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Category: Africa

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: INDIAN NAVY’s MAIDEN INITIATIVES OF INDIAN OCEAN SHIP SAGAR (IOS SAGAR) AND AFRICA INDIA KEY MARITIME ENGAGEMENT (AIKEYME)

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Posted On: 24 MAR 2025 6:00PM by PIB Delhi

    Over the past ten years, Indian Navy has deepened its partnerships with maritime agencies of Indian Ocean Region (IOR), to enhance maritime security in consonance with the GoI’s vision of Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR). Indian Navy has been collaborating with navies of IOR countries on several initiatives such as joint naval exercises, coordinated patrols, information sharing, HADR efforts, capacity building and other diplomatic engagements. With SAGAR entering its second decade, and the announcement of Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security Across the Regions (MAHASAGAR) by Hon’ble Prime Minister, during his visit to Mauritius in March 2025, Indian Navy is launching its maiden initiatives of IOS Sagar and AIKEYME, which are aimed at consolidating Indian Navy’s stature as the ‘Preferred Security Partner’ and ‘First Responder’ in Indian Ocean Region.

    IOS Sagar

    Indian Ocean Ship (IOS) Sagar, is an initiative towards continued cooperation with IOR nations. One Indian Naval ship (INS Sunayna) is being deployed to the Southwest IOR with a combined crew of India and nine Friendly Foreign Countries (Comoros, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, Sri Lanka , South Africa). The ship is planned to be deployed for over a month in April 2025, and would be undertaking port calls at Dar-es-Salaam, Nacala, Port Louis, Port Victoria and Male and Joint surveillance of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of Tanzania, Mozambique, Mauritius and Seychelles.

    The personnel from FFCs would undergo a training capsule of two weeks at various naval professional schools at Kochi, including training at Sea. The FFC personnel would be engaged in wholeship activities, watch keeping and other events related to their respective branches/ trade. The participants of IOS Sagar are also planned to witness harbour phase activities of Exercise AIKEYME at Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania.

    AIKEYME

    India and Africa give immense importance to maritime security and have reiterated their commitment to increase cooperation in tackling maritime security threats such as piracy, illegal activities including trafficking, unregulated and unreported fishing through sharing of information and surveillance. A large scale multilateral maritime engagement exercise with African Countries, titled as ‘Africa India Key Maritime Engagement’ also known as ‘AIKEYME’, which means ‘Unity’ in Sanskrit is an initiative in this direction to enhance interoperability with the navies/ maritime agencies. The maiden edition of the exercise is being co-hosted by Indian Navy and Tanzania Peoples’ Defence Force (TPDF) and would be conducted at/ off Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, and is planned to be inaugurated by Hon’ble RM Shri Rajnath Singh in mid-April 2025. The exercise is planned over six days and includes participation from Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles and South Africa in addition to the co-hosts. The Harbour Phase of the exercise would include TableTop and Command Post exercises on Piracy and Information sharing, along with training on Seamanship and Visit Board Search and Seizure (VBSS). The Sea Phase comprises Seamanship evolutions, Search and Rescue, VBSS, Small Arms firing and Helicopter Operations.

    _____________________________________________________________

    VM/SPS                                                                                                        64/25

    (Release ID: 2114491) Visitor Counter : 50

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

    March 25, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Banking: Members continue TRIPS implementation review discussion, address IP notification obligations

    Source: WTO

    Headline: Members continue TRIPS implementation review discussion, address IP notification obligations

    Under Article 71.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, the TRIPS Council is required to conduct a review of the implementation of the Agreement after two years and at periodic intervals thereafter. However, the initial review in 1999 was never completed and no other review has subsequently been initiated.
    The Chair recalled that over the past year members had spent significant time and energy on considering how to finally launch the review. They ultimately converged on a “Proposed Process for the First Review of the Implementation of the TRIPS Agreement under Article 71.1” that was circulated as document JOB/IP/79/Rev.3 on 22 November 2024.
    However, the Chair noted, despite intensive and constructive engagement by members, who have never been closer to consensus on this particular issue, that document could not be adopted. Reporting on the group consultations she held with members on 7 March to hear ideas on how to approach work on this issue in the future, she indicated that members’ concerns that had prevented the adoption of the draft document in December remained prevalent.
    A number of delegations expressed their willingness to continue discussions on this issue. Therefore, the Chair left the door open to hold another round of consultations in the coming weeks, provided that delegations remain willing to engage constructively and find an agreed solution.
    Notifications
    The WTO Secretariat provided an update on notifications under various provisions of the TRIPS Agreement received by the Council since its last meeting in November 2024. The Secretariat also submitted the “Annual report on notifications and other information flows”.
    The report indicates that although participation in WTO notifications has increased, many members are not fulfilling their ongoing notification obligations, which impacts the Council’s monitoring function. Despite considerable legislative changes in IP over the past 15 years, 21 per cent of developed and 37 per cent of developing members have not notified the Council of any new or amended laws since 2009. Furthermore, 63 per cent of IP enforcement contact points and 75 per cent of technical and financial cooperation contact points have not been updated in over a decade.
    In 2024, members submitted 125 notifications, including 116 new or updated domestic laws or regulations pertaining to the TRIPS Agreement, as required under Article 63.2. The rate of participation remained steady, with 26 members submitting at least one notification.
    Reports on technology transfer to LDCs and on technical and financial cooperation were similar to those in 2023, with 16 developed members submitting reports. However, no notifications were received in 2024 for the special compulsory licensing system or updates on biotechnology or geographical indications.
    The report also notes that the e-TRIPS information system, designed to improve transparency and provide simple online submission processes, has seen steady usage since its 2019 launch. By 2024, 93 per cent of members were using the platform and 96 per cent of total submissions were made through the platform.
    Delegations notifying new or revised legislation took the floor to inform the Council of the main elements presented in their documents. This practice has become an established tradition, with many delegations following it at recent sessions of the Council. It has proven to be very useful in improving understanding of the notifications, raising awareness and promoting transparency.
    Technology transfer
    The TRIPS Council meeting was attended by the participants of the annual WTO workshop on incentives for technology transfer to least-developed countries (LDCs) under the TRIPS Agreement. This was opened by Deputy Director-General Johanna Hill on 17 March. The workshop brought together 30 participants from LDCs, experts from eight developed members, specialists from the public and private sectors and intergovernmental organizations.
    Technology transfer is deeply embedded in the TRIPS Agreement and is explicitly mentioned in its objectives in Article 7. Since 2003, when WTO members agreed on the transparency mechanism for technology transfer under Article 66.2, developed country members have submitted over 400 reports detailing their actions and commitments. To date, the TRIPS Council has conducted 21 reviews of these reports, generating valuable insights into effective strategies and best practices.
    A follow-up to the annual review of reports from nine developed members on their technology transfer commitments and related programmes took place at the TRIPS Council. See here.
    Several LDC members thanked the Secretariat for organizing the workshop and developed countries for their detailed reports. They underscored the importance of informal dialogue between LDC members and developed country members. This is particularly important when it comes to tailoring technology transfer programmes to LDCs’ priority needs and learning from developed members’ experience, they added.
    On a separate ad hoc agenda item, members addressed a communication on “IP and innovation: Technology transfer case studies” introduced by Australia, Canada, the European Union, Israel, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei, the United Kingdom and the United States. The objective was to facilitate discussions at the TRIPS Council, using concrete case studies that show real-world technology transfer in action across industries such as agriculture, sustainability and manufacturing.
    Many projects were showcased to underline how technology transfer can support innovation and economic growth. These included a Japanese-Tanzanian partnership producing insecticide-treated nets and technical know-how provided to Sri Lankan companies in the manufacturing and textile industries. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) presented WIPO GREEN, an online platform connecting providers and seekers of eco-friendly technologies to combat climate change.
    Non-violation and situation complaints (NVSCs)
    The Chair reported on the consultations she held in early March with the most active members and Group coordinators on this issue, where delegations largely repeated their known positions. One member suggested that the Secretariat organize a briefing session on this issue to provide an overview of the points and arguments raised in the past, she said.
    She underlined that none of the various suggestions made by her predecessors in meetings and informal consultations as to how members could resume a substantive debate have been taken up by members, indicating that there is little desire to restart substantive discussions on this issue. Taking into account that the 14th Ministerial Conference (MC14) will take place in March 2026, she reminded members that the examination of the scope and modalities of these complaints is a ministerial mandate for this Council, which members should make a serious effort to fulfill.
    At the 13th Ministerial Conference (MC13), ministers adopted the Decision on TRIPS Non-Violation and Situation Complaints, tasking the TRIPS Council to continue its review of the scope and modalities for NVSCs and to make recommendations to MC14. It was also agreed that, in the meantime, members would not bring such complaints under the TRIPS Agreement.
    Non-violation and situation complaints (NVSCs) refer to whether and under what conditions members should be able to bring WTO dispute complaints where they consider that another member’s action, or a particular situation, has deprived them of an expected advantage under the TRIPS Agreement, even though no obligation under the Agreement has been violated.
    Members have historically differed on whether such non-violation cases are feasible in intellectual property. Some delegations consider NVSCs essential to maintaining the proper balance of rights and obligations within the TRIPS Agreement while helping to ensure that legitimate obligations are not circumvented or avoided. Others believe there is no place for the application of non-violation complaints in the area of intellectual property because of the legal insecurity and curtailment of flexibilities that could ensue and favour their complete ban in the TRIPS area.
    Pandemic response
    The Chair highlighted the WTO’s compilation document COVID-19: Measures Regarding Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, available on its website. This document, compiled by the Secretariat using official sources and verified by relevant members, provides a non-exhaustive overview of IP-related measures taken in response to the pandemic. She urged delegations to update the Secretariat with any new measures, modifications or expirations.
    Discussions continued on proposals under paragraph 24 of the Ministerial Declaration on the WTO Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic and Preparedness for Future Pandemics, reaffirmed in the Abu Dhabi Ministerial Declaration of March 2024. This provision mandates the Council to assess challenges and lessons from the pandemic, including through members’ proposals.
    Members also continued to review two submissions: one by the United Kingdom on Intellectual Property, Voluntary Licensing, and Technology Transfer, and another by Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt and India on TRIPS for Development and Post-MC13 Work on TRIPS-Related Issues. The debate centered on pandemic preparedness and the WTO’s role in addressing IP concerns.
    Some delegations stressed the need for balancing IP rights with public health to secure access to medicines in future crises. Others highlighted the need for updated IP policies and voluntary licensing as key for effective technology transfer, calling for evidence-based discussions under this agenda item.
    Other issues
    Members discussed a second ad hoc agenda item under the heading of “IP and the public interest”, included at the request of Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, India and Pakistan. These delegations submitted a paper on this topic, entitled “Intellectual Property for Development Group – Side Activity: 30 Years of Developing Countries’ Expectations and Concerns about TRIPS”.
    Participating members presented a summary of a side event organized on 19 March by the informal group of countries known as “Intellectual Property (IP) for Development”. At this event, delegates and experts were invited to an initial discussion to reflect on the history of the TRIPS negotiations, 30 years after their conclusion. Proponents noted that a discussion on the evolution and impact of TRIPS will help to improve the available information, providing valuable insights and reflections for assessing the expectations of developing economies.
    The Chair said that there have been no new acceptances of the protocol amending the TRIPS Agreement since the last Council meeting. This means that, to date, the amended TRIPS Agreement applies to 141 members. Twenty-five members have yet to accept the Protocol.

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    MIL OSI Global Banks –

    March 25, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Security Council Examines Ways to Strengthen United Nations Peacekeeping against New Threats

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    Delegates Debate ‘Christmas-Tree’ Add-on Mandates versus Focusing on Core Tasks

    The Security Council today debated ways to adapt United Nations peacekeeping to evolving threats with Member States emphasizing the need to partner with regional organizations and actively involve local communities, particularly women.  They also stressed the importance of aligning mandates with available resources, leveraging intelligence-led strategies and digital tools for data-driven decision-making, and avoiding overly broad “Christmas-tree mandates” that prolong operations and escalate costs.

    “Terror and extremist groups, organized crime, the weaponization of new technologies and the effects of climate change are all testing our capacities to respond,” United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres said during the Council’s day-long open debate focusing on the ability of United Nations peace operations to adjust to new realities on the ground.  These challenges along with more complex and deadly wars, he cautioned, “throw fuel on the fires of conflict”.

    He also highlighted a “persistent mismatch between mandates and available resources”, as well as growing divisions within Council itself.  To address this, he called for a tailored and collective approach to peace operations. Announcing a forthcoming United Nations peace operation review — mandated by Member States in the Pact for the Future, he said that this process will incorporate insights from the New Agenda for Peace and from the first comprehensive study of special political missions in the 80-year history of the United Nations.

    Peace operations, he emphasized, must engage early with host nations and local partners, guided by clear, achievable mandates and viable exit strategies.  “Today’s open debate provides a vital opportunity for the Council to share perspectives and ideas to inform the review process,” Mr. Guterres concluded.

    Cultural Shifts Required

    “The fact that peace operations are effective is one of the most verified findings in international relations literature,” said Jenna Russo, Director of Research at the International Peace Institute and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations.  “Yet, there is often a dissonance between these findings and the lived experiences of those in conflict settings,” she added.

    Offering four recommendations, she first called for a stronger planning culture within the Secretariat.  Bureaucratic and political barriers have kept this culture of planning from taking root, she said, adding that the Organization should build the capacity to discern emerging trends, anticipate potential shifts and respond proactively.

    Secondly, she said, the Organization must embrace a “risk-tolerant culture around peace operations”, noting that “personnel are structurally disincentivized from trying new things and reporting what doesn’t work for fear that their budgets and jobs may suffer the consequences”.  She highlighted the need for a culture that creates space for trying and even failing, with the aim of learning and improving — “this culture must come from the top”.

    “The Secretariat should tell the Council what it needs to hear, not what it wants to hear,” she underscored as her third recommendation, citing the 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.  Instead of the Secretariat pre-emptively lowering the bar on what is politically possible, she said, it should present a wide range of options and leave it to the Council to adjust the bar.

    Modular Approach — Building Blocks

    Her final recommendation was that the Council should consider the advantages and the risks of a modular approach to peace operations.  Mandated sets of activities like electoral support, human rights monitoring or security sector reform can be “treated like building blocks that can be scaled up or down over the lifespan of a mission”, she said.  This approach can promote more tailored responses and align mandates with available resources, but it comes with the risk that broader peacebuilding aspects “could fall by the wayside if the Council or host States view them as optional”, she added.

    In the ensuing open debate, speakers stressed the need to evolve with the times, underscored the importance of regional partnerships and called for a more people-centered approach that involves local communities, and specifically women, in peace efforts.

    Closer Cooperation with Regional Organizations

    “For millions, the blue flag and the blue helmets are symbols of hope,” said Lars Løkke Rasmussen, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Denmark and Council President for March, as he spoke in his national capacity.  However, just as conflicts and needs have evolved, so must the UN’s tools, he stressed, urging closer collaboration with regional and subregional organizations — “especially the African Union” — and the inclusion of women in peace processes.

    Zane Dangor, Director-General of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation of South Africa, said that deployments by regional and subregional organizations, such as the African Union and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), if authorized and supported by the UN, could off-set the limitations of the Organization’s peacekeeping operations.  Calling for the accelerated implementation of Council resolution 2719 (2023), he said the Council can also gain insights from the experiences of African peace operations that are often conducted in difficult conditions and with limited resources.

    Jiří Kozák, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, emphasized that strong coordination with regional partners, such as the African Union and European Union, must be systematic, practical and based on the sharing of resources, information and best practices.  “Improved coordination will ensure stronger political and operational support,” he added.

    Similarly, Guyana’s representative highlighted the need for deeper collaboration with regional organizations and reiterated the calls of previous speakers who stressed that women must be present at all levels — from peacekeeping forces to peace negotiations.

    “Peace should be built from the ground up,” said Javier Martínez-Acha Vásquez, Panama’s Minister for Foreign Affairs.  Conflict-resolution mechanisms “are more likely to last when women are leaders and involved in the peacebuilding process”, he added.  Insun Kang, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, called for a people-centered approach that respects host country priorities and national ownership.  “This approach views local populations as not just beneficiaries of peacekeeping efforts, but active participants,” she said, noting her country’s rice cultivation and vocational training initiatives in South Sudan.

    Noting that the Council has not mandated a new peacekeeping operation in 10 years, Syed Tariq Fatemi, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, warned that the UN’s absence is being filled by “negative actors and soldiers of fortune”.  UN peacekeeping is cost effective, representing only 3 per cent of global military spending.  The Council must ensure it is properly funded and resourced.

    Accountability for Performance

    As the global leader of peacekeeping capacity-building, the United States aims to ensure that its programmes have measurable effects on the ground, said that country’s representative. “Robust accountability measures will enhance the effectiveness and efficiencies of UN peacekeeping missions,” she said, adding that accountability must incentivize positive performance and expedient consequences for performance failures.

    On that, Somalia’s delegate, pointing to Africa’s experience with peacekeeping operations, stressed that “success depends on two interlinked principles — clear strategic planning and operational adaptability”.

    Caution against ‘Christmas-Tree Mandates’

    Several speakers expressed concern about the overbroad mandates of UN peacekeeping missions, noting that these mandates often lead to prolonged missions in host countries, costing billions of dollars.  “The result is missions that are present in countries for decades and cost billions of dollars,” said the representative of the Russian Federation. Rather, she stressed that “the goal we need to be aiming for” is that, after a mandate is implemented, host States assume full responsibility for conflict prevention.

    “We must end the strange phenomenon where every mandate renewal leads to expansion,” said China’s representative, also rejecting the “unchecked growth of Christmas-tree mandates”.  He further underscored that the principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence “should always be upheld as fundamental guidelines”.

    Similarly, Algeria’s delegate said: “We are witnessing, in some cases, what can be described as ‘Christmas-tree’ mandates, under which UN missions are tasked with an overwhelming number of responsibilities, thus hindering their ability to undertake focused and targeted engagements”.

    Slovenia’s delegate was among the speakers who stressed the need to enhance early warning and rapid response capabilities to address conflicts before they escalate.  “Missions must be proactive rather than reactive,” she said.  Greece’s delegate, echoing many other delegations, condemned attacks on peacekeepers and emphasized the need to ensure their absolute safety.

    Clear, Realistic Mandates, Use of Digital Tools 

    France’s delegate said that “peacekeeping is the heart” of the UN.  Peacekeeping missions “need to be part of a strategy, but in order for them to be successful, the mandate has to be based on clear, realistic and political objectives”, he added.  The representative of the United Kingdom said the UN needs to harness innovation, using data-driven decision-making, intelligence-led approaches and digital tools.  Peacekeepers must be trained on emerging threats, including cyberwarfare, disinformation campaigns and climate-related security risks.

    On the Secretary-General’s efforts to make the united Nations fit for purpose, Beate Meinl-Reisinger, Federal Minister for European and International Affairs of Austria, stated:  “Reform, yes; replace, no.”  Underlining the need for a “flexible toolbox of peace operations”, she stressed the importance of political solutions to the success of such operations.  “They can only keep peace where there is a peace to keep,” she observed.

    Over the past eight decades, the UN has deployed more than 120 peace operations in over 50 countries, and to a very large extent, these missions have helped prevent, manage and resolve conflicts, said the representative of Sierra Leone.  When his country was in the throes of a brutal civil war more than 20 years ago, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) assisted in disarming more than 75,000 ex-combatants, restored State authority and oversaw the first post-conflict democratic elections.  “The Mission, at the time, was seen as a prototype for the UN’s new emphasis on peacebuilding and showed how a well-resourced and adaptable UN operation can support a country to rebuild, reconcile and reclaim its future,” he said.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    March 25, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Broadening EUNAVFOR MED IRINI’s mandate – E-000975/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000975/2025/rev.1
    to the Council
    Rule 144
    Özlem Demirel (The Left)

    The mandate of the EU military operation IRINI is set to be renewed for a further two years. A widening of the mandate is also under discussion.

    • 1.How can operation IRINI, in the Council’s view, be expanded beyond its existing capabilities given the current situation in the Mediterranean ?
    • 2.How should the Libyan Coastguard, Navy or General Authority for Coastal Security be involved in this expanded intelligence gathering?
    • 3.What support are Libyan actors already providing to improve the EU’s civilian or military situational awareness in the Mediterranean?

    Submitted: 6.3.2025

    Last updated: 24 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    March 25, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt – A10-0037/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt

    (COM(2024)0461 – C10‑0009/2024 – 2024/0071(COD))

    (Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2024)0461),

    – having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 212 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C10‑0009/2024),

    – having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to the budgetary assessment by the Committee on Budgets,

    – having regard to Rule 60 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade (A10-0037/2025),

    1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

    2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

    3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

     

     

    Amendment  1

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 1 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (1a) This Decision has implications for the Union budget. Accordingly, the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgets adopted a budgetary assessment, which forms an integral part of Parliament’s mandate for negotiations.

    Amendment  2

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 2 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (2a) On 17 March 2024, Egypt and the European Union jointly decided to upgrade their relations to a strategic and comprehensive partnership, based on the values of equity and mutual respect and trust in order to strengthen their common stability, peace and prosperity.

    Amendment  3

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 3

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (3) In line with the Partnership Priorities, the EU and Egypt are committed to ensuring accountability, the rule of law, the full respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms, promoting democracy, gender equality and equal opportunities as constitutional rights of all their citizens. These commitments contribute to the advancement of the partnership and to Egypt’s sustainable development and stability. The increased and constructive engagement between the EU and Egypt in the last period has opened the path to more meaningful dialogue on human rights related issues. The subcommittee on Political Matters, Human Rights and Democracy, International and Regional issues of December 2022 and the Association Committee of May 2023 provided the institutional platforms to exchange on an array of human rights issues, which the EU would like to continue and build on. The improvement of the human rights situation in Egypt will have a positive impact on EU-Egypt relations.

    (3) In line with the Partnership Priorities, the EU and Egypt are committed to ensuring accountability, the rule of law, the full respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms, promoting democracy, gender equality and equal opportunities as constitutional rights of all their citizens. These commitments contribute to the advancement of the partnership and to Egypt’s sustainable development, good governance and socio-economic stability. The increased and constructive engagement between the EU and Egypt in the last period has opened the path to more meaningful dialogue on human rights related issues. The subcommittee on Political Matters, Human Rights and Democracy, International and Regional issues of December 2022 and the Association Committee of May 2023 provided the institutional platforms to exchange on an array of human rights issues, which the EU would like to continue and build on. The steady improvement of the human rights situation and women’s rights and fundamental freedoms due to an active, coherent and proactive policy in that area in Egypt will have a positive impact on EU-Egypt relations.

    Amendment  4

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 3 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (3a) Egypt’s economic and financial situation has been marked by several macroeconomic adjustment programmes implemented under the aegis of the IMF in exchange for credit facilities (USD 12 billion from 2016 to 2019 and USD 3 billion in 2022, rising to USD 8 billion in March 2024);

    Amendment  5

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 5

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (5) The EU recognises Egypt’s key role for regional security and stability. Terrorism, organised crime and conflicts are common threats against our security and the social fabric of nations across both sides of the Mediterranean. Therefore, the EU and Egypt have a common interest in strengthening cooperation highlighted in the Partnership Priorities, in full compliance with international law, including human rights and international humanitarian law.

    (5) The EU recognises Egypt’s key role for regional security and stability. Terrorism, organised crime, such as human trafficking, irregular migration, and conflicts, are common threats against our security and the social fabric of nations across both sides of the Mediterranean. Similarly, energy is also one of the most pressing challenges facing countries on both sides of the Mediterranean. The Energy Cooperation between the Union and Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean could not only offer a source of economic prosperity for the region but also strengthen energy security for the Union by diversifying energy supplies and encouraging regional collaboration. In that respect, the East Mediterranean Gas Forum serves as a platform of positive regional cooperation. Therefore, the EU and Egypt have a common interest in strengthening cooperation highlighted in the Partnership Priorities, in full compliance with international law, including the International Law of the Sea, human rights and international humanitarian law.

    Amendment  6

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 6

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (6) Recalling the geo-political challenges, such as the consequences of Hamas terrorist attacks across Israel on 7 October 2023 as well as the conflict in Sudan, and the strategic importance of Egypt as the largest country in the region and a pillar of stability for the whole Middle East, the Union is embarking on concluding a Strategic and Comprehensive partnership with Egypt as outlined in the Joint Declaration.

    (6) Recalling the global and regional geo-political challenges, such as the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, resulting from the aftermath of the Hamas terrorist attacks across Israel on 7 October 2023, the escalating tensions in the Horn of Africa and the safety of navigation in the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, as well as migratory pressure from the conflict in Sudan, uncertainties in Syria, the instability in Libya, Egypt’s responsibilities as a host to large numbers of refugees and migrants and the strategic importance of Egypt as the largest country in the region and a pillar of stability for the whole Middle East, the Union has embarked on a Strategic and Comprehensive partnership with Egypt as outlined in the Joint Declaration.

    Amendment  7

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 7

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (7) The objective of the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership with Egypt is to elevate the EU-Egypt political relations to a strategic partnership and enable Egypt to fulfil its key role of providing stability in the region. The partnership aims to contribute to support Egypt’s macroeconomic resilience and enable the implementation of ambitious socio-economic reforms in a manner that complements and reinforces the reform process foreseen under the IMF programme for Egypt. As outlined in the Joint Declaration, the partnership will address a wide set of policy measures clustered across six pillars of intervention, namely: political relations; economic stability; investment and trade; migration; security and law enforcement cooperation; demography and human capital.

    (7) The objective of the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership with Egypt is to elevate the EU-Egypt political relations to a strategic partnership and enable Egypt to fulfil its key role of providing stability in the region, the Middle East and North Africa. The partnership aims to contribute to support Egypt’s macroeconomic resilience and enable the implementation of ambitious socio-economic reforms in a manner that complements and reinforces the reform process foreseen under the IMF programme for Egypt. As outlined in the Joint Declaration, the partnership will address a wide set of policy measures clustered across six pillars of intervention, namely: political relations; economic stability; investment and trade; irregular migration and mobility in respect of human rights; security and law enforcement cooperation; demography and human capital. Such Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership should be developed in line with initiatives at Union and Member State level such as the Global Gateway and the Mattei Plan for Africa.

    Amendment  8

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 8

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (8) Underpinning the partnership will be a financial package of EUR 7.4 billion consisting of short- and longer-term support for the necessary macro-fiscal and socio-economic reform agenda, as well as increased amounts available to support investments in Egypt and targeted support for the implementation of the different strategic priorities. Part of the support package is the EU MFA package of up to EUR 5 billion in loans, composed of two MFA operations, one short-term for up to EUR 1 billion and a regular, more medium-term one for up to EUR 4 billion, financial instruments, such as guarantees and blending instruments, aimed at mobilising public and private investments with the objective of generating substantial new investments. This will be complemented by programmes to support specific priorities under the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership through individual projects and technical assistance implemented under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument2 .

    (8) Underpinning the partnership is a financial package of EUR 7.4 billion consisting of short- and longer-term support for the necessary macro-fiscal and socio-economic reform agenda, as well as increased amounts available to support investments in Egypt and targeted support for the implementation of the different strategic priorities, particularly in terms of irregular migration and renewable energy. Part of the support package is the EU MFA package of up to EUR 5 billion in concessional loans, composed of two MFA operations, one short-term for up to EUR 1 billion and a regular, more medium-term one for up to EUR 4 billion, financial instruments, such as guarantees and blending instruments, aimed at mobilising public and private investments that benefit the majority of Egyptians with the objective of generating substantial new investments. This will be complemented by programmes to support specific priorities under the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership through individual projects and technical assistance implemented under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument2.

    __________________

    __________________

    2 Established by Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 (OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1)

    2 Established by Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 (OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1)

    Amendment  9

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 9

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (9) Egypt’s macro-fiscal situation has faced significant challenges and deteriorated substantially over recent months, as external pressures have intensified and public debt has increased further, with substantial downside risks to the economic outlook persisting. The repercussions of Russia’s war on Ukraine and of Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel have led to protracted capital outflows and lower foreign currency receipts, notably due to sharply falling income from tourism and Suez Canal proceeds. This is particularly challenging amid Egypt’s difficult fiscal situation, which is characterised by constant fiscal deficits and high and growing debt to GDP ratios.

    (9) Egypt’s macro-fiscal situation has faced significant challenges and deteriorated substantially over recent months, as external pressures have intensified and public debt has increased further, with substantial downside risks to the economic outlook persisting. The repercussions of Russia’s war on Ukraine and the geopolitical tensions and conflicts in the Middle East have led to protracted capital outflows and lower foreign currency receipts, notably due to sharply falling income from tourism, Suez Canal proceeds and gas production and loss of confidence among foreign investors. This is particularly challenging amid Egypt’s difficult fiscal situation, which is characterised by constant fiscal deficits and high and growing debt to GDP ratios. Despite that difficult external context, in 2024 Egypt was able to implement reforms, such as the unification of exchange rates and making progress in tightening monetary policy, to help preserve macroeconomic stability.

    Amendment  10

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 12

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (12) Egypt re-engaged with the IMF in early 2024 and reached a staff-level agreement on 6 March 2024 on a revamped Extended Fund Facility programme scaled up to USD 8 billion. The new programme is expected to be adopted by IMF Executive Board decision in March 2024 and aims to address the areas of 1) credible exchange rate flexibility, 2) sustainable tightening of monetary policy, 3) fiscal consolidation to preserve debt sustainability, 4) a new framework to rein in infrastructure spending, 5) providing adequate levels of social spending to protect vulnerable groups, and 6) implementation of the State Ownership Policy and reforms to level the playing field. Together with the staff level agreement’s signature, Egypt also enacted a flexibilisation of the exchange rate, and raised the central bank’s key policy rate by a sizeable 600 basis points, in line with the IMF programme’s priorities.

    (12) Egypt re-engaged with the IMF in early 2024 and reached a staff-level agreement on 6 March 2024 on a revamped Extended Fund Facility programme scaled up to USD 8 billion. Negotiations at expert level on the fourth revision of Egypt’s economic reform programme were concluded in December 2024. The new programme aims to address the areas of 1) credible exchange rate flexibility, 2) sustainable tightening of monetary policy, 3) fiscal consolidation to preserve debt sustainability, 4) a new framework to rein in infrastructure spending, 5) providing adequate levels of social spending to protect vulnerable groups from the cost of living and energy price rises, and 6) implementation of the State Ownership Policy and reforms to level the playing field by promoting the development of the private sector in the economy. Together with the staff level agreement’s signature, Egypt also enacted a flexibilisation of the exchange rate, and raised the central bank’s key policy rate by a sizeable 600 basis points, in line with the IMF programme’s priorities.

    Amendment  11

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 16

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (16) Given that there is still a significant residual external financing gap in Egypt’s balance of payments over and above the resources provided by the IMF and other multilateral institutions, the Union macro-financial assistance to be provided to Egypt is, under the current exceptional circumstances, considered to be an appropriate response to Egypt’s request for support to the economic stabilisation, in conjunction with the IMF programme. The Union’s macro-financial assistance package, including the MFA of up to EUR 4 billion under this proposal, would support the economic stabilisation and the structural reform agenda of Egypt, supplementing resources made available under the IMF’s financial arrangement.

    (16) Given that there is still a significant residual external financing gap in Egypt’s balance of payments over and above the resources provided by the IMF and other multilateral institutions and regional partners, the Union macro-financial assistance to be provided to Egypt is, under the current exceptional circumstances, considered to be an appropriate response to Egypt’s request for support to the economic stabilisation, in conjunction with the IMF programme. The Union’s macro-financial assistance package, including the MFA of up to EUR 4 billion under this proposal, would support the economic stabilisation and the structural reform agenda of Egypt, supplementing resources made available under the IMF’s financial arrangement.

    Amendment  12

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 19

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (19) The Commission should ensure that the Union’s macro-financial assistance is legally and substantially in line with the key principles, objectives and measures taken within the different areas of external action and with other relevant Union policies.

    (19) The Commission should ensure that the Union’s macro-financial assistance is legally and substantially in line with the key principles, objectives and measures taken within the different areas of external action and with other relevant Union policies, including those relating to democracy, human rights and rule of law, in line with Article 2 of the EU-Egypt Association Agreement.

    Amendment  13

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 22

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (22) A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt should be that the country continues to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights. In addition, the specific objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems, the governance and supervision of the financial sector in Egypt and promote structural reforms aimed at supporting sustainable and inclusive growth, decent employment creation and fiscal consolidation. The fulfillment of the pre-condition and the achievement of the specific objectives should be regularly monitored by the Commission services and the European External Action Service.

    (22) Macro-financial assistance should remain an economic instrument. However, a pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt should be that the country continues to make concrete, credible and tangible steps towards respecting and strengthening effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and guaranteeing respect for human rights. In addition, the specific objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems, the governance and supervision of the financial sector in Egypt and promote structural reforms aimed at supporting sustainable and inclusive growth, decent employment creation and fiscal consolidation. The fulfillment of the pre-condition and the achievement of the specific objectives should be regularly monitored by the Commission services and the European External Action Service.

    Amendment  14

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 23

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (23) In order to ensure that the Union’s financial interests linked to the Union’s macro-financial assistance are protected efficiently, Egypt should take appropriate measures relating to the prevention of, and fight against, fraud, corruption and any other irregularities linked to the assistance. In addition, a loan agreement to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities should contain provisions authorising European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to carry out investigations, including on-the-spot checks and inspections, in accordance with the provisions and procedures laid down in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council3 and Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/964 , the Commission and the Court of Auditors to carry out audits and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to exercise its competences with regard to the provision of the Union’s macro-financial assistance during and after its availability period.

    (23) It is essential to underline that Egypt has to meet the necessary economic pre-condition for eligibility. Egypt has demonstrated its solvency and financial stability, which have been verified by the Commission. However, in order to ensure that the Union’s financial interests linked to the Union’s macro-financial assistance are protected efficiently. Egypt should take appropriate measures relating to the prevention of, and fight against, fraud, corruption and any other irregularities linked to the assistance. In addition, a loan agreement to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities should contain provisions authorising European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to carry out investigations, including on-the-spot checks and inspections, in accordance with the provisions and procedures laid down in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council3 and Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/964 , the Commission and the Court of Auditors to carry out audits and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to exercise its competences with regard to the provision of the Union’s macro-financial assistance during and after its availability period.

    __________________

    __________________

    3 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1).

    3 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1).

    4 Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 of 11 November 1996 concerning on-the-spot checks and inspections carried out by the Commission in order to protect the European Communities’ financial interests against fraud and other irregularities (OJ L 292, 15.11.1996, p. 2).

    4 Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 of 11 November 1996 concerning on-the-spot checks and inspections carried out by the Commission in order to protect the European Communities’ financial interests against fraud and other irregularities (OJ L 292, 15.11.1996, p. 2).

    Amendment  15

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 26

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (26) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be managed by the Commission. In order to ensure that the European Parliament and the Council are able to follow the implementation of this Decision, the Commission should regularly inform them of developments relating to the assistance and provide them with relevant documents.

    (26) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be managed by the Commission. In order to ensure that the European Parliament and the Council are able to follow the implementation of this Decision, the Commission should regularly inform them with an annual report of developments relating to the assistance and on respect for effective democratic mechanisms, as per the pre-conditions referred to in this Decision, and provide them with relevant documents.

    Amendment  16

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 28

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (28) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be subject to economic policy conditions, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding. In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Egyptian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under that Regulation, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially important impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt, the examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of the assistance.

    (28) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be subject to sustainable economic policy reforms, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding. In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Egyptian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under that Regulation, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially important impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt, the examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of the assistance.

    Amendment  17

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 1 – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    1. The Union shall make macro-financial assistance of a maximum amount of up to EUR 4 billion available to Egypt (“the Union’s macro-financial assistance”), with a view to supporting Egypt’s economic stabilisation and a substantive reform agenda. The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance is subject to the approval of the Union budget for the relevant year by the European Parliament and the Council. The assistance shall contribute to covering Egypt’s balance of payments needs as identified in the IMF programme.

    1. The Union shall make macro-financial assistance in the form of concessional loans of a maximum amount of up to EUR 4 billion available to Egypt (“the Union’s macro-financial assistance”), with a view to supporting Egypt’s socio-economic stabilisation and a substantive structural reform agenda, as well as its responsibility to mitigate the effects of irregular migration and managing migratory flows. The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance is subject to the approval of the Union budget for the relevant year by the European Parliament and the Council. The assistance shall contribute to covering Egypt’s balance of payments needs as identified in the IMF programme.

    Amendment  18

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 1 – paragraph 3 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    3a. Macro-financial assistance may, as far as possible, contribute to the Union’s growth and economic resilience.

    Amendment  19

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 2 – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    1. A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be that Egypt continues to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights.

    1. A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be that Egypt continues to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting and strengthening effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and continues to make efforts in order to guarantee respect for human rights.

    Amendment  20

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 2 – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    2. The Commission services and the European External Action Service shall monitor the fulfilment of this pre-condition throughout the life-cycle of the Union’s macro-financial assistance.

    2. The Commission services and the European External Action Service shall monitor the fulfilment of this pre-condition throughout the life-cycle of the Union’s macro-financial assistance and report, regularly and in writing, to the European Parliament and the Council on the fulfilment of the economic policy and financial conditions set out in the Memorandum of Understanding.

    Amendment  21

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 3 – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    1. The Commission, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2), shall agree with the Egyptian authorities on clearly defined economic policy and financial conditions, focusing on structural reforms and sound public finances, to which the Union’s macro-financial assistance is to be subject, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding (“the Memorandum of Understanding”) which shall include a timeframe for the achievement of those reforms. The economic policy and financial conditions set out in the Memorandum of Understanding shall be consistent with the agreements or understandings referred to in Article 1(3), including the macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform programmes implemented by Egypt with the support of the IMF.

    1. The Commission, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2), shall agree with the Egyptian authorities on clearly defined economic policy and financial conditions, focusing on structural reforms, such as the new criminal procedure reform, and sound public finances, to which the Union’s macro-financial assistance is to be subject, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding (“the Memorandum of Understanding”) which shall include a timeframe for the achievement of those reforms. The economic policy and financial conditions set out in the Memorandum of Understanding shall be consistent with the agreements or understandings referred to in Article 1(3), including the macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform programmes implemented by Egypt with the support of the IMF.

    Amendment  22

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 3 – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    2. The conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall aim, in particular, at enhancing the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Egypt, including for the use of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. Progress in mutual market opening, the development of rules-based and fair trade, and other priorities in the context of the Union’s external policy shall also be duly taken into account when designing the policy measures. Progress in attaining those objectives shall be regularly monitored by the Commission.

    2. The economic policy and financial conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall aim, in particular, at enhancing the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Egypt, including for the use of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. Progress in mutual market opening, including for SMEs, the development of rules-based and fair trade, sustainable development, good governance and other priorities in the context of the Union’s external policy shall also be duly taken into account when designing the policy measures. Progress in attaining those objectives shall be regularly monitored by the Commission.

    Amendment  23

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 4 – paragraph 4

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    4. Where the conditions in paragraph 3 are not met, the Commission shall temporarily suspend or cancel the disbursement of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. In such cases, it shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the reasons for that suspension or cancellation.

    4. Where the conditions in paragraph 3 are not met, the Commission shall temporarily suspend or cancel the disbursement of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. In such cases, it shall inform the European Parliament and the Council without delay of the reasons for that suspension or cancellation.

    Amendment  24

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 5 – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (1) In order to finance the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, the Commission shall be empowered, on behalf of the Union, to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions in accordance with Article 220a of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046.

    1. In order to finance the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, the Commission shall be empowered, on behalf of the Union, to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions in accordance with Article 223 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509.

     

    Amendment  25

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 5 – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (2) The Commission shall enter into a loan agreement with Egypt in respect of the amount referred to in Article 1. The detailed terms of the support under the MFA in the form of loans shall be laid down in a loan agreement in accordance with Article 220 of the Financial Regulation, to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities. The loan agreement shall lay down the availability period and the detailed terms of the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, including in relation to the internal control systems. The loans shall be granted at terms that allow Egypt to repay the loan over a long period, including a possible grace period. The maximum duration of the loans shall be 35 years. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments in the operations referred to in paragraph 3.

    2. The Commission shall enter into a loan agreement with Egypt in respect of the amount referred to in Article 1. The detailed terms of the support under the MFA in the form of loans shall be laid down in a loan agreement in accordance with Article 223 of the Financial Regulation, to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities. The loan agreement shall lay down the availability period and the detailed terms of the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, including in relation to the internal control systems. Egypt shall reimburse the loan, which shall be granted at terms that allow its repayment over a long period, including, after a formal notification to the European Parliament and the Council, a possible grace period. The maximum duration of the loans shall be 35 years. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments in the operations referred to in paragraph 3.

    Amendment  26

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 6 – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    1. The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be implemented in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council7.

    1. The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be implemented in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council7.

    _________________

    _________________

    7 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.07.2018, p. 1).

    7 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj).

    Amendment  27

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point b

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (b) assess the economic situation and prospects of Egypt, as well as progress made in implementing the policy measures referred to in Article 3(1);

    (b) assess the economic situation and prospects of Egypt, as well as progress made in implementing the policy measures referred to in Article 2 and Article 3(1);

    Amendment  28

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point c

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (c) indicate the connection between the economic policy reform measures laid down in the Memorandum of Understanding, Egypt’s on-going economic and fiscal performance and the Commission’s decisions to release the instalments of the Union’s macro-financial assistance.

    (c) indicate the connection between Egypt’s economic policy reforms under the Memorandum of Understanding, its fiscal performance, and the release of Union macro-financial assistance, while outlining steps taken towards democratic mechanisms, the rule of law and human rights.

     

     

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    Political dialogue between Egypt and the EU was suspended after the revolution in 2011, and remained frozen through 2015. However, following Sisi’s election as president in May 2014, a rapprochement between Europe and Egypt gradually began to take place. The stability of the country became defining characteristics of European policy towards the Egypt. In 2024 the European Union (‘EU’) and Egypt have agreed to deepen their relationship and develop a strategic and comprehensive partnership for shared prosperity, stability and security, based on joint interest and mutual trust and building on the already existing positive agenda in EU-Egypt relations. The Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership covers specific areas of cooperation outlined in the Joint Declaration, clustered across six pillars of intervention, namely: political relations; economic stability; investment and trade; migration; security and law enforcement cooperation; demography and human capital.

    The partnership is based on a financial package consisting of short- and longer-term support for the necessary macro-fiscal and socio-economic reform agenda, as well as increased amounts available to support investments in Egypt and targeted support for the implementation of the different strategic priorities.

    Given Egypt’s critical economic and financial situation and Egypt’s role as an important stabilising factor amid geopolitical tensions in an increasingly volatile region, the Commission proposed on 15 March 2024 to support Egypt with macro-financial assistance (‘MFA’) of up to EUR 5 billion in loans as part of the EUR 7.4 billion financial package, divided into a short-term MFA operation of up to EUR 1 billion to be disbursed in one instalment, and a regular MFA operation of up to EUR 4 billion to be disbursed in three instalments.

    The short-term MFA was agreed without involvement of the European Parliament for urgency reasons. The rapporteur highlights that this can only be an exception and European Parliament should not be bypassed in the future.

    The amount of the proposed two new MFA operations corresponds to 56.7% of the estimated residual financing gap for the period FY24/25-FY26/27. This is consistent with standard practices on burden-sharing for MFA operations (for a country with an Association Agreement, the upper limit would be 60% according to the Council conclusions of 8 October 2002), taking into account the assistance pledged to Egypt by other bilateral and multilateral donors.

    The rapporteur would like to point out that the EU’s cooperation with Egypt does not begin with this MFA which is just a piece of the puzzle and in fact consequence of a longstanding cooperation with Egypt on human rights and security highlighted by the Association Agreement/Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (2004), the EU’s new Agenda for the Mediterranean (2021), the Partnership Priorities (2022) and the Joint Declaration launching a new Strategic and Comprehensive partnership (2024). Moreover, Egypt is a strategic, economic, military and geopolitical partner of the EU and the EU is the leading investor in Egypt.

    Given the instability in the region, Egypt remains a stable partner that engages in constructive dialogue with its partners. The EU need allies like that in the Middle East, and we need to emphasise their importance.

    But Egypt is also hit by a series of external shocks.

    A migratory shock first and foremost, with almost 10 million migrants and 800 000 registered refugees. Egypt is also committed to providing access to education for children, access to health services, help in finding housing and help in finding employment, with the support of NGOs. These commitments, if they are to be carried out properly, come at a cost.

    A geopolitical shock with the uncertainty of developments in Israel / Palestine and Syria.

    An economic shock, because Egypt, like many other countries, is seeing the cost of debt repayment and civil service salaries rise, thus limiting investment capacity.

    This MFA is based on strict pre-conditions requiring Egypt to continue to make concrete and credible steps towards democratic mechanism, rule of law and human rights. The rapporteur believes that those pre-conditions embedded in the long-term cooperation with Egypt will lead to reforms and long-term improvements in the country.

    Moreover, it is important to underline that Egypt already made big improvements in several areas.

    Firstly, on human rights, with a major plan launched in 2021 underlining the country’s commitment to this path. Some may feel that things are not moving fast enough, but it is hard to deny that the country is on the right track.

    Then there is the question of the place of women in society, which is very often a thermometer of democracy in a country. Wearing the veil is not compulsory. Women have access to public jobs and elected office (27% of women elected to the House, 13% to the Senate). Although Egyptian society is seen as patriarchal, the position of women has changed considerably in recent years.

    This is a financial instrument designed to support our partner in the face of the challenges it faces, but also to help it pursue change. The European Parliament will be closely monitoring progress and the rapporteur is asking the Commission to keep the European Parliament duly informed at all stages of the process. After all, the MFA is a loan and the grants are subject to reimbursement.

    To conclude the rapporteur would like to highlight that the MFA is an emergency instrument that has to be granted as soon as possible. The rapporteur is convinced that the MFA will be an effective incentive for – political and financial reforms in the country that will ensure a sustainable partnership between the EU and Egypt.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee:

    Entity and/or person

    European Commission – DG ECFIN

    European Commission – DG NEAR

    EEAS

    Embassy of Egypt

    Members of the Egyptian Parliament

    Amnesty International

    Human Rights Watch

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the concerned natural persons the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

     

     

    MINORITY POSITION

    Pursuant to Rule 56(4) of the Rules of Procedure

    Vicent Marzà Ibáñez (Greens/EFA)

    On behalf of the Greens/EFA group, I would like to express our opposition to the fact that the European Commission has treated Egypt differently from other countries that receive Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) from the EU.

    Following an agreement between the Council and Parliament, all MFAs should, as a pre-condition, respect human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. However, the Commission chose not to adhere to this policy when EC President Ursula von der Leyen announced a package of €7.4 billion in support for Egypt in March 2024, including €5 billion in Macro-Financial Assistance in the form of loans.

    We support providing Egypt with macro-financial assistance as a means to improve the living conditions of the Egyptian people, to reduce poverty and inequalities as well as to promote human rights. Our group has previously supported providing macro-financial assistance to alleviate financial burdens for countries in difficulty, while also promoting democratic values and human rights worldwide. However, the Commission must respect the agreements made by Parliament and the Council and act in line with the principles enshrined in the EU Treaties regarding external action.

     

     

    BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETS (29.1.2025)

    for the Committee on International Trade

    on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt

    (COM(2024)0461 – C10‑0009/2024 – 2024/0071(COD))

    Rapporteur for budgetary assessment: Matjaž Nemec

     

    The Committee on Budgets has carried out a budgetary assessment of the proposal under Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure and has reached the following conclusions:

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[1] (Financial Regulation),

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[2],

    – having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission (IIA) on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources[3],

    A. whereas Egypt continues to face sizeable and unmet financing needs, with an external financing gap estimated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme at around USD 17.7 billion for 2024-2027, requiring substantial international support to maintain economic stability and implement crucial reforms;

    B. whereas recently, Egypt’s macro-fiscal situation has deteriorated noticeably, with intensified external pressures and increased debt, reflecting both domestic challenges and external shocks, including the repercussions of Russia’s war against Ukraine and regional instability;

    C. whereas the destructive and ongoing conflict in Gaza and the attacks in the Red Sea have severely impacted Egypt’s key sources of foreign currency earnings, particularly tourism revenues and Suez Canal proceeds, while persistent capital outflows and lower services exports have further strained the country’s external position; whereas Egypt’s socio-economic situation, including poverty rates and the Human Development Index, are also expected to be negatively impacted[4];

    D. whereas the severe deterioration of external accounts and the strategic importance of regional stability conditionally justify this comprehensive support package, while stressing the need for the EU to work towards a lasting long-term peace solution in the Middle East, which will help alleviate the reasons behind Egypt’s financial struggles;

    E. whereas Egypt’s public debt burden had increased substantially to 95.9 % of GDP at the end of the 2022/2023 fiscal year, up from 88.5 % the previous fiscal year, reaching its highest level since 2017 and raising concerns about long-term debt sustainability;

    F. whereas Egypt’s real GDP growth declined to 2.4 % in the 2023/2024 fiscal year due to inflation and external pressures, with food price inflation remaining a strain, especially on vulnerable households;

    G. whereas all major rating agencies have downgraded Egypt’s sovereign credit ratings to below-investment grade following the outbreak of the conflict in Gaza, reflecting increased regional risks and deteriorating humanitarian and economic conditions; whereas this has further complicated the country’s access to international financial markets;

    H. whereas the proposed macro-financial assistance (MFA) of up to EUR 4 billion would help Egypt address its external financing needs while supporting the implementation of structural reforms aimed at improving the macroeconomic situation, strengthening economic governance and transparency, and enhancing conditions for sustainable and inclusive growth;

    I. whereas on 12 April 2024, the Council adopted Decision (EU) 2024/1144 providing EUR 1 billion in short-term macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt[5], pursuant to the urgency procedure provided under Article 213 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), bypassing Parliament entirely; whereas the Commission adopted a decision on 20 December 2024 to release this single instalment to Egypt;

    J. whereas the IMF has confirmed Egypt’s implementation of key reforms that have contributed to preserving macroeconomic stability despite the challenging environment;

    K. whereas the short-term macro-financial assistance was subject to conditions set out in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) agreed on and signed by the Commission and the Egyptian authorities on 29 June 2024, including the implementation of economic reforms, concrete and credible steps towards respecting democratic principles, and an on-track IMF programme; whereas the Commission and the European External Action Service undertook a review mission to Cairo in October 2024 and subsequently evaluated the Egyptian authorities’ written compliance reporting, with an overall positive assessment of Egypt’s progress in fulfilling these conditions;

    L. whereas Parliament, as one arm of the EU’s budgetary authority, was not involved in the negotiation and drafting of the MoU, which sets out the structural reform measures associated with the proposed MFA operation, including aspects of timing and sequencing for the disbursement of the initial assistance of EUR 1 billion;

    M. whereas the MoU to be concluded with the Egyptian authorities for the remainder of the MFA is an essential part of the assistance itself; whereas Parliament’s lack of involvement in this process severely hinders its budgetary scrutiny; whereas it is necessary to find an appropriate way to involve Parliament when such memorandums with non-EU countries are negotiated by the Commission;

    N. whereas the MoU should crucially provide the Commission with a mechanism to monitor progress as regards the implementation of structural reforms, notably the specific conditions for disbursement of the assistance;

    1. Recalls that while MFA is meant to be an exceptional crisis response instrument and should not serve as a substitute for structural development aid, its increasing use to address structural economic challenges in partner countries risks diluting its emergency nature;

    2. Highlights the importance of MFA in urgently addressing the situation in Egypt, taking into account Egypt’s critical economic and financial situation and its role as an important stabilising actor in an increasingly volatile region;

    3. Regrets the fact that the first proposal of this package bypassed the co-decision rights of Parliament and undermined its democratic oversight role by using Article 213 TFEU instead of Article 212 TFEU; insists that this should not set a precedent and that Parliament’s rights and role should be respected in future proposals; emphasises that MFA is an instrument requiring proper parliamentary and budgetary scrutiny;

    4. Notes that the Commission proposal of EUR 4 billion in MFA requires EUR 360 million in provisioning under the External Action Guarantee from the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, which represents a significant allocation of limited resources;

    5. Recalls its previous concerns about the effectiveness of MFA in driving sustainable reforms; acknowledges, however, that linking this assistance to the broader strategic partnership framework can, when properly implemented, provide stronger leverage for implementing the agreed reform agenda; recalls that the partnership priorities cover three broad areas, namely sustainable modern economy and social development, partnering in foreign policy, and enhancing stability;

    6. Takes note of Egypt’s overall compliance with reform implementation under the previous MFA; reiterates its calls for transparent and timely reporting of assistance implementation; calls for adequate monitoring mechanisms with clear benchmarks and outcomes to be established in the MoU, and for regular reporting to the budgetary authority on developments related to the assistance, given the unprecedented size of this MFA package;

    7. Notes that while the MFA loan structure spreads repayments over a longer period, this creates extended contingent liabilities for the EU budget that require careful monitoring over multiple financial frameworks;

    8. Emphasises that the MFA constitutes a general budgetary support instrument for the benefit of Egypt and that the EU has no control over how the funds are actually spent; nevertheless encourages the Egyptian authorities and counterparties to disclose information on spending at the Commission’s request;

    9. Recalls that Article 6 of the Financial Regulation establishes the obligation for the Commission to ensure compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and to respect the values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union when implementing the EU budget; stresses that such a budgetary principle constitutes a core legal requirement for any form of EU financial assistance; underscores, therefore, the fact that the proposal lacks sufficient safeguards and clear benchmarks to measure progress towards compliance, particularly regarding respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities and freedom of belief, in order to protect the EU’s financial interests and ensure the MFA’s implementation in accordance with the Regulation;

    10. Recalls that a pre-condition for granting MFA involves respecting effective democratic mechanisms, including a multiparty parliamentary system and the rule of law, and guaranteeing respect for human rights; highlights that, in this case, Egypt should continue to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting these criteria; emphasises the need to ensure their robust implementation;

    11. Emphasises that strict adherence to democratic principles, the rule of law and fundamental freedoms should remain non-negotiable prerequisites for accessing EU financial support; calls on the Commission to withhold disbursements in the absence of credible progress on these fronts; notes that the Commission’s decision to disburse the short-term macro-financial assistance reflects Egypt’s progress in implementing reforms and the EU’s commitment to supporting Egypt’s economic stabilisation and reform agenda under the strategic and comprehensive partnership, while noting that human rights challenges in Egypt remain significant; stresses, in this respect, the importance of Egypt’s stability and its crucial role in the region, particularly in the current geopolitical context;

    12. Regrets Parliament’s lack of involvement in and scrutiny of the MoU concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities, which, among other things, includes important budgetary provisions that fall within the remit of Parliament, will determine clearly defined economic policy and financial conditions, focusing on structural reforms and sound public finances, and will include a time frame for achieving those reforms, which are linked to loan disbursement;

    13. Concludes that the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt is compatible with the elements referred to in Rule 58(3) of the Rules of Procedure.

     

    As part of its budgetary assessment, the Committee on Budgets also submits the following amendments to the proposal:

     

    Amendment  1

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 1 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (1a) This Decision has implications for the Union budget. Accordingly, the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgets adopted a budgetary assessment, which forms an integral part of Parliament’s mandate for negotiations.

     

    Amendment  38

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 5 – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (1) In order to finance the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, the Commission shall be empowered, on behalf of the Union, to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions in accordance with Article 220a of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046.

    (1) In order to finance the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, the Commission shall be empowered, on behalf of the Union, to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions in accordance with Article 223 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509.

     

    Amendment  39

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 5 – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (2) The Commission shall enter into a loan agreement with Egypt in respect of the amount referred to in Article 1. The detailed terms of the support under the MFA in the form of loans shall be laid down in a loan agreement in accordance with Article 220 of the Financial Regulation, to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities. The loan agreement shall lay down the availability period and the detailed terms of the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, including in relation to the internal control systems. The loans shall be granted at terms that allow Egypt to repay the loan over a long period, including a possible grace period. The maximum duration of the loans shall be 35 years. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments in the operations referred to in paragraph 3.

    (2) The Commission shall enter into a loan agreement with Egypt in respect of the amount referred to in Article 1. The detailed terms of the support under the MFA in the form of loans shall be laid down in a loan agreement in accordance with Article 223 of the Financial Regulation, to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities. The loan agreement shall lay down the availability period and the detailed terms of the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, including in relation to the internal control systems. The loans shall be granted at terms that allow Egypt to repay the loan over a long period, including a possible grace period. The maximum duration of the loans shall be 35 years. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments in the operations referred to in paragraph 3.

     

    Amendment  40

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 6 – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (1) The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be implemented in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council7.

    (1) The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be implemented in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council7.

    _________________

    _________________

    7 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.07.2018, p. 1).

    7 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast) (OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj).

    Amendment  41

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point b

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (b) assess the economic situation and prospects of Egypt, as well as progress made in implementing the policy measures referred to in Article 3(1);

    (b) assess the economic situation and prospects of Egypt, as well as progress made in implementing the policy measures referred to in Articles 2 and 3(1);

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur for budgetary assessment declares that he received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the budgetary assessment, prior to the adoption thereof in committee:

    Entity and/or person

    European Commission

    Ambassador of Egypt to the EU

    Head of delegation of the European Union to Egypt

    The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt

    The list is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur for budgetary assessment.

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur for budgetary assessment declares that he has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

     

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

    Title

    Macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt

    References

    COM(2024)0461 – C10-0009/2024 – 2024/0071(COD)

    Committee(s) responsible

    INTA

     

     

     

     Date announced in plenary

    BUDG

    13.11.2024

    Rapporteur for budgetary assessment

     Date appointed

    Matjaž Nemec

    24.10.2024

    Discussed in committee

    16.1.2025

     

     

     

    Date adopted

    29.1.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    32

    5

    1

    Members present for the final vote

    Georgios Aftias, Rasmus Andresen, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Tobiasz Bocheński, Olivier Chastel, Tamás Deutsch, Angéline Furet, Jens Geier, Thomas Geisel, Jean-Marc Germain, Sandra Gómez López, Monika Hohlmeier, Alexander Jungbluth, Janusz Lewandowski, Giuseppe Lupo, Siegfried Mureşan, Matjaž Nemec, Danuše Nerudová, João Oliveira, Ruggero Razza, Karlo Ressler, Julien Sanchez, Hélder Sousa Silva, Joachim Streit, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs, Lucia Yar, Auke Zijlstra

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Damian Boeselager, Michalis Hadjipantela, Moritz Körner, Tiago Moreira de Sá, Rasmus Nordqvist, Michele Picaro, Jacek Protas, Beata Szydło

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Thierry Mariani, Aodhán Ó Ríordáin

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL
    IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

    32

    +

    ECR

    Tobiasz Bocheński, Michele Picaro, Ruggero Razza, Beata Szydło

    NI

    Thomas Geisel

    PPE

    Georgios Aftias, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Michalis Hadjipantela, Monika Hohlmeier, Janusz Lewandowski, Siegfried Mureşan, Danuše Nerudová, Jacek Protas, Karlo Ressler, Hélder Sousa Silva

    PfE

    Tamás Deutsch, Angéline Furet, Thierry Mariani, Tiago Moreira de Sá, Julien Sanchez

    Renew

    Olivier Chastel, Moritz Körner, Joachim Streit, Lucia Yar

    S&D

    Jens Geier, Jean-Marc Germain, Sandra Gómez López, Giuseppe Lupo, Matjaž Nemec, Aodhán Ó Ríordáin, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs

     

    5

    –

    PfE

    Auke Zijlstra

    The Left

    João Oliveira

    Verts/ALE

    Rasmus Andresen, Damian Boeselager, Rasmus Nordqvist

     

    1

    0

    ESN

    Alexander Jungbluth

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

     

     

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS (30.1.2025)

    for the Committee on International Trade

    on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt

    (COM(2024)0461 – C10‑0009/2024 – 2024/0071(COD))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Tineke Strik

     

    SHORT JUSTIFICATION

    As enshrined in the Treaties, the EU is required to uphold and promote the principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in its external action. While acknowledging the importance of the EU-Egypt strategic partnership and the need for MFA-support to Egypt in light of the economic impact of, among others, the current geopolitical situation, this opinion aims to integrate human rights, democracy and the rule of law as core parts of the MFA and to strengthen provisions related to parliamentary scrutiny and transparency. The Rapporteur is pleased that the Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) confirmed that these founding principles of the EU should form the basis of EU-Egypt relations, and concrete improvement from Egypt in this regard is a precondition for the disbursement of the MFA. Moreover, the vote confirmed that the AFET Committee is convinced that Commission services and the European External Action Service have the responsibility to integrate this approach into the Memorandum of Understanding to be negotiated with Egypt, and report on progress on the specific conditions to the European Parliament and Council. Payment of each instalment should be subject to concrete improvements on human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The Rapporteur has full trust that the competences of the AFET Committee will be integrated into the report of the Committee on International Trade, and will engage with the respective Rapporteur to that end.

    AMENDMENTS

    The Committee on Foreign Affairs submits the following to the Committee on International Trade, as the committee responsible:

    Amendment  1

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 3

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (3) In line with the Partnership Priorities, the EU and Egypt are committed to ensuring accountability, the rule of law, the full respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms, promoting democracy, gender equality and equal opportunities as constitutional rights of all their citizens. These commitments contribute to the advancement of the partnership and to Egypt’s sustainable development and stability. The increased and constructive engagement between the EU and Egypt in the last period has opened the path to more meaningful dialogue on human rights related issues. The subcommittee on Political Matters, Human Rights and Democracy, International and Regional issues of December 2022 and the Association Committee of May 2023 provided the institutional platforms to exchange on an array of human rights issues, which the EU would like to continue and build on. The improvement of the human rights situation in Egypt will have a positive impact on EU-Egypt relations.

    (3) In line with the Partnership Priorities, the EU and Egypt are committed to ensuring accountability, the rule of law, the full respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms, promoting democracy, gender equality and equal opportunities as constitutional rights of all their citizens. These commitments contribute to the advancement of the partnership and to Egypt’s sustainable social and economic development and stability. The increased and constructive engagement between the EU and Egypt in the last period has opened the path to more meaningful dialogue on human rights related issues. The subcommittee on Political Matters, Human Rights and Democracy, International and Regional issues of December 2022 and the Association Committee of May 2023 provided the institutional platforms to exchange on an array of human rights issues, which the EU would like to continue and build on. A future improvement of the human rights situation in Egypt, such as improving the rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, introducing a moratorium on death penalty, combating torture and enforced disappearances, and improving the conditions of prisons, will have a positive impact on EU-Egypt relations.

    Amendment  2

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 5

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (5) The EU recognises Egypt’s key role for regional security and stability. Terrorism, organised crime and conflicts are common threats against our security and the social fabric of nations across both sides of the Mediterranean. Therefore, the EU and Egypt have a common interest in strengthening cooperation highlighted in the Partnership Priorities, in full compliance with international law, including human rights and international humanitarian law.

    (5) The EU recognises Egypt’s key role for regional security and stability, and has a strong interest in preventing short-term economic instability in that country that could have broader consequences as well as benefit geopolitical rivals. Terrorism, organised crime, disinformation, conflicts and persecution of religious and ethnic minorities are common threats against our security and the social fabric of nations across both sides of the Mediterranean. Therefore, the EU and Egypt have a common interest in strengthening cooperation highlighted in the Partnership Priorities, in full compliance with international law, including human rights and international humanitarian law, as well as in promoting joint interests and addressing common challenges.

    Amendment  3

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 6

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (6) Recalling the geo-political challenges, such as the consequences of Hamas terrorist attacks across Israel on 7 October 2023 as well as the conflict in Sudan, and the strategic importance of Egypt as the largest country in the region and a pillar of stability for the whole Middle East, the Union is embarking on concluding a Strategic and Comprehensive partnership with Egypt as outlined in the Joint Declaration.

    (6) Recalling the geo-political challenges, such as the broader consequences of the situation in the Middle East following the Hamas terrorist attacks of 7 October 2023, as well as the armed conflict in Sudan and instability in Syria, and the strategic importance of Egypt as the largest country in the region and a pillar of stability and security for the whole Middle East, the Union is embarking on concluding a Strategic and Comprehensive partnership with Egypt as outlined in the Joint Declaration.

    Amendment  4

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 9

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (9) Egypt’s macro-fiscal situation has faced significant challenges and deteriorated substantially over recent months, as external pressures have intensified and public debt has increased further, with substantial downside risks to the economic outlook persisting. The repercussions of Russia’s war on Ukraine and of Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel have led to protracted capital outflows and lower foreign currency receipts, notably due to sharply falling income from tourism and Suez Canal proceeds. This is particularly challenging amid Egypt’s difficult fiscal situation, which is characterised by constant fiscal deficits and high and growing debt to GDP ratios.

    (9) Egypt’s macro-fiscal situation has faced significant challenges and deteriorated substantially over recent months, as external pressures have intensified and public debt has increased further, with substantial downside risks to the economic outlook persisting. The repercussions of Russia’s war on Ukraine and of the situation in the Middle East have led to protracted capital outflows and lower foreign currency receipts, notably due to sharply falling income from tourism and Suez Canal proceeds. This is particularly challenging amid Egypt’s difficult fiscal situation, which is characterised by constant fiscal deficits and high and growing debt to GDP ratios. Moreover, instability and uncertainty in Syria would further exacerbate the already existing macro-financial issues for Egypt.

    Amendment  5

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 19

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (19) The Commission should ensure that the Union’s macro-financial assistance is legally and substantially in line with the key principles, objectives and measures taken within the different areas of external action and with other relevant Union policies.

    (19) As enshrined in Article 212 TFEU, the Commission should ensure that the Union’s macro-financial assistance is legally and substantially in line with the key principles, objectives and measures taken within the different areas of external action, and in particular with Article 2 of the EU-Egypt Association Agreement of 2004 concerning the respect of democratic principles and fundamental human rights and with other relevant Union policies.

    Amendment  6

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 22

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (22) A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt should be that the country continues to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights. In addition, the specific objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems, the governance and supervision of the financial sector in Egypt and promote structural reforms aimed at supporting sustainable and inclusive growth, decent employment creation and fiscal consolidation. The fulfillment of the pre-condition and the achievement of the specific objectives should be regularly monitored by the Commission services and the European External Action Service.

    (22) A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt should be that the country takes concrete and credible steps towards respecting and enhancing effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights, In addition, the specific objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems, the governance and supervision of the financial sector in Egypt and promote structural reforms aimed at supporting sustainable and inclusive growth, decent employment creation and fiscal consolidation. The fulfillment of the pre-condition and the achievement of the specific objectives should be regularly monitored by the Commission services and the European External Action Service.

    Amendment  7

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 26

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (26) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be managed by the Commission. In order to ensure that the European Parliament and the Council are able to follow the implementation of this Decision, the Commission should regularly inform them of developments relating to the assistance and provide them with relevant documents.

    (26) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be managed by the Commission. In order to ensure that the European Parliament and the Council are able to follow the implementation of this Decision, the Commission should regularly inform them with an annual report of developments relating to the assistance and on the respect of effective democratic mechanisms, as per the pre-conditions referred to in this Decision and, provide them with relevant documents.

    Amendment  8

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 28

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (28) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be subject to economic policy conditions, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding. In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Egyptian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under that Regulation, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially important impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt, the examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of the assistance.

    (28) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be subject to economic policy and democracy, rule of law and human rights conditions, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding. In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Egyptian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under that Regulation, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially important impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt, the examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of the assistance.

    Amendment  9

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 1 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be managed by the Commission in a manner consistent with the agreements or understandings reached between the IMF and Egypt, and with the key principles and objectives of economic reforms set out in the EU-Egypt Association Agreement.

    The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be managed by the Commission in a manner consistent with the agreements or understandings reached between the IMF and Egypt, and with the key principles and objectives set out in the EU-Egypt Association Agreement.

    Amendment  10

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 1 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    The Commission shall regularly inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments regarding the Union’s macro-financial assistance, including disbursements thereof, and shall provide those institutions with the relevant documents in due time.

    The Commission shall regularly inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments regarding the Union’s macro-financial assistance, including disbursements thereof, as well as on the progress made relating to economic and democratic reforms in Egypt, and shall provide those institutions with the relevant documents, including third-party independent assessments, in due time.

    Amendment  11

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 1 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    The transparent management of funds allocated under this macro-financial assistance is essential in order to ensure that resources are used wisely, in accordance with the set objectives. The Union shall ensure that effective and independent control and audit mechanisms are put in place to prevent any misappropriation.

    Amendment  12

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 2 – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    1. A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be that Egypt continues to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights.

    1. A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be that Egypt takes concrete and credible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and made a quantitative and substantial improvement in the respect for human rights, since the signing in June 2024 of the Memorandum of Understanding linked to the EUR 1 billion macro-financial assistance package, and that it continues to make concrete and credible improvements in those areas throughout the period covered by this Decision.

    Amendment  13

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 2 – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    2. The Commission services and the European External Action Service shall monitor the fulfilment of this pre-condition throughout the life-cycle of the Union’s macro-financial assistance.

    2. The Commission services and the European External Action Service shall monitor the fulfilment of this pre-condition throughout the life-cycle of the Union’s macro-financial assistance in a transparent process in which civil society and international entities such as UN organisations are able to contribute, and report, regularly and in writing, to the European Parliament on the conditions referred to in Article 2 (1).

    Amendment  14

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 3 – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    1. The Commission, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2), shall agree with the Egyptian authorities on clearly defined economic policy and financial conditions, focusing on structural reforms and sound public finances, to which the Union’s macro-financial assistance is to be subject, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding (“the Memorandum of Understanding”) which shall include a timeframe for the achievement of those reforms. The economic policy and financial conditions set out in the Memorandum of Understanding shall be consistent with the agreements or understandings referred to in Article 1(3), including the macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform programmes implemented by Egypt with the support of the IMF.

    1. The Commission, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2), shall agree with the Egyptian authorities on clearly defined economic policy and financial conditions, focusing on structural reforms and sound public finances, as well as on democracy, rule of law and human rights conditions, to which the Union’s macro-financial assistance and the release of each separate instalment is to be subject, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding (“the Memorandum of Understanding”) which shall include a timeframe for the achievement of those reforms. The economic policy and financial conditions set out in the Memorandum of Understanding shall be consistent with the agreements or understandings referred to in Article 1(3), including the macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform programmes implemented by Egypt with the support of the IMF.

    Amendment  15

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 3 – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    2. The conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall aim, in particular, at enhancing the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Egypt, including for the use of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. Progress in mutual market opening, the development of rules-based and fair trade, and other priorities in the context of the Union’s external policy shall also be duly taken into account when designing the policy measures. Progress in attaining those objectives shall be regularly monitored by the Commission.

    2. The conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall aim, in particular, at introducing reforms towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and ensuring respect for human rights, enhancing the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Egypt, including for the use of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. Progress in mutual market opening, poverty reduction, good governance, the fight against corruption, the development of rules-based and fair trade, and other priorities in the context of the Union’s external policy, including those relating to democracy, rule of law and human rights, shall also be duly taken into account when designing the policy measures. Progress in attaining those objectives shall be regularly monitored by the Commission.

    Amendment  16

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 4 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – point c

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (c) the satisfactory implementation of the economic policy conditions and financial conditions agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding.

    (c) the satisfactory implementation of the economic policy conditions, financial conditions, and democracy, rule of law and human rights conditions, agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding.

    Amendment  17

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (ca) outline the concrete and credible steps Egypt has taken towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, and the rule of law, and towards ensuring respect for human rights.

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur for the opinion received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the opinion:

    Entity and/or person

     

    European Commission – DG ECFIN

    EEAS

    Various Egyptian authorities on multiple occassion

    Amnesty International

    Euromed Rights

    CIHRS

    Egyptian Front for Human Rights

    Committee to Protect Journalists

    Various Members of the Egyptian Parliament

    UNHCR

    Save the Children

    Frontex

    Various diplomats of EU Member States in Caïro

    Various local civil society organisations in Egypt

    Third country diplomat in Egypt

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur for the opinion.

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur for the opinion declares that she has submitted to the concerned natural persons the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Title

    Macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt

    References

    COM(2024)0461 – C10-0009/2024 – 2024/0071(COD)

    Committee(s) responsible

    INTA

     

     

     

    Opinion by

     Date announced in plenary

    AFET

    13.11.2024

    Rapporteur for the opinion

     Date appointed

    Tineke Strik

    14.10.2024

    Discussed in committee

    3.12.2024

     

     

     

    Date adopted

    30.1.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    59

    6

    7

    Members present for the final vote

    Mika Aaltola, Lucia Annunziata, Petras Auštrevičius, Jordan Bardella, Dan Barna, Wouter Beke, Robert Biedroń, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Marc Botenga, Grzegorz Braun, Sebastião Bugalho, Danilo Della Valle, Özlem Demirel, Elio Di Rupo, Michael Gahler, Geadis Geadi, Giorgos Georgiou, Raphaël Glucksmann, Bernard Guetta, Rima Hassan, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Rihards Kols, Andrey Kovatchev, Vilis Krištopans, Nathalie Loiseau, Claudiu Manda, David McAllister, Sven Mikser, Francisco José Millán Mon, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Leoluca Orlando, Kostas Papadakis, Tonino Picula, Thijs Reuten, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Andreas Schieder, Alexander Sell, Villy Søvndal, Davor Ivo Stier, Sebastiaan Stöteler, Stanislav Stoyanov, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Michał Szczerba, António Tânger Corrêa, Marta Temido, Cristian Terheş, Riho Terras, Hermann Tertsch, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Reinier Van Lanschot, Roberto Vannacci, Hilde Vautmans, Harald Vilimsky, Željana Zovko

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Jaume Asens Llodrà, Malik Azmani, Engin Eroglu, Sandra Gómez López, Evin Incir, András László, Ana Catarina Mendes, Hans Neuhoff, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Chloé Ridel, Tineke Strik, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Matej Tonin, Ivaylo Valchev, Isabel Wiseler-Lima

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Catarina Vieira

     

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    59

    +

    ECR

    Geadis Geadi, Rihards Kols, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza, Cristian Terheş, Ivaylo Valchev

    PPE

    Mika Aaltola, Wouter Beke, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Sebastião Bugalho, Michael Gahler, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Andrey Kovatchev, David McAllister, Francisco José Millán Mon, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Riho Terras, Matej Tonin, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Željana Zovko

    PfE

    András László, António Tânger Corrêa, Hermann Tertsch, Roberto Vannacci

    Renew

    Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Engin Eroglu, Bernard Guetta, Nathalie Loiseau, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans

    S&D

    Lucia Annunziata, Robert Biedroń, Elio Di Rupo, Raphaël Glucksmann, Sandra Gómez López, Evin Incir, Claudiu Manda, Ana Catarina Mendes, Sven Mikser, Tonino Picula, Thijs Reuten, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Andreas Schieder, Marta Temido

    The Left

    Özlem Demirel, Rima Hassan

    Verts/ALE

    Jaume Asens Llodrà, Leoluca Orlando, Villy Søvndal, Tineke Strik, Reinier Van Lanschot, Catarina Vieira

     

    6

    –

    NI

    Grzegorz Braun, Kostas Papadakis

    PfE

    Jordan Bardella, Sebastiaan Stöteler, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Harald Vilimsky

     

    7

    0

    ECR

    Sebastian Tynkkynen

    ESN

    Hans Neuhoff, Alexander Sell, Stanislav Stoyanov

    The Left

    Marc Botenga, Danilo Della Valle, Giorgos Georgiou

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

     

     

     

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    Title

    Macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt

    References

    COM(2024)0461 – C10-0009/2024 – 2024/0071(COD)

    Date submitted to Parliament

    15.3.2024

     

     

     

    Committee(s) responsible

    INTA

     

     

     

    Committees asked for opinions

     Date announced in plenary

    AFET

    13.11.2024

     

     

     

    Rapporteurs

     Date appointed

    Céline Imart

    30.9.2024

     

     

     

    Discussed in committee

    14.10.2024

    30.1.2025

     

     

    Date adopted

    20.3.2025

     

     

     

     

    BUDG

    29.1.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    28

    7

    5

    Members present for the final vote

    Christophe Bay, Brando Benifei, Anna Bryłka, Udo Bullmann, Benoit Cassart, Markéta Gregorová, Bart Groothuis, Céline Imart, Karin Karlsbro, Bernd Lange, Ilia Lazarov, Thierry Mariani, Javier Moreno Sánchez, Ştefan Muşoiu, Daniele Polato, Majdouline Sbai, Lukas Sieper, Dominik Tarczyński, Francesco Torselli, Kathleen Van Brempt, Jörgen Warborn, Iuliu Winkler, Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Mika Aaltola, Nicolas Bay, Markus Buchheit, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Danilo Della Valle, Borja Giménez Larraz, Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Marina Mesure, Martin Schirdewan, Kris Van Dijck

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Hildegard Bentele, Mélanie Disdier, Niels Geuking, Chloé Ridel, Romana Tomc, Matthieu Valet

    Date tabled

    24.3.2025

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    28

    +

    ECR

    Nicolas Bay, Daniele Polato, Dominik Tarczyński, Francesco Torselli, Kris Van Dijck

    ESN

    Markus Buchheit

    NI

    Lukas Sieper

    PPE

    Mika Aaltola, Hildegard Bentele, Niels Geuking, Borja Giménez Larraz, Céline Imart, Ilia Lazarov, Romana Tomc, Jörgen Warborn, Iuliu Winkler, Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez

    PfE

    Christophe Bay, Anna Bryłka, Mélanie Disdier, Thierry Mariani, Matthieu Valet

    Renew

    Benoit Cassart, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Bart Groothuis, Karin Karlsbro

    S&D

    Javier Moreno Sánchez

     

    7

    –

    S&D

    Udo Bullmann

    The Left

    Danilo Della Valle, Marina Mesure, Martin Schirdewan

    Verts/ALE

    Markéta Gregorová, Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Majdouline Sbai

     

    5

    0

    S&D

    Brando Benifei, Bernd Lange, Ştefan Muşoiu, Chloé Ridel, Kathleen Van Brempt

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    March 25, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan – A10-0038/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

    (COM(2024)0159 – C9‑0146/2024 – 2024/0086(COD))

    (Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2024)0159),

    – having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 212 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9‑0146/2024),

    – having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to Rule 60 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the budgetary assessment by the Committee on Budgets,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade (A10-0038/2025),

    1. Adopts its position at first reading, taking over the Commission proposal;

    2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

    3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

     

     

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    In an increasingly challenging global economic context, Jordan faces persistent structural challenges compounded by significant external shocks. While the country has maintained moderate growth of around 2% in recent years, this level remains insufficient to address fundamental economic needs: reducing high unemployment (22.9% in 2022) and alleviating a substantial public debt burden (88.7% of GDP in 2023).

    These domestic challenges are further exacerbated by heightened regional tensions, including the war between Israel and Gaza and ongoing instability in Syria, which are disrupting trade, straining public resources and jeopardizing key sectors such as tourism. Therefore, Jordan is facing a series of unfavorable factors with economic, political, social and demographic consequences, and must receive appropriate and rapid support as a reliable and stable partner of the EU. Moreover, the migratory pressure is very high in the Kingdom with 1.3 million refugees from Syria out of total of 3.8 million of refugees. It means 1/3 of the Kingdom population are refugees.

    To support Jordan’s economic stability and cover the country’s residual financing needs over the operation’s availability period, the Commission proposes a macro-financial assistance (MFA) operation of up to €500 million in loans, despite the Jordan’s request for €700 million.

    This assistance is designed to address pressing economic challenges, including high public debt, a structurally elevated budget deficit (5.1% of GDP in 2023), and a persistent external deficits (average of around 6.5% of GDP over the last five years). It also aims to mitigate the fiscal constraints exacerbated by recent crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and regional instability.

    The political and economic conditions necessary for granting the proposed MFA are fulfilled, as confirmed by the Commission’s evaluation of Jordan’s current situation. The loan will be provided under the External Action Guarantee with a provisioning at a rate of 9%, which will be programmed under the NDICI-GE, for a total amount of EUR 45 million. To ensure risk coverage, the EU will provision 9% of the total amount, or €45 million, under the External Action Guarantee.

    The MFA will have a validity period of two and a half years following the entry into force of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The disbursement of funds will occur in three tranches, contingent upon the full and timely implementation of the agreed-upon economic policies outlined in the MoU. These policies include ambitious reforms in key areas such as public governance, fiscal management, and anti-corruption efforts, ensuring that the assistance supports Jordan’s long-term economic resilience.

    This assistance complements the ongoing IMF program approved in January 2024, which provides $1.2 billion over four years, and aligns with support from other international partners, including substantial U.S. grants. It also builds on Jordan’s track record with macro-financial assistance, being the fourth MFA operation since 2014, totaling €1.08 billion to date. These successive programs underscore the EU’s ongoing commitment to strengthening Jordan’s institutional capacity and promoting economic stability.

    By addressing Jordan’s immediate financing needs and supporting reforms in key areas, the MFA reinforces the country’s economic resilience while contributing to regional stability. Subordinated to clear economic policy conditions, this assistance ensures accountability and progress. The full and timely implementation of these policies will remain a prerequisite for the disbursement of each tranche, ensuring that Jordan continues to meet its reform commitments.

    Jordan is a key partner in the region, able to engage in dialogue with the various geopolitical players in the Middle East. It is important to give Jordan due consideration and not to take its support for granted. It is therefore important to build a global and strategic partnership with Jordan, alongside and in addition to this MFA, in order to quickly lay the foundations for tomorrow’s collaboration.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee:

    Entity and/or person

    European Commission – DG ECFIN

    European Commission – DG NEAR

    EEAS

    Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the concerned natural persons the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

     

    BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETS (4.2.2025)

    for the Committee on International Trade

    on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

    (COM(2024)0159 – C9‑0146/2024 – 2024/0086(COD))

    Rapporteur for budgetary assessment: Johan Van Overtveldt 

    The Committee on Budgets has carried out a budgetary assessment of the proposal under Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure and has reached the following conclusions:

    A. whereas Jordan continues to face significant external financing needs and economic challenges, with a current account deficit of 7.1 % of gross domestic product (GDP) in the first half of 2023, driven by persistent deficits in trade in goods; whereas Jordan’s public debt burden remains high at 88.7 % of GDP in 2023, raising concerns about long-term fiscal sustainability;

    B. whereas Jordan’s narrow revenue base, with domestic tax revenue at only 16 % of GDP, raises concerns about long-term fiscal sustainability and capacity to service external debts;

    C. whereas the policy measures associated with macro-financial assistance (MFA) cover selected provisions related to the Association Agreement and the EU-Jordan Partnership Priorities 2021-2027;

    D. whereas significant structural challenges hinder economic growth, with deficiencies in the business environment, access to finance, labour market flexibility and public administration; whereas unemployment remains high, especially among women, youth and university graduates, with women’s labour force participation at just 14 % in 2023, among the lowest globally; whereas the EU-Jordan Partnership Priorities 2021-2027 aim to address these issues by fostering decent work, innovation, skills development and comprehensive social protection systems;

    E. whereas the EU-Jordan Partnership Priorities 2021-2027 highlight cooperation in inter-religious and intercultural dialogue and the protection of cultural heritage as drivers of peace and sustainable development; whereas these efforts can include safeguarding historical manuscripts and archives, contributing to inclusive dialogue and mutual understanding;

    F. whereas Jordan’s economy has suffered significantly from protracted conflicts and crises in the region, notably in neighbouring Syria, and most recently in Israel/Gaza and the Red Sea; whereas these pose further risks to Jordan’s economic outlook, particularly affecting tourism and trade, with disruptions to exports and vessel traffic;

    G. whereas the severe deterioration of external accounts and Jordan’s strategic importance for regional stability justify this support package;

    H. whereas the conflicts in Gaza and the wider region have been exacerbating socioeconomic challenges in Jordan given its geographical position;

    1. Notes that the Commission proposal of EUR 500 million in MFA requires EUR 45 million in provisioning under the External Action Guarantee from the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe; points out that the evolving financial and economic realities in Jordan might require a revision of the proposed amount of MFA, consequently having an effect on provisioning;

    2. Notes that the assistance will be disbursed in three instalments between 2024 and 2027, with release strictly linked to the progress of the implementation of both the International Monetary Fund programme and additional policy measures;

    3. Recalls that this represents the fourth MFA operation for Jordan since 2014, bringing total MFA support to EUR 1.58 billion, demonstrating the EU’s sustained commitment to supporting Jordan’s economic stability;

    4. Acknowledges that the loan structure includes a grace period and spreads repayments over a long period, creating extended contingent liabilities for the EU budget that require monitoring over multiple financial frameworks;

    5. Acknowledges that the International Monetary Fund assessed Jordan’s public debt level as sustainable in its report of January 2024, while noting that debt sustainability risks remain significant;

    6. Recalls that previous MFA operations for Jordan have demonstrated positive track records in terms of repayment;

    7. Emphasises that the MFA underpins Jordan’s continued commitment to values shared with the Union, including democracy, rule of law, good governance and respect for human rights; highlights that these commitments are key to ensuring effective reforms and long-term stability; stresses that a precondition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance is that Jordan respects effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and guarantees respect for human rights;

    8. Stresses the importance of the regular verification of Jordan’s compliance with the preconditions, ongoing conditionality and objectives to protect the EU’s financial interests and ensure the implementation of the MFA in accordance with the regulation;

    9. Calls for proper monitoring and regular reporting to Parliament and the Council on developments relating to the assistance as well as the continuous monitoring of conditions and objectives;

    10. Recalls that while MFA is meant to be an exceptional crisis response instrument, its increasing use to address structural economic challenges in partner countries risks diluting its emergency nature;

    11. Concludes that the proposal for a decision on providing macro-financial assistance to Jordan is compatible with the EU’s budgetary framework and financial rules.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The Chair in his capacity as rapporteur for budgetary assessment declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

    Title

    Macro-financial assistance to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

    References

    COM(2024)0159 – C9-0146/2024 – 2024/0086(COD)

    Committee(s) responsible

    INTA

     

     

     

     Date announced in plenary

    BUDG

    25.4.2024

    Rapporteur for budgetary assessment

     Date appointed

    Johan Van Overtveldt

    5.12.2024

    Discussed in committee

    16.1.2025

     

     

     

    Date adopted

    29.1.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    35

    2

    1

    Members present for the final vote

    Georgios Aftias, Rasmus Andresen, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Tobiasz Bocheński, Olivier Chastel, Tamás Deutsch, Angéline Furet, Jens Geier, Thomas Geisel, Jean-Marc Germain, Sandra Gómez López, Monika Hohlmeier, Alexander Jungbluth, Janusz Lewandowski, Giuseppe Lupo, Siegfried Mureşan, Matjaž Nemec, Danuše Nerudová, João Oliveira, Ruggero Razza, Karlo Ressler, Julien Sanchez, Hélder Sousa Silva, Joachim Streit, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs, Lucia Yar, Auke Zijlstra

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Damian Boeselager, Michalis Hadjipantela, Moritz Körner, Tiago Moreira de Sá, Rasmus Nordqvist, Michele Picaro, Jacek Protas, Beata Szydło

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Thierry Mariani, Aodhán Ó Ríordáin

     

     

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL
    IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

    35

    +

    ECR

    Tobiasz Bocheński, Michele Picaro, Ruggero Razza, Beata Szydło

    NI

    Thomas Geisel

    PPE

    Georgios Aftias, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Michalis Hadjipantela, Monika Hohlmeier, Janusz Lewandowski, Siegfried Mureşan, Danuše Nerudová, Jacek Protas, Karlo Ressler, Hélder Sousa Silva

    PfE

    Tamás Deutsch, Angéline Furet, Thierry Mariani, Tiago Moreira de Sá, Julien Sanchez

    Renew

    Olivier Chastel, Moritz Körner, Joachim Streit, Lucia Yar

    S&D

    Jens Geier, Jean-Marc Germain, Sandra Gómez López, Giuseppe Lupo, Matjaž Nemec, Aodhán Ó Ríordáin, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs

    Verts/ALE

    Rasmus Andresen, Damian Boeselager, Rasmus Nordqvist

     

    2

    –

    PfE

    Auke Zijlstra

    The Left

    João Oliveira

     

    1

    0

    ESN

    Alexander Jungbluth

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS (31.1.2025)

    for the Committee on International Trade

    on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

    (COM(2024)0159 – C9‑0146/2024 – 2024/0086(COD))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Malik Azmani

     

     

    AMENDMENTS

    The Committee on Foreign Affairs submits the following to the Committee on International Trade, as the committee responsible:

    Amendment  1

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (2) Since 2011, Jordan has embarked on a number of political reforms to strengthen parliamentary democracy and the rule of law. A Constitutional Court and an Independent Electoral Commission have been set up and a number of major laws, including the Electoral Act and the Political Parties Act as well as laws on decentralisation and municipalities, have been passed by the Jordanian Parliament. Legislative improvements as regards the independence of the judiciary and women’s rights have been adopted.

    (2) Since 2021, Jordan has embarked on a number of political reforms to strengthen parliamentary democracy and the rule of law. A Constitutional Court and an Independent Electoral Commission have been set up and a number of major laws, including the Electoral Act and the Political Parties Act as well as laws on decentralisation and municipalities, have been passed by the Jordanian Parliament. Legislative improvements as regards the independence of the judiciary and women’s rights have been adopted. The European Election Observation Mission in Jordan took note of the inclusive and well-organised parliamentary elections that took place on 10 September 2024 in the context of the political modernisation initiated by the King in 2021. It is crucial that the Union continues to support peace in Jordan and does everything within its power to preserve the unique Jordanian model of ethnic and religious representation in order to ensure legitimate representation of those groups.

    Amendment  2

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 3

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (3) The Jordanian economy has suffered significantly from protracted conflicts in the region, notably in neighbouring Syria, and most recently in Israel/Gaza and the Red Sea. Since the start of the war in Syria, the Jordanian economy has been impacted by a large inflow of Syrian refugees, which has increased pressure on its fiscal position, public services and infrastructure. In addition to regional instability, the macroeconomic and fiscal challenges related to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020/2021, commodity price developments following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, high exposure to trade fluctuations and the increase of borrowing costs for emerging markets globally continued to weigh on the Jordanian economy. As a result, Jordan experienced an economic contraction in 2020, followed by a slow economic recovery, as unemployment increased significantly in 2020 and remained high, and new fiscal and external financing needs emerged.

    (3) The Jordanian economy has suffered significantly from protracted conflicts in the region, notably in neighbouring Syria, and most recently in Israel/Gaza and the Red Sea. Since the start of the war in Syria, the Jordanian economy has been impacted by a large inflow of Syrian refugees, which has increased pressure on its fiscal position, public services and infrastructure. The current uncertainty in Syria further exacerbates the already highly detrimental instability for Jordan. Jordan hosts around 1,3 million refugees, making it one of the countries with the highest number of refugee populations per capita. In addition to regional instability, the macroeconomic and fiscal challenges related to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020/2021, commodity price developments following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, high exposure to trade fluctuations and the increase of borrowing costs for emerging markets globally continued to weigh on the Jordanian economy. As a result, Jordan experienced an economic contraction in 2020, followed by a slow economic recovery, as unemployment increased significantly in 2020 and remained high, and new fiscal and external financing needs emerged. Moreover, significant structural issues hinder economic growth, particularly in the area of private sector development. Challenges such as an unfavourable business environment and inflexibility in the labour market remain unresolved.

    Amendment  3

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 4 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (4a) The Union recognises Jordan’s pivotal role in promoting regional stability and mediating conflicts, particularly amidst heightened tensions. The proposed macro-financial assistance aims to support Jordan in maintaining its positive role in the region. In that context, and in recognition of Jordan being one of the Union’s strongest regional partners, it is imperative for the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to further deepen and strengthen the EU-Jordan partnership, thereby advancing cooperation.

    Amendment  4

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 21

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (21) A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance should be that Jordan respects effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights. In addition, the specific objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Jordan and promote structural reforms aimed at supporting sustainable and inclusive growth, employment creation and fiscal consolidation. Both the fulfilment of the pre-conditions and the achievement of those objectives should be regularly monitored by the Commission and the EEAS.

    (21) A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance should be that Jordan respects effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights. In addition, the specific objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Jordan and promote structural reforms aimed at supporting sustainable and inclusive growth, employment creation, and fiscal consolidation and policies. Both the fulfilment of the pre-conditions and the achievement of those objectives should be regularly monitored by the Commission and the EEAS, which should subsequently be reported to the European Parliament. The Union should encourage Jordan’s efforts toward economic diversification and sustainability, particularly in sectors such as renewable energy, technology  and digital services, in order to reduce its reliance on tourism and chemical exports and to enhance long-term resilience.

    Amendment  5

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 27

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (27) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be subject to economic policy conditions, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding. In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Jordanian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under that Regulation, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially important impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Jordan, the examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of the assistance.

    (27) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be subject to clear and measurable economic, as well as democracy, rule of law and human rights policy conditions, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding. In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Jordanian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under that Regulation, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially important impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Jordan, the examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding, including clear and measurable benchmarks to evaluate the implementation of each instalment, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of the assistance.

    Amendment  6

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 2 – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    2. The Commission and the European External Action Service shall monitor the fulfilment of this pre-condition throughout the life cycle of the Union’s macro-financial assistance..

    2. The Commission and the European External Action Service shall monitor the fulfilment of this pre-condition throughout the life cycle of the Union’s macro-financial assistance in a transparent process in which independent third parties are able to contribute meaningfully. The Commission and the EEAS shall also report, both regularly and in writing, to the European Parliament and to the Council on the fulfilment of the pre-condition referred to in paragraph 1.

    Amendment  7

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 3 – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    2. The conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall aim, in particular, at enhancing the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Jordan, including for the use of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. Progress in mutual market opening, the development of rules-based and fair trade, and other priorities in the context of the Union’s external policy shall also be duly taken into account when designing the policy measures. Progress in attaining those objectives shall be regularly monitored by the Commission.

    2. The conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall aim, in particular, at enhancing the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Jordan, including for the use of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. This shall include the publication of regular and detailed reports by the Jordanian government on the use of funds, specifying allocations for key sectors such as healthcare, education, and infrastructure, ensuring public access to such information. Progress in public services, mutual market opening, the development of rules-based and fair trade, and other priorities in the context of the Union’s external policy, including those related to democracy, rule of law and human rights, shall also be duly taken into account when designing the policy measures. Progress in attaining those objectives shall be regularly monitored by the Commission and the EEAS, and shall be communicated to the European Parliament.

    Amendment  8

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 4 – paragraph 4

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    4. Where the conditions referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 3 are not met, the Commission shall temporarily suspend or cancel the disbursement of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. In such cases, it shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the reasons for the suspension or cancellation.

    4. Where the conditions referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 3 are not met, the Commission shall temporarily suspend or cancel the disbursement of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. In such cases, it shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the reasons for the suspension or cancellation and of the subsequent steps.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR FOR THE OPINION HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur for the opinion received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the opinion:

    Entity and/or person

     

    European Commission – DG ECFIN

    The Court of Auditors

    The Ambassador of Jordan to the EU

    Member of the Royal committee to Modernize the Political System in Jordan

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur for the opinion.

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur for the opinion declares that he has submitted to the concerned natural persons the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

     

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Title

    Macro-financial assistance to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

    References

    COM(2024)0159 – C9-0146/2024 – 2024/0086(COD)

    Committee(s) responsible

    INTA

     

     

     

    Opinion by

     Date announced in plenary

    AFET

    25.4.2024

    Rapporteur for the opinion

     Date appointed

    Malik Azmani

    14.10.2024

    Date adopted

    30.1.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    54

    11

    6

    Members present for the final vote

    Mika Aaltola, Lucia Annunziata, Petras Auštrevičius, Jordan Bardella, Dan Barna, Wouter Beke, Robert Biedroń, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Marc Botenga, Grzegorz Braun, Sebastião Bugalho, Danilo Della Valle, Özlem Demirel, Elio Di Rupo, Michael Gahler, Geadis Geadi, Giorgos Georgiou, Raphaël Glucksmann, Bernard Guetta, Rima Hassan, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Rihards Kols, Andrey Kovatchev, Vilis Krištopans, Nathalie Loiseau, Claudiu Manda, David McAllister, Sven Mikser, Francisco José Millán Mon, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Leoluca Orlando, Kostas Papadakis, Tonino Picula, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Andreas Schieder, Alexander Sell, Villy Søvndal, Davor Ivo Stier, Sebastiaan Stöteler, Stanislav Stoyanov, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Michał Szczerba, António Tânger Corrêa, Marta Temido, Cristian Terheş, Riho Terras, Hermann Tertsch, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Reinier Van Lanschot, Roberto Vannacci, Hilde Vautmans, Harald Vilimsky, Željana Zovko

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Malik Azmani, Engin Eroglu, Sandra Gómez López, Evin Incir, András László, Ana Catarina Mendes, Hans Neuhoff, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Tineke Strik, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Matej Tonin, Ivaylo Valchev, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Milan Zver

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Catarina Vieira

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    54

    +

    ECR

    Geadis Geadi, Rihards Kols, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Cristian Terheş, Ivaylo Valchev

    PPE

    Mika Aaltola, Wouter Beke, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Sebastião Bugalho, Michael Gahler, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Andrey Kovatchev, David McAllister, Francisco José Millán Mon, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Riho Terras, Matej Tonin, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Željana Zovko, Milan Zver

    PfE

    András László

    Renew

    Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Engin Eroglu, Bernard Guetta, Nathalie Loiseau, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans

    S&D

    Lucia Annunziata, Robert Biedroń, Elio Di Rupo, Raphaël Glucksmann, Sandra Gómez López, Evin Incir, Claudiu Manda, Ana Catarina Mendes, Sven Mikser, Tonino Picula, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Andreas Schieder, Marta Temido

    The Left

    Özlem Demirel, Rima Hassan

    Verts/ALE

    Leoluca Orlando, Villy Søvndal, Tineke Strik, Reinier Van Lanschot, Catarina Vieira

     

    11

    –

    ECR

    Sebastian Tynkkynen

    NI

    Grzegorz Braun, Kostas Papadakis

    PfE

    Jordan Bardella, Vilis Krištopans, Sebastiaan Stöteler, António Tânger Corrêa, Hermann Tertsch, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Roberto Vannacci, Harald Vilimsky

     

    6

    0

    ESN

    Hans Neuhoff, Alexander Sell, Stanislav Stoyanov

    The Left

    Marc Botenga, Danilo Della Valle, Giorgos Georgiou

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

     

     

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    Title

    Macro-financial assistance to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

    References

    COM(2024)0159 – C9-0146/2024 – 2024/0086(COD)

    Date submitted to Parliament

    8.4.2024

     

     

     

    Committee(s) responsible

    INTA

     

     

     

    Committees asked for opinions

     Date announced in plenary

    AFET

    25.4.2024

     

     

     

    Rapporteurs

     Date appointed

    Céline Imart

    30.9.2024

     

     

     

    Discussed in committee

    14.10.2024

    30.1.2025

     

     

    Date adopted

    20.3.2025

     

     

     

     

    BUDG

    29.1.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    35

    2

    3

    Members present for the final vote

    Christophe Bay, Brando Benifei, Anna Bryłka, Udo Bullmann, Benoit Cassart, Markéta Gregorová, Bart Groothuis, Céline Imart, Karin Karlsbro, Bernd Lange, Ilia Lazarov, Thierry Mariani, Javier Moreno Sánchez, Ştefan Muşoiu, Daniele Polato, Majdouline Sbai, Lukas Sieper, Dominik Tarczyński, Francesco Torselli, Kathleen Van Brempt, Jörgen Warborn, Iuliu Winkler, Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Mika Aaltola, Nicolas Bay, Markus Buchheit, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Danilo Della Valle, Borja Giménez Larraz, Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Marina Mesure, Martin Schirdewan, Kris Van Dijck

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Hildegard Bentele, Mélanie Disdier, Niels Geuking, Chloé Ridel, Romana Tomc, Matthieu Valet

    Date tabled

    24.3.2025

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    35

    +

    ECR

    Daniele Polato, Dominik Tarczyński, Francesco Torselli, Kris Van Dijck

    NI

    Lukas Sieper

    PPE

    Mika Aaltola, Hildegard Bentele, Niels Geuking, Borja Giménez Larraz, Céline Imart, Ilia Lazarov, Romana Tomc, Jörgen Warborn, Iuliu Winkler, Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez

    PfE

    Christophe Bay, Anna Bryłka, Mélanie Disdier, Thierry Mariani, Matthieu Valet

    Renew

    Benoit Cassart, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Bart Groothuis, Karin Karlsbro

    S&D

    Brando Benifei, Udo Bullmann, Bernd Lange, Javier Moreno Sánchez, Ştefan Muşoiu, Chloé Ridel, Kathleen Van Brempt

    Verts/ALE

    Markéta Gregorová, Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Majdouline Sbai

     

    2

    –

    ECR

    Nicolas Bay

    ESN

    Markus Buchheit

     

    3

    0

    The Left

    Danilo Della Valle, Marina Mesure, Martin Schirdewan

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    March 25, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – The specific challenges of EU external border regions with migration – E-001080/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001080/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle (Renew), Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez (Renew)

    EU external border regions, such as the Canary Islands, face specific challenges as regards migration, bearing – as key entry points for migration flows – a disproportionate burden in the reception of migrants. However, EU external border regions often have more difficulty gaining access to EU funds (such as the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF)), and often lack direct representation in important discussions the outcome of which directly affects the EU external border regions, such as the strategic dialogues on migration with third countries.

    Against this background,

    • 1.Is the Commission considering easing the conditions for access to these key funds by reducing administrative burdens and adapting indicators to different realities, such as those faced by EU external border regions?
    • 2.Is the Commission considering establishing subnational allocations within the AMIF to ensure direct financial support to (EU external border) regions?
    • 3.Does the Commission plan to establish a formal mechanism for including EU external border regions in migration dialogues with third countries? If so, when is this expected to be implemented, and what is the anticipated format?

    Submitted: 12.3.2025

    Last updated: 24 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    March 25, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Competition Commission of India (CCI) investigated 35 cartel cases in last five years

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Competition Commission of India (CCI) investigated 35 cartel cases in last five years

    CCI has Signed MoUs with Global Regulators for Competition Law Cooperation

    Competition Act 2023 Introduced ‘Lesser Penalty Plus’ for Cartel Disclosures

    Posted On: 24 MAR 2025 6:15PM by PIB Delhi

    The Competition Commission of India (CCI) investigated a total of 35 cartel cases across various sectors over the last five financial years (till 13.03.2025).

    CCI has signed Bilateral/Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Egypt, Mauritius, Japan, Brazil, BRICS (Brazil, the Russian Federation, People’s Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa), Canada, European Commission, Australia and United States Department of Justice (DOJ) for cooperation in the field of competition law and policy. These MOUs include provision for enforcement cooperation between CCI and its MoU partners, subject to their respective legal framework, constraints, enforcement interests and available resources.

    In addition, India has signed 14 Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with its trading partners. Some of these FTAs have a separate Chapter on Competition, according to which each Party shall, in accordance with its laws and regulations, take measures which it considers appropriate against anticompetitive activities, in order to facilitate trade and investment flows between the Parties and the efficient functioning of its market.

    The Commission has a Division for trend analysis and conducting research in various sectors of the economy to have a holistic view and to detect any anti-competitive activities. The Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023 introduced the concept of “lesser penalty plus” within the framework of Section 46 of the Act. Consequently, on 20.02.2024, the CCI (Lesser Penalty) Regulations, 2024 were notified, replacing the 2009 regulations and introducing a “lesser penalty plus”(LPP) mechanism to incentivize disclosures of cartels. The LPP mechanism was introduced to incentivize an existing lesser penalty applicant in respect of a cartel to give full, true, and vital disclosures about another cartel, hitherto not in the knowledge of the CCI.

    To further widen the scope of cartel investigation, Hub & Spoke mechanism has been incorporated by introducing the Proviso in Section 3(3) of the Competition Act, 2002 through the Amendment Act 2023 which provides that an enterprise or association of enterprises or a person or association of persons though not engaged in identical or similar trade shall also be presumed to be part of the agreement under this sub-section if it participates or intends to participate in the furtherance of such agreement. 

    CCI, through its enforcement and advocacy mandate, seeks to promote and sustain competition in the markets by conducting market studies and advocacy events, imparting training about competition issues besides carrying out market corrections to eliminate distortions. The CCI conducted 1446 advocacy programmes during the last five financial years (till 19.03.2025).

    This information was given by Minister of Finance and Corporate Affairs, Shri Nirmala Sitharaman, in  reply to a question in the Lok Sabha today.

    *****

    NB/AD

    (Release ID: 2114500) Visitor Counter : 68

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

    March 25, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: International Workshop on Land Governance Kick Starts with Global Participation from 22 Countries in Gurugram, Haryana

    Source: Government of India (2)

    International Workshop on Land Governance Kick Starts with Global Participation from 22 Countries in Gurugram, Haryana

    Fostering Cross-Country Knowledge Sharing; SVAMITVA Scheme Showcased as a Model for Rural Empowerment

    Participants Gain Practical Insights into Drone Surveying and Geospatial Technologies for Sustainable Land Governance

    Posted On: 24 MAR 2025 6:11PM by PIB Delhi

    In a significant milestone, the Ministry of Panchayati Raj (MoPR) inaugurated the first-of-its-kind International Workshop on Land Governance today at the Haryana Institute of Public Administration (HIPA) in Gurugram. This six-day workshop, organized in collaboration with the Ministry of External Affairs under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme, brings together more than 40 senior officials from 22 countries across Africa, Latin America, and South-East Asia to explore innovative approaches for addressing global land governance challenges. The inaugural session witnessed distinguished participation from senior officials, including Shri Sushil Kumar Lohani, Additional Secretary, Ministry of Panchayati Raj; Shri Viraj Singh, Additional Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs; Shri Alok Prem Nagar, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Panchayati Raj; and Shri Ramesh Chander Bidhan, Director General, Haryana Institute of Public Administration. This landmark initiative strongly aligns with the vision of Hon’ble Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi to transform rural India through technological innovation and securing land rights.

    In his address, Shri Sushil Kumar Lohani, Additional Secretary, Ministry of Panchayati Raj, articulated the vision behind SVAMITVA and its potential for global replication, offering valuable insights into policy advancements and India’s strategic vision for land governance. “SVAMITVA represents more than just a land mapping exercise; it is a comprehensive approach towards rural empowerment through secure property rights”, Shri Lohani stated. He said “With over 3.17 lakh villages mapped across 67,000 sq. km, representing an estimated asset base of Rs.132 lakh crore, we have demonstrated the scalability and impact of this model. We are eager to share our experiences and learn from our international partners to collectively advance land governance worldwide”. Shri Lohani emphasized upon the transformative role of geospatial technologies in land governance, underlining the technical expertise that has made SVAMITVA one of the world’s largest rural mapping initiatives. He said, “The integration of drone technology with traditional surveying methods has revolutionized our approach to mapping rural inhabited areas, delivering unprecedented accuracy and efficiency”.

    Addressing the International Workshop, Shri Viraj Singh, Additional Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, emphasized upon the diplomatic significance of the workshop. Shri Singh said “This initiative exemplifies India’s commitment to South-South Cooperation and knowledge sharing. By bringing together nations facing similar challenges, we are fostering a collaborative approach towards addressing land governance issues globally.” He also highlighted the role of the ITEC programme in facilitating international cooperation and the role of collaboration with the Ministry of Panchayati Raj in advancing ITEC’s objectives.

    Shri Alok Prem Nagar, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Panchayati Raj, said that the SVAMITVA Scheme exemplifies how innovative approaches can transform rural communities by securing property rights and unlocking economic potential. “SVAMITVA demonstrates how innovative approaches to land governance can directly contribute to achieving Sustainable Development Goals related to poverty reduction, secure land tenure, and sustainable land use” he said. Shri Smit Shah, President of the Drone Federation of India, provided insights into India’s rapidly evolving drone ecosystem, highlighting how policy reforms and technological advancements have positioned India as a leader in drone-based solutions for land governance.

    Innovations in Geospatial Technologies and Drone Solutions

    A major highlight of the inaugural day was the cutting-edge exhibition that highlighted the latest advancements in land governance, digital cadastral systems, and geospatial technologies. The event showcased a wide range of technological solutions, from precision drone mapping and 3D geospatial data analytics to integrated land administration systems. The exhibition also spotlighted high-precision surveying equipment and comprehensive GIS applications designed to enhance land governance. Local innovations in drone technology and UAV-based land administration solutions were prominently featured, alongside contributions from government bodies that demonstrated survey-grade drones, CORS & Rover systems, and other transformative tools. Attendees had the opportunity to engage in hands-on demonstrations of drone flight planning, data processing techniques, and real-time, high-accuracy surveying capabilities, offering a comprehensive look at the future of land management.

    Technical Sessions Highlight SVAMITVA’s Impact and Methodology

    On the inaugural day, participants also engaged in in-depth technical discussions on  the modernization of land governance and its impact, as well as resource mobilization and administrative tasks.  A comprehensive overview of the SVAMITVA Scheme was presented, emphasizing its objectives, implementation strategy, and its positive impact on rural communities, particularly in fostering financial inclusion and economic empowerment. Presentations from various countries, sharing their experiences and best practices in land administration systems were also made. Participants also benefited from practical drone demonstrations, interactive sessions with vendors, and knowledge assessments to reinforce learning outcomes.

     

    Global Participation Highlights International Interest

    The ongoing workshop has garnered significant international participation, with delegates from 22 countries, including Turkmenistan, Colombia, Zimbabwe, Fiji, and several others, underscoring the global significance of land governance issues.The workshop, which combines interactive technical sessions, field visits, and hands-on demonstrations, highlights India’s leadership role in South-South Cooperation. By offering technical expertise, policy guidance, and skill development opportunities through SVAMITVA, India is contributing to building institutional capacity for partner nations in land governance, property rights management, and rural development. The event explores challenges such as property disputes, outdated land databases, and the need for high-resolution digital maps. This six-day international workshop will continue with detailed technical sessions, field demonstrations, and visits to the Survey of India lab, providing participants with practical insights into drone-based surveying, data processing, and the integration of geospatial technologies in land administration.

    About SVAMITVA Scheme: The SVAMITVA (Survey of Villages Abadi and Mapping with Improvised Technology in Village Areas) Scheme is a flagship initiative of the Government of India implemented by the Ministry of Panchayati Raj. It aims to provide rural property owners with “Record of Rights” by using drone surveying technology to map inhabited areas of villages. The scheme has successfully mapped over 3.17 lakh villages across India, representing an estimated asset base of Rs.132 lakh crore.

    The Ministry of Panchayati Raj presented a short film on the #SVAMITVA_Scheme at the International Workshop on Land Governance at HIPA, Gurugram, highlighting its impact on rural land governance.

    The film showcased how #SVAMITVA revolutionized property rights through drone-based… pic.twitter.com/4EczUeIdYY

    — Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Government of India (@mopr_goi) March 24, 2025

    ***

    Aditi Agrawal

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    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

    March 25, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Local staff ‘particularly vulnerable’ to detention, as UN calls for their release

    Source: United Nations MIL OSI

    24 March 2025 Peace and Security

    Staff members of the United Nations around the world who are recruited locally are “particularly vulnerable” to detention and should be released and allowed to go home according to the UN Secretary-General, António Guterres.

    In the last year alone 101 UN staff members were arrested or detained globally of whom at least 52 UN personnel remain in detention.

    The UN has a presence on the ground in some of the world’s most dangerous and unstable locations including Gaza, Sudan, Yemen, Haiti and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    In a statement ahead of the International Day of Solidarity with Detained and Missing Staff Members the UN chief said that UN staff often serve “at immense personal risk – facing threats of kidnap, violence, harassment, detention, and more.”

    Mr. Guterres urged governments to ensure the safety and security of UN staff and to seek justice for crimes committed against them.

    He called on all states to fulfill their obligations under international conventions related to the protection of UN personnel.

    “Together, we must protect those who serve humanity and help build a better and safer world for all.”

    Held in Yemen

    The Arabian Peninsula state of Yemen is a particularly dangerous place to work for the United Nations.

    “In Yemen, 23 UN staff members, along with many other humanitarian workers, remain detained – some for more than three years,” the President of the United Nations General Assembly, Philémon Yang, said in his message to mark the international day.

    He said that “one UN aid worker from the World Food Programme has died while detained,” adding that those colleagues had “dedicated themselves to educating children, providing vital medical and food assistance to millions, and promoting peace and dialogue.

    “Their work must be protected. I stand in full solidarity with all those detained. They must be released and protected.”

    The staff detained in Yemen are all national staff and, prior to their detention, worked with UN and other agencies including the UN human rights office (OHCHR), the UN Development Programme, UNICEF, UNESCO, the World Food Programme, and the NGOs, CARE, Save the Children, and Oxfam.

    The President of the General Assembly – which comprises all 193 UN member states – called for the immediate and unconditional release of all UN staff detained in Yemen and elsewhere.

    Solidarity and action

    The International Day of Solidarity with Detained and Missing Staff Members marks the anniversary of the abduction of Alec Collett, a former journalist working for the UN Palestine refugee agency, UNRWA, who was abducted by a gunman in 1985. His body was found in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley in 2009.

    The aim of the international day is to mobilize action, demand justice and strengthen the resolve to protect UN staff and peacekeepers, as well as workers in the non-governmental community and the media.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    March 25, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Video: SADC-EAC JOINT SUMMIT CLOSING COMMUNIQUE

    Source: Republic of South Africa (video statements)

    SADC-EAC JOINT SUMMIT CLOSING COMMUNIQUE

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IAoUtrlMbco

    MIL OSI Video –

    March 25, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: WFP races to support new Congolese arrivals in Burundi as aid operations become stretched to the limit

    Source: World Food Programme

    Photo: WFP/Irenee Nduwayezu. A congolese refugee, near the rugombo stadium in the western of Burundi. refugees from Eastern Democratic Republic of The Congo (DRC), forced to flee violence following the conflicts between the March Movement 23(M23) and DRC forces (FARDC).

    Photo credit

    BUJUMBURA, Burundi – The UN World Food Programme (WFP) has rapidly mobilized additional assistance in Burundi to support the large influx of families fleeing violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The sharp increase in refugees in need of aid has placed a significant strain on WFP food assistance programmes in Burundi.

    Since January 2025, nearly 70,000 people – mainly women, children and the elderly – have fled fighting in DRC to Burundi, many making dangerous river crossings and walking long distances in search of safety. More continue to arrive each day, adding to what is already the largest influx into Burundi in decades. 

    Cross border movement into DRC’s other neighbours, including Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania, is also increasing due to the escalating conflict in the country’s east and this threatens to worsen hunger across the region.

    “Refugees are arriving every day, some weighed down with hastily packed bundles and suitcases, and others with nothing but the clothes on their backs,” said Dragica Pajevic, WFP’s Deputy Regional Director for eastern Africa, who is currently on the ground supporting operations in Burundi. “The number of refugees has doubled in just a few weeks, and although we are grateful for the funding received to-date, it’s simply not enough. Our available resources are stretched beyond capacity, and we’re being forced to adapt our operations and reduce rations to reach as many people as possible.” 

    Of the 70,000 people who have arrived in Burundi from DRC in recent weeks, 60,000 have been registered for food assistance, doubling WFP’s total refugee caseload to 120,000 in just a few weeks. WFP is providing hot meals to the new Congolese refugees, who are housed in temporary transit camps, schools, churches and sports stadiums.

    Meanwhile, WFP’s existing refugees are receiving food rations – provided as a mix of in-kind food and cash. But to stretch limited resources, WFP was forced in March to reduce rations for existing refugees from 75 percent to 50 percent.  

    WFP currently only has the funds to sustain operations for 120,000 refugees through June. Without additional financial support, WFP will be forced to suspend food assistance entirely from July – or even earlier as refugee numbers continue to increase as conflict in eastern DRC intensifies. 

    To ensure uninterrupted assistance, WFP urgently needs US$19.8 million to maintain adequate support for the most vulnerable until the end of the year. This would also allow WFP to once again provide all refugees with full rations – vital life-saving support at this time of acute crisis.  

    Notes to editor:

    High resolutions photos are available here.

    Broadcast quality footage is available here.

    #                    #                      #

    The United Nations World Food Programme is the world’s largest humanitarian organization saving lives in emergencies and using food assistance to build a pathway to peace, stability and prosperity for people recovering from conflict, disasters and the impact of climate change.

    Follow us on X, formerly Twitter, via @wfp_media @wfp_Africa 

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    March 25, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: ‘Racism requires ignorance’: How art and culture can help end racial discrimination

    Source: United Nations 2

    By Ana Carmo

    24 March 2025 Human Rights

    Despite significant progress over the years, the fight against racism and racial discrimination remains as urgent as ever. 

    “Ignorance allows for racism, but racism requires ignorance. It requires that we don’t know the facts,” says Sarah Lewis, Associate Professor of African and African American Studies at Harvard University and founder of the Vision & Justice programme there, which connects research, art, and culture to promote equity and justice.

    Ms. Lewis was at the UN Headquarters for an event marking last week’s International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.

    In an interview with UN News’s Ana Carmo, she discussed the crucial intersection of art, culture, and global action to tackle racial discrimination in the face of ongoing challenges.

    The interview has been edited for length and clarity.

    UN News: How can art contribute to both raising awareness of racial discrimination, and inspiring action towards its elimination?

    Sarah Lewis: I grew up not far from the United Nations, just ten blocks away. As a young girl, I became interested in the narratives that define who counts and who belongs. Narratives that condition our behaviour, narratives that allow for the implementation of laws and norms.

    And what I’ve come to study is the work of narratives over the course of centuries through the force of culture. We’re here to celebrate much of the policy work that’s been done through different states, but none of that work is binding and will last without the messages that are sent throughout the built environment, sent through the force of images, sent through the power of monuments.

    One of the thinkers in the United States who first focused on that idea was formerly enslaved abolitionist leader Frederick Douglass, and his speech Pictures in Progress, delivered in 1861 at the start of the American Civil War, offers a blueprint for how we must think about the function of culture for justice.

    He was not fixated on the work of any one artist. He was focused on the perceptual changes that happen in each of us, when we are confronted with an image that makes clear the injustices we didn’t know were happening, and forces action.

    UN News: This year also marks the 60th anniversary of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. How do you think societies can really engage with these historical struggles for racial justice, particularly in the context where racial discrimination is still deeply entrenched?

    Sarah Lewis: We are speaking at a moment in which we’ve altered norms around what we teach, what is in our curriculum in states around the world. We are in a moment in which there’s a sense that one can teach slavery, for example, as beneficial, for the skills that [it] offered the enslaved.

    When you ask what nations can do, we must focus on the role of education. Ignorance allows for racism, but racism requires ignorance. It requires that we don’t know the facts. When you come to see how slavery, for example, was, abolished but transformed into various forms of systemic and sustained inequity, you realize that you must act.

    Without the work of education, we can’t cohere, safeguard and implement the norms and new policies and treaties that we advocate for here today.

    UN Photo

    In the past, a hopeful future for South Africa was hindered by apartheid, but overcoming racial injustice paved the way for a society based on equality and shared rights for all.

    UN News: You speak about the power of education and this idea that we need to change the narratives. How can we as societies ensure that the narratives and bias really change?

    Sarah Lewis: If education is important, the related question is, how do we best educate? And we don’t only educate through the work of colleges and universities and curriculums of all kinds, we educate through the narrative messaging in the world all around us.

    What can we do on a personal, daily level, leader or not, is to ask ourselves the questions: what are we seeing and why are we seeing it? What narratives are being conveyed in the society that define who counts and who belongs? And what can we do about it if it needs to be changed?

    We all have this individual, precise role to play in securing a more just world in which we know we all can create.

    UN News: When you were an undergraduate at Harvard, you mentioned that you noticed exactly that, that something was missing and that you had questions about what was not being taught to you. How important is to include the visual representation topic in schools, especially in the United States?

    Sarah Lewis: Silence and erasure cannot stand in states who work to secure justice around the world. I’m fortunate to have gone to extraordinary schools but I found though that much was being left out of what I was being taught, not through any design or any individual culprit, any one professor or another, but through a culture that had defined and decided which narratives mattered more than others.

    I really learned about this through the arts, right through understanding and thinking through what mainstream society tells us we should be focusing on in terms of the images and artists that matter.

    I wrote a book ten years ago on – effectively – failure, on our failure to address these narratives that are being left out. And in many ways, you can see, the idea of justice as society’s reckoning with failure.

    Justice requires humility on the part of all of us to acknowledge how wrong we have been. And it’s that humility that the educator has, that the student has and it’s the posture that we all need to adopt as citizens to acknowledge what we need to put back into the narratives of education today.

    UN News: You speak in your book about the role of the ‘almost failure’ as a near win in our own lives. How can we all see the somewhat progress being made, to achieve the elimination of racial discrimination in societies, and not feel defeated by the failures?

    Sarah Lewis: How many movements for social justice began when we admitted failure? When we admitted that we were wrong? I would argue they all have been born of that realisation. We cannot be defeated. There are examples of men and women who exemplify how we do it.

    I’ll tell you a quick story about one. His name was Charles Black Jr, and we’re here today, in part because of his work in the United States. In the 1930s, he went to a dance party and found himself so fixated by the power of this trumpet player.

    It was Louis Armstrong, and he had never heard of him, but he knew in that moment that because of the genius coming out of this black man, that racial segregation in America, must be wrong – that he was wrong.

    © Unsplash/Joshua J. Cotten

    A mural of the I Am a Man protest that took place in Memphis, Tennessee, during the Civil Rights Movement in the USA.

    It was then that he began walking towards justice, he became one of the lawyers for the ‘Brown v Board of Education’ case that helped outlaw segregation in the United States, and went on to teach every year at Columbia and Yale University, and would hold this ‘Armstrong listening night’ to honor the man who showed him that he was wrong, that society was wrong, and that there was something he could do about it.

    We must find ways to allow ourselves to not let that feeling of failure defeat us, but to continue. There are countless examples I could offer in that vein, but the story of Charles Black Jr. is one that demonstrates the catalytic force of that recognition of that internal dynamic that is the smaller, more private encounter and experience that often leads to the public forms of justice that we celebrate today. 

    Listen to the full interview on SoundCloud:

    Soundcloud

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    March 25, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: BitMart Continues 7th Anniversary Celebrations with an Exclusive Event in São Paulo, Brazil

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Mahe, Seychelles , March 24, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — On March 20, 2025, BitMart, a leading global cryptocurrency exchange, hosted its second offline event in celebration of its 7th anniversary. Held in the vibrant city of São Paulo, Brazil, the event brought together industry leaders, partners, and crypto enthusiasts for an unforgettable evening of networking, insights, and celebration. 

    A Night of Innovation, Connection, and Celebration

    In a vibrant setting, the event provided a unique platform for guests to engage in thought-provoking discussions on the evolution of cryptocurrency markets, the latest trends in DeFi, and the future of blockchain adoption in Latin America.

    Throughout the night, key milestones, technological advancements, and BitMart’s vision for the future were highlighted. As the industry continues to evolve, BitMart remains dedicated to delivering cutting-edge solutions that enhance user experience and drive global crypto adoption.

    Looking Ahead: A Future of Growth & Collaboration

    As the event concluded, attendees raised their glasses to seven years of innovation, resilience, and success. The celebration served as a testament to BitMart’s unwavering commitment to empowering the crypto community and shaping the future of Web3. With Brazil as a key strategic market, BitMart looks forward to furthering its presence in Latin America, fostering collaborations, and unlocking new opportunities in the region.

    About BitMart
    BitMart is the premier global digital asset trading platform. With millions of users worldwide and ranked among the top crypto exchanges on CoinGecko, it currently offers 1,700+ trading pairs with competitive trading fees. Constantly evolving and growing, BitMart is interested in crypto’s potential to drive innovation and promote financial inclusion. New users can register here to unlock an $8,000+ welcome bonus.

    Disclaimer:

    Use of BitMart services is entirely at your own risk. All crypto investments, including earnings, are highly speculative in nature and involve substantial risk of loss. Past, hypothetical, or simulated performance is not necessarily indicative of future results. The value of digital currencies can go up or down and there can be a substantial risk in buying, selling, holding, or trading digital currencies. You should carefully consider whether trading or holding digital currencies is suitable for you based on your personal investment objectives, financial circumstances, and risk tolerance. BitMart does not provide any investment, legal, or tax advice.

    The MIL Network –

    March 25, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: How dreams, prophecies and intuitions can impact the decision to migrate

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By James Kwateng-Yeboah, Assistant Professor, Department for the Study of Religion, Saint Mary’s University

    Aspirations transform migration from mere physical movement into a deeply personal conviction, reshaping how individuals see themselves and their futures.
    (NEOM/Unsplash)

    When governments, policymakers or the news media discuss migration, the focus is almost exclusively on those who physically cross borders, seek asylum or arrive at ports of entry. But migration does not begin at at the moment of departure or upon arrival. It starts much earlier, as an aspiration.

    Recent surveys show a sharp rise in global migration aspirations. In Canada, a Gallup poll found that 20 per cent of the population surveyed want to leave and much of this increase occurred since 2021.

    In the United States, that figure has hit a record 21 per cent. These figures challenge the common assumption that Canada and the U.S. are simply migration destinations. Increasingly, they are also places people aspire to leave. But what fuels migration desire?

    As a scholar of religion and migration, my recently published research focuses on aspiring migrants: those who dream and plan for a future elsewhere, even if they never leave.

    While studies have shown how religion might aid or hinder a person’s integration into new societies, I explore how religion shapes who wants to migrate in the first place and why.

    Not everyone who wants to migrate will ultimately do so, but their aspirations matter. Migration aspirations influence education, career choices, family formation and even political engagement. Yet, the forces behind these aspirations remain largely understudied.

    Migration aspirations influence education, career choices, family formation and even political engagement.
    (Evangeline Shaw/Unsplash)

    Who wants to migrate?

    My interviews with young Ghanaians between the ages of 20 and 35 reveal that migration is not just about where people go. It’s also about who they believe they are meant to be.

    Analyzing 565 surveys and 25 in-depth interviews, I found that the aspiraton to migrate was widespread, with nearly 78 per cent of those surveyed expressing a desire to migrate. However, aspirations were not evenly distributed.

    University students were the most eager to migrate, often viewing higher education abroad as a stepping stone. Family history also shaped migration aspirations. Those with relatives abroad and no prior travel experience were significantly more likely to want to leave, suggesting the influence of migrant social networks.

    Yet the strongest predictors of migration aspirations among participants were experiences like dreams, prophecies and intuitions that were considered religiously significant.

    Individuals who reported having migration-related dreams were more than twice as likely to express a strong desire to migrate, while those who believed migration was part of a divine plan were more than three times as likely. These findings challenge the traditional idea that migration is purely an economic decision, highlighting the role of religion and spirituality.

    Spiritual experiences and migration

    Dreams, prophecies and intuitions do more than inspire migration desires. They shape how people perceive and legitimize migration. These experiences transform migration from mere physical movement into a deeply personal conviction, reshaping how they see themselves and their futures.

    Participants in my study who had migratory dreams described them as vivid, immersive experiences in which they found themselves leaving their homeland, boarding airplanes or settling in foreign countries.

    These dreams transported them into sensory encounters with airports, unfamiliar climates like snowfall and racially diverse communities. Such dreams made migration feel imminent, influencing behaviours such as preparing travel documents and expanding social networks.

    Prophecy in many religious traditions are declarations made by spiritual leaders, often perceived as divine revelations about an individual’s life, future or destiny. In the context of migration, these prophecies foretell a person’s foreseeable journey abroad, shaping their understanding of the future.

    Dreams, prophecies and intuitions do more than inspire migration desires. They shape how individuals perceive and legitimize migration.
    (Adedotun Adegborioye/Unsplash)

    Migratory prophecies are often delivered in Pentecostal-Charismatic churches, through sermons, prayer sessions or direct pronouncements from pastors. Their significance lies not in predictive accuracy, but in their ability to inspire, shape emotions, and guide behaviours regarding migration.

    These prophecies legitimize a person’s migration aspirations as part of a divine plan, enhancing the aspiring migrant’s self-perception as one destined for success. They foster an internalized identity of a successful migrant even before the individual embarks on their journey, highlighting their potential to elevate social status and bring honour to their families and communities.

    Intuitions attributed to divine prompting also generate an inner certainty about migration. People feel an inexplicable but profound conviction that they must migrate, leading them to align their life decisions with what they perceive as a higher plan.

    By reinforcing deeply held aspirations, spiritual experiences do not just shape the desire to migrate; they construct the migrant’s very sense of self, embedding migration into their personal identity long before they ever set foot on foreign soil.

    Informing policy

    Most migration policies focus on border control, but rarely consider the social and cultural dynamics that shape migration. Dreams, prophecies and intuitions act as indicators of unmet aspirations.

    Understanding these experiences can help migration policymakers create strategies that are cross-culturally sensitive and context-specific. These strategies should move beyond the economics of migration to address the full spectrum of human motivations.

    Additionally, governments and news media must confront idealized narratives of migration destinations portrayed as utopias of opportunity. When such expectations clash with the stark realities of labour exploitation, cultural alienation and systemic racism, the resulting disillusionment can profoundly affect the well-being of individuals and communities.

    A responsible approach to migration must present a balanced view, acknowledging both opportunities and challenges, while preparing aspiring migrants for the complexities of their journeys and recognizing their aspirations as integral to their personhood.

    James Kwateng-Yeboah does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. How dreams, prophecies and intuitions can impact the decision to migrate – https://theconversation.com/how-dreams-prophecies-and-intuitions-can-impact-the-decision-to-migrate-250736

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    March 25, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Canada: Investments will boost child care for families

    Source: Government of Canada regional news

    Here are the 22 additional child care centres joining the $10 a Day ChildCareBC spaces in B.C.:

    Pumpkin Patch Nursery School, Black Creek
    Pumpkin Patch Nursery School, 24 spaces

    Burnaby Association for Community Inclusion
    Little Eagles Childcare – Centre for Excellence, 37 spaces

    Kootenay Family Place, Castlegar
    Castlegar & District Kids’ Club, 25 spaces

    Onesky Community Resources Society, Cawston
    Cawston Primary Preschool, 16 spaces

    Little Kritters Daycare, Charlie Lake
    Little Kritters Daycare, eight spaces

    Little Lakers Learning Centre Society, Christina Lake
    Little Lakers Learning Centre, eight spaces

    Serendipity Child Development Society, Madeira Park
    Serendipity Child Care Centre, 13 spaces

    Southern Cortes Community Association, Mansons Landing
    Cortes Island Playschool, 28 spaces

    Boys and Girls Clubs of Central Vancouver Island, Parksville
    Parksville Child and Family Centre, 111 spaces

    Peachland Childcare Inc.
    Peachland Childcare Inc., eight spaces

    Onesky Community Resources Society, Penticton
    Edmonton Ave. Child Care Centre, 112 spaces

    Cheeky Monkey’s Daycare, Quesnel
    Cheeky Monkey’s Daycare, seven spaces

    North & South Shuswap Community Resource Association, Sorrento
    Sorrento Preschool, 20 spaces

    Al-Mustafa Islamic Association, Surrey
    Al-Mustafa Junior Kindergarten, 20 spaces

    B.C. Family Hearing Resource Society, Surrey
    Communication Stars Specialized Childcare, 12 spaces

    City of Surrey
    Fraser Heights Recreation Centre, 72 spaces

    District of Tofino
    Community Children’s Centre, 18 spaces

    The Trail District Day Care Society
    Sunshine Children’s Centre, 26 spaces

    Ucluelet and Area Child Care Society
    Ucluelet Children’s Centre, 80 spaces

    Developmental Disabilities Association of Vancouver-Richmond, Vancouver
    Kids at G.F. Strong Child Development Centre, 40 spaces

    Okanagan Boys and Girls Clubs, Vernon
    Okanagan Boys and Girls Club-Lakers Club, 36 spaces

    Evangelical Free Church of Williams Lake
    Maranatha Minis Daycare, 49 spaces

    MIL OSI Canada News –

    March 25, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: ‘Peace Operations Face Serious Barriers that Demand New Approaches’, Secretary-General Stresses, at Security Council Open Debate

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    Following are UN Secretary-General António Guterres’ remarks to the Security Council’s open debate titled “Advancing Adaptability in UN Peace Operations — Responding to New Realities”, in New York today:

    I thank the Government of Denmark for convening this high-level discussion.

    United Nations peace operations safeguard people and communities in some of the most desperate places on earth.

    These operations comprise both peacekeeping operations and special political missions.

    Their work ranges from early warning to preventive diplomacy, from peacemaking to verifying peace agreements to protecting civilians, from negotiating ceasefires to helping parties implement them on the ground, to electoral support and observer missions.

    Collectively, these operations represent a critical tool at this Council’s disposal to maintain international peace and security in a variety of contexts.

    Since the first special political mission and peacekeeping operation were deployed in 1948, our peace operations have grown, adapted and evolved.

    Time and again, they allow us to mount tailored responses that have saved lives, reduced violence, prevented the expansion and spillover of deadly conflicts and stopped atrocities.

    Peace operations are designed not only to be an effective example of multilateralism in action — but a cost-effective one.

    At their best, they show how when the UN comes together to address challenges; the burden is diminished on individual countries alone.

    But as we all know, peace operations face serious barriers that demand new approaches.

    Wars are becoming more complex and more deadly.  They last longer and are more enmeshed in global and regional dynamics.

    Negotiated settlements have been harder to achieve. Meanwhile, our peace operations are confronted with a complex interplay of threats — many of which do not respect national borders.

    Terror and extremist groups, organized crime, the weaponization of new technologies, and the effects of climate change are all testing our capacities to respond.  And, I regret to say, geopolitical divisions are undermining peace.

    The bilateral and multilateral arrangements that — for decades — have managed tensions and maintained stability are eroding.

    Violations of international law, human rights and the UN Charter are rampant — seemingly without consequence.

    Trust is in short supply among — and within — countries and regions.

    All of these challenges and more throw fuel on the fires of conflict.

    Meanwhile, our peace responses are struggling.  We see a persistent mismatch between mandates and available resources.  And we see increasing differences of views — including in this Council itself — around how peace operations should work, under what circumstances, with what mandates they should be deployed, and for how long.

    This is a grim diagnosis, but we must face facts.

    The good news is that, through the Pact for the Future, Member States committed to working to adapt peace operations for the future.

    This is an important opportunity to gain a shared understanding of what makes peace operations successful, what is hindering their effectiveness, and what new models we can use to make them more adaptable, flexible and resilient — while recognizing the limitations in situations where there is little or no peace to keep.

    My recent proposals to you in the context of Haiti are a good example.  We must keep working for a political process — owned and led by the Haitian people — that restores democratic institutions through elections.  And the UN has a clear role to play in supporting stability and security, while addressing the root causes of the appalling crisis.

    The UN stands ready to assume the responsibility of the logistical and operational expenditures — including transportation, medical capabilities and support for the national police — that can support an international force established by Member States that is able to confront the gangs in Haiti and create conditions for peace.  And the salaries of the force are paid through the trust fund that already exists.

    This is a good example of how we can design a tailored and collective approach to peace operations in an extremely complex and dangerous environment.

    Other examples of adapting our peace operations include the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which recently developed an adaptation plan to support the parties to uphold their obligations under resolution 1701 (2006), and our operations in Abyei, Sudan, where we reconfigured our peace operations into a multinational force.

    We also increasingly see the enormous benefits of strengthening cooperation with regional and subregional organizations.  Security Council resolution 2719 (2023) is an important example.

    This breakthrough has lifted our partnership with the African Union to a new level as we work to establish peace enforcement missions under the responsibility of the African Union, supported by the United Nations.  We are now working actively across our two Secretariats to meet the vision of the resolution, and I urge Council members to fully support this work.

    It’s time to build on these examples and continue adapting our peace operations for current and future challenges.

    Work is now under way to review all forms of peace operations, as requested by Member States in the Pact for the Future.

    The review will aim to critically examine these tools and propose concrete recommendations to make them fit for today.

    This will include extensive consultations with Member States and others to inform — and inspire — recommendations.

    The review will build on the analysis presented in the New Agenda for Peace.

    It will be informed by the first comprehensive study of the history of special political missions in the 80 years of the United Nations, which will be released soon.

    And it will reflect the Pact’s call to ensure that peace operations engage at the earliest possible stage in planning transitions with host countries, UN country teams and local and regional groups.

    The review also aligns with the Pact’s call to this Council to ensure that peace operations are guided by clear and sequenced mandates that are realistic and achievable — with viable exit strategies and transition plans.

    And it will draw on the discussions taking place in preparation for the Peacekeeping Ministerial in Berlin in May focusing on the future of peacekeeping.

    Throughout, we will hold extensive consultations to capture as wide a spectrum of views as possible and to benefit from worldwide expertise.

    From Member States, host States, troop- and police-contributing countries and financial contributors to regional organizations, civil society and academia, and our own leaders and experts within UN peace operations and the Secretariat.

    And the review will, of course, help inform our efforts through our UN@80 initiative, to find efficiencies and improvements across our work in light of the continued funding challenges we face as an organization.

    Today’s open debate provides a vital opportunity for the Council to share perspectives and ideas to inform the review process.  I urge all Members to support it.  And I call on this Council to continue working to overcome divisions and disagreements around peace operations and build the unified and consistent political support our peace operations — and the women and men who conduct them — need and deserve.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    March 25, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Port Saunders — Port Saunders RCMP responds to disturbance; suspect fled from police, crashed vehicle and arrested for impaired operation

    Source: Royal Canadian Mounted Police

    Forty-seven-year-old Chad Sinnicks of Hawke’s Bay was arrested for impaired operation and a number of other offences by Port Saunders RCMP on March 22, 2025, after crashing a vehicle on Route 430 near Port Saunders.

    At approximately 11:30 p.m., police received a report of a disturbance at a commercial property in Reef’s Harbour involving an assault, threats and property damage. Sinnicks, who was identified as the involved suspect, left the area in a vehicle prior to police arrival and was suspected to be driving while impaired.

    A short time, later, officers located the described vehicle and attempted to conduct a traffic stop. The vehicle fled from police and became out of sight. Police continued south on Route 430 looking for the suspect vehicle which was located a few minutes later in a ditch on the side of the highway. Sinnicks was arrested for impaired operation and was transported to the detachment. He provided breath samples that were above the legal limit.

    Chad Sinnicks is set to appear in court at a later date to face the following criminal charges:

    • Impaired operation
    • Impaired operation with a blood alcohol concentration above 80 mgs%
    • Flight from police
    • Assault
    • Uttering Threats
    • Mischief under $5000.00 – property damage
    • Various offences of the Highway Traffic Act

    The investigation is ongoing with additional charges pending.

    RCMP NL continues to fulfill its mandate to protect public safety, enforce the law, and ensure the delivery of priority policing services in Newfoundland and Labrador.

    MIL Security OSI –

    March 25, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: East of Empire: partitioning of India and Palestine unleashed the violent conflict that continues today

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Erin O’Halloran, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Department of Archaeology, University of Cambridge

    What can Indian and Pakistani press archives, government records and memoirs tell us about the Middle East of the 1920s and ’30s, when Britain’s empire was in its twilight years? What did the dissolution of the Ottoman empire, the movement for Egyptian independence, or the crisis in British Mandate Palestine have to do with the decision to partition India?

    How did Muhammad Ali Jinnah go from being a secular young man appalled by Indian interference in the Ottoman Caliphate crisis to the moving spirit behind the demand for Pakistan – a new Islamic nation which, he claimed, would be capable of defending Muslims abroad?

    These are the kinds of questions that kept me awake at night for years. The result of that insomnia is my new book, East of Empire: Egypt, India, and the World Between the Wars.


    Looking for something good? Cut through the noise with a carefully curated selection of the latest releases, live events and exhibitions, straight to your inbox every fortnight, on Fridays. Sign up here.


    My focus is the quarter-century which immediately preceded the end of empire in India-Pakistan and Palestine-Israel. Both countries were partitioned along ethnic lines – the former by the British and the latter by the UN – resulting in catastrophic bloodshed and the forced displacement of millions.

    These partitions took place barely six months apart, between 1947 and 1948. They remain at the heart of horrific state violence on both continents, not to mention intergenerational trauma and rancorous historical debate.

    For much of the period my book deals with, from 1919 until the mid-1930s, the division of territory between religious or ethnic blocs would have been difficult for most people living in the Middle East and South Asia to fathom. There were no obvious frontiers that could be drawn between local communities. Particularly in cities and towns, neighbours of different ethnicities and faiths lived cheek by jowl.

    In fact, it was precisely during this time, between the first and second world wars, that Egyptians and Indians came to think of their movements for self-determination as shared across communal divides.

    Artists, politicians, activists and intellectuals described a thick and flexible web of interconnections – some spiritual or linguistic, others cultural and geopolitical – which together made up something called the sharq, orient, or “east”. This was said to transcend all kinds of barriers, depending on who you asked – creed, language, ethnicity, nation, gender and class, for starters.

    Many historians writing about this period have picked up this “easternism” for closer inspection – only to swiftly place it back down again. They argue it is too vague, amorphous and internally contradictory to be of much use as an analytical category. They are not wrong. Between the 1920s and ’40s, there were many (perhaps even countless) visions of the east in circulation.

    There was the east of orientalists – foreign, exotic and “other”. There was the anti-colonial east, a geography of allies in the battle against foreign domination. Then there was the spiritual east, often contrasted with the materialist west. There was the Islamic east, a region populated largely (though never exclusively) by Muslims. There was also the cosmopolitan east, a rich tapestry of cultures bound together by commerce and exchange of ideas. Finally, there was the strategic east, a geopolitical bloc or bulwark that might counter other constellations of power.

    It is important to underscore that none of these concepts were mutually exclusive. Instead, proponents of easternism tended to connect several “kinds” of eastern ideas together into a personally appealing hybrid.

    Thus in his memoir, Sultan Mahomed Shah, Aga Khan III, revisited his long-cherished dream of an eastern bloc of Muslim nations, serving as both a moral compass to the world and a healthy check on the power of Europe and the United States.

    For the Egyptian feminist Huda Shaarawi, the east was unapologetically anticolonial. In the pages of her magazine, l’Egyptienne, it was frequently ancient and exotic – but also, crucially, a stage upon which women from many cultural, ethnic and religious backgrounds would together forge the future in their own image.

    Given the dizzying array of potential easts, it was never what academics would call a coherent ideology. But this did not prevent it from being a highly prominent feature of both political debate and action in Egypt, India and the broader Arab-Asian region throughout the interwar period.

    Beginning in the 1920s and deep into the ’30s, various eastern visions flowed in and out of alignment with one another as headlines changed, alliances evolved, and priorities shifted. With the onset of war in Europe in 1939, however, the stakes of these ideological differences began to spike.

    Subjected to the unrelenting pressure of war, the many strands of easternism began to splinter, putting paid to the more fluid and open-ended possibilities that had animated preceding decades.

    In their stead emerged postwar ideologies with sharper edges, hardened national frontiers, and – following years of globally cataclysmic violence – little faith in the pacifist and humanist ideals of a bygone era. This almost chemical transformation is the backdrop against which votes affirmed the partitions of India and Palestine in 1947.

    Here, then, is the story told in East of Empire: how visions of a transnational, fluid and nonconformist east shaped the interwar politics of India and Egypt, and why these visions gave way to a more rigid, militant nationalism by the end of the second world war.

    The book revisits a near-forgotten chapter in the rise of anticolonialism and the end of the British empire across the Middle East and South Asia. And it explains the conditions under which these bold and optimistic visions buckled – unleashing torrents of violence we have yet to staunch, almost 80 years later.

    Erin O’Halloran has received funding from the British Academy and UK Research & Innovation.

    – ref. East of Empire: partitioning of India and Palestine unleashed the violent conflict that continues today – https://theconversation.com/east-of-empire-partitioning-of-india-and-palestine-unleashed-the-violent-conflict-that-continues-today-251338

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    March 25, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: Secretary-General’s remarks to the Security Council – Advancing Adaptability in UN Peace Operations: responding to new realities [bilingual, as delivered; scroll down for all-English and all-French versions]

    Source: United Nations – English

    r. President, Excellencies,
     
    I thank the government of Denmark for convening this high-level discussion.

    United Nations peace operations safeguard people and communities in some of the most desperate places on earth. 

    These operations comprise both peacekeeping operations and special political missions.

    Their work ranges from early warning to preventive diplomacy…

    From peacemaking to verifying peace agreements to protecting civilians…

    From negotiating ceasefires to helping parties implement them on the ground…

    To electoral support and observer missions.

    Collectively, these operations represent a critical tool at this Council’s disposal to maintain international peace and security in a variety of contexts.

    Since the first special political mission and peacekeeping operation were deployed in 1948, our peace operations have grown, adapted and evolved.

    Time and again, they allow us to mount tailored responses that have saved lives, reduced violence, prevented the expansion and spillover of deadly conflicts, and stopped atrocities.

    Peace operations are designed not only to be an effective example of multilateralism in action — but a cost-effective one.

    At their best, they show how when the UN comes together to address challenges, the burden is diminished on individual countries alone.  

    But as we all know, peace operations face serious barriers that demand new approaches.

    Wars are becoming more complex and more deadly. 

    They last longer, and are more enmeshed in global and regional dynamics. 

    Negotiated settlements have been harder to achieve.

    Meanwhile, our peace operations are confronted with a complex interplay of threats — many of which do not respect national borders.

    Terror and extremist groups, organized crime, the weaponization of new technologies, and the effects of climate change are all testing our capacities to respond.

    And, I regret to say, geopolitical divisions are undermining peace.

    The bilateral and multilateral arrangements that — for decades — have managed tensions and maintained stability are eroding.  

    Violations of international law, human rights and the UN Charter are rampant — seemingly without consequence.

    Trust is in short supply among — and within — countries and regions.

    All of these challenges and more throw fuel on the fires of conflict.

    Meanwhile, our peace responses are struggling.  

    We see a persistent mismatch between mandates and available resources.

    And we see increasing differences of views — including in this Council itself — around how peace operations should work, under what circumstances, with what mandates they should be deployed, and for how long.

    Excellencies,

    This is a grim diagnosis, but we must face facts.

    The good news is that, through the Pact for the Future, Member States committed to working to adapt peace operations for the future.

    This is an important opportunity to gain a shared understanding of what makes peace operations successful …

    What is hindering their effectiveness …

    And what new models we can use to make them more adaptable, flexible and resilient — while recognizing the limitations in situations where there is little or no peace to keep. 

    My recent proposals to you in the context of Haiti are a good example.

    We must keep working for a political process — owned and led by the Haitian people — that restores democratic institutions through elections.

    And the UN has a clear role to play in supporting stability and security, while addressing the root causes of the appalling crisis.

    The UN stands ready to assume the responsibility of the logistical and operational expenditures — including transportation, medical capabilities and support for the national police — that can support an enhanced international force by Member States that is able to confront the gangs in Haiti and create conditions for peace.   

    And the salaries of the force are paid through the trust fund that already exists.

    This is a good example of how we can design a tailored and collective approach to peace operations in an extremely complex and dangerous environment. 

    Other examples of adapting our peace operations include UNIFIL, which recently developed an adaptation plan to support the parties to uphold their obligations under resolution 1701…

    And our operations in Abyei, Sudan, where we reconfigured our peace operations into a multinational force.

    We also increasingly see the enormous benefits of strengthening cooperation with regional and subregional organizations.

    Security Council resolution 2719 is an important example.

    This breakthrough has lifted our partnership with the African Union to a new level as we work to establish peace enforcement missions under the responsibility of the African Union, supported by the United Nations.

    We are now working actively across our two Secretariats to meet the vision of the resolution, and I urge Council Members to fully support this work.

    Excellencies,

    It’s time to build on these examples and continue adapting our peace operations for current and future challenges. 

    Work is now underway to review all forms of peace operations, as requested by Member States in the Pact for the Future.

    The review will aim to critically examine these tools and propose concrete recommendations to make them fit for today.

    This will include extensive consultations with Member States and others to inform — and inspire — recommendations.

    The review will build on the analysis presented in the New Agenda for Peace.

    It will be informed by the first comprehensive study of the history of special political missions in the 80 years of the United Nations, which will be released soon.

    And it will reflect the Pact’s call to ensure that peace operations engage at the earliest possible stage in planning transitions with host countries, UN Country Teams and local and regional groups.

    The review also aligns with the Pact’s call to this Council to ensure that peace operations are guided by clear and sequenced mandates that are realistic and achievable — with viable exit strategies and transition plans.

    And it will draw on the discussions taking place in preparation for the Peacekeeping Ministerial in Berlin in May focusing on the future of peacekeeping.

    Excellences,

    Tout au long de l’étude, nous mènerons des consultations approfondies afin de recueillir un éventail de vues aussi large que possible et de bénéficier d’une expertise mondiale.

    Celle des États Membres, des pays hôtes, des pays fournisseurs de contingents ou de personnel de police et des contributeurs financiers…

    Celle des organisations régionales, de la société civile et des milieux universitaires, ainsi que de nos propres hauts responsables et experts des opérations de paix des Nations Unies et du Secrétariat.

    Bien entendu, l’étude contribuera à éclairer les efforts que nous déployons dans le cadre de l’initiative ONU80, afin de dégager des gains d’efficacité et des améliorations dans tous nos axes de travail – compte tenu des défis persistants de financement auxquels notre Organisation est confrontée.

    Excellences,

    Le débat public d’aujourd’hui est une occasion précieuse pour le Conseil de partager toute idée et point de vue qui pourrait contribuer à l’étude.

    J’invite tous les États Membres à apporter leur pierre à l’édifice.

    Et j’appelle ce Conseil à continuer à œuvrer pour surmonter les divisions et les désaccords entourant les opérations de paix, et bâtir le soutien politique unifié et cohérent dont nos opérations de paix – et les femmes et les hommes qui les mènent – ont tant besoin.

    Je vous remercie.

    ***
    All-English

    Mr. President, Excellencies,
     
    I thank the government of Denmark for convening this high-level discussion.

    United Nations peace operations safeguard people and communities in some of the most desperate places on earth. 

    These operations comprise both peacekeeping operations and special political missions.

    Their work ranges from early warning to preventive diplomacy…

    From peacemaking to verifying peace agreements to protecting civilians…

    From negotiating ceasefires to helping parties implement them on the ground…

    To electoral support and observer missions.

    Collectively, these operations represent a critical tool at this Council’s disposal to maintain international peace and security in a variety of contexts.

    Since the first special political mission and peacekeeping operation were deployed in 1948, our peace operations have grown, adapted and evolved.

    Time and again, they allow us to mount tailored responses that have saved lives, reduced violence, prevented the expansion and spillover of deadly conflicts, and stopped atrocities.

    Peace operations are designed not only to be an effective example of multilateralism in action — but a cost-effective one.

    At their best, they show how when the UN comes together to address challenges, the burden is diminished on individual countries alone.  

    But as we all know, peace operations face serious barriers that demand new approaches.

    Wars are becoming more complex and more deadly. 

    They last longer, and are more enmeshed in global and regional dynamics. 

    Negotiated settlements have been harder to achieve.

    Meanwhile, our peace operations are confronted with a complex interplay of threats — many of which do not respect national borders.

    Terror and extremist groups, organized crime, the weaponization of new technologies, and the effects of climate change are all testing our capacities to respond.

    And, I regret to say, geopolitical divisions are undermining peace.

    The bilateral and multilateral arrangements that — for decades — have managed tensions and maintained stability are eroding.  

    Violations of international law, human rights and the UN Charter are rampant — seemingly without consequence.

    Trust is in short supply among — and within — countries and regions.

    All of these challenges and more throw fuel on the fires of conflict.

    Meanwhile, our peace responses are struggling.  

    We see a persistent mismatch between mandates and available resources.

    And we see increasing differences of views — including in this Council itself — around how peace operations should work, under what circumstances, with what mandates they should be deployed, and for how long.

    Excellencies,

    This is a grim diagnosis, but we must face facts.

    The good news is that, through the Pact for the Future, Member States committed to working to adapt peace operations for the future.

    This is an important opportunity to gain a shared understanding of what makes peace operations successful …

    What is hindering their effectiveness …

    And what new models we can use to make them more adaptable, flexible and resilient — while recognizing the limitations in situations where there is little or no peace to keep. 

    My recent proposals to you in the context of Haiti are a good example.

    We must keep working for a political process — owned and led by the Haitian people — that restores democratic institutions through elections.

    And the UN has a clear role to play in supporting stability and security, while addressing the root causes of the appalling crisis.

    The UN stands ready to assume the responsibility of the logistical and operational expenditures — including transportation, medical capabilities and support for the national police — that can support an international force established by Member States that is able to confront the gangs in Haiti and create conditions for peace.   

    And the salaries of the force are paid through the trust fund that already exists.

    This is a good example of how we can design a tailored and collective approach to peace operations in an extremely complex and dangerous environment. 

    Other examples of adapting our peace operations include UNIFIL, which recently developed an adaptation plan to support the parties to uphold their obligations under resolution 1701…

    And our operations in Abyei, Sudan, where we reconfigured our peace operations into a multinational force.

    We also increasingly see the enormous benefits of strengthening cooperation with regional and subregional organizations.

    Security Council resolution 2719 is an important example.

    This breakthrough has lifted our partnership with the African Union to a new level as we work to establish peace enforcement missions under the responsibility of the African Union, supported by the United Nations.

    We are now working actively across our two Secretariats to meet the vision of the resolution, and I urge Council Members to fully support this work.

    Excellencies,

    It’s time to build on these examples and continue adapting our peace operations for current and future challenges. 

    Work is now underway to review all forms of peace operations, as requested by Member States in the Pact for the Future.

    The review will aim to critically examine these tools and propose concrete recommendations to make them fit for today.

    This will include extensive consultations with Member States and others to inform — and inspire — recommendations.

    The review will build on the analysis presented in the New Agenda for Peace.

    It will be informed by the first comprehensive study of the history of special political missions in the 80 years of the United Nations, which will be released soon.

    And it will reflect the Pact’s call to ensure that peace operations engage at the earliest possible stage in planning transitions with host countries, UN Country Teams and local and regional groups.

    The review also aligns with the Pact’s call to this Council to ensure that peace operations are guided by clear and sequenced mandates that are realistic and achievable — with viable exit strategies and transition plans.

    And it will draw on the discussions taking place in preparation for the Peacekeeping Ministerial in Berlin in May focusing on the future of peacekeeping.

    Excellencies,

    Throughout, we will hold extensive consultations to capture as wide a spectrum of views as possible and to benefit from worldwide expertise.

    From Member States, host States, troop- and police-contributing countries and financial contributors…

    To regional organizations, civil society and academia, and our own leaders and experts within UN peace operations and the Secretariat.

    And the review will, of course, help inform our efforts through our UN@80 initiative, to find efficiencies and improvements across our work in light of the continued funding challenges we face as an organization.  

    Excellencies,

    Today’s open debate provides a vital opportunity for the Council to share perspectives and ideas to inform the review process.

    I urge all Members to support it.

    And I call on this Council to continue working to overcome divisions and disagreements around peace operations, and build the unified and consistent political support our peace operations — and the women and men who conduct them — need and deserve.

    Thank you.

    ***
    All-French

    Monsieur le Président, Excellences,

    Je remercie le Gouvernement danois d’avoir organisé ce débat de haut niveau.

    Les opérations de paix des Nations unies protègent les personnes et les communautés dans certains des endroits les plus éprouvés de la planète. 

    Ces opérations comprennent à la fois les opérations de maintien de la paix et les missions politiques spéciales.

    Leur travail va de l’alerte rapide à diplomatie préventive…

    Du rétablissement de la paix à la vérification de l’application des accords de paix et de la protection des civils…

    De la négociation de cessez-le-feu au soutien de leur mise en œuvre par les parties sur le terrain…

    Ou encore aux missions d’observation et d’appui électoral.

    Prises ensemble, ces opérations dotent le Conseil d’un outil essentiel pour maintenir la paix et la sécurité internationales dans divers contextes.

    Depuis le déploiement de la première mission politique spéciale et de la première opération de maintien de la paix en 1948, nos opérations de paix se sont développées, adaptées et transformées.

    Elles nous permettent régulièrement d’intervenir de façon ciblée pour sauver des vies, réduire la violence, enrayer l’élargissement et le débordement de conflits meurtriers, et mettre fin à des atrocités.

    Les opérations de paix sont conçues pour démontrer non seulement l’efficacité du multilatéralisme en action mais aussi son intérêt en termes de coûts.

    Dans le meilleur des cas, elles montrent qu’il est possible d’alléger le fardeau qui pèse sur chaque pays individuellement lorsque les Nations Unies se rallient pour agir.

    Toutefois, comme nous le savons tous, les opérations de paix se heurtent à des obstacles de taille, et de nouvelles approches s’imposent.

    Les guerres deviennent plus complexes et plus meurtrières.

    Elles durent plus longtemps et sont davantage imbriquées dans des dynamiques mondiales et régionales.

    Il est plus difficile de parvenir à des règlements négociés.

    Parallèlement, un entrelacs complexe de menaces, dont beaucoup transcendent les frontières nationales, se dresse face aux opérations de paix.

    Les groupes terroristes et extrémistes, la criminalité organisée, la militarisation des nouvelles technologies et les effets des changements climatiques sont autant de phénomènes qui mettent à l’épreuve nos capacités d’intervention.

    Et – je suis navré de le constater – les divisions géopolitiques sapent la paix.

    Les accords bilatéraux et multilatéraux qui, pendant des décennies, avaient permis de maîtriser les tensions et de préserver la stabilité s’érodent.

    Les violations du droit international, des droits humains et de la Charte des Nations Unies sont légion – sans que cela ne porte à conséquence, semble-t-il.

    La confiance se fait rare entre les pays, entre les régions, et à l’intérieur de ceux-ci.

    Tous ces dangers, et bien d’autres encore, attisent la flamme des conflits.

    De notre côté, nos interventions en faveur de la paix sont à la peine.

    Nous constatons une asymétrie persistante entre les mandats confiés et les ressources disponibles.

    Et nous constatons des divergences de vues de plus en plus marquées – y compris au sein même de ce Conseil – sur les modalités de fonctionnement des opérations de paix, les circonstances justifiant leur déploiement, la teneur de leur mandat et leur durée.

    Excellences,

    Le diagnostic peut paraître sombre, mais il correspond à la réalité.

    La bonne nouvelle est que les États Membres se sont engagés dans le Pacte pour l’avenir à adapter les opérations de paix pour l’avenir.

    Voilà une occasion privilégiée de dégager une réponse commune aux questions suivantes : quelles sont les conditions de réussite des opérations de paix ?

    Quels obstacles se dressent sur le chemin ?

    Et quels nouveaux modèles nous pouvons appliquer afin de les rendre plus adaptables, plus souples et plus résilientes – tout en reconnaissant les cas limites où l’on sait qu’il y a peu ou pas de paix à maintenir.

    Les propositions que je vous ai faites récemment dans le contexte d’Haïti en sont une bonne illustration.

    Nous devons continuer d’œuvrer en faveur d’un processus politique – maîtrisé et conduit par le peuple haïtien – qui rétablisse les institutions démocratiques par la voie électorale.

    L’ONU a un rôle clair à jouer pour appuyer la stabilité et la sécurité, tout en s’attaquant aux causes profondes de cette crise effroyable.

    L’ONU est prête à assumer la responsabilité des dépenses logistiques et opérationnelles – y compris le transport, les capacités médicales et le soutien envers la police nationale – qui peuvent appuyer une force internationale renforcée par les États membres, qui soit capable de faire face aux gangs en Haïti et de créer les conditions de la paix.

    Les salaires de la force quant à eux sont couverts par le fonds d’affectation spéciale qui existe déjà.

    Nous avons là un bon exemple de la manière dont nous pouvons concevoir une approche adaptée et collective des opérations de paix dans un environnement extrêmement complexe et dangereux.

    Parmi les autres exemples d’adaptation de nos opérations de paix, citons la FINUL, qui a récemment élaboré un plan d’adaptation pour aider les parties à respecter les obligations que leur fait la résolution 1701.

    On peut également évoquer nos opérations à Abyei, au Soudan, où nous avons reconfiguré nos opérations de paix en une force multinationale.

    Nous prenons également de plus en plus la mesure des avantages considérables que présente le renforcement de la collaboration avec les organisations régionales et sous-régionales.

    La résolution 2719 du Conseil de sécurité revêt une importance certaine à cet égard.

    Cette avancée a porté notre partenariat avec l’Union africaine à un niveau supérieur, alors que nous œuvrons à la mise en place de missions d’imposition de la paix sous la responsabilité de l’Union africaine, avec le soutien des Nations unies.

    Nos deux Secrétariats travaillent désormais activement à concrétiser la vision énoncée dans la résolution, et j’invite les membres du Conseil à y apporter leur plein concours.

    Excellences,

    Il est temps de s’inspirer de ces exemples et de continuer à adapter nos opérations de paix aux défis actuels et futurs. 

    Des travaux sont en cours pour réexaminer toutes les formes d’opérations de paix, comme l’ont demandé les États Membres dans le Pacte pour l’avenir.

    L’objectif est de procéder à un examen critique de ces outils et de proposer des recommandations concrètes afin de les adapter au monde d’aujourd’hui.

    Il s’agira notamment de mener des consultations approfondies avec les États Membres et d’autres parties prenantes afin de nourrir – et d’inspirer – ces recommandations.

    L’étude fera fond sur l’analyse présentée dans le Nouvel Agenda pour la paix.

    Elle prendra pour appui l’étude d’ensemble de l’histoire des missions politiques spéciales, la première effectuée en 80 ans d’existence de l’ONU, qui sera publiée prochainement.

    Elle se fera aussi l’écho de l’appel lancé dans le Pacte pour veiller à ce que les opérations de paix s’engagent le plus tôt possible dans la planification des transitions avec les pays hôtes, l’équipe de pays des Nations Unies et les groupes locaux et régionaux.

    L’étude s’inscrit également dans le sillage de la demande qui est adressée au Conseil dans le Pacte pour que les opérations de paix soient guidées par des mandats clairs et séquencés, réalistes et réalisables, ainsi que des stratégies de sortie et des plans de transition viables.

    Elle s’appuiera enfin sur les discussions qui se tiennent en préparation de la Conférence ministérielle sur le maintien de la paix qui aura lieu à Berlin en mai et qui sera consacrée à l’avenir du maintien de la paix.

    Excellences,

    Tout au long de l’étude, nous mènerons des consultations approfondies afin de recueillir un éventail de vues aussi large que possible et de bénéficier d’une expertise mondiale.

    Celle des États Membres, des pays hôtes, des pays fournisseurs de contingents ou de personnel de police et des contributeurs financiers…

    Celle des organisations régionales, de la société civile et des milieux universitaires, ainsi que de nos propres hauts responsables et experts des opérations de paix des Nations Unies et du Secrétariat.

    Bien entendu, l’étude contribuera à éclairer les efforts que nous déployons dans le cadre de l’initiative ONU80, afin de dégager des gains d’efficacité et des améliorations dans tous nos axes de travail – compte tenu des défis persistants de financement auxquels notre Organisation est confrontée.

    Excellences,

    Le débat public d’aujourd’hui est une occasion précieuse pour le Conseil de partager toute idée et point de vue qui pourrait contribuer à l’étude.

    J’invite tous les États Membres à apporter leur pierre à l’édifice.

    Et j’appelle ce Conseil à continuer à œuvrer pour surmonter les divisions et les désaccords entourant les opérations de paix, et bâtir le soutien politique unifié et cohérent dont nos opérations de paix – et les femmes et les hommes qui les mènent – ont tant besoin.

    Je vous remercie.
     

    MIL OSI Africa –

    March 25, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Video: President Cyril Ramaphosa participates in the joint EAC-SADC Summit

    Source: Republic of South Africa (video statements)

    President Cyril Ramaphosa participates in the joint EAC-SADC Summit

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Di_lnFqVbE

    MIL OSI Video –

    March 25, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: Cameroon: African Development Bank Group approves €330 million loan to upgrade Ngaoundéré-Garoua road to improve connectivity and strengthen regional integration

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    YAOUNDE, Cameroon, March 24, 2025/APO Group/ —

    The African Development Bank Group (www.AfDB.org) has given the green light to a loan of €330.48 million to Cameroon to redevelop and widen a key section of the Douala-Ndjamena economic corridor, a vital part of plans promoting strengthened regional integration.

    The financing agreement for the 246-km-long Ngaoundéré-Garoua section of the Douala-Ndjamena economic corridor, one of the most strategic corridors in Central Africa, comes under  part of Phase 4 of the Transport Sector Support Programme (PAST4).

    It was signed on 19 March 2025 in Yaoundé by Solomane Koné, the African Development Bank Group’s Acting Director General for Central Africa, and Alamine Ousmane Mey, Minister of Economy, Planning and Regional Development and Governor of the Bank for Cameroon.

    “The redevelopment of the Ngaoundéré-Garoua road section is crucial to the competitiveness of our economy, due to improved connectivity and easier movement,” said Mey. “[…] It will also enable us to make better use of the agro-pastoral and commercial potential of the areas it crosses, to the great benefit of local communities.”

    Koné added: “Phase 4 of the Transport Sector Support Programme, approved by the Board of Directors of the African Development Bank on 13 December 2024, was designed to amplify the impact of the Bank Group’s previous actions and to support its leadership and its dynamic cooperation with Cameroon within the transport sector.”

    The ceremony was attended by Hilarion Etong, Senior Deputy Speaker of Cameroon’s National Assembly, and several members of the government, including Jean Ernest Ngallé Bibéhè, Minister of Transport, Emmanuel Nganou Djoumessi, Minister of Public Works, and Ibrahim Talba Malla, Minister Delegate to the Presidency in charge of Public Contracts, as well as local elected representatives and governors of regions such as Adamaoua and the North.

    The Bank Group will provide 97 per cent of the total cost of Phase 4 of the Transport Sector Support Programme, which amounts to €340.7 million. The Government of Cameroon will contribute €9.14 million.

    The aim of the programme is to modernise a strategic section of Cameroon’s road network, which is essential for transporting people and goods between the north and south of the country. To enhance traffic flow, three interchanges are also planned. The programme includes measures to improve transport and support local residents, specifically through the construction of socio-economic infrastructure such as markets, schools and health centres. Bringing this stretch of road up to international standards will have a highly positive impact on the competitiveness of the economy and the dynamics of integration in the sub-region.

    “Cameroon’s geostrategic position places our country at the core of the integration challenges facing the CEMAC (https://apo-opa.co/41UocZF) (Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa) region,” explained Mey. “An improved Ngaoundéré-Garoua section will undoubtedly boost cross-border trade by significantly increasing traffic on the Garoua-Maroua-Kousseri-Ndjamena road (in Chad) and the Garoua-Magada-Yagoua-Bongor-Ndjamena road.”

    Phase 4 of the Transport Sector Support Programme is in keeping with Cameroon’s National Development Strategy for 2020-2030 (SND30) and the Bank Group’s priorities in Cameroon’s Country Strategy Paper for 2023-2028, which is aligned with the objective of diversifying Cameroon’s economy, in particular by facilitating access to markets for agricultural and industrial producers in the north of the country.

    The African Development Bank Group and Cameroon are strategic partners, particularly in the infrastructure sector, with investments of $1.88 billion in transport infrastructure. The Bank Group’s commitment is reflected in major investments in the construction and upgrading of roads, bridges and strategic corridors, thereby facilitating the movement of people and the transport of goods on a national and regional scale. By adopting an integrated and inclusive approach in line with its Ten-Year Strategy 2024-2033, the Bank Group is stimulating the structural transformation of the economy and regional integration, with a view to sustainable growth and job creation for the benefit of inhabitants.

    MIL OSI Africa –

    March 25, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: UNAIDS chief warns of ‘real surge’ in deaths unless US restores funding

    Source: United Nations 2

    24 March 2025 Health

    Amid continuing uncertainty about the impact of deep US funding cuts to humanitarian work worldwide, the head of the UN agency coordinating the fight against HIV-AIDS warned that an addition 6.3 million people will die in the next four years, unless support is reinstated.

    “We will see a …real surge in this disease – [we] will see it come back and we see people dying the way we saw them in the 90s and in 2000s,” said Winnie Byanyima, UNAIDS Executive Director, pointing to a “tenfold increase” from the 600,000 AIDS-related deaths recorded globally in 2023.

    “We also expect an additional 8.7 million new infections. At the last count, there were 1.3 million new infections globally (in) 2023”.

    Speaking in Geneva, Ms. Byanyima noted that the funding freeze announced by the White House on 20 January was due to end next month, after a 90-day review.

    “We have not heard of other governments pledging to fill the gap,” she told journalists.

    Already, drop-in centres where HIV patients can pick up the anti-retroviral medicines they need are not reopening, “for fear that this might not be consistent with the new guidelines”, she maintained.

    “This sudden withdrawal of US funding has led (to) shutting down of many clinics, laying off of thousands of health workers, these are nurses, doctors, lab technicians, pharmacy workers…it’s a lot.”

    Focus on Africa

    Focusing on Africa – where the east and south of the continent share 53 per cent of the global HIV burden – Ms. Byanyima warned that closing down “all of a sudden drop-in centres for girls and young women will be disastrous, because more than 60 per cent of new infections – amongst young – new infections on the continent are amongst girls and young women”.

    Speaking to UN News earlier this month, the head of the UNAIDS office in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Susan Kasedde, said there were still major questions over the extent and scope of cuts due to be made to US PEPFAR initiative programmes, which began in 2003 to prevent and contain HIV infections – the presidency’s emergency plan which has saved an estimated 26 million lives.

    There are currently around 520,000 people living with HIV in the DRC, including 300,000 women and 50,000 children. The epidemic continues to grow, as the number of new infections is almost double the number of deaths linked to the disease.

    PEPFAR’s expected contribution for the 2025 fiscal year was due to be $105 million, and it aims to provide treatment half of the population living with HIV in the DRC – some 209,000 people.

    “This means that we currently have 440,000 people living with HIV who are on treatment. Thanks to this treatment, they are alive”, said Ms. Kasedde.

    “And then treatment cannot work without operational capacity, treatment cannot be provided if there is not a proper-functioning supply chain”, she stressed, pointing out that the response to HIV in the DRC involve largely interdependent programmes which reinforce each other.

    Global impact of cuts

    Several other UN agencies that are heavily reliant on US funding have also warned that the cut in support – in addition to chronic under-investment in humanitarian work globally – is already having a serious impact on the communities they serve.

    On Friday, the UN refugee agency, UNHCR, said that thousands have been left without lifesaving aid in the war-torn eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    The UN International Organization for Migration (IOM) also announced that funding cuts have severe repercussions for vulnerable migrant communities, exacerbating humanitarian crises and undermining essential support systems for displaced populations.

    Together with IOM, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) warned last Friday that that the liquidity crunch has jeopardized lifesaving work, including progress in reducing child mortality, which has fallen by 60 per cent since 1990.

    “It is reasonable for the United States to want to reduce its funding – over time. But the sudden withdrawal of lifesaving support is having a devastating impact across countries, particularly Africa, but even in Asia and Latin America,” said UNAIDS’ Ms. Byanyima.

    “We urge for a reconsideration and an urgent restoration of services – of life-saving services.”

    Presidential appeal

    And in a direct appeal to President Donald Trump, the UNAIDS chief noted that just as President George W Bush had introduced the groundbreaking PEPFAR initiative, the new White House incumbent could also be part of the “prevention revolution”, involving injectable HIV injections that are required just twice a year to provide protection.

    “The deal is that an American company is enabled to produce and to license generics across the regions to produce millions and roll out this injectable to those who really need it,” she insisted.

    According to UNAIDS, approximately 40 million people globally live with HIV, based on 2023 data. Of this number, some 1.3 million became newly infected with HIV in the same year and 630,000 people died from AIDS-related illnesses.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    March 25, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: UK sanctions for human rights violations and abuses during the Sri Lankan civil war

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    UK sanctions for human rights violations and abuses during the Sri Lankan civil war

    The UK has today sanctioned figures responsible for serious human rights violations and abuses during the civil war in Sri Lanka.

    • The UK sanctions former Sri Lankan commanders and an ex–Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) commander responsible for serious human rights violations and abuses during the civil war. 

    • Sanctions aim to seek accountability for serious human rights violations and abuses, committed during the civil war, and to prevent a culture of impunity.  

    • UK is committed to working with new Sri Lankan government on human rights, welcoming their commitments to national unity.

    The UK government has imposed sanctions on four individuals responsible for serious human rights abuses and violations during the Sri Lanka civil war; including extrajudicial killings, torture and/or perpetration of sexual violence. 

    The individuals sanctioned by the UK today include former senior Sri Lankan military commanders, and a former LTTE military commander who later led the paramilitary Karuna Group, operating on behalf of the Sri Lankan military against the LTTE. 

    The measures, which include UK travel bans and asset freezes, target individuals responsible for a range of violations and abuses, such as extrajudicial killings, during the civil war.

    Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, David Lammy, said: 

    The UK government is committed to human rights in Sri Lanka, including seeking accountability for human rights violations and abuses which took place during the civil war, and which continue to have an impact on communities today.

    I made a commitment during the election campaign to ensure those responsible are not allowed impunity. This decision ensures that those responsible for past human rights violations and abuses are held accountable.

    The UK government looks forward to working with the new Sri Lankan government to improve human rights in Sri Lanka, and welcomes their commitments on national unity.

    During her January visit to Sri Lanka, Minister for the Indo-Pacific, Catherine West MP, held constructive discussions on human rights with the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, civil society organisations, as well as political leaders in the north of Sri Lanka.   

    For communities to move forward together, there must be acknowledgement, and accountability for past wrongdoing, which the sanctions listings introduced today will support. We want all Sri Lanka communities to be able to grow and prosper. 

    The UK remains committed to working constructively with the Sri Lankan Government on human rights improvements as well as their broader reform agenda including economic growth and stability. As part of our Plan for Change, the UK recognises that promoting stability overseas is good for our national security. 

    The UK has long led international efforts to promote accountability in Sri Lanka alongside partners in the Core Group on Sri Lanka at the UN Human Rights Council, which includes Canada, Malawi, Montenegro, and North Macedonia.  

    Notes to editors:

    Those sanctioned are:  

    • former Head of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces, Shavendra Silva;  

    • former Navy Commander, Wasantha Karannagoda;  

    • former Commander of the Sri Lankan Army, Jagath Jayasuriya;  

    • former military commander of the terrorist group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan. Also known as Karuna Amman, he subsequently created and led the paramilitary Karuna Group, which worked on behalf of the Sri Lankan Army. 

    The UK has supported Sri Lanka’s economic reform through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme, supporting debt restructuring as a member of Sri Lanka’s Official Creditor Committee and providing technical assistance to Sri Lanka’s Inland Revenue Department. 

    The UK and Sri Lanka share strong cultural, economic and people to people ties, including through our educational systems. The UK has widened educational access in Sri Lanka through the British Council on English language training and work on transnational education to offer internationally accredited qualifications.

    Media enquiries

    Email newsdesk@fcdo.gov.uk

    Telephone 020 7008 3100

    Contact the FCDO Communication Team via email (monitored 24 hours a day) in the first instance, and we will respond as soon as possible.

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    Published 24 March 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    March 25, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: WFP and Japan support Angola to strengthen food and water security in drought stricken areas

    Source: World Food Programme

    LUANDA, Angola — The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) welcomes a contribution of US$ 2 million from the Government of Japan to support over 27,000 people affected by drought in southern Angola. This funding will enhance the food and water security while strengthening the resilience of smallholder farmers through Japanese agricultural technology innovations.

    In collaboration with the Government of Angola, WFP will scale up efforts to promote sustainable access to water, boost agricultural production, and improve the livelihoods of communities impacted by a prolonged drought and the El Niño event in Huíla and Cunene provinces. Through this initiative, WFP will provide solar-powered water supply and small-scale irrigation systems, skills training, and technical assistance to strengthen local value chains and create economic opportunities for smallholder farmers.

    WFP will also partner with a Japanese technology company, leveraging its expertise and innovative solutions to help unlock the country’s agricultural potential and advance national development priorities. 

    “WFP’s collaboration with the Government of Japan and the Japanese private sector has the potential to become a game-changer for Angola’s agriculture sector,” said José Ferrão, WFP Head of Office in Angola. “By combining WFP’s deep field presence and knowledge of the local context and Japan’s cutting-edge technology, this project will empower communities facing climate shocks to build long-term food and water security.”

    This generous contribution comes from a new initiative dedicated to sustainable socioeconomic development in Africa, in the lead-up to the Ninth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD9) to be held in Yokohama, Japan in August 2025.

    “The project supported by this new initiative and implemented in collaboration with WFP and NEC Corporation will be presented at TICAD9 as a model of co-created innovative solutions with Africa,” said Toru Suzuki, the Japanese Ambassador to Angola. 

    “It also contributes to Japan’s Country Development Cooperation Policy for Angola, which is aligned with the National Development Plan (2023-2027), that identifies the agriculture sector as a driver to promote food security and economic diversification and accelerating sustainable development.”

    WFP has been complementing the Government’s drought response efforts by delivering specialised nutrition support and food vouchers to families with malnourished children, as well as pregnant and breastfeeding women and girls. WFP also trains and mentors health facility staff and community health workers to conduct nutrition screenings and deliver programmes to address moderate acute malnutrition and improve maternal and child health outcomes. 

    #                    #                       #

    The United Nations World Food Programme is the world’s largest humanitarian organization saving lives in emergencies and using food assistance to build a pathway to peace, stability, and prosperity for people recovering from conflict, disasters, and the impact of climate change.

    Follow WFP on X via @wfp_media, @wfp_SAfrica

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    March 25, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: 1.5 million-year-old bone tools discovered in Tanzania rewrite the history of human evolution

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jackson K Njau, Associate professor, Indiana University

    The ancestors of humans started making tools about 3.3 million years ago. First they made them out of stone, then they switched to bone as a raw material. Until recently, the earliest clear evidence of bone tool making was from sites in Europe, dated to 400,000 years ago. But archaeologists have now found and dated bone tools in Tanzania that are a million years older.

    The tools are made from the bones of large animals like hippos and elephants, and have been deliberately shaped to make them useful for butchering large carcasses.

    The discovery of bone implements that are the oldest ever found, by far, casts light on human evolution. It shows that our hominin ancestors were able to think about and make this technology a lot earlier than anyone realised.

    I am a scientist who co-directs a multidisciplinary research project team at the Olduvai Gorge in Tanzania, focusing on hominin evolution. Our project’s main goal has been to investigate the changes in hominin technology and behaviour that happened between 1.66 million and 1.4 million years ago.

    We’re interested in this time period because it marks a pivotal change in human technology, from the rudimentary stone knives and cores of the Oldowan culture to the more advanced crafted stone handaxes of the Acheulean culture.

    We found the Olduvai bone tools in 2018 and recently described them in the journal Nature. They show that by 1.5 million years ago, our ancestors (Homo erectus) had already developed the cognitive abilities required to transfer skills from making stone tools to making bone tools.

    This leap in human history was a game-changer because it allowed early hominins to overcome survival challenges in landscapes where suitable stone materials were scarce.

    Tools at Olduvai

    Olduvai Gorge is a Unesco World Heritage site. It became well known in 1959 through the pioneering work of palaeontologists Louis and Mary Leakey, whose discoveries of early human remains reshaped our understanding of human evolution. The site offers an unparalleled window into human history, spanning nearly 2 million years.


    Read more: Finds in Tanzania’s Olduvai Gorge reveal how ancient humans adapted to change


    Aside from fossilised bones, it has yielded the most detailed record of stone tool cultures in the world. It has documented the evolution from the simple chopping tools and stone knives of the Oldowan industry (about 2 million years ago) to the more advanced Acheulean tools (1.7 million years ago), such as handaxes, cleavers, picks and spheroids and then on – through arrowheads, points and blades (about 200,000 years ago) to the micro-blades of the Later Stone Age (about 17,000 years ago).

    All these tools provide a glimpse into the ingenuity and cultural advancements of our early ancestors.

    And now the picture has new detail.

    Our team uncovered 27 ancient bone tools during excavations at the T69 Complex, FLK West site at Olduvai. We know how old they are because we found them securely embedded underground where they had been left 1.5 million years ago, along with thousands of stone artefacts and fossilised bones. We dated them using geochronological techniques.

    Reopening of Trench 69 at Olduvai Gorge in 2020. After each field season, archaeological trenches are backfilled. Photo: J.K. Njau, Author provided (no reuse)

    Unlike stone, bone shafts crack and break in a way that allows the systematic production of elongated, well-shaped artifacts. Flaking them by hitting them with another object – a process called knapping – results in pointed tools that would be ideal for butchering, chopping and other tasks.

    The knapped tools we found were made from large shaft fragments that came from the limb bones of elephants and hippos, and were found at hippo butchery sites. Hominins likely brought elephant bones to the site on a regular basis, and obtained limb bones from butchered hippos at the site itself.

    What Homo erectus knew

    The find shows that 1.5 million years ago, Homo erectus could apply knapping skills to bone. Homo erectus, regarded as the evolutionary successor to the smaller-brained Homo habilis, left a lasting imprint on history. Its fossils, found at Olduvai, offer a glimpse into a span of about a million years, stretching from 1.5 million to roughly 500,000 years ago.

    Now we know that these hominins not only understood the physical properties of bones but also knew about skeletal anatomy. They could identify and select bones suitable for flaking. And they knew which animals had skeletons large enough to craft reliable tools after the animals’ death.


    Read more: Large mammals shaped the evolution of humans: here’s why it happened in Africa


    We don’t know exactly why they chose bones as a raw material. It may have been that suitable stone material was scarce, or they recognised that bones provided a better grip and were more durable.

    Fossil extraction and preparation is conducted at Olduvai Gorge field labs. Here, Naibo Mesi and Agustino Songita work on one of the bone tools from Trench 69 Complex. Photo: R. Peters., Author provided (no reuse)

    Why haven’t such old bone tools been found before? The answer is likely that they are destroyed by weathering, abrasion from water transport, trampling and scavenger activity. Organic materials don’t always get time to fossilise. Also, analysts were not used to looking for bone tools among fossils.

    This discovery will likely encourage researchers to pay closer attention to the subtle signs of bone knapping in fossil assemblages. This way we will learn more about the evolution of human technology and behaviour.

    – 1.5 million-year-old bone tools discovered in Tanzania rewrite the history of human evolution
    – https://theconversation.com/1-5-million-year-old-bone-tools-discovered-in-tanzania-rewrite-the-history-of-human-evolution-251826

    MIL OSI Africa –

    March 25, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Will mummy make it better? The curious case of mummified remedies in early modern medicine

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Michelle Spear, Professor of Anatomy, University of Bristol

    Andrea Izzotti/Shutterstock

    The history of medicine is filled with remedies that, viewed through a modern lens, seem perplexing, misguided or downright macabre. Among these is “mumia” — a medicinal substance derived from mummified human remains.

    From the 12th to the 17th century, physicians across Europe prescribed powdered mummy as a cure-all for ailments ranging from internal bleeding and broken bones to epilepsy and melancholia.

    Once regarded as a potent elixir infused with the life force of the ancients, mumia was a staple in apothecaries, sought after by the wealthy and recommended by the learned. Yet, as medical knowledge evolved, so too did attitudes toward this unusual remedy, and by the 18th century, it had largely faded into obscurity.

    The belief in mumia’s healing power was deeply rooted in prevailing medical theories of the time. One such theory was the doctrine of signatures, which held that natural substances resembled the ailments they were meant to cure.

    Mummified flesh, preserved for centuries, seemed an obvious candidate for treating decay, wounds and internal deterioration. Another influential idea was vitalism, the notion that life force could be transferred from one body to another, particularly from a preserved human to a living patient.

    Adding to this was the European fascination with the medical traditions of the Islamic world. Arabic physicians such as Avicenna had described the therapeutic use of bitumen – a naturally occurring tar-like substance also called mūmiyā – that had medicinal applications in wound healing.

    When these texts were translated into Latin, European scholars mistakenly conflated mūmiyā with Egyptian mummies, assuming that the embalmed dead were imbued with similar restorative properties. The result was a booming trade in ground-up human remains, with mummies sourced from Egyptian tombs, grave robbers and even local execution sites.

    Grave robbers got in on the racket.
    David Leshem/Shutterstock

    Mumia was prescribed for an astonishing array of conditions. Physicians believed it could speed up healing, prevent infection and even cure epilepsy. Ingested in powdered form or mixed into tinctures, it was recommended for internal bleeding, strokes and tuberculosis. Some suggested it could ward off melancholy or restore youthful vitality, making it a popular remedy among the European elite.

    Apothecaries stocked mummy powder alongside other human-derived medicines such as powdered skull (cranium humanum) and distilled human fat (axungia hominis).

    The more ancient the remains, the more potent they were thought to be. However, as the demand for mumia outstripped the supply of genuine Egyptian mummies, opportunistic traders turned to more recent corpses – some even resorting to robbing the gallows to meet the market’s needs.

    Eventual decline

    Despite its widespread use, mumia was not without its detractors. By the 16th century, some physicians began to question both its efficacy and its ethical implications. The Swiss physician Paracelsus (1493–1541) argued that only fresh human remains – not ancient, embalmed flesh – had medicinal value, while others dismissed the practice as nothing more than superstition.

    The growing emphasis on empirical science in the 17th and 18th centuries further eroded faith in mumia. As anatomy and pathology advanced, the idea that centuries-old preserved tissue could heal the living seemed increasingly implausible. At the same time, public attitudes toward human remains began to shift.

    The rise of Egyptology and archaeological interest in mummies reframed them as historical artefacts rather than medical commodities, making their consumption distasteful even to those who had once sworn by their healing properties.

    By the early 18th century, mumia had largely disappeared from medical practice, relegated to the annals of history as an example of medicine’s sometimes gruesome past.

    Mumia’s decline serves as a reminder of how medical knowledge evolves, shedding once-revered treatments in favour of evidence-based approaches. Yet, while medicinal cannibalism may seem shocking today, the pursuit of miraculous cures continues. From stem cell therapies to longevity supplements, the desire to harness the essence of life itself persists – albeit with more scientific rigour.

    Looking back at the use of mummified medicine, we are reminded that the boundary between science and superstition is not always as clear as we might like to believe.

    Michelle Spear does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Will mummy make it better? The curious case of mummified remedies in early modern medicine – https://theconversation.com/will-mummy-make-it-better-the-curious-case-of-mummified-remedies-in-early-modern-medicine-247727

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    March 25, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: How we revealed the life story of PG Tips chimp – written in her bones

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stuart Black, Associate Professor, Department of Archaeology, University of Reading

    Chimpanzees helped to make PG Tips tea famous with their iconic TV ads in the 1970s. But what happened to these animals afterwards? Our new study, using techniques previously used only on human remains, reveals the fascinating life story of Choppers, a celebrity chimpanzee, also known as Ada Lott from the PG Tips ads.

    Zoos have transformed over the last century. They once focused on entertainment, but in the UK zoos now have a greater emphasis on education, conservation, research and welfare. And our new study, led by experts at National Museums Scotland, shows how these changes are written on Choppers’ body.

    Choppers died aged 46 in 2016, which is close to the average age for a wild or captive chimpanzee. Following her death, Choppers was donated to the National Museums of Scotland, which enabled an analytical investigation into her life through her remains. Researchers from across the UK created the most comprehensive osteobiography of a zoo animal by bringing together archival, chemical and metric analyses.

    Osteobiography involves the analysis of bones and other tissue. It is more commonly used in archaeology to reconstruct the life stories of ancient human subjects, such as Richard III, identifying where and how they lived in remarkable detail.

    As a celebrity, Choppers’ life has been extensively documented. This combination of
    archival material and osteobiographical analysis provides one of the most complete
    assessments of the life of an animal in zoo care.

    The findings of our study paint a rich picture of Choppers’ key life events, including evidence of injuries sustained when she was poached from the wild at just six weeks old. Choppers had a broken right arm, which seemed to have healed badly. Her lower arm bones were bowed and much shorter than her left side. She seems to have not been able to bear much weight on this arm, which likely contributed to joint disease here and elsewhere in her skeleton.

    It is also likely that many, if not all, of her social group were killed in her capture. The physical trauma would impact her throughout her life, impairing her movement and exacerbating degenerative issues associated with old age.

    Analysis of Choppers’ tooth enamel indicates a geographical and dietary shift between the ages of three and four, coinciding with her relocation to the UK from Sierra Leone. In the following three years she played the grandmother character in the PG Tips adverts, which ran in the UK throughout the 70s and 80s and featured a family of tea drinking chimps.

    A collection of PG Tips adverts using chimpanzees.

    The long-running ads helped PG Tips become the market leader of tea in Britain for 35 years. Her performance career was short, ending before the onset of puberty, and Choppers probably retired at around the age of six or seven. In part this is due to behavioural change as adult chimpanzees become less predictable, but also as a result of human perceptions of the cuteness of adult chimpanzees compared to infants.

    Choppers transitioned from a relatively active life with high levels of direct interaction with humans, to a sedentary life with two companion chimpanzees, Noddy and Brooke, who were also retired from the entertainment industry. She was cared for by Twycross Zoo in Leicestershire for the rest of her life.

    Choppers’ upper jaw was significantly elongated compared with wild chimpanzees, reflecting an early diet of sugary soft fruit, but also of her performance diet that mimicked that of humans. The PG Tips advertisements followed on from a longstanding trope in the mid-20th century of chimpanzees participating in tea parties, eating cake, drinking “tea” and apeing human behaviour. The chimpanzees drank fruit juice or milk rather than tea during tea parties and advertisements.

    In recent years there has been a shift towards tougher, less sugary vegetables in the diets of zoo primates, which is leading to improvements in their health and behaviour.

    Later in life, Choppers was housed for a time with another chimpanzee, Bobby. Together they had one daughter, Holly.

    Across the world today, there is considerable variation in zoo regulation, management and welfare. Despite accreditation of zoos and improved regulation, the illegal trafficking of chimpanzees and other primates into private collections and disreputable zoos continues. Choppers’ story is testament to the many thousands of chimpanzees that were (and still are) forcibly extracted from the wild for zoos, circuses, laboratories and private collections.

    Choppers was not an unusual chimpanzee, but her story is an individual one, which resonates with human attitudes towards wildlife, zoos, entertainment, welfare and quality of life.

    Stuart Black receives funding from The Wellcome Trust, UKRI and other research councils.

    David Cooper has received funding from The Wellcome Trust.

    Juliette Waterman received funding from the Wellcome Trust while this research was carried out.

    – ref. How we revealed the life story of PG Tips chimp – written in her bones – https://theconversation.com/how-we-revealed-the-life-story-of-pg-tips-chimp-written-in-her-bones-252224

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    March 25, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: World Water Day 2025: Preserving Africa’s Water Resources (By Mtchera Johannes Chirwa and Anthony Nyong)

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    ABIDJAN, Ivory Coast, March 24, 2025/APO Group/ —

    By Mtchera Johannes Chirwa, Director for Water Development and Sanitation, and Anthony Nyong, Director for Climate Change and Green Growth, African Development Bank Group (www.AfDB.org).

    Each year, World Water Day highlights the pressing challenges surrounding global water resources and the actions needed to address them. Nowhere is this more critical than in Africa, where nearly 1.4 billion people live, a number expected to rise to 2.5 billion by 2050. On the continent, approximately 411 million people – almost one-third of the total population – lacked basic drinking water services as of 2020. In Sub-Saharan Africa alone, about 387 million people struggle daily without access to safe water.

    Africa is home to vital natural water towers, including mountains and glaciers that play a key role in water security and climate resilience. However, these resources are under serious threat. Glaciers in the Rwenzori Mountains, Mount Kenya, the Virunga Mountains, and Mount Kilimanjaro are shrinking at an alarming rate and are expected to vanish entirely by 2050, jeopardizing water supplies for millions of people. On this World Water Day, the urgency to protect what remains and to collaborate on securing water resources for future generations has never been greater.

    Water is fundamental to Africa’s socioeconomic development. The International High-Level Panel on Water Investments for Africa estimates that Sub-Saharan Africa loses 5% of its GDP annually – equivalent to $170 billion per year – due to poor water infrastructure. Yet, investing in water security offers enormous returns. According to the African Union, every dollar invested in water and sanitation generates at least seven dollars in benefits across health, education, food security, and environmental protection.

    Climate change amplifies water scarcity, disrupting hydrological cycles, altering rainfall patterns, and reducing water availability for crops, livestock, and pasture. This directly threatens food and nutritional security across the continent. Addressing these challenges requires both practical solutions and strong policy frameworks. Integrated water management plans focused on river basins and catchments are essential for optimizing water use, while investing in resilient infrastructure ensures reliable access, particularly in regions prone to floods and droughts. Water-saving practices, such as rainwater harvesting and wastewater reuse, can help maximize available resources. Restoring natural ecosystems, including riverbanks and wetlands, plays a crucial role in safeguarding water sources. Nature-based solutions, such as afforestation and ecosystem restoration, are equally important in strengthening water resilience and helping landscapes adapt to climate change.

    Policy measures must complement these practical interventions. Strengthening water management laws and regulations is crucial for long-term success. Establishing and training local water management committees enhances coordination and decision-making, while improved weather monitoring and early warning systems help communities prepare for and respond to climate shocks more effectively.

    The African Development Bank has placed water security and climate resilience at the center of its Ten-Year Strategy (2024–2033) (apo-opa.co/420gbm3), aligning with the Africa Water Vision 2025 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Recognizing that water security is a cornerstone of progress across all sectors, the Bank invests approximately $2.8 billion annually to build resilience.

    To further accelerate climate action, it has established the Climate Action Window (apo-opa.co/4iSKTEr) under the African Development Fund, aiming to mobilize between $4 billion and $8 billion for climate-focused initiatives. Seventy-five percent of these funds are allocated to climate adaptation, with significant investments dedicated to water infrastructure. During the first call for proposals in December 2023, nine water-focused projects, totaling approximately $72 million, were selected to enhance investment in water infrastructure and sanitation. An additional 12 projects, amounting to $98 million, address multiple sectors, including water access for agriculture, improving the resilience of water systems, and strengthening climate information and early warning systems.

    Currently, the Bank manages 121 active water operations, including six multinational and regional projects valued at approximately $6 billion – all are based on climate-informed designs. The African Water Facility (www.AfricanWaterFacility.org), hosted and managed by the African Development Bank, also plays a pivotal role in ensuring that water sector projects are designed with sustainability and climate resilience in mind. In Kenya, the Bank-funded Kenya Towns Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation Program (apo-opa.co/4kYg0Ao) has significantly improved access to water supply across 19 towns, while wastewater management services have been expanded in 17 towns, benefitting more than three million people. The program incorporates solar energy to reduce water production and distribution costs. The Othaya Sewerage Wastewater Treatment Project, as part of this initiative, promotes waste reuse for energy and agriculture through the production of cooking briquettes and organic fertilizer.

    In Ethiopia and South Sudan, the Bank’s Climate Proof Water for Food Project is designed to enhance adaptation and resilience for approximately 211,000 people in Ethiopia’s Gambella region and South Sudan’s Unity State. This initiative includes the construction and rehabilitation of four solar-powered water supply systems and integrated flood management measures to support the transition to climate-smart agriculture.

    Tackling Africa’s water security and climate challenges requires strategic planning, investment in resilient infrastructure, and policies that integrate climate adaptation into water management frameworks. The African Development Bank’s ongoing initiatives demonstrate that placing water at the heart of climate action – by investing in resilient infrastructure, restoring ecosystems, and strengthening governance – is crucial in mitigating the impact of climate change and preserving the continent’s water resources for future generations.

    MIL OSI Africa –

    March 25, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: The International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation (ITFC) Signs US$ 20 Million Line of Financing Agreement with Trustbank in Uzbekistan

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    TASHKENT, Uzbekistan, March 24, 2025/APO Group/ —

    The International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation (ITFC) (www.ITFC-idb.org/), a member of the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) Group, signed a US$20 million Line of Trade Financing Agreement with Trustbank in Uzbekistan under the Murabaha structure. This agreement aims to bolster trade finance accessibility for SMEs, women entrepreneurs, green financing initiatives, and food security aimed at reinforcing Uzbekistan’s economic resilience.

    Under this facility, import and pre-export financing will be available to private-sector businesses in Uzbekistan, driving trade and supporting sectors critical to the country’s economic development.

    The signing ceremony took place at ITFC’s headquarters, with Mr. Sardor Normukhamedov, Chairman of the Management Board of Trustbank, and Mr. Nazeem Noordali, Officer-in-Charge, CEO ITFC, formalizing the agreement.

    Commenting on the signing, Nazeem Noordali stated: “The private sector remains a key driver of Uzbekistan’s economic development, and Trustbank’s commitment to supporting its growth is commendable. At ITFC, we are dedicated to empowering businesses through strategic trade finance solutions, and this partnership with Trustbank provides a robust platform to achieve tangible and lasting economic impact.”

    “Our bank always strives for innovation, reliability and dynamic development. Cooperation with ITFC will allow us to combine our experience and advanced financial instruments to create effective solutions that meet modern challenges.” stated Mr. Sardor Normukhamedov.

    This financing falls within the US$600 million Framework Agreement signed between ITFC and the Republic of Uzbekistan in March 2024, which underscores ITFC’s long-term commitment to fostering private sector development and strengthening the trade ecosystem of Uzbekistan.

    This agreement, the third consecutive facility between ITFC and Trustbank, brings the total financing provided to the bank to over US$44 million, further unlocking trade opportunities and enhancing financial inclusion. Since 2019, ITFC has approved over US$168 million in support of Uzbekistan’s private sector, reinforcing its role in driving economic opportunities and advancing UN SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth).

    MIL OSI Africa –

    March 25, 2025
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