The government recently announced a framework to regulate carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) by New Zealand companies.
Energy and Climate Change Minister Simon Watts outlined new rules that would allow emitters to capture their carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions and inject them underground for permanent disposal. They would then avoid having to pay for those emissions under the Emissions Trading Scheme.
Globally, CCUS is currently used mostly by coal or gas-fired power stations, liquefied natural gas plants and petroleum refineries. There are 41 commercial operations around the world, and they capture about 40 million tonnes of CO₂ annually.
Our peers (Australia, the United States and the European Union) already have CCUS frameworks and storage projects. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change acknowledges CCUS’s role in curbing emissions, but highlights challenges in scaling and technology readiness.
New Zealand faces the challenge of reducing emissions from strategic industries such as steel, concrete, fossil fuels and their derivatives (methanol, ammonia). CCUS has been tabled as an interim solution, strongly supported by the fossil fuel industry. However, critics warn it could reduce incentives to phase out fossil fuels.
The government argues its CCUS framework aligns New Zealand with international standards. This claim has merit insofar as successful climate action is likely to require international collaboration and technology transfer.
CCUS in New Zealand could enable reinjection of CO₂ produced from the Kapuni gas field in Taranaki, with “utilisation” involving diverting some of the gas for use in the food and beverage or horticulture industries.
However, leakage of CO₂ from long-term disposal sites is a major technical risk and New Zealand’s framework must be clear on how it would deal with this liability.
Rules for CCUS projects generally require operators to monitor, report and remedy any leakage of CO₂. But because the industry is young, it is useful to take a broader look at geological leakage in the past to reveal how future challenges play out.
Lake Boehmer, in the the Permian Basin of West Texas, wasn’t always there. But 20 years ago an old irrigation well started leaking saltwater and hasn’t stopped since.
The well was drilled in 1951 by an oil and gas company. No oil was discovered so the well was handed over to the landowner for irrigation. The well produced water, but also poisonous hydrogen sulphide, enough to kill a farmhand in 1953.
In the 1990s, the well started leaking. Water from a deep aquifer had pushed its way up alongside the well through geological layers of salt. The water dissolved the salt, worsening the leak, and emerged from underground three times saltier than seawater.
The Railroad Commission, which regulates the oil and gas industry in Texas, says they are not liable to plug the well because they only have jurisdiction over oil wells. The original operator, which is claimed to have promised to plug the well “any time it becomes polluted with mineral water”, is no longer in business. No one can find the landowner.
After 20 years, Lake Boehmer has grown to 60 acres. Its shore is rimmed in salt crystals and the odd dead bird from hydrogen sulphide exposure. No one can agree who should fix it.
Could something similar happen with CCUS? Exacerbating factors in the Boehmer case include deterioration of an aged well – it’s almost 50 years since leakage started – and the absence of a backstop party as the final holder of liability. Both could happen with CCUS under the wrong circumstances.
Better ways of dealing with leakage
The Decatur CCUS project in the US state of Illinois has been injecting CO₂ produced from corn ethanol two kilometres deep into sandstone. Over about a decade, 4.5 million tonnes of CO₂ has been injected – emissions diverted from the atmosphere.
The US government imposes strict monitoring rules on CCUS projects. Special monitoring wells are drilled into the disposal aquifer to measure pressure changes and how far the CO₂ has travelled.
Unfortunately, one of these wells started to leak, possibly due to corrosion. It allowed about 8,000 tonnes of CO₂ to escape into overlying geological layers.
This is rightly concerning, but to put it into perspective, the size of the leak is 0.2% of the injected CO₂ volume and none of it has escaped to the atmosphere or shallow groundwater. The leak was detected, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) intervened, issuing a notice that the leak be remediated, and the company plugged the well.
This illustrates a functioning CCUS framework. Monitoring requirements ensured the leak was discovered and the regulator was empowered to dictate remedial action.
However, critics have questioned the timeliness of the operator’s disclosure. The site remains on hold but may resume operations if the EPA is satisfied with the fix.
Lessons for New Zealand
A proposal circulated last year suggests the government will model its legislation on Australia and the EU, with CCUS operators being responsible for leaks during disposal operations and for a time after site closure.
This is like the Decatur situation. It makes sense for operators to fix leaks because they have the technical expertise and are the direct financial beneficiaries of emissions disposal.
It gets trickier on generational time frames. Companies can go out of business or might leave the country. In these cases, the government is liable for long-term leakage and may seek financial security from the operator to cover future costs.
A leak arising decades after closure could be more difficult to detect and costly to fix, especially if held up by a protracted fight around liability. This is the Lake Boehmer example.
Some CCUS seems inevitable if the world is to meet climate targets. It is therefore important to prepare for the possibility of a leak by having robust practices and clear responsibility.
Although it may seem unfair to burden future generations with looking after CO₂ disposal sites, we argue it is preferable to a legacy that has those same climate-warming gases in the atmosphere.
David Dempsey receives funding from MBIE for research into carbon dioxide removal.
Andrew La Croix receives funding from MBIE for research into carbon dioxide removal.
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Jennifer Lacy-Nichols, Senior Research Fellow in Commercial Determinants of Health, The University of Melbourne
Good quality information about when and how alcohol and gambling industries try to influence government decision making should be easily accessible. But in Australia, it’s not.
When we mapped the network of alcohol and gambling interests in Australia in our recent study, we revealed a complex web of memberships and partnerships.
We then used the latest data on political donations from the Australian Electoral Commission to show how these companies can “double donate”, or potentially donate more than twice. That’s once directly and via their often-multiple associations.
We’re concerned about the lack of transparency in these associations and political donations, and the potential for influencing public health policy on everything from gambling reform to alcohol labelling.
Understanding which companies are connected with alcohol and gambling associations can be challenging. This was immediately apparent when we mapped alcohol and gambling industry associations (such as Clubs Australia, which represents both community clubs and large pokies venues, or Alcohol Beverages Australia, which represents drinks manufacturers, distributors and retailers).
Just 75 (59.5%) of the 126 industry associations we identified disclosed their members or corporate partners.
When we documented the members and corporate sponsors of those 75 associations, we found a large and well-connected network.
Unsurprisingly, major alcohol and gambling companies were among the members and corporate sponsors. But these were in the minority. More than three-quarters (78.3%) were from other industries such as health, finance, construction, law, entertainment and telecommunications. Some of these were among the most well-connected organisations in the network.
The figure below shows the links between the most connected associations and corporate partners, using data from 2022.
The larger circles indicate more connections in the network (for example, associations with more partners). Circles of alcohol interests are blue, gambling is pink, industry associations are orange, and other industries are shown in grey. The lines show a direct link (for instance, between a company and industry association).
We revealed a large and well-connected network of alcohol and gambling associations. Author provided
We also investigated how transparent these relationships were. We mapped disclosures about two prominent groups: the hotels associations (which represent pubs and hotels) and the clubs associations.
Of the 658 relationships assessed, only 91 (13.8%) were transparently disclosed. Alcohol companies were the least transparent (disclosing none fully). Gambling companies fully disclosed only 19 relationships.
The figure below compares the number of disclosures from alcohol, gambling and other companies about their relationships with hotels and clubs associations.
On the left, we have industry sectors. On the right we have the clubs and hotels associations they partner with. In the middle we show how many of those relationships were fully, partially or not disclosed at all.
Here’s what hotels and clubs assocations disclosed. Author provided
Poor transparency is just the start
Poor transparency in membership of hotels and clubs associations makes it even harder to keep track of which companies are making political donations to which parties, and how much they’re donating in total.
Donations are often said to buy access to politicians, which can facilitate political influence. Companies who may not want to visibly support political parties can donate via intermediaries – in this case, associations that represent their interests. Depending on how many associations a company belongs to, companies can cultivate multiple access points to government.
These multiple access points are often opaque. The potential links between the thousands of donors in political donation data from the Australian Electoral Commission are not explicit. This makes it challenging for someone with limited time and resources to easily understand which company is giving money to which party, how much, and why. So much of the money in Australian politics is effectively hidden.
It was only through extensive data collection, cleaning and linking that we could map links between alcohol and gambling sectors. We then linked our dataset to the new data published by the Australian Electoral Commission on February 1.
If we look at just alcohol and gambling companies, we can see that several essentially “double donate”. They donate once directly and a second time (or more) indirectly via their associations.
We put together a simple visual below to show the flow of funds for the largest alcohol and gambling donors and associations in our dataset.
On the left we have the alcohol and gambling companies donating to political parties on the right. In the middle, we have have alcohol and gambling industry associations also donating to the political parties. The lines represent the financial connection between entities. The wider the lines, the more money we know is donated.
Alcohol and gambling industry donations to political parties, 2023-24. Author provided
Why aren’t recent reforms enough?
The most recent donation reforms mean political donations over A$5,000 must be disclosed, and these must be disclosed monthly. However, these reforms are far weaker than originally proposed (real-time reporting, $1,000 disclosure cap). This potentially allows alcohol and gambling industries to influence government and hide it.
Our current political integrity safeguards are failing us. That’s because the reforms do not compel industry groups to disclose their members or funders. This potentially allows companies to donate to political parties under the radar.
This would be the case for the 51 organisations we found that did not have a list of members publicly available.
Better transparency – about donations, lobbyists, conflicts of interest and more – can help ensure government decision-making is not unduly influenced by vested interests.
With a federal election looming, it is important the public can trust policies from all sides of politics are free from undue influence.
Cara Platts from the University of Melbourne coauthored the academic paper on which this article is based, and contributed to this article.
Jennifer Lacy-Nichols receives funding from the Victorian Health Promotion Association and the National Health and Medical Research Council. She is a member of Transparency International Australia, the Public Health Association of Australia and Healthy Food Systems Australia.
Appeals to fiscal restraint have been quiet. Labor is trumpeting its responsible economic management, while the Liberals are promising to “set the right priorities”. There is little talk of slashing and saving.
The combination of the cost-of-living crisis and WA’s strong economy has dampened the public’s appetite for austerity. It has also provided the parties with the cover to spend without seeming fiscally reckless.
While the policy priorities between the parties are broadly similar, there remain significant differences.
Policy debates on housing and climate
In housing, for example, all parties promise to slash stamp duty for first home buyers, but their proposals otherwise differ:
the Greens pledge to regulate short-stay accommodation, strengthen renters’ rights and set housing targets.
For climate policy, the differences are starker. Labor promises a coal-free grid by 2030 and a green energy future built in WA, driven by windfarms and WA-made home batteries. It stops short at reducing natural gas use, unlike the Greens.
However, Labor has also pushed back against environmental regulation. Premier Roger Cook lobbied the federal government to abandon environmental protection legislation.
The recent release of a long-withheld independent report that prompted sweeping changes to the WA Environmental Protection Agency was criticised by conservation organisations for its lack of consultation outside of the mining industry.
The Liberals agree on the need for batteries and wind power. However, they also promise to extend the lifespan of WA’s coal power stations and lift the ban on uranium mining in WA.
In her campaign launch speech, Liberal leader Libby Mettam pledged to cut “green tape” and defund the Environmental Defenders Office. This is on the grounds that “taxpayer money should not be spent propping up activists”.
The culture wars cometh
Mettam’s choice to target “activists” signals the Liberals’ flirtation with the culture wars. This term refers to conflict over social issues concerning identity and inclusion such as gender, race and sexuality. These issues are invoked by politicians to win votes from a polarised electorate.
Centre-right parties around the world have embraced culture wars, including in Australia.
Aligning herself with federal Liberal leader Peter Dutton, Mettam has stated she will refuse to stand in front of the First Nations flags.
She’s also promised to “ban the use of puberty blockers, cross-sex hormone treatments and surgical intervention for children under the age of 16 for the purpose of gender transition” and launch a comprehensive review of these treatments.
There are incentives for the Liberals to engage in culture war tactics.
Labor’s electoral position is stable. It also holds a dominant share of political donations. Public desire for big spending is limiting the effectiveness of traditional conservative attacks on Labor’s economic management.
The Liberals may perceive culture-war signalling as their most viable strategy for winning government. And, if the results of recent elections around the world are anything to go by, then “anti-woke” politics is surging.
Scandals involving various Liberal candidates further deepen the perception the Liberals are engaged in culture wars.
Albany candidate Thomas Brough was ordered to take workplace training with the Australian Human Rights Commission after making comments falsely linking the LGBTQIA+ community with paedophilia. Brough (who is a doctor) was referred to the State Administrative Tribunal by the Medical Board for the comments.
Brough also came under fire for suggesting a “posse” of regional doctors would help gun owners navigate new stricter gun laws introduced by Labor. Brough has not been asked by the party to resign.
Similarly, a rising star for the Liberals and candidate for Churchlands, Basil Zempilas, made widely condemned comments about transgender people on his radio show in 2020, shortly after becoming Lord Mayor of Perth. Apologising after, he said he had “forgotten he was lord mayor”.
The party also preselected candidates whose digital footprints revealed unpalatable views.
During an awkward press conference, Darling Range candidate Paul Mansfield was confronted with what the ABC described as “a series of derogatory social media posts, including homophobic slurs and two lewd posts about women”.
Kimberley candidate Darren Spackman was asked to leave the party after derogatory social media posts he made in 2022 about Indigenous people were republished.
The preselection of these candidates could be written off as the reflection of a hollowed-out party struggling to attract strong candidates.
But under Mettam, the WA Liberal Party is caught between signalling it is part of the anti-woke surge and being seen to resist discrimination.
It is unclear whether the culture wars will secure votes for the Liberals. Recent research shows strong support for issues such as transgender rights among Australian voters.
How WA voters respond to culture-war messaging will undoubtedly inform the Liberals’ position in the federal election.
The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Last month tech giant Meta announced plans to build the world’s longest submarine communication cable.
Known as Project Waterworth, the 50,000-kilometre cable would link five continents. Meta says it would improve connectivity and technological development in countries including the United States, India and Brazil.
But submarine cables can do far more than just enhance telecommunications. In fact, a recent conference I attended in London highlighted how a relatively new generation of cables can also be used to keep us safe from threats such as climate change and natural disasters.
The Transatlantic submarine cable, connecting British North America to Ireland, was laid in 1858. Rod Allday, CC BY-SA
These cables are equipped with sensors that measure vital environmental data in the ocean. This data includes seismic activity, temperature fluctuations and pressure changes. It can be used to improve early-warning systems for tsunamis and earthquakes as well as tracking changes in the climate.
OFS – short for optical fibre sensing – cables are aimed at protecting critical infrastructure. They use the fibre within to detect vibrations surrounding the cable. This allows cable operators to identify potential disruptions from fishing activity, ship anchors and other physical disturbances.
The topic of sensing cables comes up at conferences, thanks to industry professionals who work on it pro bono. But the technology isn’t widely adopted by the broader industry and governments. For example, SMART cables have been around since 2010, but there are only two projects in development.
The reasons for this slow uptake boil down to three major concerns, as discussed at the conference.
1. Outdated regulation
The legal framework governing undersea cables is outdated.
This legal ambiguity introduces additional complexities to already lengthy and complex processes for obtaining permits when sensing technologies are integrated into cables.
2. No clear business model
Industry executives question the financial feasibility of sensing cables. For example, during the conference in London, several industry executives suggested adding sensors raises costs by approximately 15%, with no clear revenue return.
Unlike data traffic, environmental data doesn’t directly generate income. Unless governments intervene with funding, tax incentives or expedited permits, cable operators have little incentive to absorb these added costs and complexities.
3. Security risks
At the subsea cable conference in London, several industry insiders also warned embedding sensors in cables could create new security risks.
Some governments might view sensing-equipped cables as surveillance tools rather than neutral scientific infrastructure.
There is also concern such cables could become attractive targets for malicious actors.
But there are good reasons for more countries and industry to invest in SMART cables.
For example, information on ocean depth, seabed composition and temperature fluctuations is valuable. A wide array of industries, from shipping and offshore energy to fisheries and insurance, could leverage this data to enhance their operations and mitigate risks.
Scientists have also pointed out that in order to better understand climate change, we need more and better data about what’s happening in the ocean.
Current subsea cable regulatory hurdles make investing in sensing technology challenging. But if regulation is updated, projects such as Meta’s Waterworth Project could more easily integrate sensors.
With experts suggesting the Waterworth Project be viewed as multiple cables instead of one, sensors could just be deployed on less geopolitically sensitive cable branches.
They could facilitate the creation of an open-access, publicly funded database for ocean observation data. Such a platform could consolidate real-time data from sensing cables, satellites and marine sensors. This would provide a transparent, shared resource for scientists, policymakers and industries alike.
Of course, deploying sensing technology may not be feasible in volatile regions such as the Baltic or South China seas.
But there is potential in areas especially vulnerable to climate change, such as the Pacific. Here, scientific data could be harnessed to model oceanic changes and explore solutions to rising sea levels and extreme weather patterns.
Data collected from submarine cables can help us better understand the effects of climate change on the ocean. somavarapu madhavi/Shutterstock
A path forward
Portugal demonstrates a path forward for SMART cables. Despite the regulatory challenges, it is actively investing in SMART cables in order to improve climate data.
Other governments can learn from this if they wish to fulfil their moral duty to invest in infrastructure that serves as a public good.
The idea of embedding sensors in cables may not be the perfect climate change fix. But it’s a step toward understanding the ocean’s invisible rhythms – a small but necessary gesture to stop pretending our planet’s breakdown will fix itself.
Cynthia Mehboob does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
On Valentine’s Day 2025, heavy rains started to fall in parts of rural Appalachia. Over the course of a few days, residents in eastern Kentucky watched as river levels rose and surpassed flood levels. Emergency teams conducted over 1,000 water rescues. Hundreds, if not thousands of people were displaced from homes, and entire business districts filled with mud.
For some, it was the third time in just four years that their homes had flooded, and the process of disposing of destroyed furniture, cleaning out the muck and starting anew is beginning again.
Historic floods wiped out businesses and homes in eastern Kentucky in February 2021, July 2022 and now February 2025. An even greater scale of destruction hit eastern Tennessee and western North Carolina in September 2024, when Hurricane Helene’s rainfall and flooding decimated towns and washed out parts of major highways.
Scenes of flooding from several locations across Appalachia in February 2025.
Each of these events was considered to be a “thousand-year flood,” with a 1-in-1,000 chance of happening in a given year. Yet they’re happening more often.
The floods have highlighted the resilience of local people to work together for collective survival in rural Appalachia. But they have also exposed the deep vulnerability of communities, many of which are located along creeks at the base of hills and mountains with poor emergency warning systems. As short-term cleanup leads to long-term recovery efforts, residents can face daunting barriers that leave many facing the same flood risks over and over again.
Exposing a housing crisis
For the past nine years, I have been conducting research on rural health and poverty in Appalachia. It’s a complex region often painted in broad brushstrokes that miss the geographic, socioeconomic and ideological diversity it holds.
There is considerable local inequality that is often overlooked in a region portrayed as one-dimensional. Poverty levels are indeed high. In Perry County, Kentucky, where one of eastern Kentucky’s larger cities, Hazard, is located, nearly 30% of the population lives under the federal poverty line. But the average income of the top 1% of workers in Perry County is nearly US$470,000 – 17 times more than the average income of the remaining 99%.
This income and wealth inequality translates to unequal land ownership – much of eastern Kentucky’s most desirable land remains in the hands of corporations and families with great generational wealth.
When I first moved to eastern Kentucky in 2016, I was struck by the grave lack of affordable, quality housing. I met families paying $200-$300 a month for a small plot to put a mobile home. Others lived in “found housing” – often-distressed properties owned by family members. They had no lease, no equity and no insurance. They had a place to lay one’s head but lacked long-term stability in the event of disagreement or disaster. This reality was rarely acknowledged by local and state governments.
Eastern Kentucky’s 2021 and 2022 floods turned this into a full-blown housing crisis, with 9,000 homes damaged or destroyed in the 2022 flood alone.
“There was no empty housing or empty places for housing,” one resident involved in local flood recovery efforts told me. “It just was complete disaster because people just didn’t have a place to go.”
Most homeowners did not have flood insurance to assist with rebuilding costs. While many applied to the Federal Emergency Management Agency for assistance, the amounts they received often did not go far. The maximum aid for temporary housing assistance and repairs is $42,500, plus up to an additional $42,500 for other needs related to the disaster.
The federal government often provides more aid for rebuilding through block grants directed to local and state governments, but that money requires congressional approval and can take months to years to arrive. Local community coalitions and organizations stepped in to fill these gaps, but they did not necessarily have sufficient donations or resources to help such large numbers of displaced people.
Affordable rental housing is hard to find in much of Appalachia. When flooding wipes out homes, as Jackson, Ky., saw in July 2022 and again in February 2025, it becomes even more rare. Michael Swensen/Getty Images
With a dearth of affordable rentals pre-flood, renters who lost their homes had no place to go. And those living in “found housing” that was destroyed were not eligible for federal support for rebuilding.
The sheer level of devastation also posed challenges. One health care professional told me: “In Appalachia, the way it usually works is if you lose your house or something happens, then you go stay with your brother or your mom or your cousin. … But everybody’s mom and brother and cousin also lost their house. There was nowhere to stay.” From her point of view, “our homelessness just skyrocketed.”
The cost of land – social and economic
After the 2022 flood, the Kentucky Department for Local Government earmarked almost $300 million of federal funding to build new, flood-resilient homes in eastern Kentucky. Yet the question of where to build remained. As another resident involved in local flood recovery efforts told me, “You can give us all the money you want; we don’t have any place to build the house.”
It has always been costly and time-intensive to develop land in Appalachia. Available higher ground tends to be located on former strip mines, and these reclaimed lands require careful geotechnical surveying and sometimes structural reinforcements.
If these areas are remote, the costs of running electric, water and other infrastructure services can also be prohibitive. For this reason, for-profit developers have largely avoided many counties in the region. The head of a nonprofit agency explained to me that, because of this, “The markets have broken. … We have no [housing] market.”
Eastern Kentucky’s mountains are beautiful, but there are few locations for building homes that aren’t near creeks or rivers. Strip-mined land, where mountaintops were flattened, often aren’t easily accessible and come with their own challenges. Posnov/Moment via Getty Images
There is also some risk involved in attempting to build homes on new land that has not previously been developed. A local government could pay for undeveloped land to be surveyed and prepared for development, with the prospect of reimbursement by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development if housing is successfully built. But if, after the work to prepare the land, it is still too cost-prohibitive to build a profitable house there, the local government would not receive any reimbursement.
Some counties have found success clearing land for large developments on former strip mine sites. But these former coal mining areas can be considerable distances from towns. Without robust public transportation systems, these distances are especially prohibitive for residents who lack reliable personal transportation.
Another barrier is the high prices that both individual and corporate landowners are asking for properties on higher ground.
The scarcity of desirable land available for sale, combined with increasingly urgent demand, has led to prices unaffordable for most. Another resident involved in local flood recovery efforts explained: “If you paid $5,000 for 30 acres 40 years ago, why won’t you sell that for $100,000? Nope, [they want] $1 million.” That makes it increasingly difficult for both individuals and housing developers to purchase land and build.
One reason for this scarcity is the amount of land that is still owned by outside corporate interests. For example, Kentucky River Properties, formerly Kentucky River Coal Corporation, owns over 270,000 acres across seven counties in the region. While this landholding company leases land to coal, timber and gas companies, it and others like it rarely permit residential development.
But not all unused land is owned by corporations. Some of this land is owned by families with deep roots in the region. People’s attachment to a place often makes them want to stay in their communities, even after disasters. But it can also limit the amount of land available for rebuilding. People are often hesitant to sell land that holds deep significance for their families, even if they are not living there themselves.
Rural communities are often tight-knit. Many residents want to stay despite the risks. AP Photo/Timothy D. Easley
One health care professional expressed feeling torn between selling or keeping their own family property after the 2022 flood: “We have a significant amount of property on top of a mountain. I wouldn’t want to sell it because my papa came from nothing. … His generation thought owning land was the greatest thing. … And for him to provide his children and his grandchildren and their great-grandchildren a plot of land that he worked and sweat and ultimately died to give us – people want to hold onto that.”
She recognized that land was in great demand but couldn’t bring herself to sell what she owned. In cases like hers, higher grounds are owned locally but still remain unused.
Moving toward higher ground, slowly
Two years after the 2022 flood, major government funding for rebuilding still has not resulted in a significant number of homes. The state has planned seven communities on higher ground in eastern Kentucky that aim to house 665 new homes. As of early 2025, 14 houses had been completed.
Progress on providing housing on higher ground is slow, and the need is great.
In the meantime, when I conducted interviews during the summer and fall of 2024, many of the mobile home communities that were decimated in the 2022 flood had begun to fill back up. These were flood-risk areas, but there was simply no other place to go.
Last week, I watched on Facebook a friend’s live video footage showing the waters creeping up the sides of the mobile homes in one of those very communities that had flooded in 2022. Another of my friends mused: “I don’t know who constructed all this, but they did an unjustly favor by not thinking how close these towns was to the river. Can’t anyone in Frankfort help us, or has it gone too far?”
With hundreds more people now displaced by the most recent flood, the need for homes on higher grounds has only expanded, and the wait continues.
Kristina Brant has received funding from the National Science Foundation and United States Department of Agriculture to support her past and ongoing research in rural Appalachia.
Many articles have indicated that, in addition to millions of birds dying from avian flu, infected flocks have widely been killed en masse in an attempt to contain its spread. The livestock industry euphemistically calls this killing of infected animals “depopulation,” and around 150 million birds have been depopulated since the current crisis began.
The unusually heavy media coverage of expensive eggs, depopulated chickens and avian flu has highlighted some of the deep problems and risks of modern poultry production. Unfortunately, however, important context and dynamics have been regularly omitted.
Unpacking key omissions helps to better understand both the nature of these chronic risks of infectious disease and the perilous response of the Trump administration.
In the U.S., avian flu recently spilled over into cattle — causing widespread illness after a mutation enabled intra-species transmission.
Avian flu has also caused a small number of severe human illnesses in the U.S. (primarily workers in poultry operations). Although no human-to-human transmission is evident — a necessary condition for a pandemic — this potential remains a grave threat.
Key issues underplayed
Although the media coverage of egg prices, depopulated chickens and avian flu has cast a valuable spotlight on many aspects of modern poultry production, it has also tended to leave out some important elements.
Modern chickens have been selectively bred to either put on weight (broilers) or produce eggs (layers) very quickly. Broilers reach slaughter weight in a mere six weeks. Layer hens produce nearly an egg a day for about a year or two, before being slaughtered. These short life-cycles are rarely mentioned in coverage of depopulations.
According to the U.S. Census of Agriculture, over 97 per cent of layers live in operations with at least 10,000 birds. Over 99 per cent of broilers are grown in operations with annual sales of at least 100,000 birds.
This scale also relates to a question that has, with a few notable exceptions, received scant coverage: since infected populations cannot simply be shipped to the slaughterhouse, how are the birds actually killed?
A leading approach to depopulation is ventilation shutdown. This involves turning off the powerful fans needed to make the ambient conditions in large enclosures bearable, and results in agonizing deaths.
Researchers are investigating ways to augment ventilation shutdown as part of a broader research agenda seeking to develop systematic ways to depopulate large operations. This agenda clearly illustrates that the livestock industry is acutely aware of the great risks of infectious disease evolution within these spaces.
In response to scrutiny, the Trump administration initially tried to blame Biden for the depopulation of chickens. While such deflection might work for a time, Trump and his advisors realize they need a strategy to increase egg supplies.
In this context, it’s unsurprising that Trump is laying out a simple plan to increase the egg supply: rebuilding layer populations, reducing depopulations and trusting the livestock and pharmaceutical industries to find ways of containing avian flu — likely through vaccines and strengthened biosecurity.
It’s profoundly irrational to be weakening infectious disease surveillance in the midst of the current avian flu crisis (and amid mounting infectious disease risks more generally).
It’s also hard to fathom how further empowering the leading actors in poultry production can be expected to resolve the risks of avian flu that are so bound up in the nature of modern production.
Tony Weis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Ruolz Ariste, Adjunct Professor, School of Public Policy and Administration, Carleton University
As Canada’s federal parties gear up for the upcoming federal election, one of the key issues on the campaign trail will be how Canada will meet its climate policy targets.
Several strategies exist to meet these targets, including: a border charge on imports, a border rebate for exports, a domestic output-based subsidy or a consumer-based carbon rebate like the Canada Carbon Rebate (CCR).
The CCR, introduced by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s administration to curb carbon emissions, is designed to offset the costs of carbon pricing by providing rebates to households.
The debate surrounding the CCR is crucial, as carbon pricing is the most effective measure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions when paired with accompanying measures. Yet, despite its effectiveness, Canada’s major political parties are willing to scrap it because it’s not politically rewarding.
CCR is widely misunderstood
The CCR is widely misunderstood in Canada, leading to misleading narratives about its economic and environmental impacts.
A recent report from the Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) argues that industries facing pollution charges could become less competitive because of the CCR, potentially increasing Canada’s federal budget deficit by $4 billion by 2030, and making Canadians worse off.
However, these reports fail to fully assess the impacts of carbon pricing and risk distorting the debate and influencing policy in ways that could weaken Canada’s climate strategy.
Yet an overlooked crucial fact in the debate on the CCR is that 80 per cent of Canadian families received more in rebates than they paid in pollution pricing in 2024 because major polluters bear the highest costs under the system.
The missing perspective in assessments
While the PBO’s report may be valid from a business standpoint, the report didn’t run a full cost-benefit analysis, which would have weighed both the economic costs and the social benefits of reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
In climate policy, the social perspective is much more important than the business one. Without this context, reports like the PBO’s risk being misinterpreted, particularly by politicians opposed to climate action. This could have significant negative consequences for environmental policy in Canada.
A major issue in economic assessments is that the benefits of greenhouse gas reduction are typically excluded because they extend beyond national borders. As a result, emissions reduction can appear to be a poor investment, when in reality, its global and long-term benefits far outweigh the initial expenses.
The Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat’s cost-benefit guide acknowledges this issue. Under normal circumstances, global benefits should be excluded in cost-benefit analysis. However, given the nature of climate change, the guide states that the costs and benefits of greenhouse gas reductions — calculated using the social cost of greenhouse gas — are appropriate to include in cost-benefit analysis.
A recent UN report supports this approach, estimating that while global carbon policy measures could cost more than US$1 trillion annually, the economic benefits will be far greater. Shifting to a green economy could yield US$26 trillion by 2030, compared to maintaining business as usual.
Carbon leakage challenge
A major challenge for Canada’s carbon pricing strategy is that many of its key trading partners don’t impose similar emissions pricing on consumers.
Instead of reducing emissions, this carbon leakage simply shifts emissions elsewhere, undermining global efforts to address climate change. To counter this, there has been a growing interest in policies designed to prevent this from happening, such as border carbon adjustments.
This issue is critical to Canada’s ability to meet its climate policy targets. Without effective measures to prevent carbon leakage, the country could face higher costs and less impact on global emissions reduction efforts.
Ideally, Canada would not have to choose between strong climate policy and economic competitiveness. However, without a co-ordinated global approach to carbon policy, Canada faces difficult trade-offs.
At the heart of this debate is the “polluter-pays principle,” which holds that those who pollute must bear the costs of their actions. This principle is central to climate justice.
Carbon pricing is the only abatement instrument that can implement the polluter-pays principle, but additional policies — such as border charges on imports, border rebates for exports or domestic output-based subsidies — are required to make it more efficient and politically viable.
Currently, 75 carbon taxes and emissions trading systems are in operation worldwide, covering approximately 24 per cent of global emissions.
Canada is considering its own CBAM, but challenges remain. Implementing such a policy could lead to heightened trade tensions with the U.S. or even provoke retaliatory actions.
Need for international co-operation
To make carbon pricing and border adjustments work, international organizations must help close the knowledge and information gaps. One way to do this is by providing more accurate data on embedded carbon prices to improve the calculation of carbon prices down the road.
Further research is also needed to understand how domestic climate policies impact other nations and how to ensure CBAM’s interoperability with other climate measures. Such work will contribute to the optimization of climate policies for the benefit of all.
In the meantime, Canada’s climate policy must strive to integrate CBAM in a way that aligns with global trade systems like the WTO. Some trade law experts have expressed concerns that CBAM may not be compatible with the WTO General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and this must be addressed.
If Canada were to keep the CCR, this integration would be especially important as Canada navigates future trade relations with the U.S. under Trump’s unpredictable administration. Canada doesn’t want to fall behind in its climate action efforts.
Canadians would like the country to lead on climate action while staying competitive. A public consultation on this matter would be a good move from any elected political leader.
Ruolz Ariste is currently affiliated with Carleton University and Université du Québec en Outaouais.
Since 2015, youth mental health has noticeably declined. Currently, 1.25 million young people in Canada require mental health support. (Shutterstock)
Canada urgently needs to take action to support the well-being of young people and secure a healthier and more prosperous future for generations to come.
The recently published Lancet Psychiatry Commission on Youth Mental Health shows that this problem is global, and in part driven by megatrends — major and long-lasting societal changes such as climate change, insecure employment and growing intergenerational inequality. These issues are situated within decades of colonial and neoliberal political, social and economic policies.
To support youth mental health, Canada must work towards reversing these megatrends while also investing in youth mental health services.
The youth mental health problem is global, and in part driven by ‘megatrends’ — major and long-lasting societal changes such as climate change, insecure employment and growing intergenerational inequality. (Shutterstock)
We were inspired by The Lancet Psychiatry Commission on Youth Mental Health, which calls for global action to address this urgent mental health crisis affecting young people. This global initiative involved researchers from diverse fields, service providers and young people, and was co-led by Srividya Iyer (a co-author on this piece and Canada Research Chair in Youth, Mental Health, and Learning Health Systems). It advances a framework for improving youth mental health care, integrating all sectors providing services relevant to mental health (for example, community centres, stand-alone clinics, hospitals) and all types of interventions, ranging from prevention to specialized services for youth with long-term mental health problems.
The situation in Canada
Canada is a global leader in creating new mental health services for youth, which began with the creation of a network of programs for youth with psychosis. Lessons learned have inspired transformation in broader youth mental health services, called “Integrated Youth Services” (IYS).
Designed with input from youth and their families, IYS do not require transition from pediatric to adult care at age 18, which prevents youth from slipping through the cracks between the two systems. IYS integrate mental health, medical health and other social services; and create primary mental health care services.
These services and investments represent Canada’s critical commitment to youth mental health. However, there have been relatively fewer efforts to address other elements responding to factors contributing to worse youth mental health, such as the ongoing harms of colonization and the climatecrisis.
To truly address the youth mental health crisis, we must move beyond just creating services and into creating a world that supports young people to thrive. In these areas, young people themselves have shown us the way through initiatives like the Indigenous Climate Action Youth Leadership, the Anti-Racist Youth Lab and EveryChildNow, which takes action on youth poverty.
What can we do
Society must embrace a strong cultural shift that prioritizes a duty to young people. (Shutterstock)
To support young people, the Lancet report highlights that society must embrace a strong cultural shift that prioritizes a duty to young people, future generations and intergenerational equity, ensuring that present-day policies consider their long-term impacts. The influence of megatrends suggests that activism on any of these societal issues can benefit youth mental health.
For those who want to take action directly, advocating for increasing mental health and social service funding, supporting local organizations dedicated to young people, involving youth in decision-making processes, and fostering nurturing social communities are all important steps.
In light of the upcoming federal election, Canadians should demand that all political parties have a clear plan for youth mental health. Policymaking should prioritize youth, family and community needs. Policies should be evidence-based, especially since intuitively helpful but untested ideas may have unintended consequences (for example, negative effects of universal prevention efforts) or can be complicated (such as the relationship between social media use and youth mental health).
Continuous funding for mental health research can generate knowledge that can inform practice and policy, anticipate and respond to future priorities, test innovative interventions (like nature-based, social prescribing and intergenerational connection) and improve existing systems and interventions.
Young people are tomorrow’s leaders, innovators and contributors. Ignoring their mental health problems undermines their potential and jeopardizes Canada’s ability to build a prosperous, inclusive society. Prioritizing youth mental health is not just a strategic investment for the country’s resilience — it is an ethical imperative.
Tovah Cowan receives funding from CIHR for a Planning and Dissemination grant supporting a project related to improving learning health systems for youth mental health services. Her current salary is paid through a CIHR grant previously awarded to Dr. Iyer.
Camila Velez receives funding from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) through a Doctoral Scholarship and a Planning and Dissemination grant for an International Symposium on arts-based research in youth mental health. Her current research assistant salary is paid through a CIHR grant previously awarded to Dr. Iyer.
Nora Morrison’s current salary is paid through a CIHR grant previously awarded to Dr. Srividya Iyer.
Rubén Valle receives his salary from a CIHR grant previously awarded to Dr. Iyer.
Srividya N. Iyer is supported by the Canada Research Chairs Program (Tier 1) and has received peer-reviewed grants from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Fonds de Recherche du Québec – Santé and the International Development Research Centre.
Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Mahtot Gebresselassie, Assistant Professor, Environmental and Urban Change, York University, Canada
In late 2024, the Ontario legislature passed Bill 212 giving the provincial government significant control over municipal bike lanes. The law requires municipalities to ask the province for its approval to install bike lanes if they would remove a lane for other vehicular traffic. The legislation also allows for the removal of three major bike lanes in Toronto.
Supporters of such moves argue that bike lanes worsen traffic congestion, negatively impact local businesses and delay emergency vehicles from getting where they need to go. However, research shows that bike lanes improve transportation infrastructure, including preventing injuries.
One of the main values of bike lanes is that they promote safety for all road users. Many cities around the world install bike lanes to wholly or partially separate cyclists from larger vehicles. This separation limits the interaction with cars and makes cycling safer.
A 2016 paper that looked at data on bike networks and injuries in 10 Canadian and U.S. cities between 2000 and 2015 showed that an increase in bike networks led to a decrease in fatal and serious injuries.
The safety associated with bike lanes can also encourage more people to take up cycling. A 2020 poll from the Canadian Automobile Association indicates that 40 per cent of Canadians reported they would feel encouraged to cycle on bike lanes physically separated from other vehicles.
More inclusive roads
Bike lanes can make cycling more inclusive for women, children, older adults, people with disabilities and those with limited transportation options.
Fewer women bike compared to men. A 2014 study that surveyed cyclists in five U.S. cities found that more women than men strongly agreed that protected bike lanes made them feel safe and new ones increased how often they cycled.
Older adults and people with disabilities also benefit from bike lanes, as they provide a more suitable cycling environment for riding with limited physical acuity and slower speeds.
Some argue that bike lanes reduce street parking, which can lead to lower economic activity. However, a 2012 study showed that people who cycle, walk and use transit frequent local businesses more and spend the same or more than those who use private cars.
When it comes to congestion, a 2018 study on the impact of installing bike lanes on arterial roads in Toronto found that the most affected street segments would only result in an estimated one-minute delay.
A 2022 study from Melbourne showed a minor effect on traffic when bike lanes were added to residential streets with low speed limits. It also found the “selective inclusion” of safe cycling lanes, in the worst cases, leads to a delay of less than 10 seconds per kilometre for drivers.
In New York, a 2016 study found that adding bike lanes reduced the average time for car travel on major thoroughfares from an average of 4.5 minutes to 3 minutes.
Examples from elsewhere indicate that removing bike lanes would not bode well for Toronto. A well-used bike lane in London, England was removed in December 2020 following residents’ complaints that they caused traffic congestion. A study found that the removal resulted in longer travel time on the street compounded by cars illegally parking in the space previously reserved for the bike lane.
Toronto Fire Services (TFS) response time increased by 30 seconds within the same corridor compared to a two-second increase for the entire city. However, these evaluations were for two months in 2023. In October 2024, TFS Chief Jim Jessop said the Bloor Street West bike lanes did not lead to an increase in response time.
If these bike lanes are removed and replaced with others elsewhere, it could create a poorly connected bike network. The safety and convenience associated with connected bike networks will be lost as a result.
Based on what research tells us, Toronto’s bike lanes should stay. Bike lanes provide various benefits, including making our streets more inclusive of more people.
Bike lanes offer safety on the roads by reducing the risk of fatal or non-life-threatening injuries on roads, and are a tremendous gain for transportation infrastructure.
Even in cases where a bike lane causes a few seconds of delay, politicians and city planners must consider the trade-off — especially if it means saving a person’s life.
The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Wildfire season in Canada has historically spanned from late April to August — with the most damaging of these fires typically burning in June and July. But in recent years, we’ve seen a significant change in when wildfires burning; they are no longer a seasonal phenomenon.
For example, in 2024, Alberta’s wildfire season started in February due to the province’s warm and dry conditions. Québec recorded its forth earliest wildfire since 1973 in mid-march of the same year. British Columbia then reported their first wildfires of the season shortly after.
In 2023, Canada had one of its most catastrophic wildfire years — with over 18.4 hectares of forest burned. These wildfires caused approximately 232,000 people to be evacuated from their homes in British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Québec.
The huge number of wildfires that burned in 2023 released more than three times the total CO2 emissions of Canada’s entire transportation sector produces in a year. This catastrophic wildfire season also started burning far earlier than normal.
Changing wildfire patterns represent a growing danger to Canadians and our nation’s communities, ecosystems and air quality.
Recipe for a wildfire
The recipe for wildfire is simple and needs only three ingredients: fuel (combustible vegetation), ignition (either from human or natural causes — such as lightning) and favourable weather conditions (hot, dry and windy weather).
But drought can act as a key accelerating factor. As a professor who specializes in sustainable land and water management, I have spent over 15 years researching the impacts of climate change on natural disasters. My most recent research has highlighted the role that droughts play in wildfire vulnerability in Canada.
Droughts not only dry vegetation — which gives wildfires more fuel — they also prolong hot, dry and windy weather. This further creates a high-risk environment for wildfires to ignite and spread.
Canada may appear to be a water-rich country, with vast networks of lakes, rivers and considerable amounts of annual precipitation. But these rich resources suffer from significant seasonal and regional variations.
During 2023, there was a strong link between soil moisture levels measured between May and October and wildfire activity. Areas with the lowest soil moisture levels experienced heightened wildfire activity. This underscores the critical role of drought conditions in amplifying wildfire risks.
The total economic damage and losses are estimated to be more than $250 billion. This catastrophic crisis has clearly highlighted the growing impacts of climate change on densely populated areas at the interface of wildland and urban zones.
But another important factor that significantly contributed to the damage caused by these wildfires in California was the wildland-urban interface (WUI). These are areas where natural, undeveloped vegetation meets human development. This creates a high-risk zone where flammable plants and structures combine — increasing the chance of wildfires spreading from wildlands to communities.
In Canada, the WUI is rapidly expanding as large cities contend with population growth. But this is putting even more Canadians at risk from potentially detrimental wildfires. The recent, severe wildfires in California’s WUI areas offer a clear warning for Canada, highlighting an urgent need to address the risks associated with these rapidly growing zones.
Safeguarding strategies
One way of safeguarding Canada’s expanding WUI zones is by using the leaf area index (LAI). This is a measure of vegetation density.
The more dense the vegetation in a particular region (which means it has a higher LAI value), the greater that area’s risk of wildfire. This is because densely wooded areas contain significant fuel sources for wildfires, making them capable of sustaining and intensifying fire spread.
British Columbia’s coastline, Eastern Canada, Southern Ontario and parts of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick (including Halifax and Saint John) are all densely vegetated, highly populated areas that are highly susceptible to wildfire threats — especially during periods of drought and high temperatures.
By pinpointing Canada’s most vulnerable regions, targeted wildfire prevention strategies can be carried out to mitigate risks and enhance community resilience in the face of escalating wildfire threats. This might include reducing the amount of dry vegetation, carrying out controlled burns and building fire-resistant infrastructure.
Canada announced a new goal to build nearly 3.9 million houses by 2031. For these houses to be built, parts of WUI zones will need to be used. It will be important for planning and development policies to ensure resilience against wildfires.
Canada stands at a pivotal moment in wildfire risk management because of expanding WUI zones, prolonged drought conditions and intensifying fire weather converge. Without a multi-pronged strategy, wildfires will only continue to be a growing threat to ecosystems, infrastructure and public safety.
Hossein Bonakdari does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Ontario Premier Doug Ford’s election gamble has paid off. As a consequence of last night’s election results, the Progressive Conservatives are now set to form their third consecutive majority government.
By and large, last night’s election results were dull and uninspiring, looking very similar to the outcome of the province’s election in 2022. The Progressive Conservatives return (going from 79 to 80) with only one additional member of caucus, receiving a noticeable but modest two per cent bump in support.
And, while the Liberals saw even more of a recovery from 2018, the generally widespread distribution of that vote means that they were only able to gain five seats. Although tarnished, the New Democrats return as the official opposition party.
Unprepared rivals
These lacklustre results flow directly from lacklustre campaigns. The fact is that, regardless of Premier Ford’s legitimate calls for a renewed mandate amidst an aggressive American administration, the party had been looking for an excuse to call a premature election for quite some time. In doing so, they were able to — quite intentionally — catch their rivals unprepared, complete with incomplete candidate slates, unknown leaders and undercooked policy platforms.
It meant that, while Ford was able to run a safe and constrained front-runner’s campaign, his main opponents struggled to find the momentum necessary to move the dial and exploit enough backlash. This is alongside real policy vulnerabilities in health care and education, with enough voters expressing discontent with what they felt to be an unnecessary and self-serving election call.
Chaotic news cycle
There are good reasons to believe that voters were mostly apathetic towards the parties and their candidates. Alongside the reasons already stated, the dense, chaotic and ever-shifting news cycle of the last few months may have entailed that this election was able to slip by quietly.
But this does not seem to be the full story, as this year’s turnout — while still low — is slightly higher than that of 2022. Instead, voters also seemed to have wanted to maintain the status quo.
On the local level, siting members of the provincial legislature from all three parties generally performed quite well. Of the 111 ridings with party-nominated incumbents, for example, only four lost. So while many voters may have been unhappy with the election call, the unpredictable environment may have also had the reverse effect of leading them to support, if not fully endorse, the leaders they already have.
Regardless of the more limited dynamics of this election, however, we cannot overlook the fact that this has been a very real accomplishment for Doug Ford and the Progressive Conservatives. In a period of high executive turnover and anti-incumbent backlash, Doug Ford has, as the leader of the Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario, brought about a track record of secure, consecutive majorities — a feat that was last attained by Leslie Frost and John Robarts.
In many ways, it brings to mind the years of the traditional “big blue machine,” when the party controlled the government of Ontario for 40 consecutive years.
Durable persona
Here, Ford’s success is much deeper than a matter of suave electoral maneuvering, and it is more long-standing than the recent confrontation with the Trump administration. Instead, these results attest to the fact that, while the Premier is not without his detractors, he has nevertheless managed to secure a stable, solid and sufficient base of support through the combination of both a carefully balanced policy agenda and a durable leadership persona.
As with his successful conservative predecessors, Ford practices a form of the pragmatic and moderate governance that characterizes Ontario. A large part of what makes this successful is the fact that while it makes policy decisions flexible, it does not make them arbitrary.
Ford continues to emphasize a government oriented around continual economic growth and innovation as a means to accomplish raising living standards, fund the province’s social programs and — more recently — rival the United States. Combined with Ford’s aptitude in retail politics this has created a clear and accessible political project supported by big developers, small business owners and private-sector workers’ unions.
In a political environment shaped by personality, Ford continues to suck up the majority of the political oxygen in Ontario. Even while a good portion of Ontarians may dislike Ford — he is far from the most popular of Canada’s premiers — they have not experienced an overriding need to get rid of the incumbent, nor pursue another course of change.
While politics is impossible to predict, it suggests that this state of continuity will persist in Ontario, even amid a chaotic global environment.
Sam Routley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
The visit of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky to the White House has not gone to plan – at least not to his plan. There were extraordinary scenes as a press conference between Zelensky and Trump descended into acrimony, with the US president loudly berating his opposite number, who he accused of “gambling with world war three”.
“You either make a deal or we’re out,” Trump told Zelensky. His vice-president, J.D. Vance, also got in on the act, accusing the Ukrainian president of “litigating in front of the American media”, and saying his approach was “disrespectful”. At one point he asked Zelensky: “Have you said thank you even once?”
Reporters present described the atmosphere as heated with voices raised by both Trump and Vance. The New York Times said the scene was “one of the most dramatic moments ever to play out in public in the Oval Office and underscored the radical break between the United States and Ukraine since Mr Trump took office”.
Underlying the angry exchanges were differences between the Trump administration and the Ukrainian government over the so-called “minerals deal” that Zelensky was scheduled to sign. But any lack of Ukrainian enthusiasm for the deal is understandable.
In its present form, it looks more like a memorandum of understanding that leaves several vital issues to be resolved later. The deal on offer is the creation of what will be called a “reconstruction investment fund”, to be jointly owned and managed by the US and Ukraine.
Into the proposed fund will go 50% of the revenue from the exploitation of “all relevant Ukrainian government-owned natural resource assets (whether owned directly or indirectly by the Ukrainian government)” and “other infrastructure relevant to natural resource assets (such as liquified natural gas terminals and port infrastructure)”.
This means that private infrastructure – much of it owned by Ukraine’s wealthy oligarchs – is likely to become part of the deal. This has the potential of further increasing friction between Zelensky and some very powerful Ukrainians.
Meanwhile, US contributions are less clearly defined. The preamble to the agreement makes it clear that Ukraine already owes the US. The very first paragraph notes that “the United States of America has provided significant financial and material support to Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022”.
Western and Ukrainian analysts have also pointed out that there may be fewer and less accessible mineral and rare earth deposits in Ukraine than are currently assumed. The working estimates have been based mostly on Soviet-era data.
Since the current draft leaves details on ownership, governance and operations to be determined in a future fund agreement, Trump’s very big deal is at best the first step. Future rounds of negotiations are to be expected.
Statement of intent
From a Ukrainian perspective, this is more of a strength than a weakness. It leaves Kyiv with an opportunity to achieve more satisfactory terms in future rounds of negotiation. Even if any improvements will only be marginal, it keeps the US locked into a process that is, overall, beneficial for Ukraine.
Take the example of security guarantees. The draft agreement offers Ukraine nothing anywhere near Nato membership. But it notes that the US “supports Ukraine’s efforts to obtain security guarantees needed to establish lasting peace”, adding that: “Participants will seek to identify any necessary steps to protect mutual investments.”
The significance of this should not be overstated. At its bare minimum, it is an expression of intent by the US that falls short of security guarantees but still gives the US a stake in the survival of Ukraine as an independent state.
But it is an important signal both in terms of what it does and does not do – a signal to Russia, Europe and Ukraine.
Trump does not envisage that the US will give Ukraine security guarantees “beyond very much”. He seems to think that these guarantees can be provided by European troops (the Kremlin has already cast doubts on this idea).
But this does not mean the idea is completely off the table. On the contrary, because the US commitment is so vague, it gives Trump leverage in every direction.
He can use it as a carrot and a stick against Ukraine to get more favourable terms for US returns from the reconstruction investment fund. He can use it to push Europe towards more decisive action to ramp up defence spending by making any US protection for European peacekeepers contingent on more equitable burden-sharing in Nato.
And he can signal to the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, that the US is serious about making a deal stick – and that higher American economic stakes in Ukraine and corporate presence on the ground would mean US-backed consequences if the Kremlin reneges on a future peace agreement and restarts hostilities.
That these calculations will ultimately lead to the “free, sovereign and secure Ukraine” that the agreement envisages is not a given.
For now, however, despite all the shortcomings and vagueness of the deal on key issues –– and the very public argument between the parties – it still looks like it serves all sides’ interests in moving forward in this direction.
This article has been updated with details of the meeting between Volodymyr Zelensky and Donald Trump.
Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU’s Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.
Tetyana Malyarenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Conservatives now claim we are in the middle of a “movement” of workers away from the New Democratic Party, which has historically been seen as the party of labour, toward both federal and provincial conservative parties.
Former Conservative Party of Canada leader Erin O’Toole reached out to workers in the last federal election and current Conservative leader, Pierre Poilievre, continues to do so.
However, the actual extent of union support for Ford must be put into context. There is no evidence to suggest a major political re-alignment of unions with conservative parties. At the same time, the ability of Ford’s brand of populism to engage with a strategic transactionalism in some unions is a serious challenge to labour movement solidarity.
Local autonomy is part of a democratic labour movement, and many of the endorsements for Ford came from union locals, not the entirety of a union’s membership.
Some unions have policies of not endorsing any party, while others allow endorsements by union locals of individual candidates. More importantly, even if unions decide to endorse a candidate or party, individual members vote for whoever they want. Union members continue to vote in complex and contradictory ways, and they can be swayed by populist politicians as much as any other voter.
Right-wing populism presents a challenge to unions whose members are not isolated from populist politics. Ford’s brand of populism has proven effective in attracting and dividing organized labour, especially public versus private sector union members. He uses populist rhetoric to challenge public sector unions while making more moderate overatures to non-union and private sector workers.
This pivoting populism has proven effective. Promises of a “buck-a-beer” and allowing liquor into corner stores appeals to workers while potentially reducing unionized jobs at LCBO outlets and government revenue for health care and education.
Ford has also demonstrated the ability to shift his populist message when needed. He quickly positioned himself as a leading voice against tariffs proposed by United States President Donald Trump. He successfully engaged a nationalist economic populism defending workers, specifically in Ontario’s manufacturing sector.
Despite being caught saying he was “100 per cent” happy with Trump’s victory, he pivoted to a message that muzzled, at least temporarily, the racist, anti-immigrant, anti-transgender and anti-climate change sentiments of Trumpian populism.
Ford’s folksy rhetoric was flexible enough to maintain his appeal. Union leaders representing workers supportive of Ford, especially in the private sector, either felt pressure to reflect their members politics or were supportive themselves. As a result, some unions were more open to being transactional with the Ontario PCs than in the past.
Transactional approach to politics
In their recent book Shifting Gears, labour experts Stephanie Ross and Larry Savage document Unifor’s shift toward a more transactional approach when dealing with political parties. They argue the union abandoned its traditional party-union alliance with the NDP for more pragmatic relationships with those in power.
Transactional politics are increasingly practised by many unions, and Ford has used it to his advantage. Private sector unions in the building trades and hospitality industries that endorsed Ford have secured millions in training funds from the government.
Ford’s transactional relationships with unions are not without growing pains. Several unions that supported the Ontario PCs in the 2022 election condemned Bill 28, which would have removed the right to strike for 55,000 educational workers. After thousands walked off the job in response, the government withdrew the bill.
Here, we see a broader form of transactional politics in play. If Ford wanted to maintain even minimal union support, he had to recognize basic rights for unionized workers.
The current levels of union support for the Ontario PCs may have an exaggerated significance. After all, the Conservatives only slightly increased their popular vote and lost three seats, dropping to 80 from 83. Similarly, the NDP remains the official opposition, but had their seat count and popular vote diminished, while the Liberals increased both.
The future of labour
Shifting union support for political parties can have an impact, as unions have people and resources that can be allocated to campaigns. But there are limits to the union support conservative parties can build.
First, much of this support is driven by right-wing populism, which can fade over time. The traditional conservative business community can reinstate neoliberal policies that restricts unions and their power.
Second, transactional politics that use taxpayer money are expensive for governments. After all, not every union can be awarded a new training centre.
Perhaps the most significant implications are for the future of the labour movement itself. The politics between unions that collaborate with right-wing populists and those who are attacked by them remain divisive as labour leaders have publicly debated the issue. At what point will the fissures erupt and threaten overall solidarity?
It may be time for the labour movement to go on the offensive against support for right-wing populists among their own memberships — the unions giving endorsements in exchange for resources and the bare minimum, in terms of union recognition.
At this juncture, this will be a struggle. Union political education has always been a challenge, and it’s more difficult in the era of right-wing legacy and social media. Any attempt by central labour bodies, such as the Ontario Federation of Labour, to sanction or expel affiliates who support right-wing parties would have high political costs.
But accommodating, rather than confronting, right-wing populist sentiments among workers and maintaining inter-union solidarity may eventually lead to the movement and political realignment conservatives are hoping for.
Steven Tufts receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. He also sits on the board of an organisation that has recevied past funding from the Ontario Skills Development Fund mentioned in the article.
The cost of living crisis, which saw inflation in the US peak at a four-decade high of 9.1% in 2022, played a significant role in determining the outcome of last November’s presidential election.
Exit polls across ten of the key battleground states showed 32% of voters considered the economy to be the most important election issue. Among that group of voters, a staggering 81% voted for Donald Trump.
Trump had spent most of his election campaign saying his administration would tackle high prices – even vowing to bring them down on day one. However, the latest figures suggest inflation in the US has increased since he took office, rising unexpectedly to a six-month high of 3% in January.
This rise is largely because of the economy Trump inherited. But some experts have expressed concerns that his stated economic strategy, including trade tariffs, major tax cuts and lower interest rates, will only add to inflation.
While tax cuts and interest rate changes are familiar policies, the use of tariffs has been less common in recent decades. These are used by governments to balance trade relationships or in retaliation to tariffs imposed by other countries. They generally make foreign imported goods more expensive while also raising tax revenues for governments.
The Trump administration has set tariffs of 25% on all steel and aluminium imports, and imposed 10% trade tariffs on a wide range of consumer imports from China. While proposed tariffs of 25% on imports from Mexico and Canada have been temporarily paused, the US has signalled its intention to introduce tariffs on imports from the European Union.
A General Motors car assembly facility in Ontario, Canada, where economists predict the proposed tariffs would have a catastrophic effect. JHVEPhoto / Shutterstock
Will tariffs lead to inflation?
Trump’s aides insist the tariffs won’t have a negative impact on American consumers and businesses. On February 18, Peter Navarro, senior counsel for trade and manufacturing at the White House, told the New York Times: “It’s not going to be painful for America. It’s going to be a beautiful thing.”
Navarro argues that foreign exporters, concerned about losing market share, will reduce the pre-tariff price they charge US importers.
But economic theory suggests that tariffs generally do lead to higher prices. Peter Lavelle, a trade expert at the UK’s Institute for Fiscal Studies, says that evidence from Trump’s first term – when tariffs were imposed on solar panels, washing machines, steel and aluminium – shows these costs were “almost entirely passed on to domestic consumers”, thus adding to inflation.
A key reason for the tariffs is to make US domestic manufacturing more competitive on the international stage. This could bring manufacturing jobs back to the US. Manufacturing employment declined by 35% in the US from its peak of 19.6 million in 1979 to 12.8 million in 2020.
However, there was no evidence of tariffs bringing manufacturing jobs back to the US during Trump’s first term. In fact, manufacturing employment remained static between 2017 and 2021.
There are fears that tariffs could instead trigger a trade war, where countries retaliate with tariffs of their own. Canadian officials, for instance, have made it clear they will introduce retaliatory tariffs on the US – “selected in order to hit particularly red and purple [Trump-supporting] states”.
Economists analyse such scenarios using game theory. A trade war takes the form of what economics-speak calls a “non-cooperating Nash equilibrium”, where the economic outcome is negative for all countries involved.
Some recent modelling on the impact of Trump’s proposed tariffs on Canada and Mexico supports this view. Tariff retaliation is likely to raise inflation rates even further than otherwise in all three economies.
A trade war could also squeeze profit margins for exporting producers in the US, by making some US-produced goods relatively more expensive. This would show up in lower real income through reduced employment and wages. This outcome, like higher prices, is unlikely to be popular with US voters.
Given the evidence from Trump’s first term, it is difficult to see how tariffs will be anything but inflationary. Trump’s proposed tax cuts valued at US$5-11 trillion would also add to inflationary pressures, as would the lower interest rates he has called for.
Ana Swanson, a trade and international economist at the New York Times, believes the threat of tariffs is being used merely as a negotiating strategy. However, like many other economists, Swanson sees uncertainty as the biggest impact of Trump’s tariff policy.
In a podcast on February 4, she said: “If you, as the business, are watching out for the threat of tariffs, are you going to make an investment in a new factory or hire new workers?” Uncertainty leads to reduced investment and lower growth.
Realistically, Trump was never going to bring down prices for US consumers. To do that would be deflationary, and economists generally fear deflation even more than inflation. Falling prices lead to deferred spending and can be devastating for economic growth.
The best outcome for US consumers is that prices increase at a slower rate, close to the US Federal Reserve’s inflation target of 2%. However, given the recent uptick in inflation, as well as Trump’s strategy of tariffs, tax cuts and lower interest rates, the direction of travel all points towards higher price rises.
Recent evidence from elections in many advanced economies shows that voters do not like inflation, and will punish administrations who are in power during inflationary periods.
Since inflation peaked in many advanced economies in 2022, more than 70% of incumbent administrations have been voted out of government. Trump should keep this in mind as he embarks on his quest to make America’s economy great again.
Conor O’Kane does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Elon Musk is wielding a chainsaw against US government departments, potentially culling tens of thousands of jobs, as part of a huge plan to shrink the government and slash federal spending.
This large-scale purge of public servants, coordinated through Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency (Doge), may end up creating one of the biggest employment cuts in US history. Tech company IBM laid off 60,000 people in 1993, and about 25,000 workers (some outside the US) lost their jobs when Lehman Brothers bank went bust in 2008, but this swathe of job losses could outstrip them both, with numbers predicted to hit around 300,000.
On Friday February 21, Musk sent a “productivity email” to all federal employees demanding that they summarise the work they’d done in the past week. President Donald Trump hailed Musk’s ultimatum as “ingenious” and echoed that failure to comply would mean that employees would be “semi-fired or fired”.
By the Monday, chaos reigned in Washington. The bedlam left career civil servants unsure of how, or even whether, to reply, marking the latest flashpoint in a tumultuous last month created by Doge and aimed at trimming the federal workforce. Adding insult to injury, Musk later admitted the email was a ruse to test whether federal workers “had a pulse”. A follow-up email is rumoured to be coming this weekend.
On X, Musk doubled down, posting an image of the cartoon character SpongeBob SquarePants looking at a “Got Done Last Week” list that included: “Cried about Trump, Cried about Elon, Cried about Trump and Elon some more.” Days earlier, at the annual gathering of the US right wing, the Conservative Political Action Conference, Musk brandished a chainsaw and screamed “Chainsaw!” to show the uproarious Maga crowd how he intended to eviscerate the federal bureaucracy.
Political payback?
Doge’s proposed job cuts are vast and deep. So far, much of Musk’s ire has been directed at the US Agency for International Development (USAid), where 4,700 employees have already been put on leave – with 1,600 of those positions terminated.
It’s perhaps no surprise that Doge started with this soft target. Although the US spends only about 1% of federal money on development aid, polls consistently show that Americans, especially Republicans, think Washington overspends on foreign assistance.
The cuts also come amid rising speculation that these firings could be part of a political retaliation by the White House. Influential adviser Stephen Miller claimed, without showing evidence, that 98% of workers at USAid “either donated to Kamala Harris or another leftwing candidate”.
The Trump administration has also forced out dozens of officials across the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency charged with investigating attempts at foreign interference in US elections.
Even the Pentagon, traditionally a “third rail” for Republican presidents when it comes to spending reductions, is feeling the squeeze. The US secretary of defense, Pete Hegseth, has promised to slash military spending by 8% over the next five years from its US$850 billion (£674 billion) annual budget. While US service members in uniform are currently exempt from job losses, many expect civilian workers, especially those in their probationary period, to be shown the door soon.
There are many thousands of federal jobs across the US.
Washington DC, which voted for former vice-president Harris over Trump by a margin of 92.5% to 6.6%, is home to the largest number of government jobs: about 2.2 million civilians. However, federal workers are spread across the US. That includes red states where Trump won in 2024. For example, there are more than 129,000 federal jobs in Texas, more than 94,000 in Florida, and more than 79,000 in Georgia.
For Trump, this complicates the Doge agenda to make a dent in America’s US$36 trillion (£28.6 trillion) debt through mass job terminations. While many Maga supporters cheered campaign pledges to eliminate government “waste, fraud and abuse”, many now confront the stark reality of job losses in their communities (or even their own jobs).
Trump has promised to get spending by the national government under control, but without addressing reform of essential services – such as Medicare and social security – it’s unclear how he can achieve this goal.
Backlash and legal battles
Public opinion towards Musk breaks sharply along partisan lines. According to recent polling by YouGov, 42% of Americans have a positive view of Musk (52% unfavourable), including 79% of Republicans but just 10% of Democrats. The same percentage, 42%, think favourably of Doge, with similar partisan divides. But the number of Americans who rate Musk positively has been dropping in the past few weeks, although he is seen as increasingly influential.
Contributing to negativity, Musk’s rollout of Doge to oversee cuts to the federal labour force hasn’t come without major flubs. For example, he recently fired (before un-firing) workers at the National Nuclear Security Administration, tasked with overseeing the country’s nuclear weapons stockpiles.
Even some Trump loyalists are pushing back. After Musk’s “document work or resign” email was blasted to the FBI, newly minted director Kash Patel sent his own message telling employees not to respond, declaring: “The FBI, through the Office of the Director, is in charge of all of our review processes.”
On X, Harvard political scientist Maya Sen called the reaction “probably a good development for the rule of law”, adding: “Musk got a head start but separate & distinct interests of new political appointees over their own workforces will clash more and more w/Musk.”
The Trump administration now faces mounting legal challenges to Doge’s agenda. An amended lawsuit filed by a cadre of unions, including the nation’s largest federation of unions, AFL-CIO, alleged that mass firings of probationary workers is illegal, and that only federal agencies have control over human resources decisions.
Beyond legal chokepoints, Musk confronts increasing scepticism – even within Doge itself. On Tuesday February 25, 21 employees from Doge resigned, saying they would not use their professional skills to “dismantle critical public services”.
Even among some Republican lawmakers, there’s worry about the breakneck speed of firings. Republican representative Jeff Van Drew, for example, said that “we have to be really careful that we’re cutting things that don’t hurt everyday people”. Some have criticised Musk’s flippant attitude toward longstanding public servants. Others think Musk is taking a hatchet to a problem that requires a scalpel.
Whether a hatchet, a scalpel or a chainsaw, Musk’s slash-and-burn approach carries risks. By the 2026 midterms (when 35 of the 100 Senate seats will be up for election), the picture of Musk gleefully slicing government jobs could be less a symbol of efficiency, more a symbol of Trump-era hubris.
Thomas Gift does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Donald Trump’s grab for Ukraine’s minerals, which the US president is demanding as compensation for his country’s wartime assistance to Kyiv, might seem like a new low in a week of US-Ukraine relations lows.
The latest draft of Trump’s “minerals deal” would grant the US substantial control of a new fund that would invest in Ukrainian reconstruction. The fund would receive 50% of the profits from the future monetisation of government-owned Ukrainian natural resources such as lithium and titanium, as well as coal, gas, oil and uranium.
This deal, despite offering no guarantee of continued US military support, is a slight improvement on Trump’s first offering. That bid would have imposed financial conditions on Ukraine harsher than those forced on Germany after the first world war.
However, the deal will still require future generations of Ukrainians to shoulder the cost of a war for which they bear no responsibility. Commentators, including British foreign minister David Lammy, have noted that it would be more just to seize frozen Russian assets and use them to cover the cost of repairing the damage Russia has wreaked across the country.
But, while many in the west have balked at Trump’s barefaced extractivism, his actions are entirely in line with the way western capitalists have approached Ukraine and its resources since the 19th century.
The Donbas region of Ukraine is a major coal mining and industrial area. deniks315 / Shutterstock
Ukraine’s east, referred to as Donbas, is often thought to have been industrialised in the 1930s, when Joseph Stalin was leading the Soviet Union. At this time, Donbas was marketed to the world as a symbol of proletarian superabundance. It was a place where miners and steelworkers exceeded their production quotas by 30 or 40 times.
But the development of industrial extraction in eastern Ukraine dates back much earlier and was powered, in part, by European capital and technology.
In the mid-19th century, when this part of Ukraine was controlled by the Russian empire, the Russian tsars opened the country’s borders to foreign capital investment in the hopes of accelerating its industrialisation drive. A series of fiscal measures were introduced that made it more attractive to foreigners to invest in the empire’s emerging industrial markets.
This encouraged a wave of economic migration from western Europe to all regions of the multinational state. Foreign capitalists often partnered with Russian business elites based in Saint Petersburg and other major cities and set about generating huge amounts of profit from the extraction of the empire’s valuable resources.
Donbas, with its wealth of minerals, was a region of particular interest for foreign capitalists. French, Belgian, German, Dutch and British industrialists all relocated to the region in the second half of the 19th century hoping to make their fortunes by excavating the region’s salt, chalk, gypsum, and coal. In fact, there was so much Belgian capital circulating at one point that Donbas became known as “the tenth Belgian province”.
Despite the paternalism of some foreign managers, the extraction of Ukraine’s minerals did little to improve the life of local communities. Rather, it contributed to the displacement of indigenous people and caused massive environmental and ecological damage.
Urban planning often replicated the segregated conditions of European colonies in Africa and India. Foreign settlers lived apart from local workers, in privileged housing located in better provisioned parts of town downwind of the toxic fumes of the blast furnaces and the chimney stacks.
In the settlement of Hughesovka (now known as Donetsk), which was named after the Welsh industrialist John Hughes, Welsh settlers attempted to reconstruct the trappings of British life on the Ukrainian steppe.
They built tennis courts and an Anglican church, arranged tea parties, and even had an amateur dramatics society. Meanwhile, the local workforce lived in abject poverty, often accommodated in barracks or mud dugouts.
In these dismal conditions, infectious disease and dissatisfaction were widespread. There are several reports of riots following large-scale outbreaks of cholera and local hospitals were reportedly overflowing.
Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, this period of European capitalist exploitation was drawing considerable interest from researchers.
The “European” industrial heritage of Donbas was being used to tell different stories about the region and to highlight its complex, multicultural history. This heritage was seen to hold potential as a counter-narrative to the toxic “Russian world” propaganda emanating from the occupied territories, which maintains that Ukraine is an integral part of Russia’s historic sphere of cultural influence.
But there is a danger in being too romantic about this chapter in history. Foreign capitalist investment in the extraction of Ukrainian minerals was not a classic example of settler colonialism. However, it bore many similarities to western European colonial practices in other parts of the world at this time.
What this history reminds us is that Ukraine has long been located at the intersection of empires. And these empires have often collaborated to plunder the country’s resources, offering little or nothing in return.
We can see this kind of predatory collaboration of imperial and neo-imperial regimes once again taking shape. Russia’s leader, Vladimir Putin, is trying to tempt Trump away from a deal with Ukraine with promises of access to Ukraine’s rare earth minerals in the occupied territories.
We must continue to gather and protest, as many of us did on the three-year anniversary of the full-scale invasion this week, to resist such politics of resourcification.
Victoria Donovan’s research has received funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council, 2019-2023.
A homeless man asleep in Edinburgh, where the author carried out research into the link between drug use and exploitation.Serge Bertasius Photography/Shutterstock
All names have been changed to protect the identities of interviewees.
Patrick is 32 years old and has been homeless on and off in Edinburgh since growing up in care. He speaks with a rasping quality due to the ravages of sleeping outdoors in cruel Scottish winters. Until recently, he was one of thousands of people in the UK trapped in exploitation, often referred to as modern slavery.
In the UK over the past five years, more than 59,000 people have been identified as possible victims of exploitation – sometimes having been trafficked into the country for this express purpose. Some are forced into criminal forms of labour, like growing marijuana, or put to work in agriculture, hospitality, care or construction in illegal conditions. Still more are trapped in private homes in what is termed “domestic servitude”.
And there is Patrick’s category, which is sexual exploitation.
Patrick began taking drugs at 14 years old while in care. Two years later, he was kicked out of the children’s home and met an older man who introduced him to gammahydroxybutrate, or “G” as Patrick calls it. This is known as a “chemsex” drug due to its ability to induce arousal and reduce inhibitions.
The dealer began having sex with him and taking him to sex parties with other men. Soon, Patrick was addicted to G and, over time – the precise length is unclear as, like many people who’ve experienced trauma and addiction, his memories are highly fragmented – the man began to control him. If Patrick wanted more G, he had to have sex with the older man or with other people he selected. Specific sex acts were demanded, regardless of Patrick’s consent.
This controlling behaviour escalated: if Patrick wanted heating in the room in which he slept, if he wanted access to electricity to charge his phone, if he wanted clean clothes or food, if he wanted to avoid being hit, sex was required.
“I never had a choice,” Patrick tells me about his time living in that house. “If I hadn’t got the drugs, I’d die.”
The man kept him on a chemical leash for years. He was not physically restrained in the house, and he had access to his own bank account and benefits payments. Sometimes he slept rough to escape the abuse – but he always returned, because he lived in fear of “rattling”, as he calls withdrawal.
It wasn’t just fear of the physical suffering involved in going without the drug. Patrick’s father murdered his mother when he was a small child. He describes his addiction as a chance to feel free of that trauma – to feel “like superman, like flying”.
Addiction was a driving force in Patrick’s exploitation. And he isn’t alone: several court cases involving the exploitation of homeless people have acknowledged the role of addiction in their victimisation.
In 2013, R v Connors found that the Connors family, which ran a casual construction business in Bedfordshire, had recruited homeless men into their service. The men were promised accommodation, food and reasonable wages, only to receive “something like £10 per day” – if they were paid at all. They worked long hours in poor conditions without necessary equipment or clothing, and “on occasion they were subjected to violence or the threat of violence”.
As a result, three members of the Connors family received custodial sentences of between four and 14 years. The court judgement noted that their victims “were chosen deliberately. Usually they were homeless, addicted to alcohol, friendless and isolated.”
Three years later, the case of R v Rooney found that 11 members of the Rooney family had victimised at least 18 people in Lincolnshire, forcing them to work without pay and to live in squalid conditions for up to 26 years. In one instance, they made a victim dig his own grave to force him to sign a contract of lifelong servitude. Nine members of the family were sentenced to jail, with most receiving sentences of five years or more.
After a subsequent unsuccessful appeal, the judge drew a direct link between victimisation, addiction and homelessness, stating: “The appellants were said to have manipulated and controlled these men by withholding pay [and] feeding their vulnerabilities and addictions, such as to alcohol or cannabis.”
It didn’t end there. In 2020, the office of the UK’s Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner examined Operation Fort, “the UK’s largest anti-slavery prosecution”, which took four years to conclude. It found that some of the victims had been recruited from homeless shelters and were addicted to drugs or alcohol.
Illicit drug use is damaging large parts of the world socially, politically and environmentally. Patterns of supply and demand are changing rapidly. In our longform series Addicted, leading experts bring you the latest insights on drug use and production as we ask: is it time to declare a planetary emergency?
The role of addiction in all these cases is important to acknowledge – as is recognising that homelessness isn’t a singular thing. Some people experience homelessness only once; others are homeless repeatedly and for years. There are people for whom lacking shelter is the main measure by which they are disadvantaged, which differs to those who are “multiply excluded” or who have “severe and multiple disadvantages” – including histories of institutional care, substance dependency, and criminal records. And that’s without layering on additional factors such as race, ethnicity, sexuality and gender.
As part of my PhD research, I spent several months investigating Edinburgh’s street community, delving into homeless people’s experiences of exploitation, and finding out how and why these experiences occurred.
I chose to work exclusively with people who, like Patrick, were either British or had migration statuses that afforded them the same rights as British people (such as access to benefits). Other statuses – like being an asylum seeker, being on highly restrictive work visas or being undocumented – are widely recognised to make people more vulnerable to being exploited. Removing this factor enabled me to focus on victimisation that could not be explained by immigration policy, and which might point to new or under-explored territories.
I uncovered many cases like Patrick’s: homeless British people who had been exploited. But I also met people who were homeless and had not been exploited. And one of the main differences was addiction. Everyone who had been exploited while homeless had a substance dependency. And it seemed to be this, more than homelessness, which had put them in harm’s way.
Debt bondage on the streets of Edinburgh
Like Patrick, Paul is a white Scottish man in his 30s. He began sofa-surfing at the age of 11 after leaving his abusive family home. Since then, his life has been chronically chaotic: rough sleeping, prison, time in hostels, social housing and back again. Addiction has been the sole stable feature – in his case, a heroin habit which started “when I was 22, in prison”.
Paul has done various things for money over the years: begging (but only once because “I couldn’t deal with the shame of sitting down with people I knew walking past”); house-breaking (“shit stuff I wish I could take back”); shoplifting and reselling (“bacon, cheese, booze, anything that was more expensive”); and also drug running. It was this last method where he got into trouble.
A homeless man sleeping outside a branch of Barclays bank in Princes Street, central Edinburgh. Serge Cornu/Shutterstock
Paul was shoplifting and wasn’t making much money when he “got an offer” to become a drug runner instead. Although movies would have us believe that most modern slavery is the result of kidnapping or abduction, it’s usually the result of a subtler process. The potential victim is offered something they need, such as money or passage to a different country, and it goes wrong.
For Patrick and Paul, what they needed was drugs. Paul accepted the offer and began working as a runner, taking drugs from the dealer’s house to the customers and risking arrest on the way. He was paid in small amounts of heroin for his personal use. Looking back, he sees the dealer as “basically getting me deeper and deeper into trouble”, by escalating his addiction and using it as a control mechanism to keep him working – like the chemical leash experienced by Patrick.
For Jack, a third Scottish homeless man, it was worse. Initially, he bought drugs (both heroin and crack cocaine) using cash, but then a dealer began giving him more than he could afford. “I’d say I only want a half-ounce … and he’d say nah, he’s gonna give me the full one.”
Over time, Jack’s debt grew. He tried to repay it by working as a drug runner for the man, but the money could never be paid off. This was partly because he always needed his next hit, but also because the dealer was inflating the debt each time. There was no way out.
The dealer was also, according to Jack, “quite a fuckin’ scary bloke” – which turned out to be Jack’s way of disclosing that he had been threatened when he tried to leave for a different dealer. At least once, he had been hit.
The Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority describes debt bondage as when “an employer or controller will use different tactics to trap the victim in an endless cycle of debt which can never be repaid”. In Jack’s case, as with others in my investigation, it was a particular instrumentalisation of that chemical leash.
“We call it ‘in your pocket’,” Jack explains. “That’s what they say: ‘I’ve got him in my pocket now.’”
Paul and Jack had experienced localised permutations of what government and police call county lines – the transporting of drugs by children or vulnerable adults under coercion.
It may have a special label, but this is a normal part of the drug dealing business model. When I recount Paul’s and Jack’s experiences to Ryan, another homeless Scottish man who is familiar with the drug economy thanks to his dealer dad, he snorts: “Well aye, obviously.”
Into the arms of would-be exploiters
Patrick, Paul and Jack had all been exploited within the drug economy in one way or another, and this is where government-approved county lines strategies are focused. But addiction drives exploitation more broadly than the drug sector itself; as in the Rooney and Connors cases, legal employment sectors including construction and farmwork are subject to addiction-fuelled exploitation too.
When Jack was approached to paint scaffolding poles for £80 a day, he jumped at the chance – it looked like good money for an easy task. But the job wasn’t what it seemed. The recruiter knew Jack was an addict and dropped him off alone at a warehouse with a bag of speed, so he would work through the night with no sleep. This happened for four weekends in a row, with the man alternating between treating Jack well (“made me feel like I was ‘the man’”) and frightening him (“he pure intimidated me”). The £80 per day never materialised.
In Paul’s case, he was offered farmwork by a man outside a soup kitchen he frequented. Paul says he didn’t trust the guy “just from looking at him … and the way he went about it, like strolling up to a homeless place. That’s where most serial killers go to get victims.”
Paul was warned off by street acquaintances who’d heard of people being treated badly at the farm. “They were living in, basically, homeless situations – in a barn or something with no heating and stuff like that, being worked when the guy says … You’ve no money to get home, you don’t know where you are.”
Yet even with this information, when it happened a second time, Paul decided to go. He needed money for his heroin habit. Thankfully, he was too slow to say yes and he lost out to two other men. He doesn’t know what happened to them.
When Paul and I met, he was staying off heroin, thanks to methadone and various other prescription drugs. I asked what he’d do if someone approached him with the same kind of job offer now. He said he’d decline; he no longer needs the money for heroin.
Video: BBC Scotland.
Lorraine, in her 40s and also Scottish, spent years doing sex work. She’d been in various situations during that time, including being deceived into brothel work based on potential earnings which turned out to be untrue, and being pimped by someone who “was supposed to be a friend”.
When we met, Lorraine was no longer doing sex work for anyone but herself. I asked what had changed. Along with getting a place in an emergency shelter, she said it was “because I’m not using [drugs], you know; I’m not using any more. I used to be a prolific crack and heroin addict.”
Paul and Lorraine aren’t alone. Nearly everyone I’ve interviewed draws a direct line between the high cost of illegal drugs and the likelihood of being exploited. In contrast, those who’ve got clean are free from coercion and able to get by on their benefits – benefits they receive, in general, for severe mental health conditions and learning disabilities.
Can criminals be victims too?
Ryan was right when he snorted “aye, obviously” to me: the link between addiction and exploitation should be plain to see. There are passing mentions of addiction issues among homeless survivors peppered in the Rooney, Connors, Operation Fort and other case documents. So why had all bar one of the people whom I met, and who shared their stories of exploitation with me, not been flagged as possible victims by services?
The one exception to this rule offers some answers.
Piotr came to the UK after seeing an advert for a job in a car garage. He liked that first job. Even though it paid lower than the minimum wage, it was enough to meet his needs and the boss was reasonable. But when that garage closed and his long-distance marriage broke down, Piotr relapsed into alcoholism. He needed to find a new job so he could fund his daily intake.
Another garage owner who was aware of Piotr’s dependency offered him work. They didn’t make an agreement about money, but Piotr told me he’d hoped to get around £20 a day plus some food or cigarettes. That may sound bad to people accustomed to legal minimum wages, but the reality turned out much worse.
Piotr wasn’t paid at all. He slept in a caravan on the garage site, and if he wanted to use gas or electricity, he had to pay for it … with no wages. He told me how the boss would shout at him, and sometimes hit him too.
Thankfully, after around a year, Piotr was able to leave and, during the period we met, he was working somewhere that treated him better and paid him consistently – though still below the legal minimum.
It was while Piotr was working at this new and better place that homelessness support workers encountered him and began to wonder whether he’d been exploited. The fact they were correct isn’t the point here; rather, why had they flagged his victimisation but not Patrick’s, Paul’s, Lorraine’s or Jack’s? And what might this tell us about homelessness and exploitation more broadly?
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The answer may lie in a concept introduced nearly 40 years ago by criminologist Nils Christie. The “ideal victim” is the notion that we’re more willing to view some people as victims than others. Christie suggested various criteria that make people more likely to receive the social label of “victim”: including that they’re weaker than the perpetrator; that they’re carrying out a respectable project at the time of the harm occurring; and that their general behaviour is blameless – namely, they were doing nothing illegal nor putting themselves at risk.
In this analysis, it should be obvious that Patrick, Paul, Lorraine and Jack are all non-ideal victims. Most have been in prison, some multiple times, and all regularly commit crimes by taking drugs or earning money in illegal (drug running, stealing) or semi-legal (sex work) ways. In contrast, Piotr does none of these things.
But while social bias goes against viewing Patrick, Paul, Lorraine and Jack as victims, empirical data tells us otherwise. Studies show that “engagement in offending behaviour is one of the strongest correlates of victimisation”. Substance abuse in particular is recognised to put people at greater risk of becoming victims of crime.
Yet the support workers I interviewed make it clear that, in general, their homeless clients are not asked about their various criminal activities. Their rationale varied: some felt that asking probing questions about these activities might harm their relationship, making clients suspicious of their motives and damaging their ability to support them. Others felt it was simply none of their business how or whether clients earned money illegally, either because of their perceived remit of their work, or because they viewed the activities as distasteful or shameful.
Drinking alcohol was safe to ask about, as was working in legal sectors like car garages – but not heroin, not crack cocaine, not G, not sex work, not drug running, and so on.
Paradoxically, then, the very aspects of someone’s life which may instinctively put off support workers, police, medical professionals and others from viewing them as possible victims are the same aspects which make them more at risk of victimisation.
Compounding this, Piotr is not British while all the others are. There is very limited data on exploitation in the homelessness community but, according to information published by the charities Unseen and The Passage, most people who are identified as victims of exploitation have been migrants. Two-thirds of those highlighted by the latter have “no recourse to public funds”, a particularly precarious form of migration status which bans people from accessing benefits and other forms of social assistance.
In theory, this should have meant that my investigation – which excluded anyone in that precarious category, solely interviewing British people or migrants who have the same protections as UK citizens – wouldn’t have easily found victims. But when I spent lots of time getting to know people living on the streets of Edinburgh, I found this wasn’t the case.
That doesn’t mean Unseen or The Passage are wrong in their activities or data, far from it. Victimisation is not a zero-sum game: multiple categories of homeless people can be at especially high risk. Rather, it brings an additional population into view for deeper consideration.
A tent pitched in New Calton burial ground in Calton Hill, Edinburgh. Fotokon/Shutterstock
Following Christie’s concept, academics have considered how migration and victimhood intersect, noting that migrants’ perceived “weakness, frailty and passivity” aligns with the ideal victim idea. On exploitation specifically, a great deal of research and action has taken place to highlight the ways in which the UK’s “hostile environment” migration policy renders migrants vulnerable to exploitation.
This combination of perception and policy makes it plausible that homeless people of foreign origin are more easily recognised as victims than people who have remained in the area in which they grew up, like the Scottish people encountered in my investigation – and especially those exhibiting some of the other “unideal” factors I’ve described.
What does this mean?
The finding that addiction is an important driver of exploitation among the homeless community offers guidance for targeted intervention. People who are homeless and have substance dependencies should be considered higher risk for exploitation than people who are homeless without addictions.
While there are many factors which contribute to victimisation, and this article is the product of a broader body of research, it does offer a strong indication of one place we should look for harm.
Second, police and other frontline services should consider biases that may be blinding them to some victims, specifically British people with offending records.
Third, my investigation points to a broader question: if addiction is driving vulnerability to exploitation, what does this mean for drug and alcohol policy? In England, funding of local council addiction services has halved over the past ten years; while in Scotland as well as England and Wales, the high rate of drug-related deaths demonstrates a desperate need for more intervention.
Meanwhile, the National Police Chiefs’ county lines policing strategy for 2024-2027 doesn’t mention addiction even once. There is a glaring need for a better-funded, more joined-up approach to understanding and addressing addiction, thereby reducing exploitation crimes.
Going further, one useful response could be the UK-wide introduction of “safe consumption rooms”, whose main purpose is to reduce drug-related harms including contamination and overdose. After much political debate, the first such facility in Scotland, called the Thistle and located in Glasgow, opened on January 13 2025.
Video: Channel 4 News.
In the context of exploitation, these safe consumption rooms could remove the obstacle of illegality from identification. In a space in which drug-taking is explicit, people may feel safer to disclose harm, and support workers may feel safer to probe into people’s lifestyles.
This builds on my forthcoming study, to be published in a collection from Amsterdam University Press. It shows how health clinics and social spaces that are explicitly run by and for sex workers, and which have no links to policing, are able to identify victims of exploitation who have otherwise gone unnoticed or avoided sharing their victimisation out of fear of being criminalised, because of their involvement with the sex industry or their migration statuses. By creating safe spaces free from judgement or criminalisation, we open new opportunities for support.
Being able to regulate drugs by decriminalising them may also be beneficial. It would not remove the problem – alcohol is legal and Piotr was still exploited – but it could blunt the instrumentalisation of addiction by would-be exploiters, making it harder to construct “drug debt bondage” like that experienced by Jack, and more difficult to hold the threat of imposed withdrawal over victims, as experienced by Patrick.
So far, the Labour government appears to be continuing this disappointing track record. In its election manifesto, it pledged to introduce “a new offence of criminal exploitation of children, to go after the gangs who are luring young people into violence and crime”. But this reinforces the “ideal victim” problem: children are innocents, but what of their adult, addicted counterparts? And what about the drug policies underlying this illicit economy?
Since taking office, and as we approach the ten-year anniversary of the UK’s “world-leading” Modern Slavery Act, the government has committed to a “holistic victim-centred approach”, but there is no indication that this will include people like Patrick, Paul and Jack.
We have known the factors driving modern slavery for years. This investigation provides more evidence that we must address drug policy and addiction support as part of any effective strategy to reduce the deeply damaging effects of exploitation.
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Emily Kenway receives funding from the University of Edinburgh and is on the boards of National Ugly Mugs (trustee) and the New Economy Organisers Network (chair). She is the author of Who Cares: The Hidden Crisis of Caregiving, and How We Solve It (Headline, 2023), which was a finalist for the Orwell Prize for Political Writing.
We often set ambitious goals, such as going to the gym, adopting healthier eating habits, or reducing our social media use. However, despite our best intentions, staying committed can often feel like an uphill battle.
A review of evidence published in 2024 highlights why. While understanding the benefits of behaviour change and believing in its value are important, these play only minor roles. The strongest determinant of our ability to shift how we act everyday is our habits.
As the 19th and 20th-century philosopher William James put it, we are essentially “bundles of habits”. He believed that these habits could hold people back from achieving their full potential. If he were around today, he would probably be concerned at the way some people mindlessly check their phones every five minutes.
In a recent academic review, my colleagues and I at Trinity College Dublin illustrated that habits are governed by a delicate balance between two distinct brain systems. One system drives automatic responses to familiar cues in the environment, while the other enables the control of behaviour directed towards goals.
This interplay helps explain why we might mindlessly scroll through social media when bored, yet still retain the ability to deliberately put our phones away to focus on work. We reviewed decades of research from laboratory studies and real world settings for the study. Here, we share five practical strategies to help you build positive habits and break negative ones.
1. Forget the 21-day myth
Forget the 21-day rule – there is no magic number. This rule refers to a popular perception that it takes 21 days to form a new habit. Habit formation is different for every person.
In one study, habit formation such as having a piece of fruit with lunch was estimated to take 66 days on average, but it varied widely between individuals, from 18 days to 254 days.
It also depends on the specific habit itself. A study demonstrated this using a subset of AI called machine learning. The study analysed more than 12 million gym visits and 40 million instances of hospital handwashing to understand how habits form.
The research found that forming a gym habit typically takes months, while hospital staff can develop a handwashing habit in just weeks. No matter how long it takes, the key is sticking with it, even if you miss a day here and there.
2. Make rewards your ally
Your brain learns to repeat behaviour that is rewarding. One study examining people’s intake of water throughout the day found that it was more of a habit for people who perceived it as more rewarding.
The habit loop can also be reinforced through external rewards, such as treating yourself to something enjoyable after completing a workout.
Rewards are also important for breaking habits. If scrolling through social media becomes a way to unwind, try replacing it with an alternative activity that provides a similar sense of relaxation and enjoyment.
By substituting a positive behaviour, you not only avoid feeling deprived but also create a competing response to the old habit, making it easier to break the cycle.
3. Stack your habits
The brain has a natural tendency to combine different actions and respond to contextual cues – the kind that help people understand their surroundings. A strategy called habit stacking takes advantage of this by linking a desired behaviour to something you already do.
For example, research on flossing found that people who flossed immediately after brushing their teeth were more likely to establish a lasting habit. The existing cue – brushing your teeth – serves as a reminder, making the new habit – flossing – feel like a natural part of your routine.
So, if you want to start meditating, pair it with your morning coffee. Sip your coffee, then meditate for five minutes. Over time, the two types of behaviour become intertwined, making it easier to stick with your goals.
4. Watch out for stress
When life gets overwhelming, many of us find ourselves falling back into old habits, even ones we thought we had moved past. Acute and chronic stress can shift the balance away from controlled goal directed behaviour towards the automatic response system in the brain.
A functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study revealed that prolonged stress in humans leads to an over-reliance on the brain’s circuits that drive habits, while suppressing the prefrontal cortex, which governs deliberate decision making.
The good news? These effects are reversible. After a six week stress-free period, participants returned to goal directed behaviour, and their brain activity normalised.
5. Plan for weak moments
We like to set new ambitious goals when we feel motivated. Motivational changes are often initiated based around time, such as the start of a new year, a phenomenon known as the “fresh start effect”. But it is important to be strategic and prepare for situations when motivation is low and we still want to work towards our goals.
A powerful strategy for overcoming these weak moments is to plan ahead for specific situations by saying, “If I find myself reaching for a snack when I’m stressed, then I will take a five-minute walk instead.” This strategy is generally referred to as “if-then” plans.
This approach helps to preemptively trigger a healthier response in those moments when bad habits might otherwise take over.
So, while it might seem difficult, if you’re looking to rid yourself of a bad habit or replace it with a good one, our research suggests it’s possible to change your behaviour using strategies based on scientific evidence.
Eike Buabang receives funding from the Government of Ireland Postdoctoral Fellowship Programme.
At the heart of the BBC’s new series Miss Austen is a fictional Cassandra Austen (played by Keeley Hawes). Reviews have stressed that the real life Cassandra’s destruction of her sister Jane Austen’s letters has been considered one of the greatest acts of literary vandalism in history. These letters would have provided an invaluable insight into the author who died so young.
Why Cassandra destroyed her sister’s correspondence – and what she destroyed – cannot be known. But Miss Austen gives us intriguing speculation. It deals with family relationships, and with what gets passed down to subsequent generations.
In Miss Austen, Mary Austen is considering encouraging her son James Edward to write a biography of his literary father and aunt. Cassandra must find her sister’s letters before they get into the wrong hands. What happens next is a clever blend of fact and fiction.
James Edward Austen-Leigh did publish the first full biography of his aunt with the help of his sisters, although not until 1869.
However, the series also deviates from fact in its depiction of an incident in Jane’s life in the early 1800s. She may have met a young gentleman at a seaside resort in Devon. This young man may have admired Jane and she may have admired him in turn.
This story was recounted to James Edward Austen-Leigh by his sister when he was preparing a second edition of his Jane Austen memoir. She had been told the story by Cassandra and, though she could not remember the young man’s name, she knew he died shortly after Jane’s encounter with him.
Miss Austen picks up on the suggestion of Jane’s shadowy seaside encounter, locates the events firmly in Sidmouth, names the gentleman Mr Hobday and gives the encounter an intriguing twist by making it Cassandra’s, not Jane’s, romance.
Jane Austen might have enjoyed this fictionalisation.
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A love of fiction and an aversion to history
In the concluding paragraphs of Mansfield Park (1814), Austen’s narrator purposely abstains from dates, “that every one may be at liberty to fix their own”. In Northanger Abbey, the heroine Catherine Morland has no taste for “real, solemn History.” Instead, the novels of Maria Edgeworth and Frances Burney are championed as “works in which the greatest powers of the mind are displayed”.
Miss Austen’s Jane is played by Patsy Ferran as witty, acerbic and, crucially, devoted to fiction. She is utterly determined to become a published author and her family support her in this pursuit. This Austen is true to the version of the author that scholars and biographers have presented in recent years.
Jane Austen’s novels are not about the union of one couple. They explore communities and dependence, particularly that of women. Foremost in these explorations are sisterly bonds.
In Austen’s fiction, these bonds may indeed be mutually supportive and fulfilling. But they are always complex too. It is the truth of these complexities that the series Miss Austen captures so beautifully, via Isabella Fowle and her relationship with her sisters, and of course via Cassandra’s relationship with hers.
This adaptation should send viewers to read Gill Hornby’s novel, and to read and reread Jane Austen. Miss Austen embraces the possibilities of fiction in rethinking the lives of the past.
I hope viewers of Miss Austen will think more favourably about the real Cassandra too.
She kept letters and Jane’s manuscripts, leaving them to her nieces on her death. Jane and Cassandra had six brothers.
She was not the only one who had letters that gave insight into Jane Austen’s mind. She must have also written countless more to her other brothers and their wives, her nieces and nephews and her friends.
Many of these are now lost to us. But Cassandra’s curation of her sister’s correspondence can be seen in a positive light when we reflect on what she preserved in relation to what was lost.
Gillian Dow does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
The goal of brushing one’s teeth is to have fresh breath and prevent cavities. But the effect of toothpaste on the complex ecosystem of bacteria in our mouths — the oral microbiome — is often overlooked.
Recent research has highlighted just how crucial the oral microbiome is for our overall health. A well-balanced microbiome helps regulate harmful bacteria, aids digestion and protects the gums. But does toothpaste support this balance, or could it be disrupting it? And could the toothpaste of the future be designed to work with the oral microbiome rather than against it?
The mouth is one of the most densely populated microbial habitats in the body, home to more than 700 species of bacteria. These bacteria inhabit not only the surfaces of the teeth and gums in biofilm – a sticky, structured community that can be both beneficial and harmful – but also thrive in our saliva, contributing to the dynamic oral microbiome.
A healthy microbiome includes bacteria that help regulate pH levels (a measure of how acidic or alkaline a substance is), break down food and even produce natural antimicrobial compounds. But when the balance is disrupted — often due to diet, poor oral hygiene or certain medical conditions — harmful bacteria can take over. This imbalance, known as dysbiosis, is linked to tooth decay and gum disease.
What does toothpaste actually do?
The main function of toothpaste isn’t to kill bacteria outright but to disrupt the biofilm that allows harmful bacteria to thrive. Brushing mechanically removes this biofilm from teeth and gums, while abrasives in toothpaste help break it up further.
Many toothpastes also contain fluoride, which strengthens tooth enamel and helps prevent cavities. Interestingly, fluoride itself doesn’t kill bacteria, but it makes it harder for acid-producing bacteria like Streptococcus mutans, a key player in tooth decay, to cause damage.
Some toothpastes include antibacterial agents, such as triclosan (now banned in some countries due to safety concerns) or newer alternatives like stannous fluoride and zinc compounds. These ingredients target harmful bacteria, but there’s still debate about whether they also disrupt beneficial microbes in the process.
Despite toothpaste being a daily staple, research into its effects on the oral microbiome is still evolving. Some studies suggest that certain antibacterial agents reduce both harmful and beneficial bacteria, potentially changing the microbiome in ways we don’t yet fully understand. Others indicate that the microbiome recovers quite quickly after brushing, making any disruption temporary.
Scientists are now exploring whether future toothpaste formulations could take a more targeted approach, reducing harmful bacteria while preserving beneficial species. Some emerging research looks at probiotics and prebiotics — ingredients that could actively support a healthier oral microbiome rather than simply disrupting it.
Keeping the oral microbiome in balance isn’t just about avoiding cavities. There’s growing evidence linking gum disease to heart disease, diabetes and harms during pregnancy. Inflammation triggered by harmful oral bacteria can spread beyond the mouth, potentially contributing to long-term health problems.
Brushing with fluoride toothpaste twice a day and cleaning between the teeth helps reduce the bacterial load in the mouth, lowering the risk of both oral and systemic diseases.
As our understanding of the oral microbiome grows, toothpaste may evolve to become more selective in its action. Instead of broad-spectrum antibacterial agents, future formulations might include ingredients that support beneficial bacteria while keeping harmful species in check.
Some promising candidates include arginine, a naturally occurring amino acid that promotes the growth of beneficial bacteria, and plant-derived antimicrobials that disrupt harmful biofilms without killing good bacteria. However, research in this area is still in its early stages, and more evidence is needed to determine the long-term effects of these ingredients.
Toothpaste plays a key role in oral health by breaking up bacterial biofilm, reducing the risk of tooth decay and gum disease. While some ingredients may affect the oral microbiome, research suggests that brushing and flossing remain the most effective ways to maintain a healthy mouth.
Future toothpaste innovations may shift towards microbiome-friendly formulations but, for now, the best advice remains the same: brush twice a day with fluoride toothpaste, spit out the excess and clean between your teeth daily.
Nothing to disclose.
Albert Leung and Niamh Coffey do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Source: The Conversation – UK – By Ankit Bhandekar, Research Student — Atmosphere, Oceans and Climate, University of Reading
Delhi is perhaps the most polluted of the world’s megacities. Every winter, the city’s 30 million residents breathe air so toxic that visibility drops to mere metres. If you stand on top of one of Delhi’s monuments you can barely make out buildings across the street as the thick, acrid smog burns your eyes and scratches your throat.
But conditions can and do change rapidly. January 2025 offered a dramatic demonstration of how weather patterns can rapidly transform the city’s air quality.
On January 5, favourable winds improved air quality enough to lift some restrictions. Yet by January 15, as winds calmed and temperatures dropped, pollution levels soared dramatically, forcing the city to implement its maximum “severe +” interventions. These include banning trucks from entering the city, restricting private vehicles and moving schools to online classes.
Delhi didn’t suddenly have more cars, factories, power plants or construction sites from one week to the next. Those things are consistent sources of pollution. There are some events that add to air pollution in the shorter term, such as fireworks during Diwali, or the mass burning of unwanted crop debris (known as stubble), both of which take place in October or November.
But that wasn’t what happened in January. Instead, the sudden reversal revealed how weather, not just emissions, dictates Delhi’s ability to breathe. Understanding this will be crucial if the city is to clean up its air.
A meteorological prison
Delhi is one of many large cities found in a flat and hugely fertile region spanning the Indian subcontinent to the south of the Himalayas. It’s known as the Indo-Gangetic plains, as it contains the floodplains of the Indus and Ganges-Brahmaputra rivers and their tributaries. More than a billion people live in this part of the world.
Delhi specifically is also bordered by another mountain range to its south, the Aravallis. While modest compared to the Himalayas, these mountains contribute to the city sitting in a natural bowl-like area, which makes it harder for pollution to disperse.
This geographical positioning means its location naturally collects airborne pollutants from surrounding agricultural areas. Even if Delhi somehow produced zero emissions, the region would still be likely to experience air quality problems during winter.
In winter, Delhi experiences “temperature inversions” where warmer air sits above colder air like a lid on a pot. This phenomenon occurs naturally in the region but is intensified by the city’s heat-trapping urban landscape. Normally, temperature decreases with height, allowing air to mix vertically, since warm air rises. Under inversion conditions, this pattern reverses and pollutants are trapped near the ground.
The height up to which pollutants can disperse, known as the “mixing height”, also dramatically reduces in winter. While summer allows mixing up to an altitude of about one kilometre, winter can compress this to just a few hundred meters, concentrating pollutants in a much smaller volume of air.
Meanwhile the Himalayas block air from flowing northward, forcing pollution to travel the entire stretch of northern India before finding an exit over the Bay of Bengal. In cities, urban structures further complicate this by creating “surface roughness”, a frictional effect that slows pollution dispersion.
Seasonal factors
There are also seasonal factors that make pollution accumulate or disperse more at certain times of year.
Satellite map showing smoky skies over northern India in November 2022 (Delhi is the small unlabelled region between Haryana and Uttar Pradesh). The red images show fires started by farmers to clear away unwanted crop residue. This ‘stubble burning’ is a big source of pollution downwind in Delhi. Nasa
Delhi’s summer monsoon season runs from July to September, providing natural cleansing through rainfall. During post-monsoon months (October-November), rainfall is minimal. At the same time, wind speeds decrease, limiting ventilation. These conditions compress the atmospheric boundary layer — the lowest part of atmosphere influenced by Earth’s surface — trapping pollutants near ground level.
Throughout winter (December-February), cooler surface temperatures intensify temperature inversions. This creates lots of fog, which combines with pollutants in the atmosphere to form Delhi’s characteristic smog. The reduced mixing height during this period severely restricts vertical dispersal of pollutants.
In pre-monsoon months (March-May), strong westerly winds can blow additional dust from the Thar Desert and agricultural regions toward Delhi. However, higher temperatures increase vertical mixing, improving overall dispersion despite this additional dust.
Season-specific approach
India’s technological interventions, including smog towers and anti-smog guns,have shown limited effectiveness in addressing the causes of pollution. Even more ambitious proposals such as using cloud seeding to induce precipitation aren’t very practical. Cloud seeding is expensive, can only cover a limited area, and needs very specific meteorological conditions.
An anti-smog gun in Delhi sprays water to suppress dust and reduce air pollution. PradeepGaurs / shutterstock
To manage its air quality, Delhi needs a season-specific approach that anticipates weather patterns and pulses in emissions. Getting ahead of the smog could involve a few different things.
Preventive planning would mean implementing stricter emission controls before the cold, still winter days when fog is likely, rather than reacting after pollution has already accumulated.
It would involve solutions that span the whole of the Indo-Gangetic plains, rather than focusing just on Delhi (or indeed any other individual urban centre). After all, many of India’s most polluted cities share the same weather conditions, and the long-range transport of pollution can play a huge role.
A season-specific approach would mean some fixed seasonal policies would instead adapt to forecast meteorological conditions. For instance, construction restrictions (building dust is a big source of air pollution) might be tightened when inversions are predicted, even on seemingly clear days.
Finally, by combining meteorological and air quality monitoring, authorities could provide targeted warnings and interventions days before visible pollution accumulates.
Understanding these natural constraints isn’t just an academic exercise – it’s essential for developing effective policies that can protect millions of residents year-round. As climate change potentially alters these meteorological patterns, the need for scientifically informed policy becomes even more critical.
Ankit Bhandekar receives funding from Natural Environment Research Council (NERC).
Laura Wilcox receives funding from the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC), the Norwegian Research Council, and Horizon Europe.
The visit of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky to the White House has not gone to plan – at least not to his plan. There were [extraordinary scenes] as a press conference between Zelensky and Trump descended into acrimony, with the US president loudly berating his opposite number, who he accused of “gambling with world war three”.
“You either make a deal or we’re out,” Trump told Zelensky. His vice-president, J.D.Vance, also got in on the act, accusing the Ukrainian president of “litigating in front of the American media”, and saying his approach was “disrespectful”. At one point he asked Zelensky: “Have you said thank you even once?”
Reporters present described the atmosphere as heated with voices raised by both Trump and Vance. The New York Times said the scene was “one of the most dramatic moments ever to play out in public in the Oval Office and underscored the radical break between the United States and Ukraine since Mr Trump took office”.
Underlying the angry exchanges were differences between the Trump administration and the Ukrainian government over the so-called “minerals deal” that Zelensky was scheduled to sign. But any lack of Ukrainian enthusiasm for the deal is understandable.
In its present form, it looks more like a memorandum of understanding that leaves several vital issues to be resolved later. The deal on offer is the creation of will be called a “reconstruction investment fund”, to be jointly owned and managed by the US and Ukraine.
Into the proposed fund will go 50% of the revenue from the exploitation of “all relevant Ukrainian government-owned natural resource assets (whether owned directly or indirectly by the Ukrainian government)” and “other infrastructure relevant to natural resource assets (such as liquified natural gas terminals and port infrastructure)”.
This means that private infrastructure – much of it owned by Ukraine’s wealthy oligarchs – is likely to become part of the deal. This has the potential of further increasing friction between Zelensky and some very powerful Ukrainians.
Meanwhile, US contributions are less clearly defined. The preamble to the agreement makes it clear that Ukraine already owes the US. The very first paragraph notes that “the United States of America has provided significant financial and material support to Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022”.
Western and Ukrainian analysts have also pointed out that there may be fewer and less accessible mineral and rare earth deposits in Ukraine than are currently assumed. The working estimates have been based mostly on Soviet-era data.
Since the current draft leaves details on ownership, governance and operations to be determined in a future fund agreement, Trump’s very big deal is at best the first step. Future rounds of negotiations are to be expected.
Statement of intent
From a Ukrainian perspective, this is more of a strength than a weakness. It leaves Kyiv with an opportunity to achieve more satisfactory terms in future rounds of negotiation. Even if any improvements will only be marginal, it keeps the US locked into a process that is, overall, beneficial for Ukraine.
Take the example of security guarantees. The draft agreement offers Ukraine nothing anywhere near Nato membership. But it notes that the US “supports Ukraine’s efforts to obtain security guarantees needed to establish lasting peace”, adding that: “Participants will seek to identify any necessary steps to protect mutual investments.”
The significance of this should not be overstated. At its bare minimum, it is an expression of intent by the US that falls short of security guarantees but still gives the US a stake in the survival of Ukraine as an independent state.
But it is an important signal both in terms of what it does and does not do – a signal to Russia, Europe and Ukraine.
Trump does not envisage that the US will give Ukraine security guarantees “beyond very much”. He seems to think that these guarantees can be provided by European troops (the Kremlin has already cast doubts on this idea).
But this does not mean the idea is completely off the table. On the contrary, because the US commitment is so vague, it gives Trump leverage in every direction.
He can use it as a carrot and a stick against Ukraine to get more favourable terms for US returns from the reconstruction investment fund. He can use it to push Europe towards more decisive action to ramp up defence spending by making any US protection for European peacekeepers contingent on more equitable burden-sharing in Nato.
And he can signal to the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, that the US is serious about making a deal stick – and that higher American economic stakes in Ukraine and corporate presence on the ground would mean US-backed consequences if the Kremlin reneges on a future peace agreement and restarts hostilities.
That these calculations will ultimately lead to the “free, sovereign and secure Ukraine” that the agreement envisages is not a given.
For now, however, despite all the shortcomings and vagueness of the deal on key issues –– and the very public argument between the parties – it still looks like it serves all sides’ interests in moving forward in this direction.
This article has been updated with details of the meeting between Volodymyr Zelensky and Donald Trump.
Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU’s Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.
Tetyana Malyarenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Since the Labour government came to power in the UK past year, its international relations have been pursued under the banner of what foreign secretary David Lammy calls “progressive realism”. This involves “using realist means to pursue progressive ends”, including taking “pragmatic steps” to improve relations with other states.
Lammy rejects the notion that “idealism has no place in foreign policy” but also argues that the UK should be “realistic about the state of the world and the country’s role in it”.
The visit of the UK prime minister, Keir Starmer, to the White House to meet US president Donald Trump has been the biggest test of this approach. Outlining a set of foreign policy principles is one thing, acting on them is another.
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In practice, progressive and realist foreign policies can pull in different directions. Combining them might be a form of “cakeism” – you usually can’t be a realist and have your progressivism too. Sometimes, however, clever diplomacy can find a way.
Did Starmer find that way in his response to Trump’s ideas on negotiating with Russia without a defined role for Ukraine?
Progressive realism in action
Progressivism is associated with a commitment to the rule of international law. In the case of Ukraine, that would mean opposing any peace deal that rewarded Russia’s aggression or the concession of land to Russia.
Progressivism is also associated with a support for international criminal law. The progressive in this case might be opposed to any peace deal that did not see Russian president Vladimir Putin hauled before the International Criminal Court (the same court that Trump has sanctioned).
Realism, on the other hand, is sometimes associated with a foreign policy committed to the promotion of self-interest, defined narrowly as the material wellbeing of the nation. Faced with the threat of further US tariffs, and the impact they would have on the government’s economic priorities, the realist would probably recommend that the UK do absolutely nothing to upset Trump.
Starmer has so far managed to walk this particular tightrope with a “pragmatic” form of progressivism. He remains committed to the vision of a world order based on international law and so is not realist in that sense. He was not willing to betray Ukraine just to be friends with Trump and avoid US tariffs, for instance.
But he was pragmatic because he realised the only way to advance progressive principles was to persuade Trump that they set out the path to a sustainable peace. For this reason, my colleague Jamie Gaskarth and I have argued UK policy might better be described as “progressive pragmatism”.
Starmer has a broader definition of the national interest than that sometimes associated with realism. It is in the UK’s interest to maintain an international order based on laws that codify the progressive principles of national self-determination and international justice.
From this perspective, the UK is right not to turn its back on Ukrainian self-determination by jumping on Trump’s bandwagon. That is a slippery slope. It can lead to a world order that is unstable because it is dictated by the great powers. Ukraine today, Greenland, Palestine, Taiwan tomorrow.
His pragmatism was very much on display in Washington, however. It meant staying close to the US not just to avoid tariffs, which Starmer appears to have done with the help of an invitation from King Charles for a state visit to the UK. It meant working with Trump’s ideas on Russia to persuade him that supporting Ukraine is the way to a “durable” peace.
Durable peace here is not simply a question of satisfying Russia and having sufficient military force on the ground (the so-called US “backstop”) to deter future Russian aggression. It must also respect the political power of a progressive principle: national self-determination.
To conclude a peace that does not include the Ukrainian people is not just a moral betrayal, it is politically imprudent because it creates grievances, which become causes of conflict. That does not mean the only way forward is to return to the pre-2014 status quo, but it does mean Kyiv’s involvement in peace negotiations has to be meaningful, not symbolic.
In 1990 the transatlantic positions were reversed. UK prime minister Margaret Thatcher was troubled by the fall of Berlin wall. She proposed that the occupying powers that had divided Germany in 1945 decide the terms of reunification.
The administration of the then US president, George Bush senior, had a broader understanding of history and the future. They realised that a dictated peace after the first world war contributed to the grievances that led to the second.
On that occasion the US approach prevailed. Germany was allowed to reunify on its own terms and choose its own alliances. It was a progressive and pragmatic solution that was committed to national self-determination and it set the foundations for the durable peace that self-described realists thought would never happen.
Starmer made a point in Washington of congratulating Trump for breaking the impasse. He was rewarded when the president suggested that a trade deal is now on the table. As he flies back across the Atlantic, Starmer might continue the flattery by comparing Trump’s actions to the way Ronald Reagan sowed the seeds of the new world order in the 1980s.
He should recall, however, that the details of that new order were subsequently worked out by the administration of George Bush Snr., which had a pragmatic respect for national self-determination. That now means supporting Ukraine in any upcoming negotiation.
Jason Ralph has in the past received funding from Research Councils UK and the EU. He does not currently hold a research grant. He is a member of the UK Labour Party.
Keir Starmer was only the second European leader to visit Donald Trump’s second White House. The first, France’s Emmanuel Macron, had barely taken off when Starmer touched down, but had already raised the bar by behaving regally in front of the world’s media alongside his fellow president in the Oval Office.
In manner, Macron manifested his eight years in office (four of which were already spent with Trump in the White House). Starmer has had a mere eight months. But it was a challenge, judged in its own immediate terms, that the prime minister met.
Raising the curtain, in a highly untypical coup de théâtre, Starmer flourished – as few can – a letter from the King to give to the president, and then effectively forced Trump to read it on camera and agree to the invitation enclosed within.
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Starmer of course knew he was nudging an open door: much came down to assiduous preparation. The British Embassy, under a finally confirmed ambassador Peter Mandelson, worked overtime to choreograph and lubricate.
Starmer had been wise in contradicting Trump only indirectly. Nothing could be gained – as president Zelenskyy already demonstrated – from doing so publicly. So early an offer of a state visit to the UK ran the risk of appearing desperate, but was mitigated by its also being “unprecedented” as the second to be offered to Trump. A word recently worn smooth by over-use, there was nevertheless another precedent set in the suggestion of a pre-state visit visit between Trump and the king. With this president, more than any other, royal diplomacy is a critical national asset.
Starmer’s announcement of an increase in defence spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2027 worked similarly well. That funds are to be diverted from foreign aid for that purpose the Labour leadership deemed as being politically cost-free – or at least good value – politically. It was, indeed, almost Trumpian. The relevant minister disagreed.
It is hard to recall greater shifts in a country’s foreign policy in so short a space of time. Insofar as one can discern Trump’s purposefulness, it is to create pandemonium, which has the secondary effect of galvanising actors to act – not least for fear of further pandemonium.
Thus last week the US voting with Russia, Iran and North Korea, and not with Britain, at the UN. The Trump administration’s designation of choice is now “the Russia-Ukraine conflict”, as if it were merely a border dispute.
Therefore, ahead of Starmer’s arrival in Washington, he was faced with the US apparently aligning itself with a country his describes as “the most acute threat” to the UK. “Jaw-dropping” was the adjective of choice for more than a few informed observers who had thought themselves prepared for whatever may transpire.
The actors Trump primarily wishes to galvanise are European leaders, recalcitrants he thinks should do more to keep their own peace. For Macron to have been told that Putin would accept Nato forces policing the peace was scene-changing, but the only witness to the veracity of that news was Trump, who exhales untruths as easily as he breathes. The Russians soon denied it.
Macron’s offer of France’s (non-Nato) airborne nuclear force complemented Starmer’s commitment to British boots on the ground and helped him elicit Trump’s commitment to mutual defence.
But Trump guaranteeing the peace that Starmer and Macron are willing to police was the cherry conspicuously missing from the cake. The suggestion was subject to a classic Trump equivocation (we’ll always support the Brits, but they won’t need our support).
For the British government, July’s election already resembles a hospital pass. The effect of 20% tariffs on GDP growth could be catastrophic. Trump’s talk of tariff-free trade deals was more than expected, but one such was offered last time without much being doing about, before it was cancelled by President Biden. This time, Trump has said his vice president is drawing up a plan, even that being absent before.
And in a categorical demonstration of the benefits of lobbying there was effective presidential approval of the Chagos islands deal, simultaneously shooting one of Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch’s few foxes stone dead.
Warm words
Thus has passed the most potentially difficult meeting of a prime minister and a president since Suez. Nothing else comes close. Cliche – eggshells, tightropes – proliferated in previews.
When Starmer was last at the White House, in September, he had asked Biden for a meeting about Ukraine and received it. However unsatisfactory the outcome, public face was maintained. Trump has the ability – and the form – to have humiliated in a way which would permanently have scarred Starmer. That he did the opposite ought not to distract from the vulnerability of the supplicant.
Instead there were encomia from Trump as to the two countries – “special relationship”, “unique friendship”, “fantastic country”, “I’ve always cared” – and of Starmer – “a special man”, “a very special person”. And in describing Starmer’s accent as “beautiful”, the president revealed the hitherto unknown allure of the adenoidal.
Power plays sit ill with Starmer, but he nonetheless ventured two corrections from his armchiar, one to a statement made by the president and another to one made by the vice-president. The subsequent praise for Starmer’s negotiating tenacity from Trump, that much-vaunted artist of the deal, was as priceless – and unfamiliar – as the following morning’s front pages.
However successful this visit, however, nothing can be assumed, still less guaranteed. That the British government would so extensively war-game a meeting with its closest ally tells its own tale, or, rather a tale perhaps yet to be told. At this moment, for the next four years the relationship at least feels more secure than it did a few days before the trip. By such diurnal turns are the affairs of allies now measured.
Martin Farr does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Source: The Conversation – UK – By Andre Spicer, Professor of Organisational Behaviour, Bayes Business School, City St George’s, University of London
When Oscar-winning screenwriter William Goldman was asked whether it was possible to predict a hit film, he responded with three words that have become a Hollywood maxim: “Nobody knows anything.” He went on to explain that “not one person in the entire motion picture field knows for a certainty what’s going to work”.
Although Goldman’s famous phrase might resonate through the film business, it doesn’t stop people cooking up theories around which films might succeed at the annual Academy of Motion Picture Awards. Over the years, a range of theories have appeared, including: Oscar winners are not always the best films; there is an Oscar-worthy format that winners follow; and that winning an Oscar is actually a long-term curse.
Although there is a great deal of speculation about such theories, it’s less clear what the evidence actually says about them. To find out, I took a look at the rapidly growing field of “Oscarology” – the scientific study of the Academy Awards.
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One common theory is that it is entirely predictable who the Oscars will go to. Interestingly, this seems to have some truth to it. One statistical analysis found that by tracking a range of factors, it was possible to predict the winner of the Academy Awards in the four major categories with an overall accuracy of 69%.
Nickel Boys, one of the best picture nominees.
Factors which go into making these predictions include whether the nominee won a Golden Globe or Directors Guild award, and their previous nominations for an Oscar. Past success is a strong indicator of future success, with one important exception: having previously won an Academy Award means a nominee for best actor or best actress is much less likely to win again.
A second theory is that winning an Oscar is a golden ticket to big financial rewards. This is indeed correct. A study found there is a substantial boost in US box office earnings following a win in the the best supporting actor/actress, best actor/actress and best picture categories.
Best picture nominee Conclave stars Ralph Fiennes, also nominated for best actor.
Further research has found that Oscar nominations really make a positive impact on box office receipts – while actually winning the award gives a more modest boost. Interestingly, winning an award does not always translate to success in other parts the world. One study found that Oscar winners that were comedies performed better in Asian markets, but dramas performed worse.
The next theory is the idea that Oscar winners follow a particular format. Researchers have indeed found there is an Oscar-worthy format which some filmmakers follow. The “Oscar bait” format uses genres like war movies, historical epics and biographies, as well as plot elements such as war crimes, disabilities, political intrigue and show business.
Mikey Madison, star of best picture nominee Anora, is also up for best actress.
However, making a film using this Oscar-worthy format is not a guarantee of success. Films employing this concept which were nominated for an award received significantly greater financial returns. However, those using the Oscar-bait format which missed out on a nomination typically made large losses.
Then comes the theory that winning an Oscar is more about the quality of networks rather than the quality of the film. Again, there is some truth to this. Researchers have found that one way to improve the chances of winning an Oscar is to be part of film industry networks and work alongside people who have already won awards.
As well as a best picture nomination, Wicked’s Ariana Grande and Cynthia Erivo are also nominated.
There are some indicators that Oscars do not necessarily go to the best-quality movies. One analysis which compared Oscar winners to lists of 100 best movies of all time found that only 26% of films which appeared on all three main lists of best movies were also Oscar winners.
This research also notes that some movies which are staples of lists of classic movies (such as Singing in the Rain) were not even nominated for the best picture Oscar. What this suggests is that winning an Oscar does not always mean a film will be seen as a classic – and vice versa.
Best picture nominee I’m Still Here sees Brazilian Fernanda Torres nominated for best actress.
The final theory is that there is an “Oscar curse” – that winning an Oscar leads to personal and professional tragedy. This theory is largely incorrect. Researchers have found that Oscar winners live about one year longer than their less successful peers. Others have found that winning an Academy Award leads to greater professional success, with Oscar winners and nominees appearing in more films than their non-winning peers.
However, one area of truth in the idea of an Oscar curse is for men in their personal lives. Nominees and winners of the best actor award had a higher divorce rate than their peers.
Theories around the Oscars may prove to be not entirely correct – but they do provide a useful approximation of which films will triumph. Past performance, social networks and formula-following all seem to be good indicators of who will succeed. Perhaps Goldman’s advice that “no one knows anything” is not entirely true.
Andre Spicer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
The Vegan Tigress, a new play by Claire Parker, shines a spotlight on the largely-forgotten feminist fairytale writer Mary De Morgan (1850-1907). And the timing is particularly apt. The show opened, at London’s Bread & Roses Theatre, in the lead up to International Women’s Day and during the year of the 175th anniversary of De Morgan’s birth.
The production, by LynchPin Theatre Company, is part of a wider cultural project to celebrate underappreciated Victorian women writers, actors and activists. Parker has also written plays on feminist actor Ellen Terry and her daughter Edie Craig.
It also speaks to a general resurgence of interest in the creative De Morgan family. Mary’s father was Augustus De Morgan, the mathematician and logician and her brother was the potter, tile designer and novelist William De Morgan.
The Bread and Roses Theatre – an intimate space above a lively Clapham pub – creates an immersive experience. The audience shares De Morgan’s modest London quarters along with the accidentally summoned ghost of her ex-lover’s formidable mother: Lady Tuttle (played by Edie Campbell).
Providing comedic value, Tuttle deploys her spectral status to prank De Morgan (played by Parker), but her presence also highlights the stark differences between them, staging a debate between feminist and patriarchal versions of Victorian-Edwardian womanhood.
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Shrill-voiced, upper-class and tightly corseted, Tuttle opposes women’s education and refers to suffragettes as “hyenas in petticoats and bitter spinsters”.
Striding across the stage swathed in silk skirts and a velvet, lace-trimmed bodice, she is both a mesmerising and somewhat villainous matriarch. By contrast, De Morgan is an irreverent free spirit who wears bohemian clothing, admires revolutionaries and has been a suffragist since she was 16.
The show portrays De Morgan as a pioneering professional woman, writing feverishly at a desk flanked by piles of beautiful antiquarian books. Parker and Campbell are hypnotic in their imaginative retellings and performances of De Morgan’s stories such as the The Hair Tree (1877), which are woven into the play.
The Vegan Tigress transports the audience into fantastical realms, fusing eerie lighting with dazzling props and sound effects – thunder, birdsong, clamouring voices.
With impressive ease, the actors shape-shift into bizarre animal forms – a puppet parrot, a tortured tiger and a grotesque tortoise. Together they illuminate the sociopolitical subtexts of De Morgan’s stories.
The trailer for The Vegan Tigress.
Her subversive tale from 1877, A Toy Princess (which Parker describes in the play), critiques doll-like ideals of femininity, prefigures the feminist fairy tales of Angela Carter and resonates with the Barbiemania that surrounded the release of the Barbie film in 2023.
In literature and in life, De Morgan resists conventional narratives of marriage and motherhood, enacting alternative destinies for women.
Especially successful as a visual manifestation of the stories’ transformative power is the simultaneously symbolic and literal change we witness in Lady Tuttle.
The more she reads The Windfairies (1900, one of three fairy tale collections by De Morgan) and political publications (Votes for Women), the less straitlaced she becomes – literally. Her corset unbuttons and her tied hair loosens. Despite being a ghost, Lady Tuttle comes alive as her mind expands, testifying to the powerful potential of reading and writing.
In joyful and poignant moments of female bonding in the second half of the play, Tuttle and De Morgan dance the tango, and embark arm-in-arm on the trip of a lifetime to Egypt, where De Morgan worked in real life in a girls’ reformatory. The show becomes a celebration of female creativity, companionship and community.
At the play’s close, the fourth wall is broken and the audience is addressed by De Morgan as “people from the future”. It prompts a reflection on how far we have come since first-wave feminism, but also how far we still have to go (given #MeToo and the reversal of Roe v Wade, the US Supreme Court ruling that legalised abortion across the States in 1973), making Parker’s revival of De Morgan timely and important.
If De Morgan’s legacy is, as she soliloquises, “arming lost, disenfranchised girls and women with the tools to stand their ground”, what will ours be?
Lucy Ella Rose does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, has arrived in Washington for talks with his US counterpart, Donald Trump. One of the key issues on their agenda is the “very big deal” announced by the US president on February 25. This deal would give the United States access to Ukraine’s critical mineral and rare earth deposits in return for continuing US support.
Trump has made sure his domestic audience understands that – as he told his first cabinet meeting on February 26 – in contrast to his Democratic predecessor, Joe Biden, he’s getting something out of Kyiv in return for the support the US has given Ukraine in the past.
The message coming from the Ukrainian side was a bit more circumspect. Zelensky took pains to emphasise that the deal was still a draft and that its successful conclusion would depend on the outcome of talks with Trump.
The lack of Ukrainian enthusiasm for the deal is justified. In its present form, it looks more like a memorandum of understanding that leaves several vital issues to be resolved later. The deal on offer is the creation of will be called a “reconstruction investment fund”, to be jointly owned and managed by the US and Ukraine.
Into the proposed fund will go 50% of the revenue from the exploitation of “all relevant Ukrainian government-owned natural resource assets (whether owned directly or indirectly by the Ukrainian government)” and “other infrastructure relevant to natural resource assets (such as liquified natural gas terminals and port infrastructure)”.
This means that private infrastructure – much of it owned by Ukraine’s wealthy oligarchs – is likely to become part of the deal. This has the potential of further increasing friction between Zelensky and some very powerful Ukrainians.
Meanwhile, US contributions are less clearly defined. The preamble to the agreement makes it clear that Ukraine already owes the US. The very first paragraph notes that “the United States of America has provided significant financial and material support to Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022”.
Western and Ukrainian analysts have also pointed out that there may be fewer and less accessible mineral and rare earth deposits in Ukraine than are currently assumed. The working estimates have been based mostly on Soviet-era data.
Since the current draft leaves details on ownership, governance and operations to be determined in a future fund agreement, Trump’s very big deal is at best the first step. Future rounds of negotiations are to be expected.
Statement of intent
From a Ukrainian perspective, this is more of a strength than a weakness. It leaves Kyiv with an opportunity to achieve more satisfactory terms in future rounds of negotiation. Even if any improvements will only be marginal, it keeps the US locked into a process that is, overall, beneficial for Ukraine.
Take the example of security guarantees. The draft agreement offers Ukraine nothing anywhere near Nato membership. But it notes that the US “supports Ukraine’s efforts to obtain security guarantees needed to establish lasting peace”, adding that: “Participants will seek to identify any necessary steps to protect mutual investments.”
The significance of this should not be overstated. At its bare minimum, it is an expression of intent by the US that falls short of security guarantees but still gives the US a stake in the survival of Ukraine as an independent state.
But it is an important signal both in terms of what it does and does not do – a signal to Russia, Europe and Ukraine.
Trump does not envisage that the US will give Ukraine security guarantees “beyond very much”. He seems to think that these guarantees can be provided by European troops (the Kremlin has already cast doubts on this idea).
But this does not mean the idea is completely off the table. On the contrary, because the US commitment is so vague, it gives Trump leverage in every direction.
He can use it as a carrot and a stick against Ukraine to get more favourable terms for US returns from the reconstruction investment fund. He can use it to push Europe towards more decisive action to ramp up defence spending by making any US protection for European peacekeepers contingent on more equitable burden-sharing in Nato.
And he can signal to the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, that the US is serious about making a deal stick – and that higher American economic stakes in Ukraine and corporate presence on the ground would mean US-backed consequences if the Kremlin reneges on a future peace agreement and restarts hostilities.
That these calculations will ultimately lead to the “free, sovereign and secure Ukraine” that the agreement envisages is not a given.
For now, however, despite all its shortcomings and vagueness on key issues, it looks like it serves all sides’ interests in moving forward in this direction, albeit at a snail’s pace.
Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU’s Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.
Tetyana Malyarenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Ontario Premier Doug Ford’s election gamble has paid off. As a consequence of last night’s election results, the Progressive Conservatives are now set to form their third consecutive majority government.
By and large, last night’s election results were dull and uninspiring, looking very similar to the outcome of the province’s election in 2022. The Progressive Conservatives return (going from 79 to 80) with only one additional member of caucus, receiving a noticeable but modest two per cent bump in support.
And, while the Liberals saw even more of a recovery from 2018, the generally widespread distribution of that vote means that they were only able to gain five seats. Although tarnished, the New Democrats return as the official opposition party.
Unprepared rivals
These lacklustre results flow directly from lacklustre campaigns. The fact is that, regardless of Premier Ford’s legitimate calls for a renewed mandate amidst an aggressive American administration, the party had been looking for an excuse to call a premature election for quite some time. In doing so, they were able to — quite intentionally — catch their rivals unprepared, complete with incomplete candidate slates, unknown leaders and undercooked policy platforms.
It meant that, while Ford was able to run a safe and constrained front-runner’s campaign, his main opponents struggled to find the momentum necessary to move the dial and exploit enough backlash. This is alongside real policy vulnerabilities in health care and education, with enough voters expressing discontent with what they felt to be an unnecessary and self-serving election call.
Chaotic news cycle
There are good reasons to believe that voters were mostly apathetic towards the parties and their candidates. Alongside the reasons already stated, the dense, chaotic and ever-shifting news cycle of the last few months may have entailed that this election was able to slip by quietly.
But this does not seem to be the full story, as this year’s turnout — while still low — is slightly higher than that of 2022. Instead, voters also seemed to have wanted to maintain the status quo.
On the local level, siting members of the provincial legislature from all three parties generally performed quite well. Of the 111 ridings with party-nominated incumbents, for example, only four lost. So while many voters may have been unhappy with the election call, the unpredictable environment may have also had the reverse effect of leading them to support, if not fully endorse, the leaders they already have.
Regardless of the more limited dynamics of this election, however, we cannot overlook the fact that this has been a very real accomplishment for Doug Ford and the Progressive Conservatives. In a period of high executive turnover and anti-incumbent backlash, Doug Ford has, as the leader of the Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario, brought about a track record of secure, consecutive majorities — a feat that was last attained by Leslie Frost and John Robarts.
In many ways, it brings to mind the years of the traditional “big blue machine,” when the party controlled the government of Ontario for 40 consecutive years.
Durable persona
Here, Ford’s success is much deeper than a matter of suave electoral maneuvering, and it is more long-standing than the recent confrontation with the Trump administration. Instead, these results attest to the fact that, while the Premier is not without his detractors, he has nevertheless managed to secure a stable, solid and sufficient base of support through the combination of both a carefully balanced policy agenda and a durable leadership persona.
As with his successful conservative predecessors, Ford practices a form of the pragmatic and moderate governance that characterizes Ontario. A large part of what makes this successful is the fact that while it makes policy decisions flexible, it does not make them arbitrary.
Ford continues to emphasize a government oriented around continual economic growth and innovation as a means to accomplish raising living standards, fund the province’s social programs and — more recently — rival the United States. Combined with Ford’s aptitude in retail politics this has created a clear and accessible political project supported by big developers, small business owners and private-sector workers’ unions.
In a political environment shaped by personality, Ford continues to suck up the majority of the political oxygen in Ontario. Even while a good portion of Ontarians may dislike Ford — he is far from the most popular of Canada’s premiers — they have not experienced an overriding need to get rid of the incumbent, nor pursue another course of change.
While politics is impossible to predict, it suggests that this state of continuity will persist in Ontario, even amid a chaotic global environment.
Sam Routley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Healthy coastal ecosystems play crucial roles in the U.S. economy, from supporting multibillion-dollar fisheries and tourism industries to protecting coastlines from storms.
They’re also difficult to manage, requiring specialized knowledge and technology.
That’s why the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration – the federal agency best known for collecting and analyzing the data that make weather forecasts and warnings possible – leads most of the government’s work on ocean and coastal health, as well as research into the growing risks posed by climate change.
The government estimates that NOAA’s projects and services support more than one-third of the nation’s gross domestic product. Yet, this is one of the agencies that the Trump administration has targeted, with discussions of trying to privatize NOAA’s forecasting operations and disband its crucial climate change research.
As a marine environmental historian who studies relationships among scientists, fishermen and environmentalists, I have seen how NOAA’s work affects American livelihoods, coastal health and the U.S. economy.
Here are a few examples from just NOAA’s coastal work, and what it means to fishing industries and coastal states.
Preventing fisheries from collapsing
One of the oldest divisions within NOAA is the National Marine Fisheries Service, known as NOAA Fisheries. It dates to 1871, when Congress created the U.S. Commission of Fish and Fisheries. At that time, the first generation of conservationists started to worry that America’s natural resources were finite.
By conducting surveys and interviewing fishermen and seafood dealers, the fish commissioners discovered that freshwater and saltwater fisheries across the country were declining.
Looking back on 150 years of NOAA’s fisheries history.
Oil spills and raw sewage were polluting waterways. Fishermen were using high-tech gear, such as pound nets, to catch more and more of the most valuable fish. In some areas, overfishing was putting the future of the fisheries in jeopardy.
One solution was to promote aquaculture, also known as fish or shellfish farming. Scientists and entrepreneurs reared baby fish in hatcheries and transferred them to rivers, lakes or bays. The Fish Commission even used refrigerated railroad cars to ship fish eggs across the country.
Men carry pails of fish specimens to a U.S. Fish Commission ‘fish car’ – a train car designed specifically for transporting fish or fish eggs to stock U.S. rivers, lakes and coastal waters – in this historical photo. Smithsonian Institution Archives
Corals build up reefs over centuries, creating “cities of the sea.” When they’re healthy, they provide nurseries that protect valuable fish species, like snapper, from predators. Reefs also attract tourism and protect coastlines by breaking up waves that cause storm-driven flooding and erosion.
The corals of Hawaii, Florida, Puerto Rico and other tropical areas provide over $3 billion a year in benefits – from sustaining marine ecosystems to recreation, including sport fishing.
A third important aspect of NOAA’s coastal work involves controlling invasive species in America’s waters, including those that have menaced the Great Lakes.
Zebra and quagga mussels, spiny water flea and dozens of other Eurasian organisms colonized the Great Lakes starting in the late 1900s after arriving in ballast water from transoceanic ships. These invaders have disrupted the Great Lakes food web and clogged cities’ water intake systems, causing at least $138 million in damage per year.
Zebra mussels found attached to this boat at an inspection station in Oregon show how easily invasive species can be moved. The boat had come from Texas and was on its way to Canada. Oregon Department of Fish & Wildlife, CC BY-SA
In the Northwest Atlantic, Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico, invasive lionfish, native to Asia and Australia, have spread, preying on native fish essential to coral reefs. Lionfish have become one of the world’s most damaging marine fish invasions.
When Republican President Richard Nixon proposed consolidating several different agencies into NOAA in 1970, he told Congress that doing so would promote “better protection of life and property from natural hazards,” “better understanding of the total environment” and “exploration and development leading to the intelligent use of our marine resources.”
The Trump administration is instead discussing tearing down NOAA. The administration has been erasing mentions of climate change from government research, websites and policies – despite the rising risks to communities across the nation. The next federal budget is likely to slash NOAA’s funding.
Commercial meteorologists argue that much of NOAA’s weather data and forecasting, also crucial to coastal areas, couldn’t be duplicated by the private sector.
As NOAA marks its 55th year, I believe it’s in the nation’s and the U.S. economy’s best interest to strengthen rather than dismantle this vital agency.
Christine Keiner conducted research at the NOAA Library for her books “The Oyster Question” and “Deep Cut.”
Americans’ trust in government and politicians is at record lows. In a 2022 Pew Research survey, about two-thirds of respondents said that all or most people who run for office want to serve their own personal interests rather than the community’s.
I have taught political ethics to hundreds of public policy students at the Harvard Kennedy School over the past 25 years. One of the most important concepts we discuss is directly tied to that falling faith in government. It’s a term people love to throw around but can’t always define: conflicts of interest.
Conflicts of interest pervade public service and jeopardize the quality of government action by degrading officials’ judgments. Controlling such conflicts is essential to the success of democracy because all citizens rely on millions of officials – from the president down to the person analyzing water quality in your city – to do their jobs conscientiously, using their best judgment. Citizens’ safety depends on government action in countless ways: to keep drinking water, food and medicines safe; to protect everyone from dangerous products and from individual and corporate predators; to keep airplanes, cars and trains from colliding; to ensure access to education, health care and pensions.
But what counts as a conflict of interest? In the public sector, they arise when an official has “secondary,” private interests that may affect their judgment about how best to promote the public good. The more intense these private interests are – such as the promise of great financial gain or the welfare of loved ones – the greater the conflict and risk to public good.
Not just money
Secondary interests often stem from financial concerns: future employment prospects, corporate positions, stock holdings, real estate and gifts. But secondary interests can also arise from concern for the well-being of family members and friends.
A conflict between primary and secondary interests – public vs. private – threatens the public by clouding the good judgment of officials. They may be tempted, even unconsciously, to make decisions that achieve secondary interests at the cost of not doing their best to advance the public interest.
During his last weeks in office, for example, former President Joe Biden pardoned his son Hunter and, preventively, many members of his family. The Constitution establishes the president’s pardon power as a mechanism to correct miscarriages of justice in the court system. Did Biden’s concern for the welfare of his family – a secondary, private interest – cloud his judgment about how best to use this extraordinary power to pardon for the sake of justice, a primary, public interest? It is impossible to peer inside his mind, but anyone can see that there was a strong conflict of interest.
Many public officials mistakenly deny that there is a conflict at all. Charlie Wilson, a secretary of defense in the 1950s, was previously president and CEO of General Motors, a defense contractor. “For years I thought what was good for our country was good for General Motors, and vice versa,” he said during confirmation hearings. “The difference did not exist. Our company is too big. It goes with the welfare of the country.”
After Trump was elected in 2016, he famously said that “the president can’t have a conflict of interest.” It wasn’t true then, and it’s not true now. Conflict of interest is an ethical principle that applies to everyone acting in a public role. The principal law regulating conflict of interest in the federal government does exempt the president and vice president. However, the emoluments clause of the Constitution prohibits some conflicts of interest.
The president enters his second term with large private assets in social media platform Truth Social and cryptocurrency $Trump – industries that the United States is figuring out how to regulate.
When leaders have a conflict of interest, it doesn’t necessarily mean they make bad judgments or act corruptly. Nevertheless, such conflicts can reduce citizens’ confidence about their leaders’ judgment.
Cost for the country
Conflicts of interest create three problems for democracy.
Most important, the public suffers when officials’ judgments are compromised: when they are no longer doing their level best for Americans because they are concerned about various private interests rather than with citizens’ rights and well-being.
Second, conflicts of interest reduce trust and confidence in government and democracy. Even if officials who have large conflicts of interest resist the pull of secondary interests, members of the public may – especially in this time of cynicism about government – still suspect that their leaders are acting corruptly.
Third, when officials use their powers to benefit their private interests rather than the public interests, they profit from their offices: This is corrupt and unfair.
Reducing risk
Though conflicts of interest are ubiquitous, there are good strategies to mitigate and manage them.
Federal agencies, as well as many state and local governments, require officials to mitigate their conflicts of interest by divesting from secondary interests, such as shifting from specific stock holdings to general funds and resigning from positions on boards of directors. Most U.S. presidents since Jimmy Carter have put their substantial assets into blind trusts in order to manage their conflicts of interests. In a blind trust, the owner knows the value of the trust but not the particular stocks and other holdings in it.
Transparency and disclosure is another common management tool. When information about officials’ secondary interests is publicly available, citizens can better understand the forces that affect the judgment of those in government. For example, people who have undergone Senate confirmation for high-level positions in the federal government must file extensive disclosures that detail their assets and many of their prior sources of income.
Finally, it is important to create offices and procedures with staff dedicated to monitoring and mitigating conflicts of interest. In the executive branch, the seventy-some staff at the Office of Government Ethics, and many more ethics officers across the federal government, regulate conflicts of interest and other ethical issues. In February 2025, Trump dismissed the office’s director, who had been confirmed by the Senate two months before.
Many states and cities have ethics commissions that adjudicate conflicts of interest, deciding when officials should recuse themselves from particular decisions in which they are conflicted. In 2002, for example, New York City’s Conflicts of Interest Board issued an advisory opinion about how multibillionaire Michael Bloomberg, the mayor at the time, should manage his conflicts of interest. They advised that he should recuse himself from all matters relating to the Bloomberg company, divest from large stock holdings and transfer those assets into professionally managed mutual funds, among other recommendations.
Wealth – and hyperwealth
Many conflict of interest measures are formulated with moderately wealthy individuals in mind. For example, the median wealth of a U.S. senator in 2018 was US$1.75 million. At that level, measures such as blind trusts, divestment and recusal are usually very workable.
Hyperwealthy multibillionaires, however, raise unprecedented conflict of interest concerns that are far more difficult to mitigate and manage. Because their financial interests are enormous and range across many parts of the economy, standard conflict of interest measures have proven difficult to implement.
Archon Fung serves on the National Governing Board of Common Cause, whose mission is to “to create open, honest, and accountable government that serves the public interest.” The organization has advocated to control conflicts of interest of many public figures, including Donald Trump and Elon Musk.
He also consults for Apple and serves on the Board of Advisors for the Boston Review.
