Category: Economy

MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements – A10-0117/2025

Source: European Parliament

DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements

(COM(2025)0084 – C10‑0036/2025 – 2025/0040(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2025)0084),

– having regard to Article 294(2) and Articles 172 and 173, Article 175, third paragraph, Article 182(1), Article 188, second paragraph, and Articles 183 and 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C10‑0036/2025),

– having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 29 April 2025 [1],

– after consulting the Committee of the Regions,

– having regard to Rule 60 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs under Rule 59 of the Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy and of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0117/2025),

1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Amendment 1

AMENDMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT [*]

to the Commission proposal

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2025/0040 (COD)

Proposal for a

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 172 and Article 173, Article 175, third paragraph, Article 182(1), Article 188, second paragraph, Article 183 and Article 194 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 29 April 2025 [2],

After consulting the Committee of the Regions▌,

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,

Whereas:

(1) The Union faces massive financing needs to deliver on its objectives in the areas of innovation, the green and digital transition, and social investment and skills, while a complex backdrop affecting the Union’s competitiveness and industrial base characterised by changing global dynamics, slow economic growth, accelerated climate change and environmental degradation, technological competition and rising geopolitical tensions needs to be addressed. In that context, enhancing the Union’s autonomy, in particular in the area of energy, by supporting investments that strengthen a renewable-based and clean energy system, is essential to reduce dependencies and safeguard economic and political stability.

(1a) Additionality and the leveraging effect of the EU guarantee are the foundation of both the EFSI and the InvestEU Programme, enabling especially the scaling up of new and innovative technologies and companies as well as de-risking investment for private investors. It is necessary for the European Parliament to have better oversight over the InvestEU Programme to ensure that the EU guarantee is used in accordance with the programme’s objectives, such as fostering sustainable growth and competitiveness, with genuine additionality compared to private investors.

(2) The Draghi report assesses the combined additional investment needs in Europe at EUR 750-800 billion per year by 2030, with EUR 450 billion needed for the energy transition alone. This includes a substantial amount for the green and digital transition. Ensuring sufficient public and private investment is critical to boost productivity growth and achieve Union’s goals, leverage private investments with the objective to decarbonise industry, accelerate the production, storage and deployment of clean energy and electrification, strengthen interconnections and grids, advance sustainable and circular business models, foster sustainable building renovation, develop clean tech manufacturing as well as digital technologies and their diffusion across economic sectors.

(2a) Europe is experiencing an acute housing crisis which consists in two market failures: a shortage of affordable and social housing, and a failure to bridge the energy efficiency gap, with 46 million Europeans living in energy poverty. According to an analysis by the EIB Group, an estimated annual investment of EUR 300 to 400 billion is needed for construction and renovation only. In that regard, the Commission is planning to present a first-ever European Affordable Housing Plan and is partnering with the EIB Group, national promotional banks and international financial institutions to develop a European investment platform for affordable and sustainable housing. Increasing the amount available under the social investment and skills policy window would allow greater support from InvestEU for that key priority. In particular, it is necessary for the Commission and implementing partners to enhance the visibility and accessibility of financing instruments in relation to housing. This would contribute to the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights.

(2b) In the light of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, increased national and European spending is required to enhance European defence capabilities and to support the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). On 19 March 2025, the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy presented a White Paper for European Defence –Readiness 2030 containing a plan to significantly step up Europe’s spending on security and defence. InvestEU enables financing and investment operations to develop the Union defence industry and military mobility, including financial support to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and mid-caps. Increasing the amount available under the relevant windows would allow greater support from InvestEU for this key priority. In particular, it is necessary for the Commission and implementing partners to enhance the visibility and accessibility of financing instruments for SMEs, mid-caps, and start-ups in the defence supply chain.

(2c) In 2024, the Commission launched, together with the European Investment Fund, an export credit guarantee facility under InvestEU with a view to encouraging Union SMEs to strengthen economic ties with Ukraine and revitalise trade, thereby contributing to Ukraine’s economic recovery and improving the competitiveness of SMEs. It is important that as many European export credit agencies as possible participate in this facility.

(2d) The Letta and Draghi reports underline the importance of well-functioning transport networks and services to ensure a transition towards a green economy while strengthening the Union’s competitiveness. In that regard, massive strategic investments are needed to complete missing links and to modernise transport infrastructure, where major gaps exist in public and private financing.

(3) The InvestEU Fund is the main EU-level tool to leverage public and private funding to support a broad range of Union policy priorities. Through its comprehensive network of implementing partners, including the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Investment Fund (EIF), other international financial institutions and national promotional banks and institutions, the InvestEU Fund is delivering much-needed financing through its risk-sharing capacity. The InvestEU interim evaluation highlighted that budgetary guarantees are inherently efficient for the EU budget and confirmed that the programme is well on track to mobilise investment, with a notable expected impact on the real economy. However, approvals of financing and investment operation under InvestEU were heavily frontloaded, and as a result, if no action is taken to address the issue, new approvals for some financial products may cease after 2025.

(4) The financial capacity of InvestEU Fund should be increased and used even more efficiently in combination with resources that will become available under the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) and other legacy instruments (CEF Debt Instrument and InnovFin Debt Facility) implemented by the EIB Group. These combinations potentially reduce the budget revenues from legacy instruments. However, they would also create the possibility for an increased volume of guarantee cover to be provided for strategic investments in key Union priority areas for an additional investment of around EUR 25 billion that can be expected to be mobilised and by leading to an increased diversification of risks and thus not substantially increasing the risks for the Union budget.

(5) With the EUR 4,5 billion increase of the EU guarantee underpinned by ▌additional reflows of EUR 1,8 billion, and the efficiency measures implemented by combining the capacities of the legacy instruments with the InvestEU Fund, it is expected that around EUR 70 billion in additional investment could be mobilised. The financial contribution of the EIB Group should be proportionally adjusted to the share of the increased EU guarantee allocated to them. The indicative distribution of the EU guarantee between the four policy windows should be increased proportionally to the increase of the EU guarantee.

(5a) InvestEU advisory services play an important role in the development of a pipeline of projects. Those advisory services are particularly useful in complex areas, such as affordable social housing and defence. It would therefore be appropriate to use EUR 200 million in reflows to increase the amount made available for such services. Furthermore, it is necessary to enhance the interaction between the various components of the InvestEU Programme, in particular between the InvestEU Advisory Hub and the InvestEU Portal.

(5b) The Commission estimates the amount of provisioning required to cover future life-time losses from the operations supported under the InvestEU Fund with a 95 % confidence level of the value at risk. Taking into account the positive experience with the InvestEU Programme to date and in order to maximise budgetary efficiency while preserving a suitable level of risk management, it would be appropriate for the Commission to assess whether to reduce that level to 90 %, which would be in line with risk-related methodologies in Union external policies and would enable a high volume of financing and investment operations in support of the Union’s strategic priorities.

(6) In order to enhance the attractiveness of the Member State compartment under the InvestEU Fund, it should be made possible for Member States to contribute also in a fully funded manner through an InvestEU financial instrument in addition to the existing option of contributing to the EU guarantee. The support from InvestEU financial instrument should, to the extent possible, be implemented following the same principles as those of the EU guarantee. Through the InvestEU financial instrument, non-euro Member States could benefit from the InvestEU programme financially more efficiently in their own currency. The InvestEU financial instrument should also provide a further incentive for responsibly increasing the risk appetite of the implementing partners thereby contributing to the crowding-in of private capital.

(6a) It is possible to combine amounts allocated to the Member State compartment with resources under the EU compartment in a layered structure to achieve a better risk coverage, in particular with a first loss tranche covered by national resources. Member States should further explore that possibility to mobilise more investments in strategic areas. To ensure coherence with the objectives of the InvestEU Programme, such combinations should respect the principles of EU value-added, fair competition, and the integrity of the internal market, and should support cross-border cooperation where relevant.

(7) In line with an overall objective of simplification so as to alleviate the administrative burden for final recipients, financial intermediaries and implementing partners, reporting requirements, including those relating to key performance and monitoring indicators, should be reduced, where appropriate, in particular those that affect small businesses and small-size operations. Without prejudice to the definition of an SME for the purposes of other Union acts and any future programmes and funds, the application of the definition of an SME for the purposes of the InvestEU Programme should be adjusted to remove complexities to the extent possible, taking account of the possibility for implementing partners to request information on the ownership structure of SMEs for the purpose of calculating the headcount. In that regard, and as noted in Recital 14 of Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC [3], enterprises should be permitted to use solemn declarations to certify specific characteristics relevant to their SME status, such as the autonomy of their ownership structures. Specific attention should be paid to social economy enterprises and micro finance institutions.

(7a) It is appropriate for the Commission to take further non-legislative simplification measures in order to complement this amending Regulation, such as reducing the frequency of progress reports to be submitted by implementing partners. However, it is important that such measures do not compromise the effectiveness of auditing and monitoring mechanisms necessary to ensure alignment with the Union’s policy objectives.

(7b) It is important that State aid procedures applicable to operations supported under the InvestEU Fund be proportionate, predictable, and streamlined. In that context, it is also important that the Commission explore all available means to simplify and accelerate State aid assessments. This could include making greater use of the principle of market conformity. Furthermore, it is necessary that, where appropriate, the Commission provide timely guidance and further clarify and simplify the application of State aid rules to national financial instruments.

(8) The frequency and scope of reports should also be reduced for the InvestEU programme and its predecessor, the EFSI programme.

(9) For the Commission’s accounting, implementing partners should provide for combinations audited financial statements in line with Article 212(4) of the Financial Regulation, clearly delineating the amounts related to the different legal basis.

(10) Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 should be amended to allow for combinations of support under those Regulations and the EU guarantee under this Regulation.

(10a) On 18 April 2019, the Commission declared that ‘without prejudice to the prerogatives of the Council in the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), one-off contributions by Member States, either by a Member State or by national promotional banks classified in the general government sector or acting on behalf of a Member State, into thematic or multi-country investment platforms should in principle qualify as one-off measures within the meaning of Articles 5(1) and 9(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 (13) and Article 3(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 (14). In addition, without prejudice to the prerogatives of the Council in the implementation of the SGP, the Commission will consider to what extent the same treatment as for the EFSI in the context of the Commission communication on flexibility can be applied to the InvestEU Programme as the successor instrument to the EFSI with regard to one-off contributions provided by Member States in cash to finance an additional amount of the EU guarantee for the purposes of the Member State compartment’. Since then, the economic governance framework has changed. In light of this, Member State contributions should still be considered as one-off measures.

(11) Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely to address Union-wide and Member State specific market failures and the investment gap within the Union, to accelerate the Union’s green and digital transition, enhance its competitiveness and strengthen its industrial base cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but can be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve those objectives.

(11a) In order to support the European Parliament in exercising its institutional role in overseeing Union funds and ensuring alignment with agreed policy objectives, the independent final evaluation report on the InvestEU Programme referred to in Article 29(3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/523 should assess the effectiveness and impact of the derogations introduced by this amending Regulation, in particular their role in facilitating access to finance for target groups such as SMEs. It should also consider the overall functioning of the InvestEU Programme in the light of the principles of transparency, accountability and performance monitoring, including an examination of the relevance of financial thresholds applicable to SMEs in the light of economic developments.

(11b) With a view to reducing administrative complexity and legal uncertainty, the independent final evaluation report on the InvestEU Programme referred to in Article 29(3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/523 should also take into account any regulatory adjustments arising from the projected legislative proposal on a small mid-cap enterprise category. Due attention should be given to the effectiveness of measures aimed at facilitating enterprise development,

HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2021/523 [InvestEU Regulation]

Regulation (EU) 2021/523 is amended as follows:

(1) In Article 1, the first paragraph is replaced by the following:

‘This Regulation establishes the InvestEU Fund, which shall provide for an EU guarantee and an InvestEU financial instrument to support financing and investment operations carried out by the implementing partners that contribute to objectives of the Union’s internal policies.’;

(2) Article 2 is amended as follows:

(a) points (3), (4) and (5) are replaced by the following:

‘(3) ‘policy window’ means a targeted area for support by the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument as laid down in Article 8(1);’

(4) ‘compartment’ means a part of the support provided under the InvestEU Fund defined in terms of the origin of the resources backing it;’

(5) ‘blending operation’ means, under the EU compartment, an operation supported by the Union budget that combines non-repayable forms of support, repayable forms of support, or both, from the Union budget with repayable forms of support from development or other public finance institutions, or from commercial finance institutions and investors; for the purposes of this definition, Union programmes financed from sources other than the Union budget, such as the EU ETS Innovation Fund, may be assimilated to Union programmes financed by the Union budget;’;

(b) point (8) is replaced by the following:

‘(8) ‘contribution agreement’ means a legal instrument whereby the Commission and one or more Member States specify the conditions for the implementation of the contribution under the Member State compartment, as laid down in Articles 10 and 10a, respectively;’;

(c) points (10) and (11) are replaced by the following:

‘(10) ‘financing and investment operations’ or ‘financing or investment operations’ means operations to provide finance directly or indirectly to final recipients through financial products:

(a) in the context of the EU guarantee, carried out by an implementing partner in its own name, provided by the implementing partner in accordance with its internal rules, policies and procedures and accounted for in the implementing partner’s financial statements or, where applicable, disclosed in the notes to those financial statements;

(b) in the context of the InvestEU financial instrument, carried out by the implementing partner in its own name or in its own name but on behalf of the Commission, as applicable;

(11) ‘funds under shared management’ means funds that provide for the possibility of allocating a portion of those funds to the provisioning for a budgetary guarantee or to a financial instrument under the Member State compartment of the InvestEU Fund, namely the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 of the European Parliament and of the Council [4], the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council [5] (the ‘ESF+ Regulation for 2021-2027’), the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF) established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council [6] and the European Agriculture Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) established by Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council [7] (the ‘CAP Strategic Plans Regulation’);’;

(d) point 12 is replaced by the following:

‘(12) ‘guarantee agreement’ means a legal instrument whereby the Commission and an implementing partner specify the conditions for proposing financing and investment operations in order for them to be granted the benefit of the EU guarantee and/or of the InvestEU financial instrument, for providing the EU guarantee or support through the InvestEU financial instrument for those operations and for implementing them in accordance with this Regulation;’;

(e) point 21 is replaced by the following:

‘(21) ‘small and medium-sized enterprise’ (‘SME’) means (a) in case of financial products not conferring advantage in State aid terms, an enterprise which, according to its last annual or consolidated accounts, employs an average number of employees during the financial year of less than 250 and which has an annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50 million and where information relating to the autonomy of its ownership structure for the purpose of calculating those thresholds may be made by way of a solemn declaration by the enterprise, or (b) in case of other types of financial products, a micro, small or medium-sized enterprise within the meaning of the Annex to Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC [8] or as otherwise defined in the guarantee agreement;’;

(f) the following point 24 is added:

‘(24) ‘InvestEU financial instrument’ means a measure defined in Article 2, point (30), of the Financial Regulation to be implemented under the Member State compartment of the InvestEU Fund.’;

(3) Article 4 is amended as follows:

(a) paragraph 1 is amended as follows:

(i) in the first subparagraph, the first sentence is replaced by the following:

‘The EU guarantee for the purposes of the EU compartment referred to in point (a) of Article 9(1) shall be EUR 30 652 310 073 in current prices.’;

(ii) the second subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘An additional amount of the EU guarantee may be provided for the purposes of the Member State compartment referred to in point (b) of Article 9(1) of this Regulation, subject to the allocation by Member States, pursuant to Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council [9] (the ‘Common Provisions Regulation for 2021-2027’) and Article 81 of the CAP Strategic Plans Regulation, of the corresponding amounts.’;

(b) in paragraph 2, the second subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘An amount of EUR 15 827 310 073 in current prices of the amount referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 of this Article shall be allocated for the objectives referred to in Article 3(2).’;

(ba) paragraph 3 is replaced by the following:

‘3. The financial envelope for the implementation of the measures provided for in Chapters VI and VII shall be EUR 630 000 000 in current prices.’

(4) in Article 6(1), the first sentence is replaced by the following:

‘The EU guarantee and the InvestEU financial instrument shall be implemented in indirect management with the bodies referred to in points (c)(ii), (c)(iii), (c)(v) and (c)(vi) of Article 62(1) of the Financial Regulation.’;

(5) Article 7 is amended as follows:

(a) The title is replaced by the following:

‘Combinations’

(b) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

‘Support from the EU guarantee under this Regulation, Union support provided through the financial instruments established by the programmes in the programming period 2014-2020 and Union support from the EU guarantee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 may be combined to support financial products or portfolios implemented or to be implemented by the EIB or the EIF under this Regulation.’;

(c) paragraph 4 is replaced by the following:

‘Support from the EU guarantee under this Regulation, Union support provided through the guarantee under the financial instruments established by the programmes in the programming period 2014-2020 and released from the operations approved under these instruments and Union support provided through the EU guarantee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 and released from operations approved under that EU guarantee may be combined to support financial products or portfolios containing exclusively financing and investment operations eligible under this Regulation, implemented or to be implemented by the EIB or the EIF under this Regulation.’;

(d) the following paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 are added:

‘5. By derogation from Article 212(3), second subparagraph of the Financial Regulation, the released guarantee under the financial instruments established by the programmes in the programming period 2014-2020 may be used for covering financing and investment operations eligible under this Regulation for the purpose of the combination referred to in paragraph 4.

6. By derogation from Article 216(4), point (a) of the Financial Regulation, the provisioning corresponding to the released guarantee under the Union support from the EU guarantee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 may not be taken into account for the purpose of operations referred to in Article 216(4) of the Financial Regulation and may be used for covering financing and investment operations eligible under this Regulation for the purpose of the combination referred to in paragraph 4.

7. The release of the guarantee under the financial instruments established by the programmes in the programming period 2014-2020, the transfer of corresponding assets from fiduciary accounts to Common Provisioning Fund and the release of the guarantee under the Union support from the EU guarantee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 referred to in paragraph 4 shall take place by an amendment of the relevant agreements signed between the Commission and the EIB or the EIF.

The conditions of the use of the released guarantees referred to in the first subparagraph, to cover financing and investment operations eligible under this Regulation, and where relevant, the transfer of corresponding assets from fiduciary accounts to the Common Provisioning Fund, shall be set out in the guarantee agreement referred to in Article 17.

The terms and conditions of the financial products referred to in paragraphs 1 and 4 of this Article and of the portfolios concerned, including the respective pro rata shares of losses, revenues, repayments and recoveries or the respective non pro rata shares in accordance with the second subparagraph of paragraph 3, shall be set out in the guarantee agreement referred to in Article 17.’;

(6) In Article 8(8), the second subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘The Commission, together with implementing partners, shall seek to ensure that the part of the EU guarantee under the EU compartment used for the sustainable infrastructure policy window is distributed with the aim of achieving a balance between the different areas referred to in point (a) of paragraph 1.’;

(7) In Article 9(1), point (b) is replaced by the following:

‘(b) the Member State compartment shall address specific market failures or suboptimal investment situations in one or several regions or Member States to deliver the policy objectives of the contributing funds under shared management or of the additional amount provided by a Member State under Article 4(1), third subparagraph, or under Article 10a(1), second subparagraph, in particular to strengthen economic, social and territorial cohesion in the Union by addressing imbalances between its regions.’;

(8) Article 10 is amended as follows:

(a) the title is replaced by the following:

‘Specific provisions applicable to the EU Guarantee implemented under the Member State compartment’;

(b) in paragraph 2, the fourth subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘The Member State and the Commission shall conclude a contribution agreement or an amendment to it following the Commission Decision approving the Partnership Agreement pursuant to the Common Provisions Regulation for 2021-2027 or the CAP Strategic Plan under the CAP Strategic Plans Regulation or simultaneously to the Commission Decision amending a programme in accordance with the Common Provisions Regulation for 2021-2027 or a CAP Strategic Plan in accordance with the provisions on the amendment to the CAP Strategic Plan laid down in the CAP Strategic Plans Regulation.’;

(c) in paragraph 3, point (b) is replaced by the following:

‘(b) the Member State strategy, consisting of the type of financing, the target leverage, the geographical coverage, including regional coverage if necessary, types of projects, the investment period and, where applicable, the categories of final recipients and of eligible intermediaries;’;

(9) The following Article 10a is inserted:

‘Article 10a

Specific provisions applicable to the InvestEU financial instrument implemented under the Member State compartment

1. A Member State may contribute amounts from the funds under shared management to the Member State compartment of the InvestEU Fund in view of deploying them through the InvestEU financial instrument.

Member States may also provide additional amounts for the purposes of the InvestEU financial instrument. Such amounts shall constitute an external assigned revenue in accordance with Article 21(5), second sentence of the Financial Regulation.

Amounts allocated by a Member State on a voluntary basis pursuant to the first and second subparagraph shall be used for supporting financing and investment operations in the Member State concerned. Those amounts shall be used to contribute to the achievement of the policy objectives specified in the Partnership Agreement referred to in Article 11(1)(a) of the Common Provisions Regulation for 2021-2027, in the programmes or in the CAP Strategic Plan which contribute to the InvestEU Programme, in order to implement relevant measures set out in the recovery and resilience plans in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/241 or, in other cases, for the purposes laid down in the contribution agreement, depending on the origin of the amount contributed.

2. Contribution to the InvestEU financial instrument shall be subject to the conclusion of a contribution agreement between a Member State and the Commission, which for the contributions from funds under shared management shall be done in accordance with Article 10(2), fourth subparagraph.

Two or more Member States may conclude a joint contribution agreement with the Commission.

3. The contribution agreement shall at least contain the amount of the contribution by the Member State and the currency of the financing and investment operations, provisions on the Union remuneration for the InvestEU financial instrument, the elements set out in points (b) to (e) and (g) of Article 10(3) and the treatment of resources generated by or attributable to the amounts contributed to the InvestEU financial instrument.

4. The contribution agreements shall be implemented through guarantee agreements concluded in accordance with Article 10(4), first subparagraph.

Where no guarantee agreement has been concluded within 12 months from the conclusion of the contribution agreement, the contribution agreement shall be terminated or prolonged by mutual agreement. Where the amount of a contribution agreement has not been fully committed under one or more guarantee agreements within 12 months from the conclusion of the contribution agreement, that amount shall be amended accordingly. The unused amount of a contribution from funds under shared management delivered through the InvestEU Programme shall be re-used in accordance with the respective Regulations. The unused amount of a contribution by a Member State under paragraph 1, second subparagraph, of this Article shall be paid back to the Member State.

Where a guarantee agreement has not been duly implemented within the period specified in Article 14(6) of the Common Provisions Regulation for 2021-2027 or Article 81(6) of the CAP Strategic Plans Regulation, or, in the case of a guarantee agreement related to amounts provided in accordance with paragraph 1, second subparagraph, of this Article, in the relevant contribution agreement, the contribution agreement shall be amended. The unused amounts allocated by Member States pursuant to the provisions on the use of the funds under shared management delivered through the InvestEU Programme shall be re-used in accordance with the respective Regulations. The unused amount of an InvestEU financial instrument attributable to the contribution by a Member State under paragraph 1, second subparagraph, of this Article shall be paid back to the Member State.

Resources generated by or attributable to the amounts contributed to the InvestEU financial instrument pursuant to the provisions on the use of the funds under shared management delivered through the InvestEU Programme shall be re-used in accordance with the respective Regulations. The resources generated by or attributable to the amounts contributed to the InvestEU financial instrument under paragraph 1, second subparagraph, of this Article shall be paid back to the Member State.

5. Contracts implementing the InvestEU financial instrument between the implementing partner and the final recipient or the financial intermediary or other entity referred to in Article 16(1), point (a), shall be signed by 31 December 2028.’;

(9a) In Article 11(1), point (d)(i) is replaced by the following:

‘(i) be allocated an amount of up to EUR 450 000 000 from the financial envelope referred to in Article 4(3) for the advisory initiatives referred to in Article 25 and the operational tasks referred to in point (ii) of this point;’;

(10) the title of Chapter IV is replaced by the following:

‘EU guarantee and InvestEU financial instrument’;

(11) in Article 13(4), the first two sentences are replaced by the following:

‘75 % of the EU guarantee under the EU compartment as referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 4(1), amounting to EUR 22 989 232 555, shall be granted to the EIB Group. The EIB Group shall provide an aggregate financial contribution amounting to EUR 5 747 308 139.’;

(12) Article 16 is amended as follows:

(a) in paragraph 1, the second subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘The InvestEU financial instrument may be used to provide funding to the implementing partners for the types of financing referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph provided by the implementing partners.

In order to be covered by the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument, the financing referred to in the first and second subparagraph shall be granted, acquired or issued for the benefit of financing and investment operations referred to in Article 14(1), where the financing by the implementing partner was granted in accordance with a financing agreement or transaction signed or entered into by the implementing partner after the signature of the guarantee agreement and that has not expired or been cancelled.’;

(b) paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:

‘Financing and investment operations through funds or other intermediate structures shall be supported by the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument in accordance with the provisions laid down in the investment guidelines, as applicable, even if such structures invest a minority of their invested amounts outside the Union and in third countries referred to Article 14(2) or invest a minority of their invested amounts into assets other than those eligible under this Regulation.’;

(13) Article 17 is amended as follows:

(a) in paragraph 1, the first subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘The Commission shall conclude a guarantee agreement with each implementing partner on the granting of the EU guarantee up to an amount to be determined by the Commission or on providing support under the InvestEU financial instrument.’;

(b) paragraph 2 is amended as follows:

(i) point (c) is replaced by the following:

‘(c) detailed rules on the provision of the EU guarantee or support under the InvestEU financial instrument in accordance with Article 19, including on the coverage of financing and investment operations or portfolios of specific types of instruments and the respective events that trigger possible calls on the EU guarantee or the use of the InvestEU financial instrument;’;

(ii) point (f) is replaced by the following:

‘(f) the commitment of the implementing partner to accept the decisions by the Commission and the Investment Committee as regards the use of the EU guarantee or of the InvestEU financial instrument for the benefit of a proposed financing or investment operation, without prejudice to the decision-making of the implementing partner in respect of the proposed financing or investment operation without the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument;’;

(iii) points (h) and (i) are replaced by the following:

‘(h) financial and operational reporting and monitoring of the financing and investment operations under the EU guarantee and the InvestEU financial instrument;

(i) key performance indicators, in particular as regards the use of the EU guarantee and the InvestEU financial instrument, the fulfilment of the objectives and criteria laid down in Articles 3, 8 and 14, and the mobilisation of private capital;’;

(ba) the following paragraph is added:

‘5a. The Commission shall, upon request, provide to the European Parliament and the Council the names of the implementing partners party to the guarantee agreements and the main content of those agreements, having due regard to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of their business secrets.’;

(14) Article 18 is amended as follows:

(a) the title is replaced by the following:

‘Requirements for the use of the EU guarantee and the InvestEU financial instrument’;

(b) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

‘1. The granting of the EU guarantee and the support from the InvestEU financial instrument shall be subject to the entry into force of the guarantee agreement with the relevant implementing partner.’;

(c) paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:

‘Financing and investment operations shall be covered by the EU guarantee or be supported through the InvestEU financial instrument only where they fulfil the criteria laid down in this Regulation and, if applicable, in the relevant investment guidelines, and where the Investment Committee has concluded that those operations fulfil the requirements for benefiting from the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument. The implementing partners shall remain responsible for ensuring that the financing and investment operations comply with this Regulation and the relevant investment guidelines.’;

(d) paragraph 3 is amended as follows:

(i) the first sentence is replaced by the following:

‘No administrative costs or fees related to the implementation of financing and investment operations under the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument shall be due to the implementing partner by the Commission unless the nature of the policy objectives targeted by the financial product to be implemented and the affordability for the targeted final recipients or the type of financing provided allow the implementing partner to duly justify to the Commission the need for an exception.’

(ii) the following second subparagraph is added:

‘Notwithstanding the first subparagraph, implementing partners are entitled to appropriate fees in relation to the management of fiduciary accounts relating to the InvestEU financial instrument.’

(e) paragraph 4 is replaced by the following:

‘In addition, the implementing partner may use the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument to meet the relevant share of any recovery costs in accordance with Article 17(4), unless those costs have been deducted from recovery proceeds.’;

(15) Article 19 is amended as follows:

(a) the title is replaced by the following:

‘Coverage and terms of the EU guarantee and of the InvestEU financial instrument’;

(b) paragraph 1 is amended as follows:

(i) the second sentence of the first subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘The remuneration for the EU guarantee or for the InvestEU financial instrument may be reduced in the duly justified cases referred to in Article 13(2).’;

(ii) the second subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘The implementing partner shall have appropriate exposure at its own risk to financing and investment operations supported by the EU guarantee or by the InvestEU financial instrument, unless exceptionally the policy objectives targeted by the financial product to be implemented are of such nature that the implementing partner could not reasonably contribute its own risk-bearing capacity to it.’;

(c) in paragraph 2, first subparagraph, point (a), the introductory sentence is replaced by the following:

‘for debt products referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph of Article 16(1):’;

(d) the following paragraph 2a is inserted:

‘2a. The InvestEU financial instrument shall cover:

(a) for debt products consisting of guarantees and counter-guarantees referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph of Article 16(1):

(i) the principal and all interest and amounts due to the implementing partner but not received by it in accordance with the terms of the financing operations prior to the event of default;

(ii) restructuring losses;

(iii) losses arising from fluctuations of currencies other than the euro in markets where possibilities for long-term hedging are limited;

(b) for other eligible types of financing referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph of Article 16(1): the amounts invested or lent by the implementing partner;

For the purposes of point (a)(i) of the first subparagraph, for subordinated debt a deferral, reduction or required exit shall be considered to be an event of default.

The Invest EU financial instrument shall cover the entire exposure of the Union with respect to the relevant financing and investment operations.’;

(16) in Article 22, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

‘A scoreboard of indicators (the ‘Scoreboard’) shall be established to ensure that the Investment Committee is able to carry out an independent, transparent and harmonised assessment of requests for the use of the EU guarantee or, as applicable, the InvestEU financial instrument for financing and investment operations proposed by implementing partners.’;

(17) in Article 23, paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:

‘EIB financing and investment operations that fall within the scope of this Regulation shall not be covered by the EU guarantee or benefit from the InvestEU financial instrument where the Commission delivers an unfavourable opinion within the framework of the procedure provided for in Article 19 of the EIB Statute.’;

(18) Article 24 is amended as follows:

(a) in paragraph 1, first subparagraph is amended as follows:

(i) point (a) is replaced by the following:

‘(a) examine the proposals for financing and investment operations submitted by implementing partners for coverage under the EU guarantee or for support from the InvestEU financial instrument that have passed the policy check referred to in Article 23(1) of this Regulation or that have received a favourable opinion within the framework of the procedure provided for in Article 19 of the EIB Statute;’;

(ii) point (c) is replaced by the following:

‘(c) check whether the financing and investment operations that would benefit from the support under the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument comply with all relevant requirements.’;

(b) in paragraph 4, second subparagraph, the last sentence is replaced by the following:

‘Any project assessment conducted by an implementing partner shall not be binding on the Investment Committee for the purposes of granting a financing or investment operation coverage by the EU guarantee or support from the InvestEU financial instrument.’;

(c) paragraph 5 is amended as follows:

(i) in the second subparagraph, the first sentence is replaced by the following:

‘Conclusions of the Investment Committee approving the coverage of the EU guarantee or support from the InvestEU financial instrument for a financing or investment operation shall be publicly accessible and shall include the rationale for the approval and information on the operation, in particular its description, the identity of the promoters or financial intermediaries, and the objectives of the operation.’;

(ii) in the fifth subparagraph, the second sentence is replaced by the following:

‘That submission shall include any decisions rejecting the use of the EU guarantee or support from the InvestEU financial instrument.’;

(d) in paragraph 6, the first sentence is replaced by the following:

‘Where the Investment Committee is requested to approve the use of the EU guarantee or support from the InvestEU financial instrument for a financing or investment operation that is a facility, programme or structure which has underlying sub-projects, that approval shall comprise those underlying sub-projects unless the Investment Committee decides to retain the right to approve them separately.’;

(19) in Article 25(2), point (c) is replaced by the following:

‘(c) where appropriate, assist project promoters in developing their projects so that they fulfil the objectives set out in Articles 3 and 8 and the eligibility criteria set out in Article 14, and facilitate the development of among others important projects of common European interest and aggregators for small-sized projects, including through investment platforms as referred to in point (f) of this paragraph, provided that such assistance does not prejudge the conclusions of the Investment Committee with respect to the coverage of the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument with respect to such projects;’;

(20) Article 28 is amended as follows:

(a) in paragraph 2, the following second subparagraph is added:

‘Implementing partners shall be exempt from reporting on key performance and monitoring indicators laid down in Annex III, except those in points 1, 2, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 5.2, 6.3 and 7.2, as far as financing or investments operations benefiting final recipients receiving financing or investment supported by the EU guarantee or by the InvestEU financial instrument from an implementing partner or a financial intermediary not exceeding EUR 300 000 are concerned.’;

(b) paragraphs 3 and 4 are replaced by the following:

‘3. The Commission shall report on the implementation of the InvestEU Programme in accordance with Articles 241 and 250 of the Financial Regulation. In accordance with Article 41(5) of the Financial Regulation, the annual report shall provide information on the level of implementation of the Programme with respect to its objectives and performance indicators. For that purpose, each implementing partner shall provide on an annual basis the information necessary to allow the Commission to comply with its reporting obligations, including information on the operation of the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument.’

4. Once a year, each implementing partner shall submit a report to the Commission on the financing and investment operations covered by this Regulation, broken down by EU compartment and Member State compartment, as appropriate. Each implementing partner shall also submit information on the Member State compartment to the Member State whose compartment it implements. The report shall include an assessment of compliance with the requirements on the use of the EU guarantee and the Invest EU financial instrument and with the key performance indicators laid down in Annex III to this Regulation. The report shall also include operational, statistical, financial and accounting data on each financing or investment operation and an estimation of expected cash flows, at the level of compartment, policy window and the InvestEU Fund. The report may also include information on barriers to investment encountered when carrying out financing and investment operations covered by this Regulation. The reports shall contain the information the implementing partners have to provide under point (a) of Article 158(1) of the Financial Regulation.’;

(21) Article 35 is amended as follows:

(a) the title is replaced by the following:

‘Transitional and other provisions’;

(b) paragraphs 1 and 2 are replaced by the following:

‘1. By way of derogation from Article 212(3), first and fourth subparagraph, of the Financial Regulation, any revenues, repayments and recoveries from financial instruments established by programmes referred to in Annex IV to this Regulation may be used for the provisioning of the EU guarantee or the implementation of the measures provided for in Chapters VI and VII under this Regulation, taking into account the relevant provisions concerning the budget laid down in the Public Sector Loan Facility Regulation for 2021-2027.

2. By way of derogation from Article 216(4), point (a), of the Financial Regulation, any surplus of provisions for the EU guarantee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 may be used for the provisioning of the EU guarantee or the implementation of the measures provided for in Chapters VI and VII under this Regulation, taking into account the relevant provisions concerning the budget laid down in the Public Sector Loan Facility Regulation for 2021-2027.

▌ By way of derogation from Article 214(4)(d) of the Financial Regulation, any revenues from the EU guarantee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 received in 2027 may be used for the provisioning of the EU guarantee or the implementation of the measures provided for in Chapters VI and VII under this Regulation.’;

(22) Annex I is replaced by the following:

‘ANNEX I

AMOUNTS OF EU GUARANTEE PER SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE

The indicative distribution referred to in the fourth subparagraph of Article 4(2) towards financial and investment operations shall be as follows:

(a) up to EUR 11 589 045 902 for objectives referred to in point (a) of Article 3(2);

(b) up to EUR 7 707 119 112 for objectives referred to in point (b) of Article 3(2);

(c) up to EUR 8 095 166 498 for objectives referred to in point (c) of Article 3(2);

(d) up to EUR 3 260 978 561 for objectives referred to in point (d) of Article 3(2).’;

(23) In Annex III, the following two paragraphs are added in point 1 below point 1.4:

‘By way of derogation from Article 2(40) of the Financial Regulation, when determining the leverage and multiplier effect for financing and investment operations providing performance guarantees, the amount of risk coverage shall be assimilated to the amount of reimbursable financing.

By way of derogation from Article 222(3) of the Financial Regulation, the financing and investment operations providing performance guarantees shall not be required to achieve multiplier effect.’;

(24) In Annex V, the following paragraph is added:

‘This Annex also applies to the InvestEU financial instrument.’

Article 2

Amendments to Regulation 2015/1017 [EFSI Regulation]

Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 is amended as follows:

(1) Article 11a is amended as follows:

(a) the title is replaced by the following:

‘Combinations’.

(b) the following second subparagraph is inserted:

‘The EU guarantee may be granted to cover financing and investment operations eligible under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council for the purposes of combinations referred to in Article 7(4) of that Regulation and it may cover losses in relation to financing and investment operations covered by the combined support.’;

(2) Article 16 is amended as follows:

(a) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

‘1. The EIB, in cooperation with the EIF where appropriate, shall submit once a year a report to the Commission on EIB financing and investment operations covered by this Regulation. The report shall include an assessment of compliance with the requirements on the use of the EU guarantee and with the key performance indicators referred to in Article 4(2), point (f)(iv). The report shall also include statistical, financial and accounting data on each EIB financing and investment operation and on an aggregated basis.’;

(b) paragraph 2 is deleted;

(c) in paragraph 3, the following subparagraph is added:

‘In relation to the combinations referred to in Article 11a, the EIB and the EIF, respectively, shall provide the Commission annually with the financial statements in accordance with Article 212(4) of the Financial Regulation. Such financial statements shall include accounting data about the support provided by the EU guarantee under this Regulation clearly delineated from the support provided by the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council.’;

(3) in Article 22(1), the fifth subparagraph is deleted.

Article 3

Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 [CEF]

In Article 29 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1153, the following paragraph is added:

‘5. The guarantee supported by the Union budget and provided by the EIB through the CEF Debt Instrument established under Regulation (EU) 1316/2013 may be granted to cover financing and investment operations eligible under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council(*) for the purpose of combination referred to in Article 7 of that Regulation and may cover losses in relation to the financing and investment operations covered by the combined support.’;

(*) Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 establishing the InvestEU Programme and amending Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 (OJ L 107, 26.3.2021, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/523/oj)’.

Article 4

Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2021/695 [Horizon Europe]

In Article 57 of Regulation (EU) 2021/695, the following paragraph is added:

‘3. The guarantee supported by the Union budget and provided by the EIB through the InnovFin Debt Facility established under Regulations (EU) 1290/2013 and 1291/2013 may be granted to cover financing and investment operations eligible under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council(*) for the purpose of combination referred to in Article 7 and may cover losses of the financial product containing the financing and investment operations and covered by the combined support.’:

(*) Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 establishing the InvestEU Programme and amending Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 (OJ L 107, 26.3.2021, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/523/oj)’.

Article 5

Entry into force

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels,

For the European Parliament For the Council

The President The President

MIL OSI Europe News –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Congresswoman Norma Torres Leads Letter from Former Mayors in Urging Speaker Johnson to Halt Harmful Big Ugly Reconciliation Bill
Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Norma Torres (35th District of California)
July 02, 2025

Washington, D.C. – Today, Congresswoman Norma J. Torres (CA-35), along with other former Mayors serving in Congress, sent a letter to House Speaker Mike Johnson, sounding the alarm on the devastating impacts of the House Republican-led Big Ugly reconciliation package. In the letter, the signers—all of whom have firsthand experience managing city budgets and responding to local community needs—warn that the bill’s drastic cuts to Medicaid, food assistance, and job-creating tax credits would be catastrophic for local governments and working families alike.

“As a former mayor, I know the real consequences of decisions made in Washington,” said Rep. Norma Torres, who previously served as Mayor of Pomona, California. “This bill is not beautiful—it is brutal. It guts healthcare, slashes food assistance, and pulls the rug out from under job-creating programs, all to finance massive tax giveaways to the ultra-wealthy. Our cities and constituents will pay the price.”

The letter outlines the projected consequences of the proposed legislation:
- The largest Medicaid cut in U.S. history—a $1 trillion reduction in coverage, stripping healthcare from 17 million Americans and putting rural hospitals and city health systems under immense strain. Medicaid is known as Medi-Cal in California.
- Drastic cuts to SNAP and child nutrition programs, which feed 42 million Americans—including 1 in 5 children—while shifting costs to already-overburdened states and cities. SNAP is known as CalFresh in California
- Threats to infrastructure, energy, and clean manufacturing jobs, risking nearly 2 million American jobs, and weakening energy independence in favor of foreign competitors.
“This bill is a job-killer, a healthcare wrecker, and a hunger-inducer,” Torres continued. “It is nothing more than a cynical effort to rob working families in our cities and towns in order to further enrich those at the very top. There’s still time to stop this and get it right. Our cities deserve better. Our people deserve better.”

The letter, grounded in the shared experiences of former mayors, urges Speaker Johnson to reconsider the partisan path of the current reconciliation process and instead work across the aisle on a proposal that supports—not sacrifices—American families.

The letter from former Mayors was signed by the following Members of Congress:
- Rep. Norma Torres (CA-35), former Mayor of Pomona, CA.
- Rep. Nanette Barragán (CA-44), former Mayor of Hermosa Beach, CA.
- Rep. Judy Chu (CA-28), former Mayor of Monterey Park, CA.
- Rep. Emanuel Cleaver (MO-05), former Mayor of Kansas City, MO.
- Rep. Laura Friedman (CA-30), former Mayor of Glendale, CA.
- Rep. Robert Garcia (CA-42), former Mayor of Long Beach, CA.
- Rep. Sam Liccardo (CA-16), former Mayor of San Jose, CA.
- Rep. Kevin Mullin (CA-15), former Mayor of South San Francisco, CA.
- Rep. Greg Stanton (AZ-04), former Mayor of Phoenix, AZ.
- Rep. Marilyn Strickland (WA-10), former Mayor of Tacoma, WA.
- Rep. Thomas Suozzi (NY-03), former Mayor of Glen Cove, NY.
Full letter

###
MIL OSI USA News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: In Dialogue with Latvia, Experts of the Human Rights Committee Welcome Law Granting Latvian Citizenship to Stateless Children, Raise Questions on Hate Crimes and Access to Elections for Minorities and Non-Citizens

Source: United Nations – Geneva

The Human Rights Committee today concluded its consideration of the fourth periodic report of Latvia on how it implements the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Committee Experts welcomed the adoption of the 2020 Latvian citizenship law, which granted Latvian citizenship to children who would otherwise be stateless, while raising questions on hate crimes against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons and access to elections for minorities and non-citizens.

One Committee Expert welcomed the adoption of a 2020 law which automatically granted Latvian citizenship to children of non-citizens who were not nationals of another State, and the recent reduction in the number of non-citizens.

Another Expert commended the State party for the establishment of a special unit to investigate hate crimes, and on changes in the criminal law addressing motivations for such crimes, including sexual orientation and gender identity. How were these changes publicised? Incidents of violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons remained underreported, the Expert noted; how was law enforcement trained to facilitate reporting and to recognise and support victims?

A Committee Expert said the Pre-Election Campaign Law prohibited pre-election campaign materials in any language other than Latvian, except for European Parliament elections. How did the State party ensure that this prohibition did not unduly restrict accessibility and the participation of minorities in elections? Could the State party explain why non-citizen residents, including long-term residents, were excluded from elections?

Osams Abu Meri, Minister for Health of the Republic of Latvia, introducing the report, said the fact that Latvia was a neighbouring country of Russia, which had invaded parts of Georgia and launched a full-scale military aggression against Ukraine, must not be overlooked. According to article 89 of the Constitution, the international human rights obligations binding upon Latvia formed an integral part of the domestic legal system. Domestic courts in Latvia had referred to the general comments and opinions issued by the Committee in numerous cases.

The delegation said work had been done to raise the awareness of those individuals in charge of prosecuting hate crimes, addressing victims’ rights from a broader, human rights-focused framework. The Ministry of Justice had also disseminated a circular on the interpretation of existing legal frameworks on hate crime and targeting the members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community. As this was a very hot topic for Latvian society, the public broadcaster had also addressed the issue.

The delegation also said that if someone wanted to be elected or vote in Latvia, they needed to obtain citizenship. A Constitutional Court decision issued at the beginning of the year stated that the contested legal provisions did not impose a complete ban on the use of foreign languages, and only applied to individual campaigning with voters, hence they were in conformity with the Constitution. The Court decided that restrictions on fundamental rights were proportional.

In concluding remarks, Mr. Abu Meri expressed gratitude for the open and constructive dialogue. Latvia’s experience during these challenging times, as its neighbours Russia and Belarus deployed the full arsenal of hybrid warfare, had a broader relevance. Latvia would not only withstand these threats but remain steadfast in the rule of law, the principles of human rights and a rule-based law and order.

Changrok Soh, Committee Chairperson, in concluding remarks, expressed gratitude to all who had contributed to the dialogue. The Committee commended the State party for progress in several areas, including access to justice and gender equality, however remained concerned about the treatment of asylum seekers and non-residents, among other issues.

The delegation of Latvia was made up of representatives of the Ministry of Health; the Ministry of Welfare; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Ministry of Education and Science; the Ministry of Justice; the Ministry of Culture; the Ministry of the Interior; the Ministry for Culture on Cooperation with Non-governmental Organisations; the Ministry of Defence; the Prosecutor General’s Office; the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs; the Internal Security Bureau; the State Police; the State Border Guard; the Cadet Force Centre; and the Permanent Mission of Latvia to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

The Human Rights Committee’s one hundred and forty-fourth session is being held from 23 June to 17 July 2025. All the documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage. Meeting summary releases can be found here. The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

The Committee will next meet in public at 3 p.m., Wednesday 2 July to begin its consideration of the seventh periodic report of Spain (CCPR/C/ESP/7).

Report

The Committee has before it the fourth periodic report of Latvia (CCPR/C/LVA/4).

Presentation of the Report

HOSAMS ABU MERI, Minister for Health of the Republic of Latvia, presenting the report, said the situation in Europe had changed significantly since Latvia had last reported to the Committee. The fact that Latvia was a neighbouring country of Russia which, starting from 2008, had invaded parts of Georgia and acquired military and political control over parts of Ukraine, and on 24 February 2022 launched a full-scale military aggression against Ukraine, must not be overlooked. Because of these events, Latvia increasingly had legitimate reasons to fear for its security, territorial integrity, and democratic order. These events, along with information and hybrid warfare operations directed against Latvia, had strengthened efforts to defend democracy, national security, and effectively implement the rights and freedoms protected by the Covenant.



According to Article 89 of the Constitution of Latvia, the international human rights obligations binding upon Latvia formed an integral part of the domestic legal system. To illustrate, domestic courts in Latvia had referred to the General Comments and opinions issued by the Committee in numerous cases.



The financial resources allocated to domestic courts had steadily and consistently increased. Moreover, in 2024, the Academy of Justice, a new institution for the professional development of judges, prosecutors, prosecutor assistants, and investigators, was established. The Ombudsperson’s Office of Latvia had consistently received the highest “A” status of accreditation, and continued to operate in accordance with the highest international standards concerning respect for human rights and good governance. In 2022, Latvia ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The Ombudsperson had been entrusted with the function of the national preventive mechanism, and, as of October 2024, had a new Department on the Prevention of Discrimination.



Latvia had continued to support the naturalisation of non-citizens; these were not stateless persons, as they enjoyed the right to reside in Latvia, along with a set of rights and obligations that extended beyond those prescribed by the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. In recent years, Latvia had seen a gradual and steady decline in the number of non-citizens residing in the country. A significant achievement in reducing the number of non-citizens in Latvia was the enactment of the law on the discontinuation of the non-citizen status for children, which had contributed to a substantial decrease in the number of non-citizens among younger age groups. Since 2020, all children born in non-citizen families had been granted citizenship at birth.



Between 2024 and 2027, Latvia had identified three priority areas for gender equality: increasing equal rights and opportunities in the labour market and education; reducing negative gender stereotypes; and integrating the principle of gender equality into policy planning.

In respect to combating gender-based violence, Latvia had significantly strengthened legal protections, expanded victim support services, and increased awareness-raising campaigns to challenge societal norms that perpetuate violence. Between 2022 and 2024, the authorities, together with non-governmental organisations, held workshops and discussions for young people on how to build non-violent relationships, based on the principle of gender equality.



In 2024, Latvia took a significant step forward in recognising diverse family forms by introducing civil partnership legislation. This legal framework allowed both same-sex and opposite-sex couples to register their partnership, granting them a range of rights and protections previously reserved for married couples. In 2021, the Latvian Parliament enacted amendments to the Criminal Law adding to the list of aggravating circumstances motivation based on “social hatred”, which covered hatred based on sexual orientation. Additionally, awareness-raising measures were continuously implemented, and investigators, prosecutors, and judges regularly attended trainings on the investigation and prosecution of hate crimes.

Questions by Committee Experts

A Committee Expert noted the various positive developments linked to civil and political rights, asking for additional information on the legal status of the Committee’s views in the national legal framework. What steps had Latvia taken to inform the public, including persons who did not read Latvian or English, about their rights under the Covenant and the possibility of submitting cases to the Committee under the Optional Protocol?

The Committee appreciated the rating of the Ombudsman and the increasing material and financial resources allocated to it, and the Expert asked for information on proposals to amend the Ombudsman’s enabling law. Regarding the implementation of the Corruption Prevention and Combating Action Plan, what mechanisms were in place to evaluate the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures? Regarding judicial integrity, were there plans to adopt additional safeguards to prevent undue political influence in the judiciary?

Another Expert commended the State party for the establishment of a special unit to investigate hate crimes and on changes in the criminal law, adding “social enmity” and “any other characteristic” to cover sexual orientation and gender identity, and asked how these changes were publicised. Incidents of violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons remained underreported, the Expert noted; how was law enforcement trained to facilitate reporting and to recognize and support victims?

Could the State party be more specific about the risks to national security posed by individuals with ties to the Russian Federation? How could fluency in the Latvian language prevent such risks? The Expert also asked for the number of persons deported so far, their background and to which countries they were deported. Had there been a state of emergency in parts of the country, in particular the Belarussian border from August 2021 to August 2023, and could the delegation confirm that Latvia did not derogate from its obligations under the Covenant during that period?

Regarding the equality of women, and efforts towards narrowing the gender pay gap, another Committee Expert asked what measures had been helpful so far, and what additional measures the government intended to introduce to narrow it further? Could the State party provide statistical data on gender-based violence and femicide from the last three years? What measures was the government preparing to improve prevention of the concerning occurrence of online violence against women, including against women journalists and women in politics and other leadership positions?

Regarding the right to life, a Committee Expert asked for disaggregated data on the high numbers of deaths in all places of detention, including psychiatric facilities. Was the definition of torture in line with that of international treaties, and what measures were in place to protect persons complaining of torture in places of detention?

Responses by the Delegation

Responding to the issues raised, the delegation said concerning the status of the Covenant and awareness-raising on submitting complaints, the Constitutional Court of Latvia had explained that the views of the Committee did not have the status of a legally binding instrument. While the Committee’s decisions did carry the weight of authoritative interpretation, they were not formally binding. The Committee’s views and opinions were soft-ball instruments, but had been taken into account by the courts over the years. Regarding awareness-raising on the United Nations human rights treaties, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had published informative material on its website in various languages, including guidance on submitting complaints to various treaty bodies, and ensuring accessible and transparent information for applicants. This was how Latvia ensured that society was informed about the Committee and the possibility of submitting complaints.

On training in the armed forces, the delegation said there were education programs which included human rights. The Ombudsman was appointed after approval by the Parliament. This aimed to strengthen human rights protection and ensure public awareness of the position. This approach aligned with the spirit of the Constitution and existing practice, whilst supporting the principles of democratic governance. On the Department of Discrimination, there was an Anti-Discrimination Unit, consisting of five people. There was a separation of the powers in Latvia, the delegation said, and there was currently a discussion on the procedure of nomination of the Ombudsman. There was no influence by political parties on the Ombudsman, and the election was entirely transparent.

Regarding anti-corruption measures, the Anti-Corruption Action Plan was in place since 2023, and the main reason for lack of fulfilment of its tasks was the lack of funding. The effectiveness of the Plan itself was usually measured by assessing the percentage of accomplished tasks, as well as feedback from institutions involved in its implementation. In 2025, six persons were fined in cases relating to corruption, and 2024 data showed that corruption was effectively investigated and sent to prosecution. On the independence of investigations conducted by the Internal Security Bureau, pre-trial detentions were supervised by a prosecutor. In accordance with the law, the Minister of the Interior could only supervise the legality and justification of the Bureau’s decisions, and could revoke them if necessary. On transparency of lobbying, work continued on effective implementation of legislation in this regard, and there was no Transparency Register yet.

The delegation said work had been done to raise the awareness of those individuals in charge of prosecuting hate crimes, addressing victim’s rights from a broader, human rights-focused framework. A specific hate speech conference event had been held in October 2024, with twenty-two participants who worked on such violations. A training session was also held for judges, prosecutors and investigators, focusing on a victim-centred approach to the justice system. For the general public, there were two specific web platforms with information about hate speech, hate crime, and related issues, and these were supported by the Ministries of Culture and Education, and the Ombudsman’s Bureau. The Ministry of Justice had also disseminated a circular on the interpretation of existing legal frameworks on hate crime and targeting the members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community. As this was a very hot topic for Latvian society, the public broadcaster had also addressed the issue. The legal framework, which prescribed criminal liability for social, national and ethnic hatred as an aggravating circumstance was sufficient and proportionate to existing needs.

Numbers of hate speech and hate crimes were not so large, usually fewer than 10 criminal cases per year, the delegation said, but this did not reflect the priority of the topic, as the Government was working on the issue. With regard to ethnic tensions, it was important to look at the information space, and how people used and consumed information inside the country. According to research and statistics, minorities, as well as the general population, found news and entertainment important, and consumed it at the same rates, showing that society was living in the same space. There were differences of opinion in society, as should be the case in any healthy society. Latvian society had gone through traumas, and was dealing with them, including by taking care of minorities, legally, but also practically, including through an annual festival celebrating cultural minorities.

Latvia saw its society as one which facilitated civic participation, and was working to strengthen this. Even Roma representatives and organisations were finally putting their projects forward, and they were being supported. Work was also being done on media literacy, as the current greatest threat to human rights was the great mass of information that was available, meaning critical thinking was a critical tool for building a cohesive society. Latvia had acquired a large number of refugees, including those fleeing from Ukraine, and was providing measures and support for their language acquisition and cultural and societal integration.

Latvia was working with the Roma strategy at the European Union level and had its own strategic plan for Roma integration. Unfortunately, the community was one of the most stigmatised, as it was across Europe. It was important for this stigmatisation to be approached and that communities were approached, with Roma mediators involved in the efforts to end the stigma. Hate speech had increased in the digital environment, and a plan was being put together to address it.

The delegation said the issue of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was not an ethnic issue: it was an issue of international law, colonialism, and history. This was how society and the government had treated it. The government had been very clear that this was an issue that had to unite everybody within the country, no matter the language and ethnicity of the individual. Research showed that there was an increase of differences of opinion on the issue within the country, but these were not aligned with ethnicity. The Russian minority was very vocal in its lack of support for the actions of Russia. On the declaration of a State emergency at the border, there had been a deliberate attempt by Belarus to destabilise European countries, including Latvia, in response to the imposition of sanctions on the Belarus regime. Actions to protect the external borders must be interpreted in the light of the broader geo-political context and the will to protect the system against abuse, including the instrumentalisation of migrants and refugees.

The gender pay gap had reduced further in Latvia, the delegation said, and female employment rates were relatively high, but the government needed to look into employment equality further, including encouraging women’s participation in science, technology, engineering and mathematics. Latvia was one of the rare countries that admitted to having problems in its prisons, and the government had approved an action plan to implement the Committee’s recommendations in this regard, showing its determination to tackle the issue. Prison staff were instructed and trained on sensitive periods in the life of a prisoner, aiming to limit incidents of self-harm and suicide.

Questions by Committee Experts

In follow-up questions, Experts asked for figures on deaths in prisons, and the reconciliation between self-administration prisons and the official system, and whether the former was to the detriment of detainees. Did psychiatric facilities offer education and therapeutic facilities, and was there sufficient staff? Another Expert asked for clarification on training in hate crimes and hate speech, asking whether it was mandatory and country-wide, or whether people could opt out. How was disaggregated data and statistics gathered on hate speech and hate crimes? There appeared to be a tension between language groups, and the Expert wondered how promoting a culture of human rights education and speech could be of help in resolving these matters.

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said the Ministry of Justice had prepared a general policy planning document to combat and reduce the effects of informal prison hierarchies in Latvian prisons. This included building a new prison, and the education of prison guards and administration, including a new education centre, among others. One of the biggest problems in Latvian prisons was the outdated prison infrastructures, and the construction of the new prison to remedy this would be concluded in September 2025, with prisoners to be relocated in 2026.

There were 26,132 persons with mental disabilities in the country in 2019, and the situation was roughly the same now. It was very important today for persons with mental disabilities to have access to independent living, and Latvia had 12 social service homes, with between 50 and 150 places to which persons could be admitted voluntarily and could leave freely. There was only one long-term facility, with approximately 200 beds, meant for persons with severe mental disorders, and this hospital was also only for voluntary treatment. Regarding treatment and rehabilitation, nowadays in all treatment centres there were muti-professional teams, and staff workers ensuring integrated healthcare. Great efforts were made to ensure there were recreational facilities at all hospitals.

There was no mandatory training for judges, except on children’s rights, and training on hate speech and hate crimes were mostly linked to the specialisation of judges. In Latvia, the media enjoyed independence, and investigative journalism thrived, holding the government and the judiciary to account. The most common form of corruption involved the use of administrative resources, the delegation said.

The delegation said amendments had been made to the Criminal Code in 2024, establishing accountability for acts of violence against immediate family or in partner relationships. The amendments introduced the punishment of imprisonment for up to three years if the perpetrator committed a violent act against a family member, spouse or former spouse. Cases of spousal rape were considered rape under the Criminal Code, and sanctions were higher if there were aggravating circumstances. It was ensured that these crimes were reviewed by the courts in a timely manner. More than 13 trainings had been conducted for judges, investigators, prosecutors and those who worked on family violence cases. Every year, at least 20 women were killed by their partner in Latvia. The State believed that, in many instances, these deaths were preventable. From 1 July, electronic monitoring of offenders could be applied in criminal proceedings, providing an opportunity to prevent both femicides and homicides.

The ratification of the Istanbul Convention was a significant step in Latvia and was a cornerstone policy for the country. Changing societal attitudes towards women and violence and shifting deeply ingrained cultural norms and stereotypes required public awareness campaigns, which took time to yield results. Real-life stories of survivors had been made accessible to the public to raise awareness of the issue and encourage others to come forward. Services were accessible and no proof was required to receive help.

In December 2023, preventive visits had been carried out to two prisons, to assess potential risks of violent behaviour. Conferences had been held in cooperation with the Ombudsman’s office and non-governmental organizations dedicated to the prevention of violent conduct, attended by representatives of the prison administration. There had been an increase in crimes committed by prison administration officials in 2025, but this was due to the mandate to increasingly investigate these kinds of crimes.

Questions by Committee Experts

A Committee Expert asked why Latvia did not systematically collect and publish data on the length and frequency of pretrial detention. What steps would be taken to address this gap? Could data be provided on the use of non-custodial alternatives to detention? How was it ensued that all detainees were fully informed of their rights and access to a lawyer from the outset of detention? Would the State implement mandatory audiovisual recording of all police interviews with detained persons? How was it ensured that detainees received timely and effective assistance from qualified lawyers, including during the initial critical hours of detention?

What specific safeguards existed to prevent undue political influence in the appointment of Supreme Court judges? How did the State party address reports of politicisation and corruption in the judicial system? What measures were taken to improve trust in the justice system? What was the current operational status of the academy of justice? What specific training programmes had been implemented for judges and prosecutors since it opened? What steps had been taken to ensure timely issuance of judgements? Could information be provided on the types and lengths of sentences provided to minors? How was it ensured the detention of minors was used only as a last resort and for the shortest possible time?

Another Committee Expert said the overall national referral mechanism had not yet been established; why was this? How would the State implement the relevant European Parliament directive in time? How did the conflict in Ukraine impact trafficking in Latvia and different categories of victims, including victims of sexual exploitation and child trafficking? Were training activities organised for law enforcement in this regard? How did Latvia’s transition from a country of origin to country of transit and destination impact Government prevention efforts? What measures were being taken to promptly investigate, prosecute and punish all cases of trafficking? What remedies were provided to victims? How many cases had been raised against persons involved in human trafficking?

In mid-2024, the Ministry of Culture launched a study to ensure the safety of journalists in Latvia. What was its progress thus far? How were its recommendations being implemented? The Government informed the Committee that the criminal proceedings concerning serious bodily injuries inflicted to the journalist and publisher Leonids Jākobsons were terminated on 19 February 2025, as the authorities were unable to find the perpetrators. How often were similar cases involving infliction of serious bodily injuries terminated because of lack of success in finding perpetrators? How would the State ensure that similar incidents did not repeat, and that there was no impunity for perpetrators?

Could the delegation elaborate on the legal basis for the drastic revocation of TV Rain’s broadcasting licence on 6 December 2022, that was challenged before the Administrative Regional Court? The National Security Concept of 28 September 2023 served to prohibit the production of public television and radio content in Russian. What was the legal basis for this policy, and had there been any legal and administrative actions taken to implement it thus far?

Another Committee Expert said that in June 2023, Latvia established an enhanced border regime with restrictive measures, which had been extended to the end of 2025. Could the delegation confirm this? How did the State party justify prolonging these restrictions long after the formal state of emergency had ended? Credible reports indicated that from 2021 to 2025, the State border guard had engaged in 28,000 pushbacks to Belarus and other countries, without assessing the risks individuals would face. How did these pushbacks comply with the principle of non-refoulment? Refugees at the border were reportedly subjected to violence and abuse and left without water and food. What concrete actions had the State party taken to monitor the State border guard? How were the border guards trained to prevent ill-treatment of migrants?

How many official border crossing points were operating today? What steps were being taken to facilitate applications for persons seeking protection? What percentage of asylum seekers were detained and for how long? The Committee was concerned about the detention of children who sought asylum; would Latvia consider a policy of never detaining children for immigration reasons? The State had a good practice of providing free legal aid to refugees challenging asylum decisions, however reports stated it was not respected in practice. How did the State party uphold this commitment in practice?

The Committee welcomed the adoption of a 2020 law which automatically granted Latvian citizenship to children of non-citizens who were not nationals of another State. The Committee also welcomed the reduction in the number of non-citizens. Would the State party consider amending its citizenship law to grant nationality to all children born in Latvia who would otherwise be stateless? Was the State party considering extending political rights to non-citizens?

The Committee appreciated the measures adopted to safeguard the rights of conscientious objectors following the re-introduction of compulsory military service for men under Law 75 on the State Defence Service. The Committee also noted that the term of Alternative Civil Service was equal in length to military service, which was an improvement. Would the State consider allowing the Conscription Control Commission to operate independently of the miliary? Were conscientious objectors assigned responsibilities in alternative civil services, as opposed to non-combat roles within the military? How would the State party respect the rights of conscientious objectors during emergencies and armed conflicts?

A Committee Expert said the Committee understood that the Pre-Election Campaign Law prohibited pre-election campaign materials in any language other than Latvian, except for European Parliament elections. How did the State party ensure that this prohibition did not unduly restrict accessibility and the participation of minorities in elections?

Could the State party explain why non-citizen residents, including long-term residents, were excluded from elections? Would the State party be willing to permit their participation in elections? Where did the State party see the most need for further improvement regarding accessibility for persons with disabilities in elections? What measures had the State party taken to follow up on treaty body recommendations, including those calling on political parties to introduce quotas to promote women’s representation in political life?

The Committee had questions regarding the transition to Latvian as the exclusive language of instruction, eliminating Russian as a second language in schools and preschools. While this transition was envisaged a long time ago, its implementation had been rushed. How does the State party ensure that schools were ready within the limited timeframe, especially schools where many teachers lacked sufficient proficiency in Latvian? There were serious concerns about the lack of meaningful minority community consultation and participation during the law’s adoption. How many stakeholders were involved and how was active participation and meaningful dialogue ensured? The Committee was informed that national minority pupils at pre-school and primary education levels had a right to request education programmes on their language and cultural history. Did communities have to fund these programmes themselves? How were people made aware of these programmes and how easy was it to apply for them?

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said that while not all police interviews were recorded, this did not affect police investigations. All interviews with children were recorded. All interviews were documented in written form.

Legal aid was provided by the court administration. There had been just one case where a higher court judge had not been appointed by the parliament. Reports of corruption in the court system were legally investigated. The parliament adopted a law establishing a new judicial academy in 2024. In January this year, the newly established institution officially commenced its operations. The academy had been admitted as a member of the European Judicial Network. During this year, 106 events and trainings had already been held at the academy.

Latvia remained susceptible to labour exploitation, sham marriages, forced begging, as well as sexual exploitation. This year, just one criminal investigation had been launched so far in this regard. At the beginning of the Ukrainian refugee crisis, a programme was established that strengthened the capacity of State border guards to identify possible victims of human trafficking. All unaccompanied minors had been given legal assistance. Since 2022, there had been one case of sexual exploitation of a Ukrainian woman.

Regarding the case of the grievous bodily harm reflected on the journalist Leonids Jākobsons, despite its best efforts, the State had been unable to identify the perpetrator, and the proceedings had been closed. However, should new information emerge, the criminal proceedings could be reopened, and investigations could resume. In a 2019 case involving a journalist who had been persecuted and harassed for over a year, the perpetrator was identified and sentenced to prison for two years. This emphasised that the State recognised the importance of journalists and were committed to ensuring their safety and security.

A study had been launched which looked at updating the legal definition of “the media”. Seminars were provided for journalists that helped them to protect themselves. Meetings were held with the police once a year, to help them support journalists. Materials were envisaged for judges to help them on cases involving journalists.

Latvia was a democratic State that promoted the right to a fair trial and access to justice. A case was ongoing regarding Russian propaganda channels spreading hate speech in Latvia. The Government could not assess the outcome of the case at this point.

No languages had been prohibited in Latvia. Statistics showed that only 54 per cent of Latvian youth knew Russian language. The official State language was the Latvian language.

Around 47 to 50 per cent of television programmes and 35 percent of radio programmes were available in Russian language, and 13 per cent of the printed press was in Russian language. A law was in place which obligated the public broadcaster to broadcast in minority languages. The public broadcaster independently decided on media content and in which languages it should be broadcast. Work was being done to promote the inclusion of more minorities.

The state of emergency situation at the border with Belarus had been ended, but a new “enhanced border protection regime” had been introduced and would be in force until the end of the year. During legislative amendments, the State had assessed a proportional and law-based solution, considering European Union court rulings in this field. A lot of work had been done to comply with international obligations and the principle of non-refoulment. A document had been developed to instruct personnel at the border on how to deal with these cases.

Significant training had been provided to border staff, with more than 1,000 border guards trained in 2024 on asylum rights. The State did not have information on 20 deaths registered at the border with Belarus. There had been a case in 2024 in which a dead body was found on the Latvian border. This year, there had been 63 applications for asylum so far. As a rule, asylum seekers were not detained in Latvia and were accommodated in open space centres. However, due to several circumstances, the law on asylum permitted the detention of asylum seekers, such as in the case of security threats. Each case was individually and thoroughly assessed. Minors under 14 years old were not detained; they were placed in different facilities. Efforts were taken to accommodate minors with their families when possible. State-provided legal assistance could be accessed once an asylum decision had been appealed.

Regarding conscientious objection, no one from the Ministry of Defence had interfered with the Conscription Control Commission, and changes were not considered. The State defence service law set basic criteria for alternative service. So far, just three applications had been received, including for religious and health reasons. Military service was for a fixed period and a solider could choose whether to extend their contract or not. International regulations set a two-month resignation notice for military service, which the State believed was a reasonable amount of time. A reserve solider who could not perform military service due to their beliefs could be enrolled in the national armed force reserves. The State was not considering amending paragraph five of the military law.

Latvia did not consider “non-citizens” to be stateless persons. All non-citizens had the right to naturalise. The number of Latvian non-citizens had decreased by around 77 per cent in recent years. After a change in regulations in 2020, more than 500 children had been automatically registered after birth. Several campaigns had been carried out on the possibility of acquiring Latvian citizenship.

If someone wanted to be elected or vote in Latvia, they needed to obtain citizenship. A Constitutional Court decision issued at the beginning of the year stated that the contested legal provisions did not impose a complete ban on the use of foreign languages, and only applied to individual campaigning with voters, hence they were in conformity with the Constitution. The Court decided that restrictions on fundamental rights were proportional. Russian language was still widespread in Latvia, justifying the need to strengthen the use of Latvian as the official State language. The Constitutional Court had taken article 27 of the Covenant into account, which recognised the obligation to ensure minority groups could use their mother tongue. It found amendments in the law complied with article 27.

The naturalisation procedure was fairly easy. The path for non-citizens was wide, short and easy to walk.

Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

The Committee asked follow-up questions regarding actions taken to implement the national security policy before the Constitutional Court; the permanence of the enhanced border regime; ill-treatment of migrants crossing the Belarus/Latvia border between 2021 and 2022; granting citizenship to children born in Latvia who would otherwise be stateless; providing for honourable discharges from military service; the exclusion of non-citizens from all elections; alternative programmes for minority languages in schools; and measures in place to ensure detention of minors was only implemented as a measure of last resort.

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said the public broadcaster was bound by media laws. Currently Belarussian authorities at the border were refusing to cooperate with Latvian authorities. These non-cooperation issues had brought about an increase in criminal activities across the border, including organised crime. This year, there had been 186 irregular migration cases across the border. An investigation had been launched in 2021 and 2022 regarding individuals who had attempted to cross the Belarussian border, which had analysed a significant amount of information. During the investigation, it was determined that injuries to migrants were not caused by the actions of border officials, but were likely obtained during the journey to cross the border.

Reasons for terminating a military contract prior to its conclusion were not specified in national laws. An agreement simply needed to be reached.

Only persons with Latvian citizenship had the right to vote. Using languages other than Latvian during political campaigning in the election period was not prohibited. The provision about using just the official language applied only to the pre-election period. Non-citizens who chose to keep their status still had the right to receive healthcare and work in the country.

Teachers were instructed on teaching methodologies in a linguistically diverse environment, and on how to teach students whose native language was not Latvian. There were targeted grants supporting minority languages and cultures.

As of 25 June this year, there were 27 inmates who were children. Four of these children were detained, with the rest serving their sentences on probation. This illustrated that incarceration of children in Latvia was a last resort.

Closing Statements

HOSAMS ABU MERI, Minister for Health of the Republic of Latvia, expressed gratitude for the open and constructive dialogue. A wide range of topics had been addressed, including efforts to combat hate crimes, gender equality, and matters of national security. Latvia’s experience during these challenging times, as its neighbours Russia and Belarus deployed the full arsenal of hybrid warfare, had a broader relevance. Latvia would not only withstand these threats but remain steadfast in the rule of law, the principles of human rights and a rule-based law and order. These circumstances reaffirmed Latvia’s commitment to uphold the rights enshrined in the Covenant. Latvia appreciated the engagement and interest of the Committee.

CHANGROK SOH, Committee Chairperson, expressed gratitude to all who had contributed to the dialogue. The Committee commended the State party for progress in several areas, including access to justice and gender equality, however remained concerned about the treatment of asylum seekers and non-residents, among other issues. Mr. Soh thanked all involved in the dialogue for their engagement and commitment.

___________

Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media;
not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

CCPR25.013E

MIL OSI United Nations News –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Canada: Province launches program to fund IVF, support families
Source: Government of Canada regional news

People on the path to parenthood now have more supports as the Province launches its first-ever, publicly funded in-vitro fertilization (IVF) program, making IVF care more affordable and accessible for hopeful parents throughout British Columbia.

“For people needing to access IVF care to start a family, the costs can make it simply out of reach,” said Josie Osborne, Minister of Health. “Being able to have a child shouldn’t depend on how much money you make. That’s why today we are launching B.C.’s first-ever, publicly funded IVF program that will ensure more people can access this life-changing treatment and bring hope to thousands of British Columbians on their path to parenthood.”

Starting Wednesday, July 2, 2025, eligible B.C. residents have access to one-time funding of up to $19,000 toward the cost of a single standard IVF cycle, including treatment and medications. Participating fertility clinics may now submit applications on behalf of their patients to the Ministry of Health. Applications will be reviewed in the order they are received, with provincial funding provided directly to a patient’s fertility clinics to limit up-front costs.

“For those wanting to start a family, barriers to conceiving a child can have a profound effect on people,” said Jennifer Blatherwick, parliamentary secretary for gender equity. “Empowering people in becoming parents sometimes means specialized supports are needed and B.C.’s new publicly funded IVF program will help more people on the path to parenthood.”

Funding amounts will be based on household income to ensure that more individuals and families can benefit from the program, with greater support for those who need it the most and are otherwise unable to afford the cost. Households with a pre-tax income of $100,000 or less will be eligible for the full $19,000, with benefits phasing out for households earning more than $250,000. The Province estimates that the program will fund between 1,100 and 4,500 IVF cycles, with the funding available this fiscal year.

To be eligible, individuals must be at least 18 years of age, 41 years of age or younger at the time of application and enrolled in the Medical Services Plan. Applicants who turned 42 between April 1, 2025, and July 2, 2025, are also eligible to apply. These criteria are in line with other Canadian jurisdictions.

B.C. will deliver the program through Olive Fertility Centre, Pacific Centre for Reproductive Medicine, and Grace Fertility and Reproductive Medicine. For those who need to travel, the Travel Assistance Program will help alleviate some of the transportation costs for those eligible B.C. residents receiving IVF treatment as part of this program.

This initiative is part of B.C.’s broader work to improve gender equity and reproductive autonomy. The Province is investing in improved access to maternal and women’s health services, including access to free prescription birth control, expanded perinatal care, mental health support and initiatives to address health equity throughout the province.

Quotes:

Dr. K. Seethram, managing partner, Pacific Centre for Reproductive Medicine –

“The novel funding program in British Columbia has drawn from the pan-Canadian experience, stakeholder input and expert opinion to craft a very thorough and progressive model, which has the ability to change, scale and expand as shifts occur in the needs of our population. The program of provincial IVF funding will open doors for patients who could not otherwise access IVF care and creates an environment where infertility treatments can start quickly, restoring hope and promise to those in need.”

Niamh Tallon, clinical medical director, Olive Fertility Clinic –

“This is a monumental moment for individuals and couples struggling with infertility, who dream of starting or growing their families but rely on advanced fertility services. The B.C. government’s new funding initiative acknowledges the significant financial barriers many face. By addressing these challenges, this program is a critical step toward ensuring more equitable access to fertility care, aligning B.C. with other provinces that have already embraced similar measures.”

Anthony Cheung, clinical medical director, Grace Fertility Clinic –

“Grace Fertility Centre is so happy that provincial IVF funding is finally available for B.C. residents. IVF treatment is a highly emotional journey for anyone. To have some government support will certainly help to alleviate some of the financial stress.”

Rachelle Pastilha, IVF patient –

“Knowing that the government is stepping in to help with funding makes a world of difference. It brings real hope — not just for us, but for so many others out there who are going through the same thing. So, thank you, from the bottom of my heart. This means more than words can say — for my family, and for countless others.”

Quick Facts:
- Infertility is a disease of the male or female reproductive system defined by the failure to achieve a pregnancy after 12 months or more of regular unprotected sexual intercourse.
- According to a recent report from the World Health Organization, one in six people globally are affected by infertility over the duration of their reproductive lives.
- In-vitro fertilization (IVF) is a fertility treatment that includes a complex set of procedures that can lead to a pregnancy.
- New clinics that become fully accredited and licensed to provide IVF services in B.C. are encouraged to contact the Ministry of Health about participating in the program.
Learn More:

To learn more about the IVF program, visit: https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/health/accessing-health-care/publicly-funded-ivf-program

MIL OSI Canada News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: ATF Warns Public of Scam Involving Fraudulent Calls
Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

Washington, D.C. – The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) is alerting the public to a scam involving fraudulent phone calls from individuals claiming to be “ATF Officers” or “Agents.” These scammers, using phone numbers appearing to originate from Martinsburg, West Virginia, are instructing victims to purchase Apple gift cards in amounts of $500 or $1,000 to “clear a red flag” from their accounts. Victims are then asked to provide gift card numbers to the callers.

The ATF emphasizes that these calls are not legitimate and is working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which is actively investigating this scam. The public is urged to exercise caution and avoid sharing personal or financial information with unsolicited callers.

ATF Will Never:
- Call or email private citizens to demand payment or threaten arrest. You will not be asked to wire a “settlement” to avoid arrest.
- Ask you to use large sums of your own money to help catch a criminal.
- Request you send money via wire transfer to foreign accounts, cryptocurrency, or gift/prepaid cards.
- Call you about “frozen” Social Security numbers or to coordinate inheritances.
How to Protect Yourself:
- Do not share personal or financial information with unsolicited callers or emails.
- Verify the legitimacy of any contact claiming to be from a government agency by calling official numbers listed on agency websites, such as www.atf.gov.
- Report suspicious calls to the ATF at 1-888-ATF-TIPS (1-888-283-8477) or the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center at www.ic3.gov.
- If you have been a victim of this scam, contact your local law enforcement immediately.
Disclaimer on ATF.gov

ATF enhanced its websites by adding a prominent disclaimer to outline what ATF will never do, reinforcing public awareness and protection against scams. For more information or to report suspicious activity, contact your local ATF field office or visit www.atf.gov/contact/submit-a-tip.

ATF is the lead federal law enforcement agency with jurisdiction involving firearms and violent crimes, and enforces criminal and regulatory laws involving bombs, explosives, and arson. More information about ATF and its programs is available at www.atf.gov. For more information, contact ATF Public Affairs Division at liaison2@atf.gov.

###

MIL Security OSI –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI: Donegal Group Inc. Announces Release Date for Second Quarter 2025 Results

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

MARIETTA, Pa., July 02, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Donegal Group Inc. (NASDAQ:DGICA) and (NASDAQ:DGICB) announced today that it plans to release its results for second quarter ended June 30, 2025, on Thursday, July 24, 2025, before the opening of regular trading on the NASDAQ Stock Market. The Company will provide a supplemental investor presentation in the Investors section of its website at investors.donegalgroup.com, concurrently with its earnings press release.

At approximately 8:30 am ET on Thursday, July 24, 2025, the Company will make available in the Investors section of its website a pre-recorded audio webcast featuring management commentary by Kevin Burke, President and Chief Executive Officer; Jeffrey Miller, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer; and select members of the senior management team. Management will address questions they receive in advance in their prepared remarks. Questions for consideration should be submitted via e-mail to investors@donegalgroup.com by 5:00 pm ET on Thursday, July 10, 2025.

About Donegal Group Inc.

Donegal Group Inc. is an insurance holding company whose insurance subsidiaries and affiliates offer property and casualty lines of insurance in 21 Mid-Atlantic, Midwestern, Southern and Southwestern states. Donegal Mutual Insurance Company and its insurance subsidiaries conduct business together with the insurance subsidiaries of Donegal Group Inc. as the Donegal Insurance Group. The Donegal Insurance Group has an A.M. Best rating of A (Excellent).

The Class A common stock and Class B common stock of Donegal Group Inc. trade on the NASDAQ Global Select Market under the symbols DGICA and DGICB, respectively. The Company is focused on several primary strategies, including achieving sustained excellent financial performance, strategically modernizing its operations and processes to transform its business, capitalizing on opportunities to grow profitably and providing superior experiences to its agents, customers and employees.

Investor Relations Contact

Karin Daly
Vice President, The Equity Group Inc.
Phone: (212) 836-9623
E-mail: kdaly@equityny.com

The MIL Network –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: The EIB reinforces global partnerships to boost food security and promote rural development, fight hunger and poverty
Source: European Investment Bank
- As part of its strategic cooperation with UN agencies, the EIB formalises its partnership with the World Food Programme, paving the way for the implementation of the first EIB-backed climate risk insurance scheme and enhancing EIB’s impact in fragile contexts.
- The EIB extends its partnership with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations to strengthen sustainable agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa.
- Under the Seville Platform for Action, EIB joins the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty in two initiatives to fast-track finance for ending hunger, poverty and climate risk.
The European Investment Bank (EIB) announced new partnerships and commitments to promote food security and sustainable agriculture around the world and to combat hunger and poverty and. These steps were taken during the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4) in Seville, Spain.

The EIB Group is supporting food security and sustainable agriculture across the globe. These partnerships and initiatives with UN institutions and the Global Alliance against hunger and poverty will improve and expand our support to those who need it most,” said EIB Vice-President Ambroise Fayolle. “By leveraging synergies and sharing best practices, we aim to enhance food security and nutrition, empower farmers around the world—particularly women—, support adaptation to climate change, and transform agriculture into a more resilient and sustainable sector.”

Partnership with World Food Programme

The EIB formalised a partnership with the World Food Programme (WFP) through a MoU that outlines key areas of cooperation, including climate resilience, food security and nutrition, critical agricultural infrastructure, innovative financing instruments, and inclusive access to finance for agricultural SMEs and smallholder farmers. This partnership has a global scope, with a focus on sub-Saharan Africa and fragile countries.

In addition, the EIB and WFP have signed a Letter of Understanding, enabling the EIB to directly finance WFP operations and benefit from its advisory and implementation expertise.

The first joint initiative will be a climate-risk insurance project in Ethiopia. This complements an existing €110 million EIB credit line to the Development Bank of Ethiopia aimed at improving rural access to finance – especially for small-scale farmers and women – and strengthening rural financial institutions.

“This partnership between the European Investment Bank and the World Food Programme reflects our shared commitment to investing in sustainable solutions that tackle the root causes of hunger, build resilience, and support communities most vulnerable to the impacts of conflict, climate and economic shocks,” said Rania Dagash-Kamara, Assistant Executive Director for Partnerships and Innovation at WFP.

Extension of memorandum of understanding with FAO

The EIB and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) renewed their joint commitment to promoting sustainable agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa by extending their Memorandum of Understanding – originally signed in 2015 and renewed in 2020 – until 2030. As part of this strengthened collaboration, the EIB has provided €1.4 million to the FAO for technical assistance in identifying and preparing projects that support sustainable and climate-resilient agriculture.

This collaboration has already facilitated the preparation of complex operations in Ethiopia and Liberia, including sector studies, feasibility assessments, and evaluations of project promoters’ implementation capacities.

By leveraging the FAO’s expertise, the EIB aims to expand its agrifood and bioeconomy lending pipeline, contributing to improved food security, increased farmer incomes, women’s empowerment and job creation.

A particular focus will be on supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in agriculture re and smallholder farmers through financial intermediaries while engaging the public and private sectors in developing agrifood value chains.

“FAO, through its Investment Centre, is enthusiastic about growing its collaboration with the European Investment Bank (EIB) by signing this MoU, first established in 2015 and regularly renewed as a cornerstone of our shared commitment, said Mohamed Manssouri, Director of the FAO Investment Centre. “Within this framework, the latest agreement signed in 2023 is achieving great results for beneficiary countries, with two approved operations unlocking a EUR 130 million credit line to support local banks lending to smallholders and agri-SMEs across Sub-Saharan Africa, and more investments are under preparation. This partnership directly supports FAO’s vision for Better Production, Better Nutrition, a Better Environment and a Better Life, leaving no one behind,” he added.

Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty

In 2024, the EIB joined other financial institutions in the Group of 20 global alliance against hunger and poverty led by Brazil. In line with its mission to eradicate hunger and extreme poverty, the EIB committed to supporting the alliance’s integrated, multi-level approach combining social protection with access to essential services in education, health, finance and agriculture.

At FfD4, the EIB joined two initiatives led by the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty through the Seville Action Platform to fast-track finance for ending hunger, poverty and climate risk. These initiatives focus on building better-integrated finance for sustainable development goals (SDGs) 1 and 2 and on scaling up finance for climate-resilient social protection and smallholder agriculture. They aim to accelerate the implementation of large-scale national programs by streamlining financial flows from multiple donors and connecting them directly to on-the-ground needs.

Background information

EIB

The European Investment Bank (EIB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. It finances investments contributing to EU policy goals. EIB Global carries out the EIB’s operations outside the EU. As a key partner in the EU’s Global Gateway, the EIB aims to support at least €100 billion of investments by 2028, one third of the strategy’s target. Over the 2014–2023 period, EIB lending outside the EU totalled more than €70 billion, with a significant share supporting infrastructure, climate, and food security. With offices across the world, EIB Global is close to local people, firms and institutions, and fosters strong Team Europe partnerships with development finance institutions.

FAO

The FAO Investment Centre works to deliver investment and finance solutions that promote inclusive economic growth, better diets and nutrition, greater equity and climate resilience. The Centre provides a full suite of investment support services to FAO Member states, working in over 120 countries. It partners with governments, national and international financing institutions, the private sector, research institutions, academia and producer organizations to help countries achieve lasting impact at scale.

WFP

The World Food Programme is the world’s largest humanitarian organization saving lives in emergencies and using food assistance to build a pathway to peace, stability and prosperity, for people recovering from conflict, disasters and the impact of climate change.

The Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty

The Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty was established in 2024 as a proposal from the Brazilian presidency of the G20 to support and accelerate efforts to eradicate hunger and poverty (Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 1 and 2), while reducing inequalities (SDG 10). The core of the Alliance is the Policy Basket, a menu of rigorously evaluated policy instruments, ensuring that donor investments are directed toward cost effective, high-impact initiatives. Acting as a neutral facilitator, the Alliance builds partnerships and mobilizes financial and knowledge resources to implement these policy instruments.

In an innovative approach, the Alliance reduces transaction costs and avoids duplication of efforts by leveraging a unified database, streamlining the identification of knowledge and funding needs and opportunities. The Alliance also differentiates itself by favoring the pooling of resources and expertise, enabling greater impact and efficiency compared to fragmented individual efforts. This allows the implementation of comprehensive, multisectoral strategies.
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Green taxation in Cyprus – E-001234/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament
The green taxation reform is a key element of Cyprus’ Recovery and Resilience Plan[1]. It aims to internalise environmental externalities, encouraging more efficient use of resources and incentivising the adoption of renewable energy.

This is crucial in Cyprus where the green taxation system and municipal waste recycling lag behind the rest of Europe, and water scarcity is a particular issue.

The green taxation reform includes a carbon tax, which constitutes a transition towards the Emissions Trading System 2 on buildings, road transport and additional sectors (ETS2) applicable from 2027, a levy on water and a charge on landfill waste, both of which will be incrementally increased.

The reform should precisely set the right incentives for transitioning to climate neutrality, modernising waste and water management and enhancing renewable energy capacity. It is crucial to pass it soon so that this incentivisation happens quickly. The reform will help Cyprus come closer to its climate objectives and the legally binding maximum landfill rate of 10% by 2035.

Regarding the availability of tools to support Cyprus in closing its infrastructure gaps and mitigating the transition costs for households, on top of e.g. structural and cohesion funds, the Social Climate Fund (SCF) will support a socially fair transition towards climate neutrality by addressing the effects of the EU-wide introduction of carbon pricing in the buildings and road transport sectors applicable from 2027.

Already as of 2026, the SCF will provide Member States with dedicated funding to support vulnerable groups, with building renovation, decarbonisation of heating, renewable energy as well as sustainability mobility and transport.

[1] https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility/country-pages/cyprus-recovery-and-resilience-plan_en.
Last updated: 2 July 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Canada: New chief, next step for municipal policing option
[. The IAPS will empower municipalities to adopt strategies that effectively respond to their specific safety concerns, enhancing public safety across the province.

Chief Parhar brings more than 25 years of policing experience, including senior roles with the Calgary Police Service, most recently as deputy chief. His frontline policing experience and deep understanding of Alberta’s complex and diverse public safety landscape positions him to lead the agency as it takes shape and begins its work as a new municipal policing option, keeping communities safe.

Once operational, the agency will strengthen Alberta’s existing policing model and complement the province’s current police services, which includes the RCMP, Indigenous policing services and municipal police. It will help fill gaps and ensure law enforcement resources are deployed efficiently to meet Alberta’s evolving public safety needs and improve law enforcement response times, particularly in rural communities.

“Appointing Chief Sat Parhar is a key milestone in Alberta’s plan to give municipalities a real choice in how their communities are kept safe. This is about building a modern police service that reflects the priorities of Albertans, strengthens local decision-making, and ensures every corner of our province, especially rural areas, can count on responsive, effective law enforcement. With his decades of experience and deep understanding of Alberta’s policing landscape, he is the right leader to bring this vision to life.”

Danielle Smith, Premier

“This appointment signifies a significant step forward in our efforts to establish a more robust, community-focused policing model that is better equipped to meet the unique needs of our local residents. Under Chief Parhar’s visionary leadership, we are confident that we will develop a modern, efficient police service that not only enhances public safety but also aligns closely with the priorities and values of Albertans. His experience and commitment are vital in shaping an IAPS that is responsive, transparent, and dedicated to fostering trust and collaboration within the community, ultimately ensuring a safer and more connected society for all.”

Mike Ellis, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency ServicesMike Ellis, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Services

Chief Parhar’s immediate priorities will be to hire an executive team and commence organizational planning such as developing key recruitment, training and other operational policies. Chief Parhar’s appointment is the first step of many to establishing the IAPS.

“It’s an honour to take on this role and help shape a modern police service built for Alberta. My focus from day one will be on setting high standards for professionalism, building strong relationships with our partners and ensuring this service reflects the needs and priorities of the communities we serve.”

Sat Parhar, chief, Independent Agency Police Service

The Independent Agency Police Service was formally created through regulation following the passing of Public Safety Statutes Amendment Act, 2024. The agency will operate as an independent Crown corporation, and will be renamed the Alberta Sheriffs Police Service, with its head office located in Calgary. The IAPS will be operationally independent from the provincial government with civilian oversight, consistent with all police services in Alberta.

“When it comes to policing, municipalities like ours deserve a choice – especially when the current system leaves us disadvantaged simply because of our size. We look forward to learning more about what that alternative will look like once an Alberta police agency is fully established and the options are clear. For us, this is about fairness, sustainability, and ensuring municipalities have access to policing solutions that reflect both their needs and their realities.”

Jack Van Rijn, Mayor of the Town of Coaldale

Quick facts
- The regulation establishes the IAPS Provincial Corporation and its governance structure including board of directors, board of director powers, financial responsibilities and accountabilities.
Related news
- Expanding municipal police service options (April 7, 2024)
Multimedia
- Watch the news conference
MIL OSI Canada News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the Commission delegated regulation of 10 June 2025 amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 to add Algeria, Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Monaco, Namibia, Nepal and Venezuela to the list of high-risk third countries which have provided a written high-level political commitment to address the identified deficiencies and have developed an action plan with the FATF, and to remove Barbados, Gibraltar, Jamaica, Panama, the Philippines, Senegal, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates from that list – B10-0311/2025

Source: European Parliament

B10‑0311/2025

European Parliament resolution on the Commission delegated regulation of 10 June 2025 amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 to add Algeria, Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Monaco, Namibia, Nepal and Venezuela to the list of high-risk third countries which have provided a written high-level political commitment to address the identified deficiencies and have developed an action plan with the FATF, and to remove Barbados, Gibraltar, Jamaica, Panama, the Philippines, Senegal, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates from that list

(C(2025)3815) – 2025/2740(DEA))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Commission delegated regulation (C(2025)3815),

– having regard to Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC [1], and in particular Article 9(2) and Article 64(5) thereof,

– having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 of 14 July 2016 supplementing Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council by identifying high-risk third countries with strategic deficiencies [2], in particular the Annex thereto,

– having regard to Rule 114(3) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the Commission presents the delegated regulation as an omnibus package to secure its passage, thereby including several countries and territories that deserve separate parliamentary scrutiny;

B. whereas the addition to the list of several jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies in their anti-money laundering / countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regimes, including Algeria and the criminal Venezuelan narco-regime, should not be used as a strategy to put pressure on Parliament to accept deals with the colony of Gibraltar;

C. whereas Gibraltar is widely recognised as an offshore financial centre with a favourable tax regime and financial regulation that has raised concerns for its use for illicit financial activities that result in a severe distortion of the European Economic Area (EEA);

D. whereas transparency and international cooperation are critical to the integrity of the global financial system and to combating money laundering, tax evasion and terrorist financing;

E. whereas concerns persist about financial opacity and the facilitation of illicit financial activities in Gibraltar that are affecting the whole EEA, in particular surrounding municipalities;

F. whereas Articles 61 and 62 of Directive (EU) 2015/849 highlight the need to identify and assess the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing in different financial sectors and activities;

G. whereas Gibraltar is listed as a non-cooperative jurisdiction in some Member States;

1. Objects to the Commission delegated regulation;

2. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission and to notify it that the delegated regulation cannot enter into force;

3. Considers that the Commission delegated regulation:

(a) positively addresses the risks in the cases of Algeria, Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Monaco, Namibia, Nepal and Venezuela;

(b) does not properly take into account the threats to the international financial system in the case of Gibraltar, in accordance with the criteria set out in Directive (EU) 2015/849 and other relevant regulations;

(c) does not take into account the colony’s effective compliance with international standards against money laundering, tax evasion and terrorist financing, in accordance with the relevant provisions of Directive (EU) 2015/849;

(d) does not encourage Gibraltar’s current government to take the necessary measures to protect the integrity of the global financial system and to prevent illicit financial activities, in accordance with the principles and objectives set out in the current legislation;

(e) does not take into account the Spanish negotiating position for the long-term on the decolonisation procedure;

4. Calls on the Commission to submit a new delegated act as soon as possible which does not delete Gibraltar from the table in point I of the Annex to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675;

5. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

MIL OSI Europe News –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Eligible spending under ReArm Europe – E-001294/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament

The classification of the functions of government (COFOG) is a classification of transactions designed to apply to general government and its subsectors.

In the current version of the COFOG classification, which is used both globally and in Europe, there are 10 divisions, including division 02 Defence.

The classification is centred on primary purpose of government expenditure. Thus, division 02 Defence captures all government expenditure with primary purpose of supporting and developing defence capabilities, but it excludes expenditure and investment that has other primary purposes, like climate change.

The activation of the national escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact for defence[1] was justified by the exceptional circumstances created by Russia’s aggression of Ukraine and its major impact on Member States’ public finances.

The activation is framed in scope, size, and time to cater for a quick transition to a higher defence spending regime while preserving fiscal sustainability.

Member States should use the financial assistance provided under the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Regulation[2] to carry out common procurements. Eligible defence common procurement should relate to the list of priority areas identified by Article 1 of SAFE Regulation.

In addition, Article 16 sets out eligibility conditions applying to contractors, subcontractors and products participating in common procurement supported by SAFE.

Therefore, to be supported under the SAFE instrument, investments also contributing to tackling climate change need to fall into one of the areas identified in Article 1 of SAFE Regulation and be channelled through common procurement, which complies with the eligibility conditions set out in the regulation.
- [1] https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/a57304ce-1a98-4a2c-aed5-36485884f1a0_en?filename=Communication-on-the-national-escape-clause.pdf.
- [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Inhumane conditions in EU-funded Greek reception centres – E-001589/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament
The general rules on material reception conditions and healthcare foreseen in Article 19 of the recast Reception Conditions Directive[1] must be applied by all Member States.

The Pact on Migration and Asylum[2] will provide Member States with an opportunity to align national legislation and practices with EU law.

In this regard, the Commission is carefully monitoring the way in which all Member States will transpose the recast Reception Conditions Directive into national law by 12 June 2026, including in particular Article 19 of this directive.

The Commission’s dedicated Task Force for Migration Management[3] coordinates with relevant Greek authorities and actors, as they fulfil their duty to provide, in particular, adequate reception facilities and protection of unaccompanied minors and other vulnerable groups, among other areas.

The Commission conducts audits and on-the-spot checks to ensure that every euro from the budget is spent in line with the rules and generates added value[4].

If the Commission discovers deficiencies, it can intervene by interrupting or suspending payments to beneficiaries or Member States. If at a later stage the Commission detects any wrongdoing, it can introduce financial corrections and recover the funds already paid.

The Commission opened an infringement procedure in January 2023 by sending a letter of formal notice to Greece[5], for incorrectly transposing certain provisions of the Reception Conditions Directive and is in close contact with the Greek authorities to ensure its correct transposition and application of the recast Reception Conditions Directive. The Commission will continue to monitor transposition in light of the Pact provisions.

[1] Directive (EU) 2024/1346 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection, OJ L, 2024/1346, 22.5.2024, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1346/oj.

[2] https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en.

[3] Commission press release (IP/20/1728) of 23 September 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1728.

[4] In the case of the Home Affairs Funds programs, the Member States’ authorities are responsible for selecting the projects to finance in accordance with the relevant EU rules and assume responsibility for the day-to-day management and for ensuring that the actions supported by the funds are implemented correctly and effectively.

[5] On 26 January 2023 the Commission sent letters of formal notice to Greece alleging failure to transpose in a fully conform manner all provisions of Directive 2013/33/EU (the Reception Conditions Directive).
Last updated: 2 July 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: IDB and EIB strengthen partnership to boost development impact
Source: European Investment Bank

EIB

The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the European Investment Bank (EIB) signed a cooperation agreement to increase financing and deliver stronger development impact in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), during the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD4) in Seville.

The agreement reflects a shared commitment by both institutions to work closer and more effectively as a system to increase resource mobilisation for the financing of sustainable development in LAC. It also strengthens the pipeline of EU-aligned financing under the European Union’s Global Gateway, helping to convert priorities into results on the ground in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The partnership aims to:
- Scale up joint financing – through increased co-financing, including joint sovereign-guaranteed operations such as Results-Based Loans in priority sectors.
- Mobilise private capital – by streamlining collaboration on non-sovereign operations and scaling financial innovations such as blended finance, de-linked guarantees, and co-guarantees to reduce risk and attract investment.
- Strengthen system-wide collaboration – by exploring exposure exchange agreements, expanding mutual reliance beyond procurement to include environmental and social standards and results frameworks, and promoting staff exchanges to deepen operational alignment.
- Align European resources with LAC priorities – by translating Global Gateway objectives into actionable pipelines and maximising the impact of EU funding across LAC.
“This agreement shows what MDBs can do when we act as a system – aligning tools, mobilising capital and speeding up delivery. Together with the EIB, we’re also strengthening the bridge between Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean, while creating impact on the ground,” said IDB President Ilan Goldfajn.

“Europe supports Latin America and the Caribbean. This new agreement strengthens our strategic partnership, which is key to developing our projects and having greater impact on the ground,” said EIB Group President Nadia Calviño.

About the IDB

The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) is devoted to improving lives across Latin America and the Caribbean. Founded in 1959, the IDB works with the region’s public sector to design and enable impactful, innovative solutions for sustainable and inclusive development. Leveraging financing, technical expertise and knowledge, it promotes growth and well-being in 26 countries.

About EIB Global:

The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by the Member States. It finances investments that pursue EU policy objectives.

EIB Global is the EIB Group’s specialised arm devoted to increasing the impact of international partnerships and development finance, and a key partner of Global Gateway. It aims to support €100 billion of investment by the end of 2027 – around one-third of the overall target of this EU initiative. Within Team Europe, EIB Global fosters strong, focused partnerships alongside fellow development finance institutions and civil society. EIB Global brings the EIB Group closer to people, companies and institutions through its offices across the world. Photos of EIB headquarters for media use are available here. http://twitter.com/EIB https://www.linkedin.com/company/eib-global/
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Increasing the adoption of artificial intelligence by public administrations in the EU – E-001509/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament
The Commission adopted the AI (Artificial Intelligence) Continent Action Plan[1] and launched a public consultation[2] for the Apply AI strategy to identify key challenges for AI uptake in industrial sectors and public administration.

The Commission’s efforts to support the digitalisation of public administrations include the network of European Digital Innovation Hubs (EDIHs)[3] that support municipalities and regions in their digital transformation. Starting in December 2025, EDIHs will become Experience Centres for AI, accelerating uptake of AI inter alia in public administration.

Moreover, the Commission will support up to four pilot projects with a EUR 21 million budget to accelerate the deployment of generative AI solutions in public administrations.

The Commission has also promoted the creation of a Data Space for Smart Communities[4] to allow local and regional administrations to share local data and use Local Digital Twins.

The CitiVERSE[5] initiative facilitates city planning using Extended Reality tools. Moreover, the Alliance for Language Technologies project[6] federates Member States to address the shortages of language data for AI[7].

[1] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/ai-continent_en.

[2] The consultation closes on 4 June 2025.

[3] https://european-digital-innovation-hubs.ec.europa.eu/home.

[4] https://www.ds4sscc.eu/.

[5] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/factpages/citiverse.

[6] www.alt-edic.eu/about-us/.

[7] The ALT-EDIC projects co-financed by the DIGITAL programme include ALT-EDIC4EU (EUR 4M), LLMs4EU (EUR 40M), and OpenEuroLLM (40 Mio) to improve the European Language Technology Ecosystem, the collection of high-quality data and the development of multilingual LLMs.
Last updated: 2 July 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Threat to the EU from the mafia of Türkiye and the Occupied Territories – E-001699/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament
The Commission takes a comprehensive approach to protect the EU from financial crime. The anti-money laundering (AML/CFT) Directive[1] includes the obligation to identify third countries posing significant money laundering risks.

The AML package adopted in 2024[2] further strengthen these efforts inter alia by establishing mechanisms to better identify and manage risks from third countries.

The Commission engages in depth with candidate countries on topics related to organised crime, corruption and drug trafficking in the context of the negotiations on accession, which offers a direct and operational framework to engage with Türkiye.

Risks stemming from Türkiye and in the non-government controlled areas of the Republic of Cyprus are part of these ongoing discussions with Türkiye.

As a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Commission is fully aware of Türkiye’s compliance levels on AML/CFT, including its efforts to address any concerns through tangible actions, and of the risks associated with the non-government controlled areas as highlighted in the evaluation reports concerning Cyprus.

While FATF removed Türkiye from its ‘grey list’ of countries in June 2024, the Commission agrees that close monitoring of the effectiveness of Türkiye’s AML/CFT framework is essential.

In line with the EU methodology for identifying high risk third countries[3], as regards any candidate country, the Commission may consider mitigating measures included in the accession negotiations that address the identified strategic deficiencies.

[1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2015/849/oj/eng.

[2] https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/latest-update-anti-money-laundering-and-countering-financing-terrorism-legislative-package-2024-04-24_en.

[3] SWD(2020) 99: https://finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/f745b6e8-735b-4855-b050-f52276356fe6_en?filename=200507-anti-money-laundering-terrorism-financing-action-plan-methodology_en.pdf.
Last updated: 2 July 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Implementation of the Migration Pact in the context of the Polish Government’s position – E-000547/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament
The Asylum and Migration Management Regulation[1] foresees a mandatory but flexible solidarity mechanism, whereby each Member State has full discretion to choose between the available forms of solidarity, namely relocation, financial contributions and alternative measures (in-kind support).

A reference key, based on the size of the population (50% weighting ) and of the gross domestic product of the Member States (50% weighting ), should be applied in accordance with the mandatory fair share principle for the operation of the solidarity mechanism enabling the determination of the overall contribution of each Member State.

The Asylum and Migration Management Regulation also foresees possible deduction of solidarity contributions for Member States facing migratory pressure or a significant migratory situation.

The Asylum and Migration Management Regulation also requires that e ach year, by 15 October, the Commission adopts an implementing decision determining whether a particular Member State is under migratory pressure, at risk of migratory pressure during the upcoming year, or facing a significant migratory situation.

In doing so, the Commission will take into account qualitative and quantitative indicators, in accordance with Articles 9 and 10 of the regulation, including the number of beneficiaries of temporary protection in a given Member State. M ilitary assistance provided to Ukraine is not among the indicators set by the regulation.

[1] Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on asylum and migration management, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1147 and (EU) 2021/1060 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 604/2013; OJ L, 2024/1351, 22.5.2024.
Last updated: 2 July 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – High wage inequalities in the European Union – E-002555/2025
Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-002555/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Galato Alexandraki (ECR)

Despite the European Union’s principle of convergence, average wages still vary enormously between the Member States. According to recent data from 2023, the average monthly full-time wage in the EU was around EUR 3 155, dropping to less than EUR 1 125 in Bulgaria and reaching EUR 6 755 in Luxembourg. And although these disparities become narrower when purchasing power standards (PPS) are taken into account, significant inequalities persist. Low wages in many Eastern and Southern European countries, such as Greece, limit people’s ability to make a decent living and increase brain drain. While the EU has adopted the Minimum Wages Directive, it is unclear whether there are effective tools to ensure real convergence of incomes in terms of quality of life. This issue directly concerns social cohesion and the sustainability of economies.

In view of the above, can the Commission say:

1.Is there a plan to reduce disparities in average wages between Member States, not only in absolute terms but also taking into account purchasing power standards (PPS)?

2.Does it envisage further regulatory action or financial support so that the wages in the countries with the lowest salaries can actually approach the European average in real terms?

Submitted: 25.6.2025
Last updated: 2 July 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – High wage inequalities in the European Union – E-002555/2025
Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-002555/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Galato Alexandraki (ECR)

Despite the European Union’s principle of convergence, average wages still vary enormously between the Member States. According to recent data from 2023, the average monthly full-time wage in the EU was around EUR 3 155, dropping to less than EUR 1 125 in Bulgaria and reaching EUR 6 755 in Luxembourg. And although these disparities become narrower when purchasing power standards (PPS) are taken into account, significant inequalities persist. Low wages in many Eastern and Southern European countries, such as Greece, limit people’s ability to make a decent living and increase brain drain. While the EU has adopted the Minimum Wages Directive, it is unclear whether there are effective tools to ensure real convergence of incomes in terms of quality of life. This issue directly concerns social cohesion and the sustainability of economies.

In view of the above, can the Commission say:

1.Is there a plan to reduce disparities in average wages between Member States, not only in absolute terms but also taking into account purchasing power standards (PPS)?

2.Does it envisage further regulatory action or financial support so that the wages in the countries with the lowest salaries can actually approach the European average in real terms?

Submitted: 25.6.2025
Last updated: 2 July 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Africa: South Africa looks to global lessons as it sharpens its focus on gender priorities at G20

Source: South Africa News Agency

South Africa looks to global lessons as it sharpens its focus on gender priorities at G20

As the G20 Technical Meetings continue in South Africa, a powerful voice is emerging from within the country’s leadership, calling for bolder and more targeted investments in women, youth, and persons with disabilities.

Advocate Joyce Mikateko Maluleke, the Chairperson of the G20 Empowerment Women Working Group (EWWG) and Director-General of the Department of Women, Youth and Persons with Disabilities, told SAnews that South Africa is drawing critical lessons from global partners to respond to some of its most urgent challenges.

The Third Technical Meeting of the G20 EWWG is currently taking place at the Skukuza Conference Centre at the Kruger National Park in Mpumalanga.

“There’s a lot that, as a country, we are learning from other countries. We have three priorities: valuing the care economy – both paid and unpaid; unlocking genuine financial inclusion for women, and eradicating gender-based violence and femicide,” Maluleke said.

Maluleke began by addressing the crisis of gender-based violence and femicide (GBVF), which she said continues to tear through the country’s social fabric.

“Gender-based violence is a crisis in South Africa. It’s really one thing that, as a country, we want to learn from other countries. Other countries have done so many things… for prevention, even regulating access to social media, because one of the biggest challenges is that our children have a lot of unlimited access to the internet at an early age. Other countries shared that they control what young persons have access to,” she explained.

From controlling explicit media to implementing surveillance technologies that aid in prevention and justice, Maluleke said there is much to learn from.

“They have used technology to protect women. For example, you find that there’s a surveillance camera every few meters. It does help because they can follow up… They have invested in prevention,” she said.

Investing in strong family support structures, something other countries do well, is an area where South Africa must improve. Maluleke said this is one of the biggest prevention measures that the country needs to adopt.

On financial inclusion, Maluleke highlighted the need to replicate successful international models that empower women from the ground up.

“We’ve learned from them… The support they give to women in businesses starts from their education systems. Countries like Germany have invested in vocational training, and they have elevated artisanship to the same level as those that went to university,” she said.

In Germany, Maluleke noted, 60% of learners pursue technical training, while only 40% go to university.

“That’s why Germany is so strong in terms of engineering and [technical fields],” she remarked.

The third priority, which is care work, remains an often-overlooked economic force, Maluleke said.

“Most countries have indicated that [care work] is a strong, unseen engine of the economy. Women will stay at home to raise children and to look after those who are sick…” she said, urging for an investment in systems that allow for a balance between work and life commitments.

“Care work, they say, is work of love. Yes, we love our parents, but we must still be able to live,” Maluleke emphasised.

On prevention strategies for GBVF, the Director-General stressed the urgent need to shift focus and budget accordingly.

“… [UN Women] said: ‘Preventing gender-based violence is not expensive. Not preventing gender-based violence is expensive.” It costs [a lot to raise] children [whose] families… are not able to [take them] to school, who won’t be able to contribute to the GDP… and who [might] end up getting involved in substance abuse, and to rehabilitate them is expensive,” she said.

Towards a stronger declaration and legacy

As deliberations continue, South Africa is preparing for the signing of a declaration that addresses its three focus areas, namely, care work, financial inclusion and GBVF.

Maluleke explained that every working group works on the technical meetings, which will culminate in the declaration that will be signed by Ministers in the G20 when they meet.

She emphasised that a key objective is to secure tangible outcomes from the G20 engagement.

“One of the achievements that we would like to achieve is that the financial sector needs to ensure that when Ministers sign the declaration as a product… they also launch a legacy project,” she added.

Indeed, one such legacy project is already in the pipeline.

“We already have the World Bank… The World Bank will be launching, as a legacy project of the South African G20 Presidency, a financial facility on care work.

“Women, who are running ECDs [Early Childhood Development Centres], will be able to apply for funding from that fund. They will launch it at the Minister’s meeting,” Maluleke said.

Consensus and Positive Masculinity

With 21 countries now part of the G20, following the African Union’s recent inclusion, building consensus remains a major hurdle.

“All of them must consent to the declaration. That’s why we’re starting the negotiations today… and even tomorrow, we will be negotiating,” Maluleke said.

Alongside the declaration, South Africa is preparing another powerful intervention: a conference on positive masculinity.

“Masculinity shouldn’t destroy. It should protect,” Maluleke said.

The event will bring together G20 countries, guest nations, and international organisations, aiming to change the mindset of men and reframe masculinity as a force for protection and empowerment.

“There are countries that have reduced gender-based violence. They say gender-based violence can be prevented, but you have to invest in that prevention.

“Gender-based violence doesn’t discriminate… All of us have to make sure that we prevent it so that we protect our girls,” the Director-General said.

As negotiations unfold and commitments solidify, South Africa is poised to drive meaningful change – not just at home but across the G20 platform by aligning global best practices with local action, and by ensuring no one is left behind in the fight for dignity, equity and justice. – SAnews.gov.za

DikelediM
Wed, 07/02/2025 – 16:00

MIL OSI Africa –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LCQ21: Controlling expenditure on public works projects

Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

Following is a question by the Hon Chan Siu-hung and a written reply by the Secretary for Development, Ms Bernadette Linn, in the Legislative Council today (July 2):

Question:

It is learnt that public works expenditures involving infrastructure, healthcare, education, housing, and so on account for a substantial proportion of government spending. However, there are views pointing out that the model of division of labour in which policy bureaux or government departments, as “users”, only need to specify the requirements and functions during the planning stage of a project, leaving the subsequent processes such as design and construction to be spearheaded by technical departments like the Civil Engineering and Development Department or the Architectural Services Department, is prone to result in user departments lacking awareness of project budget control and losing sight of cost-effectiveness, whereas the technical departments may need to adopt more costly building designs, methods, or materials, among others, in a bid to meet the individual requirements of user departments, hence driving up the cost of works even at the inception stage (i.e. the “upstream stage”) of the project. Therefore, various government departments should shift their mindset towards upholding an “awareness of being property owners” to take the lead in formulating a reasonable budget right at the early stage of project planning and strictly monitor its implementation. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:

(1) whether it will consider strengthening various government departments’ awareness of being property owners, with a view to exercising stringent control over the estimates of expenditure at the upstream stage of public works projects; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that;

(2) of the strategies and specific measures implemented by the Project Strategy and Governance Office under the Development Bureau at various stages (including upstream, midstream and downstream) of public works to reduce project cost; whether an assessment has been conducted on the respective effectiveness of these strategies and measures; and

(3) whether it has drawn on the cost control measures adopted by the Mainland and various places in the world at the upstream stage of public works; if not, of the reasons for that; if so, the details, including whether such measures encompass a concept similar to the awareness of being property owners?

Reply:

President,

The Development Bureau (DEVB) established the Project Cost Management Office in 2016 and upgraded it to become the Project Strategy and Governance Office (PSGO) in April 2019 for formulating and implementing strategic initiatives and enhancing capabilities in cost surveillance and project governance to public works projects. On monitoring project estimates of public works, there is a set of stringent vetting mechanisms in place. While not compromising the functionality, quality and safety of works, the PSGO, as an independent third party, participates in project cost vetting from project inception stage in accordance with the “fitness-for-purpose and no frills” principle, and will follow up on project development and design optimisation and continuously monitor the performance of the projects during construction stage, and implement suitable measures for cost saving.

Our responses to the three parts of the question are as follows:

(1) At different project implementation stages, the works departments have been maintaining communication with the project proponent policy bureaux, providing advice to the project proponent policy bureaux on project planning and design, cost estimation, progress, etc. In addition, senior management of project proponent policy bureaux participated in the project management and leadership development programme under the Centre of Excellence for Major Project Leaders under the DEVB to reinforce and strengthen their understanding of project cost management and ensure that public funds are used properly. To further enhance capabilities in cost surveillance and project governance, the DEVB is working with the Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau to study on optimising the preparatory and conceptual work before project inception, with emphasis on strengthening the review of site selection, usage mix, scale, design, implementation programme, etc, by the project proponent policy bureaux and user departments. This will help the project proponent policy bureaux and user departments to comprehensively evaluate the cost-effectiveness of different implementation proposals with the “ownership” mindset, so as to formulate practical and cost-effective proposals. By planning ahead the overall estimates before project inception, the project cost-effectiveness can be further enhanced. We are currently formulating relevant details and guidelines, with the relevant measures planned to be implemented within this year.

(2) The PSGO vigorously scrutinises cost estimates of public works projects. During the project inception stage, we also examine the technical feasibility statement submitted by the works departments to establish the technical feasibility of the project and review the preliminary cost estimate and cash flow requirements.

During the design stage, we liaise with project proponent policy bureaux and user departments to enhance project cost-effectiveness, reduce cost and minimise risk of cost overrun through design optimisation by means of exploring different design options, construction methods and procurement models. We also carry out benchmarking with costs of other similar projects and make reference to the prevailing market situation, to ensure that the project estimates are reasonable. Furthermore, the Government adopts parallel tendering before submitting funding application of the projects to the Legislative Council so as to accurately reflect the tender prices in the approved project estimate for better financial management of the projects to reduce the risk of cost overrun.

During the construction stage, the DEVB regularly conducts high-level meetings with works departments, complemented with the established Integrated Capital Works Platform, enabling management of different departments to grasp the real-time performance of each project, closely monitor the implementation programme of projects and provide timely intervention so as to mitigate the risks of project cost overrun and delays. At the same time, the PSGO also examines major variations in projects during the construction period and provides independent advice to works departments to ensure the cost-effectiveness of the major variations.

Since its establishment, the PSGO has scrutinised more than 540 capital works projects, and successfully saved about $190 billion (about 16 per cent) in construction cost out of the original estimate of about $1,200 billion proposed by the project proponent policy bureaux.

In addition, the overall cost management performance of the Capital Works Programme has all along been well performed. In the past ten years, there were 575 Category A projects approved by the Finance Committee of the Legislative Council, and so far only 15 projects required budget increase. Besides, in the past ten years, the total expenditure of the 510 Category A projects with their final accounts settled (including expenditure of the additional funding) was about 90 per cent of the total original approved project estimates.

The DEVB has completed the strategic study on relatively high construction costs in Hong Kong. We will progressively launch the relevant cost control measures along the following four directions, which includes (i) optimising the project procurement model, (ii) reviewing the design standards and requirements, (iii) applying advanced technologies and construction methods, and (iv) streamlining the approval process, once they are ready so as to reduce the construction costs.

(3) The Government has been liaising and actively exchanging project management experience with other authorities, including the Mainland, Singapore and the United Kingdom, to enhance the project delivery capabilities and performance. For example, the DEVB signed the Letter of Intent on Strengthening Guangdong-Hong Kong Cooperation in Construction and Related Engineering Sectors with the Department of Housing and Urban-Rural Development of Guangdong Province to deepen the co-operation in construction and engineering sectors between Guangdong and Hong Kong. We also signed a Memorandum of Understanding each with the Centre for Public Project Management of the Ministry of Finance of Singapore and the Infrastructure and Projects Authority, part of the Cabinet Office and HM Treasury of the United Kingdom, in December 2022 and February 2023 respectively. The DEVB also organised the Project Cost Management Forum to allow local and overseas industry leaders to exchange views and share experiences regarding project cost control. Among them, we make reference to the process and experience of implementing projects in the Mainland, as well as their practices for optimising construction programme. In addition, we understand that the Singapore government is involved in the upstream process of project planning to review the scope, design and cost reasonableness of the projects, and enhance the cost-effectiveness of the projects by revising the scope of the projects or optimising the design. We will continue to make reference to the experience of project cost control in different places and formulate comprehensive and systematic measures to manage project costs.

Ends/Wednesday, July 2, 2025
Issued at HKT 19:26

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – EU funding of Israeli companies involved in the ongoing genocide in Palestine – E-002540/2025
Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-002540/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Anthony Smith (The Left), Manon Aubry (The Left), Damien Carême (The Left), Marina Mesure (The Left), Arash Saeidi (The Left), Emma Fourreau (The Left), Rima Hassan (The Left), Younous Omarjee (The Left), Leila Chaibi (The Left)

Last October, we sent the European Commission Question for written answer E-001930/2024/rev.1[1] on support from the Horizon Europe programme for Israeli companies involved in the ongoing genocide in Palestine. In response, the Commission said it was unaware of such practices and reiterated that the funded projects were closely monitored and conditional on respect for human rights in accordance with Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement.

However, a recent investigation by journalists[2] has revealed that EUR 42 million from the European Defence Fund, as well as funds from seven other European countries, have been allocated to the ACTUS project. EUR 14 million of this funding were provided to a subsidiary of Israel Aerospace Industries, Israel’s leading defence company, for building drones. This support is in addition to the millions of euros from the Horizon programme dedicated to military research involving Israeli ministries and military companies[3].

In light of the above:

1.Does the European Commission intend to condemn participation in the genocide in Gaza by Israeli companies receiving EU funds?

2.Does it plan to stop these companies from receiving EU financial support?

3.Will it propose suspending the EU-Israel Association Agreement to the Council, in order to fully respect human rights commitments?

Submitted: 24.6.2025

[1] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-10-2024-001930_EN.html

[2] https://disclose.ngo/fr/article/la-france-et-leurope-financent-sans-le-dire-lindustrie-militaire-israelienne.

[3] https://www.lecho.be/economie-politique/europe/general/des-fonds-europeens-de-recherche-financent-la-defense-israelienne/10609758.html.
Last updated: 2 July 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Systemic political repression – Russian hybrid influence undermining democracy in the EU’s Eastern Partnership – E-002502/2025
Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-002502/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Krzysztof Brejza (PPE)

On 23 June 2025, a Georgian court sentenced opposition leader Zurab Japaridze to seven months’ imprisonment and imposed a two-year ban on political activity. This follows a concerning trajectory of judicial repression orchestrated by the ruling Georgian Dream party, under the influence of oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili. Numerous high-profile opposition leaders – including Mikheil Saakashvili, Nika Melia, Nika Gvaramia and Irakli Okruashvili – are currently imprisoned or facing imminent imprisonment under politically motivated charges.

These developments constitute a systematic dismantling of democratic institutions, in direct violation of Georgia’s obligations under the EU-Georgia Association Agreement, and align with Russian hybrid warfare objectives in the Eastern Partnership region – seeking to erode democratic governance, provoke instability and obstruct Euro-Atlantic integration.

In this context:

1.What immediate and tangible measures will the Commission adopt to secure the release of Mr Japaridze and other political detainees?

2.What specific political, legal or financial instruments will the Commission activate to impose individualised sanctions on Mr Ivanishvili and affiliated enablers of repression?

3.In view of Georgia’s democratic backsliding, when will the Commission initiate a formal review of the Association Agreement, and under what criteria?

Submitted: 23.6.2025
Last updated: 2 July 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Irregular contracts connected to Begoña Gómez under investigation by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office – E-002511/2025
Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-002511/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Jorge Buxadé Villalba (PfE), Hermann Tertsch (PfE)

The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) is investigating Juan Carlos Barrabés (businessman and co-director of a master’s programme at Complutense University), Begoña Gómez (wife of the Spanish President and other co-director of the master’s programme) and a manager at Red.es as part of its investigation into the alleged misuse of funds, influence peddling and misconduct in several EU-funded public contracts.

The investigation found evidence that procurement processes had been manipulated, with subjective overvaluations made on the basis of recommendations from individuals such as Pedro Sánchez’s wife, Begoña Gómez. In particular, the company backed by Begoña Gómez was awarded three contracts amounting to EUR 10.2 million, under the European Social Fund and NextGenerationEU.

Considering the above:

1.Is the Commission aware of the cases that EPPO is currently investigating in relation to Begoña Gómez?

2.Has the Commission alerted OLAF of this issue and requested information from the Spanish authorities to ensure that the EU’s financial interests are safeguarded?

3.Will the Commission launch regulatory procedures to recuperate these public funds if it were to be proven that they were awarded irregularly?

Submitted: 23.6.2025
Last updated: 2 July 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Africa: Egypt: Dr. Rania Al-Mashat Participates in Several Events on Expanding Fiscal Space for Developing Countries, National Frameworks and Platforms, and Aligning Capital Flows with Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

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As part of her ongoing participation in the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development in Seville, Spain, within the Egyptian delegation headed by H.E. Prime Minister Dr. Mostafa Madbouly, on behalf of H.E. President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, H.E. Dr. Rania A. Al-Mashat, Minister of Planning, Economic Development and International Cooperation, participated in a number of events concerning expanding fiscal space for developing countries, national frameworks and platforms, aligning capital flows with Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and a new vision for debt.

Expanding Fiscal Space for Developing Countries and a New Vision for Debt

H.E. Dr. Rania Al-Mashat participated in a panel titled “Expanding Fiscal Space: A New Vision for Debt and Development Finance,” with the participation of Dr. Mahmoud Mohieldin, Chair of the UN Expert Group on Debt and the UN Special Envoy on Financing the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda; Ms. Rola Dashti, Executive Secretary of the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA); and Ms. Zuzana Brixiova, Director of Macroeconomics, Finance and Governance Division at the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA).

The Minister of Planning, Economic Development and International Cooperation emphasized that the 4th International Conference on Financing for Development represents a pivotal moment for fulfilling the international community’s commitments for achieving SDGs, particularly after the successive crises the world is facing, which undermine the ability of developing and emerging countries to meet the requirements of the development path.

H.E. Minister Al-Mashat highlighted the importance of implementing the recommendations of the UN expert group’s report on solving the debt problem in Global South countries.

These included 11 key recommendations, among them: redirecting and renewing resources of existing funds in multilateral development banks and the International Monetary Fund to enhance liquidity, adopting policies to extend maturities and finance loan repurchases, reducing debt service during crises, reforming the G20 Common Framework to include all middle-income countries, and reforming the Debt Sustainability Analyses (DSA) of the IMF and World Bank to better reflect the situation of low and middle-income countries, among other recommendations.

H.E. Dr. Al-Mashat expressed her aspiration that the 4th International Conference on Financing for Development will contribute to taking concrete steps towards restructuring the global financial system, which has become inadequate for the magnitude of challenges and changes facing developing and emerging countries. She noted that rising debts and decreasing investments undermine the ability of developing and emerging countries to catch up. She also stressed the need to overcome global challenges and return to the multilateral development cooperation system.

H.E. Dr. Al-Mashat reiterated Egypt’s efforts to promote financing for development through innovative mechanisms such as debt swap programs with Germany and Italy, and the signing of a new agreement with China. She pointed to the credibility and trust between Egypt and international financing institutions, which facilitated the mobilization of more than $15.6 billion in development financing for the private sector since 2020.

Reforming the Global Financial Architecture: Aligning Capital Flows with Development and Climate Goals

In a related context, H.E. Dr. Rania Al-Mashat participated in a high-level session titled “Reforming the International Financial Architecture: Aligning Capital Flows with Development and Climate Goals,” organized by the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI), the Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN), and the Belt and Road Green Development Council (BRIGC).

Participants included Professor Jeffrey Sachs, President of the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN); Mr. Claver Gatete, Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA); Professor Kevin Urama, Chief Economist of the African Development Bank; and Ms. Carla Louveira, Minister of Finance of Mozambique, among others.

H.E. Dr. Rania Al-Mashat reaffirmed that achieving inclusive and sustainable development in the African continent cannot be based solely on borrowing or on mobilizing domestic resources. Instead, it is essential to integrate both approaches to ensure sufficient and sustainable financing for development projects.

H.E. Minister Al-Mashat also emphasized that Egypt is working to achieve a delicate balance between domestic and international financing, guided by a clear vision that mobilizing domestic resources supports sustainability, while international partnerships provide momentum for implementing major strategic projects.

Regarding the global financial structure,H.E. Dr. Al-Mashat added that the current international financial system has led to a deepening of the disparity in capital flows between developing, emerging, and developed countries, and limits financing opportunities in southern countries. She asserted that developing countries, especially African nations, still bear unfair financial burdens due to the high cost of financing compared to developed countries, and this disparity weakens our ability to achieve the SDGs within set timelines.

H.E. Minister Al-Mashat mentioned that capital flows are moving in the opposite direction, away from the countries with the greatest needs, despite the high-return investment opportunities these countries offer. She underscored that instead of capital flowing towards high-yield development opportunities, we observe outflows due to increased risks associated with global fluctuations, which limits the ability of countries to attract long-term financing. She concluded that serious reforms are urgently needed in the international financial system.

Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Ministry of Planning, Economic Development, and International Cooperation – Egypt.

MIL OSI Africa –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Booker Surveys Major NJ TRANSIT, Amtrak Infrastructure Project

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for New Jersey Cory Booker

KEARNY, N.J. – This morning, U.S. Senator Cory Booker (D-NJ) was joined by NJ TRANSIT President & CEO Kris Kolluri and Amtrak Acting Senior Vice President of Capital Delivery Jim Short for a tour and status update on the progress on the new Portal North Bridge, which spans the Hackensack River between Kearny and Secaucus. The ongoing project is set to replace the current 114-year-old swing bridge, which opens for maritime traffic and is a frequent source of delays and frustration for the 200,000 NJ TRANSIT and Amtrak customers that cross the Hackensack River each day.

“Hundreds of thousands of people rely on NJ TRANSIT and Amtrak every single day. It’s imperative we take steps to bolster their operations at every turn so that our public transit infrastructure continues to serve our region’s economy and passengers along the Northeast Corridor. I’m proud to have helped secure significant federal funding for this $2.2 billion project, including $495 million from Amtrak and roughly 50 percent of the remaining $1.73 billion from key federal transit programs I’ve long championed. I was pleased to see the project’s progress and hear it is on track to open on budget and ahead of schedule in 2026,” said Senator Booker.

“Senator Booker has been a tireless advocate for infrastructure that delivers real results, and his support has been instrumental in bringing the Portal North Bridge project to this point,” said NJ TRANSIT President & CEO Kris Kolluri. “His visit today comes as we mark major progress, with structural work complete and the first track set to open in 2026.”

“Portal North Bridge continues to be a model for all major infrastructure projects across America, and Senator Booker’s championing of the project is a major factor in driving the successful construction of this project,” said Amtrak Acting Senior Vice President of Capital Delivery Jim Short. “Between the great progress taking place on the project and the strong collaboration with our partners at NJ TRANSIT, and the advocacy of the United States Department of Transportation, the Federal Railroad Administration, Federal Transit Administration, and so many more, this is a project that will make train travel in New Jersey better than it has ever been.”

The Portal North Bridge is a new, modern two-track, high-level, fixed-span bridge that will improve service and capacity along this section of the Northeast Corridor. The new Portal North Bridge rises 50 feet over the Hackensack River, nearly doubling the height clearance and will allow marine traffic to pass underneath without interrupting rail traffic.

The Portal North Bridge project remains on time and on budget, with both tracks set to open in 2026.

MIL OSI USA News –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI: Chicken Road Game India: A Simple Casual Game Captivating Mobile Gamers
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Gurugram, Haryana, July 02, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) —

In India’s booming mobile gaming landscape, simplicity often wins. One game that has grabbed attention recently is Chicken Road Game a light-hearted, casual game that challenges players to guide a chicken across hazard-filled roads. With its simple concept and quick gameplay, the game has resonated with millions of Indian players looking for easy, on-the-go fun.

>>> Learn More About Game >>>

What Is Chicken Road Game?

Chicken Road Game is a hyper-casual mobile game where players help a chicken cross busy roads, rivers, and railway tracks without getting hit or falling. The objective is simple: move as far as possible and avoid obstacles. With each step, the tension builds — should you risk another move or stop to secure your progress?

The game is quick to pick up. Players tap or swipe to control movement, aiming to survive the longest streak possible.

>>> Learn More About Game >>>

Why Chicken Road Appeals to Indian Players

1️⃣ Hyper-Casual Fun Suited to Indian Lifestyles

India’s mobile-first population embraces quick, lightweight games that fit into short breaks, commutes, and daily routines. Chicken Road offers fast rounds lasting 30-60 seconds, making it ideal for players on the move.

2️⃣ Low Data and Device Requirements

Designed to work smoothly even on low-end smartphones and with limited data, the game is accessible across India’s diverse regions — from metro cities to small towns.

3️⃣ Simple Yet Addictive Gameplay

There are no complicated instructions or heavy graphics. The charm lies in the game’s increasing challenge as players aim for high scores.

4️⃣ Social Engagement

Players often share scores in WhatsApp groups or challenge friends, making it a fun and social experience without the need for complex multiplayer features.

From Frogger to Chicken Road: A Familiar Concept with a Modern Twist

Games like Chicken Road Game draw inspiration from arcade classics like Frogger, where players guide characters across dangerous paths. But Chicken Road adds endless levels, randomised obstacles, and a fresh visual style that keeps every attempt unique.

The game’s blocky, colourful graphics and intuitive controls make it easy for players of all ages to enjoy.

Cultural Fit for Indian Gamers

✅ Short, Flexible Play Sessions
Whether during tea breaks, metro rides, or study pauses, Chicken Road fits into the small pockets of free time that define daily life in India.

✅ Family-Friendly
Its humorous, non-violent concept appeals to players across generations — from kids to grandparents.

✅ Relatable Humor
The chicken-crossing-road theme adds a light, quirky charm that resonates with Indian players who appreciate casual, fun entertainment.

The Strategy Behind the Simplicity

While luck plays a role, Chicken Road also requires timing and decision-making. Players must judge when to move, when to pause, and how far to push their streak.

This simple risk-reward mechanic keeps players engaged, encouraging repeat attempts to beat personal bests or friends’ scores.

Responsible Gameplay

Although Chicken Road is lighthearted, players are reminded to enjoy it in moderation. It’s designed for quick fun rather than long, intensive play sessions, making it easy to balance with daily responsibilities.

The Future of Chicken Road in India

India’s gaming market is growing rapidly, with casual and hyper-casual games leading the charge. The continued success of Chicken Road will likely depend on:
- Adding local languages and themes to appeal even more to Indian players.
- Introducing social features like leaderboards or challenges.
- Staying true to its simple, accessible nature as it evolves.
Final Thoughts

Chicken Road Game shows that even in a world of high-end mobile games, a simple concept with fun gameplay can capture hearts. In India, where casual gaming continues to thrive, this game stands out as a light and entertaining option for players seeking quick fun on their devices.

Whether it’s during a chai break, on the bus, or while waiting in a queue, Chicken Road offers a dose of cheerful challenge — no complex controls, no lengthy tutorials, just pure, simple fun.

Contact Information

Company Name: Chicken Road
Address: 673, JMD Building, Gurugram, Haryana
Website: https://chicken-roadd.com
Email: sumit@chicken-roadd.com
Phone: +91-2049157035
Media Contact: Sumit

Disclaimer

This press release is for informational and entertainment purposes only. It does not offer legal or financial advice. Always gamble responsibly, know your limits, and comply with local laws. Some links in this content may be affiliate links. Availability may vary by region.

Attachment
- Chicken Road
The MIL Network –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Russia: Russia is experiencing a full-fledged cyclical cooling of the economy for the first time, says Central Bank head

Translation. Region: Russian Federal

Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

St. Petersburg, July 2 (Xinhua) — Russia has entered a period of cyclical cooling of the economy, which is inevitable, Elvira Nabiullina, head of the Central Bank of Russia, said at the Financial Congress in St. Petersburg on Wednesday.

According to E. Nabiullina, earlier economic downturns in Russia were associated with external shocks, and for the first time the country is fully going through a period of cyclic overheating with cyclic cooling. In this situation, as she pointed out, the main task is to manage long-term growth, and therefore it is necessary to direct resources where they give the greatest return.

Sberbank CEO German Gref also noted that there are signs that the Russian economy has begun to slow down sharply. Among the reasons for this phenomenon, he named the high key rate in the country, the crisis in the raw materials markets, the fall in prices for key export goods and difficulties in the labor market. –0–

MIL OSI Russia News –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Russia: Exclusive: China plays a significant role in maintaining international order and multilateralism – Kyrgyz expert

Translation. Region: Russian Federal

Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

BISHKEK, July 2 (Xinhua) — China offers an alternative path to global governance that is focused on justice and mutual benefit. The country plays an important role in maintaining international order and multilateral cooperation, Kyrgyz political scientist, professor of international relations at Ala-Too International University Kubanychbek Taabaldiev said in an interview with Xinhua.

Historically, China has thought in global terms, he said. With centuries of wisdom, China’s rulers have always put stability at home and in their neighbors first, and the current Chinese leadership continues to adhere to this philosophy.

“The growth of China’s image in the international arena is the result of the country’s strategic, multi-layered approach to all aspects of modernity, and especially to global positioning,” noted K. Taabaldiev, adding that this can be regarded as evidence of China’s increased influence in world affairs, in particular in the context of strengthening the country’s economic, technological and diplomatic power.

As the expert pointed out, China has become one of the world’s leading economic centers, a major trading partner for many countries and an important investor, especially within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. He drew attention to the fact that the implementation of this initiative and the results already being achieved have strengthened the positive perception of China in the Global South.

“In an increasingly complex world undergoing fundamental changes and major global political players trying to maintain their superiority, China, with its pragmatic foreign policy and measured response to crises, plays a significant and growing role in maintaining the international order and multilateral cooperation,” the Xinhua source emphasized.

This year marks the 80th anniversary of the founding of the UN. K. Taabaldiev noted that China, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, actively participates in peacekeeping missions, as well as in global agreements on sustainable development, climate conservation and security.

“China adheres to the position of recognizing the role of the UN in the world order and consistently supports its efforts in resolving international problems through its institutions,” the political scientist stated, pointing out that China opposes unilateral approaches in resolving international problems, the policy of double standards and the dominance of individual states in the international system, emphasizing the importance of true multilateralism.

“It is clear that China is demonstrating a desire to form a more just, inclusive and multipolar system of international relations,” the expert added.

Speaking about the three global initiatives put forward by China (the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, the Global Civilization Initiative) and the concept of a community with a shared future for humanity, K. Taabaldiev noted that they find understanding and support in the international community, including the countries of the Global South.

“China’s initiative to form a community with a shared future for mankind and the launch of three global initiatives demonstrate the country’s desire to make an active contribution to rethinking and reforming the global governance system. This means that China offers an alternative path to global governance that is focused on inclusiveness, fairness and mutual benefit,” said K. Taabaldiev.

In his view, China’s indicative effect in the global economy is that over the past decades it has demonstrated rapid economic growth, infrastructure modernization, and the fact that poverty reduction is possible when based on its own realities and priorities.

“The basis for such effective changes was the country’s development model, which is based on a combination of state strategic planning and market mechanisms. And this model attracts the attention of many countries around the world. China’s economic successes and the changes caused by this within the country have an impact on the Global South,” the expert said.

China’s policy, as K. Taabaldiev noted, is aimed at strengthening international cooperation, and this is already being implemented through the Belt and Road initiative, as well as bilateral and multilateral agreements. China provides a platform for the development of trade, investment and exchange of experience, creating opportunities for mutually beneficial growth.

Touching upon the Chinese model of people’s democracy, the political scientist emphasized that it represents a unique political approach, visibly different from Western models of governance. The main thing here is that the Chinese system involves the entire population of the country in governance through the implementation of the policy of the ruling political force in the interests of both the state and the people. Such a policy promotes broad participation of the people from the stage of discussing ideas to the stage of implementing decisions. And for the countries of the Global South, K. Taabaldiev is sure, this can be a source of inspiration in several aspects.

“Firstly, the path to development and stability can be built on its own cultural, historical and institutional foundations, rather than by copying Western models. Secondly, the Chinese governance system emphasizes practical efficiency, consensus, long-term planning and broad participation of the population in solving specific problems,” the expert said, adding that China has introduced a new concept of democracy with national specifics into world politics, which presupposes the formation of a society of cultural diversity. -0-

MIL OSI Russia News –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI: TopLine Credit Union Members And Employees Donate Clothing And Shoes

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

MAPLE GROVE, Minn., July 02, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — TopLine Financial Credit Union, a Twin Cities-based member-owned financial services cooperative, held their fourth annual clothing and shoe drive during the month of May benefitting three local non-profits, African Education and Health Initiative (AFEDHI), Union Gospel Mission and YMCA of the North Youth and Family Services. TopLine members and employees generously donated shirts, jeans, socks, shoes and more to help neighbors in need.

Employees were able to participate by donating clothing items, shoes and money in exchange for a “Foundation Friday/Saturday” sticker, allowing them to wear jeans to work. TopLine and community members could also purchase items from the credit union’s Amazon Wishlist or Target Registry and have them delivered directly to TopLine, and in return delivered to charitable partners. When the program ended employees and members had donated more than 1,300 pounds of clothing and shoes and $1,100 in cash to assist local individuals and families.

“Thank you to all of our generous donors, employees and members, who contributed clothing and shoes to our annual donation drive,” says Mick Olson, TopLine President and CEO. “We are proud to support our community non-profit partners who empower individuals and families on their path to independence.”

African Education and Health Initiative (AFEDHI) is a non-profit organization with a vision to ensure that African students in rural areas and suburbs, have access to educational materials such as books, computers and other reading aids to support their educational needs and goals. For more information or to donate, visit https://afedhi.org/.

Union Gospel Mission Twin Cities is a Christian ministry dedicated to serving people facing homelessness, poverty, or addiction in the community. Union Gospel Mission helps people rebuild their lives through a variety of time-tested and proven life-changing programs. To learn more, visit https://www.ugmtc.org/.

The YMCA of the North Youth and Family Services is a leading nonprofit dedicated to strengthening communities through youth development, healthy living and social responsibility. To Learn more about the Y’s mission and work, visit ymcanorth.org/youthandfamilyservices.

TopLine Financial Credit Union, a Twin Cities-based credit union, is Minnesota’s 9^th largest credit union, with assets of over $1.1 billion and serves over 70,000 members. Established in 1935, the not-for-profit financial cooperative offers a complete line of financial services from its ten branch locations — in Bloomington, Brooklyn Park, Champlin, Circle Pines, Coon Rapids, Forest Lake, Maple Grove, Plymouth, St. Francis and in St. Paul’s Como Park — as well as by phone and online at www.TopLinecu.com. Membership is available to anyone who lives, works, worships, attends school or volunteers in Anoka, Benton, Carver, Chisago, Dakota, Hennepin, Isanti, Kanabec, Mille Lacs, Pine, Ramsey, Scott, Sherburne, Washington and Wright counties in Minnesota and their immediate family members, as well as employees and retirees of Anoka Hennepin School District #11, Anoka Technical College, Federal Premium Ammunition, Hoffman Enclosures, Inc., GRACO, Inc., and their subsidiaries. Visit us on our Facebook or Instagram. To learn more about the credit union’s foundation, visit www.TopLinecu.com/Foundation.

CONTACT:
Vicki Roscoe Erickson
Senior Vice President and Chief Marketing Officer
TopLine Financial Credit Union
verickson@toplinecu.com | 763.391.0872

A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/4bf0d14e-f8ac-4d2c-a758-1c1f678f8c97

The MIL Network –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI: AIMaster Launches AI Training Contracts, Ushering in a New Era of “Yield Anchoring” in the Crypto Asset Market
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

London, UK , July 02, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Against the backdrop of accelerating integration between artificial intelligence and blockchain technology, AI computing platform AIMaster has officially launched the world’s first income-generating contract product focused on AI model training participation.

This groundbreaking initiative injects new momentum into the digital economy by offering a hardware-free, maintenance-free, and stable-profit path for global users, opening the door to a new model of accessible, quantifiable, and sustainable participation in AI-based computing power sharing.

AI Training Becomes a New Income Stream for the Masses

Unlike traditional “mining” or standard cloud computing services, AIMaster’s newly released training contract product is directly tied to the training of large-scale foundational AI models—such as image generation, natural language processing, and predictive algorithms—all of which require intensive GPU resources. By purchasing cloud computing contracts through the platform, users can indirectly contribute to these training tasks and earn daily returns based on task execution and completion.
This model represents a direct transformation from “technology” to “profit,” converting computing power—once monopolized by tech giants—into a digital asset accessible to users around the world.

Key Features of the Contract Model
- Zero Entry Barrier, No Hardware Required: Users do not need to purchase graphics cards or understand AI technologies. Simply register and activate a contract with one click to participate.
- Daily Earnings Release with Principal Returned at Contract Maturity: The platform offers multiple contract options with flexible durations, ensuring daily income payout and full return of principal upon contract expiry.
- Real and Verifiable Tasks: All training tasks are connected to real-time computing resource scheduling systems, with visible progress tracking to ensure full transparency and eliminate virtualization risks.
Leading the Trend Toward “Yield-Anchored” Digital Logic

As global AI development accelerates—with demand surging from OpenAI to NVIDIA, and from Sora to multimodal generation models—AI training resources are facing exponential growth in demand. AIMaster is at the forefront of this trend, transforming “high-density computing demand” into an “investable income scenario.”

In contrast to the high-risk and high-volatility nature of token speculation, AIMaster’s AI training contracts offer a stable and clearly defined path to returns—potentially becoming the “value-anchored asset” that drives the next bull market.

“We provide the fuel for the AI world through computing power—empowering everyone to participate in this technological revolution.” — The AIMaster Team

Limited-Time Global New User Benefits

To celebrate the launch, AIMaster is offering a special limited-time promotion for global users:
- Get a $10 AI computing bonus upon registration, which can be used to activate contracts
- Earn extra income boosts through daily logins
- Enjoy 24-hour double earnings for first-time contract activations
Visit our official website now to start your AI training contract journey

About AIMaster

AIMaster is an innovative technology platform focused on AI computing power services. The company is dedicated to transforming complex AI training tasks into cloud-based contract products that everyday users can participate in and benefit from. Backed by a team of seasoned professionals from the fields of artificial intelligence, blockchain, and financial technology, AIMaster is committed to building a global “technology-as-an-asset” value network, promoting accessibility and assetization of AI capabilities worldwide.

For more information, media inquiries, or business partnerships, please contact:
Name: John Ace
Position: Advertising Manager
Phone: +44 7441 424573
Email: info@aimaster.vip
Website: https://aimaster.vip

Company Address: 60-62 Margaret Street, London, England, W1W 8TF, UK

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The MIL Network –
July 3, 2025