NewzIntel.com

Category: Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Michael S Barr: Artificial intelligence and the labor market – a scenario-based approach

    Source: Bank for International Settlements

    Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today. In my remarks, I would like to address a key question facing economists, policymakers, and people all over the world: How will artificial intelligence, particularly generative artificial intelligence, or GenAI, affect workers and the labor market in the years ahead?

    Before I turn to that issue, I’d like to touch on a topic that I expect is also of interest: the outlook for the U.S. economy and the implications for monetary policy.

    The U.S. economy entered this quarter in a relatively strong position: The unemployment rate has been low and stable, and the disinflationary process has continued on a gradual, albeit uneven, path towards our 2 percent objective. Private domestic final purchases have been solid. Overall, the economy has been resilient.

    Against that backdrop, the outlook has been clouded by trade policies that have led to an increase in uncertainty, contributing to declines in measures of consumer and business sentiment. I expect tariffs to lead to higher inflation in the United States and lower growth both in the United States and abroad starting later this year.

    In my view, higher tariffs could lead to disruption to global supply chains and create persistent upward pressure on inflation. Faced with substantial tariffs, businesses will likely change how they source intermediate inputs, and it will take time and investment for them to reroute their distribution networks. Conversely, global trade networks may change rapidly, and some suppliers may not be able to adapt quickly enough to survive these changes. This concern is particularly acute for small businesses, which are less diversified, less able to access credit, and hence more vulnerable to adverse shocks. Small businesses play a vital role in production networks, often providing specialized inputs that can’t easily be sourced elsewhere, and business failures could further disrupt supply chains. As we saw during the pandemic, such disruptions can have large and lasting effects on prices, as well as output.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Secretary-General of ASEAN Attends the Signing Ceremony of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on ASEAN 2045: Our Shared Future

    Source: ASEAN

    Secretary-General of ASEAN, Dr. Kao Kim Hourn, took part in the Signing Ceremony of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on ASEAN 2045: Our Shared Future. This marks a milestone for ASEAN as it embarks on a new chapter in its Community-building process for the next 20 years, towards a resilient, innovative, dynamic, and people-centred ASEAN.
     
     

    Download the ASEAN Community Vision 2045: https://asean.org/book/asean-2045-our-shared-future-2/
    Read more on the ASEAN Community Vision 2045 : https://asean.org/book/frequently-asked-questions-on-asean-2045-our-shared-future/

    The post Secretary-General of ASEAN Attends the Signing Ceremony of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on ASEAN 2045: Our Shared Future appeared first on ASEAN Main Portal.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Adriana D Kugler: Assessing maximum employment

    Source: Bank for International Settlements

    Thank you, Francine, and thank you to the Central Bank of Iceland for the invitation to speak to you today.

    My subject is the Federal Reserve’s mandate of maximum employment. In the Fed’s monetary policymaking, maximum employment and stable prices are linked in the mandate assigned to the Federal Reserve by U.S. law, which we refer to as the dual mandate. Icelanders, I know, are a seafaring people, and those here will understand what I mean when I say that the dual mandate is our “lodestar,” a word our two languages share. It is our goal and our guide in setting monetary policy.

    There is an important distinction between our dual-mandate goals. For reasons that I will explain, while the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has defined “stable prices” as 2 percent annual inflation, such numerical precision is not possible in defining maximum employment.

    To achieve price stability, the Fed adopted a numerical target for inflation in 2012 that hasn’t changed. It has remained unchanged because the Committee has repeatedly reaffirmed the judgment that it made in 2012 that 2 percent inflation is the rate most consistent with its statutory mandate. In contrast, the Federal Reserve has not spelled out a numerical goal for the unemployment rate or some other measure of employment because maximum employment can move up and down over time and is not directly measurable, and also because the different factors that determine it are either difficult or impossible to measure in real time.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Klaas Knot: A true treasure – why we need diversity and inclusion in the financial industry

    Source: Bank for International Settlements

    Welcome dear colleagues! Welcome to the conference and welcome to our renovated building.

    After several years of construction, De Nederlandsche Bank returned a few months ago to this updated version of our historic home. It is not only energy-efficient and sustainable, but also – quite unusual for a central bank – partially open to the public: on the ground floor, visitors can walk in to have a coffee, work, study, or simply look around.

    Look at our extensive art collection – as you can do later today – or visit the vault where we used to store our gold bars and our money. Now we call it the New Treasury and use it as an exhibition space where visitors can learn more about our role and responsibilities and explore our collection of historic banknotes, with a lot of European pre-euro examples. I hope you take the opportunity to visit the exhibition. 

    Of course I am convinced that the introduction of the euro was a positive change – I am the president of the Dutch Central Bank, after all – but despite everything we gained in this monetary union, we also lost something.

    In our banknotes we lost colour, individuality, diversity. Because the pre-euro banknotes all tell their own story. Of national identity, cultural heritage, time and place. They differ in colour, imagery, size; even in the feel of the paper.

    The Italian lira, with historic painters and sculptors: ornate and expressive.
    The German mark, with scientists and writers: inventive and efficient.
    The Dutch guilder, with colourful birds and sunflowers: bold and modernist.

    To name only a few.

    These banknotes remind us that diversity is not disorder.

    It is depth.
    It is opportunity.
    It is strength.

    The banknotes remind us that it is never one person, one idea that makes us strong.

    Our strength as nations, as the European Community, as financial institutions, is always the product of a flock of ideas, a blend of people, a collection of perspectives. 

    At De Nederlandsche Bank, our vision is ‘connected and diverse’. We believe that to safeguard financial stability and promote sustainable prosperity, we must reflect the society we serve – one that is increasingly complex, international, and indeed, diverse. That is why we aim for a workforce that mirrors the richness of our society.

    Diversity for us is sometimes broad and visible: diversity in gender, age and cultural heritage. But it can also be less visible: diversity in physical and mental ability, sexual orientation, faith, background, education. We don’t pursue diversity for appearances sake. We pursue it because it sharpens our thinking, deepens our dialogue, and improves our decision-making. Complex challenges – like climate risk, digital transformation, and geopolitical uncertainty – demand diverse perspectives. 

    That is not an abstract mission, but a commitment to tangible goals. We are aiming for full gender balance in our workforce and leadership by 2028.

    We are not there yet, we hope to hit our target if we can continue improving by 2% per year. Currently, women make up 43% of DNB’s management, and we are still working on this. We are using the updated definitions from the Dutch Statistical Office to improve cultural representation, with the aim of having 26% of our employees and managers come from a migrant background.

    We have achieved this on the work floor, but not yet in management, where the figure is currently just over 13%; so this is also a work in progress.

    We are making all this happen by translating our ambition for diversity and inclusion into our policies and daily work processes.

    And by keeping track of our progress. We believe – obviously – that data drives progress. What gets measured, gets managed.

    So we have established a Diversity Board to guide and accelerate our progress, and we measure our progress with a Diversity Dashboard. Recently, we published our Out & Proud Statement, in which we explicitly express our support for LGTBIQ+ inclusion and speak out against intolerance. Because there is a world to be gained, and in some cases, regained when it comes to LGTBIQ+ inclusion.

    I am saddened to see that LGTBIQ+ inclusion has declined in recent years in European countries and across the world. Statistics show decreasing support for LGTBIQ+ inclusion – also among younger people.

    We are seeing more frequent physical, verbal and online violence, and politicians are rolling back previously attained rights for LGBTIQ+ couples.This declining support and safety affects LGTBIQ+ people throughout society, including those working at central banks and other financial institutions.

    For our employees to reach their full potential, for them to make the best contribution to our work and mission and – not least – for us to fulfil our potential as an employer, our employees must feel safe, must be able to express themselves. That’s why we have to work together to become – and stay – diverse and inclusive organisations. And that requires the involvement of all of us.

    At DNB, we encourage this by empowering our internal networks, like Young DNB, DNB Pride, DNB International, Blended and Female Capital, but we also try hard to involve every employee outside those networks. Because only by involving everyone can we ensure that every colleague – regardless of who they are – feels seen, heard and valued.

    This is my call to action to you today:

    let’s talk, let’s exchange experiences, let’s exchange ideas to make this happen. For instance by ensuring that – where that is not already happening – we create space for internal networks, for LGBTIQ+ employee resource groups. And, even better, let’s create an international network for these groups, so they can strengthen each other, and by doing so, strengthen our organisations.

    Do you know what this is?

    After the introduction of the euro, we shredded all those beautiful old banknotes. We packed the shreds in small bags, which we handed out as souvenirs to visitors of DNB. One of our doormen used to say, with a big wink and a smile: “It’s a jigsaw puzzle.”

    But of course there is a lesson here: creating a diverse and inclusive workplace is a human-made jigsaw puzzle that we can only put together through human-made solutions.

    We have to look for and connect the diversity of our people. We have to ensure that human uniqueness is not just tolerated, but treasured in our financial institutions.

    Because only then can we truly claim to be resilient. Only then can we speak credibly in the public debate. Only then we can see the full picture: a financial sector that not only serves society – but represents it. 

    And our banknotes?

    There is good news on that front: the European Central Bank is preparing to introduce a new generation of euro banknotes. The ECB is consciously seeking to reflect more of the identities, histories and cultures of the people who use them.

    So once more – I hope – the designs will be colourful, representative and diverse. Because diversity does not weaken unity, it strengthens it. Not only in the European Union, not only in the financial sector, but for all of us.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Sabine Mauderer: Price stability and climate change

    Source: Bank for International Settlements

    Check against delivery 

    1 Introduction 

    Ladies and gentlemen. 

    I am delighted to have the opportunity to open this conference today.

    I am sure, we all agree: climate change alters the environment in which central banks operate. 

    According to the NGFS long-term scenarios, unmitigated climate change leads to losses in global GDP of almost 15 % by 2050 – relative to a scenario without climate change. This is a conservative estimate, as it does not yet account for key risks, such as sea level rise and climate tipping points.

    Given the context of this conference, there is no need to give you any further examples about the relevance of climate change. Instead, allow me to briefly recap why and how we as central bankers need to deal with climate change: In doing so, I will focus on some of the most important aspects. 

    2 Physical impacts and climate policies

    Let me turn to the two dimensions of what we call “climate change” for short: the impacts of climate change itself, and the effects of our attempts to mitigate it. 

    Central banks monitor both dimensions because of their relevance for output and prices. This is why I highly appreciate that the impacts of physical risk and transition risk on inflation are at the core of today’s conference. 

    Let’s start with physical risks. 

    In addition to the consequences of gradual shifts in temperature patterns or sea level rise, acute physical risks such as hurricanes, droughts or floods can damage the economy, with impacts lasting beyond the short-term. As the timing, location and magnitude of such shocks are largely unpredictable, central banks are on high alert. 

    In theory, the direction of price developments depends on the balance between supply and demand. Severe weather events could affect either side. Supply-side disruptions tend to cause higher prices whereas a reduction in demand tends to entail lower prices. 

    Without pre-empting the work presented at this conference: As outlined in a recent technical paper by the NGFS1, the emerging empirical work on the linkage between weather shocks and inflation suggests that the upward pressure from the supply side dominates, for instance, for agricultural production.

    One key finding is that food prices tend to rise in the aftermath of a weather shock – associated with negative supply impacts – with some spillovers into overall inflation.2 Moreover, the specific nature of the shock matters, with nonlinear inflationary effects being documented in the case of heatwaves.

    The type of damages can differ as well: while heatwaves tend to impact labour and agricultural productivity, leaving the capital stock unaffected, severe storms tend to impair infrastructure, housing, and the capital stock of an economy.3

    There is also the second dimension – transition risk. Many jurisdictions have committed to decarbonise their economies. This goes hand in hand with substantial structural changes that can also pose risks for price stability. 

    But the picture emerging here is more mixed: the impact of a green transition on inflation depends on its drivers and how it unfolds in the economy. 

    Moreover, short and long-run effects can differ.

    What are these drivers? Let me briefly elaborate. 

    Depending on the policy mix, the pace of technological progress, changes in preferences and the role of international trade relations4 – to mention just a few main aspects – the transition will affect the supply and demand side of the economy in multiple ways. 

    Hence there is no straightforward answer to the question whether inflationary or disinflationary effects will dominate. A higher carbon price, for example, makes carbon intensive products and businesses more expensive. As a result, consumer price inflation may rise in the short-term. 

    Over the medium to long run, however, higher costs of brown products will make it more attractive to shift to greener production processes – and invest in innovative green technologies. 

    Green innovations, efficiency gains and maturing technologies, together with an increasing usage of clean energy, can drive energy costs and prices down over time.5 Therefore, inflationary pressures are likely to remain contained in the medium to long run, especially in the event of an orderly transition with predictable carbon prices.

    Along the way, central banks will have to make sure that inflation expectations remain well-anchored, as maintaining price stability is their core mandate.

    Accelerating the green transition is up to our governments, but price stability and a sound financial system are important facilitators of this process.

    3 Conclusion

    Ladies and gentlemen. 

    Our economies are facing multidimensional, unprecedented structural changes. The green transition is just one aspect. 

    At the current juncture, the approaching threats of climate change are overshadowed by other topics. We are all witnessing the shift in attention to artificial intelligence, tariffs and trade wars, and the rising geopolitical uncertainties.

    The many unknowns associated to these topics make strategic long-term decisions particularly challenging for policymakers, firms and households alike. 

    Yet, climate change is and remains an urgent issue that involves answering complicated questions. The physical principles of climate change have not changed. Climate change will not simply disappear if we try to ignore it.

    But we will get closer to a solution every day – if we tackle these questions courageously and analytically. 

    Events like this conference are important to keep the attention on the problem and to improve our understanding of climate risks.

    In this spirit, I wish you a successful and productive discussion.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Secretary-General of ASEAN meets with the Chairman of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade

    Source: ASEAN

    Secretary-General of ASEAN, Dr. Kao Kim Hourn, today met with the Chairman of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), Mr. Ren Hongbin, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The meeting focused on exploring ways to further deepen bilateral trade and economic cooperation between ASEAN and China, especially looking at untapped potentials.

    The post Secretary-General of ASEAN meets with the Chairman of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade appeared first on ASEAN Main Portal.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: ASEAN-U.S. Cybersecurity Training Level 1 for IT Professionals at the ASEAN Secretariat

    Source: ASEAN – Association of SouthEast Asian Nations

    A five-half-day workshop on Cybersecurity Training Level 1 for IT Professionals was conducted at the ASEAN Headquarters/Secretariat from 19 to 23 May 2025, and attended by participants from the ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Entities and Project Management Team. This workshop was sponsored by the ASEAN-US Partnership Program and designed to deliver an advanced technical training to participants by equipping them with the knowledge to manage cybersecurity systems, respond to incidents, and implement best practices in securing organizational data.

    The post ASEAN-U.S. Cybersecurity Training Level 1 for IT Professionals at the ASEAN Secretariat appeared first on ASEAN Main Portal.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: A new era of app development with AI agents at the center

    Source: Microsoft

    Headline: A new era of app development with AI agents at the center

    As we transition to a world where work is increasingly done through human collaboration with agents, the way we think about applications is changing dramatically. Microsoft Power Apps is at the center of evolving how we build agent-centric apps, what it means to use them, and how we manage thousands of these solutions at scale.

    Today, we’re announcing three major updates that bring this vision to life:

    • Plans in Power Apps are now generally available, giving developers a team of specialized agents that help them to go from business idea to end-to-end solution in record time.
    • New agent feed in Power Apps enters public preview, delivering an intuitive new experience for business users to manage and collaborate with agents inside their apps, making apps the hub of human-agent collaboration.
    • The managed platform is expanding the world-class governance, security, and operational control that supports millions of users today. And now, developers can deploy code-first apps built using tools, such as Cursor or VS code to Microsoft Power Platform to take advantage of the built-in security, management, governance, and deployment capabilities.

    Together, these capabilities form a unified development experience that accelerates app creation, supercharges productivity, and governs agentic experiences. Let’s dive into what these updates mean for developers and business users, and how to start building with AI from day one. 

    Explore solutions with Power Apps

    Start with a plan 

    Introduced at Microsoft Ignite 2024, plans are now generally available in Power Apps. Developers can now work with a team of agents to define requirements, map processes, create data models, and architect multiple components of a solution to work together. Whether you’re expanding on existing assets or starting a fully new solution, plans bring it all together, guiding you from problem statement to working code.  

    Early adopters like Heineken or EY are already seeing the potential of accelerating their development cycles and uncovering new efficiencies. Based on the success of customers we are now rolling out plans to more regions and languages.  

    We’ve been working with the plans, and this has so much potential. You really see how it’s going to increase our speed to market and grow our footprint when it comes to our global team across the world.  

    —Giada Binelli, Global Product Owner for low-code platforms, The HEINEKEN Company

    From business requirements to agentic solutions 

    The new process mapping agent, now available in public preview, helps transform solution requirements and user personas into comprehensive process maps that anchor the plans. This visual blueprint provides an end-to-end view of the process, data, and solution architecture to optimize it—detailing how each component addresses specific business challenges. Developers can drill down into each step for nuanced improvements and get suggestions on how to best combine apps, agents, and flows to further fine-tune your processes. 

    [embedded content]

    A walkthrough video of plans in Power Apps. Maker proceeds from the initial description, defines business requirements, process map, and data model, and is presented with solution architecture proposal—including Microsoft Copilot Studio agents. They also move from the plan to building a Microsoft Copilot Studio agent and an app in Power Apps. Note: the recorded video is pre-release documentation and was edited for marketing purposes; in-product experience might slightly differ from it.

    Developers can now jumpstart plans using existing solutions by easily adding already-built apps and tables into their plans. This capability allows developers to integrate prior work into a cohesive, interconnected solution that unlocks new value and can be further optimized as the plan evolves. 

    Additionally, suggested solutions will also include reports, portals, and Microsoft Copilot Studio agents. This expansion allows developers to architect a comprehensive, intelligent solution upfront, before diving into creation of individual artifacts. 

    [embedded content]

    A maker moves from plan to Power Apps Studio with a single click and sees an app being generated from the plan. Note: the recording is adjusted for marketing purposes, in-product experience might slightly differ from it.

    With a single click, developers can jump into the right authoring tool to refine and deploy their apps and agents—carrying over the requirements and data they defined in the plan. That context powers the generation of the initial app or agent, accelerating the time it takes to build individual solution elements and keeping personas and business logic front and center. 

    Generate AI-tailored experiences 

    Power Apps is also introducing generated pages, empowering developers to create fully customized user experiences in native React code. Simply describe what you want an app or page to do, easily add Microsoft Dataverse tables, attach a whiteboard sketch, and iteratively refine the design and functionality of the app page using natural language. Developers can also add rich interactions like drag and drop, file upload, and on-hover animations to an app in just a few minutes. Sign up for the Early Access Program to be among the first to try generated pages.

    [embedded content]

    A maker uses new capability to create generated page from natural language, and sees the agent reasoning as well as code streamed live. Note: in-product experience might slightly differ from it.

    Apps are the new frontier for human-agent collaboration

    People are increasingly collaborating on key business functions with agents, and these users need new workspaces to work with those digital coworkers. Now, applications built in Power Apps support human-agent collaboration with agent feed, where business users can: 

    • See agent actions (public preview)
      A comprehensive activity feed that surfaces what agents are doing on their behalf, wherever they are in the app. 
    • Get real-time guidance (Early Access Program)
      Receive prompts and recommendations on when and how to step in to unblock or reassign tasks on the spot. 
    • Automate work with intelligent actions (Early Access Program)
      Configure and automate workflows from within the templates, without ever leaving the interface. 

    [embedded content]

    A walkthrough of agent feed capability from user point of view as well as experience of maker setting up the experience. Note: the recording is pre-release and was edited for marketing purposes; in-product experience might slightly differ from it.

    On the homepage, as well as in continuously visible left-hand pane feed, users gain a unified view of every agent assigned to their app and how they are performing. The agent feed dynamically highlights completed tasks, surfaces in-app prompts when agents need help, and recommends the next best action—whether that’s unblocking or reassigning work. Users are guided in real time with contextual suggestions, helping them focus their attention on the highest-value tasks and accelerating decision making.

    Enterprise-grade managed platform for all your solutions 

    Microsoft Power Platform delivers true enterprise scale. In November 2024, we announced major updates to our managed capabilities—spanning Microsoft Power Platform and Microsoft Copilot Studio, with new capabilities for managed governance, managed security and managed operations. By March we expanded these further with managed availability, an enhanced tool to give admins visibility and control over agents. 

    Enterprises running solutions on Microsoft Power Platform can now take advantage of new monitoring updates. Improved visibility into how apps, flows, and agents are used help them to better manage adoption, troubleshoot, and optimize. Additionally, the security score can be customized to suit organizational needs to strengthen defenses. 

    This fully managed platform gives enterprise teams the control and insights they need to confidently scale solutions. 

    Bring code-first apps to a fully managed platform

    Now, developers joining our Early Access Program will be able to bring their code-built apps from Cursor or Visual Studio Code into the Microsoft Power Platform ecosystem, unlocking the same enterprise-grade reliability and operational excellence across all development approaches. This is a significant step forward in our journey to support all developers and all solutions, backed by enterprise-grade governance, security, operations, and availability. If you are interested in the potential to participate in an early access preview, please sign up. 

    [embedded content]

    A recording of developer working in Visual Studio Code and publishing their app to Power Apps and then running and sharing it. Note: in-product experience might slightly differ from it.

    Embrace the future of intelligent app development with Power Apps 

    With the latest advancements in Power Apps, you’re equipped to transform ideas into intelligent, collaborative solutions faster than ever. Whether you’re a seasoned developer or a business user, these tools empower you to gain an AI advantage and streamline processes to enhance productivity. 

    Experience the future of app development—explore the new features, join our Early Access Program, and start building intelligent apps today. 

    Get started now

    Join us for the sessions during Microsoft Build 2025

    And don’t forget to follow news in Microsoft Power Automate, Microsoft Power Pages, and Microsoft Copilot Studio, as well as all the important updates to our managed platform.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: ICC responds to US-EU tariff proposal

    Source: International Chamber of Commerce

    Headline: ICC responds to US-EU tariff proposal

    ICC Secretary General John W.H. Denton AO said:

    “The proposed tariff hike on EU imports introduces major uncertainty into one of the most stable and integrated trade relationships in the world. The immediate effect — for businesses on both sides of the Atlantic — will be to further chill investment decisions, disrupt essential supply chains and undermine market confidence.

    “The transatlantic relationship is not only of immense economic importance — it is, in many ways, the cornerstone of the rules-based global trading system. For decades, EU-US trade has set an important standard for openness, reliability and shared prosperity. A sharp escalation in tariffs between two central pillars of the global economy risks sending shockwaves through the global business community at a time when stability is at an absolute premium.

    “We call on the US and EU to redouble ongoing efforts to renew their trade relationship. A swift and coordinated de-escalation is essential to preserve the trust and stability that underpin international commerce, business investment and job creation.”

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Members consider China’s request for panel to examine Canadian surtax measures

    Source: World Trade Organization

    The DSB Chair, Ambassador Clare Kelly (New Zealand), announced at the start of the meeting that Canada’s request for a panel in DS636, “China — Additional Import Duties on Certain Agricultural and Fishery Products from Canada”, had been removed from the agenda at the request of Canada.

    DS627: Canada — Measures on Certain Products of Chinese Origin

    China submitted its first request for the establishment of a dispute panel with respect to the surtax measures imposed by Canada on certain products of Chinese origin, including electric vehicles and steel and aluminium products. The request also cites Canada’s alleged decision to impose measures on certain solar products, critical minerals, semiconductors, permanent magnets and natural graphite imported from China. China also cited in its panel request any other Canadian surtax measures on products or materials that originate in China.

    China and Canada held consultations in April 2025 but failed to resolve the dispute, China said, prompting its request for the panel. China said the measures are in direct breach of Canada’s WTO obligations. China said it remains open to working with Canada to resolve the dispute amicably in accordance with WTO rules.

    Canada said it engaged with China in a constructive manner during the consultations. It is unfortunate that China has included in its panel request claims related to certain solar products, critical minerals, semiconductors, permanent magnets and natural graphite imported from China, Canada said, noting that there are no Canadian surtax measures on these products.

    Canada said its surtax measures on electric vehicles, steel and aluminium products are justified under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and that it was fully prepared to defend these measures. In light of this, Canada said it is not ready to accept the establishment of a panel. Canada remains committed to maintaining constructive dialogue with China and to the rules-based multilateral trading system, it added.

    The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to the matter if requested by a member.

    Appellate Body appointments

    Colombia, speaking on behalf of 130 members, introduced for the 87th time the group’s proposal to start the selection processes for filling vacancies on the Appellate Body. The extensive number of members submitting the proposal reflects a common interest in the functioning of the Appellate Body and, more generally, in the functioning of the WTO’s dispute settlement system, Colombia said.

    The United States said it does not support the proposal and noted its longstanding concerns with WTO dispute settlement that have persisted across US administrations. The US cited as an example its concern over rulings containing interpretations deviating from the text of WTO agreements and creating precedents. It emphasized that the dispute settlement system was intended to resolve specific disputes rather than create new rules for members. The US reiterated that fundamental reform of WTO dispute settlement is needed and that it will reflect on the extent to which it is possible to achieve such a reformed WTO dispute settlement system.

    More than 20 members took the floor to comment, one speaking on behalf of a group of members. Several members urged others to consider joining the Multi-party interim appeal arrangement (MPIA), a contingent measure to safeguard the right to appeal in the absence of a functioning Appellate Body. A number welcomed the decision of Malaysia and Paraguay to join the MPIA.

    Colombia, on behalf of the 130 members, said it regretted that for the 87th occasion members have not been able to launch the selection processes. Ongoing conversations about reform of the dispute settlement system should not prevent the Appellate Body from continuing to operate fully, and members shall comply with their obligation under the Dispute Settlement Understanding to fill the vacancies as they arise, Colombia said for the group.

    Dispute settlement reform

    The DSB Chair said that, as members would recall from the last General Council (GC) meeting on 20-21 May, the GC Chair Ambassador Saqer Abdullah Almoqbel (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) had informed members about his intention to consult with interested delegations on advancing work in three key areas, including dispute settlement reform. The consultations are now ongoing, the DSB Chair said.

    Surveillance of implementation

    The United States presented status reports with regard to DS184, “US — Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan”,  DS160, “United States — Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act”, DS464, “United States — Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on Large Residential Washers from Korea”, and DS471, “United States — Certain Methodologies and their Application to Anti-Dumping Proceedings Involving China.”

    The European Union presented a status report with regard to DS291, “EC — Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products.”

    Indonesia presented its status reports in DS477 and DS478, “Indonesia — Importation of Horticultural Products, Animals and Animal Products.” 

    Next meeting

    The next regular DSB meeting will take place on 23 June 2025.

    Share

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Members advance discussions on special and differential treatment proposals

    Source: WTO

    Headline: Members advance discussions on special and differential treatment proposals

    Members heard updates from three facilitators of the discussions. Barbados, speaking on behalf of the G-90, presented a roadmap for future work leading up to the 14th Ministerial Conference (MC14) in March 2026, with a view to achieving possible outcomes at MC14 regarding the three proposals. The Group reiterated its commitment to advancing the proposals in a constructive, evidence-based and inclusive manner.
    The Chair, Ambassador Kadra Ahmed Hassan of Djibouti, briefed members on recent bilateral consultations with delegations and group coordinators regarding the Committee’s work going forward. She recognised willingness from members to engage in S&DT negotiations with flexibility and pragmatism.
    On the SPS and TBT proposals, the facilitator Daniel Lim of Singapore updated members on his consultations, encouraging collaboration with the SPS and TBT committees. He said he has been working with members and these committees to convene a thematic session in July, which would explore possible avenues to address the challenges and needs faced by developing economies and least developed countries (LDCs).
    The chairs of the SPS and TBT committees, Cecilia Risolo of Argentina and Daniela García of Ecuador, respectively, also provided detailed updates on their committees’ work, including efforts to enhance the implementation of S&DT for developing members and LDCs. Members were also encouraged to participate in the upcoming thematic session on TBT, scheduled for 24 June 2025.
    Regarding the issue of technology transfer to LDCs under TRIPS Article 66.2, the facilitator Joel Richards of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines informed members that an informal thematic information session is planned for 12 June 2025. This session will provide an opportunity for LDCs, donor members, external experts, private sector representatives and relevant international organizations to share insights into LDCs’ needs and how these can be effectively addressed. Several members also emphasized the importance of ensuring synergies with relevant technical committees.
    The facilitator Eduardo Terada Kosmiskas of Brazil submitted an update on his consultations regarding the proposal on trade-related investment measures. He called on members to continue to be flexible in exploring ways to advance discussions on the G-90 proposal.
    The Chair urged members to make full use of the facilitators and to continue engaging constructively. Members underlined the need for collaboration with relevant WTO bodies, with a view to fostering shared understandings and developing collective solutions to the specific challenges faced by developing economies, particularly LDCs. The Chair noted:  “With less than a year until MC14, it is clear that we need to work with a sense of urgency and stronger focus on results.”
    The negotiations taking place in the special session are mandated by Paragraph 44 of the 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration.
    More information on special and differential treatment is available here.

    Share

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Introducing the Agent Store: Build, publish and discover agents in Microsoft 365 Copilot

    Source: Microsoft

    Headline: Introducing the Agent Store: Build, publish and discover agents in Microsoft 365 Copilot

    As organizations embrace AI to transform how work gets done, agents are emerging as a powerful new way to automate tasks, streamline workflows, and boost productivity. Today, we’re excited to introduce the Agent Store—a centralized, curated marketplace that features agents built by Microsoft, trusted partners, and customers.

    Whether you’re a developer looking to reach millions of users or an employee seeking AI tools to boost productivity, the Agent Store is your one-stop shop for the next generation of AI assistants.

    What is the Agent Store?

    The Agent Store offers a new, immersive experience within Microsoft 365 Copilot that enables users to browse, install, and try agents tailored to their needs. It provides:

    • Agents from Microsoft, trusted partners, and customers
    • Personalized discovery based on user activities and profiles
    • Seamless integration across Microsoft 365 products including Teams and m365copilot.com
    • Support for both Microsoft 365 Copilot licensed customers and unlicensed customers

    This is more than just a marketplace—it’s a centralized platform where users can discover powerful tools to enhance productivity and streamline their workflows.

    Why agents? Why now?

    Microsoft 365 Copilot is the UI for AI—your personal assistant grounded in your work content. Agents, on the other hand, are purpose-built assistants designed to automate specific business processes. They can be as simple as a knowledge agent or as complex as a multi-modal orchestrator.

    With the Agent Store, we’re making it easier than ever to discover agents that solve real business problems, share and deploy agents across teams and organizations, and build and publish agents using both low-code and pro-code tools.

    What’s in the Agent Store today?

    The Agent Store launches with over 70 agents and a growing catalog. Key features include:

    • Curated collections of Microsoft built and high-quality partner-built agents
    • Agent detail pages with descriptions and capabilities
    • Search with zero-query suggestions
    • Merchandising to highlight top agents
    • URL-based sharing to drive adoption and virality

    For developers and partners

    The Agent Store is a powerful platform for developers and partners to showcase solutions and drive user adoption. With support for both Microsoft Copilot Studio and the Microsoft 365 Agents Toolkit, you can build agents your way—whether you’re using low-code tools or writing custom orchestration logic. Publishing to the Agent Store gives you:

    • Access to Microsoft 365 Copilot users across Microsoft 365 hubs including Teams and m365copilot.com
    • Co-marketing and partner support opportunities
    • Insights into usage and feedback

    Learn more about publishing agents.

    What’s next?

    We are just getting started. In the coming months, we will continue to evolve the Agent Store experience with smarter recommendations, deeper integration across Microsoft 365 apps, expanded merchandising and editorial content, and more options for partners and developers to grow their user base.

    Get started

    Explore the Agent Store today and see how agents can help you work smarter, faster, and more creatively. Whether you’re building or browsing, the Agent Store is your launchpad for the future of work.

    Start building today!

    [embedded content]

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Samsung Spotlights 2025 TV Line-Up with Samsung Vision AI: Next-Level Picture Quality and Smart Features Arrive in UK

    Source: Samsung

    Chertsey, U.K. – Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.’s latest 2025 TV and AV-line-up is available to buy in the UK. To celebrate the launch and power of Samsung Vision AI, Samsung held its “The Home of Vision” event, showcasing the power of AI in Movies, Gaming and Sports.
     
    The Home of Vision event was an immersive adventure bringing to life Samsung’s vision to elevate TVs from screens to intelligent smart home companions that adapt to your needs, becoming the centerpiece of the home.
     
    Jose Barreiro-Lopez, Vice President of TV and AV, Samsung Europe, commented: “Samsung has been the No. 1 TV globally for 19 years in a row[1]. This year we are transforming our TVs into a true AI-powered companion, designed to be at the heart of every home.
     
    “Our event showcases the breadth of our TV line-up with the promise to elevate every home entertainment scenario. Whether you are immersed in a cinematic film, cheering on your favourite sports team or enjoying a gaming session with your friends, our TVs are built to cater for every experience, and Samsung Vision AI elevates them to the next level.”
     
    Unlock the Full Potential of Vision AI at Home
    “The Home of Vision” event featured immersive, interactive zones designed to showcase consumers’ favourite TV pastimes, Gaming, Movies and Sport, and how Samsung Vision AI is used to not only enhance the picture and sound of these experiences, but to create new ways to enjoy them.
     

     
    Samsung’s Home of Vision cinema re-imagined iconic film scenes with stunning clarity and depth, thanks to powerful AI picture optimisation. Showcasing a diverse range of film genres, it demonstrated how advanced AI technologies can analyse your content and surroundings to automatically adjust the picture enhance your experience.
     
    The film experience also features AI Sound. By analysing your room’s acoustic properties, it dynamically adapts the sound to create rich, spatial audio that surrounds you. The audio performance of the new line-up has also been upgraded. AI Sound works in combination with the latest Samsung Q-Series Soundbar line-up, which seamlessly integrates with selected TVs[2] via Q-Symphony, perfect for cinema-like quality at home.
     

     
    House of Vision’s Sports Zone further demonstrated how Samsung Vision AI intelligently adapts to your viewing set-up – offering a truly personalised experience for every sports fan.
     
    Highlighting AI Motion Enhancer Pro, it sharpens low-resolution content, reduces blurring and ball distortion, allowing your TV to adapt for the sports you love watching. When watching fast-paced matches, such as football, AI Motion Enhancer Pro intelligently tracks the ball’s movement and enhances its resolution in real time – ensuring each moment appears crisp and clear, delivering a viewing experience that feels as immersive as being in the stadium.
     

     
    For gamers, Samsung Vision AI can be a game-changer. Home of Vision featured an immersive e-sports inspired environment with Neo QLED 4K QN90F displays and dynamic lighting to create an engaging and atmospheric experience, showcasing features that respond to gameplay in real time.
     
    AI Auto Game Mode automatically detects game titles and genres, fine-tuning settings to deliver a next-level experience – meaning gamers no longer need to manually adjust their settings. If you are a fan of RTS games and want to change over to an FPS, AI Auto Game Mode will adapt in real time, so you never miss a shot.
     
    Powered by Samsung Vision AI, the latest Samsung TVs takes viewing experience to the next level – with industry-leading Quantum Dot technology delivering vibrant, true-to-life visuals for an unforgettable viewing experience. Samsung’s Glare-Free technology[3], now introduced across select Neo QLED and OLED models, cuts reflections while preserving deep blacks and sharp images – even in bright rooms. A new anti-reflective material ensures stunning picture quality in any light.
     
    Soundbar models such as the HW-Q990F and HW-Q930F offer a three-dimensional surround sound with support for Dolby Atmos and DTS:X, providing a superior audio experience.
     
    Pricing & Availability
    The following models from the 2025 line-up are available to purchase or pre-order:

    Neo QLED 8K – QN900F, QN990F – RRP starting from £3,399
    Neo QLED 4K – QN90F, QN85F, QN80F, QN70F – RRP starting from £1,099
    QLED – Q8F, Q7F – RRP starting from £519
    OLED – S95F, S90F – RRP starting from £1,499
    Lifestyle – Frame Pro, Frame – RRP starting from £1,099
    Soundbars – Q990F, Q930F, Q800F, QS700F – RRP starting from £749

     
    Promotions available on Samsung.com/uk:
     
    From 21st-27th May: on selected AI TVs

    Galaxy S25 on us with code AITV[4]
    Up to 20% off with code SPRING[5]
    Claim up to £1,000 cashback[6]

    From 28th May-10th June: on selected AI TVs

    Galaxy S25 on us with code AITV4[4]
    Up to 20% off with code SPRING5[5]

     
    [1]Samsung TV has been ranked No.1 selling TV Brand for 19 consecutive years by Omdia
    [2]Compatible list of Samsung TVs 2022-2025 available from Samsung.com
    [3]Measured against Unified Glare Rating (UGR) testing standard, validated as ‘Glare Free’ by UL
    [4]Purchase from samsung.com/uk by 10.06.25. Enter code AITV at checkout to redeem free Galaxy S25. Colour may vary. While stocks last
    [5]Purchase from samsung.com/uk by 10.06.25. Enter code SPRING at checkout
    [6]For cashback purchase by 27/05/25. Claim between 30 & 60 days of purchase. To claim and for full T&Cs see https://samsungoffers.claims/preorder2025VisionAI

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: RBI imposes monetary penalty on Transactree Technologies Private Limited (‘Lendbox’)

    Source: Reserve Bank of India

    The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has, by an order dated May 23, 2025, imposed a monetary penalty of ₹40 lakh (Rupees Forty Lakh only) on Transactree Technologies Private Limited [also referred to as ‘Lendbox’] (the company), for non-compliance with certain provisions of the ‘Non-Banking Financial Company – Peer to Peer Lending Platform (Reserve Bank) Directions, 2017’ issued by RBI. This penalty has been imposed in exercise of powers conferred on RBI under the provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 58G read with clause (aa) of sub-section (5) of Section 58B of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934.

    A scrutiny of the company was conducted by RBI in September 2023. Based on supervisory findings of non-compliance with RBI directions and related correspondence in that regard, a notice was issued to the company advising it to show cause as to why penalty should not be imposed on it for its failure to comply with the said directions.

    After considering the company’s reply to the notice, additional submissions made by it and oral submissions made during the personal hearing, RBI found, inter alia, that the following charges against the company were sustained, warranting imposition of monetary penalty.

    The company:

    1. routed the amounts disbursed and collected in loan accounts in the P2P Platform through a ‘co-lending escrow account’ in violation of the laid down ‘Fund Transfer Mechanism’; and

    2. did not: (a) disclose credit assessment and risk profile of the borrowers to the prospective lenders; and (b) disbursed loans to individual borrowers without the specific approval of individual lenders.

    This action is based on deficiencies in regulatory compliance and is not intended to pronounce upon the validity of any transaction or agreement entered into by the company with its customers. Further, imposition of this monetary penalty is without prejudice to any other action that may be initiated by RBI against the company.

    (Puneet Pancholy)  
    Chief General Manager

    Press Release: 2025-2026/404

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Mammography equipment market in South Korea to grow at 4% CAGR through 2036, forecasts GlobalData

    Source: GlobalData

    Mammography equipment market in South Korea to grow at 4% CAGR through 2036, forecasts GlobalData

    Posted in Medical Devices

    The market for mammography equipment in South Korea is undergoing significant growth. This upsurge is attributable to the broadening scope of breast cancer screening initiatives, increased public awareness, and the incorporation of sophisticated imaging technologies. Owing to these factors, the mammography equipment market in South Korea is set to grow at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of approximately 4% through 2036, forecasts GlobalData, a leading data and analytics company.

    GlobalData’s latest report, “Mammography Equipment Market Size by Segments, Share, Regulatory, Reimbursement, Installed Base and Forecast to 2036,” reveals that South Korea represented nearly 20% of the mammography equipment market in the Asia-Pacific region in 2024. This significant share highlights the country’s strong healthcare infrastructure, early embrace of new technologies, and a clear national focus on preventive healthcare and innovation.

    In March 2025, a comprehensive Korean study revealed that the utilization of Lunit INSIGHT MMG, an AI-powered mammography software developed by the South Korean medical AI firm Lunit Inc., enhanced breast cancer detection rates by 13.8% without elevating recall rates. The findings affirm South Korea’s advancing role in shaping high-impact, AI-driven medical imaging practices that prioritize accuracy without added patient burden.

    Shagufta Hasan, Medical Devices Analyst at GlobalData, comments: “Despite the growth of mammography market in South Korea, breast cancer detection still faces challenges related to inconsistent access, diagnostic delays, and disparities in the adoption of technology, factors that may hinder early intervention and patient outcomes. However, solutions such as the Lunit INSIGHT MMG and DBT represent a transformative shift in breast imaging. These advanced diagnostic solutions are paving the way for more detailed, efficient, and accessible screening pathways, aligning with the country’s broader commitment to preventive healthcare and innovation.”

    AI solutions such as Lunit INSIGHT MMG and DBT streamline case prioritization, support early diagnosis, and enhance precision across diverse clinical environments. By reducing diagnostic delays and standardizing interpretation regardless of reader experience, these solutions help bridge gaps in access and technological disparities, ultimately supporting more equitable breast cancer screening outcomes.

    Hasan concludes: “South Korea appears to be strategically poised to influence the future of breast imaging through continued investment, fostering strategic partnerships, and expanding its global outreach. By reinforcing its position in the advancement of diagnostic technologies, it is likely to enhance access to high-quality care to patients with breast cancer, and bolster its global impact.”

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Taiwan commits to multi-layered defense modernization amid heightened regional tensions, observes GlobalData

    Source: GlobalData

    Taiwan commits to multi-layered defense modernization amid heightened regional tensions, observes GlobalData

    Posted in Aerospace, Defense & Security

    Taiwan is undertaking a comprehensive, multi-layered defense modernization effort, driven by rising security threats and the imperative to deter potential aggression from China. With defense spending projected to reach $23.5 billion in 2030, Taiwan is prioritizing advanced air, naval, and unmanned systems, while also strengthening logistics and support infrastructure to enhance resilience and sustain prolonged military operations, says GlobalData, a leading data and analytics company.

    GlobalData’s latest report, “Taiwan Defense Market Size and Trends, Budget Allocation, Regulations, Key Acquisitions, Competitive Landscape and Forecast, 2025-30,”Australia Defense Market Size and Trends, Budget Allocation, Regulations, Key Acquisitions, Competitive Landscape and Forecast, 2022-27’ reveals that the country’s cumulative defense spending is anticipated to reach $112.2 billion during 2026-30, out of which the acquisition budget share is estimated to be approximately average 14.7%, amounting to $16.5 billion.

    Abhijit Apsingikar, Aerospace & Defense Analyst at GlobalData, comments: “Persistent Chinese incursions into territorial waters and airspace, along with the constant threat of a potential naval amphibious invasion, have compelled Taiwan to make substantial investments in strengthening its overall defense posture.”

    Against this backdrop, Taiwan placed a contract to procure 66 new F-16 Block 70/72 aircraft in 2020 and first of the new aircraft were delivered in March 2025. The country has also completed modernizing its existing fleet of 139 F-16 A/B multirole aircraft to F-16 Block 70/72 standard as a part of the first phase of Peace Phoenix Rising program, last of which was delivered in December 2023. Taiwan is also in the process of reinforcing its sea denial capabilities by investing in Hai Kun-class submarines, while also investing in acquisition of Harpoon Coastal Defense System.

    Over the period 2020-25, Taiwan sanctioned a large defense investment fund disbursed over multiple years. The key focus of these investments was directed towards strengthening the defense infrastructure and to revitalize defense R&D capabilities within the country, with its Navy being a key beneficiary. Taiwan is also in the process of building a new 2,500-ton light frigate to bolster its naval defense capabilities.

    Apsingikar continues: “The ongoing Russo-Ukraine war offers a template for Taiwan to adopt proven methods for defending against a stronger adversary by deploying unmanned platforms such as unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned ground vehicles, unmanned surface vessels and unmanned underwater vehicles. These platforms can assist Taiwan to compensate for its relatively smaller military strength and combat potential”

    Although Taiwan’s defense RDT&E spending is modest with a budgetary allocation of $530 million for 2025, its anticipated to be directed mainly towards R&D in automated unmanned systems. For instance, Taiwan is developing Huilong uncrewed underwater vehicle (UUV), the Endeavor Manta Unmanned Surface Vessel, and Tu-40 Fixed Wing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.

    Apsingikar concludes: “Taiwan is strategically focused on building a resilient and multi-layered defense posture. The emphasis is not only on acquiring advanced platforms but also on investing in robust logistics, maintenance, and support infrastructure. This integrated approach is critical to sustaining prolonged defense operations and delaying potential aggression long enough to enable allied intervention. By learning from modern conflict scenarios, Taiwan is prioritizing asymmetric warfare capabilities, particularly unmanned systems and sea denial strategies, to offset its numerical disadvantage and enhance its deterrence credibility in the region.”

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: APAC automotive infrared reflective glazing market to record 1.0% CAGR over 2024-29, forecasts GlobalData

    Source: GlobalData

    APAC automotive infrared reflective glazing market to record 1.0% CAGR over 2024-29, forecasts GlobalData

    Posted in Automotive

    The automotive sector in the Asia-Pacific (APAC) region is witnessing a transformative shift driven by advancements in glazing technology, particularly infrared-reflecting (IRR) glazing. This innovative technology is revolutionizing passenger comfort and energy efficiency in vehicles. As automakers embrace larger glazing areas and panoramic roofs, the APAC IRR glazing market is expected to record a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 1.0% over 2024-29, according to GlobalData, a leading data and analytics company.

    GlobalData’s latest report, “Global Sector Overview & Forecast: Automotive Glazing Q1 2025,” reveals that the APAC automotive Infrared reflective glazing market is poised to grow from an estimated 65.1 million units in 2024 to 68.6 million units in 2029.

    Madhuchhanda Palit, Automotive Analyst at GlobalData, comments: “The introduction of IRR glazing has revolutionized the way vehicles manage heat load, particularly in regions with high solar exposure. In the APAC market, where temperatures can soar, the ability of IRR glazing to reject up to 60% of solar energy translates into a marked reduction in cabin temperatures.  As automakers in the APAC region increasingly prioritize sustainability and efficiency, the integration of IRR glazing is poised to become a standard feature in new vehicle models.”

    The evolution of IRR glazing technology has been propelled by advancements in coating processes, particularly the magnetron sputtering technique, which allows for the production of multilayer coatings on a large scale. This innovation has enabled manufacturers to create high-performance glazing solutions that meet the stringent visible light transmittance requirements essential for automotive applications. Companies like Guardian and Saint-Gobain are at the forefront of this trend, offering products such as Guardian SilverGuard IRR and Sun Ban, which not only enhance thermal performance but also provide superior UV protection.

    Moreover, as automakers like BMW, Citroen, and Ford lead the charge in offering advanced glazing solutions, the opportunity for IRR glazing to enhance vehicle differentiation and aesthetics becomes increasingly pronounced. The integration of IRR technology into vehicle design not only meets consumer demands but also allows manufacturers to stand out in a crowded marketplace.

    Palit adds: “Looking ahead, the future of the IRR glazing market in the APAC region appears promising. As vehicle designs continue to evolve, there is an increasing trend towards larger sunroofs and glass surfaces, necessitating innovative glazing solutions that address heat absorption and privacy concerns. The advancements in coating technologies, such as the magnetron sputtering process, are expected to enhance the production capabilities of IRR glazing, further driving market growth.”

    In addition, with the rising number of electric vehicles (EVs) in the APAC region, the demand for energy-efficient solutions like IRR glazing is anticipated to surge. EV manufacturers are particularly interested in technologies that extend battery range and reduce energy consumption, making IRR glazing a viable choice.

    Palit concludes: “In summary, the IRR glazing market is set to experience significant growth in the APAC region, driven by consumer demand for comfort, energy efficiency, and aesthetic appeal. The advancements in glazing technology and the competitive landscape will further fuel this expansion, positioning IRR glazing as a critical component in the evolving automotive sector.

    “While the future holds considerable potential, it is essential for stakeholders to remain agile and responsive to market dynamics, ensuring that innovations continue to meet the diverse needs of consumers across the region.”

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Ionis’ Olezarsen to achieve global sales of approximately $849 million by 2032, forecasts GlobalData

    Source: GlobalData

    Ionis’ Olezarsen to achieve global sales of approximately $849 million by 2032, forecasts GlobalData

    Posted in Pharma

    Ionis Pharmaceuticals has announced positive topline results from the ESSENCE study evaluating Olezarsen in individuals with moderate hypertriglyceridemia who are at risk of atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease (ASCVD). Upon approval, the drug is projected to achieve global sales of approximately $849 million by 2032, according to GlobalData, a leading data and analytics company.

    The study met its primary endpoint, demonstrating a statistically significant, placebo-adjusted reduction in triglyceride levels of 61% and 58% at six months with the 80mg and 50mg monthly doses, respectively (p

    Dr Shireen Mohammad, Senior Cardiovascular and Metabolic Disorders Analyst at GlobalData, concludes: “This data is highly anticipated and will be crucial in determining the drug’s efficacy and safety profile. Positive results could pave the way for regulatory approval and establish olezarsen as a first-in-class treatment option for patients with limited alternatives.”

    Olezarsen is an antisense oligonucleotide (ASO) designed to selectively inhibit the expression of the APOC3 gene. By decreasing the production of apolipoprotein C-III (ApoC-III)—a protein that hinders triglyceride metabolism—olezarsen promotes the efficient breakdown and clearance of triglyceride-rich lipoproteins. This leads to a marked reduction in plasma triglyceride levels, positioning olezarsen as a promising treatment for severe hypertriglyceridemia, familial chylomicronemia syndrome (FCS), and other dyslipidemias.

    Key opinion leaders (KOLs) interviewed by GlobalData emphasized a significant unmet need for effective treatments targeting rare genetic lipid disorders, particularly FCS and familial hypercholesterolemia (FH).

    Dr Mohammad adds: “Notably, there are currently no FDA-approved therapies for FCS, underscoring the urgency for new options that can lower triglyceride levels and mitigate associated complications. With its targeted mechanism and encouraging data, olezarsen has the potential to address this therapeutic gap.”

    Pivotal Phase III results from the ongoing CORE and CORE2 trials, which are evaluating olezarsen for the treatment of severe hypertriglyceridemia (sHTG), are expected in Q3 2025.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Joint Statement of the Special AEM-Closer Economic Relations (CER) Consultation

    Source: ASEAN – Association of SouthEast Asian Nations

    1. The Special AEM-Closer Economic Relations (CER) Consultation was held on 20 May 2025 via videoconference. The Consultation was co-chaired by H.E. Tengku Datuk Seri Utama Zafrul Aziz, Minister of Investment, Trade and Industry of Malaysia; Senator the Honourable Don Farrell, Minister for Trade and Tourism, Australia; and the Honourable Todd McClay, Minister for Trade and Investment, New Zealand. The Meeting also welcomed the participation of H.E. Filipus Nino Pereira, Minister of Commerce and Industry, Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste as an observer.
     
    2. The Meeting exchanged views on recent regional and global economic developments and their implications for trade, investment, and economic integration, and discussed ways to strengthen ASEAN-CER economic partnership amid the emerging global economic landscape.
     
    Download the full statement here
    The post Joint Statement of the Special AEM-Closer Economic Relations (CER) Consultation appeared first on ASEAN Main Portal.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Joint Statement of The Special AEM-METI Consultation

    Source: ASEAN – Association of SouthEast Asian Nations

    1. The Special ASEAN Economic Ministers- Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (AEM-METI) Consultation was held on 20 May 2025 virtually. The Consultation was co-chaired by H.E. Tengku Datuk Seri Utama Zafrul Aziz, Minister of Investment, Trade and Industry of Malaysia, and H.E. Muto Yoji, Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan. The Meeting also welcomed the participation of H.E. Filipus Nino Pereira, Minister of Commerce and Industry, Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste as an observer.
     
     
    2. The Meeting expressed our deepest condolences to the people of Myanmar and Thailand for the tragic loss caused by the devastating earthquake on 28 March 2025. The Meeting extended heartfelt thoughts to the affected communities during this difficult time, and we stand in solidarity with them as they recover and rebuild.
     
    Download the full statement here.
    The post Joint Statement of The Special AEM-METI Consultation appeared first on ASEAN Main Portal.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Galaxy S25 Ultra: Explore More with Your Truest AI Companion

    Source: Samsung

    From everyday dilemmas to complex curiosities, the Galaxy S25 Ultra powered by Google Gemini Live is here to help you think faster, act smarter, and do more. Whether you’re figuring out what to cook, how to style your outfit, or breaking down big life questions, your true AI companion has your back, instantly.
     
    Explore new ways to learn, create, and connect with the world like never before.
     
    Find more here:
     

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Meeting of 16-17 April 2025

    Source: European Central Bank

    Account of the monetary policy meeting of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank held in Frankfurt am Main on Wednesday and Thursday, 16-17 April 2025

    22 May 2025

    1. Review of financial, economic and monetary developments and policy options

    Financial market developments

    Ms Schnabel recalled that President Trump’s announcement on 2 April 2025 of unexpectedly high tariffs had sparked a sharp sell-off in global equity markets and in US bond markets, leading to a surge in financial market volatility. The severity of the tariffs and the manner in which they had been introduced had led to a breakdown of standard cross-market correlations, with a sell-off of US equities occurring at the same time as a sell-off of Treasuries in the context of a marked depreciation of the US dollar against major currencies.

    Movements in euro area risk-free rates reflected the opposing impacts of the historic German fiscal package and the global trade conflict. At the long end of the yield curve, the expected positive growth impulse from fiscal policy, as well as expectations of tighter monetary policy in the future, had been the dominant factors, pulling up nominal and real interest rates. At the short end of the yield curve, the decline in inflation compensation, driven mainly by falling inflation risk premia, had been larger than the rise in real yields, leading to a decline in nominal rates. These developments reflected both the negative fallout from tariffs and lower commodity prices. Investors expected the ECB to react to the evolving situation by lowering rates more than had previously been anticipated, but to start raising them again in the coming year. Amid the market turbulence, euro area bond markets had continued to function smoothly, and the bond supply had been absorbed well in the context of strong investor demand and well-functioning dealer intermediation. On the back of the sharp correction in stock prices and the marked appreciation of the euro exchange rate, financial conditions in the euro area had tightened, despite lower nominal short-term rates.

    Turning to market developments since the previous Governing Council meeting, President Trump’s announcement on 2 April 2025 had led the VIX volatility index to temporarily reach levels not seen since the COVID-19 pandemic. Within a few days the S&P 500 index had dropped by 12%, triggering sharp corrections in stock markets around the world, including in the euro area. Despite a rebound after the pausing of “reciprocal” tariffs on 9 April 2025, the US benchmark equity index had lost 8% in the year to date while euro area stock markets were almost back to the levels seen at the start of the year. Stocks in trade-sensitive US sectors had been hit much harder than other stocks, and they had also dropped by much more than their euro area counterparts.

    The market turbulence had spilled over to government bond markets, but the reaction had differed markedly between the euro area and the United States. US government bond yields had risen at the same time as the US equity sell-off, which was highly unusual because Treasury bonds normally benefited from safe-haven flows. US ten-year asset swap spreads had likewise risen sharply, which was also unusual. Meanwhile, Bund yields had declined and the spread between the Bund and overnight index swap (OIS) rates had narrowed substantially as German government bonds had continued to perform their role as a safe-haven asset.

    The risk-off sentiment had also affected the dynamics of the US dollar exchange rate, but this too had reacted differently from what would normally have been expected. In January 2025 the EUR/USD exchange rate had hit a low of 1.02, but the euro’s downward trend had been reversed around the time of the announcement in early March 2025 of the reform of the German debt brake, with a positive growth narrative for Europe emerging in light of higher defence and infrastructure spending. The euro exchange rate had received a second major boost after the 2 April tariff announcement in the United States. This strong upward move had not been driven, as was usually the case, by changes in the yield differential, which had moved in the opposite direction, but by US dollar weakness as investors had revised down their US growth expectations. Over recent weeks the US dollar had thus not benefited from the widespread risk-off mood.

    Recent developments had been reflected in global portfolio flows. The March 2025 round of the Bank of America Fund Manager Survey had recorded the strongest shift out of US equities on record, with 45% of managers reporting that they had reduced their positions. At the same time, a significant share of fund managers had reported that they had changed their positioning in favour of euro area equities. This marked a significant shift of perspectives away from US exceptionalism towards Europe being seen as the bright spot among major economies, given the expected fiscal boost in Germany and the pick-up in European defence spending.

    Dynamics in risk-free bond markets illustrated the opposing impacts of the German fiscal package and the tariff announcements over recent weeks. In the euro area, the overall increase in longer-term nominal interest rates had been driven by a rise in real rates, indicating that market participants viewed the German fiscal package as fostering long-term growth. Real rates had kept rising during the tariff tensions, as investors had continued to expect, on balance, an improved growth outlook for the euro area. By contrast, inflation compensation had decreased across the yield curve after increasing only briefly in response to the German fiscal package.

    Ms Schnabel then turned to the drivers of developments in euro area inflation compensation. On the one hand, bond market investors were pricing in higher inflation compensation owing to the expansionary German fiscal measures to be implemented over the next decade. On the other hand, concerns about the trade war had pulled inflation compensation lower, more than compensating for the impact of the German fiscal package on short to medium-term maturities. One important driver of the downward revision had been the sharp drop in oil prices in the wake of the tariff announcements and rising fears of a global recession.

    Market participants currently expected the ECB to implement a faster and deeper easing cycle towards a terminal rate of around 1.7% in May 2026. However, the ECB was expected to start raising rates again in 2026 in a J-curve pattern, with rate expectations picking up notably over longer horizons.

    In corporate bond markets, credit spreads had increased globally in response to the risk-off sentiment and the sharp sell-off in risk asset markets. However, the surge in US investment-grade corporate bond spreads had been more pronounced compared with developments in their euro area counterparts.

    Sovereign spreads had remained resilient over the past few weeks. The marked rise in the Bund yield after the announcement of the German fiscal package in March 2025 had not translated into an increase in sovereign spreads, which had even declined slightly at that time. The benign reaction of euro area government bond markets over recent weeks could be explained by expectations of positive economic spillovers from Germany to the rest of the euro area, possible prospects of increased European unity and, in the case of Italy, positive rating action.

    Government bond issuance in the euro area had continued to be absorbed well as investor demand had remained robust, with primary and secondary markets continuing to function smoothly. Higher volatility in government bond markets had not led to a meaningful deterioration in liquidity conditions, unlike in previous stress episodes. Hence, the turbulence in US Treasury markets had not had repercussions for the functioning of euro area sovereign bond markets.

    Ms Schnabel concluded by considering the implications of recent market developments for overall financial conditions. Since the March monetary policy meeting financial conditions had tightened, mainly owing to lower equity prices and a stronger nominal effective exchange rate of the euro, which had more than compensated for the easing impulse stemming from lower nominal short-term interest rates. Real rates had gradually shifted up across the yield curve. Overall, recent market developments might not only be a reflection of short-term market disturbances but also of a broader shift in global financial markets, with the euro area being one potential beneficiary.

    The global environment and economic and monetary developments in the euro area

    Starting with inflation in the euro area, Mr Lane stated that the disinflation process was well on track. Inflation had continued to develop as expected, with both headline inflation in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) and core inflation (HICP inflation excluding energy and food) declining in March. Headline inflation had declined to 2.2% in March, from 2.3% in February. Energy inflation had decreased to -1.0%, in part owing to a sharper than expected decline in oil prices, while food inflation had increased to 2.9% on the back of higher unprocessed food prices. Core inflation had declined to 2.4% in March, from 2.6% in February. While goods inflation remained stable at 0.6%, there had been a marked downward adjustment in services inflation, which had dropped to 3.5% in March from 3.7% in February, confirming the more muted repricing momentum in some services that had been expected.

    Most exclusion-based measures of underlying inflation had eased further in March. The Persistent and Common Component of Inflation (PCCI), which had the best predictive power for future headline inflation, had decreased to 2.2% in March from 2.3% in February. Domestic inflation was unchanged in March after declining to 3.9% in February, down from 4.0% in January. The differential between domestic inflation and services inflation reflected the significant deceleration of inflation in the traded services segment seen in the recent data.

    Wage growth was moderating. The annual growth rate of compensation per employee had declined to 4.1% in the fourth quarter of 2024, down from 4.5% in the third quarter and below the March 2025 projection of 4.3%. Negotiated wage growth had also come in at 4.1% in the fourth quarter of 2024. According to the April round of the Corporate Telephone Survey, leading non-financial corporations in the euro area had reduced their wage growth expectations for 2025 to 3.0%, down from 3.6% in the previous survey round. Respondents to the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises had marked down their wage growth expectations for the next 12 months to 3.0%, from 3.3% in the last survey round. Looking ahead, the ECB wage tracker also pointed to a substantial decrease in annual growth of negotiated wages between 2024 and 2025, with one-off payments becoming a less dominant component of salary increases. Wage expectations reported in the Survey of Professional Forecasters and the Consensus Economics survey also signalled an easing of labour cost growth in 2025 compared with last year (between 0.7 and 1.0 percentage point), which was broadly in line with the March projections.

    Looking ahead, inflation was expected to hover close to the inflation target of 2% for the remainder of the year. Core inflation, and in particular services inflation, was expected to decline until mid-2025 as the effects from lagged repricing faded out, wage pressures receded, and past monetary policy tightening continued to feed through. Surveys confirmed this overall picture, while longer-term inflation expectations had remained well anchored around the 2% target. At the same time, market participants had markedly revised down their expectations for inflation over shorter horizons, with the one-year forward inflation-linked swap rates one year ahead, two years ahead and four years ahead declining by around 20 basis points to 1.6%, 1.7% and 1.9% respectively.

    Global growth was expected to have maintained its momentum in the first quarter of the year, with the global composite output Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) released on 3 April averaging 52.0. The manufacturing PMI had been recovering and stood above the threshold indicating expansion, while the services PMI had lost some momentum in advanced economies. However, global growth was likely to be negatively affected by the US-initiated increases in tariffs and the resulting financial market turmoil, which had come against the backdrop of already elevated geopolitical tensions.

    Triggered by concerns about global demand, oil and gas prices, along with other commodity prices, had declined sharply since 2 April. Compared with the assumption for the March projections, Brent crude oil prices were now approximately 10% lower in US dollar terms and 18.3% lower in euro terms. Gas prices stood 37% below the value embedded in the March projections. The euro had strengthened over recent weeks as investor sentiment had proven more resilient towards the euro area than towards other economies, with the EUR/USD exchange rate up 9.6% and the nominal effective exchange rate up 5.5% compared with the assumptions for the March projections.

    Euro area economic growth had slowed to 0.2%, quarter on quarter, in the fourth quarter of 2024, down from 0.4% in the third quarter. This figure was 0.1 percentage points higher than had been foreseen in the March projections. As projected, growth had been entirely driven by domestic demand. The economy was also likely to have grown in the first quarter of the year, and manufacturing had shown signs of stabilisation. The initial tariff announcements by the United States in early 2025 had so far seemed not to have materially dampened economic sentiment and might even have led to some frontloading of trade. However, some more recent surveys indicated a decline in sentiment. These included the latest Consumer Expectations Survey, the ZEW Indicator of Economic Sentiment and the Sentix Economic index.

    The labour market remained resilient. The unemployment rate had edged down to 6.1% in February. At the same time, labour demand was cooling. The job vacancy rate had remained unchanged at 2.5% in the fourth quarter of 2024 and now stood 0.8 percentage points below its peak in the second quarter of 2022. Total job postings and new postings were 16% and 26% lower respectively compared with a year ago. Additionally, fewer firms had reported that labour was a limiting factor for production. The employment PMI had remained broadly neutral in March at 50.4, pointing to stable employment conditions in the first quarter of 2025.

    Fiscal policies were identified as another potential source of resilience. Newly announced government measures were expected to have a relatively limited impact on the fiscal stance of the euro area compared with the assessment included in the March projections. But the scope for infrastructure investment and climate transition investment, as well as spending on defence in the largest euro area economy, had been substantially increased as a result of the loosening of the German debt brake, together with enhanced flexibility for greater spending on defence across euro area countries as a result of EU initiatives.

    The economic outlook was clouded by exceptional uncertainty, however. Downside risks to economic growth had increased. The major escalation in global trade tensions and the associated uncertainty were likely to lower euro area growth by dampening exports and investment. Deteriorating financial market sentiment could lead to tighter financing conditions and increased risk aversion, and could make firms and households less willing to invest and consume. Geopolitical tensions, such as Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine and the tragic conflict in the Middle East, also remained a major source of uncertainty. At the same time, an increase in defence and infrastructure spending would add to growth.

    Increasing global trade disruptions were adding more uncertainty to the outlook for euro area inflation. Falling global energy prices and the appreciation of the euro could put further downward pressure on inflation. This could be reinforced by lower demand for euro area exports owing to higher tariffs and by a re-routing of exports into the euro area from countries with overcapacity. Adverse financial market reactions to the trade tensions could weigh on domestic demand and thereby also lead to lower inflation. By contrast, a fragmentation of global supply chains could raise inflation by pushing up import prices. A boost in defence and infrastructure spending could also raise inflation over the medium term. Extreme weather events, and the unfolding climate crisis more broadly, could drive up food prices by more than expected.

    Turning to the monetary and financial analysis, risk-free interest rates had declined in response to the escalating trade tensions. However, the risk-free ten-year OIS rate was about 20 basis points higher than at the cut-off date for the March projections. Bank bond spreads had increased by nearly 30 basis points. Credit spreads had increased by 23 basis points for investment-grade corporate bonds and by as much as 95 basis points for the high-yield segment. The Eurostoxx index had fallen by around 4.8% since the cut-off date for the March projections, while indicators of market volatility had increased.

    The latest information on the availability and cost of credit for the broader economy predated the market tensions but continued to indicate a gradual normalisation in credit conditions, though with some mixed evidence. The interest rate on new loans to firms had declined by 15 basis points in February, to 4.1%, which was about 120 basis points below its October 2023 peak. However, interest rates on new mortgages had increased by 8 basis points in February, to 3.3%, which was around 70 basis points below their November 2023 peak. Loan growth was picking up at a moderate pace. Annual growth in bank lending to firms had increased to 2.2% in February, from 2.0% in January, amid marked month-on-month volatility. Corporate debt issuance had been weak in February, but the annual growth rate had stabilised at 3.2%. Lending to households had edged up further to 1.5% on an annual basis in February, from 1.3% in January, led by mortgages. According to the latest bank lending survey for the euro area, which had been conducted between 10 and 25 March 2025, credit standards had tightened slightly further for loans to firms and consumer credit in the first quarter, while there had been an easing of credit standards for mortgages. This evidence resonated with the results of the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises, which also showed almost unchanged availability of bank loans to firms in the first quarter, owing to concerns about the economic outlook and borrower creditworthiness, compounded by high uncertainty.

    Monetary policy considerations and policy options

    In summary, the incoming data confirmed that the disinflation process remained well on track. Both headline and core inflation in March had come in as expected. In particular, the projected drop in services inflation in March had been confirmed in the data and underpinned confidence in the underlying downward trajectory. The more forward-looking indicators of underlying inflation remained consistent with inflation settling at around the target in a sustained manner, with domestic inflation also coming down on the back of lower labour cost growth, which was decelerating somewhat faster than had been expected. The euro area economy had been building up some resilience against global shocks, but the outlook for growth had deteriorated materially owing to rising trade tensions. Increased uncertainty was likely to reduce confidence among households and firms, and the adverse and volatile market response to the recent trade tensions was likely to have a tightening impact on financing conditions and thereby further weigh on the euro area economic outlook.

    Based on this assessment, Mr Lane proposed lowering the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. In particular, lowering the deposit facility rate – the rate through which the Governing Council steered the monetary policy stance – was rooted in its updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. A further cut at the present meeting was important in ensuring that inflation stabilised at the target in a sustainable manner, while also avoiding the possibility that external adverse shocks to the economic outlook could be exacerbated by too high a level of the policy rate.

    Looking ahead, it remained more important than ever to maintain agility in adjusting the stance as appropriate on a meeting-by-meeting basis and to not pre-commit to any particular rate path.

    2. Governing Council’s discussion and monetary policy decisions

    Economic, monetary and financial analyses

    Regarding global conditions, members stressed that the outlook for global growth was highly uncertain. In reaction to the frequent – and often contradictory – tariff announcements and retaliation over the last few weeks, the International Monetary Fund was currently revising its World Economic Outlook. Since the Governing Council’s last monetary policy meeting the euro had appreciated by 4.2% in nominal effective terms and by 6.4% against the US dollar, driven by market expectations of a narrowing growth differential between the euro area and the United States and possibly by a broad-based investor reassessment of the risk attached to exposures to the United States. Energy and food commodity prices had also declined sharply owing to growth concerns as the trade war intensified. The combined effect of a weakening dollar and declining oil and gas prices meant that, in euro terms, oil prices had fallen by 18.3% and gas prices by 37% since the March Governing Council meeting. Macroeconomic data did not yet reflect fully the ongoing trade war, which would only show through more clearly in the data during the second quarter of 2025. The composite output PMI for global activity excluding the euro area had remained broadly stable in March.

    Global trade was expected to slow significantly. This reflected lower imports primarily from the United States, China, Mexico and Canada – all countries with sizeable reciprocal trade relations. In the first quarter trade had still been strong owing to a rebound at the beginning of the year, in part driven by a frontloading of imports in anticipation of future tariffs. However, high-frequency and more timely data (based on vessel movements) had already started weakening, in particular for US imports. Private sector forecasts for US growth in 2025 had started trending down in the run-up to the 2 April tariff announcement. However, that event, together with the deterioration in financial conditions that followed, had led to a further downward revision to US GDP growth prospects for this year, as the high uncertainty around US policies was expected to hold back investment and economic activity. In this context the impact of the confidence channel was regarded as particularly important. While most economists had assumed that with higher tariffs and a trade war the US dollar would appreciate, the latest developments pointed to adverse confidence effects and the self-defeating nature of tariffs weakening the dollar. Private sector forecasts for Chinese growth in 2025 had also been revised down since early April, as the contribution from net exports – a key source of support for Chinese growth in 2024 – was expected to decline significantly this year. The Chinese Government’s announcement of additional fiscal support to boost consumption was seen as likely to only partially offset the loss of international trade.

    In general, protectionism and policy unpredictability were seen as the ultimate sources of distress. This raised the question of whether the impact of these factors could unwind when the policy approach that had generated them might reverse. Indeed, the view was expressed that mutually beneficial trade agreements could be reached, leading to a much more benign outcome. At the same time, it was argued that, first, a complete unwinding of the 2 April tariff policy announcement was unlikely and, second, even in the event of a complete policy turnaround, it was questionable whether the world economy could return to its previous status quo.

    The recent strong appreciation of the euro was largely explained by portfolio rebalancing due to growing concerns among investors about US economic policies and the risks that these posed to large exposures to the United States. Overall, the current state of the world economy was not regarded as being at an equilibrium, and it might take several years before the global economy reached a new equilibrium. For a long time the world had been in a configuration centred on the United States running large current account deficits, with optimistic consumers, high private sector investment rates and a large fiscal deficit.

    Looking ahead, two polar scenarios could be seen. One was a stabilisation of the situation, whereby the US current account deficit was structural and largely financed by capital inflows. In this situation, the ongoing portfolio rebalancing across currencies would eventually reverse in favour of the United States, leading to a renewed real appreciation of the US dollar, partly driven by relative price adjustments. However, recent events had eroded trust in the US system, and it was challenging to envisage how it might be restored.

    The other possible direction that the global order could take was a continuation of current rebalancing trends. Such a situation could lead temporarily to much higher US inflation as a result of the combined effects of tariffs and a potentially weaker exchange rate. More generally, the new equilibrium could entail high tariffs, an increase in home bias – for trade balance or security reasons – and a more fragmented world. This more fragmented environment was likely to be characterised by stronger inflationary pressures. In addition, the move to a new equilibrium would involve costly adjustment dynamics, as firms, households and governments would have to re-optimise in light of the new constellation, but also owing to the high levels of uncertainty in the transition period. In the meantime, the erosion of confidence in the US economy and in the global order of international trade and finance was expected to result in a higher global cost structure arising from protectionist policies and a higher risk premium arising from unpredictability. An intermediate scenario was also possible, in which the euro would become increasingly attractive, thus expanding its international role as a reserve currency.

    Overall, even if it was known with certainty where the new equilibrium lay, there would still be major adjustment dynamics along the way. In addition, as global supply chains had been shaped over the years to best adapt to the old equilibrium, they would need to adjust to the new one, with a likely loss of market value for those firms that had been most engaged in the old global order. Throughout this process there would be path dependence in the dynamics of the economy.

    With regard to economic activity in the euro area, members concurred that the economic outlook was clouded by exceptional uncertainty. Euro area exporters faced new barriers to trade, although the scope and nature of those barriers remained unclear. Disruptions to international commerce, financial market tensions and geopolitical uncertainty were weighing on business investment. As consumers became more cautious about the future, they might hold back from spending, thus delaying further the more robust consumption-led recovery that the staff projections had been foreseeing for a number of projection rounds.

    At the same time, the euro area economy had been building up some resilience against the global shocks. Domestic demand had contributed significantly to euro area growth in the fourth quarter of 2024, with business investment and private consumption growing robustly in spite of the already high uncertainty. The manufacturing output PMI had risen above 50 in March for the first time in two years, while the services business activity PMI had remained in expansionary territory, with relatively solid industrial production numbers confirming information from the soft indicators. While the trade conflict was a significant drag on foreign demand, the expected fiscal spending would counter some of those effects. The economy was likely to have grown in the first quarter of the year, and manufacturing had shown signs of stabilisation. Unemployment had fallen to 6.1% in February, its lowest level since the launch of the euro. Looking ahead, a strong labour market, higher real incomes and the impact of an easier monetary policy stance should underpin spending.

    For the near term, it was argued that the likely slump in trade and the surge in uncertainty were hitting the euro area at a critical juncture, when the recovery was still weak and fragile. It was seen as becoming increasingly clear that the impact of the trade shock might be very strong in terms of activity in the United States, with potentially substantial spillovers to the euro area. Even with the additional spending on defence and infrastructure, it was likely that, on balance, euro area growth would be worse in 2025 than previously expected. Incorporating the impact from the most recent escalation of trade tensions, potential retaliatory measures from the EU and the financial market turbulence of recent weeks could weaken activity in 2025 significantly. As a result, it was suggested that the probability of a recession over the next four quarters in the euro area and the United States had increased measurably.

    However, it was also argued that, while complicated, the situation still had upside potential. First, the strong market reaction might impose some discipline on the US Administration. Second, there was room for mutually beneficial trade agreements which would de-escalate the severity of the tariff increase threatened in the 2 April announcement. Regarding the fallout for growth, the ultimate effects of the new trade frictions would crucially depend on the substitutability of items imported by the United States. The bulk of exports from the euro area to the United States comprised pharmaceuticals, machinery, vehicles and chemicals, and these were highly differentiated products which were difficult to substitute away from in the short run. This rigidity would limit the drag on the euro area’s foreign demand. Moreover, the almost prohibitive tariffs between China and the United States were seen as likely to redirect demand towards euro area firms.

    A further factor that could attenuate the repercussions of trade frictions and uncertainty was the announcement of the German fiscal package and the step-up in European defence spending, which would raise domestic demand. This new factor was seen as unmitigated good news, as it would help to revive the European growth narrative and foster confidence in the euro area. What mattered was not only the direct effects of fiscal spending on demand and activity, but also the expected crowding-in of private investment in anticipation of the future fiscal stimulus. In the Corporate Telephone Survey, firms were already reporting that they were planning to enhance capacity in view of the defence and infrastructure initiatives. The Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises also pointed to greater optimism among firms on investment. Construction was set to recover further. It was therefore argued that the negative impact of tariffs could be seen as more or less the same size as the positive impact coming from the fiscal expansion in Germany. Of course, the time profiles of the impacts of the two major shocks – tariff increases and fiscal stimulus – were different. In the short term the negative effects on demand would dominate, as additional investment in defence and infrastructure would take time to come on stream and support growth.

    At the same time, the view was expressed that even in the medium term defence spending would not be a clear game changer, because it would not only materialise with a delay, but would likely lift euro area GDP growth by at most a couple of tenths of a percentage point. In any case, the fiscal stimulus was still uncertain in terms of its scale and modalities of implementation. In this context, it was noted that the reaction of the markets to the fiscal announcement from Germany suggested that the euro area economy was likely to respond to the new fiscal impulse with an increase in GDP and only a very mild increase in inflation. This demonstrated that the euro area economy was not seen as constrained by structural problems.

    Overall, members assessed that downside risks to economic growth had increased. The major escalation in global trade tensions and associated uncertainties would likely lower euro area growth by dampening exports, and it might drag down investment and consumption. Deteriorating financial market sentiment could lead to tighter financing conditions, increase risk aversion and make firms and households less willing to invest and consume. Geopolitical tensions, such as Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine and the tragic conflict in the Middle East, also remained a major source of uncertainty. At the same time, an increase in defence and infrastructure spending would add to growth.

    In view of all the uncertainties surrounding the outlook, the view was expressed that for the coming meetings of the Governing Council it was important to develop alternative scenarios. These should factor in the prevailing very high level of uncertainty and assist in identifying the relevant channels and quantifying the impact on growth, jobs and inflation. In addition to scenario analysis, it was important to use high-frequency and unconventional sources of information to better understand the direction the economy was taking. There was also a need to broaden the set of indicators to be monitored, given the challenges in interpreting some of the standard statistics which were influenced and distorted by special factors such as the frontloading of orders and the associated build-up of inventories.

    A silver lining in the turbulent situation that Europe was facing was a strong impetus for European policymakers to swiftly implement the structural reforms set out in the reports by Mario Draghi and Enrico Letta. If effective, such concrete action had the potential to become a major tailwind for the euro area economy in the future, amplifying the stimulating effect of the additional fiscal spending that was planned in Germany. At the same time, it was cautioned that, to reap all the benefits from reform, Europe had to act quickly and on an ambitious scale.

    The important policy initiatives that had been launched at the national and EU levels to increase defence spending and infrastructure investment could be expected to bolster manufacturing, which was also reflected in recent surveys. In the present geopolitical environment, it was even more urgent for fiscal and structural policies to make the euro area economy more productive, competitive and resilient. The European Commission’s Competitiveness Compass provided a concrete roadmap for action, and its proposals, including on simplification, should be swiftly adopted. This included completing the savings and investment union, following a clear and ambitious timetable, which should help savers benefit from more opportunities to invest and improve firms’ access to finance, especially risk capital. It was also important to rapidly establish the legislative framework to prepare the ground for the potential introduction of a digital euro. Governments should ensure sustainable public finances in line with the EU’s economic governance framework and prioritise essential growth-enhancing structural reforms and strategic investment.

    With regard to price developments, members concurred with the assessment presented by Mr Lane. In spite of all remaining uncertainties, the recent inflation data releases had been broadly in line with the March ECB staff projections, with respect to both headline and core inflation. This suggested that inflation was on course for the 2% target, with long-term inflation expectations also remaining well anchored. Taking the February and March inflation data together, there was now much more confidence that the baseline scenario for inflation in the March projections was materialising. This held even without the appreciation of the euro or the decline in oil prices and commodity prices that had taken place since the finalisation of the projections.

    Looking ahead, it was argued that inflation would likely be lower in 2025 than foreseen in the March projections if the exchange rate and energy prices remained around their current levels. Recent market-based measures of inflation expectations also indicated that inflation might be falling faster than previously assumed. Inflation fixings now implied that investors expected inflation (excluding tobacco) to remain just below 2% in 2025 and to decline to around 1.2% in early 2026, before returning to around 1.6% by mid-2026. This signalled that risks to price stability might now be tilted to the downside, especially in the near term. The latest information also suggested that wage growth was moderating at a slightly faster pace than previously expected. Over a longer horizon, the tighter financial conditions, including the appreciation of the euro, the sharp drop in oil and gas prices and the headwinds from weaker economic activity, were seen as important new factors dampening inflation. There was now a risk that inflation could fall well below 2% at least over the remainder of the current year. Trade diversion and price concessions by Chinese exporters could also compound the ongoing depreciation of the renminbi and exert further downward effects on inflation, if not countered by measures by the European Commission. If there were to be retaliation against the tariffs imposed on US imports from the euro area, the direct inflationary impact could be counterbalanced by other factors, including the exchange rate, weaker raw material prices or possibly tighter financial conditions. Over the short term, the countervailing effects from increased fiscal spending were, moreover, unlikely to offset the further disinflationary pressures emanating from the international environment.

    At the same time, it was underlined that upside risks had not vanished. The rising momentum that had been detected in the PCCI indicators of underlying inflation warranted monitoring to confirm whether this increase was temporary and related to repricing early in the year in line with previous seasonal patterns. Although market-based measures of inflation compensation had fallen significantly, owing to lower inflation risk premia, genuine inflation expectations had been revised to a much lesser extent, and analysts’ inflation expectations were mostly well above inflation fixings. It also had to be considered that the likely re-flattening of the Phillips curve, which reflected among other things less frequent price adjustments, implied that meaningful downward deviations of inflation from target were unlikely in the absence of a deep and protracted recession. But such an event had a low probability in light of the expected fiscal impulse. In addition, the precise impact of the stronger euro was uncertain, especially given that one of the reasons behind the appreciation was a positive confidence shock as Europe offered stability in turbulent times. Moreover, successful trade negotiations and the resolution of trade disputes could give a boost to energy prices, changing the inflation picture very quickly. Finally, while the newly announced fiscal stimulus was unlikely to cause inflationary pressure over the short term in view of the underutilised capacities, the economy was likely to bump up against capacity constraints over the medium term, especially in the labour market. Indeed, inflation expectations reported in the Consumer Expectations Survey, the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises and the Survey of Professional Forecasters remained tilted to the upside over longer horizons. It was argued that, taken as a whole, the current environment posed some downside risks to inflation over the short run, but notable upside risks over the medium term. If retaliation against US tariffs affected products that were hard to substitute, such as intermediate goods, the inflationary impact could be sizeable and persistent as higher input costs from tariffs would be gradually passed on to consumers. This could more than offset the disinflationary pressure from reduced foreign demand. The closely interconnected global trade system implied that tariffs might be passed along entire supply chains. The need to absorb tariffs in profit margins at a time when these were already squeezed because of high wage growth would increase the probability and strength of the pass-through. Upside risks to inflation over the medium term were seen to hold especially in a scenario in which the trade war led to a permanently more fragmented global economy, owing to a less efficient allocation of resources, more fragile supply chains and less elastic global supply.

    Overall, increasing global trade disruptions were adding more uncertainty to the outlook for euro area inflation. Falling global energy prices and an appreciation of the euro could put further downward pressure on inflation. This could be reinforced by lower demand for euro area exports owing to higher tariffs and by a re-routing of exports into the euro area from countries with overcapacity. Adverse financial market reactions to the trade tensions could weigh on domestic demand and thereby also lead to lower inflation. By contrast, a fragmentation of global supply chains could increase inflation by pushing up import prices. A boost in defence and infrastructure spending could also lift inflation over the medium term. Extreme weather events, and the unfolding climate crisis more broadly, could drive up food prices by more than expected.

    Turning to the monetary and financial analysis, members highlighted that the period since the 5-6 March meeting had been characterised by exceptional financial market volatility. This had led to some financial data indicating sizeable daily moves that were several standard deviations away from their mean. Risk-free interest rates had declined since the March meeting in response to the escalating trade tensions, although long-term risk-free rates were still higher than at the cut-off date for the March staff projections. Equity prices had fallen amid high volatility and corporate bond spreads had widened around the globe. Partly in response to the turmoil, financial markets were now fully pricing in the expectation of a 25 basis point rate cut at the current meeting.

    The euro had strengthened considerably over recent weeks as investor sentiment proved more resilient towards the euro area than towards other economies. While the appreciation of the euro had been sizeable, since the inception of the euro the bilateral EUR/USD exchange rate had fluctuated in a relatively wide band, with the rate currently somewhere in the middle of the range. The recent adjustment across asset prices was atypical, as the financial market turbulence had come together with a rebalancing of international portfolios away from US assets towards exposures to other regions, such as the euro area. One explanation, which was supported by the coincidental weakening of the US dollar and by some initial market intelligence, was that domestic and foreign investors had moved out of US assets, possibly reflecting a loss of confidence in US fiscal and trade policies.

    Turning to broader financing conditions, the latest official statistics on corporate borrowing, which predated the market tensions, continued to indicate that past interest rate cuts had made it less expensive for firms to borrow. The average interest rate on new loans to firms had declined to 4.1% in February, from 4.3% in January. The cost to firms of issuing market-based debt had declined to 3.5% in February but there had been some upward pressure more recently. Moreover, growth in lending to firms had picked up again in February, to 2.2%, while debt securities issuance by firms had grown at an unchanged rate of 3.2%. At the same time, credit standards for business loans had tightened slightly again in the first quarter of 2025, as reported in the April round of the bank lending survey. This was mainly because banks were becoming more concerned about the economic risks faced by their customers. Demand for loans to firms had decreased slightly in the first quarter, after a modest recovery in previous quarters.

    The average rate on new mortgages, at 3.3% in February, had risen on the back of earlier increases in longer-term market rates. Mortgage lending had continued to strengthen in February, albeit at a still subdued annual rate of 1.5%, as banks had eased their credit standards and households’ demand for loans had continued to increase strongly.

    Monetary policy stance and policy considerations

    Turning to the monetary policy stance, members assessed the data that had become available since the last monetary policy meeting in accordance with the three main elements that the Governing Council had communicated in 2023 as shaping its reaction function. These comprised (i) the implications of the incoming economic and financial data for the inflation outlook, (ii) the dynamics of underlying inflation, and (iii) the strength of monetary policy transmission.

    Starting with the inflation outlook, members widely agreed that the latest data, including the HICP inflation figures for February and March and recent outturns for services inflation, provided further evidence that the disinflationary process was well on track. They thus expressed increased confidence that inflation would return to target in line with the March baseline projections.

    However, the March baseline projections had not incorporated the latest US policy announcements, which had increased downside risks to growth and inflation over the short term. The most recent forces at play, such as the negative demand shock linked to the tariff proposals and the related pervasive uncertainty, the appreciation of the euro and the decline in oil and gas prices, would further dampen the inflation outlook in the near term.

    Over the medium term the picture for inflation remained more mixed, as the effects of fiscal spending, retaliatory tariffs and the disruption of value chains might point in different directions, with each shock having an impact on growth and inflation with a different time profile. It was pointed out that the inflationary effects of tariffs might outweigh the disinflationary pressure from reduced foreign demand over the medium term, especially if the European Union retaliated by imposing tariffs on products that were not easily substitutable, such as intermediate goods. As a result, firms might suffer from rising input costs that would, over time, be passed on to consumers as the erosion of profit margins made cost absorption difficult. If this occurred at the same time as the support to economic activity from fiscal policy kicked in, there would be a significant risk of higher inflation. Overall, it was too early to draw firm conclusions at a time when many trade policy options were still on the table.

    Turning to underlying inflation, members concurred that most indicators were pointing to a sustained return of inflation to the 2% medium-term target. Wage growth had been slowing further – slightly faster than expected. In view of the high uncertainty, companies were also likely to be cautious about accepting high wage demands. Domestic inflation had remained unchanged, after falling slightly in February. This suggested that inflation had been quite stubborn despite the marked decline in services inflation, although progress had also been seen in this indicator when looking back over the past six months. The PCCI, which had the best leading indicator properties for inflation and still showed rising momentum, warranted further monitoring.

    Finally, incoming data confirmed that the transmission of monetary tightening remained largely as intended. Bank credit growth was overall on a gradual, slow recovery path, although from quite subdued levels. Nevertheless, it was increasing somewhat more strongly than had previously been expected for both non-financial corporations and households. There had been an easing of credit standards and strong demand for housing loans, which could foreshadow a pick-up in construction activity. At the same time, market-based indicators pointed to a tightening of financial conditions and, despite recent interest rate cuts, the latest round of the bank lending survey pointed to tighter credit standards for both firms and consumer credit. This was due to anticipated higher default risks against a background of weaker growth. Moreover, uncertainty had been very high and, in the presence of high uncertainty, the response of intermediaries to lower risk-free rates and, more generally, the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, were seen as more sluggish.

    Monetary policy decisions and communication

    Against this background, all members agreed with the proposal by Mr Lane to lower the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. In particular, lowering the deposit facility rate – the rate through which the Governing Council steered the monetary policy stance – was justified by the updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. Members expressed increased confidence that inflation would return to target over the medium term and that the fight against the inflation shock was nearly over.

    Some members indicated that, before the US tariff announcement on 2 April, they had considered a pause to rate cuts at the current meeting to be appropriate, preferring to wait for the next round of projections for greater clarity on the medium-term inflation outlook. These members attached a higher probability to the possibility that the trade shock would be inflationary beyond the short term, in view of the destructive effects of breaking up global value chains. While the inflationary effects of the proposed tariffs might differ for the United States and Europe, the pandemic experience had shown that, despite different weights attached to demand versus supply factors, in the end inflation developments in the two economies had been quite synchronous, and the same might occur again this time. Overall, this pointed to upside risks to inflation in the medium to long term that counterbalanced the downside risks stemming from weaker economic activity. However, recent events had convinced these members that cutting interest rates at the current meeting provided some insurance against negative outcomes and avoided contributing to additional uncertainty in times of financial market volatility. In addition, a cut at the present meeting could be seen as frontloading a possible cut at the June meeting, which underlined the need to retain full optionality for the upcoming meetings.

    At the same time, it was felt that the tariff tensions did not seem to come with the inflationary effects that many members had previously associated with such an event, at least not over the short to medium-term horizons. In part, this was because the euro was seemingly turning into more of a safe-haven currency and was subject to revaluation pressures. Disinflationary forces were thus likely to dominate in the short term. In addition, the growth outlook had weakened, with tariffs, related uncertainty and geopolitical tensions acting as a drag. In this regard, it was argued that a 25 basis point rate cut would lean against the substantial risks to growth in the short term and the tightening of financial conditions that had resulted from the tariff events, without the risk of fuelling inflation further down the line.

    In these turbulent times, members stressed the need to be a beacon of stability, thus instilling confidence and not causing more surprises in an already volatile environment, which might amplify market turbulence. This spoke in favour of a 25 basis point cut.

    A standard 25 basis point rate reduction was seen as consistent with the fact that, while very uncertain, the range of potential outcomes from the current situation still entailed some upside risks to inflation for the euro area economy. On the one hand, countervailing forces that would bring the US Administration to change course could eventually emerge. One such force had been the observed outflows from the US Treasuries market, which might have contributed to the 90-day pause applied to most US tariffs. On the other hand, there had been – and could be further – mitigating factors in the euro area. These included a more growth-supportive fiscal outlook as well as an opportunity to make swift progress on other European policy initiatives. Another factor potentially protecting against more adverse scenarios could be a stronger commitment by the Chinese Government to domestic demand-led growth in China. In addition, a possible structural increase in international demand for the euro, while entailing downside risks to inflation, was also a symptom of a largely positive development, namely a shift into European assets. A portfolio shift could lower long-term interest rates in the euro area and lead to cheaper financing for planned investment projects. Finally, the appreciation of the euro would further reduce the price of energy imports in euro terms, which could counterbalance some of the negative effects of the tariffs and the exchange rate on energy-intensive exporters.

    These arguments notwithstanding, a few members noted that they could have felt comfortable with a 50 basis point rate cut. These members attached more weight to the change in the balance of risks since the Governing Council’s March meeting, pointing out that downside risks to growth had increased and, even in the event of a relatively mild trade conflict, uncertainty was already discouraging consumption and investment. In this context, they emphasised that downside risks to inflation had clearly increased. The same members also argued that a larger interest rate cut could have offset more of the recent tightening of financial conditions, including higher corporate bond spreads and lower equity prices, which had weakened the transmission of past monetary policy decisions. In this respect it was argued that surprising the markets should not be excluded, and it was recalled that there had been previous cases in which the Governing Council had not shied away from surprises when appropriate.

    At the same time, it was argued that the optimal monetary policy response depended on the outcome of tariff negotiations, including the scope of the tariffs and the extent of potential retaliation, and on how tariffs fed through global supply chains. The view was also expressed that a forward-looking central bank should only act forcefully to the tariff shock if it expected a sharp deterioration in labour market conditions or an unanchoring of inflation expectations to the downside. However, the initial conditions, featuring a still resilient labour market and elevated momentum in underlying inflation and services inflation, made such a scenario unlikely. Moreover, the economy was coming out of a high-inflation period with consumers’ and firms’ inflation expectations one year ahead still standing at almost 3%. In such a situation, an unanchoring of inflation expectations to the downside was highly unlikely, while the higher than expected food and services inflation in March and rising momentum in services underlined the continued need to monitor inflation developments. If the decline in economic activity turned out to be short-lived, an accommodative response of monetary policy might, given transmission lags, exert its peak impact when the economy was already recovering and inflation was rising, and would therefore be misguided. It could also coincide with when fiscal policy was starting to boost domestic demand, although anticipation channels could lead to some of the impact of infrastructure and defence spending on inflation being smoothed out and dampened in the medium term. Finally, it was argued that cutting interest rates further could no longer be justified by the intention to return to neutral territory since, by various measures, monetary policy was no longer restrictive. Bank lending was recovering, domestic demand was expanding and the level of interest rates was contributing measurably to demand for all types of loan, as shown in the most recent bank lending survey.

    Looking ahead, members stressed that maintaining a data-dependent approach with full optionality at every meeting was warranted more than ever in view of the high uncertainty. Keeping a cautious approach and a firm commitment to price stability had contributed to the success so far, with inflation back on track despite unprecedented challenges. However, agility might be required in the present environment, with the need for the Governing Council to be ready to react quickly if necessary.

    Turning to communication aspects, members noted that it was time to remove the phrase “our monetary policy is becoming meaningfully less restrictive” from the monetary policy statement. Reference to a restrictive policy stance, in various formulations, had proven useful over past phases in which inflation had still been high, providing a clear message that monetary policy was contributing to disinflation. Such a signal was no longer needed. In the present conditions, dropping the sentence avoided the perception that the neutral level of interest rates was the end point of the current cycle, which was not necessarily the case. However, dropping the sentence did not imply that monetary policy had necessarily left restrictive territory. At the current juncture, there was no need to take a stand on whether monetary policy was still restrictive, already neutral or even moving into accommodative territory. Such a categorisation, especially in the current turbulent context, was very hard to provide. Instead, the change in wording was seen as consistent with an approach that was not guided by interest rate benchmarks but by the need to always determine the policy stance that was appropriate. In other words, policy would be set so as to provide the strongest assurance that inflation would be anchored sustainably at the medium-term target, given the set of initial conditions and the shocks that the Governing Council had to tackle at any given time.

    Members reiterated that the Governing Council remained determined to ensure that inflation would stabilise sustainably at its 2% medium-term target. Its interest rate decisions would continue to be based on its assessment of the inflation outlook in light of the incoming economic and financial data, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. While noting that markets were functioning in an orderly manner, it was seen as helpful to reiterate that the Governing Council stood ready to adjust all instruments within the ECB’s mandate to ensure that inflation stabilised sustainably at the medium-term target and to preserve the smooth functioning of monetary policy transmission.

    Taking into account the foregoing discussion among the members, upon a proposal by the President, the Governing Council took the monetary policy decisions as set out in the monetary policy press release. The members of the Governing Council subsequently finalised the monetary policy statement, which the President and the Vice-President would, as usual, deliver at the press conference following the Governing Council meeting.

    Monetary policy statement

    Monetary policy statement for the press conference of 17 April 2025

    Press release

    Monetary policy decisions

    Meeting of the ECB’s Governing Council, 16-17 April 2025

    Members

    • Ms Lagarde, President
    • Mr de Guindos, Vice-President
    • Mr Centeno*
    • Mr Cipollone
    • Mr Demarco, temporarily replacing Mr Scicluna*
    • Mr Dolenc, Deputy Governor of Banka Slovenije
    • Mr Elderson
    • Mr Escrivá
    • Mr Holzmann*
    • Mr Kazāks
    • Mr Kažimír
    • Mr Knot*
    • Mr Lane
    • Mr Makhlouf
    • Mr Müller
    • Mr Nagel
    • Mr Panetta
    • Mr Patsalides
    • Mr Rehn
    • Mr Reinesch*
    • Ms Schnabel
    • Mr Šimkus
    • Mr Stournaras
    • Mr Villeroy de Galhau
    • Mr Vujčić
    • Mr Wunsch

    * Members not holding a voting right in April 2025 under Article 10.2 of the ESCB Statute.

    Other attendees

    • Mr Dombrovskis, Commissioner**
    • Ms Senkovic, Secretary, Director General Secretariat
    • Mr Rostagno, Secretary for monetary policy, Director General Monetary Policy
    • Mr Winkler, Deputy Secretary for monetary policy, Senior Adviser, DG Monetary Policy

    ** In accordance with Article 284 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

    Accompanying persons

    • Mr Arpa
    • Ms Bénassy-Quéré
    • Mr Debrun
    • Mr Gavilán
    • Mr Kaasik
    • Mr Kelly
    • Mr Koukoularides
    • Mr Kroes
    • Mr Lünnemann
    • Ms Mauderer
    • Mr Martin
    • Mr Nicoletti Altimari
    • Mr Novo
    • Mr Rutkaste
    • Ms Schembri
    • Mr Šiaudinis
    • Mr Šošić
    • Mr Välimäki
    • Ms Žumer Šujica

    Other ECB staff

    • Mr Proissl, Director General Communications
    • Mr Straub, Counsellor to the President
    • Ms Rahmouni-Rousseau, Director General Market Operations
    • Mr Arce, Director General Economics
    • Mr Sousa, Deputy Director General Economics

    Release of the next monetary policy account foreseen on 3 July 2025.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Verizon reports preliminary results of shareholder vote at 2025 annual meeting

    Source: Verizon

    Headline: Verizon reports preliminary results of shareholder vote at 2025 annual meeting

    BASKING RIDGE, NJ – Verizon Communications Inc. (NYSE, Nasdaq: VZ) has announced preliminary results of the shareholder vote at its annual meeting, which was held today in a virtual-only format.

    Verizon’s shareholders elected each of Verizon’s 10 directors to a one-year term. Shareholders also voted in favor of two management proposals:

    • Approved the compensation of the company’s named executive officers as described in the 2025 proxy statement; and
    • Ratified the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as the company’s independent registered public accounting firm.

    All three shareholder proposals were defeated: issue report on climate lobbying alignment; issue  report on lead-sheathed cables; and assess risks related to discrimination in advertising services.

    Vote tallies are considered preliminary until the final results are tabulated and certified by independent inspectors of election. The final results will be posted on Verizon’s website at www.verizon.com/about/investors.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: NOIA Statement on House Passage of the Reconciliation Package

    Source: National Ocean Industries Association – NOIA

    Headline: NOIA Statement on House Passage of the Reconciliation Package

    For Immediate Release: Thursday, May 22, 2025NOIA .org
    NOIA Statement on House Passage of the Reconciliation Package
    Washington, D.C. – National Ocean Industries Association (NOIA) President Erik Milito issued the following statement after the House of Representatives passed its version of the reconciliation package, which includes critical offshore energy provisions:
    “House passage of this legislation is a significant milestone in advancing American energy dominance. Many of the included provisions are vital to preserving the Gulf of America’s role as a strategic energy hub and reinforcing U.S. leadership in offshore energy.
    “As the Senate moves forward, we urge lawmakers to deliver a final, balanced reconciliation package that maintains essential offshore oil and gas measures while ensuring current offshore energy tax credits are protected from premature repeal or phase-out. Undermining these credits risks disrupting critical investments in American manufacturing, infrastructure, ports, shipbuilding, and offshore energy projects nationwide.
    “The reconciliation process is a historic opportunity to advance U.S. energy production, environmental stewardship, and economic resilience. NOIA looks forward to working closely with Congress to secure a successful outcome.”
    ##
    About NOIAThe National Ocean Industries Association (NOIA) represents and advances a dynamic and growing offshore energy industry, providing solutions that support communities and protect our workers, the public and our environment.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: DG Okonjo-Iweala, IPU Secretary General Chungong urge parliaments to ratify WTO Fisheries Agreement

    Source: World Trade Organization

    Adopted at the WTO’s 12th Ministerial Conference (MC12) in June 2022, the Agreement tackles some of the most harmful forms of fisheries subsidies, including those that contribute to illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, the depletion of overfished stocks, and unregulated high seas fishing.

    “We are on the verge of a major milestone,” said WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo- Iweala. “This Agreement is not only about preserving deteriorating fish stocks: it is about people’s livelihoods and food security. It’s about responding to problems of the global commons – and demonstrating that the multilateral trading system is delivering global public goods. We need 12 more acceptances to bring it into force. It is now time for the remaining parliaments to take action. This is about improving economic and environmental sustainability – it would be wonderful if we can get this done in time for next month’s 2025 United Nations Oceans Conference in France.”

    IPU Secretary General Martin Chungong added: “Parliaments are the vital link between global agreements and national action. By ratifying this Agreement, they can help restore marine ecosystems, support livelihoods and show that multilateralism works.”

    The joint call for action builds on the letter sent by the IPU Secretary General and the WTO Director-General in September 2023 encouraging parliamentarians to get involved in the campaign to promote the ratification of the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies.

    The upcoming 2025 United Nations Oceans Conference, taking place from 9 to 13 June in Nice, France, presents a timely opportunity for the Agreement’s ratification and entry into force, building political momentum for action to address rapidly deteriorating fish stocks.

    A prompt entry into force of the Agreement would send a powerful signal of global resolve to implement Sustainable Development Goal 14.6, which aims to eliminate harmful fisheries subsidies and promote the sustainable use of marine resources.

    The 2022 Agreement has already shown that WTO members can deliver meaningful multilateral outcomes, even amid geopolitical tensions and economic uncertainty. Finalizing ongoing negotiations on additional disciplines to address subsidies contributing to overcapacity and overfishing would further strengthen efforts toward long-term sustainability.

    The Agreement holds particular significance for coastal communities in small, vulnerable economies (SVEs) and least-developed countries (LDCs), which depend heavily on marine resources for food security, employment, and economic resilience. Many SVEs and LDCs have already ratified the Agreement, recognizing its potential to preserve marine ecosystems and advance fairness in ocean governance. Even landlocked members see value in the Agreement because it helps address food insecurity. The full list of WTO members that have deposited their instruments of acceptance is available here.

    The WTO Fisheries Funding Mechanism (Fish Fund) is ready to become operational once the Agreement enters into force. In collaboration with international partners, the Fund will provide technical assistance and capacity-building to developing economies that have ratified the Agreement. More information is available here.

    The WTO Secretariat and the IPU reaffirm their commitment to working with national and regional parliaments through technical briefings, outreach activities, and targeted support to ensure swift ratification and effective implementation of the Agreement.

    Share

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Frank Elderson: Nature’s bell tolls for thee, economy!

    Source: European Central Bank

    Keynote speech by Frank Elderson, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, at the Naturalis Biodiversity Center

    Leiden, 22 May 2025

    Thank you for inviting me to speak at this annual biodiversity dinner. The wide range of speakers here this evening – on international biodiversity day – is testament to the relevance of biodiversity across disciplines.

    Nature isn’t just the roots and shoots of biologists, macroecologists and natural scientists. Beyond its intrinsic value, nature provides vital services that are relevant for all of us – for entrepreneurs, workers, policymakers and bankers, but also for central bankers and financial supervisors.

    A thriving natural environment provides vital benefits that sustain our well-being and serve as a crucial driving force for the global economy. Think of fertile soils, pollination, timber, fishing stocks, clean water and clean air.

    But we are well aware of the daunting facts that confirm the dire state of ecosystem services. Intensive land use, the climate crisis, pollution, overexploitation and other human pressures are rapidly and severely damaging our natural resources.

    75% of land surface ecosystems and 66% of ocean ecosystems have been damaged, degraded or modified.

    We are using natural resources 1.7 times faster than ecosystems can regenerate them. Consequently, the contribution that nature can make to our economies – and our way of life – is steadily diminishing every day.

    These fateful facts and figures confront us as vividly as Edvard Munch’s iconic scream. Yet, accounting for nature and the services it provides is challenging. What nature provides to the economy is typically not measured directly in statistics like GDP.

    We price portfolios instead of pollinators, we monitor markets instead of mangroves and we watch wages instead of water supplies. However, the reality is that while our economies are heavily reliant on ecosystem services, the economic value of those pollinators, mangroves and water supplies is not sufficiently taken into account.

    Nature is too often still wrongly seen as a free good, readily available and abundant in supply, without opportunity costs. For such a good, there is no market – and therefore no price.

    So, why can’t governments intervene by pricing and creating a market for nature as has been done for emissions?

    Unlike for the climate crisis – which can be quantified through carbon emissions and their direct links to rising temperatures – there is no single metric that can be used to quantify the wide range of ecosystem services.

    What is the common denominator of clean air, fertile soils and coasts protected by mangrove forests? Nature is beautifully complex, but this complexity makes it harder to establish a market for nature than a market for climate, such as the carbon markets created through emissions trading systems.

    For central banks to effectively fulfil their mandates, we need to enhance our capacity to measure the vital services that nature provides to our economy and identify the financial risks caused by the degradation of these services. And while this is admittedly not an easy task, it is encouraging that multiple stakeholders are making progress, including academia, firms and also the ECB. We are enhancing our tools, methodologies and data to assess the economic implications of ecosystems and their degradation. And I am pleased to be able to share some of our latest insights this evening.

    I will argue that while nature services may appear to be freely available, they are in fact not abundant at all and there are substantial costs to using and losing them. Costs that we currently overlook when headlines report on GDP growth.

    Accounting for nature in monetary policy and banking supervision

    Nature being of vital importance for the economy and the financial system is hardly a novel insight. Besides scientists, a number of central banks and prudential supervisors have also been highlighting their interlinkages for several years now.[1] And while the climate crisis has received most of the attention, it is encouraging that work on nature-related risks has also significantly evolved.

    Moreover, the ECB has taken significant steps to account for nature-related risks in the pursuit of its mandate. For instance, we take into account the effects nature degradation can have on banks’ balance sheets. The degradation of nature could damage companies’ production processes and consequently weaken their creditworthiness, which might in turn impair loans granted by banks. In our role as the supervisor of Europe’s largest banks, we therefore aim to ensure that the banks we supervise adequately manage both climate-related and nature-related risks.[2] Encouragingly, we are seeing a growing set of good practices among the banks we supervise in terms of identifying, quantifying and managing nature-related risks.

    But are we fully aware of – and sufficiently alert to – how nature degradation could eventually hit balance sheets?

    Advancing our understanding does not mean that economists and supervisors should start studying ants in Aragon, ladybirds in Lombardy or honeybees in Holland (although it is very important that entomologists do!).

    Instead, central banks and supervisors need to gain a better understanding of just how vulnerable the economy and the financial system are to nature degradation.[3]

    Capturing the risks related to ecosystem degradation

    An ECB study in 2023 found that nearly 75% of banks’ corporate lending goes to firms that are highly dependent on at least one ecosystem service.[4] This finding underscores just how interconnected nature, the economy and the financial system really are.[5] But that study does not tell us exactly how much of our economic activity is at risk, or which economic sectors and regions will be most affected.

    To better understand this impact, the ECB has teamed up with the Resilient Planet Finance Lab at the University of Oxford.

    The interdisciplinary team has developed systemic risk indicators that move beyond dependency analysis to a comprehensive assessment of nature-related financial risks. In essence, this indicator assesses the economic implications of the deteriorating state of ecosystems. It shows how much of the economic value added by a particular industry– what economists call “gross value added” – is at risk when ecosystem services degrade. Tomorrow we will publish a blog post showing some of the preliminary results of our work, but I can already share some findings with you this evening.

    Water – the natural currency underwriting purchases, investments and trades

    Our preliminary findings indicate two things. First, water – too little, too much or too dirty water that is –has been identified as posing the most significant risk to the euro area economy. Losses related to water scarcity, poor water quality and flood protection emerge as the most critical from a value added perspective. Concretely, surface water scarcity alone puts almost 15% of the euro area’s economic output at risk. This is not surprising because water is not just any resource – it is one of the most essential natural resources we possess. Second, agriculture is the most exposed sector, as it would suffer the largest proportional output losses due to a decline in surface water. But other sectors are also likely to be significantly affected.

    Chart 1

    Proportion of national gross value added (GVA) at risk due to surface water scarcity in Europe and globally (supply chain risks)

    Water is, for instance, an indispensable resource in industry. In the Netherlands, industry alone uses over 2.6 trillion litres of fresh water a year.[6] This water usage is more than three times the total annual water consumption of all households in the Netherlands. Water is also essential for energy production, not only in hydropower plants but also in thermal power plants – including nuclear – where it is used for cooling and steam generation. It is consumed in vast quantities for mining and mineral processing, which are crucial for the energy transition, as well as in the construction sector for producing concrete, to name just a few examples.

    The risk posed by water scarcity is not hypothetical, we are already experiencing the impact today. I am sure that many of you remember when the summers of 2018, 2019 and 2020 brought severe droughts and heatwaves even to the Netherlands. In 2018 alone, economic losses in the Netherlands were up to €1.9 billion for agriculture and €155 million for shipping, with widespread but hard-to-quantify damage to ecosystems. This year’s drought is especially alarming: spring 2025 is on track to become the driest ever recorded in the Netherlands, likely surpassing the previous record set nearly 50 years ago. And droughts are only projected to increase further as the climate crisis continues to develop. Worryingly, in the driest scenario an average summer in the 2040s will be about as dry as an extremely dry summer now.

    Effective water management will thus be crucial for sustaining production. However, the risk persists that during periods of drought, production might need to be scaled down. Some industrial processes may become economically unviable and might need to relocate.

    For example, some have even gone as far as to point at a risk that more frequent droughts could render traditional tulip-growing regions such as the Bollenstreek unsuitable for bulb cultivation.[7] This may compel growers to explore better-positioned locations where water is more reliably available to safeguard the iconic Dutch tulip industry.

    Hence, as a consequence of water scarcity, our economies could produce less, and production costs are likely to rise during any inevitable transition phase.

    Let me also point out that biodiversity is a critical – and often underestimated – factor in ensuring the availability and quality of fresh water. Ecosystems such as forests and wetlands regulate the quantity, timing and purity of water flows by stabilising soils and filtering pollutants. Maintaining healthy and diverse ecosystems will be crucial for resilient water provisioning as climate change intensifies, particularly in regions facing growing water stress.

    Beyond these macroeconomic impacts, ecosystem degradation can significantly affect financial stability, for example through the loans that banks grant to households and firms. In essence, the greater the impact on firms, the higher the risk of defaults and the higher the risk on banks’ balance sheets.

    For example, in our research with the University of Oxford we found that more than 34% of banks’ total outstanding nominal amount – over €1.3 trillion – is currently extended to sectors exposed to high water scarcity risk.

    As the next step in our research, we will examine changes in the probability of default in the sectors most affected by dwindling ecosystems. Think about it as stress-testing the resilience of banks’ credit portfolios to nature degradation. We plan to publish these results later this year, complete with a more in-depth analysis on the topic, so stay tuned.

    Multiple stakeholders are taking action

    Encouragingly, our work with the University of Oxford is not an isolated case. We are in fact seeing a wide range of stakeholders taking action to better account for ecosystem services.

    For instance, I hear that our host this evening – the Naturalis Biodiversity Center – has teamed up with banks to combine insights from science and finance to further develop indicators quantifying ecosystem services.

    We are also seeing a growing set of good practices among the banks we supervise in terms of identifying, quantifying and managing nature-related risks. Banks typically conduct materiality assessments to understand where they are most affected. And banks also grapple with the challenge that nature-related risks are difficult to express in a single metric. Once they know where they are exposed, they then typically conduct deep dives on specific topics.

    One bank, for example, has conducted a quantitative scenario analysis to understand how the profitability of its customers could be affected if a water pollution tax were to be implemented.

    Other banks design customer scorecards and engage with the most vulnerable counterparties, sometimes offering small discounts or other incentives when customers meet key performance indicators that increase their resilience.

    It is also encouraging that progress is being made at the international level. The Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) – a network of 145 central banks and supervisors from around the world – has developed a conceptual framework offering central banks and supervisors a common understanding of nature-related financial risks and a principle-based risk assessment approach.[8][9] And the Financial Stability Board recently took stock of supervisory and regulatory initiatives among its members, finding that a growing number of financial authorities are considering the potential implications of nature-related risks for the financial sector.[10]

    So scientists, banks, policymakers and supervisors are in fact taking action. That’s good news. Given the high level of uncertainty regarding impacts, non-linearities, tipping points and irreversibility, continuous scientific input and engagement are essential to determine the transmission channels from nature to our economies.

    Reliable and comparable data are key to managing risks and identifying opportunities

    Before I conclude, let me stress a vital enabler to better measure ecosystem services: data. Closer cooperation with natural scientists can help us better understand the data they have available on the status of nature and the ecosystem services it provides. The National Hub for Biodiversity Information provided by our host tonight is an excellent example.[11]

    Moreover, continuous engagement with the scientific community can also help improve our understanding of non-linearities, tipping points and the irreversibility of the biodiversity crisis.

    Similarly, the availability of reliable and comparable data from companies is essential for us to know where the risks are hiding and where opportunities can be found. Such data can, for example, provide insights into companies’ reliance on fresh water for their production processes. In this context, the reporting requirements in the EU’s sustainable finance framework are not merely a “nice to have”, they are providing indispensable information about financial risks and are a solution to the patchwork of different reporting criteria.

    Does that mean that there is no room for simplification? Does it mean that there is no room to ease the reporting burden on smaller firms?

    Of course not.

    As the ECB noted in its recent opinion[And they do!
    Send not to know
    For whom the bell tolls.
    It tolls for thee, ECOnomy!

    Thank you for your attention.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Press Briefing Transcript: Julie Kozack, Director, Communications Department, May 22, 2025

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    May 22, 2025

    SPEAKER:  Ms. Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department, IMF

    MS. KOZACK: Good morning, everyone and welcome to this IMF Press Briefing.  It is wonderful to see you all today on this rainy Washington morning, especially those of you here in person and of course also those of you joining us online.  My name is Julie Kozak.  I’m the Director of Communications at the IMF.  As usual, this press briefing will be embargoed until 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time in the United States.  And as usual, I will start with a few announcements and then I’ll take your questions in person on WebEx and via the Press Center.  

    So first, our Managing Director, Kristalina Georgieva, and our First Deputy Managing Director, Gita Gopinath, are currently attending the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting taking place in Canada right now.  Second, on May 29th through 30th, the Managing Director will travel to Dubrovnik, Croatia to attend a joint IMF Croatia National Bank Conference focused on promoting growth and resilience in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe.  The Managing Director will participate in the opening panel and will hold meetings with regional counterparts.  

    On June 2nd, the Managing Director will travel to Sofia, Bulgaria to attend the 30th Anniversary celebration of the National Trust Ecofund.  During her visit, she will also hold several bilateral meetings with the Bulgarian authorities.  

    Our Deputy Managing Director, Nigel Clarke, will travel to Paraguay, Brazil, and the Netherlands next month.  On June 6th, he will launch the IMF’s new regional training program for South America and Mexico, which will be hosted in Asuncion by the Central Bank of Paraguay.  From there, he will travel to Brasilia to deliver a keynote speech on June 10th during the Annual Meeting of the Caribbean Development Bank.  He will also then travel to the Netherlands on June 12th to 13th to participate in the 2025 Consultative Group to Assist the Poor Symposium and to meet with the Dutch authorities.  

    Our Deputy Managing Director, Kenji Okamura, will be in Japan from June 11th to 12th for the 10th Tokyo Fiscal Forum to discuss fiscal frameworks and GovTech in the Asia Pacific region.  

    And finally, on a kind of housekeeping or scheduling issue, the Article IV Consultation for the United States will be undertaken on a later timetable this year, with discussions to be held in November.  

    And with those rather extensive announcements, I will now open the floor to your questions.  For those connecting virtually, please turn on both your camera and microphone when speaking.  All right, let’s open up.  Daniel.

     

    QUESTIONER: Thanks for taking my question.  I just wonder if the IMF has any reaction to the passage of last night in the House of Representatives of the One Big, Beautiful bill.  And a related question, how concerned are you by the increase in yields on long-dated U.S. treasuries?  What do you think it says about the market’s view of U.S. debt going into the future and sort of any possible spillovers for IMF borrowers as well?  MS. KOZACK: On the first question, what I can say is we take note of the passing of the legislation in the House of Representatives earlier this morning.  What we will do is we will look to assess a final bill once it has passed through the Senate and also once it’s been enacted.  And, of course, we will have opportunities to share our assessment over time in the various products where we normally would convey our fulsome views.  

    On your second question, which was on the bond market.   What I can say there is that we know that the U.S. government bonds are a safe haven asset, and the U.S. dollar, of course, plays a key role as the world’s reserve currency.  The U.S. bond market plays a critical role, of course, in finance and in safe assets.  And this is underpinned by the liquidity and depth of the U.S. market and also the sound institutions in the U.S.  We don’t see any changes in those functions.  And, of course, what we can also say is that although there has been some volatility in markets, market functioning, including in the U.S. Treasury market, has so far been orderly.  

     

    QUESTIONER: My question is about Ukraine.  Two topics particularly.  So, the first one, when is the next review of the Ukraine’s EFF is going to be completed, and what amount of money would be disbursed to Kyiv?  And could you please outline the total sum that is remaining within the current program?  And the second part, it’s about debt level.  What is the IMF assessment of current Ukraine’s government debt level?  Is it stable?  Do you see any vulnerabilities and any risks for Ukraine?  Thank you.  

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Ukraine?  Does anyone online want to come in on Ukraine?  Okay, I don’t see anyone.  

    What I can say on Ukraine is that just two days ago, our Staff team started policy discussions with the Ukrainian authorities on the eighth review under the eff.  So, the team is on the ground now.  The discussions are taking place in Kiev and the team will provide an update on the progress at the end of the mission.

    In terms of the potential disbursement, I’m just looking here; that’s the seventh disbursement.  We will come back to you on the size of the disbursement, but it should show in the Staff report for the Seventh Review what would be expected for the Eighth Review.  And it would also show the remaining size of the program.  But we’ll come back to you bilaterally with those exact answers.  

    And what I can then say on the debt side is at the time of the Seventh Review under the program, we assessed debt, Ukraine’s debt to be sustainable on a forward-looking basis and as with every review that the team of course, will update its assessment as part of the eighth review discussion.  We’ll have more to say on the debt as the eighth review continues.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Just one more thing on Ukraine.  Does it make sense for them to consider using the euro as a defense currency for their currency, given the shifting geopolitical sense and what we are seeing with the dollar? MS. KOZACK: So right now, under the program, Ukraine has an inflation targeting regime, and that is where what the program is focused on, our program with Ukraine. So, they have an inflation targeting regime.  They are very much focused on ensuring the stability of that monetary policy regime that Ukraine has.  And, of course, that involves a floating exchange rate.  And I don’t have anything beyond that to say on the currency market.

     

    QUESTIONER: The agreement with the IMF established a target for the Central Bank Reserve to meet by June.  According to the technical projection, does the IMF believe Argentina will meet this target?  And if it’s not met, is it possible that we will grant a waiver in the future?

    MS. KOZACK: anything else on Argentina?  

    QUESTIONER: About Argentina, what is your assessment of the progress of the program agreed with Argentina more than a month after its announcement in last April?  

     

    QUESTIONER: The government is about to announce a measure to gain access to voluntarily, of course, but to the dollars that are “under the mattress”, as we call them, undeclared funds to probably meet these targets that Roman was asking about.  I was wondering if this measure has been discussed with the IMF.  And also, you mentioned Georgieva visiting Paraguay and Brazil, if you there’s any plan to visit Argentina as well?  

    QUESTIONER: President Milei is about to announce, you know, Minister Caputo, in a few minutes that there is a measure to use similar to attacks Amnesty.  Is the IMF concerned that this could violate its regulations against illicit financial flows? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, with respect to Argentina, on April 11th, I think, as you know, our Executive Board approved a new four-year EFF arrangement for Argentina.  It was for $20 billion.  It contained an initial disbursement of $12 billion.  And that the aim of that program is to support Argentina’s transition to the next phase of its stabilization program and reforms.  

    President Milei’s administration’s policies continued to deliver impressive results.  These include the rollout of the new FX regime, which has been smooth, a decline in monthly inflation to 2.8 percent in April, another fiscal surplus in April, and reaching a cumulative fiscal surplus of 0.6 percent of GDP for the year, and efforts to continue to open up the economy.  At the same time, the economy is now expanding, real wages are recovering, and poverty continues to fall in Argentina.  

    The Fund continues to support the authorities in their efforts to create a more stable and prosperous Argentina.  Our close engagement continues, including in the context of the upcoming discussions for the First Review of the program.  This First Review will allow us to assess progress and to consider policies to build on the strong momentum and to secure lasting stability and growth in Argentina.  And in this regard, there is a shared recognition with the authorities about the importance of strengthening external buffers and securing a timely re-access to international capital markets.  

    What I can say on the question about the announcements on that — the question on the undeclared assets.  All I can say right now is that we’re following developments very closely on this, and of course, the team will be ready to provide an assessment in due course.  

    On the second part of that question, I do want to also note, and this is included in our Staff report, that the authorities have committed to strengthening financial transparency and also to aligning Argentina’s AML CFT, the Anti-Money Laundering framework, with international standards, as well as to deregulating the economy to encourage its formalization.  So, any new measures, including those that may be aimed at encouraging the use of undeclared assets, should be, of course, consistent with these important commitments.  

    And on your question about Paraguay and Brazil, I just want to clarify that it is our Deputy Managing Director, Nigel Clarke, who will be traveling to Brazil and Paraguay, not the Managing Director.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Two questions on Syria.  With the U.S. and EU announcing the lifting of sanctions recently, how does this affect any sort of timeline with providing economic assistance?  And secondly, the Managing Director has said that the Fund has to first define data.  Can you just walk through what that entails?  

    MS. KOZACK: Can you just repeat what you said?  The Managing Director has said?

     

    QUESTIONER: The need to define data.  Just sort of a similar question.  I’m just wondering, following the World Bank statement last week about, you know, Syria now being eligible to borrow from the bank, what sort of discussions the Fund has had with the Syrian authorities since the end of the Spring Meetings and, you know, any update you can give us around possible discussions around an Article IV.  

     

    QUESTIONER: About the relationship and if there’s any missed planned virtual or on the ground? 

    MS. KOZACK: Let me step back and give a little bit of an overview on Syria. So, first, you know, we’re, of course, monitoring developments in Syria very closely.  Our Staff are preparing to support the international community’s efforts to help with Syria’s economic rehabilitation as conditions allow.  We have had useful discussions with the new Economic Team who took office in late March, including during the Spring Meetings.  And, of course, you will perhaps have seen the press release regarding the roundtable that was held during the Spring Meetings.  IMF Staff have already started to work to rebuild its understanding of the Syrian economy.  We’ve been doing this through interactions with the authorities and also through coordination with other IFIs. And just to remind everyone, our last Article IV with Syria was in 2009.  So, it’s been quite some time since we have had a substantive engagement with Syria.  Syria will need significant assistance to rebuild its economic institutions.  We stand ready to provide advice and targeted and well-prioritized technical assistance in our areas of expertise. I think this goes a little bit to your question on, like, what do we mean by defining data.  I think what the Managing Director was really referring to there is since it has been such a long time since we have had a substantive engagement with Syria, the last Article IV, as I said, was in 2009.  I think there, what she’s really referring to is the need to really work with the Syrian authorities to rebuild basic economic institutions, including the ability to produce economic statistics, right, so that we — so that we and the authorities and the international community of course, can conduct the necessary economic analysis so that we can best support the reconstruction and recovery efforts.  

    With respect to the lifting of sanctions, what I can say there is that, of course, the lifting of sanctions and the lifting of sanctions are a matter between member states of the IMF.  What we can say in serious cases that the lifting of sanctions could support Syria’s efforts to overcome its economic challenges and help advance its reconstruction and economic development.  Syria, of course, is an IMF member, and as we’ve just said, you know, we are, of course, engaged closely with the Syrians to explore how, within our mandate, we can best support them.  

     

    QUESTIONER: My question is on Russia.  In what ways is the IMF monitoring Russia’s economy under the current sanctions and conflict conditions, and have regular Article IV Consultations or other surveillance activities with Russia resumed to track its economic developments?  

    MS. KOZACK: What I can say with respect to Russia is that we are, our Staff, are analyzing data and economic indicators that are reported by the Russian authorities.  We are also looking at counterparty data that is provided to us by other countries, and this is particularly true for cross-border transactions, as well as data from third-party sources. So, this data collection using official and other sources does allow us to put together a picture of the Russian economy.  

    We did provide an assessment in the 2025 April WEO, the one that we just released about a month ago.  In this WEO, we assess Russia’s growth at — we expect Russia to grow at 1.5 percent in 2025, 0.9 percent in 2026, and we expect inflation to come down to 8.2 percent in 2025 and 4.4 percent in 2026.  And I don’t have a timetable for the Article IV at this time.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I’d like to ask about Deputy Management Director Okamura’s visits to Japan.  So, my question is, what economic topics will be on the agenda during his stay?  Could you tell me a bit more in detail?  

    MS. KOZACK: Deputy Managing Director Okamura will travel to Japan, as I said, from June 11th to 12th, and he will be attending the Tokyo Fiscal Forum.  So, this will be the 10th Tokyo Fiscal Forum.  It’s an annual conference that we co-host in Japan every year and the focus is on issues of fiscal policy. In this particular one, Deputy Managing Director Okamura will be discussing fiscal frameworks. It’s very important for all countries to have sound fiscal frameworks so they can implement sound fiscal policy.  He will also be discussing GovTech not only in Japan but in the Asia Pacific region.  And of course, GovTech is very important for countries because it’s a way of modernizing and making government both provision of services in some cases but also potentially collection of revenue more effective and more efficient.  So, those will be the focus of his discussions in Tokyo.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I have a question on the recent bailout package by IMF to Pakistan.  The Indian government has expressed a lot of displeasure with Pakistan planning to use this package to build — rebuild — areas that allegedly support cross-border terrorism.  Does the IMF have any assessment of this?  Secondly, I also have another question.  Could you please provide information on the majority vote that was received in approving this bailout package for Pakistan on May 9th?  If you can disclose the information.  

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Pakistan?  

     

    QUESTIONER: Just adding to that, do you have an update on the implications of the escalation of facilities in that border between Pakistan and India on both economies.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Thanks a lot.  I guess the only spin I would put on is generally what safeguards does the IMF have that its funds won’t be used for military or in support of military actions, not only there but as a general matter.  And I also, if you’re able to, there was some controversy about the termination of India’s Executive Director of the IMF, K.V. Subramanian.  Do you have any insight into–there are reports there–what it was about but what do you say it’s about?  Thanks a lot.  

    MS. KOZACK: With respect to the Indian Executive Director who had been at the Fund, all I can say on this is that the appointment of Executive Directors is a member for the — is a matter for the member country.  It’s not a matter for the Fund, and it’s completely up to the country authorities to determine who represents them at the Fund.  

    With respect to Pakistan and the conflict with India, I want to start here by first expressing our regrets and sympathies for the loss of life and for the human toll from the recent conflict.  We do hope for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.  

    Now, turning to some of the specific questions about the Board approval of Pakistan’s program, I’m going to step back a minute and provide a little bit of the chronology and timeframe.  The IMF Executive Board approved Pakistan’s EFF program in September of 2024.  And the First review at that time was planned for the first quarter of 2025.  And consistent with that timeline, on March 25th of 2025, the IMF Staff and the Pakistani authorities reached a Staff-Level Agreement on the First Review for the EFF.  That agreement, that Staff-Level Agreement, was then presented to our Executive Board, and our Executive Board completed the review on May 9th.  As a result of the completion of that review, Pakistan received the disbursement at that time.  

    What I want to emphasize here is that it is part of a standard procedure under programs that our Executive Board conducts periodic reviews of lending programs to assess their progress.  And they particularly look at whether the program is on track, whether the conditions under the program have been met, and whether any policy changes are needed to bring the program back on track.  And in the case of Pakistan, our Board found that Pakistan had indeed met all of the targets.  It had made progress on some of the reforms, and for that reason, the Board went ahead and approved the program.  

    With respect to the voting or the decision-making at our Board, we do not disclose that publicly.  In general, Fund Board decisions are taken by consensus, and in this case, there was a sufficient consensus at the Board to allow us to move forward or for the Board to decide to move forward and complete Pakistan’s review.  

    And with respect to the question on safeguards, I do want to make three points here.  The first is that IMF financing is provided to members for the purpose of resolving balance of payments problems.  

    In the case of Pakistan, and this is my second point, the EFF disbursements, all of the disbursements received under the EFF, are allocated to the reserves of the central bank.  So, those disbursements are at the central bank, and under the program, those resources are not part of budget financing.  They are not transferred to the government to support the budget. 

    And the third point is that the program provides additional safeguards through our conditionality.  And these include, for example, targets on the accumulation of international reserves.  It includes a zero target, meaning no lending from the central bank to the government.  And the program also includes substantial structural conditionality around improving fiscal management.  And these conditions are all available in the program documents if you wanted to do a deeper dive.  And, of course, any deviation from the established program conditions would impact future reviews under the Pakistan program.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I have a question on Egypt.  There is a mission in Egypt for the First Review of the EFF loan program.  So, can you please update us on the ongoing discussions, especially since the Prime Minister of Egypt announced yesterday that the program could be concluded in 2027 rather than 2026?  

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Egypt?  I have a question from the Press Center on Egypt, which I will read aloud.  The question is when will the Fifth Review currently underway with the Egyptian government be concluded, and when will the Executive Board approve this review?  And how much money will Egypt receive once the review is approved?  

    So, here’s what I can share on Egypt.  First, let me start here.  So first, I just want to say that the Fund remains committed to supporting Egypt in building its economic resilience and fostering higher private sector-led growth.  Egypt has made clear progress on its macroeconomic reform program, with notable improvements in inflation and foreign exchange reserves.  For the past few weeks, IMF Staff has had productive discussions with the Egyptian authorities on economic performance and policies under the EFF.  As Egypt’s macroeconomic stabilization is taking hold, efforts must now focus on accelerating and deepening reforms that will reduce the footprint of the state in the Egyptian economy, level the playing field, and improve the business environment.  Discussions will continue between the IMF and the Egyptian authorities on the remaining policies and reforms that could support the completion of the Fifth Review.  

     

    QUESTIONER: My question is about Sri Lanka.  Sri Lanka’s program is subject to IMF Board approval.  The review is subject to IMF Board approval, but we still haven’t got any word on when that would be.  Is there any delay in this?  And is this delay attributed to the pending electricity adjustments, tariff adjustments, that the Sri Lankan government has committed to?  

    MS. KOZACK: So just stepping back for a minute.  On April 25th, IMF Staff and the Sri Lankan authorities reached Staff-Level Agreement on the Fourth Review of Sri Lanka’s program under the EFF.  And once the review is approved by our Executive Board, Sri Lanka will have access to about $344 million in financing.  Completion of the review is subject to approval by the Executive Board, and we expect that Board meeting to take place in the coming weeks.  

    The precise timing of the Board meeting is contingent on two things.  The first is implementation of prior actions, and the main prior actions are relating to restoring electricity, cost recovery pricing and ensuring proper function of the automatic electricity price adjustment mechanism.  And the second contingency is completion of the Financing Assurances Review, which will focus on confirming multilateral partners, committed financing contributions to Sri Lanka and whether adequate progress has been made in debt restructuring.  So, in a nutshell, completion of the review is subject to approval by the Executive Board.  We expect the Board meeting to take place in the coming weeks.  And it’s contingent on the two matters that I just mentioned.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Thank you for having my questions on Ecuador.  Since the IMF is still completing the second review under the EFF program for Ecuador, do you think it’s going to be time to change the program, the goals, or maybe the amount of the program?  Because Ecuador is now facing different challenges compared to 2024.  The oil prices are falling, so that is going to affect the fiscal situation for Ecuador.  And also, I would like to know if Ecuador is still looking for a new program under the RSF.  And the last one, I would like to know if, do you think that Ecuador is going to need to make some important changes this year on oil subsidies and a tax reform?  I think, as I said, Ecuador now is facing some important challenges in the fiscal situation, so do you think it’s going to be possible because of, you know, all the social protests and all that kind of stuff?  Do you think it’s going to be possible to do that in Ecuador?  

     

    QUESTIONER: Is there a request, an official request, in place to modify the program?  And if there is, of course, details of the new one, you can share.  

    MS. KOZACK: And then I have one question online from the Press Center regarding Ecuador.  Is the sovereign negotiating new targets, given their fiscal position deteriorated compared to last year?  Our understanding is that $410 million was not dispersed under the First Review.?

    So let me share what I can on Ecuador.  So, right now, representatives from the IMF, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank are in Quito this week to meet with the authorities and discuss the strengthening of financial and technical support to the country.  As part of this tripartite visit, we have a new IMF Mission Chief who is participating, and she is also using that opportunity to have courtesy meetings with the authorities and to continue discussions and advance toward a Second Review under Ecuador’s EFF.  

    What else I can add, just as background, is that the Executive Board in December approved the First Review of Ecuador’s 48-month EFF.  About $500 million was disbursed after the approval of that Frist Review.  And at that time, the Executive Board also concluded the Article IV Consultation.

    I can also say that the authorities have made excellent progress in the implementation of their economic program under the EFF.  And regarding the precise timing of the Second Review, we will provide an update on the next steps in due course and when we’re able to do so.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Just a quick question on tariffs.  I’m just wondering if the IMF has a response to the U.S.-China deal that was struck in Geneva earlier this month.  You know, if the deal holds, I appreciate it’s a 90-day pause, but if the deal holds, how would you foresee that changing the Fund’s current economic forecast for the U.S. and China and for the global economy?  Thanks.  

    MS. KOZACK: As you noted, earlier in May, China and the U.S. announced a 90-day rollback of most of the bilateral tariffs imposed since April 2nd, and they established a mechanism to discuss economic and trade relations.  The two sides reduced their tariff from peak levels, leaving in place 10 percent additional tariffs.  So, the additional tariffs before this agreement were 125 percent.  Now, the additional tariff has agreed to be 10 percent, you know, for the 90 days.  This is obviously a positive step for the world’s two largest economies.

    What I can also add is that for the U.S., you may recall, during the Spring Meetings, we talked a lot about the overall effective tariff rate for the U.S.  At that time, we assessed it at 25.5 percent.  This announcement and the reduction in tariffs will bring the U.S. effective tariff rate down to a bit over 14 percent.  

    Now, with respect to the impact, what I can say is that the reduction in tariffs and the easing of tensions does provide some upside risk to our global growth forecast.  We will be updating that global growth forecast as part of our July WEO.  And so that will give us an opportunity to provide a full assessment.  All of this said, of course, the outlook, the global outlook in general does remain one of high uncertainty.  And so that uncertainty is still with us.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I have a broad question regarding the following – at the IMF World Bank Spring Meeting, the recent one,  the Treasury Secretary Bessent called for the IMF and the World Bank to refocus on their core mission on macroeconomic stability and development.  Did the IMF start any discussion on this topic with the U.S. administration?  And my second question, do you foresee any changes to your lending programs to take into account the views of the Trump Administration regarding issues like climate change and international development?  Thank you.  

    MS. KOZACK: What I can say on this is the U.S. is our largest shareholder, and we greatly value the voice of the United States.  We have a constructive engagement with the U.S. authorities, and we very much appreciate Secretary Bessent’s reiteration of the United States’ commitment to the Fund and to our role.  The IMF has a clearly defined mandate to support economic and financial stability globally.  Our Management Team and our entire Staff are focused exactly on this mandate, helping our 191 members tackle their economic challenges and their balance of payments risks.  

    What I can also add is that at the most recent Spring Meetings, the ones we just had in April, our membership identified two areas where they’ve asked the IMF to deepen our work.  And the first is on external imbalances, and the second is on our monitoring of the financial sector.  So they’re looking for us to really deepen our work in these two areas.  

    As far as taking that work forward, we will continue working with our Executive Board on these areas, as well as to carry out some important policy reviews.  And I think the Managing Director referred to these during the Spring Meetings.  The first is the Comprehensive Surveillance Review, which will set out our surveillance priorities for the next five years.  And the second is the review of program design and conditionality.  And that will carefully consider how our lending can best help countries address low growth challenges and durably resolve their balance of payments weaknesses.  

    I have a slight update for you on Ukraine, which says — so the eighth — so if we look at the documents that were published at the time of the Seventh Review program, the one that was approved by the Executive Board a little while ago, based on that, the Eighth Review disbursement would be about $520 million.  And, the discussions of the Eighth Review are ongoing, and any disbursement, as always, is subject to approval by our Executive Board. 

    And with that, I will bring this press briefing to a close.  So first, let me thank you all for your participation today.  As a reminder, the briefing is embargoed until 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time in the United States.  As always, a transcript will be made available later on IMF.org.  In case of any clarifications or additional queries, please do not hesitate to reach out to my colleagues at media@imf.org.  This concludes our press briefing, and I wish everyone a wonderful day.  I look forward to seeing you next time.  Thanks very much.

     

      

    *  *  *  *  *

     

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Meera Louis

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Samsung Electronics Secures Two Leadership Positions in 3GPP

    Source: Samsung

    ▲ (From left) Rajavelsamy Rajadurai and Lixiang Xu
     
    Samsung Electronics has secured new chair and vice-chair positions in the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), the world’s largest telecommunications standards organization.
     
    Established in 1998, 3GPP develops global mobile communications standards with participation from major companies and organizations including Samsung, Qualcomm, Apple, Ericsson, Nokia and Huawei. The international body consists of three Technical Specification Groups (TSGs) — Service and System Aspects (SA), Radio Access Network (RAN) and Core Network and Terminals (CT) — each overseeing four to six Working Groups (WGs) for a total of 15 WGs across the organization.
     
    Rajavelsamy Rajadurai, Principal Architect at Samsung R&D Institute India-Bangalore (SRI–B), has been elected chair of 3GPP’s Service and System Aspects Working Group 3 (SA WG3). Meanwhile, Lixiang Xu, Principal Engineer at Samsung R&D Institute China-Beijing (SRC-B), has been elected vice chair of 3GPP’s Radio Access Network Working Group 3 (RAN WG3). SA WG3 defines standards related to network security and user privacy, whereas RAN WG3 develops base station interface protocol technologies. 
     
    In March, Dr. Younsun Kim, Master at Samsung Research, was elected chair of 3GPP’s Technical Specification Group Radio Access Network (TSG RAN) — leading standardization across all areas of wireless technology including the physical layer, protocol aspects and radio resource control.
     
    With these latest appointments, Samsung now holds three chair positions (SA WG2, SA WG3 and TSG RAN) and five vice-chair positions (SA WG4, SA WG6, RAN WG2, RAN WG3 and CT WG3) within 3GPP.
     
    Beginning in the second half of 2025, 3GPP will initiate research into 6G technologies. SA WG3 plans to explore security enhancements to counter cyberattacks, including those from quantum computers, and to develop privacy protection technologies for mobile communications networks. RAN WG3 is expected to research AI-powered solutions to reduce energy consumption at base stations and improve service quality. These groups are positioned to play a crucial role in advancing the use of AI, strengthening security and promoting sustainability — all key focus areas in the development of 6G.
     
    Through its expanded leadership within 3GPP, Samsung has established a framework to help drive standards across the mobile industry and collaborate with partners to shape the future of next-generation communications.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Budget 2025: Pacific Ministry faces major cuts, yet new initiatives aim for development

    By ‘Alakihihifo Vailala of PMN News

    Funding for New Zealand’s Ministry for Pacific Peoples (MPP) is set to be reduced by almost $36 million in Budget 2025.

    This follows a cut of nearly $26 million in the 2024 budget.

    As part of these budgetary savings, the Tauola Business Fund will be closed. But, $6.3 million a year will remain to support Pacific economic and business development through the Pacific Business Trust and Pacific Business Village.

    The Budget cuts also affect the Tupu Aotearoa programme, which supports Pacific people in finding employment and training, alongside the Ministry of Social Development’s employment initiatives.

    While $5.25 million a year will still fund the programme, a total of $22 million a year has been cut over the last four years.

    The ministry will save almost $1 million by returning funding allocated for the Dawn Raids reconciliation programme from 2027/28 onwards.

    There are two years of limited funding left to complete the ministry Dawn Raids programmes, which support the Crown’s reconciliation efforts.

    Funding for Pasifika Wardens
    Despite these reductions, a new initiative providing funding for Pasifika Wardens will introduce $1 million of new spending over the next four years.

    The initiative will improve services to Pacific communities through capacity building, volunteer training, transportation, and enhanced administrative support.

    Funding for the National Fale Malae has ceased, as only $2.7 million of the allocated $10 million has been spent since funding was granted in Budget 2020.

    The remaining $6.6 million will be reprioritised over the next two years to address other priorities within the Arts, Culture and Heritage portfolio, including the National Music Centre.

    Foreign Affairs funding for the International Development Cooperation (IDC) projects, particularly focussed on the Pacific, is also affected. The IDC received an $800 million commitment in 2021 from the Labour government.

    The funding was time-limited, leading to a $200 million annual fiscal cliff starting in January 2026.

    Budget 2025 aims to mitigate this impact by providing ongoing, baselined funding of $100 million a year to cover half of the shortfall. An additional $5 million will address a $10 million annual shortfall in departmental funding.

    Support for IDC projects
    The new funding will support IDC projects, emphasising the Pacific region without being exclusively aimed at climate finance objectives. Overall, $367.5 million will be allocated to the IDC over four years.

    Finance Minister Nicola Willis said the Budget addressed a prominent fiscal cliff, especially concerning climate finance.

    “The Budget addresses this, at least in part, through ongoing, baselined funding of $100 million a year, focused on the Pacific,” she said in her Budget speech.

    “Members will not be surprised to know that the Minister of Foreign Affairs has made a case for more funding, and this will be looked at in future Budgets.”

    More funding has been allocated for new homework and tutoring services for learners in Years nine and 10 at schools with at least 50 percent Pacific students to meet the requirements for the National Certificate of Educational Achievement (NCEA).

    About 50 schools across New Zealand are expected to benefit from the initiative, which will receive nearly $7 million over the next four years, having been reprioritised from funding for the Pacific Education Programme.

    As a result, funding will be stopped for three programmes aimed at supporting Tu’u Mālohi, Pacific Reading Together and Developing Mathematical Inquiry Communities.

    Republished from Pacific Media Network News with permission.

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Money Market Operations as on May 22, 2025

    Source: Reserve Bank of India
    (Amount in ₹ crore, Rate in Per cent)
      Volume
    (One Leg)    		 Weighted
    Average Rate    		 Range
    A. Overnight Segment (I+II+III+IV) 6,19,034.06 5.78 1.00-6.03
         I. Call Money 19,706.01 5.85 4.85-5.90
         II. Triparty Repo 4,18,840.25 5.79 5.60-5.91
         III. Market Repo 1,78,992.80 5.78 1.00-6.03
         IV. Repo in Corporate Bond 1,495.00 5.93 5.90-6.00
    B. Term Segment      
         I. Notice Money** 84.50 5.77 5.45-5.90
         II. Term Money@@ 1,255.00 – 6.05-6.15
         III. Triparty Repo 3,348.00 5.82 5.75-5.90
         IV. Market Repo 695.06 5.85 5.85-5.85
         V. Repo in Corporate Bond 0.00 – –
      Auction Date Tenor (Days) Maturity Date Amount Current Rate /
    Cut off Rate
    C. Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF), Marginal Standing Facility (MSF) & Standing Deposit Facility (SDF)
    I. Today’s Operations
    1. Fixed Rate          
    2. Variable Rate&          
      (I) Main Operation          
         (a) Repo          
         (b) Reverse Repo          
      (II) Fine Tuning Operations          
         (a) Repo Thu, 22/05/2025 1 Fri, 23/05/2025 4,341.00 6.01
         (b) Reverse Repo          
      (III) Long Term Operations^          
         (a) Repo          
         (b) Reverse Repo          
    3. MSF# Thu, 22/05/2025 1 Fri, 23/05/2025 616.00 6.25
    4. SDFΔ# Thu, 22/05/2025 1 Fri, 23/05/2025 1,38,547.00 5.75
    5. Net liquidity injected from today’s operations [injection (+)/absorption (-)]*       -1,33,590.00  
    II. Outstanding Operations
    1. Fixed Rate          
    2. Variable Rate&          
      (I) Main Operation          
         (a) Repo          
         (b) Reverse Repo          
      (II) Fine Tuning Operations          
         (a) Repo          
         (b) Reverse Repo          
      (III) Long Term Operations^          
         (a) Repo Thu, 17/04/2025 43 Fri, 30/05/2025 25,731.00 6.01
         (b) Reverse Repo          
    3. MSF#          
    4. SDFΔ#          
    D. Standing Liquidity Facility (SLF) Availed from RBI$       8,735.56  
    E. Net liquidity injected from outstanding operations [injection (+)/absorption (-)]*     34,466.56  
    F. Net liquidity injected (outstanding including today’s operations) [injection (+)/absorption (-)]*     -99,123.44  
    G. Cash Reserves Position of Scheduled Commercial Banks
         (i) Cash balances with RBI as on May 22, 2025 9,62,288.12  
         (ii) Average daily cash reserve requirement for the fortnight ending May 30, 2025 9,48,817.00  
    H. Government of India Surplus Cash Balance Reckoned for Auction as on¥ May 22, 2025 4,341.00  
    I. Net durable liquidity [surplus (+)/deficit (-)] as on May 02, 2025 2,34,873.00  
    @ Based on Reserve Bank of India (RBI) / Clearing Corporation of India Limited (CCIL).
    – Not Applicable / No Transaction.
    ** Relates to uncollateralized transactions of 2 to 14 days tenor.
    @@ Relates to uncollateralized transactions of 15 days to one year tenor.
    $ Includes refinance facilities extended by RBI.
    & As per the Press Release No. 2019-2020/1900 dated February 06, 2020.
    Δ As per the Press Release No. 2022-2023/41 dated April 08, 2022.
    * Net liquidity is calculated as Repo+MSF+SLF-Reverse Repo-SDF.
    ¥ As per the Press Release No. 2014-2015/1971 dated March 19, 2015.
    # As per the Press Release No. 2023-2024/1548 dated December 27, 2023.
    ^ As per the Press Release No. 2025-2026/91 dated April 11, 2025.
    Ajit Prasad          
    Deputy General Manager
    (Communications)    
    Press Release: 2025-2026/391

    MIL OSI Economics –