, additionally, how they might be recovering . Oleksii Marushchak, a researcher at the I.I. Schmalhausen Institute of Zoology in Kyiv, said after listening to the recordings:

    It is important to reiterate that the majority of interviewees at the time of participating in the study were far from the frontline, where the horrors of war are much more intense than anything that you will hear in the soundscape recordings. One can only imagine what it must be like for people and animals living in close proximity to frontline areas.

    Sound is relevant not just to criminal investigations but also the issue of environmental reparations. There now exists a Register of Damage for Ukraine, as the first step in creating an international compensation mechanism to deal with multiple damages – including to the environment – caused during the war. It would be a highly innovative, and welcome, development if this future mechanism were to admit soundscape ecology evidence.

    There is also scope for Ukrainian prosecutors to further expand their pioneering work in investigating environmental war crimes and ecocide (which has wider relevance to the work of the International Criminal Court in The Hague) by listening to such recordings – and to the rich information that animals, forests, rivers and soil can help communicate through sound.

    When the war ends, it will be essential to consider all the evidence of its many effects and consequences, and sound recordings could be very important.

    Janine Natalya Clark receives funding from the Leverhulme Trust.

    ref. Sounds of the Ukraine war: what these recordings of daily life reveal about the human and environmental costs – https://theconversation.com/sounds-of-the-ukraine-war-what-these-recordings-of-daily-life-reveal-about-the-human-and-environmental-costs-253390

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Security: New NATO-Ukraine Centre hosts resilience workshop to enhance cooperation and readiness

    Source: NATO

    The NATO Joint Analysis Training and Education Centre (JATEC) in Bydgoszcz, Poland held a workshop on total defence and resilience on 2-3 April 2025.

    21 participants from six NATO Allies and Ukraine addressed topics including the security of critical services, strategic communications, transport and military mobility. The workshop aimed to enhance collaboration and inform future planning for NATO and Ukraine, identify key challenges and develop actionable strategies for Ukraine’s long-term security and defence readiness. In the workshop, experts from several Swedish government agencies shared Sweden’s approach to national resilience-building. This was complemented by NATO’s pool of resilience civil experts, who offered experience and best practices from across the Alliance. 

    In 2024, Allies agreed to deepen cooperation with partners on resilience. The mutually beneficial work between NATO and Ukraine through JATEC directly contributes to this initiative. In the same year, Allies also agreed to continue supporting Ukraine, including by establishing JATEC. Opened in February 2025, JATEC is the first civil-military organisation to be jointly run by NATO and a partner nation. It analyses wartime experiences in Ukraine and provides NATO and Allies with insights on the latest battlefield developments, emerging technologies, lessons learned, and new education and training systems, as well as developing and testing new military concepts. JATEC’s work will help to further strengthen Ukraine’s defence sector, enhance its deterrence and defence, and reach full interoperability with NATO.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI: Ellomay Capital Ltd. Announces the Execution of an Agreement to sell 49% of its Italian Solar Portfolio of 198 MW to Clal Insurance, a Leading Israeli Institutional Investor

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Tel-Aviv, Israel, April 09, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Ellomay Capital Ltd. (NYSE American; TASE: ELLO) (“Ellomay” or the “Company”), a renewable energy and power generator and developer of renewable energy and power projects in Europe, USA and Israel, today announced that it entered into an investment agreement (the “Clal Agreement”) with Clal Insurance Ltd., a leading Israeli institutional investor, and several of its affiliates (together, “Clal”), for an aggregate investment by Clal of approximately €52 million.

    Pursuant to the Clal Agreement, Clal and Ellomay will set up a new Israeli limited partnership (the “Israeli LP”) in which an entity wholly-owned by Ellomay will be the general partner and Ellomay will hold 51% of the limited partner interests and Clal will hold the remaining 49%. The Israeli LP will wholly-own a newly founded Luxembourg entity, to which Ellomay’s wholly-owned subsidiary, Ellomay Luxembourg Holdings, S.à.r.l. (“Ellomay Luxembourg”), will transfer all of the issued and outstanding shares of seven Italian project companies, who hold a solar portfolio in an aggregate capacity of approximately 198 MW (the “Italian Solar Portfolio”). The Italian Solar Portfolio consists of (a) solar facilities with an aggregate capacity of 38 MW that are connected to the grid and operating and (b) additional solar facilities with an aggregate capacity of 160 MW that have reached Ready-to-Build status and with respect to which Engineering, Procurement and Construction agreements were executed. Project finance agreements were executed with respect to the Italian Solar Portfolio in March 2025.

    The Clal Agreement includes customary representations and warranties of Ellomay and Clal and an indemnification mechanism for breaches of representations, warranties and undertakings, subject to customary caps and limitations, as a sole remedy, subject to customary exceptions. The Clal Agreement provides Clal with a right of first look commencing with the consummation of the transactions contemplated by the Clal Agreement with respect to investment in other solar projects currently developed or that will be developed by Ellomay and its subsidiaries in Italy for an investment under similar terms as the Clal Agreement, mutatis mutandis. Pursuant to the right of first look mechanism, Ellomay will provide Clal certain information with respect to each project that has reached Ready-to-Build status and Ellomay decided to advance its construction, and Clal will have a few months to notify Ellomay that it is interested in investing up to 49% in such projects or any portion thereof upon the terms set forth in the notice provided to Clal by Ellomay.

    The Clal Agreement provides that upon consummation of the transactions contemplated by the Clal Agreement, Ellomay and Clal will sign a partners agreement (the “Clal PA”) and Ellomay will issue Clal a warrant (the “Clal Warrant”).

    The Clal PA sets forth the relationship between the general partner and the limited partners, the governance and management of the Israeli LP, the funding and financing of the Israeli LP and the mechanism for future transfers of interests in the Israeli LP. Pursuant to the Clal PA, Clal undertakes to provide its pro rata portion of the amounts required for the development of the Italian Solar Portfolio to the Israeli LP, which in turn will fund the Luxembourg subsidiary and the Italian project companies. Ellomay’s aggregate funding commitment in the Italian Solar Portfolio has already been provided by Ellomay. The Clal PA also provides for the payment of annual management fees to Ellomay. The Clal PA provides each limited partner with customary rights, including a full tag-along right in the event of a change in control of Ellomay and includes customary veto rights. The Clal PA provides that following repayment of partners’ loans, the Israeli LP’s surpluses will be distributed to the limited partners, pro rata to their holdings, on a semi-annual basis, subject to maintaining the working capital required by the Israeli LP for the two following quarters.

    The Clal Warrant covers 416,000 ordinary shares of Ellomay, with an exercise price of NIS 69.7 (approximately $18.5) per share. The Clal Warrant is for a term of twenty-six months and may only be exercised on a cashless basis. In the event Ellomay’s shares are traded at a price higher than NIS 80 (approximately $21.2) per share when the Clal Warrant is exercised, Ellomay, at its discretion, may choose to issue shares on a cashless basis assuming a market price per share of NIS 80 and pay Clal the remainder in cash. 

    The consummation of the transactions contemplated by the Clal Agreement is subject to the fulfillment or waiver of several customary conditions to closing, including receipt of regulatory approvals, that are not entirely within the control of Ellomay, Ellomay Luxembourg, Clal or the Israeli LP. There can be no assurance as to whether or when the conditions to closing will be satisfied.

    Ran Fridrich, CEO and a board member of Ellomay, commented: “Ellomay is pleased to announce the establishment of a partnership with Clal Insurance, which will invest in a 198 MW solar portfolio in central and northern Italy. The Company sees great importance in the entry of a quality institutional investor as a partner to part of its Italian solar portfolio, and in Clal’s interest in examining participation in the future in building the remainder of the Company’s Italian portfolio and views this as a vote of confidence in the Company, its management and its operations. The Company thanks the investment team of Clal, led by Barak Bensky, for their professional work in a complex cross-border transaction.”

    About Ellomay Capital Ltd.

    Ellomay is an Israeli based company whose shares are registered with the NYSE American and with the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange under the trading symbol “ELLO”. Since 2009, Ellomay focuses its business in the renewable energy and power sectors in Europe, USA and Israel.

    To date, Ellomay has evaluated numerous opportunities and invested significant funds in the renewable, clean energy and natural resources industries in Israel, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Texas, USA, including:

      Approximately 335.9 MW of operating solar power plants in Spain (including a 300 MW solar plant in owned by Talasol, which is 51% owned by the Company) and approximately 38 MW of operating solar power plants in Italy;
      9.375% indirect interest in Dorad Energy Ltd., which owns and operates one of Israel’s largest private power plants with production capacity of approximately 850MW, representing about 6%-8% of Israel’s total current electricity consumption;
      Groen Gas Goor B.V., Groen Gas Oude-Tonge B.V. and Groen Gas Gelderland B.V., project companies operating anaerobic digestion plants in the Netherlands, with a green gas production capacity of approximately 3 million, 3.8 million and 9.5 million Nm3 per year, respectively;
      83.333% of Ellomay Pumped Storage (2014) Ltd., which is involved in a project to construct a 156 MW pumped storage hydro power plant in the Manara Cliff, Israel;
      Solar projects in Italy with an aggregate capacity of 294 MW that have reached “ready to build” status; and
      Solar projects in the Dallas Metropolitan area, Texas, USA with an aggregate capacity of approximately 27 MW that are placed in service and in process of connection to the grid and additional 22 MW are under construction.

    For more information about Ellomay, visit http://www.ellomay.com.

    Information Relating to Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains forward-looking statements that involve substantial risks and uncertainties, including statements that are based on the current expectations and assumptions of the Company’s management. All statements, other than statements of historical facts, included in this press release regarding the Company’s plans and objectives, expectations and assumptions of management are forward-looking statements. The use of certain words, including the words “estimate,” “project,” “intend,” “expect,” “believe” and similar expressions are intended to identify forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. The Company may not actually achieve the plans, intentions or expectations disclosed in the forward-looking statements and you should not place undue reliance on the Company’s forward-looking statements. Various important factors could cause actual results or events to differ materially from those that may be expressed or implied by the Company’s forward-looking statements, including the inability to fulfill all of the conditions to closing set forth in the Clal Agreement, changes in the market price of the Company’s shares, changes in electricity prices and demand, regulatory changes increases in interest rates and inflation, changes in the supply and prices of resources required for the operation of the Company’s facilities (such as waste and natural gas) and in the price of oil, the impact of the war and hostilities in Israel and Gaza, the impact of the continued military conflict between Russia and Ukraine, technical and other disruptions in the operations or construction of the power plants owned by the Company and general market, political and economic conditions in the countries in which the Company operates, including Israel, Spain, Italy and the United States. These and other risks and uncertainties associated with the Company’s business are described in greater detail in the filings the Company makes from time to time with Securities and Exchange Commission, including its Annual Report on Form 20-F. The forward-looking statements are made as of this date and the Company does not undertake any obligation to update any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.

    Contact:
    Kalia Rubenbach (Weintraub)
    CFO
    Tel: +972 (3) 797-1111
    Email: hilai@ellomay.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Radware Schedules Conference Call for Its First Quarter 2025 Earnings

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    TEL AVIV, Israel, April 09, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Radware® (NASDAQ: RDWR), a global leader in application security and delivery solutions for multi-cloud environments, will announce its first quarter results on Wednesday, May 7, 2025.

    Conference Call Details
    Radware management will host a call on Wednesday, May 7, 2025, at 8:30 a.m. EDT to discuss its first quarter 2025 results and outlook for the second quarter of 2025. Participants are advised to join the call approximately 15 minutes before the start time.

    US: 1-877-704-4453 (toll free)
    International: 1-201-389-0920

    In addition, the call will be webcast live on the Company’s website at http://www.radware.com/ir/investor-events/.

    A replay of the call will be available for seven days, starting two hours after the end of the call, on telephone number 1-844-512-2921 (toll free) or 1-412-317-6671. Access ID: 13752770.

    About Radware
    Radware® (NASDAQ: RDWR) is a global leader in application security and delivery solutions for multi-cloud environments. The company’s cloud application, infrastructure, and API security solutions use AI-driven algorithms for precise, hands-free, real-time protection from the most sophisticated web, application, and DDoS attacks, API abuse, and bad bots. Enterprises and carriers worldwide rely on Radware’s solutions to address evolving cybersecurity challenges and protect their brands and business operations while reducing costs. For more information, please visit the Radware website.

    Radware encourages you to join our community and follow us on: Facebook, LinkedIn, Radware Blog, X, and YouTube.

    ©2025 Radware Ltd. All rights reserved. Any Radware products and solutions mentioned in this press release are protected by trademarks, patents, and pending patent applications of Radware in the U.S. and other countries. For more details, please see: https://www.radware.com/LegalNotice/. All other trademarks and names are property of their respective owners.

    Radware believes the information in this document is accurate in all material respects as of its publication date. However, the information is provided without any express, statutory, or implied warranties and is subject to change without notice.

    The contents of any website or hyperlinks mentioned in this press release are for informational purposes and the contents thereof are not part of this press release.

    Safe Harbor Statement
    This press release includes “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Any statements made herein that are not statements of historical fact, including statements about Radware’s plans, outlook, beliefs, or opinions, are forward-looking statements. Generally, forward-looking statements may be identified by words such as “believes,” “expects,” “anticipates,” “intends,” “estimates,” “plans,” and similar expressions or future or conditional verbs such as “will,” “should,” “would,” “may,” and “could.” Because such statements deal with future events, they are subject to various risks and uncertainties, and actual results, expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements, could differ materially from Radware’s current forecasts and estimates. Factors that could cause or contribute to such differences include, but are not limited to: the impact of global economic conditions, including as a result of the state of war declared in Israel in October 2023 and instability in the Middle East, the war in Ukraine, tensions between China and Taiwan, financial and credit market fluctuations (including elevated interest rates), impacts from tariffs or other trade restrictions, inflation, and the potential for regional or global recessions; our dependence on independent distributors to sell our products; our ability to manage our anticipated growth effectively; our business may be affected by sanctions, export controls, and similar measures, targeting Russia and other countries and territories, as well as other responses to Russia’s military conflict in Ukraine, including indefinite suspension of operations in Russia and dealings with Russian entities by many multi-national businesses across a variety of industries; the ability of vendors to provide our hardware platforms and components for the manufacture of our products; our ability to attract, train, and retain highly qualified personnel; intense competition in the market for cybersecurity and application delivery solutions and in our industry in general, and changes in the competitive landscape; our ability to develop new solutions and enhance existing solutions; the impact to our reputation and business in the event of real or perceived shortcomings, defects, or vulnerabilities in our solutions, if our end-users experience security breaches, or if our information technology systems and data, or those of our service providers and other contractors, are compromised by cyber-attackers or other malicious actors or by a critical system failure; our use of AI technologies that present regulatory, litigation, and reputational risks; risks related to the fact that our products must interoperate with operating systems, software applications, and hardware that are developed by others; outages, interruptions, or delays in hosting services; the risks associated with our global operations, such as difficulties and costs of staffing and managing foreign operations, compliance costs arising from host country laws or regulations, partial or total expropriation, export duties and quotas, local tax exposure, economic or political instability, including as a result of insurrection, war, natural disasters, and major environmental, climate, or public health concerns; our net losses in the past and the possibility that we may incur losses in the future; a slowdown in the growth of the cybersecurity and application delivery solutions market or in the development of the market for our cloud-based solutions; long sales cycles for our solutions; risks and uncertainties relating to acquisitions or other investments; risks associated with doing business in countries with a history of corruption or with foreign governments; changes in foreign currency exchange rates; risks associated with undetected defects or errors in our products; our ability to protect our proprietary technology; intellectual property infringement claims made by third parties; laws, regulations, and industry standards affecting our business; compliance with open source and third-party licenses; complications with the design or implementation of our new enterprise resource planning (“ERP”) system; our reliance on information technology systems; our ESG disclosures and initiatives; and other factors and risks over which we may have little or no control. This list is intended to identify only certain of the principal factors that could cause actual results to differ. For a more detailed description of the risks and uncertainties affecting Radware, refer to Radware’s Annual Report on Form 20-F, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the other risk factors discussed from time to time by Radware in reports filed with, or furnished to, the SEC. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date on which they are made and, except as required by applicable law, Radware undertakes no commitment to revise or update any forward-looking statement in order to reflect events or circumstances after the date any such statement is made. Radware’s public filings are available from the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov or may be obtained on Radware’s website at www.radware.com.

    CONTACTS
    Investor Relations:
    Yisca Erez, +972-72-3917211, ir@radware.com

    Media Contact:
    Gerri Dyrek, gerri.dyrek@radware.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – State of play: EU support to Ukraine – Payments, reform and investment, use of immobilised Russian assets – 09-04-2025

    Source: European Parliament 2

    Since the start of Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, the European Union has provided Ukraine with financial, military and humanitarian support on an unprecedented level. To date, the support to Ukraine from ‘Team Europe’ – comprising the EU and its Member States – amounts to €143 billion. This support includes macro-financial assistance, financial support through the Ukraine Facility, humanitarian aid and military assistance from Member States and through the European Peace Facility, as well as support to EU Member States hosting Ukrainian refugees. The disbursement of EU payments under the Ukraine Facility is conditional on Ukraine implementing the Ukraine Plan, an ambitious plan for reform and investment drafted by Ukraine’s government and endorsed by the EU. The European Commission and the Ukrainian government publish data on the progress of the reforms and on the disbursal of payments. Those data form the basis for a Ukraine Facility Dialogue, which ensures the democratic scrutiny of the EU’s support to Ukraine. In addition to the Ukraine Facility, Regulation (EU) 2024/2773 provides for a €18.1 billion EU macro-financial assistance loan for Ukraine as part of a €45 billion G7 loan. Furthermore, a Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism was established, which uses extraordinary revenues originating from Russian sovereign assets immobilised in the G7 member states to repay loans and the associated interest costs. The rights, responsibilities and obligations provided for in the framework agreement under the Ukraine Facility, referred to in Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2024/792, will apply to the macro-financial assistance loan in order to ensure seamless political and financial management of both. The European Parliament has repeatedly called for the confiscation of the immobilised Russian sovereign assets as such – instead of just using the extraordinary revenues – to finance further support for Ukraine and the country’s reconstruction.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: The Capture of Königsberg: 80 Years of a Historic Victory

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: State University of Management – Official website of the State –

    On April 9, 1945, during the East Prussian Operation, troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front under the command of Marshal of the Soviet Union Alexander Vasilevsky stormed and captured the fortress city of Königsberg.

    It was not for nothing that the ancient German city was considered the stronghold of East Prussia. Shortly before the start of World War II, the fortress was modernized, equipped with the most modern military equipment, food and ammunition warehouses. The old forts were also strengthened, and anti-tank ditches and hundreds of pillboxes connected by underground passages were built along the perimeter. Documentation on the number of German troops defending the city was lost, but in all likelihood the group numbered at least 100 thousand people, supplemented by police and the Volkssturm – the people’s militia.

    As for the Volksturm, the situation here echoes the current state of affairs in Ukraine, where citizens are mobilized by force, seized right on the streets. In Germany in 1945, an order was issued stating that all men between the ages of 16 and 60 were required to report to mobilization points. In case of evasion, civilians faced a military field court. The mobilized were given uniforms, rifles, and sent into battle without any training. And there was no shortage of civilians in Königsberg. Gauleiter of East Prussia Erich Koch forbade the evacuation of the civilian population, since he saw no reason for this literally until the approach of Soviet troops to the city borders.

    The Red Army’s offensive on Königsberg began on April 6, 1945. Not all of Vasilevsky’s forces were used for it. The marshal formed assault detachments and groups totaling about 25,000 men, which included the most experienced fighters from rifle companies, engineering brigades, and chemical battalions – flamethrowers. The groups also included one or two tanks, several artillery pieces, and platoons of machine gunners and mortarmen.

    Despite fierce German resistance, Hitler’s order to hold the city to the last soldier, and the brutal actions of SS and Gestapo brigades shooting soldiers who tried to escape or surrender, Königsberg capitulated 81 hours after the assault began.

    The fortress commandant, General Otto Lasch, signed the corresponding document on April 9 at 21:30, but the resistance of individual groups of Wehrmacht soldiers continued until the next day, which is why the reverse side of the medal “For the Capture of Königsberg” bears the date April 10, 1945. Incidentally, this is the only medal of the USSR established for the capture of a city other than the capital.

    235 participants in the assault on Königsberg were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union, 156 regiments, divisions, and corps were awarded orders, and 98 units were named “Königsberg”. In honor of the capture of the city, a salute was given with 24 artillery salvos from 324 guns.

    On September 30, 1945, a monument to 1,200 guardsmen who died during the assault was ceremoniously unveiled in Königsberg at the site of a mass grave. It is the first monument in the Soviet Union to perpetuate the memory of soldiers who died in the Great Patriotic War.

    The State University of Management congratulates you on this memorable date and remembers the representative of our university who had the opportunity to participate in the East Prussian operation.

    Georgy Lagunov is a junior sergeant, a DShK heavy machine gunner, a candidate of economic sciences, associate professor, and a leading research fellow at the Research Laboratory. He was an Honored Worker of Higher Professional Education of the Russian Federation. He served in the Red Army from 1943 to 1945, a resident of besieged Leningrad and a participant in the defense of the city, awarded with the appropriate awards. On the day of crossing the border with Germany, he was seriously wounded in the arm and leg by a shell explosion. After an eight-month course of treatment, he was declared unfit for further service. After the war, he studied at the Leningrad Electrical Machine-Building College at the S.M. Kirov Electrosila Plant, the All-Union Correspondence Economic Institute, and the correspondence postgraduate program at MIEI. Since 1958, he worked at the Research Laboratory of Economics and Organization of Production of the Moscow City Council of National Economy, which was formed that year at MIEI. A number of the laboratory’s works were awarded medals of the All-Russian Exhibition Centre, including a gold one, and prizes and certificates of the USSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education. Later, he became an associate professor of the Department of National Economic Planning and eventually worked at our university for over 30 years.

    Königsberg was transferred under the jurisdiction of the USSR after the end of World War II, and in 1946 it was renamed Kaliningrad, and remains an integral part of the Russian Federation to this day.

    #Scientific regiment

    Subscribe to the TG channel “Our GUU” Date of publication: 04/09/2025

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI: Valeura Energy Inc.: Q1 2025 Operations and Financial Update

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SINGAPORE, April 09, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Valeura Energy Inc. (TSX:VLE, OTCQX:VLERF) (“Valeura” or the “Company”) is pleased to provide an update on Q1 2025 operations.

    Highlights

    • Operations continuing smoothly, with oil production averaging 23.9 mbbls/d(1);
      • Continual programme of development and appraisal drilling throughout the quarter;
      • Strong ongoing safety performance, with no lost time injuries;
    • Strong cash position at March 31, 2025 of US$238.3 million, and no debt;
      • Taxes paid of US$39.2 million in Q1;
      • Repurchased 963,401 shares in Q1;
    • Resilient ongoing business based on strong balance sheet and cash flow, creating growth optionality in the current volatile climate.

    (1) Working interest share oil production, before royalties.

    Dr. Sean Guest, President and CEO commented:

    “Our strong operational and financial performance continued throughout Q1 2025, and our business is more resilient than ever. With our corporate restructuring completed in November 2024, and the final tax payment under the previous structure now behind us, we see an energised ability to generate cash flow as we look at the remainder of 2025. 

    We are carefully monitoring the current volatile market conditions while simultaneously reviewing and optimising our expenditures. However, our strong financial position with cash of US$238 million and no debt makes Valeura not only resilient, but also well positioned for attractive inorganic opportunities that may emerge during such a turbulent market environment.

    Notwithstanding the recent market volatility, we are maintaining all of our previously disclosed guidance assumptions for the year.” 

    Q1 2025 Update

    Valeura’s working interest share production before royalties averaged 23.9 mbbls/d during Q1 2025, a decrease of 8.4% from Q4 2024. Rates were affected by a planned seven-day annual maintenance shutdown of the Nong Yao field near the end of the quarter. All planned work on the Nong Yao facilities was conducted safely and under time and budget with production resuming on April 1, 2025. Valeura re-iterates its full year 2025 production guidance outlook of 23.0 – 25.5 mbbls/d.

    Oil sales totalled 1.88 million bbls during Q1 2025, less than the 2.15 million bbls produced. Sales were lower than in Q4 2024 and reflect the fact that at the beginning of the quarter, the Company had record low crude oil in inventory. At the end of the quarter Valeura had 0.89 million bbls in inventory, which is expected to be sold in Q2 2025 (including a lifting of approximately 0.25 million bbls which was sold on April 1, 2025).

    Price realisations averaged US$78.7/bbl during Q1 2025, reflecting a US$2.9/bbl premium over the Brent crude oil benchmark. Oil revenue during Q1 2025 was US$148.1 million, 35% lower than Q4 2024. The quarter-on-quarter difference is due to less oil volumes sold, and also one sale occurring very late in the quarter, for which revenue is expected to be received in April 2025. Accordingly, the Company recorded a receivable associated with that lifting of approximately US$30 million as at March 31, 2025.

    In addition to routine operating costs and planned capital spending, the Company has made a final tax payment of US$39.2 million in connection with its corporate restructuring that was completed in November 2024. This payment effectively completes the tax obligations for its Thai III licences under their previous organisation structure, and became due in Q1 2025, earlier than usual tax payments for Thai III licences which are payable in May and August of each year. Following the restructuring, petroleum income tax loss carry-forwards that were previously associated with only the Wassana asset are now being applied to all of the Company’s Thai III petroleum concessions, being Wassana, Nong Yao, and Manora, thereby resulting in a more efficient tax structure for the business.

    While the Company acknowledges the global market and oil price volatility experienced in early April 2025, at this time, Valeura re-affirms all of its guidance outlook expectations for 2025. The Company maintains a scenario-based approach to planning its investments, driven largely by forecast oil prices. Recent market conditions underscore the importance of such an approach, but more importantly highlight the value of maintaining a strong balance sheet so as to capitalise on emerging inorganic growth opportunities. As of March 31, 2025, Valeura had US$238.3 million in cash, with no debt.

    During the quarter, the Company acquired 963,401 shares as part of its NCIB programme.

    Operations Update

    Valeura provided an operations update on March 25, 2025, along with its announcement of results for Q4 and the full year 2024. Since that time, the Company has been conducting a drilling campaign on the Jasmine / Ban Yen field, and will provide an update in due course. 

    On March 28, 2025, an earthquake struck central Myanmar, which borders Thailand to the north-west. All Valeura’s personnel were confirmed safe, and all facilities continue to operate safely.

    Results Timing and AGM

    Valeura intends to release its full unaudited financial and operating results for Q1 2025 on May 14, 2025, and will discuss the results in more detail through a management webcast hosted in conjunction with its Annual General Meeting of Shareholders (the “meeting”) later that day. The notice of meeting and related Management’s Information Circular have been mailed to shareholders and are available on the Company’s website at www.valeuraenergy.com/governance and on SEDAR+ at www.sedarplus.ca.

    For further information, please contact:

    Valeura Energy Inc. (General Corporate Enquiries)
    +65 6373 6940
    Sean Guest, President and CEO
    Yacine Ben-Meriem, CFO
    Contact@valeuraenergy.com

    Valeura Energy Inc. (Investor and Media Enquiries)
    +1 403 975 6752 / +44 7392 940495
    Robin James Martin, Vice President, Communications and Investor Relations
    IR@valeuraenergy.com

    About the Company

    Valeura Energy Inc. is a Canadian public company engaged in the exploration, development and production of petroleum and natural gas in Thailand and in Türkiye. The Company is pursuing a growth-oriented strategy and intends to re-invest into its producing asset portfolio and to deploy resources toward further organic and inorganic growth in Southeast Asia. Valeura aspires toward value accretive growth for stakeholders while adhering to high standards of environmental, social and governance responsibility.

    Additional information relating to Valeura is also available on SEDAR+ at www.sedarplus.ca.

    Advisory and Caution Regarding Forward-Looking Information

    Certain information included in this news release constitutes forward-looking information under applicable securities legislation. Such forward-looking information is for the purpose of explaining management’s current expectations and plans relating to the future. Readers are cautioned that reliance on such information may not be appropriate for other purposes, such as making investment decisions. Forward-looking information typically contains statements with words such as “anticipate”, “believe”, “expect”, “plan”, “intend”, “estimate”, “propose”, “project”, “target” or similar words suggesting future outcomes or statements regarding an outlook.

    Forward-looking information in this news release includes, but is not limited to, the Company’s anticipated full year 2025 guidance assumptions, being full year working interest share oil production before royalties of 23.0 – 25.5 mbbls/d, capex of US$125 – 150 million, exploration expense of approximately US$11 million, and adjusted opex of US$125 – 245 million, all as more fully described in the January 9, 2025 press release; the anticipated receivable of approximately US$30 million as at March 31, 2025; and Valeura’s expectation that it will benefit from a more efficient tax structure as a result of the corporate restructuring. Although the Company believes the expectations and assumptions reflected in such forward-looking information are reasonable, they may prove to be incorrect.

    Forward-looking information is based on management’s current expectations and assumptions regarding, among other things: political stability of the areas in which the Company is operating; continued safety of operations and ability to proceed in a timely manner; continued operations of and approvals forthcoming from governments and regulators in a manner consistent with past conduct; ability to achieve extensions to licences in Thailand and Türkiye to support attractive development and resource recovery; future drilling activity on the required/expected timelines; the prospectivity of the Company’s lands; the continued favourable pricing and operating netbacks across its business; future production rates and associated operating netbacks and cash flow; decline rates; future sources of funding; future economic conditions; the impact of inflation of future costs; future currency exchange rates; interest rates; the ability to meet drilling deadlines and fulfil commitments under licences and leases; future commodity prices; the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine; the impact of conflicts in the Middle East; royalty rates and taxes; management’s estimate of cumulative tax losses being correct; future capital and other expenditures; the success obtained in drilling new wells and working over existing wellbores; the performance of wells and facilities; the availability of the required capital to funds its exploration, development and other operations, and the ability of the Company to meet its commitments and financial obligations; the ability of the Company to secure adequate processing, transportation, fractionation and storage capacity on acceptable terms; the capacity and reliability of facilities; the application of regulatory requirements respecting abandonment and reclamation; the recoverability of the Company’s reserves and contingent resources; future growth; the sufficiency of budgeted capital expenditures in carrying out planned activities; the impact of increasing competition; the availability and identification of mergers and acquisition opportunities; the ability to successfully negotiate and complete any mergers and acquisition opportunities; the ability to efficiently integrate assets and employees acquired through acquisitions; global energy policies going forward; international trade policies; future debt levels; and the Company’s continued ability to obtain and retain qualified staff and equipment in a timely and cost efficient manner. In addition, the Company’s work programmes and budgets are in part based upon expected agreement among joint venture partners and associated exploration, development and marketing plans and anticipated costs and sales prices, which are subject to change based on, among other things, the actual results of drilling and related activity, availability of drilling, offshore storage and offloading facilities and other specialised oilfield equipment and service providers, changes in partners’ plans and unexpected delays and changes in market conditions. Although the Company believes the expectations and assumptions reflected in such forward-looking information are reasonable, they may prove to be incorrect.

    Forward-looking information involves significant known and unknown risks and uncertainties. Exploration, appraisal, and development of oil and natural gas reserves and resources are speculative activities and involve a degree of risk. A number of factors could cause actual results to differ materially from those anticipated by the Company including, but not limited to: the ability of management to execute its business plan or realise anticipated benefits from acquisitions; the risk of disruptions from public health emergencies and/or pandemics; competition for specialised equipment and human resources; the Company’s ability to manage growth; the Company’s ability to manage the costs related to inflation; disruption in supply chains; the risk of currency fluctuations; changes in interest rates, oil and gas prices and netbacks; the risk that the Company’s tax advisors’ and/or auditors’ assessment of the Company’s cumulative tax losses varies significantly from management’s expectations of the same; potential changes in joint venture partner strategies and participation in work programmes; uncertainty regarding the contemplated timelines and costs for work programme execution; the risks of disruption to operations and access to worksites; potential changes in laws and regulations, including international treaties and trade policies; the uncertainty regarding government and other approvals; counterparty risk; the risk that financing may not be available; risks associated with weather delays and natural disasters; and the risk associated with international activity. See the most recent annual information form and management’s discussion and analysis of the Company for a detailed discussion of the risk factors.

    Certain forward-looking information in this news release may also constitute “financial outlook” within the meaning of applicable securities legislation. Financial outlook involves statements about Valeura’s prospective financial performance or position and is based on and subject to the assumptions and risk factors described above in respect of forward-looking information generally as well as any other specific assumptions and risk factors in relation to such financial outlook noted in this news release. Such assumptions are based on management’s assessment of the relevant information currently available, and any financial outlook included in this news release is made as of the date hereof and provided for the purpose of helping readers understand Valeura’s current expectations and plans for the future. Readers are cautioned that reliance on any financial outlook may not be appropriate for other purposes or in other circumstances and that the risk factors described above or other factors may cause actual results to differ materially from any financial outlook.

    The forward-looking information contained in this news release is made as of the date hereof and the Company undertakes no obligation to update publicly or revise any forward-looking information, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, unless required by applicable securities laws. The forward-looking information contained in this news release is expressly qualified by this cautionary statement.

    This news release does not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy securities in any jurisdiction, including where such offer would be unlawful. This news release is not for distribution or release, directly or indirectly, in or into the United States, Ireland, the Republic of South Africa or Japan or any other jurisdiction in which its publication or distribution would be unlawful. 

    Neither the Toronto Stock Exchange nor its Regulation Services Provider (as that term is defined in the policies of the Toronto Stock Exchange) accepts responsibility for the adequacy or accuracy of this news release.

    This information is provided by Reach, the non-regulatory press release distribution service of RNS, part of the London Stock Exchange. Terms and conditions relating to the use and distribution of this information may apply. For further information, please contact rns@lseg.com or visit www.rns.com.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-Evening Report: The Coalition’s domestic gas plan would lower prices – just not very much

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Samantha Hepburn, Professor, Deakin Law School, Deakin University

    A LNG carrier departs Gladstone. Ivan Kuzkin/Shutterstock

    It surprised many Australians when the Coalition announced a plan straight from the progressive side of politics: force large gas companies to reserve gas for domestic use – at a lower cost than they could sell it for overseas.

    As a populist move during a cost-of-living election, it’s a good one. Australia’s gas producers sell 70% of gas extracted on the east coast overseas under long-term contracts, even as southeastern states such as Victoria face possible gas shortages. Western Australia has long had an effective policy requiring up to 15% of offshore gas to be reserved for domestic use.

    After a fortnight’s delay, the Coalition has now publicly released the modelling behind its policy. Undertaken by Frontier Economics, the modelling indicates that reserving 50 to 100 petajoules of gas in the first year would cut wholesale prices by 23%. This would mean a 15% drop in prices for large-scale users – but only a 7% fall for household gas bills and a 3% fall in electricity bills.

    This doesn’t sound like much, because it isn’t. Gas prices soared during the Ukraine war and haven’t yet returned to their pre-war levels. Labor has dubbed the plan “gaslighting”, and will rely instead on a gas policy released last year to open up more gasfields and build import terminals. Gas producers don’t like the Coalition’s plan, and neither does billionaire Liberal benefactor Gina Rinehart. Dutton’s plan isn’t crazy – it’s just not likely to make a big difference.

    Most of Queensland’s gas is exported at present.
    Chris Andrews Fern Bay/Shutterstock

    How would this gas reservation policy work?

    The Coalition has proposed what it calls an East Coast Reservation Scheme, with the goal of progressively decoupling Australia’s east coast gas market from the volatile international market.

    It has two parts. First, it would require new exporters, in the first year of operation, to reserve an additional 50–100 petajoules for the domestic market. Second, it would create a gas security charge, to be imposed on gas producers seeking to export “additional” (non-contracted) gas on the international market.

    This would give gas producers an incentive to sell non-contracted gas to the domestic market, because they would get greater profits selling in Australia, even at a lower base price.

    Further, the policy would prevent gas producers from charging domestic buyers international prices, setting a competitive price.

    In effect, the gas security charge is akin to a levy or a reverse tariff. The levy can be avoided if producers supply up to 100 petajoules to domestic markets. That’s about as much gas as New South Wales’ gas pipelines deliver each year – 101 petajoules (PJ) as of 2022–23, or the equivalent of 26 full liquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers, which hold about 3.8 PJ on average.

    What are the issues with this plan?

    There are legitimate concerns. First, the policy does not directly address domestic gas pricing and won’t help with the cost of living crisis. Over time, it could create a more competitive domestic market, but the fact producers could make marginally more money selling gas on the domestic market doesn’t guarantee change.

    Second, the policy does not directly address the looming gas supply crisis. That’s because existing gas producers would not be legally obliged to commit to more gas domestically – they could still export it. The obligation to commit an additional 50-100 petajoules to the domestic market only applies to gas exporters in their first year of operation.

    If policymakers want to solve the supply crisis, they would be better served by imposing direct export controls in the form of a clear gas reservation mandate. This works, as Western Australia’s long experience shows.

    How did we get here?

    When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, it led to huge spikes in global gas prices and shortages in Europe as the world moved away from Russian gas.

    In the 2010s, Australia had already been ramping up gas production. But in the wake of the Ukraine war, Australia became a major gas exporter. Producers traded as much gas as possible on the international market, selling it for over A$40/GJ. Meanwhile, Australia’s coal production was falling.

    Domestic gas demand shot up, and prices went from $8 to $30 a gigajoule. In response, the Albanese government introduced an emergency price cap for the wholesale gas market, prohibiting producers from entering into supply contracts with domestic purchasers for prices above a cap, currently set at $12/GJ. While the cap did partly insulate domestic consumers, it was always intended as a temporary measure.

    The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission recently predicted a gas supply shortfall of up to 40 petajoules in the southern states as early as September due to declining production in Victoria and South Australia as well as higher demand. Without access to uncontracted Queensland gas, supply will run very low. This is a significant energy security risk, and one the Coalition’s gas policy doesn’t directly address.

    Victorian residents are more reliant on gas than other states – and shortfalls are looming.
    M-Production/Shutterstock

    What’s next?

    Australia is one of the world’s top three LNG exporters. The fact a gas giant could be facing domestic shortages is both unnecessary and embarrassing. Reaching this point represents decades of policy failure.

    Reserving gas for domestic use works for the west coast, and it would work for the east. But the Coalition’s plan is not quite a gas reservation scheme. It doesn’t create a comprehensive reservation mandate and questions remain about its capacity to address domestic pricing and supply.

    At present, it seems like a lot of effort without great benefit. Will households really notice their gas bill is 7% cheaper?

    Samantha Hepburn does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. The Coalition’s domestic gas plan would lower prices – just not very much – https://theconversation.com/the-coalitions-domestic-gas-plan-would-lower-prices-just-not-very-much-254194

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: ‘Germany is back’: 3 ways NZ can benefit from Europe’s renewed centre of power

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Mathew Doidge, Senior Research Fellow, National Centre for Research on Europe, University of Canterbury

    Getty Images

    It’s unlikely many New Zealanders paid close attention to Foreign Minister Winston Peters’ statement late last year that “New Zealand and Germany are committed to enhancing their partnership”.

    Peters had been visiting Berlin two weeks after Donald Trump’s US election victory, but well before the real contours of the second Trump administration came into focus.

    The foreign minister’s diplomatic tone may have suited the less heated atmosphere of the time, but 2025 is a very different place. With the pillars of the international system New Zealand depends on crumbling, strong ties with an active Germany at the heart of Europe begin to look more important.

    Germans, too, are grappling with the same uncertainties – not least Friedrich Merz, the Christian Democratic Union party leader who is all but certain to be the new chancellor when coalition negotiations conclude.

    Among the most pro-American of Europe’s leaders, Merz will enter the Chancellery at a time when US relations are fraught. Even before the February election results were finalised, he acknowledged this new reality, calling to “strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that […] we can really achieve independence from the USA”.

    With Trump’s reversal of US support for Ukraine, his “might is right” foreign policy and hostile trade tariffs, Germany and the European Union have begun to reassess their place in the new world order. New Zealand will be watching closely.

    Easing the ‘debt brake’

    Former German Chancellor Olaf Scholz called Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine a Zeitenwende – a watershed moment from which “the world afterwards will no longer be the same as the world before”. Trump 2.0 has only reinforced this rupture.

    Responding to events even before assuming office, Merz (supported by the Social Democratic Party and the Greens) reformed Germany’s “debt brake”, or Schuldenbremse.

    Restricting government borrowing to 0.35% of GDP, the brake was introduced by former chancellor Angela Merkel in 2009 to limit indebtedness following the global financial crisis. It achieved its aim, but contributed significantly to the current parlous state of German infrastructure and defence.

    The reform allows greater borrowing for defence and establishes a €500 billion infrastructure fund (with €100 billion for climate and economic transformation as the price for Green support).

    This is the first step in Merz’s goal to transform Germany from “a sleeping middle power to a leading middle power again”, and exercise greater leadership in the European Union alongside France and Poland.

    With Emmanuel Macron’s French presidency ending in 2027, and France’s far-right gaining strength (Marine Le Pen’s recent embezzlement conviction notwithstanding), a strong Germany at the heart of Europe is essential to the maintenance of the EU and its approach to world affairs.

    As an important – perhaps vital – partner for New Zealand and the Pacific, three key considerations stand out.

    A leading middle power: Friedrich Merz addressing Christian Democratic Union supporters in Berlin on election night, February 23.
    Getty Images

    Pacific re-engagement

    Germany’s ties with Samoa and the Pacific may be a century old, but it has recently begun looking south again, including opening an embassy in Suva in August 2023.

    Now, the Trump administration’s axing of USAID has put foreign aid in the region under a cloud. Pacific states are not eligible for German bilateral development support, but are covered by more general climate change and disaster preparedness programmes.

    Since stepping up Pacific engagement in 2022, Germany has also joined the Partners in the Blue Pacific and been an advocate for Pacific projects within the EU’s Global Gateway Initiative (a framework for global infrastructure investment).

    Importantly, Germany does not intend to establish significant independent Pacific aid projects. Rather, it sees itself as a “force multiplier”, partnering with other donors to support their efforts. New Zealand therefore has an opportunity to both strengthen relations with Germany and add impact to its own Pacific projects.

    Climate resilience

    Climate change is the single greatest security threat to Pacific island states, and yet another area the US is pulling back from. But while Germany has been a strong player on climate policy, Merz has been a critic of the Greens and environmental policy in general.

    The balance of power in the new Bundestag may now force a change of mindset. Merz’s coalition will hold just 328 seats in the 630-seat chamber, meaning Green support cannot be discounted. A more serious commitment to climate policy will be the price.

    There is a base to work from, too. Germany co-founded the UN Group of Friends on Climate and Security with Nauru in 2018, and has identified climate issues as a driving force behind its Pacific engagement. Again, this is an area where New Zealand’s interests can be served by closer engagement with Germany.

    The rules-based order

    Ultimately, the international trade system and multilateral frameworks for cooperation and conflict resolution are crucial pillars of the Germany-New Zealand relationship.

    With the US no longer a reliable backstop, Germany and the EU are also the bulwark for a rules-based order grounded in international law. Merz’s debt brake reform, seen as strengthening Europe, was framed in these terms:

    Our friends in the EU are looking to us just as much as our adversaries and the enemies of our democratic and rules-based order.

    “Germany is back,” Merz said in March. We may well see New Zealand’s foreign minister back in Germany before long, too.

    Mathew Doidge does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. ‘Germany is back’: 3 ways NZ can benefit from Europe’s renewed centre of power – https://theconversation.com/germany-is-back-3ways-nz-can-benefit-from-europes-renewed-centre-of-power-253926

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI USA: Oversight and Intelligence Subcommittee Chairman Mills Delivers Opening Remarks at Hearing on Biden Administration’s Far-Left Foreign Policy

    Source: US House Committee on Foreign Affairs

    Media Contact 202-321-9747

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, House Foreign Affairs Oversight and Intelligence Subcommittee Chairman Cory Mills delivered opening remarks at a full committee hearing titled, “Deficient, Enfeebled, and Ineffective: The Consequences of the Biden Administration’s Far-Left Priorities on U.S. Foreign Policy.”

    Watch Here

    -Remarks- 

    Good afternoon and welcome to the first hearing of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Intelligence in the 119th Congress. 

    As we start the new Congress, I am looking forward to working with my colleagues to deliver real results for the American people by advancing President Trump’s America first foreign policy agenda.

    Over the next few months, through our State Department reauthorization deliberations, this Subcommittee will work to identify areas of the Secretary’s Office, or the “S Bureau,” that must be reformed and reprogrammed to reorient the United States as a leader on the world stage while ensuring that taxpayer dollars are effectively used to bolster U.S. national security efforts. 

    For far too long, the State Department prioritized radical liberal political ideologies and woke policies over advancing diplomatic objectives that serve American interests and protect the American people from our adversaries.

    While the Biden administration was trying to figure out what pronouns to use, our adversaries grew stronger and more emboldened. 

    China aggressively enforced unlawful territorial claims in the South China Sea and has undermined the United States and our allies at every turn. Russia invaded Ukraine. North Korea ramped up its military provocations. Iran advanced its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program, empowering its proxies to cause chaos throughout the Middle East. Israel was attacked and global shipping routes in the Red Sea were blocked. 

    Over the last four years, among others, the American people watched these foreign policy failures unfold and voted for real change and action on November 4th. The American people gave President Trump and the Republican-led Congress a mandate to reverse the damage and restore common sense to the federal government.

    Today, this Subcommittee will take its first step to deliver on this mandate by examining the State Department’s Office of Diversity and Inclusion. 

    The Office of Diversity and Inclusion detrimentally influenced operations across the Department by: making DEI a “core precept” for promotion consideration within the ranks of the Foreign Service; granting passport applicants the ability to select “X” as a gender; and using taxpayer dollars to fund numerous woke projects, including “commemorating black consciousness month with an event in which employees learned about the inclusion of Afro-Brazilian culture through music and LGBTQI+ culture through Vogue dance” in Brazil. That was a mouthful.

    These policies corrupted the core mission of the State Department and we must restore unity and fundamental American principles to the Department, eliminate wasteful spending, and ensure that President Trump’s Executive Orders are fully implemented, not subverted by rebranding DEI-driven programs. It is our duty to ensure that America becomes safer, stronger, and more prosperous.

    I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before the Subcommittee today. 

    I look forward to a productive discussion on how we can enhance America’s security through common sense policies and responsible leadership.  

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: Satellogic Awarded $30 Million Contract for Its AI-First Constellation Services

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NEW YORK, April 08, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Satellogic Inc. (NASDAQ: SATL), a leader in high-resolution Earth observation data, has been awarded a multi-year contract valued at $30 million to provide near-daily and ultra-low latency analytics from its groundbreaking, AI-first constellation to a strategic defense and security customer. This innovative approach generates analytics directly onboard each satellite, enabling insights to be downlinked within minutes, significantly enhancing operational responsiveness and decision-making capabilities.

    Under the terms of the agreement, Satellogic will deliver multiband optical imagery captured by the satellite constellation. The constellation is uniquely designed to run AI algorithms in real time, enabling advanced defense and security surveillance applications including rapid change monitoring, detection of defense targets (e.g. aircraft and other vehicles), pattern of life assessment and monitoring of other sensitive defense sites.

    “This award demonstrates Satellogic’s capabilities in providing rapid innovation that develops new space capabilities tailored to the evolving and demanding mission requirements of allied security customers,” said Emiliano Kargieman, Chief Executive Officer. “We are proud to support our international defense customers with data-driven insights designed to enhance strategic decision-making and operational efficiency.”

    The constellation’s combination of global, frequent revisit rates, high-quality multispectral imagery and rapid on-orbit processing of analytics, enable defense and intelligence analysts to quickly detect changes in infrastructure, military asset positioning, and activity patterns as they happen at critical locations worldwide. The solution is configured to deliver global coverage on a very rapid cadence to meet demanding AI-enabled defense analytics missions.

    Satellogic remains dedicated to providing innovative satellite solutions and advanced analytics tailored to the evolving requirements of the global defense and security sector.

    For more information, please visit www.satellogic.com.

    About Satellogic

    Founded in 2010 by Emiliano Kargieman and Gerardo Richarte, Satellogic (NASDAQ: SATL) is the first vertically integrated geospatial company, driving real outcomes with planetary-scale insights. Satellogic is creating and continuously enhancing the first scalable, fully automated EO platform with the ability to remap the entire planet at both high-frequency and high-resolution, providing accessible and affordable solutions for customers.

    Satellogic’s mission is to democratize access to geospatial data through its information platform of high-resolution images to help solve the world’s most pressing problems including climate change, energy supply, and food security. Using its patented Earth imaging technology, Satellogic unlocks the power of EO to deliver high-quality, planetary insights at the lowest cost in the industry.

    With more than a decade of experience in space, Satellogic has proven technology and a strong track record of delivering satellites to orbit and high-resolution data to customers at the right price point.

    To learn more, please visit: http://www.satellogic.com

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the U.S. federal securities laws. The words “anticipate”, “believe”, “continue”, “could”, “estimate”, “expect”, “intends”, “may”, “might”, “plan”, “possible”, “potential”, “predict”, “project”, “should”, “would” and similar expressions may identify forward-looking statements, but the absence of these words does not mean that a statement is not forward-looking. These forward-looking statements are based on Satellogic’s current expectations and beliefs concerning future developments and their potential effects on Satellogic. Forward-looking statements are predictions, projections and other statements about future events that are based on current expectations and assumptions and, as a result, are subject to risks and uncertainties. These statements are based on various assumptions, whether or not identified in this press release. These forward-looking statements are provided for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to serve, and must not be relied on by an investor as, a guarantee, an assurance, a prediction or a definitive statement of fact or probability. Actual events and circumstances are difficult or impossible to predict and will differ from assumptions. Many actual events and circumstances are beyond the control of Satellogic. Many factors could cause actual future events to differ materially from the forward-looking statements in this press release, including but not limited to: (i) our ability to generate revenue as expected, (ii) our ability to effectively market and sell our EO services and to convert contracted revenues and our pipeline of potential contracts into actual revenues, (iii) risks related to the secured convertible notes, (iv) the potential loss of one or more of our largest customers, (v) the considerable time and expense related to our sales efforts and the length and unpredictability of our sales cycle, (vi) risks and uncertainties associated with defense-related contracts, (vii) risk related to our pricing structure, (viii) our ability to scale production of our satellites as planned, (ix) unforeseen risks, challenges and uncertainties related to our expansion into new business lines, (x) our dependence on third parties to transport and launch our satellites into space, (xi) our reliance on third-party vendors and manufacturers to build and provide certain satellite components, products, or services, (xii) our dependence on ground station and cloud-based computing infrastructure operated by third parties for value-added services, and any errors, disruption, performance problems, or failure in their or our operational infrastructure, (xiii) risk related to certain minimum service requirements in our customer contracts, (xiv) market acceptance of our EO services and our dependence upon our ability to keep pace with the latest technological advances, (xv) competition for EO services, (xvi) challenges with international operations or unexpected changes to the regulatory environment in certain markets, (xvii) unknown defects or errors in our products, (xviii) risk related to the capital-intensive nature of our business and our ability to raise adequate capital to finance our business strategies, (xix) substantial doubt about our ability to continue as a going concern, (xx) uncertainties beyond our control related to the production, launch, commissioning, and/or operation of our satellites and related ground systems, software and analytic technologies, (xxi) the failure of the market for EO services to achieve the growth potential we expect, (xxii) risks related to our satellites and related equipment becoming impaired, (xxiii) risks related to the failure of our satellites to operate as intended, (xxiv) production and launch delays, launch failures, and damage or destruction to our satellites during launch and (xxv) the impact of natural disasters, unusual or prolonged unfavorable weather conditions, epidemic outbreaks, terrorist acts and geopolitical events (including the ongoing conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, in the Gaza Strip and the Red Sea region) on our business and satellite launch schedules. The foregoing list of factors is not exhaustive. You should carefully consider the foregoing factors and the other risks and uncertainties described in the “Risk Factors” section of Satellogic’s Annual Report on Form 10-K and other documents filed or to be filed by Satellogic from time to time with the Securities and Exchange Commission. These filings identify and address other important risks and uncertainties that could cause actual events and results to differ materially from those contained in the forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made. Readers are cautioned not to put undue reliance on forward-looking statements, and Satellogic assumes no obligation and does not intend to update or revise these forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events, or otherwise. Satellogic can give no assurance that it will achieve its expectations.

    Media Contacts

    Satellogic, Inc.
    Ryan Driver, VP of Strategy & Corporate Development
    pr@satellogic.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI USA: Murkowski, Shaheen Seek Explanation for Alarming Email from Department of Homeland Security to Ukrainians in the United States

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Alaska Lisa Murkowski

    04.08.25

    Washington, D.C. – U.S. Senators Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) and Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Ranking Member of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, sent a letter to Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem yesterday seeking answers following reports that Ukrainians on humanitarian parole in the United States had received threatening emails from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) stating that their humanitarian parole status had been terminated and that they had seven days to depart the country. 

    Even if this message was sent in error, threatening the abrupt termination of humanitarian parole for Ukrainians is alarming and adverse to the U.S. national interest,” the Senators wrote. “At a time when a Kremlin official was in the United States negotiating with Administration officials, this mixed message sends the wrong signal: that the U.S. may abandon Ukrainians in need even as Ukraine remains under attack by Vladimir Putin.”

    “We urge the agency to provide immediate clarification to Ukrainians in the United States that their humanitarian parole has not been terminated, and that there are no plans to terminate the program while Ukraine is still under active attack by Russia,” the Senators concluded. “We also request a briefing on any future plans regarding humanitarian parole for Ukrainians and an immediate explanation as to how these emails were sent in error.”

    The full text of the letter can be found here and below.

    Dear Secretary Noem: 

    We are extremely concerned about notifications that Ukrainians on humanitarian parole in the United States have received official notifications from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—apparently in error—that their parole had been terminated and that they are required to depart the United States within seven days. 

    Even if this message was sent in error, threatening the abrupt termination of humanitarian parole for Ukrainians is alarming and adverse to the U.S. national interest. At a time when a Kremlin official was in the United States negotiating with Administration officials, this mixed message sends the wrong signal: that the U.S. may abandon Ukrainians in need even as Ukraine remains under attack by Vladimir Putin.

    Ukrainians who have participated in the Uniting for Ukraine program have entered the U.S. lawfully, passed rigorous screening and vetting requirements and have been required to find financial support from private U.S. sponsors. These are individuals, including children, who have fled a war zone and followed a lawful process. Many are working in our states, paying taxes and contributing to local communities. Abruptly and cruelly telling victims of Russia’s war to leave the country would not reflect American values—and it risks emboldening Putin to continue the war, despite President Trump’s stated objectives to establish peace. 

    For many Ukrainians, conditions on the ground in Ukraine remain unsafe for them to return, as Putin continues to violate the limited ceasefire Russia pledged it would honor on March 18. Twenty percent of Ukraine remains occupied, the frontline in Donbas remains volatile and Russia has escalated the use of swarms of drones to attack population centers across the country, including Kyiv. We support the Administration’s desire to reach a just and sustainable peace in Ukraine, but until that goal is realized, we must continue to offer safe harbor to the Ukrainian families that have found temporary homes in our states. 

    The fact that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) drafted such a notification is alarming. DHS has not issued a public announcement about any planned policy change and the agency’s website continues to display information about the availability of parole for Ukrainians. Nor has Congress been notified regarding any proposed changes to the program. Congressional staff inquiries to DHS on Friday resulted in conflicting responses that demonstrated a disturbing lack of interagency coordination or strategy on the status of humanitarian parole for Ukrainians. 

    We urge the agency to provide immediate clarification to Ukrainians in the United States that their humanitarian parole has not been terminated, and that there are no plans to terminate the program while Ukraine is still under active attack by Russia. We also request a briefing on any future plans regarding humanitarian parole for Ukrainians and an immediate explanation as to how these emails were sent in error. 

    We appreciate your urgent attention to this matter.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: In “Era of Savage Cuts’, UN Aid Chief Urges Security Council to Provide Security, Resources for Saving as Many Survivors Possible of Russian Airstrikes in Ukraine

    Source: United Nations 4

    Strike in Dnipro Region Last Friday Marks Deadliest Attack Involving Children 

    Russian Federation airstrikes in Ukraine continue to kill and maim civilians — including children at a playground last week — the United Nations top humanitarian official told the Security Council today.  In what he called an “era of savage cuts”, he also appealed to Council members to provide at least the security and resources needed to save as many survivors of this war as possible. 

    “A massive strike in the densely populated city of Kryvyi Rih in the Dnipro region last Friday resulted in multiple civilian casualties,” said Tom Fletcher, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator addressing the 15-member Council. 

    According to local authorities, 18 civilians were killed — including nine children — and 75 others injured when a children’s playground and nearby residential area were struck.  The Office for the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) in Ukraine, which verified many of the casualties, confirmed it was the single deadliest attack involving children since the start of the war in February 2022. 

    Fighting has also continued unabated in the frontline regions of Kherson, Kharkiv, Donetsk and in the border areas of Sumy, where more than 90 civilian casualties were recorded last week alone.  From 24 February 2022 to 31 March 2025, OHCHR has verified at least 12,910 civilian deaths, including 682 children, and nearly 30,700 injuries across Ukraine, he said.  Meanwhile, 3.7 million people remain internally displaced, with new waves of displacement in the country’s north-east, and nearly 7 million Ukrainian refugees recorded worldwide.  The UN remains unable to access an estimated 1.5 million civilians in Russian-occupied areas of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia. 

    Underscoring the plight of women in this war, he said that since February 2022, pre-term births have accounted for nearly half of all deliveries, putting both mothers and newborns at high risk.  Gender-based violence, including intimate partner violence, has surged by 36 per cent, with displaced and refugee women suffering the most severe mental health challenges and facing critical gaps in protection and care, he warned.  

    Despite Scale of Crisis, $2.6 Billion Ukraine Humanitarian Response Plan for 2025 Only 17 Per Cent Funded 

    Despite the scale of this crisis, only 17 per cent of the $2.6 billion required for the 2025 Ukraine Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan has been secured.  As a result, the UN is prioritizing limited resources for frontline support, emergency response, evacuations, and aid for the displaced — but more funding is urgently needed.  

    “We welcome the announcement of a ceasefire focused on energy infrastructure, as well as negotiations to ensure safe navigation in the Black Sea,” Fletcher said.  But as talks continue, so do the bombardments.  Indiscriminate attacks are strictly prohibited under international law, he recalled.  “Even wars have rules,” he also stressed, urging the Council to ensure that “this era of increasingly belligerent, transactional, self-defeating, nationalism is not also remembered as one of callous impunity and brutal indifference, in which the rights of civilians are discarded again and again with a shrug”.  

    Russian Federation’s Representative:  Strike on Kryvyi Rih was Precision Missile strike on Military Meeting of Unit Commanders and Western Instructors 

    In the ensuing discussion, the Russian Federation’s delegate said the strike on Kryvyi Rih was a precision missile strike on a military meeting of unit commanders and Western instructors.  The strike succeeded in damaging the command of the Ukrainian forces, he said, adding that a gathering of service members and Western officers is a legitimate target for his country’s army.  The fact that a military meeting was happening in a civilian area shows that the Ukrainian army is using civilians as human shields, he said, adding that Ukrainian eyewitnesses have confirmed that a cluster munition was not used.  Dismissing the efforts of the “Ukrainian propaganda machine” regarding this and other strikes, he said video clips by ordinary citizens refute their claims. 

    Civilians must stay far away from gatherings of military officers, he said, adding that Ukrainians are not being told the truth — Kyiv is milking the tragedy that it is responsible for.  Nor will the Ukrainians be told of the continuous shelling of Russian border towns, he said.  The goal of Ukraine and Western countries is to undermine the Russian Federation-United States dialogue, he said, adding:  “What you are doing is far too obvious.”  The ceasefire cannot be misused so “Ukraine can lick its wounds and resume its war”, he said, adding that it is essential to do away with the root causes.  No one will be allowed to use the negotiation process to strengthen Ukraine’s military — the demilitarization of that country is essential, he stressed. 

    United States Representative:  Russian President Vladimir Putin Does Not Want to End War

    The United States representative said that in its bilateral engagements between both Russian Federation and Ukraine, the United States had tabled a proposal in March.  While Ukraine was ready to accept, she recalled, Russian Federation representatives insisted on a more limited agreement which would cover only strikes on energy infrastructure and the elimination of the use of force in the Black Sea.  She called on both the Russian Federation and Ukraine to exercise restraint and demonstrate their commitment to peace.  The Russian Federation must bear in mind that strikes like the one on Kryvyi Rih and executions of prisoners of war have the potential to damage peace efforts.  “We will ultimately judge President Putin’s commitment to peace by Russia’s actions,” she stated. 

    “We can see that Putin does not want to end the war; he is looking for ways to preserve the option of reigniting it in any moment with even greater force,” Ukraine’s delegate said.  Moscow has “not moved one inch away from its genocidal and maximalist war aims”.  On the other hand, Ukraine has taken concrete steps towards peace, while the Russian Federation “continues to drag its feet and commit atrocities”.  “Every missile, every strike killing people every day proves that Russia only wants war,” she went on to say.  Moscow has not only failed to cease its attacks on Ukrainian civilians, but it has also significantly escalated the scale of its assaults. 

    On 4 April, a missile landed near a playground, tearing through homes, schools and restaurants, killing 20 people, including nine children.  She rejected Moscow’s falsehoods about alleged military targets in the area.  “All witnesses and footages from cameras inside and outside the local restaurant debunk Russian representatives’ lies and disinformation,” she said.  It confirms that there was no military presence in the restaurant or in the surrounding area at the time of the strike.  Staying silent about the fact that the Russian Federation is killing children with ballistic missiles is wrong and dangerous.  “It only emboldens the scum in Moscow to continue the war and keep ignoring diplomacy,” she said. 

    Several European Speakers Criticize Russian Federation

    Several speakers from Europe strongly criticized the Russian Federation, with Denmark’s delegate stating that Moscow’s deliberate delays and new preconditions raised for even a partial ceasefire seem particularly cynical given reports that the missile that struck Kryvyi Rih was fired from the Black Sea. “Russia has said it only attacks military targets”, but the missile strike on Kryvyi Rih on 4 April hit residential buildings and a playground.  “We heard claims that a high precision strike has been launched to target a military group that was meeting at a restaurant at the time — trying to justify it as a military target,” Slovenia’s delegate said.  But these claims have been disproved. 

    “Russia is not negotiating in good faith; it’s procrastinating, and its goal continues to be the capitulation of Ukraine,” echoed France’s delegate, Council President for April.  But France and other Europeans “are not sitting on our hands” and continue to work to secure a just and lasting peace.  “It is time for the Kremlin to end its aggression against Ukraine and to uphold its obligations under the UN Charter and it is time for President Putin to agree to a full and immediate ceasefire,” added the United Kingdom’s representative. 

    The representative of the European Union, speaking in its capacity as observer, stressed that “there can be no negotiations on Ukraine without Ukraine, and no negotiations that affect European security without Europe”.  He reaffirmed the bloc’s unwavering support for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders.  There is no doubt “who truly seeks peace and who instead is determined to prolong a ruthless war of territorial conquest”, Czechia’s delegate added.  “Moscow is trying to falsely present itself as a victim” and expecting the world to provide security assurances, “preferably at the expense of legitimate security interests of its neighbours”, Poland’s representative also stated. 

    Focus on Plight of Children

    Estonia’s delegate, speaking also for Latvia and Lithuania, said that Moscow has killed over 600 Ukrainian children since the beginning of the full-scale invasion in 2022, while the real numbers might be higher.  That country deserves to be listed in the annexes of the annual Children and Armed Conflicts report for carrying out grave violations against children in Ukraine.  Other Council members, including the delegates of Pakistan, Guyana and Panama, echoed concerns for children living under conflict in Ukraine, with the latter underscoring that “children must never be targets in a war”. 

    Global Impact of War in Ukraine:  Food Insecurity, Energy Crises 

    Some speakers shared ways the war in Ukraine was affecting them with Algeria’s delegate stating that the food insecurity and energy crises resulting from this conflict also hits the civilian population in other regions around the world.  Greece’s delegate pointed out that freedom of navigation in the Black Sea will be a crucial contribution to global food security and supply chains.  The representative of the Republic of Korea expressed concern that the military cooperation between the Russian Federation and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea “is intensifying rather than waning”, as exemplified by last month’s high-level reaffirmation in Pyongyang to implement their Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. 

    Momentum for Peace Talks 

    Other Council members, including the delegate from China, said that although the situation on the battlefield remains complicated, the momentum for peace talks has emerged.  “The window of peace is opening,” he stated, adding that talks must address the root causes of the crisis.  The Ukraine conflict is complex and restoring peace will require persistent efforts. 

    “The path forward requires sustained commitment to diplomatic solutions and unwavering adherence to intentional humanitarian law,” echoed Somalia’s delegate.  His counterpart from Sierra Leone urged negotiators and intermediators to approach ceasefire discussions objectively, mindful of the contextual underpinnings of this conflict. “We call on all parties to negotiate in good faith in the US-led talks, taking into consideration the legitimate concerns involving both parties,” she said.

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