HONG KONG, Feb. 13, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Diginex Limited (“Diginex Limited” or the “Company”), a Cayman Islands-based impact technology company specializing in environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues, today announced the development of new AI functionality which is expected to be built leveraging OpenAI’s platform. The Company anticipates that the deployment of this AI feature will contribute to revenue growth starting in 2025 by enhancing diginexESG‘s value proposition and driving increased customer adoption. The initial focus will be on helping companies comply with sustainability disclosure requirements set by the International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), which are increasingly being mandated for companies involved in global ESG reporting. These features will provide rapid data extraction, improved compliance, and enhanced risk assessment for users of the Company’s ESG SaaS reporting product, diginexESG.
This AI functionality positions diginexESG to capture the growing demand for ESG reporting solutions – a market projected to reach between USD 1.5 billion and USD 4.35 billion by 2027, with an expected CAGR of 15.9% to 30% according to industry research from Verdantix – and is alongside the Company’s recent selection by the Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau (FSTB) of Hong Kong for the Green and Sustainable Fintech PoC program. The FSTB, which oversees financial and treasury policy for the Hong Kong SAR Government, launched this program to support innovative green fintech solutions with measurable environmental and financial impact. This builds on previous recognition where, in December 2023, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, named Diginex as winner of the “Sustainability or Climate-related Disclosure and Reporting” category.
The FSTB launched this program to accelerate the development and commercial adoption of green fintech solutions by technology firms and research institutions. “We are thrilled to receive this endorsement and support from FSTB, which underscores the importance of AI technology in addressing significant challenges within the ESG and sustainability industry,” said Mark Blick, Chief Executive Officer of Diginex Limited. “We will be accelerating our efforts to deliver innovative AI-powered functionality that will support companies with their ESG, Climate and Supply Chain data collection and reporting while improving efficiency and customer experience. We plan to collaborate closely with leading global financial institutions to introduce this new feature to their clients.”
About Diginex Limited
Diginex Limited is a Cayman Islands exempted company incorporated under the laws of the Cayman Islands in 2024, with subsidiaries located in Hong Kong, United Kingdom and United States of America. Diginex Limited conducts operations through its wholly owned subsidiary Diginex Solutions (HK) Limited, a Hong Kong corporation (“DSL”) and DSL is the sole owner of (i) Diginex Services Limited, a corporation formed in the United Kingdom and (ii) Diginex USA LLC, a limited liability company formed in the State of Delaware. DSL commenced operations in 2020, is headquartered in Hong Kong, and is a software company that empowers businesses and governments to streamline ESG, climate, and supply chain data collection and reporting. DSL is an impact technology business that helps organizations to address the some of the most pressing ESG, climate and sustainability issues, utilizing blockchain, machine learning and data analysis technology to lead change and increase transparency in corporate social responsibility and climate action.
Diginex’s products and services solutions enable companies to collect, evaluate and share sustainability data through easy-to-use software. For more information, please visit the Company’s website: https://www.diginex.com/.
Forward-Looking Statements
Certain statements in this announcement are forward-looking statements, including, but not limited to, statements concerning the Company’s product offerings, business strategy, projections and future growth. These forward-looking statements involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties and are based on the Company’s current expectations and projections about future events that the Company believes may affect its financial condition, results of operations, business strategy and financial needs, including the expectation that the Company’s business strategy will be successful. Investors can identify these forward-looking statements by words or phrases such as “approximates,” “believes,” “hopes,” “expects,” “anticipates,” “estimates,” “projects,” “intends,” “plans,” “will,” “would,” “should,” “could,” “may” or other similar expressions. The Company undertakes no obligation to update or revise publicly any forward-looking statements to reflect subsequent occurring events or circumstances, or changes in its expectations, except as may be required by law. Although the Company believes that the expectations expressed in these forward-looking statements are reasonable, it cannot assure you that such expectations will turn out to be correct, and the Company cautions investors that actual results may differ materially from the anticipated results.
For investor and media inquiries, please contact:
Diginex Investor Relations Email:ir@diginex.com
Jackson Lin Lambert by LLYC Phone: +1 (646) 717-4593 Email: jian.lin@llyc.global
Source: United States Small Business Administration
ATLANTA – The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) announced the opening of a Business Recovery Center (BRC) in Bulloch County to assist small businesses and private nonprofit (PNP) organizations who sustained economic losses caused by Tropical Storm Debby and Hurricane Helene.
Beginning Friday, Feb.14, SBA customer service representatives will be on hand at the BRC to answer questions about SBA’s disaster loan program, explain the application process and help individuals complete their application. Walk-ins are accepted, but you can schedule an in-person appointment in advance at appointment.sba.gov. The BRC hours of operation is listed below.
Business Recovery Center (BRC)
Bulloch County
Statesboro-Bulloch County Library
124 S. Main Street
Statesboro, GA 30458
Opening: Friday, Feb. 14, 12 p.m. to 6 p.m.
Hours: Monday – Friday, 9 a.m. to 6 p.m.
Saturday, 9 a.m. to 4 p.m.
Closed: Sunday
The SBA’s Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) program is available to small businesses, small agricultural cooperatives, nurseries, and PNPs that suffered financial losses directly related to these disasters. The SBA is unable to provide disaster loans to agricultural producers, farmers, or ranchers, except for small aquaculture enterprises.
EIDLs are available for working capital needs caused by the disaster and are available even if the business or PNP did not suffer any physical damage. The loans may be used to pay fixed debts, payroll, accounts payable, and other bills that could have been paid had the disaster not occurred.
The loan amount can be up to $2 million with interest rates as low as 4% for small businesses and 3.25% for PNPs, with terms up to 30 years. Interest does not accrue, and payments are not due, until 12 months from the date of the first loan disbursement. The SBA sets loan amount terms based on each applicant’s financial condition.
To apply online and receive additional disaster assistance information visit sba.gov/disaster. Applicants may also call the SBA’s Customer Service Center at (800) 659-2955 or send an email to disastercustomerservice@sba.gov for more information on SBA disaster assistance. For people who are deaf, hard of hearing, or have a speech disability, please dial 7-1-1 to access telecommunications relay services.
The deadlines to return economic injury applications are June 24, 2025, for Tropical Storm Debby and June 30, 2025, for Hurricane Helene.
###
About the U.S. Small Business Administration
The U.S. Small Business Administration helps power the American dream of business ownership. As the only go-to resource and voice for small businesses backed by the strength of the federal government, the SBA empowers entrepreneurs and small business owners with the resources and support they need to start, grow or expand their businesses, or recover from a declared disaster. It delivers services through an extensive network of SBA field offices and partnerships with public and private organizations. To learn more, visit www.sba.gov.
Twenty-two projects around Te Taitokerau are to share $600,000 of Northland Regional Council funding designed to help build climate resilience.
Council Deputy Chair Tui Shortland says during the council’s Long-Term Plan 2024-2034 consultation, the region’s communities had emphasised the importance they placed on council taking a leading role in helping to build that resilience.
That had resulted in the council establishing a $600,000 fund to support communities to prepare for the growing effects of climate change and the natural hazard risks our region faces.
Councillor Shortland says the council had received a huge level of interest from communities across Northland, expressing their ideas and aspirations for a climate resilient future for Te Taitokerau.
“In this first round we had an overwhelming response, with 96 applications requesting $3.2 million.”
Councillor Shortland says deciding how to allocate the $600,000 available had been extremely difficult, but 22 projects that met the fund criteria and aimed to build community capacity and strengthen connections to build community resilience would receive a portion of this pūtea.
“Six of the projects directly focus on building kai resilience for the region.”
“These include on the ground community-led mahi that aims to educate and empower communities to grow their own kai and projects that identify and strengthen food support networks and develop a strategy for how the region can become self-sufficient in food production and distribution.”
Four projects supported water supply investigations to future proof water resilience and water tanks in vulnerable communities. “This extends the water resilience mahi NRC previously supported through the Water Resilience Fund which has now been replaced with this Climate Resilient Communities Fund.”
Three rural marae will receive funding to support the installation of solar panels, improving energy resilience and benefiting the wider community in times of need. Investing in energy security not only keeps the power on when energy infrastructure goes down, but reduces energy costs for our people and importantly helps reduce Te Taitokerau’s greenhouse gas emissions.
Funding will support four projects that look to nature-based solutions to build resilience to the changing climate, recognising how restoring wetlands, river margins and coastal dune systems can enhance protection from weather events, increase carbon sequestration and support our indigenous biodiversity.
Three other projects aim to build resilience across multiple impact areas looking holistically at how our resilience could be improved as the climate changes.
Two planning projects have been funded that will help the respective communities understand how climate change could impact them and to formulate specific plans to reduce these impacts.
Successful applicants and their projects are:
Bream Bay Coastal Care Trust – Bream Bay Coastal Restoration Project ($23,000)
Climate Change Taitokerau Northland Trust – Kai Sovereignty Strategy ($20,000)
Coastal Restoration Trust of New Zealand- Te Taitokerau branch – Te Taitokerau How to restore dunes video ($30,708)
Community Business Environment Centre – Hokinganui a Kai ($40,000)
Hokianga Community Educational Trust – He Kete Kai o Hokianga -Future Proofing our Hokianga Food Systems ($36,786.39)
Matatina Marae Trust – Matatina Kai Whenua – community garden at marae for self sufficiency ($22,476)
Maungarongo Whenua Trust on behalf of Ricco Tito -Taiao Kaitiaki Oranga ō te Waīma ($30,000)
Morehu Marae Committee – Water tank replacement at marae ($7127.66)
Ngaitupoto Trustees Marae – Solar system ($35,000)
Opuawhanga Community Hall Trust – Resilience Network ($10,500)
Oromahoe 18R2B2B2 Trust – Te Wai Ora, Te Whenua Ora: Oromahoe Water Feasibility Study ($25,000)
Pakanae 5A Trust – Cultural and Nature-Based Resilience Programme ($30,000)
Puketawa Marae – Solar Energy for marae resilience ($26,037.49)
Roma Marae – Te Ngao ki te Marae o Roma (Energy Resilience at Roma Marae) ($25,000)
Rural Support Trust Northland – Rural Support Climate Resilience ($40,000)
Te Hapua Sports and Recreation Club – Water Resilience ($6956.52)
Te Kōhanga Reo O Manaakitia – Kia manawaroa Te Kōhanga Reo o Manaakitia ($7200)
Te Maire Whanau Trust – Whānau-Led Fruit Orchard Development ($30,000)
Te Paatu ki Kauhanga Trust Board – Kāmehameha ($40,000)
Te Pokapu Tiaki Taiao O Te Tai Tokerau Trust -Tuituia Te Kahunuku & Food Resiliency ($32,325)
Te Runanga o Ngati Hine Trust – Tanks a lot ($40,000)
Whakapara Marae Trust – Te Taiao o nga Waipukehia” The environment of the flooded waters ($30,000) .
A report into the insurance industry’s response into New Zealand’s largest ever weather events has set out a number of actions to improve responses to future events.
The North Island Weather Events: The Insurance Industry response by the Insurance Council of New Zealand Te Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa (ICNZ) examined insurers performance of claims related to the Auckland Anniversary Weekend floods and Cyclone Gabrielle in early 2023.
“The loss and devastation on families and communities was severe and the insurance industry has worked hard to settle claims and get people back on their feet as quickly as possible,” ICNZ Chief Executive Kris Faafoi said.
The North Island weather events resulted in more than 118,000 claims at an estimated value of $3.8 billion.
Despite the scale and complexity of the weather events, 91% of claims were resolved in 12 months, a rate of progress that surpassed previous major disasters. Within 16 months, 96% were settled.
“The industry response reflects the many people who worked hard every day to help assess and resolve claims and provide certainty for customers, including the additional 1,000 plus staff brought in to help deal with the surge in claims.
“We recognise that some of those affected are still dealing with the impact of these events. The industry is continually looking to improve its response and help customers recover.
“Some of the issues identified are being addressed by insurers. These include refining event response plans, investing in digital tools to manage the claims process more effectively, and improving communications with customers and support for vulnerable customers.
“The lessons learnt from previous major events were a significant factor in the industry’s preparedness and response to the North Island weather events. However, each event is unique, and it takes time for insurers to fully scale up in response to a surge in claims while also supporting their everyday operations.
“The report identifies a number of external factors that had an impact on claims, such as the need for better data sharing among Emergency Management agencies and councils, timely assessments for stickered properties, and access to skilled labour to assess land claims.
“The industry is working closely with the Natural Hazards Commission to identify new approaches to make land claims processes more effective for customers.
“We are also fostering closer relationships with Emergency Management authorities so our sector can get access to information about the scale and impact of events as early as possible to ensure a faster and effective response and recovery.
“More broadly, the insurance sector has called for a cross-sector recovery framework to enhance coordination and improve the response and recovery to natural disasters.
“Insurers have also consistently emphasised the importance of a collective approach to address climate change risks. By supporting climate adaptation – such as avoiding building in dumb places and investing in public infrastructure – we can better prepare New Zealand for future natural disasters,” Kris Faafoi said.
The Ministry of Food Processing Industries (MoFPI) has been implementing Central Sector Umbrella Scheme – PMKSY since 2016-17 to create post-harvest infrastructure and processing facilities to boost the overall development of the food processing sector including reduction in post-harvest losses. The component schemes under PMKSY provide credit linked financial assistance (capital subsidy) in the form of grants-in-aid to entrepreneurs for setting up of food processing/preservation infrastructure which, inter-alia, includes cold storages and refrigerated vehicles to minimize post-harvest losses.
The Ministry of Food Processing Industries has been implementing schemes to boost food processing industries through infrastructure creation, grant of sales based incentives, capacity expansion, and other supporting measures. Under component schemes of PMKSY, as per the Scheme guidelines, consent to operate (CTO) issued by the concerned state Pollution board/Agency in respect of Water and Air, is mandatory for release of instalment of Grant-In-Aid/Subsidy to the approved projects. Further, Project Implementation Agency (PIA) has to comply with the requirements of Cold Chain infrastructure as per the directions of Ministry of Environment, Forest & Climate change, Government of India with respect to use of Non-ODS (Non- Ozone depleting Substances) and low GWP (Low Global Warming Potential) refrigerants-based energy efficient cooling systems.
Under PMKSY component schemes, assistance can also be availed for Renewable/alternate energy technologies (solar, bio-mass, wind, etc.) for the project (Max. eligible permissible cost is Rs. 35 Lakh per project). Eligible entities from across the country may apply and avail the benefits.
National Institute of Food Technology, Entrepreneurship & Management -Thanjavur under Ministry of Food Processing Industries (MoFPI) has made efforts to promote and develop sustainable packaging technology through development of biodegradable plastics, safe and environmental friendly packaging solutions from biopolymers such as poly lactic acid (PLA), starch, nano fibres etc
The Ministry of Food Processing Industries through implementation of PMKSY, helps in creation of modern infrastructure with efficient supply chain management from farm gate to retail outlet across the country. The scheme not only provide a boost to the growth of food processing sector in the country but also helps in, interalia, reducing wastage of agricultural produce, increasing the processing level and enhancing the export of the processed foods.
MoFPI is also implementing a Centrally Sponsored Scheme- PM Formalisation of Micro Food Processing Enterprises Scheme (PMFME) for providing technical, financial and business support for setting up/upgradation of 2 lakh Micro Food Processing Enterprises. Production Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme has been launched by MoFPI for the period 2021-22 to 2026-27 to create global food champions and improving the visibility of Indian food brands abroad.
Besides above, the allied Ministries/Departments and their Agencies such as Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare, Ministry of Fisheries, Animal Husbandry and Dairying, APEDA, MPEDA, etc. also extend enabling support through their respective schemes like Mission for Integrated Development of Horticulture, Agriculture Export Promotion Plan Scheme, National Agriculture Infra Financing Facility, etc.
Steps to help the agri-products and the processed foods export sector include inter- alia financial assistance to exporters by Agricultural and Processed Food Products Export Development Authority (APEDA) under the Scheme of quality control, setting up of in house quality control laboratory and implementation of Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) in processing units, conducting awareness programme on quality assurance and quality management system and training programme on food safety norms, developing packaging for export of various food products and setting up of agri export zones in geographically contiguous areas in different states. In addition. Ministry of Food Processing Industries, under its Plan Scheme, also provides financial assistance to food processing industries for implementation of total quality management including ISO 9000, HACCP etc. and to establish Quality Control Laboratories in the Country
This information was given by the Minister of State for Food Processing Industries Shri Ravneet Singh in a written reply in Lok Sabha today.
Headline: Public Invited to Appeal or Comment on Flood Maps in Freestone County, Texas
Public Invited to Appeal or Comment on Flood Maps in Freestone County, Texas
DENTON, Texas – Preliminary flood risk information and updated Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) are available for review in Freestone County, Texas. Residents and business owners are encouraged to review the latest information to learn about local flood risks and potential future flood insurance requirements.The updated maps were produced in coordination with local, state and FEMA officials. Significant community review of the maps has already taken place, but before the maps become final, community residents can identify any concerns or questions about the information provided and participate in the 90-day appeal and comment periods.The 90-day appeal and comment period will begin on or around Feb. 13, 2025. Appeals and comments may be submitted through May 14, 2025, for:The cities of Fairfield, Oakwood, Streetman and Teague; the towns of Kirvin and Wortham; and the unincorporated areas of Freestone County.Residents may submit an appeal if they consider modeling or data used to create the map to be technically or scientifically incorrect. An appeal must include technical information, such as hydraulic or hydrologic data, to support the claim. Appeals cannot be based on the effects of proposed projects or projects started after the study is in progress.If property owners see incorrect information that does not change the flood hazard information — such as a missing or misspelled road name in the Special Flood Hazard Area or an incorrect corporate boundary — they can submit a written comment.The next step in the mapping process is to resolve all comments and appeals. Once these are resolved, FEMA will notify communities of the effective date of the final maps.To review the preliminary maps or submit appeals and comments, visit your local floodplain administrator (FPA). A FEMA Map Specialist can identify your community FPA. Specialists are available by telephone at 877-FEMA-MAP (877-336-2627) or by email at FEMA-FMIX@fema.dhs.gov.The preliminary maps may also be viewed online:The Flood Map Changes Viewer at http://msc.fema.gov/fmcv FEMA Map Service Center at http://msc.fema.gov/portalThe Base Level Engineering-to-FIRM Viewer at https://webapps.usgs.gov/fema/ble_firmFor more information about the flood maps:Use a live chat service about flood maps at floodmaps.fema.gov/fhm/fmx_main.html (just click on the “Live Chat Open” icon).Contact a FEMA Map Specialist by telephone at 877-FEMA-MAP (877-336-2627) or by email at FEMA-FMIX@fema.dhs.gov.There are cost-saving options available for those newly mapped into a high-risk flood zone. Learn more about your flood insurance options by talking with your insurance agent or visiting floodsmart.gov. alexa.brown Thu, 02/13/2025 – 17:46
Headline: Disaster Recovery Center in Richmond County Closing; Reopening at New Location
Disaster Recovery Center in Richmond County Closing; Reopening at New Location
The Disaster Recovery Center (DRC) in Richmond County will close at its current location at 6 p.m. Friday, Feb. 14. It will reopen at 8 a.m., Tuesday, Feb. 18, and close at 5:30 p.m., Friday, Feb. 28, at a new location.Richmond County DRC (current location)Hub for Community Innovation631 Chafee AvenueAugusta, GA 30904Richmond County DRC (new location)Diamond Lakes Branch Library101 Diamond Lakes WayHephzibah, GA 30815Hours: 8 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. Monday through Friday; closed Saturday and Sunday.All other Disaster Recovery Centers are now closed permanently. However, survivors can meet with FEMA representatives at the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) Business Recovery Centers (BRCs) in Jeff Davis and Bulloch counties at these locations:Jeff Davis CountyJeff Davis County Recreation Department (beginning Feb. 13)83 Buford RdHazlehurst, GA 31539Hours: 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. Monday–Friday; 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. Saturday; closed Sunday.Bulloch County Statesboro-Bulloch County Library (beginning Feb. 18)124 S. Main St.Statesboro, GA 30458Hours: 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. Monday–Friday; 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. Saturday; closed Sunday.The Feb. 7 deadline for Georgia survivors of Tropical Storm Debby (Aug. 4–20) and Hurricane Helene (Sept. 24–Oct. 30) in the 63 counties designated for Individual Assistance to apply for FEMA disaster assistance has now passed. To check on the status of your application, go to DisasterAssistance.gov. You may also use the FEMA App for mobile devices or call toll-free 800-621-3362. The telephone line is open every day and help is available in most languages. You can also contact the Georgia Call Center at 678-547-2861 for assistance with your application or visit an SBA Business Recovery Center or Business Resource Assessment Center. jakia.randolph Thu, 02/13/2025 – 13:18
I am delighted to be here with you today. What better place than Glasgow to discuss the economic impacts of climate change and the green transition! And not just because it played host to the 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference.
Glasgow is also where Adam Smith, the father of modern economics, studied and taught as a professor. Have you ever wondered what he would have thought of climate change? As a famed free-market economist, he might not be the first person you would think of. But even Adam Smith acknowledged that the invisible hand can sometimes lead to suboptimal outcomes.
Climate change is a prime example of this: market prices do not reflect the negative side effects of greenhouse gas emissions. Fortunately, it is now widely acknowledged that governments need to intervene and encourage individuals and companies to reduce their emissions.
Switching to a net-zero emissions economy is a major task. It requires changes in behaviour, innovation and significant investment to rebuild our capital stock. And this transition requires significant financing.
In my speech, I will explore what financing the transition to a greenhouse gas-neutral economy could look like. More specifically, I will focus on two key issues. First, how much investment is needed to achieve greenhouse gas neutrality, and how much of this investment is “additional”? Second, what could the financing mix to fund this investment look like?
I know that answering these questions seems like a tough challenge – a taughy fleece tae scoor. But I will do my best to illustrate my points with clear, practical examples. Along the way, I will discuss electric cars and heating systems to help us understand the issues.
My remarks will focus on the European Union (EU), borrowing some detailed insights from Germany. Unfortunately, these data do not cover the United Kingdom (UK). But I will do my best to infer some insights for the UK as well.
2 How much needs to be invested?
Let me start with the question of how much the EU needs to invest to achieve greenhouse gas neutrality. The EU’s Fit for 55 package aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 per cent by 2030. These reductions are benchmarked against 1990 emission levels. This is an intermediate step towards full greenhouse gas neutrality, for which the EU still needs to pass legislation.
From 2021 to 2030, the European Commission estimates that EU countries need to invest over €1.2 trillion annually.[1] This amounts to nearly 8 per cent of the EU’s GDP. The private sector must take on the bulk of these investments. The investment needs are significantly more than the actual annual investment of €760 billion in the previous decade.
The European Commission defines the difference between the investment required and the actual investment as the “additional” investment need. This additional investment need amounts to €480 billion, or around 3 per cent of GDP.
This definition of “additional” investment is very useful from an accounting perspective. It gives a clear picture of how much more the EU needs to invest to meet its climate goals. However, from a financing perspective, it helps to define additional investment differently.
There are two types of investment needed to achieve greenhouse gas neutrality. The first type is investment that would not happen without the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. A prime example of this type of investment is technology to capture and store carbon dioxide. This technology will play a crucial role in sectors that are difficult to decarbonise. These investments need economic resources and financing beyond what an economy spends just to maintain its capital stock.
The second type is investment where a greenhouse gas-neutral alternative replaces a fossil fuel-based technology. To illustrate this point, imagine two households buying a new car. The Jones family spend €45,000 on a new combustion engine car. From a technical perspective, the Jones family are making a replacement investment. No additional financing is needed. Meanwhile, the Smith family decide to switch from a combustion engine car to an electric vehicle. Let us say a comparable electric car costs €50,000. Of this amount, €45,000 is a replacement investment. Only the remaining €5,000 requires additional financing.
Contrast this with how the European Commission defines additional investment: They subtract the annual average value of electric cars bought in the past from the value of electric vehicles needed to meet the EU’s intermediate greenhouse gas reduction goals. Past registrations of electric vehicles fell significantly short of what is needed. Accordingly, the additional investments, as defined by the European Commission’s accounting perspective, are presumably much higher than the additional financing needs.
How great could the additional financing needs be? While we do not yet have specific figures for the EU, there are some numbers for Germany. A recent study estimates that Germany needs to invest around €390 billion annually from 2021 to 2030 to reduce emissions by 65 per cent compared to 1990.[2] They measure this absolute sum in 2020 prices. Relative to GDP, the investment amounts to 11 per cent.
This is fairly close to the 8 per cent investment needs calculated by the European Commission for the EU.[3] However, only around 30 per cent of this investment requires additional financing. In absolute terms, this amounts to about €120 billion.
Let me pause for a moment to summarise the two key takeaways from my remarks so far. First, the transition to greenhouse gas neutrality calls for significant investment. However, in many cases, we are replacing fossil-based technologies with greenhouse gas-neutral alternatives. Accordingly, the additional financing needs are much smaller and seem manageable.
Second, we can minimise the additional financing needs by replacing already largely depreciated capital stock. By contrast, replacing relatively new capital stock that has barely depreciated would increase the economic and financial costs. Let me illustrate this point with a brief anecdote.
On 1 January 2024, the German government introduced a new law governing heating systems. In German, it is known by the beautiful name “Gebäudeenergiegesetz”. This law mandates that heating systems use around two-thirds renewable energy. In anticipation of this new law, many households replaced their old gas heating systems with new ones. These heating systems can run for around 25 years, so they depreciate over a long period.
Bad luck if you just installed a new gas heating system and live in the German city of Mannheim. Here, the local gas provider has said it intends to stop its services in 2035. This means that a long-term investment will become unviable when little more than half of it has depreciated: A waste of both financial and economic resources.
This anecdote highlights one key point: to avoid wasting money, we need a clear and reliable path to greenhouse gas neutrality. With a clear path mapped out, people can confidently invest in the transition.
3 What could the financing mix look like?
Now, let us explore what the potential financing mix could look like. To achieve a greenhouse gas-neutral economy, households, firms and the public sector all need to invest. They can fund these investments using both internal and external sources.
As the name would suggest, internal financing comes from within. Like the Smith family putting aside some of their income to pay for their new car. Or think of a firm that sells its products and saves some of the profits. That is internal financing, too. External financing, on the other hand, comes from outside sources such as banks or investors.
Regarding their financing mix, households, non-financial firms and the public sector differ considerably. Households tend to save significantly and mainly use bank loans as a source of external finance. The public sector, on the other hand, raises most of its funds from external sources by issuing debt securities. Only firms have a more diversified financing mix. Equity and bank loans play prominent roles here. Note that these observations hold for the EU, the UK and Germany alike.
So, what might the financing mix for the transition to a greenhouse gas-neutral economy look like? To estimate these figures, we need two key components: First, the respective shares of households, firms and the public sector in total investment. According to rough estimates by Bundesbank staff for Germany, households might have to cover about one-third of the investment, the public sector around 20 per cent, and firms just under half.[4]
Second, estimates for the future financing structure of the sectors. We assume that future financing structures will remain unchanged from today.[5] This implies that past financing structures are suitable for future climate investment. If this were not the case, perhaps due to the need for innovative financing instruments, the financing structure may differ.
What result do we get when we combine the two components? For Germany, we estimate that about 20 per cent of the financing mix could come from internal financing, primarily household savings. In terms of external financing, bank loans might play the largest role. They account for over one-quarter of the estimated financing mix. Households in particular obtain almost all their external financing from banks.
The second-largest external financing source could be debt securities, accounting for around 20 per cent. The public sector plays a prominent role here, with funding coming almost exclusively from bonds. Finally, the third-largest external financing source could be equity financing, comprising around one-sixth. Firms are the only users of this financing source, as households and the public sector do not issue equity. Different instruments, like loans from non-bank financial intermediaries, might cover the final sixth of the overall investment needs.
So, what does this mean for the EU and the UK? Can the findings for Germany be generalised? Fortunately, the financing structures of households, firms and governments are largely comparable across these regions.[6] Therefore, one of the two components in the calculations is roughly equal.
The second component – the sectoral investment needs – is less certain. I am not aware of any studies for the EU or the UK that divide the investment needs across households, firms and the public sector.[7] Without a better alternative, the findings for Germany may provide a reasonable initial estimate for both the EU and the UK.
4 Concluding remarks
Let me summarise and conclude. I have three main takeaways to share.
First, “additional” investment needs to become greenhouse gas-neutral can also be defined from a financing perspective. In many cases, we are replacing fossil fuel-based technologies with greenhouse gas-neutral alternatives. And this requires additional financing only if greenhouse gas-neutral technologies are more expensive or if the capital stock being replaced is not yet fully depreciated. The additional financing needs are significantly smaller than the total investment required. Accordingly, I am confident that our financial system can mobilise the necessary financing.
Second, banks may play a larger role in financing the climate transition than is commonly anticipated. The main reason for this conclusion is that a substantial portion of climate investments falls on households. They need to make their homes more energy-efficient and replace fossil-fuelled heating systems with greenhouse gas-neutral alternatives. And households simply do not have many viable alternatives to bank loans.
Accordingly, a robust banking system is essential for achieving greenhouse gas neutrality. That is why we at the Bundesbank are committed to completing the European banking union. However, we also need to improve access to alternative financing sources. Non-financial firms, in particular, would greatly benefit from better capital market financing. That is why we at the Bundesbank are dedicated to creating a European capital markets union.
Third, legislators can minimise the additional financing needs by ensuring that the path to greenhouse gas neutrality is planned stringently and for the long term. Why? Because it provides incentives to avoid investments in fossil fuel technologies that may not be fully depreciated before they become non-viable.
Footnotes:
See European Commission (2023), Investment needs assessment and funding availabilities to strengthen EU’s Net-Zero technology manufacturing capacity, SWD (2023) 68 final.
Kemmler et al. (2024), Klimaschutzinvestitionen für die Transformation des Energiesystems, Prognos. This study is only available in German.
One reason why Germany’s investment needs relative to GDP are higher than the EU’s is that Germany intends to achieve greenhouse gas neutrality sooner (in 2045 rather than 2050).
The estimates are based on the public sector shares provided in Brand and Römer (2022), Öffentliche Investitionsbedarfe zur Erreichung der Klimaneutralität in Deutschland, KfW Research – Fokus Volkswirtschaft, Nr. 395 and various plausibility assumptions. The analysis assumes that the public sector’s involvement in industry and the residential investment sector is minimal or non-existent. This is because the analysis looks at financing flows before any government support, such as subsidies.
More precisely, the financing structure is derived from the average internal and external financing flows over the period 2018 to 2022. This averaging smooths out short-term fluctuations and centres on the reference year of 2020 used in the Kemmler et al (2024) study. Internal financing enters the calculation on a net basis, assuming that the depreciation inflows finance the replacement investments.
In the EU and UK, households rely slightly less on bank loans than in Germany, but the share is still high. In the public sector, Germany has a significantly higher share of debt security financing, particularly compared to the EU. In the UK, non-financial firms have a significantly lower share of equity financing and a higher share of (bank) loans compared to Germany. In contrast, in the EU, non-financial firms have a slightly higher share of equity financing and a smaller share of (bank) loans compared to Germany. All figures are based on average financial flows from 2018 to 2022.
European Commission, op. cit., estimates that, in the EU, the public sector could account for 17 to 20 per cent of total investment. However, it does not clarify how this investment will be split between households and firms. For the UK, HM Government (2023), Mobilising Green Investment – 2023 Green Finance Strategy, mentions that most investment must come from the private sector. However, it likewise does not provide any details on how this investment will be split between households and firms.
Source: United States Senator for Louisiana Bill Cassidy
WASHINGTON – U.S. Senators Bill Cassidy, M.D. (R-LA) and Cory Booker (D-NJ) introduced the Flood Insurance Affordability Tax Credit Act to give low- and middle-income households enrolled in the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) a 33 percent refundable tax credit to combat rising flood insurance premiums. FEMA’s risk assessment program, Risk Rating 2.0, has caused flood insurance premiums to skyrocket, leaving many Americans vulnerable, including thousands of Louisianans who have been forced to drop their policies.
“While we work to fix the broken National Flood Insurance Program, this tax credit provides relief to current policyholders struggling with skyrocketing premiums. It also provides a path for others to re-enroll in the program,” said Dr. Cassidy. “We must give Americans the ability to protect their families and homes.”
“Flood insurance is a critical safety net for families, but costs are going up and it’s harder and harder to afford,” said Senator Booker. “This bipartisan legislation will provide much needed relief by offering a tax credit to help people across the nation, particularly in New Jersey, who are struggling to keep up with rising flood insurance premiums. Protecting your family and your home shouldn’t be a luxury, and this bill is an important step toward making flood insurance more affordable for all Americans.”
The Flood Insurance Affordability Tax Credit Act will also direct the U.S. Treasury Secretary to establish a program where premiums can be paid in advance on behalf of taxpayers when premiums are due, benefitting families when they need it most.
Background
In 2024, Cassidy has delivered a series of speeches on the U.S. Senate floor calling for action on NFIP. Most recently, he highlighted the need for the Flood Insurance Affordability Tax Credit on the Senate floor.
In October 2024, Cassidy released a report outlining the current state of the NFIP and the issues that have led to skyrocketing premiums for millions of homeowners.
In January 2024, the U.S. Senate Banking Committee held a hearing on NFIP at the request of Cassidy. The hearing highlighted the urgent need for Congress to act and featured a Louisiana witness. Cassidy also participated in a roundtable hosted by GNO, Inc. and the Coalition for Sustainable Flood Insurance before introducing the bill to hear from community leaders and advocates on the issue.
Cassidy traveled St. Bernard Parish in 2023 to talk with residents about their flood insurance premiums, recording the second episode of his series Bill on the Hill.
Co-signed initiative to spur funding for wind energy sector in the European Union, supporting transition to net zero and boosting innovation of Europe’s renewable energy manufacturers
Up to €8 billion of new wind energy investments in real economy thanks to leverage effect of EIB counter-guarantee and BNP Paribas’ portfolio of bank guarantees
This deal between EIB and BNP Paribas is part of the EIB’s contribution to the European Wind Power Package. The operation is backed by InvestEU, the EU programme aiming to mobilise investment of more than €372 billion by 2027.
BNP Paribas has signed an agreement with the European Investment Bank (EIB) that will stimulate up to €8 billion of funding for wind energy projects across the European Union. This initiative will unlock key investments to support new wind farm projects, supply chain efficiency and improved grid interconnections, therefore accelerating wind energy development and ultimately increasing production.
Under the agreement, the EIB has extended a €500 million counter-guarantee, enabling BNP Paribas, to establish a €1 billion portfolio of bank guarantees designed to back new investments in wind farms in the EU. The leverage effect of such a counter-guarantee is expected to spur up to €8 billion of investments in the real economy.
The agreement falls under a €5 billion initiative announced by the EIB in support of the European Wind Power Package presented by the European Commission in October 2023. The initiative aims at accelerating wind energy deployment and strengthening the competitiveness of Europe’s wind industry. The programme aims to support the production of 32 GW of the 117 GW of wind capacity needed to enable the European Union to meet its goal of generating at least 45% of its energy from renewable sources by 2030.This transaction is part of BNP Paribas’ long-standing commitment to supporting the energy transition by directing its financing towards low-carbon energy, which will account for at least 90% of the bank’s energy production financing by 2030.
Supporting renewable energy is key to European energy independence, saysEIB Vice-President Ambroise Fayolle. “Guarantees, like the ones EIB provides through this new financial instrument, contribute to enable the funding of essential projects that drive the green transition, support the decarbonization of the European economy, and strengthen industrial competitiveness.
“BNP Paribas is pleased to reinforce our historic relationship with the European Investment Bank, this time to support the continent’s growing wind energy sector,”saysAlain Papiasse, Chairman of Corporate and Institutional Banking at BNP Paribas “This partnership reflects our mutual commitment to advancing sustainable energy projects that strengthen the continent’s economy while reducing its carbon footprint. By uniting our expertise and resources with the EIB’s pivotal support, we hope to help drive lasting, positive projects for communities, businesses and the environment.
Yannick Jung,Head of Global Banking at BNP Paribas stated “We see the EIB’s invaluable support in this partnership as a way of accelerating our ongoing strategy to facilitate the transition to a Low Carbon Economic Model. By supporting European Corporates along the Wind Value Chain, we believe our collective efforts will inspire innovation, foster sustainability and pave the way for a more robust Europe”.
Background information
About the EIB
The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. It finances investments that contribute to EU policy objectives by bolstering digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, agriculture and bioeconomy, social infrastructure, high-impact investments outside the EU, and the Capital Markets Union.
The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund (EIF), signed nearly €89 billion in new financing for over 900 projects in 2024. These commitments are expected to mobilise around €350 billion in investment, supporting 400 000 companies and 5.8 million jobs.
All projects financed by the EIB Group are in line with the Paris Climate Accord and the EIB Group does not fund investments in fossil fuels. Almost 60% of the EIB Group’s annual financing supports projects directly contributing to climate change mitigation, adaptation, and a healthier environment.
In 2024, France was the largest recipient of EIB Group financing, with total investment of €12.6 billion. Two-thirds of this financing went to projects contributing to the fight against global warming and adaptation to its effects.
About BNP Paribas
BNP Paribas is the European Union’s leading bank and key player in international banking. It operates in 63 countries and has nearly 183,000 employees, including more than 145,000 in Europe. The Group has key positions in its three main fields of activity: Commercial, Personal Banking & Services for the Group’s commercial & personal banking and several specialised businesses including BNP Paribas Personal Finance and Arval; Investment & Protection Services for savings, investment and protection solutions; and Corporate & Institutional Banking, focused on corporate and institutional clients. Based on its strong diversified and integrated model, the Group helps all its clients (individuals, community associations, entrepreneurs, SMEs, corporates and institutional clients) to realise their projects through solutions spanning financing, investment, savings and protection insurance. In Europe, BNP Paribas has four domestic markets: Belgium, France, Italy and Luxembourg. The Group is rolling out its integrated commercial & personal banking model across several Mediterranean countries, Turkey, and Eastern Europe. As a key player in international banking, the Group has leading platforms and business lines in Europe, a strong presence in the Americas as well as a solid and fast-growing business in Asia-Pacific. BNP Paribas has implemented a Corporate Social Responsibility approach in all its activities, enabling it to contribute to the construction of a sustainable future, while ensuring the Group’s performance and stability.
About InvestEU and the wind power package
The InvestEU programme provides the European Union with long-term funding by leveraging substantial private and public funds in support of a sustainable recovery. It also helps mobilise private investment for the European Union’s strategic priorities such as the European Green Deal and the digital transition. InvestEU brings all EU financial instruments previously available for supporting investments within the European Union together under one roof, making funding for investment projects in Europe simpler, more efficient and more flexible. The programme consists of three components: the InvestEU Fund, the InvestEU Advisory Hub, and the InvestEU Portal. The InvestEU Fund is deployed through implementing partners that will invest in projects using the EU budget guarantee of €26.2 billion. The entire budget guarantee will back the investment projects of the implementing partners, increase their risk-bearing capacity and thus mobilise at least €372 billion in additional investment.
The European Commission presented the European Wind Power Package in October 2023 to tackle the unique set of challenges faced by the wind sector, including insufficient and uncertain demand, slow and complex permitting, lack of access to raw materials and high inflation and commodity prices, among others. In a specific Action Plan, the Commission set out a set of initiatives concerning permitting, auction design, skills and access to finance to ensure that the clean energy transition goes hand-in-hand with industrial competitiveness and that wind power continues to be a European success story. As part of this plan, in July 2024, the European Investment Bank (EIB) activated a €5 billion initiative to support manufacturers of wind-energy equipment in Europe.
Question for written answer E-000543/2025 to the Commission Rule 144 Cristina Guarda (Verts/ALE)
The Friuli-Venezia Giulia Region recently approved[1] a preliminary policy paper concerning the project to form an inline flood retention basin by building an inline weir with vertical sluice gates upstream of the Dignano bridge [‘Costruzione di una traversa laminante, con luci mobili a paratoie piane, adiacente al ponte di Dignano per la creazione di un bacino di espansione in linea, in alveo attivo’][2].
As part of an appeal to preserve the River Tagliamento, the international scientific community[3] has highlighted that the planned works would violate a number of European regulations and EU environmental directives[4] and that the weir would be built on a Site of Community Importance[5] and across a river that is classified under Directive 2000/60/EC as a body of water of high ecological status[6]. Further shortcomings have been flagged by the Italian Institute for Environmental Protection and Research (ISPRA) and a number of associations[7] and activist groups[8].
Because climate change is a factor, the effective mitigation of hydrogeological risks requires an exhaustive analysis of all alternative proposals which, in addition to actively involving local communities, should also evaluate all potential benefits and drawbacks, not just flood risk.
Despite claims to the contrary, the Region’s project would not eliminate the flood risk in the Middle and Lower Tagliamento but only mitigate it, thus putting the planned works on a par with a number of alternative proposals that have not been given due consideration.
In the light of the above,
1.Will the Commission verify whether the Friuli-Venezia Giulia Region’s project complies with EU law?
2.What is the Commission planning to do to protect the Tagliamento?
Submitted: 5.2.2025
[1] Decision No 530 of 11 April 2024 of the Friuli-Venezia Giulia Region.
[2] The works will be carried out as part of the Eastern Alps River Basin Authority’s Flood Risk Management Plan.
[3] Coordinated by the Italian Centre for River Restoration (CIRF), this appeal was signed by over 800 researchers hailing from 35 countries https://www.freetagliamento.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Tagliamento_petition_26Oct24_EN_rev.pdf
[4] They include the Water, Birds and Habitat Directives (Directives 2000/60/EC, 2009/147/EC and 92/43/EEC respectively), the Nature Restoration Law and the Alpine Convention.
[7] They include ‘Assieme per il Tagliamento’ [‘All together for the Tagliamento’], whose petition against altering the river’s morphology has gathered 13 750 signatures.
Union Minister Dr. Jitendra Singh Highlights in Rajya Sabha India’s robust disaster preparedness including earthquake preparedness as well as disaster management strategies Gujarat Disaster Management Committee was the first of its kind to be established when Sh Narendra Modi was the Chief Minister and subsequently, inspired by this, in 2005, the National Disaster Management Committee came into existence
Posted On: 13 FEB 2025 7:47PM by PIB Delhi
Union Minister Dr. Jitendra Singh, while responding to questions in the Rajya Sabha, outlined India’s robust disaster preparedness including earthquake preparedness as well as disaster management strategies. He emphasized the significant progress made over the years in strengthening the nation’s resilience to seismic activities, particularly in high-risk regions like Gujarat, Uttarakhand, and the Himalayan belt.
Dr. Jitendra Singh highlighted that following the Gujarat earthquakes, the Gujarat Disaster Management Committee was the first of its kind to be established when Sh Narendra Modi was the Chief Minister and subsequently, inspired by this, in 2005, the National Disaster Management Committee came into existence. The Institute of Seismological Research was first established in Gujarat by Narendra Modi as CM and later as PM he also set up the National Centre of Seismology, reinforcing the country’s scientific approach towards earthquake preparedness.
The Minister informed the House that in the last decade, seismic observatories have increased significantly. In 2014, there were only 80 observatories, whereas today, their number has grown to 168. This expansion surpasses the progress made in the previous 70 years, ensuring better monitoring and response capabilities.
In earthquake-prone areas like Kutch, Bhuj, Uttarakhand, and the Himalayan belt, significant preventive measures have been adopted. Dr. Jitendra Singh recalled that in 2016, Prime Minister Narendra Modi proposed a 10-point agenda for disaster risk reduction, aligning with the Vision Document 2047, which envisions an earthquake-resilient India. Regular mock exercises are conducted as part of the preventive strategy.
Retrofitting of structures has been a major focus post-Bhuj and Kutch earthquakes. Recognizing that nearly 59-60% of India’s geographical area is prone to earthquakes, building code compliance has been strictly enforced. Old buildings are being retrofitted and strengthened to withstand seismic events. Notably, AIIMS New Delhi and Bhuj hospitals were among the first institutions included in the restructuring plan. Moving forward, schools and other sensitive infrastructure will also be integrated into the retrofitting initiative. Financial grants have been sanctioned to support these efforts.
For the Himalayan region, which is highly vulnerable to earthquakes, early warning systems and a well-defined disaster response framework have been established. Public awareness campaigns have also been a priority. Dr. Jitendra Singh mentioned initiatives such as ‘Aapda Ka Samna’ on Doordarshan, mock drills, and the ‘Homeowners Guide for Earthquake and Cyclone Safety,’ which provides citizens with essential safety measures. Additionally, in 2021, simplified earthquake safety guidelines were introduced, offering comprehensive specifications for statistical and building infrastructure safety under the Building Code of India.
Regarding Northeast India’s earthquake preparedness, Dr. Jitendra Singh affirmed that it remains a top priority. Several observatories have been installed to monitor seismic activities of magnitude 3.0 and above. Over the past few years, special attention has been given to strengthening disaster resilience in the region. He also underscored that most of the missions and schemes launched in the first 100 days of the Modi Government 3.0 either focus on the Northeast or emphasize technological advancements. Notable initiatives include ‘Mission Mausam’ under the Ministry of Earth Sciences, a semiconductor development mission, and a ₹1,000 crore allocation for space startups. The Minister also noted that Prime Minister Modi has visited the Northeast nearly 70 times in the last decade, demonstrating the government’s commitment to the region’s development.
Addressing the issue of infrastructure insurance against earthquake-induced damage, Dr. Jitendra Singh informed the Rajya Sabha about the ‘Risk Transfer Mechanism’. This mechanism assesses disaster-related damages and ensures the provision of insurance coverage. He stressed that comprehensive guidelines have been established, and it is the responsibility of relevant agencies to ensure strict adherence to these protocols.
The Minister reiterated the government’s commitment to enhancing disaster preparedness and resilience across India, leveraging advanced technology, public awareness, and proactive policy measures to mitigate earthquake risks effectively.
Headline: Joseph Hiatt Named First Superintendent of Yellow Mountain State Natural Area
Joseph Hiatt Named First Superintendent of Yellow Mountain State Natural Area jejohnson6
Joseph Hiatt has been promoted to park superintendent of Yellow Mountain State Natural Area in Avery and Mitchell counties, the N.C. Division of Parks and Recreation announced. Hiatt is serving as the first park superintendent of the state natural area, which was previously managed by staff at Grandfather Mountain State Park.
A park superintendent oversees operations and administration at a park and has a wide range of responsibilities that include staffing, law enforcement, planning, resource management, education, and visitor services. At a state natural area transitioning from being managed by another state park, priorities will be hiring staff, monitoring accesses, marking boundaries, and overseeing natural resource projects and conservation efforts.
Hiatt is being promoted from a ranger position at Chimney Rock State Park. A native of Greensboro, he attended the University of North Carolina at Greensboro and received a bachelor’s degree in parks and recreation management. He worked for the Greensboro Parks and Recreation Department while in college and later also worked in maintenance for Forsyth County Parks and Recreation Department’s Triad Park.
Hiatt began his career with the division as an environmental education instructor at Haw River State Park, taking a break in between seasons to hike the entire Appalachian Trail. In 2016, he joined Dismal Swamp State Park as a park ranger, before heading out west to Chimney Rock. After a few years there, he was promoted to lead natural resource ranger at the park. Hiatt holds a pesticide applicator license and an intermediate law enforcement certificate. He is also currently serving as the chair of the division’s interpretation and education council.
“We are thrilled to have a park superintendent at Yellow Mountain State Natural Area, which at nearly 4,000 acres is one of the larger units in the state parks system,” said Deputy Director of Operations Kathy Capps. “Joe’s dedication to natural resource management, education, and law enforcement has been evident in his many years of service for State Parks. We look forward to him taking on the challenge of shaping the future of Yellow Mountain.”
Yellow Mountain State Natural Area comprises three land parcels spanning two counties and 3,805 acres of mountain landscape near the Tennessee border. Part of the Roan Mountain highlands, it is one of the most biologically diverse areas in the southern Appalachians, home to many rare and endangered species, including the golden-winged warbler. Though the state natural area is named after Big Yellow and Little Yellow mountains, it includes a number of high-elevation heath balds and mountain peaks.
The state natural area has been open under the management of Grandfather Mountain State Park but has sustained significant damage due to Hurricane Helene. It does not have public facilities, but the division is working on repairing the existing storm-damaged roads and assessing the landscape for potential passive recreation opportunities.
About North Carolina State Parks North Carolina State Parks manages more than 264,000 acres of iconic landscape within North Carolina’s state parks, state recreation areas and state natural areas. It administers the N.C. Parks and Recreation Trust Fund, including its local grants program, as well as a state trails program, North Carolina Natural and Scenic Rivers and more, all with a mission dedicated to conservation, recreation and education. The state parks system welcomes more than 19 million visitors annually.
About the North Carolina Department of Natural and Cultural Resources The N.C. Department of Natural and Cultural Resources (DNCR) manages, promotes, and enhances the things that people love about North Carolina – its diverse arts and culture, rich history, and spectacular natural areas. Through its programs, the department enhances education, stimulates economic development, improves public health, expands accessibility, and strengthens community resiliency.
The department manages over 100 locations across the state, including 27 historic sites, seven history museums, two art museums, five science museums, four aquariums, 35 state parks, four recreation areas, dozens of state trails and natural areas, the North Carolina Zoo, the State Library, the State Archives, the N.C. Arts Council, the African American Heritage Commission, the American Indian Heritage Commission, the State Historic Preservation Office, the Office of State Archaeology, the Highway Historical Markers program, the N.C. Land and Water Fund, and the Natural Heritage Program. For more information, please visit www.dncr.nc.gov.
Finding a home that stays cool in this heat is a real challenge. Homebuyers and renters face two problems: a shortage of heat-resistant homes, and a lack of reliable, independent information about how homes perform in the heat.
So, how can you avoid buying or renting a “hot box”? Here’s a handy list of 12 features to check next time you’re searching for a place to live.
Ask these 4 questions before you inspect
1. Does the house have insulation? Ceiling, wall and underfloor insulation seals the indoor environment, slowing or preventing heat from leaking in or out.
2. Does it have double-glazed windows?Insulated glass, made from two or more window panes with a space in between, keeps heat out in summer and inside during winter.
3. How big is the house? Australian homes are among the largest in the world. Cooling a large home with air conditioning can be costly. Check the floor plan to see if you can shut doors and close off internal spaces, so you only cool the parts you need during hot spells.
4. Has the house had an energy and thermal performance assessment? The Residential Efficiency Scorecard is delivered by the Victorian government on behalf of all Australian governments. The report, undertaken by an accredited assessor, rates a home’s energy use and comfort, and recommends improvements. Other assessments also exist.
Look for these 8 things during an inspection
1. Check the colour and nature of external walls, roof and surrounding surfaces.Dark-coloured roofs or walls, and other hard surfaces such as concrete, absorb more heat. This heat builds up during the day and radiates out at night, causing what’s known as the heat island effect.
2. Look at internal floors and surfaces. Brick walls or concrete surfaces inside can be a good thing, if the hot weather doesn’t last too long. That’s because the home will take longer to heat up. But these heavy materials will also take longer to cool down once the heatwave is over. Good ventilation may compensate for that.
3. Consider the size and position of windows and doors. Openings on each side of rooms and the house as a whole allows cooling through natural ventilation. You can open up the house and let the cool air flow from one side to the other during the night, or once the cool change comes. Security doors and fly screens will keep insects and potential intruders out.
4. Is there external shading, such as blinds or greenery? Ensuring windows and walls are shaded on the outside is the best way to keep the heat out, particularly on the west-facing side. Large unshaded glass windows facing north and west can cause the home to heat up in summer. Vertical blinds work well on west-facing windows. On the north side, horizontal shading such as a pergola blocks out the sun in summer – when it is higher in the sky. It also lets the sun in during winter when the sun is lower in the sky, to gently warm the home.
5. Check for ceiling fans. Ceiling fans cool a home and use little energy. Check how many are installed and where they are located. Ceiling fans are ideal in living spaces, but also work well in bedrooms to help you stay comfortable on hot nights.
Ceiling fans can make you feel cooler without costing a lot of money. Artazum, Shutterstock
6. Investigate the air-con. If the house has air-conditioning, ask about its age, and look up its energy rating on energyrating.gov.au.
7. Consider garden spaces. Plants and trees can creating a “microclimate” around your home, keeping it cool. Also look at the landscape beyond the property – a tree-lined street can reduce temperatures and improve thermal comfort during a heatwave.
8. Note the position of the afternoon sun. Visit potential homes during the mid-late afternoon or check the sun’s path through the home – perhaps using a sun tracking app. If air conditioners are turned on, consider what this might mean for energy bills. What would the home feel like without it? Are there other ways to keep the building cool?
Most Australian homes perform poorly when it comes to maintaining a comfortable temperature range indoors. This is particularly true for those built before the 1990s, when minimum energy performance standards were introduced. But these standards set a low bar compared with those overseas.
This, coupled with the absence of requirements for landlords or sellers (except in the ACT) to have the home assessed or declare a rating, means buyers and renters are left in the dark when it comes to making informed choices.
Renters and lower-income households are at greatest risk of living in a home that is too hot or too cold. The private rental stock in Australia is among the poorest, most uncomfortable housing in the Western world.
While the ACT has introduced minimum energy efficiency standards for rental properties, standards across the country contain few provisions that promise improved thermal comfort.
Until the regulatory landscape changes and energy performance must be disclosed, we hope these tips will help you avoid the worst of Australia’s hot boxes.
Sarah Robertson has received funding from various sources, including the Lord Mayor’s Charitable Foundation and the Fuel Poverty Research Network. She has benefitted from Australian Research Council, Victorian government and various local government and industry partnerships to support research related to this topic.
Nicola Willand receives funding for research from various organisations, including the Australian Research Council, the Victorian state government, the Lord Mayor’s Charitable Foundation, the Future Fuels Collaborative Research Centre and the National Health and Medical Research Council. She is a trustee of the Fuel Poverty Research Network charity and affiliated with the Australian Institute of Architects.
Ralph Horne has received funding from various sources including the Australian Research Council, the Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute and the Victorian government to support research related to this topic.
Trivess Moore has received funding from various organisations including the Australian Research Council, Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, Victorian government and various industry partners. He is a trustee of the Fuel Poverty Research Network.
[. However, many of these technologies don’t yet exist, are still early in development or are not yet commercially available. Given our energy leadership, Alberta will continue to lead the way.
Alberta’s government is investing $55 million from the industry-funded TIER program to help industries, big and small, test and implement the technologies they need to keep leading the world. Delivered through Emissions Reduction Alberta, this funding will help 15 projects develop cutting-edge technologies that could one day be used across Canada and around the world.
“When it comes to innovation, Alberta’s track record is second to none. This funding will help empower our industry and businesses to develop the new technologies that are in demand around the world. This funding is a win-win: creating jobs, reducing emissions, and strengthening our economy for the benefit of all Albertans.”
This funding will support projects across the economy, including the energy, newsprint, cement, water treatment, dairy and forestry sectors. In total, $46 million will go to 12 projects through Emissions Reduction Alberta’s Industrial Transformation Challenge, with an additional $8.7 million invested in three projects approved through the Partnership Intake Program.
“By investing in these technologies today, we are helping to maintain Alberta as a global leader in industrial innovation and paving the way for a more sustainable and competitive future across our industries.”
Funding ranges from $500,000 to $10 million for each project, including:
$10 million to help Alberta Newsprint Company make best-in-class energy efficiency upgrades that will reduce costs and improve the mill’s competitiveness.
$8.4 million to help Dairy Innovation West advance a new approach for developing concentrated milk products that can be transported with less energy and further processed into other dairy products, increasing the province’s milk-processing capacity.
$7.45 million to help the City of Calgary install a first-in-Alberta and second-in-Canada technology to use thermal energy at the Fish Creek wastewater treatment plant.
$4 million to help Lafarge Canada explore using calcined clay in cement products, lowering the overall emission intensity of cement while maintaining strength.
$3.7 million to help Flash Forest Inc. advance a proof-of-concept that uses drones, AI-based site selection software and ecological science to speed up and improve tree planting and reforestation.
$2 million to help Merlin Plastics develop a commercial-scale operation that will divert hard-to-recycle plastics from landfills or incineration.
$700,000 to help TS-Nano Canada test a new product that will more effectively seal oil and gas wells, reducing potential methane leaks and reducing operational costs.
“With support from the Government of Alberta and Emissions Reduction Alberta, Alberta Newsprint Company will adopt state-of-the-art technologies that significantly reduce its carbon footprint, demonstrating Alberta’s leadership in sustainable manufacturing.”
“This funding support enables the City of Calgary to employ innovative low-carbon technology to heat the new infrastructure for the Fish Creek Wastewater Treatment Plant Upgrade project. By using heat pumps to recover thermal energy from wastewater effluent as a heat source, the project significantly reduces the plant’s greenhouse gas emissions.”
“The support from the Government of Alberta and Emissions Reduction Alberta has been instrumental in driving the development and deployment of innovative technologies for the Dairy Innovation West facility. This funding not only accelerates our progress but also underscores Alberta’s commitment to advancing clean technology and sustainable solutions that have a lasting impact both locally and globally.”
A full list of funding and project details can be found at https://www.eralberta.ca.
Quick facts
These projects are estimated to reduce 119,000 tonnes of emissions each year, 394,000 tonnes of emissions by 2030, and more than 2.2 million tonnes of emissions by 2050.
These projects are estimated to create almost 1,600 jobs and inject $237 million into Alberta’s GDP by 2027.
Emissions Reduction Alberta’s Partnership Intake Program acts as a catalyst to de-risk and deploy novel technology solutions by giving applicants the opportunity to leverage funding from both Emissions Reduction Alberta and trusted partner organizations.
Industrial Transformation Challenge applicants and their technologies can originate from anywhere in the world, but projects must be piloted, demonstrated or deployed in Alberta and show significant emissions reduction and economic benefits within the province.
Successful applicants are eligible for up to $10 million per project, with a minimum request of $500,000. Funding received through the Industrial Transformation Challenge will match private contributions on a one-to-one basis.
Headline: Progress and lessons learned on the road to 2030 climate goals
2025 is a notable year in the world’s continued efforts toward a more sustainable future. It marks the five-year countdown to 2030, the end of the timeline for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 2025 will also be the 30thconvening of the UN Climate Change Conference—also known as COP30—and it is taking place in Brazil, both a symbolically and strategically important nation in the world’s fight against climate change and environmental degradation.
It is also a notable year for Microsoft. In addition to celebrating the 50thanniversary of our company’s founding, it is the midpoint of our own sustainability journey. In 2020 we announced our ambitions to be carbon negative, water positive, and zero waste by 2030, all while protecting ecosystems. We have made tremendous progress over the past five years, and we are proud of what we’ve accomplished. We’ve also learned lessons along the way, lessons that constantly inform and shape our path toward 2030 and beyond.
The goals that we set in 2020 reflected what we believed we needed to do in order to help push the world toward a net-zero economy. I joined Microsoft on this journey two years ago—becoming our Chief Sustainability Officer in January 2023—and I continue to be impressed by the work of employees across the company in their relentless pursuit of these goals.
In June 2020, we announced our largest power PPA to date at the time—a 500MW PPA with Sol Systems. Today, we are one of the largest carbon-free energy buyers in the world, with a 34-gigawatt (GW) contracted renewable energy portfolio across 24 countries to date. We are bringing more carbon-free electricity onto the grids where we operate, and we continue to advocate for the expansion of clean energy solutions around the world.
A key component of our water positive goal is to replenish more water than we consume across our global operations. We’ve grown our replenishment portfolio to 90 projects in over 40 locations around the world.
On our journey to become zero waste, we’re finding opportunities to keep electronics in circulation. The repairability of our current portfolio of Surface devices has evolved significantly from our first field-repairable product in 2019. This is also true of Xbox,which recently announcedhow they’re working to expand the number of ways players can get support to repair their consoles and accessories.
We exceeded our land protection goal, with 15,849 acres of protected land and surpassed our initial target of 11,000 acres by more than 40%.
This is only a snapshot of the real progress we’ve made over the last 5 years. We have a longstanding commitment to sustainability, and our experience shows us that the investments and innovations we’ve focused on are good for our company, our customers, the economy, and our planet. Every investment has also been a learning opportunity, a chance to test our assumptions and adjust as needed.
While we are proud of these achievements, we know that our work is far from over, and that the path ahead has gotten harder. The world is not on track to meet critical climate goals and we see many of these challenges reflected in our own journey.
In 2020, Microsoft leaders referred to our sustainability goals as a “moonshot,” and nearly five years later, we have had to acknowledge that the moon has gotten further away. However, the force creating this distance from our goals in the short term is the same one that will help us build a bigger, faster, and more powerful rocket to reach them in the long term: artificial intelligence (AI). This is not hyperbole. Already, we are seeing AI make a positive impact on the planet, and in the coming years, this technology will begin to rapidly accelerate climate solutions at a scale we’ve not yet seen. In November 2023, we introduced ourAI and Sustainability Playbook, which highlights five foundational enabling conditions needed to unlock AI’s full transformative potential for accelerating sustainability progress. In January, weshared a reportthat highlights our progress and the innovations that have advanced each of those five pillars.
Building the AI economy of the future is a top priority for our business, but we are also in the business of sustainability. As CSO, it is my job to ensure that these dual mandates are working together.
To achieve this, we need to run our sustainability initiatives like we run the rest of our business: ensuring that our focus is on the highest-impact interventions that truly move the needle when it comes to planetary impact.
Carbon Neutrality
Microsoft announced that it was carbon neutral in 2012, several years ahead of our ambitious goal to be carbon negative by 2030. Microsoft’s prior years achieving carbon neutrality were based on a common combination of environmental attributes purchased with funds from our corporate-wide carbon fee and our overall carbon emissions reduction efforts. This is a prime example of where we have learned and adjusted along our journey. While we continue to apply the carbon fee to investments in emissions reductions, we have ceased purchasing non-additional, unbundled renewable energy certificates. We are refocusing the use of these funds on more long-term, higher-impact investments across carbon reduction, carbon removal, and clean electricity procurement. These interventions are expected to more effectively help us achieve our goal of becoming carbon negative by 2030 and may take us out of carbon-neutral position.
We will also continue to invest in innovative climate solutions through our $1BClimate Innovation Fund (CIF). Since launching the CIF in 2020, Microsoft has committed nearly $800M to solutions ranging from sustainable fuels and low-carbon building materials to carbon dioxide removal, water innovation, and circular economy technologies. We now have a portfolio of 63 investees that we’re helping to scale. Going forward, we will extend this strategy and continue to invest our capital to build new markets and increase the market supply of emerging sustainable technologies to address carbon, water, and waste.
We are proud to continue making decisions that drive positive environmental impact in the market and deliver high-integrity investments. We remain resolute in our commitment to our climate goals and to empowering others with the technology needed to build a more sustainable future.
In my first year with Microsoft, I wrote a piece on LinkedIn:Removing Roadblocks in the Race to Net Zero, where I compared reaching our sustainability goals to training for a marathon, noting that “it will take focus, planning, and perseverance to reach the finish line.” Today—and now two years into my role—I would like to add another comparison, to an African proverb that says the following: “If you want to travel fast, travel alone; if you want to travel far, travel together.”
In 2025, the moon is further away, so we all must travel together and do more if we are going to reach it. We will continue to work in close collaboration with our employees, customers, suppliers, industry peers, partners, and with policymakers to maximize our impact in pursuit of our shared goals.
Tags: COP30, net zero, sustainability, Sustainable Development Goals, UN Climate Change Conference
Source: United States Senator Ron Wyden (D-Ore)
February 13, 2025
U.S. Must Resist Reported U.K. Efforts to Spy on Americans’ Encrypted Files, They Write in Bipartisan Letter
Washington, D.C. – U.S. Senator Ron Wyden, D-Ore., and Representative Andy Biggs, R-Ariz., today urged Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard to protect U.S. communications from demands by the United Kingdom that will leave all Americans less secure and more vulnerable to spying by China, Russia, and other adversaries.
Wyden and Biggs wrote in response to reports that the U.K. ordered Apple to build a backdoor into encrypted iCloud backups to enable government surveillance of messages, photos and other files. Apple is barred from even disclosing the U.K. order to the public, or members of Congress, according to the Washington Post.
“If the U.K. does not immediately reverse this dangerous effort, we urge you to reevaluate U.S.-U.K. cybersecurity arrangements and programs as well as U.S. intelligence sharing with the U.K.,” Wyden and Biggs wrote. “The bilateral U.S.-U.K. relationship must be built on trust. If the U.K. is secretly undermining one of the foundations of U.S. cybersecurity, that trust has been profoundly breached.”
Creating a backdoor for the U.K. government would open a glaring new security weakness in all encrypted products subject to the reported order. Weakening American cybersecurity is particularly shortsighted following China’s “Salt Typhoon” hack of U.S. phone networks — which included tapping President Trump and Vice President Vance’s calls. In response, U.S. cybersecurity officials publicly recommended Americans to use encrypted services to secure their calls, texts, and other communications against foreign hackers and criminals.
According to a public report published by the U.K. Parliament’s intelligence oversight committee in 2023, the U.K. benefits greatly from a “mutual presumption towards unrestricted sharing of [Signals Intelligence]” between the U.S. and U.K. and that “[t]he weight of advantage in the partnership with the [National Security Agency] is overwhelmingly in [the U.K.’s] favour.”
Read the full letter to DNI Gabbard here.
Check against delivery.
1 Introduction
Ladies and gentlemen,
I am delighted to be here with you today. What better place than Glasgow to discuss the economic impacts of climate change and the green transition! And not just because it played host to the 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference.
Glasgow is also where Adam Smith, the father of modern economics, studied and taught as a professor. Have you ever wondered what he would have thought of climate change? As a famed free-market economist, he might not be the first person you would think of. But even Adam Smith acknowledged that the invisible hand can sometimes lead to suboptimal outcomes.
Climate change is a prime example of this: market prices do not reflect the negative side effects of greenhouse gas emissions. Fortunately, it is now widely acknowledged that governments need to intervene and encourage individuals and companies to reduce their emissions.
Switching to a net-zero emissions economy is a major task. It requires changes in behaviour, innovation and significant investment to rebuild our capital stock. And this transition requires significant financing.
In my speech, I will explore what financing the transition to a greenhouse gas-neutral economy could look like. More specifically, I will focus on two key issues. First, how much investment is needed to achieve greenhouse gas neutrality, and how much of this investment is “additional”? Second, what could the financing mix to fund this investment look like?
I know that answering these questions seems like a tough challenge – a taughy fleece tae scoor. But I will do my best to illustrate my points with clear, practical examples. Along the way, I will discuss electric cars and heating systems to help us understand the issues.
My remarks will focus on the European Union (EU), borrowing some detailed insights from Germany. Unfortunately, these data do not cover the United Kingdom (UK). But I will do my best to infer some insights for the UK as well.
2 How much needs to be invested?
Let me start with the question of how much the EU needs to invest to achieve greenhouse gas neutrality. The EU’s Fit for 55 package aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 per cent by 2030. These reductions are benchmarked against 1990 emission levels. This is an intermediate step towards full greenhouse gas neutrality, for which the EU still needs to pass legislation.
From 2021 to 2030, the European Commission estimates that EU countries need to invest over €1.2 trillion annually.[1] This amounts to nearly 8 per cent of the EU’s GDP. The private sector must take on the bulk of these investments. The investment needs are significantly more than the actual annual investment of €760 billion in the previous decade.
The European Commission defines the difference between the investment required and the actual investment as the “additional” investment need. This additional investment need amounts to €480 billion, or around 3 per cent of GDP.
This definition of “additional” investment is very useful from an accounting perspective. It gives a clear picture of how much more the EU needs to invest to meet its climate goals. However, from a financing perspective, it helps to define additional investment differently.
There are two types of investment needed to achieve greenhouse gas neutrality. The first type is investment that would not happen without the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. A prime example of this type of investment is technology to capture and store carbon dioxide. This technology will play a crucial role in sectors that are difficult to decarbonise. These investments need economic resources and financing beyond what an economy spends just to maintain its capital stock.
The second type is investment where a greenhouse gas-neutral alternative replaces a fossil fuel-based technology. To illustrate this point, imagine two households buying a new car. The Jones family spend €45,000 on a new combustion engine car. From a technical perspective, the Jones family are making a replacement investment. No additional financing is needed. Meanwhile, the Smith family decide to switch from a combustion engine car to an electric vehicle. Let us say a comparable electric car costs €50,000. Of this amount, €45,000 is a replacement investment. Only the remaining €5,000 requires additional financing.
Contrast this with how the European Commission defines additional investment: They subtract the annual average value of electric cars bought in the past from the value of electric vehicles needed to meet the EU’s intermediate greenhouse gas reduction goals. Past registrations of electric vehicles fell significantly short of what is needed. Accordingly, the additional investments, as defined by the European Commission’s accounting perspective, are presumably much higher than the additional financing needs.
How great could the additional financing needs be? While we do not yet have specific figures for the EU, there are some numbers for Germany. A recent study estimates that Germany needs to invest around €390 billion annually from 2021 to 2030 to reduce emissions by 65 per cent compared to 1990.[2] They measure this absolute sum in 2020 prices. Relative to GDP, the investment amounts to 11 per cent.
This is fairly close to the 8 per cent investment needs calculated by the European Commission for the EU.[3] However, only around 30 per cent of this investment requires additional financing. In absolute terms, this amounts to about €120 billion.
Let me pause for a moment to summarise the two key takeaways from my remarks so far. First, the transition to greenhouse gas neutrality calls for significant investment. However, in many cases, we are replacing fossil-based technologies with greenhouse gas-neutral alternatives. Accordingly, the additional financing needs are much smaller and seem manageable.
Second, we can minimise the additional financing needs by replacing already largely depreciated capital stock. By contrast, replacing relatively new capital stock that has barely depreciated would increase the economic and financial costs. Let me illustrate this point with a brief anecdote.
On 1 January 2024, the German government introduced a new law governing heating systems. In German, it is known by the beautiful name “Gebäudeenergiegesetz”. This law mandates that heating systems use around two-thirds renewable energy. In anticipation of this new law, many households replaced their old gas heating systems with new ones. These heating systems can run for around 25 years, so they depreciate over a long period.
Bad luck if you just installed a new gas heating system and live in the German city of Mannheim. Here, the local gas provider has said it intends to stop its services in 2035. This means that a long-term investment will become unviable when little more than half of it has depreciated: A waste of both financial and economic resources.
This anecdote highlights one key point: to avoid wasting money, we need a clear and reliable path to greenhouse gas neutrality. With a clear path mapped out, people can confidently invest in the transition.
3 What could the financing mix look like?
Now, let us explore what the potential financing mix could look like. To achieve a greenhouse gas-neutral economy, households, firms and the public sector all need to invest. They can fund these investments using both internal and external sources.
As the name would suggest, internal financing comes from within. Like the Smith family putting aside some of their income to pay for their new car. Or think of a firm that sells its products and saves some of the profits. That is internal financing, too. External financing, on the other hand, comes from outside sources such as banks or investors.
Regarding their financing mix, households, non-financial firms and the public sector differ considerably. Households tend to save significantly and mainly use bank loans as a source of external finance. The public sector, on the other hand, raises most of its funds from external sources by issuing debt securities. Only firms have a more diversified financing mix. Equity and bank loans play prominent roles here. Note that these observations hold for the EU, the UK and Germany alike.
So, what might the financing mix for the transition to a greenhouse gas-neutral economy look like? To estimate these figures, we need two key components: First, the respective shares of households, firms and the public sector in total investment. According to rough estimates by Bundesbank staff for Germany, households might have to cover about one-third of the investment, the public sector around 20 per cent, and firms just under half.[4]
Second, estimates for the future financing structure of the sectors. We assume that future financing structures will remain unchanged from today.[5] This implies that past financing structures are suitable for future climate investment. If this were not the case, perhaps due to the need for innovative financing instruments, the financing structure may differ.
What result do we get when we combine the two components? For Germany, we estimate that about 20 per cent of the financing mix could come from internal financing, primarily household savings. In terms of external financing, bank loans might play the largest role. They account for over one-quarter of the estimated financing mix. Households in particular obtain almost all their external financing from banks.
The second-largest external financing source could be debt securities, accounting for around 20 per cent. The public sector plays a prominent role here, with funding coming almost exclusively from bonds. Finally, the third-largest external financing source could be equity financing, comprising around one-sixth. Firms are the only users of this financing source, as households and the public sector do not issue equity. Different instruments, like loans from non-bank financial intermediaries, might cover the final sixth of the overall investment needs.
So, what does this mean for the EU and the UK? Can the findings for Germany be generalised? Fortunately, the financing structures of households, firms and governments are largely comparable across these regions.[6] Therefore, one of the two components in the calculations is roughly equal.
The second component – the sectoral investment needs – is less certain. I am not aware of any studies for the EU or the UK that divide the investment needs across households, firms and the public sector.[7] Without a better alternative, the findings for Germany may provide a reasonable initial estimate for both the EU and the UK.
4 Concluding remarks
Let me summarise and conclude. I have three main takeaways to share.
First, “additional” investment needs to become greenhouse gas-neutral can also be defined from a financing perspective. In many cases, we are replacing fossil fuel-based technologies with greenhouse gas-neutral alternatives. And this requires additional financing only if greenhouse gas-neutral technologies are more expensive or if the capital stock being replaced is not yet fully depreciated. The additional financing needs are significantly smaller than the total investment required. Accordingly, I am confident that our financial system can mobilise the necessary financing.
Second, banks may play a larger role in financing the climate transition than is commonly anticipated. The main reason for this conclusion is that a substantial portion of climate investments falls on households. They need to make their homes more energy-efficient and replace fossil-fuelled heating systems with greenhouse gas-neutral alternatives. And households simply do not have many viable alternatives to bank loans.
Accordingly, a robust banking system is essential for achieving greenhouse gas neutrality. That is why we at the Bundesbank are committed to completing the European banking union. However, we also need to improve access to alternative financing sources. Non-financial firms, in particular, would greatly benefit from better capital market financing. That is why we at the Bundesbank are dedicated to creating a European capital markets union.
Third, legislators can minimise the additional financing needs by ensuring that the path to greenhouse gas neutrality is planned stringently and for the long term. Why? Because it provides incentives to avoid investments in fossil fuel technologies that may not be fully depreciated before they become non-viable.
Footnotes:
See European Commission (2023), Investment needs assessment and funding availabilities to strengthen EU’s Net-Zero technology manufacturing capacity, SWD (2023) 68 final.
Kemmler et al. (2024), Klimaschutzinvestitionen für die Transformation des Energiesystems, Prognos. This study is only available in German.
One reason why Germany’s investment needs relative to GDP are higher than the EU’s is that Germany intends to achieve greenhouse gas neutrality sooner (in 2045 rather than 2050).
The estimates are based on the public sector shares provided in Brand and Römer (2022), Öffentliche Investitionsbedarfe zur Erreichung der Klimaneutralität in Deutschland, KfW Research – Fokus Volkswirtschaft, Nr. 395 and various plausibility assumptions. The analysis assumes that the public sector’s involvement in industry and the residential investment sector is minimal or non-existent. This is because the analysis looks at financing flows before any government support, such as subsidies.
More precisely, the financing structure is derived from the average internal and external financing flows over the period 2018 to 2022. This averaging smooths out short-term fluctuations and centres on the reference year of 2020 used in the Kemmler et al (2024) study. Internal financing enters the calculation on a net basis, assuming that the depreciation inflows finance the replacement investments.
In the EU and UK, households rely slightly less on bank loans than in Germany, but the share is still high. In the public sector, Germany has a significantly higher share of debt security financing, particularly compared to the EU. In the UK, non-financial firms have a significantly lower share of equity financing and a higher share of (bank) loans compared to Germany. In contrast, in the EU, non-financial firms have a slightly higher share of equity financing and a smaller share of (bank) loans compared to Germany. All figures are based on average financial flows from 2018 to 2022.
European Commission, op. cit., estimates that, in the EU, the public sector could account for 17 to 20 per cent of total investment. However, it does not clarify how this investment will be split between households and firms. For the UK, HM Government (2023), Mobilising Green Investment – 2023 Green Finance Strategy, mentions that most investment must come from the private sector. However, it likewise does not provide any details on how this investment will be split between households and firms.
Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
In the fight against climate change, emissions of methane – which has a warming effect over 80 times greater than CO2 over a 20-year timeframe – from coal mines remain a significant source of greenhouse gases (GHG). Coal mines account for over 10% of methane emissions from human activity. As long as coal’s share in the global energy mix remains significant, mitigating large emissions associated with its extraction presents an under-exploited and under-capitalized opportunity to deliver near-term GHG emissions cuts.
Gassy underground coal mines employ large-scale ventilation systems that pump fresh air into the workings to dilute and remove methane released during mining operations. This ventilation air, discharged through dedicated (ventilation) shafts, contains methane in concentrations typically ranging from 0.1% to 1.0% by volume, known as Ventilation Air Methane (VAM). While removing methane from the mine is necessary for maintaining safe underground working conditions, the continuous discharges of large volumes of VAM constitute a significant source of greenhouse gas emissions.
A new UNECE report developed by the UNECE Group of Experts on Coal Mine Methane and Just Transition sheds light on the urgency of tackling VAM emissions. A single ventilation shaft in an operating coal mine can expel up to 50,000 tonnes of methane annually – equivalent to the emissions (CO2e) generated by 2 million cars. Since coal mines are expected to continue to operate for at least the next two decades, reducing these emissions presents an immediate and effective way to slow down climate change, complementing scaled-up decarbonization efforts.
The report “Best Practice Guidance on Ventilation Air Methane Mitigation” highlights the cost-effectiveness of VAM mitigation. Advanced technologies, such as Regenerative Thermal Oxidation (RTO), have been successfully deployed in large-scale, long-term projects, proving the technical viability of VAM mitigation. RTO installations are actively reducing methane emissions at coal mines in the United States and China. For such projects to be economically sustainable, the value of emission reductions must reach approximately USD 20 per tonne of CO2e – an economically feasible target when compared to other climate mitigation efforts.
The cost of a VAM mitigation plant is all about the volume of air being processed, and therefore the methane content in the ventilation air to be processed is a key factor determining the revenue and thus also the economic viability of the plant. A plant processing VAM concentration of 0.2% will have a total cost per mitigated tCO2e around USD $20. Where such mechanisms exist, this cost could be balanced by Carbon Emission Reduction Credits, or by avoided emissions penalty.
Despite its potential, VAM mitigation faces technical challenges. Methane concentrations in ventilation air are often very low, and mine shafts release vast volumes of air. The report emphasizes that only one technology, RTO, has consistently reduced methane emissions from coal mines, though other catalytic processes are emerging.
The report aligns with global efforts to address methane emissions, including the Paris Agreement and the Global Methane Pledge, which aims to cut methane emissions by 30% by 2030. In this context, VAM mitigation could play a key role in achieving these ambitious objectives.
This Best Practice Guidance on VAM serves as a call to action for the mining industry and policymakers, underscoring the significant potential of VAM mitigation as a cost-effective solution to reduce emissions.
The report provides practical guidance on securing financial support, assessing the feasibility of VAM mitigation plants, and understanding the key aspects of technology integration. It also offers a clear 8-step model for preparing potential VAM projects, making this complex topic accessible and actionable.
In addition to the Best Practice Guidance, the UNECE Group of Experts on Coal Mine Methane and Just Transition – through its Task Force on Methane Emissions Reduction – has developed complementary resources to further support methane monitoring and mitigation efforts. These include:
Template for Estimating Emissions from Underground Coal Mines – A user-friendly tool designed to improve emissions data collection for policymakers and companies. This template streamlines the tracking of methane emissions, destruction, and off-site transportation, and accounts for avoided methane emissions and CO2 emissions resulting from these processes.
Join the Discussion at the UNECE Resource Management Week 2025
The UNECE Resource Management Week 2025 (24–28 March, Geneva), and particularly the meeting of the Group of Experts on Coal Mine Methane and Just Transition, will provide a platform to discuss methane mitigation strategies, including the VAM Best Practice Guidance, which will be presented for endorsement.
Bringing together policymakers, industry representatives, and experts, the event will facilitate discussions on innovative solutions, financing mechanisms, and regulatory approaches to support methane emission reductions.
Introductory remarks by Frank Elderson, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, at the MNI Webcast on Climate Change: Impact on Monetary Policy and Bank Supervision
Frankfurt am Main, 12 February 2025
Central banks and supervisors are not climate and nature policymakers.
Central banks and supervisors are climate and nature policy takers.
And we face an ever-increasing volume of climate and nature-related factors that we must take into account in order to successfully deliver on our mandate.
This is the fundamental principle that underpins all our climate and nature-related activities at the European Central Bank.
It is a principle grounded in irrefutable facts established by the scientific community and transposed to make their implications clear for the economy and financial system. At the ECB, we have translated this principle into our monetary policy and supervisory work as a strategic commitment to account for the ongoing climate and nature crises, irrespective of shifts in the macroeconomic tides and no matter what direction the political winds may blow.
This is why, both in our monetary policy and in our banking supervision, we have meticulously formulated strategies that are robust and resilient in all weathers. In the face of changing climates, be they macroeconomic, political or indeed at the level of our planetary ecosystem, we will continue to deliver on our mandate to keep prices stable and ensure Europe’s banks are safe and sound.
Climate and nature in monetary policy
Let me start with what we our doing when it comes to accounting for climate and nature in our monetary policy.
When the ECB concluded its strategy review in the summer of 2021, our new strategy explicitly acknowledged the profound implications of climate change for the economy and therefore its relevance for monetary policy. In our strategy, we also formulated a concrete action plan, and we are delivering on that plan.
First, we have made significant progress in improving our ability to take climate considerations into account in the macroeconomic analyses that inform our policy discussions.
Second, with respect to our monetary policy instruments, we started tilting our purchases of corporate bonds towards issuers with a better climate performance to avoid undue exposures to climate-related risks. While the last remaining purchases were suspended at the start of this year, if any corporate bond purchases were to be needed for monetary policy purposes in the future, the established direction of the tilt would set the minimum benchmark. With respect to the collateral we require for our lending operations, further technical work on incorporating climate change collateral considerations is still ongoing.
Our current actions aim to support a high degree of confidence in the alignment of our activities, within our mandate, with the goals set by the Paris Agreement. We have committed to regularly reviewing all our measures to assess their impact. If necessary, we will adapt them to ensure they continue to fulfil their monetary policy objectives and support the decarbonisation path to reach the goals set by the Paris Agreement and the EU’s climate neutrality objectives. Within our mandate, we will also look into addressing additional nature-related challenges.
Climate and nature in banking supervision
Let me move to the steps we have taken in banking supervision.
Our supervisory strategy was formulated after we learnt in 2019 that less than a quarter of the banks under our supervision had demonstrably reflected on how the climate and nature crises were affecting their risk management. This observation was obviously concerning, so in 2020 we published a guide setting out our supervisory expectations. These expectations outline the ECB’s understanding of the safe and prudent management of climate and nature-related risks under the prevailing prudential framework. Since then, we have consistently taken these risks into account in our supervisory work.
Considering the requirements clearly set out in the Capital Requirements Directive as implemented in national law, and the need for banks to implement a regular process for identifying all material risks, banks must ensure that practices are in place for the sound management of climate and nature-related risks. They had to achieve this by the end of last year and, in the run-up to that deadline, we also set interim deadlines for banks to remediate certain shortcomings related to the management of these risks. These deadlines were informed by what the banks themselves considered reasonable when we first started discussing climate and nature-related risk management with them.
We are still following up on the two earlier interim deadlines while we begin assessing banks’ practices in light of their final end-2024 deadline.
After the first interim deadline back in March 2023, we saw that many banks still had not implemented an adequate materiality assessment of the impact of climate and nature-related risks across their portfolios. The ECB imposed binding supervisory decisions on 28 banks, with 22 of them being told that if they did not remedy their shortcomings by a certain date, they would incur a periodic penalty payment for each day they remained in breach of our requirements. Encouragingly, almost all banks submitted an adequate materiality assessment in time, which shows that our supervisory efforts have been effective in almost all cases. For a few banks, the process to determine whether penalties have been incurred is ongoing.
For the second interim deadline of the end of 2023, we asked banks to clearly include climate and nature-related risks in their governance, strategy and risk management. As with the first interim deadline, we found weaknesses in banks’ practices that we communicated to them in the form of further feedback letters. In a small group of outliers, foundational elements for the adequate management of climate and nature-related risks are still missing. These banks received binding supervisory decisions in autumn 2024, again outlining the potential imposition of periodic penalty payments if they fail to meet the requirements in a timely manner.
To avoid any doubt, we will proceed in exactly the same way with respect to the third and final deadline that fell due at the turn of the year. We want to see evidence that banks’ risk management practices ensure the sound management of climate and nature-related risks across all areas of our supervisory expectations. For instance, this means that banks need to consider these risks in their stress-testing frameworks, including in plausible baseline and adverse scenarios that are in line with scientific evidence. Thereafter, banks will have to keep updating their practices in accordance with advances in data availability, methodologies and legislative and regulatory requirements. Banks need to ensure that their risk management practices remain commensurate with the magnitude of the climate and nature-related risks that they face. As supervisors, it is our job to make sure they do. To deliver on this, we will use – obviously always in a proportionate way – all supervisory instruments that we have at our disposal.
Conclusion
Let me conclude.
While the fundamental principle – that climate and nature are relevant for both monetary policy and banking supervision and, therefore, must be taken into account in the exercise of our tasks – is independent of the actions of climate and nature policymakers, the intensity and configuration of the risks that will ultimately materialise is not. The choices that climate and nature policymakers make will determine what combination of transition and physical risks materialises in the years to come. Regrettably, the prevailing consensus among climate scientists is that the goal of limiting global heating to 2 degrees Celsius, as set out in the Paris Agreement, is not currently being met. Last October the UN Emissions Gap Report concluded that the world is on track for an average increase of 3.1 degrees.[1] And even that dramatic number will only be achieved if all governments stick with their current policies. The physical risks of climate and nature hazards are currently materialising at an ever-increasing scale and frequency.[2] These physical risks will continue increasing or transition policies will have to be implemented more abruptly to secure a timely transition which will cause an increase in transition risks.
To identify climate and nature-related risks, central banks, supervisors and the banks we supervise are reliant on good data. Reporting requirements in the EU’s sustainable finance framework will improve the availability of reliable and comparable data that are needed to identify and manage financial risks. This is essential to ensure that the broader sustainable finance framework can serve its purpose of unlocking finance for the green transition and thereby contributing to Europe’s competitiveness agenda.
It is inevitable that climate and nature-related risks will increase. Concealing them will not make them disappear. And ignoring them will not make them less threatening for monetary policy and banking supervision. This is why we are delivering on our strategic commitment to take them into account in our work.
The New Zealand government and the mainstream media have gone ballistic (thankfully not literally just yet) over the move by the small Pacific nation to sign a strategic partnership with China in Beijing this week.
It is the latest in a string of island nations that have signalled a closer relationship with China, something that rattles nerves and sabres in Wellington and Canberra.
The Chinese have politely told the Kiwis to back off. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun told reporters that China and the Cook Islands have had diplomatic relations since 1997 which “should not be disrupted or restrained by any third party”.
“New Zealand is rightly furious about it,” a TVNZ Pacific affairs writer editorialised to the nation. The deal and the lack of prior consultation was described by various journalists as “damaging”, “of significant concern”, “trouble in paradise”, an act by a “renegade government”.
Foreign Minister Winston Peters, not without cause, railed at what he saw as the Cook Islands government going against long-standing agreements to consult over defence and security issues.
“Should New Zealand invade the Cook islands?” . . . New Zealand Herald columnist Matthew Hooton’s view in an “oxygen-starved media environment” amid rattled nerves. Image: New Zealand Herald screenshot APR
‘Clearly about secession’ Matthew Hooton, who penned the article in The Herald, is a major commentator on various platforms.
“Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown’s dealings with China are clearly about secession from the realm of New Zealand,” Hooton said without substantiation but with considerable colonial hauteur.
“His illegal moves cannot stand. It would be a relatively straightforward military operation for our SAS to secure all key government buildings in the Cook Islands’ capital, Avarua.”
This could be written off as the hyperventilating screeching of someone trying to drum up readers but he was given a major platform to do so and New Zealanders live in an oxygen-starved media environment where alternative analysis is hard to find.
The Cook Islands, with one of the largest Exclusive Economic Zones in the world — a whopping 2 million sq km — is considered part of New Zealand’s backyard, albeit over 3000 km to the northeast. The deal with China is focused on economics not security issues, according to Cooks Prime Minister Mark Brown.
Deep sea mining may be on the list of projects as well as trade cooperation, climate, tourism, and infrastructure.
The Cook Islands seafloor is believed to have billions of tons of polymetallic nodules of cobalt, copper, nickel and manganese, something that has even caught the attention of US Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Various players have their eyes on it.
Glen Johnson, writing in Le Monde Diplomatique, reported last year:
“Environmentalists have raised major concerns, particularly over the destruction of deep-sea habitats and the vast, choking sediment plumes that excavation would produce.”
All will be revealed Even Cook Island’s citizens have not been consulted on the details of the deal, including deep sea mining. Clearly, this should not be the case. All will be revealed shortly.
New Zealand and the Cook Islands have had formal relations since 1901 when the British “transferred” the islands to New Zealand. Cook Islanders have a curious status: they hold New Zealand passports but are recognised as their own country. The US government went a step further on September 25, 2023. President Joe Biden said:
“Today I am proud to announce that the United States recognises the Cook Islands as a sovereign and independent state and will establish diplomatic relations between our two nations.”
A move to create their own passports was undermined by New Zealand officials who successfully stymied the plan.
New Zealand has taken an increasingly hostile stance vis-a-vis China, with PM Luxon describing the country as a “strategic competitor” while at the same time depending on China as our biggest trading partner. The government and a compliant mainstream media sing as one choir when it comes to China: it is seen as a threat, a looming pretender to be South Pacific hegemon, replacing the flip-flopping, increasingly incoherent USA.
Climate change looms large for island nations. Much of the Cooks’ tourism infrastructure is vulnerable to coastal inundation and precious reefs are being destroyed by heating sea temperatures.
“One thing that New Zealand has got to get its head round is the fact that the Trump administration has withdrawn from the Paris Climate Accord,” Dr Robert Patman, professor of international relations at Otago University, says. “And this is a big deal for most Pacific Island states — and that means that the Cook Islands nation may well be looking for greater assistance elsewhere.”
Diplomatic spat with global coverage The story of the diplomatic spat has been covered in the Middle East, Europe and Asia. Eyebrows are rising as yet again New Zealand, a close ally of Israel and a participant in the US Operation Prosperity Guardian to lift the Houthi Red Sea blockade of Israel, shows its Western mindset.
Matthew Hooton’s article is the kind of colonialist fantasy masquerading as geopolitical analysis that damages New Zealand’s reputation as a friend to the smaller nations of our region.
Yes, the Chinese have an interest in our neck of the woods — China is second only to Australia in supplying much-needed development assistance to the region.
It is sound policy not insurrection for small nations to diversify economic partnerships and secure development opportunities for their people. That said, serious questions should be posed and deserve to be answered.
Geopolitical analyst Dr Geoffrey Miller made a useful contribution to the debate saying there was potential for all three parties to work together:
“There is no reason why New Zealand can’t get together with China and the Cook Islands and develop some projects together,” Dr Miller says. “Pacific states are the winners here because there is a lot of competition for them”.
I think New Zealand and Australia could combine more effectively with a host of South Pacific island nations and form a more effective regional voice with which to engage with the wider world and collectively resist efforts by the US and China to turn the region into a theatre of competition.
We throw the toys out We throw the toys out of the cot when the Cooks don’t consult with us but shrug when Pasifika elders like former Tuvalu PM Enele Sopoaga call us out for ignoring them.
In Wellington last year, I heard him challenge the bigger powers, particularly Australia and New Zealand, to remember that the existential threat faced by Pacific nations comes first from climate change. He also reminded New Zealanders of the commitment to keeping the South Pacific nuclear-free.
To succeed, a “Pacific for the peoples of the Pacific” approach would suggest our ministries of foreign affairs should halt their drift to being little more than branch offices of the Pentagon and that our governments should not sign up to US Great Power competition with China.
Ditching the misguided anti-China AUKUS project would be a good start.
Friends to all, enemies of none. Keep the Pacific peaceful, neutral and nuclear-free.
Eugene Doyle is a community organiser and activist in Wellington, New Zealand. He received an Absolutely Positively Wellingtonian award in 2023 for community service. His first demonstration was at the age of 12 against the Vietnam War. This article was first published at his public policy website Solidarity and is republished here with permission.
When Elon Musk acquired Twitter in 2022, many users looked for alternatives, fuelling a wave of online migration from the social media platform. Musk says he’s using Twitter, now named X, to champion free speech and that “cancel culture has been cancelled”. But his closeness to Donald Trump and his use of X to support far-right political ideologies around the world, have driven even more people to explore new options.
How do these alternative platforms differ from traditional social media, and what does the future hold for these online spaces? In this episode of The Conversation Weekly podcast, we speak to Robert Gehl, Ontario Research Chair of Digital Governance at York University, Canada, about the evolving landscape of decentralised social media.
In 2018, technologists working at the World Wide Web Consortium built a new protocol for social media called ActivityPub. It would give birth to the Fediverse, a decentralised form of social media. Robert Gehl likens the Fediverse to email.
”A friend of mine can have a Gmail account, another friend can have an Outlook account with Microsoft. I could have an account with ProtonMail. And even though these are three different companies and three different locations in the world, I can email all my friends and they can email me back because all those email servers agree to speak a shared protocol.“
ActivityPub does the same, but for social media. Somebody could set up a server that speaks that protocol and invite their friends to sign up. Somebody else could set up a different type of server, and those two could connect using ActivityPub’s protocol. Gehl explains: “You can build a big network out of all these little servers that removes a centre.”
Examples of platforms on the Fediverse include micro-blogging site Mastodon, image-sharing site Pixelfed and video-sharing platform PeerTube. By comparison to these decentralised systems, traditional social media platforms like X, Instagram or YouTube centralise user data, content, moderation and governance and control how information is organised and distributed to their users.
Other alternative platforms, which aren’t part of the Fediverse, include Bluesky, which launched to the public in 2024. Bluesky grew out of Twitter, and Twitter’s founder, Jack Dorsey, used to be on its board. However, Gehl says analysts still see Bluesky as a quite centralised because of the way it’s designed.
”They’re building an architecture where all posts are accessible and then they let people build filters to go to that big stack of posts and pull out the things that they want to see … I personally find Mastodon and the Fediverse to be a little bit more compelling because they’re federated systems. When you run a federated social media system, you install the software like Mastodon, and then it pulls in messages from the network as need be … so you don’t have the entire network on one box.“
Listen to the interview with Robert Gehl on The Conversation Weekly podcast, which also includes an introduction with Nehal El-Hadi, interim editor-in-chief at The Conversation Canada.
This episode of The Conversation Weekly was written and produced by Mend Mariwany with assistance from Katie Flood and Gemma Ware, Sound design was by Michelle Macklem, and theme music by Neeta Sarl.
The India Meteorological Department (IMD) has been actively working for the development and implementation of a national framework for climate services (NFCS) to strengthen climate change adaptation by integrating weather and climate services with sectoral policies and programs. The NFCS aims to support decision-making in critical sectors such as agriculture, water resources, health, and disaster management. Some examples of the sector-specific weather and climate services are:
Establishment of Agromet Advisory Services (AAS) for farmers.
Collaboration with the Central Water Commission (CWC) for flood and drought forecasting.
Climate-sensitive health risk mapping and early warnings for vector-borne diseases.
Strengthening climate resilience through the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and State Disaster Management Plans.
Establishing a climate data portal for researchers and stakeholders.
Organizing stakeholder consultation workshops with State Governments to identify the gap areas and possible solutions.
In October 2023, Climate Research & Services (CRS), IMD, Pune, organized a stakeholder consultation workshop on the NFCS-India at Pune. In collaboration with key ministries, the IMD continues to expand sector-specific climate services to ensure a science-based, policy-driven, and impact-oriented approach to climate resilience.
The Ministry continuously enhances and upgrades meteorological observations, communications, modeling tools, and forecasting systems. The IMD uses the latest tools and technologies to predict severe weather events. This includes sophisticated dynamical numerical weather prediction models at higher spatial and temporal resolution, multi-model ensemble methods, artificial intelligence, and machine learning (AI/ML) & data science methodologies, complemented with improved ground-based & upper air observations and advanced remote sensing network for real-time monitoring and predictions. IMD uses the latest dissemination tools, including Common Alert Protocol (CAP), mobile apps, websites, APIs, and other social media platforms, to provide efficient, effective, and timely early warning services. IMD is constantly working to improve and adapt to the latest technologies.
The Ministry is making continuous efforts to make advancements in cyclone prediction systems to minimize the impact of cyclones in the country. The India Meteorological Department has demonstrated its capability to provide high-precision early warning for cyclones in recent years. The IMD provides heatwave forecasts and warning information to stakeholders, including ministries of the Union Government, State Governments, and local Government bodies. The IMD issues various outlooks/forecasts/warnings for the public and disaster management authorities to prepare for extreme weather events, including cyclones, heat waves, etc. While issuing the alert, a suitable color code is used to highlight the impact of the severe weather expected and signal disaster management about the course of action to be taken regarding an impending disaster weather event.
The Government of India recognizes that weather and climate extremes disproportionately affect vulnerable populations, including the poor, women, children, and marginalized communities. Multiple initiatives focusing on adaptation, resilience-building, social protection, and inclusive policies have been implemented to address these challenges. Some of the work related to the Ministry of Earth Sciences in collaboration with other ministries are:
Impact-Based Forecasting (IBF) provides localized risk assessments for vulnerable populations before extreme events like cyclones, floods, and heatwaves.
Heat Action Plans (HAPs) are implemented in various cities to protect vulnerable groups such as daily wage workers, older people, and slum dwellers.
Training and capacity-building programs for women, children, and marginalized groups through local NGOs and government agencies
Disaster management authority programs include strengthening climate-resilient housing and infrastructure in coastal, flood-prone, and drought-affected areas.
Apart from this, initiatives from the other ministries of the Government of India include:
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) provides employment in climate-resilient infrastructure, such as water conservation, afforestation, and drought-proofing.
National Adaptation Fund for Climate Change (NAFCC) funds projects that enhance the adaptive capacity of rural and vulnerable communities in agriculture, water, and disaster-prone areas.
National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) and State Action Plans on Climate Change (SAPCCs) incorporate gender and social inclusion measures.
Jal Shakti Abhiyan & Atal Bhujal Yojana focus on water conservation, groundwater recharge, and access to clean drinking water in drought-prone regions.
Public Distribution System (PDS) Strengthening ensures food security for low-income communities during climate shocks such as droughts and floods.
This information was given by Union Minister of State (Independent Charge) for Science & Technology and Earth Sciences, Dr. Jitendra Singh in a written reply in the Rajya Sabha today.
The Ministry of Earth Sciences (MoES) explores integrating Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies into weather forecasting systems in addition to physics-based numerical models. This initiative is part of a broader strategy to enhance the accuracy and efficiency of meteorological predictions, which are crucial for various sectors, including agriculture, disaster management, and urban planning. The key initiatives, future plans, and innovative projects are as follows:
Collaborative Research Across Institutes: Institutions under MoES are actively working to incorporate AI/Machine Learning (ML) methodologies into their research activities and operational frameworks. This collaborative approach ensures a comprehensive application of AI technologies across Earth Sciences.
Achievements and outcomes of AI and ML in the research and development of weather prediction are provided below:
Improved the short-range precipitation forecast in 1-day, 2-day, and 3-day lead times with a reduction in bias.
Developed high-resolution (300 meters) urban gridded meteorological datasets for temperature and precipitation.
Developed the time-varying Normalized Difference Urbanization Index with a spatial resolution of 30 meters from 1992-2023.
Developed very high-resolution precipitation datasets for verification purposes.
To monitor and predict Tropical Cyclone Heat Potential (TCHP) using AI/ML methodologies.
The AI/ML is used to correct the bias of the NWP model products.
The Ministry has established a dedicated virtual center on AI/ML/Deep Learning (DL) at the Indian Institute of Tropical Meteorology (IITM) in Pune. This center focuses on leveraging AI, ML, and DL techniques for advancements in Earth Sciences. It has already developed several AI/ML-based applications tailored for localized predictions and the analysis of weather and climate patterns.
This information was given by Union Minister of State (Independent Charge) for Science & Technology and Earth Sciences, Dr. Jitendra Singh in a written reply in the Rajya Sabha today.
Current Status of Earthquake preparedness and Early Warning Systems in Earthquake Prone regions of the Country:
India has a well-defined National Seismological Network, expanded in the length and breadth of the country, that monitors seismic activity 24×7 around the corner in real-time mode and disseminates earthquake-related parameters and reports to various stakeholders and the public nationwide promptly through Bhukamp App and other unified Dissemination System (e.g. website; social media / whatsapp; twitter; telephone, Fax).
National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) has undertaken the Earthquake Disaster Risk Indexing (EDRI) project to systematically address the challenges of rapid urbanization and ensuring earthquake resilience in growing cities and assess earthquake risk across Indian cities. The results of the EDRI and risk assessment have far-reaching implications, particularly in cities experiencing rapid urbanization. By integrating the risk index into urban planning frameworks, cities can adopt risk-informed decision-making, ensuring safer infrastructure development and community resilience. This initiative underscores NDMA’s commitment to developing for proactive disaster risk reduction in urban India.
To address the community-based preparedness and raise awareness in earthquake- prone regions, NDMA runs TV and radio campaigns focused on earthquake preparedness, highlighting critical do’s and don’ts during seismic events. Special programs like ‘Aapda ka Samna’, aired on Doordarshan, feature expert discussions on prevention and mitigation strategies, equipping the public with actionable knowledge to safeguard lives and property.
Additionally, The Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) has developed a seismic zoning map of India to update stakeholders regarding earthquake precautionary measures.
Status of earthquake early warning systems:
Research efforts have started in India for developing an Earthquake Early Warning (EEW) System for Himalayan region, but these are still at a nascent stage. The National Centre for Seismology (NCS), Ministry of Earth Sciences has concerted efforts to develop an Earthquake Early Warning (EEW) System for the Himalayan region under its pilot project. However, National Centre for Seismology (NCS) under Ministry of Earth Sciences (MoES) is capable of recording any earthquake of M:2.5 and above in and around Delhi, M:3.0 and above for NE region, M:3.5 and above in Peninsular and extra-peninsular region, M:4.0 and above in Andaman region, and M:4.5 and above in border regions lying between 0 – 40 degree; N: 60 – 100 degree East. The details of the earthquakes reported by NCS are available in public domain through social media and on the website of NCS (seismo.gov.in).
National Centre for Seismology (NCS), Ministry of Earth Sciences (MoES) monitors the earthquake activity in and around the country on 24×7 basis and this information is disseminated after the occurrence of the earthquake to all nodal state and central disaster management authorities in the least possible time. For this purpose, NCS maintains the National Seismological Network (NSN) comprising of 166 permanent seismological observatories spread across the country. The details of the earthquakes reported by NCS and the observatories of NSN are available in public domain through social media and on the website of NCS (seismo.gov.in).
Additionally, probabilistic seismic hazard maps by BIS and Seismic Microzonation of strategic cities falling in the seismic Hazard Zone III, IV, and V by NCS-MoES and with its technical partner institutes a step towards earthquake risk mitigation of the country.
The status of infrastructure resilience in earthquake-prone regions of India varies from “Poor to Moderate”, with significant concerns regarding non-compliance with building codes that were constructed earlier.
Infrastructure resilience in earthquake-prone regions is a key aspect of risk management. Multiple organizations are already working in this regard. As also explained above, NDMA has undertaken the Earthquake Disaster Risk Indexing (EDRI) project to address the challenges of rapid urbanization and ensure earthquake resilience in growing cities. Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) has published criterion for constructing of earthquake resilient structures. The design of structure should be such that the whole structure behaves as one unit at the time of vibration rather than assemblage of parts. However, it is not economical to demolish and reconstruct most of the poorly built structures; for such poorly built structures BIS has prepared guidelines for their retrofitting. Also, HUDCO & BMTPC have published guidelines and brochures for construction and retrofitting of buildings. Based on these guidelines, critical facilities like hospitals, schools and bridges may be typically reinforced to withstand seismic forces, ensuring they remain operational during an emergency.
NDMA, has developed guidelines and formulates programs targeting earthquake risk mitigation to mitigate losses in a systematic and coordinated manner.
These initiatives are:
Home Owner’s Guide for Earthquake & Cyclone Safety (2019): The guide will make homeowners aware of various considerations and minimum requirements, which need to be taken care of while constructing and buying a house.
Simplified Guidelines for Earthquake Safety (2021): It provides details based on the National Building Code of India 2016 (released by the Bureau of Indian Standards, Government of India) to those who are constructing a house and who are buying a flat in multi-storey buildings, which are made of either masonry or reinforced concrete (RC). This Guide focuses to address this aspiration of potential homeowners, and provides the basic information that they should have when constructing individual houses or buying flats in multi-storey buildings.
The National Centre for Seismology (NCS), Ministry of Earth Sciences (MoES) conducts Seismic Microzonation of cities in India to generate integrated seismological, geological, and geotechnical parameters for earthquake risk resilient structures/infrastructures and buildings.
This information was given by Union Minister of State (Independent Charge) for Science & Technology and Earth Sciences, Dr. Jitendra Singh in a reply in the Rajya Sabha today.
The Government of India is implementing various flagship and other schemes for the development of the North Eastern Region through the respective Line Ministries/Departments.
Under 10% GBS, an expenditure of Rs.5.74 lakh crores has been incurred by these Central Ministries/Departments since financial year 2014-15, the year–wise details are at Annexure-I.
The Ministry of DoNER is also implementing five schemes under which development projects are posed by the State Governments of NER as well as by the Central Ministries/Agencies for implementation in the region. The timeline for the implementation of projects sanctioned under the schemes varies from project to project depending on the sector, geographical location, cost etc. The list of the schemes of MDoNER, the budget outlay and the sectors covered under these schemes are at Annexure- II.
This information was given by the Minister of State of the Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region Dr. Sukanta Majumdar in a written reply to a question in Rajya Sabha today.
EIB signed with Ministry for Finance the first €130 million tranche of the €260 million financing package approved by the EU Bank.
The EIB’s support will enhance Malta’s national co-financing contribution for the implementation of various EU funds, driving investments in crucial sectors of the economy.
Since 1979, the EIB Group has invested more than €1 billion in Malta.
The European Investment Bank (EIB) approved a financing package of €260 million to support the Maltese government’s investments aimed at fostering a smarter, greener, and more resilient economy. The first €130 million tranche was signed this morning in Valletta by Clyde Caruana, Minister for Finance, and Kyriacos Kakouris, EIB Vice-President. This landmark agreement will help Malta co-finance initiatives that receive grants through the European Union budget for the 2021-2027 period, advancing strategic investments in critical sectors that drive economic growth, job creation, and social cohesion.
This funding will drive investment in key areas, including modernising health infrastructure to improve healthcare accessibility, strengthening SMEs by enhancing credit access and fostering entrepreneurship, and accelerating digital transformation to expand connectivity and drive innovation. Additionally, the financing will support biodiversity protection, wastewater management, and sustainable transport initiatives such as cycling infrastructure and energy-efficient solutions. These efforts will encourage sustainable mobility, lower emissions, and enhance energy security, reinforcing Malta’s economic, social, and territorial cohesion in alignment with EU policy priorities.
The EIB will support Malta’s national co-financing share for the implementation of the Operational Programmes for the 2021-2027 period under different EU funds, namely the Cohesion Fund (CF), the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF), and the Just Transition Fund (JTF).
Minister for Finance Clyde Caruana commented: “The financing package we have just signed is a testament to the shared values between Malta and the EIB, serving as a crucial step in driving Malta’s economic growth. Through such commitment and collaboration, Malta’s vision for the future will become a reality, thus ensuring that society and local businesses will continue to thrive and excel.”
EIB Vice-President Kyriacos Kakouris highlighted: “This agreement demonstrates the EIB’s strong commitment to Malta’s sustainable growth. By accelerating investments in key areas—healthcare, digital innovation, sustainable transport, and environmental protection—we aim to enhance economic resilience and improve the quality of life for Maltese citizens. Together, we are shaping a greener, more innovative, and competitive future for Malta.”
The EIB in Malta
The European Investment Bank (EIB) has been supporting the Maltese economy since before the country’s accession to the European Union, with its first project signed in 1979 to help expand the commercial port of Valletta Grand Harbour. Since then, the EIB Group’s financing in Malta has exceeded €1 billion, aiding vital sectors such as SME access to finance, urban regeneration, climate action, telecommunications, and the construction of affordable housing. The EIB has also supported landmark infrastructure projects that have transformed the heart of Valletta, including the Parliament building and the open-air theatre at the City Gate. As the EU’s long-term lending institution, the EIB remains committed to promoting sustainable investment and fostering economic resilience in Malta and across Europe.
Background information
The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. Built around eight core priorities, we finance investments that contribute to EU policy objectives by bolstering climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and bioeconomy, social infrastructure, high-impact investments outside the European Union, and the capital markets union.
The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund (EIF), signed nearly €89 billion in new financing for over 900 high-impact projects in 2024, boosting Europe’s competitiveness and security.
All projects financed by the EIB Group are in line with the Paris Climate Agreement, as pledged in our Climate Bank Roadmap. Almost 60% of the EIB Group’s annual financing supports projects directly contributing to climate change mitigation, adaptation, and a healthier environment.
Fostering market integration and mobilising investment, the Group supported a record of over €100 billion in new investment for Europe’s energy security in 2024 and mobilised €110 billion in growth capital for startups, scale-ups and European pioneers. Approximately half of the EIB’s financing within the European Union is directed towards cohesion regions, where per capita income is lower than the EU average.
Introductory remarks by Frank Elderson, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, at the MNI Webcast on Climate Change: Impact on Monetary Policy and Bank Supervision
Frankfurt am Main, 12 February 2025
Central banks and supervisors are not climate and nature policymakers.
Central banks and supervisors are climate and nature policy takers.
And we face an ever-increasing volume of climate and nature-related factors that we must take into account in order to successfully deliver on our mandate.
This is the fundamental principle that underpins all our climate and nature-related activities at the European Central Bank.
It is a principle grounded in irrefutable facts established by the scientific community and transposed to make their implications clear for the economy and financial system. At the ECB, we have translated this principle into our monetary policy and supervisory work as a strategic commitment to account for the ongoing climate and nature crises, irrespective of shifts in the macroeconomic tides and no matter what direction the political winds may blow.
This is why, both in our monetary policy and in our banking supervision, we have meticulously formulated strategies that are robust and resilient in all weathers. In the face of changing climates, be they macroeconomic, political or indeed at the level of our planetary ecosystem, we will continue to deliver on our mandate to keep prices stable and ensure Europe’s banks are safe and sound.
Climate and nature in monetary policy
Let me start with what we our doing when it comes to accounting for climate and nature in our monetary policy.
When the ECB concluded its strategy review in the summer of 2021, our new strategy explicitly acknowledged the profound implications of climate change for the economy and therefore its relevance for monetary policy. In our strategy, we also formulated a concrete action plan, and we are delivering on that plan.
First, we have made significant progress in improving our ability to take climate considerations into account in the macroeconomic analyses that inform our policy discussions.
Second, with respect to our monetary policy instruments, we started tilting our purchases of corporate bonds towards issuers with a better climate performance to avoid undue exposures to climate-related risks. While the last remaining purchases were suspended at the start of this year, if any corporate bond purchases were to be needed for monetary policy purposes in the future, the established direction of the tilt would set the minimum benchmark. With respect to the collateral we require for our lending operations, further technical work on incorporating climate change collateral considerations is still ongoing.
Our current actions aim to support a high degree of confidence in the alignment of our activities, within our mandate, with the goals set by the Paris Agreement. We have committed to regularly reviewing all our measures to assess their impact. If necessary, we will adapt them to ensure they continue to fulfil their monetary policy objectives and support the decarbonisation path to reach the goals set by the Paris Agreement and the EU’s climate neutrality objectives. Within our mandate, we will also look into addressing additional nature-related challenges.
Climate and nature in banking supervision
Let me move to the steps we have taken in banking supervision.
Our supervisory strategy was formulated after we learnt in 2019 that less than a quarter of the banks under our supervision had demonstrably reflected on how the climate and nature crises were affecting their risk management. This observation was obviously concerning, so in 2020 we published a guide setting out our supervisory expectations. These expectations outline the ECB’s understanding of the safe and prudent management of climate and nature-related risks under the prevailing prudential framework. Since then, we have consistently taken these risks into account in our supervisory work.
Considering the requirements clearly set out in the Capital Requirements Directive as implemented in national law, and the need for banks to implement a regular process for identifying all material risks, banks must ensure that practices are in place for the sound management of climate and nature-related risks. They had to achieve this by the end of last year and, in the run-up to that deadline, we also set interim deadlines for banks to remediate certain shortcomings related to the management of these risks. These deadlines were informed by what the banks themselves considered reasonable when we first started discussing climate and nature-related risk management with them.
We are still following up on the two earlier interim deadlines while we begin assessing banks’ practices in light of their final end-2024 deadline.
After the first interim deadline back in March 2023, we saw that many banks still had not implemented an adequate materiality assessment of the impact of climate and nature-related risks across their portfolios. The ECB imposed binding supervisory decisions on 28 banks, with 22 of them being told that if they did not remedy their shortcomings by a certain date, they would incur a periodic penalty payment for each day they remained in breach of our requirements. Encouragingly, almost all banks submitted an adequate materiality assessment in time, which shows that our supervisory efforts have been effective in almost all cases. For a few banks, the process to determine whether penalties have been incurred is ongoing.
For the second interim deadline of the end of 2023, we asked banks to clearly include climate and nature-related risks in their governance, strategy and risk management. As with the first interim deadline, we found weaknesses in banks’ practices that we communicated to them in the form of further feedback letters. In a small group of outliers, foundational elements for the adequate management of climate and nature-related risks are still missing. These banks received binding supervisory decisions in autumn 2024, again outlining the potential imposition of periodic penalty payments if they fail to meet the requirements in a timely manner.
To avoid any doubt, we will proceed in exactly the same way with respect to the third and final deadline that fell due at the turn of the year. We want to see evidence that banks’ risk management practices ensure the sound management of climate and nature-related risks across all areas of our supervisory expectations. For instance, this means that banks need to consider these risks in their stress-testing frameworks, including in plausible baseline and adverse scenarios that are in line with scientific evidence. Thereafter, banks will have to keep updating their practices in accordance with advances in data availability, methodologies and legislative and regulatory requirements. Banks need to ensure that their risk management practices remain commensurate with the magnitude of the climate and nature-related risks that they face. As supervisors, it is our job to make sure they do. To deliver on this, we will use – obviously always in a proportionate way – all supervisory instruments that we have at our disposal.
Conclusion
Let me conclude.
While the fundamental principle – that climate and nature are relevant for both monetary policy and banking supervision and, therefore, must be taken into account in the exercise of our tasks – is independent of the actions of climate and nature policymakers, the intensity and configuration of the risks that will ultimately materialise is not. The choices that climate and nature policymakers make will determine what combination of transition and physical risks materialises in the years to come. Regrettably, the prevailing consensus among climate scientists is that the goal of limiting global heating to 2 degrees Celsius, as set out in the Paris Agreement, is not currently being met. Last October the UN Emissions Gap Report concluded that the world is on track for an average increase of 3.1 degrees.[1] And even that dramatic number will only be achieved if all governments stick with their current policies. The physical risks of climate and nature hazards are currently materialising at an ever-increasing scale and frequency.[2] These physical risks will continue increasing or transition policies will have to be implemented more abruptly to secure a timely transition which will cause an increase in transition risks.
To identify climate and nature-related risks, central banks, supervisors and the banks we supervise are reliant on good data. Reporting requirements in the EU’s sustainable finance framework will improve the availability of reliable and comparable data that are needed to identify and manage financial risks. This is essential to ensure that the broader sustainable finance framework can serve its purpose of unlocking finance for the green transition and thereby contributing to Europe’s competitiveness agenda.
It is inevitable that climate and nature-related risks will increase. Concealing them will not make them disappear. And ignoring them will not make them less threatening for monetary policy and banking supervision. This is why we are delivering on our strategic commitment to take them into account in our work.
2. Negotiations ahead of Parliament’s first reading (Rule 72) (action taken)
The decision of the AFET and BUDG committees to enter into interinstitutional negotiations had been announced on 10 February 2025 (minutes of 10.2.2025, item 7).
As no request for a vote pursuant to Rule 72(2) had been made, the committees responsible had been able to enter into negotiations upon expiry of the deadline.
3. Commission Work Programme 2025 (debate)
Commission statement: Commission Work Programme 2025 (2025/2500(RSP))
The President gave explanations on the conduct of the debate, as a new format was being tested.
The following spoke: Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, on the presence of the Commission at the debate.
Maroš Šefčovič (Member of the Commission) made the statement.
The following spoke: Jeroen Lenaers, on behalf of the PPE Group, Iratxe García Pérez, on behalf of the S&D Group, Jordan Bardella, on behalf of the PfE Group, Nicola Procaccini, on behalf of the ECR Group, Valérie Hayer, on behalf of the Renew Group, Bas Eickhout, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Martin Schirdewan, on behalf of The Left Group, René Aust, on behalf of the ESN Group, Tomas Tobé, Camilla Laureti, Sebastiaan Stöteler, who also answered a blue-card question from Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, Patryk Jaki, who also answered a blue-card question from Yvan Verougstraete, Billy Kelleher, Kira Marie Peter-Hansen, who also answered a blue-card question from Tomáš Zdechovský, Pasquale Tridico, Christine Anderson, Kateřina Konečná, who also answered a blue-card question from Tomáš Zdechovský, Dolors Montserrat, Mohammed Chahim, Tamás Deutsch, who also answered a blue-card question from Martin Hojsík, Lídia Pereira, who also answered a blue-card question from João Oliveira, Gabriele Bischoff, Charlie Weimers, who also answered a blue-card question from Petras Gražulis, Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, who also answered a blue-card question from Sander Smit, Željana Zovko, Damian Boeselager, Andrey Novakov, Yannis Maniatis, Jorge Buxadé Villalba, Adrian-George Axinia, Gordan Bosanac, Tomislav Sokol, Ana Catarina Mendes, Irene Montero, Monika Beňová, Lena Düpont, Alex Agius Saliba, Karlo Ressler, Paolo Borchia, Assita Kanko, Martin Hojsík, Angelika Niebler, Anna Bryłka, Zsuzsanna Borvendég, Elissavet Vozemberg-Vrionidi, Heléne Fritzon, Harald Vilimsky, Beata Szydło, Paulo Cunha, who also answered a blue-card question from João Oliveira, Mario Mantovani, Hannah Neumann, Li Andersson, Thomas Geisel, Nikolina Brnjac, Kathleen Van Brempt, Gilles Pennelle, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan and Marion Maréchal.
The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Michał Wawrykiewicz, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Hilde Vautmans, Tilly Metz, Lynn Boylan, Lukas Sieper, Sunčana Glavak, Maria Grapini, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Seán Kelly, Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis, Thomas Bajada, Cristina Maestre and Jean-Marc Germain.
The following spoke: Maroš Šefčovič.
The following spoke: Jeroen Lenaers, who referred to the presence of the Commission at the debate.
The debate closed.
4. One year after the murder of Alexei Navalny and the continued repression of the democratic opposition in Russia (debate)
Statements by Parliament: One year after the murder of Alexei Navalny and the continued repression of the democratic opposition in Russia (2024/2526(RSP))
The President made an introductory address.
The following spoke: Sandra Kalniete, on behalf of the PPE Group, Andreas Schieder, on behalf of the S&D Group, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, on behalf of the PfE Group, Nicola Procaccini, on behalf of the ECR Group, Bernard Guetta, on behalf of the Renew Group, Sergey Lagodinsky, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Martin Schirdewan, on behalf of The Left Group, and Petar Volgin, on behalf of the ESN Group.
The debate closed.
(The sitting was suspended for a few moments.)
IN THE CHAIR: Sophie WILMÈS Vice-President
5. Resumption of the sitting
The sitting resumed at 12:05.
6. Voting time
For detailed results of the votes, see also ‘Results of votes’ and ‘Results of roll-call votes’.
6.1. VAT: rules for the digital age * (vote)
Report on the draft Council directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC as regards VAT rules for the digital age [15159/2024 – C10-0170/2024 – 2022/0407(CNS)] – Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. Rapporteur: Ľudovít Ódor (A10-0001/2025)
Before the vote, Ľudovít Ódor (rapporteur) to make a statement on the basis of Rule 165(4).
(‘Results of votes’, item 1)
6.2. Administrative cooperation in the field of taxation *(vote)
Report on the proposal for a Council directive amending Directive 2011/16/EU on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation [COM(2024)0497 – C10-0169/2024 – 2024/0276(CNS)] – Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. Rapporteur: Aurore Lalucq (A10-0002/2025)
6.3. Objection pursuant to Rule 115(2) and (3): Genetically modified maize DP910521 (vote)
Motion for a resolution tabled by the ENVI Committee, in accordance with Rule 115(2) and 115(3), (B10-0061/2025) – Members responsible: Martin Häusling, Biljana Borzan, Anja Hazekamp
6.4. Objection pursuant to Rule 115(2) and (3): Genetically modified maize MON 95275 (vote)
Motion for a resolution tabled by the ENVI Committee, in accordance with Rule 115(2) and 115(3), on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 95275 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (D102172/03 – 2024/3011(RSP)) (B10-0060/2025) –Members responsible:Martin Häusling, Biljana Borzan, Anja Hazekamp
8. Approval of the minutes of the previous sitting
The minutes of the previous sitting were approved.
9. Collaboration between conservatives and the far right as a threat to competitiveness in the EU (topical debate)
The following spoke: René Repasi to open the debate proposed by the S&D Group.
The following spoke: Adam Szłapka (President-in-Office of the Council) and Stéphane Séjourné (Executive Vice-President of the Commission).
The following spoke: Daniel Caspary, on behalf of the PPE Group, Javi López, on behalf of the S&D Group, António Tânger Corrêa, on behalf of the PfE Group, Carlo Fidanza, on behalf of the ECR Group, Billy Kelleher, on behalf of the Renew Group, Daniel Freund, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Martin Schirdewan, on behalf of The Left Group, Ivan David, on behalf of the ESN Group, Lukas Mandl, Heléne Fritzon, Klara Dostalova, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Sandro Gozi, Maria Ohisalo, Marina Mesure, Markus Buchheit, Lukas Sieper, Angelika Niebler, Katarina Barley, Anders Vistisen, Charlie Weimers, Charles Goerens, Thomas Waitz, Jussi Saramo, Erik Kaliňák, Alma Ezcurra Almansa, Mohammed Chahim, Paolo Borchia, Assita Kanko, Moritz Körner, Reinier Van Lanschot, Luis-Vicențiu Lazarus, Riho Terras, Alessandra Moretti, Ondřej Knotek, Stefano Cavedagna, Anna Stürgkh, Majdouline Sbai, François-Xavier Bellamy, Andreas Schieder, Jorge Buxadé Villalba, Cristian Terheş, Stefan Berger, Vasile Dîncu, Afroditi Latinopoulou, Thomas Pellerin-Carlin, Csaba Dömötör, Estelle Ceulemans, Jean-Paul Garraud, Tiemo Wölken and Marc Angel.
The following spoke: Stéphane Séjourné and Adam Szłapka.
The debate closed.
10. Competitiveness Compass (debate)
Council and Commission statements: Competitiveness Compass (2025/2531(RSP))
Adam Szłapka (President-in-Office of the Council) and Stéphane Séjourné (Executive Vice-President of the Commission) made the statements.
The following spoke: Christian Ehler, on behalf of the PPE Group.
IN THE CHAIR: Roberts ZĪLE Vice-President
The following spoke: Mohammed Chahim, on behalf of the S&D Group, Tom Vandendriessche, on behalf of the PfE Group, Johan Van Overtveldt, on behalf of the ECR Group, Morten Løkkegaard, on behalf of the Renew Group, Marie Toussaint, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Hanna Gedin, on behalf of The Left Group, Sarah Knafo, on behalf of the ESN Group, Markus Ferber, Gabriele Bischoff, who also answered a blue-card question from Bogdan Rzońca, Anders Vistisen, Piotr Müller, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Ville Niinistö, Anthony Smith, Lefteris Nikolaou-Alavanos, Peter Liese, Alex Agius Saliba, Julie Rechagneux, who also answered a blue-card question from Anthony Smith, Elena Donazzan, Pascal Canfin, Sara Matthieu, Per Clausen, who also answered a blue-card question from Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Andreas Schwab, Irene Tinagli, who also answered a blue-card question from Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă, András Gyürk, Gheorghe Piperea, Svenja Hahn, João Oliveira, Lídia Pereira, Aurore Lalucq, Jana Nagyová, Giovanni Crosetto, Anna-Maja Henriksson, Rudi Kennes, Massimiliano Salini, Ana Catarina Mendes, who also answered blue-card questions from João Oliveira and Lídia Pereira, Margarita de la Pisa Carrión, who also answered a blue-card question from Dario Nardella, Kosma Złotowski, Anna Stürgkh, Fernando Navarrete Rojas, Estelle Ceulemans, Sebastian Kruis, Dick Erixon, Jeannette Baljeu, Jens Gieseke, Jonás Fernández, Tomasz Buczek, Antonella Sberna, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Tom Berendsen, Laura Ballarín Cereza, Pascale Piera, Nora Junco García, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Dario Nardella, Ľudovít Ódor, Eszter Lakos and Carla Tavares.
IN THE CHAIR: Christel SCHALDEMOSE Vice-President
The following spoke: Virgil-Daniel Popescu, Lara Wolters, Jessica Polfjärd, Delara Burkhardt, Eero Heinäluoma, Victor Negrescu and Marcos Ros Sempere.
The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Hélder Sousa Silva, Nina Carberry, Maria Zacharia, Maria Grapini and Sebastian Tynkkynen.
The following spoke: Stéphane Séjourné and Adam Szłapka.
The debate closed.
11. Composition of committees and delegations
The ECR Group had notified the President of the following decisions changing the composition of the committees and delegations:
– ITRE Committee: Diego Solier to replace Carlo Ciccioli
– PETI Committee: Chiara Gemma
The decisions took effect as of that day.
12. Need for targeted support to EU regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine (debate)
Council and Commission statements: Need for targeted support to EU regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine (2025/2532(RSP))
Adam Szłapka (President-in-Office of the Council)andRaffaele Fitto(Executive Vice-President of the Commission) made the statements.
The following spoke: Andrzej Halicki, on behalf of the PPE Group, Marcos Ros Sempere, on behalf of the S&D Group, Sebastian Tynkkynen, on behalf of the ECR Group, Ľubica Karvašová, on behalf of the Renew Group, Mārtiņš Staķis, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Marcin Sypniewski, on behalf of the ESN Group, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Marina Kaljurand, Tobiasz Bocheński, Elsi Katainen, Michael von der Schulenburg, Andrey Novakov, Eero Heinäluoma, Georgiana Teodorescu, Eugen Tomac, Mika Aaltola, Carla Tavares, Aurelijus Veryga, Petras Auštrevičius, Riho Terras, Reinis Pozņaks, Christophe Gomart and Maciej Wąsik.
The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Seán Kelly, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Liudas Mažylis, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė and Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă.
The following spoke: Raffaele Fitto and Adam Szłapka.
The debate closed.
13. US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement and the World Health Organisation, and the suspension of US development and humanitarian aid (debate)
Commission statement: US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement and the World Health Organisation, and the suspension of US development and humanitarian aid (2025/2527(RSP))
Hadja Lahbib (Member of the Commission) made the statement.
The following spoke: Michał Szczerba, on behalf of the PPE Group, Mohammed Chahim, on behalf of the S&D Group, Ondřej Knotek, on behalf of the PfE Group, Alexandr Vondra, on behalf of the ECR Group, Barry Andrews, on behalf of the Renew Group, Michael Bloss, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Jonas Sjöstedt, on behalf of The Left Group, Christine Anderson, on behalf of the ESN Group, Udo Bullmann, who also declined to take a blue-card question from Alexander Sell, António Tânger Corrêa, Anna Zalewska, Dan Barna, Ignazio Roberto Marino, Isabel Serra Sánchez, Alexander Sell, Ondřej Dostál, Tomislav Sokol, Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis, Gerolf Annemans, Francesco Torselli, Charles Goerens, Lena Schilling, Marc Botenga, Anja Arndt, David McAllister, Tiemo Wölken, who also answered a blue-card question from Alexander Sell, Julien Sanchez, Laurence Trochu, Sigrid Friis and Isabella Lövin.
IN THE CHAIR: Antonella SBERNA Vice-President
The following spoke: Catarina Martins, who also answered a blue-card question from Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă, Stanislav Stoyanov, Radan Kanev, Nicola Zingaretti, Juan Carlos Girauta Vidal, Sergio Berlato, who also answered a blue-card question from Radan Kanev, Michal Wiezik, Rasmus Nordqvist, Valentina Palmisano, Milan Mazurek, Lídia Pereira, Marta Temido, who also answered a blue-card question from João Oliveira, Marieke Ehlers, who also answered a blue-card question from Nicolae Ştefănuță, Lukas Sieper on some of the remarks made by the previous speaker, Nikolas Farantouris, Sander Smit, who also answered a blue-card question from Anna Strolenberg, Antonio Decaro, Hermann Tertsch, Murielle Laurent, Roman Haider, Leire Pajín, Virginie Joron, Heléne Fritzon, Gerald Hauser, Robert Biedroń, Anne-Sophie Frigout and Aleksandar Nikolic.
The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Seán Kelly, Marit Maij, Alexander Jungbluth, Lukas Sieper, Nikolina Brnjac and Michał Wawrykiewicz.
The following spoke: Hadja Lahbib.
The debate closed.
14. Honouring the memory of Ján Kuciak and Martina Kušnírová: advancing media freedom, strengthening the rule of law and protecting journalists across the EU (debate)
Commission statement: Honouring the memory of Ján Kuciak and Martina Kušnírová: advancing media freedom, strengthening the rule of law and protecting journalists across the EU (2025/2556(RSP))
Michael McGrath (Member of the Commission) made the statement.
The following spoke: Miriam Lexmann, on behalf of the PPE Group, Ana Catarina Mendes, on behalf of the S&D Group, Juan Carlos Girauta Vidal, on behalf of the PfE Group, Małgorzata Gosiewska, on behalf of the ECR Group, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, on behalf of the Renew Group, Tineke Strik, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Konstantinos Arvanitis, on behalf of The Left Group, Milan Uhrík, on behalf of the ESN Group, David Casa, Emma Rafowicz, Irena Joveva, Katarína Roth Neveďalová, Magdalena Adamowicz, Sophie Wilmès, Hristo Petrov and Laurence Farreng.
IN THE CHAIR: Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS Vice-President
The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Maria Zacharia and Lukas Sieper.
The following spoke: Michael McGrath.
The debate closed.
15. Debate on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (debate)
Michalis Hadjipantela, Evin Incir, Malik Azmani, Vladimir Prebilič, Isabel Serra Sánchez and Sebastiaan Stöteler introduced their groups’ motions for resolutions.
The following spoke: Reinhold Lopatka, on behalf of the PPE Group, Nacho Sánchez Amor, on behalf of the S&D Group, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, on behalf of the ECR Group, Mélissa Camara, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Giorgos Georgiou, on behalf of The Left Group, Nikos Papandreou and Per Clausen.
The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Geadis Geadi and Maria Zacharia.
The following spoke: Glenn Micallef (Member of the Commission).
The debate closed.
Vote: 13 February 2025.
15.2. Repression by the Ortega-Murillo regime in Nicaragua, targeting human rights defenders, political opponents and religious communities in particular
Željana Zovko, Leire Pajín, Carlo Fidanza, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Diana Riba i Giner and Tomasz Froelich introduced their groups’ motions for resolutions.
The following spoke: Antonio López-Istúriz White, on behalf of the PPE Group, Francisco Assis, on behalf of the S&D Group, Davor Ivo Stier, Gabriel Mato and Francisco José Millán Mon.
The following spoke: Glenn Micallef (Member of the Commission).
The debate closed.
Vote: 13 February 2025.
15.3. Continuing detention and risk of the death penalty for individuals in Nigeria charged with blasphemy, notably the case of Yahaya Sharif-Aminu
Miriam Lexmann, Hannes Heide, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Catarina Vieira, Merja Kyllönen, Susanna Ceccardi and Tomasz Froelich introduced their groups’ motions for resolutions.
The following spoke: Arkadiusz Mularczyk, on behalf of the ECR Group.
The following spoke: Glenn Micallef (Member of the Commission).
The debate closed.
Vote: 13 February 2025.
16. Silent crisis: the mental health of Europe’s youth (debate)
Commission statement: Silent crisis: the mental health of Europe’s youth (2025/2552(RSP))
Glenn Micallef (Member of the Commission) made the statement.
The following spoke: Tomislav Sokol, on behalf of the PPE Group, Alex Agius Saliba, on behalf of the S&D Group, Aurelijus Veryga, on behalf of the ECR Group, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, on behalf of the Renew Group, Ignazio Roberto Marino, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Catarina Martins, on behalf of The Left Group, Milan Mazurek, on behalf of the ESN Group, Adam Jarubas, Nikos Papandreou, Michele Picaro and Nicolae Ştefănuță.
IN THE CHAIR: Victor NEGRESCU Vice-President
The following spoke: Emma Fourreau, Alvise Pérez, András Tivadar Kulja, Romana Jerković, Kim Van Sparrentak, Elena Nevado del Campo, Nicolás González Casares, Peter Agius, Maria Walsh and Jessika Van Leeuwen.
The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Martine Kemp, Ana Miranda Paz, João Oliveira and Sunčana Glavak.
The following spoke: Glenn Micallef.
The debate closed.
17. Explanations of vote
Written explanations of vote
Explanations of vote submitted in writing under Rule 201 appear on the Members’ pages on Parliament’s website.
18. Agenda of the next sitting
The next sitting would be held the following day, 13 February 2025, starting at 09:00. The agenda was available on Parliament’s website.
19. Approval of the minutes of the sitting
In accordance with Rule 208(3), the minutes of the sitting would be put to the House for approval at the beginning of the afternoon of the next sitting.
20. Closure of the sitting
The sitting closed at 21:26.
LIST OF DOCUMENTS SERVING AS A BASIS FOR THE DEBATES AND DECISIONS OF PARLIAMENT
I. Motions for resolutions tabled
Recent dismissals and arrests of mayors in Türkiye
The following Members or political groups had requested that a debate be held, in accordance with Rule 150, on the following motions for resolutions:
on the recent dismissals and arrests of mayors in Türkiye (B10-0100/2025) Isabel Serra Sánchez, Özlem Demirel on behalf of The Left Group
on the recent dismissals and arrests of mayors in Türkiye (B10-0103/2025) Vladimir Prebilič, Mélissa Camara, Mounir Satouri, Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Catarina Vieira, Maria Ohisalo, Erik Marquardt, Nicolae Ştefănuță, Ville Niinistö, Villy Søvndal on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
on the recent dismissals and arrests of mayors in Türkiye (B10-0110/2025) Malik Azmani, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Petras Auštrevičius, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Sophie Wilmès, Lucia Yar on behalf of the Renew Group
on the recent dismissals and arrests of mayors in Türkiye (B10-0115/2025) Sebastiaan Stöteler, Marieke Ehlers, Jaroslav Bžoch, Roberto Vannacci, Susanna Ceccardi on behalf of the PfE Group
on the recent dismissals and arrests of mayors in Türkiye (B10-0119/2025) Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Evin Incir, Nikos Papandreou, Pina Picierno on behalf of the S&D Group
on the recent dismissals and arrests of mayors in Türkiye (B10-0121/2025) Sebastião Bugalho, Vangelis Meimarakis, Željana Zovko, Wouter Beke, Antonio López Istúriz White, Isabel Wiseler Lima, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Tomáš Zdechovský, Mirosława Nykiel, Jessica Polfjärd, Luděk Niedermayer, Jan Farský, Inese Vaidere on behalf of the PPE Group
on the recent dismissals and arrests of mayors in Türkiye (B10-0124/2025) Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Veronika Vrecionová, Ondřej Krutílek, Assita Kanko, Alexandr Vondra on behalf of the ECR Group
Repression by the Ortega-Murillo regime in Nicaragua, targeting human rights defenders, political opponents and religious communities in particular
The following Members or political groups had requested that a debate be held, in accordance with Rule 150, on the following motions for resolutions:
on the repression by the Ortega-Murillo regime in Nicaragua, targeting human rights defenders, political opponents and religious communities in particular (B10-0126/2025) Sebastião Bugalho, Željana Zovko, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Gabriel Mato, David McAllister, Vangelis Meimarakis, Wouter Beke, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Tomáš Zdechovský, Mirosława Nykiel, Jessica Polfjärd, Luděk Niedermayer, Jan Farský, Andrey Kovatchev, Inese Vaidere on behalf of the PPE Group
on the repression by the Ortega-Murillo regime in Nicaragua, targeting human rights defenders, political opponents and religious communities in particular (B10-0128/2025) Diana Riba i Giner, Catarina Vieira, Maria Ohisalo, Nicolae Ştefănuță, Ville Niinistö on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
on the repression by the Ortega-Murillo regime in Nicaragua, targeting human rights defenders, political opponents and religious communities in particular (B10-0130/2025) Tomasz Froelich on behalf of the ESN Group
on the repression by the Ortega-Murillo regime in Nicaragua, targeting human rights defenders, political opponents and religious communities in particular (B10-0131/2025) Bernard Guetta, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Engin Eroglu, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar on behalf of the Renew Group
on the repression by the Ortega-Murillo regime in Nicaragua, targeting human rights defenders, political opponents and religious communities in particular (B10-0132/2025) Hermann Tertsch, Jorge Martín Frías, Gerolf Annemans, Nikola Bartůšek, Roberto Vannacci, Susanna Ceccardi on behalf of the PfE Group
on the repression by the Ortega-Murillo regime in Nicaragua, targeting human rights defenders, political opponents and religious communities in particular (B10-0134/2025) Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Leire Pajín on behalf of the S&D Group
on the repression by the Ortega-Murillo regime in Nicaragua, targeting human rights defenders, political opponents and religious communities in particular (B10-0135/2025) Adam Bielan, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Mariusz Kamiński, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Assita Kanko, Ivaylo Valchev, Alexandr Vondra, Aurelijus Veryga, Alberico Gambino on behalf of the ECR Group
Continuing detention and risk of the death penalty for individuals in Nigeria charged with blasphemy, notably the case of Yahaya Sharif-Aminu
The following Members or political groups had requested that a debate be held, in accordance with Rule 150, on the following motions for resolutions:
on continuing detention and risk of the death penalty for individuals in Nigeria charged with blasphemy, notably the case of Yahaya Sharif-Aminu (B10-0101/2025) Merja Kyllönen on behalf of The Left Group
on continuing detention and risk of the death penalty for individuals in Nigeria charged with blasphemy, notably the case of Yahaya Sharif-Aminu (B10-0104/2025) Catarina Vieira, Maria Ohisalo, Nicolae Ştefănuță on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
on continuing detention and risk of the death penalty for individuals in Nigeria charged with blasphemy, notably the case of Yahaya Sharif-Aminu (B10-0111/2025) Susanna Ceccardi, Nikola Bartůšek on behalf of the PfE Group
on continuing detention and risk of the death penalty for individuals in Nigeria charged with blasphemy, notably the case of Yahaya Sharif-Aminu (B10-0113/2025) Tomasz Froelich on behalf of the ESN Group
on continuing detention and risk of the death penalty for individuals in Nigeria charged with blasphemy, notably the case of Yahaya Sharif-Aminu (B10-0117/2025) Jan Christoph Oetjen, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Engin Eroglu, Karin Karlsbro, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Urmas Paet, Marie Agnes Strack Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar on behalf of the Renew Group
on continuing detention and risk of the death penalty for individuals in Nigeria charged with blasphemy, notably the case of Yahaya Sharif-Aminu (B10-0120/2025) Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Hannes Heide on behalf of the S&D Group
on continuing detention and risk of the death penalty for individuals in Nigeria charged with blasphemy, notably the case of Yahaya Sharif-Aminu (B10-0122/2025) Sebastião Bugalho, Vangelis Meimarakis, Željana Zovko, Wouter Beke, Isabel Wiseler Lima, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Tomáš Zdechovský, Mirosława Nykiel, Jessica Polfjärd, Luděk Niedermayer, Jan Farský, Inese Vaidere, Andrey Kovatchev on behalf of the PPE Group
on continuing detention and risk of the death penalty for individuals in Nigeria charged with blasphemy, notably the case of Yahaya Sharif-Aminu(B10-0123/2025) Bert Jan Ruissen, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Bogdan Rzońca, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Michał Dworczyk, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Assita Kanko, Alexandr Vondra, Alberico Gambino on behalf of the ECR Group
II. Delegated acts (Rule 114(2))
Draft delegated acts forwarded to Parliament
– Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Regulation (EU) 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards OTC derivatives identifying reference data to be used for the purposes of the transparency requirements laid down in Article 8a(2) and Articles 10 and 21 (C(2025)00417 – 2025/2534(DEA))
Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 24 January 2025
referred to committee responsible: ECON
– Commission Delegated Regulation amending the regulatory technical standards laid down in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/931 as regards the specification of the formula for calculating the supervisory delta of call and put options mapped to the commodity risk category (C(2025)00459 – 2025/2537(DEA))
Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 28 January 2025
referred to committee responsible: ECON
– Commission Delegated Regulation amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/624 as regards ante-mortem inspections in slaughterhouses, ante-mortem inspections at the holding of provenance and post-mortem inspections (C(2025)00539 – 2025/2540(DEA))
Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 30 January 2025
referred to committee responsible: ENVI opinion: AGRI
– Commission Delegated Regulation amending the regulatory technical standards laid down in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/2059, Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/2060 and Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/1577 as regards the technical details of back-testing and profit and loss attribution requirements, the criteria for assessing the modellability of risk factors, and the treatment of foreign-exchange risk and commodity risk in the non-trading book (C(2025)00595 – 2025/2543(DEA))
Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 3 February 2025
referred to committee responsible: ECON
– Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council by laying down detailed rules for the yearly calculation of price differences between eligible aviation fuels and fossil kerosene and for the EU ETS allocation of allowances for the use of eligible aviation fuels (C(2025)00681 – 2025/2559(DEA))
Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 6 February 2025
referred to committee responsible: ENVI opinion: ITRE
– Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2023/2053 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the management of bluefin tuna in the eastern Atlantic and in the Mediterranean (C(2025)00748 – 2025/2560(DEA))
Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 7 February 2025
referred to committee responsible: PECH
III. Implementing measures (Rule 115)
Draft implementing measures falling under the regulatory procedure with scrutiny forwarded to Parliament
– Commission Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2023/1803 as regards International Financial Reporting Standard 9 and International Financial Reporting Standard 7 (Text with EEA relevance) (D103844/01 – 2025/2525(RPS) – deadline: 21 April 2025) referred to committee responsible: ECON opinion: JURI
– Commission Regulation amending and correcting Regulation (EU) No 142/2011 as regards certain requirements for the placing on the market and imports of animal by-products and derived products not intended for human consumption (D103880/01 – 2025/2535(RPS) – deadline: 28 April 2025) referred to committee responsible: ENVI
IV. Transfers of appropriations and budgetary decisions
In accordance with Article 29 of the Financial Regulation, the Committee on Budgets had decided to approve transfer of appropriations No 1/2025 – Section IX – European Data Protection Supervisor.
In accordance with Article 31(1) of the Financial Regulation, the Committee on Budgets had decided to approve the Commission’s transfer of appropriations DEC 01/2025 – Section III – Commission.
In accordance with Article 31(6) of the Financial Regulation, the Council of the European Union had decided to approve the Commission’s transfer of appropriations DEC 01/2025 – Section III – Commission.
The Chinese have politely told the Kiwis to back off. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun told reporters that China and the Cook Islands have had diplomatic relations since 1997 which “should not be disrupted or restrained by any third party”.
“New Zealand is rightly furious about it,” a TVNZ Pacific affairs writer editorialised to the nation. The deal and the lack of prior consultation was described by various journalists as “damaging”, “of significant concern”, “trouble in paradise”, an act by a “renegade government”.
Foreign Minister Winston Peters, not without cause, railed at what he saw as the Cook Islands government going against long-standing agreements to consult over defence and security issues.
“Should New Zealand invade the Cook islands?” . . . New Zealand Herald columnist Matthew Hooton’s view in an “oxygen-starved media environment” amid rattled nerves. Image: New Zealand Herald screenshot APR
‘Clearly about secession’ Matthew Hooton, who penned the article in The Herald, is a major commentator on various platforms.
“Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown’s dealings with China are clearly about secession from the realm of New Zealand,” Hooton said without substantiation but with considerable colonial hauteur.
“His illegal moves cannot stand. It would be a relatively straightforward military operation for our SAS to secure all key government buildings in the Cook Islands’ capital, Avarua.”
This could be written off as the hyperventilating screeching of someone trying to drum up readers but he was given a major platform to do so and New Zealanders live in an oxygen-starved media environment where alternative analysis is hard to find.
The Cook Islands, with one of the largest Exclusive Economic Zones in the world — a whopping 2 million sq km — is considered part of New Zealand’s backyard, albeit over 3000 km to the northeast. The deal with China is focused on economics not security issues, according to Cooks Prime Minister Mark Brown.
Deep sea mining may be on the list of projects as well as trade cooperation, climate, tourism, and infrastructure.
The Cook Islands seafloor is believed to have billions of tons of polymetallic nodules of cobalt, copper, nickel and manganese, something that has even caught the attention of US Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Various players have their eyes on it.
Glen Johnson, writing in Le Monde Diplomatique, reported last year:
“Environmentalists have raised major concerns, particularly over the destruction of deep-sea habitats and the vast, choking sediment plumes that excavation would produce.”
All will be revealed Even Cook Island’s citizens have not been consulted on the details of the deal, including deep sea mining. Clearly, this should not be the case. All will be revealed shortly.
New Zealand and the Cook Islands have had formal relations since 1901 when the British “transferred” the islands to New Zealand. Cook Islanders have a curious status: they hold New Zealand passports but are recognised as their own country. The US government went a step further on September 25, 2023. President Joe Biden said:
“Today I am proud to announce that the United States recognises the Cook Islands as a sovereign and independent state and will establish diplomatic relations between our two nations.”
A move to create their own passports was undermined by New Zealand officials who successfully stymied the plan.
New Zealand has taken an increasingly hostile stance vis-a-vis China, with PM Luxon describing the country as a “strategic competitor” while at the same time depending on China as our biggest trading partner. The government and a compliant mainstream media sing as one choir when it comes to China: it is seen as a threat, a looming pretender to be South Pacific hegemon, replacing the flip-flopping, increasingly incoherent USA.
Climate change looms large for island nations. Much of the Cooks’ tourism infrastructure is vulnerable to coastal inundation and precious reefs are being destroyed by heating sea temperatures.
“One thing that New Zealand has got to get its head round is the fact that the Trump administration has withdrawn from the Paris Climate Accord,” Dr Robert Patman, professor of international relations at Otago University, says. “And this is a big deal for most Pacific Island states — and that means that the Cook Islands nation may well be looking for greater assistance elsewhere.”
Diplomatic spat with global coverage The story of the diplomatic spat has been covered in the Middle East, Europe and Asia. Eyebrows are rising as yet again New Zealand, a close ally of Israel and a participant in the US Operation Prosperity Guardian to lift the Houthi Red Sea blockade of Israel, shows its Western mindset.
Matthew Hooton’s article is the kind of colonialist fantasy masquerading as geopolitical analysis that damages New Zealand’s reputation as a friend to the smaller nations of our region.
Yes, the Chinese have an interest in our neck of the woods — China is second only to Australia in supplying much-needed development assistance to the region.
It is sound policy not insurrection for small nations to diversify economic partnerships and secure development opportunities for their people. That said, serious questions should be posed and deserve to be answered.
Geopolitical analyst Dr Geoffrey Miller made a useful contribution to the debate saying there was potential for all three parties to work together:
“There is no reason why New Zealand can’t get together with China and the Cook Islands and develop some projects together,” Dr Miller says. “Pacific states are the winners here because there is a lot of competition for them”.
I think New Zealand and Australia could combine more effectively with a host of South Pacific island nations and form a more effective regional voice with which to engage with the wider world and collectively resist efforts by the US and China to turn the region into a theatre of competition.
We throw the toys out We throw the toys out of the cot when the Cooks don’t consult with us but shrug when Pasifika elders like former Tuvalu PM Enele Sopoaga call us out for ignoring them.
In Wellington last year, I heard him challenge the bigger powers, particularly Australia and New Zealand, to remember that the existential threat faced by Pacific nations comes first from climate change. He also reminded New Zealanders of the commitment to keeping the South Pacific nuclear-free.
To succeed, a “Pacific for the peoples of the Pacific” approach would suggest our ministries of foreign affairs should halt their drift to being little more than branch offices of the Pentagon and that our governments should not sign up to US Great Power competition with China.
Ditching the misguided anti-China AUKUS project would be a good start.
Friends to all, enemies of none. Keep the Pacific peaceful, neutral and nuclear-free.
Eugene Doyle is a community organiser and activist in Wellington, New Zealand. He received an Absolutely Positively Wellingtonian award in 2023 for community service. His first demonstration was at the age of 12 against the Vietnam War. This article was first published at his public policy website Solidarity and is republished here with permission.
