B10‑0127/2025
European Parliament resolution on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo
(2025/2553(RSP))
The European Parliament,
– having regard to its previous resolutions on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Great Lakes Region,
– having regard to the Council conclusions of 20 February 2023 entitled ‘A renewed EU Great Lakes Strategy: Supporting the transformation of the root causes of instability into shared opportunities’,
– having regard to the statement of 25 January 2025 by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU on the latest escalation in eastern DRC,
– having regard to the Memorandum of Understanding of 26 October 2023 on sustainable raw materials between the EU and the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
– having regard to the Memorandum of Understanding of 19 February 2023 on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains between the EU and Rwanda,
– having regard to the letter of 27 December 2024 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the President of the UN Security Council,
– having regard to the press statement by the UN Security Council of 26 January 2025 on the situation in Democratic Republic of Congo,
– having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1533 (2004) of 12 March 2004,
– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas for decades the resource-rich and multi-ethnic eastern region of the DRC has been plagued by violence, war and unimaginable human suffering; whereas the long-term consequences of the terrible 1994 Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi are still fuelling violence, hatred and forced displacements today;
B. whereas on 27 January 2025 the roughly 2 000-soldier-strong rebel group M23 gained control of Goma, the capital of the DRC region of North Kivu and a central hub with two million inhabitants; whereas numerous UN reports have confirmed the presence of 3 000-4 000 Rwandan soldiers in the DRC who are cooperating with the M23 and are taking part in combat operations; whereas on 6 February 2025 the M23 reiterated that it wanted to ‘liberate all of the Congo’ in its first public meeting as its fighters advanced towards South Kivu;
C. whereas there have been numerous UN reports about the illegal smuggling of minerals from the DRC to Rwanda, which then sells these minerals on the international market, claiming that they originate from Rwanda; whereas Rwandan exports of gold and coltan have risen sharply in recent years;
D. whereas numerous UN Group of Experts reports have documented that Rwanda is supporting the M23 rebel military group; whereas Rwanda has even sent numerous soldiers into the DRC; whereas in 2012 the M23 briefly captured Goma, but Rwanda ended its support for the rebel force due to international pressure and a cut in development funding;
E. whereas, since the resurgence of the M23, the already very dire humanitarian situation has further deteriorated, with a total lack of humanitarian assistance, forced evictions from camps for internally displaced people and increased violence against innocent civilians, including a large increase in sexual violence against girls and women;
F. whereas after a ceasefire that lasted several years, the M23 fighters took up arms again at the end of 2021; whereas martial law has been in force since 2021 in eastern DRC and the civilian government has been replaced by the military;
G. whereas, before this latest episode in the crisis, 800 000 internally displaced people were already in overcrowded sites for displaced people around Goma; whereas over 6.4 million people were already displaced throughout the country before the current escalation (of which 2.9 million were new displacements in 2024 alone);
H. whereas for decades the central DRC Government has not been able to ensure complete control over the vast territory of the DRC, particularly in eastern DRC; whereas more than 100 rebel groups have exploited this vacuum and are often supported by neighbouring countries to ensure access to the many natural resources in eastern DRC, among other reasons; whereas the rebel groups often recruit child soldiers in a blatant violation of international law and assault on humanity;
I. whereas the conflict is fuelled by the smuggling of minerals, such as tin, tungsten, coltan (tantalum), gold and diamonds, which are often mined in inhumane conditions; whereas armed groups control mining areas and smuggling routes, whereas gold and coltan, in particular, are transported across the border to Rwanda (and Uganda) and from there sold on as ‘conflict-free’ raw materials; whereas the DRC Government estimates that it loses USD 1 billion a year in revenue from raw materials illegally taken out of the country; whereas in addition to state and rebel actors from outside the DRC, many Congolese actors from the security sector are also part of these complex interdependencies;
J. whereas on 8 February 2025 at a joint summit in Tanzania’s capital Dar es Salaam, the regional blocs of southern Africa, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and eastern Africa, the East African Community (EAC), called for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire, demanded the withdrawal of uninvited foreign armed forces from the DRC territory, urged all warring parties to hold peace talks within five days, and demanded the reopening of Goma airport and other key routes to facilitate humanitarian aid; whereas the African Union is set to address the matter at a meeting in Addis Ababa on 14 February 2025; whereas other mediation efforts are ongoing, notably by France, which aims to bring all actors to the negotiation table;
K. whereas the EU and Rwanda Memorandum of Understanding on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains is focused on the advancement of due diligence and traceability, cooperation in fighting against the illegal trafficking of raw materials and alignment with international environmental, social and governance standards; whereas the EU has a similar memorandum of understanding with the DRC and other countries in the region;
L. whereas Rwanda has repeatedly claimed that the DRC is supporting rebels from the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), an extremist group who aim to overthrow the government in Rwanda; whereas the FDLR is also accused of guerrilla attacks and assaults on civilians, such as the assassination of the late Italian Ambassador Luca Attanasio in 2021; whereas the government in Kinshasa published a declaration at the end of 2023 stating that all soldiers cooperating with the FDLR would be arrested; whereas Rwanda claims that the DRC Government is not militarily capable of providing full security in the east of its country;
M. whereas Uganda and the DRC have been cooperating in many ways, including in their efforts to fight terrorism in the region; whereas this has led to an increased Ugandan presence in eastern DRC, which has also resulted in increased illegal transfers of minerals from eastern DRC to Uganda;
N. whereas a private Romanian security company and a small number of independent military trainers had been active on the side of the DRC Government from the beginning of 2023, but largely withdrew in the midst of intensified fighting in late January 2025;
O. whereas the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Monusco) has been trying to stabilise eastern DRC since 1999; whereas the SADC Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo has been deployed since December 2023, with 2 100 soldiers from Tanzania and Malawi and 2 900 soldiers from South Africa;
P. whereas public sentiment in Kinshasa against perceived inaction by the international community led to attacks on and the looting of the diplomatic missions of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the United States, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya and the United Nations, as well as civil society organisations;
Q. whereas the EU is trying to intensify its presence in the region, including through its recent support for the ‘Green Corridor Kivu-Kinshasa’ programme via a Global Gateway initiative, which aims to help establish a sustainable 2 600 km corridor connecting eastern DRC to Kinshasa and the Atlantic Coast, covering 540 000 km2;
R. whereas the Commission announced new humanitarian support for the DRC, with an initial amount of EUR 60 million for 2025; whereas the EU is a major donor to the humanitarian response in the DRC and has provided over EUR 272 million in humanitarian assistance since early 2023;
S. whereas the DRC has been a clear critic of Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and has supported numerous resolutions at the UN and other international forums condemning the Russian war of aggression and expansion;
T. whereas the Council appointed Johan Borgstam as the EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region on 1 September 2024;
1. Strongly condemns the breaches of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of eastern DRC by the rebels of the M23 and Rwanda;
2. Urges the Rwandan Government to withdraw its troops from DRC territory, the presence of whom is a clear violation of international law and the UN Charter, and cease cooperation with the M23 rebels; underlines that the territorial integrity of the DRC must be respected;
3. Calls on all regional actors to cease their support to the numerous rebel groups; demands therefore that both the M23 and FDLR groups, among others, be dissolved; underlines that, as well as Rwanda and the DRC, all regional actors have a special responsibility in this regard;
4. Recalls that only an inclusive and regional approach will be able to address and tackle the multifaceted long-standing problems in the region; strongly welcomes the joint SADC and EAC peace summit in Dar es Salaam on 8 February 2025; reiterates in this regard its full support to the Luanda and Nairobi processes and calls on all Great Lake countries, in particular the DRC and Rwanda, to urgently pursue negotiations in these frameworks; emphasises that any solution must also address the root causes of the conflict, including, but not limited to, the illicit trafficking of natural resources; underlines that regional organisations, such as the African Union, the SADC and the EAC, must play a central role in all of these efforts; underlines as well that a lasting solution requires a reform of the DRC security sector, with a better organised DRC army and administration;
5. Expresses concern over the lack of coherence in the EU response to the Great Lakes Region’s crises and calls on the Council to reassess the implementation of its renewed EU Great Lakes strategy; recalls that the EU and its special representative for the region are ready to assist all mediation efforts; urges the EU to cooperate with other actors on the ground, in particular Monusco, to ensure the protection of civilians in eastern DRC;
6. Is appalled by the shocking use of sexual violence as a tool of repression and weapon of war in eastern DRC, as well as the unacceptable recruitment of child soldiers by the various rebel groups; demands that these matters be addressed by the international community without delay; strongly reiterates that any attack against UN-mandated forces is inexcusable and might be considered a war crime;
7. Is outraged by the humanitarian catastrophe and lack of humanitarian assistance and expresses its concern that the crisis will further deteriorate unless immediate action is taken, including improved humanitarian access and improvements to the sanitary situation; is deeply concerned about the humanitarian situation of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of displaced people in eastern DRC and in the DRC as a whole; underlines that all countries in the region have a legal and moral obligation to ensure the safety of international aid workers on their territories; underlines that Rwanda has a special responsibility to facilitate humanitarian access to the region;
8. Expresses its condolences to all the victims of the recent violence and expresses its gratitude to the numerous aid workers who, despite the very difficult and challenging conditions, continue to provide much-needed support to the population;
9. Reiterates its condemnation of hate speech and xenophobia, as well as ethnic-based politics; underlines that all those responsible for sustaining armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC must be held accountable;
10. Calls for an urgent increase in the overall EU support budget for the region, in particular given the unknown future engagement of the US Government;
11. Expresses its strong concern about the increasing presence of disinformation campaigns; condemns in particular efforts by Russia to foster anti-Western sentiments through the dissemination of fake news about Western players on social media;
12. Calls on the Commission to urgently review its engagement with Rwanda and prepare a set of possible measures with clear pathways towards implementation in case the Rwandan Government does not swiftly reverse its policies, including, among others, a possible suspension of bilateral assistance and a halt of the Memorandum of Understanding on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains;
13. Calls on the Member States to consider the adoption of additional restrictive measures against natural or legal persons, entities or bodies that sustain, support or benefit from the armed conflict, instability or insecurity in the DRC, as well as those responsible for inciting violence, or exploiting the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, including through the illicit exploitation and trade of natural resources;
14. Urges the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to immediately cease military assistance to the Rwandan armed forces via the European Peace Facility;
15. Expresses its concern about the increasing presence of Chinese actors in the mining sector of the DRC and the region acting without respect for economic and social responsibilities; recalls that European industries and companies in the region will only have long-term security of supply if a long-lasting and peaceful solution to the conflict is found;
16. Strongly condemns the attack on diplomatic institutions of the EU, its Member States and civil society organisations, such as political foundations in Kinshasa, and underlines that the protection of civilians and diplomatic staff must be guaranteed; demands that those responsible be brought to justice;
17. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Governments of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe and South Africa, as well as the secretariats of Monusco, the SADC and the EAC.
