NewzIntel.com

Category: Africa

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Palestinian Rights Committee Bureau Welcomes Historic Resolution Requesting Advisory Opinion from International Court of Justice, Rejects Actions that Obstruct Aid

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    The following statement was issued today by the Bureau of the General Assembly’s Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People:

    The Bureau of the UN Palestinian Rights Committee warmly welcomes the General Assembly’s adoption of a timely and important resolution to urgently request an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the obligations of Israel in relation to the presence and activities of the United Nations, other international organizations and third States.  The path to peace begins with justice — no more, no less.  This groundbreaking initiative spearheaded by Norway stands as a testament to the international community’s unwavering commitment to uphold human rights, international humanitarian law, and the urgent pursuit of justice for the Palestinian people.

    By an overwhelming majority vote of 137 in favour to 12 against, with 22 abstaining, the UN Member States requested the World Court to act urgently, giving the matter top priority.  This step follows closely the adoption of resolution ES-10/25, which deplored the measures taken by Israel, the occupying Power, that impede assistance to the Palestinian people, including the illegitimate legislation adopted by the Knesset against the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and reaffirmed full support for the mandate of the Agency and demanded an end to the obstruction of UNRWA’s vital operations and full respect for Israel’s international legal obligations.

    Israel’s relentless and brutal war on the Gaza Strip has resulted in over 45,000 Palestinians killed, the majority children and women, more than 107,000 injured, over 70,000 homes destroyed or damaged, in addition to other vital civilian infrastructure, and approximately 1.9 million forcibly displaced and suffering a humanitarian catastrophe, including starvation, cold and the spread of diseases.  Now is the time for decisive action — no more impunity, no more obstruction, no more weaponization of vital humanitarian aid. 

    Israel must implement, without delay, all of its legal obligations under international law, including the binding provisional measures as set out by the International Court of Justice in the case brought by South Africa under the Genocide Convention to prevent further harm to the Palestinian civilian population.

    The Committee Bureau reiterates its longstanding call for an immediate ceasefire, unobstructed and immediate provision of humanitarian aid, and a just and peaceful resolution to the question of Palestine that ends the Israeli unlawful occupation, enables the Palestinian people to achieve their inalienable rights, including self-determination and achieve the two-State solution on the pre-1967 borders with East Jerusalem as the capital of the State of Palestine in accordance with international law and the relevant UN resolutions.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Security and economic woes plague West Africa, as key elections loom

    Source: United Nations 4

    By Vibhu Mishra

    Peace and Security

    West Africa and the Sahel continue to grapple with a confluence of political, security and humanitarian crises as countries prepares for pivotal elections in 2025, the UN special envoy for the vast region told ambassadors in the Security Council on Friday.

    Leonardo Santos Simão, highlighted upcoming presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau, and the adoption of constitutional reforms amid a strained political environment in Gambia.

    He also commended recent successful elections in Ghana and Senegal, noting the signing of a “Peace Pact” by all presidential candidates in Ghana and the smooth transfer of power following orderly concessions by political rivals.  

    In Senegal, electoral observer missions highlighted the transparency of the process and the trust placed by political parties in national institutions, he added.

    “These two elections demonstrate progress in democracy in the region,” Mr. Simão said.

    Challenges remain

    However, several countries in the region – including Ghana and Senegal – continue to face significant economic challenges.

    “They will require support to manage rising debt and implement projects that protect livelihoods, otherwise their democratic gains may fail to satisfy the expectations of the populations, in particular among women and the youth,” Mr. Simão warned.

    He also urged efforts to prioritise preventive diplomacy and dialogue in the region, while emphasising he remains focused on fostering mutual understanding and encouraging common ground with all stakeholders.

    “While the positive outcomes of these engagements are gradual, there are promising signs of increased collaboration on people-centred, pragmatic solutions to the region’s security, governance, humanitarian and socio-economic challenges,” he added.

    Escalating security threats

    Insecurity remains the most urgent concern, with terrorist groups becoming increasingly aggressive and utilising sophisticated weaponry, including drones. Recent attacks in the Central Sahel have claimed many lives, affecting civilians and security personnel alike.

    Beyond the Sahel, violent extremism and organized crime have begun to spill into Gulf of Guinea nations, such as Benin and Togo, threatening more regional destabilisation.  

    The cessation of operations by the G5-Sahel Joint Force and the restructuring of the Accra Initiative, highlight the urgent need to reinvigorate regional security mechanisms, Mr. Simão said.

    He called for increased support for the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), the only functioning security platform in the Lake Chad Basin, which is struggling to counter increasingly well-equipped terrorist groups.

    Humanitarian crisis deepens

    The humanitarian situation in the region also remains challenging.

    Chad, hosting two million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) – including those fleeing the violence in Sudan – is grappling with the dual challenges of displacement and severe flooding.

    In Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Nigeria, escalating violence has displaced millions, while underfunded humanitarian appeals leave many vulnerable.

    “I urge partners to contribute to the humanitarian appeal, which remains less than 50 percent funded,” Mr. Simão said.

    Withdrawal from ECOWAS

    He also briefed Council members of the Summit of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) last week, where leaders took note of the decision by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to withdraw from the bloc.  

    While formal withdrawal proceedings are expected to commence in late January 2025, ECOWAS leaders also extended a six-month window for dialogue, in case rapprochement is possible.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Jury Finds Convicted Killer Guilty of Kidnapping and Racketeering

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

               WASHINGTON – Christopher Green, 38, of Washington D.C., was found guilty on Wednesday of racketeering and kidnapping, in connection with a series of violent crimes he committed in early 2017.

               The verdict was announced by U.S. Attorney Matthew M. Graves, FBI Assistant Director, Washington Field Office, David Sunberg, Chief Malik Aziz of the Prince Georges Police Department, and Chief Pamela Smith of the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD).

               Following a 12-day re-trial, the jury found Green, 38, aka “Twin,” guilty of RICO conspiracy and VICAR kidnapping. U.S. District Court Judge Randolph D. Moss scheduled sentencing for March 31, 2025. 

               In 2021, Green was found guilty of first-degree murder with aggravating circumstances, assault with a dangerous weapon, and attempted robbery in connection with other offenses committed during the same period.

              According to the government’s evidence, Green was a core member of a criminal organization that operated in the District of Columbia, Prince George’s County, Maryland, and elsewhere, primarily making money through a series of armed robberies. Green’s actions in Southeast Washington on April 9, 2017, led to the death of 25-year-old Zaan Scott. Mr. Scott, a swim coach at the Eastern Market pool, who was on his way home when Green attempted to rob him at gunpoint. Mr. Scott died on May 17, 2017, of a blood clot that the medical examiner determined was a result of the shooting. Green also was found guilty at the initial trial of firing gunshots at another victim on Feb. 23, 2017.

           The kidnapping conviction in the retrial involved an incident on April 8, 2017, in which Green confronted a young man at gunpoint as the man was getting out of his car in a convenience store parking lot.  Green ordered the victim back into the car and robbed him of his ATM card.  He then forced the victim to drive to a nearby apartment complex, where he robbed him of his sneakers and other belongings. 

                Green has been detained since his arrest in April 2017.

               The case was investigated by the FBI’s Washington Field Office, the Metropolitan Police Department, and the Prince George’s County Police Department. It is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Nihar R. Mohanty and Michael Liebman.

    19cr0019

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Chad: New EUR 28 million African Development Bank-funded solar project to boost Chad’s energy access

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    ABIDJAN, Ivory Coast, December 20, 2024/APO Group/ —

    The Board of Directors of the African Development Bank Group (www.AfDB.org) has approved funding worth EUR 28 million to build solar power plants in Gassi and Lamadji, Chad. This is part of the Bank’s Desert to Power program to increase energy access across Africa.

    The funding includes EUR 20 million in direct support, combining a loan and a grant from the Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa, plus EUR 8 million in financial guarantees. These guarantees are split equally between the African Development Fund and the Green Climate Fund, which both contribute EUR 4 million each to support this clean energy project.

    This important project is part Chad’s Desert to Power plan. It will increase power supply by 20% and pave the way for the country’s energy transition from expensive, polluting fuel-based power to clean energy. The project will build two solar power plants in the outskirts of N’Djamena, each able to produce 15-megawatt peak of electricity. It also includes new power stations, connection lines, and a 6-megawatt-hour battery system to store energy for when the sun isn’t shining. The total project cost is estimated at EUR 41 million. The Bank’s financing is in addition to financing expected from other Development Finance Institutions (DFIs).

    Kevin Kariuki, Vice President of the Power, Energy, Climate, and Green Growth complex at the African Development Bank, said: “The Gassi and Lamadji solar project is a landmark development that underscores Chad’s strong commitment to the transition to renewable energy under the Desert to Power Initiative, and the Bank’s continued commitment to supporting transformative, clean energy projects across the continent. This project not only facilitates the Government of Chad’s efforts to increase access to energy through renewable energy but also drives local economic growth and strengthens the country’s energy security.”

    Wale Shonibare, the Bank’s Director of the Energy Financial Solutions, Policy, and Regulations department, added, “As a pioneering solar project in Chad, this initiative exemplifies the scale of renewable energy potential in the Sahel region. It demonstrates how strong partnerships and the Bank’s deployment of its suite of instruments and innovative solutions can advance the energy transition and foster sustainable economic development.”

    The solar plants are expected to generate 61 gigawatt-hours of clean, reliable, and affordable energy each year responding to Chad’s energy deficit. This will reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 49,000 tons each year, helping Chad meet its climate change commitments under the Paris Agreement. The project will create 200 jobs during construction, with special opportunities for women and young people and 34 permanent jobs during operation. The project will generate revenue for the national treasury through taxes, reduce fuel subsidies, and improve the country’s balance of payments by reducing energy imports. 

    Aligned with the Bank’s Ten-Year Strategy, the New Deal on Energy for Africa, and its High 5 objective of “Light Up and Power Africa,” the Gassi and Lamadji Solar PV project reinforces Chad’s commitment to increase energy access through renewable energy. It also supports the African Development Bank’s mission to promote sustainable, inclusive, and resilient energy development across Africa.

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Madagascar: African Development Fund approves a grant of over $9 million to strengthen protection and sustainable use systems for natural capital and ecosystems

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    ABIDJAN, Ivory Coast, December 20, 2024/APO Group/ —

    The Board of Directors of the African Development Fund (https://apo-opa.co/4iITWIP) – the African Development Bank Group’s (www.AfDB.org) concessional financing window – approved a donation of $9.42 million to Madagascar to implement climate resilience through the Preservation of Biodiversity in National Parks Project.

    The grant, agreed on 18 December 2024 in Abidjan, comes from the Climate Action Window (https://apo-opa.co/3VOUrYa), a mechanism of the Fund, created during the 16th replenishment round to help combat the significant shortage of climate finance in Africa. The window is split into three sub-windows – adaptation, mitigation and technical assistance – and is aimed at the least developed countries on the continent.

    The project aims to strengthen the resilience of agricultural protection system value chains and preserve and ensure the sustainable use of natural capital and ecosystems to increase Madagascar’s resilience to climate change. It plans to develop the capacity of communities living alongside the national parks to adapt to climate change, develop and refurbish access roads to ensure the parks are accessible in every season, build sustainable conservation infrastructure, provide water from boreholes and micro-dams, and construct public primary schools, along with five basic health centres to benefit local communities.

    Furthermore, the project will help secure the land in the protected areas concerned and support the local economy through income-generating activities. The various support activities, particularly training and awareness-raising campaigns, will help establish a sense of responsibility among the direct beneficiaries in how they carry out development initiatives.

    “The project is targeting direct investment in climate-smart agriculture to improve agricultural production, the conservation of natural habitats and ecosystems, the development of socioeconomic infrastructure, and the participation of local people, by creating job opportunities to improve their livelihoods,” commented Adam Amoumoun, head of the African Development Bank’s Country Office for Madagascar.

    “Activities to conserve and maintain protected areas will have a positive impact in terms of reducing carbon emissions in the three intervention areas; this will be incorporated into a study on implementing contractual payment mechanisms for ecosystem services and the development of a carbon market,” he added.

    The project’s direct intervention area covers three national parks – Lokobe, Nosy Hara and Andringitra – and surrounding areas. Three other national parks – Montagne d’Ambre, Ankarafantsika and Analamazaotra Mantadia – will benefit from the training and capacity-building component for young people and women.

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Video: Sudan/Egypt, Syria, Libya & other topics Daily Press Briefing | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    • Sudan.
    • Sudan/Egypt
    • Libya
    • Syria
    • OCHA/Türkiye
    • Israel/Yemen
    • Occupied Palestinian Territory
    • Security Council/Afternoon meeting
    • MONUSCO
    • Security Council
    • Central African Republic
    • Liberia
    • West and Central Africa
    • Ukraine
    • International Days

    Sudan
    The Secretary-General is outraged by the killing of three World Food Programme staff members in Sudan on 19 December, when the agency’s field office in Yabus, in Blue Nile State, was hit by aerial bombardment.  He sends his deepest condolences to the families of the victims and their WFP colleagues.   The Secretary-General condemns all attacks on UN and aid personnel and facilities. He calls for a thorough investigation.   Yesterday’s incident underscores the devastating toll that Sudan’s brutal conflict is having on millions of people in need and the humanitarians trying to reach them with life-saving assistance.  2024 is the deadliest year on record for aid workers in Sudan. Just last month, in November, a colleague from OCHA was killed in El-Fasher. Yet despite significant threats to their personal safety, our colleagues continue to do all they can to provide vital support wherever it is needed.  The Secretary-General calls on the parties to adhere to their obligations to protect civilians, including aid personnel, as well as humanitarian premises and supplies. Attacks must not be directed against them and all feasible precautions must be taken to avoid harming them.   After more than 20 months of conflict in Sudan, the Secretary-General once again stresses the need for an immediate ceasefire. The United Nations will continue to back international mediation efforts and work with all relevant stakeholders to help bring an end to the war. For her part, Cindy McCain, WFP’s Executive Director, said that we are urgently working to establish the circumstances around this appalling incident. She also demanded a thorough investigation and for the perpetrators to be held accountable. Yesterday at the Security Council, Edem Wosornu, Director of Operations at OCHA, spoke about the staggering humanitarian crisis in the Sudan. She also reminded Council members that in 2024, humanitarian organizations faced significant funding gaps and called on donors to provide the $4.2 billion humanitarians need to support nearly 21 million people inside Sudan next year.
    Sudan/Egypt
    The Emergency Relief Coordinator, Tom Fletcher, has allocated $6 million from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) to address the humanitarian needs of refugees fleeing conflict in Sudan to Egypt, in support of the ongoing response there. The conflict in Sudan has created the world’s fastest-growing displacement crisis. Of the more than 3 million people who have sought protection across Sudan’s borders since April of last year, some 1.2 million are being hosted by Egypt – more than in any other country – according to recent data from the Egyptian Government. This influx of new arrivals has placed additional strain on host communities in Egypt, stretching public services and resources. The funding from CERF will help support people’s most urgent needs including food, water, shelter, cash assistance and protection services.

    Full Highlights:
    https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/ossg/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=20%20December%202024

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lvlnbuezom8

    MIL OSI Video –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Sudan’s El Fasher siege: UN humanitarians killed as refugee crisis intensifies

    Source: United Nations 4

    Peace and Security

    The ongoing conflict in Sudan – particularly around besieged El Fasher – and a growing refugee crisis on the South Sudan border, have intensified an already alarming humanitarian crisis, according to UN agencies on Friday. 

    In a new report, the UN human rights office (OHCHR) has detailed the catastrophic humanitarian situation unfolding in El Fasher, the capital of Sudan’s North Darfur state.

    The city has been under siege for seven months by fighters from the powerful militia known as the RSF, which has been battling Government forces for control of Sudan since April last year. Thousands of civilians are trapped, leaving at least 782 civilians dead and over 1,143 injured.

    “The continuing siege of El Fasher and the relentless fighting are devastating lives everyday on a massive scale,” said UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk.

    The report, based on 52 interviews conducted in October and November with survivors who fled El Fasher, reveals a widespread use of explosive weapons in populated areas by the Rapid Support Forces and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) – together with their allied militias.

    These actions raise serious concerns about violations of international humanitarian law, including potential war crimes.

    Hospitals and camps targeted

    The report highlights attacks on key civilian infrastructure, including hospitals and camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs).

    The Al-Saudi Maternity Hospital, the last remaining public hospital in El Fasher providing surgical and reproductive health services, has been repeatedly shelled by the RSF.

    Tumbasi Medical Centre was similarly targeted in August, resulting in the deaths of 23 people and injuries to 60 more.

    The report also documents increased cases of sexual violence since the siege began, exacerbating the suffering of vulnerable populations.

    The Zamzam IDP camp, located 15 km south of El Fasher and home to hundreds of thousands of displaced people, has been shelled six times by the RSF, reportedly killing at least 15 civilians.

    “Attacks against the civilian population and protected persons and objects, including medical facilities, may amount to war crimes,” said Li Fung, the UN High Commissioner’s Representative in Sudan.

    Risk of escalation

    The situation in El Fasher remains dire, with the report warning of potential large-scale attacks on Zamzam camp and the city itself

    “Any large-scale attack on Zamzam camp and El Fasher city will catapult civilian suffering to catastrophic levels,” Mr. Türk cautioned.

    Rights office, OHCHR, has called on all parties – as well as the international community – to engage in mediation efforts and immediately end hostilities.

    © UNHCR/Reason Moses Runyanga

    Families arrive at a transit centre in Renk, South Sudan, after fleeing escalating violence in Sudan.

    WFP workers killed

    The World Food Programme (WFP) mourned the deaths of three staff members in the Blue Nile state, killed during an aerial bombardment on 19 December.

    WFP Executive DirectorCindy McCain condemned the attack, calling for accountability.

    “Any loss of life in humanitarian service is unconscionable. Humanitarians are not, and must never be, a target,” Ms. McCain gravely stated.

    “2024 is the deadliest year on record for aid workers in Sudan. Yet despite significant threats to their personal safety, they continue to do all they can to provide vital support wherever it is needed,” underscored Secretary-General António Guterres in a statement released by his spokesperson.

    Refugee crisis at the border

    Meanwhile, the spillover from the war between rival militaries is overwhelming neighbouring South Sudan.

    UNHCR warns that over 80,000 people have fled into South Sudan in just three weeks, joining the more than one million Sudanese refugees already there.

    “The recent surge in arrivals in South Sudan is overwhelming services in border areas, and funding for the humanitarian response remains insufficient,” said Marie-Helene Verney, UNHCR Representative in South Sudan.

    Call for accountability

    The UN is calling for a renewed push for mediation and increased international support to prevent further civilian suffering.

    Ms. Fung expressed the need for accountability and compliance with international law particularly due to “the Jeddah Declaration of Commitments that was signed by both parties in May 2023.”

    The OHCHR report also underscores the urgent need for a thorough investigation into potential war crimes and for those responsible to be held accountable.

    Emergency funds for Egypt

    The Emergency Relief Coordinator, Tom Fletcher, has allocated $6 million from the UN’s Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) to address the humanitarian needs of refugees fleeing conflict in Sudan to Egypt, in support of the ongoing response there.

    The conflict in Sudan has created the world’s fastest-growing displacement crisis, the UN Spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric told reporters on Friday.

    “Of the more than three million people who have sought protection across Sudan’s borders since April of last year, some 1.2 million are being hosted by Egypt – more than in any other country – according to recent data from the Egyptian Government,” he told reporters at the daily briefing in New York. 

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: At a Glance – Plenary round-up – December 2024 – 20-12-2024

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Union’s external relations topped the agenda for the December 2024 plenary session, with several debates on statements by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and Vice-President of the European Commission, Kaja Kallas, attending the plenary for the first time in her new capacity. These included the toppling of the Syrian regime and its consequences; Russia’s disinformation activities and fraudulent justification of its war against Ukraine; the use of rape as a weapon of war (e.g. in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan). The day after Kallas’s remarks on the crackdown on peaceful pro-European demonstrators in Georgia, Salome Zourabichvili, President of Georgia, addressed Members in a formal sitting. Other debates on Commission statements covered, inter alia: the situation in Mayotte following the recent devastating cyclone; a European innovation act; harassment and cyber-violence against female politicians in EU candidate and neighbouring countries; a shared vision for sustainable European tourism; promoting social dialogue and the right to strike; tackling abusive subcontracting; the need to ensure swift action and transparency on public-sector corruption allegations; urgent EU action to preserve nature and biodiversity; and the Commission’s plans to revise outstanding proposals on animal welfare in its 2025 work plan. Members also debated ahead of the European Council meeting of 19 December 2024 and set out their expectations ahead of the EU-Western Balkans Summit that took place the previous day. Parliament created two new standing committees, upgrading the former sub-committees on Public Health, and on Security and Defence; and set up two special committees: on the European Democracy Shield, and the Housing Crisis.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Verizon donates $25,000 to the American Red Cross in response to the Franklin Fire

    Source: Verizon

    Headline: Verizon donates $25,000 to the American Red Cross in response to the Franklin Fire

    IRVINE, C.A. – To support much needed local wildfire relief efforts in response to the Franklin Fire in Malibu, California, Verizon is upholding its commitment to the community with a $25,000 donation to the American Red Cross.

    “The Franklin Fire in Malibu is a reminder of the disruptive impact wildfires can have on our communities,” said Steven Keller, Pacific Market President for Verizon. “We hope our grant to the American Red Cross will provide much-needed aid to those affected by the fire.”

    Earlier this year, Verizon contributed to the American Red Cross in response to various wildfires in Southern California, including the Mountain, Line, Bridge and Airport wildfires. 

    “We sincerely thank Verizon for their generous $25,000 donation to support our response to the Malibu Franklin Fire,” said Joanne Nowlin, CEO, American Red Cross Los Angeles Region. “This contribution strengthens the American Red Cross Los Angeles Region’s commitment to providing relief, hope and care to those affected by disasters.”

    Wildfire conditions and Public Safety Power Shutdowns in the Malibu area caused a service interruption for some customers. In response, our engineers and local emergency crews worked quickly to mitigate impacts and, as a result,we are seeing the restoration of service to those customers affected across the area. In support of public safety agencies responding to the Franklin Fire, the Verizon Frontline Crisis Response Team provided mission-critical communications support, deploying mobile assets to help provide connectivity in the area.

    Verizon facilitates year-round efforts to ensure the network is engineered for resilience, with extensive redundancy measures and backup power solutions across critical sites. To learn more about Verizon’s emergency response efforts, visit our Emergency Resource Center.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Adopting Resolution 2764 (2024), Security Council Underscores Importance of Preserving Child Protection Capacities in UN Mission Transitions

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    The Security Council today adopted a resolution highlighting the need for sustainable child protection capacities in United Nations peace operations and the importance of their smooth, responsible transfer to the Organization’s country teams during mission transitions or withdrawals.

    Unanimously adopting resolution 2764 (2024) (to be issued as document S/RES/2764(2024)), the Council condemned all violations of applicable international law involving the recruitment and use of children by parties to armed conflict, as well as their re-recruitment, killing and maiming, rape and other forms of sexual violence, abductions and attacks against schools and hospitals.

    The 15-member organ further called for “strengthened coordination” among key stakeholders to “ensure the continuity, effectiveness, and sustainability of child protection activities.”  These actors include the heads of UN peace operations, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Co-Chairs of the Country Task Forces on Monitoring and Reporting, as well as relevant Governments and authorities.

    The representative of Malta, the draft’s author and Chair of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, noted that the text has gathered the support of more than 100 States.  She emphasized that her country has placed the protection of children in armed conflict at the forefront of its agenda, noting that the resolution reaffirmed States’ determination to address violations against children in conflict zones and recognized the need to sustain child protection capacities during UN mission transitions.  Describing the text as “a call to action”, she further underscored the critical need for the timely recruitment and deployment of Child Protection Advisers.

    Ecuador’s delegate, Vice-Chair of the Working Group, said that his country’s joint leadership with Malta over the last two years has produced the adoption of nine consensus-based documents about children in Afghanistan, Colombia, Philippines, Iraq, Nigeria, Mali, Central African Republic, Somalia and South Sudan.  These conclusions stand as road maps to guide the action of States and the international community.  She called on the Working Group to continue its efforts — together with the Special Representative, the monitoring and reporting mechanism, and UN personnel on the ground — in shedding light on grave violations against children.

    Hailing the text’s adoption, Sierra Leone’s representative stressed that “more than 470 million children are affected by armed conflict globally” and that peace operations and other programmatic interventions play a critical role in protecting civilians and stabilizing the post-conflict situation. “It is in this spirit that we hope that this resolution will ensure the prioritization of child protection capacity and mechanisms in differentiated contexts of UN mission transitions,” he added.

    Expressing deep concern that grave violations against children “have risen to shocking levels in recent years”, the United Kingdom’s delegate called on the Council and the wider UN system to “do more to protect children who are uniquely vulnerable and often the primary victims of conflict”. Welcoming the resolution’s focus on the crucial role of dedicated Child Protection Advisers in UN missions, he called for greater coordination on child protection across the entire system, along with an effective monitoring and reporting mechanism.

    The Russian Federation’s delegate welcomed a “balanced and laconic resolution” that represented the Council’s constructive approach towards unity on the important mandate — “which of late has regrettably been politicized”.  Voicing support for the African Union’s efforts on promoting the child component in its peacekeeping operations, she called for renewing the request for Secretary-General António Guterres to ensure that information communicated regarding violations against children is accurate, objective and reliable.

    The representative of the United States said that “this resolution serves as a poignant reminder of the urgency and necessity of strengthening the international community’s child protection capacities”. She emphasized the crucial need for those States named in the Secretary-General’s annual children and armed conflict report to enter action plans with the Special Representative’s office to address the concerns raised.  Guyana’s delegate stressed that the Council must use its tools to improve the protection of children.  “We have seen examples of how increased child protection capacity in countries has led to improvements in the lives of the children,” she observed, pointing to the negative impacts of abrupt UN mission closures on child protection.  The adopted text provides critical details for coordination and smooth and responsible mission responsibilities during transitions, she added.

    “They [children] embody the seeds of hope for better future,” said Algeria’s delegate, stressing that the adopted text constitutes an important step towards ensuring sustainable protection of children in armed conflict.  The speaker for the Republic of Korea noted today’s adoption demonstrates strong global commitment to strengthening the children and armed conflict framework developed over 25 years and represents a milestone in global efforts to bridge the gap in child protection capacities.

    Japan’s delegate emphasized the vital importance of education in post-conflict settings — a prerequisite for lasting, sustainable peace, that must be prioritized, as the resolution pointed out.  He supported the text’s call for dedicated child protection capacities and reintegration assistance to end and prevent violations.

    NEW – Follow real-time meetings coverage on our LIVE blog.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Security Council Renews Mandate of Stabilization Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2765 (2024)

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    The Security Council today extended for one year the mandate of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), expressing grave concern over the ongoing offensive by the 23 March Movement (M23) in North Kivu, in violation of the ceasefire, and the unauthorized presence of external forces from a neighbouring State in the eastern part of the country.

    Unanimously adopting resolution 2765 (2024) (to be issued as document S/RES/2765 (2024)), the Council — acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations — decided that the new mandate expires on 20 December 2025.  The mandate includes, on an exceptional basis and without precedent to peacekeeping’s basic principles, its Force Intervention Brigade.

    The draft further decided that MONUSCO’s authorized troop ceiling will comprise 11,500 military personnel, 600 military observers and staff officers, 443 police personnel and 1,270 personnel of formed police units.

    The text also decided to retain the Mission’s key strategic priorities — protecting civilians, supporting the stabilization and strengthening of State institutions and key governance and security reforms. In this regard, it authorized MONUSCO to use “all means at its disposal … to promptly and effectively prevent armed groups’ attacks against civilians”.

    By its other terms, the text requested the Secretary-General — in his quarterly reports on MONUSCO — to provide updates on progress towards the implementation of its gradual, responsible and sustainable withdrawal to evaluate the Mission’s performance, including its Force Intervention Brigade, and provide operational assessments and recommendations.

    Furthermore, the text requested a tailored approach to MONUSCO’s gradual, responsible and sustainable withdrawal, considering evolving conflict dynamics and protection risks in hotspot areas across North Kivu and Ituri Provinces.  It requested that this strategy be shared with the Council by 31 March 2025.

    “Today’s adoption can be a moment that will significantly change the trajectory of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo towards the peaceful resolution of the conflict,” said the representative of Sierra Leone, a co-penholder of the draft.  He supported Kinshasa’s efforts to protect civilians and stabilize and strengthen State institutions.  However, he cautioned that M23’s territorial expansion remains deeply concerning, demanding that it end its offensive and cease its expansion in the east of the country without delay.

    France’s delegate, noting that the text reaffirms that protection of civilians will be a priority task for MONUSCO, said the Mission will also continue its disengagement.  Condemning all obstacles to the implementation of its mandate — including the territorial expansion of M23 — he reaffirmed support for the Luanda process and urged all stakeholders to continue negotiations.

    After the vote, Mozambique’s delegate, speaking also for Algeria, Guyana and Sierra Leone, stressed that the resolution arrives “at a pivotal moment” for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region.  Highlighting MONUSCO’s efforts to support Kinshasa in addressing the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in the eastern part of the country, he underscored that effective implementation of its mandate remains crucial to the stability of the country and the protection of civilians.  Effective collaboration with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is vital, particularly in planning the next steps for the Mission’s drawdown and consolidating the drawdown in South Kivu.

    At the national level, he underlined the critical importance of revitalizing the Nairobi process in sustainably addressing the issue of local armed groups.  Simultaneously, the establishment of a robust State presence in the eastern regions is vital in ensuring a well-equipped State apparatus capable of administering the territory and countering all threats against civilians.  He also highlighted the critical contributions of the African Union in addressing the protracted conflict in the eastern part of the country as well as Angola’s leadership and mediation efforts.  While national and regional efforts are vital, he called on the Security Council to continue playing a constructive role in achieving a peaceful conflict settlement.

    China’s delegate, noting that the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is at a critical juncture, commended Angola’s efforts to promote the Luanda process.  He further voiced support for Kinshasa in safeguarding its national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, adding that the UN should fully respect the views and demands of its Government and ensure that the withdrawal of MONUSCO does not create a security vacuum.

    Meanwhile, the United Kingdom’s delegate expressed disappointment that the Luanda process Heads of State summit was postponed and urged all parties to engage with the process in good faith.  Also expressing concern about the surge in violence since 15 December, including the presence of Rwanda Defence Forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, he called on parties to the conflict to refrain from obstructing the Mission’s operations.

    “While we fully support the extension of MONUSCO’s mandate”, the representative of the United States said, “we remain dismayed that some members of the Council resisted the inclusion of language factually describing Rwanda’s role in [the eastern part of the country],” especially in the face of “extensive evidence” of Rwanda’s deployment of troops in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its influence over M23 operations.  She also expressed disappointment that Rwanda’s President declined to attend the tripartite summit, “forfeiting a significant opportunity to advance peace efforts”.  Highlighting the ceasefire agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda and the establishment of the verification mechanism to monitor the ceasefire, she added:  “We must not lose sight of how far we have come.”

    NEW – Follow real-time meetings coverage on our LIVE blog.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Amid Growing Strength of Terrorist Groups in Sahel, West Africa, Senior Official Urges Security Council to Scale Up Support within Regional Frameworks

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    In a region grappling with escalating threats due to violent non-State actors, civic restrictions, political transitions and heightened humanitarian needs, the head of UN efforts in West Africa and the Sahel called on the Security Council for scaled up support within regional frameworks, as speakers welcomed small signs of progress on the democratic front.

    Leonardo Santos Simão, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), presenting the latest Secretary-General’s report (document S/2024/871), reported that he just attended the 15 December Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Summit, where Heads of State took note of the decision of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger to withdraw from the organization.  ECOWAS responded with an offer of six months for dialogue to encourage those countries to remain, he added.  Regional leaders unanimously acknowledge insecurity as the region’s most urgent concern, with terrorists becoming increasingly aggressive, and utilizing sophisticated weaponry, including drones, he said, also drawing attention the spread, beyond the Sahel, of violent extremism and organized crime to northern Benin and Togo, and the Gulf of Guinea countries.

    To address such threats, he called for the Council to scale up support within regional frameworks.  While the announced operationalization of the ECOWAS Standby Force is a positive step, the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) joint force has ceased operations, and the Accra Initiative is undergoing restructuring, to model the Multinational Joint Task Force, “the primary security cooperation mechanism in the Lake Chad Basin region, and the only functioning platform for cooperation on regional security in West Africa and the Sahel”.  He went on to highlight a trip in November to Chad with Special Representative Abdou Abarry, Head of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), during which they met the Lake Chad Basin Commission as well as a camp for internally displaced persons — of whom the country presently hosts 2 million, amid severe flooding, with the worsening humanitarian situation in other countries leading to further displacement.  In this context, he urged support for the underfunded humanitarian appeal, which is less than 50 per cent funded.  Addressing climate resilience, he spotlighted meetings held between stakeholders to discuss the transboundary management of water at the 2024 UN Climate Change Conference in Baku, and welcomed the visit, in December, of the Council’s informal expert group on climate change, peace and security to the Lake Chad Basin region.

    On human rights issues, he deplored the closing of 8,200 schools in the region, due to insecurity and expressed concern about persisting human rights violations and civic restrictions in Guinea and Central Sahel.  However, he welcomed progress in fighting impunity, citing the conviction of those responsible for the 2009 Guinea stadium massacre.  Detailing progress in the region on the democratic front, he noted his visit to Ghana during the presidential and legislative elections; as well as taking note of legislative elections in Senegal on 17 November, Côte d’Ivoire on track to its 2025 presidential elections and Liberia making progress in democratic consolidation.  However, in Guinea-Bissau, the parliamentary elections planned for November 2024 have been postponed sine die, he said, also pointing out that, in the Gambia, 2025 will be a critical year for the adoption of constitutional reforms, due to a political environment in which consensus has eroded.

    The Council also heard from Levinia Addae-Mensah, Executive Director, West Africa Network for Peacebuilding, a network encompassing 750 civil society organizations across the region, who described a “heightened security threat profile”, leading to expanding zones of instability and ungoverned spaces in the region, due to recent democratic transformations and security challenges stemming from the growing strength of terrorist and violent extremist groups in the Sahel and some coastal States.  Citing data from the group’s early warning system indicates that 76 per cent of armed attacks occurred around tri-border communities with inadequate State presence, she pointed out that “cascaded negative effects” of such dynamics led to challenges, including the closing of 12,000 schools, exacerbating the vulnerability of girls to early marriage, female genital mutilation and trafficking.

    Despite these challenges, she took note of positive trends, including progress towards democratic governance in Liberia, Senegal and Ghana; strengthened early warning systems and response mechanisms; and development of national and local infrastructures for peace.  Despite the shrinking of civic spaces, her organization is strengthening resilience through initiatives, such as Security Consultative Committees, which it introduced in Mali, she said, pointing out that such “a dichotomous reality” underscores the value of organic approaches to peacebuilding.  In closing, she highlighted processes that presented opportunities to reset approaches to addressing threats in the region, including the 2025 review of United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture and the Africa Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions.

    In the ensuing discussion, many speakers echoed concerns about the security situation in the region, with several urging support for regional security initiatives. Among them was the representative of Sierra Leone, co-penholder on the file, speaking also for Algeria, Guyana and Mozambique, who urged predictable funding for regional security mechanisms, spotlighting the importance of the Multinational Joint Task Force in fighting terrorist groups in the Lake Chad Basin, and the potential of a fully operationalized Accra Initiative in addressing security threats, including the recruitment and radicalization of young people in the region.

    Switzerland’s delegate called for a holistic approach to security, stressing that insecurity also hinders the improvement of the socioeconomic and humanitarian situation in the region.  Voicing alarm about the persistence and spread of armed conflict, terrorism and violent extremism, she said:  “It is necessary to engage in actions to maintain and promote dialogue and social cohesion, and to tackle the root causes of fragility.”

    The representative of the Republic of Korea concurred, pointing out that the “lack of coordinated regional responses and fragmented counter-terrorism efforts heighten the risk of terrorist expansion across the Central Sahel and into coastal States”.  He therefore encouraged ECOWAS and regional States to foster effective collaboration to counter terrorism and transnational organized crime, an appeal echoed by the representative of Japan.

    Also on the security front, the United Kingdom underscored that “private military security companies — like the Wagner Group and Africa Corps — are not the answer”.  Rather, these entities have a track record of worsening existing conflicts and undermining long-term development and stability.  On the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the region, he called for more humanitarian access, highlighting his Government’s support for more than 16 million people in the Sahel since 2019.

    Similarly, the representative of the United States, Council President for December, speaking in her national capacity, warned that, amid Governments’ struggle to reclaim control over territory, leaders who engage in heavy-handed counter-terrorism tactics, while neglecting to address the drivers of marginalization, are only worsening the security situation.

    However, the Russian Federation’s delegate countered that the fractious security situation “is the heavy burden of the consequences of the military aggression waged by Western countries against Libya — a burden borne, to this day, by all States in the region”.  Long-term stability in the Sahel requires the international community to support Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso “who stand at the forefront of the fight against pan-African terrorist groups”, she added, also stressing that the Council should respect the decision by members of the Alliance of Sahel States to leave ECOWAS.

    Meanwhile, China’s delegate called for the international community to “maintain necessary patience” with countries in transition and provide them with “small constructive support”. Countries in the region must foster collective security and continuously enhance counter-terrorism cooperation, he said.  To that end, his country, as announced at the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in September, will provide expertise and support to the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism and United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism Programme Office for Counter-Terrorism and Training in Africa.

    Malta’s delegate was among several speakers highlighting democratic concerns, welcoming Ghana’s introduction of a 40 to 50 per cent target of women in elected and appointed positions.  However, she urged transitional Governments to adhere to previously agreed electoral timelines, pointing to postponed elections in Guinea-Bissau and Burkina Faso, as well as similar negative trends in the Gambia and Nigeria.

    Addressing the humanitarian picture, Guyana’s representative, also speaking for Switzerland, as the Council’s informal co-focal points on conflict and hunger, noted that, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 48.6  million people throughout the region were projected to experience food insecurity in the “critical June and August lean period”, mainly due to worsening security conditions in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Nigeria.  She called for increased international support, particularly in capacity-building; respect for international humanitarian law to protect humanitarian personnel, as well as objects indispensable to civilian survival; and a comprehensive overview that acknowledges the interrelated nature of existing and emerging challenges, including food insecurity.

    Many delegates drew attention to the exacerbating impact of climate change on the regional humanitarian situation, including Ecuador’s representative, who called on the international community to intensify its efforts in providing aid, and Slovenia’s delegate, who warned that:  “Crop failures, combined with the local grievances and ongoing instability create a fertile ground for recruitment by extremist armed groups.”  In this context, she echoed the Secretary-General’s call for countries in the region and ECOWAS to develop conflict-sensitive climate adaptation plans as part of comprehensive peacebuilding strategies.

    France’s representative concurred, observing that, by making access to resources difficult, climate change impacts “are an additional hurdle in West Africa”.  France has therefore renewed its support to regional climate, peace and security mechanisms to address these challenges.  He added that improving the situation in the region requires a peaceful political climate, common commitment by all actors to pursue dialogue, a return to constitutional order and universal respect for human rights and the freedoms of association and expression.

    NEW – Follow real-time meetings coverage on our LIVE blog.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Security Council 1970 Sanctions Committee Removes One Entry from Its Sanctions List

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    Press Release

    On 20 December 2024, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) removed the following entry from its Sanctions List of individuals and entities.

    A. Individuals

    LYi.020 Name: 1: ABDELHAFIZ 2: ZLITNI 3: na 4: na
    Title: na Designation: a) Minister for Planning and Finance in Colonel Qadhafi’s Government. b) Secretary of the General People’s Committee for Finance and Planning c) Temporary head of the Central Bank of Libya DOB: 1935 POB:  Good quality a.k.a.: na Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: na Passport no: na National identification no: na Address: Libya Listed on: 24 Jun. 2011 ( amended on 26 Sep. 2014, 11 Nov. 2016 ) Other information: Listed pursuant to paragraph 15 of resolution 1970 and paragraph 19 of resolution 1973 (Travel Ban, Asset Freeze). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link:  https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-UN-Notices-Individuals

    Press releases concerning changes to the Committee’s Sanctions List may be found in the “Press Releases” section on the Committee’s website at the following URL:  https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1970/press-releases.

    The updated version of the Committee’s Sanctions List, available in HTML, PDF and XML format, may be found at the following URL:  https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1970/materials.

    The United Nations Security Council Consolidated List is also updated following all changes made to the Committee’s Sanctions List and is accessible at the following URL:  https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/content/un-sc-consolidated-list.

    For information media. Not an official record.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Security Council Extends Mandate of United Nations Observer Force in Golan for Six Months through Resolution 2766 (2024), Amid Reports of Israel Incursion

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    The Security Council today renewed the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan for six months until 30 June 2025 and requested the Secretary-General to ensure that the Force has the required capacity and resources to fulfil its mandate “in a safe and secure way”.

    UNDOF was established immediately following the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement between Israel and Syria, with a mandate to maintain the ceasefire and supervise the area of separation — a demilitarized buffer zone — as well as the area of limitation — where Israeli and Syrian troops and equipment are restricted — in the Golan.

    Today’s unanimous adoption of resolution 2766 (2024) (to be issued as document S/RES/2766(2024)) follows reports of Israeli troops entering the demilitarized zone after the fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad earlier this month. 

    Speaking after the adoption, Algeria’s delegate highlighted that the collaborative efforts of the Russian Federation and the United States in drafting the text “has enabled us to unanimously renew the mandate of UNDOF, which comes at a critical juncture for Syria and the whole region”.

    He said the resolution underscores that there should be no military forces, equipment or personnel in the area of separation other than those of UNDOF.  “The actual presence of Israeli forces in the area is illegal and constitutes a flagrant violation of the 1974 disengagement agreement and relevant Security Council resolutions,” he warned.

    Drawing attention to a protest in the Dara’a Governorate in Syria earlier today during which Israeli soldiers opened fire, injuring a young man, he said:  “To those who still doubt that we are witnessing the occupation of new territories in Syria, I would ask:  What is your stance on this?”

    The mandate of UNDOF has been extended every six months, last renewed on 27 June.  (See Press Release SC/15748.)

    NEW – Follow real-time meetings coverage on our LIVE blog.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Completes the First Review under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) Arrangement for Togo

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    December 20, 2024

    • The IMF Executive Board completed today the first review under the ECF-arrangement for Togo, allowing the authorities to draw the equivalent of about US$57.4 million (SDR 44.0 million). The Executive Board approved the 42-month ECF-arrangement in March 2024.
    • Togo’s growth performance has remained robust, and inflation is moderating. The medium-term outlook is broadly favorable, with continued robust growth but also elevated risks.
    • Togo has continued to advance its reform agenda, and the program is on track. Policy priorities are to (i) make growth more inclusive while strengthening debt sustainability, and (ii) implement structural reforms to support growth and limit financial sector and associated fiscal risks.

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed the first review of the ECF-arrangement for Togo. The Board’s decision enables the immediate disbursement of SDR 44.0 million (about US$ 58.7 million), which will be used for budget support. The ECF-arrangement provides overall financing of SDR 293.60 million (about US$ 390 million).

    The IMF approved the ECF-arrangement on March 1st, 2024 (see Press Release No. 24/64) to help the authorities address the legacies of the shocks seen since 2020, notably the COVID-pandemic and the increase in global food and fuel prices. The Togolese authorities were able to lessen these shocks’ impacts on the Togolese economy and population. However, this resulted in an increase in fiscal deficits and debt. The IMF-supported government program aims to (i) make growth more inclusive while strengthening debt sustainability, and (ii) implement structural reforms to support growth and limit financial sector and associated fiscal risks.

    The medium-term outlook is broadly favorable, with continued robust growth. Economic growth reached an estimated 5.6 percent in 2023 and is projected at 5.3 percent in 2024-25 and around 5.5 percent per year thereafter according to IMF staff projections, barring major adverse shocks. Headline inflation eased to 3.3 percent in October 2024 and core inflation (which excludes the prices of food and transport) to 2.2 percent (annual averages).

    However, the outlook is subject to high risks. In particular, terrorist attacks in the country’s North continues unabated and appears to be intensifying, putting pressure on spending. The authorities are contending with the challenging trade-offs between fiscal consolidation to lower the debt burden and the need to maintain robust growth in the context of limited fiscal space.

    Implementation of the program is on track. The authorities have met all end-June quantitative performance criteria, and prospects for meeting the quantitative targets for the rest of the year are favorable. The authorities also have met two out of the four due structural benchmarks, and there are prospects for the authorities to deliver at a later stage on the limited elements that have led to the missing of two benchmarks. Further, prospects for meeting the two end-December benchmarks are good. Finally, the authorities have made good progress on the reform of the remaining state-owned bank.

    At the conclusion of the Executive Board’s discussion, Mr. Bo Li, Deputy Managing Director, and Acting Chair, made the following statement: 

    “The Togolese authorities have shown strong implementation of the program supported under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF). The authorities have met all quantitative targets despite security challenges and tight financing conditions, and they have progressed on structural reforms to strengthen revenue mobilization, inclusion, and public financial management. 

    “Togo’s outlook is subject to elevated risks, broadly as at the program request in March 2024, while security conditions have deteriorated. In line with this, the design of the program as conceived at the outset remains broadly appropriate, and the authorities should continue to implement the program with determination to place the country on the path of strong and sustainable growth.   

    “In the area of fiscal policies, the authorities should continue to aim to address debt vulnerabilities in a context of regional vulnerabilities while supporting growth and enhancing inclusion. For this, it will be important to implement the agreed fiscal anchor by limiting fiscal deficits to 3 percent of GDP from 2025 onwards, continue to raise tax revenue while making taxation more efficient, and implement structural reforms to enhance the efficiency of spending and make the social safety net more effective and efficient. 

    “It will also be essential to continue efforts to strengthen governance. The authorities’ recent request for an IMF Governance Diagnostic is welcome, as is their commitment to strengthening beneficial ownership declarations for companies benefiting from public procurement contracts. On the financial sector, the authorities should continue the reform of the remaining public bank by bringing the bank’s capital in line with regulatory requirements and reforming its operations to ensure its stability and profitability. Efforts to strengthen the AML/CFT framework will also be important.

    Togo: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2020–29
     

    2020

    2021

    2022

    2023

    2024

    2025

    2026

    2027

    2028

    2029
     

    Estimates

    Projections
     

    (Percentage change, unless otherwise indicated)

    Real GDP

    2.0

    6.0

    5.8

    5.6

    5.3

    5.3

    5.5

    5.5

    5.5

    5.5

    Real GDP per capita

    -0.4

    3.5

    3.3

    3.1

    2.8

    2.8

    3.0

    3.0

    3.0

    3.0

    GDP deflator

    1.8

    2.5

    3.7

    2.9

    2.2

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    Consumer price index (average)

    1.8

    4.5

    7.6

    5.3

    3.3

    2.3

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    GDP (CFAF billions)

    4253

    4621

    5069

    5507

    5927

    6366

    6850

    7371

    7932

    8536

    Exchange rate CFAF/US$ (annual average level)

    575

    554

    622

    606

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    Real effective exchange rate (appreciation = –)

    -2.0

    -1.4

    2.3

    -5.4

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    Terms of trade (deterioration = –)

    -1.4

    6.6

    23.3

    3.4

    0.9

    -1.7

    -0.8

    1.4

    1.3

    0.4
       

    Monetary survey

    (Percentage change of beginning-of-period broad money)

      Net foreign assets

    14.1

    5.6

    -0.6

    6.2

    4.9

    -0.1

    3.0

    2.8

    2.2

    2.2

      Net credit to government

    -1.6

    -0.3

    8.0

    0.2

    -2.9

    1.0

    1.2

    2.0

    0.2

    0.2

      Credit to nongovernment sector

    0.2

    6.0

    10.7

    1.5

    7.3

    6.5

    4.4

    4.6

    4.9

    4.8

      Broad money (M2)

    11.4

    12.3

    14.9

    8.5

    8.8

    7.4

    7.6

    7.6

    7.6

    7.6

      Velocity (GDP/end-of-period M2)

    2.1

    2.1

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0
     

    Investment and savings

    		  

      Gross domestic investment

    21.4

    23.4

    25.9

    28.0

    25.7

    24.2

    25.0

    25.9

    26.7

    27.2

       Government

    9.3

    8.2

    9.7

    11.5

    9.0

    7.1

    7.7

    8.4

    8.9

    9.4

       Nongovernment

    12.1

    15.2

    16.2

    16.5

    16.7

    17.1

    17.3

    17.5

    17.8

    17.8

      Gross national savings

    21.1

    21.2

    22.5

    25.1

    22.7

    21.2

    22.4

    23.7

    24.7

    25.2

       Government

    2.2

    3.6

    1.4

    4.8

    4.1

    4.1

    4.7

    5.4

    5.8

    6.4

       Nongovernment

    18.9

    17.6

    21.0

    20.3

    18.6

    17.1

    17.7

    18.3

    18.9

    18.8
     

    Government budget

    		  

      Total revenue and grants

    16.6

    17.1

    17.6

    19.8

    18.8

    18.6

    19.1

    19.5

    19.9

    20.3

       Revenue

    14.1

    15.3

    15.1

    16.8

    16.6

    17.1

    17.6

    18.1

    18.5

    19.1

        Tax revenue

    12.5

    14.0

    13.9

    14.8

    15.2

    15.7

    16.2

    16.7

    17.2

    17.7

      Expenditure and net lending (excl. banking sector operation)

    23.7

    21.8

    26.0

    26.6

    23.7

    21.6

    22.0

    22.6

    22.9

    23.3

      Overall primary balance (commitment basis, incl. grants)

    -4.7

    -2.5

    -5.9

    -3.9

    -3.7

    -0.5

    -0.6

    -0.8

    -1.0

    -1.1

      Overall balance (commitment basis, incl. grants, excl. banking sector operations)

    -7.0

    -4.7

    -8.3

    -6.7

    -4.9

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

      Overall balance (commitment basis, incl. grants)

    -7.0

    -4.7

    -8.3

    -6.7

    -6.4

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

      Overall primary balance (cash basis, incl. grants)

    -4.7

    -3.4

    -5.9

    -3.9

    -3.7

    -0.5

    -0.6

    -0.8

    -1.0

    -1.1

      Overall balance (cash basis, incl. grants, excl. banking sector operations)

    -7.1

    -5.6

    -8.3

    -6.7

    -4.9

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

      Overall balance (cash basis, incl. grants)

    -7.1

    -5.6

    -8.3

    -6.7

    -6.4

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0
     

    External sector

    		  

    Current account balance

    -0.3

    -2.2

    -3.5

    -2.9

    -3.0

    -2.9

    -2.6

    -2.2

    -2.0

    -2.0

       Exports (goods and services)

    23.3

    23.7

    26.6

    25.5

    25.7

    25.6

    26.0

    26.2

    26.2

    26.1

       Imports (goods and services)

    -32.3

    -34.0

    -38.8

    -36.2

    -35.4

    -34.4

    -33.9

    -33.7

    -33.5

    -33.5

    External public debt1

    27.6

    27.3

    26.2

    25.9

    29.5

    29.0

    29.9

    30.6

    30.8

    30.4

    External public debt service (percent of exports)1

    6.9

    5.2

    8.3

    8.2

    8.4

    15.5

    9.2

    8.3

    7.2

    6.5

    Domestic public debt2

    34.6

    37.6

    41.2

    42.1

    40.2

    39.1

    36.6

    34.3

    32.3

    31.4

    Total public debt3

    62.2

    64.9

    67.4

    68.0

    69.7

    68.2

    66.4

    64.8

    63.1

    61.8

    Total public debt (excluding SOEs)4

    60.1

    63.0

    65.8

    66.6

    68.6

    67.2

    65.6

    64.1

    62.5

    61.3

    Present value of total public debt3

    …

    …

    …

    60.6

    60.7

    57.7

    54.5

    51.5

    48.8

    47.1

    Sources: Togolese authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections.
     

    1 Includes state-owned enterprise external debt.

    2 Includes domestic arrears and state-owned enterprise domestic debt.

    3 Includes domestic arrears and state-owned enterprise debt.

    4 Includes domestic arrears.
    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Kwabena Akuamoah-Boateng

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/12/20/pr24494-togo-imf-exec-board-completes-first-rev-ecf-arrangement

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: IMF Executive Board Completes the First Review under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) Arrangement for Togo

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    December 20, 2024

    • The IMF Executive Board completed today the first review under the ECF-arrangement for Togo, allowing the authorities to draw the equivalent of about US$57.4 million (SDR 44.0 million). The Executive Board approved the 42-month ECF-arrangement in March 2024.
    • Togo’s growth performance has remained robust, and inflation is moderating. The medium-term outlook is broadly favorable, with continued robust growth but also elevated risks.
    • Togo has continued to advance its reform agenda, and the program is on track. Policy priorities are to (i) make growth more inclusive while strengthening debt sustainability, and (ii) implement structural reforms to support growth and limit financial sector and associated fiscal risks.

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed the first review of the ECF-arrangement for Togo. The Board’s decision enables the immediate disbursement of SDR 44.0 million (about US$ 58.7 million), which will be used for budget support. The ECF-arrangement provides overall financing of SDR 293.60 million (about US$ 390 million).

    The IMF approved the ECF-arrangement on March 1st, 2024 (see Press Release No. 24/64) to help the authorities address the legacies of the shocks seen since 2020, notably the COVID-pandemic and the increase in global food and fuel prices. The Togolese authorities were able to lessen these shocks’ impacts on the Togolese economy and population. However, this resulted in an increase in fiscal deficits and debt. The IMF-supported government program aims to (i) make growth more inclusive while strengthening debt sustainability, and (ii) implement structural reforms to support growth and limit financial sector and associated fiscal risks.

    The medium-term outlook is broadly favorable, with continued robust growth. Economic growth reached an estimated 5.6 percent in 2023 and is projected at 5.3 percent in 2024-25 and around 5.5 percent per year thereafter according to IMF staff projections, barring major adverse shocks. Headline inflation eased to 3.3 percent in October 2024 and core inflation (which excludes the prices of food and transport) to 2.2 percent (annual averages).

    However, the outlook is subject to high risks. In particular, terrorist attacks in the country’s North continues unabated and appears to be intensifying, putting pressure on spending. The authorities are contending with the challenging trade-offs between fiscal consolidation to lower the debt burden and the need to maintain robust growth in the context of limited fiscal space.

    Implementation of the program is on track. The authorities have met all end-June quantitative performance criteria, and prospects for meeting the quantitative targets for the rest of the year are favorable. The authorities also have met two out of the four due structural benchmarks, and there are prospects for the authorities to deliver at a later stage on the limited elements that have led to the missing of two benchmarks. Further, prospects for meeting the two end-December benchmarks are good. Finally, the authorities have made good progress on the reform of the remaining state-owned bank.

    At the conclusion of the Executive Board’s discussion, Mr. Bo Li, Deputy Managing Director, and Acting Chair, made the following statement: 

    “The Togolese authorities have shown strong implementation of the program supported under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF). The authorities have met all quantitative targets despite security challenges and tight financing conditions, and they have progressed on structural reforms to strengthen revenue mobilization, inclusion, and public financial management. 

    “Togo’s outlook is subject to elevated risks, broadly as at the program request in March 2024, while security conditions have deteriorated. In line with this, the design of the program as conceived at the outset remains broadly appropriate, and the authorities should continue to implement the program with determination to place the country on the path of strong and sustainable growth.   

    “In the area of fiscal policies, the authorities should continue to aim to address debt vulnerabilities in a context of regional vulnerabilities while supporting growth and enhancing inclusion. For this, it will be important to implement the agreed fiscal anchor by limiting fiscal deficits to 3 percent of GDP from 2025 onwards, continue to raise tax revenue while making taxation more efficient, and implement structural reforms to enhance the efficiency of spending and make the social safety net more effective and efficient. 

    “It will also be essential to continue efforts to strengthen governance. The authorities’ recent request for an IMF Governance Diagnostic is welcome, as is their commitment to strengthening beneficial ownership declarations for companies benefiting from public procurement contracts. On the financial sector, the authorities should continue the reform of the remaining public bank by bringing the bank’s capital in line with regulatory requirements and reforming its operations to ensure its stability and profitability. Efforts to strengthen the AML/CFT framework will also be important.

    Togo: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2020–29
     

    2020

    2021

    2022

    2023

    2024

    2025

    2026

    2027

    2028

    2029
     

    Estimates

    Projections
     

    (Percentage change, unless otherwise indicated)

    Real GDP

    2.0

    6.0

    5.8

    5.6

    5.3

    5.3

    5.5

    5.5

    5.5

    5.5

    Real GDP per capita

    -0.4

    3.5

    3.3

    3.1

    2.8

    2.8

    3.0

    3.0

    3.0

    3.0

    GDP deflator

    1.8

    2.5

    3.7

    2.9

    2.2

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    Consumer price index (average)

    1.8

    4.5

    7.6

    5.3

    3.3

    2.3

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    GDP (CFAF billions)

    4253

    4621

    5069

    5507

    5927

    6366

    6850

    7371

    7932

    8536

    Exchange rate CFAF/US$ (annual average level)

    575

    554

    622

    606

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    Real effective exchange rate (appreciation = –)

    -2.0

    -1.4

    2.3

    -5.4

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    Terms of trade (deterioration = –)

    -1.4

    6.6

    23.3

    3.4

    0.9

    -1.7

    -0.8

    1.4

    1.3

    0.4
       

    Monetary survey

    (Percentage change of beginning-of-period broad money)

      Net foreign assets

    14.1

    5.6

    -0.6

    6.2

    4.9

    -0.1

    3.0

    2.8

    2.2

    2.2

      Net credit to government

    -1.6

    -0.3

    8.0

    0.2

    -2.9

    1.0

    1.2

    2.0

    0.2

    0.2

      Credit to nongovernment sector

    0.2

    6.0

    10.7

    1.5

    7.3

    6.5

    4.4

    4.6

    4.9

    4.8

      Broad money (M2)

    11.4

    12.3

    14.9

    8.5

    8.8

    7.4

    7.6

    7.6

    7.6

    7.6

      Velocity (GDP/end-of-period M2)

    2.1

    2.1

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0
     

    Investment and savings

    		  

      Gross domestic investment

    21.4

    23.4

    25.9

    28.0

    25.7

    24.2

    25.0

    25.9

    26.7

    27.2

       Government

    9.3

    8.2

    9.7

    11.5

    9.0

    7.1

    7.7

    8.4

    8.9

    9.4

       Nongovernment

    12.1

    15.2

    16.2

    16.5

    16.7

    17.1

    17.3

    17.5

    17.8

    17.8

      Gross national savings

    21.1

    21.2

    22.5

    25.1

    22.7

    21.2

    22.4

    23.7

    24.7

    25.2

       Government

    2.2

    3.6

    1.4

    4.8

    4.1

    4.1

    4.7

    5.4

    5.8

    6.4

       Nongovernment

    18.9

    17.6

    21.0

    20.3

    18.6

    17.1

    17.7

    18.3

    18.9

    18.8
     

    Government budget

    		  

      Total revenue and grants

    16.6

    17.1

    17.6

    19.8

    18.8

    18.6

    19.1

    19.5

    19.9

    20.3

       Revenue

    14.1

    15.3

    15.1

    16.8

    16.6

    17.1

    17.6

    18.1

    18.5

    19.1

        Tax revenue

    12.5

    14.0

    13.9

    14.8

    15.2

    15.7

    16.2

    16.7

    17.2

    17.7

      Expenditure and net lending (excl. banking sector operation)

    23.7

    21.8

    26.0

    26.6

    23.7

    21.6

    22.0

    22.6

    22.9

    23.3

      Overall primary balance (commitment basis, incl. grants)

    -4.7

    -2.5

    -5.9

    -3.9

    -3.7

    -0.5

    -0.6

    -0.8

    -1.0

    -1.1

      Overall balance (commitment basis, incl. grants, excl. banking sector operations)

    -7.0

    -4.7

    -8.3

    -6.7

    -4.9

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

      Overall balance (commitment basis, incl. grants)

    -7.0

    -4.7

    -8.3

    -6.7

    -6.4

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

      Overall primary balance (cash basis, incl. grants)

    -4.7

    -3.4

    -5.9

    -3.9

    -3.7

    -0.5

    -0.6

    -0.8

    -1.0

    -1.1

      Overall balance (cash basis, incl. grants, excl. banking sector operations)

    -7.1

    -5.6

    -8.3

    -6.7

    -4.9

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

      Overall balance (cash basis, incl. grants)

    -7.1

    -5.6

    -8.3

    -6.7

    -6.4

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0
     

    External sector

    		  

    Current account balance

    -0.3

    -2.2

    -3.5

    -2.9

    -3.0

    -2.9

    -2.6

    -2.2

    -2.0

    -2.0

       Exports (goods and services)

    23.3

    23.7

    26.6

    25.5

    25.7

    25.6

    26.0

    26.2

    26.2

    26.1

       Imports (goods and services)

    -32.3

    -34.0

    -38.8

    -36.2

    -35.4

    -34.4

    -33.9

    -33.7

    -33.5

    -33.5

    External public debt1

    27.6

    27.3

    26.2

    25.9

    29.5

    29.0

    29.9

    30.6

    30.8

    30.4

    External public debt service (percent of exports)1

    6.9

    5.2

    8.3

    8.2

    8.4

    15.5

    9.2

    8.3

    7.2

    6.5

    Domestic public debt2

    34.6

    37.6

    41.2

    42.1

    40.2

    39.1

    36.6

    34.3

    32.3

    31.4

    Total public debt3

    62.2

    64.9

    67.4

    68.0

    69.7

    68.2

    66.4

    64.8

    63.1

    61.8

    Total public debt (excluding SOEs)4

    60.1

    63.0

    65.8

    66.6

    68.6

    67.2

    65.6

    64.1

    62.5

    61.3

    Present value of total public debt3

    …

    …

    …

    60.6

    60.7

    57.7

    54.5

    51.5

    48.8

    47.1

    Sources: Togolese authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections.
     

    1 Includes state-owned enterprise external debt.

    2 Includes domestic arrears and state-owned enterprise domestic debt.

    3 Includes domestic arrears and state-owned enterprise debt.

    4 Includes domestic arrears.
    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Kwabena Akuamoah-Boateng

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: The Gambia: IMF Executive Board Completes the Second Review Under the Extended Credit Facility

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    December 20, 2024

    • The IMF Executive Board completed today the second review under The Gambia’s Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement, enabling the immediate disbursement of about US$10.8 million to help meet financing needs and bolster inclusive, sustainable growth.
    • Economic recovery is strengthening, and inflation is gradually decreasing, although the pace remains slow. The country remains vulnerable to global shocks.
    • Program performance has been affected by fiscal pressures and delays in reform implementation, but the authorities remain committed to overall program targets. Steadfast implementation of the policy and reform agenda will be essential to safeguard macroeconomic gains and debt sustainability.

    Washington, DC – December 20, 2024: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed today the second review under The Gambia’s Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement, approved by the IMF Executive Board on January 12, 2024, in the amount of SDR74.64 million (about US$97.3 million). The completion of the review allows for the immediate disbursement of SDR 8.29 million (about US$10.8 million), bringing total disbursements under the arrangement to about SDR 24.87 million (US$32.4 million).

    The economic recovery in The Gambia is strengthening. Real GDP growth is expected to reach 5.8 percent in 2024, supported by a broad-based rebound in economic activity. In particular, tourist arrivals are recovering and nearing pre-pandemic levels, while remittance inflows remain strong. Headline inflation has decreased significantly from a peak of 18.5 percent in September 2023, although energy prices led to a small uptick in inflation to 10 percent in October 2024.

    While the authorities remain committed to the objectives set out in the program and revenue collection has been strong, spending pressures from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Summit and emergency support to the public utility company NAWEC have weighed on fiscal balances. The new foreign exchange policy is working well, and international reserves exceeded targets by the end of September.  

    Based on the strength of the macroeconomic program, growth is projected at 5.9 percent in 2025 and around 5 percent in the medium term, though risks remain from global conflicts, commodity price shocks, and fluctuations in tourism and remittance flows. Steadfast implementation of the policy and reform agenda will be essential to safeguard macroeconomic gains and debt sustainability.

    Following the Executive Board’s discussion, Deputy Managing Director Bo Li issued the following statement:

    “The Gambia’s economic recovery is strengthening while inflation has trended down. Program implementation was mixed, reflecting broadly satisfactory adherence to quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets but delays in implementing structural benchmarks. The authorities remain committed to their reform agenda, despite global economic headwinds. 

    “Continued commitment to fiscal consolidation is critical to reduce fiscal risks and preserve debt sustainability. Finalizing and implementing the Domestic Revenue Mobilization Strategy will help secure consolidation gains and lower reliance on costly domestic and external financing. Improving the structure of expenditures will help maintain social services and space for growth-enhancing capital expenditures. Strengthening public financial management, including by preventing domestic arrears accumulation, and improving the performance of state-owned enterprises will help contain fiscal risks. To reduce debt vulnerabilities, it is crucial to adhere to the agreed fiscal targets, focus on grants and concessional loans, limit fiscal risks from PPPs, and implement a strong medium-term fiscal framework.

    “The Central Bank of The Gambia has appropriately maintained its tight monetary policy stance and is encouraged to remain vigilant and data dependent to ensure that inflation converges to the central bank’s medium-term target. The foreign exchange market has performed well following the introduction of the new foreign exchange policy. Going forward, the central bank is encouraged to continue pursuing an exchange rate that fully reflects market forces. The central bank’s commitment to cease financial support to public entities is welcome to prevent risks to its balance sheet.

    “Progress with structural reforms will be essential, including to enhance governance and further improve the business environment to promote private sector development and job creation. The publication of the action plan for the implementation of the recommendations of the governance diagnostic report as a prior action for this review was an important milestone. Adopting strong climate-related policies including through a possible RSF arrangement will be essential to build The Gambia’s resilience to climate risks.” 

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Julie Ziegler

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: The Gambia: IMF Executive Board Completes the Second Review Under the Extended Credit Facility

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    December 20, 2024

    • The IMF Executive Board completed today the second review under The Gambia’s Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement, enabling the immediate disbursement of about US$10.8 million to help meet financing needs and bolster inclusive, sustainable growth.
    • Economic recovery is strengthening, and inflation is gradually decreasing, although the pace remains slow. The country remains vulnerable to global shocks.
    • Program performance has been affected by fiscal pressures and delays in reform implementation, but the authorities remain committed to overall program targets. Steadfast implementation of the policy and reform agenda will be essential to safeguard macroeconomic gains and debt sustainability.

    Washington, DC – December 20, 2024: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed today the second review under The Gambia’s Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement, approved by the IMF Executive Board on January 12, 2024, in the amount of SDR74.64 million (about US$97.3 million). The completion of the review allows for the immediate disbursement of SDR 8.29 million (about US$10.8 million), bringing total disbursements under the arrangement to about SDR 24.87 million (US$32.4 million).

    The economic recovery in The Gambia is strengthening. Real GDP growth is expected to reach 5.8 percent in 2024, supported by a broad-based rebound in economic activity. In particular, tourist arrivals are recovering and nearing pre-pandemic levels, while remittance inflows remain strong. Headline inflation has decreased significantly from a peak of 18.5 percent in September 2023, although energy prices led to a small uptick in inflation to 10 percent in October 2024.

    While the authorities remain committed to the objectives set out in the program and revenue collection has been strong, spending pressures from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Summit and emergency support to the public utility company NAWEC have weighed on fiscal balances. The new foreign exchange policy is working well, and international reserves exceeded targets by the end of September.  

    Based on the strength of the macroeconomic program, growth is projected at 5.9 percent in 2025 and around 5 percent in the medium term, though risks remain from global conflicts, commodity price shocks, and fluctuations in tourism and remittance flows. Steadfast implementation of the policy and reform agenda will be essential to safeguard macroeconomic gains and debt sustainability.

    Following the Executive Board’s discussion, Deputy Managing Director Bo Li issued the following statement:

    “The Gambia’s economic recovery is strengthening while inflation has trended down. Program implementation was mixed, reflecting broadly satisfactory adherence to quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets but delays in implementing structural benchmarks. The authorities remain committed to their reform agenda, despite global economic headwinds. 

    “Continued commitment to fiscal consolidation is critical to reduce fiscal risks and preserve debt sustainability. Finalizing and implementing the Domestic Revenue Mobilization Strategy will help secure consolidation gains and lower reliance on costly domestic and external financing. Improving the structure of expenditures will help maintain social services and space for growth-enhancing capital expenditures. Strengthening public financial management, including by preventing domestic arrears accumulation, and improving the performance of state-owned enterprises will help contain fiscal risks. To reduce debt vulnerabilities, it is crucial to adhere to the agreed fiscal targets, focus on grants and concessional loans, limit fiscal risks from PPPs, and implement a strong medium-term fiscal framework.

    “The Central Bank of The Gambia has appropriately maintained its tight monetary policy stance and is encouraged to remain vigilant and data dependent to ensure that inflation converges to the central bank’s medium-term target. The foreign exchange market has performed well following the introduction of the new foreign exchange policy. Going forward, the central bank is encouraged to continue pursuing an exchange rate that fully reflects market forces. The central bank’s commitment to cease financial support to public entities is welcome to prevent risks to its balance sheet.

    “Progress with structural reforms will be essential, including to enhance governance and further improve the business environment to promote private sector development and job creation. The publication of the action plan for the implementation of the recommendations of the governance diagnostic report as a prior action for this review was an important milestone. Adopting strong climate-related policies including through a possible RSF arrangement will be essential to build The Gambia’s resilience to climate risks.” 

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Julie Ziegler

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/12/20/pr24496-gambia-imf-executive-board-completes-2nd-review-under-ecf

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: UN Disarmament Chief Calls Out ‘Unacceptable Levels’ of Civilian Fatalities in Ukraine, as Security Council Debates Western Arms Supplies to Kyiv, Moscow’s Ongoing Attacks

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    Meeting again today to discuss Western arms supplies to Ukraine, the Security Council heard that civilians there continue to be killed and injured by a panoply of deadly munitions, while the organ’s members alternately urged a diplomatic end to the violence and condemned Moscow’s initial — and continued — aggression.

    “More than 1,000 days have passed since the Russian Federation’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, launched on 24 February 2022 in violation of the UN Charter and of international law,” observed Izumi Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs.  Since the Council last met on this topic on 31 October, the world has continued to witness “unacceptable levels” of civilian deaths and injuries, she noted, also spotlighting Moscow’s “systematic and deliberate” targeting of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.

    Transfers of arms and ammunition, and the provision of other forms of military assistance to Ukraine’s Armed Forces, have also continued, she said.  Additionally, there have been reports of States transferring — or planning to transfer — weapons and ammunition to the Russian Federation.  Further reports refer to an increase in military cooperation between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation, including troop deployment by the former into the latter’s Kursk region.

    “I urge all concerned to refrain from any steps that may lead to further spillover and intensification of the conflict, as well as any further harm to civilians,” she said, citing reports by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) of over 12,340 civilians killed — and more than 27,836 injured — between 24 February 2022 and 30 November 2024.  She also noted reports of cross-border strikes by Ukraine inside the Russian Federation – with some reportedly resulting in damage to civilian objects.

    Expressing particular concern over the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, the use and transfer of cluster munitions and recent announcements regarding the transfer of non-persistent anti-personnel landmines, she called on States to abide by their international obligations and become parties to disarmament treaties “as a matter of priority”.  Further, universal participation in arms-control instruments is essential to prevent the diversion of conventional arms and to regulate the international arms trade.

    Concluding, she reiterated the Secretary-General’s call for “a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in Ukraine, consistent with the UN Charter”.

    United States’ Speaker:  Permanent Council Member Violating UN Charter

    “This document has meaning,” stressed the representative of the United States, Council President for December, as he took the floor in his national capacity.  For 80 years — “through thick and thin”, he noted — the Council has worked to uphold the Charter’s principles and to oppose territorial conquest.  Now, today, one of the organ’s permanent members is openly, unashamedly violating the Charter, as well as Council resolutions — that it voted for — to prevent a rogue nation from acquiring nuclear weapons.

    He went on to detail Beijing’s continued supply of dual-use items to Moscow’s war-industrial base, stating that China “telegraphs tacit approval for Russia’s war” by doing so.  “Russia listens only to strength and action — something we collectively lacked when Russia invaded Crimea, and when it invaded Georgia before that,” he noted, adding:  “Appeasement didn’t work then, and it won’t work now.”  Therefore, the United States and its partners will continue supporting both Ukraine and the UN Charter.

    Russian Federation’s Speaker:  Ukraine ‘Gold Mine’ for Military-industrial Complex of ‘Anglo-Saxon Countries’

    Meanwhile, the representative of the Russian Federation said that there would have been no war “if the United States had not supported the coup d’état in Kyiv in 2014” and had not “made Ukraine into anti-Russia”.  Noting that Ukraine has become a “gold mine” for the military-industrial complex of “Anglo-Saxon countries”, he said that half of all weapons sales went to 41 United States corporations.  In 2023, the revenue of 100 major weapons manufacturers reached $632 billion, he added.

    “It would be naïve to think that these unprincipled traders will give up on their huge profits for the benefit of the helpless Ukrainians,” he emphasized.  Further, he said that the Pentagon had to admit that the whereabouts of more than half of the Javelin and Stinger missiles sent to Ukraine were unknown, highlighting the corruption that “accompanies Western supplies”.  He concluded:  “My advice to all of those who are hoping that military activities will stop:  don’t have any illusions about the real intent of the comedian Zelenskyy.  We never had them.”

    Ukraine’s Speaker:  Kyiv Strikes Legitimate Military Targets on Its Occupied Territory and in Russian Federation

    “Ukraine never wanted this war and — more than any country across the globe — Ukraine wants the war to end,” stressed that country’s representative.  Noting that the Russian Federation again prefaced today’s meeting “with air terror against Ukrainian cities”, he described Moscow’s behaviour as:  “A — plan a strike; B — call a Security Council meeting; C — carry out a strike; D — call a meeting to complain about Western weapons supplies”.  This correlation has been registered in at least 18 cases, he emphasized.

    Against this backdrop, Ukraine strikes legitimate military targets on its occupied territories and in the Russian Federation, he went on to say, stressing that “it is more than easy” for Moscow to stop the war it launched.  Instead, Russian Federation President Vladimir V. Putin called for a “high-tech duel” between his country and the West, in which Moscow would strike Kyiv with medium-range ballistic missiles while Western missile-defence systems would attempt to protect it.  “Yesterday’s revelations from Putin leave no room for doubt:  his regime must be neutralized as soon as possible,” he urged.

    Council Members Weigh In

    Throughout the meeting, several Council members also pointed out that it was Moscow who originated the war.  “It is quite clear that this conflict began with Russia’s invasion of a neighbouring country in violation of the UN Charter,” stressed the representative of the Republic of Korea.  “Today’s meeting on the issue of weapons transfers to Ukraine is irrelevant,” he added, underscoring:  “The world knows the difference between an aggressor and a victim.”  He also expressed concern over the future of the “illegal coalition” between Moscow and Pyongyang, which is internationalizing the conflict.

    Similarly, Japan’s representative — noting today’s “shamefully familiar topic” — underscored that “there is only one aggressor in this conflict”.  The Russian Federation launched this unprovoked war of aggression, and that country is the one systematically violating international law.  Also expressing concern over Moscow’s military cooperation with Pyongyang and Tehran, he stressed:  “We must focus on Russia’s violations of international law and not fall prey to its disinformation or malicious tactics.”

    Echoing that was France’s delegate, who said that today’s “umpteenth meeting” on arms transfers requested by the Russian Federation was merely “a smokescreen to mask” its treatment of Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence.  “There is one aggressor:  Russia,” he underscored.  Moscow can choose to cease its aggression at any time without harming its own security, but Ukraine’s right to defend itself includes striking Russian Federation military targets.

    “Every country has an inalienable right to defend itself in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter,” observed Slovenia’s representative, adding:  “By extension, every country has the right to procure the means to defend themselves.”  As others, he said that “it is worth pointing to the source of inconsistencies with international law during this war — it is Russia that illegally invaded Ukraine”.  Also expressing concern over the extent of mine use in Ukraine, he stressed that these weapons will “pose a threat to the civilian population for years to come”.

    Ukraine Most Mined Country in the World 

    On that, Guyana’s delegate observed that Ukraine is now considered “the most-mined country in the world”, as potentially 23 per cent of its land is at risk of contamination with likely clearing costs of over $34 billion.  Emphasizing that such weapons “have no place in our world”, she called on all States transferring weapons and ammunition into the conflict area to do so within the existing international legal framework — including Council resolutions – and with adequate controls in place to prevent their irregular transfer. 

    In that vein, Mozambique’s delegate called on weapons-exporting States to refrain from transferring arms where risks of human-rights violations or breaches of international humanitarian law exist.  Similarly, recipient States must ensure that the arms transferred are used in a manner consistent with applicable international legal instruments and are not diverted or transferred to other destinations.  Ecuador’s representative concurred, urging States to act responsibly at every stage of the chain of transfer to prevent the diversion or misuse of arms.

    Algeria’s representative, citing the use of modern medium- and long-range missiles in Ukrainian and Russian Federation territory, called on both parties to ensure that these weapons do not fall into the hands of criminals, terrorists or extremist groups — who often use such weapons against defenceless civilians.  Adding to that, the representative of Sierra Leone urged all parties to “refrain from further escalation in pursuit of the option of winning battles at all costs”.  For his part, the representative of Malta stressed:  “The people of Ukraine deserve better.  The people of Russia deserve better.  Both nations deserve a peaceful future.”

    “Weapons may help win a war, but cannot bring about lasting peace,” observed China’s representative, recalling that Beijing has called on the parties to cease hostilities and restore peace for the past three years.  “The United States is the only country that has chosen to turn a blind eye to China’s efforts,” he said, adding that one country’s security cannot be achieved at the expense of another’s.  He also expressed hope that the United States will abandon the “zero-sum mentality of the cold war”.

    Switzerland’s representative, meanwhile, noted that today’s meeting was one of approximately 70 so far dedicated to Ukraine.  “And, for the seventieth time, I repeat that Russia must immediately withdraw its troops from the entire territory of Ukraine,” she said, adding:  “This repetition is important, however; we cannot — and must not — normalize what has happened in Ukraine.”

    “This Christmas, I suggest the Russian delegation reads How Much Land Does a Man Need? by Leo Tolstoy,” said the representative of the United Kingdom.  Noting that this is a story about a man who — in his greed to acquire more and more land — exhausts himself and dies, he said that the man is then buried in a six-foot grave — “which is all the land he ends up with”.  “The moral is quite clear,” he observed, adding: “The Russians would do well to heed the wisdom of their forebears.”

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Guterres voices alarm over M23 rebel offensive in DR Congo, ‘devastating toll’ on civilians

    Source: United Nations 4

    Peace and Security

    The UN chief on Thursday expressed alarm over a renewed offensive by M23 rebels in recent days in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) which is taking a “devastating toll” on civilians.

    Secretary-General António Guterres in a statement issued by his Spokesperson noted the Rwandan-backed rebels seizure of Sake, in South Kivu, “which increases the threat” to the regional capital Goma – all of which is “heightening the threat of a regional war.” Rwanda denies any direct involvement with M23 fighters.

    Since the UN Mission withdrew from South Kivu in June 2024, peacekeepers have defended key positions in North Kivu, including Goma and Sake, where clashes between the M23, the Congolese Armed Forces and other armed groups have continued.

    Recent fighting in the village of Bweremana north of Minova claimed at least 10 lives and triggered mass displacement toward Kalehe, Goma and Rusayo, leaving more than 250,000 people displaced, the UN peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO, said.

    “The Secretary-General calls on the M23 to immediately cease its offensive, withdraw from all occupied areas and abide by the 31 July 2024 ceasefire agreement,” said the UN chief’s statement.

    Rwandan troops inside DRC

    He added that he was deeply troubled by the most recent report of the Group of Experts established under Security Council resolution 1533, which highlighted the “presence of Rwandan troops on Congolese soil and continued support to the M23.”

    He calls on all involved in the on-going conflict in eastern DRC to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC and “put an end to all forms of support to armed groups, whether Congolese or foreign.”

    Mr. Guterres also reaffirmed his “unwavering support” for the Luanda peace process headed by President João Lourenço of Angola to de-escalate tensions between the DRC and Rwanda.

    Mediation talks began in the Angolan capital in June 2022. The UN chief commended the Angolan president for progress made so far.

    Civilian protection paramount

    “He urges the parties to remain engaged in the Luanda process and maintain momentum on the neutralization of the FDLR [ethnic Hutu rebel group of exiled Rwandan refugees] and withdrawal of Rwandan forces, as well as the swift operationalization of the Reinforced Ad-Hoc Verification Mechanism.”

    The UN chief urged all parties to the fighting to uphold human rights and international humanitarian law, including by ensuring immediate and unfettered access to populations in need of humanitarian assistance.

    “He reaffirms the determination of MONUSCO to implement its mandate to protect civilians. He strongly condemns action by any party that endangers the safety and security of UN blue helmets and civilian personnel.” 

    Soundcloud

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Ghana Armed Forces and US Army medics build partnerships through training

    Source: United States Army

    1 / 3 Show Caption + Hide Caption – Ghana Armed Forces Capt. Emmanuel Oti Boateng and U.S. Army Spc. Danielle Soberanis, a medic assigned to U.S. Army Southern European Task Force Africa, (SETAF-AF), assess a simulated casualty during the Partner Medical Training exercise at Caserma Del Din, Vicenza, Italy, Jan. 15, 2025. SETAF-AF strengthens interoperability with African partners through focused security cooperation exchanges such as the Partner Medical Training. The Partner Medical Training enables teams from SETAF-AF, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, the Dental Health Activity – Italy, and the Ghana Armed Forces to share medical best practices, strengthening readiness and interoperability between partners, while challenging medics to conduct their duties under the stress of simulated combat scenarios and preparing teams for the upcoming U.S. Army Best Medic Competition in Texas. (U.S. Army photo by 1st Lt. Katherine Sibilla) (Photo Credit: 1st Lt. Katherine Sibilla) VIEW ORIGINAL
    2 / 3 Show Caption + Hide Caption – U.S. Army Sgt. Nathan S. Nance, a combat medic assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry, 173rd Airborne Brigade, fills a syringe during the Partner Medical Training exercise at Caserma Del Din, Vicenza, Italy, Jan. 15, 2025.U.S. Army Southern European Task Force Africa, (SETAF-AF), strengthens interoperability with African partners through focused security cooperation exchanges such as the Partner Medical Training. The Partner Medical Training enables teams from SETAF-AF, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, the Dental Health Activity – Italy, and the Ghana Armed Forces to share medical best practices, strengthening readiness and interoperability between partners, while challenging medics to conduct their duties under the stress of simulated combat scenarios and preparing teams for the upcoming U.S. Army Best Medic Competition in Texas. (U.S. Army photo by 1st Lt. Katherine Sibilla) (Photo Credit: 1st Lt. Katherine Sibilla) VIEW ORIGINAL
    3 / 3 Show Caption + Hide Caption – Ghana Armed Forces Capt. Emmanuel Oti Boateng, prepares to insert a syringe into a simulated casualty during the Partner Medical Training exercise at Caserma Del Din, Vicenza, Italy, Jan. 15, 2025.U.S. Army Southern European Task Force Africa, (SETAF-AF), strengthens interoperability with African partners through focused security cooperation exchanges such as the Partnered Medical Training. The Partner Medical Training enables teams from SETAF-AF, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, the Dental Health Activity – Italy, and the Ghana Armed Forces to share medical best practices, strengthening readiness and interoperability between partners, while challenging medics to conduct their duties under the stress of simulated combat scenarios. (U.S. Army photo by 1st Lt. Katherine Sibilla) (Photo Credit: 1st Lt. Katherine Sibilla) VIEW ORIGINAL

    Back to 

    U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa

    VICENZA, Italy — Augustine Akagri had never felt anything like the biting cold of the Italian Alps. As a warrant officer class II in the Ghana Armed Forces with 15 years of combat medical experience and a Ghana Jungle Badge, he believed he was ready for any challenge — until he faced the Army Combat Fitness Test (ACFT) in subzero temperatures.

    “When I was going through it [ACFT] I felt the cold in my ribs and my tongue was numb,” said Akagri.

    What carried him through wasn’t his medical training, but the resilience skills he had learned during a session with U.S. Army Chaplain Capt. Allen Hoskyn the day before.

    “The resilience training helped a lot, I told myself ‘forget this cold and this numbness, I need to finish this,” said Akagri.

    1 / 3 Show Caption + Hide Caption – Ghana Armed Forces Warrant Officer Class 2 Emmanuel Adarkwa, left, and U.S. Army Sgt. Heith E. Walston, a combat medic assigned to the 173rd Airborne Brigade, treat a simulated casualty during the Partner Medical Training exercise at Caserma Del Din, Vicenza, Italy, Jan. 15, 2025. U.S. Army Southern European Task Force Africa, (SETAF-AF), strengthens interoperability with African partners through focused security cooperation exchanges such as the Partner Medical Training. The Partner Medical Training enables teams from SETAF-AF, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, the Dental Health Activity – Italy, and the Ghana Armed Forces to share medical best practices, strengthening readiness and interoperability between partners, while challenging medics to conduct their duties under the stress of simulated combat scenarios. (U.S. Army photo by 1st Lt. Katherine Sibilla) (Photo Credit: 1st Lt. Katherine Sibilla) VIEW ORIGINAL
    2 / 3 Show Caption + Hide Caption – Ghana Armed Forces Warrant Officer Class 2 Augustine Akagri, a combat medic, simulates reacting to contact during the Partner Medical Training exercise at Caserma Del Din, Vicenza, Italy, Jan. 15, 2025. U.S. Army Southern European Task Force Africa, (SETAF-AF), strengthens interoperability with African partners through focused security cooperation exchanges such as the Partner Medical Training. The Partner Medical Training enables teams from SETAF-AF, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, the Dental Health Activity – Italy, and the Ghana Armed Forces to share medical best practices, strengthening readiness and interoperability between partners, while challenging medics to conduct their duties under the stress of simulated combat scenarios. (U.S. Army photo by 1st Lt. Katherine Sibilla) (Photo Credit: 1st Lt. Katherine Sibilla) VIEW ORIGINAL
    3 / 3 Show Caption + Hide Caption – Ghana Armed Forces Capt. Emmanuel Oti Boateng, a combat medic, prepares to fire an M-4 Carbine in a simulated stress shoot during the Partnered Medical Training exercise at Caserma Del Din, Vicenza, Italy, Jan. 15, 2025. U.S. Army Southern European Task Force Africa, (SETAF-AF), strengthens interoperability with African partners through focused security cooperation exchanges such as the Partnered Medical Training. The partnered Medical Training enables participants from SETAF-AF, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, the Dental Health Activity – Italy, and the Ghanaian Armed Forces to share medical best practices, strengthening readiness and interoperability between partners. The event also challenges medics to conduct their duties while under the stress of simulated combat scenarios, preparing teams for the upcoming Best Medic Competition Feb. 2025 in Texas. (U.S. Army photo by 1st Lt. Katherine Sibilla) (Photo Credit: 1st Lt. Katherine Sibilla) VIEW ORIGINAL

    The ACFT was just the beginning of Akagri’s experience. Alongside two other medics from the Ghana Armed Forces, he participated in the U.S. Army Southern European Task Force-Africa (SETAF-AF) Partner Medical Training exercise, designed to strengthen medical readiness and interoperability between partners.

    The three-day event brought together U.S. Army medics and medical professionals from SETAF-AF, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and Dental Health Activity-Italy to train with the Ghana Armed Forces team. Participants underwent intensive medical training over the first two days, followed by a final day dedicated to testing. During the testing phase, participants were divided into three mixed teams, with each team comprising members from all participating units. The teams tackled 12 challenging lanes which included tactical combat casualty care, stress shooting and K9 tactical combat casualty care.

    1 / 3 Show Caption + Hide Caption – U.S. Army Sgt. Heith E. Walston, a combat medic assigned to the 1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade, checks the breathing pattern on a simulated casualty during the Partner Medical Training exercise at Caserma Del Din, Vicenza, Italy, Jan. 15, 2025.U.S. Army Southern European Task Force Africa, (SETAF-AF), strengthens interoperability with African partners through focused security cooperation exchanges such as the Partner Medical Training. The Partner Medical Training enables teams from SETAF-AF, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, the Dental Health Activity – Italy, and the Ghana Armed Forces to share medical best practices, strengthening readiness and interoperability between partners, while challenging medics to conduct their duties under the stress of simulated combat scenarios and preparing teams for the upcoming U.S. Army Best Medic Competition in Texas. (U.S. Army photo by 1st Lt. Katherine Sibilla) (Photo Credit: 1st Lt. Katherine Sibilla) VIEW ORIGINAL
    2 / 3 Show Caption + Hide Caption – Ghana Armed Forces Warrant Officer Class 2 Augustine Akagri, a combat medic, places a litter with a simulated casualty in a medical vehicle during the Partner Medical Training exercise at Caserma Del Din, Vicenza, Italy, Jan. 15, 2025. U.S. Army Southern European Task Force Africa, (SETAF-AF), strengthens interoperability with African partners through focused security cooperation exchanges such as the Partner Medical Training. The Partner Medical Training enables teams from SETAF-AF, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, the Dental Health Activity – Italy, and the Ghana Armed Forces to share medical best practices, strengthening readiness and interoperability between partners, while challenging medics to conduct their duties under the stress of simulated combat scenarios. (U.S. Army photo by 1st Lt. Katherine Sibilla) (Photo Credit: 1st Lt. Katherine Sibilla) VIEW ORIGINAL
    3 / 3 Show Caption + Hide Caption – Ghana Armed Forces Warrant Officer Class 2 Augustine Akagri, a combat medic, assesses a simulated casualty during the Partner Medical Training exercise at Caserma Del Din, Vicenza, Italy, Jan. 15, 2025.U.S. Army Southern European Task Force Africa, (SETAF-AF), strengthens interoperability with African partners through focused security cooperation exchanges such as the Partner Medical Training. The Partner Medical Training enables teams from SETAF-AF, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, the Dental Health Activity – Italy, and the Ghana Armed Forces to share medical best practices, strengthening readiness and interoperability between partners, while challenging medics to conduct their duties under the stress of simulated combat scenarios. (U.S. Army photo by 1st Lt. Katherine Sibilla) (Photo Credit: 1st Lt. Katherine Sibilla) VIEW ORIGINAL

    Not only did the training provide valuable experience for both Ghanaian and American medics, but it also created an opportunity to exchange medical knowledge.

    “They [Ghanaian medics] have much more clinical medical knowledge, whereas we focus more on trauma,” said Sgt. Brayden Chapman, a combat medic from the 1-503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade. “I saw different ways of treating wounds because they use a different set of medications than we do, based on what’s available to them versus what’s available to us.”

    Chapman added, “Overall, the training was of deep value.”

    1 / 3 Show Caption + Hide Caption – Ghana Armed Forces Warrant Officer Class 2 Augustine Akagri, a combat medic, left, and U.S. Army Sgt. Brayden J. Chapman, a combat medic assigned to the 1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade, discuss how to approach a simulated casualty during the Partner Medical Training exercise at Caserma Del Din, Vicenza, Italy, Jan. 15, 2025. U.S. Army Southern European Task Force Africa, (SETAF-AF), strengthens interoperability with African partners through focused security cooperation exchanges such as the Partner Medical Training. The Partner Medical Training enables teams from SETAF-AF, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, the Dental Health Activity – Italy, and the Ghana Armed Forces to share medical best practices, strengthening readiness and interoperability between partners, while challenging medics to conduct their duties under the stress of simulated combat scenarios and preparing teams for the upcoming U.S. Army Best Medic Competition in Texas. (U.S. Army photo by 1st Lt. Katherine Sibilla) (Photo Credit: 1st Lt. Katherine Sibilla) VIEW ORIGINAL
    2 / 3 Show Caption + Hide Caption – Ghana Armed Forces Capt. Emmanuel Oti Boateng, left, and U.S Army Spc. Danielle Soberanis, right, a medic assigned to U.S. Army Southern European Task Force Africa, (SETAF-AF), listen to instructions given by a lane grader during the Partner Medical Training exercise at Caserma Del Din, Vicenza, Italy, Jan. 15, 2025. SETAF-AF strengthens interoperability with African partners through focused security cooperation exchanges such as the Partnered Medical Training. The Partner Medical Training enables teams from SETAF-AF, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, the Dental Health Activity – Italy, and the Ghana Armed Forces to share medical best practices, strengthening readiness and interoperability between partners, while challenging medics to conduct their duties under the stress of simulated combat scenarios. (U.S. Army photo by 1st Lt. Katherine Sibilla) (Photo Credit: 1st Lt. Katherine Sibilla)
    3 / 3 Show Caption + Hide Caption – Ghana Armed Forces Warrant Officer Class 2 Emmanuel Adarkwa, left, Ghana Armed Forces Warrant Officer Class 2 Augustine Akagri, center, Ghana Armed Forces Capt. Emmanuel Oti Boateng, right, fire M-4 Carbines in a simulated stress shoot during the Partner Medical Training exercise at Caserma Del Din, Vicenza, Italy, Jan. 15, 2025. U.S. Army Southern European Task Force Africa, (SETAF-AF), strengthens interoperability with African partners through focused security cooperation exchanges such as the Partner Medical Training. The Partner Medical Training enables teams from SETAF-AF, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, the Dental Health Activity – Italy, and the Ghana Armed Forces to share medical best practices, strengthening readiness and interoperability between partners, while challenging medics to conduct their duties under the stress of simulated combat scenarios. (U.S. Army photo by 1st Lt. Katherine Sibilla) (Photo Credit: 1st Lt. Katherine Sibilla) VIEW ORIGINAL

    Like Chapman, Akagri gained a wealth of medical knowledge during the three-day training, which he hopes to share with his unit back in Ghana.

    “It’s been an amazing experience. We’ve learned a lot of things, and we were also able to share our ideas with the other participants,” Akagri said.

    Most of all, Akagri will remember the cold weather — and that he’ll think twice before turning off the AC at home.

    “When I turned off the AC in my house, my wife told me, ‘How are you going to cope when you’re out there [in Italy]?’ So when I got here and felt the cold, I kept remembering her words.”

    About SETAF-AF

    SETAF-AF provides U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Army Europe and Africa a dedicated headquarters to synchronize Army activities in Africa and scalable crisis-response options in Africa and Europe.

    Follow SETAF-AF on: Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, LinkedIn & DVIDS

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-Evening Report: China has invested billions in ports around the world. This is why the West is so concerned

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Claudio Bozzi, Lecturer in Law, Deakin University

    Shutterstock

    On his way to the G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro in November, Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Peruvian President Dina Boluarte to officially open a new US$3.6 billion (A$5.8 billion) deepwater mega-port in Peru called Chancay.

    China’s state-owned Cosco shipping giant had purchased a 60% stake in the port for US$1.6 billion (A$2.6 billion), which gave the company exclusive use of the port for 60 years.

    Days later, the first ship departed for Shanghai loaded with blueberries, avocados and minerals.

    Chancay is part of China’s vision of a 21st century maritime Silk Road that will better connect China’s manufacturing hubs with its trading partners around the world. This has involved a heavy investment in ports in many countries, which has the West concerned about China’s expanding influence over global shipping routes.

    Newly re-elected US President Donald Trump made clear these concerns when he claimed China was “operating” the Panama Canal and the US intended to take it back.

    China does not operate the canal, though. Rather, a Hong Kong company operates two ports on either side of it.

    A booming port expansion

    The scale and scope of the maritime Silk Road is impressive. China has invested in 129 ports in dozens of countries through its state-owned enterprises, mostly in the Global South. Seventeen of these ports have majority-Chinese ownership.

    According to one estimate, Chinese companies invested US$11 billion (A$17.7 billion) in overseas port development from 2010–19. More than 27% of global container trade now passes through terminals where leading Chinese firms hold direct stakes.

    China has entered Latin America aggressively, becoming the region’s top trading partner. Its port strategy has clearly signalled a long-term goal to access the exports essential to its food and energy security: soybeans, corn, beef, iron ore, copper and battery-grade lithium.

    Last year, for example, Portos do Paraná, the Brazilian state-owned enterprise that acts as the port authority in the state of Paraná, signed a letter of intent with China Merchants Port Holdings to expand Paranaguá Container Terminal, the second-largest terminal in South America. China may invest in even more Brazilian ports, as 22 terminals are scheduled to be auctioned before the end of 2025.

    In Africa, Chinese investment grew from two ports in 2000 to 61 facilities in 30 countries by 2022.

    And in Europe, Chinese enterprises have complete or majority ownership of two key ports in Belgium and Greece – the so-called “dragon’s head” of the Belt and Road Initiative in Europe.

    What’s driving this port strategy?

    China’s emergence as a maritime and shipping power is central to Xi’s ambition for global economic dominance.

    For one, China requires stable access to key trading routes to continue meeting the demand for Chinese exports globally, as well as the imports Beijing needs to keep its economy humming.

    Controlling ports also enables China to create economic zones in other countries that give port owners and operators privileged access to commodities and products. Some fear this could allow China to disrupt supplies of certain goods or even exert influence over other countries’ politics or economies.

    Another key driver of this strategy is the metals and minerals needed to fuel China’s rise as a tech superpower. Beijing has concentrated its port investment in regions where these critical resources are located.

    For example, China is the world’s largest importer of copper ore, mainly from Chile, Peru and Mexico. It is also one of the world’s major lithium carbonate importers.), mainly from Chile and Argentina. And its port deals in Africa give it access to rare earths and other minerals.

    In addition, tapping into Latin America counteracts the trade tensions China has experienced recently with Europe. It also preempts concerns about possible US tariffs imposed on Chinese goods by Trump.

    Military concerns

    These moves have prompted concern in Washington that China is challenging US influence in its own backyard.

    China maintains that its seaport diplomacy is market oriented. However, it has established one naval base in the strategically located African nation of Djibouti. And it is believed to be building another naval base in Equatorial Guinea.

    According to a recent report by the Asia Society Policy Institute, strategy analysts believe China is seeking to “weaponise” the Belt and Road Initiative.

    One way it is doing this is by requiring the commercial ports it invests in to be equally capable of acting as naval bases. So far, 14 of the 17 ports in which it has a majority stake have the potential to be used for naval purposes. These ports can then serve a dual function and support the Chinese military’s logistics network and allow Chinese naval vessels to operate further away from home.

    US officials are also concerned China could leverage its influence over private companies to disrupt trade during a time of war.

    How is the West responding?

    While China’s investments are raising suspicions, the West’s willingness to invest in ports at this scale is limited. The US International Development Finance Corporation, for instance, has a much slower, rigorous process for its investments, which generally leads to fairer outcomes for both investors and host nations.

    However, some Western companies are acquiring stakes in established and newly built ports in other countries, albeit not to the extent of Chinese enterprises.

    The French shipping and logistics company CMA CGM’s global port development strategy, for example, includes investments in 60 terminals worldwide. In 2024, it acquired control over South America’s largest container terminal in the Port of Santos, Brazil.

    Trump has threatened tariffs as one way of countering China’s global sea power. An advisor on his transition team has proposed a 60% tariff on any product transiting through the Chancay port in Peru or any other Chinese-owned or controlled port in South America.

    Rather than making nations reluctant to sign port deals with Beijing, however, this kind of action just erodes Washington’s regional influence. And China is likely to take retaliatory measures, like banning the export of critical minerals to the US.

    Host nations like Peru and Brazil, meanwhile, are using the competition for port investment to their advantage. Attracting interest from both the West and China, they are increasingly asserting their autonomy and adopting a strategy of using ports to “play everywhere” on the global stage.

    Claudio Bozzi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. China has invested billions in ports around the world. This is why the West is so concerned – https://theconversation.com/china-has-invested-billions-in-ports-around-the-world-this-is-why-the-west-is-so-concerned-244733

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: FS attends thematic meetings at World Economic Forum Annual Meeting (with photos/video)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    FS attends thematic meetings at World Economic Forum Annual Meeting (with photos/video)
    FS attends thematic meetings at World Economic Forum Annual Meeting (with photos/video)
    ***************************************************************************************

         The Financial Secretary, Mr Paul Chan, concluded his visit to Davos, Switzerland, yesterday (January 23, Davos time). He attended thematic meetings at the World Economic Forum (WEF) Annual Meeting and met with political, business and financial leaders from around the globe.     In the morning, Mr Chan participated in a discussion session titled “Stemming Financial Fragmentation” and served as one of the panelist’s. The session focused on addressing the risks of financial fragmentation amid rising geopolitical tensions.     Mr Chan noted that while geopolitics may subject regional and global financial markets to greater volatility, Hong Kong boasts a robust financial system and strong buffer, maintains a free and open business environment, and steadfastly upholds the linked exchange rate system. A recent survey conducted by a foreign chamber of commerce in Hong Kong revealed that international investors and companies remain optimistic about the city’s business prospects. He emphasised that Hong Kong’s financial markets have undergone remarkable transformation on various fronts, including the stock market and asset and wealth management business which have achieved significant growth since Hong Kong’s return to the motherland. Meanwhile, Hong Kong is actively embracing financial innovation, including the development of digital assets, with appropriate regulations in place to promote the responsible and sustainable growth. In response to questions, Mr Chan stated that China’s economy is steadily advancing, with solid progress towards high-quality development. The country is also committed to accelerating high-level openness and mutually beneficial cooperation as its national policy.     Later, Mr Chan participated in a thematic meeting organised by the Giving to Amplify Earth Action launched by the WEF, where he spoke on promoting investment in climate projects. He noted that Hong Kong, as an international financial centre, plays to its strengths as a “super connector” and “super value-adder”: on one hand, Hong Kong provides financial support for green and transition projects through its comprehensive financial services; on the other hand, it actively seeks to facilitate cooperation among the public, private and philanthropic sectors. Examples include hosting international conferences such as “Wealth for Good in Hong Kong”, which brings together decision-makers from global funds (including family funds) to promote synergies between global wealth and climate projects, thereby fostering impact investments. Through these efforts, Hong Kong seeks to make greater contributions to regional and global sustainable development.     Mr Chan also continued his meetings with various political and business leaders yesterday. He held bilateral discussions with the Minister of Investment of Saudi Arabia, Mr Khalid Al-Falih, and the Minister of Finance of Egypt, Mr Ahmed Kouchouk, respectively. During these meetings, they exchanged views on international and regional landscapes, and discussed ways to strengthen bilateral investment and trade relations. Mr Chan said that Hong Kong actively seeks to develop trade relations with “Global South” countries, and extended invitations to the Ministers to lead business delegations to Hong Kong to explore mutually beneficial cooperation opportunities.     In the afternoon, Mr Chan met with the President and the Chief Executive Officer of Franklin Templeton, Ms Jenny Johnson, to discuss the business expansion plans of the international fund group in the region. They also exchanged views on the current global economic and financial market landscapes.     Mr Chan is scheduled to depart from Switzerland today (January 24, Davos time) and will return to Hong Kong on Saturday morning (January 25, Hong Kong time).

     
    Ends/Friday, January 24, 2025Issued at HKT 9:00

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

  • MIL-Evening Report: ‘Entire Pacific region at risk’, says UNAIDS on Fiji HIV outbreak

    RNZ Pacific

    Fiji’s Minister for Health and Medical Services has declared an HIV outbreak.

    Dr Ratu Atonio Rabici Lalabalavu announced 1093 new HIV cases from the period of January to September 2024.

    “This declaration reflects the alarming reality that HIV is evolving faster than our current services can cater for,” he said.

    “We need the support of every Fijian. Communities, civil society, faith-based organizations, private sector partners, and international allies must join us in raising awareness, reducing stigma, and ensuring everyone affected by HIV receives the care and support they need.”

    In early December, the Fiji Medical Association called on the government to declare an HIV outbreak “as a matter of priority”.

    As of mid-December, 19 under-fives were diagnosed with HIV in Fiji.

    The UN Development Programme has recently delivered 3000 antiretroviral drugs to Fiji to support the HIV response.

    World’s largest epidemic
    A report released in mid-2024 showed that in 2023, 6.7 million people living with HIV were residing in Asia and the Pacific, making it the world’s largest epidemic after eastern and southern Africa.

    “Among countries with available data, HIV epidemics are growing in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Fiji, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Papua New Guinea and the Philippines,” the report said.

    The regional director of UNAIDS Asia Pacific Eamonn Murphy said rising new infections in Fiji “put the entire Pacific region at risk”.

    “Prioritisation of HIV by the government is critical for not only the people of Fiji, but the entire Pacific,” he said.

    “Political will is the essential first step. There must also be community leadership and regional solidarity to ensure these strategies work.”

    UNAIDS said the 1093 cases from January to September was three times as many as there were in 2023.

    Preliminary Ministry of Health numbers show that among the newly-diagnosed individuals who are currently receiving antiretroviral therapy, half contracted HIV through injecting drug use. Over half of all people living with HIV who are aware of their status are not on treatment.

    Second-fastest growth
    “Fiji has the second fastest growing HIV epidemic in the Asia and the Pacific region,” Murphy said.

    He said the data does not just tell the story about a lack of services, but it indicates that even when people know they are HIV-positive, they are fearful to receive care.

    “There must be a deliberate effort to not only strengthen health systems, but to respond to the unique needs of the most affected populations, including people who use drugs.

    “Perpetuating prejudice against any group will only slow progress.”

    UNAIDS also said the HIV Outbreak Response Plan called for a combination of prevention approaches.

    Since the sexual transmission of HIV remains a significant factor, other key approaches are condom distribution and pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP), a treatment taken by an HIV-negative person to reduce the risk of contracting HIV if they are exposed.

    UNAIDS support
    Through the Australian government’s Indo-Pacific HIV Partnership, UNAIDS is supporting Fiji to scale up prevention approaches.

    United Nations Resident Coordinator in Fiji Dirk Wagener said the outbreak declaration and the launch of high-impact interventions, such as needle syringe programmes and PrEP, marked a critical turning point in Fiji’s efforts to combat the epidemic.

    “The Joint UN Team on HIV, with UNAIDS as its secretariat, stands ready to provide coordinated and sustained support to ensure the success of these strategies and to protect the most vulnerable.”

    The HIV Surge Strategy includes tactics for Fiji to achieve the Global AIDS Strategy targets — 95 percent of all people living with HIV aware their status, 95 percent of diagnosed people on antiretroviral therapy, and 95 percent of people on treatment achieving a suppressed viral load.

    This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI Australia: MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH ON PUBLIC SCHOOL FUNDING

    Source: Australian Education Union

    Prime Minister Albanese has today delivered an historic commitment for full funding of Australia’s public schools.

    Australian Education Union Federal President Correna Haythorpe said the AEU welcomes the announcement that the Commonwealth Government will lift their commitment to a full 25% of the Schooling Resource Standard (SRS) by 2034, with states expected to get rid of the 4% accounting trick brought in by the Morrison Government in 2018.

    The Albanese and Malinauskus Governments have today signed the first heads of agreement under the new offer, providing $1 billion in additional funding for South Australian public schools.

    The Prime Minister also announced an agreement has been signed with the Allan Government for Victorian public schools.

    “This heralds a major breakthrough on full and fair funding negotiations for public schools,” Ms Haythorpe said.

    “With the signing of these agreements, public schools in South Australia will see guaranteed funding increases every year, allowing them to employ more teachers, more education support staff and to provide more help for those students who need it.”

    “That is lifechanging for students and for the teachers and support staff who give 100% every day.”

    “Teachers, students and parents will finally see their public schools funded to the level needed for every child to reach their potential.”

    AEUSA President Jennie Marie Gorman welcomed today’s announcement, and the benefits it will bring to South Australian teachers and students.

    “As a former principal, I know the realities facing schools everyday and I understand the value of what this funding deal will bring for schools across our state. For students who need support with their learning, for teachers who need resources to address escalating workloads and to provide high quality learning programs, this announcement will be welcome news indeed,” Ms Gorman said.

    AEUVIC President Justin Mullaly said the Victoria agreement will see teachers and students better resourced in public schools.

    “Additional Commonwealth funding for Victorian public schools means dedicated and hardworking teachers, Education Support staff, and principals will have more of the resources they need to better meet the learning and wellbeing needs of all students,” Mr Mullaly said.

    “The commitment to increase funding means it will be easier to attract and retain school staff and better address teacher shortages. Public schools will be able to employ extra teachers and ES so that every student gets more of the individual support they need and that school staff workloads can be managed.”

    This announcement ends the practice of states artificially inflating their SRS share by 4% through the inclusion of non-school spending and sets a precedent that must be followed in new agreements in every state and the NT.

    “Today’s announcement provides all state governments the opportunity to ensure that public schools are genuinely on the pathway to 100% SRS funding. We urge all state governments to finish negotiations and deliver full funding for their public school communities. Further delay means that public schools will be denied the vital resources that they need to deliver high quality teaching and learning programs,” Ms Haythorpe said.

    “We welcome South Australia and Victoria signing on to this historic agreement and look forward to the other states signing. We call on the states not to delay.”

    “Teachers know the importance of this funding, and the need for it to be rolled out as quickly as possible because of the difference it will make in classrooms, and parents understand the importance of teachers being supported to do their jobs well,” Ms Haythorpe said.

    The AEU now calls on all political parties to support this full funding, for the future of Australian public schools.

    “With a federal election looming, all political parties must back the Albanese Government’s offer in. Further, the Leader of the Opposition Peter Dutton must give an iron clad guarantee to public school communities that he will honour all school funding bilateral agreements in full should he become Prime Minister in any future election,” Ms Haythorpe said.

    “Australia’s students cannot afford further delays in negotiations. It is time to get the deals done so that public schools have certainty.”

    ENDS

    MEDIA CONTACT:

    Kylie Jensen – 0402 298 728

    MIL OSI News –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: DRC has created a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Judith Verweijen, Assistant professor, Utrecht University

    After nearly three decades of warfare, armed conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) seems only to intensify. The Rwanda-backed M23 rebellion has been at the centre of attention in recent years. However, eastern DRC is home to more than 100 other armed groups, which are a major source of instability too. The question of their demobilisation has haunted the country ever since the end of the Second Congo War in 2003.

    A new chapter in this long-standing conundrum seems to have started. In 2022, the government decided to form an alliance with armed groups to fight their common enemy, the M23 and its Rwandan backers. At around the same time, it launched an initiative to create an army reserve, known as the Reserve armée de la défense (RAD). This formalised the Congolese army’s established practice of using armed groups as auxiliaries.

    The creation of the reserve army allows the government to reward armed group allies with integration while bringing them under institutionalised control. But will this actually work?

    Our past and ongoing research on army integration and demobilisation in eastern DRC casts doubt on the plan, for three reasons.

    The first risk is that armed groups will boost their numbers to gain a stronger bargaining position once integration does occur.

    Secondly, reservist forces may compete with the army over territorial control and limited resources and turn against those who created them.

    Finally, merely absorbing armed groups into a reserve force does little to address the long-standing grievances that underlie conflict in the east.

    The Wazalendo: eastern DRC’s predatory patriots

    On 9 May 2022, in a secretive meeting in the town of Pinga in North Kivu, the Congolese armed forces and several Congolese armed groups agreed to cease hostilities against each other and instead form an alliance to fight their common enemy, the M23.

    As a result, these groups became quasi-official and increasingly presented themselves as defenders of Congo’s territorial integrity. They started to call themselves Wazalendo or patriots in Kiswahili. Fuelled by President Félix Tshisekedi’s supportive rhetoric, the Wazalendo became symbols of Congolese resistance against foreign aggression. This benefited the president’s 2023 electoral campaign.

    Across North and South Kivu provinces, armed groups have rebranded themselves Wazalendo, even when not part of the coalition fighting the M23.

    As the Congolese army’s attention is on the M23, these armed groups have benefited from the lull in operations against them. Most Wazalendo groups are allowed to roam around freely and have dramatically expanded their zones of influence and violent systems of revenue generation.

    This includes taxation at markets and rapidly proliferating roadblocks, but also ransom kidnappings and contract killings. There is also evidence that Wazalendo groups are engaged in torture, sexual violence and arbitrary arrests, and frequently recruit child soldiers.

    Chequered history of integration

    A few months after the Pinga meeting, Congo’s government launched a new national defence policy that mentioned the establishment of the reserve army. Though it was passed unanimously in parliament in April 2023, MPs voiced concerns that the new army reserve risked repeating mistakes of the past.

    The army is itself the product of the painstaking integration of former belligerents after the Second Congo War (1998-2003). But rebel-military integration became an open-ended process. Armed group officers alternately integrated into and deserted from the army in the hope of gaining higher ranks and positions in a next round of integration.

    Unending rebel integration also weakened the national army. It reinforced parallel command chains, facilitated intelligence leaks and created a lopsided hierarchy.

    The first iteration of the M23 rebellion in 2012 was the result of rebel integration gone wrong. In its aftermath, the Congolese government banned the wholesale negotiated integration of armed groups into the army.

    Hurdles to integration

    The reserve army risks unleashing the same dynamics of rewarding rebellion by doling out positions to armed group leaders and granting them impunity for past violence. In April 2024, the leaders of many Wazalendo groups were flown to Kinshasa where the army reserve leadership told them to start preparing lists of their combatants ahead of their integration.

    This has prompted numerous armed groups to step up recruitment.

    The prospect of integration has also triggered fierce competition for positions between Wazalendo commanders. This risks worsening animosities between groups.

    Other hurdles, some of which have been faced before, include:

    Unity of command. Forcing smaller armed groups into a hierarchical mould doesn’t always work. Most have deep local roots, with their recruitment and influence limited to a relatively small area. Used to calling the shots in their home areas, these commanders tend to be reluctant to take orders from higher-placed outsiders.

    Ethnic competition. Armed groups may resist full integration if they feel their rank and positions in the reserve army will be lower and that this will hamper their ability to protect members of their ethnic community. Such “local security dilemmas” have obstructed army integration and demobilisation efforts in the past.

    Resources. Armed groups currently enjoy substantial income, and considerable freedom in obtaining it. Will the reserve army command allow its members to engage in illegal taxation, kidnapping for ransom, robbery and ambushes? If not, how will it compensate for their lost opportunities? In addition, the reserve army is likely to compete with the army over revenue-generating opportunities. And some of its members may leak intelligence to fellow armed groups.

    Painkiller or cure?

    The army reserve may be read as the latest attempt at solving the decades-old problem of getting rid of the many armed groups in eastern DRC, this time by bringing them into the fold of the state yet not into the army.

    However, this solution does risk unleashing many of the same detrimental dynamics as army integration. It may fuel armed mobilisation and militarisation rather than contain it.

    Wazalendo groups are currently in a comfortable position and there are no repercussions for not integrating the reserve force. To contain them, both the DRC’s army and the military justice system would need to be professionalised.

    Even if the reserve army did not have negative ripple effects, it would be an unlikely cure for armed mobilisation. That requires comprehensive, bottom-up peace efforts that tackle deep-seated grievances related to past violence and conflict over belonging, territory and local authority. Barring such efforts, the reserve force will remain a painkiller at best.

    – DRC has created a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire
    – https://theconversation.com/drc-has-created-a-reserve-force-to-fight-the-m23-why-this-may-backfire-247476

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Global: DRC has created a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Judith Verweijen, Assistant professor, Utrecht University

    After nearly three decades of warfare, armed conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) seems only to intensify. The Rwanda-backed M23 rebellion has been at the centre of attention in recent years. However, eastern DRC is home to more than 100 other armed groups, which are a major source of instability too. The question of their demobilisation has haunted the country ever since the end of the Second Congo War in 2003.

    A new chapter in this long-standing conundrum seems to have started. In 2022, the government decided to form an alliance with armed groups to fight their common enemy, the M23 and its Rwandan backers. At around the same time, it launched an initiative to create an army reserve, known as the Reserve armée de la défense (RAD). This formalised the Congolese army’s established practice of using armed groups as auxiliaries.

    The creation of the reserve army allows the government to reward armed group allies with integration while bringing them under institutionalised control. But will this actually work?

    Our past and ongoing research on army integration and demobilisation in eastern DRC casts doubt on the plan, for three reasons.

    The first risk is that armed groups will boost their numbers to gain a stronger bargaining position once integration does occur.

    Secondly, reservist forces may compete with the army over territorial control and limited resources and turn against those who created them.

    Finally, merely absorbing armed groups into a reserve force does little to address the long-standing grievances that underlie conflict in the east.

    The Wazalendo: eastern DRC’s predatory patriots

    On 9 May 2022, in a secretive meeting in the town of Pinga in North Kivu, the Congolese armed forces and several Congolese armed groups agreed to cease hostilities against each other and instead form an alliance to fight their common enemy, the M23.

    As a result, these groups became quasi-official and increasingly presented themselves as defenders of Congo’s territorial integrity. They started to call themselves Wazalendo or patriots in Kiswahili. Fuelled by President Félix Tshisekedi’s supportive rhetoric, the Wazalendo became symbols of Congolese resistance against foreign aggression. This benefited the president’s 2023 electoral campaign.

    Across North and South Kivu provinces, armed groups have rebranded themselves Wazalendo, even when not part of the coalition fighting the M23.

    As the Congolese army’s attention is on the M23, these armed groups have benefited from the lull in operations against them. Most Wazalendo groups are allowed to roam around freely and have dramatically expanded their zones of influence and violent systems of revenue generation.

    This includes taxation at markets and rapidly proliferating roadblocks, but also ransom kidnappings and contract killings. There is also evidence that Wazalendo groups are engaged in torture, sexual violence and arbitrary arrests, and frequently recruit child soldiers.

    Chequered history of integration

    A few months after the Pinga meeting, Congo’s government launched a new national defence policy that mentioned the establishment of the reserve army. Though it was passed unanimously in parliament in April 2023, MPs voiced concerns that the new army reserve risked repeating mistakes of the past.

    The army is itself the product of the painstaking integration of former belligerents after the Second Congo War (1998-2003). But rebel-military integration became an open-ended process. Armed group officers alternately integrated into and deserted from the army in the hope of gaining higher ranks and positions in a next round of integration.

    Unending rebel integration also weakened the national army. It reinforced parallel command chains, facilitated intelligence leaks and created a lopsided hierarchy.

    The first iteration of the M23 rebellion in 2012 was the result of rebel integration gone wrong. In its aftermath, the Congolese government banned the wholesale negotiated integration of armed groups into the army.

    Hurdles to integration

    The reserve army risks unleashing the same dynamics of rewarding rebellion by doling out positions to armed group leaders and granting them impunity for past violence. In April 2024, the leaders of many Wazalendo groups were flown to Kinshasa where the army reserve leadership told them to start preparing lists of their combatants ahead of their integration.

    This has prompted numerous armed groups to step up recruitment.

    The prospect of integration has also triggered fierce competition for positions between Wazalendo commanders. This risks worsening animosities between groups.

    Other hurdles, some of which have been faced before, include:

    Unity of command. Forcing smaller armed groups into a hierarchical mould doesn’t always work. Most have deep local roots, with their recruitment and influence limited to a relatively small area. Used to calling the shots in their home areas, these commanders tend to be reluctant to take orders from higher-placed outsiders.

    Ethnic competition. Armed groups may resist full integration if they feel their rank and positions in the reserve army will be lower and that this will hamper their ability to protect members of their ethnic community. Such “local security dilemmas” have obstructed army integration and demobilisation efforts in the past.

    Resources. Armed groups currently enjoy substantial income, and considerable freedom in obtaining it. Will the reserve army command allow its members to engage in illegal taxation, kidnapping for ransom, robbery and ambushes? If not, how will it compensate for their lost opportunities? In addition, the reserve army is likely to compete with the army over revenue-generating opportunities. And some of its members may leak intelligence to fellow armed groups.

    Painkiller or cure?

    The army reserve may be read as the latest attempt at solving the decades-old problem of getting rid of the many armed groups in eastern DRC, this time by bringing them into the fold of the state yet not into the army.

    However, this solution does risk unleashing many of the same detrimental dynamics as army integration. It may fuel armed mobilisation and militarisation rather than contain it.

    Wazalendo groups are currently in a comfortable position and there are no repercussions for not integrating the reserve force. To contain them, both the DRC’s army and the military justice system would need to be professionalised.

    Even if the reserve army did not have negative ripple effects, it would be an unlikely cure for armed mobilisation. That requires comprehensive, bottom-up peace efforts that tackle deep-seated grievances related to past violence and conflict over belonging, territory and local authority. Barring such efforts, the reserve force will remain a painkiller at best.

    Michel Thill is a Senior Program Officer for swisspeace, a Basel University affiliated practice and research institute dedicated to advancing effective peacebuilding. swisspeace receives funding from research funding bodies, and bilateral and multilateral organizations. Michel is also a Fellow of the Rift Valley Institute.

    Judith Verweijen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. DRC has created a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire – https://theconversation.com/drc-has-created-a-reserve-force-to-fight-the-m23-why-this-may-backfire-247476

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: DRC creates a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Judith Verweijen, Assistant professor, Utrecht University

    After nearly three decades of warfare, armed conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) seems only to intensify. The Rwanda-backed M23 rebellion has been at the centre of attention in recent years. However, eastern DRC is home to more than 100 other armed groups, which are a major source of instability too. The question of their demobilisation has haunted the country ever since the end of the Second Congo War in 2003.

    A new chapter in this long-standing conundrum seems to have started. In 2022, the government decided to form an alliance with armed groups to fight their common enemy, the M23 and its Rwandan backers. At around the same time, it launched an initiative to create an army reserve, known as the Reserve armée de la défense (RAD). This formalised the Congolese army’s established practice of using armed groups as auxiliaries.

    The creation of the reserve army allows the government to reward armed group allies with integration while bringing them under institutionalised control. But will this actually work?

    Our past and ongoing research on army integration and demobilisation in eastern DRC casts doubt on the plan, for three reasons.

    The first risk is that armed groups will boost their numbers to gain a stronger bargaining position once integration does occur.

    Secondly, reservist forces may compete with the army over territorial control and limited resources and turn against those who created them.

    Finally, merely absorbing armed groups into a reserve force does little to address the long-standing grievances that underlie conflict in the east.

    The Wazalendo: eastern DRC’s predatory patriots

    On 9 May 2022, in a secretive meeting in the town of Pinga in North Kivu, the Congolese armed forces and several Congolese armed groups agreed to cease hostilities against each other and instead form an alliance to fight their common enemy, the M23.

    As a result, these groups became quasi-official and increasingly presented themselves as defenders of Congo’s territorial integrity. They started to call themselves Wazalendo or patriots in Kiswahili. Fuelled by President Félix Tshisekedi’s supportive rhetoric, the Wazalendo became symbols of Congolese resistance against foreign aggression. This benefited the president’s 2023 electoral campaign.

    Across North and South Kivu provinces, armed groups have rebranded themselves Wazalendo, even when not part of the coalition fighting the M23.

    As the Congolese army’s attention is on the M23, these armed groups have benefited from the lull in operations against them. Most Wazalendo groups are allowed to roam around freely and have dramatically expanded their zones of influence and violent systems of revenue generation.

    This includes taxation at markets and rapidly proliferating roadblocks, but also ransom kidnappings and contract killings. There is also evidence that Wazalendo groups are engaged in torture, sexual violence and arbitrary arrests, and frequently recruit child soldiers.

    Chequered history of integration

    A few months after the Pinga meeting, Congo’s government launched a new national defence policy that mentioned the establishment of the reserve army. Though it was passed unanimously in parliament in April 2023, MPs voiced concerns that the new army reserve risked repeating mistakes of the past.

    The army is itself the product of the painstaking integration of former belligerents after the Second Congo War (1998-2003). But rebel-military integration became an open-ended process. Armed group officers alternately integrated into and deserted from the army in the hope of gaining higher ranks and positions in a next round of integration.

    Unending rebel integration also weakened the national army. It reinforced parallel command chains, facilitated intelligence leaks and created a lopsided hierarchy.

    The first iteration of the M23 rebellion in 2012 was the result of rebel integration gone wrong. In its aftermath, the Congolese government banned the wholesale negotiated integration of armed groups into the army.

    Hurdles to integration

    The reserve army risks unleashing the same dynamics of rewarding rebellion by doling out positions to armed group leaders and granting them impunity for past violence. In April 2024, the leaders of many Wazalendo groups were flown to Kinshasa where the army reserve leadership told them to start preparing lists of their combatants ahead of their integration.

    This has prompted numerous armed groups to step up recruitment.

    The prospect of integration has also triggered fierce competition for positions between Wazalendo commanders. This risks worsening animosities between groups.

    Other hurdles, some of which have been faced before, include:

    Unity of command. Forcing smaller armed groups into a hierarchical mould doesn’t always work. Most have deep local roots, with their recruitment and influence limited to a relatively small area. Used to calling the shots in their home areas, these commanders tend to be reluctant to take orders from higher-placed outsiders.

    Ethnic competition. Armed groups may resist full integration if they feel their rank and positions in the reserve army will be lower and that this will hamper their ability to protect members of their ethnic community. Such “local security dilemmas” have obstructed army integration and demobilisation efforts in the past.

    Resources. Armed groups currently enjoy substantial income, and considerable freedom in obtaining it. Will the reserve army command allow its members to engage in illegal taxation, kidnapping for ransom, robbery and ambushes? If not, how will it compensate for their lost opportunities? In addition, the reserve army is likely to compete with the army over revenue-generating opportunities. And some of its members may leak intelligence to fellow armed groups.

    Painkiller or cure?

    The army reserve may be read as the latest attempt at solving the decades-old problem of getting rid of the many armed groups in eastern DRC, this time by bringing them into the fold of the state yet not into the army.

    However, this solution does risk unleashing many of the same detrimental dynamics as army integration. It may fuel armed mobilisation and militarisation rather than contain it.

    Wazalendo groups are currently in a comfortable position and there are no repercussions for not integrating the reserve force. To contain them, both the DRC’s army and the military justice system would need to be professionalised.

    Even if the reserve army did not have negative ripple effects, it would be an unlikely cure for armed mobilisation. That requires comprehensive, bottom-up peace efforts that tackle deep-seated grievances related to past violence and conflict over belonging, territory and local authority. Barring such efforts, the reserve force will remain a painkiller at best.

    – DRC creates a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire
    – https://theconversation.com/drc-creates-a-reserve-force-to-fight-the-m23-why-this-may-backfire-247476

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Global: DRC creates a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Judith Verweijen, Assistant professor, Utrecht University

    After nearly three decades of warfare, armed conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) seems only to intensify. The Rwanda-backed M23 rebellion has been at the centre of attention in recent years. However, eastern DRC is home to more than 100 other armed groups, which are a major source of instability too. The question of their demobilisation has haunted the country ever since the end of the Second Congo War in 2003.

    A new chapter in this long-standing conundrum seems to have started. In 2022, the government decided to form an alliance with armed groups to fight their common enemy, the M23 and its Rwandan backers. At around the same time, it launched an initiative to create an army reserve, known as the Reserve armée de la défense (RAD). This formalised the Congolese army’s established practice of using armed groups as auxiliaries.

    The creation of the reserve army allows the government to reward armed group allies with integration while bringing them under institutionalised control. But will this actually work?

    Our past and ongoing research on army integration and demobilisation in eastern DRC casts doubt on the plan, for three reasons.

    The first risk is that armed groups will boost their numbers to gain a stronger bargaining position once integration does occur.

    Secondly, reservist forces may compete with the army over territorial control and limited resources and turn against those who created them.

    Finally, merely absorbing armed groups into a reserve force does little to address the long-standing grievances that underlie conflict in the east.

    The Wazalendo: eastern DRC’s predatory patriots

    On 9 May 2022, in a secretive meeting in the town of Pinga in North Kivu, the Congolese armed forces and several Congolese armed groups agreed to cease hostilities against each other and instead form an alliance to fight their common enemy, the M23.

    As a result, these groups became quasi-official and increasingly presented themselves as defenders of Congo’s territorial integrity. They started to call themselves Wazalendo or patriots in Kiswahili. Fuelled by President Félix Tshisekedi’s supportive rhetoric, the Wazalendo became symbols of Congolese resistance against foreign aggression. This benefited the president’s 2023 electoral campaign.

    Across North and South Kivu provinces, armed groups have rebranded themselves Wazalendo, even when not part of the coalition fighting the M23.

    As the Congolese army’s attention is on the M23, these armed groups have benefited from the lull in operations against them. Most Wazalendo groups are allowed to roam around freely and have dramatically expanded their zones of influence and violent systems of revenue generation.

    This includes taxation at markets and rapidly proliferating roadblocks, but also ransom kidnappings and contract killings. There is also evidence that Wazalendo groups are engaged in torture, sexual violence and arbitrary arrests, and frequently recruit child soldiers.

    Chequered history of integration

    A few months after the Pinga meeting, Congo’s government launched a new national defence policy that mentioned the establishment of the reserve army. Though it was passed unanimously in parliament in April 2023, MPs voiced concerns that the new army reserve risked repeating mistakes of the past.

    The army is itself the product of the painstaking integration of former belligerents after the Second Congo War (1998-2003). But rebel-military integration became an open-ended process. Armed group officers alternately integrated into and deserted from the army in the hope of gaining higher ranks and positions in a next round of integration.

    Unending rebel integration also weakened the national army. It reinforced parallel command chains, facilitated intelligence leaks and created a lopsided hierarchy.

    The first iteration of the M23 rebellion in 2012 was the result of rebel integration gone wrong. In its aftermath, the Congolese government banned the wholesale negotiated integration of armed groups into the army.

    Hurdles to integration

    The reserve army risks unleashing the same dynamics of rewarding rebellion by doling out positions to armed group leaders and granting them impunity for past violence. In April 2024, the leaders of many Wazalendo groups were flown to Kinshasa where the army reserve leadership told them to start preparing lists of their combatants ahead of their integration.

    This has prompted numerous armed groups to step up recruitment.

    The prospect of integration has also triggered fierce competition for positions between Wazalendo commanders. This risks worsening animosities between groups.

    Other hurdles, some of which have been faced before, include:

    Unity of command. Forcing smaller armed groups into a hierarchical mould doesn’t always work. Most have deep local roots, with their recruitment and influence limited to a relatively small area. Used to calling the shots in their home areas, these commanders tend to be reluctant to take orders from higher-placed outsiders.

    Ethnic competition. Armed groups may resist full integration if they feel their rank and positions in the reserve army will be lower and that this will hamper their ability to protect members of their ethnic community. Such “local security dilemmas” have obstructed army integration and demobilisation efforts in the past.

    Resources. Armed groups currently enjoy substantial income, and considerable freedom in obtaining it. Will the reserve army command allow its members to engage in illegal taxation, kidnapping for ransom, robbery and ambushes? If not, how will it compensate for their lost opportunities? In addition, the reserve army is likely to compete with the army over revenue-generating opportunities. And some of its members may leak intelligence to fellow armed groups.

    Painkiller or cure?

    The army reserve may be read as the latest attempt at solving the decades-old problem of getting rid of the many armed groups in eastern DRC, this time by bringing them into the fold of the state yet not into the army.

    However, this solution does risk unleashing many of the same detrimental dynamics as army integration. It may fuel armed mobilisation and militarisation rather than contain it.

    Wazalendo groups are currently in a comfortable position and there are no repercussions for not integrating the reserve force. To contain them, both the DRC’s army and the military justice system would need to be professionalised.

    Even if the reserve army did not have negative ripple effects, it would be an unlikely cure for armed mobilisation. That requires comprehensive, bottom-up peace efforts that tackle deep-seated grievances related to past violence and conflict over belonging, territory and local authority. Barring such efforts, the reserve force will remain a painkiller at best.

    Michel Thill is a Senior Program Officer for swisspeace, a Basel University affiliated practice and research institute dedicated to advancing effective peacebuilding. swisspeace receives funding from research funding bodies, and bilateral and multilateral organizations. Michel is also a Fellow of the Rift Valley Institute.

    Judith Verweijen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. DRC creates a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire – https://theconversation.com/drc-creates-a-reserve-force-to-fight-the-m23-why-this-may-backfire-247476

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Security Council Press Statement on Situation in Democratic Republic of Congo

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    The following Security Council press statement was issued today by Council President Amar Bendjama (Algeria):

    The members of the Security Council condemned in the strongest terms ongoing advances by the M23 in North-Kivu, including the control of Masisi centre on 4 January 2025 and of Sake on 23 January 2025, and expressed serious concerns regarding imminent threats against Goma, which are putting hundreds of thousands of civilians at heightened risk. These advances represent a serious violation of the ceasefire, exacerbate the grave humanitarian and displacement crisis in the Eastern DRC and undermine efforts to reach a lasting peaceful and political solution to the conflict through the Luanda process. The members of the Security Council echoed the statement by the Secretary-General dated 26 January 2025 and demanded that the ongoing offensive and advances towards Goma immediately stop. They further called on the M23 to reverse its territorial expansion without delay.

    The members of the Security Council reiterated their full support to MONUSCO, which is acting within its mandate and doing essential work in the DRC, including near Goma, and expressed their strong commitment to the safety and security of its peacekeepers. They paid tribute to all peacekeepers who risk their lives. They expressed their deepest condolences and sympathy to the families of the peacekeepers killed, as well as to South Africa, Malawi and Uruguay.  They also expressed their condolences to the United Nations. They wished a speedy and full recovery to the peacekeepers injured. They reiterated that attacks against peacekeepers may constitute war crimes. They stressed that involvement in planning, directing, sponsoring or conducting attacks against MONUSCO peacekeepers constitutes a basis for sanctions designations pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolutions.

    The members of the Security Council condemned the ongoing flagrant disregard for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC, including the unauthorized presence in the Eastern DRC of external Forces as reported by the Group of Experts and demanded that these forces withdraw immediately and that the M23 put an end to the establishment of parallel administrations in the DRC territory. They urged all parties to scrupulously abide by the ceasefire. They further reiterated their condemnation of the systematic illicit exploitation of the natural resources in eastern DRC, noting that these actions fuel the conflict. 

    They urged Rwanda and the DRC to return to diplomatic talks to achieve a lasting and peaceful resolution of the protracted conflict in the region including by addressing respective issues pertaining to the presence of Rwanda Defence Forces in the Eastern DRC and DRC support to the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) respectively, as reported by the Group of Experts. The members of the Security Council reaffirmed their unwavering support for the ongoing mediation efforts between the DRC and Rwanda through the Luanda Process led by the AU -designated mediator President João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço of Angola.

    The members of the Security Council are also deeply alarmed by continued occurrences of GPS jamming and spoofing activities in support of M23 operations in North Kivu, which represent imminent risk to civil aviation safety and negatively impact the delivery of humanitarian assistance to populations in need. They called for an end to reported GPS jamming and spoofing and deployment of Surface to Air Missiles, which threaten the safety and security of UN peacekeepers, and impede the implementation of their Protection of Civilians mandate.

    The members of the Security Council condemned persistent violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights in the eastern part of the DRC, including sexual and gender-based violence, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, and summary killings by armed groups. The members of the Security Council called for all perpetrators to be held accountable. They urged both parties to fully and rapidly implement their commitments agreed under the Luanda process, and to fully cooperate in good faith with Angola in order to accelerate the implementation of the harmonized plan for the neutralization of the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and the disengagement of Forces. Council members also stressed the importance of resuming consultations under the Nairobi Process under the guidance of former President Uhuru Kenyatta to address the protracted issue of armed groups, including the M23, operating in the DRC, and to identify pathways to peace and stability in the region.

    The members of the Security Council reaffirmed their strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as all States in the region. They recalled resolution 2765 (2024) and expressed their full support to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) and the Office of the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –