Category: Asia Pacific

  • MIL-OSI Global: Mark Carney’s cabinet: A course correction on gender, but there’s more work ahead

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Jeanette Ashe, Visiting Senior Research Fellow, King’s College London

    Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has unveiled his federal cabinet in his first major opportunity to define his newly elected government’s direction.

    For academics and activists concerned with gender equity, the cabinet announcement was a crucial litmus test for Carney’s approach to inclusive governance. Overall, Carney demonstrated a significant course correction with cabinet appointments that reflect a clear commitment to gender parity going forward.

    Carney entered office amid mounting scrutiny. His first cabinet, swiftly formed following his swearing-in as prime minister to replace Justin Trudeau, broke with his predecessor’s near decade-long tradition of gender-balanced cabinets.

    Controversially, Carney also eliminated the Minister for Women and Gender Equality (WAGE) upon taking office in March. This decision prompted sharp criticism from feminist organizations, including the Canadian Research Institute for the Advancement of Women, Women’s Shelters Canada, YWCA Canada and Action Canada for Sexual Health and Rights.

    Demanded a reversal

    They wrote and signed an open letter to Carney in March at the annual gathering of the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women.

    These groups viewed the removal of WAGE not only as a symbolic loss but as one with tangible, negative policy implications for millions of women and gender-diverse individuals across Canada. They argued: “Gender equality is not an afterthought; it is the backbone of a strong economy and resilient society.”

    Investing in feminist policies, including health care, childcare and pharmacare is, in other words, good for business, they said.

    In response to this organized feminist pushback, Carney has revised his approach. His cabinet comprises 28 full ministers: 14 women and 15 men, including the prime minister. In addition, Carney appointed 10 junior ministers as secretaries of state: four women and six men. WAGE has also now been restored as a full ministry.

    Men hold the most substantive posts

    While reinstating gender parity in cabinet marks an improvement, it is not without caveats. While women now make up almost half of both cabinet tiers, it’s not sufficient. Substantive representation, in which women hold influential decision-making positions, is lacking.

    A closer look reveals Carney’s appointments may be seen as a form of gender-washing — symbolically inclusive, but not substantively so.




    Read more:
    Gender washing: seven kinds of marketing hypocrisy about empowering women


    Notably, men hold five of the six most powerful positions in his core cabinet: finance, justice and attorney general, government House leader, president of the King’s Privy Council and president of the Treasury Board. Only one of these key roles — foreign affairs — was awarded to a woman, Anita Anand.

    This reflects persistent gender trends identified by scholars like Roosmarijn de Geus and Peter Loewen, who found in 2021 that women are under-represented in Canada in the more influential or “masculine” portfolios such as finance and defence, and over-represented in those perceived as caring or social in nature.

    While women are at Canada’s cabinet table, most do not have seats with the greatest views. Equity in numbers does not yet translate to equity in influence.

    Formalizing gender parity

    Overall, Canada’s broader trends in political representation remain troubling. The 2025 election saw a decrease in both the proportion of women candidates and elected MPs.

    Canada has now slipped to 70th in the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s global ranking for women in national parliaments. With only 30.9 per cent of parliamentary seats held by women, Canada falls well below peer countries such as the United Kingdom (40.5 per cent) and New Zealand (45.5 per cent).

    Relying on the electoral fortunes of a single party to push for and uphold gender equity in Canada’s Parliament is unsustainable.

    Carney has now shown responsiveness to feminist public critique — a pragmatic move given the high number of women who supported the Liberal Party. If he wants to demonstrate ongoing commitment, his next step could be institutionalizing gender parity in ways that outlast any single leader or party. Such a change would ensure equity in politics is justice-based, not leader-based.

    More specifically, Parliament could amend the Parliament of Canada Act to require gender-balanced cabinets. Legislated gender quotas for political parties would also help ensure a minimum baseline of equitable representation in the House of Commons.




    Read more:
    Women in politics: To run or not to run?


    More than 100 countries have adopted such quotas. Canada could join them given most Canadians support their use.

    The Speaker of the House of Commons could also be tasked with producing annual gender-sensitive assessments of Parliament, policy outputs and government structures.

    Overall, Carney’s new cabinet is a win for feminist advocacy, but it cannot be the final word. Canada needs legal mechanisms, cultural shifts and institutionalized reforms to ensure its democratic institutions are truly representative.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Mark Carney’s cabinet: A course correction on gender, but there’s more work ahead – https://theconversation.com/mark-carneys-cabinet-a-course-correction-on-gender-but-theres-more-work-ahead-256541

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Consumer NZ – Smaller banks pack a punch: Consumer’s best and worst banks in 2025

    Source: Consumer NZ

    The Co-operative Bank has topped the rankings for customer satisfaction, while ANZ finished at the bottom, according to Consumer NZ’s latest independent survey of New Zealand banking customers.

    The Co-operative Bank has taken out the top spot in Consumer’s latest banking satisfaction survey, earning a customer satisfaction score of 77%.  

    At the other end of the scale, ANZ – the country’s largest bank – scored just 57%. The average satisfaction score across all banks was 64%.

    “This is the fourth year in a row that The Co-operative Bank has won our People’s Choice award,” says Jon Duffy, CEO of Consumer NZ.  

    “It’s an impressive result, especially considering its market share – less than 1%.

    “Bigger is not necessarily better. ANZ is New Zealand’s most profitable bank, with the biggest market share, but when it comes to customer satisfaction, it finished bottom of our survey.

    Consumer’s annual independent survey measures customer satisfaction across 17 areas, including trust, value for money, digital banking, and customer service.

    Don’t bank on the big banks

    Duffy notes this year’s survey results come amid persistent concerns about the state of competition in New Zealand’s banking sector and the ever-present threat of scams.  

    Our survey also found that more than 1 in 5 New Zealanders have fallen victim to a scam that has involved their bank account or a financial service.  

    While some progress has been made by banks to address scams – following pressure from central government and advocates for banks to increase efforts to protect customers – New Zealand still lags behind other countries when it comes to banking technology.  

    “The pace of innovation in the sector has been glacial. Technologies like comprehensive open banking and real-time payments that could save consumers money and keep us safe are still on the ‘to do’ list for banks,” says Duffy.

    ”Our research also shows fewer than 3% of New Zealanders switch banks each year – one of the lowest switching rates of any service sector we monitor.

    “Low switching rates and low satisfaction scores – particularly among banks with the biggest customer bases – is never a good sign for consumers. Banks are yet to deliver improvements to their switching services, as recommended by the Commerce Commission’s market study to improve competition in the sector.  

    “This is why we publish our annual satisfaction surveys. We strongly encourage people to do their homework and switch to a bank with higher customer satisfaction. It’s easier than you might think and a powerful way to foster competition so that we can collectively raise the bar,” says Duffy.

    Key findings from Consumer’s 2025 banking satisfaction survey

    The Co-operative Bank achieved the highest overall satisfaction score (77%) delivering consistent, above-average experiences across the board, particularly around digital banking, savings interest rates, and advice

    ANZ scored the lowest customer satisfaction rating (57%), with particularly low scores for interest on savings, fees, responsible lending, advice and overall value for money

    Consumer says the 20-point gap between the survey’s top and bottom performers highlights just how much customer experience can differ between banks. The full survey results (paywalled) and methodology are available on Consumer’s website: Best and worst banks in 2025. https://consumernz.cmail20.com/t/i-l-fhdtre-ijjdkdttjk-j/

    Notes

    Our data is from a nationally representative survey of 1,920 New Zealanders, aged 18 years and older, conducted online in February 2025

    Ratings cover satisfaction across 17 key service areas. Satisfaction ratings show the proportion of respondents who scored their provider 8, 9 or 10 on a scale from 0 (very dissatisfied) to 10 (very satisfied).

    Market share is based on the latest figures from the Banking Ombudsman Scheme Dashboard.

    Annual profit before tax figures are from each bank’s latest financial disclosures.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Awards – Finalists announced for 2025 ExportNZ ASB Central Region Awards

    Source: Business Central

    ExportNZ is proud to announce the finalists for the 2025 ExportNZ ASB Central Region Export Awards.
    The awards recognise exporting excellence from across the Central New Zealand Region – from Greater Wellington to Wairarapa, Horowhenua, Whanganui and Manawatū.
    This year’s new-look event is being hosted for the first time in Palmerston North, at the Palmerston North Conference and Function Centre on June 6.
    The awards are judged by a highly experienced panel of exporting specialists from ExportNZ, ASB and NZTE.
    This year’s finalists represent a wide range of businesses from across the Central region, with judges commending their innovation, creativity and endeavour amidst a challenging global market.
    ExportNZ national Chair and chief judge David Boyd says this year’s finalists are a special group:
    “Entrants in the Export Awards always amaze us with their ingenuity and innovation but I can honestly say that this year’s standards are exceptional and in all categories.
    “From groundbreaking scientific breakthroughs to excellence in constant improvement of everyday processes, our exporters are amazing!”
    This year’s category finalists are:
    DHL Best Emerging Business
    – DownUnder Honey
    – Ellen Joan Ford
    – Fleet Line Markers
    – Mana Pacific Consultants
    – Mufftech
    – Powa Products International Ltd
    Gallagher Insurance Best Established Business
    – Biophive
    – ITL
    – IPU New Zealand
    – Noske Rail
    – NZP (an ICE Pharma Company)
    – OBO
    CentrePort Excellence in Innovation
    – NovaLabs
    – Proliant Health & Biologicals
    – Sharesies
    – The Village Goldsmith
    Business Central Excellence in Sustainability
    – NZP (an ICE Pharma Company)
    – Fleet Line Markers
    – BioLumic
    All category winners are also eligible for the supreme award, ASB Exporter of the Year. In 2024, Wellington’s Lane Street Studios received both Best Emerging Business and the supreme award. Lane Street Studios CEO Kirsty Grant says:
    “Being recognised as Best Emerging Business and overall Exporter of the Year in 2024 was a significant achievement for myself and the team. We have all worked extremely hard to get our business established after building during covid and the myriad of challenges that impacted our industry.
    “As our business is considered to be a weightless export, receiving the recognition of these awards was also an acknowledgement of the substantial contribution our sector makes to the NZ economy – with so much more potential for growth.
    “We are very excited for future exporters to also be recognised for their work in supporting and further developing crucial trade relationships for NZ. Bring on the 2025 awards,” Grant said.
    Gala Dinner and Winners Announcement
    The winners in each category will be revealed during the upcoming Gala Dinner on June 6, at the Palmerston North Conference and Function Centre. Tickets for the event are available for purchase here: ExportNZ ASB Central Region Export Awards 2025 | ExportNZ
    About the ExportNZ ASB Central Region Export Awards:
    The ExportNZ ASB Central Region Export Awards recognize and honour the remarkable work of Wellington exporters, showcasing their contributions to New Zealand’s global reputation. Now in its 9 th year, the awards provide a vital role in celebrating success and fostering growth in the export sector.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Greenpeace flagship Rainbow Warrior returns for 40th anniversary of French bombing in Auckland on 10 July

    Source: Greenpeace

    The iconic Greenpeace flagship Rainbow Warrior will return to Aotearoa this year to mark the 40th anniversary of the bombing of the original Rainbow Warrior at Marsden Wharf in Auckland by French government agents on 10th July 1985.
    Russel Norman says, “The Rainbow Warrior’s return to Aotearoa comes at a pivotal moment-when the fight to protect our planet’s fragile life-support systems has never been as urgent, or more critical.
    “Here in Aotearoa, the Luxon Government is waging an all-out war on nature, and on a planetary scale, climate change, ecosystem collapse, and accelerating species extinction pose an existential threat.
    “As we remember the bombing and the murder of our crew member, Fernando Pereira, it’s important to remember why the French Government was compelled to commit such a cowardly act of violence.
    “Our ship was targeted because Greenpeace and the campaign to stop nuclear weapons testing in the Pacific were so effective. We posed a very real threat to the French Government’s military programme and colonial power.
    “It’s also critical to remember that they failed to stop us. They failed to intimidate us, and they failed to silence us. Greenpeace only grew stronger and continued the successful campaign against nuclear weapons testing in the Pacific.
    “Forty years later, it’s the oil industry that’s trying to stop us. This time, not with bombs but with a legal attack that threatens the existence of Greenpeace in the US and beyond.
    “But just like in 1985 when the French bombed our ship, now too in 2025, we will not be intimidated, we will not back down, and we will not be silenced.
    “We cannot be silenced because we are a movement of people committed to peace and to protecting Earth’s ability to sustain life, protecting the blue oceans, the forests and the life we share this planet with,” says Norman.
    “In the 40 years since, the Rainbow Warrior has sailed on the front lines of our campaigns around the world to protect nature and promote peace. In the fight to end oil exploration, turn the tide of plastic production, stop the destruction of ancient forests and protect the ocean, the Rainbow Warrior has been there to this day.
    “Right now the Rainbow Warrior is preparing to sail through the Tasman Sea to expose the damage being done to ocean life, continuing a decades-long tradition of defending ocean health,” says Norman.
    This follows the Rainbow Warrior spending six weeks in the Marshall Islands where the original ship carried out Operation Exodus, in which the Greenpeace crew evacuated the people of Rongelap from their home island that had been made uninhabitable by nuclear weapons testing by the US Government.
    In Auckland this year, several events will be held on and around the ship to mark the anniversary, including open days with tours of the ship for the public.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI Video: India-Pakistan Ceasefire

    Source: United States of America – Department of State (video statements)

    We welcome the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and commend Prime Ministers Modi and Sharif for choosing the path of peace.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UFLTGUAoJNE

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI: Satellogic Reports First Quarter 2025 Financial Results and Provides Business Update

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Revenue of $3.4 million in 1Q 2025

    Domestication to U.S. Completed

    Awarded $30 Million Contract for AI-First Constellation and Closed $20 Million Registered Direct Offering

    NEW YORK, May 13, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Satellogic Inc. (NASDAQ: SATL), a leader in sub-meter resolution Earth Observation (“EO”) data collection, today provided a business update and reported its financial results for the three months ended March 31, 2025.

    “The year is off to a great start with our recent announcements in April related to our $30 million low latency, near-daily AI-first constellation contract, our sovereign defense and intelligence imagery sales to Brazil and Singapore, and the closing of a registered direct offering in which we received $20 million in gross proceeds, which further strengthened our liquidity position. These milestones, coupled with the completion of our domestication during the first quarter, positions Satellogic to focus on significant growth opportunities, underscoring the value of our data insights and technology,” said Satellogic CEO, Emiliano Kargieman.

    Rick Dunn, Chief Financial Officer, added, “In terms of financial results, we ended the quarter with $17.7 million of cash on hand (which does not include the proceeds from the aforementioned offering) and continued to reduce our cash used in operations by $5.4 million, or 53%, compared to the three months ended March 31, 2024. Our revenue also increased modestly by 2% to $3.4 million compared to the prior year period.”

    “We expect that our revenue for 2025 will largely be dependent on closing opportunities within our Space Systems line of business, which we anticipate will contribute considerable per unit cash flow and strong gross margin. As we look to 2025 and beyond, management continues to focus on near-term growth opportunities and moving the Company forward on a path to profitability,” concluded Dunn.

    Financial Results for the Three Months Ended March 31, 2025

    • Revenue for the three months ended March 31, 2025, increased by $0.1 million, or 2%, to $3.4 million, as compared to revenue of $3.3 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024. The increase was driven primarily by a $0.4 million increase in imagery ordered by new and existing Asset Monitoring customers, partially offset by a $0.4 million decrease in revenue generated from the Space Systems business line. Revenue for the three months ended March 31, 2025 included $2.6 million attributable to our Asset Monitoring line of business, $0.4 million attributable to our Space Systems line of business, and $0.4 million attributable to our CaaS line of business compared to $2.2 million, $0.7 million and $0.4 million, respectively, in the prior period.
    • Cost of Sales, exclusive of depreciation, decreased $0.1 million, or 5%, to $1.2 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025 from $1.3 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024. The decrease was driven primarily by lower Space Systems costs on lower sales volume, partially offset by higher outsourced ground station costs. However, as a percentage of revenue, our cost of sales were 37% for the three months ended March 31, 2025, as compared to 39% for the three months ended March 31, 2024.
    • Selling, General and Administrative expenses decreased $2.9 million, or 31%, to $6.5 million during the three months ended March 31, 2025, from $9.4 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024. The decrease was driven primarily by a $0.5 million decrease in professional fees consisting mainly of the accrued advisory fee pursuant to the Liberty Subscription Agreement and professional fees related to the secured convertible notes in 2024, partially offset by professional fees related to our domestication in 2025. The decrease was also partially driven by decreases in salaries, wages, stock-based compensation and other benefits as a result of the Company’s workforce reductions in 2024 and other expense reductions resulting from continued cash control measures during 2024.
    • Engineering expenses decreased $1.9 million, or 43%, to $2.5 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025 from $4.4 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024. The decrease was driven primarily by a decrease in salaries, wages, and other benefits and stock-based compensation as a result of the Company’s workforce reductions in 2024. The decrease was also partially driven by other expense reductions resulting from continued cash control measures during 2024, including the termination of our high-throughput plant lease in the Netherlands.
    • Net loss for the three months ended March 31, 2025, increased by $17.4 million to $32.6 million, as compared to a net loss of $15.2 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024. The increase was primarily driven by an increase in the change in fair value of financial instruments ($21.6 million) and other (expense) income, net ($1.6 million) offset by increases in revenue and decreases in operating costs.
    • Non-GAAP Adjusted EBITDA loss for the three months ended March 31, 2025, improved by $3.1 million to $6.1 million, from an Adjusted EBITDA loss of $9.1 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024, primarily due to year-over-year increases in revenue and decreases in operating expenses.
    • Cash and Cash Equivalents were $17.7 million at March 31, 2025, compared to $22.5 million at December 31, 2024.
    • Net cash used in operating activities was $4.7 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to $10.1 million for the three months ended December 31, 2024. This decline in net cash used by operations was primarily due to workforce reduction and overall cost control initiatives.

    Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures

    We monitor a number of financial performance and liquidity measures on a regular basis in order to track the progress of our business. Included in these financial performance and liquidity measures are the non-GAAP measures, Non-GAAP EBITDA and Non-GAAP Adjusted EBITDA. We believe these measures provide analysts, investors and management with helpful information regarding the underlying operating performance of our business, as they provide meaningful supplemental information regarding our performance and liquidity by removing the impact of items that we believe are not reflective of our underlying operating performance. The non-GAAP measures are used by us to evaluate our core operating performance and liquidity on a comparable basis and to make strategic decisions. The non-GAAP measures also facilitate company-to-company operating performance comparisons by backing out potential differences caused by variations such as capital structures, taxation, depreciation, capital expenditures and other non-cash items (i.e., embedded derivatives, debt extinguishment and stock-based compensation) which may vary for different companies for reasons unrelated to operating performance. However, different companies may define these terms differently and accordingly comparisons might not be accurate. Non-GAAP EBITDA and Non-GAAP Adjusted EBITDA are not intended to be a substitute for any GAAP financial measure. For the definitions of Non-GAAP EBITDA and Non-GAAP Adjusted EBITDA and reconciliations to the most directly comparable GAAP measure, net loss, see below.

    We define Non-GAAP EBITDA as net loss excluding interest, income taxes, depreciation and amortization. We did not incur amortization expense during the years ended December 31, 2024 and 2023.

    We define Non-GAAP Adjusted EBITDA as Non-GAAP EBITDA further adjusted for professional fees related to the secured convertible notes, other expense (income), net, changes in the fair value of financial instruments and stock-based compensation. Other expense (income), net includes foreign exchange gain or loss and other non-operating income and expenses not considered indicative of our ongoing operational performance.

    The following table presents a reconciliation of Non-GAAP EBITDA and Non-GAAP Adjusted EBITDA to its net loss for the periods indicated.

      Three Months Ended March 31,
    (in thousands of U.S. dollars)   2025       2024  
    Net loss available to stockholders $ (32,581 )   $ (15,178 )
    Interest expense         9  
    Income tax expense   715       1,433  
    Depreciation expense   2,687       2,845  
    Non-GAAP EBITDA $ (29,179 )   $ (10,891 )
    Professional fees related to Secured Convertible Notes         971  
    Other expense (income), net   167       (1,401 )
    Change in fair value of financial instruments   22,361       752  
    Stock-based compensation   595       1,446  
    Non-GAAP Adjusted EBITDA $ (6,056 )   $ (9,123 )
     

    About Satellogic

    Founded in 2010 by Emiliano Kargieman and Gerardo Richarte, Satellogic (NASDAQ: SATL) is the first vertically integrated geospatial company, driving real outcomes with planetary-scale insights. Satellogic is creating and continuously enhancing the first scalable, fully automated EO platform with the ability to remap the entire planet at both high-frequency and high-resolution, providing accessible and affordable solutions for customers.

    Satellogic’s mission is to democratize access to geospatial data through its information platform of high-resolution images to help solve the world’s most pressing problems including climate change, energy supply, and food security. Using its patented Earth imaging technology, Satellogic unlocks the power of EO to deliver high-quality, planetary insights at the lowest cost in the industry.

    With more than a decade of experience in space, Satellogic has proven technology and a strong track record of delivering satellites to orbit and high-resolution data to customers at the right price point.

    To learn more, please visit: http://www.satellogic.com

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the U.S. federal securities laws. The words “anticipate”, “believe”, “continue”, “could”, “estimate”, “expect”, “intends”, “may”, “might”, “plan”, “possible”, “potential”, “predict”, “project”, “should”, “would” and similar expressions may identify forward-looking statements, but the absence of these words does not mean that a statement is not forward-looking. These forward-looking statements are based on Satellogic’s current expectations and beliefs concerning future developments and their potential effects on Satellogic and include statements concerning Satellogic’s strategic realignment as a U.S. company, and the visibility and high growth opportunities it will provide in connection therewith. Forward-looking statements are predictions, projections and other statements about future events that are based on current expectations and assumptions and, as a result, are subject to risks and uncertainties. These statements are based on various assumptions, whether or not identified in this press release. These forward-looking statements are provided for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to serve, and must not be relied on by an investor as, a guarantee, an assurance, a prediction or a definitive statement of fact or probability. Actual events and circumstances are difficult or impossible to predict and will differ from assumptions. Many actual events and circumstances are beyond the control of Satellogic. Many factors could cause actual future events to differ materially from the forward-looking statements in this press release, including but not limited to: (i) our ability to generate revenue as expected, including due to challenges created by macroeconomic concerns, geopolitical uncertainty (e.g., trade relationships), financial market fluctuations and related factors, (ii) our ability to effectively market and sell our EO services and to convert contracted revenues and our pipeline of potential contracts into actual revenues, (iii) risks related to the secured convertible notes, (iv) the potential loss of one or more of our largest customers, (v) the considerable time and expense related to our sales efforts and the length and unpredictability of our sales cycle, (vi) risks and uncertainties associated with defense-related contracts, (vii) risk related to our pricing structure, (viii) our ability to scale production of our satellites as planned, (ix) unforeseen risks, challenges and uncertainties related to our expansion into new business lines, (x) our dependence on third parties, including SpaceX, to transport and launch our satellites into space, (xi) our reliance on third-party vendors and manufacturers to build and provide certain satellite components, products, or services and the inability of these vendors and manufacturers to meet our needs, (xii) our dependence on ground station and cloud-based computing infrastructure operated by third pirates for value-added services, and any errors, disruption, performance problems, or failure in their or our operational infrastructure, (xiii) risk related to certain minimum service requirements in our customer contracts, (xiv) market acceptance of our EO services and our dependence upon our ability to keep pace with the latest technological advances, including those related to artificial intelligence and machine learning, (xv) our ability to identify suitable acquisition candidates or consummate acquisitions on acceptable terms, or our ability to successfully integrate acquisitions, (xvi) competition for EO services, (xvii) challenges with international operations or unexpected changes to the regulatory environment in certain markets, (xviii) unknown defects or errors in our products, (xix) risk related to the capital-intensive nature of our business and our ability to raise adequate capital to finance our business strategies, (xx) uncertainties beyond our control related to the production, launch, commissioning, and/or operation of our satellites and related ground systems, software and analytic technologies, (xxi) the failure of the market for EO services to achieve the growth potential we expect, (xxii) risks related to our satellites and related equipment becoming impaired, (xxiii) risks related to the failure of our satellites to operate as intended, (xxiv) production and launch delays, launch failures, and damage or destruction to our satellites during launch, (xxv) the impact of natural disasters, unusual or prolonged unfavorable weather conditions, epidemic outbreaks, terrorist acts and geopolitical events (including the ongoing conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, in the Gaza Strip and the Red Sea region) on our business and satellite launch schedules and (xxvi) the anticipated benefits of the domestication may not materialize. The foregoing list of factors is not exhaustive. You should carefully consider the foregoing factors and the other risks and uncertainties described in the “Risk Factors” section of Satellogic’s Annual Report on Form 10-K and other documents filed or to be filed by Satellogic from time to time with the Securities and Exchange Commission. These filings identify and address other important risks and uncertainties that could cause actual events and results to differ materially from those contained in the forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made. Readers are cautioned not to put undue reliance on forward-looking statements, and Satellogic assumes no obligation and does not intend to update or revise these forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events, or otherwise. Satellogic can give no assurance that it will achieve its expectations.

    Contacts

    Investor Relations:

    Ryan Driver, VP of Strategy & Corporate Development
    ryan.driver@satellogic.com

    Media Relations:

    Satellogic
    pr@satellogic.com

    SATELLOGIC INC.
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS AND COMPREHENSIVE LOSS
    UNAUDITED
     
      Three Months Ended March 31,
    (in thousands of U.S. dollars, except share and per share amounts)   2025       2024  
    Revenue $ 3,387     $ 3,328  
    Costs and expenses      
    Cost of sales, exclusive of depreciation shown separately below   1,237       1,305  
    Selling, general and administrative   6,485       9,389  
    Engineering   2,493       4,387  
    Depreciation expense   2,687       2,845  
    Total costs and expenses   12,902       17,926  
    Operating loss   (9,515 )     (14,598 )
    Other (expense) income, net      
    Interest income, net   177       204  
    Change in fair value of financial instruments   (22,361 )     (752 )
    Other (expense) income, net   (167 )     1,401  
    Total other (expense) income, net   (22,351 )     853  
    Loss before income tax   (31,866 )     (13,745 )
    Income tax expense   (715 )     (1,433 )
    Net loss available to stockholders $ (32,581 )   $ (15,178 )
    Other comprehensive loss      
    Foreign currency translation gain (loss), net of tax   257       (137 )
    Comprehensive loss $ (32,324 )   $ (15,315 )
           
    Basic net loss per share for the period attributable to holders of Common Stock $ (0.34 )   $ (0.17 )
    Basic weighted-average Common Stock outstanding   96,655,349       90,331,496  
    Diluted net loss per share for the period attributable to holders of Common Stock $ (0.34 )   $ (0.17 )
    Diluted weighted-average Common Stock outstanding   96,655,349       90,331,496  
    SATELLOGIC INC.
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
    UNAUDITED
     
      March 31,   December 31,
    (in thousands of U.S. dollars, except per share and par value amounts)   2025       2024  
    ASSETS      
    Current assets      
    Cash and cash equivalents $ 17,716     $ 22,493  
    Restricted cash   305        
    Accounts receivable, net of allowance of $148 and $148, respectively   1,799       1,464  
    Prepaid expenses and other current assets   4,274       3,907  
    Total current assets   24,094       27,864  
    Property and equipment, net   25,802       27,228  
    Operating lease right-of-use assets   6,538       877  
    Other non-current assets   4,968       5,722  
    Total assets $ 61,402     $ 61,691  
    LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ (DEFICIT) EQUITY      
    Current liabilities      
    Accounts payable $ 3,742     $ 3,754  
    Warrant liabilities   14,902       11,511  
    Earnout liabilities   1,992       1,501  
    Operating lease liabilities   989       363  
    Contract liabilities   6,308       5,871  
    Accrued expenses and other liabilities   13,661       11,621  
    Total current liabilities   41,594       34,621  
    Secured Convertible Notes at fair value   96,590       79,070  
    Operating lease liabilities   5,812       516  
    Other non-current liabilities   498       516  
    Total liabilities   144,494       114,723  
    Commitments and contingencies      
    Stockholders’ (deficit) equity      
    Preferred stock, $0.0001 par value, 5,000,000 shares authorized, 0 shares issued and outstanding as of December 31, 2024 and December 31, 2023          
    Class A Common Stock, $0.0001 par value, 385,000,000 shares authorized, 84,451,437 shares issued and 83,883,614 shares outstanding as of March 31, 2025 and 83,000,501 shares issued and 82,432,678 shares outstanding as of December 31, 2024          
    Class B Common Stock, $0.0001 par value, 15,000,000 shares authorized, 13,582,642 shares issued and outstanding as of March 31, 2025 and December 31, 2024          
    Treasury stock, at cost, 567,823 shares as of March 31, 2025 and 567,823 shares as of December 31, 2024   (8,603 )     (8,603 )
    Additional paid-in capital   358,511       356,247  
    Accumulated other comprehensive loss   (314 )     (571 )
    Accumulated deficit   (432,686 )     (400,105 )
    Total stockholders’ (deficit) equity   (83,092 )     (53,032 )
    Total liabilities and stockholders’ (deficit) equity $ 61,402     $ 61,691  
    SATELLOGIC INC.
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS
    UNAUDITED
     
      Three Months Ended March 31,
    (in thousands of U.S. dollars)   2025       2024  
    Cash flows from operating activities:      
    Net loss $ (32,581 )   $ (15,178 )
    Adjustments to reconcile net loss to net cash used in operating activities:      
    Depreciation expense   2,687       2,845  
    Operating lease expense   421       538  
    Stock-based compensation   595       1,446  
    Change in fair value of financial instruments, net of interest paid on Secured Convertible Notes   20,691       752  
    Foreign exchange differences   (188 )     (643 )
    Loss on disposal of property and equipment   28       78  
    Expense for estimated credit losses on accounts receivable, net of recoveries         16  
    Non-cash change in contract liabilities   (46 )     (501 )
    Other, net         56  
    Changes in operating assets and liabilities:      
    Accounts receivable   (21 )     (932 )
    Prepaid expenses and other current assets   830       (377 )
    Accounts payable   569       1,764  
    Contract liabilities   438       (25 )
    Accrued expenses and other liabilities   2,024       601  
    Operating lease liabilities   (169 )     (555 )
    Net cash used in operating activities   (4,722 )     (10,115 )
    Cash flows from investing activities:      
    Purchases of property and equipment   (1,913 )     (1,942 )
    Net cash used in investing activities   (1,913 )     (1,942 )
    Cash flows from financing activities:      
    Proceeds from issuance of Common Stock under ATM Program, net of transaction costs   1,143        
    Payments for withholding taxes related to the net share settlement of equity awards   (375 )     (184 )
    Proceeds from exercise of stock options   916        
    Net cash provided by (used in) financing activities   1,684       (184 )
    Net (decrease) increase in cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash   (4,951 )     (12,241 )
    Effect of foreign exchange rate changes on cash and cash equivalents   177       542  
    Cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash – beginning of period   23,682       24,603  
    Cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash – end of period $ 18,908     $ 12,904  

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Global Star Acquisition Inc. and K Enter Holdings Inc. Finalize Business Combination

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SEOUL and NEW YORK, May 13, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Global Star Acquisition Inc. (NASDAQ: GLST) (“Global Star”), a special purpose acquisition company and K Enter Holdings Inc. (“K Enter”), a holding company with an internal K drama production team and controlling interest in six diversified entertainment operating companies based in Korea and engaged in the entertainment content and IP creation businesses, today announced the completion of the previously announced business combination that will result in the creation of K Wave Media Ltd. Accordingly, K Wave Media Ltd.’s ordinary shares and warrants are expected to commence trading on The Nasdaq Global Market under the symbols “KWM” and “KWMWW”, respectively on May 14, 2025.

    The business combination was approved at a special meeting of GLST’s stockholders on February 3, 2025.

    “We are proud to complete this milestone transition of K Wave Media to become the first Korean content media alliance to list on the Nasdaq stock exchange,” said Tan Chin Hwee, Executive Chairman and Interim CEO of K Enter. “We are laser focused on pursuing our planned growth initiatives across the value chain of our Korean entertainment and media business lines, now with enhanced U.S. visibility to attract a core retail and institutional shareholder base. Additionally, we are appreciative of Global Star’s partnership and mutual determination to achieve K Wave’s public listing. We are poised to become a leading player in IP-based diversified entertainment delivering high quality K-content to our loyal global fanbase.”

    K Wave Media will continue to be led by Tan Chin Hwee, Executive Chairman and Interim CEO of K Enter, until a successor is appointed.

    Advisors

    D. Boral Capital acted as Global Star’s Capital Markets Advisor on the transaction. Loeb & Loeb LLP acted as U.S. legal counsel to K Enter. Duane Morris LLP acted as legal counsel to Global Star.

    About K Enter Holdings Inc.

    K Enter Holdings Inc. is a Delaware corporation with contracts to acquire controlling equity interests in six diversified entertainment operating companies based in Korea, engaged in the entertainment content, IP creation, merchandising and entertainment investment businesses (the “Six Korean Entities”). K Enter has an internal K drama production team. The Six Korean Entities to be acquired by K Enter include Play Company Co., Ltd, a Korean IP merchandising company, and Solaire Partners Ltd., a Korean IP content-specialized private equity firm, Studio Anseilen Co., Ltd., a K drama production company, and The LAMP Co., Ltd., Bidangil Pictures Co., Ltd., and Apeitda Co., Ltd., each of which is a K movie production company.

    About Global Star Acquisition Inc.

    Global Star Acquisition Inc., a Delaware corporation, is a blank check company formed for the purpose of effecting a merger, capital stock exchange, asset acquisition, stock purchase, reorganization or similar business combination with one or more businesses.

    Cautionary Statements Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release is provided for informational purposes and for no other purpose. No representations or warranties, express or implied are given in, or in respect of, this press release. To the fullest extent permitted by law under no circumstances will Global Star, K Enter, or any of the Six Korean Entities, interest holders, affiliates, representatives, partners, directors, officers, employees, advisors or agents be responsible or liable for any direct, indirect or consequential loss or loss of profit arising from the use of this press release, its contents, its omissions, reliance on the information contained within it, or on opinions communicated in relation thereto or otherwise arising in connection therewith. Industry and market data used in this press release have been obtained from third-party industry publications and sources as well as from research reports prepared for other purposes. Neither Global Star nor K Enter has independently verified the data obtained from these sources and cannot assure you of the data’s accuracy or completeness. This data is subject to change. In addition, this press release does not purport to be all-inclusive or to contain all the information that may be required to make a full analysis of Global Star, K Enter or the Proposed Business Combination. Viewers of this press release should each make their own evaluation of Global Star and K Enter and of the relevance and adequacy of the information and should make such other investigations as they deem necessary. This press release contains certain “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the federal securities laws, including statements regarding the benefits of the Proposed Business Combination, including K Enter’s ability to accelerate the development of its products and bring them to market, the anticipated timing for completion of the Proposed Business Combination, and Global Star’s and K Enter’s expectations, plans or forecasts of future events and views as of the date of this press release. Global Star and K Enter anticipate that subsequent events and developments will cause Global Star’s and K Enter’s assessments to change. These forward-looking statements, which may include, without limitation, words such as “expect,” “estimate,” “project,” “budget,” “forecast,” “anticipate,” “intend,” “plan,” “may,” “will”, “could,” “should,” “believes,” “predicts,” “potential,” “might,” “continues,” “think,” “strategy,” “future,” and similar expressions, involve significant risks and uncertainties (most of which factors are outside of the control of Global Star or K Enter).

    In addition, this press release includes a summary set of risk factors that may have a material impact on Global Star, K Enter or the Proposed Business Combination, which are not intended to capture all the risks to which Global Star, K Enter or the Proposed Business Combination is subject or may be subject. Factors that may cause such differences include but are not limited to: (1) the occurrence of any event, change or other circumstance that could give rise to the termination of the Merger Agreement; (2) the risk that the Proposed Business Combination may not be completed in a timely manner or at all, which may adversely affect the price of the securities; (3) the risk that the Proposed Business Combination may not be completed by Global Star’s business combination deadline; (4) the inability to complete the Proposed Business Combination, including but not limited to due to the failure to obtain approval of the stockholders of Global Star or K Enter for the Merger Agreement, to receive certain governmental, regulatory and third party approvals or to satisfy other conditions to closing in the Merger Agreement; (5) the failure to achieve the minimum amount of cash available following any redemptions by Global Star’s stockholders; (6) the inability to obtain or maintain the listing of Global Star’s common stock on Nasdaq following the Proposed Business Combination, including but not limited to redemptions exceeding anticipated levels or the failure to meet Nasdaq’s initial listing standards in connection with the consummation of the Proposed Business Combination; (7) the effect of the announcement or pendency of the Proposed Business Combination on K Enter’s business relationships, operating results, and business generally; (8) risks that the Proposed Business Combination disrupts current plans and operations of K Enter or the Six Korean Entities; (9) the inability to realize the anticipated benefits of the Proposed Business Combination and to realize estimated pro forma results and underlying assumptions, including but not limited to with respect to estimated stockholder redemptions and costs related to the Proposed Business Combination; (10) the possibility that Global Star or K Enter or the Six Korean Entities may be adversely affected by other economic or business factors; (11) changes in the markets in which K Enter and the Six Korean Entities compete, including but not limited to with respect to its competitive landscape, technology evolution, changes in entertainment choices or regulatory changes; (12) changes in domestic and global general economic conditions; (13) risk that K Enter may not be able to execute its growth strategies; (14) the risk that K Enter experiences difficulties in managing its growth and expanding operations after the Proposed Business Combination; (15) the risk that the parties will need to raise additional capital to execute the business plan, which may not be available on acceptable terms or at all; (16) the ability to recognize the anticipated benefits of the Proposed Business Combination to achieve its commercialization and development plans, and identify and realize additional opportunities, which may be affected by, among other things, competition, the ability of K Enter to grow and manage growth economically and hire and retain key employees; (17) risk that K Enter may not be able to develop and maintain effective internal controls; (18) the risk that K Enter may fail to keep pace with rapid technological developments or changes in entertainment tastes to provide new and innovative products and services, or may make substantial investments in unsuccessful new products and services; (19) the ability to develop, license or acquire new content, products and services; (20) the risk that K Enter is unable to secure or protect its intellectual property; (21) the risk of product liability or regulatory lawsuits or proceedings relating to K Enter’s business; (22) the risk of cyber security or foreign exchange losses; (23) changes in applicable laws or regulations; (24) the outcome of any legal proceedings that may be instituted against the parties related to the Merger Agreement or the Proposed Business Combination; (25) the impact of the global COVID-19 pandemic and response on any of the foregoing risks, including but not limited to supply chain disruptions; (26) the risk that K Enter fails to successfully and timely consummate its acquisition of one or more of the Six Korean Entities’; and (27) other risks and uncertainties identified in the registration statement on Form F-4, which included a proxy statement/prospectus filed in connection with the Proposed Business Combination (the “Registration Statement”), including those under “Risk Factors” therein, and in other filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) made by Global Star. You should carefully consider the foregoing factors and the other risks and uncertainties described in the “Risk Factors” section of Global Star’s Annual Report on Form 10-K, Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q and the Registration Statement filed with the SEC with respect to the Proposed Business Combination, and other documents filed by Global Star from time to time with the SEC. These filings identify and address other important risks and uncertainties that could cause actual events and results to differ materially from those contained in the forward-looking statements. The foregoing list of factors is not exhaustive, are provided for illustrative purposes only, and are not intended to serve as, and must not be relied on as, a guarantee, an assurance, a prediction or a definitive statement of fact or probability. Actual events and circumstances are difficult or impossible to predict and will differ from assumptions. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made. If any of these risks materialize or our assumptions prove incorrect, actual results could differ materially from the results implied by these forward-looking statements. There may be additional risks that neither Global Star nor K Enter presently know or that Global Star and K Enter currently believe are immaterial that could also cause actual results to differ materially from those contained in the forward-looking statements. Global Star and K Enter anticipate that subsequent events and developments will cause Global Star’s and K Enter’s assessments to change. However, while Global Star and K Enter may elect to update these forward-looking statements at some point in the future, Global Star and K Enter specifically disclaim any obligation to do so. Neither Global Star nor K Enter gives any assurance that Global Star or K Enter, or the combined company, will achieve its expectations. Accordingly, undue reliance should not be placed upon the forward-looking statements, and they should not be relied upon as representing Global Star’s and K Enter’s assessments as of any date subsequent to the date of this press release.

    Contact

    K Enter Holdings, Inc.
    Ted Kim
    Director and Co-Founder, K-Enter Holdings
    ted@globalfundpe.com

    Investor Contact
    MZ Group
    Shannon Devine/Rory Rumore
    +1 (203) 741-8811
    GLST@mzgroup.us

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: authID Reports Financial and Operating Results for the First Quarter Ended March 31, 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    DENVER, May 13, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — authID® (Nasdaq: AUID) (“authID” or the “Company”), a leading provider of biometric identity verification and authentication solutions, today reported financial and operating results for the first quarter ended March 31, 2025.

    First Quarter 2025 vs. First Quarter 2024 Financial Summary

    • Total revenue for the quarter increased to $0.30 million, compared to $0.16 million a year ago.
    • Operating expenses were $4.7 million, compared to $3.3 million a year ago.
    • Net loss was $4.3 million, or $0.40 per share, compared to a loss of $3.1 million, or $0.32 per share a year ago.
    • Adjusted EBITDA Loss of $3.9 million (non-GAAP measure as defined below), compared with $2.4 million a year ago.
    • Gross bARR (Booked Annual Recurring Revenue) of $0.01 million (non-GAAP measure as defined below), compared with $0.10 million a year ago.

    “I’m incredibly excited about authID’s growth prospects in 2025 and beyond,” said Rhon Daguro, authID’s Chief Executive Officer. “We have solidified our foundation to become a leader in the evolving and fast-growing biometric authentication market while making progress on our ambitious 2025 goals. We are continuing to advance our conversations with key enterprise and platform partner prospects in order to achieve our bookings targets and are intensifying our focus on the large enterprise and large channel OEM segments as we move through the second quarter.

    “We recently secured nearly $9 million in capital through two financing rounds to improve our balance sheet, broaden our investor base and provide us with additional expertise and support as we scale our business and invest in new opportunities. Through these efforts we have also created an advisory board comprised of two new expert advisors, Eric Swider and Donald Nitti. Both leaders have extensive experience in different industry and government sectors where authID’s biometric identity solutions can address critical needs.

    “As we move through the year, we continue to expect to close multiple Fortune 500 and multi-national customers in 2025, and we are currently in the late stages of our sales cycle with these potential customers. I’m pleased with our momentum to date and remain confident that we will sign new customers and drive significant growth towards our $18 million bookings target for 2025.”

    Recent Business and Operational Highlights

    • Secured nearly $9 million dollars after expenses from existing and new shareholders through two registered direct offerings, while also creating an advisory board comprised of two new expert advisors, Eric Swider and Donald Nitti.
    • Signed a paid live production trial agreement with a Global Fortune 500 prospect to deliver authID’s solution in a controlled rollout. Upon completion, authID expects to secure a longer-term agreement.
    • Advanced to final stages with a Global Fortune 500 biometric hardware provider to embed authID into a solution offering reusable, interoperable identity credentials for employee workforces.
    • Confirmed as the selected vendor by one of the largest identity fraud platforms and are in the final stages of contract negotiations.
    • Launched efforts into the Public Sector by providing a reuseable identity platform for removing the barriers between siloed systems for government workforces.
    • Began integration with a blockchain-based data privacy and security platform to validate identity of data owners through privacy preserving biometrics which bring authID’s technology into smart cities in South America and India to start.
    • Identified new opportunities in the Indian banking sector with our Indian partner to protect high value transactions and account access with authID’s PrivacyKey technology
    • Successfully delivered a proof of concept and entered into contract negotiations with a Fortune 500 prospect to deliver identity verification and biometric solutions.
    • Named “Best ID Management Platform” Award in 2025 FinTech Breakthrough Awards for the third time. authID was recognized for its groundbreaking biometric identity verification technology, which has set a new standard for precision, speed, and data privacy in the fintech industry, as well as the verification landscape at large.

    Financial Results for the First Quarter Ended March 31, 2025

    Total revenue for the three months ended March 31, 2025 was $0.30 million, compared with $0.16 million a year ago.

    Operating expenses for the three months ended March 31, 2025, were $4.7 million, compared to $3.3 million a year ago. The 2025 increase is primarily due to increased headcount investment in sales and R&D.

    Net loss for the three months ended March 31, 2025 was $4.3 million, of which non-cash charges were $0.5 million, compared with a net loss of $3.1 million a year ago, of which non-cash charges were $0.8 million

    Loss per share for the three months ended March 31, 2025 was $0.40, compared with $0.32 a year ago.

    Adjusted EBITDA loss was $3.9 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024, compared with $2.4 million a year ago. The increase in Adjusted EBITDA loss is primarily driven by the increase in headcount investment in sales and R&D. Please refer to Table 1 for reconciliation of net loss to Adjusted EBITDA (a non-GAAP measure).

    Remaining Performance Obligation (RPO) as of March 31, 2025, was $13.85 million, of which $1.01 million is held as deferred revenue and $12.84 million is related to other non-cancellable contracted amounts, compared to RPO of $4.03 million as of March 31, 2024. The Company expects to recognize the full RPO of $13.85 million over the entire life of the contracts, which are typically signed with a 3-year term.

    The gross amount of Booked Annual Recurring Revenue or bARR, (a non-GAAP measure, as defined below), signed in the first quarter of 2025 was $0.01 million, down from $0.10 million of gross bARR a year ago. The net amount of bARR was negative $0.13 million compared to $0.10 million of net bARR signed in the comparable period in 2024. The Q1 bARR is comprised of $0 million in Committed Annual Recurring Revenue (cARR) and $0.01 million in estimated Usage Above Commitments (UAC).

    The net amount of bARR reflects the deduction of the bARR of contracts previously included in reported bARR, due to certain customers experiencing delays in Production Go-Live timing and volume ramping. See below for further definition and explanation of ARR and bARR, non-GAAP measures.

    Conference Call

    A conference call and webcast will be held today at 5.00 p.m. EDT, hosted by authID Chief Executive Officer, Rhon Daguro and Chief Financial Officer, Ed Sellitto to discuss the financial results and provide a corporate update. To participate on the live conference call, please access this registration link and you will be provided with dial-in details. To avoid delays, participants are encouraged to dial into the conference call 15 minutes ahead of the scheduled start time. A live webcast of the call will be available at webcast registration and on the “Events & Presentations” page of the Company’s website at investors.authid.ai. Only participants on the live conference call will be able to ask questions.

    A replay of the event and a copy of the presentation will also be available for 90 days at authID’s Investor Relations site.

    About authID Inc.

    authID (Nasdaq: AUID) ensures enterprises “Know Who’s Behind the Device™” for every customer or employee login and transaction through its easy-to-integrate, patented biometric identity platform. authID powers biometric identity proofing in 700ms, biometric authentication in 25ms, and account recovery with a fast, accurate, user-friendly experience. With our ground-breaking PrivacyKey Solution, authID provides a 1-to-1-billion false match rate, while storing no biometric data. authID stops fraud at onboarding, blocks deepfakes, prevents account takeover, and eliminates password risks and costs, through the fastest, most frictionless, and most accurate user identity experience demanded by today’s digital ecosystem.

    For further information please visit authid.ai

    Investor Relations Contacts
    authID Investor Relations
    investor-relations@authID.ai

    Media Contacts
    Walter Fowler
    1-631-334-3864
    wfowler@nexttechcomms.com

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This Press Release includes “forward-looking statements.” All statements other than statements of historical facts included herein, including, without limitation, those regarding the future results of operations, growth and sales, potential contract signings, booked Annual Recurring Revenue (bARR) (and its components cARR and UAC), Annual Recurring Revenue (ARR), cash flow, cash position and financial position, business strategy, plans and objectives of management for future operations of both authID Inc. and its business partners, are forward-looking statements. Such forward-looking statements are based on a number of assumptions regarding authID’s present and future business strategies, and the environment in which authID expects to operate in the future, which assumptions may or may not be fulfilled in practice. Actual results may vary materially from the results anticipated by these forward-looking statements as a result of a variety of risk factors, including the Company’s ability to attract and retain customers; successful implementation of the services to be provided under new customer contracts and their adoption by customers’ users; the Company’s ability to compete effectively; changes in laws, regulations and practices; the increase in international tariffs and uncertainty over international trading conditions, changes in domestic and international economic and political conditions, the impact of the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, inflationary pressures, changes in interest rates, and others. See the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year ended December 31, 2024 filed at www.sec.gov and other documents filed with the SEC for other risk factors which investors should consider. These forward-looking statements speak only as to the date of this release and cannot be relied upon as a guide to future performance. authID expressly disclaims any obligation or undertaking to disseminate any updates or revisions to any forward-looking statements contained in this release to reflect any changes in its expectations with regard thereto or any change in events, conditions, or circumstances on which any statement is based.

    Non-GAAP Financial Information

    The Company provides certain non-GAAP financial measures in this statement. These non-GAAP key business indicators, which include Adjusted EBITDA, bARR and ARR should not be considered replacements for and should be read in conjunction with the GAAP financial measures.

    Management believes that Adjusted EBITDA, when viewed with our results under GAAP and the accompanying reconciliations, provides useful information about our period-over-period results. Adjusted EBITDA is presented because management believes it provides additional information with respect to the performance of our fundamental business activities and is also frequently used by securities analysts, investors, and other interested parties in the evaluation of comparable companies. We also rely on Adjusted EBITDA as a primary measure to review and assess the operating performance of our company and our management.

    Adjusted EBITDA is a non-GAAP financial measure that represents GAAP net loss adjusted to exclude (1) interest expense and debt discount and debt issuance costs amortization expense, (2) interest income, (3) depreciation and amortization, (4) stock-based compensation expense (stock options) and certain other items management believes affect the comparability of operating results.

    Please see Table 1 below for a reconciliation of Adjusted EBITDA – continuing operations to net loss – continuing operations, the most directly comparable financial measure calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP.

     
     TABLE 1
    Reconciliation of Loss from Continuing Operations to Adjusted EBITDA Continuing Operations.
     
      Three Months Ended
    March 31,
      2025   2024
    Loss from continuing operations $ (4,339,467 )   $ (3,057,577 )
                   
    Addback:              
                   
    Interest expense, net   12,712       13,138  
    Other income   (51,544 )     (108,920 )
    Depreciation and amortization   30,192       43,408  
    Stock compensation   454,339       722,971  
    Adjusted EBITDA continuing operations (Non-GAAP)   (3,893,768 )     (2,386,980 )
     

    Management believes that bARR and ARR, when viewed with our results under GAAP, provide useful information about the direction of future growth trends of the Company’s revenues. We also rely on bARR as one of several primary measures to review and assess the sales performance of our Company and our management team in connection with our executive compensation. The Company defines Booked Annual Recurring Revenue or bARR, as the amount of annual recurring revenue represented by the estimated amounts of annual recurring revenue we believe will be earned under such contracted orders, looking out eighteen months from the date of signing of each customer contract. This estimate is comprised of two components (1) Committed Annual Recurring Revenue (cARR), which represents the minimum amounts that customers are contractually committed to pay each year over the life of the contract and (2) Usage Above Commitments (UAC), which represents our estimate of the rate of annual recurring revenue arising from actual usage of our services above the contractual minimums, that we believe the Customer will achieve after 18 months. The net amount of bARR reflects the deduction of the bARR of contracts previously included in reported bARR, which were subject to attrition, or other downward adjustments during the quarter.

    The company defines Annual Recurring Revenue or ARR, as the amount of recurring revenue recognized during the last three months of the relevant period as determined in accordance with GAAP, multiplied by four.

    bARR may be distinguished from ARR, as bARR does not take specifically into account the time to implement any contract for authID’s services, nor for any ramp in adoption, or seasonality of usage of our biometric products but is based on the assumption that 18 months after signing these matters will have been generally resolved. Furthermore, bARR is based on estimates of future revenues under particular contracts, whereas ARR, whilst also forward-looking, is based on historical revenues recognized in accordance with GAAP during the relevant period. A reconciliation of bARR to a GAAP measure is not provided as there is no comparable GAAP measure and we believe that any attempt at such reconciliation may be confusing to investors. bARR and ARR have limitations as analytical tools, and you should not consider them in isolation from, or as a substitute for, analysis of our results as reported under GAAP. Some of these limitations are:

    • bARR & ARR should not be considered as predictors of future revenues but only as indicators of the direction in which revenues may be trending. Actual revenue results in the future as determined in accordance with GAAP may be significantly different to the amounts indicated as bARR or ARR at any time.
    • bARR and ARR are to be considered “forward-looking statements” and subject to the same risks, as other such statements (see note on “Forward-Looking Statements” above).
     
    authID INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS
    (Unaudited)
     
      Three Months Ended
    March 31,
      2025   2024
    Revenues, net $ 296,256     $ 157,378  
                   
    Operating Expenses:              
    General and administrative   2,645,700       2,062,361  
    Research and development   1,998,663       1,204,968  
    Depreciation amortization   30,192       43,408  
    Total operating expenses   4,674,555       3,310,737  
                   
    Loss from operations   (4,378,299 )     (3,153,359 )
                   
    Other Income (Expense):              
    Interest expense, net   (12,712 )     (13,138 )
    Other income   51,544       108,920  
    Other income (expense), net   38,832       95,782  
                   
    Net loss before income taxes   (4,339,467 )     (3,057,577 )
    Income tax expense          
    Net Loss $ (4,339,467 )   $ (3,057,577 )
                   
                   
    Net Loss Per Share – Basic and Diluted operations $ (0.40 )   $ (0.32 )
                   
    Weighted Average Shares Outstanding – Basic and Diluted   10,920,909       9,450,220  
     
    authID INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
     
        March 31,
    2025
          December 31,
    2024
     
    ASSETS   (Unaudited)          
    Current Assets:              
    Cash $ 2,866,347     $ 8,471,561  
    Accounts receivable, net   1,028,564       97,897  
    Contract assets   487,551       426,859  
    Deferred contract costs   595,359       617,918  
    Other current assets, net   623,475       460,192  
    Total current assets   5,601,296       10,074,427  
                   
    Intangible assets, net   185,226       213,718  
    Goodwill   4,183,232       4,183,232  
    Total assets $ 9,969,754     $ 14,471,377  
                   
    LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY              
    Current Liabilities:              
    Accounts payable and accrued expenses $ 811,934     $ 1,715,410  
    Commission liability   191,519       459,657  
    Severance liability   325,000       325,000  
    Convertible debt, net         240,884  
    Deferred revenue   1,011,448       215,237  
    Total current liabilities   2,339,901       2,956,188  
                   
    Total liabilities $ 2,339,901     $ 2,956,188  
                   
    Commitments and Contingencies (Note 8)              
                   
    Stockholders’ Equity:              
    Common stock, $0.0001 par value, 150,000,000 shares authorized as of March 31, 2025 and December 31, 2024; 10,920,909 shares issued and outstanding as of March 31, 2025 and December 31, 2024   1,092       1,092  
    Additional paid-in capital   185,766,847       185,312,508  
    Accumulated deficit   (178,147,996 )     (173,808,529 )
    Accumulated comprehensive income   9,910       10,118  
    Total stockholders’ equity   7,629,853       11,515,189  
    Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity $ 9,969,754     $ 14,471,377  
     
    authID INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS
    (Unaudited)
     
      Three Months Ended
    March 31,
      2025   2024
    CASH FLOWS FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES:              
                   
    Net loss $ (4,339,467 )   $ (3,057,577 )
    Adjustments to reconcile net loss with cash flows from operations:              
    Stock-based compensation   454,339       722,971  
    Depreciation and amortization expense   30,192       43,408  
    Amortization of debt discounts and issuance costs   4,116       4,115  
                   
    Changes in operating assets and liabilities:              
    Accounts receivable   (930,667 )     (237,506 )
    Contract assets   (60,692 )     (49,713 )
    Deferred contract cost   22,559       (3,417 )
    Other current assets   (163,283 )     (9,521 )
    Commission liability   (268,138 )     (40,950 )
    Accounts payable and accrued expenses   (903,476 )     (495,357 )
    Deferred revenue   796,211       176,019  
    Net cash flows from operating activities   (5,358,306 )     (2,947,528 )
                   
    CASH FLOWS FROM INVESTING ACTIVITIES:              
    Purchase of intangible assets   (1,700 )      
    Net cash flows from investing activities   (1,700 )      
                   
    CASH FLOWS FROM FINANCING ACTIVITIES:              
    Repayment of convertible notes   (245,000 )      
    Net cash flows from financing activities   (245,000 )      
                   
    Effect of Foreign Currencies   (208 )     (3,359 )
                   
    Net Change in Cash   (5,605,214 )     (2,950,887 )
    Cash, Beginning of the Period   8,471,561       10,177,099  
    Cash, End of the Period $ 2,866,347     $ 7,226,212  
                   
    Supplemental Disclosure of Cash Flow Information:              
    Cash paid for interest $ 13,137     $ 9,023  

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Waldencast Reports Q1 2025 Financial Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Q1 Net Revenue of $65.4 million, (4.1)% decline from Q1 2024
    76.4% Adjusted Gross Margin, an improvement of 10 basis points
    $4.4 million of Adjusted EBITDA

    LONDON, May 13, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Waldencast plc (NASDAQ: WALD) (“Waldencast” or the “Company”), a global multi-brand beauty and wellness platform, today reported operating results for the three months ended March 31, 2025 (“Q1 2025”) on Form 6-K to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), which are also available on our investor relations site at http://ir.waldencast.com/.

    Michel Brousset, Waldencast Founder and CEO, said: “As anticipated, in Q1 2025, Milk Makeup results were impacted by the cycling of the very successful launch of Jellies in Q1 2024, as well as the significant inventory reduction at the retail level versus a year ago.”

    “Despite a broader slowdown in the prestige beauty category in the U.S., Milk Makeup ended the quarter on a very strong note, fueled by the highly successful launch of Hydro Grip Gel Tint, which sold out shortly after release. We are also very pleased with the brand’s entry into Ulta Beauty, with retail sales beginning in late February. Both initiatives exceeded expectations and contributed to the brand’s high single-digit growth in U.S. retail sales. This solid domestic performance was offset by the contraction of international sales, which faced a difficult comparison against last year’s Q1 distribution expansion, as well as inventory reduction by retail partners. In Q1, Milk Makeup partnered with Nike Running in North America for the Nike After Dark Tour in Los Angeles, bringing sport and self-expression together to keep expanding reach and deepen community engagement.”

    “The Obagi Medical brand delivered a solid performance in the first quarter, although out of stocks in some key SKUs dampened volume growth. We are accelerating ongoing efforts to transform our supply chain—consolidating third party logistics partners and enhancing operational capabilities—to improve fulfillment, increase reliability, and support long-term, scalable growth.”

    “Despite a difficult quarter, we continue to increase our investments in marketing, up in the high teens, to fuel brand equity and set a strong foundation for delivering our long-term ambitions, starting with our 2025 objectives.”

    “We are confident in our ability to deliver a stronger performance throughout the remainder of the year, beginning in Q2. Key drivers include a robust pipeline of breakthrough innovation at both Milk Makeup and Obagi Medical, combined with restocking of Hydro Grip Gel Tint which is expected to fuel continued consumer demand. We also anticipate a meaningful uplift in Milk Makeup volumes from the successful Ulta Beauty launch. Additionally, ongoing improvements from Obagi Medical’s supply chain restructuring are expected to enhance fulfillment rates and operational resilience,” concluded Mr. Brousset.

    Q1 2025 Results Overview

    Please refer to the definitions and reconciliations set out further in this release with respect to certain adjusted non-GAAP measures discussed below which are included to provide an easier understanding of the underlying performance of the business, but should not be seen as a substitute for the U.S. GAAP numbers presented in this release.

    For the three months ended March 31, 2025 compared to the three months ended March 31, 2024:

    Net Revenue decreased 4.1% year-over-year to $65.4 million.

    Gross Profit was $47.2 million, while Adjusted Gross Profit totaled $50.0 million, or 76.4% of net revenue, an expansion of 10 basis points compared to the prior year.

    Net Loss for Q1 2025 was $20.7 million primarily driven by Depreciation and Financial charges. Non-recurring legal and advisory expenses totaled $1.5 million, continuing their decline from prior quarter.

    Adjusted EBITDA was $4.4 million, or 6.7% of net revenue. The year-over-year decline reflects sustained investments in sales and marketing, and G&A deleverage stemming from lower revenue.

    Liquidity: As previously announced, during Q1, Waldencast secured a new $205 million five-year credit facility, comprising a $175 million term loan and a $30 million revolving credit facility (“RCF”). This refinancing replaces the previous bank loans, enhances financial flexibility, and extends the Company’s debt maturity profile to March 2030, supporting long-term strategic priorities.

    As of March 31, 2025, the Company held $10.8 million in cash and cash equivalents, $172.1 million in net debt, and approximately $22.5 million in available capacity under the RCF. The increase in net debt during the quarter is primarily due to refinancing-related costs. Cash consumption reflects lower Adjusted EBITDA and an inventory build-up to support expected sales growth in future quarters.

    Outstanding Shares: As of April 30, 2025, we had 123,011,239 ordinary shares outstanding, consisting of 112,644,711 Class A shares and 10,366,528 Class B shares. As of December 31, 2024, we had 122,692,968 ordinary shares outstanding, consisting of 112,026,440 Class A shares and 10,666,528 Class B shares.

                           
    (In $ millions, except for percentages)   Q1 2025   % Sales   % Growth     Q1 2024   % Sales
    Waldencast                      
    Net Revenue   65.4   100.0%   (4.1)%     68.3   100.0%
    Adjusted Gross Profit   50.0   76.4%   (4.0)%     52.1   76.3%
    Adjusted EBITDA   4.4   6.7%   (61.5)%     11.4   16.6%
                           
    Obagi Medical                      
    Net Revenue   36.2   100.0%   7.1%     33.8   100.0%
    Adjusted Gross Profit   29.7   82.0%   7.9%     27.5   81.4%
    Adjusted EBITDA   5.9   16.3%   (12.5)%     6.7   20.0%
                           
    Milk Makeup                      
    Net Revenue   29.3   100.0%   (15.1)%     34.5   100.0%
    Adjusted Gross Profit   20.4   69.5%   (17.3)%     24.6   71.3%
    Adjusted EBITDA   4.4   14.9%   (56.4)%     10.0   29.1%
                           

    First Quarter 2025 Brand Highlights:

    Obagi Medical:

    • Net Revenue reached $36.2 million, up 7.1% from $33.8 million in Q1 2024.
    • Growth was fueled by continued strength in the direct-to-consumer channels. The benefits from transitioning to a first-party model with our primary e-commerce distributor have now fully annualized.
    • The Physician Dispense channel declined in the quarter, largely due to ongoing supply chain restructuring and temporary inventory constraints affecting key products, which limited sales during the quarter.
    • Adjusted Gross Margin of 82.0% increased 60 basis points from Q1 2024, supported by a favorable channel mix and lower promotional activity.
    • Adjusted EBITDA was $5.9 million, down 12.5% compared to Q1 2024. The Adjusted EBITDA margin declined by 370 basis points year-over-year to 16.3%, primarily due to higher marketing investments and increased supply chain costs aimed at supporting future growth.

    Milk Makeup:

    • As anticipated, Milk Makeup’s Net Revenue declined in the quarter. Net Revenue was $29.3 million, down 15.1% versus $34.5 million in Q1 2024. This result was a combination of cycling a very successful launch of Jellies in Q1 2024 and a significant reduction of retail inventory levels quarter-over-quarter.
    • Sales momentum accelerated in March, driven by the successful strategic launch of Hydro Grip Gel Tint, which significantly exceeded expectations and led to out of stocks.
    • The brand also expanded into Ulta Beauty during the quarter, with strong initial sell-out contributing to high single-digit growth in U.S. retail sales.
    • Adjusted Gross Margin declined by 180 basis points versus Q1 2024, mostly impacted by set-up costs for new retailers.
    • Adjusted EBITDA was $4.4 million, with an Adjusted EBITDA margin of 14.9%. The margin contraction was primarily driven by increased marketing investments and G&A deleverage resulting from lower sales.

    Fiscal 2025 Outlook:

    While mindful of the broader macroeconomic environment and assuming no further material changes to current tariffs, including the latest updates on China, we remain confident that our strategic initiatives position us well to deliver on our full-year guidance of mid-teens net revenue growth and an adjusted EBITDA margin in the mid-to-high teens.

    Given our high gross margin business model and limited reliance on Asian sourcing, we expect a limited increase in cost of goods with any necessary price adjustments (likely in the low-to-mid single digits) to offset the announced tariff scenario.

    Conference Call and Webcast Information

    Waldencast will host a conference call to discuss its first quarter results on Wednesday, May 14, 2025, at 8:30 AM EDT for the period ended March 31, 2025. Those interested in participating in the conference call are invited to dial (877) 704-4453. International callers may dial (201) 389-0920. A live webcast of the conference call will include a slide presentation and will be available online at https://ir.waldencast.com/. A replay of the webcast will remain available on the website until our next conference call. The information accessible on, or through, our website is not incorporated by reference into this release.

    Non-GAAP Financial Measures

    In addition to the financial measures presented in this release in accordance with U.S. GAAP, Waldencast separately reports financial results on the basis of the measures set out and defined below which are non-GAAP financial measures. Waldencast believes the non-GAAP measures used in this release provide useful information to management and investors regarding certain financial and business trends relating to its financial condition and results of operations. Waldencast believes that the use of these non-GAAP financial measures provides an additional tool for investors to use in evaluating ongoing operating results and trends. These non-GAAP measures also provide perspective on how Waldencast’s management evaluates and monitors the performance of the business.

    There are limitations to non-GAAP financial measures because they exclude charges and credits that are required to be included in GAAP financial presentation. The items excluded from GAAP financial measures such as net income/loss to arrive at non-GAAP financial measures are significant components for understanding and assessing our financial performance. Non-GAAP financial measures should be considered together with, and not alternatives to, financial measures prepared in accordance with GAAP.

    Please refer to definitions set out in the release and the tables included in this release for a reconciliation of these metrics to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures.

    Adjusted Gross Profit is defined as GAAP gross profit excluding the impact of amortization of the supply agreement and formulation intangible assets, and the amortization of the fair value of the related party liability from the Obagi Medical China Business, which was not acquired by Waldencast at the time of the business combination with Obagi Medical and Milk Makeup (the “Business Combination”). The Adjusted Gross Profit reconciliation by Segment for each period is included in the Appendix.

    Adjusted Gross Margin is defined as Adjusted Gross Profit divided by GAAP Net Revenue.

    Adjusted EBITDA is defined as GAAP net income (loss) before interest income or expense, income tax (benefit) expense, depreciation and amortization, and further adjusted for the items as described in the reconciliation below. We believe this information will be useful for investors to facilitate comparisons of our operating performance and better identify trends in our business. Adjusted EBITDA excludes certain expenses that are required to be presented in accordance with GAAP because management believes they are non-core to our regular business. These include non-cash expenses, such as depreciation and amortization, stock-based compensation, the amortization and release of fair value of the related party liability to the Obagi Medical China Business, change in fair value of assets and liabilities, and foreign currency translation loss (gain). In addition, adjustments include expenses that are not related to our underlying business performance including (1) legal, advisory and consultant fees related to the financial restatement of previously issued financial statements and associated regulatory investigation, and (2) other non-recurring costs, primarily legal settlement costs and restructuring costs. The Adjusted EBITDA by Segment for each period is included in the Appendix.

    Adjusted EBITDA Margin is defined as Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of net revenue. The Adjusted EBITDA Margin reconciliation by Segment for each period is included in the Appendix.

             
    (In thousands, except for percentages)   Three Months
    Ended March 31,
    2025
      Three Months
    Ended March 31,
    2024
    Net Loss   $ (20,735 )   $ (3,894 )
    Adjusted For:        
    Depreciation and amortization     14,998       14,884  
    Interest expense, net     6,384       4,293  
    Income tax expense (benefit)     1,398       (685 )
    Stock-based compensation expense     2,368       1,059  
    Legal and advisory non-recurring costs(1)     1,474       7,924  
    Change in fair value of assets and liabilities     (1,167 )     (12,160 )
    Amortization and release of related party liability(2)           (316 )
    Other costs(3)     (353 )     246  
    Adjusted EBITDA   $ 4,366     $ 11,351  
    Net Revenue   $ 65,442     $ 68,272  
    Net Loss % of Net Revenue   (31.7 )%   (5.7 )%
    Adjusted EBITDA Margin     6.7 %     16.6 %
    (1)   Includes mainly legal, advisory and consultant fees related to the financial restatement of the 2020-2022 periods and associated regulatory investigation, and the Business Combination.
    (2)   Relates to the fair value of the related party liability for the unfavorable discount to the Obagi Medical China Business as part of the Business Combination.
    (3)   Other costs include legal settlements, foreign currency translation losses and (gains), and restructuring costs.
         

    Net Debt Position is defined as the principal outstanding for the 2022 term loan and 2022 revolving credit facility minus the cash and cash equivalents as of March 31, 2025.

         
    (In thousands)   Reconciliation of
    Net Carrying
    Amount of debt to
    Net Debt
    Current portion of long-term debt   $ 7,740  
    Long-term debt     164,694  
    Net carrying amount of debt     172,434  
    Adjustments:    
    Add: Unamortized debt issuance costs     10,401  
    Less: Cash & cash equivalents     (10,782 )
    Net Debt   $ 172,053  
             

    About Waldencast plc

    Founded by Michel Brousset and Hind Sebti, Waldencast’s ambition is to build a global best-in-class beauty and wellness operating platform by developing, acquiring, accelerating, and scaling conscious, high-growth purpose-driven brands. Waldencast’s vision is fundamentally underpinned by its brand-led business model that ensures proximity to its customers, business agility, and market responsiveness, while maintaining each brand’s distinct DNA. The first step in realizing its vision was the Business Combination. As part of the Waldencast platform, its brands will benefit from the operational scale of a multi-brand platform; the expertise in managing global beauty brands at scale; a balanced portfolio to mitigate category fluctuations; asset light efficiency; and the market responsiveness and speed of entrepreneurial indie brands. For more information please visit: https://ir.waldencast.com.

    Obagi Medical is an industry-leading, advanced skin care line rooted in research and skin biology, refined with a legacy of over 35 years’ experience. First known as leaders in the treatment of hyperpigmentation with the Obagi Nu-Derm® System, Obagi Medical products are designed to address the appearance of premature aging, photodamage, skin discoloration, acne, and sun damage. More information about Obagi Medical is available on the brand’s website at www.obagi.com.

    Founded in 2016, Milk Makeup quickly became a cult-favorite among the beauty community for its values of self-expression and inclusion, captured by its signature “Live Your Look”, its innovative formulas, and clean ingredients. The brand creates vegan, cruelty-free, clean formulas and has its Milk Makeup HQ in Downtown NYC. Currently, Milk Makeup offers over 250 products through its U.S. website www.MilkMakeup.com, and retail partners including Sephora globally, Ulta Beauty in the U.S., Lyko in Scandinavia, Space NK and Boots in the United Kingdom and many more.

    Cautionary Statement Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

    All statements in this release that are not historical, are forward-looking statements made pursuant to the safe harbor provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Such statements include, but are not limited to, statements about: Waldencast’s outlook and guidance for 2025; our ability to deliver financial results in line with expectations; expectations regarding sales, earnings or other future financial performance and liquidity or other performance measures; our long-term strategy and future operations or operating results; expectations with respect to our industry and the markets in which it operates; future product introductions; developments relating to the ongoing investigation and legal proceedings; and any assumptions underlying any of the foregoing. Words such as “anticipate,” “believe,” “continue,” “could,” “estimate,” “expect,” “intend,” “may,” “plan,” “predict,” “project,” “should,” and “will” and variations of such words and similar expressions are intended to identify such forward-looking statements.

    These forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future performance, conditions or results, and involve a number of known and unknown risks, uncertainties, assumptions and other important factors, many of which are outside of our control, that could cause actual results or outcomes to differ materially from those discussed in the forward-looking statements, including, among others: (i) the impact of the material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting, including associated investigations, our efforts to remediate such material weakness and the timing of remediation and resolution of associated investigations; (ii) our ability to recognize the anticipated benefits from any acquired business, including the Business Combination; (iii) our ability to successfully implement our management’s plans and strategies; (iv) the overall economic and market conditions, sales forecasts and other information about our possible or assumed future results of operations or our performance; (v) the general impact of geopolitical events, including the impact of current wars, conflicts or other hostilities; (vi) the potential for delisting, legal proceedings or existing or new government investigation or enforcement actions, including those relating to the restatement or the subject of the Audit Committee of our Board of Directors’ review further described in our annual report filed on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2022; (vii) our ability to manage expenses, our liquidity and our investments in working capital; (viii) any failure to obtain governmental and regulatory approvals related to our business and products; (ix) the impact of any international trade or foreign exchange restrictions, increased tariffs, foreign currency exchange fluctuations; (x) our ability to raise additional capital or complete desired acquisitions; (xi) our ability to comply with financial covenants imposed by the new 2025 credit agreement we entered into referenced in the section entitled “Liquidity” above and the impact of debt service obligations and restricted debt covenants; (xii) volatility of Waldencast’s securities due to a variety of factors, including Waldencast’s inability to implement its business plans or meet or exceed its financial projections and changes; (xiii) the ability to implement business plans, forecasts, and other expectations, and identify and realize additional opportunities; (xiv) the ability of Waldencast to implement its strategic initiatives and continue to innovate Obagi Medical’s and Milk Makeup’s existing products and anticipate and respond to market trends and changes in consumer preferences; (xv) any shifts in the preferences of consumers as to where and how they shop; (xvi) the impact of any unfavorable publicity on our business or products; (xvii) changes in future exchange or interest rates or credit ratings; (xviii) changes in, and uncertainty with respect to, laws, regulations, and policies, including as a result of the change in the U.S. administration; and (xix) social, political and economic conditions. These and other risks, assumptions and uncertainties are more fully described in the Risk Factors section of our 2024 20-F (File No. 01-40207), filed with the SEC on March 20, 2025, and in our other documents that we file or furnish with the SEC, which you are encouraged to read.

    Should one or more of these risks or uncertainties materialize, or should underlying assumptions prove incorrect, actual results may vary materially from those indicated or anticipated by such forward-looking statements. Accordingly, you are cautioned not to rely on these forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date they are made. Waldencast expressly disclaims any current intention, and assumes no duty, to update publicly any forward-looking statement after the distribution of this release, whether as a result of new information, future events, changes in assumptions or otherwise.

    Contacts:

    Investors
    ICR
    Allison Malkin
    waldencastir@icrinc.com

    Media
    ICR
    Brittney Fraser/Alecia Pulman
    waldencast@icrinc.com

    Appendix

    Adjusted Gross Profit

         
        Group
    (In thousands, except for percentages)   Three months
    ended March 31,
    2025
      Three months
    ended March 31,
    2024
    Net Revenue   $ 65,442     $ 68,271  
    Gross Profit     47,205       49,580  
    Gross Profit Margin     72.1 %     72.6 %
    Gross Margin Adjustments:        
    Amortization of the fair value of the related party liability(1)           (316 )
    Amortization impact of intangible assets(2)     2,801       2,801  
    Adjusted Gross Profit   $ 50,006     $ 52,065  
    Adjusted Gross Margin %     76.4 %     76.3 %
    (1)   Relates to the fair value of the related party liability for the unfavorable discount to the Obagi Medical China Business as part of the Business Combination.
    (2)   The supply agreement and formulations intangible assets are amortized to cost of goods sold.
         
        Obagi Medical   Milk Makeup
    (In thousands, except for percentages)   Three months
    ended March 31,
    2025
      Three months
    ended March 31,
    2024
      Three months
    ended March 31,
    2025
      Three months
    ended March 31,
    2024
    Net Revenue   $ 36,166     $ 33,768     $ 29,276     $ 34,503  
    Gross Profit     26,851       24,989       20,354       24,597  
    Gross Profit Margin     74.2 %     74.0 %     69.5 %     71.3 %
    Gross Margin Adjustments:                
    Amortization of the fair value of the related party liability           (316 )            
    Amortization impact of intangible assets     2,801       2,801              
    Adjusted Gross Profit   $ 29,652     $ 27,474     $ 20,354     $ 24,597  
    Adjusted Gross Margin %     82.0 %     81.4 %     69.5 %     71.3 %
                                     

    Adjusted EBITDA Margin by Segment

        Obagi Medical   Milk Makeup
    (In thousands, except for percentages)   Three months
    ended March 31,
    2025
      Three months
    ended March 31,
    2024
      Three months
    ended March 31,
    2025
      Three months
    ended March 31,
    2024
    Net Loss   $ (9,056 )   $ (5,761 )   $ (1,004 )   $ 5,340  
    Adjusted For:                
    Depreciation and amortization     10,420       10,395       4,578       4,489  
    Interest expense (income), net     3,385       3,187       (3 )     (55 )
    Income tax expense (benefit)     1,369       (687 )     25        
    Stock-based compensation expense     (526 )     (781 )     568       357  
    Legal and advisory non-recurring costs     189       467              
    Change in fair value of assets and liabilities     14                    
    Amortization and release of related party liability           (316 )            
    Other costs     104       239       206       (105 )
    Adjusted EBITDA   $ 5,900     $ 6,743     $ 4,370     $ 10,026  
    Net Revenue   $ 36,166     $ 33,768     $ 29,276     $ 34,503  
    Net Loss % of Net Revenue   (25.0 )%   (17.1 )%   (3.4 )%     15.5 %
    Adjusted EBITDA Margin     16.3 %     20.0 %     14.9 %     29.1 %
        Central costs
    (In thousands, except for percentages)   Three months
    ended March 31,
    2025
      Three months
    ended March 31,
    2024
    Net Loss   $ (10,676 )   $ (3,472 )
    Adjusted For:        
    Interest expense, net     3,002       1,160  
    Income tax expense     3       2  
    Stock-based compensation expense     2,326       1,482  
    Legal and advisory non-recurring costs     1,285       7,457  
    Change in fair value of assets and liabilities     (1,181 )     (12,160 )
    Other costs     (664 )     112  
    Adjusted EBITDA   $ (5,904 )   $ (5,419 )
    Net Revenue   $     $  
    Net Loss % of Net Revenue   N/A     N/A  
    Adjusted EBITDA Margin   N/A     N/A  
                 

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-Evening Report: Using a blue inhaler alone is not enough to manage your asthma

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Stephen Hughes, Lecturer in Pharmacy Practice, University of Sydney

    New Africa/Shutterstock

    Inhalers have been key to asthma management since the 1950s. The most common, salbutamol, comes in a familiar blue-coloured inhaler (or “puffer”).

    This kind of “rescue inhaler” brings quick relief from asthma symptoms. You may know these inhalers by their brand names such as Ventolin, Asmol or Zempreon.

    But there is growing evidence that using this kind of inhaler without treating the underlying condition may not only be ineffective – it could actually increase the risk of an asthma attack.

    Next month, the National Asthma Council is releasing updated guidelines that reflect this shift. Here’s what’s changing and what you need to know.

    What is a bronchodilator?

    Bronchodilators such as salbutamol act by relaxing smooth muscle in the airways. While they don’t address inflammation, which is the key cause of asthma, bronchodilators are effective at quickly opening up constricted airways.

    This means for people experiencing typical asthma symptoms – such as tightness of the chest and shortness of breath – a puff of salbutamol brings relief within ten minutes. The effect can last up to six hours.

    Salbutamol relaxes the airway muscles that tighten due to asthma.
    BlueRingMedia/Shutterstock

    Salbutamol is used by people with asthma and other respiratory conditions, such as chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (which includes chronic bronchitis and/or emphysema). As part of a management plan made with a doctor, salbutamol is used to relieve shortness of breath when it occurs.

    In Australia, more than 60% of salbutamol is purchased over the counter (without a prescription) in pharmacies. Many of these purchases may be for people with infrequent asthma symptoms, meaning less than twice a month.

    However, we now know there are safer and more effective ways for people with infrequent asthma to manage it in the long term.

    So, what’s wrong with using salbutamol?

    Treating symptoms is only one part of asthma management. Salbutamol doesn’t address the root cause – why the airways of people who get asthma become constricted in the first place.

    It’s a bit like taking pain relief for a swollen elbow without treating the tendonitis causing the pain.

    In asthma, chronic inflammation is usually a result of genes and environment interacting.

    Some people have airways that overreact to triggers in the environment. These triggers include pollens, moulds and dust mites, or air that is cold or humid.

    Over the long term, chronic inflammation can lead to changes in the airways. The airway walls become thicker and produce more mucus, allowing less space for air to flow through them.

    Using short-acting treatments such as salbutamol without addressing chronic inflammation in the airways poses risks.

    Salbutamol can become less effective with regular use. This means people with shortness of breath don’t gain the relief they expect and need, and paradoxically, their airways may become more “twitchy” (sensitive to environmental triggers) and inflamed. One response to this is people use more salbutamol and the problem is compounded.

    Strong data links increased use of short-term inhalers such as salbutamol to higher risk of asthma flare-ups, hospital admissions and even death.

    Purchasing three or more salbutamol inhalers per year is considered overuse.

    According to asthma guidelines in Australia and globally, needing salbutamol for symptom relief on more than two days a week is an indicator of poorly controlled asthma, requiring review and possibly anti-inflammatory treatment.

    Using your blue inhaler more than two days a week may indicate poorly controlled asthma.
    Kotcha K/Shutterstock

    What do the new guidelines recommend?

    In 2019, the Global Initiative for Asthma, an independent not-for-profit organisation, radically changed its recommendations for salbutamol use. This is based on its committee of asthma experts reviewing the evidence.

    Australian asthma guidelines from the National Asthma Council are set to follow suit.

    The council’s 2025 Australian Asthma Handbook now states that salbutamol alone is inadequate treatment for asthma in adults or adolescents.

    Previously, the guidelines recommended people with infrequent symptoms to use salbutamol when needed and “alone” – that is, without an anti-inflammatory preventer.

    The new recommendations specifically warn against anyone with asthma using a short-acting bronchodilator such as salbutamol by itself, due to the increased health risks mentioned above.

    People with asthma who use salbutamol, for example, should also use an anti-inflammatory treatment that provides preventive cover, such as an inhaled corticosteroid.

    The 2025 Australian Asthma Handbook now recommends anti-inflammatory relievers from day one when it comes to asthma treatment in adults and adolescents.

    These inhalers contain, in a single dose (one puff), both a bronchodilator (to relieve symptoms) and a low-dose anti-inflammatory corticosteroid (to treat underlying inflammation).

    They are recommended instead of salbutamol-only inhalers for symptom relief, even for those whose symptoms are infrequent.

    When used in place of salbutamol-only inhalers, anti-inflammatory relievers have demonstrated improvements in quality of life for people with asthma, as well as lower risks of hospitalisations and death.

    In the case of children with asthma, global guidelines emphasise the use of anti-inflammatory inhalers and discourage over-reliance on bronchodilators.

    Will I need to change my inhaler?

    Currently, combination anti-inflammatory relievers are only available with a prescription from a doctor. These prescriptions with repeats can allow people with asthma up to 12 months of treatment.

    In Australia you can still buy salbutamol in a pharmacy without a prescription, after consultation with a pharmacist.

    However, if you have asthma and you’re concerned about the new guidance, you should speak to your pharmacist or doctor for advice.

    Stephen Hughes receives research grant funding from the Australian Government Department of Health and Aged Care Medical Research Future Fund, The Australian Research Council and Asthma Australia. He is a past Board Member of the National Asthma Council of Australia and current member of its Finance and Risk Management Committee.

    Bandana Saini has received funding from 1) Australian Government Department of Health Initiatives (via MRFFs or Community Pharmacy Agreement based investigator initiated grants, 2) National Health and Medical Research Council or from 3) organisations such as Asthma Australia.

    ref. Using a blue inhaler alone is not enough to manage your asthma – https://theconversation.com/using-a-blue-inhaler-alone-is-not-enough-to-manage-your-asthma-250133

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Tribunal Initiates Inquiry—Steel Strapping from China, Türkiye, South Korea, and Vietnam

    Source: Government of Canada News (2)

    Ottawa, Ontario, May 13, 2025—The Canadian International Trade Tribunal today initiated a preliminary injury inquiry into a complaint by JEM Strapping Systems Inc., of Brantford, Ontario, that they have suffered injury as a result of the dumping of steel strapping from the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of Türkiye, the Republic of Korea, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the subsidizing of steel strapping originating in or exported from the People’s Republic of China. The Tribunal’s inquiry is conducted pursuant to the Special Import Measures Act (SIMA) as a result of the initiation of dumping and subsidizing investigations by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA).

    On July 10, 2025, the Tribunal will determine whether there is a reasonable indication that the alleged dumping and subsidizing have caused injury or retardation, or are threatening to cause injury, as these words are defined in SIMA. If so, the CBSA will continue its investigations and, by August 8, 2025, will make preliminary determinations. If these preliminary determinations indicate that there has been dumping or subsidizing, the CBSA will then continue its investigations and, concurrently, the Tribunal will initiate a final injury inquiry.

    The Tribunal is an independent quasi-judicial body that reports to Parliament through the Minister of Finance. It hears cases on dumped and subsidized imports, safeguard complaints, complaints about federal government procurement and appeals of customs and excise tax rulings. When requested by the federal government, the Tribunal also provides advice on other economic, trade and tariff matters.

    Any interested person, association or government that wishes to participate in the Tribunal’s inquiry may do so by filing a Form I – Notice of Participation.

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Padilla, Young Introduce Bipartisan Bill to Expedite Access to Innovative Medical Technologies

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Alex Padilla (D-Calif.)

    Padilla, Young Introduce Bipartisan Bill to Expedite Access to Innovative Medical Technologies

    WASHINGTON, D.C. — U.S. Senators Alex Padilla (D-Calif.) and Todd Young (R-Ind.) introduced the Ensuring Patient Access to Critical Breakthrough Products Act, bipartisan legislation that would enable millions of older Americans to receive quicker access to life-changing medical innovations.

    Currently, seniors wait an estimated 5.7 years from when the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) authorizes a breakthrough technology until Medicare covers the technology. The legislation would create a faster pathway for the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to provide transitional coverage for certain new and emerging medical device innovations to Medicare beneficiaries.

    “Timely access to lifesaving breakthrough medical advancements protects millions of patients in need,” said Senator Padilla. “This critical bipartisan legislation would ensure Medicare covers cutting-edge devices shortly after FDA authorization to better diagnose, prevent, and treat life-threatening illnesses. I will keep working across the aisle to support health care innovation and expand access to care for rural and underserved communities.”

    “Bureaucratic red tape is preventing millions of seniors in America from accessing medical advancements that have the potential to reduce health care costs, cure diseases, and save lives. Our bill would streamline Medicare coverage of these advancements to better ensure patients receive timely access to breakthrough technologies,” said Senator Young.

    More specifically, the Ensuring Patient Access to Critical Breakthrough Products Act would:

    • Provide temporary Medicare coverage for medical devices and diagnostic tests approved or cleared under the FDA Breakthrough Devices Program.
    • Allow technology developers to work with CMS during the temporary coverage period on a proposal for permanent Medicare coverage.
    • Grant CMS permission to immediately suspend or terminate Medicare coverage if subsequent clinical evidence demonstrates the technology causes harm or provides no clinical benefit to Medicare beneficiaries. 

    Senator Padilla has long been a leader in the fight to make health care more equitable, affordable, and accessible in the United States. Earlier this year, Padilla introduced the bipartisan Health Accelerating Consumers’ Care by Expediting Self-Scheduling (ACCESS) Act to improve digital health services by allowing patients to easily search for and book health care appointments online while protecting personal health information. Last year, Padilla, Senator Mazie Hirono (D-Hawaii), and Senator Cory Booker (D-N.J.) introduced the Health Equity and Accountability Act (HEAA) of 2024 to address health disparities among racial and ethnic minorities as well as women, the LGBTQ+ community, rural populations, and socioeconomically disadvantaged communities across the United States. Additionally, Padilla and Booker introduced the Equal Health Care for All Act, bicameral legislation that would make equal access to medical care a protected civil right to help address the racial inequities and structural failures in America’s health care system. He also recently joined Senator Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) and over 100 lawmakers in reintroducing the Medicare for All Act, historic legislation that would guarantee health care as a fundamental human right to all people in the United States regardless of income or background.

    Full text of the bill is available here.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Padilla, Schatz, Wyden Lead Push Warning Trump Admin of Harmful Impacts of SAVE Act, Anti-Voter Executive Order in Native Communities

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Alex Padilla (D-Calif.)

    Padilla, Schatz, Wyden Lead Push Warning Trump Admin of Harmful Impacts of SAVE Act, Anti-Voter Executive Order in Native Communities

    WASHINGTON, D.C. — Today, U.S. Senators Alex Padilla (D-Calif.), Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration with oversight over elections, Brian Schatz (D-Hawaii), Vice Chairman of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, and Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) led 11 Senators in sounding the alarm on the devastating impacts of President Trump’s anti-voter “election integrity” executive order and the SAVE Act on Native American voting rights. In a letter to Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum, the Senators specifically warn about the challenges Native communities will face with the proposed requirements of documentary proof of citizenship and restrictions on mail-in voting.
    “Enactment of new voter registration policies under the Executive Order and the SAVE Act would lead to mass disenfranchisement of eligible Native voters and further depress the Native vote,” wrote the Senators. “Tribal IDs generally lack place of birth information required by the legislation, and the vast majority of these IDs lack the specific U.S. citizenship documentation required by the Executive Order. And the SAVE Act’s in-person requirement would exacerbate existing barriers, such as requiring IDs that list residential mailing addresses, by forcing many Native voters to travel great distances, including costly flights or multi-hour drives, to reach their local elections office or polling place.”
    “As Secretary of the Interior, you have a special moral and legal responsibility to uphold our nation’s trust and treaty obligations,” continued the Senators. “If implemented, the sweeping federal mandates included in the Executive Order and the SAVE Act would disenfranchise eligible Native voters who are following state laws. We encourage your active engagement with the White House and the Department of Justice to ensure that Native communities are able to exercise the franchise fully and have their voices heard at the ballot box.”
    Tribal IDs are currently an acceptable form of documentation to register to vote in nearly every state, but the SAVE Act and Trump executive order require that an ID must show place of birth and citizenship, which the majority of Tribal IDs lack, adding another barrier to the ballot box for many Native American communities. The Senators underscored that if enacted, these provisions would force Tribal voters who live in rural and remote locations to travel significant distances to prove their citizenship in order to register to vote.
    The Senators also emphasized the disproportionate impact the vote-by-mail restrictions would have on Native communities, which often rely more on mail-in voting because of a lack of infrastructure and transportation access. Trump’s executive order penalizes states that accept absentee or mail-in ballots received after Election Day, harming Native voters in states like Alaska, North Dakota, Oregon, and California that process ballots as long as they are postmarked by Election Day. In Alaska specifically, which has 229 federally recognized Tribes, vote-by-mail is essential because polling sites can be hundreds of miles away for villages that are not on the road system.
    Only 66 percent of Native Americans eligible to participate in elections are currently registered to vote, leaving more than 1 million eligible voting-age Native Americans unregistered. Creating further obstacles to register to vote would likely reduce these numbers even further.
    In addition to Senators Padilla, Schatz, and Wyden, the letter was also signed by Senators Catherine Cortez Masto (D-Nev.), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-N.Y.), Mazie Hirono (D-Hawaii), Tim Kaine (D-Va.), Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.), Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.), Jacky Rosen (D-Nev.), Tina Smith (D-Minn.), Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), and Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.).
    Senator Padilla has led the charge opposing President Trump and Republicans’ reckless attempts to restrict the right to vote. As President Trump marked 100 disastrous days in office, he recently led his Democratic colleagues on the Senate floor to speak out against the SAVE Act and attacks on election integrity. Last month, Padilla warned Secretaries of State, Lieutenant Governors, and Chief Election Officials across the country of the devastating potential impacts of Republicans’ SAVE Act, concerns that have been echoed by top election officials across the country. He also led 11 Senators in introducing the Defending America’s Future Elections Act to repeal Trump’s illegal anti-voter executive order and prevent the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) from accessing sensitive voter registration data and state records. Padilla previously led 14 Democratic Senators in calling on Trump to revoke his illegal anti-voter executive order and issued a statement slamming the order when it was announced.
    Full text of the letter is available here and below:
    Dear Secretary Burgum:
    We write to express our serious concern over the impact of the Administration’s March 25 Executive Order 14284 “Preserving and Protecting the Integrity of American Elections” on Native communities. As former Governor of North Dakota, and now as Secretary of the Interior, you must appreciate that Indian Country faces voting challenges unique to the rest of the country, including remote locations, limited resources, and a legacy of legal discrimination. Unfortunately, both this Executive Order, and the related Safeguard American Voter Eligibility (SAVE) Act (H.R. 22) recently passed by the House of Representatives, would represent the largest steps backwards for Native American voting rights in many decades. We urge you to ensure that the federal government meets its trust responsibility to safeguard Native American voting rights and to engage in Tribal consultation on any new policies that impact the Native vote.
    Enactment of new voter registration policies under the Executive Order and the SAVE Act would lead to mass disenfranchisement of eligible Native voters and further depress the Native vote. For example, both the Executive Order and the SAVE Act include a requirement for voters to provide documentary proof of citizenship when registering or re-registering to vote. Tribal IDs generally lack place of birth information required by the legislation, and the vast majority of these IDs lack the specific U.S. citizenship documentation required by the Executive Order. And the SAVE Act’s in-person requirement would exacerbate existing barriers, such as requiring IDs that list residential mailing addresses, by forcing many Native voters to travel great distances, including costly flights or multi-hour drives, to reach their local elections office or polling place.
    What’s more, under the Executive Order, the Attorney General is directed to take action against states with laws that accept absentee or mail-in ballots received after Election Day. This directive will have a disproportionate impact on Native communities, given the remote locations of many Native communities, along with a general lack of infrastructure and transportation access. As a result, Native voters often must rely on vote-by-mail systems to cast their ballots, but extremely long distances and unpredictable weather can result in mail delays that impact the arrival times of ballots. For example, in states like Alaska, which is home to 229 federally recognized Tribes, voters must rely on mail-in ballots due to the lack of local polling sites in Native villages, the majority of which are not on the road system; in fact, the nearest polling site might be hundreds of miles away by plane or boat. So, it is standard practice for many states to allow ballots to be counted for several days following the federal election as long as they were postmarked before or on election day. Of note, no state allows hand-delivered ballots to be returned after Election Day. If the Executive Order’s provision were enforced, it risks further disenfranchisement of Native voters in states like Alaska, North Dakota, Oregon, and California that accept absentee or mail-in ballots postmarked by the day before Election Day.
    As Secretary of the Interior, you have a special moral and legal responsibility to uphold our nation’s trust and treaty obligations. If implemented, the sweeping federal mandates included in the Executive Order and the SAVE Act would disenfranchise eligible Native voters who are following state laws. We encourage your active engagement with the White House and the Department of Justice to ensure that Native communities are able to exercise the franchise fully and have their voices heard at the ballot box.
    Thank you for your attention to this matter and we welcome the opportunity to further discuss these concerns with you.
    Sincerely,

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee on the Rights of the Child Commend Norway on Child Welfare Act, Raise Questions on Proposed Increased Use of Force in Schools and Data on Children with Disabilities

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on the Rights of the Child today concluded its review of the seventh periodic report of Norway, with Committee Experts commending the State on the new child welfare act, while raising questions about the proposed increased use of force in schools and the lack of data on children with disabilities. 

    Bragi Gudbrandsson, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, commended Norway for the child welfare act which was a wonderful piece of legislation. 

     

    Mr. Gudbrandsson said the Committee was concerned that Norway planned to use stronger force and constraints.  How had the country reached this situation?

    Faith Marshall Harris, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, also emphasised her concern, stating that instead of teachers being trained to de-escalate violence, they were given the power to use more force than police officers.  It seemed that the Government had responded in a knee-jerk reaction to media pressure; however, the situation was more about training teachers to deal with these situations in a non-violent way.  Norway was encouraged to rethink this approach. 

    Thuwayba Al Barwani, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, said Norway had excellent data but when it came to disability, there was no disaggregated data to better understand the situation of children with disabilities in the country.  How many of these children lived with their families? How many lived in residential care? How many were receiving support services?  What awareness raising campaigns were in place to remove stigma and educate about disability? 

    What measures were in place to provide quality psychological care for children with mental health disabilities in all municipalities?   

    The delegation said the new education act introduced a broader scope for exercising force and restraint.  Employees could now intervene against pupils when necessary.  Norway shared the Committee’s concerns and had tried to state explicitly in the provision that this was a last resort, with strict measures for physical restriction to take place.  The Government and municipalities focused on the competence of the staff to put pre-emptive measures in place so that physical interventions were a last resort and only used when necessary. 

    The delegation said the Norwegian strategy for equality for all ran until 2030, with an important competence to increase the visibility of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in all municipalities.  In 2025, the Government allocated 280 million kroner for grants for people with disabilities.  Norway could not definitively say how many people with disabilities were living in the country.  A recent report by Statistic Norway, focused on the different definitions of disability, which would hopefully assist the State in future.

    Introducing the report, Lene Vågslid, Minister of Children and Families of Norway and head of the delegation, said since the last dialogue with the Committee in 2018, Norway had taken significant steps to further strengthen children’s rights. 

    Last month, the Government presented a proposal for a new children’s act to Parliament, which included a new provision on the child’s right to privacy, and the parents’ responsibility in this regard.  Norway had introduced a range of measures in recent years to develop and improve the child welfare sector, including the new child welfare act, which entered into force in 2023, placing greater emphasis on prevention and helping children and parents as early as possible.  For the first time, a white paper on “Safe digital upbringing” would soon be presented to Parliament to develop policies that empowered and protected children in their digital lives. 

    In closing remarks, Mr. Gudbrandsson said it was clear Norway was on an exciting journey in revisiting the fundamental principles of the Convention, which was reflected in the new legislation, guidelines and action plans; the Committee was very impressed and appreciated these efforts. 

    In her closing remarks, Ms. Vågslid thanked the Committee for the important questions and the dialogue.  Norway aimed to highlight that all sectors were working towards the best possible outcomes for children. 

    The delegation of Norway was comprised of representatives from the Ministry of Children and Families; the Ministry of Culture and Equality; the Ministry of Education and Research; the Ministry of Justice and Public Security; the Ministry of Health Services; the Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion; and the Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations Office at Geneva. 

    Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, while webcasts of the public meetings can be found here. The programme of work of the Committee’s ninety-ninth session and other documents related to the session can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public at 3. pm on Wednesday, 14 May to begin its consideration of the combined fifth and sixth periodic reports of Indonesia (CRC/C/IDN/5-6).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the seventh periodic report of Norway (CRC/C/NOR/7).

    Presentation of Report

    LENE VÅGSLID, Minister of Children and Families of Norway and head of the delegation, said since the last dialogue with the Committee in 2018, Norway had taken significant steps to further strengthen children’s rights.  Fundamental children’s rights were included in the Norwegian Constitution, including that the best interests of the child must be a key consideration, and that children had a right to be heard regarding issues affecting them.  Moreover, the Convention was implemented through the human rights act, meaning it was applied as Norwegian law and prevailed if in conflict with other legislation. 

    Last month, the Government presented a proposal for a new children’s act to Parliament, which included a new provision on the child’s right to privacy, and the parents’ responsibility in this regard.  There were also several amendments to strengthen children’s rights when parents separated, including mandatory mediation for the parents and children. Additionally, the new education act of 2023 applied to all public primary and secondary education and contained general provisions stating that the best interests of pupils should be a fundamental consideration in actions and decisions concerning them. 

    Norway had introduced a range of measures in recent years to develop and improve the child welfare sector, including the new child welfare act, which entered into force in 2023, placing greater emphasis on prevention and helping children and parents as early as possible.  Last month, the Government launched the Quality Improvement Initiative, to give children relying on child welfare services greater predictability and stability. 

    It was only in exceptional cases, and as a matter of last resort, that the best interest of the child could lead to children being separated from their parents.  From 2023, children in health institutions had the right to be accompanied by a parent or guardian throughout their stay.  Families who had a child with a serious illness, injury or disability now had a right to a coordinator.  The Government also recently decided to incorporate the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities into the human rights act. 

    Since 2022, Norway had offered collective protection to around 90,000 refugees from Ukraine, many of them children.  The State had also increased the earmarked budget line for strengthened child expertise in asylum reception centres, and the County Governor’s supervision of unaccompanied minors was increased.  A national strategy for children in low-income families (2020-2023) was put forward in 2020 and renewed in 2024, aiming to strengthen the economy of low-income families and reduce economic barriers to kindergartens and after-school programmes. 

    In 2023, the Government introduced a “youth guarantee” which ensured young people close follow-up and individual support.  Since 2022, a cross-sector initiative called the Core Group for Vulnerable Children and Youth coordinated efforts across eight ministries and 14 agencies to address the needs of at-risk children.  Two weeks ago, Norway launched a national mission on the inclusion of children in education, work and societal life, with the key goal of reducing exclusion among children by 2035. 

    For the first time, a white paper on “Safe digital upbringing” would soon be presented to Parliament to develop policies that empowered and protected children in their digital lives.  Norway had also, for the first time, established a Ministry of Digitalisation, working closely together on children’s behalf.  Norway had high ambitions for all its children and was committed to advancing their well-being.  Ms. Vågslid concluded by commending the important role played by the United Nations treaty bodies in improving States’ implementation of human rights. 

    TORMOD C. ENDRESEN, Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations Office at Geneva, said Norway was looking forward to doing a deep dive with the Committee on the Rights of the Child in the country.  He then introduced the Norwegian delegation. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    BRAGI GUDBRANDSSON, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, said the Committee was aware of Norway’s exemplary record in children’s rights, being the first country to incorporate the Convention into domestic legislation, and the first in the world to establish the position of Ombudsman for children.  For this reason, the Committee would do its best to give Norway a critical appraisal. 

    The Government of Norway had been criticised in the law-making process, including the lack of a child rights assessment impact, and that children’s views were not included in the process of lawmaking.  It was understood that steps had been taken to address this; could the delegation share these with the Committee?  Could some examples be provided?  How was it ensured that the public administration act contributed to strong policies for children?  It was interesting that Norway had not yet formulated a comprehensive implementation plan for the Convention on a national, regional or sectoral basis. Could the delegation comment on this? 

    Norway was commended for collaboration between the Ministries and the Core Group for Vulnerable People.  Had it addressed the discrepancies in resources between the different municipalities? Had a strategy been devised in this regard?  Were children regularly consulted by the Core Group?  Norway currently did not collect disaggregated data which was of concern to the Committee.  Could the State use a safeguard strategy, rather than simply not collecting the statistics?  How did the State address the concerns of unaccompanied minors in reception centres? What was the status of amendments to the legal aid act?  To what extent were local politicians aware of the Committee’s observations since 2018? What was being done to improve this situation?  How were the concluding observations applied in the Government? 

    Mr. Gudbrandsson commended Norway for the child welfare act which was a wonderful piece of legislation.  The lack of participation of children in Norway was of concern, with many pieces of legislation being implemented without children having a chance to provide their views.  Were steps being taken to follow-up the child welfare act to ensure children were heard? Was there a possibility to accommodate the views of the children during child abuse cases through the Barnahus model? Would the State consider the age limit for accessing Barnahus services to 18?  It was important to provide young offenders with inappropriate sexual behaviour with good therapy, and Norway was commended for thinking about this.  The Committee welcomed the State’s action plan to address violence against children.  Had an evaluation of the previous plans been conducted?  How had this impacted the new plan? 

    The Committee was concerned that Norway planned to use stronger force and constraints.  How had the country reached this situation? Would Norway ban child marriages completely without any exceptions?  There was a lack of specific prohibition of the sale and sexual exploitation of children; could this be explained? 

    MARY BELOFF, Committee Vice-Chair and Taskforce Member, said Norway’s high-level delegation present before the Committee highlighted the country’s commitment to human rights.  Norway was an exemplary country in so many ways.  Why did discrimination still persist in such an egalitarian community, particularly when it came to Sami, migrant, asylum and refugee children? Where did the root causes lie? Were there any plans to diminish the levels of discrimination seen against children? 

    All State practices in Norway kept the best interests of the child in mind.  However, there were certain cases where questions arose. Was there an instrument for local and national authorities for this purpose?  How could the best interest of the child be reconciled with chemical restraints or practices of confinement?  How was it assessed whether the best interests of the children involved were satisfied? 

    If a child needed to be removed from their family, was there a protocol in place to ensure that the best interests of the child were still respected?  How was the situation of brothers and sisters assessed and the impact on children’s mental health?  Was there sufficient information to provide a solution to deportation or family reunification as it pertained to refugees?  How did “extended detention” reconcile with the best interests of the child?

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said the proposed children’s act strengthened the rights of all children in Norway and put their safety first, with the best interests of the child always considered most important.  The act aimed to facilitate the child’s contact with both parents and reduce conflict in situations of separation of parents.  The new act also included special provisions for cases of abuse of children.

    Norway placed a great emphasis on human rights and had implemented human rights conventions in the national law; in case of conflict, the conventions would prevail.  Norway’s Parliament had considered the ratification of the third Optional Protocol on several occasions, most recently in 2022, but given several reservations expressed, had voted not to implement it by an 80 per cent majority.  Given that recent decision, the Government was currently not considering ratifying the third Optional Protocol.  The Government remained adamant to develop a national complaints procedure and had taken steps in this regard.  A child-friendly website had been designed, allowing children to access the complaints procedure more easily. 

    The participation of children was becoming an increasingly valued part of Norway’s decision-making process.  The right to be heard was enshrined in the Constitution, and there were now established youth councils and mandated conversations with the Government and youth-oriented non-governmental organizations.  In March this year, the Government developed and clarified the role of the Norwegian Directorate for Children, Youth and Family which would now oversee all aspects pertaining to children and participation, and provide guidance to the public sector in this regard. 

    There were many national complaints bodies in Norway which had the competence to handle complaints concerning children.  Several measures had been taken to strengthen children’s right to complain. Politicians at all levels were responsible for following Norwegian law in all their decisions, and the Convention was part of Norwegian law.  Politicians received a copy of the Convention on the first day of work and an informative poster.  All general comments made by the Committee were published on the Government’s website in Norwegian and English. 

    The Norwegian Human Rights Institution had created a guide on children’s rights which was available online.  Since 2018, it was forbidden to enter a marriage with someone under 18 in Norway, and from this year, foreign marriages of a person under the age of 18 were not recognised. 

    In April, a bill was submitted to parliament for a new administrative procedural act.  The legal aid act stipulated the right to free legal aid for natural citizens, including minors.  The Norwegian Barnahus model was evaluated in 2021, with the system seeming to work well and in accordance with international conventions.  The Government aimed to strengthen the legal protection of child suspects, including around interrogation of minors. The evaluation of the Barnahus model did not delve further into the proposal to raise the age for access to services to 18. 

    Residents in asylum reception centres took part in an information programme about the Norwegian society and its fundamental values.  The objective was to help residents take care of their own living situations and also inform them of their rights.  In cases of expulsion, an extended right to free legal aid was granted. 

    In recent years, Norway had taken significant steps to strengthen the child welfare services through policies, research, and financial commitments.  The child welfare services aimed to do everything within their power to allow children to live at home.  The municipalities were vital in this regard.  In Norway, around 54,000 children and adolescents received help from child welfare services annually.  The new child welfare act entered into force in 2023, and children were provided with additional rights, including speaking to child welfare authorities without parental consent.  The new participation regulation came into force in 2024 and clarified the duty of the child welfare services to provide child participation in cases.  Norway was working to improve the system, including through evaluating the new rules, developing more child friendly processes, and ensuring access to qualified legal representation to children, among other measures.   

    Norway had been working hard on foster homes; nine out of 10 children living in alternative care lived in foster homes.  Several measures had been launched to improve the situation of foster parents, including for them to be given clearer decision-making authority.  Children who had lived in a foster home for at least two years could be proposed a permanent residence in the home, if the aim of reunification had been abandoned.  The State was currently investing in models for foster homes for siblings. 

    The responsibility of the treatment and follow-up of intersex children was assigned to two hospitals, and necessary medical treatment was initiated when relevant. Treatment practices in Norway were aligned with the rest of the Nordic countries.    Norway did not collect any data or statistics based on the ethnicity of the population.  The Government was strengthening and renewing its efforts to combat hate and discrimination based on ethnicity and religion, and had delivered four action plans, including against anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim racism and hate speech, as well as discrimination against the Sami.  A study showed that a high number of children with ethnic backgrounds had experienced racism. 

    The kindergarten act and education act stated that children had the right to an education free from discrimination.  The new education act introduced a broader scope for exercising force and restraint. Employees could now intervene against pupils when necessary.  Norway shared the Committee’s concerns and had tried to state explicitly in the provision that this was a last resort, with strict measures for physical restriction to take place.   

    Several guidelines had been produced by the immigration service and the appeals board on how to hear children in the case-handling process.   

    Questions by Committee Experts

    THUWAYBA AL BARWANI, Committee Vice-Chair and Taskforce Member, acknowledged the hard work Norway had put into the strategy of equality for persons with disabilities 2020 to 2030.  How had the strategy helped mitigate the discrimination of vulnerable children? What interventions were envisaged to address access to services for children with disabilities to ensure their rights were upheld?  The Committee had heard reports of abuse of children with psychosocial disabilities, particularly girls.  What measures had been taken to address this problem?  To what extent did these children know their rights?  Was the State party making efforts to give them opportunities to be heard and their views taken into account? 

    There had been violations found in 76 per cent of respite homes; how was the Government planning to regulate these homes?  Were there efforts to reduce and phase out these institutions and replace them with more community-based care? 

    Norway had excellent data but when it came to disability, there was no disaggregated data to better understand the situation of children with disabilities in the country. How many of these children lived with their families?  How many lived in residential care?  How many were receiving support services?  What awareness raising campaigns were in place to remove stigma and educate about disability? 

    What measures were in place to provide quality psychological care for children with mental health disabilities in all municipalities?   

    The Committee had received reports that children without resident permits could not be seen by a general practitioner, and could only receive emergency health care, which was of concern.  Was the Government planning to change this practice?  The Committee welcomed Norway’s commitment to protect intersex children from violence; however, it was concerned that unnecessary irreversible surgeries had been performed on intersex children without their informed consent.  Was this the case?  Had data been collected on these practices?  Had there been redress for these children?  How was the Government planning to protect children from these practices?  What measures did the Government have to combat family poverty?  What additional measures were in place to improve the living conditions of children in municipal housing? 

    FAITH MARSHALL HARRIS, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, said Norway had been the envy of the world in terms of the environment and had an incredible record. Why was the State now granting more licenses for gas and extraction and exports?  The Committee was concerned about this change of direction.  Why was the State turning its back on the commitments made in the Paris Agreement?  Why was Norway undermining its incredible heritage in this direction?  Given the fact that this was so important to the lives of children, was there a mechanism in place for consulting them on these major decisions?

    Children with disabilities in Svalbard could not receive special education and had to move with their parents to the mainland; could more information be provided on this? The use of force by teachers in the classroom against disruptive pupils was concerning and seemed to escalate violence. Instead of teachers being trained to de-escalate violence, they were given the power to use more force than police officers.  It seemed that the Government had responded in a knee-jerk reaction to media pressure; however, the situation was more about training teachers to deal with these situations in a non-violent way.  Norway was encouraged to rethink this approach. 

    Could Norway provide more information about programmes and strategies for the Sami people?  Had Norway developed a national referral mechanism for trafficking?  Was legal representation available to children from the very start of an investigation?  How were children who had come out of warzones being rehabilitated? 

    BRAGI GUDBRANDSSON, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, asked what services children with challenging behaviours were entitled to by law? 

    MARY BELOFF, Committee Vice-Chair and Taskforce Member, asked how children were heard in cases where the State legally granted a sex change?  Had a legal definition of statelessness been adopted? What mechanisms existed to protect children who had been exposed on the internet?  Did children deprived of liberty receive information on their rights?

    A Committee Expert said Norway did not participate in the ministerial conference on ending violence against children; was there a specific reason for this? 

    Another Expert asked about the Norwegian children’s act.  When would this be finished?  How much were children involved in that act? 

    An Expert asked what was being done to prevent violence against children, including risks in the digital environment?  How was the birth declaration of refugee or stateless individuals conducted?  What was being done to support those parents?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said children’s rights would always be work in progress; it was important to evolve and improve.  Children in Norway were among the highest users of screens, social media and digital technology globally.  How could the State protect them in their everyday life?  This was a difficult problem to solve. 

    The work with the Core Group for Vulnerable Children and Youth started in 2021.  There was a need for a better cross-sectoral collaboration to ensure children, youth and their families received the necessary support and follow-up.  The Core Group was comprised of representatives from seven ministries. Last year, the Core Group was evaluated, with conclusions finding that it was well established.  The Core Group did not consult children directly in its work. 

    To combat complex forms of discrimination, it was important to apply a cross-sectional approach when developing legislation.  The action plan to combat hate speech and discrimination against the Sami was launched in January this year, and included 32 measures under headings such as dialogue, democracy, safety and security, among others.  Many valuable inputs from those concerned had been received, including from young people, as well as the Sami Parliament, which was actively involved in the development of the plan.

    The Norwegian strategy for equality for all ran until 2030, with an important competence to increase the visibility of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in all municipalities.  In 2025, the Government allocated 280 million kroner for grants for persons with disabilities.  Norway could not definitively say how many persons with disabilities were living in the country.  A recent report by Statistic Norway focused on the different definitions of disability, which would hopefully assist the State in the future.

    Every year, the Government submitted a forward-looking white paper to the Sami Parliament.  The Government aimed to get more qualified teachers in Sami schools and kindergartens.  The lack of Sami language competence was the biggest challenge to provide good services to the Sami population.  The Government had financed a school programme to assist students with a Roma background to complete primary and secondary education.  The unique framework of the Svalbard community determined what services could be provided.  It was not possible to ensure all needs could be met in the archipelago as on the mainland, including the educational offering, particularly special education, which required a tailored, individual approach.  Any additional needs needed to be met on the mainland. 

    The education act and the private school act that clarified employees to use physical interventions, included an obligation to prevent physical intervention from occurring. The Government and municipalities focused on the competence of the staff to put pre-emptive measures in place so that physical interventions were a last resort and only used when necessary. Schools should have an environment where all students thrived and benefited from education, including those who exhibited disruptive behaviours.  The solutions for these students needed to be adapted to each individual pupil.  This year, the Norwegian Government had allocated money to municipalities to address these issues.   

    Minors who came to Norway alone were a particularly vulnerable group and given high priority. In 2022, an independent evaluation of minors in asylum reception centres was conducted to ensure they received the necessary care, and violations were detected in several centres.  In 2025, the Government increased the funding of independent supervision and funding in several reception centres.  Norway worked systematically to improve the care provided to children in reception centres.  It was mandatory for reception centres to have routines in place to handle violence against children, with staff required to report any violent behaviour to relevant authorities.  The Norwegian Directorate of Immigration had instructed follow-up procedures for minor asylum seekers who may be victims of human trafficking, violence or child marriage. The Directorate of Immigration had developed specific action cards for the reception centres, for each of these specific issues.

    The Directorate of Immigration required that cooperation resident councils were established within asylum centres to ensure residents could express their views on the operation of the centre.  When applying for protection, all unaccompanied asylum-seeking minors were offered an asylum interview, either in person or online.  Clear child-friendly guidelines had been prepared on interviewing children which needed to be followed by police units.  The Immigration Appeal Board heard children orally if deemed necessary.  It was rare for children to be involved in the Board meetings.  Child hearings were conducted orally by the local police in Norway. The police had received guidance on how to hear children in a child-friendly manner. 

    A person charged with a criminal offence who was under the age of 18 at the time of the offense would only be sentenced to preventive detention in extraordinary circumstances. Unfortunately, there were cases where the court had found there were no alternative ways to safeguard public security. In light of the recommendation from the Committee, the Norwegian Government was monitoring this situation. 

    Human trafficking was a grave violation of human rights and a crime with serious consequences. The level of trafficking was low in Norway.  The Government had decided to release a strategy on trafficking in human beings which would be presented in 2025.  Training to detect victims of torture and trafficking was of utmost importance; a national guideline was published in this regard in 2023.  There were several provisions in the criminal procedure act which granted the right to a publicly appointed defence council, which was an unconditional right if the individual was a minor at the time of the offence. 

    More than 89 per cent of children in Norway participated in kindergartens.  The Government’s strategy to 2030 aimed to ensure all children could participate in high quality kindergartens, regardless of where they lived and their financial situation.  The Government had taken steps in 2024 to reduce the price of kindergarten places, significantly lowering barriers for families to enrol their children in kindergartens.  Children of minority backgrounds had lower levels of enrolment.  Children in asylum reception centres were not entitled to a place in kindergarten, but grants were provided to assist them in this regard. 

    Municipalities were strengthening formal competence in education.  School absenteeism could have many different courses and the severity of cases varied.  Absenteeism early in the school year could have significant consequences for pupils. The Government was strengthening efforts to prevent students from developing school absenteeism.

    The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ project was an important measure to ensure the Convention was implemented throughout the whole country. A guide had been created to help the municipalities understand and implement the Convention, and films and other materials had been made to increase the understanding of using the Convention in practice. 

    Children and young people would have to live with the climate, and the decisions made today would affect their future.  It was crucial to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius. Norway was contributing to this effort by striving to complete its own climate goals and it collaborated with the European Union in this regard.  The Government involved children and young people in the development of the climate policy.  An agreement had been reached which safeguarded the rights of reindeer herders. The State had taken a responsibility to ensure that reindeer herders could utilise additional land for winter grazing.  Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the supply of gas from Norway to Europe had helped free Europe from Russian gas.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    FAITH MARSHALL HARRIS, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, congratulated Norway on the outcome for the reindeer herders.  The issues of violence and bullying in schools was an increasing worldwide phenomenon which had reached even Norway.  Did Norway consider that the socialisation in schools needed to increase?  What would be done about this?  Was the issue of displacement among indigenous peoples being addressed?  Was their free, prior and informed consent being obtained for development activities? 

    A Committee Expert asked if the Immigration Appeals Board had an administrative and judicial competency?  What kind of appeals did it hear?  Were there age assessment appeals before this Board?  How was the right of children to be heard guaranteed if the Board did not hear children directly?  Did the Board hear appeals from detention conditions?  Was there mandatory reporting with regards to the best interest of the child?  Did permanency only apply to children in residential care or those in all care settings?

    Another Expert said developing countries were most vulnerable to the impact of greenhouse gases. What was Norway doing for those countries? 

    A Committee Expert asked if children in Norway had been consulted regarding the ratification of the third Optional Protocol?  Norway should be commended regarding its commitment to the landmine treaty, as landmines were some of the worst arms affecting children.  Did the State plan to take a stronger stance?

    Another Committee Expert asked if there were positive parenting programmes in place in Norway? How was artificial intelligence used in Norway and how did the State protect children from its threats? 

    MARY BELOFF, Committee Vice-Chair and Taskforce Member, asked why Norway did not feel the need to have a differentiated response between the ages of 15 to 18? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said three quarters of the country’s child and adolescent mental health services had implemented cognitive behaviour therapies to address trauma.  The Norwegian Board of Health Supervision conducted nationwide inspections of children in respite homes between 2022 and 2023, and had provided several recommendations, with follow-up measures now initiated.  Since 1991, Norway had implemented a reform for the care of people with developmental disabilities, with the goal to phase out institutional care.  Data showed that almost 20,000 children had received one or more municipal care services. 

    Children with disabilities should be treated equally and protected against discrimination. The Ombudsman for Children played an important role in raising awareness about children’s rights.  Illegal substance use among children and young people in Norway was relatively low.  However, there had been a concerning increase in cocaine use among young men and boys.  The Government was particularly focused on preventing substance use among children and young people.  Most children and young people in Norway reported a good quality of life and satisfaction; however, there had been an increase of poor self-mental health diagnosis among young people in Norway, particularly after the COVID-19 pandemic. The Government aimed to ensure that everyone had access to good quality, low-threshold mental health services, and municipal capacities had been developed in this regard.

    Combatting violence against children was a high priority for the Norwegian Government and a national action plan had been developed.  A whitepaper on safe digital upbringing would soon be submitted to Parliament.  The development of social media was being debated, and Norway was assessing an age limit for social media services.  Most social media services were not developed with children’s wellbeing in mind. Children of any age could refuse a parent sharing videos or photos of them on social media.

    In cases of separation, parents should have shared daily authority as a general rule, to safeguard the child’s right to family life and reduce conflict.  Norway had a free and low threshold counselling service for families to prevent disputes.  The Norwegian Directorate of Children and Youth offered a wealth of online resources for parents to help them navigate different aspects of parenting. 

    The Government had proposed legislative amendments to ensure foster parents could be given direct authority to make decisions on behalf of the child.  Foster parents were given the right to appeal the decision to move a child.  The child welfare act regulated follow-up between parents and monitored the child’s development. 

    Children could be placed in child welfare institutions if they had serious behavioural problems; this was the case for approximately 20 per cent of children residing in these institutions.  The State had a duty to ensure these children received the necessary care and help required. 

    Norway’s housing allowance had been strengthened in 2024 and 2025 to help those struggling in the housing market.  The Government had strengthened the grants scheme for the inclusion of children and youth. Policies targeted newly arrived refugees and immigrants who had lived in Norway for years, to increase their access to the labour market.   

    The Government had initiated a series of measures to improve the school environment and was further strengthening this effort.  Studies showed that pupils who did not use their phones in school hours experienced less bullying, and for this reason there was a directive for schools to keep school-hours mobile free.  Schools and kindergartens had an obligation to act if a child was experiencing bullying.

    An age assessment was considered during the asylum decision.  It was not the case that the Immigration Appeal Board never heard the child. When it was assessed that the case was sufficiently informed, the Board could decide on the case without a hearing. Usually, it was assessed that the case was sufficiently informed, as the child had previously been heard through an asylum-seeking interview.  The detention of children was only used to carry out an immediate pending return. Minors above 16 years old could be granted a resident permit if they reached the age of 18.  This was important to reduce the number of asylum-seeking minors embarking on dangerous journeys to Norway and Europe.  There were special penal sentences in place for juvenile offenders.

    Norway regretted the decision of some countries to withdraw from the mine ban treaty and had no plans to withdraw. 

    Gender affirming treatment was not provided to intersex children based on this diagnosis alone; it was only after a diagnosis of gender dysmorphia where treatment could be received, following years of monitoring.  Surgeries were not performed on the psychosocial indications of intersex children.  The last time this occurred was several decades ago. 

    When giving birth in Norway, most births took place in a hospital, where the birth was then registered.  If the birth took place at home without a doctor or midwife present, it was up to the mother to report the birth within one month. 

    Closing Remarks

    BRAGI GUDBRANDSSON, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, appreciated the rich, comprehensive information shared by the delegation.  It was clear Norway was on an exciting journey in revisiting the fundamental principles of the Convention, which was reflected in the new legislation, guidelines and action plans; the Committee was very impressed and appreciated these efforts.  The proposal to expand the use of force in schools and residential care was of concern to the Committee and it was hoped this would be carefully considered before being enacted. 

    LENE VÅGSLID, Minister of Children and Families of Norway and head of the delegation, thanked the Committee for the important questions and the dialogue.  Norway had seen a rise in the exclusion of children which it wished to turn around.  The proposed children’s act aimed to secure the child’s right to family life, provided it was in their best interest.  Norway aimed to highlight that all sectors were working towards the best possible outcomes for children.  Norway looked forward to receiving the Committee’s concluding observations.

    SOPIO KILADZE, Committee Chair, thanked Norway for the dialogue and for acknowledging the challenges faced by the country.  The concluding observations would contain recommendations to make Norway a better place for children.  Ms. Kiladze extended warm regards on behalf of the Committee to the children of Norway.

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

    CRC25.010E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-Evening Report: The pay equity puzzle: can we compare effort, skill and risk between different industries?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Gemma Piercy, Lecturer, Sociology, Social Policy and Criminology, University of Waikato

    Getty Images

    Last week’s move by the government to amend pay equity laws, using parliamentary urgency to rush the reforms through, caught opposition parties and New Zealanders off guard.

    Protests against the Equal Pay Amendment Bill have continued into this week, driven to some extent by disappointment that an apparent political consensus on the issue has broken down.

    In 2017, the National-led government passed a forerunner to the current legislation for the health sector only, the Care and Support Workers (Pay Equity) Settlement Act. Later, in opposition, National also supported the Labour government’s Equal Pay Act in 2018, as well as the Equal Pay Amendment Act in 2020.

    That legislation was designed to extend a pay equity process to all occupations and create a clearer pathway for making pay equity claims. With both major parties seemingly aligned, some 33 pay equity claims were under way.

    Those claims – all halted now – involve the education, health and social services sectors. As such, the government would have to meet the costs of successful claims.

    This explains why one rationale for the law change has been that the claims were potentially too expensive. The other rationale (preferred by Finance Minister Nicola Willis and Workplace Relations Minister Brooke van Velden) is that the existing policy wasn’t sufficiently rigorous in determining the validity of some claims.

    In reality, both the cost and the policy framework allowing equity claims to proceed are interrelated: the more permissive the framework, the higher the potential cost to the government and employers.

    But while equal pay for equal work is the goal, it’s important to understand that equal pay and pay equity are not the same thing.

    Equal pay is about making sure men and women are paid at the same rate in a specific occupation.

    Pay equity, on the other hand, involves a more complex process. It aims to establish pay relativities between famale-dominated industries and other sectors using specific criteria. And herein lies the core of the argument.

    Comparing different work sectors

    According to van Velden, the framework for comparing different kinds of work was too loose, or simply not realistic:

    You have librarians who’ve been comparing themselves to transport engineers. We have admin and clerical staff […] comparing themselves to mechanical engineers. We don’t believe we have that setting right.

    On the surface, this may seem logical. And previous policy advice provided to the government suggests the recent law change will move New Zealand’s framework into line with other countries.

    But using a proxy method of comparison between types of work in different industries or sectors remains central to any pay equity claim.

    That’s because pay equity seeks to make visible and fix the deep, structural inequalities that have historically seen women’s work undervalued compared to men’s work. It’s about ensuring jobs that are different but of equal value are paid similarly, as a way to achieve gender equality.

    Women’s employment is still concentrated in lower-paying industries and occupations, so comparisons have to be made with other sectors.

    The factors used to measure that relativity are known as “comparators”. Rather than using tools developed and tested under the previous legislation, the new system will introduce “a hierarchy of comparators”, with a preference for comparators to be chosen within the same industry or occupation making the pay equity claim.

    Comparators are selected to help compare the nature of different kinds of work in male-dominated and female-dominated industries. This is based on an assessment of skills, experience and qualifications, level of responsibilities, types of working conditions and degree of effort.

    The assessment is completed through in-depth interviews with workers in comparison occupations. It uses resources such as Employment New Zealand’s skills recognition tool to evaluate the validity of those comparators.

    Different kinds of cost

    The subjective nature of valuing different kinds of work is part of the problem, of course. But New Zealand research shows only part of the gender pay gap can be attributed to objectively measurable pay differences within specific industries. Pay equity is about addressing both the objective and subjective elements contributing to that gap.

    We’ll need to carefully monitor the new system to see whether its narrower comparator requirements affect its capacity to close the gender pay gap.

    Treasury’s concerns also need to be considered. The former budget allocation of NZ$17 billion over four years suggests the costs of settling pay equity claims may be considerable.

    On the other hand, they may be bearable. Last year in the United Kingdom, for example, Birmingham City Council was effectively bankrupt and feared pay equity claims might be a final straw. In the end, the costs were not as high as initially anticipated.

    Finally, focusing exclusively on reducing fiscal cost risks other costs rising instead. Women who are paid less than they should be will struggle to put food on the table, pay back student loans, get onto the property ladder, contribute to Kiwisaver and afford their retirement.

    Without pay equity, in other words, there is less economic activity in general.

    Gemma Piercy received funding from the Pay Equity Unit (2004-2009), part of the former Department of Labour, now Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment.

    Bill Cochrane and Suzette Dyer do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. The pay equity puzzle: can we compare effort, skill and risk between different industries? – https://theconversation.com/the-pay-equity-puzzle-can-we-compare-effort-skill-and-risk-between-different-industries-256464

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Banking: DG Okonjo-Iweala and Japan’s Prime Minister issue joint call to strengthen trading system

    Source: World Trade Organization

    “The Director-General discussed with the Prime Minister and other key ministers the growing pressures facing the multilateral trading system, including rising trade tensions and risks of fragmentation,” according to a joint statement issued after the meeting. 

    “They shared the view that, in a time of uncertainty and disruption, the value of the multilateral trading system is unquestionable. They reiterated their shared commitment to working closely together, along with other WTO members, to manage current and future tensions in global trade, to strengthen the multilateral trading system, and to advance meaningful reform of the WTO.”

    The importance of free, open and predictable trade as a key driver of growth and reinforcing the multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core were key themes that featured prominently during the meetings, the statement noted.  The full statement is available here.

    In addition to the Prime Minister, DG Okonjo-Iweala also met with Japanese Foreign Affairs Minister Takeshi Iwaya, Minister of Finance Katsunobu Kato, and Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Yoji Muto during her stay in Tokyo.

    The Director-General will later travel to the Republic of Korea to attend a meeting of trade ministers at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum taking place in Jeju on 15-16 May.

    Share

    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI USA: Lightning in Southeast Asia

    Source: NASA

    A flash of lightning shines brighter than the lights of nearby cities in this Oct. 29, 2024, image taken by astronaut Don Pettit while aboard the International Space Station. At the time of this photograph, little to no moonlight illuminated the scene. This allows astronauts to see and photograph a variety of light sources with a high degree of contrast against the dark land and water surfaces. Bright light associated with lightning is a common occurrence during the monsoon season across Southeast Asia.
    Read more about this photo.
    Text credit: NASA/Andrea Wenzel
    Image credit: NASA/Don Pettit

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – European Union policies insufficient on the prevention of genocide – E-001691/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001691/2025/rev.1
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Afroditi Latinopoulou (PfE)

    Most European Member States have signed the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,[1] adopted by the UN General Assembly on 9 December 1948 and in force from 12 January 1951, which, inter alia, provides for the obligation to prevent the crime of genocide.

    However, at the European Union level, there is currently no corresponding legal commitment to the prevention of the crime of genocide, since the only relevant text, Decision 2003/335/JHA on the investigation and prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, focuses on suppression[2] and prosecution.

    At the same time, it is noted that the academic field of genocide studies, which is essential for raising awareness among European societies about genocides such as the Pontic, Asia Minor Greek and Armenian genocides, has not been developed at European level.

    Given the above:

    Does the Commission intend to establish a legal framework for the prevention of crimes of genocide, especially given the impact of genocides on the increase in migration flows?

    Submitted: 28.4.2025

    • [1] https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-prevention-and-punishment-crime-genocide
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EL/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32003D0335
    Last updated: 13 May 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Discharge 2023: EU general budget – Commission, executive agencies and European Development Funds – P10_TA(2025)0077 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section III – Commission,

    –  having regard to its decisions on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budgets of the executive agencies for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to Rule 101 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Development, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Regional Development, the Committee on Culture and Education, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,

    –  having regard to the letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0074/2025),

    A.  whereas the eleventh EDF has reached its final stage as its sunset clause came into effect on 31 December 2020; whereas, however, specific contracts for existing financing agreements were signed until 31 December 2023, and the implementation of the ongoing projects funded by the EDF will continue until their final completion;

    B.  whereas the ninth, tenth and eleventh(1) EDFs were not incorporated into the Union general budget and continue to be implemented and reported on separately until their closure;

    C.  whereas, for the 2021-2027 MFF, development cooperation aid to ACP countries is integrated in the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (‘NDICI-Global Europe’) as part of the EU general budget, and development cooperation aid to OCTs, including Greenland, has been incorporated into the Decision on the Overseas Association;

    D.  whereas the EDFs are managed almost entirely by the Commission’s DG INTPA with a small proportion (7 %) of the 2023 EDF expenditure being managed by DG NEAR;

    Political priorities

    1.  Underlines its strong commitment to the Union’s fundamental values and principles which are enshrined in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU); in the framework of the discharge process, stresses especially the principles of sound financial management as set out in Article 317 TFEU and the combatting of fraud and protection of the financial interests of the Union as set out in Article 325 TFEU;

    2.  Underlines the importance of the principle of separation of powers in the Union and recalls that according to the Treaty, the institutions shall practice mutual sincere cooperation; believes that under no circumstances the actions of one Union institution should affect the independence of another institution; urges all other institutions to respect the role of the Parliament as the sole Union institution directly elected by the citizens and to refrain from any undue, direct or indirect interference in its legislative processes, thereby ensuring that Parliament’s decision making-process remains free and independent from other Union institutions or any other entities;

    3.  Highlights the importance of the Union budget for achieving the Union’s political priorities, as well as its role in assisting Member States in unforeseen situations such as international conflicts or crises and their consequences; points out in this regard the continuing relevance of investments and support from the Union budget for reducing disparities between Member States and regions, for promoting economic growth and employment, for combating poverty and social exclusion, and thus for improving the daily life of European citizens;

    4.  Notes that the Court of Auditors (the Court) for the financial year 2023 has issued a clean opinion concerning the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of revenue; at the same time, regrets that the Court has had to issue for the 5th consecutive year an adverse opinion on the legality and regularity of Union budget expenditure and a qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of expenditure under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF);

    5.  Expresses its deep concerns that the overall error rate estimated by the Court has been on a rising trend since the financial year 2020 and has reached 5,6 % for the financial year 2023; notes that there are significant differences in the error rates between headings which range from spending areas with error rates below the materiality threshold of 2 % up to an error rate of 9,3 % in the case of cohesion policy; further notes that discharge is a political process where all issues related to a specific financial year may be taken into consideration and that the decision on whether to grant or refuse discharge should remain factual and anchored in the Union acquis, and that it is taken for the budget as a whole; urges the Commission, finally, to take into account the Court’s recommendations and to reduce the overall error rate over the coming years; further asks the Commission to present an Action Plan within the four months on reducing the error rate;

    6.  Is concerned that the Commission and the Court have different interpretations of what the “error rate” represents, thus generating confusion; expresses its support for a common audit approach and methodology and strongly calls on both institutions to find a solution to the divergent approaches before the 2024 discharge; is concerned that the Commission is systematically underestimating the existing error level and that this could lead to an ineffective protection of the financial interests of the Union;

    7.  Expresses again its deep its concern that the accumulated outstanding commitments (RAL – reste à liquider) have reached a record level of EUR 543 billion, equivalent to 3,2 % of the total GDP of the Union at the end of 2023 and representing more than double the Union annual budget for 2023; underlines that such a record high level of outstanding commitments risks creating challenges for the future smooth implementation of extraordinary high levels of payments and/or leading to significant decommitments to the detriment of the implementation of Union policy objectives;

    8.  Further expresses its concern that the outstanding debt from borrowing has reached EUR 458,5 billion, equivalent to 2,7 % of the total GDP of the Union at the end of 2023; notes that the increase in outstanding debt during 2023, equivalent to EUR 110,5 billion, has made the Union one of the largest debt issuers in Europe; further notes that the amount of outstanding debt is projected to increase further during the coming years, especially due to increased borrowing linked to the RRF and financial assistance to a number of countries including Ukraine which is the victim of a war of aggression by Russia; reiterates its deep concerns that the increase in debt makes the Union budget more vulnerable to increases in interest rates since a part of the debt will have to be serviced and repaid by the Union budget;

    9.  Recalls the importance of a strict application of the financial rules of the Union in all programmes and on all beneficiaries, in order to avoid all forms of fraud, conflicts of interest, corruption, double funding and money laundering;

    10.  Underlines the importance of the rule of law as one of the fundamental values of the Union and stresses that the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism is crucial in order to ensure that Member States continue to respect the principles of the rule of law; reiterates its deep concerns about the deteriorating rule of law situation in certain Member States including attacks or restrictions to the activities of civil society organisations, which not only poses a significant threat to democratic values but also leads to an increased risk of financial losses for the Union budget; calls for the provision of adequate support to civil society organisations active in the field; acknowledges the emergence of new forms of rule of law violations by national governments and calls on the Commission to address these evolving challenges; calls on the Commission to ensure strict and fast implementation of all elements of the mechanism when Member States breach the principles of the rule of law where such breaches affect, or risk affecting, the financial interests of the Union; at the same time, underlines the need for complete and timely information on decisions related to the implementation of the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism; encourages the Commission to explicitly assess when shortcomings in the rule of law are of a systemic nature; calls for a stronger emphasis on the implementation of country-specific recommendations, coupled with effective follow-up mechanisms and measurable benchmarks; proposes the establishment of a comprehensive rule of law monitoring framework involving all Union institutions, Member States, and candidate countries, aimed at ensuring coherence and uniformity across the Union, while at the same time ensuring a fair and impartial application; calls on the Commission to propose measures to ensure the protection of final beneficiaries in cases of breaches of the rule of law by national governments without undermining the application and effectiveness of the regulation;

    11.  Takes note of the innovative nature of the RRF and its contribution to supporting Member States in recovering from the economic and social consequences of the pandemic and creating a more resilient European economy; is of the opinion that any shift to a performance-based approach based on the RRF as a model requires addressing the many issues identified in its implementation, as well as assessing data on its full impact, before using such a model; recalls the many problems identified in the implementation of the RRF which would need to be addressed, including, but not limited to: the lack of adequate consultation of the regional and local authorities and other relevant stakeholders, such as social partners and civil society organisations and the lack of their involvement in the implementation; the weak cross border dimension, which may hint to a reduced EU added value in that respect; the lack of a clear definition of the milestones and targets and their satisfactorily fulfilment; the insufficient flexibility; the common debt with long-term debt payment as a consequence; the serious transparency, audit and control problems of the program which make it impossible for the citizens to be informed about the final beneficiaries of actions funded by the Union and pushes Member States to use RRF funds to cover projects very similar to those financed by Cohesion funds but with a much more limited capacity of control; reiterates the concern about the interpretation of the Commission and Member States on what a “final recipient” of RRF funding represents, which is not in line with the agreement of the REPowerEU negotiations and maintains that ministries, public authorities or other contracting authorities cannot be listed as final recipients of RRF funding; further expresses concern about the findings of the Court in relation to the risk of double funding and financing of recurring budgetary expenditure which are not in line with the RRF legal basis;

    12.  Notes that the set-up of the NGEU mechanism implies that the repayment of NGEU loans must start before the end of 2027 and be completed by 2058 at the latest; is concerned that the increase in interest rates over the last years has increased the borrowing costs under the NGEU significantly compared with original estimates; reiterates the need to fully respect the timeline of the legally binding roadmap for the introduction of new own resources and underlines that swift progress on new own resources is essential to repay NGEU and safeguard the current and future MFFs;

    13.  Stresses the urgent need for significant de-bureaucratisation, streamlining and simplification of all Union policies and their funding in line with the recommendations in the Draghi report(2) in order to ease the burdens for European businesses and increase European competitiveness, while ensuring the protection of the financial interests of the Union; underlines that simplification will also have a positive effect on error rates in the implementation of policies because many errors happen because of overcomplicated rules which are difficult to navigate, especially for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), new applicants, spin-offs and start-ups;

    14.  Reiterates the need to balance the further simplification of rules and procedures with much more systematic use of digitalised reporting, better and more robust controls and adequate ex post checks on the most repeated areas of irregular spending that do not add excessive bureaucratic complexity for beneficiaries, develop training sessions and practical information for applicants, in particular new applicants, and improve the assistance and guidelines for SMEs, spin-offs, start-ups, administration and payment agencies and all other relevant stakeholders; reminds that a robust control system under the responsibility of the Commission is particularly needed for the RRF;

    15.  Stresses the need and highlights the importance of the NDICI programme for the support to global challenges, the promotion of human rights, freedoms and democracy; underlines the importance of reinforcing the Eastern Neighbourhood line in order to support political, economic and social reforms in this challenged region;

    16.  Underlines that it is imperative for the credibility of the Union that the Commission ensures that no Union funds are allocated to individuals or organisations linked to any kind of terrorist movements or any other movement expressing extremist views, inciting violence and/or hatred, that are directly in opposition to the European Union’s fundamental values, including Islamist anti-Semitic, anti-Christian and anti-Islamic movements; in this context, recalls that there have been allegations that 19 of 13 000 UNRWA employees in Gaza were involved in the despicable terrorist attacks by Hamas against Israel on 7 October; recalls that in 9 cases their employment was formally terminated in the interests of UNRWA; takes note of the results of the investigation launched by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS); underlines that the Commission should also establish better controls ensuring that no such funding happens indirectly through third parties and organise better traceability of Union funds to final beneficiaries;

    17.  Reiterates deep concerns about the increase in the exploitation of Union funds against Union principles and values, especially when the use of funds and transfers to other organisations are not entirely traceable; warns of the danger of Union funds ultimately being used within corrupt circles and being subject to fraud and irregularities, foreign interference or entrism; emphasises the importance of ‘final beneficiary transparency’ for Union funds;

    18.  Emphasises the importance of maintaining institutional integrity and preventing potential foreign interference; condemns any improper attempt to influence the legislative activities of the European Parliament; insists on the responsibility of OLAF to conduct all necessary in-depth investigations; stresses the importance of the work carried out by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in protecting the European Union’s financial interests; insists to provide to the EPPO adequate financial and human resources; recalls the Agreement establishing an interinstitutional body for ethical standards for members of institutions and advisory bodies referred to in Article 13 of the Treaty on European Union, and insist on its swift implementation in all EU institutions;

    19.  Recalls the crucial role of civil society organisations (CSOs), including NGOs, in upholding democratic values to support a vibrant and lively democratic society, ensuring a sound basis for broad coverage of all relevant views in different debates and highlights that CSOs may receive support from Union funds to exercise these functions, as provided in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union;

    20.  Notes that there have been allegations from some Members of the Budgetary Control committee that grant agreements, concluded by the Commission included detailed lobbying activities which could be interpreted as potentially interfering with internal decision making in the Union Institutions; notes that the Commission took a series of measures to address the allegations by adopting guidance on funding for activities related to the development, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of Union legislation and policy, stating that while such grant agreements did not breach the EU legal framework, they could potentially entail a reputational risk for the Union; notes that all grant agreements include a disclaimer stating that ‘views of the beneficiary do not in any way represent views of the EU and that granting authority cannot be held responsible for them’; notes that such a disclaimer was further added in the 2024 call for proposals for operation grants;

    21.  Notes that a screening of grant agreements in all portfolios to verify their alignment with the new guidance is ongoing and that, so far, the Commission has not communicated to the Parliament the full results of the screening nor other measures that the Commission might take, if necessary; calls the Commission to keep the discharge authority informed at all times; emphasises that transparency in stakeholder meetings is fundamental to democratic integrity and should apply equally to all entities engaging with Union institutions; stresses that clear documentation and disclosure of such interactions strengthens public trust and democratic accountability;

    22.  Recalls that EU funding requires stringent accountability and transparency standards; in line with the ECA recommendations in the Special Report 05/2024(3) and the recent special Report 11/2025(4), urges the Commission to ensure that the information disclosed in the Financial Transparency System is frequently updated, reliable, comparable and useful; stresses the need to allocate additional resources to the EUTR Secretariat to enable a systematic and thorough monitoring of the Transparency Register; this should include allocating resources towards AI implementation to develop an AI based search mechanism; recalls the need to proactively check that all entities beneficiaries of EU funds respect EU values;

    23.  Welcomes the reply of Commissioner Serafin to the written question(5), once again confirming EU funding was granted and used by NGOs in full respect of EU Treaties and LIFE Regulation(6); takes further note of the recent ECA Special Report on transparency of EU funding granted to NGOs(7), which, while stating that the use of EU funding for NGO advocacy is legal, also confirms it is in line with EU’s legal transparency requirements as laid down in the EU Financial Regulation; at the same time ECA SR 11/2025 points to the fact that more should be done to improve transparency of EU funding received by all beneficiaries; calls in this regard on the Commission to implement ECA recommendations regarding screening of self-declarations in the EU’s Financial Transparency System, as well as proactive monitoring of the respect to EU fundamental values and principles by the beneficiaries;

    24.  Welcomes the entry into force of the recast of the Financial Regulation; welcomes, in particular, the enhancements related to tracking Union funds through digital tools and interoperability that will bolster the protection of the Union Financial Interests, the targeted extension of the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) to shared management following MFF 2027, the reference to the Rule of Law conditionality mechanism and the introduction of a conditionality based on Union values as enshrined in Article 2 TEU, as well as the opportunity to streamline SMEs and individual applicants with the introduction of very low-value grants;

    CHAPTER 1 – Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF)

    The European Court of Auditors’ statement of assurance and budgetary and financial management

    Reliability of the accounts

    25.  Welcomes the Court’s conclusion in its annual report on the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023(8), that the consolidated accounts of the European Union for that year are reliable; notes that the Court has issued a clean opinion on the reliability of the accounts every year since 2007;

    26.  Notes that on 31 December 2023, total liabilities amounted to EUR 679,9 billion, and total assets amounted to EUR 467,7 billion; notes that the difference of EUR 212,2 billion represents the negative net assets, comprising debt and the portion of expenses already incurred by the Union up to 31 December 2023 that must be funded by future budgets;

    27.  Notes that at the end of 2023, the estimated value of incurred but not yet claimed eligible expenses due to beneficiaries, recorded as accrued expenses, was EUR 155,2 billion (2021: EUR 148,7 billion), of which EUR 7,4 billion is related to accrued RRF expenditure;

    28.  Welcomes the Court’s conclusion that the assets, liabilities, revenue and expenses, including those related to NextGenerationEU (NGEU), the estimate related to the UK’s withdrawal process, and the impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, are presented fairly in the consolidated annual accounts;

    Legality and regularity of Union revenue

    29.  Notes the Court’s conclusion that the Union’s revenue is free from material error and that the managing systems examined by the Court were generally effective;

    Legality and regularity of Union expenditure

    30.  Strongly regrets the adverse opinion on the legality and regularity of the Union budget expenditure issued by the Court for the fifth year in a row; considers this increasingly problematic, as the Commission seems unable, or unwilling, to identify the cause and address the underlying issues; regrets the Commission is not accepting some recommendations of the Court of Auditors; notes in particular the importance of reinforcement of financial management of the Commission and Member States, that is considered as not reliable by the Court and therefore compromises the reliability of the Annual Management and Performance Report; calls on the Commission to present a clear action plan on reducing the error rate within the following four months; stresses that Parliament shall duly scrutinise such an action plan;

    31.  Is seriously concerned by the Court’s estimation of the error level of 5,6 % in 2023 expenditure; notes that this is an accelerated deterioration compared to the previous two years (4,2 % in 2022 and 3.0 % in 2021); notes with concern that the Court continues to detect substantial issues in reimbursement-based expenditure where the estimated level of error is 7,9 %; notes that the effect of the errors found by the Court is estimated to be both material and pervasive; calls for the Commission’s financial management to be tightened up, in accordance with the recommendations made by the Court in its Annual Reports and Special Reports, in order to resolutely tackle the high error rate over the next few years; underlines the Court’s warning that the increasing European debt is placing growing pressure on the Union budget;

    32.  Notes that the Commission in its Annual Management and Performance Report categorises the expenditure into higher, medium and lower risk categories, in order to focus action on high-risk areas; while the Court uses only two risk categories in order to produce an opinion on the legality and regularity of the expenditures; is worried that the Court’s work revealed limitations in the Commission’s ex-post work, which, taken together, affect the robustness of the Commission’s risk assessment; notes with concern that one of the areas most impacted was ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’, where the Court assessed the majority of the spending to be high risk, while the Commission classified only a minority in this way;

    33.  Reiterates the concerns about the Court observation that the Commission’s risk assessment is likely to underestimate the level of risk in several areas; is also worried by recurrent weaknesses identified by the Court in Member States’ management and control systems, which are still not still preventing or detecting irregularities in heading 2, thus limiting the reliance that can be placed on their work, while the Commission’s error rates do still rely on these national systems, which do not work effectively;

    34.  Notes that the increase is primarily caused by the estimated level of error under MFF heading 2 – cohesion, resilience and values, where the Court found 9,3 % of expenditure to be in breach of Union rules and regulations; recalls the underlying issues that are reported by the Court and that have been known for several years;

    35.  Underlines that the estimated level of error in the Union’s expenditure, as presented in the Court’s statement of assurance, is an estimate of the money that should not have been paid out because it was not used in accordance with the applicable rules and regulations; considers that, though not an indicator of fraud or corruption, the estimated level of error represents expenditure where corrective actions are necessary, and thus shows a wasteful use of resources; regrets that, while being a problem in itself, this will also give a negative impression to citizens, and may even call into question the Commission’s ability to effectively protect the Union’s financial interests;

    36.  Notes with concern that the Commission´s own estimate of the risk at payment is only 1,9 % for 2023 and has been at that level since 2020; notes that the Commission estimates its capacity to correct and recover irregular expenditure during implementation of the associated programmes at 1,0 %, resulting in a risk at closure of 0,9 %; is concerned that again for this year the Commission’s risk at payment is not only below the Court estimated level of error of 5,6 % but also below the Court range, which is between 4,4 % and 6,8 %; highlights that the divergence between the Court’s overall error rate and the Commission’s risk at payment is also evident in some of the specific spending areas, in particular in heading 2, even more than in the past; welcomes the Court’s estimate of the level of error as an important indicator for the existing risks;

    37.  Notes the multi-annual perspective of the Commission’s risk at closure, as corrections and recoveries after year-end are not reflected in the Court’s estimate of the level of error; regrets, however, the confusion caused by the Commission’s presentation of the risk at payment;

    38.  Recalls the positions expressed in the 2022 discharge resolution and the exchanges of views in the discharge hearings for the financial year 2023 on the diverging methodologies and estimates between the Court and the Commission of errors made in Union expenditure; notes in particular that the Court’s error rate is based on a statistical sample, whereas the Commission’s risk at payment is to a large extent compiled from the error rates reported by national auditing authorities in Member States and calculated only after corrections and repayments; reminds that the Court’s error rate includes the errors that remained undetected by the Member States and the Commission, which demonstrates that the Commission’s error rates are an underestimation; notes with concern an even wider gap between the Court’s and Commission’s estimates; further notes that the Commission and the Court are organising joint workshops on this issue; notes that the Court recently aligned its methodology on procurement in the decentralised agencies with the methodology of the Commission; reiterates its support for the independent audit approach and methodology of the Court and invites the Commission to cooperate with the Court with a view to increasing harmonisation and providing for more comparable estimates of the level of error;

    39.  Recalls that the discharge authority needs a statement of assurance, provided by the Court, on the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions at year-end for its decision on discharge for that year; notes that Union spending programmes are multiannual and that their management and control systems cover multiple years, allowing for corrections and recoveries after year-end;

    40.  Recalls that the Commission is responsible for preventing and detecting fraud; notes that the Court, in the exercise of its mandate, is obliged to report any cases of irregularity; notes that the Court forwards to the EPPO suspicions of criminal offences falling under its competences and to OLAF suspicions of fraud, corruption or other illegal activity affecting the Union’s financial interests; notes that, in 2023, the Court reported 20 cases of suspected fraud to OLAF, and in parallel reported 12 of these cases to the EPPO, resulting so far in four OLAF investigations and nine EPPO investigations; commends the Court for its reporting of cases of irregularity to OLAF and the EPPO, as information resulting from audit engagements usually has a high degree of reliability; reminds in this framework of the key role played by the whole Union’s anti-fraud architecture and expresses some concerns about the refusal of some Member States to cooperate with one of its elements, the EPPO;

    Budgetary and financial management

    41.  Notes that in 2023, 98,9 % of the available commitment appropriations were used (EUR 184,4 billion out of EUR 186,5 billion); notes that the available appropriations were higher than the MFF ceiling of EUR 182,7 billion due to the use of special instruments for new or unforeseen events; notes that 90,0 % of payment appropriations were used (EUR 162,0 billion of EUR 165,2 billion available);

    42.  Notes with concern that the total outstanding commitments, which represent future debts if not decommitted, reached an all-time high of EUR 543 billion (2022: EUR 450 billion); notes that the Commission foresees a decrease from 2025 to 2029 when committed amounts for both NGEU and the 2021-2027 programming period should be paid out; notes however that the actual amounts for 2023 (EUR 543 billion) are much higher than the forecasted amount (EUR 490 billion), calling the Commission’s estimates into question;

    43.  Recalls that the time available for implementing shared management funds under the 2021-2027 MFF is shorter than under previous MFFs because of the n+2 for the last year, which, coupled with the high RAL, will raise the risk of decommitments; notes the Court’s observation that the Commission has increased its forecasted amount of decommitments from EUR 7,6 billion for 2023-2027, to EUR 8,1 billion for 2024-2027 to EUR 8,8 billion for 2025-2027, a 15 % increase in 2 years; underlines with concern that the Commission has underestimated its projections for the RAL in the last two years, and that the Commission therefore likely underestimates the amount of decommitments that will be made until 2027; notes the introduction of the “cascade mechanism” following the mid-term review of the MFF 2021-2027 and the incentive to use decommitted amounts to cover increased interest costs for amounts borrowed by the Commission for NGEU;

    44.   Notes that the latest long-term payment forecast produced by the Commission foresees substantial decommitments as of 2027 unless Member States undertake additional efforts and implement at a much faster pace than in the period 2014-2020; notes that for the CF, ERDF, and ESF+ cohesion policy funds, the Commission forecast total decommitments for 2024-2027 at EUR 2,2 billion, more than five times its 2022 forecast of EUR 0,4 billion; warns that for the Just Transition Fund (JTF), the low implementation in 2023 puts important amounts at risk from 2025 onwards; calls on the Commission and on the Member States to use all of the available possibilities to avoid decommitments;

    45.  Notes with concern that Union debt increased from EUR 344,3 billion in 2022 to EUR 458,5 billion in 2023, 60 % of which is related to NGEU; notes that only for the debt issued for NGEU, associated interest costs need to be paid directly from the Union Budget and that, due to increased interest rates, these costs for the current MFF (until the end of 2027) are estimated to be between EUR 17 billion and EUR 27 billion higher than the initially forecasted EUR 14,9 billion;

    46.  Notes with concern that the total exposure of the Union budget because of guarantees and contingent liabilities for loans rose to EUR 298,0 billion; notes that assumptions on capital-market interest should be made conservatively, both for existing debt and new debt and that for both categories a viable plan for its repayment is necessary; notes that the Court received information from the Commission that indicates that the exposure will steadily increase in the coming years, putting additional pressure on the headroom of the budget and further reducing the flexibility of the Union budget; supports the Court recommendations to the Commission to act more proactively to ensure that its mitigating tools (such as the Common Provisioning Fund) have sufficient capacity as well as to provide more transparent reporting on total annual budget exposure, making its estimate public;

    47.  Notes with concern that the Court in its Special Report 07/2024(9) observed that a significant share of recovery orders issued between 2014 and 2022 were still outstanding at the time of their audit; further notes that the Commission, in its replies to the Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control’s (CONT Committee) written questions for the 2023 discharge, mentioned that there are 1 357 overdue recovery orders for a total outstanding amount of approximately EUR 335 million for the period 2014-2023; calls on the Commission to prioritise collecting monies under overdue recovery orders and to keep the Committee on Budgetary Control informed about progress made;

    48.  Highlights that equality is a founding value of the Union and is enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; recalls the commitment of the Union to gender mainstreaming in its policy-making and implementation of Union funds, including gender budgeting; encourages the Commission to continue the efforts made in gender budgeting and in tracking the impact of the Union budget to foster gender equality; recalls the obligation of the Commission to accompany all legislative proposals with an impact assessment when they are projected to have a significant economic, social, and environmental impact in order to guarantee, among other things, fair distribution of funds;

    49.  Notes that the review of the Interinstitutional Agreement on the Transparency Register is due by July 2025; calls on the Commission to ensure that the process is as open as possible, to align financial reporting requirements across all categories of registrants (including funding sources and lobbying budgets), addressing also the risk identified in the Court’s Special Report on the EU Transparency Register (SR 05/2024) regarding self-declarations on the category of interest representation; believes that, in order to address the recommendations of the Court, the resources of the secretariat of the Transparency Register should be increased;

    50.  Recalls the following findings of the Court of Auditors’ Special Report 11/2025: (i) that the identification and registration of entities as NGOs are not always consistent and reliable; (ii) that despite a more streamlined granting process, issues with the completeness and accuracy of data remain; (iii) that the lack of a reliable overview of Union spending on NGOs hampers useful analysis; (iv) that the calls for proposals in the Court’s sample were transparent; (v) that respect for Union values is not pro-actively verified; and (vi) that transparency practices vary widely in the Court’s sample, with larger NGOs performing better. calls on the Commission to fully implement the recommendations in the Court’s Special Report;

    Recommendations

    51.  Strongly supports the recommendations of the Court in its annual report on the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (annual report for the 2023 financial year)(10) as well as in related special reports; calls on the Commission to implement them without delay and to keep the discharge authority informed on the progress of the implementation;

    52.  Calls on the Court to look for ways, together with the Commission, to align their methodologies for the general budget, as in the case of procurement for the decentralised agencies, while respecting the different roles;

    53.  Calls on the Commission, in particular, to:

       (i) continue to engage with the Court in order to increase understanding, convergence and comparability of the two approaches to the diverging estimates of errors in Union expenditure;
       (ii) qualify the impact of corrective measures on the overall level of error;
       (iii) look for ways, together with the Court, to align their methodologies as regards the evaluation of procurement errors, and the estimation of the level of error for the general budget, as in the case of procurement for the decentralised agencies, while respecting the different roles;
       (iv) present the discharge authority with a strategy to strengthen the use of funds for their intended purpose, increase absorption and prevent decommitments in order to maximise the EU-added value of the Union Budget;
       (v) increase the reliability of the forecast of the outstanding commitments with a more realistic estimate of the absorption of Union funds to give the discharge authority a better forecast of the development of the RAL over the years and better protect the Union budget;
       (vi) report on, and provide sufficient measures to, protecting the Union budget from the different risks identified beyond the RAL, such as decommitments in cohesion policy, the increasing debt, increased budget exposure and the impact of increasing inflation;
       (vii) provide more transparent reporting on total annual budget exposure by presenting, in the Annual Management and Performance Report, a multi-annual outlook on the exposure of the Union Budget to budgetary guarantees;
       (viii) substantially simplify rules and procedures and improve the assistance to, and ensure consistent and user-friendly guidelines for SMEs, new applicants, spin-offs, start-ups, administration and payment agencies, CSOs and all other relevant stakeholders, without compromising the quality of the controls;
       (ix) make sure that the mitigation tools in place have sufficient capacity to effectively face the exposure risks of the Union budget;
       (x) boost efforts to improve transparency in the use of funds, including as regards information on final beneficiaries, including on the funds that are allocated for the preparation of policy and legislative proposals;
       (xi) put in place all necessary means for ensuring that all interest representatives that approach Union institutions are registered in the Transparency Register; further asks the Commission to set up an effective mechanism to ensure that entities funded by the Union in the Transparency Register are aligned with Union values and demand full transparency on their financing, providing a deeper insight into the financing of all entities registered and which should be the condition to approach all Union institutions, bodies and agencies;
       (xii) together with Parliament and Council, guarantee adequate resources for the secretariat of the Transparency Register in order to ensure that the entries on the lobbying activities of all interest representatives can be checked for accuracy and that lobbying become more transparent as requested in the Court in Special Report 05/2024 on the EU Transparency Register; calls on the Commission to allocate adequate resources to identify irregularities to guarantee a wide range of search capabilities;
       (xiii) require interest representatives in the Transparency Register to list their financial supporters by self-declaring that they are only representing their interests or the collective interests of their members and to propose an amendment to Annex II to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 May 2021 to require them to list their financial supporters in the EU Transparency Register, even if they state in that register that they are only representing the interests of their own members; urges entities already registered that have not listed their financial resources by self-declaration to declare them voluntarily before the interinstitutional agreement is amended;
       (xiv) continue to support Member States in improving both the quality and the quantity of checks and to share best practices in the fight against fraud and corruption;
       (xv) address the situation regarding late recovery orders and to take all necessary measures to recover the majority of the amount outstanding for the period 2014-2023, including implementation of corporate escalation mechanisms, and keep the discharge authority informed on the progress made in recovering the sums;
       (xvi) reinforce the capacity of the Anti-fraud Architecture of the Union, including the provision of sufficient financial and human resources, and facilitate the cooperation between them;

    Revenue

    54.  Welcomes that for 2023, the Court is also able to issue a clean opinion on the legality and regularity of revenue; at the same time, stresses that the problems with customs duties not being declared or being incorrectly declared (a customs gap) leading to a shortfall in collected import duties has been a persistent problem for many years and could potentially entail a loss of traditional own resources for the Union and for the Member States;

    55.  Notes with serious concern that the Court has examined the implementation of the Commission’s Customs Action Plan, which has the potential to lead to a significant reduction of the customs gap, and has again identified insufficient progress in the implementation of some actions from this plan; notes that the Commission, as part of this plan, proposed a customs reform in May 2023(11), including the establishment of the EU Customs Authority and EU Customs Data Hub;

    56.  Recalls that the Court has highlighted the risks to the EU’s financial interests from inadequate or ineffective customs controls of imported goods; commends the efforts made by OLAF on the fight against Fraud linked to customs duties and VAT; underlines the rise of the ecommerce and the online platforms risks due to potential security and safety threats and risk of non-compliance with EU taxation and customs rules, product standards, intellectual property rights, prohibitions and restrictions;

    57.  Notes with concern that the Court revealed that the Commission did not charge late interest payments for six cases related to late corrections to GNI data by Member States where the Commission has expressed reservations; agrees with the Court that the Commission, as a matter of principle, ought to charge late interest payments in such cases in order to create an incentive for Member States to address the reservations within the deadlines;

    58.  Notes with satisfaction that the new own resource based on non-recycled plastic packaging waste generated by Member States in 2023 amounted to EUR 7,2 billion, equivalent to 4,0 % of the EU’s total revenue; further notes that the Court identified(12) some problems related to the reliability and comparability of data; stresses that it provides an excellent example of a new own resource, as it creates positive incentives for Member States to reduce the volume of non-recycled plastic packaging while at the same time generating a new revenue stream for the Union;

    59.  Stresses that the Commission’s proposals concerning new own resources from 2021 comprising three elements, the first based on revenues from emissions trading (ETS), the second drawing on the resources generated by the Union’s carbon border adjustment mechanism, and the third based on the share of residual profits from multinationals that will be re-allocated to Member States under the OECD/G20 agreement on a re-allocation of taxing rights (“Pillar One”) are obvious candidates for such new resources; at the same time, points out that other sources might also be considered if they should prove to be easier for Member States to approve; welcomes other initiatives that may lead to new own resources for the Union budget;

    60.  Calls on the Commission, in particular, to:

       (i) increase focus and pressure on the implementation of the Customs Action Plan and not least the proposal for a significant customs reform from May 2023, including the establishment of the EU Customs Authority and EU Customs Data Hub; ensure that Member States implement effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for non-compliance with reporting obligations; initiate infringement proceedings in those cases where there is sufficient evidence that Member States are implementing a manifestly inadequate penalty system for breaches of the Directive on Administrative Cooperation 6(13) (DAC 6);
       (ii) insist on the importance of intensifying and diversifying the International customs cooperation with trade partners and stresses the need to strengthen the fight against cross-border tax and customs fraud in the context of the expansion of e-commerce;
       (iii) create incentives for Member States to address reservations related to corrections of GNI data by Member States within the deadlines by charging late interest payments;
       (iv) continue work towards the introduction of additional new own resources;

    Single market, Innovation and Digital

    61.  Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 1 ‘Single Market, Innovation and Digital’ was EUR 25,3 billion (13,2 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: EUR 15,3 billion (60,5 %) for Research, EUR 4,1 billion (16,1 %) for Transport, Energy and Digital, EUR 2,3 billion (9,1 %) for the InvestEU Programme, EUR 2,2 billion (8,7 %) for Space, and EUR 1,4 billion (5,6 %) for other areas;

    62.  Notes that the Court has examined 127 transactions covering the full range of spending under this MFF heading, notably the Horizon 2020 programme (90 transactions), Horizon Europe (7 transactions), the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), space programmes and financial instruments, and also that it has reviewed the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency’s (CINEA) ex ante control system for CEF grants in the transport and energy sectors and the regularity information given in the annual activity reports of the Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (DG RTD) and the European Health and Digital Executive Agency (HaDEA);

    63.  Notes that the Court estimates that the level of error in spending on ‘Single Market, Innovation and Digital’ in 2023 was material at 3,3 %; notes the Court’s observation that research and innovation expenditure is most affected by error, particularly in the area of personnel costs; further notes that the Commission estimates the risk at payment as 1,4 % for this heading, which is in the lower half of the range of the Court’s estimate; is concerned by the Court’s conclusion that the Commission’s risk at payment for this heading remains an underestimate, because of weaknesses identified by the Court in the Commission’s ex post audits in this area since the financial year 2019(14);

    64.  Notes with concern that 39 (31 %) of the 127 transactions that the Court examined contained errors; is deeply concerned that for seven cases of quantifiable errors made by beneficiaries, the Commission (or the auditors contracted by the beneficiaries) had sufficient information to prevent, or to detect and correct the error before accepting the expenditure, and thus, had the Commission made proper use of all the information at their disposal, the estimated level of error for this chapter would have been 1,4 percentage points lower; highlights that this points to weaknesses in the Commission’s controls;

    Research and innovation

    65.  Highlights the importance of Union research and innovation (R&I) funding programmes for the scientific, societal, economic and technological development of the Union, reducing inequalities, achieving the green and digital transitions and decreasing the Union’s energy dependency on Russia; recalls that Horizon Europe is the most significant research and innovation programme in Europe, with a total budget of EUR 95,5 billion for 2021-2027, including EUR 5,4 billion from the NGEU instrument; notes that the RRF has allocated around EUR 48 billion in investments to R&I; underlines that in order to enhance the Union’s competitiveness and close the innovation gap, additional funding for R&I is needed, taking into account the Draghi report’s pertinent recommendations; highlights, in particular, the need to increase defence-related R&I spending due to the current geopolitical conditions, which could serve as an important component of the innovation policy strategy;

    66.  Notes that its predecessor, Horizon 2020, with a budget of EUR 75,6 billion funded more than 35 000 projects between 2014 and 2020 and its calls attracted over a million individual applications from 177 countries; further notes that in her hearing for the 2023 discharge, Commissioner Ivanova underlined the EU added value of EU R&I funding programmes, explaining that the final evaluation of Horizon 2020 estimated that, for each euro of costs linked to the programme five euros worth of benefits would be generated for society by 2040; deeply regrets that 74 % of proposals assessed as high quality by independent experts could not be funded due to budget constraints; notes that an additional EUR 159 billion would have been needed to fund all high-quality proposals; stresses the importance of ensuring sufficient funding for Union research and innovation, not the least to increase the Union’s competitiveness and prosperity, in line with the Union’s strategic agenda for 2024-2029;

    67.  Notes the late adoption of the Horizon Europe legal bases in 2021 and welcomes that the Commission managed to reach close to 100 % budget implementation in 2023; notes that the number of grant agreements signed by the end of 2023 was 10 674 and a further two framework agreements were signed;

    68.  Notes with concern that the Court found errors relating to ineligible costs in 30 of the 97 research and innovation transactions in its sample, and that these errors represent 71 % of the Court’s estimated level of error for this heading in 2023; reiterates its concern that after 9 years of implementation of the Horizon 2020 programme, the calculation of personnel costs remains a major source of errors, as 22 of the 30 research transactions with quantifiable errors in the Court’s sample (around 73 %) are affected by the incorrect application of the methodology for calculating personnel costs; acknowledges both the Commission’s and the Court’s continued efforts to remedy this situation; welcomes that the Commission has accepted the Court’s recommendations to enhance beneficiaries’ compliance with the daily-rate rules and to ensure clarity concerning daily-rate rules in Horizon Europe documents;

    69.  Underlines the importance of simplifying the rules and procedures governing Union R&I funding; notes that in 2023 the Commission has continued the roll out of simplified cost options such as lump sums and unit costs in Horizon Europe; further notes the remarks made by the Director-General for Research and Innovation in the exchange of views with the CONT Committee that the Commission intends to increase the disbursement of Horizon Europe funds through lump sums to 50 % by 2027; welcomes that the Commission, taking the Court’s recommendations issued in its annual reports for 2022 into account, will further specify the requirements defining the proper implementation of lump sum grants, including the elements of each work package triggering payment, and will also provide detailed guidance to those involved in assessing the implementation of projects; further notes that, as described in the Commission’s assessment of Lump Sum Funding in Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe 2018-2024, beneficiaries would welcome more clarity on how lump sum grants would be audited; is concerned that the ex post audit strategy for Horizon Europe is not yet developed;

    70.  Stresses the crucial role of the private sector in addressing the innovation gap in the Union and improving the Union’s competitiveness and prosperity; believes, in particular, that it is imperative to continue to promote and facilitate as much as possible the participation of SMEs in Union R&I funding programmes; notes the Court’s conclusion that SMEs and newcomers are more prone to making errors than other beneficiaries since they lack the experience and resources to administer the funds; welcomes the efforts made by the Commission to support SMEs specifically, for example through information campaigns, contacts with the system of National Contact Points and the dedicated helpdesk of the Research Enquiry Service; considers that the simplification of rules and procedures is the major driver for increased participation of SMEs;

    Energy, Transport and Digital

    71.  Highlights the importance of Union investments in the development of high performing, sustainable and efficiently interconnected trans-European networks in the fields of transport, energy and digital services and notes that the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), with EUR 4,1 billion of expenditure in 2023, is a key Union instrument in delivering these objectives;

    72.  Draws attention to the need to simplify the application procedures under the Connecting Europe Facility for Transport (CEF-T) in order to enable greater participation of smaller entities and local initiatives in the development of European transport infrastructure; regrets that the CEF-T budget does not cover all the needs for sustainable transport investments and that most of the CEF-T budget has already been allocated, leaving a funding gap until 2027;

    73.  Recalls that the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the resulting sanctions imposed on Russia continued to adversely impact the Union’s transport sector in 2023, leading to traffic shortages, supply chain bottlenecks, and the necessity to bypass traditional routes, thereby extending journey times and increasing costs; points out that the Eastern border regions, especially in the Baltic states, Finland, Poland, and Romania, have been particularly affected by economic losses and a halt of cross-border mobility as a consequence of the Russian aggression; calls on the Commission to introduce targeted measures, including in the next MFF, to facilitate recovery of the affected regions;

    74.  Calls on the Commission to conduct a comprehensive review of the funding allocated to the cross-border and multi-country infrastructure projects, facing significant implementation challenges, financial difficulties, or delays, such as Rail Baltica; points out that this review should address inefficiencies in planning and management as well as escalating construction costs that threaten project timelines and objectives; reiterates that greater transparency in the management of public funds increases citizens’ trust in the Union institutions;

    75.  Notes with concern that the Court found two errors in CEF projects in its 2023 sample, and that one of these relates to a serious breach of the Union’s public procurement rules, and has led to the contract being awarded to a consortium that did not fulfil the selection criteria and that this error contributed 28 % to the estimated error rate for heading 1;

    76.  Is deeply concerned by the Court’s findings in relation to the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency’s (CINEA)ex ante control system for CEF grants in the transport and energy sectors, in particular the Court’s conclusion that while the strategies for both CEF1 (2014-2020) and CEF2 (2021-2027) are based on a sound analysis of risks and past irregularities, the guidelines for ex-ante checks on procurement were not detailed enough; fully supports the Court’s recommendation that the Commission should further develop these guidelines;

    Recommendations

    77.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) secure the provision of adequate resources to support high-quality research and innovation project proposals with an EU added value in the short-term through the 2026 draft budget and in the medium-term through the Commission’s proposal for the next Multiannual Financial Framework;
       (ii) continue to simplify rules and procedures in line with the new financial regulation, to support training sessions and user-friendly, consistent and practical information for applicants in Member States, in particular for SMEs, new applicants, spin-offs, start-ups, CSOs or local action groups and to encourage applications from beneficiaries in Member States with more limited participation, as well as from smaller entities;
       (iii) continue to apply simplified rules and procedures, digitalisation measures and simplified cost options (SCOs) while addressing, in particular, the risk of irregularities and fraud and the costs of controls, and finalising the ex post audit strategy for Horizon Europe as soon as possible;
       (iv) further specify the requirements for defining proper implementation of lump sum grants, taking into account the Court’s pertinent recommendations from its 2022 Annual Report, and verify the actual implementation of projects using lump sums;
       (v) undertake a thorough analysis of procurement errors found and further develop the guidelines describing the extent of the checks to be performed for ex ante controls on procurement for CEF projects, as recommended by the Court;

    Cohesion, Resilience and Values

    78.  Stresses the importance of Union cohesion policy for economic and territorial convergence and development in the regions of the Union, as well as for supporting the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights; notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 2 ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’ was EUR 73,3 billion (38,4 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 47,8 % for the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and other regional operations, 18,9 % for the European Social Fund (ESF), 9,8 % for the Cohesion Fund (CF), 3,8 % for Erasmus+, 2,1 % for CEF Transport, and 3,8 % for other areas;

    79.  Notes that the Court has examined a sample of 238 transactions covering the full range of spending under MFF Heading 2; notes with concern that the Court’s estimated overall level of error in expenditure under this heading in 2023 increased to 9,3 %, which is significantly above the materiality threshold; draws attention to the marked increase in the overall level of error estimated by the Court in 2023 compared to previous years (6,4 % in 2022, 3,6 % in 2021);

    80.  Is concerned about the Court’s observation that the significant additional resources made available under the Recovery Assistance for Cohesion and the Territories of Europe (REACT-EU), the approaching end of the eligibility period for 2014-2020 programmes (31 December 2023), and parallel implementation of the NGEU programme have put additional pressure on Member State’s administrations, increasing the risk of errors; is in particular concerned by the practice of reducing Member States’ co-funding, as is the case under REACT-EU, the Coronavirus Investment Initiative (CRII) and CRII+, which reduces the ownership and associated incentives for properly overseeing expenditure; notes from the Commission replies the acknowledgement that some authorities may have carried out less effective controls and verifications due to the heavy overload and increasing pressure of parallel implementation of 2014-2020 programmes and of additional funding under NGEU;

    81.  Notes the Court’s analysis of transactions with additional funding through REACT-EU and flexibility through CRII+ and Cohesion’s Action for Refugees (CARE) and their contribution to the estimated levels of error; notes in particular the conclusion that errors found in 100 % EU-funded priorities contributed 5,0 % to the total estimated level of error of 9,3 %; is concerned that increasing flexibilities, without either decreasing requirements or increasing preventive checks and controls at the same time, contributed to the high error rate;

    82.  Notes the Court’s Review 03/2024 “An overview of the assurance framework and the key factors contributing to errors in 2014-2020 cohesion spending” that provides a multi-annual overview covering six years of audit results, including an assessment of management and control issues, aiming to strengthen the assurance model; is concerned by the Court’s conclusion that, although the assurance framework for cohesion policy has helped to reduce the level of error, it has not been effective in bringing the overall level of error below the materiality threshold of 2 %; is worried that the Commission can rely only to a limited degree on the work of the national audit authorities, because of the systematic weaknesses; supports the Court’s recommendation to the Commission to strengthen the implementation of the assurance framework for the 2021-2027 cohesion spending; reminds the Commission of the discharge authority’s call to work closely with the Member States to improve the management and control system for Union expenditure to reduce the high error rate to below the 2 % materiality threshold;

    83.  Notes the Court’s observation in its review on the reliability of the work of key actors in the control system for cohesion policy; is concerned by the Court’s finding that during a 6-year period managing authorities, the first line of defence for detection and prevention of errors, are not sufficiently effective in mitigating the inherent high risk of error in cohesion policy; considers it even more worrying that the Court found that the second line of defence, the Member States’ audit authorities, are not able to determine the correct error rate for the packages of expenditure they audit and provide assurance on, since the Court detected additional errors in at least 39 % of these packages; notes that these errors have been detected and reported by the Court annually for more than 6 years and that there is therefore a systemic issue;

    84.  Notes the Court’s categorisation of errors found in cohesion expenditure, with ineligible projects accounting for 29 %, ineligible costs for 26 % and serious non-compliance in public procurement procedures accounting for 21 % of errors and ERDF and CF related expenditure accounting for the largest share of errors (80 %); notes that expenditure under the ESF+, YEI and FEAD are proportionally less affected by error, as they together account for 16 % of errors, while they together account for around 20 % of the budget under this heading;

    85.  Notes the study commissioned by the Committee on Budgetary Control on ‘Lessons learned from the implementation of crisis response tools’ that shows that absorption of uncommitted cohesion resources was supported by the flexibilities introduced under CRII and CRII+; is concerned by the finding of the researchers that quality of fast-tracked projects might not have reached the same level as investments before the pandemic; is further concerned by the researchers’ observation that the risk of low-quality projects is entirely borne by the Union Budget, because of 100 % EU-funding in CRII, CRII+ and REACT-EU; considers that 100 % EU-funding might help absorption, but that absorption is not a goal in itself;

    86.  Stresses that, in its most recent discharge opinions, the Committee on Regional Development called for additional advisory support from the Commission to national, local and regional authorities to avoid a situation of administrative overload; recognises the Commission’s efforts but, observes that, regrettably, these have not been sufficient to mitigate the risk of error; warns that a similar administrative overload might occur at the end of the RRF eligibility period and the final years of the MFF; underlines the need to address the insufficient administrative capacity of national, local and regional authorities as a matter of urgency; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to provide them with clear guidance, and to increase its support for administrative capacity building, including through staff training, best practice sharing, peer-to-peer reviews and technical assistance to ensure effective fund management;

    87.  Notes the public discussions on the post-2027 multiannual financial framework that may indicate a shift towards a performance-based model, coupling investments and reforms, and a desire to simplify rules and procedures; calls on the Commission to prioritise the financial responses to the current threats resulting from the geopolitical situation; warns that any decision on the future design of spending programmes must not be to the detriment of oversight and control of Union expenditure in terms of transparency and information at Union level about non-compliance with rules and regulations; considers that the errors identified by the Court and the way the Commission handles those errors are also an indication of a properly functioning management and control system and notes that both institutions stated their commitment to improve the system and bring down the error rate;

    88.  Notes, as in previous years, the Court’s observation that the Commission’s desk reviews, to review and assess the work of audit authorities, are aimed at checking only consistency of regularity information, and that they are therefore too limited to confirm the residual error rate reported by the national authorities in their assurance packages; notes the Commission’s reply that it complements its desk review with on-the-spot audit work covering the programmes and assurance packages, which enables it to establish a reasonable and fair estimate of the error rates for each programme; considers that the Court’s observation is about the scope of the desk reviews and the fact that they are only aimed at consistency and therefore too limited to provide the Commission with information that is sufficiently reliable;

    89.  Is concerned about the persistent shortcomings observed by the Court in the work of national audit authorities as visible in the weaknesses identified in the assurance packages, with a residual error rate above the materiality threshold for more than 60 % of the value of assurance packages audited in 2023; stresses with concern that managing authorities consistently do not effectively succeed in preventing or detecting irregularities in expenditure declared by beneficiaries and that this reduces the extent to which the Commission can rely on their work;

    90.  Reminds that in shared management, it is the Commission’s responsibility to make sure that Member States set up management and control systems that function effectively during the implementation of programmes; is worried that both the Commission and the Court have identified that not all Member States’ management and control systems function effectively, thus negatively effecting the reliability of the Commission error rates, as they rely on these national systems, which do not work effectively; calls into question the possibility for the Commission to continue to rely on national systems;

    91.  Considers that for the single audit approach to work well, and in order to achieve reduced administrative burden for beneficiaries and managing authorities, adherence to audit standards at all levels of control and audit is of essential importance; is therefore worried by the Court’s finding in its annual report that essential supporting documents about compliance with eligibility conditions were not presented by programme authorities and beneficiaries, and also by the finding by the Court presented in its review that insufficient documentation of audit work from audit authorities limits the reliance that can be placed on audit work of national audit authorities;

    92.  Recalls that following Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council(15) (CPR) for the programming period 2021-2027, Member States need to comply with horizontal and thematic enabling conditions, which need to remain fulfilled and respected throughout the implementation period of the funds; recalls that when enabling conditions are not fulfilled at the time of submission of a payment application to the Commission for the specific objective concerned, the related expenditure will not be reimbursed from the Union budget until the Commission is satisfied that the enabling condition has been fulfilled; recalls the strong regrets of the discharge authority in relation to the Commission decision of 13 December 2023(16) considering that Hungary fulfilled the horizontal enabling condition related to judicial independence that enabled the Hungarian authorities to submit reimbursement claims of up to EUR 10,2 billion; notes with concern that since the release of these funds, the Hungarian government has not taken steps to reinstate the independence of the judiciary but on the contrary; reiterates its worries about the lack of adequate control mechanisms or unreliable public procurement procedures to guarantee sound financial management and the protection of the Union budget; believes that this decision politically contradicts the prolongation of the measures adopted under Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092(17) (the ‘Conditionality Regulation’);

    93.  Expresses deep concern over the findings in the 2023 Rule of Law Report regarding the rule of law situation in Hungary, particularly the persistent and systemic challenges in the judiciary and the media sectors; notes with alarm the increasing pressure on judicial independence, including concerns over the selection and promotion of judges, and recent reports of intimidation and interference in judicial decisions, as exemplified by the resignations of judges in protest against political influence; notes with concern in the same vein that the head of the Hungarian Integrity Authority, a key institution established as a condition set by the Commission for the release of Union funds under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, is facing increasing pressure from the Hungarian government; calls on the Commission to ensure a coordinated and holistic approach across all relevant Union funds and legislative tools, emphasizing that Union funds must not be allocated to activities undermining democracy or reinforcing authoritarianism;

    94.  Recalls that the Conditionality Regulation establishes a mechanism and measures to protect the Union Budget from breaches of the rule of law when other procedures set out in Union legislation would not protect the budget more efficiently; recalls that this mechanism was activated on 15 December 2022 in the case of Hungary over concerns related to its system of public procurement, resulting in a temporary suspension of 55 % of budgetary commitments for three cohesion policy programmes; recalls that the same regulation, in line with Article 6 of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093(18) (the ‘MFF Regulation’), stipulates that suspended commitments of 2022 (year n), may not be re-entered into the budget beyond 2024 (year n+2) and that therefore 55 % of commitments from 2022, around EUR 1 billion, were decommitted in December 2024; notes that no other procedures under the Conditionality Regulation are ongoing;

    95.  Notes that the Commission allocated an equivalent of five full-time staff members to the implementation of the Conditionality Regulation and reiterates the European Court of Auditor’s concerns raised in its Special Report 03/2024 that current staff numbers appear to be insufficient to ensure a strict and coherent application of the Regulation;

    96.  Reiterates the need to treat as a single, integral package all the measures required for the release of Union funding under the Conditionality Regulation, the CPR and Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council(19) (the ‘RRF Regulation’); stresses the importance of the protection of the Union financial interests also for disbursement of pre-financing;

    97.  Notes that some investments which would have been eligible for financing under cohesion are included in the National Recovery and Resilience Plans; recalls that the general objective of the RRF enshrined in Article 4 of the RRF Regulation is to promote the Union’s economic, social and territorial cohesion, and that one of its six pillars is specifically dedicated to this purpose; acknowledges that the wide scope of the RRF results in limited overlap with other Union funding programmes, as intended by the co-legislators when establishing the Article 9 of the RRF Regulation, which establishes additionality and complementarity funding as key principles; draws attention, however, to the risks of double funding emerging from such situations;

    98.  Expresses its preoccupation about the visible delays in implementation of cohesion policy in Member States and the lack of capacity of national administrations to deal in parallel with different spending programmes (e.g. cohesion programmes and RRF programmes) covering complementary or even similar objectives; calls on the Commission to ensure that sufficient technical assistance is provided to Member States facing difficulties in order to address existing delays in the implementation of cohesion programmes;

    99.  Recognises the disproportionate impact of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine on eastern regions of the Union bordering Russia and Belarus; draws attention to the costs borne by these regions and Member States as a result of their shared border with hostile neighbouring countries, notably their need to increasingly direct public funding into security, defence and preparedness, while facing dramatically reduced resources due to a disruption in economic activities, cross-border trade and other exchanges, and in cohesion programmes, particularly Interreg programmes; notes the measures taken by the European Commission to support these regions, notably through flexibilities provided under cohesion policy; welcomes that providing support to eastern border regions most affected by Russia’s aggression is included in the mission letter of the Executive Vice President for Cohesion and Reforms; calls on the Commission to ensure the provision of adequate support for eastern regions of the Union bordering Russia and Belarus to cope with the disproportionate consequences of the Russian war of aggression, both in the short-term through the 2026 draft budget and in the medium-term through the Commission’s proposal for the next MFF;

    100.  Stresses the importance of ESF+ which aims to achieve high employment, fair social protection, a skilled and resilient workforce, and inclusive/cohesive societies as key in eradicating poverty; expresses the need to provide it with the continued financial and political support of the Union, national and regional institutions in the delivery of its objectives and targets in the years to come; underlines the importance of closely involving regional actors, in particular civil society organisations and social partners working on the ground in the implementation of ESF+ funded activities;

    101.  Welcomes the frontloading of EUR 100 million from the 2027 budget of Erasmus+ to the 2023 budget of Erasmus+, which enabled continued support to pupils, students, teachers and qualified staff fleeing from Ukraine, and the extra EUR 20 million awarded to Erasmus+ in 2023 as a result of Parliament’s insistence; stresses that frontloading must remain an exception to rapid response to unforeseen acute crisis situations; underlines that any frontloading of Erasmus+ cannot result in cuts for the programme at the end of current MFF; emphasises that every effort must be made to respond to such situations preferentially with additional funding;

    102.  Emphasises the need for strict oversight of the allocation of funds to prevent misuse within the Erasmus programme; asks the Commission to gather evidence to investigate any case of fraudulent or suspicious recipients, in accordance with its duties outlined in the Financial Regulation and Erasmus+ grant agreements; calls for adequate safeguarding of the programme from abuse by organizations whose activities are not aligned with the fundamental values of the Union (human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law, human rights); recalls that the Commission is legally bound to ensure that programme beneficiaries commit to and ensure the respect of these values and do not commit professional misconduct;

    103.  Notes that in 2023, the budget of the EU4Health programme, the main financial instrument to support Union health initiatives, was EUR 735 million, mainly managed by Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety and the Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA) and implemented through the European Health and Digital Executive Agency; acknowledges the progress of initiatives funded under this programme, notably in the areas of health emergency preparedness, the Beating Cancer Plan, the Pharmaceutical Strategy for Europe and in the implementation of Union health legislation;

    Recommendations

    104.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) re-consider the practice of 100 % Union funding in Union crisis response instruments, where increasing pre-financing might provide faster availability of funds, while maintaining a shared financial budgetary control responsibility in implementation of the funds by maintaining financial involvement from both national and Union level;
       (ii) ensure selection of qualitatively good projects with cohesion policy funds by favouring long-term investments, and duly justifying 100 % Union funding while limiting its application;
       (iii) address the systemic issue of non-detection of errors at Member State level in cohesion policy spending with an action plan, aimed at reporting an accurate error rate in assurance packages, and detection of errors at the first lines of defence by making available more, and/or better targeting existing resources and increase detection capacity at Member State and Commission level;
       (iv) calculate and report to the discharge authority the cost of control for all expenditure handled by national authorities concerning cohesion policy funds, and NGEU, and compare these figures with the cost of control when only Cohesion policy funds were handled by the same authorities;
       (v) address the recurrent issue of insufficient documentation at beneficiary, programme authority and audit authority level, not only through checks, awareness raising and information on requirements, but also through increased digitalisation and where possible, through financial incentives to penalise non-respect of the requirements for sound financial management;
       (vi) expand the scope of its desk review of assurance packages to review more quality criteria in addition to consistency to make a reliable estimate of the residual error rate for the assurance package under review, as well as of the risk at payment as a whole;
       (vii) step up its monitoring of the horizontal and thematic enabling conditions in all Member States to identify potential threats for the protection of the Union Budget and ensure enhanced transparency and stakeholder participation in the application of this tool;
       (viii) closely align the rule of law report with the Conditionality Regulation and report in more detail on the breaches of the principles of the rule of law that can be used as input to trigger the Conditionality Regulation;
       (ix) continuously monitor the implementation by the Hungarian Government of measures foreseen in Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022; assess to what extent the situation has improved or worsened, including in relation to the challenges faced by the Hungarian Integrity Authority, and take all necessary actions in accordance with the Conditionality Regulation;
       (x) provide Member States with increased technical assistance in order to address delays in the implementation of national programmes in order to increase the absorption rate;
       (xi) closely monitor and mitigate the increasing risk of double funding between Cohesion programmes and RRF funding and address any such occurrences without delay;
       (xii) further enhance simplification in the implementation of cohesion programmes and work closely with Member States to identify best practices regarding the digitalisation of practices and procedures;
       (xiii) take all necessary measures to bring down the error rate in close cooperation with the Court of Auditors;
       (xiv) ensure the provision of adequate support for eastern regions of the Union bordering Russia and Belarus to cope with the disproportionate consequences of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, both in the short-term and in the medium-term;

    Natural resources

    105.  Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 3 ‘Natural resources’ was EUR 59,5 billion (31,1 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 65,0 % for direct payments under the European Agricultural Guarantee fund (EAGF), 27,6 % for the Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), 4,2 % for market-related expenditure under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF), 1,9 % for Maritime and Fisheries, 0,9 % for Environment and Climate (LIFE), and 0,4 % for other areas;

    106.  Notes that the Court has examined a sample of 218 transactions covering the full range of spending under this MFF heading; notes that the Court also examined the regularity information given in the annual activity reports of the Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI) and the Directorate-General for Climate Action (DG CLIMA), as well as selected systems in 20 Member States and the United Kingdom; notes that the Court estimates the level of error for ‘Natural Resources’ to be 2,2 % (2,2 % in 2022) and that the majority of the errors found affected rural development transactions;

    107.  Points out, however, that this is partly due to the complexity of environmental schemes in rural development programmes and the recognized negative issue of “gold plating” at national level;

    108.  Notes, in this context, the lower-than-expected implementation rate of EAFRD funding for the period 2023-2027, with an absorption rate of only 1 % at the end of 2023, with payments amounting to EUR 0,7 billion, and expects the absorption rate to increase significantly in the course of the next reporting period;

    109.  Notes that the Court found 16 quantifiable errors in rural development, 15 in direct payments, three in expenditure related to market measures, and three in non-CAP expenditure; is reassured by the Commission’s assessment that most errors concern clerical mistakes and by the actions taken by the Commission to prevent errors in the future;

    110.  Notes the categorisation of errors by the Court, with ineligible claims accounting for 35 % of the errors, and administrative errors and inaccurate information on areas or animals for 21 % and 20 % respectively; notes with concern, that as in previous years, that the Court found in several cases that the Member State authorities and the Commission had sufficient information to prevent, or to detect and correct the error before accepting the expenditure and that, had the Member State authorities and the Commission made proper use of all the information at their disposal, the estimated level of error for this chapter would have been 1.0 percentage point lower;

    111.  Notes that 2023 was the first year of the CAP 2023-2027 new delivery model, which integrates performance elements, agreed with the Member States in Strategic Plans, as basis for payments; notes that 2023 was a modest start of the new delivery model, EUR 63,65 million declared on the basis of generated outputs and therefore subject to a ‘performance clearance’ by DG AGRI out of EUR 215,52 million declared under the CAP Strategic plans under sectoral interventions and rural development; notes that in 2024 payments under the new delivery model will have increased substantially; notes the Court’s observations as regards processing performance data for the Annual Performance Reports where Member States are in the process of setting-up systems and procedures and at times manually aggregate data, with associated risks for the reliability of data;

    112.  Recalls the farmers’ protests across Europe towards the end of 2023 and early 2024 and the Commission’s response aimed at simplification, in particular for small farmers, and increasing discretionary powers for Member States; stresses that simplification should go hand in hand with sound financial management and take into account the Union’s climate commitments; welcomes the Commission’s targeted approach, especially concerning the distinction between farm size in terms of agricultural land and number of farms; cautions that discretion given to Member States should also be accompanied by thorough oversight by the Commission;

    113.  Recalls that both the Commission and Member States are responsible for addressing fraud in CAP spending; welcomes in that regard the work done in terms of anti-fraud risk assessments and the update of its anti-fraud strategy by DG AGRI;

    114.  Notes the Court’s Special Report 07/2024 on the Commission’s systems for recovering irregular expenditure, and the Commission’s reply; notes the Court’s observation that recoveries concerning agricultural expenditure have been relatively successful, attributed in part to the so-called 50-50 rule that incentivised Member States to recover funds; notes that this rule has not been retained in the 2023-2027 CAP and the Court’s warning that this might lead to a deterioration of the rate of recovery for agricultural expenditure;

    115.  Notes the Court’s Special Report 20/2024 on Common Agriculture Policy Plans and the Commission’s reply; stresses the importance of ensuring that all key elements for assessing performance are provided; considers that plans need to account for specific situations in specific Member States and that therefore a certain level of divergence is even desirable, is however worried that divergence in ambitions may mean that there is no level playing field for farmers across Member States; is further disappointed by the Court’s finding that although the new monitoring framework has been simplified, the CAP objectives lack clarity and indicators focus on outputs rather than results, and that important result indicators are missing; notes that the Court recommends the Commission to promote exchange of best practices in the plans and strengthening the future CAP monitoring framework;

    116.  Notes the Court’s Special Report 19/2024 on Organic farming in the EU, and the Commission’s reply; is once more worried by the Court’s finding that a weak strategic framework and data constraints prevent the measurement of the impact of the policy; considers that the increased focus on performance and definition of targets and indicators, and the related monitoring of results across Union policies needs to be supported by an equal increase of the Commission’s capacity to define performance frameworks and monitor performance;

    117.  Welcomes the increased competitiveness achieved through market measures in the wine sector and encourages the Commission and Member States to persevere in their efforts to replicate this success in other sectors;

    118.  Recalls that democracy and pluralism are fundamental values of the Union enshrined in Article 2 TEU; further recalls that, in line with Article 11 TEU, Union institutions shall give citizens and representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action in order to maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue; underlines that separation of powers between the institutions as laid down in Article 13 TEU must always be respected and that Union institutions shall practice mutual sincere cooperation;

    119.  Recognises the importance of the LIFE programme; recalls the provisions of the LIFE+ Regulation, including those related to operating grants, the eligibility conditions, the award criteria, the overall allocation for 2021-2027 and the distribution of funds within the programme;

    120.  Notes that some members of the Budgetary Control committee requested access to a series of grant agreements under the LIFE programme, as well as other Union funding programmes, and after scrutinising them expressed concerns on the content of several of the programmes in February 2024; notes that the Commission, including the Internal Audit Service (IAS), was initially not aware of any issue, but adopted a series of measures with the aim of addressing the concerns; recalls the discharge written questions and hearings with the Secretary-General of the Commission on 5 November 2024, the responsible Commissioners for MFF Heading 3 on 12 November, and the Commissioner responsible for Budget and administration on 9 December 2024 where the concerns and the Commission’s response were discussed;

    121.  Notes the concerns expressed by some members of the Budgetary Control Committee that certain grant agreements between the European Union Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency (CINEA) and beneficiaries, such as CSOs and private companies, under the LIFE Programme include ‘work plans’ containing detailed advocacy actions towards Union institutions or their representatives, as well as other actions directed towards certain trade agreements which the Union was negotiating, or litigation measures to be pursued by the respective entities; acknowledges that this could be potentially interpreted as interfering with internal decision making in Union institutions; notes that the Commission has performed a legal analysis of the grant agreements that raised concerns of some Members of the CONT Committee, which concluded that there was no evidence that the entities concerned had breached their contractual or code of conduct obligations, yet the Commission asked some beneficiaries to make amendments to the grant agreements that contained the specific provisions that potentially entailed a reputational risk; further notes that all grant agreements include a disclaimer stating that ‘views of the beneficiary do not in any way represent views of the EU and that granting authority cannot be held responsible for them’;

    122.  Underlines that Union financing should not contribute to undermining the rule of law, nor the values on which the Union is founded; recalls the provisions of Article 163 of the Financial Regulation; considers it crucial that there should be no funding without traceability of funds;

    123.  Notes the actions taken by the Commission to address the allegations which included the issuance of guidance for Commission services on funding activities related to the development, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of Union legislation and policy and screening of their contract portfolios to determine which agreements were not in line with the guidance; takes note of the measures adopted so far by the Commission while awaiting the results of the screening of the grant agreements with all the beneficiaries, which was requested by the Commission’s Corporate Management Board;

    124.  Notes the decision-making structure, including the evaluation board within CINEA, for deciding on contracts between the Commission and beneficiaries; urges the Commission to ensure that the decision-making structure of CINEA for deciding on contracts to be awarded features clear accountability, clear responsibilities and a practical structure;

    125.  Notes that the executive agency conducts annual bottom-up risk management exercises and that these bottom-up risk management exercises did not identify any critical risks; notes that irrespective of the financing programme, evaluation procedures should be constantly reviewed and adapted if needed;

    126.  Notes reports in the media that the President of the Commission hired a paid special adviser to deliver a report on the “Strategic Dialogue on the Future of EU Agriculture” who received a salary equal to a Director-General in the Commission; is concerned by the remuneration of all the special advisers and the discretion the Commission has in deciding their remuneration, which creates arbitrary inequalities;

    Recommendations

    127.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) closely monitor the Member States’ progress as regards the processing of performance data and the aggregation of data for the annual performance report and keep the discharge authority informed about issues with reliability of performance data, in particular where it concerns manually aggregated data;
       (ii) inform the discharge authority why the Court concludes that for several years several errors could have been prevented, had the Commission and Member States used all information at their disposal and why the Commission and Member States do not manage to address this issue appropriately;
       (iii) apply the lessons learned as regards the reduction of the administrative burden from its response to the farmers’ protests in future policy initiatives, while taking due account of the risk of abuse of funds where control measures are reduced, or risk of too much divergence between Member States when discretionary powers are used without proper oversight;
       (iv) keep the discharge authority informed about the recovery rates of agricultural expenditure, in particular if the rate deteriorates in comparison to the recovery rate under the previous CAP and swiftly mitigate the causes for the deterioration, including considering the introduction of new incentives for Member State authorities to recover funds;
       (v) assess the differences in ambition of strategic plans and inform the discharge authority whether there is divergence between Member States, threatening the level-playing field for farmers, and assess how the Commission addresses those differences;
       (vi) make better use of its capacity for setting-up performance frameworks, for defining objectives and indicators and holding those contributing to the achievements, be they Member States or beneficiaries, accountable for their contributions;
       (vii) update the Commission’s anti-fraud strategy to devote attention to advocating for and upholding a clear separation of executive and legislative power in the Union;
       (viii) have a clear and comprehensive strategy at Commission level as to how to better protect the financial interests of the Union and ensure that Union funds are spent for their intended purposes and diligently apply the Financial Regulation provisions, including by ensuring that grant agreements can be suspended or terminated when beneficiaries violate the Union’s legislation;
       (ix) ensure a fair distribution of Union funds to CSOs to contribute to a pluralistic and vibrant society;
       (x) ensure that the Commission’s guidance adopted in 2024 is applied by all authorising officers and, if necessary, further develop guidance to fully align grant agreements with Treaty provisions and existing legislation;
       (xi) make the results of the screening of grant agreements available to the discharge authority in order to allow an assessment of the extent to which the Commission may be exposed to a reputational risk;
       (xii) adequately address issues such as revolving doors, transparency in financing and donations, the fight against money laundering, limiting foreign interference, independence from political and economic influence, whistleblowing and transparent governance structures, in respect of all entities receiving Union funds;
       (xiii) review the template for MoUs between the Commission and executive agencies to ensure clearer division of responsibilities;
       (xiv) instruct the audit structure to review contracts with beneficiaries and to flag in case they identify contracts that are not in line with applicable financial rules;
       (xv) have the IAS review contracts between the Commission and grantees, specifically to search for content that is not in line with applicable financial rules within work packages;
       (xvi) evaluate the decision-making structure in the areas of the awarding of contracts and instruct Commission services and executive agencies to perform better checks on the content of contracts at all stages, including by ensuring that work packages and key performance indicators as listed by applicants align with the objectives of respective funding programmes;
       (xvii) adopt more precise categorisation of entities listed in the Financial Transparency System;
       (xviii) review its rules for special advisers to remove the arbitrary selection and remuneration;
       (xix) further enhance simplification in the implementation of programmes and work closely with Member States to identify best practices regarding the digitalisation of practices and procedures;
       (xx) improve the quality of dialogue with farmers from all Member States;
       (xxi) react more quickly when serious concerns of the discharge authority are flagged to the Commission;
       (xxii) perform adequate checks of entities listed in the Transparency Register, in order to ensure that they comprehensively list their activities in the Register;
       (xxiii) draw clearer lines of responsibility when implementing collaborative platforms;
       (xxiv) instruct the Corporate Management Board to submit consolidated information on the list of critical risks to the internal audit service and ensure executive agencies address potential risks and ensure a transparent selection of independent evaluators to prevent conflict of interest and guarantee their independence;
       (xxv) instruct all DGs and executive agencies to review the distribution of funds dedicated to auditing in order to ensure sufficient resources;
       (xxvi) ensure that proposals for Multiannual Work Programmes of any Union funding instrument have clear guidelines on the activities eligible for funding, clearer rules on screening of applications and on admissible content as well as clearer requirements for transparency and traceability of the use of Union funds, including in relation to the disclosure requirements under the EU Transparency Register;
       (xxvii) ensure that all grant agreements respect the necessary requirements related to transparency, traceability and visibility of funds;

    Migration and Border management

    128.  Notes that in 2023 the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 4 ‘Migration and Border Management’ was EUR 2,7 billion (1,4 % of the Union budget spending) distributed as follows: 1,2 billion (46,5 %) for three decentralised agencies, the European Boarder Coast Agency (FRONTEX), the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) and the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (EU- LISA); 1 billion (38,6 %) for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), and 0,4 billion (14,9 %) for the Integrated Border Management Fund (IBMF);

    129.  Notes that in 2023 a significant portion of the spending under MFF heading 4 still concerned the completion of projects remaining from the 2014-2020 MFF; notes that 18 % of AMIF national programmes for 2014-2020 remained undeclared at the end of 2023 and that the last annual accounts and the request for payment of the final balance for these funds will be provided by the Member States as part of the closure package by 31 December 2024 at the latest;

    130.  Notes that the Court examined a sample of 23 transactions, which is not large enough to be representative of the spending under MFF headings 4 and 5 and, thus, it cannot provide a separate estimate of the error rate for these headings; further notes that the Court’s audit results show that the expenditure under MFF headings 4 and 5 is affected by eligibility and procurement issues and that it is a high-risk area (7 out of 23 transactions audited, i.e. 30,4 %, were affected by errors); is concerned that the Court detected four quantifiable errors which had a financial impact on the amounts charged to the Union budget and that it also found further ten cases of non-compliance with legal and financial provisions (which had no direct financial impact on the Union budget); therefore, invites the Court to provide a clear estimate of the error rate for heading 4; notes that the Commission concludes that the risk at payment in 2023 is 1,1 % for the expenditure on migration and border management;

    131.  Notes that the Commission has accepted the Court’s recommendation made in its annual report for 2023 to provide further guidance on applicable rules to the Member State authorities responsible for implementing DG HOME funding via shared management; regrets that the Commission has not yet fully implemented the Court’s previous recommendations that were due to be addressed by the end of 2023; notes that DG HOME is undertaking a reassessment of its ex-ante methodology to ensure the respect of the rules applicable to post-2021 generation of grants, and that this reassessment will also address the Court’s relevant recommendations and those of the IAS audit on the preparedness for closing actions and programmes funded under the Internal Security Fund (ISF) and the AMIF 2014-2020 through direct and shared management;

    132.  Notes with concern that two reservations on the declaration of assurance were issued in DG HOME’s Annual Activity Report for 2023 and that one reservation concerns the implementation of AMIF and ISF 2014-2020 in several Member States and the other reservation concerns the implementation of Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI) 2021-2027 in one Member State; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to take remedial measures for the underlying issues that necessitated the reservations;

    133.  Welcomes the progress identified by the Court in its review of the preparatory work done by five member state audit authorities in managing the transition of the AMIF, BMVI and ISF funds to the CPR of the 2021-2027 MFF; observes that these audit authorities reported to the Court that the support and guidance DG HOME provided to them was satisfactory; notes with concern that at the time of the Court’s audit four out of five Member State audit authorities had not finalised their audit strategies;

    134.  Takes note of the adoption of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum; welcomes that the mid-term revision of the MFF 2021-2027 allocated an additional EUR 2 billion to migration and border management for 2024-2027 to address the growing challenges in migration and border management resulting from the current geopolitical context; notes, however, that additional funds might be needed with a view to ensuring the full implementation of the Pact; calls for the quick implementation of the Pact in the Member States;

    135.  Stresses that securing the Union’s external borders is a pillar of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum; notes with concern that the Commission reported that the number of irregular border crossings in the Union increased in 2023 to 380 000, compared to 330 000 in 2022; observes that the BMVI can support frontline Member States to ensure they have the resources for infrastructure, facilities and installations necessary to secure the external borders of the Union, including electronic border security enhancements and other tools for border surveillance as provided for in annex III of the BMVI regulation; notes the European Council conclusions of 9 February 2023 that the Union will step up its action to prevent irregular departures and loss of life, to reduce pressure on the borders of the Union and on reception capacities, to fight against smugglers and to increase returns; underlines the need to better protect vulnerable people from smuggling and trafficking networks and address the negative effects of the instrumentalisation of migrants as part of hybrid attacks, notably by pro-Russian forces, as well as by the Belarusian regime;

    136.  Recalls that, according to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, Member States and the Commission must ensure respect for fundamental rights and compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in the implementation of Union funds;

    137.  Notes the Court’s conclusion that the AMIF 2014-2020 was performing below expectations in terms of facilitating returns of migrants: also takes note of the fact that the Court and the Commission agree that progress in this area was particularly affected by COVID-19-related travel restrictions; further notes that in 2023 return measures were supported with EUR 29,8 million from the AMIF; considers that the Commission must provide stronger efforts to assist Member States in addressing irregular border crossing and in successfully implementing returns of third-country nationals, as well as the integration of legal migrants; looks forward to receiving consolidated information in 2025 on progress in this regard through the ex-post evaluation AMIF 2014-2020; highlights that the Commission should continue to take action on migration and asylum within the framework of external action, including the ‘Team Europe’ approach while also increasing the transparency of the programming and implementation of the Union home affairs funds in third countries and safeguarding the role of the Parliament;

    Recommendations

    138.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) address the Court’s recommendations in a thorough and timely manner and share DG HOME’s revised ex-ante methodology, once completed, with the discharge authority;
       (ii) continue to support the Member State managing and audit authorities in the timely finalisation of their audit strategies for MFF 2021-2027 funds, paying particular attention to eligibility and procurement issues, as well as all other recurrent findings of the Court;
       (iii) take action to improve the performance of actions funded by the Union in terms of effective returns and combatting irregular migration, while ensuring the full respect of Union legislation and the fundamental values of the Union;
       (iv) take action to increase the efficiency of Union spending on the protection and management of the European Union’s external borders;
       (v) monitor, assist in and scrutinise the timely progress of the administrative, operational and legal steps required by Member States and Union agencies for the full implementation of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum by 2026;
       (vi) increase the transparency of the programming and implementation of the Union home affairs funds in third countries, while safeguarding the role of Parliament in ensuring the democratic scrutiny of Union spending;
       (vii) continuously assess, in the implementation of the Union Budget, compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Union values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, in accordance with Article 6 of the Financial Regulation;

    Security and Defence

    139.  Notes that in 2023 the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 5 ‘Security and Defence’ was EUR 1,4 billion (0,7 % of the Union budget spending) distributed as follows: 500 million (38,4 %) for the European Defence Fund (EDF), 300 million (19 %) for military mobility, 200 million (17,1 %) for decentralised agencies, namely the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), Europol and European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), 200 million (13,1 %) for the ISF, and 200 million (12,4 %) for nuclear safety, decommissioning and other areas;

    140.  Notes that in 2023 a significant portion of the spending under MFF heading 5 still concerned the completion of projects remaining from the 2014-2020 MFF; notes that 25 % of ISF national programmes for 2014-2020 remained undeclared at the end of 2023 and that the last annual accounts and the request for payment of the final balance for these funds will be provided by the Member States as part of the closure package by 31 December 2024 at the latest;

    141.  Notes with concern that, for the reasons explained in the section on migration and border management, the Court cannot provide a separate estimate of the error rate for MFF heading 5 ‘Security and Defence’ and that, based on its audit results, the Court considers expenditure from this heading to be high-risk; therefore, invites the Court to provide an estimate of the error rate for this heading as well; notes that the Commission concludes that in 2023 the risk at payment was 0,5 % for the expenditure on security and defence;

    142.  Observes that the Commission has not accepted the Court’s recommendation to carefully check and document the technical aspects of military mobility grant applications to the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) during the grant award procedure and that the Commission considers that its current processes already ensure a check on whether dual-use infrastructure projects meet the eligibility conditions;

    143.  Recalls the highly unstable geopolitical situation in the Union’s neighbourhood giving rise to greater security and defence challenges, including hybrid threats, and thereby to greater investment needs in security, defence and preparedness, since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; draws attention to the fact that MFF heading 5, dedicated to security and defence, is the smallest of all MFF headings and regrets that the Union’s current budget for ensuring the security and defence of its citizens is not equal to the challenges to be met either in the short or the long term; notes that in 2023 Union funding in support of the defence industry came exclusively from the EDF; recalls the role played by the EDF in supporting European technological expertise in emerging and disruptive technologies; welcomes that submissions to the 2023 EDF calls increased by 72 % compared to the previous year, demonstrating the strong and constantly growing interest of European defence industry actors and research organisations in the EDF and the high demand for funding in this sector; notes that under the 2023 calls, the Union committed EUR 1,15 billion for 61 defence R&D projects, benefiting 581 legal entities from 26 Member States and Norway; notes that on average 17 entities from eight different Member States and Norway participate in each project; underlines the importance of a level playing field in supporting cross-border defence R&D cooperation;

    144.  Welcomes the Commission’s actions to enhance support for SMEs in the defence sector, in particular appreciates that the EU Defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS), which provides a diverse range of instruments tailored to support SMEs within the defence ecosystem, became fully operational in 2023, with EUR 224 million allocated to it from the EDF budget; appreciates, further, the role of the SME bonus under the EDF in facilitating the access of smaller actors and innovators in defence supply chains; notes that in the 2023 EDF calls, 42 % of the entities selected for funding were SMEs, an increased share compared to 2022 (38,2 %), and that 18 % of the total funding available through the EDF calls is allocated to SMEs;

    145.  Recalls that the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) was a precursor programme of the EDF with a budget of EUR 90 million that funded 18 research projects selected following calls for proposals in the years 2017 to 2019; further recalls that the Court, in its Special Report 10/2023 ‘The Preparatory action on defence research’, has observed that the Union still lacked a long-term strategy for the projects under the EDF, particularly in terms of impact, additional research, development, manufacturing and procurement; welcomes that the Commission has accepted all of the Court’s recommendations and has confirmed that their implementation is ongoing; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s adoption of a European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and legislative proposal establishing the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) as well as its commitment to build up the EDF; nevertheless, in view of the geopolitical realities the Union faces, is concerned that the full implementation of the Court’s recommendations is expected only in 2026;

    146.  Recalls the Court’s observations in its Special Report 10/2023 regarding the limited availability of human resources at the Commission and the subsequent risk for the EDF; notes that the growing number of proposals to evaluate and projects to manage puts considerable pressure on human resources; further notes the large share of seconded national experts (17 %) among DG DEFIS staff in 2023 and DG DEFIS’s intention to reinforce staff by the selection of officials through specialised EPSO competitions in the field of space and defence, for which the reserve lists were finalised in November 2023;

    147.  Notes that the implementation of ‘Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0’ is ongoing, with EUR 1,74 billion allocated for dual-use transport infrastructure projects under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) between 2021-2027; notes that so far the Union has co-funded 95 military mobility projects in 21 Member States and that 94 of these projects are still ongoing and most of them are expected to be finalised between 2026 and 2027; notes with concern that following three calls for proposals organised in 2021, 2022 and 2023, the entirety of the military mobility envelope under the CEF for the current programming period has thereby already been exhausted; considers that although making the budget quickly available by frontloading amounts into the 2022 and 2023 calls responded to the need to take into account the evolution of the security situation in Europe following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, it simultaneously led to Union funding being unstable and unpredictable by leaving a gap of more than four years with no more Union funds available for military mobility calls to finance dual-use infrastructure projects until the post-2027 MFF; recalls the Court’s conclusions in its Special Report 04/2025 that the Action Plan was not built on sufficiently solid foundations and that progress towards its objective, namely ensuring swift and seamless movement of personnel, materiel and assets at short notice and on a large scale, has been variable due to design weaknesses and remaining obstacles to implementation; notes that the Commission considers that more action is needed to strengthen dual-use transport infrastructure corridors, including on regulatory issues such as cross-border movement permission procedures; notes the Court’s observation that the Commission had not carried out a robust assessment of the overall funding required to make its objectives and targets achievable; regrets that only EUR 300 million was spent on military mobility in 2023 and is concerned that calls for proposals under the military mobility envelope faced a four-time oversubscription rate, demonstrating the increased interest among Member States and project beneficiaries;

    148.  Expresses deep concern over the Commission’s decision to proceed with the adoption of the “Rearm EU” initiative without prior consultation of the European Parliament; regrets that such a decision bypasses the principle of institutional balance and undermines Parliament’s role as co-legislator in shaping strategic and budgetary priorities; urges the Commission to refrain from initiating substantial policy instruments that impact the Union’s financial and strategic architecture without ensuring full respect for the prerogatives of the Parliament;

    149.  Notes that the European Parliament has called on the Union and its Member States to put in place a legal framework enabling Russia to be classified as a State sponsor of terrorism;

    Recommendations

    150.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) develop a longer-term strategy for the EDF, building on the experience with Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) and the Court’s recommendations, as soon as possible;
       (ii) secure the provision of adequate resources to enhance Union defence cooperation, in the short-term through the 2026 draft budget and the timely recruitment of expert staff, and in the medium-term through the Commission’s proposal for the next MFF;
       (iii) further strengthen military mobility in the Union by substantially increasing the funding available to improve dual-use transport infrastructure corridors and by taking action to eliminate administrative, procedural and regulatory barriers to cross-border military movements, while prioritising Union funding to projects that best respond to the current European threat landscape; taking into account the Court’s findings and recommendations in special report 04/2025;
       (iv) take action to ensure due diligence in relation to project criteria for dual-use military mobility infrastructure projects, in line with the Court’s recommendation;

    Neighbourhood and the world

    151.  Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 6 ‘Neighbourhood and the world’ was EUR 15,2 billion (7,4 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 63,4 % for the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-Global Europe), 16,4 % for Humanitarian Aid (HUMA), 16 % for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III) and 4.2 % for other actions and programmes; notes that in total, payments for ‘Neighbourhood and the world’ reached 15,2 billion in 2023, representing approximatively 8 % of the overall Union expenditure excluding RRF;

    152.  Notes that the Court examined a sample of 72 transactions, which is not adequately representative of the spending under this MFF heading and, therefore, cannot provide an estimate of the error rate; considering that the Court’s audit results show that this is a high-risk area (of 37 out of 72 transactions audited, i.e. 51.4 %, were affected by errors), invites the Court to provide a clear estimate of the error rate for this chapter; notes that the Court found 31 errors that had a financial impact on the Union budget, relating to ineligible beneficiaries, ineligible costs, expenditure not incurred, and breaches of public procurement rules, areas that could point to risks of unreliable functioning of control mechanisms;

    153.  Notes, additionally, that the Court detected 19 cases of non-compliance with legal and financial provisions, none of which had direct financial impact on the Union budget, and which included issues such as ambiguous cost allocations, non-compliance with visibility rules, and inadequate documentation;

    154.  Is concerned that the Court found a significant non-compliance with visibility rules in an EU-funded project under indirect management by DG NEAR, which concerned a contribution agreement worth EUR 21,2 million signed with an international organisation in a project where the aim was to support Eastern partnership countries in tackling COVID-19; notes that the Court found that most donation certificates it checked did not contain any acknowledgment that the medical equipment donated was funded by the Union; recalls that beneficiaries of Union funds are required to clearly publicise the fact that the Union has financed or co-financed the action they are implementing; notes the Commission’s replies that it is discussing new communication and visibility guidelines with the United Nations to reduce the risks of errors on compliance with visibility rules;

    155.  Expresses concern that the Court, in its IT audit on the information system OPSYS’ component for managing user access and rights, found three shortcomings including (i) that the Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) had not formalised a procedure for granting and removing access rights for system administrators and to standard users; (ii) four cases in which standard users had more access rights than they needed for their jobs, which is not in line with the Commission’s IT standards; and that (iii) DG INTPA did not manage all administrator accounts belonging to staff of other directorates-general; is concerned that these weaknesses increase the risks of both inappropriate access to the system and non-compliance with the rules and procedures for implementing external action projects, and also undermine the integrity of system processes and data;

    156.  Notes that the Commission intensified communication with international organisations in order to raise awareness of the need to ensure that the Court’s auditors obtain full access to documents when auditing projects funded by the Union, and that the Commission has supported initiatives to find permanent solutions to the issues of access to and retention of documents; notes, however, the Commission’s acknowledgment that despite efforts, some constraints regarding access to documents persist due to the existing legal frameworks of the implementing partners, which are not expected to change in the near future;

    157.  Urges the Commission to enhance the rule of law conditionality-based approach of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) III funding in order for the instrument to serve its purpose of effectively preparing accession countries to fulfil the conditions of becoming Member States of the Union; reiterates its calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of the Court’s Special Report 01/2022 in order to ensure an effective impact of Union financial assistance in support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans, in particular by developing guidelines on the application of the provisions on modulation and conditionality under IPA III;

    158.  Stresses that Union aid should under no circumstances – directly or indirectly – be financing terrorism, hence it should not support any entity connected to Hamas or any other terrorist or extremist organisation; notes to this end, it is legitimate and necessary to be able to clearly know and identify all the final beneficiaries of European aid in third countries; emphasises the need for strict control over the distribution and use of aid to ensure no misuse of funds;

    159.  Notes with regret that the European Commission financed the Gaziantep Islamic Science and Technology University, which has proven ties to terrorist organisation of Hamas; calls on the Commission to cancel all ties to this university and other universities with ties to terrorist organisations;

    160.  Urges the Commission, in the context of delivering enhanced support and humanitarian aid to the Palestinian population, to also make full use of trusted partners, such as the WHO, WFP UNICEF or different Red Crescent organisations; recalls the importance for the Commission to guarantee independent controls of UNRWA by external experts, the Court and experienced international partners;

    161.  Notes that the Commission has been working in the last months with UNRWA, to enhance the neutrality processes and control systems in the Agency, in line with findings of the investigations by the UN OIOS on the allegations of involvement of 19 of its staff in the 7th October 2023 attack, and to monitor the application of the action plan presented by UNRWA on the implementation of the recommendations of the Independent Review Group led by former French Minister of Foreign Affairs Colonna to strengthen control and oversight; notes that the Commission has reassessed the Union’s 2024 funding decision for UNRWA and that, through an exchange of letters between Commissioner Várhelyi and UNRWA Commissioner General Lazzarini in April 2024, the Union reached an agreement about the Union’s conditional assistance for UNRWA, linked to a number of milestones in relation to three work streams, including the screening of UNRWA staff, an audit by the Union, as well as the reinforcement of the Department of Internal Investigations and Ethics office; notes that Union assistance was resumed;

    162.  Recalls the necessity for the Palestinian Authority to remove all educational materials and content that fail to adhere to UNESCO standards by the next school year, in particular those that contain antisemitism as defined by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance classification endorsed by the Union, incitement to violence, hate speech, and glorification of terrorism; recalls the provisions of previous discharge resolutions; stresses that financial support from the Union for the Palestinian Authority in the area of education should be provided on the condition that textbook content is aligned with UNESCO standards, that all anti-Semitic references are deleted, and that examples which incite to hatred and violence are removed, as repeatedly requested in the resolutions accompanying the discharge decisions; recalls the findings of the Georg Eckert Institute’s report funded by the Union, which revealed a complex picture on the textbooks; notes that the Union does not fund the Palestinian textbooks, and that neither are they the responsibility of UNRWA, which nevertheless reviews all issued textbooks to address any problematic content;); notes that the Commission will carry out close scrutiny to ensure that no Union funds are allocated, directly or indirectly, to the drafting, teaching, or exposure of such educational materials to Palestinian children, including those provided by UN organisations;

    163.  Notes DG NEAR’s acknowledgement in its AAR 2023 that projects in Kyiv received regular visits but security constraints limited on-site monitoring and project visits in other Ukrainian regions; further notes that the constraints on adequately monitoring projects in Ukraine led to a renewed reservation in the 2023 AAR of DG NEAR and that corrective actions are being implemented, such as monitoring progress on project implementation through desk reviews, remote solutions and using a service provider;

    164.  Welcomes that OLAF provides targeted anti-fraud assistance to authorities and supports the accession of Ukraine to the Union Anti-Fraud Programme; notes that the Framework Agreement for the Ukraine Facility, which entered into force in June 2024, provides for legally binding arrangements for the management, control, supervision, monitoring, evaluation, reporting and audit of funds under the Facility, as well as measures to prevent, investigate and correct irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest, and provisions on the roles of OLAF and EPPO; welcomes, in addition, that, pursuant to article 36 of the Ukraine Facility Regulation, the Commission established in June 2024 an Audit Board, with the mission of assisting the Commission in assessing the effectiveness of Ukraine’s management and control systems regarding the funds provided under the Facility and in fighting mismanagement of Union funding under the Ukraine Facility; calls on the Commission to keep the European Parliament regularly informed about the activities and findings of the Audit Board in order to ensure proper parliamentary oversight;

    165.  Notes with concern the recent reports on the findings of a draft audit report paid for by the Commission on the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) Secretariat which allege to suspected fraud, unpaid salaries and further liabilities; notes that as reported the Commission has contributed EUR 3,7 million to the Secretariat in 2023 and is trying to recover EUR 3,6 million as of March 2024; asks the Commission to ensure full transparency and accountability, grant access to the audit report and inform the members of Parliament on the concrete steps taken;

    166.  Calls on the Commission in line with the Court’s recommendations in its opinion 03/2024 to integrate into the new MFF legislative proposal the recommendations of the External Action Guarantee complementing the Commission’s evaluation, including increased use of blending (grants) in LDCs, fragile or conflict-affected countries and engaged coordination with stakeholders such as civil society;

    167.  Is concerned about the allocation of EFSD+ under the new flexible ‘Support to Investments’ envelope in favour of benefiting countries where the Global Gateway investments are easier to implement at the expense of prioritising LDCs, and fragile and conflict-affected countries; calls for reporting on the volume of EFSD+ amounts allocated and contractualised in these countries and for transparency on how the quota of allocations to LDCs within country MIPs is respected within allocations of the regional MIPs;

    168.  While recognising the Global Gateway strategy as a concerted Union response to global challenges, reiterates that actions bringing together public and private investment must always be guided by the legal framework as provided by the NDICI Regulation, the Agenda 2030, and the needs of partner countries, as communicated by way of an honest dialogue at eye level; is concerned about inconsistencies surrounding Global Gateway programmes; calls, therefore, for improved transparency, democratic accountability, robust monitoring and evaluation mechanisms in Global Gateway and Team Europe initiatives; calls for a centralised, publicly accessible platform, regularly updated, to detail Global Gateway projects, including their objectives, funding sources, implementing partners, and expected outcomes;

    European Development Fund (EDF)

    169.  Notes that to audit the regularity of transactions, the Court examined a sample of 140 transactions, representing the full range of spending from the EDFs; notes, furthermore, that this comprised 31 transactions related to the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, 87 transactions authorised by 14 EU delegations(20) and 19 payments approved by Commission headquarters;

    170.  Notes with concern that, out of the 140 transactions examined, 62 (44,3 %) contained errors, compared to 57 (40,7 %) in 2022 for the same number of transactions; stresses, moreover, that the Court quantified 52 errors (48 in 2022), on the basis of which it estimated the level of error for the financial year 2023 to be 8,9 % (7,1 % in 2022);

    171.  Highlights with concern that the three most common types of errors in the financial year 2023 related to expenditure not incurred at 45 % (51 % in 2022), to absence of essential supporting documents at 31 % (7 % in 2022) and to ineligible expenditure at 23 % (24 % in 2022);

    172.  Notes the Commission’s replies to written questions to Commissioners Jutta Urpilainen and Oliver Varhelyi that in 2023 approximately 45 % of the total errors are due to excess clearing, a practice where expenditure not incurred is included in the accounts as expenditure incurred, and that therefore such errors are temporary, since they will no longer exist after the final clearings; notes furthermore that, to reduce these temporary errors, the Commission has requested its partners to review their reporting templates to allow for easier identification of incurred expenditure, and that DG INTPA launched a special working group to screen the compliance of relevant organisations through a risk management framework; also notes that DG INTPA is currently reviewing its control strategy, which aims also to identify how ex-ante controls can be strengthened and to improve the reporting of the pillar-assessed organisations to the Commission; calls on the Commission to report to the discharge authority on the effects of these actions;

    173.  Notes that the expected outcomes of DG INTPA’s ongoing review of its control strategy include the reinforcement of guidance on financial reporting and also on enhanced ex-ante controls so as to prevent errors including on excess clearing; calls on the Commission to report to the discharge authority on the remedial measures taken upon finalisation of this review;

    174.  Is concerned that, as in previous years, some international organisations provided only limited access to documents (e.g., in read-only format), which hindered the planning, execution and quality control of the Court’s audit and led to delays; notes that audit and control issues were discussed with UN entities on several occasions, including in the context of joint technical reference group meetings and the relevant EU-UN Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) working group; notes furthermore that the Commission is working with the International Organisations concerned and has intensified communication with them on the Court’s access to documents; encourages, as in previous years, the Commission to increase these efforts;

    175.  Stresses that, according to Court’s assessment, the Residual Error Rate (RER) study does not constitute an assurance engagement or an audit and is based on the RER methodology and manual provided by DG INTPA; notes that DG INTPA clarifies that the RER study is meant to be a key indicator for the estimated financial impact of residual errors, i.e., it measures the proper functioning of the internal control system and thus, demonstrates the Commission’s corrective capacity; stresses that, as in previous years, the Court has found limitations in the study; notes, furthermore, the Court’s opinion, as in previous years, that the RER methodology allows the contractor to rely entirely on the results of DG INTPA´s controls, and that relying on the work of other auditors is contrary to the purpose of an RER study; highlights the Court’s finding that in cases where these previous checks were carried out under the FAFA between the European Commission and the United Nations, the contractor is not always able to carry out additional substantive testing as the FAFA limits the Commission’s verification rights; highlights the Commission’s reply which recognised the limitations in terms of controls set in the FAFA; urges the Commission to look for workable solutions to resolve this issue;

    176.  Recalls that two EUTFs were created under the EDFs; recalls that EUTF for Africa has mobilised over EUR 5 billion, with 88 % of contributions (EUR 4,4 billion) coming from the EDF and the Union budget; deplores that, despite several requests from Parliament, the process of managing and allocating these funds still lacks transparency; is concerned by the Court’s findings in its Special report 17/2024 “The EU trust fund for Africa Despite new approaches, support remained unfocused; notes that, despite an innovative approach to identifying human rights risks in a difficult environment, these risks were not comprehensively addressed and that the Court found that the assessment of potential risks to human rights was not comprehensive; recalls that the Commission is unable to identify and report on the most efficient and effective approaches to reducing irregular migration and forced displacements in Africa according to the Court; regrets that the new monitoring system aggregates information from all EUTF projects, but suffers from issues of data accuracy; notes that the Union’s Africa trust fund is set to be phased out in 2025;

    Recommendations

    177.  Calls on the Commission to act on the Court’s recommendations:

       (i) as regards the OPSYS application system, formalise and enhance the procedure for granting and removing access rights for system administrators and to standard users, enhance the quality of the new software, and allocate resources needed to enhance its maturity and robustness;
       (ii) strengthen guidance and controls to ensure that organisations implementing contracts under indirect management, including international organisations, international financial institutions and state agencies, comply with visibility rules;
       (iii) continue to intensify its communication with international organisations in order to provide the Court with complete, unlimited and timely access to documents necessary to carry out its task in accordance with the TFEU, and not just in read-only format;
       (iv) put in place adequate ex ante and ex post control measures in unstable or conflict zones to ensure the proper control of spending of Union funds and ways to recover the Union funds;
       (v) take measures to improve controls systems for the clearing of pre-financing paid to international organisations;
       (vi) strengthen ex ante controls before accepting expenditure;

    178.  Furthermore, calls on the Commission to:

       (i) strictly monitor through all available mechanisms and work with UNRWA to ensure the implementation of all agreed actions to guarantee that UNRWA works in full compliance with humanitarian principles and neutrality, including in the forthcoming EU-UNRWA joint declaration and the upcoming financing decisions for conditional Union assistance;
       (ii) ensure that all contracts involving Union funds fully respect applicable Union legislation, including accountability, transparency, and sound financial management, and that this includes verifying that there are no subcontractors, natural persons, participants in workshops and/or trainings or recipients of financial support made to third parties subject to Union restrictive measures or involved in the financing of terrorism or acts of terrorism as well as other acts of hatred and incitement to hatred;
       (iii) increase evidence-based targeting of geographical areas and beneficiaries, and improve the accuracy of reported achievements of future development action, including through the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe;

    European public Administration

    179.  Notes that the Commission is directly responsible for the implementation of 59,1 % of the overall administrative budget of the Union, equivalent to EUR 7,2 billion; further notes that 70 % of the administrative expenditure relates to human resources including pensions while the remaining primarily covers expenditure related to buildings, equipment, energy, communications and IT; notes with satisfaction that also for 2023 the Court concludes that the spending area is low risk;

    180.  Notes that during 2023, 2152 civil servants left the Commission primarily due to retirement, resignation or the end of their contracts; notes that this represents a relatively high turnover, which should give the Commission ample possibilities to address persistent imbalances in geographical representation throughout the services;

    181.  Encourages the Commission together with EPSO to ensure that necessary technical systems are put in place as quickly as possible and that processes are accelerated in order for the Commission and other Union institutions to be able to rely on EPSO for the selection of highly qualified and motivated candidates for all types of jobs in the institutions;

    182.  Appreciates that female representation in management positions increased from 46,1 % in December 2022 to 47,8 % in December 2023; encourages the Commission to continue to focus on ensuring and maintaining gender balance on all levels of management;

    183.  Notes with satisfaction that the Commission has implemented policies to enhance work-life balance and staff well-being, including the right to disconnect; at the same time commends that a new decision on the prevention and fight against harassment was adopted which establishes the position of a Chief Confidential Counsellor as key figure in the fight against harassment; stresses the need to provide this position with the appropriate resources to effectively carry out multiple challenging tasks;

    184.  Acknowledges the progress of the Commission with regard to the internalisation of crèche staff;

    185.  Notes with satisfaction that the Commission issued updated versions of the guidelines on ethical standards for participation of the Members of the European Commission in the election campaign to the European Parliament and guidelines for the participation of Members of the Commission in election campaigns at Member State level; further commends that in March 2023, the Commission adopted much needed strengthened rules on missions and costs paid by third parties;

    186.  Stresses the need to ensure that all the Union Institutions in Luxembourg can attract staff to all types of jobs and careers; notes that especially for servants in lower pay grades Luxembourg can be a less attractive option due to the costs of living; notes that with the agreement on the budget for 2025 the first step has been taken by establishing a special housing allowance for staff in lower grades working in Union institutions in Luxembourg;

    187.  Notes that the Commission has an ambitious goal of reducing the overall office space of the Commission by 25 % and the number of buildings by 50 % by 2030 compared to 2020; notes that the total reduction in overall space reached a little over 83 000 m2 in 2023, equal to a reduction of 11 %; welcomes that this goal is an important element in the Commission achieving carbon neutrality and reducing administrative costs; stresses that it is important that the reduction in the number of building and office space and the resulting roll-out of collaborative work spaces and other significant administrative changes happens in close cooperation with staff;

    188.  Is concerned about the severe delays, including delays of up to 6 months, faced by civil servants across the institutions when receiving the reimbursements of healthcare costs under the institutions’ sickness insurance scheme; is also concerned about the inadequate treatment of civil servants and MEPs with autoimmune diseases, neurological disorders, COPD (obstructive pulmonary disease), long COVID, undiagnosed and rare diseases by the sickness insurance scheme of the institutions; notes that patients with these symptoms are often not reimbursed for their diagnostic tests;

    189.  Notes that, in 2023, the Ombudsman launched 398 inquiries concerning the Commission; further notes that during 2023 the Commission received 187 closing decisions without remarks and 17 decisions of maladministration; notes with concern that the Ombudsman receives many citizens’ complaints about extreme delays in gaining access to requested documents from the Commission and encourages the Commission to strive to speed up the processing of such requests and further reduce the number of decisions of maladministration and establish clear rules concerning access to all types of written texts whether on paper, email, text messages or any other form of communication, which is part of an administrative process related to Commission policies or decisions; notes that out of the nine investigations related to the Commission concluded by OLAF in 2023, seven were closed with recommendations; calls on the Commission to ensure transparency and accountability in the follow-up to these cases;

    190.  Expresses deep concern that there has been allegations of corruption linked to the Commission; at the same time deplores that there has been allegations about officials from the Commission that allegedly accepted gifts from a country that the Union was negotiating an agreement with; stresses the need for a clear and systematic approach to ensure that all OLAF cases involving relevant potential criminal offences are promptly referred to the EPPO and the competent national authorities; calls on the Commission to reinforce relevant rules and procedures in order to ensure that all cases are handled in a strict, correct and efficient way;

    191.  Notes that only very few cases of psychological and sexual harassment have been recognised as such in the past years and expresses concern that this may point to institutional blind spots in the Commission, given the significant number of employees of the institution;

    192.  Expresses deep concern regarding reports of an ongoing investigation involving the former Commissioner for Justice, who is alleged to have been engaged, during his time in office, in money laundering activities involving funds of unknown origin; calls on the Commission to fully cooperate with the Belgian authorities and to urgently clarify whether these activities were in any way connected to his official duties within the Commission;

    193.  Calls on the Commission to prioritise permanent staff over external consultants and contractual staff, in order to guarantee high quality working conditions and to prevent knowledge and experience from being lost; calls for flexibility for DGs with a high proportion of seconded national experts (SNE) in the establishment plan to convert SNE posts into temporary agent posts with the aim of ensuring better expertise retention, operational functionality and business continuity; further insists on avoiding the externalisation of tasks to consultancies when available know-how can be found in-house;

    194.  Notes that, in recent years, the Commission has increasingly outsourced impact assessments to external companies, raising concerns about potential conflicts of interest; calls on the Commission to strengthen provisions to prevent possible conflicts of interest and to provide better guidance to staff handling public procurement procedures for policy-related service contracts;

    195.  Regrets the alleged espionage organised by the Hungarian Government against OLAF staff during an investigative mission; calls for the swift establishment of robust protection measures to safeguard Union institutional staff on mission in Member States and to prevent any violations;

    196.  Welcomes the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2023/2841(21); takes note of cybersecurity investments, including EUR 30 million allocated to enhancing digital security in the Commission; calls on the Commission to spare no effort in further developing a cybersecurity culture, promoting training and awareness within the Union institution; stresses the importance of continued adequate investments in cybersecurity towards the longer term indicative target in the order of at least 10 % of total IT spending;

    197.  Reiterates its concern that the significant risks to the security and protection of the registry and operating mechanism of the Union system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading against cyberattacks have still not been adequately addressed; points out that this issue has been highlighted in the Annual Activity Reports (AARs) since 2010, with reservations raised in each report; notes that this concern is once again emphasised in the Directorate-General for Climate Action’s 2023 AAR, further underscoring the persistent failure to prioritise the security of the system;

    European Schools

    198.  Notes that the European Schools’ overall budget for 2023 was EUR 417,5 million primarily funded by the Commission, other Union institutions, Member States and fees from parents; further notes that almost 80 % of the budget was spent on staff costs;

    199.  Notes with satisfaction that the Court is able to conclude that nothing has come to their attention that causes them to believe that the consolidated accounts for 2023 are not prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with the International Public Sector Accounting Standards;

    200.  Observes that the Court found some systematic or recurrent weaknesses in payments and related human resources (HR) and procurement procedures including insufficient verification of supporting evidence affecting the regularity of some HR procedures and payments;

    201.  Calls on the Commission, in particular, to:

       (i) ensure that Union Institutions can rely on EPSO to efficiently organise and complete selection procedures and other staff related procedures in order to provide Union Institutions with sufficient highly qualified and motivated candidates for open positions;
       (ii) explore all possibilities to correct significant geographical and gender imbalances in different categories of the staff;
       (iii) continue work on measures that will ensure that Union Institutions based in Luxembourg can continue to attract highly qualified staff for all types of job profiles;
       (iv) ensure that the roll-out of collaborative work spaces and other significant administrative changes happens in close cooperation with staff;
       (v) make more staff available for processing of reimbursement requests for the sickness insurance scheme, to improve staff training and to have better IT software available to process requests more quickly;
       (vi) act as a role model, particularly for diseases that do not fall into classical fields and rare diseases; urges the Commission to expand their technical knowledge and handling of these cases; urges the Commission to expand the catalogue of tests eligible for reimbursement to include a wider bandwidth for laboratory tests and other diagnostic procedures and exams as well as treatments; urges the Commission to do this promptly;
       (vii) ensure the rapid introduction of strong protective mechanisms for Union institutional staff on mission in Member States and third countries, safeguarding their rights;
       (viii) support the European Schools in their implementation, as soon as possible, of recommendations by the Court from previous years and the recommendation from the report concerning the financial year 2023 which asks the schools to perform systematic checks of supporting evidence on allowances paid to seconded staff;
       (ix) prepare a report analysing the reasons why the vast majority of harassment complaints (requests for assistance) in the Commission are dismissed, most of them without even opening an administrative inquiry, and recommending how such dysfunctionality of the formal procedure can be addressed;
       (x) ensure that as of 2025, requests for assistance in harassment cases are followed up with a proper administrative inquiry by the Investigation and Disciplinary Office (IDOC) or OLAF so as to ensure that harassers are held accountable and sanctioned proportionately to their wrongdoing;

    CHAPTER II – Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)

    General remarks

    202.  Notes that in 2023, 27 recovery and resilience plans (RRPs) were revised, and that these revisions had an impact on the pace of implementation of the existing plans, causing delays; notes at the same time that the political priorities in Member States can change; notes that increased energy prices, high inflation and supply chain disruptions caused by Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, and, in some cases, natural disasters, contributed to the revision of the RRPs; underlines that the delays caused by the revisions of the RRPs came in addition to existing ones, as shown by the significant differences between the foreseen calendar of payments requests and the actual transmission of these requests by the Member States to the Commission; remains concerned by the risk of under-implementation and of failure to reach the milestones and targets (M&Ts) as agreed in the RRPs; emphasises the need for enhanced monitoring mechanisms to ensure that delays do not disproportionately impact key projects;

    203.  Notes that there should be a clear thematic link between reforms and investments and that there may be, in certain cases, a long delay between the creation of the national recovery plans and the completion of milestones and targets; regrets that the RRF design does not allow for sufficient flexibility to respond to emerging crises in a prompt manner;

    204.  Draws attention with utmost concern to the statement of the President of the Court, arguing that approximately half of the RRF disbursements had not reached the real economy, and questions if the other half may have been used either to substitute recurring budgetary expenditure or generate profit to Member States from the increased interest rates;

    205.  Recalls that the RRF is a temporary recovery instrument based on performance, i.e. that payments are linked to the satisfactory fulfilment of M&Ts related to reforms and investments included in the national RRPs; stresses that the effectiveness of the RRF must be assessed, not only in terms of disbursement, but also in terms of its ability to generate tangible, long-term improvements of the consequences of the pandemic; recalls that there is no definition in the RRF Regulation of the “satisfactory fulfilment of M&Ts”; recalls that each national plan should effectively address all or a significant subset of challenges identified in the European Semester, particularly the country- specific recommendations (CSRs) adopted by the Council; notes the fact that, thanks to the RRF, the percentage of CSRs with progress has increased by 17 % between 2021 and 2023;

    206.  Notes that in 2023, the Commission disbursed a total of EUR 75 billion, and additional pre-financing payments of EUR 7,1 billion, which brought the total disbursements by the end of 2023 to EUR 220,8 billion, divided into EUR 141,6 billion in grants (40 % of the total EUR 357 billion for grants under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) envelope) and EUR 79,2 billion in loans (27 % of the total EUR 291 billion for loans under the RRF envelope); mandates detailed reporting requirements on how Member States allocate funds, preventing substitution of recurring budgetary expenditures, and ensuring funds reach intended beneficiaries;

    Court’s observations

    207.  Notes that the Court issued a qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of the RRF expenditure in 2023; is concerned that the Court concluded that seven out of 23 RRF payments made in 2023 were affected by quantitative findings and that six of these payments were affected by material error; notes that in the Court’s opinion, except for those matters, the RRF expenditure accepted in the accounts for the year 2023 is legal and regular in all material respects; notes that the nature of the RRF spending model relies on the assessments of milestones and targets (M&Ts) to be made by the Commission; notes that in 2023, the Court checked 452 M&Ts included in 23 grant payments and that it does not provide an error rate due to the nature of the RRF’s spending model but estimates the minimum financial impact of its findings to be above the materiality threshold; is convinced that Member States should also bear responsibility for errors detected in post-disbursement;

    208.  Expresses deep concern that the Court was unable to verify the actual financial impact of erroneous or ineligible RRF payments due to the inherent limitations of the milestone and target-based assessment model; calls on the Commission to develop a more transparent error-tracking methodology to prevent misallocation and inefficiency;

    209.  Notes that the Court audited 325 out of 542 milestones and 127 out of 135 targets included in 2023 payment requests for grants; regrets that the Court considers that 16 of them were affected by regularity issues (2.4 % of the total); is concerned by the fact that the Court considers that the requirements had not been satisfactorily fulfilled for seven M&Ts in six payments and that the Commission had still made the corresponding payments; notes that the Court’s conclusions are based on extensive audit work and regrets that the Commission contests some of the Court’s conclusions; notes that all of the RRF payments must be assessed against the framework communicated and applied by the Commission, which must take into consideration for each payment the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee and the scrutiny by Member State experts under the comitology procedure; requests the Commission to ensure that all disputed payments related to unsatisfactorily fulfilled M&Ts undergo independent external review to strengthen public trust in the process; recommends an introduction of real-time tracking systems for disbursements and expenditures to prevent misallocations under the RRF and the MFF;

    210.  Notes with particular concern that the Court has identified nine potential cases of ineligible M&Ts linked to the continuation of a pre-existing project that either started before the eligibility period, or that were a substitution of recurring national budgetary expenditure; regrets the lack of clarity in the RRF Regulation, and does not share the Commission’s interpretation that the eligibility period concerns only the date of start of works on a specific project rather than the beginning of the preparatory or projection phase; regrets that such a view led to measures which were planned before the RRF eligibility period being included in the RRPs, and acknowledges that any measure must respect the scope, objectives and eligibility conditions set by the RRF Regulation; calls on the Commission to implement stricter verification mechanisms to prevent the inclusion of pre-existing projects that do not provide added value under the RRF framework;

    211.  Recalls that RRF funds shall not be used to replace recurring budgetary expenditure, unless in duly justified case; and is preoccupied by the Court’s findings that some M&Ts that were a substitution of recurring national budgetary expenditure were not adequately justified in the RRPs;

    212.  Notes with concern the Court’s finding that NGEU borrowing may more than double by 2026 while the bulk of repayment is deferred to future MFFs; recalls that the repayment of NGEU borrowing must start before the end of 2027, if unused appropriations remain available in the budget line to cover NGEU financing costs, and be completed by 2058 at the latest; notes that the Union budget exposure at the end of 2023 is expected to rise in 2024 and 2025, mainly due to RRF loans; is concerned that potential changes in market conditions might result in higher borrowing costs which, for the NGEU debt relating to grants, will have to be borne by the Union budget; is concerned that there is to date still no repayment plan for the NGEU common debt, and that the Union’s debt continues to rise, with a large share of this increase attributed to the temporary recovery instrument, NGEU; is concerned that the increased debt and the associated higher interest costs will have long-term consequences for the Union’s fiscal stability, potentially leading to greater financial strain and a reduced capacity to respond to future challenges or invest in key strategic areas;

    213.  Notes the Court’s finding that payments from RRF were lower than expected in 2023; emphasises that the Court has criticised the slow disbursement and absorption of RRF funds; is concerned by the Court’s findings in Special Report 13/2024 that absorption of RRF funds has progressed with some delays, that Member States may not be able to complete all measures at the end of the RRF’s implementation period for which a significant proportion of funds have already been paid out, and that the second half of the RRF’s implementation period is more challenging with an increase in number of M&Ts, a shift from reforms to investments and more advanced stage of implementation, and a high proportion of measures to be completed in the last year;

    214.  Notes, conversely, that according to the Commission the achievement of M&Ts is broadly on track, as by 31 August 2024, over 40 % of the available RRF funds had been disbursed to Member States, with the disbursement of grants reaching 48 % and loans slightly exceeding 30 %; notes that the pace of payment requests has also accelerated since the second half of 2023 with the revision of the RRPs linked to the introduction of the REPowerEU chapters was finalised in 2023;

    215.  Notes the Court’s findings in Special Report 13/2024 that additional reasons for slow absorption included measures not being suited to the RRF’s timeframe and underestimation of the time needed to implement them (due to public procurement and state aid rules); as well as uncertainties on implementing rules and how they should be applied including lacking guidance on the ‘do no significant harm’ principle (DNSH) and how to ascribe to it;

    216.  Expresses strong concerns about the Court’s observation that point to persistent weaknesses in the implementation of Member States control systems as this poses a risk to the availability of complete and accurate data underlying payment requests, access to those requests for control purposes, and the effective functioning of Member State control systems to protect the Union’s financial interests; recalls that, according to the RRF Regulation, Member State control systems have a key role to play in ensuring that the financial interests of the Union are protected effectively; urges the Commission to take decisive and swift action whenever necessary, including imposing financial corrections, and to make full use of the provisions of the RRF Regulation if deficiencies persist in the control systems of Member States;

    217.  Expresses concern about the Court’s findings in Special Report N°22/2024 on ‘Double funding from the EU budget: Control systems lack essential elements to mitigate the increased risk resulting from the RRF model of financing not linked to cost’; highlights that Member States can propose so-called ‘zero cost measures’, i.e. measures estimated to have no costs to be financed by the RRF, and for which there is no check at all for double-funding, as the Commission considers that measures which receive no RRF funds are free of risk from that perspective; also notes with concern the Court’s findings that from Member States’ perspective, the many layers of governance involved including national, regional or municipality level, make coordination and oversight very challenging; is concerned that when checks are performed, (i) they suffer from a very complicated environment with different IT tools used often not interoperable and data recorded in an often non-standardised way, leaving manual cross-checks across databases as the only possible tool to check for double funding, and (ii) Member States’ control systems rely to a large extent on self-declarations by recipients of Union funds; notes, however, that the Court did not find any case of double funding;

    218.  Notes the Commission’s observation that, according to the RRF Regulation, double funding is explicitly linked to budgetary costs and thus, there can be no double funding if the Member State has not submitted any cost estimate linked to a specific measure as part of its national plan; notes that the Commission underlines that no-cost reforms do not increase the financial envelope but are nevertheless essential criteria for the Commission’s positive assessment of RRPs, as well as their full implementation for the relevant payments; points out that the Commission, shortly after the Court audit field work, acknowledged it had identified the first two potential cases of double funding;

    219.  Recalls that Article 9 of the RRF Regulation establishes additionality and complementarity between Union programmes and instruments funding as key principles; believes that, to respect these principles but avoid the risk of double financing, the same measures already included in other national plans benefiting from Union funding (e.g. cohesion, agriculture, etc.) should either not be included in RRPs or more thoroughly described, even if they do not incur any costs, in order to avoid double funding; underlines that due to the different model of implementation, double funding between RRF and other Union financing instruments might be more difficult to identify, and urges the Commission to remain vigilant and pro-active in identifying any potential situation of double funding;

    220.  Regrets the lack of adequate safeguards to prevent double funding of projects under both the RRF and other Union financial instruments; calls for an automated cross-checking system between RRF and cohesion Funds, the Common Agricultural Policy, and other Union funding programmes to detect and eliminate duplicate claims;

    221.  Expresses concern about the Court’s finding in its Review 01/2023: ‘EU financing through cohesion policy and the RRF: A comparative analysis’ that reporting of fraud involving RRF expenditure still lacks a standardised approach with strong coordination and cooperation between Member States, which are obliged to report on cases of suspected fraud not in an integrated IT system, but in the management declaration accompanying every payment request, although Member States have also reported cases outside of the management declarations; regrets that there are no clear guidelines about exactly when a case of suspected fraud should be reported, whether there is a reporting threshold, and what standard information should be reported for each case and about the remedial measures taken; furthermore supports the request made by the Court to the Commission in the same review 01/2023 to obtain sufficient assurance from the Member States on the effectiveness of national systems to prevent, detect and correct fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest;

    222.  Expresses concerns that in 2023 the Commission had to introduce 10 additional control milestones for seven Members States to address the weaknesses identified in their control systems; reminds and supports the Court’s evaluation that the fact control milestones were introduced, which means that Member states systems were not fully functional when the plans started to be implemented, posing a serious risk to the regularity of the of the RRF expenditure and to the protection of financial interests;

    223.  Regrets the findings of the Court’s Special Report No 26/2023 that several policy areas in the RRF’s pillar containing health policies lack a corresponding common indicator to measure progress; is concerned that this impedes the proper monitoring and understanding of progress made towards achieving milestones and targets linked to health policies;

    224.  Welcomes that, in 2023, the Commission made progress in eliminating any possibility of misinterpretation of figures of the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard and that the Scoreboard further addressed the related recommendation of the Court to improve the presentation of data displayed on the Scoreboard and to improve explanations with regard to its limitations, in particular by better explaining the underlying methodologies and explicitly stating, where applicable, that the data is estimated;

    Audit and control

    225.  Welcomes that, based on the Court’s recommendations and the experience gained, the Commission, in 2023, published three methodological notes to clarify the application of the RRF Regulation, including its framework for (i) assessing the satisfactory fulfilment of M&Ts, upon conducting an assessment, and (ii) the application of the provisions related to the reversal of M&Ts, as well as a methodology to determine the amount to be suspended if a milestone or target is not satisfactorily fulfilled; takes note of the updated Guidance on RRPs, adopted on 19 July 2024, which provides additional guidance to ensure the continued adequacy of controls to identify and avoid any risk of double funding as well as the methodology for reductions and recoveries under the RRF in accordance with Article 24(8) of the RRF Regulation;

    226.  Calls on the Commission to increase the number of ex-post audits and on-the-ground inspections for RRF-funded projects, particularly in high-risk sectors such as digital infrastructure, energy where previous Union funding programmes have identified significant irregularities;

    227.  Warns that the inclusion of pre-existing projects and the substitution of recurring budgetary expenditures within the RRF framework undermines the additionality principle, effectively converting the instrument into a backdoor financing mechanism for Member States’ regular budgets, rather than fostering genuine post-crisis recovery and resilience; calls for an urgent review to prevent further dilution of the RRF’s purpose;

    228.  Advocates more decisiveness on the part of both the Commission and Member States in order to detect irregularities in the spending of RRF funds and to recover undue payments;

    229.  Is concerned with the Court’s counter-reply to the Commission’s replies on the existence of an assurance gap at Union level regarding compliance with Union and national rules on public procurement and State aid; notes that the Commission argues that the assurance provided by DG ECFIN covers the effectiveness of Member States’ controls on compliance with public procurement and state aid rules. however, stresses that while DG ECFIN’s AAR refers to Commission assessments of the existence and effectiveness of Member States’ controls, there is no conclusion regarding their effectiveness; expresses concern that, according to the Court, this represents an important limitation of the scope of the Commission’s declaration of assurance, meaning that the Commission still does not provide full assurance as to whether RRF expenditure – which the Commission manages directly – complies with the rules;

    230.  Stresses that delays in disbursement and absorption of RRF funds not only slow down economic recovery but also create substantial risks of last-minute, low-quality spending towards the end of the RRF period; calls on the Commission to introduce stricter interim evaluations to prevent a ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ rush that could lead to waste and misallocation;

    231.  Notes with serious concern that Member States may strategically forego their final payment requests to avoid fulfilling politically sensitive milestones and targets, thereby evading necessary but unpopular reforms; calls on the Commission to introduce financial penalties for incomplete RRF implementation to prevent manipulation of the payment structure;

    232.  Notes that the Commission’s replies that it extended the scope of its audit work beyond that required by the RRF Regulation to verify that the control procedures put in place in the Member States give the necessary assurance that Member States regularly and effectively verify compliance with public procurement and State aid rules and eligibility for RRF measures, but disagrees with the Commission’s opinion that the conclusions of DG ECFIN’s Annual activity report cover this;

    233.  Notes with concern that, as stated by the Commission in its mid-term evaluation of the RRF of 21 February 2024, a majority of Member States consider that the payment suspension methodology remains unclear when it comes to reforms because of the discretion given to the Commission in applying the methodology; urges the Commission to revise this methodology in order to avoid any double standards in its application;

    234.  Notes that the Commission’s IAS, in its audit on ex-ante controls of the RRF payment requests carried out in 2023, identified a very important issue according to which DG ECFIN, in cooperation with the Recovery and Resilience Task Force, should further develop and formalise the existing guidance for the cases where DG ECFIN requests that Member States make additional commitments concerning action stemming from audit and control milestones, in particular that the guidance should define (i) how DG ECFIN should follow up the fulfilment of the formal confirmation on the Member State’s commitment, (ii) the criteria for determining the deadlines for the Member States to fulfil the commitments, and (iii) the relations between the ‘commitment framework’, the ‘framework for assessing M&Ts under the RRF Regulation’ and the ‘Reversal of M&Ts under the Facility’;

    235.  Notes that the Commission checks during its “Protection of the Financial Interest of the Union” audits that Member States have a clear and codified process for transmitting cases of fraud, corruption, conflict of interest and double funding to all competent authorities, including the EPPO where relevant;

    236.  Is concerned by the Court reporting in its annual reports that by the end of 2023, the EPPO had 206 active investigations related to funds used to implement RRF measures and estimated potential damages of over EUR 1,8 billion (concerning both national and Union funding); notes that the 206 open investigations concern ten Member States, with around 75 % of these cases coming from one country; is worried that at the end of 2023 the Member States’ management declarations had not reported a single case of detected suspected fraud, meaning that none of the EPPO open cases were reported by Member States themselves, casting doubts on Member States’ ability to detect and fight frauds; stresses that, while no investigation has yet been completed, the figures presented by the EPPO confirm that the risk of fraud is present in the RRF, and that they call into question the reliability of Member State management declarations in terms of reporting detected fraud and the remedial measures taken; calls for urgent reinforcement of fraud detection mechanisms, including a mandatory fraud risk assessment for all large-scale RRF projects; calls on the Commission to ensure that the EPPO has adequate resources to investigate cases of fraud related to RRF expenditure, given the increasing number of investigations and high estimated damages;

    237.  Warns that Member States’ self-reported fraud cases under RRF remain significantly underreported, creating a misleading picture of financial integrity;

    238.  Strongly regrets the lack of transparency in reporting fraud linked to RRF funds and insists that all Member States comply with standardised reporting obligations and use the Irregularity Management System (IMS);

    239.  Recalls that the Financial Regulation recast in force since 30 September 2024 (‘FR recast’) provides for the extension of its scope of the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) to shared management and direct management in cases where the budget is implemented with Member States, for programmes adopted or financed as from 1 January 2028; calls on the Commission to act on the most serious grounds for exclusion in order to better protect the financial interests of the Union;

    240.  Notes that, with a view to reducing the margin between the Commission and the Court, for different interpretations of M&Ts, the Commission has published its approach to the concepts of the start date of a measure and the concept of ‘substitution of recurring national budgetary expenditure’ as Annex II and Annex III of its 2024 Annual Report on the implementation of the RRF; re-iterate its calls on the Commission to keep working with the Court in order to bring the interpretation of M&Ts as close together as possible;

    Implementation and impact

    241.  Urges the Commission to minimise risks that Member States might chose not to receive parts or the entire amounts of the last payment request, thus avoiding the fulfilment of the last M&Ts and jeopardising the overall implementation of the RRPs; is extremely concerned about the additional risks of measures being reversed after the RRF lifetime, and urges the Commission, when making the final payments, to ensure that such situations will not occur;

    242.  Emphasises that, according to the Commission’s mid-term evaluation of the RRF of 21 February 2024, Member States highlighted the need to mobilise more resources than initially planned to revise the RRPs, and that the efficiency of the performance-based approach is reduced by the ‘excessively complex procedures’ for the plan modifications, which do not distinguish between major or minor amendments and require Council approval for any modification;

    243.  Stresses that for control and audits in the RRF, Member States should put in place arrangements to prevent, detect and correct corruption, fraud and conflicts of interests, and that the Commission performs ex-post and system audits on M&Ts; stresses that some confusion persists with respect to the role of the Court, which has developed a strategy (2021-2025 Strategy) for carrying out its responsibilities for the NGEU programme and the RRF, which some Member States perceive as an unnecessary overlap and administrative burden; is concerned that the Commission, both in its mid-term evaluation of the RRF of 21 February 2024 and its RRF Annual Report of 10 October 2024, acknowledged that Member States’ authorities at all levels found the audit and control procedures to be too complex, and that Member States complained about overlapping audits by national authorities, the Commission and the Court; fully supports the Court work on the RRF; welcomes that the Commission has admitted and accepted that the Court has a full audit mandate on RRF, which is one of the foundation for the Parliament discharge on the RRF funds; recommends to the Member States to cooperate with the European Court of Auditors;

    244.  Is concerned that the Commission Annual Report of 10 October 2024 on the RRF implementation highlighted the entry costs for Member States’ administrations, with room for further simplification; notes, according to this Commission’s Annual Report, that concerning the design of the instrument, in the mid-term evaluation Member States referred to the combined obligations linked to (i) the evidence needed to prove fulfilment of M&Ts, (ii) demanding reporting requirements, for example the common indicators and the bi-annual data; and (iii) the audit and control framework; recalls that Member States see room for simplifying control and audit procedures, ensuring better coordination among the actors involved and avoiding multiple checks; also notes, again according to the Commission RRF Annual Report 2024, that some national authorities also pointed to inflexibility in the Commission’s assessment of milestones and targets and the rigid and resource-intensive procedures to revise RRPs;

    245.  Notes that one of the objectives of the RRF is to help Member States to implement ambitious reforms and investments that make their economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and prepared for the green and digital transitions; highlights with concerns the finding of the Court in its Special Report 15/2024 underlining the lack of relevance, quality and comparability of data submitted by the Member States, with data insufficient to evaluate progress on climate adaptation in the Member States, and thus paving the way for possible greenwashing; expresses concern that the RRF could become a financial vehicle for superficial rebranding of conventional expenditures as ‘green’; encourages the Commission to introduce a mechanism within the RRF framework to track the environmental impact of investments and ensure alignment with the Union’s climate objectives;

    246.  Highlights the RRF impact on the Union business and SMEs; notes that RRF has provided EUR 78 billion in direct support to SMEs, representing 12 % of total RRF expenditure, and that broader measures benefiting businesses amount to EUR 152 billion (23 % of total RRF spending); notes that EUR 2,75 million SMEs, approximately 11 % of all active SMEs in the Union, have received support through the RRF; underlines that nearly 600 000 businesses have benefited from digitalisation initiatives, while EUR 5,2 billion have been allocated to green transition projects, including renewable energy and hydrogen;

    247.  Highlights with concern that the facilitation of cross-border projects has not worked out; deplores that, despite the inclusion in the RRPs of several measures linked to Important Projects of Common Interest (‘IPCEIs’) and cross-border measures in the REPowerEU chapters, the national governance of the Facility has not sufficiently promoted cross-border cooperation; strongly insists that Union financing should be better linked with the achievement of common Union objectives and should generate EU added value;

    248.  Emphasises that the Commission Annual Report of 10 October 2024 on the RRF implementation acknowledged the insufficient involvement of Member States of regional and local authorities, civil society organisations, social partners, and other relevant stakeholders in the preparation and the implementation of the national RRPs; calls for their close involvement in the implementation of the national RRPs on the ground;

    249.  Urges the Commission not to approve any revision of RRPs, which may lead to a re-packaging of planned reforms or investments into the RRPs if they don’t respect the conditions of the RRF Regulation; notes that any revision should always aim to create added value and increase synergies;

    Transparency

    250.  Recalls that, while Member States are not required to publish all data on final recipients, Regulation (EU) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council(22) amending the RRF Regulation requires Member States to publish information on the 100 final recipients receiving the highest amount of funding under the RRF; welcomes that on 10 October 2024, the Commission published, as part of the RRF Annual Report 2024, a dedicated Annex to provide further clarity on the concept of final recipients under the RRF Regulation and the scope of the publication of data on the largest 100 final recipients; expresses deep concern over the interpretation of the Commission of the concept of “final recipient” under the RRF, as often they are listed only at the ministry level, and that the descriptions are vague, with many examples available in almost all lists provided by Member States; reiterates its demand that the list of 100 largest final recipients provides the factual natural person or entity that is the last in a chain of money transfers to be made available in a publicly accessible database to enhance accountability and enable independent oversight, while respecting the legal framework of Union data protection; is concerned that otherwise it will be problematic to measure the impact and guarantee visibility of the RRF funds to the citizens, although also takes into account the RRF Scoreboard and the project map; stresses that, should the Commission continue to refuse to ensure full transparency, Parliament must consider all available measures to enforce compliance, to prevent a similar interpretation from being applied to the transparency provisions in other financial regulations;

    251.  Reminds the Commission that the letter and spirit of the RRF Regulation must be strictly followed, and that the adoption of guidelines or other internal documents must be fully in line with the results of the negotiations between the co-legislators; is convinced that this has not been the case when the Commission adopted the provisions related to the interpretation of what a “final recipient” is in its Guidance on RRPs in the context of REPowerEU;

    252.  Notes that not being able to ascertain final recipients of RRF funding poses a severe risk to the transparency and traceability of Union funds and thus to the protection of the financial interests of the Union;

    253.  Recalls that a robust IT infrastructure is essential for data collection, programme monitoring and evaluation, and that managing authorities and beneficiaries are critical of the level of information required and duplication with other domestic systems; notes that, in contrast to the Cohesion Policy, the Court under the RRF pointed to the different structures and approaches used by national monitoring authorities, which could be perceived as less reliable by providing non-homogeneous information and leaving room for a potentially high number of errors; stresses that, in this respect, centralised interoperable systems facilitate efficient data collection and reporting, while fragmented systems underscore the need for streamlined approaches;

    254.  Welcomes that the ‘FR recast’ establishes horizontal measures for a centralised website (Financial Transparency System) at Union level, covering all recipients of Union funding, and notes that this website is due to overcome the current fragmentation, enhance transparency, and facilitate public scrutiny of recipients; notes that the Commission, as from the next MFF (i.e. post 2027) will be required to use the relevant data stored in the data mining and risk-scoring tool, Arachne, to feed the centralised website for transparency purposes, and that, in line with data protection rules, the website will include only public data, e.g. relevant data on recipients, contractors, subcontractors, and beneficiaries; further stresses that all Member States will have an obligation to provide the Commission with access to this data, to be fed into Arachne by automated means; regrets that the use of Arachne by Member States is not compulsory;

    255.  Notes that the final M&T of the national RRPs must be completed by 31 August 2026 according to Articles 18(4) and 20(5) of the Regulation; recalls the need for the Commission to work closely with every Member State to speed up implementation on the ground including through providing regular guidance and, upon request, technical assistance to help the implementation of the plans; re-iterates its concerns about the possibility of the reversal of M&Ts after the lifetime of the RRF, and urges the Commission to prevent such situations;

    256.  Calls on the Commission to reject any request of revision of RRPs which would lower the overall ambition of the plan or would eliminate important structural reforms from the RRPs, and to prioritise the completion of measures related to CSRs in RRPs; further calls on the Commission to step up its technical assistance to Member States lagging behind in the RRF implementation;

    Recommendations

    257.  Calls on the Commission to act on the Court’s recommendations from its Annual Report as well as those of its related special reports, and welcomes that the Commission accepts the vast majority of them; calls on the Commission to implement them and to keep the discharge authority informed on the progress of the implementation;

    258.  Calls on the Commission to grant full access to the Court to the new reporting tool on the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), FENIX as soon as possible;

    259.  Furthermore, calls on the Commission to:

       (i) carefully balance auditing and control requirements with the administrative burden imposed on Member States and beneficiaries of future performance-based instruments, while maintaining a sufficient level of control and audit that would grant a solid protection of the Union financial interests;
       (ii) closely monitor the continued fulfilment of M&Ts, in particular those related to audit, monitoring and control and ensure an adequate monitoring of any potential reversal of previously completed M&Ts;
       (iii) use the results of its checks on Member States control systems to express a clear conclusion on their effectiveness and take all appropriate measures;
       (iv) establish one single contact point for Member States on the Statement of Assurance at the Commission to which the Court can have access without further burdening Member States with requests for additional proofs;
       (v) record and monitor systematically all irregularities and all frauds affecting RRF funds;
       (vi) consistently and accurately apply the provisions related to the “final recipients”, of the RRF Regulation, by revising its Guidance on RRPs in the context of REPowerEU, and to communicate with Member States on the correct application of the definition of “final recipients”; calls on the Commission to come forward with proposals requiring Member States to publish details of all final recipients;
       (vii) streamline its control on the M&Ts through the implementation of a Single Audit approach, which would allow reduction of the administrative burden, the consolidation of audit responsibilities between the Commission and the Court, the coordination of audit timelines and requirements to avoid duplication and overlapping controls and audits, but at the same time ensuring the full protection of the Union financial interests;
       (viii) support Member States in making IT systems truly interoperable, so as to facilitate efficient data collection, reporting and exchange between various government departments and agencies to allow the minimisation of the risks of double funding, actively cross-check between relevant databases, and communicate with Member States about their administrative capacities to ensure double funding does not occur; notes in this regard, the positive examples provided at the Court Conference on Transparency and Traceability of EU Recovery and Resilience Funding in October 2024;
       (ix) work closely with Member States to ensure that M&Ts, in particular those of a structural nature or linked with CSRs, are fully and diligently implemented, and that no revision of RRPs will be approved in cases where ambition has been lowered or important measures have been weakened; avoid, to the extent possible, the revision of plans that would represent a “re-packaging” of planned measures into the RRPs if they don’t respect the conditions of the RRF Regulation;
       (x) strictly apply the provisions of the RRF Regulation, including those regarding suspension of payments or recoveries of amounts, in particular if the protection of the financial interests of the Union is not ensured;
       (xi) apply very strictly the methodology on partial payments, including as regards structural measures and measures linked to the implementation of CSRs;
       (xii) develop a methodology based on quality and comparability of data to evaluate progress on green and digital transitions, as well as the tangible benefits, in the Member States;
       (xiii) ensure that Member States diligently apply the visibility provisions of the RRF, making sure that measures implemented through the Facility are adequately flagged as funded by the Union;
       (xiv) provide technical assistance, administrative support and advice to Member States to strengthen their administrative capacity, including through the organisation of regular meetings of the Informal Expert Group on the implementation of the RRF to discuss technical aspects and encourage the exchange of good practices amongst national authorities;
       (xv) perform, whenever a revision of the RRPs is proposed, a comprehensive analysis of new and existing measures and whether they would substitute recurring budgetary expenditure or would be in breach of other eligibility conditions of the RRPs;
       (xvi) provide training and support to Member States to increase administrative capacities including training on specialised skills, knowledge and providing examples of best practices;
       (xvii) keep working with the Court in order to bring the interpretation of M&Ts as close together as possible;
       (xviii) use the recommendations of the Court from its work on the RRF and the experience gained in the implementation for the design of the next multiannual financial framework architecture including the implementation of future Union performance-based instruments;
       (xix) strengthen the design of future performance-based instruments by ensuring a closer link between disbursements and progress in implementation;
       (xx) ensure that any future revision, as well as the overall implementation, of RRPs is done in close cooperation with and consultation of local and regional authorities, and other relevant stakeholders in order to maximise the RRP’s impact;
       (xxi) analyse the weaknesses present in performance-based instruments, and address these weaknesses when designing new programmes in the future;
       (xxii) build, in the next MFF, on a high-level of interoperability and data exchange between various government departments and agencies to facilitate efficient data sharing and real-time updates across multiple platforms in order to allow to track overlapping projects, minimising the risks of double counting and double funding.
    (1) The 11th EDF covers the 2021-2027 MFF.
    (2) ‘The future of European competitiveness’, 9 September 2024.
    (3) Special report 05/2024: EU Transparency Register – provides useful but limited information on lobbying activities.
    (4) Special Report 11/2025 Transparency of EU funding granted to NGOs – despite progress, the overview is still not reliable.
    (5) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-000595-ASW_EN.pdf.
    (6) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R0783.
    (7) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-000595-ASW_EN.pdf.
    (8) OJ C, C/2024/5882, 9.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5882/oj.
    (9) ECA Special Report 07/2024: The Commission’s systems for recovering irregular EU expenditure – Potential to recover more and faster.
    (10) OJ C, C/2024/5882, 9.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5882/oj.
    (11) COM(2023) 258.
    (12) ECA Special Report 16/2024: EU revenue based on non‑recycled plastic packaging waste – A challenging start hindered by data that is not sufficiently comparable or reliable.
    (13) Council Directive (EU) 2018/822 of 25 May 2018 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation in relation to reportable cross-border arrangements (OJ L 139, 5.6.2018, p. 1; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/822/oj).
    (14) ECA 2023 Annual Report para 1.35.
    (15) Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj).
    (16) Commission Decision of 13.12.2023 on the reassessment, on the Commission’s initiative, of the fulfilment of the conditions under Article 4 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 following Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 regarding Hungary, C(2023)8999.
    (17) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj).
    (18) Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 (OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 11; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2093/oj).
    (19) Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility (OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj).
    (20) Angola, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Fiji, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, The Gambia, Togo and Uganda.
    (21) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/2841 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 laying down measures for a high common level of cybersecurity at the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union (OJ L, 2023/2841, 18.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2841/oj).
    (22) Regulation (EU) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 February 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/241 as regards REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans and amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) 2021/1060 and (EU) 2021/1755, and Directive 2003/87/EC (OJ L 63, 28.2.2023, p. 1; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/435/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: MH17: International Civil Aviation Organisation Vote

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments 2

    News story

    MH17: International Civil Aviation Organisation Vote

    The UK Government has issued a statement following the outcome of the International Civil Aviation Organisation hearing on the case of Flight MH17.

    On 12 May 2025, in a historic first, a clear majority of ICAO Council States decided that the Russian Federation breached Article 3bis of the Chicago Convention by using weapons against civil aircraft in flight which led to the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 in July 2014.

    Through this decision, the ICAO Council upholds respect for the Convention on International Civil Aviation and sets out important expectations in relation to the obligations on States to create safer skies and, moreover, that those who violate the rules set out under this Convention will be held to account.

    Most importantly, this decision helps secures justice for the families of the 298 people lost as a result of the downing of flight MH17, including 10 UK citizens, on 17 July 2014. It is also a salient reminder of Russia’s reckless and dangerous behaviour and its callous disregard for civilian lives.

    This is the first time the ICAO Council has taken a decision on the merits of an ICAO international legal dispute in its 80-year history, and the UK congratulates the clear leadership provided by ICAO to ensure the case was progressed robustly and transparently. The UK remains committed to supporting ICAO in its endeavours to uphold international law and to ensure our skies remain safe and secure.

    Media enquiries

    Email newsdesk@fcdo.gov.uk

    Telephone 020 7008 3100

    Contact the FCDO Communication Team via email (monitored 24 hours a day) in the first instance, and we will respond as soon as possible.

    Updates to this page

    Published 13 May 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: SCMA visits Hungary and Egypt to promote development opportunities in GBA

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    SCMA visits Hungary and Egypt to promote development opportunities in GBA 
         While in Beijing, Mr Tsang led the HKSAR Government delegation to meet with Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Ms Hua Chunying and leaders of various bureaus to deepen their understanding of the country’s foreign policies and the latest developments of the international situation. He expressed his gratitude to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for its staunch and continuous support for the HKSAR and hoped it would continue to provide support and guidance the HKSAR Government in handling external affairs of Hong Kong, to support Hong Kong in intensifying international interaction and co-operation, and to showcase the successful implementation of “one country, two systems” to the world.
     
         In addition to the visit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr Tsang also met with the Hong Kong Basic Law Committee of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and the Committee on Liaison with Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and Overseas Chinese of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and toured the China Foreign Affairs University. Before leaving Beijing tomorrow, he will visit the Museum of Early Revolutionary Activities of the Communist Party of China in Beijing (the Red Building of Peking University), one of the main venues of the May Fourth Movement, meet with Hong Kong students in Beijing, and visit the Office of the Government of the HKSAR in Beijing to receive briefings on its work.
     
         Mr Tsang will depart Beijing for Budapest, Hungary, in the early hours of May 15. He will attend the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area – Europe (Hungary) Economic and Trade Cooperation Exchange Conference co-organised by Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao on May 16. The conference aims to promote the enormous business opportunities brought about by the GBA to the Hungarian business community and how Hong Kong can play its important function as a “super connector” and “super value-adder” between the two places.
     
         During his stay in Hungary, Mr Tsang will meet with local political and business representatives to learn about the latest developments in the region and explore ways to further strengthen co-operation between Hungary and Hong Kong, with a view to opening up new opportunities for enterprises of both places.
     
         After completing his visit to Hungary, Mr Tsang will depart for Cairo, Egypt, on May 17 and attend the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area – Africa (Egypt) Economic and Trade Cooperation Exchange Conference on May 19 to promote the latest developments and the development potential of the GBA, as well as Hong Kong’s unique advantages under “one country, two systems”. During his stay, he will exchange views with representatives of the local political and business circles to understand the local development trends and promote interface between the industries of Hong Kong and Egypt.
     
         The Commissioner for the Development of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, Ms Maisie Chan, and the Director-General of Investment Promotion, Ms Alpha Lau, will join the visit.
     
         Mr Tsang will depart from Egypt on the evening of May 19 and return to Hong Kong on May 20. During his absence, the Under Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs, Mr Clement Woo, will be the Acting Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs.
    Issued at HKT 19:24

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Acting CE meets Governor of Hunan Province (with photo)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    Acting CE meets Governor of Hunan Province (with photo) 
         Mr Chan welcomed Mr Mao and his delegation to Hong Kong to organise an exchange conference promoting economic and trade co-operation between Hunan and the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. Mr Chan said that Hong Kong and Hunan have been maintaining close economic and trade relations, and Hong Kong has been a significant source of external investment and an important trading partner for Hunan. In the past year, Hong Kong established 208 foreign-invested enterprises in Hunan, and the total value of imports and exports between the two places reached about RMB56.3 billion. Many Hong Kong enterprises have investment projects in Hunan. He pointed out that under the “one country, two systems” principle, Hong Kong has the distinctive advantages of enjoying strong support of the motherland and being closely connected to the world. Hong Kong will fully leverage its strengths as a “super connector” and “super value-adder” to assist Hunan in expanding into international markets. He believes that the two places can complement each other’s strengths and achieve mutual success through collaboration.
     
         Mr Chan said that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government is determined to develop the low-altitude economy and has set up a working group to formulate the development strategy. Hunan is the first province in the country to pilot the opening of an entire low-altitude area, and possesses policy and industrial strengths. He believes that the two places can strengthen exchanges and co-operation in the field of low-altitude economy.
     
         Mr Chan also mentioned that after the commissioning of Express Rail Link service between Hong Kong and Changsha, the shortest travelling time between the two places was reduced to within three hours. With profound historical and cultural value, Hunan Province has become a popular travel destination for Hong Kong citizens. He also hoped that citizens of Hunan would visit Hong Kong more often to experience the charm of Hong Kong as an events capital, further promoting cultural exchanges between the two places. Hong Kong will continue to strengthen co-operation with Hunan in areas including trade, culture, tourism and youth exchanges, with a view to making greater contributions to the country’s development together.
    Issued at HKT 18:35

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Federal Jury Convicts Man of Murder and First-Degree Child Abuse of a Toddler

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (b)

              MARQUETTE – Acting U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Michigan Andrew Byerly Birge announced that a federal jury convicted Eugene Walter-George Rantanen, (37, L’Anse, Michigan) of murder and first-degree child abuse. Rantanen is scheduled to be sentenced this fall.

              On February 19, 2024, a nineteen-month-old toddler became unresponsive while in the sole custody of Rantanen, while the two were inside the L’Anse Reservation of the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community.  After extensive medical intervention, the child succumbed to the injuries and died on February 24, 2024.  Based on the medical examiner’s testimony at trial, the toddler had suffered blunt force trauma to the head, which caused significant injuries to the brain.  Based on government-witness testimony at trial, the only plausible explanation for the toddler’s injuries was that Rantanen caused the severe brain injuries.

              “Any time a child dies, it is a tragedy.  But it is particularly tragic when a caretaker causes the death,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Birge. “My office will hold individuals like Rantanen accountable for their violent crimes whenever it can.”

              “This conviction confirms that Eugene Rantanen will no longer pose a threat to anyone, especially our children,” said Cheyvoryea Gibson, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI in Michigan. “This outcome results from a thorough and cooperative investigation with the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community Tribal Police, the Village of L’Anse Police, the Baraga County Sheriff’s Office, the Michigan State Police, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Michigan. I extend my deepest condolences to those who truly loved the young victim—no one should ever have to endure such a heartbreaking loss.”

              The FBI, Michigan State Police, Keweenaw Bay Indian Community Tribal Police, Baraga County Sheriff’s Office, and Village of L’Anse Police investigated this case, and Assistant U.S. Attorneys Alexis Sanford and Jeanne Long are prosecuting it.

              This case was part of the Department of Justice’s work to combat the missing and murder indigenous person’s (MMIP) crisis.  Per the Bureau of Indian Affairs, “For decades, Native American and Alaska Native communities have struggled with high rates of assault, abduction, and murder of tribal members. Community advocates describe the crisis as a legacy of generations of government policies of forced removal, land seizures and violence inflicted on Native peoples.”  The BIA website has more information about the MMIP crisis at https://www.bia.gov/service/mmu/missing-and-murdered-indigenous-people-crisis.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Change of British High Commissioner to Fiji: Kanbar Hossein-Bor

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    Change of British High Commissioner to Fiji: Kanbar Hossein-Bor

    Mr Kanbar Hossein-Bor has been appointed British High Commissioner to the Republic of Fiji.

    Mr Kanbar Hossein-Bor has been appointed British High Commissioner to the Republic of Fiji, non-resident British High Commissioner to the Republic of Kiribati and His Majesty’s non-resident Ambassador to the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, in succession to Dr Brian Jones who will be transferring to another Diplomatic Service appointment.  Mr Hossein-Bor will take up his appointment during July 2025.

    Curriculum Vitae

    Full name: Kanbar Hossein-Bor

    Year Role
    2021 to 2025 FCDO, Deputy Director Democratic Governance and Media Freedom Co-ordinator
    2018 to 2020 Dhaka, Deputy High Commissioner
    2015 to 2015 Monrovia, Chargé d’Affaires
    2012 to 2015 FCO, Head, Libya Team
    2009 to 2012 The Hague, Head of International Tribunals and UK Agent to the International Court of Justice
    2006 to 2007 Baghdad, Legal Adviser and Head of Justice and Human Rights Section
    2006 to 2009 FCO, Legal Directorate
    2002 to 2005 Barrister, Private Practice

    Media enquiries

    Email newsdesk@fcdo.gov.uk

    Telephone 020 7008 3100

    Contact the FCDO Communication Team via email (monitored 24 hours a day) in the first instance, and we will respond as soon as possible.

    Updates to this page

    Published 13 May 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI: EMGS reports first quarter 2025 results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Electromagnetic Geoservices ASA’s (“EMGS” or the “Company”) financial report and market presentation for the first quarter of 2025 are attached.

    Summary:

    * The Company recorded revenues of USD 10.0 million, up from USD 0.2 million in the first quarter of 2024 and up from USD 9.7 million in the fourth quarter of 2024.

    * Adjusted EBITDA (including capitalised multi-client expenses and vessel and office lease expenses) of USD 2.0 million, up from negative USD 3.8 million in the first quarter of 2024.

    * Free cash decreased with USD 3.1 million during the quarter, to USD 6.0 million.

    * During the quarter, the Atlantic Guardian completed the first of two proprietary acquisitions in India and commenced mobilisation for the second proprietary acquisition.

    * Subsequent to the end of the quarter, on 6 May 2025, EMGS announced the establishment of a new business platform within offshore subsea construction through the acquisition of the OSCV Siem Day.

    A pre-recorded presentation will be available over the internet from 20:00 (local time Norway) today. To access the presentation, please go to the Company’s homepage (www.emgs.com) and follow the link.

    Contact
    Anders Eimstad, Chief Financial Officer, +47 94 82 58 36

    About EMGS
    EMGS, the marine EM market leader, uses its proprietary electromagnetic (EM) technology to support oil and gas companies in their search for offshore hydrocarbons. EMGS supports each stage in the workflow, from survey design and data acquisition to processing and interpretation. The Company’s services enable the integration of EM data with seismic and other geophysical and geological information to give explorationists a clearer and more complete understanding of the subsurface. This improves exploration efficiency and reduces risks and the finding costs per barrel. CSEM technology can also be used to detect the presence of marine mineral deposits (primarily Seabed Massive Sulphides) and EMGS believes that the technology can also be used to estimate the mineral content of such deposits. The Company is undertaking early-stage initiatives to position itself in this future market.

    This information is subject of the disclosure requirements pursuant to section 5-12 of the Norwegian Securities Trading Act.

    Attachments

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: CE begins Kuwait visit

    Source: Hong Kong Information Services

    Chief Executive John Lee met Kuwait’s local leaders and business representatives, as well as visited cultural facilities on the first day of his visit to the country.
     
    While leading a business delegation comprising representatives from Hong Kong and Mainland enterprises, Mr Lee met the Amir, head of state of Kuwait Meshal Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, Kuwait Crown Prince Sabah Al-Khaled Al-Hamad Al-Mubarak Al-Sabah and Kuwait Acting Prime Minister Fahad Yousuf Saud Al-Sabah in the morning to exchange views on strengthening co-operation between Hong Kong and Kuwait.
         
    Mr Lee then attended a roundtable meeting chaired by the Acting Prime Minister, engaging in in-depth discussions with senior officials of the Kuwait government on areas such as finance, trade, and innovation and technology (I&T).
     
    Mr Lee and the Acting Prime Minister witnessed the signing of Memoranda of Understanding by Invest Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Trade Development Council with the Kuwait Direct Investment Promotion Authority respectively. He and the delegation also participated in a luncheon hosted by the Acting Prime Minister.
     
    The Chief Executive noted that Kuwait is the first member of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) to sign both an Investment Promotion & Protection Agreement and a Comprehensive Avoidance of Double Taxation Agreement with Hong Kong, establishing a robust framework and foundation for economic and trade co-operation between the two places.
     
    He pointed out that Kuwait has been actively developing a diversified economy in recent years, proposing Kuwait Vision 2035 to promote digital transformation and develop the country into a regional and international financial and trade centre.
     
    He highlighted that Hong Kong, as an international financial, shipping and trade centre with world-class professional services, has vast opportunities for co-operation with Kuwait in areas such as finance, investment, digital economy, and I&T, and can assist Kuwait in advancing its Vision 2035.
     
    Underscoring that Kuwait is the rotating President of the GCC currently, Mr Lee expressed his anticipation to strengthen co-operation between Hong Kong and Kuwait, adding that he looks forward to establishing closer economic, trade and cultural exchanges with more GCC member states.
     
    Additionally, Mr Lee emphasised that Hong Kong enjoys the advantage of connecting the country with the world under the “one country, two systems” principle. Hong Kong will fully leverage its role as a bridge to serve enterprises in going global and attracting external investment, complementing the strengths of Mainland enterprises while deepening international exchanges and co-operation.
     
    He welcomed the Kuwaiti Government and enterprises to utilise Hong Kong’s role as a super connector and super value-adder to explore new opportunities under the Belt & Road Initiative for mutual benefit.
     
    Later, Mr Lee and the delegation met representatives of a local corporation, Bukhamseen Group Holding Company, to learn about the latest developments in the company’s businesses in construction, real estate, financial services, and culture and tourism.
     
    Apart from introducing Hong Kong’s development opportunities and its highly internationalised and market-oriented business environment with its pool of professional services talent, Mr Lee also welcomed the company to use Hong Kong as a springboard to develop diversified businesses and tap into the Mainland market, better grasping the immense opportunities brought by the Belt & Road Initiative and the development of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area.
     
    Afterwards, Mr Lee visited the Sheikh Abdullah Al Salem Cultural Centre to learn about Kuwait’s arts and culture projects and developments.
     
    Mr Lee made it clear that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government is committed to developing Hong Kong into an East-meets-West centre for international cultural exchanges, with the West Kowloon Cultural District as one of the world’s largest arts and culture projects.
     
    He noted that both Hong Kong and Kuwait place importance on arts and culture development, and he looks forward to further deepening connections and co-operation in cultural exchanges between the two places.
     
    The delegation led by Mr Lee attended a dinner hosted by the Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary of the People’s Republic of China to the State of Kuwait Zhang Jianwei.
     
    Mr Lee thanked the embassy for making meticulous arrangements for the visit and for its continued support to the Hong Kong SAR Government and the Hong Kong Economic & Trade Office in Dubai.
     
    The Hong Kong SAR Government will continue to promote economic, trade, and cultural exchanges between Hong Kong and Kuwait.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Russia-China ties on full display on Victory Day – but all is not as well as Putin is making out

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham

    Chinese troops participating in Russia’s Victory Day parade in Red Square, Moscow, on May 9 is a clear indication that President Xi Jinping is fully committed to his “no-limits” partnership with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin.

    Xi’s own attendance of the parade, which came as part of a state visit to Russia, underlines that China is not only supporting Russia. It signified that Beijing wants this support to be understood clearly in Kyiv, Washington and European capitals.

    Travelling to Moscow and having his troops goose-step down Red Square was not a last-minute decision by Xi. Nor was the multitude of agreements signed by the two leaders and their joint declaration anything but part of a well established pattern of deepening relations between Russia and China.

    This trend has accelerated since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. But the breadth and depth of China’s commitment to Russia at this particular moment is undoubtedly related to the broader upheaval in the international order that has been worsened since Donald Trump’s return to the White House.


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    The Trump administration, possibly spooked by market wobbles, has taken steps to restore stability. China and the US have agreed a deal to slash the import tariffs they have imposed on each other. But uncertainty remains – above all about how the complex relationships in the triangle of Washington, Beijing and Moscow will work out and where this will leave the rest of the world.




    Read more:
    Trump, Xi and Putin: a dysfunctional love triangle with stakes of global significance


    On May 8, in the wake of Xi and Putin’s meetings in Moscow, Russia and China released a joint statement. It stressed the intention of the two leaders to “enhance the coordination of their approaches and to deepen the practical cooperation on maintaining and strengthening global strategic stability, as well as to jointly address common challenges and threats in this sphere”.

    They reiterated this determination in their press statements afterwards. Putin emphasised that he and Xi “personally control all aspects of [the] Russia-China partnership and do all we can to expand the cooperation on bilateral issues and the international agenda alike”.

    A Chinese read-out from the talks was similarly clear on the alignment between the countries. Xi reportedly said that “in the face of unilateralist countercurrents, bullying and acts of power politics, China is working with Russia to shoulder the special responsibilities of major countries and permanent members of the UN Security Council”.

    This unequivocal display of how close Moscow and Beijing are – as well as Putin and Xi personally – is important for both nations. For Russia, it remains important to demonstrate that western attempts at international isolation have not succeeded.

    For China, the very public consolidation of ties with Russia is above all a signal to the US. China is keen to stress that Trump’s efforts to engineer a split between Moscow and Beijing, which the American president described as necessary to “un-unite” the two nations during an interview with US talk show host Tucker Carlson in November 2024, have largely failed.

    However, beyond the glossy surface of the celebrations in Moscow, all is not as well for Russia as Putin is trying to make out. For all the public displays of friendship between Xi and Putin, the relationship between the two countries remains highly asymmetrical.

    Russia would not be able to continue to wage its war against Ukraine without Chinese support. Trade between Russia and China is critical to propping up the Russian war economy, reaching a record high of nearly US$250 billion (£190 billion) in 2024. Their trade has increased by more than 60% since 2021, yet it is only marginally up since 2023.

    China’s diplomatic clout is also helpful for Russia. If Beijing had taken an unequivocal stance opposing Moscow’s aggression, fewer leaders in the developing world would have sided with Putin.

    In this case, Russia would probably have lost organisations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Brics group of emerging economies as platforms to further its broader agenda of restoring its erstwhile status as a great power.

    In that agenda, Putin has been moderately successful. But with South Africa and India’s leaders absent from Russia’s Victory Day commemorations, the list of attendees was shorter than at the Brics summit in Kazan, Russia, in October 2024.

    A doubled-edged sword

    Notably absent from the celebrations in Moscow was high-level representation from North Korea and Iran. These are two key allies of Russia with whom Moscow signed strategic partnership agreements in June 2024 and January 2025, respectively.

    Tehran simply sent its ambassador to Moscow to attend. However, it may have compensated Putin in a different and materially more significant way.

    According to reports, Iran is readying a delivery of launchers to enable Russia to use the short-range ballistic missiles already delivered last year. This would further add to Russia’s reliance on Iranian hardware in Ukraine, which has so far been most visible in the use of Iranian-made Shahed drones.

    North Korea dispatched a military delegation led by three-star general Kim Yong-bok. Kim is widely considered the commander of North Korean forces fighting alongside Russian troops in the Kursk region of western Russia, where Ukrainian forces seized territory in August 2024 as a possible bargaining chip in future negotiations with Russia.

    Putin officially acknowledged the participation of North Korean troops in this operation in a statement on April 28. This acknowledgment came two days after he had announced the defeat of Ukrainian forces there in a highly choreographed and televised meeting with his chief of general staff, Valery Gerasimov.

    The demonstration of Russia’s close relationships with its three core allies – China, Iran and North Korea – is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it clearly indicates that Putin is far from isolated on the international stage.

    But it also signals that Russia has become a lot more dependent on these relationships than would befit Putin’s dreams of restoring Russia’s great-power status. Neither can be much comfort to Ukraine and its allies, unfortunately.

    Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU’s Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.

    ref. Russia-China ties on full display on Victory Day – but all is not as well as Putin is making out – https://theconversation.com/russia-china-ties-on-full-display-on-victory-day-but-all-is-not-as-well-as-putin-is-making-out-256385

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI USA: Murphy, Blumenthal, 36 Colleagues Reintroduce Legislation To Ban Conversion Therapy

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Connecticut – Chris Murphy

    May 13, 2025

    WASHINGTON—U.S. Senators Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) and Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) joined 36 of their Senate colleagues in reintroducing the Therapeutic Fraud Prevention Act, legislation that would ban so-called “conversion therapy,” a practice fraudulently claiming to change an individual’s sexual orientation or gender identity. The practice has been recognized by the national community of professionals in health, education, social work, and counseling as being both dangerous and useless.
    “Conversion therapy isn’t just junk science—it’s a cruel, phony practice that tells gay and transgender kids there’s something wrong with them. This bill would shut down the predators peddling these abusive treatments and finally call this scam what it is: dangerous, hateful fraud,” said Murphy.
    “The dangerous and debunked practice of so-called conversion therapy is seriously damaging to the LGBTQ+ community and most especially to children,” said Blumenthal. “Everyone, regardless of who they are and who they love, deserves to be protected from the discrimination and hate that fuels this harmful procedure. I am proud to sponsor the Therapeutic Fraud Prevention Act and stand with LGBTQ+ Americans in the fight against this discredited therapy.”
    U.S. Senators Patty Murray (D-Wash.), Cory Booker (D-N.J.), Tammy Baldwin (D-Wis.), Michael Bennet (D-Colo.), Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.), Chris Coons (D-Del.), Catherine Cortez Masto (D-Nev.), Tammy Duckworth (D-Ill.), Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), John Fetterman (D-Pa.), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-N.Y.), Maggie Hassan (D-N.H.), Martin Heinrich (D-N.M.), John Hickenlooper (D-Colo.), Mazie Hirono (D-Hawaii), Tim Kaine (D-Va.), Mark Kelly (D-Ariz.), Andy Kim (D-N.J.), Angus King (I-Maine), Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.), Ben Ray Luján (D-N.M.), Ed Markey (D-Mass.), Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.), Alex Padilla (D-Calif.), Jack Reed (D-R.I.), Jacky Rosen (D-Nev.), Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), Adam Schiff (D-Calif.), Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.), Elissa Slotkin (D-Mich.), Tina Smith (D-Minn.), Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.), Peter Welch (D-Vt.), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.) and Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) also cosponsored the legislation. The bill was introduced in the House with 70 original cosponsors.
    The Therapeutic Fraud Prevention Act is endorsed by the Congressional Equality Caucus, Human Rights Campaign, PFLAG, American Academy of Pediatrics, Equality California, National Association of School Psychologists, Christopher Street Project, and Advocates for Trans Equality.
    Full text of the legislation is available HERE. 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: CREA Foundation Creates Two Scholarships, Bonus Opportunities for Real Estate Students

    Source: US State of Connecticut

    CREA Foundation, Inc. has created two, renewable scholarships for UConn students interested in studying commercial real estate, and they include bonus opportunities to set them up for success.

    “We’re excited and eager to partner with CREA to introduce more students to the real estate industry,’’ said David Wharmby, director of the Center for Real Estate and Urban Economic Studies at UConn. “This gift will ensure that they are not just career-ready but have solid work experience in the industry.’’

    Open to rising juniors, CREA Foundation will award a $10,000 renewable scholarship for two students majoring or minoring in real estate. CREA Scholars will also have the opportunity to have an internship with CREA, LLC or local partners, and will have a CREA mentor to answer questions and offer guidance. Scholarship applications are now open and will be awarded in late summer.

    CREA has created similar programs with Indiana University, Indianapolis, and California State University, Northridge, and they are going exceptionally well, said UConn alumnus and CREA CEO Tony Bertoldi ’89. He said he and his team are excited to welcome a new generation of industry experts, engage with them, and help them find their career path.

    “We want to improve the pipeline of talent coming into our business,’’ he said. “When we’re in the interview process, I look for applicable experience. It’s a great advantage to have that exposure beyond the classroom.’’

    CREA is a national tax-credit syndicator, working with developer and investor partners to create affordable housing. Its Foundation supports access to higher education and introductory work experiences.

    “Tony has hired lots of our graduates and knows they have the skills to succeed and contribute right away,’’ Wharmby said.

    “I had a great experience at UConn,’’ said Bertoldi, who has served as a guest speaker in real estate courses and is a serial UConn donor. A recent trip back to campus reignited his enthusiasm. “I saw the opportunity to do something meaningful for UConn.’’

    “It’s a fantastic gift,’’ Wharmby said. “I think real estate offers a really exciting, broad, diverse career opportunity. Not a lot of students know about it until they get to college. With these scholarships, we’re exposing the industry to a broader set of students.’’

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Threat of enslavement hangs over reported plans to deport migrants from US to Libya

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Martin Plaut, Senior Research Fellow, Horn of Africa and Southern Africa, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of London

    Human rights organisations have expressed alarm at possible US plans to send a group of migrants from Vietnam, Laos and the Philippines to Libya on a military flight. They have pointed to the appalling conditions migrants face there, which the US State Department described as “harsh and life-threatening” in its 2023 Libya review.

    The review quoted the UN support mission in Libya and civil society groups as saying they had “numerous reports of women subjected to forced prostitution in prisons or detention facilities”. A UN fact-finding mission to Libya, also in 2023, made similarly shocking allegations about conditions in Libya’s network of official migrant detention centres.

    Such centres are run by the Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration, an official entity of the Libyan interior ministry. But, in reality, it is Libya’s complex patchwork of militias that is in control.

    Based on interviews with more than 100 migrants, the report concluded that it had “reasonable grounds to believe that migrants were enslaved in detention centres … in Abu Salim, Zawiyah and Mabani, as well as in places of detention in al-Shwarif, Bani Walid, Sabratah, Zuwarah and Sabha”.


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    There is no evidence that the proposed US scheme is in any way connected to the Libyan organisations involved in slavery. Trump has also denied any knowledge of the Libya deportations, referring journalists questioning him about it to the US Department of Homeland Security.

    But the situation is dire for the tens of thousands of refugees and migrants who wind up in Libya each year in an attempt to cross into Europe. The threat of enslavement poses a real threat to anyone sent there.

    Concern about slavery in Libya was perhaps most visibly highlighted in a CNN report from 2017. After receiving grainy footage of a slave sale, CNN sent journalists to Libya to gather evidence. They reported uncovering nine migrant slave auction sites.

    In their report, which gained widespread international attention, the journalists wrote:

    Carrying concealed cameras into a property outside the capital of Tripoli last month, we witness[ed] a dozen people go ‘under the hammer’ in the space of six or seven minutes.

    ‘Does anybody need a digger? This is a digger, a big strong man, he’ll dig,’ the salesman, dressed in camouflage gear, says. ‘What am I bid, what am I bid?’ Buyers raise their hands as the price rises, ‘500, 550, 600, 650 …’ Within minutes it is all over and the men, utterly resigned to their fate, are being handed over to their new ‘masters’.

    After the auction, we met two of the men who had been sold. They were so traumatised by what they’d been through that they could not speak, and so scared that they were suspicious of everyone they met.

    Unlike the Libyan media, which questioned the credibility of the CNN report, Libya’s authorities denounced the migrant slave auctions and said they would launch a formal investigation. But there is no indication that the proposed investigation has changed the operation of the detention centres.

    CNN journalists witnessed migrants being sold at auctions in 2017.

    CNN’s findings were replicated by other investigations. Shamsuddin Jibril, a Cameroonian migrant who saw men traded publicly in the streets of the Libyan town of Sabha, told the Guardian in 2017: “[The slave traders] took people and put them in the street under a sign that said ‘for sale’. They tied their hands just like in the former slave trade, and drove them … in the back of a Toyota Hilux”.

    These practices are still happening. David Yambio, who himself experienced enslavement in Libya, is now the president of the Refugees in Libya movement. I spoke to Yambio while writing my book, Unbroken Chains: A 5,000 year history of African enslavement. He told me:

    From my own experience, and through my daily work with Refugees in Libya, I can confirm that slavery is taking place inside Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration detention facilities.

    I was held in places in such conditions between 2019 and 2022. To this day, people are still being enslaved inside these centres: Tariq al-Sikka, Ain Zara, Abu Salim, Al-Nasr in Zawiya, Al-Mabani, Bir Al-Ghanam, Al-Assah, Al-Maya, Ganfouda and Ajdabiya. The list goes on.

    Just hours ago, I was in contact with around 130 women still enduring the same conditions inside Al-Nasr detention centre (known as Osama Prison) in Zawiya. It is concerning and it is an indisputable fact.

    The Libyan route

    Libya is one of the leading destinations for migrants attempting to reach Europe through Africa. In April 2025 alone, the European border force, Frontex, recorded 15,718 migrants from across the world making what they term “illegal border crossings” by traversing the central Mediterranean from Libya.

    One of the largest groups seeking to reach Europe via Libya are Eritreans. Work led by Mirjam van Reisen of Leiden University has provided firsthand accounts of Eritreans describing the situation in the Tajoura detention centre, where Libyans come to select people to work.

    The labourers are often referred to as slaves. One interviewee said: “Every morning when someone comes there, he says: ‘We need five eubayd, which means five slaves. I need five slaves.’ Everybody that is hearing that one, they are feeling angry.” Their forced labour ranges from farm and construction work to road work and garbage collecting.

    Some refugees manage to raise funds from friends and family members to escape captivity. They are held in detention centres until they are deported or traffickers receive fees for taking them across the Mediterranean. Research by the UN suggests this ranges between US$850 (£644) and US$4,500 (£3,400) per crossing.

    US officials say the military could start flying migrants to Libya imminently. However, authorities in Tripoli have rejected the use of Libyan territory as a destination for deporting migrants without its knowledge or consent.

    There are also judicial hurdles. On May 7, a federal judge in Massachusetts ruled that the deportation of immigrants to Libya would be in violation of a court order he issued in March.

    However, the Trump administration’s record suggests it does not always follow such rulings. This leaves the migrants in considerable jeopardy.

    Martin Plaut does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Threat of enslavement hangs over reported plans to deport migrants from US to Libya – https://theconversation.com/threat-of-enslavement-hangs-over-reported-plans-to-deport-migrants-from-us-to-libya-256145

    MIL OSI – Global Reports