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Category: Banking

  • MIL-OSI: CDPQ to sell 2,500,000 common shares of Intact Financial

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    MONTRÉAL, Feb. 18, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — CDPQ today announced its intention to sell 2,500,000 common shares of Intact Financial Corporation (TSX: IFC), representing approximately 1.4% of the issued and outstanding common shares of Intact as of February 18, 2025.

    The common shares are being sold at a gross price of $278.60 per share, which has been underwritten by CIBC Capital Markets and National Bank Financial. CDPQ expects to receive gross cash proceeds of approximately $696,500,000 from the offering.

    This transaction is part of CDPQ’s regular portfolio rebalancing. Once the transaction is complete, CDPQ will own approximately 6.6% of Intact’s issued and outstanding common shares, remaining its largest shareholder and Intact continuing as one of CDPQ’s largest holdings in the public markets.

    “CDPQ has been a major shareholder of Intact for over fifteen years, during which time our investment in the company has generated significant returns for our depositors,” said Vincent Delisle, Executive Vice-President and Head of Liquid Markets at CDPQ. “This transaction allows us to monetize a portion of these returns while retaining significant ownership in the company, based on our confidence in Intact’s growth prospects, including through several strategic operations based and managed in Québec.”

    “CDPQ continues to be a valued partner in Intact’s evolution as a leading global P&C insurer. This transaction enables a significant gain on a portion of one of their largest investments while remaining able to support our growth ambitions,” said Ken Anderson, Executive Vice President and CFO, Intact Financial Corporation. “We have delivered an annualized total shareholder return of 15% over the last 10 years, and we remain well positioned to sustain our track record of outperformance, given the strength of our platforms, our talented team and our clear strategic roadmap.”

    ABOUT CDPQ
    At CDPQ, we invest constructively to generate sustainable returns over the long term. As a global investment group managing funds for public pension and insurance plans, we work alongside our partners to build enterprises that drive performance and progress. We are active in the major financial markets, private equity, infrastructure, real estate and private debt. As at June 30, 2024, CDPQ’s net assets totalled CAD 452 billion. For more information, visit cdpq.com, consult our LinkedIn or Instagram pages, or follow us on X.

    CDPQ is a registered trademark owned by Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec and licensed for use by its subsidiaries. 

    ABOUT INTACT FINANCIAL CORPORATION
    Intact Financial Corporation (TSX: IFC) is the largest provider of Property and Casualty (P&C) insurance in Canada, a leading Specialty lines insurer with international expertise and a leader in Commercial lines in the UK and Ireland. The business has grown organically and through acquisitions to almost $24 billion of total annual operating direct premiums written (DPW).

    In Canada, Intact distributes insurance under the Intact Insurance brand through agencies and a wide network of brokers, including its wholly owned subsidiary BrokerLink. Intact also distributes directly to consumers through the belairdirect brand and affinity partnerships. Additionally, Intact provides exclusive and tailored offerings to high-net-worth customers through Intact Prestige. In the US, Intact Insurance Specialty Solutions provides a range of Specialty insurance products and services through independent agencies, regional and national brokers, wholesalers and managing general agencies. Across the UK, Ireland, and Europe, Intact provides Personal, Commercial and/or Specialty insurance solutions through the RSA, 123.ie, NIG and FarmWeb brands.

    For more information
    CDPQ Media Relations Team
    + 1 514 847-5493
    medias@cdpq.com

    Caroline Audet
    Manager, Media Relations and Public Affairs, Intact Financial
    416 227-7905 / 514 985-7165
    media@intact.net

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: Susan Campfield to Retire as Director of Norwood Financial Corp and Wayne Bank

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    HONESDALE, Pa., Feb. 18, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Susan Campfield has announced her retirement from the Board of Directors of Norwood Financial Corp (Nasdaq Global Market-NWFL) and its subsidiary, Wayne Bank, effective February 18, 2025.

    After serving the companies for 19 years, Campfield announced her retirement stating, “I have enjoyed supporting this great bank and all of the good it has done and is doing in the communities that we serve. It has been one of the real honors of my professional life.”

    Campfield joined the Board of Directors in 2006 as a fixture in the Wayne County, Pennsylvania business community. For over 33 years, she served as President and Chief Executive Officer of Gumble Brothers, Inc., a building material supplier located in Paupack, Pennsylvania. In her role, Campfield worked with numerous contractors and builders, which gave her an extensive knowledge of the local construction market. She brought expertise on the local economy and business opportunities for the bank during her time as Director.

    Norwood Financial Corp is the parent company of Wayne Bank, which operates from thirty offices throughout Northeastern Pennsylvania and Upstate New York, including those offices operating under the Bank of Cooperstown and Bank of the Finger Lakes brands. The Company’s stock trades on the Nasdaq Global Market under the symbol “NWFL”.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 contains safe harbor provisions regarding forward-looking statements. When used in this discussion, the words “believes”, “anticipates”, “contemplates”, “expects”, “bode”, “future performance” and similar expressions are intended to identify forward-looking statements. Such statements are subject to certain risks and uncertainties, which could cause actual results to differ materially from those projected. Those risks and uncertainties include, among other things, changes in federal and state laws, changes in interest rates, our ability to maintain strong credit quality metrics, our ability to have future performance, our ability to control core operating expenses and costs, demand for real estate, government fiscal and trade policies, cybersecurity and general economic conditions. The Company undertakes no obligation to publicly release the results of any revisions to those forward-looking statements which may be made to reflect events or circumstances after the date hereof or to reflect the occurrence of unanticipated events.

    Contact:   John M. McCaffery
        Executive Vice President &
        Chief Financial Officer
        NORWOOD FINANCIAL CORP
        272-304-3003
        www.waynebank.com

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: World News in Brief: $53.2 billion needed for Palestinian recovery, UN condemns UNRWA schools raid, Lebanon-Israel tensions continue

    Source: United Nations 2

    Humanitarian Aid

    The reconstruction of Gaza and the occupied West Bank will require an estimated $53.2 billion over the next ten years, according to the latest Damage and Needs Assessment from the UN and partners. 

    “Palestinians will need joint action to address the immense recovery and reconstruction challenges ahead. A sustainable recovery process must restore hope, dignity, and livelihoods for the two million people in Gaza,” said Muhannad Hadi, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

    The assessment estimates that $29.9 billion is required to repair physical infrastructure, while $19.1 billion is needed to address economic and social losses.

    Housing remains the most severely affected sector, accounting for the largest share of recovery needs, with $15.2 billion – or 30 percent of the total cost – earmarked for rebuilding homes.

    Over the next three years alone, $20 billion will be required to stabilise essential services and lay the foundation for long-term recovery.

    Commitment to Gaza’s future 

    Mr. Hadi reaffirmed the UN’s continued support, stating: “The UN stands ready to support the Palestinian people both on humanitarian assistance and a future recovery and reconstruction process.”

    “Once conditions are in place, temporary shelters will be established, basic services restored, the economy kick-started, and individual and social rehabilitation begun while the longer-term recovery and reconstruction advances,” he added.

    A crucial element of Gaza’s recovery will be restoring the administrative authority of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the Strip.

    “The international community must make collective efforts to support a just and lasting peace,” said Mr. Hadi, emphasising that Gaza is an integral part of this effort based on UN resolutions and international law, with Jerusalem as the capital of both States.

    UN condemns raid on UNRWA schools 

    In East Jerusalem, Philippe Lazzarini, Commissioner-General of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), reported that Israeli forces accompanied by local authorities forcibly entered the UNRWA Kalandia Training Centre, ordering its immediate evacuation.

    At least 350 students and 30 staff were present at the time. Tear gas and sound bombs were deployed during the incident.

    Earlier on Tuesday morning, Israeli police officers, accompanied by municipal staff, also visited several UNRWA schools in East Jerusalem, demanding their closure.

    The incidents disrupted the education of approximately 250 students attending three UNRWA schools, alongside the 350 trainees affected at the Kalandia Training Centre.

    UN chief condemns violations

    UN Secretary-General António Guterres strongly condemned the breach of the UN’s inviolable premises in occupied East Jerusalem, including the attempt to forcibly enter three UNRWA schools.

    “The use of tear gas and sound bombs in educational environments while students are learning is both unnecessary and unacceptable,” said the Secretary-General Spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric.

    “This is a clear violation of Israel’s obligations under international law, including obligations concerning the privileges and immunities of the UN and its personnel,” he added.

    Mr. Dujarric emphasised that Israel’s internal legal provisions do not alter its international legal obligations and cannot justify their breach.

    Lebanon: Tensions ease along the Blue Line of separation

    In northern Lebanon, Tuesday marked the deadline for the Israel Defense Forces’ withdrawal south of the Blue Line, alongside the parallel deployment of Lebanese Armed Forces to positions in southern Lebanon, under the cessation of hostilities agreement reached between Israel and Hezbollah leaders on 26 November 2024.

    UN peacekeepers report that Lebanese troops continue their deployment across southern Lebanon with active support from the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), while displaced families are gradually returning to their homes.

    Lebanese troops continue to dispose of “unauthorised weapons” abandoned during the conflict in UNIFIL’s area of operations, said Mr. Dujarric.

    Call for stability

    UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert and Lieutenant General Aroldo Lázaro Sáenz, Force Commander of UNIFIL urged both parties to honour ceasefire commitments to ensure communities in southern Lebanon and northern Israel can feel safe again following the weeks of deadly fighting last year.

    The UN remains committed to supporting all parties in upholding their obligations, Mr. Dujarric affirmed.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI Security: United States Attorney’s Office Announces Departure of Jaime Esparza

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    SAN ANTONIO – The United States Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Texas announced today the departure of Jaime Esparza as U.S. Attorney.

    Esparza was confirmed by the U.S. Senate in December 2022. He came to the Western District of Texas after serving as the District Attorney for the 34th Judicial District of Texas, in El Paso, from 1993 to 2020.

    As U.S. Attorney, Esparza led the handling of more than 41,000 federal criminal prosecutions—including immigration, drugs, firearm, white collar, and violent crime—and more than 10,000 civil cases in this southern border district. He made it a priority to disrupt and dismantle criminal organizations, including gangs, cartels and smuggling organizations. He also led and elevated outreach programs to educate the public on the dangers of fentanyl and machinegun conversion devices, and to bring awareness to domestic violence issues, among others.

    Under Esparza’s leadership, the civil section defended the United States in numerous civil actions and sought and obtained civil penalties against numerous individuals and entities under the False Claims Act. Additionally, his team of asset recovery lawyers obtained millions of dollars in restitution for victims and forfeited millions of dollars in property that were used to commit crimes or were obtained with proceeds of crime.

    The Western District of Texas is comprised of 93,000 square miles, 68 counties, covers 660 miles of U.S./Mexico border, and has divisional offices in El Paso, Del Rio, Waco, San Antonio, Austin, Pecos-Alpine, and Midland-Odessa. Its civil and criminal attorneys practice in District, Magistrate, and Bankruptcy Courts throughout the District, as well as in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.

    Under the Vacancy Reform Act, First Assistant U.S. Attorney Margaret Leachman now serves as the Acting U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Texas.

    Leachman has been with the Western District of Texas for more than 30 years and has served in numerous roles, including as Senior Litigation Counsel, Chief of the Criminal Division, Chief of the El Paso Division, and as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Appellate and Major Crimes sections.

    ###

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: African Union Summit: African Development Bank President Highlights a Decade of Economic Transformational Impact

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    ABIDJAN, Ivory Coast, February 18, 2025/APO Group/ —

    • “It’s been my greatest honor to serve you and Africa”—Adesina tells African leaders
    • Governments across Africa pay tribute to Adesina’s exceptional leadership
    • UN Secretary General Guterres says global financial architecture hampering Africa’s development, calls for reforms

    African Development Bank Group (www.AfDB.org/en) President Dr. Akinwumi A. Adesina, delivered a compelling farewell address to Heads of State and Government at the 38th African Union Summit, highlighting a decade of remarkable achievements by the Bank in driving Africa’s economic transformation. Adesina’s participation at the august continental gathering in Addis Ababa ended on a high note as African leaders considered and endorsed four Bank-led initiatives including the drive to connect 300 million Africans to electricity by 2030, measuring Africa’s green wealth as part of its GDP, a $20 billion facility to provide Africa with a financial buffer and a roadmap for the continent to achieve inclusive growth and rapid sustainable development.

    Adesina, who is also the Chairman of the Group’s Boards of Directors, underscored the impact of the Bank’s High 5s Agenda—Light up and Power Africa, Feed Africa, Industrialize Africa, Integrate Africa, and Improve the Quality of Life for the People of Africa—which has impacted more than half a billion lives across the continent.

    “It has been an unprecedented partnership to advance the goal of the African Union towards achieving Agenda 2063: the Africa we want,” said Adesina who in February 2022, became the first president of the Bank Group to address the AU Summit.

    During the final day of the assembly, several African governments and AU officials paid tribute to Dr. Adesina for his exceptional leadership of the Bank and strong global advocacy for Africa, He ends his tenure as the Bank Group’s president on 1st September 2025.

    The February 15–16 Summit saw the election of Djibouti’s Foreign Minister Mahmoud Ali Youssouf as Chairperson of the African Union Commission, taking over from Moussa Faki Mahamat. Algeria’s Ambassador, Salma Malika Haddadi, was elected the Commission’s Deputy Chairperson.

    Reflecting on his tenure at the helm of the African Development Bank, Dr. Adesina said the Bank has transformed 515 million lives, including 231 million women, over the past decade:

    • 127 million people gained access to better services in terms of health.
    • 61 million people gained access to clean water.
    • 33 million people benefited from improved sanitation.
    • 46 million people gained access to ICT services, and
    • 25 million people gained access to electricity.

    He cited the landmark Africa Energy Summit held in Tanzania in January, where 48 nations signed the Dar Es Salaam Declaration to adopt bold policies in support of an initiative by the World Bank and the African Development Bank to extend electricity access to 300 million Africans by 2030. That meeting, attended by 21 heads of state, secured $48 billion in commitments from the two institutions and an additional $7 billion from other development partners.

    The Addis Ababa Summit endorsed the Dar Es Salaam Energy Declaration, the Baku Declaration by African Heads of State on Measuring the Green Wealth of Africa. The Assembly also adopted the African Financing Stability Mechanism, a groundbreaking initiative by the African Development Bank to provide $20 billion in debt refinancing for African nations alongside  the Strategic Framework on Key Actions to Achieve Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development in Africa report which  outlines key actions required to enable Africa to achieve, and sustain an annual growth rate of at least 7% of GDP over the next five decades.

    On food security, Adesina cited the Bank’s Technologies for African Agricultural Transformation (TAAT), the Dakar 2 Food Summit that mobilized $72 billion in 2023, and the $1.5 billion Africa Emergency Food Production Facility that was launched in May 2022 to avert a major food and fertilizer crisis triggered by global conflicts.

    “The African Development Bank accelerated food production in Africa. Over 101 million people became food secure. We mobilized $72 billion to implement the food and agriculture delivery compacts across the continent,” he stressed. With the support of the Bank, Ethiopia has achieved self-sufficiency in wheat production within four years and is now a wheat-exporting nation.

    A Decade of Transformative Impact

    With a strong focus on job creation, the Bank has trained 1.7 million youth in digital skills and is rolling out Youth Entrepreneurship Investment Banks to drive youth-led economic growth. “Our goal is simple: create youth-based wealth across Africa,” Adesina reiterated.

    Additionally, the Affirmative Finance Action for Women in Africa (AFAWA) initiative has provided $2.5 billion in financing to over 24,000 women-owned businesses, said Adesina.

    Over the past decade, the African Development Bank has invested over $55 billion in infrastructure, making it the largest multilateral financier of African infrastructure.

    The Bank has also prioritized healthcare, committing $3 billion in quality healthcare infrastructure and another $3 billion for pharmaceutical development, including establishing the Africa Pharmaceutical Technology Foundation.

    Historic Financial Mobilization for Africa

    Under Adesina’s presidency, the Bank achieved its largest-ever capital increase, growing from $93 billion in 2015 to $318 billion currently. The most recent replenishment of the African Development Fund, the Bank Group’s concessional window, raised a record $8.9 billion for Africa’s 37 low-income countries, setting the stage for a target of $25 billion for its upcoming 17th replenishment.

    The Africa Investment Forum, a joint effort with eight other partner institutions, has also mobilized over $200 billion in investment commitments, reinforcing Africa as a leading investment destination.

    As he bade farewell, the outgoing Bank chief expressed gratitude to the African Heads of State, the African Union Commission, regional economic communities, and the people of Africa for their unwavering support.

    “As today will be my final attendance of the AU Summit as President of the African Development Bank, I would like to use this opportunity to immensely thank your Excellencies Heads of State and Government for your extraordinary support over the past ten years. I am very grateful for your always being there for the African Development Bank—your Bank. I am very grateful for your kindness, friendship, and partnership as we forged global alliances to advance the continent’s interest around the world,” he said. 

    The 2025 Summit under the theme, “Justice for Africans and People of African Descent Through Reparations,” drew global political leaders and other dignitaries, including UN Secretary-General António Guterres, and the Prime Minister of Barbados, Mia Mottley.

    Guterres reiterated calls for reform of the international financial architecture, which is hampering the development of many African economies, beset by expensive debt repayments and high borrowing costs, which limits their capacity to invest in education, health and other essential needs.

    Prime Minister Mottley emphasized Africa’s strategic role in shaping global economic trends, particularly highlighting the continent’s control of 40% of the world’s minerals. She stressed the importance of addressing emerging challenges like artificial intelligence, urging African nations to take a proactive role in technological advancement rather than becoming “victims of technology.”

    She also underscored the urgency of removing artificial barriers between Africa and the Caribbean, calling for the elimination of transit visa requirements to boost trade and integration. Mottley echoed demands for reparatory justice, noting that both the Caribbean and Africa began their independence journey with “chronic deficits” in resources, fairness, and opportunity.

    Opening the Summit on Saturday, Ethiopian Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed urged continued unity among member countries in addressing the challenges.

    “In a world marked by rapid change and multiple challenges, we find ourselves at the crossroads of uncertainty and opportunity. This movement calls upon us to strengthen our collective resolve, embrace resilience and foster unity across Africa”, he said.

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: CCI approves amalgamations of Chaitanya India Fin Credit Private Limited and Svatantra Holdings Private Limited into Svatantra Microfin Private Limited

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Posted On: 18 FEB 2025 7:09PM by PIB Delhi

    The Competition Commission of India has  approved amalgamations of Chaitanya India Fin Credit Private Limited and Svatantra Holdings Private Limited into Svatantra Microfin Private Limited.

    The proposed transaction relates to the amalgamation of Svatantra Holdings Private Limited (SHPL) and Chaitanya India Fin Credit Private Limited (CIFCPL) into Svatantra Microfin Private Limited (SMPL), through the Scheme of Amalgamation entered into between SHPL, CIFCPL, SMPL and their respective shareholders as has been approved by the board of directors. Further, as a consequence of the foregoing, Svatantra Micro Housing Finance Corporation Limited (SMHFCL) will become a wholly owned subsidiary of SMPL.

    SHPL is engaged in the business of making investments in equity shares, preference shares and other securities. It is an unregistered Core Investment Company in terms of Core Investment Companies (Reserve Bank) Directions, 2016.

    SMPL is engaged in the business of providing micro finance loans and personal loans to low-income individuals and households in rural/semi-urban areas. SMPL is a middle layer non-deposit taking Non-Banking Financial Company-Micro Finance Institution (NBFC-MFI) registered with the RBI.

    CIFCPL is engaged in the business of providing micro finance loans and personal loans to low-income individuals and households in rural/ semi-urban areas. CIFCPL is a middle layer non-deposit taking NBFC-MFI registered with the RBI. in 2009.

    SMHFCL is a registered Non-deposit Taking Housing Finance Company (NBFC HFC) (Middle Layer) and is engaged in the business of providing secured housing loans to the financially excluded rural and urban low-income families, loans to individuals against property and loans to corporations/institutions for construction/real estate projects.

    Detailed order of the Commission will follow.

    *****

    NB/AD

    (Release ID: 2104452) Visitor Counter : 85

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Straight Talk Wireless Rewards People for their Use of Unlimited Data this Tax Season with The Data Bank by Straight Talk

    Source: Verizon

    Headline: Straight Talk Wireless Rewards People for their Use of Unlimited Data this Tax Season with The Data Bank by Straight Talk

    NEW YORK – Straight Talk Wireless, a leading prepaid brand covered by Verizon’s 5G network and sold at Walmart, is launching The Data Bank by Straight Talk, a limited-time event that turns mobile data usage into real financial rewards. Taking place in Union Square Park in New York City on February 18 and Kennedy Commons in East New Jersey on February 19, The Data Bank brings attention to the exceptional value provided by Straight Talk’s unlimited data plans by giving customers the opportunity to check their data usage and be rewarded with a gift card through an interactive, bank-like experience.

    Tax season can be a stressful time for many, and Straight Talk recognizes that even when money feels tight, people can still be Data Rich – thanks to its real unlimited data plans.  In fact, data plays a crucial role in people’s everyday lives, especially during tax season. According to Straight Talk’s third annual Tax Time Survey, more than half of Americans (57%) use their mobile data for online banking, and 53% access it during tax season, whether it’s to file taxes right on their phone or speak with tax advisors. With this limited-time event, Straight Talk aims to give back when tax refunds might not be enough.

    “At Straight Talk, we understand that tax season can be a hectic time, and many families rely on their refund checks to help manage their finances. That’s why we aim to alleviate some of that tax time stress with the launch of our innovative Data Bank event,” said David Kim, SVP & CRO of Verizon Value. “The Data Bank by Straight Talk is designed to show how impactful having real unlimited data is by rewarding mobile data usage with gift cards, especially at a time when families are looking for extra financial flexibility. Straight Talk is committed to supporting consumers with their truly unlimited data during tax time and all year long.”

    How The Data Bank Works:

    At The Data Bank by Straight Talk, visitors will step into a custom-designed truck converted into a mobile “bank,” where they can interact with Straight Talk’s “teller,”@alexonabudget (influencer and money expert), check their data usage and convert their data usage into a gift card on site.

    Be one of the first to experience the bank-like event and get rewarded with extra cash at one of the following locations:

    • New York City: February 18 at Union Square Park 10AM ET until supplies last
    • East New Jersey: February 19 at Kennedy Commons 11AM ET until supplies last

    For those not in the area, you can still take advantage of Straight Talk’s unlimited data online at StraightTalk.com or at Walmart stores. In addition to supplying users with real unlimited data they can rely on, Straight Talk is also offering new and existing customers a free Samsung A16 or Moto G Power 5G with the purchase of a qualifying service plan. These offers will be available at StraightTalk.com and at Walmart stores so customers can take advantage of the latest features and benefits.

    For more information on Straight Talk Wireless, visit www.straighttalk.com.

    About Straight Talk Wireless

    Straight Talk Wireless provides quality no-contract wireless solutions to value-conscious consumers and is available exclusively at Walmart, Walmart.com, and Straighttalk.com.

    Straight Talk is part of the Verizon Value portfolio of prepaid brands, which includes Total Wireless, Visible, Tracfone, Simple Mobile, SafeLink, Walmart Family Mobile, and Verizon Prepaid.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Piero Cipollone: Striking the right balance: the ECB’s balance sheet and its implications for monetary policy

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at an MNI Connect webcast

    Frankfurt am Main, 18 February 2025

    Today I would like to discuss the ECB’s balance sheet and its implications for our monetary policy.

    In recent years, the monetary policy debate has mainly focused on our interest rate decisions. This is for good reason. In response to the biggest inflation shock in a generation, we embarked on the fastest tightening of monetary policy in the ECB’s history through rate hikes.

    During this tightening phase, we used policy rates as the primary tool for setting our monetary policy stance, while normalising our balance sheet in a measured and predictable way. We initiated the gradual unwinding of our asset purchase programmes and recalibrated our targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs).[1] As a result, the size of our balance sheet has fallen by more than a quarter from its peak.

    Policy rates remain our primary instrument and will therefore continue to attract the most attention. But we should not underestimate the important role that our balance sheet policies have played over time as a component of our overall monetary policy stance and in ensuring the smooth transmission of our monetary policy to the real economy. This still holds true today as we make our monetary policy less restrictive.

    Inflation has now fallen substantially to levels close to 2%. Our latest projections foresee it converging towards our target over the medium term, and the risks to the inflation outlook – once sharply skewed to the upside – have now become more balanced.

    At the same time, the euro area’s economic recovery remains weak – especially in the near term. The risks to the growth outlook are tilted to the downside and, if they materialise, may derail the recovery, with implications for the inflation outlook.

    Against this background, the Governing Council has gradually been reducing the degree of monetary policy restriction by cutting policy rates towards neutral territory. While our direction is clear, we are very attentive to incoming information in view of the prevailing uncertainty about the economic environment. We continue to make decisions on a meeting-by-meeting and data-dependent basis. This gives us the option to adapt our interest rate path if necessary to ensure that inflation stabilises sustainably at our 2% medium-term target.

    However, given the importance of financial conditions in determining the inflation outlook, we also need to consider the role played by the reduction of our balance sheet. In the tightening phase our rate decisions and balance sheet policies complemented each other, but they are now going in opposing directions.

    This divergence has important implications across at least two dimensions.

    First, it contributes to a steepening of the yield curve. Our rate cuts exert downward pressure primarily at the short end of the yield curve. At the same time, the gradual runoff of our asset purchase portfolios exerts upward pressure on long-term and, to a lesser extent, intermediate yields. This has been compounded by recent spillovers from the US.[2]

    Second, it may affect credit supply. Declining levels of central bank liquidity could constrain banks’ ability to extend credit, resulting in tighter credit conditions and potentially slowing down the investment and consumption that are critical for economic recovery.

    In setting the policy stance, we therefore need to consider the impact of the overall set of financial conditions resulting from our interest rate and balance sheet policies. In other words, we need to strike the right balance if we are to achieve our inflation aim without an undue negative impact on incomes and employment. A rate cut has a more contained easing effect when the balance sheet is simultaneously reduced. This has implications when discussing the appropriate policy rate path.

    We also need to consider the potential risks to the transmission of our monetary policy. In the past, abundant levels of liquidity have acted as a safeguard against spikes in liquidity needs that emerged regardless of where our rates stood. With this in mind, we need to carefully monitor the transition from abundant to less ample excess liquidity, mindful of the potential implications for financial stability.

    Today, I would like to take stock of the ECB’s experience with balance sheet policies, explaining why they remain a vital part of our monetary policy toolbox. I will then discuss the implications of the ECB’s balance sheet for our monetary policy in the current environment.

    The ECB’s experience with balance sheet policies

    At the ECB, balance sheet policies have served a dual purpose over time, allowing us to deliver on our price stability mandate amid exceptionally difficult circumstances.

    First, during periods when interest rates approached their effective lower bound and inflation remained below target, the ECB used asset purchases to support an accommodative monetary policy stance.

    For instance, the ECB launched its asset purchase programme (APP) in 2015 to stimulate the economy and inflation at a time when deflationary threats loomed large. Asset purchases and the associated provision of central bank liquidity worked in several ways – including through the portfolio rebalancing, exchange rate and credit channels – to generate a significant upward effect on both economic activity and inflation.[3]

    Second, balance sheet policies have been pivotal to ensuring the smooth transmission of our monetary policy to the real economy, in both tightening and easing phases.

    At times when we were lowering our policy rates, our TLTROs, launched in 2014, provided banks with long-term funding on favourable terms to incentivise them to lend to firms and households. This led to a persistent compression in lending rates and an increase in loan volumes over time.[4]

    But balance sheet policies were also instrumental in ensuring the smooth transmission of monetary policy at times when we were increasing our policy rates. The announcement of our Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI) in 2022 allowed us to embark on the fastest rate hiking cycle in our history without sparking financial fragmentation in the euro area.

    Of course, the stance and transmission functions of our balance sheet policies do not operate in isolation. There can be beneficial interactions between the two.

    As rates increased, for example, euro area banks had sufficient liquidity to manage any maturity mismatches that arose. This – alongside strengthened regulation and supervision – helped them to emerge unscathed from the market turbulence in March 2023 that saw the collapse of three regional banks in the United States.

    The proportionate use of balance sheet policies in an evolving economic landscape

    The substantial expansion of the ECB’s balance sheet required careful monitoring of potential side effects. That is why the principle of proportionality lies at the core of how we use our balance sheet instruments.[5]

    In its 2021 strategy review, the Governing Council assessed that its use of balance sheet measures – alongside negative interest rates and forward guidance – had indeed been proportionate, taking into account any side effects, for instance on inequality and the financial sector.[6]

    Some concerns, however, require a more nuanced perspective.

    For example, there is little evidence to suggest that excessive risk appetite may be attributable to larger central bank balance sheets. If this were the case, we should have seen less risk-taking in markets as central banks began to withdraw their market footprint.

    But the opposite has been the case. Today equity markets are near all-time highs. This may be due to “animal spirits”[7], which have also been observed outside periods of central bank balance sheet growth. We saw them at play, for instance, during the dot-com bubble – a period when the cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings ratio hit its historic peak and central bank balance sheets were distinctly lean.

    Moreover, as the Eurosystem gradually reduces its footprint in sovereign bond markets by reducing its holdings of euro area government bonds, concerns about the size of the balance sheet are becoming less and less justified (Chart 1).[8]

    Chart 1

    Size of euro area government bond market and the Eurosystem’s market footprint

    (left-hand scale: EUR billions; right-hand scale: percentages)

    Sources: Eurosystem and Centralised Securities Database.

    Notes: The chart shows the evolution of the size of the euro area government bond market and splits it into outright holdings (yellow) and mobilised collateral (green), as well as what is not held or mobilised as collateral with the Eurosystem (blue). The Eurosystem market footprint is a relative measure, computed as the share of the Eurosystem’s euro area government bond (EGB) holdings compared with the nominal amount outstanding. Outright holdings are EGBs held by the Eurosystem via purchase programmes, adjusted by EGBs lent back via the securities lending against cash collateral facilities. Mobilised collateral includes EGBs mobilised as collateral for open market operations. The latest observations are for 31 January 2025.

    Going forward, an evolving economic landscape suggests that balance sheet policies could be increasingly useful as monetary policy instruments. Let me highlight two developments that are particularly relevant here.

    First, the non-bank financial sector has grown considerably over time and is becoming increasingly relevant in the funding of the real economy.

    In the euro area, the financial assets of non-banks have more than doubled since the global financial crisis.[9] Compared with banks, non-banks are more responsive to monetary policy measures that influence longer-term interest rates, such as asset purchases.[10] Given that non-banks adjust their portfolios more actively in response to changes in interest rates, this also increases the need for sufficient liquidity in the system to facilitate these adjustments.

    Second, geopolitical fragmentation means that the global economy is becoming more shock prone and subject to higher levels of uncertainty (Chart 2).

    Chart 2

    Global Economic Policy Uncertainty index

    (index)

    Source: Bloomberg.

    Note: The latest observation is for December 2024.

    In this environment, we need to remember that the euro area is subject to fragmentation risk. A key lesson from the sovereign debt crisis is that balance sheet policies have been instrumental in making the euro area a more “normal” jurisdiction from the perspective of monetary policy.

    As we navigate an increasingly complex economic landscape, the transition from abundant to less ample excess liquidity represents an inflection point that also requires close monitoring.

    In this environment, banks’ liquidity needs are met via a broad mix of instruments under our new operational framework. These include our short-term main refinancing operations (MROs) and three-month longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) and will also include – at a later stage – structural longer-term credit operations and a structural portfolio of securities.[11]

    However, the decline in excess liquidity warrants careful monitoring, as it could exert additional tightening pressures on financial and financing conditions, potentially exceeding the intended policy stance.

    The implications of the ECB’s balance sheet for monetary policy in the current environment

    It is in this context that I would like to talk about the implications of our balance sheet for monetary policy in the current environment.

    The ECB’s balance sheet has been reduced at a faster pace than those of central banks in other major economies during their tightening cycles (Chart 3). So far, much of this decline can be attributed to banks’ repayments of TLTRO loans.[12]

    Chart 3

    Central bank total assets

    (index = 100 at the start of the respective policy rate hiking cycles)

    Sources: Bloomberg and ECB calculations.

    Notes: The x-axis starts on 21 July 2022, 16 March 2022 and 15 December 2021 for the Eurosystem, Federal Reserve System, and Bank of England respectively. For the Bank of England, reserve balances are used as a proxy for the total balance sheet. The latest observations are for 12 February 2025.

    Looking ahead, however, any further reduction in the size of our balance sheet will stem from the gradual unwinding of our asset purchase portfolios, as the Eurosystem no longer reinvests the principal payments from maturing securities.

    As in the past, the normalisation of our balance sheet has implications for our monetary policy stance and the possible risks to monetary policy transmission.

    The monetary policy stance

    Let me start with the implications for our monetary policy stance.

    Our reaction function for rate decisions is built around three well-known criteria: (i) the inflation outlook, (ii) the dynamics of underlying inflation and (iii) the strength of monetary policy transmission.

    Inflation has fallen by around three-quarters from its peak in late 2022 (Chart 4). The disinflation process is well on track, and our staff projections see inflation averaging 2.1% this year, 1.9% next year and 2.1% in 2027.

    Chart 4

    Headline inflation

    (annual percentage changes)

    Source: Eurostat.
    Note: The latest observation is for January 2025 (flash estimate).

    Most measures of underlying inflation suggest that inflation will settle at around our 2% medium-term target on a sustained basis. In particular, the ECB’s measure of the persistent and common component of inflation (PCCI)[13] – a more forward-looking indicator of underlying inflationary pressures that tends to better predict future inflation – stood at 2.1% in December, and 2.0% when excluding energy.

    Domestic inflation remains high, as wages and prices in certain sectors are still adjusting to the past inflation surge with a substantial delay. But our wage tracker is signalling a significant moderation in wage growth, and profits are partially buffering the impact on inflation.

    It is the third leg of our reaction function – the strength of monetary policy transmission – that I would like to discuss in more detail, however.

    As we cut interest rates, new borrowing for firms and households is becoming less expensive. But financing conditions continue to be tight – in part because our monetary policy remains restrictive and past rate hikes are still working their way through the economy.[14]

    While credit continues to expand, lending to firms and households remains subdued by historical standards. In December, the annual growth rate of lending to firms was roughly two-thirds below its historical average.[15] Growth in housing loans increased gradually but also remained muted overall, at around one-fifth of its long-term average (Chart 5).[16]

    Chart 5

    Loans to firms and households

    (percentage points)

    Sources: ECB (BSI) and ECB staff calculations.

    Note: The latest observations are for December 2024.

    At the same time, the recent gradual recovery in lending has not kept pace with the nominal growth of the economy, as reflected in the continued decline of the loan-to-GDP ratio (Chart 6).

    Chart 6

    Ratio of bank loans to GDP

    (percentages)

    Sources: ECB (BSI), Eurostat and ECB staff calculations.

    Note: The latest observation is for the third quarter of 2024.

    While policy rates remain our primary instrument for adjusting our monetary policy stance, the normalisation of our balance sheet may also affect the stance through two key channels.

    First, while our rate cuts exert downward pressure primarily at the short end of the yield curve, our quantitative tightening exerts upward pressure on long-term maturities and, to a lesser extent, intermediate ones. This serves to tighten financial conditions.[17]

    Indeed, the runoff of the asset portfolios of central banks has arguably been one of several factors contributing to a steepening of sovereign yield curves in recent months – akin to a reversal of the duration risk channel previously associated with central banks through quantitative easing (Chart 7).

    Chart 7

    New duration risk absorbed by private investors

    (EUR billions per basis point)

    Sources: Bloomberg and ECB.

    Notes: The chart shows the month-on-month change in the duration of government bonds held by private investors (i.e. investors other than the domestic central bank). Rates are approximated by weighted average maturity.

    At its peak in early 2022, the impact of current and expected Eurosystem bond holdings in our asset portfolios lowered ten-year sovereign bond yields by around 175 basis points.[18] Due to quantitative tightening, however, the easing impact has now fallen to around 75 basis points and is expected to further reduce over time (Chart 8).

    Chart 8

    Impact of APP and PEPP sovereign bond holdings on ten-year sovereign risk premia

    (basis points)

    Source: ECB calculations.

    Notes: The impacts are derived from an affine arbitrage-free model of the term structure with a quantity factor (see Eser et al., op. cit.) and an alternative version of the model recalibrated so that the model-implied yield reactions to the March PEPP announcement match the two-day yield changes observed after 18 March 2020. The model results are derived using GDP-weighted averages of the zero-coupon yields of the big-four sovereign issuers (DE, FR, IT and ES). The continuous line represents estimates based on real-time survey expectations. The dashed line is based on projections of the Eurosystem’s holdings of big-four sovereign bonds in the APP and PEPP as informed by the ECB’s December 2024 Survey of Monetary Analysts. The model abstracts from any potential holdings in a structural portfolio of securities. The latest observations are for January 2025 (monthly data).

    According to ECB research, an expected €1 trillion reduction in bond holdings may raise long-term risk-free interest rates by about 35 basis points (Chart 9).[19]

    Chart 9

    Expected term premium impact from running down the asset portfolio by €1 trillion

    (basis points)

    Sources: ECB December 2024 Survey of Monetary Analysts (SMA) and Akkaya, Y. et al., op.cit.

    Notes: The chart depicts the expected effect on the term premium of various assets with a ten-year maturity resulting from an expected €1 trillion decrease in the ECB’s bond holdings. Results are based on individual SMA responses from December 2022 until December 2023.

    Second, an environment marked by declining levels of central bank liquidity may constrain banks’ ability to extend credit.

    Research documents the strong relationship between loan supply and structural sources of liquidity, such as reserves obtained through credit easing programmes or those injected through quantitative easing interventions.

    More specifically, a €1 change in non-borrowed reserves or credit easing reserves is associated with a corresponding change in credit of approximately 15 cents or 10 cents respectively.[20] In other words, a €500 billion drop in non-borrowed reserves – similar to the one expected in 2025 as a result of the decline in our APP and PEPP holdings – is associated with a €75 billion decline in credit supply, equivalent to about 0.6 percentage points of downward pressure on loans to the non-financial private sector.[21]

    Accordingly, as central bank liquidity declines, we may see tighter credit conditions in the economy. This could slow down investment and consumption, with firms cutting back on capital expenditure and consumers reducing purchases of big-ticket items that require financing.[22]

    Incoming data suggest that euro area GDP growth will remain subdued in the short term. Industrial production decreased notably in December and surveys indicate that manufacturing is continuing to contract, whereas services activity is expanding at a moderate pace (Chart 10).

    Chart 10

    Purchasing Managers’ Index

    (diffusion indices)

    Source: S&P Global.

    Notes: “Output” and “New orders” correspond to the manufacturing and composite indices, and “Business activity” and “New business” to the services index. The latest observations are for January 2025.

    Given the uncertain economic environment, we are yet to see a sustained rebound in investment (Chart 11).[23] And while we continue to expect consumption to be the main driver of the recovery, rising real incomes have not yet encouraged households to increase their spending in a commensurate manner (Chart 12).[24] In the face of subdued domestic demand, our latest staff projections forecast a slower economic recovery than had been forecast in the September projections.[25]

    Chart 11

    Detailed decomposition of euro area real GDP

    (quarter-on-quarter percentage changes and percentage point contributions)

    Sources: Eurostat and ECB staff calculations.

    Note: The latest observations are for the fourth quarter of 2024 for real GDP, and for the third quarter of 2024 for the other components.

    Chart 12

    Real household disposable income and consumption

    (second quarter of 2022 = 100)

    Sources: Eurostat and ECB staff calculations.

    Note: The latest observations are for the third quarter of 2024.

    Moreover, geopolitical risks may create further headwinds for the recovery, which we will need to monitor carefully. Forthcoming findings from the ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey (CES) suggest that consumers’ concerns about geopolitical risks are negatively affecting economic sentiment – leading to more pessimistic expectations, more elevated income uncertainty and, ultimately, a lower propensity to consume.

    We are determined to ensure that inflation stabilises sustainably at our 2% medium-term target. As we gradually cut rates towards neutral territory, we need to be mindful of the fact that we now have two monetary policy tools working in opposing directions, given our ongoing quantitative tightening. This is a first in our history at the ECB.

    We therefore need to ensure that we factor in the tightening of our balance sheet when calibrating our rate cuts to achieve our inflation aim. This is because the stance effects stemming from our rate cuts will be somewhat dampened by the tightening induced by the normalisation of our balance sheet.

    This is an important consideration when discussing the appropriate policy rate path.

    Risks to the transmission of our monetary policy

    Similarly, we need to be mindful of the possible risks to the transmission of our monetary policy to the real economy in view of the prevailing uncertainty and potential risks to financial stability.

    This cautious approach is crucial, especially given historical precedents where central banks faced unexpected challenges.

    In late 2019, for instance, the Federal Reserve System was unexpectedly forced to temporarily reverse its balance sheet retrenchment due to liquidity challenges in financial markets.[26] In 2022 the Bank of England halted quantitative tightening and launched emergency gilt purchases to safeguard financial stability after pension funds’ liability-driven investment strategies exposed systemic risks.[27]

    Recent bouts of market volatility also underscore that we should remain alert to the emergence of financial stability risks that may endanger transmission. Last August several factors converged to spark substantial market volatility.[28] The VIX, a market index that measures the implied volatility of the S&P 500 index, recorded its largest ever one-day spike (Chart 13).[29]

    Chart 13

    VIX index

    (percentages)

    Source: ECB staff calculations.

    Notes: Long run average calculated since January 2000. The latest observations are for 7 February 2025.

    Faced with such episodes of volatility, the further decline in our balance sheet must remain on a gradual and predictable path to avoid financial amplification effects.[30] This is especially important in an environment where euro area banks are already tightening their credit standards, especially for firms and consumer credit, due to higher perceived risks related to the economic outlook (Chart 14).[31]

    Chart 14

    Credit standards, demand for loans to firms and contributing factors

    (net percentages)

    Source: ECB (bank lending survey).

    Notes: “Actual” values are changes that have occurred, while “expected” values are changes anticipated by banks. Net percentages for the questions on credit standards for loans are defined as the difference between the sum of the percentages of banks responding “tightened considerably” and “tightened somewhat” and the sum of the percentages of banks responding “eased somewhat” and “eased considerably”. Net percentages for the questions on demand for loans are defined as the difference between the sum of the percentages of banks responding “increased considerably” and “increased somewhat” and the sum of the percentages of banks responding “decreased somewhat” and “decreased considerably”. “Other financing needs” as unweighted average of “M&A and corporate restructuring” and “debt refinancing/restructuring and renegotiation”; “Use of alternative finance” as unweighted average of “internal financing”, “loans from other banks”, “loans from non-banks”, “issuance/redemption of debt securities” and “issuance/redemption of equity”. The net percentages for “Other factors” refer to an average of the further factors which were mentioned by banks as having contributed to changes in credit standards or changes in loan demand, respectively. The latest observations are for the fourth quarter of 2024 (January 2025 bank lending survey).

    Our balance sheet policy instruments continue to be a crucial item in our toolbox. The expectation that we will use them if necessary protects the smooth transmission of our monetary policy and reduces the likelihood that we will need to use these tools in the first place.

    Moreover, in an environment of heightened uncertainty, even in the context of excess liquidity, we need to remain prudent and be ready to step in should another shock emerge. We should maintain the flexibility to swiftly expand liquidity facilities if stressful conditions arise.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    The ECB’s experience with balance sheet policies to date demonstrates their importance both for the monetary policy stance and for the transmission of our monetary policy to the real economy. They are a vital part of our toolkit.

    While policy rates remain our primary instrument for adjusting the monetary policy stance, we should also consider the role played by quantitative tightening in influencing overall financial and financing conditions – be it through the yield curve or through the bank lending channel.

    To strike the right balance, we should ensure that our rate decisions adequately compensate for the tightening induced by the reduction of our balance sheet.

    Thank you.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: African Development Bank 2022-2026 country strategy for Benin sends very positive signals at halfway point

    Source: African Development Bank Group
    Rice production in Benin has almost doubled in the space of three years, heading north from 406,000 tonnes in 2020 to nearly 712,000 tonnes in 2023 and thereby exceeding the initial target of 700,000 tonnes. Maize production rose to 1.7 million tonnes in 2023, compared with 1.5 million tonnes three years earlier.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Risk weight in Italian healthcare bodies – E-002729/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation)[1] assigns under Art. 116 a 100% risk weight to exposures of credit institutions to Public Sector Entities (PSEs) without an external rating; unless it has an original maturity of three months or less, in which case a 20% risk weight is applied.

    However, the same provision specifies that, under exceptional circumstances, competent authorities of each Member State might decide to treat exposures to PSEs as exposures to the central government, regional government, or local authority in whose jurisdiction they are established, if they are covered by an appropriate guarantee by the central government, regional government or local authority.

    When proposing the Banking Package[2], the Commission recognised that different approaches to PSE funding structures exist among Member States, including in their health systems.

    In addition, that standardising these funding structures through banking regulation was not appropriate, leaving the consideration of such specific cases to the above-mentioned competent authorities.

    The co-legislators agreed with this approach when endorsing Regulation (EU) 2024/1623[3], which entered into force on 1 January 2025.

    To enhance transparency on the prudential treatment of lending to PSEs, co-legislators have tasked the European Banking Authority with creating and maintaining a publicly accessible database of PSEs within the EU which are treated as the central, regional, or local government of the Member State in which they are established for the purposes of prudential capital requirements.

    This initiative will provide a comprehensive overview of the approaches of the above-mentioned competent authorities, thereby promoting transparency across Member States.

    • [1] Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1-337.
    • [2] https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/latest-updates-banking-package-2023-12-14_en
    • [3] Regulation (EU) 2024/1623 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as regards requirements for credit risk, credit valuation adjustment risk, operational risk, market risk and the output floor (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L, 2024/1623, 19.6.2024.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Possible takeover of Commerzbank by UniCredit – E-003033/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission does not comment on individual cases of potential take-overs on which it might be required to decide, based on its competences.

    The banking sector in the EU has robust capital positions and ample liquidity. It has shown high profitability in recent years, in part due to the reforms carried out since the 2007 financial crisis, including the establishment of the Banking Union[1].

    In this context, take-overs, mergers and other forms of consolidation can make banks more resilient to shocks, for example where they lead to greater asset or geographic diversification.

    Bank consolidations may also allow European banks to increase the efficiency of their business models, to pursue growth strategies and to increase their investments in digitalisation.

    At the same time, EU merger control ensures that banking consolidations with a EU dimension do not stifle competition and thereby harm consumers.

    The Commission is in constant contact with Member States’ administrations and competition authorities and cover a wide range of subjects.

    • [1] https://finance.ec.europa.eu/banking/banking-union/what-banking-union_en?prefLang=fr
    Last updated: 18 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Deposit guarantee amount – E-002883/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Based on aggregate harmonised index of consumer prices[1] for EU Member States as published by the statistical office of the EU, aggregate inflation between December 2010 and November 2024 was 39,6%.

    Directive 2014/49/EU[2], does not include a mechanism to automatically adjust the coverage level to inflation. The primary objective of the directive is to improve depositors’ confidence that their deposits up to the guaranteed amount are protected. This confidence limits the risk of panic withdrawals which could threaten financial stability in the EU.

    In 2019, the European Banking Authority (EBA) has assessed the adequacy of the current coverage level for deposits, as per Article 19(6) of the directive.

    While this assessment[3] did not take into account inflation, the EBA concluded that the current coverage level under Directive 2014/49/EU is adequate and that the proportion of depositors fully covered by the EUR 100 000 coverage level has increased in comparison with 2007.

    EBA issued an additional report on deposit coverage in December 2023[4]. According to this report, 96% of depositors are fully covered and a potential increase of the coverage level would have no impact on the vast majority of depositors.

    For the above-mentioned reasons, the Commission does not intend to modify the corresponding provisions of the existing framework.

    • [1] The Harmonised Indices of Consumer Prices measure the changes over time in the prices of consumer goods and services acquired by households. They give a comparable measure of inflation as they are calculated according to harmonised definitions.
    • [2]  OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 149-178.
    • [3] https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/documents/10180/2622242/324e89ec-3523-4c5b-bd4f-e415367212bb/EBA%20Opinion%20on%20the%20eligibility%20of%20deposits%20coverage%20level%20and%20cooperation%20between%20DGSs.pdf?retry=1
    • [4] Report on Deposit Coverage in response to European Commission’s call for advice: https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2023-12/cfe9c89f-23ec-42d0-88fd-fc873ff26c76/EBA%20Report%20on%20deposit%20coverage%20in%20response%20to%20EC%20CfA.pdf
    Last updated: 18 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Boozman, Cotton, Thune Introduce Legislation to Repeal the Federal Death Tax

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Arkansas – John Boozman
    WASHINGTON––U.S. Senators John Boozman (R-AR) and Tom Cotton (R-AR) joined Senate Majority Leader John Thune (R-SD) and 45 of their Senate Republican colleagues to introduce legislation that would permanently repeal the federal estate tax, commonly known as the death tax. The Death Tax Repeal Actwould end this punitive tax that threatens family-run farms, ranches and businesses upon the owner’s death. 
    “Arkansas’s farm families and small businesses should have the opportunity to preserve their legacies for the next generation instead of getting hit with a penalty that jeopardizes their livelihoods,” said Boozman. “They need certainty and relief from this counterproductive burden. Repealing the death tax supports our agriculture producers and entrepreneurs so they can continue to grow their operations and benefit their local economy.”
    “Families shouldn’t have to sell major portions of their businesses or farms after the death of a parent just to afford the estate tax. Breaking apart a family’s livelihood is neither fair nor good for the economy. This legislation would end the federal death tax, making it much easier to preserve a family’s legacy and way of life,” said Cotton. 
    “Family farms and ranches play a vital role in our economy and are the lifeblood of rural communities in South Dakota,” said Thune. “Losing even one of them to the death tax is one too many. It’s time to put an end to this punishing, burdensome tax once and for all so that family farms, ranches and small businesses can grow and thrive without costly estate planning or massive tax burdens that can threaten their viability.”
    The Death Tax Repeal Act would:
    Fully repeal the Estate Tax;
    Repeal the Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax for when a grandparent transfers assets to a grandchild; and
    Maintains step-up basis to allow the evaluation of an inherited asset to be adjusted to reflect a fair market value at the time of death
    The legislation is also cosponsored by Senators Jim Banks (R-IN), John Barrasso (R-WY), Marsha Blackburn (R-TN), Katie Britt (R-AL), Ted Budd (R-NC), Shelley Moore Capito (R-WV), John Cornyn (R-TX), Kevin Cramer (R-ND), Mike Crapo (R-ID), Ted Cruz (R-TX), John Curtis (R-UT), Steve Daines (R-MT), Joni Ernst (R-IA), Deb Fischer (R-NE), Lindsay Graham (R-SC), Chuck Grassley (R-IA), Bill Hagerty (R-TN), Josh Hawley (R-MO), John Hoeven (R-ND), Cindy Hyde-Smith (R-MS), Ron Johnson (R-WI), Jim Justice (R-WV), John Kennedy (R-LA), James Lankford (R-OK), Mike Lee (R-UT), Cynthia Lummis (R-WY), Roger Marshall, M.D. (R-KS), Mitch McConnell (R-KY), Dave McCormick (R-PA), Jerry Moran (R-KS), Bernie Moreno (R-OH), Markwayne Mullin (R-OK), Pete Ricketts (R-NE), Jim Risch (R-ID), Mike Rounds (R-SD), Eric Schmitt (R-MO), Rick Scott (R-FL), Tim Scott (R-SC), Tim Sheehy (R-MT), Thom Tillis (R-NC), Tommy Tuberville (R-AL), Roger Wicker (R-MS) and Todd Young (R-IN).
    Companion legislation was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives by Rep. Randy Feenstra (R-IA-04). 
    The Death Tax Repeal Act is supported by more than 190 members of the Family Business Coalition and more than 105 members of the Family Business Estate Tax Coalition, which includes the National Federation of Independent Business, the National Restaurant Association, the National Association of Home Builders and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
    Click here for full text of the legislation.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Piero Cipollone: Striking the right balance: the ECB’s balance sheet and its implications for monetary policy

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at an MNI Connect webcast

    Frankfurt am Main, 18 February 2025

    Today I would like to discuss the ECB’s balance sheet and its implications for our monetary policy.

    In recent years, the monetary policy debate has mainly focused on our interest rate decisions. This is for good reason. In response to the biggest inflation shock in a generation, we embarked on the fastest tightening of monetary policy in the ECB’s history through rate hikes.

    During this tightening phase, we used policy rates as the primary tool for setting our monetary policy stance, while normalising our balance sheet in a measured and predictable way. We initiated the gradual unwinding of our asset purchase programmes and recalibrated our targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs).[1] As a result, the size of our balance sheet has fallen by more than a quarter from its peak.

    Policy rates remain our primary instrument and will therefore continue to attract the most attention. But we should not underestimate the important role that our balance sheet policies have played over time as a component of our overall monetary policy stance and in ensuring the smooth transmission of our monetary policy to the real economy. This still holds true today as we make our monetary policy less restrictive.

    Inflation has now fallen substantially to levels close to 2%. Our latest projections foresee it converging towards our target over the medium term, and the risks to the inflation outlook – once sharply skewed to the upside – have now become more balanced.

    At the same time, the euro area’s economic recovery remains weak – especially in the near term. The risks to the growth outlook are tilted to the downside and, if they materialise, may derail the recovery, with implications for the inflation outlook.

    Against this background, the Governing Council has gradually been reducing the degree of monetary policy restriction by cutting policy rates towards neutral territory. While our direction is clear, we are very attentive to incoming information in view of the prevailing uncertainty about the economic environment. We continue to make decisions on a meeting-by-meeting and data-dependent basis. This gives us the option to adapt our interest rate path if necessary to ensure that inflation stabilises sustainably at our 2% medium-term target.

    However, given the importance of financial conditions in determining the inflation outlook, we also need to consider the role played by the reduction of our balance sheet. In the tightening phase our rate decisions and balance sheet policies complemented each other, but they are now going in opposing directions.

    This divergence has important implications across at least two dimensions.

    First, it contributes to a steepening of the yield curve. Our rate cuts exert downward pressure primarily at the short end of the yield curve. At the same time, the gradual runoff of our asset purchase portfolios exerts upward pressure on long-term and, to a lesser extent, intermediate yields. This has been compounded by recent spillovers from the US.[2]

    Second, it may affect credit supply. Declining levels of central bank liquidity could constrain banks’ ability to extend credit, resulting in tighter credit conditions and potentially slowing down the investment and consumption that are critical for economic recovery.

    In setting the policy stance, we therefore need to consider the impact of the overall set of financial conditions resulting from our interest rate and balance sheet policies. In other words, we need to strike the right balance if we are to achieve our inflation aim without an undue negative impact on incomes and employment. A rate cut has a more contained easing effect when the balance sheet is simultaneously reduced. This has implications when discussing the appropriate policy rate path.

    We also need to consider the potential risks to the transmission of our monetary policy. In the past, abundant levels of liquidity have acted as a safeguard against spikes in liquidity needs that emerged regardless of where our rates stood. With this in mind, we need to carefully monitor the transition from abundant to less ample excess liquidity, mindful of the potential implications for financial stability.

    Today, I would like to take stock of the ECB’s experience with balance sheet policies, explaining why they remain a vital part of our monetary policy toolbox. I will then discuss the implications of the ECB’s balance sheet for our monetary policy in the current environment.

    The ECB’s experience with balance sheet policies

    At the ECB, balance sheet policies have served a dual purpose over time, allowing us to deliver on our price stability mandate amid exceptionally difficult circumstances.

    First, during periods when interest rates approached their effective lower bound and inflation remained below target, the ECB used asset purchases to support an accommodative monetary policy stance.

    For instance, the ECB launched its asset purchase programme (APP) in 2015 to stimulate the economy and inflation at a time when deflationary threats loomed large. Asset purchases and the associated provision of central bank liquidity worked in several ways – including through the portfolio rebalancing, exchange rate and credit channels – to generate a significant upward effect on both economic activity and inflation.[3]

    Second, balance sheet policies have been pivotal to ensuring the smooth transmission of our monetary policy to the real economy, in both tightening and easing phases.

    At times when we were lowering our policy rates, our TLTROs, launched in 2014, provided banks with long-term funding on favourable terms to incentivise them to lend to firms and households. This led to a persistent compression in lending rates and an increase in loan volumes over time.[4]

    But balance sheet policies were also instrumental in ensuring the smooth transmission of monetary policy at times when we were increasing our policy rates. The announcement of our Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI) in 2022 allowed us to embark on the fastest rate hiking cycle in our history without sparking financial fragmentation in the euro area.

    Of course, the stance and transmission functions of our balance sheet policies do not operate in isolation. There can be beneficial interactions between the two.

    As rates increased, for example, euro area banks had sufficient liquidity to manage any maturity mismatches that arose. This – alongside strengthened regulation and supervision – helped them to emerge unscathed from the market turbulence in March 2023 that saw the collapse of three regional banks in the United States.

    The proportionate use of balance sheet policies in an evolving economic landscape

    The substantial expansion of the ECB’s balance sheet required careful monitoring of potential side effects. That is why the principle of proportionality lies at the core of how we use our balance sheet instruments.[5]

    In its 2021 strategy review, the Governing Council assessed that its use of balance sheet measures – alongside negative interest rates and forward guidance – had indeed been proportionate, taking into account any side effects, for instance on inequality and the financial sector.[6]

    Some concerns, however, require a more nuanced perspective.

    For example, there is little evidence to suggest that excessive risk appetite may be attributable to larger central bank balance sheets. If this were the case, we should have seen less risk-taking in markets as central banks began to withdraw their market footprint.

    But the opposite has been the case. Today equity markets are near all-time highs. This may be due to “animal spirits”[7], which have also been observed outside periods of central bank balance sheet growth. We saw them at play, for instance, during the dot-com bubble – a period when the cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings ratio hit its historic peak and central bank balance sheets were distinctly lean.

    Moreover, as the Eurosystem gradually reduces its footprint in sovereign bond markets by reducing its holdings of euro area government bonds, concerns about the size of the balance sheet are becoming less and less justified (Chart 1).[8]

    Chart 1

    Size of euro area government bond market and the Eurosystem’s market footprint

    (left-hand scale: EUR billions; right-hand scale: percentages)

    Sources: Eurosystem and Centralised Securities Database.

    Notes: The chart shows the evolution of the size of the euro area government bond market and splits it into outright holdings (yellow) and mobilised collateral (green), as well as what is not held or mobilised as collateral with the Eurosystem (blue). The Eurosystem market footprint is a relative measure, computed as the share of the Eurosystem’s euro area government bond (EGB) holdings compared with the nominal amount outstanding. Outright holdings are EGBs held by the Eurosystem via purchase programmes, adjusted by EGBs lent back via the securities lending against cash collateral facilities. Mobilised collateral includes EGBs mobilised as collateral for open market operations. The latest observations are for 31 January 2025.

    Going forward, an evolving economic landscape suggests that balance sheet policies could be increasingly useful as monetary policy instruments. Let me highlight two developments that are particularly relevant here.

    First, the non-bank financial sector has grown considerably over time and is becoming increasingly relevant in the funding of the real economy.

    In the euro area, the financial assets of non-banks have more than doubled since the global financial crisis.[9] Compared with banks, non-banks are more responsive to monetary policy measures that influence longer-term interest rates, such as asset purchases.[10] Given that non-banks adjust their portfolios more actively in response to changes in interest rates, this also increases the need for sufficient liquidity in the system to facilitate these adjustments.

    Second, geopolitical fragmentation means that the global economy is becoming more shock prone and subject to higher levels of uncertainty (Chart 2).

    Chart 2

    Global Economic Policy Uncertainty index

    (index)

    Source: Bloomberg.

    Note: The latest observation is for December 2024.

    In this environment, we need to remember that the euro area is subject to fragmentation risk. A key lesson from the sovereign debt crisis is that balance sheet policies have been instrumental in making the euro area a more “normal” jurisdiction from the perspective of monetary policy.

    As we navigate an increasingly complex economic landscape, the transition from abundant to less ample excess liquidity represents an inflection point that also requires close monitoring.

    In this environment, banks’ liquidity needs are met via a broad mix of instruments under our new operational framework. These include our short-term main refinancing operations (MROs) and three-month longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) and will also include – at a later stage – structural longer-term credit operations and a structural portfolio of securities.[11]

    However, the decline in excess liquidity warrants careful monitoring, as it could exert additional tightening pressures on financial and financing conditions, potentially exceeding the intended policy stance.

    The implications of the ECB’s balance sheet for monetary policy in the current environment

    It is in this context that I would like to talk about the implications of our balance sheet for monetary policy in the current environment.

    The ECB’s balance sheet has been reduced at a faster pace than those of central banks in other major economies during their tightening cycles (Chart 3). So far, much of this decline can be attributed to banks’ repayments of TLTRO loans.[12]

    Chart 3

    Central bank total assets

    (index = 100 at the start of the respective policy rate hiking cycles)

    Sources: Bloomberg and ECB calculations.

    Notes: The x-axis starts on 21 July 2022, 16 March 2022 and 15 December 2021 for the Eurosystem, Federal Reserve System, and Bank of England respectively. For the Bank of England, reserve balances are used as a proxy for the total balance sheet. The latest observations are for 12 February 2025.

    Looking ahead, however, any further reduction in the size of our balance sheet will stem from the gradual unwinding of our asset purchase portfolios, as the Eurosystem no longer reinvests the principal payments from maturing securities.

    As in the past, the normalisation of our balance sheet has implications for our monetary policy stance and the possible risks to monetary policy transmission.

    The monetary policy stance

    Let me start with the implications for our monetary policy stance.

    Our reaction function for rate decisions is built around three well-known criteria: (i) the inflation outlook, (ii) the dynamics of underlying inflation and (iii) the strength of monetary policy transmission.

    Inflation has fallen by around three-quarters from its peak in late 2022 (Chart 4). The disinflation process is well on track, and our staff projections see inflation averaging 2.1% this year, 1.9% next year and 2.1% in 2027.

    Chart 4

    Headline inflation

    (annual percentage changes)

    Source: Eurostat.
    Note: The latest observation is for January 2025 (flash estimate).

    Most measures of underlying inflation suggest that inflation will settle at around our 2% medium-term target on a sustained basis. In particular, the ECB’s measure of the persistent and common component of inflation (PCCI)[13] – a more forward-looking indicator of underlying inflationary pressures that tends to better predict future inflation – stood at 2.1% in December, and 2.0% when excluding energy.

    Domestic inflation remains high, as wages and prices in certain sectors are still adjusting to the past inflation surge with a substantial delay. But our wage tracker is signalling a significant moderation in wage growth, and profits are partially buffering the impact on inflation.

    It is the third leg of our reaction function – the strength of monetary policy transmission – that I would like to discuss in more detail, however.

    As we cut interest rates, new borrowing for firms and households is becoming less expensive. But financing conditions continue to be tight – in part because our monetary policy remains restrictive and past rate hikes are still working their way through the economy.[14]

    While credit continues to expand, lending to firms and households remains subdued by historical standards. In December, the annual growth rate of lending to firms was roughly two-thirds below its historical average.[15] Growth in housing loans increased gradually but also remained muted overall, at around one-fifth of its long-term average (Chart 5).[16]

    Chart 5

    Loans to firms and households

    (percentage points)

    Sources: ECB (BSI) and ECB staff calculations.

    Note: The latest observations are for December 2024.

    At the same time, the recent gradual recovery in lending has not kept pace with the nominal growth of the economy, as reflected in the continued decline of the loan-to-GDP ratio (Chart 6).

    Chart 6

    Ratio of bank loans to GDP

    (percentages)

    Sources: ECB (BSI), Eurostat and ECB staff calculations.

    Note: The latest observation is for the third quarter of 2024.

    While policy rates remain our primary instrument for adjusting our monetary policy stance, the normalisation of our balance sheet may also affect the stance through two key channels.

    First, while our rate cuts exert downward pressure primarily at the short end of the yield curve, our quantitative tightening exerts upward pressure on long-term maturities and, to a lesser extent, intermediate ones. This serves to tighten financial conditions.[17]

    Indeed, the runoff of the asset portfolios of central banks has arguably been one of several factors contributing to a steepening of sovereign yield curves in recent months – akin to a reversal of the duration risk channel previously associated with central banks through quantitative easing (Chart 7).

    Chart 7

    New duration risk absorbed by private investors

    (EUR billions per basis point)

    Sources: Bloomberg and ECB.

    Notes: The chart shows the month-on-month change in the duration of government bonds held by private investors (i.e. investors other than the domestic central bank). Rates are approximated by weighted average maturity.

    At its peak in early 2022, the impact of current and expected Eurosystem bond holdings in our asset portfolios lowered ten-year sovereign bond yields by around 175 basis points.[18] Due to quantitative tightening, however, the easing impact has now fallen to around 75 basis points and is expected to further reduce over time (Chart 8).

    Chart 8

    Impact of APP and PEPP sovereign bond holdings on ten-year sovereign risk premia

    (basis points)

    Source: ECB calculations.

    Notes: The impacts are derived from an affine arbitrage-free model of the term structure with a quantity factor (see Eser et al., op. cit.) and an alternative version of the model recalibrated so that the model-implied yield reactions to the March PEPP announcement match the two-day yield changes observed after 18 March 2020. The model results are derived using GDP-weighted averages of the zero-coupon yields of the big-four sovereign issuers (DE, FR, IT and ES). The continuous line represents estimates based on real-time survey expectations. The dashed line is based on projections of the Eurosystem’s holdings of big-four sovereign bonds in the APP and PEPP as informed by the ECB’s December 2024 Survey of Monetary Analysts. The model abstracts from any potential holdings in a structural portfolio of securities. The latest observations are for January 2025 (monthly data).

    According to ECB research, an expected €1 trillion reduction in bond holdings may raise long-term risk-free interest rates by about 35 basis points (Chart 9).[19]

    Chart 9

    Expected term premium impact from running down the asset portfolio by €1 trillion

    (basis points)

    Sources: ECB December 2024 Survey of Monetary Analysts (SMA) and Akkaya, Y. et al., op.cit.

    Notes: The chart depicts the expected effect on the term premium of various assets with a ten-year maturity resulting from an expected €1 trillion decrease in the ECB’s bond holdings. Results are based on individual SMA responses from December 2022 until December 2023.

    Second, an environment marked by declining levels of central bank liquidity may constrain banks’ ability to extend credit.

    Research documents the strong relationship between loan supply and structural sources of liquidity, such as reserves obtained through credit easing programmes or those injected through quantitative easing interventions.

    More specifically, a €1 change in non-borrowed reserves or credit easing reserves is associated with a corresponding change in credit of approximately 15 cents or 10 cents respectively.[20] In other words, a €500 billion drop in non-borrowed reserves – similar to the one expected in 2025 as a result of the decline in our APP and PEPP holdings – is associated with a €75 billion decline in credit supply, equivalent to about 0.6 percentage points of downward pressure on loans to the non-financial private sector.[21]

    Accordingly, as central bank liquidity declines, we may see tighter credit conditions in the economy. This could slow down investment and consumption, with firms cutting back on capital expenditure and consumers reducing purchases of big-ticket items that require financing.[22]

    Incoming data suggest that euro area GDP growth will remain subdued in the short term. Industrial production decreased notably in December and surveys indicate that manufacturing is continuing to contract, whereas services activity is expanding at a moderate pace (Chart 10).

    Chart 10

    Purchasing Managers’ Index

    (diffusion indices)

    Source: S&P Global.

    Notes: “Output” and “New orders” correspond to the manufacturing and composite indices, and “Business activity” and “New business” to the services index. The latest observations are for January 2025.

    Given the uncertain economic environment, we are yet to see a sustained rebound in investment (Chart 11).[23] And while we continue to expect consumption to be the main driver of the recovery, rising real incomes have not yet encouraged households to increase their spending in a commensurate manner (Chart 12).[24] In the face of subdued domestic demand, our latest staff projections forecast a slower economic recovery than had been forecast in the September projections.[25]

    Chart 11

    Detailed decomposition of euro area real GDP

    (quarter-on-quarter percentage changes and percentage point contributions)

    Sources: Eurostat and ECB staff calculations.

    Note: The latest observations are for the fourth quarter of 2024 for real GDP, and for the third quarter of 2024 for the other components.

    Chart 12

    Real household disposable income and consumption

    (second quarter of 2022 = 100)

    Sources: Eurostat and ECB staff calculations.

    Note: The latest observations are for the third quarter of 2024.

    Moreover, geopolitical risks may create further headwinds for the recovery, which we will need to monitor carefully. Forthcoming findings from the ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey (CES) suggest that consumers’ concerns about geopolitical risks are negatively affecting economic sentiment – leading to more pessimistic expectations, more elevated income uncertainty and, ultimately, a lower propensity to consume.

    We are determined to ensure that inflation stabilises sustainably at our 2% medium-term target. As we gradually cut rates towards neutral territory, we need to be mindful of the fact that we now have two monetary policy tools working in opposing directions, given our ongoing quantitative tightening. This is a first in our history at the ECB.

    We therefore need to ensure that we factor in the tightening of our balance sheet when calibrating our rate cuts to achieve our inflation aim. This is because the stance effects stemming from our rate cuts will be somewhat dampened by the tightening induced by the normalisation of our balance sheet.

    This is an important consideration when discussing the appropriate policy rate path.

    Risks to the transmission of our monetary policy

    Similarly, we need to be mindful of the possible risks to the transmission of our monetary policy to the real economy in view of the prevailing uncertainty and potential risks to financial stability.

    This cautious approach is crucial, especially given historical precedents where central banks faced unexpected challenges.

    In late 2019, for instance, the Federal Reserve System was unexpectedly forced to temporarily reverse its balance sheet retrenchment due to liquidity challenges in financial markets.[26] In 2022 the Bank of England halted quantitative tightening and launched emergency gilt purchases to safeguard financial stability after pension funds’ liability-driven investment strategies exposed systemic risks.[27]

    Recent bouts of market volatility also underscore that we should remain alert to the emergence of financial stability risks that may endanger transmission. Last August several factors converged to spark substantial market volatility.[28] The VIX, a market index that measures the implied volatility of the S&P 500 index, recorded its largest ever one-day spike (Chart 13).[29]

    Chart 13

    VIX index

    (percentages)

    Source: ECB staff calculations.

    Notes: Long run average calculated since January 2000. The latest observations are for 7 February 2025.

    Faced with such episodes of volatility, the further decline in our balance sheet must remain on a gradual and predictable path to avoid financial amplification effects.[30] This is especially important in an environment where euro area banks are already tightening their credit standards, especially for firms and consumer credit, due to higher perceived risks related to the economic outlook (Chart 14).[31]

    Chart 14

    Credit standards, demand for loans to firms and contributing factors

    (net percentages)

    Source: ECB (bank lending survey).

    Notes: “Actual” values are changes that have occurred, while “expected” values are changes anticipated by banks. Net percentages for the questions on credit standards for loans are defined as the difference between the sum of the percentages of banks responding “tightened considerably” and “tightened somewhat” and the sum of the percentages of banks responding “eased somewhat” and “eased considerably”. Net percentages for the questions on demand for loans are defined as the difference between the sum of the percentages of banks responding “increased considerably” and “increased somewhat” and the sum of the percentages of banks responding “decreased somewhat” and “decreased considerably”. “Other financing needs” as unweighted average of “M&A and corporate restructuring” and “debt refinancing/restructuring and renegotiation”; “Use of alternative finance” as unweighted average of “internal financing”, “loans from other banks”, “loans from non-banks”, “issuance/redemption of debt securities” and “issuance/redemption of equity”. The net percentages for “Other factors” refer to an average of the further factors which were mentioned by banks as having contributed to changes in credit standards or changes in loan demand, respectively. The latest observations are for the fourth quarter of 2024 (January 2025 bank lending survey).

    Our balance sheet policy instruments continue to be a crucial item in our toolbox. The expectation that we will use them if necessary protects the smooth transmission of our monetary policy and reduces the likelihood that we will need to use these tools in the first place.

    Moreover, in an environment of heightened uncertainty, even in the context of excess liquidity, we need to remain prudent and be ready to step in should another shock emerge. We should maintain the flexibility to swiftly expand liquidity facilities if stressful conditions arise.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    The ECB’s experience with balance sheet policies to date demonstrates their importance both for the monetary policy stance and for the transmission of our monetary policy to the real economy. They are a vital part of our toolkit.

    While policy rates remain our primary instrument for adjusting the monetary policy stance, we should also consider the role played by quantitative tightening in influencing overall financial and financing conditions – be it through the yield curve or through the bank lending channel.

    To strike the right balance, we should ensure that our rate decisions adequately compensate for the tightening induced by the reduction of our balance sheet.

    Thank you.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: District Court Enters Permanent Injunctions Prohibiting Unauthorized Debits to Consumer and Small Business Bank Accounts

    Source: US Justice – Antitrust Division

    Headline: District Court Enters Permanent Injunctions Prohibiting Unauthorized Debits to Consumer and Small Business Bank Accounts

    On Jan. 31, a court in Miami entered the final in a series of consent decrees, permanently barring 10 individuals and entities from operating a scheme to steal funds from thousands of bank accounts belonging to consumers and small businesses across the United States.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI: Dominion Lending Centres Inc. Increases and Extends Credit Facility

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    VANCOUVER, British Columbia, Feb. 18, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Dominion Lending Centres Inc. (TSX:DLCG) (“DLCG” or the “Corporation”) is pleased to announce that it has amended and extended its credit facilities with The Toronto-Dominion Bank effective February 18, 2025. The maturity date for the credit facilities has been extended from December 19, 2026 to February 18, 2030.

    The amended credit facilities are comprised of two senior credit facilities (collectively, the “Senior Credit Facilities”).   The Senior Credit Facilities provide the Corporation with a revolving credit line and a term facility. The revolving credit facility was increased by $10 million, from $15 million to $25 million, and was undrawn at closing. The term facility has $30.48 million drawn at closing. Interest on the Senior Credit Facilities is based on the prime borrowing rate (or alternatively, at the Corporation’s option, Term CORRA (Canadian Overnight Repo Rate Average)) plus an additional amount determined based on the Corporation’s total leverage. On closing of the Senior Credit Facilities, the interest rate is anticipated to be equal to the prime borrowing rate.    

    About Dominion Lending Centres Inc.
    Dominion Lending Centres Inc. is Canada’s leading network of mortgage professionals. DLCG operates through Dominion Lending Centres Inc. and its three main subsidiaries, MCC Mortgage Centre Canada Inc., MA Mortgage Architects Inc. and Newton Connectivity Systems Inc., and has operations across Canada. DLCG extensive network includes over 8,500 agents and over 500 locations. Headquartered in British Columbia, DLC was founded in 2006 by Gary Mauris and Chris Kayat.

    DLCG can be found on X (Twitter), Facebook and Instagram and LinkedIn @DLCGmortgage and on the web at www.dlcg.ca. 

    Contact information for the Corporation is as follows:

    Eddy Cocciollo
    President
    647-403-7320
    eddy@dlc.ca    		 James Bell
    EVP, Corporate and Chief Legal Officer
    403-560-0821
    jbell@dlcg.ca    		  


    NEITHER THE TSX EXCHANGE NOR ITS REGULATION SERVICES PROVIDER (AS THAT TERM IS DEFINED IN THE POLICIES OF THE TSX EXCHANGE) ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ADEQUACY OR ACCURACY OF THIS RELEASE.

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Economic ‘green shoots’ and lower interest rates disguise worrying trends in NZ’s job market

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Cristóbal Castro Barrientos, PhD candidate, NZ Policy Research Institute, Auckland University of Technology

    Max Dallocco/Shutterstock

    Despite Prime Minister Christopher Luxon’s reassurance that “some green shoots” are starting to show in the economy, including a 50 point cut in the official cash rate expected to be announced later today, the outlook for 2025 remains uncertain for many – and grim for some.

    Unemployment reached 5.1% in the final quarter of 2024, the highest level since 2020, according to the latest data from Stats NZ. That translates to a total of 156,000 unemployed individuals.

    At the same time, a 1% decrease in gross domestic product in the third quarter of 2024 puts more pressure on the job market.

    While the unemployment rate may not have reached the levels of past crises – the rate exceeded 6% during the 2008-2009 recession – the devil is in the detail.

    The Stats NZ data show the most affected sectors include male-dominated occupations such as technicians and machinery operators, accounting for 85% of the latest job losses.

    Women have seen smaller declines in employment and a slight increase in transitions to part-time roles. But the shift from full-time to part-time employment, especially among men, suggests the creation of quality full-time jobs will be a challenge.

    Job losses concentrated in male-dominated industries also have broader economic implications. They may signal shifts in household income dynamics, particularly for families that depend on a male breadwinner.

    It could also contribute to rising male underemployment (when a worker’s job doesn’t fully utilise their skills, education or experience) and further disparities in the employment rates of men and women.

    Overall, these trends raise questions about the nature and quality of work now available in the job market, and what strategies the government can respond with.

    A rise in ‘discouraged’ workers

    In the fourth quarter of 2024, the annualised employment rate (representing the proportion of the working-age population employed over a year, adjusted for seasonal fluctuations) was 67.4%, compared with 69% in the same period of the previous year.

    This is the most significant decline since 2009. It reflects job losses and a “discouraged worker” effect.

    Discouraged workers are those who have stopped seeking employment due to a perceived lack of opportunities. Instead of remaining in the labour force, they may rely on savings, family support, welfare, or transition into informal or temporary work.

    According to recent data, the most affected sectors include male-dominated occupations such as technicians and machinery operators.
    Kajohnwit Boonsom/Shutterstock

    A drop in quality work

    The rise in part-time employment, particularly among men, raises concerns about the quality of the labour market. Although employment levels appear stable, the growth of less secure jobs may conceal structural weaknesses.

    In the fourth quarter of 2024, the number in part-time employment reached 585,000, the highest figure since 1986. Over the past year, 36,000 men left full-time jobs, while 9,000 transitioned to part-time work.

    One of the main risks of this trend is that companies may be cutting costs without resorting to mass layoffs, which implies reduced job security for workers. Many of these transitions to part-time employment are not voluntary but rather a sign that the economy is not generating enough stable job opportunities.

    Additionally, part-time jobs often offer lower wages, fewer benefits and fewer opportunities for career advancement.

    This type of employment can contribute to stagnation in skill development and reduce workers’ purchasing power, ultimately affecting consumer spending and overall economic growth.

    There is also a perception of discrimination against part-time workers, with one in three reporting feeling discriminated against in their jobs.

    A year of two halves

    While consumer confidence has been low, recent revisions to economic growth estimates suggest the economy hasn’t been as weak as perceived.

    Current projections are that unemployment may reach a peak between 5.3% and 5.6% in mid-2025 and then trend downwards.

    With inflation now within the Reserve Bank of New Zealand’s target range, changes in the official cash rate are needed to contain the damage to a weakened labour market. The central bank is forecast to cut the interest rate by 50-points today.

    The weak growth in the working-age population and a potential decline in labour force participation could limit how high unemployment rises, as fewer people may be actively looking for work. But this does not mean a strong recovery is imminent.

    New Zealand faces a significant but not insurmountable challenge. An unemployment rate of 5.1% should raise a red flag and is devastating for the increasing number of workers who have lost their jobs. But the data also show the increase is part of an anticipated economic cycle.

    What matters is how the government reacts to the increases in unemployment and changes to the job market. A supportive job-creation policy and a coordinated strategy for the most affected sectors will be key in avoiding long-lasting pain in the labour market.

    Cristóbal Castro Barrientos does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Economic ‘green shoots’ and lower interest rates disguise worrying trends in NZ’s job market – https://theconversation.com/economic-green-shoots-and-lower-interest-rates-disguise-worrying-trends-in-nzs-job-market-249685

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Barr, Artificial Intelligence: Hypothetical Scenarios for the Future

    Source: US State of New York Federal Reserve

    Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) have accelerated rapidly over the past few years.1 It is now commonplace to see autonomous vehicles navigating city streets, and generative AI tools are available on phones and other devices wherever we go. AI innovations make headlines and play a big role in financial markets, and generative AI has the potential to change how we think about productivity, labor markets and the macroeconomy.2 Today, I will address that question by outlining two hypothetical scenarios for AI’s impact and the implications for businesses, regulators, and society. I will focus my comments on Generative AI, or GenAI, a subset of AI that has seen significant growth and integration into economic activity in just a few short years.
    GenAI and Its AdoptionCompared to earlier iterations of AI, GenAI is able to generate content, which allows it to significantly enhance productivity across a range of knowledge-based activities and be used by people without coding skills. GenAI will likely become a “general purpose technology,” with widespread adoption, continuous improvement, and productivity enhancements to a wide range of sectors across the economy. We are already seeing GenAI improve the productivity of its own R&D.3 There is widespread enthusiasm for GenAI, and survey evidence shows much faster rates of consumer adoption of GenAI already than were seen for the personal computer or the internet.4 While actual deployment of GenAI is limited to some business functions, and there have been pitfalls along the way, businesses in almost every sector are experimenting with or considering how to make use of the technology.5
    Firms are also exploring Agentic AI—Gen AI systems that not only produce new content, but are also able to proactively pursue goals by generating innovative solutions and acting upon them at speed and scale.6 Imagining Agentic AI’s ultimate application, some speculate that we could experience a “country of geniuses in a data center”—a collective intelligence that surpasses human capabilities in problem-solving and collaboration.7 Some believe Agentic AI has the potential to connect ideas in disparate domains, potentially transforming research and development and society more broadly.8
    Hypothetical Scenarios Considering How GenAI Could EvolveToday, I will outline two hypothetical scenarios for considering how GenAI could evolve.9 In one, we see only incremental adoption that primarily augments what humans do today, but still leads to widespread productivity gains. In the other, we see transformative change where we extend human capabilities with far-reaching consequences. For each scenario, I consider the potential implications for the economy and financial sector.
    Thinking through hypothetical scenarios can help widen our lens to a range of possible outcomes and provide a framework for assessing the balance between benefits and risks. Scenarios are not predictions of the future, but provide a framework for analyzing the factors that could lead to different outcomes. Reality is complex. GenAI adoption rates will vary across industries, leading to diverse impacts on market structures. Elements of both scenarios will likely come to pass, and play out at different rates, which will influence the effects on the economy and society. In the short term, GenAI may be overhyped, while in the long run, it may be underappreciated. And, of course, things might turn out differently from these hypotheticals.
    Hypothetical 1: Incremental Progress with Widespread Productivity GainsFirst, let me begin with the incremental scenario, where GenAI primarily augments work in existing processes and leads to steady and widespread productivity gains, but does not fundamentally unlock new capabilities or transform the economy.
    In this state of the world, GenAI tools enhance efficiency and enable more personalized solutions across industries, in ways that have incremental—but still meaningful—effects on people’s lives. For instance, in customer service, professional writing—but not this speech—and software engineering, GenAI-powered tools are already supporting workers, improving accuracy and speed, and these effects could spread to other sectors.10 In this world, health care sees significant improvements as GenAI reduces administrative burdens, assists with diagnostics, and personalizes treatment plans based on real-time patient data. Medicines and other treatments are developed at a faster pace.11 Education is similarly affected, as GenAI alleviates administrative tasks for teachers, allows lessons to be tailored to individual students, and permits students to learn by doing.12 In manufacturing, GenAI-optimized supply chains anticipate and adjust more quickly to disruptions, and current manufacturing processes are refined through virtual iteration.13 In materials science, GenAI-driven experimentation accelerates the discovery of new materials, leading to advances in everything from construction to electronics.14 Turning to the financial sector, we could see similar productivity gains. Community banks leverage GenAI-powered chatbots to provide customized financial advice rooted in local knowledge, while institutions of all sizes continue to advance use of GenAI for compliance monitoring, fraud detection, risk management, and document analysis.15
    The impact to society would be incrementally positive in this state of the world. Humans would use GenAI as a tool to deliver goods and services that we currently produce in a more efficient way. Productivity would go up. The economy would grow at a faster pace.16
    What does this mean for the labor force? The impact will depend on the industry and the nature of the job. GenAI experiments suggest the technology holds the promise of levelling up skills and bringing productivity of lower-performing workers into line with higher performing workers.17 In other cases, it could augment the highest performers, leaving them more time for creativity or strategic aspects of their roles. Increasing automation for certain tasks may displace some workers, where certain skills can be replicated by GenAI. Historically, as technology has replaced some jobs, it has augmented existing roles or created new ones.18 However, this is not to downplay the individual cost for workers who need to retrain, find other employment, or change careers in response to major changes in labor demand. Society will need to account for these possible effects of AI.
    What does this mean for the economy? As I noted before, the economy should grow, if the incremental productivity gains are widespread. However, in this scenario, it is possible that the expected value creation from GenAI was overhyped, anticipating transformative breakthroughs rather than incremental productivity gains. This could trigger market corrections for the firms that have heavily invested in this technology if reality doesn’t measure up to expectations. While the U.S. economy experienced a surge of productivity growth during the dot.com boom in the late 1990s, it was followed by a wave of bankruptcies, capital overhang, and a cautious business investment climate.19 The effects of the ensuing recession were widespread.
    What does this mean for financial stability and other financial risks? In this incremental scenario, GenAI may magnify both the vulnerabilities and sources of resilience that already exist in the system. Attractive trades become more crowded, but risk managers gain new insights.20 Malicious actors gain new tools, but cyber defenders become better armed. So long as financial regulators, enterprise risk managers, and others charged with managing downside risks prioritize efforts to keep pace with the evolving financial ecosystem, there’s nothing to suggest a wholesale transformation of the balance of risks. Of course, keeping pace will pose challenges, and it’s important that we all focus on the need to meet these risks.
    Hypothetical Scenario 2: Transformative ChangeNow, let’s consider a more dramatic hypothetical scenario, in which GenAI adoption extends beyond improving on what we currently do, and provides new expertise and capabilities that have transformative effects on the economy and society. In this scenario, humans deploy their imagination and creativity—combined with robust investment in research and development—to deploy intelligent GenAI systems to make rapid breakthroughs in, for example, biotechnology, robotics, and energy, fundamentally reshaping existing industries and creating new ones. In this instance, to focus the mind, we can think of GenAI as no longer only a tool for scientists to analyze data—in a sense, it becomes the scientist, directing the research.21
    For instance, let’s say that GenAI applications in health care do not simply improve how we currently deliver care, but also enable therapies that target genetic mutations and cure diseases previously considered incurable.22 Similarly, manufacturing evolves to create GenAI-driven robotic factories, with goods produced with new materials and atomic precision.23 Materials science is transformed through the discovery of programmable materials and self-healing substances, all of which reshape construction, technology, and consumer goods.24 Meanwhile, GenAI optimizes fusion energy research, expediting the shift to sustainable energy sources.25 And GenAI helps to create the next generation of quantum computing.26 In that way, GenAI improves its own energy sources and computing capabilities, enabling it to become a more powerful creative tool.27
    Finance also looks radically different than it does today. Individuals with access to hyper-personalized financial planning and businesses with innovative products and services seamlessly connect with one another through near-frictionless or novel forms of financial intermediation.28 Trading strategies and risk-management practices are boosted by greater GenAI-based analytic tools that have dynamic real-time access to an enormous knowledge base in both the public and private domains.29
    Although this transformative scenario is more speculative and is accompanied by a far greater degree of uncertainty than the first, it is important to consider given the extraordinary opportunities for human advancement and welfare that could arise, even if just one of its transformative components were to come to fruition. We would need to fundamentally reimagine how the economy is structured.
    What are the impacts on the labor force, in a world where GenAI’s capabilities extend beyond what humans can accomplish today? Humans may have a role to manage multi-agent GenAI frameworks, or fill gaps where GenAI solutions remain expensive or inefficient for some applications. But this is a world where some workers may see their current jobs disappearing. It is also a world in which they may see their own work transformed and have many more choices about the work they do. The nature of labor would radically change, and this will require us to have broader conversations about how to organize the economy. These conversations should wrestle with how to navigate major economic shifts in a way that recognizes the impact on the human condition, and the extent to which people derive their communities, friendships, personal sense of meaning and dignity from their work.
    What about the competitive landscape? There is probably a greater likelihood that rewards for businesses would be distributed more unevenly at first, as significant breakthroughs with far-reaching ramifications may benefit a subset of firms and industries and concentrate economic power in firms that control GenAI breakthroughs. If only a handful of firms have the ability to accomplish the incredible things I’ve mentioned above, they may dominate markets and crowd out competitors. To the extent that GenAI becomes broadly effective, widely available, and cheap, these market advantages could lessen over time if the right regulatory environment supports competitive market dynamics.30 But history suggests caution in this regard; a handful of players may dominate.31
    And finally, for finance, we should anticipate fundamental changes in this scenario. When it’s working well, the financial system helps move money and risk through time and space.32 To the extent there are fundamental changes to how the economy is organized, we could need a new set of institutions, markets, and products to facilitate transactions among households, businesses, and GenAI agents.
    What Should We Do?Among the many ways in which we can help to harness the potential benefits of GenAI and minimize its risks, I will highlight only a couple today.
    Financial institutions, and the Federal Reserve System, should consider investing sufficient resources in understanding GenAI technology, incorporating it into their workflows where appropriate, and training staff on how to use the technology responsibly and effectively.33 Meanwhile, the financial regulatory community should approach the changing landscape with agility and flexibility. And beyond the financial sector, collaboration between governments, private industry, and research institutions will be critical to ensure that GenAI systems are not weaponized in catastrophic ways. We should continue to focus on responsible AI research and development and implement safeguards against misuse, including monitoring systems, standards for secure AI system development, and agreement on red lines for acceptable use cases.34 We should be attuned to the impact of GenAI on our economic and political institutions. There’s a risk that it concentrates economic and political power in the hands of the very few and could lead to the gains being realized only by a small group, while the rest are left behind.
    Another thing I want to emphasize is AI governance. I think most would agree that the goal of the technology is to improve the human condition, and to do that, we need to be intentional in advancing that goal. We should make sure that we think about GenAI as enhancing, not replacing, humans, and set up best practices and cultural norms to that end. Every financial institution should recognize the limitations of the technology, explore where and when GenAI belongs in any process, and identify how humans can be best positioned to be in the loop. We should also focus on data quality, and make sure that uses of GenAI do not perpetuate or amplify biases inherent in the data used to train the system or make incorrect inferences to the extent the data is incomplete or nonrepresentative.35 In the realm of regulation, frameworks for understanding model risk may need to be updated to address the complexity and challenges of explaining AI methods and the difficulty of assessing data quality.
    We need to be attuned to the risk in finance. The very attributes that make GenAI attractive—the speed, automaticity, and ability to optimize financial strategies—also present risk.36 When the technology becomes ubiquitous, use of GenAI could lead to herding behavior and the concentration of risk, potentially amplifying market volatility. As GenAI agents will be directed to maximize profit, they may converge on strategies to maximize returns through coordinated market manipulation, potentially fueling asset bubbles and crashes. Speed, automaticity, and ubiquity could generate new risks at wide scale.37
    We also should monitor how introduction of this technology changes the banking landscape. Nonbanks may be more nimble and risk-forward in incorporating GenAI into their operations, which may push intermediation to less-regulated, less transparent corners of the financial sector. In addition, this competitive pressure may push all institutions, including regulated institutions, to take a more aggressive approach to GenAI adoption, heightening the governance, alignment, and financial risks I mentioned before.
    In conclusion, while AI’s impact will vary across industries and the reality is evolving, the scenarios I have outlined today provide a framework to begin thinking about how we should respond to developments in GenAI. However, as I mentioned above, elements of both scenarios will likely be present in the future, and play out at different rates, which will influence the effects on the economy and society. Rapid advances in this technology, such as Agentic AI and advancements in open-source models, underscore just how new this technology is and the importance of understanding what it means for individuals, businesses, and markets. Thank you.

    1. The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Reserve Board. Return to text
    2. See, for instance, Lisa D. Cook, “Artificial Intelligence, Big Data, and the Path Ahead for Productivity,” (speech at Technology-Enabled Disruption: Implications of AI, Big Data, and Remote Work Conference, Atlanta, Georgia, October 1, 2024). Return to text
    3. See Gaurav Sett, “How AI Can Automate AI Research and Development,” RAND Commentary, October 24, 2024. Return to text
    4. See Cory Breaux and Emin Dinlersoz, “How Many U.S. Businesses Use Artificial Intelligence?” (Washington: U.S. Census Bureau, November 28, 2023); Alexander Bick, Adam Blandin, and David J. Deming, “The Rapid Adoption of Generative AI,” NBER Working Paper No. 32966 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, September 2024, revised February 2025); and Leland Crane, Michael Green, and Paul Soto, “Measuring AI Uptake in the Workplace,” FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, February 5, 2025). Return to text
    5. There’s evidence of firms experimenting with these tools and then abandoning them—due to a multitude of reasons. See Kathryn Bonney, Cory Breaux, Cathy Buffington, Emin Dinlersoz, Lucia S. Foster, Nathan Goldschlag, John C. Haltiwanger, Zachary Kroff, and Keith Savage, “Tracking Firm Use of AI in Real Time: A Snapshot from the Business Trends and Outlook Survey,” NBER Working Paper No. 32319 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2024). Return to text
    6. For more on Agentic AI’s uses, advantages, and risks, see Mark Purdy, “What Is Agentic AI, and How Will It Change Work?” Harvard Business Review (December 12, 2024). Return to text
    7. See Dario Amodei, “Machines of Loving Grace,” October 2024, https://darioamodei.com/machines-of-loving-grace. Return to text
    8. For biology and drug discovery, see Jean-Philippe Vert, “Unlocking the Mysteries of Complex Biological Systems with Agentic AI,” MIT Technology Review (November 13, 2024), https://www.technologyreview.com/2024/11/13/1106750/unlocking-the-mysteries-of-complex-biological-systems-with-agentic-ai; and “Owkin Announces First Patient Dosed in Phase I AI-Optimized Clinical Trial of OKN4395, a First-in-Class EP2/EP4/DP1 Triple Inhibitor for Patients with Solid Tumors,” Business Wire, January 30, 2025, https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20250130436779/en/Owkin-Announces-First-Patient-Dosed-in-Phase-I-AI-optimized-Clinical-Trial-of-OKN4395-a-First-in-Class-EP2EP4DP1-Triple-Inhibitor-for-Patients-with-Solid-Tumors. Return to text
    9. Others have used other types of scenarios. See Anton Korinek, “The Economics of Transformative AI,” The Reporter (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, December 31, 2024); Iñaki Aldasoro, Leonardo Gambacorta, Anton Korinek, Vatsala Shreeti, and Merlin Stein, “Intelligent Financial System: How AI Is Transforming Finance (PDF),” BIS Working Papers No. 1194 (Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements, June 2024); and Ethan Mollick, Co-Intelligence: Living and Working with AI (New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2024). Return to text
    10. For worker productivity gains in customer service, see Erik Brynjolfsson, Danielle Li, and Lindsey R. Raymond, “Generative AI at Work,” NBER Working Paper No. 31161 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2023, revised November 2023). For GenAI assisted writing gains, see Shakked Noy and Whitney Zhang, “Experimental Evidence on the Productivity Effects of Generative Artificial Intelligence,” Science, vol. 381, no. 6654 (July 2023): 187–92; Jordan Usdan, Allison Connell Pensky, and Harley Chang, “Generative AI’s Impact on Graduate Student Writing Productivity and Quality,” SSRN (August 29, 2024), https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4941022. For software engineering, see Sida Peng, Eirini Kalliamvakou, Peter Cihon, and Mert Demirer, “The Impact of AI on Developer Productivity: Evidence from GitHub Copilot,” arXiv:2302.06590, February 13, 2023; Leonardo Gambacorta, Han Qiu, Shuo Shan, and Daniel M. Rees, “Generative AI and Labour Productivity: A Field Experiment on Coding (PDF),” BIS Working Papers No. 1208 (Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements, September 2024); Zheyuan (Kevin) Cui, Mert Demirer, Sonia Jaffe, Leon Musolff, Sida Peng, and Tobias Salz, “The Effects of Generative AI on High-Skilled Work: Evidence from Three Field Experiments with Software Developers,” SSRN (September 5, 2024, revised February 10, 2025), https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4945566. For worker gains in the consulting industry, see Fabrizio Dell’Acqua, Edward McFowland III, Ethan Mollick, Hila Lifshitz-Assaf, Katherine C. Kellogg, Saran Rajendran, Lisa Krayer, François Candelon, and Karim R. Lakhani, “Navigating the Jagged Technological Frontier: Field Experimental Evidence of the Effects of AI on Knowledge Worker Productivity and Quality (PDF),” Harvard Business School Working Paper No. 24-013 (September 2023). Return to text
    11. See Ethan Goh, Robert Gallo, Jason Hom, et al., “Large Language Model Influence on Diagnostic Reasoning: A Randomized Clinical Trial,” JAMA Network Open (October 28, 2024), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2825395; Nikhil Agarwal, Alex Moehring, Pranav Rajpurkar, and Tobias Salz, “Combining Human Expertise with Artificial Intelligence: Experimental Evidence from Radiology,” NBER Working Paper No. 31422 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2023, revised March 2024); Ashley Capoot, “Reid Hoffman Enters ‘Wondrous and Terrifying’ World of Health Care with Latest AI Startup,” CNBC, February 2, 2025, https://www.cnbc.com/2025/02/02/reid-hoffman-launches-manas-ai-a-new-drug-discovery-startup.html; Kang Zhang, Xin Yang, Yifei Wang, Yunfang Yu, Niu Huang, Gen Li, Xiaokun Li, Joseph C. Wu, and Shengyong Yang, “Artificial Intelligence in Drug Development,” Nature Medicine, vol. 31 (January 2025): 45–59, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-024-03434-4; Qian Liao, Yu Zhang, Ying Chu, Yi Ding, Zhen Liu, Xianyi Zhao, Yizheng Wang, Jie Wan, Yijie Ding, Prayag Tiwari, Quan Zou, and Ke Han, “Application of Artificial Intelligence in Drug-Target Interactions Prediction: A Review,” NPJ Biomedical Innovations, vol. 2, no. 1 (January 2025), https://doi.org/10.1038/s44385-024-00003-9. Return to text
    12. For more on education, see Justin Wolfers, “An Econ Educators Guide to our AI-Powered Future,” Macmillan Learning, EconEd (presentation), September 26, 2024, https://www.macmillanlearning.com/college/us/events/econed; and Anne J. Manning, “Professor Tailored AI Tutor to Physics Course. Engagement Doubled,” Harvard Gazette, September 5, 2024. Return to text
    13. See Maxime C. Cohen and Christopher S. Tang, “The Role of AI in Developing Resilient Supply Chains,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (February 5, 2024); and Remko Van Hoek and Mary Lacity, “How Global Companies Use AI to Prevent Supply Chain Disruptions,” Harvard Business Review, November 21, 2023. Return to text
    14. See Sheldon Fernandez, “How Generative AI Can Be Used in Electronics,” Forbes, April 26, 2023, https://www.forbes.com/councils/forbestechcouncil/2023/04/26/how-generative-ai-can-be-used-in-electronics-manufacturing. Return to text
    15. For U.S. financial institutions, see Elizabeth Judd, “How to Balance Human and Machine While Using Chatbots,” Independent Banker, January 1, 2025; and U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Artificial Intelligence in Financial Services (PDF)” (Washington: U.S. Department of the Treasury, December 2024). For foreign financial institutions, see Bank of England and Financial Conduct Authority, “Artificial Intelligence in UK Financial Services—2024” (London: Bank of England and Financial Conduct Authority, November 21, 2024); and Bank of Japan, “Use and Risk Management of Generative AI by Japanese Financial Institutions,” Financial System Report Annex (Tokyo: Bank of Japan, October 29, 2024). For global financial institutions, see OECD, “FSB Roundtable on Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Finance (PDF),” Financial Stability Board, September 30, 2024. Return to text
    16. Lida R. Weinstock and Paul Tierno, “The Macroeconomic Effects of Artificial Intelligence (PDF),” Congressional Research Service, January 28, 2025. Return to text
    17. See Shakked Noy and Whitney Zhang, “Experimental Evidence on the Productivity Effects of Generative Artificial Intelligence,” Science, vol. 381, no. 6654 (July 13, 2023): 187–92; Brynjolfsson et al., “Generative AI at Work” (see footnote 9); and “for software engineering” from footnote 9; Korinek (2024) from footnote 7. Return to text
    18. See David H. Autor, “Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of Workplace Automation,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 29, no. 3 (Summer 2015): 3–30.See Simona Abis and Laura Veldkamp. Return to text
    19. See Ben S. Bernanke, “Will Business Investment Bounce Back?” (speech at the Forecasters Club, New York, NY, April 24, 2003). Return to text
    20. See Financial Stability Board, The Financial Stability Implications of Artificial Intelligence (Basel, Switzerland: Financial Stability Board, November 14, 2024); and Jon Danielsson and Andreas Uthemann, “How AI Can Undermine Financial Stability,” VoxEU: CEPR, January 22, 2024. Return to text
    21. For some very early examples, see Davide Castelvecchi, “Researchers Built an ‘AI Scientist’—What Can It Do?” Nature, August 30, 2024, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-024-02842-3; Daniil A. Boiko, Robert MacKnight, Ben Kline, and Gabe Gomes, “Autonomous Chemical Research with Large Language Models,” Nature, December 20, 2023, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-023-06792-0; and Helena Kudiabor, “Virtual Lab Powered by ‘AI Scientists’ Super-Charges Biomedical Research,” Nature, December 4, 2024, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-024-01684-3. Return to text
    22. For more on drug discovery and gene therapy, see Betty Zou, “Team Uses AI and Quantum Computing to Target ‘Undruggable’ Cancer Protein,” Phys Org, January 27, 2025; and Mohammad Ghazi Vakili et al., “Quantum-Computing-Enhanced Algorithm Unveils Potential KRAS Inhibitors,” Nature Biotechnology, January 22, 2025, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-024-02526-3. Return to text
    23. See NASA Technology Transfer Program, “Robonaut 2: Hazardous Environments (MSC-TOPS-44)”. Return to text
    24. For more on material sciences innovation, see Andy Extance, “First GPT-4-Powered AI Lab Assistant Independently Directs Key Organic Reactions,” Chemistry World, January 8, 2024, https://www.chemistryworld.com/news/first-gpt-4-powered-ai-lab-assistant-independently-directs-key-organic-reactions/4018723.article; Chenyang Liu, Xi Zhang, Jiahui Chang, You Lyu, Jianan Zhao, and Song Qiu, “Programmable Mechanical Metamaterials: Basic Concepts, Types, Construction Strategies—A Review,” Frontiers, vol. 11 (March 19, 2024); Aidan Toner-Rodgers, “Artificial Intelligence, Scientific Discovery, and Product Innovation,” MIT, November 27, 2024, https://aidantr.github.io/files/AI_innovation.pdf; and Thomas Hayes et al., “Simulating 500 Million Years of Evolution with a Language Model,” Science, January 16, 2025. Return to text
    25. See Tan Sui, “AI Could Help Overcome the Hurdles to Making Nuclear Fusion a Practical Energy Source,” The Conversation, January 29, 2025, https://theconversation.com/ai-could-help-overcome-the-hurdles-to-making-nuclear-fusion-a-practical-energy-source-247608; Jaemin Seo, SangKyeun Kim, Azarakhsh Jalalvand, Rory Conlin, Andrew Rothstein, Joseph Abbate, Keith Erickson, Josiah Wai, Ricardo Shousha, and Egemen Kolemen, “Avoiding Fusion Plasma Tearing Instability with Deep Reinforcement Learning,” Nature, vol. 626, February 21, 2024, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-024-07024-9; and Massimiliano Lupo Pasini, German Samolyuk, Markus Eisenbach, Jong Youl Choi, Junqi Yin, and Ying Yang, “First-Principles Data for Solid Solution Niobium-Tantalum-Vanadium Alloys with Body-Centered-Cubic Structures,” Nature: Scientific Data, vol. 11, no. 907 (August 22, 2024), https://doi.org/10.1038/s41597-024-03720-3. Return to text
    26. Nakia Melecio, “Exploring the Synergy: Quantum Computing and Generative AI at the Intersection of Innovation,” ScaleUp Lab Program, Enterprise Innovation Institute, Georgia Tech. Return to text
    27. For an example on GenAI and quantum computers, see Rahul Rao, “Quantum Computers Can Now Run Powerful AI That Works like the Brain,” Scientific American, April 22, 2024, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/quantum-computers-can-run-powerful-ai-that-works-like-the-brain. For an example about AI and clean energy, see Office of Policy, “How AI Can Help Clean Energy Meet Growing Electricity Demand” (Washington: U.S. Department of Energy, August 16, 2024). For examples of how GenAI is augmenting creativity, see Tojin T. Eapen, Daniel J. Finkenstadt, Josh Folk, and Lokesh Venkataswamy, “How Generative AI Can Augment Human Creativity,” Harvard Business Review (July–August 2023); and Anil R. Doshi and Oliver P. Hauser, “Generative AI Enhances Individual Creativity but Reduces the Collective Diversity of Novel Content,” Science Advances, vol. 10, no. 28 (July 12, 2024). Return to text
    28. See Iñaki Aldasoro, Leonardo Gambacorta, Anton Korinek, Vatsala Shreeti, and Merlin Stein, “Intelligent Financial System: How AI Is Transforming Finance (PDF),” BIS Working Papers No. 1194 (Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements, June 2024); and Sarah Hammer, “From Turing to Trading: How AI Is Revolutionizing Finance,” Finance Centers at the Wharton School, July 10, 2024. Return to text
    29. Large language models may even allow for the creation of synthetic data that allows for enhancing macroeconomic nowcasting and forecasting through economic AI agents that can also help with analyzing macroeconomic trends and contribute to more informed financial decisionmaking. See Anne Lundgaard Hansen, John J. Horton, Sophia Kazinnik, Daniela Puzzello, and Ali Zarifhonarvar, “Simulating the Survey of Professional Forecasters,” SSRN (December 1, 2024), https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5066286. Return to text
    30. Kelly Ng, Brandon Drenon, Tom Gerken, and Marc Cieslak, “DeepSeek: The Chinese AI App That Has the World Talking,” BBC News, February 4, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5yv5976z9po. Return to text
    31. For example, see IBM Newsroom, “Data Suggests Growth in Enterprise Adoption of AI Is Due to Widespread Deployment by Early Adopters, But Barriers Keep 40% in the Exploration and Experimentation Phases,” IBM, January 10, 2024, https://newsroom.ibm.com/2024-01-10-Data-Suggests-Growth-in-Enterprise-Adoption-of-AI-is-Due-to-Widespread-Deployment-by-Early-Adopters; and Jefferies Editorial Team, “Can Startups Outsmart Big Tech in the AI Race?” Jefferies, September 17, 2024, https://www.jefferies.com/insights/boardroom-intelligence/can-startups-outsmart-big-tech-in-the-ai-race. Return to text
    32. If AI agents proliferate in financial transactions, we will also need to be careful about the potential for unintended consequences such as collusion among AI agents. See Winston Wei Dou, Itay Goldstein, and Yan Ji, “AI-Powered Trading, Algorithmic Collusion, and Price Efficiency,” Jacobs Levy Equity Management Center for Quantitative Financial Research Paper, The Wharton School Research Paper, May 30, 2024, https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4452704. Return to text
    33. See Request for Information on the Development of an Artificial Intelligence (AI) Action Plan, 90 Fed. Reg. 9,088 (PDF) (February 6, 2025). Return to text
    34. See Heather Domin, “AI Governance Trends: How Regulation, Collaboration, and Skills Demand Are Shaping the Industry,” World Economic Forum, September 5, 2024. Return to text
    35. For more on bias introduced in models, see Moshe Glickman and Tali Sharot, “How Human–AI Feedback Loops Alter Human Perceptual, Emotional, and Social Judgements,” Nature Human Behavior, December 18, 2024, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-024-02077-2; Saul Asiel Flores, “‘Bias in, Bias out’: Tackling Bias in Medical Artificial Intelligence,” Yale School of Medicine, November 18, 2024; and Adam Zewe, “Researchers Reduce Bias in AI Models While Preserving or Improving Accuracy,” MIT News, December 11, 2024. For governance in central banks, see Claudia Alvarez Toca and Alexandre Tombini, Governance of AI Adoption in Central Banks (PDF) (Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements, January 2025). Return to text
    36. See, e.g., Michael P. Wellman, “Artificial Intelligence in Financial Services (PDF)” (written testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, September 20, 2023). Return to text
    37. See Jon Danielsson and Andreas Uthemann, “AI Financial Crises,” VoxEU: CEPR, July 26, 2024. For more on algorithm collusion, see Wei Dou et al., “AI-Powered Trading, Algorithmic Collusion, and Price Efficiency” (see footnote 33). Return to text

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial News: Banks Prevent Twice as Many Fraudulent Transactions in 2024

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Central Bank of Russia –

    However, cyber fraudsters are not abating their activity. They managed to steal 27.5 billion rubles from bank clients, which is 74% more than in 2023. Last year, the Bank of Russia took a number of measures that improved the quality and speed of interaction between the regulator, banks andlaw enforcement agencies for the exchange of data on fraudulent transactions. Now indatabase The regulator receives information about thefts even if the victim immediately contacts the police without disputing the transaction at his bank.

    In 2024, the Bank of Russia initiated the blocking of almost 172 thousand phone numbers of fraudsters, as well as just over 46 thousand fraudulent websites and pages on social networks.

    Preview photo: Janews / Shutterstock / Fotodom

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    HTTPS: //VVV.KBR.ru/Press/Event/? ID = 23382

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: On holding auctions on February 19, 2025 to place OFZ issues No. 26245RMFS and No. 26247RMFS

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    For bidders

    We inform you that, based on the letter of the Bank of Russia and in accordance with Part I. General Part and Part II. Stock Market Section of the Rules for Conducting Trading on the Stock Market, Deposit Market and Credit Market of Moscow Exchange PJSC, the order establishes the form, time, term and procedure for holding auctions for the placement and trading of the following federal loan bonds:

    1.

    Name of the Issuer Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation
    Name of security federal loan bonds with constant coupon income
    State registration number of the issue 26245RMFS from 08.05.2024
    Date of the auction February 19, 2025
    Information about the placement (trading mode, placement form) The placement of Bonds will be carried out in the Trading Mode “Placement: Auction” by holding an Auction to determine the placement price. BoardId: PACT (Settlements: Ruble)
    Trade code CO26245RMFS9
    ISIN code RO000A108EG6
    Calculation code B01
    Additional conditions of placement The share of non-competitive bids in relation to the total volume of bids submitted by the Bidder may not exceed 90%.
    Trading time Trading hours: bid collection period: 14:30 – 15:00; bid execution period: 15:30 – 18:00.

    2.

    Name of the Issuer Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation
    Name of security federal loan bonds with constant coupon income
    State registration number of the issue 26247RMFS from 08.05.2024
    Date of the auction February 19, 2025
    Information about the placement (trading mode, placement form) The placement of Bonds will be carried out in the Trading Mode “Placement: Auction” by holding an Auction to determine the placement price. BoardId: PACT (Settlements: Ruble)
    Trade code CO26247RMFS5
    ISIN code RO000A108EF8
    Calculation code B01
    Additional conditions of placement The share of non-competitive bids in relation to the total volume of bids submitted by the Bidder may not exceed 90%.
    Trading time Trading hours: bid collection period: 12:00 – 12:30; bid execution period: 13:00 – 18:00.

    Contact information for media 7 (495) 363-3232Pr@moex.kom

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    HTTPS: //VVV. MEEX.K.M.M.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Security: FBI Media Alert: FBI Offers Reward for Los Lunas Bandit in a Black Hoodie Responsible for a Bank Robbery

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News

    The FBI and Los Lunas Police Department are asking for the public’s help to identify a man who robbed U.S. Bank at 2421 Main Street SE, Los Lunas, on Wednesday, February 12, 2025, at approximately 5 p.m.

    Suspect description:

    • Race: Hispanic
    • Height: approximately 5’10”- 6’0”
    • Build: Thin
    • Clothing: Blue Jeans, Black Hoodie, Sunglasses, Face mask, black shoes

    The suspect entered the bank and passed a demand note to the teller, then verbally demanded more money from a second teller. He was observed leaving northbound from the bank.

    The FBI is offering a reward of up to $2,000 for information leading to the arrest and conviction of this suspect. Anyone with information about this robbery is asked to contact the FBI at (505) 889-1300.

    Information about other bank/credit union robbers wanted by the FBI can be found at bankrobbers.fbi.gov. Bank robbery carries a possible prison term of up to 20 years. The use of a gun, other dangerous weapon, toy gun, or hoax bomb device during the commission of a bank robbery can be punishable by a prison term of up to 25 years.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Meet the Council drop-in for business support

    Source: Scotland – City of Edinburgh

    A Meet the Council event will be held on Tuesday 11 March at the Assembly Rooms on George Street between 10:00am and 2:00pm.

    Local businesses are encouraged to register in advance to secure a space to the drop-in, with opportunities throughout the day to meet with key Council teams and hear about opportunities for business growth.

    Offering a single point of access for business support, the event will bring together Council officers from:
    • Building standards
    • Business Gateway
    • Commercial property
    • Cultural events
    • Economic development
    • Edinburgh Convention Bureau
    • Environmental health
    • Film Edinburgh
    • Forever Edinburgh
    • JET (Jobs, Education & Training)
    • Licensing
    • Non-Domestic Rates
    • Parental Employability Support
    • Planning
    • Procurement
    • The Edinburgh Employer Recruitment Incentive
    • The Edinburgh Guarantee
    • Trading standards
    • Visitor Levy

    Throughout the day, external partners will also be on hand to present and share their expertise, including:
    • Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce, an independent membership organisation which supports over 1,000 organisations who employ more than 120,000 staff in the Capital
    • British Business Bank, a government-owned economic bank specialised in helping businesses in the UK access financial support
    • Federation of Small Businesses, a non-profit organisation that helps small businesses and the self-employed
    • Capital City Partnership, the anchor delivery body for Edinburgh’s employability strategy, working together to tackle inequality and poverty
    • Edinburgh Social Enterprise Network, which works to create opportunities for Edinburgh’s Social Enterprise community to develop and thrive
    • Forth Green Freeport, Scotland’s largest opportunity to deliver a just transition to net zero, to attract significant inward investment, to build international trade and export capability, and to create high quality and well paid jobs.

    Councillor Lezley Marion Cameron, Housing, Homelessness and Fair Work Convener, said: 

    Edinburgh continues to have the strongest local economy outside of London and the highest number of registered Living Wage employers in Scotland. The entrepreneurialism, success and resilience of Edinburgh business owners contributes hugely to what makes our City of Edinburgh a unique and special place to live and work.

    We would like to work much more closely with the business community in offering meaningful support, understand more fully the views, concerns and aspirations of business owners and work jointly in securing a vibrant, sustainable, and resilient economic future for Edinburgh.

    We recognise that the current economic climate is challenging, and in working together with businesses and other partners, there is much we can do collectively to grow and sustain Edinburgh’s economy, promote the benefits of Fair Work, and become a fairer city for all. That’s why the Council is hosting this opportunity for businesses to meet us face-to-face and engage with our staff teams across a variety of services which support business.

    Whether you’re looking for advice on funding, navigating licensing, or exploring how we can support employers, this event is an ideal place to connect directly with the right people, who can provide the advice and support you need.

    The Meet the Council event is designed to support Edinburgh’s business community and help foster a thriving, greener, and fairer economy – as outlined in the Council’s Business Plan 2023-27.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Farmer confidence jumps to 10-year high

    Source: Federated Farmers

    Farmer confidence has risen to its highest level in over a decade, rebounding from record lows in recent years.
    Federated Farmers’ latest Farm Confidence Survey shows falling interest rates, rising incomes and more favourable farming rules have all played a major role in that improvement.
    “I’ve definitely noticed a significant shift in the mood of rural New Zealand. Farmers are feeling a lot more positive,” Federated Farmers president Wayne Langford says.
    “The last few years have been bloody tough for a lot of our farming families, with falling incomes, rising interest rates and unpaid bills starting to pile up on the kitchen bench.
    “At the same time, we’ve also been struggling with an incredibly challenging regulatory environment and farming rules that haven’t always been practical, affordable or fair.
    “These survey results paint a clear picture of a sector finally able to breathe a sigh of relief as some of that weight is lifted.”
    The January survey shows farmers’ confidence in current general economic conditions has surged from a deeply negative -66% in July 2024 to a net positive score of 2%.
    This marks the largest one-off improvement since the question was introduced in 2016.
    Meanwhile, a net 23% of farmers now expect better economic conditions over the next year – the highest confidence level since January 2014.
    There has also been a sharp lift in profitability, with 54% of farmers now reporting making a profit – double the number in the last survey six months ago.
    Langford says it’s important to note that, despite confidence being at its highest point in more than a decade, it’s still only just in the positive.
    “It’s been a remarkable recovery in farmer confidence over a short period of time, but I’m very conscious that we were coming off an extremely low base.
    “We’ve come a long way, but there’s a long way to go yet. Federated Farmers will keep pushing hard to cut costs out of farmers’ businesses and reduce some of that regulatory burden.”
    The survey results show regulation and compliance costs remains the greatest concern for farmers, followed by interest rates and banks, and input costs.
    “When it comes to farmer confidence, a lot of it comes down to what’s coming into our bank account, and what’s going out the other side. It’s a simple equation,” Langford says.
    “A lot of that is market driven, and farmers are used to riding those highs and lows, but Government rules and regulations have a significant impact on farmers’ costs.
    “Those compliance costs really can make or break your season and have a significant impact on a farmer’s confidence to keep investing in their business.
    “The Government have made a great start cutting through red tape for farmers and repealing a lot of the most unworkable rules, but there’s still a lot of work to be done.”
    Interest rates and banking issues have consistently been a top concern for farmers, which is why Federated Farmers fought so hard for a banking inquiry, Langford says.
    “Interest payments are a huge cost for most farming businesses and farmers have been under massive pressure from their banks in recent years.
    “We want to see the Government take a much closer look at our banking system and whether farmers are getting a fair deal from their lenders.”
    The survey shows farmers’ highest priorities for the Government are the economy and business environment, fiscal policy, and reducing regulatory burdens.
    “If the Government are serious about their ambitious growth agenda and doubling exports over the next decade, this is where they need to be focusing their energy,” Langford says.
    “For farmers to have the confidence to invest in our businesses, employ more staff, and grow our economy, we need to have confidence in our direction of travel as a nation too.
    “As a country, we’re never going be able to regulate our way to prosperity, but with the right policy settings, we might just be able to farm our way there.”
    The report’s key findings include:
    – General economic conditions (current): Farmer confidence has surged by 68 points since July 2024, rebounding from a deeply negative -66% to a net positive score of 2%. This marks the largest one-off improvement since the question was introduced in 2016.
    – General economic conditions (expectations): Optimism is rising, with net expectations increasing by 29 points since January 2024. A net 23% of farmers now anticipate better conditions over the next year-the highest confidence level seen since January 2014.
    – Farm profitability (current): The number of farmers making a profit has doubled since the last survey, with 54% of farmers now reporting a profit-up from just 27%. The net profitability score has surged by 60 points, the strongest turnaround since July 2022.
    – Farm profitability (expectations): Confidence in future profitability continues to climb, with a net 31% of farmers expecting improvement over the next 12 months-a 41-point increase since July 2024. This is the highest forward-looking profitability score since July 2017.
    – Farm production (expectations): A net 16% of farmers expect production to increase in the next year, extending a positive trend. This marks the first time since 2016/17 that there have been three consecutive periods of predicted growth.
    – Farm spending (expectations): Spending intentions have strengthened, with a net 23% of farmers planning to increase spending over the next 12 months-up 26 points from July 2024. This is the strongest expected rise since January 2023.
    – Farm debt (expectations): 41% of farmers plan to reduce their debt in the next year, up from 23% in July 2024. Lower interest rates, improved confidence, and stronger production forecasts are driving this shift.
    – Ability to recruit (experienced): Hiring challenges persist, with a net 16% of respondents reporting difficulty recruiting skilled staff in the past six months, largely unchanged from July 2024. However, this is the least difficult period for recruitment since July 2012.
    – Greatest concerns (current): The top concerns for farmers remain Regulation & Compliance Costs, Debt, Interest & Banks, and Input Costs.
    – Highest government priorities: Farmers want the Government to prioritise the Economy & Business Environment, Fiscal Policy, and reducing Regulatory Burdens.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News –

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Speech by Tiff Macklem, Governor of the Bank of Canada

    Source: Bank of Canada

    OTTAWA – On Friday, February 21, 2025, Tiff Macklem, Governor of the Bank of Canada, will speak before the Mississauga Board of Trade-Oakville Chamber of Commerce. 

    Topic

    Trade friction, structural change and monetary policy

    Time

    12:45 (Eastern Time)

    Place

    Hilton Meadowvale
    6750 Mississauga Road
    Mississauga, ON L5N 2L3

    Lock-Up

    At 11:00 (ET), journalists are invited to review copies of the speech, under embargo, at the Bank’s head office in Ottawa. Please use the Bank of Canada Museum entrance, located at 30 Bank Street (corner of Bank and Wellington), and bring photo ID.

    For security reasons, journalists wishing to attend must confirm their presence by contacting Media Relations before noon (ET) on Thursday, February 20, 2025. Those who have not registered will not be admitted to the lock-up.

    The embargo will be lifted at 12:30 (ET).

    Distribution

    The Governor’s text will be available on the Bank’s website at 12:30 (ET).

    Media Availability

    At approximately 14:10 (ET), the Governor will hold a press conference in Hazel McCallion D.

    Accredited journalists who wish to participate remotely must contact Media Relations for connection information before noon (ET) on Thursday, February 20, 2025.

    Audience Q&A

    There will be an audience Q&A period.

    Webcast

    Audio and video webcasts of the speech and press conference will be available.

    Note

    Those wishing to attend are asked to contact
    .

    For more information, please contact Media Relations.

    MIL OSI Canada News –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Launch of the RBIDATA Mobile App by RBI

    Source: Reserve Bank of India

    Today, the Reserve Bank of India launched RBIDATA, a Mobile App, that offers macroeconomic and financial statistics relating to the Indian economy in a user-friendly and visually engaging format.

    The key features of the app include:

    • Access to over 11,000 different series of economic data to give a comprehensive view of the Indian economy.

    • Users can view time series data in graphs/charts and download data for analysis.

    • The app includes details such as data source, unit of measurement, frequency, recent updates. Additional notes are also provided to help users understand the graphs/charts better.

    • The ‘Popular Reports’ section features a series of frequently viewed reports.

    • ‘Search’ option allows users to access data directly from home screen, without the need to navigate various sections or publications.

    • The ‘Banking Outlet’ section helps users find banking facilities within 20 km of their location.

    • Users can access data about SAARC countries through the ‘SAARC Finance’ link in the app.

    This app offers quick access to the Database on the Indian Economy (DBIE – https://data.rbi.org.in) portal and aims to serve the researchers, students, and the general public. It is available for both iOS and Android users (version 12 and above). The app also lets users provide feedback to improve its functionality.

    (Puneet Pancholy)  
    Chief General Manager

    Press Release: 2024-2025/2193

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Young Scientist from GUU Became a Laureate of the Moscow Government Prize

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: State University of Management – Official website of the State –

    Maxim Rybachuk, a leading specialist at the Center for Strategic and Innovative Research at the Research Institute of Public Policy and Management of Industrial Economics at the State University of Management, has become a laureate of the Moscow Government Prize for Young Scientists for 2024.

    The Moscow Government Prize Competition for Young Scientists has been held since 2013. Awards are given annually for achieving outstanding results in fundamental and applied scientific research in the field of natural, technical and humanitarian sciences, as well as for the development and implementation of new technologies, equipment, devices, equipment, materials and substances that contribute to improving the efficiency of activities in the real sector of the economy and the social sphere of the capital.

    In total, over 8,000 applications were submitted for the awards during the competition, 1,332 of which were submitted this year. Awards were given to 758 young scientists, 78 of which were submitted this year.

    The award was presented to the laureates by Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin.

    “We have never had so many competition applications – more than 1,300 works were submitted. And choosing you was not an easy task for us either. So these are truly well-deserved awards that you have earned with your talent, skill, and commitment to science. And of course, I hope that these awards are not the last in your life, but only the beginning of your great scientific career,” Sergei Semenovich addressed the young scientists.

    The mayor also announced a decision to double the bonus, which has not been indexed since 2019. The 2024 bonuses are also planned to be recalculated taking into account the increase. At the moment, it is 2 million rubles.

    A young scientist from the State University of Management, Maxim Rybachuk, received the award in the Social Sciences category for a series of nine previously published works on the topic of “Socioeconomic Ecosystems as a Core Component of the Systemic Transformation of the Russian Economy”. In his research, Maxim Aleksandrovich analyzed the landscape of the Russian ecosystem market, defined the criteria for ecosystems, key market players and their industry specifics. He assessed the impact of the development of the ecosystem structure of the economy on Russia’s GDP and put forward a number of recommendations in the field of economic policy to protect market participants from the unconstructive influence of ecosystems. In particular, it was proposed to create a national regulator that would combine functions similar to those of the FAS Russia and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation in relation to the activities of ecosystems, because ecosystems are not subject to antimonopoly legislation.

    We congratulate Maxim Rybachuk on receiving the prestigious award and wish him further success in his scientific work for the benefit of the Russian economy.

    Subscribe to the TG channel “Our GUU” Date of publication: 02/18/2025

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI: Coop Pank extends authorities of Margus Rink as a Member of the Supervisory Board of Coop Liising AS

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Today, on January 18th, 2025, the Coop Pank AS decided to extend the term of office of Mr. Margus Rink, a Member of the Supervisory Board of Coop Liising AS a subsidiaries of Coop Pank AS, for a another 3-years term effective as of the end of his previous term.

    Margus Rink has been the Chairman of the Management Board of Coop Pank AS since 2017. He is also a member of the Supervisory Board of bank’s subsidiaries Coop Liising AS and Coop Kindlustusmaakler AS. Margus Rink is a member of the Council of the Estonian Banking Association and member of the management board of Estonian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Margus Rink obtained a master’s degree in business administration from the Faculty of Economics of the University of Tartu in 2000 and a bachelor’s degree in financial accounting and analysis from the same university in 1994.
    Margus Rink currently owns 806 000 shares in Coop Pank and 7 subordinated bonds of Coop Pank.

    Coop Pank, based on Estonian capital, is one of the five universal banks operating in Estonia. The bank has 209 500 everyday banking customers. Coop Pank uses the synergies between retail and banking and brings everyday banking services close to people’s homes. The majority shareholder of the bank is the domestic retail chain Coop Eesti, whose sales network includes 320 stores.

    Additional information:
    Katre Tatrik
    Communication Manager
    Tel: +372 5151 859
    E-mail: katre.tatrik@cooppank.ee

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Firing civil servants and dismantling government departments is how aspiring strongmen consolidate personal power – lessons from around the globe

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Erica Frantz, Associate Professor of Political Science, Michigan State University

    A leader bent on expanding his own power would see the government’s bureaucracy as a key target. Andry Djumantara – iStock/Getty Images Plus

    With the recent confirmations of Tulsi Gabbard and Robert F. Kennedy Jr. – two of the most controversial of President Donald Trump’s high-level administration nominees – the president’s attempt to remake government as a home for political loyalists continues.

    Soon after coming to office for a second term, Trump aggressively sought to overhaul Washington and bring the federal government in line with his political agenda. He is spearheading an effort to purge the government’s ranks of people he perceived as his opponents and slash the size of long-standing bureaucratic agencies – in some instances dismantling them entirely.

    At the helm of much of this is businessman Elon Musk, who is not only the world’s richest man but also the largest donor of the 2024 election and the owner of multiple businesses that benefit from lucrative government contracts.

    Musk – and a small cohort of young engineers loyal to him but with little experience in government – descended on Washington, announced their control over multiple government agencies, fired career civil servants, and even strong-armed access to government payment systems at the Treasury Department, where the inspector general had just been sacked.

    This unprecedented sequence of events in the U.S. has left many observers in a daze, struggling to make sense of the dramatic reshaping of the bureaucracy under way.

    Yet, as researchers on authoritarian politics, it is no surprise to us that a leader bent on expanding his own power, such as Trump, would see the bureaucracy as a key target. Here’s why.

    Elon Musk, standing next to President Donald Trump, explains his theory concerning government bureaucracy.

    Dismantle democracy from within

    A well-functioning bureaucracy is an organization of highly qualified civil servants who follow established rules to prevent abuses of power. Bureaucracies, in this way, are an important part of democracy that constrain executive behavior.

    For this reason, aspiring strongmen are especially likely to go after them. Whether by shuffling the personnel of agencies, creating new ones, or limiting their capacity for oversight, a common tactic among power-hungry leaders is establishing control over the government’s bureaucracy. Following a failed coup attempt in 2016, for example, Turkish President Reccep Tayyip Erdoğan fired or detained as many as 100,000 government workers.

    In the short term, greater executive control over the bureaucracy gives these leaders a valuable tool for rewarding their elite supporters, especially as diminished government oversight increases opportunities for corruption and the dispersion of rewards to such insiders. Erdoğan, for example, by 2017 had worked to fill lower-level bureaucratic positions with loyalists of his party, the AKP, to ensure the party’s influence over corruption investigations.

    In the long term, this hollowing out and reshaping of the bureaucracy is part of a broader plan in which aspiring autocrats usurp control over all institutions that can constrain them, such as the legislature and the courts. As we document in our book, “The Origins of Elected Strongmen,” attacks on the bureaucracy constitute a significant step in a larger process in which elected leaders dismantle democracy from within.

    Take control of bureaucracy

    The seemingly bizarre series of events that have transpired in Washington since Trump came to power are highly consistent with other countries where democracy has been dismantled.

    Take Benin, for example. Its leader, Patrice Talon – one of the wealthiest people in Africa – came to power in democratic elections in 2016.

    Soon after taking control, Talon created new agencies housed in the executive office and defunded existing ones, as a means of skirting bureaucratic constraints to his rule. The central affairs of the state were in the hands of an informal cabinet, initially led by Olivier Boko, a wealthy businessman considered to be Talon’s right-hand man despite not having any official position in government.

    Talon and his inner circle used this control over the state to enrich themselves, turning the country into what one journalist referred to as “a company in the hands of Talon and his very close clique.”

    Consolidating control over the bureaucracy was just one step in a larger process of turning Benin into an autocratic state. Talon eventually amassed greater power and influence over key state institutions, such as the judiciary, and intervened in the electoral process to ensure his continued rule. By 2021, Benin could no longer be considered a democracy.

    Purge civil service

    A similar dynamic occurred in Hungary. After governing relatively conventionally for one term, Prime Minister Viktor Orban was defeated in elections in 2002. He blamed that outcome on unfriendly media and never accepted the results as legitimate.

    Orban returned to office in 2010, bent on retribution.

    Orban ordered mass firings of civil servants and put allies of his party, Fidesz, in crucial roles. He also used the dismantling of bureaucratic constraints to pad the pockets of the elites whose support he needed to maintain power.

    As a Hungarian former politician wrote in 2016, “While the mafia state derails the bureaucratic administration, it organizes, monopolizes the channels of corruption and keeps them in order.”

    Likewise in Venezuela, President Hugo Chavez had his cronies draw up a blacklist of civil servants to be purged for signing a petition in support of a referendum to determine whether Chávez should be recalled from office in 2004; government employees who signed were subsequently fired from their jobs.

    More than a decade later, Nicolas Maduro, Venezuela’s current leader, would conduct his own purge of civil servants after they signed a petition to hold another recall referendum. After multiple rounds of government and military purges, Maduro was able to overturn an election he lost and jail his opponents, knowing full well the judges and generals would follow his orders.

    Benin’s leader, Patrice Talon, consolidated control over the bureaucracy as part of a larger process of turning the country into an autocratic state.
    Yanick Folly/AFP via Getty Images

    Foster culture of secrecy and suspicion

    Orban and Chavez, like Talon, were democratically elected but went on to undermine democracy.

    In environments where loyalty to the leader is prioritized over all else, and purges can happen at a moment’s notice, few people are willing to speak up about abuses of power or stand in the way of a power grab.

    Fostering a culture of secrecy and mutual suspicion among government officials is intentional and serves the leader’s interests.

    As a World Bank report highlighted in 1983, in President Mobutu Sese Seko’s Zaire, now Democratic Republic of Congo, the bureaucracy had been “privatized by the ruling clique,” creating a climate in which “fear and repression … prevented any serious threat from dissenting groups.”

    When leaders gain full power over the bureaucracy, they use it to reward and punish ordinary citizens as well. This was a tried-and-true tactic under the PRI’s rule in Mexico for much of the 20th century, where citizens who supported the PRI were more likely to receive government benefits.

    In short, when aspiring autocrats come to power, career bureaucrats are a common target, often replaced by unqualified loyalists who would never be hired for the position based on merit. Recent events in the U.S., as unprecedented as they may seem, are precisely what we would expect with the return of Trump, a would-be autocrat, to power.

    Andrea Kendall-Taylor is affiliated with the Center for New American Security.

    Joe Wright has received funding from the Charles Koch Foundation.

    Erica Frantz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Firing civil servants and dismantling government departments is how aspiring strongmen consolidate personal power – lessons from around the globe – https://theconversation.com/firing-civil-servants-and-dismantling-government-departments-is-how-aspiring-strongmen-consolidate-personal-power-lessons-from-around-the-globe-249089

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI: First Bank Welcomes Joe Shearin, President, Greater Richmond Market

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    STRASBURG, Va., Feb. 18, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — First National Corporation (the “Company” or “First National”) (NASDAQ: FXNC), the bank holding company of First Bank (the “Bank”) is pleased to announce the addition of Joe Shearin as President, Greater Richmond Market. Joe will lead First Bank’s strategic efforts across Richmond, Southside Virginia, and northern North Carolina. He will be responsible for community impact and all lines of business banking and business development in the expanded footprint, following the 2024 merger with Touchstone Bank.

    Joe brings over 40 years of banking experience and is retired President and CEO of Sonabank/Southern National Bancorp (formerly EVB/Eastern Virginia Bankshares). During Joe’s tenure as President and CEO of Sonabank, he successfully led the company through major economic conditions, while growing the bank from approximately $500 million in assets to over $3.4 billion when he retired.

    “We are thrilled to have a banker of Joe Shearin’s experience and caliber join our team. He is a proven community leader, and with his banking expertise and knowledge of the greater Richmond and Southside Virginia communities, this is a tremendous win for First Bank,” said Scott C. Harvard, CEO of First National Corporation and First Bank. “We believe banking is a people business, and Joe is a known and trusted advisor to his clients and in the community. His experience clearly aligns with our culture and strategic commitment to growth in the Richmond region and beyond.”

    Joe was appointed in 2023 by Governor Glen Youngkin as the Executive Director of the Small Business Financing Authority (VSBFA). The VSBFA is dedicated to providing essential financing programs that support businesses, not-for-profits, and economic development authorities with the financing necessary for economic growth and expansion throughout the Commonwealth. In addition, Joe is the Founder and CEO of Jamescrest Consulting Group, whose mission is to assist organizations develop strategies to help improve their efficiencies, productivity, and profitability. A graduate, and now trustee, of North Carolina Wesleyan University, Joe has served as board member for Infinex Financial Services, Virginia Bankers Association, and director and previous chairman of Virginia Association of Community Banks. Currently he is director and Chairman of the Board for Community Bankers Bank. Joe is very active in the community, serving with many non-profit organizations.

    “As a long-time Prince George and Richmond area resident, I am excited about the opportunity to lead true community banking here. First Bank understands what is important to our current clients and is eager to share those values with new and existing customers,” Joe stated. “While the banking industry in the Tri-Cities market is competitive, we feel the flexibility and efficiency that First Bank provides are key aspects of how we do business and do it well. Our team is focused on delivering community banking with a personal touch and a commitment to service.”

    Joe and his team stand prepared to meet the banking needs of small businesses, corporations, real estate investors, individuals, municipalities, and non-profits alike.

    Harvard added, “Joe adds to already impressive roster of leadership in our growing Richmond area market. His experience fully aligns with our culture and our focus on positioning First Bank for transformational growth in greater Richmond and beyond. We are excited about the significant contributions he will bring to First Bank.”

    First National Corporation (NASDAQ: FXNC) is the parent company and bank holding company of First Bank, a community bank that first opened for business in 1907 in Strasburg. The Bank offers loan and deposit products and services through its website, www.fbvirginia.com, its mobile banking platform, a network of ATMs located throughout its market area, a loan production office, a customer service center in a retirement community, and thirty-three bank branch office locations located through the Shenandoah Valley, the south-central regions of Virginia, the Roanoke Valley, the Richmond MSA, and in northern North Carolina. In addition to providing traditional banking services, the Bank operates a wealth management division under the name First Bank Wealth Management. First Bank also owns First Bank Financial Services, Inc, which owns an interest in an entity that provides title insurance services.

    CONTACTS

    Scott C. Harvard
    President and CEO
    (540) 465-9121
    sharvard@fbvirginia.com

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/d129ef30-5acb-4c96-b0a0-51f51dc1babc

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: BOBC Auction Results – 18 February 2025

    Source: Bank of Botswana

    The Monetary Policy Rate (MoPR) was unchanged at 1.9 percent of the previous week, for a paper maturing on 26 February 2025. The summarised results of the auction held on 18 February 2025, are attached below:

    BOBC Auction Results – 18 February 2025.pdf

    MIL OSI Economics –