Category: Ukraine

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on energy-intensive industries – B10-0199/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Giorgio Gori, Wouter Beke, Jana Nagyová, Mariateresa Vivaldini, Brigitte van den Berg, Benedetta Scuderi
    on behalf of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy

    B10‑0199/2025

    European Parliament resolution on energy-intensive industries

    (2025/2536(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the report of September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘On the future of European competitiveness’,

     having regard to the report of April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘Action Plan for Affordable Energy’ (COM(2025)0079),

     having regard to the question to the Commission on energy-intensive industries (O‑000010/2025 – B10‑0000/2025),

     having regard to Rules 142(5) and 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy,

    A. whereas energy-intensive industries (EIIs) account for a significant share of the EU’s economy and play a key role in job creation, especially in areas and regions where they are concentrated; whereas EIIs are crucial for the EU’s strategic autonomy and competitiveness, as well as for decarbonisation, taking into account their energy footprint;

    B. whereas the transition to a decarbonised economy and a clean energy system must lead to reducing energy prices and must take into account all available technologies that contribute to reaching the EU’s net zero goal for 2050 in the most cost-efficient way, avoiding lock-in effects and taking into account the different energy mix across Member States, including with regard to renewables and nuclear;

    C. whereas electrification is at the centre of the decarbonisation of EIIs; whereas EIIs include sectors that use fossil resources to meet temperature, pressure or reaction requirements, such as chemicals, steel, paper, plastics, mining, refineries, cement, lime, non-ferrous metals, glass, ceramics and fertilisers, for which greenhouse gas emissions are hard to reduce because they are intrinsic to the process or because of high capital or operating expenditure costs or low technological maturity;

    D. whereas the energy price gap between the EU and the US and China undermines the competitiveness of the EU’s industries; whereas elevated and volatile fossil fuel prices heavily affect electricity prices and the affordable cost of renewable energy sources is not transferred to energy bills;

    E. whereas an insufficiently integrated energy union poses further challenges to EIIs, in particular in relation to the lack of cross-border interconnections and the limited availability of clean energy, owing to lengthy permitting procedures or high capital or operating expenditures, as well as grid congestion;

    F. whereas the emissions trading system (ETS) provided long-term investment signals and helped bring down the emissions of ETS sectors by 47 %; whereas the energy market has profoundly changed since the introduction of the ETS, especially after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the shift from pipeline gas to liquid natural gas (LNG); whereas a lack of carbon market transparency risks hampering EIIs’ competitiveness; whereas ETS revenues are used unevenly across Member States, failing to adequately support EIIs’ decarbonisation;

    G. whereas unnecessary regulatory burdens and lengthy permitting procedures undermine the business case for investing in decarbonisation in Europe; whereas the concept of overriding public interest is provided for in EU legislation; whereas complex and fragmented EU funding impedes timely investment in net-zero technologies and digitalisation, in particular for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs);

    H. whereas the lack of necessary private investment risks hindering EIIs’ decarbonisation; whereas relying excessively on State aid can have the unwanted consequences of exacerbating disparities and distorting competition across the EU;

    I. whereas the EU’s dependencies and limited access, both in quantity and quality, to primary and secondary raw materials pose significant challenges to EIIs; whereas circularity and efficiency can help reduce the annual investment needs in industry and in energy supply; whereas currently, ferrous metals exported to non-EU countries account for more than half of all EU waste exports, raising concerns about their sound treatment;

    J. whereas unfair competition from non-EU countries, including subsidised overcapacity, poses a great challenge to EU companies; whereas many regions around the world do not currently have ambitious decarbonisation targets, thus increasing the risk of carbon leakage;

    K. whereas a profound transformation of EIIs cannot succeed without the involvement of local and regional communities, workers and social partners, which are heavily affected by the transition;

    1. Reiterates its commitment to the EU’s decarbonisation objectives and to stable and predictable climate and industrial policies;

    2. Calls on the Member States to accelerate permitting and licensing processes for clean energy projects, ensuring administrative capacity, and to facilitate grid connections to enable clean, on-site energy generation, especially in remote areas; stresses that the growth of renewables and electrification will require massive investment in grids and in flexibility, storage and distribution networks; calls on the Commission to develop, beyond the concept of overriding public interest, solutions for speeding up decarbonisation projects;

    3. Believes that further action is needed to implement the electricity market design (EMD) rules, especially to promote power purchase agreements (PPAs) and two-way contracts for difference (CfDs) to reduce volatility and energy costs for EIIs; calls on the Commission to propose urgent measures to address current barriers to the signing of long-term agreements, especially for SMEs, using risk reduction instruments and guarantees, including public guarantee such as by the European Investment Bank (EIB); suggests that additional ways to decouple fossil fuel prices from electricity prices be explored, in the framework of the EMD, including with the aim of boosting long-term contracts in line with the affordable energy action plan, and by advancing the analysis of short-term markets to 2025;

    4. Calls on the Commission to assess the possibility of scaling up best practice for EIIs from Member States, such as Italy’s energy release; calls on the Commission to develop recommendations for reducing the exposure of consumers, and especially EIIs, to rising energy costs, such as by reducing taxes and levies and harmonising network charges, while ensuring public investment in grids;

    5. Calls for the enhancement of energy system integration, in particular in relation to cross-border interconnections, to ensure clean and resilient energy supply; asks for increased investment in flexibility, such as storage, including pumped storage hydropower and heat and waste heat storage, and demand response, to optimise grid stability; recalls the importance of energy efficiency in bringing costs down;

    6. Underlines the need to phase out natural gas as soon as possible; stresses that some sectors cannot rely substantially on electrification in the short to medium term; calls on the Member States – over the same time span and for these limited sectors – to develop measures to address gas price spikes in duly justified cases; calls on the Commission to develop tools to ensure gas supply at a mitigated cost, by enabling demand aggregation, building on AggregateEU, and joint gas purchasing, while keeping decarbonisation objectives; highlights the importance of encouraging stable contracts with gas suppliers, diversifying supply routes and improving market transparency and stability, in line with current legislation; calls for an impact assessment in the upcoming ETS review to analyse the relationship between the gas market and CO2 prices and the role of the market stability reserve and its parameters;

    7. Calls on the Commission to support EIIs in adopting clean and net-zero technologies, including hydrogen, and energy-efficient production methods by strengthening funding mechanisms and ensuring that ETS revenue is used effectively by Member States; calls for EU-level support to be complemented by State aid that allows for targeted support to EIIs, while preserving a level playing field within the single market;

    8. Calls for InvestEU to be topped up before the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) and for leftover Resilience and Recovery Facility loans to support investment in EII decarbonisation; notes that the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform already allows for flexibility within current programmes but that this is insufficient; insists that the upcoming MFF increase funding to support EIIs, building on the Innovation Fund and the Connecting Europe Facility – Energy or through the competitiveness fund; stresses that the European Hydrogen Bank and the carbon contracts for difference programme need to be scaled up; calls on the Commission to build on the Net-Zero Industry Act[1] in the upcoming decarbonisation accelerator act, to streamline the processes for granting permits and strategic project status;

    9. Stresses the need to simplify bureaucratic procedures to enhance the attractiveness of private investment and support EIIs’ transition; believes that both InvestEU and the EIB are pivotal in catalysing private financing, especially through de-risking measures;

    10. Emphasises the need to secure access to critical raw materials; stresses that the upcoming circular economy act should improve resource efficiency, including through better waste management of products containing critical raw materials, as well as fostering the demand and availability of secondary raw materials; stresses the need to define those secondary raw materials that are strategic and that should be subject to export monitoring, such as steel and metal scrap, and to tackle any imbalance in their supply and demand, including by exploring export restrictions; insists on the effective enforcement of the Waste Shipment Regulation[2];

    11. Calls on the Commission to make full and efficient use of trade defence instruments; calls on the Commission to find a permanent solution to address unfair competition and structural overcapacity, before the expiry of current steel safeguard measures in 2026; calls on the Commission to engage with the US in relation to the announced tariffs on EU imports and avoid any harmful escalation;

    12. Stresses that an effective implementation of the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) is essential to ensure a level playing field for EU industries and prevent carbon leakage, taking into account the impact of the parallel phasing out of the ETS free allowances and the risk of increased production costs; calls on the Commission to address the risks of resource shuffling and circumvention of the CBAM; asks, furthermore, for the implementation of an effective solution for EU exporters and an analysis of the possible extension to further sectors and downstream products, preceded by an impact assessment;

    13. Calls for the creation of lead markets for clean and circular European products, via non-price criteria in EU public procurement, such as sustainability and resilience and a European preference for strategic sectors, as well as by creating voluntary labelling schemes and minimum EU content requirements in a cost-effective way;

    14. Highlights the importance of a just transition to assist areas heavily reliant on EIIs, by keeping and creating quality jobs through upskilling and reskilling programmes for workers and through the effective use of regional support mechanisms, such as the Just Transition Fund and the Cohesion Fund; stresses that public support will be pivotal for the transition of EIIs and that this support should be tied to their commitment to safeguarding employment and working conditions and preventing off-shoring; welcomes the Union of Skills initiative to ensure a good match between skills and labour market demands;

    15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Global Economy – KOF Economic Forecast, spring 2025: Swiss economy caught in the tension between trade conflict and fiscal stimulus

    Source: KOF Economic Institute

    Uncertainty is currently unusually high owing to the geopolitical strategy of the new US administration. Assuming that the international trade conflict does not escalate any further, KOF is forecasting that real sport-adjusted gross domestic product (GDP) will increase by 1.4 per cent in 2025. Although this international trade conflict is a burden, the fiscal stimulus expected in individual European Union (EU) countries is boosting economic activity. This is improving the outlook for the Swiss economy. KOF is predicting GDP growth of 1.9 per cent for 2026. The labour market will turn the corner and inflation will remain low. However, this forecast is subject to considerable downside risks.

    The economic outlook is largely being determined by the latest economic policy events. In particular, the geopolitical strategy adopted by the new US administration has far-reaching consequences for global economic developments. While the current trade conflict is acting as a drag on the international economy, EU countries’ additional fiscal packages should provide increasing impetus from the end of this year and improve the economic outlook in Switzerland’s key European markets.

    Growing trade policy uncertainty is weighing on the investment plans of Swiss firms and households. Adjusted for one-off effects, the investment situation remains subdued for the time being. If the fiscal programmes of European trading partners take effect, this should reduce economic policy uncertainty in Europe, provide positive stimulus and boost the economy. This will primarily benefit manufacturing – especially suppliers to the defence sector – and industry-related services. Through the transmission mechanism of foreign trade this should stimulate investment in equipment and, indirectly, private consumption. Major infrastructure projects and fiscal stimulus from Europe should also directly or indirectly support construction investment during the forecast period.

    Swiss labour market stabilising, real wages rising

    Private consumption will be underpinned by the stabilising labour market. Employment and the number of people in work are likely to increase in line with GDP growth over the next few years, while the unemployment rate as defined by the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) will rise only slowly and will soon peak at 3 per cent. KOF expects real wages – according to the Swiss wage index (SLI) – to rise by 0.9 per cent this year and 0.6 per cent next year.

    Low inflationary pressures: KOF does not expect any further interest-rate cuts by the SNB during the forecast period

    Inflation – as measured by the national consumer price index (CPI) – fell to 0.3 per cent in February compared with the same month last year and has thus been below 1 per cent for six months now. KOF is forecasting inflation rates of 0.5 per cent for this year and 0.6 per cent for next year. Following the recent reduction in the Swiss National Bank’s (SNB) key interest rates by 25 basis points to 0.25 per cent, KOF does not expect to see any further interest-rate cuts during the forecast period.

    High uncertainty during the trade conflict; downside risks predominant

    As it is still unclear which of the trade policy measures threatened by the Trump administration to date will ultimately be implemented and what further measures might follow, the latest forecast is subject to greater uncertainty than usual, with downside risks predominating. In order to factor in this uncertainty, KOF has used its new trade model to carry out additional calculations, which analyse in detail the possible trade policy measures and their potential impact on both international trade and the Swiss economy. This analysis shows that if the trade conflict spread, this could entail considerable downside risks for the Swiss economy.

    The main downside risk is that the US government imposes further tariffs on other countries and products, including any retaliatory tariffs implemented in response. In addition, the fiscal stimulus introduced in Europe may be ineffective or only materialise with a delay. And, finally, geopolitical conflicts such as the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East could escalate, impacting commodity prices and global trade.

    There is an upside risk that the US government’s threatened tariffs will only be used as a bargaining chip and will either not be introduced or will be withdrawn after just a short period of time. And, last but not least, a swift end to the war in Ukraine and a solution to the Middle East conflict could have a positive impact on energy prices and global trade.

    MIL OSI – Submitted News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EU citizens most concerned with security and unity, survey shows

    Source: European Union 2

    The European Parliament’s Winter 2025 Eurobarometer survey, released today, highlights historic levels of approval for EU membership linked to peace and security.

    European Parliament President Roberta Metsola said: “Two thirds of Europeans want the EU to play a greater role in their protection. This is a clear call for action which we will answer. Europe needs to be stronger so that our citizens feel safer. The European Parliament will ensure that every proposal put forward is bold and ambitious enough to match the serious level of threat Europe faces. Europe must step up today, or it risks being stepped over tomorrow.”

    66% of EU citizens want the EU to take a more important role in protecting them against global crises and security risks. This view is particularly strong amongst younger respondents to the survey. At the national level, results for a stronger role of the EU range from 87% in Sweden to 47% in Romania and 44% in Poland.

    Almost three quarters of EU citizens (74%) believe their country has benefited from being a member of the EU. This is the highest result ever recorded in a Eurobarometer survey for this question since it was first asked in 1983. Fitting the current context, respondents mention the EU’s contribution to maintaining peace and strengthening security (35%) as the main reason why membership is considered beneficial.

    In addition, there is wide agreement among EU citizens that EU Member States should be more united to face current global challenges (89%) and that the European Union needs more means to deal with the challenges ahead (76%).

    Citizens expect the EU to strengthen security and defence and to enhance competitiveness

    In a rapidlychanging geopolitical environment, defence and security (36%) as well as competitiveness, economy and industry (32%) are identified as the areas on which the EU should focus most to reinforce its position in the world. These are also the topics that featured high on last week’s European Council with Parliament’s President calling for faster action and bolder ambition. While the results for defence and security have remained stable compared to February/March 2024, those for competitiveness, economy and industry have increased by five points. These two areas are followed by energy independence (27%), food security and agriculture (25%) and education and research (23%).

    Economic and security issues are also at the forefront when it comes to the topics citizens want the European Parliament to address as a priority. Four in ten Europeans mention inflation, rising prices and the cost of living (43%), followed by the EU’s defence and security (31%), the fight against poverty and social exclusion (31%) and support to the economy and the creation of new jobs (29%). Inflation, rising prices and the cost of living is a main priority across all age groups and with peak results recorded in Portugal (57%), France (56%), Slovakia (56%), Croatia (54%) and Estonia (54%).

    As shown by the EP’s previous survey, inflation and the cost of living had already played a major role as a driving force in the last European elections and the economic situation continues to be a main concern for many Europeans. A third (33%) expect their standard of living to decrease in the next five years, seven points more than in June-July 2024. This is the case for 53% of French respondents (+8 pp) and 47% of Germans (+15 pp).

    Peace and democracy remain EU core values

    Looking at the values Europeans would like the European Parliament to defend, peace (45%), democracy (32%) and the protection of human rights in the EU and worldwide (22%) come first. The results for this question have remained stable, underlining citizens steadfast support for the EU’s founding values and principles.

    Two-thirds of citizens support a stronger role for the EP

    As historic trend lines show, in moments of crisis citizens look to the EU for decisive actions and solutions. When the EU is perceived as coming together and delivering results, support indicators are high – which is currently the case.  50% of respondents have a positive image of the EU. In the last decade, this positive perception was only higher once (at 52%), in spring 2022 in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The positive image of the EP is stable at a high level (41%). A few months into the legislative term, over six in ten (62%) citizens would like to see the European Parliament play a more important role, a six- percentage point increase compared to February-March 2024, a few months before the June 2024 European elections.

    Full results can be found here.

    Background   

    The European Parliament’s Winter 2025 Eurobarometer survey was carried out between 09 January and 04 February 2025 in all 27 EU Member States. The survey was conducted face-to-face, with video interviews used additionally in Czechia, Denmark, Finland, Malta, Netherlands, and Sweden. 26.354 interviews were conducted in total and EU results are weighted according to the size of the population in each country.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Major £1.6 billion equipment contract to support British Defence jobs and boost Army readiness

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    Major £1.6 billion equipment contract to support British Defence jobs and boost Army readiness

    British Army equipment, including tanks and armoured vehicles, will receive world-class maintenance and spare parts under a contract which supports 1,600 UK jobs. 

    • Significant contract update to provide kit maintenance and increased vehicle availability.   

    • Directly supports 1,600 defence jobs across the country, supporting a 6,000-strong business supply chain.   

    • Investment in British firm Babcock boosts defence as an engine for UK economic growth.    

    British Army equipment, including tanks and armoured vehicles, will receive world-class maintenance and spare parts under a contract which supports 1,600 UK jobs.    

    The five-year £1.6 billion contract extension with British defence firm Babcock will cover vital military assets including Challenger 2 tanks, 105mm artillery guns and Trojan armoured vehicles, ensuring they remain combat-ready to meet emerging threats.   

    The Service Provision and Transformation Contract will sustain 1,600 highly skilled jobs in locations across the UK, including over 400 in Telford and over 250 in Dorset. The investment follows the Prime Minister’s historic commitment to increase defence spending to 2.5% of GDP, recognising the critical importance of military readiness in an era of heightened global uncertainty.   

    Maintenance services will cover preventative maintenance, emergency repairs and spare parts management. It will also include digital transformation to improve fleet management efficiency, keeping more vehicles and equipment primed for soldiers to use – boosting national security and renewing Britain’s economy as we deliver on our Plan for Change.  

    The move to boost the readiness of British Army combat vehicles comes as the UK continues to lead planning efforts for a Coalition of Willing nations to help secure a just and lasting peace in Ukraine. Following the planning meeting attended by approximately 30 nations last week, further operational planning meetings will be led by UK Commander Joint Operations, General Nick Perry.   

    Defence Secretary John Healey MP said:  

    Tanks, armoured vehicles and kit are the backbone of the British Army. We are taking action to ensure the outstanding service men and women of our Armed Forces are properly equipped and ready to respond to ever-changing global threats.    

    Supported by largest sustained increase in defence spending since the Cold War, this substantial investment with Babcock demonstrates how defence is an engine for growth: supporting businesses of all sizes and sustaining more than 1,600 good, well-paid jobs across Britain.

    National security is the bedrock of a successful economy and our Government’s Plan for Change.

    Babcock’s Chief Executive Officer, David Lockwood said: 

    In a period of increased global instability, more is being expected of our armed forces. This contract extension ensures that Babcock continues to provide the British Army with the tools to do its job, when and wherever they are needed. Our know-how, application of technology and extensive experience in the land domain help ensure that the British Army is ready to fight and win wars.

    While the Land Integrated Operating Services programme places future contracts, this deal will also support approximately 6,000 UK businesses throughout the wider supply chain, as well as 200 apprentices. These apprenticeships will offer valuable training and development opportunities in fields such as HGV maintenance and automotive refinishing, providing career paths in the defence sector for the next generation of skilled workers.   

    MOD Director Land Environment, Major General Lizzie Faithfull-Davies CBE said:    

    It has taken a lot of hard work to collaboratively deliver this SPTC Reframe contract amendment. I am delighted to renew our relationship with Babcock. With this amended contract, DE&S, the Army, and Babcock will now provide even better support to the in-Service platforms of our Armed forces; ensuring that the vehicles the Army will fight from are repaired, maintained, and ready whenever the Army need them.

    The work comes ahead of the Defence Industrial Strategy, which will bolster UK industry and provide more opportunities for defence to be an engine for economic growth. It follows a recent commitment to launch a new hub to provide small and medium enterprises (SMEs) with better access to the defence supply chain, and a commitment to set direct SME spending targets for the Ministry of Defence by June this year.

    Updates to this page

    Published 26 March 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – Outcome of the meetings of EU leaders on 20 March 2025 – 26-03-2025

    Source: European Parliament 2

    With the geopolitical situation evolving rapidly in the first months of 2025, EU leaders had already convened three times in advance of their regular March meeting. Next to competitiveness – originally due to be the central focus point – the spring European Council meeting covered issues including Ukraine, the Middle East and European defence. On competitiveness, the EU-27 outlined precise directions to accelerate the EU’s economic agenda, focusing on three priorities: cutting red tape, ensuring affordable energy and turning savings into investments. Following Hungary’s renewed refusal to agree to conclusions on Ukraine, a separate statement, ‘firmly supported by 26 Heads of State or Government’, was published, emphasising the EU’s commitment to provide further comprehensive support to Ukraine and to contribute to security guarantees. As European Council President António Costa intended, the meeting concluded in one day. It started with the customary speech by Parliament’s President, Roberta Metsola, who told EU leaders that Europe had ‘thrived on soft power’ for decades, but with the global order now changing, ‘Europe must position itself as a force to be reckoned with’. This requires ‘getting serious about our security, our readiness and our competitiveness’. There was a working lunch with United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, and an exchange of views with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. In the afternoon, a Euro Summit in inclusive format took place in the presence of European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde and Eurogroup President Paschal Donohoe. Over dinner, EU leaders held a first discussion on the next long-term EU budget and own resources.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: World News in Brief: Human rights in Ukraine, multilateralism gets airborne, enforced disappearances in Colombia

    Source: United Nations MIL OSI b

    Human Rights

    The UN human rights chief on Thursday told a conference in the Ukrainian capital that in the face of Russia’s continuing full-scale invasion, they must unite and keep faith in democratic institutions.

    Addressing the conference in Kyiv on reclaiming human rights and preserving dignity, High Commissioner Volker Türk once again voiced his “full solidarity” with the Ukrainian people and concern over the latest wave of attacks on energy facilities as temperatures plummet.

    “Children, older people and those with disabilities will suffer most,” he added.

    Relentless assault

    “From relentless drone attacks to the occupation of territory, from the suppression of culture to the abuse of prisoners of war – the human rights of Ukrainians are under siege. And this must end.”

    He said it was more important than ever for unity, “moment to recommit to human rights and human dignity, and to build and maintain trust in each other and in democratic institutions.”

    He added that the UN human rights office he leads, OHCHR, is doing its part to ensure accountability and justice by creating a public record of rights violations occurring during Ukraine’s war of national survival, which has already informed cases before the European Court of Human Rights and the International Court of Justice.

    “I commend Ukrainians for coming together around human rights and around human dignity and assure you of our full commitment and support,” he concluded.

    ICAO, ‘a powerful example of multilateralism in action,’ says UN chief

    UN Secretary-General António Guterres marked the 80th anniversary of the signing of the convention that opened the way to mass civilian air travel, by praising the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) as a testament to global cooperation.

    “Across the decades, your organization, which the Convention established, has expanded dramatically, from 54 nations gathered in Chicago in 1944 to a membership of 193 today,” he noted.

    Mr. Guterres highlighted the significant challenges facing the aviation industry today, particularly its role in addressing the climate crisis.

    Tourism revival

    According to the latest World Tourism Barometer from the UN Tourism agency, global travel is on track for a full recovery to pre-pandemic levels by the end of 2024, with 1.1 billion international tourists recorded in the first nine months of the year. However, this resurgence brings about sustainability challenges.

    “Accounting for around 2 per cent of global carbon dioxide emissions, aviation is one of the most challenging sectors to decarbonise. But with innovation and investment, it can be done,” Mr. Guterres noted.

    ICAO’s new Long-Term Strategic Plan outlines its commitment to achieving net zero carbon dioxide emissions by 2050.

    The Secretary-General commended ICAO’s leadership for aligning its efforts with the 2030 Agenda, ensuring that all countries benefit from sustainable aviation advancements.

    Enforced disappearances remain daily reality in Colombia

    Enforced disappearances remain a daily occurrence in Colombia, not just a historical legacy of the past, according to findings released on Thursday by the UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances (CED) following their two-week mission to the country.

    The preliminary findings painted a grim picture of disappearances including children, journalists, social leaders and migrants.

    With estimates ranging from 98,000 to 200,000 missing persons, the exact scope of the crisis remains unclear due to fragmented record-keeping and institutional inefficiencies. 

    “Although enforced disappearances started in Colombia around the 1940s, they are not just a crime of the past. They continue to occur daily across the country in diverse circumstances,” the delegation reported after visiting six cities and meeting with 80 authorities, including the Minister of Justice and Attorney General.

    The investigation exposed a bureaucratic system where victims’ families face challenges in seeking justice.

    ‘No end in sight’ to anguish

    One victim told investigators, “We don’t know where to turn. We’re tossed between institutions, no end in sight”.

    The situation is further complicated by overlapping mandates among various agencies, with officials reporting that coordination efforts often result in endless meetings rather than concrete action. A single search process may require coordination with up to 60 different national and territorial authorities.

    The Committee emphasised that immediate action is needed to streamline institutional responses and improve coordination. They noted that marginalised individuals, face additional obstacles in reporting disappearances, particularly in areas controlled by armed groups.

    “Families of the disappeared deserve clarity, justice and accountability. Every disappeared person represents a family waiting for answers, a community torn apart and a society grappling with unresolved pain,” the delegation said.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI China: Russia, US agree to ensure implementing Black Sea initiative

    Source: China State Council Information Office 3

    Russia and the United States have agreed to ensure the implementation of the Black Sea Initiative, provided that sanctions were eased on Russia’s agricultural and food trade, the Kremlin said Tuesday.

    The Kremlin said the agreement includes ensuring the safety of navigation in the Black Sea, the non-use of force, and preventing commercial ships from being used for military purposes, with inspections in place to enforce this.

    It also added that the United States will help in restoring Russia’s access to global markets for agricultural and fertilizer exports, lowering shipping insurance costs, and improving access to ports and international payment systems.

    The agreement will enter into force after a series of sanctions and restrictions related to its agricultural and food trade were lifted, the Kremlin noted.

    The move would include lifting Western sanctions on the Russian Agricultural Bank, which services agricultural businesses, and reconnecting the bank to the SWIFT international messaging system.

    Russia has also listed in the conditions the removal of restrictions on its food and fertilizer producers and exporters, on the servicing of related Russian-flagged vessels in ports, and on the related agricultural machinery supplies to Russia.

    The Kremlin statement came after Russian and U.S. representatives wrapped up their Monday’s talks in Riyadh, capital of Saudi Arabia, where both sides sought arrangements for the safety of navigation in the Black Sea.

    Russia and Ukraine signed separately with Türkiye and the United Nations the Black Sea Grain Initiative in Istanbul in July 2022, which secured the export of Ukrainian grain and other agricultural products from Black Sea ports.

    As a parallel agreement, Russia and the UN signed a memorandum of understanding on the facilitation of Russian food and fertilizer exports.

    On July 17, 2023, Russia suspended its participation in the Black Sea deal, citing unfulfilled commitments to the Russian part. 

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: Russia, US agree on energy facility categories subject to ceasefire

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Russia and the United States have agreed on a category list of energy facilities spared from being targeted during a 30-day energy ceasefire in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, according to a Kremlin statement Tuesday.

    The list includes oil refineries, oil and gas pipelines and storage facilities, electricity generation and transmission infrastructure, nuclear power plants, and hydroelectric dam facilities.

    The Kremlin added that the 30-day ceasefire on energy facilities is in effect starting from March 18 and may be extended by mutual agreement or cease to be in effect if violated by one of the parties.

    In an earlier statement, the Kremlin noted that Russia and the United States agreed to form measures to implement the 30-day ceasefire agreement.

    Russia and Ukraine held separate talks with the United States in Riyadh, capital of Saudi Arabia, on March 23-25.

    Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov said earlier in the day after the talks with the U.S. delegation that “all parties” agreed to develop measures implementing the energy facility ceasefire. 

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: Europe urged to unite amid US tariffs, rising debt, and big tech challenges

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    European unity is vital to tackling economic challenges ranging from new U.S. tariffs and rising public debt to the expanding influence of big tech firms, Italian political figures and analysts have said at a conference in Rome.

    The conference, titled “Governing Europe and Italy in the Age of Donald Trump,” was hosted by LUISS University on Monday evening and featured prominent speakers, including former Italian Prime Ministers Mario Monti and Giuliano Amato, Finance Minister Giancarlo Giorgetti, European Commission Vice-President Raffaele Fitto, and LUISS professors.

    “What we are seeing today is not the only time Europe has faced big challenges,” said Monti, who served as Italy’s prime minister between 2011 and 2013 during the global sovereign debt crisis. “But we must act together to confront the current challenges.”

    Earlier this month, U.S. President Donald Trump announced a 25-percent tariff on aluminum, steel, and related imports, with another round set to take effect on April 2, though details remain unclear. In response, the European Union initially planned retaliatory tariffs for April 1 but postponed them by at least two weeks following a European Council meeting to allow more time for negotiations.

    On the sidelines of the conference, economics professor Pietro Reichlin told Xinhua that the Trump administration’s unpredictable tariff policies complicate the EU’s response strategies.

    Reichlin stressed the importance of understanding U.S. trade goals to reach an agreement, pointing to the EU’s surplus in goods and the U.S. strengths in services and energy as potential negotiation points.

    Italy’s Finance Minister Giorgetti warned that mounting debt and the growing influence of big tech firms – particularly U.S. giants such as Google and leading players in artificial intelligence, are increasingly limiting the policymakers’ options.

    According to Eurostat, the EU’s average debt stood at 81.6 percent of GDP at the end of the third quarter of 2024 while the eurozone recorded an average ratio of 88.1 percent. Italy’s debt-to-GDP ratio reached 136.3 percent, second only to Greece.

    Speakers stressed the need for greater cohesion within Europe to address external trade pressures, the Ukraine conflict, and internal disputes within the bloc. Amato emphasized that cooperation, not conflict, drives prosperity.

    Reichlin also stressed the importance of adapting to evolving trade dynamics with China. “Adjusting trade relations is crucial, as both sides stand to benefit from deeper engagement,” he said. 

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: Russia, Ukraine hold parallel US-mediated talks in Saudi Arabia

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Three days of technical-level negotiations on the details of a potential ceasefire in Ukraine concluded Tuesday without an official joint statement, as participating parties offered somewhat conflicting assessments of the talks.

    The intense parallel interactions between the United States and delegations from Ukraine and Russia on the table, including a 12-hour one between the United States and Russia on Monday, and two shorter rounds between the United States and Ukraine on Sunday and Tuesday, came as fighting on the battlefield remains intense.

    Although Washington signaled on Tuesday its willingness to continue facilitating negotiations between the warring parties, analysts remain skeptical about the prospects of such a diplomatic push, citing deep-seated distrust, conflicting demands among stakeholders, and the inherent complexities of the process.

    Conflicting assessments

    For the latest talks, which build on previous negotiations held in Saudi Arabia and subsequent phone exchanges between the presidents of the three countries, the U.S. delegation included Andrew Peek, a senior director at the White House National Security Council, and Michael Anton, a senior official from the State Department. The Russian delegation was led by Grigory Karasin, chair of the Federation Council’s Foreign Affairs Committee, and Sergei Beseda, an advisor to the director of the Federal Security Service. Defense Minister Rustem Umerov headed the Ukrainian delegation.

    On Tuesday, hours after the U.S. and Ukrainian delegations concluded their second round of talks, the White House issued separate statements elaborating on its understanding of the parallel meetings.

    It stated that the United States had agreed separately with Russia and Ukraine to “ensure safe navigation, eliminate the use of force, and prevent the use of commercial vessels for military purposes in the Black Sea,” and to develop measures for implementing the presidents’ agreement to “ban strikes against energy facilities of Russia and Ukraine.”

    The United States, with Russia and Ukraine respectively, also “welcomes the good offices of third countries with a view toward supporting the implementation of the energy and maritime agreements” and “will continue working toward achieving a durable and lasting peace,” the statement added.

    Among the outcomes of the U.S.-Russia talks, the United States pledged to help restore Russia’s access to the global market for agricultural and fertilizer exports, reduce maritime insurance costs, and improve access to ports and payment systems for such transactions.

    In the U.S.-Ukraine talks, both sides reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to facilitating the exchange of prisoners of war, securing the release of civilian detainees, and ensuring the return of forcibly transferred Ukrainian children.

    Meanwhile, the Kremlin stated on Tuesday that Russia and the United States had agreed to ensure the implementation of the Black Sea Initiative, contingent on the easing of sanctions on Russia’s agricultural and food trade.

    Russia also stipulated the removal of restrictions on its food and fertilizer producers and exporters, the servicing of related Russian-flagged vessels in ports, and the supply of agricultural machinery to Russia, according to the Kremlin.

    It further announced that a “temporary moratorium” on strikes against energy facilities — including nuclear power plants, oil refineries, gas pipelines, and hydroelectric dams — would be in effect for 30 days starting March 18 and “may be extended by mutual agreement.”

    Previously, Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed on March 18 to halt attacks on energy facilities in a phone call with U.S. President Donald Trump.

    As for Kiev, while Umerov stated on Tuesday that “all parties” had agreed on the need to prohibit attacks on energy infrastructure in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, he also warned that any movement of Russian military vessels beyond the eastern part of the Black Sea would “violate the agreement’s spirit” and be considered a “threat to Ukraine’s national security.” In response, Ukraine would exercise its right to self-defense, he cautioned.

    Mixed sentiments

    Commenting on the three-day peace negotiations, Trump said the U.S. side was “in deep discussions with Russia and Ukraine,” which were “going well.”

    He added that he would look into Russia’s requests for sanctions relief.

    However, the mood is quite different for both Russia and Ukraine. Although the meetings in Saudi Arabia hinted at the possibility of a broader ceasefire, the two countries remain wary of the latest deal, voicing contrasting concerns over its implementation.

    In an interview with local media, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said Moscow needs “clear guarantees” from the White House regarding the agreement on the safety of shipping in the Black Sea.

    “Given the sad experience of agreements with just Kiev, the guarantees can only be the result of an order from Washington to (Ukrainian President Volodymyr) Zelensky and his team,” Lavrov said.

    Zelensky accused the Kremlin of “lying” and “manipulating” by saying the Black Sea ceasefire depends on “sanctions,” warning that the Russians “must understand that if they launch strikes, there will be a strong response.”

    At a press conference earlier Tuesday, Zelensky criticized Washington’s decision to help restore Russia’s access to the world market for agricultural goods, dismissing it as “a weakening of the position and a weakening of sanctions.”

    The Ukrainian president said he hopes to gain clarity from an upcoming summit in Paris regarding which countries would deploy forces to enforce the peace agreements.

    “Our task is to come out with the result of understanding who we have and who is ready” to contribute forces to implement measures to halt the conflict, Zelensky said.

    In the meantime, Europe, once again finding itself sidelined in addressing the conflict, has been actively organizing support for Ukraine in recent weeks.

    French President Emmanuel Macron announced that leaders of the so-called “coalition of the willing” will meet again this week, focusing on short-term military support for Ukrainian forces and exploring long-term “security guarantees” to help sustain Ukraine’s defense. Macron’s remarks have been dismissed by the United States as “a posture and a pose.”

    The meeting in Paris with Zelensky will be the latest in a series of high-stakes gatherings among European leaders, following London’s hosting of discussions on Thursday among European military chiefs from the coalition backing Ukraine.

    Britain and France are taking a leading role in organizing Western support for Ukraine after Trump surprised Europe by initiating talks with Putin. The two European powers have pledged to help provide the military force needed to keep Russia “at bay” if a ceasefire is reached.

    Uncertain future

    Notably, the battlefield showed no signs of quieting despite the peace talks in Saudi Arabia, with both Russia and Ukraine reporting fresh waves of drone strikes and accusing each other of escalation.

    On Tuesday, the Russian Defense Ministry said Ukraine had “continued to deliberately strike Russian peaceful energy infrastructure facilities using UAVs.”

    “By continuing daily attacks on Russian energy infrastructure, Zelensky confirms his inability to negotiate and his lack of control by external guarantors responsible for ensuring compliance with any possible agreements,” the ministry said.

    In Ukraine, the number of people injured on Monday in a Russian missile strike on the northeastern city of Sumy rose to 101, including 23 children, according to the Sumy regional administration.

    Preliminary data indicated that a Russian missile struck a residential area of the city, damaging several apartment buildings and an educational institution, the Sumy Regional Prosecutor’s Office said in a statement.

    Experts have pointed out that a real, permanent peace settlement could be far off, citing deep-rooted divisions and a growing trust deficit among the stakeholders.

    Khalid Almatrafi, Bureau Chief of Asharq TV in Saudi Arabia, told Xinhua that “the escalating mutual attacks … reflect the deepening gap between the two sides and complicate any negotiating process.”

    The repeated accusations deepen mistrust and make it difficult to establish any “confidence-building measures,” which are essential for transitioning from a ceasefire to a sustainable political settlement, said Almatrafi.

    Echoing Almatrafi’s viewpoint, Abdulaziz Alshaabani, a Saudi researcher at Al Riyadh Center for Political and Strategic Studies, said that “a lack of trust” poses a major threat to reaching an agreement, “given the history of violations of agreements between the two sides.”

    “In 2022, several rounds of negotiations took place … in the end, nothing came of it,” said Andrey Kortunov, a scholar with the Valdai Discussion Club in Russia. “Over the past three years, there has been a major escalation, and the situation has changed,” making it “difficult for both sides to find compromises,” Kortunov said.

    “Given the difficulty in enforcing a halt to strikes on energy infrastructure agreed upon last week, it remains to be seen how effective the latest deal will be,” The Independent, a British online newspaper, reported.

    The newspaper also questioned Washington’s motives in assuming the mediator’s role, particularly concerning Ukraine’s mineral and energy resources.

    “The Trump administration has claimed that Washington’s stake in Ukraine’s minerals and energy resources could deter Russia from launching future attacks,” but such a diplomatic push would, in fact, grant Washington “a vast stake in Ukraine’s rare earth mineral deposits,” it said.

    “Ukraine’s gas infrastructure could also be of interest to the White House, with Kiev owning the world’s third-largest underground gas storage capacity,” it noted. 

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Australia: Shareholder activism: reflections on the current, and future, landscape

    Source: Allens Insights (legal sector)

    Campaigns keep evolving, with more high stakes ahead 11 min read

    Last year was another big one for shareholder activists globally, with investor sentiment in 2024 taking its cues from disruption across the broader economic and geopolitical landscape. Closer to home, activity was more stable in Australia—as it typically is, owing to our smaller footprint, more stringent company laws and stable markets—but campaigns continue to evolve, with activists refining their strategies to both capitalise on financial opportunities and seek redress for governance concerns.

    We expect high stakes for the rest of the year as the Trump administration’s policies upend commercial and regulatory settings and potentially tip the scales in favour of activists. While shareholder activism is now a standard part of the investment landscape in the US, the practice is reverberating around Australia and the rest of the world.

    In this Insight, we bring together the key takeaways from 2024 and provide our thoughts on what we see ahead.

    A snapshot of the numbers

    Activist activity has well and truly bounced back from the subdued levels brought about by the pandemic.

    Over 1000 companies were targeted by activist campaigns worldwide for the second consecutive year.1 The US continues to be the epicentre of activity, with nearly 600 US-listed companies facing activist demands, marking a 7% increase from 2023 and 16% from 2022. There was a strong showing from non-traditional and first-time activists—a record-breaking 160 different investors launched campaigns in the US in 2024, which included 45 first-time activists, also a record.

    Activity in Asia was similarly strong (particularly in Japan and South Korea), though Europe trended down, owing to ongoing disruption brought about by the conflict in Ukraine and generally subdued economic activity. There, the United Kingdom hosts the lion’s share of activity, with 42% of campaigns targeting British companies.

    Australia saw a modest rise in activity year on year, with 56 companies targeted, up nominally from the 54 campaigns recorded in 2023. While the volume of campaigns remained steady, the effectiveness of Australian activists improved—activists were assessed as having achieved their objectives in 25% of resolved campaigns, up from 16% in 2023.

    Despite this, Australian activists struggled to secure board representation in target companies, with only seven board seats gained in 2024, down significantly from 26 in 2023. This divergence suggests that although activism remains a powerful force for corporate engagement, the dominant institutional investors and influential proxy advisors remain selective and largely hesitant in delivering changes at the board level.

    All up, campaign volumes continue to be strong, though success is trickier to measure. Whether the public demands of activists are met is one tangible way of assessing effectiveness, but the overall impact of a campaign can often manifest in less direct ways. For example, the opportunity cost of management in responding to a campaign, the inherent value derived from the ensuing publicity and any derivative or other trading in the target securities—and, of course, the concessions that play out behind closed doors—often contribute to the effectiveness of shareholder activism.

    Stories from the front line

    These are some of the headline-grabbing campaigns that played out in the last year or so that have set the tone for activist causes.

    One of the most closely watched activist campaigns was Glenview Capital’s attempt to gain board representation at CVS Health. Glenview increased its stake in CVS in the third quarter of 2024 by 31%, making its US$635 million holding (equivalent to 1% of the stock) the largest of all three activist hedge funds with an interest in the company. The intervention came following a 27% drop in share price since the beginning of 2024, a market reaction reportedly attributed to higher medical costs in CVS’s insurance segment caused by an influx of medical procedures delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Glenview secured four board seats in November 2024, including Glenview CEO Larry Robbins. It was reported that the board appointments were made amid the prospect of Glenview initiating a public and more aggressive proxy fight. This case highlights the increasing sophistication of activist investors targeting high-profile global companies, and underscores the importance of clear, proactive shareholder engagement strategies—a strategy that Australian boards should observe as activism intensifies.

    The activist campaign led by Elliott Investment Management resulted in a change of CEO at Starbucks and a correspondent increase in share value by 24%, equating to US$26 billion in value and marking the company’s most successful day since its initial public offering in 1992.

    In July 2024, it was reported that Elliott had become one of the largest investors in Starbucks, and sought to leverage its position by presenting a proposal to the board for an overhaul of domestic and international strategy. The move followed the stock price having declined by 24% since the former CEO, Laxman Narasimhan, was appointed in March 2023. While Elliott approached the board in private and did not publicly advocate for a replacement CEO, there were persistent leaks to the media, which commentators assessed as likely prompting the decision. On 13 August 2024, the board announced the appointment of Brian Niccol, former CEO of restaurant chain Chipotle, who is credited with Chipotle’s modernisation and an increase in its stock price by 770% since 2018.

    The campaign illustrates that one response strategy in dealing with activists, particularly high-profile investors, can be to move pre-emptively to instigate change before the issues are forced.

    In June 2024, Elliott also disclosed an 11% economic stake in Southwest Airlines worth US$1.9 billion, and converted enough of its derivate holdings in September to amass a 10% common stock holding that enabled Elliott to call a special meeting. Conversely to its approach for Starbucks, it engaged in a more public campaign, by proposing that ‘enhancing the board, upgrading leadership and a comprehensive business review’ were necessary to increase Southwest’s stock price. In October 2024, it was announced that Southwest would appoint five independent directors nominated by Elliott in addition to another board member, and that the former chief executive and then chairman would accelerate his retirement. Following the announcement of the personnel changes, Elliott withdrew its demand for a special shareholder meeting intended to replace 10 members of Southwest’s 15-person board. Elliott’s influence has continued to grow since then, with Southwest disclosing on 19 February 2025 that the company’s agreement with Elliott has been amended to increase the maximum aggregate economic exposure that Elliott may acquire, from 14.9% to 19.9%, but limit it from acquiring more than 12.49% of outstanding common stock until 1 April 2026. When Elliott disclosed its position in June 2024, the Southwest stock price was US$29.70, and as at 14 March 2025, it was US$31.73.

    Consistent with the sentiments of the Trump administration’s focus on rolling back diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) programs, a group of Apple shareholders submitted on 25 February 2025 a proposal titled ‘Request to Cease DEI Efforts’. This was rejected at Apple’s shareholder meeting in February 2025, with 97.67% of the vote being against the proposal. The campaign against Apple is one of several anti-DEI proposals that have been levied against prominent companies, including Costco, where the proposal was defeated by 98% of votes, and farm equipment maker John Deere, where the proposal was defeated by 98.7%. These proposals have attracted significant attention, by harnessing viral social media campaigns advocating for customer boycotts, inundating company social media accounts with negative comments, and lobbing the threat of lawsuits alleging that DEI initiatives constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. Despite the spotlight (or perhaps because of it?), shareholders of the world’s most valuable listed company voted overwhelmingly not to abandon its DEI initiatives.

    Activist themes

    We see two broad themes that motivate activists at the moment. For the reasons set out in the next section, we think the global economic and geopolitical settings provide an opportunity to shape activist behaviours.

    First, there is the more traditional activist strategy where professional investors identify companies that they perceive could optimise their performance or enhance their governance structures, and then seek to exert influence to encourage the company to focus on increasing shareholder returns. They do this by pushing for one or a combination of:

    Second, there is the rising influence of public sentiment and political undercurrents playing out in the theatre of public markets, and the volatility that comes with it. Activist campaigns are increasingly becoming a proxy for broader societal dissatisfaction.

    In Australia, this dual-track activism—balancing financial imperatives with political and social influences—reinforces the heightened investor expectations for action and accountability for these issues at the board level.

    For instance, shareholder dissent on pay has markedly increased in Australia recently, seeing over 40 strikes among ASX 300 companies in 2023 and 2024, compared with 22–26 strikes recorded between 2018 and 2022.2 Among those receiving a strike was the Australian Securities Exchange itself, with 26.15% of votes against the adoption of the remuneration report. Commentators assessed that the vote was an expression of shareholder dissatisfaction with the $250 million write-down and anticipated cost of a further $300 million to replace the CHESS technology system. Although 13 companies in the ASX 300 received a second strike in 2024, not a single board spill proposal came close to succeeding, with none receiving more than 20% of votes in favour.3 This demonstrates that while strikes are increasing, this is not being accompanied by momentum to trigger broader change to leadership structures—it would appear that shareholders are looking to use their vote to send a shot across the bow as an appropriate warning, rather than achieve a fundamental governance reset.

    Shareholders and special interest groups have also used the proxy forum to express dissatisfaction regarding climate action, reflecting broader societal concerns around environmental sustainability and climate change. Last year, Market Forces led an activist campaign against Woodside Energy, advocating for an overhaul to its climate transition action plan and encouraging other shareholders to push for further board renewal at the 2025 AGM. At the AGM in April 2024, 58.4% of proxies cast were against the transition strategy, following three hours of questions. Earlier this month, another activist shareholder group, the Australasian Centre for Corporate Responsibility, advised investors to vote against the re-election of all three directors standing at the 2025 AGM and continues to integrate climate concerns into its analysis of shareholder returns.

    There is a similar experience in the UK, where Shell shareholders are still asked to vote on resolutions brought by activists to align the company’s medium-term emissions reduction targets with the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement and to factor ‘Scope 3’ emissions from fuels burnt by consumers into such calculations. Although the resolution received just 18.6% support from shareholders in 2024 (down 1.4% from 2023), the sustained pressure and media exposure may have contributed to the environmental, social and governance (ESG) proposals instead advanced by Shell’s board.

    For a more detailed analysis of the specific tactics that activists deploy pursuing these issues and how companies can prepare, see our earlier Insight.

    Our expectations for the road ahead

    Economic and geopolitical disruption to fuel activity

    The global economy is currently experiencing disruption. The focal point is, of course, the US, where the combination of (promised) tax cuts and deregulation will free up capital for investors to pursue short-term opportunities. As the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Chair, John Lonsdale, remarked in his recent address at the Australian Financial Review Banking Summit, ‘what happens in the world’s biggest economy has implications for the world, and therefore for Australia’. We thus expect the positive conditions for activists will spill across borders, and perhaps the momentum will too—the Australian Securities and Investments Commission recently outlined its first steps towards easing compliance obligations for directors.

    The hoped-for spike in M&A activity creates the opportunity for shareholder activism, so we anticipate elevated volumes of activity in the near term. At the same time, the imposition of tariffs and other protectionist policies—and the market volatility and trade war they may set off—will create winners and losers, with companies that struggle in the turbulence becoming targets for activists.

    A reckoning on ESG and DEI initiatives

    There has been mounting pushback on ESG and, more recently, DEI policies of corporations, with activists querying their necessity and appropriateness. Critics, who may not be shareholders, will be even more emboldened by the priorities and tone of the Trump administration.

    We expect that activists will continue to seek out opportunities to make high-profile examples of some companies. However, while proponents of these initiatives have attracted significant attention, we haven’t yet seen this noise translate into strong shareholder support for campaigns, as the recent experience with Apple demonstrates.

    The anti-anti-ESG and DEI cause

    While some activists are seeking to challenge ESG and DEI initiatives as a corporate priority, we anticipate others that may already be frustrated with perceived slow progress on sustainability, diversity and broader governance issues will look to double down and push for companies to stay the course.

    This sentiment will be particularly emboldened if governments consider rolling back regulations or shifting priorities. If it is perceived that lawmakers and regulators aren’t creating the framework to manage these issues, then we expect activists to take matters into their own hands by using shareholder meetings as forums or otherwise turning to the courts.

    Scrutiny of board composition and director accountability

    We are seeing investors pay closer attention to the fitness for office of individual board members, by using their vote to signal dissatisfaction and impose accountability for governance missteps when directors stand for election or re-election. This can be in relation to a company that has experienced an issue, or could follow individual directors to unrelated companies.

    Expect to see closer scrutiny of board composition and more protest votes against director elections. Even if candidates still easily obtain the ordinary majority needed to carry the resolution, this is a far cry from the near 100% backing candidates would typically receive, and, particularly for larger companies, shows at least some institutional investors (whose holding may have previously been seen as more passive) are sending a message.

    Leveraging technology and AI in activist strategies

    Artificial intelligence (AI) has transformed a number of different fields, and has a role to play in the shareholder activism space as well, by making campaigns data driven and, as a consequence, more cost effective.

    AI can be deployed by activists to monitor and analyse tremendous amounts of data associated with corporate disclosures and financial performance, and to recognise the vulnerabilities and patterns in would-be candidates for a campaign. As these tools grow in sophistication, we expect to see activists be able to penetrate the market more deeply, and move with greater efficiency and precision in identifying opportunities.

    Activism has never been a simple strategy. We anticipate a continued evolution of the activist playbook in light of the above.

    MIL OSI News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Maritime truce would end a sorry war on the waves for Russia that set back its naval power ambitions

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Colin Flint, Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Utah State University

    A warship is seen docked in the port of the Black Sea city of Sochi. Mikhail Mordasov/AFP via Getty Images

    Away from the grueling land battles and devastating airstrikes, the Ukraine war has from its outset had a naval element. Soon after the February 2022 invasion, Russia imposed a de facto naval blockade on Ukraine, only to see its fleet stunningly defeated during a contest for control of the Black Sea.

    But that war on the waves looks like it could be ending.

    Under the terms of a deal announced on March 25, 2025, by the U.S. and agreed upon in Saudi Arabia, both sides of the conflict committed to ensuring “safe navigation, eliminate the use of force, and prevent the use of commercial vessels for military purposes in the Black Sea,” according to a White House statement.

    The naval aspect of the Ukraine war has gotten less attention than events on land and in the skies. But it is, I believe, a vital aspect with potentially far-reaching consequences.

    Not only have Russia’s Black Sea losses constrained Moscow’s ability to project power across the globe through naval means, it has also resulted in Russia’s growing cooperation with China, where Moscow is emerging as a junior party to Beijing on the high seas.

    Battle over the Black Sea

    The tradition of geopolitical theory has tended to paint an oversimplification of global politics. Theories harkening back to the late 19th century categorized countries as either land powers or maritime powers.

    Thinkers such as the British geopolitician Sir Halford Mackinder or the U.S. theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan characterized maritime powers as countries that possessed traits of democratic liberalism and free trade. In contrast, land powers were often portrayed as despotic and militaristic.

    While such generalizations have historically been used to demonize enemies, there is still a contrived tendency to divide the world into land and sea powers. An accompanying view that naval and army warfare is somewhat separate has continued.

    And this division gives us a false impression of Russia’s progress in the war with Ukraine. While Moscow has certainly seen some successes on land and in the air, that should not draw attention away from Russia’s stunning defeat in the Black Sea that has seen Russia have to retreat from the Ukrainian shoreline and keep its ships far away from the battlefront.

    As I describe in my recent book, “Near and Far Waters: The Geopolitics of Seapower,” maritime countries have two concerns: They must attempt to control the parts of the sea relatively close to their coastlines, or their “near waters”; meanwhile, those with the ability and desire to do so try to project power and influence into “far waters” across oceans, which are the near waters of other countries.

    The Black Sea is a tightly enclosed and relatively small sea comprising the near waters of the countries that surround it: Turkey to the south, Bulgaria and Romania to the west, Georgia to the east, and Ukraine and Russia to the north.

    Control of the Black Sea’s near waters has been contested throughout the centuries and has played a role in the current Russian-Ukraine war.

    Russia’s seizure of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 allowed it to control the naval port of Sevastopol. What were near waters of Ukraine became de facto near waters for Russia.

    Controlling these near waters allowed Russia to disrupt Ukraine’s trade, especially the export of grain to African far waters.

    But Russia’s actions were thwarted through the collaboration of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey to allow passage of cargo ships through their near waters, then through the Bosporus into the Mediterranean Sea.

    Ukraine’s use of these other countries’ near waters allowed it to export between 5.2 million and 5.8 million tons of grain per month in the first quarter of 2024. To be sure, this was a decline from Ukraine’s exports of about 6.5 million tons per month prior to the war, which then dropped to just 2 million tons in the summer of 2023 because of Russian attacks and threats. Prior to the announcement of the ceasefire, the Foreign Agricultural Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture had forecasted a decline in Ukrainian grain exports for 2025.

    But efforts to constrain Russia’s control of Ukraine’s near waters in the Black Sea, and Russia’s unwillingness to face the consequences of attacking ships in NATO countries’ near waters, meant Ukraine was still able to access far waters for economic gain and keep the Ukrainian economy afloat.

    For Putin, that sinking feeling

    Alongside being thwarted in its ability to disrupt Ukrainian exports, Russia has also come under direct naval attack from Ukraine. Since February 2022, using unmanned attack drones, Ukraine has successfully sunk or damaged Russian ships and whittled away at Russia’s Black sea fleet, sinking about 15 of its prewar fleet of about 36 warships and damaging many others.

    Russia has been forced to limit its use of Sevastopol and station its ships in the eastern part of the Black Sea. It cannot effectively function in the near waters it gained through the seizure of Crimea.

    Russia’s naval setbacks against Ukraine are only the latest in its historical difficulties in projecting sea power and its resulting tendency to mainly focus on the defense of near waters.

    In 1905, Russia was shocked by a dramatic naval loss to Japan. Yet even in cases where it was not outright defeated, Russian sea power has been continually constrained historically. In World War I, Russia cooperated with the British Royal Navy to limit German merchant activity in the Baltic Sea and Turkish trade and military reach in the Black Sea.

    In World War II, Russia relied on material support from the Allies and was largely blockaded within its Baltic Sea and Black Sea ports. Many ships were brought close to home or stripped of their guns as artillery or offshore support for the territorial struggle with Germany.

    During the Cold War, meanwhile, though the Soviet Union built fast-moving missile boats and some aircraft carriers, its reach into far waters relied on submarines. The main purpose of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet was to prevent NATO penetration into the Black Sea.

    And now, Russia has lost control of the Black Sea. It cannot operate in these once secure near waters. These losses reduce its ability to project naval power from the Black Sea and into the Mediterranean Sea.

    Ceding captaincy to China

    Faced with a glaring loss in its backyard and put in a weak position in its near waters, Russia as a result can project power to far waters only through cooperation with a China that is itself investing heavily in a far-water naval capacity.

    Joint naval exercises in the South China Sea in July 2024 are evidence of this cooperation. Wang Guangzheng of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy’s Southern Theater said of the drill that “the China-Russia joint patrol has promoted the deepening and practical cooperation between the two in multiple directions and fields.” And looking forward, he claimed the exercise “effectively enhanced the ability to the two sides to jointly respond to maritime security threats.”

    Warships of the Chinese and Russian navies take part in a joint naval exercise in the East China Sea.
    Li Yun/Xinhua via Getty Images

    This cooperation makes sense in purely military terms for Russia, a mutually beneficial project of sea power projection. But it is largely to China’s benefit.

    Russia can help China’s defense of its northern near waters and secure access to far waters through the Arctic Ocean – an increasingly important arena as global climate change reduces the hindrance posed by sea ice. But Russia remains very much the junior partner.

    Moscow’s strategic interests will be supported only if they match Chinese interests. More to the point, sea power is about power projection for economic gain. China will likely use Russia to help protect its ongoing economic reach into African, Pacific, European and South American far waters. But it is unlikely to jeopardize these interests for Russian goals.

    To be sure, Russia has far-water economic interests, especially in the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa. And securing Russian interests in Africa complements China’s growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean to secure its own, and greater, global economic interests. But cooperation will still be at China’s behest.

    For much of the Ukraine war, Russia has been bottled up in its Black Sea near waters, with the only avenue for projecting its naval power coming through access to Africa and Indian Ocean far waters – and only then as a junior partner with China, which dictates the terms and conditions.

    A maritime deal with Ukraine now, even if it holds, will not compensate for Russia’s ongoing inability to project power across the oceans on its own.

    Editor’s note: This is an updated version of an article originally published by The Conversation U.S. on Oct. 3, 2024.

    Colin Flint does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Maritime truce would end a sorry war on the waves for Russia that set back its naval power ambitions – https://theconversation.com/maritime-truce-would-end-a-sorry-war-on-the-waves-for-russia-that-set-back-its-naval-power-ambitions-253089

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: World News in Brief: Alarm over Türkiye detentions, Ukraine update, Sudan-Chad border emergency

    Source: United Nations MIL OSI b

    Peace and Security

    The UN human rights office (OHCHR) expressed major concern on Tuesday following the detention of at least 92 people by the Turkish authorities over the past week, including Istanbul’s mayor, Ekrem İmamoğlu, who has been charged with corruption and removed from office.

    “These detentions triggered country-wide demonstrations that were met with unlawful blanket bans on protests in three cities,” said OHCHR spokesperson Liz Throssell.

    More than 1,000 people have been detained during the protests, among them at least nine media workers.

    Türkiye has reportedly seen its largest street protests in more than a decade following the arrest of current Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s main political rival, Mr. İmamoğlu.

    Legitimate right of protest

    Ms. Throssell said that all those detained “for the legitimate exercise of their rights must be released immediately and unconditionally.”

    Those facing charges should be treated with dignity, she added, and their rights to due process while their rights to a fair trial – including access to a lawyer of their own choice – must be fully ensured.

    “We urge the authorities to ensure that the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly are guaranteed, in line with international law, and that credible allegations of unlawful use of force against protesters are promptly and thoroughly investigated,” Ms. Throssell underscored.

    Ukraine: Dozens injured in Sumy attack; UN welcomes announcement of Black Sea ceasefire

    More than 80 civilians – including children – were injured following a Russian missile attack on the city of Sumy on Monday in Ukraine’s northeast, UN humanitarians have reported.

    Citing local authorities, more than 20 children were injured with two schools, a hospital and multiple homes suffering extensive damage in the attack, said UN Spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric.

    “Complementing the efforts of the first responders, and immediately after the attack, humanitarian organizations provided first aid and helped transport the wounded to the hospitals. They also distributed shelter materials, blankets and other necessities.”

    UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Ukraine, Mattias Schmale, condemned the attack in Sumy and recent drone strikes in the cities of Zaporizhzhia and Kyiv.

    Since the escalation of the war in 2022 following Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Human Rights Monitoring Mission to Ukraine has verified more than 2,500 child casualties in that country, Mr. Dujarric maintained.

    It also noted an alarming increase in child casualties in 2024, caused by explosive weapons targeting territory inside Ukraine, due to intensified attacks along the frontline in the Donetsk Region and increased use of long-range missiles, drones and aerial bombing.

    Black Sea announcements

    The White House on Tuesday said that Russia and Ukraine had reached separate agreements following talks in Saudi Arabia with US negotiators, with both agreeing to a maritime ceasefire in the crucial Black Sea shipping corridor.

    The US said Moscow and Kyiv had agreed to the principal of safe navigation, eliminating the use of force and preventing the use of commercial vessels for military purposes.

    Asked for reaction from the Secretary-General, UN Spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric told the regular noon briefing that the two announcements were a welcome development.

    “These issues, notably, on the freedom of navigation and Black Sea, are issues that the Secretary-General, his team, notably Rebeca Grynspan [head of trade and development body, UNCTAD] and others, have been working on since almost the start of the conflict. And there continues to be discussions on these issues.”

    Mr. Dujarric said the UN had played no part in discussions in Riyad but noted Ms. Grynspan had been in Moscow for talks Monday on resuming the Memorandum of Understanding between Russia, Ukraine, Türkiye and the United Nations under the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which Moscow pulled out of in July 2023.

    He confirmed talks had also taken place recently in Washington.

    The UN has been heavily invested in ensuring that Ukrainian grain exports via the Black Sea can happen safely, along with the transport of Russian food and fertilizer, to halt spiralling food prices worldwide and stave off famine in vulnerable countries.

    The UN-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative was agreed by Russia, Ukraine, Türkiye and the UN in Istanbul in July 2022. It allowed more than 30 million tonnes of grain and other foodstuffs to leave Ukraine’s ports and played an “indispensable role” in global food security, Mr. Guterres said at the time.

    Sudanese uprooted by conflict drag themselves across Chad’s border

    Finally, to the Sudan-Chad border, where UN teams have said that a humanitarian emergency is underway, with the number of people fleeing to eastern Chad expected to surpass one million by the end of the year.

    There are already 970,000 refugees in Chad today, the result of almost two years of heavy fighting in Sudan between rival militaries. Many have endured terrible violence and sexual abuse.

    The refugees are being housed in 18 refugee camps and other shelters, but this has added to pressures on already neglected communities in eastern Chad, according to the UN Development Programme, UNDP.

    To help, the UN agency’s Resident Representative in Chad, Francis James, said that a new centre for women should open in Adre next month. It’s an initiative of the UN Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed and its purpose is to strengthen ties between host and refugee communities, Mr. James said:

    “You have refugees coming over, literally crawling over and stumbling over the border, and you need social protection…but also you need to give them hope.”

    Other UN projects include supporting women and girls to go back to school.

    UNDP’s Mr. James explained that it was key that classrooms are built close to the refugee camps so that schoolgoers can avoid walking “for kilometres through dangerous zones” where they risk being assaulted.

    Continued attacks in Sudan

    Stéphane Dujarric said on Tuesday the UN was “gravely alarmed by continued attacks on civilians” inside Sudan.

    Dozens of casualties were reported on Monday night when an air strike hit a market around 40 kilometres north-west of Darfur’s main city of El Fasher – which remains besieged by the Rapid Support Forces militia who have been fighting Government troops for nearly two years for control of Sudan.

    “Our humanitarian colleagues are also deeply concerned about escalating attacks on populated areas in Khartoum,” Mr. Dujarric continued.

    There were reports of civilians killed and injured in eastern Khartoum on Monday when artillery struck a mosque during evening prayers. Civilian casualties were also reported on Sunday as a result of heavy shelling in Omdurman – Khartoum’s twin city across the Nile.  

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: What do the Trump administration’s sanctions on the ICC mean for justice and human rights?

    Source: Amnesty International –

    On 6 February 2025, United States President Donald Trump issued an Executive Order authorizing sanctions on the International Criminal Court (ICC) and its Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan. This Executive Order is intended to stop the ICC from undertaking its independent mandate. It also poses a significant threat to the ICC and its staff.  UN experts strongly condemned the move, calling it “an attack on global rule of law” that undermines international justice.

    This Executive Order is similar to one issued by President Trump towards the end of his first term in 2020, which was later lifted by President Biden. Trump’s new executive action is a direct response to the ICC’s efforts to hold Israeli nationals accountable for alleged crimes under international law in Palestine. In November 2024, the court issued arrest warrants against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, as well as al-Qassam brigades commander Mohammed Diab Ibrahim Al-Masri, on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

    By imposing sanctions on the ICC, the Trump administration is undermining efforts to deliver justice, not only to Palestinians, but to victims of the most serious crimes everywhere. This includes people in Afghanistan, Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, Darfur (Sudan), DRC, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, the Philippines, Ukraine and Venezuela, where the ICC is currently conducting investigations or has issued arrest warrants.

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI Video: Victims of Slavery & amp;Transatlantic Slave Trade & other topics – Daily Press Briefing | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:
    Victims of Slavery and Transatlantic Slave Trade
    Detained and Missing Staff
    Syria/Security Council
    Occupied Palestinian Territory
    UN Interim Force In Lebanon
    Democratic Republic of the Congo
    Democratic Republic of the Congo / Mediation
    Burundi
    Sudan
    South Sudan
    Ukraine
    Myanmar
    Ecuador
    Child Mortality

    VICTIMS OF SLAVERY AND TRANSATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE
    Today is the International Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Slavery and the Transatlantic Slave Trade. The Secretary-General spoke at the General Assembly event to mark the Day and said that the transatlantic slave trade is an indelible stain on the conscience of humanity.
    Today, he said, we remember the women, children, and men forced to work in agonizing conditions, savagely punished, and deprived of their dignity and human rights, and we take strength in their resistance and demands for justice.
    The Secretary-General said the obscene profits derived from chattel slavery and the racist ideologies that underpinned the trade are still with us, and he urged everyone to play their part in building inclusive societies free from the evils of racism.

    DETAINED AND MISSING STAFF
    Today is the International Day of Solidarity with Detained and Missing Staff Members. One hundred and one personnel were arrested or detained last year alone. In total, at least 52 of UN personnel are still in detention globally.
    In his message, the Secretary-General says we stand with all those detained, and with their families and loved ones, as we call for their immediate release and safe return.
    He urges governments to ensure the safety and security of UN personnel, and to continue pursuing accountability and justice for these crimes, while enhancing support and protection.
    And in a video message, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, said that the rights of all U.N. staff must be fully respected.
    Out of the 52 detained colleagues, 23 as you know are arbitrarily detained in Yemen alone. Eight of those are from the Human Rights Office. “Their continued detention is a grave injustice,” Mr. Türk said.
    On this Day, the UN renews the calls for their immediate and unconditional release.

    SYRIA/SECURITY COUNCIL
    This morning at the Security Council, the UN Special Envoy for Syria, Geir Pedersen, told Council members that Syria stands at a crossroads: either to return to violence or to overcome the conflict and revive the economy. To take the right path, Syria needs increased and continued international support, he said.
    For his part, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Tom Fletcher, said that we are making progress on the humanitarian front. We are now using more routes to deliver aid.
    He added that the reality is still grim. 16 million people – nearly three-quarters of the Syrian population – lack sufficient food, water, shelter, and medicine. We need to move with greater urgency, while we can – he said.

    Full Highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=25%20March%202025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c8EmEq44Veo

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: FCDO statement on Riyadh talks

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    News story

    FCDO statement on Riyadh talks

    The FCDO has released a statement following ceasefire talks in Riyadh today: 25 March

    An FCDO spokesperson said:

    “We are in close contact with US and Ukraine following the conclusion of talks in Riyadh today.

    “President Zelenskyy has already shown Ukraine is the party of peace by proposing a full, immediate and unconditional ceasefire.  We hope that President Putin will agree to this without further delay. 

    “We thank the US for their efforts. We are continuing to work closely with international partners towards a lasting and durable peace.”

    Media enquiries

    Email newsdesk@fcdo.gov.uk

    Telephone 020 7008 3100

    Contact the FCDO Communication Team via email (monitored 24 hours a day) in the first instance, and we will respond as soon as possible.

    Updates to this page

    Published 25 March 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Decision 2003/17/EC as regards the equivalence of field inspections carried out in the Republic of Moldova on fodder plant seed-producing crops and on the equivalence of fodder plant seed produced in the Republic of Moldova, and as regards the equivalence of field inspections carried out in Ukraine on beet seed-producing crops and oil plant seed-producing crops and on the equivalence of beet seed and oil plant seed produced in Ukraine – A10-0043/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council

    amending Council Decision 2003/17/EC as regards the equivalence of field inspections carried out in the Republic of Moldova on fodder plant seed-producing crops and on the equivalence of fodder plant seed produced in the Republic of Moldova, and as regards the equivalence of field inspections carried out in Ukraine on beet seed-producing crops and oil plant seed-producing crops and on the equivalence of beet seed and oil plant seed produced in Ukraine

    (COM(2024)0052 – C9-0026/2024 – 2024/0027(COD))

    (Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2024)0052),

     having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 43(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0026/2024),

     having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

     having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 20 March 2024[1],

     having regard to Rule 60 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (A10-0043/2025),

    1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

    2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

    3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

    Amendment  1

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 3

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (3) The Commission examined the relevant legislation of the Republic of Moldova. It also carried out in 2016 an audit of the system of official controls and of certification of cereal, vegetable and oil and fibre plant seed in the Republic of Moldova and published its findings in a report4. On the basis of the audit, the Commission concluded that the national authorities responsible for the implementation of seed certification in the Republic of Moldova are competent, have adequate facilities in place, and operate appropriately. Those authorities are also responsible for field inspections of seed-producing fodder plants and for the certification of seed of fodder plants.

    (3) The Commission examined the relevant legislation of the Republic of Moldova. It also carried out in 2016 an audit of the system of official controls and of certification of cereal, vegetable and oil and fibre plant seed in the Republic of Moldova and published its findings in a report4. Following the receipt of additional documentation from the Republic of Moldova, the Commission considered that all recommendations made in the audit report had been addressed in a satisfactory manner. On the basis of the audit, the Commission concluded that the national authorities responsible for the implementation of seed certification in the Republic of Moldova are competent, have adequate facilities in place, and operate appropriately. Those authorities are also responsible for field inspections of seed-producing fodder plants and for the certification of seed of fodder plants.

    __________________

    __________________

    4 ‘Final report of an audit carried out in the Republic of Moldova from 14 June to 21 June 2016 in order to evaluate the system of official controls and certification of seed and their equivalence with European Union requirements’ https://ec.europa.eu/food/audits-analysis/audit-report/details/3667.

    4 ‘Final report of an audit carried out in the Republic of Moldova from 14 June to 21 June 2016 in order to evaluate the system of official controls and certification of seed and their equivalence with European Union requirements’ https://ec.europa.eu/food/audits-analysis/audit-report/details/3667.

     

     

    Amendment  2

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 7

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (7) The Commission examined the relevant legislation of Ukraine. It also carried out an audit in 2015 of the system of official controls and of certification of cereal seed in Ukraine and published its findings in a report6. On the basis of the audit, the Commission concluded that the national authorities responsible for the implementation of seed certification in Ukraine are competent, have adequate facilities in place, and operate appropriately. Those authorities are also responsible for the field inspections of seed-producing crops of beet, sunflower, swede rape and soya bean, and for the certification of seed of those crops.

    (7) The Commission examined the relevant legislation of Ukraine. It also carried out an audit in 2015 of the system of official controls and of certification of cereal seed in Ukraine and published its findings in a report6. Following the receipt of additional documentation from Ukraine, the Commission considered that all recommendations made in the audit report had been addressed in a satisfactory manner. On the basis of the audit, the Commission concluded that the national authorities responsible for the implementation of seed certification in Ukraine are competent, have adequate facilities in place, and operate appropriately. Those authorities are also responsible for the field inspections of seed-producing crops of beet, sunflower, swede rape and soya bean, and for the certification of seed of those crops.

    __________________

    __________________

    6 ‘Final report of an audit carried out in Ukraine from 26 May 2015 to 4 June 2015 in order to evaluate the system of official controls and certification of cereal seed and their equivalence with European Union requirements’ https://ec.europa.eu/food/audits-analysis/audit-report/details/3499.

    6 ‘Final report of an audit carried out in Ukraine from 26 May 2015 to 4 June 2015 in order to evaluate the system of official controls and certification of cereal seed and their equivalence with European Union requirements’ https://ec.europa.eu/food/audits-analysis/audit-report/details/3499.

     

     

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    The Rapporteur welcomes the European Commission proposal, which aims to update Council Decision 2003/17/EC that grants equivalence to certain non-EU countries as regards field inspections and production of seed of certain species that are carried out in accordance with Council Directives 66/401/EEC, 66/402/EEC, 2002/54/EC, 2002/55/EC and 2002/57/EC. The legal basis of this act is the Article 43(2) of the TFEU. That equivalence system contributes to the maintenance of the continuous supply of high quality seed in the Union.

    The Republic of Moldova has been included in the list of non-EU countries since 2018. Similarly, Ukraine joined this list in 2020 for seeds of different agricultural crops.

    The requesting countries have their seed laboratories accredited by the International Seed Testing Association. This provides additional assurance on the quality of the inspections and the seed produced in those countries and their compliance with Union legislation.

    Moreover, both Ukraine and Moldova have been admitted to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Seed Schemes for the Varietal Certification of Seed moving in International Trade, with respect to the seeds of the requested agricultural crops.

    Lastly, the Commission examined Ukraine’s and Moldova’s relevant legislation, carried out audits of systems of official controls and seed certification, and found them appropriate to the EU legislation.

    The Rapporteur supports the Commission’s proposal and suggest adopting it with the two factual and technical amendments related to the inspections. These amendments aim to ensure, in the long term, products entering single market fully comply with EU production requirements.

    As set out in the Commission’s proposal, all conditions are met in order to grant the equivalence to the Ukraine and Moldova. Given the evolving needs of the agricultural sector and international trade in high-quality seed production, as well as the importance of fostering global collaboration, the proposal should enhance the trade of seeds that complies with the Union regulations.

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur declares under her exclusive responsibility that she did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    Title

    Granting equivalence with EU requirements to Moldova and Ukraine as regards field inspections and production of seed

    References

    COM(2024)0052 – C9-0026/2024 – 2024/0027(COD)

    Date submitted to Parliament

    5.2.2024

     

     

     

    Committee(s) responsible

    AGRI

     

     

     

    Rapporteurs

     Date appointed

    Veronika Vrecionová

    20.11.2024

     

     

     

    Discussed in committee

    3.12.2024

    30.1.2025

     

     

    Date adopted

    19.3.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    30

    13

    1

    Members present for the final vote

    Arno Bausemer, Sergio Berlato, Stefano Bonaccini, Mireia Borrás Pabón, Daniel Buda, Gheorghe Cârciu, Asger Christensen, Barry Cowen, Carmen Crespo Díaz, Ivan David, Valérie Deloge, Salvatore De Meo, Csaba Dömötör, Paulo Do Nascimento Cabral, Herbert Dorfmann, Luke Ming Flanagan, Cristina Guarda, Martin Häusling, Krzysztof Hetman, Céline Imart, Elsi Katainen, Stefan Köhler, Norbert Lins, Cristina Maestre, Dario Nardella, Gilles Pennelle, Alvise Pérez, Katarína Roth Neveďalová, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Arash Saeidi, Eric Sargiacomo, Christine Singer, Raffaele Stancanelli, Anna Strolenberg, Pekka Toveri, Jessika Van Leeuwen, Veronika Vrecionová, Thomas Waitz, Maria Walsh

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Sakis Arnaoutoglou, Alexander Bernhuber, Benoit Cassart, Elena Sancho Murillo, Anna Zalewska

    Date tabled

    25.3.2025

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Welcoming US scientists and researchers to Europe after Trump administration budget cuts – E-001093/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001093/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Thomas Pellerin-Carlin (S&D), Raphaël Glucksmann (S&D), Christophe Clergeau (S&D), Emma Rafowicz (S&D), Claire Fita (S&D), Aurore Lalucq (S&D), Murielle Laurent (S&D), Chloé Ridel (S&D), Pierre Jouvet (S&D), Nora Mebarek (S&D), Eric Sargiacomo (S&D), François Kalfon (S&D)

    President Donald Trump’s recent decision to cut funding for research on health, climate, diversity, gender and social inequality is alarming. Massive numbers of jobs will be cut at public scientific bodies such as the Environmental Protection Agency and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

    On 15 February 2025, President Trump signed an executive order slashing the funds allocated to universities by national health institutions, especially for research projects linked to climate change and environmental justice.

    NASA’s chief scientist was barred from attending the 62nd Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) session, and NASA terminated the contracts of her team, which coordinated one of the IPCC working groups.

    Given the massive funding cuts for key research areas in the US, does the Commission intend to offer those researchers specific packages to attract them to Europe, as has been the case for Ukrainian researchers since the war in Ukraine began?

    Submitted: 13.3.2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Sen. Warner Speaks at Senate Intelligence Committee Hearing

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Commonwealth of Virginia Mark R Warner

    BROADCAST-QUALITY VIDEO OF SEN. WARNER’S OPENING REMARKS IS AVAILABLE HERE

    WASHINGTON – Today, Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA) delivered opening remarks at the Intelligence Committee’s annual Worldwide Threats Assessment hearing.

    Sen. Warner’s opening remarks as delivered are below:

    Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning, everybody, and I want to thank all the witnesses for being here.

    I got to say, I’ve been on the committee now for 14 years, and this year’s assessment is clearly one of the most complicated and challenging in my tenure on the committee.

    And I want to get into that in a moment, but I want to, first of all, address the recent story that broke in the news.

    Yesterday, we stunningly learned that senior members of this administration and according to reports, two of our witnesses here today, were members of a group chat that discussed highly sensitive and likely classified information that supposedly even included ‘weapons packages, targets and timing,’ and included the name of an active CIA agent.

    Putting aside for a moment that classified information should never be discussed over an unclassified system, it’s also just mind boggling to me that all these senior folks were on this line and nobody bothered to even check, security hygiene 101…

    Who are all the names? Who are they?

    Well, it apparently includes a journalist.

    And no matter how much the Secretary of Defense or others want to disparage him, this journalist had at least the ethics to not report everything he heard.

    The question I raise is: everybody on this committee gets briefed on security protocols. They’re told you don’t make calls outside of SCIFs of this kind of classified nature.

    Director Gabbard is the executive in charge of all keeping our secrets safe. Were these government devices? Or were they personal devices? Have the devices been collected to make sure there’s no malware?

    There’s plenty of declassified information that shows that our adversaries, China and Russia, are trying to break in to encrypted systems like Signal.

    I can just say this. If this was the case of a military officer, or an intelligence officer, and they had this kind of behavior, they would be fired. I think this is one more example of the kind of sloppy, careless, incompetent behavior, particularly towards classified information, that this is not a one off or a first time error.

    Let me take a couple of minutes and review some of the other reckless choices that this administration has made regarding our national security. We all recall it seems like it wasn’t that long ago, but less than two months ago, in the first two weeks, the administration canceled all U.S. foreign assistance.

    Now, some may say, how can that how bad can that be, its foreign assistance?

    Well, U.S. foreign assistance paid for the units in Ukraine to provide air defense to civilian cities being attacked by Russia.

    Foreign assistance paid for guarding camps in Syria, where ISIS fighters are to be detained.

    Foreign assistance paid for programs abroad that ensure that diseases like Ebola don’t come home.

    And until recently, it paid for the construction of a railway in Africa that would have help given the United States much needed access to critical minerals in Congo.

    Now that project… China is going to try to finance it as well.

    In the first two weeks, the administration fired several of our most experienced FBI agents, including the head of the criminal Investigative submission, the head of the intelligence division, the head of the Counterterrorism division, the heads of the New York, Washington and Miami field office, all individuals who were distinctly and directly responsible for helping to keep America safe.

    The irony a little bit, was the recently dismissed head of the counterterrorism division was involved in disrupting the ISIS attacks planned for Oklahoma City and Philadelphia and helped lead the effort to bring to justice the key planner of the Abbey Gate bombing in Afghanistan, who killed 13 U.S. servicemen and 150 civilians.

    That very Abbey Gate effort was actually praised by the president in his state of the Union address.

    The administration’s response to these agents’ good works and years of service was to force these folks out.

    It’s hard to imagine how that makes our country safer.

    Nor can I understand how Americans are made more secure by firing more than 300 staff at the National Nuclear Security Administration, including those responsible for overseeing the security and safety of the nuclear stockpile, or by ousting 130 employees at CSA.

    The agency directly responsible for trying to take on China’s salt typhoon attack again. After Salt Typhoon, I would have thought folks on that group chat might have thought twice.

    Or how are we made safer by sacking a thousand employees at the CDC and NIH. We’re actually directly working on trying to keep our country safe from disease by pushing out hundreds of intelligence officers.

    The amazing thing is our intelligence officers, they’re not interchangeable like a Twitter coder. Our country makes $20,000 to $40,000 of an investment just in getting a security clearance.

    It literally goes into six figures when you take the training involved. Can anyone tell how firing probationary individuals without any consideration for merit or expertise is an efficient use of taxpayer dollars?

    And just to make clear that yesterday’s story in the Atlantic was not this rookie one-off, it’s a pattern.

    I want to acknowledge Director Ratcliffe was not here in his position with this took place.

    But again, earlier in the administration, when a new unclassified network was used, thereby exposing literally hundreds of CIA officers’ identities.

    Those folks can’t go into the field now.

    How does that make our government more efficient?

    You know, again, this pattern of an amazing, cavalier attitude towards classified information is reckless and sloppy.

    And perhaps what troubles me most is the way the administration has decided that we can take on all of our problems by ourselves without any need for friends or allies.

    I agree that we’ve got to put America’s priorities first, but American first cannot mean America alone.

    The intelligence we gather to keep Americans safe depends on a lot of allies around the world who have access to sources that we don’t have.

    That’s sharing of information saves lives. And it’s not hypothetical.

    We all remember (because it was declassified) last year when Austria worked with our community to make sure to expose a plot against Taylor Swift in Vienna that could have killed literally hundreds of individuals.

    However, these relationships are not built in stone. They’re not dictated by law. Things like the Five Eyes are based on trust built on decades, but so often that trust is now breaking literally overnight.

    Yet suddenly, for no reason that I can understand, the United States is starting to act like our adversaries are our friends. Voting in the UN with Russia, Belarus and North Korea. It’s a rogues gallery if ever heard one.

    Treating our allies like adversaries, whether it’s threats to take over Greenland or over the Panama Canal, a destructive trade war with Canada, or literally threatening to kick Canada out of the Five Eyes, I feel our credibility is being enormously undermined with our allies, who I believe, and I think most of us on this committee, regardless of party believes, makes our country safer and stronger.

    But how can our allies ever trust us as the kind of partner we used to be when we, without consultation or notice, for example, stop sharing information to Ukraine in its war for survival against Russia. Or how can our allies not only not trust our government, but potentially not our businesses with such arbitrary political decision?

    Let me give you a few examples. You know, as a result of a lot of work from this committee and others in Congress, we made sure America’s commercial space industry is second to none from space to launch to commercial sensing and communications.

    The United States has taken a lead. Yet overnight, this administration called into question the reliability of American commercial tech industry.

    When maps are and other commercial space companies were directed to stop sharing intelligence with Ukraine.

    I’m going to tell you… I’m a business guy. Can’t say longer than being an elected official, but pretty close. That shockwave across all of commercial space and frankly, not just commercial space. I’ve heard it from some of our hyperscalers, in the tech community, has sent an enormous chill.

    Who’s going to hire an American commercial space company, government or foreign business with the ability to have that taken down so arbitrarily?

    It’s not just in the case of commercial space.

    We’ve seen that Canada, Germany, Portugal have all been saying they’re rethinking buying F-35s.

    I’ve heard from Microsoft and Google directly, and Amazon that they’re having questions about whether they can still sell their services.

    We’ve also seen foreign adversaries and friends take advantage of this RIF in our national security areas, and our scientists.

    Germany has already put out ads trying to attract some of our best scientists who’ve been RIFed and the Chinese intelligence agencies are posting on social media sites in the hopes of luring individuals with that national security clearance who’ve been pushed out, perhaps arbitrarily, to come into their service.

    So, no, the signal fiasco is not a one off. It is, unfortunately, a pattern we’re seeing too often repeated.

    I fear that we feel the erosion of trust from our workplace, from our companies, and from our allies and partners can’t be put back in the bottle overnight. Make no mistake, these actions make America less safe.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Transcript: Governor Hochul On “Mornings With Zerlina”

    Source: US State of New York

    arlier today, Governor Kathy Hochul was a guest on SiriusXM’s “Mornings with Zerlina” with Zerlina Miller. The Governor spoke on her proposal for universal free school meals, the ongoing Budget negotiations and which challenges she is prioritizing from the Trump administration.

    AUDIO: The Governor’s remarks are available in audio form here.

    A rush transcript of the Governor’s remarks is available below:

    Zerlina Miller, SiriusXM: Welcome back to “Mornings with Zerlina.” Joining us on the phone is the first woman to ever be Governor of the great State of New York. Governor Kathy Hochul is all on the line. Good morning, Governor.

    Governor Hochul: Good morning.

    Zerlina Miller, SiriusXM: It is quite a time. There is so much going on and I’m so grateful that you were able to join us this morning.

    One of the things we’ve been focused on since January 20 is the role and the importance of Democratic Governors in being the bulwark against some of the authoritarian moves of the Trump administration. How do you see yourself and your role as the Governor of New York in holding the line for democracy?

    Governor Hochul: That’s an excellent question, and I appreciate the role that Congress plays. I’m a former member of Congress and I would’ve stayed if I had not voted to support the Affordable Care Act representing a very Republican district. So, I have been there. But also — now serving as Governor for the last three-and-a-half years — there is enormous power in being able to speak up with one voice to represent an entire state, a large state like New York, and to call out what is happening to not just the people of our state, but the people all across America. And if we abrogate that responsibility at this moment in history, then we’re not fulfilling our obligations to our citizens or to this nation, and that’s what I feel so strongly about — the role I can play now.

    There are pathways to have a relationship that’s workable on infrastructure and other areas where there’s common interest with the Trump administration, but what I’ve said from the very beginning, and say it all the time: If you cross the line and you come after policies and programs that help New Yorkers and take them away, or you challenge our very values — the ideals that we hold dear in the State of New York — then you have a fight with me.

    So, that’s our position.

    Zerlina Miller, SiriusXM: What are some of the things that you’re speaking up about?

    Governor Hochul: Well, first of all, women’s rights — and this is an issue we have, actually with a judge right now in Louisiana who’s trying to force us to extradite a medical doctor, an abortion provider who prescribed telemedicine abortion pills to a family, a woman and her mother in Louisiana.

    They want me to extradite this person and send her there to face criminal charges. This is, again, a fallout from administration stacking the Supreme Court, overturning Roe v. Wade and the fallout continues all these years later. So, standing up for women’s rights, but also, Medicaid. I was out the very first days they talked about undoing the Medicaid promise that we’ve made to our citizens since the 1960s that we will take care of them. They think it’s just people in poverty who aren’t working — they are wrong. These are our senior citizens in nursing homes and these are programs for children. So, I’ve been out there speaking out strongly on those issues.

    Now we have cuts to FEMA. Are you kidding me? Have they watched the news? Did they see the weather? They see the devastation all across America and at this time of great crisis, you are now talking about eliminating FEMA assistance for states. So, I will tell you this — on education, school lunches, I was in a school just a couple days ago saying, “Don’t touch this essential program that the Department of Education provides,” and there’s almost too much and, in that sense, you have to be a little bit selective or your voice becomes just one of many and you really have to pick your fights.

    But I have to say this, there are plenty of fights to choose from.

    Zerlina Miller, SiriusXM: There are plenty of fights to choose from. Just the ones you just listed off — the Medicaid cuts, FEMA cuts, Department of Education. I feel like cutting the department — I mean they’re really cutting everywhere. You have Elon Musk and his unelected crew of “tech bros,” I guess is the way to describe them. Running from agency to agency and cutting staff and funding. I mean, talk a bit about the impact specifically of the Department of Education cuts in addition to the free school lunches, because I think that that is still very much new, right? It just happened and so the impact has not necessarily been felt by everyone yet.

    Governor Hochul: Right. Before I get to that, let me just quickly say that when we first started seeing these cuts from Elon Musk, we took an exact opposite approach here. We actually have advertising in Union Station in Washington and here in New York at Penn Station. People going on a train see the message, which Elon Musk may say, “You are fired,” but in New York, we say, “You’re hired.” We are trying to hire these individuals because they’re enormously talented. We value public servants. We know the critical role they have in keeping the plane safe, and protecting our nuclear codes, and making sure social security checks are received by our grandparents and parents.

    But on education, New York State receives about $5 billion in assistance, whether it’s $2 billion for Pell Grants — creating that pathway to a higher education, which changes everything, including my own family’s trajectory — $2 billion for school lunches. I mean, you have to go to some of these school lunch rooms and know that there are children whose stomach should be growling throughout the day because their parents, their mom, most likely, did not have the ability to pack that lunch, send them along with money to buy lunch and these are the kids that are the collateral damage of this war on government.

    And if we as moms and parents — first Mom Governor of New York — if I don’t use my voice to stand up for those children across my state in this nation, then what am I doing here? And that’s how strongly I feel about these fights when it comes to the education cuts. There’s a lot of uncertainty and chaos, and we’re trying to do our Budget here in the State of New York, not knowing whether or not the $93 billion we receive from the federal government is going to be affected, so it’s complicating things. But, if our voices don’t rise up at this moment, then why are we sitting in these seats?

    Zerlina Miller, SiriusXM: In the last few minutes here, I want to ask about tariffs because one of the things that is true about New York, it is quite large and it goes up right on the line of Canada and some of the folks who live in New York — the farmers and the folks who benefit from being able to have small businesses in that area will be impacted by Trump’s tariffs. Talk a bit about, number one, the impact and what you can do as Governor to protect their interests.

    Governor Hochul: That is something that has been top of mind, particularly in our farm community. Literally on Saturday morning, I was out celebrating Maple Syrup Weekends. New York is the number two producer of maple syrup in the nation, so I was out there with farmers.

    They said, “What will the tariffs do to you out in this rural area?” Probably a red county. I’m pretty sure that the father who ran the farm was a Republican supervisor, and they are so frightened about tariffs for their farms. Everything from the steel that goes into how they process the maple syrup all the way to the fertilizer.

    I mean, how many people think about fertilizer? There’s something called potash — most of it from our country, in New York, particularly — comes from Canada and it’s only manufactured in Canada, Ukraine, and Russia. So I’d rather get it from Canada any day of the week. But this is what’s jeopardized. So it’s the farm community that is really, really, really anxious at a time when they don’t need this extra stress.

    But also, I’m from Buffalo. I’m from Western New York. The synergy between Ontario and Western New York. It is just one large committee. Everybody supports the Buffalo Bills, everybody watches the hockey games, and so there’s a lot of cross pollination. This is not a foreign country to us. These are our friends to the north, so there’s a lot of business exchange, a lot of trade back-and-forth.

    We have a $50 billion trade balance, which is pretty much in balance with our largest trading partner, which is Canada. That being jeopardized sends chills down the spines of our business leaders who don’t know whether all their costs, all the materials they need. We get so much lumber, we build housing with lumber from Canada, and what is that going to do to our ability to be able to build the housing that I am pushing for — to make up for years of people not having the ambition to do it.

    So, I have to say this: The ripple effect touches every sector of our economy here in New York. And what that means, contrary to what Donald Trump promised, which is lower prices on Election Day. Remember he said that countless times on the campaign trail? The opposite is true.

    Prices are going up and will be going up. And lastly, Canada, because they’re frustrated with these policies — threatened to raise our energy costs that we get from Canada by 25 percent. Now, that is the last thing New Yorkers need right now is a higher energy bill because of the Trump tariffs. So it’s wide ranging and my fear is only just beginning.

    Zerlina Miller, SiriusXM: In the last few minutes here, I wanted to ask you about being somebody who has to stand up for the people in the State of New York against the administration that is trying to grab all the power that they can in such a short amount of time. Do you ever feel afraid or nervous about becoming a target by this administration? They obviously are targeting and attacking people who stand up against them.

    Governor Hochul: No, fear is never an option for someone in my position. Fear is paralyzing at this moment in history when we’re called to stand up to basically the disintegration, the destruction of our democracy and our nation as we know it.

    I do not want to be, as Theodore Roosevelt described as “The Man in the Arena,” which I changed to “The Woman in the Arena.” I will never be the timid soul on the sidelines, questioning what others do. I will be in that arena. I will stand up. I will cooperate and have a partnership with the Trump administration on areas of mutual interest.

    And I will do that because it’s important to my state to get Penn Station redone and focus on infrastructure. But I said this in my first call with the president, after he was elected, I said, “But I will stand up to you. You go after women’s rights, you have to get through me. You’re going to challenge my citizens on issues. And my immigrant community, we are going to have a fight.” So I cannot let fear dictate how I respond. I must govern with strength at this moment. And then that’s exactly what we’re doing.

    Zerlina Miller, Sirius XM: New York Governor Kathy Hochul, thank you so much for being with us. It’s Women’s History Month, it’s the perfect time to have this conversation. Thank you, again. Come back anytime.

    Governor Hochul: Alright, thank you. Bye-bye.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Olli Rehn: Eurozone outlook and European Central Bank monetary policy

    Source: Bank for International Settlements

    Presentation accompanying the speech

    Let me first thank MNI for inviting me to speak at this conference. To kick off, I will briefly discussthe economic outlook in the eurozone and the current lines of thought in the ECB’s monetary policy.

    In presenting my remarks here, I will focus particularly on how the significant shifts in world politics of recent weeks will, in my view, affect the euro area economy and the European Central Bank’s monetary policy.

    Slide 2: Geopolitics dominates economic outlook

    Geopolitics currently dominates and weighs on the outlook for the global economy, and does so with exceptional force. 

    Russia’s illegal, brutal war of aggression in Ukraine has been going on for more than three years. It has shaken the European security order, and more recent events since the Munich Security Conference a month ago have marked a major disruption in the world order – in a way that is dangerous for Europe. This has forced the European Union to seek to strengthen its common defences.

    It is clear that the United States is undergoing a fundamental change of direction both in its foreign and security policy and in its domestic political development. This is not necessarily just a temporary phenomenon, but may be a more permanent turn in US politics. And US foreign policy is now operating under a very different kind of rationality than it used to.

    “America first” trade policy in the US is profoundly protectionist but highly unpredictable. There will be no winners in a trade war. Tariffs and the related uncertainty will hit investment and slow down growth everywhere. The latest indicators on the US economy point to weaker than expected growth, which would also affect growth prospects in Europe.

    As a result of the turmoil in world politics in recent weeks, Europe has woken up to the necessity of strengthening common defence. The situation is acute, and many EU countries, led by Germany, have announced significant decisions to increase defence spending. Europe is now taking action and responding to the challenge of forming and financing a common, strong defence.

    These defence investments will have to be made in a situation where the public deficits of EU Member States are already large. However, the investments required for defence are of such a magnitude that they cannot be financed simply by increasing taxation or cutting other public sector expenditure. It is therefore, in my view, justified, in the short term, to utilize the flexibility elements included in the EU’s new fiscal rules, provided that longer-term debt sustainability is not compromised. 

    This is why we also need common European financing solutions, implemented in a way that strengthens our common security and accelerates joint procurement and production – I am thinking of air defence and drone production, for example.

    Slide 3: Bank of Finland’s scenario calculation: A trade war would weaken growth worldwide

    Recent statements from the United States about imposing import tariffs have raised the threat of a trade war in the global economy. An analysis published a week ago by the Bank of Finland illustrates the significant risks that a trade war would pose to economic growth.

    The study assumes that the United States would impose a 25% tariff increase on all imports from the euro area and a 20% increase on all imports from China. It also assumes that the euro area and China would impose equivalent tariffs on the United States. Moreover, the calculations take into account the potential economic effects of increased uncertainty affecting economic policy.

    The scenario demonstrates that there are no winners in a trade war. As a result, world GDP would decline by more than 0.5% per year. The effects on the euro area and China would be even greater. A key aspect of a trade war is the rise in uncertainty, which we are already witnessing and which could lead to a reduced willingness to investment among businesses.

    Efforts should, in any case, be made to prevent the threat of a trade war through a fair negotiated solution to mitigate the negative effects on growth. To support a negotiated solution, Europe should be prepared to respond to the imposition of tariffs with potential countermeasures.

    It must also be said that when a brutal war is being fought on European soil, a trade war is the last thing we need right now – especially among allies.

    Slide 4: Growth in the euro area economy picking up gradually

    US tariffs and increased uncertainty are already having adverse effects on economic growth outlook in the euro area in the immediate and near term.

    Europe’s response to the deterioration of the security situation will have its own effects on European economies, which are very difficult to quantify at this stage.

    The growth outlook for the euro area remains subdued. According to the ECB’s March forecast, growth in the euro area is gradually picking up, but at a slower pace than expected, and growth risks are on the downside.

    In addition to cyclical factors, the euro area economy is also experiencing structural problems. In the ECB’s new forecast, productivity growth is slower than before. The weakness appears to be more structural than previously. But it would be wrong to say that it is entirely structural.

    One – if not the only – reason for Europe’s slow productivity growth is precisely the weak development of investment in recent years. The background is a great deal of uncertainty fuelled by geopolitics, but there were also tight financial conditions for a long time.

    Let me reveal that I don’t belong to those who makes a crystal-clear distinction between structural and cyclical factors – it would be against my macroeconomic training. Rather, I see the distinction as a line drawn in water. Here, I feel like applying a giant of economics: “In the long run, we will all retire. But in the meantime, we need more productive investment.”

    In other words: although the euro area’s longer-term challenges of growth and competitiveness cannot be solved by monetary policy, the fall in interest rates brings welcome room for manoeuvre for households and companies. Rate cuts have been supportive of the investments that are required to improve productivity. Of course, in the long term, the level and growth of investments is determined by their expected real returns.

    Although there is little to be positive about in the security situation in Europe, the expected increases in defence spending and investment are at least likely to support GDP growth over the medium-term.

    Slide 5: Euro area inflation stabilising at the 2% target

    Inflation in the euro area is stabilising at the ECB’s 2% target. The path of disinflation has been pretty much in line with forecasts. Wage inflation has largely decelerated, and forward-looking wage indicators point to a clear slowdown in wage growth. Most measures of core inflation − which excludes energy and food prices − also point to a sustained convergence of inflation around the 2% target over the medium term.

    Risks to the inflation outlook are two-sided. Protectionism in world trade dampens growth and increases uncertainty about the inflation outlook. Geopolitical tensions pose a wide range of risks to the energy market, consumer confidence and corporate investment.

    Slide 6: ECB’s decision to ease monetary policy spurred by inflation stabilising and growth weakening

    The ECB’s latest decision to ease monetary policy leaned on the fact that inflation is stabilising and growth weakening. Thus, the Governing Council decided to cut the key policy rate by 25 basis points.

    The rate cut was the sixth since we started easing monetary policy. Since last June, the deposit facility rate has been lowered by a total of 1.5 percentage points, from 4% to 2.5%. Monetary policy is thus becoming meaningfully less restrictive.

    The decision was based, as usual, on three elements: the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission.

    We are not pre-committed to any interest rate path. Policy rates are set at each meeting based on the latest information and our comprehensive assessment, next time on 17 April. The Governing Council retains full freedom of action in times of pervasive uncertainty.

    Slide 7: Europe is under challenge from the world of geopolitics – investment is needed now in security and productivity

    Let me now conclude. The world is now experiencing a transition of potentially similar magnitude as 30 years ago, when the Berlin Wall fell, the Cold War ended and Europe united. At that time, the evolution of humanity took a step forward and security rooted in cooperation was strengthened.

    Today the world only is in reverse gear: power politics has returned in a brutal way with Russia’s invasion, the United States is standing by Russia and playing sphere-of-influence politics, and China is challenging the entire international order. 

    But we must be able to navigate even in this geopolitically difficult terrain. With the Munich Security Conference, Europe has received yet another wake-up call.

    At the same time, we must focus on our own economic problems. Europe needs investments in productivity growth – in human capital and in research and innovation. Protectionism highlights the need to complete the single market and expand the EU’s network of free trade agreements.

    The stabilisation of inflation and the weakening of the growth outlook have supported monetary policy easing since last summer. The ECB’s monetary policy has been reasonably successful in bringing inflation down without inflicting unnecessary pain to the real economy.

    The past few weeks have shown that Europe must urgently get its act together and stand united in the face of external security threats. In the coming weeks and months, Europe will have to demonstrate that it is taking action and meeting the challenge of strengthening its defence. There is no time to waste.

    Thank you very much. I am happy to take any questions you have.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI USA News: Outcomes of the United States and Russia Expert Groups On the Black Sea

    Source: The White House

    class=”has-text-align-center”>Outcomes of the United States and Russia Expert Groups
    On the Black Sea
    in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
    March 23-25, 2025

    In line with presidential-level discussions between President Donald J. Trump and President Vladimir Putin, the United States facilitated bilateral technical-level talks with the Russian delegation March 23-25 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Following those discussions:
     

    • The United States and Russia have agreed to ensure safe navigation, eliminate the use of force, and prevent the use of commercial vessels for military purposes in the Black Sea.
    • The United States will help restore Russia’s access to the world market for agricultural and fertilizer exports, lower maritime insurance costs, and enhance access to ports and payment systems for such transactions.
    • The United States and Russia agreed to develop measures for implementing President Trump’s and President Putin’s agreement to ban strikes against energy facilities of Russia and Ukraine.
    • The United States and Russia welcome the good offices of third countries with a view toward supporting the implementation of the energy and maritime agreements.
    • The United States and Russia will continue working toward achieving a durable and lasting peace.

    The United States reiterated President Donald J. Trump’s imperative that the killing on both sides of the Russia-Ukraine conflict must stop, as the necessary step toward achieving an enduring peace settlement. To that end, the United States will continue facilitating negotiations between both sides to achieve a peaceful resolution, in line with the agreements made in Riyadh.

    The United States expresses gratitude to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman for his leadership and hospitality in once again facilitating these important discussions in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA News: Outcomes of the United States and Ukraine Expert Groups On the Black Sea

    Source: The White House

    class=”has-text-align-center”>Outcomes of the United States and Ukraine Expert Groups
    On the Black Sea
    in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
    March 23-25, 2025

    In line with presidential-level discussions between President Donald J. Trump and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the United States facilitated bilateral technical-level talks with the Ukrainian delegation March 23-25 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Following those discussions:

    • The United States and Ukraine have agreed to ensure safe navigation, eliminate the use of force, and prevent the use of commercial vessels for military purposes in the Black Sea.
    • The United States and Ukraine agreed that the United States remains committed to helping achieve the exchange of prisoners of war, the release of civilian detainees, and the return of forcibly transferred Ukrainian children.
    • The United States and Ukraine agreed to develop measures for implementing President Trump’s and President Zelenskyy’s agreement to ban strikes against energy facilities of Russia and Ukraine.
    • The United States and Ukraine welcome the good offices of third countries with a view toward supporting the implementation of the energy and maritime agreements.
    • The United States and Ukraine will continue working toward achieving a durable and lasting peace.

    The United States reiterated to both sides President Donald J. Trump’s imperative that the killing on both sides of the Russia-Ukraine conflict must stop, as the necessary step toward achieving an enduring peace settlement. To that end, the United States will continue facilitating negotiations between both sides to achieve a peaceful resolution, in line with the agreements made in Riyadh.

    The United States expresses gratitude to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman for his leadership and hospitality in once again facilitating these important discussions in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Dimitar Radev: Bulgaria currently fulfils unconditionally all nominal convergence criteria

    Source: Bank for International Settlements

    Dear colleagues and guests,

    Thank you for inviting me to open today’s conference. It is taking place at a particularly dynamic and challenging moment for both the global and the Bulgarian economy. Such forums are extremely useful for the exchange of analyses, opinions and ideas at a time when the need to adapt economic processes to new realities is becoming increasingly clear.

    Let’s start with the geopolitical context. In my opinion, at least for the last 35 years, it has not been as important for the economic and financial, but also for the political development of Bulgaria, as it is now.

    The key words for today’s geopolitical context are uncertainty and unpredictability about what lies ahead or, as the President of the ECB very well put it these days, quoting Paul Valéry: “The trouble with our times is that the future is not what it used to be.”

    The obvious question is, what to do in such an environment? Politicians are facing it, but not only them. It is not my job to give advice on what should be done on the political front, at least not in my capacity. I shall therefore confine myself to one sentence: Active participation in strengthening and developing the European project in today’s geopolitical context is the surest guarantee for Bulgaria’s good prospects.

    I will focus more on the economic and financial aspects.

    Developments in Ukraine and the Middle East, the increasing trade conflicts between leading economies and the process of geopolitical fragmentation, as well as the boom in digital technology development are triggering significant structural transformations in global supply chains with uncertain duration, depth and consequences.

    These developments are already having a tangible impact on international trade, leading to increased volatility in commodity prices and forcing a number of countries to adapt their economic and, in particular, industrial policies to rising protectionism worldwide. In pursuit of economic security, many economies are reviewing their dependence on external suppliers and taking measures to localise critical industries, restructuring their production chains.

    These developments are likely to have an increasing impact on Europe, which remains one of the most vulnerable economies in the context of global geopolitical uncertainties, especially with regard to energy resources. For us, this vulnerability is an even more serious risk factor, given that our country remains one of the most energy-intensive economies in Europe. Breaking long-standing energy dependencies, soaring gas and electricity prices and the need for accelerated energy transformation pose serious challenges to European economies. Energy costs continue to be significantly higher than in the US and some Asian economies, creating serious structural challenges for the competitiveness of European industry.

    In this complex global environment, Bulgaria’s starting macroeconomic position is actually not at all bad. In 2024, the country’s real GDP grew by 2.8%, i.e. above expectations, and according to the latest BNB forecast, economic growth will remain stable on positive territory, standing at 2.5% this year and 3.0% in 2026. Growth will be supported primarily by domestic demand in a context of historically very low unemployment and the absence of macroeconomic imbalances.

    The performance of our banking sector remains robust, with capital buffers, liquidity coverage and profitability above the EU average.

    Despite the deterioration of fiscal indicators in recent years, our country still has manoeuvrability, both in terms of the fiscal space available and in terms of the opportunities to restore the fiscal buffers exhausted by the recent budgets.

    Last but not least, our country currently fulfils unconditionally all nominal convergence criteria, including the price stability criterion, with which we have had problems in recent years.

    For a small and open economy like ours, which is highly integrated into global supply chains, geopolitical developments also pose a number of risks, mostly related to:

    • a continued decline in foreign demand for Bulgarian goods and services, especially in view of the deepening structural challenges faced by some of our main euro area trading partners; and
    • increased fluctuations in the prices of key energy and non-energy raw materials, which affect business production costs and household disposable income.

    In an environment of such risks, it is essential that the economy is well prepared for unexpected shocks affecting the aggregate supply of goods and services. Macroeconomic preparations mainly consist of maintaining sufficient buffers in the banking and fiscal sectors. On the one hand, the existence of such buffers would contribute to cushioning the effect of materialisation of risks and, on the other hand, to adapting to and potentially benefiting from changes in the global economy, such as the restructuring of global production chains. A good example in this regard in recent years is the relatively smooth transition of the Bulgarian economy through the COVID crisis. The high levels of fiscal reserve and bank capitalisation maintained at that time allowed our country to recover relatively quickly from the crisis and without the need for external financial support.

    In such an environment, it is extremely important to break the momentum of quantitative and structural deterioration of our fiscal position and restore fiscal buffers. I will give the following example. By the end of 2024, the fiscal reserve reached its historical low, both as a percentage of GDP (4.7%) and as a percentage of total budgetary expenditure under the Consolidated Fiscal Programme (12.3%). For comparison, the average values of these indicators for the last two decades amounted to 8.8% and 24.4%, respectively. The consolidation of the fiscal stance will remain a serious medium-term challenge against the objective need for higher public investment and military expenditure.

    Let me also say a few words about the role of the BNB. In this uncertain environment, the BNB will continue to apply conservative supervisory and regulatory policies, introducing preventive measures to ensure the resilience of the banking system. The consistency and predictability of the policies we pursue are key to the confidence of the banking sector, businesses and investors.

    Our approach will continue to include:

    • maintaining high capital and liquidity buffers that ensure the resilience of the banking system;
    • strict supervision of lending to avoid the accumulation of excessive risks on banks’ balance sheets; and
    • policy flexibility so that we can respond adequately to new challenges, including in terms of anticipatory economic growth objectives.

    In other words, we not only want to ensure stability, but also to create a predictable environment in which economic actors can plan and invest with greater confidence.

    Finally, of course, I will also touch on the subject of the country’s accession to the euro area.

    This topic unites more strongly than before the current issues we are discussing from geopolitics to economics and finance.

    We have, indeed, one final step left. I am convinced that we are able to do it with dignity and self-confidence. It is not by chance that I emphasised that at the moment our country meets all the convergence criteria.

    As a central bank, we are focused both on the successful implementation of this final step and on our full readiness to work in the context of the shared monetary sovereignty of the euro area. This includes two main groups of tasks.

    The first relates to the operationalisation of the existing capacity to operate in the euro area, including the performance of functions that we cannot perform in a currency board environment. These functions relate both to the participation in defining the Eurosystem’s monetary policy, which required the building of strong analytical capacity, and to the implementation of the common monetary policy at national level through its main instruments, including the conduct of open market operations, the preparation of conditions for participation and the technical provision of access for Bulgarian banks to the ECB’s standing facilities. In addition to our participation in the process of creating and distributing the money supply, the BNB will also act as a lender of last resort, providing extraordinary liquidity support to Bulgarian banks in case of need.

    The second task is related to logistics and technical preparation of the process of exchange and functioning of the banking system in the context of the euro area. What has been done so far is truly unprecedented for the bank and the country in terms of scale and technical complexity. It includes construction and renting of areas; supply of machinery, equipment and materials; providing in practice a new fleet of armoured and security vehicles; creation of a qualitatively new payment and IT infrastructure; development and approval of transport schemes and security systems; full readiness to mint Bulgarian euro coins and deliver the necessary euro banknotes; obtaining the necessary licences and certificates; carrying out a large number of public procurements. I am making this incomplete enumeration to underline two things: first that we have been working hard on this topic and not since yesterday or today; and second, that the BNB and the banking sector are very ready to join and operate within a euro area context.

    Allow me to finish with a few conclusions:

    • First, geopolitical uncertainty is one of the main risks to the country’s economy and finances and requires the maintenance of buffers in the banking and fiscal spheres and readiness to implement adaptive policies;
    • Second, the banking sector is well prepared to face the risks stemming from the external macroeconomic environment and can play an important role in the materialisation of potential development opportunities for key sectors of the economy by channelling credit resources to them;
    • Third, unlike the banking sector, public finances need to restore fiscal buffers in the medium term while preserving the long-term sustainability of government debt; and
    • Fourth, joining the euro area has enormous potential to become a catalyst for the country to navigate successfully in the face of global uncertainty. And this potential needs to be exploited.

    Thank you for your attention and I wish you interesting and fruitful discussions!

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Global: How US foreign aid cuts are threatening independent media in former Soviet states

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jeremy Hicks, Professor of Russian Culture and Film, Queen Mary University of London

    Oleksandr Polonskyi / Shutterstock

    Before Donald Trump’s administration suspended – and subsequently resumed – American military aid to Ukraine, it had announced its intention to cut 90% of United States Agency for International Development (USAid) foreign aid contracts. These funding cuts will endanger life around the world, including in Ukraine.

    USAid has provided Ukraine with US$2.6 billion (£2 billion) in humanitarian aid, US$5 billion in development assistance, and more than US$30 billion in direct budget support since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. The funding has helped pay for bomb shelters and medical equipment, among other things.

    But the purge of US foreign aid programmes will also affect Ukraine and other former Soviet countries in more insidious ways. The funding cuts could lead to a decline in the number of independent media outlets in the region, which are key to the fight for democracy and human rights.

    Government censorship over the war in Ukraine has led to the collapse of independent journalism in Russia. Russian media reports on the war, which they still refer to as a “special military operation”, can only use official Russian military sources. Violating laws on disseminating “fake news” is penalised by hefty prison sentences.

    These developments led to an exodus of international news organisations from Russia shortly after the start of the war, with global news media citing the need to protect their journalists. Since relocating from Moscow to the Latvian capital, Riga, US government-funded Radio Free Europe’s reporting on the war in Ukraine has been highly acclaimed.

    It has also been growing in popularity in Russia, despite being labelled “undesirable” – and effectively blocked – by the Russian authorities. According to a 2023 survey, 9% of the Russian adult population consume Radio Free Europe content every week. Official Russian media saw domestic audience numbers fall by as much as 30% in 2024.

    However, the cuts to US foreign aid risk squandering this growing advantage in the struggle to report on the Ukraine war objectively. Radio Free Europe, which billionaire businessman Elon Musk described in February as “just radical left crazy people talking to themselves”, has had all of its US grants pulled.

    It already updates its website less, and it is reportedly contemplating staff cuts. Its online television channel, Current Time, has had to close down some of its programmes. The Czech foreign minister, Jan Lipavsky, has said he would discuss with fellow EU foreign ministers “how to at least partially maintain” the group’s broadcasting.

    Ukraine’s media outlets are also now facing a crisis. Despite martial law, Ukrainian media stands out as a positive example of media diversity and independence in the post-Soviet world. Ukraine ranks 61 out of 180 countries in Reporters Without Borders’ press freedom index. This puts it well above Russia, Belarus and all of the former Soviet countries apart from Moldova and the Baltic states.

    However, many Ukrainian media outlets are experiencing the effects of US foreign funding cuts. The subscription model followed by English language publication, the Kyiv independent, is rare in the region. One of the affected organisations is Ukrainian Pravda, an online news outlet that has played a leading role in Ukrainian civil society.

    Journalists at Ukrainian Pravda, which is now facing funding cuts of up to 15%, were key in covering Ukraine’s so-called Revolution of Dignity in 2014. Pro-European and anti-corruption protests ultimately brought down the Russian-backed government of Viktor Yanukovych.

    While covering deadly clashes between protesters and the police in Kyiv on January 24 2014, Ukrainian Pravda’s website received over 1.6 million visitors. This was a record for Ukrainian online media at the time.

    Resilient media landscape

    One cause for optimism is the media’s resilience in former Soviet countries. The media landscape in the region has successfully adapted to many disruptions over the past 35 years.

    The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 meant the creation of new national media. This involved a shift from state-funded to market-funded models, often through advertising, as well as negotiating the wider move from analogue to digital.

    An encouraging example is the Artdocfest film festival. It began life in Moscow in 2007 showing independent Russian language or Russia-related documentary films. Depicting opposition figures and taboo topics, the festival served as an oasis of free speech in a growing desert of repression and conformism.

    As political restrictions on what the festival could show grew more severe, it partially relocated to Riga in 2014, the year Russia invaded eastern Ukraine. And following Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, the festival no longer screens any films in Russia, as well as any films funded by the Russian government.

    The relocation has required finding new funding sources, shifting the focus away from Russia itself by making English (as opposed to Russian) the festival’s official language, and introducing a new Baltic programme. The festival remains a forum for criticising the shortcomings of Russia and other post-Soviet societies.

    In implicit tribute to Artdocfest’s importance, the Russian television network RT has created its own similar sounding RTdocfest, where the Kremlin’s narrative is the only one.

    A press conference in Riga in February 2023 ahead of that year’s Artdocfest.
    Artdocfest

    Since 2022, the Russian slogan sila v pravde (“strength is in truth”) has become one of the rallying cries of the country’s campaign in Ukraine. It is widely known from Brother 2, an anti-Ukrainian Russian film released in 2000.

    There is a bitter irony in its espousal by Vladimir Putin’s regime, which has been founded on lies, disinformation and distortion. Nevertheless, strength does lie in truth.

    Ensuring the region’s independent media landscape remains is critical to telling the truth about Russia’s war in Ukraine, and exposing injustice and corruption throughout the post-Soviet world.

    Jeremy Hicks is a member of the Labour Party (UK)

    ref. How US foreign aid cuts are threatening independent media in former Soviet states – https://theconversation.com/how-us-foreign-aid-cuts-are-threatening-independent-media-in-former-soviet-states-251763

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Trump’s desire to ‘un-unite’ Russia and China is unlikely to work – in fact, it could well backfire

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Linggong Kong, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science, Auburn University

    Presidents Xi Jinping of China and Russia’s Vladimir Putin. Getty Images

    Is the U.S. angling for a repeat of the Sino-Russian split?

    In an Oct. 31, 2024, interview with right-wing pundit Tucker Carlson, President Donald Trump argued that the United States under Joe Biden had, in his mind erroneously, pushed China and Russia together. Separating the two powers would be a priority of his administration. “I’m going to have to un-unite them, and I think I can do that, too,” Trump said.

    Since returning to the White House, Trump has been eager to negotiate with Russia, hoping to quickly bring an end to the war in Ukraine. One interpretation of this Ukraine policy is that it serves what Trump was getting at in his comments to Carlson. Pulling the U.S. out of the European conflict and repairing ties with Russia, even if it means throwing Ukraine under the bus, can be seen within the context of a shift of America’s attention to containing Chinese power.

    Indeed, after a recent call with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Trump told Fox News: “As a student of history, which I am – and I’ve watched it all – the first thing you learn is you don’t want Russia and China to get together.”

    The history Trump alludes to is the strategy of the Nixon era, in which the U.S. sought to align with China as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union, encouraging a split between the two communist entities in the process.

    Yet if creating a fissure between Moscow and Beijing is indeed the ultimate aim, Trump’s vision is, I believe, both naive and shortsighted. Not only is Russia unlikely to abandon its relationship with China, but many in Beijing view Trump’s handling of the Russia-Ukraine war –- and his foreign policy more broadly – as a projection of weakness, not strength.

    A growing challenge

    Although Russia and China have at various times in the past been adversaries when it suited their interests, today’s geopolitical landscape is different from the Cold War era in which the Sino-Soviet split occurred. The two countries, whose relationship has grown steadily close since the fall of the Soviet Union,have increasingly shared major strategic goals – chief among them, challenging the Western liberal order led by the U.S.

    Soviet soldiers keep watch on the Chinese-Soviet border during a monthslong conflict in 1969.
    Keystone/Getty Images

    Both China and Russia have, in recent years, adopted an increasingly assertive stance in projecting military strength: China in the South China Sea and around Taiwan, and Russia in former Soviet satellite states, including Ukraine.

    In response, a unified stance formed by Western governments to counter China and Russia’s challenge has merely pushed the two countries closer together.

    Besties forever?

    In February 2022, just as Russia was preparing its invasion of Ukraine, Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping announced a “friendship without limits” – in a show of unified intent against the West.

    China has since become an indispensable partner for Russia, serving as its top trading partner for both imports and exports. In 2024, bilateral trade between China and Russia reached a record high of US$237 billion, and Russia now relies heavily on China as a key buyer of its oil and gas. This growing economic interdependence gives China considerable leverage over Russia and makes any U.S. attempt to pull Moscow away from Beijing economically unrealistic.

    That doesn’t mean the Russian-Chinese relationship is inviolable; areas of disagreement and divergent policy remain.

    Indeed, there are areas that Trump could exploit if he were to succeed in driving a wedge between the two countries. For example, it could serve Russia’s interests to support U.S. efforts to contain China and discourage any expansionist tendencies in Beijing – such as through Moscow’s strategic ties with India, which China views with some alarm – especially given that there are still disputed territories along the Chinese-Russian border.

    Putin know who his real friends are

    Putin isn’t naive. He knows that with Trump in office, the deep-seated Western consensus against Russia – including a robust, if leaky, economic sanctions regime – isn’t going away anytime soon. In Trump’s first term, the U.S. president likewise appeared to be cozying up to Putin, but there is an argument that he was even tougher on Russia, in terms of sanctions, than the administrations of Barack Obama or Joe Biden.

    So, while Putin would likely gladly accept a Trump-brokered peace deal that sacrifices Ukraine’s interests in favor of Russia, that doesn’t mean he would be rushing to embrace some kind of broader call to unite against China. Putin will know the extent to which Russia is now reliant economically on China, and subservient to it militarily. In the words of one Russian analyst, Moscow is now a “vassal” or, at best, a junior partner to Beijing.

    Transactional weakness

    China for its part views Trump’s peace talks with Russia and Ukraine as a sign of weakness that potentially undermines U.S. hawkishness toward China.

    While some members of the U.S. administration are undoubtedly hawkish on China – Secretary of State Marco Rubio views the country as the “most potent and dangerous” threat to American prosperity – Trump himself has been more ambivalent. He may have slapped new tariffs on China as part of a renewed trade war, but he has also mulled a meeting with President Xi Jinping in an apparent overture.

    Beijing recognizes Trump’s transactional mindset, which prioritizes short-term, tangible benefits over more predictable long-term strategic interests requiring sustained investment.

    This changes the calculation over whether the U.S. may be unwilling to bear the high costs of defending Taiwan. Trump, in a deviation from his predecessor, has failed to commit the country to defending Taiwan, the self-governing island claimed by Beijing.

    Rather, Trump had indicated that if the Chinese government were to launch a military campaign to “reunify” Taiwan, he would opt instead for economic measures like tariffs and sanctions. His apparent openness to trade Ukraine territory for peace now has made some in Taiwan concerned over Washington’s commitment to long-established international norms.

    Insulating the economy

    China has taken another key lesson from Russia’s experience in Ukraine: The U.S.-led economic sanctions regime has serious limits.

    Even under sweeping Western sanctions, Russia was able to stay afloat through subterfuge and with support from allies like China and North Korea. Moreover, China remains far more economically intertwined with the West than Russia, and its relatively dominant global economic position means that it has significant leverage to combat any U.S.-led efforts to isolate the country economically.

    Indeed, as geopolitical tensions have driven the West to gradually decouple from China in recent years, Beijing has adapted to the resulting economic slowdown by prioritizing domestic consumption and making the economy more self-reliant in key sectors.

    A souvenir shopkeeper displays Matryoshka dolls featuring Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump.
    Misha Friedman/Getty Images

    That in part also reflects China’s significant global economic and cultural strength. Coupled with this has been a domestic push to win countries in the Global South around to China’s position. Beijing has secured endorsements from 70 countries officially recognizing Taiwan as part of China.

    China’s turn to exploit a split?

    As such, Trump’s plan to end the Russia-Ukraine war by favoring Russia in the hope of drawing it into an anti-China coalition is, I believe, likely to backfire.

    While Russia may itself harbor concerns about China’s growing power, the two country’s shared strategic goal of challenging the Western-led international order — and Russia’s deep economic dependence on China — make any U.S. attempt to pull Moscow away from Beijing unrealistic.

    Moreover, Trump’s approach exposes vulnerabilities that China could exploit. His transactional and isolationist foreign policy, along with his encouragement of right-wing parties in Europe, may strain relations with European Union allies and weaken trust in American security commitments. Beijing, in turn, may view this as a sign of declining U.S. influence, giving China more room to maneuver, noticeably in regard to Taiwan.

    Rather than increasing the chances of a Sino-Russia split, such a shift could instead divide an already fragile Western coalition.

    Linggong Kong does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Trump’s desire to ‘un-unite’ Russia and China is unlikely to work – in fact, it could well backfire – https://theconversation.com/trumps-desire-to-un-unite-russia-and-china-is-unlikely-to-work-in-fact-it-could-well-backfire-252243

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Trump is not a king – but that doesn’t stop him from reveling in his job’s most ceremonial and exciting parts

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Shannon Bow O’Brien, Associate Professor of Instruction, The University of Texas at Austin

    President Donald Trump speaks with Elon Musk next to a Tesla Model S on the South Lawn of the White House on March 11, 2025. Andrew Harnik/Getty Images

    Heads of state are the symbolic leader of a country. Some of them, like King Charles III of the United Kingdom, carry out largely ceremonial roles these days. Others, like Saudi Arabian King Salman, are absolute monarchs and involved in governing the country’s day-to-day activities and policies. It also means that the Saudi monarch gets to do whatever he wants without much consequence from others.

    In the United States, the president is both the head of state and head of government. The head of government works with legislators and meets with other world leaders to negotiate agreements and navigate conflicts, among other responsibilities.

    Some presidents, like Jimmy Carter, got so bogged down in the specifics that the nighttime comedy show “Saturday Night Live” made fun of it in 1977. “SNL” spoofed Carter responding in extreme, mundane detail to a question about fixing a post office’s letter sorting machines.

    As a political scientist who studies American presidents, I see that President Donald Trump loves the power and prestige that comes with being head of state, but does not seem to particularly enjoy the responsibility of being head of government.

    Trump rarely talks about the often-tedious process of governing, and instead acts with governance by decree by signing a flurry of executive orders to avoid working with other parts of the government. He has also likened himself to a king, writing on Feb. 19, 2025, “Long Live the King!”

    As much as Trump loves hosting sports teams and talking about paving over the White House’s rose garden in a remodeling project, he seems to begrudgingly accept the role of head of government.

    President Donald Trump is driven around the track prior to the Daytona 500 in Daytona Beach, Fla., on Feb. 16, 2025.
    Chris Graythen/Getty Images

    ‘You have to be thankful’

    Trump revels in social events where he is heralded as the most important person in the room. On Feb. 9, 2025, Trump became the first sitting president to attend a Super Bowl. A week later, he attended the Daytona 500 at Daytona Beach, Florida, where his limousine led drivers in completing a ceremonial lap.

    Trump’s preference for serving as head of state and not head of government was on full display during his now infamous Feb. 28, 2025, White House meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

    In the televised Oval Office meeting, Trump repeatedly told Zelenskyy, “You have to be thankful.”

    Trump was demanding deference from Zelenskyy to show his inferior and submissive position as a recipient of U.S. aid and military support. These are mannerisms of absolute kings, not elected officials.

    Governing through executive orders

    The beginning of Trump’s second term in office has been filled with announcements of changes – mostly through executive actions. The Trump administration has ordered the Pentagon to stop cyber operations against Russia and fired hundreds of employees at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The administration has also closed the Social Security Administration’s civil rights office and, among many other things, named the president chair of the Kennedy Center, a performance arts venue in Washington.

    Trump has enacted policy changes almost exclusively through executive orders, instead of working with Congress on legislation.

    Executive orders do not have to be negotiated with the legislative branch and can be written by a small team of advisers and approved by presidents. Within the first six weeks, Trump has signed more than 90 executive orders. By comparison, former President Joe Biden signed 162 executive orders during his four years in office.

    Many of Trump’s executive orders are being challenged in court, and some have been found to likely not be constitutional.

    More importantly, Trump’s successor can turn executive orders into confetti in an instant, simply with a signature. Trump himself has signed at least two executive orders that rescind over 60 previous executive orders, mostly signed by Biden.

    The fact that Trump has removed almost all of Biden’s executive orders highlights how the orders can create change for a moment, or a few years. But when it comes to long-term policy change, congressional action is needed.

    President Donald Trump signed a series of executive orders at the White House on March 6, 2025.
    Alex Wong/Getty Images

    Trump gets bored

    Early in Trump’s first term in 2017, the administration planned themed weeks called “Made in America” and “American Heroes,” for example, to emphasize changes it intended to pursue.

    Trump’s staff launched, stopped and then relaunched a themed infrastructure week seven times in 2019. This happened after Trump repeatedly derailed infrastructure events to focus on a more interesting event or topic, ranging from defending his comments that seemed to suggest support for white supremacists to discussing the reboot of Roseanne Barr’s sitcom.

    In his second term, Trump has farmed out many head of government tasks to other people, notably billionaire Elon Musk, who is leading the new so-called Department of Government Efficiency. By mid-February 2025, Trump gave Musk, who holds the title of special government employee, oversight for hiring decisions at every governmental agency.

    But as DOGE has initiated widespread cuts at different government agencies and offices in an effort to trim government waste, Musk has reportedly clashed with Trump’s cabinet members. This includes Secretary of State Marco Rubio, as well as other independent agencies funded by Congress.

    Government agencies, funding recipients and others are pushing back against the cuts and at times are succeeding in getting court rulings that halt the dismissal of government workers, or reinstate other workers at their jobs.
    Trump also seems to have abdicated most responsibility of bureaucracy to others by allowing Musk’s team unprecedented access to sensitive government programs and documents that include people’s personal information.

    Absolute kings, queens, emperors and dictators are heads of state who demand obedience because they hold the nation in their grip.

    Presidents from elected democracies may, as in the case of the U.S., have a ceremonial aspect to the job, but it is only a part of it. The people democratically elect American presidents to serve everyone and provide the best government possible.

    Shannon Bow O’Brien does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Trump is not a king – but that doesn’t stop him from reveling in his job’s most ceremonial and exciting parts – https://theconversation.com/trump-is-not-a-king-but-that-doesnt-stop-him-from-reveling-in-his-jobs-most-ceremonial-and-exciting-parts-251445

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on general guidelines for the preparation of the 2026 budget, Section III – Commission – A10-0042/2025

    Source: European Parliament 2

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on general guidelines for the preparation of the 2026 budget, Section III – Commission

    (2024/2110(BUI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to Article 314 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

     having regard to Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

     having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021-2027[1] and to the joint declaration agreed between Parliament, the Council and the Commission in this context[2] and the related unilateral declarations[3],

     having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2022/2496 of 15 December 2022 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[4],

     having regard to the Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[5] (MFF Revision),

     having regard to its position of 16 December 2020 on the draft Council regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[6],

     having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2022 on upscaling the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework: a resilient EU budget fit for new challenges[7],

     having regard to its resolution of 3 October 2023 on the proposal for a mid-term revision of the multiannual financial framework 2021-2027[8],

     having regard to its resolution of 27 February 2024 on the draft Council regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[9],

     having regard to Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020 on the system of own resources of the European Union and repealing Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom[10],

     having regard to the Commission proposal of 22 December 2021 for a Council decision amending Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 on the system of own resources of the European Union (COM(2021)0570) and its position of 23 November 2022 on the proposal[11],

     having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast)[12] (the Financial Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‘European Climate Law’)[13],

     having regard to the EU’s obligations under the Paris Agreement and its commitments under the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework,

     having regard to the EU gender equality strategy 2020-2025,

     having regard to its resolution of 10 May 2023 on the impact on the 2024 EU budget of increasing European Union Recovery Instrument borrowing costs[14],

     having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget[15],

     having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources[16],

     having regard to the Interinstitutional Proclamation on the European Pillar of Social Rights[17] of 13 December 2017,

     having regard to the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2025[18] and the joint statements agreed between Parliament, the Council and the Commission annexed hereto,

     having regard to Enrico Letta’s report entitled ‘Much more than a market’, presented in the European Parliament on 21 October 2024,

     having regard to Mario Draghi’s report entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’, presented in the European Parliament on 17 September 2024,

     having regard to Sauli Niinistö’s report entitled ‘Safer together – Strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness and readiness’, presented in the European Parliament on 14 November 2024,

     having regard to the presentation of the EU Competitiveness Compass by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on 29 January 2025,

     having regard to the joint white paper of 19 March 2025 for European Defence Readiness providing a framework for the ReArm Europe plan (JOIN(2025)0120),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

     having regard to the proposal of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2025 amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements (COM(2025)0084),

     having regard to the Council conclusions of 18 February 2025 on the budget guidelines for 2026,

     having regard to Rule 95 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Regional Development and the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

     having regard to the letters from the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, the Committee on Culture and Education and the Committee on Constitutional Affairs,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A10-0042/2025),

    Budget 2026: building a resilient, sustainable and prosperous future for Europe

    1. Highlights the anticipated economic growth projected for 2025 and 2026 within the EU[19], accompanied by an easing of inflation; notes nonetheless the uncertainties stemming from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which directly threatens the security of the EU, and the worsening effects of climate change and the biodiversity crisis, also manifested in the increasing frequency and intensity of natural disasters, which are compounded by new significant geopolitical changes and a deteriorating international rules-based order, heightened security threats and a rise in global protectionism; emphasises that, in such an increasingly volatile landscape, it is imperative for the EU to enhance its defence and security capabilities, social, economic and territorial cohesion and political and strategic autonomy, decrease its dependence, increase its competitiveness and ensure a prosperous future for the continent and its people, who are currently facing an increasingly high cost of living;

    2. Is determined to ensure that the 2026 budget, by focusing on strategic preparedness and security, economic competitiveness and resilience, sustainability, climate, as well as strengthening the single market, provides the people in the EU with a robust ecosystem and delivers on their priorities, thus reinforcing a socially just and prosperous Europe; underlines the need for additional investment in security and defence, research, innovation, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), health, energy, migration, as well as land and maritime border protection, inclusive digital and green transitions, job creation, and the provision of opportunities for young people; insists that this be accompanied by administrative simplification, as indicated in the Competitiveness Compass; insists that the EU budget is the largest investment instrument with leverage effect, complementing national budgets and therefore enabling the EU to navigate the complexities of a rapidly changing world while ensuring prosperity, social cohesion and stability for its people; is strongly of the opinion that the EU should use this leverage effect to the maximum degree to boost the Union’s objectives and policymaking, as well as private investment;

    Investing in a solid, sustainable and resilient economy

    3. Is adamant that sound economic resilience and sustainability can be achieved in the EU by boosting public and private investment, increasing innovation and supporting competitiveness, including by addressing the skills gap and fostering more industrial production in Europe as a source for robust economic growth and quality jobs, and thereby guaranteeing the Union’s strategic autonomy, ensuring that the EU remains agile and self-reliant in the face of global challenges, disruptions and volatility; highlights the need to promote innovation, prioritise education, reduce costs and the administrative burden, and strengthen the single market, particularly as regards services;

    4. Reaffirms, in this regard, that research and innovation remain crucial for the EU’s success in cutting-edge industries and new clean and sustainable technologies; recalls the long-standing goal of increasing research and innovation investment to 3 % of gross domestic product (GDP); calls, therefore, for increased funding to be provided under Horizon Europe to fund at least 50 % of all excellent proposals in all scientific disciplines, enable researchers as well as companies, especially SMEs, to bring new developments to the market, and to scale up, ensure solid economic growth and boost the Union’s competitiveness in the global economy, thereby preventing actors from leaving for competing regions while also ensuring that Europe has the knowledge base it needs to pursue the Green Deal commitments;

    5. Highlights the importance of targeted support in encouraging public-private partnerships and accessible and increased financing to support SMEs as the backbone of the European economy and a vector for pioneering innovation, emphasising the role of the European Innovation Council, InvestEU and the SME component of the single market programme in empowering start-ups and scale-ups of innovative companies, supporting them in their growth and contributing to a greater role for the EU economy on the global stage; expresses its concern that, according to the interim evaluation of InvestEU, envelopes for many financial products may run out by the end of 2025 without budgetary reinforcements; takes note of the Commission proposal in this regard; underlines, furthermore, the importance of the single market programme to leverage the full potential of the EU’s cross-border dimension;

    6. Stresses that the modernisation of the economy will require blending public and private investment; emphasises, in this regard, the necessity of private investments to maximise the leverage effect of public spending; recalls that these efforts should lead to simplification and reduce the financial burden for the EU’s SMEs while maintaining EU standards;

    7. Underscores the urgency of further accelerating the digital and green transitions as catalysts for a future-oriented and resource-efficient economy that remains attractive for innovative businesses and that is based on market-driven investments providing quality jobs and leaving no one behind; advocates substantial investment in forward-looking digital infrastructure, underpinned by well-regulated, human-centred and trustworthy artificial intelligence and cybersecurity; stresses the need to improve citizens’ basic digital skills to match the needs of companies and to equip citizens to counter disinformation; stresses, further, the need to increase the resilience of the Union’s democracy in fighting malign foreign interference;

    8. Recognises the strategic value of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) and the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) for contributing to the economic, social and climate goals of the EU’s cross-border transport infrastructure; calls for network extensions, particularly towards candidate countries and the EU’s strategic partners, as regards the EU’s sustainable and smart mobility strategy and the complementarities between the TEN-T and the Trans-European Networks for Energy (TEN-E);

    A better-prepared Union, capable of effectively responding to crises

    9. Underlines the need to enhance EU security and defence capabilities to create a genuine defence union and to better prepare for and respond to unprecedented geopolitical challenges and new hybrid security threats; stresses the essential role of common investment, research, production and procurement mechanisms, including in new disruptive technologies supporting an independent EU defence industry; considers that there is an EU added value in security and defence cooperation that not only makes Europe and its people safer but also leads to greater efficiency, potential savings, quality job creation and enhanced strategic autonomy; calls therefore for immediate upscaling and much better coordination of defence spending by Member States; stresses in particular the need to provide adequate resources to innovate and enhance Member States’ military capabilities, as well as their interoperability; takes note, in line with the Commission’s ‘ReArm Europe’ plan, of its call for the European Investment Bank (EIB) and other international financial institutions and private banks in Europe to invest more actively in the European defence industry while safeguarding their operations and financing capacity; recalls the importance of investing in and developing dual-use equipment and, particularly, of strengthening EU military mobility as regards funding dual-use transport infrastructure along priority axes; calls on the Commission to assess the possibility of using calls for this purpose under the CEF transport programme, in the light of the military mobility funding gap; underlines the urgent need to strengthen the EU’s cybersecurity capabilities to fight hybrid warfare;

    10. Recalls the role of the EU’s space programme in enhancing the strategic security of the Union through a variety of civil and military applications; underlines that a strong European space sector is fundamental for European security, open strategic autonomy, secure connectivity, the protection of critical infrastructure and advancing the twin green and digital transitions, and therefore requires sufficient resources;

    11. Highlights, in the face of new challenges in internal and external security, the importance of ensuring proper implementation of the Asylum and Migration Pact, in full compliance with international human rights law, and of respecting the principles of solidarity and the fair sharing of responsibility; stresses that effective management and protection of the EU’s external borders, both land and maritime, are essential for maintaining the freedoms of the Schengen area and crucial for the security of the EU and its citizens; emphasises the need to better protect people from trafficking and enhance support to strengthen cross-border cooperation between the Member States and the Union in combating criminal networks, particularly those involved in migrant smuggling and human trafficking, so as to reinforce law enforcement and the judicial response to these criminal networks, as well as to support Member States facing hybrid threats, in particular the instrumentalisation of migrants as defined in the Crisis Regulation[20];

    12. Recalls the vital role that the Integrated Border Management Fund, the Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI) and the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund play in protecting external borders; calls, in addition, for appropriate funding for border protection capabilities, including physical infrastructure, buildings, equipment, systems and services required at border crossing points, as provided for in Annex III to the BMVI Regulation[21], and for the requirements to be met in terms of reception conditions, integration, return and readmission procedure; reaffirms that cooperation agreements with non-EU countries in full respect of international law can help to prevent irregular migration and strengthen border security;

    13. Acknowledges the common agricultural policy (CAP) as a key strategic European policy for food security and greater EU autonomy in affordable and high-quality food production; stresses the crucial role of the CAP in ensuring a decent income for EU farmers as well as a productive, competitive and sustainable European agriculture; regrets that direct payments have significantly decreased in real terms due to inflation, while the administrative burden on farmers has increased due to the accumulation of bureaucracy; urges the Commission to reduce the administrative burden while maintaining high production standards and the requirement to implement EU legislation; calls for adequate resources and for direct payments to be protected to help farmers cope with the impact of inflation, fuel costs, changes in the global food and trade market and adverse climate events, affecting agricultural production and threatening food security, including in the outermost regions; highlights, in this regard, the role of the agricultural reserve; emphasises the need to help small and medium-sized farms and new and young farmers by supporting generational renewal and ensuring continued support for the promotion of EU agricultural products; underlines the need for appropriate support for research and innovation to make the agricultural sector more sustainable, including water management, in particular through the Horizon Europe programme, without reducing European agricultural production and while preventing European farmers from facing unfair competition from imported products that do not meet our standards; welcomes the Commission’s preparation of a second simplification package; underscores that food security is an essential component for geopolitical stability;

    14. Stresses the strategic role of fisheries and aquaculture and the need for them to be adequately supported financially; acknowledges that the common fisheries policy ensures a stable income and long-term future for fishers by contributing to protecting sustainable marine ecosystems, which are key to the sector’s competitiveness; insists that special attention must be devoted to the EU’s fishing fleet in order to improve safety and security, including by combating illegal fishery actions and improving working conditions, energy efficiency and sustainability, as well as by renewing the fleet; reaffirms that the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund should support a human resources policy capable of addressing future challenges, in order to promote an inclusive, diversified and sustainable blue economy; expresses its concern about the effect of the end of the Brexit transition period in June 2026 on the fishing and aquaculture sectors;

    15. Stresses that enhancing energy security and independence remains fundamental for the EU; highlights the EU’s role in ensuring security of energy supply, assisting households, farmers and businesses in mitigating price volatility and managing price gaps in comparison to the rest of the world; calls, therefore, for additional investment in critical infrastructure and connectivity, including large-scale cross-border electricity grids and hydrogen infrastructure for hard-to-abate sectors, which are an essential prerequisite to the decarbonisation of European industry, in low-carbon and renewable energy sources and connectivity, in particular by properly funding the CEF, as well as in energy efficiency; highlights the need to adapt European infrastructure to meet future energy demands as part of the transition to a clean and modern economy; underlines the importance of investing in new, expanding and modernising interconnector capacity for electricity trading, in particular cross-border capacity, for a fully integrated EU energy market that enhances Europe’s diversified supply security and resilience to energy market disruptions, reducing external dependencies and ultimately ensuring affordable and sustainable energy for EU citizens and businesses; stresses, in this regard, the need to strengthen cooperation with Africa;

    16. Recalls, in this context, the current housing crisis in Europe, including the lack of decent and affordable housing; calls, therefore, for swift additional investments through a combination of funding sources, including the EIB and national promotional banks, in areas with a positive impact on reducing the cost of living for households, improving the energy efficiency of buildings and deploying renewable energy sources; calls for a coordinated approach at EU level that respects the principle of subsidiarity, encourages best practices and effectively uses all relevant funding mechanisms in addressing this pressing challenge;

    17. Is highly concerned by the strong impacts of climate change and the biodiversity crisis both in Europe and globally and by the fact that the year 2024 was assessed to be the planet’s warmest year on record; calls for sufficient funding for the LIFE programme to finance climate and environment-related projects, including in the area of climate change mitigation and adaptation, and for increased budgetary flexibility to adequately respond to natural disasters in the EU; regrets that increasing numbers of natural disasters have led to a high number of victims, as well as to long-term devastating effects on citizens, farmers and businesses based and working in the regions concerned, as well as in the ecosystems impacted; calls for increased funding for the EU Solidarity Fund, RESTORE (Regional Emergency Support to Reconstruction) and the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, including for increasing rescEU capacities, which allow for more cost-efficient capacity building, in order to support Member States quickly and effectively in overwhelming crisis situations; recognises the EU’s role as a hub for coordinating and improving Member States’ preparedness and capacities to respond immediately to large-scale, high-impact emergencies, and its added value both for Member States and citizens; stresses, in this regard, that the EU Civil Protection Mechanism is a tangible expression of European solidarity, reinforcing the EU’s role as a crisis responder; acknowledges that the European Union Solidarity Fund or any other fund alone cannot fully compensate for the extreme weather events of increased frequency and severity caused by climate change today and in the future; stresses the need to invest in and prioritise preparedness, prevention, and adaptation measures, prioritising nature-based solutions; stresses that it is crucial to ensure that Union spending contributes to climate mitigation, adaptation efforts and water resilience infrastructure; emphasises that these investments are far lower than the cost of climate inaction;

    Enhancing citizens’ opportunities in a vibrant society

    18. Insists that continued investment in EU4Health and Cluster Health in Horizon Europe are key to improving health and preparedness for future health crises, thereby improving the health status of EU citizens; stresses the need for health investments for maximum impact; highlights its support for a holistic regulatory and funding approach to Europe’s life sciences and biotech ecosystem, including the creation of cutting-edge European clusters of excellence, as a central pillar of a stronger European health union, to which a European plan for cardiovascular diseases and lifestyles should be added, focusing on primary and secondary prevention as key objectives to increase life expectancy in the EU; highlights the need to create a more supportive care system to respond to demographic challenges and the ageing population; reiterates its support for Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan, as well as the importance of European investment in tackling childhood diseases, rare diseases and antimicrobial resistance; reiterates the importance of the gender aspect of health, including sexual and reproductive health and access to services; is highly concerned by the current mental health crisis in Europe, affecting in particular the young generation, exacerbated by recent global events, which requires immediate action to be taken; underlines the need to prevent shortages of critical medicines, medical countermeasures and healthcare workers faced by some Member States; calls, in this respect, for better coordination at EU level and joint procurement of medicines in order to reduce costs;

    19. Stresses the importance of investing in young generations and their skills, as major agents of change and progress, by ensuring access to quality education; considers it essential that all students, without discrimination and in every EU Member State, should have full access to the Erasmus+ programme and underlines the essential role of Erasmus+ in facilitating cultural exchange, strengthening European identity and promoting peace through mutual understanding and cooperation, making it a cornerstone of European integration and unity; recalls the need to tackle the skills deficit, the brain drain and the correlation between market needs and skills; considers that for the EU workforce to remain competitive in the future, establishing key areas for training and reskilling is needed; stresses that further investment is required in modernising the Union’s education systems, by equipping them for the digital and green transitions, creating talent booster schemes and incentivising young entrepreneurs; points, in this respect, to the relevance of sufficient financial resources for EU programmes such as the European Social Fund Plus, Erasmus+ and the EU Solidarity Corps, which have proven highly effective in helping to achieve high employment levels and fair social protection, in broadening education and training across the Union, as well as in promoting new job opportunities and fostering skills, youth participation and equal opportunities for all; calls on the Commission to do its utmost so that all university students remain eligible to participate in the Erasmus+ programme, including in Hungary;

    20. Recalls the role of the EU budget in contributing to the objectives of the European Pillar of Social Rights; highlights the role of the EU budget in contributing to initiatives that reinforce social dialogue and facilitate labour mobility, including in the form of training, networking and capacity building;

    21. Highlights the ever-increasing threats and dangers of organised and targeted disinformation campaigns against the EU by foreign stakeholders undermining European democracy; calls for the mobilisation of all relevant Union programmes, including Creative Europe, to fund actions in 2026 that promote inclusive digital and media literacy, in particular for young people, combating disinformation, countering online hate speech and extremist content, while encouraging the active participation of citizens in democratic processes and safeguarding media freedom and pluralism for good cultural resilience, all of which are fundamental to a thriving democracy;

    22. Calls on the Commission to increase EU funding for protecting citizens, religious communities and public spaces against terrorist threats, combating radicalisation and terrorist content online, as well as countering hate speech and rising antisemitism, anti-Muslim hatred and racism;

    23. Calls on the Commission to ensure the swift, full and proper implementation and robust enforcement of the Digital Services Act[22], the Digital Market Act[23] and the Artificial Intelligence Act[24], also by allocating sufficient human resources; stresses the importance of tackling foreign interference, addressing the dangers of biased algorithms, and safeguarding transparency, accountability and the integrity of the digital public space;

    24. Underlines the added value of funding programmes in the areas of democracy, rights and values; recalls the important role that the EU budget plays in the promotion of the European values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union and in supporting the key principles of democracy, the rule of law, solidarity, inclusiveness, justice, non-discrimination and equality, including gender equality; reaffirms, furthermore, the essential role of the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme in promoting European values and citizens’ rights, in particular its Union Values strand, as well as gender equality, thereby sustaining and further developing an open, rights-based, democratic, equal and inclusive society based on the rule of law; stresses the need for targeted measures to address gender disparities and promote equal opportunities through EU funding allocations; stresses that supporting investigative journalism with sufficient resources is a strategic investment in democracy, transparency and social justice; reiterates the importance of the Daphne and Equality and Rights programmes, and stresses that necessary resources should be devoted to combating discrimination in all its forms, as well as tackling forms of violence;

    25. Emphasises the valuable work carried out under the Union Values strand, which provides, among other things, direct funding to civil society organisations as key actors in vibrant democracies; stresses that citizens and civil society organisations, promoting the will and interest of citizens, represent the core of European democracy; underlines, in this regard, the importance of all EU programmes and increased funding in supporting the genuine engagement of civil society, particularly in the context of the impact of reduced funding for civil society by the EU’s international partners;

    26. Considers it essential for the Union’s stability and progress and its citizens’ trust to ensure the proper use of Union funds and to take all steps towards protecting the Union’s financial interests, in particular by applying the rule of law conditionality; underscores the undeniable connection between respect for the rule of law and efficient implementation of the Union’s budget in accordance with the principles of sound financial management under the Financial Regulation; reiterates that under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation[25], the imposition of appropriate measures must not affect the obligations of governments to implement the programme or fund affected by the measure, and in particular the obligations they have towards final recipients; insists, therefore, that in cases of breaches of the rule of law by national governments, the Commission should explore alternative ways to implement the budget, including by assessing the possibility of diverting sources to directly and indirectly managed programmes, in order to ensure that local and regional authorities, civil society and other beneficiaries can continue to benefit from Union funding, without weakening the application of the regulation; highlights the role of the European Court of Auditors and its constant activity in defence of transparency, accountability and strict compliance with the regulations on all of the funds and programmes;

    A strong Union in a changing world

    27. Observes that the need for the EU to maintain and augment its presence on the global stage is increasingly crucial amid escalating global conflicts, geopolitical shifts and foreign influence efforts worldwide, particularly considering developments with other major global providers of aid; stresses that in order to achieve this, the Union requires sufficient funding and resources to act, including to respond to major crises in its neighbourhood and throughout the world, in particular in the light of the sudden decrease in international funding; stresses the importance of the humanitarian aid programme and regrets that resources are not increasing in line with record-high needs; underscores the need to strengthen the EU’s role as a leading humanitarian actor while effectively addressing emerging crises, particularly in regions facing protracted conflict, displacement, food insecurity and natural disasters; emphasises that the Union also requires sufficient resources for long-term investments in building global partnerships, and points out the importance of the participation of non-EU countries in Union programmes, where appropriate;

    28. Underlines that the EU’s security environment has changed dramatically following Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine and unpredictable changes in the policies of its main allies; recalls the importance of enhancing citizens’ safety and of achieving efficiency in the area of defence and strategic autonomy, through a comprehensive approach to security that covers military and civilian capabilities, external relations and internal security; stresses the importance of the Internal Security Fund to ensure funding to tackle increased levels of serious organised crime with a cross-border dimension and cybercrime; recognises the pressure which increased defence spending represents for Member Sates’ national budgets; stresses the importance of Member States stepping up their efforts and increasing funding for their defence capabilities, in a consistent and complementary manner in line with the NATO guideline;

    29. Stresses that, beyond the enormous sacrifices of the people of Ukraine in withstanding Russia’s war of aggression for our common European security, this war has also had substantial economic and social consequences for people throughout Europe; recalls that certain Member States, in particular those with a land border with Russia and/or Belarus in the Baltic region, and frontline Member States, as well as vulnerable sectors of the economy, remain particularly exposed to the consequences of the war and deserve support in areas such as agriculture, infrastructure and military mobility, in the spirit of EU solidarity;

    30. Firmly reiterates its unconditional and full support for Ukraine in its fight for its freedom and democracy against Russian aggression, as the war on its soil has passed the three-year mark; underlines the ongoing need for high levels of funding, including in humanitarian aid and for repairs to critical infrastructure, and for improved capacity along the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes; welcomes the renewed and reinforced intention of the Commission and Member States to work in a united way to address Ukraine’s pressing defence needs and to further support the Ukrainian economy by providing regular and predictable financial support and facilitating investment opportunities; welcomes the agreement with the Council on macro-financial assistance for Ukraine of up to EUR 35 billion, making use of the proceeds of frozen Russian assets through the new Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism, in order to support Ukraine’s recovery, reconstruction and modernisation, as well as to foster Ukraine’s progress on its path to EU accession; stresses the importance of ensuring accountability regarding core international crimes;

    31. Insists on the benefits of pre-accession funds, both for the enlargement countries and for the EU itself, as the funding creates more stability in the region; welcomes the implementation of the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans to further support the economic convergence of Western Balkan countries with the EU’s single market through investment and growth in the region; insists on the need to deploy the necessary funds to support Moldova’s accession process, in line with the EU’s commitment to enlargement and regional stability; underlines the role of the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova and highlights the necessity of securing sufficient financial resources for its full implementation; underlines the importance of sustained support for candidate countries in implementing the necessary accession-related reforms, in particular regarding the rule of law, anti-corruption and democracy and in enhancing their resilience and preventing and countering hybrid threats; calls on the Commission to allocate additional funding to support civil society, independent media organisations and journalists;

    32. Underlines, furthermore, that EU neighbourhood policy, namely its Eastern and Southern Partnerships, contributes to the overall goal of increasing the stability, prosperity and resilience of the EU’s neighbours and thereby of increasing the security of our continent; stresses, therefore, the importance of reinforcing the Southern and Eastern Neighbourhood budget lines in order to support political, economic and social reforms in the regions, facilitate peace processes and reconstruction and provide assistance to refugees, in particular through continuous, reinforced and predictable funding and continuous implementation on the ground; recalls that the EU must continue to alleviate other crises and assist the most vulnerable populations around the world through its humanitarian aid programme, as well as by maintaining its global positioning with the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument for supporting global challenges and promoting human rights, freedoms and democracy, as well as for the capacity building of civil society organisations and for delivering on the Union’s international climate and biodiversity commitments, within a comprehensive monitoring and control system;

    Cross-cutting issues in the 2026 budget

    33. Underlines that the repayment of the European Union Recovery Instrument (EURI) borrowing costs is a legal obligation for the EU and therefore non-discretionary; notes that borrowing costs depend on the pace of disbursements under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) as well as on market fluctuations in bond yields and are therefore inherently partly unpredictable and volatile; insists, therefore, on the need for the Commission to provide reliable, timely and accurate information on NextGenerationEU (NGEU) borrowing costs and on expected RRF disbursements throughout the budgetary procedure as well as on available decommitments; expects the Commission to update the decommitments forecast when it presents the draft budget; recalls that the three institutions agreed that expenditures covering the financing costs of NGEU must aim at not reducing EU programmes and funds;

    34. Recalls its support for the amended Commission proposals for the introduction of new own resources; is highly concerned by the complete lack of progress on the new own resources in the Council, in particular in view of increasing investment and unforeseen needs; considers that the introduction of new own resources, in line with the roadmap in the interinstitutional agreement of 2020, is essential to cover NGEU borrowing costs while shielding the margins and flexibility mechanisms necessary to cater for these needs;

    35. Highlights again Parliament’s full support for the cohesion policy and its key role in delivering on the EU’s policy priorities and its general growth; reiterates that the cohesion policy’s optimal added value for citizens depends on its effective and timely implementation; in the same vein, urges the Member States and the Commission to accelerate the implementation of operational programmes under shared management funds as well as of the recovery and resilience plans so as to ensure swift budgetary execution and to avoid accumulated payment backlogs in the two last years of the MFF period, in particular through additional capacity building and technical assistance for Member States; reaffirms the imperative of a robust and transparent mechanism for accurately monitoring disbursements to beneficiaries;

    36. Notes that particular attention must be paid to rural and remote areas, areas affected by industrial transition and regions which suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps, such as islands and outermost, cross-border and mountain regions and all those affected by natural disasters; stresses that these regions should benefit from adequate funding to offset the special characteristics and constraints of their structural social and economic situation, as referred to in Article 349 TFEU; stresses the vital importance of the POSEI programme for maintaining agricultural activity in the outermost regions and bringing food to local markets; calls for the programme budget to be increased to reflect the real needs of farmers in these regions; notes that there has been no such increase since 2013, despite the fact that farmers in these regions face higher production costs due to inflation and climate change; stresses also that the Overseas Countries and Territories associated with the EU, as referred to in Articles 198-204 TFEU, should benefit from adequate funding for their sustainable economic and social development, in the light of their geopolitical importance for global maritime trade routes and key partnerships such as those on sustainable raw materials value chains;

    37. Reiterates that EU programmes, policies and activities, where relevant, should be implemented in such a way that promotes gender equality in the delivery of their objectives; welcomes the Commission’s work on developing gender mainstreaming in order to meaningfully measure the gender impact of Union spending, as set out in the interinstitutional agreement;

    38. Takes note that the climate mainstreaming target of 30 % is projected to be met by 33.5 % in 2025, while the biodiversity target will be below 8.5 % in 2025, and unless dedicated action is undertaken the 10 % target will not be met in 2026; stresses the need for continuous efforts towards the achievement of the climate and biodiversity mainstreaming targets laid down in the interinstitutional agreement in the Union budget and the EURI expenditures;

    39. Stresses that the 2026 Union budget should be aligned with the Union’s ambitions of making the Union climate neutral by 2050 at the latest, as well as the Union’s international commitments, in particular under the Paris Agreement and the Kunming-Montreal Agreement, and should significantly contribute to the implementation of the European Green Deal and the 2030 biodiversity strategy;

    40. Recalls that effective programme implementation is achievable only with the backing of a committed administration; emphasises the essential work carried out by bodies and decentralised agencies and asserts that they must be properly staffed and sufficiently resourced, while taking into account inflation, so that they can fulfil their responsibilities effectively and contribute to the achievement of the Union political priorities, also when given new tasks and mandates;

    41. Recalls that, in accordance with the Financial Regulation, when implementing the budget, Member States and the Commission must ensure compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and respect the Union’s values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; underlines in particular Articles 137, 138 and 158 of the Financial Regulation and recalls the Commission and the Member States’ obligation to exclude from Union funds any persons or entities found guilty by a final judgment of terrorist offences, as well as by final judgments of terrorist activities, inciting, aiding, abetting or attempting to commit such offences, and corruption or other serious offences; highlights the need to leverage efforts in tackling fraud both at Union and Member State level and to this end ensure appropriate financial and human resources covering the Union’s full anti-fraud architecture; recalls the importance of providing the Union Anti-Fraud Programme with sufficient financial resources;

    42. Underlines the importance of effective communication and the visibility of EU policies and programmes in raising awareness of the added value that the EU brings to citizens, businesses and partners;

    °

    ° °

    43. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors.

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS (20.2.2025)

    for the Committee on Budgets

    on guidelines for the 2026 budget – Section III

    (2024/2110(BUI))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Michael Gahler

     

    OPINION

    The Committee on Foreign Affairs calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

    1. Welcomes the fact that the multiannual financial framework (MFF) revision in 2024 provided for additional funding under Heading 6 and for the EUR 50 billion Ukraine Facility; deplores, however, the fact that the MFF revision fell short of the needs identified by Parliament; reiterates the urgent need to increase funding, particularly in crisis-affected regions where the needs are greatest, and to address the various challenges in the neighbourhood, invest in partnerships and strengthen the geopolitical position of the EU; underlines in particular the need for continued efforts to finance Ukraine’s immediate funding needs; emphasises that the EU should without any delay intensify its efforts to enable frozen and immobilised Russian assets to be used for Ukraine’s reconstruction, reparations and budgetary needs, in full compliance with EU and international law; underlines that the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI – Global Europe) and the Global Gateway are crucial instruments within the Union’s external action toolbox; stresses the importance of the EU’s humanitarian aid policies and instruments; calls in general for a more strategic and impactful approach to EU funding abroad while advancing open strategic autonomy;

    2. Reiterates that an increased level of funding should be allocated for the Southern Neighbourhood in 2025 to support political, economic and social reforms in the region; highlights in particular the pressing need to contribute significantly to the reconstruction of Gaza and to provide additional humanitarian aid in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria; recalls that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA) has up to now been the principal humanitarian assistance structure in Gaza and the West Bank as well as an essential service provider in the region; recalls the need to continue supporting key regional partners such as Jordan in order to foster peace in the region;

    3. Welcomes the new Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans and the proposed Facility for Moldova, as well as the role of the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) III in financing actions in the region; underlines that the Reform Agendas, which beneficiaries need to develop, are a promising instrument to speed up transformation and compliance with EU norms; calls on the Commission, in the interests of a successful accession process, to strictly apply the conditionalities enshrined in the two facilities; calls furthermore on the Commission to accompany all 10 enlargement countries on their path to European integration and to provide tailored assistance to address their respective challenges; calls on the Commission to allocate additional funding to support civil society and independent media organisations and journalists; calls on the Commission to ensure that it retains the possibility to withhold funds, either temporarily or indefinitely, if those funds would contribute to the budgets of governments – whether at the national or sub-national level – whose actions are significantly undermining the stability of the country or its neighbours, or the country’s progress towards European integration, particularly regarding democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to present a proposal for an instrument for pre-accession assistance for the next MFF that incorporates the facilities to avoid overlaps and covers all 10 enlargement countries and which should ensure strong institutional and economic preparedness for EU membership; calls also on the Commission to speed up the integration of all candidate countries in the EU roaming area;

    4. Highlights the importance of the EU’s ensuring that EU funds do not go towards financing educational literature that romanticises martyrdom, violence or terrorism;

    5. Underlines the need for the Directorate-General for Enlargement and the Eastern Neighbourhood (DG ENEST), the Directorate-General for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf (DG MENA) and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to be provided with sufficient financial and human resources to promote peace, prosperity, security and EU values and interests in both the European neighbourhood and across the globe; underlines the need to provide adequate resources to both the EEAS and the Commission for strategic communication and to counter disinformation; highlights the need to maintain the current structure of the network of EU delegations around the world and to provide financing that is commensurate with the role that the Union expects all delegations to play on the ground; notes, furthermore, that the EEAS, with 145 delegations around the globe, cannot be measured according to the same logic as that applied to European institutions in Brussels and Luxembourg; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Council not to apply the 2 % logic to the EEAS; insists on a budgetary increase for common foreign and security policy (CFSP) actions and common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions, as well as other appropriate peace, conflict and crisis response instruments; stresses the need to improve IT and security protocols within EEAS headquarters, EU Delegations and in Commission directorates-general with responsibilities in EU External Action; stresses the importance of investing in European security and defence by bolstering the Union’s strategic autonomy and collective defence capabilities;

    6. Welcomes the establishment of the EU Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova); highlights the essential role of the EUPM Moldova and calls on the EU and its Member States to extend the mission’s mandate beyond May 2025, while increasing resources to enhance its effectiveness;

    7. Reiterates the EU’s commitment to promoting gender equality and the empowerment of women globally, as enshrined in the EU Gender Action Plan III (2021–2025); calls for increased resources to support women’s rights, including efforts to eliminate gender-based violence, strengthen women’s participation in decision-making processes and promote economic empowerment; emphasises the importance of gender mainstreaming across all budgetary and policy initiatives to ensure equal opportunities and inclusivity; stresses that gender equality is not only a fundamental right but also a crucial driver of social and economic development;

    8. Calls on the Commission to collaborate with the EPLO office in Washington, D.C., and the EU delegation in the United States to identify, fund and implement initiatives aimed at strengthening the transatlantic relationship, including exchange programmes for professionals working in public institutions in both the EU and the United States;

    9. Underlines that any disbursements from the European budget must depend on the beneficiary country’s respect for the rule of law, human rights and compliance with international obligations, and with respect for international agreements;

    10. Considers that more EU funds need to be allocated to joint cyber defence in order to counter the digital threats from Russia, the People’s Republic of China and others; considers that the Commission needs to secure the necessary funding for a future cyber army that can help EU institutions and Member States to defend themselves against cyberattacks from hostile states;

    11. Stresses the need for the visibility and communication of EU aid, particularly in candidate countries, but also in other partner countries;

    12. Stresses the urgent need for the EU to invest in research and development concerning low-cost drones, not only in order to support Ukraine in its efforts to defend itself against Russia, but also to strengthen European defence; considers that the EU should cooperate with Ukraine on the development of a drone system following their successful use of drones.

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

    INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Date adopted

    19.2.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    40

    13

    8

    Members present for the final vote

    Mika Aaltola, Petras Auštrevičius, Dan Barna, Wouter Beke, Robert Biedroń, Ľuboš Blaha, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Marc Botenga, Helmut Brandstätter, Sebastião Bugalho, Tobias Cremer, Danilo Della Valle, Loucas Fourlas, Alberico Gambino, Giorgos Georgiou, Christophe Gomart, Rima Hassan, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Ondřej Kolář, Rihards Kols, Andrey Kovatchev, Reinhold Lopatka, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Marion Maréchal, David McAllister, Vangelis Meimarakis, Sven Mikser, Francisco José Millán Mon, Hannah Neumann, Urmas Paet, Kostas Papadakis, Tonino Picula, Thijs Reuten, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Mounir Satouri, Andreas Schieder, Alexander Sell, Villy Søvndal, Davor Ivo Stier, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Cristian Terheş, Riho Terras, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Reinier Van Lanschot, Nicola Zingaretti, Željana Zovko

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Krzysztof Brejza, Jaroslav Bžoch, Engin Eroglu, Tomasz Froelich, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Ana Catarina Mendes, Alessandra Moretti, Ana Miguel Pedro, Chloé Ridel, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza, Marco Tarquinio

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Anna Bryłka, Mélissa Camara, Alexander Jungbluth, Erik Marquardt, Leire Pajín, Kristian Vigenin

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    40

    +

    ECR

    Cristian Terheş

    PPE

    Mika Aaltola, Wouter Beke, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Krzysztof Brejza, Sebastião Bugalho, Loucas Fourlas, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Ondřej Kolář, Andrey Kovatchev, Reinhold Lopatka, Antonio López-Istúriz White, David McAllister, Vangelis Meimarakis, Francisco José Millán Mon, Davor Ivo Stier, Riho Terras, Željana Zovko

    Renew

    Petras Auštrevičius, Dan Barna, Helmut Brandstätter, Engin Eroglu, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann

    S&D

    Robert Biedroń, Tobias Cremer, Ana Catarina Mendes, Sven Mikser, Alessandra Moretti, Tonino Picula, Thijs Reuten, Chloé Ridel, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Andreas Schieder, Marco Tarquinio, Kristian Vigenin, Nicola Zingaretti

     

    13

    ECR

    Rihards Kols, Marion Maréchal

    ESN

    Tomasz Froelich, Alexander Jungbluth, Alexander Sell

    NI

    Ľuboš Blaha, Kostas Papadakis

    PfE

    Jaroslav Bžoch, Pierre-Romain Thionnet

    The Left

    Marc Botenga, Danilo Della Valle, Giorgos Georgiou, Rima Hassan

     

    8

    0

    ECR

    Alberico Gambino, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza

    Verts/ALE

    Mélissa Camara, Erik Marquardt, Hannah Neumann, Mounir Satouri, Villy Søvndal, Reinier Van Lanschot

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORT AND TOURISM (19.2.2025)

    for the Committee on Budgets

    on general guidelines for the preparation of the 2026 budget, Section III – Commission

    (2024/2110(BUI))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Gheorghe Falcă

     

    OPINION

    The Committee on Transport and Tourism calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

    A. whereas the Connecting Europe Facility for Transport (CEF-T) has been a highly successful EU instrument for strategic investment in the development of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T), aimed at transforming the EU’s roads, railways, ports, inland waterways and airways into a connected, safe, efficient, sustainable and competitive transport system; whereas the completion deadlines of 2030 for the core network, 2040 for the extended core network and 2050 for the comprehensive network are binding on the Member States and often require massive and sustained infrastructure investments; whereas the CEF-T should remain an important transport funding instrument in the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework (MFF);

    B. whereas modern, interconnected and multimodal transport infrastructure within a single European transport area is central to creating growth and jobs in the EU, completing the European single market and ensuring territorial cohesion, including for the benefit of peripheral, rural, mountainous, island and outermost regions and other geographically disadvantaged areas; whereas the Draghi and Letta reports call on the EU to step up its efforts to develop a competitive industrial strategy in the face of global competition; whereas successful decarbonisation that safeguards the global competitiveness of European industries requires significant investment in renewable-energy-based transport networks and alternative fuel infrastructure for sustainable transport; whereas digitalisation across all transport sectors can yield significant efficiency gains, which often have the potential to exceed the initial investments; whereas sufficient investment is required to achieve this and other technological solutions to enhance interoperability between digital, energy and transport networks and to maximise network benefits; whereas increased investment in road safety is necessary to achieve the goals of the EU’s Vision Zero strategy and ensure the safety of roads and road users; whereas the transport sector faces labour and skills shortages, combined with sometimes poor working conditions;

    C. whereas the efficient use of EU funds is paramount to achieving strategic objectives within limited financial envelopes, particularly in the light of inflationary pressures that have led to significant increases in construction, energy and raw material costs, threatening the financial feasibility of key infrastructure projects of common European interest; whereas resilient and coordinated EU funding mechanisms are vital for maintaining project momentum despite economic volatility; whereas the imperative of maximising the impact of EU spending requires inflation-adjusted budgetary provisions, the reallocation of underutilised funds, as well as clear monitoring and improved reporting frameworks;

    D. whereas delays in planning, permitting and procurement processes also hinder the timely implementation of transport and infrastructure projects, jeopardising EU transport and infrastructure development; whereas establishing optimised approval procedures is crucial to accelerating project timelines and ensuring budget absorption;

    E. whereas, as envisaged under the Omnibus simplification package outlined by the Commission in its Competitiveness Compass, reducing regulatory and administrative burdens and simplifying implementation are key to ensuring equal access to funding for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), regional authorities and disadvantaged regions; whereas the simplification of EU regulatory and administrative processes at all levels, coupled with streamlined access to funding, are essential for achieving the timely and efficient implementation of projects under CEF-T and tourism programmes, particularly for SMEs and regional authorities;

    F. whereas the action plan on military mobility 2.0 outlines ambitious EU-level initiatives; whereas, however, inadequate funding remains a significant obstacle to their effective implementation;

    G. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, like the COVID-19 pandemic, has underscored the vulnerability of the EU’s transport and tourism sectors to external shocks; whereas it is more necessary now than ever before to strengthen transport connections with Ukraine and Moldova; whereas the EU-Ukraine road transport agreement, which facilitates road freight transport and transit by setting up solidarity corridors, has been extended until 30 June 2025, with the possibility of tacit renewal for a further six months; whereas the European transport network is critical infrastructure facing increasing digital and/or physical security risks and needs to be protected from external threats to maintain the societal functions for which it is vital;

    H. whereas tourism, a major economic activity accounting for almost 10 % of the EU’s GDP and identified in the Commission’s 2021 industrial strategy as a critical ecosystem for the EU’s economy and for employment, continues to face economic, environmental, employment-related and digital challenges;

    1. Calls for a significant increase in the CEF-T budget to secure adequate funding for ongoing and planned TEN-T projects, focusing on cross-border infrastructure with the highest added value for the EU and on the elimination of bottlenecks and missing links, including within Member States, in order to enhance passenger and freight flow throughout Europe; underlines, furthermore, the value of smaller-scale projects in improving cross-border connectivity and their eligibility for EU funding;

    2. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement that it will develop an EU industrial action plan for the automotive sector, as proposed in the Draghi report, and calls for swift progress in the ongoing strategic dialogue;

    3. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement that it will develop a new maritime industrial strategy to enhance the competitiveness, sustainability and resilience of the European maritime manufacturing sector; appreciates the Commission’s announcement that it would present a European port strategy to limit the risks of economic dependence, espionage and sabotage linked to the economic presence and operational involvement of entities from non-EU countries in EU ports;

    4. Calls, further, for a strategic action plan for the EU aviation sector to identify potential reductions in administrative burdens and to assess financial needs for maintaining the sector’s competitiveness in the face of decarbonisation pressures and the associated risks, including an uneven playing field and carbon leakage, and geopolitical challenges, and with regard to a cross-country analysis of working conditions as a determinant in attracting and retaining skilled workers and boosting productivity;

    5. Welcomes the commitment to put forward a plan to develop an ambitious European high-speed rail network to help connect EU capitals, including through night trains, and to accelerate rail freight, as well as to set up a single digital ticketing and booking system for railways as soon as possible, as already outlined in the revised TEN-T guidelines; underlines the need for ambitious support for the deployment of the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS);

    6. Advocates a comprehensive strategy on hyperloop, with clear timelines, detailed investment frameworks and support for research, development and deployment;

    7. Welcomes, in this respect, the Commission’s announcement under the Competitiveness Compass presenting a sustainable transport investment plan and calls on the Commission to define financing measures for the above-mentioned strategies and action plans, including by de-risking the investment needed to swiftly ramp up charging infrastructure as well as for the production and distribution of renewable and low-carbon transport fuels, without jeopardising existing market choices;

    8. Underlines again the role of the Social Climate Fund in supporting investment for an inclusive transition towards more sustainable mobility and calls on the Member States to address transport poverty with specific policies and financing measures in their national Social Climate Plans;

    9. Highlights the need to address the shortage of qualified labour, women’s employment and an ageing workforce in the transport sector; calls, in this regard, for sufficient support for the safety and good working conditions of transport workers as well as for the funding of safe and secure truck parking areas across the EU;

    10. Calls for the digitalisation of transport through intelligent solutions and digital booking platforms to facilitate seamless cross-border travel; calls for the systematic reduction of EU regulatory burdens across all transport modes to free up resources, including EU budgetary means, for increased investment in transport infrastructure; underlines the strong need for prior impact assessments of all new legislative initiatives with respect to their budgetary implications but also the regulatory or administrative burdens that the proposals would create or resolve;

    11. Calls on the Commission to address inflationary pressures and resource scarcity by incorporating inflation adjustments into the budget; notes that the inclusion of realistic price adjustments is essential to safeguarding the viability of transport and infrastructure projects against the impact of inflation-induced cost increases; supports the reallocation of unused funds to strategic clusters, such as transport infrastructure, sustainable transport solutions and innovation; calls strongly for the integration of inflation-resilient frameworks and adaptive budget mechanisms within the MFF to avoid financing challenges in upcoming cycles;

    12. Emphasises the importance of bolstering co-financing mechanisms, particularly for large-scale projects such as the Clean Aviation, Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) and Europe’s Rail Joint Undertakings, to ensure their timely implementation despite economic constraints; insists on the leveraging of public-private partnerships (PPPs) to mobilise additional resources;

    13. Advocates innovative financing models, in particular the facilitation of PPPs by providing guarantees or implementing risk-sharing mechanisms, in order to attract private investment in transport and tourism infrastructure, including for a faster transition to alternative fuels; stresses that these PPPs can also contribute to knowledge-sharing, innovation and support for SMEs and start-ups;

    14. Stresses the need to reinforce the budgets of transport agencies, in particular the EU Aviation Safety Agency, the European Maritime Safety Agency, and the EU Agency for Railways, so that they can fulfil the additional tasks assigned to them by the co-legislators in recently adopted EU legislation, as well as in order to support critical safety, sustainability, interoperability, competitiveness, innovation and modernisation initiatives;

    15. Calls resolutely for the streamlining of application and reporting procedures in relation to EU funds in line with Directive 2021/1187[26]; insists on transparent and fair allocation of EU transport funding using digital platforms in order to simplify access for SMEs and regional stakeholders; calls for the establishment of expedited review processes for critical transport and infrastructure projects in order to reduce delays; proposes the implementation of the ‘once-only’ principle for administrative processes, allowing applicants to provide information once and reuse it across EU programmes, thus reducing redundancy and delays, including for the increased blending of EU funds;

    16. Insists on the restoration of the military mobility budget to the originally proposed EUR 6.5 billion over seven years; reiterates that the drastic cut of 75 % to military mobility funding within the transport pillar considerably weakens this policy; highlights the critical role of that funding in adapting parts of the TEN-T infrastructure for dual use along priority axes, in order to facilitate the short-notice, large-scale movement of military equipment and humanitarian aid across the continent, enabling a joint response to military threats to the EU Member States and their allied nations; calls for military mobility to be included in the white paper on the future of European defence;

    17. Reiterates that, to help Ukraine withstand Russia’s war of aggression and to accelerate its post-war recovery and integration into the EU market, alongside the upcoming decisions on the renewal of the EU-Ukraine road transport agreement, it is imperative to pursue projects to improve the capacity along the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes, encompassing railway upgrades, improved border crossings and the crucial step of integrating relevant lines of Ukraine’s rail system into the EU’s standard gauge to facilitate the uninterrupted movement of goods and services; considers that the 2026 budget should also help alleviate the economic and social hardship faced by the people of the EU’s eastern border regions, especially the Baltic states, Finland, Poland and Romania, who have been particularly affected by economic losses and the suspension of cross-border mobility as a consequence of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; calls for the financing of further EU measures against the Russian shadow fleet;

    18. Reiterates its repeated request to create a specific EU programme and a dedicated budget line for tourism in the current MFF and beyond, increasing the sector’s resistance to economic shocks and contributing to further growth and jobs across the value chain, bringing significant benefits and long-term well-being to local people and their businesses; highlights the need to reduce administrative burdens for SMEs operating in the tourism sector by simplifying rules, minimising data collection requirements, where appropriate, and providing tailored financial support; notes that the tourism sector stands to benefit greatly from digital innovations, such as smart tourism platforms and integrated digital ticketing systems for attractions and services, which enhance visitor experiences while driving significant economic growth for local communities; stresses that the further development of sustainable tourism, including through the promotion of regional products to strengthen local value chains or the management of tourist flows, could foster economic growth in less popular, more remote and peripheral areas, improve urban-rural connectivity and bolster the climate resilience of EU territories.

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

    INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Date adopted

    19.2.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    36

    6

    0

    Members present for the final vote

    Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Daniel Attard, Tom Berendsen, Nina Carberry, Benoit Cassart, Carlo Ciccioli, Vivien Costanzo, Johan Danielsson, Valérie Devaux, Siegbert Frank Droese, Gheorghe Falcă, Jens Gieseke, Sérgio Humberto, François Kalfon, Elena Kountoura, Merja Kyllönen, Luis-Vicențiu Lazarus, Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Milan Mazurek, Alexandra Mehnert, Ştefan Muşoiu, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Philippe Olivier, Matteo Ricci, Arash Saeidi, Marjan Šarec, Rosa Serrano Sierra, Virginijus Sinkevičius, Kai Tegethoff, Elissavet Vozemberg-Vrionidi, Kosma Złotowski

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Arno Bausemer, Ondřej Krutílek, Elżbieta Katarzyna Łukacijewska, Elena Nevado del Campo, Luděk Niedermayer, Andrey Novakov, Beata Szydło, Flavio Tosi, Kathleen Van Brempt

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Marie Dauchy, Elisabeth Grossmann

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL
    BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    36

    +

    ECR

    Carlo Ciccioli, Ondřej Krutílek, Beata Szydło, Kosma Złotowski

    PPE

    Tom Berendsen, Nina Carberry, Gheorghe Falcă, Jens Gieseke, Sérgio Humberto, Elżbieta Katarzyna Łukacijewska, Alexandra Mehnert, Elena Nevado del Campo, Luděk Niedermayer, Andrey Novakov, Flavio Tosi, Elissavet Vozemberg-Vrionidi

    Renew

    Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Benoit Cassart, Valérie Devaux, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Marjan Šarec

    S&D

    Daniel Attard, Vivien Costanzo, Johan Danielsson, Elisabeth Grossmann, François Kalfon, Ştefan Muşoiu, Matteo Ricci, Rosa Serrano Sierra, Kathleen Van Brempt

    The Left

    Elena Kountoura, Merja Kyllönen, Arash Saeidi

    Verts/ALE

    Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Virginijus Sinkevičius, Kai Tegethoff

     

    6

    ESN

    Arno Bausemer, Siegbert Frank Droese, Milan Mazurek

    NI

    Luis-Vicențiu Lazarus

    PfE

    Marie Dauchy, Philippe Olivier

     

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT (19.2.2025)

    for the Committee on Budgets

    on general guidelines for the preparation of the 2026 budget – Section III – Commission

    (2024/2110(BUI))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Gabriella Gerzsenyi

     

     

    OPINION

    The Committee on Regional Development calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

    A. whereas pursuant to Article 174 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), ‘in order to promote its overall harmonious development, the Union shall develop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of its economic, social and territorial cohesion. In particular, the Union shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions and the backwardness of the least-favoured regions’;

    B. whereas cohesion policy is a key instrument for reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions within the Union and for addressing the fact that the least-favoured regions lag behind, playing a vital role in promoting sustainable development and also addressing environmental challenges, complementing national budgets and enhancing the EU’s ability to navigate global complexities;

    C. whereas among the regions concerned, particular attention must be paid to rural areas, areas affected by the industrial and automotive transitions, less-developed areas inside the so-called developed regions, eastern EU regions bordering on Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, regions which suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps, as well as outermost regions, islands and Mediterranean regions facing environmental and economic vulnerabilities;

    D. whereas the absorption rate of cohesion policy funds remains very low partly owing to delays to the start of programmes and the high level of bureaucracy and complexity required in cohesion-funded projects, which can lead to unforced errors;

    E. whereas among the beneficiaries concerned, particular attention should be paid to vulnerable people, such as persons with disabilities;

    1. Considers that, as the EU’s main long-term investment instrument, cohesion policy is based on solidarity, creates sustainable growth and jobs across the Union and contributes to key Union objectives and priorities, including its climate, energy and biodiversity targets, competitiveness, as well as sustainable and socially inclusive economic growth, to tackle demographic challenges and ensure equitable access to affordable housing;

    2. Recalls that cohesion policy has proven to be a helpful tool in tackling challenges in various crises, such as the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and its effects on the energy supply, the high cost of living, inflation, and the needs of refugees and displaced persons, as well as natural disasters; underlines, however, that the resulting legislative amendments to cohesion policy have repeatedly brought unexpected changes to its objectives and resources, while cohesion policy should, when needed, complement rather than replace other financial instruments designed for emergency response;

    3. Reiterates the need for coordination at budgetary level between all the financial instruments supporting cohesion policy; believes that, to make the most of NextGenerationEU funds, these should support and complement cohesion policy measures;

    4. Emphasises the need to ensure that the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle is observed across the EU budget; stresses, in this regard, that cohesion policy should not undergo any fundamental changes which could jeopardise the structural and investment funds’ ability to deliver on their goals; stresses that the setting of new priorities should entail new resources and underlines that the long-term investment objectives of cohesion policy are to reduce regional disparities and enhance competitiveness;

    5. Is concerned about the state of implementation of cohesion policy programmes for 2021-2027; urges the Commission to step up monitoring efforts, ensuring respect for the rule of law, a transparent, fair and responsible use of EU resources, as well as their sound financial management; urges the Commission to strengthen its cooperation with the Member State authorities at all levels in order to reduce bureaucracy to make cohesion funds more accessible to local and regional authorities, among others, and to avoid decommitments, unfinished projects and any political manipulation of fund allocation; stresses, therefore, the need to introduce a ‘smart conditionality’ mechanism;

    6. Notes that the Just Transition Fund needs adequate financial resources and a long-term perspective to ensure its effectiveness in supporting regions’ transition towards climate neutrality, while ensuring that the most vulnerable regions are properly supported in the transition process; emphasises the need for a realistic and balanced approach to the just transition, ensuring economic, social and environmental sustainability, with the meaningful participation of local and regional authorities, as well as economic and social partners;

    7. Calls for further simplification of cohesion policy to reduce the growing administrative burden, enhance fund accessibility and ensure investments tailored to the specific needs of regions while enabling the effective management of funds in line with the needs of final beneficiaries; highlights, in this context, the importance of the newly-created EU Councillors network, which is jointly run by the European Committee of the Regions and the European Commission, as a key tool for strengthening the ability to gather evidence of how the Union operates at local level;

    8. Underlines that rural areas are a core part of Europe’s identity and economic potential; welcomes cohesion policy measures that recognise the contribution of more prosperous and resilient rural areas to Europe’s overall resilience; calls for adequate funding to enhance their role in environmental protection, food production, tourism and ensuring ‘the right to stay’; calls for increased public investment to tackle demographic challenges and support young people by improving services and infrastructure, expanding access to digital education, technologies and innovations, so as to raise living standards, increase the stock of affordable housing and foster equal access for citizens and families to culture and high quality education, essential social services and other public services, while making more efficient use of resources, reducing the impact on the environment and creating new opportunities for rural SMEs;

    9. Notes that the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund support investments in sustainable urban development, underlining its importance as a key component of integrated territorial development, with at least 8 % of ERDF resources at the national level being allocated to urban areas through the relevant mechanisms; further notes that this should include special attention to the sustainable development of functional urban and metropolitan areas, facilitating the digital, green and industrial transitions;

    10. Calls for increased investment in digitalisation and innovation to enhance the competitiveness of SMEs in less-developed regions, including rural and peripheral areas, in order to bridge the digital divide and foster inclusive economic growth;

    11. Underlines that sustainable development is directly linked to having a highly skilled work force; insists, therefore, on the need for increased efforts to ensure an adequate degree of upskilling and reskilling of all relevant working age individuals, as well as initiatives to increase citizens’ acceptance of the economic, industrial and energy transitions;

    12. Recalls the importance of mechanisms and strategies adapted to the diversity of the EU’s territories, and therefore calls for a full use of Article 349 TFEU to adapt cohesion policy to the specificities of the outermost regions; reiterates that the outermost regions should receive specific additional allocations to offset the extra costs incurred as a result of permanent constraints on their development; calls for an Islands Pact to be considered by the EU institutions with the participation of the principal stakeholders, along the lines of the Urban Pact and the future Rural Pact;

    13. Reaffirms the need for close cooperation between national, regional, local and other authorities as well as their dialogue with civil society organisations and all relevant stakeholders, including economic and social partners, universities and innovation centres; recognises the importance of research and innovation policy in driving economic growth and enhancing competitiveness in order to fulfil cohesion policy objectives; highlights the need to support the commercialisation and scaling up of interregional innovation projects, underlining the importance of developing value chains, particularly in less-developed regions;

    14. Reiterates the need to strengthen the administrative capabilities and capacity of local, regional and national authorities, which are key components in the effective planning and implementation of initiatives and projects at the local level; highlights the importance of stronger ownership, responsibility, partnership and decentralisation; strongly considers that increased financial resources dedicated to technical assistance are key to effective project implementation;

    15. Emphasises that the implementation of cohesion policy must respect horizontal principles, including its place-based nature, multilevel governance, sustainability, the partnership principle, gender equality and non-discrimination, ensuring that all projects contribute to a more equitable and inclusive Union;

    16. Stresses the need to strengthen awareness-raising among European citizens about cohesion policy achievements and calls for further information measures promoting it such as accessible data platforms, as cohesion policy is a particularly effective means of promoting strong and balanced European regions.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under her exclusive responsibility that she did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

    INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Date adopted

    19.2.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    29

    0

    1

    Members present for the final vote

    Adrian-Dragoş Benea, Gordan Bosanac, Irmhild Boßdorf, Daniel Buda, Klára Dobrev, Klara Dostalova, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Gabriella Gerzsenyi, Krzysztof Hetman, Ľubica Karvašová, Elsi Katainen, Isabelle Le Callennec, Elena Nevado del Campo, Andrey Novakov, Valentina Palmisano, Vladimir Prebilič, Sabrina Repp, Marcos Ros Sempere, André Rougé, Antonella Sberna, Mārtiņš Staķis, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza, Rody Tolassy, Francesco Ventola, Marta Wcisło

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Dan Barna, Sofie Eriksson, Denis Nesci, Jacek Protas

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Francisco Assis

     

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    29

    +

    ECR

    Denis Nesci, Antonella Sberna, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza, Francesco Ventola

    PPE

    Daniel Buda, Gabriella Gerzsenyi, Krzysztof Hetman, Isabelle Le Callennec, Elena Nevado del Campo, Andrey Novakov, Jacek Protas, Marta Wcisło

    PfE

    Klara Dostalova, André Rougé, Rody Tolassy

    Renew

    Dan Barna, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Ľubica Karvašová, Elsi Katainen

    S&D

    Francisco Assis, Adrian-Dragoş Benea, Klára Dobrev, Sofie Eriksson, Sabrina Repp, Marcos Ros Sempere

    The Left

    Valentina Palmisano

    Verts/ALE

    Gordan Bosanac, Vladimir Prebilič, Mārtiņš Staķis

     

     

    1

    0

    ESN

    Irmhild Boßdorf

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

     

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT (19.2.2025)

    for the Committee on Budgets

    on guidelines for the 2026 budget – Section III

    (2024/2110(BUI))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Dario Nardella

     

    OPINION

    The Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

    1. Highlights the crucial role of agricultural and rural development policies, particularly the common agricultural policy (CAP), in achieving the Union’s objectives under Article 39 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; highlights the fact that these policies are tools for farmers to provide safe, healthy, affordable and sustainable food of high quality, while ensuring fair and viable incomes for all farmers, in particular active, small-scale and young farmers, including targeting to prevent land abandonment and promoting short food supply chains; underlines that these policies aim to foster sustainable food systems and secure the long-term viability, profitability, sustainability and safety of EU agricultural production, the development of rural areas and the Union’s food sovereignty, while taking into consideration animal welfare standards, climate protection, mitigation and biodiversity measures; recalls, in this regard, that the strong and simplified EU financial support for a competitive and sustainable farming sector should be increased in the 2026 CAP budget allocation to better reflect the growing challenges in rural areas, including depopulation, and keep rural areas alive; underlines that, according to the latest Eurobarometer survey, support for the CAP has reached an all-time high, with over 70 % of respondents agreeing that the CAP fulfils its role in providing safe, healthy and sustainable food of high quality;

    2. Notes that spending under the CAP significantly exceeds the climate and biodiversity mainstreaming targets and requests that this surplus be used to allocate funds that directly contribute to achieving the primary objectives of the CAP;

    3. Calls on the Commission to secure additional funding for further nature objectives rather than relying on the CAP, which must above all remain a fund that ensures food security and a viable income for our farmers;

    4. Upholds the promotion of EU agricultural products as a cornerstone of agricultural policy, with the aim of strengthening the competitiveness and relevance of all production sectors, especially that of wine and high-quality products, which need to have better access to both internal and external markets so as to promote diversification and internationalisation; recalls the success achieved by such promotion programmes in the opening up and consolidation of new markets; stresses the need to ensure an adequate promotion-policy budget in the coming financial years;

    5. Stresses the need for a stronger, better equipped, flexible and more reactive agricultural reserve, with adequate funding to cope with market imbalances or unpredictable external factors, such as extreme and recurring weather events, animal diseases, water stress or an evolving geopolitical context, which are having an increasing impact on agricultural production and markets, farmers’ incomes, farm continuity and food security; calls on the Commission to make use of the crisis reserve in the most efficient, expeditious and transparent way; stresses the need to simplify administrative procedures in order to guarantee the swift disbursement of that aid; points out that an increase in the agricultural reserve must not affect direct payments; calls on the Commission to develop a comprehensive crisis management strategy for each major agricultural sector, ensuring the rapid and effective deployment of the crisis reserve, while considering the establishment of new crisis and risk management instruments; acknowledges though that the agricultural reserve alone cannot fully compensate for the increasing frequency and severity of extreme weather events caused by climate change; stresses the need to fund preventive mitigation and adaptation measures that enhance the resilience, including climate resilience, of rural areas and food production systems;

    6. Strongly opposes any proposals to reduce the level of pre-allocated funds from the CAP in the future budget; points out that those funds should be increased by at least the equivalent of cumulative inflation since the start of the current budget period in order to avoid hidden reductions in CAP funding; stresses that farmers need the continuity and predictability of the CAP and that emerging new priorities cannot lead to cuts to the CAP budget; advocates for transparency and accountability in the allocation of CAP funds and encourages Member States and the Commission to enhance cooperation and strengthen anti-fraud measures; stresses the need for a fair distribution of CAP support between and within Member States; calls on the Commission to mobilise funds outside the CAP, given the challenges facing EU agriculture and to simplify the administrative procedures for farmers who receive aid; insists that any revenue accruing to the Union budget from assigned revenue or repayments of irregularities relating to agriculture should remain under the agriculture component of Heading 3 of the multiannual financial framework (MFF);

    7. Underlines that CAP simplification measures adopted in 2024 must be the starting point for the next CAP reform;

    8. Recalls that innovation can play a key role in enhancing the productivity, competitiveness, resilience and adaptability of agriculture; underlines, in this regard, the importance of increasing funding for research, thereby avoiding additional bureaucracy, both in the future budget allocations in the framework of the Horizon Europe research programme, as well as in the CAP, while creating funding mechanisms that ensure the continuity of existing and successful agri-food projects, established and funded through the NextGenerationEU instrument; calls therefore for adequate funding for climate change mitigation, precision agriculture, circular economy projects, renewable energy production in rural areas, development and technology-neutral innovation, including for projects promoting animal and plant health and the efficient use of resources, such as water, in agriculture; notes that production efficiency may also be an aim in itself, and that such funding should, in addition to improving the competitiveness of the agricultural sector, increase its resilience to challenges such as climate change and the spread of animal diseases; stresses the importance of ensuring adequate resources for training and knowledge exchange through European instruments, such as the Agricultural Knowledge and Innovation Systems;

    9. Highlights the fact that digitalisation is a crucial tool in the development and enhancement of the value of rural areas, including inner areas, and plays a key role in addressing depopulation and attracting young people to these areas; welcomes the digital transformation in agriculture and rural areas, including its use in irrigation, to improve the efficiency, environmental, social and economic sustainability, traceability and precision of agricultural systems, ensuring more effective use of the EU’s budgetary resources and promoting entrepreneurship in rural areas, thus making them more attractive to people and businesses; calls on the Commission and the Member States, in this context, to strengthen the technological and communications infrastructure in rural areas, including broadband internet coverage, and encourages them to leverage technologies to enhance access to critical information and digitalise administrative processes for CAP support so as to reduce the bureaucratic burden and enable more efficient access to support and services; recalls that the uptake of innovative digital technologies requires sufficient funding, as well as targeted training, education and support programmes for farmers, particularly for small-scale and older farmers, to ensure equitable and affordable access to digital tools;

    10. Notes with concern the continuing loss of farms and farmers, which has a significant socio-economic impact on rural areas; urges, therefore, the EU institutions and Member States to address labour and skills shortages by stepping up their efforts to promote generational renewal in the agricultural sector and rural areas, including in outermost regions and inner areas; highlights the importance of improving the profitability of the agricultural sector by enhancing fiscal and support measures that make farming activities more attractive and by improving access to land, financing and insurance, particularly for women, families involved in small-scale farming, marginalised groups and first-time farmers, such as young people; underlines that young farmers have the potential to be a driving force in sustainable and climate-friendly farming and highlights the need to empower them, including through the use of Union funds and adapted advisory and training tools; underlines that building and modernising rural infrastructure improves the quality of life in rural areas, which is essential for generational renewal; proposes, in this context, the inclusion of a specific indicator in future policies to monitor the rate of generational renewal and the level of services and infrastructure in rural areas;

    11. Calls for EU programmes to prioritise projects that safeguard existing jobs in the agricultural sector and promote the creation of quality employment; stresses that all jobs in the agricultural sector must respect workers’ rights, provide stable and regulated pay, and ensure good working conditions; emphasises the importance of effectively combating poverty and social exclusion in rural areas;

    12. Recalls the challenges that the agri-food sector has faced and is facing, such as the COVID-19 crisis, the harmful effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, natural disasters and rising input costs; regrets that direct payments and CAP subsidies have decreased significantly in real terms due to inflation, resulting in difficulties in implementing rural development measures, while the administrative burden on farmers has increased due to the accumulation of bureaucracy; calls on the Commission to allocate adequate resources to help farmers cope with those inflationary effects, including fuel costs, and underscores that the 2 % deflator of the current MFF does not compensate for the loss of value resulting from inflation; asks the Commission to provide a more flexible deflator in the next MFF and, furthermore, to work closely with the Member States to implement best practices at national and European levels to help farmers cope with inflation and record costs;

    13. Requests that, following the repeated economic crises and extreme weather events caused by climate change that have affected agricultural companies, the unspent resources of the 2014-2022 rural development plans be spent by 31 December 2026 as a derogation from the N+3 rules laid down in Article 38 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013[27];

    14. Welcomes the decision of the European Investment Bank to identify agriculture and the bio-economy as key priorities in its 2024-2027 Strategic Roadmap;

    15. Expresses its concern about the adverse effects on the European agri-food sector of political instability in certain Member States and at global level, as well as of geopolitical tensions related to trade or international crises; underlines that the signing of the Mercosur Agreement in December 2024 will have implications for Union farmers and producers; invites the Commission to improve trade agreements to protect EU farmers, to ensure fair competition and a level playing field, and to allocate sufficient funds to mitigate the negative effects of trade agreements on the agricultural sector; recalls that European farmers may face unfair competition from third country producers who do not meet the same production standards as those in the EU and calls therefore for a proper level of reciprocity; reiterates the negative cascade effects of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine on global food security and farmers’ livelihoods; highlights the need to make sure that the reform of the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine provides stability and protection for EU farmers; highlights the need to start better preparation for an enlargement of the Union, taking account of European farmers’ interests, especially with regard to the adoption of balanced and enhanced measures to safeguard the European agricultural sector, while also ensuring support for Ukraine;

    16. Calls on the Commission to encourage Member States to revise their national strategic plans, including the rapid use of funds from the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, and to provide funding to strengthen the relative negotiating positions of farmers in value chains, and for the Commission to swiftly approve these modifications;

    17. Stresses the vital importance of the programme of options specifically relating to remoteness and insularity (POSEI) for maintaining agricultural activity in the outermost regions of Europe, for the provision of food and agricultural products there and for the food sovereignty of the EU as a whole; calls for the budget of the scheme, which has not been increased since 2013, to be increased to reflect the real needs of farmers in the outermost regions, as farmers in those areas are facing higher production costs; calls therefore on the Commission to apply without delay a 2 % deflator to the POSEI financial envelopes in order to mitigate the substantial losses for producers in real terms and ensure fairer support for all farmers;

    18. Urges the Commission to ensure adequate resources for the implementation of an EU water management strategy and to continue developing water collection, storage and distribution activities, while preserving the status of water bodies, in order to render the use of water reserves more efficient in agriculture, both in crop irrigation and livestock farming, given that droughts are becoming increasingly severe across the Union.

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

    INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Date adopted

    18.2.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    34

    2

    8

    Members present for the final vote

    Sergio Berlato, Stefano Bonaccini, Mireia Borrás Pabón, Daniel Buda, Waldemar Buda, Gheorghe Cârciu, Asger Christensen, Barry Cowen, Carmen Crespo Díaz, Ivan David, Valérie Deloge, Paulo Do Nascimento Cabral, Herbert Dorfmann, Carlo Fidanza, Luke Ming Flanagan, Maria Grapini, Cristina Guarda, Martin Häusling, Krzysztof Hetman, Céline Imart, Elsi Katainen, Stefan Köhler, Norbert Lins, Cristina Maestre, Dario Nardella, Maria Noichl, Gilles Pennelle, André Rodrigues, Katarína Roth Neveďalová, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Eric Sargiacomo, Christine Singer, Raffaele Stancanelli, Anna Strolenberg, Pekka Toveri, Jessika Van Leeuwen, Veronika Vrecionová, Thomas Waitz, Maria Walsh

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Peter Agius, Benoit Cassart, Ton Diepeveen, Elisabetta Gualmini, Esther Herranz García

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    34

    +

    ECR

    Sergio Berlato, Waldemar Buda, Carlo Fidanza, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Veronika Vrecionová

    NI

    Katarína Roth Neveďalová

    PPE

    Peter Agius, Daniel Buda, Carmen Crespo Díaz, Paulo Do Nascimento Cabral, Herbert Dorfmann, Esther Herranz García, Krzysztof Hetman, Céline Imart, Stefan Köhler, Norbert Lins, Pekka Toveri, Jessika Van Leeuwen, Maria Walsh

    PfE

    Raffaele Stancanelli

    Renew

    Benoit Cassart, Asger Christensen, Barry Cowen, Elsi Katainen, Christine Singer

    S&D

    Stefano Bonaccini, Gheorghe Cârciu, Maria Grapini, Elisabetta Gualmini, Cristina Maestre, Dario Nardella, Maria Noichl, André Rodrigues, Eric Sargiacomo

     

    2

    PfE

    Ton Diepeveen

    The Left

    Luke Ming Flanagan

     

    8

    0

    ESN

    Ivan David

    PfE

    Mireia Borrás Pabón, Valérie Deloge, Gilles Pennelle

    Verts/ALE

    Cristina Guarda, Martin Häusling, Anna Strolenberg, Thomas Waitz

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY CONTROL (18.2.2025)

    Mr Johan Van Overtveldt

    Chair

    Committee on Budgets

    BRUSSELS

    Subject: Opinion on Guidelines for the 2026 Budget – Section III (2024/2110(BUI))

    Dear Mr Van Overtveldt,

    Under the procedure referred to above, the Committee on Budgetary Control has been asked to submit an opinion to your committee. At its meeting of 18 February 2025, the committee decided to send the opinion in the form of a letter.

    Yours sincerely,

    Niclas Herbst

     

    CONT Chair

    Rapporteur for the Commission Discharge

    OPINION

    1. Recalls its strong commitment to the fundamental principles and values enshrined in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU);

    2. Stresses the fundamental importance of respect for the rule of law to protect the financial interests of the Union in the implementation of EU funds; recalls the improvements needed in the application of the Rule of law Conditionality Regulation and a swifter follow-up by the Commission on breaches of the rule of law principles that affect or risk affecting the EU financial interests, including the Single Market dimension, as for example procurement and state aid;

    3. Stresses that the sound and timely implementation of the budget contributes to addressing more efficiently and effectively the needs and challenges faced by the Union and its citizens in different policy areas; warns that the implementation of the budget under time pressure may lead to an increase in errors and irregularities;

    4. Recalls that for the last years all available flexibility measures in the EU Budget were used; reiterates the need for flexibility in the EU Budget to address potential new circumstances where EU action is necessary; notes that increasingly the headroom in the EU Budget is used to provide funding to respond to crises; notes in addition, that exposure of the EU Budget to guarantees and contingent liabilities is projected to rise in the coming years, putting additional strain on the headroom in the Budget which further limits the flexibility of the EU Budget, as are the increased interest payments for NGEU related borrowing; urges the Commission to work on a more stringent risk assessment framework to define the exposure more accurately to prevent over-burdening of the EU Budget;

    5. Stresses the need to protect the EU Budget from any misuse, particularly fraud and corruption, and calls on the Commission to continue to be vigilant and proactive in the current and future cases when the lack of respect for Union values and the Rule of Law affect or threaten to affect the Union’s financial interests;

    6. Stresses the importance of the EU anti-fraud architecture and the need to provide increased resources and to strengthen the role of the European anti-fraud office (OLAF), the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) in the fight against fraud and corruption; stresses the need for a comprehensive cooperation between all these institutions;

    7. Notes that while the digital transformation is indispensable to increase the efficiency, control and transparency of the EU Budget, this shift has also heightened its exposure to cyber fraud affecting the financial interests of the Union; calls on the Commission to allocate sufficient funds to strengthen EU digital infrastructure, research and development while ensuring that investments in cybersecurity are impactful and contribute to the overall protection of the Union’s financial interests;

    8. Is concerned that total outstanding commitments are reaching record levels for several years now; notes that the Commission projects outstanding commitments to decrease after 2024, when NGEU draws to a close; considers that until the projected decrease of the RAL, the risk of decommitments, and a related reduction of EU added value for the EU Budget, remains high; calls on the Commission to enact a more strategic, transparent, and proactive approach to managing decommitments, also considering the use of decommitments in the cascade mechanism;

    9. Is concerned that the Union’s debt continues to rise, with a large share of this increase attributed to the temporary recovery instrument NGEU; is concerned that the increased debt and the associated higher interest costs will have long-term consequences on the EU’s fiscal stability, potentially leading to greater financial strain and a reduced capacity to respond to future challenges or invest in key strategic areas; encourages the Commission to explore options to reduce the overall debt burden, such as optimising the timing and structure of debt issuance, and consider alternative financing mechanisms that could reduce reliance on high-interest debt; stresses that introducing new own resources is also necessary to prevent future generations from bearing the burden for past debts;

    10. Expresses regret that the overall error rate estimated by the Court has been increasing since the 2020 financial year, reaching 5,6 % for the 2023 financial year; notes significant variations in error rates across different budget headings, with some areas reporting error rates below the materiality threshold of 2 %, while cohesion policy has an error rate as high as 9,3 %; notes in particular the conclusion that errors found in 100 % EU-funded priorities contributed 5,0 % to the total estimated level of error of 9,3 %; is concerned that increasing flexibilities without at the same time either decreasing requirements or increasing ex ante checks and controls contributed to the high error rate; calls on the Commission to take careful consideration of the lessons learned from the implementation of EU crisis response tools, such as increased flexibility;

    11. Notes that the Court issued a qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of the RRF expenditure in 2023; expresses concern that the Court found 7 out of 23 RRF payments made in 2023 were impacted by quantitative issues, with 6 of these payments being affected by material errors; notes in addition that absorption of RRF funds was delayed in 2023, and that Member States may not be able to complete all measures at the end of the RRF’s implementation period; notes further that the second half of the RRF’s implementation period (post 2023) is more challenging with an increase in number of milestones and targets to be implemented, a shift from reforms to investments, and a high proportion of measures to be completed in the last year; calls on the Commission to support the Member States’ authorities in the implementation of funds, in particular where additional administrative capacity is needed, to stimulate absorption and reduce the occurrence of errors; calls on the Commission to transparently inform the Parliament about the progress of implementation and absorption of funds and to timely propose solutions where bottlenecks in the implementation are observed;

    12. Recalls the importance of protecting the Union’s own resources from any fraudulent irregularity and, to that end, stimulate the cooperation between anti-fraud services and customs agencies to detect, prevent and correct fraud affecting Union revenue; recalls its position on the amended Commission proposals endorsing the introduction of new own resources.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR FOR OPINION HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The Chair in his capacity as rapporteur for opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

    LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ENVIRONMENT, CLIMATE AND FOOD SAFETY (18.2.2025)

     

    Mr Johan Van Overtveldt

    Chair

    Committee on Budgets

    BRUSSELS

     

    Subject: Opinion on Guidelines for the 2026 Budget – Section III (2024/2110(BUI))

    Dear Mr Chair,

    The Coordinators of the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI) decided on 16 December 2024 that ENVI would provide an opinion on the Guidelines for the 2026 budget – Section III (2024/2110(BUI)) in the form of a letter. Therefore, as both ENVI Chair and Standing Rapporteur for the Budget, let me provide you with ENVI’s contribution in the form of resolution paragraphs, which was adopted by ENVI at its meeting[28] of 18 February 2025 and which I kindly request will be taken into account by your committee:

    1. Highlights that the current serious geopolitical context requires the Union to allocate sufficient resources for accelerating the green transition to transform the EU into a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy; calls on the Commission and Member States to ensure the full execution of the REPowerEU Plan to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy sources and of energy efficiency technologies to speed up the green transition and end dependency on fossil fuels

    2. Stresses the importance of the Paris Agreement’s goal of keeping the global average temperature increase below 1,5°C compared to pre-industrial times; recalls the Union’s obligations to deliver the financial commitments made for international climate financing; considers that the Union should continue leading the efforts towards decarbonisation at global level;

    3. Stresses that the Union’s budget for 2026 should be aligned with the realisation of the European Union’s objectives to reduce pollution and enhance biodiversity, as well as the long-term vision for a prosperous, modern, competitive and climate-neutral economy, the legally enshrined objective to reach climate neutrality by 2050 and the Union’s intermediate climate targets for 2030 and 2040, as laid down in the European Climate Law;

    4. Points out that the European Green Deal is a growth strategy, whose effective implementation with adequate funding  is fundamentally connected to the Union’s strength and competitiveness; believes that the future Clean Industrial Deal and Circular Economy Act should further increase the Union’s competitiveness capacity and sustainability and resource-efficiency to achieve the European Green Deal objectives and ensure a just and inclusive transition;

    5. Reminds that the EU’s long-term budget for 2021-2027, together with NextGenerationEU, is aimed at implementing the EU’s long-term priorities in various areas, including climate and the environment; emphasizes, specifically, that 30 % of total EU expenditures under the MFF have to be allocated to climate-related projects, including clean-tech and innovation projects; stresses that the future Multi-Financial Framework post-2027 should maintain the level of ambition on climate and environment protection;

    6. Considers it unacceptable that the Union did not reach its objective of allocating at least 7.5 % of annual expenditure to biodiversity in 2024;  calls on the Member States and Commission to take the necessary measures to ensure that the 10 % objective will be reached in both 2026 and 2027 in order to achieve concrete outcomes, including the objectives set in the Kunming-Montreal Agreement, whilst ensuring cost-effectiveness and long-term sustainability; notes the importance of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) to reach biodiversity objectives;

    7. Emphasises the need to allocate sufficient funding for each individual budget line that contributes to the achievement of the green transition, with a particular focus on sustainability, climate change, innovation, competitiveness, resource-efficiency and biodiversity conservation, such as attention to bees and pollinators’ protection and their role as indicators for healthy ecosystems; emphasizes the importance of the Social Climate Fund (SCF), established to support vulnerable groups in the Union’s green transition;

    8. Highlights the importance of improving disaster prevention and preparedness by implementing climate adaptation measures, allowing the Union to better prevent and respond to emergencies like recent climate change events; emphasizes the ongoing need to ensure sufficient funding for the Union’s civil protection mechanism;

    9. Notes the relevance of the reports adopted by the European Court of Auditors (ECA) in relation to the management of EU funds linked to climate and environment; urges the Commission and the Member States to implement the recommendations of the reports, in particular report 15/2024 on climate adaptation[29] regarding the need to ensure that all relevant EU-funded projects are adapted to the current and future climate conditions; recalls the importance of the ECA recommendations in its special report 14/2024[30], emphasising the need for the Commission to better estimate climate spending under future funding instruments, to ensure their adequate design, and to enhance the performance of green transition measures; 

    10. Emphasises the need for more ambitious funding allocations for programs like LIFE to support climate and environment-related projects, as well as for the Just Transition Fund to assist the most vulnerable carbon-intensive regions in addressing the economic and social impacts of the climate transition to leave no one behind; emphasises that the funding under LIFE is crucial for the protection of nature and biodiversity, the transition towards an energy efficient, circular, climate neutral, competitive and climate resilient economy and for democratic participation in decision-making processes;  notes that efficient and result-driven climate and biodiversity financing should be integrated into programming activities, while remaining flexible enough to address the diverse needs of different regions and sectors;

    11. Reminds that a stronger European Health Union requires adequate funding with health-related expenditure that follows the ‘One Health’ and ‘Health in all policies’ approaches, securing the proper implementation of, inter alia, the European Health Data Space and of the Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan;

    12. Strongly reiterates its regrets over the redeployment from the EU4Health programme of 1 billion EUR over the 2025-2027 period; considers that this funding shortfall threatens the programme’s ability to achieve its critical objectives; renews its call for the Commission, Member States, and other stakeholders to identify practical solutions to offset this cut, ensuring that the programme’s objective of building stronger, more resilient, and more accessible health systems is achieved; calls as well for increased amounts allocated to Cluster Health in Horizon Europe; recognises that stronger health systems directly contribute to economic stability and productivity by reducing health-related workforce disruptions and increasing the resilience of the labour market;

    13. Highlights the importance of effectively allocating sufficient human and financial resources to all relevant DGs for the implementation of the adopted legislation related to climate environment, chemicals and health as well as to the relevant European agencies, including the European Environment Agency (EEA), the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the European Medicines Agency (EMA);

    14. Highlights the need for a strengthened EU own resources system that can address current challenges while supporting the Union’s environmental, climate and health objectives; stresses the importance of implementing the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism effectively, enabling the Commission to take compensatory measures to address any shortfalls in meeting the EU budget’s overall climate spending target.

    I have sent a similar letter to Mr Andrzej Halicki, general rapporteur for the 2026 budget.

    Yours sincerely,

    Antonio Decaro

     

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The Chair in his capacity as rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

     

    LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRY, RESEARCH AND ENERGY (19.2.2025)

    Mr Johan VAN OVERTVELDT

    Chair

    Committee on Budgets

     

    BRUSSELS

    Subject: Opinion in the form of a letter on the Guidelines for the 2026 budget – Section III (2024/2110(BUI))

    Dear Mr Chair,

    Under the procedure referred to above, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy has been asked to submit an opinion to your committee. On 19 February 2024, the committee adopted an opinion in the form of letter during its regular meeting.

    The Committee on Industry, Research and Energy calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions into its motion for a resolution.

    Yours sincerely,

    Borys BUDKA  

    ITRE Chair

     

    SUGGESTIONS

    1.  Recalls that the Union Budget for 2026 should concretely reflect the political priorities of the new legislative term, considering also the various pledges made by Commissioners during their confirmation hearings in Parliament in November 2024; insists that the 2026 budget needs to fully implement all programmes agreed under the current Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), as well as set  in motion and finance new strategic EU initiatives, such as the Clean Industrial Deal for competitive industries and quality jobs; underscores that the 2026 budget must be aligned with the Union’s objectives and international commitments;

    2.  Notes that multiple challenges facing Europe require greater investment and coordination at European level, as well as more concrete action by Member States; calls on the Commission to propose a Union Budget for 2026 that reflects the urgent nature of these challenges; among others, the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine and hybrid attacks on Member States and their energy and digital infrastructure; maintains this requires multiple forms of EU and national level investments and preparedness, including improving the resilience of digital and energy infrastructure, direct support for Ukraine, accelerated investment in Europe’s defence industry, and support for the EU’s Eastern border regions most directly impacted by the war and Russian hybrid operations; the need to strengthen Europe’s economic competitiveness and industrial base in a volatile environment where global competitors benefit from extensive state support, leading to unfair competition for European companies; the urgent necessity to improve Europe’s research and innovation capabilities, including greater support for SMEs, start-ups and scale-ups; the digital revolution, including the acceleration of artificial intelligence and growing concerns about cybersecurity; and the need to achieve a just climate transition, as we adapt our economy to the Union’s long-term energy goals and climate neutrality by 2050, by accelerating the decarbonisation in Europe’s energy markets, implementing European Green Deal legislation and achieving a circular economy;

    3.  Notes that EU companies face considerably higher electricity and gas prices compared with the USA, China and other global actors, which presents a significant competitiveness disadvantage, especially but not only for Europe’s energy intensive industries; emphasises the need to  tackle energy poverty and limit the damaging effects of high energy prices on European consumers, many of whom are already struggling with a high cost of living; stresses the importance of reducing EU dependence on fossil-fuels and improving energy efficiency; underlines that security of supply concerns remain paramount and should be addressed in the 2026 budget, given  that energy supplies are easily weaponised by state actors; insists on the need to improve energy interconnections, modernise energy grids, integrate a higher share of renewables while ensuring sufficient clean baseload energy and system flexibilities, therefore calls for significantly increased funding for the Connecting Europe Facility – Energy, which is the flagship EU programme in this field but currently has limited resources to credibly advance Europe towards an interconnected, resilient and decarbonised energy system, able to deliver affordable prices; calls for urgently ending any remaining EU import dependencies on Russia:

    4.   Recalls the need to strengthen the resilience of the EU economy and the competitiveness of Union industries, with ambitious EU industrial policies that can create quality jobs and contribute significantly towards achieving the EU’s social, digital and green objectives, whilst preserving a level playing field in the Single Market; therefore believes that the Union Budget for 2026 should mark the start of the investment boost recommended in the Draghi report by investing strongly in industrial competitiveness, open strategic autonomy and creating pathways towards decarbonisation, while securing EU supply chains for strategic sectors and technologies and improving access to critical raw materials; insists that the 2026 budget must continue strengthening the Union’s competitiveness with increased support for SMEs, midcaps and start-ups, including greater support for scale up to compete globally, in particular through the European Innovation Council;

    5.  Recalls that the 2026 budget for Horizon Europe will be the first after the mid-term review of this strategic EU programme, and therefore needs to offer sufficient investment in fundamental and applied research, foster collaborative research and facilitate the scale-up and commercialisation of research results to ensure Europe can retain and further develop the necessary knowledge base to confront the scientific and economic challenges of the coming decades; regrets that the existing level of Horizon Europe funding is ultimately insufficient to develop the ideas and technologies necessary for the twin green and digital transitions, or to fully deliver on the stated EU goals of sustainable growth and open strategic autonomy; calls for an increase in the 2026 budget for Horizon Europe, including through the reuse of all available decommitments allowing each sub-programme to fund at least 50% of all excellent proposals, given that presently a majority of excellent proposals remain unfunded; calls for maintaining stable and sufficient funding of the ITER project;

    6.  Stresses that significant investments are necessary to address Europe’s connectivity gap and other Digital Decade 2030 targets; recalls that the European Commission estimates that achieving the full gigabit target could exceed €200 billion; calls therefore for adequate resources to be allocated to provide high speed connectivity including gigabit and 5G services, in addition to investments in next generation digital infrastructures and emerging technologies; calls for further investments that foster the development of European digital sovereignty and an EU-based digital sector in order to catch up in crucial areas such as quantum computing and Artificial Intelligence; calls on the Commission to allocate sufficient resources to ensure the full implementation and robust enforcement of the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act; stresses the importance of tackling foreign interference, addressing the dangers of biased algorithms, and safeguarding transparency, accountability, and the integrity of the digital public space.

    7.  Underlines that a strong and sustainable European space sector is fundamental for European security, open strategic autonomy, secure connectivity, protection of critical infrastructure and advancing the twin green and digital transitions; regrets that EU and its Member States funding for space programmes is highly fragmented and only a fraction of the level in the US, while other global actors including China are rapidly increasing investments; calls on the Commission and Member States to ensure sufficient funding for the European space industry, which includes fostering investments from the private sector; calls furthermore for a sufficient level of  EU investments supporting R&I in the field of space;

    8.  Calls for adequate funding and staffing for all agencies and Union bodies in the policy areas of industry, research, energy, space and cybersecurity, in order to cope with increased workload and new regulatory obligations; 

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

    LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON CULTURE AND EDUCATION (19.2.2025)

    Mr Johan Van Overtveldt

    Chair

    Committee on Budgets

    BRUSSELS

    Subject: Opinion on Guidelines for the 2026 Budget –Section III 2024/2110(BUI)

    Dear Mr Van Overtveldt,

    to above, the Committee on Culture and Education has been asked to submit an opinion to your committee. At its meeting of 3 December 2024, the committee decided to send the opinion in the form of a letter. It considered the matter at its meeting of 19 February 2025 and adopted the opinion at that meeting[31].

    The Committee on Culture and Education:

    1. Insists that funding for the most successful EU and crucial programmes like Erasmus+, the European Solidarity Corps (ESC), Creative Europe and the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme has to be excluded from debt repayment needs for the European Union Recovery Instrument (EURI) over the whole remaining MFF period; stresses that the ‘EURI cascade mechanism’ has to be implemented effectively, protecting important programme initiatives that directly benefit citizens;

    2. Welcomes further simplification in line with EP calls, e.g. through the use of lump sums in Erasmus+ , for the programmes that are close to the citizens and need to be accessible also for organisations with limited administrative capacities, and calls for further efforts to achieve that end; underlines that attention should be given to peripheral, mountainous and rural areas that experience more difficulties in accessing EU funds; calls on the Commission to continue to share regularly with Parliament, including the Committee on Culture and Education, updated indicators and statistics on the absorption of funds in these programmes;

    3. Welcomes that mobility grants under Erasmus+ were increased to offset rising living costs, upon Parliament’s insistence on an increase to the programme’s budget, to ensure that the programme remains accessible and inclusive;

    4. Stresses necessary efforts to widen participation and to meet inclusivity targets in order to widen the participation of the most vulnerable youth groups and people with disabilities;

    5. Strongly warns against any cuts, and calls for an increase of the funding for the programme, taking into account the high implementation rates and absorption capacities of the programme; calls in particular to preserve funding to initiatives that support teacher development, such as the European Universities and the Erasmus+ Teacher Academies; highlights the growing number of applicants – e.g. a 94% increase  in school education mobility applications from 2022 to 2023 ; regrets, however, the consequence of  lower success rates, notably for school accreditations, which underscores the need for a substantial funding increase to meet the growing demand;

    6. Insists that all funding initially allocated to the programme will be used for investing in the future of young people;

    7. Emphasises the need to support sport under Erasmus+ to promote its role in improving physical and mental health and social inclusion, and to fight discrimination;

    8. Deplores the additional, unanticipated costs for the media strand of Creative Europe, including the implementation of not only the AVMSD, but also of EMFA, including the secretariat of the European Board for Media Services, an additional expenditure that was not taken into account when the current MFF was set up; insists that new initiatives should always be financed from fresh money;

    9. Stresses that the budget for the Creative Europe programme is insufficient to meet the high demand for projects across all its strands, with alarmingly low success rates (e.g. 17% in 2023 under the culture strand); calls for an increase of its funding and highlights the need for synergies between Creative Europe and other EU funds.

    10. Calls for an increase in funding for the ESC programme, given the modest year-on-year increases of about 2% of its budget under the MFF, which is not sufficient to offset inflation rates, and the fact that it is heavily over-subscribed, resulting in a high rejection rate and, therefore, in many cases, disappointment for the young applicants; welcomes the fact that the number of participants with fewer opportunities in the programme (38%)  is the highest of any EU programme and should be maintained;

    11. Stresses the importance of the CERV programme for building bridges between European citizens from different Member States and promoting their engagement and participation in the democratic life of the Union, while also contributing to preserving social cohesion and helping to prevent democratic backsliding, particularly in the current challenging political situation; insists, therefore, on an increase for its budget;

    12. Points out that pilot projects and preparatory actions (PPs and PAs) serve as testbeds for new policy initiatives and need adequate funding to properly fulfil that function; deplores any attempts to thwart potentially successful proposals for PPs and PAs already at the selection stage and calls for better cooperation between the Commission and the European Parliament on the selection and implementation of PPs and PAs.

    Yours sincerely,

    Nela Riehl

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

    LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS (18.2.2025)

    Mr Johan Van Overtveldt

    Chair

    Committee on Budgets

    BRUSSELS

    Subject: Opinion on Guidelines for the 2026 Budget – Section III (2024/2110(BUI))

    Dear Mr Van Overtveldt,

    Under the procedure referred to above, the Committee on Constitutional Affairs has been asked to submit an opinion to your committee. At its meeting of 29 January 2025, the committee decided to send the opinion in the form of a letter.

    The Committee on Constitutional Affairs considered the matter at its meeting of 18 February 2025. At that meeting[32], it decided to submit the opinion set out below to the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible.

    Yours sincerely,

    Sven Simon

     

     

    OPINION

    1. Points out that future substantial EU enlargement cannot be met without a larger EU budget and sufficient new own resources; calls for the necessary budgetary and institutional reforms to be agreed and adopted before substantial enlargement takes place;

    2. Reminds of the need to secure proper financing for the structures within the EU institutions that are responsible for communication with citizens and countering disinformation such as the Commission Representations and European Parliament Liaison Offices, in order to enable them to effectively fulfil their tasks;

    3. Recommends that the Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations receives adequate resources, in particular for staffing purposes in view of the significant enlargement of its tasks as foreseen by the Commission proposal for the recast of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 1141/2014;

    4. Urges the Committee on Budgets to incorporate the above mentioned budget lines augmentations in its position, as they serve the purpose of delivering concrete results and quality communication to citizens.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The Chair declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

     

     

    INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    Date adopted

    20.3.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    27

    8

    0

    Members present for the final vote

    Georgios Aftias, Rasmus Andresen, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Olivier Chastel, Tamás Deutsch, Angéline Furet, Thomas Geisel, Andrzej Halicki, Monika Hohlmeier, Alexander Jungbluth, Fabienne Keller, Ondřej Kovařík, Janusz Lewandowski, Victor Negrescu, Danuše Nerudová, João Oliveira, Karlo Ressler, Bogdan Rzońca, Julien Sanchez, Hélder Sousa Silva, Nicolae Ştefănuță, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs, Lucia Yar, Auke Zijlstra

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Stine Bosse, Mohammed Chahim, Rasmus Nordqvist

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Sakis Arnaoutoglou, Łukasz Kohut, Marit Maij, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Mirosława Nykiel, Leire Pajín, Krzysztof Śmiszek

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    27

    +

    ECR

    Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Bogdan Rzońca

    PPE

    Georgios Aftias, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Andrzej Halicki, Monika Hohlmeier, Łukasz Kohut, Janusz Lewandowski, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Karlo Ressler, Hélder Sousa Silva

    Renew

    Stine Bosse, Olivier Chastel, Fabienne Keller, Lucia Yar

    S&D

    Sakis Arnaoutoglou, Mohammed Chahim, Marit Maij, Victor Negrescu, Leire Pajín, Krzysztof Śmiszek, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs

    Verts/ALE

    Rasmus Andresen, Rasmus Nordqvist, Nicolae Ştefănuță

     

    8

    ESN

    Alexander Jungbluth

    NI

    Thomas Geisel

    PfE

    Tamás Deutsch, Angéline Furet, Ondřej Kovařík, Julien Sanchez, Auke Zijlstra

    The Left

    João Oliveira

     

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Amid U.S. threats, Canada’s national security plans must include training in non-violent resistance

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Richard Sandbrook, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of Toronto

    Canadians are currently learning tough lessons about national security thanks to United States President Donald Trump’s repeated annexation threats.

    It’s clear that American proclamations of support for universal human rights, national sovereignty and a rules-based international order can vanish with a change of leadership. These ideals, though tarnished by some past U.S. actions, have now been replaced by the predatory dictum known as “might makes right.”

    Although it seems unthinkable that Trump will invade Canada, we live in an increasingly unstable world and Canadians need to be prepared for the worst. In the midst of a federal election campaign, party leaders need to present innovative ideas to fight Trump and potential American aggression.




    Read more:
    An American military invasion of Canada? No longer unthinkable, but highly unlikely


    More than military defence

    Unfortunately, the common assumption is that national security depends wholly on military strength and alliances. But the emergency Canada is now facing demands a rethink.

    Of course, Canada would not dispense with its military. It’s needed, especially to defend Canada’s northern frontier. However, Canada cannot match the U.S. in military power, nor would anything be achieved if it broke its commitments to the United Nations’ Non-Proliferation Treaty — a pact designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons — by acquiring nukes.

    Either of these tactics would be suicidal. Canada’s real strength is its unity and institutions.

    Canadians can paralyze military might through civil, non-violent resistance. Familiarity with these techniques could empower Canadian citizens to preserve a vibrant democracy.

    Non-violent resistance can not only a more effective defence, but also much less devastating in terms of lives lost and property destroyed. Responding to an invasion with military force would only mean widespread casualties and the destruction of Canada’s largest cities.

    Canada should therefore aim to subvert the will of the occupying force, not drive it, through armed defence, to fear, hatred and further violence.

    What is civil defence?

    Non-violent resistance involves using a country’s citizens and institutions to deter an invasion, and if that fails, to defeat and drive out the invaders. It has a long history both as a spiritual practice and a strategic weapon.

    Civil defence, however, only emerged as a strategic concept in the 1980s and 1990s. It is a system of deterrence and defence that relies on a united and resolute citizenry employing only non-violent tactics.

    An early American proponent was the Albert Einstein Institution’s Gene Sharp, an American political scientist. Recent advocates from around the world — Srdja Popovic, Erica Chenoworth and Michael Beer — follow in Sharp’s footsteps.

    Civil defence is not merely a theory. There is a long history of improvised civilian resistance to invasions, most recently in Ukraine.

    Ukrainians undertook many inspirational acts of non-violent resistance following the Russian invasion in 2022. They blocked tanks and convoys, berated or cajoled Russian soldiers to undermine their resolve, gave the wrong directions to Russian convoys, refused to co-operate and mounted spontaneous protests in occupied towns. But then the bloody carnage on both sides overwhelmed civilian defence.

    Countries that include Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, Germany and Lithuania have institutionalized civil defence at various times. In Canada, civil defence was part of the mandate of Public Safety Canada during the Cold War. The idea then faded, being replaced by emergency management.

    Public Safety Canada protected Canadians from both human-made and natural disasters. The agency, now the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness of Canada, should be resuscitated. The toll being exacted by climate disasters is reason enough.

    Making Canada ungovernable

    Non-violent resistance involves determined citizens deterring an aggressor by signalling that the targeted country is united in opposition to a takeover.

    A potential aggressor fears contagion from the democratic ethos of these citizens. If invaded, the civilians defeat the invaders by rendering their society ungovernable by the aggressor.

    When the Warsaw Pact army invaded Czechoslovakia to crush the “Prague Spring” in 1968, the commanders soon learned that tanks and heavily armed soldiers were useless against unarmed civilians who refused to comply. The country was unruleable. Soviet troops were also infected with the democratic spirit and had to be rotated out of the country. It took several months and concessions from the Soviet Union before order could be restored.

    The invader cannot consolidate control if citizens and their institutions refuse to comply with its rule. The tactics involve a complete refusal to co-operate with the occupying force along with open defiance.

    That means that governments at all levels in the invaded nation continue to supply only basic services: clean water, electricity and policing, for example. Governments resign and civil servants find ways to subvert every order issued by the invader.

    Crowds fill urban squares in silent or derisory defiance of orders, making it apparent to all — the occupiers, the dictator’s audience back home, less committed citizens and global observers — who are the true purveyors of violence against non-violent people

    Throughout the occupation, citizens and non-governmental organizations focus on subverting the loyalty and morale of the occupying troops and functionaries and rallying international support.

    In Canada’s case, the long history of friendship with Americans would likely mean that the morale of the occupiers would be low. The aim is to encourage defections by soldiers and functionaries, and erode the support base of the dictator. This erosion of support could lead to the overthrow of the leader, or at least to his concoction of a compromise to cover a retreat.

    Attracting international support to Canada’s cause would not be a challenge. Trump has already alienated most of humankind and foreign governments during his first weeks in office.

    Obstacles

    Non-violent resistance is most effective with nation-wide training, organization and leadership. The national government is best equipped to provide the facilities. Training of volunteers could include responding to natural disasters and emergencies, as well as implementing a civil defence strategy.

    Yet partisan divides and apathy make such nationwide training difficult. It would likely be viewed with suspicion by right-wing populist forces in this era of conspiracy theories and misinformation.




    Read more:
    How conspiracy theories polarize society and provoke violence


    Apathy might also be a problem.

    These considerations suggest that top-down, apolitical training in civilian defence may not work. If so, training and organization should be the goal of as many existing civil society associations as possible: churches, synagogues, temples, civil rights groups, unions, Indigenous rights organizations, peace advocates and climate groups, for example.

    The manual authored by Michael Beer, the longtime director of the Nonviolence International non-governmental organization, includes more than 300 tactics. Widespread training and organization can not only deter aggression but ensure countries remain free of tyrants.

    Canada’s leverage

    Amid the ongoing threats against Canadian sovereignty, Canada is an ideal candidate for effective civil defence. Although it might be unlikely Trump will order a military invasion of Canada, a united country capable of non-violent resistance decreases the risk.

    Canada cannot match the U.S. in firepower or economic strength. But it shares with America a language, a history of common struggles, myriad cross-border personal relationships and basic democratic values still considered important by many Americans, if not Trump.

    All of these factors give Canada considerable leverage.

    Richard Sandbrook is Vice-President of Science for Peace, a registered charity.

    ref. Amid U.S. threats, Canada’s national security plans must include training in non-violent resistance – https://theconversation.com/amid-u-s-threats-canadas-national-security-plans-must-include-training-in-non-violent-resistance-252451

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Pakistani exports stifling the Beet sector – P-001167/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-001167/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Anne-Sophie Frigout (PfE), Barbara Bonte (PfE), Anna Maria Cisint (PfE), Hermann Tertsch (PfE), Irmhild Boßdorf (ESN)

    The beet sector is going through a major crisis, triggered by the ban on neonicotinoids, for which a solution has yet to be found. This crisis has been aggravated by the lift on customs duties for Ukraine, whose sugar exports increased from 20 000 tonnes pre-war to 500 000 tonnes in 2023.

    The EU-Mercosur trade agreement risks increasing the strain, as it would see a further 190 000 tonnes of sugar and 650 000 tonnes of ethanol imported into the EU. Also contributing to this destabilisation are the exports of industrial alcohol from Pakistan, exempt from customs duties, which benefit from the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP+) in return for efforts to ensure human and labour rights are upheld. Since 2018, its exports have increased from 2 % to 20 % of the EU market, rising by more than 200 % between 2021 to 2022. Yet we are witnessing the sharpest democratic backsliding since 2008, with the agricultural sector under the control of the Pakistani army and fundamental rights clearly being violated[1].

    In accordance with Regulation (EU) 2015/478 and Regulation (EU) 978/2012:

    • 1.Will the Commission activate the safeguard clause on the basis of the evidence provided for over a year by the EU industry concerned?
    • 2.Will it investigate the failure to comply with the principles of good governance laid down in the GSP+?

    Supporters[2]

    Submitted: 19.3.2025

    • [1] https://www.radiofrance.fr/franceculture/podcasts/la-revue-de-presse-internationale/la-revue-de-presse-internationale-emission-du-vendredi-31-janvier-2025-7626409
    • [2] This question is supported by Members other than the authors: Julie Rechagneux (PfE), Mélanie Disdier (PfE), Malika Sorel (PfE), Julien Leonardelli (PfE), Valérie Deloge (PfE), Gilles Pennelle (PfE)
    Last updated: 25 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News