Category: Africa

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Protection of the Holy Monastery of Sinai – E-002184/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU and the EU Delegation in Cairo are aware of and closely monitoring the developments following the Ismailia Court of Appeals’ ruling linked to the legal status of Saint Catherine’s Monastery in Sinai.

    In a meeting called by the Arab Republic of Egypt’s Foreign Ministry, the Egyptian authorities assured Member States’ Ambassadors and the EU Head of Delegation in Cairo that the Egyptian government remains fully committed to preserving the monastery’s religious, historical, and spiritual status.

    The Egyptian authorities reaffirmed that the monks’ access to the site will not be affected by the court ruling. This matter is also subject to ongoing direct negotiations between the Greek and Egyptian governments.

    The EU, and its Member States, will continue to follow this matter and the commitments made by the government of Egypt.

    Last updated: 10 July 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Closure of the Monastery of St Catherine in Sinai and violation of religious freedoms by the Egyptian authorities – E-002164/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU and the EU Delegation in Cairo are aware of and continue to monitor the recent developments in Egypt after the Ismailia Court of Appeals issued a ruling linked to the legal status of Saint Catherine’s Monastery in Sinai.

    In a meeting called by the Arab Republic of Egypt’s Foreign Ministry, the Egyptian authorities assured Member States’ Ambassadors and the EU Head of Delegation in Cairo that the Egyptian government remains fully committed to preserving the monastery’s religious, historical, and spiritual status, adding that the current status of the area around Saint Catherine’s Monastery is untouchable. It was reaffirmed that the monks’ access to the site will not be affected by the court ruling.

    The EU welcomes the commitments of the governments of Greece and Egypt to work together towards safeguarding the rights of Saint Catherine’s Monastery and awaits any new developments with regard to its legal status.

    The EU will continue to follow the situation closely and await the result of the discussions between the Egyptian and Greek Authorities, insisting on the necessity to preserve the monastery’s religious, historical, and spiritual status, in accordance with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation World Heritage Convention[1].

    • [1] United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation World Heritage convention website, Saint Catherine Monastery: https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/954/.
    Last updated: 10 July 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Overlooked and underestimated: Sand and dust storms wreak havoc across borders

    Source: United Nations 2

    That’s how much sand and dust enters the atmosphere on an annual basis according to the World Meteorological Organization (WMO)’s annual report on the storms which scatter such particles across borders worldwide.

    The UN weather agency’s reports warns that while the amount of dust decreased marginally in 2024, the impact on humans and economies is increasing.

    WMO estimates that over 330 million people across 150 countries are affected by sand and dust storms, leading to premature deaths and other health consequences in addition to steep economic costs.

    More than just a dark sky 

    Sand and dust storms do not just mean dirty windows and hazy skies. They harm the health and quality of life of millions of people and cost many millions of dollars,” said Celeste Saulo, the Secretary-General of WMO.

    While the movement of sand and dust is a natural weather process, increased land degradation and water mismanagement have, in the past few decades, exacerbated the prevalence and geographic spread.

    Dust and sand particles – 80 per cent of which come from North Africa and the Middle East – can be transported thousands of kilometres across borders and oceans.

    “What begins in a storm in the Sahara, can darken skies in Europe. What is lifted in Central Asia, can alter air quality in China. The atmosphere does not recognize borders,” said Sara Basart, WMO Scientific Officer, at a briefing in Geneva.

    And this is precisely what happened in 2024. Dust and sand from the Western Sahara travelled all the way to Spain’s Canary Islands. And fierce winds and drought in Mongolia brought dust to Beijing and northern China.

    Fast-growing challenge

    “These extreme weather events are not local anomalies. Sand and dust storms are fast becoming one of the most overlooked yet far-reaching global challenges of our time,” said a senior official on Thursday morning speaking on behalf of Philémon Yang, President of the General Assembly.

    The storms can obscure sunlight, altering ecosystems on land and in the ocean. In addition to environmental impacts, these weather occurrences have profound impacts on humans and their economies.

    “Once considered seasonal or localised, sand and dust storms have escalated into a persistent and intensifying global hazard,” said Rola Dashti, the co-chair of the UN Coalition on Combating Sand and Dust Storms.

    Between 2018-2022, over 3.8 billion people were exposed to dust particles, with the worst-affected regions experiencing dust exposure 87 per cent of the time during that same period.

    These particles exacerbate cardiovascular diseases and have other adverse health effects, leading to 7 million premature deaths each year especially among already vulnerable populations.

    Mr. Yang referred to this as the “staggering human toll”: from an economic perspective, storms can lead to a 20 per cent reduction in crop production among rural communities, pushing them towards hunger and poverty.

    In the Middle East and North Africa alone, economic losses in 2024 as a result of sand and dust storms accounted for 2.5 per cent of the regional GDP.

    Can’t go it alone

    WMO is calling on the international community to invest more in early warning systems and data tracking.

    No country, no matter how prepared, can face this challenge alone. Sand and dust storms are a trans-boundary threat that demands coordinated, multisectoral and multilateral action,” said Ms. Dashti.

    With 2025-2034 declared the Decade on Combating Sand and Dust Storms, Mr. Yang said this should prove a turning point. He urged Member States to move from awareness to action – and fragmentation to coordination. 

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – Human rights violations in Dubai, Central African Republic and Syria

    Source: European Parliament

    On Thursday, Parliament adopted three emergency resolutions on Dubai, the Central African Republic, and Syria.

    Ryan Cornelius’ case in Dubai

    Parliament calls for the immediate and unconditional release of Ryan Cornelius, a 71-year-old British citizen detained in Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), since 2008. They denounce his inhumane conditions of detention and urge the UAE to abolish the practice of debt-related imprisonment and to respect international human rights standards.

    They also point out that the assets seized in this particular case exceed by far the debt owed and demand that Ryan Cornelius be granted an enforceable right to compensation and other remedies, in accordance with international law. Originally sentenced to 10 years on charges of alleged fraud, Ryan Cornelius’ sentence was extended by another 20 years under Dubai Law 37 of 2009, applied retroactively and in violation of international legal standards.

    MEPs call on the UK government, the EU Special Representative for Human Rights and the EU Delegation to the United Arab Emirates to raise this issue in all bilateral contacts with the authorities and note that the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has declared this imprisonment illegal, citing lack of due process, forced confessions and refusal of a lawyer.

    The resolution was adopted by 511 votes in favour, 50 against, and 75 abstentions. For more details, the full version will be available here. (10/07/25)

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Breaking News: China to Work with Egypt to Uphold International Trade and Economic Order – Chinese Premier

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    CAIRO, July 10 (Xinhua) — China hopes to work with Egypt to uphold economic globalization and the international trade and economic order, Chinese Premier Li Qiang said in Cairo on Thursday.

    As Li Qiang noted during talks with Egyptian Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly, the two countries should safeguard the common interests of a wide range of developing countries and promote peace and stability in the Middle East and the world as a whole. –0–

    Please note: This information is raw content obtained directly from the source of the information. It is an accurate report of what the source claims and does not necessarily reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

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    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Breaking: China looks to optimize trade, expand cooperation with Egypt — Chinese Premier

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    CAIRO, July 10 (Xinhua) — China is committed to working with Egypt to promote the optimization and development of bilateral trade and create more bright spots of cooperation and new economic growth points, Chinese Premier Li Qiang said in Cairo on Thursday.

    As Li Qiang noted during talks with Egyptian Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly, the two countries could expand cooperation in emerging areas such as new energy, electric vehicles, artificial intelligence and the digital economy. –0–

    Please note: This information is raw content obtained directly from the source of the information. It is an accurate report of what the source claims and does not necessarily reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

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    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – European subsidies for South African wine producers – E-002728/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002728/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Céline Imart (PPE), Daniel Buda (PPE), Esther Herranz García (PPE), Gilles Pennelle (PfE), Carlo Fidanza (ECR), Jessika Van Leeuwen (PPE), Dolors Montserrat (PPE)

    At a time when the European wine sector is experiencing an unprecedented crisis – marked by large-scale restructuring within its own vineyards, mass grubbing up, and growing distress among producers, including tragic cases of suicide – the South African wine sector has announced the release of a EUR 15 million EU subsidy to ‘promote diversity and inclusivity’ in farms across the country.

    Beyond the legal considerations, the decision to release such an amount at the current time is a serious moral and political failure: how can financial support such as this for a non-EU country be justified when winegrowers in France and across Europe are on the brink of collapse, and essential funding is lacking?

    Given the foregoing:

    • 1.Where exactly do the funds for this subsidy come from?
    • 2.Does the Commission intend to activate all possible political and legal levers to suspend or reverse this funding?
    • 3.Will the Commission only react when tractors are rolling over the cobblestones of the Schuman roundabout?

    Submitted: 3.7.2025

    Last updated: 10 July 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Safeguards attached to European Peace Facility top-up support for the Rwanda Defence Force – E-003054/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Council decision (CFSP) 2024/2880 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to support the deployment of the Rwanda Defence Force in Mozambique covers the acquisition of non-lethal individual equipment for the Rwandan troops (RDF) deployed in Cabo Delgado and the costs of transporting staff, equipment and supplies between Rwanda and Mozambique.

    The RDF was deployed at the request of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique and was instrumental in tackling the security crisis in Cabo Delgado.

    Regardless of the assistance measure in question, the EU condemned Rwanda’s support for M23 and military presence on Congolese territory, and urged Rwanda to end its cooperation with M23 and withdraw its military forces from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

    In July 2024, the EU imposed restrictive measures on nine individuals and one entity responsible for acts that constitute serious human rights violations and abuses in the DRC and for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the eastern DRC. Notably, it imposed restrictive measures against the Deputy Commander of the Special Force Command of the RDF.

    Each assistance measure adopted within the framework of the European Peace Facility includes robust safeguards, which are duly implemented by the High Representative of the Union in the arrangements with the beneficiary to ensure the end users’ compliance with the requirements and conditions established by the Council.

    This was the case for the initial assistance measure as well as for the top-up adopted on 18 November 2024. Failure to comply with international law may result in the suspension or termination of the assistance measure.

    The EPF assistance measure is duly circumscribed. It is not intended to support specific individuals or the RDF as a whole, but to sustain the RDF units deployed in Mozambique’s northern province of Cabo Delgado, with the full support of the Mozambican authorities.

    Last updated: 10 July 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Insurance Biz Africa launches pan-African Insurance Webinar Master Series

    Source: APO – Report:

    Digital news publisher, Insurance Biz Africa, is proud to announce the launch of a series of pan-African webinar sessions whose objectives are to take an unprecedented deep dive into the forces reshaping the insurance industry across Africa and the world.

    The 8-part series, themed: “Innovate. Adapt. Insure the Future“, hosted by Insurance Biz Africa, will feature two-hour webinars designed to unpack the most pressing risks, opportunities, and regulatory changes facing insurers across Africa and beyond.

    “This is a pivotal moment for the insurance industry. The annual webinar series will provide crucial insights into topics from AI and climate risk to ESG, equipping professionals and regulators to navigate volatility with confidence. The series is designed to ignite long-lasting conversations around pertinent areas of insurance and reinsurance upon which the industry can build solutions,” says Insurance Biz Africa Founding Editor and Managing Director of New Africa Business News Services (NABNS), Kwanele Sibanda.

    “At NABNS, we believe the time is ripe for bold conversations and collaborative thinking. Our series will not only educate but spark innovation, ensuring insurance and reinsurance remain pillars of economic resilience,” adds Kwanele.

    “Kicking off with Insuring Against Civil Unrests on the 23rd of July, the timing couldn’t have been more perfect, especially seeing what is currently happening across Africa in countries like Kenya, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Togo, Mali and Lybia because of political tensions. This 2-hour session will see Sasria, the only riots and civil unrests insurer in South Africa present a case study in reflection of South Africa’s July 2021 civil unrests. Sasria will also participate in the panel of experts,” concludes Kwanele.

    Insurance Webinar Master Series 2025 Themes & Dates:

    22 July 2025 – Insuring Against Unrest: Lessons from SA’s July 2021 Riots and the Evolving Role of Insurers and Reinsurers

    05 August 2025Cybersecurity and Systemic Risk: Building Insurance Resilience in the Digital Era

    Discuss insurance solutions for large-scale cyber events affecting entire economies.

    14 August 2025The Future of Underwriting: Leveraging AI, Data, and Automation Across the Insurance Value Chain

    Explore how AI and advanced analytics can revolutionize underwriting precision and speed.

    • Webinar 4:

    26 August 2025Bridging the Protection Gap: Innovations in Inclusive Insurance and Risk Transfer
    Innovative products, partnerships, and risk mechanisms that extend protection to underserved markets.

    04 September 2025ESG and Sustainable Insurance: From Compliance to Competitive Advantage
    Move beyond ESG box-ticking towards long-term, sustainable profitability.

    18 September 2025Index Insurance and Alternative Risk Transfer: Unlocking Scalable, Transparent Risk Solutions

    Examine new models to insure communities and sectors exposed to systemic risks.

    • Webinar 7:

    30 September 2025Navigating AI and Digital Disruption in Life Insurance: Risks, Rewards & Regulation

    Balance the transformative potential of AI with evolving consumer protection frameworks.

    • Webinar 8:

    09 October 2025Climate Change and Capital Strain: Managing Volatility in a New Risk Era

    Understand how insurers can adapt capital models amid climate-driven losses.

    Bonus Session:

    October 2025Insurtech and Distribution: Reimagining Customer Engagement in Insurance

    Explore new technologies reshaping sales, service, and product design.

    Each session will bring together industry leaders presenting case studies and learnings, global experts, and policymakers engaging in robust discussions, live Q&As, and actionable insights.

    Registration & Sponsorship Opportunities:

    Insurance companies, brokers, reinsurers, regulators, and service providers are encouraged to register early or partner as sponsors to showcase leadership in this high-impact series.

    For more details, registration, or sponsorship opportunities, visit: https://apo-opa.co/44yEOZH or contact info@insurancebiz.co.za

    – on behalf of New Africa Business News Services.

    Additional Information:
    To Register: https://apo-opa.co/4nIgBrg
    Insurance Biz Africa: https://apo-opa.co/4kzR4hb

    Contact:
    Issued By: New Africa Business News Services (NABNS)
    Contact: Kwanele Sibanda
    Email: Kwanele@nabns.com
    Tel: +27 27 71 316 8517

    About Insurance Biz Africa:
    Insurance Biz Africa is South Africa’s premier digital news platform dedicated to the insurance, reinsurance, and wealth management sectors. Launched in 2013, the publication offers in-depth industry coverage, expert insights, executive interviews, and regulatory updates to a targeted audience of professionals, decision-makers, and thought leaders. It is owned and published by New Africa Business News Services (NABNS), a division of SAEN Media (Pty) Ltd. The publication adheres to the Press Council of South Africa’s Code of Ethics and remains committed to journalistic integrity and excellence in financial reporting.

    Media files

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    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Lancaster House 2.0: Declaration on Modernising UK-French Defence and Security Cooperation

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    Lancaster House 2.0: Declaration on Modernising UK-French Defence and Security Cooperation

    Declaration on Modernising UK-French Defence and Security Cooperation.

    The UK and France, as Europe’s only nuclear powers and leading militaries, share a unique responsibility for European and international defence and security. Our two nations represent nearly 40% of the defence budget of European Allies, and more than 50% of European spending on research and technology.

    Since the Chequers Declaration in 1995, successive generations of leaders have recognised the intertwined nature of our vital interests, affirming that a threat to one would represent a threat against the other. In 2010, through the Lancaster House Treaties, our nations formalised this shared cooperation to address the challenges of that era: expeditionary warfare and counterterrorism.

    Fifteen years later, the threats we face have changed fundamentally with state-on-state conflict rising globally and, since Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, the return of full-scale war to Europe. We have a shared responsibility to strengthen Euro-Atlantic security and recall, in this regard, the critical deterrence that NATO provides. We reaffirm the importance of intensifying our efforts in support of NATO and acting jointly within it.  We also recognise the value of a stronger and more capable European defence that contributes positively to transatlantic and global security and is complementary to, and interoperable with, NATO. In this regard, we underline that the European Union remains a unique and essential partner for NATO. We also welcome the progress we have made on the UK-EU Security Defence Partnership in bringing together our shared interests in protecting the continent.

    The UK and France share the same understanding of the threats we face. The return of conventional warfighting at scale in Europe and beyond, strategic competition on the global stage, combined with hostile state activity, rapid expansion in hybrid warfare and disinformation, create a febrile and dangerous international order. States are increasingly using hybrid tactics against us, either directly or using proxies, to undermine our national security and our democracies. 

    The UK and France are willing and able to act together, decisively, to protect our shared interests, allies, partners in Europe and beyond, values and, fundamentally, our democratic way of life. We must be ready and willing to oppose our adversaries across the full spectrum of national security, requiring a new, whole of society and government approach. We are resolved to deepen and expand our partnership to jointly deter and respond to the heightened challenge these evolving threats pose including cyber, sabotage, espionage, malign use of artificial intelligence and foreign information manipulation and interference. This can only be achieved by the further integration of our Military, National Security, Diplomatic, Intelligence and Economic levers.

    It is in this context that we, as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and President of the French Republic, have decided to reboot, modernise and build upon our bilateral defence and security relationship, including under the Lancaster House Treaties, in order to effect a generational shift in both our bilateral cooperation and our joint contribution to the defence of Europe, its citizens and of its interests. Today, we have declared our intent to carry out a series of ambitious projects and new areas of collaboration that will underpin our defence and security relationship for the next fifteen years and beyond.

    1. Deepening our longstanding and resolute commitment to cooperation between our independent nuclear deterrents by:

    a. Setting out our contribution to the defence of European partners and NATO Allies, and stating that whilst our nuclear forces are independent, they can be coordinated, as set out in the Northwood Declaration;

    b. Enhancing mutual understanding of respective nuclear deterrence policies, doctrine and plans, and strengthening our ability to make coordinated decisions in peace time and in crisis;

    c. Expanding cooperation on nuclear research (as initiated since 2010) including by making greater use of the facilities in each other’s countries;

    d. Coordinating more closely to uphold and reinforce the international non-proliferation architecture; and

    e. Establishing a UK-France Nuclear Steering Group to provide political direction for this cooperation, led by the Presidency of the French Republic and the Cabinet Office to coordinate across policy, capability and operations.

    2. Launch the Combined Joint Force – overhauling the existing Combined Joint Expeditionary Force to refocus it on the Euro-Atlantic and warfighting at scale to deter, placing it on an operational footing for the first time by endeavouring to:

    a. Significantly increase the declared Combined Joint Force (CJF) capacity, up to fivefold, ensuring the ability to plan and command Combined Corps Capability (the highest level of fielded forces in our armies). This Corp can provide the Land component of a broader joint force combining all military functions, as part of NATO or bilaterally. The CJF will facilitate the deployment of a force fully interoperable with NATO and available as the Alliance’s Strategic Reserve; this is a critical step towards the UK and France providing two fully interoperable Strategic Reserve Corps to NATO, enabled by the CJF.

    b. Adopt new missions, enabling the CJF to conduct activity in the Euro-Atlantic to deter our adversaries and reassure our Allies and partners, while also being prepared to compete with our adversaries further afield if needed.

    c. Establish a mechanism to share, coordinate and synchronise military activity and the deployment of UK and French forces globally, ensuring we are providing the most effective deterrence posture.

    d. Establish a dedicated cell to operationalise the CJF, overseeing military strategic coordination and planning through to operational coordination.

    e. Maintain the ability for the CJF to integrate additional allies and partners under UK-French leadership and to ensure the CJF is complementary to NATO.

    f. Use the CJF structures to underpin the Coalition of the Willing for Ukraine. The force will provide the joint planning framework to cohere the Coalition, ensure joint operational and strategic messaging. It will provide Coalition leadership and command and control for the planning and operational deployment of the Coalition covering all five domains, preparing for the operational deployment of the CJF in the event of a ceasefire – which can be supported by allies.

    3. Embark upon an ‘Entente Industrielle’ to enhance capability and industrial co-operation, bringing our defence industries and militaries closer than ever before to strengthen NATO, by endeavouring to:

    a. Launch the development phase of the Future Cruise and Anti-Ship Weapon (FC/ASW) programme to provide the next generation of long-range, highly survivable Deep Strike Missiles.

    b. Jointly develop the next generation of beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles for our fighter jets, while also extending the Meteor capability, launching a joint study with industry to inform our future development of its successor.

    c. Acquire new SCALP & Storm Shadow missiles, following their successful use by Ukraine, upgrading UK and French production lines to bolster national stockpiles to deter our adversaries.

    d. Establish a new, joint Complex Weapons Portfolio Office, embedded with OCCAR, through which we will deliver our joint projects within OCCAR, starting with SCALP & Storm Shadow acquisition and also working closely with MBDA to identify the opportunities from our investments and to reduce duplication, working closely with MBDA, starting with studies on Air Dominance and Cooperative Strike future capabilities.

    e. Focus greater efforts on integrated air and missile defence (IAMD) in our capability relationship, including (but not limited to) C-UAS and counter-hypersonic capabilities, drawing especially from the Aster family increments, including potentially SAMP/T NG and CAMM.

    f. Continue to work closely on current and future long range strike capabilities through the European Long Range Strike Approach (ELSA initiative). Along with our ELSA allies (amongst them Germany), we will remain open to expanding this cooperation to extended-range deep strike capability should military requirements and industrial capacity align. We will be carefully examining, with our defence industries, the capability opportunities this presents.

    g Develop a Directed Energy Weapons partnership, sharing information, collaborating on research and projects of shared interest, and exploring industry collaboration on radiofrequency weapons.

    h. Collaborate on developing algorithms for synchronised missile and drone strikes using artificial intelligence and machine learning, to build our future interoperability.

    i. Explore a combat air interoperability roadmap, including potential collaboration on armaments, to support the connectivity and interoperability of our current and future combat air forces and their contribution to European and NATO air superiority.

    j. Commit to align standards for weapons safety and testing, to bring operational benefits and save time and money in our joint programmes.

    k. Work closely together on wider export campaigns for UK-French capabilities and establishing a new joint team, with an initial focus on supporting the export of A400M (including through the set up of a NATO High Visibility Project) and identifying further concrete areas for joint export promotion.

    l. Recognising the importance of improving European defence industrial resilience, the UK and France will enhance reciprocal market access in defence and security.

    4.  Develop new cooperation in every domain to enhance military interoperability and support NATO, driven by annual meetings of our Joint Chiefs. This will include:

    a. Developing a new Bilateral Vision Statement between the armies and committing to enduring support to NATO through the CJF. This represents operational interoperability at the highest level of fielded forces in our armies, enhancing British and French joint commitments and opportunities offered through the Forward Land Forces in Estonia.

    b. Driving naval interoperability in support of warfighting, notably on information, data and communications, leveraging the opportunities of next generation digital architectures, deepening cooperation on maritime air defence, and continuing to coordinate Carrier Strike Group activity. Additionally, expanding cooperation on global maritime domain awareness to better deter maritime hybrid threats, including to critical undersea infrastructure and sanctions circumvention by the Russian Shadow Fleet, with an initial focus on the Channel and the Atlantic. Finally, facilitating mutual access support facilities for naval aircraft and warships.

    c. Increasing the complexity of combined Air Defence exercises, cooperating on responses to High-Altitude threats, enhancing cooperation in the development of Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS) capabilities, particularly in the integration of Command And Control (C2) systems. Pursuing a joint ambition to develop the A400M into a multi-mission platform, incorporating C2, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and potential strike capabilities. Aiming to synchronise fast jet pilot training to enhance interoperability and efficiency.

    d. Enabling interoperability across the space domain, including satellite communications capabilities, developing cooperation and potential joint capability in space control, space-based ISR systems, and Low Earth Orbit satellites. We will jointly spearhead closer operational space coordination and deliver space support to bolster Euro-Atlantic security operations.

    e. Sharing best practice in Cyber, with the UK providing support to the French establishment of a Cyber Training Academy, and France supporting the establishment of the UK’s new Cyber & Electromagnetic Command. Jointly galvanising wider NATO Cyber exercise activity, whilst fusing UK-French operational cooperation to act amongst Allies as European leaders in the domain.

    5. Reinforce the UK-France integrated defence and security partnership to deter and respond to the full spectrum of threats, by endeavouring to:

    a. Work together to make the fullest possible use of the UK-EU Security and Defence Partnership. Noting the shared UK and EU commitment to explore possible mutual involvement in respective defence initiatives, including within the Security Action For Europe (SAFE) instrument, in accordance with the respective legal frameworks, the UK and France will explore possibilities for mutually beneficial enhanced cooperation.

    b. Strengthen our defence and security policy coordination and cooperation on key areas for Euro-Atlantic security (Ukraine, NATO, the future of Euro-Atlantic security) and reasserting the unique contribution of our bilateral partnership to European and global security.

    c. Exploit areas of policy dialogue and cooperation in countering hybrid threats, Space, Cyber and AI – including through fostering links between national agencies, exchanging doctrines and responsible practices.

    d. Launch a new Global Maritime Security Dialogue to cohere our strategic approaches to deterring threats to our shared maritime interests.

    e. Establishing a dialogue on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief to build on our existing frameworks and scope future mutual assistance arrangements.

    f. Coordinate and align resources to enhance regional resilience, including on maritime security, in the Indo-Pacific in the medium-term and, in accordance with our respective international obligations, provide for reciprocal base access to facilities, including Réunion Island, New Caledonia and French Polynesia.

    g. Bring together our intelligence, law enforcement and policy expertise across the overt and covert environments to deter, counter and respond to the full range of hybrid threats including physical threats to people, sabotage and foreign interference, including Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), cyber and espionage.  Jointly pursuing attributions and coordinating on sanctions, as well as exploring how we can further lead joint operational efforts to combat the hybrid threats. We will continue our cooperation in NATO, G7 and other multilateral forums.

    h. Further strengthen our cooperation to counter FIMI, to raise the costs for states seeking to undermine our security and democratic institutions. We will pursue the interoperability of our systems to analyse FIMI and increase efforts to jointly respond to it, including through exposure, sanctions and strategic communication. We will continue working together to build collective responses to FIMI in multilateral fora.

    i. Build on the UK-French Pall Mall Process and the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace, to tackle the threat posed by the proliferation of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities and address the shared challenges we face in cyberspace, and increase the cost to our adversaries through deterrence, sanctions and attributions.

    j. Engage in regular technical exchanges and proactively exploring joint research opportunities to harness the transformative potential of Artificial Intelligence and emerging technologies, while addressing associated national security challenges. The UK and France are uniquely placed to lead international efforts and response capabilities.

    k. Jointly maximise our impact against the highest-threat terrorist groups. Internationally, we will deepen our cooperation with Syria, and will look to enhance our coordination against the expanding terrorist threat in sub-Saharan Africa and central Asia. Domestically, we will build resilience against terrorist threats to critical infrastructure, including transport connections between our countries.

    6. Enhance communications and institutional exchanges across our two systems, as an enabler to our strengthened partnership across the entirety of defence and national security, by endeavouring to:

    a. Develop a new joint UK-France cross government secure communication system.

    b. Expand people and training links between the UK and French Militaries, optimising our networks of exchange and liaison officers, with a focus on junior officer exchanges, to develop a shared strategic culture in the next generation of military leaders across all three services.

    c. Continue to enable the constant exchange of national security and defence personnel and their families, to constantly deepen and forge our relationship for future generations and to ensure our Armed Forces have the conditions they need to perform effectively, and that they, and their family members, do not experience disadvantages as a result of their service. This might include reciprocal access to rights to work and related facilitations for defence personnel and their household members serving in each other’s countries.

    Updates to this page

    Published 10 July 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Security: Two Former West Virginia Correctional Officers Sentenced to Prison for Federal Civil Rights Crimes in Connection with Death of Inmate

    Source: US FBI

    CHARLESTON, W.Va. – Two former correctional officers from the Southern Regional Jail in Beaver, West Virginia, were sentenced today for their roles in an assault that resulted in the death of a pretrial detainee, identified by the initials Q.B., on March 1, 2022. Mark Holdren, 41, of Beckley, was sentenced to 20 years in prison and Johnathan Walters, 33, of Rainelle, was sentenced to 21 years in prison, with each prison sentence to be followed by three years of supervised release.

    Holdren and Walters each pleaded guilty to conspiring with other officers to violate inmate Q.B.’s civil rights, resulting in Q.B.’s death. According to court documents filed in connection with the guilty pleas, Holdren responded to a call for officer assistance after Q.B. tried to push past another correctional officer and leave his assigned pod. When Holdren arrived, officers were engaged in restraining Q.B. Holdren began using force against Q.B., including multiple knee-strikes that he knew were unreasonable.

    Holdren and other officers then conspired to violate Q.B.’s civil rights by unlawfully assaulting him as punishment for his attempt to leave the pod. As a part of the conspiracy, Holdren and other officers brought Q.B. to an interview room, where Walters joined them. In the interview room, Holdren and other officers used unreasonable force against Q.B., including striking Q.B. in the head multiple times, kicking, knee-striking him, pulling and twisting his fingers, and using pepper spray, all while Q.B. was restrained, handcuffed and posed no threat to anyone.

    After assaulting Q.B. in the interview room, officers transported him to another pod. During the transport, Q.B. became limp and was unable to walk on his own. Walters and other officers then carried Q.B. by his arms and legs to the pod’s entryway door, where Walters admitted he used unreasonable force to swing Q.B.’s head into the metal door to open the door. Walters and other officers then carried Q.B. into a cell, where they dropped the unresponsive and handcuffed Q.B. onto the concrete floor. Shortly thereafter, responding emergency medical personnel declared that Q.B. was deceased.

    With their guilty pleas, Holdren and Walters each further admitted knowing that the interview room to which officers brought Q.B. was a “blind spot” – meaning, there were no surveillance cameras to record what happened there. Holdren and Walters were aware that, prior to the assault of Q.B. on March 1, 2022, officers would bring inmates, including pretrial detainees, who had engaged in misconduct to “blind spots” in the jail, so that officers could use unreasonable force without being captured on video, thereby avoiding accountability for their actions. Holdren and Walters each further admitted knowing that officers could not use unreasonable force to punish inmates, including pretrial detainees such as Q.B.  

    United States District Judge Joseph R. Goodwin imposed today’s sentences.

    Holdren and Walters are two of six correctional officers who were indicted in this case. In November 2024, defendant Corey Snyder pleaded guilty in connection with the use of unreasonable force against Q.B., resulting in his death. Jacob Boothe pleaded guilty in August 2024 to failing to intervene to protect Q.B. from the officers’ assault. Snyder and Boothe are scheduled for sentencing before Judge Goodwin on July 10, 2025.

    Ashley Toney pleaded guilty on August 8, 2024, to failing to intervene to protect Q.B. from the officers’ assault. Judge Goodwin sentenced Toney, 25, of Fairdale, to six years and six months in prison on June 9, 2025.

    On January 27, 2025, a federal jury returned guilty verdict at trial for the sixth indicted defendant, Chad Lester, a former lieutenant at the Southern Regional Jail, finding him guilty on three obstruction of justice charges for his role in conspiring to cover up the death of Q.B. Judge Goodwin sentenced Lester, 35, of Odd, to 17 years and six months in prison on May 15, 2025.

    Prior to the indictment of the six defendants, former correctional officers Steven Nicholas Wimmer and Andrew Fleshman each pleaded guilty to conspiring to use unreasonable force against Burks. Chief United States District Judge Frank W. Volk sentenced Wimmer, 26, of Bluefield, to nine years in prison on May 7, 2025. Fleshman, 23, of Shady Spring, is scheduled for sentencing before Chief Judge Volk on July 14, 2025.

    Assistant Attorney General Harmeet K. Dhillon of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division and Acting United States Attorney Lisa G. Johnston for the Southern District of West Virginia made today’s announcement.

    The FBI Pittsburgh Field Office investigated the case.

    Deputy Chief Christine M. Siscaretti and Trial Attorney Tenette Smith of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division prosecuted the case in partnership with the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of West Virginia.

    A copy of this press release is located on the website of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of West Virginia. Related court documents and information can be found on PACER by searching for Case No. 5:23-cr-188.

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    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: UK-France Leaders Declaration

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    UK-France Leaders Declaration

    The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the French Republic met today in Downing Street for the 37th UK-France Summit.

    The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the French Republic met today in Downing Street for the 37th UK-France Summit.

    The United Kingdom and France share a commitment to peace, democracy, the rule of law, the rules-based international order, and human rights. In an international context in which these values are increasingly jeopardised, France and the United Kingdom share a responsibility to stand up for these aims and values, as major European countries, permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, major world economies, and open democracies. Our relationship and cooperation are fundamental.

    Our two countries share a unique friendship, an intertwined history and profound connections between our people, businesses, and communities. As we open a new chapter in our bilateral and European ties, also building on the outcome of the first EU-UK Summit held in May 2025, we want to make our people safer and more secure, champion fair and lasting peace worldwide, deepen our defence and security collaboration, support competitiveness and growth for our economies, providing jobs, and prosperity to our countries.

    Foreign Policy/Global Issues

    We reaffirm our determination to ensure Russia does not prevail in its illegal war of aggression, as well as our commitment to lasting support to Ukraine, including security assurances that safeguard its independence and sovereignty. Today we convened the Coalition of the Willing bringing together more than thirty nations committed to Ukraine’s long-term security. We welcomed the development of mature operational plans to deploy a reassurance force once hostilities have ceased, and to help secure Ukraine’s skies and seas and regenerate Ukraine’s armed forces. We have agreed to launch a Counter-Shadow Fleet Partnership to crack down on dangerous Russian-backed vessels in the Channel, reduce Russian oil revenues via these vessels, and safeguard our maritime security. Alongside this, we commit to seeking a lowering of the crude oil price cap, further depriving Russia of the oil revenues it uses to fund its barbaric war. We will strengthen our joint efforts to prevent the supplying of dual-use components and weapons to Russia by third countries’ entities. We reiterate our readiness to step up pressure on Russia as it refuses to commit to peace. We are committed to defending democracy and stability in the wider European neighbourhood and have agreed to work together on new support to strengthen resilience in the Western Balkans and Moldova. We welcome the conclusion of the negotiations on a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and urge the parties to sign this agreement as soon as possible

    We reaffirm our determination that Iran can never have a nuclear weapon. We will continue our cooperation, including in the E3 format with Germany, working with the US to ensure a robust deal on Iran’s nuclear programme that takes into account our shared security interests. We will continue to advocate for the resumption of Iran’s full cooperation with the IAEA. We are committed to addressing the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, pushing for an immediate ceasefire, and the release of all remaining hostages. We reaffirm our commitment to recognising a Palestinian state, as a contribution to a peace process. We will work together to support its development and the realisation of a Two-State Solution. We are also stepping up our coordination on security and humanitarian challenges in support of wider regional stability in Syria and Lebanon.

    Beyond Europe, we share a responsibility and resolve to defend our values and interests. As demonstrated by the actions of Russia’s enablers, our security is inextricably linked to the Indo-Pacific. We will strengthen our coordination and work together for a free, open, and sovereign Indo-Pacific through new joint maritime security training, reciprocal base access, and joint support to regional organisations. We will launch a Global Maritime Security Dialogue. We jointly reaffirm our commitment to peace and stability in the Korean peninsula, in the South and East China Seas, and in the Taiwan Strait, where we call for the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. We will keep coordinating efforts and initiatives to address peace and security challenges in Africa and their humanitarian consequences, in particular regarding Sudan and the Great Lakes.

    We will continue to act through the European Political Community to respond to common security challenges, including irregular migration, and promoting stability and democratic resilience, competitive and economic growth throughout the continent.

    We share a commitment to strengthening the multilateral system and working together for reform across the three pillars of the UN. We have today agreed to expand our cooperation on humanitarian disaster preparation and responses, and to coordinate our work on global issues such as climate change, poverty and promotion of sexual and reproductive health rights. We support the next phase of the International Advisory Panel on Biodiversity Credits by each committing seed funding to unlock philanthropic finance and sustainable nature-positive outcomes.

    Defence And Security

    The return of conventional warfighting at scale in Europe, combined with hostile state actors, hybrid warfare and disinformation, requires a new, whole of society and government approach. As Europe’s two nuclear powers and leading militaries, we share responsibility for the continent’s defence and security. We are united in the face of profound security threats and challenges, in particular the immediate and pressing threat posed by Russia to Euro-Atlantic security.

    Today we announced Lancaster House 2.0 to modernise our cooperation. Through this we agree to deepen and broaden our unique defence and security partnership enshrined in the 2010 Lancaster House Treaties, a core pillar of security in Europe, complementing our cooperation in NATO and reinforcing Europe’s contribution to it, as well as the UK-EU Security and Defence Partnership.

    Deepening our longstanding and resolute commitment to cooperation of our independent nuclear deterrents, we have agreed to set out, in a specific statement, our contribution to the defence of European partners and NATO allies, and that whilst our nuclear forces are independent, they can be coordinated. We have decided to establish a UK-France Nuclear Steering Group that will coordinate policy, capability and operation.

    We will launch the Combined Joint Force, to build a shared capability of sufficient scale for warfighting, and ready to operate in all domains, including space and cyber, in the defence of Europe. This evolution of the existing Combined Joint Expeditionary Force will continue to be at the forefront of Coalition of the Willing planning. We have also agreed the path for new military capability projects, including the next generation of our Deep Strike and Air-to-Air missiles.

    We will deepen our cooperation on cyber issues, tackling the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial hacking capabilities. We will address emerging threats, including in the hybrid domain, whilst harnessing the transformative potential of Artificial Intelligence and emerging technologies. We will maximise our impact against the highest-threat terrorist groups including deepening our counter-terrorism cooperation in Syria.

    We are committed to redoubling our collaboration to ensure the Euro-Atlantic security architecture remains fit for purpose, with European allies both shouldering their existing obligations and fully involved in shaping any new arrangements. We will intensify our cooperation with Germany and other partners to this end.

    Irregular Migration

    The cruelty of organised gangs who smuggle individuals across the Channel at great risk to life blights both our societies. Today, we announce a strengthening of our cooperation to tackle illegal Channel crossings, focused on reducing the risk to life at sea, breaking the criminal gang networks through law enforcement cooperation, and working upstream to tackle the root causes and smuggling networks.

    We continue to work together on novel and innovative approaches to intercept boats, exemplified by the ongoing French Maritime Review supporting enhanced Maritime co-operation, to ensure we adapt as the criminal gangs change their approach. We seek to use all the tools at our disposal, including both existing and new sanctions, to tackle people smuggling, trafficking, and organised immigration crime. In parallel, the United Kingdom is intensifying its efforts to reform its domestic asylum system, deliver on increasing returns and tackle illegal working.

    France and the UK have agreed to trial a pilot to deter illegal journeys across Europe to the UK and dangerous small boat crossings while saving lives, as an innovative approach to break the business model of organised gangs. It will provide for the readmission of migrants directly to France after an illegal journey by small boat to the United Kingdom and will also offer a reciprocal legal route to the UK for migrants in France, with a principle of equivalence between the number of readmissions to France and the number of legal admissions to the UK. The agreement will be finalised and signed subject to completing prior legal scrutiny in full transparency and understanding with the Commission and EU Member states as this initiative is related to an EU external border, and implemented within a few weeks, subject to the above processes, with real-time monitoring. We are pursuing an ambitious approach that complements wider European cooperation on irregular migration, including working together to prevent irregular Channel crossings within the Common Understanding agreed at the UK-EU Summit on 19 May.

    In this context, building on the Sandhurst Agreement, the United Kingdom reaffirms its commitment to fund Maritime action, increased law enforcement response onshore and inland, alongside new joint upstream working to tackle the issue at source and in transit, through the existing financial agreement through to March 2026, and through the finalisation of a new three year cycle (2026-2029) as soon as possible.

    Growth

    We will ensure continued cooperation and leadership on economic sectors of the future, leading to more growth, skills, and high-quality jobs for our people. This collaboration will make us stronger, remove barriers, and boost our collective resilience and cooperation on economic security, including on critical minerals. We will lead Europe on safely harnessing AI to the benefit of our people and economies, partnering our supercomputers and incubators, and combining the forces of our world-leading universities and research.

    We are committed to protecting our Critical National Infrastructure that underpins our thriving economies. Satellite connectivity is strategically important to Europe’s security and resilience and the UK’s investment in the Eutelsat Group is a demonstration of our commitment to this important technology, alongside the French Government and other existing shareholders. The UK will thus join, prorated to its current stake, the capital increase led by the French State and other existing shareholders of Eutelsat announced on June 19 – taking the total amount of capital raised to €1.5 billion. In the context of European Space Projects, we welcome UK suppliers bidding for supply chain commercial contracts when conditions are met. We will also work towards a resilient terrestrial alternative to Global Navigation Satellite Systems.

    Together, we will lead the way for Europe’s transition to net zero, creating the green jobs of the future and securing affordable energy supplies for our people. Today we reassert our resolve to diversify civil nuclear supply chains from Russia, upskill our nuclear workforces, and manage a responsible nuclear legacy. We welcome the confirmation by EDF of a 12.5% stake in Sizewell C post Financial Close and the proposed issuance of a €6 billion/£5 billion debt guarantee facility to Sizewell C from Bpifrance Assurance export.

    Today, we have agreed that our regulators will move forward in assessing interconnection projects under proportionately-agreed cost and revenue sharing arrangements between beneficiaries, aiming at delivering 1GW further interconnection by 2035. The delivery of further interconnection will be considered in line with national strategic plans. We will continue to work together on key technologies, including offshore wind, carbon capture, usage and storage, and hydrogen.

    We agree to deepen our collaboration on transport, particularly across the Channel, seeking ways to support decarbonisation, protect maritime workers’ pay and conditions, and support growth in the international rail sector. We also welcome the newly-adopted full bilateral framework on the Channel Tunnel, supporting the continued flow of passengers and goods.

    People-to-People

    We are delighted to announce an exceptional cultural partnership with the unprecedented loan of the Bayeux Tapestry to the UK, for an exhibition in the British Museum between September 2026 and July 2027, and the loan of the Sutton Hoo Treasures among other masterpieces from the British Museum, for exhibitions in the Museums of Rouen and Caen, recalling the deep historical ties between our two countries. This exchange will feature as part of the 2027 European Year of the Normans which will celebrate the millennium of William the Conqueror, through cooperation, cultural and educational activities that will recall the strength of our links, past, present, and future. We will celebrate artistic, educational, and community-driven activity through events and initiatives that will support our creative industries. We will also work together to celebrate the 2027 Grand Départ of the Tour de France from the UK.

    We welcome the decision by the French government to facilitate the recognition by local authorities of UK blue badges throughout France for disabled drivers. We will expand connections between UK and French schools, supported by an extension of the arrangements we have made to facilitate school trips in both directions. We will maintain our working relationships on the introduction of the Schengen Entry/Exit System (EES) within the agreed EU framework and timetable to assure security and fluidity across our common border crossing points. Finally, we welcome further constructive exchanges between our Parliaments.

    Updates to this page

    Published 10 July 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: 10 July 2025 Statement Fourth meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) Emergency Committee regarding the upsurge of mpox 2024

    Source: World Health Organisation

    The Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO) is hereby transmitting the report of the fourth meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR) Emergency Committee (Committee) regarding the upsurge of mpox 2024, held on Thursday, 5 June 2025, from 12:00 to 17:00 CEST.

    Concurring with the advice unanimously expressed by the Committee during the meeting, the WHO Director-General determined that the upsurge of mpox 2024 continues to meet the criteria of a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) and, accordingly, on 9 June 2025, issued temporary recommendations to States Parties, available here.  

    The WHO Director-General expresses his most sincere gratitude to the Chair, Members, and Advisors of the Committee.

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    Proceedings of the meeting

    Sixteen (16) Members of, and two Advisors to, the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR) Emergency Committee (Committee) were convened by teleconference, via Zoom, on Thursday, 5 June 2025, from 12:00 to 17:00 CEST. Fourteen (14) of the 16 Committee Members, and the two Advisors to the Committee participated in the meeting.

    The Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO) joined in person and welcomed the participants, including Government Officials designated to present their views to the Committee on behalf of the two invited States Parties – Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The opening remarks by the Director-General are available here.

    The Representative of the Office of Legal Counsel then briefed the Members and Advisors on their roles and responsibilities and identified the mandate of the Committee under the relevant articles of the IHR. The Ethics Officer from the Department of Compliance, Risk Management, and Ethics provided the Members and Advisors with an overview of the WHO Declaration of Interests process. The Members and Advisors were made aware of their individual responsibility to disclose to WHO, in a timely manner, any interests of a personal, professional, financial, intellectual or commercial nature that may give rise to a perceived or actual conflict of interest. They were additionally reminded of their duty to maintain the confidentiality of the meeting discussions and the work of the Committee. Each Member and Advisor was surveyed, with no conflicts of interest identified.

    The meeting was handed over to the Chair who introduced the objectives of the meeting, which were to provide views to the WHO Director-General on whether the event continues to constitute a PHEIC, and if so, to provide views on the potential proposed temporary recommendations.

    Session open to representatives of States Parties invited to present their views

    The WHO Secretariat presented an overview of the global epidemiological situation of mpox, including all circulating clades of monkeypox virus (MPXV). Over the past 12 months, the majority of mpox cases have continued to be reported from the African continent, largely driven by outbreaks of MPXV clade Ib in East African countries, including the DRC, where clade Ia is co-circulating. Sierra Leone however is experiencing a rapidly evolving outbreak, which based on available genomic sequencing results, appears to be driven by MPXV clade IIb. Outside of the African region, there continues to be a steady report of monthly cases (between about 500 – 1000 monthly), from all regions, mostly reflecting ongoing circulation of MPXV clade IIb among men who have sex with men (MSM).

    In the DRC, while surveillance- and access to healthcare-related challenges persist, particularly in the eastern part of the country, trends in most Provinces where MPXV clade Ib is circulating, including those of North Kivu and South Kivu, are now appearing to stabilize or decline. Similar trends are also observed in areas endemic for MPXV clade Ia. In the capital Kinshasa, where the upsurge is driven by a co-circulation of MPXV clades Ia and Ib, the disease appears to be clustered geographically and in specific demographic groups, with incidence disproportionately higher among young adults, reflecting dynamics of transmission sustained by sexual networks in key areas of the city.

    In Burundi, a steady decline in incidence of mpox cases has been observed since late 2024. Initially concentrated in and around Bujumbura and later spreading to the administrative capital Gitega, with at its peak cases reported in most districts, the upsurge appears to now be concentrated only in a few hotspots.

    In Uganda, although national trends indicate a decrease in mpox cases since mid-February 2025, including a clear downward trend in the capital Kampala, limitations in testing capacity warrant cautious interpretation. Clusters are concentrated in urban settings, with transmission primarily among young adults, consistent with sexual contact transmission dynamics.

    In Kenya, although the number of mpox cases remains low, recent data suggest an upward trend. Surveillance is likely underestimating the actual incidence of mpox cases. Transmission has been associated with mobile populations, including truck drivers and sex workers.

    Sierra Leone has recently faced a significant upsurge of MPXV clade IIb, with a peak reproduction number in the capital Freetown, exceeding that observed in the past in Kinshasa, DRC, or Kampala, Uganda. Over the past three weeks, the number of observed mpox cases has been declining, possibly due to a combination of, increased natural immunity in high-risk groups and public health interventions. Transmission remains concentrated in urban areas and among young adults, likely to be associated with sexual contact.

    Travel-associated cases are declining but remain a concern. Notably, recent diagnoses of MPXV clade Ib infection in Australia – linked to exposure in Thailand – highlight the risk of undetected transmission in countries or areas with underperforming surveillance. The majority of secondary transmission resulting from imported mpox cases occurs through close, intimate, or sexual contact.

    MPXV clade Ia continues to show higher mortality, especially in children the DRC with a case fatality rate of 2-3%, although data should be interpreted considering, inter alia, the limitation of syndromic surveillance. Across all clades, individuals with underlying immunosuppression, particularly those with HIV infection, remain at greatest risk of severe outcomes and death. The overall case fatality rate for MPXV clade Ib and clade IIb remains around 0.5%.

    The WHO Secretariat presented the assessed risk by MPXV clades and further expressed in terms of overall public health risk where any given clade/s is/are circulating, as: Clade Ib – high public health risk in the DRC and neighbouring countries; Clade Ia – moderate public health risk in the DRC; Clade II – moderate public health risk in Nigeria and countries of West and Central Africa where mpox is endemic; and clade IIb – moderate public health risk globally. It was noted that the above risk assessment corresponds to the one presented during the third meeting of the Committee on 25 February 2025.

    The WHO Secretariat subsequently underscored progress in mpox control efforts, attributing gains to partnerships among national governments, communities, and WHO. However, these are now at risk due to a worsening funding shortfall, not only for the response but for global health programs that support mpox prevention and control activities.

    An updated WHO Mpox Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan (SPRP, available here), covering the period May-August 2025 and integrating lessons from operational reviews conducted in early 2025, was issued in April 2025. While the strategy remains fit for purpose, the funding environment has deteriorated. Despite a $145 million funding requirement to support all partners involved in mpox response efforts, including $47 million for WHO, the Organization has received no new financial commitments since the issuance of the new SPRP, and resource constraints now threaten the sustainability of operations – personnel levels have dropped, and essential supplies, including vaccines, cannot be deployed efficiently.

    WHO has issued updated clinical care and infection prevention and control (IPC) guidance, emphasizing the importance of integrating mpox-related interventions into broader health programs and health services delivery. However, the effective implementation of the guidance remains limited by logistical and financial barriers, and its application at local level requires intensified support. Community-centered care strategies, such as home-based care with IPC integration and linkage to primary care, have been endorsed to alleviate pressure on health facilities.

    Seven countries have initiated mpox vaccination (Central African Republic, DRC, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Uganda), with four additional countries (Angola, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, and South Africa) poised to begin. Vaccine supply exists with 2.9 million vaccine doses in countries, but resource limitations hamper distribution and administration, with only approximately 724,000 doses administered to date. Strengthened coordination is essential to ensure equitable and timely delivery to high-risk populations.

    While recent progress in controlling and responding to the spread of mpox are encouraging, sustainability hinges on urgent and sustained resource mobilization, greater integration within health systems, and continued prioritization of community engagement. Without this, current gains risk being reversed.

    Representatives of Burundi and the DRC updated the Committee on the mpox epidemiological situation in their countries and their current control and response efforts, needs and challenges, and plans in the medium term.

    In Burundi, since the mpox upsurge started in July 2024, cumulatively, approximately 4,000 confirmed cases of mpox, including one death, were observed. The number of cases has been subsiding and, as of 25 May 2025, mpox cases are occurring in 9 districts, including two hotspots. The response in Burundi is focusing on rapid response to alerts and contract tracing. Among the challenges in responding to mpox are insufficient resources to provide food for cases, lack of clean water in some of the hotspots, and the absence of a functional multisectoral One Health platform.

    In the DRC, the number of mpox cases is plateauing, with a significant decrease in positivity rate, further corroborating the declining trends. Outside areas considered to be endemic, adults account for the majority of cases, with sexual contact being the most frequent mode of transmission. Overall, as a result of contact tracing activities, 83,000 contacts were identified, with a median of 5 contacts per case. More than two million mpox vaccine doses were received, with approximately 600,000 people vaccinated to date. Efforts are ongoing to make triage more efficient and effective, and improve diagnostics for mpox, including transport of samples from the affected communities. National authorities have developed a plan to intensify the response to the mpox outbreak, focusing on surveillance, contact tracing, risk communication, and vaccination. However, the funding gap is again impacting response activities, particularly in remote areas.

    Members of, and Advisors to, the Committee then engaged in questions and answers with the presenters from States Parties and the WHO Secretariat, revolving around the issues and challenges enumerated below.

    Global epidemiology, clade distribution, and risk assessment – The global epidemiological risk has remained largely unchanged since the Committee last met on 25 February 2025. However, 17 countries in Africa are currently reporting mpox outbreaks (i.e. one case or more in the last six weeks). MPXV clade Ib continues to spread in high-risk groups and has been newly detected in countries including Ethiopia, Malawi, South Sudan, and Zambia. Sierra Leone is experiencing a distinct outbreak, likely due to MPXV clade IIb according to initial evidence. This outbreak poses a specific local and regional risk and is a reminder of the ongoing risk of mpox outbreaks in specific contexts. The Committee asked about progress made towards the elimination of mpox in the WHO European Region. In that respect, the WHO Secretariat indicated that MPXV clade IIb continues to circulate at low levels, predominantly among MSM. Despite the reduced number of cases, elimination has not been achieved, with persistent transmission linked to gaps in immunity, behavioral risk factors, and communication barriers. Given the patterns of international travel, the risk of reintroduction in the WHO European Region persists.

    Surveillance, laboratory testing, and confidence in data – On the specific question of confidence in trends in the DRC, while there remain many specific challenges to surveillance, stable or decreasing trends observed in syndromic surveillance, epidemiological case-based surveillance and laboratory-based surveillance, coupled with decreases in test positivity, bring some confidence in the robustness of the assessment. Caution is warranted particularly when interpreting current trends in some areas of the Eastern Provinces of the DRC where access remains constrained, although, overall, Eastern DRC had been seeing a sustained decline in reported cases before the more recent security constraints. Concerns were expressed about the possibility of undetected transmission of MPXV in West Africa, including in Ghana and Togo in relation to MPXV clade Ib, as well as in Sierra Leone, in relation to MPXV clade IIb, despite of the declining trajectory of the number of cases after it peaked in early 2025. Concerns were also expressed regarding the need for enhanced genomic sequencing capacity. Burundi was commended for its strong surveillance performance, including its high testing rate and contact follow-up capacity. National laboratory diagnostic approaches generally report adhering to WHO protocols. However, in Sierra Leone, due to the burden of response activities, only 2% of samples positive for MPXV infection (prior to early May 2025) underwent genomic sequencing.he WHO Secretariat continues to support countries experiencing upsurges of mpox cases by providing technical assistance, including facilitating shipment of specimens to national or international laboratories.

    Patterns of transmission – The Committee highlighted that, unlike in most other areas experiencing the MPXV clade Ib outbreaks, an increased number of paediatric mpox cases is observed in the Provinces of North and South Kivu, DRC. While detailed epidemiological data are limited, this age pattern could potentially be explained, inter alia, by the build-up of immunity among adults following sexual exposure, leading to infections due to non-sexual exposure withing households. There have been anecdotical reports of exposure in paediatric healthcare facilities. It was noted that outbreaks of mpox have not otherwise been reported in educational or other settings where children are congregating.

    Contact tracing – Approaches to contact tracing differ across countries. In some settings the absence of systematic tracing and access to diagnostics reduces the effectiveness of overall control actions. The need to optimize public health resource allocation was underscored. This would entail reassessing the feasibility of traditional contact tracing in certain settings, as well as the use of mpox vaccine among identified contacts to reduce secondary transmission.

    Vaccination – As of June 2025, approximately 2.9 million mpox vaccine doses have been distributed across the African continent, the majority to the DRC, which has received about 2.5 million doses. Of these, approximately 600,000 doses have been administered. The remaining 1.9 million doses comprise 1.5 million LC16m8 vaccine doses donated by Japan (not yet deployed as training of health workers is underway) and 367,000 MVA-BN doses. A further 349,000 doses secured by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) remain undeployed due to funding shortages. An additional 219,000 MVA-BN doses have been pledged by the Government of the United States of America, pending approval for deployment. Strategies for the use of mpox vaccine have evolved in response to supply constraints and emerging epidemiological trends. In the DRC, since February 2025, approximately105,000 doses have been administered to children under 12 and approximately 56,000 doses to adolescents aged 12 to 18. Additional groups targeted by vaccination efforts in the DRC include healthcare workers, individuals at risk of severe disease – such as people living with HIV – and, in more recent phases, key populations in transmission hotspots, including sex workers, and MSM. In Sierra Leone, the vaccination strategy was initially focused on healthcare and frontline workers and people living with HIV. The focus of vaccination efforts then shifted to hotspots and contacts, sex workers, and MSM within those hotspots. Initially, most countries began with a two-dose regimen; however, the majority have now transitioned to a single-dose approach or are preparing to shift toward intradermal fractional dosing. These dose-sparing strategies were endorsed in the WHO position paper, if vaccine resources were limited, published on 23 August 2024, available here.[1] It was noted that intradermal fractional dosing, where each vial can yield four to five doses, is applicable only to the MVA-BN vaccine and has already been employed in some settings. Overall, the uptake of available vaccines has remained lower than anticipated due to logistical, operational, and financial barriers. Further efforts are needed to optimize the strategic use of available mpox vaccine and maximize its public health impact.

    Mpox and HIV infections and integration of health services – Coinfection with HIV presents significant challenges for health services in the management of mpox, especially in countries with high HIV prevalence. In Kinshasa, DRC, 9.3% of mpox cases are reported to be HIV-positive, though this figure likely underrepresents the true burden due to limited HIV testing and integration of health services. In Uganda, 55% of deaths associated with MPXV infection have occurred among people living with HIV. The importance of co-located testing services and data systems was underscored to capture the dual burden of HIV and mpox more effectively. Reference to WHO technical guidance was made in relation to the use of rapid tests for HIV diagnosis, immediate linkage to care for those who test positive, and protocols for clinical management of coinfected individuals. The needs for improving triage systems and refining clinical diagnostic criteria for mpox were highlighted, with emphasis on the misclassification of dermatological conditions, such as chickenpox. Overall, the integration of health care delivery remains uneven across countries.

    Funding – Funding gaps remain one of the most critical threats to the mpox response. It was noted that, since the launch of the updated SPRP in April 2025, WHO has not received any additional earmarked contributions, resulting in the scaling back of operations, including surveillance, laboratory support, community outreach, and vaccine-related logistics. Serious concerns were expressed regarding the sustainability of key control interventions, including HIV-related, the interruption of which could lead to the intensification of transmission and, hence, limit the ability of public health systems to adapt and respond to changing transmission patterns. However, it was emphasized that lessons should be learned from the experience of Burundi that, despite operating with limited resources, has made substantial progress in controlling the upsurge of mpox, thanks largely to non-pharmaceutical interventions – a combination of sensitive surveillance, effective contact tracing, strong laboratory testing capacity, and decentralized district-level interventions leveraging on community engagement.

    Anticipated scenarios for controlling and responding to mpox – The Committee expressed concerns about the current epidemiological trajectory suggesting that mpox may be moving toward endemicity in some countries, or areas thereof, in the African continent. Although some countries are seeing sustained declining trends, MPXV transmission persists. This is consistent with preliminary modelling work suggesting that the actual case counts may be higher than reported due to diagnostic and surveillance gaps. Such scenario raises concern in terms of future interspersed surges of cases in countries in the African continent, as well as exportation of cases within and beyond the continent. Therefore, the observed epidemiological evolution of mpox since the public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) was determined in August 2024, requires the development of adequate definitions to describe the pattern of mpox transmission experienced by countries, or areas thereof, and, consequently, assist in setting the goals for control, and guide control and response interventions accordingly. 

    Deliberative session

    Following the session open to invited States Parties, the Committee reconvened in a closed session to examine the questions in relation to whether the event constitutes a PHEIC or not, and if so, to consider the temporary recommendations drafted by the WHO Secretariat in accordance with IHR provisions.

    The Chair reminded the Committee Members of their mandate and recalled that a PHEIC is defined in the IHR as an “extraordinary event, which constitutes a public health risk to other States through the international spread of disease, and potentially requires a coordinated international response”.

    The Committee was unanimous in expressing the views that the ongoing upsurge of mpox still meets the criteria of a PHEIC and that the Director-General be advised accordingly.

    The overarching considerations underpinning the advice of the Committee are determined by (a) challenges in accurately describing the multi-faceted epidemiological patterns and profiles associated with multiple circulating MPXV clades, observed and markedly differing from historical experience with the disease; (b) uncertainties related to funding availability in the immediate and medium term, both, domestically and internationally; and (c) the subsequent challenges in defining public health strategic approaches for controlling and responding to the spread of mpox.

    On that basis, the Committee considered that:

    The event is “extraordinary” because of (i) the emergence and spread of MPXV clade 1b has introduced new uncertainties regarding virus evolution, and the current and foreseeable dynamics of mpox spread; (ii) the establishment of sustained community transmission of MPXV clade I in additional countries in the African continent, without a full appreciation of the factors driving the rapid evolution of the surge of mpox cases; (iii) the disproportionate burden of mpox cases among children, especially in the Eastern Provinces of the DRC, with not yet fully explained dynamics of transmission; and (iv) the persistent challenges integrating health service delivery to mpox patients, due to the likelihood of comorbidities and heightened vulnerability.

    The event “constitutes a public health risk to other States through the international spread of disease” because of (i) sub-optimal surveillance systems in many countries and regions, likely leading to undetected transmission and subsequent spread of MPXV clade I into additional countries in the African continent. Such consideration applies to both countries in West Africa, where MPXV clade I had not previously been identified, but are experiencing significant population movement with central and east African countries where that virus is spreading, as well as to countries outside the African continent (e.g. exported case of MPXV clade Ib infection from Thailand to Australia); and (ii) the continuous exportation of MPXV clade I mpox cases from Africa to other continents, some of which resulting in secondary transmission.

    The event “requires a coordinated international response” because (i) there is a need for concerted efforts by the international community to supplement domestic funding for mpox control and response activities, as well as those of United Agencies, other international institutions and partnerships operational in the field and/or involved in vaccine procurement and related logistics; (ii) access to vaccine, even when available, remains challenging in terms of delivery capacity at the local level; (iii) in the context of limited funding, there is a need to facilitate the exchange of experience between countries, in particular those of countries like Burundi, that despite operating with limited resources, has made substantial progress in controlling the upsurge of mpox through the implementation of non-pharmaceutical interventions; and (iv) there is a need to monitor the spread and phylogenetic evolution of MPXV clades through genetic sequencing, not always available or optimally performing, in countries experiencing upsurges of mpox.

    The Committee subsequently considered the draft of the temporary recommendations proposed by the WHO Secretariat.

    Anticipating the possibility that the WHO Director-General may determine that the event continues to constitute a PHEIC, the Committee had received a proposed set of revised temporary recommendations ahead of the meeting. This reflected the proposal to extend most of the temporary recommendations issued on 27 February 2025. While acknowledging that the standing recommendations for mpox are approaching their expiration (20 August 2025) and could potentially benefit from extension or revision, the Committee reiterated the relevance of the proposed temporary recommendations. However, the Committee emphasized the needs (i) to prioritize temporary recommendations related to non-pharmaceutical interventions, taking into account implementation challenges and successful experiences on the ground; and (ii) to anchor vaccine deployment in evidence-based approaches.

    Conclusions

    Considering the complexity of the epidemiological evolution of the spread of mpox, of the distribution of the MPXV clades, the challenges in implementing efficient and effective control and response interventions, as well as issues raised by the Committee in occasion of their previous meetings, the Committee welcomed the proposal by the WHO Secretariat to hold an informal technical meeting aimed at assisting countries to prioritise response measures adapted to the varied epidemiological contexts, ahead of its next formal meeting should the WHO Director-General determine that the event continues to constitute a PHEIC.

    The Committee agreed to provide its feedback to the WHO Secretariat on the proposed set of temporary recommendations the day after the meeting (i.e. 6 June 2025), and to finalize the report of the meeting during the week of 9 June 2025.

    The Acting Director of the Department of Epidemic and Pandemic Threat Management at WHO headquarters, on behalf of the WHO Deputy Director-General, expressed her gratitude to the Committee’s Officers, its Members and Advisors and closed the meeting.


    References: 

    [1] On 6 June 2025, after the fourth meeting of the Committee, WHO published the Meeting of the Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization (SAGE), 10-13 March 2025, including a section on mpox vaccine. The report is available here.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) road engineers and transport experts conduct working field visit to Dakar-Diamniadio-Thies highway & Dakar Ter

    Source: APO

    The ECOWAS Commission, as part of the final technical review workshop for the Praia-Dakar-Abidjan Corridor Technical Studies, conducted Regional Road Engineers and Transport Experts drawn from ECOWAS Member States to a day’s field visit to the financing, operations and maintenance of major road and rail infrastructure projects in Senegal on the 28th of June,2025.

    The visits to “Train Express Régional” TER Dakar Railway Service, and the Dakar-Diamniadio-Thies Highway forms part of efforts by the ECOWAS Commission to tap on home-grown expertise and solutions as it works with Member States to implement major regional corridor highway and railway projects. It also to ensure a critical mass of like-minded professionals to support the uniform development of Transport Infrastructure in the region, through experience sharing from regional models in infrastructure financing and operations as successfully implemented by the Senegalese Government.

    The 36km TER Dakar urban railway service has 13 stations with 15 dual-mode 4-car trains has gradually become a key complementary mode for peri-urban commuters from urban settlements around Dakar for their daily trips. Experts boarded the train for firsthand experience of the service and discussed key areas in operations, signalization, scheduling, maintenance and deliberate policies to encourage local skill and capacity development in rail operations railway services. Other areas visited were the railway operations room, maintenance center, terminals and related facilities. Experiences gathered also covered design of systems, revenue collection and management and general operations of modern urban railway service.

    Participants also visited the Dakar-Diamniadio concession highway, and the Diamniadio-Thies Highways which presents similar design and operational specifications for the key regional supra-national corridor highways such as the Dakar-Abidjan and Abidjan-Lagos Corridor Highways. The visit covered sections of the Highway, toll stations and traffic monitoring centers and the offices of the Concessionaires. Discussions centered on design principles, elements and financing models. Valuable lessons were learnt on local expertise development, traffic surveillance, operations of the Highway, road safety, tolling and revenue management. Particular notice was made of the predominance of local experts, local content and the use of home-grown project finance arrangements, using Public-Private financing options.

    These major infrastructure projects highlighted the potential of regional, the home-grown initiatives adopted to address the financing gap in infrastructure development and the local expertise development to sustain operations. The railway service and highways connecting the city of Dakar and inland destinations provide very options for urban mobility, job opportunities for the youth and contribute immensely to economic development.

    The visits formed part of the validation workshop of the Praia-Dakar-Abidjan Projects Corridor and presented several hands-on experiences to be considered for major regional transport infrastructure projects, as well as similar national peri-urban mass transportation initiatives.

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

    Media files

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    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Boost for British consumers and Developing Countries

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    Press release

    Boost for British consumers and Developing Countries

    Boost for British consumers and Developing Countries as UK launches new trade measures

    • New measures will make it easier for developing countries to trade, supporting jobs and economic growth in the UK overseas. 

    • UK businesses and consumers to benefit from more competitively priced imports as part of upgrades to the Developing Countries Trading Scheme. 

    • Part of the UK’s Plan for Change and recently launched Trade Strategy to grow trade with markets of the future, strengthen global partnerships and deliver for British households. 

    British consumers and businesses are set to benefit from a package of new trade measures unveiled today (10 July), which will simplify imports from developing countries — helping to lower prices on everyday goods while supporting jobs and growth in some of the world’s poorest nations.

    The measures will give UK consumers greater access to competitively priced imports — from clothes to food and electronics — as upgrades to the Developing Countries Trading Scheme (DCTS) make it easier for businesses to trade with the UK, helping to lower prices on the high street.

    Upgrades include simplified rules of origin, enabling more goods from countries like Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines to enter the UK tariff-free — even when using components from across Asia and Africa. They also ensure countries such as Bangladesh and Cambodia continue to benefit with zero tariffs on products like garments and electronics.

    This will open up new commercial opportunities for UK businesses to build resilient supply chains, invest in emerging markets, and tap into fast-growing economies.

    Ministers briefed British business leaders and Ambassadors from around the world on the changes at a joint Department for Business and Trade (DBT) and Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) reception in London today.

    Minister for International Development Jenny Chapman, said: 

    The world is changing. Countries in the Global South want a different relationship with the UK as a trading partner and investor, not as a donor.

    These new rules will make it easier for developing countries to trade more closely with the UK. This is good for their economies and for UK consumers and businesses.

    Minister for Trade Policy Douglas Alexander, said: 

    No country has ever lifted itself out of poverty without trading with its neighbours.

    Over recent decades trade has been an essential ingredient in lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty around the globe.

    The DCTS allows some of the world’s poorest countries to export to the UK duty and quota-free, with over £16 billion in UK imports benefiting from tariff savings since its launch in June 2023.

    In addition to the DCTS changes, the UK will:

    • offer targeted support to help exporters in developing countries access the UK market and meet import standards; and
    • make it easier for partner countries to trade services — such as digital, legal, and financial services — by strengthening future trade agreements. This will create new opportunities for UK businesses to collaborate and invest in fast-growing sectors. 

    The reforms will support trade with emerging markets in Asia and Africa, strengthening the UK’s global partnerships, with major retailers such as M&S and Primark expected to benefit.  

    Director of Sourcing, Marks & Spencer PLC, Monique Leeuwenburgh said:

    We are supportive of changes to the DCTS rules of origin for garments.

    The ongoing collaboration between the government and retail industry has provided clarity and certainty for businesses in good time.

    This change will enable us to maintain our long-standing and trusted relationships with our key partners in Bangladesh, to deliver the same great quality Clothing & Home products at great value for our customers.

    Interim Chief Executive at Primark, Eoin Tonge said:

    We welcome the changes to the DCTS rules of origin for garments which remove the potential cliff edge when a country graduates from Least Developed Country status.

    This will help us to maintain our existing supply chain strategy in our key sourcing markets in Asia, such as Bangladesh and Cambodia.

    We welcome the opportunity to collaborate with the government on these changes and their responsiveness to the concerns of UK retailers in this very technical area of trade policy.

    Adam Mansell, CEO, The UK Fashion & Textiles Association said said:

    UKFT welcomes these additional changes to the Rules of Origin under the DCTS, which will bring real benefits to the fashion industry in the UK and in DCTS countries.

    The new rules demonstrate a genuine commitment from the government to modernise trade policy to support global economic growth.

    At a time of such uncertainty in international trade, these reforms are especially welcome.

    Yohan Lawrence, Secretary General of the Joint Apparel Association Forum (JAAF), Sri Lanka, said:

    We warmly welcome the UK’s Trade Strategy.

    The new rules allowing greater regional sourcing for garments while retaining duty-free access to the UK are a game-changer.

    With the UK as our second-largest apparel market, this will boost exports, support livelihoods, and help us compete more fairly with global competitors.

    The updated rules are part of the UK’s wider Trade for Development offer which aims to support economic growth in partner countries while helping UK businesses and consumers access high-quality, affordable goods. 

    And just last month, the UK’s Trade Strategy was published in further support of the Plan for Change to grow the economy, strengthen international ties, and deliver for households across the UK. 

    Notes to editors: 

    • Launched in 2023, following the UK’s exit from the EU, the Developing Countries Trading Scheme (DCTS) is the UK’s flagship trade preference scheme, covering 65 countries and offering reduced or zero tariffs on thousands of products. 

    • The UK is committed to growing services trade with developing countries, supporting digital trade and professional services. 

    • The announcement follows engagement with UK businesses and international partners, major importers and trade associations.

    Updates to this page

    Published 10 July 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Russia: China ready to deepen cooperation with Egypt within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative – Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China /more details/

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    CAIRO, July 10 (Xinhua) — China is willing to strengthen cooperation with Egypt under the Belt and Road Initiative in areas including economy, trade, finance, manufacturing, new energy, science and technology, and cultural and humanitarian exchanges, Chinese Premier Li Qiang said in Cairo on Thursday.

    As Li Qiang indicated during his meeting with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, China is ready to encourage more competitive Chinese companies to invest in the Egyptian economy.

    Li Qiang conveyed cordial greetings from Chinese President Xi Jinping to A.F. al-Sisi, saying that under the strategic guidance of the two heads of state, China-Egypt relations have been developing rapidly in recent years.

    According to the Premier of the State Council, the Chinese side hopes to work with Egypt to take advantage of the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries to develop traditional friendship, strengthen political mutual trust and continue to firmly support each other on issues affecting mutual core interests.

    China, Li Qiang continued, is willing to work with Egypt to continuously enrich the China-Egypt comprehensive strategic partnership, promote new achievements of bilateral cooperation in various fields, and consistently move towards the goal of building a China-Egypt community with a shared future in the new era.

    According to Li Qiang, today’s international situation is characterized by growing turbulence and worsening chaos, in particular, this concerns protracted and intractable conflicts in West Asia and North Africa.

    The head of the Chinese government stressed that China is ready to maintain close communication with Egypt and facilitate a speedy end to hostilities in the Gaza Strip.

    The Chinese side is also willing to work with Egypt to help alleviate the humanitarian crisis, prevent the spread and escalation of the conflict, and make unremitting efforts for a comprehensive, fair and lasting settlement of the Palestinian issue, Li Qiang noted.

    He said China hopes to strengthen communication and coordination with Egypt in multilateral forums including the UN, BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to implement genuine multilateralism.

    Li Qiang added that China is willing to work with Egypt to promote the building of an equal and orderly multipolar world and an inclusive economic globalization that benefits everyone, and promote the sustainable and long-term development of China-Arab and China-Africa cooperation.

    A.F. al-Sisi asked Li Qiang to convey his sincere greetings and good wishes to Xi Jinping, pointing out that under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, China has achieved remarkable achievements in socio-economic development.

    China is a sincere friend of Egypt, and since the establishment of diplomatic relations, bilateral ties have consistently developed in a stable and successful manner, the Egyptian leader stated.

    In recent years, he particularly noted, Egypt and China, through joint efforts, have established a comprehensive strategic partnership, as a result of which bilateral ties have reached the highest level in history.

    A.F. al-Sisi assured that Egypt firmly adheres to the one-China principle and is ready to maintain close high-level exchanges with China, advance the joint construction of the Belt and Road, and deepen cooperation in areas such as economy, trade, investment, new energy, infrastructure and tourism.

    According to him, Egypt welcomes the entry of more Chinese enterprises into the Egyptian market and is ready to create favorable conditions for this.

    A.F. al-Sisi added that his country supports a number of global initiatives put forward by Xi Jinping and is willing to strengthen multilateral cooperation with China to promote peace and development around the world. –0–

    Please note: This information is raw content obtained directly from the source of the information. It is an accurate report of what the source claims and does not necessarily reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    .

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: China Ready to Deepen Cooperation with Egypt under Belt and Road Initiative – Premier of State Council of China

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    CAIRO, July 10 (Xinhua) — China is willing to strengthen cooperation with Egypt under the Belt and Road Initiative in areas including economy, trade, finance, manufacturing, new energy, science and technology, and cultural and humanitarian exchanges, Chinese Premier Li Qiang said in Cairo on Thursday.

    As Li Qiang indicated during his meeting with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, China is ready to encourage more competitive Chinese companies to invest in the Egyptian economy.

    Li Qiang conveyed cordial greetings from Chinese President Xi Jinping to A.F. al-Sisi, saying that under the strategic guidance of the two heads of state, China-Egypt relations have been developing rapidly in recent years.

    According to the Premier of the State Council, the Chinese side hopes to work with Egypt to take advantage of the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries to develop traditional friendship, strengthen political mutual trust and continue to firmly support each other on issues affecting mutual core interests.

    China, Li Qiang continued, is willing to work with Egypt to continuously enrich the China-Egypt comprehensive strategic partnership, promote new achievements of bilateral cooperation in various fields, and consistently move towards the goal of building a China-Egypt community with a shared future in the new era.

    According to Li Qiang, today’s international situation is characterized by growing turbulence and worsening chaos, in particular, this concerns protracted and intractable conflicts in West Asia and North Africa.

    The head of the Chinese government stressed that China is ready to maintain close communication with Egypt and facilitate a speedy end to hostilities in the Gaza Strip.

    The Chinese side is also willing to work with Egypt to help alleviate the humanitarian crisis, prevent the spread and escalation of the conflict, and make unremitting efforts for a comprehensive, fair and lasting settlement of the Palestinian issue, Li Qiang noted.

    He said China hopes to strengthen communication and coordination with Egypt in multilateral forums including the UN, BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to implement genuine multilateralism.

    Li Qiang added that China is willing to work with Egypt to promote the building of an equitable and orderly multipolar world and an inclusive economic globalization that benefits everyone, and promote the sustainable and long-term development of China-Arab and China-Africa cooperation. –0–

    Please note: This information is raw content obtained directly from the source of the information. It is an accurate report of what the source claims and does not necessarily reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    .

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Devil worship, muti and murder: what’s behind the growth of occult gangs in South Africa?

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Ashwill Ramon Phillips, Lecturer and Postgraduate Supervisor, Department of Criminology, University of the Free State

    Gang-related crime in South Africa is widespread, but is under-reported outside hotspots such as the Cape Flats in Cape Town or Westbury in Johannesburg. In these areas gangs are deeply rooted and contribute to ongoing violence, drug trafficking and territorial conflict.

    But gangs have continued to evolve and gang violence has consistently increased throughout South Africa, particularly in the Gauteng and Free State provinces. In the Free State in the east-central part of the country, devil-worshipping and witchcraft-related gang practices have been reported.

    Gang-related violence is fuelled by poverty, social exclusion, unemployment and the need for protection from rival gangs.




    Read more:
    Here’s how some of Cape Town’s gangsters got out – and stayed out


    In my doctoral study in criminology, I explored the phenomenon of occult-inspired gangs in the Free State. I interviewed 23 active gang members, 16 offenders who weren’t affiliated to gangs, and 18 service providers like social workers and correctional officials working with these groups.

    In a more recent study I developed a typology of occult gangs: a framework that captures their structure, symbolism, hierarchy and spiritual practices.

    This matters because in order to prevent gang-related crime it is essential to understand how they operate.

    The rise of Free State occult gangs

    In 1997, a South African Police Service investigation uncovered a so-called devil worshipping group or “evil church” that had migrated from parts of northern Africa and established itself in Maseru, Lesotho (South Africa’s neighbour). This group reportedly blended occult practices with traditional African witchcraft. This led local communities to label it as a devil-worshipping gang.

    Since 2011, groups like this have expanded across the Free State. There are now about 40 such gangs active in the province, as reported by the police and confirmed in my research. Some of the better known gangs are the Triple 6 (666), Born-To-Kill (BTK), Natural Born Killers (NBK), International Junior Portuguese (IJP), and Maroma (Romans/Romas).

    More typical street gangs are mostly known for expanding their territory through profit from the drug trade and extortion. But these Free State gangs incorporate spirituality and esoterism (special hidden knowledge) to assert dominance, foster cohesion and generate fear within communities.

    They engage in serious crimes including murder, organ trafficking and rape. They are particularly known for acts such as ritual stabbings, cannibalism, and alleged communication with demonic forces.

    The communities in which these groups operate, and gang members themselves, refer to them as “devil worshipping gangs”. This is because of the explicit link between certain gang-related practices and satanism, or the worship of the devil as depicted in the Christian bible.

    Some groups merge beliefs and rituals related to Satan and anti-Christianity with witchcraft. Or they use symbols commonly associated with satanism such as “666” and inverted crosses. But labelling all such groups as “devil worshipping gangs” is misleading. The term “occult gangs” better captures the range of practices involved.

    While both devil worshipping and witchcraft-related practices can play a role in criminal gang activity, they differ in origin and form. Devil worshipping draws from western occult traditions, using symbols and rituals to strengthen gang identity. Witchcraft-based practices typically involve the malicious use of muti (traditional African medicine) and muti murders (murders for body parts to use in muti). As one participant told me:

    Yes, there are gangs that believe in muti. There are also gangs that believe in the devil. IJP and Roma believe in muti, while BTK and Triple 6 believe in getting power from the devil. They say they speak to Lucifer to give them powers.

    So, infamous gangs in the Free State are not only dreaded for their brutality but also for their reported links to ritual murder, blood oaths, the use of muti and the consumption of human organs and blood. According to my research these activities have progressed from being viewed as urban legends and community myths to becoming lived realities.

    Inside the gangs

    My gang typology study sample consisted of 39 male offenders, aged 14 to 38. Participants were either serving sentences or awaiting trial for serious offences such as murder, rape and armed robbery.

    The gang members spoke openly about seeking power through supernatural means. Some believed that consuming blood and participating in occult rituals could make them invisible to police and invincible against their enemies. As one told me:

    The minute you drink blood you are invoking spirits to become part of you, demons to become part of you, and give you the powers that you need to do what you have to do…

    Ritual stabbings, inverted crosses, and the “mark of the beast” (“666”) were part of their gang symbolism – seen in gang graffiti and tattoos and furthered by involvement in spiritual gatherings and the use of muti.

    These elements form part of a shared gang ideology that offers meaning, identity and purpose to marginalised young people. I found that the gang members in my studies often lacked family support, social support or significant formal education.

    To prevent young people from joining gangs, it is crucial to understand what pulls them in. Several participants described joining gangs not only for wealth, protection or status, but for a sense of spiritual power. Especially in communities where traditional religion, ancestral beliefs and Christian teachings coexist and sometimes collide.

    My typology of occult gangs has the potential to inform targeted prevention programmes, rehabilitation efforts and policing strategies that take the spiritual realities of gang members seriously.

    A new approach to fighting crime is needed

    The rise of occult gangs has now progressed beyond the Free State. Similar trends are observed in the Eastern Cape, Northern Cape, Gauteng and Western Cape provinces.

    The intersection of faith, fear and violence in these gangs challenges mainstream approaches to crime prevention. Traditional anti-gang strategies assume that gangs are driven mainly by socioeconomic factors or rational incentives. They fail to account for spiritual motivations and metaphysical beliefs.

    The presence of ritual elements complicates investigations and amplifies fear. It makes gangs seem more powerful than they are.

    At the same time, public institutions such as the police and social workers often lack the frameworks and cultural sensitivity to address the spiritual dimensions of the offences perpetrated by these groups.

    The struggle with the occult gangs in South Africa mirrors similar challenges in other countries, like Nigeria, the DRC and Haiti, where spiritual symbolism and ritualised violence are central to gang identity.

    Effective interventions must include culturally grounded strategies to help members disengage from gangs, involving traditional leaders, healers, faith-based actors and mental health professionals.




    Read more:
    Rituals, rites and rumours: how women claim power in Zimbabwe’s informal gold mines


    By addressing the spiritual, social, and psychological dimensions of gang involvement, more sustainable pathways out of these groups can be created.

    Gang violence in South Africa is evolving, and so must the response. It shouldn’t just punish young offenders, but offer them a genuine alternative.

    Ashwill Ramon Phillips does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Devil worship, muti and murder: what’s behind the growth of occult gangs in South Africa? – https://theconversation.com/devil-worship-muti-and-murder-whats-behind-the-growth-of-occult-gangs-in-south-africa-260141

    MIL OSI

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: TikTok users in Ghana and Zimbabwe enjoy making fun of government – why it can have a downside

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jacob Nyarko, Lecturer of Communication Studies, University of Cape Coast

    Browse the internet or turn on the global news and chances are the coverage of Africa you find is about war, coups, displaced populations and disease.

    Generally, the west and its media are blamed for this negative, Afropessimistic portrayal of the continent.

    Africans have taken strategic steps to repair this negative narrative. An example is the Africa Rising campaign. It was launched in 2000 by a coalition of African activists and organisations. Its objective was to highlight the role of Africa in global development and encourage Africans at home and the diaspora to contribute positively. Social media platforms played a large role in content distribution and messaging. The success of this campaign is still the subject of debate.




    Read more:
    Western media outlets are trying to fix their racist, stereotypical coverage of Africa. Is it time African media did the same?


    As communication scholars, we were intrigued by the visual appeal of the social media platform TikTok. With our area of expertise being Ghana and Zimbabwe respectively, we were interested in how citizens of these countries were using the popular TikTok app to report on themselves.

    Our study explored the self-critical content that many Africans share on TikTok. We found that TikTok posts and comments by Ghanaian and Zimbabwean creators generated entertaining information. We call this “fun journalism”. TikTokers use it to comment on important issues, but the way they do it could also harm the reputation of the two countries and influence decisions in unintended ways.

    Fun journalism and reputation

    As a creative and innovative platform, TikTok has enabled users to produce multimedia materials and share them across the globe for fun and entertainment. According to the Digital 2025: Ghana report by Datareportal, 81% of Ghanaians aged 16 and over use the internet to access TikTok monthly. That makes it the second most popular platform after WhatsApp (93%). Zimbabwe has 2.05 million TikTok users aged 18 and above, according to tech data aggregator Datareportal.

    Studies show that users tend to “play” with social media, even when they use it for serious things. Our study showed that the fun videos uploaded by TikTokers from Ghana and Zimbabwe covered serious issues like security, education, sanitation, corruption, entertainment, religion and sports.




    Read more:
    Nigerian TikTok star Charity Ekezie uses hilarious skits to dispel ignorance about Africa


    For example, one Ghanaian TikTok video compares how a Ghanaian and a European would react if they picked up money that someone had lost. The video suggests an African would keep the money, while a European would try to locate the original owner.

    In many instances, users ridiculed their countries and fellow citizens. They compared African conditions to the global north in ways that degraded local endeavours. For example, in one TikTok video, a user imitated Zimbabwean president Emmerson Mnangagwa having difficulties explaining the number of zeroes in a million. This gave the impression that he was semi-literate and out of his depth.

    We found that, generally, the entertaining discourses on TikTok were laden with insults and critiques of government. Though some of the content raised legitimate concerns, it seldom offered solutions to the identified challenges. This suggested that TikTok content that jokingly covered significant national development issues eroded reputational gains made by the two countries by framing them negatively. We cite several examples in the study.

    Comparing this phenomenon to other countries, a study on Chinese uploads onto TikTok showed the following results: 41% positive, 53% neutral and 6% negative.

    Self-ridiculing factors and misinformation

    TikTokers ridiculed the reputation of Ghana and Zimbabwe in three ways:

    • Exaggerated production of video content. This includes emotional background sounds, tone of voice, slang, animation, unfavourable shooting locations and poor video quality

    • comparing African countries to foreign conditions

    • generating unfavourable comments.

    “Fake news” has become an integral part of social media, raising doubts about the credibility of information generally. We argue that such content should no longer be seen as harmless humour.

    link text

    Implications and measures

    As the press freedom rankings of both countries fall, TikTok can be a safe, open space for citizens to raise important public concerns.

    The platform makes space for a diversity of opinions from the youthful populations found in the two countries. This is important for communication and building consensus in development.

    We argue that TikTokers should be encouraged to offer constructive criticisms of their countries and propose solutions instead of insults.

    Policy makers should tap into the vast repository of “fun” information published on TikTok for development. The opinions expressed by citizens online are a helpful reflection of societal needs. This can be taken into consideration when formulating policies.




    Read more:
    How memes in the DRC allow people to laugh at those in power – and themselves


    Mainstream professional media could adopt the fun journalism model to tell serious stories in ways that boost development and reputation. The platform’s wide usage will make information accessible to a large audience.

    Media regulatory bodies, nongovernmental organisations and civil society groups are encouraged to educate netizens to publish critical and progressive stories about their countries. This can help combat misinformation and disinformation on social media, particularly TikTok.

    Finally, governments should take steps to positively project their respective countries to the world. They could run educational programmes to inculcate a sense of patriotism and identity to rekindle the initiatives that Africa Rising advocated.

    Jacob Nyarko receives funding from the University of Cape Coast, Ghana for this work.

    Oswelled Ureke does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. TikTok users in Ghana and Zimbabwe enjoy making fun of government – why it can have a downside – https://theconversation.com/tiktok-users-in-ghana-and-zimbabwe-enjoy-making-fun-of-government-why-it-can-have-a-downside-259734

    MIL OSI

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Must Lead the Charge to Reverse Global Fossil Fuel Financing Bans

    Source: APO


    .

    The African Energy Chamber (AEC) (www.EnergyChamber.org) – the voice of the African energy sector – is urging OPEC member states and their allies to take decisive action to reverse global bans on fossil fuel financing and champion Africa’s right to develop its oil and gas resources. As the 9th OPEC International Seminar convened on Tuesday in Vienna, the Chamber reiterated that it is time to urgently put upstream financing back on the table and push back against policies that deny African nations the capital needed to industrialize, grow and lift millions out of poverty.

    For too long, Africa has borne the brunt of contradictory global energy policies. While developed nations continue to fast-track public and private investments into natural gas to bolster their own energy security, multilateral institutions enforce blanket bans on upstream oil and gas financing that disproportionately restrict African countries. In 2019, the European Investment Bank announced it would end fossil fuel financing by 2021, a position echoed by several European development agencies and financial institutions. The World Bank followed suit, gradually phasing out support for oil and gas and culminating in a near-total exclusion of upstream fossil fuel investments. While these policies may align with net-zero targets in wealthy economies, in Africa, they are actively obstructing access to energy, job creation and industrial growth.

    Yet even as development finance dries up abroad, Europe has made clear exceptions for itself. Under its 2022 Taxonomy for Sustainable Activities, the EU classified certain natural gas and nuclear investments as “transitional” – opening the door for continued funding within its borders. The result is a glaring double standard: natural gas is deemed essential for energy security in Berlin and Brussels, but off-limits in Lagos or Dakar. This hypocrisy must be addressed if the global energy transition is to be just and equitable.

    Africa holds more than 125 billion barrels of proven oil reserves and over 620 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, yet over 600 million Africans lack access to electricity, and more than 900 million lack access to clean cooking fuels. In this context, African nations need robust investment in oil and gas infrastructure – not ideological restrictions that ignore the realities on the ground.

    “What Africa needs right now is to drill, baby, drill. Most of our multilateral institutions don’t finance oil and gas – they say it’s wrong. It’s extremely hypocritical. Denying fossil fuel investment is denying economic justice, food security and a pathway out of poverty for millions,” said NJ Ayuk, Executive Chairman of the AEC. “We can’t keep apologizing for oil. No country in the world has developed through renewables alone. OPEC members must pressure institutions like the World Bank to lift their financing bans and support Africa’s right to industrialize.”

    At the OPEC Seminar, the AEC urged producing countries to rally around three urgent financial priorities. First, OPEC members must press the World Bank and other multilateral institutions to lift harmful financing restrictions on fossil fuels. It is untenable that the World Bank – originally established to support post-war reconstruction and global development – continues to deny funding for upstream oil and gas projects across Africa. With recent signals from Bank leadership hinting at a possible policy shift, now is the time for oil-producing nations to push for a reversal that puts energy access and economic transformation in the Global South at the center of development finance.

    Second, OPEC countries – with their sovereign wealth funds and surplus revenues – are uniquely positioned to create a dedicated investment vehicle for fossil fuel development in underfunded markets. An OPEC-led facility focused on financing strategic upstream projects could prove instrumental in unlocking capital for bankable ventures across Africa. Such a fund would not only accelerate production but also help stabilize global supply and pricing.

    Finally, the Chamber emphasizes the need for a pragmatic, dual-track approach to the energy transition that recognizes the differing realities of the Global North and South. While developed nations move toward decarbonization, Africa must prioritize industrialization and energy security. Natural gas – abundant, reliable and cleaner-burning than coal – offers a critical bridge fuel to power fertilizer production, manufacturing, petrochemicals and regional electricity networks.

    True climate justice must include energy justice, which means recognizing Africa’s right to harness its resources, grow its economies and meet the needs of its people on its own terms. Africa does not need charity; it needs capital. As the voice of Africa’s energy sector, the Chamber stands firm in its call for OPEC producers and the World Bank to help deliver it.

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of African Energy Chamber.

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: TikTok users in Ghana and Zimbabwe enjoy making fun of government – why it can have a downside

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jacob Nyarko, Lecturer of Communication Studies, University of Cape Coast

    Browse the internet or turn on the global news and chances are the coverage of Africa you find is about war, coups, displaced populations and disease.

    Generally, the west and its media are blamed for this negative, Afropessimistic portrayal of the continent.

    Africans have taken strategic steps to repair this negative narrative. An example is the Africa Rising campaign. It was launched in 2000 by a coalition of African activists and organisations. Its objective was to highlight the role of Africa in global development and encourage Africans at home and the diaspora to contribute positively. Social media platforms played a large role in content distribution and messaging. The success of this campaign is still the subject of debate.


    Read more: Western media outlets are trying to fix their racist, stereotypical coverage of Africa. Is it time African media did the same?


    As communication scholars, we were intrigued by the visual appeal of the social media platform TikTok. With our area of expertise being Ghana and Zimbabwe respectively, we were interested in how citizens of these countries were using the popular TikTok app to report on themselves.

    Our study explored the self-critical content that many Africans share on TikTok. We found that TikTok posts and comments by Ghanaian and Zimbabwean creators generated entertaining information. We call this “fun journalism”. TikTokers use it to comment on important issues, but the way they do it could also harm the reputation of the two countries and influence decisions in unintended ways.

    Fun journalism and reputation

    As a creative and innovative platform, TikTok has enabled users to produce multimedia materials and share them across the globe for fun and entertainment. According to the Digital 2025: Ghana report by Datareportal, 81% of Ghanaians aged 16 and over use the internet to access TikTok monthly. That makes it the second most popular platform after WhatsApp (93%). Zimbabwe has 2.05 million TikTok users aged 18 and above, according to tech data aggregator Datareportal.

    Studies show that users tend to “play” with social media, even when they use it for serious things. Our study showed that the fun videos uploaded by TikTokers from Ghana and Zimbabwe covered serious issues like security, education, sanitation, corruption, entertainment, religion and sports.


    Read more: Nigerian TikTok star Charity Ekezie uses hilarious skits to dispel ignorance about Africa


    For example, one Ghanaian TikTok video compares how a Ghanaian and a European would react if they picked up money that someone had lost. The video suggests an African would keep the money, while a European would try to locate the original owner.

    In many instances, users ridiculed their countries and fellow citizens. They compared African conditions to the global north in ways that degraded local endeavours. For example, in one TikTok video, a user imitated Zimbabwean president Emmerson Mnangagwa having difficulties explaining the number of zeroes in a million. This gave the impression that he was semi-literate and out of his depth.

    We found that, generally, the entertaining discourses on TikTok were laden with insults and critiques of government. Though some of the content raised legitimate concerns, it seldom offered solutions to the identified challenges. This suggested that TikTok content that jokingly covered significant national development issues eroded reputational gains made by the two countries by framing them negatively. We cite several examples in the study.

    Comparing this phenomenon to other countries, a study on Chinese uploads onto TikTok showed the following results: 41% positive, 53% neutral and 6% negative.

    Self-ridiculing factors and misinformation

    TikTokers ridiculed the reputation of Ghana and Zimbabwe in three ways:

    • Exaggerated production of video content. This includes emotional background sounds, tone of voice, slang, animation, unfavourable shooting locations and poor video quality

    • comparing African countries to foreign conditions

    • generating unfavourable comments.

    “Fake news” has become an integral part of social media, raising doubts about the credibility of information generally. We argue that such content should no longer be seen as harmless humour.

    link text

    Implications and measures

    As the press freedom rankings of both countries fall, TikTok can be a safe, open space for citizens to raise important public concerns.

    The platform makes space for a diversity of opinions from the youthful populations found in the two countries. This is important for communication and building consensus in development.

    We argue that TikTokers should be encouraged to offer constructive criticisms of their countries and propose solutions instead of insults.

    Policy makers should tap into the vast repository of “fun” information published on TikTok for development. The opinions expressed by citizens online are a helpful reflection of societal needs. This can be taken into consideration when formulating policies.


    Read more: How memes in the DRC allow people to laugh at those in power – and themselves


    Mainstream professional media could adopt the fun journalism model to tell serious stories in ways that boost development and reputation. The platform’s wide usage will make information accessible to a large audience.

    Media regulatory bodies, nongovernmental organisations and civil society groups are encouraged to educate netizens to publish critical and progressive stories about their countries. This can help combat misinformation and disinformation on social media, particularly TikTok.

    Finally, governments should take steps to positively project their respective countries to the world. They could run educational programmes to inculcate a sense of patriotism and identity to rekindle the initiatives that Africa Rising advocated.

    – TikTok users in Ghana and Zimbabwe enjoy making fun of government – why it can have a downside
    – https://theconversation.com/tiktok-users-in-ghana-and-zimbabwe-enjoy-making-fun-of-government-why-it-can-have-a-downside-259734

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Devil worship, muti and murder: what’s behind the growth of occult gangs in South Africa?

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Ashwill Ramon Phillips, Lecturer and Postgraduate Supervisor, Department of Criminology, University of the Free State

    Gang-related crime in South Africa is widespread, but is under-reported outside hotspots such as the Cape Flats in Cape Town or Westbury in Johannesburg. In these areas gangs are deeply rooted and contribute to ongoing violence, drug trafficking and territorial conflict.

    But gangs have continued to evolve and gang violence has consistently increased throughout South Africa, particularly in the Gauteng and Free State provinces. In the Free State in the east-central part of the country, devil-worshipping and witchcraft-related gang practices have been reported.

    Gang-related violence is fuelled by poverty, social exclusion, unemployment and the need for protection from rival gangs.


    Read more: Here’s how some of Cape Town’s gangsters got out – and stayed out


    In my doctoral study in criminology, I explored the phenomenon of occult-inspired gangs in the Free State. I interviewed 23 active gang members, 16 offenders who weren’t affiliated to gangs, and 18 service providers like social workers and correctional officials working with these groups.

    In a more recent study I developed a typology of occult gangs: a framework that captures their structure, symbolism, hierarchy and spiritual practices.

    This matters because in order to prevent gang-related crime it is essential to understand how they operate.

    The rise of Free State occult gangs

    In 1997, a South African Police Service investigation uncovered a so-called devil worshipping group or “evil church” that had migrated from parts of northern Africa and established itself in Maseru, Lesotho (South Africa’s neighbour). This group reportedly blended occult practices with traditional African witchcraft. This led local communities to label it as a devil-worshipping gang.

    A BTK gang tattoo. Ashwill Ramon Phillips

    Since 2011, groups like this have expanded across the Free State. There are now about 40 such gangs active in the province, as reported by the police and confirmed in my research. Some of the better known gangs are the Triple 6 (666), Born-To-Kill (BTK), Natural Born Killers (NBK), International Junior Portuguese (IJP), and Maroma (Romans/Romas).

    More typical street gangs are mostly known for expanding their territory through profit from the drug trade and extortion. But these Free State gangs incorporate spirituality and esoterism (special hidden knowledge) to assert dominance, foster cohesion and generate fear within communities.

    They engage in serious crimes including murder, organ trafficking and rape. They are particularly known for acts such as ritual stabbings, cannibalism, and alleged communication with demonic forces.

    NBK gang tattoo. Ashwill Ramon Phillips

    The communities in which these groups operate, and gang members themselves, refer to them as “devil worshipping gangs”. This is because of the explicit link between certain gang-related practices and satanism, or the worship of the devil as depicted in the Christian bible.

    Some groups merge beliefs and rituals related to Satan and anti-Christianity with witchcraft. Or they use symbols commonly associated with satanism such as “666” and inverted crosses. But labelling all such groups as “devil worshipping gangs” is misleading. The term “occult gangs” better captures the range of practices involved.

    While both devil worshipping and witchcraft-related practices can play a role in criminal gang activity, they differ in origin and form. Devil worshipping draws from western occult traditions, using symbols and rituals to strengthen gang identity. Witchcraft-based practices typically involve the malicious use of muti (traditional African medicine) and muti murders (murders for body parts to use in muti). As one participant told me:

    Yes, there are gangs that believe in muti. There are also gangs that believe in the devil. IJP and Roma believe in muti, while BTK and Triple 6 believe in getting power from the devil. They say they speak to Lucifer to give them powers.

    So, infamous gangs in the Free State are not only dreaded for their brutality but also for their reported links to ritual murder, blood oaths, the use of muti and the consumption of human organs and blood. According to my research these activities have progressed from being viewed as urban legends and community myths to becoming lived realities.

    Inside the gangs

    My gang typology study sample consisted of 39 male offenders, aged 14 to 38. Participants were either serving sentences or awaiting trial for serious offences such as murder, rape and armed robbery.

    The gang members spoke openly about seeking power through supernatural means. Some believed that consuming blood and participating in occult rituals could make them invisible to police and invincible against their enemies. As one told me:

    The minute you drink blood you are invoking spirits to become part of you, demons to become part of you, and give you the powers that you need to do what you have to do…

    A drawing by a Triple 6 gang member. Ashwill Ramon Phillips

    Ritual stabbings, inverted crosses, and the “mark of the beast” (“666”) were part of their gang symbolism – seen in gang graffiti and tattoos and furthered by involvement in spiritual gatherings and the use of muti.

    These elements form part of a shared gang ideology that offers meaning, identity and purpose to marginalised young people. I found that the gang members in my studies often lacked family support, social support or significant formal education.

    To prevent young people from joining gangs, it is crucial to understand what pulls them in. Several participants described joining gangs not only for wealth, protection or status, but for a sense of spiritual power. Especially in communities where traditional religion, ancestral beliefs and Christian teachings coexist and sometimes collide.

    My typology of occult gangs has the potential to inform targeted prevention programmes, rehabilitation efforts and policing strategies that take the spiritual realities of gang members seriously.

    A new approach to fighting crime is needed

    The rise of occult gangs has now progressed beyond the Free State. Similar trends are observed in the Eastern Cape, Northern Cape, Gauteng and Western Cape provinces.

    The intersection of faith, fear and violence in these gangs challenges mainstream approaches to crime prevention. Traditional anti-gang strategies assume that gangs are driven mainly by socioeconomic factors or rational incentives. They fail to account for spiritual motivations and metaphysical beliefs.

    The presence of ritual elements complicates investigations and amplifies fear. It makes gangs seem more powerful than they are.

    At the same time, public institutions such as the police and social workers often lack the frameworks and cultural sensitivity to address the spiritual dimensions of the offences perpetrated by these groups.

    A drawing by a BTK gang member. Ashwill Ramon Phillips

    The struggle with the occult gangs in South Africa mirrors similar challenges in other countries, like Nigeria, the DRC and Haiti, where spiritual symbolism and ritualised violence are central to gang identity.

    Effective interventions must include culturally grounded strategies to help members disengage from gangs, involving traditional leaders, healers, faith-based actors and mental health professionals.


    Read more: Rituals, rites and rumours: how women claim power in Zimbabwe’s informal gold mines


    By addressing the spiritual, social, and psychological dimensions of gang involvement, more sustainable pathways out of these groups can be created.

    Gang violence in South Africa is evolving, and so must the response. It shouldn’t just punish young offenders, but offer them a genuine alternative.

    – Devil worship, muti and murder: what’s behind the growth of occult gangs in South Africa?
    – https://theconversation.com/devil-worship-muti-and-murder-whats-behind-the-growth-of-occult-gangs-in-south-africa-260141

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Security Council Press Statement on Signature of Peace Agreement between Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    The following Security Council press statement was issued today by Council President Asim Iftikhar Ahmad (Pakistan):

    The members of the Security Council welcomed the peace agreement signed between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda on 27 June, and expressed their deep appreciation to the United States, Qatar and the African Union for their facilitation efforts.

    The members of the Security Council urged the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda to honour in good faith their obligations and commitments for lasting peace in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, including those related to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and resolution 2773 (2025).

    The members of the Security Council expressed their determination to actively support the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda in the implementation and follow-up of this agreement.

    For information media. Not an official record.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Saudi Arabia lifesaving date shipment to feed 100,000 conflict affected Mozambicans

    Source: World Food Programme

    MAPUTO – The King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre (KSrelief), in partnership with the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), has delivered 23 metric tonnes of premium Saudi dates to support more than 100,000 vulnerable women, children, and families in northern Mozambique who are suffering from the impacts of conflict and displacement.

    Dates, a staple of Saudi generosity and nutrition for centuries, are rich in fibre, antioxidants, and essential minerals such as potassium, magnesium, and iron. This donation will directly enhance the diets of families struggling with food insecurity, providing both immediate nourishment and a symbol of solidarity from the people of Saudi Arabia.

    The shipment arrived at the Port of Nacala and was swiftly transported to Cabo Delgado Province, where distribution to conflict-affected households is already underway.

    “These dates will strengthen the diets of 100,000 people—especially women and children—and represent a meaningful gesture of solidarity from the people of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the people of Mozambique”, said Antonella D’Aprile, WFP Country Director in Mozambique.

    Mr. Mishaal Bin Shail, Acting Charge d’affaires of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Mozambique, added. “The gift of dates is a quiet yet powerful symbol of goodwill reflecting shared values, strengthening the bonds of friendship between our nations, and echoing a border spirit of care and solidarity that defines the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s engagement with vulnerable communities”.

    Mozambique is currently facing one of its most severe food security crises in recent years. An estimated 5 million people require urgent humanitarian assistance, and nearly 40 percent of children under five are suffering from chronic malnutrition. In the north, ongoing conflict and climate shocks continue to displace families and disrupt livelihoods, making life-saving support more critical than ever.

    Saudi Arabia’s humanitarian assistance, coordinated by KSrelief, is a cornerstone of its foreign aid. Since 2015, KSrelief has delivered aid to vulnerable communities worldwide. Between 2022 and 2024 alone, Saudi Arabia provided 160 metric tonnes of dates to Mozambique, reaffirming its long-term commitment to the country’s recovery and resilience.

    ###

    About WFP

    The United Nations World Food Programme is the world’s largest humanitarian organization, saving lives in emergencies and using food assistance to build a pathway to peace, stability and prosperity for people recovering from conflict, disasters and the impact of climate change.

    Follow us on X, formerly Twitter, via @wfp_mozambique, @WFP_Safrica and @wfp_media

    About KSrelief

    The King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre (KSrelief), established under the guidance of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, represents Saudi Arabia’s commitment to global humanitarian efforts. Inaugurated in May 2015, KSrelief has provided impartial humanitarian aid and relief to over 100 countries in cooperation with local, regional and international organizations.

    About Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Mozambique

    The embassy of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Maputo represents the Kingdom’s official diplomatic presence in the Republic of Mozambique. The Embassy is dedicated to fostering strong and cooperative bilateral relations between Saudi Arabia and Mozambique, with a focus on political dialogue, economic collaboration, and cultural exchange.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI: Bitget Annual Trading Competition KCGI Launches With $6 Million Prize Pool

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    VICTORIA, Seychelles, July 10, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Bitget, the world’s leading crypto exchange and Web3 company, has officially opened registration for KCGI 2025, the most anticipated trading competition of the year, featuring a massive 6 million USDT prize pool, brand-new segments, and early-bird rewards that make joining early a winning move.

    From team battles to bot duels, KCGI 2025 isn’t just a tournament — it’s a spectacle. This year’s edition takes competition to the next level with enhanced challenge modes, region-based leaderboards, and incentives for everyone from strategic captains to high-velocity newcomers. Whether you’re a pro with a polished strategy or a rookie with something to prove, the game is on. There is a spot with your name on it.

    “Every year during KCGI we witness traders across the globe strategize, synchronize and innovate,” said Gracy Chen, CEO at Bitget. “There’s a lot of community and teamwork involved, KCGI is our way of showing gratitude to our top traders. That said, we’re excited to kick off this year’s competition with 6 million USDT up for grabs and a range of dynamic challenges ahead. We’re inviting our community to lead, win, and shape the future of trading.”

    6 Million USDT Promotion Pool

    This year’s 6 million USDT promotion pool is packed with surprises. Top-performing participants may unlock VIP experiences with Bitget partners. Those partners include LALIGA matchday access, MotoGP circuit passes, and other premium rewards that go beyond the charts. It’s not just about who trades best. It’s also about who dares to play big, lead boldly, and win in style.

    KCGI 2025 introduces four high-stakes categories:

    • Team Battle – Form alliances, build your squad, and rise through the ranks together.
    • Copy Trading Showdown – Let your strategy do the talking, or ride with the best.
    • Bot Trading Competition – Code it. Launch it. Dominate the charts.
    • On-chain Arena – The ultimate test of decentralized skill and chain-savvy moves.

    Early registrants unlock exclusive perks like trading bonuses, entry into mystery prize draws, and first dibs on team captaincy slots. Participants from over 100 countries are expected to join. Thus, it has not only become the largest KCGI yet but also the most global, collaborative, and competitive.

    The official Team Battle segment begins July 24, but the smart money moves early. Traders who register now not only secure their seat, but they also set the tone for the event.

    Get in early. Build your team. Shape the leaderboard.

    KCGI 2025: This isn’t just trading, it’s a full-on battle with rewards.

    About Bitget

    Established in 2018, Bitget is the world’s leading cryptocurrency exchange and Web3 company. Serving over 120 million users in 150+ countries and regions, the Bitget exchange is committed to helping users trade smarter with its pioneering copy trading feature and other trading solutions, while offering real-time access to Bitcoin priceEthereum price, and other cryptocurrency prices.

    Formerly known as BitKeep, Bitget Wallet is a leading non-custodial crypto wallet supporting 130+ blockchains and millions of tokens. It offers multi-chain trading, staking, payments, and direct access to 20,000+ DApps, with advanced swaps and market insights built into a single platform.

    Bitget is at the forefront of driving crypto adoption through strategic partnerships, such as its role as the Official Crypto Partner of the World’s Top Football League, LALIGA, in EASTERN, SEA and LATAM markets, as well as a global partner of Turkish National athletes Buse Tosun Çavuşoğlu (Wrestling world champion), Samet Gümüş (Boxing gold medalist), and İlkin Aydın (Volleyball national team), to inspire the global community to embrace the future of cryptocurrency.

    For more information, visit: WebsiteTwitterTelegramLinkedInDiscordBitget Wallet

    For media inquiries, please contact: media@bitget.com

    Risk Warning: Digital asset prices are subject to fluctuation and may experience significant volatility. Investors are advised to only allocate funds they can afford to lose. The value of any investment may be impacted, and there is a possibility that financial objectives may not be met, nor the principal investment recovered. Independent financial advice should always be sought, and personal financial experience and standing carefully considered. Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future results. Bitget accepts no liability for any potential losses incurred. Nothing contained herein should be construed as financial advice. For further information, please refer to our Terms of Use.

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/c7165dcd-738c-44c1-a485-b90d3695b922

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Plans to relocate Gazans to a ‘humanitarian city’ look like a crime against humanity – international law expert

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By James Sweeney, Professor, Lancaster Law School, Lancaster University

    The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are refusing to implement a government plan to move hundreds of thousands of Palestinians into a what it calls a “humanitarian city” in Rafah on Gaza’s southern border with Egypt. Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir, chief of the IDF general staff said the plan was not part of the military’s operational plan for destroying Hamas and freeing the remaining hostages.

    Army reservists have reportedly also complained that the plan amounts to a war crime. In my view as an expert in international law, they are correct. Forcibly relocating a population is prohibited, even in war. It is also a crime against humanity and could even amount, under certain circumstances, to genocide.

    There is some important historical context to consider before examining the legal issues at play.


    Sign up to receive our weekly World Affairs Briefing newsletter from The Conversation in the UK. Every Thursday we’ll bring you expert analysis of the big stories in international relations.


    The prosecution of crimes against humanity first took place at the Nuremberg trials of surviving senior Nazis after the second world war. By that time the idea of war crimes was clearly established – but they tended to concern what you should not do to the enemy civilian population.

    The problem was that the worst atrocities of the Nazis were committed against their own people – the German Jews (and many, many others too). The idea of crimes against humanity was created to fill this gap, and was used to prosecute the surviving masterminds of the Holocaust.

    Conditions for a ‘crime against humanity’

    Crimes against humanity are a category that contains several separate crimes. If the right conditions are there, you might talk about “the crime against humanity of murder” or the “crime against humanity of rape”. The conditions are that the underpinning crime takes place against a backdrop of a “widespread or systematic” attack on a civilian population.

    The attack does not have to include a literal armed attack: apartheid, for example, was established as a crime against humanity in 1973 in response to the policies of the South African government. It is also not necessary that there is an armed conflict for a particular crime to be a crime against humanity.

    Within the category of crimes against humanity is included “deportation and forcible transfer” (see article 7 of the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court).

    This is what the Israeli government’s plan for moving Palestinians into a “humanitarian city” would appear to amount to. If the plan stopped at leaving Gazan Palestinians in Rafah then it would be “forcible transfer”, and if they were relocated to another country it would be “deportation”.

    Coercion is key to the crime of forcible transfer. It’s fanciful to think that every single Gazan civilian would want to move to Rafah in circumstances where they would be security-checked on entry and thereafter forbidden from leaving.

    How could a liveable city, with all the infrastructure needed, even be created? What of the dentists, doctors, teachers, lawyers, mechanics, entrepreneurs and anyone else who was able to make an honest living? Will they really be given a place to carry out their work?

    Ethnic cleansing

    The term “ethnic cleansing” is sometimes used to describe what is being proposed by the Israeli government. I dislike the term, and it has no meaning in law. It became a commonly used term during the 1990s conflict in the former Yugoslavia when ethnic Serbs, and in some instances ethnic Croats, expelled hundreds of thousands of people of any other ethnicity out of the territory that they held.

    For this practice, the president of the former Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milošević, and a string of Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat leaders were charged with crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

    Milošević died before the ICTY could deliver a verdict in his case, but many others were found guilty. The actions of the Bosnian Serb forces in the town of Srebrenica were even found by the ICTY to have been an act of genocide, because they were not just expelling non-Serbs but wiping them out: at one point in July 1995 they killed around 8,000 men and boys in just a few days.

    A lot would depend on the conditions in which the Palestinians would live in the “humanitarian city”. If they were deprived of sufficient food and medical supplies in a way that could only be seen as intended to lead to their deaths, then that too could be held to qualify as an act of genocide.

    Justice and accountability

    It is clear to me that the forced relocation of Gazans to a “humanitarian city” would violate international law. What is not so clear cut is how to hold its instigators to account.

    There are already arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and his former defence minister, Yoav Gallant. But there is no international police force and so the ICC relies on participating states to arrest suspects on its behalf. Hungary welcomed Netanyahu in April this year, while announcing it would withdraw from the ICC.

    In the same way, Netanyahu flew to Washington DC this week to meet with Donald Trump, but was not arrested because the US doesn’t recognise the ICC. During his visit, Netanyahu announced he would be nominating Trump for the Nobel peace prize.

    South Africa has also sought to hold the state of Israel to account at the International Court of Justice, alleging the crime of genocide. The court has yet to rule, saying only that it is plausible that acts of genocide might occur in Gaza.

    Since Hamas launched its vicious attack on Isreal on the October 7 2023, there has been constant violence and massive loss of life in the region. However, the proposed “humanitarian city” is not, in my view, a lawful route to peace and stability. As for anyone actually facing justice for the many atrocities that we have seen, an international consensus in favour simply doesn’t exist. And, in the current climate, there’s little sign that it will exist any time soon.

    James Sweeney does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Plans to relocate Gazans to a ‘humanitarian city’ look like a crime against humanity – international law expert – https://theconversation.com/plans-to-relocate-gazans-to-a-humanitarian-city-look-like-a-crime-against-humanity-international-law-expert-260727

    MIL OSI Analysis

  • MIL-OSI USA: Readout of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Christopher Grady’s Meeting with Papua New Guinea Prime Minister James Marape

    Source: US Defense Joint Chiefs of Staff

    Headline: Readout of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Christopher Grady’s Meeting with Papua New Guinea Prime Minister James Marape

    Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Christopher Grady welcomed Papua New Guinea Prime Minister James Marape to Washington, D.C., on Tuesday, July 9, 2025, as part of the United States’ continued focus on strengthening defense relationships across the Pacific Islands region.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Video: WhatsApp Video 2025-07-10 at 10.45.46 (1).mp4

    Source: Republic of South Africa (video statements)

    Government News | July is National Savings Month in South Africa and is aimed at raising awareness about the importance of saving and to foster responsible financial behaviour among South Africans

    #GovZAUpdates

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SodKbpUdSWo

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  • MIL-OSI Africa: Ethiopia: His Excellency Ato Ahmed Shide, Minister of Finance meets the World Bank Executive Director

    Source: APO

    H.E. Ahmed Shide meets with the World Bank Executive Director for Africa Group 1 Constituency, Dr. Zarau Kibwe arrives for a three-day official visit in Ethiopia. Dr. Kibwe represents Ethiopia and a group of 21 other African countries in the World Bank Board. 

    His Excellency briefed the Executive Director on the successful implementation of the macroeconomic reform, strong portfolio performance, and discussed ways to deepen cooperation between Ethiopia and the World Bank. 

    During the meeting, H.E. Minister Ahmed Shide commended the World Bank’s critical role in supporting Ethiopia’s development priorities, with a portfolio exceeding $16 billion across key sectors, including the recent USD 1 billion support for Development Policy Operations II. The Minister mentioned the importance of continued support from IDA21 allocations to sustain the macroeconomic reform and to finance key priority areas, including infrastructure, agricultural productivity, and climate resilience initiatives to further advance the country’s development agenda. 

    The Executive Director congratulated the Government of Ethiopia on concluding the MoU under the G20 Common Framework, praised the macroeconomic reform implementation, and reaffirmed his commitment to supporting the country’s development priorities. 

    During his visit, Dr. Kibwe will also meet with different government officials and stakeholders to discuss collaborative efforts between Ethiopia and the World Bank.

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Ministry of Finance, Ethiopia.

    Media files

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  • MIL-OSI Africa: Nigeria: Violence and widespread displacement leave Benue facing a humanitarian disaster

    Source: APO


    .

    • At least 510,182 internally displaced people (IDPs) across Benue state
    • Dire conditions in IDP camps
    • Children and pregnant women amongst most vulnerable

    The Nigerian authorities must take urgent steps to avert a humanitarian catastrophe in the central state of Benue where attacks by gunmen have displaced at least 500,000 people, many of whom are languishing in squalid camps without access to sufficient water, poor sanitation, food and healthcare, Amnesty International said today.

    In the most recent attack on 14 June, gunmen raided the town of Yelewata, killing more than 100 people and forcing over 3,941 more to flee their homes. The smell of decomposing bodies hung in the air during a visit to the affected community by Amnesty International in the aftermath of the attacks. Signs of the recent violence were unmistakable with bullet shells littering the ground, and mass graves that had been newly dug to bury the dead.

    Survivors were seen carrying bags of grain, bundles of firewood and other household items as they sought safety and shelter in camps for internally displaced persons (IDP). According to interviews with IDPs in Gwer West, Agatu, Ukum, Kwande, Logo, Guma and Makurdi IDP camps, as well as a makeshift IDP camp at Makurdi Modern Market, communities who come under attack are often left to fend for themselves with security forces only arriving long after the gunmen had left.

    “The Nigerian authorities have failed the people of Benue state again and again. Rampant attacks by gunmen have deprived thousands of people of their rights to life, physical integrity, liberty, freedom of movement and access to livelihoods. Survivors of these harrowing attacks face the fresh torment of being displaced in overcrowded, unhygienic camps where disease runs rampant and essentials such as  food and clean water are scarce,” said Isa Sanusi, Director of Amnesty International Nigeria.

    “The situation risks creating a humanitarian disaster, which the authorities must urgently address by ensuring that people’s essential needs are met by providing desperately needed aid.”

    Besides interviews with IDPs, Amnesty International also spoke to camps officials, medical workers and non-governmental organizations in the affected areas. It found that communities across Benue state, including Gwer West, Gwer-East, Agatu, Apa, Ukum, Kwande, Logo,and Guma, continue to face a brutal pattern of violence.

    This is typically unleashed at night, although daytime attacks also occur, with gunmen systematically overrunning villages, using firearms to carry out indiscriminate or targeted killings from a distance. This is accompanied by brutal close-range violence with machetes and knives used to inflict grievous injuries, including hand amputations.

    Misery of the IDP camps

    As of 31 December 2024, an estimated 500,182 people had fled to IDPs camps in Benue state to escape years of attacks by gunmen. More than 10,000 additional people have been displaced since the start of 2025 following attacks on communities in Gwer West, Agatu, Ukum (Gbagir), Kwande (Anwase), Logo, and Guma (Yelewata, Agan, and Gbajimba), among others.

    Amnesty International’s visits to IDP camps reveal wholly inadequate shelter, exposing IDPs to harsh weather, overcrowding, and heightened risks of disease, as well as gender-based violence, including rape and domestic violence.

    Access to healthcare is also a major challenge in the IDP camps with a lack of treatment for the most common diseases and ailments, such as malaria, typhoid, and stomach ulcers. According to a camp official, births occur almost daily in the IDP camps, with many pregnant women requiring medical attention but also contracting infections because of inadequate hygiene facilities.

    An IDP told Amnesty International: “If we don’t get drugs, we just sit and watch the sick person helplessly.”

    Many children are unable to exercise their right to an education in the camps.

    “Our children no longer go to school and there are no arrangements by the authorities to teach children in the IDP camp. The government should bring an end to insecurity in our local government area and Benue state. Before that, provide us with food and proper shelter at the IDP camps,” an IDP told Amnesty International.

    A camp official told Amnesty International that a makeshift school built in one of the camps had been shut down for over three years because camp authorities could not continue paying ad-hoc teachers their stipends. 

    There are hundreds of minors who fled their homes due to attacks and now live without parental care. The children were separated from their families while fleeing attacks on their villages and communities. The authorities have been unable to provide these vulnerable children with a safe place to live and essential services. Two female IDPs told Amnesty International:

    “When we arrived, they [my children] left. I do not know where they have gone. I can’t speak with them; I don’t have a phone….I have 8 children and because we do not have enough space here in the IDP camp, many of them have left me and I do not know where they are.”

    Amnesty International is calling on the Nigerian authorities to take immediate steps to provide sufficient and accessible humanitarian support to the survivors of these attacks. Authorities must take steps to domesticate and effectively implement the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons within the country’s legal system.

    “The authorities’ persistent failure to hold suspected perpetrators to account is fueling a cycle of impunity that is making everyone feel unsafe. Authorities must now end the growing culture of impunity for these attacks.”

    “We call on the authorities to ensure that all people displaced because of the attacks in Benue state are provided with adequate relief, including protection, shelter, food, clean water, sanitation and healthcare. Authorities must ensure that all people who have suffered losses from the crisis are also provided with adequate compensation,” said Isa Sanusi.

    Background

    Amnesty International Nigeria has been monitoring the escalating bandit attacks and clashes between herders and farmers in Benue state since 2016. In 2020, the organization investigated the authorities’ failure to protect rural communities from attacks, and in 2025, it investigated the mounting death toll and looming humanitarian crisis amid unchecked attacks by armed groups.

    Nigeria is state party to a number of treaties that guarantee the human rights of everybody in the country regardless of the circumstances. This includes the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights which requires Nigerian authorities to ensure equal access to amongst others the rights to housing, health, food, water, sanitation and education.

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Amnesty International.

    MIL OSI Africa