Category: Ukraine

MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Targeted attacks against Christians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo – defending religious freedom and security – P10_TA(2025)0066 – Thursday, 3 April 2025 – Strasbourg

Source: European Parliament

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

– having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

– having regard to the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which guarantees the right to freedom of conscience and the free exercise of religious worship for all citizens,

– having regard to the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 25 November 1981,

– having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights,

– having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the eastern DRC has endured decades of widespread violence and instability; whereas the situation continues to deteriorate significantly, with persistent human rights violations by armed groups, mass displacement, attacks on civilians and alarming humanitarian conditions further exacerbated by armed conflicts, such as the conflict between the DRC Government, the Rwanda-backed armed rebel group March 23 Movement (M23) and other militias, which has already resulted in the forceful internal displacement of 4,6 million people in the eastern DRC; whereas around 100 separate armed groups are estimated to be operating in the eastern DRC; whereas a series of overlapping issues are driving destabilisation in the country;

B. whereas M23 has intensified attacks in North Kivu and on 19 March 2025, it seized the mineral-rich town of Walikale, defying the ceasefire;

C. whereas the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) is one of the most prominent extremist groups with explicitly religious objectives, especially since its leader pledged allegiance to the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2019, becoming its Central Africa Province branch (ISCAP); whereas the ADF’s attacks need to be seen in the wider African context of a rise in the number of Islamist groups, in particular those affiliated to ISIS, in the Sahel region, the Horn of Africa, Mozambique, Nigeria and the DRC; whereas the ADF has been designated a terrorist group by Uganda and the United States;

D. whereas in May 2024, the UN Group of Experts on the DRC warned that the ‘armed group established strong networks in prisons, particularly in Kinshasa where ADF detainees were active in recruiting and mobilising combatants and collaborators’, using not only ideological means, but also coercion, deception, abduction and financial incentives to attract members and collaborators;

E. whereas the ADF has a long history of committing terrorist attacks in the eastern DRC, particularly in North Kivu and Ituri provinces; whereas North Kivu is a resource-rich region, with vast supplies of critical raw materials including cobalt, gold and tin, which are necessary for the global digital and energy transitions; whereas it is known that the ADF and other armed groups, including M23, have been relying on, among other sources of financing, the illegal exploitation of these resources to fund their activities; whereas the Congolese Catholic Church claims that the ADF is responsible for the deaths of around 6 000 civilians in Beni between 2013 and 2021 and more than 2 000 in Bunia in 2020 alone; whereas in 2024, a large number of Christians were killed in the DRC by jihadists; whereas civilians in the DRC’s eastern provinces are facing an increasing number of attacks, killings and abductions, as well as church bombings and the destruction of (religious) property, perpetrated by armed groups with extremist and jihadist ideologies; whereas most victims of ADF attacks have been Christian; whereas these attacks undermine religious freedom and exacerbate intercommunal tensions; whereas the Catholic bishops of the DRC spoke out in an April 2021 statement about the threat of the ‘Islamization of the region [North Kivu] as a sort of deeper strategy for a long-term negative influence on the general political situation of the country’;

F. whereas in 2021, a prominent local Muslim leader received death threats from the ADF, and he was later gunned down; whereas in 2023, the ADF bombed services at a Pentecostal church in Kasindi, killing 14 people; whereas the ADF has been linked to an attack on the village of Mukondi in 2023, in which at least 44 civilians were killed, according to local authorities; whereas the group claimed 48 attacks in December 2024 alone, killing over 200 people; whereas in January 2024, the ADF killed eight people in Beni during an attack on a Pentecostal church and, in May 2024, ADF assailants reportedly killed 14 Catholics in the North Kivu province for refusing to convert to Islam; whereas the ADF also reportedly executed 11 Christians in the village of Ndimo in Ituri province and kidnapped several others;

G. whereas local and international human rights organisations have documented numerous instances of religious violence in the DRC, while stressing the urgent need for the state to provide adequate protection; whereas, while the DRC Government has demonstrated a strong intention to address the impacts of armed group violence in the eastern DRC, other recent developments call into question the government’s commitment to safeguarding religious freedom specifically; whereas women and children are particularly vulnerable to rape as weapon of war, human trafficking and sexual slavery;

H. whereas the Armed Forces of the DRC have been conducting a joint military offensive, Operation Shujaa, with the Ugandan People’s Defence Force against the ADF and other insurgent forces in the eastern DRC since November 2021; whereas the conflict between the DRC Government and the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels has led to a decrease in the funds, personnel and equipment being allocated to this counterterrorism operation;

I. whereas the right to freedom of religion and belief is a fundamental human right and must be protected given the high level of violence and persecution; whereas the Constitution of the DRC provides for freedom of religion and prohibits discrimination based on religious belief;

J. whereas over 7 million people in the DRC are currently displaced because of the wider ongoing conflicts, with limited access to food, water, healthcare and essential services; whereas state authorities and rebel groups have obligations to civilians under international humanitarian law, including protecting and facilitating access to humanitarian assistance, and permitting freedom of movement;

K. whereas women and children in the DRC face increased levels of sexual and gender-based violence, including rape as a weapon of war, resulting in there being one victim of rape every four minutes;

L. whereas the illegal exploitation of mineral resources continues to fuel conflict in the region, necessitating stronger international oversight and responsible sourcing policies;

M. whereas in March 2025, President Félix Tshisekedi of the DRC and President Paul Kagame of Rwanda issued a joint statement announcing a ceasefire; whereas despite this, the violence perpetrated by the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels continues;

N. whereas the DRC has one of the highest rates of internal displacement in the world; whereas many women and children live in precarious conditions and are being exposed to the risk of harassment, assault, sexual exploitation and forced military recruitment; whereas displaced populations often receive no basic life-saving services and are at risk of malnutrition and disease; whereas cities that host internally displaced people in precarious circumstances are also targets of attacks by different militias, causing great distress to the displaced communities and to the local population;

O. whereas the EU has committed to supporting stability in the DRC through diplomatic engagement, financial assistance and targeted sanctions against individuals responsible for violence and human rights abuses; whereas on 17 March 2025, the EU imposed sanctions on nine individuals and one entity responsible for acts that constitute serious human rights violations and abuses or that sustain the conflict in the DRC, including through the illegal exploitation of resources, but further diplomatic and economic measures may be necessary;

P. whereas the Council has renewed the EU’s financial support for the deployment of Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) troops in Mozambique under the European Peace Facility (EPF); whereas the head of these forces was previously deployed in the eastern DRC to support abuses committed by the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels, giving rise to serious doubt as to whether there are sufficient safeguards attached to EPF support, including effective vetting and other human rights requirements;

Q. whereas the EU has repeatedly affirmed its commitment to the promotion and protection of religious freedom globally, and has taken steps to combat religious persecution and intolerance in various parts of the world; whereas Christians are the largest persecuted religious group in the world;

R. whereas Parliament has consistently called for the strengthening of international efforts to combat religious persecution and to hold accountable those responsible for attacks on minority communities;

1. Strongly condemns the occupation of Goma and other territories in the eastern DRC by M23 and the RDF as an unacceptable breach of the DRC’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; urges the Rwandan Government to withdraw its troops from DRC territory, the presence of whom is a clear violation of international law and the UN Charter, and cease cooperation with the M23 rebels; demands that Rwanda and all other potential state actors in the region cease their support for M23;

2. Expresses deep concern at the alarming continuation of violence; deplores the loss of life and the attacks, both indiscriminate and targeted, against civilians; expresses deep concern over the worsening security and humanitarian crises in the eastern DRC as a whole; calls for the immediate cessation of all forms of violence and for the commitment of all parties involved in the ongoing conflict in the eastern DRC to respect international humanitarian law;

3. Strongly condemns the targeted terrorist attacks carried out by the ADF against Christian communities in the eastern DRC, including killings, abductions and the destruction of religious property, and calls for an immediate halt to such acts of violence; expresses its solidarity with the families of the victims and with Christian communities;

4. Strongly condemns the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group and the ADF, as well as other rebel groups, and their egregious human rights abuses that amount to crimes against humanity in accordance with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC); underlines that there must be no impunity for the perpetrators of these acts and that those responsible should be referred to the ICC; encourages the establishment of an international commission of inquiry to examine the human rights violations committed in the DRC, renewed investigations in North Kivu by the ICC Prosecutors Office and the creation of a special tribunal for atrocity crimes in the DRC, including crimes committed against Christian communities; backs the efforts by the National Episcopal Conference of Congo and the Church of Christ in Congo, which launched the ‘Social pact for peace and coexistence in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Great Lakes Region’, with the aim of restoring peace in the country’s eastern provinces;

5. Supports the international efforts against the ADF, including the Shujaa counterterrorism operation carried out jointly by the DRC and Ugandan armed forces; encourages the EU Member States to consider ways of contributing to these efforts, including increased efforts to trace and interdict ISIS secret funds held overseas and to trace any raw materials stemming from their illegal exploitation by the ADF; calls for the EU to support the necessary capacity-building and expertise to combat ADF ideology and rhetoric, particularly within the Muslim communities of both Uganda and the DRC, to prevent recruitment among those communities; requests the application of the EU global human rights sanctions regime to those responsible for planning, ordering or participating in the killing of Christians in the DRC;

6. Calls for an immediate and effective ceasefire, and for the full implementation of diplomatic agreements, including the Luanda and Nairobi peace processes; underlines the urgent need for the stabilisation of the country and reiterates its call on M23 to halt its territorial advances and withdraw from the territory of the DRC;

7. Reiterates its full support for the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) in protecting civilians and stabilising the region; urges the EU to cooperate with all actors on the ground, in particular MONUSCO, to ensure the protection of civilians in the eastern DRC; calls on the UN to work towards a stronger mandate for MONUSCO in order to enable peacemaking; calls on the UN to ensure the protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law;

8. Urges the international community to increase support for services in the eastern DRC so that civilians who have been targeted can have access to legal services and psychological support; calls on the DRC Government to counter extremist propaganda; calls for the establishment of early warning mechanisms to more effectively prevent and respond to attacks by the ADF and other armed groups against civilians;

9. Reiterates its call for all parties, including armed groups operating in the eastern DRC, to allow and facilitate humanitarian access to address the urgent need for essential services in the eastern DRC and neighbouring countries, notably Burundi; emphasises that humanitarian workers must be able to operate safely to deliver life-saving assistance to Congolese civilians; stresses that this is a central obligation under international humanitarian law, and that perpetrators violating these obligations should be held to account; calls on all parties to provide a safe environment for civil society organisations;

10. Is appalled by the shocking use of sexual violence against women and children as a tool of repression and weapon of war in the eastern DRC, and by the unacceptable recruitment of child soldiers by the various rebel groups; demands that these matters be addressed by the international community without delay;

11. Calls for stricter enforcement of the EU regulation on conflict minerals(1) to prevent illicit trade from fuelling armed groups in the DRC; reiterates its previous call on the Commission to suspend the EU’s Memorandum of Understanding with Rwanda; requests that the Commission share detailed mapping of current projects with Rwandan authorities and its assessment of whether they may contribute to addressing or may fail to address human rights violations either inside Rwanda or in the DRC;

12. Calls for the EU and its Member States to support the DRC in implementing the recommendations of the 2010 mapping report by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), including reforming the security sector, strengthening its efforts to prevent further atrocities against civilians, and ending support for or collaboration with abusive armed groups; urges the DRC Government to ensure accountability for human rights violations and prosecute those responsible for attacks; calls for the EU and its Member States to support the DRC in fighting corruption, strengthening governance and the rule of law, improving security and ensuring the lasting protection of communities at risk, including religious communities, and to ensure that perpetrators of attacks are brought to justice;

13. Underlines the role of communities, including religious communities and faith-based organisations in the DRC, in promoting peace, social cohesion and the well-being of local communities;

14. Calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service to intensify diplomatic efforts by working closely with regional partners, including the African Union, the East African Community and the United Nations, in order to step up diplomatic efforts to achieve a sustainable resolution to the conflict and prevent extremist groups from using religion as a tool for violence and division;

15. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to increase humanitarian aid to address the urgent needs of displaced persons and vulnerable communities in the DRC, ensuring safe access to food, medical care and shelter;

16. Supports the imposition of further targeted EU sanctions against individuals and entities responsible for financing or engaging in violence, human rights abuses and resource exploitation; calls for the implementation of the sanctions outlined in the OHCHR mapping report;

17. Confirms its commitment to freedom of thought, conscience and religion as a fundamental human right guaranteed by international legal instruments recognised as holding universal value, and to which most countries in the world have committed, and which is enshrined in the Constitution of the DRC;

18. Echoes the calls for international solidarity in defending religious freedom and the protection of religious minorities in conflict zones, particularly in the DRC, while addressing the root causes of violent extremism in the DRC and its neighbourhood;

19. Urges the EU to uphold its commitment to the promotion of religious freedom and the protection of communities, including religious communities, ensuring that the rights of these groups are prioritised in the EU’s external policies;

20. Notes, with concern, the growing influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Africa, which is a staunch supporter of the Putin regime and its violent, unlawful war in Ukraine; underlines that this development raises significant questions regarding the broader geopolitical and ideological objectives of the Russian Federation in Africa;

21. Deplores the fact that Rwanda announced the termination of its diplomatic relations with Belgium, and expresses its solidarity with Belgium;

22. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Governments and Parliaments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, the African Union, the secretariats of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Southern African Development Community and the East African Community, and other relevant international bodies.

(1)

Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas (OJ L 130, 19.5.2017, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/821/oj).

MIL OSI Europe News –

April 7, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Energy-intensive industries – P10_TA(2025)0065 – Thursday, 3 April 2025 – Strasbourg

Source: European Parliament

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the report of September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘On the future of European competitiveness’,

– having regard to the report of April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘Action Plan for Affordable Energy’ (COM(2025)0079),

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy,

A. whereas energy-intensive industries (EIIs) account for a significant share of the EU’s economy and play a key role in job creation, especially in areas and regions where they are concentrated; whereas EIIs are crucial for the EU’s strategic autonomy and competitiveness, as well as for decarbonisation, taking into account their energy footprint;

B. whereas the transition to a decarbonised economy and a clean energy system must lead to reducing energy prices and must take into account all available technologies that contribute to reaching the EU’s net zero goal for 2050 in the most cost-efficient way, avoiding lock-in effects and taking into account the different energy mix across Member States, including with regard to renewables and nuclear;

C. whereas technological neutrality is crucial for European industry as it ensures fair competition, fosters innovation and supports the clean transition without favouring specific technologies; whereas maintaining a neutral regulatory framework allows companies to choose the most efficient and sustainable solutions based on market needs rather than top-down preferences set by policymakers; whereas this approach encourages investment, boosts competitiveness and allows industry to adapt to new technologies;

D. whereas electrification is at the centre of the decarbonisation of EIIs; whereas EIIs include sectors that use fossil resources to meet temperature, pressure or reaction requirements, such as chemicals, steel, paper, plastics, mining, refineries, cement, lime, non-ferrous metals, glass, ceramics and fertilisers, for which greenhouse gas emissions are hard to reduce because they are intrinsic to the process or because of high capital or operating expenditure costs or low technological maturity;

E. whereas the energy price gap between the EU and the US and China undermines the competitiveness of the EU’s industries; whereas elevated and volatile fossil fuel prices heavily affect electricity prices and the affordable cost of renewable energy sources is not transferred to energy bills;

F. whereas an insufficiently integrated energy union poses further challenges to EIIs, in particular in relation to the lack of cross-border interconnections and the limited availability of clean energy, owing to lengthy permitting procedures or high capital or operating expenditures, as well as grid congestion;

G. whereas the emissions trading system (ETS) provided long-term investment signals and helped bring down the emissions of ETS sectors by 47 %; whereas the energy market has profoundly changed since the introduction of the ETS, especially after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the shift from pipeline gas to liquid natural gas (LNG); whereas a lack of carbon market transparency risks hampering EIIs’ competitiveness; whereas ETS revenues are used unevenly across Member States, failing to adequately support EIIs’ decarbonisation;

H. whereas unnecessary regulatory burdens and lengthy permitting procedures undermine the business case for investing in decarbonisation in Europe; whereas the concept of overriding public interest is provided for in EU legislation; whereas complex and fragmented EU funding impedes timely investment in net-zero technologies and digitalisation, in particular for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs);

I. whereas the lack of necessary private investment risks hindering EIIs’ decarbonisation; whereas relying excessively on State aid can have the unwanted consequences of exacerbating disparities and distorting competition across the EU;

J. whereas the EU’s dependencies and limited access, both in quantity and quality, to primary and secondary raw materials pose significant challenges to EIIs; whereas circularity and efficiency can help reduce the annual investment needs in industry and in energy supply; whereas currently, ferrous metals exported to non-EU countries account for more than half of all EU waste exports, raising concerns about their sound treatment;

K. whereas unfair competition from non-EU countries, including subsidised overcapacity, poses a great challenge to EU companies; whereas many regions around the world do not currently have ambitious decarbonisation targets, thus increasing the risk of carbon leakage;

L. whereas a profound transformation of EIIs cannot succeed without the involvement of local and regional communities, workers and social partners, which are heavily affected by the transition;

1. Reiterates its commitment to the EU’s decarbonisation objectives and to stable and predictable climate and industrial policies;

2. Calls on the Member States to accelerate permitting and licensing processes for clean energy projects, ensuring administrative capacity, and to facilitate grid connections to enable clean, on-site energy generation, especially in remote areas; stresses that the growth of renewables and electrification will require massive investment in grids and in flexibility, storage and distribution networks; calls on the Commission to develop, beyond the concept of overriding public interest, solutions for speeding up decarbonisation projects;

3. Believes that further action is needed to implement the electricity market design (EMD) rules, especially to promote power purchase agreements (PPAs) and two-way contracts for difference (CfDs) to reduce volatility and energy costs for EIIs; calls on the Commission to propose urgent measures to address current barriers to the signing of long-term agreements, especially for SMEs, using risk reduction instruments and guarantees, including public guarantee such as by the European Investment Bank (EIB); suggests that additional ways to decouple fossil fuel prices from electricity prices be explored, in the framework of the EMD, including with the aim of boosting long-term contracts in line with the affordable energy action plan, and by advancing the analysis of short-term markets to 2025 with a view to considering alternative market design options;

4. Calls on the Commission to assess the possibility of scaling up best practice for EIIs from Member States, such as Italy’s energy release; calls on the Commission to develop recommendations for reducing the exposure of consumers, and especially EIIs, to rising energy costs, such as by reducing taxes and levies and harmonising network charges, while ensuring public investment in grids;

5. Calls for the enhancement of energy system integration, in particular in relation to cross-border interconnections, to ensure clean and resilient energy supply; asks for increased investment in flexibility, such as storage, including pumped storage hydropower and heat and waste heat storage, and demand response, to optimise grid stability; recalls the importance of energy efficiency in bringing costs down;

6. Underlines the need to phase out natural gas as soon as possible; stresses that some sectors cannot rely substantially on electrification in the short to medium term; underlines that carbon capture, utilisation and storage plays a key role in the decarbonisation of hard-to-abate sectors and the production of low-carbon products, including low-carbon hydrogen; calls on the Member States – over the same time span and for these limited sectors – to develop measures to address gas price spikes in duly justified cases; calls on the Commission to develop tools to ensure gas supply at a mitigated cost, by enabling demand aggregation, building on AggregateEU, and joint gas purchasing, while keeping decarbonisation objectives; highlights the importance of encouraging stable contracts with gas suppliers, diversifying supply routes and improving market transparency and stability, in line with current legislation; calls for an impact assessment in the upcoming ETS review to analyse the relationship between the gas market and CO2 prices and the role of the market stability reserve and its parameters;

7. Calls on the Commission to support EIIs in adopting clean and net-zero technologies, including carbon capture and storage and low-carbon hydrogen, and energy-efficient production methods by strengthening funding mechanisms and ensuring that ETS revenue is used effectively by Member States; calls for EU-level support to be complemented by State aid that allows for targeted technology neutral support to EIIs, while preserving a level playing field within the single market;

8. Calls for InvestEU to be topped up before the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) and for leftover Resilience and Recovery Facility loans to support investment in EII decarbonisation; notes that the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform already allows for flexibility within current programmes but that this is insufficient; insists that the upcoming MFF increase funding to support EIIs, building on the Innovation Fund and the Connecting Europe Facility – Energy or through the competitiveness fund; stresses that the European Hydrogen Bank and the carbon contracts for difference programme need to be scaled up; calls on the Commission to build on the Net-Zero Industry Act(1) in the upcoming decarbonisation accelerator act, to streamline the processes for granting permits and strategic project status;

9. Stresses the need to simplify bureaucratic procedures to enhance the attractiveness of private investment and support EIIs’ transition; believes that both InvestEU and the EIB are pivotal in catalysing private financing, especially through de-risking measures;

10. Emphasises the need to secure access to critical raw materials; stresses that the upcoming circular economy act should improve resource efficiency, including through better waste management of products containing critical raw materials, as well as fostering the demand and availability of secondary raw materials; stresses the need to define those secondary raw materials that are strategic and that should be subject to export monitoring, such as steel and metal scrap, and to tackle any imbalance in their supply and demand, including by exploring export restrictions; insists on the effective enforcement of the Waste Shipment Regulation(2);

11. Calls on the Commission to make full and efficient use of trade defence instruments; calls on the Commission to find a permanent solution to address unfair competition and structural overcapacity, before the expiry of current steel safeguard measures in 2026; calls on the Commission to engage with the US in relation to the announced tariffs on EU imports and avoid any harmful escalation;

12. Stresses that an effective implementation of the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) is essential to ensure a level playing field for EU industries and prevent carbon leakage, taking into account the impact of the parallel phasing out of the ETS free allowances and the risk of increased production costs; calls on the Commission to address the risks of resource shuffling and circumvention of the CBAM; asks, furthermore, for the implementation of an effective solution for EU exporters and an analysis of the possible extension to further sectors and downstream products, preceded by an impact assessment;

13. Calls for the creation of lead markets for clean and circular European products, via non-price criteria in EU public procurement, such as sustainability and resilience and a European preference for strategic sectors, as well as by creating voluntary labelling schemes and minimum EU content requirements in a cost-effective way;

14. Highlights the importance of a just transition to assist areas heavily reliant on EIIs, by keeping and creating quality jobs through upskilling and reskilling programmes for workers and through the effective use of regional support mechanisms, such as the Just Transition Fund and the Cohesion Fund; stresses that public support will be pivotal for the transition of EIIs and that this support should be tied to their commitment to safeguarding employment and working conditions and preventing off-shoring; welcomes the Union of Skills initiative to ensure a good match between skills and labour market demands;

15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

(1)	Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s net-zero technology manufacturing ecosystem and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1724 (OJ L, 2024/1735, 28.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1735/oj).
(2)	Regulation (EU) 2024/1157 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on shipments of waste, amending Regulations (EU) No 1257/2013 and (EU) 2020/1056 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 (OJ L, 2024/1157, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1157/oj).

MIL OSI Europe News –

April 7, 2025

MIL-OSI Economics: BSTDB and Express Leasing Strengthen Partnership to Support Small Business, Green Finance and Women Entrepreneurs in Moldova

Source: Black Sea Trade and Development Bank

Press Release | 07-Apr-2025

Empowering Businesses with Sustainable Finance and Equal Growth Opportunities

The Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB) has provided a USD 3 million combined Micro and SME, Green, and Gender Equality Credit Line to the Moldovan microfinance institution Express Leasing and Microcredit SRL.

The financing will support micro and small businesses across Moldova, including projects with sustainability impact. This initiative reflects BSTDB’s commitment to SMEs and climate-conscious financing, helping to align its operations with the climate priorities of its shareholders and contributing to the broader decarbonization efforts in the region.

A portion of the funds will be allocated to supporting women entrepreneurs, promoting inclusive economic growth and fostering greater opportunities for women-led businesses in the country.

“The financing to Express Leasing consists of three key components, all aimed at supporting sustainable market development, a core objective of BSTDB’s strategy. By extending funds for green investments and empowering women entrepreneurs, we are not only strengthening Moldova’s SME sector but also enhancing our contribution to a low-carbon and more inclusive regional economy,” said Dr. Serhat Köksal, BSTDB President.

We are honored to strengthen our collaboration with BSTDB through this credit line that will enable us to reach more entrepreneurs, particularly women and those committed to sustainability,” said Sergiu Rosca, Executive Director of Express Leasing. “This partnership empowers us to continue supporting Moldova’s small businesses—the backbone of our economy—while also driving green innovation and inclusivity in finance.

OCN ICS “Express Leasing & Microcredit” SRL is a limited liability leading non-bank financial institution incorporated in the Republic of Moldova. Owned 100% by Broadhurst Investment Limited (registered in Cyprus), the company’s main activity is loan and lease financing focusing on SMEs and micro-financing sector.

The Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB) is an international financial institution established by Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Türkiye, and Ukraine. The BSTDB headquarters are in Thessaloniki, Greece. BSTDB supports economic development and regional cooperation by providing loans, credit lines, equity and guarantees for projects and trade financing in the public and private sectors in its member countries. The authorized capital of the Bank is EUR 3.45 billion. For information on BSTDB, visit www.bstdb.org.

Contact: Haroula Christodoulou

: @BSTDB

MIL OSI Economics –

April 7, 2025

MIL-OSI: Shell first quarter 2025 update note

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

The following is an update to the first quarter 2025 outlook and gives an overview of our current expectations for the first quarter. Outlooks presented may vary from the actual first quarter 2025 results and are subject to finalisation of those results, which are scheduled to be published on May 2, 2025. Unless otherwise indicated, all outlook statements exclude identified items.

See appendix for the definition of the non-GAAP measure used and the most comparable GAAP measure.

Integrated Gas

$ billions	Q4’24	Q1’25 Outlook	Comment
Adjusted EBITDA:
Production (kboe/d)	905	910 – 950	Impacted by unplanned maintenance, including in Australia.
LNG liquefaction volumes (MT)	7.1	6.4 – 6.8	Reflects weather impact (cyclones) and unplanned maintenance in Australia.
Underlying opex	1.0	0.9 – 1.1
Adjusted Earnings:
Pre-tax depreciation	1.4	1.2 – 1.6
Taxation charge	0.6	0.7 – 1.0
Other Considerations:
Trading & Optimisation results are expected to be in line with Q4’24, despite a higher (non-cash) impact from expiring hedge contracts compared to the previous quarter.

Upstream

$ billions	Q4’24	Q1’25 Outlook	Comment
Adjusted EBITDA:
Production (kboe/d)	1,859	1,790 – 1,890
Underlying opex	2.5	2.1 – 2.7
Adjusted Earnings:
Pre-tax depreciation	2.8	1.9 – 2.5
Taxation charge	2.6	2.4 – 3.2
Other Considerations:
The share of profit / (loss) of joint ventures and associates in Q1’25 is expected to be ~$0.2 billion. Q1’25 exploration well write-offs are expected to be ~$0.1 billion. The Q1’25 outlook reflects the completion of the SPDC divestment in March 2025.

Marketing

$ billions	Q4’24	Q1’25 Outlook	Comment
Adjusted EBITDA:
Sales volumes (kb/d)	2,795	2,500 – 2,900
Underlying opex	2.5	2.3 – 2.7
Adjusted Earnings:
Pre-tax depreciation	0.6	0.5 – 0.7
Taxation charge	0.3	0.2 – 0.5
Other Considerations:
Combined Mobility & Lubricants results expected to be in line with Q4’24. Overall Marketing results are expected to be impacted by a lower contribution from Sectors & Decarbonisation.

Chemicals and Products

$ billions	Q4’24	Q1’25 Outlook	Comment
Adjusted EBITDA:
Indicative refining margin	$5.5/bbl	$6.2/bbl
Indicative chemicals margin	$138/tonne	$126/tonne	The Chemicals sub-segment adjusted earnings are expected to be in line with Q4’24.
Refinery utilisation	76%	83% – 87%
Chemicals utilisation	75%	79% – 83%
Underlying opex	2.1	1.8 – 2.2
Adjusted Earnings:
Pre-tax depreciation	0.9	0.8 – 1.0
Taxation charge / (credit)	(0.2)	(0.2) – 0.3
Other Considerations:
Trading & Optimisation in Q1’25 is expected to be significantly higher than Q4’24, in line with Q2’24 and Q3’24 contributions.

Renewables and Energy Solutions

$ billions	Q4’24	Q1’25 Outlook	Comment
Adjusted Earnings	(0.3)	(0.3) – 0.3

Corporate

$ billions	Q4’24	Q1’25 Outlook	Comment
Adjusted Earnings	(0.4)	(0.6) – (0.4)

Shell Group

$ billions	Q4’24	Q1’25 Outlook	Comment
CFFO:
Tax paid	2.9	2.5 – 3.3
Derivative movements	0.3	(2) – 2
Working capital	2.4	(5) – 0	Includes ~$0.5 billion of deferred German Mineral Oil Taxes settlements.
Other Shell Group Considerations:
The Q1’25 net debt movement will reflect a ~$1.5 billion increase related to loan facilities provided at completion of the sale of SPDC in Nigeria as well as lease additions associated with the Pavilion acquisition.

Guidance

The ‘Quarterly Databook’ contains guidance on Indicative Refining Margin, Indicative Chemicals Margin and full-year price and margin sensitivities (Link).

Consensus

The consensus collection for quarterly Adjusted Earnings, Adjusted EBITDA is per the reporting segments and CFFO at a Shell group level, managed by Vara Research, is expected to be published on April 23, 2025.

Appendix

Indicative Margins

Chemicals & Products	Q4’24	Q1’25 Updated Outlook
Indicative refining margin	$5.5/bbl	$6.2/bbl
Indicative chemicals margin	$138/tonne	$126/tonne

Volume Data

	Q4’24 Adjusted	Q1’25 QPR Outlook	Q1’25 Updated Outlook
Integrated Gas
Production (kboe/d)	905	930 – 990	910 – 950
LNG liquefaction volumes (MT)	7.1	6.6 – 7.2	6.4 – 6.8
Upstream
Production (kboe/d)	1,859	1,750 – 1,950	1,790 – 1,890
Marketing
Sales volumes (kb/d)	2,795	2,500 – 3,000	2,500 – 2,900
Chemicals & Products
Refinery utilisation	76%	80% – 88%	83% – 87%
Chemicals utilisation	75%	78% – 86%	79% – 83%

Underlying Opex

Underlying operating expenses is a measure aimed at facilitating a comparative understanding of performance from period to period by removing the effects of identified items, which, either individually or collectively, can cause volatility, in some cases driven by external factors. For further details see the 4th Quarter 2024 and full year unaudited results (Link).

$ billions	Q4’24	Q4’24 Adjusted	Q1’25 Updated Outlook
Production and manufacturing expenses	5.8
Selling, distribution and administrative expenses	3.2
Research and development	0.3
Operating Expenses (Opex)	9.4	9.4
Less: Identified Items		0.3
Underlying Opex		9.1
of which:
Integrated Gas	1.1	1.0	0.9 – 1.1
Upstream	2.6	2.5	2.1 – 2.7
Marketing	2.6	2.5	2.3 – 2.7
Chemicals and Products	2.1	2.1	1.8 – 2.2
Renewables and Energy Solutions	0.8	0.7

Depreciation, depletion and amortisation

$ billions	Q4’24	Q4’24 Adjusted	Q1’25 Updated Outlook
Depreciation, Depletion & Amortisation	7.5	7.5
Less: Identified Items		1.7
Pre-tax depreciation (as Adjusted)		5.8
of which:
Integrated Gas	2.0	1.4	1.2 – 1.6
Upstream	2.9	2.8	1.9 – 2.5
Marketing	1.0	0.6	0.5 – 0.7
Chemicals and Products	1.2	0.9	0.8 – 1.0
Renewables and Energy Solutions	0.5	0.1

Tax Charge

$ billions	Q4’24	Q4’24 Adjusted	Q1’25 Updated Outlook
Taxation Charge	3.2	3.2
Less: Identified Items and Cost of supplies adjustment		(0.2)
Taxation Charge (as Adjusted)		3.4
of which:
Integrated Gas	0.5	0.6	0.7 – 1.0
Upstream	2.8	2.6	2.4 – 3.2
Marketing	0.2	0.3	0.2 – 0.5
Chemicals and Products	(0.4)	(0.2)	(0.2) – 0.3
Renewables and Energy Solutions	0.1	0.1

Adjusted Earnings

The “Adjusted Earnings” measure aims to facilitate a comparative understanding of Shell’s financial performance from period to period by removing the effects of oil price changes on inventory carrying amounts and removing the effects of identified items. These items are in some cases driven by external factors and may, either individually or collectively, hinder the comparative understanding of Shell’s financial results from period to period. This measure excludes earnings attributable to non-controlling interest. For further details see the 4th Quarter 2024 and full year unaudited results (Link).

$ billions	Q4’24	Q4’24 Adjusted	Q1’25 Updated Outlook
Income/(loss) attributable to Shell plc shareholders	0.9	0.9
Add: Current cost of supplies adjustment attributable to Shell plc shareholders		—
Less: Identified items attributable to Shell plc shareholders		(2.8)
Adjusted Earnings		3.7
of which:
Renewables and Energy Solutions	(1.2)	(0.3)	(0.3) – 0.3
Corporate	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.6) – (0.4)

Enquiries

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Cautionary Note

The companies in which Shell plc directly and indirectly owns investments are separate legal entities. In this announcement “Shell”, “Shell Group” and “Group” are sometimes used for convenience to reference Shell plc and its subsidiaries in general. Likewise, the words “we”, “us” and “our” are also used to refer to Shell plc and its subsidiaries in general or to those who work for them. These terms are also used where no useful purpose is served by identifying the particular entity or entities. ‘‘Subsidiaries’’, “Shell subsidiaries” and “Shell companies” as used in this announcement refer to entities over which Shell plc either directly or indirectly has control. The terms “joint venture”, “joint operations”, “joint arrangements”, and “associates” may also be used to refer to a commercial arrangement in which Shell has a direct or indirect ownership interest with one or more parties. The term “Shell interest” is used for convenience to indicate the direct and/or indirect ownership interest held by Shell in an entity or unincorporated joint arrangement, after exclusion of all third-party interest.

The numbers presented in this announcement may not sum precisely to the totals provided and percentages may not precisely reflect the absolute figures due to rounding.

Forward-Looking statements
This announcement contains forward-looking statements (within the meaning of the U.S. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995) concerning the financial condition, results of operations and businesses of Shell. All statements other than statements of historical fact are, or may be deemed to be, forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are statements of future expectations that are based on management’s current expectations and assumptions and involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results, performance or events to differ materially from those expressed or implied in these statements. Forward-looking statements include, among other things, statements concerning the potential exposure of Shell to market risks and statements expressing management’s expectations, beliefs, estimates, forecasts, projections and assumptions. These forward-looking statements are identified by their use of terms and phrases such as “aim”; “ambition”; ‘‘anticipate’’; “aspire”; “aspiration”; ‘‘believe’’; “commit”; “commitment”; ‘‘could’’; “desire”; ‘‘estimate’’; ‘‘expect’’; ‘‘goals’’; ‘‘intend’’; ‘‘may’’; “milestones”; ‘‘objectives’’; ‘‘outlook’’; ‘‘plan’’; ‘‘probably’’; ‘‘project’’; ‘‘risks’’; “schedule”; ‘‘seek’’; ‘‘should’’; ‘‘target’’; “vision”; ‘‘will’’; “would” and similar terms and phrases. There are a number of factors that could affect the future operations of Shell and could cause those results to differ materially from those expressed in the forward-looking statements included in this announcement, including (without limitation): (a) price fluctuations in crude oil and natural gas; (b) changes in demand for Shell’s products; (c) currency fluctuations; (d) drilling and production results; (e) reserves estimates; (f) loss of market share and industry competition; (g) environmental and physical risks, including climate change; (h) risks associated with the identification of suitable potential acquisition properties and targets, and successful negotiation and completion of such transactions; (i) the risk of doing business in developing countries and countries subject to international sanctions; (j) legislative, judicial, fiscal and regulatory developments including tariffs and regulatory measures addressing climate change; (k) economic and financial market conditions in various countries and regions; (l) political risks, including the risks of expropriation and renegotiation of the terms of contracts with governmental entities, delays or advancements in the approval of projects and delays in the reimbursement for shared costs; (m) risks associated with the impact of pandemics, regional conflicts, such as the Russia-Ukraine war and the conflict in the Middle East, and a significant cyber security, data privacy or IT incident; (n) the pace of the energy transition; and (o) changes in trading conditions. No assurance is provided that future dividend payments will match or exceed previous dividend payments. All forward-looking statements contained in this announcement are expressly qualified in their entirety by the cautionary statements contained or referred to in this section. Readers should not place undue reliance on forward-looking statements. Additional risk factors that may affect future results are contained in Shell plc’s Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2024 (available at www.shell.com/investors/news-and-filings/sec-filings.html and www.sec.gov). These risk factors also expressly qualify all forward-looking statements contained in this announcement and should be considered by the reader. Each forward-looking statement speaks only as of the date of this announcement, April 7, 2025. Neither Shell plc nor any of its subsidiaries undertake any obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statement as a result of new information, future events or other information. In light of these risks, results could differ materially from those stated, implied or inferred from the forward-looking statements contained in this announcement.

Shell’s net carbon intensity
Also, in this announcement we may refer to Shell’s “net carbon intensity” (NCI), which includes Shell’s carbon emissions from the production of our energy products, our suppliers’ carbon emissions in supplying energy for that production and our customers’ carbon emissions associated with their use of the energy products we sell. Shell’s NCI also includes the emissions associated with the production and use of energy products produced by others which Shell purchases for resale. Shell only controls its own emissions. The use of the terms Shell’s “net carbon intensity” or NCI is for convenience only and not intended to suggest these emissions are those of Shell plc or its subsidiaries.

Shell’s net-zero emissions target
Shell’s operating plan and outlook are forecasted for a three-year period and ten-year period, respectively, and are updated every year. They reflect the current economic environment and what we can reasonably expect to see over the next three and ten years. Accordingly, the outlook reflects our Scope 1, Scope 2 and NCI targets over the next ten years. However, Shell’s operating plan and outlook cannot reflect our 2050 net-zero emissions target, as this target is outside our planning period. Such future operating plans and outlooks could include changes to our portfolio, efficiency improvements and the use of carbon capture and storage and carbon credits. In the future, as society moves towards net-zero emissions, we expect Shell’s operating plans and outlooks to reflect this movement. However, if society is not net zero in 2050, as of today, there would be significant risk that Shell may not meet this target.

Forward-Looking Non-GAAP measures

This announcement may contain certain forward-looking non-GAAP measures such as Adjusted Earnings, Adjusted EBITDA, Cash flow from operating activities excluding working capital movements, Cash capital expenditure, Net debt and Underlying operating expense.

Adjusted Earnings and Adjusted EBITDA are measures used to evaluate Shell’s performance in the period and over time.
The “Adjusted Earnings” and Adjusted EBITDA are measures which aim to facilitate a comparative understanding of Shell’s financial performance from period to period by removing the effects of oil price changes on inventory carrying amounts and removing the effects of identified items.
Adjusted Earnings is defined as income/(loss) attributable to shareholders adjusted for the current cost of supplies and excluding identified items. “Adjusted EBITDA (CCS basis)” is defined as “Income/(loss) for the period” adjusted for current cost of supplies; identified items; tax charge/(credit); depreciation, amortisation and depletion; exploration well write-offs and net interest expense. All items include the non-controlling interest component.
Cash flow from operating activities excluding working capital movements is a measure used by Shell to analyse its operating cash generation over time excluding the timing effects of changes in inventories and operating receivables and payables from period to period. Working capital movements are defined as the sum of the following items in the Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows: (i) (increase)/decrease in inventories, (ii) (increase)/decrease in current receivables, and (iii) increase/(decrease) in current payables. Cash capital expenditure is the sum of the following lines from the Consolidated Statement of Cash flows: Capital expenditure, Investments in joint ventures and associates and Investments in equity securities. Net debt is defined as the sum of current and non-current debt, less cash and cash equivalents, adjusted for the fair value of derivative financial instruments used to hedge foreign exchange and interest rate risks relating to debt, and associated collateral balances. Underlying operating expenses is a measure of Shell’s cost management performance and aimed at facilitating a comparative understanding of performance from period to period by removing the effects of identified items, which, either individually or collectively, can cause volatility, in some cases driven by external factors. Underlying operating expenses comprises the following items from the Consolidated statement of Income: production and manufacturing expenses; selling, distribution and administrative expenses; and research and development expenses and removes the effects of identified items such as redundancy and restructuring charges or reversals, provisions or reversals and others.

We are unable to provide a reconciliation of these forward-looking non-GAAP measures to the most comparable GAAP financial measures because certain information needed to reconcile those non-GAAP measures to the most comparable GAAP financial measures is dependent on future events some of which are outside the control of Shell, such as oil and gas prices, interest rates and exchange rates. Moreover, estimating such GAAP measures with the required precision necessary to provide a meaningful reconciliation is extremely difficult and could not be accomplished without unreasonable effort. Non-GAAP measures in respect of future periods which cannot be reconciled to the most comparable GAAP financial measure are calculated in a manner which is consistent with the accounting policies applied in Shell plc’s consolidated financial statements.
The contents of websites referred to in this announcement do not form part of this announcement.

We may have used certain terms, such as resources, in this announcement that the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) strictly prohibits us from including in our filings with the SEC. Investors are urged to consider closely the disclosure in our Form 20-F, File No 1-32575, available on the SEC website www.sec.gov.

LEI number of Shell plc: 21380068P1DRHMJ8KU70

The MIL Network –

April 7, 2025

MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: President Lai delivers remarks on US tariff policy response

Source: Republic of China Taiwan

Details
2025-03-13
President Lai holds press conference following high-level national security meeting
On the afternoon of March 13, President Lai Ching-te convened a high-level national security meeting, following which he held a press conference. In remarks, President Lai introduced 17 major strategies to respond to five major national security and united front threats Taiwan now faces: China’s threat to national sovereignty, its threats from infiltration and espionage activities targeting Taiwan’s military, its threats aimed at obscuring the national identity of the people of Taiwan, its threats from united front infiltration into Taiwanese society through cross-strait exchanges, and its threats from using “integrated development” to attract Taiwanese businesspeople and youth. President Lai emphasized that in the face of increasingly severe threats, the government will not stop doing its utmost to ensure that our national sovereignty is not infringed upon, and expressed hope that all citizens unite in solidarity to resist being divided. The president also expressed hope that citizens work together to increase media literacy, organize and participate in civic education activities, promptly expose concerted united front efforts, and refuse to participate in any activities that sacrifice national interests. As long as every citizen plays their part toward our nation’s goals for prosperity and security, he said, and as long as we work together, nothing can defeat us. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: At many venues recently, a number of citizens have expressed similar concerns to me. They have noticed cases in which members of the military, both active-duty and retired, have been bought out by China, sold intelligence, or even organized armed forces with plans to harm their own nation and its citizens. They have noticed cases in which entertainers willingly followed instructions from Beijing to claim that their country is not a country, all for the sake of personal career interests. They have noticed how messaging used by Chinese state media to stir up internal opposition in Taiwan is always quickly spread by specific channels. There have even been individuals making careers out of helping Chinese state media record united front content, spreading a message that democracy is useless and promoting skepticism toward the United States and the military to sow division and opposition. Many people worry that our country, as well as our hard-won freedom and democracy and the prosperity and progress we achieved together, are being washed away bit by bit due to these united front tactics. In an analysis of China’s united front, renowned strategic scholar Kerry K. Gershaneck expressed that China plans to divide and conquer us through subversion, infiltration, and acquisition of media, and by launching media warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare. What they are trying to do is to sow seeds of discord in our society, keep us occupied with internal conflicts, and cause us to ignore the real threat from outside. China’s ambition over the past several decades to annex Taiwan and stamp out the Republic of China has not changed for even a day. It continues to pursue political and military intimidation, and its united front infiltration of Taiwan’s society grows ever more serious. In 2005, China promulgated its so-called “Anti-Secession Law,” which makes using military force to annex Taiwan a national undertaking. Last June, China issued a 22-point set of “guidelines for punishing Taiwan independence separatists,” which regards all those who do not accept that “Taiwan is part of the People’s Republic of China” as targets for punishment, creating excuses to harm the people of Taiwan. China has also recently been distorting United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758, showing in all aspects China’s increasingly urgent threat against Taiwan’s sovereignty. Lately, China has been taking advantage of democratic Taiwan’s freedom, diversity, and openness to recruit gangs, the media, commentators, political parties, and even active-duty and retired members of the armed forces and police to carry out actions to divide, destroy, and subvert us from within. A report from the National Security Bureau indicates that 64 persons were charged last year with suspicion of spying for China, which was three times the number of persons charged for the same offense in 2021. Among them, the Unionist Party, Rehabilitation Alliance Party, and Republic of China Taiwan Military Government formed treasonous organizations to deploy armed forces for China. In a democratic and free society, such cases are appalling. But this is something that actually exists within Taiwan’s society today. China also actively plots ways to infiltrate and spy on our military. Last year, 28 active-duty and 15 retired members of the armed forces were charged with suspicion of involvement in spying for China, respectively comprising 43 percent and 23 percent of all of such cases – 66 percent in total. We are also alert to the fact that China has recently used widespread issuance of Chinese passports to entice Taiwanese citizens to apply for the Residence Permit for Taiwan Residents, permanent residency, or the Resident Identity Card, in an attempt to muddle Taiwanese people’s sense of national identity. China also views cross-strait exchanges as a channel for its united front against Taiwan, marking enemies in Taiwan internally, creating internal divisions, and weakening our sense of who the enemy really is. It intends to weaken public authority and create the illusion that China is “governing” Taiwan, thereby expanding its influence within Taiwan. We are also aware that China has continued to expand its strategy of integrated development with Taiwan. It employs various methods to demand and coerce Taiwanese businesses to increase their investments in China, entice Taiwanese youth to develop their careers in China, and unscrupulously seeks to poach Taiwan’s talent and steal key technologies. Such methods impact our economic security and greatly increase the risk of our young people heading to China. By its actions, China already satisfies the definition of a “foreign hostile force” as provided in the Anti-Infiltration Act. We have no choice but to take even more proactive measures, which is my purpose in convening this high-level national security meeting today. It is time we adopt proper preventive measures, enhance our democratic resilience and national security, and protect our cherished free and democratic way of life. Next, I will be giving a detailed account of the five major national security and united front threats Taiwan now faces and the 17 major strategies we have prepared in response. I. Responding to China’s threats to our national sovereignty We have a nation insofar as we have sovereignty, and we have the Republic of China insofar as we have Taiwan. Just as I said during my inaugural address last May, and in my National Day address last October: The moment when Taiwan’s first democratically elected president took the oath of office in 1996 sent a message to the international community, that Taiwan is a sovereign, independent, democratic nation. Among people here and in the international community, some call this land the Republic of China, some call it Taiwan, and some, the Republic of China Taiwan. The Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other, and Taiwan resists any annexation or encroachment upon our sovereignty. The future of the Republic of China Taiwan must be decided by its 23 million people. This is the status quo that we must maintain. The broadest consensus in Taiwanese society is that we must defend our sovereignty, uphold our free and democratic way of life, and resolutely oppose annexation of Taiwan by China. (1) I request that the National Security Council (NSC), the Ministry of National Defense (MND), and the administrative team do their utmost to promote the Four Pillars of Peace action plan to demonstrate the people’s broad consensus and firm resolve, consistent across the entirety of our nation, to oppose annexation of Taiwan by China. (2) I request that the NSC and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs draft an action plan that will, through collaboration with our friends and allies, convey to the world our national will and broad social consensus in opposing annexation of Taiwan by China and in countering China’s efforts to erase Taiwan from the international community and downgrade Taiwan’s sovereignty. II. Responding to China’s threats from infiltration and espionage activities targeting our military (1) Comprehensively review and amend our Law of Military Trial to restore the military trial system, allowing military judges to return to the frontline and collaborate with prosecutorial, investigative, and judicial authorities in the handling of criminal cases in which active-duty military personnel are suspected of involvement in such military crimes as sedition, aiding the enemy, leaking confidential information, dereliction of duty, or disobedience. In the future, criminal cases involving active-duty military personnel who are suspected of violating the Criminal Code of the Armed Forces will be tried by a military court. (2) Implement supporting reforms, including the establishment of a personnel management act for military judges and separate organization acts for military courts and military prosecutors’ offices. Once planning and discussion are completed, the MND will fully explain to and communicate with the public to ensure that the restoration of the military trial system gains the trust and full support of society. (3) To deter the various types of controversial rhetoric and behavior exhibited by active-duty as well as retired military personnel that severely damage the morale of our national military, the MND must discuss and propose an addition to the Criminal Code of the Armed Forces on penalties for expressions of loyalty to the enemy as well as revise the regulations for military personnel and their families receiving retirement benefits, so as to uphold military discipline. III. Responding to China’s threats aimed at obscuring the national identity of the people of Taiwan (1) I request that the Ministry of the Interior (MOI), Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), and other relevant agencies, wherever necessary, carry out inspections and management of the documents involving identification that Taiwanese citizens apply for in China, including: passports, ID cards, permanent residence certificates, and residence certificates, especially when the applicants are military personnel, civil servants, or public school educators, who have an obligation of loyalty to Taiwan. This will be done to strictly prevent and deter united front operations, which are performed by China under the guise of “integrated development,” that attempt to distort our people’s national identity. (2) With respect to naturalization and integration of individuals from China, Hong Kong, and Macau into Taiwanese society, more national security considerations must be taken into account while also attending to Taiwan’s social development and individual rights: Chinese nationals applying for permanent residency in Taiwan must, in accordance with the law of Taiwan, relinquish their existing household registration and passport and may not hold dual identity status. As for the systems in place to process individuals from Hong Kong or Macau applying for residency or permanent residency in Taiwan, there will be additional provisions for long-term residency to meet practical needs. IV. Responding to China’s threats from united front infiltration into Taiwanese society through cross-strait exchanges (1) There are increasing risks involved with travel to China. (From January 1, 2024 to today, the MAC has received reports of 71 Taiwanese nationals who went missing, were detained, interrogated, or imprisoned in China; the number of unreported people who have been subjected to such treatment may be several times that. Of those, three elderly I-Kuan Tao members were detained in China in December of last year and have not yet been released.) In light of this, relevant agencies must raise public awareness of those risks, continue enhancing public communication, and implement various registration systems to reduce the potential for accidents and the risks associated with traveling to China. (2) Implement a disclosure system for exchanges with China involving public officials at all levels of the central and local government. This includes everyone from administrative officials to elected representatives, from legislators to village and neighborhood chiefs, all of whom should make the information related to such exchanges both public and transparent so that they can be accountable to the people. The MOI should also establish a disclosure system for exchanges with China involving public welfare organizations, such as religious groups, in order to prevent China’s interference and united front activities at their outset. (3) Manage the risks associated with individuals from China engaging in exchanges with Taiwan: Review and approval of Chinese individuals coming to Taiwan should be limited to normal cross-strait exchanges and official interactions under the principles of parity and dignity, and relevant factors such as changes in the cross-strait situation should be taken into consideration. Strict restrictions should be placed on Chinese individuals who have histories with the united front coming to Taiwan, and Chinese individuals should be prohibited from coming to Taiwan to conduct activities related in any way to the united front. (4) Political interference from China and the resulting risks to national security should be avoided in cross-strait exchanges. This includes the review and management of religious, cultural, academic, and education exchanges, which should in principle be depoliticized and de-risked so as to simplify people-to-people exchanges and promote healthy and orderly exchanges. (5) To deter the united front tactics of a cultural nature employed by Chinese nationals to undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty, the Executive Yuan must formulate a solution to make our local cultural industries more competitive, including enhanced support and incentives for our film, television, and cultural and creative industries to boost their strengths in democratic cultural creation, raise international competitiveness, and encourage research in Taiwan’s own history and culture. (6) Strengthen guidance and management for entertainers developing their careers in China. The competent authorities should provide entertainers with guidelines on conduct while working in China, and make clear the scope of investigation and response to conduct that endangers national dignity. This will help prevent China from pressuring Taiwanese entertainers to make statements or act in ways that endanger national dignity. (7) The relevant authorities must adopt proactive, effective measures to prevent China from engaging in cognitive warfare against Taiwan or endangering cybersecurity through the internet, applications, AI, and other such tools. (8) To implement these measures, each competent authority must run a comprehensive review of the relevant administrative ordinances, measures, and interpretations, and complete the relevant regulations for legal enforcement. Should there be any shortcomings, the legal framework for national security should be strengthened and amendments to the National Security Act, Anti-Infiltration Act, Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, Laws and Regulations Regarding Hong Kong & Macao Affairs, or Cyber Security Management Act should be proposed. Communication with the public should also be increased so that implementation can happen as soon as possible. V. Responding to threats from China using “integrated development” to attract Taiwanese businesspeople and youth (1) I request that the NSC and administrative agencies work together to carry out strategic structural adjustments to the economic and trade relations between Taiwan and China based on the strategies of putting Taiwan first and expanding our global presence while staying rooted in Taiwan. In addition, they should carry out necessary, orderly adjustments to the flow of talent, goods, money, and skills involved in cross-strait economic and trade relations based on the principle of strengthening Taiwan’s foundations to better manage risk. This will help boost economic security and give us more power to respond to China’s economic and trade united front and economic coercion against Taiwan. (2) I request that the Ministry of Education, MAC, Ministry of Economic Affairs, and other relevant agencies work together to comprehensively strengthen young students’ literacy education on China and deepen their understanding of cross-strait exchanges. I also request these agencies to widely publicize mechanisms for employment and entrepreneurship for Taiwan’s youth and provide ample information and assistance so that young students have more confidence in the nation’s future and more actively invest in building up and developing Taiwan. My fellow citizens, this year marks the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. History tells us that any authoritarian act of aggression or annexation will ultimately end in failure. The only way we can safeguard freedom and prevail against authoritarian aggression is through solidarity. As we face increasingly severe threats, the government will not stop doing its utmost to ensure that our national sovereignty is not infringed upon, and to ensure that the freedom, democracy, and way of life of Taiwan’s 23 million people continues on as normal. But relying solely on the power of the government is not enough. What we need even more is for all citizens to stay vigilant and take action. Every citizen stands on the frontline of the defense of democracy and freedom. Here is what we can do together: First, we can increase our media literacy, and refrain from spreading and passing on united front messaging from the Chinese state. Second, we can organize and participate in civic education activities to increase our knowledge about united front operations and build up whole-of-society defense resilience. Third, we can promptly expose concerted united front efforts so that all malicious attempts are difficult to carry out. Fourth, we must refuse to participate in any activities that sacrifice national interests. The vigilance and action of every citizen forms the strongest line of defense against united front infiltration. Only through solidarity can we resist being divided. As long as every citizen plays their part toward our nation’s goals for prosperity and security, and as long as we work together, nothing can defeat us.

Details
2025-02-14
President Lai holds press conference following high-level national security meeting
On the morning of February 14, President Lai Ching-te convened the first high-level national security meeting of the year, following which he held a press conference. In remarks, President Lai announced that in this new year, the government will prioritize special budget allocations to ensure that Taiwan’s defense budget exceeds 3 percent of GDP. He stated that the government will also continue to reform national defense, reform our legal framework for national security, and advance our economic and trade strategy of being rooted in Taiwan while expanding globally. The president also proposed clear-cut national strategies for Taiwan-US relations, semiconductor industry development, and cross-strait relations. President Lai indicated that he instructed the national security and administrative teams to take swift action and deliver results, working within a stable strategic framework and according to the various policies and approaches outlined. He also instructed them to keep a close watch on changes in the international situation, seize opportunities whenever they arise, and address the concerns and hope of the citizens with concrete actions. He expressed hope that as long as citizens remain steadfast in their convictions, are willing to work hand in hand, stand firm amidst uncertainty, and look for ways to win within changing circumstances, Taiwan is certain to prevail in the test of time yet again. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: First, I would like to convey my condolences for the tragic incident which occurred at the Shin Kong Mitsukoshi department store in Taichung, which resulted in numerous casualties. I have instructed Premier Cho Jung-tai (卓榮泰) to lead the relevant central government agencies in assisting Taichung’s municipal government with actively resolving various issues regarding the incident. It is my hope that these issues can be resolved efficiently. Earlier today, I convened this year’s first high-level national security meeting. I will now report on the discussions from the meeting to all citizens. 2025 is a year full of challenges, but also a year full of hope. In today’s global landscape, the democratic world faces common threats posed by the convergence of authoritarian regimes, while dumping and unfair competition from China undermine the global economic order. A new United States administration was formed at the beginning of the year, adopting all-new strategies and policies to address challenges both domestic and from overseas. Every nation worldwide, including ours, is facing a new phase of changes and challenges. In face of such changes, ensuring national security, ensuring Taiwan’s indispensability in global supply chains, and ensuring that our nation continues to make progress amidst challenges are our top priorities this year. They are also why we convened a high-level national security meeting today. At the meeting, the national security team, the administrative team led by Premier Cho, and I held an in-depth discussion based on the overall state of affairs at home and abroad and the strategies the teams had prepared in response. We summed up the following points as an overall strategy for the next stage of advancing national security and development. First, for overall national security, so that we can ensure the freedom, democracy, and human rights of the Taiwanese people, as well as the progress and development of the nation as we face various threats from authoritarian regimes, Taiwan must resolutely safeguard national sovereignty, strengthen self-sufficiency in national defense, and consolidate national defense. Taiwan must enhance economic resilience, maintain economic autonomy, and stand firm with other democracies as we deepen our strategic partnerships with like-minded countries. As I have said, “As authoritarianism consolidates, democratic nations must come closer in solidarity!” And so, in this new year, we will focus on the following three priorities: First, to demonstrate our resolve for national defense, we will continue to reform national defense, implement whole-of-society defense resilience, and prioritize special budget allocations to ensure that our defense budget exceeds 3 percent of GDP. Second, to counter the threats to our national security from China’s united front tactics, attempts at infiltration, and cognitive warfare, we will continue with the reform of our legal framework for national security and expand the national security framework to boost societal resilience and foster unity within. Third, to seize opportunities in the restructuring of global supply chains and realignment of the economic order, we will continue advancing our economic and trade strategy of being rooted in Taiwan while expanding globally, strengthening protections for high-tech, and collaborating with our friends and allies to build supply chains for global democracies. Everyone shares concern regarding Taiwan-US relations, semiconductor industry development, and cross-strait relations. For these issues, I am proposing clear-cut national strategies. First, I will touch on Taiwan-US relations. Taiwan and the US have shared ideals and values, and are staunch partners within the democratic, free community. We are very grateful to President Donald Trump’s administration for their continued support for Taiwan after taking office. We are especially grateful for the US and Japan’s joint leaders’ statement reiterating “the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element of security and prosperity for the international community,” as well as their high level of concern regarding China’s threat to regional security. In fact, the Democratic Progressive Party government has worked very closely with President Trump ever since his first term in office, and has remained an international partner. The procurement of numerous key advanced arms, freedom of navigation critical for security and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and many assisted breakthroughs in international diplomacy were made possible during this time. Positioned in the first island chain and on the democratic world’s frontline countering authoritarianism, Taiwan is willing and will continue to work with the US at all levels as we pursue regional stability and prosperity, helping realize our vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Although changes in policy may occur these next few years, the mutual trust and close cooperation between Taiwan and Washington will steadfastly endure. On that, our citizens can rest assured. In accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances, the US announced a total of 48 military sales to Taiwan over the past eight years amounting to US$26.265 billion. During President Trump’s first term, 22 sales were announced totaling US$18.763 billion. This greatly supported Taiwan’s defensive capabilities. On the foundation of our close cooperation with the past eight years’ two US administrations, Taiwan will continue to demonstrate our determination for self-defense, accelerate the bolstering of our national defense, and keep enhancing the depth and breadth of Taiwan-US security cooperation, along with all manner of institutional cooperation. In terms of bilateral economic cooperation, Taiwan has always been one of the US’s most reliable trade partners, as well as one of the most important cooperative partners of US companies in the global semiconductor industry. In the past few years, Taiwan has greatly increased both direct and indirect investment in the US. By 2024, investment surpassed US$100 billion, creating nearly 400,000 job opportunities. In 2023 and 2024, investment in the US accounted for over 40 percent of Taiwan’s overall foreign investment, far surpassing our investment in China. In fact, in 2023 and 2024, Taiwanese investment in China fell to 11 percent and 8 percent, respectively. The US is now Taiwan’s biggest investment target. Our government is now launching relevant plans in accordance with national development needs and the need to establish secure supply systems, and the Executive Yuan is taking comprehensive inventory of opportunities for Taiwan-US economic and trade cooperation. Moving forward, close bilateral cooperation will allow us to expand US investment and procurement, facilitating balanced trade. Our government will also strengthen guidance and support for Taiwanese enterprises on increasing US investment, and promote the global expansion and growth of Taiwan’s industries. We will also boost Taiwan-US cooperation in tech development and manufacturing for AI and advanced semiconductors, and work together to maintain order in the semiconductor market, shaping a new era for our strategic economic partnership. Second, the development of our semiconductor industry. I want to emphasize that Taiwan, as one of the world’s most capable semiconductor manufacturing nations, is both willing and able to address new situations. With respect to President Trump’s concerns about our semiconductor industry, the government will act prudently, strengthen communications between Taiwan and the US, and promote greater mutual understanding. We will pay attention to the challenges arising from the situation and assist businesses in navigating them. In addition, we will introduce an initiative on semiconductor supply chain partnerships for global democracies. We are willing to collaborate with the US and our other democratic partners to develop more resilient and diversified semiconductor supply chains. Leveraging our strengths in cutting-edge semiconductors, we will form a global alliance for the AI chip industry and establish democratic supply chains for industries connected to high-end chips. Through international cooperation, we will open up an entirely new era of growth in the semiconductor industry. As we face the various new policies of the Trump administration, we will continue to uphold a spirit of mutual benefit, and we will continue to communicate and negotiate closely with the US government. This will help the new administration’s team to better understand how Taiwan is an indispensable partner in the process of rebuilding American manufacturing and consolidating its leadership in high-tech, and that Taiwan-US cooperation will benefit us both. Third, cross-strait relations. Regarding the regional and cross-strait situation, Taiwan-US relations, US-China relations, and interactions among Taiwan, the US, and China are a focus of global attention. As a member of the international democratic community and a responsible member of the region, Taiwan hopes to see Taiwan-US relations continue to strengthen and, alongside US-China relations, form a virtuous cycle rather than a zero-sum game where one side’s gain is another side’s loss. In facing China, Taiwan will always be a responsible actor. We will neither yield nor provoke. We will remain resilient and composed, maintaining our consistent position on cross-strait relations: Our determination to safeguard our national sovereignty and protect our free and democratic way of life remains unchanged. Our efforts to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, as well as our willingness to work alongside China in the pursuit of peace and mutual prosperity across the strait, remain unchanged. Our commitment to promoting healthy and orderly exchanges across the strait, choosing dialogue over confrontation, and advancing well-being for the peoples on both sides of the strait, under the principles of parity and dignity, remains unchanged. Regarding the matters I reported to the public today, I have instructed our national security and administrative teams to take swift action and deliver results, working within a stable strategic framework and according to the various policies and approaches I just outlined. I have also instructed them to keep a close watch on changes in the international situation, seize opportunities whenever they arise, and address the concerns and hope of the citizens with concrete actions. My fellow citizens, over the past several years, Taiwan has weathered a global pandemic and faced global challenges, both political and economic, arising from the US-China trade war and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Through it all, Taiwan has persevered; we have continued to develop our economy, bolster our national strength, and raise our international profile while garnering more support – all unprecedented achievements. This is all because Taiwan’s fate has never been decided by the external environment, but by the unity of the Taiwanese people and the resolve to never give up. A one-of-a-kind global situation is creating new strategic opportunities for our one-of-a-kind Taiwanese people, bringing new hope. Taiwan’s foundation is solid; its strength is great. So as long as everyone remains steadfast in their convictions, is willing to work hand in hand, stands firm amidst uncertainty, and looks for ways to win within changing circumstances, Taiwan is certain to prevail in the test of our time yet again, for I am confident that there are no difficulties that Taiwan cannot overcome. Thank you.

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2025-01-01
President Lai delivers 2025 New Year’s Address
On the morning of January 1, President Lai Ching-te delivered his 2025 New Year’s Address, titled “Bolstering National Strength through Democracy to Enter a New Global Landscape,” in the Reception Hall of the Presidential Office. President Lai stated that today’s Taiwan is receiving international recognition for its performance in many areas, among them democracy, technology, and economy. In this new year, he said, Taiwan must be united, and we must continue on the right course. The president expressed hope that everyone in the central and local governments, regardless of party, can work hard together, allowing Taiwan sure footing as it strides forward toward ever greater achievements. President Lai emphasized that in 2025, we must keep firm on the path of democracy, continue to bolster our national strength, make Taiwan more economically resilient, enhance the resilience of supply chains for global democracies, and continue working toward a Balanced Taiwan and generational justice, ensuring that the fruits of our economic growth can be enjoyed by all our people. The president said that Taiwan will keep going strong, and we will keep walking tall as we enter the new global landscape. A translation of President Lai’s address follows: Today is the first day of 2025. With a new year comes new beginnings. I wish that Taiwan enjoys peace, prosperity, and success, and that our people lead happy lives. Taiwan truly finished 2024 strong. Though there were many challenges, there were also many triumphs. We withstood earthquakes and typhoons, and stood firm in the face of constant challenges posed by authoritarianism. We also shared glory as Taiwan won the Premier12 baseball championship, and now Taiwanese people around the world are all familiar with the gesture for Team Taiwan. At the Paris Olympics, Wang Chi-lin (王齊麟) and Lee Yang (李洋) clinched another gold in men’s doubles badminton. Lin Yu-ting (林郁婷) took home Taiwan’s first Olympic gold in boxing. At the International Junior Science Olympiad, every student in our delegation of six won a gold medal. And Yang Shuang-zi’s (楊双子) novel Taiwan Travelogue, translated into English by King Lin (金翎), became a United States National Book Award winner and a tour de force of Taiwan literature on the international level. Our heroes of Taiwan are defined by neither age nor discipline. They have taken home top prizes at international competitions and set new records. They tell Taiwan’s story through their outstanding performances, letting the world see the spirit and culture of Taiwan, and filling all our citizens with pride. My fellow citizens, we have stood together through thick and thin; we have shared our ups and downs. We have wept together, and we have laughed together. We are all one family, all members of Team Taiwan. I want to thank each of our citizens for their dedication, fueling Taiwan’s progress and bringing our nation glory. You have given Taiwan even greater strength to stand out on the global stage. In this new year, we must continue bringing Taiwan’s stories to the world, and make Taiwan’s successes a force for global progress. In 2025, the world will be entering a new landscape. Last year, over 70 countries held elections, and the will of the people has changed with the times. As many countries turn new pages politically, and in the midst of rapid international developments, Taiwan must continue marching forward with steady strides. First, we must keep firm on the path of democracy. Taiwan made it through a dark age of authoritarianism and has since become a glorious beacon of democracy in Asia. This was achieved through the sacrifices of our democratic forebears and the joint efforts of all our citizens. Democracy’s value to Taiwan lies not just in our free way of life, or in the force driving the diverse and vigorous growth of our society. Democracy is the brand that has earned us international trust in terms of diplomacy. No matter the threat or challenge Taiwan may face, democracy is Taiwan’s only path forward. We will not turn back. Domestic competition among political parties is a part of democracy. But domestic political disputes must be resolved democratically, within the constitutional system. This is the only way democracy can continue to grow. The Executive Yuan has the right to request a reconsideration of the controversial bills passed in the Legislative Yuan, giving it room for reexamination. Constitutional institutions can also lodge a petition for a constitutional interpretation, and through Constitutional Court adjudication, ensure a separation of powers, safeguard constitutional order, and gradually consolidate the constitutional system. The people also have the right of election, recall, initiative, and referendum, and can bring together even greater democratic power to show the true meaning of sovereignty in the hands of the people. In this new year, the changing international landscape will present democratic nations around the world with many grave challenges. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and conflict between Israel and Hamas rage on, and we are seeing the continued convergence of authoritarian regimes including China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, threatening the rules-based international order and severely affecting peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and the world at large. Peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are essential components for global security and prosperity. Taiwan needs to prepare for danger in times of peace. We must continue increasing our national defense budget, bolster our national defense capabilities, and show our determination to protect our country. Everyone has a responsibility to safeguard Taiwan’s democracy and security. We must gather together every bit of strength we have to enhance whole-of-society defense resilience, and build capabilities to respond to major disasters and deter threats or encroachment. We must also strengthen communication with society to combat information and cognitive warfare, so that the populace rejects threats and enticements and jointly guards against malicious infiltration by external forces. Here at home, we must consolidate democracy with democracy. Internationally, we must make friends worldwide through democracy. This is how we will ensure security and peace. The more secure Taiwan, the more secure the world. The more resilient Taiwan, the sounder the defense of global democracy. The global democratic community should work even closer together to support the democratic umbrella as we seek ways to resolve the war in Ukraine and conflict between Israel and Hamas. Together, we must uphold stability in the Taiwan Strait and security in the Indo-Pacific, and achieve our goal of global peace. Second, we must continue to bolster our national strength, make Taiwan more economically resilient, and enhance the resilience of supply chains for global democracies. In the first half of 2024, growth in the Taiwan Stock Index was the highest in the world. Our economic growth rate for the year as a whole is expected to reach 4.2 percent, leading among the Four Asian Tigers. Domestic investment is soaring, having exceeded NT$5 trillion, and inflation is gradually stabilizing. Export orders from January to November totaled US$536.6 billion, up 3.7 percent from the same period in 2023. And compared over the same period, exports saw a 9.9 percent increase, reaching US$431.5 billion. Recent surveys also show that in 2024, the average increase in salaries at companies was higher than that in 2023. Additionally, over 90 percent of companies plan to raise salaries this year, which is an eight-year high. All signs indicate that Taiwan’s economic climate continues to recover, and that our economy is growing steadily. Our overall economic performance is impressive; still, we must continue to pay attention to the impact on Taiwan’s industries from the changing geopolitical landscape, uncertainties in the global economic environment, and dumping by the “red supply chain.” For a nation, all sectors and professions are equally important; only when all our industries are strong can Taiwan be strong as a nation. Our micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) are the lifeblood of Taiwan, and the development of our various industrial parks has given Taiwan the impetus for our prosperity. We must carry the spirit of “Made in Taiwan” forward, bringing it to ever greater heights. Thus, beyond just developing our high-tech industry, our Executive Yuan has already proposed a solution that will help traditional industries and MSMEs comprehensively adopt technology applications, engage in the digital and net-zero twin transition, and develop channels, all for better operational structures and higher productivity. Taiwan must continue enhancing its economic resilience. In recent years, Taiwan has significantly increased its investments in the US, Japan, Europe, and the New Southbound countries, and such investment has already surpassed investment in China. This indicates that our efforts in diversifying markets and reducing reliance on any single market are working. Moving forward, we must keep providing assistance so that Taiwan industries can expand their global presence and market internationally from a solid base here in Taiwan. At the same time, Taiwan must use democracy to promote economic growth with the rest of the world. We must leverage our strengths in the semiconductor and AI industries. We must link with democratic countries so that we can together enhance the resilience of supply chains for global democracies. And through international cooperation across many sectors, such as UAVs, low-orbit communications satellites, robots, military, security and surveillance, or biopharmaceuticals, renewable energy technology, new agriculture, and the circular economy, we must keep abreast of the latest cutting-edge technology and promote diverse development. This approach will help Taiwan remain a leader in advancing global democratic supply chains, ensuring their security and stability. Third, we must continue working toward a Balanced Taiwan and generational justice, ensuring that the fruits of our economic growth can be enjoyed by all our people. Democracy means the people have the final say. Our nation belongs to all 23 million of us, without regard for ethnic group, generation, political party, or whether we live in urban or rural areas. In this new year, we must continue to pursue policies that promote the well-being of the nation and the people. But to that end, the central government needs adequate financial resources to ensure that it can enact each of these measures. Therefore, I hope that the ruling and opposition parties can each soberly reconsider the amendments to the Act Governing the Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures and find a path forward that ensures the lasting peace and stability of our country. For nine consecutive years, the minimum wage has continued to rise. Effective today, the minimum monthly salary is being raised from NT$27,470 to NT$28,590, and the hourly salary from NT$183 to NT$190. We hope by raising the pay for military personnel, civil servants, and educators for two consecutive years, coupled with benefits through wage increases and tax reductions, that private businesses will also raise wages, allowing all our people to enjoy the fruits of our economic growth. I know that everyone wants to pay lower taxes and rent. This year, we will continue to promote tax reductions. For example, unmarried individuals with an annual income of NT$446,000 or less can be exempt from paying income tax. Dual-income families with an annual income of NT$892,000 or less and dual-income families with two children aged six or younger with an annual income of NT$1,461,000 or less are also exempt from paying income tax. Additionally, the number of rent-subsidized housing units will also be increased, from 500,000 to 750,000 units, helping lighten the load for everyone. This year, the age eligibility for claiming Culture Points has been lowered from 16 to 13 years, so that now young people aged between 13 and 22 can receive government support for experiencing more in the arts. Also, our Taiwan Global Pathfinders Initiative is about to take effect, which will help more young people in Taiwan realize their dreams by taking part in education and exchange activities in many places around the world. We are also in the process of establishing a sports ministry to help young athletes achieve their dreams on the field, court, and beyond. The ministry will also be active in developing various sports industries and bringing sports and athletics more into the lives of the people, making our people healthier as a result. This year, as Taiwan becomes a “super-aged society,” we will launch our Long-term Care 3.0 Plan to provide better all-around care for our seniors. And we will expand the scope of cancer screening eligibility and services, all aimed at creating a Healthy Taiwan. In addition, Taiwan will officially begin collecting fees for its carbon fee system today. This brings us closer in line with global practices and helps us along the path to our goal of net-zero emissions by 2050. We will also continue on the path to achieving a Balanced Taiwan. Last month, the Executive Yuan launched the Trillion NT Dollar Investment National Development Plan and its six major regional flagship projects. Both of these initiatives will continue to expand the investment in our public infrastructure and the development of local specialty industries, narrowing urban-rural and wealth gaps so that all our people can live and work in peace and happiness. My fellow citizens, today’s Taiwan is receiving international recognition for its performance in many areas, among them democracy, technology, and economy. This tells us that national development is moving in the right direction. In this new year, Taiwan must be united, and we must continue on the right course. We hope that everyone in the central and local governments, regardless of party, can work hard together to ensure that national policies are successfully implemented, with the people’s well-being as our top priority. This will allow Taiwan sure footing as it strides forward toward ever greater achievements. In this new year, we have many more brilliant stories of Taiwan to share with the world, inspiring all Taiwanese, both here and around the world, to cheer time and again for the glory of Taiwan. Taiwan will keep going strong. And we will keep walking tall as we enter the new global landscape. Thank you.

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2024-10-10
President Lai delivers 2024 National Day Address
President Lai Ching-te on the morning of October 10 attended the ROC’s 113th Double Tenth National Day Celebration in the plaza fronting the Presidential Office Building, and delivered an address titled “Taiwan Together for Our Shared Dream.” A translation of the president’s address follows: National Day Celebration Chairperson Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜), Vice President Bi-khim Hsiao, Premier Cho Jung-tai (卓榮泰), Prime Minister of Tuvalu Feleti Teo and Madame Tausaga Teo, heads of delegations from diplomatic allies and friendly nations, distinguished guests from home and abroad, and my fellow citizens here in person and watching on TV or online: Good morning. Today, we gather together to celebrate the birthday of the Republic of China, praise the beautiful Taiwan of today, and usher in the better Taiwan for tomorrow. One hundred and thirteen years ago, a group of people full of ideals and aspirations rose in revolt and overthrew the imperial regime. Their dream was to establish a democratic republic of the people, to be governed by the people and for the people. Their ideal was to create a nation of freedom, equality, and benevolence. However, the dream of democracy was engulfed in the raging flames of war. The ideal of freedom had for long eroded under authoritarian rule. But we will never forget the Battle of Guningtou 75 years ago, or the August 23 Artillery Battle 66 years ago. Though we arrived on this land at different times and belonged to different communities, we defended Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. We defended the Republic of China. We will never forget the Kaohsiung Incident 45 years ago, or wave after wave of democracy movements. Again and again, people who carried the dream of democracy and the ideal of freedom, through valiant sacrifice and devotion, gave their lives to open the door to democracy. Over more than a century, the people’s desire to master their own destiny has finally been fulfilled. My fellow citizens, though the Republic of China was driven out of the international community, the people of Taiwan have never exiled themselves. On this land, the people of Taiwan toil and labor, but when our friends face natural disasters or an unprecedented pandemic, we do not hesitate to extend a helping hand. “Taiwan Can Help” is not just a slogan. It is a movement by the people of Taiwan to cherish peace and do good for others. In the past, our people, going out into the world equipped with only a briefcase, sparked Taiwan’s economic achievements. Now, Taiwan’s chip technology drives the whole world, and has become a global force for prosperity and development. The people of Taiwan are diverse, and they are fearless. Our own Nymphia Wind is a queen on the world stage. The people of Taiwan are truly courageous. Lin Yu-ting (林郁婷), a daughter of Taiwan, is a queen of the boxing world. At 17 years old, Taiwan’s own Tsai Yun-rong (蔡昀融) put steady hands to work and won first place for woodwork in a global skills competition. Chen Sz-yuan (陳思源), at 20, took first for refrigeration and air conditioning, using the skills passed down by his father. A new generation of “Made in Taiwan” youth is putting a new shine on an old label. I want to thank generation after generation of fellow citizens for coming together and staying together through thick and thin. The Republic of China has already put down roots in Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. And the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other. On this land, democracy and freedom are growing and thriving. The People’s Republic of China has no right to represent Taiwan. The 23 million people of Taiwan, now more than ever, must reach out our branches to embrace the future. My fellow citizens, we have overcome challenge after challenge. All along, the Republic of China has shown steadfast resolve; and all along, the people of Taiwan have shown unwavering tenacity. We fully understand that our views are not all the same, but we have always been willing to accept one another. We fully understand that we have differences in opinion, but we have always been willing to keep moving forward hand in hand. This is how the Republic of China Taiwan became what it is today. As president, my mission is to ensure that our nation endures and progresses, and to unite the 23 million people of Taiwan. I will also uphold the commitment to resist annexation or encroachment upon our sovereignty. It is also my mission to safeguard the lives and property of the public, firmly carry out our Four Pillars of Peace action plan, strengthen national defense, stand side by side with democratic countries, jointly demonstrate the strength of deterrence, and ensure peace through strength, so that all generations can lead good lives. All the more, my mission is to care for the lives and livelihoods of the 23 million people of Taiwan, actively develop our economy, and expand investment in social care. I must also ensure that the fruits of our economic growth can be enjoyed by all our people. However, Taiwan faces relentless challenges, and the world’s challenges are just as much our own. The world must achieve sustainable development as we grapple with global climate change. Sudden outbreaks of infectious diseases impact human lives and health around the globe. And expanding authoritarianism is posing a host of challenges to the rules-based international order, threatening our hard-won free and democratic way of life. For these reasons, I have established three committees at the Presidential Office: the National Climate Change Committee, the Healthy Taiwan Promotion Committee, and the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee. These committees are interrelated, and they are closely connected by the theme of national resilience. We intend to build up a more resilient Taiwan, proactively deal with challenges, and bring Taiwan into deeper cooperation with the international community. We must strengthen Taiwan’s ability to adapt to the risks associated with extreme weather, continue promoting our second energy transition, and ensure a stable power supply. We must steadily advance toward our goal of net-zero transition by 2050 through the development of more forms of green energy, deep energy saving, and advanced energy storage. In terms of health, we must effectively fight the spread of global infectious diseases, and raise the population’s average life expectancy while reducing time spent living with illness or disability. We must achieve health equality so that people are healthy, the nation is stronger, and so that the world embraces Taiwan. Finally, we must strengthen resilience throughout Taiwan in national defense, economic livelihoods, disaster prevention, and democracy. As the people of Taiwan become more united, our nation grows more stable. As our society becomes better prepared, our nation grows more secure, and there is also greater peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan is resolved in our commitment to upholding peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and achieving global security and prosperity. We are willing to work with China on addressing climate change, combatting infectious diseases, and maintaining regional security to pursue peace and mutual prosperity for the well-being of the people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. For a long time now, countries around the world have supported China, invested in China, and assisted China in joining the World Trade Organization, thereby promoting China’s economic development and enhancing its national strength. This was done out of the hope that China would join the rest of the world in making global contributions, that internally it would place importance on the livelihoods of the people, and that externally it would maintain peace. As we stand here today, international tensions are on the rise, and each day countless innocents are suffering injuries or losing their lives in conflict. We hope that China will live up to the expectations of the international community, that it will apply its influence and work with other countries toward ending Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and conflicts in the Middle East. And we hope that it will take up its international responsibilities and, along with Taiwan, contribute to the peace, security, and prosperity of the region and the globe. In an era when the international landscape is becoming increasingly chaotic, Taiwan will become more calm, more confident, and stronger; it will become a force for regional peace, stability, and prosperity. I believe that a stronger democratic Taiwan is not only the ideal of our 23 million people, but also the expectation of the international community. We will continue to make Taiwan stronger and promote cross-sector economic development. Taiwan’s economic strength is no “miracle”; it is the result of the joint efforts of all the people of Taiwan. We must strive for an innovative economy, a balanced Taiwan, and inclusive growth; we must stay on top of changes in global trends, and continue to remain a key player in supply chains for global democracies. Going forward, in addition to our 5+2 innovative industries plan and Six Core Strategic Industries policy, we will more vigorously develop Taiwan’s Five Trusted Industry Sectors, namely semiconductors, AI, military, security and surveillance, and next-generation communications, and help expand their global presence. We will also promote the transformation and development of medium, small, and micro enterprises and help them develop their international markets. My fellow citizens, we will continue working to achieve a Taiwan that is balanced across all its regions. In the central government’s proposed general budget plan for next year, general grants for local governments and general centrally funded tax revenues increased significantly, by NT$89.5 billion, reaching a total of NT$724.1 billion, a record high. And our budget for flood control will be raised by NT$15.9 billion from this year, bringing the total to NT$55.1 billion. This will help municipalities across the country in addressing the challenges of extreme weather. We will also expedite improvements to the safety of our national road network and create a human-friendly transportation environment. Furthermore, we will improve our mass rapid transit network and connect the greater Taipei area comprising Taipei, New Taipei, Keelung, and Taoyuan. We will roll out the new Silicon Valley plan for Taoyuan, Hsinchu, and Miaoli to form a central technology cluster connecting the north with the south and launch the Smart Technology Southern Industrial Ecosystem Development Plan. We will accelerate promotion of safety in our eastern transportation network so that locals can go home on safer roads. We will also enhance basic infrastructure in the outlying island areas to raise the quality of life for locals and increase their capacity for tourism. My fellow citizens, we must all the more ensure the well-being of our people across the generations. To our young parents, we will continue to promote version 2.0 of our national childcare policy for ages 0–6. We are going even further by already increasing childcare subsidies, and we will also enhance the quality of preschool services. Children are the future of our country, and the government has the responsibility to help take care of them. To our young students, we will continue to provide free tuition for students of high schools and vocational high schools, and we will also continue to subsidize tuition for students of private junior colleges, colleges, and universities. And we are taking that a step further by establishing the Ten-Billion-Dollar Youth Overseas Dream Fund. Young people have dreams, and the government has the responsibility to help youth realize those dreams. To our young adults and those in the prime of life, next year, the minimum wage will once again be raised, and the number of rent-subsidized housing units will be increased. We will expand investment in society and provide more support across life, work, housing, and health, and support for the young and old. Raising a family is hard work, and the government has a responsibility to help lighten the load. To our senior citizens all around Taiwan, next year, Taiwan will become a “super-aged society.” In advance, we will launch our Long-term Care 3.0 Plan and gradually implement the 888 Program for the prevention and treatment of chronic diseases. We will also establish a NT$10 billion fund for new cancer drugs and advance the Healthy Taiwan Cultivation Plan. We will build a stronger social safety net and provide enhanced care for the disadvantaged. And we will bring mental health support to people of all ages, including the young and middle-aged, to truly achieve care for all people of all ages throughout the whole of our society. I am deeply aware that what everyone cares about the most is the pressure of high housing prices, and that what they most detest is rampant fraud. I give the people my promise that our administration will not shirk these issues; even if it offends certain groups, we will address them no matter the price. We will redouble our efforts to combat fraud and fight housing speculation. We will expand care for renters and strike a balance with the needs of people looking to change homes. We will walk together, continuing down the path toward achieving housing justice. We have with us today former President Chen Shui-bian, former President Tsai Ing-wen, and leaders from different political parties. I want to thank all of you for attending. Your presence represents the strength our nation has built up over generations, as well as the values and significance of Taiwan’s diverse democracy. Our nation must become more united, and our society must grow more stable. I also want to thank Legislative Yuan President Han and Premier Cho for recently initiating cooperation among the ruling and opposition parties to facilitate discussion among the ruling and opposition party caucuses. In democratic countries, political parties internally promote the nation’s progress through competition, and externally they unite to work toward achieving national interests. No matter our political party, no matter our political stances, national interests come before the interests of parties, and the interests of parties can never take precedence over the interests of the people. And this is precisely the spirit upheld by those who sacrificed, who gave everything they had, in order to establish the Republic of China. This is the lesson we take from our predecessors who, generation upon generation, overcame authoritarianism, and sacrificed and devoted themselves to the pursuit of democracy. That is precisely why, regardless of party affiliation or regardless of our differences, we are gathered here today. Regardless of what name we choose to call our nation – the Republic of China; Taiwan; or the Republic of China Taiwan – we must all share common convictions: Our determination to defend our national sovereignty remains unchanged. Our efforts to maintain the status quo of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait remain unchanged. Our commitment to hoping for parity and dignity, and healthy and orderly dialogue and exchanges between the two sides of the strait remains unchanged. Our determination, from one generation to the next, to protect our free and democratic way of life remains unchanged. I believe this is the dream that Taiwan’s 23 million people all share; it is also the shared ideal that Taiwanese society and the international community hold. The stronger the commitment of the Taiwanese people, the greater the tenacity of democracy around the world. The greater the tenacity of the Taiwanese people, the stronger the commitment of democracy around the world. Let’s keep going, Republic of China! Let’s keep going, Taiwan! Regardless of our differences, let’s keep going forward! Thank you.

Details
2024-06-24
President Lai’s remarks on legislative amendments
On the morning of June 24, President Lai Ching-te delivered his remarks on recent legislative amendments. In remarks, President Lai emphasized opposition to an expansion of legislative power, not legislative reforms, and said that the legislature should naturally engage in reforms, but refrain from an excessive expansion of power, adding that any proposal for legislative reform should remain legal and constitutional. Particularly, the president said, the investigative powers of the Legislative Yuan should not infringe upon the powers of the judiciary or the Control Yuan, and more importantly, they must not infringe upon people’s basic rights, including the right to privacy, trade secrets, and the freedom to withhold expression. Therefore, on the basis of safeguarding the constitutional order and protecting the rights of the people, the president stated that he will petition the Constitutional Court for a constitutional interpretation, as well as petition for a preliminary injunction. Emphasizing that the president’s role is as a guardian of democratic and constitutional governance, President Lai said that given that there are concerns about the recent amendments being unconstitutional, concerns that they confound constitutional provisions on the separation of powers and those on checks and balances, it is incumbent upon him to perform his duties as president and take action. Today, he said, he has decided to petition the Constitutional Court for a constitutional interpretation to rule on the constitutionality and legitimacy of the recent amendments. Stating that this approach is responsible to our nation and to our history and actually reflects the expectations of the people, the president expressed his hope that all of our fellow citizens can work together to safeguard our constitutional system and more deeply entrench our democracy, allowing for the sustainable development of Taiwan’s democracy. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: One month ago, I was sworn in as president, taking an oath before the people to observe the Constitution and faithfully perform my duties. Therefore, following the legislature’s passing of amendments to the Law Governing the Legislative Yuan’s Power and to the Criminal Code, earlier this morning, I signed these amendments into law in accordance with the Constitution, and will promulgate the bills today. However, aside from the deliberative process over the amendments raising pronounced concerns from the public, the contents of the bills also risk compromising the constitutional principle of separation of powers, as well as that of checks and balances. A moment ago, Attorney Hong Wei-sheng (洪偉勝) explained our reasons for seeking to petition for a constitutional interpretation. I would like to share with our fellow citizens that it is the responsibility and mission of the president to safeguard our free and democratic constitutional system and protect the rights of the people. In a free and democratic constitutional system, core principles include separation of powers, checks and balances, and the protection of human rights. Separation of powers should be based on the Constitution, with the branches working independently while respecting one another. Regarding checks and balances, branches should function according to their institutional design to ensure constitutionally responsible government. Therefore, I must emphasize that we are opposing an expansion of legislative power, not legislative reforms. The legislature should naturally engage in reforms, but refrain from an excessive expansion of power. Any proposal for legislative reform should remain legal and constitutional. Particularly, the investigative powers of the Legislative Yuan should not infringe upon the powers of the judiciary or the Control Yuan. More importantly, they must not infringe upon people’s basic rights, including the right to privacy, trade secrets, and the freedom to withhold expression. Therefore, on the basis of safeguarding the constitutional order and protecting the rights of the people, I will petition the Constitutional Court for a constitutional interpretation, as well as petition for a preliminary injunction. On the issue of the president giving an address on the state of the nation at the Legislative Yuan, there are already existing regulations in place in the Constitution and the Law Governing the Legislative Yuan’s Power. During legislative sessions, the legislature may invite the president to give a state of the nation address on national security and major policies. I have previously said that on the condition of legal and constitutional procedures, I am willing to deliver a state of the nation address at the Legislative Yuan. However, recent amendments passed by the legislature redefine the president’s address on the state of the nation as compulsory and require that the address be followed with an on-the-spot question and answer session, in an attempt to change the design of responsible government in the Constitution. This disrupts the institution of the Executive Yuan being responsible to the Legislative Yuan, leading to concerns about an overreaching expansion of the power originally bestowed to legislators by the Constitution. As president, I will not impose my personal opinions on the constitutional order; nor will I place my personal interests before national interests. As a physician, I deeply understand that any diagnosis should be made with care. When performing organ transplants, the physician must carefully evaluate and match various attributes, such as blood type, physical constitution, and other conditions. The same principles for treating illness hold true for governing a country. Institutional or legal transplants performed in the absence of careful evaluation or discussion could lead to negative outcomes for the nation’s constitutional governance and the protection of the people’s rights. We must address these issues seriously. Every law has far-reaching impact on our nation, our society, and the next generation. The president’s role is as a guardian of democratic and constitutional governance. Given that there are concerns about the recent amendments being unconstitutional, concerns that they confound constitutional provisions on the separation of powers and those on checks and balances, it is incumbent upon me to perform my duties as president and take action. Today, I have decided to petition the Constitutional Court for a constitutional interpretation to rule on the constitutionality and legitimacy of the recent amendments. This approach is responsible to our nation and to our history and actually reflects the expectations of the people. The Constitution stands as the supreme legal basis of our nation, and the Constitutional Court is the highest judicial organ that works to maintain the constitutional order and protect the rights of citizens. As to the interpretation, ruling and opposition parties must respect and accept the results, no matter what they turn out to be. And we also hope that the public will be able to support the results. In the coming days, as this process of constitutional interpretation unfolds, there will be much discussion and debate among the public. I am confident that this will be a reaffirmation, by Taiwanese society, of our democratic and constitutional governance, and that it will make our democratic society even more mature. For democracy to be even more deeply entrenched, it needs defending, and it needs dialogue. And the historic moment to defend the constitutional structure of free democracy is now. I hope that all of my fellow citizens can work together to safeguard our constitutional system and more deeply entrench our democracy, allowing for the sustainable development of Taiwan’s democracy. Thank you. Also in attendance were Secretary-General to the President Pan Men-an (潘孟安), Deputy Secretary-General to the President Xavier Chang (張惇涵), and agent ad litem Attorney Hong.

Details
2025-04-06
President Lai delivers remarks on US tariff policy response
On April 6, President Lai Ching-te delivered recorded remarks regarding the impact of the 32 percent tariff that the United States government recently imposed on imports from Taiwan in the name of reciprocity. In his remarks, President Lai explained that the government will adopt five response strategies, including making every effort to improve reciprocal tariff rates through negotiations, adopting a support plan for affected domestic industries, adopting medium- and long-term economic development plans, forming new “Taiwan plus the US” arrangements, and launching industry listening tours. The president emphasized that as we face this latest challenge, the government and civil society will work hand in hand, and expressed hope that all parties, both ruling and opposition, will support the measures that the Executive Yuan will take to open up a broader path for Taiwan’s economy. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: My fellow citizens, good evening. The US government recently announced higher tariffs on countries around the world in the name of reciprocity, including imposing a 32 percent tariff on imports from Taiwan. This is bound to have a major impact on our nation. Various countries have already responded, and some have even adopted retaliatory measures. Tremendous changes in the global economy are expected. Taiwan is an export-led economy, and in facing future challenges there will inevitably be difficulties, so we must proceed carefully to turn danger into safety. During this time, I want to express gratitude to all sectors of society for providing valuable opinions, which the government regards highly, and will use as a reference to make policy decisions. However, if we calmly and carefully analyze Taiwan’s trade with the US, we find that last year Taiwan’s exports to the US were valued at US$111.4 billion, accounting for 23.4 percent of total export value, with the other 75-plus percent of products sold worldwide to countries other than the US. Of products sold to the US, competitive ICT products and electronic components accounted for 65.4 percent. This shows that Taiwan’s economy does still have considerable resilience. As long as our response strategies are appropriate, and the public and private sectors join forces, we can reduce impacts. Please do not panic. To address the reciprocal tariffs by the US, Taiwan has no plans to adopt retaliatory tariffs. There will be no change in corporate investment commitments to the US, as long as they are consistent with national interests. But we must ensure the US clearly understands Taiwan’s contributions to US economic development. More importantly, we must actively seek to understand changes in the global economic situation, strengthen Taiwan-US industry cooperation, elevate the status of Taiwan industries in global supply chains, and with safeguarding the continued development of Taiwan’s economy as our goal, adopt the following five strategies to respond. Strategy one: Make every effort to improve reciprocal tariff rates through negotiations using the following five methods: 1. Taiwan has already formed a negotiation team led by Vice Premier Cheng Li-chiun (鄭麗君). The team includes members from the National Security Council, the Office of Trade Negotiations, and relevant Executive Yuan ministries and agencies, as well as academia and industry. Like the US-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement, negotiations on tariffs can start from Taiwan-US bilateral zero-tariff treatment. 2. To expand purchases from the US and thereby reduce the trade deficit, the Executive Yuan has already completed an inventory regarding large-scale procurement plans for agricultural, industrial, petroleum, and natural gas products, and the Ministry of National Defense has also proposed a military procurement list. All procurement plans will be actively pursued. 3. Expand investments in the US. Taiwan’s cumulative investment in the US already exceeds US$100 billion, creating approximately 400,000 jobs. In the future, in addition to increased investment in the US by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, other industries such as electronics, ICT, petrochemicals, and natural gas can all increase their US investments, deepening Taiwan-US industry cooperation. Taiwan’s government has helped form a “Taiwan investment in the US” team, and hopes that the US will reciprocate by forming a “US investment in Taiwan” team to bring about closer Taiwan-US trade cooperation, jointly creating a future economic golden age. 4. We must eliminate non-tariff barriers to trade. Non-tariff barriers are an indicator by which the US assesses whether a trading partner is trading fairly with the US. Therefore, we will proactively resolve longstanding non-tariff barriers so that negotiations can proceed more smoothly. 5. We must resolve two issues that have been matters of longstanding concern to the US. One regards high-tech export controls, and the other regards illegal transshipment of dumped goods, otherwise referred to as “origin washing.” Strategy two: We must adopt a plan for supporting our industries. For industries that will be affected by the tariffs, and especially traditional industries as well as micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises, we will provide timely and needed support and assistance. Premier Cho Jung-tai (卓榮泰) and his administrative team recently announced a package of 20 specific measures designed to address nine areas. Moving forward, the support we provide to different industries will depend on how they are affected by the tariffs, will take into account the particular features of each industry, and will help each industry innovate, upgrade, and transform. Strategy three: We must adopt medium- and long-term economic development plans. At this point in time, our government must simultaneously adopt new strategies for economic and industrial development. This is also the fundamental path to solutions for future economic challenges. The government will proactively cooperate with friends and allies, develop a diverse range of markets, and achieve closer integration of entities in the upper, middle, and lower reaches of industrial supply chains. This course of action will make Taiwan’s industrial ecosystem more complete, and will help Taiwanese industries upgrade and transform. We must also make good use of the competitive advantages we possess in such areas as semiconductor manufacturing, integrated chip design, ICT, and smart manufacturing to build Taiwan into an AI island, and promote relevant applications for food, clothing, housing, and transportation, as well as military, security and surveillance, next-generation communications, and the medical and health and wellness industries as we advance toward a smarter, more sustainable, and more prosperous new Taiwan. Strategy four: “Taiwan plus one,” i.e., new “Taiwan plus the US” arrangements: While staying firmly rooted in Taiwan, our enterprises are expanding their global presence and marketing worldwide. This has been our national economic development strategy, and the most important aspect is maintaining a solid base here in Taiwan. We absolutely must maintain a solid footing, and cannot allow the present strife to cause us to waver. Therefore, our government will incentivize investments, carry out deregulation, and continue to improve Taiwan’s investment climate by actively resolving problems involving access to water, electricity, land, human resources, and professional talent. This will enable corporations to stay in Taiwan and continue investing here. In addition, we must also help the overseas manufacturing facilities of offshore Taiwanese businesses to make necessary adjustments to support our “Taiwan plus one” policy, in that our national economic development strategy will be adjusted as follows: to stay firmly rooted in Taiwan while expanding our global presence, strengthening US ties, and marketing worldwide. We intend to make use of the new state of supply chains to strengthen cooperation between Taiwanese and US industries, and gain further access to US markets. Strategy five: Launch industry listening tours: All industrial firms, regardless of sector or size, will be affected to some degree once the US reciprocal tariffs go into effect. The administrative teams led by myself and Premier Cho will hear out industry concerns so that we can quickly resolve problems and make sure policies meet actual needs. My fellow citizens, over the past half-century and more, Taiwan has been through two energy crises, the Asian financial crisis, the global financial crisis, and pandemics. We have been able to not only withstand one test after another, but even turn crises into opportunities. The Taiwanese economy has emerged from these crises stronger and more resilient than ever. As we face this latest challenge, the government and civil society will work hand in hand, and I hope that all parties in the legislature, both ruling and opposition, will support the measures that the Executive Yuan will take to open up a broader path for Taiwan’s economy. Let us join together and give it our all. Thank you.

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

April 7, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: Ukraine: Rights chief urges probe into attack that killed nine children

Source: United Nations 2-b

6 April 2025 Human Rights

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called on Sunday for an investigation into the Russian attack on the Ukrainian city of Kryvyi Rih which reportedly killed 18 people, including nine children.

Volker Türk issued a statement expressing shock at the attack, which occurred on Friday evening as families gathered near a playground, a restaurant and residential buildings.

A team from the UN Human Rights Office in Ukraine visited the impact site the following day, documented the damage, and established the names and identity of the children who were killed.

‘An unimaginable horror’

The incident is the deadliest single strike harming children which the Office has verified since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

“It’s an unimaginable horror — nine children killed, most while playing in a park, as a military weapon exploded into shrapnel above them,” said Mr. Türk.

He added that “the use of an explosive weapon with wide area effects by the Russian Federation in a densely populated area —and without any apparent military presence — demonstrates a reckless disregard for civilian life.”

Documenting the aftermath

The attack took place just before 7 PM on Friday, local time. The missile detonated over a residential area with a playground, restaurant and multi-storey buildings.

Eighteen people were killed, including nine children, and 75 were wounded, including 12 children, according to local authorities. Many of the casualties occurred in the playground.

The UN Human Rights Office verified many of the casualties, including each of the children killed, and continues to collect information to verify the remaining cases.

The team also documented damage from hundreds of pieces of shrapnel to buildings, playground swings and slides, trees, and on the ground.

The statement noted that while Russian authorities claimed a military group was targeted, local residents, a business association representative and staff of the restaurant told UN Human Rights that dozens of professional women and men in the beauty sector had been attending an industry forum hosted by the local business association in the restaurant, shortly before the attack.

The event was publicized online well in advance, and all witnesses conveyed that there had been no military presence at the restaurant or in the area at the time of the strike.

Uphold humanitarian law

“International humanitarian law requires parties to a conflict to use means or methods of combat that in the prevailing circumstances are not likely to strike military and civilians without distinction,” said Mr. Türk.

“It also requires the parties to take all feasible precautions to minimize harm to civilians, including by verifying that the objects targeted are not civilian but military objectives, and choosing tactics and weapons that would avoid or at the very least minimize incidental loss of civilian life.”

The statement noted that even if the Russian authorities had information that military personnel could be present, the mode and circumstances of attack may constitute an indiscriminate attack.

Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited under international humanitarian law, and if they amount to attacks directed against civilians may constitute war crimes, Mr. Türk added.

The UN rights chief called for a prompt, thorough and independent investigation into the attack.

MIL OSI United Nations News –

April 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Canada: Prime Minister Carney speaks with Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Sir Keir Starmer

Source: Government of Canada – Prime Minister

Today, the Prime Minister, Mark Carney, spoke with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Sir Keir Starmer.

The leaders discussed the United States’ unjustified global trade actions and the need to reinforce our trade relationships with reliable partners. Prime Minister Carney highlighted his plan to fight the imposition of tariffs targeting Canada, including those targeting the auto, steel and aluminum industries, protect Canadian workers and businesses, and build Canada’s economy.

Prime Minister Carney and Prime Minister Starmer also discussed global issues of mutual concern, including supporting Ukraine in the face of Russia’s invasion. They agreed to remain in close contact.

Associated Links

MIL OSI Canada News –

April 7, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: PM call with Prime Minister Carney of Canada: 6 April 2025
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

Press release

PM call with Prime Minister Carney of Canada: 6 April 2025

The Prime Minister spoke to the Prime Minister of Canada Mark Carney this evening.
The Prime Minister spoke to the Prime Minister of Canada Mark Carney this evening.

They discussed their commitment to working together to maintain global economic stability in the wake of the announcement from the United States this week. An all-out trade war is in no-one’s interest, they agreed.

Both agreed on the importance of free and open trade between like-minded nations, and the Prime Minister stated that trading blocs such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership will be important in this new global era.

Prime Minister Carney thanked the Prime Minister for his leadership on Ukraine and reaffirmed his commitment to Canada playing a role in the Coalition of the Willing.

Looking ahead, the Prime Minister said he was looking forward to travelling to Canada for the G7 Summit in June.

They agreed to stay in close contact.

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Published 6 April 2025
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
April 7, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: World Health Day: Focusing on women’s physical and mental health around the world

Source: United Nations MIL OSI

Close to 300,000 women continue to die during pregnancy or childbirth each year. More than two million babies die in their first month of life and around two million more are stillborn, says the World Health Organization (WHO) which is kicking off a year-long campaign on maternal and newborn health.

The data adds up to one preventable death every seven seconds, according to the UN health agency.

The Healthy beginnings, hopeful futures campaign is asking governments and health policy makers to ramp up efforts to end preventable maternal and newborn deaths, and prioritize women’s longer-term health and well-being.

Helping every woman and baby survive and thrive

Through a series of strategic actions, WHO aims to not only save lives but ensure both mothers and infants thrive. In collaboration with partners, it will focus on empowering healthcare professionals and sharing crucial information about healthy pregnancies, safe childbirth, and postnatal care.

Listening to women

Access to high-quality, compassionate care is essential for women and families everywhere, WHO emphasises. Health systems must evolve to address a wide range of health concerns, including obstetric complications, mental health issues, non-communicable diseases, and family planning – ensuring that women’s needs are met both before, during, and after childbirth.

© UNICEF/Eyad El Baba

Girls affected by the ongoing conflict in Gaza receive a care and protection package distributed by UNICEF.

Women in war zones

At the same time, the proportion of women and girls caught in conflict zones has skyrocketed in the past year, with women now making up 40 per cent of all civilian deaths in armed conflicts.

Today, over 600 million women and girls live in areas affected by violence – an alarming 50 per cent increase since 2017.

As conflict intensifies across the globe, women and girls are bearing a heavy mental health toll. From Afghanistan and Gaza to Georgia and Ukraine, millions are grappling with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), anxiety, depression and trauma, with limited access to support and care.

Around one in five people affected by a humanitarian crisis will develop long-term mental health conditions. Despite this, only two per cent of those in need receive the care they require. Mental health funding globally represents between one and two percent of health spending.

Stark divide on mental health

The gap between high and low-income countries in mental health services is stark. In wealthy nations, there are more than 70 mental health workers for every 100,000 people. In contrast, in low-income countries, that number drops to fewer than one.

As conflicts drag on, the number of affected women continues to rise, making this crisis even more urgent. UN gender equality agency, UN Women, spoke to women in Afghanistan, Gaza, Georgia, and Ukraine to understand how these conflicts are stoking a mental health crisis.

© UNFPA Ukraine

UNFPA’s mobile psychosocial support teams travel across Ukraine, including to the front lines, offering immediate emergency interventions as well as access to longer-term assistance.

Women in Gaza trapped in trauma

In Gaza, relentless bombing, displacement, and deprivation have created a humanitarian catastrophe. Living under siege and the constant threat of violence, women and girls face extreme levels of fear, trauma, and exhaustion.

Data from UN Women shows that 75 per cent feel regular depression, 62 per cent cannot sleep, and 65 per cent suffer from nightmares and anxiety – most are left to cope alone.

“My mental and psychological health is suffering,” said one 27-year-old pregnant mother of three from Khan Younis. “Sometimes I go to the toilet just to cry and cry until I feel better.”

Women are not only dealing with their own trauma – they are also trying to care for their children.

“I have not prioritized my health because I am the primary caregiver for my children, assuming the roles of both father and mother,” the 27-year-old mother added.

Afghanistan: Women Erased from Public Life

In Afghanistan, the return of the Taliban has dealt a crushing blow to women’s rights and mental health. Alison Davidian, UN Women’s Country Representative, warns that nearly four years of Taliban decrees have “eviscerated” women’s autonomy.

With no women in leadership roles and 98 per cent reporting no influence over local decisions, many feel trapped in a life of isolation and despair.

“Three years ago, an Afghan woman could run for president. Now, she may not even be able to decide when to buy groceries,” Davidian says. The result is overwhelming psychological distress, with 68 per cent of women in Afghanistan reporting their mental health as “bad” or “very bad.”

© IOM/Léo Torréton

An IOM mental health and psychosocial support counsellor leads a session with women in Paktika province, Afghanistan.

Georgia: Antidepressant use on the rise

In Georgia, ongoing displacement and conflict have left many women with no access to adequate mental healthcare. Approximately 200,000 people remain internally displaced, with nearly 40 per cent living in shelters under dire conditions.

Mental health issues are widespread, with 23 per cent suffering from PTSD, 10 per cent reporting depression, and 9 per cent dealing with anxiety. Yet only about a third of those affected have sought care.

“We saw a sharp increase in antidepressant use, particularly in areas with high numbers of displaced people,” said Elene Rusetskaia of the Women’s Information Centre. “The mental health problem is very serious, especially among children.”

Ukraine: Domestic Violence and Depression Soar Amid War

In Ukraine, the war stemming from Russia’s invasion has pushed women’s mental health into crisis. Gender-based violence has surged 36 per cent since 2022, and women are shouldering more unpaid care work – up to 56 hours per week. Forty-two percent are now at risk of depression, while 23 per cent report needing counseling.

Displaced women, many of them refugees, are facing some of the worst mental health challenges, with limited access to support services.

A recent survey by the International Migration Organization (IOM) found that 53 per cent of internally displaced people in Ukraine suffer from depression, yet assistance remains scarce.

In response, UN Women has provided protection, legal aid, and psychosocial support to more than 180,000 women and girls in Ukraine through the Women’s Peace and Humanitarian Fund.

Healthcare funding

The current humanitarian funding crisis, exacerbated by declining health spending in host countries, is affecting the scope and quality of public health and nutrition programmes for refugees and host communities, the UN refugee agency, UNHCR, has said.

In Jordan, 335,000 women of reproductive age are at risk of losing essential maternal health. Without enough funding, prenatal care, safe delivery and newborn health services will disappear.

In Bangladesh, around a million Rohingya refugees face a severe health crisis due to the funding freeze, threatening access to essential medical services. In UNHCR-supported programmes, over 40,000 pregnant women may lose access to critical antenatal care, with 5,000 at risk of delivering in unsafe conditions.

In Burundi, the suspension of nutrition programmes in several camps means that thousands of refugee children under five may not receive adequate treatment for malnutrition.

Necessity, not luxury

For women and girls in conflict zones, mental health care is a critical need, not a luxury. Recovery, dignity, and survival depend on access to trauma care, counseling, and community-based services.

As conflicts continue to devastate communities, the need for mental health support becomes more urgent than ever. Countries must invest in mental health as a core part of humanitarian response, especially in conflict settings, UN Women, emphasized, calling on governments to listen – and act.

Listen to an interview with the Representative ad interim of the UN reproductive health agency, UNFPA, in Sudan:

Soundcloud

MIL OSI United Nations News –

April 7, 2025
MIL-OSI China: 3 injured after Russia’s air attack on Kiev

Source: China State Council Information Office

At least three people were injured in a Russian ballistic missile attack on the Ukrainian capital early Sunday morning, Ukraine’s State Service for Emergencies said.

Several explosions were heard on Sunday morning in Kiev as Russia launched a fresh wave of air attacks on the city, triggering the operation of its air defense, according to Kiev’s military administration.

The air attack has caused fires in the urban districts of Darnytskyi and Obolon, and rescuers are heading to the scene, said the Kiev military administration in a post on the social platform Telegram.

“Explosions in the capital. Air defense is in operation. Stay in shelters!” Mayor Vitali Klitschko was quoted as saying earlier on Telegram by media reports, adding: “The missile attack on Kiev is ongoing.”

As of 7:16 a.m. local time (0416 GMT), 128 firefighters and 27 units of equipment were still working to deal with the aftermath of the strikes.

MIL OSI China News –

April 6, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: April 5th, 2025 As Republicans Tank Economy, Heinrich Fights Against Trump-Musk Handouts to Billionaires at the Expense of New Mexico Families

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for New Mexico Martin Heinrich
WASHINGTON — Last night, U.S. Senator Martin Heinrich (D-N.M.) stood up for New Mexico families by voting against Senate Republicans’ budget resolution that funds Donald Trump and Elon Musk’s tax handouts for billionaires at the expense of working people.
Heinrich pushed to amend Republicans’ resolution by repeatedly voting to lower costs for families — particularly as Trump’s tariffs push America to the brink of a recession. Heinrich and Senate Democrats also worked to block cuts to Medicaid, extend the tax credits for health care premiums, and prevent millions of Americans from losing health insurance, protect Social Security, and reverse cuts to the Social Security Administration, including cuts by Elon Musk’s DOGE.
Heinrich additionally led an amendment with U.S. Senator John Hickenlooper (D-Colo.) to prevent the sale of our public lands as Congressional Republicans publicly discuss public lands sales to fund their tax breaks for billionaires. Republicans blocked it.
“Republicans’ budget resolution is a massive tax handout for Donald Trump, Elon Musk, and their billionaire donors. It has one aim: Billionaires win, American families lose.
“Throughout the night and into the early morning, I fought back, introducing and voting for dozens of amendments to shield New Mexico families from Republicans’ harmful legislation. Amendments that would rescind President Trump’s tariff taxes if the price of groceries, medicine, and other household goods increase, protect Medicaid by blocking Musk’s DOGE cuts that threaten rural hospital closures, reverse cuts to Social Security, and prevent the sale of our public lands to fund tax cuts for billionaires. Republicans blocked every single one of them.
“When Republicans had the opportunity to go on the record and show the American people whose side they’re on, they put their billionaire donors on a pedestal and threw working people under the bus. Rather than putting New Mexico families first, Donald Trump, Elon Musk, and their Republican enablers in Congress are tanking our economy, pushing us into a recession.”
Last night, Senate Republicans blocked Heinrich’s efforts to:
Fight Increasing Costs, Including From Trump’s Tariffs
Senate Republicans voted against:
Rescinding President Trump’s tariff taxes that increase the price of groceries, medicine, and other household goods.
Protecting food assistance for kids and seniors, who are otherwise significantly harmed by rising grocery prices.
Preventing essential services for children, families, and seniors from being defunded to give massive tax cuts to billionaires.
Protecting agriculture programs that support farmers and rural economies.
Prioritize Working Families Over Billionaires
Senate Republicans voted against:
Providing tax cuts for the middle class and small businesses while ensuring large corporations and the ultra-wealthy pay their fair share.
Preventing tax handouts for people making over $100 million a year.
Preventing tax handouts for people making over $500 million a year.
Preventing tax handouts for people making over $1 billion a year.
Preventing tax handouts for corporations making over $1 billion a year.
Preventing more than $37 trillion from being added to the debt in 30 years—more debt than has accumulated over the past 249 years.
Protect Medicare and Medicaid
Senate Republicans voted against:
Stopping cuts to Medicare and Medicaid.
Preventing cuts to Medicaid that could lead to rural hospital closures, increased costs for people with private insurance, and higher rates of uncompensated care.
Protecting Americans from losing health care through Medicaid, including seniors, children, families, individuals with disabilities, veterans, and military families.
Preserving access to health care by preventing cuts to Medicaid that could lead to loss of benefits or coverage, and slashed provider payments.
Lowering prescription drug costs for seniors and people with disabilities with Medicare.
Extending the health care premium tax credits created in the Affordable Care Act to prevent millions of Americans from losing health insurance.
Safeguard Social Security
Senate Republicans voted against:
Reversing cuts to the Social Security Administration, including cuts by Elon Musk’s DOGE.
Preventing Elon Musk’s DOGE from closing Social Security field and regional offices, preserving access to benefits for seniors and people with disabilities.
Preventing Elon Musk’s DOGE from limiting access to Social Security phone services to protect seniors’ access to Social Security benefits.
Protect Our National Security and Provide Disaster Relief
Senate Republicans voted against:
Protecting service members by prohibiting the use of Signal and other commercial messaging applications for sharing information on the timing, sequencing, or weapons to be used related to impending U.S. military operations.
Prohibiting any reduction in U.S. security assistance and intelligence-sharing with Ukraine.
Supporting the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) role in providing nonpartisan and long-term disaster relief to disaster survivors.
Support Our Farmers and Federal Workers
Senate Republicans voted against:
Ensuring contracts made with our farmers are honored.
Protecting legally binding collective bargaining agreements and the right to organize for federal workers.
Below is a total list of amendments that Heinrich filed to amend Republicans’ budget resolution to cut taxes for billionaires at the expense of working people:
Amendment to prevent the sale of public lands.
Amendment to lower housing costs for Americans.
Amendment to reduce Department of Veterans Affairs wait times for 136,000 veterans per day.
Amendment to reduce Social Security Administration wait times for 344,000 Americans per day.
Amendment to scale up American manufacturing by supporting small and medium-sized manufactures enhance competitiveness, productivity, and technological performance.
Amendment to recruit and hire additional wildland firefighters.
Amendment to exempt federal wildland firefighters and personnel from hiring freezes and reinstate federal wildland firefighters and personnel fired by Trump, Elon Musk, or DOGE.
Amendment to increase forest health and wildfire mitigation forest treatments to support wildland firefighting.
Amendment to hire reforestation crews and promote the recovery of burned forest land to support healthy watersheds, outdoor recreation, and timber resources.
Last month, Heinrich attempted to amend Republicans’ prior resolution by offering an amendment to reinstate blocked grants for survivors of sexual assault and domestic violence and ensure law enforcement can hold predators and abusers accountable. Republicans voted against his amendment. Watch Heinrich’s video here.

MIL OSI USA News –

April 6, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: UN deplores deadly attack on city in central Ukraine

Source: United Nations 2-b

5 April 2025 Peace and Security

The UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Ukraine has strongly condemned a missile strike in Kryvyi Rih on Friday which killed more than a dozen people, including at least nine children, and left several others injured.

Matthias Schmale said he was outraged by reports of yet another Russian attack on the city, which is located in the Dnipro region.

“This attack follows a deeply disturbing pattern of repeated attacks on populated areas across Ukraine that continue to kill and maim civilians,” he said, noting that the country’s second-largest city, Kharkiv, was “still reeling” from a massive attack the night before.

“The cost to families is unbearable. Civilians are protected under international humanitarian law. They are not a target,” he said.

Young lives lost

In response to the incident, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) called for an immediate end to attacks on civilian areas in Ukraine.

“We are devastated by the horrific attack in Kryvyi Rih that reportedly killed at least nine children and injured many more, including one as young as three months old,” said UNICEF Regional Director for Europe and Central Asia, Regina De Dominicis.

The missile reportedly struck a residential neighbourhood in the Saksahanskyi district in the early evening, when many families gathering ahead of the weekend, she said, adding that it landed near a playground, tearing through homes, schools and a restaurant.

“Among the scenes of devastation, parents were seen weeping, cradling the body of their dead son. No child should ever suffer such terror. No parent should ever endure such pain,” she said.

Stolen futures

UNICEF and partners are on the ground supporting affected families and coordinating with local authorities to deliver emergency assistance.

Ms. De Dominicis noted that more than 2,500 children have been killed or injured, and millions of young lives have been upended, since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

“Every child killed is a future stolen,” she remarked. “The brutal use of explosive weapons in populated areas and attacks on civilian facilities and infrastructure, which disproportionally harm children, must end.”

MIL OSI United Nations News –

April 6, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: PM call with President Macron of France: 5 April 2025
Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

Press release

PM call with President Macron of France: 5 April 2025

The Prime Minister spoke to the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, this afternoon.
The Prime Minister spoke with President Macron following this week’s announcement that the US will impose additional tariffs.

They agreed that a trade war was in nobody’s interests, but nothing should be off the table and that it was important to keep business updated on developments.

The Prime Minister and President also shared their concerns about the global economic and security impact, particularly in South East Asia.

Following discussions between military planners in Ukraine this week, they discussed the good progress that has been made on the Coalition of the Willing.

The Prime Minister and President agreed to stay in close contact over the coming weeks.

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Published 5 April 2025
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
April 6, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Coalition of the Willing Military Chiefs in Ukraine ahead of crucial meetings next week
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

Press release

Coalition of the Willing Military Chiefs in Ukraine ahead of crucial meetings next week

As part of the UK’s leading efforts to build a Coalition of the Willing to secure a lasting peace in Ukraine, the Chief of the Defence Staff Admiral Sir Tony Radakin met with Ukrainian and French counterparts in Kyiv.
Chief of the Defence Staff Admiral Sir Tony Radakin met with Ukrainian and French counterparts in Kyiv.

UK continues to lead international efforts to secure a lasting peace in Ukraine.

Defence chiefs meet in Kyiv to coordinate military planning of multinational force to deter future Russian aggression.

Visit comes as Defence Secretary John Healey prepares to host meetings of defence ministers in Brussels.

As part of the UK’s leading efforts to build a Coalition of the Willing to secure a lasting peace in Ukraine, the Chief of the Defence Staff Admiral Sir Tony Radakin met with Ukrainian and French counterparts in Kyiv.

The meetings focused on how to build on Ukraine’s current capabilities to put the country in the strongest possible position for the future.

The Defence Chiefs addressed the structure, size and composition required of any future reassurance force in Ukraine. With 30 countries expected to contribute to the Coalition, the UK’s leadership has been critical in pulling together partners and allies around the world.

Discussions will continue this coming week as the Defence Secretary hosts the next meeting of Coalition of the Willing defence ministers in Brussels with his French counterpart on Thursday and chairs the Ukraine Defence Contact Group with his German counterpart on Friday.

The UK and France will convene defence ministers from coalition nations to discuss the next stages of planning to support the security arrangements which will be needed to prevent any further Russian aggression. Discussions will build on the military planning that has taken place over the last few weeks with nations looking at contributing their own capabilities to support any future force.

Meanwhile, the Ukraine Defence Contact Group will bring together around 50 nations to drive forward additional military support for Ukraine in the face of ongoing Russian attacks. The UK convened and chaired the UDCG for the first time in February, with 46 nations in attendance, raising extra 1.5billon Euros in military aid for Ukraine.

Defence Secretary John Healey MP said:

Our coalition of nations, working at pace and willing to stand with Ukraine for the long-term, is a stark contrast to Russia who stand alone with only North Korea for a friend.

As Putin prevaricates over a ceasefire, we will continue to ramp up our military planning, exploring the air, sea and land forces that could support a lasting peace in Ukraine.

However, we will not jeopardise the peace by forgetting about the war. That’s why in the week ahead we will also convene the Ukraine Defence Contact Group to supply Ukraine with the military equipment they need to put them in the strongest possible position as they fight back brutal continuing Russian attacks.

The Chief of the Defence Staff’s visit follows a series of high-level engagements hosted in both Paris and London in the past month, with the Prime Minister travelling to Paris and hosting leaders in London and the Defence Secretary conducting simultaneous visits to France as well as joining an operational planning meeting alongside the Prime Minister at the UK’s Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ).

Chief of the Defence Staff Admiral Sir Tony Radakin said:

The UK is ironclad in our support for Ukraine, which is why we’re stepping up for a just and lasting peace.

Our meetings looked at how we can build on the formidable capabilities of the Ukrainian Army and put them in the strongest possible position to deter Russian aggression.

I am encouraged by the strength of unity we’ve seen between our European and international allies.

This work delivers on the Prime Minister’s four-point plan to support Ukraine by ramping up delivery of weapons and equipment, boosting Ukraine’s defensive capabilities in the long term, working with allies to develop robust security assurances, and keeping up pressure on Putin.

The UK is fully committed to working with allies to step up support to ensure Ukraine remains in the strongest possible position, which is why £4.5 billion of military support will be provided this year – more than ever before.

The Defence Secretary has been clear that supporting Ukraine is vital to the security of stability of Europe, which is essential to the UK economy. The UK’s national security is a foundation for the government’s Plan for Change.

Last month, the Prime Minister announced a historic £1.6bn deal to provide more than five thousand air defence missiles for Ukraine in a boost for UK jobs and growth. The Chancellor also announced a £2.26 billion loan to bolster Ukrainian defence capabilities from frozen Russian assets.

The MOD has sent around 400 different capabilities to Ukraine, with a new £150 million package including drones, tanks and air defence systems announced on 12 February 2025, a £225 million package including drones, boats and munitions announced on 19 December 2024, and 650 lightweight multirole missiles announced on 6 September 2024.

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MIL OSI United Kingdom –
April 6, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: McCaul Statement on 3-Year Anniversary of War in Ukraine

Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Michael McCaul (10th District of Texas)

WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Congressman Michael McCaul (R-Texas) — chairman emeritus of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs — released the following statement on the 3-year anniversary of the war in Ukraine.

“Three years ago today, Putin sent his army into Ukraine, shattering peace in Europe and threatening global stability. Putin’s autocratic friends in China, Iran, and North Korea quickly came to his aid — bolstering Russia’s defense industrial base and sending thousands of troops to fight and kill the Ukrainian people. Make no mistake: This unholy alliance formed by our adversaries seeks to undermine western values, weaken U.S. national security, and upend the global balance of power.

“I agree with President Trump that this would never have happened had he been in office. There’s a reason these hostile regimes did not attack sovereign territories during his first term: He projected peace through strength. All the pain and bloodshed in Europe could have been prevented if Democrats — under both the Obama and Biden administrations — had stood up to Putin sooner.

“This war has raged for three years too many. Putin could stop the killing today, but since he refuses — President Trump has answered the call to help put an end to the fighting. As he and his team continue negotiations, I urge them to ensure the agreement holds the Kremlin accountable for its crimes and contains serious teeth to ensure Putin cannot resurrect his quest to recreate the Soviet Union by taking Ukraine. Only then will lasting peace be secured.”

###

MIL OSI USA News –

April 5, 2025
MIL-OSI China: Ukraine’s membership not part of peace deal: NATO Chief

Source: China State Council Information Office

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte clarified in Brussels on Friday that Ukraine’s potential NATO membership will not be included as part of any peace agreement.

Speaking at a press conference following a NATO foreign ministers meeting, Rutte reaffirmed that member states had agreed at last year’s Washington summit that Ukraine’s accession to the Alliance is “irreversible.” However, he emphasized that there was never a promise to Ukraine to include NATO membership in any peace deal.

The two-day meeting also saw concerns raised over sweeping new U.S. tariffs announced by President Donald Trump. Norway’s Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide warned on Thursday that such tariffs could contradict NATO’s founding principles. He suggested that economic measures undermining trade among NATO allies risk weakening the alliance as a whole.

MIL OSI China News –

April 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: To Improve Republican Budget Resolution, Shaheen Offers Dozens of Amendments that Would Lower Health Care Costs, Shield Families and Businesses from Rising Prices, Keep Americans Safe and Secure
US Senate News:
Source: United States Senator for New Hampshire Jeanne Shaheen

(Washington, DC) – U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), a top member of the U.S. Senate Appropriations and Armed Services Committees and Ranking Member of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, will offer dozens of amendments to the budget resolution tonight that would make health care more affordable, lower the costs of energy bills, protect American consumers and businesses from rising prices imposed by President Trump’s tariffs and keep Americans safe by enhancing military preparedness, strengthening our air traffic controller workforce, cracking down on drugs and investing in the northern border.

“Let’s be very clear: Tonight’s budget resolution process is all about slashing critical services and raising costs on families to free up dollars for tax cuts to the wealthiest in the country. Meanwhile, I’m offering opportunities for bipartisan collaboration to deliver commonsense solutions for Americans grappling with high costs,” said Shaheen. “Americans want, expect and deserve their elected representatives to work together to make progress on the issues they’re facing – and partisan exercises like this do nothing to make their lives better. I’m working to cut through Washington dysfunction and advocate for Granite Staters.”

Below is an overview of the dozens of amendments Senator Shaheen is introducing for consideration tonight.

To help lower everyday costs, Shaheen introduced amendments that would:
- Protect Americans from a national sales tax that raises costs on clothing, toys, electronics and energy.
- Help families struggling with high grocery bills by restoring cancelled federal food assistance programs.
- Support American jobs and manufacturers hurt by Trump’s tariffs.
- Enhance housing affordability by preventing construction cost increases due to tariffs and delays and expanding investment in housing development.
- Help households afford groceries, including preventing broad tariffs which would raise the price of food or cuts to food aid for families.
- Prevent funding cuts to child care or early childhood education programs helping New Hampshire families.
- Support affordable housing in disaster recovery by rebuilding with resilient and cost-effective methods, especially those that lower home insurance rates.
- Lower sugar prices for American businesses and consumers harmed by the U.S. sugar program.
To help make health care more affordable and accessible, Shaheen introduced amendments that would:
- Prioritize Affordable Care Act tax credits that give 22 million Americans access to affordable, quality health insurance.
- Ensure that Medicaid expansion programs aren’t eliminated by drastic cuts to federal funding, including New Hampshire’s Granite Advantage covering more than 60,000 Granite Staters.
- Ensure that patients suffering from diabetes do not face unnecessary barriers to care, including access to $35 insulin.
- Ensure hospitals and doctors working in rural areas can keep their doors open and continue providing lifesaving care for their patients.
- Ensure that our community health centers can continue to provide vital care to their patients.
To help enhance public safety and keep families secure, Shaheen introduced amendments that would:
- Make investments in the Air Traffic Controller workforce and overturning the reckless firing of hundreds of Federal Aviation Administration personnel critical to aviation safety.
- Support her Cooper Davis Act and limit illegal drug sales on social media.
- Improve cell service and communications for emergency services along the northern border.
- Ensure that DHS has the technology needed to monitor and defend the U.S.-Canada border against the flow of drugs and illegal migration.
- Raise pay for U.S. Bureau of Prisons correctional officers in New Hampshire and across the country.
- Preserve funding for programs that support survivors of sexual and domestic violence.
- Ensure local law enforcement agencies and communities are not left with the bill for unfunded federal mandates.
- Prioritize the deportation of undocumented individuals who pose threats to our national security or public safety.
- Ensure that increased funding for the DOJ and DHS is focused on stopping the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.
- Restore retention incentives and union protections for federal correctional officers and staff, including those at FCI Berlin.
To help lower American households’ energy costs, Shaheen introduced amendments that would:
- Protect Americans from higher energy costs for gas, heating oil and propane due to broad tariffs.
- Protect bipartisan investments that lower energy costs, promote electric grid reliability and improve drinking water and wastewater infrastructure, including addressing PFAS contamination.
- Protect families, farmers and businesses from higher energy costs by ensuring energy saving and renewable energy projects funded by Congress continue.
- Prevent Congress from blocking state or local governments from updating their building codes to protect life and property, reduce losses from disasters or lower energy costs for families.
- Support energy efficient building construction and retrofits to lower energy costs and enhance electric grid reliability.
- Support resources that help make home heating more affordable, including energy assistance from the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) and weatherization.
To help bolster America’s national security and support American service members and their families, Shaheen introduced amendments that would:
- Support military service members, veterans and families, including by protecting family members who were recently fired from federal employment solely because they were new to a job.
- Replenish the defense industrial base ramping up to support Ukraine.
- Replenish the defense industrial base ramping up to support the defense of Taiwan.
- Ensure that federal employees essential to national security are not impacted by federal hiring freezes or reduction in force (RIF) initiatives.
- Require oversight over wasteful spending.
- Protect DoD’s policy that ensures service women receive the same coverage for contraception as civilian women.
- Ensure that U.S. farmers do not suffer economic harm due to the freeze on U.S. assistance.
- Call on the Administration to use the REPO Act authorities to seize Russian assets and support Ukraine.
Additional amendments introduced by Shaheen would:
- Prevent a reduction in postal service for rural America, including by preventing closure of processing centers.
- Ensure that Americans are protected against fraud, price gouging and higher rental and housing prices caused by illegal price information sharing.
- Support funding to assist Afghan SIVs and refugee resettlement.
- Cut more than $40 billion in wasteful agriculture spending going to large corporate farm operations while preserving benefits to small family farms.
- Ensure strong funding for the Northern Border Regional Commission.
- Prevent adding $5 trillion of tax cuts to the national debt and raising interest rates when the Federal Government is already paying $1 trillion per year in interest.
- Support American farmers and address world hunger.
- Address corruption and conflicts of interest from Special Government Employees like Elon Musk by prohibiting them from receiving federal contracts while they’re working for the government.
MIL OSI USA News –
April 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Kaine Leads Colleagues in Calling on Trump Administration to Reinstate Temporary Protected Status for Venezuela

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Virginia Tim Kaine
WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Tim Kaine (D-VA), Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, led 18 of his colleagues in urging Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem to reconsider the Trump Administration’s termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Venezuelans who applied for TPS under its designation in 2023. The Administration’s decision has been temporarily put on hold by a court order, postponing the harm it will cause to approximately 350,000 people who remain at risk of losing TPS.
“Contrary to your assertion that ‘there are notable improvements in several areas, such as the economy, public health, and crime that allow for these nationals to be safely returned,’ the country conditions in Venezuela have deteriorated significantly since 2023, as discussed in detail below,” the senators wrote. “There is no credible evidence demonstrating substantive improvements in the human rights or security situation at this time. Nicolas Maduro’s third term began in January 2025 and has thus far has been characterized by political violence, violent crime, and corruption. Indeed, he remained in power through violent repression surrounding his July 2024 election, which the United States and international observers deemed fraudulent. Numerous credible sources have documented how the regime uses waves of repression, including politically motivated arrests and forcible disappearances, to maintain power. According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the Maduro regime was holding over 1,000 political prisoners as of March 10, 2025.”
“For the reasons discussed above, we ask that you reconsider your February 1, 2025 decision and instead extend TPS for Venezuelans in the United States for the maximum statutory period of 18 months. Congress intended TPS to be both a humanitarian tool and a pragmatic response to unstable conditions abroad,” they continued.
Kaine has long advocated for TPS for vulnerable people from countries around the world, such as Cameroon, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Sudan, and Ukraine. Amid spiking violence in Haiti in 2024, Kaine also urged the Biden Administration to extend TPS for Haiti and urged the Trump Administration to reconsider the cancelation of this designation in 2025.
In addition to Kaine, the letter was signed by U.S. Senators Michael Bennet (D-CO), Cory Booker (D-NJ), Chris Coons (D-DE), Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV), Tammy Duckworth (D-IL), Dick Durbin (D-IL), Andy Kim (D-NJ), Edward J. Markey (D-MA), Patty Murray (D-WA), Alex Padilla (D-CA), Jack Reed (D-RI), Bernie Sanders (I-VT), Brian Schatz (D-HI), Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), and Peter Welch (D-VT).
Full text of the letter follows below and is available here.
Dear Secretary Rubio and Secretary Noem:
We ask that you reconsider your February 1, 2025 decision to terminate Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Venezuelans who applied for TPS under the 2023 designation. While a court order has temporarily postponed the harms that will be caused by this decision, approximately 350,000 people remain at risk of losing TPS.
Contrary to your assertion that “there are notable improvements in several areas, such as the economy, public health, and crime that allow for these nationals to be safely returned,” the country conditions in Venezuela have deteriorated significantly since 2023, as discussed in detail below.
There is no credible evidence demonstrating substantive improvements in the human rights or security situation at this time. Nicolas Maduro’s third term began in January 2025 and has thus far has been characterized by political violence, violent crime, and corruption. Indeed, he remained in power through violent repression surrounding his July 2024 election, which the United States and international observers deemed fraudulent. Numerous credible sources have documented how the regime uses waves of repression, including politically motivated arrests and forcible disappearances, to maintain power. According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the Maduro regime was holding over 1,000 political prisoners as of March 10, 2025.
Through draconian legal measures and organized violence, the Maduro regime is engaging in an active campaign to violate human rights and repress civil society. For example, the National Assembly passed an “anti-NGO law” that provides legal pretext for targeting human rights defenders, political opposition, and journalists. In this environment, organized crime and humanitarian crisis have grown.
Governance in Venezuela has broken down, leaving the basic needs of its citizens unmet – sufficient food, clean water, and medicines are inaccessible for most. The United Nations World Food Program estimates that approximately 40 percent of the population is experiencing moderate to severe food insecurity, and that four million people require urgent food assistance. The Venezuelan government is unable or unwilling to provide justice or protection for its citizens. In fact, the government of Venezuela is frequently itself a perpetrator or beneficiary of human rights abuses.
The current conditions in Venezuela described above clearly continue to meet the requirement of INA §244(b)(1)(C) that “there exist extraordinary and temporary conditions in the foreign state that prevent aliens who are nationals of the state from returning to the state in safety.” Insofar as you have found that “even assuming the relevant conditions in Venezuela remain both ‘extraordinary’ and ‘temporary,’ termination of the 2023 Venezuela TPS designation is required because it is contrary to the national interest,” the lack of notice and opportunity for stakeholders and the public to comment on the termination and the national interest before it went into effect makes your decision legally infirm and deeply flawed policy-wise.
On March 31, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California ordered that the decision to vacate the extension of the 2023 designation and to terminate that designation be postponed pending further litigation. In a seventy-eight-page decision, the court relied on “[t]he lack of support for the vacatur – both legal and evidentiary” in postponing your decision.
For the reasons discussed above, we ask that you reconsider your February 1, 2025 decision and instead extend TPS for Venezuelans in the United States for the maximum statutory period of 18 months. Congress intended TPS to be both a humanitarian tool and a pragmatic response to unstable conditions abroad. While DHS has the authority to terminate TPS, that authority must be exercised with diligence, transparency, and fidelity to the law.
Sincerely,

MIL OSI USA News –

April 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Scalise: Democrats Want to Shut Down Government to Stop Trump’s Progress

Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Steve Scalise (1st District of Louisiana)

WASHINGTON, D.C.—Today, House Majority Leader Steve Scalise (R-La.) appeared on Fox News’ The Story with Martha MacCallum to discuss tonight’s vote to keep the government funded as Democrats work against American families. Leader Scalise also highlighted Vice President Vance’s visit with House Republicans and shared how House Republicans are working with the White House to implement President Trump’s agenda.

Click here or the image above to view Leader Scalise’s full interview.
On House Republicans working with the Trump-Vance Administration to keep the government open:“Yeah, great to be with you, Martha. When you just heard that comment from [Rep. Jim] McGovern, here he is trying to figure out how to blame Republicans as he’s also trying to engineer a government shutdown. Democrats are trying to have it both ways. Democrats are trying to unite everybody against this bill to shut the government down. You see President Trump pushing as well as all of us in our House leadership to get this bill passed. We had JD Vance, the Vice President, come and talk to our members this morning and did a great job of really laying out why it’s so important that we keep the government open and pass this bill so that we can continue on with the great work that’s being done to get our economy back on track, to get our country moving again.“There are a lot of problems that need to be worked out. You just saw President Trump again delivering by getting a peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia. President Trump is doing his job. The Democrats want to shut the government down to stop that progress. We’re going to do our job here in the House in just an hour, as you pointed out, and then let the Senate do their job.“Thomas Massie is the only hard no. We’re working, obviously, there are other members that have had some questions, which we always have when you move a big bill through the House. We had our budget just a few weeks ago, and that passed with just one vote extra. That was a bill where we were talking to members the morning and the day of the vote, which is no surprise on those kinds of votes. Today’s no different. We’re still having conversations with members, but at the end of the day, we’re going to pass the bill.”On Democrats rallying around a government shutdown:“Well, if there was a shutdown [from the Senate side], at that point, it would be Chuck Schumer’s shutdown because the Republicans are united in getting this done. Chuck Schumer has got to figure out what he’s going to do. We’ve heard him decry government shutdowns over the years. This is a clean CR to prevent a government shutdown. So if he voted to shut the government down now, how would he explain that when you compare that to his previous comments? And think about what’s in this bill, Martha. I’m not just talking about keeping the government funded. This bill also includes a pay raise for our troops. Our junior enlisted members of the military are going to be getting the largest pay raise in over 40 years. Why would you vote against that? Democrats are going to have to answer that question along with others if they vote no on this bill. Let’s go get it done.”

MIL OSI USA News –

April 5, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: Economic and Social Council Fills Vacancies in 15 Subsidiary Bodies

Source: United Nations 4

The Economic and Social Council convened today to conduct elections, nominations, confirmations, and appointments to fill vacancies in 15 of its subsidiary bodies.

The Council, which plays a vital role in advancing the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development, oversees a complex ecosystem of subsidiary entities, comprising regional and functional commissions, standing committees, and expert and ad hoc bodies.

For instance, its Statistical Commission, established in 1946, is responsible for the development of international statistics concepts and methods, including their implementation at the national and international level. The United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, formed in 2000, advises the Council on Indigenous peoples’ rights and provides recommendations to Member States on issues affecting indigenous communities. And the Commission on Narcotic Drugs formulates international drug policies and oversees the implementation of global drug control treaties.

Statistical Commission

The Council by secret ballot today elected Romania to the Statistical Commission for a four-year term beginning on 1 January 2026 and expiring on 31 December 2029. In a second round of balloting, the Russian Federation was elected for the same four-year term.

Since the number of candidates from the African States, the Asia-Pacific States, the Latin American and Caribbean States and the Western European and other States was equal to the number of vacancies, the Council also elected Austria, Benin, Brazil, Burundi, China, Cuba, Eritrea, Finland, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru and Uzbekistan by acclamation for the same four-year term.

Commission on Population and Development

To the Commission on Population and Development, the Council elected Bolivia, Cameroon, China, Cuba, Ireland, Ghana, Malaysia, Mongolia, Norway, Russian Federation, Senegal, United Kingdom and the United Republic of Tanzania by acclamation for a four-year term of office beginning at the first meeting of the Commission’s sixtieth session in 2026 and expiring at the close of its sixty-third session in 2030.

The Council also elected Albania, by acclamation, to the Commission for a term of office beginning on 4 April 2025 and expiring at the close of the Commission’s fifty-ninth session in 2026. Japan and the Philippines were elected, by acclamation, for a four-year term beginning at the first meeting of the fifty-ninth session and expiring at the close of the sixty-second session in 2029.

Commission on the Status of Women

To the Commission on the Status of Women, the Council elected Cabo Verde, China, Gabon, Japan, Maldives, Mongolia, Morocco, Qatar, United Republic of Tanzania and Zimbabwe, by acclamation, for a four-year term of office beginning at the first meeting of the Commission’s seventy-first session in 2026 and expiring at the close of its seventy-fourth session in 2030.

Commission on Narcotic Drugs

To the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the Council elected from the Asia-Pacific States — by secret ballot — Pakistan, Kazakhstan, United Arab Emirates and Kyrgyzstan for a four-year term beginning on 1 January 2026 and expiring on 31 December 2029. From the Eastern European States, it elected Slovenia, Lithuania and Ukraine, and from the Western European and Other States, it elected Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, Australia and, in a second round of balloting, France, for the same four-year term beginning on 1 January 2026.

Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice

From the African States and the Latin American and Caribbean States, the Council elected Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Honduras, Mauritania and Trinidad and Tobago, by acclamation, to the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice for a four-year term of office beginning on 1 January 2026.

Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues

To the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, the Council elected by secret ballot from the Eastern European States Valts Ernštreits of Latvia and Suleiman Mamutov of Ukraine for a three-year term of office beginning on 1 January 2026.

Since the number of candidates from the African States, the Asia-Pacific States, the Latin American and Caribbean States and the Western European and other States was equal to or less than the number of vacancies, the Council elected Brenda Gunn of Canada, Nan Li of China, Rodrigo Paillalef Monnard of Chile, Diego A. Tituaña Matango of Ecuador and Anne-Chantal Nama of Cameroon, by acclamation, for the same three-year term of office.

Executive Board of the United Nations Children’s Fund

Since the number of candidates from the Asia-Pacific States, the Eastern European States, the Latin American and Caribbean States and the Western European and other States was equal to or less than the number of vacancies, the Council elected Antigua and Barbuda, China, Georgia, Guatemala, Iceland, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Norway, Ukraine and the United Kingdom, by acclamation, to the Executive Board of the United Nations Children’s Fund for a three-year term of office beginning on 1 January 2026.

The Council also elected by acclamation Canada, Türkiye and Liechtenstein to complete the unexpired term of office of Australia, France and Portugal, respectively, beginning on 1 January 2026 and expiring on 31 December 2027. Australia, France and Portugal resigned from their seats on the Executive Board effective 31 December 2025.

Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme/United Nations Population Fund/United Nations Office for Project Services

Next, the Council elected Armenia, Bolivia, China, Cuba, Estonia, Finland, Japan, Nepal, Norway, Rwanda and the United States, by acclamation, to the Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme/United Nations Population Fund/United Nations Office for Project Services for a three-year term of office beginning on 1 January 2026.

The Council also elected by acclamation Monaco, New Zealand and Türkiye to complete the unexpired term of office of Austria, Luxembourg and Ireland, respectively, beginning on 1 January 2026 and expiring on 31 December 2026. Switzerland was elected to complete the unexpired term of office of Belgium, beginning on 1 January 2026 and expiring on 31 December 2027. Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg and Ireland resigned from their seats on 31 December 2025.

Executive Board of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women

The Council next elected Burkina Faso, China, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Japan, the Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Rwanda and Senegal by acclamation to the Executive Board of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women for a three-year term of office beginning on 1 January 2026.

Executive Board of the World Food Programme

The Council also elected Cuba, Gabon and Kenya by acclamation to the Executive Board of the World Food Programme for a three-year term of office beginning on 1 January 2026.

Programme Coordinating Board of the Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)

The Council by secret ballot elected Ukraine to the Programme Coordinating Board of the Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) for a three-year term of office beginning on 1 January 2026. Further, it elected Kenya, by acclamation, to the Programme Coordinating Board for the same term.

The Council then elected by acclamation the Philippines to complete the unexpired term of office of Japan, beginning on 4 April 2025 and expiring on 31 December 2027.

Committee for Programme and Coordination

The Council next nominated China, Cuba, Egypt, Nigeria, Republic of Korea and Senegal, for election by the General Assembly to the Committee for Programme and Coordination for a three-year term beginning on 1 January 2026.

Commission for Social Development

To the Commission for Social Development, the Council elected Switzerland, by acclamation, for a term beginning on 4 April 2025 and expiring at the close of the Commission’s sixty-seventh session in 2029.

Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International Standards of Accounting and Reporting

Next, the Council elected Belarus, Colombia, India and Kyrgyzstan, by acclamation, to the Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International Standards of Accounting and Reporting, each for a term of office beginning on 4 April 2025 and expiring on 31 December 2027. Greece was elected, by acclamation, to the same body for a term of office beginning on 4 April 2025 and expiring on 31 December 2026.

Committee for the United Nations Population Award

Finally, the Council elected Cyprus, by acclamation, to the Committee for the United Nations Population Award for a term of office beginning on 4 April 2025 and expiring on 31 December 2027.

MIL OSI United Nations News –

April 5, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: Human Rights Council Concludes Fifty-Eighth Regular Session after Adopting 32 Resolutions

Source: United Nations – Geneva

Extends 16 Country Specific and Thematic Mandates and Establishes an Intergovernmental Working Group to Draft a Legally Binding Instrument on the Human Rights of Older Persons

Invites General Assembly to Consider Establishing a Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes Committed by All Parties in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel since 2014

The Human Rights Council today concluded its fifty-eighth regular session after adopting 32 resolutions. In these texts, among other things, the Council voted to extend 16 country specific and thematic mandates, and to establish an open-ended intergovernmental working group to draft an international legally binding instrument on the human rights of older persons.

In a resolution on the human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the obligation to ensure accountability and justice, the Council invited the General Assembly to consider establishing an ongoing international, impartial and independent mechanism to assist in the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for the most serious crimes under international law committed by all parties in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel since 2014. The Council also adopted resolutions on human rights in the occupied Syrian Golan, the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, and on Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan.

The Council extended 13 country mandates during the session. It decided to extend, for a period of one year, the mandate of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan under agenda item two. It also extended, for a period of one year, the mandates of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus and the Group of Independent Experts on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus; the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar; the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran; the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine; and the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic under agenda item four.

Under agenda item 10, the Council extended for a period of one year the mandates of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Mali; and the independent human rights expert appointed by the High Commissioner and tasked with undertaking the monitoring of the human rights situation in Haiti. It also extended, for a period of two years, the mandate of the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua; and the capacity of the Office of the High Commissioner, including its field-based structure in Seoul, to allow the implementation of relevant recommendations made by the group of independent experts on accountability for human rights violations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in its report, under agenda item four.

The Council decided to extend, for a period of three years, the mandates of the

Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, and the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism.

The Council requested its Advisory Committee to prepare, in close cooperation with the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures, an in-depth study review on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measure on the right to health of individuals in vulnerable situations. It also requested its Advisory Committee to draft a set of recommended guidelines for applying the existing human rights framework to the conception, design, development, testing, use and deployment of neurotechnologies.

Further resolutions adopted concerned cultural rights and the protection of cultural heritage; the negative impact of the non-repatriation of funds of illicit origin to the countries of origin on the enjoyment of human rights; human rights, democracy and the rule of law; the question of the realisation in all countries of economic, social and cultural rights; the promotion of the enjoyment of the cultural rights of everyone and respect for cultural diversity; the effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights; women, diplomacy and human rights; the human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment: ocean and human rights; the impact of anti-personnel mines on the full enjoyment of all human rights; human rights defenders and new and emerging technologies; combatting intolerance, negative stereotyping and stigmatisation of, and discrimination, incitement to violence and violence against, persons based on religion or belief; and technical assistance and capacity-building for South Sudan.

The Council appointed three members of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Member from Central and Eastern Europe, the Russian Federation, Central Asia and Transcaucasia, Antonina Gorbunova (Russian Federation); Member from Central and South America, and the Caribbean, Anexa Brendalee Alfred Cunningham (Nicaragua); and member from the Pacific, Valmaine Toki (New Zealand).

The Council also adopted ad referendum the draft report of the fifth-eighth session.

Jürg Lauber, President of the Human Rights Council, said the Council had reviewed and adopted the results of the Universal Periodic Review of 14 countries; adopted 32 resolutions; and appointed three mandate holders of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. He expressed sincere gratitude to the Bureau of the Council, the Secretariat, and the Member States, for their support and cooperation during the session.

The fifty-ninth regular session of the Human Rights Council is scheduled to be held from 16 June to 11 July 2025.

Action on Resolutions

Action on Resolutions Under Agenda Item Two on the Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General

In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.6) on Advancing human rights in South Sudan, adopted by a vote of 24 in favour, 6 against and 17 abstentions, the Council decides to extend the mandate of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, composed of three members, for a further period of one year; requests the Commission to present a comprehensive report on the situation of human rights in South Sudan to the Council at its sixty-first session, to be followed by an enhanced interactive dialogue, and that the report and an easy-to-read version of it be made available on the website of the Office of the High Commissioner in an accessible format and also requests the Commission to present its latest report, in combination with an oral update on its work, to the General Assembly at its eightieth session, followed by an interactive dialogue.

In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.30/Rev.1) on the Human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the obligation to ensure accountability and justice, adopted by a vote of 27 in favour, 4 against and 16 abstentions (as orally revised), the Council reiterates its request to the Commission of Inquiry to report on both the direct and the indirect transfer or sale of arms, munitions, parts, components and dual-use items to Israel, the occupying Power, and requests, instead, that the report be submitted to the Council at its sixty-first session; invites the General Assembly to consider establishing an ongoing international, impartial and independent mechanism to assist in the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for the most serious crimes under international law committed by all parties in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel since 2014, to closely cooperate with the Commission of Inquiry to collect, consolidate, preserve and analyse evidence of violations of international law and violations and abuses of human rights, and to prepare case files in order to facilitate and expedite fair and independent criminal proceedings, in accordance with international legal standards, in national, regional and international courts or tribunals that have or may in the future have jurisdiction over these crimes, in accordance with international law; and requests the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to report on the implementation of the present resolution to the Human Rights Council at its sixty-first session, to be followed by an interactive dialogue.

Action on Resolutions Under Agenda Item Three on the Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, including the Right to Development.

In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.1) on the Negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights, adopted by a vote of 28 in favour, 16 against and 3 abstentions, the Council requests the Advisory Committee of the Council to prepare, in close cooperation with the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures, an in-depth study review on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measure on the right to health of individuals in vulnerable situations, and to present its comprehensive report and findings to the Council at its sixty-fourth session; requests the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to organise a biennial panel discussion, to be held at the sixtieth session of the Council, on the impact of unilateral coercive measures and overcompliance on the right to food and food security, and requests the Special Rapporteur to act as rapporteur of the panel discussion and to prepare a report thereon, and to submit and present the report to the Council at its sixty-first session.

In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.4/Rev.1) on Cultural rights and the protection of cultural heritage, adopted without a vote, the Council requests the High Commissioner to convene, before the sixty-fourth session of the Council, a one-day workshop to review and promote the tools for the dissemination of good practices and possible methods of, as well as challenges encountered in, implementing an approach to digital heritage that promotes universal respect for cultural rights by all, and to make the workshop accessible to persons with disabilities; also requests the High Commissioner to submit a report thereon to the Council at its sixty-sixth session; and decides to remain seized of the matter.

In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.5) on Freedom of religion or belief, adopted without a vote, the Council decides to extend the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief for a further period of three years; requests the Special Rapporteur to report annually to the Council and to the General Assembly in accordance with their respective programmes of work; and decides to remain seized of this question under the same agenda item and to continue its consideration of measures to implement the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief.

In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.9) on Neurotechnology and human rights, adopted without a vote, the Council requests its Advisory Committee to draft a set of recommended guidelines for applying the existing human rights framework to the conception, design, development, testing, use and deployment of neurotechnologies and to present it to the Council at its sixty-fourth session.

In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.16) on the Negative impact of the non-repatriation of funds of illicit origin to the countries of origin on the enjoyment of human rights, and the importance of improving international cooperation, adopted by a vote of 29 in favour, 15 against and 3 abstentions, the Council requests the High Commissioner for Human Rights to organise, prior to the sixty-second session of the Council, a one-day intersessional expert meeting, fully accessible to persons with disabilities, on strengthening international cooperation and shared responsibilities in facilitating the repatriation of illicit funds to advance human rights; requests the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to organise, before the sixty-third session of the Council, a regional expert meeting in Africa on ways to support governments’ efforts in repatriating funds of illicit origin; and also requests the Office of the High Commissioner to prepare a substantive report on enhancing international cooperation and national efforts to facilitate the repatriation of illicit funds and ensure the effective use of repatriated funds for sustainable development and realisation of economic, social and cultural rights, and to present the report to the Council at its sixty-fourth session.

In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.17/Rev.1) on Human rights, democracy and the rule of law, adopted without a vote, the Council decides that the theme of the sixth session of the Forum on Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, to be held in 2026, will be “Education for civic participation: empowering future generations, fostering knowledge and critical thinking”; and decides that participation in the sixth session of the Forum will be in accordance with the modalities set out by the Council in its resolutions 28/14, 34/41, 40/9, 46/4 and 52/22.

In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.7) on the Question of the realisation in all countries of economic, social and cultural rights, adopted without a vote, the Council decides to convene, at its sixty-first session, a panel discussion, accessible to persons with disabilities and open to the participation of States and other relevant stakeholders, on promising practices and measures to mobilise public resources to finance sustainable development in a manner consistent with States’ economic, social and cultural rights obligations; and requests the Secretary-General to prepare and submit to the Council, at its sixty-fourth session, a report, in formats accessible to persons with disabilities, on the question of the realisation in all countries of economic, social and cultural rights under agenda item 3.

Before the resolution was adopted, the Council rejected amendment L.33 by a vote of 9 in favour, 24 against and 13 abstentions.

In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.12) on the Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, adopted without a vote, the Council decides to extend the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food for a period of three years; requests the Special Rapporteur to provide advice and guidance to States and all relevant stakeholders on shaping food systems governance in line with international human rights law; and requests the Special Rapporteur to report annually on the implementation of the mandate to the Council and the General Assembly in accordance with their programmes of work.

In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.13) on the Promotion of the enjoyment of the cultural rights of everyone and respect for cultural diversity, adopted without a vote, the Council requests the Special Rapporteur to continue to work with relevant stakeholders towards the comprehensive promotion and protection of cultural rights, and to report regularly to the Council and the General Assembly, in accordance with their respective programmes of work.

In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.14) on the Effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights, adopted by a vote of 29 in favour, 12 against and 6 abstentions, the Council requests the High Commissioner for Human Rights to provide global analytical and policy strategies in the context of reforms of the international financial architecture; and requests the Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights, to continue to report regularly to the Council and the General Assembly in accordance with their programmes of work.

In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.24/Rev.1) on the Open-ended intergovernmental working group for the elaboration of a legally binding instrument on the promotion and protection of the human rights of older persons, adopted without a vote, the Council decides to establish an open-ended intergovernmental working group with the mandate of elaborating and submitting to the Council a draft international legally binding instrument on the human rights of older persons with the objective of promoting, protecting and ensuring the full enjoyment of human rights by older persons; also decides that the open-ended intergovernmental working group will meet for two five-day sessions each year in Geneva in a hybrid format, should the General Assembly agree to reintroduce such a format, and that it will be webcast, and that the organisational session should be held before the end of 2025 and no later than the start of the sixty-first session of the Human Rights Council, for three working days; and requests the open-ended intergovernmental working group to submit a report on progress made to the Council for its consideration at its sixty-third session and to make the report available in an easy-to-read accessible format.

In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.29) on the Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, adopted without a vote, the Council decides to extend the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism for a period of three years, with the same terms as provided for by the Human Rights Council in its resolution 49/10.

In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.15) on Women, diplomacy and human rights, adopted without a vote, the Council decides to commemorate the International Day of Women in Diplomacy during one panel at the annual full-day discussion on the human rights of women, to be held during the fifty-ninth, the sixty-second and the sixty-fifth sessions of the Council, including with discussions on the elimination of discrimination and structural barriers that hinder women’s participation and representation in decision-making; and invites all States, organizations of the United Nations system and civil society to participate in this celebration.

In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.26/Rev.1) on the Human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment: ocean and human rights, adopted without a vote, the Council calls upon States to adopt and implement strong laws ensuring, among other things, the rights to participation, to access to information and to justice, including to an effective remedy, in environmental matters; and calls upon all States to conserve, protect and restore healthy ecosystems and biodiversity and to ensure their sustainable management and use by applying a human rights-based approach that emphasizes participation, inclusion, transparency and accountability in the management of natural resources.

In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.21) on the Impact of anti-personnel mines on the full enjoyment of all human rights, adopted without a vote, the Council calls upon all States and other relevant stakeholders to cooperate effectively to address the impact of anti-personnel mines on the protection and promotion of all human rights; and requests the High Commissioner for Human Rights to prepare a report, in consultation with States and other relevant stakeholders, on the impact of antipersonnel mines on the enjoyment of all human rights, with particular emphasis on economic, social and cultural rights, and to present the report to the Council at its sixty-second session, followed by an interactive dialogue.

In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.27/Rev.1) on Human rights defenders and new and emerging technologies: protecting human rights defenders, including women human rights defenders, in the digital age, adopted without a vote (as orally revised), the Council requests the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to convene three regional workshops, including through hybrid modalities, to assess risks created by digital technologies to human rights defenders and best practices to respond to these concerns in different geographical areas, bearing in mind current and emerging business models and gender, geographic and other digital divides and sensitivities, with participation from civil society, human rights defenders and the private sector; and also requests the Office of the High Commissioner to prepare a report containing a summary of those consultations, which could include recommendations for due diligence and improved responses to risks created by digital technologies to human rights defenders, including those exposed to discrimination and those working in situations of armed conflict, and to present it to the Council at its sixty-third session.

Before the resolution was adopted, the Council rejected amendment L.35 by a vote of 4 in favour, 26 against and 15 abstentions; L.36 by a vote of 10 in favour, 23 against and 14 abstentions; and L.37 by a vote of 7 in favour, 24 against and 15 abstentions.

Action on Resolutions Under Agenda Item Four on Human Rights Situations that Require the Council’s Attention

In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.2) on the Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, adopted without a vote, the Council decides to renew, for a period of two years, the capacity of the Office of the High Commissioner, including its field-based structure in Seoul, to allow the implementation of relevant recommendations made by the group of independent experts on accountability for human rights violations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in its report; requests the High Commissioner to provide an oral update on the progress made in this regard to the Council at its sixty-first session and to submit a full report on the implementation of the recommendations to the Council at its sixty-fourth session; decides to extend the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in accordance with Council resolution 37/28, for a period of one year; and requests the Office of the High Commissioner to continue to organise a series of consultations and outreach activities with victims, affected communities and other relevant stakeholders.

In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.3) on the Promotion and protection of human rights in Nicaragua, adopted by a vote of 29 in favour, 4 against and 14 abstentions, the Council decides to renew, for a period of two years, the mandate of the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua as established in its resolution 49/3; requests the Group to submit a comprehensive report to the Council at its sixty-first and sixty-fourth sessions, during an interactive dialogue, and to present an oral update to the Council at its sixtieth and sixty-third sessions; also requests the Group to present its most recent report, in combination with an oral update on its work, to the General Assembly at its eightieth and eighty-first sessions, followed by an interactive dialogue; and requests the High Commissioner to strengthen monitoring and engagement, including by preparing reports that are comprehensive, gender-responsive and take into account race and ethnic origin on the situation of human rights in Nicaragua, and to present them to the Council at its sixtieth and sixty-third sessions, to be followed by an interactive dialogue, and to present an oral update to the Council at its fifty-ninth and sixty-second sessions.

In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.10) on the Situation of human rights in Belarus, adopted by a vote of 25 in favour, 5 against and 17 abstentions, adopted without a vote (as orally revised), the Council decides to extend the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus for a further period of one year, effective from the end of its fifty-ninth session, and requests the Special Rapporteur to continue to monitor developments and to make recommendations on ways to strengthen respect for and protection and fulfilment of human rights in Belarus, and to submit a report on the situation of human rights in Belarus to the Council at its sixty-second session and to the General Assembly at its eighty-first session, including in an easy-to-read version and in an accessible format; also decides to extend the mandate of the Group of Independent Experts on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus for a further period of one year; and requests the Group of Independent Experts to give an oral update to the Council at its sixtieth session and to present a comprehensive report at its sixty-first session, including in an easy-to-read version and in an accessible format, both to be followed by an interactive dialogue.

In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.11/Rev.1) on the Situation of human rights in Myanmar, adopted without a vote (as orally revised), the Council calls for the timely designation of a resident coordinator of United Nations local agencies in Myanmar on a permanent basis; decides to extend the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar for a further period of one year; requests the Special Rapporteur to present, during an enhanced interactive dialogue, an oral update to the Council at its fifty-ninth session and to submit a report to the Third Committee of the General Assembly at its eightieth session and to the Council at its sixty-first session, and also requests the Special Rapporteur to continue to monitor the situation of human rights in Myanmar; requests the High Commissioner to submit to the Council, at its sixty-second session, a comprehensive report on the overall situation of human rights in Myanmar; and reiterates the need to establish a country office of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Myanmar and to issue a standing invitation to all special procedures of the Council.

In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.20/Rev.1) on the Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, adopted by a vote of 24 in favour, 8 against and 15 abstentions, the Council decides to extend the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran for a further period of one year in order to continue to monitor the ongoing situation of human rights, and requests the Special Rapporteur to submit a report to the Council at its sixty-first session and to the General Assembly at its eightieth session; also decides that the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran should continue for one year to thoroughly and independently monitor and investigate allegations of recent and ongoing serious human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran; and requests the Fact-Finding Mission to present a report to the Council at its sixty-first session during a joint interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur, and to present an oral update, to be followed by an interactive dialogue, on the implementation of the mandate to the General Assembly at its eightieth session.

In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.22) on the Situation of human rights in Ukraine stemming from the Russian aggression, adopted by a vote of 25 in favour, 4 against and 18 abstentions, the Council decides to extend the mandate of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, defined by the Human Rights Council in its resolution 49/1, for a further period of one year, complementing, consolidating and building upon the work of the human rights monitoring mission in Ukraine, in close coordination with the human rights monitoring mission in Ukraine and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights; and requests the Commission of Inquiry to give an oral update to the Human Rights Council at its sixtieth session, to be followed by an interactive dialogue, to submit a comprehensive report to the Council at its sixty-first session, to be followed by an interactive dialogue, and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its eightieth session, also to be followed by an interactive dialogue.

In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.25) on the Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic, adopted without a vote (as orally revised), the Council decides to extend the mandate of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic for a period of one year; requests the Office of the High Commissioner to strengthen the resources of the Commission of Inquiry in order for it to completely fulfil its mandate within the Syrian Arab Republic, in particular with regard to security and logistical support and victim protection expertise, welcomes the broad access granted by the interim authorities to the Commission, and encourages the interim authorities to grant the Commission necessary access throughout the Syrian Arab Republic and to cooperate closely with the Commission; requests the Commission of Inquiry to present an oral update to the Human Rights Council at both its fifty-ninth and sixtieth sessions, to be followed by an updated report during an interactive dialogue at the sixty-first session of the Council; and reaffirms its decision to transmit the report and oral updates of the Commission of Inquiry to relevant bodies of the United Nations.

Action on Resolutions Under Agenda Item Seven on the Human Rights Situation in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories

In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.19) on Human rights in the occupied Syrian Golan, adopted by a vote of 27 in favour, 6 against and 14 abstentions, the Council demands that Israel stop its repressive measures against the Syrian citizens in the occupied Syrian Golan and release immediately the Syrian detainees in Israeli prisons; requests the Secretary-General to disseminate the present resolution as widely as possible and to report on this matter to the Council at its sixty-first session; and decides to continue its consideration of the human rights violations in the occupied Syrian Golan at its sixty-first session.

In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.31) on the Right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, adopted by a vote of 43 in favour, 2 against and 2 abstentions, the Council calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to end immediately its unlawful presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, which constitutes a wrongful act of continuing character entailing its international responsibility, and to reverse and redress any impediments to the political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Palestine, in accordance with the legal findings and determinations of the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion of 19 July 2024, and reaffirms its support for the solution of two States, Palestine and Israel; and urges all States to adopt measures to promote the realisation of the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people, and to render assistance to the United Nations regarding the implementation of this right.

In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.32/Rev.1) on Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, adopted by a vote of 34 in favour, 3 against and 10 abstentions (as orally revised), the Council reiterates its request to the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel, as mandated by the Human Rights Council in its resolution 55/32 of 5 April 2024, to prepare a report on the identities of settlers, as well as settler groups and their members, that have engaged in or continue to engage in acts of violence, intimidation, harassment or terror against Palestinian civilians and the actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, and by third States to ensure accountability for violations or abuses of international law in this regard, and requests, instead, that the report be submitted to the Council at its sixty-first session; and requests the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to report on the implementation of the provisions of the present resolution to the Human Rights Council at its sixty-first session.

Action on Resolutions Under Agenda Item Nine on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Forms of Intolerance: Follow-up to and Implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action

In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.18) on Combatting intolerance, negative stereotyping and stigmatisation of, and discrimination, incitement to violence and violence against, persons based on religion or belief, adopted without a vote, the Council requests the High Commissioner to prepare and submit to the Council at its sixty-first session a comprehensive follow-up report with elaborated conclusions based upon information provided by States on the efforts and measures taken for the implementation of the present resolution.

Action on Resolutions Under Agenda Item 10 on Technical Assistance and Capacity Building

n a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.8) on Technical assistance and capacity-building for Mali in the field of human rights, adopted without a vote, the Council decides to extend the mandate of Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Mali for a period of one year in order to permit the mandate holder to continue to evaluate the situation of human rights in Mali; and requests the Independent Expert to submit a report to the Council at its sixty-first session; decides to hold a dialogue at its sixty-first session, in the presence of the Independent Expert and representatives of the Government of Mali, to assess the changes in the situation of human rights in the country.

In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.23) on Technical assistance and capacity-building for South Sudan, adopted without a vote, the Council requests the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, in cooperation and collaboration with the Government of South Sudan and relevant mechanisms of the African Union, to enhance the technical assistance provided to the Government of South Sudan to continue to assist it in addressing human rights challenges in the post-conflict transition; also requests the Office of the High Commissioner to present a comprehensive report to the Council at its sixty-second session, to be followed by an interactive dialogue, with the participation of representatives of the African Union; and further requests the Office of the High Commissioner to submit the above-mentioned report and recommendations to the Human Rights Council, then to share them with the African Union and all relevant organs of the United Nations, including the United Nations Mission in South Sudan.

In a resolution (A/HRC/58/L.28) on Technical assistance and capacity-building to improve the situation of human rights in Haiti, in connection with a request from the authorities of Haiti for coordinated and targeted international action, adopted without a vote, the Council decides to extend, for a renewable period of one year, the mandate of the independent human rights expert appointed by the High Commissioner and tasked with undertaking, with the assistance of the Office of the High Commissioner and in collaboration with the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, the monitoring of the human rights situation in Haiti, ensuring, in particular, the inclusion of a gender perspective in all of his work; requests the independent expert to devote greater attention to the situation of children, women and girls and to trafficking in persons, to monitor the impact of illicit arms trafficking on the human rights situation in Haiti and to formulate recommendations to consolidate national, regional and international responses on this issue; also requests the independent expert to provide advice and technical assistance to the Government of Haiti, national human rights institutions and civil society organizations, including women’s rights organizations, to assist in their efforts to ensure respect for and the promotion and protection of human rights; and requests the High Commissioner to provide to the Council, within the framework of an interactive dialogue with the participation of the independent human rights expert, an oral update on the situation of human rights in Haiti at its sixtieth session and a report on the subject at its sixty-first session.

Other Matters

The Council appointed three members of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Member from Central and Eastern Europe, the Russian Federation, Central Asia and Transcaucasia, Antonina Gorbunova (Russian Federation); Member from Central and South America, and the Caribbean, Anexa Brendalee Alfred Cunningham (Nicaragua); and member from the Pacific, Valmaine Toki (New Zealand).

The Council also adopted its draft report ad referendum for the fifty-eighth session.

___________

Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media;
not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

HRC25.005E

MIL OSI United Nations News –

April 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Video: Myanmar, Occupied Palestinian Territory & other matters – Daily Press Briefing (4 April 2025)

Source: United Nations (Video News)

Noon briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

Highlights:
Myanmar
Occupied Palestinian Territory
Sudan
South Sudan
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Haiti
Ukraine
Food Prices
Mine Awareness Day
Colombia
International Days
Deputy Secretary-General
Antisemitism

MYANMAR
As announced by the Secretary-General yesterday, Tom Fletcher, the Emergency Relief Coordinator, arrived this morning. Upon arrival, he met with humanitarian teams in Yangon. In the afternoon, he travelled to Mandalay, which as you know, is the epicentre of the earthquake, where tomorrow he is expected to meet with people impacted by the earthquake, as well as with local responders and other humanitarian workers.
More than 25 search-and-rescue teams are working, medical teams and supplies have been deployed, and water and shelter kits have been distributed in Mandalay and beyond. Just yesterday, more than 30 tons of medical supplies arrived in Myanmar, bringing the total to 100 tons since the earthquakes struck.
The UN Refugee Agency, for its part, has deployed plastic sheets and kitchen sets for about 25,000 people impacted.
The agency is also mobilizing supplies from its warehouses in Myanmar for an additional 25,000 people, but it will need to replenish stocks urgently to meet the massive needs due to the quake.
Our humanitarian colleagues are preparing a new appeal aligned with the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, which, as you know, calls for $1.1 billion as needs continue to outpace available supplies and response capacity. So far, less than 5 per cent of this appeal has been received.
For its part, UNHCR is appealing for $16 million to assist 1.2 million people. The funds will be used to manage displacement sites and support vulnerable people in six impacted regions until the end of the year.

OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY
The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports that thousands more families have now fled westward in the Gaza Strip, in response to another displacement order issued by Israeli forces and covering parts of Gaza City. OCHA warns that these displacement orders have left civilians exposed to hostilities and deprive them of access to essential services for their basic survival.
All crossings, as you know, continue to be closed. We are now in the second month. So, no supplies can come into Gaza.
The World Food Programme has warned that food stocks in Gaza are running out, and assistance programmes are gradually shutting down. As we told you earlier this week, all WFP-supported bakeries had to close. Now, food parcel distributions are soon to end. Hot meals currently continue, but with dwindling supplies. The World Food Programme reminds us that a single hot meal provides 25 per cent or less of a person’s daily dietary needs.
Meanwhile, sanitation conditions across Gaza are likely worsening public health risks. Our humanitarian colleagues say that three makeshift displacement sites in Al Mawasi are now reporting infestations of fleas and mites, causing rashes and other health issues. Treating these infestations require chemicals and other items that will only be available once the crossings are again open for the entry of supplies.
UN humanitarian partners warn that criminal looting and general insecurity are again on the rise, linked to the closure and to lack of basic supplies. On Wednesday, one of the distribution points used by UNRWA was looted, along with nearby buildings. In a social media post, our colleagues at UNRWA said this wasn’t an isolated incident, but rather a symptom of a broader breakdown in civil order.
Turning to the West Bank, OCHA reports that tens of thousands of people remain displaced, unable to return home due to ongoing operations by Israeli forces in the north, mainly in Jenin and Tulkarm. Our humanitarian partners are providing urgent aid and psychosocial support to those impacted.

Full highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=04%20April%202025

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QmG9TgZHpoA

MIL OSI Video –

April 5, 2025

MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: IMPORT OF STEEL AND ITS DOMESTIC PRODUCTION

Source: Government of India

Posted On: 04 APR 2025 8:33PM by PIB Delhi

The details of import of finished steel in India for the last five years, country-wise and year-wise is placed at Annexure.

The details of domestic crude steel production for the last five years, year-wise is given below:-

Domestic Crude Steel Production
Year	Quantity (in MnT)
2019-20	109.14
2020-21	103.54
2021-22	120.29
2022-23	127.20
2023-24	144.30
Source: Joint Plant Committee (JPC); MnT=million tonnes

Steel is a deregulated sector and the government acts as a facilitator by creating a conducive policy environment for the development of steel sector in the country. The decision regarding import and export are taken by steel companies based on techno-commercial considerations and market dynamics.

Government has taken steps to ensure that only quality steel is produced in the country or imported from outside. In this direction, 151 BIS standards have been notified and have been covered by Quality Control Orders (QCOs) by Ministry of Steel to ensure that only quality steel is made available to the end users & the public at large.

The Government has taken following steps to encourage domestic steel production:-

Domestically Manufactured Iron & Steel Products (DMI&SP) Policy for promoting ‘Made in India’ steel for Government procurement.
Implementation of Production Linked Incentive (PLI) Scheme for Specialty Steel to promote the manufacturing of ‘Specialty Steel’ within the country and reduce imports by attracting capital investments.

Country-wise and Year-wise import of finished Steel during last five year

IMPORT OF FINISHED STEEL (‘000 tonnes)
Country	2019-20	2020-21	2021-22	2022-23	2023-24
ARGENTINA	26	7	1	0	0
AUSTRALIA	4	2	1	0	1
AUSTRIA	13	71	9	10	52
BAHARAIN	10	14	5	1	3
BELGIUM	74	56	28	33	17
BRAZIL	23	5	6	3	1
CANADA	20	17	10	11	6
CHINA	1207	843	833	1407	2687
CZECH REP	2	0	1	2	4
DENMARK	3	2	2	1	1
FINLAND	9	5	5	7	6
FRANCE	56	121	58	77	15
GERMANY	135	146	151	112	80
INDONESIA	464	79	241	148	94
ITALY	81	33	34	31	23
JAPAN	1018	560	664	841	1274
KAZAKHSTAN	3	11	1	6	0
KOREA	2687	1947	2009	2228	2670
KUWAIT	8	3	3	3	9
MALAYSIA	51	42	8	20	6
NEPAL	6	6	9	59	120
NETHERLANDS	11	20	13	4	3
NEWZELAND	1	1	0	1	1
OMAN	4	12	5	7	11
POLAND	8	5	7	6	3
PORTUGAL	2	1	2	2	0
ROMANIA	3	1	1	2	17
RUSSIA	71	63	55	313	53
SAUDI ARABIA	8	36	14	9	39
SINGAPORE	139	43	8	6	4
SLOVENIA	11	7	6	4	1
SOUTH AFRICA	22	15	8	5	7
SPAIN	32	20	27	21	5
SWEDEN	23	27	39	48	20
SWITZERLAND	1	1	1	1	1
TAIWAN	165	186	194	163	185
THAILAND	52	50	25	53	58
TURKEY	5	8	2	3	3
U.K.	17	11	6	5	4
UAE	21	21	24	12	52
UKRAINE	84	31	22	7	1
USA	65	54	29	17	20
VIETNAM	86	133	75	320	737
OTHERS	39	39	26	11	27
TOTAL	6768	4752	4669	6022	8320
Source: Joint Plant Committee (JPC)

This information was given by the Minister of State for Steel and Heavy Industries, Shri Bhupathiraju Srinivasa Varma in a written reply in the Rajya Sabha today.

*****

TPJ/NJ

(Release ID: 2119067) Visitor Counter : 17

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

April 5, 2025

MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Third Hong Kong Pop Culture Festival opens today (with photos)

Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

The opening ceremony of the third Hong Kong Pop Culture Festival (PCF) was held today (April 4) at the Grand Theatre of the Hong Kong Cultural Centre (HKCC). Organised by the Leisure and Cultural Services Department, the PCF this year is themed “More Than Joy”. Audiences can appreciate how pop culture can be transmitted and transformed, and how integration and breakthroughs are possible in addition to joy and laughter.

     The Acting Secretary for Culture, Sports and Tourism, Mr Raistlin Lau; the Director of Leisure and Cultural Services, Ms Manda Chan; and an actor of the opening film “The Banquet” (1991), Mr Eric Tsang, officiated at the opening ceremony.

     The opening programme, “Silhouette Resonance x The Banquet (1991)”, began after the ceremony. Pop singer Alfred Hui, a cappella choral theatre company Yat Po Singers, and beatboxer Heartgrey (Eric So) together with a live band performed songs from classic comedy films with fresh arrangements by renowned musician Ng Cheuk-yin. The digitally restored version of “The Banquet” (1991) was screened following the performance. Blending entertainment with cultural artistry, the audience was offered a fresh and inspiring perspective on the vibrancy of Hong Kong’s pop culture.

     Another highlight programme that kicks off the PCF is outdoor music carnival “ImagineLand 2025” to be held tomorrow (April 5) and on Sunday (April 6) at the HKCC Piazza, and the Central Lawn & Event Trellis of Salisbury Garden, the Avenue of Stars free of charge. Supported by the Cultural and Creative Industries Development Agency, “ImagineLand 2025” features both daytime and evening programmes, encompassing music, films, comics, and more.

    During “ImagineLand 2025”, “Go Beyond Concert”, “Comics Fun Experience Gallery” and “Funarts Corner” will be available during the day, while film programme “Movie Under the Stars” will be held at night. Over 35 musicians and artists from Hong Kong and eight countries and regions including the Mainland, Japan, Korea, the United States, Australia, France, the United Kingdom and Ukraine will perform on the three stages of “Go Beyond Concert”, showcasing boundless possibilities of music across the performances. Major line-ups of local artists include Ivana Wong, Joey Tang, Yatfung, Cloud, Ashley Lin, Pandora, Wan Pin Chu and more, performing mesmerising popular songs and original works.

     At “Comics Fun Experience Gallery”, Hong Kong comics and animation from different eras will be displayed to highlight the creativity of local artists with immersive photo-taking opportunities. The exhibition also features the works of local humourist cartoonists and explores how comics intertwine with the city’s pop culture. Workshops on art, music, and crafts will be available for the public at “Funarts Corner”. In the evenings, two comedies, “Table For Six” (2022) and “Forbidden City Cop” (1996)”, will be screened at “Movie Under the Stars” tomorrow and on Sunday respectively, allowing audiences to enjoy outdoor films while relaxing on the lawn.

     Other highlights include the “Laughter Double Bill: Hong Kong Comedy Film Spectacular” film screening programme; exhibitions “Comic Fun for All: The Magic of Hong Kong Comedy Comics” and “Legends of HK Film Comedies, 1980s and 1990s”; concerts “The 2025 Fiesta of Music Office Bands, Choirs and Orchestras-Bands ‘The Animated Melodies – Our Nostalgic Memories’”, “Ko Shan Fest” and “Music & Laughs”, and more. To support the PCF’s theme of “More Than Joy”, the Hong Kong Public Libraries will also organise book displays and subject talks in a series of activities under the theme of “Happy Reading”.

Several industry partners are also offering a range of events as part of the festival, which are not to be missed.

     Hong Kong’s pop culture has drawn inspiration particularly from humour, a constant trendsetter that has left a deep footprint on many aspects of the city’s rich and colourful pop cultural landscape. The PCF 2025, with more than 20 programmes, not only delights audiences with exciting performances and works but also offers insight into the development paths of Hong Kong’s pop culture along the line of “happiness”. By participating in these activities, audiences will be able to discover their own happiness.

     For more details, please visit the website: www.pcf.gov.hk, or call 2601 8703.



MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

April 5, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: Minutes – Thursday, 3 April 2025 – Strasbourg – Final edition

Source: European Parliament

PV-10-2025-04-03

iPlPv_Sit

Minutes

Thursday, 3 April 2025 – Strasbourg

Abbreviations and symbols

+	adopted
–	rejected
↓	lapsed
W	withdrawn
RCV	roll-call votes
EV	electronic vote
SEC	secret ballot
split	split vote
sep	separate vote
am	amendment
CA	compromise amendment
CP	corresponding part
D	deleting amendment
=	identical amendments
§	paragraph

IN THE CHAIR: Younous OMARJEE
Vice-President

1. Opening of the sitting

The sitting opened at 09:00.

2. Council positions at first reading (Rule 64)

– Position of the Council at first reading with a view to the adoption of a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Union labour market statistics on businesses, repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 530/1999 and Regulations (EC) No 450/2003 and (EC) No 453/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council – Adopted by the Council on 24 March 2025 (17082/1/2024 – COM(2025)0134 – C10-0054/2025 – 2023/0288(COD))
referred to committee responsible: ECON

– Position of the Council at first reading with a view to the adoption of a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1011 as regards the scope of the rules for benchmarks, the use in the Union of benchmarks provided by an administrator located in a third country, and certain reporting requirements – Adopted by the Council on 24 March 2025 (05123/1/2025 – COM(2025)0155 – C10-0055/2025 – 2023/0379(COD))
referred to committee responsible: ECON

– Position of the Council at first reading with a view to the adoption of a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Border Regions’ instrument for development and growth (BRIDGEforEU) – Adopted by the Council on 24 March 2025 (17102/1/2024 – COM(2025)0131 – C10-0057/2025 – 2018/0198(COD))
referred to committee responsible: REGI

The three-month period available to Parliament under Article 294 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union for it to adopt its positions would begin the following day, 4 April 2025.

3. European Action Plan on Rare Diseases (debate)

Commission statement: European Action Plan on Rare Diseases (2025/2637(RSP))

Olivér Várhelyi (Member of the Commission) made the statement.

The following spoke: Tomislav Sokol, on behalf of the PPE Group, Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis, on behalf of the S&D Group, Ondřej Knotek, on behalf of the PfE Group, Michele Picaro, on behalf of the ECR Group, Stine Bosse, on behalf of the Renew Group, Tilly Metz, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Catarina Martins, on behalf of The Left Group, Christine Anderson, on behalf of the ESN Group, András Tivadar Kulja, Romana Jerković, Gerald Hauser, Francesco Torselli, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, Ignazio Roberto Marino, Ondřej Dostál, Adam Jarubas, Nicolás González Casares, Marie-Luce Brasier-Clain (the President reminded Members to keep to the subject of the debate), Billy Kelleher, Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă, Rosa Estaràs Ferragut, Nikos Papandreou, Margarita de la Pisa Carrión, Michalis Hadjipantela, Marta Temido, Viktória Ferenc, who also answered a blue-card question from András Tivadar Kulja, Letizia Moratti, Estelle Ceulemans, Laurent Castillo and Leire Pajín.

The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Maria Grapini, Alexander Jungbluth, Lukas Sieper and Kateřina Konečná.

The following spoke: Olivér Várhelyi.

The following spoke: András Tivadar Kulja who made a personal statement in response to the intervention by Alexander Jungbluth.

The debate closed.

4. Establishment of a European Day of the Righteous (debate)

Commission statement: Establishment of a European Day of the Righteous (2025/2638(RSP))

Olivér Várhelyi (Member of the Commission) made the statement.

The following spoke: Letizia Moratti, on behalf of the PPE Group, Pierfrancesco Maran, on behalf of the S&D Group, Julien Leonardelli, on behalf of the PfE Group, Antonella Sberna, on behalf of the ECR Group, Billy Kelleher, on behalf of the Renew Group, Catarina Vieira, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Petr Bystron, on behalf of the ESN Group, Ernő Schaller-Baross, Arkadiusz Mularczyk and Cristian Terheş.

The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Liudas Mažylis, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Petras Gražulis and Lukas Sieper.

The following spoke: Olivér Várhelyi.

IN THE CHAIR: Roberts ZĪLE
Vice-President

The debate closed.

5. 110th anniversary of the Armenian genocide (debate)

Commission statement: 110th anniversary of the Armenian genocide (2025/2639(RSP))

Olivér Várhelyi (Member of the Commission) made the statement.

The following spoke: Miriam Lexmann, on behalf of the PPE Group, Yannis Maniatis, on behalf of the S&D Group, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, on behalf of the PfE Group, Nicolas Bay, on behalf of the ECR Group, Nathalie Loiseau, on behalf of the Renew Group, Markéta Gregorová, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Pernando Barrena Arza, on behalf of The Left Group, Stanislav Stoyanov, on behalf of the ESN Group, Reinhold Lopatka, Vasile Dîncu, Julie Rechagneux, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Helmut Brandstätter, Marie Toussaint, Marina Mesure, Sander Smit, Evin Incir, Paolo Inselvini, Tomislav Sokol and Marcos Ros Sempere.

The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Sebastian Tynkkynen, Petras Gražulis and Lukas Sieper.

The following spoke: Olivér Várhelyi.

The debate closed.

(The sitting was suspended at 11:14.)

IN THE CHAIR: Christel SCHALDEMOSE
Vice-President

6. Resumption of the sitting

The sitting resumed at 12:03.

7. Request for the waiver of immunity

The competent German authorities had sent the President a request for Petr Bystron’s immunity to be waived in connection with judicial proceedings in Germany.

Pursuant to Rule 9(1), the request had been referred to the committee responsible, in this case the JURI Committee.

8. Verification of credentials

On the basis of a unanimous proposal by the JURI Committee issued at its meeting of 18 March 2025, Parliament verified the credentials of Sirpa Pietikäinen, Andi Cristea and Liudas Mažylis in accordance with Rule 3(4).

⁂

The following spoke: Anders Vistisen, Matthieu Valet and Tomasz Froelich, on certain amendments tabled (the President provided some clarifications).

9. Voting time

For detailed results of the votes, see also ‘Results of votes’ and ‘Results of roll-call votes’.

9.1. Establishing an EU talent pool ***I (vote)

Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an EU talent pool [COM(2023)0716 – C9-0413/2023 – 2023/0404(COD)] – Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. Rapporteur: Abir Al-Sahlani (A10-0045/2025) (This document is not available in all languages)

(Majority of the votes cast)

DECISION TO ENTER INTO INTERINSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS (request by the PfE, ECR, The Left and ESN Groups to put this decision to the vote) (Rule 72)

Approved

Detailed voting results

9.2. Granting equivalence with EU requirements to Moldova and Ukraine as regards field inspections and production of seed ***I (vote)

Report on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Decision 2003/17/EC as regards the equivalence of field inspections carried out in the Republic of Moldova on fodder plant seed-producing crops and on the equivalence of fodder plant seed produced in the Republic of Moldova, and as regards the equivalence of field inspections carried out in Ukraine on beet seed-producing crops and oil plant seed-producing crops and on the equivalence of beet seed and oil plant seed produced in Ukraine [COM(2024)0052 – C9-0026/2024 – 2024/0027(COD)] – Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development. Rapporteur: Veronika Vrecionová (A10-0043/2025) (This document is not available in all languages)

(Majority of the votes cast)

DECISION TO ENTER INTO INTERINSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS (request by the PfE Group to put this decision to the vote) (Rule 72)

Approved

Detailed voting results

9.3. Estimates of revenue and expenditure for the financial year 2026 – Section I – European Parliament (vote)

Report on Parliament’s estimates of revenue and expenditure for the financial year 2026 [2024/2111(BUI)] – Committee on Budgets. Rapporteur: Matjaž Nemec (A10-0048/2025)

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

Adopted

The following had spoken:

Matjaž Nemec (rapporteur), before the vote, to make a statement under Rule 165(4).

Detailed voting results

9.4. Prosecution of journalists in Cameroon, notably the cases of Amadou Vamoulké, Kingsley Fomunyuy Njoka, Mancho Bibixy, Thomas Awah Junior, Tsi Conrad (vote)

Motions for resolutions RC-B10-0230/2025 (minutes of 3.4.2025, item I), B10-0230/2025, B10-0231/2025, B10-0232/2025, B10-0233/2025, B10-0234/2025, B10-0235/2025 and B10-0236/2025 (minutes of 2.4.2025, item I) (2025/2627(RSP))

(Majority of the votes cast)

JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

Adopted

(Motions for resolutions B10-0231/2025 and B10-0234/2025 fell.)

Detailed voting results

9.5. Execution spree in Iran and the confirmation of the death sentences of activists Behrouz Ehsani and Mehdi Hassani (vote)

Motions for resolutions RC-B10-0220/2025 (minutes of 3.4.2025, item I), B10-0220/2025, B10-0222/2025, B10-0224/2025, B10-0225/2025 and B10-0226/2025 (minutes of 2.4.2025, item I) (2025/2628(RSP))

(Majority of the votes cast)

JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

Adopted

(Motion for a resolution B10-0222/2025 fell.)

Detailed voting results

9.6. Immediate risk of further repression by Lukashenka’s regime in Belarus – threats from the Investigative Committee (vote)

Motions for resolutions RC-B10-0219/2025 (minutes of 3.4.2025, item I), B10-0218/2025, B10-0219/2025, B10-0221/2025, B10-0223/2025, B10-0227/2025 and B10-0229/2025 (minutes of 2.4.2025, item I) (2025/2628(RSP))

(Majority of the votes cast)

JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

Adopted

(Motion for a resolution B10-0218/2025 fell.)

Detailed voting results

9.7. Amending Directives (EU) 2022/2464 and (EU) 2024/1760 as regards the dates from which Member States are to apply certain corporate sustainability reporting and due diligence requirements ***I (vote)

Amending Directives (EU) 2022/2464 and (EU) 2024/1760 as regards the dates from which Member States are to apply certain corporate sustainability reporting and due diligence requirements [COM(2025)0080 – C10-0038/2025 – 2025/0044(COD)] – Committee on Legal Affairs

(Majority of the votes cast)

PROPOSAL TO REJECT THE COMMISSION PROPOSAL

Rejected

COMMISSION PROPOSAL and AMENDMENTS

Approved

Parliament’s first reading thus closed.

Detailed voting results

9.8. Energy-intensive industries (vote)

Motion for a resolution B10-0209/2025 (minutes of 3.4.2025, item I) (2025/2536(RSP))

The debate had taken place on 2 April 2025 (minutes of 2.4.2025, item 4).

(Majority of the votes cast)

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

Adopted

The following had spoken:

Pascale Piera, to move an oral amendment to add a new paragraph after paragraph 1. Parliament had not agreed to put the oral amendment to the vote as more than 39 Members had opposed it.

Detailed voting results

9.9. Targeted attacks against Christians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo – defending religious freedom and security (vote)

Motions for resolutions RC-B10-0211/2025, B10-0211/2025, B10-0212/2025, B10-0213/2025, B10-0214/2025, B10-0215/2025, B10-0216/2025 and B10-0217/2025 (minutes of 3.4.2025, item I) (2025/2612(RSP))

The debate had taken place on 1 April 2025 (minutes of 1.4.2025, item 17).

(Majority of the votes cast)

REQUEST FOR POSTPONEMENT (The Left Group)

Rejected

JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

Adopted

(Motions for resolutions B10-0212/2025 and B10-0213/2025 fell.)

The following had spoken:

Marc Botenga, on behalf of The Left Group, before the vote, to request that the vote be postponed under Rule 206(4) and Patryk Jaki, against that request.

Detailed voting results

(The sitting was suspended at 12:40.)

IN THE CHAIR: Javi LÓPEZ
Vice-President

10. Resumption of the sitting

The sitting resumed at 15:01.

11. Approval of the minutes of the previous sitting

The minutes of the previous sitting were approved.

12. Health care related tourism: protecting EU patients abroad (debate)

Commission statement: Health care related tourism: protecting EU patients abroad (2025/2640(RSP))

Olivér Várhelyi (Member of the Commission) made the statement.

The following spoke: Tomislav Sokol, on behalf of the PPE Group, Maria Grapini, on behalf of the S&D Group, Margarita de la Pisa Carrión, on behalf of the PfE Group, Michele Picaro, on behalf of the ECR Group, Billy Kelleher, on behalf of the Renew Group, Valentina Palmisano, on behalf of The Left Group, Siegbert Frank Droese, on behalf of the ESN Group, Seán Kelly, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú and Liudas Mažylis.

The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Bogdan Rzońca, Lukas Sieper and Alvise Pérez.

The following spoke: Olivér Várhelyi.

The debate closed.

13. Explanations of vote

13.1. Targeted attacks against Christians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo – defending religious freedom and security (RC-B10-0211/2025) (oral explanations of the vote)

Seán Kelly

13.2. Written explanations of the vote

In accordance with Rule 201, written explanations of the vote could be found on the Members’ pages on Parliament’s website.

14. Approval of the minutes of the sitting and forwarding of texts adopted

In accordance with Rule 208(3), the minutes of the sitting would be put to the House for approval at the start of the next sitting.

With Parliament’s agreement, the texts adopted during the part-session would be forwarded to their respective addressees without delay.

15. Dates of the next part-session

The next part-session would be held from 5 May 2025 to 8 May 2025.

16. Closure of the sitting

The sitting closed at 15:39.

17. Adjournment of the session

The session of the European Parliament was adjourned.

Alessandro Chiocchetti	Roberta Metsola
Secretary-General	President

LIST OF DOCUMENTS SERVING AS A BASIS FOR THE DEBATES AND DECISIONS OF PARLIAMENT

I. Motions for resolutions tabled

Prosecution of journalists in Cameroon, notably the cases of Amadou Vamoulké, Kingsley Fomunyuy Njoka, Mancho Bibixy, Thomas Awah Junior, Tsi Conrad

Joint motion for a resolution tabled under Rule 150(5) and Rule 136(4):

on the prosecution of journalists in Cameroon, notably the cases of Amadou Vamoulké, Kingsley Fomunyuy Njoka, Mancho Bibixy, Thomas Awah Junior and Tsi Conrad (2025/2627(RSP)) (RC-B10-0230/2025)
(replacing motions for resolutions B10-0230/2025, B10-0232/2025, B10-0233/2025, B10-0235/2025, B10-0236/2025 and B10-0237/2025)
Sebastião Bugalho, Tomáš Zdechovský, Michael Gahler, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Tomas Tobé, Luděk Niedermayer, Seán Kelly, Vangelis Meimarakis, Andrey Kovatchev, Wouter Beke, Danuše Nerudová, Loránt Vincze, Jessica Polfjärd, Łukasz Kohut, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Miriam Lexmann, Inese Vaidere
on behalf of the PPE Group
Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Marta Temido
on behalf of the S&D Group
Waldemar Tomaszewski, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Assita Kanko, Alexandr Vondra, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Adam Bielan
on behalf of the ECR Group
Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Olivier Chastel, Engin Eroglu, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar
on behalf of the Renew Group
Catarina Vieira
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Rima Hassan
on behalf of The Left Group

Execution spree in Iran and the confirmation of the death sentences of activists Behrouz Ehsani and Mehdi Hassani

Joint motion for a resolution tabled under Rule 150(5) and Rule 136(4):

on the execution spree in Iran and confirmation of the death sentences of activists Behrouz Ehsani and Mehdi Hassani (2025/2628(RSP)) (RC-B10-0220/2025)
(replacing motions for resolutions B10-0220/2025, B10-0224/2025, B10-0225/2025, B10-0226/2025 and B10-0228/2025)
Sebastião Bugalho, Loucas Fourlas, Michael Gahler, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Tomas Tobé, Davor Ivo Stier, Luděk Niedermayer, Seán Kelly, Vangelis Meimarakis, Andrey Kovatchev, Wouter Beke, Danuše Nerudová, Loránt Vincze, Jessica Polfjärd, Łukasz Kohut, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Tomáš Zdechovský, Miriam Lexmann, Inese Vaidere, Milan Zver
on behalf of the PPE Group
Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Daniel Attard, Evin Incir
on behalf of the S&D Group
Adam Bielan, Mariusz Kamiński, Reinis Pozņaks, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Rihards Kols, Michał Dworczyk, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Maciej Wąsik, Aurelijus Veryga, Dick Erixon, Charlie Weimers, Beatrice Timgren, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Assita Kanko, Alexandr Vondra
on behalf of the ECR Group
Helmut Brandstätter, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Engin Eroglu, Bart Groothuis, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Urmas Paet, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar
on behalf of the Renew Group
Hannah Neumann
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Immediate risk of further repression by Lukashenka’s regime in Belarus – threats from the Investigative Committee

Joint motion for a resolution tabled under Rule 150(5) and Rule 136(4):

on the immediate risk of further repression by Lukashenka’s regime in Belarus – threats from the Investigative Committee (2025/2629(RSP)) (RC-B10-0219/2025)
(replacing motions for resolutions B10-0219/2025, B10-0221/2025, B10-0223/2025, B10-0227/2025 and B10-0229/2025)
Sebastião Bugalho, Miriam Lexmann, Michael Gahler, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Tomas Tobé, Dariusz Joński, Luděk Niedermayer, Seán Kelly, Vangelis Meimarakis, Andrey Kovatchev, Wouter Beke, Danuše Nerudová, Loránt Vincze, Jessica Polfjärd, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Tomáš Zdechovský, Inese Vaidere
on behalf of the PPE Group
Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Robert Biedroń
on behalf of the S&D Group
Adam Bielan, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Mariusz Kamiński, Bogdan Rzońca, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Rihards Kols, Michał Dworczyk, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Maciej Wąsik, Reinis Pozņaks, Ivaylo Valchev, Marlena Maląg, Aurelijus Veryga, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Dick Erixon, Charlie Weimers, Beatrice Timgren, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Assita Kanko, Alexandr Vondra, Roberts Zīle
on behalf of the ECR Group
Michał Kobosko, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Helmut Brandstätter, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Engin Eroglu, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Eugen Tomac, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas
on behalf of the Renew Group
Mārtiņš Staķis
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Merja Kyllönen, Jonas Sjöstedt, Hanna Gedin, Per Clausen, Jussi Saramo, Li Andersson

Energy-intensive industries

Motions for resolutions tabled under Rule 136(2) to wind up the debate:

on energy-intensive industries (2025/2536(RSP)) (B10-0209/2025)
Giorgio Gori, Wouter Beke, Brigitte van den Berg, Benedetta Scuderi
on behalf of the ITRE Committee

Targeted attacks against Christians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo – defending religious freedom and security

Motions for resolutions tabled under Rule 136(2) to wind up the debate:

on the targeted attacks against Christians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: defending religious freedom and security (2025/2612(RSP)) (B10-0211/2025)
Hilde Vautmans, Abir Al-Sahlani, Dan Barna, Urmas Paet, Yvan Verougstraete
on behalf of the Renew Group

on targeted attacks against Christians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo – defending religious freedom and security (2025/2612(RSP)) (B10-0212/2025)
Alexander Sell, Tomasz Froelich
on behalf of the ESN Group

on the targeted attacks against Christians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: defending religious freedom and security (2025/2612(RSP)) (B10-0213/2025)
Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Matthieu Valet, Susanna Ceccardi, Silvia Sardone, Roberto Vannacci, Hermann Tertsch, Jorge Martín Frías
on behalf of the PfE Group

on the targeted attacks against Christians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: defending religious freedom and security (2025/2612(RSP)) (B10-0214/2025)
Mounir Satouri
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

on the targeted attacks against Christians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: defending religious freedom and security (2025/2612(RSP)) (B10-0215/2025)
Lukas Mandl, David McAllister, Andrzej Halicki, Michael Gahler, Sebastião Bugalho, Željana Zovko, François-Xavier Bellamy, Christophe Gomart, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Andrey Kovatchev, Miriam Lexmann, Rasa Juknevičienė, Antonio López-Istúriz White
on behalf of the PPE Group

on the targeted attacks against Christians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: defending religious freedom and security (2025/2612(RSP)) (B10-0216/2025)
Adam Bielan, Mariusz Kamiński, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Cristian Terheş, Maciej Wąsik, Aurelijus Veryga, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński
on behalf of the ECR Group

on targeted attacks against Christians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: defending religious freedom and security (2025/2612(RSP)) (B10-0217/2025)
Yannis Maniatis, Marit Maij
on behalf of the S&D Group

Joint motion for a resolution tabled under Rule 136(2) and (4):

on the targeted attacks against Christians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: defending religious freedom and security (2025/2612(RSP)) (B10-0211/2025)
(replacing motions for resolutions B10-0211/2025, B10-0214/2025, B10-0215/2025, B10-0216/2025 and B10-0217/2025)
Lukas Mandl, David McAllister, Andrzej Halicki, Michael Gahler, Sebastião Bugalho, Željana Zovko, François-Xavier Bellamy, Christophe Gomart, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Andrey Kovatchev, Miriam Lexmann, Rasa Juknevičienė, Antonio López-Istúriz White
on behalf of the PPE Group
Yannis Maniatis, Marit Maij
on behalf of the S&D Group
Patryk Jaki, Adam Bielan, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Aurelijus Veryga, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Bogdan Rzońca, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Mariusz Kamiński, Marlena Maląg, Marion Maréchal, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Alberico Gambino, Nicolas Bay, Waldemar Buda, Piotr Müller, Maciej Wąsik, Kosma Złotowski, Jacek Ozdoba, Daniel Obajtek, Tobiasz Bocheński, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Carlo Fidanza, Cristian Terheş
on behalf of the ECR Group
Hilde Vautmans, Petras Auštrevičius, Dan Barna, Olivier Chastel, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Urmas Paet, Lucia Yar
on behalf of the Renew Group
Mounir Satouri
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

II. Petitions

Petitions Nos 0260-25 to 0376-25 had been entered in the register on 28 March 2025 and had been forwarded to the committee responsible, in accordance with Rule 232(9) and (10).

The President had, on 28 March 2025, forwarded to the committee responsible, in accordance with Rule 232(15), petitions addressed to the European Parliament by natural or legal persons who were not citizens of the European Union and who did not reside, or have their registered office, in a Member State.

III. Decisions to draw up own-initiative reports

Decisions to draw up own-initiative reports (Rule 55)

(Following the Conference of Presidents’ decision of 26 March 2025)

AFCO Committee

– Implementation of the Charter on Fundamental Rights of the European Union in the EU legal framework (2025/2075(INI))
(opinion: LIBE)

AFET, DEVE committees

– Global Gateway – past impacts and future orientation (2025/2073(INI))
(opinion: INTA)

CONT Committee

– Evaluating the successes achieved and lessons learned from EU enlargements since 2004 in the implementation of the EU budget (2025/2071(INI))

ECON Committee

– Access to finance for SMEs and scale-ups (2025/2072(INI))

FEMM Committee

– Gender inequalities in health, specifically as regards gender-specific conditions (2025/2074(INI))
(opinion: SANT)

Decisions to draw up own-initiative reports (Rules 55 and 213)

(Following the Conference of Presidents’ decision of 26 March 2025)

EUDS Special Committee

– Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield (2025/2069(INI))

HOUS Special Committee

– Housing crisis in the European Union with the aim of proposing solutions for decent, sustainable and affordable housing (2025/2070(INI))

IV. Consent procedure

Reports with a motion for a non-legislative resolution (Rule 107(2))

(Following notification by the Conference of Committee Chairs on 26 March 2025)

INTA Committee

– The termination of the Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) between the EU and the Republic of Cameroon on forest law enforcement, governance and trade in timber and timber products to the European Union (FLEGT) (2024/0245M(NLE) – 2024/0245(NLE))
(opinion: DEVE)

V. Documents received

The following documents had been received:

1) from other institutions

– Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements (COM(2025)0084 – C10-0036/2025 – 2025/0040(COD))
In accordance with Rules 151(1) and 152(1), the President would consult the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on this proposal.
referred to committee responsible: BUDG, ECON
opinion: ENVI, ITRE, TRAN

2) from Members

– Catherine Griset. Motion for a resolution on promoting knowledge learning and transfer in the crafts and heritage restoration professions (B10-0153/2025)
referred to committee responsible: CULT

– Beatrice Timgren. Motion for a resolution on reassessing the European Green Deal: innovation before costly emission cuts (B10-0170/2025)
referred to committee responsible: ENVI
opinion: ITRE

– Virginie Joron. Motion for a resolution on the annulment of the elections in Romania (B10-0172/2025)
referred to committee responsible: LIBE

– Ľuboš Blaha, Fernand Kartheiser, Hans Neuhoff, Friedrich Pürner, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza, Filip Turek, Claudiu-Richard Târziu, Milan Uhrík and Petar Volgin. Motion for a resolution on the deteriorating rule of law situation in Romania (B10-0173/2025)
referred to committee responsible: LIBE

– Christine Anderson, Anja Arndt, René Aust, Arno Bausemer, Zsuzsanna Borvendég, Irmhild Boßdorf, Markus Buchheit, Petr Bystron, Ivan David, Ondřej Dostál, Tomasz Froelich, Petras Gražulis, Roman Haider, Gerald Hauser, Marc Jongen, Alexander Jungbluth, Mary Khan, Maximilian Krah, Rada Laykova, Luis-Vicențiu Lazarus, Milan Mazurek, Alexander Sell, Petra Steger, Stanislav Stoyanov, Marcin Sypniewski and Stanisław Tyszka. Motion for a resolution on political repression and fundamental rights in Bulgaria (B10-0198/2025)
referred to committee responsible: LIBE

ATTENDANCE REGISTER

Present:

Aaltola Mika, Adamowicz Magdalena, Aftias Georgios, Agirregoitia Martínez Oihane, Agius Peter, Agius Saliba Alex, Alexandraki Galato, Allione Grégory, Al-Sahlani Abir, Anadiotis Nikolaos, Anderson Christine, Andersson Li, Andresen Rasmus, Andrews Barry, Andriukaitis Vytenis Povilas, Angel Marc, Annemans Gerolf, Annunziata Lucia, Arias Echeverría Pablo, Arimont Pascal, Arłukowicz Bartosz, Arnaoutoglou Sakis, Arndt Anja, Arvanitis Konstantinos, Asens Llodrà Jaume, Assis Francisco, Attard Daniel, Aubry Manon, Auštrevičius Petras, Azmani Malik, Bajada Thomas, Baljeu Jeannette, Ballarín Cereza Laura, Bardella Jordan, Barley Katarina, Barna Dan, Barrena Arza Pernando, Bartulica Stephen Nikola, Bartůšek Nikola, Bausemer Arno, Bay Nicolas, Bay Christophe, Beke Wouter, Beleris Fredis, Bellamy François-Xavier, Benjumea Benjumea Isabel, Berendsen Tom, Berger Stefan, Berlato Sergio, Bernhuber Alexander, Biedroń Robert, Bielan Adam, Bischoff Gabriele, Blaha Ľuboš, Blinkevičiūtė Vilija, Blom Rachel, Bloss Michael, Bocheński Tobiasz, Boeselager Damian, Bogdan Ioan-Rareş, Bonaccini Stefano, Bonte Barbara, Borchia Paolo, Borrás Pabón Mireia, Borvendég Zsuzsanna, Bosanac Gordan, Boßdorf Irmhild, Bosse Stine, Botenga Marc, Boyer Gilles, Boylan Lynn, Brandstätter Helmut, Brasier-Clain Marie-Luce, Braun Grzegorz, Brejza Krzysztof, Bricmont Saskia, Brnjac Nikolina, Brudziński Joachim Stanisław, Buchheit Markus, Buczek Tomasz, Buda Daniel, Buda Waldemar, Budka Borys, Bugalho Sebastião, Buła Andrzej, Bullmann Udo, Burkhardt Delara, Buxadé Villalba Jorge, Bystron Petr, Bžoch Jaroslav, Camara Mélissa, Canfin Pascal, Carberry Nina, Cârciu Gheorghe, Carême Damien, Casa David, Caspary Daniel, Castillo Laurent, Cavazzini Anna, Cavedagna Stefano, Ceccardi Susanna, Cepeda José, Ceulemans Estelle, Chahim Mohammed, Chaibi Leila, Chastel Olivier, Chinnici Caterina, Christensen Asger, Ciccioli Carlo, Cifrová Ostrihoňová Veronika, Ciriani Alessandro, Clausen Per, Clergeau Christophe, Cormand David, Corrado Annalisa, Costanzo Vivien, Cotrim De Figueiredo João, Cowen Barry, Cremer Tobias, Crespo Díaz Carmen, Cristea Andi, Crosetto Giovanni, Cunha Paulo, Dahl Henrik, Danielsson Johan, Dávid Dóra, David Ivan, Decaro Antonio, de la Hoz Quintano Raúl, Della Valle Danilo, Deloge Valérie, De Masi Fabio, De Meo Salvatore, Demirel Özlem, Devaux Valérie, Dibrani Adnan, Diepeveen Ton, Dieringer Elisabeth, Dîncu Vasile, Di Rupo Elio, Disdier Mélanie, Dobrev Klára, Doherty Regina, Doleschal Christian, Dömötör Csaba, Do Nascimento Cabral Paulo, Donazzan Elena, Dorfmann Herbert, Dostalova Klara, Dostál Ondřej, Droese Siegbert Frank, Düpont Lena, Dworczyk Michał, Ecke Matthias, Ehler Christian, Ehlers Marieke, Eriksson Sofie, Erixon Dick, Eroglu Engin, Estaràs Ferragut Rosa, Everding Sebastian, Ezcurra Almansa Alma, Falcă Gheorghe, Falcone Marco, Farantouris Nikolas, Farreng Laurence, Ferber Markus, Ferenc Viktória, Fernández Jonás, Firmenich Ruth, Flanagan Luke Ming, Fourlas Loucas, Fourreau Emma, Fragkos Emmanouil, Freund Daniel, Frigout Anne-Sophie, Friis Sigrid, Fritzon Heléne, Froelich Tomasz, Fuglsang Niels, Funchion Kathleen, Furet Angéline, Furore Mario, Gahler Michael, Galán Estrella, Gálvez Lina, Gambino Alberico, García Hermida-Van Der Walle Raquel, Garraud Jean-Paul, Gasiuk-Pihowicz Kamila, Geadi Geadis, Gedin Hanna, Geese Alexandra, Geier Jens, Geisel Thomas, Gemma Chiara, Gerbrandy Gerben-Jan, Germain Jean-Marc, Gerzsenyi Gabriella, Geuking Niels, Gieseke Jens, Giménez Larraz Borja, Girauta Vidal Juan Carlos, Glavak Sunčana, Glück Andreas, Glucksmann Raphaël, Goerens Charles, Gomart Christophe, Gómez López Sandra, Gonçalves Bruno, Gonçalves Sérgio, González Casares Nicolás, González Pons Esteban, Gori Giorgio, Gosiewska Małgorzata, Gotink Dirk, Gozi Sandro, Grapini Maria, Gražulis Petras, Gregorová Markéta, Grims Branko, Griset Catherine, Gronkiewicz-Waltz Hanna, Groothuis Bart, Grossmann Elisabeth, Grudler Christophe, Gualmini Elisabetta, Guarda Cristina, Guetta Bernard, Guzenina Maria, Győri Enikő, Gyürk András, Hadjipantela Michalis, Haider Roman, Halicki Andrzej, Hansen Niels Flemming, Hassan Rima, Hauser Gerald, Häusling Martin, Hava Mircea-Gheorghe, Heide Hannes, Heinäluoma Eero, Herbst Niclas, Herranz García Esther, Hetman Krzysztof, Hohlmeier Monika, Hojsík Martin, Holmgren Pär, Homs Ginel Alicia, Humberto Sérgio, Ijabs Ivars, Imart Céline, Incir Evin, Inselvini Paolo, Iovanovici Şoşoacă Diana, Jalloul Muro Hana, Jamet France, Jarubas Adam, Jerković Romana, Jongen Marc, Joński Dariusz, Joron Virginie, Jouvet Pierre, Joveva Irena, Juknevičienė Rasa, Junco García Nora, Jungbluth Alexander, Kalfon François, Kaliňák Erik, Kaljurand Marina, Kalniete Sandra, Kamiński Mariusz, Kanev Radan, Kanko Assita, Karlsbro Karin, Kartheiser Fernand, Karvašová Ľubica, Katainen Elsi, Kefalogiannis Emmanouil, Kelleher Billy, Keller Fabienne, Kelly Seán, Kemp Martine, Kennes Rudi, Khan Mary, Kircher Sophia, Knafo Sarah, Knotek Ondřej, Kohut Łukasz, Kolář Ondřej, Kollár Kinga, Kols Rihards, Konečná Kateřina, Kopacz Ewa, Körner Moritz, Kountoura Elena, Kovařík Ondřej, Kovatchev Andrey, Krištopans Vilis, Kruis Sebastian, Krutílek Ondřej, Kubín Tomáš, Kuhnke Alice, Kulja András Tivadar, Kulmuni Katri, Kyllönen Merja, Kyuchyuk Ilhan, Lakos Eszter, Lalucq Aurore, Lange Bernd, Langensiepen Katrin, Laššáková Judita, László András, Latinopoulou Afroditi, Laureti Camilla, Laykova Rada, Lazarov Ilia, Lazarus Luis-Vicențiu, Le Callennec Isabelle, Leggeri Fabrice, Lenaers Jeroen, Leonardelli Julien, Lewandowski Janusz, Lexmann Miriam, Liese Peter, Lins Norbert, Loiseau Nathalie, Løkkegaard Morten, Lopatka Reinhold, López Javi, López Aguilar Juan Fernando, Lövin Isabella, Luena César, Łukacijewska Elżbieta Katarzyna, Lupo Giuseppe, McAllister David, Maestre Cristina, Magoni Lara, Maij Marit, Maląg Marlena, Manda Claudiu, Mandl Lukas, Maniatis Yannis, Mantovani Mario, Maran Pierfrancesco, Marczułajtis-Walczak Jagna, Mariani Thierry, Marino Ignazio Roberto, Marquardt Erik, Martins Catarina, Marzà Ibáñez Vicent, Mato Gabriel, Matthieu Sara, Mavrides Costas, Mayer Georg, Mazurek Milan, Mažylis Liudas, McNamara Michael, Mebarek Nora, Mehnert Alexandra, Meimarakis Vangelis, Mendia Idoia, Mertens Verena, Mesure Marina, Metsola Roberta, Metz Tilly, Mikser Sven, Millán Mon Francisco José, Miranda Paz Ana, Molnár Csaba, Montero Irene, Montserrat Dolors, Morace Carolina, Morano Nadine, Moratti Letizia, Moreira de Sá Tiago, Moreno Sánchez Javier, Moretti Alessandra, Motreanu Dan-Ştefan, Mularczyk Arkadiusz, Müller Piotr, Mureşan Siegfried, Muşoiu Ştefan, Nagyová Jana, Nardella Dario, Navarrete Rojas Fernando, Nemec Matjaž, Nerudová Danuše, Nesci Denis, Neuhoff Hans, Neumann Hannah, Nevado del Campo Elena, Niebler Angelika, Niedermayer Luděk, Niinistö Ville, Nikolic Aleksandar, Ní Mhurchú Cynthia, Noichl Maria, Nordqvist Rasmus, Novakov Andrey, Nykiel Mirosława, Obajtek Daniel, Ódor Ľudovít, Oetjen Jan-Christoph, Ohisalo Maria, Oliveira João, Omarjee Younous, Ó Ríordáin Aodhán, Orlando Leoluca, Ozdoba Jacek, Paet Urmas, Pajín Leire, Palmisano Valentina, Panayiotou Fidias, Papadakis Kostas, Papandreou Nikos, Pappas Nikos, Pascual de la Parte Nicolás, Patriciello Aldo, Paulus Jutta, Pedulla’ Gaetano, Pellerin-Carlin Thomas, Peltier Guillaume, Penkova Tsvetelina, Pennelle Gilles, Pereira Lídia, Pérez Alvise, Peter-Hansen Kira Marie, Petrov Hristo, Picaro Michele, Picula Tonino, Piera Pascale, Pietikäinen Sirpa, Pimpie Pierre, de la Pisa Carrión Margarita, Polato Daniele, Polfjärd Jessica, Popescu Virgil-Daniel, Pozņaks Reinis, Prebilič Vladimir, Princi Giusi, Protas Jacek, Rackete Carola, Radtke Dennis, Rafowicz Emma, Ratas Jüri, Rechagneux Julie, Regner Evelyn, Repasi René, Repp Sabrina, Ressler Karlo, Reuten Thijs, Riba i Giner Diana, Ricci Matteo, Ripa Manuela, Rodrigues André, Ros Sempere Marcos, Roth Neveďalová Katarína, Rougé André, Ruissen Bert-Jan, Ruotolo Sandro, Rzońca Bogdan, Saeidi Arash, Salini Massimiliano, Salis Ilaria, Salla Aura, Sánchez Amor Nacho, Sanchez Julien, Sancho Murillo Elena, Saramo Jussi, Sardone Silvia, Šarec Marjan, Sargiacomo Eric, Satouri Mounir, Saudargas Paulius, Sbai Majdouline, Sberna Antonella, Schaldemose Christel, Schaller-Baross Ernő, Schenk Oliver, Scheuring-Wielgus Joanna, Schieder Andreas, Schilling Lena, Schneider Christine, Schwab Andreas, Seekatz Ralf, Sell Alexander, Serrano Sierra Rosa, Serra Sánchez Isabel, Sidl Günther, Sienkiewicz Bartłomiej, Sieper Lukas, Simon Sven, Singer Christine, Sinkevičius Virginijus, Sjöstedt Jonas, Śmiszek Krzysztof, Smith Anthony, Smit Sander, Sokol Tomislav, Solier Diego, Solís Pérez Susana, Sommen Liesbet, Sonneborn Martin, Sorel Malika, Sousa Silva Hélder, Søvndal Villy, Squarta Marco, Staķis Mārtiņš, Stancanelli Raffaele, Ştefănuță Nicolae, Steger Petra, Stier Davor Ivo, Storm Kristoffer, Stöteler Sebastiaan, Stoyanov Stanislav, Strada Cecilia, Streit Joachim, Strik Tineke, Strolenberg Anna, Sturdza Şerban Dimitrie, Stürgkh Anna, Szczerba Michał, Szekeres Pál, Szydło Beata, Tamburrano Dario, Tânger Corrêa António, Tarczyński Dominik, Tarquinio Marco, Tarr Zoltán, Târziu Claudiu-Richard, Tavares Carla, Tegethoff Kai, Temido Marta, Teodorescu Georgiana, Terheş Cristian, Ter Laak Ingeborg, Terras Riho, Tertsch Hermann, Thionnet Pierre-Romain, Timgren Beatrice, Tinagli Irene, Tobback Bruno, Tobé Tomas, Tolassy Rody, Tomac Eugen, Tomašič Zala, Tomaszewski Waldemar, Tomc Romana, Tonin Matej, Toom Jana, Topo Raffaele, Torselli Francesco, Tosi Flavio, Toussaint Marie, Tovaglieri Isabella, Toveri Pekka, Tridico Pasquale, Tsiodras Dimitris, Turek Filip, Tynkkynen Sebastian, Uhrík Milan, Ušakovs Nils, Vaidere Inese, Valchev Ivaylo, Valet Matthieu, Van Brempt Kathleen, Van Brug Anouk, Vandendriessche Tom, Van Dijck Kris, Van Lanschot Reinier, Van Leeuwen Jessika, Vannacci Roberto, Van Overtveldt Johan, Van Sparrentak Kim, Varaut Alexandre, Vasconcelos Ana, Vasile-Voiculescu Vlad, Vautmans Hilde, Vedrenne Marie-Pierre, Ventola Francesco, Veryga Aurelijus, Vešligaj Marko, Vicsek Annamária, Vieira Catarina, Vigenin Kristian, Vilimsky Harald, Vincze Loránt, Vind Marianne, Vistisen Anders, Vivaldini Mariateresa, Volgin Petar, von der Schulenburg Michael, Vondra Alexandr, Voss Axel, Vrecionová Veronika, Vázquez Lázara Adrián, Waitz Thomas, Walsh Maria, Walsmann Marion, Warborn Jörgen, Warnke Jan-Peter, Wąsik Maciej, Wawrykiewicz Michał, Wechsler Andrea, Weimers Charlie, Werbrouck Séverine, Wiezik Michal, Winkler Iuliu, Winzig Angelika, Wiseler-Lima Isabel, Wiśniewska Jadwiga, Wolters Lara, Yar Lucia, Yon-Courtin Stéphanie, Yoncheva Elena, Zacharia Maria, Zalewska Anna, Žalimas Dainius, Zan Alessandro, Zarzalejos Javier, Zdechovský Tomáš, Zdrojewski Bogdan Andrzej, Zijlstra Auke, Zīle Roberts, Zingaretti Nicola, Złotowski Kosma, Zovko Željana, Zver Milan

MIL OSI Europe News –

April 5, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: Switzerland gains ground in promoting its human rights priorities

Source: Switzerland – Federal Administration in English

After six weeks of work, the first session of the Human Rights Council (HRC) chaired by a Swiss national has drawn to a close at the UN in Geneva. Swiss diplomat Jürg Lauber led the deliberations of the 58th session of the HRC, during which the 47 member states, including Switzerland, discussed several critical global challenges, including those in Ukraine, the Middle East and Syria. On the latter, steps on a possible path towards peace and stability were taken. Efforts to abolish the death penalty – one of Switzerland’s priorities – also continued to make headway.

MIL OSI Europe News –

April 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Latest news – 7 April – 11 April: Work in Parliamentary Committees

Source: European Parliament

In the week of 7 April, most of Members’work will be in Parliamentary Committees. Members will vote on the revision of the foreign investment screening regulation and on suspension of the EU Safeguard Regulation vis-a-vis Ukraine. The Committee on Employment and Social Affairs will host an Interparliamentary Committee Meeting on “Affordable Housing for All”. Committees on Foreign Affairs and on Budgets will jointly hold a second Ukraine Facility Dialogue with Commissioner Marta Kos. Follow the links below to discover the week’s highlights.

MIL OSI Europe News –

April 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – Public hearings and debates

Source: European Parliament

Public Hearings and Debates © European Union (2025) – European Parliament

A number of public hearings and exchanges of views will take place this week. Topics include human rights in Cuba, press freedom, crypto-assets, internet safety for minors, the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism and legal proceedings by popular action in Spain. Members will also discuss the digital euro and Ukraine’s energy sector. Follow the links below to find out more about the highlighted events.

MIL OSI Europe News –

April 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Altered EU flag – E-000074/2025(ASW)

Source: European Parliament

The visual that the Honourable Members refer to is an artistic illustration of the EU and Ukrainian flags, used for communication purposes. It symbolises European solidarity with Ukraine. This is just one of several examples of artistic interpretation of flags used for communication purposes also by other EU institutions.

No member of the College has provided comments on the use of this visual.

Last updated: 4 April 2025

MIL OSI Europe News –

April 5, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2024 – P10_TA(2025)0057 – Wednesday, 2 April 2025 – Strasbourg

Source: European Parliament

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 14, 16, 21, 24, 36 and 41 thereof,

– having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources(1),

– having regard to the report of 20 June 2024 by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) entitled ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy Report – Our Priorities in 2024’,

– having regard to the ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’, endorsed by the European Council on 21 March 2022,

– having regard to NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, adopted on 29 June 2022,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 22 March 2024, 18 April 2024, 27 June 2024, 19 December 2024, 6 March 2025 and 20 March 2025,

– having regard to the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions of 18 March 2024, 22 April 2024, 24 May 2024, 24 June 2024, 22 July 2024, 14 October 2024, 18 November 2024, 16 December 2024, 27 January 2025, 24 February 2025 and 17 March 2025,

– having regard to the declaration of the Summit between the EU and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) adopted on 18 July 2023,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 of 22 March 2021 establishing a European Peace Facility, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2015/528(2),

– having regard to the Political Guidelines of the Commission President for 2024-2029,

– having regard to the 2024 enlargement reports presented by the Commission on 30 October 2024,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans(3),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 March 2025 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova(4),

– having regard to Sauli Niinistö’s report of 30 October 2024 on strengthening Europe’s civil and military preparedness and readiness,

– having regard to the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, adopted in 2004, updated in 2008 and further supplemented in 2020 with a guidance note on the Guidelines’ implementation,

– having regard to its resolutions on breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, adopted in accordance with Rule 150 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on European Economic Security Strategy (JOIN(2023)0020),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 December 2020 entitled ‘The EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade’ (JOIN(2020)0018),

– having in regard to the Commission Recommendation of 3 October 2023 on critical technology areas for the EU’s economic security for further risk assessment with Member States (C(2023)6689),

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 of 17 May 2019 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States(5),

– having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation(6),

– having regard to its resolution of 9 October 2024 on strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian interference ahead of the upcoming presidential elections and a constitutional referendum on EU integration(7),

– having regard to its resolution of 24 October 2024 on the misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan(8),

– having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on the security and defence implications of China’s influence on critical infrastructure in the European Union(9),

– having regard to its resolutions of 24 October 2024 on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia(10) and of 5 October 2023 on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh after Azerbaijan’s attack and the continuing threats against Armenia(11),

– having regard to its resolutions on historical remembrance, including its resolutions of 2 April 2009 on European conscience and totalitarianism(12), of 19 September 2019 on the importance of European remembrance for the future of Europe(13), of 15 December 2022 on 90 years after the Holodomor: recognising the mass killing through starvation as genocide(14) and of 17 January 2024 on European historical consciousness(15),

– having regard to the report of 9 May 2022 on the final outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe,

– having regard to the EU Action Plan on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in External Action 2021-2025 (GAP III),

– having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), which entered into force in the EU on 1 October 2023,

– having regard to the UN resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on 25 September 2015 at the UN Sustainable Development Summit in New York entitled ‘Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’ (Agenda 2030), which established the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),

– having regard to the UN resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on 8 December 1949 on assistance to Palestine refugees,

– having regard to the UN Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 on a peaceful and accepted settlement of the Middle East situation,

– having regard to the UN Security Council resolution of 11 August 2006on the situation in the Middle East,

– having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 and the UN Human Rights Council resolution of 22 June 2020 on the prevention of genocide,

– having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),

– having regard to the agreement between the International Criminal Court and the European Union of 28 April 2006 on cooperation and assistance(16),

– having regard to the advisory opinion requested from the International Court of Justice by the UN General Assembly in its resolution of 30 December 2022 on Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120),

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0010/2025),

A. whereas the world faces rapid geopolitical shifts, with autocratic powers, both individually and in coordinated efforts, actively challenging the international rules-based order and its multilateral institutions, international law, democratic institutions and societies, as well as our alliances; whereas all EU leverage should be assessed in order to dissuade countries from supporting Russia’s aggression;

B. whereas the BRICS summit held in Kazan, Russia, from 22 to 24 October 2024 underscores how Putin leverages international platforms to counteract isolation and build alliances; whereas a unified and strategic EU response is required to uphold the principles of the rules-based international order;

C. whereas the EU and its Member States should review development assistance to governments of countries that openly support Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and monitor their votes on relevant UN resolutions;

D. whereas the geopolitical confrontation between democracies and authoritarian and dictatorial regimes is growing, conflicts are multiplying, and the use of force is increasingly treated as a standard tool for pursuing political aims; whereas force is wielded not only by states but also by an expanding array of non-state actors; whereas the EU needs to reinforce transatlantic relations and build constructive partnerships with like-minded partners in the Global South;

E. whereas the geopolitical context in which the EU is operating has accentuated the need for more ambitious, credible, decisive and unified EU action and a fully fledged European foreign policy on the world stage and has highlighted the necessity for Member States to demonstrate the required political will to rebuild their defence capabilities, while strengthening the EU’s transatlantic bonds and partnerships with like-minded countries; whereas the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) needs to become a fully fledged EU policy through which the EU can address the key geopolitical challenges; whereas the EU should be guided in its external action by the values and principles enshrined in Article 2, Article 3(5) and Article 21 TEU, which have inspired the EU’s own creation, development and enlargement; whereas it is in the EU’s interest to stand up accordingly for universal values, norms and principles such as freedom and democratic standards, as well as human rights, the rule of law, international justice and the Helsinki Final Act, in particular as regards the non-violation of international borders;

F. whereas the EU is faced with the rapid rise of new threats at its borders and on its territory, which are destabilising the EU’s functioning, in particular targeted disinformation, cyber and hybrid attacks, the instrumentalisation of migratory flows, in addition to international terrorism and religious radicalism;

G. whereas strategic autonomy requires the EU to act independently on the global stage when needed, particularly in foreign and security policy; whereas the EU has recognised the need to reduce undue reliance on external actors for safeguarding its interests in an unpredictable and multipolar world;

H. whereas the EU needs to develop an independent and autonomous European diplomacy, including public and cultural, economic, climate, digital and cyber diplomacy, led by an EU diplomatic service which is driven by a common diplomatic culture;

I. whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine violates the rules-based international order, fundamental principles of international law as enshrined in the UN Charter and key conventions and resolutions, the Helsinki Final Act and the European Convention on Human Rights;

J. whereas the Russian violations of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War comprise executions of prisoners and the denial of access to humanitarian organisations and medical treatment for prisoners;

K. whereas the ICC has issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin and the Russian High Commissioner for Children, Maria Lvova-Belova, for their involvement in the abduction of Ukrainian children to Russia; whereas Russia, assisted by the Belarusian regime, is undertaking to re-educate Ukrainian hildren and erase their Ukrainian identity; whereas Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s regime in Belarus has to be held fully accountable for its complicity in the war of aggression against Ukraine and war crimes such as the abduction of thousands of Ukrainian children;

L. whereas the ICC has additionally issued arrest warrants for Russian military leaders Sergei Shoigu, Valery Gerasimov, Viktor Sokolov and Sergei Kobylash, accused of directing attacks on civilian targets;

M. whereas the Hungarian Government is blocking the EUR 5 billion Ukraine Assistance Fund set up in March 2024 within the European Peace Facility (EPF); whereas the Hungarian Government has been blocking the eighth tranche of EPF reimbursements for Member States that have delivered military aid to Ukraine since May 2023;

N. whereas Russian shadow fleet tankers pose a considerable risk to maritime and environmental security by turning off or manipulating their automatic identification systems; whereas these tankers provide an estimated USD 12 billion to Russia’s war budget each month, thereby directly funding its aggressive military operations;

O. whereas Vladimir Putin’s regime has instrumentalised history in an attempt to secure the loyalty of the Russian population by creating nostalgia for the supposed greatness of the Soviet Empire, falsifying the history of Russia and Ukraine, rejecting Nikita Khrushchev’s policy to acknowledge and condemn Stalinist crimes, reneging on Mikhail Gorbachev’s recognition and condemnation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and declaring the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest tragedy of the previous century;

P. whereas Russia and other malign actors in its neighbouring countries promote anti-Western and divisive rhetoric and exploit ethnic tensions in the Western Balkans in order to inflame conflict and divide communities, including through the instrumentalisation of the Serbian Orthodox Church;

Q. whereas 2024 marked the 20th anniversary of the ‘big bang’ enlargement when 10 countries joined the EU; whereas enlargement is of the utmost strategic importance for the EU, as it represents a geostrategic investment in long-term peace, democracy, stability, security, climate protection and prosperity across the continent, and in particular in the face of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the preparation for enlargement requires reforms in the EU and whereas the EU should conduct the enlargement process in parallel with the institutional and decision-making reforms necessary to safeguard the EU’s integration capacity;

R. whereas the EU must maintain the momentum for the acceleration of its enlargement policy while accession countries continue to reform and achieve the required benchmarks related to the EU acquis; whereas consistent messages and a clear path towards integration for candidate countries are vital for keeping the pro-European perspective alive;

S. whereas the future of the Balkans and the countries in the Eastern Neighbourhood lies in the EU;

T. whereas the Union is founded on the values of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, which are part of the Copenhagen criteria, which are the key set of criteria for EU membership; whereas the accession process is a merit-based and reversible process;

U. whereas joining the EU requires foreign policy alignment, including on the votes on United Nations General Assembly resolutions, support for Ukraine and alignment with sanctions against Russia; whereas most of the countries of the Western Balkans have reached high levels of alignment with the CFSP, a notable exception being Serbia;

V. whereas North Macedonia concluded the Prespa Agreement with Greece and the Treaty of friendship, good-neighbourliness and cooperation with Bulgaria;

W. whereas the citizens of Georgia have demonstrated their commitment to democratic values and to their country making progress with EU integration; whereas the democratic backsliding in Georgia needs to be reversed; whereas the Georgian authorities should heed the will of the Georgian people to join the EU and should ensure free and fair elections, stop democratic backsliding, abandon the laws that jeopardise Georgia’s European future and pursue pro-European democratic reforms; whereas Georgia should align with the EU’s CFSP, including the sanctions adopted unanimously against Russia;

X. whereas any partnership agreement between the EU and Azerbaijan – including on energy – must have strong conditions attached on the respect of international law, fundamental rights and international obligations and, in particular, on Azerbaijan making substantial progress towards a comprehensive and sustainable peace agreement with Armenia;

Y. whereas the Mediterranean is of great importance to the EU, both historically and geographically; whereas the countries of the Southern Neighbourhood play an important role in ensuring that irregular migration flows are managed on the basis of the principles of solidarity, balance, shared responsibility and in full compliance with applicable EU and international law and, in particular, human rights and humanitarian law;

Z. whereas strategic partnerships and agreements between the EU and countries of origin and transit, such those between EU and Mauritania, are proving to be a successful model for the prevention of irregular migration and the fight against migrant smugglers;

AA. whereas the supply of thousands of Shahed drones from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Russia has further cemented Iran’s role as a pariah state; whereas North Korea and China further demonstrate their unwavering disregard to international laws and norms;

AB. whereas on 28 May 2024, Norway, Ireland and Spain recognised the State of Palestine, followed on 4 June 2024 by a decision of Slovenia’s parliament to do the same;

AC. whereas China defines itself as a ‘near-Arctic state’ and endeavours to develop, in close partnership with Russia, a Polar Silk Road;

AD. whereas the Belt and Road Initiative, known in China as the One Belt One Road, challenges the EU’s interests;

AE. whereas on 14 October 2024 the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the British Foreign Secretary agreed to launch strategic consultations on issues such as the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, the Indo-Pacific, the Western Balkans and hybrid threats;

AF. whereas all UN agencies embody the rules-based international order as they uphold and implement both the letter and the spirit of the UN Charter, to which all UN Member States must abide;

AG. whereas the EU’s credibility and coherence is a paramount requirement for the correct implementation of its external action, as this reinforces trust in the EU among various actors and non-EU countries; whereas the efficiency of the EU’s actions worldwide is contingent on ensuring the highest level of coordination and coherence in the EU’s external action; whereas coordination between the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) should be strengthened, particularly due to the insufficient operational budget of the EEAS;

AH. whereas the implementation of gender equality and the WPS agenda requires initiatives that promote gender-responsive leadership, protect women’s rights and combat sexual and gender-based violence in conflict and post-conflict settings; whereas the funding of these initiatives is essential for supporting local civil society organisations and providing survivor-centred support;

AI. whereas human rights defenders (HRDs) are the EU’s main allies in defending and promoting human rights abroad; whereas HRDs are increasingly at risk of attacks and threats from state and non-state actors; whereas Parliament has consistently called for the proper and coordinated implementation of the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders (2008); whereas the Member States, alongside the EU institutions, should implement these Guidelines, which include a range of specific commitments, such as regular reporting, coordination and action in support of HRDs;

AJ. whereas the consequences of climate change will have an ever-increasing effect on various spheres of human life, including geopolitical order and global stability; whereas it is of crucial importance that fighting climate change, necessitating climate action, and aiding those who are hardest hit by its repercussions, becomes a cornerstone of the CFSP; underlines the fundamental role which the Commission and the Member States, in a joint approach, must play in the advancement of climate diplomacy globally;

AK. whereas the report entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’, presented by Sauli Niinistö, Special Adviser to the President of the European Commission, provides strategic recommendations for enhancing Europe’s civilian and military preparedness in the light of escalating and complex security threats;

AL. whereas this report first reviews the VP/HR’s annual CFSP report and subsequently complements it with Parliament’s positions on the CFSP objectives in 2025; whereas in so doing, the report expands particularly on (1) the global consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, (2) conflict and peace in the Middle East, (3) cooperation with like-minded partners and (4) the general visibility and influence of EU action abroad; whereas Parliament’s forward-looking CFSP position is ultimately underlined by key demands concerning the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) and the parliamentary oversight of the MFF; whereas there is a need to defend and strengthen the rules-based international order, the universal norms, values and principles of the UN Charter such as human rights and international justice, multilateralism, and the Helsinki Final Act, in particular as regards the non-violation of international borders;

1. Underscores that its resolutions on the implementation of the CFSP are a key component of its contribution to EU foreign policymaking; underlines that these resolutions manifest the practical implication of the strengthened right of scrutiny in the area of foreign policy conferred on Parliament by the Treaty of Lisbon; recalls that the 2024 resolution is the first of this nature in this legislative term and aims to serve as a guide for the EU executive when setting foreign policy priorities for this term; highlights the fact that in an ever volatile international environment, the EU needs to simultaneously tackle numerous foreign policy challenges affecting it directly or indirectly, such as the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, the conflicts in the Middle East, increasing great power competition, constant attempts to undermine the multilateral rules-based international order and an increased nexus of foreign and internal crises; strongly believes that in order to stay relevant on the international stage, the EU needs to pursue a determined, disciplined and assertive foreign policy that fulfils the EU’s own strategic objectives and continues defining, asserting and defending its interests in the world; recalls that the EU should be guided in its external action by the values and principles enshrined in Article 2, Article 3(5) and Article 21 TEU, which have inspired the EU’s own creation, development and enlargement, including democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, and the principles of equality and solidarity; further believes that the CFSP should ensure the implementation of the UN’s 2030 Agenda and the SDGs;

2. Emphasises that the core principles of the EU’s CFSP are rooted in the EU’s steadfast commitment to a rules-based, multilateral international order, as enshrined in the UN Charter, and in the EU’s clear preference for peaceful, diplomatic cooperation among all its Member States; encourages all parties to resolve disputes through dialogue, with mutual respect for international law, sovereignty and territorial integrity; reaffirms its dedication to advancing global peace and stability by promoting diplomatic initiatives aimed at conflict prevention and dispute resolution and which foster international collaboration on key global challenges, such as climate change, human rights and sustainable economic development; calls for ongoing partnerships with international actors to ensure the effectiveness of global peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts;

I.The VP/HR’s 2024 annual report

3. Notes that the report was submitted to the European Parliament on 20 June 2024; recalls that the report should be forward-looking in nature; comments hereinafter on several developments emphasised by the VP/HR in his report;

4. Welcomes in particular:

	–	the local, vibrant civil societies in the enlargement countries that play a constructive role in the EU integration processes, while underlining that civil society is vital in fostering democracy and pluralism and promoting good governance as well as social progress and that the enlargement countries should provide an enabling space and an appropriate framework for cooperation to ensure their meaningful involvement;
	–	the successful finalisation of the screening process for Albania at the end of 2023 and the opening of the first cluster of negotiating chapters on fundamentals and on external relations (Cluster 6) in 2024; welcomes Albania’s ambition of closing accession negotiations swiftly; highlights the need to further intensify reforms to address deficiencies that persist regarding the ‘fundamentals’, in particular concerning the rule of law, fighting corruption and organised crime; cautions against undermining the work of independent institutions such as the Special Anti-Corruption and Organised Crime Structure (SPAK); underscores the importance of a viable political pluralism and a competitive opposition and calls for dialogue and constructive engagement between the majority and the opposition to overcome the strong political polarisation in the country and to foster inclusive democratic processes that respects all parties, including the Greek, Roma and Egyptian minorities in the country; commends the country’s consistent, full alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy, including with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus;
	–	the decision on the opening of accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina; encourages the authorities to take all of the relevant steps set out in the Commission’s recommendation of 12 October 2022; urges the country’s political leaders to implement a substantial set of reforms, including electoral reforms, in accordance with the decisions of domestic and international courts, in order to ensure the principles of equality and non-discrimination for all citizens and constituent peoples, as enshrined in its constitution and in full respect of the judgments of domestic and international courts, including all rulings of the European Court of Human Rights regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina; denounces the recurring inflammatory rhetoric and secessionist laws and policies of the leadership of the entity ‘Republika Srpska’ (RS), including the celebration of the unconstitutional ‘RS Day’ on 9 January 2025; calls on the Member States and representatives of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina to promote and support the implementation of these judgments; takes note of the ruling of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the case of Milorad Dodik on 26 February 2025 and condemns his unprecedented attacks on the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with the RS leadership, and the intimidation of the opposition in RS; reiterates its call for targeted sanctions against destabilising actors within Bosnia and Herzegovina, notably Milorad Dodik, as well as other high-ranking officials of RS and Serbian officials providing political and material support for secessionist policies; endorses the statement made by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on 10 March 2025 in Sarajevo and calls for dialogue between all parties to safeguard stability in the country; calls on all Member States to ensure that such sanctions can be adopted by the Council and to impose them bilaterally or in concert with other Member States if their adoption in the Council is not possible; welcomes the agreement reached to extend the mandate of the EU forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Operation Althea until November 2025 and recalls that this mission still plays a pivotal role in the security and stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina; welcomes the arrival of the reserve forces of EUFOR Althea; urges the EU’s military mission to actively prevent unlawful parades and other provocations as well as threats against all people working to help the victims of genocide and investing in inter-ethnic reconciliation and a peaceful future for the country; calls for security at the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial Centre to be ensured;
	–	the progress in the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, especially in the areas of freedom of movement and energy; calls on Kosovo and Serbia to continuously engage in this dialogue in good faith and in the spirit of compromise to achieve a comprehensive, legally binding agreement on the normalisation of their relations, based on mutual recognition, in accordance with international law and without further delay; regrets, in this context, the lack of progress in the implementation of the path to normalisation and calls for efforts to be made and capacity to be dedicated to the EU-facilitated dialogue; commits, hence, to work closely with the outgoing as well as the incoming EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and other Western Balkan regional issues; calls on the VP/HR to take advantage of the new term of the Commission to overcome the stalemate and give a new impetus to the dialogue and to come up with a new, innovative and balanced approach to the mediation;
	–	the 2024 Enlargement Report on Serbia, presented by the Commission on 31 October 2024; reiterates its position that accession negotiations with Serbia should advance only if the country aligns with EU sanctions against Russia and makes significant progress on its EU-related reforms, in particular in the area of the ‘fundamentals’; reminds the Serbian authorities that the proper functioning of democratic institutions is at the core of Serbia’s EU accession process and the EU accession methodology; recalls in this context its position that the Serbian parliamentary and local elections held on 17 December 2023 deviated from international standards and Serbia’s commitments to free and fair elections; reiterates its serious concerns over these irregularities and the overall election environment, which fell below the standards expected of an EU candidate country; urges Serbia’s political leadership to ensure constructive, inclusive dialogue across the political spectrum and to deliver on the necessary reforms for Serbia to progress on the path to EU accession; has closely followed the large mobilisation of students, joined by other groups of citizens following the tragic incident of the Novi Sad railway station; recalls that freedom of assembly is a fundamental right and upholds a no tolerance policy towards violence against peaceful protesters; condemns the reported cases of abusive attacks against and the digital surveillance and harassment of journalists, human rights activists and civil society organisations in Serbia, including, most recently, a police raid on four leading civil society organisations on 25 February 2025 ostensibly regarding their misuse of USAID funds; calls for a thorough, impartial and speedy investigation into the allegations of violence against demonstrators and of police misconduct during protests; expresses its solidarity with the participants of the peaceful demonstrations, most notably those at the demonstration of 15 March 2025, the largest mass protest in the modern history of Serbia; regrets the appeasing approach of the Commission towards Serbia despite its year-long roll-back on the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights, as well as its destabilising influence on the whole region; urges the Commission, including at the highest level, to use clearer language towards Serbia and to consistently address its significant shortcomings, lack of progress and even backsliding, thus upholding the EU’s fundamental values;
	–	Kosovo’s application for EU membership and the Kosovo Report 2024 and reiterates its call on the Member States in the European Council to mandate the Commission to present the questionnaire and to submit its opinion on the merits of the country’s application; recalls that Kosovo’s bid to be considered a candidate country will be assessed on the basis of its own merits and of its success in meeting the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership; welcomes, however, the lifting of visa requirements for Kosovo citizens; regrets the restrictive measures imposed by the Council against Kosovo and calls for their immediate lifting, as proposed by the VP/HR;
	–	the progress made by Montenegro in meeting the interim benchmarks for Chapters 23 and 24 of the EU acquis; encourages the country to continue to make progress on and implement EU-related reforms swiftly; expresses, nonetheless, its concerns over controversial ideas for legislative proposals on citizenship and foreign agents floated in public; stresses the importance of the new government being able and committed to take forward the EU-related reforms and keep Montenegro firmly on the EU strategic path; expects the country to start closing chapters in the accession negotiations and to be ready to join the EU within the next couple of years;
	–	the successful finalisation of the screening process for North Macedonia at the end of 2023; urges the government of North Macedonia to achieve tangible results in fulfilling its obligation under the EU negotiating framework and the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 18 July 2022, including relevant constitutional changes, in line with the country’s commitments;
	–	the successful resumption of the CFSP dialogue between the EU and its partners in the Western Balkans and the importance of these partnerships for peace and security; recalls that EU enlargement is a geostrategic investment, which requires commitment from both the EU and the enlargement countries on their pathways to accession; recalls in this context the continued need for reforms regarding the rule of law, fundamental rights and public administration, and for alignment with the CFSP, including on sanctions and on the EU’s visa policy; highlights, additionally, the threats posed by malign foreign interference in the region and underlines the importance of combating disinformation to contain anti-Western and divisive rhetoric which seeks to exploit and exacerbate ethnic tensions in the region; cautions against engagement with the EU’s systemic rivals, which could undermine the prosperous, sustainable and secure future that EU accession offers; recalls, in this context, the added value of the investments made by the EU under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance III, the newly established Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, and the Western Balkans Investment Framework; calls on the Western Balkan countries to use all the resources made available to support their alignment with the EU acquis; calls upon the Commissioner for Enlargement to increase the visibility of EU action in the Balkans;
	–	the decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova; commends the fact that the CFSP alignment rate of Moldova has substantially increased from 54 % in 2022 to 86 % in 2024 and encourages Ukraine and Moldova to continue this positive trend towards full alignment; calls for the acceleration of the screening process and the timely organisation of the subsequent intergovernmental conferences;
	–	Armenia’s decision to suspend its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization and cease all payments to its budget in 2024, following Russia’s failure to assist Armenia against Azerbaijan’s military aggression, and to seek a more reliable security architecture; supports Armenia’s official request for the Russian Federation to withdraw its Federal Security Service border guards from its international airport and the Armenia-Iran border; welcomes the regular meetings under the EU-Armenia Political and Security Dialogue format and the EU-Armenia Partnership Council and commends the decision to adopt the assistance measures under the EPF in support Armenian armed forces on 13 June and 22 July 2024 respectively;
	–	the successful conclusion of negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the full text of the draft Agreement on Peace and Establishment of Interstate Relations; commends Armenia for paving the way for the finalisation of the text and urges the Azerbaijani leadership to sign and implement the peace agreement in good faith, as concluded in the negotiations; encourages further progress in the framework of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border delimitation process, which has led to an agreement on several sections of the border and the opening of regional communications on the basis of the sovereignty and jurisdiction of both countries, and reciprocity and equality, as a key measure to unblock regional development, enhance connectivity and foster sustainable peace and prosperity, as well as facilitate reconciliation among communities based on increased people-to-people contacts; reaffirms its support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Armenia and Azerbaijan and strongly supports the normalisation of their relations based on the principles of the mutual recognition of territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders, in accordance with the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration; reiterates its demand for the withdrawal of Azerbaijan’s troops from the entirety of Armenia’s sovereign territory and the release of the 23 remaining Armenian hostages;
	–	the activities of the civilian European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) under the common security and defence policy (CSDP), which contributes to security in the region by substantially decreasing the number of incidents in conflict-affected and border areas, and reduces the level of risks for the population living in such areas; welcomes Armenia’s assistance with the activities of the EUMA on its territory; commends the Council for the decision to increase the number of deployed observers as well as the mission’s capacity and to extend its deployment timeframe; calls for further expansion and presence in the region; calls on the Commission to provide support for Armenia for de-mining;
	–	the continued work of the EEAS on addressing and countering foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) through the EU FIMI Toolbox, the setting up of a STRATCOM taskforce, and through close cooperation with Member States, international partners, civil society and other relevant stakeholders; reiterates its call to promote the continuous flow of intelligence from Member States to the EEAS on foreign and security issues occurring outside the EU; calls, in this regard, for strengthening the EU INTCEN, the EEAS Crisis Response Centre and the EU Satellite Centre by enhancing its staff, financial resources and capabilities;
	–	the proposal of the VP/HR for an anti-corruption sanctions regime, which would allow the EU to target serious acts of corruption worldwide; calls for its swift adoption by the Council;

5. Condemns in particular:

	–	the ongoing illegal and unjustifiable Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the increasing Russian attacks against civilian targets and civilian infrastructure within Ukraine; demands that Russia and its proxy forces cease all military action and that the Russian Federation immediately and unconditionally withdraw its troops and equipment from Ukraine and any other country whose territory, or parts thereof, it unlawfully occupies; reiterates its policy of non-recognition of Ukrainian territories temporarily occupied by Russia, including but not limited to the Crimean Peninsula; condemns any hybrid attacks executed by Russia in Ukraine and strongly denounces the spread of Russia’s propaganda about its war in Ukraine;
	–	the role of the illegitimate regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka in allowing the country to serve as a Russian military base, effectively surrendering national sovereignty to the Kremlin in order to maintain its grip on Belarus, while brutally oppressing the Belarusian people in order to stay in power; deplores the fact that severe human rights abuses were committed in the run-up to the sham election on 26 January 2025; is alarmed by the Putin and Lukashenka regimes’ instrumentalisation of migration, particularly in the light of the influx of thousands of migrants into Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, which Russia and Belarus orchestrate to force their passage into the EU; deplores the Putin regime’s political instrumentalisation of migration, which has led to the closing of the Finnish border with Russia;
	–	the illegal North Korean involvement in the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine by its sending of military equipment and ammunition to Russia, as well as by its sending of thousands of soldiers to wage war against Ukraine;
	–	North Korea’s continued weapons testing and development of its nuclear programme, in violation of the UN resolution, further escalating tensions in the Indo-Pacific region; demands that North Korea abandon its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner; urges the North Korea authorities to cease their ongoing crimes against humanity and to undertake a process of reform whereby all human rights are respected and protected;
	–	the increasing malicious activities, interference and hybrid warfare deployed by the Russian Federation, its institutions and proxies in undermining and subverting the democratic stability and sovereignty of Georgia and the Republic of Moldova and in particular the recent interference in the constitutional referendum on EU accession and the presidential elections;
	–	the attack on Kosovan police officers by well-organised Serbian paramilitaries in Banjska/Banjskë in the north of Kosovo on 24 September 2023 which resulted in the death of the Kosovan police officer Afrim Bunjaku and the injuring of two more Kosovan police officers; condemns the hideous terrorist attack on critical infrastructure near Zubin Potok; stresses that the perpetrators of these deplorable attacks must be held accountable and face justice without delay;
	–	the continued illegal occupation, under international law, by Türkiye, a NATO member country, of 37 % of Cyprus, an EU Member State;
	–	the brutal and indiscriminate terrorist attacks committed by Hamas across Israel on 7 October 2023, which triggered a Israeli military response and a conflict in Gaza that has a devastating effect on civilians and caused a catastrophic humanitarian situation;
	–	the fact that Hamas has taken and is still holding innocent people, including women and children, hostages, and calls for the unconditional and immediate release of hostages;
	–	the deliberate and malignant fuelling of an exceptionally tense situation, through repeated attacks targeting Israel since 7 October 2023, by state and non-state actors in the region with Iran being the main instigator, as well as the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon acting as some of its proxies;
	–	Iran’s persistent non-compliance with its legal safeguard obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and with its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) condemns, further, the advancement of its nuclear programme beyond all credible civilian justification and the destabilisation of the Middle East this causes, including through proxies, such as attacks on Israel and sponsoring terrorism and civil conflicts; the attacks perpetrated or attempted within the EU by terrorist organisations and networks affiliated to Iran;
	–	the wrongful detention of European citizens in Iran, the execution of the European citizen of dual German-Iranian nationality Jamshid Sharmahd on 29 October 2024, and the brutal oppression of the people of Iran, in particular the women; reiterates its unwavering support for the women of Iran, who are still subjected to gross violations of their fundamental rights two years after the Women, Life, Freedom movement was brutally repressed; urges the VP/HR to do the utmost to free these citizens and to put an end to the practice of Iranian hostage diplomacy, through which it detains foreign civilians and dual nationals, including by encouraging the Member States to recommend that their citizens abstain from travelling to Iran;
	–	the growing military cooperation between Iran and Russia, in particular the intention to sign a treaty on a comprehensive strategic partnership and Iran’s provision of drones and ballistic missiles to Russia for use against Ukraine and its people;
	–	the recent adoption of the law on the ‘promotion of virtue and prevention of vice’ in Afghanistan, as well as the systematic violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular the extreme interpretation of sharia which erases women from public life, bars them from working, hinders their access to all public places without being chaperoned by a male relative and to education beyond the sixth grade, amounting to gender apartheid; demands from the de facto authorities of Afghanistan that all gender-based restrictions on women be lifted and stresses that this must be a key condition for any engagement of the international community with the Taliban; insists on maintaining strict, conditional engagement with the Taliban based on the five benchmarks set by the Council for engaging with the de facto authorities and by holding the perpetrators of these grave violations of girls’ and women’s rights accountable, including through restrictive measures;
	–	the increasing breadth and intensity of operations, including cyberattacks and foreign information manipulation by the Chinese Government, as well as vessels and aircraft attempting to intimidate China’s neighbours, which violate peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding international waters and impede the freedom of navigation rights of all other parties; strongly condemns statements by the Chinese President that the People’s Republic of China will never renounce the right to use force with respect to Taiwan, and insists that the use of coercive measures to achieve unification contradicts international law;
	–	the government-led system of forced labour and the persistent violations of human rights, in particular the systematic repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang Province; observes with concern the intense crackdown on ethnic minorities in Tibet, Hong Kong and Macau and the transnational repression of Chinese dissidents, as well as the persistent presence of Chinese police officers on EU territory; has taken note of and deplores the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for not implementing the recommendations of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); calls on the PRC to allow the OHCHR independent access to the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and invites the OHCHR to issue a comprehensive situational update and an action plan for holding the PRC accountable; calls on all EU Member States to suspend extradition treaties with Hong Kong and the PRC and to protect those individuals who are being harassed and persecuted;
	–	the deterioration of stability in the Sahel, exacerbated by the numerous military coups in the region in recent years; recalls that stability in the Sahel has direct repercussions for the security of European external borders and the management of irregular migration flows from the African continent; emphasises that the EU should urgently review its regional strategy for the Sahel;
	–	the coups in Burkina Faso and in Niger, with President Bazoum being detained and the constitution suspended; is increasingly concerned by the decision of the central Sahel military regimes in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger to leave the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), thus plunging ECOWAS into a deep political crisis; condemns additionally the physical attack on 29 September 2024 on an ECOWAS Member of Parliament and other participants of an officially declared opposition rally in Lomé; calls on the Togolese authorities to ensure the promotion and protection of the fundamental principles of human and peoples’ rights enshrined in Article 4 of the revised ECOWAS Treaty, such as the rights of peaceful assembly, freedom of association, belief and expression; calls on the ECOWAS authorities and its member states to support the efforts needed to safeguard the principles of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights throughout the subregion; takes note of the closure of the European Union Military Partnership Mission in Niger (EUMPM Niger) and of the Capacity Building Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) and the non-renewal of the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM); observes with concern how Russia has intensified the development of state-to-state relationships and cooperation initiatives with African states through military cooperation and a commitment to cooperate on the development of nuclear energy; condemns the rise of terrorist attacks and heavy civilian losses in the Sahel, as well as the presence and predation activities of Russian paramilitaries, which have led to the population being displaced and an influx of refugees, also caused by the instability in the region; deplores the fact that the void UN peacekeepers have left has effectively been filled by Wagner Group mercenaries and Russian and Turkish military, whose industries supply arms to Sahelian capitals;
	–	the civil war in Sudan, the devastating consequences for the civil population, the atrocities committed against them and, in particular, the despicable large-scale use of rape as a weapon of war;
	–	the last minute tactical and technical constraints imposed by the authorities of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which prevented the EU Election Observation Mission from monitoring the presidential elections; condemns the violence committed by the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel movement destabilising the eastern DRC; calls for a review of the EU strategy for the Great Lakes region;
	–	the authoritarian regime of Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo, who are systematically undermining Nicaragua’s democratic structures; recalls that the regime in Nicaragua maintains strong ties with other autocracies, such as those in Iran, Venezuela and Cuba; condemns the systematic human rights violations and abuses perpetrated by the Cuban regime; strongly condemns and fully rejects the electoral fraud orchestrated by the regime in Venezuela and demands that the Maduro government cease its policy of repression and attacks on civil society and the opposition; recalls that on 19 September 2024, Parliament recognised Edmundo González Urrutia as the legitimate and democratically elected President of Venezuela and María Corina Machado as the leader of the democratic forces in Venezuela; highlights the fact that various democratic states in the region and throughout the world have recognised González as president-elect; recalls that he should have been sworn in on 10 January 2025; expresses satisfaction that on 17 December 2024, Parliament awarded the 2024 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to María Corina Machado, as the leader of the democratic forces in Venezuela, and to president-elect Edmundo González Urrutia, representing all Venezuelans inside and outside the country fighting for the reinstitution of freedom and democracy;
	–	the employment of the ‘Cuban medical brigade’ in some European countries as a form of infringement of fundamental rights and freedoms and of slavery and forced labour;
	–	the risk of collapse of the state structures and difficult humanitarian situation in Haiti due to rampant gang violence;
	–	the fact that the PRC, Russia, Iran and other totalitarian or authoritarian regimes use information manipulation and malign interference as integral instruments to exert pressure on multilateral institutions and democratic values and norms, to abuse power, to increase the incidence and severity of human rights violations, to constrict spaces for civil society, independent media and democratic opposition movements, to spread anti-Western disinformation and to use various forms of transnational repression to intimidate and constrict spaces for civil society, independent media and democratic opposition movements in the diaspora;
	–	the increasing attacks, harassment, arbitrary detention, torture and killings of HRDs worldwide, especially those advocating for environmental, indigenous, women’s, LGBTQI+ and anti-corruption rights; further notes the increasingly sophisticated tactics used by state and non-state actors, including digital surveillance and smear campaigns, aimed at silencing HRDs; stresses the urgent need to protect HRDs, who also play a critical role in upholding democracy and the rule of law globally; calls for enhanced support and protection mechanisms for HRDs facing threats, harassment and violence, especially those in high-risk areas or working on sensitive issues such as environmental, indigenous and women’s rights;
	–	attempts to circumvent EU and international sanctions, which it sees as strategies posing direct threats to the international rules-based order;
	–	the failure by Azerbaijan to comply with the order of 17 November 2023, issued by the International Court of Justice, indicating provisional measures regarding the safe, unimpeded and expeditious return of the 100 000 ethnic Armenians who fled Nagorno-Karabakh after the September 2023 pre-planned, unjustified military attack by Azerbaijan, as well as the refusal of Azerbaijani authorities to release all 23 Armenian prisoners of war it currently detains; stresses the need to support all initiatives and activities that could lead to the establishment of lasting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan; demands, to that end, the withdrawal of Azerbaijan’s troops from the entirety of Armenia’s sovereign territory and warns, simultaneously, that any further military action against Armenia would be unacceptable and would have serious consequences for the partnership between Azerbaijan and the EU; highlights the fact that Azerbaijan’s connectivity issues with its exclave Nakhchivan should be resolved with full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Armenia; reiterates its position that the EU should be ready to impose sanctions on any individuals and entities that threaten the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Armenia; stresses that Parliament’s multiple warnings on the situation have not led to any change in the EU’s stance towards Azerbaijan; calls for the EU to end its reliance on gas exports from Azerbaijan; calls on the Commission to suspend the 2022 memorandum of understanding on the strategic partnership in the field of energy and to act accordingly; insists that any future partnership agreement between the EU and Azerbaijan be conditional on the release of all political prisoners and the improvement of the human rights situation in the country; condemns the Russian ‘gas laundering’ through Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani authorities’ facilitation of Russia’s circumvention of EU sanctions; calls for the EU to cease all technical and financial assistance to Azerbaijan that might contribute to strengthening its military or security capabilities; calls on the Member States to freeze exports of all military and security equipment to Azerbaijan; condemns Azerbaijan’s repeated attempts to denigrate and destabilise Member States, including through the so-called Baku Initiative Group; condemns the ongoing deterioration of the human rights situation in the country;

6. Concurs with:

	–	the need to improve relations with Türkiye; welcomes the partial de-escalation of tensions in the east Mediterranean and the Aegean but reiterates its concern that Türkiye’s foreign policy continues to be at odds with EU priorities under the CFSP; recalls, in this context, the signature and the evocation of the memorandum of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on comprehensive security and military cooperation and on the delimitation of maritime zones;
	–	the call on Türkiye to work on a constructive, and not assertive nor aggressive, approach in its neighbourhood, including the Southern Caucasus; regrets that Türkiye continues to dispute the sovereignty and sovereign rights of an EU Member State; recalls that Türkiye’s accession process is contingent on its full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and on its normalisation of relations with all EU Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus; calls for the status of the buffer zone and the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus to be respected; urges Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to cease and reverse all such unilateral activities and refrain from any further actions and provocations; calls for engagement in peaceful UN-led negotiations and for real progress to be made in the Cyprus settlement talks, firmly within the agreed UN framework, which is the only framework accepted by the EU and the international community, and in line with EU law, values and principles;
	–	the assessment that, in the absence of a drastic change of course by the Turkish Government and the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus as a sovereign state, Türkiye’s EU accession process cannot be resumed; is alarmed by the recent arrest of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Mayor, Ekrem İmamoğlu, of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), days before he was chosen by the CHP as its candidate for the next presidential election, and deplores the permanent targeting of the political opposition;
	–	the urgent need for the EU and the Turkish Government to move forward toward a mutual reflection process, including a modernised association agreement, which would lead to a mutually beneficial, more dynamic and strategic partnership, with strict conditionality on the respect of rule of law, fundamental rights, international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and good neighbourly relations, considering the key role played by Türkiye, for example, in the Black Sea region and its significance as a NATO ally;
	–	the fact that Türkiye is making an inadequate effort in aligning with the EU’s CFSP, including on sanctions and the anti-circumvention of sanctions, as well as with the need for Türkiye to cooperate closely with the EU’s Sanctions Envoy; deplores the unacceptable nature of the solidarity and support that the President of Türkiye has publicly provided to the terrorist organisation Hamas; reiterates its concerns about the ongoing deterioration of democratic standards in Türkiye; recalls that Türkiye also targets the EU with foreign information manipulation and interference and that its government is considering introducing a Russian-style foreign agents law; underlines the incompatibility between Türkiye’s candidacy for BRICS+ and the EU’s CFSP;
	–	the concern over democratic backsliding in Georgia, manifested by the fact that the parliamentary elections held on 26 October 2024 did not respect international standards for democratic elections or its commitments as a member of the OSCE to carry out free and fair elections, thus undermining the legitimacy of the results and the public’s trust in the government; emphasises that violations of electoral integrity are incompatible with the standards expected from an EU candidate country; rejects any recognition of the parliamentary elections and considers Georgia to be a state captured by the illegitimate Georgian Dream regime and thus rejects any decisions taken by the body that has taken control of the country, such as the rushed adoption of amendments to the Code on Administrative Offences, the Criminal Code and the Law on Assemblies and Manifestations; calls urgently for early elections conducted in an improved election environment, managed by an independent and impartial election administration with widespread international observation, to ensure a genuinely free, fair and transparent process that would represent the will of the people of Georgia; concurs with the European Council’s conclusions of 27 June 2024 that a failure to reverse the current course of action, including the law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’, the law on ‘family values and protection of minors’, as well as the changes to the Electoral Code, jeopardises Georgia’s EU path, de facto leading to a halt of the accession process; continues to recognise Salome Zourabichvili as the legitimate President of Georgia and representative of the Georgian people; praises her efforts to peacefully steer the country back towards a democratic and European path of development; calls on the President of the European Council to invite President Zourabichvili to represent Georgia at an upcoming European Council meeting and at the next European Political Community summit; reiterates its unwavering support for the Georgian people’s legitimate European aspirations, which are being betrayed by the Georgian Government; demands the immediate release of all people detained for peacefully protesting against the recent decisions by Georgia concerning a suspension of EU integration; calls for the EU’s funding mechanisms to be adjusted to take into account the needs that arise in a more hostile and anti-democratic environment; highlights the urgency of the need to support civil society in the light of growing repression and the suspension of the activities of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and therefore urges the Commission to ramp up support without delay; maintains the view that the measures taken so far by the EU in response to the flagrant democratic backsliding and reneging on previous commitments do not yet fully reflect the severity of the situation in Georgia and the latest developments; welcomes the Council’s decision to suspend visa-free travel for Georgian diplomats and officials, but considers it necessary to initiate reflection on the possible suspension of Georgia’s visa-free status, based on non-compliance with fundamental rights benchmarks; deplores the obstruction by the Hungarian and Slovak Governments of the Council decisions on the introduction of sanctions against individuals responsible for democratic backsliding in Georgia; calls on the Commission to use the frozen EUR 120 million originally intended as support for the Georgian authorities to enhance the EU’s support for Georgia’s civil society, in particular the non-governmental sector and independent media, which are increasingly coming under undue pressure from the ruling political party and the authorities, as well as to support programmes supporting democratic resilience and electoral integrity; strongly encourages the EU and its Member States to introduce personal sanctions against all key figures of the political regime, as well as their family members and the regime’s enablers in administration, business, the media, the justice system and law enforcement agencies; calls for the EU, in cooperation with other jurisdictions, in particular the United Kingdom, to freeze the financial assets of Bidzina Ivanishvili; encourages individual Member States and relevant regional organisations to avoid actively legitimising the self-appointed Georgian Dream authorities and call, in this regard, for suspending the EU Georgia Association Council;
	–	the observation that Russia and China have become significant players in the Southern Neighbourhood, especially North Africa, while Türkiye and the Gulf states, chief among them the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, have risen as regional forces; argues that the idea of a single ‘neighbourhood’ for both Eastern and Southern Europe overlooks their distinct challenges; concurs further with the strategic relevance of the Southern Neighbourhood, its stability, economic development and prosperity; recalls that instability and insecurity in the Southern Neighbourhood remains an ongoing challenge for European external border management; underlines the interference of strategic competitors in the region and calls strongly for the EU to send a solid and clear political message in favour of renewed cooperation with countries of the Southern Neighbourhood; calls on the VP/HR and the Commission to release, as an urgent matter, the new pact for the Mediterranean and to secure adequate resources for its timely and effective implementation; reiterates that a dynamic network of strategic partnerships tailored to the specific needs and aspirations of each country in our Southern Neighbourhood should be at the centre of the new pact; believes, in this context, that the EU should conduct a thorough review of the current incentive structure that combines the promise of financial assistance and trade benefits in exchange for political and economic reforms and ensure that it aligns with broader EU objectives, including the promotion of human rights and democratic values; stresses that besides prioritising bilateral cooperation, the EU should also continue to foster regional cooperation through existing frameworks such as the Union for the Mediterranean, which offers a valuable platform for promoting dialogue and joint action on issues of common concern;
	–	the concern about Russian and Chinese pressure exerted in Central Asia and stresses the need to scale up the EU’s presence in the region in response, given its geostrategic importance; highlights the hesitation of Central Asian states to lend support to Russia’s war of aggression given the effect the war is having on the region; underlines the EU’s interest in increasing economic relations and intensifying political ties with the countries of Central Asia, in part to address the circumvention of sanctions against Russia and Belarus; calls on the authorities of the Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, to cooperate closely with the EU, in particular with its Sanctions Envoy; encourages the Commission and the Member States to continue promoting political and economic reforms that strengthen the rule of law, democracy, good governance and respect for human rights;
	–	the fact that the Arctic is of geostrategic importance as regards the expansion of potential maritime routes, access to natural resources, climate conservation and territorial claims; stresses that this importance is heightened not only by Russian military expansion in the High North but also by China’s increasing presence and interest in the region, and its self-proclamation as a ‘near-Arctic state’; underscores the need for ensuring freedom and safety of navigation amid these two states’ growing influence and militarisation; underlines the importance of preserving security, stability and cooperation in the Arctic; stresses that the region must remain free from military tensions and natural resource exploitation, while respecting the rights of indigenous peoples; reiterates the need to include the EU’s Arctic policy in the CFSP and engage in effective cooperation with NATO; calls for the Arctic to be addressed regularly within the Political and Security Committee and Council meetings;
	–	the strategic importance of the Taiwan Strait and the Indo-Pacific in the face of increasing Chinese intimidation in the region, including through military and hybrid means, and stresses the need to scale up the EU’s presence in the region; underlines the EU’s interest in increasing economic relations and intensifying substantial ties with like-minded partners in the region, including Taiwan; asks the Commission and the Member States to follow a coordinated EU strategy of preparedness and anticipation of possible scenarios in the Taiwan Strait, while regularly informing Parliament and providing an impact assessment;
	–	the effectiveness of the implementation of a Gulf strategy, advancing in a strategic partnership with each of the Gulf countries and working together to promote global and regional security and prosperity;
	–	the focus on achieving accountability in the cyberspace, through the operationalisation of the EU digital diplomacy toolbox and the attention given to strengthening global cyber resilience; calls for an increased focus on building the cyber resilience capacity of developing democracies faced with hybrid challenges to their electoral systems; calls for increasing joint cyber defence exercises between the EU and NATO in order to improve interoperability and readiness to counter hybrid threats;
	–	the commitment to place democracy promotion at the forefront of the CFSP and to ensure the EU’s proactive role in this regard, building on lessons learned from previous democracy support actions, in particular in support of civil society, HRDs, critical voices, democratic opposition and media;
	–	the need to fight impunity and strengthen accountability efforts globally, including through the ICC, and to stand up for international law and international humanitarian law; remains deeply concerned about the trend of state officials undermining decisions of international institutions and their employees; expresses its utmost concern about the US sanctions against the ICC, its prosecutors, judges and staff, which constitute a serious attack on the international justice system; calls on the Commission to urgently activate the blocking statute and on the Member States to urgently increase their diplomatic efforts in order to protect and safeguard the ICC as an indispensable cornerstone of the international justice system; regrets the failure of some ICC member states to execute ICC arrest warrants, thereby undermining the ICC’s work;
	–	the urgent and ongoing need to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment through all EU external action a foreign policy that takes into account gender mainstreaming in line with the 2021-2025 Gender Action Plan, especially in light of the current global rollback of women’s rights; emphasises that at the current rate of progress, achieving gender equality worldwide will take another 131 years, underscoring the critical importance of accelerating efforts to safeguard and advance women’s rights and opportunities;

II.CFSP objectives in 2025

7. Identifies, in the following section, Parliament’s CFSP objectives in 2025, thus complementing the views expressed in the VP/HR’s annual CFSP report;

Addressing the global consequences of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine

8. Emphasises that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its consequences, including economic uncertainty, food insecurity and high energy prices, in combination with the revisionist behaviour of the Russian Federation against a number of states neighbouring the Black Sea, destabilises and threatens the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans, which in turn erodes the European security architecture; underlines, in this context, the need for reinforcing the EU’s capacities to support democratic institutions in our immediate neighbourhood; underlines, also, the importance of the protection of the EU’s eastern border, which contributes to the security of the entire EU; stresses that the East Shield and the Baltic Defence Line should be the flagship EU projects for fostering deterrence and overcoming potential threats from the east and would establish an integrated land border management system that is designed to strengthen the EU’s external land border with Russia and Belarus against military and hybrid threats;

9. Notes that the EU’s response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is being closely watched by autocratic actors around the world and will have a decisive influence in shaping their behaviour on the international stage; is concerned by the growing cooperation and coordination among autocratic regimes, including through their material or other support for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; urges the Council to impose restrictive measures against countries that deliver military goods, such as unmanned aerial vehicles and surface-to-surface missiles, to the Russian Federation for use against civilian targets; recalls that the use of such military goods against civilian targets is a war crime; notes, with grave concern, the increasing cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and underscores that the employment of North Korean troops by Russia is widening the scale of the conflict; emphasises, equally, the urgent need for further sanctions against Belarus, mirroring all sanctions against Russia;

10. Holds the view that the EU and its Member States are now Ukraine’s only strategic allies and accordingly calls for the EU and its Member States to meaningfully increase and speed up military and economic support, humanitarian assistance, as well as financial aid in every possible way to put Ukraine in a position of strength, in order to liberate all its people and to deter any further aggression by Russia following a potential ceasefire agreement; suggests, to this end, strengthening the European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine, which has trained approximately 75 000 Ukrainian troops, and underlines the urgent need to provide Ukraine with increased air defence and surface-to-surface capacities to defend its critical energy infrastructure, and calls on the Member States to immediately lift restrictions on the use of Western weapons systems, such as long-range Taurus missiles, delivered to Ukraine, against legitimate military targets on Russian territory, which would be fully in line with Ukraine’s right to self-defence according to the UN Charter;

11. Reaffirms its commitment to supporting Ukraine’s desire for a just and lasting peace and to the peace formula and Victory Plan put forward by Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy; recalls that any initiative, in particular diplomatic solutions, aimed at ending the Russian war of aggression and achieving a just and lasting peace needs to be based on terms and input provided by Ukraine and ultimately accepted by the Ukrainian people; expresses, in this context, deep concern over the apparent shift in the United States’ stance on the Russian war of aggression, which has included openly blaming Ukraine for the ongoing war, suspending US military aid and attempting to coerce Ukraine into relinquishing its legitimate right to self-defence; strongly deplores any attempts at blackmailing Ukraine’s leadership into surrendering to the Russian aggressor for the sole purpose of announcing a so-called peace deal and considers that the current attempt by the US administration to negotiate a ceasefire and peace agreement without the involvement of European states, which will ultimately have to bear the outcome, is counterproductive, as it empowers the belligerent Russian State, thus showing that aggressive policy is not punished but rewarded; is cautiously optimistic about the proposal for a 30-day ceasefire agreement; recalls that a ceasefire can be an effective tool for suspending hostilities, but only if the aggressor fully adheres to it; expects, therefore, Russia to agree to it and follow it by ceasing all attacks on Ukraine, its military positions, civilian population, infrastructure and territory; concludes, nevertheless, taking into account the history of Russia’s violations of previous agreements, that peace can only be achieved by empowering Ukraine through robust security guarantees; is, conversely, of the opinion, that any settlement that undermines Ukraine’s legitimate aspirations, such as its right to choose its own security arrangements, or which lacks credible security guarantees, will risk subjecting Ukraine and other European countries to renewed Russian aggression; insists, therefore, that the EU engage in security commitments towards Ukraine as recommended in the Kyiv Security Compact in order to deter further Russian aggression;

12. Highlights that the financial support provided by the EU and its Member States to Ukraine exceeds that of any single country, reflecting the EU’s unparalleled commitment to Ukraine; underscores that the EU’s role in any negotiations impacting the security of Europe must be commensurate with its political and economic weight; reaffirms that there can be no negotiations relating to European security without the EU at the table;

13. Expects the Member States to keep its sanctions against Russia in place as long as needed to secure a just and lasting peace and until accountability has been achieved; calls, in the interim, for the EU and the Member States to reinforce the effectiveness and impact of its sanction packages adopted so far and to agree on new ones as soon as the need arises; points, in this context, towards sectors of special importance for the Russian economy, in particular banking, the metallurgy, nuclear, chemical and agricultural sectors, and raw materials such as aluminium, steel, uranium, titanium and nickel; calls for a ban or targeted tariffs on Russian imports to the EU with the aim of fully closing the flow of grain, potash and fertilisers; recalls that the strict implementation and uniform application of restrictive measures in all Member States is a precondition for the credibility and effectiveness of the EU’s external action; underscores, thus, the importance of ending all EU imports of Russian energy and supporting G7 efforts to lower the oil price cap; calls on the Commission to impose penalties on all European companies that continue to engage in business with the Russian Federation, as well as to further assess and combat sanction circumvention;

14. Appeals for proactive diplomacy with non-EU countries in order to minimise the circumvention of these sanctions; calls on the Commission to critically assess EU assistance to non-EU countries that actively support Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and urges the Council to impose restrictive measures on non-EU countries enabling Russia’s war of aggression, whether through the facilitation of sanction circumvention or through the provision of direct military assistance, such as in the case of Belarus, Iran or North Korea; calls on all countries to fully align with all EU sanctions packages;

15. Deplores the ‘no limits’ partnership between Russia and China, in particular the renewed commitment to strengthen their military ties; welcomes the Council’s decision to impose sanctions on Chinese companies for their support of Russia’s war in Ukraine;

16. Expresses its most serious concerns over Russia’s and China’s surveillance and sabotage of critical maritime infrastructures, such as seabed communication cables and offshore energy facilities; expresses in particular its strong concern about the damage to two subsea communications cables, one linking Finland and Germany and the other connecting Sweden to Lithuania, within less than 24 hours on 17 and 18 November 2024, and about the damaging by a tanker of the Russian shadow fleet of the EstLink2 power cable, linking Estonia and Finland, on 25 December 2024; calls on the EU to put in place effective monitoring and surveillance systems and regional coastguard cooperation to ensure the prevention and rapid detection of attacks against such infrastructures; welcomes in that regard, the launch of the operation ‘Baltic Sentry’ by NATO, with the participation of several Member States, to improve the security of critical undersea infrastructures in the Baltic Sea; calls on Member States to fully abide by the commitments of the New York joint statement on the security and resilience of undersea cables; recalls also that similar sabotage activities targeting critical underwater infrastructure are taking place in the Taiwan Strait;

17. Calls for the EU and its Member States to exercise strict control over, prevent and limit the activities of Russia’s shadow fleets which, in addition to violating EU and G7 sanctions, poses an immense ecological threat to ecosystems as a result of its technical deficiencies and frequent breakdowns; urges the Commission to take swift action, within the framework of the EU’s cooperation with the International Maritime Organization, and to design more targeted sanctions against the shadow fleet in the next sanctions package against Russia; specifies that such sanctions should designate all possible individual shadow fleet vessels, as well as their owners, operators, managers, etc.; recommends banning tanker sales to countries facilitating trade with Russia; notes that the flag states contributing to the Russian shadow fleet are thereby also helping the Russian war effort;

18. Reiterates its call for the necessary measures to be taken to return forcibly deported and illegally adopted Ukrainian children from Russia or occupied Ukrainian territory;

19. Calls on the Commission and the Council to designate the Russian State-funded private military Wagner Group as a terrorist organisation; draws attention to the so-called ‘Africa Corps’ that was created following the death of the Wagner Group’s former leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, in August 2023, and placed directly under the control of the Russian Ministry of Defence, in an effort to regroup Wagner elements under government control;

20. Reiterates that Ukraine, as a victim of aggression, has the legitimate right to self-defence in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter; calls on the VP/HR, the Commission the Council and the Member States concerned to enable effective Ukrainian countermeasures against Russia; recalls that Russia has violated international law and that the full seizure of the frozen Russian assets is an appropriate step towards enforcing Russia’s obligation to abide by international law, and to compensate Ukraine and other injured parties for the losses caused by Russia’s war of aggression; calls on the Commission to establish a sound legal regime for the confiscation of Russian State assets frozen by the EU; reminds the Commission that any such proposal does not take away the need for continued financial, political, military and humanitarian support; calls for the inclusion of all assets of the Russian State, Russian local authorities, Russian State-owned companies, and of individuals on the EU sanctions list, and for those assets to be used to compensate Ukraine for the damage caused by this war;

21. Points to the estimate of the latest Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment that at least EUR 506 billion will be required over the next decade for Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction; welcomes the EU’s Ukraine Facility, which has a budget of almost EUR 50 billion, and the EU’s Loan Cooperation Mechanism, which offers loans to Ukraine of up to EUR 45 billion and which responds to Parliament’s call and builds upon the decision of the Council to direct extraordinary revenues stemming from immobilised Russian State assets to the Ukraine Assistance Fund and the Ukraine Facility, as well as upon the G7’s decision to offer Ukraine a USD 50 billion loan secured through immobilised Russian State assets; expresses its conviction that the new Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism is a substantive step towards making Russia financially compensate for the massive damage it continues to cause in Ukraine;

22. Denounces the abusive use by the Hungarian Government of its veto power to delay or effectively block EU essential aid from being granted to Ukraine, attempting to undermine the unified EU position on Ukraine; calls on the VP/HR and the Council President as well as the Member States to use all available tools to prevent the Hungarian Government from further blocking aid;

23. Urges the VP/HR and the other Member States to overcome the blockade by the Hungarian Government of the EPF’s funding and disbursement decision, i.e. the one of EUR 450 million to Poland, being compensation for equipment delivered to Ukraine; urges them to guarantee that the EU’s only instrument in support of military aid to Ukraine becomes fully functional again; calls on the VP/HR to advance proposals to prevent such blockades in the future or to find an alternative mechanism that is fully reliable;

24. Underscores the urgent need for the EU and its Member States to push for the creation of a special international tribunal with jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the crime of aggression committed against Ukraine by the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation and its allies; condemns the execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war by Russian forces; underscores that no peace will be sustainable without justice; welcomes the establishment of the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine in The Hague; expresses support for all the activities of the ICC and International Court of Justice in prosecuting the crimes committed on Ukrainian territory; welcomes Ukraine’s ratification of the Rome Statute of the ICC, which allowed it to become a state party to it as of January 2025;

25. Commends Ukraine for its progress in the EU accession screening process despite wartime conditions and calls on Ukraine to continue its progress towards EU membership using all the resources made available to it under the Ukraine Facility and to ensure the meaningful involvement of its civil society in the implementation and monitoring phases thereof; recalls that EU accession is a strictly merit-based process that requires the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership, including those concerning democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental values and the fight against corruption;

26. Believes that both Ukraine’s and Moldova’s accession to the EU would be a mutually beneficial investment in a united and strong Europe; welcomes the growth plan for the Republic of Moldova and the adoption of the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova, worth EUR 1,9 billion, which serves the purpose of accelerating EU-related reforms; expresses concern about the negative consequences of the suspension of USAID to Moldova; considers that this gap should be offset to the extent possible by EU sources, the European Endowment for Democracy and others; encourages the VP/HR to additionally enhance the CFSP partnership with Ukraine and Moldova and in this context welcomes the signature of the security and defence partnership between the EU and Moldova in May 2024; recalls the fact that the security of the Republic of Moldova is inextricably linked to the security of Ukraine; underscores, hence, the need to increase financial contributions from the EPF to further enhance Moldova’s defence capabilities;

27. Praises the Moldova for running the presidential election and the referendum professionally and with an extraordinary sense of duty and dedication, despite the continued massive interference from Russia and its proxies; welcomes the outcome of the 2024 Moldovan European Union membership referendum which enshrined the commitment to joining the EU in the country’s constitution; expresses its support to Moldova in defending its democracy; strongly condemns such constant and coordinated attempts by the Russian Federation, pro-Russian oligarchs and Russian-sponsored local proxies to destabilise the Republic of Moldova, sow divisions within Moldovan society and derail the country’s pro-European direction through hybrid attacks, the weaponisation of energy supplies, disinformation campaigns, bomb threats and staged protests as well as the threat or use of violence; commends the establishment and operations of the EU Partnership Mission in Moldova which have enhanced the Moldovan authorities’ capabilities to address Russian interference; calls on the Council, the Commission and the EEAS to provide the additional resources, including human and financial resources, equipment and civilian experts, necessary to continue implementing the mission’s mandate beyond May 2025;

28. Stresses the importance of the EPF for enhancing the EU’s ability to prevent conflicts, build peace and strengthen international security;

29. Welcomes the launch of the Belarus-EU consultative group to enable continuous dialogue between the EU and the Belarusian democratic forces; reiterates its support for the release of all political prisoners and the brave activists and journalists in Belarus who continue to resist the regime of the illegitimate leader in spite of ongoing crackdowns, notably the refusal to renew the passports of Belarussians abroad, and who have expressed their desire for democratic development in Belarus and for membership of the EU, including at the New Belarus Conference held in Warsaw in August 2023; underlines that such efforts demonstrate the fundamental role of civil society in strengthening democracy;

Resolving conflict and supporting peace in the Middle East

30. Affirms the right of Israel to defend itself as enshrined in and constrained by international law; recalls that Israel has the obligation to address the risk of mass starvation and the outbreak of disease epidemics in Gaza; recalls that Israel also has the obligation to protect the civilian population and that military operations must be proportionate and in line with international humanitarian law; expresses its concern about the military action by the Israeli Defence Forces in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank and in Lebanon; calls for an immediate and permanent ceasefire including the unconditional release of all hostages;

31. Deeply regrets the breakdown of the ceasefire in Gaza, which has caused a large number of civilian casualties in recent air strikes; deplores, in this context, the refusal of Hamas to hand over the remaining hostages; calls for an immediate return to the full implementation of the ceasefire-hostage release agreement and stresses the need for progress towards its second phase; praises the commitment of mediators, including the US, Egypt and Qatar, whose efforts were pivotal in achieving the ceasefire-hostage release agreement in the first place; stands ready to engage in discussions on future concrete contributions to support a ceasefire; considers that it is crucial that all obligations made under the deal are upheld, ensuring the release of all hostages and establishing a lasting cessation of violence, as well as allowing unrestrained access and sustained distribution of humanitarian and medical assistance in the Gaza Strip; welcomes, to that end, the redeployment of EUBAM Rafah on 31 January 2025 to support the Palestinian Authority in facilitating crossings for medical evacuations; expresses its unease about the recent closing of the Rafah Crossing Point until further notice as a result of military operations in Gaza initiated on 18 March 2025; calls for all parties to fully commit to their obligations and to prioritise the protection of civilians; urges all European and international actors to actively oversee the implementation of the ceasefire and hold accountable those who fail to comply;

32. Believes that the Association Council with Israel, held in Brussels on 24 February 2025, was a first step towards re-engaging in frank and open discussion with the Israeli Foreign Minister, which will require following up; acknowledges the value of engaging with Israel to strengthen the EU’s role in the Middle East, while stressing that the partnership must be based on full respect for rights and values; recalls that compliance with Article 2 of the Association Agreement is a crucial element of the partnership and calls for continued monitoring and assessment of its implementation by the Israeli Government; welcomes the anticipated High-Level Dialogue with the Palestinian Prime Minister in April 2025;

33. Reiterates its unwavering support for a negotiated two-state solution on the basis of the 1967 borders, with two sovereign, democratic states as peaceful neighbours and with Jerusalem as their shared capital, which remains the most viable path to lasting peace and security for both Israelis and Palestinians; calls for the VP/HR to support all efforts to this end, and in particular the Global Alliance for the Implementation of the two-State Solution; calls on all parties to renew efforts to remove the obstacles to this solution and to engage in dialogue aimed at achieving mutual understanding and respect; welcomes the prospect of a return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza; regrets the fact that the Palestinian Authority has not held elections since 2005, which hampers its credibility, and expects elections to be held soon; is convinced that there can be no prospect for peace, security, stability and prosperity for Gaza as well as for reconciliation between the Israeli and Palestinian populations as long as Hamas and other terrorist groups play a role in the Gaza Strip; calls, therefore, on the EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process to support efforts to counteract the further radicalisation of young people in the region; condemns the acceleration of the illegal Israeli settlement of Palestinian territory, which violates international law, undermines efforts towards achieving a two-state solution, and poses a significant obstacle to lasting peace; expresses concern over the rising violence committed by Israeli forces and extremist settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and welcomes sanctions adopted against extremist Israeli settlers; reiterates the important role of the Abraham Accords as a framework for achieving durable peace stability and prosperity in the Middle East; welcomes the Arab Recovery and Reconstruction Plan presented at the Cairo Summit on 4 March 2025, which represents a serious basis for discussions on the future of the Gaza Strip; encourages the VP/HR and the Commissioner for the Mediterranean to engage constructively with Arab partners to provide credible solutions for the reconstruction, governance and security of Gaza; rejects, on the other hand, the ‘Trump-Gaza’ proposal, which ignores the volatile security conditions across the Middle East; holds the opinion that the extent of destruction and human suffering in Gaza requires comprehensive international engagement, with the United States, together with the EU, the UN, Arab states, and other international partners, complementing each other’s efforts in order for negotiations to resume and to be constructive; is committed to the future normalisation efforts between Israel and Arab states in the region;

34. Supports a just and viable solution to the question of Palestinian refugees; underscores that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) plays an important role in providing humanitarian aid and essential services which in the present circumstances must not be interrupted, and considers that all UN agencies active in the region must be supported in their efforts; recalls, however, its concern regarding serious allegations made against staff members of UNRWA which suggest that UNRWA has employed members of the terrorist organisation Hamas; welcomes the actions taken by the UN following the allegations regarding the Agency’s staff and welcomes UNRWA’s full commitment to implement the recommendations stemming from the ‘Colonna report’; echoes the European Council conclusions of 17 October 2024 which condemn any attempt to abrogate the 1967 agreement between Israel and UNRWA; insists that the Commission ensure that no funds from the EU budget finance, contribute to or support the activities of Hamas or Hezbollah; stresses that additional measures may be needed in the future to strive for even more transparency and accountability;

35. Expresses concern about rising tensions in the Middle East and urges all involved parties to uphold international humanitarian law, to show maximum restraint and to commit to de-escalation, as a regional conflict must be avoided at all costs; deplores the loss of thousands of civilian lives; urges the disarmament of Hezbollah as part of broader measures to reduce hostilities and ensure regional stability; calls on the VP/HR to come forward with a comprehensive EU Middle East strategy, to increase the EU’s effective presence in the region, to promotes long-term stability and peace in the region and to strengthen partnerships with key regional stakeholders; stresses that the strategy must be fleshed out within the first months of the new Commission’s mandate and should be reflected in the forthcoming MFF for it to have any tangible impact on a rapidly deteriorating situation; underscores the need for Member States to step up their diplomatic efforts with international partners, including with the Gulf countries, in order to encourage urgent de-escalation and meaningful dialogue; underlines the need to prioritise and strengthen civil society organisations in the region, particularly organisations working on the protection of human rights and peacebuilding;

36. Strongly condemns the destabilising role that the Iranian regime and its network of non-state actors play in the region; recalls that Iran has stepped out of the shadow of its proxies and condemns Iran’s two direct and open attacks on Israel’s territory in 2024, to which Israel retaliated both times, representing an unprecedented scaling up of the conflict; strongly condemns Hezbollah’s attacks against Israel which led to an Israeli ground invasion in Lebanon causing a high number of civilian casualties, forced displacement and escalating violence in Lebanon; takes note of the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, agreed on 27 November 2024 for a period of 60 days; urges Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1701; recalls the need for a permanent cessation of hostilities as soon as possible to create space for a diplomatic solution along the Blue Line; demands the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 in its entirety, as the only path to de-escalate tensions and stabilise the Israel-Lebanon border in a durable manner and fully restore the sovereignty, territorial integrity and stability of Lebanon; welcomes the Council Decision of 21 January 2025 to adopt a third assistance measure under the European Peace Facility worth EUR 60 million to the benefit of the Lebanese Armed Forces;

37. Calls on the Council and the VP/HR to add Hezbollah in its entirety to the EU list of terrorist organisations;

38. Takes note of the arrest warrant issued by the ICC on 21 November 2024;

39. Echoes the call of ICC President Judge Tomoko Akane for the EU to take immediate action to protect the ICC and the rule of law in the international community, including by swiftly amending the EU blocking statute to bring the ICC within its scope;

40. Welcomes the formation of a new government; wishes President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam success in delivering on the aspirations of the Lebanese people; is committed to supporting the country in rebuilding state institutions capable of fulfilling their mission at the service of all citizens, in taking forward a reform-oriented and forward-looking agenda, particularly regarding civil liberties and the rule of law; supports reconstruction efforts while embarking on a path of political stabilisation and socio-economic recovery; calls on the VP/HR to relaunch the EU-Lebanon Partnership, including by holding an Association Council soon;

41. Strongly condemns recent attacks against the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) by the Israeli Defence Forces and Hezbollah; reiterates the inviolability of all UN personnel and premises and reaffirms the essential stabilising role played by UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, to which 16 Member States contribute, and calls for an immediate end to these attacks;

42. Welcomes the EU’s decision to renew sanctions against Iran until July 2025, including by sanctioning Iran’s production of unmanned drones and missiles and its supply thereof to Russia and the wider Middle Eastern region; highlights the strong links between Iran and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), its proxies such as the Houthis and militias operating in Iraq and Syria; strongly condemns the high number of terrorist and assassination attacks, or attempted attacks, perpetrated by the IRGC all over the world, including on European soil, over the past few decades; reiterates its call for the IRGC to be added to the EU list of terrorist organisations; points out that the sanctioning options that have not yet been exhausted include a much more restrictive approach to technology transfers through exports of products that are not categorised as ‘dual-use’;

43. Strongly condemns the destabilising Houthi attacks against commercial as well as military vessels transiting the Red Sea; stresses that these have caused significant disruption to global trade as shipping companies are forced to reroute much of the Red Sea’s traffic around the southern tip of Africa; calls for collective action and encourages enhanced EU engagement and international cooperation, and strongly urges for continued action to ensure the freedom of navigation in one of the world’s most critical waterways; calls for the immediate cessation of these illegal attacks;

44. Shares the objective of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons at all costs; points, however, to the fact that the regime in Tehran has clearly rejected a revival of the JCPOA and has refused to cooperate in its ongoing dispute with the International Atomic Energy Agency; highlights that, at the same time, Iran has increased its nuclear weapons capability; regrets the fact that there is currently no strategy in place to persuade Iran to refrain from building military nuclear capacity, nor a plan of action for the event that Iran does cross the nuclear threshold; calls upon the VP/HR to put forward a revised strategy towards Iran that prepares for all events;

45. Expresses concern regarding the inflammatory rhetoric, fuelled by mis- and disinformation, that surrounds this conflict, and its instrumentalisation by malicious actors to sow distrust and hatred including within European societies, as illustrated notably, but not solely, by the worrying rise of antisemitism; warns that it should be a primary focus of the EU fight against disinformation and calls for a coordinated approach by the Commission, taking into account the external and internal dimensions of its policies, including but not limited to the forthcoming strategic communication plan to promote the EU’s role in the Southern Neighbourhood;

46. Welcomes the historic fall of the Assad regime in Syria; recalls that it only survived so long thanks to the support of its Russian and Iranian allies and that its collapse shows they are weakened; welcomes the fresh start in EU-Syria relations, manifested by the appointment of an EU Chargé d’Affaires in Damascus, diplomatic engagement and high-level meetings undertaken by Member States and EU leaders, as well as the ninth Brussels Conference that took place on 17 March 2025 with the participation of interim Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani; considers that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the new Syrian authorities should not be a pretext for leniency for Member State nationals who fought as part of Islamist groups in Syria; declares that these fighters still represent a threat to the countries of which they are nationals and to all Member States of the EU; reiterates its unwavering support for the territorial integrity of Syria and highlights the need to urgently step up humanitarian aid and protection for the 16,7 million people in need; welcomes, to this end, the indefinite extension of humanitarian exemptions and the gradual, yet conditional, suspension of sanctions on a range of economic sectors so as to provide the Syrian economy with a much-needed lifeline; pledges to closely monitor the political transition process and to call on the Member States to reverse the lifting of sanctions should the Syrian authorities not live up to their stated commitments; recognises the challenge for orderly state-building linked to the risk of insurgency by armed groups loyal to the former regime and encourages the caretaker authorities to urgently organise paramilitary and civilian disarmament, especially following the inacceptable retaliatory targeting of the Alawite community based on its perceived association with the Assad regime; calls for the EU and its Member States to support the implementation process of the agreement between the Syrian transitional government and the Kurdish-led SDF, in order to guarantee the Kurdish community full recognition and political participation in Syria; calls on all parties to contribute to a peaceful and Syrian-led political transition towards an inclusive, democratic governance model that ensures the representation, participation and equal rights of women, minorities and all members of Syrian society regardless of ethnicity or religion and that puts the good functioning of the state institutions and the wellbeing of the Syrian people at the heart of their actions; welcomes the caretaker President al-Sharaa’s acknowledgement of Syria’s diversity, while taking note that the composition of the current interim government is lacking in this regard; strongly believes that the success of the Syrian political transition, notably the safeguarding of civil peace and the building of trust in state institutions, hinges on transitional justice and reconciliation as a path to fighting the impunity of all parties responsible for violations of international humanitarian law; stresses that the fight against impunity in Syria is a moral and political imperative for Europe and the international community; calls on the EU and its Member States to support the work of the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011; encourages Syria to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and align national legislation accordingly, as well as give the ICC retroactive jurisdiction through a declaration; calls on the EU and its Member States to consider the establishment of a special mission, in cooperation with international partners, to help document cases of serious crimes by the Assad regime, as well as by all other factions; stresses the importance of preserving the territorial integrity of Syria, also to help preserve stability in the region; calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to take immediate steps to prevent any re-establishment or reinforcement of Russian forces, paramilitaries or intelligence in the country;

Incentivising cooperation with like-minded partners

47. Acknowledges that the requirement for unanimity forces the Member States to work relentlessly to achieve compromise and unity, which is the source of the EU’s political leverage on the world stage; points out, however, that the trade-off between the ideal of unity and the high costs of unanimity in terms of credibility on the global stage should be assessed critically, particularly bearing in mind the effective functioning of an enlarged EU;

48. Regrets, in this context, the fact that individual Member States have used their veto right to water down agreements, delay decision-making or thwart a common policy altogether; regrets that the potential for fast, efficient and effective foreign, security and defence action, as provided for, inter alia, by the passerelle clauses of the TEU, has never been used;

49. Reiterates its call for the Council to gradually switch to qualified majority voting for decisions in areas of the CFSP that do not have military or defence implications; acknowledges the concerns of some Member States, which fear a decreased ability to influence foreign and security policy at EU level; encourages, pending the full application of qualified majority voting to decisions without military or defence implications, the full use of all currently existing possibilities to enhance decisiveness in this regard, including the use of constructive abstention in line with Article 31(1) TEU; recognises that progress towards the application of qualified majority voting can only be gradual, building on the formation of a European strategic culture;

50. Highlights that the world is becoming more multipolar and less multilateral; emphasises that multilateral forums, chief among them the UN and its agencies, should be considered the EU’s format of cooperation of choice; calls on the Member States to reinforce inclusive forms of multilateral governance and encourages, in this context, the Commission, the EEAS and the Council to step up interinstitutional cooperation with multilateral organisations that are integral to the international rules-based order and thereby protect the UN and the multilateral system as a whole; expresses concern, in this respect, about the increasing relevance of exclusive formats of cooperation, which experience increasing competition; expresses concern at the growing membership of the BRICS group, which currently includes 45 % of the world’s population; stresses that such cooperation provides Russia with the means to circumvent measures intended to politically isolate the country and enables China to further extend its influence through its modus operandi of financing infrastructure projects; underlines that the seriousness of China’s engagement will depend on its willingness to make concessions to address the management and the restructuring of the debt of the countries of the Global South; observes, at the same time, that international institutions and norms are increasingly being instrumentalised and undermined by autocratic regimes; stresses that this trend puts the EU in a delicate position, having to balance the need to appeal for a broad and inclusive concept of multilateralism while reinforcing cooperation with selected, like-minded partners;

51. Calls on the Commission and the Council to re-evaluate and reassess the EU’s approach towards the BRICS group and its partners and to develop a separate EU policy towards BRICS+;

52. Calls strongly for a review of EU financial assistance to third countries to ensure that it does not support governments that challenge European values, spread anti-Western propaganda, support Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and undermine the current international order that upholds democracy, human rights and the fight against corruption;

53. Stresses, in this context, that the geopolitical context in which the EU is operating remains marked by radical uncertainty and a shift from cooperation to competition; observes with concern how all types of interaction are being weaponised and notes that this trend impairs international cooperation at a time when global transitions need to accelerate in order to effectively address global challenges; recalls that the EU cannot afford to turn inwards and must remain open and engaged in the world to defend its values and its interests; underlines that, in light of intensified efforts by third countries to destabilise the international order and undermine multilateralism through the spread of disinformation, enhanced cooperation and coordination with like-minded partners is essential;

54. Calls for the EU institutions and the Member States to actively support a comprehensive institutional reform of multilateral institutions, first and foremost the UN system and particularly the UN Security Council, which should include measures aimed at limiting the use of veto powers, boosting regional representation, making the executive body accountable to the assembly that elects it and redefining the composition to better reflect geopolitical reality, including by establishing a permanent seat for the EU; stresses that such reforms are essential to strengthen multilateralism, improve global governance and values-based decision-making, and address international challenges more inclusively and responsively;

55. Recalls the importance of a strong and constructive partnership with the UK given not only the existence of an unprecedentedly comprehensive Trade and Cooperation Agreement, the foundation of shared values such as democracy, support for multilateralism and human rights, but also the scope of the issues of common interest in fields such as defence, climate and energy, border management, the fight against terrorism, organised crime and the promotion of peace and stability; welcomes, especially, the renewed impetus from the new UK Government to reflect with the EU on possibilities for closer and more permanent foreign policy and security cooperation, underpinned by concrete actions and building on the good cooperation at UN level as well as the effective coordination between the EU and the UK on the adoption and monitoring of the implementation of sanctions against Russia; believes that such coordination is of added value for both the EU and the UK and hence welcomes the agreement to work towards the creation of an EU-UK security partnership based on shared interest and collective responsibility; believes that in the scope of such a partnership, topics such as maritime security should be consulted on; demands that Parliament be duly involved and informed in such reflections before and after the anticipated UK-EU Summit;

56. Takes note of the result of the presidential and congressional elections in the United States; expresses concern over the fast pace at which the new US administration has been reversing established partnerships and diplomatic tradition; expresses dismay concerning the current policy of appeasing Russia and targeting traditional allies; regrets recent comments made by US Vice President Vance, which question shared values underpinning the transatlantic partnership; warns that through such erratic policy, the Trump administration is gambling with a scarce good, namely trust in the US; believes, nonetheless, that the transatlantic relationship remains indispensable for the security of the partners on both sides of the Atlantic and is therefore worth investing in; deems it more crucial than ever to continue engaging with US counterparts at federal and state level; encourages Member States to pursue bilateral diplomatic channels with counterparts in the US as the format of cooperation preferred by the US administration, showing unity and commitment to a common EU position; reiterates the importance of EU-US summits to be held on a regular basis to provide top-level impetus to the future cooperation; fully supports the deepening of cooperation in the framework of the EU-US transatlantic dialogue, such as through transatlantic parliamentary diplomacy;

57. Deplores the decision by the US to bring a sudden halt to most of its humanitarian aid and development assistance, including but not limited to the aid provided until now by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), with devastating effects on countless people’s lives, but which also risks severe consequences for human rights and global security; recognises that the EU cannot replace USAID, but needs to strategically and smartly reallocate resources through a Team Europe approach so as to mitigate impacts, in both the interests of the countries affected and our own interests; welcomes the announcement by the Commission and the EEAS that efforts are underway to inject liquidity in severely affected areas through redeploying and increasing pre-financing; commends the decision to initiate mapping at EU level, which should also take into account secondary effects, and asks for the results to be shared with the Member States and with Parliament; asks the Commission to issue a statement taking stock of the holistic response of the EU to this crisis;

58. Calls on the Commission to foster closer ties with Canada in order to counter global challenges that affect our shared values, interests, security and prosperity; believes that the bilateral security and defence dialogue as well as the upcoming security and defence partnership provide the basis for enhanced security and defence cooperation, including on respective initiatives to boost defence industry production;

59. Reiterates, irrespectively, the need for Member States to fully operationalise the concept of EU strategic autonomy and defence readiness and to this end make collective and well-coordinated investments in their security and defence with the objective of achieving a genuine European Defence Union that is interoperable and complementary with the NATO alliance and can act independently when needed; considers that the EU must act urgently to reduce its dependencies on non-EU countries for its defence capabilities, in particular for strategic enablers, ensuring its own autonomous security; recalls that the EDTIB is a strategic asset for both the Union’s security and defence and for its foreign policy; calls for its significant strengthening and for the deepening of defence industrial partnerships and integration of the industrial basis of like-minded reliable partners into the EDTIB, first and foremost Ukraine;

60. Encourages close relations with western European non-EU countries, in particular cooperation in certain areas of EU external action; welcomes in this context the conclusion of negotiations on a broad package of measures for future EU-Switzerland relations, which mark a significant milestone in advancing and deepening the already close relationship; calls on the Commission to modernise and deepen bilateral relations between the EU and Switzerland; stresses the importance of promoting stronger relations with Norway, particularly in the scope of the security and defence partnership as well as the cooperative management of shared stocks and the continuation of long-standing fishing activities; calls for the swift signing of the association agreement between the EU and Andorra and San Marino;

61. Welcomes the new momentum in bilateral relations between the EU and Armenia, which is strongly supported by the authorities in Yerevan; calls on the Commission and the Council to actively support Armenia’s desire for increased cooperation with the EU; expresses full support for the newly launched work on the EU-Armenia Partnership Agenda, establishing more ambitious joint priorities for cooperation across all dimensions;

62. Expresses its strong support for the activities of the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) and underscores the important role it plays; calls on EUMA to continue to closely monitor the evolving security situation on the ground, provide transparent reporting to Parliament and actively contribute to conflict resolution efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to strengthen EUMA’s mandate, increase its size and extend its duration; calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to agree to have such a civilian mission on their side of the border as well;

63. Is of the view that the centre of gravity in the global order is shifting towards the Indo-Pacific and that the EU must strengthen its active role and presence in this region to safeguard its interests, promote stability and uphold a rules-based international order; reiterates that a peaceful, free, stable and rules-based Indo-Pacific region is of vital European interest; is concerned that great power competition in the region is imposing parameters on the EU’s ability to promote multilateralism in the region; points out, in this context, that the Asia-Europe Meeting is still hamstrung because of the geopolitical tensions with Russia; calls, in this context for enhanced foreign, security and defence policy ties with like-minded partners in the region in line with the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific; encourages the VP/HR to promote the visibility and impact of the EU’s external action together with our Indo-Pacific partners, particularly Australia, India, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan;

64. Recalls, in this context, the strategic partnership the EU enjoys with Japan, which should serve as a role model for a fruitful bilateral partnership that allows effective policy-shaping in multilateral contexts; notes that the EU and Japan are celebrating 50 years of their respective diplomatic missions in 2024 and strongly emphasises the EU’s interest in deepening and broadening this partnership bilaterally in the 50 years to come; welcomes, to this end, the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement and the EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA), the latter of which provides for, among other things, consultations on the development of respective defence initiatives including exchange of information on defence industry-related matters, as well as the exploration of possible mutual involvement in respective defence initiatives;

65. Notes that geopolitical challenges have strengthened the shared interest of the EU and India in ensuring security, prosperity and sustainable development; calls for an India-EU summit to keep bilateral relations high on the agenda; identifies climate change and green growth, digitalisation and new technologies, research and development, connectivity, trade and investment, foreign, security and defence policy as the key areas of cooperation; calls, in this respect, for stronger buy-in from Member States; calls, equally, on the Member States to expand and broaden the India-EU cooperation on maritime security in response to China’s evolving presence in the Indo-Pacific; highlights the need to engage with India on its heavy military dependency on Russia as well as its supply of restricted critical technologies to Russia; urges India to condemn Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and to join the EU sanctions policy towards Russia;

66. Considers India an important democratic partner and encourages the EU to strictly engage with the Indian Government on the respect of human rights and rule of law, both internally and worldwide; calls for the full implementation of the EU Strategy on India of 2018 and the EU-India Roadmap to 2025 in close coordination with Member States’ own actions; stresses in particular the need to promote greater synergies in foreign and security policy through existing dialogue mechanisms and other forums set up under the EU-India Roadmap to 2025; believes that the momentous visit of the President of the Commission and the College of Commissioners to India on 27 and 28 February 2025 marked the beginning of a new chapter in the history of EU-India relations and reaffirmed the strategic link and its untapped potential; welcomes the announcement of a forthcoming strategic EU-India agenda;

67. Recalls the EU’s commitment to its ‘One China’ policy as one of the principles of EU-China relations; underscores that Taiwan is a key democratic partner for the EU in the Indo-Pacific region; recognises the importance of Taiwan in securing global supply chains, especially in the high-tech sector, and urges the EU and its Member States to engage in closer cooperation with Taiwan in order to further boost economic, trade and investment ties; encourages the Commission to launch, without delay, preparatory measures for negotiations on an investment agreement with Taiwan; emphasises that any attempt from authoritarian regimes to restrict the benign development of EU-Taiwan relations is not acceptable;

68. Strongly condemns China’s continued military provocations against Taiwan and reiterates its firm rejection of any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure, through clear and consistent signalling, that any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by means of force or coercion, cannot be accepted and will have high costs; highlights that China’s territorial claims have no basis in international law and that only Taiwan’s democratically elected government can represent the Taiwanese people; denounces, furthermore, China’s blocking of Taiwan’s meaningful participation in multilateral organisations, such as the WHO, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, by its continuous distortion of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758; calls, accordingly, for the EU and its Member States to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in relevant international organisations;

69. Expresses deep concern about the latest shifts in China’s domestic and military posture since the 20th national congress of the Chinese Communist Party; holds the view that China demonstrates that it has both the intent and increasingly the economic, diplomatic, technological and military power to redefine the global order; underscores that the military-civil fusion strategy is a testament to such means; stresses, in this context, that the EU needs to be more assertive and unified in its approach to China and therefore calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to review the strategy towards China that takes full account of the increasingly oppressive domestic policies, the assertive foreign policy as well as the use of economic coercion as a means by which China aims to reach its objectives; considers that the challenges stemming from the rise of China as a global actor require a balanced multi-dimensional response along the principle of ‘cooperate where possible, compete where needed and confront where necessary’, through which the EU maintains its selective engagement with China as a permanent member of the UN Security Council on a number of key issues;

70. Highlights that the PRC’s increasingly aggressive posture poses a threat to the freedom of navigation and jeopardises the stability which is vital for global trade; emphasises that this situation is being watched with concern by a growing number of like-minded partners committed to peace and stability in the region; underlines the need to shore up deterrence against destabilising behaviour, including through regular operations to assert freedom of navigation over the PRC’s attempts to impose control over international waters and airspace;

71. Holds the view that China, through the continued growth of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, including in the areas of technology and military capability transfers, (indirectly) enables the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine;

72. Reiterates its condemnation of China’s violation of its international commitments, its breaches of the Sino-British and Sino-Portuguese Joint Declarations, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the ‘one country, two systems’ principle and the Hong Kong Basic Law as well as the crackdown on the special administrative region’s autonomy and opposition figures, including members of civil society and their family members; calls on the Commission to assess the autonomous status of Hong Kong and Macao in the light of China’s breaches of the Sino-British and Sino-Portuguese Joint Declarations and the crackdown on Hong Kong’s autonomy;

73. Is concerned about the growing economic penetration of Chinese companies within the EU, including in strategic sectors such as battery manufacturing; stresses the urgent need to continue the policy of de-risking by continuing to reduce economic dependence in critical sectors, in line with the EU’s economic security strategy;

74. Reiterates that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a crucial partner in reinforcing rules-based multilateralism; supports ASEAN’s efforts to finalise negotiations with China on an effective and substantive code of conduct in the South China Sea; encourages enhanced EU engagement and cooperation with ASEAN and efforts towards a comprehensive strategic partnership, building on economic ties and sustainable growth, and in particular on political cooperation with regard to human rights and democracy; calls for increased support for Myanmar’s national unity government and for greater pressure to be applied to ASEAN countries to align on international sanctions against Myanmar’s military junta;

75. Urges the VP/HR and the Member States to focus on bilateral relations with partners in Africa, among others South Africa, Ghana, Morocco, Kenya, Senegal and Mauretania, taking into account mutual needs and interests in order to foster real and balanced partnerships; believes that the ‘more for more’ principle should be integrated fully into relations with non-EU countries, whereby the EU develops stronger partnerships with those countries that uphold the principles of the CFSP and the common security and defence policy (CSDP), and the fundamental values of the EU; is of the belief that the EU needs to maintain a continued focus on Africa, which is already a strategic continent and will become an increasingly important player in the future;

76. Calls for the EU to suspend both its Memorandum of Understanding on raw materials and all military cooperation with Rwanda, including through the EPF and any other mechanisms, until Rwanda ends its illegal support for armed groups and fully respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); condemns the breaches of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the eastern DRC by the rebels of M23; condemns the capture of Goma and Bukavu by the M23 armed group and its continued offensive in South Kivu, which has further exacerbated the acute humanitarian crisis, heightened the risk of the DRC’s destabilisation and a full-blown regional war; supports the Luanda Nairobi peace process to achieve a political solution to the conflict by diplomatic means and urges the VP/HR to continue diplomatic outreach to the conflict and regional parties and to increase pressure on parties to re-engage in peaceful negotiations, including through the postponing of the EU Security and Defence Consultations with Rwanda and adoption of sanctions depending on the situation on the ground and progress in ongoing regional mediations processes; is deeply concerned about the humanitarian situation of thousands of displaced persons in the area; urges the VP/HR to engage in clear actions in line with the EU’s Great Lakes strategy in order to restore stability and to cooperate with the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) for the protection of civilians in the eastern DRC;

77. Underlines that the recent developments in Tunisia have raised concerns about human rights and democratic standards, with reports indicating limited transparency, restricted opposition participation and reduced political competition in the presidential election; underlines the EU’s continued commitment to and support for Tunisia during this politically and socio-economically sensitive period, through maintaining contact at various levels;

78. Underscores that the EU has a direct and vital interest in the stability, security and economic growth of the Mediterranean basin as well as the wider Southern Neighbourhood; recalls that the European neighbourhood policy was launched with the laudable goals of fostering stability, prosperity and good governance in the southern Mediterranean; acknowledges, however, that it is evident today that its instruments, objectives and principles are no longer aligned with the region’s current realities; regrets that, almost 30 years after the launch of the so-called Barcelona Process, the creation of an area of shared prosperity, stability and freedom with the Mediterranean countries of the Southern Neighbourhood has not been achieved; calls on the Commission to present a new pact for the Mediterranean; believes that the EU and the countries of the Southern Neighbourhood should conclude memorandums of understanding aimed at promoting stability, prosperity and the defence of human rights, conditional on cooperating on migration; recalls that instability and insecurity in the Southern Neighbourhood remains an ongoing challenge for European external border management; argues that, while prioritising bilateral relations with countries in the region, the EU should also continue to foster regional cooperation through existing frameworks such as the Union for the Mediterranean; welcomes the appointment of a Commissioner in charge of the Mediterranean;

79. Stresses the need for the EU to strengthen and deepen its cooperation with Arab countries and the Gulf, in response to the pressing geopolitical, social, and economic challenges facing the region; emphasises that enhanced collaboration should prioritise key areas such as migration, digital transformation, security, the green transition and cultural exchange to build a resilient partnership; calls for a strategic approach that tailors engagement with each country to foster sustainable development and mutual understanding;

80. Welcomes the successful conclusion of the first EU-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit and believes this summit to have marked a pivotal moment in the relationship between the EU and its partners from the GCC, stressing mutual commitment to strengthening ties across key strategic, economic, and cultural areas;

81. Underlines the importance of upholding and promoting democratic values in the region; condemns the rise of hate speech, including against the European institutions, and attacks on individual freedoms and the international order, both within Member States and abroad;

82. Emphasises that the countries of the EU, Latin American and the Caribbean are like-minded and share values, languages, history, culture and religion, which should make them natural partners in today’s geopolitical context; notes that the EU’s engagement in the region has dwindled in recent decades, which has created a vacuum for the growing influence of China and Russia; urges countries across Latin America to adopt a firmer attitude of condemnation of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; calls on the Member States and the EEAS to pursue proactive diplomacy in the region, with a strong emphasis on defending the multilateral global order, international law and respect for democracy and human rights; urges for multilateral initiatives to address political instability in the most volatile countries in the region, for instance in Haiti;

83. Welcomes the signing of the EU-Chile Advanced Framework Agreement and calls for its swift and full ratification; welcomes, equally, the conclusion of the negotiations on the modernised EU-Mexico Global Agreement, which was announced by the Commission on 17 January 2025 and for which Parliament still has to give its consent; highlights that the agreement would reinforce the EU’s strategic partnership with Mexico, recognising the country’s pivotal role in Latin America and its ambition to diversify trade and political partnerships to reduce economic dependency on the US;

84. Takes note of the conclusion of the agreement with Mercosur; expresses concern regarding its potentially negative impact on EU sustainability and safety standards and on the competitiveness of the EU agri-food sector, and underlines that Parliament must examine whether the agreement meets the EU sustainability standards and complies with the reciprocity principle, before ratification can be considered;

85. Welcomes the EU-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) informal meeting and the implementation of initiatives under the EU-CELAC Roadmap 2023-2025 and, in this regard, underlines the need to adopt a new and ambitious roadmap at the 2025 summit, that keeps strengthening the partnership and takes into account best practices accomplished so far;

86. Underlines the need for a tougher approach to address violence against environmental defenders and to step up the EU’s efforts to assist in the preservation of biodiversity and in adaptation to the climate emergency; suggests further strengthening cooperation against organised crime and drug trafficking which also has an impact on the EU; calls for a substantial increase in bi-regional cooperation in the fight against this phenomenon;

87. Calls on the VP/HR to make the work with like-minded democracies a priority of her term and to systematise cooperation and consultation with democratic like-minded partners in order to promote democracy and improve common preparedness and access to crisis response resources; reiterates, in this context, the recommendation to deepen ties with regional organisations such as ASEAN and the African Union to enhance cooperative security frameworks;

88. Reiterates its support for the European Political Community as a platform for discussion, dialogue and cooperation with European partners on the foreign policy and security challenges we are facing, with the aim of strengthening security and stability in Europe and pursuing political and security cooperation based on shared interests; calls for the close involvement of Parliament in the clarification of the scope and the future work of this community; underlines that, for the future success and coherence of this format, some level of alignment on democratic values and principles is essential; reiterates that the European Political Community may under no circumstances become a pretext for delays to the EU accession of enlargement countries;

89. Believes also in the significance of building new alliances, inter alia with the countries in our neighbourhood as well as in the Global South, taking into account mutual needs and interests in order to foster real, balanced and equal partnerships; stresses the importance of establishing these political agreements with third countries, based on common European values and fundamental rights; calls for the EU to respond to partner countries’ expectations and to deliver quickly on political agreements with them in order to show that the EU is a reliable and strategic partner and demonstrate that the international rules-based system can meet contemporary challenges; calls on the Commission to ensure the active involvement of Parliament in the establishment, implementation and monitoring of the future clean trade and investment partnerships; calls, in this context, for collaborative initiatives between the EU and Global South countries to assess and tackle the debt crisis; notes that agreements with the Global South, especially on raw materials, should contribute to local economic development rather than deepening dependence and excessive resource exploitation;

Fostering EU action abroad

90. Highlights the role of the VP/HR as a bridge-builder between the CFSP and EU external relations to ensure the highest level of coordination and coherence in EU external action; stresses the need for the EU to foster the visibility and effectiveness of its external action and development cooperation efforts, regrets, nonetheless, that in some cases there is a lack of clarity in the external representation of the EU, hindering the EU’s strategic communication abroad; stresses the need to clearly define the competences of the VP/HR, the President of the Commission and the President of the European Council with regard to the EU’s external action and representation so that the EU’s voice is coherent and perceived as such by its partners; calls on the Commission to strengthen its coordination with the EEAS in external action, including by ensuring full compliance with Articles 3.2 and 9 of the EEAS Decision(17), which may need to be updated;

91. Calls for the EEAS – both its headquarters and EU delegations – to be strengthened through the provision of the appropriate financial and human resources so that the EU can be better prepared for current and emerging global challenges; calls for the EEAS to be able to select and recruit its permanent EU diplomatic staff and to ensure a fair gender and geographical balance among Member States across all levels within the EEAS; calls on the VP/HR to swiftly come up with proposals for the future operational structure of the EU’s external action and to that end to fully take into account Parliament’s recommendation of 15 March 2023 taking stock of the functioning of the EEAS and for a stronger EU in the world(18); stresses the need to strengthen strategic communication and the EU’s work on countering disinformation via dedicated resources and offices in strategically relevant regions and countries;

92. Recalls that the EU has a strategic interest in advancing sustainable development, poverty reduction and equality globally, as these efforts contribute to long-term global peace and security; calls on the Commission to effectively and swiftly use the Global Gateway Initiative as a sustainable alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and as an instrument to increase the EU’s presence and visibility worldwide; recalls that the Global Gateway Initiative is to be understood as a strategic concept integrating foreign, economic and development policy, including the climate and digital transitions, as well as infrastructure investment in order to strengthen close partnership based on mutual benefits, economic development and resilient supply chains; stresses, in this context, that coordination with international financial institutions, well-defined private-sector involvement and tailored strategic communications, including in the recipient countries, are essential in order for the instrument to reach the desired scale; is concerned by reports that a number of Global Gateway projects are being implemented by Chinese companies in direct violation of the initiative’s aims and objectives, which includes the strengthening of the EU’s economic security and fostering economic development and mutually beneficial partnerships with third countries; calls, therefore, for an immediate investigation and the removal of all Chinese companies involved in Global Gateway; stresses that the EU’s support should complement other initiatives such as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor and the Lobito Corridor, and should in particular aim at achieving the Sustainable Development Goals;

93. Reiterates that Parliament plays an integral role in the CFSP and makes a specific contribution thereto by virtue of its parliamentary diplomacy and its distinct instruments, channels and contacts, including its democracy support programmes, the Foreign Affairs Committee, regular parliamentary dialogues and official delegations; emphasises that parliamentary diplomacy has a great potential to engage key political stakeholders and facilitate democratic governance; stresses, in particular, the added value of parliamentary diplomacy during the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and highlights, in this context, the valuable cooperation at political and technical level between the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the European Parliament;

94. Firmly believes that diplomacy is a significant part of EU action; calls, in this light, for the further development of the EU’s preventive diplomacy as a proactive external policy tool to pre-empt, mediate and peacefully resolve conflict between parties, calls on the EEAS to integrate the EU’s preventive diplomacy tools within structural prevention mechanisms and actions, such as political agreements among different actors involved in conflicts, national dialogues for reconciliation, peacebuilding and transitional justice, as well as truth and reconciliation commissions; urges the EEAS to conduct ‘lessons learnt’ exercises to assess diplomatic efforts, identify areas for improvement and integrate best practice into future initiatives; calls for the EEAS’ capacities in those regards to be increased, in particular in the relevant crisis preparedness and response divisions; stresses the urgent need to double the relevant EU budget within the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument and strongly increase EU action on mediation, dialogue and reconciliation;

95. Reaffirms the role of the EU special representatives (EUSRs), who promote the EU’s policies and interests in specific regions and countries and play an important role in the development of a stronger and more effective CFSP by providing the EU with an active political presence in key countries and regions, acting as a ‘voice’ and ‘face’ for the EU and its policies; emphasises the importance of equipping EUSRs with sufficient resources enabling them to effectively implement those tasks; stresses the importance for EUSRs of having a broad, flexible mandate, capable of adapting to evolving geopolitical circumstances in order to promote the EU’s policies and interests in specific regions and countries and play an active role in preventive diplomacy efforts; insists that the appointment of new EUSRs should take place only after a hearing in Parliament;

96. Underlines that corruption enables and exacerbates human rights violations, abuses, and the erosion of democratic principles and the rule of law; calls for the EU and its Member States to address the risks that corruption poses to stability, governance and peace, and to prevent and counter these threats to EU interests and to global prosperity and security, particularly in the EU’s eastern and southern neighbourhoods; encourages closer coordination between the EU, its Member States and allies and partners wherever possible, in order to tackle systemic corruption that empowers autocratic regimes, facilitates the spread of malign influence, deprives societies of essential resources and undermines democratic values, human rights and the rule of law; stresses the crucial role of civil society and independent journalists in non-EU countries in monitoring and exposing corruption; calls, therefore, for the EU to adopt a comprehensive and swiftly implemented anti-corruption framework within its foreign policy, encompassing the EU sanctions regime, the proposed anti-corruption directive and the broader EU anti-corruption strategy; urges the VP/HR to propose concrete and far-reaching measures in this regard, and supports the inclusion of anti-corruption provisions in EU trade agreements with non-EU countries;

97. Underlines the EU’s missions and operations abroad for promoting peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world; calls on the VP/HR:

	–	to prepare the proposals for the necessary CFSP missions to be launched in 2025, using the EU’s Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) as preventive military reinforcement; recalls that the administrative expenditure for these measures, including the RDC’s standby expenditure, should be charged to the EU budget;
	–	to work with Cyprus, Türkiye, the UK and the UN to implement concrete measures for a demilitarisation of the buffer zone in Cyprus, and to improve security on the island, both of the Greek Cypriot community and of the Turkish Cypriot community;
	–	to support an increased role of the two EU civilian CSDP missions, EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah, in line with European Council conclusions of 21 and 22 March 2024, recalling they can play an important role based on the principle of the two-state solution and the viability of a future Palestinian state, and to participate in the facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Gaza Strip, to improve the efficiency of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, and to prepare for its return to the Gaza Strip;
	–	to create the necessary conditions for the full reactivation of EUBAM Rafah to allow it to act as a neutral third party at the Rafah crossing point, in coordination with the Palestinian Authority as well as the Israeli and Egyptian authorities; expects the reinforcement of the scope and mandates of EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah on the ground to be included as key priorities of the forthcoming EU-Middle East strategy;
	–	to further increase the number of observers deployed as part of the EU civilian mission in Armenia on the Armenian side of the international border with Azerbaijan and reiterate calls for Azerbaijan to cooperate with the mission and cease its smear campaign against it;
	–	to work with Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Taiwan and ASEAN member states to facilitate the peace and security of the Indo-Pacific and south-east Asian regions;
	–	to develop strategies to counter hybrid attacks on the EU’s eastern border and in the outermost regions of the EU, particularly those involving instrumentalising migration as a tactic to destabilise Member States and exert political pressure, to encourage solidarity among the Member States with the countries faced with such attacks, such as Poland and Lithuania, and to propose retaliatory measures against Comoros for its exploitation of the waves of migration in Mayotte;

98. Calls on the VP/HR to follow up on the examples of the successful evacuation actions in Sudan and of the stepped-up consular protection, and to work towards a comprehensive system of protection for EU citizens abroad; stresses that the impact of continuous crises and conflicts worldwide can entail the risk of overloading Member States’ consular protection and/or assistance capacities and calls, in this regard, for the strengthening of the capabilities and resources of the EEAS Crisis Response Centre and the EU Civil Protection Mechanism; recalls its longstanding position of applying a similar level of protection for the local staff in EU delegations and CFSP missions and operations;

III.The next MFF and its parliamentary oversight

99. Believes that there is a need for stronger institutionalised parliamentary oversight of the EU’s external action, including regular and timely, yet secure, access to confidential information and briefings in the European Parliament in line with Article 36 TEU; emphasises the need for more feedback from the VP/HR and the EEAS about the actions taken and the effects achieved, in order to fulfil Parliament’s recommendations outlined in the resolutions on foreign affairs matters;

100. Underlines that in the CFSP, which comprises the CSDP, the European Parliament exercises its budgetary function jointly with the Council; recalls that the European Parliament also exercises the function of political control and consultation over those policies as referred to in Article 36 TEU;

101. Recalls that in line with Article 41 TEU, all CFSP and CSDP administrative and operating expenditure should be charged to the EU budget, except for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications;

102. Underlines that CFSP or CSDP decisions entailing expenditure always constitute basic choices for those policies and must be subject to parliamentary oversight; calls on the VP/HR to consult Parliament before proposing CFSP or CSDP decisions, thereby ensuring transparency and accountability in line with Article 36 TEU;

103. Recalls that Parliament’s exercise of its budgetary function is inextricably linked to its function of political control and consultation; recalls that Article 36 TEU establishes a specific relationship between the VP/HR and the European Parliament, which is a prerequisite for Parliament to exercise those functions, and that the VP/HR should support Parliament in those regards;

104. Regrets that the budget for civilian CSDP missions is insufficient; recalls that the number and tasks of such missions have increased, the security environment has become more challenging, and the cost of operations has increased; urges the European Council to provide for a substantive increase in CFSP funding placed under a separate Civilian CFSP and Crisis Management heading; calls for the efficient use of the funds allocated to civilian CSDP missions to be ensured, in order to make sure that these missions are able to respond effectively to crisis situations and unforeseen events; calls on the VP/HR and the Commission to come forward with joint proposals to those ends;

105. Is deeply concerned that the EEAS is structurally underfunded and that this already entails serious and far-reaching negative consequences for the EU’s external action and the performance of the EU institutions in this area; underlines that a specific approach to the EEAS’ administrative budget is necessary and recalls that the absence of corrective action risks having a severe impact on the EU’s relations with third countries;

106. Calls on the Commission to consider in its proposal for the next MFF under the EU external action heading:

	–	robust capabilities and resources for EU external action that take into account the increasingly challenging international arena, recalling in this regard that it is crucial to further strengthen EU support for human rights, democracy and development in third countries;
	–	resources for the EU’s digital diplomacy, given the current context of rapid technological advancements and geopolitical competition;
	–	resources for green diplomacy;
	–	a dedicated budget for specific EU foreign policy actions on gender equality and the women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda, in order to integrate gender perspectives into EU diplomatic and human security efforts,
	–	resources for preventive scrutiny of potential beneficiaries to ensure that EU funds under no circumstance directly or indirectly support activities, projects or literature that incite violence and hatred, including antisemitism, and to ensure that all recipients of EU funding are monitored accordingly;

107. Calls on the Commission to present its proposals for the next MFF in the first semester of 2025 to allow for sufficient time to negotiate the programmes; underlines the need for a more detailed budgetary nomenclature in the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument, the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance and the CFSP budget, which allow the budgetary authority to set policy and geographic priorities in the framework of the annual budgetary procedure;

108. Underlines that each matter raised above requires an appropriate response by the executive; calls on the VP/HR to respond to Parliament’s calls, requests and concerns swiftly and in writing; considers that oral statements in committee or plenary can only constitute a sufficient response in exceptional or urgent cases; stresses that in the current challenging geopolitical context, close cooperation and partnership between the European Parliament and the VP/HR are of strategic importance; expects more systematic exchanges prior to the adoption of mandates and CFSP strategies and an improved flow of information on negotiations and the implementation of international agreements, as well as memoranda of understanding; expects, in addition, Parliament to be effectively incorporated throughout EU external policies and action, thereby mobilising parliamentary diplomacy in support of the VP/HR’s efforts;

o
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109. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

(1)	OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 28, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_interinstit/2020/1222/oj.
(2)	OJ L 102, 24.3.2021, p. 14, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2021/509/2024-03-18.
(3)	OJ L, 2024/1449, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1449/oj.
(4)	OJ L, 2025/535, 21.3.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/535/oj.
(5)	OJ L 129I, 17.5.2019, p. 13, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2019/797/oj.
(6)	OJ C, C/2023/1226, 21.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1226/oj.
(7)	OJ C, C/2025/204, 14.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/204/oj.
(8)	OJ C, C/2025/487, 29.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/487/oj.
(9)	OJ C, C/2024/5719, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5719/oj.
(10)	OJ C, C/2025/486, 29.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/486/oj.
(11)	OJ C, C/2024/1188, 23.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/1188/oj.
(12)	OJ C 137E, 27.5.2010, p. 25.
(13)	OJ C 171, 6.5.2021, p. 25.
(14)	OJ C 177, 17.5.2023, p. 112.
(15)	OJ C, C/2024/5721, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5721/oj.
(16)	OJ L 115, 28.4.2006, p. 50, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2006/313/oj.
(17)	Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service (OJ L 201, 3.8.2010, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2010/427/oj).
(18)	European Parliament recommendation of 15 March 2023 to the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy taking stock of the functioning of the EEAS and for a stronger EU in the world (OJ C, C/2023/410, 23.11.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/410/oj).

MIL OSI Europe News –

April 5, 2025

Category: Ukraine

Press Release | 07-Apr-2025

‘An unimaginable horror’

Documenting the aftermath

Uphold humanitarian law

Associated Links

PM call with Prime Minister Carney of Canada: 6 April 2025

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Listen to an interview with the Representative ad interim of the UN reproductive health agency, UNFPA, in Sudan:

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PM call with President Macron of France: 5 April 2025

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Coalition of the Willing Military Chiefs in Ukraine ahead of crucial meetings next week

Defence Secretary John Healey MP said:

Chief of the Defence Staff Admiral Sir Tony Radakin said:

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Statistical Commission

Commission on Population and Development

Commission on the Status of Women

Commission on Narcotic Drugs

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Executive Board of the United Nations Children’s Fund

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Committee for Programme and Coordination

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Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International Standards of Accounting and Reporting

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