NewzIntel.com

Category: Weather

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Statement by IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi on the Occasion of the International Conference on Nuclear Security 2024

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

    When we met the last time, at ICONS 2020, many of us could not have imagined the momentous change we would experience between then and today, change that would affect billions of people, international peace and security, and nuclear security. A global pandemic was in the making and a war – in Ukraine – for first time soon would be fought among the facilities of one of Europe’s biggest nuclear power programmes.

    Meanwhile, profound technological advances have been made. Assessing their impact on nuclear security is a crucial task. Artificial Intelligence, and unmanned vehicles pose both a threat to nuclear security and offer new tools with which to enhance it. In the nuclear field itself, Small Modular Reactors promise new opportunities for applications such as desalination and power brought to remote communities via barge, but also require us to consider new security elements.

    The use of nuclear science and technology, often facilitated by the IAEA, has come on in leaps and bounds. Climate change and the drive for energy security are fuelling a desire for nuclear power. At this past Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, COP28, world leaders – those whose states use nuclear power and those whose do not – for the first time in nearly 30 years of COP meetings agreed nuclear power must be part of the transition to net zero. More than 20 countries have signed a pledge towards tripling nuclear power capacity and at the IAEA’s Nuclear Energy Summit in March heads of state agreed on the urgent need for conducive financial conditions. 

    Nuclear security is relevant throughout all the steps of the nuclear fuel cycle and is part of the social contract that underpins the existence and growth of nuclear power. Nuclear power programmes require national nuclear security threat assessments and “security by design”. Nurturing relevant research and a strong security culture are key, not only in countries with NPPs.

    The use of life-saving and life-affirming applications of nuclear science and technology is growing, from cancer patients gaining access to radiotherapy to farmers benefiting from new crop varieties developed with the help of irradiation. IAEA initiative such as Rays of Hope: Cancer care for all; Nutec Plastics; Zoonotic Disease Integrated Action (ZODIAC); and Atoms4Food are key vehicles facilitating wider access.

    All these opportunities to use nuclear and radioactive material depend on a strong and adaptive global nuclear security regime. For countries new to using nuclear and radioactive material, this means building up legal infrastructure, practices and culture that bolster nuclear security.  Nationally and across borders, collaboration and laser-focused vigilance are key to preventing groups with malicious intent from using nuclear and radioactive material to cause panic and harm.

    The threats to nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities are real and varied. The international nuclear security threat landscape keeps evolving. Today, anyone can type a few words into a computer and generative AI can create images of nuclear Armageddon, meaning it is now possible to spread panic about radiation fallout without a nuclear device. Risk scenarios include theft of nuclear and other radioactive material for use in improvised devices and sabotage at nuclear installations or during transport of nuclear and radioactive material. The risk of cyber-attacks requires the implementation of computer security programmes by those who use nuclear power and those who don’t. Risks come from outsiders and from those within the fold who are disgruntled or have been corrupted.

    Nuclear security is the national responsibility of individual states, but it also benefits enormously from close collaboration and the enabling role of the IAEA.  ICONS, which started in 2013, has been the place for ministers, policymakers, senior officials, and experts to gather to assesses current priorities, prepare for new challenges, and engage in scenario-based policy discussions. ICONS 2024, presided over by the co-presidents, HE Tim Watts, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia and HE Sungat Yessimkhanov, Vice-Minister of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, covers the themes of policy, law and regulation; technology and infrastructure for prevention, detection and response; capacity building; and cross-cutting areas, such as the interface between nuclear security and nuclear safety. ICONS is the most important high-level international meeting on nuclear security. At this time of heightened tensions, it is imperative that there remains a unity of purpose and that nuclear security does not become a political football.

    This year marks the 10-year anniversary of the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Security. The IAEA is at the forefront of adapting nuclear security to new challenges, including war. The seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security have broad international support. They have brought crucial clarity at a time of war and are testament to the adaptiveness of the IAEA and the security regime.

    Those seven pillars are backed up by an enormous ongoing effort by the IAEA to support Ukraine, including through the continuous presence of IAEA experts at all of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants, including Zaporizhzhya NPP on the front lines of the war. When there were allegations of nuclear security breaches, the IAEA was there to investigate with impartiality and science. We set the facts straight that no nuclear material had been diverted, cutting through the fog of war, and diffusing a tense situation.   

    Not all our efforts require quite as much courage as our experts have shown in Ukraine, nor do they make international headlines. But every day, the IAEA – the Secretariat and the Member States – work together fastidiously to underpin nuclear security, never resting, always learning.

    Radioactive sources are extensively used in many domains, including medicine, industry, agriculture and research. An incident in one State can have far-reaching consequences for others, so security for one is security for all. That means supporting States with no, or less developed nuclear security infrastructure makes everyone safer. That support, which often comes via the IAEA, includes making lawmakers aware of their responsibilities.

    Nuclear Security requires the implementation of appropriate and robust legislative regulatory frameworks. In 2022, the first Conference of the Parties to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (A/CPPNM) was held under the auspices of the IAEA. Reflecting the global importance of the legal framework and of nuclear security, parties managed to agree an outcome document and for the IAEA convene a subsequent conference. Since 2020, 14 new parties have joined the A/CPPNM bringing the total to 136. Five new Parties joined the CPPNM, bringing that total to 164. In addition to the A/CPPNM, political commitment to legally non-binding instruments, like the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary guidance, is a strong indication of radiation safety and nuclear security culture.

    But legal frameworks are just the beginning. They must be implemented. The IAEA plays a central role in assisting its Members States so they are able to do that. Last year we inaugurated the most visible symbol of our collaboration: the Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre (NSTDC). This first-of-its-kind space, made possible by 15 donors, is a cornerstone for capacity building amid the growing need for sophisticated hands-on nuclear security training using advanced, specialized equipment. The NSTDC is part of a wide range of services offered by the IAEA, including peer reviews, such as the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS), of which there have now been more than 100, and Advisory Missions on Regulatory Infrastructure for Radiation Safety and Nuclear Security (RISS), a service we launched in 2022. Our Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) now has 145 members and has enabled the reporting of more than 600 incidents in which nuclear or radioactive material went out of regulatory control.  Almost 8,000 people have benefited from our training in nuclear security, and we continue to work very hard to remove barriers that prevent talent from entering the field.  In March 2021, we launched the Women in Nuclear Security Initiative (WINSI) to support the achievement of gender equality in nuclear security. Meanwhile, the IAEA’s Marie Sklodowska Curie Fellowship Programme financially supports women pursuing a master’s degree in nuclear subjects and offers them internships, while our Lise Meitner offers women in the early and middle part of their career enriching opportunities within the field.   

    As the use of nuclear and other radioactive material around the world increases, more and more States are needing to increase their level of nuclear security. Nuclear security is as important as nuclear safety – we must put it on equal footing in terms of reliability of funding and the robustness of implementation.

    At ICONS 2024 we are – as the name of the conference indicates – “shaping the future”, not only of nuclear security, but of the world our children will inherit. That is because nuclear security is about more than preventing nuclear terrorism. It is an enabler to providing, through nuclear science and technology, the clean energy; cutting-edge medicine; nutritious food and hope for a better tomorrow.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: IAEA Director General’s Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

    (As prepared for delivery)

    As the armed conflict in Ukraine enters its fourth year, the nuclear safety and security situation throughout the country continues to be highly precarious. The presence of the IAEA at all Ukrainian nuclear facilities has been and continues to be an invaluable asset to the international community and must be preserved.

    The IAEA remains present at Ukraine’s nuclear power plant facilities. Difficult conditions have in the past month complicated and delayed one rotation of experts, which was safely completed in recent days. Back in December, a drone hit and severely damaged an IAEA official vehicle during a rotation. As I reported to you in the special Board meeting shortly afterward, staff survived this unacceptable attack unharmed, but the rear of the vehicle was destroyed. Other episodes followed, confirming the dangerous situation.

    Around Ukraine, the Khmelnitsky NPP, the Rivne NPP and the South Ukraine NPP, continue to operate amid serious challenges, including on the electricity infrastructure, a major risk to the reliable and stable supply of power crucial for the safe operation of NPPs. The electrical grid’s ability to provide a reliable off-site power supply to Ukrainian NPPs was further reduced by damage sustained following military attacks in November and December 2024, a mission of IAEA experts that visited and assessed seven critical electrical substations concluded late last year. Considering the seriousness of the situation, I visited the Kyivska electrical substation last month to observe the damage sustained first hand. On what was my 11th visit to Ukraine since the start of the war, I also met with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, reiterating the IAEA’s commitment to supporting nuclear safety and security in Ukraine and our readiness to support the country’s plans to expand nuclear power at Khmelnytskyy NPP. Consultations with Moscow have also taken place and will continue, in the interest of nuclear safety and security at Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant.

    At Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), where the 6 reactor units are in cold shutdown, the status of the off-site power supply remains extremely vulnerable. For about one week ZNPP had to rely on a single off-site power line following the loss of its only remaining back-up line, confirming the extremely fragile situation. 

    Last month at the Chornobyl site a drone caused significant damage to the structure built to prevent any radioactive release from the reactor damaged in the 1986 accident and to protect it from external hazards. Although this attack did not result in any radioactive release, it nevertheless underlines the persistent risk to nuclear safety during this military conflict.

    Since the Board gathered for its last regular meeting in November 2024, the Agency has arranged 31 deliveries of nuclear safety, security and medical equipment and supplies to Ukraine, bringing the total so far to 108 deliveries valued at more than EUR 15.6 million. The Agency also has initiated the first phase of its support on safety and security of radioactive sources in Ukraine.

    We are grateful to all 30 donor states and the European Union for their extrabudgetary contributions, and I encourage those who can, to support the delivery of the comprehensive assistance programme, for which EUR 22 million are necessary.

    As reflected in my latest report to the Board on Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine, I would like to reiterate that all the IAEA’s activities in Ukraine are being conducted in line with relevant resolutions of the UN General Assembly and of the IAEA policy-making organs.

    Madame Chairperson,

    In February, I travelled to Fukushima to participate in collecting water samples off the coast of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. I did this together with scientists from China, Korea and Switzerland as part of additional measures to promote transparency and build trust in the region during the ongoing release of ALPS-treated water from the plant. Additional measures focus on expanding international participation and transparency, allowing hands-on independent measurements of the concentration level of the water. This work is conducted within agreed parameters set by the IAEA in its role as an independent, impartial and technical organization.  IAEA officials and experts from laboratories from China, France, the Republic of Korea, and Switzerland also sampled ALPS -treated water – prior to dilution – from measurement/confirmation tanks on the premises at the site. The IAEA has maintained its independent monitoring and analysis efforts, confirming that tritium concentrations in the discharged batches remain far below operational limits.

    In December 2024, an IAEA Task Force concluded that the approach TEPCO, and the Government of Japan are taking continues to align with international safety standards.

    While in Japan, I also visited facilities where soil removed after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident is safely stored, managed, and recycled, an effort the IAEA has been supporting by working to ensure it meets international safety standards.

    You have before you the Nuclear Safety Review 2025 and the Nuclear Security Review 2025. Both documents present, in their respective areas, an analytical overview, the global trends, and the Agency’s main activities in 2024. They also identify the top priorities for the years ahead.

    This month the inaugural meeting of the Nuclear Security Working Group established under the Nuclear Harmonization and Standardization Initiative’s Regulatory Track will identify nuclear security topics of common interest amongst participating States and share regulatory approaches, good practices and lessons learned in ensuring the security of SMRs.

    Our preparatory work in advance of the launch of Atomic Technology Licensed for Applications at Sea (ATLAS) later this year is progressing. ATLAS will provide a framework to enable the peaceful maritime uses of nuclear technology, a prospect that is generating significant interest.

    Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (Joint Convention) later this month will participate in the 8th Review Meeting to study National Reports with the aim of improving safety in radioactive waste and spent fuel management.

    December saw the start of a new project supporting the establishment of sustainable regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety and the security of radioactive material in Central East Asia and the Pacific Islands.

    In June, Romania will host ConvEx-3, the IAEA’s highest level and most complex emergency exercise. In the event of an incident with transboundary implications, Member States will be called upon to implement a harmonized response and therefore this exercise will have a particular focus on regional collaboration.

    The International Conference on Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Preparedness and Response will be held in December in Riyadh in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

    Madame Chairperson,

    Today, 417 nuclear power reactors operating in 31 countries make up almost 377 gigawatts of installed capacity, providing just under 10 per cent of the world’s total electricity and a quarter of its low-carbon supply.

    It is clear that countries are turning more and more to nuclear energy. In the IAEA’s high case scenario, global nuclear electricity generating capacity is seen increasing two and a half times by 2050.  Delivering on that promise will require public support. That is why the first IAEA International Conference on Stakeholder Engagement for Nuclear Power Programmes will gather governments, industry and practitioners from around the world in the final week of May. Mayors of municipalities with nuclear power facilities from around the world will share their experiences. No one is better placed to assess the impact and contribution to the community of nuclear facilities than those living there.

    Following our first Nuclear Stakeholder Engagement School, hosted by the Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Trieste, Italy last November, we are now planning two more later this year. In addition, we have also established a new Stakeholder Engagement Advisory Service, which will help countries assess and strengthen their stakeholder engagement programmes.

    The use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is rapidly evolving and growing in all spheres of life, including in nuclear science and technology. AI data centres require a lot of energy and nuclear reactors provide clean, reliable, and adaptable options, including in the form of SMRs and micro reactors.  Meanwhile, the integration of AI into the nuclear sector offers the chance to streamline operations across the nuclear power project life cycle. In this context the IAEA will host the International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Energy this December. We look forward to welcoming as many of you as possible to this important and first-of-a-kind event here at the Agency’s headquarters.

    Within the Secretariat we are also intent on making the most of AI while mitigating its risks, therefore we have established official guidelines, a portal and a community of practice.

    Our work on fusion continues apace with the publication of Experiences for Consideration in Fusion Plant Design Safety and Safety Assessment.

    Madame Chairperson,

    The Nuclear Technology Review before you highlights key advancements in nuclear applications that support Member States in addressing critical priorities. This year’s review places particular emphasis on innovations in food safety and authenticity, energy security, early disease detection and cancer treatment, environmental sustainability, and advanced manufacturing.

    In November, the IAEA hosted the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Science, Technology and Applications and the Technical Cooperation Programme. The Ministerial Declaration recognized both the critical role of nuclear science, technology, and applications in tackling global challenges, and the important role of the Technical Cooperation programme as a key mechanism in transferring, expanding and further accelerating Member State access to nuclear technology, materials, equipment and expertise for peaceful purposes.

    I am pleased to report the IAEA’s technical cooperation programme achieved an implementation rate of 86% in 2024. We provided our emergency assistance to Türkiye and Syria, assessing damage to civil structures following the earthquakes and building the capacities of Turkish and Syrian experts in non-destructive testing. We initiated procurement to reinstate X-ray and laboratory services in Grenada and Honduras in the aftermath of Hurricane Beryl and Tropical Storm Sara, and we aided oil-spill clean-up efforts in Trinidad and Tobago.

    In 2024, the Rate of Attainment for contributions to the TC Fund was 95%, underscoring Member States’ commitment to our work. To ensure resources for the TC programme are sufficient, assured and predicable, I urge Member States to contribute on time, and in full, to the TC Fund.

    Our flagship initiatives are making progress across the globe. Under Atoms4Food, about 27 countries from all regions have officially requested support. Member States have pledged almost EUR 9 million, two thirds of which was contributed by Japan to support livestock production in Côte d’Ivoire, food safety in Mauritania, and molecular laboratories in Vietnam, among other projects.

    Our network of international partnerships has grown with Memoranda of Understanding having been signed with Anglo American, CGIAR, and the Inter-American Institute of Cooperation in Agriculture (IICA). The partnership with Anglo American focuses on combating soil salinization through climate-smart agricultural practices.

    While I was in Japan last month, I signed a partnership with Sumitomo Corporation, one of the world’s largest integrated trading companies, to cooperate particularly in the area of sustainable uses of nuclear related technologies for multiple areas, including healthcare, shipping, fusion and capacity building efforts.  

    Under Rays of Hope, the Anchor Centre in Argentina held its first capacity-building event to strengthen paediatric radiotherapy services in Latin America and the Caribbean, creating a regional network for knowledge exchange and support.

    In January 2025, the IAEA conducted its first national-level quality assurance audit in diagnostic radiology, reviewing 16 hospitals in Qatar.

    The International Conference on Advances in Radiation Oncology (ICARO-4) will take place in the first week of June, focusing on emerging radiotherapy techniques to address global health challenges.

    Under the Zoonotic Disease Integrated Action (ZODIAC), a novel surveillance technology for high-risk pathogens was transferred to the IAEA’s Animal Production and Health Laboratory in November and will soon be passed on to Member States. New funding pledges from the Republic of Korea, Portugal, and Japan are supporting ZODIAC’s coordinated research projects in Asia and Africa, as well as the development of AI-driven platforms for zoonotic disease monitoring.

    Under NUTEC Plastics 104 Member States are engaged in microplastic monitoring, with 42 developing recycling technologies. Four countries in Asia-Pacific and Latin America have validated radiation-based upcycling technology at lab scale, with private sector collaboration helping to build up operations. China is developing a pilot-scale facility, bringing the total number of countries promoting the technology to nine.

    In November this year, the International High-Level Forum on NUclear TEChnology for Controlling Plastic Pollution (NUTEC-Plastics): Scaling Solutions and Partnerships for Global Impact will take place in the Philippines. I thank the Philippines Government for hosting this important milestone.

    The Global Water Analysis Laboratory Network (GloWAL) baseline survey has received 85 responses from 65 countries, informing future activities. Its first coordination meeting for the Spanish-speaking Latin America and the Caribbean is underway.

    Under ReNuAL 2, the construction of new greenhouses in Seibersdorf is nearing completion and the modernized laboratories will be ready to welcome staff soon.  

    Madame Chairperson,

    Regarding the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme, you have before you my latest report on verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).

    Following my last report, Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60% U‑235 has increased to 275 kg, up from 182 kg in the past quarter. Iran is the only non-nuclear weapon State enriching to this level, causing me serious concern.

    It has been four years since Iran stopped implementing its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), including provisionally applying its Additional Protocol and therefore it is also four years since the Agency was able to conduct complementary access in Iran.

    You also have before you my report on the NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran says it has declared all nuclear material, activities and locations required under its NPT Safeguards Agreement. However, this statement is inconsistent with the Agency’s findings of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at undeclared locations in Iran. The Agency needs to know the current location(s) of the nuclear material and/or of contaminated equipment involved.

    There is also a discrepancy in the material balance of uranium involved in uranium metal production experiments conducted at Jaber Ibn Hayan Mutlipurpose Laboratory, for which Iran has not accounted.

    Having stated it had suspended such implementation, Iran still is not implementing modified Code 3.1, which is a legal obligation for Iran.

    I am seriously concerned that the outstanding safeguards issues remain unresolved. They stem from Iran’s obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and need to be resolved for the Agency to be in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.

    I deeply regret that Iran, despite having indicated a willingness to consider accepting the designation of four additional experienced Agency inspectors, did not accept their designation.

    There has been no significant progress towards implementing the Joint Statement of 4 March 2023. I call upon Iran urgently to implement the Joint Statement through serious engagement.

    In response to the Board’s request in its resolution of November 2024, I will produce a comprehensive and updated assessment on the presence and use of undeclared nuclear material in connection with past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.

    High-level engagement is indispensable to making real progress. My visit to Tehran last November, and meetings with President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi indicate that there may be room for constructive compromises. I hope to see them again soon and pursue effective dialogue and tangible results.

    The Board has before it for approval a draft Additional Protocol for Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

    I have made it a priority to strengthen the legal framework for safeguards. Since the last Board meeting in November, Oman, Mongolia, Cyprus, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Zambia have amended their original Small Quantities Protocols and Saudi Arabia has rescinded its original SQP. The number of States with safeguards agreements in force remains 191, and 143 of these States have additional protocols in force. I call upon the remaining three States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons without comprehensive safeguards agreements to bring such agreements into force without delay. I also encourage States that have not yet concluded additional protocols to do so as soon as possible, and I reiterate my repeated calls for the remaining 14 States with SQPs based on the original standard text to amend or rescind them as soon as possible. Let me assure you that I will continue to use my good offices to strengthen the indispensable legal framework on which the continued peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology rest.

    The IAEA continues to monitor the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear programme.

    The Agency has observed that the 5MW(e) reactor at Yongbyon resumed operation in mid-October 2024, following a shutdown period of approximately 60 days. This shutdown is assessed to be of sufficient length to refuel the reactor and start its seventh operational cycle. Strong indicators of preparations for a new reprocessing campaign, including the operation of the steam plant serving the Radiochemical Laboratory, have been observed.

    In late-January 2025, the DPRK released photographs of General Secretary Kim Jong Un visiting “the nuclear material production base and the Nuclear Weapons Institute”. The depicted centrifuge cascades and infrastructure are consistent with the layout of a centrifuge enrichment facility and with the structure of the Yongbyon Uranium Enrichment Plant. This development follows the DPRK’s publication in September 2024 of photographs of an undeclared enrichment facility at the Kangson Complex. The undeclared enrichment facilities at both Kangson and Yongbyon, combined with General Secretary Kim’s call for “overfulfilling the plan for producing weapons-grade nuclear materials,” are of serious concern. There are indications that the uranium enrichment plants at Kangson and Yongbyon continue to operate, and there are indications that the light water reactor (LWR) at Yongbyon continues to operate. Additions to the support infrastructure have been observed adjacent to the LWR.

    There were no indications of significant changes at the Nuclear Test Site at Punggye-ri, which remains prepared to support a nuclear test.

    The continuation and further development of the DPRK’s nuclear programme are clear violations of relevant UN Security Council resolutions and are deeply regrettable. I call upon the DPRK to comply fully with its obligations under relevant UN Security Council resolutions, to cooperate promptly with the Agency in the full and effective implementation of its NPT Safeguards Agreement and to resolve all outstanding issues, especially those that have arisen during the absence of Agency inspectors from the country. The Agency continues to maintain its enhanced readiness to play its essential role in verifying the DPRK’s nuclear programme.

    Concerning the safety of the LWR, we lack the necessary information to make an assessment. Safety should always be a paramount consideration when operating a reactor. Nuclear safety is a sovereign responsibility of the State and the IAEA supports the States in this area.

    Following the change of Government in the Syrian Arab Republic towards the end of 2024, I have written to the new Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates. I requested cooperation with the Agency to enable us to fulfill our obligation to verify nuclear material and facilities under Syria’s safeguards agreement. I conveyed the importance of continuing and reinforcing cooperation between Syria and the Agency to address unresolved issues. Clarifying these issues remains essential to Syria demonstrating its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and international peace and security.

    I hope to be able to engage with the new government soon. Bringing total clarity to the situation regarding past activities in this field in Syria is indispensable to the realization of current efforts to modernize the country and put it on a firm path to peace and development.

    In April and May, the IAEA will participate in the Third Preparatory Meeting for the 2026 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in New York.

    Madame Chairperson,

    The IAEA’s Marie Sklodowska‑Curie Fellowship Programme has been expanding the talent base for the nuclear field since 2020 with 760 female students and graduates from 121 Member States so far having been supported in studying in 72 countries. In the current, fifth cycle, we selected 200 candidates from 109 countries. I would like to thank Member States that have contributed so far. For this programme to continue accepting new fellowship candidates it urgently needs further support. I ask those who can, to support this endeavor. 

    This year, we have planned three Lise Meitner Programme cohorts, in Argentina, Canada and Japan. They are focused on nuclear power, advanced nuclear technologies and research reactors.

    I am happy to report that we have reached parity, women now make up half the staff in the professional and higher categories. This is up from about 30% when I took office in 2019.

    I thank Member States who have paid their regular budget contributions, including some who paid in advance. It is important that all Member States pay their contributions in a timely manner. This will ensure liquidity of the regular budget throughout the year, allowing the Agency to carry out its activities effectively.

    You recently received for your consideration my proposed programme and budget for the 2026-2027 biennium.

    It has been prepared with due consideration of the constraints of the prevailing financial environment. Despite increasing demands and higher operational costs, I have decided for the third time in a row to propose a zero real growth budget. The proposal maintains balance among the different programmes and emphasises my commitment to ensuring our resources are managed with discipline, efficiency and restraint so that we maximize the impact of the Agency’s work.

    This being our first Board meeting of 2025, I want to conclude by saying that I look forward to making 2025 a successful year in which the IAEA benefits all Member States as we advance our common goals of peace and development.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Defense News in Brief: Around the Air Force: US Air Force Academy Commencement, Modernizing Pilot Training, Hurricane Hunters

    Source: United States Spaceforce

    In this week’s look Around the Air Force, Secretary of the Air Force Troy Meink delivers a commencement address to the U.S. Air Force Academy’s class of 2025, the T-7A Red Hawk is the future of pilot training, and Air Force Reserve Hurricane Hunters are ready for the Atlantic hurricane season.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: expert reaction to a real-time rapid analysis of heat-related excess mortality for 19-22 June 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Scientists comment on a real-time forecast of heat related deaths during the 19-22 June 2025 heatwave.

    Prof Hannah Cloke, Professor of Hydrology, University of Reading, said:

    “This is a simple, rapid analysis that uses an already understood relationship between heat and excess mortality, and applies the numbers from the ECMWF forecast for average daily temperatures for this weekend. While this isn’t peer reviewed science, it does highlight something we already understand well, that hot weather over a long period kills people. Every one of these figures is an individual person, with a family and a community that will be devastated by their early death. This is no less a tragedy than a plane crash or an outbreak of a deadly disease.

    “Climate change is making heatwaves more common, longer and hotter in the UK, but no-one should die because they are unprepared for hot weather or because their home heats up and kills them. While we should urgently curb emissions to reduce the heating of our planet, saving lives in the future, we can save lives now by adapting our homes and practices so that people don’t die needlessly in hot weather. With better planning, building regulations, and early warnings leading to action, we can stop people from getting dangerously overheated and dying.

    “The study notes a limitation that it does not consider temporal attenuation of temperature. Hot weather is less dangerous if you are able to cool off. You could save a life by checking on a vulnerable or elderly person and helping them to cool down, if just for a few hours. Shading windows or changing your plans to avoid the fiercest daytime heat could be the difference between life and death.”

     

    Dr Chloe Brimicombe, Climate Scientist and Heat Specialist and Freelance Consultant, said: 

    “This real time analysis although alarming is accurate and can be taken into account through syndromic surveillance (real time tracking) by the health service. It is consistent with patterns we see with other UK heatwaves and is good to see this transparency. 

    “Heatwaves might be silent killers but they also subtly impact every part of our society from how we shop to hospital admissions to productivity and our pets and wildlife too. And we need a policy response that brings everyone together and tackles it across society not just the health sector.” 

    ‘Real-time forecast of heat-related excess mortality during the 19-22 June 2025 heatwave in England and Wales’ by Garyfallos Konstantinoudis et al. was published at 00:01 UK time on Saturday 21 June.

    Declared interests

    Prof Hannah Cloke: “works with and advises the Met Office and Environment Agency and a Fellow of ECMWF which provided the forecast data used in the study.”

    Dr Chloe Brimicombe: No disclosure. 

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Canada partners with First Nations, Inuit and Métis on 3 new Indigenous-led climate projects in developing countries

    Source: Government of Canada News

    June 21, 2025 – Ottawa, Ontario – Global Affairs Canada

    Indigenous Peoples have a strong connection to the natural world, and their leadership is key in tackling climate change. That is why Canada is committed to working in true partnership with Indigenous Peoples for inclusive and collaborative climate action by supporting Indigenous-led projects and Indigenous leadership on climate resilience here at home and in the most vulnerable regions of the world.

    Today, on National Indigenous Peoples Day, the Honourable Randeep Sarai, Secretary of State (International Development), in collaboration with Indigenous partners, announced $5.1 million in federal funding over 2 years to support 3 new Indigenous-led initiatives that will help build climate resilience and support climate action by Indigenous Peoples in South America, Africa and the Indo-Pacific region. These initiatives will be designed and implemented in partnership with First Nations, Inuit and Métis in Canada and Indigenous Peoples abroad.

    The new projects are as follows:

    Our Collective Futures: Indigenous Peoples Partnering for Lands and Waters: The Assembly of First Nations will partner with Indigenous Peoples in the Indo-Pacific to strengthen climate resilience centering on the needs of Indigenous Peoples and their self-determined priorities for climate and biodiversity action. This will be done through knowledge-sharing and capacity-building to develop and implement climate solutions and will increase access to these solutions for Indigenous Peoples, in particular women and youths, who are disproportionately affected by climate change. This project builds on local efforts led by the Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact.

    The Indigenous Climate Action Partnership: The Inuit Circumpolar Council (Canada) will aim to increase the climate resilience of Indigenous Peoples in developing countries by fostering partnerships, shared learning and mutual support in climate adaptation work and advocacy skills. The project will highlight Indigenous-led nature-based solutions through learning experiences on the land and connect Indigenous leaders around the world.

    A World of Wahkohtowin: The Métis National Council will collaborate with Indigenous Peoples in Colombia and Zambia to co-create culturally relevant climate adaptation strategies that are deeply connected to the identities of the Nations and Peoples involved.  Rooted in the value of wahkohtowin— a Cree word meaning kinship and interconnectedness—this work emphasizes the importance of building respectful, reciprocal relationships across Nations. The initiative aims to reduce poverty by safeguarding the livelihoods and resources that Indigenous communities depend on while also supporting gender equality and on-site learning.

    This announcement is being made during Canada’s National Indigenous History Month, a time to recognize and honour the rich histories, cultures and contributions of First Nations, Inuit and Métis, as well as deepen our understanding of Indigenous Peoples in Canada and around the world.

    MIL OSI Canada News –

  • Heatwave grips Kashmir, water shortages hit J&K once again

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    An unprecedented heatwave has gripped Kashmir, with temperatures exceeding 35°C for the past few days.

    Srinagar city recorded a high of 35.2°C on Thursday — the highest June temperature in the past two decades. Jammu city, too, saw a maximum of 36.5°C, narrowing the temperature gap between the two cities to just 1.3°C.

    The heat wave has caused a sharp drop in the water level of the Jhelum River, the Valley’s main water body. Originating at the Verinag Spring in Anantnag district and flowing into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) via Uri in Baramulla district, the Jhelum has been severely affected.

    With perennial water reservoirs in the mountains already depleted due to reduced snowfall in winter, water levels in streams, rivers, lakes, springs, and wells across the Valley have alarmingly diminished.

    Farmers in Ganderbal, Srinagar, Budgam, Bandipora, Kupwara, Baramulla, Shopian, Kulgam, and Anantnag districts are already reporting water shortages for their paddy fields and apple orchards. Paddy crops, especially in higher areas, have begun to suffer due to inadequate irrigation.

    Paddy requires substantial water until the grains mature, and only during ripening and harvest can farmers allow their fields to dry. Apple orchards also require regular irrigation during the fruiting season; insufficient water leads to apples that lack color, succulence, and have a much shorter shelf life.

    While occasional rainfall in April and May had temporarily compensated for reduced water discharge in local rivers and streams, the current heat wave is worsening the situation.

    The Meteorological Department, however, offered some relief. A Met office forecast on Friday said, “Weather is likely to remain mainly dry in the Kashmir division with isolated light rain in the Jammu division during the next 24 hours. Scattered to fairly widespread light rain is likely to occur across J&K in the following two days.”

    Meanwhile, the School Education Department has announced a 10-day summer break starting July 1.

    IANS

  • Heatwave grips Kashmir, water shortages hit J&K once again

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    An unprecedented heatwave has gripped Kashmir, with temperatures exceeding 35°C for the past few days.

    Srinagar city recorded a high of 35.2°C on Thursday — the highest June temperature in the past two decades. Jammu city, too, saw a maximum of 36.5°C, narrowing the temperature gap between the two cities to just 1.3°C.

    The heat wave has caused a sharp drop in the water level of the Jhelum River, the Valley’s main water body. Originating at the Verinag Spring in Anantnag district and flowing into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) via Uri in Baramulla district, the Jhelum has been severely affected.

    With perennial water reservoirs in the mountains already depleted due to reduced snowfall in winter, water levels in streams, rivers, lakes, springs, and wells across the Valley have alarmingly diminished.

    Farmers in Ganderbal, Srinagar, Budgam, Bandipora, Kupwara, Baramulla, Shopian, Kulgam, and Anantnag districts are already reporting water shortages for their paddy fields and apple orchards. Paddy crops, especially in higher areas, have begun to suffer due to inadequate irrigation.

    Paddy requires substantial water until the grains mature, and only during ripening and harvest can farmers allow their fields to dry. Apple orchards also require regular irrigation during the fruiting season; insufficient water leads to apples that lack color, succulence, and have a much shorter shelf life.

    While occasional rainfall in April and May had temporarily compensated for reduced water discharge in local rivers and streams, the current heat wave is worsening the situation.

    The Meteorological Department, however, offered some relief. A Met office forecast on Friday said, “Weather is likely to remain mainly dry in the Kashmir division with isolated light rain in the Jammu division during the next 24 hours. Scattered to fairly widespread light rain is likely to occur across J&K in the following two days.”

    Meanwhile, the School Education Department has announced a 10-day summer break starting July 1.

    IANS

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Senegal and Kenya Top African Development Bank’s Electricity Regulatory Index, as Regulators Drive Tangible Reforms

    Source: African Development Bank Group

    Kenya and Senegal have claimed the top spots in the African Development Bank’s 2024 Electricity Regulatory Index (ERI), demonstrating exceptional progress in power sector governance and regulatory outcomes. The comprehensive assessment, officially unveiled today at the Africa Energy Forum in Cape Town, evaluates regulatory frameworks across 43 African countries.

    Uganda, Liberia and Niger round out the top five performers, with Niger registering one of the biggest gains, underlining the strong impact of sustained reforms and political commitment to power sector development.

    The ERI evaluates three dimensions—Regulatory Governance, Regulatory Substance, and Regulatory Outcomes (ROI). Notably, the ROI, which tracks service delivery and utility performance, recorded the most substantial improvement across the continent.

    Key findings from the 2024 ERI:

    • Kenya and Senegal led with a score of 0.892, reflecting standout progress in tariff reform, regulatory outcomes, and utility performance.
    • A remarkable 41 out of 43 participating countries achieved RGI scores above 0.5, representing a significant increase from 24 countries in 2022.
    • Countries scoring below 0.500 reduced significantly from 19 in 2022 to just 6 in 2024.
    • Even the lowest-performing country tripled its score—from about 0.10 to 0.33.
    • The ROI surged from roughly 0.40 in 2022 to 0.62 in 2024, showing that reforms are delivering tangible service improvements on the ground.

    Now in its seventh edition, the ERI shows strong momentum toward more effective, transparent, and impactful regulation, with real-world results beginning to emerge.

    “The 2024 ERI shows that Africa’s regulators are stepping up. We are now seeing stronger institutions delivering real results for utilities and consumers. This shift is critical if we are to achieve Mission 300 and connect 300 million people to electricity by 2030,” says Dr. Kevin Kariuki, AfDB Vice President for Power, Energy, Climate and Green Growth.

    For the first time, the 2024 ERI also assessed regional regulatory bodies, recognizing their growing role in harmonizing technical standards and enabling cross-border electricity trade.

    As the backbone of Mission 300, ERI continues to inform the design and implementation of national energy compacts—currently active in 12 countries, with another 20 in development.

    Bridging the Gap – Addressing Ongoing Challenges

    While celebrating regulatory progress, the report calls for greater focus on regulatory independence, the financial viability of utilities, and the integration of off-grid and mini-grid systems into national frameworks. The ERI underscores that regulation must translate into better access, affordability, and reliability, especially for underserved rural populations.

    The report outlines priority areas for enhancing regulatory effectiveness:

    • Strengthening regulatory independence
    • Enhancing accountability mechanisms
    • Promoting transparency and predictability
    • Improving stakeholder participation
    • Deepening economic regulation and advancing cost-reflective tariff methodologies.

    “The ERI 2024 tells a hopeful story. African countries are not just passing laws—they are implementing them. Regulators are transforming from administrative bodies into strategic institutions with measurable influence. However, challenges related to independence, financing, and enforcement persist,” said Wale Shonibare, Director for Energy Financial Solutions, Policy and Regulation at the Bank Group.

    Launched in 2018, the ERI is a diagnostic and policy tool used by governments, regulators, and development partners to identify gaps, track progress, and prioritize reform efforts. The 2024 edition incorporates extensive feedback from utilities, regulators, and regional energy bodies.

    The full ERI 2024 report will be available here.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Prime Minister Carney announces changes in the senior ranks of the public service

    Source: Government of Canada – Prime Minister

    Canada’s new government has a mandate for change. A stronger Canada depends on a strong and effective public service – one that is focused on execution, delivery, and impact.

    Today, the Prime Minister, Mark Carney, announced the following changes in the senior ranks of the public service:

    Jean-François Tremblay, currently Deputy Minister of Environment and Climate Change, becomes Senior Official at the Privy Council Office, effective June 30, 2025, while he prepares for his upcoming role as Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

    Mollie Johnson, currently Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Plans and Consultations) and, concurrently, Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Clean Growth), Privy Council Office, becomes Deputy Minister of Environment and Climate Change, effective June 30, 2025.

    Nancy Hamzawi, currently Executive Vice-President of the Public Health Agency of Canada, becomes President of the Public Health Agency of Canada, effective June 20, 2025.

    Alison O’Leary, currently Assistant Deputy Minister, Federal-Provincial Relations and Social Policy, Department of Finance Canada, becomes Associate Deputy Minister of Finance, effective June 30, 2025.

    The Prime Minister also announced that Kaili Levesque, Associate Deputy Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, will provide direct support to the Secretary of State (Nature), and that Mark Schaan, Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Artificial Intelligence), Privy Council Office, will provide direct support to the Minister of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Innovation.

    The Prime Minister took the opportunity to congratulate Heather Jeffrey, former President of the Public Health Agency of Canada, on her recent retirement from the public service. He thanked her and Suzy McDonald, Associate Deputy Minister of Finance, for their dedication and service to Canadians throughout their careers and wished them all the best in the future.

    Biographical Notes

    MIL OSI Canada News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Alexander Novak: For sustainable economic growth it is important to create a favorable investment climate

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak took part in the session “Business Climate of Russia. National Model and Regional Opportunities” at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. The session was also attended by Minister of Economic Development Maxim Reshetnikov, General Director of JSC “Barkli” Leonid Kazinets, Chairman of the public organization “Business Russia”, founder of the R-Pharm group of companies Alexey Repik.

    Alexander Novak recalled that one of the key tasks for economic development set by the President is to increase investment by 60% by 2030 and ensure sustainable economic growth in the long term.

    “To achieve ambitious goals to attract investment to the economy, it is important to create a favorable investment climate. Much work has been done in this direction in recent years. The National Entrepreneurial Initiative, the National Investment Climate Rating, and “Business Climate Transformation” were launched. In 2020, as a result of this work, our country moved up in the Doing Business rating from 123rd to 28th place. In certain areas, the breakthrough was even more significant. We worked on simplifying procedures and reducing the time it takes for organizations to connect to networks in the electric power industry. Thanks to the successful joint work of businesses with the Government and the regions, we moved up from 168th to 8th place in the rating for this indicator,” said Alexander Novak.

    Among other important steps to improve the investment climate, he named the implementation of a project to reengineer industrial construction rules, the reform of regulatory authorities, the improvement of corporate regulation, and the introduction of regional and municipal investment standards. All of this has had a positive impact on investment activity in the regions and throughout the country, but today this work needs to be restarted in order to enter the top twenty countries among 180 participants in the World Bank’s Be Ready investment climate business rating by 2030.

    To this end, on the instructions of the President, a national model of target conditions for doing business is being developed jointly with the Agency for Strategic Initiatives. With the participation of businesses, representatives of federal and regional authorities, 11 working groups have been created for the entire life cycle of business: from registering a company to deploying work within the country and selling its products abroad. Business conditions will be improved according to 40 criteria and 150 indicators at the federal level and 27 indicators at the regional level.

    The national model of target conditions for doing business will be launched next year, which will help to achieve one of the national goals of attracting investment into the Russian economy.

    At the end of the session, Alexander Novak announced the results of the National Investment Climate Rating for 2025. The Deputy Prime Minister presented an honorary diploma for first place to Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin – the capital became the leader of the rating. Two regions at once took second place in the rating: Nizhny Novgorod and the Republic of Tatarstan. Third place was taken by the Moscow Region and the Republic of Bashkortostan.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Banking: First “Manitoba Wind Energy Indigenous Equity Summit” a success

    Source: – Press Release/Statement:

    Headline: First “Manitoba Wind Energy Indigenous Equity Summit” a success

    A unique conference, presented by Canadian Renewable Energy Association (CanREA) in collaboration with Indigenous Clean Energy (ICE), recognizes the critical role of Indigenous engagement in Manitoba’s energy transition.

    Winnipeg, Manitoba, June 20, 2025—More than 120 people attended the Manitoba Wind Energy Indigenous Equity Summit, held at the Winnipeg Art Gallery on June 18, 2025, presented by Canadian Renewable Energy Association (CanREA) in collaboration with Indigenous Clean Energy (ICE).

    This unique, invitation-only event brought together key representatives from Manitoba’s Indigenous and renewable energy communities to discuss Manitoba Hydro’s recently launched wind energy procurement, entitled “Call for Power: Indigenous Majority Owned Wind,” part of the Manitoba Affordable Energy Plan. This is the province’s first significant wind-energy procurement in many years. An RFP for 600 MWs of wind energy is expected to be issued in August of this year, with a majority Indigenous-ownership criteria.

    “In order for Manitoba’s new wind energy procurement to succeed, the renewable energy industry must commit to ensuring that development plans align with the priorities of Indigenous communities,” said Evan Wilson, CanREA’s Vice President of Policy—Western Canada and National Affairs.

    The Summit kicked off with opening remarks by the Hon. Mike Moyes, Manitoba’s Minister of Environment and Climate Change, as well as the Hon. Adrien Sala, Minister of Finance and Minister responsible for Manitoba Hydro, who spoke about the importance of collaboration and the value that such an event can bring to the process.

    In “Wind Energy 101 – Developer Spotlight Panel,” Wilson moderated a panel of wind energy developers with successful projects elsewhere in Canada, including Ina Gjoka (Innergex), Brian Hodder (Renewable Energy Systems / RES Group), Galvin Clancey (Nordex) and Jennifer Tuck (Potentia Renewables), who shared lessons learned and ideas for how best to work together for Manitoba’s energy transition.

    Following this discussion, ICE’s Founding Executive Director, Chris Henderson, moderated a panel on “Indigenous Nation: Wind Pathways Success,” featuring panelists Kory Wood (Kikinaw Energy Services), Troy Jerome (Sentii Energy, Kiruguj First Nation), and Drew Bernard (Lennox Island First Nation).

    “Indigenous 51% equity is essential to Manitoba’s wind call for power. The Government of Manitoba’s Indigenous inclusion goal was supported by CanREA members and Indigenous communities at the Indigenous Equity Summit in Winnipeg. Indigenous Clean Energy’s collaboration with CanREA was positive, reflecting this vision,” said Henderson.

    Later that morning, CanREA’s Director for Saskatchewan and Indigenous Engagement, Kelly Hall, emceed a session on “Indigenous Loan Guarantees & Financing Options,” in which the Canada Infrastructure Bank’s Justin Lok presented on Financing Indigenous Equity, the Manitoba Finance Treasury Division’s Nicoleta Oprea presented on the Government of Manitoba Treasury, and the Canada Indigenous Loan Guarantee Corporation’s Pearl Yuzicappi presented on the Canada Development Investment Corporation.

    The afternoon was split into two simultaneous tracks: The CanREA track consisted of a session on “Wind Energy Procurement Guidance,” in which CanREA’s Director for Manitoba & Saskatchewan and for Indigenous Engagement, Kelly Hall, hosted Bryce Wood and team from Manitoba Environment and Climate Change’s Environmental Approvals Branch, as well as Adrienne McGarrigle of Solas Energy, who offered guidance to help navigate the upcoming Wind Energy Procurement Process.

    The Indigenous Clean Energy track consisted of several sessions. It began with an “Indigenous Nation-Nation Experience Sharing Session,” with opening remarks by Kisik Energy Manitoba’s Darrell Brown, a Founding Chair at ICE. Next, the “Indigenous Renewables Turtle Island Landscape” session was facilitated by ICE’s Henderson and ICE Board Member Mihskakwan James Harper of NRStor.

    The “Indigenous Wind Project Development Discussion,” also facilitated by Henderson, featured Kory Wood (Kikinaw Energy Services), Troy Jerome (Sentii Energy, Kiruguj First Nation) and Drew Bernard (Lennox Island First Nation).

    The Summit closed with an open Q&A discussion with the audience, facilitated by CanREA & ICE, with special guest Isabelle Deguise of Renewable Energy Systems (RES) Canada Inc., who is also a CanREA Board member.

    “The first-ever Manitoba Wind Energy Indigenous Equity Summit was a great success.  Indigenous engagement is a priority for the clean energy industry, as it is critical to the success of the energy transition in Manitoba, and across Canada. As Manitoba’s current Indigenous wind energy procurement progresses, CanREA will continue to advocate for Indigenous engagement, share our industry knowledge and be a voice for the industry in Manitoba,” said Hall.

    CanREA thanks all attendees and speakers for participating in the Summit, with a special thanks to ICE for their collaboration in organizing, supporting and executing the Summit, and to our generous sponsors, Northland Power (the Wellness and Networking Break Sponsor), and MLT Aikins (the Networking Lunch Sponsor). Doing double duty, Drew Lafond and Kevin Mehi of MLT Aikins also presented at the Summit, focusing on “Legal Considerations for Indigenous Equity Ownership.”

    Photos

    Photo: In “Wind Energy 101 – Developer Spotlight Panel,” CanREA’s Evan Wilson (far right) moderated a panel of wind energy developers with successful projects elsewhere in Canada, including (from L to R) Brian Hodder (Renewable Energy Systems / RES Group), Ina Gjoka (Innergex), Jennifer Tuck (Potentia Renewables) and Galvin Clancey (Nordex).

    Photo: The panel on “Indigenous Nation: Wind Pathways Success” featured, from left to right: moderator Mihskakwan James Harper (NRStor & ICE board member), and speakers Kory Wood (Kikinaw Energy Services), Drew Bernard (Lennox Island First Nation), and Chris Henderson (Indigenous Clean Energy). 

    Photo: The Manitoba Wind Energy Indigenous Equity Summit kicked off with opening remarks by the Hon. Mike Moyes, Manitoba’s Minister of Environment and Climate Change (left), as well as the Hon. Adrien Sala, Minister of Finance and Minister responsible for Manitoba Hydro (right), who spoke about the importance of collaboration and the value that such an event can bring to the process. Centre: Kelly Hall, CanREA’s Director for Manitoba & Saskatchewan and for Indigenous Engagement.

    Quotes

    “In order for Manitoba’s new wind energy procurement to succeed, the renewable energy industry must commit to ensuring that development plans align with the priorities of Indigenous communities.”
    —Evan Wilson, Vice President of Policy—Western Canada and National Affairs, Canadian Renewable Energy Association (CanREA)

    “Indigenous 51% equity is essential to Manitoba’s wind call for power. The Government of Manitoba’s Indigenous inclusion goal was supported by CanREA members and Indigenous communities at the Indigenous Equity Summit in Winnipeg. Indigenous Clean Energy’s collaboration with CanREA was positive, reflecting this vision.” 
    —Chris Henderson, Founding Executive Director, Indigenous Clean Energy (ICE)

    “The first-ever Manitoba Wind Energy Indigenous Equity Summit was a great success. Indigenous engagement is a priority for the clean energy industry, as it is critical to the success of the energy transition in Manitoba, and across Canada. As Manitoba’s current Indigenous wind energy procurement progresses, CanREA will continue to advocate for Indigenous engagement, share our industry knowledge and be a voice for the industry in Manitoba.”
    —Kelly Hall, Director for Manitoba & Saskatchewan, and for Indigenous Engagement, Canadian Renewable Energy Association (CanREA)

    For media inquiries or interview opportunities, please contact: 

    Communications Canadian Renewable Energy Association communications@renewablesassociation.ca 

    About CanREA 

    The Canadian Renewable Energy Association (CanREA) is the voice for wind energy, solar energy and energy storage solutions that will power Canada’s energy future. We work to create the conditions for a modern energy system through stakeholder advocacy and public engagement. Our diverse members are uniquely positioned to deliver clean, low-cost, reliable, flexible and scalable solutions for Canada’s energy needs. For more information on how Canada can use wind energy, solar energy and energy storage to help achieve its net-zero commitments, consult “Powering Canada’s Journey to Net-Zero: CanREA’s 2050 Vision.” Follow us on Bluesky and LinkedIn here. Learn more at renewablesassociation.ca. 

    The post First “Manitoba Wind Energy Indigenous Equity Summit” a success appeared first on Canadian Renewable Energy Association.

    MIL OSI Global Banks –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Montenegro – P10_TA(2025)0130 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the other part(1), which entered into force on 1 May 2010,

    –  having regard to Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union of 15 December 2008,

    –  having regard to the Commission opinion of 9 November 2010 on Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2010)0670), the European Council’s decision of 16-17 December 2010 to grant Montenegro candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 29 June 2012 to open EU accession negotiations with Montenegro,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)(2),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans(3),

    –  having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19-20 June 2003,

    –  having regard to the Sofia Declaration of the EU-Western Balkans summit of 17 May 2018 and the Sofia Priority Agenda annexed thereto,

    –  having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 13 December 2023 in Brussels, and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

    –  having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0694),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report’ (COM(2024)0800), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union: Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Montenegro’ (SWD(2024)0829),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0694),

    –  having regard to the Commission’s overview and country assessments of 31 May 2023 and of 13 June 2024 of the economic reform programme of Montenegro, and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans and Türkiye adopted by the Council on 16 May 2023 and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans Partners, Türkiye, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine adopted by the Council on 14 May 2024,

    –  having regard to the EU-Montenegro Intergovernmental Accession Conferences of 22 June 2021, 13 December 2021, 29 January 2024, 26 June 2024 and 16 December 2024,

    –  having regard to the 11th EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Council on 14 July 2022,

    –  having regard to the declaration and recommendations adopted at the 22nd meeting of the EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 31 October and 1 November 2024,

    –  having regard to Montenegro’s accession to NATO on 5 June 2017,

    –  having regard to Special Report 01/2022 of the European Court of Auditors of 10 January 2022 entitled ‘EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans: despite efforts, fundamental problems persist’,

    –  having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), ratified by Montenegro in 2013, and to the recommendations of the Commission on gender equality and combating gender-based violence,

    –  having regard to the World Press Freedom Index report published annually by Reporters Without Borders,

    –  having regard to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) data on the Ukraine Refugee Situation as of April 2025,

    –  having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement(4),

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Montenegro,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(5),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0093/2025),

    A.  whereas enlargement is a key EU foreign policy tool and a strategic geopolitical investment in peace, stability, security and prosperity;

    B.  whereas the new enlargement momentum, sparked by the changing geopolitical reality and the EU membership applications by several Eastern Partnership countries, has prompted the EU to accelerate its efforts towards delivering on its long-overdue commitments to the Western Balkans; whereas the future of the Western Balkan countries lies within the EU;

    C.  whereas each country is judged on its own merits in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, including full respect for democracy, the rule of law, good governance, fundamental EU values and alignment with EU foreign and security policy; whereas the implementation of necessary reforms in the area of ‘fundamentals’ determines the timetable and progress in the accession process;

    D.  whereas Montenegro has gone furthest in the accession process, with all 33 chapters of the EU acquis open and six provisionally closed, and has significant public support therefor;

    E.  whereas the EU is Montenegro’s largest trading partner, investor and provider of financial assistance;

    F.  whereas Montenegro is exposed to malign foreign influence, disinformation campaigns and other forms of influence, including election meddling, hybrid warfare strategies and unfavourable investments from non-EU actors, particularly Russia and China, which are trying to influence Montenegro’s political, economic and strategic trajectory and threaten democratic processes and media integrity, jeopardising the country’s prospects for EU accession;

    G.  whereas on 8 June 2024, an ‘All-Serb Assembly’ took place in Belgrade with the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians under the slogan ‘One people, one Assembly’;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1.  Recognises Montenegro’s firm commitment to EU accession and reaffirms its full support for the country’s future EU membership; welcomes Montenegro’s leading regional position in the EU accession process as well as the overwhelming support of Montenegro’s citizens and the majority of political actors for joining the EU in 2028;

    2.  Welcomes Montenegro’s positive progress in enacting EU-related reforms and measures, underpinned by an ambitious timeline and calls for collective efforts of political actors, civil society and citizens; commends Montenegro for meeting the interim benchmarks for Chapters 23 and 24, which continue to determine the overall pace of negotiations, and for receiving a positive Interim Benchmark Assessment Report; welcomes the closure of three more negotiating chapters, bringing the total to six;

    3.  Encourages all political actors to stay focused on EU integration and the required reforms; stresses the need for political stability, commitment and constructive engagement in consensus building across party lines in order to move swiftly and more effectively towards closing additional chapters in 2025, so as to achieve the country’s ambitious timeline; stresses that the reforms adopted must be implemented effectively and consistently to ensure genuine progress and full alignment with EU legislation; calls for a strengthening of the functioning of, and coordination between, state institutions in order to achieve political stability and advance the country’s substantial progress in implementing key EU-related reforms, in particular electoral and judicial reforms and the fight against organised crime and corruption;

    4.  Underlines that the credibility of the EU, including its enlargement policy as a whole, would be affected if tangible progress achieved by certain Western Balkan countries does not translate into clear advancements on the EU accession path;

    5.  Welcomes Montenegro’s sustained full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP), including EU restrictive measures, inter alia, those related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and those targeted against cyberattacks, as well as its support for the international rules-based order at UN level; encourages Montenegro to strengthen the enforcement of restrictive measures and avoid their circumvention and to seize the assets of those sanctioned; calls on all government representatives to respect and promote CFSP alignment and EU values and refrain from any activities that may threaten Montenegro’s strategic path towards EU membership and its sovereignty; is highly concerned, in this context, by public high officials’ statements in support of the President of the Republika Srpska entity, Milorad Dodik, who is undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina; regrets the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians from Montenegro in the ‘All-Serbian Assembly’ in Belgrade as well as their support for the declaration adopted on that occasion undermining the sovereignty of Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo;

    6.  Underlines the strategic importance of Montenegro’s NATO membership and welcomes its active involvement in EU common security and defence policy missions and operations, such as EU Naval Force Operation Atalanta, and in NATO and other international and multilateral missions; welcomes the decision of Montenegro’s Council for Defence and Security to approve the participation of its armed forces in the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine and NATO’s Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine and calls on the Montenegrin Parliament to adopt these decisions, thereby reinforcing the country’s commitment to collective security;

    7.  Commends Montenegro for its humanitarian and material support to Ukraine and for extending the temporary protection mechanism that grants persons fleeing Ukraine the right to stay in Montenegro for one year; recalls that Montenegro is among the Western Balkan countries hosting the largest number of Ukrainian refugees, with over 18 800 refugees from Ukraine registered in Montenegro as of 31 January 2025, according to UNHCR statistics;

    8.  Remains seriously concerned by malign foreign interference, destabilisation efforts, cyberattacks, hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns, including attempts to influence political processes and public opinion, by third-country actors, which discredit the EU and undermine Montenegro’s progress on its accession path; urges Montenegro to adopt countermeasures in stronger cooperation with the EU and NATO and through increased regional cooperation among the Western Balkan countries; notes that religious institutions can be used as a tool for external influence and condemns any undue interference by the Serbian Orthodox Church in this regard; reiterates the importance of building resilience capacity against foreign information manipulation and interference, including through greater oversight of the media landscape, public awareness campaigns and media literacy programmes; recommends that Montenegro establish a dedicated hybrid threat task force;

    9.  Urges the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Delegation of the EU to Montenegro and the Montenegrin authorities to boost strategic communication to Montenegrin citizens on the benefits of the enlargement process and EU membership, as well as on the concrete accession criteria that Montenegro still needs to fulfil to align with EU requirements; urges them, furthermore, to improve the EU’s visibility in the country, including as regards EU-funded projects; calls for StratCom monitoring to be expanded in order to concentrate on cross-border disinformation threats in the Western Balkan countries and their neighbours; calls on the Commission to further support the efforts of the EEAS and the Western Balkans Task Force so as to expand outreach activities by increasing visibility in local media, fact-checking reports and partnering with civil society organisations to counter false narratives more effectively;

    10.  Welcomes the Montenegrin Parliament’s renewed engagement in the Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    11.  Recognises the Montenegrin Parliament’s key role in the accession process, notably as regards passing accession-related legislation, and underlines the importance of parliamentary cooperation in this regard; reiterates the European Parliament’s readiness to use its political and technical resources to advance the EU-related reform agenda, including through democracy support activities; notes, with concern, the re-emerging tensions and ethnic polarisation, which are slowing the reform process; calls for constructive dialogue and consensus building across the political spectrum, prioritising legislative quality, and strongly urges that solutions be found through parliamentary dialogue; calls for preventing identity politics from diverting attention from the EU agenda or straining relations with its neighbours, ensuring that Montenegro remains firmly on the EU path; welcomes the agreement between the Montenegrin Prime Minister and opposition leaders to request an opinion from the Venice Commission regarding the termination of the mandate of Constitutional Court judge Dragana Đuranović and for the opposition to return to the parliament;

    12.  Expresses its concern about attempts to amend the law on Montenegrin citizenship in the Montenegrin Parliament, which could have serious and long-term implications for the country’s decision-making processes and identity, while emphasising that any discussions on identity politics must be handled with the utmost sensitivity to avoid further polarisation and should aim for broad societal consensus; encourages the Montenegrin authorities to consult and coordinate with the EU on any possible changes to the law on citizenship and stresses the importance of achieving consensus on any matters relating to this subject of crucial importance for the identity and independence of Montenegro;

    13.  Strongly encourages the Montenegrin Parliament to hold inclusive and transparent public consultations and regular and meaningful engagement with civil society in decision-making from an early stage in the legislative process, notably for key legislation in the EU reform process; encourages a more active role for the Montenegrin Parliamentary Women’s Club;

    14.  Calls on Montenegro to fully align its electoral legal framework with EU standards, notably as regards harmonising electoral legislation, voting and candidacy rights restrictions, transparency, dispute resolution mechanisms, campaign and media oversight, and political party and election campaign financing, and to implement the recommendations of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights(6); urges Montenegro to increase transparency and control of political party spending and prevent the abuse of state resources by bringing the relevant legislation into line with EU standards, as well as enhancing the enforcement of third-party financing rules and strengthening sanctions for violations; highlights the role of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption (APC) in this regard, and calls for increased cooperation between the APC and financial intelligence authorities to detect and prevent foreign influence in political campaigns; calls, furthermore, on Montenegro to implement the recommendations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) on gender parity on electoral lists;

    15.  Reiterates its call on the Montenegrin authorities to establish a single nationwide municipal election day, as provided for in the Law on Local Self-Government, in order to enhance governance efficiency, reduce political tensions and strengthen the stability and effectiveness of municipal and state institutions; recalls that future disbursement of funds under the Reform and Growth Facility is contingent on the fulfilment of this reform, in line with Montenegro’s commitments in its reform agenda, and should be pursued as a matter of priority; welcomes the fact that, in 2022, elections in 14 municipalities were held on the same day; calls for a robust legislative framework in this regard; is concerned by the misconduct of the electoral process in the municipality of Šavnik;

    16.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to adopt the Law on Government that should enable an improved governance framework and the optimisation of public administration;

    17.  Underlines the importance of a professional, merit-based, transparent and depoliticised civil service; calls on Montenegro to amend and implement the relevant legislation to provide a framework for the professionalisation, optimisation and rationalisation of state administration, including procedural safeguards against politically motivated decisions on appointments and dismissals, as well as high standards for managerial positions; regrets the lack of significant progress in adopting and effectively implementing such legislation and highlights that this allows for public service recruitment to remain subject to political influence;

    18.  Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report; notes, with concern, the identified deficiencies, including judicial appointments and the independence of the prosecutor’s office;

    19.  Welcomes the progress made in implementing key judicial reforms, adopting a new strategic framework and completing long-outstanding judicial appointments; calls on Montenegro to fill the remaining high-level judicial positions;

    20.  Urges Montenegro to further align its legal framework, including the constitution, in particular on the composition and decision-making process of the Judicial Council, with EU laws and standards on the independence, accountability, impartiality, integrity and professionalism of the judiciary, and to further depoliticise appointments to bolster independence, implement outstanding international recommendations, and determine criteria for the retirement of judges and prosecutors in line with European standards and in full compliance with the Constitution; regrets the pending case backlog and calls on Montenegro to take measures to reduce the duration of legal proceedings, particularly for serious and organised crime cases, notably on money laundering; recommends that Montenegro adopt the amendments to the Constitution in the final stage of the country’s EU accession negotiations;

    21.  Notes the steps taken in the fight against corruption, including new laws and provisions on the protection of whistleblowers, the creation of a new National Council for the fight against corruption and a new anti-corruption strategy for 2024-2028; encourages Montenegro to further align with the EU acquis and EU standards and address recommendations by the Commission, the Venice Commission and the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); encourages the Montenegrin authorities to continue addressing existing deficiencies in the handling of organised crime cases and the seizure and confiscation of criminal assets;

    22.  Urges Montenegro to step up its criminal justice response to high-level corruption, including by strengthening the effective enforcement of existing criminal legislation and imposing effective and deterrent penalties, and to create conditions for judicial institutions and independent bodies dealing with corruption to function effectively, free from political influence;

    23.  Notes the work of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption and calls for it to be provided with sufficient funding and for it to be depoliticised; expects the Agency to deliver tangible results and act non-selectively to strengthen its integrity and enhance its authority in carrying out its competences effectively; calls for a stronger corruption prevention framework;

    24.  Urges Montenegro to align its weapons legislation with EU law and international standards, particularly as regards technical standards for firearm markings, deactivation procedures and regulations for alarm and signal weapons, as well as to establish a standardised and effective data collection and reporting system for firearms; is appalled by the tragic mass shooting in Cetinje and expresses its condolences to the victims’ families; expresses its concern over the exploitation of this tragedy for disinformation and ethnic polarisation; urges Montenegro to strengthen its crisis communication to counter disinformation and ensure responsible media reporting in the aftermath of violent incidents; calls for systematic actions in the areas of security, mental well-being and institutional transparency, as well as in civic education and public awareness, outreach and educational initiatives, on the dangers and risks of firearms, in line with citizens’ expectations and societal needs;

    25.  Calls on Montenegro to urgently fully align its visa policy with that of the EU, especially as regards countries posing irregular migration or security risks to the EU; expresses its concern that, contrary to expectations, two additional countries have been added to the visa-free regime and that Russian and Belarusian passport holders continue to benefit from a visa-free regime; notes that the harmonisation of the visa policy is also provided for in Montenegro’s reform agenda under the Reform and Growth Facility;

    26.  Welcomes the ongoing cooperation between Montenegro and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), Europol, Eurojust and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), and notes the importance of this cooperation in tackling cross-border crime, including the trafficking of weapons, drugs and human beings, and in combating terrorism and extremism; welcomes the entry into force of the upgraded agreement on operational cooperation in border management with Frontex on 1 July 2023 and encourages further cooperation between Montenegro and Frontex to strengthen border management, support asylum procedures, fight smuggling and enhance readmission;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    27.  Regrets that the most vulnerable groups in society still face discrimination; calls on Montenegro to adopt a new anti-discrimination law and relevant strategies, through an inclusive, transparent and meaningful process that actively involves those most affected, to improve vulnerable groups’ access to rights; underlines that respect for the rights of all national minorities is an integral part of the EU acquis; calls for stronger implementation to ensure equal treatment of all ethnic, religious, national and social groups so that they are guaranteed equal rights and opportunities and can fully participate in social, political and economic life;

    28.  Welcomes Montenegro’s multi-ethnic identity and calls for the further promotion of and respect for the languages, cultural heritage and traditions of local communities and national minorities, as this is closely intertwined with Montenegro’s European perspective;

    29.  Underlines the multi-ethnic identity of the Bay of Kotor; stresses that Montenegro’s European perspective is closely intertwined with the protection of minorities and their cultural heritage; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to nurture the multi-ethnic nature of the state, including the traditions and cultural heritage of the Croatian community in the Bay of Kotor;

    30.  Expresses its grave concern over the endangered heritage sites in Montenegro such as the Bay of Kotor and Sveti Stefan; stresses that Sveti Stefan, along with Miločer Park, was listed among the ‘7 Most Endangered heritage sites in Europe’ for 2023;

    31.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the difficult living conditions of Roma people in Montenegro and the discrimination they face, and calls for more measures to promote intercultural understanding in schools; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to also take measures to improve the climate of societal inclusion for LGBTI persons;

    32.  Welcomes that Montenegro has aligned its legislative and institutional framework with the EU acquis and international human rights standards regarding compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and its optional protocols; urges the authorities to address shortcomings in implementation, namely related to accountability and monitoring;

    33.  Calls for the effective implementation of strategies to uphold the rights of persons with disabilities across all sectors and policies;

    34.  Condemns all hate speech, including online and gender-based hate speech, and hate crimes; welcomes the criminalisation of racism and hate speech;

    35.  Emphasises the need to strengthen institutional mechanisms for gender quality and calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the gender pay gap, to improve women’s participation in decision-making – in both the public domain, particularly public administration, and judicial and security sectors, and in business – to ensure the increased political participation of women, to introduce gender responsive budgeting, and to combat gender stereotypes and strengthen efforts to combat discrimination against women, particularly in rural areas; welcomes recent efforts aimed at boosting women’s representation in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) and encourages further efforts in technology sectors;

    36.  Is deeply concerned by the high rates of gender-based violence, including domestic violence and femicide; calls on Montenegro to fully align its definitions of gender-based violence and domestic violence with the Istanbul Convention, and with recommendations of international bodies, and to set up effective protection and prevention mechanisms and support centres, and ensure effective judicial follow-up for victims of domestic and sexual violence as well as a more robust penal policy towards perpetrators; calls for the collection of disaggregated data on gender-based violence and gender disparities to improve policy responses;

    37.  Regrets that the draft law on legal gender recognition was not adopted in 2024, despite it being a measure under Montenegro’s EU accession programme; urges Montenegro to adopt the law without delay;

    38.  Welcomes Montenegro’s new media laws and its strategy for media policy aimed at strengthening the legal framework to effectively protect journalists and other media workers; insists on a zero-tolerance policy with regard to pressure on, harassment of, or violence against journalists, particularly by public figures; underlines the need for effective investigations, the prosecution of all instances of hate speech, smear campaigns and strategic lawsuits against journalists, and follow-up of past cases; stresses the need to ensure journalists’ rights to access information and maintain a critical stance; notes a significant improvement in Montenegro’s press freedom, demonstrated by its progress on the World Press Freedom Index;

    39.  Expresses its concern over cases where journalists, academics and civil society organisations have faced pressure for exercising free speech, including instances where the police have initiated misdemeanour proceedings against them; is concerned by the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) to target journalists;

    40.  Regrets the prevailing high level of polarisation in the media and its vulnerability to political interests and foreign influence as well as foreign and domestic disinformation campaigns that spread narratives that negatively impact democratic processes in the country and endanger Montenegro’s European perspective; calls on Montenegro to further develop improved media literacy programmes and include them as a core subject in education; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to ensure the editorial, institutional and financial independence of the public service broadcaster RTCG, as well as the legality of the appointment of its management and full respect for court rulings concerning RTCG; recalls that it needs to comply with the law and the highest standards of accountability and integrity; regrets that the independence of public media is being weakened and undermined; calls on all media entities to comply with legal requirements on public funding transparency;

    41.  Welcomes the publication of the 2023 population census results; calls on the authorities to avoid any politicisation of the process; encourages stakeholders to use these results in a non-discriminatory manner;

    42.  Welcomes Montenegro’s vibrant and constructive civil society and underlines its importance in fostering democracy and pluralism and in promoting good governance and social progress; expresses its concern over the shrinking space for civil society organisations with a critical stance, and condemns all smear campaigns, intimidation and attacks against civil society organisations, notably by political figures in the context of proposals for a ‘foreign agent law’; notes that such laws have the potential to undermine fundamental freedoms and the functioning of civil society and are inconsistent with EU values and standards; calls for a supportive legal framework and clear and fair selection criteria in relation to public funding; calls for the Council for Cooperation between the Government and non-governmental organisations to resume work; underlines the importance of building collaborative relationships and genuinely consulting civil society on draft legislation from an early stage onwards;

    Reconciliation, good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation

    43.  Recalls that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation are essential elements of the enlargement process; commends Montenegro’s active involvement in regional cooperation initiatives; recalls that good neighbourly relations are key for advancing in the accession process;

    44.  Regrets that Chapter 31 could not be closed in December 2024; calls on all engaged parties to find solutions to outstanding bilateral issues in a constructive and neighbourly manner and prioritise the future interests of citizens in the Western Balkans; recalls that using unresolved bilateral and regional disputes to block candidate countries’ accession processes should be avoided; welcomes bilateral consultations between the Republic of Croatia and Montenegro on the status of unresolved bilateral issues; encourages the authorities to continue pursuing confidence-building measures;

    45.  Notes Montenegro’s amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code to address legal and practical obstacles to the effective investigation, prosecution, trial and punishment of war crimes in line with relevant recommendations; calls on Montenegro to apply a proactive approach to handling war crimes cases, in line with international law and standards, to identify, prosecute and punish the perpetrators and the glorification of war crimes and ensure access to, and delivery of justice, redress and reparations for victims, and clarify the fate of missing persons; calls on Montenegro to allocate sufficient resources to specialised prosecutors and courts and proactively investigate all war crime allegations and raise issues of command responsibility, as well as to review past cases that were not prosecuted in line with international or domestic law; calls for regional cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of individuals indicted for war crimes; recognises that addressing these issues and safeguarding court-based facts are an important foundation for trust, democratic values, reconciliation and strengthening bilateral relations with neighbouring countries, and encourages Montenegro to step up these efforts;

    46.  Warns against the dangers of political revisionism, which distorts historical facts for political purposes, undermines accountability and deepens societal divisions; strongly condemns the glorification of war criminals and widespread public denial of international verdicts for war crimes, including by the Montenegrin authorities; considers that President Jakov Milatović’s statement expressing regret over the participation of Montenegrin forces in the bombardment of the city of Dubrovnik was a valuable contribution to regional peace and reconciliation;

    47.  Reiterates its support for the initiative to establish the Regional Commission for the establishment of facts about war crimes and other gross human rights violations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia (RECOM);

    48.  Reiterates its call for the archives that concern the former republics of Yugoslavia to be opened and for access to be granted to the files of the former Yugoslav Secret Service and the Yugoslav People’s Army Secret Service in order to thoroughly research and address communist-era crimes;

    Socio-economic reforms

    49.  Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in SEPA payment schemes, lowering costs for citizens and businesses; underlines that this opens up opportunities for business expansion, increased competitiveness, innovation and improved access to foreign direct investments;

    50.  Welcomes the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which aims to integrate the region into the EU’s single market, promote regional economic cooperation and deepen EU-related reforms, and which includes the EUR 6 billion Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans; welcomes Montenegro’s adoption of a reform agenda and encourages its full implementation; notes that the implementation of the defined reform measures under Montenegro’s reform agenda for the Growth Plan would provide access to over EUR 380 million in grants and favourable loans, subject to successful implementation; stresses the importance of inclusive stakeholder consultations, including local and regional authorities, social partners and civil society, in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases;

    51.  Encourages Montenegro to make best use of all EU funding available under the Pre-accession Assistance Instrument (IPA III), the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the IPARD programme and the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, to accelerate socio-economic convergence with the EU and further align its legislation with the EU on fraud prevention; recalls the conditionality of EU funding, which may be modulated or suspended in the event of significant regression or persistent lack of progress on fundamentals;

    52.  Calls for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the accession countries in order to facilitate close cooperation and the prosecution of the misuse of EU funds, including through the secondment of national liaison officers to the EPPO; encourages Montenegro to fully implement working arrangements with the EPPO; calls for the EU to make the necessary legal and political arrangements to extend the jurisdiction of the EPPO to EU funds devoted to Montenegro as a candidate country;

    53.  Positively notes Montenegro’s economic growth; calls for more steps to reduce the budget deficit and public debt, and to further remove indirect tax exemptions that do not align with the EU acquis; welcomes the efforts to reduce these fiscal vulnerabilities; reiterates the need for increased public investment in the education system for sustainable social and economic development;

    54.  Notes Montenegro’s public debt to foreign financial institutions and companies that can be used as a tool to influence its policy decisions, in particular those related to China and Russia; welcomes the efforts to reduce these vulnerabilities and calls on the authorities to further reduce economic dependence on China and to continue making use of the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the EU Global Gateway initiative and the Reform and Growth Facility, with a view to finding greener and more transparent alternatives for financing infrastructure projects; calls on Montenegro to increase transparency in future infrastructure projects, ensure competitive bidding and avoid excessive debt dependence on foreign creditors;

    55.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to take measures to counter depopulation and emigration, in particular through investments in education and healthcare, especially in the north of the country, as well as through decentralisation by investing in medium-sized cities;

    56.  Encourages the Montenegrin authorities to boost the digital transformation and pursue evidence-based labour market policies to address the persistently high unemployment rate, in particular among women and young people, while bolstering institutional capacity and enhancing the underlying digital policy framework, and to effectively implement the Youth Guarantee and the new Youth Strategy; urges the authorities to address brain drain as a matter of urgency; encourages the development of targeted preventive measures and incentives to legalise informal businesses and employees, as a large informal sector continues to hinder economic and social development in Montenegro;

    57.  Welcomes the calls for the prompt integration of all Western Balkan countries into the EU’s digital single market before actual EU membership, which would crucially enable the creation of a digitally safe environment;

    58.  Calls for more transparency in public procurement, notably for procedures via intergovernmental agreements, and for full compliance with EU rules and principles; calls on Montenegro to reduce the number of public procurement procedures without notices; expresses its concern over the financial burden and lack of transparency surrounding the construction of the Bar-Boljare motorway financed by a Chinese loan; stresses that the secrecy surrounding loan agreements and construction contracts raises accountability concerns;

    59.  Expresses its concern over any agreements or projects that circumvent public procurement rules, transparency obligations and public consultation requirements, as set out in national legislation and EU standards; calls on the Government of Montenegro to ensure full respect for the principles of transparency, accountability, inclusive decision-making and the rule of law in all public infrastructure and development initiatives;

    Energy, the environment, biodiversity and connectivity

    60.  Urges Montenegro to advance the green transition, with the support of EU funding, improve its institutional and regulatory framework and enhance energy resilience by finally adopting and implementing the long-overdue National Energy and Climate Plan, adopting energy efficiency laws and integrating further with EU energy markets; calls for all new green transition projects to be implemented in line with EU standards on the environment, State aid and concessions;

    61.  Regrets the lack of progress on key sector reforms in the area of transport policy; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to align the country’s transport development with the Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy for the Western Balkans, focusing on railways, multimodality and reducing CO2 emissions and other environmental impacts, and to further implement its Transport Development Strategy and strengthen administrative capacities for the implementation of trans-European transport networks;

    62.  Welcomes the reduction of data roaming charges between the EU and the Western Balkan countries and calls on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to take all necessary steps towards the goal of bringing data roaming prices close to domestic prices by 2028; welcomes the entry into force of the first phase of the implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    63.  Encourages the adoption of sectoral strategies for waste management, air and water quality, nature protection and climate change, ensuring strategic planning for investments; notes the lack of progress and associated rising costs in building essential waste water treatment plants to prevent sewage pollution in rivers and the sea in seven municipalities;

    o
    o   o

    64.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commissioner for Enlargement, the Commissioner for the Mediterranean, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and to the President, Government and Parliament of Montenegro, and to have it translated and published in Montenegrin.

    (1) OJ L 108, 29.4.2010, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2010/224/oj.
    (2) OJ L 330, 20.9.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1529/oj.
    (3) OJ L, 2024/1449, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1449/oj.
    (4) OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 105.
    (5) OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
    (6) https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/montenegro.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Implementation report on the Recovery and Resilience Facility – P10_TA(2025)0128 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to Article 175 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility(1) (RRF Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 February 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/241 as regards REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans and amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) 2021/1060 and (EU) 2021/1755, and Directive 2003/87/EC(2) (REPowerEU Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(3) (Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765 of 29 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(4) (MFF Regulation),

    –  having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources(5) (the IIA),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(6) (Financial Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241(7),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on the effective coordination of economic policies and on multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97(8),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 23 June 2022 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility(9),

    –  having regard to the Commission notice of 22 July 2024 entitled ‘Guidance on recovery and resilience plans’(10),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 21 February 2024 on strengthening the EU through ambitious reforms and investments (COM(2024)0082),

    –  having regard to the Commission’s third annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (COM(2024)0474),

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ (ECA) annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the budget for the 2023 financial year, together with the institutions’ replies,

    –  having regard to special report 13/2024 of the ECA of 2 September 2024 entitled ‘Absorption of funds from the Recovery and Resilience Facility – Progressing with delays and risks remain regarding the completion of measures and therefore the achievement of RRF objectives’, special report 14/2024 of the ECA of 11 September 2024 entitled ‘Green transition – Unclear contribution from the Recovery and Resilience Facility’, and special report 22/2024 of the ECA of 21 October 2024 entitled ‘Double funding from the EU budget – Control systems lack essential elements to mitigate the increased risk resulting from the RRF model of financing not linked to costs’,

    –  having regard to the study of December 2023 supporting the mid-term Evaluation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility,

    –  having regard to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) 2024 annual report published on 3 March 2025,

    –  having regard to the report of September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (Draghi report),

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 8 October 2024 entitled ‘Mid-term review of the post-COVID European recovery plan (Recovery and Resilience Facility)’(11),

    –  having regard to the information published on the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard (RRF Scoreboard),

    –  having regard to the Commission staff working document of 20 November 2024 entitled ‘NGEU Green Bonds Allocation and Impact report 2024’ (SWD(2024)0275),

    –  having regard to its in-house research, in-depth analysis and briefings related to the implementation of the RRF(12),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation in Hungary and frozen EU funds(13),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

    –  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety and the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs under Rule 59 of the Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0098/2025),

    A.  whereas the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) was created to make European economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and better prepared in the light of unprecedented crises in 2019 and 2022, by supporting Member States in financing strategic investments and in implementing reforms;

    B.  whereas reforms and investments under the RRF help to make the EU more resilient and less dependent by diversifying key supply chains and thereby strengthening the strategic autonomy of the EU; whereas reforms and investments under the RRF also generate European added value;

    C.  whereas the RRF, as well as other EU funds, such as the European instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency, has helped to protect labour markets from the risk of long-term damage caused by the double economic shock of the pandemic and the energy crisis;

    D.  whereas RRF expenditure falls outside the ceilings of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) and borrowing proceeds constitute external assigned revenue; whereas Parliament regrets that they do not form part of the budgetary procedure; whereas based on the Financial Regulation’s principle of transparency, citizens should know how and for what purpose funds are spent by the EU;

    E.  whereas, due to the lack of progress in introducing new own resources in the EU and the need to ensure the sustainability of the EU’s repayment plan, a clear and reliable long-term funding strategy is essential to meet repayment obligations without forcing difficult trade-offs in the EU budget that could undermine future investments and policy priorities; whereas further discussions and concrete financial solutions will be necessary to secure the long-term viability of the EU’s debt repayment plan;

    F.  whereas the borrowing costs for NextGenerationEU (NGEU) have to be borne by the EU budget and the actual costs exceed the 2020 projections by far as a result of the high interest rates; whereas the total costs for NGEU capital and interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget; whereas Parliament has insisted that the refinancing costs be placed over and above the MFF ceilings; whereas a three-step ‘cascade mechanism’ including a new special EURI instrument was introduced during the 2024 MFF revision to cover the significant cost overruns resulting from NGEU borrowing linked to major changes in the market conditions; whereas an agreement was reached during the 2025 budgetary procedure to follow an annual 50/50 benchmark, namely to finance the overrun costs in equal shares by the special EURI instrument de-commitment compartment and the Flexibility Instrument;

    G.  whereas the bonds issued to finance the RRF are to be repaid in a manner that ensures the steady and predictable reduction of liabilities, by 2058 at the latest; whereas the Council has yet to adopt the adjusted basket of new own resources proposed by the Commission, which raises concerns about the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU;

    H.  whereas the social dimension is a key aspect of the RRF, contributing to upward economic and social convergence, restoring and promoting sustainable growth and fostering the creation of high-quality employment;

    I.  whereas the RRF should contribute to financing measures to strengthen the Member States’ resilience to climate disasters, among other things, and enhance climate adaptation; whereas the Member States should conduct proper impact assessments for measures and should share best practice on the implementation of the ‘do no significant harm’ (DNSH) principle;

    J.  whereas the RRF plays an important role in supporting investments and reforms in sustainable mobility, smart transport infrastructure, alternative fuels and digital mobility solutions, thus enhancing connectivity and efficiency across the EU; whereas it is regrettable that only a few Member States chose to use the RRF to support investments, particularly in high-speed railway and waterway infrastructure, aimed at developing European corridors, despite the encouragement of cross-border and multi-country projects; whereas it is crucial to increase investments in transport infrastructure, particularly in underserved regions, to improve connectivity, support regional cohesion and contribute to the green transition;

    K.  whereas by 31 December 2024, Member States had submitted 95 payment requests and the level of RRF disbursements including pre-financing stood at EUR 197,46 billion in grants (55 % of the total grants envelope) and EUR 108,68 billion in loans (37 % of the total loans envelope); whereas three Member States have already received their fifth payment, while one Member State has not received any RRF funding; whereas all Member States have revised their national recovery and resilience plans (NRRP) at least once; whereas 28 % of milestones and targets have been satisfactorily fulfilled and the Commission has made use of the possibility to partially suspend payments where some milestones and targets linked to a payment request were not found to be satisfactorily fulfilled; whereas delays in the execution of planned reforms and investments, particularly in social infrastructure and public services, could lead to the underutilisation of available resources, thereby reducing the expected impact on economic growth, employment and social cohesion;

    L.  whereas the ECA has revealed various shortcomings of the RRF, in particular in relation to its design, its transparency and reporting, the risk of double funding and the implementation of twin transition measures;

    M.  whereas according to the ECA, performance is a measure of the extent to which an EU-funded action, project or programme has met its objectives and provides value for money; whereas moreover, financing not linked to costs does not, in itself, make an instrument performance-based;

    N.  whereas robust audit and control systems are crucial to protect the financial interests of the EU throughout the life cycle of the RRF; whereas the milestones commonly known as ‘super milestones’, in particular related to the rule of law, had to be fulfilled prior to any RRF disbursements;

    O.  whereas the RRF Regulation refers to the RRF’s ‘performance-based nature’ but does not define ‘performance’; whereas RRF performance should be linked to sound financial management principles and should measure how well an EU-funded action, project or programme has met its objectives and provided value for money;

    P.  whereas effective democratic control and parliamentary scrutiny over the implementation of the RRF require the full involvement of Parliament and the consideration of all its recommendations at all stages;

    Q.  whereas the Commission has to provide an independent ex post evaluation report on the implementation of the RRF by 31 December 2028, consisting of an assessment of the extent to which the objectives have been achieved, of the efficiency of the use of resources and of the European added value, as well as a global assessment of the RRF, and containing information on its impact in the long term;

    R.  whereas the purpose of this report is to monitor the implementation of the RRF, in accordance with Parliament’s role as laid down in the RRF Regulation, by pointing to the benefits and shortcomings of the RRF, while drawing on the lessons learnt during its implementation;

    Strengthening Europe’s social and economic resilience

    1.  Highlights the fact that the RRF is an unprecedented instrument of solidarity in the light of two unprecedented crises and a cornerstone of the NGEU instrument, ending in 2026; emphasises the importance of drawing lessons from its implementation for the upcoming MFF, including as regards transparency, reporting and coherent measurement of deliverables; highlights the stabilising effect of the RRF for Member States at a time of great economic uncertainty, as it mitigates negative economic and social consequences and supports governments by contributing to the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, by promoting economic recovery and competitiveness, boosting resilience and innovation, and by supporting the green and digital transitions;

    2.  Highlights the important role of the RRF in preventing the fragmentation of the internal market and the further deepening of macroeconomic divergence, in fostering social and territorial cohesion by providing macroeconomic stabilisation, and in offering assurance to the financial markets by improving investor confidence in turbulent times, thereby lowering yield spreads;

    3.  Welcomes the fact that the RRF is a one-off instrument providing additional fiscal space that has contributed to the prevention of considerable economic and social divergences between Member States with diverse fiscal space; highlights the Commission finding that the RRF has led to a sustained increase in investments across the EU and that the Commission expects the RRF to have a lasting impact across the EU beyond 2026, given its synergies with other EU funds; is, however, concerned that the RRF expiration in 2026 poses a significant risk of a substantial decline in public investment in common European priorities;

    4.  Recalls that the MFF and RRF combined amount to almost EUR 2 trillion for the 2021-2027 programming period, but points to the fact that the high inflation rates and the associated increases in the cost of goods and services have decreased the current value of European spending agreed in nominal terms;

    5.  Takes note of the Commission’s projection in 2024 concerning the potential of NGEU’s impact on the EU’s real gross domestic product (GDP) by 2026, which is significantly lower than its simulation in 2020 (1,4 % compared with 2,3 %), due in part to adverse economic and geopolitical conditions, and of the estimation that NGEU could lead to a sizeable, short-run increase in EU employment by up to 0,8 %; notes that the long-term benefits of the RRF on GDP will likely exceed the budgetary commitments undertaken by up to three to six times , depending on the productivity effects of RRF investment and the diligent implementation of reforms and investments;

    6.  Highlights the difficulty of quantifying the precise social and economic impact of the RRF, as it takes time for the impact of reforms and investments to become clear; stresses the need for further independent evaluations to assess the effective impact of reforms and investments and for further improvements of the underlying methodology; notes the Commission’s finding that approximately half of the expected increase in public investment between 2019 and 2025 is related to investment financed by the EU budget, particularly by the RRF, but notes that some investments have not yet delivered measurable impact;

    7.  Notes that the RRF has incentivised the implementation of some reforms included in the country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester through the inclusion of such reforms in the NRRPs; underlines that there has been a qualitative leap forward in terms of monitoring RRF implementation; recalls that the RRF Scoreboard is used to monitor the progress made towards achieving milestones and targets, as well as compliance with horizontal principles, and in particular the six pillars, namely the green transition, the digital transformation, smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (including economic cohesion, jobs, productivity, competitiveness, research, development and innovation, and a well-functioning internal market with strong small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)), social and territorial cohesion, health, economic, social and institutional resilience with the aim of, inter alia, increasing crisis preparedness and crisis response capacity, and policies for the next generation, children and young people, such as education and skills; highlights that the overall uptake of country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester remains low and has even dropped;

    8.  Highlights that in the context of the new economic governance framework, the set of reforms and investments underpinning an extension of the adjustment period should be consistent with the commitments included in the approved NRRPs during the period of operation of the RRF and the Partnership Agreement under the Common Provisions Regulation(14); observes that the five Member States that requested an extension of the adjustment period by 31 December 2024 relied partly on the reforms and investments already approved under the RRF to justify the extension; takes note of the fact that most Member States have included information on whether the reforms and investments listed in the medium-term fiscal-structural plans are linked to the RRF;

    9.  Welcomes the fact that the RRF provides support for both reforms and investments in the Member States, but notes with concern that the short timeframe for the remaining RRF implementation poses challenges to the completion of key reforms and large-scale investments that are to be finalised towards the end of the RRF and to the timely fulfilment of the 70 % of milestones and targets that are still pending;

    10.  Recalls that RRF expenditure should not substitute recurring national budgetary expenditure, unless duly justified, and should respect the principle of additionality of EU funding; insists that the firm, sustainable and verifiable implementation of non-recurrence, together with the targeting of clearly defined European objectives of reforms and investments, is key to ensure additionality and the long-lasting effect of additional European funds; recalls the need to uphold this principle and appeals against the crowding out or replacement of cohesion policy by the RRF or other temporary instruments, as cohesion policy remains essential for long-term sustainable territorial cohesion and convergence;

    11.  Highlights that prioritising RRF implementation, the lack of administrative capacity in many Member States and challenges posed by global supply chains have contributed to the delayed implementation of cohesion policy; calls on the Commission, in this context, to provide a comprehensive assessment of the RRF’s impact on other financial instruments and public investments, technical support, and the administrative and absorption capacities of the Member States;

    12.  Recalls that, in reaction to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the REPowerEU revision contributes to Europe’s energy security by reducing its dependence on fossil fuels, diversifying its energy supplies, investing in European resources and infrastructure, tackling energy poverty and investing in energy savings and efficiency in all sectors, including transport; emphasises that through REPowerEU, an additional EUR 20 billion in grants was made available in 2023, including EUR 8 billion generated from the front-loading of Emissions Trading System allowances and EUR 12 billion from the Innovation Fund; highlights Parliament’s successes in negotiations, in particular on the provisions on replenishing the Innovation Fund, the 30 % funding target for cross-border projects, the focus of investments on tackling energy poverty for vulnerable households, SMEs and micro-enterprises, and the flexible use of unspent cohesion funds from the 2014-2020 MFF and of up to 7,5 % of national allocations under the 2021-2027 MFF;

    13.  Recalls its call to focus RRF interventions on measures with European added value and therefore regrets the shortage of viable cross-border or multi-country measures, including high-speed railway and sustainable mobility infrastructure projects for dual use that are essential for completing the TEN-T network, and the related risk of re-nationalising funding; notes that the broad scope of the RRF objectives has contributed to this by allowing a wide variety of nationally focused projects to fall within its remit;

    14.  Highlights the modification of Article 27 of the RRF Regulation through REPowerEU, which significantly strengthened the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of the RRF by encouraging the Member States to amend their NRRPs to add RepowerEU chapters, including a spending target of at least 30 % for such measures in order to guarantee the EU’s energy autonomy; is concerned by the broad interpretation adopted by the Commission, which allows any reduction in (national) energy demand to make a case for a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    15.  Welcomes the possibility of using RRF funding to contribute to the objectives of the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP) by supporting investments in critical technologies in the EU in order to boost its industrial competitiveness; notes that no Member State has made use of the possibility to include in its NRRP an additional cash contribution to STEP objectives via the Member State compartment of InvestEU; recalls that Member States can still amend their national plans in that regard; expects the revision processes to be efficient, streamlined and simple, especially considering the final deadline of 2026, the current geopolitical context and the need to invest in European defence capabilities;

    16.  Recalls the application of the DNSH principle for all reforms and investments supported by the RRF, with a targeted derogation under REPowerEU for energy infrastructure and facilities needed to meet immediate security of supply needs; encourages the Commission to assess the feasibility of a more uniform interpretation of the DNSH principle between the RRF and the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities, while taking into account the specificities of the RRF as a public expenditure programme;

    Financial aspects of the RRF

    17.  Stresses that the RRF is the first major performance-based instrument at EU level which is exclusively based on financing not linked to costs (FNLC); recalls that Article 8 of the RRF Regulation stipulates that the RRF must be implemented by the Commission in direct management in accordance with the relevant rules adopted pursuant to Article 322 TFEU, in particular the Financial Regulation and the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation; regrets that the Council did not agree to insert specific rules in the Financial Regulation to address the risks of this delivery model, such as double funding; considers that the rules of the Financial Regulation should be fully applicable to future instruments based on FNLC, including as regards fines, penalties and sanctions;

    18.  Notes that only 13 Member States have requested loans and that EUR 92 billion of the EUR 385,8 billion available will remain unused since this amount was not committed by the deadline of 31 December 2023; takes note of the fact that loans were attractive for Member States that faced higher borrowing costs on the financial markets or that sought to compensate for a reduction in RRF grants; points out that some Member States have made limited use of RRF loans, either due to strong fiscal positions or administrative considerations; calls on the Commission to analyse the reasons for the low uptake in some Member States and to consider these findings when designing future EU financial instruments; notes with concern that national financial instruments to implement the NRRPs have not been sufficiently publicised, leading to limited awareness and uptake by potential beneficiaries; considers that a political discussion is needed on the use of unspent funds in the light of tight public budgets and urgent EU strategic priorities; calls for an assessment of how and under which conditions unused RRF funds could be redirected to boost Europe’s competitiveness, resilience, defence, and social, economic and territorial cohesion, particularly through investments in digital and green technologies aligned with the RRF’s original purpose;

    19.  Recalls the legal obligation to ensure full repayment of NGEU expenditure by 31 December 2058 at the latest; reminds the Council and the Commission of their legal commitment under the interinstitutional agreement concluded in 2020 to ensure a viable path to refinancing NGEU debt, including through sufficient proceeds from new own resources introduced after 2021 without any undue reduction in programme expenditure or investment instruments under the MFF; deplores the lack of progress made in this regard, which raises concerns regarding the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU, and urges the Council to adopt new own resources without delay and as a matter of urgency; urges the Commission, furthermore, to continue efforts to identify additional genuine new own resources beyond the IIA and linked to EU policies, in order to cover the high spending needs associated with the funding of new priorities and the repayment of NGEU debt;

    20.  Notes with concern the Commission’s estimation that the total cost for NGEU capital and interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget ; recalls that recourse to special instruments had to be made in the last three budgetary procedures to cover EURI instrument costs; highlights that the significant increase in financing costs puts pressure on the future EU budget and limits the capacity to respond to future challenges;

    21.  Takes note of the Commission’s target to fund up to 30 % of NGEU costs by issuing greens bonds; notes that by 31 December 2024 the Commission had issued European green bonds amounting to EUR 68.2 billion;

    Design and implementation of NRRPs

    22.  Notes that 47 % of the available RRF funds had been disbursed by 31 December 2024, with grants reaching 55 % and loans 37 %, which has resulted in a high proportion of measures still to be completed in 2025 and 2026; is concerned, however, about the ECA’s finding that only 50 % of disbursed funds had reached final beneficiaries in 15 out of 22 Member States by October 2023; calls on the Commission to take the recommendations of the ECA duly into account in order to improve the functioning of any future performance-based instruments similar to the RRF, in particular in the context of a more targeted MFF;

    23.  Welcomes the fact that all Member States have surpassed the targets for the green (37 %) and the digital transitions (20 %), with average expenditure towards climate and digital objectives of the RRF as a whole standing at 42 % and 26 % respectively; notes that the ECA has cast doubt on how the implementation of RRF measures has contributed to the green transition and has recommended improvements to the methodologies used to estimate the impact of climate-related measures; highlights the fact that the same methodological deficiencies exist across all pillars of the RRF;

    24.  Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on social objectives, with Member States planning to spend around EUR 163 billion; underlines that such spending must be result-oriented, ensuring measurable economic and/or social benefits; stresses the need to accelerate investments in the development of rural, peripheral and outermost, isolated and remote areas, and in the fields of affordable housing, social protection and the integration of vulnerable groups, and youth employment, where expenditure is lagging behind; calls for an in-depth evaluation by the Commission, under the RRF Scoreboard, of the projects and reforms related to education and young people implemented by Member States under the RRF; regrets the delayed implementation of health objectives observed in certain Member States, given that the instrument should also improve the accessibility and capacity of health systems, and of key social infrastructure investments, including early childhood education and care facilities; stresses that these delays, in some cases linked to shifting budgetary priorities and revised national implementation timelines, risk undermining the achievement of the RRF’s social cohesion objectives;

    25.  Reiterates its negotiating position to include targets for education (10 %) and for cultural activities (2 %); encourages the Commission’s effort to evaluate these targets as a benchmark in its assessment of education policy in NRRPs, through the RRF Scoreboard;

    26.  Observes that a large majority of NRRPs include a specific section explaining how the plan addresses gender-related concerns and challenges; is concerned, however, that some NRRPs do not include an explanation of how the measures in the NRRP are expected to contribute to gender equality and equal opportunities for all and calls on the Member States concerned to add such explanations without delay;

    27.  Stresses the importance of reforms focusing on labour market fragmentation, fostering quality working conditions, addressing wage level inequalities, ensuring decent living conditions, and strengthening social dialogue, social protection and the social economy;

    28.  Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on the digital transformation objective, with EUR 166 billion allocated to corresponding plans; welcomes the contributions made under the smart, sustainable and inclusive growth pillar, in particular to competitiveness and support for SMEs; notes the need for an acceleration of investments in transnational cooperation, support for competitive enterprises leading innovation projects, and regulatory changes for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, which are lagging behind;

    29.  Stresses that the success of EU investments depends on well-functioning capital markets; calls on the Member States to ensure a more effective and timely disbursement of funds, particularly for SMEs and young entrepreneurs, to streamline application procedures with a view to enhancing accessibility and to implement specific measures to provide targeted support to help them play a more prominent role in the process of smart and inclusive growth;

    30.  Is concerned that the achievement of milestones and targets lags behind the indicative timetable provided in the NRRPs, and that the pace of progress is uneven across Member States; regrets the time lag between the fulfilment of milestones and targets and the implementation of projects; highlights that the RRF will only achieve its long-term and short-term potential if the reform and investment components, respectively, are properly implemented; welcomes the fact that, following a slow start, RRF implementation has picked up since the second half of 2023 but significant delays affecting key reforms and investments still persist and have been attributed to various factors, including the revisions linked to the inclusion of REPowerEU, mounting inflation, the insufficient administrative capacity of Member States, in particular the smaller Member States, uncertainties regarding specific RRF implementation rules, high energy costs, supply shortages and an underestimation of the time needed to implement measures; notes that the postponement of key implementation deadlines by some governments to 2026 raises concerns about the capacity of some Member States to fully absorb the allocated funds within the set timeframe of the RRF; stresses the importance of maintaining a realistic and effective implementation schedule to prevent the risk of incomplete projects and missed opportunities for structural improvements; calls on the Commission to ensure that administrative bottlenecks are urgently addressed;

    31.  Recalls the modification of the RRF Regulation through the inclusion of the REPowerEU chapter; stresses the importance of the REPowerEU chapters in NRRPs and calls on the Member States to prioritise mature projects and implement their NRRPs more quickly, both in terms of reforms and investments, and, where necessary, to adjust NRRPs in line with the RRF’s objectives, without undermining the overall balance and level of ambition of the NRRPs, in order to respond to challenges stemming from geopolitical events and to tackle current realities on the ground;

    32.  Highlights the fact that the RRF could have helped to mitigate the effects of the current EU-wide housing crisis; regrets that some Member States did not make use of this opportunity and stresses the importance for the Member States to accelerate investments in availability and affordability of housing;

    33.  Highlights the role of ‘super milestones’ in protecting the EU’s financial interests against rule of law deficiencies and in ensuring the full implementation of the requirements under Article 22 of the RRF Regulation; welcomes the fact that all but one Member State have satisfactorily fulfilled their ‘super milestones’; recalls that the Commission must recover any pre-financing that has not been netted against regular payment requests by the end of the RRF;

    34.  Notes the high administrative burden and complexity brought by the RRF; stresses the considerable efforts required at national level to implement the RRF in parallel with structural funds; notes that between 2021 and 2024 the demand-driven Technical Support Instrument supported more than 500 RRF-related reforms in the Member States, directly or indirectly related to the preparation, amendment, revision and implementation of the NRRPs; takes note of the Commission guidance of July 2024 with simplifications and clarifications to streamline RRF implementation but expects the Commission to act swiftly on its promise to cut the administrative burden by 25 %; urges the Commission to give clear and targeted technical support to the Member States, allowing them to develop efficient administrative capacity to implement the milestones and targets; calls on the Commission to decrease the level of complexity of EU public procurement rules which apply to higher-value contracts;

    35.  Expresses concern over the complexity of application procedures for RRF funding, particularly for SMEs and non-governmental organisations, which require external consultancy services even for small grants; emphasises that such bureaucratic obstacles contradict the original objectives of the RRF, which aimed to provide rapid and direct financial support; calls for an urgent simplification of application and reporting requirements, particularly for smaller beneficiaries, to maximise the absorption and impact of funds and to assist with their contribution to the green and digital transitions;

    36.  Believes that implementation delays underscore the risk that measures for which RRF funding has been paid will not be completed by the 2026 payment deadline; welcomes the Commission’s statement at the Recovery and Resilience Dialogue (RRD) of 16 September 2024 that it will not reimburse non-implemented projects; considers it a shortcoming that RRF funds paid for milestones and targets assessed as fulfilled cannot be recovered if related measures are not eventually completed; encourages the Commission to take into account the ECA’s recommendations related to this and to assess, in cooperation with the Member States, the measures most at risk of not being completed by 31 August 2026; stresses the importance of monitoring these measures, facilitating timely follow-up and working towards solutions to overcome delays;

    37.  Notes with concern that the remaining implementation timeframe of the RRF is too short for the implementation of many innovative projects; further notes that innovative projects, by definition, are more difficult to plan and more likely to encounter obstacles during implementation, making them unsuited to the RRF’s strict deadlines; urges the Commission to create future programmes that are flexible enough to give proper answers in changing circumstances and that at the same time guarantee a certain degree of predictability;

    38.  Notes that some milestones and targets may be no longer achievable because of objective circumstances; stresses that any NRRP revisions should be made in accordance with the RRF Regulation, including the applicable deadlines, and should not entail backtracking on reforms, commitments or lower quality projects but should maintain the overall ambition and the efficiency of public spending;

    39.  Is concerned about the Commission’s uneven assessment of NRRPs, which has led to double standards in the application of the Regulation; is further concerned about the uneven and different definition of milestones and targets from one NRRP to the other, as consistently reported by the ECA;

    40.  Highlights that the duration of the Commission’s assessment of payment requests by Member States differs considerably among the Member States and stresses the need for more transparency from the Commission; urges the Commission to accelerate its assessments and to ensure the equal treatment of the Member States; highlights the need to ensure a level playing field across the EU for measures and indicators that are used to assess all RRF projects;

    41.  Urges the Member States to increase their efforts to address administrative bottlenecks and provide sufficient administrative capacity to accelerate RRF implementation in view of the 2026 deadline and to avoid concentrating RRF projects in more developed regions and capitals by enabling RRF funds to flow into projects in the most vulnerable regions, thereby serving the RRF’s objective to enhance the EU’s social, territorial and economic cohesion; emphasises the importance of fair regional distribution within the NRRPs while ensuring that RRF funds are allocated based on economic and social impact, feasibility and long-term benefits;

    42.   Calls for an 18-month extension of mature RRF projects through an amendment of the RRF Regulation by co-decision, if needed; emphasises that the envisaged extension of projects will be conducted by the Commission based on objective, clear and fair benchmarks; welcomes the possibility of establishing a targeted and performance-based prioritisation and transfer system after the 2026 deadline in order to allow for the finalisation of ongoing projects through other funding schemes, including the European Investment Fund and a possible new European competitiveness fund; urges the Commission to present a strategy to address the huge demand for public investment beyond 2026 without compromising budgetary resources in other critical areas;

    43.  Calls for an evaluation of how this framework could enable targeted investments in EU defence supply chains, strategic stockpiles and defence innovation, ensuring alignment with broader European security objectives;

    44.  Is concerned that some Member States might choose to forego parts of the amounts or entire amounts associated with their last payment request, thus avoiding the fulfilment of the last milestones and targets;

    Transparency, monitoring and control

    45.  Takes note of the fact that the Commission had planned to conduct 112 RRF audits in all Member States in 2024; reminds the Commission of its obligation, in accordance with Article 24(9) of the RRF Regulation, to recover funding in case of incorrect disbursements or reversals of measures;

    46.  Notes that the Commission relies on its own methodologies when calculating partial payments and suspensions of funds; regrets that these methodologies were only developed two years after the start of the RRF implementation and without the consultation of Parliament;

    47.  Welcomes the extensive work of the ECA in relation to the RRF and deems it important to thoroughly assess its findings, in particular its findings that milestones and targets are often rather vague and output-oriented and are therefore not fit to measure results and impacts, and its findings regarding the risks of double funding resulting from overlaps with other policies; notes that the Commission has accepted many but not all of the ECA’s recommendations; stresses that weaknesses in financial controls, as highlighted by the ECA, must be urgently addressed to prevent double funding, cost inefficiencies, and mismanagement of EU funds; calls for enhanced transparency and for the full consideration of the ECA’s recommendations without adding unnecessary administrative burden;

    48.  Notes that the ECA considers that the RRF focuses on progress on implementation rather than performance, particularly because RRF-funded measures focus on outputs rather than results, vary in ambition, sometimes lack clarity and do not always cover a measure’s key implementation stages, including completion;

    49.  Notes that the ECA’s audits revealed several cases in which funding had been disbursed but the requirements related to the fulfilment of corresponding milestones and targets had not been adequately met; further notes that the Commission framework for assessing the ‘satisfactory fulfilment’ of the relevant milestones and targets contains discretionary elements, such as ‘minimal deviation from a requirement’ or ‘proportional delays’, and that the methodology for the determination of partial payments does not provide an explanation for the values chosen as coefficients, thereby leaving room for interpretation; asks the Commission to provide Parliament with further clarification;

    50.  Insists that, as a rule, measures already included in other national plans benefiting from EU funding (e.g. cohesion, agriculture, etc.) should not be included in NRRPs, even if they do not incur any costs; urges the Commission to remain vigilant and proactive in identifying any potential situation of double funding in particular in regard to the different implementation models of the RRF and other EU funding instruments;

    51.  Regrets the lack of a proper RRF audit trail and the persistent lack of transparency despite the bi-annual reporting requirement for Member States on the 100 largest final recipients, which was introduced into REPowerEU upon Parliament’s request; regrets the delays in reporting by some Member States and the limited informative value of the information provided, which ultimately prevents compliance checks by the Commission or the ECA; reiterates its call for the lists of the largest final recipients for each Member State to be regularly updated and published on the RRF Scoreboard and to include information on the economic operators involved, including contractors and sub-contractors, and their beneficial owners, and not simply ministries or other government bodies or state companies; further regrets that the current definition of ‘final recipient’ leaves room for interpretation, resulting in different final beneficiaries for similar measures among Member States; calls on the Commission, in this context, to ensure a common understanding of what constitutes a ‘final recipient’ so that this can be applied consistently;

    52.  Is concerned about persistent weaknesses in national reporting and control mechanisms, due in part to absorption pressure affecting the capacity to detect ineligible expenditure and due to the complexity of the audit and control procedures, which created uncertainty in the Member States and an overload of administrative procedures; calls on the Commission to provide assurance on whether Member States’ control systems function adequately and to check the compliance of RRF-funded investment projects with EU and national rules; calls for payments to be reduced and, where appropriate, amounts to be recovered in accordance with Article 22 of the RRF Regulation, should weaknesses persist in the national control systems; regrets the reliance on manual cross-checks and self-declarations by recipients of EU funds in the absence of interoperable IT tools and harmonised standards, despite the existence of tools such as the Early Detection and Exclusion System and ARACHNE, whose use is currently not mandatory, thereby risking that expenditure is declared twice; recalls, in this regard, the reluctance of the Member States to make progress in developing the relevant IT tools in a timely manner;

    53.  Shares the view of the ECA that the FNLC model does not preclude reporting on actual costs; notes that having clear insights on costs also facilitates the work of control and oversight bodies, as well as the EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), and enables enhanced public scrutiny;

    54.  Reiterates the role of the RRF Scoreboard in providing information for citizens on the overall progress in the implementation of NRRPs; underlines the importance of the Scoreboard in strengthening transparency and calls on the Commission to increase the level of transparency and data visualisation in the Scoreboard;

    55.  Recalls that the reporting on the progress of implementation in the RRF Scoreboard is based on information provided by the Member States on a bi-annual basis;

    56.  Highlights the important role of the EPPO and OLAF in protecting the EU’s financial interests; welcomes the fact that EPPO investigations into RRF-related fraud and corruption cases have led to several arrests, indictments and seizures of RRF funds; recalls that the EPPO was handling 307 active cases related to the RRF in 2024, corresponding to about 17 % of all expenditure fraud investigations and causing an estimated damage to the EU’s financial interests of EUR 2,8 billion; expects the number of investigations to grow as RRF implementation advances; calls on the Commission to look into the management declarations of the Member States in terms of their reporting of detected fraud and the remedial measures taken;

    Role of the European Parliament

    57.  Reiterates the importance of Parliament’s role in scrutinising and monitoring the implementation of the RRF and in holding the Commission accountable; highlights Parliament’s input provided through various channels, in particular through various plenary debates, parliamentary resolutions, bi-monthly RRD meetings with the responsible Commissioners, over 30 meetings of the standing working group on the scrutiny of the RRF, numerous parliamentary questions, the annual discharge procedure of the Commission and the regular flow of information and ad hoc requests for information from the Commission; regrets that the model of using milestones and targets to trigger disbursement was not accompanied by adequate budgetary control mechanisms, resulting in a diminished role for Parliament compared to its scrutiny of MFF spending;

    58.  Recalls Parliament’s rights as laid down in Article 25 of the RRF Regulation, in particular the right to simultaneously receive from the Commission information that it transmits to the Council or any of its preparatory bodies in the context of the RRF Regulation or its implementation, as well as an overview of its preliminary findings concerning the satisfactory fulfilment of the relevant milestones and targets included in the NRRPs; encourages the sharing of relevant outcomes of discussions held in Council preparatory bodies with the competent parliamentary committees;

    59.  Recalls further the right of Parliament’s competent committees to invite the Commission to provide information on the state of play of the assessment of the NRRPs in the context of the RRD meetings;

    60.  Regrets the fact that Parliament has no role in the design of NRRPs and is not consulted on payment requests; criticises furthermore the fact that Parliament has not been provided with a clear and traceable overview of the implementation status of projects and payments; expects to be informed about the context of NRRP revisions in order to make its own assessment of the revisions and to have an enhanced role in possible future instruments based on the RRF experience;

    Stakeholder involvement

    61.  Regrets the insufficient involvement of local and regional authorities (LRAs), civil society organisations, social partners, national parliaments and other relevant stakeholders in the design, revision or implementation of NRRPs leading to worse policy outcomes, as well as limited ownership; regrets that in the design and implementation of the NRRPs, some Member States have clearly favoured some LRAs or stakeholders to the detriment of others; recalls that the participation of LRAs, national authorities and those responsible for developing these policies is crucial for the success of the RRF, as stated in Article 28 of the RRF Regulation; recalls that Parliament supported a binding provision in the RRF to establish a multilevel dialogue to engage relevant stakeholders and discuss the preparation and implementation of NRRPs with them, with a clear consultation period; calls, therefore, for the maximum possible stakeholder involvement in the implementation of NRRPs, in accordance with the national legal framework and based on clear and transparent principles;

    62.  Reiterates the need for regular interaction between national coordinating authorities and national stakeholders involved in the monitoring of the implementation of the NRRPs, in line with the principle of transparency and accountability; stresses that more regular and public communication from the national coordinating authorities is needed to ensure that updated information about the progress of the implementation of NRRPs is made available;

    63.  Stresses that decisions should be made at the level that is most appropriate; is convinced that the application of the partnership principle and a stronger involvement of LRAs could make project implementation more efficient, reduce disparities within Member States and result in more and better quality measures with a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    64.  Believes that valuable lessons can be drawn from the RRF to be reflected in the design of performance-based instruments in the next MFF, in particular in the light of the EU’s competitiveness and simplification agendas;

    Lessons for the future

    65.  Believes that the combination of reforms and investments has proved successful but that a clearer link is needed between the two; highlights the importance of aligning any funding with the objectives of the instrument and disbursing it in line with the progress made towards them; insists that the level of ambition of NRRPs should not be lowered but should be commensurate with the RRF timeline to ensure their successful implementation;

    66.  Is convinced, as highlighted by the Draghi report, that boosting EU competitiveness, decarbonising the EU’s economy and making it more circular and resource-efficient, as well as closing the skills gap, creating quality jobs and enhancing the EU’s innovation capacity, will be central priorities beyond 2026; is concerned that a sizeable funding gap will arise after the RRF ceases to operate at the end of 2026, notably for public investment in common European priorities, since financial resources from national budgets vary significantly among Member States; highlights the need to use the lessons learned from the RRF to better leverage public and private investments with a view to addressing the financing gap in European objectives and transitions, which the Draghi report estimates at over EUR 800 billion annually, while ensuring seamless continuity of investments in common European goods;

    67.  Welcomes the enhanced use of financial instruments made possible by the option to channel RRF funds towards the Member States’ compartment of InvestEU;

    68.  Urges the Commission to apply the lessons learned and the ECA’s observations, and to ensure that future performance-based instruments are well-targeted, aligned with the aim of financing European public goods and prioritising the addressing of clearly defined strategic challenges, economic sustainability and competitiveness; calls for it to be ensured that all future instruments are designed to measure not only inputs or short-term outputs and progress but also results in terms of long-term impacts backed by outcomes;

    69.  Notes that, according to the ECA, it is essential that future performance-based instruments are not designed and implemented in a way that is detrimental to accountability and, in particular, that appropriate control systems are in place in the Member States and are checked by the Commission before implementation starts; notes that this would involve setting minimum requirements for the Member States’ controls and the Commission’s checks;

    70.  Calls on the Commission to conduct an independent evaluation and to report on the RRF impact on private investments at aggregate EU level, in particular on its potential crowding-out effect on private investments and its determinants; calls further for objective and clear analyses from the Commission on how the implementation of reforms and investments within the NRRPs affects the economies of the individual Member States, with special regard to smart, sustainable and inclusive growth; urges the Commission to take the lessons learned from these analyses and from the ECA’s observations on the RRF implementation into account when drawing up its proposals for the next programming period;

    71.  Underlines that all EU-funded investments and reforms should be coordinated and coherent with strategic planning at national level and should focus on projects with a clear European added value; underlines the need for a spending target for cross-border and multi-country investments; calls on the Commission to develop a credible methodology to assess the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of EU funded projects;

    72.  Highlights that meaningful social and territorial dialogues with a high level of involvement of LRAs, social partners, civil society organisations and national parliaments within the national legal framework are essential for national ownership, successful implementation and democratic accountability; expresses concern over the insufficient involvement of all relevant stakeholders in the implementation and oversight of RRF-funded initiatives; stresses in particular that regions and city councils cannot be mere recipients of decisions, without being given the opportunity to have a say on reforms and investments that truly transform their territories;

    73.  Believes that it is essential to adopt differentiated strategies that recognise the cultural diversity of the various regions and enhance their economic and social cohesion instead of applying a homogeneous or one-size-fits-all approach that could be to the detriment of the less developed regions; calls, therefore, for dialogues with stakeholders to be strengthened and more diligently employed as they could inspire future initiatives and mechanisms in the EU and its Member States;

    74.  Underlines the requirement of the RRF Regulation to publicly display information about the origin of funding for projects funded by the EU to ensure buy-in from European citizens;

    75.  Highlights that the RRD meetings have been an important tool in enhancing transparency and accountability, which are crucial for the optimal implementation of the RRF;

    76.  Reiterates that further efforts are required to improve the transparency and traceability of the use of EU funds; stresses the need to ensure that data that is relevant for performance measurement is available and that information on performance is presented in a better and more transparent manner; stresses that the feedback mechanism between performance information and programme design or adjustment should be enhanced;

    77.  Considers that better training and capacity-building across all regions and authorities involved, in particular at national level, could have accelerated the RRF’s implementation and enabled the implementing authorities to better adapt to the performance-based nature of the RRF; considers that the Commission could have assisted Member States more at the planning stage and provided earlier implementation guidance, in particular with a view to strengthening their audit and control systems and the cross-border dimension of the RRF;

    78.  Highlights the importance of mitigating the risk of double funding; suggests the deployment of an integrated and interoperable IT and data mining system and the development of clear standards for datasets to be applied across Member States, with a view to allowing comprehensive and automated expenditure tracking; calls for improved coordination mechanisms that define clear responsibilities among the bodies involved in the implementation of the various EU and national programmes, while avoiding unnecessary bureaucratic complexity and ensuring an efficient allocation of funds; encourages the integration of advanced data analytics and AI tools to enhance performance tracking, evaluation and reporting to alleviate manual workload and to streamline reporting processes; underlines that such progress can only happen if there is also operational support to digitalise administrations;

    79.  Strongly urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure that any type of EU FNLC or EU funding that is performance based complies with EU and national rules, ultimately protecting the financial interests of the EU; reiterates the accountability and responsibility of the Commission and the Member States to ensure the legality and the regularity of EU funding, as well as the respect of sound financial management principles;

    80.  Considers that the role of Parliament in the monitoring of the RRF should be further enhanced;

    81.  Calls for future performance-based instruments to have a single audit trail to trace budget contributions to the projects funded; underlines the need for project-level auditing to mitigate reputational risks in the eyes of the general public and to facilitate the recovery of funds in case measures are reversed; underlines the need to reduce administrative bottlenecks and burden;

    82.  Demands that any possible future performance-based programmes make clearer links between the milestones and targets and the actual projects being implemented; stresses that there should be less of a delay between the fulfilment of milestones and the implementation of projects;

    83.  Reiterates its call for an open platform which contains data on all projects, final recipients and the regional distribution of funding, thereby facilitating auditing and democratic oversight;

    84.  Stresses that any possible future budgetary decisions on EU borrowing should respect the unity of the budget and Parliament’s role as part of the budgetary authority; highlights the risks of cost overruns for the repayment of debt, resulting inter alia from volatile interest rates; deems it important to ensure from the outset that sufficient funding is available to cover these costs without presenting a detriment to other programmes or political priorities;

    85.  Invites the Commission and the Member States to closely assess and learn from instruments and tools such as the RRF, in order to maximise the efficiency and impact of EU funding, investments and reforms, streamline policy objectives, improve the collaboration of the institutions and stakeholders at national and European level, and increase national ownership;

    86.  Notes the declared intention of the Commission to draw on the RRF experience when designing its proposals for the post-2027 EU funding programmes, due later this year; acknowledges that the independent ex post evaluation will come too late to feed into the process leading up to the next programming period, but expects the Commission and the co-legislators to take due account of the lessons learned from the RRF and of the recommendations of relevant stakeholders, in particular LRA, civil society organisations and social partners; believes that, as the EU plans for future economic resilience, there is also a need to further mobilise private investment, strengthen capital markets and ensure that public spending remains fiscally responsible and strategically targeted to make the EU more resilient and sovereign in an ever more conflictual geopolitical context;

    o
    o   o

    87.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

    (1) OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj.
    (2) OJ L 63, 28.2.2023, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/435/oj.
    (3) OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/765, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/765/oj.
    (5) OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 28.
    (6) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (7) OJ L, 2024/795, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/795/oj.
    (8) OJ L, 2024/1263, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1263/oj.
    (9) OJ C 32, 27.1.2023, p. 42.
    (10) OJ C, C/2024/4618, 22.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4618/oj.
    (11) OJ C, C/2024/7057, 4.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7057/oj.
    (12) European Parliament, Think Tank https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/research/advanced-search?textualSearch=RRF&startDate=01%2F07%2F2019&endDate=&sort=RELEVANCE.
    (13) OJ C, C/2024/5742, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5742/oj.
    (14) Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Moldova – P10_TA(2025)0131 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Republic of Moldova 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0698),

    –  having regard to the Commission opinion of 17 June 2022 on the application by the Republic of Moldova (hereinafter ‘Moldova’) for membership of the European Union (COM(2022)0406) and the joint staff working document of 6 February 2023 entitled ‘Association Implementation Report on the Republic of Moldova’ (SWD(2023)0041),

    –   having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 March 2025 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova(1),

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Moldova,

    –  having regard to the Commission analytical report of 1 February 2023 on Moldova’s alignment with the EU acquis (SWD(2023)0032),

    –  having regard to the proposal of 9 October 2024 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova (COM/2024/0469),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 9 October 2024 on the Moldova Growth Plan (COM/2024/0470),

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

    –  having regard to the visit of the delegation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to Moldova on 25-27 February 2025,

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0096/2025),

    A.  whereas, following Moldova’s application for EU membership of 3 March 2022, the European Council granted it candidate status on 23 June 2022 and subsequently decided to open accession negotiations on 14 December 2023;

    B.  whereas in June 2024 negotiations on Moldova’s EU accession started;

    C.  whereas Moldova held a referendum on 20 October 2024, the outcome of which confirmed the embedding of EU accession into its Constitution, despite various forms of manipulative interference to destabilise the country, illicit financing of political actors, disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks;

    D.  whereas the Association Agreement(2), which includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (AA/DCFTA), remains the basis for political association and economic integration between the EU and Moldova, and a regular political and economic dialogue is ongoing between the two sides;

    Progress with EU accession-related reforms, in particular on the rule of law and governance

    1.  Commends Moldova’s exemplary commitment and steady progress with EU accession-related reforms despite significant internal and external challenges – such as Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine – which made it possible for accession negotiations to start in June 2024, half a year after the relevant decision by the European Council on 14 December 2023 and less than two years after the country’s application for EU membership on 3 March 2022;

    2.  Recognises that EU-Moldova relations have entered into a new phase, with intensifying cooperation, gradual alignment across all policy areas of the EU acquis and advancement on the EU integration path; welcomes the progress achieved in the bilateral screening process since it started in July 2024 and the recent closing of screening for cluster 1 (fundamentals) and cluster 2 (internal market); commends and supports the ambition of the Moldovan Government to open negotiations on cluster 1 (fundamentals), cluster 2 (internal market) and cluster 6 (external relations) in the coming months, as well as completing the screening process for all clusters by the end of 2025; calls on the Commission to enhance its support to the Moldovan Government in order to ensure the successful achievement of these key objectives; encourages the Council to take a merit-based approach in its decisions on Moldova’s negotiation process; deplores the bilateralisation and instrumentalisation of the EU accession process, such as the opposition of the Hungarian Government to opening negotiations on clusters 1, 2 and 6, which has led to a delay and serves Russia’s objective of obstructing the European integration of the region;

    3.  Believes that Moldova’s capacity to consolidate its current progress with EU accession-related reforms and sustain the ambitious pace towards EU membership will require the strong and genuine support of a parliamentary majority after the elections in autumn 2025;

    4.  Notes that the outcomes of both the constitutional referendum on EU accession, held on 20 October 2024, and the presidential election, held on 20 October 2024 and 3 November 2024, confirmed the support of a majority of the people of Moldova for the country’s goal of EU membership and the required pro-EU reforms; underlines that this referendum and election were held professionally and with an extraordinary sense of duty and dedication, despite a massive hybrid campaign by Russia and its proxies which used various tools, such as the strategic exploitation of social media, AI-generated content, ‘leaks’ of fake documents, intimidation, which entailed various forms of manipulative interference to destabilise the country, illicit financing of political actors, vote-buying, including by Russia’s instrumentalisation of parts of the clergy from the Metropolis of Chisinau and All Moldova, disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks; recalls that these attacks had four key strategies: divide society, delegitimise institutions, discredit democratic actors and promote Russian influence; welcomes the outcome of the 2024 constitutional referendum which enshrined the commitment to joining the EU in the country’s constitution; strongly condemns the increasing attempts by Russia, pro-Russian oligarchs and Russian-sponsored local proxies to destabilise Moldova, sow divisions within Moldovan society and derail the country’s pro-EU direction through hybrid attacks, the instrumentalisation of energy supplies, disinformation, manipulation and intimidation campaigns targeting civil society organisations and independent media;

    5.  Notes that the upcoming parliamentary elections on 28 September 2025 will be of crucial importance for the continuation of Moldova’s pro-EU trajectory; is concerned about the likely intensification of foreign, in particular Russian, malign interference and hybrid attacks ahead of the elections; calls for the EU to increase its support, including financial and technical support, for the Moldovan Government’s efforts to counter such interference in the country’s democratic process, including through additional sanctions listings, an extension and consolidation of the mandate and resources of the EU Partnership Mission (EUPM) in Moldova and the granting of additional support thereto, and the sharing of expertise in foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), countering hybrid threats and strengthening resilience; calls similarly for an increase in efforts by the Moldovan authorities and the EU in support of independent media and pro-democracy civil society, in order to enable journalists at national and regional level to counter FIMI and to strengthen digital literacy;

    6.  Stresses the importance of strategic communication, debunking and combating false, Russia-promoted narratives about the EU and its policies and of highlighting the concrete short- and long-term benefits of EU accession for the people of all of Moldova, with a special focus on regions such as Gagauzia as well as socio-economically disadvantaged communities in rural areas; calls for the EU to step up its support for Moldova in this regard;

    Socio-economic reforms

    7.  Welcomes the Commission’s Moldova Growth Plan, which is aimed at supporting Moldova’s socio-economic and fundamental reforms and enhancing access to the EU’s single market; welcomes the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova, which underpins the Growth Plan and is worth EUR 2,02 billion, making it the largest EU financial support package for Moldova since its independence; underlines that this facility provides Moldova with EUR 520 million in non-repayable support and a maximum amount of EUR 1,5 billion in loans, with an 18 % pre-financing rate, demonstrating the EU’s recognition of the urgency of supporting Moldova’s reforms and resilience; calls on the Commission to support the Moldovan authorities in implementing the necessary Reform Agenda for the effective absorption of funds from this facility, ensuring that the benefits of this support are promptly felt by Moldova’s citizens; looks forward to the announced impact assessment of the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova in the form of a Commission staff working document within three months of the adoption of the corresponding regulation;

    8.  Calls on the Commission to include adequate dedicated pre-accession funds for Moldova in the EU’s next multiannual financial framework, and to begin preparing Moldova for the efficient use of future pre-accession funds as a newly designated EU candidate country;

    9.  Reiterates that the support of the people of Moldova for European integration can be strengthened with a tangible improvement in their livelihoods, by strengthening state institutions and public administration in order to use project funding effectively and to implement and enforce the EU acquis, ensuring a robust welfare system and fighting corruption and oligarchic influence and ensuring accountability; calls on the Moldovan authorities to continue to ensure the meaningful involvement of civil society organisations, diaspora, vulnerable groups and social partners, including trade unions, in order to strengthen trust in democratic institutions and processes and boost public support for EU accession-related reforms;

    10.  Stresses the importance of civil society organisations in monitoring governance and progress with EU-related reforms, promoting transparency, defending human rights and countering disinformation and external malign influence by anti-reform political actors and Russian proxies;

    11.  Calls for comprehensive social policy reforms to address poverty and persistent large-scale emigration, increase healthcare coverage, strengthen public education, improve working conditions and develop adequate social protection systems; emphasises that economic development must be inclusive and sustainable, with opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises; stresses the need for targeted social investment in Moldova’s young people and rural areas to reduce regional disparities and safeguard social cohesion;

    12.  Calls for special emphasis on Moldova’s participation in EU social, educational, and cultural programmes in order to promote social convergence, innovation and technological advancement;

    13.  Calls on Moldova to implement the Reform Agenda, which outlines the key socio-economic and fundamental reforms to accelerate the growth and competitiveness of Moldova’s economy and its convergence with the EU on the basis of enhanced implementation of the AA/DCFTA;

    14.  Strongly calls for the acceleration of Moldova’s gradual integration into the EU and the single market by continuing to align its legal and regulatory framework with the EU acquis and associating the country to more EU programmes and initiatives, including through the granting of observer status to Moldovan officials and experts in relevant EU bodies, which would deliver tangible socio-economic benefits even before the country formally joins the EU; congratulates Moldova on its inclusion in the geographical scope of the Single Euro Payments Area payment schemes, facilitating transfers in euro and reducing costs for Moldova’s citizens and businesses; commends the inclusion of roaming liberalisation in the updated EU–Moldova Association Agreement; welcomes Moldova’s recent progress in the transposition of the EU’s roaming and telecommunications acquis and expresses support for a swift decision on the inclusion of Moldova into the EU ‘roam like at home’ area; calls on the service providers to cooperate in good faith with the Moldovan authorities on implementing ‘roam like at home’;

    15.  Welcomes the renewal of the EU’s temporary trade liberalisation measures in July 2024 in order to support Moldova’s economy, substituting the loss of trade caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its unfriendly policies towards Moldova; calls for the EU to take swift and significant steps towards the permanent liberalisation of its tariff-rate quotas, in order to ensure predictability and increase the country’s attractiveness to investors;

    16.  Notes that the recent decision of the US administration to suspend support for civil society, independent media, key reforms and infrastructure projects has created additional urgent needs in Moldova, regarding which the EU should step in; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to increase its funding for EU instruments supporting democracy, such as the European Endowment for Democracy, and for other key projects that had until recently been funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and other US agencies;

    Human rights

    17.  Notes Moldova’s progress towards achieving gender equality, including its adoption of the Programme for Promoting and Ensuring Equality between Women and Men for the 2023-2027 period, and calls for its continued efforts in this regard, particularly to reduce the gender pay gap, fight against stereotypes, discrimination and gender-based violence, and to increase the representation of women in politics and business;

    18.  Welcomes the efforts by the Moldovan authorities to combat violence against women and improve protection for survivors, in particular the adoption of the National Programme on Preventing and Combatting Violence against Women and Domestic Violence for the 2023-2027 period; notes that the impact of this, however, is still lacking and therefore calls for the establishment of more shelters for survivors of domestic violence, for adequate attention by the justice system to violence against women and for policy changes and increased awareness-raising among men regarding gender-based violence;

    19.  Calls on the Moldovan Government to strengthen its efforts, including the effective implementation of its legislative framework, to combat racial discrimination, marginalisation, racist hate speech and hate crimes targeting members of ethnic minority groups, including the Roma;

    20.  Commends Moldova’s efforts to improve the rights of the LGBTIQ+ community in recent years;

    21.  Calls on the Moldovan Government to fully align its legislation on the rights of persons with disabilities with the EU acquis and to tackle the systemic problem of children with intellectual disabilities being placed in psychiatric institutions;

    Energy, environment and connectivity

    22.  Condemns Russia’s instrumentalisation of energy against Moldova, most recently by halting gas supplies to the Transnistrian region on 1 January 2025, in violation of contractual obligations, and thereby provoking a serious crisis in the region; applauds the Commission’s swift proposal of a Comprehensive Strategy for Energy Independence and Resilience and its support package worth EUR 250 million, which will reduce the energy bills of Moldovan consumers, including in the Transnistrian region, support Moldova’s decoupling from Russia’s energy supplies and integrate Moldova into the EU energy market; emphasises the need for the EU and the Moldovan authorities to effectively communicate about the substantial EU support package aimed at addressing Moldova’s energy crisis;

    23.  Commends the alignment of the Moldovan energy sector with the EU acquis; calls on the Moldovan Government to continue its efforts, with EU support that includes the tools available from the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova, to diversify gas and electricity supply routes, develop connectivity, increase energy efficiency and its internal production and storage capacity, as well as advance its full integration into the EU energy market in order to ensure Moldova’s energy security and resilience; stresses the importance of the completion of the Vulcanesti-Chisinau 400 kV overhead power line by the end of 2025 in order to reduce Moldova’s reliance on energy infrastructure in the Transnistrian region; calls on the EU to mobilise the necessary resources to help compensate for the withdrawal of USAID support for Moldova’s energy sector;

    24.  Commends the Moldovan Government for its progress on decarbonisation, energy efficiency and transitioning to a green economy, including doubling the share of renewable energy to 30 % by 2030; encourages the EU and its Member States to continue to provide financial support and expertise to Moldovan counterparts in this area; welcomes the adoption in 2023 of Moldova’s National Climate Change Adaptation Programme until 2030 and its Action Plan for this purpose; calls on the Moldovan Government to adopt and begin implementing its National Energy and Climate Plan for the 2025-2030 period; notes the importance of implementing the commitments of the Energy Community’s Decarbonisation Roadmap, and implementing the Monitoring, Reporting, Verification and Accreditation package with a view to introducing carbon pricing and aligning with the EU emissions trading system;

    25.  Believes that an extension of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) corridor Baltic Sea-Black Sea-Aegean Sea (Corridor IX) to include the route of Chisinau-Constanta-Varna-Bourgas would be a strategic investment in the region’s transport infrastructure, enhancing connectivity and promoting economic growth, in view of the enlargement of the EU to the east and the potential positive impact of this extension on the region’s security and stability, serving as a key logistics route for NATO and enhancing the EU’s geostrategic autonomy;

    Rule of law and good governance

    26.  Underlines that comprehensive justice reform remains key for the success of Moldova’s democratic and EU accession-related reforms; recognises Moldova’s sustained efforts to build an independent, impartial, accountable and professional judicial system and conclude the vetting process by the end of 2026; calls, therefore, for the EU to continue actively supporting the justice reform and the process of vetting both judges and prosecutors, including the attraction, training and recruitment of qualified judicial personnel and increase in judicial capacity;

    27.  Notes that Moldova has achieved progress in the fight against and prevention of corruption, but stresses the need to continue the fight against money laundering; welcomes the entry into force in February 2024 of Moldova’s National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Programme for 2024-2028; highlights the need to ensure enhanced coordination among all key anti-corruption and justice institutions in order to implement comprehensive reforms and to ensure that they have adequate resources and capacities; stresses that results in terms of prosecution and conviction in corruption cases need to be delivered in order to ensure public trust in the ongoing reforms;

    28.  Recalls the importance of continuing the investigation and bringing to justice those responsible for the 2014 bank fraud; welcomes the fact that, after long efforts by the Moldovan authorities, Interpol has finally added one of the alleged perpetrators, Vladimir Plahotniuc, to its list of internationally wanted persons;

    29.  Welcomes the adoption by Moldova in 2023 of a new national strategy for preventing and combating human trafficking, aligned with the EU acquis, and the cooperation of Moldova with Europol in combating drug trafficking;

    30.  Expresses its readiness to continue supporting the Parliament of Moldova through mutually agreed democracy support activities that respond to the needs of the institution, its elected members and staff; underlines the importance of the Parliament of Moldova in fostering public debate about the country’s European future and achieving a broad consensus over, and democratic legitimacy of, EU accession-related reforms across political parties and among broader society; highlights the decision of 10 March 2025 to open a European Parliament office in Chisinau to further strengthen Parliament’s engagement with the Eastern Partnership region;

    Cooperation in the field of common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and progress on resolving the Transnistrian conflict

    31.  Welcomes Moldova’s consistent cooperation on foreign policy issues and the significantly increased rate, notably from 54 % in 2022 to 86 % in 2024, of its alignment with the EU’s CFSP positions and restrictive measures; invites it to continue to improve this alignment, including on restrictive measures against Russia, and to continue cooperation on preventing the circumvention of sanctions against Russia and Belarus related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

    32.  Underlines that Moldova is a key contributor to the regional and European security, including through its unwavering support to Ukraine since the start of Russia’s war of aggression, for example by welcoming Ukrainian war refugees, and through its contributions to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, for example by deploying firefighting teams to tackle severe wildfires in Greece;

    33.  Expresses its support for the EUPM in Moldova and calls on the Member States to contribute the necessary experts and financial resources, in anticipation of a potential intensification of hybrid threats; welcomes the recent extension of the EUPM’s mandate until April 2026; encourages the Moldovan authorities to make full use of the EUPM’s expertise to enhance its preparedness, particularly in view of repeated electoral interference ahead of the parliamentary elections on 28 September 2025; calls for the EU to draw from the experience gained in Moldova in protecting the electoral process and democratic institutions in the EU itself; encourages the European External Action Service and the Commission to use all available EU instruments in the area of countering hybrid threats, in order to continue to support Moldova, including by swiftly deploying a Hybrid Rapid Response Team; welcomes the establishment of Moldova’s Centre for Strategic Communications and Countering Disinformation, as a means of coordinating the fight against foreign interference among the various Moldovan institutions, and of the National Agency for Cyber Security and the National Institute for Cyber Security Innovations; notes that Moldova’s National Security Strategy, adopted in December 2023, highlights EU accession as a key objective and for the first time identifies Russia as the source of major threats to Moldova’s security; stresses the importance of improving information sharing and intelligence cooperation between Moldova and the EU and its Member States on security threats;

    34.  Reiterates its full commitment to Moldova’s territorial integrity and to the peaceful resolution of the conflict, based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova in its internationally recognised borders;

    35.  Welcomes the Commission’s initiatives to include proactive support for the Transnistrian region in its energy emergency support packages, and exchange of information and practical cooperation between the Moldovan Government and the de facto authorities of the Transnistrian region throughout the energy crisis caused by Russia; welcomes the progress regarding the conditionalities for Tiraspol in light of the recent gas transit agreement and calls for the full implementation of these conditionalities, including the release of all political prisoners by Tiraspol and the dismantling of the remaining illegal checkpoints;

    36.  Welcomes Moldova’s keen interest in contributing to the EU’s common security and defence policy (CSDP) and the fact that Moldova is the first country to sign a security and defence partnership with the EU; welcomes Moldova’s continued active participation in EU missions and operations under the CSDP, namely the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation Althea) and the EU Training Mission in Somalia, its interest in participation in PESCO projects and the ongoing negotiations on a framework agreement with the European Defence Agency; calls on the EU to include Moldova in the EU security and defence programmes and related budget allocations, including the European Defence Industry Programme and Readiness 2030, allowing the country to participate in joint procurement alongside the Member States;

    37.  Welcomes the allocation of EUR 50 million to modernise the defence capacities of the Moldovan Armed Forces in the context of the current security challenges through the European Peace Facility (EPF) for 2024; notes that Moldova is the second-largest EPF beneficiary after Ukraine, with a total of EUR 137 million allocated since 2021; welcomes the announced support of EUR 60 million to be provided to Moldova from the EPF budget in 2025; calls on the Member States to progressively increase the EPF funding for Moldova to further enhance the country’s defence capabilities;

    o
    o   o

    38.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Moldova.

    (1) OJ L, 2025/535, 21.3.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/535/oj.
    (2) Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part (OJ L 260, 30.8.2014, p. 4, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2014/492/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Warner, Kaine, Scott Urge EPA to Reinstate Funding for Canceled Community Resilience Grants

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Commonwealth of Virginia Mark R Warner

    WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Sens. Mark R. Warner, Tim Kaine (both D-VA), and Rep. Bobby Scott (D-VA-03) sent a letter to Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator Lee Zeldin urging the agency to reverse its decision to terminate two major Community Change Grants in Virginia. The canceled grants – approximately $40 million – would have supported dozens of community projects aimed at strengthening flood resilience, reducing pollution, and improving energy efficiency in Hampton and across Southwest Virginia.

    The grants, funded by the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), were intended to support projects that increase resilience to major weather events, reduce pollution, and build community capacity.

    The City of Hampton received $20 million in federal funding to address severe flood risk in the Aberdeen Gardens neighborhood. That funding would have advanced 51 projects ranging from stormwater infrastructure upgrades and rain garden construction to stream restoration efforts and improved public health protections for an area where over 22 percent of properties fall within FEMA-designated flood zones.

    United Way of Southwest Virginia and the University of Virginia’s College at Wise also received nearly $20 million in federal funding to support flood-resilient housing, the construction of a community center and flood shelter in Dickenson County, and energy efficiency upgrades at childcare centers in eight counties in Southwest Virginia. These investments would have delivered long-term savings, improved disaster readiness, and supported vulnerable Appalachian communities hit hard by extreme weather in recent years.

    In the letter, the lawmakers wrote, “We are deeply concerned that the EPA no longer considers community resiliency, environmental conservation, and economic development to be administration funding priorities.”

    They continued, “EPA’s decision to terminate these grants will leave communities in Virginia less resilient, less prosperous, and more vulnerable to extreme weather-related disasters. We urge you to reinstate this critical funding for communities throughout Virginia.”

    Sens. Warner, Kaine, and Rep. Scott have long advocated for resiliency efforts in Virginia, championing legislation and funding to help communities strengthen infrastructure against extreme weather. The senators were strong supporters of the Inflation Reduction Act, which authorized the Community Change Grants program to help historically neglected and underserved communities address flooding, pollution, and climate vulnerabilities.

    The lawmakers have also continuously stood up against the Trump administration’s efforts to cancel necessary federal funding for Virginia’s communities. Most recently, Sens. Warner, Kaine, and Rep. Scott wrote to Department of Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem to reverse the cancellation of critical infrastructure funding for the Commonwealth. 

    Text of the letter is available here and below.

    Dear Administrator Zeldin:

    We write regarding the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) decision to terminate approximately $40 million in funding intended to prevent localized pollution and mitigate the effects of flooding in Hampton, Virginia, and to support economic development, enhance resilient infrastructure, and lower energy costs across seven counties in Southwest Virginia. We strongly urge you to reverse this decision that will impact efforts to improve resiliency, environmental conservation, energy efficiency, and economic outcomes in communities across the Commonwealth.

    The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) provided approximately $2 billion to EPA to establish the Community Change Grants Program. Congress intended this funding to be used to support projects that increase community resilience, reduce pollution, and build community capacity. In 2024, EPA selected 105 projects, including two projects in Virginia.

    The City of Hampton, Virginia, was awarded just over $20 million to address significant flood risk in the historic Aberdeen Gardens neighborhood. In a locality where 22 percent of properties are in Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)-designated Special Flood Hazard Areas, the city and their nonprofit partner, Wetlands Watch, planned to leverage federal funding to advance 51 projects to update stormwater infrastructure, initiate stream-restoration projects, and construct community rain gardens. These projects were intended to mitigate flood risk, lessen the financial burden of flooding on the neighborhood’s residents, and improve environmental and public health outcomes.

    The United Way of Southwest Virginia and the University of Virginia were awarded nearly $20 million to fund eight projects across the Virginia coalfields. Funding would have supported the construction of flood-resilient housing infrastructure in Buchanan County and a new community center and flood shelter in Dickenson County, two communities that have been devastated by flooding and extreme weather in recent years. Additionally, the grant would support energy efficiency upgrades at childcare facilities in eight counties, enabling thousands of dollars of energy cost savings to go towards childcare worker salaries.

    In terminating these grants, EPA wrote to awardees that, “the objectives of the award are no longer consistent with EPA funding priorities.” We are deeply concerned that the EPA no longer considers community resiliency, environmental conservation, and economic development to be administration funding priorities. EPA’s decision to terminate these grants will leave communities in Virginia less resilient, less prosperous, and more vulnerable to extreme weather-related disasters. We urge you to reinstate this critical funding for communities throughout Virginia. 

    Thank you for your attention to this letter. We look forward to your response.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: REP TED LIEU AND SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN LEAD 23 SENATORS AND 49 MEMBERS IN INTRODUCING RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING WORLD REFUGEE DAY

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Ted Lieu (33 District of California)

    WASHINGTON—Today, Congressman Ted Lieu (D-Los Angeles County) and Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, introduced a resolution to honor World Refugee Day and the United States’ commitment to supporting refugees and forcibly displaced persons worldwide. The World Refugee Day Resolution was cosponsored by 23 Senators and 49 Members of Congress.

    “There used to be more consensus among Democrats and Republicans that the world’s wealthiest nation has an obligation to help those seeking refuge from violence, persecution, human rights abuses, and other dangers,” said Representative Lieu. “A strong U.S. foreign aid program was once considered both morally correct policy, and a smart return on investment that engendered good will and protected our national security. Now, Trump has turned his back on the world’s most vulnerable people by banning refugees and pulling funding for foreign aid programs. This is a terrible abdication of our duty to help those who need it the most. On World Refugee Day, those of us who want the world to be a more peaceful, prosperous place for everyone reiterate our call to help refugees who are fleeing unimaginable circumstances. Everyone deserves to live freely and safely.”

    “Conflict, persecution and violence continue to force millions of people from their homes – with more than 123 million people forcibly displaced at the end of 2024, including Afghans, Burmese Rohingya and Sudanese,” said Ranking Member Shaheen. “The United States has long been a leader in supporting refugees overseas and welcoming the most vulnerable, promoting stability around the world and boosting the U.S. economy through refugees’ contributions. Yet the Trump Administration is turning its back on this bipartisan legacy of support, slashing U.S. foreign aid programs that help refugees and host communities and indefinitely suspending the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. On this World Refugee Day, our resolution honors the resilient spirit of forcibly displaced persons globally and calls on the Trump Administration to recommit to supporting refugees and displaced persons.”

     This bill as the support of:

    “With an ongoing refugee ban leaving so many with no path to protection – it is imperative we take this opportunity to stand in solidarity with all those forced to flee their homes around the world,” said Erol Kekic, Chief Strategy Officer at Church World Service. “CWS thanks Senator Shaheen and Representative Lieu for honoring refugees and leading this year’s congressional World Refugee Day resolution. From 80 years of walking alongside newcomers, CWS knows that refugees and immigrants enrich our communities – culturally, artistically, religiously, and economically. They are our neighbors and friends. They are mothers and fathers working to build better futures for their children.” 

    “Today, more than 123 million people around the world have been forcibly displaced from their homes—the highest number in recorded history,” said Myal Greene, President and CEO of World Relief. “On World Refugee Day, we remember that behind every statistic is a person made in the image of God, longing for safety, stability, and hope. This crisis should stir the conscience of lawmakers and citizens alike–particularly those, like me, motivated by the Christian faith. We urge Congress to champion policies that protect the persecuted, restore dignity, and uphold America’s long legacy of welcoming those fleeing violence and oppression.” 

    “On World Refugee Day, we are reminded that the right to seek safety is both a legal commitment and a moral imperative,” said Sharif Aly, President of the International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP). “The United States has the capacity, and the obligation, to uphold its commitments to refugees and asylum seekers. Yet today, tens of thousands of people who were promised protection under the U.S. resettlement program remain stranded due to unlawful and discriminatory policies. We commend this resolution for reaffirming the values enshrined in our Constitution and refugee laws and urge our leaders to restore U.S. leadership in protecting the rights and dignity of those forced to flee.” 

    “There has never been a more urgent moment for Congress to reaffirm America’s support for refugees, both at home and abroad,” said Jeremy Konyndyk, President of Refugees International. “On World Refugee Day, we must renew our pledge to advance refugee protection, including by ensuring refugees have a role in shaping policy; to uphold the right to seek asylum; and to generously welcome those who seek safety and the chance to rebuild their lives with dignity and opportunity.” 

    “RCUSA reminds the Trump administration of the incredible contributions that refugees have made in the 45-year history of the refugee resettlement program,” said John Slocum, Executive Director of Refugee Council USA. “We stand in solidarity with those forced to flee their homes due to violence and persecution – families and individuals continue to seek safety, dignity, freedom, and opportunity in the face of unimaginable hardship. As global displacement reaches historic highs, the United States must lead with compassion and courage. That means rejecting fear-based policies and recommitting to a system that upholds the rights of all people to seek safety. Congress must invest in our nation’s capacity to welcome refugees and asylum seekers — and safeguard the use of public resources in good faith. RCUSA calls on all people of conscience to stand with refugees, asylum seekers, and immigrants, not only today but every day. Our work is far from over.”  

    The resolution is supported by the following organizations: Church World Service, Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law, Center for Victims of Torture, Climate Refugees, Dorothy Day Catholic Worker, Florence Immigrant & Refugee Rights Project, Franciscan Action Network, Friends Committee on National Legislation, HIAS, International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP), Just Neighbors, National Partnership for New Americans, Presidents’ Alliance on Higher Education and Immigration, Refugee Advocacy Lab, Refugee Council USA, Refugee Congress, Refugees International, Unitarian Universalists for Social Justice, United Church of Christ, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), World Relief and Women’s Refugee Commission. 

    The House resolution is cosponsored by Representatives Gabe Amo (D-RI), Yassmin Ansari (D-AZ), Becca Balint (D-VT), Joyce Beatty (D-OH), Sheila Cherfilus-McCormick (D-FL), Judy Chu (D-CA), Gil Cisneros (D-CA), Steve Cohen (D-TN), Danny Davis (D-IL), Diana Degette (D-CO), Suzan DelBene (D-WA), Mark DeSaulnier (D-CA), Adriano Espaillat (D-NY), Chuy Garcia (D-IL), Robert Garcia (D-CA), Sylvia Garcia (D-TX), Jonathan L. Jackson (D-IL), Pramila Jayapal (D-WA), Hank Johnson (D-GA), Ro Khanna (D-CA), Troy A. Carter, Sr. (D-LA), Summer Lee (D-PA), Teresa Leger Fernandez (D-NM), Stephen Lynch (D-MA), Jennifer McClellan (D-VA), Betty McCollum (D-MN), Jim McGovern (D-MA), Robert Menendez (D-NJ), Gwen Moore (D-WI), Seth Moulton (D-MA), Kevin Mullin (D-CA), Jerrold Nadler (D-NY), Eleanor Norton (D-DC), Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY), Ilhan Omar (D-MN), Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), Mark Pocan (D-WI), Delia Ramirez (D-IL), Jan Schakowsky (D-IL), Darren Soto (D-FL), Shri Thanedar (D-MI), Dina Titus (D-NV), Rashida Tlaib (D-MI), Jill Tokuda (D-HI), Paul Tonko (D-NY), Derek Tran (D-CA), Nydia Velazquez (D-NY), Bonnie Watson Coleman (D-NJ), Nikema Williams (D-GA).

    The Senate resolution is cosponsored by Senators Michael Bennet (D-CO), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Cory Booker (D-NJ), Chris Coons (D-DE), Tammy Duckworth (D-IL), Dick Durbin (D-IL), John Fetterman (D-PA), John Hickenlooper (D-CO), Mazie Hirono (D-HI), Tim Kaine (D-VA), Angus King (I-ME), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Ed Markey (D-MA), Jeff Merkley (D-OR), Chris Murphy (D-CT), Patty Murray (D-WA), Jacky Rosen (D-NV), Brian Schatz (D-HI), Adam Schiff (D-CA), Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), Peter Welch (D-VT), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) and Ron Wyden (D-OR).  

    ### 

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Extreme Heat to Impact New York State

    Source: US State of New York

    overnor Kathy Hochul today updated New Yorkers on the high outdoor temperatures that will impact most of the State beginning on Sunday. The National Weather Service is forecasting that major to extreme risk of heat-related impacts are possible starting on Sunday through at least Wednesday across New York State. On Sunday, “feels-like” temperatures may reach up to or above 100 degrees especially in the Western New York, Finger Lakes, Southern Tier, and Mid-Hudson Regions. On Monday, “feels-like” temperatures will be 95-110 degrees across all of NYS, with overnight temperatures ranging from 70-85 degrees and may be higher in urban areas. On Tuesday, “feels-like” temperatures will range from 85-110 degrees statewide. Feels like temperature will remain high Wednesday, but will decline into the 90s.

    “The number one cause of weather-related death is extreme heat, but preparation, communication and other precautions can save lives,” Governor Hochul said. “That is why we are deploying a whole of government approach to keep New Yorkers safe, working to protect our most vulnerable populations, and encouraging voters to take advantage of early voting ahead of the June 24 Primary Election Day.”

    Voters in New York City, Albany, Syracuse, and elsewhere can expect high temperatures on Primary Election Day, Tuesday June 24. To beat the heat, take advantage of early voting or request an early mail ballot in person at your local county board of elections office.

    Extreme heat is dangerous and is the leading cause of weather-related fatalities in the United States. The most common heat-related illnesses are heat stroke (sun stroke), heat exhaustion, heat cramps and heat rash. Learn more about heat related illness, including signs and symptoms and when to take action on the State Health Department’s extreme heat advice webpage.

    New Yorkers should also plan accordingly for pet care to ensure pet safety during periods of extreme heat:

    • Provide ample water indoors and outdoors.
    • Limit outdoor activity, and if outdoors, rest in shaded areas regularly.
    • Be mindful of pavement temperatures — hot surfaces may cause burns on paws, so consider walking on grass or using pet boots.
    • Never leave pets in vehicles unattended when heat is a risk.
    • Know the signs of heatstroke in pets including excessive panting, drooling, lethargy, vomiting and stumbling.

    New York State agencies are taking the actions and making recommendations to respond to the forecasted heat. These include:

    New York State Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services
    The Office of Emergency Management is in regular contact with county emergency managers to ensure cooling centers are available, and to offer support and advise on extreme heat risks. In addition, the agency is facilitating preparations and coordinating guidance and communications with State agency partners. Information on how to manage extreme heat can be found online. To receive real time weather and emergency alerts, New Yorkers are encouraged to text the name of their county or borough to 333111.

    New York State Department of Public Service
    The Department of Public Service (DPS) is tracking electric system conditions and overseeing utility response to any situations that may arise as a result of this week’s extreme heat and potential thunderstorm activity. DPS has been in direct contact with utility leaders to ensure they are preparing their systems for the extreme heat and will be tracking system conditions throughout the event. New York’s utilities have approximately 5,500 workers available, as necessary, to engage in damage assessment, response, repair, and restoration efforts across New York State for this heat event. Agency staff will track utilities’ work throughout the event and ensure utilities shift appropriate staffing to regions that experience the greatest impact.

    During heat waves, increased usage of electric devices such as air conditioners place a considerable demand on the state’s electricity system and instances of low voltage or isolated power outages can result. The record for such usage was set on July 19, 2013, when it reached 33,956 MWs (one megawatt of electricity is enough to power up to 1,000 average-sized homes).

    DPS is tracking electric system conditions and overseeing utility response to any situations that may arise as a result of the incoming thunderstorms and extreme heat. DPS has been in direct contact with utility leaders to ensure they are preparing their systems for the extreme heat and will be monitoring system conditions throughout the event.

    Department staff, as a part of annual summer preparation activities, work with all utilities to confirm that they will reliably meet customer demands for the summer operating period. Based on staff review and assessment of utility data, meetings with each of the individual utilities and the New York Independent System Operator, staff found that the state’s electric transmission and distribution systems are prepared to reliably meet forecasted 2025 summer electric demands.

    If necessary during next week’s expected heat, DPS will activate its standard peak load reduction program for all New York State agencies; NYISO will activate their voluntary Emergency Response Demand Program to curtail load if needed.

    New York State Department of Health
    The State Health Department is taking a number of steps to promote the safety of all New Yorkers in periods of extreme heat, especially those most at risk. The Department has distributed guidance to all hospitals and nursing homes and will issue additional guidance to hosts of any scheduled public events with over 5,000 people in attendance. The Department is working with DSHES and local health departments and emergency managers to ensure access to cooling centers and safe spaces during this extreme heat.

    The New York State Department of Health’s interactive Heat Risk and Illness Dashboard allows the public and county health care officials to determine the forecasted level of heat-related health risks in their area and raise awareness about the dangers of heat exposure.

    New York State Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation
    Many New York State Park beaches and pools are open for the season. Prior to making a trip, potential visitors should call ahead to the park they plan to visit or check https://parks.ny.gov/parks/ for park hours and operations. Changes in weather and water conditions may affect swimming status. Park status updates are also available on the free New York State Parks Explorer mobile app for iOS and Android devices.

    New York State Department of Agriculture and Markets
    The agency has compiled important information, including preventative measures, to help mitigate the effects of extreme heat on farm workers and farm animals. The Department will also be working closely with partners at The New York Extension Disaster Education Network (NY EDEN) at Cornell University to monitor any potential impacts of the extreme heat expected this week. NY EDEN is also a resource for farmers and farm workers during a heat wave, and additional information can be found at https://eden.cce.cornell.edu/natural-hazards/heat-wave/.

    New York State Department of Environmental Conservation
    The Department of Environmental Conservation’s (DEC) Emergency Management staff, Environmental Conservation Police Officers, Forest Rangers, and both central office and regional staff remain on alert and continue to monitor weather forecasts. Working with partner agencies, DEC is prepared to coordinate resource deployment of all available assets, including first responders, to targeted areas in preparation for potential impacts due to heavy rainfall and flooding.

    Unpredictable weather and storms in the Adirondacks, Catskills, and other backcountry areas can create unexpectedly hazardous conditions. Visitors should be prepared with proper clothing and equipment for rain, mud, and warmer temperatures to ensure a safe outdoor experience.

    Hikers are advised to temporarily avoid all high-elevation trails, as well as trails that cross rivers and streams. Hikers in the Adirondacks are encouraged to check the Adirondack Backcountry Information webpages for updates on trail conditions, seasonal road closures, and general recreation information.

    Hiking Safety
    Hiking in the heat is always risky. New Yorkers and visitors should review the following tips to prevent heat exhaustion and heat stroke:

    • Slow your pace.
    • Drink water and rest often.
    • Seek shade and avoid long periods in direct sunlight.
    • Bring at least 2 liters of water for any hike.
    • Bring a water filter, especially for longer hikes.
    • Bring salty snacks to keep your electrolytes in check.
    • Wear sunscreen.
    • Leave your pets at home — the heat is harder on them, especially walking on hot rocks.
    • Consider staying home yourself and rescheduling for another day when weather conditions improve.

    Even if the weather is forecast to be high heat all day, there’s always a chance of hypothermia due to a sudden storm or drop in temperatures. This can increase dramatically if you’re sweating and not wearing sweat-wicking clothing made of fabrics such as wool or polyester. Many cases of hypothermia are in the summer when people least expect it.

    Whether you are hiking, mountain biking or paddling, Hike Smart NY can help you prepare with a list of 10 essentials, guidance on what to wear, and tips for planning your trip with safety and sustainability in mind. In an emergency, call 9-1-1. To request Forest Ranger assistance, call 1-833-NYS-RANGERS.

    Air Quality
    DEC is continuing to monitor air quality across the State and will issue air quality health advisories as necessary. New Yorkers are encouraged be “Air Quality Aware” and check airnow.gov for accurate information on air quality forecasts and conditions. To view the latest DEC air quality forecasts, visit the DEC website.

    Extreme Heat
    DEC recently released preliminary Urban Heat Island maps to help communities better understand, plan for, and adapt to extreme heat exposures on the neighborhood level. Links to the maps, as well as additional information and data, can be found on DEC’s Extreme Heat Action Plan webpage  and posted at nys-heat.daveyinstitute.com/hottest-hour. The project advances a key action in the Extreme Heat Action Plan and advances a 2022 law signed by Governor Hochul directing DEC to study the impacts of disproportionate concentrations of extreme heat in disadvantaged communities across the state.

    The New York State Department of Labor has released comprehensive guidance to help employers better protect outdoor workers during extreme heat and advises workers and employers to engage in extreme heat best practices such as:

    • Ensure access to clean drinking water at no cost to workers, available at all times and as close to the worksite as possible.
    • Provide shade and paid rest when the heat index reaches 80 degrees Fahrenheit or above, and more frequent rest breaks once the heat index exceeds 90 degrees.
    • Wear proper PPE so long as they do not interfere with safety equipment, including sunscreen, cooling vests, wide-brim hats, and lightweight, loose-fitting clothing.

    More information on best practices for working in extreme heat can be found here.

    Thruway Authority maintenance crews will be conducting standard daily operations during times where temperatures are lowest and will enhance patrols monitoring the highway. Motorists are reminded and encouraged to take breaks at one of 26 service areas, or three Welcome Centers located on the Thruway system.

    New York State Department of Transportation maintenance crews will conduct most outdoor work during morning hours and follow established hydration and rest protocols to help mitigate the risks associated with high temperatures.

    New York State Office of Children and Family Services
    The agency is taking a number of actions to ensure activities at residential centers, detention programs and congregate care programs are conducted in a safe manner during the heat. This includes checking cooling equipment, ensuring proper amounts of water are available and consumed, rescheduling activities and meetings, and identifying staff and clients who may be affected by heat. They are also providing guidance to child care programs and groups associated with the Commission for the Blind statewide.

    New York State Office of Mental Health
    In advance of the hot conditions, New Yorkers should be aware of the impact high heat may have on individuals receiving antipsychotic medications, who are at particular risk of heat stroke and neuroleptic malignant syndrome during periods of extreme heat, which is more likely in poorly ventilated areas. Children and the elderly are at increased risk.

    In addition to monitoring individuals at risk, such conditions are best prevented by a heightened attention to hydration, particularly those at high risk, including individuals taking antipsychotic medications, the elderly, children and those with poor fluid intake. Also, individuals at high-risk should remain in cooler areas; be monitored for temperature elevations; avoid direct exposure to sunlight and wear protective clothing and sunscreen. Anticholinergic medications may interfere with sweating and should be minimized.

    New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance
    The agency is reminding local departments of social services and emergency homeless shelter operators of the need to provide fans to help maintain reasonable air circulation during times of extreme heat and humidity. Also, shelter providers should provide a cooling room in the facility for residents, if feasible.

    Metropolitan Transportation Authority
    To reduce potential impacts to service and reduce response times to heat-related events, NYC Transit will implement heat patrols to proactively increase track inspections and stage extra personnel in key risk areas including power substations, machine rooms, generators, cables, and connections. To ensure functioning air conditioning, subway railcars and buses will be inspected before being placed in service. Paratransit service providers are reminded vehicles must have functioning air-conditioning. Buses and operators will be on standby for any support needed with subways or emergency service. NYC Transit also completes a continuous welded rail watch when rail temperatures exceed 100 degrees to be vigilant of rail kinks or other issues.

    Long Island Rail Road and Metro-North Railroad crews will be staged at key locations to be able to respond quickly to weather-related issues. The railroads will monitor rail temperatures, deploy heat patrols to inspect the rails for any kinks, and stage additional Power Department personnel to protect power substations and overhead aerial lines. Train crews have been instructed to report any rail conditions that need attention.

    The Port Authority Office of Emergency Management coordinates with facility teams to monitor weather conditions and operational impacts and maintains communication with regional partners to support response readiness during periods of elevated temperatures.

    For a complete listing of weather watches, warnings, advisories and latest forecasts, visit the National Weather Service website.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Congressman Nick Langworthy Holds Press Conference on Energy Choice Act, Vows to End Blue-State Wars on American Energy

    Source: US Congressman Nick Langworthy (NY-23)

    ELMIRA, N.Y. – Today, Congressman Nick Langworthy (NY-23) held a press conference in Elmira, NY, on the Energy Choice Act to prohibit states or local governments from banning an energy service’s connection, reconnection, modification, installation, or expansion based on the type or source of energy to be delivered.

    “Governor Kathy Hochul and Democrats in Albany are hurting New Yorkers with their relentless war on American energy,” said Congressman Langworthy. “Her effort to ban the use of gas in buildings across the state will not only increase energy costs for families, but it will also eliminate a reliable and necessary source of energy that keeps homes heated and people safe. As this is becoming a dangerous trend in blue states across the country, the Energy Choice Act would end these costly bans and secure our nation’s energy future.”

    Watch the livestream here.

    “The Independent Oil and Gas Association of New York (IOGANY) fully supports the passage of the proposed Energy Choice Act. IOGANY is an association of oil and gas producers, pipeline companies, and associated support industries that provide safe, reliable, cost-effective energy in New York State. We are also New York State business owners and homeowners that are experiencing the same inflationary costs as NY citizens. 

    “During the past decade, New York has implemented policies to improve New York’s air quality through the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA). Both of these policies are focused on reaching emission reduction goals by reducing the use of fossil fuels and increasing the use of green energy (wind and solar). These efforts have resulted in increased electric and natural gas utility bills as costs of these green energy programs are passed through to the business community and homeowners. Everyone knows the sun does not shine and the wind does not blow all the time, so this transition is impacting energy reliability.  

    “In addition to increased utility bills, these policies will force home and business owners to pay to convert buildings and homes to use primarily electric energy (new electric appliances and heating systems), as well as, purchase electric vehicles and pay for charging stations installation. This is increasing the cost of living in New York State at a time when we already have a high tax burden and people are leaving the state.

    “IOGANY members, as citizens and business owners in New York, want clean air but question what this effort will cost citizens and will reliable energy be available to support our current standard of living. We also question if the current established emission goals can be reached while still providing safe, reliable, cost-effective energy. Cleaner air is a wonderful objective but at what cost and impact on our standard of living. This is why as individuals and members of the oil and gas industry, we support the Clean Energy Choice Bill passage,” said the Independent Oil and Gas Association of New York.

     

    “This Energy Choice legislation is of key importance to all New Yorkers. This bill gives the ability to adequately power and heat our homes, businesses, and institutions that make New York the Empire State. The plumbing and heating contractors of the NYS PHCC have members throughout the entire state, employing thousands of technicians, many union plumbers, who see firsthand how ill-conceived but well-intentioned local and state restrictive energy laws are jeopardizing our energy usage and supply in our great state.  Everyone wants to have efficient, environmentally friendly and reliable energy.  This law would allow for the use of not only renewable gas and hydrogen but also other fuels like bio biodiesel, all made in New York. The NYS PHCC fully supports Congress member Langworthy’s Energy Choice Act,” said Terence O’Brien Co-Executive Director; NYS PHCC.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Change of British High Commissioner to Jamaica: Alicia Herbert

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    Change of British High Commissioner to Jamaica: Alicia Herbert

    Ms Alicia Herbert OBE has been appointed British High Commissioner to Jamaica in succession to Ms Judith Slater. Ms Herbert will take up her appointment during September 2025.

    Curriculum Vitae           

    Full name                                Alicia Jacinta Herbert

    Year Role
    2021 to 2025 FCDO, Director Education, Gender and Equality and UK Gender Envoy
    2016 to 2020 DFID/FCDO, Head, Children Youth and Education
    2012 to 2016 Maputo, Country Director, DFID Mozambique
    2009 to 2012 Abuja, Deputy Country Director, DFID Nigeria
    2006 to 2009 Khartoum, Head, Governance, Security and Development, DFID Sudan
    2002 to 2006 Maputo, Social Development Adviser, DFID Mozambique
    1999 to 2002 DFID, Social Development Adviser, Climate and Environment Department

    Media enquiries

    Email newsdesk@fcdo.gov.uk

    Telephone 020 7008 3100

    Email the FCDO Newsdesk (monitored 24 hours a day) in the first instance, and we will respond as soon as possible.

    Updates to this page

    Published 20 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: UKAEA welcomes UK-Japan fusion partnership

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    News story

    UKAEA welcomes UK-Japan fusion partnership

    UK-Japan partnership to further collaboration in key fusion areas, including R&D, regulation, skills and workforce

    Kerry McCarthy, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (Minister for Climate) and Hiroshi Masuko, Senior Deputy Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, signing the Memorandum of Cooperation on fusion energy.

    UKAEA welcomes the signing of a Memorandum of Cooperation between UK and Japan, to strengthen our already close bond on developing fusion energy.

    Fusion is a global challenge with global solutions and UKAEA looks forward to working with Japanese scientists and innovators to advance fusion energy.

    More information can be found here.

    Updates to this page

    Published 20 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Coventry Very Light Rail welcomes Simon Lightwood, Minister for Local Transport

    Source: City of Coventry

    As part of Better Transport Week, Simon Lightwood MP visited the CVLR track in the city centre.

    Better Transport Week began on Monday, 16 June, and will run until 22 June. The annual event celebrates the importance of sustainable transport, which brings people together and connects communities.

    Simon Lightwood was welcomed by Councillor Jim O’Boyle, Mayor Richard Parker, and Ben Plowden, CEO, Campaign for Better Transport. He was introduced to CVLR and the track installation process, followed by a visit and ride on the innovative vehicle.

    Simon Lightwood, Minister for Local Transport, said: “I think it’s a fantastic innovation by the local authority, a really smooth, light, and airy ride. I can really see the benefits that it could bring, not only here in Coventry, but potentially to the rest of the world.”

    Councillor Jim O’Boyle, Cabinet Member for Jobs, Regeneration, and Climate Change at Coventry City Council, said: “There is no better place to celebrate Better Transport Week than in Coventry, where our innovation and manufacturing skills have enabled us to create a new very light rail system that has the potential to change how people move around small to medium sized cities. We are pleased to welcome Simon Lightwood, so we cannot only show him how brilliantly it works but also discuss the potential – that’s what’s really exciting.

    “This system will create jobs for local people, and this is just the beginning of our plans to put Coventry Very Light Rail at the heart of the growing green economy here in Coventry.”

    An interview with Simon Lightwood and Councillor O’Boyle is available to watch on YouTube.

    Friday, 20th June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Low-income homeowners hit by disasters may get less help from the government, as Trump administration nixes rules on fairness, community input and resilience

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Ivis García, Associate Professor of Landscape Architecture and Urban Planning, Texas A&M University

    Hurricane Helene caused extensive damage to homes in North Carolina in 2024. AP Photo/Kathy Kmonicek

    Imagine that a hurricane has destroyed your home.

    The roof is gone. The floors are flooded. Your family’s belongings are ruined.

    When this happens, you can apply for federal disaster aid, hoping for a lifeline. For many low-income families and other people of modest means, funding for that aid is often channeled to the states through the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery program.

    Known as CDBG-DR, this program mainly provides funding to repair and rebuild homes belonging to people of low-to-moderate income who either have no insurance at all or whose coverage falls short of what is needed to making housing safe again.

    When homes are damaged beyond repair or located in areas where it’s too dangerous to rebuild because of the likelihood of future bouts of flooding in the same place, the CDBG-DR program can help pay for residents to move somewhere else that is less prone to disasters. In both cases, it covers costs that the Federal Emergency Management Agency does not pay for.

    But in 2025, with hurricane season underway, the rules for who gets help and how it’s distributed have changed significantly.

    As an urban planner who has researched disaster recovery efforts, I’m alarmed by Memorandum 2025-02, which HUD published on its website in March 2025.

    The memo changes the rules for nearly US$12 billion in disaster recovery funding approved by Congress for disasters occurring in 2023 and 2024. And HUD is implementing these changes early in the process, before any of this money has been distributed.

    This home in Puerto Rico was destroyed when Hurricane Fiona struck the island in September 2022.
    Ivis Garcia

    What has changed

    The memo does away with the civil rights certifications, fair housing assessments, environmental standards and citizen advisory groups
    that have long been mandatory for the recipients of disaster recovery funds.

    Civil rights certification means that CDBG-DR grantees must verify that disaster aid will be distributed without discrimination based on race, ethnicity, age, disability status, or other characteristics known as “protected classes.” Without this certification, there’s no formal process to ensure disaster aid is distributed fairly.

    Fair housing obligations are assessments of whether middle- and lower-income families, people of color or people with disabilities can find safe, affordable housing without facing any discrimination.

    In addition, HUD no longer requires detailed demographic reporting on who is applying for or receiving aid. This includes information such as gender, race, age, disability status and the language someone speaks.

    Another change is that HUD’s updated disaster recovery guidelines no longer require economic development funds to emphasize people of modest incomes or their communities. Under the new rules, any business hit by a disaster can get recovery funds. It doesn’t matter how much money the owners make, as long as they can show that the disaster affected them.

    And several important environmental protections have been rolled back. HUD previously mandated that disaster recovery projects comply with federal building standards.

    Those codes are tougher than the local housing codes. These included rules for building homes higher off the ground to avoid future flooding and using stronger construction methods to withstand extreme weather events. Without them, new construction may be less durable and less safe – especially in areas hit hard by hurricanes or other natural disasters.

    Strong energy efficiency standards help keep long-term utility costs low and reduce pressure on power grids during extreme weather events. They also make rebuilt homes more sustainable by reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

    Tina Brotherton, 88, right, gets help from 9-year-old neighbor Lainey Hamelink as she surveys the wreckage of her business, Tina’s Dockside Inn. It was completely destroyed in Hurricane Idalia, as was Brotherton’s nearby home, in Horseshoe Beach, Fla., in 2023.
    AP Photo/Rebecca Blackwell

    Less coordination and communication

    HUD has also removed a requirement for the nonprofits, local governments and other recipients of CDBG-DR grants to create and convene citizen advisory groups. That change took effect on March 24, 2025.

    These groups, which have long made it easier for local communities to have a say regarding federally funded disaster recovery efforts, have played an important role in making sure those efforts reflect the needs and priorities of local residents – especially those most affected.

    While eliminating this step may make it easier and faster for local governments to spend the recovery funds allocated for their communities, it also means there’s less opportunity for their own communities to influence how those funds are spent. Without that input, recovery efforts fail to resolve the real challenges people are facing.

    Staffing and funding cuts

    The White House’s 2026 budget proposal retains the HUD program that distributes disaster recovery grants while eliminating the related Community Development Block Grant program, which helps people experiencing homelessness and also funds everything from child care to services for older people.

    I’m concerned about how CDBG-DR grants will be distributed, apart from the program’s changes. HUD’s Office of Community Planning and Development, which administers the CDBG-DR program, is slated to lose 84% of its staff, according to widespread media reports published earlier this year.

    The Trump administration is also calling for cutting HUD’s staff, and President Donald Trump’s proposed 2026 budget would cut the agency’s entire budget in half.

    In its March 25 HUD memo, the Trump administration framed these policy changes as a way to streamline recovery efforts and provide greater flexibility in the use of federal disaster funds. The memo also asserted that the changes were needed for compliance with executive orders that banned the use of diversity, equity and inclusion criteria and hiring practices that the administration considers to be discrimintory.

    But critics of the policy rollbacks, including the National Low Income Housing Coalition, which advocates affordable housing, worry that removing long-standing safeguards could weaken the CDBG-DR program’s core mission of equitably distributing aid and building resilient communities. The standards and community input systems HUD has abandoned, the coalition says, have historically helped ensure that disaster recovery funds reach the people who need them most.

    Ivis García does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Low-income homeowners hit by disasters may get less help from the government, as Trump administration nixes rules on fairness, community input and resilience – https://theconversation.com/low-income-homeowners-hit-by-disasters-may-get-less-help-from-the-government-as-trump-administration-nixes-rules-on-fairness-community-input-and-resilience-257439

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Senegal and Kenya Top African Development Bank’s Electricity Regulatory Index, as Regulators Drive Tangible Reforms

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    Kenya and Senegal have claimed the top spots in the African Development Bank’s 2024 Electricity Regulatory Index (ERI) (www.AfDB.org), demonstrating exceptional progress in power sector governance and regulatory outcomes. The comprehensive assessment, officially unveiled today at the Africa Energy Forum in Cape Town, evaluates regulatory frameworks across 43 African countries. 

    Uganda, Liberia and Niger round out the top five performers, with Niger registering one of the biggest gains, underlining the strong impact of sustained reforms and political commitment to power sector development. 

    The ERI evaluates three dimensions—Regulatory Governance, Regulatory Substance, and Regulatory Outcomes (ROI). Notably, the ROI, which tracks service delivery and utility performance, recorded the most substantial improvement across the continent. 

    Key findings from the 2024 ERI: 

    • Kenya and Senegal led with a score of 0.892, reflecting standout progress in tariff reform, regulatory outcomes, and utility performance. 
    • A remarkable 41 out of 43 participating countries achieved RGI scores above 0.5, representing a significant increase from 24 countries in 2022.  
    • Countries scoring below 0.500 reduced significantly from 19 in 2022 to just 6 in 2024.  
    • Even the lowest-performing country tripled its score—from about 0.10 to 0.33. 
    • The ROI surged from roughly 0.40 in 2022 to 0.62 in 2024, showing that reforms are delivering tangible service improvements on the ground. 

    Now in its seventh edition, the ERI shows strong momentum toward more effective, transparent, and impactful regulation, with real-world results beginning to emerge. 

    “The 2024 ERI shows that Africa’s regulators are stepping up. We are now seeing stronger institutions delivering real results for utilities and consumers. This shift is critical if we are to achieve Mission 300 and connect 300 million people to electricity by 2030,” says Dr. Kevin Kariuki, AfDB Vice President for Power, Energy, Climate and Green Growth. 

    For the first time, the 2024 ERI also assessed regional regulatory bodies, recognizing their growing role in harmonizing technical standards and enabling cross-border electricity trade. 

    As the backbone of Mission 300, ERI continues to inform the design and implementation of national energy compacts—currently active in 12 countries, with another 20 in development. 

    Bridging the Gap – Addressing Ongoing Challenges 

    While celebrating regulatory progress, the report calls for greater focus on regulatory independence, the financial viability of utilities, and the integration of off-grid and mini-grid systems into national frameworks. The ERI underscores that regulation must translate into better access, affordability, and reliability, especially for underserved rural populations.  

    The report outlines priority areas for enhancing regulatory effectiveness:  

    • Strengthening regulatory independence 
    • Enhancing accountability mechanisms 
    • Promoting transparency and predictability 
    • Improving stakeholder participation 
    • Deepening economic regulation and advancing cost-reflective tariff methodologies. 

    “The ERI 2024 tells a hopeful story. African countries are not just passing laws—they are implementing them. Regulators are transforming from administrative bodies into strategic institutions with measurable influence. However, challenges related to independence, financing, and enforcement persist,” said Wale Shonibare, Director for Energy Financial Solutions, Policy and Regulation at the Bank Group. 

    Launched in 2018, the ERI is a diagnostic and policy tool used by governments, regulators, and development partners to identify gaps, track progress, and prioritize reform efforts. The 2024 edition incorporates extensive feedback from utilities, regulators, and regional energy bodies.  

    The full ERI 2024 report will be available here (https://apo-opa.co/4kPeDmZ). 

    – on behalf of African Development Bank Group (AfDB).

    Media Contact: 
    Gertrude Kitongo
    Communication and External Relations Department 

    Technical Contact: 
    Callixte Kambanda
    Manager, Energy Policy, Regulations, and Statistics 
    email: c.kambanda@afdb.org

    About the African Development Bank Group:
    The African Development Bank Group (AfDB) is Africa’s premier development finance institution. It comprises three distinct entities: the African Development Bank (AfDB), the African Development Fund (ADF) and the Nigeria Trust Fund (NTF). On the ground in 44 African countries with an external office in Japan, the AfDB contributes to the economic development and the social progress of its 54 regional member states. 

    Media files

    Download logo

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Green Deal undermining the operational efficiency of police forces – E-001286/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    1. The EU’s net greenhouse gas emissions reduction target of at least 55% by 2030 compared to 1990 and the climate neutrality target by 2050, enshrined in the European Climate Law, require a swift decrease in emissions from all sectors. The regulation on CO2 emission standards for new passenger cars and vans[1] sets targets for the average emissions per manufacturer, which get stricter over time, up to a 100% emission reduction target for new vehicles registered in the EU from 2035 onwards. The regulation creates long-term certainty so that investments can be channelled in clean technologies, new value chains in the EU, recharging infrastructure, and the reskilling of users.

    Over the past years, the efficiency and range of zero-emission vehicles has steadily improved — reaching an average of close to 350 km already in 2022[2], and the availability of recharging and refuelling infrastructure has strongly increased. As the technology develops, further improvements of these aspects are expected in the coming years.

    2. The Commission notes that the above-mentioned Regulation does not impose the use of any specific technology.

    3. The EU is not competent to determine the specific working conditions and equipment used by law enforcement authorities, including the type of patrol cars they use. It is for the relevant national authorities to do so.

    • [1] http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/631/2024-01-01.
    • [2] https://alternative-fuels-observatory.ec.europa.eu/policymakers-and-public-authorities/electric-vehicle-model-statistics.
    Last updated: 20 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: SPC Jun 20, 2025 Day 4-8 Severe Weather Outlook

    Source: US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

    Day 4-8 Severe Weather Outlook Issued on Jun 20, 2025

    Updated: Fri Jun 20 08:45:02 UTC 2025

     .

    D4
    Mon, Jun 23, 2025 – Tue, Jun 24, 2025
    D7
    Thu, Jun 26, 2025 – Fri, Jun 27, 2025

    D5
    Tue, Jun 24, 2025 – Wed, Jun 25, 2025
    D8
    Fri, Jun 27, 2025 – Sat, Jun 28, 2025

    D6
    Wed, Jun 25, 2025 – Thu, Jun 26, 2025
    (All days are valid from 12 UTC – 12 UTC the following day)

    Note: A severe weather area depicted in the Day 4-8 period indicates 15%, 30% or higher probability for severe thunderstorms within 25 miles of any point.

    PREDICTABILITY TOO LOW is used to indicate severe storms may be possible based on some model scenarios. However, the location or occurrence of severe storms are in doubt due to: 1) large differences in the deterministic model solutions, 2) large spread in the ensemble guidance, and/or 3) minimal run-to-run continuity.

    POTENTIAL TOO LOW means the threat for a regional area of organized severe storms appears unlikely (i.e., less than 15%) for the forecast day.

     Forecast Discussion

    ZCZC SPCSWOD48 ALL
    ACUS48 KWNS 200842
    SPC AC 200842

    Day 4-8 Convective Outlook
    NWS Storm Prediction Center Norman OK
    0342 AM CDT Fri Jun 20 2025

    Valid 231200Z – 281200Z

    …DISCUSSION…
    …D4/Monday…
    A mid/upper-level shortwave trough initially over the northern
    Plains and upper Midwest is forecast to move into Ontario on Monday,
    along the northern periphery of an amplified upper ridge over the
    eastern CONUS. A cold front will move through parts of the Great
    Lakes, Upper Midwest and central Plains. The strongest deep-layer
    flow may tend to lag behind the front, but moderate to strong
    instability could support strong to potentially severe storms along
    the front during the afternoon and evening.

    Farther east, strong instability is generally forecast to develop
    across parts of the Mid Atlantic into New England. However, due to
    the influence of the upper ridge, there is currently little signal
    for diurnal storm development across this region on Monday.

    …D5/Tuesday…
    Extended-range guidance is in reasonably good agreement that a cold
    front will move southward across the lower Great Lakes into New
    England on Tuesday. Favorable low-level moisture and strong
    instability could support severe-storm potential along the front
    during the afternoon and evening. However, coverage of storms is
    currently uncertain, due to the lingering influence of the upper
    ridge, and a tendency for stronger large-scale ascent to be
    displaced well north of the front.

    The western upper trough is forecast to deamplify on Tuesday, with
    most guidance suggesting that mid/upper-level flow will tend to
    weaken downstream across the Great Plains and upper Midwest.
    However, strong to locally severe storms could again be possible
    near the front, which may begin to move northward across the central
    Plains as a warm front through the day.

    …D6/Wednesday – D8/Friday…
    Predictability begins to wane by the middle of next week regarding
    the evolution of synoptic features across the CONUS, though the same
    general pattern of a weak upper trough in the West and an upper
    ridge over the East may continue through at least Wednesday. In the
    absence of any apparent strong forcing mechanisms, organized severe
    potential (if any) may tend be focused near a convectively
    influenced front across parts of the Plains into the Midwest and
    Great Lakes.

    ..Dean.. 06/20/2025

    CLICK TO GET WUUS48 PTSD48 PRODUCT

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: SPC – No MDs are in effect as of Fri Jun 20 11:02:02 UTC 2025

    Source: US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

    Current Mesoscale DiscussionsUpdated:  Fri Jun 20 11:05:03 UTC 2025 No Mesoscale Discussions are currently in effect.

    Notice:  The responsibility for Heavy Rain Mesoscale Discussions has been transferred to the Weather Prediction Center (WPC) on April 9, 2013. Click here for the Service Change Notice.
    Archived Convective ProductsTo view convective products for a previous day, type in the date you wish to retrieve (e.g. 20040529 for May 29, 2004). Data available since January 1, 2004.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: 8 out of 10 Indian support taxing oil and gas corporations to pay for climate damages, global survey finds 

    Source: Greenpeace Statement –

    New Delhi, 19 June 2025 – A global survey shows a strong support for holding fossil fuel companies accountable for environmental damage. 80% Indian respondents believe the fossil fuel corporations should be taxed for environmental damage they cause.  The data from the survey reflects a growing public consensus that the industries driving the climate crisis should be held financially accountable for the destruction they caused. 

    A remarkable 86% of people support government spending on climate disaster relief–provided it is funded by tax on coal, oil, and gas polluters. Notably, 89% of BJP supporters and 82% of Congress (INC) supporters agree on the need to increase taxes on oil and gas corporations to support those hit hardest by extreme weather events, highlighting rare cross-party unity on climate accountability.   

    The study, jointly commissioned by Greenpeace International and Oxfam International, was launched today at the UN Climate Meetings in Bonn (SB62), where government representatives are discussing climate policies, including ways to mobilise at least US$ 1.3 trillion annually in climate finance for Global South countries by 2035. The survey was conducted across 13 countries, including most G7 countries. 

    Selomi Garnaik, Climate and Energy Campaigner at Greenpeace India said: “Communities in developing countries are paying the price for a crisis they did not cause, while fossil fuel companies continue to profit. The science is clear—over a century of burning coal, oil, and gas has fueled the climate damage we face today. This new survey reveals strong public support for making polluters pay. As we head into COP30, governments have a clear public mandate to act- stand with the people, not the polluters, and make fossil fuel companies pay for the harm they have caused.”

    The study, run by Dynata, was unveiled alongside the Polluters Pay Pact, a global alliance of communities on the frontlines of climate disasters. The Pact demands that governments make oil, gas and coal corporations – not the people – pay their fair share for the damages they cause, through the introduction of new taxes and fines.

    The Pact is backed by firefighters and other first responders, trade unions and worker groups, and mayors from countries including Australia, Brazil, Bangladesh, India, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, and South Africa, the US, and plaintiffs in landmark climate cases from Pacific island states to Switzerland.

    The Pact is also supported by over 60 NGOs, including Oxfam International, 350.org, Avaaz, Islamic Relief UK, Asociación Interamericana para la Defensa del Ambiente (AIDA), Indian Hawkers Alliance, Pacific Islands Students Fighting Climate Change, Jubilee Australia and the Greenpeace network.

    The survey’s findings published today reveal broad public support for the core demands of the Polluters Pay Pact, as climate impacts worsen worldwide and global inequality grows.

    Key findings of the survey include:

    • 81% of people surveyed globally would support taxes on the oil, gas, and coal industry to pay for damages caused by fossil-fuel driven climate disasters like storms, floods, droughts and wildfires. 
    • 87% of people surveyed in India support channeling revenues from higher taxes on oil and gas corporations towards communities most impacted by the climate crisis. Climate change is disproportionately hitting people in Global South countries, who are historically least responsible for greenhouse gas emissions. 
    • 68% of people surveyed globally felt that the fossil fuel industry and the super-rich had a negative influence on politics in their country. 77% say they would be more willing to support a political candidate who prioritises taxing the super-rich and the fossil fuel industry. 

    Amitabh Behar, Executive Director of Oxfam International, said: “Fossil fuel companies have known for decades about the damage their polluting products wreak on humanity. Corporations continue to cash in on climate devastation, and their profiteering destroys the lives and livelihoods of millions of women, men and children, predominantly those in the Global South who have done the least to cause the climate crisis. Governments must listen to their people and hold polluters responsible for their damages. A new tax on polluting industries could provide immediate and significant support to climate-vulnerable countries, and finally incentivise investment in renewables and a just transition.” 

    The Polluters Pay Pact demonstrates popular support for the campaign to make polluters pay. The campaign is being waged throughout 2025 in countries worldwide and in critical international forums, including the 4th International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD4), the UN Climate Change Conference (COP30), and negotiations for a UN tax convention that could include new rules to make multinational oil and gas companies pay their fair share for their pollution.

    ENDS

    Notes:

    [1] The research was conducted by first-party data company Dynata in May-June, 2025, in Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Kenya, Italy, India, Mexico, the Philippines, South Africa, Spain, the UK and the US, with approximately 1200 respondents in each country and a theoretical margin of error of approximately 2.83%. Together, these countries represent close to half the world’s population. Statistics available here. 

    Additional background information available here.

    [2] Learn more about the Polluters Pay Pact: polluterspaypact.org

    [3] Additional quotes here from people around the world who are backing the Polluters Pay Pact, including first responders, local administration, youth, union representatives and people bringing climate cases to courts. 

    Contacts: 

    For Greenpeace India:
    Nibedita Saha, Media Officer, [email protected]

     For Greenpeace International: 

    Tal Harris, Greenpeace International, Global Media Lead – Stop Drilling Start Paying campaign, [email protected], +41-782530550

    MIL OSI NGO –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Dangerous rise in water levels in Greece’s coastal areas – E-001799/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    In the European Climate Risk Assessment (2024)[1] there is information on sea level rise and its impacts. Also, in the first Assessment Report (2024)[2] of the Knowledge Hub on Sea Level Rise an overview of the impacts in Europe is provided.

    In addition, as addressed in the Climate Law[3] as well as the Guidelines on National Adaptation Strategies[4], Members States are supposed to execute robust climate change and vulnerability analyses and use the outcome as a base for their national adaptation strategies and plans.

    Through the Mission on Adaptation to Climate Change[5] the Commission is helping regional and local authorities to become climate resilient. This encompasses providing tools for climate risk assessment as well developing adaptation measures in coastal areas.

    In its communication ‘The road to the next Multiannual Financial Framework’[6] the Commission highlighted in February 2025 the increasing impacts of climate change in Europe that require stepping up work on climate and water resilience and preparedness. The Commission plans to put forward a proposal for the next Multiannual Financial Framework in the third quarter of 2025.

    The Commission will also step up support to implement adaptation strategies and planning, notably through the upcoming EU climate adaptation plan, foreseen for 2026.

    • [1] European Environment Agency, European Climate Risk Assessment (2024) — https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/en/eu-adaptation-policy/key-eu-actions/european-climate-risk-assessment.
    • [2] Knowledge Hub on Sea Level Rise, ‘Sea level rise in Europe’(2024), https://sp.copernicus.org/articles/sp-slre1.pdf.
    • [3]  Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 “Climate Law”, Article 5.4.
    • [4] Commission Notice Guidelines on Member States’ adaptation strategies and plans 2023/C 264/01 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EL/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52023XC0727%2801%29.
    • [5] https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/en/mission/the-mission.
    • [6] (COM(2025)46).
    Last updated: 20 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Leeds launches the pioneering Aire Resilience Company to tackle flood risk and the climate emergency

    Source: City of Leeds

    On Tuesday, leaders from businesses and institutions across Yorkshire gathered to mark the launch of the Aire Resilience Company (ARC), a new Community Interest Company (CIC) facilitating the delivery of long-term natural flood management (NFM) interventions in the Aire Valley.  

    ARC was created through a collaboration between Leeds City Council, Yorkshire Water, the Environment Agency and the Rivers Trust as a direct response to the threat of climate change and increasing flood risk. It will focus on delivering upstream interventions that work with nature to slow the flow of water, reduce pressure on Leeds’ existing flood defences, and bring wider environmental benefits to communities across Leeds and the Aire Valley. 

    By establishing a long-term, sustainable model for funding and maintenance, ARC will ensure these natural interventions continue to protect communities for many decades. 

    ARC’s work will complement and enhance the recently completed £200million Leeds Flood Alleviation Scheme which protects the city and surrounding areas from extreme flooding as experienced following Storm Eva at Christmas 2015. 

    The Leeds Natural Flood Management project, delivered by the Environment Agency in partnership with a wide range of organisations, is an integral part of this scheme. This innovative programme has an ambition to provide climate change resilience to the scheme by providing a 5% reduction in peak flows on the River Aire in Leeds up to 2069. 

    ARC will further progress this work and will fund and deliver NFM interventions upstream in the Aire Valley. This includes creating woodlands, wetlands, soil restoration, and other interventions designed to slow and hold water upstream, protecting communities downstream. These nature-based solutions also enhance biodiversity and improve water quality, contributing to a healthier and more resilient environment for both people and wildlife. 

    ARC receives funding through a consortium of local businesses who recognise the importance of acting now to prevent the impacts of climate change. This funding enables NFM delivery partners to collaborate with farmers and landowners in the mid and upper Aire catchment to install and maintain NFM works. 

    Councillor Jonathan Pryor, Leeds City Council’s deputy leader and executive member for economy, transport, and sustainable development, said: 

     “Leeds City Council is committed to building long-term resilience to the impacts of climate change, and the launch of the Aire Resilience Company is an important step forward. Flood risk remains one of the most immediate challenges our communities face, and it is essential that we take action now to protect people, homes, and businesses across the city and the wider Aire Valley. 

    “By supporting nature-based solutions alongside our major flood defence schemes, we are not only strengthening flood resilience but also contributing to our wider environmental and net zero ambitions. This collaborative approach will help ensure that Leeds remains a safe, sustainable, and thriving place for generations to come.” 

    Nicola Shaw, CEO of Yorkshire Water, said:  

    “We firmly believe that localised partnerships are the best way to deliver what our region needs. We are delighted to be a lead partner for this innovative and forward-thinking initiative. Climate change affects almost every aspect of how we operate, and it is vitally important that we take action to prepare for the challenges ahead, as well as those we are already facing. 

     “By working with Aire Resilience Company to harness the power of nature, we’re not only building climate resilience in our own business, but also helping to generate new jobs, support nature-friendly farming, and improve water quality and soil health across the catchment of the Aire. The Aire Resilience Company offers a prime example of how working together can unlock sustainable value, build climate resilience, and future-proof Leeds as a place to live and work for many years to come.” 

    Mark Lloyd, CEO of the Rivers Trust, said: 

     “Most human activity in the past few centuries has accelerated water through the landscape with drainage, straightened rivers, deforestation, impermeable surfaces and compacted soils. We need to reverse this process by slowing the flow to make use of this precious resource for people and nature and protect communities and businesses from flooding. 

    “This means taking action at scale throughout the landscape to store and absorb water by restoring natural processes. ARC is a shining example of a community coming together to make space for water and I hope it will be replicated throughout the country.” 

    Jenny Cooke, Flood Risk Manager for the Environment Agency in West Yorkshire, said:  

    “The Environment Agency, alongside a wide range of organisations, have delivered one of the largest NFM programmes in the country, covering an area of around 700km2 across the Upper Aire Catchment. This included planting woodland equivalent to the size of 650 football pitches and managing soil and land management improvements over an area the size of 1200 football pitches, to slow the flow of water and mitigate the impacts of climate change. 

    “This not only helps reduce the risk of flooding but provides wider benefits; from supporting biodiversity and enhanced habitats and improved water quality, to richer soil health. 

    “The Aire Resilience Company will continue to maintain the partnerships we have built to carry out this work and allow the initiative to flourish – we’re excited to see what the future holds! 

    “As always, we encourage everyone across Yorkshire to know their flood risk and sign up to flood warnings via Prepare for flooding: Protect yourself from future flooding – GOV.UK.” 

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Preston City Council commissions research to unlock opportunities for local food producers

    Source: City of Preston

    Preston City Council has funded two new research projects to help better understand the region’s local food supply chain – who produces food in Lancashire, what they produce, and how they can be better supported to access public sector contracts. 

    The research, recommended by the Preston Climate Jury and discussed by the Central Lancashire Procurement Practitioners group, will help map the local food supply system. 

    Researchers from Edge Hill University and Social Research Consultancy, Sustainable Solutions, will lead the work. They will carry out surveys and in-depth interviews with farmers, producers, buyers and public sector organisations.

    The aim is to identify business opportunities, supply chain gaps and procurement challenges across Lancashire. 

    Councillor Sarwar, Cabinet Member for Climate Change at Preston City Council said: 

    ”Food systems are a main driver of climate change in the UK, and I am delighted to see Preston City Council moving forward with the People’s Climate Jury recommendation to increase access to locally produced food. This is a practical step towards a more local, low-carbon food system, and is also about fairness and supporting our farmers to thrive.” 

    Councillor Wise, Cabinet Member for Community Wealth Building at Preston City Council said: 

    ”Preston has long been a leader in Community Wealth Building, this work exploring access to contracts for local food producers will be another area in which Preston is a forerunner.” 

    The findings will support Preston City Council, local anchor institutions and other public sector buyers to improve access for small producers, contributing to climate goals and the council’s Community Wealth Building strategy. 

    Sven Batke, Chair of the Greenhouse Innovation Consortium and one of the founders of EcoEdge at Edge Hill University said:  

    “To support food producers and create pragmatic, tangible outcomes that deliver net benefits for our local economy, it is essential that we work collectively and adopt data-driven approaches that are effective. This initial work will help us better understand key challenges and identify opportunities for the food sector in Lancashire.” 

    John Whitton from Sustainable Solutions said:  

    ”Farmers and growers in Lancashire are keen to support local and sustainable food initiatives that support access to public sector contracts. How to do this in practice remains elusive and is the focus of this project.” 

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –