Category: Weather

  • MIL-OSI USA: Energy Department Slashes 47 Burdensome and Costly Regulations, Delivering First Milestone in America’s Biggest Deregulatory Effort

    Source: US Department of Energy

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) today announced the first step in the Energy Department’s largest deregulatory effort in history, proposing the elimination or reduction of 47 regulations.

    Energy.gov

    May 12, 2025

    minute read time

    WASHINGTON — The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) today announced the first step in the Energy Department’s largest deregulatory effort in history, proposing the elimination or reduction of 47 regulations that are driving up costs and lowering quality of life for the American people. Once finalized, these actions will save the American people an estimated $11 billion and cut more than 125,000 words from the Code of Federal Regulations. These actions, in accordance with President Donald Trump’s Executive Order, “Zero-Based Regulation to Unleash American Energy,” advance President Trump’s promise to restore consumer freedom, lower costs, and unleash American energy dominance. 

    “While it would normally take years for the Department of Energy to remove just a handful of regulations, the Trump Administration assembled a team working around the clock to reduce costs and deliver results for the American people in just over 110 days,” said U.S. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright. “Thanks to President Trump’s leadership, we are bringing back common sense — slashing regulations meant to appease Green New Deal fantasies, restrict consumer choice and increase costs for the American people. Promises made, promises kept.”

    The 47 actions include the proposed elimination or modification to dozens of consumer appliance standards, regulations limiting building and energy production and unscientific DEI requirements for grant recipients. The full list of actions is available below:

    47 Deregulatory Actions

    1. Rescinding Requirements for Exempt External Power Supplies Under the EPS Service Parts Act of 2014
    2. Streamlining Administrative Procedures with Respect to the Import and Export of Natural Gas
    3. Streamlining Application for Presidential Permit Authorizing the Construction, Connection, Operation, and Maintenance of Facilities for Transmission of Electric Energy at International Boundaries
    4. Rescinding Collection of Information Under the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974
    5. Rescinding Regulations for Loans for Minority Business Enterprises Seeking DOE Contracts and Assistance
    6. Streamlining Applications for Authorization to Transmit Electric Energy to a Foreign Country
    7. Rescinding the Production Incentives for Cellulosic Biofuels
    8. Rescinding Reporting Requirements, Certification, Independent Verification, and DOE Review for Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Reporting
    9. Rescinding the Grant Programs for Schools and Hospitals and Buildings Owned by Units of Local Government and Public Care Institutions
    10. Rescinding the Renewable Energy Production Incentive  
    11. Streamlining the Procedures for Acquisition of Petroleum for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve
    12. Rescinding Energy Conservation Standards for Automatic Commercial Ice Makers
    13. Rescinding Energy Conservation Standards for Commercial Prerinse Spray Valves
    14. Rescinding the Energy Conservation Standards for Microwave Ovens
    15. Rescinding the Water Use Standards for Faucets
    16. Rescinding Energy Conservation Standards for External Power Supplies
    17. Rescinding in Part the Amended Energy Conservation Standards for Dehumidifiers
    18. Rescinding the Amended Design Requirements for Conventional Cooking Tops
    19. Rescinding the Amended Design Requirements for Conventional Ovens
    20. Rescinding the Amended Water Conservation Standards for Commercial Clothes Washers
    21. Rescinding the Amended Water Use Standards for Residential Clothes Washers
    22. Rescinding the Amended Water Use Standards for Residential Dishwashers
    23. Rescinding the Efficiency Standards for Battery Chargers
    24. Rescinding the Efficiency Standards for Compact Residential Clothes Washers
    25. Rescinding Floodplains and Wetlands Environmental Review Requirements
    26. Ending Requirements for Members of One Sex to Be Able to Try Out for Sports Teams of the Opposite Sex
    27. Rescinding New Construction Requirements Related to Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs or Activities
    28. Rescinding Obsolete Financial Assistance Rules
    29. Rescinding Obsolete Transfer of Proceedings Regulations
    30. Rescinding Regulations Related to Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance
    31. Rescinding Regulations Related to Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs or Activities (General Provisions)
    32. Rescinding Regulations Related to Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs or Activities (Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Age)
    33. Rescinding Unnecessary Regulation Encouraging Alternative Dispute Resolution
    34. Withdrawing Air Cleaners as a Covered Consumer Product
    35. Withdrawing Compressors as a Covered Equipment
    36. Withdrawing Miscellaneous Refrigeration Products as a Covered Consumer Product
    37. Withdrawing Portable Air Conditioners as a Covered Consumer Product
    38. Withdrawal of Fans and Blowers as Covered Equipment
    39. Rescinding Test Procedures for Small Electric Motors
    40. Rescinding Test Procedures for Commercial Warm Air Furnaces
    41. Rescinding Unnecessary ADR Regulations for DOE Contractor Employee Protection Program
    42. Request for Information on Lowering the Efficiency Standards for Furnace Fans
    43. Notice Rescinding 10 Unlawful and Burdensome Guidance documents
    44. Rescinding the Definition of Showerhead to Unleash Better Shower Pressure
    45. Withdrawing Portable Electric Spas as a Covered Product
    46. Withdrawing Miscellaneous Gas Products as a Covered Product
    47. Delaying Compliance Date for Federal Agencies to Meet the Clean Energy Federal Building Rule

    NNSA issues Notice of Intent to prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for its plutonium pit production mission

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Shaheen Holds Roundtable on Dangers of Medicaid Cuts in Nashua, Accepts Energy Champion Award in Manchester

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New Hampshire Jeanne Shaheen
    (Nashua, NH) – Today, U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) held a roundtable discussion at Greater Nashua Mental Health Center to discuss the disastrous impact that Republican-led cuts to Medicaid would have on New Hampshire. Shaheen convened local substance use disorder recovery organizations and treatment providers to hear how cutting Medicaid would hinder efforts to support Granite Staters struggling with substance use disorders. Photos from today’s events can be found here. 
    “Thousands of Granite Staters who are recovering from substance use disorders are able to get the treatment they need thanks to Medicaid – cutting the funding they count on could have serious consequences,” said Senator Shaheen. “I was grateful to hear from Granite State advocates who are on the frontlines of the fight to combat the substance use disorder crisis about how harmful cuts to Medicaid would be. We’ll keep working to make sure Republicans in Congress know just how many families would be devastated by their proposal.” 
    More than 180,000 people in New Hampshire use Medicaid for their insurance and half of those recipients are children. Under the Republican proposal, they will see significant changes to their coverage and more than 60,000 Granite Starters will be at risk of losing their coverage. This includes thousands of patients that are currently receiving treatment for substance use disorders.    
    The roundtable at Greater Nashua Mental Health Center was the latest stop on Shaheen’s “Medicaid Impact Tour”—a series of discussions across the Granite State to underscore the harm that Republican-led cuts to Medicaid would have on New Hampshire, including by raising the cost of health care and leaving thousands uninsured. The tour included stops in Berlin, Laconia, Claremont and Concord for meetings with health care providers, activists and Medicaid beneficiaries. 
    Later in the day, Shaheen was honored at New Hampshire Energy Week’s Energy Innovation and Champion Award Reception with the Elected Official Energy Champion Award for her decades of energy efficiency leadership.  
    “Throughout my career in public service—from the Governor’s office to the United States Senate—I’ve looked to energy efficiency first,” said Senator Shaheen. “This work is especially important right now as too many families feel squeezed by the high cost of living. Energy efficiency programs are an important and cost-effective way for Granite Staters to save money and have more breathing room in their household budgets.” 
    Earlier this week, Shaheen pushed back on the Trump administration’s plans to scrap the Energy Star Program, which helps Americans save on energy costs.  
    As a lead negotiator of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, Shaheen helped secure $3.5 billion in additional funding for the Weatherization Assistance Program, including $18 million for New Hampshire. Shaheen has long-championed the Weatherization Assistance Program to lower energy costs for low-income families in New Hampshire, as well as the State Energy Program, which assists states with the development of energy efficiency renewable projects. In the Fiscal Year 2024 government funding bills, Shaheen helped defend key efficiency programs at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) from cuts, including securing $366 million for weatherization efforts and $66 million for the State Energy Program, which work to bring down energy bills for families and communities. 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Governor Newsom releases state model for cities and counties to immediately address encampments with urgency and dignity

    Source: US State of California 2

    May 12, 2025

    What you need to know: Governor Newsom today released a model ordinance for cities and counties to immediately address dangerous and unhealthy encampments and connect people experiencing homelessness with shelter and services. Backed in part by $3.3 billion in new Prop 1 funding being announced today, the Governor is calling on all local governments to act without delay and use their authority affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court to address encampments.

    SACRAMENTO —  As part of California’s ambitious push to tackle the nationwide homelessness crisis head-on, Governor Gavin Newsom released a model ordinance for cities and counties to address unhealthy and dangerous encampments. The Governor is calling on every local government to adopt and implement local policies without delay, backed by billions in state funding and authority affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court last year. The model ordinance follows and builds on the Governor’s 2024 executive order, which urged all local jurisdictions to quickly address encampments and use state and local funding to connect people experiencing homelessness with the care and support they need.

    This announcement is coupled with the release of $3.3 billion in voter-approved Proposition 1 funding, which will be made available later today to communities statewide to expand behavioral health housing and treatment options for the most seriously ill and homeless in California.

    “There’s nothing compassionate about letting people die on the streets. Local leaders asked for resources — we delivered the largest state investment in history. They asked for legal clarity — the courts delivered. Now, we’re giving them a model they can put to work immediately, with urgency and with humanity, to resolve encampments and connect people to shelter, housing, and care. The time for inaction is over. There are no more excuses.”

    Governor Gavin Newsom

    Giving locals the tools they need

    Governor Newsom has been a fierce advocate for people experiencing homelessness, creating new resources to support local governments to help provide support and care. The Newsom administration has provided local communities with more than $27 billion to address homelessness, created stronger accountability laws and tools to ensure that every community is doing its part.

    Today, Governor Newsom is continuing the state’s support by sharing with local communities a model ordinance to help local governments set appropriate rules around encampments and establish effective enforcement procedures that prioritize notice, shelter, and services.  Encampments pose a serious public safety risk, and expose the people in encampments to increased risk of sexual violence, criminal activity, property damage and break-ins, and unsanitary conditions. 

    Clear formal guidelines for clearing encampments 

    The state’s model ordinance will be provided to every community as a starting point so jurisdictions can create their own policies.  It draws from the state’s proven and workable approach — an approach that, since July 2021, has cleared more than 16,000 encampments and over 311,873 cubic yards of waste and debris from sites along the state right of way. These results demonstrate that the policy is effective and scalable, offering a sound, adoptable framework for jurisdictions to resolve encampments with urgency and dignity.

    The ordinance contains key provisions, which may be modified based on local need, including:

    • A prohibition on persistent camping in one location
    • A prohibition on encampments that block free passage on sidewalks
    • A requirement that local officials provide notice and make every reasonable effort to identify and offer shelter prior to clearing an encampment

    The ordinance helps ensure that local communities take a balanced approach to address and prevent encampments with compassion and care. 

    The ordinance reflects the guidance for local governments created following the Governor’s Executive Order, requiring at least 48 hours’ notice, outreach to local service providers, and proper storage of items when addressing encampments.

    Learn about your community’s progress

    Visit accountability.ca.gov, which brings together thousands of locally reported data points to provide an accurate picture of local communities’ work to address homelessness, create housing, and create behavioral health supports.  The new accountability tool helps Californians quickly and clearly assess the progress being made by their local governments on these pressing issues and learn more about the process and funding provided to communities by the state.

    Reversing decades of inaction 

    The Newsom Administration is making significant progress in reversing decades of inaction on homelessness. Between 2014 and 2019, unsheltered homelessness in California increased by approximately 37,000 people, more than double the increase seen during the Newsom Administration.

    As states throughout the nation continue to see ever-higher increases in homeless populations, California has dramatically slowed the growth in homelessness and reduced the number of veterans and youth experiencing homelessness — more than any other state.

    Homelessness continues to increase nationwide, increasing in 2024 by more than 18%, but California is bucking the national trend by holding the statewide increase to 3%. This is a lower rate than in 40 other states.

    California is also one of the few states that have dramatically blunted the increases in unsheltered homelessness, holding it to 0.45%. By comparison, in 2024, nationwide unsheltered homelessness grew by nearly 7%. Unsheltered homelessness growth in other large population states like Illinois, Florida, New York, and Texas surpassed California’s percentage and number. California experienced the largest decrease in veteran homelessness in the nation last year.

    Recent news

    News Sacramento, California – Governor Gavin Newsom today issued a proclamation declaring May 2025 as “Older Californians Month.”The text of the proclamation and a copy can be found below: PROCLAMATIONCalifornia is home to nearly nine million older residents who…

    News What you need to know: Ahead of peak wildfire season, California has launched “Ask CAL FIRE,” an AI-powered chatbot on CAL FIRE’s website offering wildfire resources and emergency information in 70 languages. SACRAMENTO — As California marks Wildfire Preparedness…

    News What you need to know: Governor Newsom has been appointed co-chair of the U.S. Climate Alliance – a bipartisan coalition of 24 governors working to achieve a net-zero carbon pollution future in America by advancing state-led, high-impact climate action….

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Banking Union – annual report 2024 – P10_TA(2025)0105 – Thursday, 8 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 16 January 2024 on Banking Union – annual report 2023(1),

    –  having regard to the Commission’s follow-up to Parliament’s resolution of 16 January 2024 on Banking Union – annual report 2023,

    –  having regard to document published by the European Central Bank (ECB) on 25 March 2024, entitled ‘Feedback on the input provided by the European Parliament as part of its resolution on Banking Union 2023’,

    –  having regard to the ECB’s 2023 Annual Report on supervisory activities, published in March 2024,

    –  having regard to the 2023 Annual Report of the Single Resolution Board (SRB), published on 28 June 2024,

    –  having regard to the adoption of the Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD)(2) and the Anti-Money Laundering Regulation (AMLR)(3), and to the establishment of the Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA)(4),

    –  having regard to the implementation of the Basel III standards, namely to the adoption of amendments to the Capital Requirements Directive(5) and to the Capital Requirements Regulation(6),

    –  having regard to the adoption of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/2795 of 24 July 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the date of application of the own funds requirements for market risk(7),

    –  having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and funding of resolution action(8),

    –  having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/59/EU as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and financing of resolution action(9),

    –  having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/49/EU as regards the scope of deposit protection, use of deposit guarantee schemes funds, cross-border cooperation, and transparency(10),

    –  having regard to the report of its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of 23 April 2024 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme,

    –  having regard to the Commission proposal of 14 March 2018 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit servicers, credit purchasers and the recovery of collateral (COM(2018)0135),

    –  having regard to the Five Presidents’ Report of 22 June 2015 entitled ‘Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’,

    –  having regard to Enrico Letta’s report of 10 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market – Speed, security, solidarity: empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens’,

    –  having regard to Mario Draghi’s report of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

    –  having regard to the Eurogroup statement of 11 March 2024 on the future of Capital Markets Union, and to the Eurogroup statement of 16 June 2022 on the future of the Banking Union and the Eurogroup follow-up thereto of 28 April 2023,

    –  having regard to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s disclosure framework for banks’ cryptoasset exposures and to the targeted amendments to its prudential standard on banks’ exposures to cryptoassets, both published on 17 July 2024,

    –  having regard to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s core principles for effective banking supervision, published on 25 April 2024,

    –  having regard to the ECB’s Financial Stability Review of May 2024,

    –  having regard to the ECB Occasional Paper No 328 of 2023 entitled ‘The Road to Paris: stress testing the transition towards a net-zero economy’,

    –  having regard to the Financial Stability Board publication of 9 November 2015 entitled ‘Principles on Loss-absorbing and Recapitalisation Capacity of G-SIBs in Resolution’,

    –  having regard to the Financial Stability Board report of 10 October 2023 entitled ‘2023 Bank Failures – Preliminary lessons learnt for resolution’,

    –  having regard to Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper No 24-15 of 25 June 2024 entitled ‘Europe’s banking union at ten: unfinished yet transformative’(11),

    –  having regard to the Single Supervisory Mechanism supervisory priorities for 2024-2026, published in December 2023,

    –  having regard to the SRB’s biannual reporting note to the Eurogroup of 13 May 2024,

    –  having regard to the outcome of the 2023 EU-wide transparency exercise of the European Banking Authority, published on 28 July 2023,

    –  having regard to Special Report 12/2023 of the European Court of Auditors of 12 May 2023 entitled ‘EU supervision of banks’ credit risk – The ECB stepped up its efforts but more is needed to increase assurance that credit risk is properly managed and covered’,

    –  having regard to the statements by Claudia Buch, Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, at the hearings conducted by Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on 21 March 2024 and 2 September 2024,

    –  having regard to the statements by Dominique Laboureix, Chair of the SRB, at the hearings conducted by Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on 21 March 2024 and 23 September 2024,

    –  having regard to the European Banking Authority’s risk assessment reports of July 2024 and December 2024,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2019 on gender balance in EU economic and monetary affairs nominations(12),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on strengthening the international role of the euro(13),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0044/2025),

    A.  whereas the Banking Union (BU) encompasses the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Single Resolution Mechanism and a European deposit insurance that is still missing;

    B.  whereas the main objective of the BU is to safeguard the stability of the banking sector in Europe and prevent the need to bail out banks at risk of failure with taxpayers’ money;

    C.  whereas a completed BU would be a positive development for citizens and the EU economy, as it would improve the competitiveness and stability of the banking sector, reduce systemic risk, improve supply and consumer choice and offer increased opportunities for cross-border banking that enhances access to financing for households and businesses, thereby reducing costs for banks’ customers, while ensuring that public funds are not used to bail out the banking sector; whereas the ‘too big to fail’ risk has not yet been fully addressed;

    D.  whereas concluding the reform of the EU frameworks for bank crisis management and deposit insurance, focusing particularly on small and medium-sized banks, is fundamental in order to provide Europe’s banking sector with security, stability and resilience; whereas a complete BU with a true European deposit insurance scheme is a basic condition for ensuring that citizens trust European banks;

    E.  whereas fragmentation and the lack of cross-border consolidation of the EU banking sector is affecting its global competitiveness; whereas the profitability gap between EU and US banks has widened;

    F.  whereas a strong and diversified banking sector is key to delivering economic growth, increasing the possibility of home ownership, fostering investment and job creation, financing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and start-ups and ensuring the transition to a green and digital economy;

    G.  whereas around 80 % of external financing for EU companies comes from banks, while only 20 % comes from the capital markets; whereas only 30 % of credit for US firms comes from banks, while 70 % is funded via capital markets, including corporate bond holdings and shares;

    H.  whereas the EUR 356,1 billion in non-performing loans recorded at the 110 supervised institutions in 2024, compared with EUR 988,9 billion in non-performing loans recorded at the 102 supervised institutions in the second quarter of 2015, reflects a significant downward trajectory, leaving the total non-performing loan stock at 36 % of its 2015 level; whereas further efforts are required;

    I.  whereas in April 2024, it adopted its position on the review of the crisis management and deposit insurance framework;

    J.  whereas in April 2024, its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs adopted a report on the Commission’s proposal to establish a European deposit insurance scheme;

    K.  whereas financial institutions rely increasingly on the use of information and communications technology (ICT); whereas the digitalisation of finance provides key opportunities for the banking sector and has brought about significant technological advances in the EU banking sector through increased efficiency in the provision of banking services and a greater appetite for innovation; whereas it also poses challenges, including with regard to data protection, reputational risks, anti-money laundering and consumer protection concerns; whereas the EU banking sector must increase its cyber resilience to ensure that ICT systems can withstand various types of cyber security threats; whereas the ECB is currently studying the establishment of a digital euro;

    L.  whereas EU banks have withstood the impact of Russian aggression; whereas they play a pivotal role in ensuring the ongoing implementation of and compliance with the sanctions imposed by the EU against Russia in response to the invasion; whereas further coordination is needed to avoid circumvention of sanctions;

    M.  whereas climate change, environmental degradation and the transition to a low-carbon economy are factors to be taken into account when assessing the risks on banks’ balance sheets, as a source of risk potentially impacting investments across regions and sectors;

    General considerations

    1.  Acknowledges the progress made over the last 10 years through the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM); notes that the BU will not be completed without the establishment of its third pillar, the European deposit insurance scheme;

    2.  Asks the Commission to ensure that the completion of the BU and the Capital Markets Union remains a key priority; highlights that these projects offer households and SMEs access to broader funding, reduce the high reliance on bank credit to foster investments and job creation, increase financial stability, reduce the impact of economic downturns, support competitiveness, give additional investment opportunities, fund the transition to a green and digital economy and unlock the EU’s growth potential; notes that the Commission is requested to take into consideration the specificities of the different banking models, while preserving a level playing field;

    3.  Notes the need to be prepared for episodes of banking stress that could potentially lead to bank runs such as those witnessed in some jurisdictions outside the EU in March 2023, and the need to ensure the stability of deposits;

    4.   Points out that cyber resilience is a key element for the competitiveness of the EU banking sector, in particular taking into account the geopolitical situation and the need to preserve financial stability;

    5.  Notes that a more integrated BU would help to make the EU banking sector more resilient, improve access to credit and reduce costs; notes that better cross-border integration of banking business would increase the potential for private risk sharing and ensure diversification in the EU banking market; points out that a more integrated BU is not necessarily the same as a more consolidated banking market and that there are benefits for competition in a diversified banking market; stresses that a fully developed BU would allow EU banks to grow and put them in a better position to compete in the international arena;

    6.  Regrets that EU banks’ ability to finance major investments is constrained by lower profitability that is not sufficient to ensure their competitiveness; notes that the profitability gap as compared with other jurisdictions is due to both structural and regulatory factors and calls for a review to streamline the regulatory framework; notes that the specific character of the EU banking system, with its large number of smaller banks, calls for proportionate solutions that take this into account and are tailored to its characteristics, without undermining financial stability; remains mindful of the ‘too big to fail’ risk;

    7.  Calls on the Commission to assess the need to develop targeted frameworks within the BU to enhance access to finance for SMEs and start-ups, recognising their role as the backbone of the EU economy;

    8.  Regrets that EU banks’ cross-border activity is still rather limited, particularly with regard to granting loans; takes the view, therefore, that it is important to complete the BU in order to uphold the free movement of capital in a fully integrated internal market;

    9.  Calls on the EU banks still operating in Russia to exit the Russian market as soon as possible; calls on supervisory institutions to ensure that those banks push ahead with exiting the Russian market swiftly;

    10.  Invites the Commission to further explore whether the creation of a separate jurisdiction for EU banks with substantial cross-border operations(14) could help to complete the BU or whether this would increase banking sector fragmentation;

    11.  Notes that a review of the securitisation framework to strengthen European markets and the introduction of European Secured Notes as a dual-recourse funding instrument for SMEs for long-term financing could be explored, taking due account of financial stability risks;

    12.  Underlines that financial literacy is essential in modern economies, contributing to the resilience of the banking systems across Member States and encouraging cross-border financial activity;

    13.  Underlines that a high level of consumer protection will make the BU more resilient;

    14.  Takes the view that the Commission should focus on aspects that contribute to achieving the goals of digitalisation, modernisation, simplification, streamlining and increased competitiveness; maintains that legal certainty, security, predictability and stability are essential for EU banks to be able to operate under favourable conditions;

    15.  Notes that, in addition to traditional loans, diverse sources of financing can be beneficial for EU growth and EU competitiveness, and recognises the low-risk nature of asset-backed financing solutions;

    16.   Notes the ECB’s progress on the digital euro and the parliamentary dialogue being held with the ECB on the topic; understands existing reservations, such as with regard to its offline functionality, given that offline transactions reduce visibility and impair financial crime prevention; recalls that the digital euro should complement, not replace, cash; considers that the decision on whether or not to introduce a digital euro is ultimately a political decision that has to be taken by the EU’s co-legislators, given the profound potential impact of this decision on a wide range of EU domains, including privacy, consumer protection, financial stability, financial policy and other areas that go beyond the strict remit of monetary policy;

    17.  Regrets the failure of some financial institutions to ensure gender balance, especially in their management bodies; stresses that gender balance on boards and in the workforce brings both societal and economic returns; calls on financial institutions to regularly update their diversity and inclusion policies and help to foster healthy working cultures that prioritise inclusivity; calls on private and public entities to address the lack of diversity and gender balance in the management bodies of financial institutions;

    Supervision

    18.  Welcomes the adoption by the co-legislators of the new banking package implementing Basel III standards in the EU; notes the current lack of clarity concerning the implementation of the Basel III standards in some other jurisdictions and the potential risk for an international level playing field; stresses that the Commission should evaluate whether targeted changes could help to maintain the international competitiveness of EU banks without weakening their resilience; recalls that the delegated act on the date of application of the own funds requirements for market risk postponed the date of application of the new market risk framework by one year to 1 January 2026; calls on the Commission to assess whether the equivalence decisions taken with the jurisdictions not implementing the Basel III standards need to be reviewed in order to preserve the financial stability of the EU financial sector;

    19.  Acknowledges the growing phenomenon of bank branch closures, which contributes to the risk of ‘bank desertification’ in certain regions, with a particularly negative impact on vulnerable citizens without digital access; emphasises the critical role smaller banks play in ensuring access to essential banking services, especially in rural and remote areas, thereby supporting households, SMEs and local economies; notes that the high supervisory costs and regulatory burdens can pose significant challenges for smaller banks; underscores the need to apply the principle of proportionality in banking supervision, ensuring that the intensity of regulation is tailored to the size, risk profile and business model of institutions, while taking into account the essential territorial role of smaller banks and their specific characteristics;

    20.  Recalls that the Banking Package contains a high number of mandates to the European Banking Authority; calls on the European Banking Authority to respect these mandates;

    21.  Notes that even within the existing regulatory framework the banking sector has shown its resilience during the market events of recent years, and that the average Common Equity Tier 1 ratio has remained at high levels, at 15,81 %;

    22.  Notes that the non-performing loans ratio has remained stable at 2,30 % and the liquidity coverage ratio at 159,39 %;

    23.  Notes the varying levels of exposure to non-performing loans and recalls that there are Member States which have exposure levels in the order of 1 % or even lower, while other Member States have exposure levels exceeding 4 %; considers that efforts to reduce European banks’ exposure to this type of loan should continue as good risk management practice;

    24.  Highlights the fact that adverse macroeconomic conditions, geopolitical headwinds and the rapid development of deferred payment services may lead to a deterioration in asset quality and affect the level of non-performing loans in the future; highlights, therefore, the importance of prudent risk management and appropriate provisioning;

    25.  Notes that the current levels of banking sector profitability may provide an opportunity for an increase in macroprudential buffers and help to preserve banking sector resilience; invites the Commission to further explore this option and carefully evaluate how to revise the macroprudential framework, taking into consideration the potential impact on capital requirements and bearing in mind a level playing field with other jurisdictions;

    26.   Notes that the banking sector plays a role in supporting the transition to a digitalised and carbon neutral economy, in channelling funds to renewable energy sources and in supporting the achievement of the objectives of the EU Green Deal and the EU Climate Law;

    27.  Notes that the ECB takes account of climate- and nature-related financial risks in its supervisory practices and monitors growing physical and transition risks closely;

    28.  Welcomes the idea of increasing venture capital and unlocking capital to finance fast-growing companies in the EU; notes Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s commitment to put forward risk-absorbing measures to make it easier for commercial banks, investors and venture capital to finance fast-growing companies(15); notes that this must be done in a way that does not pose a systemic risk or moral hazard;

    29.  Welcomes the creation of the new Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism, which will allow more effective ways to combat money laundering and terrorist financing via direct supervision of certain financial entities and better cooperation, a better flow of information between national authorities and better coordination among sanctions enforcement authorities in Members States to help close gaps in the implementation of targeted sanctions;

    30.  Stresses the need to enhance the resilience of non-bank financial intermediaries, including by designing specific regulatory and supervisory tools; points out that such measures must guarantee the security of the financial system and be in the best interests of the customer; welcomes the Commission consultation on macroprudential policies for non-bank financial intermediaries; supports the Eurosystem’s recommendation to introduce system-wide stress tests to identify and quantify risks to the resilience of core markets; invites the Commission to investigate whether there are any gaps in the supervisory toolkit, including in relation to potential liquidity crunches and implications for systemic risk;

    31.  Notes that crypto-assets create new challenges and opportunities for the financial system but also pose risks to it, and that these require attention from the national supervisors, the SSM and the European Systemic Risk Board;

    Resolution

    32.  Recalls that the position adopted by Parliament in April 2024 on the crisis management and deposit insurance framework ensures a more consistent approach across all Member States to the application of resolution tools and deposit protection to enhance financial stability, taxpayer protection and depositor confidence; notes that small banks have some specificities that may warrant a proportionate approach; stresses that European and national competent authorities should have at their disposal appropriate and sufficient tools to respond effectively to bank failures and safeguard financial stability, and that banks need to operate in an effective regulatory environment that fosters their development;

    33.  Highlights the importance of preserving shareholders’ and creditors’ primary responsibility for bearing losses in the event of a bank’s failure; stresses that resorting to using taxpayers’ money must be avoided, which is still a key lesson learned from the global financial crisis; stresses that the bail-in of shareholders and creditors must remain the main source for resolution financing before any recourse is made to industry-funded sources;

    34.  Recalls that a sufficient minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) is crucial for a credible resolution framework and for ensuring that resolution authorities have sufficient flexibility to effectively apply the resolution strategies needed in a specific crisis situation; underlines that this minimum requirement should be sufficient to effectively implement any of the resolution strategies included in a bank’s resolution plan; recalls that the resolution framework should avoid undue increases in MREL calibration and disproportionate contributions to the Single Resolution Fund;

    35.  Stresses that if a bank’s eligible liabilities are issued to non-EU investors, the write-down or conversion of these liabilities should be enforceable with full certainty to safeguard the effective application of resolution tools;

    36.  Notes that any reliance on taxpayer money for the resolution of banks, including for liquidity support, should be avoided, in keeping with the principles of fiscal and social responsibility and market discipline;

    37.  Recalls that banks need to continue to meet their obligations and perform their key functions after the implementation of a resolution decision;

    38.  Recalls the importance of clarifying the role of the ECB as liquidity provider in resolution, paying due attention to appropriate guarantees and the ECB’s mandate;

    39.  Underlines the SRB’s announcement that it will enhance its capabilities for launching enforcement action to remove substantive impediments to resolvability; calls for the publication, at the end of each resolution planning cycle, of an anonymised list of identified impediments to resolvability and the actions adopted to address them;

    40.  Welcomes the ‘SRM Vision 2028’ strategic review initiated by the SRB to set its long-term goals, address new challenges and further strengthen collaboration with the national resolution authorities and other stakeholders; notes, in particular, the SRB’s intention to identify areas where sustainability can be embedded further in its daily operations and core business; highlights the need to ensure efficiency and cost-effectiveness in the implementation of the new strategy;

    41.  Welcomes the SRB plan to streamline the annual resolution planning cycle to ensure that it is increasingly efficient and has a greater focus on testing banks’ resolvability and the operationalisation of resolution strategies;

    42.  Welcomes the fact that the Single Resolution Fund has now been built up; calls for the full ratification of the Amending Agreement to the ESM Treaty by all Member States, including the establishment of a common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund;

    43.  Highlights the need for additional efforts to ensure full resolvability for all banks falling under the scope of resolution; recalls that achieving resolvability cannot be considered a ‘moving target’ and therefore calls for more standardisation and harmonisation of the resolvability assessment; recalls, nonetheless, the important role played by national resolution authorities in the assessment of resolvability;

    Deposit insurance

    44.  Underlines the fact that the Commission’s proposal to establish a European deposit insurance scheme was published back in 2015 and that the landscape has changed significantly since then;

    45.  Recalls that the position of its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on a European deposit insurance scheme was adopted in April 2024; notes that that position deviates from the Commission’s 2015 proposal and adopts a new approach; is waiting for, and encourages the Council to move forward with, the negotiations on a European deposit insurance scheme;

    46.  Notes that national deposit guarantee schemes were introduced successfully and have proved their functionality in a number of cases; underlines the need to take specific national characteristics into account and to preserve the well-functioning systems for smaller banks that are already in place in some Member States, such as institutional protection schemes, in a way that ensures a level playing field across the BU;

    o
    o   o

    47.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Central Bank, the Single Resolution Board and the European Banking Authority.

    (1) OJ C, C/2024/5706, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5706/oj.
    (2) Directive (EU) 2024/1640 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 on the mechanisms to be put in place by Member States for the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Directive(EU) 2019/1937, and amending and repealing Directive (EU) 2015/849 (OJ L, 2024/1640, 19.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1640/oj).
    (3) Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing (OJ L, 2024/1624, 19.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1624/oj).
    (4) Regulation (EU) 2024/1620 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 establishing the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) No 1094/2010 and (EU) No 1095/2010 (OJ L, 2024/1620, 19.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1620/oj).
    (5) Directive (EU) 2024/1619 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks (OJ L, 2024/1619, 19.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1619/oj).
    (6) Regulation (EU) 2024/1623 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as regards requirements for credit risk, credit valuation adjustment risk, operational risk, market risk and the output floor (OJ L, 2024/1623, 19.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1623/oj).
    (7) OJ L 2024/2795, 31.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2024/2795/oj.
    (8) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0326.
    (9) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0327.
    (10) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0328.
    (11) Véron, N., ‘Europe’s banking union at ten: unfinished yet transformative’, Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper No 24-15, June 2024.
    (12) OJ C 23, 21.1.2021, p. 105.
    (13) OJ C 494, 8.12.2021, p. 118.
    (14) Draghi report, p. 61.
    (15) Von der Leyen, Ursula, Europe’s Choice: Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, p. 11.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Ninth report on economic and social cohesion – P10_TA(2025)0098 – Thursday, 8 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union,

    –  having regard to Articles 4, 162, 174 to 178, and 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy(1) (Common Provisions Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on the European Regional Development Fund and on the Cohesion Fund(2),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1059 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on specific provisions for the European territorial cooperation goal (Interreg) supported by the European Regional Development Fund and external financing instruments(3),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013(4),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1056 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the Just Transition Fund(5),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013(6),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/460 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 March 2020 amending Regulations (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) No 508/2014 as regards specific measures to mobilise investments in the healthcare systems of Member States and in other sectors of their economies in response to the COVID-19 outbreak (Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative)(7),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/558 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2020 amending Regulations (EU) No 1301/2013 and (EU) No 1303/2013 as regards specific measures to provide exceptional flexibility for the use of the European Structural and Investments Funds in response to the COVID-19 outbreak(8),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/461 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 March 2020 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 in order to provide financial assistance to Member States and to countries negotiating their accession to the Union that are seriously affected by a major public health emergency(9),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/2221 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 December 2020 amending Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 as regards additional resources and implementing arrangements to provide assistance for fostering crisis repair in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and its social consequences and for preparing a green, digital and resilient recovery of the economy (REACT-EU)(10),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/562 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 April 2022 amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) No 223/2014 as regards Cohesion’s Action for Refugees in Europe (CARE)(11),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/2039 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) 2021/1060 as regards additional flexibility to address the consequences of the military aggression of the Russian Federation FAST (Flexible Assistance for Territories) – CARE(12),

    –  having regard to the URBACT programme for sustainable urban cooperation, established in 2002,

    –  having regard to the Urban Agenda for the EU of 30 May 2016,

    –  having regard to the Territorial Agenda 2030 of 1 December 2020,

    –  having regard to the 9th Cohesion Report, published by the Commission on 27 March 2024(13), and the Commission communication of 27 March 2024 on the 9th Cohesion Report (COM(2024)0149),

    –  having regard to the study entitled ‘The future of EU cohesion: Scenarios and their impacts on regional inequalities’, published by the European Parliamentary Research Service in December 2024,

    –  having regard to the Commission report of February 2024 entitled ‘Forging a sustainable future together – Cohesion for a competitive and inclusive Europe’(14),

    –  having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 31 May 2024 on the 9th Cohesion Report(15),

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 21 November 2024 entitled ‘A renewed Cohesion Policy post 2027 that leaves no one behind – CoR responses to the 9th Cohesion Report and the Report of the Group of High-Level Specialists on the Future of Cohesion Policy’,

    –  having regard to the report entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness – A competitiveness strategy for Europe’, published by the Commission on 9 September 2024,

    –  having regard to the agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

    –  having regard to the study entitled ‘Streamlining EU Cohesion Funds: addressing administrative burdens and redundancy’, published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union in November 2024(16),

    –  having regard to a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 May 2025 on the Border Regions’ Instrument for Development and Growth in the EU (BRIDGEforEU)(17),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 3 May 2022 entitled ‘Putting people first, securing sustainable and inclusive growth, unlocking the potential of the EU’s outermost regions’ (COM(2022)0198),

    –  having regard to the opinion in the form of a letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development(18),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on cohesion policy and regional environment strategies in the fight against climate change(19),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 20 May 2021 on reversing demographic trends in EU regions using cohesion policy instruments(20),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 14 September 2021 entitled ‘Towards a stronger partnership with the EU outermost regions(21),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on economic, social and territorial cohesion in the EU: the 8th Cohesion Report(22),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 21 November 2023 on possibilities to increase the reliability of audits and controls by national authorities in shared management(23),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2023 on harnessing talent in Europe’s regions(24),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2024 entitled ‘Cohesion policy 2014-2020 – implementation and outcomes in the Member States(25),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Regional Development (A10-0066/2025),

    A.  whereas cohesion policy is at the heart of EU policies and is the EU’s main tool for investments in sustainable economic, social and territorial development, and contributing to the Green Deal objectives, across the EU under its multiannual financial frameworks for the periods of 2014-2020 and 2021-2027; whereas cohesion policy, as mandated by the Treaties, is fundamental for a well-functioning and thriving internal market by promoting the development of all regions in the EU, and especially the less developed ones;

    B.  whereas cohesion policy has fostered economic, social and territorial convergence in the EU, notably by increasing the gross domestic products, for example, of central and eastern EU Member States, which went from 43 % of the EU average in 1995 to around 80 % in 2023; whereas the 9th Cohesion Report highlights that, by the end of 2022, cohesion policy supported over 4,4 million businesses, creating more than 370 000 jobs in these companies; whereas it also underlines that cohesion policy generates a significant return on investment, and that each euro invested in the 2014–2020 and 2021–2027 programmes will have generated 1,3 euros of additional GDP in the Union by 2030; whereas cohesion policy constituted, on average, around 13 % of total public investment in the EU(26);

    C.  whereas the Commission report entitled ‘The long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas: key achievements and ways forward’, presented alongside the ninth Cohesion Report, underlines that EUR 24,6 billion, or 8 % of the rural development pillar of the common agricultural policy, is directed towards investments in rural areas beyond farming investments, setting the scene for a debate on the future of rural areas;

    D.  whereas between 2021 and 2027, cohesion policy will have invested over EUR 140 billion in the green and digital transitions(27), to help improve networks and infrastructure, support nature conservation, improve green and digital skills and foster job creation and services for the public;

    E.  whereas despite the widely acknowledged and proven positive impact of cohesion policy on social, economic and territorial convergence, significant challenges remain, marked notably by development disparities at sub-national level, within regions and in regions caught in a development trap, and by the impact of climate change, in terms of demography, the digital and green transitions, and connectivity, but also in terms of sustainable economic development, in particular in least developed regions and rural and remote areas;

    F.  whereas cohesion policy and sectoral programmes of the EU have repeatedly and efficiently helped regions to respond effectively to emergencies and asymmetric shocks such as the COVID-19 crisis, Brexit, the energy crisis and the refugee crisis caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as well as natural disasters, even though it is a long-term, structural policy and not a crisis management instrument or the ‘go-to’ emergency response funding mechanism; whereas such crises have delayed the implementation of the European Structural and Investment Funds and whereas a considerable number of projects financed with Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) funds have been taken for the most part from projects that had been slated for investment under cohesion policy;

    G.  whereas despite measures already taken for the 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 periods, the regulatory framework governing the use and administration of cohesion policy instruments and funds should be further simplified and interoperable digital tools better used and developed, including the establishment of one-stop digitalised service centres, with the objective of streamlining procedures, enhancing stakeholder trust, reducing the administrative burden, increasing flexibility in fund management and speeding up payments, not only for the relevant authorities but also for the final beneficiaries; whereas it is necessary to increase the scope for using funds more flexibly, including the possibility of financing the development of dual-use products; whereas it is of utmost importance to formulate any future cohesion policy with a strategic impetus throughout the funding period, which could, however, be reassessed at midterm;

    H.  whereas the low absorption rate of the 2021-2027 cohesion policy funds, currently at just 6 %, is not because of a lack of need from Member States or regions, but rather stems from delays in the approval of operational programmes, the transition period between financial frameworks, the prioritisation of NextGenerationEU by national managing authorities, limited administrative capacity and complex bureaucratic procedures; whereas Member States and regions may not rush to absorb all available funds as they anticipate a possible extension under the N+2 or N+3 rules;

    I.  whereas radical modifications to the cohesion regulatory framework, from one programming period to the next, contribute to generating insecurity among the authorities responsible and beneficiaries, gold-plating legislation, increasing error rates (and the accompanying negative reputational and financial consequences), delays in implementation and, ultimately, disaffection among beneficiaries and the general population;

    J.  whereas there is sometimes competition between cohesion funds, emergency funds and sectoral policies;

    K.  whereas demographic changes vary significantly across EU regions, with the populations of some Member States facing a projected decline in the coming years and others projected to grow; whereas demographic changes also take place between regions, including movement away from outermost regions, but are generally observed as movement from rural to urban areas within Member States, wherein women are leaving rural areas in greater numbers than men, but also to metropolitan areas, where villages around big cities encounter difficulties in investing in basic infrastructure; whereas the provision of essential services such as healthcare, education and transportation must be reinforced in all regions, with a particular focus on rural and remote areas; whereas a stronger focus is needed on areas suffering from depopulation and inadequate services, requiring targeted measures to encourage young people to remain through entrepreneurship projects, high-quality agriculture and sustainable tourism;

    L.  whereas taking account of the ageing population is crucial in order to ensure justice among the generations and thereby to strengthen participation, especially among young people;

    M.  whereas urban areas are burdened by new challenges resulting from the population influx to cities, as well as rising housing and energy prices, requiring the necessary housing development, new environmental protection and energy-saving measures, such as accelerated deep renovation to combat energy poverty and promote energy efficiency; whereas the EU cohesion policy should help to contribute to an affordable and accessible housing market for all people in the EU, especially for low- and middle-income households, urban residents, families with children, women and young people;

    N.  whereas effective implementation of the Urban Agenda for the EU can enhance the capacity of cities to contribute to cohesion objectives, thereby improving the quality of life of citizens and guaranteeing a more efficient use of the EU’s financial resources;

    O.  whereas particular attention needs to be paid to rural areas, as well as areas affected by industrial transition and EU regions that suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps, brain drain, climate-related risks and water scarcity, such as the outermost regions, and in particular islands located at their peripheries or at the periphery of the EU, sparsely populated regions, islands, mountainous areas and cross-border regions, as well as coastal and maritime regions;

    P.  whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has created a new geopolitical reality that has had a strong impact on the employment, economic development and opportunities, and general well-being of the population living in regions bordering Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, as well as candidate countries such as Ukraine and Moldova, which therefore require special attention and support, including by accordingly adapting cohesion policy; whereas this war has led to an unprecedented number of people seeking shelter in the EU, placing an additional burden on local communities and services; whereas the collective security of the EU is strongly dependent on the vitality and well-being of regions situated at the EU’s external borders;

    Q.  whereas the unique situation of Northern Ireland requires a bespoke approach building on the benefits of PEACE programmes examining how wider cohesion policy can benefit the process of reconciliation;

    R.  whereas 79 % of citizens who are aware of EU-funded projects under cohesion policy believe that EU-funded projects have a positive impact on the regions(28), which contributes to a pro-EU attitude;

    S.  whereas overall awareness of EU-funded projects under cohesion policy has decreased by 2 percentage points since 2021(29), meaning that greater decentralisation should be pursued to bring cohesion policy even closer to the citizen;

    1.  Insists that the regional and local focus, place-based approach and strategic planning of cohesion policy, as well as its decentralised programming and implementation model based on the partnership principle with strengthened implementation of the European code of conduct, the involvement of economic and civil society actors, and multi-level governance, are key and positive elements of the policy, and determine its effectiveness; is firmly convinced that this model of cohesion policy should be continued in all regions and deepened where possible as the EU’s main long-term investment instrument for reducing disparities, ensuring economic, social and territorial cohesion, and stimulating regional and local sustainable growth in line with EU strategies, protecting the environment, and as a key contributor to EU competitiveness and just transition, as well as helping to cope with new challenges ahead;

    2.  Calls for a clear demarcation between cohesion policy and other instruments, in order to avoid overlaps and competition between EU instruments, ensure complementarity of the various interventions and increase visibility and readability of EU support; in this context, notes that the RRF funds are committed to economic development and growth, without specifically focusing on economic, social and territorial cohesion between regions; is concerned about the Commission’s plans to apply a performance-based approach to the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF); acknowledges that performance-based mechanisms can be instrumental in making the policy more efficient and results-orientated, but cautions against a one-size-fits-all imposition of the model and expresses serious doubt about ideas to link the disbursement of ESIF to the fulfilment of centrally defined reform goals, even more so if the reform goals do not fall within the scope of competence of the regional level;

    3.  Is opposed to any form of top-down centralisation reform of EU funding programmes, including those under shared management, such as the cohesion policy and the common agricultural policy, and advocates for greater decentralisation of decision-making to the local and regional levels; calls for enhanced involvement of local and regional authorities and economic and civil society actors at every stage of EU shared management programmes, from preparation and programming to implementation, delivery and evaluation, keeping in mind that the economic and social development of, and territorial cohesion between, regions can only be accomplished on the basis of good cooperation between all actors;

    4.  Emphasises that the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) plays a key role, alongside cohesion policy funds, in supporting rural areas; stresses that the EAFRD’s design must align with the rules of cohesion policy funds to boost synergies and facilitate multi-funded rural development projects;

    5.  Is convinced that cohesion policy can only continue to play its role if it has solid funding; underlines that this implies that future cohesion policy must be provided with robust funding for the post-2027 financial period; stresses that it is necessary to provide funding that is ambitious enough and easily accessible to allow cohesion policy to continue to fulfil its role as the EU’s main investment policy, while retaining the flexibility to meet potential new challenges, including the possibility of financing the development of dual-use products, and to enable local authorities, stakeholders and beneficiaries to effectively foster local development; is of the firm opinion that the capacity to offer flexible responses to unpredictable challenges should not come at the expense of the clear long-term strategic focus and objectives of cohesion policy;

    6.  Underlines the importance of the next EU multiannual financial framework (MFF) and the mid-term review of cohesion policy programmes 2021-2027 in shaping the future of cohesion policy; reiterates the need for a more ambitious post-2027 cohesion policy in the next MFF 2028-2034; calls, therefore, for the upcoming MFF to ensure that cohesion policy continues to receive at least the same level of funding as in the current period in real terms; furthermore calls for cohesion policy to remain a separate heading in the new MFF; stresses that cohesion policy should be protected from statistical effects that may alter the eligibility of regions by changing the average EU GDP; reiterates the need for new EU own resources;

    7.  Proposes, therefore, that next MFF be more responsive to unforeseen needs, including with sufficient margins and flexibilities from the outset; emphasises in this regard, however, that cohesion policy is not a crisis instrument and that it should not deviate from its main objectives, namely from its long-term investment nature; calls for the European Union Solidarity Fund to be strengthened, including in its pre-financing, making it less bureaucratic and more easily accessible, in order to develop an appropriate instrument capable of responding adequately to the economic, social and territorial consequences of future natural disasters or health emergencies; emphasises the need for Parliament to have adequate control over any emergency funds and instruments;

    8.  Recognises the need to also use nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) 3 classification for specific cases, in a manner that recognises that inequalities in development exist within all NUTS 2 regions; is of the opinion that regional GDP per capita must remain the main criterion for determining Member States’ allocations under cohesion policy; welcomes the fact that, following Parliament’s persistent calls, the Commission has begun considering additional criteria(30) such as greenhouse gas emissions, population density, education levels and unemployment rates, in order to provide a better socio-economic overview of the regions;

    9.  Stresses that the rule of law conditionality is an overarching conditionality, recognising and enforcing respect for the rule of law, also as an enabling condition for cohesion policy funding, to ensure that Union resources are used in a transparent, fair and responsible manner with sound financial management; considers it necessary to reinforce respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights, and to ensure that all actions are consistent with supporting democratic principles, gender equality and human rights, including workers’ rights, the rights of disabled people and children’s rights, in the implementation of cohesion policy; highlights the important role of the European Anti-Fraud Office and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office in protecting the financial interests of the Union;

    10.  Calls for further efforts to simplify, make more flexible, strengthen synergies and streamline the rules and administrative procedures governing cohesion policy funds at EU, national and regional level, taking full advantage of the technologies available to increase accessibility and efficiency, building on the existing and well-established shared management framework, in order to strengthen confidence among users, thus encouraging the participation of a broader range of economic and civil society actors in projects supported and maximising the funds’ impact; calls for further initiatives enabling better absorption of cohesion funds, including increased co-financing levels, higher pre-financing and faster investment reimbursements; calls for local administration, in particular representing smaller communities, to be technically trained for better administrative management of the funds; stresses, therefore, the importance of strengthening the single audit principle, further expanding simplified cost options and reducing duplicating controls and audits that overlap with national and regional oversight for the same project and beneficiary, with a view to eliminating the possibility of repeating errors in subsequent years of implementation;

    11.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to give regions greater flexibility already at the programming stage, in order to cater for their particular needs and specificities, emphasising the need to involve the economic and civil society actors; underlines that thematic concentration was a key element in aligning cohesion policy with Europe 2020 objectives; asks the Commission, therefore, to present all findings related to the implementation of thematic concentration and to draw lessons for future legislative proposals;

    12.  Acknowledges that the green, digital and demographic transitions present significant challenges but, at the same time, opportunities to achieve the objective of economic, social and territorial cohesion; recognises that, statistically, high-income areas can hide the economic problems within a region; is aware of the risk of a widening of regional disparities, a deepening of social inequalities and a rising ‘geography of discontent’ related to the transition process; underlines the need to reach the EU’s sustainability and climate objectives, and to maintain shared economic growth by strengthening the Union’s competitiveness; calls, therefore, for a European strategy that guarantees harmonious growth within the Union, meeting the respective regions’ specific needs; reaffirms its commitment to pursuing the green and digital transitions, as this will create opportunities to improve the EU’s competitiveness; underlines the need to invest in infrastructure projects that enhance connectivity, particularly in sustainable, intelligent transport, and in energy and digital networks, ensuring that all regions, including remote and less-developed ones, are fully integrated into the single market and benefit equitably from the opportunities it provides; emphasises, in this context, the need to support the development of green industries, fostering local specificities and traditions to increase the resilience of the economic environment and civil society to future challenges;

    13.  Urges that the cohesion policy remain consistent with a push towards increasing innovation and completing the EU single market, in line with the conclusions of the Draghi report on European competitiveness; underlines, in the context of regional disparities, the problem of the persisting innovation divide and advocates for a tailored, place-based approach to fostering innovation and economic convergence across regions and reducing the innovation gap; calls for a stronger role for local and regional innovation in building competitive research and innovation ecosystems and promoting territorial cohesion; points to new EU initiatives, such as regional innovation valleys and partnerships for regional innovation, that aim to connect territories with different levels of innovation performance and tackle the innovation gap; considers that this approach will reinforce regional autonomy, allowing local and regional authorities to shape EU policies and objectives in line with their specific needs, characteristics and capacities, while safeguarding the partnership principle;

    14.  Is convinced that cohesion policy needs to continue to foster the principle of just transition, addressing the specific needs of regions, while leaving no territory and no one behind; calls for continued financing of the just transition process, with the Just Transition Fund being fully integrated into the Common Provisions Regulation and endowed with reinforced financial means for the post-2027 programming period; emphasises, nonetheless, the need to assess the impact of the Just Transition Fund on the transformation of eligible regions and, while ensuring it remains part of cohesion policy, refine its approach in the new MFF on the basis of the findings and concrete measures to ensure the economic and social well-being of affected communities;

    15.  Underlines the need to improve the relationship between cohesion policy and EU economic governance, while avoiding a punitive approach; stresses that the European Semester should comply with cohesion policy objectives under Articles 174 and 175 TFEU; calls for the participation of the regions in the fulfilment of these objectives and for a stronger territorial approach; calls for a process of reflection on the concept of macroeconomic conditionality and for the possibility to be explored of replacing this concept with new forms of conditionality to better reflect the new challenges ahead;

    16.  Is concerned about the growing number of regions in a development trap, which are stagnating economically and are suffering from sharp demographic decline and limited access to essential services; calls, therefore, for an upward adjustment in co-financing for projects aimed at strengthening essential services; stresses the role of cohesion policy instruments in supporting different regions and local areas that are coping with demographic evolution affecting people’s effective right to stay, including, among others, challenges related to depopulation, ageing, gender imbalances, brain drain, skills shortages and workforce imbalances across regions; recognises the need for targeted economic incentives and structural interventions to counteract these phenomena; in this context, calls for the implementation of targeted programmes to attract, develop and retain talent, particularly in regions experiencing significant outflows of skilled workers, by fostering education, culture, entrepreneurship and innovation ecosystems that align with local and regional economic needs and opportunities;

    17.  Recognises the importance of supporting and financing specific solutions for regions with long-standing and serious economic difficulties or severe permanent natural and demographic handicaps; reiterates the need for maintaining and improving the provision of quality essential services (such as education and healthcare), transport and digital connectivity of these regions, fostering their economic diversification and job creation, and helping them respond to challenges such as rural desertification, population ageing, poverty, depopulation, loneliness and isolation, as well as the lack of opportunities for vulnerable people such as persons with disabilities; underlines the need to prioritise the development and adequate funding of strategic sectors, such as renewable energy, sustainable tourism, digital innovation and infrastructure, in a manner that is tailored to the economic potential and resources of each region, in order to create broader conditions for endogenous growth and balanced development across all regions, especially rural, remote and less-developed areas, border regions, islands and outermost regions; recalls the importance of strong rural-urban linkages and particular support for women in rural areas;

    18.  Emphasises the need for a tailored approach for the outermost regions, as defined under Article 349 TFEU, which face unique and cumulative structural challenges due to their remoteness, small market size, vulnerability to climate change and economic dependencies; underlines that these permanent constraints, including the small size of the domestic economy, great distance from the European continent, location near third countries, double insularity for most of them, and limited diversification of the productive sector, result in additional costs and reduced competitiveness, making their adaptation to the green and digital transition particularly complex and costly; underlines their great potential to further develop, inter alia through improved regional connectivity, key sectors such as blue economy, sustainable agriculture, renewable energies, space activities, research or eco-tourism; reiterates its long-standing call on the Commission to duly consider the impact of all newly proposed legislation on the outermost regions, with a view to avoiding disproportionate regulatory burdens and adverse effects on these regions’ economies;

    19.  Underlines the fact that towns, cities and metropolitan areas have challenges of their own, such as considerable pockets of poverty, housing problems, traffic congestion and poor air quality, generating challenges for social and economic cohesion created by inharmonious territorial development; emphasises the need for a specific agenda for cities and calls for deepening their links with functional urban areas, encompassing smaller cities and towns, to ensure that economic and social benefits are spread more evenly across the entire territory; highlights the need to strengthen coordination between the initiatives of the Urban Agenda for the EU and the instruments of cohesion policy, favouring an integrated approach that takes into account territorial specificities and emerging challenges; calls, furthermore, for more direct access to EU funding for regional and local authorities, as well as cities and urban authorities, by inter alia widening the use of integrated territorial investments (ITI);

    20.  Stresses the need to continue and strengthen investments in affordable housing within the cohesion policy framework, recognising its significance for both regions and cities; highlights the need to foster its changes relevant to investing in housing beyond the two current possibilities (energy efficiency and social housing); emphasises the important role that cohesion policy plays in the roll-out and coordination of these initiatives; believes, furthermore, that it is important to include housing affordability in the URBACT initiative;

    21.  Stresses the strategic importance of strong external border regions for the security and resilience of the EU; calls on the Commission to support the Member States and regions affected by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular the regions on the EU’s eastern border, by revising the Guidelines on regional State aid(31), through tailor-made tools and investments under the cohesion policy, as well as supporting them to make the most of the possibilities offered by the cohesion policy funds, including Interreg, in a flexible way, to help cope with the detrimental socio-economic impact of the war on their populations and territories; calls, furthermore, for support to be given to regions bordering candidate countries such as Ukraine and Moldova to strengthen connections and promote their EU integration;

    22.  Highlights the added value of territorial cooperation in general and cross-border cooperation in particular; underlines the importance of Interreg for cross-border regions, including outermost regions; emphasises its important role in contributing to their development and overcoming cross-border obstacles, including building trust across borders, developing transport links, identifying and reducing legal and administrative obstacles and increasing the provision and use of cross-border public services, among others; considers Interreg as the main EU instrument for tackling the persistent cross-border obstacles faced by emergency services, and proposes that there be a more prominent focus on these services; underlines the fact that cross-border areas, including areas at the EU’s external borders, bordering aggressor countries often face specific challenges; believes that EU border regions, facing multiple challenges, must be supported and is of the opinion that they must be provided with increased means; welcomes the new regulation on BRIDGEforEU; emphasises the importance of small-scale and cross-border projects and stresses the need for effective implementation on the ground; calls on the Commission to encourage Member States to actively support awareness-raising campaigns in bordering regions to maximise the impact of cross-border cooperation;

    23.  Recalls the need to ‘support cohesion’, rather than just rely on the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle, which means that no action should hamper the convergence process or contribute to regional disparities; calls for a stronger integration of these principles as cross-cutting in all EU policies, to ensure that they support the objectives of social, economic and territorial cohesion, as set out in Articles 3 and 174 TFEU; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to issue specific guidelines on how to implement and enforce these principles across EU policies, paying particular attention to the impact of EU laws on the competitiveness of less developed regions; reiterates that new legislative proposals need to take due account of local and regional realities; suggests that the Commission draw on innovative tools such as RegHUB (the network of regional hubs) to collect data on the impact of EU policies on the regions; to this end, underlines the need to strengthen the territorial impact assessment of EU legislation, with a simultaneous strengthening of the territorial aspects of other relevant policies; insists that promoting cohesion should also be seen as a way of fostering solidarity and mutual support among Member States and their regions; calls on the Commission and the Member States to continue their efforts regarding communication and visibility of the benefits of cohesion policy, demonstrating to citizens the EU’s tangible impact and serving as a key tool in addressing Euroscepticism; welcomes the launch of the multilingual version of the Kohesio platform;

    24.  Notes with concern the severe decline in recent years of adequate levels of national funding by Member States towards their poorer regions; recalls the importance of respecting the EU rule on additionality; calls on the Commission to ensure that national authorities take due account of internal cohesion in drafting and implementing structural and investment fund projects;

    25.  Insists that, in addition to adjusting to regional needs, cohesion policy must be adapted to the smallest scale, i.e. funds must be accessible to the smallest projects and project bearers; points out that their initiatives are often the most innovative and have a significant impact on rural development; reiterates that these funds should be accessible to all, regardless of their size or scope; approves of the Cohesion Alliance’s call for ‘a post-2027 Cohesion Policy that leaves no one behind’;

    26.  Stresses that delays in the MFF negotiations, together with the fact that Member States have placed a greater focus on the programming of the RRF funds, led to considerable delays in the programming period 2021-2027; stresses the importance of a timely agreement in the next framework, and therefore calls for the Common Provisions Regulation (CPR) and the budget negotiations to be finalised at least one year before the start of the new funding period so that Member States can develop their national and regional funding strategies in good time to ensure a successful transition to the next funding period and the continuation of existing ESIF projects;

    27.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Economic and Social Committee, the European Committee of the Regions and the national and regional parliaments of the Member States.

    (1) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj.
    (2) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 60, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1058/oj.
    (3) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 94, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1059/oj.
    (4) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1057/oj.
    (5) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1056/oj.
    (6) OJ L 435, 6.12.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2115/oj.
    (7) OJ L 99, 31.3.2020, p. 5, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/460/oj.
    (8) OJ L 130, 24.4.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/558/oj.
    (9) OJ L 99, 31.3.2020, p. 9, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/461/oj.
    (10) OJ L 437, 28.12.2020, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2221/oj.
    (11) OJ L 109, 8.4.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/562/oj.
    (12) OJ L 275, 25.10.2022, p. 23, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2039/oj.
    (13) European Commission: Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy, Ninth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion, 2024.
    (14) European Commission: Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy, Forging a sustainable future together: Cohesion for a competitive and inclusive Europe – Report of the High-Level Group on the Future of Cohesion Policy, February 2024.
    (15) OJ C, C/2024/4668, 9.8.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4668/oj.
    (16) European Parliament: Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Streamlining EU Cohesion funds – addressing administrative burdens and redundancy, 2024.
    (17) Not yet published in the Official Journal.
    (18) Not yet published in the Official Journal.
    (19) OJ C 494, 8.12.2021, p. 26.
    (20) OJ C 15, 12.1.2022, p. 125.
    (21) OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 18.
    (22) OJ C 125, 5.4.2023, p. 100.
    (23) OJ C, C/2024/4207, 24.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4207/oj.
    (24) OJ C, C/2024/4225, 24.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4225/oj.
    (25) OJ C, C/2024/6562, 12.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6562/oj.
    (26) European Commission, Ninth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion, op.cit.
    (27) European Commission: Ninth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion, op. cit.
    (28) European Commission: Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy and Directorate-General for Communication, Citizens’ awareness and perceptions of EU Regional Policy, Flash Eurobarometer 531, 2023.
    (29) Flash Eurobarometer 531, op. cit.
    (30) European Court of Auditors, Rapid case review – Allocation of Cohesion policy funding to Member States for 2021-2027, March 2019.
    (31) Commission communication of 29 April 2021 entitled ‘Guidelines on regional State aid’ (OJ C 153, 29.4.2021, p. 1).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – The European Water Resilience Strategy – P10_TA(2025)0091 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Article 191 thereof,

    –  having regard to the Agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

    –  having regard to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), with particular emphasis on the SDG 6 on clean water and sanitation,

    –  having regard to the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, adopted in December 2022,

    –  having regard to the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants of 22 May 2001,

    –  having regard to the precautionary principle and the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should, as a priority, be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay, as enshrined in Article 191(2) TFEU,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (European Climate Law)(1),

    –  having regard to Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy(2) (Water Framework Directive),

    –  having regard to Directive 2006/118/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on the protection of groundwater against pollution and deterioration(3) (Groundwater Directive),

    –  having regard to Directive 2008/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on environmental quality standards in the field of water policy, amending and subsequently repealing Council Directives 82/176/EEC, 83/513/EEC, 84/156/EEC, 84/491/EEC, 86/280/EEC and amending Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(4) (Environmental Quality Standards Directive),

    –  having regard to Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on the assessment and management of flood risks(5),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2020/2184 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on the quality of water intended for human consumption(6) (Drinking Water Directive),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/741 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 2020 on minimum requirements for water reuse(7) (Water Reuse Regulation),

    –  having regard to Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive)(8),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/3019 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 concerning urban wastewater treatment(9) (revised Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1785 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 amending Directive 2010/75/EU on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) and Council Directive 1999/31/EC on the landfill of waste(10),

    –  having regard to Council Directive 91/676/EEC of 12 December 1991 concerning the protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources(11),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1991 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2024 on nature restoration and amending Regulation (EU) 2022/869(12),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC(13) (Critical Entities Resilience Directive),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council on 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive)(14),

    –  having regard to Directive 2009/128/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 establishing a framework for Community action to achieve the sustainable use of pesticides(15),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013(16),

    –  having regard to Commission Regulation (EU) 2024/3190 of 19 December 2024 on the use of bisphenol A (BPA) and other bisphenols and bisphenol derivatives with harmonised classification for specific hazardous properties in certain materials and articles intended to come into contact with food, amending Regulation (EU) No 10/2011 and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/213(17),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 19 February 2021 entitled ‘A Vision for Agriculture and Food’ (COM(2025)0075),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 12 May 2021 entitled ‘Pathway to a Healthy Planet for All – EU Action Plan: ‘Towards Zero Pollution for Air, Water and Soil’’ (COM(2021)0400),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 24 February 2021 entitled ‘Forging a climate-resilient Europe – the new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change’ (COM(2021)0082),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 18 July 2007 on addressing the challenge of water scarcity and droughts in the European Union (COM(2007)0414),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 11 March 2020 entitled ‘A new Circular Economy Action Plan: For a cleaner and more competitive Europe’ (COM(2020)0098),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 14 November 2012 entitled ‘A Blueprint to Safeguard Europe’s Water Resources’ (COM(2012)0673),

    –  having regard to the EU biodiversity strategy for 2030,

    –  having regard to the COP29 Declaration on Water for Climate Action, endorsed by the European Union,

    –  having regard to the European Oceans Pact announced by Commission President von der Leyen in her political guidelines for the next European Commission (2024-2029) on 18 July 2024,

    –  having regard to the European climate adaptation plan and the European water resilience strategy announced by Commission President von der Leyen in her political guidelines for the next European Commission (2024-2029) on 18 July 2024,

    –  having regard to the EU’s 8th environment action programme,

    –  having regards to its resolution of 5 October 2022 entitled ‘Access to water as a human right – the external dimension’(18),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 19 September 2024 on the devastating floods in central and eastern Europe, the loss of lives and the EU’s preparedness to act on such disasters exacerbated by climate change(19),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 6 October 2022 on momentum for the ocean: strengthening ocean governance and biodiversity(20),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 28 November 2019 on the climate and environment emergency(21),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 14 November 2024 on the UN climate change conference in Baku, Azerbaijan (COP29)(22),

    –  having regard to the Commission report of 4 February 2025 on the implementation of the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) and the Floods Directive (2007/60/EC) entitled ‘Third river basin management plans – Second flood risk management plans’ (COM(2025)0002),

    –  having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 15/2024 of 16 October 2024 entitled ‘Climate adaptation in the EU – action not keeping up with ambition’,

    –  having regard to former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö’s report of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s civil and military preparedness and readiness’,

    –  having regard to Enrico Letta’s report of April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on the implementation of the EU water legislation(23),

    –  having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 33/2018 of 18 December 2018 entitled ‘Combating desertification in the EU: a growing threat in need of more action,

    –  having regard to the European citizens’ initiative (ECI) on the right to water,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 8 September 2015 on the follow-up to the European Citizens’ Initiative Right2Water(24),

    –  having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 64/292 of 28 July 2010, which recognises the human right to water and sanitation,

    –  having regard to the Strategic Dialogue on the future of EU agriculture,

    –  having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 20/2024 of 30 September 2024 entitled ‘Common Agricultural Policy Plans – Greener, but not matching the EU’s ambitions for the climate and the environment’,

    –  having regard to European Environment Agency report 07/2024 of 15 October 2024 entitled ‘Europe’s state of water 2024: the need for improved water resilience’ (EEA Report 07/2024),

    –  having regard to the Environment Council conclusions of 17 June 2024 on the 8th environment action programme,

    –  having regard to European Court of Auditors special report 20/2021 of 28 September 2021 entitled ‘Sustainable water use in agriculture: CAP funds more likely to promote greater rather than more efficient water use’,

    –  having regard to the European Economic and Social Committee declaration of 26 October 2023 for an EU Blue Deal,

    –  having regard to the Commission proposal of 5 July 2023 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Soil Monitoring and Resilience (Soil Monitoring Law) (COM(2023)0416),

    –  having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2000/60/EC establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, Directive 2006/118/EC on the protection of groundwater against pollution and deterioration and Directive 2008/105/EC on environmental quality standards in the field of water policy(25),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety (A10-0073/2025),

    A.  whereas water is essential for life and humanity; whereas the EU has to manage current and future water resources efficiently and respond effectively to the current water challenges, as they directly affect human health, the environment and its ecosystems, strategic socio-economic activities such as energy production, agriculture and food security, and the EU’s competitiveness;

    B.  whereas water is a scarce and limited resource and, while 70 % of the earth’s surface is water-covered, available and usable fresh water accounts for only 0,5 % of water on earth(26); whereas mountains are real water towers and important freshwater reservoirs in Europe, the Alps alone providing 40 % of Europe’s fresh water(27);

    C.  whereas groundwater supplies two thirds of the EU’s drinking water and supports many ecosystems(28); whereas the services provided by freshwater ecosystems are worth over EUR 11 trillion in Europe, and provide considerable health and recreational benefits, such as from angling(29);

    D.  whereas water stress is already occurring in Europe, affecting approximately 20 % of Europe’s territory and 30 % of the population on average every year, figures that are likely to increase in the future on account of climate change(30), despite the fact that total water abstraction at the EU-27 level appeared to decrease by 15 % between 2000 and 2019; whereas the increase in the number and recurrence of extreme weather events such as droughts and floods, and the fact that they are expected to become yet more frequent in the near future, poses a risk to human life and the EU’s food sovereignty and could lead to regions in Europe becoming uninhabitable;

    E.  whereas 78 % of Europeans consider that the EU should propose additional measures to address water-related issues in Europe and 21 % of Europeans consider pollution to be the main threat linked to water in their country(31);

    F.  whereas the human right to water and sanitation was recognised as a human right in a resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on 28 July 2010;

    G.  whereas the European Citizens’ Initiative Right2Water was the first ever to gather the required number of signatories, calling for the EU to ensure the right to water for all;

    H.  whereas the provisions of Article 14 TFEU and Protocol No 26 thereto on Services of General Interest are key elements to be prominently taken into account in all aspects of the design and implementation of the European water resilience strategy (EWRS), thus safeguarding the status of Europe’s water services as essential public services, and ensuring accessibility, equity, affordability and the maintenance of high quality standards;

    I.  whereas the Member States should follow up on the recommendations of the Commission report of November 2023(32) in order to improve water balances as the knowledge basis for making decisions about water allocation;

    J.  whereas substantive corporate value may be at risk owing to worsening water insecurity, with a decrease in the capacity of production or its complete halt as a consequence; whereas assets in water-stressed regions could become stranded, temporarily or permanently, if assumptions made about water availability and access prove inaccurate, if regulatory responses are unanticipated or if risk mitigation and stewardship plans are not put in place(33);

    K.  whereas the deadline set by the Water Framework Directive (WFD) for European rivers, lakes, transitional waters, coastal waters and groundwaters to achieve ‘good’ status was 2015, with a possible postponement to 2027 under certain conditions; whereas the objective of achieving good chemical status for all EU water bodies by 2027 remains far from being achieved, primarily due to substances such as mercury, brominated flame retardants and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons(34);

    L.  whereas the 2025 report on the implementation of the WFD shows that delays in meeting the WFD’s targets are not due to a deficiency in the legislation but to a lack of funding, slow implementation and insufficient integration of environmental objectives into sectoral policies; whereas analysis has shown that the Member States are not meeting the annual investment needs, which are estimated to be EUR 77 billion, with a financing gap currently estimated at around EUR 25 billion a year; whereas the report also shows the clear need for the Member States to increase their level of ambition and accelerate action to reduce the compliance gap as much as possible before 2027, to increase investment and ensure adequate financing, including via EU funds, to achieve the objectives of their programmes of measures, as well as to put in place additional measures to reduce current persistent environmental challenges to and improve transboundary cooperation;

    M.  whereas the water legislation has been evaluated as fit for purpose; whereas it establishes a framework for the protection of inland surface waters, transitional waters, coastal waters and groundwater; whereas, at the same time, it allows for less stringent environmental objectives to be achieved if socio-economic needs served by such human activity cannot be achieved by other means and it allows for a failure to achieve the objectives for water bodies if the reason for the failure is overriding public interest; whereas the legislation is proportionate and mandates the authorities of the Member States, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, to decide on the overriding public interest; whereas in some cases this may be the protection of the environment and in others a socio-economic activity;

    N.  whereas industry accounts for approximately 40 % of total water abstraction in Europe; whereas the largest categories of the annual water abstraction in the EU-27, according to the statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community (NACE), are abstraction for cooling in electricity generation (34 %), followed by abstraction for agriculture (29 %), public water supply (21 %) and manufacturing (15 %)(35); whereas data on water abstraction and use in the EU is historical and poor(36);

    O.  whereas electricity production is the largest water-abstracting sector, but most of the water is returned to the environment after cooling or turbine propulsion; whereas overall, agriculture is the highest net water-consuming sector at the EU level, as most of the water is consumed by the crop or evaporates; whereas other uses, such as industry and water utilities, abstract and consume comparatively less water, but they can represent significant pressures at a local level, especially on groundwater(37);

    P.  whereas all industrial activity requires water to produce its end products or to support production activities; whereas businesses depend on water for their daily operations, and as water scarcity increases, it can disrupt operations, raise costs and create regulatory and reputational risks;

    Q.  whereas the energy sector relies heavily on water resources; whereas this dependency poses a serious risk as water scarcity can impact energy production processes and supply security, especially where water is used as feedstock or for cooling; whereas the transition to renewable energy, particularly wind and solar energy, offers sustainable and water-efficient decarbonisation pathways and the opportunity to halt or reverse the trend of increasing water consumption;

    R.  whereas water is an essential resource for agriculture in the production of high-quality food, feed and renewable raw materials; whereas agriculture depends on water availability and irrigation helps to shield farmers from irregular rainfall and to increase the viability, yield and quality of the crops, but is a significant drain on water resources; whereas in view of climate change, changing weather patterns and increased frequency of floods and droughts, the importance of water as a resource for the production of high-quality agricultural products and of the need for water to be used efficiently will therefore be fundamental to the security of food supply and to the solutions to address water scarcity; whereas reducing pressure on surface water and groundwater from agriculture must go hand in hand with investment aimed at the use of reclaimed water and innovative desalination technologies, thereby achieving a better water balance as well as promoting clean alternative energies such as green hydrogen;

    S.  whereas global population growth requires increased food production, and the EU must guarantee food sovereignty, as laid down in Article 39 TFEU;

    T.  whereas reliable data on water accounting, that is, the systematic study of the current status and trends in water supply, demand, accessibility and use in domains that have been specified(38), is crucial for an assessment of the current situation in the EU and for European competitiveness;

    U.  whereas the potential of wastewater as an alternative water supply is underestimated, given that 60-70 % of the potential value of wastewater across the EU is currently unexploited(39) and less than 3 % of treated wastewater is reused in the EU(40); whereas there is significant potential for circular approaches to water in households, as only a small amount of the water in households is used for drinking and eating and therefore requires the highest quality standards;

    V.  whereas a very large quantity of water is lost due to obsolete or ageing water networks and the lack of necessary maintenance; whereas investment in the maintenance, improvement and development of resilient innovative irrigation infrastructures is essential for reducing and improving the efficiency of water consumption in agriculture; whereas such improvements in efficiency enable the water saved to be used for other purposes or enable the natural flow rates of watercourses to be maintained;

    W.  whereas clean and sufficient water is an essential element in implementing and achieving a real sustainable circular economy in the EU;

    X.  whereas water leakage is an underestimated global issue, which significantly exacerbates water scarcity, with an average of 23 % of treated water lost during distribution in the EU due to leaky pipes, outdated treatment facilities and insufficient reservoirs(41); whereas the revised Drinking Water Directive included measures to reduce water leakages, as well as risk assessment and management of the catchment areas for drinking water abstraction;

    Y.  whereas in 2021, 91 % of Europe’s groundwater bodies were reported as having achieved ‘good quantitative status’, while 77 % were reported as having ‘good chemical status’(42);

    Z.  whereas in 2021, only 37 % of Europe’s surface water bodies were reported as being in ‘good’ or ‘high’ ecological status, while 29 % achieved ‘good chemical status’(43);

    AA.  whereas the European Environment Agency emphasises that the proportion of surface waters failing to achieve good ecological status is uneven across Europe, and that these are more prevalent in parts of central and western Europe, and stresses that differences in water status between the Member States may be caused by different pressures, but that those differences may also result from varying approaches to monitoring and assessment(44);

    AB.  whereas the quality of surface waters across the continent reflects continuing and combined pressures, in particular diffuse pollution and the degradation of their natural flow and physical features; whereas pollution by nutrients and persistent priority substances, as well as by substances newly emerging as pollutants, continues; whereas groundwaters are affected by diffuse pollution and also suffer from intensive abstraction(45);

    AC.  whereas groundwater supplies 65 % of water for drinking and 25 % of water for agricultural irrigation in the EU(46); whereas it is a finite resource that needs to be protected from pollution and over-exploitation(47);

    AD.  whereas monitoring data from the European Environment Agency indicates widespread pollution by per- and polyfluoralkyl substances (PFAS), commonly referred to as ‘forever chemicals’, in European waters, posing significant risks to aquatic ecosystems and human health; whereas short-chain PFAS trifluoroacetic acid (TFA) has been detected in drinking water all over Europe; whereas PFAS persist in the environment, bioaccumulate in living organisms and cause adverse (eco)toxicological effects; whereas from a group of 6 000 to 10 000 individual substances, only a few have been extensively studied and their impact on human health and environment is known; whereas 99 % of PFAS remain undetected in the environment as a result of limits in monitoring;

    AE.  whereas the lack of EU-wide quality standards for PFAS in groundwater and insufficient monitoring of less-studied PFAS compounds exacerbate the challenge of achieving good chemical status for EU waters in line with the WFD and pose a substantial technical and financial burden on health systems and on water service providers while jeopardising applications of water and sewage sludge reuse;

    AF.  whereas hazardous chemicals, including heavy metals and other pollutants, released into water bodies by industrial activities, significantly impact water quality and aquatic ecosystems(48);

    AG.  whereas pharmaceutical substances are increasingly identified in surface water and groundwater; whereas pollution caused by pharmaceutical residues necessitates advanced water treatment technologies, including membrane filtration, activated carbon treatment, advanced oxidation processes and other innovative purification techniques;

    AH.  whereas Directive 2010/75/EU(49) mandates that the potential aggravation of the impact of industrial discharges on the state of water bodies due to variations of water flow dynamics should be explicitly taken into account in the granting and reviewing of permits; whereas the best available techniques will newly incorporate notions of environmental performance levels related to water and permits, which translate the use of these techniques into environmental performance limit values; whereas this is a welcome change with a potential improvement to the industry’s resilience, as EU installations may already face a lower production capacity seasonally due to water scarcity;

    AI.  whereas urban wastewater is one of the main sources of water pollution, if not properly collected and treated; whereas the objectives of the Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive should not be lowered, and its scope should be extended to other sectors and substances that contribute to water pollution;

    AJ.  whereas nutrient pollution in EU water bodies leads to eutrophication, loss of biodiversity, and degradation of aquatic ecosystems(50); whereas pesticide run-off contaminates surface water and groundwater, threatening water quality and human health;

    AK.  whereas research indicates that exposure in Europe to the synthetic chemical bisphenol A (BPA), which is used in products ranging from plastic and metal food containers to reusable water bottles, is well above acceptable health safety levels(51);

    AL.  whereas soil and nutrient management lies at the basis of improving water quality and availability; whereas the EWRS should focus on improving nutrient management, with the aim of closing nutrient loops to reduce nutrient emissions to waterways; whereas the safe use of sewage sludge in agriculture will also reduce the EU’s very high dependency on the import of phosphorus mineral fertiliser, for example, from Russia; whereas the safe use of sludge should therefore also be considered as contributing to European resilience and strategic autonomy;

    AM.  whereas climate change represents a major threat to water resources and aquatic ecosystems; whereas many impacts of climate change are felt through water, such as more intense and frequent droughts, more extreme flooding and more erratic seasonal rainfall; whereas floods and water scarcity compromise food and water security, and the health of the general population, ultimately affecting social cohesion, economic prosperity and stability, as well as jeopardising the long-term availability of this valuable resource;

    AN.  whereas the European climate risk assessment recognised that Europe’s policies and adaptation actions are not keeping pace with the rapidly growing risks that threaten ecosystems, infrastructure, food and water supply and people’s health, as well as the economy and finance(52);

    AO.  whereas assessments by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change show that the sea level rise due to climate change is leading to an increase in the salinity of soils and freshwaters, compromising ecosystem health and water quality, as well as affecting 80 million Europeans living in low elevation coastal zones and flood plains; whereas freshwater and marine ecosystems are interconnected as riverine pollution, disruption to sediment flows and water shortages all have a very strong impact on the health of marine ecosystems, particularly the coastal ones, as well as on the viability of social and economic activities that depend on them, such as transport, fisheries, agriculture, aquaculture and tourism;

    AP.  whereas prolonged drought, extreme heat and large-scale flooding events, caused by changing weather patterns, will intensify and become more frequent throughout the continent, damaging ecosystems and human health and leading to major disruption to economic activities and decreasing the overall quantity and quality of available water; whereas preserving water resources and the natural functions of rivers, while supplying sufficient water of good quality, is becoming a major challenge that will require increased climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts, effective management and innovative measures to increase water availability; whereas managing water scarcity and flood risks affordably and sustainably will increasingly become important across the EU;

    AQ.  whereas in 2022, Europe experienced its hottest summer and the second warmest year on record, leading to drought impacting over 15 % of EU territory; whereas the average annual economic loss caused by droughts in the EU between1981 and 2010 was estimated at around EUR 9 billion per year; whereas with no adaptation measures, it is estimated that annual drought losses in Europe and the UK could increase to EUR 45 billion per year up to 2100 with warming of 3°C(53); whereas in the period of 1998-2020, floods comprised 43 % of all disaster events in Europe; whereas climate change impacts and socio-economic developments are leading to more frequent flooding, affecting an increasing number of people and causing increasing damage; whereas 12 % of Europe’s population lives in floodplains(54);

    AR.  whereas the cost of inaction in addressing water-related challenges is extremely high, given that 90 % of disasters are related to water(55); whereas without policy action, the cost of economic losses from coastal floods alone could exceed EUR 1 trillion per year by the end of the century in the EU(56) and the economic cost of droughts in Europe could exceed EUR 65 billion a year by 2100(57);

    AS.  whereas significant differences exist between the Member States in water availability, management strategies and usage patterns, and vulnerability to climate change impacts can vary considerably; whereas a tailored approach is required to enhance water resilience and ensure sustainable water management;

    AT.  whereas droughts constitute one of the chief catastrophic consequences of climate change; whereas around 23 % of the EU’s territory is moderately susceptible to desertification and 8 % is highly susceptible to it; whereas Hungary, Bulgaria, Spain and Italy are among the countries most affected, and 74 % of Spain’s surface area is at risk of desertification; whereas the EWRS should look beyond prolonged droughts, but rather address the reality that the semi-arid line is moving north, resulting in increasing areas in the EU that will face chronic long-term unavailability of sufficient freshwater resources;

    AU.  whereas policies related to desertification, water consumption and climate change are closely interconnected; whereas as part of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, the EU reaffirmed in 2015 and later re-confirmed in 2024(58) its commitment to achieving land degradation neutrality by 2030, which, according to the European Court of Auditors special report on desertification, is unlikely to be achieved;

    AV.  whereas water infrastructure can help maintain a constant and predictable flow and supply of water; whereas in 2022, the annual average river discharge across Europe was the second lowest since records began in 1991(59);

    AW.  whereas downstream areas are particularly dependent on upstream water management and abstraction; whereas the Member States should refrain from implementing measures that significantly increase flood risks upstream or downstream of other countries in the same river basin, in accordance with the WFD;

    AX.  whereas nature-based solutions are pertinent interventions that, when tailored to specific ecosystems and needs, can increase resilience in the water cycle and provide multiple benefits in terms of biodiversity protection, carbon sequestration, improved water quality, nutrient retention, supply of drinking water, wildfire prevention and flood risk mitigation; whereas nature-based solutions can enhance the effectiveness and the operable life of water infrastructure, therefore ensuring, in many cases, complementarity of both solutions;

    AY.  whereas natural water retention measures are nature-based solutions that aim to store water in natural, agricultural, forested and urban landscapes;

    AZ.  whereas water is not a commercial product like any other but, rather, a heritage which must be protected, defended and treated as such; whereas, under Directive (EU) 2024/1203 on the protection of the environment through criminal law(60), abstraction of surface water or groundwater within the meaning of the WFD constitutes a criminal offence where such conduct is unlawful and intentional, and causes, or is likely to cause, substantial damage to the ecological status or the ecological potential of surface water bodies or to the quantitative status of groundwater bodies;

    BA.  whereas soil biodiversity and soil organic carbon affect water retention capacity; whereas soil erosion, compaction and certain soil management practices that cause soil degradation lead to a steady decrease in the water retention capacity of soil, which as a consequence exacerbates drought and flood events with a direct negative impact on farming; whereas healthy soil is therefore one of the drivers of water resilience, which itself should be approached and managed at river basin level; whereas better land management is key to preventing disasters;

    BB.  whereas the current multiannual financial framework (MFF) includes an ambitious but non-binding target of dedicating at least 7,5 % of annual EU spending to the biodiversity objectives in 2024 and 10 % in both 2026 and 2027; whereas the new financial framework should incorporate a water perspective with a view to allocating sufficient resources to the future EWRS in order to ensure resilient water ecosystems and infrastructure, and security of water supply, and to facilitate investments in innovative solutions;

    BC.  whereas cohesion funding has played a crucial role in improving water and sanitation services across the Member States; whereas continued support is required to ensure their long-term resilience and compliance with increasingly stringent quality standards;

    BD.  whereas pricing policies can improve the efficiency of water use; whereas such policies are a national competence and account for the regional differences in water availability and the source of water supply; whereas pricing can play a significant role in prompting households and other economic sectors to optimise consumption, as well as in ensuring that water users effectively participate in recovering the costs of water services; whereas pricing policies should also consider affordability for households and small businesses;

    BE.  whereas digitalisation and innovation can effectively assist the Member States, regional bodies and the Commission in collecting data on and monitoring water management; whereas the EU is at the forefront of new technological developments in the water sector, accounting for 40 % of all international patent families in this sector between 1992 and 2021(61), a position that needs to be fostered and nurtured, and the potential of the internal market fully exploited; whereas hurdles for the introduction and scaling-up of new water technologies need to be examined and a just European level playing field guaranteed; whereas continued support for research in water technology innovation is needed to secure and to create jobs and boost European competitiveness;

    BF.  whereas innovation is a crucial tool to help the water sector meet the challenges of the United Nation’s SDGs, adapt to climate change and become more water-efficient;

    BG.  whereas deployment of monitoring and modelling technologies is still lagging behind in many Member States, and the digitalisation of the sector is too slow; whereas provisions on the river basin management plans in the WFD do not explicitly include concrete measures to digitise the water sector; whereas common shortcomings for the current policies harnessing the potential digital solutions are related to the lack of technology guidance, monitoring standards, policy integration, standardisation and public involvement;

    BH.  whereas the water sector is vulnerable to various threats, including physical attacks, cyberattacks and contamination with harmful agents; whereas such incidents could result in widespread illness, casualties and service disruptions, significantly impacting public health, the environment and economic stability; whereas the digitalisation of water management might introduce further security risks in a context of increasing hostile attacks on critical infrastructure; whereas the implementation of the NIS2 Directive and Critical Entities Resilience Directive can contribute to mitigating security risks to vital (drinking) water systems and (drinking) water infrastructure, arising from geopolitical tensions;

    BI.  whereas advances in sensor technology, computing, artificial intelligence (AI) and big data management can help monitor water quantity and quality and inform the operational decisions of the policymakers and water management companies; whereas innovations in nature-based systems to manage water are available and can contribute to resilient water management;

    BJ.  whereas water is a vital component in the life cycle of AI, both in the operation of data centres and the manufacture of hardware; whereas the rapid expansion of AI could result in an exponential increase in water demand; whereas that dependency on an increasingly scarce resource poses significant challenges in terms of sustainability; whereas strategic technologies, such as semiconductors, hydrogen, electric vehicle batteries and data centres, play a key role in achieving a competitive and autonomous EU;

    BK.  whereas chiller and cooling tower systems, based on innovative cooling technologies such as evaporative and closed-loop cooling, are already available and can contribute to reducing water consumption in industrial, heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems applications;

    BL.  whereas research must be promoted with a view to producing alternative active ingredients to combat pests, to ensure greater plant health and reduce the use of inputs and phytosanitary products;

    BM.  whereas water resilience is crucial in education and teaching, and in raising awareness and giving information about the functioning of the water cycle;

    BN.  whereas limited access to water and related infrastructure has a negative impact, especially on women, as it undermines the realisation of other human rights, such as self-determination, economic independence and education;

    BO.  whereas 60 % of European river basin districts are transnational, which makes effective transboundary cooperation crucial; whereas 20 European countries depend on other countries for more than 10 % of their water resources, with five countries relying on more than 75 % of their resources coming from abroad via rivers(62); whereas this cooperation should be strengthened to account for current and future climate challenges such as droughts and floods;

    BP.  whereas United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres appointed a Special Envoy on Water, aiming to enhance international cooperation and synergies among international water processes;

    BQ.  whereas clean water access and sustainable and resilient sanitation infrastructure are key components of the One Health approach, recognising the interconnection between the health of humans and water pollution;

    BR.  whereas water cooperation across borders and sectors generates many benefits, including enhancing food security, sustaining healthy livelihoods and ecosystems, helping address resilience to climate change, contributing to disaster risk reduction, providing renewable energy, supporting cities and industry, and fostering regional integration and peace;

    BS.  whereas geopolitical developments demonstrate that the EU should be ready to withstand the challenges that go beyond the environmental sphere; whereas non-environmental threats, such as recent accidents related to the damaged cable in the Baltic Sea, send the EU a strong message that strengthening transboundary cooperation is key in addressing both the environmental and security-related objectives;

    BT.  whereas about 41 000 kilometres of inland waterways flow through 25 of the Member States; whereas inland waterways, which rely on the availability of water resources, perform a crucial role in optimising water supply and mitigating the impact of droughts and floods, as well as supporting the economic activities and the development of regions;

    BU.  whereas the increasing water scarcity, inequalities in access to water, and external shocks to the water sector have heightened interdependencies, increasing competition for water and leading to complex economic repercussions;

    General remarks

    1.  Welcomes and supports President von der Leyen’s announcement in the political guidelines for the next European Commission (2024-2029) on putting forward a European Water Resilience Strategy (EWRS) addressing water efficiency, scarcity, pollution and water-related risks, as well as the recognition that water is an indispensable resource that is increasingly under stress from climate change and increasing demands;

    2.  Believes that while implementing legislation, economic competitiveness should be taken into account in line with the Competitiveness Compass; calls for the implementation of EU environmental legislation in order to build a resilient and competitive Europe, mitigate and adapt to climate change, halt biodiversity loss, prevent pollution, ensure food security, limit resource use and waste, and strive towards efficient use of resources, including water, while taking into account the precautionary principle, the control-at-source principle and the polluter-pays principle; highlights the fact that water availability impacts the quantity, quality, variety and seasonal availability of foods that can be produced;

    3.  Calls for the EU to integrate its commitments to the COP29 Baku Dialogue on Water for Climate Action and the UN 2023 Water Conference into the international dimension of the strategy;

    4.  Stresses the urgent need to enhance water resilience and management to ensure sustainable freshwater supplies for people, the economy and the environment; emphasises that the EWRS should be developed in coordination with the European Oceans Pact, ensuring a cohesive and integrated approach to managing freshwater and ocean resources, addressing interconnected challenges, enhancing competitiveness and promoting sustainable water management across inland and marine environments, while ensuring a holistic ‘source-to-sea’ approach;

    5.  Insists on the need for a comprehensive and holistic EWRS that integrates water quality, quantity, security, infrastructure, technology and management aspects and includes the restoration of the water cycle as a key element, as it underpins economic activities, ensures resource availability and contributes to climate regulation;

    6.  Stresses the importance of water supply, in particular drinking water, as well as water security of supply; points out that all environmental restoration projects should take into account the water security aspects, prioritising solutions that not only provide environmental benefits, but also guarantee the supply and efficient management of water; emphasises, furthermore, that ecological restoration measures should be carried out in synergy with the development of the EU’s renewable energy potential and not impact the overall energy resilience;

    7.  Recommends that lakes and other freshwater-dependent habitats be included in the strategy, alongside rivers, transitional waters and groundwater, as essential components of the EU’s water resilience efforts;

    8.  Stresses the urgent need to improve crisis-warning systems with regard to heavy water incidents, as well as to improve preventive measures;

    9.  Calls on the Commission to present a European climate adaptation plan, including concrete legislative proposals and actions, particularly regarding infrastructure resilience, water management and nature-based solutions, while prioritising the protection of vulnerable communities, to make the EU more resilient and to lead by example;

    10.  Reiterates that access to clean and safe drinking water and sanitation is a human right; emphasises that this right must be unequivocally ensured, with everyone having access to affordable and good quality water services, including the inhabitants of islands and outermost regions;

    11.  Stresses that no one, whether in public places or private establishments, should be denied access to water supplied from a distribution network intended for human consumption, where available;

    12.  Notes that industrial activities and agricultural production require water to produce their end products or to support production activities, with the amount of water used varying depending on the type of activity; highlights the fact that ensuring Europe’s competitiveness and strategic autonomy requires a water-smart society where technology and data enhance a circular economy, fostering sustainable and water-efficient practices; calls on all relevant actors to accelerate the transition towards water-efficient, circular industry and agriculture by promoting and investing in innovative solutions, including digital tools and technologies, resource recovery, water reuse, renewable energy production, infrastructure, nature-based solutions and inclusive governance mechanisms;

    13.  Urges the Commission to integrate and mainstream the water dimension into internal and external EU policies through a cross-sectoral approach in order to ensure that water resilience, sustainability and security is woven into the fabric of European policies; calls on the Commission, in particular, to carry out a water-related assessment of any regulatory measure, including related to energy, as part of the socio-economic and environmental impact assessment; emphasises that assessing how each EU policy, and EU-funded projects and infrastructure, can impact water resources in terms of quantity, quality and accessibility would ensure that water resilience is a cornerstone of policy formulation and implementation, thus shifting the paradigm from treating water as an infinite resource to recognising its intrinsic value for humanity and for the EU’s ecological and socio-economic landscape and its competitiveness;

    Water efficiency

    14.  Stresses that efficient water use is essential for preserving the EU’s water resources and that water efficiency should be a key objective of the EU; calls, in this regard, for a consequential reduction in water demand, including by addressing excessive leakage levels, investing in research and innovative solutions, modernising industrial and production processes, upgrading water infrastructure, managing water resources and peak demands sustainably, prioritising uses and ensuring that higher water efficiency results in a reduction in overall freshwater consumption as well as in an increase in water availability in water-stressed areas at the local and regional levels; believes that areas affected by prolonged drought and desertification should be given priority;

    15.  Calls for a legislative framework setting sectoral water efficiency and water abstraction targets at basin level, based on up-to-date assessments of water availability and climate risks, including a water valuation approach that accounts for ecosystem services and long-term sustainability, and covering all water uses, including industry, energy, agriculture, public institutions and households; underlines the fact that these targets should be ambitious yet adaptable, taking into account the specific circumstances and progress already achieved by each Member State to ensure continued efforts towards efficiency gains across all regions; stresses the importance of efficient and uniform data collection practices across the Member States and all sectors, including through the use of innovative technologies, as well as real-time data collection points for more transparency on water consumption; emphasises the need to carry out an appropriate assessment of the environmental and socio-economic impacts of water use; stresses that the strategic importance of food production must not be compromised; emphasises that science, research and technology are important for water efficiency and water use as well as for the circular economy in this regard; calls for the creation and promotion of new smart and high-performance irrigation systems, rainwater retention and water from reuse, as well as water-efficient irrigation systems;

    16.  Reiterates the need to develop a common EU methodology for setting water efficiency and water abstraction targets to ensure the sustainable use of available renewable water resources within an integrated water resources management framework which gives due consideration to linkages beyond the water sector through the water-energy-food-ecosystems nexus, thus enabling decision-makers and economic actors to plan the necessary investment to ensure water supply security in an increasingly sustainable manner, while giving due consideration to the characteristics of the water bodies concerned;

    17.  Calls for close collaboration on integrated energy and water resource planning and related technologies across all sectors at national, regional and local levels, including between all stakeholders, in order to establish mechanisms for ensuring coherence across water and energy policies;

    18.  Calls on the Commission to put forward a comprehensive policy on sustainable water management for industry based on reducing, recovering, reusing and recycling, including a focus on the use of water-efficient and circular technologies, water recycling, pollutant reduction strategies and the promotion of closed-loop systems;

    19.  Recalls that the growing threat of water scarcity is jeopardising industries and projects that are key to Europe’s competitiveness drive, including semiconductors, data centres, renewable hydrogen and electric vehicle battery production; notes that these industries will increasingly face pressure to reduce their environmental impact and improve water resource efficiency, including both direct and indirect water usage; calls on the Member States to support water-intensive industries in setting up water-efficiency plans aimed at saving, reusing and recycling water, preventing water pollution and implementing water-efficient technologies; calls on the Commission to incorporate comprehensive water management strategies into relevant EU industrial policies and sector-specific transition pathways, with a particular focus on strategic water-intensive sectors;

    20.  Stresses that knowledge, data, research and technology are key for efficient water use; calls for adequate financial and technical support to be given to the Member States to implement efficient water management measures, including by means of innovative and modern technologies;

    21.  Welcomes the recommendations of the final report of the Strategic Dialogue on the future of EU agriculture underlining that sustainable farming practices and new business models need to be scaled up to promote more efficient use of natural resources, especially water;

    22.  Calls for the transition to a more sustainable and competitive farming model, assisted by the implementation of sustainable practices and innovative solutions that promote biodiversity, reduce chemical inputs and enable water resources to be managed efficiently, including nature-based solutions, regenerative management, smart precision irrigation technologies, digital monitoring systems, advanced treatment methods and smart water distribution networks, optimising consumption and preventing water resource depletion, and that help ensure continued productivity while enabling agriculture to reduce pollution, use pesticides and fertilisers efficiently, improve the hydrological cycle, enhance groundwater recharge and adapt to lower water use; considers that technological solutions can also include measures that can increase water absorption, infiltration and retention in agricultural systems, which are important amid increasing occurrences of both drought and heavy rains;

    23.  Points out that innovative irrigation solutions and practices can enhance water efficiency in agriculture, gaining an economic advantage while also reducing environmental burdens; notes that farmers generally lack sufficient means and incentives to know about water use by crops, actual irrigation applications, the yield responses of crops to different water management practices, and thus current on-farm water-efficiency levels; calls on the Commission and the Member States to incentivise the uptake and support the maintenance of innovative irrigation solutions such as drip irrigation to allow for an active management of water levels and efficient use of water resources, as well as to promote continuous knowledge exchange, so that all relevant stakeholders can share greater responsibility across the entire water supply chain;

    24.  Recalls that the use of nutrients such as nitrate and phosphate is essential for food production, as this activity would not be possible without their use; recommends better consideration of the nutrient cycle in agricultural production and the exploitation of the value in urban wastewater; calls for more research into the effective use of nutrients and the development of nutrient recovery technologies, in order to decrease the Union’s dependence on imported raw materials; recognises the high potential for nutrient recovery from water and calls on the Member States to support the agricultural sector to optimise their nutrient consumption including by using resources (nitrate and phosphorus) recovered from wastewater treatment plants; calls on the Commission to propose an integrated nutrient management action plan to effectively address loss of valuable agricultural inputs, recycling of nutrients, nutrient pollution and inefficiencies in the nutrient cycle; calls for the proper and safe recovery of phosphorus from organic sources and for incentivising investments in its recovery and circular nutrient management in accordance with the Commission’s JRC publication(63);

    25.  Stresses that the current Nitrates Directive is due for revision, as outdated provisions promote the use of artificial fertilisers rather than organic manure; calls for an urgent review of the Nitrates Directive before the end of this year, and its revision to promote circular nutrient management;

    26.  Emphasises, in line with the final report of the Strategic Dialogue on the future of EU agriculture, the need to support the transition to regionally adapted crop and seed varieties and the switch to different crops, with reduced water requirements and greater drought resistance, as well as the need to support the adoption of appropriate soil management practices; considers the need for stronger support for scientific research and technological development related to the breeding of new species, to enable the production and supply of foodstuffs to be diversified and their quality enhanced, while raising the level of protection for human health and the environment; notes the potential of plant varieties that are more resistant to water stress and pests and could play a role in reducing water use and could reduce the environmental footprint of crops;

    27.  Calls for financial and technical support for farmers and rural communities, particularly in water-stressed areas, to help them adopt sustainable land management practices that improve soil and water quality, contribute to biodiversity and mitigate climate change; emphasises the need for special attention to be given to regions that are particularly vulnerable to soil degradation and water scarcity;

    28.  Acknowledges the significant efforts made by farmers to enhance water quality and emphasises the need for an appropriate timeframe to allow the effects of these measures to be accurately assessed;

    29.  Points to the success of the agricultural European Innovation Partnership EIP‑AGRI and calls for the continuation of knowledge exchange, expertise and peer-to-peer learning via the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Network;

    30.  Notes the links between carbon sinking and water availability, and calls for coherence between the water resilience strategy and carbon farming schemes;

    31.  Reiterates that the Water Reuse Regulation aims at reducing the pressure on water bodies by setting out provisions on reusing water after appropriate treatment extends its life cycle, thereby preserving water resources; emphasises, however, that regulatory, financial and technological barriers, including the economic competitiveness of reclaimed wastewater, risk management planning and the sharing of responsibilities, contribute to the slow uptake of reuse of reclaimed water for agriculture; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Member States to adopt supportive policies, at both the EU and the local level, that incentivise water reuse practices, taking into account the importance of adapting wastewater treatment and quality requirements to the intended water use; notes that treated wastewater also finds valuable applications in various industrial processes and urban contexts, contributing to reducing the pressure on freshwater resources and the conservation of drinking water; calls therefore on the Commission to assess a possible extension of the scope of the Water Reuse Regulation in order to establish, at EU level, minimum water quality standards for safe water reuse for industrial and urban purposes;

    32.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to specify systems of regulatory and financial incentives for the reuse of treated wastewater in water-intensive sectors and to provide specific funding for the construction of infrastructure connecting wastewater treatment plants and refined water distribution networks; urges a streamlined approach in EU legislation to remove administrative barriers and promote safe and efficient water recycling across the Member States; calls on the Member States to set up national water reuse and saving plans to incentivise cross-sectoral cooperation in water management;

    33.  Reiterates that reused water could alleviate abstraction from rivers, lakes and groundwater for irrigated agriculture; underlines the fact that reused water can contribute to maintaining base flows and minimum water levels during dry periods;

    34.  Highlights the potential of the building sector to save water, for example, with the help of smart sub-metering systems, efficient greywater systems, reuse of domestic wastewater or rainwater harvesting; stresses that the energy performance of buildings can be enhanced by water efficiency, reducing greenhouse gas emissions; calls on the Member States and local authorities to incentivise water-saving features in new buildings; stresses, in this regard, that water-efficient practices should be factored into urban planning; highlights the fact that harvesting rain water as well as using and reusing water efficiently can improve climate adaptation in cities;

    35.  Calls for the transition, in industry and in the energy and digital sectors, to optimised cooling efficiency and alternative cooling methods that are less water-dependent, in order to ensure significant water savings in these sectors;

    36.  Points out that, while households represent 10 % of the overall water consumption in the EU, action on improving domestic water efficiency is also necessary; notes that water-saving technological solutions are readily available and can reduce water consumption in households without compromising comfort or requiring high investment; calls on the Member States to support consumers in transitioning towards such technologies and to strengthen consumer awareness of water consumption and potential efficiency gains by anchoring domestic water efficiency in water, building and consumer policies across the EU;

    37.  Notes that the leakage rates from pipes are high in some Member States, which increases the total share of domestic water consumption; welcomes the provisions of the new Drinking Water Directive on leakage rates and the ongoing work of the Commission to evaluate those rates and set threshold values that will trigger action in the Member States concerned; calls on the Member States to urgently tackle leakage in water supply networks and to fully implement the monitoring and reporting requirements of the Drinking Water Directive, so that the Commission can set a threshold value for leakage by January 2028; emphasises the need for sustainable urban irrigation networks to be modernised, to curb leakages and reduce their water footprint; calls on the Member States to regularly inform the public about the efficiency and effectiveness of their water supplies;

    38.  Points out that public sector organisations provide significant untapped potential for saving water by virtue of their size or their nature as public organisations; believes that the public sector should act as a role model for other sectors;

    39.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote easily accessible and free information, training, advisory programmes and information campaigns aimed at raising public awareness of sustainable water resource management;

    40.  Recommends that water-efficiency aspects, such as reductions in water loss and reuse of water, be integrated in the upcoming revision of the public procurement framework;

    Water pollution

    41.  Underlines the fact that the existing EU water policy framework is designed to address the effective management of water resources and the protection and restoration of freshwater and marine ecosystems, but that its poor implementation and enforcement, insufficient funding and lack of proper cost-benefit analyses of the implementation measures undermine its effectiveness;

    42.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to implement and enforce the current legislation, in particular the WFD and its ‘daughter’ directives (the Groundwater Directive and the Environmental Quality Standards Directive), with a particular focus on strengthening the monitoring and reporting mechanisms to ensure that all Member States consistently implement the required water protection measures; recalls the need for sufficient funding to implement these acts;

    43.  Stresses that the chemical pollution of surface water and groundwater poses a threat to the aquatic environment, with effects such as acute and chronic toxicity in aquatic organisms, accumulation of pollutants in the ecosystem and loss of habitats and biodiversity, as well as to human health;

    44.  Calls for the establishment of comprehensive EU-wide quality standards for PFAS in groundwater and surface water; stresses that respective updates of the relevant directives are essential for safeguarding water quality and achieving good chemical status for water bodies as mandated under the WFD;

    45.  Insists that essential uses of PFAS in critical sectors, such as medical devices, pharmaceuticals and products necessary for the twin transition to a climate neutral and digital economy, are not endangered in the context of upcoming legislative and non-legislative proposals; calls on the Commission to propose to phase out forever chemicals (PFAS) – starting with consumer goods – linked to harmful effects on human health and the environment, based on scientific evidence, allowing their use where there are no safe alternatives; underlines the need to scale up investments and accelerate the research and development of equivalent and safe alternatives;

    46.  Calls on the Commission to propose updated limits on PFAS in drinking water, taking into account the latest scientific knowledge;

    47.  Emphasises the urgency of addressing, primarily at the source, and effectively monitoring pollution from pharmaceuticals, bisphenols, antimicrobial resistance genes, persistent organic pollutants and other existing and emerging pollutants, to align with the EU’s zero pollution ambition and the goal of achieving good chemical status for all water bodies;

    48.  Calls on the Commission to close the gaps with enhanced funding and the enforcement of current laws, and the integration of circular economy principles to mitigate pollution at its source and safeguard water ecosystems for future generations; underscores the fact that antibiotic-resistant bacteria and certain emerging pollutants remain insufficiently addressed, necessitating further innovation and investment; emphasises the need for all sectors to apply sustainable production processes and circular practices, proactively preventing pollutants from entering water systems;

    49.  Recalls that microplastics may enter drinking water sources in a number of ways: from surface run-off (for example, after a rain event) to wastewater effluent (both treated and untreated), combined sewer overflows, industrial effluent, degraded plastic waste and atmospheric deposition; calls on the Commission to put forward, in line with the requirements of the Drinking Water Directive, a full risk assessment of microplastics in drinking water, while continuously working on reliable and robust sampling and analytical methods in order to appropriately address the potential threat of this emerging pollutant to sources of water intended for human consumption;

    50.  Emphasises the need to improve the monitoring and regulation of plastic pollution in freshwater and marine environments, with particular attention to microplastics and single-use plastics; encourages the Commission to assess current enforcement mechanisms and consider further measures to protect water quality;

    51.  Calls on the stakeholders to develop safe water contact materials, to substitute BPA and other bisphenols and ensure compliance with Regulation (EU) 1935/2004 on materials and articles intended to come into contact with food(64) and the recently adopted provisions as regards the use of BPA and other bisphenols and bisphenol derivatives (Commission Regulation (EU) 2024/3190);

    52.  Recalls that the revised Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive, in effect since 1 January 2025, imposes new obligations regarding water purification, requiring pharmaceutical and cosmetic producers to cover at least 80 % of the costs of removing micropollutants from wastewater, with the aim of reducing harmful substances in the environment; notes the existence of differing figures and assessments regarding the impact this would have on the pharmaceutical sector and, consequently, on the availability and affordability of medicines, and therefore calls on the Commission to conduct a new and comprehensive assessment of the impact on this sector;

    53.  Calls for increased EU support for local authorities for the modernisation of wastewater treatment plants and the promotion of water reuse, to align with the EU’s zero pollution ambition, ensuring that municipal wastewater management contributes effectively to good chemical and ecological water status;

    54.  Calls for increased monitoring of pesticide residues in water bodies and enforcement of pesticide application regulations to mitigate their impact on water quality; stresses the need for increased funding to support farmers in the adoption of low-input and organic farming practices that reduce reliance on chemical pesticides and fertilisers, as well as to provide appropriate training and independent advisory services to farmers and other operators on the use, effectiveness and toxicity of pesticides, as well as best practice;

    55.  Insists on the integration of circular economy principles to reduce hazardous chemical use in industrial processes; stresses the need for additional funding to support industries in transitioning to clean technologies that minimise water pollution(65);

    56.  Recognises the role of treated sludge as a local and circular source of fertiliser, contributing to soil health, nutrient recycling and reduced dependency on synthetic fertilisers; emphasises the importance of preventing PFAS, heavy metals, microplastics and other harmful substances from entering sewer networks in order to enable the safe and sustainable use of high-quality sewage sludge in agriculture;

    57.  Calls on the Commission to include an overview of measures in an annex to the EWRS, with a timeline for achieving the objectives in question;

    Adaptation to climate change: floods, droughts, stress areas, disaster preparedness

    58.  Calls for the climate adaptation proofing of all new EU legislative and non-legislative acts in order to ensure the integration of climate adaptation into sectoral plans and policy measures affecting water and land use; highlights, in this regard, the need for increased climate ambition as part of the fight against climate change, while urging the Member States to ensure that all climate adaptation measures affecting water use contribute to long-term, improved water resilience; calls on the Commission to take fully into account the geographical and environmental conditions in the Member States, as well as the specific situation of islands, outermost regions and other areas of high vulnerability, such as areas affected by desertification, when adopting new legislative and non-legislative proposals; asks the Commission to present a roadmap for current and ongoing legislative and non-legislative policy measures, including targets and monitoring requirements affecting water and land use;

    59.  Emphasises the need for tailored climate adaptation measures for the Mediterranean region, which faces unique challenges such as prolonged droughts and saline intrusion into freshwater resources;

    60.  Stresses the specific challenges faced by island areas due to the scarcity of drinking water and calls for targeted measures to protect island water resources, including improving rainwater collection and storage infrastructure, and implementing alternative water sources, while enhancing water resource monitoring and management systems; calls, further, on the Member States to take better account of mountainous regions in national adaptation plans in order to meet the specific challenges of water management in mountainous areas;

    61.  Reiterates that climate change mitigation and adaptation solutions should not come at the cost of ecosystem degradation, and should avoid increasing the demand for water- and energy-intensive activities, and should instead prioritise energy- and water-efficient innovation and technologies as part of moving towards a more resource-efficient economy, without undermining its productivity, while ensuring equitable access to water for all; points out that, in order to be effective, climate change mitigation and adaptation solutions should be tailored to national circumstances, while enhancing competitiveness and productivity in the short and long term; points out the possibilities of synergies, in this regard, with innovative energy production such as photovoltaics and biogas, as it can also contribute to an increase in agricultural income;

    62.  Recognises the importance of reserving water for nature and the need to maintain healthy freshwater ecosystems, for the good functioning of the water cycle, for human activities and for mitigating the impacts of droughts and water scarcity; underlines, in the context of restoring freshwater ecosystems and the natural functions of rivers, the importance of removing ‘obsolete barriers’, namely artificial barriers that no longer fulfil their original purpose or are no longer needed, wherever such opportunities exist, on the basis of current knowledge and experience; calls for the establishment of specific programmes for the cleaning and conservation of river channels, ensuring minimum flow and reducing the accumulation of debris and sediment that can affect water storage and distribution capacity;

    63.  Insists that, with climate change impact becoming more persistent, flood and drought management must fully integrate the arising risks, including changing weather patterns, such as increased rain patterns leading to excess of water; is convinced that a combination of monitoring and data collection, preparedness, emergency and recovery responses taking into account the principle of ‘building back better’(66)on the one hand, and adapting societal and economic activities on the other, is essential to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience, especially in the light of the quantitative aspect of water becoming more prominent; stresses, in this regard, the need for climate-resilient nature-based solutions and infrastructure that take into account the impact of extreme climate events in their development to ensure their viability in the face of extreme climate events;

    64.  Recalls that in 2007, the WFD was supplemented by Directive 2007/60/EC on the assessment and management of flood risks, which aims to establish a framework to reduce the adverse consequences of flooding on human health, the environment, cultural heritage and economic activity; notes that making the two directives mutually compatible is achieved through risk management plans and river basin flood management plans as the components of an integrated water management system in which coordination is crucial; recalls that flood prevention is closely connected to urban green spaces, soil protection strategies and investment in drainage networks;

    65.  Stresses that preparedness for water scarcity and drought can be significantly improved in the EU, considering that no drought management plans are in place in several Member States(67); calls on the Member States and, where applicable, competent regional and local authorities, to develop drought management plans, particularly with a view to ensuring the provision of drinking water, ensuring food production and integrating digitalised monitoring, control and early warning systems in order to support effective and data-based decisions on protection, response and communication measures with clearly defined areas of responsibility; points out the need to introduce EU-level provisions as regards drought management plans, similar to the ones on flood management plans;

    66.  Insists, in view of the numerous climatic events, such as floods, droughts and cyclones, which have affected Europe, on the importance of the EU having a robust mechanism for responding to such crises, including systems for warning and providing assistance to the civilian population; points out that digital monitoring, adequate public display of relevant data and early warning systems are key to developing effective drought and flood management plans at the level of the Member States; emphasises, further, the importance of fully using the available EU tools, such as the flood forecasts of the European Flood Awareness System and the Global Flood Awareness System, and the Global Flood Monitoring tool, as part of the Copernicus Emergency Management Service;

    67.  Stresses the importance of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) in helping countries hit by water-related disasters such as flood and droughts; calls for increased funding to provide the UCPM with sufficient and upgraded resources in order to increase preparedness and improve capacity building;

    68.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to enhance citizen preparedness in the event of water-related disasters or crisis; stresses the importance of information campaigns and demonstration exercises in education facilities, public administration and businesses in order to build a ‘preparedness culture’ for citizens;

    69.  Calls on the Member States to systematically renew and upgrade their water infrastructure, including drinking water and sanitation infrastructure, as well as infrastructure regulating river flows, and to invest in innovative solutions based on good practice, making water systems more resilient to climate change, ensuring stable drinking water supply, enabling the early detection of losses and reducing water leakages and waste, while optimising water transport and storage systems; highlights the fact that funding for innovative water infrastructure is insufficient compared to the investment needs across the EU; calls, in this regard, for dedicated funding, on national, regional or EU level, to ensure adequate financing for the development, maintenance and modernisation of water-resilient infrastructure, to foster innovative solutions and technologies and ensure long-term sustainability of that water infrastructure;

    70.  Regrets that, despite the threat that desertification poses to water quality and availability, soil fertility and food production, and despite the fact that 13 Member States have declared themselves to be affected by desertification in the context of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, the Commission is not addressing desertification effectively and efficiently; urges the Commission, therefore, in line with the Council conclusions of 14 October 2024 on desertification, land degradation and drought, to present an integrated EU-wide action plan to combat desertification, land degradation and drought, aiming at building resilience to drought and achieving land degradation neutrality in the EU by 2030, based on a full impact assessment;

    71.  Insists that the agricultural sector be further supported in implementing new technologies to reduce the demand for water, while at the same time increasing access to water, including by supporting water retention and groundwater recharge; calls for research results, for example on seawater desalination, to be made accessible and to facilitate the deployment of innovative desalination solutions; calls on the Member States to create natural water reserves based on up-to-date assessments of climate risks to protect critical water supplies and their catchments, and taking into consideration the environmental and socio-economic impact of developing such reserves; points out that such natural water reserves would complement the WFD’s requirement for Member States to identify water bodies used for drinking water abstraction, making sure they meet the objectives set out in Article 4 WFD and in the Drinking Water Directive, and would ensure their necessary protection; notes that such natural water reserves already exist under different forms in various Member States; stresses that assistance should be given to Member States or local and regional governments to help them develop natural water reserves;

    72.  Notes the potential of retention infrastructure as an example of water generation systems created using the best available, cost-effective techniques that have the lowest environmental impact, including by means of wastewater reuse or rainwater collection, in order to reduce the risks of droughts and floods, increase water security and foster circularity, water reclamation and reuse; believes that water retention facilities may be useful tools provided that they are authorised by local or national authorities under clear conditions, including the capacity of local groundwater to sustain such activities and the need for farmers accessing the water resource to adapt their practices to more sustainable practices, in particular in terms of water needs and water quality; calls on the Commission to use its available tools, including financial support, to streamline this approach among the Member States;

    73.  Deplores the unlawful or intentional abstraction of water, which is likely to cause substantial damage to water bodies; calls for strong dissuasive measures to be applied, including through the criminal law, to protect the ecological status or the ecological potential of surface water bodies or of the quantitative status of groundwater bodies; notes that additional support for training and knowledge transfer for national enforcement capacities is needed;

    74.  Notes the important cross-cutting role of nature-based solutions in addressing the challenges of the triple planetary crisis and restoring the natural water cycle; calls on the Commission and the Member States to prioritise, taking into account the environmental and socio-economic impacts, the deployment of nature-based solutions for water resilience in their policy actions and recommendations, such as the re-wetting of wetlands and peatlands to increase ground water availability and surrounding soil moisture, the restoration and protection of floodplains, natural water retention measures, revegetation as a barrier against floods, and rainwater conservation, in order to strengthen water availability, mitigate climate change risks and support long-term resilience for communities, businesses and food production; underlines that, in addition to nature-based solutions, complementary investment in engineering solutions remains necessary to ensure successful climate adaptation and water resilience in the long term;

    Funding and pricing

    75.  Notes that nature-based solutions and natural water retention measures have the potential to restore groundwater levels and support ecological flows while reducing water-related risks from water scarcity, floods and droughts; notes that in flood management, nature-based solutions cannot usually replace existing solutions and may not be effective for the most extreme events; points out, however, that nature-based solutions can enhance the effectiveness and operable life of grey infrastructure by increasing water absorption capacity, reducing water velocity and regulating peak flows; reiterates, in this regard, that the effectiveness of nature-based solutions is context-specific and must be adapted to the local situation; emphasises in this regard that a ‘one solution that fits all’ does not exist;

    76.  Stresses the need to provide financial support for sustainable innovative methods and solutions, while having due regard to public-private partnerships;

    77.  Stresses, in the context of climate adaptation, the importance of healthy soils in ensuring water security and circularity; emphasises that the natural water retention of soils must be improved through measures to enhance soil health, minimising carbon losses, as well as actions at the level of the water body, such as the stabilisation of riverbanks, including through re-naturalisation, and the restoration of the retention capacities of aquifers;

    78.  Notes that thoroughly designed forest management measures can improve watershed health, regulate water flow and reduce drought and flood stress, given the essential role of trees and forests in water cycle regulation, through their ability to purify water, increase the availability of water resources and improve soil moisture retention; proposes that this be duly considered when the Commission, in cooperation with the Member States, develops Union disaster resilience goals and that it be considered in the development and refinement of disaster risk management and contingency planning; highlights the need, in this regard, for more research, data collection, innovation and funding to support land managers in preventing the impact of environmental stressors such as drought floods and diminishing watershed function;

    79.  Recognises that urban areas are increasingly vulnerable to water-related climate risks such as flooding, water shortages and heat stress; calls for the integration of urban water resilience planning into climate adaptation strategies, including investment in green roofs, permeable infrastructure, rainwater harvesting and storm water retention systems, as well as measures aimed at increasing green and blue spaces in urban areas, in order to mitigate extreme weather impacts and to reduce the risks to human life and property; calls further for the maintenance of, and regained access to, urban waterways in cities;

    80.  Emphasises that the EWRS should ensure adequate funding from public and private sources in order to support the modernisation, upgrading, adaptation and maintenance of resilient water infrastructure, sustainable water management, data collection, research, effective monitoring, digitalisation, upskilling, nature-based solutions, the development and the uptake of innovative water-efficient technologies, as well as to ensure environmental and socio-economic sustainability in line with the goals set by the new European Competitiveness Compass;

    81.  Calls on the Commission to create a separate and dedicated fund for water resilience within the upcoming MFF; believes that specific financial mechanisms should also be established within the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund to support water-smart technologies and water investment; strongly believes that, in the interim, water should be prioritised in existing funding frameworks, including the Cohesion Fund; stresses that EU funding mechanisms must incorporate considerations of social equity and affordability, in particular in the context of providing water services to the population, ensuring support for Member States and citizens with greater financial constraints and specific realities, while meeting water management obligations; highlights the importance of adjusting existing funding, subsidies and financing streams related to water management and other related land uses, moving away from outdated engineering solutions to innovative ones, as well as nature-based solutions or a combination thereof;

    82.  Calls for targeted funding, via Horizon Europe and the EIP-AGRI, for field trials on the water relations of different cropping systems; calls for the recognition of the role of women in water policies and for specific funding to be identified to promote their access to agriculture;

    83.  Recalls that the lack of dedicated funding for water or binding funding targets within the current MFF limits the EU’s capacity to direct targeted investment towards essential water resilience measures, including infrastructure modernisation, innovation, climate adaptation measures and the implementation of nature-based solutions, and thus its competitive capacity, as the absence of a water balance creates an additional burden for the economy of the regions; notes that outermost and mountainous regions and islands in the EU are particularly struggling to access funding or public-private partnerships to support local and regional investment in water management and infrastructure;

    84.  Stresses the important role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) in water financing; highlights the fact that the EIB is actively investing in and supporting the water sector; stresses that the EU should collaborate with the EIB to share best practice and calls, further, on the EIB and other financial institutions to strengthen their role in the funding of innovative and resilient water infrastructure, improved sanitation and drinking water infrastructure, digitalisation, as well as to support projects aimed at flood risk reduction, erosion prevention and the revitalization of watercourses, by facilitating favourable conditions for water investment;

    85.  Urges the Commission to explore and promote innovative financing mechanisms, including payments for ecosystem services and green bonds, while ensuring regulatory clarity and safeguards to prevent market distortions; calls on the EIB and other financial institutions to prioritise low-interest loans and credits for Member States and regional and local authorities undertaking large-scale restoration projects, with specific provisions to support economically disadvantaged regions;

    86.  Highlights the importance of public-private partnerships as a source of funding for water investment; calls on the Commission to incentivise private investment in the water sector by creating a supportive regulatory framework that may include co-financing opportunities and public-private partnerships in order to drive innovation, improve infrastructure and ensure sustainable water management solutions across the Member States; underlines, nevertheless, that the involvement of private investment in the EU water sector must not undermine the status of water as a public good and a public service, and that the long-term resilience of the sector, as well as the principles of accessibility, affordability and sustainability must be ensured;

    87.  Calls on the Member States to adopt governance frameworks that clearly define the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in planning, financing and implementing nature-based solutions; believes that these frameworks should integrate funding from diverse sources, including philanthropic contributions and private-sector partnerships, while ensuring equitable access to resources for small-scale projects, particularly managed at local or regional levels;

    88.  Urges the Commission and the Member States to address water aspects in their budgets and to improve governance within the regions in the use of EU funds;

    89.  Underlines the need to provide targeted financial and technical assistance to municipalities to facilitate compliance with water-related legislation;

    90.  Encourages the Member States to accelerate the granting of authorisations for sustainable and innovative resilient water infrastructure projects to enable their rapid implementation in the face of the urgent challenges;

    91.  Notes that the application of the cost recovery principle on water services, which provides that all water users effectively and proportionately participate financially in the recovery of the costs of water services, remains low to non-existent in several Member States; calls on the Member States and their regional authorities to implement adequate water pricing policies and apply the cost recovery principle for both environmental and resource costs in line with the WFD; calls on the Member States to take into account the long investment cycles when implementing the cost recovery principle and to ensure sufficient funding is available for needed (re)investment;

    92.  Stresses the importance of ensuring that water pricing supports long-term water security by reflecting the economic, environmental and resource costs of water use; encourages the Member States and competent regional and local authorities to ensure that water pricing is economically sustainable, socially fair and promotes efficient water use, and that it reflects the availability of water across different Member States and regions, particularly in water-stressed regions, while safeguarding affordability for households and small businesses; calls on the Member States and competent regional and local authorities to insure transparent water prices and to raise awareness of the value of water services;

    93.  Points out that competent national water authorities will play a central role in implementing new water management and conservation plans at the level of the Member States; calls, therefore, on the Members States to financially and technically increase the capacity of those competent authorities to play a more significant enabling and advisory role in sustainable and future-proof water management and storage infrastructure; believes that EU funds, such as the Just Transition Fund, should be used to further assist Member States and water agencies in implementation;

    Digitalisation, security and technological innovation

    94.  Stresses the potential and the necessity for digitalisation and AI in improving the management and monitoring of bodies of water and water infrastructure, as well as in reporting and ensuring the comparability of data reflecting different geographical flow conditions;

    95.  Calls on the Commission, the Member States and water providers to mainstream transparency and digitalisation as fundamental principles in water management and to enhance the use of management and metering data, with the aim of strengthening monitoring, assessment, accountability and decision-making, while optimising and simplifying reporting obligations; calls for digitally enabled water technologies to facilitate real-time, sample-based and distance monitoring and reporting on water quality, leakages, usage and resources; calls for improved efficiency in the use of public funds and public spending in this area; recognises that widespread deployment of innovative digital technologies needs to be accompanied by digital skills training;

    96.  Emphasises the need to promote digitalisation and data-centric solutions in building a water-smart society; stresses the need to develop digital solutions for monitoring water consumption and optimising the use of water resources across all sectors; calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the Member States, to provide financial support for the implementation of smart water management systems, focusing on the needs of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs);

    97.  Points out that water systems, including water treatment and distribution systems, are considered one of the nation’s critical infrastructures and security pillars, and hence key for the EU’s strategic autonomy, and require increased protection and the ability of utilities to detect, respond to, and recover from physical and cyberthreats and cyberattacks; notes that a higher level of digitalisation comes with new vulnerabilities; points out that, in the event of a threat or an attack, water system operators can lose their ability to control the flow and quality of the water or lose the ability to track the true status of the water system; insists that vulnerability assessments and an emergency response plan should be an integral part of the water management system in every Member State; encourages the promotion of information sharing about threats to cybersecurity and procedures to exchange best practice among operators, as well as to establish a cybersecurity culture through technical security measures, competence building and awareness creation and communication; draws attention to the measures and provisions in the NIS2 Directive and the Critical Entities Resilience Directive which could help mitigate the arising security risks; calls on the Commission to take the lead in reinforcing the EU-level coordination formats and to propose effective tools in the upcoming Preparedness Union Strategy with the aim of ensuring timely preparedness to tackle environmental and non-environmental risks to the water bodies that are threatening the EU’s overall security;

    98.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to increase the involvement of women in decisions regarding water resilience; calls for the adoption of a methodological approach that effectively considers gender-related needs in the implementation of water supply projects, by implementing monitoring, reporting and tracking that use tools and indicators disaggregated by gender;

    99.  Notes that better data and data analysis are key to evidence-based decision-making and the swift identification of small changes in water quality that could present a threat to bodies of water, together with the evaluation of best practice and identification of the most cost-effective and impactful measures;

    100.  Stresses that improved, reliable and interoperable data on water supply, demand, distribution, accessibility and use are needed and that data points need to be established; urges the Commission and the Member States to enhance data collection and improve data interoperability across all levels to support the implementation of current water legislation, as well as to facilitate circular economy and water-smart industrial symbiosis strategies; highlights the fact that data and AI could be used in modelling water and energy consumption as well as reuse and recycling capacities;

    101.  Calls on the Commission to better recognise the fundamental role of the water sector in bolstering EU competiveness by fostering research and innovation and promoting entrepreneurship and talent; emphasises, in this regard, the importance of ramping up innovation in the water sector; points out that the European Innovation Centre for Industrial Transformation and Emissions, created as part of Directive 2010/75/EU, could play a role in this regard, as it evaluates the environmental performance of industrial technologies and gathers information on innovative industrial environmental techniques; points, further, to existing partnerships like the Water4All Partnership, a funding programme for scientific research;

    102.  Believes that there is a need to build and nurture multi-stakeholder platforms to promote innovation uptake at all levels, local and national; recommends that these platforms involve a wide range of participants – the public and private sectors, and civil society associations – to build a coalition of partners to bring about change; supports the promotion of knowledge sharing on how digital water technologies can support the implementation of existing EU water legislation, as well as capacity building at local, regional and national levels; calls on the Commission and the Members States to expand digital skills, and research and development (R&D) programmes targeting water, including through collaboration with universities, research centres and SMEs;

    103.  Acknowledges the critical role of data centres in the digital economy; notes with concern that the rapid expansion of the technology could lead to a substantial increase in AI’s demand for water resources associated with their operations, which could undermine the environmental benefits that AI promises to deliver, such as resource optimisation and carbon emission reductions, and stresses the need to integrate water efficiency measures in their design and operation; urges the Commission to address the use of water resources by information and communications technologies (ICT) and, in particular, by AI and data centres in its EWRS, in particular by encouraging data centres to reuse treated water and to promote the design of more efficient chips and components to reduce the need for cooling; recommends that the Member States prioritise water resilience strategies that address the specific challenges posed by data centres to ensure the sustainability of both the digital and the environmental agendas;

    104.  Recalls that seawater desalination is the process of removing salt from sea or brackish water to make it useable for a range of ‘fit for use’ purposes, including drinking, and that it is thus an important technological solution for people’s livelihoods; notes that, at the same time, desalination is an energy-intensive process and should ideally be done using renewable energy, whenever possible, in order to minimise environmental impacts; reiterates that desalination produces a by-product, brine (a concentrated salt solution), that must be properly disposed of to avoid adverse impacts on the marine environment; considers, therefore, that desalination based on reverse osmosis or thermal technologies should be applied, if other more environmentally sustainable options are not available or cannot be implemented, particularly in remote areas and islands; highlights, in this regard, the ongoing work on new technological solutions, such as microbial desalination cells, offering an environmentally sustainable and innovative alternative to traditional desalination methods, particularly to provide clean water and wastewater treatment to small, isolated locations without electricity;

    105.  Stresses the need for increased funding and R&D into technologies such as innovative desalination techniques in order to increase the efficiency, sustainability and the scaling up of such technologies; calls for research into the possibilities of using such technologies in agriculture to diversify the water supply points and therefore decrease the vulnerability of the sector to water stress;

    106.  Notes that in the last decade, there have been many scientific breakthroughs for making water treatment smarter and more circular, with these solutions offering opportunities for using digital solutions, AI and remote sensing to use water more efficiently and by reusing treated wastewater for irrigation and recovering energy and nutrients from wastewater;

    107.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to address the regulatory obstacles within the single market to facilitate the development, scaling-up, and placing on the market of innovative biotechnology and biomanufacturing solutions and the promotion of cleaner manufacturing and circularity;

    108.  Calls for the funding, development and authorisation of innovative solutions for crop protection and fertilisation, including biological control agents and active substances with lower impact on the environment, which are needed for a just transition to more sustainable agricultural systems;

    109.  Calls for specific programmes to be established for the cleaning and conservation of river channels, ensuring adequate flow and reducing the accumulation of debris and sediment that can affect water storage and distribution capacity;

    Cross-border and international cooperation

    110.  Stresses the need for a comprehensive EWRS that fosters cross-border cooperation, more uniform data collection and reporting, sharing best practice between local, regional and national actors, ensuring sustainable water management and equitable resource distribution among the Member States, preventing water challenges such as scarcity and flood risk from being passed on to other Member States;

    111.  Emphasises that climate change represents a major threat to water resources and aquatic ecosystems; notes that floods and water scarcity compromise food and water security and the health of the general population, ultimately affecting social cohesion and stability; recognises that water resilience is crucial for preventing and addressing current and future health, food, energy and security crises; emphasises that water resilience promotes transboundary water cooperation, serving as a catalyst for peace and security, as countries are interconnected through shared rivers and groundwater resources;

    112.  Calls for increased cross-border cooperation between the Member States in the management of shared river basins and groundwater aquifers and in the effective collection and sharing of data on water quality, pollution levels and water levels; recommends the establishment of regional cooperation centres to coordinate the implementation of joint water resilience strategies, taking into account the climate, social and economic challenges of each territory;

    113.  Calls for enhanced international cooperation, including at the level of river basins, to address the growing water crisis, ensure clean and high-quality water, promote sustainable water management and implement various innovative water technologies, including nature-based solutions; calls for the anchoring of cooperation across borders at operational, tactical and strategic levels;

    114.  Calls for the establishment of cross-border projects under Interreg and other EU funds to improve regional cooperation in the management of water resources, with a particular focus on ensuring the fair distribution of water between sectors and Member States;

    115.  Stresses the need to strengthen EU monitoring capacities through digitalisation and modern technologies, including satellite surveillance and real-time pollution tracking, which are essential for preventing and combating cross-border pollution;

    116.  Urges the Commission to implement a specific diplomatic role dedicated to resolving water-related conflicts, promoting water cooperation and protecting water sources and systems, particularly during armed conflicts and in transboundary contexts;

    117.  Urges the EU to lead international efforts to protect and restore water ecosystems in line with the SDG 6 on clean water and sanitation;

    o
    o   o

    118.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    (1) OJ L 243, 9.7.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1119/oj.
    (2) OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/60/oj.
    (3) OJ L 372, 27.12.2006, p. 19, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2006/118/oj.
    (4) OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, p. 84, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/105/oj.
    (5) OJ L 288, 6.11.2007, p. 27, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2007/60/oj.
    (6) OJ L 435, 23.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2020/2184/oj.
    (7) OJ L 177, 5.6.2020, p. 32, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/741/oj.
    (8) OJ L 164, 25.6.2008, p. 19, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/56/oj.
    (9) OJ L, 2024/3019, 12.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/3019/oj.
    (10) OJ L, 2024/1785, 15.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1785/oj.
    (11) OJ L 375, 31.12.1991, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1991/676/oj.
    (12) OJ L, 2024/1991, 29.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1991/oj.
    (13) OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 164, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2557/oj.
    (14) OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj.
    (15) OJ L 309, 24.11.2009, p. 71, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/128/oj.
    (16) OJ L 435, 6.12.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2115/oj.
    (17) OJ L, 2024/3190, 31.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/3190/oj.
    (18) OJ C 132, 14.4.2023, p. 54.
    (19) OJ C, C/2024/7216, 10.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7216/oj.
    (20) OJ C 132, 14.4.2023, p. 106.
    (21) OJ C 232, 16.6.2021, p. 28.
    (22) OJ C, C/2025/808, 11.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/808/oj.
    (23) OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 126.
    (24) OJ C 316, 22.9.2017, p. 99.
    (25) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0358.
    (26) World Meteorological Organization, 2021 State of Climate Services – Water, WMO-No 1278, WMO, Geneva, 2021.
    (27) European Environment Agency, Water resources across Europe – confronting water scarcity and drought, EEA Report 2/2009.
    (28) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (29) WWF, High Cost of Cheap Water, WWF, Gland, 2021.
    (30) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (31) European Commission, Attitudes of Europeans towards the environment, Special Eurobarometer 550, May 2024.
    (32) European Commission: Directorate-General for Environment, et al., Implementation of water balances in the EU – Final report, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.
    (33) Disclosure Insight Action (CDP) and Planet Tracker, High and Dry. How Water Issues Are Stranding Assets, 2022.
    (34) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (35) European Environment Agency, ‘Water abstraction by economic sector in the 27 EU Member States, 2000-2022’, European Environment Agency website, 5 December 2024, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/water-abstraction-by-source-and/water-abstraction-by-economic?activeTab=8a280073-bf94-4717-b3e2-1374b57ca99d.
    (36) Eurostat, ‘Archive: Water use in industry’, Eurostat website, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Archive:Water_use_in_industry&oldid=196132#Further_Eurostat_information.
    (37) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (38) Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Water accounting and auditing, A sourcebook, FAO Water Reports 43, FAO, Rome, 2016.
    (39) European Investment Bank, Wastewater as a resource, EIB, 2022.
    (40) European Commission: Directorate-General for Environment, ‘Water reuse: New EU rules to improve access to safe irrigation’, European Commission website, 26 June 2023, https://environment.ec.europa.eu/news/water-reuse-new-eu-rules-improve-access-safe-irrigation-2023-06-26_en.
    (41) European Commission: Directorate-General for Environment, ‘Zero pollution: Improved quality and access to drinking water’, European Commission website, 12 January 2023, https://environment.ec.europa.eu/news/improved-quality-and-access-drinking-water-all-europeans-2023-01-12_en.
    (42) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (43) Ibid.
    (44) Ibid.
    (45) Ibid.
    (46) Ibid.
    (47) Ibid.
    (48) European Environment Agency, ‘Industrial pollutant releases to water in Europe’, European Environment Agency website, 30 May 2024, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/industrial-pollutant-releases-to-water.
    (49) Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) (OJ L 334, 17.12.2010, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2010/75/oj).
    (50) European Commission ‘Nitrates’, European Commission website, https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/water/nitrates_en#implementation.
    (51) European Environment Agency, ‘Public exposure to widely used Bisphenol A exceeds acceptable health safety levels’, European Environment Agency website, 14 September 2023, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/newsroom/news/public-exposure-to-bisphenol-a.
    (52) European Environment Agency, European Climate Risk Assessment, EEA Report 01/2024.
    (53) Cammalleri, C. et al., Global warming and drought impacts in the EU, JRC Technical Report , Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
    (54) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (55) Feyen, L. et al., Climate change impacts and adaptation in Europe, JRC PESETA IV final report, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
    (56) European Environment AgencyEuropean Climate Risk Assessment, EEA Report 01/2024.
    (57) United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, GAR Special Report on Drought 2021, Geneva, UNDRR, 2021.
    (58) Council conclusions of 14 October 2024 on Desertification, Land Degradation and Drought.
    (59) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (60) Directive (EU) 2024/1203 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on the protection of the environment through criminal law and replacing Directives 2008/99/EC and 2009/123/EC (OJ L, 2024/1203, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1203/oj).
    (61) European Patent Office, Innovation in water-related technologies, EPO, Munich 2024.
    (62) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (63) European Commission JRC Science for Policy Report, ‘Technical proposals for the safe use of processed manure above the threshold established for Nitrate Vulnerable Zones by the Nitrates Directive (91/676/EEC)’, 2020.
    (64) Regulation (EC) No 1935/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004 on materials and articles intended to come into contact with food and repealing Directives 80/590/EEC and 89/109/EEC (OJ L 338, 13.11.2004, p. 4, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2004/1935/oj).
    (65) European Environment Agency,‘Industrial pollutant releases to water in Europe, European Environment Agency website, 30 May 2024, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/industrial-pollutant-releases-to-water.
    (66) United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Build Back Better in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction, UNISDR, Geneva, 2019.
    (67) European Commission: Directorate-General for Environment et al. Stock-taking analysis and outlook of drought policies, planning and management in EU Member States – Final Report, Publications Office of the European Union, 2023.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – A revamped long-term budget for the Union in a changing world – P10_TA(2025)0090 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to Articles 311, 312, 323 and 324 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(1) and to the joint declarations agreed between Parliament, the Council and the Commission in this context and the related unilateral declarations,

    –  having regard to Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020 on the system of own resources of the European Union and repealing Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom(2),

    –  having regard to the amended Commission proposal of 23 June 2023 for a Council decision amending Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 on the system of own resources of the European Union (COM(2023)0331),

    –  having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources(3) (the IIA),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast)(4) (the Financial Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(5) (the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

    –  having regard to its position of 27 February 2024 on the draft Council regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(6),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 10 May 2023 on own resources: a new start for EU finances, a new start for Europe(7),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2022 on upscaling the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework: a resilient EU budget fit for new challenges(8),

    –  having regard to its position of 16 December 2020 on the draft Council regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(9),

    –  having regard to the Interinstitutional Proclamation on the European Pillar of Social Rights of 13 December 2017(10) and to the Commission Action Plan of 4 March 2021 on the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights (COM(2021)0102),

    –  having regard to the Agreement adopted at the 15th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (COP 15) in Montreal on 19 December 2022 (Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework),

    –  having regard to the Agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

    –  having regard to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals,

    –  having regard to the report of 30 October 2024 by Sauli Niinistö entitled ‘Safer together – strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness and readiness’ (the Niinistö report),

    –  having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (the Draghi report),

    –  having regard to the report of 4 September 2024 of the Strategic Dialogue on the Future of EU Agriculture entitled ‘A shared prospect for farming and food in Europe’,

    –  having regard to the report of 17 April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market – speed, security, solidarity: empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens’ (the Letta report),

    –  having regard to the report of 20 February 2024 of the High-Level Group on the Future of Cohesion Policy entitled ‘Forging a sustainable future together – cohesion for a competitive and inclusive Europe’,

    –  having regard to the Budapest Declaration on the New European Competitiveness Deal,

    –  having regard to the joint communication of 26 March 2025 entitled ‘European Preparedness Union Strategy’ (JOIN(2025)0130),

    –  having regard to the joint white paper of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 7 March 2025 entitled ‘A Roadmap for Women’s Rights’ (COM(2025)0097),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: a joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 19 February 2025 entitled ‘A Vision for Agriculture and Food’ (COM(2025)0075),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘The road to the next multiannual financial framework’ (COM(2025)0046),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 9 December 2021 entitled ‘Building an economy that works for people: an action plan for the social economy’ (COM(2021)0778),

    –  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 20 March 2025, 6 March 2025 and 19 December 2024,

    –  having regard to the political guidelines of 18 July 2024 for the next European Commission 2024-2029,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 20 November 2024 entitled ‘EU budget and place-based policies: proposals for new design and delivery mechanisms in the MFF post-2027’(11),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Development, the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Regional Development, the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, the Committee on Culture and Education, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, and the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A10-0076/2025),

    A.  whereas, under Article 311 TFEU, the Union is required to provide itself with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its policies;

    B.  whereas the Union budget is primarily an investment tool that can achieve economies of scale unattainable at Member State level and support European public goods, in particular through cross-border projects; whereas all spending through the Union budget must provide European added value and deliver discernible net benefits compared to spending at national or sub-national level, leading to real and lasting results;

    C.  whereas spending through the Union budget, if effectively targeted, aligned with the Union’s political priorities and better coordinated with spending at national level, helps to avoid fragmentation in the single market, promote upwards convergence, decrease inequalities and boost the overall impact of public investment; whereas public investment is essential as a catalyst for private investment in sectors where the market alone cannot drive the required investment;

    D.  whereas the NextGenerationEU recovery instrument (NGEU) established in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic enabled significant additional investment capacity of EUR 750 billion in 2018 prices – beyond the Union budget, which amounts to 1,1 % of the EU-27’s gross national income (GNI) – prompting a swift recovery and return to growth and supporting the green and digital transitions; whereas NGEU will not be in place post-2027;

    E.  whereas in 2022 Member States spent an average of 1,4 % of gross domestic product (GDP) on State aid – significantly more than their contribution to the Union budget – with over half of the State aid unrelated to crises;

    F.  whereas the Union budget, bolstered by NGEU and loans through the SURE scheme, has been instrumental in alleviating the economic and social impact of the COVID-19 crisis and in responding to the effects of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the Union budget remains ill-equipped, in terms of size, structure and rules, to fully play its role in adjusting to evolving spending needs, addressing shocks and responding to crises and giving practical effect to the principle of solidarity, and to enable the Union to fulfil its objectives as established under the Treaties;

    G.  whereas people rightly expect more from the Union and its budget, including the capacity to respond quickly and effectively to evolving needs and to provide them with the necessary support, especially in times of crisis;

    H.  whereas, since the adoption of the current multiannual financial framework (MFF), the political, economic and social context has changed beyond recognition, compounding underlying structural challenges for the Union and leading to a substantial revision of the MFF in 2024;

    I.  whereas the context in which the Commission will prepare its proposals for the post-2027 MFF is every bit as challenging, with the established global and geopolitical order changing quickly and radically, the return of large-scale warfare in the Union’s immediate neighbourhood, a highly challenging economic and social backdrop and the worsening climate and biodiversity crisis; whereas, as the Commission has made clear, the status quo is not an option and the Union budget will need to change accordingly;

    J.  whereas the US administration has decided to retreat from the country’s post-war global role in guaranteeing peace and security, in leading on global governance in the rules-based, multilateral international order and in providing essential development and humanitarian aid to those most in need around the world; whereas the Union will therefore have to step up to fill part of the void the US appears set to leave, placing additional demands on the budget;

    K.  whereas the Union has committed to take all the steps needed to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest and to protect nature and reverse biodiversity loss; whereas delivering on the policy framework put in place to achieve this objective will require substantial investment; whereas the Union budget will have to play a key role in providing and incentivising that investment;

    L.  whereas, in order to compensate for the budget’s shortcomings, there have been numerous workaround solutions that make the budget more opaque, leaving the public in the dark about the real volume of Union spending, undermining the longer-term predictability of investment the budget is designed to provide and undercutting not only the principle of budget unity, but also Parliament’s role as a legislator and budgetary and discharge authority and in holding the executive to account;

    M.  whereas the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities; whereas breaches of those values undermine the cohesion of the Union, erode the rights of Union citizens and weaken mutual trust among Member States;

    1.  Insists that, in a fast changing world where people rightly expect more from the Union and its budget and where the Union is confronted with a growing number of crises, the next MFF must be endowed with increased resources compared to the 2021-2027 period, moving away from the historically restrictive, self-imposed level of 1 % of GNI;

    2.  Underscores that the next MFF must focus on financing European public goods with discernible added value compared to national spending; highlights the need for enhanced synergies and better coordination between Union and national spending; emphasises that spending will have to address major challenges, such as the return of large-scale warfare in the Union’s immediate neighbourhood, a highly challenging economic and social backdrop, a competitiveness gap and the worsening climate and biodiversity crisis;

    3.  Considers that the ‘one national plan per Member State’ approach as envisaged by the Commission, with the Recovery and Resilience Facility model as a blueprint, cannot be the basis for shared management spending post-2027; underlines that the design of shared management spending under the next MFF must fully safeguard Parliament’s roles as legislator and budgetary and discharge authority and be designed and implemented through close collaboration with regional and local authorities and all relevant stakeholders;

    4.  Calls for the next MFF to continue support for economic, social and territorial cohesion in order to help bind the Union together, deepen the single market, promote convergence and reduce inequality, poverty and social exclusion;

    5.  Considers that the idea of an umbrella Competitiveness Fund merging existing programmes as envisaged by the Commission is not fit for purpose; stresses that the fund should instead be a new instrument taking advantage of a toolbox of funding based on lessons learned from InvestEU and the Innovation Fund and complementing existing, highly successful programmes;

    6.  Stresses that, in particular in the light of the US’s retreat from its role as a global guarantor of peace and security, there is a clear need to progress towards a genuine Defence Union, with the next MFF supporting a comprehensive security approach through an increase in investment; stresses that defence spending cannot come at the expense of nor lead to a reduction in long-term investment in the economic, social and territorial cohesion of the Union;

    7.  Calls for genuine simplification for final beneficiaries by avoiding programmes with overlapping objectives, diverging eligibility criteria and different rules governing horizontal provisions; underlines that simplification cannot mean more leeway for the Commission without the necessary checks and balances and must therefore be achieved with full respect for the institutional balance provided for in the Treaties;

    8.  Insists on enhanced in-built crisis response capacity in the next MFF and sufficient margins under each heading; stresses that, alongside predictability for investment, spending programmes should retain a substantial in-built flexibility reserve, with allocation to specific policy objectives to be decided by the budgetary authority; underlines that flexibility for humanitarian aid should be ring-fenced; considers that the post-2027 MFF should include two special instruments – one dedicated to ensuring solidarity in the event of natural disasters and one for general-purpose crisis response;

    9.  Underlines that compliance with Union values and fundamental rights is an essential pre-requisite to access EU funds; insists that the Union budget be protected against misuse, fraud and breaches of the principle of the rule of law and calls for a stronger link between the rule of law and the Union budget post-2027;

    10.  Underlines that the repayment of NGEU borrowing must not endanger the financing of EU policies and priorities; stresses, therefore, that all costs related to borrowing backed by the Union budget or the budgetary headroom be treated distinctly from appropriations for EU programmes within the future MFF architecture;

    11.  Calls on the Council to adopt new own resources as a matter of urgency in order to enable sustainable repayment of NGEU borrowing; stresses that new genuine own resources, beyond the IIA, are essential for the Union’s higher spending needs; considers that all instruments and tools should be explored in order to provide the Union with the necessary resources, and considers, in this respect, that joint borrowing presents a viable option to ensure that the Union has sufficient resources to respond to acute Union-wide crises, such as the ongoing crisis in the area of security and defence;

    12.  Stands ready to work constructively with the Council and Commission to deliver a long-term budget that addresses the Union’s needs; highlights that the post-2027 MFF is being constructed in a far from ‘business as usual’ context and takes seriously its institutional role as enshrined in the Treaties; insists that it will only approve a long-term budget that is fit for purpose for the Union in a changing world and calls for swift adoption of the MFF to enable timely implementation of spending programmes from 1 January 2028;

    A long-term budget with a renewed spending focus

    13.  Considers that, in view of the structural challenges facing the Union, the post-2027 MFF should adjust its spending focus to ensure that the Union can meet its strategic policy aims as detailed below;

    Competitiveness, strategic autonomy, social, economic and territorial cohesion and resilience

    14.  Is convinced that boosting competitiveness, decarbonising the economy and enhancing the Union’s innovation capacity are central priorities for the post-2027 MFF and are vital to ensure long-term, sustainable and inclusive growth and a thriving, more resilient economy and society;

    15.  Considers that the Union must develop a competitiveness framework in line with its own values and political aims and that competitiveness must foster not only economic growth, but also social, economic and territorial cohesion and environmental sustainability as underlined in both the Draghi and Letta reports;

    16.  Underlines that, as spelt out in the Letta and Draghi reports, the European economy and social model are under intense strain, with the productivity, competitiveness and skills gap having knock-on effects on the quality of jobs and on living standards for Europeans already grappling with high housing, energy and food prices; is concerned that a lack of job opportunities and high costs of living increase the risk of a brain drain away from Europe;

    17.  Points out that Draghi puts the annual investment gap with respect to innovation and infrastructure at EUR 750-800 billion per year between 2025 and 2030; underlines that the Union budget must play a vital role but it cannot cover that shortfall alone, and that the bulk of the effort will have to come from the private sector – points to the need to exploit synergies between public and private investment, in particular by simplifying and harmonising the EU investment architecture;

    18.  Stresses that the Union budget must be carefully coordinated with national spending, so as to ensure complementarity, and must be designed such that it can de-risk, mobilise and leverage private investment effectively, enabling start-ups and SMEs to access funds more readily; calls, therefore, for programmes such as InvestEU, which ensures additionality and follows a market-based, demand-driven approach, to be significantly reinforced in the next MFF; considers that financial instruments and budgetary guarantees are an effective use of resources to achieve critical Union policy goals and calls for them to be further simplified;

    19.  Insists that more must be done to maximise the potential of the role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group – together with other international and national financial institutions – in lending and de-risking in strategic policy areas, such as climate and, latterly, security and defence projects; calls for an increased risk appetite and ambition from the EIB Group to crowd in investment, based on a strong capital position, and for a reinforced investment partnership to ensure that every euro spent at Union level is used in the most effective manner;

    20.  Emphasises that funding for research and innovation, including support for basic research, should be significantly increased, should be focused on the Union’s strategic priorities, should continue to be determined by the principle of excellence and should remain merit-based; considers that there should be sufficient resources across the MFF and at national level to fund all high-quality projects throughout the innovation cycle and to achieve the 3 % GDP target for research and development spending by 2030;

    21.  Stresses that the next MFF, building on the current Connecting Europe Facility, should include much greater, directly managed funding for energy, transport and digital infrastructure, with priority given to cross-border connections and national links with European added value; considers that such infrastructure is an absolute precondition for a successful deepening of the single market and for increasing the Union’s resilience in a changing geopolitical order;

    22.  Points out that a secure and robust space sector is critical for the Union’s autonomy and sovereignty and therefore needs sustained investment;

    23.  Underlines that a more competitive, productive and socially inclusive economy helps to generate high-quality, well-paid jobs, thus enhancing people’s standard of living; emphasises that, through programmes such as the European Social Fund+ and Erasmus+, the Union budget can play an important role in supporting education and training systems, enhancing social inclusion, boosting workforce adaptability through reskilling and upskilling, and thus preparing people for employment in a modern economy;

    24.  Insists that the Union budget should continue to support important economic and job-creating sectors where the Union is already a world leader, such as tourism and the cultural and creative sectors; underscores the need for dedicated funding for tourism, including to implement the EU Strategy for Sustainable Tourism, in the Union budget post-2027; points to the importance of Creative Europe in contributing to Europe’s diversity and competitiveness and in supporting vibrant societies;

    25.  Stresses that, in order to compete with other major global players, the European economy must also become more competitive and resilient on the supply side by investing more in the Union’s open strategic autonomy through enhanced industrial policy and a focus on strategic sectors, resource-efficiency and critical technologies to reduce dependence on third countries;

    26.  Considers that, in light of the above, the idea of an umbrella Competitiveness Fund merging existing programmes as envisaged by the Commission is not fit for purpose; stresses that the fund should instead be a new instrument taking advantage of a toolbox of funding based on lessons learned from InvestEU and the Innovation Fund; recalls that, under Article 182 TFEU, the Union is required to adopt a framework programme for research;

    27.  Notes that, in the Commission communication on the competitiveness compass, the Commission argues that a new competitiveness coordination tool should be established in order to better align industrial and research policies and investment between EU and national level; notes that the proposed new tool is envisaged as part of a ‘new, lean steering mechanism’ designed ‘to reinforce the link between overall policy coordination and the EU budget’; insists that Parliament must play a full decision-making role in both mechanisms;

    28.  Emphasises that food security is a vital component of strategic autonomy and that the next MFF must continue to support the competitiveness and resilience of the Union’s farming and fisheries sectors, including small-scale and young farmers and fishers, and help the sectors to better protect the climate and biodiversity, as well as the seas and oceans; highlights that a modern and simplified common agricultural policy is crucial for increasing productivity through technical progress, ensuring a fair standard of living for farmers, guaranteeing food security and the production of safe, high-quality and affordable food for Europeans, fostering generational renewal and ensuring the viability of rural areas;

    29.  Points out that the farming sector is particularly vulnerable to inflationary shocks which affect farmers’ purchasing power; calls for an increased and dedicated budget for the CAP in the next MFF, safeguarding it from possible cuts, in order to maintain its integrity and commonality, as well as the coherence and interconnection between its first and second pillar, and therefore opposes the idea of integrating the CAP into a single fund for each Member State; calls for additional dedicated funding sources to be explored where appropriate, including outside of the CAP, in order to cope with natural disasters and provide incentives to farmers and foresters to contribute to climate change mitigation, biodiversity recovery and nature protection, without measures causing a regression in EU agricultural production;

    30.  Stresses that the new global challenges facing EU farmers, including the present geopolitical situation, climate change and rising input prices, require sound financial allocation in the next CAP; emphasises that, in order to address these challenges, taking into account the lessons learned from the COVID-19 crisis, and to avoid reductions to farmers’ support, the CAP urgently needs an increased budget in the next MFF that is indexed to inflation through annual re-evaluation; underlines, in that respect, that direct payments in the current form generate clear EU added value and should continue to strengthen income security, production and protection against price volatility, better targeting persons actively engaged in agricultural production and the provision of public goods, while respecting realistic and balanced EU environmental and social standards; calls for a fair and efficient distribution of CAP support within and among the Member States; calls for the continuation and reinforcement of measures that maintain production in vulnerable areas and guarantee the viability of rural communities and the adequacy of public infrastructure, specifically regarding digitalisation and particularly through the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, and the renewed involvement of local and regional authorities in the management of such measures; stresses the need to increase and reform the agricultural reserve in order to respond effectively and rapidly to future crises that the European agricultural sector will have to deal with, and to establish new tools for managing natural, market and sanitary risks, such as an EU reinsurance scheme to better mitigate the effects of future crises and provide greater stability for farmers; emphasises that specific solutions must be found for the farmers in eastern Europe who are most affected by the cascade effects of Russia’s war against Ukraine, such as high input prices, inflation and market disturbances; urges the Commission to continue to set up the necessary financial and legal framework for the food supply chain in order to strengthen the position of farmers and better combat unfair trading practices; calls on the Commission to support EU farmers by promoting agri-food products inside and outside the Union through a dynamic and stronger EU promotion policy; regrets the funding cuts made to the programme on the promotion of agricultural products during the review of the current MFF; emphasises that the next MFF must include dedicated funds for agri-tourism, female entrepreneurship, vocational training and technological innovation in agriculture;

    31.  Recalls that social, economic and territorial cohesion is a cornerstone of European integration and is vital in binding the Union together and deepening the single market; reaffirms, in that respect, the importance of the convergence process; underlines that a modernised cohesion policy must follow a decentralised, place-based, multilevel governance approach and be built around the shared management and partnership principle, fully involving local and regional authorities and relevant stakeholders, ensuring that resources are directed where they are most needed to reduce regional disparities;

    32.  Stresses that cohesion policy funding must tackle the key challenges the Union faces, such as demographic change and depopulation, and target the regions and people most in need; calls, furthermore, for enhanced access to EU funding for cities, regions and urban authorities; recalls that, under Article 349 TFEU, the Union is required to put in place specific measures for the outermost regions and stresses, therefore, the need for continued, targeted support for these regions in the next MFF, including via a reinforced programme of options specifically relating to remoteness and insularity (POSEI);

    33.  Recalls the importance of the social dimension of the European Union and of promoting the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, its Action Plan and headline targets; emphasises that the Union budget should, therefore, play a pivotal role in reducing inequality, poverty and social exclusion, including by supporting children, families and vulnerable groups; recalls that around 20 million children in the Union are at risk of poverty and social exclusion; stresses that addressing child poverty across the Union requires appropriately funded, comprehensive and integrated measures, together with the efficient implementation of the European Child Guarantee at national level; emphasises that Parliament has consistently requested a dedicated budget within the ESF+ to support the Child Guarantee as a central pillar of the EU anti-poverty strategy;

    34.  Highlights, in this regard, the EU-wide housing crisis affecting millions of families and young people; stresses the need for enhanced support for housing through the Union budget, in particular via cohesion policy, and through other funding sources, such as the EIB Group and national promotional banks; acknowledges that, while Union financing cannot solve the housing crisis alone, it can play a crucial role in financing urgent measures and complementing broader Union and national efforts to improve housing affordability and enhance energy efficiency of the housing stock;

    35.  Points out that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has had substantial economic and social consequences, in particular in Member States bordering Russia and Belarus; insists that the next MFF provide support to these regions;

    The green and digital transitions

    36.  Highlights that the green and digital transitions are inextricably linked to competitiveness, the modernisation of the economy and the resilience of society and act as catalysts for a future-oriented and resource-efficient economy; insists therefore, that the post-2027 MFF must continue to support and to further accelerate the twin transitions;

    37.  Recalls that the Union budget is an essential contributor to achieving climate neutrality by 2050, including through support for the 2030 and 2040 targets; underlines that the transition will require a decarbonisation of the economy, in particular through the deployment of clean technologies, improved energy and transport infrastructure and more energy-efficient housing; notes that the Commission estimates additional investment needs to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 at 1,5 % of GDP per year compared to the decade 2011-2020 and that, while the Union budget alone cannot cover the gap, it must remain a vital contributor; calls, therefore, for increased directly managed support for environment and biodiversity protection and climate action building on the current LIFE programme;

    38.  Underlines that industry will be central in the transition to net zero and the establishment of the Energy Union, and that support will be needed in helping some industrial sectors and their workers to adapt; stresses the importance of a just transition that must leave no one behind, requiring, inter alia, investment in regions that are heavily fossil-fuel dependent and increased support for vulnerable households, in particular through the Just Transition Mechanism and the Social Climate Fund;

    39.  Points to the profound technological shift under way, with technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum both creating opportunities, in terms of the Union’s economic potential and global leadership and improvements to citizens’ lives, and posing reliability, ethical and sovereignty challenges; stresses that the next MFF must support research into, and the development and safe application of digital technologies and help people to hone the knowledge and skills they need to work with and use them;

    Security, defence and preparedness

    40.  Recalls that peace and security are the foundation for the Union’s prosperity, social model and competitiveness, and a vital pillar of the Union’s geopolitical standing; stresses that the next MFF must support a comprehensive security approach by investing significantly more in safeguarding the Union against the myriad threats it faces;

    41.  Underlines that, as the Niinistö report makes clear, multiple threats are combining to heighten instability and increase the Union’s vulnerability, chief among them the fragmenting global order, the security threat posed by Russia and Belarus, growing tensions globally, hostile international actors, the globalisation of criminal networks, hybrid campaigns – which include cyberattacks, foreign information manipulation, disinformation and interference and the instrumentalisation of migration – increasingly frequent and intense extreme weather events as a result of climate change, and health threats;

    42.  Points out that the Union has played a vital role in achieving lasting peace on its territory and must continue to do so by adjusting to the reality of war on its doorstep and the need to vastly boost defence infrastructure, capabilities and readiness, including through the Union budget, going far beyond the current allocation of less than 2 % of the MFF;

    43.  Notes that European defence capabilities suffer from decades of under-investment and that, according to the Commission, the defence spending gap currently stands at EUR 500 billion for the next decade; underlines that the Union budget alone cannot fill the gap, but has an important role to play, in conjunction with national budgets and with a focus on clear EU added value; considers that the Union budget and lending through the EIB Group can help incentivise investment in defence; stresses that defence spending must not come at the expense of social and environmental spending, nor must it lead to a reduction in funding for long-standing Union policies that have proved their worth over time;

    44.  Underlines the merits of the defence programmes and instruments put in place during the current MFF, which have enhanced joint research, production and procurement in the field of defence, providing a valuable foundation on which to build further Union policy and investment;

    45.  Emphasises that, given the geopolitical situation, there is a clear need to act and to progress towards a genuine Defence Union, in coordination with NATO and in full alignment with the neutrality commitments of individual Member States; concurs, in that regard, with the Commission’s analysis that the next MFF must provide a comprehensive and robust framework in support of EU defence;

    46.  Underscores the importance of a competitive and resilient European defence technological and industrial base; considers that enhanced joint EU-level investment in defence in the next MFF backed up by a clear and transparent governance structure can help to avoid duplication, generate economies of scale, and thus significant savings for Member States, reduce fragmentation and ensure the interoperability of equipment and systems; underscores the importance of technology in modern defence systems and therefore of investing in research, cyber-defence and cybersecurity and in dual-use products; points to the need to direct support towards the defence industry within the Union, thus strengthening strategic autonomy, creating quality high-skilled jobs, driving innovation and creating cross-border opportunities for EU businesses, including SMEs;

    47.  Points to the importance of increasing support in the budget for military mobility, which upgrades infrastructure for dual-use military and civilian purposes, enabling the large-scale movement of military equipment and personnel at short notice and thus contributing to the Union’s defence capabilities and collective security; highlights, in that regard, the importance of financing for the trans-European transport networks to enable their adaptation for dual-use purposes;

    48.  Emphasises that the Union needs to ramp up funding for preparedness across the board; is alarmed by the growing impact of natural disasters, which are often the result of climate change and are therefore likely to occur with greater frequency and intensity in the future; points out that, according to the 2024 European Climate Risk Assessment Report, cumulated economic losses from natural disasters could reach about 1,4 % of Union GDP;

    49.  Underlines, therefore, that, in addition to efforts to mitigate climate change through the green transition, significant investment is required to adapt to climate change, in particular to prevent and reduce the impact of natural disasters and severe weather events; considers that support for this purpose, such as through the current Union Civil Protection Mechanism, must be significantly increased in the next MFF and made available quickly to local and regional authorities, which are often on the frontline;

    50.  Emphasises that reconstruction and recovery measures after natural disasters must be based on the ‘build back better’ approach and prioritise nature-based solutions; stresses the importance of sustainable water management and security and hydric resilience as part of the Union’s overall preparedness strategy;

    51.  Recalls that the COVID-19 pandemic wreaked economic and social havoc globally and that a key lesson from the experience is that there is a need to prioritise investment in prevention of, preparedness for and response to health threats, in medical research and disease prevention, in access to critical medicines, in healthcare infrastructure, in physical and mental health and in the resilience and accessibility of public health systems in the Union; recalls that strategic autonomy in health is key to ensuring the Union’s preparedness in this area;

    52.  Considers that the next MFF must build on the work done in the current programming period by ensuring that the necessary investment is in place to build a genuine European Health Union that delivers for all citizens;

    53.  Underlines that, with technological developments, it has become easier for malicious and opportunistic foreign actors to spread disinformation, encourage online hate speech, interfere in elections and mount cyberattacks against the Union’s interests; insists that the next MFF must invest in enhanced cybersecurity capabilities and equip the Union to counter hybrid warfare in its various guises;

    54.  Stresses that a free, independent and pluralistic media is a fundamental component of Europe’s resilience, safeguarding not only the free flow of information but also a democratic mindset, critical thinking and informed decision-making; points to the importance of investment in independent and investigative journalism, fact-checking initiatives, digital and media literacy and critical thinking to safeguard against disinformation, foreign information manipulation and electoral interference as part of the European Democracy Shield initiative and therefore to guarantee democratic resilience; underscores the need for continued Union budget support for initiatives in these areas;

    55.  Underscores the importance of continued funding, in the next MFF, for effective protection of the EU’s external borders; underlines the need to counter transnational criminal networks and better protect victims of trafficking networks, and to strengthen resilience and response capabilities to address hybrid attacks and the instrumentalisation of migration, by third countries or hostile non-state actors; highlights, in particular, the need for support to frontline Member States for the purposes of securing the external borders of the EU;

    56.  Underlines that the EU’s resilience and preparedness are inextricably linked to those of its regional and global partners; emphasises that strengthening partners’ capacity to prevent, withstand and effectively respond to extreme weather events, health crises, hybrid campaigns, cyberattacks or armed conflict also lowers the risk of spill-over effects for Europe;

    External action and enlargement

    57.  Insists that, in a context of heightened global instability, the Union must continue to engage constructively with third countries and support peace, and conflict prevention, stability, prosperity, security, human rights, the rule of law, equality, democracy and sustainable development globally, in line with its global responsibility values and international commitments;

    58.  Regrets the fact that external action in the current MFF has been underfunded, leading to significant recourse to special instruments and substantial reinforcements in the mid-term revision; notes, in particular, that humanitarian aid funding has been woefully inadequate, prompting routine use of the Emergency Aid Reserve;

    59.  Underlines that the US’s retreat from its post-war global role in guaranteeing peace, security and democracy, in leading on global governance in the rules-based, multilateral international order and in providing essential development and humanitarian aid to those most in need around the world will leave an enormous gap and that the Union has a responsibility and overwhelming strategic interest in helping to fill that gap; calls on the Commission to address the consequences of the US’s retreat at the latest in its proposal for the post-2027 MFF;

    60.  Stresses that the next MFF must continue to tackle the most pressing global challenges, from fighting climate change, to providing relief in the event of natural disasters, preventing and addressing violent conflict and guaranteeing global security, ensuring global food security, improving healthcare and education systems, reducing poverty and inequality, promoting democracy, human rights, the rule of law and social justice and boosting competitiveness and the security of global supply chains, in full compliance with the principle of policy coherence for development; emphasises, in particular, the need for support for the Union’s Southern and Eastern Neighbourhoods;

    61.  Underlines that, in particular in light of the drastic cuts to the USAID budget, the budget must uphold the Union’s role as the world’s leading provider of development aid and climate finance in line with the Union’s global obligations and commitments; recalls, in that regard, that the Union and its Member States have collectively committed to allocating 0,7 % of their GNI to official development assistance and that poverty alleviation must remain its primary objective; insists that the budget must continue to support the Union in its efforts to defend the rules-based international order, democracy, multilateralism, human rights and fundamental values;

    62.  Insists that, given the unprecedented scale of humanitarian crises, mounting global challenges and uncertainty of US assistance under the current administration, humanitarian aid funding must be significantly enhanced and that its use must remain solely needs-based and respect the principles of neutrality, independence and impartiality; emphasises that the needs-based nature of humanitarian aid requires ring-fenced funding delivered through a stand-alone spending programme, distinct from other external action financing; underscores, furthermore, that effective humanitarian aid provision is contingent on predictability through a sufficient annual baseline allocation;

    63.  Emphasises that humanitarian aid, by its very nature, requires substantial flexibility and response capacity; considers, therefore, that, in addition to an adequate baseline figure, humanitarian aid will require significant ring-fenced flexibility in its design to enable an effective response to the growing crises;

    64.  Emphasises that, in a context in which global actors are increasingly using trade interdependence as a means of economic coercion, the Union must bolster its capacity to protect and advance its own strategic interests, develop more robust tools to counter coercion and ensure genuine reciprocity in its partnerships; stresses that such an approach requires the strategic allocation of external financing so as to support, for example, economic, security and energy partnerships that align with the Union’s values and strategic interests;

    65.  Considers that enlargement represents an opportunity to strengthen the Union as a geopolitical power and that the next MFF is pivotal for preparing the Union for enlargement and the candidate countries for accession; recalls that the stability, security and democratic resilience of the candidate countries are inextricably connected to those of the EU and require sustained strategic investment, linked to reforms, to support their convergence with Union standards; underlines the important role that citizens and civil society organisations play in the process of enlargement;

    66.  Points to the need for strategically targeted support for pre-accession and for growth and investment; is of the view that post-2027 pre-accession assistance should be provided in the form of both grants and loans; believes, in that context, that the future framework should allow for innovative financing mechanisms, as well as lending to candidate countries backed by the budgetary headroom (the difference between the own resources and the MFF ceilings);

    67.  Stresses that financial support must be conditional on the implementation of reforms aligned with the Union acquis and policies and adherence to Union values; emphasises, in this regard, the need for a strong governance model that ensures parliamentary accountability, oversight and control and a strong, effective anti-fraud architecture;

    68.  Reiterates its full support for Ukrainians in their fight for freedom and democracy and deplores the terrible suffering and impact resulting from Russia’s unprovoked and unjustifiable war of aggression; welcomes the decision to grant Ukraine and the neighbouring Republic of Moldova candidate country status and insists on the need to deploy the necessary funds to support their accession processes;

    69.  Underlines that pre-accession support to Ukraine has to be distinct from and additional to financial assistance for macroeconomic stability, reconstruction and post-war recovery, where needs are far more substantial and require a concerted international effort, of which support through the Union budget should be an important part;

    70.  Is convinced that the existing mandatory revision clause in the event of enlargement should be maintained in the next framework and that national envelopes should not be affected; underlines that the next MFF will also have to put in place appropriate transitional and phasing-in measures for key spending areas, such as cohesion and agriculture, based on a careful assessment of the impacts on different sectors;

    Fundamental rights, Union values and the rule of law

    71.  Emphasises the importance of the Union budget and programmes like Erasmus+ and Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values in promoting and protecting democracy and the Union’s values, fostering the Union’s common cultural heritage and European integration, enhancing citizen engagement, civic education and youth participation, safeguarding and promoting fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the rule of law; calls, in this regard, for increased funding for Erasmus+ in the next MFF; points to the importance of the independence of the justice system, the sound functioning of national institutions, de-oligarchisation, robust support for and, in line with article 11(2) TEU, an active dialogue with civil society, which is vital for fostering an active civic space, ensuring accountability and transparency and informing policymakers about best practices from the ground;

    72.  Highlights, in that connection, that the recast of the Financial Regulation requires the Commission and the Member States, in the implementation of the budget, to ensure compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and to respect the values on which the Union is founded, which are enshrined in Article 2 TEU; expects the Commission to ensure that the proposals for the next MFF, including for the spending programmes, are aligned with the Financial Regulation recast;

    73.  Stresses that instability in neighbouring regions and beyond, poverty, underlying trends in economic development, demographic changes and climate change, continue to generate migration flows towards the Union, placing significant pressure on asylum and migration systems; underlines that the post-2027 MFF must support the full and swift implementation of the Union’s Asylum and Migration Pact and effective return and readmission policies, in line with fundamental rights and EU values, including the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility; underlines, moreover, that, in line with the Pact, the EU must pursue enhanced cooperation and mutually beneficial partnerships with third countries on migration, with adequate parliamentary scrutiny, and that such cooperation must abide by EU and international law;

    74.  Underlines that compliance with Union values and fundamental rights is an essential pre-requisite to access EU funds; highlights the importance of strong links between respect for the rule of law and access to EU funds under the current MFF; believes that the protection of the Union’s financial interests depends on respect for the rule of law at national level; welcomes, in particular, the positive impact of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation in protecting the Union’s financial interests in cases of systemic and persistent breaches of the rule of law; calls on the Commission and the Council to apply the regulation strictly, consistently and without undue delay wherever necessary; emphasises that decisions to suspend or reduce Union funding over breaches of the rule of law must be based on objective criteria and not be guided by other considerations, nor be the outcome of negotiations;

    75.  Points to the need for a stronger link between the rule of law and the Union budget post-2027 and welcomes the Commission’s commitment to bolster links between the recommendations in the annual rule of law report and access to funds through the budget; calls on the Commission to outline, in the annual rule of law report from 2025 onwards, the extent to which identified weaknesses in rule of law regimes potentially pose a risk to the Union budget; welcomes, furthermore, the link between respect for Union values and the implementation of the budget and calls on the Commission to actively monitor Member States’ compliance with this principle in a unified manner and to take swift action in the event of non-compliance;

    76.  Calls for the consolidation of a robust rule of law toolbox, building on the current conditionality provisions under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the horizontal enabling conditions in the Common Provisions Regulation and the relevant provisions of the Financial Regulation and insists that the toolbox should cover the entire Union budget; underlines the need for far greater transparency and consistency with regard to the application of tools to protect the rule of law and for Parliament’s role to be strengthened in the application and scrutiny of such measures; insists, furthermore, on the need for consistency across instruments when assessing breaches of the rule of law in Member States;

    77.  Recalls that the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation provides that final recipients should not be deprived of the benefits of EU funds in the event of sanctions being applied to their government; believes that, to date, this provision has not been effective and stresses the importance of applying a smart conditionality approach so that beneficiaries are not penalised because of their government’s actions; calls on the Commission, in line with its stated intention in the political guidelines, to propose specific measures to ensure that local and regional authorities, civil society and other beneficiaries can continue to benefit from Union funding in cases of breaches of the rule of law by national governments without weakening the application of the regulation and maintaining the Member State’s obligation to pay under Union law;

    A long-term budget that mainstreams the Union’s policy objectives

    78.  Stresses that a long-term budget that is fully aligned with the Union’s strategic aims requires that key objectives be mainstreamed across the budget through a set of horizontal principles, building on the lessons from the current MFF and RRF;

    79.  Recalls that the implementation of horizontal principles should not lead to an excessive administrative burden on beneficiaries and be in line with the principle of proportionality; calls for innovative solutions and the use of automated reporting tools, including artificial intelligence, to achieve more efficient data collection;

    80.  Underlines, therefore, that the next MFF must ensure that, across the board, spending programmes pursue climate and biodiversity objectives, promote and protect rights and equal opportunities for all, including gender equality, support competitiveness and bolster the Union’s preparedness against threats;

    81.  Points out that effective mainstreaming is best achieved through a toolbox of measures, primarily through policy, project and regulatory design, thorough impact assessments and solid tracking of spending and, in specific cases, spending targets based on relevant and available data; welcomes the significant improvements in performance reporting in the current MFF, which allow for much better scrutiny of the impact of EU spending and calls for this to be further developed in the next programing period;

    82.  Welcomes the development of a methodology to track gender-based spending and considers that the lessons learnt, in particular as regards the collection of gender-disaggregated data, the monitoring of implementation and impact and administrative burden, should be applied in the next MFF in order to improve the methodology; calls on the Commission to explore the feasibility of gender budgeting in the next MFF; stresses, in the same vein, the need for a significant improvement in climate and biodiversity mainstreaming methodologies to move towards the measurement of impact;

    83.  Regrets that the Commission has not systematically conducted thorough impact assessments, including gender impact assessments, for all legislation involving spending through the budget and insists that this change;

    84.  Is pleased that the climate mainstreaming target of 30 % is projected to be exceeded in the current MFF; regrets, however, that the Union is not on track to meet the 10 % target for 2026 for biodiversity-related expenditure; insists that the targets in the IIA have nevertheless been a major factor in driving climate and biodiversity spending; calls on the Commission to adapt the spending targets contributing positively to climate and biodiversity in line with the Union policy ambitions in this regard, taking into account the investment needs for these policy ambitions;

    85.  Stresses, furthermore, that the Union budget should be implemented in line with Article 33(2) of the Financial Regulation, therefore without doing significant harm(12) to the specified objectives, respecting applicable working and employment conditions and taking into account the principle of gender equality;

    86.  Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to phase out all fossil fuel subsidies and environmentally harmful subsidies in the next MFF; expects the Commission to come forward with its planned roadmap in this regard as part of its proposal for the next MFF;

    A long-term budget with an effective administration at the service of Europeans

    87.  Underlines the need for Union policies to be underpinned by a well-functioning administration; insists that, post-2027, sufficient financial and staff resources be allocated from the outset so that Union institutions, bodies, decentralised agencies and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office can ensure effective and efficient policy design, high-quality delivery and enforcement, provide technical assistance, continue to attract the best people from all Member States, thus ensuring geographical balance, and have leeway to adjust to changing circumstances;

    88.  Regrets that the Union’s ability to implement policy effectively and protect its financial interests within the current MFF has been undermined by stretched administrative resources and a dogmatic application of a policy of stable staffing, despite increasing demands and responsibilities; points, for example, to the failure to provide sufficient staff to properly implement and enforce the Digital Services(13) and Digital Markets Acts(14), thus undercutting the legislation’s effectiveness and to the repeated redeployments from programmes to decentralised agencies to cover staffing needs; insists that staffing levels be determined by an objective needs assessment when legislation is proposed and definitively adopted, and factored into planning for administrative expenditure from the outset;

    89.  Emphasises that the Commission has sought, to some degree, to circumvent its own stable staffing policy by increasing staff attached to programmes and facilities and thus not covered by the administrative spending ceiling; underscores, however, that such an approach merely masks the problem and may ultimately undermine the operational capacity of programmes; insists, therefore, that additional responsibilities require administrative expenditure and must not erode programme envelopes;

    90.  Stresses that up-front investment in secure and interoperable IT infrastructure and data mining capabilities can also generate longer-term cost savings and hugely enhance policy delivery and tracking of spending;

    91.  Acknowledges that, in the absence of any correction mechanism in the current MFF, high inflation has significantly driven up statutory costs, requiring extensive use of special instruments to cover the shortfall; regrets that the Council elected not to take up the Commission’s proposal to raise the ceiling for administrative expenditure in the MFF revision, thus further eroding special instruments;

    A long-term budget that is simpler and more transparent

    92.  Stresses that the next MFF must be designed so as to simplify the lives of all beneficiaries by cutting unnecessary red tape; underlines that simplification will require harmonising rules and reporting requirements wherever possible, including, as relevant, ensuring consistency between the applicable rules at European, national and regional levels; underlines, in that respect, the need for a genuine, user-friendly single entry point for EU funding and a simplified application procedure designed in consultation with relevant stakeholders; points out, furthermore, that the next MFF must be implemented as close to people as possible;

    93.  Calls for genuine simplification where there are overlapping objectives, diverging eligibility criteria and different rules governing horizontal provisions that should be uniform across programmes; considers that an assessment of which spending programmes should be included in the next MFF must be based on the above aspects, on the need to focus spending on clearly identified policy objectives with clear European added value and on the policy intervention logic of each programme; stresses that reducing the number of programmes is not an end in itself;

    94.  Underlines that simplification cannot mean more leeway for the Commission without the necessary checks and balances and must therefore be achieved with full respect for the institutional balance provided for in the Treaties;

    95.  Insists that simplification cannot come at the expense of the quality of programme design and implementation and that, therefore, a simpler budget must also be a more transparent budget, enabling better accountability, scrutiny, control of spending and reducing the risks of double funding, misuse and fraud; underlines that any reduction in programmes must be offset by a far more detailed breakdown of the budget by budget line, in contrast to some programme mergers in the current MFF, such as the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI – Global Europe), which is an example not to follow; calls, therefore, for a sufficiently detailed breakdown by budget line to enable the budgetary authority to exercise proper accountability and ensure that decision-making in the annual budgetary procedure and in the course of budget implementation is meaningful;

    96.  Recalls that transparency is essential to retain citizens’ trust, and that fraud and misuse of funds are extremely detrimental to that trust; underlines, therefore, the need for Parliament to be able to control spending and assess whether discharge can be granted; insists that proper accountability requires robust auditing for all budgetary expenditure based on the application of a single audit trail; calls on the Commission to put in place harmonised and effective anti-fraud mechanisms across funding instruments for the post-2027 MFF that ensure the protection of the Union’s budget;

    97.  Reiterates its long-standing position that all EU-level spending should be brought within the purview of the budgetary authority, thereby ensuring transparency, democratic control and protection of the Union’s financial interests; calls, therefore, for the full budgetisation of (partially) off-budget instruments such as the Social Climate Fund, the Innovation Fund and the Modernisation Fund, or their successors;

    A long-term budget that is more flexible and more responsive to crises and shocks

    98.  Points out that, traditionally, the MFF has not been conceived with a crisis response or flexibility logic, but rather has been designed primarily to ensure medium-term investment predictability; underlines that, in a rapidly changing political, security, economic and social context, such an approach is no longer tenable; insists on sufficient in-built crisis response capacity in the next MFF;

    99.  Underscores that the current MFF has been beset by a lack of flexibility and an inability to adjust to evolving spending priorities; considers that the next MFF needs to strike a better balance between investment predictability and flexibility to adjust spending focus; highlights that spending in certain areas requires greater stability than in others where flexibility is more valuable; stresses that recurrent redeployments are not a viable way to finance the Union’s priorities as they damage investments and jeopardise the delivery of agreed policy objectives;

    100.  Believes that, while allocating a significant portion of funding to objectives up-front, spending programmes should retain a substantial in-built flexibility reserve, with allocation to specific policy objectives to be decided by the budgetary authority; notes that the NDICI – Global Europe’s emerging challenges and priorities cushion provides a model for such a flexibility reserve, but that the decision-making process for its mobilisation must not be replicated in the future MFF; points to the need for stronger, more effective scrutiny powers of the co-legislators over the setting of policy priorities and objectives and a detailed budgetary breakdown to ensure that the budgetary authority is equipped to make meaningful and informed decisions;

    101.  Underlines that the MFF must have sufficient margins under each heading to ensure that new instruments or spending objectives agreed over the programming period can be accommodated without eroding funding for other policy and long-term strategic objectives or eating into crisis response capacity;

    102.  Underlines that the possibility for budgetary transfers under the Financial Regulation already provides for flexibility to adjust to evolving spending needs in the course of budget implementation; stresses that, under the current rules, the Commission has significant freedom to transfer considerable amounts between policy areas without budgetary authority approval, which limits scrutiny and control; calls, therefore, for the rules to be changed so as to introduce a maximum amount, in addition to a maximum percentage per budget line, for transfers without approval; considers that for transfers from Union institutions other than the Commission that are subject to a possible duly justified objection by Parliament or the Council, a threshold below which they would be exempt from that procedure could be a useful measure of simplification;

    103.  Recalls that the current MFF has been placed under further strain due to high levels of inflation in a context where an annual 2 % deflator is applied to 2018 prices, reducing the budget’s real-terms value and squeezing its operational and administrative capacity; considers, therefore, that the future budget should be endowed with sufficient response capacity to enable the budget to adapt to inflationary shocks;

    104.  Calls for a root-and-branch reform of the existing special instruments to bolster crisis response capacity and ensure an effective and swift reaction through more rapid mobilisation; underlines that the current instruments are both inadequate in size and constrained by excessive rigidity, with several effectively ring-fenced according to crisis type; points out that enhanced crisis response capacity will ensure that cohesion policy funds are not called upon for that purpose and can therefore be used for their intended investment objectives;

    105.  Considers that the post-2027 MFF should include only two special instruments – one dedicated to ensuring solidarity in the event of natural disasters (the successor to the existing European Solidarity Reserve) and one for general-purpose crisis response and for responding to any unforeseen needs and emerging priorities, including where amounts in the special instrument for natural disasters are insufficient (the successor to the Flexibility Instrument); insists that both special instruments should be adequately funded from the outset and able to carry over unspent amounts indefinitely over the MFF period; believes that all other special instruments can either be wound up or subsumed into the two special instruments or into existing programmes;

    106.  Calls for the future Flexibility Instrument to be heavily front-loaded and subsequently to be fed through a number of additional sources of financing: unspent margins from previous years (as with the current Single Margin Instrument), the annual surplus from the previous year, a fines-based mechanism modelled on the existing Article 5 of the MFF Regulation, reflows from financial instruments and decommitted appropriations; underlines that the next MFF should be designed such that the future special instruments are not required to cover debt repayment;

    107.  Underlines that re-use of the surplus, of reflows from financial instruments and surplus provisioning and of decommitments would require amendments to the Financial Regulation;

    108.  Points out that, with sufficient up-front resources and such arrangements for re-using unused funds, the budget would have far greater response capacity without impinging on the predictability of national GNI-based contributions; insists that an MFF endowed with greater flexibility and response capacity is less likely to require a substantial mid-term revision;

    A long-term budget that is more results-focused

    109.  Emphasises that, in order to maximise impact, it is imperative that spending under the next MFF be much more rigorously aligned with the Union’s strategic policy aims and better coordinated with spending at national level; underlines that, in turn, consultation with regional and local authorities is vital to facilitate access to funding and ensure that Union support meets the real needs of final recipients and delivers tangible benefits for people; underscores the importance of technical assistance to implementing authorities to help ensure timely implementation, additionality of investments and therefore maximum impact;

    110.  Underlines that, in order to support effective coordination between Union and national spending, the Commission envisages a ‘new, lean steering mechanism’ designed ‘to reinforce the link between overall policy coordination and the EU budget’; insists that Parliament play a full decision-making role in any coordination or steering mechanism;

    111.  Considers that the RRF, with its focus on performance and links between reforms and investments and budgetary support, has helped to drive national investments and reforms that would not otherwise have taken place;

    112.  Underlines that the RRF can help to inform the delivery of Union spending under shared management; recalls, however, that the RRF was agreed in the very specific context of the COVID-19 pandemic and cannot, therefore, be replicated wholesale for future investment programmes;

    113.  Points out that spending under shared management in the next MFF must involve regional and local authorities and all relevant stakeholders from design to delivery through a place-based and multilevel governance approach and in line with an improved partnership principle, ensure the cross-border European dimension of investment projects, and focus on results and impact rather than outputs by setting measurable performance indicators, ensuring availability of relevant data and feeding into programme design and adjustment;

    114.  Underlines that the design of shared management spending under the next MFF must safeguard Parliament’s role as legislator, budgetary and discharge authority and in holding the executive to account, putting in place strict accountability mechanisms and guaranteeing full transparency in relation to final recipients or groups of recipients of Union spending funds through an interoperable system enabling effective tracking of cash flows and project progress;

    115.  Considers that the ‘one national plan per Member State’ approach envisaged by the Commission is not in line with the principles set out above and cannot be the basis for shared management spending post-2027; recalls that, in this regard, the Union is required, under Article 175 TFEU, to provide support through instruments for agricultural, regional and social spending;

    A long-term budget that manages liabilities sustainably

    116.  Recalls Parliament’s very firm opposition to subjecting the repayment of NGEU borrowing costs to a cap within an MFF heading given that these costs are subject to market conditions, influenced by external factors and thus inherently volatile, and that the repayment of borrowing costs is a non-discretionary legal obligation; stresses that introducing new own resources is also necessary to prevent future generations from bearing the burden of past debts;

    117.  Deplores the fact that, under the existing architecture and despite the joint declaration by the three institutions as part of the 2020 MFF agreement whereby expenditure to cover NGEU financing costs ‘shall aim at not reducing programmes and funds’, financing for key Union programmes and resources available for special instruments, even after the MFF revision, have de facto been competing with the repayment of NGEU borrowing costs in a context of steep inflation and rising interest rates; recalls that pressure on the budget driven by NGEU borrowing costs was a key factor in cuts to flagship programmes in the MFF revision;

    118.  Underlines that, to date, the Union budget has been required only to repay interest related to NGEU and that, from 2028 onwards, the budget will also have to repay the capital; underscores that, according to the Commission, the total costs for NGEU capital and interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25-30 billion a year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of payment appropriations in the 2025 budget;

    119.  Acknowledges that, while NGEU borrowing costs will be more stable in the next MFF period as bonds will already have been issued, the precise repayment profile will have an impact on the level of interest and thus on the degree of volatility; insists, therefore, that all costs related to borrowing backed by the Union budget or the budgetary headroom be treated distinctly from appropriations for EU programmes within the MFF architecture;

    120.  Points, in that regard, to the increasing demand for the Union budget to serve as a guarantee for the Union’s vital support through macro-financial assistance and the associated risks; underlines that, in the event of default or the withdrawal of national guarantees, the Union budget ultimately underwrites all macro-financial assistance loans and therefore bears significant and inherently unpredictable contingent liabilities, notably in relation to Ukraine;

    121.  Calls, therefore, on the Commission to design a sound and durable architecture that enables sustainable management of all non-discretionary costs and liabilities, fully preserving Union programmes and the budget’s flexibility and response capacity;

    A long-term budget that is properly resourced and sustainably financed

    122.  Underlines that, as described above, the budgetary needs post-2027 will be significantly higher than the amounts allocated to the 2021-2027 MFF and, in addition, will need to cover borrowing costs and debt repayment; insists, therefore, that the next MFF be endowed with significantly increased resources compared to the 2021-2027 period, moving away from the historically restrictive, self-imposed level of 1 % of GNI, which has prevented the Union from delivering on its ambitions and deprived it of the ability to respond to crises and adapt to emerging needs;

    123.  Considers that all instruments and tools should be explored in order to provide the Union with those resources, in line with its priorities and identified needs; considers, in this respect, that joint borrowing through the issuance of EU bonds presents a viable option to ensure that the Union has sufficient resources to respond to acute Union-wide crises such as the ongoing crisis in the area of security and defence;

    124.  Reiterates the need for sustainable and resilient revenue for the Union budget; points to the legally binding roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources in the IIA, in which Parliament, the Council and the Commission undertook to introduce sufficient new own resources to at least cover the repayment of NGEU debt; underlines that, overall, the basket of new own resources should be fair, linked to broader Union policy aims and agreed on time and with sufficient volume to meet the heightened budgetary needs;

    125.  Recalls its support for the amended Commission proposal on the system of own resources; is deeply concerned by the complete absence of progress on the system of own resources in the Council; calls on the Council to adopt this proposal as a matter of urgency; and urges the Commission to spare no effort in supporting the adoption process;

    126.  Calls furthermore, on the Commission to continue efforts to identify additional innovative and genuine new own resources and other revenue sources beyond those specified in the IIA; stresses that new own resources are essential not only to enable repayment of NGEU borrowing, but to ensure that the Union is equipped to cover its the higher spending needs;

    127.  Calls on the Commission to design a modernised budget with a renewed spending focus, driven by the need for fairness, greater simplification, a reduced administrative burden and more transparency, including on the revenue side; underlines that existing rebates and corrections automatically expire at the end of the current MFF;

    128.  Welcomes the decision, in the recast of the Financial Regulation, to treat as negative revenue any interest or other charge due to a third party relating to amounts of fines, other penalties or sanctions that are cancelled or reduced by the Court of Justice; recalls that this solution comes to an end on 31 December 2027; invites the Commission to propose a definitive solution for the next MFF that achieves the same objective of avoiding any impact on the expenditure side of the budget;

    A long-term budget grounded in close interinstitutional cooperation

    129.  Underlines that Parliament intends to fully exercise its prerogatives as legislator, budgetary authority and discharge authority under the Treaties;

    130.  Recalls that the requirement for close interinstitutional cooperation between the Commission, the Council and Parliament from the early design stages to the final adoption of the MFF is enshrined in the Treaties and further detailed in the IIA;

    131.  Emphasises Parliament’s commitment to play its role fully throughout the process; believes that the design of the MFF should be bottom-up and based on the extensive involvement of stakeholders; underlines, furthermore, the need for a strategic dialogue among the three institutions in the run-up to the MFF proposals;

    132.  Calls on the Commission to put forward practical arrangements for cooperation and genuine negotiations from the outset; points, in particular, to the importance of convening meetings of the three Presidents, as per Article 324 TFEU, wherever they can aid progress, and insists that the Commission follow up when Parliament requests such meetings; reminds the Commission of its obligation to provide information to Parliament on an equal footing with the Council as the two arms of the budgetary authority and as co-legislators on MFF-related basic acts;

    133.  Recalls that the IIA specifically provides for Parliament, the Council and the Commission to ‘seek to determine specific arrangements for cooperation and dialogue’; stresses that the cooperation provisions set out in the IIA, including regular meetings between Parliament and the Council, are a bare minimum and that much more is needed to give effect to the principle in Article 312(5) TFEU of taking ‘any measure necessary to facilitate the adoption of a new MFF’; calls, therefore, on the successive Council presidencies to respect not only the letter, but also the spirit of the Treaties;

    134.  Recalls that the late adoption of the MFF regulation and related legislation for the 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 periods led to significant delays, which hindered the proper implementation of EU programmes; insists, therefore, that every effort be made to ensure timely adoption of the upcoming MFF package;

    135.  Expects the Commission, as part of the package of MFF proposals, to put forward a new IIA in line with the realities of the new budget, including with respect to the management of contingent liabilities; stresses that the changes to the Financial Regulation necessary for alignment with the new MFF should enter into force at the same time as the MFF Regulation;

    o
    o   o

    136.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    (1) OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 11, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2093/oj.
    (2) OJ L 424, 15.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2020/2053/oj.
    (3) OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 28, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_interinstit/2020/1222/oj.
    (4) OJ L 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (5) OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj.
    (6) OJ C, C/2024/6751, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6751/oj.
    (7) OJ C, C/2023/1067, 15.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1067/oj.
    (8) OJ C 177, 17.5.2023, p. 115.
    (9) OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 240.
    (10) OJ C 428, 13.12.2017, p. 10.
    (11) OJ C, C/2025/279, 24.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/279/oj.
    (12) Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2020 on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment, and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 (OJ L 198, 22.6.2020, p. 13, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/852/oj).
    (13) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).
    (14) Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act) (OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Spain: EIB finances with €20 million Heura Foods to develop innovative and sustainable plant-based food products

    Source: European Investment Bank

    • Heura Foods is a Spain based startup that produces 100% plant-based, sustainable and healthy food products with a focus on plant-based meat.
    • The agreement will finance investments to boost Heura’s R&D&I capabilities to produce new products in several categories.
    • The agreement contributes to the EIB strategic priorities of supporting European innovation and the bioeconomy sector while fostering healthy and environmentally friendly food systems in Europe.
    • The operation is backed by InvestEU, an EU programme that aims to unlock over €372 billion in investment by 2027.

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) has signed a €20 million loan with Spanish start-up Heura Foods to support development and commercialization of innovative, sustainable and healthy food products 100% plant-based. Heura is a bioeconomy pioneer and innovator in the plant-based foods sector with headquarters in Barcelona. Heura focuses on improving food composition by replacing saturated fats and cholesterol with ingredients rich in fiber and antioxidants, while ensuring a high protein content.

    The loan will support Heura’s R&D&I programme for the development of plant-based alternatives to meat, cheese, and other animal products, as well as products that incorporate a higher share of protein than conventionally found on the supermarket shelves.  Heura’s objective is to provide nutritious alternatives to traditional meat products and popular ultra-processed food categories, using legume-based proteins and healthy fats. The loan will also permit Heura to scale up its production capacity by financing investments in equipment needed to this end, both in Heura’s laboratories and in the co-manufacturers premises in Spain.  Ultimately, the agreement will contribute to fostering healthy and environmentally friendly food systems in Europe.

    “The EIB’s support for innovation and biotechnology is key to Europe’s technological leadership. With this agreement we are boosting the dynamism of the startup ecosystem in Spain and Europe and responding to new consumer needs by developing new sustainable food products,’” said Nadia Calviño, President of the EIB Group.

    “This financing agreement with Heura is a clear example of how the EIB is stepping up its support for companies that are at the forefront of the bioeconomy sector, driving innovation and sustainability across the entire value chain. By investing in the development of new plant-based foods products, the EIB is also contributing to a more sustainable and healthy food system in Europe and the overall food security of the European Union”, said EIB Director of Equity, Growth Capital and Project Finance Alessandro Izzo.

    “Innovation is our tool to live longer and better. We are committed to simple processes, legumes, healthy fats, and science in the service of collective well-being. Our goal is to democratize food that is tasty, nutritious, and aligned with today’s challenges”, said co-founder and CEO of Heura Foods, Marc Coloma.

    “For the European Commission, fostering innovation is crucial for enhancing the competitiveness of its agri-food industry. We welcome the European Investment Bank support to research and development in innovative agri-food companies. This can help the EU to unlock new economic opportunities, create high-value jobs, and solidify its position as a leader in the evolving global food landscape. This operation is a good example of what InvestEU can do to empower businesses to grow, innovate, and build a sustainable future” stated Lucas González Ojeda, Acting Director of the European Commission Representation in Spain.

    The EIB loan is guaranteed by InvestEU, the flagship EU programme to mobilize over €372 billion of additional public and private sector investment to support EU policy goals from 2021 to 2027.

    Background information

    EIB
    The ElB is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by the Member States. Built around eight core priorities, it finances investments that pursue EU policy objectives by bolstering climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and bioeconomy, social infrastructure, the capital markets union, and a stronger Europe in a more peaceful and prosperous world.

    The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund, signed nearly €89 billion in new financing for over 900 high-impact projects in 2024, boosting Europe’s competitiveness and security.

    All projects financed by the EIB Group are in line with the Paris Agreement, as pledged in the group’s Climate Bank Roadmap. Almost 60% of the EIB Group’s annual financing supports projects that contribute directly to climate change mitigation and adaptation, and a healthier environment.

    In Spain, the EIB Group signed €12.3 billion of new financing for more than 100 high-impact projects in 2024, helping power the country’s green and digital transition and promote economic growth, competitiveness and better services for inhabitants.

    High-quality, up-to-date photos of our headquarters for media use are available here.

    InvestEU

    The InvestEU programme provides the European Union with crucial long-term funding by leveraging substantial private and public funds in support of a sustainable recovery. It also helps mobilise private investment for EU policy priorities, such as the European Green Deal and the digital transition. InvestEU brings together under one roof the multitude of EU financial instruments available to support investment in the European Union, making funding for investment projects in Europe simpler, more efficient and more flexible. The programme consists of three components: the InvestEU Fund, the InvestEU Advisory Hub and the InvestEU Portal. The InvestEU Fund is implemented through financial partners that invest in projects, leveraging on the EU budget guarantee of €26.2 billion. The entire budget guarantee will back the investment projects of the implementing partners, increasing their risk-bearing capacity and mobilising at least €372 billion in additional investment.

    Heura Foods

    Heura Foods is a 100% plant-based food technology startup founded by activists and born in Barcelona. It creates solutions that make the problems of the current food system obsolete and accelerate change towards a world where our daily eating habits have a positive impact on humans, the planet and other animals. While based on scientific discoveries and cutting-edge technologies, Heura’s innovations maintain the culinary traditions of the Mediterranean, including high nutritional density, positive climate impact and exceptional taste. Already a market leader in Spain, Heura is expanding the plant-based category across Europe.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Serbia – P10_TA(2025)0093 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part(1), which entered into force on 1 September 2013,

    –  having regard to Serbia’s application for membership of the EU of 19 December 2009,

    –  having regard to the Commission opinion of 12 October 2011 on Serbia’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2011)0668), the European Council’s decision of 1 March 2012 to grant Serbia candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 28 June 2013 to open EU accession negotiations with Serbia,

    –  having regard to the Brussels Agreement of 27 February 2023 and the Ohrid Agreement of 18 March 2023 and the Implementation Annex thereto,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III)(2),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans(3),

    –  having regard to the presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

    –   having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 17 May 2018 in Sofia and of 6 May 2020 in Zagreb,

    –   having regard to its resolutions on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,

    –  having regard to the Berlin Process, launched on 28 August 2014,

    –  having regard to the first agreement on principles governing the normalisation of relations between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo of 19 April 2013, to the agreements of 25 August 2015, and to the ongoing EU-facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of relations,

    –  having regard to the agreement on free movement between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo of 27 August 2022, to the agreement on licence plates of 23 November 2022, and to the Energy Agreements’ Implementation Roadmap in the EU-facilitated Dialogue of 21 June 2022,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Serbia 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0695),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Serbia 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0695),

    –  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 9 February 2023 on the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina,

    –  having regard to Article 14 of the Serbian Constitution on the protection of national minorities,

    –  having regard to the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, ratified by Serbia in 2001 and the Council of Europe’s European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, ratified by Serbia in 2006,

    –  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 26 and 27 October 2023 on Kosovo and Serbia,

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

    –  having regard to the European Court of Human Rights order to Serbia of 29 April 2025 to refrain from using sonic devices for crowd control,

    –  having regard to the final report of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) election observation mission on the early parliamentary and presidential elections of 3 April 2022 in Serbia, published on 19 August 2022,

    –  having regard to the European Council conclusions of December 2006, to the Council conclusions of March 2020 and to the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen criteria,

    –  having regard to the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission on the early parliamentary elections of 17 December 2023 in Serbia, published on 28 February 2024,

    –  having regard to the memorandum of understanding between the European Union and the Republic of Serbia on a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains and electric vehicles, signed on 19 July 2024,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(4),

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia, in particular that of 19 October 2023 on the recent developments in the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, including the situation in the northern municipalities in Kosovo(5), and that of 8 February 2024 on the situation in Serbia following the elections(6),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0072/2025),

    A.  whereas enlargement is one of the most successful EU foreign policy instruments and a strategic geopolitical investment in long-term peace, stability and security throughout the continent;

    B.  whereas according to the Copenhagen criteria, candidate countries must adhere to the values of the Union in order to be able to join it;

    C.  whereas democracy and the rule of law are the fundamental values on which the EU is founded;

    D.  whereas in recent years, political rights and civil liberties have been steadily eroded, putting pressure on independent media, the political opposition and civil society organisations;

    E.  whereas the Fourth Opinion on Serbia of the Council of Europe Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention on National Minorities, adopted on 26 June 2019, criticised Serbia’s delays in fully implementing education rights for minorities;

    F.  whereas freedom of religion is a core European value and a fundamental human right and Serbia is therefore obliged to respect and guarantee this freedom for all individuals residing within its territory, in accordance with its international commitments and human rights obligations;

    G.  whereas in line with Chapter 23 of the acquis, Serbia must demonstrate real improvements in the effective exercise of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities;

    H.  whereas each candidate country for enlargement is judged on its own merits, including their respect for and unwavering commitment to shared European rights and values and alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy;

    I.  whereas Serbia has not imposed sanctions against Russia following the Russian aggression in Ukraine; whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) has been steadily declining since 2021; whereas Serbia supports the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine, and has clearly condemned the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine and voted alongside the EU in the UN, even though it has not imposed sanctions against Russia; whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the CFSP dropped from 54 % in 2023 to 51 % in 2024 while other candidate countries in the region – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and North Macedonia – achieved 100 % alignment;

    J.  whereas Serbia remains a critical battleground for foreign disinformation campaigns, notably by Russia and China, which seek to create an anti-Western rhetoric; whereas the final report of the OSCE/ODHIR on the early parliamentary elections held on 17 December 2023 pointed out several procedural deficiencies, as well as the use of harsh rhetoric and the presence of consistent bias in the media that gave an unbalanced advantage to the ruling party; whereas the issues identified in that report need to be assessed thoroughly and promptly; whereas as part of the accession negotiations, Serbia adopted the Strategy for Combating Cybercrime 2019-2023 and the relevant action plans in September 2018; whereas the strategy and the relevant action plans were not renewed after December 2023; whereas Serbia did not align with the EU’s restrictive measures in reaction to cyberattacks in 2023 and 2024;

    K.  whereas the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia is a precondition for the progression of both countries towards EU membership;

    L.  whereas accession to the EU inevitably requires full alignment with the foreign policy objectives of the Union;

    M.  whereas Serbia recognises the territorial integrity of Ukraine, including the Crimean peninsula and the Donbas region;

    N.  whereas the EU is Serbia’s main trading partner, accounting for 59,7 % of Serbia’s total trade;

    O.  whereas Russia is using its influence in Serbia to try to destabilise, interfere in and threaten neighbouring sovereign states and undermine Serbia’s European future; whereas Russian propaganda outlets such as RT (formerly Russia Today) and Sputnik operate freely in Serbia and exert significant influence in shaping anti-EU and anti-democratic narratives; whereas disinformation often originates from a false or misleading statement by a political figure, which is then reported by state-owned media and subsequently amplified on social media, often with an intention to undermine political opponents and democratic principles;

    P.  whereas on 8 June 2024, an ‘All-Serb Assembly’ took place in Belgrade with the participation of political leaders from Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1.  Notes Serbia’s stated commitment to EU membership as its strategic goal and its ambition to align fully with the EU acquis by the end of 2026; urges Serbia to deliver quickly and decisively on essential reforms, especially in cluster 1, for this very ambitious commitment to be perceived as realistic, genuine and meaningful; stresses the need for Serbia to seriously and categorically demonstrate that it is strategically oriented towards the EU, by showing strong political will and consistency in the implementation of EU-related reforms and by communicating objectively and unambiguously with its citizens about the EU, Serbia’s European path and the required reforms;

    2.  Reiterates the strategic importance of the Western Balkans in the current geopolitical context and for the security and stability of the EU as a whole; outlines that, owing to its geopolitical position, the country has a direct impact on the overall stability of the region; condemns, therefore, Serbia’s attempts to establish a sphere of influence undermining the sovereignty of neighbouring countries;

    3.  Acknowledges Serbia’s good level of preparation with regard to macroeconomic stability and fiscal discipline and the Commission’s assessment that cluster 3 is technically ready for opening but notes with concern that there has been limited or no overall progress in meeting the benchmarks for EU membership across negotiating chapters, with particular shortcomings in critical areas such as the rule of law, media freedom, public administration reform, and alignment with EU policies, particularly the EU’s foreign policy;

    4.  Regrets the fact that no substantial progress has been made on Chapter 31, as Serbia’s pattern of alignment with EU foreign policy positions has remained largely unchanged, mainly due to Serbia’s close relations with Russia; recalls that Serbia remains a notable exception in the Western Balkans regarding CFSP alignment; calls on Serbia to reverse this trend and to demonstrate positive steps towards full alignment; notes that Serbia’s rate of compliance with EU statements and declarations is increasing but remains at only 61 %; welcomes Serbia’s continued active participation in and positive contribution to EU military crisis management missions and operations;

    5.  Welcomes Serbia’s humanitarian support for Ukraine and takes note of the sale of ammunition to the value of EUR 800 million for use by Ukraine in a mutually beneficial agreement; notes that Serbia has aligned with some of the EU’s positions regarding Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; regrets, however, that Serbia still does not align with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia; calls on the EU to reconsider the extent of the financial assistance provided by the EU to Serbia in the event of continued support for anti-democratic ideologies and non-alignment with the EU’s restrictive measures and the CFSP; calls on Serbia to swiftly align with the EU’s restrictive measures and general policy towards Russia and Belarus, systematically and without delay;

    6.  Stresses the importance of implementing sanctions against Russia for the security of Europe as a whole; deplores Serbia’s continued close relations with Russia, raising concerns about its strategic orientation; reiterates its calls on the Serbian authorities to enhance transparency regarding the role and activities of the so-called Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center in Nis and to immediately terminate all military cooperation with Russia; notes Serbia’s decision to support the UN resolution condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine three years after the full-scale invasion; regrets President Vučić’s immediate verbal retraction of Serbia’s UN vote, calling it a ‘mistake’; considers that maintaining privileged relations with the Kremlin regime undermines not only Serbia’s credibility as a candidate country but also the trust of its European partners and the future of EU-Serbia relations;

    7.  Regrets the continued decline in public support for EU membership in Serbia and the growing support for the Putin regime, which is the result of a long-standing anti-EU and pro-Russian rhetoric from the government-controlled media as well as some government officials; calls on the Serbian authorities to foster a fact-based and open discussion on accession to the EU;

    8.  Deplores the continued spread of disinformation, including about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; condemns the spillover effects of these actions in other countries in the region; calls on the Serbian authorities to combat disinformation and calls for the EU to enhance cooperation with Serbia to strengthen democratic resilience and counter hybrid threats;

    9.  Notes Serbia’s progress on aligning with EU visa policy and calls for full alignment, in particular with regard to those non-EU countries presenting a security threat to the EU, including the threat of cyberattacks; welcomes the agreement signed on 25 June 2024 between the EU and Serbia on operational cooperation on border management with Frontex, highlighting the need to act in line with fundamental rights and international standards;

    10.  Reiterates that the overall pace of the accession negotiations should depend on tangible progress on the fundamentals, the rule of law and a commitment to the shared European rights and values as well as to the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, which is to be conducted in good faith so that it results in a legally binding agreement based on mutual recognition, as well as alignment with the EU’s CFSP; reiterates its position that accession negotiations with Serbia should only advance if the country aligns with EU sanctions against Russia and makes significant progress on its EU-related reforms, in particular in the area of the fundamentals;

    11.  Repeats its concern regarding the appeasing approach of the Commission towards Serbia against the backdrop of the country’s year-long rollback on the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights, as well as its destabilising influence on the whole region; urges the Commission to use clearer language, including on the highest level, towards Serbia, consistently addressing significant shortcomings, lack of progress and even backsliding, thus upholding the EU’s fundamental values;

    12.  Calls on the Serbian Government to promote the role and benefits of EU accession and EU-funded projects and reforms among the Serbian population;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    13.  Notes the ongoing challenges in ensuring judicial independence, including undue influence and political pressure on the judiciary; expresses concern about the failure to implement safeguards preventing political interference in judicial appointments and disciplinary actions against judges and prosecutors; calls on Serbia to ensure that the High Judicial Council, the High Prosecutorial Council and the Government and Parliament of Serbia effectively and proactively defend judicial independence and prosecutorial autonomy;

    14.  Stresses the importance of adopting the Law on the Judicial Academy and the Venice Commission opinion and making necessary judicial appointments to reduce existing vacancies and improve the overall effectiveness of the judicial system; notes that the delay in adopting this law has stalled key judicial reforms necessary for alignment with EU standards; calls for the draft law to be amended following transparent consultation with all relevant stakeholders, with a view to ensuring the independence and control mechanisms of the institution in order to contribute to overall judicial independence;

    15.  Notes that limited progress has been made in the fight against corruption despite the adoption of a new anti-corruption strategy for 2024-2028; calls on Serbia to adopt and begin implementing the accompanying anti-corruption action plan and to establish an effective monitoring and coordination mechanism to track progress, in line with international standards; expresses concern that corruption is still prevalent in many areas, particularly related to ‘projects of interests for the Republic of Serbia’, and that strong political will is required to effectively address corruption as well as to mount a robust criminal justice response to high-level corruption; notes that Serbia ranks 105th in the Corruption Perceptions Index 2024, well below the EU average; considers that the level of corruption in Serbia is a significant obstacle to its EU accession process; notes with concern that results have still not been delivered in cases of high public interest, after several years, such as in the long-standing cases of Krušik, Jovanjica, Savamala and Belivuk; calls on Serbia to strengthen the independence of its anti-corruption institutions by ensuring that they are adequately resourced and protected from political interference; calls on the Government of Serbia to sign the Anti-Bribery Convention of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and to fully align its legal framework on police cooperation and organised crime with that of the EU;

    16.  Welcomes the more pluralistic composition of the new parliament, with a broader representation of political parties, including parties of national minorities; notes that the early election and the corresponding break in the functioning of the government and parliament have impeded progress on reforms; notes the frequent pattern of early elections, a permanent campaign mode and long delays in forming governments, as well as the disrupted work of the national parliament, including the absence of government question-time sessions, the lack of discussion on the reports of independent institutions, and the more frequent use of urgent procedures, which lead to a lack of parliamentary legislative oversight and legitimacy and do not contribute to the effective democratic governance of the country;

    17.  Takes note of the resignation of Prime Minister Miloš Vučević on 28 January 2025, which was confirmed by the National Assembly on 19 March 2025, and of the subsequent election of the new government led by Đuro Macut, appointed on 16 April 2025; takes note of the resumption of the work of the National Assembly on 4 March 2025, after a pause of three months, and condemns all the acts of violence that occurred on this occasion;

    18.  Reiterates its readiness to support the National Assembly and the members thereof in the democratic processes related to Serbia’s European path, including the proper functioning of the parliament in accordance with its rules of procedure, by using the European Parliament’s existing democracy support tools and initiatives and by supporting increased parliamentary oversight of the EU accession process and reforms;

    19.  Takes note, with deep concern, of the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission on the December 2023 elections; notes that in April 2024, the National Assembly formed a working group for the improvement of the election process but that, by the end of the year, it had not agreed on any legal measures to improve the election process; notes that two out of three representatives of civil society left the working group in February 2025; notes that steps were taken in the first months of 2025 on amending the Law on Unified Voter Registry but that there is no consensus among political and civil society actors on the content; calls on all parliamentary groups in the National Assembly to decide on the implementation of ODIHR recommendations, with the agreement of all groups; calls for equal treatment of all members of parliament in the work of the National Assembly, consistent and effective implementation of the parliamentary Code of Conduct and the impartial sanctioning of breaches of parliamentary integrity;

    20.  Is concerned about the increasing role of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) and foreign cyber operations and interference in Serbia’s democratic election processes;

    21.  Stresses the critical importance of ensuring the independence of key institutions, including media regulators such as the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM); regrets the delay in the election of the new members; regrets the irregularities in the nomination process; notes the withdrawal of several candidates from the selection in February 2025, who justified their decision on the basis of these irregularities; deeply regrets the fact that the REM neglected its legal obligations to scrutinise the conduct of the 2023 election campaign in the media in a timely manner, to report on its findings and to sanction media outlets that breached the law, spread hate speech or violated journalistic standards; notes, with concern, the absence of pluralistic political views in the nationwide media; notes that the REM should actively promote media pluralism and transparency regarding the ownership structures of media outlets and independence from foreign actors;

    22.  Notes that the REM awarded four national frequencies to channels that have a history of violating journalistic standards, including using hate speech and misleading the public, not complying with warnings issued by the REM, spreading disinformation and supporting the Kremlin’s narrative on Russia’s war in Ukraine; deeply regrets the fact that REM has not issued the fifth national licence and calls for it to be awarded through a transparent and impartial process without unnecessary delay and in compliance with international media freedom standards as soon as a new REM council is elected; calls for the Serbian Government to scrap and re-start the process of electing new members, in line with Serbian law and international media freedom standards;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    23.  Expresses its sincere condolences to the families of the 16 victims who lost their lives and to those who were injured following the collapse of the canopy of Novi Sad train station on 1 November 2024; calls for full and transparent legal proceedings following the investigation by the authorities, to bring those responsible to justice; underlines the need to examine more broadly to what extent corruption led to the lowering of safety standards and contributed to this tragedy;

    24.  Regrets the delayed response and accountability of the Serbian authorities, the slow investigation process and the lack of transparency in the aftermath of the tragedy, which were partially addressed in the face of escalating public pressure;

    25.  Expresses deep concern about the systemic issues highlighted by the student protests and various other protests in Serbia, such as issues relating to civil liberties, separation of powers, corruption, environmental protection, institutional and financial transparency, especially in relation to infrastructure projects, and accountability; regrets the fact that the government missed the opportunity to meet the demands of the students and of the citizens who support the students in good faith; affirms that the students’ demands align with reforms that Serbia is expected to implement on its European path;

    26.  Underlines the importance of freedom of speech and assembly; calls on the authorities of Serbia to ensure the protection of those participating in the peaceful protests; takes note of the mass protests on 15 March 2025, the largest in the modern history of Serbia; calls for an impartial investigation of the claims that unlawful technology of crowd control was used against the protesters, causing injuries to a number of them;

    27.  Deplores the continuing violence against students, including the recent incident at the Faculty of Sports and Physical Education building in Novi Sad, in which at least five people were injured as a result of the police storming the building accompanied by the Dean, Patrik Drid;

    28.  Condemns, in the strongest terms, the misuse of personal data from public registries to retaliate against peaceful protesters; calls on the prosecution office in Serbia to file charges against all persons who physically attacked and incited violence against the participants of the demonstrations; is deeply concerned about any act of violence; is carefully following developments as regards arrests of protesters and legal proceedings that have been opened against them; is concerned about the reports that the security services were involved in intimidation and surveillance of the protesters; condemns the language used by the Serbian authorities inciting violence against students and other protesters; notes that student activists have faced legal harassment, intimidation and excessive use of force by the authorities; calls for a thorough, impartial and speedy investigation into allegations of violence used against demonstrators and police misconduct during protests; urges the diplomatic missions of the EU and the Member States to continue to monitor closely the ongoing legal cases relating to the protests;

    29.  Is deeply concerned about the increasing political and financial pressure on primary and secondary school teachers, as well as university professors, who were deprived of their salaries for taking part in the collective action to support students’ demands; deplores in this context the unacceptable legal proceedings and media smear campaign against the Rector of the University of Belgrade;

    30.  Is deeply alarmed that the Serbian authorities have engaged in widespread illegal surveillance practices using spyware against activists, journalists and members of civil society, as indicated in the recent reports by Amnesty International and the SHARE Foundation; urges the Government of Serbia to immediately cease the use of advanced surveillance technology against activists, journalists and human rights defenders, and calls on the competent state authorities to conduct a thorough investigation into all existing cases of unlawful surveillance and use of spyware and to initiate appropriate proceedings against those responsible; calls on the European Commission, in the light of this, to follow up on these incidents, address these issues with the Serbian authorities and insist on a thorough investigation into these matters;

    31.  Deplores the alleged illegal wiretapping and detention of five activists from the opposition Movement of Free Citizens (PSG) and a student from the STAV organisation in March 2025, and the arrest warrants issued for other STAV activists; condemns the use of the case by the propaganda media and the unfounded extension of the detention; calls on the Serbian authorities to release Marija Vasić, Lazar Dinić, Mladen Cvijetić, Lado Jovović, Srđan Đurić and Davor Stefanović from detention;

    32.  Rejects allegations that the EU and some of its Member States were involved in organising the student protests with a view to triggering a ‘colour revolution’; strongly condemns, in that context, the unlawful arrests and expulsions of EU citizens and the public disclosure, by convicted war criminals, of the personal data of EU citizens, as well as hate speech against national minorities; expresses concern about the rising number of detention cases involving EU citizens at Serbia’s border; notes that anti-EU narratives are being manifested in decreasing support for EU integration in Serbian society and in a strengthening of the presence of foreign autocratic actors in the country;

    33.  Calls on the Serbian authorities to restore citizens’ confidence in state institutions by granting transparency and accountability; encourages all political and social actors to engage in an inclusive, substantive dialogue aimed at fulfilling EU-related reforms;

    34.  Notes that media freedom in Serbia has deteriorated further, as evidenced by Serbia’s drop to 98th place in the 2024 Reporter Without Borders World Press Freedom Index; urges Serbia to improve and protect media professionalism, diversity and media pluralism, and to promote quality investigative journalism, the highest ethical journalistic standards, through respecting journalistic codes of conduct, and media literacy; recalls the importance of the plurality and transparency of the media, including on aspects related to ownership and state financing, most notably through better involvement of the REM; recalls that the concentration of media ownership can have adverse effects on the freedom of the media and the professionalism of reporting; reaffirms that, as part of the accession negotiations, Serbia needs to align with the EU in matters of strategic importance, such as countering FIMI; calls on Serbia to align with EU policies in countering foreign interference and disinformation campaigns by implementing concrete regulatory measures in line with EU standards, such as the provisions included in the Digital Services Act(7) and Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising(8); encourages cooperation between Serbia, the European External Action Service and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in tackling disinformation; expects the authorities to investigate and prosecute all instances of hate speech, smear campaigns and strategic lawsuits against journalists;

    35.  Expresses its deep concerns about reported cases of abusive attacks, digital surveillance and harassment against journalists, human rights activists and civil society organisations, most recently a police raid on 25 February 2025 on four leading civil society organisations, ostensibly regarding their misuse of US Agency for International Development funds; strongly condemns persistent smear campaigns and intimidation against civil society in Serbia, including false allegations about plots to overthrow the government with foreign support;

    36.  Expresses concern that civil society organisations in Serbia face increasing challenges, including restrictive conditions, funding constraints, police raids and other forms of intimidation from state authorities; underlines the importance of a framework that enables local, vibrant civil society organisations to operate freely and participate in policymaking, including EU integration processes, in inclusive and meaningful ways; regrets that Serbia currently does not provide a framework that enables its lively and pluralistic civil society organisations, particularly those engaged in democracy support and electoral observation, to operate freely and participate in policymaking in inclusive and meaningful ways; expresses concern about recent raids of the offices of civil society organisations; calls for investigations into all attacks and smear campaigns against civil society organisations and for the improved transparency of public funding;

    37.  Condemns the political pressure exerted on universities and other research institutions through a hasty government decree that interferes with the academic freedom of researchers and cuts their salaries; condemns the vilification of professors, researchers and other academic staff in pro-government media; deplores the increasing use of temporary contracts for teachers and other civil servants as a political tool to exert pressure and control;

    38.  Urges the Serbian authorities to expand the availability of public broadcasting services in all minority languages across the country, ensuring equal access to media for all communities, while drawing on the best practice of the region of Vojvodina;

    39.  Expresses its deep concern about the draft law submitted to the Serbian Parliament on 29 November 2024, which proposes the establishment of a Russian-style foreign agents law; reminds Serbian legislators that civil society organisations and journalists play a key role in a healthy democratic society; reiterates that such legislation is incompatible with the values of the EU; notes that multiple civil society organisations suspended their cooperation with the legislative and executive branches of the government in February 2025;

    40.  Expresses grave concern about the increasing political interference in heritage protection in Serbia, including the removal of protected status from cultural monuments and the disregard for legal procedures governing their preservation, as in the case of the Generalštab Modernist Complex;

    41.  Calls on Serbia to fight disinformation, including manipulative anti-EU narratives and, in particular, to end its own state-sponsored disinformation campaigns; condemns the opening of an RT office in Belgrade, the launch of RT’s online news service in Serbian and the continued operation of the Russian online news service Sputnik Srbija, which is used to propagate pro-Russian narratives and misinformation across the Western Balkans region; urges the Serbian authorities to counter hybrid threats and fully align with the Council’s decision on the suspension of the broadcasting activities of Sputnik and RT; is deeply concerned about the spread of disinformation about the Russian aggression against Ukraine; calls on Serbia and the Commission to bolster infrastructure to fight disinformation and other hybrid threats; condemns the increasing influence of Russian and Chinese state-sponsored disinformation in Serbia, including the dissemination of anti-EU and anti-democratic narratives;

    42.  Takes note of the adoption of the national strategy for equality and the strategy for prevention of and protection against discrimination, and calls for their full implementation and for further alignment with European standards; urges the Serbian authorities to address the recommendations of the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO), with a view to improving compliance with the Istanbul Convention ratified by Serbia; notes with concern the temporary suspension of the implementation of the Law on Gender Equality by the Constitutional Court; expresses concern about the persistent lack of adequate support for organisations promoting women’s rights and gender equality;

    43.  Deeply deplores the demographic decline in Serbia, which is being exacerbated by negative net migration due to economic hardship and political persecution; stresses that it is mainly young, educated and productive people who are being forced to leave the country, as well as those pressured and threatened on account of their political views, including Dijana Hrka, the mother of one of the victims of the Novi Sad railway station tragedy, who fears for her safety after being put under pressure by SNS supporters;

    44.  Stresses that the Serbian authorities must take concrete measures to uphold and strengthen the respect for the rights of the child in the country, including by ratifying the third Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopting a national action plan for the rights of the child, adopting a new strategy on violence against children, given the expiry of the previous framework, and establishing a national framework to protect children from abuse and neglect;

    45.  Welcomes the fact that Belgrade Pride 2024 parade, the biggest in Serbia so far, passed off peacefully, though being protected by a high-profile police presence;

    46.  Highlights the need for strong commitment to safeguarding the rights of national minorities, ensuring their full representation at all levels of government, preserving their cultural identity through the use of their respective languages and by meeting their educational needs, freedom of expression and access to information, and to actively pursuing investigations into hate-motivated crimes as an irreplaceable part of common European values; regrets the fact that almost all national minorities are protected only formally; expresses concerns about the practice of pro forma representation of national minorities who are under government control; calls on Serbia to protect and promote the cultural heritage and traditions of its national minorities, in particular to create a positive atmosphere for education in minority languages, including by providing sufficient numbers of teachers, textbooks and additional materials, and deplores the violation of minority rights in this area; calls on Serbia to refrain from exploiting the national identities of national minorities that create division within these communities, and strongly condemns recorded cases of hate speech against some of them; notes the considerable delay in drafting a new action plan for the realisation of national minority rights and stresses the urgent need for Serbia to finalise and implement it promptly; highlights the need for the new action plan to fully incorporate the findings and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities;

    47.  Expresses concerns about the significant decline in the population of certain minority groups, including the Bulgarian minority; calls on Serbia to ensure the right to use names and language specific to minority groups, including women within the Bulgarian community; notes with concern that not all school textbooks have been translated into Bulgarian; calls on the Serbian Government to ensure reciprocal equal rights for the Croatian minority in Serbia as the Serbian minority enjoys in Croatia, in particular with regard to ensuring their reciprocal representation at all levels of government, including regional and local levels; reiterates its concern regarding the restrictive and arbitrary enforcement of the Law on Permanent and Temporary Residence related to the passivation of address of thousands of Albanians in the south of Serbia; emphasises the situation of the Romanian Orthodox Church in Serbia, which is not officially recognised by the state as a traditional church;

    48.  Regrets the attempts by the Serbian authorities to undermine the national identity of communities within the country; expresses concern, in this context, about the promotion of narratives such as that of the ‘Shopi nation’, which seek to erase the existence of the Bulgarian community and deny its historical roots and cultural heritage; regrets the searches carried out by the Serbian authorities at the Bosilegrad Cultural Centre and the initiation of pre-trial proceedings for ‘ethnic hatred’ against activists from non-governmental organisations;

    49.  Calls on Serbia to refrain from distorting historical events, such as the narrative surrounding the so-called Surdulica massacre, which only serve to spread division and hatred against minorities and neighbouring countries, which is incompatible with EU membership;

    Reconciliation and good neighbourly relations

    50.  Reiterates that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation remain essential elements of the enlargement process; calls on Serbia to stop restrictions on entry for regional civil society activists and artists as such practices undermine regional dialogue and cooperation; reaffirms, furthermore, the importance of the stability of south-eastern European countries and their resilience against foreign interference in internal democratic processes; stresses the importance of Serbia developing good neighbourly relations, implementing bilateral agreements and resolving outstanding bilateral issues with its neighbours; notes Serbia’s participation in regional initiatives and its active involvement in the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans and the Common Regional Market; underlines the fact that respect for national minority rights is an essential condition of Serbia’s advancement along its European path;

    51.  Calls for historical reconciliation and the overcoming of discrimination and prejudices from the past; deplores the recent inflammatory rhetoric by the government, targeting neighbouring states that did not support the opening of cluster 3 for Serbia;

    52.  Reiterates that Serbia must refrain from influencing the domestic politics of its neighbouring Western Balkan countries, including regarding the unconstitutional celebration of Republika Srpska Day in Bosnia and Herzegovina and questioning Bosnia and Herzegovina’s court decisions;

    53.  Urges Serbia to step up its reconciliation efforts and seek solutions to past disputes, in particular when it comes to missing persons, who account for 1 782 people in Croatia, 7 608 people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 1 595 people in Kosovo; calls on the Serbian authorities to achieve justice for victims by recognising and respecting court verdicts on war crimes, fighting against impunity for wartime crimes, investigating cases of missing persons, investigating grave sites, and supporting domestic prosecutors in bringing perpetrators to justice, which requires the cooperation of other parties too; strongly condemns the widespread public denials of international verdicts for war crimes, including the denial of the Srebrenica genocide;

    54.  Calls on the judicial authorities in Serbia to ensure compliance with the standards of fair trial and satisfaction of justice for victims in all war crime cases; calls for the denial of war crimes and the glorification of war criminals to be included in the Criminal Code, with a view to prosecuting any form of denial of war crimes determined by the verdicts of the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia and the International Court of Justice;

    55.  Reiterates its support for the initiative to establish a regional commission for the establishment of facts about war crimes and other gross human rights violations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia (RECOM);

    56.  Reiterates its position on the importance of opening and publishing wartime archives, and reiterates its call for the former Yugoslav archives to be opened and, in particular, for access to be granted to the files of the former Yugoslav secret service (UDBA) and the Yugoslav People’s Army Counterintelligence Service (KOS), and for the files to be returned to the respective governments if they so request;

    57.  Reiterates its full support for the EU-facilitated dialogue and welcomes the appointment of Peter Sørensen as the EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue;

    58.  Reiterates the importance of constructive engagement on the part of the authorities of both Serbia and Kosovo in order to achieve a comprehensive, legally binding normalisation agreement, based on mutual recognition and in accordance with international law; calls on both Kosovo and Serbia to implement the Brussels and Ohrid Agreements, including the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb-majority municipalities, and the lifting of Serbia’s opposition of Kosovo’s membership in regional and international organisations, and to avoid unilateral actions that could undermine the dialogue process;

    59.  Expects Kosovo and Serbia to fully cooperate and take all the necessary measures to apprehend and swiftly bring to justice the perpetrators of the 2023 terrorist attack in Banjska; deplores the fact that Serbia still has not prosecuted the culprits, most notably Milan Radoičić, the Vice-President of Srpska Lista; reiterates that the perpetrators of the terrorist attack in Zubin Potok must also be held accountable and must face justice without delay;

    60.  Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and on the Commission to take a more proactive role in leading the dialogue process; calls for an enhanced role for the European Parliament in facilitating the dialogue through regular joint parliamentary assembly meetings;

    Socio-economic reforms

    61.  Welcomes Serbia’s steady progress towards developing a functioning market economy with positive GDP growth and increased foreign investment in some sectors; takes note of that fact that Serbia received its first-ever investment-grade credit rating; underlines the fact that the EU is Serbia’s main trading partner, the largest source of foreign direct investment and by far the largest donor; reiterates that the financial assistance, which is of great benefit to Serbia, is conditional on the strengthening of democratic principles and alignment with the CFSP and other EU policies; reiterates the need for more substantial reforms in the labour market, education and public administration, including to address social inequalities; expresses concern about the scale and scope of intergovernmental contracts awarded that are exempt from the current legislative framework on public procurement; regrets, however, the fact that public debt as a percentage of GDP remains well above the eastern European average;

    62.  Is concerned about the investment in Serbia by Russia and China and their growing influence on the political and economic processes in the region;

    63.  Calls on Serbia to intensify efforts and increase investment in the socio-economic development of its border regions to address depopulation and ensure that the residents have access to essential services, including professional opportunities, healthcare and education; underlines the potential of the IPA III cross-border cooperation programmes as a key tool to promote long-term sustainable regional growth;

    64.  Welcomes Serbia’s active engagement in the implementation of the new Growth Plan for the Western Balkans; takes note of the fact that Serbia adopted its Reform Agenda on 3 October 2024; believes that embracing the opportunities of the growth plan would further enhance the Serbian economy, which over the past three years benefited from more than EUR 586 million in financial and technical assistance under IPA III; believes that the EU funding should better support the democratic reforms of the country; calls, in that context, for the relevant EU funding, including from the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, to be reprogrammed to redirect more funds towards supporting judiciary reforms and anti-corruption measures, as well as towards independent media and civil society organisations, in order to support their critical work, in particular in the vacuum created by the withdrawal of US donors; calls, furthermore, for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for fruitful cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and its Western Balkan counterparts in order to ensure that the EPPO can effectively exercise its power on IPA III and Western Balkan Facility funds in the recipient countries; urges the Serbian authorities to step up efforts to communicate clearly to citizens the benefits of the EU funds and to improve their visibility;

    65.  Regrets the lack of public consultation during the adoption of the Serbian Reform Agenda; calls for more effective oversight of the EU funding programmes and projects;

    66.  Advocates increased regional cooperation among Western Balkan countries to share best practice and develop joint strategies in combating disinformation and foreign interference; emphasises the role of the EU in facilitating such collaborative efforts; calls for the continuation and further reinforcement of the IPA regional cybersecurity programme;

    67.  Recognises the important role of Serbia’s business community in advancing economic convergence with the EU, including through the opportunities offered by and in the implementation of the growth plan as a sustainable alternative to Russian and Chinese investment in the country; welcomes the business community’s contribution to advancing socio-economic relations in the Western Balkans;

    68.  Takes note of Serbia’s business community’s efforts in advocating for the accession of the Western Balkans to the EU’s single market as a concrete step towards full EU membership; calls for clear, measurable actions and well-defined roles and responsibilities for the implementation of the Common Regional Market action plan, as a key driver for the region’s successful accession to the EU’s single market;

    Energy, the environment, sustainable development and connectivity

    69.  Calls on Serbia to increase its efforts towards the transposition of relevant environmental and climate acquis and to ensure the proper application of environmental protection standards, including by significantly enhancing its administrative and technical capacities at all levels of government, notably on waste management legislation and the adoption of the Climate Change Adaptation Programme and the National Energy and Climate Plan; urges the Serbian authorities to improve the transparency and environmental impact assessment of all investment, including from China and Russia;

    70.  Reiterates its regret regarding the lack of action on the pollution of the Dragovishtitsa river by mines operating in the region and the detrimental effect on the health of the local people and the environment;

    71.  Calls on Serbia to increase its efforts towards the decarbonisation of its energy system and to enable effective enforcement of pollution reduction regulations related to thermal power plants;

    72.  Emphasises the need for further progress in transboundary cooperation with neighbouring countries, especially with regard to transboundary road infrastructure; urges Serbia to begin implementing the activities outlined in the memorandum of understanding on environmental protection cooperation with Bulgaria;

    73.  Takes note of the EU-Serbia memorandum of understanding launching a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains and electric vehicles, in view of the European energy transition and in line with the highest environmental standards; recalls that dialogue with the affected populations, the scientific community and civil society should be at the centre of any such strategic partnership;

    74.  Welcomes the agreement reached at the EU-Western Balkans summit in Tirana on reduced roaming costs; calls, in this respect, on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to facilitate reaching the agreed targets to achieve a substantial reduction of roaming charges for data and further reductions leading to prices close to the domestic prices between the Western Balkans and the EU by 2027; welcomes the entering into force of the first phase of implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    75.  Reiterates that it is important for Serbia to continue diversifying its energy supply, to be able to break away from its dependency on Russia; takes note of the sanctions announced by the United States against Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS), a subsidiary of the Russian Gazprom; welcomes the completion of the gas interconnector between Serbia and Bulgaria (IBS) in December 2023; regrets the postponement of the launching of the IBS’s commercial operation; calls for the swift finalisation of the permitting process to ensure its full operability in compliance with the energy community acquis; notes that Serbia is taking steps to introduce a carbon tax by 2027 as a step towards aligning with the EU emissions trading system;

    76.  Notes that all chapters in cluster 4 on the green agenda and sustainable connectivity have been opened; notes the adoption of the Law on Environmental Impact Assessment as a positive step towards environmental protection in Serbia, while expressing its regret that the new law fails to align fully with the relevant EU Directive 2014/52/EU(9), since it still leaves the opportunity for significant projects to advance without comprehensive environmental scrutiny; reiterates the need to designate and rigorously manage protected areas, particularly those identified as Important Bird and Biodiversity Areas (IBAs); calls for special attention to be given to critical sites where enforcement against poaching needs to be improved;

    o
    o   o

    77.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the President, Government and National Assembly of Serbia.

    (1) OJ L 278, 18.10.2013, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2013/490/oj.
    (2) OJ L 330, 20.9.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1529/oj.
    (3) OJ L, 2024/1449, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1449/oj.
    (4) OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
    (5) OJ C, C/2024/2654, 29.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/2654/oj.
    (6) OJ C, C/2024/6339, 7.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6339/oj.
    (7) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).
    (8) Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising (OJ L, 2024/900, 20.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj).
    (9) Directive 2014/52/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 amending Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (OJ L 124, 25.4.2014, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/52/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Kennedy announces $4.6 million in Hurricane Ida aid for Harahan, New Orleans

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator John Kennedy (Louisiana)
    WASHINGTON – Sen. John Kennedy (R-La.), a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee, today announced $4,558,831 in Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grants for Louisiana disaster aid.
    “Hurricane Ida hit southeast Louisiana hard, and cities like Harahan and New Orleans are still working to recover. This $4.6 million will help Louisianians with the costs of replacing and repairing buildings that Ida damaged,” said Kennedy.
    The FEMA aid will fund the following:
    $3,191,438 to the city of Harahan, La. to replace the Fire Station No. 25 building due to Hurricane Ida damage.
    $1,367,393 to the city of New Orleans, La. for repairs to the Mahalia Jackson Theater of the Performing Arts due to Hurricane Ida damage.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Video: UN80 Initiative, Gaza, Myanmar & other topics – Daily Press Briefing

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon briefing by Stephane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:
    UN80
    Secretary-General Travels
    Occupied Palestinian Territory
    Gaza
    Lebanon/Israel
    Myanmar
    Sudan
    South Sudan
    India/Pakistan
    Kurdistan Workers’ Party
    Ukraine
    Democratic Republic of the Congo
    State of Climate in Africa
    Haiti
    Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems
    Beyond GDP
    DESA Event
    International Days
    Financial Contribution

    UN80
    The Secretary-General briefed the Member States this morning on his UN80 initiative, telling them that, as the UN celebrates its 80th anniversary, the initiative is anchored in equipping our organization in an era of extraordinary uncertainty.
    He told the Member States that the liquidity crisis we now face is not new, but today’s financial and political situation adds even greater urgency to our efforts.  We must rise to this moment. 
    Mr. Guterres said that the UN80 Initiative is structured around three key workstreams: to rapidly identify efficiencies and improvements under current arrangements; to review the implementation of all mandates given to us by Member States; and to consider the need for structural changes and programme realignment across the UN system.
    He noted that all Secretariat entities in New York and Geneva have been asked to review their functions to determine if any can be performed from existing, lower-cost locations, or may otherwise be reduced or abolished.
    On mandates, he said that we have already completed an identification of all mandates reflected in the programme budget—and will soon do so for the rest of the system. The review has so far identified over 3,600 unique mandates for the Secretariat alone. After this analytical work, relevant entities and departments will be invited to identify opportunities for improvements or consolidation of efforts.
    On structural reforms, the Secretary-General said that we have already got the ball rolling by soliciting the views of a number of UN senior leaders. Their initial submissions –nearly 50 in all– show a high level of ambition and creativity.
    He added that we know that some of these changes will be painful for our UN family. Staff and their representatives are being consulted and heard. Our concern is to be humane and professional in dealing with any aspect of the required restructuring.

    SECRETARY-GENERAL TRAVELS
    This afternoon the Secretary-General will be traveling to Germany to attend the UN Peacekeeping Ministerial that will kick off tomorrow, Tuesday in Berlin.
    He will be joined by Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Under-Secretary-General for Operational Support Atul Khare, and Under-Secretary-General for Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance Catherine Pollard.
    During the high-level opening ceremony tomorrow morning, the Secretary-General is scheduled to deliver remarks that will focus on the future of peacekeeping. He will underscore the importance of the work of our Blue Helmets and the sacrifices they make.
    He will touch upon contributions to peacekeeping during these tough times for the financing of our work across the board.
    And just to note that this meeting provides a platform for delegations to announce substantial pledges in support of closing capability gaps and adapting peace operations to better respond to existing challenges and new realities.
    While there, the Secretary-General will hold bilateral meetings with German officials, including the Chancellor of Germany Friedrich Merz, as well as other leaders and officials attending this global event. He will also have media engagements there.
    Following the Ministerial meeting in Germany, the Secretary-General will be heading to Iraq for the League of Arab States Summit, which is taking place in Baghdad on 17 May.
    While in Iraq, the Secretary-General will be holding meetings with Iraqi officials and leaders from the region attending the summit. He will discuss a wide range of topics and issues mainly pertaining to the region, as you can imagine.

    Full Highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=12%20May%202025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eVQnnyRP4oA

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Security: Homeland Security Awards $86.1 Million in Disaster Assistance

    Source: US Department of Homeland Security

    WASHINGTON – Today, the Department of Homeland Security announced that it awarded over $86 million in financial assistance to Tennessee, Texas, and California to support relief and recovery efforts following a series of natural disasters.

    Our job is to get federal disaster management back on track after years of mismanagement. Disaster relief has been so inadequate there are still open applications that were submitted after Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Under President Trump’s leadership, Secretary Noem is fixing that. These grants are a direct product of the Secretary’s efforts to ensure that states are getting the grants they need in a timely, efficient manner to lead disaster relief efforts from the local level up.” – DHS Spokesperson

    The awards are as follows:

    • Tennessee: $36.9M for permanent repairs from severe storms, tornadoes, straight-line winds, and flooding which resulted in an F-3 tornado that destroyed the Grace Baptist Church and Academy of Hamilton County buildings. The church and academy provide primary and secondary educational services to approximately 600 students in Chattanooga, TN.
    • CA: $14.2M to CA Cross Creek Flood Control District for emergency protective measures following severe winter storms, straight-line winds, flooding, landslides, and mudslides.
    • TX: $35M to the Texas Department of State Health Services (DSHS) for management costs as a result of the COVID-19 Pandemic.

    These awards come as the Department is undertaking a thorough review of grant funding to ensure that all taxpayer dollars are properly allocated to focus on disaster relief and recovery efforts.

    ###

    MIL Security OSI

  • Ministry of Environment Organises Dialogue on Montreal Protocol

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Ahead of the 30th World Ozone Day, the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change today organized a dialogue on the theme Montreal Protocol: Advancing Climate Action.

    The Montreal Protocol is an international agreement that aims to protect the ozone layer by reducing and consumption of Ozone Depleting substances.

    Addressing the event in New Delhi, Environment Secretary Leena Nandan said that India has done exceptionally well under the Montreal Protocol and has met the commitments due to the collaborative efforts of all the stakeholders. 

     

    Talking about the Ozone Day to be observed on the 16th of this month, United Nations Development Programme India Resident Representative, Angela Lusigi lauded India for being on the forefront of the protocol and the goal of reducing Hydrofluorocarbons.

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Governors and Heads of Supervision reaffirm expectation to implement Basel III and discuss work on financial impact of extreme weather events

    Source: Bank for International Settlements

    • Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision (GHOS) unanimously reaffirm their expectation to implement Basel III in full and consistently and as soon as possible.
    • The Basel Committee will publish a voluntary disclosure framework on climate-related financial risks for jurisdictions to consider.
    • GHOS agreed to prioritise further analysis on the financial risk implications of extreme weather events.

    The Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision (GHOS), the oversight body of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, met on 12 May 2025.

    Basel III implementation

    The GHOS took stock of the implementation status of the outstanding Basel III reforms, which were finalised in 2017. Members have continued to make good progress with implementation. About 70% of member jurisdictions have now implemented, or will shortly implement, the standards.

    GHOS members unanimously reaffirmed their expectation of implementing all aspects of the Basel III framework in full, consistently and as soon as possible. The series of shocks to financial markets over the past few years have highlighted the importance of having a prudent global regulatory framework in place. The GHOS tasked the Committee with continuing to monitor and assess the full and consistent implementation of Basel III.

    The GHOS also took note of the Committee’s ongoing analytical and supervisory work to assess whether specific features of the Basel Framework performed as intended during the 2023 banking turmoil, such as liquidity risk and interest rate risk in the banking book.

    Climate-related financial risks

    GHOS members discussed the Committee’s proposed Pillar 3 disclosure framework for climate-related financial risks. The Basel Committee will publish a voluntary disclosure framework for jurisdictions to consider.

    The GHOS also discussed the Committee’s broader work on climate-related financial risks. The GHOS tasked the Committee with prioritising its work to analyse the impact of extreme weather events on financial risks.


    Note to editors: 

    The Basel Committee is the primary global standard setter for the prudential regulation of banks and provides a forum for cooperation on banking supervisory matters. Its mandate is to strengthen the regulation, supervision and practices of banks worldwide with the purpose of enhancing financial stability. The Committee reports to the Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision and seeks its endorsement for major decisions. The Committee has no formal supranational authority, and its decisions have no legal force. Rather, the Committee relies on its members’ commitments to achieve its mandate. The Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision is chaired by Tiff Macklem, Governor of the Bank of Canada. The Basel Committee is chaired by Erik Thedéen, Governor of Sveriges Riksbank. 

    More information about the Basel Committee is available here.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Global: How the weather got ‘stuck’ over the UK – and produced an unusually dry and warm spring

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Simon H. Lee, Lecturer in Atmospheric Science, University of St Andrews

    Wildfires have ignited in forests and on moorland across the UK in recent months. LSP EM/Shutterstock

    A “blocking” weather system lingering high above the UK has produced one of the driest, warmest and brightest starts to spring on record.

    April 2025 was the sunniest since records began in 1910. This followed the third-sunniest March, and both months saw temperatures well above average nationwide. On May 1, the temperature reached 29.3°C in Kew Gardens in London – a new record for the date.

    Meteorologists are warning of the potential for a summer drought, as the UK has seen roughly half its usual amount of rainfall for March and April. While farmers fret about this year’s harvest, some water companies are urging customers to help reservoir levels recover by limiting water use.

    Meanwhile, wildfires have engulfed forest and moorland in areas of Scotland, Wales and England.

    Most of the UK has experienced a record-dry spring so far.
    Met Office

    For several weeks, a stubborn area of high pressure over the UK has diverted the usual flow of mild, moist air from the North Atlantic like a boulder in a river. This is known as a blocking weather system.

    Within it, air descends, warms and dries, which is why this weather pattern tends to be linked to heatwaves and drought. Blocking is usually persistent, making it seem like the weather is stuck.

    Here’s how climate change may have played a role in setting up this unusual spring.


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences. Join The Conversation for free today.


    The human fingerprint

    The warming climate means that unusually warm weather is occurring more often and becoming more intense. At the same time, we can expect more periods of both severe drought and extreme rainfall. Sudden changes from drought to deluge, termed “weather whiplash”, are due to the intensification of the water cycle in a warmer atmosphere that can hold more water vapour.

    However, certain weather patterns are necessary to produce extreme weather. More blocking events in future could increase the chance of heatwaves or drought. But are blocking weather patterns becoming more common?

    It’s difficult to determine how weather patterns will change as a result of the rising concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, which is predominantly caused by the burning of fossil fuels.

    Part of the difficulty arises from the fact that weather patterns vary year to year. Several years in a row with more blocking events than usual could make it seem like blocking is increasing due to climate change, but it could simply be down to chance.

    As a result, it is difficult to detect the fingerprint of human activity from weather observations alone. For example, blocking weather patterns over Greenland during summer have happened more often in recent decades, which can enhance the melting of the ice sheet. But it isn’t clear that this trend is the result of human-induced climate change.

    Climate models do suggest future changes in the occurrence of blocking, however. These computer simulations, consisting of equations that describe the fundamental physics of the atmosphere, are the main tool scientists use to perform experiments that parse how the climate will behave in future.

    The blocking system is visible in the area of high pressure over Britain and Ireland.
    National Centers for Environmental Prediction/National Center for Atmospheric Research/NOAA Physical Sciences Laboratory, CC BY

    When scientists run climate model simulations with increased greenhouse gas concentrations the results consistently show a decrease in blocking events. But blocking generally happens more often in real life than model simulations, which reduces the confidence scientists have in future projections.

    Keeping track of the jet stream

    The movement of weather systems in Earth’s mid-latitudes – including over the UK – is linked to the jet stream, which is a fast-flowing river of air driven by the contrast in temperature between the poles and mid-latitudes.

    Some researchers have suggested that, because the Arctic is warming faster than the tropics, the jet stream may weaken and become more “wavy”, increasing the occurrence of blocking events, contrary to what most climate models show.

    Outside of the scientific community, this idea has become popular. However, the hypothesis remains controversial among scientists, and observational evidence has weakened in recent years.

    In fact, tens of kilometres above the Earth’s surface, near commercial aircraft cruising altitudes, the opposite trends are occurring: the temperature difference between the Arctic and mid-latitudes is increasing, acting to increase the strength of the jet stream.

    There are considerable challenges with understanding how climate change is affecting the large-scale atmospheric patterns which drive the weather we experience. These include large natural variability and imperfect climate models. Models mostly suggest a decline in blocking events with climate change, though this remains relatively uncertain compared with other aspects of the science.

    Overall, we can be confident that climate change is bringing warmer conditions in all seasons. Scientists also have strong evidence to suggest that drought conditions will become more common. These changes are already affecting food production, energy generation and water availability and these impacts will continue to worsen with climate change.


    Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?

    Get a weekly roundup in your inbox instead. Every Wednesday, The Conversation’s environment editor writes Imagine, a short email that goes a little deeper into just one climate issue. Join the 45,000+ readers who’ve subscribed so far.


    Simon H. Lee has received funding from the Natural Environment Research Council and the National Science Foundation.

    Matthew Patterson receives funding from the Natural Environment Research Council in the UK via the the National Centre for Atmospheric Science.

    ref. How the weather got ‘stuck’ over the UK – and produced an unusually dry and warm spring – https://theconversation.com/how-the-weather-got-stuck-over-the-uk-and-produced-an-unusually-dry-and-warm-spring-255987

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: The Climate Fiction Prize 2025: the five shortlisted books reviewed by our experts

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Louisa Egbunike, Associate Professor in African Literature, Durham University

    Five novels have been shortlisted for the 2025 Climate Fiction Prize. Our academics review the finalists ahead of the announcement of the winner on May 14.

    And So I Roar by Abi Daré

    Abi Daré’s poignant second novel, And So I Roar, charts the parallel stories of Tia, an environmental advocate, and Adunni, a Nigerian teenager first introduced in The Girl with the Louding Voice (2020).

    Now under Tia’s care in Lagos, Adunni has escaped child marriage and domestic abuse.

    When she returns to her village, Ikati, where she and other girls are blamed for the drought and face the threat of violence, the novel unravels long-held secrets. Daré masterfully explores how environmental crises intersect with gendered violence, showing how impoverished women disproportionately bear the burden of climate change.

    And So I Roar highlights intergenerational, inter-ethnic and cross-class solidarity, celebrating the courage of women and girls who defy society’s expectations. It is a powerful testament to resilience, as women and girls confront injustice and find the strength to lift their voices and, finally, roar.

    By Louisa Uchum Egbunike, associate professor in African literature

    The Morningside by Téa Obreht

    Obreht’s The Morningside is a quietly dazzling piece of climate fiction – more adjacent to our world than removed from it, and all the more unsettling for it.

    Set in Island City, a place marked by an unnamed tragedy, the novel centres on Sil, an 11-year-old girl who moves into the Morningside apartment complex with her mother.

    Both are climate refugees, though the novel wears this reality lightly – what matters more are the small acts of home-making, the search for belonging and the ghosts that travel with them. Magical realism is deftly handled here, interlaced with hints of folklore that feel entirely plausible within the book’s fragile ecology.

    The Morningside is deeply readable – generous, tender and brimming with quiet unease. It never tips into bleakness, but its warnings are clear enough. “The things you had, the things you saw,” Sil’s mother tells us, “will probably be gone by the time [your children are] born.”

    By Sam Illingworth, professor of creative pedagogies

    Briefly Very Beautiful by Roz Dineen

    Roz Dineen’s Briefly Very Beautiful immerses readers in a world that both is and is not a familiar fiction. Crisply written, in direct, unfussy prose, it is, at one level, a story of a woman, Cass, trying to protect her children as her relationship unravels.

    At the same time, a parallel social collapse triggered by climate change puts the ordinary in an extraordinary frame.

    Much of the effect of this novel comes from Cass’s utterly believable responses to what is taking place around her, her almost peripheral awareness of other people fleeing the city, her own craving for fresh air “like she’d craved things in pregnancy, with a scary gorging hunger”.

    Briefly Very Beautiful is a novel brave enough to recognise that there is no simple, heroic response to some situations. That sometimes, the determination to live an ordinary life is the truly heroic course of action.

    By Christopher Morash, professor of Irish writing

    Orbital by Samantha Harvey

    Samantha Harvey’s Orbital skilfully exposes the human cost of space flight, set against the urgency of the climate crisis. While a typhoon of life-threatening proportions gathers across south-east Asia, six cosmonauts hurtle around Earth on the International Space Station.

    Their everyday routine of tasteless food and laboratory work is in stark contrast to the awesome spectacle of the blue planet, oscillating between night and day, dark and light, where international borders are meaningless.

    While they teach laboratory mice to orient themselves in micro-gravity, they rigorously document their own bodily functions to satisfy some “grand abstract dream of interplanetary life” away from “the planet held hostage by humans, a gun to its vitals”. These are humans, Harvey tells us, “with a godly view that’s the blessing and also the curse”. Harvey has written a novel for the end of the world as we know it. The hope it offers is that we might learn to know it differently.

    By Debra Benita Shaw, reader in cultural theory

    The Ministry of Time by Kaliane Bradley

    The best novels defy easy categorisation, and The Ministry of Time covers many genres: climate fiction, sci-fi, speculative fiction, romance, action.

    It tells the story of a female civil servant who is a handler for one of five people plucked from history before their death. It was fun to imagine how today’s world would be perceived from various perspectives, including a zesty young lesbian woman from the 17th century, a shy young lieutenant from the first world war and a 19th-century naval officer.

    The story adopts the usual dystopian tropes of a world that has destroyed itself through greed, power-seeking and over-indulgence. In the final plea to the reader not to let this terrible future unfold, the assumption is that if we’re scared enough, we’ll all give up red meat, stop flying and campaign for climate policies.

    My research, and psychological studies of fear caution us that the response is just as likely to be voting for far-right leaders, marginalisation of innocent victims, and buying up all the toilet rolls. I loved this book, but to inspire greener behaviour, showing visions of what a sustainable society might look like if we did things right would be a welcome change.

    By Denise Baden, professor of sustainable business


    Looking for something good? Cut through the noise with a carefully curated selection of the latest releases, live events and exhibitions, straight to your inbox every fortnight, on Fridays. Sign up here.


    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. The Climate Fiction Prize 2025: the five shortlisted books reviewed by our experts – https://theconversation.com/the-climate-fiction-prize-2025-the-five-shortlisted-books-reviewed-by-our-experts-253056

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Plymouth recognised after incredible tree planting winter

    Source: City of Plymouth

    Plymouth has been recognised as a Tree City of the World on back of another exceptional planting season this winter.

    Since November 2024, thanks in part to a huge new partnership effort, there are over 35,000 new trees growing and establishing across the city.

    In the city, Council teams have helped to plant over 5,700 new trees of all shapes, species and sizes all over the city to further enhance the successful legacy of the Plymouth and South Devon Community Forest.

    Meanwhile, in addition to the trees planted in and around the city, Council and Community Forest teams assisted with the planting of a vast new 30,000-strong forest on MOD land near Ernesettle.

    Be it parks and open spaces, road verges, residential streets or in school grounds, Council teams have been busy delivering a positive impact for people and nature across the city.

    Extra specially, this year a massive 658 standard and fruit trees have been established. Standards are large trees that at the time of planting are already six to ten feet tall with this year’s number nearly double that of 2024.

    On top of the standards, a further 5,102 whips have been planted as hedgerows and high-density planting areas which will become the wildlife corridors, edible hedgerows, and wooded areas of the future.

    Over the course of the season teams have engaged with hundreds of people of all ages through various community events and groups including Plymouth Tree People, Headway, Societree, and the Hoe Gardening Group, as well as through partnerships with landowners like Plymouth Community Homes and the Learning Academy Trust.

    The successful season, plus ongoing work behind the scenes, has led to Plymouth being awarded the coveted status as an official Tree City of the World.

    Tree Cities of the World programme is an international effort to recognise cities and towns committed to ensuring that their urban forests and trees are properly maintained, sustainably managed, and celebrated.

    2024-2025 Planting Season in Numbers

    5,727 planted across the city

    658 standards and fruit trees

    5,102 whips planted as hedgerows and high density areas

    30,000 planted in partnership with the MOD on land near Ernesettle RNAD

    21 sites planted, 6 of which were not on PCC owned land

    11 sites delivered through successful Trees for Climate grant applications

    246 active community volunteers on planting days over 13 sites

    40+ species of tree planted, 30+ of which are native

    45+ varieties of fruit tree planted, creating five new community orchards

    The status is awarded when a city can demonstrated having; policies for tree management; an inventory to determine what trees it has; a budget to care for those trees; a group dedicated to the care of those trees; and an annual celebration of its trees.

    Plymouth was awarded the status after a joint bid between Plymouth and South Devon Community Forest, the Council and local charity Plymouth Tree People, in recognition of the innovative approach to bring our community forest to life.

    Councillor Tom Briars-Delve, Cabinet Member for the Environment and Climate Change, said: “Another year, another incredible amount of trees planted across our beautiful city. Just marvellous.

    “Then to be become a Tree Cities of World is a real honour for our city.

    “Since taking control in 2023, this administration has championed tree planting and the natural environment so this international recognition as a leading tree city, achieved thanks to positive collaborations with local community groups, shows just how far we’ve come.”

    Penny Tarrant, Chair of Plymouth Tree People, said: “We are delighted to have worked in partnership to achieve this accolade for Plymouth. It demonstrates the commitment to and the value in working together.

    “As a local charity, our core work is to Plant, Care and Learn. As partners we have played our part in planting many street trees across the city, caring for trees via our broad Tree Warden network and in teaching about and celebrating trees through the Plymouth Urban Tree Festival, between 11 and 18 May.”

    The prolific 2024-25 planting season means that that over 17,500 trees have been planted across more than 120 sites since 2021, when the Plymouth and South Devon Community Forest was first launched.

    The Defra funded Community Forest project boundary stretches from the South Devon coast, across Plymouth and right across to the rolling landscape of Dartmoor National Park.

    By April 2026 a further 300 hectares will be planted creating a mosaic of orchards, hedgerows, areas of natural regeneration, native broadleaf, and productive woodland.

    Unlike traditional forests, the community forest isn’t geographically restricted to one place. Instead, it encompasses a wide variety of planting styles from community accessible woodland, private woodland, highway verge planting, urban wooded areas , habitat corridors and hedgerows contributing the wider England’s Communty Forests.

    Find out more about Community Forest and how to get involved at https://psdcf.com

    To contribute to the consultation on the Community Forest Plan please visit https://plymouth-consult.objective.co.uk/kse/event/38334

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI USA: Assessing the Global Climate in April 2025

    Source: US National Oceanographic Data Center

    April Highlights:

    • Temperatures were above normal across most land and ocean areas in April.
    • Preliminary data suggest that global average precipitation in April was record low.
    • Northern Hemisphere snow cover extent tied for lowest on record for the month.
    • Sea ice extent was below average around both poles.
    • Global tropical storm activity was near-normal with four named storms.
    Map of global selected significant climate anomalies and events in April 2025.

    Temperature

    Temperatures were above normal across much of the globe in April. Asia and the Arctic stood out in this regard, though western Antarctica was also warmer than normal, and most of the ocean surface was much above average. A few areas were below normal, such as northern Australia, southern South America and eastern Antarctica, as well as the Norwegian, Greenland and Barents Seas. 

    For the globe as a whole, April 2025 was 2.20°F (1.22°C) above the 20th-century baseline. This is 0.13°F (0.07°C) below the record-warm April of 2024, thus ranking second in the 1850–2025 period. According to NCEI’s Global Annual Temperature Outlook, there is only a 3% chance that 2025 will rank as the warmest year on record.

    Surface Temperature Departure from the 1991–2020 Average for April 2025 (°C). Red indicates warmer than average and blue indicates colder than average.

    Precipitation

    Large areas in central Asia and southern Africa received record-setting precipitation in April.  Parts of northern Australia also experienced abnormally high precipitation. Heavy rainfall during the month caused floods and landslides in Brazil and Congo as well as flooding in western Somalia. Despite these extreme events, the globe as a whole was much drier than the long-term average. In fact, preliminary data indicate that April 2025 might have been the driest April in the historical record, which spans from 1979 to present.

    Percent of Normal Precipitation from the 1961–1990 base period for April 2025. Brown indicates drier than average and green indicates wetter than average.

    Snow Cover

    The Northern Hemisphere snow cover extent in April was 820,000 square miles below average, tying with 2024 as the smallest April snow cover extent on record. Snow cover over North America and Greenland was below average (by 120,000 square miles), and Eurasia was also below average (by 710,000 square miles). A lack of snow cover was particularly obvious over the United States and central Eurasia.

     

    Sea Ice

    Global sea ice extent was 480,000 square miles below the 1991–2020 average, ranking in the lowest third of the historical record. Arctic sea ice extent was below average (by 160,000 square miles), with the Barents, Okhotsk, Bering and Labrador Seas having lower-than-normal ice extent. Antarctic extent was also below average (by 320,000 square miles), though extent was above normal in some areas (such as the Weddell and Amundsen Seas).

    Map of the Arctic (left) and Antarctic (right) sea ice extent in April 2025.

    Tropical Cyclones

    Four named storms occurred across the globe in April, which matches the long-term average. Most notable among these was Severe Tropical Cyclone Courtney in the southwestern Indian Ocean. Two other storms occurred in the Australian region, along with one in the southwest Pacific.


    For a more complete summary of climate conditions and events, see our April 2025 Global Climate Report or explore our Climate at a Glance Global Time Series.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Global: What causes inequality in African countries? New book traces a vicious cycle

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Murray Leibbrandt, UCT Chair in Poverty and Inequality Research; Director of ARUA’s African Centre of Excellence for Inequality Resaearch with the Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit., University of Cape Town

    Inequality is a problem that exists in various forms in sub-Saharan Africa.

    Inequality is created by, among other factors, where you are born and live. Alongside this, income, assets, and access to education and healthcare differ among and between populations. These inequalities reinforce each other. The result is persistent poverty, lack of social mobility across generations, increased exposure to climate change, and a lack of inclusive economic growth.

    Our recently published book Inequalities in Sub-Saharan Africa: Multidimensional Perspectives and Future Challenges presents an overview of the current situation. It identifies the key dimensions, challenges and causes of inequalities in the region. The book also proposes some solutions for equitable and sustainable development. These include progressive taxation and policies that address inequalities at their roots.

    The impact of inequality

    Migration: On a global scale, the greatest determinant of individual incomes – and thus of inequalities between individuals – is place of birth. More than half of income’s variability is explained by the country of residence and by the given circumstances at birth. These include being born in a rural environment.

    In sub-Saharan Africa, especially in low-income countries, internal migration remains the most prevalent migration pattern. Migration is often the chosen route for people seeking to escape poverty. The rural exodus that characterises many countries in sub-Saharan Africa illustrates this well. Young people in Africa, faced with high unemployment rates, often see migration as the only opportunity for social mobility.

    The dynamics of international migration are more complex. Given the high costs involved, international migration concerns only 2.5% of the population in sub-Saharan Africa. This is mostly intra-continental.

    Labour market: Access to the labour market remains the main
    determinant of inequalities in sub-Saharan Africa.

    Labour markets in the region are characterised by high proportions of informal employment. Formal sectors are relatively small (about 15% of total employment on the continent). Since the turn of the century, countries like Kenya have seen their share of informal employment increase significantly (from 73% in 2001 to 83% in 2017). At the same time formal wage employment has declined.

    This amplifies inequality because the informal sector is characterised by a lack of protection and high vulnerability. But not all informal activities are precarious. Some serve as springboards into formal jobs.

    In the formal sector, wage inequality in Africa is among the highest in the world.
    In South Africa, workers in high-skilled jobs earn nearly five times more than those in low-skilled jobs.

    Young people entering the labour market have much higher unemployment rates and little chance of regular employment.

    Gender inequality: Many gender inequalities persist, particularly access to the labour market. Unpaid care work makes women’s work invisible. In many African countries, women and girls spend more time on unpaid care which limits their economic opportunities.

    These inequalities are reinforced by inequalities in access to resources. About 38% of African women report owning land, compared to 51% of African men.

    Climate change: Africa is suffering the most severe impacts – droughts, floods and food insecurity – while contributing less than 5% of global carbon emissions.

    Arid conditions affect 43.5% of agricultural land in sub-Saharan Africa compared to an estimated global average of 29%. Similarly, climate change mitigation costs, such as finding alternatives to hydroelectric power, are higher for low-income countries.

    In sub-Saharan Africa, the richest 10% emit seven times more tonnes of carbon dioxide than the poorest 50%. Disadvantaged groups are more vulnerable to adverse climate effects as their housing and wealth are more likely to be damaged by storms and floods.

    Skewed economic growth benefits: Economic growth has led to notably lower reductions in poverty in African countries than elsewhere. Unequal distribution of growth and its capture by those at the top of the income distribution ladder are evidence of non-inclusive economic growth. The richest 1% of Africans received 27% of the total revenue from growth on the continent.

    What needs to be done

    It is vital to give priority to promoting social and economic inclusion in the development strategies of African countries. Importantly, multidimensional inequalities such as income and health persist because they reinforce each other. Tackling them therefore requires coordinated and coherent policies.

    Murray Leibbrandt receives funding from the National Research Foundation of South Africa, the Agence Française de Développement, UK Research and Innovation, the World Institute for Development Economics Research and the International Inequalities Institute of the London School of Economics. He is affiliated with the United Nations University’s World Institute for Development Economics Research and the Jackson School of Global Affairs at Yale University.

    Anda David, Rawane Yasser, and Vimal Ranchhod do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. What causes inequality in African countries? New book traces a vicious cycle – https://theconversation.com/what-causes-inequality-in-african-countries-new-book-traces-a-vicious-cycle-253376

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Africa: What causes inequality in African countries? New book traces a vicious cycle

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Murray Leibbrandt, UCT Chair in Poverty and Inequality Research; Director of ARUA’s African Centre of Excellence for Inequality Resaearch with the Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit., University of Cape Town

    Inequality is a problem that exists in various forms in sub-Saharan Africa.

    Inequality is created by, among other factors, where you are born and live. Alongside this, income, assets, and access to education and healthcare differ among and between populations. These inequalities reinforce each other. The result is persistent poverty, lack of social mobility across generations, increased exposure to climate change, and a lack of inclusive economic growth.

    Our recently published book Inequalities in Sub-Saharan Africa: Multidimensional Perspectives and Future Challenges presents an overview of the current situation. It identifies the key dimensions, challenges and causes of inequalities in the region. The book also proposes some solutions for equitable and sustainable development. These include progressive taxation and policies that address inequalities at their roots.

    The impact of inequality

    Migration: On a global scale, the greatest determinant of individual incomes – and thus of inequalities between individuals – is place of birth. More than half of income’s variability is explained by the country of residence and by the given circumstances at birth. These include being born in a rural environment.

    In sub-Saharan Africa, especially in low-income countries, internal migration remains the most prevalent migration pattern. Migration is often the chosen route for people seeking to escape poverty. The rural exodus that characterises many countries in sub-Saharan Africa illustrates this well. Young people in Africa, faced with high unemployment rates, often see migration as the only opportunity for social mobility.

    The dynamics of international migration are more complex. Given the high costs involved, international migration concerns only 2.5% of the population in sub-Saharan Africa. This is mostly intra-continental.

    Labour market: Access to the labour market remains the main determinant of inequalities in sub-Saharan Africa.

    Labour markets in the region are characterised by high proportions of informal employment. Formal sectors are relatively small (about 15% of total employment on the continent). Since the turn of the century, countries like Kenya have seen their share of informal employment increase significantly (from 73% in 2001 to 83% in 2017). At the same time formal wage employment has declined.

    This amplifies inequality because the informal sector is characterised by a lack of protection and high vulnerability. But not all informal activities are precarious. Some serve as springboards into formal jobs.

    In the formal sector, wage inequality in Africa is among the highest in the world. In South Africa, workers in high-skilled jobs earn nearly five times more than those in low-skilled jobs.

    Young people entering the labour market have much higher unemployment rates and little chance of regular employment.

    Gender inequality: Many gender inequalities persist, particularly access to the labour market. Unpaid care work makes women’s work invisible. In many African countries, women and girls spend more time on unpaid care which limits their economic opportunities.

    These inequalities are reinforced by inequalities in access to resources. About 38% of African women report owning land, compared to 51% of African men.

    Climate change: Africa is suffering the most severe impacts – droughts, floods and food insecurity – while contributing less than 5% of global carbon emissions.

    Arid conditions affect 43.5% of agricultural land in sub-Saharan Africa compared to an estimated global average of 29%. Similarly, climate change mitigation costs, such as finding alternatives to hydroelectric power, are higher for low-income countries.

    In sub-Saharan Africa, the richest 10% emit seven times more tonnes of carbon dioxide than the poorest 50%. Disadvantaged groups are more vulnerable to adverse climate effects as their housing and wealth are more likely to be damaged by storms and floods.

    Skewed economic growth benefits: Economic growth has led to notably lower reductions in poverty in African countries than elsewhere. Unequal distribution of growth and its capture by those at the top of the income distribution ladder are evidence of non-inclusive economic growth. The richest 1% of Africans received 27% of the total revenue from growth on the continent.

    What needs to be done

    It is vital to give priority to promoting social and economic inclusion in the development strategies of African countries. Importantly, multidimensional inequalities such as income and health persist because they reinforce each other. Tackling them therefore requires coordinated and coherent policies.

    – What causes inequality in African countries? New book traces a vicious cycle
    – https://theconversation.com/what-causes-inequality-in-african-countries-new-book-traces-a-vicious-cycle-253376

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI: Federal Home Loan Bank of Atlanta Issues Impact and Affordable Housing Advisory Council Report

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    ATLANTA, May 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Federal Home Loan Bank of Atlanta (FHLBank Atlanta) released its Impact and Affordable Housing Advisory Council (AHAC) Report, describing the organization’s highest year of funding to date for affordable housing and community development. The report also outlines the widespread reach of FHLBank Atlanta’s lending products for member institutions and the community investment programs positively impacting its district in 2024.  

    “We are proud of our work to provide nearly 800 financial institutions with access to funding to support local lending for small businesses, mortgages, and community development projects,” said Kirk Malmberg, president and CEO of FHLBank Atlanta. “Additionally, each year we work with members to ensure we offer affordable housing grant programs that address current needs. For 2024, this resulted in the introduction of Workforce Housing Plus+, a new initiative to provide downpayment assistance to a broader population of borrowers challenged by the rising cost of homes and high interest rates.”

    In total, FHLBank Atlanta contributed a record $120 million in grants for affordable housing and community development in 2024. Additional highlights of the report include:

    • $55 million distributed through the Affordable Housing Program (AHP) General Fund, supporting 66 projects that will create or rehabilitate more than 4,200 affordable housing units
    • $40 million distributed through the AHP Homeownership Set-aside Program, providing homeownership grants to more than 3,000 households for downpayment, closing cost, and home rehabilitation assistance
    • $20 million distributed through the Workforce Housing Plus+ program, providing downpayment and closing cost assistance to more than 1,300 households
    • $5.9 million in total allocated to 21 organizations addressing heirs’ property issues to help more than 5,000 families protect their assets and build generational wealth
    • $1 billion in Community Investment Program advances to support housing and economic development
    • $250,000 donated to the American Red Cross for recovery efforts following Hurricane Helene
    • 48 forums attended to promote financial literacy and homeownership knowledge sharing across the FHLBank Atlanta district

    The report also highlights FHLBank Atlanta’s culture of giving back, including its ongoing Community Involvement program and volunteerism efforts.

    “FHLBank Atlanta continues to remain a reliable source of lending for members, allowing us to deliver on our purpose of earning trust, building relationships, and bettering lives,” said Tomeka Strickland, senior vice president and director of community investment services of FHLBank Atlanta. “The record amount of grant funding we distributed last year is a direct reflection of our collaboration with members and commitment to our communities, and we look forward to strengthening these partnerships in 2025 to continue investing in the neighborhoods our members serve.”

    About Federal Home Loan Bank of Atlanta
    FHLBank Atlanta offers competitively-priced financing, community development grants, and other banking services to help member financial institutions make affordable home mortgages and provide economic development credit to neighborhoods and communities. The Bank is a cooperative whose members are commercial banks, credit unions, savings institutions, community development financial institutions, and insurance companies located in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. FHLBank Atlanta is one of 11 district banks in the Federal Home Loan Bank System (FHLBank System). Since 1990, the FHLBanks have awarded approximately $9.1 billion in Affordable Housing Program funds, assisting more than 1.2 million households. 
    For more information, visit our website at www.fhlbatl.com.

    Contact: Sheryl Touchton
    Federal Home Loan Bank of Atlanta
    stouchton@fhlbatl.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Global: Population explosions and declines are related to the stability of the economy and the environment

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Ken G. Drouillard, Professor, Great Lakes Institute for Environmental Research and Director of the School of the Environment, University of Windsor

    A country’s population is affected by, and in turn affects, environmental and economic issues. (Shutterstock)

    For 200 years, we’ve been warned of unchecked population growth and how it leads to environmental instability. On the other hand, today some countries face decreasing populations, alongside increasing proportions of elderly people, causing economic instability.

    These two facets of population crises — explosions and declines — are occurring in different parts of the world, and have a global impact on the environment and on economies. Discussions about achieving economic and environmental sustainability must consider population changes, technology and the environment, given these concepts are closely interwoven.

    Population explosions and declines are related to both environmental and economic instability; some countries make reactionary choices that trade off short-term domestic economic progress over the environment.

    The crisis of population explosions

    In 1798, English economist Thomas Malthus warned of a population explosion, inferring that population growth will outstrip agricultural production. Malthus’s ideas became re-popularized by American scientist Paul R. Ehrlich in his book published at the height of population growth in the 1960s. Both predicted that a population explosion would cause shortages in resources and escalating environmental damage.

    Like Malthus, Ehrlich was criticized for a crisis “that never happened” because human ingenuity, a byproduct of population, overcomes the worst fears of environmentalists. This counter-argument relies on technological advances making more efficient use of resources while lowering the environmental impacts.

    This is best exemplified by efficiency gains of agriculture that have continued to feed a growing world. Ehrlich’s predictions of cumulative environmental damage are best illustrated by the growing intensity of climate change and species loss as the global population continues to grow even though the current growth rate is slower than it was in the 1960s.

    A graph reflecting how population growth, species diversity and global temperature correlate over time.
    (K. Drouillard), CC BY

    Unified growth theory describes how economies change over the long term. It starts with a period of slow technological progress, low income growth and high population growth. Over time, these conditions give way to a modern growth phase, where technology improves quickly, income rises steadily and population growth slows as societies go through a demographic transition towards stable population sizes.

    Technological progress positively contributes to national economies over the long term. However, early adoption of green technology often relies on finance and government incentives that may imply short-term economic burdens. Yet when green technology is implemented and coupled to slowing population growth, it leads to decreasing national environmental footprints that pave a way towards joint environmental and economic sustainability.

    The crisis of population declines

    Declining populations cause inverted age pyramids with larger numbers of elderly people. These shifting demographics cause economic instability. They also constrain technological progress and social security.

    Population declines work against the gains described by unified growth theory. Presently, 63 countries have reached their peak population and 48 more are expected to peak within 30 years. Fears of population decline are also being forecast at the global scale.

    The global population is predicted to peak between the mid-2060s to 2100, stabilizing at 10.2 billion from its present 8.2 billion.

    In their book, Empty Planet, political scientist Darrell Bricker and political commentator John Ibbitson warn that zero population growth will happen even faster. They argue once a country decreases its fertility to below replacement (2.1 children per woman), the social reinforcements of increasing urbanization, costs of raising children and increased empowerment over family planning make it almost impossible to increase the birth rate.

    For highly affluent countries, the per capita GDP is decreasing as the proportion of elderly in the population increases. Although this pattern doesn’t hold when less affluent countries are added, the figure demonstrates tangible economic impacts for countries grappling with aging populations.

    A graph showing the percentage of elderly people in a country’s population, correlated with GDP and adjusted for inflation.
    (K. Drouillard), CC BY

    Simultaneous explosions and declines

    Affluent nations facing decline can react to economic instability in ways that counter global economic and environmental sustainability.

    In the past, affluent nations were the drivers of green technology. However, economic instability from population declines can cause reluctance to invest, adopt and share green technology crucial for mitigating environmental damage at the global scale.

    The issue is compounded by the fact that many countries overlook how their own decline in population growth contributes to economic instability. They instead focus on short-term solutions to their economic situation that may include unsustainable resource use.

    Left unaddressed, the real issue of population decline becomes unresolved, allowing social anxieties against immigration and global trade to grow. This can exacerbate the issue halting technology sharing, slowing economic growth and increasing economic inequality and environmental damage.

    The above is exemplified by policies now being implemented by the United States. Where immigration was previously used as a backstop against low fertility, growing cultural backlash to immigration pressures rooted in anxiety about economic uncertainties have generated new policies causing the deportation of millions of immigrants and closing borders. This will most likely accelerate a population decline in the U.S., as highlighted by a Congressional Budget Office report.

    At the same time, the U.S. is shifting its energy policy away from increased shares of renewable, green energy sources back to a focus on fossil fuels that will worsen climate damage.

    Climate damage costs are currently two per cent of global GDP, and may increase to between two to 21 per cent of some countries’ incomes by the end of the century. The growing applications of artificial intelligence (AI) and its high energy use will add to climate damage. AI may also contribute to the economic challenges related to population decline if it replaces, rather than supports, labour.

    Finally, tariff wars add new barriers against green technology sharing.

    Canada’s lowered immigration

    Canada, which already has a low fertility rate and is reacting to the U.S. trade war, has its own challenges. This year, immigration targets were decreased by 19 per cent. The lack of support for and subsequent removal of the carbon tax and possible extension of pipeline infrastructure could generate similar delays in the transition away from fossil fuels.




    Read more:
    Who really killed Canada’s carbon tax? Friends and foes alike


    In the most recent federal election, discussions about environmental policy were largely side-tracked by economic issues.

    Our research indicates that Canada and other affluent nations need to establish longer-term solutions to economic instabilities that mitigate environmental damage while promoting sustainable national and global economies.

    The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals offer pathways for economic, social and environmental sustainability. However, realizing these goals requires society to fully acknowledge the intertwined relationships between population growth, economy, environment and international technology-sharing in ways that transcend short-term national interests and reactionary policies.

    The past decade has seen strong momentum from social and natural sciences as well as international organizations, business and civil society. Unfortunately, the current climate of economic uncertainty is halting this progress — unless the public can force broader discussions about sustainable approaches back into the political sphere.

    Ken G. Drouillard receives funding from Natural Science and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC), Canadian Water Agency, Environment and Climate Change Canada, St. Clair River Conservation Authority and North Shore of Lake Superior Remedial Action Plans.

    Claudio N. Verani receives/has received funding from the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF), U.S. Department of Energy (DoE), Petroleum Research Fund (ACS-PRF), and the Natural Science and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC).

    Marcelo Arbex has received funding from University of Windsor UW-SSHRC Explore.

    ref. Population explosions and declines are related to the stability of the economy and the environment – https://theconversation.com/population-explosions-and-declines-are-related-to-the-stability-of-the-economy-and-the-environment-253302

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: As US doubles down on fossil fuels, communities will have to adapt to the consequences − yet climate adaptation funding is on the chopping block

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Bethany Bradley, Professor of Biogeography and Spatial Ecology, UMass Amherst

    Salt marshes protect shorelines, but they’re already struggling to survive sea-level rise. John Greim/LightRocket via Getty Images

    It’s no secret that warming temperatures, wildfires and flash floods are increasingly affecting lives across the United States. With the U.S. government now planning to ramp up fossil fuel use, the risks of these events are likely to become even more pronounced.

    That leaves a big question: Is the nation prepared to adapt to the consequences?

    For many years, federally funded scientists have been developing solutions to help reduce the harm climate change is causing in people’s lives and livelihoods. Yet, as with many other science programs, the White House is proposing to eliminate funding for climate adaptation science in the next federal budget, and reports suggest that the firing of federal climate adaptation scientists may be imminent.

    As researchers and directors of regional Climate Adaptation Science Centers, funded by the U.S. Geological Survey since 2011, we have seen firsthand the work these programs do to protect the nation’s natural resources and their successes in helping states and tribes build resilience to climate risks.

    Here are a few examples of the ways federally funded climate adaptation science conducted by university and federal researchers helps the nation weather the effects of climate change.

    Protecting communities against wildfire risk

    Wildfires have increasingly threatened communities and ecosystems across the U.S., exacerbated by worsening heat waves and drought.

    In the Southwest, researchers with the Climate Adaptation Science Centers are developing forecasting models to identify locations at greatest risk of wildfire at different times of year.

    Knowing where and when fire risks are highest allows communities to take steps to protect themselves, whether by carrying out controlled burns to remove dry vegetation, creating fire breaks to protect homes, managing invasive species that can leave forests more prone to devastating fires, or other measures.

    The solutions are created with forest and wildland managers to ensure projects are viable, effective and tailored to each area. The research is then integrated into best practices for managing wildfires. The researchers also help city planners find the most effective methods to reduce fire risks in wildlands near homes.

    Wildland firefighters and communities have limited resources. They need to know where the greatest risks exist to take preventive measures.
    Ethan Swope/Getty Images

    In Hawaii and the other Pacific islands, adaptation researchers have similarly worked to identify how drought, invasive species and land-use changes contribute to fire risk there. They use these results to create maps of high-risk fire zones to help communities take steps to reduce dry and dead undergrowth that could fuel fires and also plan for recovery after fires.

    Protecting shorelines and fisheries

    In the Northeast, salt marshes line large parts of the coast, providing natural buffers against storms by damping powerful ocean waves that would otherwise erode the shoreline. Their shallow, grassy waters also serve as important breeding grounds for valuable fish.

    However, these marshes are at risk of drowning as sea level rises faster than the sediment can build up.

    As greenhouse gases from burning fossil fuels and from other human activities accumulate in the atmosphere, they trap extra heat near Earth’s surface and in the oceans, raising temperatures. The rising temperatures melt glaciers and also cause thermal expansion of the oceans. Together, those processes are raising global sea level by about 1.3 inches per decade.

    Adaptation researchers with the Climate Adaptation Science Centers have been developing local flood projections for the regions’ unique oceanographic and geophysical conditions to help protect them. Those projections are essential to help natural resource managers and municipalities plan effectively for the future.

    Researchers are also collaborating with local and regional organizations on salt marsh restoration, including assessing how sediment builds up each marsh and creating procedures for restoring and monitoring the marshes.

    Saving salmon in Alaska and the Northwest

    In the Northwest and Alaska, salmon are struggling as temperatures rise in the streams they return to for spawning each year. Warm water can make them sluggish, putting them at greater risk from predators. When temperatures get too high, they can’t survive. Even in large rivers such as the Columbia, salmon are becoming heat stressed more often.

    Adaptation researchers in both regions have been evaluating the effectiveness of fish rescues – temporarily moving salmon into captivity as seasonal streams overheat or dry up due to drought.

    In Alaska, adaptation scientists have built broad partnerships with tribes, nonprofit organizations and government agencies to improve temperature measurements of remote streams, creating an early warning system for fisheries so managers can take steps to help salmon survive.

    Managing invasive species

    Rising temperatures can also expand the range of invasive species, which cost the U.S. economy billions of dollars each year in crop and forest losses and threaten native plants and animals.

    Researchers in the Northeast and Southeast Climate Adaptation Science Centers have been working to identify and prioritize the risks from invasive species that are expanding their ranges. That helps state managers eradicate these emerging threats before they become a problem. These regional invasive species networks have become the go-to source of climate-related scientific information for thousands of invasive species managers.

    The rise in the number of invasive species projected by 2050 is substantial in the Northeast and upper Midwest. Federally funded scientists develop these risk maps and work with local communities to head off invasive species damage.
    Regional Invasive Species and Climate Change Network

    The Northeast is a hot spot for invasive species, particularly for plants that can outcompete native wetland and grassland species and host pathogens that can harm native species.

    Without proactive assessments, invasive species management becomes more difficult. Once the damage has begun, managing invasive species becomes more expensive and less effective.

    Losing the nation’s ability to adapt wisely

    A key part of these projects is the strong working relationships built between scientists and the natural resource managers in state, community, tribal and government agencies who can put this knowledge into practice.

    With climate extremes likely to increase in the coming years, losing adaptation science will leave the United States even more vulnerable to future climate hazards.

    Bethany Bradley receives funding from the US Geological Survey as the University Director of the Northeast Climate Adaptation Science Center.

    Jia Hu has receives funding from the US Geological Survey as the University Director of the Southwest Climate Adaptation Science Center.

    Meade Krosby receives funding from the US Geological Survey as the University Director of the Northwest Climate Adaptation Science Center.

    ref. As US doubles down on fossil fuels, communities will have to adapt to the consequences − yet climate adaptation funding is on the chopping block – https://theconversation.com/as-us-doubles-down-on-fossil-fuels-communities-will-have-to-adapt-to-the-consequences-yet-climate-adaptation-funding-is-on-the-chopping-block-256307

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: England’s peatlands mapped for first time in major step towards their recovery

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    England’s peatlands mapped for first time in major step towards their recovery

    England’s most in-depth peatland map shows the extent, depth and condition of our peatlands

    • Scientific first made possible due to satellite imagery, AI and in-depth data analysis showing the extent, depth and condition of our peatlands
    • Data reveals that around 80% of England’s peatlands are in dry and degraded states, but targeted mapping will now help aid their recovery
    • Restoring 55% of peatland would have a value of around £50 billion in reduced carbon emissions alongside benefits for water storage and purification

    Scientists have mapped England’s peatlands to a level of extraordinary detail never achieved before – revealing their worrying, degraded state and need for recovery.

     The England Peat Map launched today (Saturday 10th May) is the most complete map of England’s peatlands and peaty soils to date and one’s of the world’s most comprehensive peat maps in existence. Our peatlands are a critical natural resource providing essential public goods such as carbon sequestration , water purification and storage – helping protect communities from flooding.

    The map models the extent, depth, and important aspects of the condition of our peat, including vegetation, and even shows gullies and man-made and natural drainage channels and has been produced using cutting edge techniques.

    Researchers used AI, satellite data from the European Space Agency, individual data sets from field surveys and modelled to identify the likelihood of peaty soils, and marks a step change in our ability to make decisions about land use and target conservation activities where they’re most needed.

    The map, published alongside key research, shows:

    • Peaty soil covers roughly 8.5% of England’s surface
    • Around 80% of England’s peatlands are in dry and degraded states, making this an area in need of urgent action
    • Around three quarters of our peat is covered by plants and land use types associated with dryer conditions such as heather, while only 1% is covered by important peat forming plants such as sphagnum moss
    • The most extensive peatland habitat is to be found across the Pennines, North York Moors, parts of the Lake District, and in the uplands of the South West.

    The findings present a worrying picture of widely degraded peat from the blanket bog most associated with our northern uplands to the lowland deep peat found most commonly in the fens of the East England.

    Degraded peat also emits carbon, meaning that our peatlands are releasing carbon into the atmosphere and helping drive global heating. Understanding how much peat we have is the first step to calculating how much carbon it holds and how much it’s releasing – vital information as we work together to combat climate change.

    The open source map available today on gov.uk will empower land managers and key decision makers to better understand and restore the nation’s peatland– for example, blocking drainage channels to re-wet the land and support better informed decisions on how to effectively balance biodiversity and carbon storage with food security in some of England’s most fertile farmland.

    Restoring peatland will bring benefits for nature, communities, and the wider economy. Estimates suggest restoring 55% of peatland to near-natural condition will have a value of around £50 billion in reduced carbon emissions, while their value as a source of drinking water and recreation space is worth many hundreds of millions of pounds.

    Natural England’s Chief Scientist Dr Sallie Bailey said:

    Trying to map something that’s largely underground, changes in volume depending whether it’s rained recently, and tries to swallow you up every time you set foot in it comes with its challenges, which makes this map extraordinary in its accomplishment and something of a global first.

    Mapping peat to this level of detail will help us maximise the benefits of peat and massively advances our understanding the role our peatlands are playing in a changing climate.

    Natural England Chair Tony Juniper said:

    The benefits of healthy peatlands are well documented – they are our biggest natural carbon stores, essential to the water cycle, and refuge to some of our rarest plants and wildlife, such as the carnivorous sundew plant, marsh violet, and charismatic birds like golden plover and curlew.

    The England Peat Map will allow us to make far better and more informed decisions when it comes to managing peatlands – targeting restoration efforts to the most degraded peat and identifying the best opportunities for nature recovery.

    Nature Minister Mary Creagh said:

    Our peatlands are this country’s Amazon Rainforest and in desperate need of restoration and protection, as this mapping and research work starkly demonstrates.

    That is why we have announced up to £400m for nature restoration, including of our peatlands, and are consulting on new plans to extend the ban on burning deep peat. This government, as part of our Plan for Change,  are committed to expanding nature-rich habitats and turning the tide on nature’s decline after years of neglect.

    Notes to editors

    • The full peat map can be found here: England Peat Map
    • The accompanying report can be found here: England Peat Map – NERR149
    • The report and map have been funded through Defra’s Natural Capital and Ecosystem Assessment programme (NCEA) and Nature for Climate Fund.

    Updates to this page

    Published 12 May 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI: Enwave Announces Expansion of Energy from Waste District Heating Facility in Prince Edward Island, Avoiding Landfill for Nearly 90% of the Black Cart Residential Waste in Province

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    TORONTO, May 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Enwave Energy Corporation (Enwave) has announced today the commitment to build a new waste processing facility in Prince Edward Island, beginning this fall. The facility will be in operation by 2028 and will replace the existing end-of-life system. Enwave, in partnership with the Province of Prince Edward Island, has proudly undertaken this expansion to address the growing need to identify sustainable waste solutions in the province.

    The existing district energy plant converts municipal solid waste and biomass — scrap wood from forest harvesting operations — to energy and provides that energy to its customers through the interconnected district energy network. After nearly thirty years of operation, the plant is approaching end-of-life and will be replaced with the new, expanded facility. Since 2017, the Province of Prince Edward Island and Enwave have collaborated on this project with a united goal to reduce waste and Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions at a time when sustainable waste solutions are needed more than ever.

    This new, state-of-the-art facility is capable of processing 90% of the province’s total black cart residential waste, significantly reducing landfill waste. The expansion of this critical facility will significantly replace the use of fuel oil for heating while providing further reliability and redundancy to more than 145 connected buildings in Charlottetown, the province’s capital city, including the Queen Elizabeth Hospital, the University of Prince Edward Island, schools and residences. Enwave’s district energy system has a proven track record as a reliable and critical source of energy in the province, having maintained uninterrupted operations to critical customers during recent natural phenomena such as hurricanes Juan, Dorian and Fiona, as well as during the hurricane-strength blizzard, White Juan, in 2004.

    Rendering of Enwave’s new waste processing facility in Prince Edward Island, anticipated to be in operation by 2028 to replace the existing end-of-life system.

    Enwave brings more than thirty years of experience in advanced Waste-to-Energy systems to the project, a proven path to avoiding landfill waste and reducing GHG emissions. Through this expansion, the annual impact of avoiding landfill by using up to 49,000 tonnes of municipal solid waste for heating will amount to GHG savings of up to 908,000 tonnes of CO2e by 2052, equivalent to taking 278,000 cars off the road.

    Leveraging Waste-to-Energy technology provides a real solution and tangible option for communities around the country to reduce the need for additional landfills and help to meet carbon emission reduction targets. With global waste forecasted to increase 70% by 2050, this project is a testament to scalable and sustainable pathways that directly address concerns of rising waste.

    “We are very grateful for the support and confidence of the government of PEI and the people of this province, enabling us to make this long-term commitment as a critical energy partner,” says Carlyle Coutinho, CEO of Enwave Energy Corporation. “The eight-year journey to get to this point has seen many hurdles, however both Enwave and the province have remained committed to making this expansion a reality. This project is an example of how governments and private companies can work together to achieve long-term, sustainable solutions at scale through a shared purpose, creating a better world for today and generations to come.”

    “Waste to Energy technology is a great example of a sustainable, innovative solution to meeting PEI’s energy needs,” says PEI Environment, Energy and Climate Action Minister Gilles Arsenault. “This expansion helps us continue to minimize energy costs for important provincial buildings and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. As an added benefit, using this waste for energy helps us extend the life of our existing landfill.”

    Enwave’s expansion of the waste processing facility and operations will nearly double existing waste processing capacity while directly aligning with Charlottetown’s Vision for a Sustainable Energy Future by transitioning to renewable clean energy and incorporating sustainable innovation and technology.

    “The CIB is proud to be a part of this project given the important role it will play in modernizing the city’s district energy system, ensuring affordable and clean energy supply to more than 145 connected buildings in the Charlottetown core,” says Ehren Cory, CEO, Canada Infrastructure Bank.

    The new waste processing facility expansion is supported financially by the Canadian Infrastructure Bank through an aggregate facility of $600M supporting innovative energy projects across Enwave’s portfolio, including Lakeview Village in Mississauga, Ontario (Wastewater Heat Recovery technology), Etobicoke Civic Centre in Toronto (Geo-exchange technology), and this project in PEI (Waste-to-Energy technology).

    Enwave has worked closely alongside key partners that are critical to the success of the PEI expansion project, including Maple Reindeers Constructors Ltd., Marco Group, Ramboll Group A/S, Coles Associates Ltd., Stantec, Martin GmbH, ANDRITZ TEP, LAB SA and Kone Cranes Canada Inc.

    A ceremony announcing the official groundbreaking of the new waste processing facility will take place in the fall of 2025.

    About Enwave

    Enwave is one of the largest commercial owner and operators of community-based district energy systems in North America. They develop reliable, commercial and sustainable energy solutions at scale, tailored to the unique needs of municipalities, commercial developments, universities, hospitals, data centres and residential communities. Enwave provides thermal energy services to over 100 million square feet of mixed-use space across Canada using a variety of technologies including Deep Lake Water Cooling, thermal storage, geoexchange, biomass and energy-from-waste. Enwave was acquired by Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan & IFM Investors in 2021. Since its founding over 20 years ago, Enwave has invested over $1 billion in Canadian infrastructure.

    https://www.enwave.com

    For more information, interview requests or high-res images please contact:

    Katie Good, GoodPR
    katie@goodpr.ca
    (416) 540-2195

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/09037f6e-0b81-4106-acf2-051e5ef0ebc3

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Video: Unlocking Europe’s Potential

    Source: World Economic Forum (video statements)

    Two recent landmark reports on the European Union’s economy paint an unforgiving picture of its vulnerabilities, suggesting the region faces the prospect of “slow agony”. At current productivity and demographic trends, Europe’s economic output is forecast to be the same in 2050 as it is today. With much of the power to correct course residing in national capitals, what will it take for leaders to rise to the challenge?

    This is the full audio from a session at the Forum’s Annual Meeting on 22 January, 2025. Watch it here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VqghCwdxqHo

    Speakers: Nicolas Hieronimus, Chief Executive Officer, L’Oréal

    Roula Khalaf, Editor, Financial Times

    Robert Habeck, Vice-Chancellor and Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Climate Action,

    Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action of Germany

    Belen Garijo, Chair of the Executive Board and Chief Executive Officer, Merck

    Christine Lagarde, President, European Central Bank

    Check out all our podcasts on wef.ch/podcasts (http://wef.ch/podcasts) : 

    YouTube: (https://www.youtube.com/@wef/podcasts) – https://www.youtube.com/@wef/podcasts

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    Join the World Economic Forum Podcast Club (https://www.facebook.com/groups/wefpodcastclub) : https://www.facebook.com/groups/wefpodcastclub

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LCAQca-y5v8

    MIL OSI Video

  • COP30 Brazilian presidency calls for new global climate governance

    Source: Government of India (4)

    The Brazilian presidency of COP30, this year’s climate summit, called for new global climate governance mechanisms to help nations implement their commitments to curb global warming, according to a letter it released on Thursday.

    The summit, to be hosted in the Amazonian city of Belem in November, marks the 10th anniversary of the Paris Accord, when signatories agreed to limit warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius from pre-industrial levels.

    Though nations have so far committed to plans that would limit warming to around 2.6 degrees Celsius, many are struggling to get their proposals off the drawing board and to lower carbon emissions enough to stop the planet from heating to catastrophic levels.

    According to the letter by the COP30 presidency, “the international community should investigate how climate cooperation could become better equipped to accelerate” implementation.

    The proposal was first introduced by Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva last November, during the G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro. At the time, Lula proposed creating a “United Nations climate change council” to help countries implement commitments they made to address climate change as part of the 2015 Paris Agreement.

    “There’s no point in negotiating new commitments if we don’t have an effective mechanism to accelerate the implementation of the Paris Agreement,” Lula said. “We need stronger climate governance.”

    The proposal has now been adopted by Brazilian ambassador Andre Correa do Lago, who will preside over COP30. Correa do Lago argued that, after decades of debates, the Climate Convention, known as the UNFCCC, has completed necessary negotiations but lacks implementation capacity.

    “The UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement don’t have the strength or mandate to take this forward, so we’re proposing to reconsider how we can institutionally strengthen implementation,” Lago told journalists on Wednesday.

    The COP Presidency letter suggests that the United Nations General Assembly, not COP30 itself, should be the forum for this discussion.

    “Debates at the U.N. General Assembly could explore innovative governance approaches to endow international cooperation with capabilities for rapid sharing of data, knowledge and intelligence, as well as for leveraging networks, aggregating efforts and articulating resources, processes, mechanisms and actors within and outside the U.N.,” the letter states.

    Sources in the Brazilian government told Reuters that while the creation of a U.N. Climate Council features in Lula’s diplomatic discussions with world leaders, immediate results are not anticipated in the short term.

    “It’s still an initial convincing effort,” one source said.

    (Reuters)

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: 5 ways Māngere Community Enviro Hub is helping the community grow

    Source: Secondary teachers question rationale for changes to relationship education guidelines

    In a once weed-ridden and forgotten corner of Māngere, something remarkable is flourishing. On the unused land of a former Kāinga Ora housing site, the Māngere Community Enviro Hub is now sprouting with fresh produce to feed the community.

    The hub, on the corner of Elmdon St and Watchfield Close, often echoes with the chatter of school kids gathered around the raised beds learning about growing kai, and on special occasions, the smoke from the hāngī pit signals a community gathering. At the Auckland Council-funded Māngere Community Enviro Hub, the community isn’t just watching things grow – they’re growing together.

    1. Growing kai for the community

    In just one year, the Kāinga Ora land leased to community development organisation I AM Māngere has gone from bare earth to a thriving community garden. The driving force of this transformation is software developer turned horticulturist Rata Taiwhanga, from the Etū Rākau Charitable Trust.

    In the māra kai (food garden), several garden beds are growing seasonal kai. The beds are designed in a tiered pyramid shape to create airflow. There’s also a section dedicated to Pacific and international produce such as taro, pawpaw and bananas.

    Even in cooler weather, the garden is thriving with rainbow silverbeet and winter greens. There’s a garden bed set aside for locals who can use the garden to grow vegetables for their whānau. Other produce is sold at markets for an affordable price.

    The pyramid design of the garden beds at Māngere Community Enviro Hub is designed to create airflow around the whenua (land).

    Auckland Council has supported the Māngere Community Enviro Hub through the Climate Grant, the Waste Minimisation and Innovation Fund and support through the Recovery Office. Installing a greenhouse is the next big project on the horizon which will allow the garden to extend the growing season on some crops – part of a bigger project around sustainability and climate resilience.

    “It is important for Auckland Council to support Etū Rākau and the Māngere Enviro Hub,” says Frances Hayton, Low Carbon Specialist for the Council.

    “Māngere is one of the three priority communities identified as needing support to be able to lead their own recovery following the 2023 Auckland Anniversary Weekend floods and adapt to the changing environment.

    “The Māngere Enviro Hub sits alongside other Council programmes that aim to build on the understanding within the Māngere community of a changing climate to future hazards such as floods, drought, cyclones and rising sea levels.”

    2. Composting waste and creating a circular economy

    Council funding has helped provide carbon cycle composting bins for the site. Each bin can process 750kg of food waste a week, and the compost produced is used to replenish the garden. The composting system is part of the Enviro Hub’s circular economy and the group charges local businesses, such as cafes, $30 a week to collect their food scraps. The green waste is then used to grow microgreens, which are sold back to the cafe.

    Local student Jackson has learnt how to compost Māngere Community Enviro Hub’s carbon cycle composting bins. The Council-funded bins have the capacity to compost 750kg of food scraps a week.

    Another local business supplies the Enviro Hub with mulch and brown vegetation for the garden. If the compost bins can generate excess compost, Rata hopes to sell bags at local markets.

    “The idea is to create a micro store that’s accessible for the local community as there’s no hardware store or plant store in Māngere,” says Rata. “By charging a small fee for things like plants, food or compost, it covers costs but it also shows there’s a value to what we’re creating.”

    3. Growing great minds

    The Enviro Hub works with several schools – including Māngere College, which helped build the foundations of the garden – and community groups, such as Ngāti Tamaoho, to run workshops and teach tamariki and rangitahi (children and teenagers) sustainable living skills like how to grow their own kai. From these practical skills and new-found knowledge of the environment comes personal growth, says Rata.

    “Some of these kids have a 501 gang background and what we’re trying to do here is to equip them for life,” says Rata. “I see a lot of rangatahi and they’re afraid of being Māori. They think they need to speak the reo (language) to understand the history and know their whakapapa to be Māori.

    “One thing I say to these kids is if you want to understand your culture, understand your first mother, Papatūānuku (Mother Earth). Once you learn how to look after the garden and the planet and all that, everything else will just come naturally.”

    4. Replenishing the whenua (land)

    In his workshops, Rata teaches his students how to rejuvenate the soil in the garden with compost and organic matter which brings microorganisms to the soil. He also talks to his students about carbon sequestration (the process of capturing and storing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere in the soil) and mycelium in the soil (the rootlike network of fungus) – the Enviro Hub even has a mushroom hut!

    “The way I explain the soil is like a waka,” Rata explains. “When some people first see a waka they think the ingenuity is in the sail, but it’s actually underneath the boat which creates air bubbles that make the boat go fast – it’s the same with soil and the garden.”

    Rata also leads the community on litter clean-up days and the restoration of Te Ararata Creek. This Matariki, the Enviro Hub plans to plant 500 native trees on the waterway.

    5. Feeding the community

    As well as feeding locals with fresh produce, Rata and the Enviro Hub team have worked together with the Tūpuna Maunga Authority to create community hāngī days. Earlier this year, the Māngere Community Enviro Hub and Te Pane o Mataoho / Te Ara Pueru / Māngere Mountain collaborated to feed the community with delicious hāngī.

    The hāngī pit at Māngere Community Enviro Hub is used for special events. The carbon left over from the feast is used to replenish the soil.

    The food was prepped by a kapa haka group from Māngere College and was cooked by Māori chef Kia Kanuta. The meat served was halal to cater to Māngere’s growing Muslim community.

    “For some that attended it was their first experience of hāngī and that part of Māori culture. It was important to us to make it inclusive for everyone,” says Rata. “As humans, food is our first language and it’s a common shared experience for every culture. The good thing about hāngī is it sweetens the soil and we can use the carbon back in the garden – it’s all cyclical.”

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Liberal Party reclaims Goldstein – how Tim Wilson turned back the Teal tidal wave

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Phoebe Hayman, PhD Candidate and Casual Academic in Politics, La Trobe University

    Tim Wilson’s victory over independent MP Zoe Daniel to reclaim his Melbourne seat of Goldstein has grabbed post-election headlines.

    He is the only Liberal to achieve such a feat since six Teals stormed inner-city blue-ribbon seats at the 2022 election. Wilson’s return to parliament has triggered talk of a possible tilt for the Liberal Party leadership.

    How remarkable was his victory in Goldstein? Could his successful campaign be a template for other Liberals hoping to seize back territory from the Teals?

    Coalition fightback

    Other coalition candidates also triumphed over high-profile independents.

    The Liberal Party has retained Bradfield, with Gisele Kapterian edging out Teal candidate Nicolette Boele.

    Frontbencher Dan Tehan held off a strong challenge from Alex Dyson in Wannon. Likewise, backbencher Pat Conaghan, who was challenged by Caz Heise in Cowper.

    Meanwhile in Kooyong, Amelia Hamer fell just short of Teal MP Monique Ryan.

    Growing support

    Despite the setbacks in some seats, the community independents movement is stronger than ever in 2025.

    Curtin’s Kate Chaney was widely tipped to lose her seat, but she was returned with a small two-party preferred swing.

    Other crossbenchers are back in Clark, Indi, Mackellar, Mayo, Warringah and Wentworth.

    Independent Dai Le who is not aligned with the Teals, was returned in Fowler. So, too, Andrew Gee in Calare.

    Independents received strong support from a number of quarters.

    Climate 200 funded 35 candidates, up from 22 three years ago. The Regional Voices Fund supported 13 non-metropolitan independents. The volunteer armies knocking on doors were larger than ever before.

    Voters responded. On the latest count, Labor’s primary vote was less than 35%, while support for the Liberal Party declined to around 32%. Minor parties and independents picked up 33% of the vote, with the Teals doing particularly well, according to ABC election analyst Antony Green:

    All these Teals won from second place last time. This time they are winning from first place.

    Wilson’s success in Goldstein bucked these national trends. So how did he do it?

    Learning the lessons from 2022

    At the last electon, Wilson ran using the same messaging as the national campaign – national security and the economy.

    Wilson repeatedly referred to Daniel as a Climate 200 “fake independent” and reframed the local focus of independents as “parochial”. His campaign was negative and unsuccessful.

    Wilson’s 2025 campaign had a distinct shift in tone. It is clear that he learned many lessons from his Teal rival.

    This time around, he embraced social media with a focus on community and “listening”. Despite a reputation for being combative, his posts showed a positive, hyper-local campaign that did not mention his rival at all.

    When he tapped into national themes, he focused on low inflation, affordable homes and community safety.

    Tim Wilson campaign advertisement for the seat of Goldstein.

    Like the Teals, he also managed to muster an army of volunteers. These grassroots efforts began almost a year before the election, kicked off with forums to hear from the community. Door knocking and high visibility across the electorate made a difference.

    The Jewish vote

    Goldstein is home to a significant concentration of Jewish voters and securing their vote was vital.

    The Israel-Gaza conflict, and the firebombing attack on the orthodox Adass Israel synagogue in nearby Ripponlea, brought the issue of antisemitism to the fore in the lead up to the campaign.

    For Wilson, this was the only issue on which he went negative. Daniel’s campaign described his line of attack as “brutal, hostile and abusive”.

    But it paid off with Wilson recording swings of up to 7.56% across Caulfield and Elsternwick, where the Jewish population is largest. This enabled him to recover much of the ground lost in 2022.

    Teal campaign more negative

    Daniel’s task as an independent MP was to convince voters she delivered for her community. But this was difficult to showcase, given the crowded nature of the crossbench in the 47th parliament.

    Daniel still had a strong grassroots movement behind her. But her messages about Dutton, emphasising his hard man, “Trumpian” character, brought a more negative tone to her campaign.

    Daniel recorded large swings of up to 10% in suburbs such as Moorabbin and Bentleigh, which have a lower socio-economic base than the other parts of the electorate and have traditionally voted Labor.

    But the “Golden Mile” that stretches along the bay from Brighton to Black Rock swung heavily toward Wilson. In wealthier suburbs, such as Hampton, he secured swings of up to 10% in the two-party preferred count.

    With such narrow margins, these shifts were enough to change the outcome.

    Building momentum

    Wilson won in part by adopting the campaign strategies used by the Teals. We should expect to see more candidates – including from the major parties – using these tools in future elections.

    Despite Daniel’s defeat, support for community candidates grew in 2025. But to overcome institutional barriers and the vagaries of preferences, independents will need to continue to build on their momentum.

    In 2028, the new election donations laws will also be in effect, which will limit the war chests raised by community independents.

    Campaigning skills and strategy will prove more important than ever.

    Phoebe Hayman receives funding from the Department of Education via a Research Training Scholarship.

    Amy Nethery does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Liberal Party reclaims Goldstein – how Tim Wilson turned back the Teal tidal wave – https://theconversation.com/liberal-party-reclaims-goldstein-how-tim-wilson-turned-back-the-teal-tidal-wave-256201

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI USA: Bonamici, McBath, Moore, Wilson Introduce Bill to End Corporal Punishment in Schools

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Suzanne Bonamici (1st District Oregon)

    WASHINGTON, DC [05/9/25] – Today Representatives Suzanne Bonamici (D-OR), Lucy McBath (D-GA), Gwen Moore (D-WI), and Frederica Wilson (D-FL) introduced legislation to protect students from corporal punishment in schools. 

    The Protecting Our Students in Schools Act would prohibit the practice of corporal punishment in any school that receives federal funding. It would also provide schools with the support necessary to create more nurturing and inclusive learning environments that employ restorative, evidence-based practices to improve school safety. Senator Chris Murphy (D-CT) is leading the companion in the Senate.

    “The disturbing use of corporal punishment in schools must stop,” said Congresswoman Suzanne Bonamici. “Students must feel safe and be safe in school. Fear of physical pain keeps students from reaching their full potential, inflicting damage that can last for decades. I’m grateful to partner with Reps. McBath, Moore, and Wilson to finally put a stop to the use of corporal punishment in schools that receive federal funding.”

    “When parents send their children to school, it’s with the belief that their student will learn in a safe, healthy environment,” said Congresswoman Lucy McBath. “The impacts that cruel, unnecessary punishments have on the next generation are heartbreaking and these practices still exist in Georgia today. I thank my colleagues in the House and Senate for their collaboration on this effort as we protect our children and set them up for strong, successful futures.”

    “Corporal punishment violates children’s fundamental rights to dignity, physical integrity, and protection from violence,” said Congresswoman Gwen Moore. “Every child deserves to be treated with respect and provided with a safe and nurturing learning environment. By eliminating this form of punishment, schools can create a safer, more supportive atmosphere that encourages learning, engagement, and positive relationships between students and educators.”

    “The hallways, classrooms and cafeterias of our schools should be safe, supportive environments for all students,” said Congresswoman Frederica Wilson. “Corporal punishment is a backward practice that has no place in our schools, harming our students, especially Black and Brown children. That’s why I’m proudly co-leading the Protecting Our Students in Schools Act of 2023, which implements positive reinforcement strategies, creating a better environment for our students. With this bill, we can eliminate the shameful stain of corporal punishment and promote evidence-based behavioral interventions for more positive outcomes for our students.” 

    “It’s absurd there are states that still allow educators to strike, paddle, and spank students as a means of discipline,” said Senator Chris Murphy. “This bill puts an end to that cruelty and would give schools the resources they need to create safe, supportive environments where every student can thrive.”

    Corporal punishment, the act of inflicting physical pain as a form of discipline, can result in serious injury with long-term negative consequences for students’ physical and mental health. Research overwhelmingly shows that corporal punishment in schools does not lead to improvements in student behavior; instead it is linked to poor academic performance, physical and emotional harm, and damage to students’ self-esteem and trust of educators. Corporal punishment is disproportionately applied to boys, students of color, and students with disabilities. 

    “Even amid the COVID-19 pandemic, when so many students were learning from home, nearly 20,000 students still endured corporal punishment in schools, of which 2,400 of those students have a disability,” said Dr. Jacqueline Rodriguez, CEO of the National Center for Learning Disabilities. “Corporal punishment has no place in education. On behalf of the National Center for Learning Disabilities and our partners in the disability rights community, I applaud Representative Bonamici, Senator Murphy, and the other co-sponsors for their leadership on this critical bill. Now it’s time for the rest of the members of Congress to step up and ensure all students have a safe, supportive, and high-quality public education.”

    “IDRA is pleased to support the Protecting our Students in Schools Act of 2025, an important piece of legislation that would end the harmful, outdated practice of hitting students in schools,” said Morgan Craven, National Director of Policy, Advocacy, and Community Engagement at the Intercultural Development Research Association (IDRA). “Schools should be places where all young people feel safe and supported to learn, but corporal punishment endangers students, compromises achievement, and weakens the relationships that are the foundation of strong school communities.”

    “Laws permitting educators to assault their own students should have long ago been abolished,” said Justin Driver, Robert R. Slaughter Professor of Law at Yale Law School. “Regrettably, though, the archaic and, indeed, barbaric practice of corporal punishment remains prevalent in our nation’s schools. That state-sanctioned violence prevents far too many of our youngest, most vulnerable Americans from having any real chance of fulfilling their enormous potential. I salute Congresswoman Bonamici for her steadfast leadership in seeking to eliminate the scourge of corporal punishment from our schools. And I fervently hope that this measure will soon become the law of the land.”

    A summary of the Protecting Our Students in Schools Act can be found here. The full bill text can be found here.

    The Protecting Our Students in Schools Act is endorsed by: National Education Association, American Federation of Teachers, National PTA, The Education Trust, Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, American Psychological Association, Lives in the Balance, Intercultural Development Research Association (IDRA), GLSEN, NAESP, NASSP, National Parents’ Union, National Center for Learning Disabilities, National Association of Social Workers, Federal School Discipline and Climate Coalition, National Woman’s Law Center, Human Rights Campaign, NAACP, American School Counselor Association, American Civil Liberties Union, National Urban League, Advocating 4 Kids, Inc, All4Ed, American Atheists, American Humanist Association, American Youth Policy Forum, Autistic Self Advocacy Network, Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Center for Learner Equity, Center for Popular Democracy, Children’s Defense Fund, Committee for Children, Council for Exceptional Children, Council for Administrators of Special Education, Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, Dignity in Schools Campaign, Education Reform Now, EduColor, Disability Law Colorado, Elite Educational Consulting, Every Texan, Fannie Education Alliance, First Focus Campaign for Children, Girls, Inc., Gwinnett SToPP, Ibero American Action League, Inc., KIPP Foundation, Lawyers for Good Government, Mississippi Coalition to End Corporal Punishment, National Association of Councils on Developmental Disabilities, National Black Child Development Institute, National Disability Rights Network, National Down Syndrome Congress, New Leaders, Nollie Jenkins Family Center, Inc., Open Society Policy Center, Parent Education Organizing Council, Racial Justice NOW, STAND Up, Texas Appleseed, Texas Kids Can’t Wait, The Advocacy Institute, The Arc of the United States, The Daniel Initiative, TNTP, United Women in Faith, Uplift MN, Volunteer State Seal of Biliteracy, National Association of Counsel for Children, Alliance for Educational Justice, The NOTICE Coalition, End Mass Incarceration Georgia Network, Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, Juvenile Law Center, and Represent Justice.

    Original cosponsors of the House version of Protecting Our Students in Schools Act include Representatives Chellie Pingree (D-ME), Don Beyer (D-VA), Danny Davis (D-IL), Mark Takano (D-CA), Darren Soto (D-FL), Jennifer McClellan (D-VA), Sheila Cherfilus-McCormick (D-FL), Mark DeSaulnier (D-CA), Jahana Hayes (D-CT), Bill Keating (D-MA), Joe Courtney (D-CT), Stephen Lynch (D-MA), Mary Gay Scanlon (D-PA), Mark Pocan (D-WI), and Bonnie Watson Coleman (D-NJ), Pramila Jayapal (D-WA), and Jill Tokuda (D-HI).

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News