Category: Banking

MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Budget Speech by the Financial Secretary (9)

Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

Accelerating Green DevelopmentGreen Industries171. Development of green industries is a major international trend and key to addressing global climate change. The combination of green finance and green technology will accelerate the build-up of multi-faceted industry clusters, thereby creating huge business opportunities and financing needs, and making contribution to green transformation and development.Green Finance172. We launched the Sustainable Finance Action Agenda last year, setting out goals for the banking industry to achieve net zero. We also launched the Roadmap on Sustainability Disclosure in Hong Kong. It provides a well defined pathway for large publicly accountable entities to adopt the International Financial Reporting Standards – Sustainability Disclosure Standards no later than 2028. This will make Hong Kong one of the first jurisdictions to align its local requirements with the Standards.173. To continuously support local green-finance talent training, we will extend the Pilot Green and Sustainable Finance Capacity Building Support Scheme to 2028. Over 5 700 applications have been approved under the Scheme.Green Technology174. The HKSTPC will develop the InnoCentre in Kowloon Tong into a leading green technology hub – “GreenTech Hub”, bringing together more than 200 green technology companies. The HKSTPC will invite financial and business institutions, universities, institutions supporting business, etc, to become partners of the admitted companies and provide support such as talent training, testing and application scenarios, and business matching.Green Shipping175. The Government will provide tax exemption for green methanol used for bunkering. Meanwhile, the Government will implement the Action Plan on Green Maritime Fuel Bunkering to develop Hong Kong into a green maritime fuel bunkering centre.Green Aviation176. To provide support for the decarbonisation of the international and local aviation industry, we are promoting the application of Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF) at the HKIA. The AA completed a relevant study last year. We will announce an SAF consumption target this year.Green CityWaste Reduction and Recycling177. To enhance waste reduction at source, the Government will allocate an additional funding of $180 million for increasing the number of residential food waste smart recycling bins and food waste collection facilities across the city, as well as expanding the recycling network and increasing waste recovery.Waste to Energy178. I·PARK1, Hong Kong’s first waste-to-energy facility for treating municipal solid waste, is expected to commence operation this year. Moreover, we have invited the open tender for I·PARK2, the second large-scale facility with an expected treatment capacity of 6 000 tonnes per day. It is a major step towards “zero landfill”.Charging Network for Electric Vehicles179. There are more than 100 000 electric vehicles in Hong Kong, about eight times of that five years ago. The Government will launch a $300 million subsidy scheme in the middle of the year. It is expected that the scheme will provide impetus for the industry to install 3 000 fast chargers across Hong Kong by 2030 to be used by 160 000 additional electric vehicles.Green Transformation of Public Buses and Taxis180. The Government has announced the Green Transformation Roadmap of Public Buses and Taxis and earmarked $470 million under the New Energy Transport Fund to subsidise franchised bus operators in purchasing about 600 electric buses. Also, $135 million were earmarked to subsidise the taxi trade in purchasing 3 000 electric taxis. In addition, the Funding Scheme to Trial of Hydrogen Fuel Cell Heavy Vehicles is now open for application.Smart and Green Mass Transit Systems181. Last year, the Government invited expressions of interest for the smart and green mass transit system projects in Kai Tak, East Kowloon and Hung Shui Kiu/Ha Tsuen and Yuen Long South NDAs. The Government will continue to take forward the projects with an innovative mindset, and strive to invite tenders for the Kai Tak project this year and the East Kowloon and Hung Shui Kiu/Ha Tsuen and Yuen Long South NDAs projects next year respectively. Sustainable Development of Agriculture and Fisheries Industries182. We will continue to take forward the Blueprint for the Sustainable Development of Agriculture and Fisheries to assist the upgrading and transformation of the agriculture and fisheries industries. The Government has reserved a site in Sheung Shui for the agriculture sector to set up the first multi-storey, modernised and environment-friendly livestock farm. For the fisheries sector, the first batch of marine fish-culture licences at Wong Chuk Kok Hoi and Mirs Bay will be issued in the middle of the year the earliest. We are also proactively working to establish a brand building and certification system for leisure fisheries and farming, as well as local agricultural and fisheries produce. Land and Housing SupplyLand Supply183. We need a sufficient supply of land to create the capacity for supporting the development of new industries, injecting new impetus into our economy, and providing a better living and leisure environment for our people.184. The Government will closely monitor market situation and development, and roll out sites in a paced and orderly manner. Having learned from past experience that land shortage would constrain Hong Kong’s development, we must persist with our work on planning and land creation. The pace of rolling out sites to the market can be adjusted in the light of actual circumstances. 185. The commercial property market has been facing considerable challenges in the past few years. In view of the high vacancy rates of offices in recent years and the relatively ample supply in the next few years, the Government will not roll out any commercial site for sale in the coming year to allow the market to absorb the existing supply. We will also consider rezoning some of the commercial sites into residential use and allowing greater flexibility of land use. To tie in with the relevant work, we will also extend the deadline for completing in-situ land exchange for commercial sites in the town centre of HSK/HT NDA. 186. The Land Sale List of the coming year comprises eight residential sites. There will also be railway property development projects, projects undertaken by the Urban Renewal Authority (URA) as well as private development and redevelopment projects. Taken together, the potential land supply for the whole year is expected to have a capacity for providing about 13 700 units, similar to the projected annual demand for private housing as announced in the Long Term Housing Strategy. The sale arrangements will be announced on a quarterly basis having regard to market situation and relevant circumstances.187. We will prepare land for the production of about 80 000 private housing units in the coming five years. About 65 per cent of the land comes from the NM and the Tung Chung New Town Extension. The above projection has yet to take into account the supply from development projects undertaken by the URA and other private development projects.Housing Supply188. On public housing supply, the Government has identified sufficient land for meeting the supply target of 308 000 public housing units over the next 10 years. Coupled with Light Public Housing, the total public housing supply in the coming five years will reach 190 000 units, which is about 80 per cent higher than that of the first five year period since the current term Government took office.189. On private housing supply, it is estimated that the completion of private residential units will be on average over 17 000 units annually in the coming five years, representing a decrease of about eight per cent over the annual average of the past five years. The potential supply of first hand private residential units for the next three to four years will be around 107 000 units. Infrastructure DevelopmentTransport Infrastructure190. The Government will strive to commence the detailed planning and design of the South Island Line (West) project this year. The construction works of the remaining sections of Route 6, namely the Central Kowloon Route and Trunk Road T2 and Cha Kwo Ling Tunnel, are entering the final stage. The Central Kowloon Route project is expected to be completed by the end of this year while Route 6 will be fully commissioned next year.Professional Development of Construction Industry191. I have set aside $15 million for the work of the Centre of Excellence for Major Project Leaders over the next two years to enhance the professionalism, innovation capabilities and cost-effectiveness management of the construction industry. The Centre will organise summits and various events to promote exchanges and co-operation transcending geographical and sectoral boundaries.192. To attract more young people to join the construction industry, we and the Construction Industry Council (CIC) will jointly allocate funding totalling about $95 million to continue the provision of on-the-job training subsidies to trainees enrolling in part-time construction-related degree programmes over the next two academic years. It is anticipated to benefit about 1 000 trainees.193. The CIC will allocate around $150 million to subsidise the construction industry to provide on the job training for about 2 500 graduates of degree programmes in engineering, architecture, surveying, planning and landscape architecture. This will assist more young people in obtaining professional qualifications. A Caring and Inclusive CommunitySupport for Youth194. The Government has just raised the upper age limit for participants of the Youth Employment and Training Programme to 29 and introduced workplace attachment opportunities in the GBA to help young people enhance their employability. The estimated expenditure for the Programme next year is around $100 million.195. In the coming year, we plan to offer around 4 000 short term internship placements in bureaux and departments and public organisations for tertiary students. Students who aspire to pursue a career in public service may take the opportunity to broaden their horizons and better plan for their future career development.196. The Hong Kong Housing Authority has launched the “Well Being ??? Start Up” Programme on a pilot basis, offering rent-free shop premises in its shopping centres for young people to trial their business plans. The Programme has received ardent support from different sectors of the community. The Authority will expand the programme and appeal to private landlords for support.Caring for the Elderly197. The Government will, in the next financial year, increase the number of vouchers under the Residential Care Service Voucher Scheme for the Elderly by 1 000 to 6 000 in total and increase the number of vouchers under the Community Care Service Voucher Scheme for the Elderly by 1 000 to 12 000 in total, involving an annual expenditure of about $1,710 million and $900 million respectively.198. The Working Group on Promoting Silver Economy will implement measures in five areas, namely boosting “silver consumption”, developing “silver industry”, promoting “quality assurance of silver products”, enhancing “silver financial and security arrangements”, and unleashing “silver productivity”. Relevant policy bureaux are taking forward their work.199. The HKMA will collaborate with the Hong Kong Association of Banks to formulate industry guidelines this year, with a view to encouraging banks to offer elderly-friendly electronic banking services.Support for Working Families200. As at the end of last year, about 50 000 households were receiving allowance under the Working Family Allowance Scheme, involving around 170 000 persons, inclusive of some 70 000 children. In 2025-26, the estimated expenditure for the Scheme is about $2.1 billion. The Government has increased the rates of the household and child allowances under the Scheme by 15 per cent across the board with effect from April last year.Child Protection201. The Mandatory Reporting of Child Abuse Ordinance will come into effect next January, creating a wider protection web for children. The Government will provide an additional annual provision of $186 million to increase emergency places for residential child care and strengthen professional support for child abuse victims and their families.Support for Persons with Disabilities202. The Government will set up 14 Integrated Community Rehabilitation Centres across the territory in phases to provide persons with disabilities who require medium to high level care with flexible and integrated community support services through a case management approach. Besides, 1 280 additional day community rehabilitation and home care service places will be provided for persons with disabilities, involving about $160 million additional annual expenditure.203. Starting from the third quarter of this year, the Government will regularise the Pilot Project on Enhancing Vocational Rehabilitation Services to provide training to persons with disabilities according to their personal interest and abilities to enhance their employment opportunities. The annual expenditure involved is about $100 million and it is expected to benefit about 10 000 people.Women’s Development204. The Government is committed to women’s development and launched the Women Empowerment Fund in June 2023 with an annual funding of $20 million. To date, the Fund has provided funding support to women’s groups and non governmental organisations for launching over 240 projects, empowering women to excel. This year, a two year pilot mentorship programme will be launched, pairing female university students with women leader mentors to promote women’s workplace development.District Services and Community Care Teams205. Last year, the Chief Executive announced that the Government would regularise the establishment of District Services and Community Care Teams and increase their funding by 50 per cent in the next term of service. Since the launch of the Community Care Teams, they have paid visits to about 390 000 households and provided around 43 000 times of support services. The Government will further enhance the provision of caring services.Enhancement of Public Healthcare System206. To develop primary healthcare, the Government will upgrade the District Health Centre Expresses in Central and Western District, Eastern District and Yau Tsim Mong District into District Health Centres this year, with a view to strengthening the community healthcare system.207. The Government is progressively implementing and completing the 16 works projects, which entail a total of about $190 billion, under the First Hospital Development Plan. Taking into account the latest demographic structure, planning and development situation in Hong Kong, we will review the distribution, scale and priority of projects under the Second Hospital Development Plan, and will make the announcement in due course.208. Furthermore, the Government and the HA are reviewing the structure and levels of subsidisation for public healthcare, with a view to strengthening the financial sustainability of public healthcare services and providing better support for patients with serious or critical conditions as well as those with financial difficulties. The outcome of the review will be announced this year.Combatting Illegal Betting209. In recent years, quite some members of the public have expressed concerns about the problem of illegal basketball betting in Hong Kong. According to the latest assessment of the Hong Kong Jockey Club (HKJC), the turnover of illegal basketball betting reached $70 billion to $90 billion last year. To combat illegal betting activities in an effective manner, the Government will explore regulating basketball betting activities and invite HKJC to submit a proposal.

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Budget Speech by the Financial Secretary (6)

Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

International Trade Centre105. As an international trade centre, Hong Kong capitalises on unique advantages and reinforces connectivity, and serves as a bridge linking the Mainland and global markets. It provides high-standard professional services for international trade, helping our country promote the new development pattern of “dual circulation”.Multinational Supply Chain Management Centre106. HKTDC and InvestHK jointly encourage Mainland enterprises to establish a foothold in Hong Kong and set up international or regional headquarters for managing offshore trading and supply chain, thereby assisting these enterprises in going global and planning supply chains and industry chains. HKTDC will provide them with one-stop professional consulting services to help them establish market connections and understand laws and regulations in overseas markets.107. Hong Kong serves as an important regional trade financing centre. The outstanding trade finance by banks has reached $380 billion, about 40 per cent of which provide financing for merchandise trade outside Hong Kong. The Trade Financing Liquidity Facility recently introduced by HKMA and PBoC also provides greater flexibility for RMB trade financing. In addition, the Hong Kong Export Credit Insurance Corporation will provide credit insurance for export services relating to multinational supply chain to render more comprehensive support to enterprises seeking to go global.108. The Government will make reference to the Model Law on Electronic Transferable Records advocated by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law and consider legislative amendments to facilitate digitalisation of trade documents. We will submit the relevant legislative proposal to LegCo next year.Network Expansion109. To expand our trade network and attract more inward investment and enterprises from the Global South markets to Hong Kong, the Government is following up actively with the governments of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia on the establishment of Economic and Trade Offices in these two countries. In addition, InvestHK has established consultant offices in Cairo, Egypt and Izmir, Türkiye. HKTDC has also set up a consultant office in Cambodia.110. We are exploring the signing of investment agreements with Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Egypt and Peru, and conducting negotiations with 17 countries on Comprehensive Avoidance of Double Taxation Agreements.Strengthen Co-operation with Belt and Road Countries111. Hong Kong will continue to utilise our role as a functional platform for the Belt and Road (B&R) Initiative. We, together with business and professional services sectors, will continue to further cultivate the ASEAN and Middle East markets, and explore opportunities in Central Asia, South Asia and North Africa. HKTDC will strengthen B&R project matching, particularly on green development and I&T.112. The B&R Summit is a flagship platform for Hong Kong to participate in and contribute to the B&R Initiative. The 10th Summit will be organised in September and we will encourage different sectors to hold events around the Summit period for enhancing synergies.Supporting Local Enterprises113. To support the development of local enterprises and help them go global, we will inject $1.5 billion in total into the Dedicated Fund on Branding, Upgrading and Domestic Sales and the Export Marketing and Trade and Industrial Organisation Support Fund, and streamline application arrangements. CEDB will announce details later.114. The Government has been providing loan guarantees to businesses through the SME Financing Guarantee Scheme. As at the end of last year, a total of over $288 billion of loans has been approved under the Scheme, benefitting nearly 65 000 small and medium enterprises (SMEs). To meet the financing needs of SMEs during transformation, we relaunched the principal moratorium arrangement in November last year for one year, allowing enterprises to apply for principal moratorium for up to 12 months.115. In addition, many banks have joined the Taskforce on SME Lending jointly established by HKMA and the Hong Kong Association of Banks, committing to making flexible arrangements as far as practicable to ease the cash flow burden on SMEs. The funds dedicated for SME financing in the participating banks’ loan portfolios have recently been increased to over $390 billion. 116. To further assist local SMEs in tapping into the Mainland market and increasing sales from electronic commerce (e-commerce) markets, HKTDC will launch the “E-Commerce Express” in collaboration with large-scale e-commerce platforms to provide Hong Kong enterprises with one-to-one consultation services and thematic seminars. HKTDC will also enhance its mentorship scheme together with the Trade and Industry Department. By doing so, local enterprises will better leverage e-commerce and online shopping platforms in the Mainland to boost sales. In addition, HKTDC will organise the second edition of the Hong Kong Shopping Festival.International Maritime Centre117. Hong Kong is a leading international maritime centre. The Government will continue to embrace changes and adopt an innovative spirit to create a stronger impetus for the development of the industry.Establish Hong Kong Maritime and Port Development Board118. The Government will establish the Hong Kong Maritime and Port Development Board this year to strengthen relevant research, promotion and manpower training to facilitate the sustainable development of the international maritime centre.High Value Added Maritime Services119. In the past few years, the Government has introduced a series of tax measures conducive to the development of the maritime industry. In light of changes of international tax rules, we are enhancing these measures, including introduction of tax deduction on ship acquisition cost for ship lessors under an operating lease. To drive the development of maritime services, we also propose to provide half-rate tax concession to eligible commodity traders. We will introduce a bill into LegCo in the first half of next year.Modern Logistics Development120. The Government endeavours to identify and release suitable logistics sites. The first of such logistics sites in the vicinity of the Kwai Tsing Container Terminals has just been disposed of by public tender. Meanwhile, the Government initiated a study on the development model for logistics sites in the NM in order to develop modern logistics clusters. Findings of the study are expected to be announced this year.Smart Port121. To develop smart port, the Government has set aside $215 million to install the port community system, with a view to enhancing the flow of data among stakeholders in the maritime, port and logistics industries. We will seek funding approval from LegCo this year.International Aviation Hub122. The Hong Kong International Airport (HKIA) connects to nearly 200 global destinations. Daily passenger throughput and number of aircraft movements have largely returned to pre pandemic level. Air cargo throughput has topped the global ranking for multiple years. The HKIA Three-Runway System was commissioned at the end of last year, while the related passenger facilities will commence operation by phases from the end of this year.Airport City123. The Airport Authority Hong Kong (AA) has just promulgated a development plan for expanding the Airport City. With the aviation industry as its focal point, the Airport Island as well as the land and waters in its vicinity will be utilised for the development of a new highlight project encompassing high end commercial, art, tourism and leisure activities.Facilitate C919’s Entry to International Aviation Market124. In January this year, our country’s home developed aircraft C919 was officially deployed for scheduled flights between Hong Kong and Shanghai. The inaugural flight outside of the Mainland signified a major breakthrough for home developed aircrafts to go global. Hong Kong will help C919 enter the global market. The Hong Kong International Aviation Academy will expand its training programmes to cover C919 aircraft related aspects.Aircraft Parts Processing and Trading Centre125. Under the co-ordination of InvestHK, the AA has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with a leading overseas professional aeronautic services company to explore the possibility of providing professional services such as aircraft dismantling, parts recycling and related training in Hong Kong, thereby developing Hong Kong into the first aircraft parts processing and trading centre in Asia.

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Budget Speech by the Financial Secretary (5)

Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

Strengthening Industries with Competitive Edge

72. It is imperative for Hong Kong to leverage on its strategic positioning as the “three centres and a hub” and make good use of the advantages of “one country, two systems”. With the resolute support of our country, we must consolidate and strengthen industries with clear advantages whilst actively nurturing and developing new industries, injecting new impetus to Hong Kong’s economy such that Hong Kong could contribute to the Chinese path to modernisation while realising faster and better development.

International Financial Centre

73. Last year, Hong Kong ranked among the top three international financial centres (IFC) and the top four initial public offering markets in the world. The Hong Kong stock market has been buoyant since the beginning of this year. Total assets under management amounted to over $31 trillion, with over half of the funding sourced from investors outside. The offshore Renminbi (RMB) liquidity pool has expanded to approximately RMB1.1 trillion.

74. The key to consolidating and enhancing the strengths of Hong Kong as an IFC lies in institutional innovation, product innovation, a critical mass of enterprises and financial connectivity. Over the past few years, institutional reforms to the capital market, including establishing listing avenues for new economy and technology enterprises with weighted voting rights structures, facilitating fundraising by overseas issuers, etc., coupled with the Government’s active efforts in attracting new capital overseas and expanding new markets, have injected impetus to the Hong Kong market and improved its liquidity. We are pressing ahead with high-quality development of Hong Kong’s international financial market to create more new growth areas.

Securities and derivatives market

Facilitating financing of overseas enterprises and specific products

75. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is an important economic region that continues to grow. A number of enterprises from ASEAN are seeking to apply for listing in Hong Kong, covering businesses in areas such as biotechnology, integrated logistics, mining, etc.

76. HKEX will step up its promotion in ASEAN and the Middle East, and actively explore areas of co-operation with countries in the region, including the listing of exchange-traded funds, to enrich the investment product choices in mutual markets and promote two-way capital flows. HKEX will also strive to increase the number of overseas recognised exchanges to facilitate more overseas companies’ secondary listing in Hong Kong.

77. In order to facilitate more private equity funds to list in Hong Kong, SFC has clarified the relevant regulatory requirements to encourage sizeable alternative asset funds with regular income streams to raise funds. In addition, HKEX will put forward recommendations to enhance the issuance mechanism of structured products with a view to providing greater flexibility for product listing and trading.

Improving trading and risk management efficiency

78. We will continue to advance reforms to the trading mechanism. HKEX will gradually introduce new functions to its post-trade system from the middle of this year and conduct system upgrades to ensure technical compatibility with the T+1 settlement cycle by the end of this year, and complete advance preparations for shortening the settlement cycle.

79. Riding on the reduction in minimum price spreads to be implemented in the middle of this year, HKEX is reviewing with the SFC the trading unit system, or the so-called “board lot” system, and will put forward proposed enhancements this year, so that trading arrangements can better meet liquidity characteristics of shares of different sizes and investment needs, as well as facilitate trading and improve efficiency.

80. We have submitted the subsidiary legislation with regard to the implementation of the uncertificated securities market regime to LegCo. The SFC and HKEX are working closely with the industry to carry out system upgrades and technical preparations, with a view to implementing the regime early next year.

81. To meet the risk management needs of investors, the SFC will consult the market on the proposal to increase the position limits for key index derivatives, so as to enhance flexibility for investors to use the relevant derivatives while safeguarding financial safety.

Taking forward reforms to the listing regime

82. To dovetail with the latest economic trends and corporate needs, we will review listing requirements and post-listing ongoing obligations, evaluate listing-related regulations and arrangements to improve the vetting process, optimise the thresholds for dual primary listing and secondary listing, and review the market structure, including exploring the establishment of a post-delisting over-the-counter trading mechanism.

Fixed Income and Currency Hub

83. The SFC and the HKMA have set up a task force to formulate a roadmap, covering the development of primary and secondary bond markets and foreign exchange markets, as well as infrastructural enhancement. We will also organise a flagship forum in the second half of this year to promote Hong Kong’s strengths in this regard.

84. The Government will conduct research into the current legal and regulatory regime related to the issuance and transactions of digital bonds and explore enhancement measures to promote the wider adoption of tokenisation in Hong Kong’s bond market.

85. The Government will regularise the issuance of tokenised bonds. The HKMA is preparing for issuing the third tranche of tokenised bonds, and will continue to encourage digital bonds issuances through the Digital Bond Grant Scheme, while actively exploring tokenising traditional bonds issued.

Asset and Wealth Management Centre

86. We have been striving to foster the development of the asset and wealth management industries. Measures implemented include enhancements to the Cross-boundary Wealth Management Connect in the GBA, Exchange-traded Fund (ETF) Connect, and the Mainland-Hong Kong Mutual Recognition of Funds arrangement.

87. We will formulate proposals on the preferential tax regimes for funds, single family offices and carried interest this year, including expanding the scope of “fund” under the tax exemption regime, increasing the types of qualifying transactions eligible for tax concessions for funds and single family offices, enhancing the tax concession arrangement on the distribution of carried interest by private equity funds, etc.

88. We will continue to attract global capital to Hong Kong and develop a vibrant ecosystem for family offices. InvestHK has assisted over 160 family offices in setting up operations or expanding their businesses in Hong Kong. We will be hosting the third edition of the Wealth for Good in Hong Kong Summit shortly under the theme “Hong Kong of the world, for the world”, showcasing Hong Kong’s strengths as a global hub for family offices.

Offshore RMB Business Centre

89. With the prudent and steady progress of RMB internationalisation, Hong Kong, as an offshore RMB business hub, will continue to enhance offshore RMB liquidity, improve the relevant infrastructure, and provide more investment products and risk-management tools.

90. The Government promotes the formation of the offshore RMB yield curve by regularly issuing RMB bonds of different tenors. The Hong Kong RMB Clearing Bank has been offering 24-hour cross-border clearing service since last year, bringing convenience to banks and customers in different time zones.

91. The current size of the Currency Swap Agreement between the HKMA and the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) is RMB800 billion. The HKMA will launch an RMB Trade Financing Liquidity Facility for banks as a stable source of relatively lower-cost funds, so as to support banks in providing RMB trade finance services to their corporate customers. The new facility has a total size of RMB100 billion.Â

92. To promote trading of more stocks in RMB and improve market liquidity, both places are conducting technical preparations at full speed to implement the inclusion of RMB trading counter under Southbound trading of Stock Connect. In addition, HKEX is taking forward the single tranche multiple counter arrangement, including adopting the same International Securities Identification Number for dual-counter stocks, so as to enhance settlement efficiency. The Government has also been conducting preparatory work to allow the stamp duty payable on the transfer of stocks at RMB counters to be paid in RMB, with a view to putting forward a legislative proposal next year.

Mutual market access and co-development with the Mainland

93. We will enhance the mutual market access mechanism with the Mainland, including the issuance of offshore Mainland government bond futures in Hong Kong, and implementing block trading of stocks and inclusion of real estate investment trusts under the mutual access as soon as possible. We will also actively explore opportunities to introduce further expansion initiatives, extend the Cross-boundary Wealth Management Connect Scheme in the GBA, improve market liquidity, and enrich the risk management toolbox.

94. The Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau, together with OASES and the HKTDC, will host the inaugural Hong Kong Global Financial and Industry Summit this year, which will pool together global enterprises, funds and technologies through financial empowerment, thereby elevating the level of international co-operation of industries. It will also attract more leading companies in advanced industries, domestic as well as overseas enterprises and investors to establish a foothold in Hong Kong.

95. To promote the connection of e-payment between the Mainland and Hong Kong, the PBoC and the HKMA are working closely to implement the linkage of faster payment systems of both places, with a view to providing round-the-clock real-time, small-value cross-boundary remittance service for residents in both places. The service is expected to be launched in the middle of this year at the soonest.

96. According to the “Second Agreement Concerning Amendment to the Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement Agreement on Trade in Services”, the restriction for the Mainland branches of Hong Kong banks to conduct bank card business will be lifted starting from next month. This will facilitate them in expanding their businesses in the Mainland.

Fintech and Financial Innovation

Virtual Asset Development

97. We have been actively developing the virtual asset ecosystem in Hong Kong in recent years, and have been at the forefront by establishing a framework that balances regulation and market development.

98. “Consensus”, an annual flagship event of the sector, was successfully held in Hong Kong recently, bringing together a few thousands of industry elites and companies from across the world in virtual assets, blockchain, Web3 and fintech, etc. This is a manifestation of global confidence in Hong Kong’s vibrant development in this area. During the event, the SFC also announced a roadmap on the virtual asset market.

99. We will soon promulgate a second policy statement on the development of virtual assets to explore how to leverage the advantages of traditional financial services and innovative technologies in the area of virtual assets, enhance security and flexibility of real economy activities, and encourage local and international companies to explore the innovation and application of virtual asset technologies. The Government will conduct consultation on the licensing regimes of virtual asset over-the-counter trading services and custodian services this year.

100. We have introduced into LegCo a bill to put in place a regulatory regime for issuers of fiat-referenced stablecoins. Upon the passage of the Bill, the HKMA will expedite the vetting of licence applications.

Gold and Commodities

101. The Working Group on Promoting Gold Market Development will formulate a plan this year, covering measures to enhance storage facilities, optimise trading and regulatory mechanisms, expand exchange products, and conduct market promotion. The measures will be implemented gradually.

102. London Metal Exchange, a subsidiary of HKEX, has included Hong Kong as its approved delivery point in January this year. Local warehouse operators have expressed interest in becoming its accredited warehouses. Relevant discussion is actively underway.

Non-traditional risk transfer

103. As an international risk management centre, Hong Kong has been providing diversified risk management tools. We are proactively promoting the development of insurance-linked securities by establishing a dedicated regulatory regime and launching a pilot grant scheme. To date, we have facilitated the issuance of six catastrophe bonds in Hong Kong, with issuance amount totalling over $5.8 billion. The industry responded favourably to the pilot scheme, and we will extend it for three years.

MPF “Full Portability”

104. The Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Authority will consult the public on specific proposals of MPF “Full Portability” this year and submit recommendations to the Government thereafter, such that MPF “Full Portability” can be launched soon after full implementation of the eMPF Platform.

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Budget Speech by the Financial Secretary (1)

Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

Budget Speech by the Financial Secretary (1)
Budget Speech by the Financial Secretary (1)
********************************************

Following is the full text of the Speech on the 2025-26 Budget delivered by the Financial Secretary, Mr Paul Chan, to the Legislative Council today (February 26): Mr President, Honourable Members and fellow citizens, I move that the Appropriation Bill 2025 be read a second time. Introduction 2. The Budget is presented at the halfway stage of the current-term Government. 3. Over the past year, we have seen a number of positive developments in Hong Kong. Our economy has grown for two consecutive years. The employment market has been stable, while inflation remains moderate. Our efforts to attract talent and enterprises have been remarkably successful. The successive staging of large scale international mega events has been coupled with a notable increase in visitor arrivals. And sentiment in the stock market continues to improve alongside a generally buoyant atmosphere across the city. 4. Nevertheless, Hong Kong has also experienced a lot of challenges. The international geopolitical landscape has caused disruptions to trade, supply chain, cash flow and sentiment in the investment market. Local asset prices are contained under a relatively high interest rate environment, whereas the retail and catering markets are still troubled by changes in the consumption pattern of visitors and our residents. 5. While putting Hong Kong’s economic resilience to the test, these challenges signify to us the necessity to reform, innovate and relentlessly improve in the process of economic development. Although the large-scale, counter-cyclical measures launched over the last few years in response to the pandemic have helped us achieve our goal of “supporting enterprises, safeguarding jobs, stabilising the economy and easing the burden on people”, we have experienced fiscal deficits these few years as a result. Last year, revenue related to the asset market was far lower than expected due to a host of internal and external factors, and we continue to record a higher deficit this year. 6. In this Budget, I propose a “reinforced version” of the fiscal consolidation programme, including a cumulative reduction of government recurrent expenditure by seven per cent from now through 2027-28. Strictly containing public expenditure is a must, but we should proceed in a steady and prudent manner and be careful to find a balance among the various impacts that may arise in the process. While laying a sustainable fiscal foundation for future development, this approach represents our all-out effort to minimise the impact on public services and people’s livelihood. It gives us a clear pathway towards the goal of restoring fiscal balance in the Operating Account, in a planned and progressive manner, within the current term of the Government. 7. To seize the opportunities brought about by the rapid advancement of innovation and technology, we must accelerate the development of the Northern Metropolis (NM). It is an investment in our future. Given our prerequisites and capabilities, we can suitably expand the size of bond issuance on the premise of maintaining healthy public finances and use the funds raised in a proper and flexible manner to invest in Hong Kong’s future and create value for our society. 8. In the midst of global changes, technological innovation is our core engine. We must expedite our economic development, in particular boosting new economic driving forces while enhancing the competitive edge of traditional industries at an accelerated pace. Technology reform and artificial intelligence (AI) development are remolding the global landscape, leading to the emergence of new industries, new forms of business, new products and new services. We have to seize the opportunity to make the most out of this critical window to speed up our development, establishing the new before abolishing the old. Transformation and innovation will lead our way into the future, and we are poised to fast-track the high quality development of Hong Kong’s economy. I will elaborate on this a little later. Economic Situation in 2024 9. Last year, Hong Kong’s economy progressed steadily amid a complicated and changing environment. The unstable international geopolitical situation, escalated trade conflicts and elevated global interest rates exerted adverse impact on local economic activities and confidence. Nevertheless, our country’s economy is making steady progress and has rolled out measures benefitting Hong Kong one by one. Together with the Government’s initiatives to boost the economy and interest rate cuts by the US since mid-September, they all provided support to different economic segments in Hong Kong. Hong Kong’s economy recorded moderate growth of 2.5 per cent last year. 10. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that the global economy grew by 3.2 per cent last year. Supported by the continuing expansion of external demand, Hong Kong’s total exports of goods grew by 4.7 per cent in real terms. 11. As a result of our country’s various measures benefitting Hong Kong, together with a large number of mega events organised throughout the year and the recovery of our air traffic capacity, the number of visitors increased by about 30 per cent to approximately 45 million last year, boosting the travel and transport services. Other cross-boundary economic activities also improved. Total exports of services grew by 4.8 per cent for the year. 12. As the economy grew and the Government took forward infrastructure projects, overall investment expenditure rose by 2.4 per cent. Private consumption expenditure, however, slightly declined by 0.6 per cent for the year, as a result of changes in the consumption pattern of local residents. 13. The labour market remained tight. The latest unemployment rate stayed low at 3.1 per cent. The median monthly employment earnings of full-time employees grew by a solid 4.8 per cent, year-on-year, in the fourth quarter of last year. 14. Inflation was mild in overall terms. Netting out the effects of the Government’s one-off measures, the underlying consumer price inflation rate was 1.1 per cent last year. 15. Sentiment in the asset markets improved during the year, benefitting from a series of measures of the Central Government to support Hong Kong’s capital market, as well as the rate-cut cycle of the US. The stock market saw increases in both prices and turnover volume. The Hang Seng Index rose by 18 per cent for the year, and the average daily turnover increased by 26 per cent. Funds raised by new listings increased to $88 billion. 16. The residential property market continued to adjust in the first three quarters of last year. But it stabilised after the interest rate cuts. For the year, the number of transactions increased by 23 per cent to about 53 000, while property prices fell by seven per cent. The non-residential property market remained stagnant. Economic Outlook for 2025 and the Medium Term 17. The Hong Kong economy still faces a very challenging external environment, but there are quite a few positive factors at the same time. 18. Trade protectionism affects global trade and capital flows, dampens investment and consumer confidence, and weighs on global economic growth. It is encouraging that the Mainland economy continues to grow steadily. Our country’s domestic and international circulation, expansion of high-standard opening-up, global setup of industry chains and supply chains by Mainland enterprises, etc. benefit the steady development of external trade. In addition, the Mainland economy is resilient and has a solid foundation. The Central Government’s implementation of a more proactive fiscal policy and a moderately accommodative monetary policy, along with its efforts to expand domestic demand, add momentum to economic growth. 19. The gradual easing of monetary policies by major central banks should support their economic growth. However, the economic and trade policies of the US have brought uncertainties to the pace of rate cuts this year. The European Central Bank also indicated that it would lower interest rates further if inflation broadly trends towards its target level. According to the IMF’s latest projections, the global economy will grow by 3.3 per cent this year, slightly higher than last year. 20. Against the above backdrop, Hong Kong’s exports are expected to see steady performance this year. Moreover, riding on various policies and good momentum of last year, visitor arrivals should continue to increase. Together with the recovery of other cross-boundary economic activities, these should drive continuing growth in services exports. 21. On domestic demand, investors may be more cautious due to uncertainties in the external environment. However, the expected relaxing of the global financial conditions will bode well for fixed asset investment. After last year’s adjustment, private consumption showed stabilising signs towards the end of the year. A sustained increase in residents’ income and steady development of the asset markets would boost consumption further. 22. Based on the above considerations, we forecast that Hong Kong’s economy will continue to grow moderately this year, rising by two to three per cent in real terms for the year. 23. As for prices, it is expected that domestic cost pressures might increase as the economy continues to grow. External price pressures should remain broadly in check, though geopolitical situation might bring risks. We forecast the underlying inflation rate and headline inflation rate this year to be 1.5 per cent and 1.8 per cent respectively. 24. In the medium term, monetary policy normalisation will help sustain solid growth in the global economy. The “Global South”, in particular the Mainland, will continue to be an important driver of global economic growth. 25. Geopolitics will still bring challenges to Hong Kong’s economy. However, the Mainland is promoting high-quality development through scientific and technological innovation, comprehensively deepening reform, and expanding high-standard opening-up. Hong Kong is also making every effort to promote market diversification and open up new growth areas, and the economy is expected to grow steadily. 26. Under “one country, two systems”, Hong Kong is the only place in the world that combines the global advantage and the China advantage. The current term Government has been vigorously expanding economic capacity and enhancing competitiveness, and achieved considerable results. As long as we actively integrate into our country’s development and proactively align with national development strategies, we will definitely continue to seize new opportunities arising from the economic development of our country and the world, creating a bright future. 27. We forecast that Hong Kong’s economy will grow, on average, by 2.9 per cent a year in real terms from 2026 to 2029. The underlying inflation rate is forecast to be on average 2.5 per cent a year.

Ends/Wednesday, February 26, 2025Issued at HKT 11:13

NNNN

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – 2024 annual report – A10-0010/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – 2024 annual report

(2024/2080(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 14, 16, 21, 24, 36 and 41 thereof,

– having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources [1],

– having regard to the report of 20 June 2024 by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) entitled ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy Report – Our Priorities in 2024’,

– having regard to the ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’, endorsed by the European Council on 21 March 2022,

– having regard to NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, adopted on 29 June 2022,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 22 March 2024, 18 April 2024, 27 June 2024 and 19 December 2024,

– having regard to the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions of 18 March 2024, 22 April 2024, 24 May 2024, 24 June 2024, 22 July 2024, 14 October 2024, 18 November 2024 and 16 December 2024,

– having regard to the declaration of the Summit between the EU and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) adopted on 18 July 2023,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 of 22 March 2021 establishing a European Peace Facility, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2015/528 [2],

– having regard to the Political Guidelines of the Commission President for 2024-2029,

– having regard to the 2024 enlargement reports presented by the Commission on 30 October 2024,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans [3],

– having regard to Sauli Niinistö’s report of 30 October 2024 on strengthening Europe’s civil and military preparedness and readiness,

– having regard to the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, adopted in 2004, updated in 2008 and further supplemented in 2020 with a guidance note on the Guidelines’ implementation,

– having regard to its resolutions on breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, adopted in accordance with Rule 150 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on European Economic Security Strategy (JOIN(2023)0020),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 December 2020 entitled ‘The EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade’ (JOIN(2020)0018),

– having in regard to the Commission Recommendation of 3 October 2023 on critical technology areas for the EU’s economic security for further risk assessment with Member States (C(2023)6689),

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 of 17 May 2019 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States [4],

– having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation [5],

– having regard to its resolution of 9 October 2024 on strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian interference ahead of the upcoming presidential elections and a constitutional referendum on EU integration [6],

– having regard to its resolution of 24 October 2024 on the misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan [7],

– having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on the security and defence implications of China’s influence on critical infrastructure in the European Union [8],

– having regard to its resolutions of 24 October 2024 on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia [9] and of 5 October 2023 on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh after Azerbaijan’s attack and the continuing threats against Armenia [10],

– having regard to its resolutions on historical remembrance, including its resolutions of 2 April 2009 on European conscience and totalitarianism [11], of 19 September 2019 on the importance of European remembrance for the future of Europe [12], of 15 December 2022 on 90 years after the Holodomor: recognising the mass killing through starvation as genocide [13] and of 17 January 2024 on European historical consciousness [14],

– having regard to the report of 9 May 2022 on the final outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe,

– having regard to the EU Action Plan on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in External Action 2021-2025 (GAP III),

– having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), which entered into force in the EU on 1 October 2023,

– having regard to the UN resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on 25 September 2015 at the UN Sustainable Development Summit in New York entitled ‘Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’ (Agenda 2030), which established the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),

– having regard to the UN resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on 8 December 1949 on assistance to Palestine refugees,

– having regard to the UN Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 on a peaceful and accepted settlement of the Middle East situation,

– having regard to the UN Security Council resolution of 11 August 2006on the situation in the Middle East,

– having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 and the UN Human Rights Council resolution of 22 June 2020 on the prevention of genocide,

– having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),

– having regard to the agreement between the International Criminal Court and the European Union of 28 April 2006 on cooperation and assistance [15],

– having regard to the advisory opinion requested from the International Court of Justice by the UN General Assembly in its resolution of 30 December 2022 on Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,

– having regard to the order of the International Court of Justice concerning South Africa’s request for the indication of provisional measures,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0010/2025),

A. whereas the world faces rapid geopolitical shifts, with autocratic powers, both individually and in coordinated efforts, actively challenging the international rules-based order and its multilateral institutions, international law, democratic institutions and societies, as well as our alliances; whereas all EU leverage should be assessed in order to dissuade countries from supporting Russia’s aggression;

B. whereas the BRICS summit held in Kazan, Russia, from 22 to 24 October 2024 underscores how Putin leverages international platforms to counteract isolation and build alliances; whereas a unified and strategic EU response is required to uphold the principles of the rules-based international order;

C. whereas the EU and its Member States should review development assistance to governments of countries that openly support Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and monitor their votes on relevant UN resolutions;

D. whereas the geopolitical confrontation between democracies and authoritarian and dictatorial regimes is growing, conflicts are multiplying, and the use of force is increasingly treated as a standard tool for pursuing political aims; whereas force is wielded not only by states but also by an expanding array of non-state actors; whereas the EU needs to reinforce transatlantic relations and build constructive partnerships with like-minded partners in the Global South;

E. whereas the geopolitical context in which the EU is operating has accentuated the need for more ambitious, credible, decisive and unified EU action and a fully fledged European foreign policy on the world stage and has highlighted the necessity for Member States to demonstrate the required political will to rebuild their defence capabilities, while strengthening the EU’s transatlantic bonds and partnerships with like-minded countries; whereas the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) needs to become a fully fledged EU policy through which the EU can address the key geopolitical challenges; whereas the EU should be guided in its external action by the values and principles enshrined in Article 2, Article 3(5) and Article 21 TEU, which have inspired the EU’s own creation, development and enlargement; whereas it is in the EU’s interest to stand up accordingly for universal values, norms and principles such as freedom and democratic standards, as well as human rights, the rule of law, international justice and the Helsinki Final Act, in particular as regards the non-violation of international borders;

F. whereas the EU is faced with the rapid rise of new threats at its borders and on its territory, which are destabilising the EU’s functioning, in particular targeted disinformation, cyber and hybrid attacks, the instrumentalisation of migratory flows, in addition to international terrorism and religious radicalism;

G. whereas strategic autonomy requires the EU to act independently on the global stage when needed, particularly in foreign and security policy; whereas the EU has recognised the need to reduce undue reliance on external actors for safeguarding its interests in an unpredictable and multipolar world;

H. whereas the EU needs to develop an independent and autonomous European diplomacy, including public and cultural, economic, climate, digital and cyber diplomacy, led by an EU diplomatic service which is driven by a common diplomatic culture;

I. whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine violates the rules-based international order, fundamental principles of international law as enshrined in the UN Charter and key conventions and resolutions, the Helsinki Final Act and the European Convention on Human Rights;

J. whereas the Russian violations of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War comprise executions of prisoners and the denial of access to humanitarian organisations and medical treatment for prisoners;

K. whereas the ICC has issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin and the Russian High Commissioner for Children, Maria Lvova-Belova, for their involvement in the abduction of Ukrainian children to Russia; whereas Russia, assisted by the Belarusian regime, is undertaking to re-educate Ukrainian hildren and erase their Ukrainian identity; whereas Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s regime in Belarus has to be held fully accountable for its complicity in the war of aggression against Ukraine and war crimes such as the abduction of thousands of Ukrainian children;

L. whereas the ICC has additionally issued arrest warrants for Russian military leaders Sergei Shoigu, Valery Gerasimov, Viktor Sokolov and Sergei Kobylash, accused of directing attacks on civilian targets;

M whereas the Hungarian Government is blocking the newly established EUR 5 billion Ukraine Assistance Fund set up in March 2024 within the European Peace Facility (EPF); whereas the Hungarian Government is blocking the eighth tranche of EPF reimbursements for Member States that have delivered military aid to Ukraine for more than 18 months;

N. whereas Russian shadow fleet tankers pose a considerable risk to maritime and environmental security by turning off or manipulating their automatic identification systems; whereas these tankers provide an estimated USD 12 billion to Russia’s war budget each month, thereby directly funding its aggressive military operations;

O. whereas Vladimir Putin’s regime has instrumentalised history in an attempt to secure the loyalty of the Russian population by creating nostalgia for the supposed greatness of the Soviet Empire, falsifying the history of Russia and Ukraine, rejecting Nikita Khrushchev’s policy to acknowledge and condemn Stalinist crimes, reneging on Mikhail Gorbachev’s recognition and condemnation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and declaring the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest tragedy of the previous century;

P. whereas Russia and other malign actors in its neighbouring countries promote anti-Western and divisive rhetoric and exploit ethnic tensions in the Western Balkans in order to inflame conflict and divide communities, including through the instrumentalisation of the Serbian Orthodox Church;

Q. whereas 2024 marked the 20th anniversary of the ‘big bang’ enlargement when 10 countries joined the EU; whereas enlargement is of the utmost strategic importance for the EU, as it represents a geostrategic investment in long-term peace, democracy, stability, security, climate protection and prosperity across the continent, and in particular in the face of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the preparation for enlargement requires reforms in the EU and whereas the EU should conduct the enlargement process in parallel with the institutional and decision-making reforms necessary to safeguard the EU’s integration capacity;

R. whereas the EU must maintain the momentum for the acceleration of its enlargement policy while accession countries continue to reform and achieve the required benchmarks related to the EU acquis; whereas consistent messages and a clear path towards integration for candidate countries are vital for keeping the pro-European perspective alive;

S. whereas the future of the Balkans and the countries in the Eastern Neighbourhood lies in the EU;

T. whereas the Union is founded on the values of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, which are part of the Copenhagen criteria, which are the key set of criteria for EU membership; whereas the accession process is a merit-based and reversible process;

U. whereas joining the EU requires foreign policy alignment, including on the votes on United Nations General Assembly resolutions, support for Ukraine and alignment with sanctions against Russia; whereas most of the countries of the Western Balkans have reached high levels of alignment with the CFSP, a notable exception being Serbia;

V. whereas North Macedonia concluded the Prespa Agreement with Greece and the Treaty of friendship, good-neighbourliness and cooperation with Bulgaria;

W. whereas the citizens of Georgia have demonstrated their commitment to democratic values and to their country making progress with EU integration; whereas the democratic backsliding in Georgia needs to be reversed; whereas the Georgian authorities should heed the will of the Georgian people to join the EU and should ensure free and fair elections, stop democratic backsliding, abandon the laws that jeopardise Georgia’s European future and pursue pro-European democratic reforms; whereas Georgia should align with the EU’s CFSP, including the sanctions adopted unanimously against Russia;

X. whereas any partnership agreement between the EU and Azerbaijan – including on energy – must have strong conditions attached on the respect of international law, fundamental rights and international obligations and, in particular, on Azerbaijan making substantial progress towards a comprehensive and sustainable peace agreement with Armenia;

Y. whereas the Mediterranean is of great importance to the EU, both historically and geographically; whereas the countries of the Southern Neighbourhood play an important role in ensuring that irregular migration flows are managed on the basis of the principles of solidarity, balance, shared responsibility and in full compliance with applicable EU and international law and, in particular, human rights and humanitarian law;

Z. whereas strategic partnerships and agreements between the EU and countries of origin and transit, such those between EU and Mauritania, are proving to be a successful model for the prevention of irregular migration and the fight against migrant smugglers;

AA. whereas the supply of thousands of Shahed drones from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Russia has further cemented Iran’s role as a pariah state; whereas North Korea and China further demonstrate their unwavering disregard to international laws and norms;

AB. whereas on 28 May 2024, Norway, Ireland and Spain recognised the State of Palestine, followed on 4 June 2024 by a decision of Slovenia’s parliament to do the same;

AC. whereas China defines itself as a ‘near-Arctic state’ and endeavours to develop, in close partnership with Russia, a Polar Silk Road;

AD. whereas the Belt and Road Initiative, known in China as the One Belt One Road, is a threat to the EU’s interests and undermines the CFSP;

AE. whereas on 14 October 2024 the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the British Foreign Secretary agreed to launch strategic consultations on issues such as the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, the Indo-Pacific, the Western Balkans and hybrid threats;

AF. whereas all UN agencies embody the rules-based international order as they uphold and implement both the letter and the spirit of the UN Charter, to which all UN Member States must abide;

AG. whereas the EU’s credibility and coherence is a paramount requirement for the correct implementation of its external action, as this reinforces trust in the EU among various actors and non-EU countries; whereas the efficiency of the EU’s actions worldwide is contingent on ensuring the highest level of coordination and coherence in the EU’s external action; whereas coordination between the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) should be strengthened, particularly due to the insufficient operational budget of the EEAS;

AH. whereas the implementation of gender equality and the WPS agenda requires initiatives that promote gender-responsive leadership, protect women’s rights and combat sexual and gender-based violence in conflict and post-conflict settings; whereas the funding of these initiatives is essential for supporting local civil society organisations and providing survivor-centred support;

AI. whereas human rights defenders (HRDs) are the EU’s main allies in defending and promoting human rights abroad; whereas HRDs are increasingly at risk of attacks and threats from state and non-state actors; whereas Parliament has consistently called for the proper and coordinated implementation of the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders (2008); whereas the Member States, alongside the EU institutions, should implement these Guidelines, which include a range of specific commitments, such as regular reporting, coordination and action in support of HRDs;

AJ. whereas the consequences of climate change will have an ever-increasing effect on various spheres of human life, including geopolitical order and global stability; whereas it is of crucial importance that fighting climate change, necessitating climate action, and aiding those who are hardest hit by its repercussions, becomes a cornerstone of the CFSP; underlines the fundamental role which the Commission and the Member States, in a joint approach, must play in the advancement of climate diplomacy globally;

AK. whereas the report entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’, presented by Sauli Niinistö, Special Adviser to the President of the European Commission, provides strategic recommendations for enhancing Europe’s civilian and military preparedness in the light of escalating and complex security threats;

AL. whereas this report first reviews the VP/HR’s annual CFSP report and subsequently complements it with Parliament’s positions on the CFSP objectives in 2025; whereas in so doing, the report expands particularly on (1) the global consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, (2) conflict and peace in the Middle East, (3) cooperation with like-minded partners and (4) the general visibility and influence of EU action abroad; whereas Parliament’s forward-looking CFSP position is ultimately underlined by key demands concerning the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) and the parliamentary oversight of the MFF; whereas there is a need to defend and strengthen the rules-based international order, the universal norms, values and principles of the UN Charter such as human rights and international justice, multilateralism, and the Helsinki Final Act, in particular as regards the non-violation of international borders;

1. Underscores that its resolutions on the implementation of the CFSP are a key component of its contribution to EU foreign policymaking; underlines that these resolutions manifest the practical implication of the strengthened right of scrutiny in the area of foreign policy conferred on Parliament by the Treaty of Lisbon; recalls that the 2024 resolution is the first of this nature in this legislative term and aims to serve as a guide for the EU executive when setting foreign policy priorities for this term; highlights the fact that in an ever volatile international environment, the EU needs to simultaneously tackle numerous foreign policy challenges affecting it directly or indirectly, such as the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, the conflicts in the Middle East, increasing great power competition, constant attempts to undermine the multilateral rules-based international order and an increased nexus of foreign and internal crises; strongly believes that in order to stay relevant on the international stage, the EU needs to pursue a determined, disciplined and assertive foreign policy that fulfils the EU’s own strategic objectives and continues defining, asserting and defending its interests in the world; recalls that the EU should be guided in its external action by the values and principles enshrined in Article 2, Article 3(5) and Article 21 TEU, which have inspired the EU’s own creation, development and enlargement, including democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, and the principles of equality and solidarity; further believes that the CFSP should ensure the implementation of the UN’s 2030 Agenda and the SDGs;

I. The VP/HR’s 2024 annual report

2. Notes that the report was submitted to the European Parliament on 20 June 2024; recalls that the report should be forward-looking in nature; comments hereinafter on several developments emphasised by the VP/HR in his report;

3. Welcomes in particular:

– the local, vibrant civil societies in the enlargement countries that play a constructive role in the EU integration processes, while underlining that civil society is vital in fostering democracy and pluralism and promoting good governance as well as social progress and that the enlargement countries should provide an enabling space and an appropriate framework for cooperation to ensure their meaningful involvement;

– the successful finalisation of the screening process for Albania at the end of 2023 and the opening of the first cluster of negotiating chapters on external relations (Cluster 6); welcomes Albania’s ambition of closing accession negotiations swiftly; highlights the need to further intensify reforms to address deficiencies that persist regarding the ‘fundamentals’, in particular concerning the rule of law, fighting corruption and organised crime; cautions against undermining the work of independent institutions such as the Special Anti-Corruption and Organised Crime Structure (SPAK); underscores the importance of a viable political pluralism and a competitive opposition and calls for dialogue and constructive engagement between the majority and the opposition to overcome the strong political polarisation in the country and to foster inclusive democratic processes that respects all parties, including the Greek, Roma and Egyptian minorities in the country; commends the country’s consistent, full alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy, including with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus;

– the decision on the opening of accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina; encourages the authorities to take all of the relevant steps set out in the Commission’s recommendation of 12 October 2022; urges the country’s political leaders to implement a substantial set of reforms, including electoral reforms, in accordance with the decisions of domestic and international courts, in order to ensure the principles of equality and non-discrimination for all citizens and constituent peoples, as enshrined in its constitution and in full respect of the judgments of domestic and international courts, including all rulings of the European Court of Human Rights regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina; denounces the recurring inflammatory rhetoric and secessionist laws and policies of the leadership of the entity ‘Republika Srpska’ (RS), including the celebration of the unconstitutional ‘RS Day’ on 9 January 2025; calls on the Member States and representatives of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina to promote and support the implementation of these judgments; reiterates its call for targeted sanctions against destabilising actors within Bosnia and Herzegovina, notably Milorad Dodik, as well as other high-ranking officials of RS and Serbian officials providing political and material support for secessionist policies; calls on all Member States to ensure that such sanctions can be adopted by the Council and to impose them bilaterally or in concert with other Member States if their adoption in the Council is not possible; welcomes the agreement reached to extend the mandate of the EU forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Operation Althea until November 2025 and recalls that this mission still plays a pivotal role in the security and stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina; urges the EU’s military mission to actively prevent unlawful parades and other provocations as well as threats against all people working to help the victims of genocide and investing in inter-ethnic reconciliation and a peaceful future for the country;

– the progress in the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, especially in the areas of freedom of movement and energy; calls on Kosovo and Serbia to continuously engage in this dialogue in good faith and in the spirit of compromise to achieve a comprehensive, legally binding agreement on the normalisation of their relations, based on mutual recognition, in accordance with international law and without further delay; regrets, in this context, the lack of progress in the implementation of the path to normalisation and calls for efforts to be made and capacity to be dedicated to the EU-facilitated dialogue; commits, hence, to work closely with the outgoing as well as the incoming EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and other Western Balkan regional issues; calls on the VP/HR to take advantage of the new term of the Commission to overcome the stalemate and give a new impetus to the dialogue and to come up with a new, innovative and balanced approach to the mediation;

– the 2024 Enlargement Report on Serbia, presented by the Commission on 31 October 2024; reiterates its position that accession negotiations with Serbia should advance only if the country aligns with EU sanctions against Russia and makes significant progress on its EU-related reforms, in particular in the area of the ‘fundamentals’; reminds the Serbian authorities that the proper functioning of democratic institutions is at the core of Serbia’s EU accession process and the EU accession methodology; recalls in this context its position that the Serbian parliamentary and local elections held on 17 December 2023 deviated from international standards and Serbia’s commitments to free and fair elections; reiterates its serious concerns over these irregularities and the overall election environment, which fell below the standards expected of an EU candidate country; urges Serbia’s political leadership to ensure constructive, inclusive dialogue across the political spectrum and to deliver on the necessary reforms for Serbia to progress on the path to EU accession; regrets the biased approach of the EU towards Serbia despite its year-long roll-back on the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights, as well as its destabilising influence on the whole region;

– Kosovo’s application for EU membership and the Kosovo Report 2024 and asks the Commission to respond to it; recalls that Kosovo’s bid to be considered a candidate country will be assessed on the basis of its own merits and of its success in meeting the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership; welcomes, however, the lifting of visa requirements for Kosovo citizens; regrets the restrictive measures imposed by the Council against Kosovo and calls for their immediate lifting, as proposed by the VP/HR;

– the progress made by Montenegro in meeting the interim benchmarks for Chapters 23 and 24 of the EU acquis; encourages the country to continue to make progress on and implement EU-related reforms swiftly; expresses, nonetheless, its concerns over controversial ideas for legislative proposals on citizenship and foreign agents floated in public; stresses the importance of the new government being able and committed to take forward the EU-related reforms and keep Montenegro firmly on the EU strategic path; expects the country to start closing chapters in the accession negotiations and to be ready to join the EU within the next couple of years;

– the successful finalisation of the screening process for North Macedonia at the end of 2023; urges the government of North Macedonia to achieve tangible results in fulfilling its obligation under the EU negotiating framework, including relevant constitutional changes, in line with the country’s commitments;

– the successful resumption of the CFSP dialogue between the EU and its partners in the Western Balkans and the importance of these partnerships for peace and security; recalls that EU enlargement is a geostrategic investment, which requires commitment from both the EU and the enlargement countries on their pathways to accession; recalls in this context the continued need for reforms regarding the rule of law, fundamental rights and public administration, and for alignment with the CFSP, including on sanctions and on the EU’s visa policy; highlights, additionally, the threats posed by malign foreign interference in the region and underlines the importance of combating disinformation to contain anti-Western and divisive rhetoric which seeks to exploit and exacerbate ethnic tensions in the region; cautions against engagement with the EU’s systemic rivals, which could undermine the prosperous, sustainable and secure future that EU accession offers; recalls, in this context, the added value of the investments made by the EU under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance III, the newly established Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, and the Western Balkans Investment Framework; calls on the Western Balkan countries to use all the resources made available to support their alignment with the EU acquis; calls upon the Commissioner for Enlargement to increase the visibility of EU action in the Balkans;

– the decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova; commends the fact that the CFSP alignment rate of Moldova has substantially increased from 54 % in 2022 to 86 % in 2024 and encourages Ukraine and Moldova to continue this positive trend towards full alignment; calls for the acceleration of the screening process and the timely organisation of the subsequent intergovernmental conferences;

– Armenia’s decision to suspend its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization and cease all payments to its budget in 2024, following Russia’s failure to assist Armenia against Azerbaijan’s military aggression, and to seek a more reliable security architecture; supports Armenia’s official request for the Russian Federation to withdraw its Federal Security Service border guards from its international airport and the Armenia-Iran border; welcomes the regular meetings under the EU-Armenia Political and Security Dialogue format and the EU-Armenia Partnership Council and commends the decision to adopt the assistance measures under the EPF in support Armenian armed forces on 13 June and 22 July 2024 respectively;

– the ongoing attempts by Armenia and Azerbaijan to normalise their relations, such as through the Armenia-Azerbaijan joint statement of 7 December 2023 on confidence-building measures, as well as the progress made in the framework of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border delimitation process, which has led to an agreement on several sections of the border; encourages both parties to sign a comprehensive and fair peace agreement without delay; calls on Azerbaijan to demonstrate genuine efforts to this end; reaffirms its support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Armenia and Azerbaijan and strongly supports the normalisation of their relations based on the principles of the mutual recognition of territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders, in accordance with the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration; reiterates its demand for the withdrawal of Azerbaijan’s troops from the entirety of Armenia’s sovereign territory and the release of the 23 remaining Armenian hostages;

– the activities of the civilian European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) under the common security and defence policy (CSDP), which contributes to security in the region by substantially decreasing the number of incidents in conflict-affected and border areas, and reduces the level of risks for the population living in such areas; welcomes Armenia’s assistance with the activities of the EUMA on its territory; commends the Council for the decision to increase the number of deployed observers as well as the mission’s capacity and to extend its deployment timeframe; calls for further expansion and presence in the region; calls on the Commission to provide support for Armenia for de-mining;

– the continued work of the EEAS on addressing and countering foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) through the EU FIMI Toolbox, the setting up of a STRATCOM taskforce, and through close cooperation with Member States, international partners, civil society and other relevant stakeholders; reiterates its call to promote the continuous flow of intelligence from Member States to the EEAS on foreign and security issues occurring outside the EU; calls, in this regard, for strengthening the EU INTCEN, the EEAS Crisis Response Centre and the EU Satellite Centre by enhancing its staff, financial resources and capabilities;

– the proposal of the VP/HR for an anti-corruption sanctions regime, which would allow the EU to target serious acts of corruption worldwide; calls for its swift adoption by the Council;

4. Condemns in particular:

– the ongoing illegal and unjustifiable Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the increasing Russian attacks against civilian targets and civilian infrastructure within Ukraine; demands that Russia and its proxy forces cease all military action and that the Russian Federation immediately and unconditionally withdraw its troops and equipment from Ukraine and any other country whose territory, or parts thereof, it unlawfully occupies; condemns any hybrid attacks executed by Russia in Ukraine and strongly denounces the spread of Russia’s propaganda about its war in Ukraine;

– the role of the illegitimate regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka in allowing the country to serve as a Russian military base, effectively surrendering national sovereignty to the Kremlin in order to maintain its grip on Belarus, while brutally oppressing the Belarusian people in order to stay in power; deplores the Lukashenka regime’s instrumentalisation of migration, particularly in the light of the influx of thousands of migrants into Poland, which Belarus orchestrates to force their passage into the European Union;

– the illegal North Korean involvement in the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine by its sending of military equipment and ammunition to Russia, as well as by its sending of thousands of soldiers to wage war against Ukraine;

– North Korea’s continued weapons testing and development of its nuclear programme, in violation of the UN resolution, further escalating tensions in the Indo-Pacific region; demands that North Korea abandon its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner; urges the North Korea authorities to cease their ongoing crimes against humanity and to undertake a process of reform whereby all human rights are respected and protected;

– the increasing malicious activities, interference and hybrid warfare deployed by the Russian Federation, its institutions and proxies in undermining and subverting the democratic stability and sovereignty of Georgia and the Republic of Moldova and in particular the recent interference in the constitutional referendum on EU accession and the presidential elections;

– the attack on Kosovan police officers by well-organised Serbian paramilitaries in Banjska/Banjskë in the north of Kosovo on 24 September 2023 which resulted in the death of the Kosovan police officer Afrim Bunjaku and the injuring of two more Kosovan police officers; condemns the hideous terrorist attack on critical infrastructure near Zubin Potok; stresses that the perpetrators of these deplorable attacks must be held accountable and face justice without delay;

– the brutal and indiscriminate terrorist attacks committed by Hamas across Israel on 7 October 2023, which triggered a disproportionate Israeli military response and a conflict in Gaza that has a devastating effect on civilians and caused a catastrophic humanitarian situation;

– the fact that Hamas has taken and is still holding innocent people, including women and children, hostages, and calls for the unconditional and immediate release of hostages;

– the deliberate and malignant fuelling of an exceptionally tense situation, through repeated attacks targeting Israel since 7 October 2023, by state and non-state actors in the region with Iran being the main instigator, as well as the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon acting as some of its proxies;

– Iran’s persistent non-compliance with its legal safeguard obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and with its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) condemns, further, the advancement of its nuclear programme beyond all credible civilian justification and the destabilisation of the Middle East this causes, including through proxies, such as attacks on Israel and sponsoring terrorism and civil conflicts; the attacks perpetrated or attempted within the EU by terrorist organisations and networks affiliated to Iran;

– the wrongful detention of European citizens in Iran, the execution of the European citizen of dual German-Iranian nationality Jamshid Sharmahd on 29 October 2024, and the brutal oppression of the people of Iran, in particular the women; reiterates its unwavering support for the women of Iran, who are still subjected to gross violations of their fundamental rights two years after the Women, Life, Freedom movement was brutally repressed; urges the VP/HR to do the utmost to free these citizens and to put an end to the practice of Iranian hostage diplomacy, through which it detains foreign civilians and dual nationals;

– the growing military cooperation between Iran and Russia, in particular the intention to sign a treaty on a comprehensive strategic partnership and Iran’s provision of drones and ballistic missiles to Russia for use against Ukraine and its people;

– the recent adoption of the law on the ‘promotion of virtue and prevention of vice’ in Afghanistan, as well as the systematic violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular the extreme interpretation of sharia which erases women from public life, bars them from working, hinders their access to all public places without being chaperoned by a male relative and to education beyond the sixth grade, amounting to gender apartheid; demands from the de facto authorities of Afghanistan that all gender-based restrictions on women be lifted and stresses that this must be a key condition for any engagement of the international community with the Taliban; insists on maintaining strict, conditional engagement with the Taliban based on the five benchmarks set by the Council for engaging with the de facto authorities and by holding the perpetrators of these grave violations of girls’ and women’s rights accountable, including through restrictive measures;

– the increasing breadth and intensity of operations, including cyberattacks and foreign information manipulation by the Chinese Government, as well as vessels and aircraft attempting to intimidate China’s neighbours, which violate peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding international waters and impede the freedom of navigation rights of all other parties; strongly condemns statements by the Chinese President that the People’s Republic of China will never renounce the right to use force with respect to Taiwan, and insists that the use of coercive measures to achieve unification contradicts international law;

– the government-led system of forced labour and the persistent violations of human rights, in particular the systematic repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang Province; observes with concern the intense crackdown on ethnic minorities in Tibet, Hong Kong and Macau and the transnational repression of Chinese dissidents, as well as the persistent presence of Chinese police officers on EU territory; has taken note of and deplores the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for not implementing the recommendations of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); calls on the PRC to allow the OHCHR independent access to the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and invites the OHCHR to issue a comprehensive situational update and an action plan for holding the PRC accountable;

– the deterioration of stability in the Sahel, exacerbated by the numerous military coups in the region in recent years; recalls that stability in the Sahel has direct repercussions for the security of European external borders and the management of irregular migration flows from the African continent; emphasises that the EU should urgently review its regional strategy for the Sahel;

– the coups in Burkina Faso and in Niger, with President Bazoum being detained and the constitution suspended; is increasingly concerned by the decision of the central Sahel military regimes in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger to leave the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), thus plunging ECOWAS into a deep political crisis; condemns additionally the physical attack on 29 September 2024 on an ECOWAS Member of Parliament and other participants of an officially declared opposition rally in Lomé; calls on the Togolese authorities to ensure the promotion and protection of the fundamental principles of human and peoples’ rights enshrined in Article 4 of the revised ECOWAS Treaty, such as the rights of peaceful assembly, freedom of association, belief and expression; calls on the ECOWAS authorities and its member states to support the efforts needed to safeguard the principles of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights throughout the subregion; takes note of the closure of the European Union Military Partnership Mission in Niger (EUMPM Niger) and of the Capacity Building Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) and the non-renewal of the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM); observes with concern how Russia has intensified the development of state-to-state relationships and cooperation initiatives with African states through military cooperation and a commitment to cooperate on the development of nuclear energy; condemns the rise of terrorist attacks and heavy civilian losses in the Sahel, as well as the presence and predation activities of Russian paramilitaries, which have led to the population being displaced and an influx of refugees, also caused by the instability in the region; deplores the fact that the void UN peacekeepers have left has effectively been filled by Wagner Group mercenaries and Russian and Turkish military, whose industries supply arms to Sahelian capitals;

– the civil war in Sudan, the devastating consequences for the civil population, the atrocities committed against them and, in particular, the despicable large-scale use of rape as a weapon of war;

– the last minute tactical and technical constraints imposed by the authorities of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which prevented the EU Election Observation Mission from monitoring the presidential elections; condemns the violence committed by the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel movement destabilising the eastern DRC; calls for a review of the EU strategy for the Great Lakes region;

– the authoritarian regime of Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo, who are systematically undermining Nicaragua’s democratic structures; recalls that the regime in Nicaragua maintains strong ties with other autocracies, such as those in Iran, Venezuela and Cuba; condemns the systematic human rights violations and abuses perpetrated by the Cuban regime; strongly condemns and fully rejects the electoral fraud orchestrated by the regime in Venezuela and demands that the Maduro government cease its policy of repression and attacks on civil society and the opposition; recalls that on 19 September 2024, Parliament recognised Edmundo González Urrutia as the legitimate and democratically elected President of Venezuela and María Corina Machado as the leader of the democratic forces in Venezuela; highlights the fact that various democratic states in the region and throughout the world have recognised González as president-elect; recalls that he should have been sworn in on 10 January 2025; expresses satisfaction that on 17 December 2024, Parliament awarded the 2024 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to María Corina Machado, as the leader of the democratic forces in Venezuela, and to president-elect Edmundo González Urrutia, representing all Venezuelans inside and outside the country fighting for the reinstitution of freedom and democracy;

– the employment of the ‘Cuban medical brigade’ in some European countries as a form of infringement of fundamental rights and freedoms and of slavery and forced labour;

– the risk of collapse of the state structures and difficult humanitarian situation in Haiti due to rampant gang violence;

– the fact that the PRC, Russia, Iran and other totalitarian or authoritarian regimes use information manipulation and malign interference as integral instruments to exert pressure on multilateral institutions and democratic values and norms, to abuse power, to increase the incidence and severity of human rights violations, to constrict spaces for civil society, independent media and democratic opposition movements, to spread anti-Western disinformation and to use various forms of transnational repression to intimidate and constrict spaces for civil society, independent media and democratic opposition movements in the diaspora;

– the increasing attacks, harassment, arbitrary detention, torture and killings of HRDs worldwide, especially those advocating for environmental, indigenous, women’s, LGBTQI+ and anti-corruption rights; further notes the increasingly sophisticated tactics used by state and non-state actors, including digital surveillance and smear campaigns, aimed at silencing HRDs; stresses the urgent need to protect HRDs, who also play a critical role in upholding democracy and the rule of law globally; calls for enhanced support and protection mechanisms for HRDs facing threats, harassment and violence, especially those in high-risk areas or working on sensitive issues such as environmental, indigenous and women’s rights;

– attempts to circumvent EU and international sanctions, which it sees as strategies posing direct threats to the international rules-based order;

– the failure by Azerbaijan to comply with the order of 17 November 2023, issued by the International Court of Justice, indicating provisional measures regarding the safe, unimpeded and expeditious return of the 100 000 ethnic Armenians who fled Nagorno-Karabakh after the September 2023 pre-planned, unjustified military attack by Azerbaijan, as well as the refusal of Azerbaijani authorities to release all 23 Armenian prisoners of war it currently detains; stresses the need to support all initiatives and activities that could lead to the establishment of peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the signing of a long-awaited peace agreement; calls, further, on Azerbaijan to demonstrate genuine efforts to this end; warns Azerbaijan that any military action against Armenia would be unacceptable and would have serious consequences for the partnership between Azerbaijan and the EU; highlights the fact that Azerbaijan’s connectivity issues with its exclave Nakhchivan should be resolved with full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Armenia; reiterates its position that the EU should be ready to impose sanctions on any individuals and entities that threaten the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Armenia; stresses that Parliament’s multiple warnings on the situation have not led to any change in the EU’s stance towards Azerbaijan; calls for the EU to end its reliance on gas exports from Azerbaijan; calls on the Commission to suspend the 2022 memorandum of understanding on the strategic partnership in the field of energy and to act accordingly; condemns the Russian ‘gas laundering’ through Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani authorities’ facilitation of Russia’s circumvention of EU sanctions; calls for the EU to cease all technical and financial assistance to Azerbaijan that might contribute to strengthening its military or security capabilities; calls on the Member States to freeze exports of all military and security equipment to Azerbaijan; condemns Azerbaijan’s repeated attempts to denigrate and destabilise Member States, including through the so-called Baku Initiative Group; condemns the ongoing deterioration of the human rights situation in the country;

5. Concurs with:

– the need to improve relations with Türkiye; welcomes the partial de-escalation of tensions in the east Mediterranean and the Aegean but reiterates its concern that Türkiye’s foreign policy continues to be at odds with EU priorities under the CFSP; recalls, in this context, the signature and the evocation of the memorandum of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on comprehensive security and military cooperation and on the delimitation of maritime zones;

– the call on Türkiye to work on a constructive, and not assertive nor aggressive, approach in its neighbourhood, including the Southern Caucasus; regrets that Türkiye continues to dispute the sovereignty and sovereign rights of an EU Member State; recalls that Türkiye’s accession process is contingent on its full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and on its normalisation of relations with all EU Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus; calls for the status of the buffer zone and the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus to be respected; urges Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to cease and reverse all such unilateral activities and refrain from any further actions and provocations; calls for engagement in peaceful UN-led negotiations and for real progress to be made in the Cyprus settlement talks;

– the assessment that, in the absence of a drastic change of course by the Turkish Government, Türkiye’s EU accession process cannot be resumed;

– the urgent need for the EU and the Turkish Government to move forward toward a mutual reflection process, including a modernised association agreement, which would lead to a mutually beneficial, more dynamic and strategic partnership, with strict conditionality on the respect of rule of law, fundamental rights, international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and good neighbourly relations, considering the key role played by Türkiye, for example, in the Black Sea region and its significance as a NATO ally;

– the fact that Türkiye is making an inadequate effort in aligning with the EU’s CFSP, including on sanctions and the anti-circumvention of sanctions, as well as with the need for Türkiye to cooperate closely with the EU’s Sanctions Envoy; deplores the unacceptable nature of the solidarity and support that the President of Türkiye has publicly provided to the terrorist organisation Hamas; reiterates its concerns about the ongoing deterioration of democratic standards in Türkiye; recalls that Türkiye also targets the EU with foreign information manipulation and interference and that its government is considering introducing a Russian-style foreign agents law; underlines the incompatibility between Türkiye’s candidacy for BRICS+ and the EU’s CFSP;

– the concern over democratic backsliding in Georgia, manifested by the fact that the parliamentary elections held on 26 October 2024 did not respect international standards for democratic elections or its commitments as a member of the OSCE to carry out free and fair elections; emphasises that violations of electoral integrity are incompatible with the standards expected from an EU candidate country; considers that the reported electoral fraud undermines the integrity of the election process, the legitimacy of the results and the public’s trust in the government and that the results do not serve as a reliable representation of the will of the Georgian people; considers that, with the legitimacy of the vote severely undermined by the magnitude of the violations, the international community should not recognise the election results; rejects, therefore, any recognition of the parliamentary elections and does not recognise any decisions taken by the body that has taken control of the country; calls urgently for early elections conducted in an improved election environment, managed by an independent and impartial election administration with widespread international observation, to ensure a genuinely free, fair and transparent process that would represent the will of the people of Georgia; concurs with the European Council’s conclusions of 27 June 2024 that a failure to reverse the current course of action, including the law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’, the law on ‘family values and protection of minors’, as well as the changes to the Electoral Code, jeopardises Georgia’s EU path, de facto leading to a halt of the accession process; appreciates, at the same time, the efforts made by Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili to steer the country back towards a democratic and European path of development; considers that President Salome Zourabichvili is currently the only clearly legitimate representative of the will of the Georgian people; reiterates its unwavering support for the Georgian people’s legitimate European aspirations, which are being betrayed by the Georgian Government; demands the immediate release of all people detained for peacefully protesting against the recent decisions by Georgia concerning a suspension of EU integration; calls on the Commission to use the frozen EUR 120 million originally intended as support for the Georgian authorities to enhance the EU’s support for Georgia’s civil society, in particular the non-governmental sector and independent media, which are increasingly coming under undue pressure from the ruling political party and the authorities, as well as to support programmes supporting democratic resilience and electoral integrity; strongly encourages the EU and its Member States to introduce personal sanctions against all those who are responsible for the democratic backsliding, in particular Bidzina Ivanishvili and Irakli Kobakhidze; encourages individual Member States and relevant regional organisations to avoid actively legitimising the self-appointed Georgian Dream authorities and call, in this regard, for suspending the EU Georgia Association Council;

– the observation that Russia and China have become significant players in the Southern Neighbourhood, especially North Africa, while Türkiye and the Gulf states, chief among them the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, have risen as regional forces; argues that the idea of a single ‘neighbourhood’ for both Eastern and Southern Europe overlooks their distinct challenges; concurs further with the strategic relevance of the Southern Neighbourhood, its stability, economic development and prosperity; recalls that instability and insecurity in the Southern Neighbourhood remains an ongoing challenge for European external border management; underlines the interference of strategic competitors in the region and calls strongly for the EU to send a solid and clear political message in favour of renewed cooperation with countries of the Southern Neighbourhood; calls on the VP/HR and the Commission to release, as an urgent matter, the new pact for the Mediterranean and to secure adequate resources for its timely and effective implementation; reiterates that a dynamic network of strategic partnerships tailored to the specific needs and aspirations of each country in our Southern Neighbourhood should be at the centre of the new pact; believes, in this context, that the EU should conduct a thorough review of the current incentive structure that combines the promise of financial assistance and trade benefits in exchange for political and economic reforms and ensure that it aligns with broader EU objectives, including the promotion of human rights and democratic values; stresses that besides prioritising bilateral cooperation, the EU should also continue to foster regional cooperation through existing frameworks such as the Union for the Mediterranean, which offers a valuable platform for promoting dialogue and joint action on issues of common concern;

– the concern about Russian and Chinese pressure exerted in Central Asia and stresses the need to scale up the EU’s presence in the region in response, given its geostrategic importance; highlights the hesitation of Central Asian states to lend support to Russia’s war of aggression given the effect the war is having on the region; underlines the EU’s interest in increasing economic relations and intensifying political ties with the countries of Central Asia, in part to address the circumvention of sanctions against Russia and Belarus; calls on the authorities of the Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, to cooperate closely with the EU, in particular with its Sanctions Envoy; encourages the Commission and the Member States to continue promoting political and economic reforms that strengthen the rule of law, democracy, good governance and respect for human rights;

– the fact that the Arctic is of geostrategic importance as regards the expansion of potential maritime routes, access to natural resources, climate conservation and territorial claims; stresses that this importance is heightened not only by Russian military expansion in the High North but also by China’s increasing presence and interest in the region, and its self-proclamation as a ‘near-Arctic state’; underscores the need for ensuring freedom and safety of navigation amid these two states’ growing influence and militarisation; underlines the importance of preserving security, stability and cooperation in the Arctic; stresses that the region must remain free from military tensions and natural resource exploitation, while respecting the rights of indigenous peoples; reiterates the need to include the EU’s Arctic policy in the CFSP and engage in effective cooperation with NATO; calls for the Arctic to be addressed regularly within the Political and Security Committee and Council meetings;

– the strategic importance of the Taiwan Strait and the Indo-Pacific in the face of increasing Chinese intimidation in the region, including through military and hybrid means, and stresses the need to scale up the EU’s presence in the regions in response; underlines the EU’s interest in increasing economic relations and intensifying substantial ties with like-minded partners in the region, including Taiwan;

– the effectiveness of the implementation of a Gulf strategy, advancing in a strategic partnership with each of the Gulf countries and working together to promote global and regional security and prosperity;

– the focus on achieving accountability in the cyberspace, through the operationalisation of the EU digital diplomacy toolbox and the attention given to strengthening global cyber resilience; calls for an increased focus on building the cyber resilience capacity of developing democracies faced with hybrid challenges to their electoral systems; calls for increasing joint cyber defence exercises between the EU and NATO in order to improve interoperability and readiness to counter hybrid threats;

– the commitment to place democracy promotion at the forefront of the CFSP and to ensure the EU’s proactive role in this regard, building on lessons learned from previous democracy support actions, in particular in support of civil society, HRDs, critical voices, democratic opposition and media;

– the need to fight impunity and strengthen accountability efforts globally, including through the ICC, and to stand up for international law and international humanitarian law; remains deeply concerned about the trend of state officials undermining decisions of international institutions and their employees; regrets the failure of some ICC member states to execute ICC arrest warrants, thereby undermining the ICC’s work;

– the urgent and ongoing need to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment through all EU external action a foreign policy that takes into account gender mainstreaming in line with the 2021-2025 Gender Action Plan, especially in light of the current global rollback of women’s rights; emphasises that at the current rate of progress, achieving gender equality worldwide will take another 131 years, underscoring the critical importance of accelerating efforts to safeguard and advance women’s rights and opportunities;

II. CFSP objectives in 2025

6. Identifies, in the following section, Parliament’s CFSP objectives in 2025, thus complementing the views expressed in the VP/HR’s annual CFSP report;

Addressing the global consequences of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine

7. Emphasises that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its consequences, including economic uncertainty, food insecurity and high energy prices, in combination with the revisionist behaviour of the Russian Federation against a number of states neighbouring the Black Sea, destabilises and threatens the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans, which in turn erodes the European security architecture; underlines, in this context, the need for reinforcing the EU’s capacities to support democratic institutions in our immediate neighbourhood;

8. Notes that the EU’s response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is being closely watched by autocratic actors around the world and will have a decisive influence in shaping their behaviour on the international stage; is concerned by the growing cooperation and coordination among autocratic regimes, including through their material or other support for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; urges the Council to impose restrictive measures against countries that deliver military goods, such as unmanned aerial vehicles and surface-to-surface missiles, to the Russian Federation for use against civilian targets; recalls that the use of such military goods against civilian targets is a war crime; notes, with grave concern, the increasing cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and underscores that the employment of North Korean troops by Russia is widening the scale of the conflict; emphasises, equally, the urgent need for further sanctions against Belarus, mirroring all sanctions against Russia;

9. Calls for the EU and its Member States to meaningfully increase and speed up humanitarian assistance, military support, economic and financial aid and political support in every possible way until Ukraine’s victory, in order to ultimately stop Russia’s war of aggression and allow Ukraine to liberate all its people and re-establish full control within its internationally recognised borders; welcomes the rapid creation and successful implementation of the European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine and suggests that the EU consider strengthening it; underlines, in particular, the urgent need to provide Ukraine with increased air defence and surface-to-surface capacities to defend its critical energy infrastructure, and calls on the Member States to immediately lift restrictions on the use of Western weapons systems, such as long-range Taurus missiles, delivered to Ukraine, against legitimate military targets on Russian territory, which would be fully in line with Ukraine’s right to self-defence according to the UN Charter;

10. Calls for the EU and the Member States to reinforce the effectiveness of its 15 sanction packages adopted so far and to agree on new ones as soon as the need arises; recalls that the strict implementation and uniform application of restrictive measures in all Member States is a precondition for the credibility and effectiveness of the EU’s external action; underscores, thus, the importance of ending all EU imports of Russian energy; calls on the Commission to impose penalties on all European companies that continue to engage in business with the Russian Federation, as well as to further assess and combat sanction circumvention;

11. Appeals for proactive diplomacy with non-EU countries in order to minimise the circumvention of these sanctions; calls on the Commission to critically assess EU assistance to non-EU countries that actively support Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and urges the Council to impose restrictive measures on non-EU countries enabling Russia’s war of aggression, whether through the facilitation of sanction circumvention or through the provision of direct military assistance, such as in the case of Iran or North Korea; calls on all countries to fully align with all EU sanctions packages;

12. Deplores the ‘no limits’ partnership between Russia and China, in particular the renewed commitment to strengthen their military ties; welcomes the Council’s decision to impose sanctions on Chinese companies for their support of Russia’s war in Ukraine;

13. Expresses its most serious concerns over Russia’s and China’s surveillance and sabotage of critical maritime infrastructures, such as seabed communication cables and offshore energy facilities; expresses in particular its strong concern about the damage to two subsea communications cables, one linking Finland and Germany and the other connecting Sweden to Lithuania, within less than 24 hours on 17 and 18 November 2024, and about the damaging by a tanker of the Russian shadow fleet of the EstLink2 power cable, linking Estonia and Finland, on 25 December 2024; calls on the EU to put in place effective monitoring and surveillance systems and regional coastguard cooperation to ensure the prevention and rapid detection of attacks against such infrastructures; welcomes in that regard, the launch of the operation ‘Baltic Sentry’ by NATO, with the participation of several Member States, to improve the security of critical undersea infrastructures in the Baltic Sea; calls on Member States to fully abide by the commitments of the New York joint statement on the security and resilience of undersea cables,

14. Calls for the EU and its Member States to exercise strict control over, prevent and limit the activities of Russia’s shadow fleets which, in addition to violating EU and G7 sanctions, poses an immense ecological threat to ecosystems as a result of its technical deficiencies and frequent breakdowns; urges the Commission to take swift action, within the framework of the EU’s cooperation with the International Maritime Organization, and to design more targeted sanctions against the shadow fleet in the next sanctions package against Russia; specifies that such sanctions should designate all possible individual shadow fleet vessels, as well as their owners, operators, managers, etc.; recommends banning tanker sales to countries facilitating trade with Russia; notes that the flag states contributing to the Russian shadow fleet are thereby also helping the Russian war effort;

15. Reiterates its call for the necessary measures to be taken to return forcibly deported and illegally adopted Ukrainian children from Russia or occupied Ukrainian territory;

16. Calls on the Commission and the Council to designate the Russian state-funded private military Wagner Group as a terrorist organisation; draws attention to the so-called ‘Africa Corps’ that was created following the death of the Wagner Group’s former leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, in August 2023, and placed directly under the control of the Russian Ministry of Defence, in an effort to regroup Wagner elements under government control;

17. Expresses its unwavering support for the 10-point peace formula put forward by Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and recalls that any initiative, in particular diplomatic solutions, aimed at ending the Russian war of aggression and achieving a just and lasting peace needs to be based on terms and input provided by Ukraine and ultimately accepted by the Ukrainian people; encourages the Commission and the VP/HR, as well as the Member States, to mobilise international support for the peace formula and the victory plan presented by Ukraine and to engage in security commitments towards Ukraine as recommended in the Kyiv Security Compact;

18. Reiterates that Ukraine, as a victim of aggression, has the legitimate right to self-defence in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter; calls on the VP/HR, the Commission the Council and the Member States concerned to enable effective Ukrainian countermeasures against Russia; recalls that Russia has violated international law and that the full seizure of the frozen Russian assets is an appropriate step towards enforcing Russia’s obligation to abide by international law, and to compensate Ukraine and other injured parties for the losses caused by Russia’s war of aggression; calls on the Commission to establish a sound legal regime for the confiscation of Russian state assets frozen by the EU; reminds the Commission that any such proposal does not take away the need for continued financial, political, military and humanitarian support; calls for the inclusion of all assets of the Russian state, Russian local authorities, Russian state-owned companies, and of individuals on the EU sanctions list, and for those assets to be used to compensate Ukraine for the damage caused by this war;

19. Commends the Commission’s proposal to establish the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism, worth an estimated EUR 35 billion, which responds to Parliament’s call and builds upon the decision of the Council to direct extraordinary revenues stemming from immobilised Russian state assets to the Ukraine Assistance Fund and the Ukraine Facility, as well as upon the G7’s decision to offer Ukraine a USD 50 billion loan secured through immobilised Russian state assets; expresses its conviction that the new Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism is a substantive step towards making Russia financially compensate for the massive damage it continues to cause in Ukraine;

20. Denounces the abusive use by the Hungarian Government of its veto power to delay or effectively block EU essential aid from being granted to Ukraine; condemns the misuse of the position of the EU Presidency by Viktor Orban, in pursuing his so-called peace-mission to the Russian Federation on 5 July 2024, which was an attempt to undermine the unified EU position on Ukraine, and stresses that he did not to any degree or in any capacity represent the EU;

21. Urges the VP/HR and the other Member States to overcome the blockade by the Hungarian Government of the EPF’s funding and disbursement decision and to guarantee that the EU’s only instrument in support of military aid to Ukraine becomes fully functional again; calls on the VP/HR to advance proposals to prevent such blockades in the future or to find an alternative mechanism that is fully reliable;

22. Underscores the urgent need for the EU and its Member States to push for the creation of a special international tribunal to prosecute the crime of aggression committed against Ukraine by the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation and its allies; expresses support for all the activities of the ICC and International Court of Justice in prosecuting the crimes committed on Ukrainian territory;

23. Commends Ukraine for its progress in the EU accession screening process and calls on Ukraine to continue its progress towards EU membership using all the resources made available to it under the Ukraine Facility and to ensure the meaningful involvement of its civil society in the implementation and monitoring phases thereof; recalls that EU accession is a strictly merit-based process that requires the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership, including those concerning democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental values and the fight against corruption;

24. Believes that both Ukraine’s and Moldova’s accession to the EU would be a mutually beneficial investment in a united and strong Europe; stresses that the newly proposed growth plan for the Republic of Moldova serves the purpose of accelerating EU-related reforms; calls on all co-legislators to advance the relevant legislative acts as soon as possible; encourages the VP/HR to additionally enhance the CFSP partnership with Ukraine and Moldova and in this context welcomes the signature of the security and defence partnership between the EU and Moldova in May 2024; recalls the fact that the security of the Republic of Moldova is inextricably linked to the security of Ukraine; underscores, hence, the need to increase financial contributions from the EPF to further enhance Moldova’s defence capabilities;

25. Praises the Moldova for running the presidential election and the referendum professionally and with an extraordinary sense of duty and dedication, despite the continued massive interference from Russia and its proxies; welcomes the outcome of the 2024 Moldovan European Union membership referendum which enshrined the commitment to joining the EU in the country’s constitution; expresses its support to Moldova in defending its democracy; strongly condemns such constant and coordinated attempts by the Russian Federation, pro-Russian oligarchs and Russian-sponsored local proxies to destabilise the Republic of Moldova, sow divisions within Moldovan society and derail the country’s pro-European direction through hybrid attacks, the weaponisation of energy supplies, disinformation campaigns, bomb threats and staged protests as well as the threat or use of violence; commends the establishment and operations of the EU Partnership Mission in Moldova which have enhanced the Moldovan authorities’ capabilities to address Russian interference; calls on the Council, the Commission and the EEAS to provide the additional resources, including human and financial resources, equipment and civilian experts, necessary to continue implementing the mission’s mandate beyond May 2025;

26. Stresses the importance of the EPF for enhancing the EU’s ability to prevent conflicts, build peace and strengthen international security;

27. Welcomes the launch of the Belarus-EU consultative group to enable continuous dialogue between the EU and the Belarusian democratic forces; reiterates its support for the release of all political prisoners and the brave activists and journalists in Belarus who continue to resist the regime of the illegitimate leader in spite of ongoing crackdowns, notably the refusal to renew the passports of Belarussians abroad, and who have expressed their desire for democratic development in Belarus and for membership of the EU, including at the New Belarus Conference held in Warsaw in August 2023; underlines that such efforts demonstrate the fundamental role of civil society in strengthening democracy;

Resolving conflict and supporting peace in the Middle East

28. Affirms the right of Israel to defend itself as enshrined in and constrained by international law; recalls that Israel has the obligation to address the risk of mass starvation and the outbreak of disease epidemics in Gaza; recalls that Israel also has the obligation to protect the civilian population and that military operations must be proportionate and in line with international humanitarian law; expresses in the strongest terms its concern about the disproportionate military action by the Israeli Defence Forces in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank and in Lebanon; calls for an immediate and permanent ceasefire including the unconditional release of all hostages;

29. Reiterates its unwavering support for a negotiated two-state solution on the basis of the 1967 borders, with two sovereign, democratic states as peaceful neighbours and with Jerusalem as their shared capital, which remains the most viable path to lasting peace and security for both Israelis and Palestinians; calls for the VP/HR to support all efforts to this end, and in particular the Global Alliance for the Implementation of the two-State Solution; calls on all parties to renew efforts to remove the obstacles to this solution and to engage in dialogue aimed at achieving mutual understanding and respect; regrets the fact that the Palestinian Authority has not held elections since 2005, which hampers its credibility, and expects elections to be held soon; is convinced that there can be no prospect for peace, security, stability and prosperity for Gaza as well as for reconciliation between the Israeli and Palestinian populations as long as Hamas and other terrorist groups play a role in the Gaza Strip; calls, therefore, on the EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process to support efforts to counteract the further radicalisation of young people in the region; condemns the acceleration of the illegal Israeli settlement of Palestinian territory, which violates international law, undermines efforts towards achieving a two-state solution, and poses a significant obstacle to lasting peace; reiterates in this context the important role of the Abraham Accords as a framework for achieving durable peace, stability and prosperity in the Middle East; expresses concern over the rising violence committed by Israeli forces and extremist settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and welcomes sanctions adopted against extremist Israeli settlers; supports President Biden’s three-phase peace plan and regrets the lack of will on both sides to ensure its implementation; regrets, further, that the latest rounds of peace talks did not bring any tangible results; is aware of the fact that international stakeholders, including the US, the UN, the EU and Arab states, need to complement each other’s efforts in order for negotiations to resume and to be constructive; is committed to the future normalisation efforts between Israel and Arab states in the region;

30. Supports a just and viable solution to the question of Palestinian refugees; underscores that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) plays an important role in providing humanitarian aid and essential services which in the present circumstances must not be interrupted, and considers that all UN agencies active in the region must be supported in their efforts; recalls, however, its concern regarding serious allegations made against staff members of UNRWA which suggest that UNRWA has employed members of the terrorist organisation Hamas; welcomes the actions taken by the UN following the allegations regarding the Agency’s staff and welcomes UNRWA’s full commitment to implement the recommendations stemming from the ‘Colonna report’; echoes the European Council conclusions of 17 October 2024 which condemn any attempt to abrogate the 1967 agreement between Israel and UNRWA; insists that the Commission ensure that no funds from the EU budget finance, contribute to or support the activities of Hamas or Hezbollah; stresses that additional measures may be needed in the future to strive for even more transparency and accountability;

31. Welcomes the recent ceasefire in Gaza and the progress made towards the phased release of hostages; emphasises that this represents a significant step towards relieving the immense suffering endured by civilians on both sides over the past months; praises the commitment of mediators, including the US, Egypt and Qatar, whose efforts were pivotal in achieving this breakthrough; considers that it is crucial that all obligations made under the deal are upheld, ensuring the release of all hostages and establishing a lasting cessation of violence, as well as allowing unrestrained access for humanitarian and medical assistance into the Gaza Strip; calls for all parties to fully commit to their obligations and to prioritise the protection of civilians; urges all European and international actors to actively oversee the implementation of the ceasefire and hold accountable those who fail to comply;

32. Expresses concern about rising tensions in the Middle East and urges all involved parties to uphold international humanitarian law, to show maximum restraint and to commit to de-escalation, as a regional conflict must be avoided at all costs; deplores the loss of thousands of civilian lives; urges the disarmament of Hezbollah as part of broader measures to reduce hostilities and ensure regional stability; calls on the VP/HR to come forward with a comprehensive EU Middle East strategy, to increase the EU’s effective presence in the region, to promotes long-term stability and peace in the region and to strengthen partnerships with key regional stakeholders; stresses that the strategy must be fleshed out within the first months of the new Commission’s mandate and should be reflected in the forthcoming MFF for it to have any tangible impact on a rapidly deteriorating situation; underscores the need for Member States to step up their diplomatic efforts with international partners, including with the Gulf countries, in order to encourage urgent de-escalation and meaningful dialogue; underlines the need to prioritise and strengthen civil society organisations in the region, particularly organisations working on the protection of human rights and peacebuilding;

33. Strongly condemns the destabilising role that the Iranian regime and its network of non-state actors play in the region; recalls that Iran has stepped out of the shadow of its proxies and condemns Iran’s two direct and open attacks on Israel’s territory in 2024, to which Israel retaliated both times, representing an unprecedented scaling up of the conflict; strongly condemns Hezbollah’s attacks against Israel which led to an Israeli ground invasion in Lebanon causing a high number of civilian casualties, forced displacement and escalating violence in Lebanon; takes note of the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, agreed on 27 November 2024 for a period of 60 days; urges Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1701; recalls the need for a permanent cessation of hostilities as soon as possible to create space for a diplomatic solution along the Blue Line; demands the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 in its entirety, as the only path to de-escalate tensions and stabilise the Israel-Lebanon border in a durable manner and fully restore the sovereignty, territorial integrity and stability of Lebanon;

34. Calls on the Council and the VP/HR to add Hezbollah in its entirety to the EU list of terrorist organisations;

35. Takes note of the arrest warrant issued by the ICC on 21 November 2024;

36. Highlights the need for the EU to follow up on its election observation and assist in finding solutions to electoral crises such as the one in Lebanon;

37. Strongly condemns recent attacks against the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) by the Israeli Defence Forces and Hezbollah; reiterates the inviolability of all UN personnel and premises and reaffirms the essential stabilising role played by UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, to which 16 Member States contribute, and calls for an immediate end to these attacks;

38. Welcomes the EU’s decision to renew sanctions against Iran until July 2025, including by sanctioning Iran’s production of unmanned drones and missiles and its supply thereof to Russia and the wider Middle Eastern region; highlights the strong links between Iran and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), its proxies such as the Houthis and militias operating in Iraq and Syria; strongly condemns the high number of terrorist and assassination attacks, or attempted attacks, perpetrated by the IRGC all over the world, including on European soil, over the past few decades; reiterates its call for the IRGC to be added to the EU list of terrorist organisations; points out that the sanctioning options that have not yet been exhausted include a much more restrictive approach to technology transfers through exports of products that are not categorised as ‘dual-use’;

39. Strongly condemns the destabilising Houthi attacks against commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea; stresses that these have caused significant disruption to global trade as shipping companies are forced to reroute much of the Red Sea’s traffic around the southern tip of Africa; calls for collective action and encourages enhanced EU engagement and international cooperation, and strongly urges for continued action to ensure the freedom of navigation in one of the world’s most critical waterways; calls for the immediate cessation of these illegal attacks;

40. Shares the objective of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons at all costs; points, however, to the fact that the regime in Tehran has clearly rejected a revival of the JCPOA and has refused to cooperate in its ongoing dispute with the International Atomic Energy Agency; highlights that, at the same time, Iran has increased its nuclear weapons capability; regrets the fact that there is currently no strategy in place to persuade Iran to refrain from building military nuclear capacity, nor a plan of action for the event that Iran does cross the nuclear threshold; calls upon the VP/HR to put forward a revised strategy towards Iran that prepares for all events;

41. Expresses concern regarding the inflammatory rhetoric, fuelled by mis- and disinformation, that surrounds this conflict, and its instrumentalisation by malicious actors to sow distrust and hatred including within European societies, as illustrated notably, but not solely, by the worrying rise of antisemitism; warns that it should be a primary focus of the EU fight against disinformation and calls for a coordinated approach by the Commission, taking into account the external and internal dimensions of its policies, including but not limited to the forthcoming strategic communication plan to promote the EU’s role in the Southern Neighbourhood;

42. Welcomes the historic fall of the Assad regime in Syria; recalls that it only survived so long thanks the support of its Russian and Iranian allies and that its collapse shows they are weakened; welcomes the nomination of a new Chargé d’Affaires of the EU Delegation to Syria, who made early contact with the transition authorities; reiterates its unwavering support for the people in Syria and highlights the need to urgently step up humanitarian aid and protection for the 16.7 million people in need; calls on all parties to contribute to a peaceful and Syrian-led transition towards an inclusive, democratic governance model that ensures the representation, participation and equal rights of women, minorities and all members of Syrian society regardless of ethnicity or religion and that puts the good functioning of the state institutions and the wellbeing of the Syrian people at the heart of their actions; calls on the Commission and the VP/HR to swiftly organise the ninth Brussels Conference on Syria without delay and come up with a comprehensive plan for EU support for the reconstruction of Syria, taking into account the lessons learned from Iraq and Libya, among others; urges the VP/HR to urgently present to the Council an action plan towards the swift yet reversible easing of sanctions that are not linked to the previous regime, with a review process conditional on the progress of the political transition; stresses that the fight against impunity in Syria is a moral and political imperative for Europe and the international community; calls on the EU and its Member States to support the work of the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011; calls on the EU and its Member States to consider the establishment of a special mission, in cooperation with international partners, to help document cases of serious crimes by the Assad regime, as well as by all other factions; stresses the importance of preserving the territorial integrity of Syria, also to help preserve stability in the region; calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to take immediate steps to prevent any re-establishment or reinforcement of Russian forces, paramilitaries or intelligence in the country;

Incentivising cooperation with like-minded partners

43. Acknowledges that the requirement for unanimity forces the Member States to work relentlessly to achieve compromise and unity, which is the source of the EU’s political leverage on the world stage; points out, however, that the trade-off between the ideal of unity and the high costs of unanimity in terms of credibility on the global stage should be assessed critically, particularly bearing in mind the effective functioning of an enlarged EU;

44. Regrets, in this context, the fact that individual Member States have used their veto right to water down agreements, delay decision-making or thwart a common policy altogether; regrets that the potential for fast, efficient and effective foreign, security and defence action, as provided for, inter alia, by the passerelle clauses of the TEU, has never been used;

45. Reiterates its call for the Council to gradually switch to qualified majority voting for decisions in areas of the CFSP that do not have military or defence implications; acknowledges the concerns of some Member States, which fear a decreased ability to influence foreign and security policy at EU level; encourages, pending the full application of qualified majority voting to decisions without military or defence implications, the full use of all currently existing possibilities to enhance decisiveness in this regard, including the use of constructive abstention in line with Article 31(1) TEU; recognises that progress towards the application of qualified majority voting can only be gradual, building on the formation of a European strategic culture;

46. Highlights that the world is becoming more multipolar and less multilateral; emphasises that multilateral forums, chief among them the UN and its agencies, should be considered the EU’s format of cooperation of choice; calls on the Member States to reinforce inclusive forms of multilateral governance and encourages, in this context, the Commission, the EEAS and the Council to step up interinstitutional cooperation with multilateral organisations that are integral to the international rules-based order and thereby protect the UN and the multilateral system as a whole; expresses concern, in this respect, about the increasing relevance of exclusive formats of cooperation, which experience increasing competition; expresses concern at the growing membership of the BRICS group, which currently includes 45 % of the world’s population; stresses that such cooperation provides Russia with the means to circumvent measures intended to politically isolate the country and enables China to further extend its influence through its modus operandi of financing infrastructure projects; observes, at the same time, that international institutions and norms are increasingly being instrumentalised and undermined by autocratic regimes; stresses that this trend puts the EU in a delicate position, having to balance the need to appeal for a broad and inclusive concept of multilateralism while reinforcing cooperation with selected, like-minded partners;

47. Stresses, in this context, that the geopolitical context in which the EU is operating remains marked by radical uncertainty and a shift from cooperation to competition; observes with concern how all types of interaction are being weaponised and notes that this trend impairs international cooperation at a time when global transitions need to accelerate in order to effectively address global challenges; recalls that the EU cannot afford to turn inwards and must remain open and engaged in the world to defend its values and its interests; underlines that, in light of intensified efforts by third countries to destabilise the international order and undermine multilateralism through the spread of disinformation, enhanced cooperation and coordination with like-minded partners is essential;

48. Calls for the EU institutions and the Member States to actively support a comprehensive institutional reform of multilateral institutions, first and foremost the UN system and particularly the UN Security Council, which should include measures aimed at limiting the use of veto powers, boosting regional representation, making the executive body accountable to the assembly that elects it and redefining the composition to better reflect geopolitical reality, including by establishing a permanent seat for the EU; stresses that such reforms are essential to strengthen multilateralism, improve global governance and values-based decision-making, and address international challenges more inclusively and responsively;

49. Recalls the importance of a strong and constructive partnership with the UK; welcomes the renewed impetus from the new UK Government to reflect with the EU on possibilities for closer and more permanent foreign policy and security cooperation, underpinned by concrete actions and building on the good cooperation at UN level as well as the effective coordination between the EU and the UK on the adoption and monitoring of the implementation of sanctions against Russia; believes that such coordination is of added value for both the EU and the UK and hence welcomes the agreement to work towards the creation of an EU-UK security partnership based on shared interest and collective responsibility; believes that in the scope of such a partnership, topics such as maritime security should be consulted on; demands that Parliament be duly involved and informed in such reflections;

50. Takes note of the result of the presidential and congressional elections in the United States; recalls that the transatlantic relationship remains one of the most important and strategic relationship for the EU and its Member States, which has been emphasised by the unity and strength of the partnership demonstrated following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; underlines that a strong transatlantic relationship remains indispensable for the security of the partners on both sides of the Atlantic; calls on the Commission to foster closer ties with key partners in both the US and Canada in order to counter global challenges that affect our shared values, interests, security and prosperity; in this context reiterates its call for EU-US summits to be held on a regular basis to provide top-level impetus to the future cooperation; fully supports the deepening of cooperation in the framework of the EU-US transatlantic dialogue, such as through transatlantic parliamentary diplomacy; calls for stronger transatlantic cooperation on trade, on foreign and security policy and on combatting challenges caused by rapid technological changes and growing cyber threats; welcomes in that regard the work of the Transatlantic Trade and Technology Council;

51. Reiterates, irrespectively, the need for Member States to fully operationalise the concept of EU strategic autonomy and defence readiness and to this end make collective and well-coordinated investments in their security and defence with the objective of achieving a genuine European Defence Union that is interoperable and complementary with the NATO alliance and can act independently when needed;

52. Encourages close relations with western European non-EU countries, in particular cooperation in certain areas of EU external action; welcomes in this context the conclusion of negotiations on a broad package of measures for future EU-Switzerland relations, which mark a significant milestone in advancing and deepening the already close relationship; calls on the Commission to modernise and deepen bilateral relations between the EU and Switzerland; stresses the importance of promoting stronger relations with Norway, particularly in the scope of the security and defence partnership as well as the cooperative management of shared stocks and the continuation of long-standing fishing activities; calls for the swift signing of the association agreement between the EU and Andorra and San Marino;

53. Welcomes the new momentum in bilateral relations between the EU and Armenia, which is strongly supported by the authorities in Yerevan; calls on the Commission and the Council to actively support Armenia’s desire for increased cooperation with the EU; expresses full support for the newly launched work on the EU-Armenia Partnership Agenda, establishing more ambitious joint priorities for cooperation across all dimensions;

54. Expresses its strong support for the activities of the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) and underscores the important role it plays; calls on EUMA to continue to closely monitor the evolving security situation on the ground, provide transparent reporting to Parliament and actively contribute to conflict resolution efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to strengthen EUMA’s mandate, increase its size and extend its duration; calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to agree to have such a civilian mission on their side of the border as well;

55. Is of the view that the centre of gravity in the global order is shifting towards the Indo-Pacific and that the EU must strengthen its active role and presence in this region to safeguard its interests, promote stability and uphold a rules-based international order; reiterates that a peaceful, free, stable and rules-based Indo-Pacific region is of vital European interest; is concerned that great power competition in the region is imposing parameters on the EU’s ability to promote multilateralism in the region; points out, in this context, that the Asia-Europe Meeting is still hamstrung because of the geopolitical tensions with Russia; calls, in this context for enhanced foreign, security and defence policy ties with like-minded partners in the region in line with the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific; encourages the VP/HR to promote the visibility and impact of the EU’s external action together with our Indo-Pacific partners, particularly Australia, India, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan;

56. Recalls, in this context, the strategic partnership the EU enjoys with Japan, which should serve as a role model for a fruitful bilateral partnership that allows effective policy-shaping in multilateral contexts; notes that the EU and Japan are celebrating 50 years of their respective diplomatic missions in 2024 and strongly emphasises the EU’s interest in deepening and broadening this partnership bilaterally in the 50 years to come; welcomes, to this end, the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement and the EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA), the latter of which provides for, among other things, consultations on the development of respective defence initiatives including exchange of information on defence industry-related matters, as well as the exploration of possible mutual involvement in respective defence initiatives;

57. Notes that geopolitical challenges have strengthened the shared interest of the EU and India in ensuring security, prosperity and sustainable development; calls for an India-EU summit to keep bilateral relations high on the agenda; identifies climate change and green growth, digitalisation and new technologies, research and development, connectivity, trade and investment, foreign, security and defence policy as the key areas of cooperation; calls, in this respect, for stronger buy-in from Member States; calls, equally, on the Member States to expand and broaden the India-EU cooperation on maritime security in response to China’s evolving presence in the Indo-Pacific; highlights the need to engage with India on its heavy military dependency on Russia as well as its supply of restricted critical technologies to Russia; urges India to condemn Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and to join the EU sanctions policy towards Russia;

58. Considers India an important democratic partner and encourages the EU to strictly engage with the Indian Government on the respect of human rights and rule of law, both internally and worldwide; calls for the full implementation of the EU Strategy on India of 2018 and the EU-India Roadmap to 2025 in close coordination with Member States’ own actions; stresses in particular the need to promote greater synergies in foreign and security policy through existing dialogue mechanisms and other forums set up under the EU-India Roadmap to 2025; welcomes the announcement of a forthcoming strategic EU-India agenda;

59. Recalls the EU’s commitment to its ‘One China’ policy as one of the principles of EU-China relations; underscores that Taiwan is a key democratic partner for the EU in the Indo-Pacific region; recognises the importance of Taiwan in securing global supply chains, especially in the high-tech sector, and urges the EU and its Member States to engage in closer cooperation with Taiwan in order to further boost economic, trade and investment ties; encourages the Commission to launch, without delay, preparatory measures for negotiations on an investment agreement with Taiwan; emphasises that any attempt from authoritarian regimes to restrict the benign development of EU-Taiwan relations is not acceptable;

60. Strongly condemns China’s continued military provocations against Taiwan and reiterates its firm rejection of any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure, through clear and consistent signalling, that any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by means of force or coercion, cannot be accepted and will have high costs; highlights that China’s territorial claims have no basis in international law and that only Taiwan’s democratically elected government can represent the Taiwanese people; denounces, furthermore, China’s blocking of Taiwan’s meaningful participation in multilateral organisations, such as the WHO, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, by its continuous distortion of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758; calls, accordingly, for the EU and its Member States to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in relevant international organisations;

61. Expresses deep concern about the latest shifts in China’s domestic and military posture since the 20th national congress of the Chinese Communist Party; holds the view that China demonstrates that it has both the intent and increasingly the economic, diplomatic, technological and military power to redefine the global order; underscores that the military-civil fusion strategy is a testament to such means; stresses, in this context, that the EU needs to be more assertive and unified in its approach to China and therefore calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to review the strategy towards China that takes full account of the increasingly oppressive domestic policies, the assertive foreign policy as well as the use of economic coercion as a means by which China aims to reach its objectives; considers that the challenges stemming from the rise of China as a global actor require a balanced multi-dimensional response along the principle of ‘cooperate where possible, compete where needed and confront where necessary’, through which the EU maintains its selective engagement with China as a permanent member of the UN Security Council on a number of key issues;

62. Highlights that the PRC’s increasingly aggressive posture poses a threat to the freedom of navigation and jeopardises the stability which is vital for global trade; emphasises that this situation is being watched with concern by a growing number of like-minded partners committed to peace and stability in the region; underlines the need to shore up deterrence against destabilising behaviour, including through regular operations to assert freedom of navigation over the PRC’s attempts to impose control over international waters and airspace;

63. Holds the view that China, through the continued growth of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, including in the areas of technology and military capability transfers, (indirectly) enables the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine;

64. Reiterates its condemnation of China’s violation of its international commitments, its breaches of the Sino-British and Sino-Portuguese Joint Declarations, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the ‘one country, two systems’ principle and the Hong Kong Basic Law as well as the crackdown on the special administrative region’s autonomy and opposition figures, including members of civil society and their family members; calls on the Commission to assess the autonomous status of Hong Kong and Macao in the light of China’s breaches of the Sino-British and Sino-Portuguese Joint Declarations and the crackdown on Hong Kong’s autonomy;

65. Is concerned about the growing economic penetration of Chinese companies within the EU, including in strategic sectors such as battery manufacturing; stresses the urgent need to continue the policy of de-risking by continuing to reduce economic dependence in critical sectors, in line with the EU’s economic security strategy;

66. Reiterates that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a crucial partner in reinforcing rules-based multilateralism; supports ASEAN’s efforts to finalise negotiations with China on an effective and substantive code of conduct in the South China Sea; encourages enhanced EU engagement and cooperation with ASEAN and efforts towards a comprehensive strategic partnership, building on economic ties and sustainable growth, and in particular on political cooperation with regard to human rights and democracy; calls for increased support for Myanmar’s national unity government and for greater pressure to be applied to ASEAN countries to align on international sanctions against Myanmar’s military junta;

67. Urges the VP/HR and the Member States to focus on bilateral relations with partners in Africa, among others Ghana, Morocco, Kenya, Senegal and Mauretania, taking into account mutual needs and interests in order to foster real and balanced partnerships; believes that the ‘more for more’ principle should be integrated fully into relations with non-EU countries, whereby the EU develops stronger partnerships with those countries that uphold the principles of the CFSP and the common security and defence policy (CSDP), and the fundamental values of the EU; is of the belief that the EU needs to maintain a continued focus on Africa, which is already a strategic continent and will become an increasingly important player in the future;

68. Calls for the EU to suspend both its Memorandum of Understanding on raw materials and all military cooperation with Rwanda, including through the EPF and any other mechanisms, until Rwanda ends its illegal support for armed groups and fully respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); condemns the breaches of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the eastern DRC by the rebels of M23; is deeply concerned about the humanitarian situation of thousands of displaced persons in the area; urges the VP/HR to engage in clear actions in line with the EU’s Great Lakes strategy in order to restore stability and to cooperate with the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) for the protection of civilians in the eastern DRC;

69. Underlines that the recent developments in Tunisia have raised concerns about human rights and democratic standards, with reports indicating limited transparency, restricted opposition participation and reduced political competition in the presidential election; underlines the EU’s continued commitment to and support for Tunisia during this politically and socio-economically sensitive period, through maintaining contact at various levels;

70. Underscores that the EU has a direct and vital interest in the stability, security and economic growth of the Mediterranean basin as well as the wider Southern Neighbourhood; recalls that the European neighbourhood policy was launched with the laudable goals of fostering stability, prosperity and good governance in the southern Mediterranean; acknowledges, however, that it is evident today that its instruments, objectives and principles are no longer aligned with the region’s current realities; regrets that, almost 30 years after the launch of the so-called Barcelona Process, the creation of an area of shared prosperity, stability and freedom with the Mediterranean countries of the Southern Neighbourhood has not been achieved; calls on the Commission to present a new pact for the Mediterranean; believes that the EU and the countries of the Southern Neighbourhood should conclude memorandums of understanding aimed at promoting stability, prosperity and the defence of human rights, conditional on cooperating on migration; recalls that instability and insecurity in the Southern Neighbourhood remains an ongoing challenge for European external border management; argues that, while prioritising bilateral relations with countries in the region, the EU should also continue to foster regional cooperation through existing frameworks such as the Union for the Mediterranean; welcomes the appointment of a Commissioner in charge of the Mediterranean;

71. Stresses the need for the EU to strengthen and deepen its cooperation with Arab countries and the Gulf, in response to the pressing geopolitical, social, and economic challenges facing the region; emphasises that enhanced collaboration should prioritise key areas such as migration, digital transformation, security, the green transition and cultural exchange to build a resilient partnership; calls for a strategic approach that tailors engagement with each country to foster sustainable development and mutual understanding;

72. Welcomes the successful conclusion of the first EU-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit and believes this summit to have marked a pivotal moment in the relationship between the EU and its partners from the GCC, stressing mutual commitment to strengthening ties across key strategic, economic, and cultural areas;

73. Underlines the importance of upholding and promoting democratic values in the region; condemns the rise of hate speech, including against the European institutions, and attacks on individual freedoms and the international order, both within Member States and abroad;

74. Emphasises that the countries of the EU, Latin American and the Caribbean are like-minded and share values, languages, history, culture and religion, which should make them natural partners in today’s geopolitical context; notes that the EU’s engagement in the region has dwindled in recent decades, which has created a vacuum for the growing influence of China and Russia; urges countries across Latin America to adopt a firmer attitude of condemnation of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; calls on the Member States and the EEAS to pursue proactive diplomacy in the region, with a strong emphasis on defending the multilateral global order, international law and respect for democracy and human rights; urges for multilateral initiatives to address political instability in the most volatile countries in the region, for instance in Haiti;

75. Welcomes the signing of the EU-Chile Advanced Framework Agreement and calls for its swift and full ratification; calls for progress to be made towards the signing and ratification of the EU-Mexico Global Agreement;

76. Welcomes the conclusion of the agreement with Mercosur; underlines that Parliament will examine whether the provisions on sustainability meet the highest levels of ambition;

77. Welcomes the EU-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) informal meeting and the implementation of initiatives under the EU-CELAC Roadmap 2023-2025 and, in this regard, underlines the need to adopt a new and ambitious roadmap at the 2025 summit, that keeps strengthening the partnership and takes into account best practices accomplished so far;

78. Underlines the need for a tougher approach to address violence against environmental defenders and to step up the EU’s efforts to assist in the preservation of biodiversity and in adaptation to the climate emergency; suggests further strengthening cooperation against organised crime and drug trafficking which also has an impact on the EU; calls for a substantial increase in bi-regional cooperation in the fight against this phenomenon;

79. Calls on the VP/HR to make the work with like-minded democracies a priority of her term and to systematise cooperation and consultation with democratic like-minded partners in order to promote democracy and improve common preparedness and access to crisis response resources; reiterates, in this context, the recommendation to deepen ties with regional organisations such as ASEAN and the African Union to enhance cooperative security frameworks;

80. Reiterates its support for the European Political Community as a platform for discussion, dialogue and cooperation with European partners on the foreign policy and security challenges we are facing, with the aim of strengthening security and stability in Europe and pursuing political and security cooperation based on shared interests; calls for the close involvement of Parliament in the clarification of the scope and the future work of this community; underlines that, for the future success and coherence of this format, some level of alignment on democratic values and principles is essential; reiterates that the European Political Community may under no circumstances become a pretext for delays to the EU accession of enlargement countries;

81. Believes also in the significance of building new alliances, inter alia with the countries in our neighbourhood as well as in the Global South, taking into account mutual needs and interests in order to foster real, balanced and equal partnerships; stresses the importance of establishing these political agreements with third countries, based on common European values and fundamental rights; calls for the EU to respond to partner countries’ expectations and to deliver quickly on political agreements with them in order to show that the EU is a reliable and strategic partner and demonstrate that the international rules-based system can meet contemporary challenges; calls, in this context, for collaborative initiatives between the EU and Global South countries to assess and tackle the debt crisis; notes that agreements with the Global South, especially on raw materials, should contribute to local economic development rather than deepening dependence and excessive resource exploitation;

Fostering EU action abroad

82. Highlights the role of the VP/HR as a bridge-builder between the CFSP and EU external relations to ensure the highest level of coordination and coherence in EU external action; stresses the need for the EU to foster the visibility and effectiveness of its external action and development cooperation efforts, regrets, nonetheless, that in some cases there is a lack of clarity in the external representation of the EU, hindering the EU’s strategic communication abroad; stresses the need to clearly define the competences of the VP/HR, the President of the Commission and the President of the European Council with regard to the EU’s external action and representation so that the EU’s voice is coherent and perceived as such by its partners; calls on the Commission to strengthen its coordination with the EEAS in external action, including by ensuring full compliance with Articles 3.2 and 9 of the EEAS Decision [16], which may need to be updated;

83. Calls for the EEAS – both its headquarters and EU delegations – to be strengthened through the provision of the appropriate financial and human resources so that the EU can be better prepared for current and emerging global challenges; calls for the EEAS to be able to select and recruit its permanent EU diplomatic staff and to ensure a fair gender and geographical balance among Member States across all levels within the EEAS; calls on the VP/HR to swiftly come up with proposals for the future operational structure of the EU’s external action and to that end to fully take into account Parliament’s recommendation of 15 March 2023 taking stock of the functioning of the EEAS and for a stronger EU in the world [17]; stresses the need to strengthen strategic communication and the EU’s work on countering disinformation via dedicated resources and offices in strategically relevant regions and countries;

84. Recalls that the EU has a strategic interest in advancing sustainable development, poverty reduction and equality globally, as these efforts contribute to long-term global peace and security; calls on the Commission to effectively and swiftly use the Global Gateway Initiative as a sustainable alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and as an instrument to increase the EU’s presence and visibility worldwide; recalls that the Global Gateway Initiative is to be understood as a strategic concept integrating foreign, economic and development policy, including the climate and digital transitions, as well as infrastructure investment in order to strengthen close partnership based on mutual benefits, economic development and resilient supply chains; stresses, in this context, that coordination with international financial institutions, well-defined private-sector involvement and tailored strategic communications, including in the recipient countries, are essential in order for the instrument to reach the desired scale; is concerned by reports that a number of Global Gateway projects are being implemented by Chinese companies in direct violation of the initiative’s aims and objectives, which includes the strengthening of the EU’s economic security and fostering economic development and mutually beneficial partnerships with third countries; calls, therefore, for an immediate investigation and the removal of all Chinese companies involved in Global Gateway; stresses that the EU’s support should complement other initiatives such as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor and the Lobito Corridor, and should in particular aim at achieving the Sustainable Development Goals;

85. Reiterates that Parliament plays an integral role in the CFSP and makes a specific contribution thereto by virtue of its parliamentary diplomacy and its distinct instruments, channels and contacts, including its democracy support programmes, the Foreign Affairs Committee, regular parliamentary dialogues and official delegations; emphasises that parliamentary diplomacy has a great potential to engage key political stakeholders and facilitate democratic governance; stresses, in particular, the added value of parliamentary diplomacy during the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and highlights, in this context, the valuable cooperation at political and technical level between the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the European Parliament;

86. Firmly believes that diplomacy is a significant part of EU action; calls, in this light, for the further development of the EU’s preventive diplomacy as a proactive external policy tool to pre-empt, mediate and peacefully resolve conflict between parties, calls on the EEAS to integrate the EU’s preventive diplomacy tools within structural prevention mechanisms and actions, such as political agreements among different actors involved in conflicts, national dialogues for reconciliation, peacebuilding and transitional justice, as well as truth and reconciliation commissions; urges the EEAS to conduct ‘lessons learnt’ exercises to assess diplomatic efforts, identify areas for improvement and integrate best practice into future initiatives; calls for the EEAS’ capacities in those regards to be increased, in particular in the relevant crisis preparedness and response divisions; stresses the urgent need to double the relevant EU budget within the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument and strongly increase EU action on mediation, dialogue and reconciliation;

87. Reaffirms the role of the EU special representatives (EUSRs), who promote the EU’s policies and interests in specific regions and countries and play an important role in the development of a stronger and more effective CFSP by providing the EU with an active political presence in key countries and regions, acting as a ‘voice’ and ‘face’ for the EU and its policies; emphasises the importance of equipping EUSRs with sufficient resources enabling them to effectively implement those tasks; stresses the importance for EUSRs of having a broad, flexible mandate, capable of adapting to evolving geopolitical circumstances in order to promote the EU’s policies and interests in specific regions and countries and play an active role in preventive diplomacy efforts; insists that the appointment of new EUSRs should take place only after a hearing in Parliament;

88. Underlines the EU’s missions and operations abroad for promoting peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world; calls on the VP/HR:

– to prepare the proposals for the necessary CFSP missions to be launched in 2025, using the EU’s Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) as preventive military reinforcement; recalls that the administrative expenditure for these measures, including the RDC’s standby expenditure, should be charged to the EU budget;

– to work with Cyprus, Türkiye, the UK and the UN to implement concrete measures for a demilitarisation of the buffer zone in Cyprus, and to improve security on the island, both of the Greek Cypriot community and of the Turkish Cypriot community;

– to support an increased role of the two EU civilian CSDP missions, EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah, in line with European Council conclusions of 21 and 22 March 2024, recalling they can play an important role based on the principle of the two-state solution and the viability of a future Palestinian state, and to participate in the facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Gaza Strip, to improve the efficiency of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, and to prepare for its return to the Gaza Strip;

– to create the necessary conditions for the full reactivation of EUBAM Rafah to allow it to act as a neutral third party at the Rafah crossing point, in coordination with the Palestinian Authority as well as the Israeli and Egyptian authorities; expects the reinforcement of the scope and mandates of EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah on the ground to be included as key priorities of the forthcoming EU-Middle East strategy;

– to further increase the number of observers deployed as part of the EU civilian mission in Armenia on the Armenian side of the international border with Azerbaijan and reiterate calls for Azerbaijan to cooperate with the mission and cease its smear campaign against it;

– to work with Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Taiwan and ASEAN member states to facilitate the peace and security of the Indo-Pacific and south-east Asian regions;

– to develop strategies to counter hybrid attacks on the EU’s eastern border, particularly those involving instrumentalising migration as a tactic to destabilise Member States and exert political pressure;

89. Calls on the VP/HR to follow up on the examples of the successful evacuation actions in Sudan and of the stepped-up consular protection, and to work towards a comprehensive system of protection for EU citizens abroad; stresses that the impact of continuous crises and conflicts worldwide can entail the risk of overloading Member States’ consular protection and/or assistance capacities and calls, in this regard, for the strengthening of the capabilities and resources of the EEAS Crisis Response Centre and the EU Civil Protection Mechanism; recalls its longstanding position of applying a similar level of protection for the local staff in EU delegations and CFSP missions and operations;

III. The next MFF and its parliamentary oversight

90. Believes that there is a need for stronger institutionalised parliamentary oversight of the EU’s external action, including regular and timely, yet secure, access to confidential information and briefings in the European Parliament in line with Article 36 TEU; emphasises the need for more feedback from the VP/HR and the EEAS about the actions taken and the effects achieved, in order to fulfil Parliament’s recommendations outlined in the resolutions on foreign affairs matters;

91. Underlines that in the CFSP, which comprises the CSDP, the European Parliament exercises its budgetary function jointly with the Council; recalls that the European Parliament also exercises the function of political control and consultation over those policies as referred to in Article 36 TEU;

92. Recalls that in line with Article 41 TEU, all CFSP and CSDP administrative and operating expenditure should be charged to the EU budget, except for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications;

93. Underlines that CFSP or CSDP decisions entailing expenditure always constitute basic choices for those policies and must be subject to parliamentary oversight; calls on the VP/HR to consult Parliament before proposing CFSP or CSDP decisions, thereby ensuring transparency and accountability in line with Article 36 TEU;

94. Recalls that Parliament’s exercise of its budgetary function is inextricably linked to its function of political control and consultation; recalls that Article 36 TEU establishes a specific relationship between the VP/HR and the European Parliament, which is a prerequisite for Parliament to exercise those functions, and that the VP/HR should support Parliament in those regards;

95. Regrets that the budget for civilian CSDP missions is insufficient; recalls that the number and tasks of such missions have increased, the security environment has become more challenging, and the cost of operations has increased; urges the European Council to provide for a substantive increase in CFSP funding placed under a separate Civilian CFSP and Crisis Management heading; calls for the efficient use of the funds allocated to civilian CSDP missions to be ensured, in order to make sure that these missions are able to respond effectively to crisis situations and unforeseen events; calls on the VP/HR and the Commission to come forward with joint proposals to those ends;

96. Is deeply concerned that the EEAS is structurally underfunded and that this already entails serious and far-reaching negative consequences for the EU’s external action and the performance of the EU institutions in this area; underlines that a specific approach to the EEAS’ administrative budget is necessary and recalls that the absence of corrective action risks having a severe impact on the EU’s relations with third countries;

97. Calls on the Commission to consider in its proposal for the next MFF under the EU external action heading:

– robust capabilities and resources for EU external action that take into account the increasingly challenging international arena, recalling in this regard that it is crucial to further strengthen EU support for human rights, democracy and development in third countries;

– resources for the EU’s digital diplomacy, given the current context of rapid technological advancements and geopolitical competition;

– resources for green diplomacy;

– a dedicated budget for specific EU foreign policy actions on gender equality and the women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda, in order to integrate gender perspectives into EU diplomatic and human security efforts,

– resources for preventive scrutiny of potential beneficiaries to ensure that EU funds under no circumstance directly or indirectly support activities, projects or literature that incite violence and hatred, including antisemitism, and to ensure that all recipients of EU funding are monitored accordingly;

98. Calls on the Commission to present its proposals for the next MFF in the first semester of 2025 to allow for sufficient time to negotiate the programmes; underlines the need for a more detailed budgetary nomenclature in the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument, the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance and the CFSP budget, which allow the budgetary authority to set policy and geographic priorities in the framework of the annual budgetary procedure;

99. Underlines that each matter raised above requires an appropriate response by the executive; calls on the VP/HR to respond to Parliament’s calls, requests and concerns swiftly and in writing; considers that oral statements in committee or plenary can only constitute a sufficient response in exceptional or urgent cases; stresses that in the current challenging geopolitical context, close cooperation and partnership between the European Parliament and the VP/HR are of strategic importance; expects more systematic exchanges prior to the adoption of mandates and CFSP strategies and an improved flow of information on negotiations and the implementation of international agreements, as well as memoranda of understanding; expects, in addition, Parliament to be effectively incorporated throughout EU external policies and action, thereby mobilising parliamentary diplomacy in support of the VP/HR’s efforts;

°

° °

100. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

MIL OSI Europe News –

February 27, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2024 – A10-0011/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2024

(2024/2082(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

– having regard to Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Chapter Two, Section Two thereof on provisions on the common security and defence policy (CSDP),

– having regard to the Versailles Declaration adopted at the informal meeting of heads of state or government on 11 March 2022,

– having regard to the ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’, which was approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 25 March 2022,

– having regard to the national security strategies of the EU Member States,

– having regard to the Civilian CSDP Compact – Towards more effective civilian missions, approved by the Council on 22 May 2023,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States [1],

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1968 of 17 October 2022 on a European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine)[2],

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1970 of 17 October 2022 amending Decision 2010/452/CFSP on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, EUMM Georgia [3],

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2507 of 19 December 2022 amending Decision 2010/452/CFSP on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, EUMM, Georgia [4],

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/162 of 23 January 2023 on a European Union mission in Armenia (EUMA)[5],

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/890 of 18 March 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 establishing a European Peace Facility [6],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union [7],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1092 [8],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1525 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 2023 on supporting ammunition production (ASAP)[9],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2418 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 on establishing an instrument for the reinforcement of the European defence industry through common procurement (EDIRPA)[10],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020 [11],

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 18 April 2023 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down measures to strengthen solidarity and capacities in the Union to detect, prepare for and respond to cybersecurity threats and incidents (COM(2023)0209),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 March 2023 on a European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence (JOIN(2023)0009),

– having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2113 of 3 October 2023 on critical technology areas for the EU’s economic security for further risk assessment with Member States [12],

– having regard to the annual financing decision, constituting the first part of the annual work programme for the implementation of the European Defence Fund for 2024, adopted by the Commission on 21 June 2023 (C(2023)4252),

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 January 2018 on the Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises and of 24 January 2022 on the European security situation,

– having regard to the Granada Declaration adopted at the informal meeting of heads of state or government on 6 October 2023,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 21 February 2022 extending and enhancing the implementation of the Coordinated Maritime Presences Concept in the Gulf of Guinea,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 21 and 22 March 2024, concerning the decision to open accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 May 2024 on EU security and defence,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 November 2022 entitled ‘Action plan on military mobility 2.0’ (JOIN(2022)0048),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 18 May 2022 on the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward (JOIN(2022)0024),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry’ (JOIN(2024)0010),

– having regard to the report by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2024 entitled ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy Report – Our priorities in 2024’,

– having regard to the political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, by the candidate for European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, of 18 July 2024, entitled ‘Europe’s choice’,

– having regard to the report by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market’ and in particular the section on ‘Promoting peace and enhancing security: towards a Common Market for the defence industry’, published in April 2024,

– having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 on the future of European competitiveness and Chapter Four thereof on increasing security and reducing dependencies,

– having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together: Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

– having regard to the security and defence partnerships respectively signed on 21 May 2024 by the EU and Moldova, and on 28 May 2024 by the EU and Norway,

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations, in particular Article 2(4) thereof on prohibiting the use of force and of Article 51 on the inherent right to individual and collective self-defence,

– having regard to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

– having regard to UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000) of 31 October 2000, 1889 (2009) of 5 October 2009, 2122 (2013) of 18 October 2013, 2242 (2015) of 13 October 2015 and 2493 (2019) of 29 October 2019 on Women, Peace and Security, and Resolutions 2250 (2015) of 9 December 2015, 2419 (2018) of 6 June 2018 and 2535 (2020) of 14 July 2020 on Youth, Peace and Security,

– having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 70/1 of 25 September 2015 entitled ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’,

– having regard to the Pact for the Future and Chapter Two thereof on international peace and security, adopted on 23 September 2024 by the heads of state or government of the UN member states,

– having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty,

– having regard to the Madrid Summit Declaration adopted by the heads of state or government of NATO at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Madrid on 29 June 2022,

– having regard to the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept and the NATO 2023 Vilnius Summit Communiqué,

– having regard to the three joint declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed on 8 July 2016, 10 July 2018 and 10 January 2023,

– having regard to the ninth progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017, submitted jointly by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) and the NATO Secretary General to the Council of the EU and the NATO Council on 13 June 2024,

– having regard to the Washington Summit Declaration issued by the heads of state or government of NATO participating in the North Atlantic Council meeting in Washington on 10 July 2024,

– having regard to its recommendation of 8 June 2022 on the EU’s Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine [13],

– having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement [14],

– having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2022 on recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism [15],

– having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation [16],

– having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2023 [17],

– having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on the need for unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after two years of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine [18],

– having regard to its resolution of 17 July 2024 on the need for the EU’s continuous support for Ukraine [19],

– having regard to its resolution of 19 September 2024 on continued financial and military support to Ukraine by EU Member States [20],

– having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on the security and defence implications of China’s influence on critical infrastructure in the European Union [21],

– having regard to its position of 22 October 2024 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism and providing exceptional macro-financial assistance to Ukraine [22],

– having regard to its resolution of 24 October 2024 on the misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan [23],

– having regard to Ukraine’s victory plan presented by the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, to the European Council on 17 October 2024,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0011/2025),

A. whereas this past year has been marked by a decline in global peace and security, resulting, inter alia, from conflict, geopolitical rivalry, growing militarisation, terrorism and hybrid threats, as assessed by the Normandy Index 2024 [24];

B. whereas Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine, continued armament efforts and armaments cooperation with other authoritarian powers far surpassing European stocks and production capacities, and the Russian regime’s choice to undermine the rules-based international order and the security architecture of Europe and to wage war on European countries or seek to destabilise them in order to realise its imperialist vision of the world, poses the most serious and unprecedented threat to world peace, as well as to the security and territory of the EU and its Member States; whereas Russia currently produces three million artillery shells per year, while the EU’s declared ambition within its first European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) aims for a production capacity of 2 million shells per year by the end of 2025; whereas the Russian regime is strengthening its ties with the autocratic leadership of China, Iran and North Korea to achieve its objectives;

C. whereas the EU is also facing the most diverse and complex range of non-military threats since its creation, exacerbated by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including, inter alia, foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), cyberattacks, economic pressure, food and energy blackmail, instrumentalisation of migration and subversive political influence;

D. whereas Russia illegally invaded and annexed Crimea and the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions of Ukraine; whereas Ukraine needs to be provided with the necessary military capabilities for as long as it takes for Ukraine to achieve a decisive military victory, end Russia’s illegal war of aggression, restore its sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and deter any future aggression; whereas Ukraine, in defending itself, is also protecting and fighting for European values and core security interests; whereas Russia is still illegally occupying the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia and the Transnistria region of Moldova;

E. whereas, driven by the ambition to become a global superpower, China is eroding the rules-based international order by increasingly pursuing assertive foreign and hostile economic and competition policies and exporting dual-use goods employed by Russia on the battlefield against Ukraine, thereby threatening European interests; whereas China is also heavily arming itself militarily, using its economic power to quash criticism worldwide, and is striving to assert itself as the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific region; whereas China, by intensifying its confrontational, aggressive and intimidating actions against some of its neighbours, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, poses a risk to regional and global security;

F whereas China has, for many years, promoted an alternative narrative, challenging human rights, democratic values and open markets in multilateral and international forums; whereas China’s increasing influence in international organisations has impeded positive progress and further excluded Taiwan from rightful and meaningful participation in these organisations;

G. whereas the EU’s security environment has deteriorated not only in Eastern Europe, but also in its southern neighbourhood and beyond;

H. whereas the despicable terrorist attacks by Hamas against Israel, the ongoing war in Gaza and the military operations against the Hezbollah on Lebanese territory have significantly increased the danger of a regional military confrontation in the Middle East, and the risk of escalation in the region is at its highest in decades; whereas the ongoing attacks in the Red Sea launched from the Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen, with the support of Iran, and the hijackings of commercial vessels by Somali pirates, from the Red Sea to the northwestern Indian Ocean, pose a significant threat to freedom of navigation, maritime security and international trade; whereas additional attacks by various Iran-backed militias in Iraq and Syria are further increasing the risk of regional escalation; whereas the EU has launched its own military operation, EUNAVFOR ASPIDES, to improve the security situation in the area;

I. whereas the eastern neighbourhood and Western Balkan countries face increasingly diverse threats to their security and are being negatively affected by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as the increased assertiveness of regional and global actors, such as China; whereas Kosovo and the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue face, in particular, threats of destabilisation;

J. whereas the disastrous impact of past or ongoing wars, instability, insecurity, poverty and climate change in the Sahel region, northeast Africa and Libya, poses serious risks to EU security and its economic and trade interests; whereas the instability and insecurity in the southern neighbourhood and the Sahel region are closely interlinked with and remain an ongoing challenge for EU external border management; whereas the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya and EUNAVFOR MED Operation IRINI are contributing to sustainable peace, security and stability by implementing the arms embargo, fighting illicit weapons and human trafficking, and training the Libyan coastguard;

K. whereas a part of Cyprus, an EU Member State, still remains under illegal occupation by Türkiye;

L. whereas the Arctic region is becoming increasingly important for geopolitics, economic development and transport, while, at the same time, it is facing challenges linked to climate change, militarisation and migration;

M. whereas past underinvestment in defence by EU Member States has led to an investment gap; whereas the Member States have agreed on more, better and smarter defence spending; whereas in 2024, 16 EU Member States that are also NATO allies, compared to 9 in 2023, were expected to exceed the NATO guidelines to spend at least 2 % of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence; whereas an increasing number of experts consider defence investments of 3 % of GDP to be a necessary objective in the light of the direct threat that Russia poses to the EU and its Member States;

N. whereas in 2023, Parliament and the Council concluded agreements on the European defence industry reinforcement through a common procurement act (EDIRPA) and the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), which, as short-term and emergency measures, aim to encourage the joint procurement of defence products, ramp up the European defence industry’s production capacity, replenish depleted stocks and reduce fragmentation in the defence-procurement sector;

O. whereas in 2024, the Commission issued proposals for establishing a European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and a European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), addressing, in particular, the upgrade of EU security and defence capabilities;

P. whereas building defence capabilities and adapting them to military needs requires a common strategic culture, shared threat perception and solutions to be developed and combined in doctrine and concepts;

Q. whereas the exception to the EU budget funding principle set out in Article 41(2) TEU applies to expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications only; whereas in all other cases, the VP/HR, together with the Commission, where necessary, should propose that CFSP- or CSDP-related expenditure be financed through the EU budget; whereas Articles 14(1) and 16(1) TEU establish a balance between Parliament and the Council as regards their budgetary functions; whereas the current practice does not reflect this balance;

R. whereas the Draghi report highlights a combination of structural weaknesses affecting the competitiveness of the EU’s Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), and identifies fragmentation, insufficient public defence spending and limited access to financing; whereas the European Investment Bank’s (EIB) lending policy excludes the financing of ammunition and weapons, as well as equipment or infrastructure exclusively dedicated to military and police use;

S. whereas the report by Mr Niinistö underlines the fact that the EU and its Member States are not yet fully prepared for the most severe cross-sectoral or multidimensional crisis scenarios, especially given the further deteriorating external environment; whereas the report states that many threats are already taking place continuously; whereas it insists that preparedness is needed to signal to potential adversaries that they will not be able to outlast the EU; whereas it deplores the fact that the Union lacks a common plan in the event of armed aggression and underlines that the EU needs to rethink the way it defines its security; whereas it underlines the importance of the EU being ready to act in support of a Member State in the event of external armed aggression and of further unlocking the EU’s potential for enhanced civil-military cooperation and dual-use infrastructure and technologies, through optimising the use of scarce resources and strengthening coordination mechanisms for the most severe crisis situations;

T. whereas the integration of artificial intelligence into the security and defence domain, including weapon technologies, impacts military operations by enabling autonomous systems, predictive analytics and enhanced decision-making capabilities to play a significant role in battlefields; whereas this development presents both unprecedented opportunities and profound risks;

U. whereas CSDP has 13 civilian missions, 8 military operations and 1 civilian-military mission under way, with around 5 000 personnel deployed on three continents; whereas reviews by the European External Action Service (EEAS) state that these missions and operations persistently suffer from Member States not delivering on their pledges to provide sufficient military or civilian personnel; whereas they also lack rapid decision-making and suffer from a lack of flexibility and adaptation to the specific local needs on the ground; whereas such obstacles limit the overall effectiveness of CSDP missions and operations; whereas one of the objectives of the Strategic Compass is to reinforce EU civilian and military CSDP missions and operations by providing them with more robust and flexible mandates, promoting rapid and more flexible decision-making processes and ensuring greater financial solidarity; whereas EU missions and operations are often targeted by hybrid threats, including disinformation, jeopardising their effectiveness in stabilising the countries in which they are deployed and, instead, reinforcing pre-existing instability, often benefiting malicious non-state actors;

V. whereas CSDP missions and operations greatly strengthen the resilience and stability of the European neighbourhood, including in the Mediterranean, the Western Balkans, the Eastern Partnership countries, the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa, by providing services such as military, police, coastguard, border management training and capacity building;

W. whereas the EU assistance to the Libyan coastguard is provided through the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya) and EUNAVFOR MED Operation IRINI; whereas the main goal of EUNAVFOR MED IRINI is to support the implementation of the UN Security Council’s arms embargo on Libya; whereas the Council of the EU extended the mandate of EUNAVFOR MED IRINI until 31 March 2025, including the task of training the Libyan coastguard and navy;

X. whereas the EUFOR Althea operation sets a path towards peace, stabilisation and the European integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and still plays a pivotal role in ensuring the security and stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region;

Y. whereas on 17 May 2024, the EU ended the mandate of the EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM); whereas on 30 June 2024, it ended the mandate of the European Union military partnership mission in Niger (EUMPM) and on 30 September 2024, it ended the ground mission of personnel from the EU Capacity Building Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger);

Z. whereas the EU will allocate EUR 1.5 billion for the 2021-2027 period to support conflict prevention, peace and security initiatives at national and regional level in sub-Saharan Africa; whereas additional support is also provided in Africa under the European Peace Facility (EPF), which enables the EU to provide all kinds of equipment and infrastructure to the armed forces of EU partners;

AA. whereas the EU and its Member States are facing increasing hybrid attacks on their soil, including FIMI, political infiltration and sabotage, aimed at undermining sound political debate and the trust of EU citizens in democratic institutions, as well as creating divisions in European societies and between nations; whereas in the years to come, hybrid threats will involve increased use of the systematic combination of information warfare, agile force manoeuvre, mass cyberwarfare and emerging and disruptive technologies, from seabed to space, with the deployment of advanced space-based surveillance and strike systems, all of which will be enabled by advanced AI, quantum computing, increasingly ‘intelligent’ drone swarm technologies, offensive cyber capabilities, hypersonic missile systems and nanotech- and bio-warfare; whereas Russia and China have demonstrated increased use of hybrid tools to undermine the security and stability of the EU;

AB. whereas the Russian Federation makes use of private military companies (PMCs), such as Africa Corps and the Wagner Group, as part of a hybrid warfare toolbox to maintain plausible deniability while exerting influence in various regions and gaining access to natural resources and critical infrastructure; whereas Africa Corps and the Wagner Group have reportedly committed atrocities in Ukraine, Mali, Libya, Syria and the Central African Republic; whereas the Russian Federation has reinforced anti-European sentiments, especially in countries with a strong European presence or hosting CSDP missions;

AC. whereas on 7 March 2024, Sweden joined NATO as a new member, following Finland which joined in 2023; whereas security and defence cooperation with partners and allies is crucial to the EU’s ambition of becoming an international security provider and constitutes an integral pillar of the CSDP; whereas cooperation with the UN, NATO, the African Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as numerous allies and like-minded partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, Ukraine, Moldova, the Western Balkan countries, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and certain Latin American countries, among others, is crucial to the successful implementation of the CSDP;

The consequences of a changing geopolitical paradigm for European security

1. Stresses the seriousness of the threats to the security of the European continent, which have reached a level unprecedented since the Second World War; expresses deep concern at the rise of geopolitical fractures, new and renewed imperialist ambitions for domination by authoritarian powers, systemic rivalry of great powers, nationalist unilateralism, the spread of terrorism, including jihadist terrorism, and the primary and growing use of force and violence by certain malicious actors to promote their political and economic objectives and interests or to resolve disputes;

2. Believes that the geopolitical theatres in Ukraine, the Middle East and the South China Sea and the Indo-Pacific are increasingly interconnected as Russia and China, in particular, are deepening their ties, and pose significant challenges to global peace and security and the rules-based international order that must be addressed by the international community; highlights the increase in attacks and hybrid threats aimed at undermining democratic values and structures, among other things, during elections, as well as the cohesion of and citizens’ adhesion to European values-based societies and the rule of law; believes that this trend amounts to a paradigm shift, as it reverses the logic of building international security on the basis of respect for international law, a rules-based international order and multilateralism;

3. Recognises the evolving nature of global security threats and emphasises the crucial role that diplomacy, development cooperation and arms control and disarmament play alongside military efforts in ensuring long-lasting international peace and security; notes, however, the limited impact of diplomatic efforts aimed at building peace and security in recent times; underscores that sustainable global peace and stability cannot be achieved through military measures alone, but require comprehensive strategies that address the key drivers of instability, such as poverty, inequality, governance failures and climate change; stresses that the EU’s Global Gateway initiative and other development programmes should be aligned with security objectives, fostering resilient societies by promoting inclusive economic growth, good governance and human rights;

The EU’s response: a new era of European security and defence

4. Emphasises the absolute need for the EU to recognise and meet the challenges posed by the multiple and constantly evolving threats to its security, and, for this purpose, to engage in improved and new policies and actions that enable the EU and its Member States to collectively and coherently strengthen their defence in Europe, in order to ensure the security of all EU Member States and their citizens, as well as enhancing their ability to act at the global level;

5. Recalls the importance of the EU achieving greater strategic autonomy and defence readiness, as outlined in the Strategic Compass, to ensure that its objectives are aligned with the collective and sovereign interests of its Member States and the broader vision of European security and defence; acknowledges, in this regard, that some Member States have long-standing policies of military neutrality, and respects the right of every Member State to determine its own security policy;

6. Emphasises the importance of continuing to operationalise Article 42(7) TEU on mutual assistance, ensuring solidarity among Member States, especially those whose geographical position leaves them directly exposed to imminent threats and challenges, and regardless of whether they are NATO members; calls for concrete steps towards developing a true EU solidarity policy, including by clarifying the practical arrangements in the event of a Member State activating Article 42(7) TEU and the coherence between Article 42(7) TEU and Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty;

7. Notes the overall limited progress and underinvestment in the development of a common European defence capability, industrial capacity and defence readiness since the CSDP’s establishment 25 years ago; notes, with regret, that despite the ambition of framing a common Union defence policy, as laid out in Article 42(2) TEU, concrete steps are still missing;

8. Insists on the need for a truly common approach, policies and joint efforts in the area of defence as well as a paradigm shift in the EU’s CSDP that enable the EU to act decisively and effectively in its neighbourhood and on the global stage, safeguard its values, interests and citizens and promote its strategic objectives; underlines the importance of presenting the EU as a strong and united international actor, capable of acting more strategically and autonomously, defending itself against potential enemy attacks and supporting its partners, and delivering peace, sustainable development and democracy; stresses the utmost importance of the EU and its Member States continuing to work on creating a common strategic culture in the area of security and defence; underlines the need for the Member States to collectively reflect on the future of their deterrence policies and doctrines, as well as their adaptation to the changing security environment in Europe; stresses, further, that in order to develop coherent foreign and defence policies, the EU must strengthen its democratic and independent structures, decision-making processes and operational autonomy;

9. Welcomes the objective of the Commission President to usher in a new era for European defence and security, by building a true European defence union; welcomes the appointment of Andrius Kubilius, the first-ever Commissioner for Defence and Space, tasked with working jointly with the VP/HR on a white paper on the future of European defence within the first hundred days of their mandate; stresses the need for the EU and its Member States, acting to define the European defence union, to take priority measures and prepare future actions in order to ensure the defence readiness of the EU, notably with regard to the threat posed by Russia, and to bolster deterrence and enhance operational capabilities as a tool of defence in wartime, while meeting civilian and humanitarian needs, and thus leveraging the concept of ‘dual-use’;

10. Calls for the EU and its Member States to accelerate their commitments made in the Versailles Declaration and to assume greater responsibility for their defence and security, including by achieving greater strategic autonomy and bolstering defence and deterrence capabilities, in particular on its eastern borders; stresses that NATO and the transatlantic partnership with the United States remain the cornerstones of European collective defence and that the EU and NATO play complementary, coherent and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security; stresses the need for EU Member States and the EU as a whole to step up their efforts through increased and targeted joint investments, joint procurement of defence products that are, for the most part, designed and manufactured in the EU, and the development of more joint capabilities, via, inter alia, pooling and sharing, thereby strengthening their armed forces whether for national, NATO or EU operational purposes;

11. Concurs with the ambition of strengthening the European pillar within NATO and stresses that the development of a European defence union should go hand-in-hand with the deepening of EU-NATO cooperation, making full use of the unique capacities of each organisation;

12. Stresses the need for close coordination on deterrence and collaboration between the EU and NATO with regard to developing coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities and reinforcing industrial production capacities; stresses that a European pillar within NATO notably consists of jointly acquiring strategic enablers or strategic weapons systems, which are often too expensive for a single member state, such as air-to-air refuelling capability, command and control capability, hypersonic weapons, layered air defence, electronic warfare capabilities and air and missile defence systems; believes that the European added value lies in jointly developing or buying these enablers and systems that individual EU Member States severely lack; points out that EU capability development strengthens the European pillar within NATO and contributes accordingly to transatlantic security; calls for the establishment of a regular conference between the EU and NATO in order to ensure close coordination and complementarity between both organisations and their member states in their efforts to strengthen capability development and armaments, while avoiding unnecessary and dysfunctional duplication; calls on the Commission and the Council to ensure that EU efforts in defence capability development are coherent with the objectives of the NATO Defence Planning Process; calls, further, for all EPF support for the provision of equipment to be carried out in coordination with NATO to increase efficiency and avoid unnecessary duplication;

Enhancing European security: supporting Ukraine by providing military capabilities in order to end Russia’s war of aggression

13. Reaffirms its unwavering support for the EU and its Member States to stand in solidarity with Ukraine in the face of Russia’s war of aggression and to provide Ukraine with the necessary military means and in the time it needs to defend itself, repel the Russian Armed Forces and their proxies, end the conflict, protect its sovereignty and restore its territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders; welcomes the joint security commitments between the EU and Ukraine, and the bilateral security agreements concluded by Ukraine with several Member States; underlines that such commitments and agreements are part of a wider internationally coordinated package of security guarantees for Ukraine, including the G7’s launch of a multilateral framework for the negotiation of bilateral security commitments and arrangements for Ukraine; believes that without decisive EU military support, Ukraine will not be able to achieve victory against Russia; strongly reiterates its call for EU Member States to urgently meet their commitments and deliver weapons, fighter aircrafts, drones, air defence, weapon systems and ammunition to Ukraine, including air-launched cruise missiles and surface-to-surface systems, and to significantly increase the relevant quantities; notes the successful delivery of 1 million rounds of artillery ammunition to Ukraine as agreed in March 2023 by the Council, despite the regrettable nine-month delay; acknowledges the notable advancements in the EU’s artillery ammunition production capacity, which contribute to the EU’s preparedness and ability to support Ukraine; stresses the importance of enhancing Ukraine’s anti-drone capabilities as a critical element in countering aerial threats and maintaining operational security; calls for the provision of specialised equipment and expertise to enable Ukrainian forces to swiftly identify, track and respond to hostile drone activities, ensuring robust protection for both military and civilian infrastructure; calls for the Member States to lift all restrictions hindering Ukraine from using Western weapons systems against legitimate military targets within Russia, in accordance with international law; calls on the Council to commit to transferring all confiscated military equipment or ammunition from EU operations and missions within and outside the EU to Ukraine; reiterates its position that all EU Member States and NATO allies should collectively and individually commit to supporting Ukraine militarily with no less than 0.25 % of their GDP annually;

14. Calls for the EU and its Member States to support Ukraine in expanding the international coalition in support of its victory plan and peace formula, presented by the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, as the only viable route to restoring Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity on the basis of international law, and thereby holding Russia, its leadership and its accomplices, in particular the Belarusian regime, to account for waging a war of aggression against Ukraine and committing war crimes and the crime of aggression, and ensuring Russian reparations and other payments for the extensive damage caused in Ukraine; emphasises that all initiatives aimed at ending the conflict must have the support of Ukraine and, ultimately, its people;

15. Calls on the VP/HR to mobilise more diplomatic support for Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia, using the full spectrum of the diplomatic toolbox, and encouraging EU Member States to consider imposing secondary sanctions; deplores the fact that some components of Western origin have been found in weapons and weapon systems used by Russia against Ukraine, and calls for the EU and its Member States to implement sanctions more rigorously;

16. Strongly condemns the role that North Korea plays in aiding Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine through the training of North Korean troops and their deployment to Russia to directly participate in the war or support the Russian Armed Forces; also condemns, in the strongest possible terms, North Korea’s supply of military equipment and weaponry actively deployed on the battlefield, and its involvement in sanctions evasion; considers North Korea’s actions a blatant violation of international norms and warns of the dangerous and significant risk of escalation that they pose to Europe and the broader international community; underlines, with serious concern, the risk that North Korea is using the battlefield in Ukraine as a platform to study advanced combat tactics, including drone warfare, with the intention of applying these techniques in potential future conflicts; expresses its outrage at the fact that several other rogue states are actively supporting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including Iran, among others; condemns, in this regard, Iran’s transfer of Shahed drones, ammunition and ballistic missiles to Russia, heightening the risk of potential military intervention by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; firmly believes that the EU and the international community must firmly respond to this with a combination of diplomatic, military and economic measures, and, most importantly, by providing increased support to Ukraine to strengthen its defence against this alliance of rogue states that Russia has built up; underlines the importance of closely liaising with the 2025-2029 US Administration in this regard;

17. Stresses the importance of the EPF, which has been instrumental in supporting the provision of military capabilities and training to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, while facilitating coordination for all stakeholders through the clearing house mechanism within the EU Military Staff; welcomes the establishment of the dedicated Ukraine Assistance Fund under the EPF and calls for an increase in financial resources for military assistance to Ukraine through this instrument, while also providing a medium-term financial perspective; urges the Hungarian Government to immediately cease its efforts to hinder the EU’s actions in support of Ukraine and to lift its veto on the extension of the EU’s sanctions renewal period and the EPF military support to Ukraine, including the agreed reimbursement to EU Member States for the military aid they have delivered; expresses its deep concern that the veto by the Hungarian Government has blocked the opening of a new tranche of expenditure to support the Ukrainian Armed Forces and has prevented the release of EUR 6.6 billion in partial reimbursement to the EU Member States providing military support to Ukraine; urges the Council and the VP/HR to find innovative solutions capable of lifting these blockages and offsetting these funding cuts; encourages the Member States to develop scenario-based and predictable inventories of military capabilities that can be provided under the EPF to ensure that the short-term provision of capabilities is rapidly sourced from Member States and delivered without delay, and that the long-term provision of capabilities that assist Ukraine in restoring deterrence is provided in a foreseeable time frame, in coordination with non-EU countries, when necessary; appreciates that all military assistance and weapon deliveries under the EPF have been in full compliance with the EU Common Position on arms exports, international human rights law and humanitarian law, while ensuring adequate transparency and accountability;

18. Highlights the outcome of the NATO Washington Summit, which reaffirmed that Ukraine’s future is in NATO and that the alliance supports Ukraine’s right to choose its own security arrangements and decide its own future, free from outside interference; concurs that both the EU and NATO have demonstrated political unity in solidarity with and commitment to supporting Ukraine; reiterates its belief that Ukraine is on an irreversible path to NATO membership; welcomes the allies’ pledge of long-term security assistance for the provision of military equipment, assistance and training for Ukraine; recognises the crucial role of NATO, EU-NATO cooperation and NATO allies such as the US and the UK, in coordinating efforts to support Ukraine militarily not only through the supply of weapons, ammunition and equipment, but also intelligence and data;

19. Welcomes the Council’s decision of 21 May 2024, ensuring that the net profits stemming from extraordinary revenues generated by immobilised Russian Central Bank (RCB) assets in the EU, as a result of the implementation of the EU restrictive measures, are used for further military support to Ukraine, as well as its defence industry capacities and reconstruction; also welcomes the agreement reached with the Council, which led to the Council’s decision of 23 October 2024 to adopt a financial assistance package, including an exceptional macro-financial assistance loan of up to EUR 35 billion and the establishment of a Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism that will use contributions raised from the profits of immobilised RCB assets and support Ukraine in repaying loans of up to EUR 45 billion from the EU and its G7 partners; recalls, however, that the mobilisation of this financial assistance will be at the expense of the sum earmarked for EU military support via the Ukraine Facility, which will now only benefit from a maximum of 15 % of the profits from the immobilised RCB assets;

20. Welcomes the achievements of the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM), which, to date, has trained more than 70 000 Ukrainian soldiers on EU territory, thereby making the EU the biggest provider of military training to Ukraine and significantly contributing to enhancing the military capability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces; takes note of the new goal of training 75 000 Ukrainian soldiers by the end of winter 2024/2025; welcomes the Council’s decision of 8 November 2024 to extend the mandate of the mission for two years; calls for EUMAM’s financial, logistical and human resources to be expanded and adapted to the evolving military training needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, including in the air and maritime defence domains, as well as to the requested long-term reform efforts in line with the joint security commitments between the EU and Ukraine; welcomes the Member States’ strong participation in EUMAM, which can be described as a template for future military training missions, advancing deterrence by significantly enhancing interoperability between Member States and partners, and calls on the Member States to demonstrate similar ambition and contributions to other current and future CSDP missions and operations; emphasises that EUMAM should also act as a platform for the exchange of best practices to ensure that European forces also benefit from the lessons learnt on the battlefield by the Ukrainian Armed Forces; welcomes the launch of the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), announced at the NATO Washington Summit, which coordinates the provision of military training and equipment for Ukraine by NATO allies and partners and provides logistical support; stresses the importance of close coordination between EUMAM and NSATU;

21. Commends the work of the European Union Advisory Mission Ukraine (EUAM) in implementing, in difficult conditions, its newly reinforced mandate; calls for the EU to ensure that EUAM can operate with the adequate financial, logistical and expert personnel to meet Ukraine’s needs, and welcomes the participation of non-EU countries in this regard; stresses the importance of EUAM and its role as the largest EU footprint on the ground, providing strategic advice to Ukraine’s national and state security authorities; highlights EUAM’s key tasks in combating organised and cross-border crimes, restoring public services in liberated territories and supporting the investigation and prosecution of international crimes, building on EUAM’s presence and expertise;

22. Stresses the importance of cooperation with and the gradual integration of the Ukrainian defence industry into the EU’s defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) and, to this end, calls for Ukraine’s defence to be fully taken into account in the preparation of the Commission’s new legislative initiatives aimed at strengthening the EDTIB; stresses that concrete steps should be taken towards Ukraine’s integration into EU defence policies and programmes during Ukraine’s EU accession process, including by adapting the Ukrainian Armed Forces to EU capability requirements and involving them in cross-border defence industrial and technological cooperation projects and programmes; welcomes, in this respect, the opening of the EU Defence Innovation Office in Ukraine to identify Ukrainian needs and capacities in defence innovation, facilitate joint initiatives and promote cross-border cooperation between EU and Ukrainian defence industry stakeholders, and to be a focal point for Ukrainian partners, as well as a coordination and information hub; welcomes the ongoing initiatives of several EU Member States to deepen cooperation with Ukraine in the field of defence research and industrial production, and calls for further use of Ukraine’s innovative defence potential to develop weapons and ammunition and to accelerate their production in close cooperation with the EU and other Western partners, using available support mechanisms; calls on the military industries of EU Member States to honour their commitment to establish military production on Ukrainian territory;

23. Emphasises the need to strengthen demining capabilities within Ukraine to address the widespread presence of unexploded ordnance and landmines, as well as to demine Ukraine’s seawaters in the Black Sea; advocates the allocation of dedicated resources to support comprehensive demining training, including advanced detection and disposal techniques; notes that enhanced demining capacity will not only facilitate safer military operations, but also support the recovery and safety of civilian areas affected by the war;

Joining forces to increase defence capabilities

24. Welcomes the ambition set out in the EDIS to achieve the defence readiness of the EU and its Member States and to boost the EDTIB; considers the Commission’s proposal to establish a European defence industry programme (EDIP) vital in that regard; supports the objectives of strengthening EU defence industrial preparedness, improving joint defence planning and further facilitating joint procurement by the Member States in line with the priorities set out in the capability development plan (CDP) and the areas for cooperation identified in the coordinated annual review on defence in order to launch European defence projects of common interest, in particular in strategic capability areas, such as air and missile defence, as well as to ensure security of supply and access to critical raw materials and to prevent shortages in defence production; strongly supports the idea of predominantly using EU-level cooperation in the European defence industrial sector, and supports the concrete quantified targets for cooperation presented in the EDIS, which focus in particular on joint procurement, specifically, inviting the Member States to procure at least 40 % of defence equipment in a collaborative manner by 2030, to ensure that, by 2030, the value of intra-EU defence trade represents at least 35 % of the value of the EU defence market, and to procure at least 50 % of their defence investments within the EU by 2030 and 60 % by 2035;

25. Highlights the importance of the permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) for improving and harmonising the EU’s defence capabilities; notes again, with regret, that the Member States continue not to make full use of the PESCO framework and that tangible results within the currently 66 ongoing projects remain limited; further notes with regret the lack of information provided to Parliament about the reasons for the closure of six projects and their possible results; points out that the participating Member States agreed to 20 binding commitments in order to fulfil the EU’s ambition in defence; considers it necessary to conduct a thorough review of PESCO projects with regard to results and prospects, with a view to streamlining the current set of projects to a small set of priority projects while closing projects that lack sufficient progress; suggests establishing a priority scheme within PESCO in order to effectively address the identified capability gaps and priorities;

26. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for an EDIP; notes with concern the assessment of the European Court of Auditors that the financial envelope of the EDIP is insufficient given its objectives, and therefore reiterates its call to ensure the required funding for defence; stresses that substantial budgetary efforts will be necessary for the EDIP to have a significant effect on military support for Ukraine, the development of a genuine EU defence capability and a competitive EDTIB; welcomes the 2023 revision of the CDP; regrets the limited progress made on capability development since the adoption of the first CDP in 2008; calls on the Member States to significantly increase joint efforts to achieve timely substantial progress by making full and coherent use of EU instruments, including the European Defence Fund (EDF), PESCO and the coordinated annual review on defence, as well as the instruments put forward in the EDIP proposal;

27. Welcomes the joint efforts undertaken thus far to strengthen the EU’s defence readiness through measures reinforcing and supporting the adaptation of the EDTIB, notably through the EDIRPA and ASAP regulations, and calls for their swift implementation; regrets that the financial envelope of EDIRPA remains limited and points out that the role of ASAP in relation to the ambition of supplying Ukraine with one million pieces of ammunition was restrained by the Council’s objection to its regulatory elements;

28. Welcomes the efforts and investments made thus far by companies of the EDTIB to reinforce industrial capacity, including with the support of EU instruments; highlights that further and lasting reinforcement of the EDTIB’s capacity requires first and foremost orders by the Member States, which should be conducted jointly in order to ensure the Union’s defence readiness, improve interoperability between Member States’ armed forces and achieve economies of scale, thus making the most of EU taxpayers’ money; calls, accordingly, on the Member States to intensify joint procurement efforts in line with the capability gaps identified in the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and the capability priorities of the CDP; underlines that effective joint procurement with regard to development projects, especially in the framework of the EDF, requires a joint definition of the military requirements of the respective systems in order to achieve adequate economies of scale; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to draw on the EU Military Committee’s expertise to produce such a joint definition in order to ensure military coherence at the industrial level; calls on the Member States to engage in joint procurement with a view to establishing pan-European value chains by distributing production throughout the Union and thereby increasing the economic attractiveness of joint procurement, while building strategic redundancies into production capacities for greater resilience in the event of an armed conflict; further calls on the Member States and the Commission to aim for a further strengthening of joint procurement mechanisms and sufficient coordination by the European Defence Agency;

29. Underlines the need to further support the transition of development projects to marketable solutions and welcomes the provision in the EDIP proposal in that regard; deplores the unnecessary and dysfunctional duplication of efforts with regard to the projects on the future main battle tank and the hypersonic interceptor; voices its concern that such duplications counteract the ambition laid out in the EDIS to procure 60 % from the EDTIB by 2035, as scattered resources will extend the time required to achieve marketable solutions, thus most likely leading to procurement from the United States; regrets, similarly, the mounting delays in essential capability projects, notably the Franco-German project on the Main Ground Combat System and the Franco-German-Spanish project on the Future Combat Air System, which also entail the risk of the future procurement of US solutions; stresses that all possible synergies with the EDF should be used, while avoiding the duplication of efforts;

30. Stresses the need to ensure the coherence of output between respective EU and NATO capability development planning processes; calls for the interoperability of military equipment from EU Member States and NATO Allies to be improved and for industrial cooperation to be fostered by ensuring that future EU legal standards for defence products components and ammunition are based on the NATO standards; stresses that European defence projects of common interest, as defined in the EDIP proposal, should be implemented in close coordination with NATO;

31. Highlights the vital necessity of overcoming the fragmentation of the EU’s defence industrial landscape and of finally achieving the full implementation of the EU’s internal market for defence products, as the current structure leads to unnecessary duplications and the multiplication of inefficiencies in defence investments and their use, and structurally hampers the strengthening of defence readiness; is concerned that the internal market for defence products is still undermined by insufficiently harmonised application of its rules by the Member States and by disproportionate use of the exemption provided for in Article 346 TFEU; endorses the call for the creation of a true single market for defence products and services, as also presented in Mr Niinistö’s report; emphasises the need for a newly updated and effective regulatory framework aimed at reducing barriers for market entry for defence products, enabling EU defence industrial consolidation and permitting EU companies to fully exploit business potential, encouraging innovation and more and smoother cross-border as well as civil and military cooperation, boosting production, increasing security of supply and ensuring smarter and more efficient public investments in the EDTIB; underlines, at the same time, the importance of maintaining fruitful competition between different competitors and of avoiding oligopolies in which individual providers can freely determine the prices and availability of defence goods; calls on the Commission to present proposals to complete the EU internal market for defence, based, in particular, on an assessment of EU rules for defence procurement and transfer of defence-related products, and on the identification and analysis of limitations and loopholes in the current legal framework; further calls on the Commission to make suggestions for an interpretation of Article 346 TFEU in line with the current reality of an interdependent security architecture in the EU; calls for the implementation of Directive 2009/81/EC on defence and sensitive security procurement [25] and Directive 2009/43/EC on intra-EU transfers of defence-related products [26] (the Transfers Directive) to be improved, and where needed, in the light of the EDIS, for proposals for the revision of these directives to be submitted;

32. Stresses the importance of ensuring a balanced effort between strengthening the existing armament industrial capabilities of the Member States in the short- and medium-term and supporting research and development (R&D) for new and innovative military equipment and armament tailored to the present and future needs of the armed forces of the Member States and to EU defence capabilities, such as those required by CSDP missions and operations and the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC); emphasises that priority should be given to keeping and enhancing the technological advantage through targeted strategic projects as a key element in deterrence with regard to our adversaries and competitors; underlines the importance of including all Member States in security and defence strategies, particularly with regard to the development of the defence industry;

33. Stresses the need to develop an effective EU-level armaments policy that includes the establishment of a functioning and effective external trade dimension, is aimed at supporting partners that face threats by aggressive authoritarian regimes, and prevents arms deliveries to undemocratic aggressive regimes in line with the eight existing EU criteria; stresses the need to overcome the very narrow and national interpretation of Article 346 TFEU in this regard;

34. Stresses that cooperation with international partners in the defence sector should be limited to like-minded partners and should not contravene the security and defence interests of the EU and its Member States; recalls that dependencies on high-risk suppliers of critical products with digital elements pose a strategic risk that should be addressed at EU level; calls on the Member States’ relevant authorities to reflect on how to reduce these dependencies and undertake an immediate assessment and review of existing Chinese investments in critical infrastructure, including power grids, the transport network and information and communication systems, to identify any vulnerabilities that could impact the security and defence of the Union;

35. Welcomes the revision of the EU’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Regulation; stresses the need to further strengthen FDI screening procedures by incorporating due diligence standards to identify cases where governments of states hold leverage over investors in EU critical infrastructure, such as European ports, and in undersea cables in the Baltic, Mediterranean and Arctic seas in ways that would contravene the security and defence interests of the Union and its Member States, as established within the framework of the CFSP pursuant to Title V of the TEU; underlines that this approach should also be applied to candidate countries; believes that additional legislation is needed to effectively protect the security of European ICT supply chain from high-risk vendors and protect against cyber-enabled intellectual property theft; calls for the creation of a European framework aimed at closely regulating and setting minimum standards and conditions for the export of intellectual property and technologies that are critical to the security and defence of the Union, including dual-use goods;

Research and development for defence technology and equipment

36. Supports a significant increase in investments in defence R&D, with a particular emphasis on collaborative initiatives, thereby strengthening the EU’s technological leadership and competitiveness in defence and ensuring a spillover effect in the civilian marketplace; notes, in this regard, that in 2022, the Member States invested approximately EUR 10.7 billion in defence R&D; underlines that technological advancement in critical domains – air, land, maritime, space and cyber – requires stable long-term investment across the Member States to keep pace with rapid global innovation;

37. Stresses the need for EU R&D instruments and funding to be used as effectively as possible in order to address capability gaps and priorities in a timely manner as laid out in the Defence Investment Gap Analysis and the CDP; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Member States to align EDF projects and funding with the EU’s urgent capability needs and prioritise them on this basis, and to focus on the most relevant and promising research activities; further calls on the Commission to initiate a thorough review of the EDF in view of a revised follow-up financial instrument for the next multiannual financial framework (MFF); calls on the Commission and the Member States to adopt an approach that incorporates a low energy, carbon and environmental footprint by design when implementing relevant EU funds and to regularly report on progress; recalls that the R&D actions can be directed at solutions to improve efficiency, reduce the carbon footprint and achieve sustainable best practices; welcomes the relevant investment of EUR 133 million provided for in the first annual work programme, but notes that this represents only 11 % of the overall annual EDF budget; recalls the role of NextGenerationEU in climate action and calls on the Member States to use resources from their national recovery plans to invest in the sustainability of their military infrastructure;

Dual-use and emerging and disruptive technologies

38. Stresses the need to develop a more proactive role for the EU in sustaining investment in dual-use technologies, which can be applied in both civilian and military contexts, as a means to enhance the EU’s resilience against hybrid and emerging threats; underlines the need to support, in particular, the testing of prototypes of new products and to focus on new technologies in close cooperation with Ukrainian defence and technological actors; underlines the importance of ensuring the financial viability of companies, including small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), that invest in such innovation; advocates the promotion of civilian commercialisation of these technologies as a way to expand market opportunities and strengthen the European industrial base, fostering synergies between military and civilian development;

39. Highlights the important role that emerging disruptive technologies, such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, cloud computing and robotics, play in defence; stresses that the development and harnessing of these technologies in defence require further EU-coordinated investment and research efforts so that the defence equipment suppliers in the EU remain at the forefront of innovation; notes that under the current EDF Regulation, with its long implementation cycles, the Commission fails to provide funding to research projects in a timely manner; calls, therefore, for a more flexible and faster approach for research projects on emerging disruptive technologies, reflecting the increasing pace of developments in that field building on the work of the European Defence Agency’s Hub for European Defence Innovation and drawing on the work of the US Defence Advanced Research Project Agency; further calls for the EU to play a leading role in promoting research into the military applications of artificial intelligence and in establishing governance frameworks for the responsible development and use of this technology;

40. Reiterates its call on the Commission to share with Parliament a detailed analysis of the risks linked to the misuse, by our adversaries, of technologies such as semiconductors, quantum computing, blockchains, space, artificial intelligence and biotechnologies, including genomics, as well as the list of proposed EU actions in these fields, in line with the EU’s economic security strategy; is concerned about the role of Chinese military-linked companies in gathering the genetic data of EU citizens;

Defence SMEs

41. Reiterates that defence-related SMEs from across the Union are the backbone of the European defence industry and supply chains and are key to innovation in these areas, and emphasises the need to provide support to SMEs and start-ups, in particular, in the defence and dual-use sector; stresses that the EDIS and the EDIP must ensure a level playing field for all defence industry actors across the Union and promote cooperation between bigger and smaller companies from all Member States, ensuring that the industry will not be dominated by some large companies from a limited number of Member States; encourages the Member States to provide special opportunities for SMEs in the European defence sector to participate in the bidding process through such measures as creating a pre-approved list of companies to facilitate a faster engagement process, introducing private equity firms that invest in SMEs into the procurement process, assisting SME growth through incubation and capital investment, reducing the complexities of bidding for contracts, and implementing internal measures to reform the amount of time taken to process contract details;

Military mobility

42. Highlights the importance of developing, maintaining and protecting the infrastructure necessary to ensure the rapid and efficient military mobility of our armed forces across the Member States; underlines the need to ensure the resilience of critical infrastructure that allows military mobility and the provision of essential services; recognises that military logistics can contribute to deterrence by signalling the EU’s overall military preparedness;

43. Underlines the urgent need to substantially enhance and invest in military mobility, prioritising investments and removing bottlenecks and missing links; stresses, in this regard, the importance of swiftly implementing projects and regulatory measures in accordance with the EU Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0; supports new strategic investments in civil and military infrastructure, such as ports, airports and highways, which will also allow the smooth transfer of military units and supplies, including rapid reaction forces, heavy equipment, goods and humanitarian aid;

44. Calls on the Commission to develop an integrated approach to military mobility and logistics that ensures that the Council’s pledge to remove all remaining barriers by 2026 is upheld, and that coincides with much higher EU investment in key aspects of military mobility; further calls for the appropriate EU funding for ongoing and necessary military mobility projects to be secured in the next MFF; calls on the Member States to take further action to simplify and harmonise procedures for military mobility and shorten the timelines for granting permissions so that the Member States can act faster and increase their efficiency of response, in line with their defence needs and responsibilities, both in the context of CSDP missions and operations and in the context of national and multinational activities; encourages the Member States to use the third-country PESCO agreement on military mobility as a template for partner country participation, with an emphasis on tailoring PESCO projects to CSDP mission needs;

An updated Strategic Compass: promoting a common strategic vision and coherence, and improving EU decision-making on defence issues within the EU institutional framework

Strategic Compass

45. Stresses that geopolitical developments and threats have continued to evolve rapidly since the Strategic Compass was adopted by Member States in March 2022; calls, therefore, for a review of the comprehensive joint threat assessment enshrined in the Strategic Compass, from which priorities for EU action should derive; believes that this review exercise should serve to define common views on Europe-wide capability gaps, which should be addressed via bilateral, multinational or EU-level programmes, funds, projects and instruments, and set out the timeframe within which this should be done; calls, furthermore, for the Commission and the VP/HR to present updated measures for the Strategic Compass following this review exercise, if necessary, and for this to inform the preparation of the white paper on the future of European defence; reiterates that the Strategic Compass’s ambitious aims and milestones can only be achieved with corresponding political willingness and action on behalf of the Member States and the EU institutions; stresses the need for coherence and compatibility between the Strategic Compass and NATO’s Strategic Concept;

46. Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to ensure that the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap is fully implemented and is improved within the context of updated measures under the Strategic Compass; calls for the timeframes for reviewing the Roadmap to be reconsidered and, in particular, for the overall objectives to be reviewed much earlier than 2030; calls on the Member States to develop national structures in support of the objectives; urges the VP/HR to propose to the Member States an action programme composed of priority actions presented in the Roadmap that can be implemented in the short term;

Defence governance: consolidating the EU institutional framework and decision-making process in defence and security fields

47. Suggests that the Council review the institutional settings of its decision-making bodies competent for defence and security, and consider setting up a new permanent decision-making body made up of ministers of defence from Member States, without prejudice to the respective distribution of competences within national ministries in this regard;

48. Stresses that effective EU-level cooperation in the field of security and defence and swift, coordinated responses to security challenges require coherence between the different structures of the Council and the Commission; stresses, furthermore, the need to prevent overlaps, guarantee efficient public investments, address critical capabilities gaps and develop coherent security strategies with respect to partners, third countries and various regions of the world, both in policymaking processes and in current and future initiatives; notes the unclear division of portfolios and the potential overlap of competences among commissioners in the field of security and defence following the creation of the position of Commissioner for Defence and Space, and therefore calls on the Commission to clearly delineate the competences of the commissioners in this field; invites the Commission to carry out an internal review of its various structures, including the Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS) and the European Defence Agency, and of their mandates in order to ensure complementarity and the efficient administration of current and future initiatives under the CSDP; calls on the Member States and the Commission to dedicate further financial and human resources to the EEAS to ensure that it can effectively perform its role as the EU’s diplomatic service in the light of the highly competitive geopolitical context and the increased demands on its limited capacities in recent years;

49. Reaffirms that, in order to become a credible geopolitical player, the EU should reform its process for decision-making on the CFSP/CSDP and underlines, in this regard, that institutional reflections on lifting the requirement for unanimity in this process should be considered; recalls that the EU Treaty framework already allows a number of different institutional forms of cooperation in the field of foreign, security and defence policy and notes with regret that the potential for fast action in this field, as provided for in the ‘passerelle clauses’ of the TEU, has been used only in a very limited manner; calls on the Council to consider all possibilities to strengthen and deepen its process for decision-making on the CFSP/CSDP with a view to realising the untapped potential within the Treaties; reiterates its call for the Council to gradually switch to qualified majority voting for decisions on the CFSP and CSDP, at least in those areas that do not have military implications; suggests, furthermore, that the Council pursue making full use of the ‘passerelle clauses’ and the scope of articles that enhance EU solidarity and mutual assistance in the event of crises;

50. Strongly reiterates its call to strengthen the EU Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and achieve its full operational readiness, including through the provision of adequate premises, staff, enhanced command and control, and effective communication and information systems for all CSDP missions and operations; stresses the need to achieve timely results with regard to the MPCC, given the ambition of the Strategic Compass that the MPCC should function as the EU’s preferred command and control structure and be capable of planning and conducting all non-executive military missions and two small-scale or one medium-scale executive operation, as well as live exercises; stresses the need for the MPCC to facilitate synergies between civil and military instruments and calls for joint civil-military headquarters combining civil and military instruments to be set up at European level in the longer term, in order to make full use of the EU’s integrated approach in crisis management right from the strategic planning phase to the actual conduct of the mission or operation; takes the view that the EU’s Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) should consider how to protect a deployed force against multiple hybrid threats and conduct advanced operations at a far higher level of risk than in current contexts; calls on the Commission, the EEAS, the MPCC, the CPCC, the EU Military Committee and the EU Military Staff to foster a new culture of understanding between civilian and military partners, develop interagency cooperation and ensure the transfer of best practices in mission planning and the associated concepts, including by developing a model for generating and sharing best practices;

51. Reiterates its full support for the Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) to achieve full operational capability in the first half of 2025 at the latest, with at least 5 000 troops available for rescue and evacuation tasks, initial entry and stabilisation operations or the temporary reinforcement of missions; notes that EU Battlegroups, which have never been deployed despite being operational since 2007, will be an integral part of the wider EU RDC framework; welcomes the planning and realisation of live exercises within the framework of the RDC and encourages the continuation of such initiatives;

52. Considers the RDC to be a key element for achieving the EU’s level of ambition and believes that additional troops and force elements should gradually be assigned to it, with reference to the Helsinki Headline Goal of 1999; believes that it would make sense to use the White Paper process to launch a discussion about the creation of additional permanent multinational EU military units that could fulfil complementary tasks to the RDC; highlights the need to engage further with NATO on the establishment of the RDC, in line with the principle of the single set of forces;

53. Reiterates its call on the Member States to consider the practical aspects of implementing Article 44 TEU during the operationalisation of the RDC, as well as in other relevant CSDP missions, in order to enable a group of willing and capable Member States to plan and carry out a mission or operation within the EU framework, thereby facilitating the swift activation of the RDC; calls on the Member States to commit to substantially narrowing critical gaps in strategic enablers in a timely manner, in particular those linked to the RDC, such as strategic airlift, secure communications and information systems, medical assets, cyber-defence capabilities and intelligence and reconnaissance; calls on the Commissioner for Defence and Space to consider including, in his proposed European defence projects of common interest, initiatives aimed at providing the necessary strategic enablers that would facilitate CSDP missions and operations and the RDC;

Increasing resources dedicated to the EU common security and defence policy

54. Welcomes the increased budgets and investment in defence by Member States and the increase, albeit modest, in the EU budget for the CSDP in 2024; strongly believes that, in the light of unprecedented security threats, all EU Member States should urgently reach a level of defence spending, as a proportion of their GDP, that is significantly higher than NATO’s current target of 2 %; acknowledges that 23 of the 32 NATO Allies, including 16 countries that are members of both the EU and NATO, were expected to meet NATO’s spending target of devoting 2 % of their GDP to defence expenditure by the end of 2024; points out that this has increased sixfold since 2014, when this target was pledged; notes that the EU’s current budget for security and defence given the current geopolitical upheaval and Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, is not equal to the challenges to be met in the short and long term; recommends, in the light of the estimated need for EUR 500 billion of defence investment by 2035 and on the basis of continuous analysis of capability needs and gaps, that the Member States further increase defence investments, in particular for the joint procurement of defence capabilities, and fully supports the targets set under the EDIS in this respect;

55. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to initiate an open discussion on the basis of among other things, the recommendations presented in the reports by Mr Draghi and Mr Niinistö, including increasing the resources allocated to security and defence in the next MFF and exploring all effective funding options to this end, and pooling parts of national defence budgets at EU level in order to generate economies of scale; further calls on the Member States to amend the EPF financing process to ensure adequate and sustainable support for partners and allies, while also aligning with CSDP missions and operations; calls for a strategy to be devised with the aim of creating centres of excellence in different regions of the EU, without duplicating NATO’s work in these fields, in order to promote innovation and the participation of all Member States, ensuring that the capabilities and specialised knowledge of each Member State contribute to a more cohesive and integrated defence industrial base;

56. Recalls that the EU’s objectives of solidarity, cohesion and convergence also apply to defence; stresses that the financial means needed to rebuild and expand our defence capabilities in the decade to come will have a significant impact on the soundness and sustainability of public finances, and therefore requires cooperation and coordination at EU level through a genuine defence economic policy; underlines that increases in defence investment should not compete with other investment priorities, including social cohesion; further recalls that financing orientations should be anchored in a whole-of-society approach to resilience and therefore need to be broadly supported by European citizens, and that this support needs be sustainable in the long term; stresses that the financial burden must therefore be shared fairly, especially by profitable companies that already benefit from public participation or state aids; emphasises, furthermore, that public spending should be complemented by increased private funding; calls on the Commission to reflect upon possible fiscal avenues that would allow a fairer distribution of the financial burden and limit competition disturbances in the EDTIB induced by state aids and market-distorting tendering processes;

57. Calls for the next MFF to genuinely provide the means for a defence union; supports proposals to provide massive EU financial investment in European defence and to stimulate research and technological innovation and dual-use projects in the European defence industry, thereby strengthening its competitiveness and promoting advances that contribute both to security and to sustainable economic growth; underlines that defence investment from the EU budget should only complement, but not replace, financial efforts by the Member States, especially with regard to the ambition of countries that are members of both the EU and NATO to invest 2 % of their GDP in defence; invites the Member States to bring forward the re-assessment of the scope and definition of common costs, to enhance solidarity and stimulate participation in CSDP military missions and operations, and of exercise-related costs, in line with the Strategic Compass;

58. Is concerned about the lack of much-needed private financing for the EDTIB, particularly for SMEs, which may derive from a lack of long-term government contracts or from an overly narrow interpretation of environmental, social and governance criteria; welcomes, therefore, the clarification provided by the European Securities and Market Authority on 14 May 2024 to the effect that only companies involved in weapons banned under international law are automatically excluded from accessing funds; welcomes the proposals made in Mr Niinistö’s report to avoid fragmentation in defence spending, combine relevant funding streams and trigger more private-sector investment; calls on the Commission to assess the recommendations and come up with concrete proposals; highlights the need for the defence industry to get better access to capital markets;

EIB lending policy for the defence sector

59. Stresses the importance of access for the defence sector to the loans provided by the EIB as a catalyst for private investment in the European defence industry; welcomes the further extension of the EIB’s eligibility criteria to dual-use goods and calls on the EIB to take further measures in this regard; stresses that given that the EIB’s objective of promoting the development of the EU and supporting its policies, in particular defence policy and the strengthening of the EDTIB, in line with Article 309 TFEU, the EIB should further review its lending policy and continuously adapt it; calls on the EIB to conduct a review of the impact of the extension of its dual-use goods policy and to reform its eligibility list as appropriate so that ammunition and military equipment that go beyond dual-use application are no longer excluded from EIB financing; welcomes the EIB’s 2022 Strategic European Security Initiative aimed at supporting dual-use research, development and innovation, security infrastructure and technology projects focused on cybersecurity, New Space, artificial intelligence and quantum technologies;

Contributing more effectively to global security through EU common security and defence policy and strengthening the role of the EU as a security actor

De-escalation, preventing wars and supporting conflict resolution

60. Expresses its very strong concern about and condemnation of China’s support to Russia in its war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular through cooperation with Russia’s military industrial and technological base, the exportation of dual-use goods to Russia and the ongoing involvement of China-based companies in sanctions evasion and circumvention; expresses, in this regard, serious concern about recent reports claiming that China is producing long-range attack drones for use by Russia in its war of aggression against Ukraine, and demands that if China continues to support Russia’s armament efforts, this must have serious consequences for the EU’s external policy towards China; deplores the ‘no limits’ partnership between Russia and China and expresses serious concern about the renewed commitment by China and Russia to further strengthen their ties; welcomes the Council’s decision to impose sanctions on Chinese companies for their support for Russia’s war in Ukraine;

61. Is deeply concerned about China’s increasing investments in military capabilities and the militarisation of its supply chains to bolster its industry while taking advantage of the political and economic opportunities created by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; is also deeply concerned about the effect that European dependencies on China have on the credibility of the Member States’ ability to safeguard their national security and of the ability of the EU as a whole to effectively criticise and counter China’s economic coercion, possible further escalation with Taiwan and support to Russia; calls on the Commission and the Member States to seriously implement a policy of ‘de-risking’ with the aim of managing the risks coming from economic and technological engagement with China; calls, in this regard, for the risks posed by Chinese suppliers in EU critical infrastructure to be addressed, and for no EU funds or subsidies to be directed to advancing the position of these suppliers in Europe;

62. Strongly condemns China’s unwarranted military exercises of 14 October 2024 around Taiwan; condemns, furthermore, the increasing number of hostile acts being conducted by China against Taiwan, including cyberattacks, influence campaigns, the entry of Chinese warplanes into Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone and the severing of subsea cables; reaffirms its strong commitment to preserving the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and underscores that any attempt to unilaterally change it, particularly by means of force or coercion, will not be accepted and will be met with a decisive and firm reaction; lauds the restraint and disciplined reaction of the Taiwanese authorities and calls on the Chinese authorities to exercise restraint and avoid any actions that may further escalate cross-strait tensions; calls for regular exchanges between the EU and its Taiwanese counterparts on relevant security issues and for stronger cooperation on countering disinformation and foreign interference; stresses that any escalation in the Taiwan Strait would have detrimental effects on Europe’s security and economy and therefore urges the Commission to start developing contingency planning and mitigation measures on the basis of likely escalation scenarios, such as an economic blockade of Taiwan by China;

63. Expresses deep concern at China’s increasingly aggressive actions in the South China Sea and in the Indo-Pacific region, namely its use of military and economic coercion, hybrid warfare tactics, dangerous manoeuvres conducted by its navy and coast guard against its neighbours and island-building, in order to advance unlawful maritime claims and threaten maritime shipping lanes; points to reports that a Chinese-linked ship cut a Taiwanese undersea cable in early January 2025 and calls for a thorough investigation into the matter; calls, furthermore, for Taiwan and the EU to share information about such incidents; reiterates its strong interest in and support for freedom of navigation and maritime security everywhere, and notably in the South China Sea; calls on the Chinese authorities to put an end to all aggressive and provocative actions, in particular air and maritime operations in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, that endanger stability in the Indo-Pacific region and thereby undermine international peace and security, the sovereignty of countries in the region, the safety of life at sea and freedom of navigation in full compliance with UNCLOS; applauds the increase in freedom of navigation exercises conducted by several EU countries, including France, the Netherlands and Germany; notes that these activities are in line with international law and calls for more cooperation and coordination with regional partners, including through Coordinated Maritime Presences in the north-western Indian Ocean, among other areas, in order to increase freedom of navigation operations in the region;

64. Remains concerned about the political and economic pressure being exerted by China and Russia in Central Asia and stresses the need to scale up the EU’s presence in the region in response; underlines the EU’s interest in strengthening security cooperation, economic relations and political ties with the countries of Central Asia, including in order to address the circumvention of sanctions against Russia and Belarus;

65. Condemns Iran, in the strongest terms, for its destabilising activities in the Middle East region, including through its proxies, and for its continued support for terrorist groups, which pose a direct threat to regional, European and global security; condemns the growing military cooperation between Iran and Russia, in particular their intention to sign a treaty on a comprehensive strategic partnership; expresses, however, full support for and solidarity with Iran’s civil society and democratic forces and calls for increased international efforts to support these groups in their struggle for freedom and human rights; welcomes the EU’s decision to renew sanctions against Iran until July 2025, including by sanctioning Iran’s production of drones and missiles and its supply thereof to Russia and the wider Middle East region; points out that the sanction options that have not yet been exhausted include a much more restrictive approach to technology transfers through exports of products that are not categorised as dual-use;

66. Unequivocally condemns the Iranian Government for aiding and abetting internationally recognised terrorist organisations and networks that have perpetrated or attempted attacks within the EU, posing a direct threat to European security, sovereignty and stability; recalls, in this respect, that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps has been involved in planning and carrying out dozens of assassinations and terrorist attacks, including on EU soil, over the past 30 years and, more recently, in attacks against Jewish synagogues and individuals, as well as against Israeli embassies in several Member States; urges the EU and the Member States to enhance intelligence-sharing and counter-terrorism measures to prevent any future attacks; reiterates its long-standing call to add the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to the EU list of terrorist organisations and supports the initiatives taken by some Member States in this regard;

67. Considers Iran’s nuclear weapons programme to be one of the foremost threats to global security and stresses that if Iran succeeds in acquiring a nuclear breakout capability, it risks intensifying in belligerence and stepping up its state sponsorship of terrorism and proliferation of missiles and drones;

68. Reiterates its condemnation, in the strongest terms, of the despicable terrorist attacks perpetrated by the terrorist organisation Hamas against Israel on 7 October 2023, which contributed to further destabilisation in the Middle East, intensified by aggressions against Israel by Iranian proxies (such as terrorist organisations including Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen) and the Iranian regime itself; reiterates that Israel has the right to defend itself, as enshrined in and constrained by international law; calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all remaining hostages held by Hamas; calls for all parties to put an immediate end to all hostilities and fully abide by international law, including international humanitarian law; welcomes the recent ceasefire in Gaza and the progress made towards the phased release of hostages; emphasising that this represents a significant step in relieving the immense suffering endured by civilians on both sides over the past months; praises the commitment of mediators, including the United States, Egypt and Qatar, whose efforts were pivotal in achieving this breakthrough; considers that it is crucial that all obligations made under the deal are upheld, ensuring the release of all hostages, establishing a lasting cessation of violence and allowing unrestrained access of humanitarian and medical assistance to the Gaza Strip; calls for all parties to fully commit to their obligations and to prioritise the protection of civilians; urges all European and international actors to actively oversee the implementation of the ceasefire and hold accountable those who fail to comply with it;

69. Expresses its deep concern regarding the military escalation in the Middle East, which contributes to further destabilisation in the region; deplores the unacceptable number of civilian casualties, the forced displacement caused by the escalating violence and the persistent use of military force; expresses serious concern, furthermore, about the ongoing military action by the Israeli Defence Forces in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank; condemns the Israeli Defence Forces firing on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which is a grave violation of international law; reaffirms the essential stabilising role played by UNIFIL, to which 16 Member States contribute, in southern Lebanon; calls for immediate ceasefires in both Gaza and Lebanon, an end to the hostilities, the full and symmetrical implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701(2006) and the protection of the civilian populations; stresses the need for the EU and other international actors to assume greater responsibility and assist governments and civil society organisations in the Middle East with reaching durable and sustainable peace, in particular by continuing to support a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine, as well as by countering terrorism and radicalisation in the region; underscores that the evolution of conflicts in the region has repercussions on neighbouring regions and on Europe and poses security challenges for the EU with regard to the future of deterrence, humanitarian law and crisis management;

70. Urges the Council and the Member States to designate Hezbollah, in its entirety, as a terrorist organisation and to push for its full disarmament in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1701(2006); highlights recent decisions taken by several states, including the United States and Canada, to list Samidoun as a terrorist organisation acting as proxy of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; stresses that Samidoun was banned in Germany in 2023 and calls on other EU Member States to take similar measures by banning the organisation within their territory;

71. Notes that the Jordan-Syria border is being used as a crossing point for arms and drug trafficking; emphasises the need for the EU to further support Jordan, which has been weakened by the current crisis in the Middle East, and calls for the increased use of the EPF protect the Jordan-Syria border;

72. Recognises that Türkiye is a country of strategic relevance for the EU; notes that Türkiye is increasingly present in areas where the EU has key security interests and CSDP missions and operations, and notes with regrets the role that Türkiye plays in destabilising certain areas of concern for the EU and in its neighbourhoods; points out Türkiye’s illegal activities against the EU’s interests in the eastern Mediterranean, which violate international law, including UNCLOS; reiterates its condemnation of the signature of the memoranda of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on comprehensive security and military cooperation and on the delimitation of maritime zones, which are interconnected and are clear violations of international law, the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and the sovereign rights of EU Member States; deplores the fact that Türkiye undermines the effectiveness of EU sanctions against Russia and reiterates its call on Türkiye to fully align with these; calls on Türkiye to refrain from undermining EU CSDP missions and operations; reiterates its call on Türkiye to fulfil its obligation regarding the full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement with respect to all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus;

73. Deplores the fact that despite de-escalation efforts, Türkiye continues to retain the threat of casus belli against Greece and to illegally occupy the northern part of the Republic of Cyprus; strongly condemns Türkiye’s illegal activities in Cyprus, including its violation of the status of the buffer zone, its increasing militarisation of the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus and its efforts to upgrade the secessionist entity in the occupied area of Cyprus in violation of international law, noting that these activities that are not conducive to the resumption of the UN-led negotiations; condemns Türkiye’s continuous violations of UN Security Council resolutions 550(1984) and 789(1992), which call on Türkiye to transfer the area of Varosha to its lawful inhabitants under the temporary administration of the UN by supporting the opening of the town of Varosha to the public; strongly urges Türkiye, once more, to reverse its illegal and unilateral actions in Varosha; further calls on Türkiye to withdraw its troops from Cyprus;

74. Calls urgently for the resumption of negotiations on the reunification of Cyprus under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General and reaffirms its unconditional support for Cyprus in resolving the issue; calls on Türkiye to accept a fair, comprehensive and viable solution to this issue;

75. Calls for the EU to play a significant role in the Mediterranean and to become a security actor with the ability to guarantee the stability of the region and respect for international law and UNCLOS; welcomes, in this regard, the appointment of a Commissioner for the Mediterranean, working under the guidance and political steering of the VP/HR; stresses the need for the VP/HR, in cooperation with the Commissioner for the Mediterranean where necessary and in consultation with Member States, to develop a coherent security strategy with regard to the Mediterranean region and its neighbouring countries, including in North Africa, the Levant and the Sahel; calls for enhanced cooperation with partner countries in the Mediterranean to combat extremism, terrorism, the illicit trade in weapons and human trafficking;

76. Notes with concern the violations of migrants’ fundamental rights in Libya, as highlighted in UN Security Council Resolution 2755(2024); stresses the need to examine the role of CSDP missions and operations – EUBAM Libya and EUNAVFOR IRINI – in effectively fighting against the smuggling and trafficking of human beings, and their activities in relation to the need to protect migrants’ fundamental rights;

77. Notes that the rapid collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s criminal regime in Syria, which has been supported by the Kremlin since 2015, constitutes a significant political defeat for Vladimir Putin and threatens Russia’s strategic and military presence in Syria; recalls that since 2015, the Khmeimim and Tartus military bases have served as key points for Russian power projection in the Middle East and Africa; notes further that the Khmeimim and Tartus military bases were vital for the supply and transport of heavy weaponry and equipment to Russia’s private military companies, such as the Wagner Group and its operations in Libya, Mali, the Central African Republic, and Sudan; stresses that losing military bases in Syria could weaken Russia’s operational capacity and influence in Africa; calls, therefore, for the EU and its Member States to closely monitor the situation in Syria, make ties with the new Syrian regime conditional on Russia’s full withdrawal from the country and prevent Russia from establishing new military bases elsewhere in the region; recognises, in this regard, the EU’s significant leverage with regard to Syria in terms of political recognition, the easing of sanctions, trade agreements, and financial support for reconstruction, positioning the EU as an alternative to Türkiye in shaping Syria’s future;

78. Expresses its growing concern about and condemns the continuing attempts by Russia to destabilise the countries in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood through the use of FIMI, political assassinations, threats and territorial occupations in a bid to negatively impact their European aspirations and stability; underlines the need to reinforce the EU’s capacities to defend and develop democratic and value-based societies in the countries in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood;

79. Reaffirms the EU’s commitment to support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its internationally recognised borders and the efforts to reach a peaceful, lasting, comprehensive political settlement of the Transnistrian conflict; strongly condemns the constant and coordinated attempts by Russia, pro-Russian oligarchs and Russian-sponsored local proxies to destabilise the Republic of Moldova, sow divisions within Moldovan society and derail the country’s European course through hybrid attacks, the weaponisation of energy supplies, disinformation, bomb threats and staged protests, as well as the threat or use of violence; notes with concern that the Security and Intelligence Service of the Republic of Moldova has reported an unprecedented level of intensity in Russia’s actions aimed at anchoring Moldova within its sphere of influence; underlines that this hybrid threat is targeted at democratic processes and undermines European integration, including by amplifying radical separatist tendencies in the south of the country, particularly in Gagauzia, using propaganda, manipulating the information space, interfering in the electoral process and conducting subversive operations;

80. Reiterates its calls on Russia to withdraw its military forces and equipment from the territory of the Republic of Moldova, to ensure the full destruction of all ammunition and equipment in the Cobasna depot under international oversight and to support a peaceful resolution to the Transnistrian conflict, in line with the principles of international law; calls for enhanced EU support for Moldova in combating FIMI, hybrid threats and cyberattacks; urges the Member States to increase funding for the EPF to strengthen the defence capabilities of Moldova;

81. Recognises that Georgia was the first target, in 2008, of Russia’s full-scale military aggression and its attempts to forcefully redraw the borders of a sovereign state in Europe; stresses that since 2008, Russia has persisted in its illegal occupation of and effective control over the occupied regions of Georgia; underlines that Russia’s military presence and significant military build-up in the occupied regions, its unlawful activities, its continued borderisation activities along the administrative boundary lines and its human rights abuses in Georgia pose a serious risk to the country’s security and to the broader security framework of Europe; reiterates its calls on Russia to withdraw its military forces and equipment from the territory of Georgia;

82. Strongly condemns Russia’s shooting down of Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 on 25 December 2024, killing 38 of the 67 passengers on board; underlines that this highlights once more the brutal and belligerent nature of the Russian regime;

83. Urges the EU to continue its active engagement and take decisive steps, through its important instruments, to ensure that Russia fulfils its obligations under the EU-mediated ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008, in particular its obligations to withdraw all its military forces from the occupied regions of Georgia, to allow the deployment of international security mechanisms inside both Georgian regions and the EU Monitoring Mission’s unhindered access to the whole territory of Georgia, and to engage constructively in the Geneva International Discussions and the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms; calls on the EEAS to prepare a comprehensive report on violations of the 12 August 2008 ceasefire agreement, to identify and communicate clearly the provisions that have still not been fulfilled by Russia and to submit recommendations;

84. Condemns Azerbaijan for its continued efforts to undermine the possibility of regional peace and its continued threats against Armenia; calls for the EU and its Member States to suspend any security, technical or financial assistance provided to Azerbaijan, including through various EU instruments, that might contribute to the increase of Azerbaijan’s offensive capabilities or endanger the security, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Armenia;

85. Recalls that a year has passed since Azerbaijan’s seizure of Nagorno-Karabakh, which resulted in the forced displacement of more than 140 000 Armenians from the region; condemns the military support and the supply of arms provided by non-EU countries to Azerbaijan; points out that Azerbaijan has been guilty of serious breaches of human rights in Nagorno-Karabakh; condemns the destruction of the Armenian cultural heritage in the region by Azerbaijan; calls on the Council to consider imposing targeted and individual sanctions against those responsible for ceasefire violations and human rights abuses in Nagorno-Karabakh;

86. Welcomes the decision to adopt the first assistance measure under the EPF in support of Armenian armed forces, as this would strengthen the resilience of Armenia in the context of ensuring security, independence and sovereignty; calls for the further reinforcement of the cooperation between Armenia and the EU in the field of security and defence, in particular in the area of mine clearance, including through the use of the EPF, taking into account Armenia’s reconsideration of its membership of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation; welcomes the actions undertaken by several Member States to provide defensive military support to Armenia and urges the other Member States to consider similar initiatives;

87. Emphasises that the EU should urgently review its regional strategy for the Sahel, following the various coups in the region; strongly deplores the forced departure of French troops and UN peacekeeping forces from the region and condemns the presence instead of private military companies (PMCs) and state-sponsored proxies such as the Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group); underscores that that these PMCs have played a destabilising role in the Sahel and have supported various repressive regimes in an attempt to further Russia’s influence in Africa; points out the supply of weapons by Russia to the Sahel’s military regimes; further notes that other actors, such as Türkiye, are increasingly present in the region; urges the EU Special Representative for the Sahel and the Member States to maintain diplomatic engagement and continue supporting civil society and spending on development and humanitarian aid;

88. Expresses its concern about the lack of coherence in the EU response to the Great Lakes region’s crises and calls on the Council to reassess its renewed EU Great Lakes Strategy adopted on 20 February 2023; recognises the importance of a genuine commitment by the EU to peace in the region; notes with concern the role that Rwanda has played in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and calls on the EU to impose conditions on any military support to Rwanda; condemns the breaches of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of eastern DRC by M23 rebels; is deeply concerned about the humanitarian situation of thousands of displaced persons in the area; urges the VP/HR to engage in clear actions in line with the EU Great Lakes Strategy in order to restore stability and to cooperate with the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) to protect civilians in eastern DRC; urges the Rwandan Government to withdraw its troops from DRC territory and cease cooperation with the M23 rebels; urges the VP/HR and the Member States to urgently review military assistance to the Rwandan armed forces through the European Peace Facility and consider suspending it in the event that the Rwandan Government does not comply with urgent calls for its withdrawal from DRC by the UN and the EU;

89. Is concerned about the limited role played by the EU in the Horn of Africa, while the involvement of other foreign actors is growing; calls for a review of the EU strategy in the region, with a view to achieving the EU’s goals of promoting peace, stability, and inclusive and sustainable economic development in the region; calls on the Council, the Commission and the EEAS to reflect on how to best use CSDP missions and operations deployed in the region to further these goals and enhance the EU’s activities;

90. Recognises that the Arctic region has significant strategic and geopolitical importance owing to its emerging maritime routes, wealth of natural resources and opportunities for economic development unlocked by global warming, while being increasingly contested; is alarmed by the intensifying militarisation and resource competition driven by Russian and Chinese activities in the region;

91. Underlines the importance of preserving security, stability and cooperation in the Arctic; stresses that the region must remain free from military tensions and natural resource exploitation and that the rights of indigenous peoples must be respected; reiterates the need to include the Union’s Arctic policy in the CSDP and to strengthen deterrence and defence capabilities in close coordination with NATO; emphasises that EU-NATO cooperation is essential to counterbalance the expanding influence of Russia and China in the region; calls for issues of interest to the Arctic to be addressed regularly within the Political and Security Committee and Council meetings;

Gender dimension and women’s role in peace and security

92. Emphasises the disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflicts on women and girls, especially in terms of conflict-related sexual violence; highlights the imperative need to ensure the provision and accessibility of the appropriate healthcare in armed conflicts, including sexual and reproductive health and rights; calls on the EU and Member States to ensure that armed conflicts are considered through a gender lens;

93. Recalls that mainstreaming and operationalising gender perspectives in external relations and implementing the ‘Women, Peace and Security’ agenda in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions are long-standing priorities for the EU; recalls in this regard the importance of strengthening women’s participation in conflict prevention and resolution, peace negotiations, peacebuilding and peacekeeping, humanitarian action and post-conflict reconstruction;

94. Stresses that the integration of a gender perspective into all external and internal CSDP activities helps to improve the CSDP’s operational effectiveness and is a driver of the EU’s credibility as a proponent of gender equality worldwide; insists therefore on the importance of delivering on all the commitments made by the EU, including those in the EU’s Gender Action Plan (GAP) III (2020-2024) and in the Strategic Compass; also insists that the update of the Strategic Compass propose further measures to ensure gender equality and the full and meaningful participation of women in the CSDP, especially in military missions;

95. Welcomes the inclusion of gender and human rights perspectives and the appointment of gender advisers in all CSDP missions and operations and the establishment of a network of gender focal points; calls for the new Civilian CSDP Compact to be used to strive for the full participation of women in civilian CSDP missions;

CSDP missions and operations

96. Underlines the importance of clear and achievable goals, openness to the host country’s perspectives and ownership, as well as of equipment and the necessary financial, logistical and human resources for each of the CSDP missions and operations; also underlines the deterioration of the security environment where many CSDP missions are present; calls for improvements to the governance of evaluation and control of CSDP missions and operations; reiterates its call for comprehensive assessments of CSDP missions and operations, in particular of the realism of their mandates in relation to the resources and equipment allocated, their management, methods of recruiting their staff and of matching profiles to the skills required, transparency on calls for tender, activities and results obtained, lessons learned on good practices and difficulties encountered; stresses the particular need for all missions and operations to have sunset provisions to allow a sustainable termination if necessary; calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to continue to effectively design CSDP missions and operations, including robust, result-oriented, flexible and modular mandates, in order to adapt to the changing security context and needs of host countries, and to maintain a strong partnership with host governments, civil society and local populations, ensuring the creation of the necessary conditions for the missions and operations to achieve their goals over the long term; calls for the Member States to use the new Civilian CSDP Compact to strengthen their strategic vision of civilian crisis management by clarifying the role, effectiveness and added value of civilian CSDP, and by defining a shared level of ambition for civilian crisis management; also calls for the synergies and complementarities between the civilian and military dimensions of the CSDP to be built on; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to develop, together with the Member States, a structured and regular civilian Capability Development Process to assess the availabilities of Member States’ capability needs, develop requirements, conduct a gap analysis and periodically review progress; believes in the necessity of establishing a solid policy on the equipment and services needed by partner countries where civilian CSDP missions take place;

97. Notes that the CFSP budget for civilian CSDP missions has only marginally increased between the multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2014-2020 and the MFF 2021-2027, while at the same time the number of missions and their tasks and costs have increased; calls for a substantive increase in funding for the CFSP budget, while at the same time ensuring the efficient use of the funds allocated to CSDP civilian missions, in order to make sure that they respond effectively to crisis situations and unforeseen events; calls for the establishment of a dedicated budget line or ‘civilian support facility’, to provide partner countries with the necessary equipment and services to enhance their civilian capabilities;

98. Reiterates its call on the EEAS to take concrete action to support CSDP missions and operations defending against cyber and hybrid attacks and countering FIMI in countries where CSDP missions and operations are deployed, in particular in the Western Balkans and in the Eastern Partnership countries; calls on the Commission to take into account CSDP missions and operations when formulating its European Democracy Shield in order to pre-empt threats aiming to discredit the EU’s external actions and safeguard EU personnel deployed abroad; insists on the need to build on lessons learned across the different CSDP missions and operations, as well as cooperating with Member States’ missions and operations so as to better communicate and identify threats in order to pre-empt or respond to them in a timely manner when necessary; calls for an improved response capability, strategic communication and enhanced outreach in the areas of deployment – using the relevant local languages – in order to better inform the local population of the rationales, benefits and roles of the CSDP missions and operations in their respective regions, informing them as well of the consequences of relying on the support of other actors aiming at destabilising them, in particular Russia and China; also calls on the Commission and the EEAS to increase the visibility of CSDP missions and operations in the Eastern Partnership countries by including them in their political messaging, making documents publicly accessible and engaging with the international press; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to adjust the advisory mandates of CSDP missions and operations to include specialised training on combating hybrid warfare activities, cyber warfare and open source intelligence (OSINT) analysis; calls on the EEAS to increase its cooperation and coordination with other missions and operations by like-minded partners and organisations, including United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, in countering FIMI operations in the field;

99. Stresses that corruption in theatres of operations can adversely impact CSDP missions and operations by exposing them to reputational damage, wasting resources, and exacerbating poor governance and maladministration, as well as increasing local levels of bribery, fraud, extortion, and nepotism; calls for strategies to be implemented to prevent and combat corruption, developing anti-corruption expertise and knowledge and stepping up efforts to mitigate corruption risks in current and future CSDP missions and operations;

100. Calls on the Council and the EEAS to include a cultural heritage protection component in its CSDP missions and operations in order to provide assistance and education to local partners on addressing security challenges relating to the preservation and protection of cultural heritage; notes that the inclusion of cultural heritage protection and intercultural dialogue in mission mandates would be beneficial to the process of conflict resolution and reconciliation;

101. Highlights the need to extend the mandates of CSDP missions and operations deployed in neighbouring eastern European countries, where heightened security threats justify a reinforced EU presence; encourages all Member States to deploy personnel to those missions and operations; also encourages greater third country participation in these missions, particularly from third countries that have successfully hosted completed CSDP missions; calls on the Member States to examine how new CSDP missions and operations can be established in EU candidate countries, if necessary, and in close cooperation with their national authorities; calls on the EEAS to ensure that the CSDP missions’ support to security sector reforms includes training for ministerial officials; calls for the EEAS and the European Security and Defence College to help develop the expertise of civil and defence staff supporting and deployed in CSDP missions and operations; recognises the opportunity for third countries hosting CSDP missions and operations to help the EU achieve CSDP objectives and demonstrate their capacity to provide security to others via their participation in out-of-area CSDP missions and operations;

102. Welcomes the UN Security Council’s extension of the mandate of the European Union Force (EUFOR) Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) beyond 2025, as an established and proven peacekeeping mission that has significantly contributed to the stability of both the country and the region; further welcomes the mission’s positive response to the request from the BiH Ministry of Security’s Civil Protection Agency, offering assistance to national authorities on addressing the impact of the recent flooding; takes the view that this extension reflects the shared commitment across the political spectrum in BiH to uphold peace and security in cooperation with the EU; welcomes the continued presence of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo and commends the role it plays in strengthening security and stability; calls on all parties involved to adhere to the requirements of international law, restrain and prevent any disruptive actions from destabilising the northern region of Kosovo; urges them to engage in the structured dialogue mediated by the EU; condemns in the strongest possible terms the terrorist attack by Serbian paramilitaries against Kosovo’s police and the hideous terrorist attack on critical infrastructure near Zubin Potok in northern Kosovo; stresses that the perpetrators of these deplorable terrorist attacks must be held accountable and face justice without delay; calls for the strengthening of both EUFOR’s Operation Althea and KFOR with additional resources;

103. Commends the establishment and operations of the EU Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova), which has contributed to strengthening the country’s crisis management structures and to enhancing its resilience to cyber and hybrid threats, and countering FIMI; calls for the mission’s mandate to be extended beyond May 2025, the adequacy of its means, methods and resources in relation to the mission’s objectives to be assessed and its resources adapted in the light of the evaluation’s conclusions in order to enhance its effectiveness; recognises the important role that the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) plays in helping to re-open rail freight through Transnistria and in thwarting multiple smuggling operations; encourages EUBAM to expand its collaboration with multiple international organisations including Europol, FRONTEX and the OSCE via its Arms Working Group, ORIO II Joint Operations and ‘EU 4 Border Security’ initiatives;

104. Welcomes the role of the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) to Georgia in monitoring the situation on the Abkhaz and South Ossetian Administrative Boundary Line; condemns the temporary detention of EUMM officers by security actors while conducting a routine patrol along the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL); expresses its profound concern about any actions that obstruct EUMM actions and seek to undermine efforts to build confidence; urges the Council and the EEAS to monitor the situation closely, promote the unimpeded access of the EUMM to Georgia’s territories occupied by Russia according to the mission’s mandate, support the extension of its mandate and strengthen its capacities in order to properly address the security and humanitarian needs of the local population in conflict-affected areas;

105. Welcomes and strongly supports the activities of the civilian European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) under the CSDP, which is helping to increase security in the region by substantially decreasing the number of incidents in conflict-affected and border areas, building confidence and reducing the level of risks for the population living in these areas; welcomes Armenia’s assistance to the activities of the EUMA on its territory; commends the Council for the decision to boost the mission’s capacity and increase the number of observers deployed as well as to extend its deployment timeframe, and calls for further expansion and a stronger presence in the region in order to create an environment conducive to EU-supported normalisation efforts between Armenia and Azerbaijan; urges Azerbaijan to allow EU observers on its side of the border as well; condemns Azerbaijani threats and Russia’s negative narrative against the EUMA;

106. Considers that the two EU civilian CSDP missions – European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) and the European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah) can play an essential role in supporting Palestinian state-building efforts; supports a stronger role for the EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah, in line with the European Council conclusions of 21 and 22 March 2024 and based on the principle of the two-state solution and the viability of a future Palestinian state, so that they can participate in the facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Gaza Strip, improve the efficiency of the Palestinian authority in the West Bank, and prepare for the authority’s return to the Gaza Strip; stresses in particular the need to create the necessary conditions for the full reactivation of EUBAM Rafah to allow it act as a neutral third party at the Rafah crossing point, in coordination with the Palestinian Authority as well as the Israeli and Egyptian authorities; expects the reinforcement of the scope and mandates of EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah on the ground to be included as key priorities of the forthcoming EU-Middle East Strategy; welcomes the Council decision to extend the mandates of the two missions until 30 June 2025;

107. Takes note that the mandates of the EUTM Mali, EUMPM in Niger and of the ground mission of personnel from EUCAP Sahel Niger ended in 2024, while the EU Capacity Mission Sahel Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) and the EU Regional Advisory and Coordination Cell (EU RACC) for the Sahel are still ongoing; acknowledges that the various international missions have not been able to achieve their goal of stabilising the region and its fragile democracies or ensuring peace in the region; is concerned by the failure of the EU’s Sahel strategy in terms of security and defence; expresses deep concern about the worsening security situation, the continuous failure of states and the resurgence of terrorism in the Sahel; takes note of the creation of a new type of hybrid civilian-military EU Security and Defence Initiative in the Gulf of Guinea (EUSDI Gulf of Guinea), established in August 2023, aiming to empower the security and defence forces of Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo and Benin to improve the stability and resilience of their northern border areas; calls on the EEAS and the Member States to closely examine the mandate of all CSDP missions in Africa, with the aim of providing achievable goals and milestones for each mission given the current political context, as well as exploring whether these missions could be amended to more effectively serve a new revised multi-dimensional EU strategy for Africa and the Sahel, as part of its integrated approach; calls in this regard, for a review, as a matter of priority, of the mandate and resources of the EUCAP Sahel Mali and EU RACC for the Sahel, proposing changes to them and consider their termination if necessary;

108. Welcomes the creation in February 2024 of EUNAVFOR ASPIDES as an EU military operation in response to the Houthi attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea, in order to contribute to the protection of freedom of navigation and the safeguarding of maritime security, especially for merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf; calls on the Member States to increase the capabilities of the EUNAVFOR ASPIDES operation and to consider merging it with the EU ATALANTA military operation, as originally envisaged, to improve the efficiency of both operations;

Improving the EU’s ability to address security challenges

Intelligence capacity

109. Stresses the importance of enhanced intelligence sharing and information exchange among Member States and EU institutions, including Parliament, to combat foreign interference, improve situational awareness and be able to better anticipate and counter threats to collective security and define common lines of action under the CSDP, particularly in the area of crisis management;

110. Underlines the need for the EU to make full use of the necessary first-hand information on global issues occurring outside its borders in the light of increasing geopolitical challenges and crises worldwide; commends the efforts of the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN) and the EU Military Staff Intelligence Directorate, cooperating in the framework of the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC), as well as the European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen), to produce all-source intelligence assessments; calls on the EU Member States to reinforce the EU INTCEN, the SIAC, the EEAS Crisis Response Centre and the EU SatCen by enhancing its staff and financial resources, as well as capabilities and information security; urges these centres, provided they have adequate information security provisions, to draw lessons from NATO’s role in facilitating public-private sharing of cyber threat intelligence, and apply this to their field, thereby offering added value to the Member States;

111. Calls on the Member States to utilise the EU INTCEN as an effective intelligence-sharing body in order to share intelligence in a secure fashion, formulate a common strategic and security culture and provide strategic information; stresses that on the basis of the intelligence gathered, the EU INTCEN should be further involved in the threat assessments carried out by the EU institutions, as well as attribution of digital operations and sanctions evasions; reiterates its call to promote the establishment of a system for the regular and continuous flow of intelligence from Member States to the EEAS and between EU Member States on foreign and security issues occurring outside the Union; underlines the importance of secure communications and a high level of information security for reliable intelligence and calls for efforts to enhance and streamline security rules and regulations to be pursued in this respect to better protect sensitive information, infrastructure and communication systems from foreign interference and attacks;

112. Calls for regular joint threat assessments with input from Member States’ intelligence services in order to inform CSDP decision-making bodies and reiterates its call for the deployment of intelligence-gathering capacities in all CSDP missions and operations, which would provide information to the EU INTCEN, EU Military Staff (EUMS), the MPCC and the CPCC;

Defence against hybrid attacks and disinformation

113. Expresses serious concern about the growing security challenges posed by cyber and hybrid attacks, as well as FIMI, all of which are aimed, inter alia, at undermining the stability of the EU’s democratic societies, in particular in EU territories far from their mainland, the alliances of EU Member States, and fostering polarisation, especially in the run-up to elections; stresses that Member States, particularly those on the EU’s eastern external border, are vulnerable to such hostile influence from Russia and Belarus; welcomes the established institutional cooperation at administrative level between the Commission, the EEAS and Parliament during the past European election campaign to prevent a massive use of FIMI by malicious third state and non-state actors; calls on the Commission, the EEAS and Parliament’s administration to strengthen their capabilities to increase resilience against hybrid attacks and FIMI; points in this regard to the recent decision by the Romanian constitutional court to annul the first round of the presidential elections following reports of massive hybrid attacks by Russia, especially via social media platforms; further calls on the administrations of the EEAS and Parliament to closely cooperate with the private sector, civil society as well as the academic and scientific community in countering malign influence campaigns and hybrid threats, including the weaponisation of new technologies;

114. Supports the pledged establishment of a ‘European Democracy Shield’ and reiterates its call on the Member States, the Commission and the EEAS to consider the creation of a well-resourced and independent structure tasked with identifying, analysing and documenting FIMI threats against the EU as a whole, to detect, track and request the removal of deceptive online content, to increase situational awareness and threat intelligence sharing, and develop attribution capabilities and countermeasures in relation to FIMI; considers that this structure would serve as a reference point and specialised knowledge hub to facilitate and foster operational exchange between Member States’ authorities and the EU institutions; stresses that the structure should clarify and enhance the role of the EEAS Strategic Communications division and its task forces as the strategic body of the EU’s diplomatic service and prevent the overlap of activities; highlights its own decision to establish a special committee on the EU Democracy Shield in the European Parliament and deems it an important way to consolidate European efforts in this field;

115. Highlights the importance of intensifying efforts to combat disinformation promoted by foreign actors aiming to undermine the credibility of the EU, particularly in EU candidate or neighbouring countries and regions where CSDP missions and operations are under way; underlines that the coordination between the EEAS and relevant EU agencies, including the EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) and relevant authorities at Member State level, must be significantly increased in order to develop coherent and efficient strategies against FIMI; underlines in this regard the need for strategic and preventive communication, and invites all EU institutions to work hand in hand with the EEAS, to strengthen the visibility, the positive perception and legitimacy of the EU’s external actions;

116. Considers that hybrid threats in the years ahead will see the combination of information warfare, agile force manoeuvre, mass cyberwarfare, and emerging and disruptive technologies from the seabed to space with the deployment of advanced air and space surveillance and strike systems, all of which will possibly be enabled by AI, quantum computing, ever smarter drone swarm technologies, offensive cyber capabilities, hypersonic missile systems, nanotechnologies and biological warfare; recognises in particular the increasing role of AI in hybrid warfare and its potential use in undermining democratic institutions, spreading disinformation, disrupting critical infrastructure, as well as influencing public opinion through automated and data-driven operations;

117. Calls for strategic, proactive and coordinated EU-level measures to counter hybrid threats and to strengthen the security and integrity of critical infrastructure in the EU, de-risking and promoting the EU’s technological edge in critical sectors, including measures to restrict or exclude high-risk suppliers; stresses in this regard the importance of the PESCO project that aims to support the Cyber and Information Domain Coordination Centre (CIDCC) to facilitate the planning and conduct of EU missions and operations with cyber- and information-domain capabilities as well as enhancing the general resilience of the EU in this area; calls, therefore, for its permanent integration in CSDP;

118. Condemns the continued malicious actions by Russia and Belarus aimed at destabilising the EU by pushing migrants to forcibly enter EU countries, constituting a hybrid attack; calls on the EU to review and update its policies concerning the strengthening of its external borders in order to bolster the security of the Union as a whole;

Cybersecurity

119. Welcomes the Cyber Solidarity Act [27] and its importance to Member States’ cyber defence capabilities; supports the promotion of platforms for information sharing and analysis and calls for this to be expanded to include the provision of threat or vulnerability intelligence with cross-border security operations centres (SOCs); calls for a clearer funding plan that specifies the amount of funds that will be used to implement the act;

120. Is concerned by the delay by many Member States in implementing the Directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive)[28] and calls for swift implementation to secure European critical infrastructure; calls on the VP/HR to better synchronise the cyber, hybrid and FIMI sanction toolboxes and use them more actively while also exploring how sectoral sanctions may be implemented;

Space

121. Welcomes the findings and recommendations in Mr Draghi’s report on the future of European competitiveness, which encourages Member States to update governance and investment rules in the space domain, in particular for defence-related areas; calls on the Commission and the Member States to invest appropriately in this domain in the context of the next MFF and also by considering any other financing instrument; highlights in particular the need to further develop the European Space Programme considering the strong connections between the space and the defence and security sectors when planning the new MFF; underlines the importance of improving cooperation between the Commission and the European Space Agency to avoid duplication of efforts and ensure more efficient use of resources; calls for fostering transatlantic cooperation and synergies with NATO to ensure effective coordination in the development of space and defence capabilities;

122. Stresses that the current pillars of the EU’s space programme – the Galileo global satellite navigation programme and the Copernicus Earth observation programme – have clear dual-use potential in developing space applications and services; stresses the importance of establishing, as a third pillar of the EU’s space programme, the IRIS2 satellite constellation to provide secure communication services to the EU and its Member States as well as broadband connectivity for European citizens, private companies and governmental authorities; recommends that Taiwan and Ukraine be granted access to the IRIS2 Satellite Constellation; highlights that, beyond satellite communications, sectors such as positioning, navigation, timing, as well as earth observation, are essential in strengthening the EU’s strategic autonomy and resilience; stresses that the development of these capabilities directly contributes to an effective crisis response and the protection of critical infrastructure; calls therefore for new EU space programmes to be considered, enabling the EU to strengthen its strategic autonomy and its status as a global space power;

123. Recognises the inadequacy of launch vehicle capabilities and satellite communications within the EU; underlines the strategic importance of advancing and enhancing these capabilities to enable the EU to effectively support Member States and CSDP missions and operations, while maintaining a resilient and autonomous posture; stresses that the development of EU-led solutions in this domain is essential for the protection of critical infrastructure and to ensure a secure and competitive presence in the space sector;

124. Calls on the Member States to address the growing threat of the weaponisation of space, in particular reports of Russia’s progress on space-based nuclear weapons technology, which would constitute a blatant violation of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty;

Maritime domain

125. Stresses that, given the growing geopolitical maritime tensions, the EU must step up its activities at sea, by leading in maritime domain awareness, protecting critical infrastructure, ensuring that its external maritime borders are monitored effectively in order to prevent illegal activities, and contributing to ensuring freedom of navigation, the safety of maritime lines of communication and of vessels and crews, and to countering illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing;

126. Underlines the commitment to strengthen the EU’s role as a guarantor of international maritime security; stresses in this regard the importance of the Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) concept, enhancing the role of the EU as a global maritime security provider and its visibility in key maritime regions, highlights the activities of CMPs in the Gulf of Guinea and in the northwestern Indian Ocean; calls on the Member States to engage actively with those initiatives and to build up their military naval capabilities with a view to enhancing the EU’s presence and visibility in the global maritime sector; recommends that CMPs be expanded to other key maritime areas across the globe;

127. Expresses its serious concerns about Russia’s and China’s surveillance and sabotage of critical maritime infrastructure, such as seabed communication cables and offshore energy facilities; expresses in particular its strong concern about the damage to two subsea communications cables, one linking Finland to Germany and the other connecting Sweden to Lithuania, within less than 24 hours on 17 and 18 November 2024, and about the damage by a tanker belonging to the Russian shadow fleet of EstLink2, linking Estonia and Finland, on 25 December 2024; calls on the EU to put in place effective monitoring and surveillance systems and regional coastguard cooperation to ensure the prevention and rapid detection of attacks against such infrastructure; welcomes, in that regard, the launch of the operation ‘Baltic Sentry’ by NATO, with participation of several Member States, to improve the security of critical undersea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea; calls on Member States to fully abide by the commitments of the New York declaration on the Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables, including the procuring of submarine cable equipment only from companies in allied countries; calls on the Commission to allocate adequate resources to the research and development of cutting-edge underwater assets and defence equipment to protect islands against possible landings and attacks by forces from third countries;

Arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament

128. Deplores the weakening of non-proliferation and arms control regimes during these unstable geopolitical times and calls for the redoubling of efforts to reverse this trend; emphasises in this regard the critical and substantial need for an increase in investment in regional and global arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament, with a particular focus on multilateral strategies; stresses that those strategies should address issues relating to unexploded ordnance and chemical weapons dumped in the previous century, which pose a threat to security, the environment, health and the economy, in particular in the Baltic, Adriatic and North seas;

129. Reaffirms its unwavering support for the EU and its Member States’ commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), recognising it as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament framework; recalls that Russia withdrew its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in October 2023;

130. Recalls that international negotiations related to non-proliferation and arms control regimes and their outcomes have an impact on Europe, in particular on EU Member States; highlights the importance of giving renewed impetus to reviving those regimes; also stresses the importance of ensuring that the EU takes an active and constructive role in advancing and strengthening the international rules-based efforts towards non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament architecture, in particular in the field of weapons of mass destruction and dual-use digital surveillance and manipulation tools;

131. Calls on the Member States to fully comply with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment as amended by Council Decision (CFSP)2019/1560, and to strictly implement criterion 4 on regional stability;

132. Stresses the need to prevent sensitive emerging technologies and key dual-use items, especially those that are critical for EU security, from being transferred to destinations of concern outside the EU; calls for the establishment and implementation of EU-wide electronic customs and export licensing systems, as a critical step towards making export controls by Member States of those technologies and items more effective;

Defence and society and civilian and military preparedness and readiness

133. Highlights the need for a broader understanding of security threats and risks among EU citizens to develop a shared understanding and alignment of threat perceptions across Europe and to create a comprehensive notion of European defence; stresses that securing support by democratic institutions and consequently by citizens is essential to develop a successful and coherent long-term EU defence, which requires an informed public debate; calls for the EU and its Member States to develop awareness-raising and educational programmes, especially for the young, aimed at improving knowledge and facilitating debates on security, defence and the importance of the armed forces and at strengthening the resilience and preparedness of societies to face security challenges, while allowing for greater public and democratic control and scrutiny of the defence sector; calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop those programmes within the framework of the European Democracy Shield, building on the model of national programmes, such as the Swedish Civil Contingency Initiative;

134. Welcomes the efforts to strengthen Europe’s civil and military preparedness and readiness, as also proposed in Mr Niinistö’s report; acknowledges the critical importance of citizens in crisis preparedness and response, in particular the psychological resilience of individuals and household preparedness; also recognises the importance of civil protection infrastructures and planning for emergency situations; supports a whole-of-society approach to resilience, involving the active engagement of EU institutions, Member States, civil society, and individual citizens in strengthening the EU security framework; stresses that CSDP decision-making bodies responsible for planning, resources and logistics have the potential to become the primary enablers of civilian crisis management during emergency situations; calls on the Member States and the Commission to closely examine the report’s recommendations and develop an EU risk assessment and preparedness strategy, joint exercises, a stronger EU-NATO cooperation interface in view of crisis situations; calls for the development of adequate civil protection infrastructure and thorough emergency planning and for the necessary investments for these purposes to be ensured, including through a dedicated EIB investment guarantee programme for crisis-proof civil defence infrastructure;

135. Recalls that terrorism, including jihadi terrorism, poses a persistent threat to the security of the EU and of its partners; calls on the EU to continue efforts to prevent this threat with determination and full solidarity, in particular through greater coordination to improve knowledge, develop preparedness and response capabilities, and to ensure closer interaction with partners and other international actors;

136. Points out that the EU’s defence policies should reflect the principles of gender equality and diversity, promoting inclusive military environments that reflect the values and diversity of European society while ensuring that all members of the European armed forces, regardless of gender or background, have equal opportunities and access to support; reiterates the important role of young people and youth organisations in maintaining and promoting peace and security and calls on the EEAS to commit to integrating young people into its youth, peace and security (YPS) agenda more systematically; also calls for developing train-the-trainers programmes and cooperation between defence institutions and universities of EU Member States, such as military courses, exercises and role playing training activities for civilian students;

137. Stresses that the EU and its Member States must address critical recruitment and retention challenges in the military by developing coordinated national and EU-level actions in order to ensure a sustainable military workforce; recommends, that the EU should support the Member States in developing policies that enhance career attractiveness and long-term retention strategies; stresses the need for the EU Military Committee (EUMC) to provide follow-up on its task of gathering and analysing data across the EU Member States on the issues of recruitment and retention, in order to identify possible measures addressing these issues; highlights that supporting the mental health and well-being of military personnel, with a focus on professional development and long-term care for veterans, must be adequately taken into consideration in the further development of the Defence Union;

138. Recalls the importance of organising joint training and exercises between European armed forces, thereby promoting interoperability, with a view to maximising mission preparedness and addressing a broad range of threats, both conventional and non-conventional; calls for the development and creation of exchange programmes at EU level for military personnel from the Member States, aimed at providing training opportunities and experience in different European military environments and structures and thereby fostering mutual understanding, cohesion, and interoperability, between the EU’s armed forces; reiterates in this respect its support for the European Initiative for the Exchange of Military Young Officers (Military Erasmus – EMILYO), operated by the European Security and Defence College;

Strengthening defence cooperation and partnerships

139. Underlines the importance of the partnership dimension of the Strategic Compass in reinforcing cooperation between the EU and its allies and partners around the world on the basis of common values and respect for human rights and democracy, in order to strengthen the perception of the deterrence principle and to counter foreign strategies aimed at undermining the EU and its partners, and destabilising the rules-based international order; calls on the EU to further engage in security cooperation with partners in all the priority areas identified in the Strategic Compass, notably in strengthening resilience of local security sectors in the area of crisis management, countering hybrid threats as well as upgrading capacities of cybersecurity institutions; also calls for closer cooperation between relevant organisations from partners with the EU Satellite Centre, the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the EU Agency for Cyber Security (ENISA); believes that the participation of partners and NATO Allies in PESCO projects, subject to the agreement by the EU Member States, contributes to improving compatibility between their standards in the defence sector as well as to sharing experience, intelligence and technical expertise in various fields;

140. Reaffirms that the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) must always strictly observe international law and the multilateral decisions taken deriving from international institutions; welcomes the adoption of the EU’s human rights and international humanitarian law due diligence policy on security sector support to third parties (EU HRDDP), serving as a basis for security and military cooperation with third countries in a way that is more compliant with human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL); calls for its thorough implementation; reiterates the call for closer cooperation with international organisations, such as, but not limited to, the UN, the African Union, and their peacekeeping missions in joint theatres, and the OSCE on security;

141. Welcomes the Joint Declaration of the G7 Defence Ministers of 19 October 2024 and their declaration of intent to increase cooperation in the defence sector; stresses the strong interest for the EU of developing international partnerships with like-minded partners in this area and the need to strengthen EU efforts to ensure that countries which were once strategic partners, and with which some Member States maintain strong cultural ties, are not drawn into the sphere of influence of systemic rivals; recalls that economic diplomacy plays a crucial role in this endeavour, serving as an essential tool to reinforce cooperative ties, promote mutual prosperity, and consolidate the EU’s presence and influence, contributing to the resilience of partners against external pressures;

EU-NATO cooperation

142. Stresses the importance of the EU’s strategic partnership with NATO, in full respect of the agreed guiding principles of transparency, reciprocity and inclusiveness, as well as respect for the decision-making autonomy and procedures of each organisation; highlights that NATO and the EU play complementary, coherent and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security and thus avoiding the duplication of defence efforts, while maintaining strong close cooperation; welcomes the accession of Sweden to NATO in 2024, and that of Finland in 2023, representing a historic step forward in strengthening security in Europe, notably in the Baltic sea region; calls on the VP/HR to operate in close coordination and unity with the NATO Secretary General;

143. Calls for further deepening of EU-NATO cooperation by building on the EU’s Strategic Compass and NATO’s new Strategic Concept, including in the fields of cybersecurity, hybrid warfare, counter terrorism, military mobility, dual-use infrastructure, conflict prevention and crisis management, military-security cooperation, countering malicious foreign interference from third countries, a coordinated approach in the Indo-Pacific, as well as increasing common action on the international stage to protect democracy; strongly supports NATO’s Open Door Policy; invites the EU and NATO to reinforce their cooperation on supporting the capacity-building of common partners;

144. Stresses the constant need for alignment among states that are both EU and NATO members and the obligation under Articles 1 and 3 of the NATO charter for cooperation, self-help and mutual aid; calls on the EU to step up its efforts on common security and defence initiatives wherever there is no NATO equivalent, to increase standardisation, improve interoperability and develop common operating procedures between Member States’ and the EU’s defence capabilities;

145. Commends the close EU-NATO cooperation in the Western Balkans, including through EUFOR Operation Althea and the KFOR military operations, which guarantee the necessary stability for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and the wider region;

146. Emphasises the vital role of the Black Sea region in the European security landscape and calls for the EU to collaborate with NATO on formulating a comprehensive strategy for this region, which should address security challenges, counter hybrid threats, enhance maritime cooperation and bolster regional partnerships;

147. Welcomes the appointment of NATO’s Special Representative for the Southern Neighbourhood and NATO’s focus on this region; considers it appropriate to strengthen coordination and consultation between EU officials in charge of policy for the Southern Neighbourhood and the Sahel and their NATO counterparts, in order to avoid publicity and fragmentation of efforts and resources;

148. Welcomes the proposal from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA) to enhance Parliament’s status to ‘partner’ under the ongoing reform of partnerships; invites its Delegation for relations with the NATO PA (DNAT) to make full use of Parliament’s current and future privileges; considers DNAT an important instrument of Parliament’s diplomacy in an enhanced EU-NATO partnership aimed at strengthening the European pillar of NATO and contributing to reaching the Alliance’s overall objectives; is of the view that DNAT can play a pivotal role in reinforcing EU-NATO cooperation, strengthening the democratic resilience of accession countries and key partners, as well as, overall, enhancing the parliamentary dimension of this essential partnership;

Partnership with the United States

149. Considers it essential to further develop the EU’s close relationship with the United States, which is based on mutual respect, the shared values of democracy, freedom and the rule of law, as well as a broad range of common or converging interests; values the United States’ commitment to and involvement in the territorial defence of Europe, in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty and its Article 5, especially in the light of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; encourages mutual security and defence initiatives, disarmament and non-proliferation, the impact of disruptive technologies, climate change, hybrid threats, cyber defence, military mobility, crisis management and the relationship with strategic competitors; calls for further strengthening of the EU-US security and defence dialogue as an important instrument in closer transatlantic cooperation;

150. Notes the importance of greater collaboration in defence production and procurement, including through equal market access for both defence industries; takes note of the US National Defence Industry Strategy of January 2024 and its ambition to deepen industrial cooperation with partners; acknowledges the vast range of possible mutually beneficial areas of cooperation in defence and its positive implications for a stronger transatlantic partnership in times of increasing geopolitical competition; stresses, however, that such cooperation requires a level playing field, which is incompatible with the provisions of the US International Trade in Arms Regulation; calls, accordingly, upon the Commission to launch a dialogue with the United States to explore the possibilities of developing mutually beneficial defence industrial cooperation based on a legal framework that ensures a level transatlantic playing field;

Partnership with the United Kingdom

151. Recognises the UK’s significant contributions to Europe’s security and stability, as well as its commitment to shared defence objectives, which enhance collective security across Europe; welcomes the strong cooperation between the EU, EU Member States and the United Kingdom when it comes to supporting Ukraine, as well as bilateral agreements such as the Trinity House agreement between the UK and Germany to deepen defence cooperation; welcomes the participation of the UK Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs at the EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting in October 2024; calls for the EU and the UK to swiftly upgrade defence cooperation and become closer security partners by signing a joint declaration with concrete engagements and structured dialogue to strengthen EU-UK cooperation on the full range of foreign and security challenges the EU and UK face on the European continent; underlines in this regard the importance of closer cooperation on information and intelligence sharing, counter terrorism, military mobility, security and defence initiatives, crisis management, cyber defence, hybrid threats and FIMI, and on jointly addressing shared threats, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;

152. Considers it essential to make progress on practical cooperation by formalising a joint declaration on a security and defence partnership with the United Kingdom as a means of strengthening European security and the European pillar of NATO, in particular in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; encourages the VP/HR to regularly invite the United Kingdom to informal Council meetings of foreign affairs (and defence) ministers to exchange views on issues of common concern while fully safeguarding the EU’s decision-making autonomy;

Partnership with Western Balkan and Eastern European partners

153. Believes that the EU’s security is closely interlinked with the security of its immediate European neighbours and that the EU has an interest in giving priority to its enlargement policy and strengthening the stability of its South-Eastern and Eastern European neighbours, in particular candidate countries; calls for stronger military-security cooperation, including civilian and military as well as policy and military security, cooperation with candidate countries and partners, particularly in areas such as resilience, cybersecurity, hybrid threats, border management, counter-terrorism and countering disinformation; reiterates the need for close cooperation with NATO in this regard;

154. Highlights that the Union should facilitate the participation of European partners with a high level of alignment with CSDP matters, most notably the Western Balkans countries, in current and future programmes linked to the defence sector; reaffirms that thorough involvement of the candidate countries would substantially facilitate their accession process by increasing their industrial and operational capacities in the defence sector, thus increasing interoperability with EU Member States’ armed forces; is of the opinion that the comprehensive inclusion of the Western Balkans candidate countries in EU defence initiatives would represent a strategic investment, as well as an integral part of the EU’s efforts to counter the growing assertiveness and foreign interference orchestrated in those countries;

155. Encourages the Member States to further utilise the European Peace Facility (EPF) for training and outfitting security services in South-Eastern and Eastern European partners hosting CSDP missions, particularly military police, medical and law enforcement infrastructure and to increase intelligence exchange capabilities via secure lines of communication;

Partnership with the African Union and African countries

156. Stresses the importance of the EU-Africa relationship for European security; considers it essential to significantly step up the EU’s partnerships with African countries;

Partnership with the Indo-Pacific region

157. Stresses the strategic significance of the Indo-Pacific region within the EU’s defence framework, recognising the necessity of addressing growing security concerns linked to China’s regional activities and their broader implications for global stability; considers it essential to strengthen the EU’s presence and partnerships in this region; is also aware of Taiwan’s leading role in high-tech development, and its extensive experience defending itself against China’s hybrid attacks, disinformation, and FIMI, which should be a foremost consideration when assessing the possibilities of strengthening multilateral exchanges and cooperation;

158. Underscores the imperative for the EU of establishing more enduring collective security through a network of regional allies and partners, forming the conventional foundation of its engagement in the region; strongly welcomes the recent conclusion of the EU-Japan Security and Defence Partnership; believes that a further deepening of the strategic and defence partnership of the EU with Japan, and the development of regular dialogue, cooperation, and capacity building with other like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region, such as Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Taiwan, are fundamental to advancing common security; reiterates its call on the EU for further engagement with emerging strategic partners in the region, such as Indonesia and Viet Nam;

Greater involvement of the European Parliament in the CSDP

159. Stresses that the strengthening of the CSDP as a political priority in the tenth legislative term and the increase in spending on defence policies and programmes at EU level and by the Member States requires full parliamentary scrutiny and accountability;

160. Calls, in this regard, for Parliament’s scrutiny, legislative and budgetary role over a growing range of defence initiatives across the EU institutions and in particular the work carried out under the CSDP to be reinforced, including by strengthening regular dialogue, the exchange of information and maintaining permanent channels of communication open between the VP/HR, the Commissioner for Defence and Space and the competent Parliament bodies; recommends the inclusion of regular intelligence updates to relevant parliamentary committees;

161. Deplores that the lack of access to information means Parliament is not in a situation to properly scrutinise PESCO projects; reiterates its call to the Member States to submit an implementation report on PESCO projects to Parliament at least twice a year; further reiterates its call on the EEAS to regularly and comprehensively report on the implementation of the Strategic Compass and other security and defence initiatives and programmes to the Subcommittee on Security and Defence; further reiterates its call on the EEAS to regularly and comprehensively report on the implementation of the Strategic Compass, other security and defence initiatives and programmes and their assessment to Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence; stresses the need to improve the scrutiny of the implementation of defence industrial regulations by the introduction of the procedure for delegated acts;

° °

162. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President of the Commission and competent Commissioners, the UN Secretary-General, the NATO Secretary General, the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the EU security and defence agencies and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and partner countries.

* * *

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

During the last years, and particularly since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU has had to face multiple and unprecedented threats to its security and new crises in its close geographical environment, including the consequences of the Hamas terrorist attacks on Israel in October, 2023.

The EU has reacted to these negative developments by involving more deeply in European security and defence, exploring new directions and launching new initiatives to strengthen and develop its defence capabilities in a collective and cooperative manner.

This first annual report on the implementation of the EU common security and defence policy (CSDP) under the tenth parliamentary term aims to present the assessment of the European Parliament on CSDP progress in the current geopolitical and security context and thus responds to the report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy, published on 20 June 2024 and entitled “Common Foreign and Security Policy Report – Our Priorities in 2024”. It also provides recommendations on the main avenues for strengthening policies and actions for the future along several dimensions, including institutional decision-making progress, the joint development of military and armament capabilities and the means of financing them.

ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that he has received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the report, until the adoption thereof in committee:

Entity and/or person

ESCRIBANO MECHANICAL AND ENGINEERIING

Apple Inc.

TECNOBIT (Grupo Oesia)

SOPRA STERIA GROUP

Human Rights Working Group of NCRI

American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium

Boeing International Corporation, Belgium

General Electric Company Honeywell Europe, RTX Corporation W.L.

Gore

Ericsson

US. Mission to the European Union

IQM Quantumm Computers

Rasmussen Global

Munich Security Conference

General Electric Company

Business Bridge Europe

Airbus

Atlantic Council of the United States, Inc

International Centre for Ukrainian Victory

Prisoner’s defenders International Network

Official Spanish Chamber of Commerce in Belgium and Luxembourg

Deloitte Advisory

Amazon Europe Core

Indra

International Committee in Search of Justice

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that he has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing

MINORITY POSITION

pursuant to Rule 55(4) of the Rules of Procedure

by Özlem Alev Demirel, Marc Botenga, Giorgos Georgiou (The Left)

This report rightly states that considering the conflicts in Ukraine, Middle East, Indo-Pacific are escalating; diplomacy, arms control/disarmament should play a crucial role. Simultaneously it denies the escalating EU-role through either direct participation in, or fuelling conflicts with arms exports. EU does not appear as diplomatic force.

We reject this report since it

• uses Russia’s illegal war as pretext for massive armament and financing the defence industry, focuses solely on a military approach instead of diplomacy, demands secondary sanctions, calls for testing of (military) prototypes in cooperation with Ukrainian defence actors

• promotes concept of “dual use” and procurement of hypersonic weapons, electronic warfare capabilities together with NATO

• demands 0.25 % of MS GDP annually for military assistance for Ukraine, which will lead to cuts in social policy

• calls for military spending above NATO’s target of 2% GDP

• calls for lifting CFSP/CSDP unanimity principle which further increases the power of big MS

• advocates youth, peace and security (YPS) agenda in view of cooperation between defence institutions and universities, including military courses/exercises

We demand:

• establishment of a system of collective security along with diplomatic efforts to end ongoing wars and conflicts

• achieving peace through conflict resolution, confidence-building, serious arms control, disarmament measures

• strict application of Article 41.2 TEU

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Date adopted	30.1.2025
Result of final vote	+: –: 0:	55 19 1
Members present for the final vote	Mika Aaltola, Petras Auštrevičius, Jordan Bardella, Dan Barna, Wouter Beke, Robert Biedroń, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Marc Botenga, Grzegorz Braun, Sebastião Bugalho, Danilo Della Valle, Özlem Demirel, Elio Di Rupo, Loucas Fourlas, Michael Gahler, Giorgos Georgiou, Raphaël Glucksmann, Bernard Guetta, Rima Hassan, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Rihards Kols, Andrey Kovatchev, Vilis Krištopans, Nathalie Loiseau, Claudiu Manda, David McAllister, Vangelis Meimarakis, Sven Mikser, Francisco José Millán Mon, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Leoluca Orlando, Kostas Papadakis, Tonino Picula, Thijs Reuten, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Andreas Schieder, Alexander Sell, Villy Søvndal, Davor Ivo Stier, Sebastiaan Stöteler, Stanislav Stoyanov, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Michał Szczerba, António Tânger Corrêa, Marta Temido, Cristian Terheş, Riho Terras, Hermann Tertsch, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Reinier Van Lanschot, Roberto Vannacci, Hilde Vautmans, Harald Vilimsky, Željana Zovko
Substitutes present for the final vote	Jaume Asens Llodrà, Malik Azmani, Engin Eroglu, Sandra Gómez López, Evin Incir, András László, Ana Catarina Mendes, Hans Neuhoff, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Chloé Ridel, Tineke Strik, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Matej Tonin, Ivaylo Valchev, Isabel Wiseler-Lima
Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote	Nikos Papandreou, Catarina Vieira

MIL OSI Europe News –

February 27, 2025

MIL-OSI: Sentinel Crest Relocates Corporate Headquarters to Palm Beach, FL

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

PALM BEACH, Fla., Feb. 26, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Sentinel Crest Capital, a leading Venture Catalyst® firm, has announced the relocation of its corporate headquarters to Palm Beach, Florida. This move aligns Sentinel Crest with other Florida-based financial powerhouses that have relocated senior operations from Manhattan to Florida’s burgeoning financial hubs of Palm Beach and Miami.

Sentinel Crest | Where speed meets precision to redefine deal-making.

The relocation underscores Sentinel Crest’s mission to strategically position itself in regions driving innovation, signaling the firm’s alignment with the industry’s shifting dynamics.

Statement from the CEO:

Joey Petelle, CEO of Sentinel Crest Capital, emphasized the firm’s forward-thinking strategy. “As velocity increases through digital technology, visionary companies are reshuffling their decks to stay at the forefront of the financial marketplace,” said Petelle. “Our relocation is not just about geography—it’s about positioning Sentinel Crest at the epicenter of innovation and opportunity.”

Highlight of Services and Expertise:

Renowned as a Capital Matchmaker, Sentinel Crest specializes in Capital Formation, Growth Advisory and equity, Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A), and Merchant Banking. The firm connects high-growth companies with capital and strategic relationships essential for scaling effectively.

“Catalysts make opportunities happen faster,” Petelle added. “At Sentinel Crest, we combine decades of industry expertise with cutting-edge technology to redefine deal-making in the financial services sector.”

Why Palm Beach:

Palm Beach’s emergence as a financial hub offers Sentinel Crest a unique platform to expand its operations while fostering collaboration with other industry leaders. The move also highlights the region’s favorable business conditions and growing recognition as a magnet for top-tier financial talent.

Technology and Innovation Focus:

The relocation reaffirms Sentinel Crest’s commitment to leveraging advanced technology, particularly artificial intelligence (AI). An early adopter of AI, the firm has integrated the technology into its proprietary tech stack to accelerate deal-making processes with unmatched speed and precision.

This innovative approach supports Sentinel Crest’s ability to deliver transformative results for clients navigating complex capital markets.

Sentinel Crest’s reputation as a trailblazer stems from bridging traditional financial expertise with modern technological advancements. “We are where speed meets precision,” said Petelle. “Our team of industry legends is redefining how deals are created and executed in today’s competitive landscape.”

To learn more about Sentinel Crest’s relocation and how it is reshaping the financial landscape, visit https://sentinelcrest.com/

About Sentinel Crest

Accelerating Deals + Empowering Results – As a Venture Catalyst®, Sentinel Crest is transforming financial markets with innovation. We are at the forefront of technology revolutionizing the financial services industry by accelerating opportunities and transforming profitable results. A team of industry legends infusing decades of expertise and relationships with cutting-edge tech stack — accelerated by the power of artificial intelligence (AI). Sentinel ensures that deals are created and executed at unmatched speed, precision, and success.

Partner with Sentinel Crest Capital — where speed meets precision to redefine deal-making.

Press Inquiries

Sentinel Crest
https://sentinelcrest.com
Jane Taylor
media@sentinelcrest.com
340 Royal Poinciana Way
Suite 328-203
Palm Beach FL 33480

A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/50cf43a8-cba3-4822-9a1a-57a17ab6fe45

The MIL Network –

February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI: Moody’s affirmed Aktia’s ratings and upgraded outlook from negative to stable

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Aktia Bank Plc
Press release
26 February 2025 at 2.00 p.m.

Moody’s affirmed Aktia’s ratings and upgraded outlook from negative to stable

On 26 February 2025, Moody’s Investors Service has upgraded the long-term outlook on Aktia’s credit ratings for short-term and long-term funding from negative to stable. At the same time, Moody’s confirmed Aktia’s short-term funding rating at A2/P-1 and long-term funding rating at A2.
Moody’s release is available at www.aktia.com under Investors > Debt & funding > Rating.

Aktia Bank Plc

Further information:
Timo Ruotsalainen, Head of Treasury, Tel. +358 50 386 1753
Oscar Taimitarha, Director, Investor Relations, Tel. +358 40 562 2315, email ir (at) aktia.fi

Distribution:
Nasdaq Helsinki Ltd
Mass media
www.aktia.com

Aktia is a Finnish asset manager, bank and life insurer that has been creating wealth and wellbeing from one generation to the next for 200 years. We serve our customers in digital channels everywhere and face-to-face in our offices in the Helsinki, Turku, Tampere, Vaasa and Oulu regions. Our award-winning asset management business sells investment funds internationally. We employ approximately 850 people around Finland. Aktia’s assets under management (AuM) on 31 December 2024 amounted to EUR 14.0 billion, and the balance sheet total was EUR 11.9 billion. Aktia’s shares are listed on Nasdaq Helsinki Ltd (AKTIA). aktia.com.

The MIL Network –

February 27, 2025

MIL-OSI: HSBC Bank Plc – Form 8.5 (EPT/RI) – Wood Group (John) plc

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

FORM 8.5 (EPT/RI)

PUBLIC DEALING DISCLOSURE BY AN EXEMPT PRINCIPAL TRADER WITH RECOGNISED INTERMEDIARY STATUS DEALING IN A CLIENT-SERVING CAPACITY
Rule 8.5 of the Takeover Code (the “Code”)

1. KEY INFORMATION

(a) Name of exempt principal trader:	HSBC Bank Plc
(b) Name of offeror/offeree in relation to whose relevant securities this form relates: Use a separate form for each offeror/offeree	Wood Group (John) plc
(c) Name of the party to the offer with which exempt principal trader is connected:	OFFEROR: Dar Al-Handasah Consultants Shair and Partners Holdings Ltd
(d) Date dealing undertaken:	25 February 2025
(e) In addition to the company in 1(b) above, is the exempt principal trader making disclosures in respect of any other party to this offer? If it is a cash offer or possible cash offer, state “N/A”	N/A

2. DEALINGS BY THE EXEMPT PRINCIPAL TRADER

Where there have been dealings in more than one class of relevant securities of the offeror or offeree named in 1(b), copy table 2(a), (b), (c) or (d) (as appropriate) for each additional class of relevant security dealt in.

The currency of all prices and other monetary amounts should be stated.

(a) Purchases and sales

Class of relevant security

Purchases/ sales

Total number of securities

Highest price per unit paid/received
(GBP)

Lowest price per unit paid/received
(GBP)

Ordinary Shares

Purchase

1,207,943

40.424 p

36.980 p

Ordinary Shares

Sale

1,261,983

40.424 p

36.980 p

(b) Cash-settled derivative transactions

Class of relevant security	Product description	Nature of dealing	Number of reference securities	Price per unit (GBP)
Class of relevant security	e.g. CFD	e.g. opening/closing a long/short position, increasing/reducing a long/short position	Number of reference securities	Price per unit (GBP)
Ordinary shares	Swap	Opening a Long Position	11,306	38.383 p
Ordinary shares	Swap	Opening a Long Position	2,824	39.437 p
Ordinary shares	Swap	Opening a Long Position	53,054	38.534 p
Ordinary shares	Swap	Opening a Long Position	7,479	37.815 p
Ordinary shares	Swap	Opening a Long Position	17,455	38.935 p
Ordinary shares	Swap	Opening a Long Position	21,922	38.396 p
Ordinary shares	Swap	Increasing a Short Position	60,000	38.400 p

(c) Stock-settled derivative transactions (including options)

(i) Writing, selling, purchasing or varying

Class of relevant security	Product description e.g. call option	Writing, purchasing, selling, varying etc.	Number of securities to which option relates	Exercise price per unit	Type e.g. American, European etc.	Expiry date	Option money paid/ received per unit

(ii) Exercise

Class of relevant security

Product description
e.g. call option

Exercising/ exercised against

Number of securities

Exercise price per unit

(d) Other dealings (including subscribing for new securities)

Class of relevant security

Nature of dealing
e.g. subscription, conversion

Details

Price per unit (if applicable)

3. OTHER INFORMATION

(a) Indemnity and other dealing arrangements

Details of any indemnity or option arrangement, or any agreement or understanding, formal or informal, relating to relevant securities which may be an inducement to deal or refrain from dealing entered into by the exempt principal trader making the disclosure and any party to the offer or any person acting in concert with a party to the offer:
Irrevocable commitments and letters of intent should not be included. If there are no such agreements, arrangements or understandings, state “none”

None

(b) Agreements, arrangements or understandings relating to options or derivatives

Details of any agreement, arrangement or understanding, formal or informal, between the exempt principal trader making the disclosure and any other person relating to:
(i) the voting rights of any relevant securities under any option; or
(ii) the voting rights or future acquisition or disposal of any relevant securities to which any derivative is referenced:
If there are no such agreements, arrangements or understandings, state “none”

None

Date of disclosure:	26 February 2025
Contact name:	Dhruti Singh
Telephone number:	0207 088 2000

Public disclosures under Rule 8 of the Code must be made to a Regulatory Information Service.

The Panel’s Market Surveillance Unit is available for consultation in relation to the Code’s dealing disclosure requirements on +44 (0)20 7638 0129.

The Code can be viewed on the Panel’s website at www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk.

The MIL Network –

February 27, 2025

MIL-OSI Africa: Ghana’s Mining in Motion Summit Gains Support from Key Leaders

Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

ACCRA, Ghana, February 26, 2025/APO Group/ —

Otumfuo Osei Tutu II, King of the Ashanti Kingdom; Hon. Emmanuel Armah Kofi Buah, Minister of Lands and Natural Resources of Ghana; and Oheneba Kwaku Duah, the son of Otumfuo Osei Tutu II and Managing Director of the Ashanti Green Initiative recently met to discuss the upcoming Mining in Motion Summit in Ghana.

They explored the summit’s potential to improve the artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) sector in Ghana and the role of government, international partners and major mining firms in accelerating the sector’s growth. Hon. Kofi Buah endorsed the event, emphasizing its significance in connecting small-scale miners with technology providers, financiers, regulatory bodies and global industry stakeholders to improve their operations and impact.

Organized by the Ashanti Green Initiative along with the World Bank, the World Gold Council and other international partners, Mining in Motion will take place from June 2 – 4 in Accra.

The summit is held under the theme Sustainable Mining & Local Growth – Leveraging Resources for Global Impact, uniting key decision-makers, including H.E. John Dramani Mahama, President of the Republic of Ghana, as well as representatives from public and private sector mining institutions from South Africa, the Republic of Guinea, the African Union, ECOWAS and the United Nations.

The three-day event will highlight the role of traditional authorities in shaping artisanal and small-scale mining practices, emphasizing the sector’s contribution to employment and economic growth. In 2024 alone, Ghana’s artisanal miners generated $5 billion in foreign exchange earnings through gold exports. Providing direct employment for over one million Ghanaians and accounting for 35% of domestic gold output, the sector has the potential to significantly shape socioeconomic development in the west African country.

As Ghana’s mining sector increasingly supports sustainable development, the Mining in Motion Summit will highlight best practices for integrating ASGM into the global financial system. Representatives from prominent international financing organizations will share their insights.

In a significant move to boost earnings for small-scale miners, Ghana has announced plans to establish a Gold Board. This new entity will simplify the process of purchasing gold from small-scale miners, providing them with easier access to global markets. With Samuel Adu Gyamfi, who was appointed Acting Managing Director of Precious Minerals Marketing Company last month and tasked with setting up the Ghana Gold Board, playing a pivotal role in shaping the summit, Mining in Motion is set to have a sizable impact on the growth of Ghana’s gold sector.

Through a series of high-level panel discussions, deal signings, project showcases and exclusive networking, Mining in Motion serves as the ideal platform to connect Ghanaian miners with regional counterparts and global investors for forge industry-changing partnerships.

Stay informed about the latest advancements, network with industry leaders and engage in critical discussions on key issues impacting ASGM and medium- to large-scale mining in Ghana. Secure your spot at the Mining in Motion 2025 Summit by visiting https://MiningInMotionSummit.com. For sponsorship opportunities or delegate participation, contact sales@energycapitalpower.com.

MIL OSI Africa –

February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Co-operation with GBA cities secured

Source: Hong Kong Information Services

Financial Secretary Paul Chan today outlined a series of measures in the Budget concerning Hong Kong’s collaboration with other cities of the Guangdong – Hong Kong – Macao Greater Bay Area (GBA) on various fronts, including youth development.

As from this year, the requirements for joining the GBA Youth Employment Scheme has been relaxed so that youngsters aged 29 or below with sub-degree or higher qualifications can join, while the limit of allowance for enterprises has been increased to $12,000 per month per person for up to 18 months.

With regard to medical co-operation, the Government is seeking to establish the Real-World Study & Application Centre for the GBA Clinical Trial Collaboration Platform by Hong Kong and Shenzhen by the end of this year.

With the data from the special measure of using Hong Kong registered drugs and medical devices used in Hong Kong public hospitals in the GBA, Mr Chan explained that the aim is to accelerate approval for the registration of new drugs in Hong Kong, the Mainland and overseas, fostering research and development, clinical trials and the application of advanced biomedical technology in Hong Kong.

On the financial front, following the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on Cross-Boundary Credit Referencing Pilots between the Monetary Authority and the People’s Bank of China, the Government will progressively expand the pilot coverage to further facilitate cross-boundary financing for enterprises.

Concerning transport and logistics, Mr Chan pointed out that 21 airlines and 125 logistics companies have participated in the sea air intermodal cargo transshipment mode under the co-operation of Hong Kong and Dongguan.

It is expected that the first phase construction of the permanent facility for the Phase 1 development of the logistics park in Dongguan will be completed within this year and the preliminary study of Phase 2 development will commence shortly.

The co-operation with GBA cities covers the construction industry as well. Mr Chan pointed out that in collaboration with Guangdong Province, the Government has successfully established the “Professional Title” evaluation mechanism for the first batch of Hong Kong engineering professionals, with the mechanism to be extended to other construction related professions with the right conditions.

The Government will collaborate with Guangdong Province and Macau to formulate GBA standards on the skill levels for skilled workers and technicians of the construction sector, and take forward the “One Examination, Multiple Certification” arrangement.

The Financial Secretary also mentioned the development of Qianhai, saying that the Qianhai Shenzhen-Hong Kong Modern Service Industry Co-operation Zone is one of the major co-operation platforms in the bay area.

“For example, the turnover of Qianhai Mercantile Exchange, a subsidiary of Hong Kong Exchanges & Clearing, exceeded RMB100 billion over the year. It operates our country’s only offshore spot trading platform for soybeans.”

He added that the Department of Justice collaborated with the relevant Mainland authorities and achieved the extension of the measures, including the one of “allowing Hong Kong invested enterprises to choose Hong Kong as the arbitration place” to other pilot cities in the bay area, thereby providing Hong Kong investors with a more facilitative business environment.

“Hong Kong will continue to support Qianhai in trying out new policies on a pilot basis and pursuing more policy innovation and breakthroughs, with a view to promoting the successful policies to the rest of the GBA and even the entire country.”

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: North Macedonia: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission
Source: International Monetary Fund

February 26, 2025

A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.

Growth is gaining momentum amid rising risks

Growth is gaining momentum. After picking up in early 2024, growth is expected at 3.3 percent in 2025, driven by stronger domestic demand as public investment projects (including the Corridor 8/10d road project) intensify and consumption is supported by government transfers and real wage growth. The impact of weak external demand seen in 2024 is expected to persist in 2025, driven by structural shifts in the European automotive sector. In the long term, high emigration, especially among the young segment of the population, is projected to lower potential growth, which Staff now estimate at 3.0 percent.

Inflation is rising again. In January, inflation reached 4.9 percent year-on-year, up from a low of 2.2 percent in August 2024. Core inflation has become the main driver and remains persistent, fueled by strong wage growth. Food inflation remains high despite administrative price controls and other interventions.

Domestic risks are elevated and the external outlook more uncertain. Weak public investment, stalled productivity reforms, emigration, and slowing activity of key trade partners threaten growth in the medium-term. Meanwhile, high real wage growth without productivity gains and increased fiscal transfers could further fuel inflation and erode competitiveness. Trade policy shifts and shocks to FDI may suppress exports and tighten financial conditions.

Adhering to the fiscal rules requires credible fiscal consolidation

IMF staff agree with the authorities’ goal of reducing the deficit this year, but are concerned revenue will underperform, rendering this goal out of reach. The 4 percent of GDP deficit envisaged in the 2025 budget will be exceeded if the authorities’ expected revenue gains (of 1½ percent of GDP) from reducing the shadow economy and increasing tax compliance fall short. We welcome the Public Revenue Office’s efforts to modernize tax collection and reduce informality, but these efforts will take time to deliver results. Staff recommends that in any planned supplementary budget, the authorities avoid increasing spending and focus on reducing tax expenditures and transfers (e.g., subsidies to agriculture). Ensuring the full and timely transfer of contributions to the second-pillar pension system is essential.

A credible fiscal strategy is needed to bring debt on a downward path. The budget deficit has exceeded the 3 percent of GDP ceiling in the fiscal rules, while public debt is on an upward trend and has surpassed 60 percent of GDP in 2024—14 percentage points above pre-pandemic levels. A credible fiscal strategy to restore compliance with fiscal rules is key, for preserving credibility to maintain access to international capital markets, for creating space for investment, and strengthening resilience against future shocks. The focus should be on:
- Controlling current spending:Staff recommend omitting further pension increases in September 2025 and returning to a rule-based pension system in 2026—indexing only to inflation—to support consolidation while protecting pensioners’ purchasing power. Staff advise limiting public wage growth to inflation in the near term. The Ministry of Finance should strengthen oversight to ensure public wage increases are consistent with achieving the fiscal rules. Over time, unifying the fragmented wage negotiating system will help prevent unexpected budget pressures.
- Mobilizing revenues. North Macedonia’s tax revenue potential is estimated at 22-24 percent of GDP. To realize these revenues, tax reforms should focus on reducing tax expenditures, limiting reduced rates and exemptions, improving tax compliance, and gradually increasing property tax. The government’s accelerated digitalization efforts will enhance revenue mobilization.
Beyond consolidation, structural fiscal reforms are needed to strengthen fiscal governance and improve spending efficiency, with some progress underway. Key ongoing measures include implementing the Public Investment Management decree and manual, adopting the PPP law, and conducting spending reviews to optimize budget allocation. Managing fiscal risks, especially from SOEs and major projects like the Corridor 8/10d road, is crucial. The inclusion of a fiscal risk assessment in the Medium Term Fiscal Strategy marks an achievement for the ministry. The state-owned electricity generator, ESM, requires investments in technology and efficiency improvements to lower production costs and expand production, while gradually reducing its role in the subsidized, regulated market. The operationalization of the Fiscal Council is a positive step and it is encouraged to strengthen its independent assessments.

Monetary and financial sector policies to maintain stability and mitigate risks

Policy rates should remain on hold and liquidity tools warrant further tightening until inflation steadily declines. Robust reserves accumulation in 2024 has fostered stability in the foreign exchange market. Given the renewed acceleration in both headline and core inflation, the National Bank (NBRNM) should remain on hold until there is clear evidence of sustained disinflation. Staff support the changes in reserve requirements implemented by the NBRNM and advise further tightening to absorb excess liquidity. The NBRNM should remain vigilant to inflationary risks from domestic factors, including wage and pension increases, as well as heightened external risks from trade uncertainties. If these risks materialize, the NBRNM should be prepared to tighten further to prevent inflation from becoming entrenched. The NBRNM has effectively managed recent challenges, including the energy cost shock. Its resilience stems from operational and financial autonomy, which underpin its independence and credibility—both essential for maintaining price and exchange rate stability and must be safeguarded.

The financial system remains resilient, but macro prudential settings may need to be tightened in response to brisk credit growth. Overall, the banking sector is well-capitalized, highly liquid, and profitable, with low system-wide non-performing loans. NBRNM’s active macroprudential and microprudential measures have strengthened resilience. Strong balance sheets and increased deposits have fueled an acceleration in lending activity towards the end of 2024. The implemented loan-to-value and debt service-to-income ratios will continue to help safeguard financial stability by reducing pressures in the real estate market and preventing higher levels of indebtedness. Staff support the NBRNM’s gradual tightening of the countercyclical capital buffer and additional capital requirements to ensure banks maintain adequate loss-absorbing and recapitalization capacity, in line with EU regulations. Should lending and real estate prices continue growing briskly, further tightening of macroprudential instruments may be warranted.

Structural reforms to boost productivity and offset costs of emigration

IMF staff support the authorities’ objectives of boosting productivity, raising living standards, and reducing informality. Over the past decade, growth in North Macedonia has lagged regional peers and convergence with the EU has stalled. High emigration has led to a declining population that threatens to be a drag on potential growth. Accelerating structural reforms is key to achieving the authorities’ objectives, offsetting the costs of emigration, and supporting the country on its path to EU accession. The priorities are well known:
- Improving the business environment. Reducing informality through streamlined business registrations and expanded digital public services is a priority. The predictability of the legal and regulatory environment can be improved by limiting the use of expedited procedures in Parliament, increasing stakeholder consultation, and applying the regulatory requirements more consistently. Simplifying and digitalizing work permits would help businesses address skill and labor shortages more efficiently. Avoiding ad-hoc adjustments to the minimum wage will help contain inflation, preserve competitiveness and provide a more predictable policy environment for business.
- Strengthening the labor market. Improving labor market outcomes can stimulate private investment, increase labor participation, and reduce emigration. Raising educational quality and job matching between firms and workers through vocational training will help address labor shortages. Expanding affordable childcare in municipalities, and gradually raising the retirement age of women to match men can help to offset workforce losses from high emigration.
- Increasing public infrastructure investment. The quality of public infrastructure in North Macedonia lags peers. The major infrastructure projects Corridor 8/10d and the Kicevo-Ohrid highways are over budget and behind schedule. Staff urge the authorities to complete the started projects and realize their investments. Capital expenditures should be safeguarded in the budget and public investment management should be strengthened to prioritize high-impact projects.
- Strengthening the rule of law and anti-corruption efforts. Improving judicial independence and impartiality would strengthen contract enforcement and help reduce informality. The fight against corruption remains weak, particularly in prosecuting high-profile cases. Aligning the Criminal Code with international standards and enhancing resources for key anti-corruption institutions are crucial. The upcoming new national anti-corruption strategy is an opportunity to accelerate reforms through stronger accountability and coordination.
- Enhancing governance.Improving public resource efficiency, accountability, and transparency requires expanding digital public services, reassessing state aid schemes, strengthening procurement systems, and improving SOE management.
The IMF team thanks the authorities of North Macedonia and other counterparts for their productive collaboration and constructive policy dialogue.

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Eva Graf

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

@IMFSpokesperson
MIL OSI Economics –
February 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Russia: North Macedonia: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission
Source: IMF – News in Russian

February 26, 2025

A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.

Growth is gaining momentum amid rising risks

Growth is gaining momentum. After picking up in early 2024, growth is expected at 3.3 percent in 2025, driven by stronger domestic demand as public investment projects (including the Corridor 8/10d road project) intensify and consumption is supported by government transfers and real wage growth. The impact of weak external demand seen in 2024 is expected to persist in 2025, driven by structural shifts in the European automotive sector. In the long term, high emigration, especially among the young segment of the population, is projected to lower potential growth, which Staff now estimate at 3.0 percent.

Inflation is rising again. In January, inflation reached 4.9 percent year-on-year, up from a low of 2.2 percent in August 2024. Core inflation has become the main driver and remains persistent, fueled by strong wage growth. Food inflation remains high despite administrative price controls and other interventions.

Domestic risks are elevated and the external outlook more uncertain. Weak public investment, stalled productivity reforms, emigration, and slowing activity of key trade partners threaten growth in the medium-term. Meanwhile, high real wage growth without productivity gains and increased fiscal transfers could further fuel inflation and erode competitiveness. Trade policy shifts and shocks to FDI may suppress exports and tighten financial conditions.

Adhering to the fiscal rules requires credible fiscal consolidation

IMF staff agree with the authorities’ goal of reducing the deficit this year, but are concerned revenue will underperform, rendering this goal out of reach. The 4 percent of GDP deficit envisaged in the 2025 budget will be exceeded if the authorities’ expected revenue gains (of 1½ percent of GDP) from reducing the shadow economy and increasing tax compliance fall short. We welcome the Public Revenue Office’s efforts to modernize tax collection and reduce informality, but these efforts will take time to deliver results. Staff recommends that in any planned supplementary budget, the authorities avoid increasing spending and focus on reducing tax expenditures and transfers (e.g., subsidies to agriculture). Ensuring the full and timely transfer of contributions to the second-pillar pension system is essential.

A credible fiscal strategy is needed to bring debt on a downward path. The budget deficit has exceeded the 3 percent of GDP ceiling in the fiscal rules, while public debt is on an upward trend and has surpassed 60 percent of GDP in 2024—14 percentage points above pre-pandemic levels. A credible fiscal strategy to restore compliance with fiscal rules is key, for preserving credibility to maintain access to international capital markets, for creating space for investment, and strengthening resilience against future shocks. The focus should be on:
- Controlling current spending:Staff recommend omitting further pension increases in September 2025 and returning to a rule-based pension system in 2026—indexing only to inflation—to support consolidation while protecting pensioners’ purchasing power. Staff advise limiting public wage growth to inflation in the near term. The Ministry of Finance should strengthen oversight to ensure public wage increases are consistent with achieving the fiscal rules. Over time, unifying the fragmented wage negotiating system will help prevent unexpected budget pressures.
- Mobilizing revenues. North Macedonia’s tax revenue potential is estimated at 22-24 percent of GDP. To realize these revenues, tax reforms should focus on reducing tax expenditures, limiting reduced rates and exemptions, improving tax compliance, and gradually increasing property tax. The government’s accelerated digitalization efforts will enhance revenue mobilization.
Beyond consolidation, structural fiscal reforms are needed to strengthen fiscal governance and improve spending efficiency, with some progress underway. Key ongoing measures include implementing the Public Investment Management decree and manual, adopting the PPP law, and conducting spending reviews to optimize budget allocation. Managing fiscal risks, especially from SOEs and major projects like the Corridor 8/10d road, is crucial. The inclusion of a fiscal risk assessment in the Medium Term Fiscal Strategy marks an achievement for the ministry. The state-owned electricity generator, ESM, requires investments in technology and efficiency improvements to lower production costs and expand production, while gradually reducing its role in the subsidized, regulated market. The operationalization of the Fiscal Council is a positive step and it is encouraged to strengthen its independent assessments.

Monetary and financial sector policies to maintain stability and mitigate risks

Policy rates should remain on hold and liquidity tools warrant further tightening until inflation steadily declines. Robust reserves accumulation in 2024 has fostered stability in the foreign exchange market. Given the renewed acceleration in both headline and core inflation, the National Bank (NBRNM) should remain on hold until there is clear evidence of sustained disinflation. Staff support the changes in reserve requirements implemented by the NBRNM and advise further tightening to absorb excess liquidity. The NBRNM should remain vigilant to inflationary risks from domestic factors, including wage and pension increases, as well as heightened external risks from trade uncertainties. If these risks materialize, the NBRNM should be prepared to tighten further to prevent inflation from becoming entrenched. The NBRNM has effectively managed recent challenges, including the energy cost shock. Its resilience stems from operational and financial autonomy, which underpin its independence and credibility—both essential for maintaining price and exchange rate stability and must be safeguarded.

The financial system remains resilient, but macro prudential settings may need to be tightened in response to brisk credit growth. Overall, the banking sector is well-capitalized, highly liquid, and profitable, with low system-wide non-performing loans. NBRNM’s active macroprudential and microprudential measures have strengthened resilience. Strong balance sheets and increased deposits have fueled an acceleration in lending activity towards the end of 2024. The implemented loan-to-value and debt service-to-income ratios will continue to help safeguard financial stability by reducing pressures in the real estate market and preventing higher levels of indebtedness. Staff support the NBRNM’s gradual tightening of the countercyclical capital buffer and additional capital requirements to ensure banks maintain adequate loss-absorbing and recapitalization capacity, in line with EU regulations. Should lending and real estate prices continue growing briskly, further tightening of macroprudential instruments may be warranted.

Structural reforms to boost productivity and offset costs of emigration

IMF staff support the authorities’ objectives of boosting productivity, raising living standards, and reducing informality. Over the past decade, growth in North Macedonia has lagged regional peers and convergence with the EU has stalled. High emigration has led to a declining population that threatens to be a drag on potential growth. Accelerating structural reforms is key to achieving the authorities’ objectives, offsetting the costs of emigration, and supporting the country on its path to EU accession. The priorities are well known:
- Improving the business environment. Reducing informality through streamlined business registrations and expanded digital public services is a priority. The predictability of the legal and regulatory environment can be improved by limiting the use of expedited procedures in Parliament, increasing stakeholder consultation, and applying the regulatory requirements more consistently. Simplifying and digitalizing work permits would help businesses address skill and labor shortages more efficiently. Avoiding ad-hoc adjustments to the minimum wage will help contain inflation, preserve competitiveness and provide a more predictable policy environment for business.
- Strengthening the labor market. Improving labor market outcomes can stimulate private investment, increase labor participation, and reduce emigration. Raising educational quality and job matching between firms and workers through vocational training will help address labor shortages. Expanding affordable childcare in municipalities, and gradually raising the retirement age of women to match men can help to offset workforce losses from high emigration.
- Increasing public infrastructure investment. The quality of public infrastructure in North Macedonia lags peers. The major infrastructure projects Corridor 8/10d and the Kicevo-Ohrid highways are over budget and behind schedule. Staff urge the authorities to complete the started projects and realize their investments. Capital expenditures should be safeguarded in the budget and public investment management should be strengthened to prioritize high-impact projects.
- Strengthening the rule of law and anti-corruption efforts. Improving judicial independence and impartiality would strengthen contract enforcement and help reduce informality. The fight against corruption remains weak, particularly in prosecuting high-profile cases. Aligning the Criminal Code with international standards and enhancing resources for key anti-corruption institutions are crucial. The upcoming new national anti-corruption strategy is an opportunity to accelerate reforms through stronger accountability and coordination.
- Enhancing governance.Improving public resource efficiency, accountability, and transparency requires expanding digital public services, reassessing state aid schemes, strengthening procurement systems, and improving SOE management.
The IMF team thanks the authorities of North Macedonia and other counterparts for their productive collaboration and constructive policy dialogue.

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Eva Graf

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

@IMFSpokesperson

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/02/26/cs-northmacedonia-2025

MIL OSI
MIL OSI Russia News –
February 26, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Chancellor to meet G20 finance ministers in South Africa
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

News story

Chancellor to meet G20 finance ministers in South Africa

At the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting in South Africa the Chancellor, Rachel Reeves, will make the case for defence investment, declaring that it’s the “bedrock of economic growth”.
Chancellor, Rachel Reeves, touches down in South Africa for the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting today, 26 February.

At the meeting Rachel Reeves will make clear that a strong defence is the “bedrock of economic growth” and make the case for “free and fair trade.”

Follows the PM’s commitment to boost the UK’s defence spending by £13.4 billion to 2.5% of GDP by 2027 and the British Government’s steadfast support for the people of Ukraine.

Following the PM’s announcement yesterday, the Chancellor will state that in a dangerous world the UK will not shy away from bolstering defence spending and will set out our ambition to raise UK defence spending further to 3% by the next parliament, subject to economic and fiscal conditions.

Protecting national security to protect the economy will also be a key message that the Chancellor will set out on the global stage today as she attends the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting in Cape Town, South Africa.

The UK is already the third largest defence spender in NATO in cash terms, and this government has already boosted defence spending by almost £3 billion at the Autumn Budget.

The Chancellor will also reaffirm our commitment to European defence and encourage other European allies at the G20 to boost their defence spending in line with the UK in response to the security threats we face.

She will also discuss the possibilities for like-minded countries to mobilise private finance to maximise our financial resources for defence.

The government’s commitment to invest in defence will protect UK citizens from threats at home but will also create a secure and stable environment in which businesses can thrive, supporting the Government’s number one mission to deliver economic growth.

Chancellor of the Exchequer, Rachel Reeves said:

It’s clear we are facing a more dangerous world, and I will not hide from this reality. This is the moment for us all to step up – and together with our European partners we will go further and faster on defence.

National security will always be the first responsibility of this government and is the bedrock economic growth. Through intelligent investment, relentless reform, and free and fair trade – the most reliable driver of global growth – we can deliver sustainable growth that puts more money into the pockets of working people.

The Chancellor is also expected to set out that she is a champion of free and fair-trade and, will continue to make the case for openness in a series of bilateral meetings with G20 finance ministers.

While in Cape Town the Chancellor will engage with best-in-class British firms in South Africa and visit Cape Town’s historic V&A Waterfront. The Chancellor is expected to welcome British companies including consultancy Turner & Townsend and engineering firm Arup winning new contracts to play a role in the site’s expansion, showcasing UK expertise in designing, planning, and building infrastructure around the world.

The Chancellor will also meet influential businesses and investors in South Africa, such as representatives from Old Mutual Limited, the Foschini Group, and Absa, at a private reception at the High Commissioner’s residence, where she will deliver a keynote speech highlighting growth and investment opportunities in the UK.

Share this page

The following links open in a new tab

Share on Facebook (opens in new tab)

Share on Twitter (opens in new tab)

Updates to this page

Published 26 February 2025
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
February 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Financial hub status gets boost

Source: Hong Kong Information Services

Financial Secretary Paul Chan this morning pledged that the Government will consolidate and enhance Hong Kong’s strengths as an international financial centre (IFC) to create more new growth areas.

In his 2025 Budget Speech, Mr Chan said the key to consolidating and enhancing the strengths of Hong Kong as an IFC lies in institutional innovation, product innovation, a critical mass of enterprises and financial connectivity.

To dovetail with the latest economic trends and corporate needs, Mr Chan said the Government will review listing requirements and post-listing ongoing obligations, evaluate listing-related regulations and arrangements to improve the vetting process, optimise the thresholds for dual primary listing and secondary listing, and review the market structure, including exploring the establishment of a post-delisting over-the-counter trading mechanism.

Riding on the reduction in minimum price spreads to be implemented in the middle of this year, Hong Kong Exchanges & Clearing is reviewing with the Securities & Futures Commission (SFC) the trading unit system or the so-called “board lot” system.

They will put forward proposed enhancements this year so that trading arrangements can better meet liquidity characteristics of shares of different sizes and investment needs as well as facilitate trading and improve efficiency.

To meet the risk management needs of investors, the SFC will consult the market on the proposal to increase the position limits for key index derivatives, so as to enhance flexibility for investors to use the relevant derivatives while safeguarding financial safety.

On product innovation, Mr Chan noted that the Government will soon promulgate a second policy statement on the development of virtual assets and conduct a consultation on the licensing regimes of virtual asset over-the-counter trading services and custodian services this year.

It will also propose measures to promote gold market development this year.

Additionally, the Government will explore enhancement measures to the legal and regulatory regime related to the issuance and transactions of digital bonds to promote the wider adoption of tokenisation in Hong Kong’s bond market.

The finance chief said the Government will organise a flagship forum in the second half of this year to promote Hong Kong’s strengths in fixed income and currencies.

Noting that the industry responded favourably to a pilot scheme on insurance-linked securities, with the issuance of six catastrophe bonds facilitated in Hong Kong and an issuance amount totalling over $5.8 billion, Mr Chan said the pilot scheme will be extended for three years.

On fostering the development of the asset and wealth management industries, Mr Chan said the Government will formulate proposals on the preferential tax regimes for funds, single family offices and carried interest this year.

He outlined that the proposals will include expanding the scope of “fund” under the tax exemption regime, increasing the types of qualifying transactions eligible for tax concessions for funds and single family offices, enhancing the tax concession arrangement on the distribution of carried interest by private equity funds.

To keep attracting global capital to Hong Kong, the Government will be hosting the third edition of the Wealth for Good in Hong Kong Summit shortly under the theme “Hong Kong of the world, for the world”, showcasing Hong Kong’s strengths as a global hub for family offices.

In addition, the inaugural Hong Kong Global Financial & Industry Summit will also be held to pool together global enterprises, funds and technologies through financial empowerment, thereby elevating the level of international co-operation of industries.

Revealing that the People’s Bank of China and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority are working closely to implement the linkage of faster payment systems of both places, Mr Chan said he expected the round-the-clock real-time, small-value cross-boundary remittance service for residents in both places to be launched in the middle of this year at the soonest.

The finance chief added that a public consultation on specific proposals of Mandatory Provident Fund “full portability” will be held this year.

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

February 26, 2025
MIL-OSI: Correction: The 2024 Annual Report of the Bank of Åland Plc has been published

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Correction: Added a missing attachment in the Swedish version.

Bank of Åland Plc
Annual Financial Report
February 26, 2025, 9.30 EET

The 2024 Annual Report of the Bank of Åland Plc has been published
The Annual Report for 2024 of the Bank of Åland Plc (Ålandsbanken Abp), including the 2024 corporate governance report, was published today in Swedish and English. The Compensation Report and the Capital and Risk Management Report were published as separate documents at the same time.

The financial reports in Swedish are being published in compliance with European Single Electronic Format (ESEF) reporting requirements. In line with ESEF requirements, the primary portions of the consolidated financial statements have been marked up with XBRL tags.

The authorised public accounting company KPMG Oy has provided an independent auditors’ affidavit of reasonable assurance about the Bank of Åland Plc’s ESEF financial statements.

The Annual Report, the Compensation Report and the Capital and Risk management Report are available for downloading from our website:

Annual Report

https://www.alandsbanken.fi/uploads/pdf/result/arsredovisn2024en.pdf

Compensation Report

https://www.alandsbanken.fi/uploads/pdf/result/ersattningsrapport2024en.pdf

Capital and Risk Management Report

https://www.alandsbanken.fi/uploads/pdf/result/capital-and-risk-management-report_2024en.xlsx

Bank of Åland Plc

For further information, please contact:
Peter Wiklöf, Managing Director and Chief Executive, Bank of Åland, tel +358 40 512 7505

Attachments

The MIL Network –

February 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: Shaping a Brighter Future for Asia and the Pacific: ADB President Asakawa’s Legacy

Source: Asia Development Bank

Transcript

In January 2020, President Masatsugu Asakawa took the helm of the Asian Development Bank with a vision for sustainable growth and regional cooperation. Little did he know that two months later, the world would face an unprecedented crisis—the COVID-19 pandemic. As the pandemic swept across countries, President Asakawa recognized the urgency and mobilized ADB’s resources to respond swiftly.

Masatsugu Asakawa
President
Asian Development Bank
2020-2025

“In a crisis, every moment counts. I’m proud that ADB acted decisively when our members needed us most.”

Under his leadership, ADB launched a $20 billion assistance package, including the COVID-19 Pandemic Response Option (CPRO) and a $9-billion Asia Pacific Access Facility (APVAX) to help countries procure and distribute drugs.

Amidst the global health crisis, another pressing challenge demanded attention—climate change. At COP26 in Glasgow, President Asakawa reaffirmed ADB’s climate leadership.

“We can’t afford to wait on climate action. That’s why we pledged at least $100 billion in climate financing by 2030 and pioneered innovative tools like the Energy Transition Mechanism and IF-CAP to drive real change.”

Under his guidance, ADB became the region’s “climate bank,” promoting sustainable, inclusive growth while addressing environmental challenges. President Asakawa advocated action to help developing member countries become more resilient against climate change impacts, such as extreme heat and accelerated glacial melt.

“Climate action has been a top priority for ADB, and for me personally. Throughout my presidency, ADB has intensified efforts to address the climate crisis— with initiatives focused on protecting vulnerable areas like the Hindu Kush-Himalaya region.”

Alongside these initiatives, President Asakawa never lost sight of the people behind ADB’s success—its staff. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, he introduced flexible work arrangements and prioritized safety measures.

“Our people are the heart of ADB. Their safety and well-being come above all else. By fostering a supportive and inclusive environment, we empower our staff to deliver their best for the communities we serve.”

In a critical moment, President Asakawa orchestrated the evacuation of 120 ADB staff and their families from Afghanistan. His actions not only safeguarded lives but reinforced a culture of care within the ADB community.

Looking beyond immediate crises, President Asakawa also focused on building stronger foundations for the future. He championed domestic resource mobilization, helping countries strengthen their financial resilience.

“True progress is when countries stand on their own feet. Our role is to help them build that foundation, strengthening their ability to create sustainable growth and resilience for future generations.”

Through initiatives like the creation of the Asia Pacific Tax Hub, ADB has helped strengthen tax systems, improve governance, and secure social safety nets for people across the region.

Understanding that the region’s prosperity depends on cooperation, President Asakawa reinforced the importance of robust partnerships to rejuvenate trade and improve supply chains.

“Asia and the Pacific has benefited immensely from globalization. With the looming threat of protectionism, our region must continue to champion connectivity and collaboration.”

To support his ambitious goals, President Asakawa also spearheaded significant transformation within ADB. A review of the Capital Adequacy Framework unlocked an additional $100 billion in lending capacity over the next decade.

Meanwhile, the new operating model introduced strategic shifts to expand private sector operations, intensify climate action, drive innovation, and locate staff closer to clients to strengthen support and responsiveness.

These initiatives align with the MDB evolution agenda, ensuring ADB remains a key player in global development.

“To meet tomorrow’s challenges, we must evolve today. Innovation isn’t just an option. It’s an imperative.”

As his tenure comes to a close, President Asakawa leaves a strengthened, future-focused ADB.

His vision encourages ADB to stay invested in the region’s success and responsive to emerging challenges. And he reminds us that building trusted, long-term partnerships is key to driving meaningful change.

“ADB’s strength lies in being a trusted development partner- a reliable friend and partner of choice for Asia and the Pacific. This close relationship is our legacy. And it’s vital we preserve it.”

President Asakawa has guided ADB through challenging times with transformative leadership that has left an indelible mark on the organization and region. As we look to the future, his legacy sets the foundation for a prosperous, resilient, inclusive, and sustainable Asia and the Pacific.

“I want to extend my heartfelt gratitude to ADB’s staff, Board of Directors, member governments, and our many partners. Together, we have achieved milestones that will continue to shape a brighter future for Asia and the Pacific.”

MIL OSI Economics –

February 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: Bridging Gaps for Noncommunicable Diseases and Mental Health: Leveraging Technology Innovations for Impact

Source: Asia Development Bank

The Manila knowledge-sharing event heard how innovative technologies could be used to better screen, diagnose, and manage NCDs and mental health conditions in various health settings. Sessions considered country case studies, regulations, and financing, and looked at ways digital health and improved early detection could help save lives and support sustainable and equitable regional growth.

MIL OSI Economics –

February 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: Securing Health in Southeast Asia

Source: Asia Development Bank

Drawing on interviews with leading public health practitioners, the publication details the experiences of Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, the Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Viet Nam. Its recommendations include making sustained investments in health, driving strong stakeholder partnerships, and building robust digital infrastructure to help countries both prepare for future pandemics and strengthen overall regional health security.

MIL OSI Economics –

February 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: FS revs up city’s trade engine

Source: Hong Kong Information Services

Financial Secretary Paul Chan said today that the Government will strive to bolster Hong Kong’s status as an international trade centre, supply chain management centre, and transportation and logistics hub.

In his 2025-26 Budget speech, he said efforts will be made to expand the city’s trade network, reinforce its connectivity and attract more inward investment, while also strengthening support for local enterprises.

As regards Hong Kong’s supply chain management capabilities, Mr Chan iterated that the Hong Kong Trade Development Council and InvestHK jointly provide assistance to Mainland enterprises in using Hong Kong as a base to manage their offshore trading and supply chain activities.

In terms of trade financing, he said the Trade Financing Liquidity Facility recently introduced by Monetary Authority (HKMA) and the People’s Bank of China provides greater flexibility for RMB financing. In addition, the Hong Kong Export Credit Insurance Corporation offers credit insurance to support enterprises seeking to go global.

Mr Chan said the Government is considering making legislative amendments to facilitate digitalisation of trade documents, and will submit proposals to the Legislative Council next year.

In efforts to expand Hong Kong’s trade network and attract more inward investment, the Financial Secretary said the Government is liaising with the governments of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia with a view to establishing Economic & Trade Offices in those countries. In addition, InvestHK has established consultant offices in Egypt and Türkiye, while the HKTDC has set up a consultant office in Cambodia.

Moreover, the Government is exploring investment agreements with Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Egypt and Peru, and is conducting negotiations with 17 countries on establishing Comprehensive Avoidance of Double Taxation Agreements.

Mr Chan outlined that Hong Kong will continue to cultivate markets in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Middle East, besides exploring opportunities in Central Asia, South Asia and North Africa. With regard to the Belt & Road (B&R) Initiative, he added that the HKTDC will strengthen project matching, particularly in relation to green development and innovation and technology (I&T).

Meanwhile, to support the development of local enterprises and help them to go global, the finance chief said the Government will inject a total of $1.5 billion into two funds: the Dedicated Fund on Branding, Upgrading and Domestic Sales and the Export Marketing and Trade and Industrial Organisation Support Fund. Application arrangements will also be streamlined.

In terms of support for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), Mr Chan also highlighted that numerous banks have joined the Taskforce on SME Lending jointly established by the HKMA and the Hong Kong Association of Banks. He said that the funds dedicated for SME financing in the participating banks’ loan portfolios recently increased to over $390 billion.

In collaboration with large-scale e-commerce platforms, the HKTDC will also launch “E-Commerce Express”, in order to provide Hong Kong enterprises with one-to-one consultation services and thematic seminars. In addition, it will enhance the mentorship scheme it operates in collaboration with the Trade & Industry Department, and will organise a second edition of the Hong Kong Shopping Festival.

Turning to Hong Kong’s maritime industry, Mr Chan said the Government will adopt an “innovative spirit” with regard to its development.

He revealed that a Hong Kong Maritime & Port Development Board will be established this year to support research, industry promotion and manpower training. In addition, he said a half-rate tax concession for eligible commodity traders will be introduced.

With regard to logistics development, the finance chief said the Government has initiated a study on developing modern logistics sites in the Northern Metropolis and expects that its findings will be announced this year.

Meanwhile, with a view to developing a smart port, $215 million has been allocated to installing a port community system that will encourage the flow of data among stakeholders in the maritime, port and logistics industries.

In relation to the Government’s plans to bolster Hong Kong’s reputation as an international aviation hub, Mr Chan said the Three-Runway System at Hong Kong International Airport was commissioned at the end of last year and that related passenger facilities will become operational in phases from the end of this year.

He also highlighted that the Airport Authority (AA) recently promulgated a development plan for the expansion of Airport City, and revealed that the Hong Kong International Aviation Academy will expand its training programmes to cover C919 aircraft following their official deployment in scheduled flights between Hong Kong and Shanghai in January.

Mr Chan added that the AA has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with a leading overseas professional aeronautic services company to explore the possibility of providing professional services such as aircraft dismantling, parts recycling and related training in Hong Kong.

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

February 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: Germany card payments market to surpass $850 billion in 2029, forecasts GlobalData

Source: GlobalData

Germany card payments market to surpass $850 billion in 2029, forecasts GlobalData

Posted in Banking

The Germany card payments market is forecast to register a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 5.9% between 2025 and 2029 to reach EUR788.1 billion ($852.1 billion) in 2029, supported by a constant consumer shift towards electronic payments, according to GlobalData, a leading data and analytics company.

GlobalData’s report, “Germany Cards and Payments – Opportunities and Risks,” reveals that card payment value in Germany registered a growth of 11.2% in 2023, driven by the rise in consumer spending. The value grew further to register an estimated growth of 6.4% to reach EUR 574.6 billion ($621.3 billion) in 2024.

Ravi Sharma, Lead Banking and Payments Analyst at GlobalData, comments: “Germany’s payment card market is experiencing rapid growth, with a decline in cash usage. It is expected to continue expanding in 2025, driven by factors such as a 100% adult banked population, the convenience of electronic payments, improving payment infrastructure, the increasing preference for contactless payments, and the growth in e-commerce payments.”

Debit cards are the most popular card type in Germany, accounting for a significant share of total card payments. While debit cards were traditionally used for cash withdrawals, their usage for payments is gradually increasing. This growth can be attributed to the rising adoption and usage of contactless debit cards, which offer convenience and speed for low-value transactions.

On the other hand, credit and charge cards have a lower adoption in Germany. This can be attributed to the debt-averse nature of German consumers. However, banks are encouraging the adoption and usage of credit cards by offering value-added benefits such as installment facilities, reward points, and discounts at partner retailers.

Despite the growth in the payment card market, Germany still has a strong inclination towards cash usage. However, the EU-wide interchange fee regulation, the growth of contactless payments, the emergence of digital-only banks, and a robust e-commerce market have contributed to a gradual increase in payment card usage.

Banks and payment companies are also focusing on expanding payment infrastructure to encourage businesses to go digital. As of July 2024, there were 3.1 million SMEs operating in the country—accounting for 99.4% of German firms. To serve them, POS providers offer low-cost mobile POS (mPOS) solutions. For example, Worldline subsidiary PAYONE offers Tap On Mobile, which enables merchants to convert Android-based mobile devices into POS terminals to accept payment via cards and mobile wallets.

Sharma concludes: “Looking ahead, a continued growth in the total card payments is expected to expand in Germany by 9% in 2025. The key drivers of this growth include the ongoing efforts to promote electronic payments, the expansion of the e-commerce market, and the availability of value-added benefits for cardholders. However, ongoing geopolitical uncertainty and economic slowdown will remain challenges.”

MIL OSI Economics –

February 26, 2025
MIL-OSI: Sydbank’s 2024 Annual Report

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Company Announcement No 08/2025
26 February 2025

Sydbank’s 2024 Annual Report

Highly satisfactory profit thanks to all-time high core income

Core income has risen to a new all-time high level of DKK 7,227m from the record-level of DKK 7,071m in 2023. The increase is mainly attributable to a rise in income from asset management due to a significant increase in capital under management.

The Sydbank Group’s 2024 financial statements show a profit before tax of DKK 3,645m compared to DKK 4,281m in 2023. The decrease of DKK 636m is primarily attributable to impairment charges, which are DKK 622m higher in 2024 than in 2023. Profit before tax equals a return on equity of 24.6%.

Profit for the year is DKK 2,762m against DKK 3,342m in 2023, equal to a return on average equity after tax of 18.6%. At the beginning of 2024 profit after tax was projected to be in the range of DKK 2,500-2,900m.

CEO Mark Luscombe comments on the profit:
– It is positive that in 2024, due to a rise in core income, we succeeded in maintaining a profit before impairment charges at the record-high level that we achieved in 2023. Impairment charges represent an expense of DKK 595m, of which DKK 446m can be attributed to the restructuring of Better Energy. Profit after tax is in the upper end of the expectations for profit for the year announced in January 2024.

Mark Luscombe comments on developments in core income:
– Since June 2024 the Danish central bank has cut its key rates by 1pp and the effect is visible in net interest income, which is reduced by DKK 79m from the record-high level in 2023. The drop has occurred despite an increase in bank lending of DKK 8bn, equal to 11%. Other core income has gone up by DKK 235m, lifting total core income to a new all-time high. This is supported by strong business momentum and a high level of customer activity within savings and investments. I would like to thank all our employees for their hard work and contribution to this strong result and express my gratitude to our customers and shareholders for their continued support.

Board chairman Lars Mikkelgaard-Jensen comments:
– It is gratifying to note that, following the resignation of Karen Frøsig in mid-2024, the Bank under the management of Mark Luscombe has succeeded in continuing the very positive development under Karen Frøsig’s management. This has also been made possible by a well-planned handover focusing completely on the change of CEO not having any impact on Sydbank’s activities. We saw a very
satisfactory trend in the Bank’s business in 2024 and the very high earnings and the Bank’s strong capital base allow us to distribute DKK 2,727m, equal to 99% of profit for 2024. 50% of profit will be distributed as dividend and the remaining share will be distributed via a new share buyback
programme of DKK 1,350m. Following the dividend payout the Bank will continue to be well capitalised.

Outlook 2025
Moderate growth is projected for the Danish economy. Profit after tax is expected to be in the range of DKK 2,200-2,600m.

The profit forecast assumes that the Danish central bank will lower the interest rate by 1pp in 2025.

The outlook is subject to uncertainty and depends on financial market developments and macroeconomic factors which may affect eg the level of impairment charges.

2024 highlights
• A 2% increase in core income
• A rise in costs (core earnings) of 6%
• Impairment charges for loans and advances: an expense of DKK 595m
• A drop in profit for the year of DKK 580m to DKK 2,762m
• An 11% rise in bank loans and advances to DKK 82.5bn
• Deposits of DKK 116.7bn
• A capital ratio of 21.4%, including a CET1 ratio of 17.8%
• A proposed dividend of DKK 26.88 per share
• New share buyback programme of DKK 1,350m

Additional information
Jørn Adam Møller, Deputy Group Chief Executive, tel +45 74 37 20 30
Lars Grubak Lohff, Press Manager, tel +45 20 31 54 65

Attachments

The MIL Network –

February 26, 2025
MIL-OSI: The 2024 Annual Report of the Bank of Åland Plc has been published

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Bank of Åland Plc
Annual Financial Report
February 26, 2025, 9.30 EET

The 2024 Annual Report of the Bank of Åland Plc has been published
The Annual Report for 2024 of the Bank of Åland Plc (Ålandsbanken Abp), including the 2024 corporate governance report, was published today in Swedish and English. The Compensation Report and the Capital and Risk Management Report were published as separate documents at the same time.

The financial reports in Swedish are being published in compliance with European Single Electronic Format (ESEF) reporting requirements. In line with ESEF requirements, the primary portions of the consolidated financial statements have been marked up with XBRL tags.

The authorised public accounting company KPMG Oy has provided an independent auditors’ affidavit of reasonable assurance about the Bank of Åland Plc’s ESEF financial statements.

The Annual Report, the Compensation Report and the Capital and Risk management Report are available for downloading from our website:

Annual Report

https://www.alandsbanken.fi/uploads/pdf/result/arsredovisn2024en.pdf

Compensation Report

https://www.alandsbanken.fi/uploads/pdf/result/ersattningsrapport2024en.pdf

Capital and Risk Management Report

https://www.alandsbanken.fi/uploads/pdf/result/capital-and-risk-management-report_2024en.xlsx

Bank of Åland Plc

For further information, please contact:
Peter Wiklöf, Managing Director and Chief Executive, Bank of Åland, tel +358 40 512 7505

Attachments

The MIL Network –

February 26, 2025
MIL-OSI: Share buyback
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Company Announcement No 06/2025
Peberlyk 4
6200 Aabenraa, Denmark

Tel +45 74 37 37 37
Fax +45 74 37 35 36

Sydbank A/S
CVR No DK 12626509, Aabenraa
sydbank.dk

26 February 2025

Dear Sirs

Share buyback

The Board of Directors has decided to implement a share buyback programme of DKK 1,350 million, however not exceeding 5,400,000 million shares. The purpose of the share buyback is to reduce the Bank’s share capital with the shares purchased under the programme.

At the general meeting of Sydbank A/S held on 21 March 2024 the Board of Directors was most recently authorised to allow the Bank to acquire own shares at a total value of up to 10% of the Bank’s share capital.

The price paid for shares may not differ by more than 10% from the price quoted on Nasdaq Copenhagen A/S at the time of purchase.

The share buyback is part of the adjustment to optimise the capital structure in accordance with the Bank’s capital targets and capital policy. At 31 December 2024 Sydbank’s CET1 ratio stood at 17.8% and its capital ratio stood at 21.7%.

The share buyback programme will be initiated on Monday 3 March 2025 and will be completed by 31 January 2026.

Sydbank has chosen Danske Bank A/S to manage the share buyback programme which will be executed in compliance with Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1052 of 8 March 2016, referred to as the Safe Harbour rules.

The share buyback programme will be subject to the following guidelines:
- Shares may not be purchased at a price higher than the higher of the following prices:
I. the price of the last independent trade
II. the highest current independent purchase bid on the trading venue where the purchase is carried out, including when the shares are traded on different trading venues.
- Purchases on any trading day must not exceed 25% of the average daily volume of the shares in the preceding 20 trading days on the trading venue on which the purchase is carried out.
On the first banking day of each week Sydbank will state the number and value of repurchased shares in a company announcement.

Sydbank may suspend or end the share buyback programme at any time. In such case this will be announced in a company announcement.

On 23 January 2025 Sydbank’s share buyback programme of DKK 1,200m was completed. The share buyback programme was launched on 4 March 2024 and Sydbank purchased 3,383,960 shares within the programme. At 24 February 2025 Sydbank owned a total of 3,384,960 own shares, equal to approx 6.2% of the Bank’s share capital. The Board of Directors recommends to the AGM to be held on 20 March 2025 that the Bank’s share capital be reduced by DKK 33,839,000 to DKK 512,044,600.

Yours sincerely


Mark Luscombe        Jørn Adam Møller
CEO        Deputy Group Chief Executive

Attachment

The MIL Network –
February 26, 2025
MIL-OSI: ING to redeem two series of SEC registered Senior Notes
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

ING to redeem two series of SEC registered Senior Notes

ING announced today it will redeem two series of outstanding SEC registered securities: the USD 500 million Callable Floating Rate Senior Notes (CUSIP 456837 BD4 / ISIN US456837BD49) and the USD 1,250 million 3.869% Callable Fixed-to-Floating Rate Senior Notes (CUSIP 456837 BA0 / ISIN US456837BA00) (together the “Callable Senior Notes”) on their call date of 28 March 2025.

The Callable Senior Notes will be redeemed in full in accordance with their terms, with payment to be made on 28 March 2025. The redemption price will be the principal amount of the Callable Senior Notes. Accrued and unpaid interest due on the redemption date will be paid in the usual manner to holders of record as of 27 March 2025. The paying agent for the Callable Senior Notes Securities is The Bank of New York Mellon, London Branch 160 Queen Victoria Street London EC4V 4LA United Kingdom.

Any future decisions by ING as to whether it will exercise (or cause to be exercised) calls in respect of debt securities will be made on an economic basis, taking into account the interests of all stakeholders. Other factors that ING will consider include prevailing market conditions, regulatory approval and capital requirements.

Note for editors

For more on ING, please visit www.ing.com. Frequent news updates can be found in the Newsroom or via X @ING_news feed. Photos of ING operations, buildings and its executives are available for download at Flickr.

ING PROFILE

ING is a global financial institution with a strong European base, offering banking services through its operating company ING Bank. The purpose of ING Bank is: empowering people to stay a step ahead in life and in business. ING Bank’s more than 60,000 employees offer retail and wholesale banking services to customers in over 100 countries.

ING Group shares are listed on the exchanges of Amsterdam (INGA NA, INGA.AS), Brussels and on the New York Stock Exchange (ADRs: ING US, ING.N).

ING aims to put sustainability at the heart of what we do. Our policies and actions are assessed by independent research and ratings providers, which give updates on them annually. ING’s ESG rating by MSCI was reconfirmed by MSCI as ‘AA’ in August 2024 for the fifth year. As of December 2023, in Sustainalytics’ view, ING’s management of ESG material risk is ‘Strong’. Our current ESG Risk Rating, is 17.2 (Low Risk).

ING Group shares are also included in major sustainability and ESG index products of leading providers including Euronext, STOXX, Morningstar and FTSE Russell.

IMPORTANT LEGAL INFORMATION

Elements of this press release contain or may contain information about ING Groep N.V. and/ or ING Bank N.V. within the meaning of Article 7(1) to (4) of EU Regulation No 596/2014 (‘Market Abuse Regulation’).

ING Group’s annual accounts are prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards as adopted by the European Union (‘IFRS- EU’). In preparing the financial information in this document, except as described otherwise, the same accounting principles are applied as in the 2023 ING Group consolidated annual accounts. The Financial statements for 2024 are in progress and may be subject to adjustments from subsequent events. All figures in this document are unaudited. Small differences are possible in the tables due to rounding.

Certain of the statements contained herein are not historical facts, including, without limitation, certain statements made of future expectations and other forward-looking statements that are based on management’s current views and assumptions and involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results, performance or events to diﬀer materially from those expressed or implied in such statements. Actual results, performance or events may diﬀer materially from those in such statements due to a number of factors, including, without limitation: (1) changes in general economic conditions and customer behaviour, in particular economic conditions in ING’s core markets, including changes affecting currency exchange rates and the regional and global economic impact of the invasion of Russia into Ukraine and related international response measures (2) changes affecting interest rate levels (3) any default of a major market participant and related market disruption (4) changes in performance of financial markets, including in Europe and developing markets

(5) fiscal uncertainty in Europe and the United States (6) discontinuation of or changes in ‘benchmark’ indices (7) inflation and deflation in our principal markets (8) changes in conditions in the credit and capital markets generally, including changes in borrower and counterparty creditworthiness (9) failures of banks falling under the scope of state compensation schemes (10) non- compliance with or changes in laws and regulations, including those concerning financial services, financial economic crimes and tax laws, and the interpretation and application thereof (11) geopolitical risks, political instabilities and policies and actions of governmental and regulatory authorities, including in connection with the invasion of Russia into Ukraine and the related international response measures (12) legal and regulatory risks in certain countries with less developed legal and regulatory frameworks (13) prudential supervision and regulations, including in relation to stress tests and regulatory restrictions on dividends and distributions (also among members of the group) (14) ING’s ability to meet minimum capital and other prudential regulatory requirements (15) changes in regulation of US commodities and derivatives businesses of ING and its customers (16) application of bank recovery and resolution regimes, including write down and conversion powers in relation to our securities (17) outcome of current and future litigation, enforcement proceedings, investigations or other regulatory actions, including claims by customers or stakeholders who feel misled or treated unfairly, and other conduct issues (18) changes in tax laws and regulations and risks of non-compliance or investigation in connection with tax laws, including FATCA (19) operational and IT risks, such as system disruptions or failures, breaches of security, cyber-attacks, human error, changes in operational practices or inadequate controls including in respect of third parties with which we do business and including any risks as a result of incomplete, inaccurate, or otherwise flawed outputs from the algorithms and data sets utilized in artificial intelligence (20) risks and challenges related to cybercrime including the eﬀects of cyberattacks and changes in legislation and regulation related to cybersecurity and data privacy, including such risks and challenges as a consequence of the use of emerging technologies, such as advanced forms of artificial intelligence and quantum computing (21) changes in general competitive factors, including ability to increase or maintain market share (22) inability to protect our intellectual property and infringement claims by third parties (23) inability of counterparties to meet financial obligations or ability to enforce rights against such counterparties (24) changes in credit ratings (25) business, operational, regulatory, reputation, transition and other risks and challenges in connection with climate change and ESG-related matters, including data gathering and reporting (26) inability to attract and retain key personnel (27) future liabilities under defined benefit retirement plans (28) failure to manage business risks, including in connection with use of models, use of derivatives, or maintaining appropriate policies and guidelines (29) changes in capital and credit markets, including interbank funding, as well as customer deposits, which provide the liquidity and capital required to fund our operations, and (30) the other risks and uncertainties detailed in the most recent annual report of ING Groep N.V. (including the Risk Factors contained therein) and ING’s more recent disclosures, including press releases, which are available on www.ING.com.

This document may contain ESG-related material that has been prepared by ING on the basis of publicly available information, internally developed data and other third-party sources believed to be reliable. ING has not sought to independently verify information obtained from public and third-party sources and makes no representations or warranties as to accuracy, completeness, reasonableness or reliability of such information.

Materiality, as used in the context of ESG, is distinct from, and should not be confused with, such term as defined in the Market Abuse Regulation or as defined for Securities and Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) reporting purposes. Any issues identified as material for purposes of ESG in this document are therefore not necessarily material as defined in the Market Abuse Regulation or for SEC reporting purposes. In addition, there is currently no single, globally recognized set of accepted definitions in assessing whether activities are “green” or “sustainable.” Without limiting any of the statements contained herein, we make no representation or warranty as to whether any of our securities constitutes a green or sustainable security or conforms to present or future investor expectations or objectives for green or sustainable investing. For information on characteristics of a security, use of proceeds, a description of applicable project(s) and/or any other relevant information, please reference the offering documents for such security.

This document may contain inactive textual addresses to internet websites operated by us and third parties. Reference to such websites is made for information purposes only, and information found at such websites is not incorporated by reference into this document. ING does not make any representation or warranty with respect to the accuracy or completeness of, or take any responsibility for, any information found at any websites operated by third parties. ING specifically disclaims any liability with respect to any information found at websites operated by third parties. ING cannot guarantee that websites operated by third parties remain available following the publication of this document, or that any information found at such websites will not change following the filing of this document. Many of those factors are beyond ING’s control.

Any forward-looking statements made by or on behalf of ING speak only as of the date they are made, and ING assumes no obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information or for any other reason.

This document does not constitute an oﬀer to sell, or a solicitation of an oﬀer to purchase, any securities in the United States or any other jurisdiction.

Attachment
- ING to redeem two series of SEC registered Senior Notes
The MIL Network –
February 26, 2025
MIL-OSI: Intermediate Capital Group plc: Board Change

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

26 February 2025

Intermediate Capital Group plc (the “Company” or “ICG”) – Board Change

The Board of ICG announces that Robin Lawther has been appointed as a Non-Executive Director of the Company. She will join the Board on 1 November 2025.

Robin holds a number of current roles, including as an Independent Non-Executive Director at Standard Chartered PLC, an Independent Non-Executive Director at Ashurst LLP, and a Global Advisory Board Member at Aon PLC. She spent over 20 years at JPMorgan Chase in a number of senior roles in Investment Banking in both North America and Europe and has significant executive and non-executive experience as well as entrepreneurial activity with earlier stage private investments.

William Rucker, Chair of ICG, said: “We are delighted to welcome Robin to the Board. She has significant experience of the financial services industry spanning both sides of the Atlantic and has knowledge of a broad spectrum of the market. Her expertise and perspective across a range of business areas and geographies will be of great value to ICG and I look forward to her joining us.”

Other appointments and other relevant information for Robin Lawther are listed below, and no other information is required to be disclosed pursuant to the Listing Rules of the Financial Conduct Authority.

Ends

Contacts

Chris Hunt
Shareholder Relations, ICG plc
+44 (0) 20 3545 2020

Andrew Lewis
Company Secretary, ICG plc
+44 (0) 20 3545 1344

Fiona Laffan
Corporate Affairs, ICG PLC
+44 (0) 20 3545 1510

Notes:

Committee Appointments

Robin Lawther will be appointed to committees of the Board following her appointment to the Board and these will be publicly disclosed in due course.

Interests in shares

As at the date of this announcement, Robin Lawther and her connected persons do not hold any shares in the Company.

Selected current roles

Standard Chartered PLC, Independent Non-Executive Director and a Member of the Risk, Remuneration, and Culture and Sustainability Committees

Ashurst LLP, Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Audit and Finance Committee

Aon PLC, Global Advisory Board Member

Selected former roles

2014-2023 Nordea Bank ABP, Independent Non-Executive Director, Chair Remuneration Committee (2017-2020), and Member of the Risk and Remuneration Committees

2014-2022 UK Government investments, Non-Executive Director and Member of the Audit, Remuneration, and Nomination Committees

2019-2021 M&G PLC, Independent Non-Executive Director, Chair Remuneration Committee, and Member of the Risk, Audit, and Nomination Committees

2016-2020 Oras Invest, Independent Non-Executive Board Member

The MIL Network –

February 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: Development Asia: 3 Lessons from Crowdsourcing Digital Solutions for Improving MSMEs’ Access to Finance

Source: Asia Development Bank

Here are three lessons that we have learned in crowdsourcing digital solutions to support MSMEs’ and WMSMEs’ access to financing:

Employ a bottom-up and top-down, collaborative approach. Effective crowdsourcing requires a deep understanding of the problem. Therefore, various stakeholders, including government and non-governmental institutions, (W)MSMEs, financial institutions, and technology service providers, were consulted to learn more about the situation on the ground to better frame and flesh out the challenges. The collaborative approach used by ADB’s IT Department, gWFX, the Private Sector Financial Institutions Division of ADB’s Private Sector Operations Department, and the Finance Sector Office ensured that the challenges were relevant and actionable. In addition, collaboration generated lessons for broader engagement with various groups.

Design problem statements tailored to match the unique needs of Developing Member Countries (DMCs). The intent behind these challenges is to obtain proposals that are no longer at the ideation stage. Instead, these should be actionable, relevant, and responsive to the specific context in the DMC covered by the challenge. Prioritizing local experience in the evaluation process also helped in shortlisting proposals that were socio-culturally and economically appropriate.

Furthermore, we used local experience as one of the criteria for evaluating submissions to ensure that the shortlisted teams were familiar with the context. Taking these criteria into consideration enabled the team to filter out which of the submitted solutions would best fit the context and needs of the respective DMCs. This was also to ensure that any solution would not leave out the women’s market segment but would instead look at technology through a gender lens and provide tools to help women access the financing they need to thrive.

Ensure the right solution is selected through validation. Beyond identifying and selecting a solution that addresses a specific challenge faced by financial institutions, it is equally crucial to validate the solution through a “test-and-learn” approach. By stress testing the solution during both the proof of concept and pilot stages, teams can assess its viability and scalability, ensuring that it meets the needs of the financial institutions and the entrepreneurs it aims to support.

For example, in Pakistan, the AI-leveraged solution for financial statement analytics underwent testing to ensure that the solution met the financial institution’s objectives of scoring WMSMEs more effectively. The team gathered business and technical requirements of the institution, prioritized features and functionalities, and worked with the IT and Operations teams to create and implement an integration roadmap. Next, the solution will be deployed in a test environment to lend to a sample size of WMSMEs for validation.

MIL OSI Economics –

February 26, 2025
MIL-OSI: Annual Report 2024
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)
- Earnings per share DKK 80.0 (2023: DKK 89.3)
- Core income DKK 13,693m (2023: DKK 14,356m)
- Core expenses DKK 6,402m (2023: DKK 6,102m)
- Loan impairment charges DKK 21m (2023: DKK 127m)
- Capital ratio of 23.1%, of which common equity tier 1 capital ratio of 17.6% (2023: 21.0% and 16.9%, respectively)
- The Group Supervisory Board proposes an ordinary dividend of DKK 24.0 per share, or DKK 1,543m for resolution at the coming annual general meeting
- New share buy-back programme of up to DKK 2.25bn is expected to be completed by 31 January 2026 at the latest and contributes to a historical capital distribution to shareholders
- The net profit is expected in the range of DKK 3.8bn-4.6bn in 2025, corresponding to earnings per share in the range of DKK 60-73
- Improved customer satisfaction, higher meeting activity and increased inflow of personal customers
- Rising business volumes, especially within asset management, where customers also achieved excellent returns.
Summary

In connection with the publication of Jyske Bank’s Annual Report 2024, Lars Mørch, CEO and Member of the Executive Board states:

“Jyske Bank delivered a net profit at DKK 5.3bn or DKK 80 per share in 2024. The profit is the second highest ever and lands at the upper end of the upgraded expectations for the year. Jyske Bank enters 2025 in good shape and with a strong business momentum.

The integration of Handelsbanken Danmark and PFA Bank have, with a few exceptions, been completed and with better-than-expected realised results and synergies. Jyske Finans’ acquisition of the Opendo leasing portfolio, which was announced in September 2024, is also proceeding according to plan.

The results reflect that net interest income showed a declining trend during the year whereas net fee and commission income was up by 6% due to increased business volumes compared with the preceding year. The increase was in particular supported by rising assets under management amid high demand for our investment products and favourable financial markets.

The credit quality is still solid with a low level of non-performing exposures and a low level of actual write-offs.

Following a few years with value-creating acquisitions, Jyske Bank is now paying both dividend and launching a share buy-back. In 2024, Jyske Bank distributed a dividend of DKK 500m and executed a share buy-back programme of DKK 1.5bn which was completed in early October. In accordance with the dividend policy the Supervisory Board proposes to the coming annual general meeting a historically large dividend of DKK 24 per share, corresponding to 30% of the shareholders’ result for 2024. For 2025, the largest single share buy-back programme to date of up to DKK 2.25bn has been launched. The programme will run until 31 January 2026 at the latest.

Customers are increasingly opting for Jyske Bank
Recently, we have seen a highly positive trend in customer satisfaction and business development.

Customer satisfaction increased across all customer segments, and it is worth noting that for the first time since 2019, satisfaction among personal customers is above the average for comparable banks. Moreover, we are pleased that for the 9th year running, our customers have named Jyske Bank the best bank at Private Banking, while satisfaction of corporate customers also shows progress.

In the fourth quarter of 2024, we saw the highest growth of mortgage loans to personal customers for more than five years, and we generally see increased meeting activity with our personal customers.

In 2024, Jyske Bank’s assets under management grew by 17%. As in previous years, customers using Jyske Bank’s asset management solutions saw strong returns in 2024, with all mixed solutions beating their benchmarks in all risk profiles.
We also saw an increase in the overall business volume with corporate customers, including growth in both lending and custody assets.

Clear strategic direction
Towards the end of 2024, Jyske Bank announced an updated strategy. The strategy builds on the Group’s strengths and should pave the way for a strong future market position. The strategy sets ambition and direction for the business and the organisation over the coming years as well as targets for improving underlying profitability up to 2028. The strategy involves tight cost management combined with increased investments in select customer segments and ensuring a solid, secure and attractive platform.

We have clear-cut targets for stronger customer focus that will make Jyske Bank even more attractive to particularly slightly larger and more complex corporate and personal customers, and it is our ambition to help customers in their sustainable transition and to use digitisation offensively to the benefit of customers and to raise efficiency in the Group.

A new and more customer-oriented organisation
We organise ourselves in a customer-oriented way and bring the value chains together to better solve our customers’ needs and requirements.

In 2024, Jyske Bank has changed its organisation to obtain stronger customer orientation in the entire value chain, stronger cross organisational collaboration, higher professionalisation of the Group’s control setup and higher development and implementation efficiency.

In the same context, Erik Gadeberg and Jacob Gyntelberg in 2024 joined the Group Executive Board as new members, and in addition, a number of new members of the Group Executive Leadership Team has led to a strengthening of Jyske Bank.

Jyske Bank invests in the development opportunities of competent employees and attracts some of the most talented profiles in the market. Our ambitions are to ensure a high level of competence in the Group.

2024 was yet another busy year for Jyske Bank’s employees, due to the integration of Handelsbanken Danmark and PFA Bank, among other things. Against this background, it was very positive news that we managed to maintain a high level of job satisfaction among the Group’s employees in the annual employee survey. Thank you to the employees for excellent performance and dedicated results in 2024.

2025 outlook
The Danish economy remains robust although some uncertainty is involved in the global economic development. On this background, Jyske Bank anticipates a net profit in the range of DKK 3.8bn-4.6bn, corresponding to earnings per share in the range of DKK 60-73”, concludes Lars Mørch.

Webcast and conference call
Jyske Bank will host a conference call in English targeting investors and analysts today at 2.00 p.m. CET (link). Conference call and presentation will be available via jyskebank.com/investorrelations.

Yours faithfully,
Jyske Bank

Contact:
Lars Mørch, CEO and Member of the Executive Board, tel. +45 89 89 20 01
Birger Krøgh Nielsen, CFO, tel. +45 89 89 64 44

Attachments

The MIL Network –
February 26, 2025
MIL-OSI: Jyske Bank initiates share repurchase programme
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

The Supervisory Board of Jyske Bank A/S (Jyske Bank) has decided to exercise the authority to repurchase shares granted by the Annual General Meeting on 21 March 2024. The share repurchase programme covers shares at a maximum value of DKK 2.25 billion.

The programme runs as from 26 February 2025 and up to and including 31 January 2026 at the latest. The share repurchase programme is initiated and structured in compliance with the EU Market Abuse Regulation and EU Commission Regulation No. 596/2014 of 16 April 2014.

Conditions for the share repurchase programme
- The purpose of the programme is to reduce the share capital of Jyske Bank.
- Jyske Bank will enter into a contract with a financial adviser which will independently of and without influence from Jyske Bank handle all purchase decisions and execute the purchases within the framework published. Jyske Bank has appointed Goldman Sachs as financial adviser and lead manager for the programme.
- The shares cannot be purchased at prices exceeding the higher of (i) the price of the latest independent trade and (ii) the price of the highest independent bid on Nasdaq Copenhagen at the time of the transaction.
- The total number of shares that may be purchased on a single trading day may not exceed 25% of the average daily trading volume over the preceding 20 trading days on Nasdaq Copenhagen.
- Jyske Bank will publish the amount of shares repurchased as well as the weighted average price per day and per venue in weekly corporate announcements during the programme.
Yours faithfully,
Jyske Bank

Contact: Birger Krøgh Nielsen, CFO, tel. +45 89 89 64 44.

Attachment
- Share repurchase programme 20250226
The MIL Network –
February 26, 2025

MIL-OSI: Notice of Annual General Meeting of Jyske Bank A/S

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

This is to give notice of an Annual General Meeting of Jyske Bank A/S, which will be held on Tuesday 25 March 2025, at 3.00 p.m. at Gl. Skovridergaard, Marienlundsvej 36, DK-8600 Silkeborg

AGENDA of general meeting:

a.	Report of the Supervisory Board on Jyske Bank’s operations during the preceding year.
b.	Presentation of the annual report for adoption or other resolution as well as resolution as to the application of profit or cover of loss according to the financial statements adopted, including the Supervisory Board’s proposal for payment of dividend.
c.	Presentation of and consultative ballot on the remuneration report.
d.	Determination of remuneration to the Shareholders’ Representatives and the Supervisory Board:
	1	Determination of the remuneration of Shareholders’ Representatives for 2025, cf. Art.15(5) of the Articles of Association.
	2	Determination of the remuneration of Supervisory Board members for 2025, cf. Art.16(9) of the Articles of Association.
e.	Consideration of motion to the effect that the Supervisory Board authorises the Bank to acquire Jyske Bank shares on one or more occasions, until the next annual general meeting, of up to a nominal amount of DKK 64,272,095 and at amounts not deviating by more than 10% from the closing bid price listed on NASDAQ Copenhagen A/S at the time of acquisition.
f.	Motions.
	Motions proposed by the Supervisory Board:
	1	Reduction of Jyske Bank’s nominal share capital by DKK 27,651,180 (corresponding to 2,765,118 shares at a nominal value of DKK 10) from DKK 642,720,950 to DKK 615,069,770. With reference to S.188(1) of the Danish Companies Act we point out that the capital reduction takes place through cancellation of previously acquired own shares acquired by Jyske Bank in accordance with authorisation from members in general meeting. Hence, the capital reduction is spent on payment of capital owners. If the motion is adopted, Jyske Bank’s holding of own shares will be reduced by 2,765,118 shares of a nominal value of DKK 10 These shares have been bought back at a total amount of DKK 1,499,999,584 which implies that, apart from the nominal capital reduction, a total amount of DKK 1,472,348,404 has been paid to the capital owners in connection with the buy-backs. The capital reduction takes place at a share premium since it will be at 542.47 for each share of a nominal amount of DKK 10, corresponding to the average price at which the shares have been bought back. In consequence of the above, the following amendment to the Articles of Association is proposed: Art. 2 to be amended to the effect that Jyske Bank’s nominal share capital be DKK 615,069,770 distributed on 61,506,977 shares.
	2	Amendments to Art. 3(8), Art. 4(2) and (3), Art. 5(1) and (2) and Art. 24(2): “VP Securities Services” to be changed into “VP Securities A/S”.
	3	To replace the existing authorizations in the Articles of Association, the Supervisory Board is authorized to carry out capital increases with and without pre-emption rights and to raise convertible loans with and without pre-emption rights by amending Art. 4(2), (3) and (5), Art. 5(1), (2), (3) and (4) of the Articles of Association. The amendments are considered together and are proposed to be changed to the following wording:
		–	Art. 4(2): As specified by the Supervisory Board in respect of time and terms and conditions, the share capital can be increased through the subscription of new shares without preferential subscription rights for existing shareholders. The increase may be in one or several issues by not more than a nominal amount of DKK 60 million (6 million shares of a face value of DKK 10). The increase may be effected through cash payment or through acquisition of existing businesses or specific assets. The increase must in every case be effected not below the market price. The increase cannot be effected through part payment. The authorisation will be effective until 1 March 2030. The new shares shall when issued and transferred be registered in the names of their holders at VP Securities A/S and in the Bank’s register of shareholders. The new shares are negotiable instruments, and there are no restrictions in their negotiability except for the provisions laid down in Art. 3 of the Articles of Association. Shareholders shall be under no obligation to have their shares redeemed in full or in part.
		–	Art. 4(3): As specified by the Supervisory Board in respect of time and terms and conditions, the share capital can be increased through the subscription of new shares with preferential subscription rights for existing shareholders. The increase may be in one or several issues by not more than a nominal amount of DKK 120 million (12 million shares of a face value of DKK 10). The increase may be effected through cash payment or in any other manner. The increase may be offered at a favourable price. The increase cannot be effected through part payment. The authorisation will be effective until 1 March 2030. The new shares shall when issued and transferred be registered in the names of their holders at VP Securities A/S and in the Bank’s register of shareholders. The new shares are negotiable instruments, and there are no restrictions in their negotiability except for the provisions laid down in Art. 3 of the Articles of Association. Shareholders shall be under no obligation to have their shares redeemed in full or in part.
		–	Art. 4(5): To be deleted.
		–	Art. 5(1): The Bank may, following resolution by the Supervisory Board, up to 1 March 2030, on one or more occasions raise loans against bonds or other instruments of debt which bonds or instruments of debt shall entitle the lender to convert his claim into shares (convertible loans) and the Supervisory Board is authorised to carry out the related capital increase. Convertible loans may be raised with a conversion right to a maximum number of shares with a total nominal value corresponding to the maximum nominal amount at the time of raising the convertible loans by which the share capital may be increased using the remaining authorization in Art. 4(3), calculated in relation to the conversion price determined at the time of raising the convertible loans. Exercising the authorisation to increase the share capital in Art. 4(3), will hence reduce the authorisation to raise convertible loans in accordance with this provision. The Bank’s shareholders shall have a preferential subscription right to convertible loans. Where the Supervisory Board decides to raise convertible loans, when exercising the authorization in this provision, the authorisation to increase the share capital, cf. Art. 4(3), shall be considered to be utilised by an amount corresponding to the maximum conversion right. The term allowed for conversion may be fixed at a period exceeding five years after the raising of the convertible loan. For shares which shall be issued on the basis of the convertible loans mentioned in this provision, the Supervisory Board shall decide – with due regard to the time of subscription or utilisation of the conversion right – the time from when such new shares shall carry a right to receive dividend and other terms and conditions of the share issue. Shares issued on the basis of the convertible loans mentioned in this provision cannot be paid in by partial payment, are registered shares and are registered in the name of the holder in VP Securities A/S and the Bank’s register of shareholders upon issuance and transfer. The new shares are negotiable instruments, and the same rules as apply to the existing shares in respect of rights and duties, redeemability and transferability shall apply.
		–	Art. 5(2): The Bank may, following resolution by the Supervisory Board, up to 1 March 2030, on one or more occasions raise loans against bonds or other instruments of debt which bonds or instruments of debt shall entitle the lender to convert his claim into shares (convertible loans) and the Supervisory Board is authorised to carry out the related capital increase. Convertible loans may be raised with a conversion right to a maximum number of shares with a total nominal value corresponding to the maximum nominal amount at the time of raising the convertible loans by which the share capital may be increased using the remaining authorization in Art. 4(2), calculated in relation to the conversion price determined at the time of raising the convertible loans. Exercising the authorisation to increase the share capital in Art. 4(2), will hence reduce the authorisation to raise convertible loans in accordance with this provision. The Bank’s shareholders shall not have a preferential subscription right to convertible loans which are offered at a subscription price and a conversion price to the effect that the right of conversion corresponds to the market price of the shares at the time the resolution to raise convertible loans by using the authorisation of this provision was passed by the Supervisory Board. The convertible bonds or other instruments of debt may be issued as payment upon the Bank’s acquisition of existing businesses or specific assets corresponding to the value of the convertible bonds or other instruments of debt. Where the Supervisory Board decides to raise convertible loans, when exercising the authorization in this provision, the authorisation to increase the share capital, cf. Art. 4(2), shall be considered to be utilised by an amount corresponding to the maximum conversion right. The term allowed for conversion may be fixed at a period exceeding five years after the raising of the convertible loan. For shares which shall be issued on the basis of the convertible loans mentioned in this provision, the Supervisory Board shall decide – with due regard to the time of subscription or utilisation of the conversion right – the time from when such new shares shall carry a right to receive dividend and other terms and conditions of the share issue. Shares issued on the basis of the convertible loans mentioned in this provision cannot be paid in by partial payment, are registered shares and are registered in the name of the holder in VP Securities A/S and the Bank’s register of shareholders upon issuance and transfer. The new shares are negotiable instruments, and the same rules as apply to the existing shares in respect of rights and duties, redeemability and transferability shall apply.
		–	Art. 5(3): To be deleted.
		–	Art. 5(4): To be deleted.
g.	Election of members:
	1	Election of Shareholders’ Representatives, cf. Art. 14(4) of the Articles of Association. The proposed candidates and further information about them are available as from Friday 28 February 2025 at Jyske Bank’s website.
	2	Election of Supervisory Board members, cf. Art. 16(1)(b) of the Articles of Association. The Supervisory Board proposes re-election of Lisbeth Holm, CEO, Vejle and Consultant and Professional Board Member, Glenn Söderholm, Vejbystrand (Sweden).
h.	Election of auditors:
	1	The Supervisory Board proposes the re-election of EY Godkendt Revisionspartnerselskab. The motion is in accordance with the recommendation of the Audit Committee to the Supervisory Board. The recommendation of the Audit Committee is free from influence by any third parties and is not – and has not been – subject to any agreement with a third party who in any way limits the appointment of specific auditors or audit firms by members in general meeting.
	2	The Supervisory Board proposes the re-election of EY Godkendt Revisionspartnerselskab for verification of statutory information on sustainability. The motion is in accordance with the recommendation of the Audit Committee to the Supervisory Board. The recommendation of the Audit Committee is free from influence by any third parties and is not – and has not been – subject to any agreement with a third party who in any way limits the appointment of specific auditors or audit firms by members in general meeting.
i.	Any other business.

Reference to Jyske Bank’s website for further information
Where in this notice of a General Meeting, reference is made to Jyske Bank’s website for further information, this link can be used: https://jyskebank.com/investorrelations/generalmeetings.

Adoption of motions – special requirements
Motions to amend the Bank’s Articles of Association at annual general meetings shall only be adopted where not less than 90 per cent of the voting share capital is represented at the annual general meeting and only where adopted by both three fourth of the votes cast and by three fourth of the voting share capital represented at the general meeting, cf. Art. 12 of the Articles of Association. Where less than 90 per cent of the voting share capital is represented at the annual general meeting, but the said motion obtains both three fourth of the votes cast and three fourth of the voting share capital represented at the annual general meeting, the said motion may be adopted at a new general meeting by the said qualified majority irrespective of the proportion of the share capital represented.

Size of the share capital, voting rights of the shareholders and registration date
Jyske Bank’s share capital is DKK 642,720,950, comprising shares at a face value of DKK 10. Any share amount of DKK 10 shall carry one vote, provided always that 4,000 votes are the highest number of votes any one shareholder may cast on his own behalf. Voting rights can only be exercised by shareholders or their proxies. For the voting right of a share to be exercised, the share shall be registered in the name of the holder in Jyske Bank’s register of shareholders not later than on the day of registration, which is Tuesday, 18 March 2025, or the title to such share shall be notified and documented to the Bank within that same time limit.

Proxy and postal vote
Shareholders may as from Friday, 28 February up to and including Friday, 21 March 2025 give voting instructions, appoint Jyske Bank’s Supervisory Board or a third party as proxy either electronically or by means of the Power of Attorney form.

Shareholders may attend the General Meeting by proxy and cast their votes by proxy.

In addition, shareholders may as from Friday, 28 February to Monday 24 March 2025 at 10.00 a.m. cast postal votes either electronically or by means of a form.

Proxies may be appointed, or postal votes may be cast electronically at the Investor Portal via Jyske Bank’s website. A form for the appointment of proxies or for casting postal votes is available at one of Jyske Bank’s branches or can be downloaded from Jyske Bank’s website. Where the form is used, please forward the completed and signed form either by post to Euronext Securities (VP Securities A/S) at the address Nicolai Eigtveds Gade 8, 1402 Copenhagen K or by email to CPH-investor@euronext.com. The form must reach Euronext Securities (VP Securitas A/S) by the above-mentioned deadlines, and proxies must have been appointed or postal votes must have been cast electronically by the same deadlines.

Custodian bank
Jyske Bank’s shareholders may choose Jyske Bank A/S as their custodian bank in order to exercise their financial rights through Jyske Bank A/S.

Questions from shareholders
Shareholders are recommended to ask questions in writing before the general meeting about the items of the agenda or Jyske Bank’s financial position. Please send questions to Jyske Bank A/S, Juridisk Afdeling, Vestergade 8-16, DK-8600 Silkeborg or by email to Juridisk@jyskebank.dk. Questions and answers will be presented at the general meeting, and shareholders who have asked questions will receive replies directly from Jyske Bank. At the General Meeting, the management will also answer questions from the shareholders about matters of importance for the financial situation of Jyske Bank and questions for consideration at the General Meeting.

Additional information
The following documents and information can be downloaded from Jyske Bank’s website from Friday, 28 February 2025:

Notice of General Meeting.
The total number of shares and voting rights at the date of the notice.
Agenda and full wording of motions.
Annual Report and the consolidated financial statements with the auditor’s report and the management’s review.
Remuneration report
List of candidates and further information about the proposed candidates with respect to election of Shareholders’ Representatives and the Supervisory Board.
The forms to be used when voting by proxy or by postal vote.

Notification of participation
Shareholders who wish to attend and cast their votes at the General Meeting may register for the General Meeting at the Investor Portal via Jyske Bank’s website as from Friday 28 February 2025 up to and including Friday 21 March 2025.
Confirmation of registration and QR code for the general meeting portal will be submitted by email (also in case of powers of attorney to third parties), and therefore it is important that you register your email address at the Investor Portal.
At the entrance to the general meeting, you press the submitted QR code in the email to register your attendance which is why you must bring your smart phone or your tablet. Any votes will also take place via the General Meeting Portal. Additional guidelines for using the General Meeting Portal will be available at the entrance to the general meeting.
If you are unable to receive confirmation of registration to the general meeting by email, you may register for the general meeting by means of the sign-up form available at Jyske Bank’s website or by contacting one of Jyske Bank’s branches. If so, you must contact and confirm your attendance at the entrance to the general meeting which requires that you produce valid identification.

Live webcast
The general meeting will be live webcasted via InvestorPortalen. The transmission will comprise images and sound. In order to follow the general meeting shareholders must log on to InvestorPortalen with their MitIDs or VP-IDs. Registration to the general meeting is not required in order to follow the webcast. It will not be possible to ask questions or make presentations and/or cast votes during the process.

Before commencement of the proceedings of the Annual General Meeting, coffee/tea etc. will be served from 1.30 p.m.

Silkeborg, 26 February 2025

The Supervisory Board

Attachment

AGM Notice 2025

The MIL Network –

February 26, 2025

Category: Banking

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

MINORITY POSITION

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

Chancellor to meet G20 finance ministers in South Africa

Share this page

Updates to this page

Transcript