Category: Economy

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – The Commission’s use of public money for behind-the-scenes political lobbying – E-002388/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002388/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Mariusz Kamiński (ECR)

    In recent months a number of stories have appeared in the media concerning the Commission’s use of public money to carry out behind-the-scenes political lobbying to push through controversial policies such as the Green Deal and climate policy.

    The reports show that experts advocating the Commission’s preferred views are also receiving funding in the areas of agriculture and the common security and defence policy.

    What is more, reports in the Welt am Sonntag[1] suggest that, in addition to supporting ‘green’ NGOs in their efforts to lobby Member States and independent institutions, including the European Parliament, the Commission has also allegedly provided funding to help NGOs sue European companies.

    One example is ClientEarth, which received EUR 350 000 to take legal action against coal-fired power plants, with the explicit aim of increasing the ‘financial and legal risk’ for their operators.

    In view of the above, please provide specific answers to the following questions, which will speed up the work of the expected committee of inquiry that more than 200 MEPs have already called for:

    • 1.Has the Commission funded and in any way mandated NGOs, consultancy firms or lobbying outfits to influence the decisions and policies of democratic governments and independent institutions?
    • 2.In what areas – other than the already confirmed cases of the Green Deal, security and defence policy and agriculture – has the Commission conducted similar lobbying campaigns, and were activities promoting the agreement with Mercosur also financed?
    • 3.What steps is the Commission intending to take in response to the criticism that there is no credible and transparent overview of the EU funds that are going to NGOs?

    Submitted: 13.6.2025

    • [1] https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/plus256221718/geheime-vertraege-offengelegt-eu-kommission-bezahlte-aktivisten-fuer-klimalobbyismus.html
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: OSCE Presence delivers specialized training on sectorial analysis of financial crimes for Albanian State Police

    Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – OSCE

    Headline: OSCE Presence delivers specialized training on sectorial analysis of financial crimes for Albanian State Police

    In support of Albania’s National Strategy for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, the OSCE Presence in Albania organized a three-day training programme on sectorial analysis on financial crimes, from 17 to 19 June 2025. This initiative is part of ongoing efforts to enhance the institutional capacity of the Albanian State Police, specifically of the Anti-Money Laundering Sector within the General Directorate.
    Led by two national experts, the training was designed to strengthen the police analytical and operational capabilities in the field of economic and financial crime. It provided 12 officers with the knowledge and skills necessary to conceive and draft sectoral analyses in this field. These skills will support strategic planning, intelligence-led investigations and effective interagency co-ordination in combating money laundering, corruption and related financial offenses.
    By delivering targeted capacity-building support, this training contributes directly to the implementation of the Albania’s National Strategy for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism and reinforces the OSCE’s commitment to promoting effective, intelligence-driven policing in Albania.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI: Descartes Acquires PackageRoute

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Strengthens Final-Mile Carrier Capabilities

    WATERLOO, Ontario and ATLANTA, June 19, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Descartes Systems Group (TSX: DSG) (Nasdaq: DSGX), the global leader in uniting logistics-intensive businesses in commerce, announced that it has acquired PackageRoute, a leading provider of final-mile carrier solutions.

    Based in the US, PackageRoute’s mission is to simplify and optimize the daily operations of final-mile carriers. The company offers a mobile and web-based platform that provides real-time visibility into package deliveries, route optimization, and fleet management. PackageRoute’s software integrates seamlessly with pickup and delivery data, enabling contractors and drivers to make better-informed decisions and operate more efficiently.   

    “PackageRoute works primarily with subcontracted delivery service providers working as agents for larger carriers,” said James Wee, General Manager of Routing, Mobile and Telematics at Descartes. “We believe PackageRoute customers can get substantial value from our integrated Descartes GroundCloud routing, safety and compliance solutions.”

    Descartes GroundCloud helps ensure seamless operations, end-to-end visibility, and standards of safety and compliance are met, including helping final-mile carriers comply with the various safety mandates of large transportation brands.

    “We continue to invest in solutions that help final-mile carriers deliver shipments safely and efficiently,” said Edward J. Ryan, Descartes’ CEO. “We’re thrilled to welcome PackageRoute’s customers, partners and team of domain experts into the Descartes family.”

    PackageRoute is headquartered in Sammamish, WA. Descartes acquired PackageRoute for approximately US $2 million, satisfied from cash on hand.

    About Descartes Systems Group           
    Descartes is the global leader in providing on-demand, software-as-a-service solutions focused on improving the productivity, security, and sustainability of logistics-intensive businesses. Customers use our modular, software-as-a-service solutions to route, track and help improve the safety, performance and compliance of delivery resources; plan, allocate and execute shipments; rate, audit and pay transportation invoices; access global trade data; file customs and security documents for imports and exports; and complete numerous other logistics processes by participating in the world’s largest, collaborative multimodal logistics community. Our headquarters are in Waterloo, Ontario, Canada and we have offices and partners around the world. Learn more at www.descartes.com, and connect with us on LinkedIn and X (Twitter).

    Descartes Investor Contact         
    Laurie McCauley
    (519) 746-2969
    investor@descartes.com

    Cautionary Statement Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

    This release contains forward-looking information within the meaning of applicable securities laws (“forward-looking statements”) that relate to Descartes’ acquisition of PackageRoute and its solution offerings; the potential to provide customers with final-mile carrier solutions; other potential benefits derived from the acquisition and PackageRoute’s solution offerings; and other matters. Such forward-looking statements involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties, assumptions and other factors that may cause the actual results, performance or achievements to differ materially from the anticipated results, performance or achievements or developments expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. Such factors include, but are not limited to, the expected future performance of the PackageRoute business based on its historical and projected performance as well as the factors and assumptions discussed in the section entitled, “Certain Factors That May Affect Future Results” in documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Ontario Securities Commission and other securities commissions across Canada including Descartes’ most recently filed management’s discussion and analysis. If any such risks actually occur, they could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition or results of operations. In that case, the trading price of our common shares could decline, perhaps materially. Readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance upon any such forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date made. Forward-looking statements are provided for the purposes of providing information about management’s current expectations and plans relating to the future. Readers are cautioned that such information may not be appropriate for other purposes. We do not undertake or accept any obligation or undertaking to release publicly any updates or revisions to any forward-looking statements to reflect any change in our expectations or any change in events, conditions or circumstances on which any such statement is based, except as required by law.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Descartes Acquires PackageRoute

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Strengthens Final-Mile Carrier Capabilities

    WATERLOO, Ontario and ATLANTA, June 19, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Descartes Systems Group (TSX: DSG) (Nasdaq: DSGX), the global leader in uniting logistics-intensive businesses in commerce, announced that it has acquired PackageRoute, a leading provider of final-mile carrier solutions.

    Based in the US, PackageRoute’s mission is to simplify and optimize the daily operations of final-mile carriers. The company offers a mobile and web-based platform that provides real-time visibility into package deliveries, route optimization, and fleet management. PackageRoute’s software integrates seamlessly with pickup and delivery data, enabling contractors and drivers to make better-informed decisions and operate more efficiently.   

    “PackageRoute works primarily with subcontracted delivery service providers working as agents for larger carriers,” said James Wee, General Manager of Routing, Mobile and Telematics at Descartes. “We believe PackageRoute customers can get substantial value from our integrated Descartes GroundCloud routing, safety and compliance solutions.”

    Descartes GroundCloud helps ensure seamless operations, end-to-end visibility, and standards of safety and compliance are met, including helping final-mile carriers comply with the various safety mandates of large transportation brands.

    “We continue to invest in solutions that help final-mile carriers deliver shipments safely and efficiently,” said Edward J. Ryan, Descartes’ CEO. “We’re thrilled to welcome PackageRoute’s customers, partners and team of domain experts into the Descartes family.”

    PackageRoute is headquartered in Sammamish, WA. Descartes acquired PackageRoute for approximately US $2 million, satisfied from cash on hand.

    About Descartes Systems Group           
    Descartes is the global leader in providing on-demand, software-as-a-service solutions focused on improving the productivity, security, and sustainability of logistics-intensive businesses. Customers use our modular, software-as-a-service solutions to route, track and help improve the safety, performance and compliance of delivery resources; plan, allocate and execute shipments; rate, audit and pay transportation invoices; access global trade data; file customs and security documents for imports and exports; and complete numerous other logistics processes by participating in the world’s largest, collaborative multimodal logistics community. Our headquarters are in Waterloo, Ontario, Canada and we have offices and partners around the world. Learn more at www.descartes.com, and connect with us on LinkedIn and X (Twitter).

    Descartes Investor Contact         
    Laurie McCauley
    (519) 746-2969
    investor@descartes.com

    Cautionary Statement Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

    This release contains forward-looking information within the meaning of applicable securities laws (“forward-looking statements”) that relate to Descartes’ acquisition of PackageRoute and its solution offerings; the potential to provide customers with final-mile carrier solutions; other potential benefits derived from the acquisition and PackageRoute’s solution offerings; and other matters. Such forward-looking statements involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties, assumptions and other factors that may cause the actual results, performance or achievements to differ materially from the anticipated results, performance or achievements or developments expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. Such factors include, but are not limited to, the expected future performance of the PackageRoute business based on its historical and projected performance as well as the factors and assumptions discussed in the section entitled, “Certain Factors That May Affect Future Results” in documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Ontario Securities Commission and other securities commissions across Canada including Descartes’ most recently filed management’s discussion and analysis. If any such risks actually occur, they could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition or results of operations. In that case, the trading price of our common shares could decline, perhaps materially. Readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance upon any such forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date made. Forward-looking statements are provided for the purposes of providing information about management’s current expectations and plans relating to the future. Readers are cautioned that such information may not be appropriate for other purposes. We do not undertake or accept any obligation or undertaking to release publicly any updates or revisions to any forward-looking statements to reflect any change in our expectations or any change in events, conditions or circumstances on which any such statement is based, except as required by law.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Christine Lagarde: Strengthening economies in a stormy and fragmenting world

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, at the ninth Annual Research Conference “Economic and financial integration in a stormy and fragmenting world” organised by the National Bank of Ukraine and Narodowy Bank Polski in Kyiv, Ukraine

    Kyiv, 19 June 2025

    It is an honour to be here in Kyiv – a city that has come to symbolise resilience, dignity and the enduring spirit of freedom. Kyiv stands not only as the heart of Ukraine, but as a beacon of what it means to hold fast to democratic values in the face of immense challenge.

    As the great Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko once wrote, “In your own house – your own truth. Your own strength and freedom.” Ukraine’s fight today reminds all of Europe of this powerful truth: our security and prosperity rely on unity, on integration with our neighbours.

    In the face of Russia’s unjustified war of aggression, Ukrainians have demonstrated extraordinary courage and resilience in defence of their country.

    In my remarks today, and in keeping with the theme of this conference, I would like to reflect on the historical lessons we have learned about strengthening and integrating economies in an increasingly stormy and fragmented world.

    Experience shows that closer ties with the European neighbourhood can provide a strong foundation for Ukraine to rebuild and emerge stronger. And as geopolitical tensions rise and global supply chains fragment, the case for deeper regional cooperation has never been clearer.

    Europe’s own long history of integration offers valuable insights that can help guide Ukraine’s path forwards. Two key lessons stand out.

    First, while deeper integration increases the potential rewards, it also raises the risks if not managed wisely. Sound domestic policy frameworks are essential to maximise growth and safeguard stability.

    Second, the benefits of integration are neither automatic nor permanent. Maintaining them depends on continuous reform – but reforms must also deliver tangible improvements for people’s lives, and do so relatively quickly.

    The benefits of integration in a fragmenting world

    During the Cold War, the Iron Curtain fractured the European economy. Trade between East and West fell by half. This division was like imposing a 48% tariff – leading to immense welfare losses and isolating the Eastern bloc from global markets.[1]

    But the transformation since Europe’s eastern enlargement has been nothing short of remarkable. On average, countries that joined the EU in 2004 have nearly doubled their GDP per capita over the past two decades.

    Critically, this was not just about catching up from a low base. Between 2004 and 2019, the EU’s new Member States saw their GDP per capita grow 32% more than comparable non-EU countries.[2] The difference was deeper economic integration – and those that were already highly embedded in the regional economy gained the most.

    While all new members experienced gains, countries with stronger integration into regional value chains recorded nearly 10 percentage points higher GDP per capita growth compared with less integrated peers – regardless of geographic proximity.[3]

    This difference was driven mainly by technology and productivity spillovers. ECB research shows that a 10% increase in productivity among western EU firms translated into a 5% productivity gain for central and eastern European firms linked to their supply chains.[4]

    The case for regional integration is therefore clear – and in today’s increasingly fragmented geopolitical landscape, it has become even more compelling.

    First, regional integration underpins growth.

    European economies are highly open, which means a world splintering into rival trading blocs poses clear risks to prosperity. Yet Europe’s most important trading partner is Europe itself: around 65% of euro area exports go to other European countries, including the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Norway. For Ukraine too, Europe is the principal trading partner, accounting for over 50% of its goods trade in 2024.

    By deepening economic ties – more closely linking neighbouring economies – we can reduce our exposure to external shocks. Rising trade within our region can help offset losses in global markets.

    Second, regional integration strengthens resilience.

    One consequence of geopolitical fragmentation is the realignment of supply chains toward trusted partners. Nearly half of firms involved in external trade have already revised their strategies – or intend to do so – including relocating parts of their operations closer to home.[5] While this trend reduces strategic dependencies, it can also raise costs.

    Yet large integrated regions can mitigate these costs by replicating many of the benefits of globalisation at the regional level. Supply chains can be reorganised regionally, allowing each country to specialise based on its comparative advantage within regional value chains.

    Ukraine stands to benefit significantly from expanding these networks across the region – and the EU stands to benefit, too, from having Ukraine as a partner.[6]

    In the automotive sector, for example, Ukrainian firms already produce around 7% of all wire harnesses used in EU vehicles.[7] As the industry shifts towards electric vehicles, which require more complex wiring systems, Ukraine’s manufacturing base is well positioned to scale up and play a larger role in the EU value chain.

    Equally transformative is Ukraine’s drone industry, which has become one of the most advanced in the region. Drones are not only a critical component of modern warfare, but also a technology with substantial spillover effects and far-reaching dual-use applications.

    Indeed, the country’s ambitious goal of producing 4.5 million drones by 2025 has accelerated innovation in materials science, battery technology and 3D printing. These advances are already finding civilian applications in sectors such as logistics, agriculture and emergency response.

    In short, for both existing EU members and neighbouring countries like Ukraine, regional integration is both a path to prosperity and a strategic anchor in an increasingly fragmented world.

    Managing the risks of integration

    But examining the experience of countries that have used regional integration as a platform for growth and reform reveals two important lessons.

    The first is that if integration is not accompanied by appropriate reforms, it can create new vulnerabilities – especially in the financial sphere.

    Financial integration often brings volatile capital inflows, which can make it difficult to distinguish sustainable growth from unsustainable excesses in real time.

    One way this can happen is when productivity gains in tradable sectors, such as manufacturing, drive up wages in those sectors, which then spill over into higher wages in non-tradable sectors and push up overall inflation.[8]

    While this effect is a normal feature of catching-up, it can make it easy to mistake genuine convergence for economic overheating. If foreign capital is in fact driving financial imbalances – such as unsustainable real estate booms – countries may exhibit the same patterns of rising wages and inflation, masking underlying vulnerabilities.

    Another potential distortion is that capital inflows can significantly affect government fiscal positions by boosting tax revenues and creating the illusion of permanently greater fiscal space. This often leads to procyclical fiscal policies, with governments increasing spending or cutting taxes during boom periods – only to face fiscal stress when inflows reverse or growth slows.

    Both dynamics have been visible during Europe’s recent experience with regional integration.

    After the eastern enlargement, financial integration accelerated rapidly. Between 2003 and 2008, the new Member States experienced an extraordinary surge in capital inflows, averaging over 12% of GDP annually – twice the typical level for emerging markets globally.[9]

    Initially, this rapid financial integration brought clear benefits: it expanded access to credit, fuelled growth and enabled much-needed development. However, in many countries, foreign capital was disproportionately channelled into consumption and construction booms, while tax revenues rose sharply on the back of property transactions and buoyant domestic demand.[10] This led to widespread misallocation of private capital and inefficient public spending.

    Capital flows then reversed sharply when the global financial crisis struck, exposing these imbalances. Between December 2008 and May 2013, external bank liabilities in non-euro area central and eastern European countries declined by an average of 27% – with some countries experiencing drops of more than 50%.[11]

    Yet the risks associated with financial integration can be avoided. Not all countries in the region were affected equally. Those that performed better typically shared two key features.

    First, they had clear policies to channel foreign investment into productive sectors. Strong industrial strategies, a skilled workforce and integration into global supply chains helped direct capital towards manufacturing and tradable services – sectors that drive export growth and are less prone to unsustainable booms and asset bubbles.[12]

    Second, they maintained robust financial policy frameworks. Tighter capital requirements, active macroprudential measures and countercyclical buffers strengthened domestic banking sectors and curbed excessive mortgage lending. These tools enabled those countries to absorb large capital inflows without creating destabilising imbalances.[13]

    The lesson is clear: as countries integrate into the region, strong domestic policy frameworks are critical to ensuring that capital inflows support long-term growth rather than generating financial instability or inefficient allocation.

    This insight is especially relevant for Ukraine today as it charts its path towards recovery. If reconstruction proceeds as planned, the country could attract significant capital inflows over the next decade. But without the right safeguards, that capital risks being misallocated – undermining long-term productivity instead of strengthening it.

    There are encouraging signs. The EU–Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area have already driven significant reforms in the financial sector. Ukraine’s banking regulation now aligns with more than 75% of EU standards, covering critical areas such as capital adequacy, governance and auditing.[14]

    The National Bank of Ukraine has adopted a risk-based supervisory model inspired by the Single Supervisory Mechanism – the system of banking supervision in Europe – markedly improving oversight. Despite extremely challenging circumstances, Ukraine is also modernising its capital markets – consolidating exchanges, upgrading settlement systems and strengthening regulatory enforcement to attract long-term investors.

    These reforms are already delivering results: in 2023, Ukraine’s banking sector remained profitable and well capitalised despite the ongoing war – an outcome that would have been unthinkable a decade ago.

    Still, further progress is essential, especially in fiscal governance. Strengthening public investment management will be critical to ensure that reconstruction funds are allocated transparently and efficiently.

    This is not just about meeting external standards. It is about ensuring that every euro, and every hryvnia, delivers real returns for the Ukrainian people.[15]

    Making integration sustainable

    However, reforms cannot be treated as a one-time effort.

    So, the second key lesson is that the benefits of regional integration are neither automatic nor permanent. Sustaining them requires continuous reform – and, just as importantly, it requires citizens to see visible, tangible improvements in their daily lives.

    In this context, there are two risks to watch out for.

    The first is that institutional reform momentum can fade if economic benefits do not follow quickly.

    Deeper regional integration typically begins with aligning framework conditions, such as legal systems, regulation and public administration. These areas often improve rapidly. But for the economic gains to materialise, domestic entrepreneurs and foreign investors must respond to the new incentives created – and this takes time.

    In the long run, evidence shows that countries with initially weaker institutions benefit the most from adopting higher standards.[16] But in the short run, if people only see the effort and not the payoff, public support for further reforms can weaken, putting long-term convergence at risk.

    The second risk is that structural shifts in the economy may weaken the link between integration and economic convergence over time.

    The integration of goods markets has traditionally driven convergence almost automatically, as foreign direct investment flows to countries with lower land and labour costs, supply chains relocate and lower-income countries benefit from technology transfers.

    As I mentioned earlier, this will remain an important mechanism even in an era of supply chain reshoring. But countries cannot rely on it as heavily as in the past. Future growth in intra-EU trade is expected to depend increasingly on services – particularly digital services.

    However, research shows that services sector activity tends to concentrate in larger, more affluent urban areas that exhibit the hallmarks of a knowledge economy: high tertiary education rates, strong technology and science sectors and robust digital infrastructure.[17]

    This means that deeper integration alone will not guarantee broad-based convergence across all regions. Over time, countries will need to invest more in education, skills and digitalisation to ensure they can build high levels of human capital.

    Maintaining the path of convergence is therefore not easy. But slowing down reform efforts is not the answer – especially in the shock-prone world we face today.

    There is a clear link between strong institutions and economic resilience. ECB research indicates that, during the pandemic, regions with lower institutional quality experienced – all else equal – an additional decline of around 4 percentage points in GDP per capita compared with the ten regions with the highest quality of government.[18]

    As our economies are increasingly buffeted by global turbulence, institutional backsliding therefore risks creating a vicious circle: repeated shocks can undermine economic convergence and further erode public confidence in the reform process.

    The best way for countries to sustain reform momentum is to recognise the importance of maintaining public support and, as far as possible, pair governance improvements with a focus on sectors where they have a clear competitive edge – and where deeper integration with the region can unlock significant and rapid growth opportunities.

    This way, the benefits of reforms will be felt more quickly and more widely.

    Ukraine is well positioned to put this into practice. Its IT sector is already relatively strong: IT services exports reached nearly USD 7 billion in 2023, making it one of the country’s leading export sectors despite the war.[19]

    Ukraine also produces around 130,000 STEM graduates each year – exceeding Germany and France[20] – and it ranks among the top five countries globally for certified IT professionals.[21] Successful IT clusters are active in several cities, and major foreign firms – including Apple, Microsoft, Boeing and Siemens – have established R&D operations in the country.

    A dynamic defence tech ecosystem is also taking shape[22], with Ukrainian start-ups attracting almost half a billion US dollars in funding in 2024 – surpassing many of their peers across central and eastern Europe.[23] Experience from countries like Israel suggests that such a foundation can enable the country to emerge as a broader technology hub in the years ahead.

    If Ukraine stays the course on institutional reform and continues to adapt its economy to new opportunities, despite the stormy environment, it can emerge as a vital engine of growth and a key contributor to the region’s future.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    Ukraine stands at a pivotal moment – facing the hardships of war, the challenge of reconstruction and the opportunity of deeper regional integration.

    In a world marked by shifting geopolitical realities, such integration offers a clear path to recovery and lasting prosperity.

    The recent history of regional integration shows not only its immense benefits, but also the importance of managing transitional risks through robust policy frameworks. It also underlines the need to sustain reform over time by ensuring that people feel its benefits.

    I am confident that Ukraine will be able to fully realise its economic potential, turning the upheaval of today into the foundation for a dynamic future.

    As Ivan Franko, one of Ukraine’s greatest poets, once wrote: “even though life is but a moment and made up of moments, we carry eternity in our souls.”

    This enduring spirit captures the resilience and potential of Ukraine’s people and its economy – a spirit that will continue to drive advancement and renewal in the years ahead.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Africa: United Arab Emirates (UAE) Undersecretary for Energy and Petroleum Affairs Joins African Energy Week (AEW) 2025

    Sharif Salim Al-Olama, Undersecretary for Energy and Petroleum Affairs at the Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has joined African Energy Week (AEW): Invest in African Energies to discuss collaborative opportunities in oil and gas. Taking place on September 29 to October 3 in Cape Town, the event is the premier platform for Africa’s energy industry. Al-Olama’s participation is expected to open new doors for multilateral deals and partnerships.  

    The UAE has emerged as Africa’s largest source of foreign direct investment, with investments from Emirati companies totaling $110 billion between 2019 and 2023. This reflects a broader trend by Emirati companies to expand their portfolios in Africa, with strengthened cooperation set to unlock a wealth of development opportunities for African nations. As African countries pursue new sources of finance to advance projects in oil, gas and logistics, UAE expertise and technology will prove invaluable. During AEW: Invest in African Energies 2025, Al-Olama is expected to share insights into opportunities for UAE-Africa collaboration.  

    AEW: Invest in African Energies is the platform of choice for project operators, financiers, technology providers and government, and has emerged as the official place to sign deals in African energy. Visit http://www.AECWeek.com for more information about this exciting event. 

    Looking to consolidate its position as a major player in Africa’s energy landscape, the UAE has strengthened ties with African nations in recent months. A deal signed with Morocco will see the UAE support the development of the Africa-Atlantic gas pipeline – transporting Nigerian gas to North Africa and then on to Europe. The UAE will help mobilize financing for the project through its Abu Dhabi sovereign wealth fund. As of May 2025, the feasibility and preliminary engineering studies for the pipeline were complete. Agreements have also been signed with Tanzania for the operation and modernization of port infrastructure while the UAE and Kenya signed a landmark comprehensive economic partnership agreement in 2025. The UAE also launched the UAE-Africa Gateway initiative in 2025, aimed at enhancing investment opportunities for Emirati companies in the sub-Saharan African region. The initiative seeks to mobilize private sector investment to advance African projects and strengthen UAE-Africa cooperation.  

    The UAE’s state-owned oil and gas companies are also expanding their presence in Africa. Notably, Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) is deepening its footprint across the continent, with strategic investments in exploration and infrastructure development. Recent milestones include ADNOC’s international arm XRG acquiring a 10% stake in Mozambique’s offshore Rovuma Basin Area 4 concession. The acquisition includes stakes in the operational Coral South FLNG project, the planned Coral North FLNG project and the Rovuma LNG projects. Collectively, these projects have a target production capacity of 25 million tons per annum. In Egypt, ADNOC partnered with energy major bp to establish Arcius Energy – a natural gas platform to unlock the country’s upstream potential. The platform aligns with ADNOC’s international expansion plans.  

    Beyond oil and gas, UAE-based companies have played an instrumental role in strengthening Africa’s trade and logistics sector. Companies such as DP World and Abu Dhabi Ports have expanded their presence across the continent. DP World operates six African ports while Abu Dhabi Ports have recently extended operations into Guinea, Egypt and Angola. In the clean energy space, Emirati companies are leading projects in solar, green hydrogen and power. Notably, Masdar has committed $2 billion to renewable energy projects in Africa through 2030, unlocking significant opportunities for African countries. AMEA Power is investing in a series of renewable energy projects across the continent, including $620 million in a 300MW wind project in Ethiopia; a 120 million solar project in South Africa; a 1GW green hydrogen development in Mauritania; two battery storage projects in South Africa; a 150 MW solar plant in Angola; among others. Currently, the company has more than 2.6 GW of clean energy projects either in operation of under construction in Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Egypt, Ivory Coast, Morocco, Togo and Tunisia.  

    “The UAE has emerged as a strong partner for African countries seeking to advance the development of their oil, gas, clean energy and infrastructure industries. By expanding their presence across the market, partnering with African firms and mobilizing capital for impactful projects, Emirati companies are playing a major role in supporting Africa’s economic growth,” states Verner Ayukegba, Senior Vice President, African Energy Chamber.  

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of African Energy Chamber.

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: CORRECTION: Africa Data Centres and Blue Turtle partner to accelerate South Africa’s digital infrastructure and cloud transformation

    Africa Data Centres (https://www.AfricaDataCentres.com), a business of Cassava Technologies, a pan-African technology group, has formed a commercial partnership with Blue Turtle, one of South Africa’s leading enterprise IT solutions providers, to deploy colocation services in the Cape Town and Midrand data centres. This agreement marks a significant step in expanding South Africa’s enterprise cloud and digital infrastructure ecosystem, enabling secure, scalable, and compliant colocation and private hosted cloud services for local enterprise customers.  

    The partnership enables Blue Turtle to deploy several racks, providing their enterprise clients with access to world-class, secure, and compliant colocation and private hosted cloud services. Additionally, this collaboration will also allow South African businesses the opportunity to rapidly embrace cloud computing, digital transformation, and data-driven operations in a scalable, compliant, and high-performance colocation environment.   

    “This partnership enables us to offer customers trusted colocation and private cloud solutions in two of South Africa’s most strategic data centre locations,” said Jan Hitge, Head of Managed Services at Blue Turtle. “As enterprise clients increasingly look for secure, scalable, and cost-efficient alternatives to on-premises infrastructure, we anticipate strong market uptake – a confidence reflected in the accelerated ramp-up timeline we’ve committed to.”  

    By providing high-availability colocation services backed by regulatory compliance, low-latency connectivity, and disaster recovery capabilities, the partnership is expected to support enterprises in modernising their IT environments, enhancing security posture, and meeting evolving data sovereignty requirements under laws such as South Africa’s Protection of Personal Information Act (POPIA).  

    “This agreement is about more than just filling racks; it’s about enabling digital transformation across the economy,” said Adil El Youssefi, CEO of Africa Data Centres. “Blue Turtle brings a strong client base and the ability to scale rapidly, making them an ideal partner in our mission to deliver secure, resilient, and sustainable digital infrastructure across South Africa. As demand for trusted infrastructure continues to climb, we will work towards this partnership evolving to support broader cloud initiatives, edge computing, and AI-ready infrastructure deployments.”  

    With commercial partners like Blue Turtle, Africa Data Centres continues to expand its footprint and impact across the continent, powering the next phase of enterprise transformation and solidifying South Africa’s status as a leading technology hub in Africa.  

    Africa Data Centres, which operates the continent’s largest interconnected, vendor- and cloud-neutral data centre platform, will benefit from Blue Turtle’s strong go-to-market capabilities and proven track record in delivering IT solutions to South Africa’s enterprise sector. 

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Africa Data Centres.

    Africa Data Centres:
    Africa Data Centres owns and operates Africa’s largest network of interconnected, carrier and cloud-neutral data centre facilities. Bringing international experts to the pan-African market, Africa Data Centres is a trusted partner for rapid and secure data centre services and interconnections across Africa. Strategically located in South, East and West Africa our world-class data centre facilities provide a home for all business-critical data for Africa’s small, medium and large enterprises and global hyperscale customers. https://www.AfricaDataCentres.com  

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Media reports of opaque funding of non-governmental organisations to promote EU climate policy (cont.) – E-002335/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002335/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Anna Bryłka (PfE)

    An article in the Welt am Sonntag (cited on 7 June 2025 in Euronews and Politico) reported allegations of certain ‘secret contracts’ between the Commission and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as ‘ClientEarth’ and ‘Friends of the Earth’[1].

    According to the article, the Commission provided up to EUR 700 000 to fund actions aimed at promoting EU climate policy, including engaging German coal power plants in legal disputes to increase their legal and financial risks. To fully clarify this issue and ensure public confidence in the Commission’s actions:

    • 1.Does the Commission plan to organise an audit or review of grant agreements with NGOs in order to ensure funding is transparent?
    • 2.What steps have been taken to investigate all allegations concerning claims that the Commission instructed NGOs to lobby for specific policies under the Green Deal?
    • 3.What additional measures does the Commission intend to introduce to increase the transparency of NGO funding and address public concerns regarding this matter?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    • [1] https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/plus256221718/geheime-vertraege-offengelegt-eu-kommission-bezahlte-aktivisten-fuer-klimalobbyismus.html?icid=search.product.onsitesearch.
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Media reports of opaque funding of non-governmental organisations to promote EU climate policy (cont.) – E-002335/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002335/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Anna Bryłka (PfE)

    An article in the Welt am Sonntag (cited on 7 June 2025 in Euronews and Politico) reported allegations of certain ‘secret contracts’ between the Commission and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as ‘ClientEarth’ and ‘Friends of the Earth’[1].

    According to the article, the Commission provided up to EUR 700 000 to fund actions aimed at promoting EU climate policy, including engaging German coal power plants in legal disputes to increase their legal and financial risks. To fully clarify this issue and ensure public confidence in the Commission’s actions:

    • 1.Does the Commission plan to organise an audit or review of grant agreements with NGOs in order to ensure funding is transparent?
    • 2.What steps have been taken to investigate all allegations concerning claims that the Commission instructed NGOs to lobby for specific policies under the Green Deal?
    • 3.What additional measures does the Commission intend to introduce to increase the transparency of NGO funding and address public concerns regarding this matter?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    • [1] https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/plus256221718/geheime-vertraege-offengelegt-eu-kommission-bezahlte-aktivisten-fuer-klimalobbyismus.html?icid=search.product.onsitesearch.
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Regulation on the taxation of tobacco products – E-002377/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002377/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Anna Bryłka (PfE)

    At a meeting of the Sub-Committee on Taxation (FISC) on 6 February 2025, the Commission’s main priorities for 2025 in the area of taxation were presented, including the objectives of the new excise directive, as its priorities in the area of tobacco taxation regulation.

    Poland is one of the largest manufacturers and exporters of tobacco products in the European Union. At the same time, the tobacco sector provides more than 30% of excise revenues for the state budget, while the shadow economy is at a historically low level of less than 5%. This is a huge achievement by the Polish authorities in the fight against the shadow economy, given that one in every five cigarettes smoked in Poland came from illegal sources in 2015, and is also the result of a sensible and balanced tax policy, including the introduction of a multi-year plan for excise duty increases.

    The approximation of the level of taxation and prices in the EU that underpins the excise directive has already failed and will only increase illegal trade and smuggling.

    • 1.Could the Commission please set out the economic and social impact of the revision of Directive 2011/64/EU on the structure and rates of excise duty applied to manufactured tobacco?
    • 2.Could the Commission please provide a timetable for the work on the proposed changes?
    • 3.Could the Commission state which Member States support the proposed changes?

    Submitted: 12.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Sanctioning of sham charities supporting Hamas – E-002378/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002378/2025
    to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
    Rule 144
    Pina Picierno (S&D)

    In October 2024, the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three individuals and one sham charity that are prominent financial supporters of Hamas but also active in Italy, Germany and Austria[1].

    On 10 June 2025, OFAC sanctioned another five people and five sham charities outside the US that stand accused of financing Hamas’s military wing under the guise of conducting humanitarian work both internationally and in Gaza. Some of them operate in the EU, specifically, in Italy and the Netherlands, and are run by people already subject to sanctions[2].

    Despite those measures, the charities continue to operate undisturbed in Europe, carrying out activities for a movement that the EU has designated a terrorist organisation.

    Taking into account that the US, an important Atlantic Alliance partner in efforts to tackle international terrorism and bring stability to the Middle East, has already sanctioned those charities, will the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy apply similar sanctions at EU level with a view to curbing terrorist activities in the Member States?

    Submitted: 12.6.2025

    • [1] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2632.
    • [2] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0162.
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Brussels endorses the CGT as a ‘trusted flagger’ on the Internet – E-002315/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002315/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Virginie Joron (PfE)

    The new EU Digital Services Act (DSA) now governs the moderation and removal of ‘illegal’ content online. Article 22 of the DSA requires online platforms to take the necessary technical and organisational measures to ensure that notices submitted by trusted flaggers are given priority. The Commission has recently confirmed that the CGT has been granted ‘trusted flagger’ status in France (5 March 2025)[1].

    However, the CGT is not recognised for its commitment to freedom of expression or to combating fraud, nor for its political neutrality.

    • 1.Can the Commission confirm that the biggest platforms (X, Meta, Youtube, etc.)[2] must address reports and requests for removal issued by the CGT as a priority, including in times of crisis?
    • 2.Is the fact of a country granting trusted flagger status to a political entity or trade union compatible with the spirit of the DSA?
    • 3.Has the CGT indeed received nearly EUR 10 million from the European Union since 2014[3]?

    Submitted: 10.6.2025

    • [1] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/trusted-flaggers-under-dsa
    • [2] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/list-designated-vlops-and-vloses
    • [3] https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/analysis.html A search of the Commission’s financial transparency register using the keyword ‘CGT’ reveals approximately EUR 10 million in European funding, of which EUR 9.14 million was reportedly paid to three organisations: 1) The CGT’s National Federation of Construction Workers (approximately half of the amount) 2) The CGT’s Confederation of Retired Workers and Trade Unionists 3) The CGT’s Federation of Metalworkers
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Brussels endorses the CGT as a ‘trusted flagger’ on the Internet – E-002315/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002315/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Virginie Joron (PfE)

    The new EU Digital Services Act (DSA) now governs the moderation and removal of ‘illegal’ content online. Article 22 of the DSA requires online platforms to take the necessary technical and organisational measures to ensure that notices submitted by trusted flaggers are given priority. The Commission has recently confirmed that the CGT has been granted ‘trusted flagger’ status in France (5 March 2025)[1].

    However, the CGT is not recognised for its commitment to freedom of expression or to combating fraud, nor for its political neutrality.

    • 1.Can the Commission confirm that the biggest platforms (X, Meta, Youtube, etc.)[2] must address reports and requests for removal issued by the CGT as a priority, including in times of crisis?
    • 2.Is the fact of a country granting trusted flagger status to a political entity or trade union compatible with the spirit of the DSA?
    • 3.Has the CGT indeed received nearly EUR 10 million from the European Union since 2014[3]?

    Submitted: 10.6.2025

    • [1] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/trusted-flaggers-under-dsa
    • [2] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/list-designated-vlops-and-vloses
    • [3] https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/analysis.html A search of the Commission’s financial transparency register using the keyword ‘CGT’ reveals approximately EUR 10 million in European funding, of which EUR 9.14 million was reportedly paid to three organisations: 1) The CGT’s National Federation of Construction Workers (approximately half of the amount) 2) The CGT’s Confederation of Retired Workers and Trade Unionists 3) The CGT’s Federation of Metalworkers
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Ireland’s schools and UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities – E-002363/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002363/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Kathleen Funchion (The Left)

    In the recent Commission staff working document, entitled ‘2025 Country Report – Ireland’, which accompanies the Commission communication entitled ‘Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the economic, social, employment, structural and budgetary policies of Ireland’ (COM(2025)0207), there is an acknowledgement that the segregated ‘special schools’ are not in line with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

    • 1.Could the Commission outline what supports, including financial supports, are available to Ireland to increase special classes within mainstream schools to cater for children with additional needs?
    • 2.What funding opportunities are there for targeted treatments within the school environment to assist with diagnoses, development and ongoing learning, such as speech and language therapy and additional resources teachers?
    • 3.What funding opportunities are there for other therapeutic treatments, play therapy counselling, nurture programme teachers and other related techniques?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Ireland’s schools and UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities – E-002363/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002363/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Kathleen Funchion (The Left)

    In the recent Commission staff working document, entitled ‘2025 Country Report – Ireland’, which accompanies the Commission communication entitled ‘Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the economic, social, employment, structural and budgetary policies of Ireland’ (COM(2025)0207), there is an acknowledgement that the segregated ‘special schools’ are not in line with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

    • 1.Could the Commission outline what supports, including financial supports, are available to Ireland to increase special classes within mainstream schools to cater for children with additional needs?
    • 2.What funding opportunities are there for targeted treatments within the school environment to assist with diagnoses, development and ongoing learning, such as speech and language therapy and additional resources teachers?
    • 3.What funding opportunities are there for other therapeutic treatments, play therapy counselling, nurture programme teachers and other related techniques?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: DLNR News Release – INCREASED FUNDING, UPDATED EQUIPMENT, ENHANCED MONITORING AND ENGAGED COMMUNITIES, June 18, 2025

    Source: US State of Hawaii

    DLNR News Release – INCREASED FUNDING, UPDATED EQUIPMENT, ENHANCED MONITORING AND ENGAGED COMMUNITIES, June 18, 2025

    Posted on Jun 18, 2025 in Latest Department News, Newsroom

     

    STATE OF HAWAIʻI

    KA MOKU ʻĀINA O HAWAIʻI

     

    JOSH GREEN, M.D.

    GOVERNOR

     

    DEPARTMENT OF LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES

    KA ‘OIHANA KUMUWAIWAI ‘ĀINA

     

    DAWN CHANG
    CHAIRPERSON

    INCREASED FUNDING, UPDATED EQUIPMENT, ENHANCED MONITORING AND ENGAGED COMMUNITIES

    Wildfire & Drought LOOKOUT! Campaign Highlights New Era of Wildfire and Drought Awareness

     

     

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

    June 18, 2025

     

    LĪHUʻE, Kaua‘i — At a news conference here today, state, county and nonprofit organizations involved in wildfire noted that since the devastating series of fires in August 2023, people are finally beginning to pay attention to the risk. They also emphasized that many parts of Hawai‘i continue to be impacted by prolonged drought conditions. Drought is already impacting an estimated 386,000 people across the state.

     

    During the 10th Wildfire & Drought LOOKOUT! campaign kickoff, Mike Walker, state protection forester with the DLNR Division of Forestry and Wildlife (DOFAW) commented, “When I started the job in 2017, DOFAW had a wildfire suppression budget of $600,000. One fire in California would use that amount in a matter of hours. By 2023, the division was able to get about $4 million for fire suppression.”

     

    It took fires on Maui and Hawai‘i Island, including the deadly Lahaina fire on August 8, 2023, to bring Hawai‘i’s overall lack of funding support for firefighting efforts, suppression and prevention costs into sharp focus. “So, unfortunately it does really take a tragedy for people to wake up and realize we have a problem and start to address it,” Walker added. DOFAW and its partners had long sought better support for wildland fire efforts.

     

    This year could see a repeat of severe wildland fire conditions due to increasing drought conditions, particularly now in the eastern part of the state.

     

    The U.S. Drought Monitor of June 12 shows extreme drought conditions on the north slopes of Mauna Kea, and a sliver of southeast Hawai‘i Island. The rest of the island is experiencing abnormally dry or moderate drought conditions.

     

    All of Maui Nui (Maui, Moloka‘i, Lāna‘i, Kahoolawe) is in moderate-to-severe drought. The south sides of O‘ahu and Kaua‘i and all of Ni‘ihau currently have abnormally dry conditions.

     

    Genki Kino, a forecaster in the Honolulu Office of the National Weather Service said,

    “We just had the second-driest wet season in the last 30 years. We’re already seeing vegetation dry out, turn brown and become more receptive to wildfire ignitions. Over the next few months, drier conditions will likely persist with drought conditions worsening across the entire state. We urge everyone to be aware of forecasts calling for windy and dry conditions that often lead to elevated fire danger.

    DLNR Chair Dawn Chang, who also co-leads the state drought council, echoed the concerns from a drought perspective. “This is early June, and we just saw a fire start on here on Kaua‘i last week, a larger one on Maui, just three days ago, and one on O‘ahu at Schofield Barracks. As drought conditions intensify, so too will the fire danger. The two go hand-in-hand and this is why, again this year, we continue to encourage water conservation measures, not only for firefighting purposes, but long-term for the preservation of fresh drinking water supplies.”

    The visibility of the Hawai‘i Wildfire Management Organization (HWMO), which co-leads the Wildfire & Drought LOOKOUT! initiative with DLNR, has risen tremendously and internationally since the 2023 fire events.

    Elizabeth Pickett, HWMO Co-Executive Directed commented, “We’ve been on the forefront of providing science-based information, education and outreach about wildfire for the past 25 years. Until 2023, we flew under the radar, but now many people are energized about protecting the homes and communities from wildfire.”

    For example, the national Firewise USA campaign, which HWMO administers, has grown exponentially from 14 communities across Hawai‘i to more than 30 in the application process or already approved. “Clearly people are beginning to understand the risks they, their families and their livelihoods face when wildfires are looming,” Pickett said.

    The amount of financial support from state and county governments, along with new firefighting apparatus and improved technology, is a long list. But, as Kaua‘i Fire Chief Mike Gibson noted, it takes years from the time you order a new truck or pumper for them to arrive.

    “Fire engines from the time we order them, take about four years before they’re delivered. Brush trucks help us the most because they’re four-wheel drive. Over the past four years, we’ve ordered six new ones. By the end of this summer, we expect to finally get our first three,” Gibson said.

    The 2025 Wildfire & Drought LOOKOUT! campaign includes radio, television and social media PSAs and written and visual resources to help people, agencies and the media develop messages they can use in their communities, with neighbors, or with mass audiences. Island-specific resources are listed in the attachment.

    “This effort has always been very collaborative, with more than 30 partners across the state involved. Sharing information and resources is a critical piece toward making Hawai‘i more fire safe and aware,” Pickett concluded.

    Similarly, Chang added, “The Hawai‘i Drought Council has dozens of stakeholders including government agencies, water suppliers, private industry and agricultural interests. We’re all in this together and the more we can work together doesn’t mean we can stop natural forces, but it does mean that we can try and not exacerbate the risks or outcomes because we lacked awareness and action.”

    # # #

    RESOURCES

    (All images/video courtesy: DLNR)

    HD video, interviews, and photographs:

    Island-specific resources and explanation attached

     

     

    HD video – Zoom recording of Wildfire & Drought LOOKOUT! news conference (June 18, 2025):https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/A9J7OD8ZWAYN078UTOMF6/Wildfire-and-Drought-News-Conf-Zoom.mp4?rlkey=umx1qe193atilp2bcl9ovrkls&st=6o2artdl&dl=0

     

    Links to clean HD video and photographs of the Wildfire & Drought LOOKOUT news conference will be distributed separately.

     

     

    Media Contact: 

    Dan Dennison

    Communications Director

    Hawaiʻi Dept. of Land and Natural Resources

    808-587-0396

    Email: Dlnr.comms@hawaii.gov

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Dangerous landslides in Gortynia – E-001461/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Cohesion Policy supports Greece with investments in road infrastructure through the sectoral programme ‘Transport’ and the regional programmes, provided they align with the programme’s priorities and the applicable regulatory framework.

    However, under the shared management and subsidiarity principles governing the Cohesion Policy Funds, project selection and implementation fall under the responsibility of the relevant national and regional managing authorities. According to the latest information provided by them, there is no provision for funding the project in question.

    In line with Article 73(2)(c) of the Common Provisions Regulation (CPR) 2021/1060[1], the Commission considers that a cost-benefit analysis is a useful tool to determine the best relationship between the amount of support, the activities undertaken and the achievement of objectives, and thus to prioritise investments for structural mobility and safety improvements.

    Especially for larger investments, cost-benefit analysis helps the competent national authorities to define the most appropriate scope of projects, their level of EU funding and the added value for the society. This added value can include economic impact and road safety.

    • [1] Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy.
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Establishment of a free zone on the EU’s eastern border in Maramureș County – E-002325/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002325/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Victor Negrescu (S&D)

    Romania, a Member State located on the EU’s eastern border, has the longest border with Ukraine of all the EU countries. The longest stretch of that border is situated in Maramureș County, which is an area of strategic importance for cross-border trade and regional cooperation. Romania has played a crucial role in providing humanitarian and logistical support in the context of Russia’s unprovoked and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine.

    The Maramureș local authorities, together with the signatory of this question, are exploring the possibility of establishing a free zone in Maramureș under EU customs legislation. This could help to diversify trade routes and with the economic recovery of Ukraine, provided it is implemented effectively and the appropriate support is provided.

    • 1.What conditions would have to be met for the Commission to approve such an area?
    • 2.What guidelines, best practices and technical assistance can be provided to ensure its compliance with EU legislation and the EU’s objectives in the region?
    • 3.What financial instruments and cross-border cooperation mechanisms can be mobilised for the development of the area?

    Submitted: 10.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Supporting children from vulnerable social groups in schools – E-001361/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Inclusion is at the core of the Erasmus+ programme which supports initiatives focused, inter alia, on educational support for children from vulnerable social groups.

    The programme funds cooperation projects that develop innovative practices to address inclusion challenges. Schools can benefit from small-scale partnerships designed for organisations with less experience in EU programmes. The European School Education Platform[1] further supports teachers with resources and tools for inclusive education.

    Erasmus + funds mobility activities for individuals including children from vulnerable groups. Additional financial support helps remove barriers to participation, covering up to 100% of additional costs to remove barriers linked to social, economic, or educational obstacles.

    The programme operates under both direct and indirect management. In the latter case, National Agencies are responsible for national implementation.

    This ensures that innovations in inclusion respond to community needs rather than top-down initiatives. Young pupils and adults who participate in mobility projects share experiences, creating opportunities for intergenerational exchange.

    By connecting participants from diverse backgrounds, Erasmus+ fosters inclusion, supports lifelong learning, and strengthens communities.

    The SALTO Resource Centres for Inclusion and Diversity in Education and Training[2] actively support education organisations. They work with National Agencies to enhance impact, offer guidance, and share best practices.

    They also conduct research on challenges faced by participants with fewer opportunities , supporting evidence-based policy and practice.

    • [1] https://school-education.ec.europa.eu/en.
    • [2] https://saltoinclusion.eu/.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI: Protocol AI Captures $16B AI Agent Market with Revolutionary Platform That Turns Anyone Into a Web3 Developer

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    DUBAI, United Arab Emirates, June 19, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Protocol AI unveils a paradigm-shifting platform that eliminates traditional barriers between innovative ideas and functional Web3 applications. The company’s autonomous AI agents, known as “pAgents,” enable users to create sophisticated decentralized applications, mini-games, and smart contracts simply by describing their vision in plain language.

    This breakthrough arrives as the on-chain AI agent sector experiences unprecedented growth, with market capitalization exploding 300% from $4.8 billion to nearly $16 billion in Q4 2024, according to CoinGecko’s annual report.

    From Concept to Creation in Minutes

    Traditional Web3 development demands extensive coding expertise and months of development time. Protocol AI shatters these constraints by deploying intelligent agents that autonomously handle complex development tasks – from smart contract generation to user interface design and multi-chain deployment.

    “Instead of spending months learning Solidity, creators can now focus entirely on their innovative concepts while our pAgents handle the technical execution,” explains the Protocol AI team.

    Comprehensive Development Ecosystem

    Protocol AI comprehensive ecosystem delivers four core innovations that revolutionize Web3 development:

    • Instant AI dApps Builder: Transform natural language into dApps in seconds with no coding required
    • Fully Compatible with EVM: Seamless integration and deployment on EVM blockchains like Ethereum, Base, BSC, and more
    • AI Owned by DAO: Communities decide how AI Agents are managed by $PROAI token holders, ensuring true decentralization
    • Proof of Value: Accelerate growth with AI dApps that ensure fair and transparent rewards for valuable contributions

    The platform supports natural language input in multiple languages, automatically translating user intentions into production-ready code across Ethereum, Binance Smart Chain, Polygon, and Solana networks. Protocol AI’s AI-driven development assistants perform contract generation, debugging, security auditing, and performance optimization autonomously, while a built-in decentralized marketplace enables immediate monetization through the native $PROAI token.

    Security remains paramount through partnerships with leading auditing firms Coinsult and Solidproof, ensuring all generated smart contracts meet rigorous safety standards. Additional collaborations with Web3Toolkit and Web3Payments provide comprehensive vulnerability testing.

    Massive Market Opportunity Meets Strategic Presale

    The convergence of AI advancement and Web3 adoption creates unprecedented opportunity. While blockchain technology promises revolutionary applications, development complexity has created significant bottlenecks. Current Web3 development sees recycling of existing talent rather than new protocol creation.

    Protocol AI addresses this gap precisely as institutional and retail interest in AI agents reaches historic highs, potentially unlocking innovation from millions of creators previously excluded by technical barriers.

    Protocol AI is conducting an exclusive presale of $PROAI tokens, offering early investors access before public availability. This strategic timing allows participants to enter the AI-Web3 convergence at foundational valuations while supporting infrastructure development that could reshape Web3 accessibility.

    Join the Protocol AI presale and secure exclusive early access to a fast-paced AI ecosystem

    Revenue Model and Growth Strategy

    The ecosystem generates value through marketplace transactions using $PROAI tokens, creating consistent utility demand. Developers earn through direct sales, subscription services, and royalty systems on their AI-generated applications. Enterprise licensing provides custom AI agent development for institutional clients.

    Platform optimization and developer onboarding continue through Q3 2025, with major blockchain partnerships expanding cross-chain capabilities in Q4. The company plans centralized exchange listings and institutional adoption initiatives throughout 2026, positioning for global scaling and advanced AI capabilities.

    Market Impact

    Protocol AI represents infrastructure for Web3’s next evolutionary phase. By removing technical barriers, the platform enables innovation from diverse backgrounds previously excluded from blockchain development. This democratization could accelerate blockchain adoption across industries and use cases not yet imagined.

    “Protocol AI doesn’t just simplify Web3 development – it reimagines who can be a Web3 developer,” the team concludes. “We’re building the bridge between human creativity and blockchain possibility.”

    Protocol AI’s launch positions early investors and developers at the forefront of a technological shift that could fundamentally reshape how Web3 protocols are conceived, created, and deployed globally.

    About Protocol AI

    Protocol AI operates a decentralized ecosystem of autonomous AI agents designed to democratize Web3 protocol development across DeFi, GameFi, SocialFi, and emerging blockchain applications.

    For more information Visit:

    Website: https://protocolai.finance

    Community: https://t.me/ProtocolAIAgent

    X: https://x.com/ProtocolAIAgent

    Documentation: https://docs.protocolai.finance

    Contact:
    Alex Jury,
    contact@protocolai.finance

    Disclaimer: This content is provided by Protocol AI. The statements, views, and opinions expressed in this content are solely those of the content provider and do not necessarily reflect the views of this media platform or its publisher. We do not endorse, verify, or guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or reliability of any information presented. We do not guarantee any claims, statements, or promises made in this article. This content is for informational purposes only and should not be considered financial, investment, or trading advice. Investing in crypto and mining-related opportunities involves significant risks, including the potential loss of capital. It is possible to lose all your capital. These products may not be suitable for everyone, and you should ensure that you understand the risks involved. Seek independent advice if necessary. Speculate only with funds that you can afford to lose. Readers are strongly encouraged to conduct their own research and consult with a qualified financial advisor before making any investment decisions. However, due to the inherently speculative nature of the blockchain sector—including cryptocurrency, NFTs, and mining—complete accuracy cannot always be guaranteed. Neither the media platform nor the publisher shall be held responsible for any fraudulent activities, misrepresentations, or financial losses arising from the content of this press release. In the event of any legal claims or charges against this article, we accept no liability or responsibility. Globenewswire does not endorse any content on this page.

    Legal Disclaimer: This media platform provides the content of this article on an “as-is” basis, without any warranties or representations of any kind, express or implied. We assume no responsibility for any inaccuracies, errors, or omissions. We do not assume any responsibility or liability for the accuracy, content, images, videos, licenses, completeness, legality, or reliability of the information presented herein. Any concerns, complaints, or copyright issues related to this article should be directed to the content provider mentioned above.

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/2b0c10e1-5c82-4c50-aa11-9dfb996ecb5f

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Protocol AI Captures $16B AI Agent Market with Revolutionary Platform That Turns Anyone Into a Web3 Developer

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    DUBAI, United Arab Emirates, June 19, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Protocol AI unveils a paradigm-shifting platform that eliminates traditional barriers between innovative ideas and functional Web3 applications. The company’s autonomous AI agents, known as “pAgents,” enable users to create sophisticated decentralized applications, mini-games, and smart contracts simply by describing their vision in plain language.

    This breakthrough arrives as the on-chain AI agent sector experiences unprecedented growth, with market capitalization exploding 300% from $4.8 billion to nearly $16 billion in Q4 2024, according to CoinGecko’s annual report.

    From Concept to Creation in Minutes

    Traditional Web3 development demands extensive coding expertise and months of development time. Protocol AI shatters these constraints by deploying intelligent agents that autonomously handle complex development tasks – from smart contract generation to user interface design and multi-chain deployment.

    “Instead of spending months learning Solidity, creators can now focus entirely on their innovative concepts while our pAgents handle the technical execution,” explains the Protocol AI team.

    Comprehensive Development Ecosystem

    Protocol AI comprehensive ecosystem delivers four core innovations that revolutionize Web3 development:

    • Instant AI dApps Builder: Transform natural language into dApps in seconds with no coding required
    • Fully Compatible with EVM: Seamless integration and deployment on EVM blockchains like Ethereum, Base, BSC, and more
    • AI Owned by DAO: Communities decide how AI Agents are managed by $PROAI token holders, ensuring true decentralization
    • Proof of Value: Accelerate growth with AI dApps that ensure fair and transparent rewards for valuable contributions

    The platform supports natural language input in multiple languages, automatically translating user intentions into production-ready code across Ethereum, Binance Smart Chain, Polygon, and Solana networks. Protocol AI’s AI-driven development assistants perform contract generation, debugging, security auditing, and performance optimization autonomously, while a built-in decentralized marketplace enables immediate monetization through the native $PROAI token.

    Security remains paramount through partnerships with leading auditing firms Coinsult and Solidproof, ensuring all generated smart contracts meet rigorous safety standards. Additional collaborations with Web3Toolkit and Web3Payments provide comprehensive vulnerability testing.

    Massive Market Opportunity Meets Strategic Presale

    The convergence of AI advancement and Web3 adoption creates unprecedented opportunity. While blockchain technology promises revolutionary applications, development complexity has created significant bottlenecks. Current Web3 development sees recycling of existing talent rather than new protocol creation.

    Protocol AI addresses this gap precisely as institutional and retail interest in AI agents reaches historic highs, potentially unlocking innovation from millions of creators previously excluded by technical barriers.

    Protocol AI is conducting an exclusive presale of $PROAI tokens, offering early investors access before public availability. This strategic timing allows participants to enter the AI-Web3 convergence at foundational valuations while supporting infrastructure development that could reshape Web3 accessibility.

    Join the Protocol AI presale and secure exclusive early access to a fast-paced AI ecosystem

    Revenue Model and Growth Strategy

    The ecosystem generates value through marketplace transactions using $PROAI tokens, creating consistent utility demand. Developers earn through direct sales, subscription services, and royalty systems on their AI-generated applications. Enterprise licensing provides custom AI agent development for institutional clients.

    Platform optimization and developer onboarding continue through Q3 2025, with major blockchain partnerships expanding cross-chain capabilities in Q4. The company plans centralized exchange listings and institutional adoption initiatives throughout 2026, positioning for global scaling and advanced AI capabilities.

    Market Impact

    Protocol AI represents infrastructure for Web3’s next evolutionary phase. By removing technical barriers, the platform enables innovation from diverse backgrounds previously excluded from blockchain development. This democratization could accelerate blockchain adoption across industries and use cases not yet imagined.

    “Protocol AI doesn’t just simplify Web3 development – it reimagines who can be a Web3 developer,” the team concludes. “We’re building the bridge between human creativity and blockchain possibility.”

    Protocol AI’s launch positions early investors and developers at the forefront of a technological shift that could fundamentally reshape how Web3 protocols are conceived, created, and deployed globally.

    About Protocol AI

    Protocol AI operates a decentralized ecosystem of autonomous AI agents designed to democratize Web3 protocol development across DeFi, GameFi, SocialFi, and emerging blockchain applications.

    For more information Visit:

    Website: https://protocolai.finance

    Community: https://t.me/ProtocolAIAgent

    X: https://x.com/ProtocolAIAgent

    Documentation: https://docs.protocolai.finance

    Contact:
    Alex Jury,
    contact@protocolai.finance

    Disclaimer: This content is provided by Protocol AI. The statements, views, and opinions expressed in this content are solely those of the content provider and do not necessarily reflect the views of this media platform or its publisher. We do not endorse, verify, or guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or reliability of any information presented. We do not guarantee any claims, statements, or promises made in this article. This content is for informational purposes only and should not be considered financial, investment, or trading advice. Investing in crypto and mining-related opportunities involves significant risks, including the potential loss of capital. It is possible to lose all your capital. These products may not be suitable for everyone, and you should ensure that you understand the risks involved. Seek independent advice if necessary. Speculate only with funds that you can afford to lose. Readers are strongly encouraged to conduct their own research and consult with a qualified financial advisor before making any investment decisions. However, due to the inherently speculative nature of the blockchain sector—including cryptocurrency, NFTs, and mining—complete accuracy cannot always be guaranteed. Neither the media platform nor the publisher shall be held responsible for any fraudulent activities, misrepresentations, or financial losses arising from the content of this press release. In the event of any legal claims or charges against this article, we accept no liability or responsibility. Globenewswire does not endorse any content on this page.

    Legal Disclaimer: This media platform provides the content of this article on an “as-is” basis, without any warranties or representations of any kind, express or implied. We assume no responsibility for any inaccuracies, errors, or omissions. We do not assume any responsibility or liability for the accuracy, content, images, videos, licenses, completeness, legality, or reliability of the information presented herein. Any concerns, complaints, or copyright issues related to this article should be directed to the content provider mentioned above.

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/2b0c10e1-5c82-4c50-aa11-9dfb996ecb5f

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Dangerous plans promoting carcinogenic waste incineration in Western Macedonia – E-002352/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002352/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Kostas Papadakis (NI)

    The plans put forward by the Government and monopoly groups with regard to carcinogenic waste incineration are causing intense concern among the people of Western Macedonia. The announcements of PPC S.A. – in the presence of the Prime Minister – regarding its intention to build a waste ‘energy recovery’ unit in the lignite yard of the Ptolemaida 5 lignite power plant which will receive 288 000 tonnes of rubbish from all over Western and Central Macedonia as well as from Thessaly, Epirus and Corfu, are a case in point.

    The New Democracy Government and PPC S.A. are engaged in a sordid propaganda campaign for the unit that will purportedly use anti-pollution technology and be environmentally friendly, advertising corresponding plants in Sweden and Denmark, which however have been the subject of specific complaints. For example, Denmark’s Society of Engineers has complained about CopenHill in Copenhagen in relation to water contamination in the adjacent port and the uncontrolled import of waste for incineration from non-EU countries.

    In view of the above:

    • 1.What is the Commission’s position on the urgent request of residents and bodies of Ptolemaida – and of Western Macedonia as a whole – to stop all plans to promote carcinogenic waste incineration immediately?
    • 2.What is the Commission’s position on the fact that the ‘green’ strategy and energy plans within the framework of the so-called circular economy and delignitisation are demonstrably very seriously affecting the health, life and rights of the people, as well as the environment itself, and are sacrificing them on the altar of the profitability of business groups?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    Last updated: 19 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Addressing the dangerous spread of non-native marine species in the South-Eastern Mediterranean – E-002328/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002328/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Fredis Beleris (PPE)

    Fisheries management under the common fisheries policy (CFP) is based on the need to ensure environmentally sustainable exploitation of marine biological resources and the long-term viability of the fisheries sector. Unfortunately, specific fish species that have invaded the South-Eastern Mediterranean – in particular the Aegean Sea – are now a particular problem and have become a threat. The impacts of these invasive non-native species affect both biodiversity and fishers. Firstly, their increase in numbers is problematic as they compete with native Mediterranean species, with the reduction of available food and space presenting a key challenge. Secondly, they either cause damage to fishing equipment or to catches, and at the same time, these species have no significant commercial value because they are unfamiliar to the majority of consumers and as a result there is very little demand for them.

    In view of the above, the Commission is asked:

    • 1.Will it take measures to reinforce scientific research and systematic monitoring of the spread of non-native species?
    • 2.Does it intend to strengthen actions to inform and raise awareness among fishers, consumers and the general public about the risks and commercial possibilities associated with these species?
    • 3.Does it intend to finance the inclusion of specific measures to limit these populations, with financial incentives for fishers, through the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    Last updated: 19 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Human rights situation in the Philippines and EU-Philippines free trade agreement negotiations – E-001506/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU remains concerned about the human rights situation in the Philippines. The European External Action Service and the Commission raise these concerns regularly, both bilaterally and when engaging in multilateral fora such as the United Nations Human Rights Council.

    Human rights issues are an integral part of the EU’s relations with the Philippines, as set out in the partnership and cooperation agreement (PCA)[1] and are discussed in detail during the annual meetings of the EU-Philippines Subcommittee on Good Governance, the Rule of Law and Human Rights and in the GSP+ monitoring under the Generalised Scheme of Preferences[2] (GSP) .

    T he Commission finances programmes that strengthen the rule of law by improving access to justice, supporting judicial reforms and enhancing accountability and human rights protection across the country.

    The Commission engages with, and welcomes input from, all civil society, including human rights organisations.   The EU text proposals[3] include a chapter on trade and sustainable development (TSD), in line with the 2022 Commission TSD communication[4], proposing more participation and support for civil society and a stronger focus on implementation and enforcement and cover human rights through the proposed provisions on labour standards and gender equality.  

    The EU has proposed human rights as an essential element of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) by linking to the relevant provisions of the PCA.

    In 2022, the Commission published a Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA)[5], which includes a dedicated section with a human rights impact assessment, and all elements in the SIA are taken into consideration in the text proposals and during the ongoing FTA negotiation.

    • [1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents/treaties-agreements/agreement/?id=2011002&DocLanguage=en.
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2012/978/2023-11-28.
    • [3] https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/09242a36-a438-40fd-a7af-fe32e36cbd0e/library/ad546f8a-b5ba-4a51-ba60-88993dc42d18?p=1.
    • [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022DC0409&qid=1656586727707.
    • [5] https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/09242a36-a438-40fd-a7af-fe32e36cbd0e/library/7ce196ff-3fba-487e-a6ce-1f72e04e40d0/details?download=true.
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Apollo Vredestein workers fall victim to inadequate State aid rules – P-001790/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    1. In 2014, the Commission approved aid to Apollo Tyres on the basis of state aid rules applicable at the time. In 2020, the Commission approved state aid schemes related to COVID-19 measures, based on which Hungary granted aid to Apollo Tyres to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy and to partially compensate the company for losses suffered because of the lockdown measures introduced by the Hungarian government. The Commission does not have any indication that either the 2014 aid measure or the 2020 schemes were not implemented in line with those decisions.

    2. Current state aid rules, where relevant, already include strict anti-relocation safeguards. The Commission does not consider that there is a need to review those provisions. They ensure that state aid cannot be used in a way that would encourage or facilitate the relocation of services or production to another Member State.

    3. The European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers (EGF) can be used to support affected workers by funding reintegration pathways, training, and guidance. The ESF+ already supports Twente as one of the 35 Dutch Labour Market Regions. The Netherlands can also apply for one-off re-active assistance from EGF when redundancies cannot be avoided to finance labour market policy measures. More generally, the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) contributes to enhancing competitiveness of the East Netherlands regional economy through smart and green innovation, including for energy transition and circularity, transition to clean industries, skills for the green transition and access to employment in clean and resource-efficient technologies.

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: How Moscow Saves Money Through Construction Project Expertise

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

    The cost of construction projects in the capital, according to the results of state examination, decreased by 13.5 percent in the first five months of 2025. This was reported at the XXVIII St. Petersburg International Economic Forum by the Deputy Mayor of Moscow for Urban Development Policy and Construction Vladimir Efimov.

    “Thanks to the state examination, the initially declared cost of construction projects financed from the city budget decreased by a total of 13.5 percent in January-May of this year. Thus, in five months the capital saved 24.5 billion rubles. This is almost 30 percent more than the figures for the same period last year,” said Vladimir Efimov.

    The main task of state expertise is to ensure compliance with state safety standards and other norms in construction projects. Specialists also analyze cost estimates and price indicators to eliminate irrational spending of budget funds.

    “Experts check the compliance of the declared types and volumes of work, material resources, and also compare the data presented in the estimate with the estimate and regulatory base of the city of Moscow. If the project meets all the requirements, it receives a positive conclusion. Thus, since the beginning of the year, more than 500 sets of design and estimate documentation have successfully passed the state examination,” noted the Chairman of the Moscow City Committee for Pricing Policy in Construction and State Expertise of Projects (Moskomexpertiza)

    Ivan Shcherbakov.

    The funds optimized as part of the examination can be redistributed between other urban development projects, for example, directed towards the repair and construction of social, educational, sports institutions and much more.

    Get the latest news quicklyofficial telegram channel the city of Moscow.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    https: //vv.mos.ru/nevs/ite/155486073/

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Christopher Hui attends SH seminar

    Source: Hong Kong Information Services

    Secretary for Financial Services & the Treasury Christopher Hui today attended a seminar in Shanghai discussing the collaborative development of the Shanghai and Hong Kong international financial centres.

    A 2025 Lujiazui Forum event, the seminar featured a research report, “Synergistic Development of Shanghai & Hong Kong as International Financial Centres in the New Era”, jointly released by the Hong Kong Financial Services Development Council and the Shanghai Research Center for Financial Stability & Development.

    Addressing the seminar, Mr Hui highlighted that Hong Kong and Shanghai are unlocking many more new opportunities for collaborative development, with their positions as the country’s “dual engine” financial centres, providing strong support for the country’s “dual circulation” strategy.

    On Wednesday, the treasury chief attended the Lujiazui Forum opening ceremony and plenary session.

    Speaking at the fourth plenary session titled “Deepening the Cooperation between Shanghai & Hong Kong as International Financial Centers”, Mr Hui said the mutual-market access between financial markets on the Mainland and Hong Kong has been expanding in scope and capacity.

    The programmes enhance not only the product offering for domestic and foreign investors but also the attraction for more capital influx into the capital markets of the two places, promoting long-term development of the markets.

    “In future, we anticipate closer collaboration with Shanghai in areas such as financial innovation and green finance to achieve synergy effects.”

    On Monday morning, Mr Hui signed the Action Plan for Collaborative Development of Shanghai & Hong Kong International Financial Centres, on behalf of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, with Shanghai.

    The action plan covers various measures to promote collaborative development, including supporting Mainland banks and financial institutions headquartered in Shanghai to set up regional headquarters in Hong Kong, and pressing ahead with the linkage of the Faster Payment System in Hong Kong with the Internet Banking Payment System on the Mainland.

    During his two-day trip to Shanghai, Mr Hui also visited the Shanghai Gold Exchange, the Shanghai Clearing House and the Shanghai Futures Exchange, and met Bank of China (Hong Kong) Deputy Chief Executive Wang Huabin and Bank of Communications President Zhang Baojiang.

    During these engagements, discussioins were held to explore the opportunities and models for co-operation.

    Mr Hui returned to Hong Kong this afternoon.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Governor Signe Krogstrup: Climate Risks and Financial Stability – Staying the Course Amid Uncertainty

    Source: Danmarks Nationalbank

    Pressing global challenges and high uncertainty rightly command our attention in the current juncture, but they also threaten to overshadow issues such as climate change. Meanwhile, physical risks of climate change are becoming more evident, and the global transition remains too slow.

    Governor Krogstrup commented: “Rather than looking away, the many concurrent challenges should reinforce our commitment to addressing these in a risk-based, prioritized manner.”

    Scenario analysis is a cornerstone of climate risk assessment. While climate policy is a government responsibility, climate-related risks fall squarely within the mandates of central banks. At Danmarks Nationalbank, climate work is integrated into scenario analysis and data collection. Nationalbanken has developed scenarios and collaborated with the Danish Research Institute for Economic Analysis and Modelling (DREAM) to understand how the green transition may impact the Danish economy and banks.

    Governor Krogstrup concluded by calling for collaboration: “The risks arising from climate change are global and multidisciplinary. Learning from each other and collaborating is not only useful — it is necessary.”

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Governor Signe Krogstrup: Climate Risks and Financial Stability – Staying the Course Amid Uncertainty

    Source: Danmarks Nationalbank

    Pressing global challenges and high uncertainty rightly command our attention in the current juncture, but they also threaten to overshadow issues such as climate change. Meanwhile, physical risks of climate change are becoming more evident, and the global transition remains too slow.

    Governor Krogstrup commented: “Rather than looking away, the many concurrent challenges should reinforce our commitment to addressing these in a risk-based, prioritized manner.”

    Scenario analysis is a cornerstone of climate risk assessment. While climate policy is a government responsibility, climate-related risks fall squarely within the mandates of central banks. At Danmarks Nationalbank, climate work is integrated into scenario analysis and data collection. Nationalbanken has developed scenarios and collaborated with the Danish Research Institute for Economic Analysis and Modelling (DREAM) to understand how the green transition may impact the Danish economy and banks.

    Governor Krogstrup concluded by calling for collaboration: “The risks arising from climate change are global and multidisciplinary. Learning from each other and collaborating is not only useful — it is necessary.”

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Minutes – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg – Final edition

    Source: European Parliament

    PV-10-2025-06-18

    EN

    EN

    iPlPv_Sit

    Minutes
    Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

     Abbreviations and symbols

    + adopted
    rejected
    lapsed
    W withdrawn
    RCV roll-call votes
    EV electronic vote
    SEC secret ballot
    split split vote
    sep separate vote
    am amendment
    CA compromise amendment
    CP corresponding part
    D deleting amendment
    = identical amendments
    § paragraph

    EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

    2025 – 2026 SESSION

    Sittings of 16 to 19 June 2025

    STRASBOURG

    MINUTES

    WEDNESDAY 18 JUNE 2025

    IN THE CHAIR: Roberta METSOLA
    President

    1. Opening of the sitting

    The sitting opened at 09:02.



    2. Negotiations ahead of Parliament’s first reading (Rule 72) (action taken)

    The decision of the LIBE Committee to enter into interinstitutional negotiations had been announced on 16 June 2025 (minutes of 16.6.2025, item 12).

    As no request for a vote pursuant to Rule 72(2) had been made, the committee responsible had been able to enter into negotiations upon expiry of the deadline.



    3. Upcoming NATO summit on 24-26 June 2025 (debate)

    Commission statement: Upcoming NATO summit on 24-26 June 2025 (2025/2748(RSP))

    The President provided some clarifications on the arrangements for the conduct of the debate, for which a test format was to be used.

    Kaja Kallas (Vice President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) made the statement.

    The following spoke: Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, on behalf of the PPE Group, Yannis Maniatis, on behalf of the S&D Group, Harald Vilimsky, on behalf of the PfE Group, Alexandr Vondra, on behalf of the ECR Group, Valérie Hayer, on behalf of the Renew Group, Bas Eickhout, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Marc Botenga, on behalf of The Left Group, René Aust, on behalf of the ESN Group, Michael Gahler, Sven Mikser, Jean-Paul Garraud, Adam Bielan, Dan Barna, Mārtiņš Staķis, Özlem Demirel, Milan Uhrík, Ruth Firmenich, Ingeborg Ter Laak and Eero Heinäluoma.

    IN THE CHAIR: Sabine VERHEYEN
    Vice-President

    The following spoke: Anna Bryłka, Rasa Juknevičienė, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Petras Auštrevičius, Sebastião Bugalho, Hannah Neumann, Merja Kyllönen, Pekka Toveri, Elio Di Rupo, Roberto Vannacci, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Wouter Beke, Dan Nica, Hans Neuhoff, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Branislav Ondruš, who also answered a blue-card question from Maria Grapini, Riho Terras, Tobias Cremer, Jaak Madison, Markéta Gregorová, Michał Szczerba, Marina Mesure, Sarah Knafo, Ondřej Dostál, Angelika Niebler, who also declined to take a blue-card question from Özlem Demirel, Tonino Picula, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Stephen Nikola Bartulica, Massimiliano Salini, Evin Incir, Lucia Yar, Mika Aaltola, Giorgos Georgiou, Davor Ivo Stier, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Georgiana Teodorescu, Reinier Van Lanschot, Željana Zovko, Rihards Kols, Irene Montero, Eszter Lakos, Petar Volgin and Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez.

    IN THE CHAIR: Javi LÓPEZ
    Vice-President

    The following spoke: José Cepeda, Petra Steger, who also declined to take a blue-card question from Marta Wcisło, Jüri Ratas, Loucas Fourlas, Niels Fuglsang, Engin Eroglu, Miriam Lexmann, Kathleen Funchion, Ana Miguel Pedro, who also answered a blue-card question from João Oliveira, Francisco Assis, Matej Tonin, Johan Van Overtveldt, Anders Vistisen, Marta Wcisło, Ville Niinistö, Sandra Kalniete and Danilo Della Valle.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Hélder Sousa Silva, Maria Grapini, João Oliveira, Petras Gražulis, Lukas Sieper, Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis, Lefteris Nikolaou-Alavanos and Juan Fernando López Aguilar.

    The following spoke: Kaja Kallas.

    The debate closed.

    (The sitting was suspended at 11:43.)



    IN THE CHAIR: Roberta METSOLA
    President

    4. Resumption of the sitting

    The sitting resumed at 12:00.



    5. Voting time

    For detailed results of the votes, see also ‘Results of votes’ and ‘Results of roll-call votes’.



    5.1. Macro-financial assistance to Egypt ***I (vote)

    Report on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt [COM(2024)0461 – C10-0009/2024 – 2024/0071(COD)] – Committee on International Trade. Rapporteur: Céline Imart (A10-0037/2025)

    An initial vote had been held on 1 April 2025 and the matter had been referred back to the committee responsible for interinstitutional negotiations under Rule 60(4) (minutes of 1.4.2025, item 6.11).

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    REQUEST FROM THE LEFT GROUP TO PROCEED WITH A VOTE ON THE AMENDMENTS (Rule 60(3))

    Rejected

    PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT

    Adopted (P10_TA(2025)125)

    Parliament’s first reading thus closed.

    Detailed voting results



    5.2. Adoption by the Union of the Agreement on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty ***I (vote)

    Report on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adoption by the Union of the Agreement on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty between the European Union, the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States [COM(2024)0257 – C10-0058/2024 – 2024/0148(COD)] – Committee on International Trade – Committee on Industry, Research and Energy. Rapporteurs: Anna Cavazzini and Borys Budka (A10-0009/2025)

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    COMMISSION PROPOSAL and AMENDMENTS

    Approved (P10_TA(2025)126)

    Parliament’s first reading thus closed.

    Detailed voting results

    2

    The following had spoken:

    Anna Cavazzini (rapporteur), before the vote, to make a statement on the basis of Rule 165(4).



    5.3. EU/Euratom Agreement on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty: adoption by Euratom * (vote)

    Report on the Proposal for a Council decision on the adoption by the European Atomic Energy Community of the Agreement on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty between the European Union, the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States [COM(2024)0256 – C10-0092/2024 – 2024/0146(NLE)] – Committee on Industry, Research and Energy. Rapporteur: Borys Budka (A10-0008/2025)

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    COMMISSION PROPOSAL TO THE COUNCIL

    Approved by single vote (P10_TA(2025)127)

    Detailed voting results



    5.4. Implementation report on the Recovery and Resilience Facility (vote)

    Report on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility [2024/2085(INI)] – Committee on Budgets – Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. Rapporteurs: Victor Negrescu and Siegfried Mureşan (A10-0098/2025)

    The debate had taken place on 17 June 2025 (minutes of 17.6.2025, item 10).

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

    Adopted (P10_TA(2025)128)

    Detailed voting results



    5.5. The Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law report (vote)

    Report on The Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law report [2024/2078(INI)] – Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. Rapporteur: Ana Catarina Mendes (A10-0100/2025)

    The debate had taken place on 17 June 2025 (minutes of 17.6.2025, item 11).

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

    Adopted (P10_TA(2025)129)

    Detailed voting results



    5.6. 2023 and 2024 reports on Montenegro (vote)

    Report on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Montenegro [2025/2020(INI)] – Committee on Foreign Affairs. Rapporteur: Marjan Šarec (A10-0093/2025)

    The debate had taken place on 17 June 2025 (minutes of 17.6.2025, item 12).

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

    Adopted (P10_TA(2025)130)

    Detailed voting results



    5.7. 2023 and 2024 reports on Moldova (vote)

    Report on 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Moldova [2025/2025(INI)] – Committee on Foreign Affairs. Rapporteur: Sven Mikser (A10-0096/2025)

    The debate had taken place on 17 June 2025 (minutes of 17.6.2025, item 13).

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

    Adopted (P10_TA(2025)131)

    Detailed voting results

    7

    (The sitting was suspended for a few moments.)



    IN THE CHAIR: Christel SCHALDEMOSE
    Vice-President

    6. Resumption of the sitting

    The sitting resumed at 12:35.



    7. Approval of the minutes of the previous sitting

    The minutes of the previous sitting were approved.



    8. Stopping the genocide in Gaza: time for EU sanctions (topical debate)

    The following spoke: Manon Aubry to open the debate proposed by the The Left Group.

    The following spoke: Kaja Kallas (Vice President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy).

    The following spoke: Hildegard Bentele, on behalf of the PPE Group, Nacho Sánchez Amor, on behalf of the S&D Group, Juan Carlos Girauta Vidal, on behalf of the PfE Group (the President noted that some comments needed to be checked), Sebastian Tynkkynen, on behalf of the ECR Group, Hilde Vautmans, on behalf of the Renew Group, Tineke Strik, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Hanna Gedin, on behalf of The Left Group, Marc Jongen, on behalf of the ESN Group, Seán Kelly, Evin Incir, Beatrice Timgren, Barry Andrews, Jaume Asens Llodrà, Nikos Pappas, Kateřina Konečná, Matjaž Nemec, Christophe Bay, Kristoffer Storm, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Ana Miranda Paz, Isabel Serra Sánchez, Ruth Firmenich, Francisco Assis, Abir Al-Sahlani, Ignazio Roberto Marino, Per Clausen, Cecilia Strada, Irena Joveva, Ville Niinistö, Özlem Demirel, Alex Agius Saliba, Lucia Yar, Giorgos Georgiou, Elio Di Rupo, Billy Kelleher, Estrella Galán, Ciaran Mullooly, Mimmo Lucano, Pernando Barrena Arza and Jussi Saramo (once the checks had been carried out, the President provided some clarifications).

    The following spoke: Kaja Kallas.

    The debate closed.



    9. Freedom of assembly in Hungary and the need for the Commission to act (debate)

    Commission statement: Freedom of assembly in Hungary and the need for the Commission to act (2025/2758(RSP))

    Michael McGrath (Member of the Commission) made the statement.

    The following spoke: Tomas Tobé, on behalf of the PPE Group, Iratxe García Pérez, on behalf of the S&D Group, Kinga Gál, on behalf of the PfE Group, Paolo Inselvini, on behalf of the ECR Group, Fabienne Keller, on behalf of the Renew Group, Terry Reintke, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Konstantinos Arvanitis, on behalf of The Left Group, Zsuzsanna Borvendég, on behalf of the ESN Group, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Klára Dobrev, Harald Vilimsky, who also declined to take a blue-card question from Nicolae Ştefănuță, Nicolas Bay, who also answered a blue-card question from Mélissa Camara, Dainius Žalimas, who also answered a blue-card question from Lukas Sieper, Tineke Strik, Ilaria Salis, who also declined to take a blue-card question, Christine Anderson, who also declined to take a blue-card question, Judita Laššáková, Maria Walsh, Ana Catarina Mendes and Hermann Tertsch.

    IN THE CHAIR: Martin HOJSÍK
    Vice-President

    The following spoke: Arkadiusz Mularczyk, who also answered a blue-card question from Lukas Sieper, Moritz Körner, Mélissa Camara, who also answered a blue-card question from Jacek Ozdoba, Carolina Morace, Milan Mazurek, Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă, Arba Kokalari, Marc Angel, Paolo Borchia, Jacek Ozdoba, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Daniel Freund (the President reminded him of the rules on conduct), Li Andersson, Tomasz Froelich, Lukas Sieper, Mirosława Nykiel, Alessandro Zan, Jorge Buxadé Villalba, Tobiasz Bocheński, who also answered a blue-card question from Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Kim Van Sparrentak, Lena Düpont, Krzysztof Śmiszek, András László, who also answered a blue-card question from Michał Wawrykiewicz, Rasmus Nordqvist, who also answered a blue-card question from Tomasz Froelich, Evin Incir, Juan Fernando López Aguilar and Chloé Ridel.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Sebastian Tynkkynen and Alexander Jungbluth.

    The following spoke: Michael McGrath.

    The debate closed.



    10. Safeguarding the rule of law in Spain, ensuring an independent and autonomous prosecutor’s office to fight crime and corruption (debate)

    Commission statement: Safeguarding the rule of law in Spain, ensuring an independent and autonomous prosecutor’s office to fight crime and corruption (2025/2759(RSP))

    Michael McGrath (Member of the Commission) made the statement.

    The following spoke: Tomas Tobé, on behalf of the PPE Group, Javier Moreno Sánchez, on behalf of the S&D Group, Jorge Buxadé Villalba, on behalf of the PfE Group, Diego Solier, on behalf of the ECR Group, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, on behalf of the Renew Group, Diana Riba i Giner, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Isabel Serra Sánchez, on behalf of The Left Group, Dolors Montserrat, Evelyn Regner, who also declined to take a blue-card question from Enikő Győri, Hermann Tertsch, Nora Junco García, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Jaume Asens Llodrà, Lena Düpont, Francisco Assis, Petra Steger, Siegfried Mureşan, who also answered a blue-card question from Maria Grapini, and Sandro Ruotolo.

    IN THE CHAIR: Younous OMARJEE
    Vice-President

    The following spoke: Enikő Győri, who also answered a blue-card question from Gabriella Gerzsenyi, Michał Wawrykiewicz, who also answered a blue-card question from Nicolás González Casares, Evin Incir, who also declined to take a blue-card question from François-Xavier Bellamy, Csaba Dömötör, Sebastião Bugalho, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, who also declined to take a blue-card question from François-Xavier Bellamy, Fabrice Leggeri, François-Xavier Bellamy to raise a point of order (the President cut off the speaker as his remarks did not constitute a point of order), Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Juan Carlos Girauta Vidal, who also accepted a blue-card question from François-Xavier Bellamy (the President cut him off and made some clarifications on the blue-card procedure), David Casa, Ana Miguel Pedro, Dirk Gotink, Andrey Kovatchev and Javier Zarzalejos.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: José Cepeda, András László, Sebastian Tynkkynen and Lukas Sieper.

    The following spoke: Michael McGrath.

    The debate closed.



    11. Clean Industrial Deal (debate)

    Question for oral answer O-000020/2025 by Tom Berendsen, on behalf of the ITRE Committee to the Commission: Clean Industrial Deal (B10-0006/2025) (2025/2656(RSP))

    Tom Berendsen moved the question.

    Stéphane Séjourné (Executive Vice-President of the Commission) answered the question.

    The following spoke: Angelika Winzig, on behalf of the PPE Group, Nicolás González Casares, on behalf of the S&D Group, Paolo Borchia, on behalf of the PfE Group, Daniel Obajtek, on behalf of the ECR Group, Christophe Grudler, on behalf of the Renew Group, Sara Matthieu, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Per Clausen, on behalf of The Left Group, and Anja Arndt, on behalf of the ESN Group.

    The following spoke: Stéphane Séjourné.

    Motions for resolutions tabled under Rule 142(5) to wind up the debate: minutes of 19.6.2025, item I.

    The debate closed.

    Vote: 19 June 2025.



    12. Electricity grids: the backbone of the EU energy system (debate)

    Report on electricity grids: the backbone of the EU energy system [2025/2006(INI)] – Committee on Industry, Research and Energy. Rapporteur: Anna Stürgkh (A10-0091/2025)

    Anna Stürgkh introduced the report.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva (Member of the Commission).

    The following spoke: Seán Kelly, on behalf of the PPE Group, Bruno Tobback, on behalf of the S&D Group, András Gyürk, on behalf of the PfE Group, Ondřej Krutílek, on behalf of the ECR Group, Christophe Grudler, on behalf of the Renew Group, Kira Marie Peter-Hansen, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Dario Tamburrano, on behalf of The Left Group, Sarah Knafo, on behalf of the ESN Group, Angelika Winzig, Mohammed Chahim, Aleksandar Nikolic, Diego Solier, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Jutta Paulus, Markus Buchheit, who also answered a blue-card question from Jutta Paulus, Fernand Kartheiser, Paulo Cunha, Tsvetelina Penkova, Isabella Tovaglieri, who also declined to take a blue-card question from Dario Nardella, Mariateresa Vivaldini, Barry Andrews, Benedetta Scuderi, Marcin Sypniewski, who also answered a blue-card question from Stine Bosse, Fidias Panayiotou, Mirosława Nykiel, Yannis Maniatis and Julie Rechagneux.

    IN THE CHAIR: Antonella SBERNA
    Vice-President

    The following spoke: Ivars Ijabs, Michael Bloss, Andrea Wechsler, Dario Nardella, Mireia Borrás Pabón, Marion Maréchal, Bart Groothuis, Virgil-Daniel Popescu, Jens Geier, Nikola Bartůšek, Beatrice Timgren, Wouter Beke, Nicolás González Casares, who also answered blue-card questions from João Oliveira and Mireia Borrás Pabón, Gilles Pennelle, Hildegard Bentele, who also answered a blue-card question from Lukas Sieper, Sofie Eriksson, Niels Flemming Hansen, Jüri Ratas, Michał Szczerba, Dimitris Tsiodras, Krzysztof Hetman, Andreas Schwab, Regina Doherty and Tomislav Sokol.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Billy Kelleher, João Oliveira, Maria Zacharia and Lukas Sieper.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva and Anna Stürgkh.

    The debate closed.

    Vote: 19 June 2025.



    13. Composition of committees and delegations

    The ECR Group had notified the President of the following decision changing the composition of the committees and delegations:

    – ITRE Committee: Anna Zalewska

    The decision took effect as of that day.



    14. Rise in violence and the deepening humanitarian crisis in South Sudan (debate)

    Commission statement: Rise in violence and the deepening humanitarian crisis in South Sudan (2025/2751(RSP))

    Ekaterina Zaharieva (Member of the Commission) made the statement.

    The following spoke: Michael Gahler, on behalf of the PPE Group, Marit Maij, on behalf of the S&D Group, György Hölvényi, on behalf of the PfE Group, Adam Bielan, on behalf of the ECR Group, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, on behalf of the Renew Group, Erik Marquardt, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Özlem Demirel, on behalf of The Left Group, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Francisco Assis, Barry Andrews, Murielle Laurent and Leire Pajín.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Alessandra Moretti, Nikos Papandreou and Sebastian Tynkkynen.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva.

    IN THE CHAIR: Roberts ZĪLE
    Vice-President

    The debate closed.



    15. Debate on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (debate)

    (For the titles and authors of the motions for resolutions, see minutes of 18.6.2025, item I.)



    15.1. Media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli

    Motions for resolutions B10-0282/2025, B10-0283/2025, B10-0287/2025, B10-0288/2025, B10-0289/2025, B10-0290/2025 and B10-0295/2025 (2025/2752(RSP))

    Rasa Juknevičienė, Tobias Cremer, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Dainius Žalimas, Lena Schilling, Danilo Della Valle and Petr Bystron introduced their groups’ motions for resolutions.

    The following spoke: Liudas Mažylis, on behalf of the PPE Group, Nacho Sánchez Amor, on behalf of the S&D Group, and Thierry Mariani, on behalf of the PfE Group.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Lukas Sieper.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva (Member of the Commission).

    The debate closed.

    Vote: minutes of 19.6.2025, item 5.1.



    15.2. Case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran

    Motions for resolutions B10-0280/2025, B10-0284/2025, B10-0285/2025, B10-0286/2025, B10-0296/2025, B10-0299/2025 and B10-0300/2025 (2025/2753(RSP))

    Michał Wawrykiewicz, Evin Incir, Veronika Vrecionová, Abir Al-Sahlani, Alice Kuhnke, Jonas Sjöstedt and Sebastiaan Stöteler introduced their groups’ motions for resolutions.

    The following spoke: Alice Teodorescu Måwe, on behalf of the PPE Group, Francisco Assis, on behalf of the S&D Group, Gerolf Annemans, on behalf of the PfE Group, Hilde Vautmans, on behalf of the Renew Group, Wouter Beke, Daniel Attard and Danuše Nerudová.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva (Member of the Commission).

    The debate closed.

    Vote: minutes of 19.6.2025, item 5.2.



    15.3. Dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali

    Motions for resolutions B10-0281/2025, B10-0291/2025, B10-0292/2025, B10-0293/2025, B10-0294/2025, B10-0297/2025 and B10-0298/2025 (2025/2754(RSP))

    Christophe Gomart, Laura Ballarín Cereza and Catarina Vieira introduced their groups’ motions for resolutions.

    The following spoke: Ingeborg Ter Laak, on behalf of the PPE Group, Marta Temido, on behalf of the S&D Group, and Reinhold Lopatka.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva (Member of the Commission).

    The debate closed.

    Vote: minutes of 19.6.2025, item 5.3.



    16. Digital Markets, Digital Euro, Digital Identities: economical stimuli or trends toward dystopia (topical debate)

    The following spoke: Rada Laykova to open the debate proposed by the ESN Group.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva (Member of the Commission).

    The following spoke: Fernando Navarrete Rojas, on behalf of the PPE Group, Aurore Lalucq, on behalf of the S&D Group, Piotr Müller, on behalf of the ECR Group, Billy Kelleher, on behalf of the Renew Group, Sergey Lagodinsky, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Jussi Saramo, on behalf of The Left Group, Siegbert Frank Droese, on behalf of the ESN Group, Lídia Pereira, Stefano Cavedagna, Katri Kulmuni, Damian Boeselager, Milan Mazurek, Fabio De Masi, Paulius Saudargas, Marlena Maląg, Diego Solier, Gheorghe Piperea, Dick Erixon and Claudiu-Richard Târziu.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva.

    The debate closed.



    17. Oral explanations of votes (Rule 201)

    No oral explanations of votes were made.



    18. Explanations of votes in writing (Rule 201)

    Explanations of votes given in writing would appear on the Members’ pages on Parliament’s website



    19. Agenda of the next sitting

    The next sitting would be held the following day, 19 June 2025, starting at 09:00. The agenda was available on Parliament’s website.



    20. Approval of the minutes of the sitting

    In accordance with Rule 208(3), the minutes of the sitting would be put to the House for approval at the beginning of the afternoon of the next sitting.



    21. Closure of the sitting

    The sitting closed at 21:10.



    LIST OF DOCUMENTS SERVING AS A BASIS FOR THE DEBATES AND DECISIONS OF PARLIAMENT



    I. Motions for resolutions tabled

    Media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli

    The following Members or political groups had requested that a debate be held, in accordance with Rule 150, on the following motions for resolutions:

    on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli (2025/2752(RSP)) (B10-0282/2025)
    Lena Schilling, Mélissa Camara, Mounir Satouri, Ville Niinistö, Maria Ohisalo, Mārtiņš Staķis, Nicolae
    Ştefănuță, Markéta Gregorová
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli (2025/2752(RSP)) (B10-0283/2025)
    Danilo Della Valle
    on behalf of The Left Group

    on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli (2025/2752(RSP)) (B10-0287/2025)
    Urmas Paet, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Engin Eroglu, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Eugen Tomac, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas, Olivier Chastel
    on behalf of the Renew Group

    on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli (2025/2752(RSP)) (B10-0288/2025)
    Petr Bystron, Tomasz Froelich, Hans Neuhoff, Alexander Sell
    on behalf of the ESN Group

    on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli (2025/2752(RSP)) (B10-0289/2025)
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Tobias Cremer
    on behalf of the S&D Group

    on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli (2025/2752(RSP)) (B10-0290/2025)
    Sebastião Bugalho, David McAllister, Željana Zovko, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Tomas Tobé, Miriam Lexmann, Andrey Kovatchev, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Dariusz Joński, Loránt Vincze, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Davor Ivo Stier, Luděk Niedermayer, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Liudas Mažylis, Inese Vaidere, Rasa Juknevičienė
    on behalf of the PPE Group

    on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli (2025/2752(RSP)) (B10-0295/2025)
    Adam Bielan, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Reinis Pozņaks, Rihards Kols, Alexandr Vondra, Mariusz Kamiński, Veronika Vrecionová, Ondřej Krutílek, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Assita Kanko, Bogdan Rzońca, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński
    on behalf of the ECR Group

    Case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran

    The following Members or political groups had requested that a debate be held, in accordance with Rule 150, on the following motions for resolutions:

    on the case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran (2025/2753(RSP)) (B10-0280/2025)
    Jonas Sjöstedt
    on behalf of The Left Group

    on the case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran (2025/2753(RSP)) (B10-0284/2025)
    Alice Kuhnke, Maria Ohisalo, Mounir Satouri, Nicolae
    Ştefănuță, Mélissa Camara, Ville Niinistö, Hannah Neumann
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    on the case of Dr Ahmadreza Djalali’s illegal arrest and detention in Iran (2025/2753(RSP)) (B10-0285/2025)
    Abir Al-Sahlani, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Engin Eroglu, Bart Groothuis, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar
    on behalf of the Renew Group

    on the case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran (2025/2753(RSP)) (B10-0286/2025)
    Sebastiaan Stöteler, Marieke Ehlers, António Tânger Corrêa, Nikola Bartůšek, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Gerolf Annemans, Hermann Tertsch
    on behalf of the PfE Group

    on the case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran (2025/2753(RSP)) (B10-0296/2025)
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Evin Incir, Chloé Ridel
    on behalf of the S&D Group

    on the case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran (2025/2753(RSP)) (B10-0299/2025)
    Sebastião Bugalho, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Željana Zovko, David McAllister, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Tomas Tobé, Miriam Lexmann, Andrey Kovatchev, Loucas Fourlas, Dariusz Joński, Loránt Vincze, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Davor Ivo Stier, Luděk Niedermayer, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Liudas Mažylis, Inese Vaidere
    on behalf of the PPE Group

    on the case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran (2025/2753(RSP)) (B10-0300/2025)
    Adam Bielan, Reinis Pozņaks, Rihards Kols, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Mariusz Kamiński, Alexandr Vondra, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Alberico Gambino, Carlo Fidanza, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Assita Kanko, Bogdan Rzońca, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Cristian Terheş, Diego Solier, Nora Junco García, Michał Dworczyk, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Marion Maréchal
    on behalf of the ECR Group

    Dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali

    The following Members or political groups had requested that a debate be held, in accordance with Rule 150, on the following motions for resolutions:

    on dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali (2025/2754(RSP)) (B10-0281/2025)
    Merja Kyllönen
    on behalf of The Left Group

    on dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali (2025/2754(RSP)) (B10-0291/2025)
    Nathalie Loiseau, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Engin Eroglu, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Yvan Verougstraete, Lucia Yar
    on behalf of the Renew Group

    on dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali (2025/2754(RSP)) (B10-0292/2025)
    Tomasz Froelich, Hans Neuhoff, Alexander Sell
    on behalf of the ESN Group

    on dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali (2025/2754(RSP)) (B10-0293/2025)
    Matthieu Valet, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Nikola Bartůšek
    on behalf of the PfE Group

    on dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali (2025/2754(RSP)) (B10-0294/2025)
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Laura Ballarín Cereza
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Catarina Vieira
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    on dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali (2025/2754(RSP)) (B10-0297/2025)
    Sebastião Bugalho, Christophe Gomart, Željana Zovko, David McAllister, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Tomas Tobé, Miriam Lexmann, Andrey Kovatchev, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Dariusz Joński, Loránt Vincze, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Davor Ivo Stier, Luděk Niedermayer, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Liudas Mažylis, Inese Vaidere
    on behalf of the PPE Group

    on dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali (2025/2754(RSP)) (B10-0298/2025)
    Adam Bielan, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Alexandr Vondra, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Assita Kanko, Bogdan Rzońca, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Małgorzata Gosiewska
    on behalf of the ECR Group



    II. Delegated acts (Rule 114(2))

    Draft delegated acts forwarded to Parliament

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the identification of sub-categories within net-zero technologies and the list of specific components used for those technologies. (C(2025)02901 – 2025/2733(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 23 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ITRE
    opinion: ECON, EMPL, ENVI, IMCO, REGI

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2019/125 concerning trade in certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (C(2025)03066 – 2025/2727(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 21 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: INTA

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1242 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the addition of vehicle sub-groups for extra-heavy-combination lorries (C(2025)03071 – 2025/2726(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 20 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ENVI

    – Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards measures adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organisation for the monitoring, reporting and verification of aviation emissions for the purpose of implementing a global market-based measure and repealing Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/1603 (C(2025)03075 – 2025/2725(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 20 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ENVI
    opinion: ITRE

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 273/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EC) No 111/2005 as regards the inclusion of the drug precursors 4-piperidone and 1-boc-4-piperidone in the list of scheduled substances (C(2025)03079 – 2025/2729(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 21 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: LIBE

    – Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards on the authorisation and organisational requirements for approved publication arrangements and approved reporting mechanisms, and on the authorisation requirements for consolidated tape providers, and repealing Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/571 (C(2025)03100 – 2025/2765(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 12 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ECON

    – Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards specifying the input and output data of consolidated tapes, the synchronisation of business clocks and the revenue redistribution by the consolidated tape provider for shares and ETFs, and repealing Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/574 (C(2025)03102 – 2025/2761(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 12 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ECON

    – Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards on the obligation to make market data available to the public on a reasonable commercial basis (C(2025)03103 – 2025/2762(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 12 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ECON

    – Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council with detailed rules and procedures on the acceptance of air traffic controller licences and certificates issued by third countries. (C(2025)03114 – 2025/2732(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 23 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: TRAN

    – Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 of the European Parliament and of the Council by specifying the rules on the identification of authorised oil and gas producers who are required to contribute to the objective of reaching the Union-target for available CO2 injection capacity by 2030, on the calculation of their respective contributions, and on their reporting obligations (C(2025)03218 – 2025/2730(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 21 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ITRE
    opinion: ECON, EMPL, ENVI, IMCO, REGI

    – Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards specifying the information in an application for authorisation to offer asset-referenced tokens to the public or to seek their admission to trading (C(2025)03221 – 2025/2737(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 5 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ECON

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) No 748/2012 as regards updating the references to the environmental protection requirements and correcting that Regulation (C(2025)03287 – 2025/2735(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 28 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: TRAN

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1241 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards geographic coordinates in Annexes VII and XIII thereto (C(2025)03293 – 2025/2734(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 28 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: PECH

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending the Annex to Regulation (EU) No 609/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council to allow the use of monosodium salt of L-5-methyltetrahydrofolic acid as a source of folate in infant formula and follow-on formula, processed cereal-based food and baby food, total diet replacement for weight control and in food for special medical purposes (C(2025)03411 – 2025/2736(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 4 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ENVI

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2017/745 of the European Parliament and of the Council, as regards the assignment of Unique Device Identifiers for spectacle frames, spectacle lenses and ready-to-wear reading spectacles (C(2025)03484 – 2025/2763(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 12 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: SANT

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2019/2144 of the European Parliament and of the Council to take into account regulatory developments concerning amendments to UN Regulations Nos 25, 34, 79, 100, 117, 127 and 152, and the new UN Regulations Nos 167, 169 and 171 adopted by the World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (C(2025)03502 – 2025/2738(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 5 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: IMCO

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Delegated Regulation (EU) No 876/2013 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards changes to the functioning and management of colleges for central counterparties (C(2025)03626 – 2025/2755(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 11 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ECON

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the date of application of the own funds requirements for market risk (C(2025)03643 – 2025/2764(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 12 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ECON

    – Commission Delegated Regulation on the implementation of the Union’s international obligations, as referred to in Article 15(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the other part, as regards picked dogfish (C(2025)03715 – 2025/2768(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 13 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: PECH

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 to add Algeria, Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Monaco, Namibia, Nepal and Venezuela to the list of high-risk third countries which have provided a written high-level political commitment to address the identified deficiencies and have developed an action plan with the FATF, and to remove Barbados, Gibraltar, Jamaica, Panama, the Philippines, Senegal, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates from that list (C(2025)03815 – 2025/2740(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 1 month from the date of receipt of 10 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ECON, LIBE

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/530 as regards its date of application (C(2025)03819 – 2025/2766(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 12 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: INTA



    ATTENDANCE REGISTER

    Present:

    Aaltola Mika, Abadía Jover Maravillas, Adamowicz Magdalena, Aftias Georgios, Agirregoitia Martínez Oihane, Agius Peter, Agius Saliba Alex, Alexandraki Galato, Allione Grégory, Al-Sahlani Abir, Anadiotis Nikolaos, Anderson Christine, Andersson Li, Andresen Rasmus, Andrews Barry, Andriukaitis Vytenis Povilas, Androuët Mathilde, Angel Marc, Annemans Gerolf, Annunziata Lucia, Antoci Giuseppe, Arias Echeverría Pablo, Arimont Pascal, Arłukowicz Bartosz, Arnaoutoglou Sakis, Arndt Anja, Arvanitis Konstantinos, Asens Llodrà Jaume, Assis Francisco, Attard Daniel, Aubry Manon, Auštrevičius Petras, Axinia Adrian-George, Azmani Malik, Bajada Thomas, Baljeu Jeannette, Ballarín Cereza Laura, Bardella Jordan, Barley Katarina, Barna Dan, Barrena Arza Pernando, Bartulica Stephen Nikola, Bartůšek Nikola, Bausemer Arno, Bay Nicolas, Bay Christophe, Beke Wouter, Bellamy François-Xavier, Benea Dragoş, Benjumea Benjumea Isabel, Beňová Monika, Bentele Hildegard, Berendsen Tom, Berg Sibylle, Berlato Sergio, Bernhuber Alexander, Biedroń Robert, Bielan Adam, Bischoff Gabriele, Blaha Ľuboš, Blinkevičiūtė Vilija, Blom Rachel, Bloss Michael, Bocheński Tobiasz, Boeselager Damian, Bogdan Ioan-Rareş, Bonaccini Stefano, Bonte Barbara, Borchia Paolo, Borrás Pabón Mireia, Borvendég Zsuzsanna, Borzan Biljana, Bosanac Gordan, Boßdorf Irmhild, Bosse Stine, Botenga Marc, Boyer Gilles, Brasier-Clain Marie-Luce, Braun Grzegorz, Brejza Krzysztof, Bricmont Saskia, Brnjac Nikolina, Bryłka Anna, Buchheit Markus, Buczek Tomasz, Buda Daniel, Buda Waldemar, Budka Borys, Bugalho Sebastião, Buła Andrzej, Buxadé Villalba Jorge, Bystron Petr, Bžoch Jaroslav, Camara Mélissa, Canfin Pascal, Carberry Nina, Cârciu Gheorghe, Carême Damien, Casa David, Caspary Daniel, Cassart Benoit, Castillo Laurent, del Castillo Vera Pilar, Cavazzini Anna, Cavedagna Stefano, Ceccardi Susanna, Cepeda José, Ceulemans Estelle, Chahim Mohammed, Chaibi Leila, Chastel Olivier, Christensen Asger, Ciccioli Carlo, Cifrová Ostrihoňová Veronika, Ciriani Alessandro, Cisint Anna Maria, Clausen Per, Clergeau Christophe, Cormand David, Corrado Annalisa, Costanzo Vivien, Cotrim De Figueiredo João, Cowen Barry, Cremer Tobias, Cristea Andi, Crosetto Giovanni, Cunha Paulo, Dahl Henrik, Danielsson Johan, Dauchy Marie, Dávid Dóra, David Ivan, Decaro Antonio, de la Hoz Quintano Raúl, Della Valle Danilo, Deloge Valérie, De Masi Fabio, Demirel Özlem, Deutsch Tamás, Devaux Valérie, Dibrani Adnan, Dieringer Elisabeth, Dîncu Vasile, Di Rupo Elio, Disdier Mélanie, Dobrev Klára, Doherty Regina, Doleschal Christian, Dömötör Csaba, Do Nascimento Cabral Paulo, Donazzan Elena, Dorfmann Herbert, Dostalova Klara, Dostál Ondřej, Droese Siegbert Frank, Düpont Lena, Dworczyk Michał, Ecke Matthias, Ehler Christian, Ehlers Marieke, Eriksson Sofie, Erixon Dick, Eroglu Engin, Estaràs Ferragut Rosa, Everding Sebastian, Falcă Gheorghe, Falcone Marco, Farreng Laurence, Farský Jan, Ferber Markus, Ferenc Viktória, Fernández Jonás, Fidanza Carlo, Fiocchi Pietro, Firmenich Ruth, Flanagan Luke Ming, Fourlas Loucas, Fourreau Emma, Fragkos Emmanouil, Freund Daniel, Fritzon Heléne, Froelich Tomasz, Fuglsang Niels, Funchion Kathleen, Furet Angéline, Furore Mario, Gahler Michael, Gál Kinga, Galán Estrella, Gálvez Lina, Gambino Alberico, García Hermida-Van Der Walle Raquel, Garraud Jean-Paul, Gasiuk-Pihowicz Kamila, Geadi Geadis, Gedin Hanna, Geese Alexandra, Geier Jens, Geisel Thomas, Gemma Chiara, Georgiou Giorgos, Gerbrandy Gerben-Jan, Gerzsenyi Gabriella, Geuking Niels, Gieseke Jens, Giménez Larraz Borja, Girauta Vidal Juan Carlos, Glavak Sunčana, Glucksmann Raphaël, Goerens Charles, Gomart Christophe, Gomes Isilda, Gómez López Sandra, Gonçalves Bruno, Gonçalves Sérgio, González Casares Nicolás, González Pons Esteban, Gori Giorgio, Gosiewska Małgorzata, Gotink Dirk, Gozi Sandro, Grapini Maria, Gražulis Petras, Gregorová Markéta, Grims Branko, Griset Catherine, Gronkiewicz-Waltz Hanna, Groothuis Bart, Grossmann Elisabeth, Grudler Christophe, Gualmini Elisabetta, Guarda Cristina, Guetta Bernard, Guzenina Maria, Győri Enikő, Gyürk András, Haider Roman, Halicki Andrzej, Hansen Niels Flemming, Hassan Rima, Hauser Gerald, Häusling Martin, Hava Mircea-Gheorghe, Heinäluoma Eero, Henriksson Anna-Maja, Herbst Niclas, Herranz García Esther, Hetman Krzysztof, Hojsík Martin, Holmgren Pär, Hölvényi György, Homs Ginel Alicia, Humberto Sérgio, Ijabs Ivars, Imart Céline, Incir Evin, Inselvini Paolo, Iovanovici Şoşoacă Diana, Jalloul Muro Hana, Jamet France, Jarubas Adam, Jerković Romana, Jongen Marc, Joński Dariusz, Joron Virginie, Jouvet Pierre, Joveva Irena, Juknevičienė Rasa, Junco García Nora, Jungbluth Alexander, Kabilov Taner, Kalfon François, Kaliňák Erik, Kaljurand Marina, Kalniete Sandra, Kamiński Mariusz, Kanev Radan, Kanko Assita, Karlsbro Karin, Kartheiser Fernand, Karvašová Ľubica, Katainen Elsi, Kefalogiannis Emmanouil, Kelleher Billy, Keller Fabienne, Kelly Seán, Kennes Rudi, Khan Mary, Kircher Sophia, Knafo Sarah, Knotek Ondřej, Kobosko Michał, Köhler Stefan, Kohut Łukasz, Kokalari Arba, Kolář Ondřej, Kollár Kinga, Kols Rihards, Konečná Kateřina, Kopacz Ewa, Körner Moritz, Kountoura Elena, Kovařík Ondřej, Kovatchev Andrey, Krištopans Vilis, Kruis Sebastian, Krutílek Ondřej, Kubín Tomáš, Kuhnke Alice, Kulmuni Katri, Kyllönen Merja, Kyuchyuk Ilhan, Lagodinsky Sergey, Lakos Eszter, Lalucq Aurore, Lange Bernd, Langensiepen Katrin, Laššáková Judita, László András, Latinopoulou Afroditi, Laurent Murielle, Laureti Camilla, Laykova Rada, Lazarov Ilia, Lazarus Luis-Vicențiu, Le Callennec Isabelle, Leggeri Fabrice, Lenaers Jeroen, Leonardelli Julien, Lewandowski Janusz, Lexmann Miriam, Liese Peter, Lins Norbert, Loiseau Nathalie, Løkkegaard Morten, Lopatka Reinhold, López Javi, López Aguilar Juan Fernando, López-Istúriz White Antonio, Lövin Isabella, Lucano Mimmo, Luena César, Łukacijewska Elżbieta Katarzyna, Lupo Giuseppe, McAllister David, Madison Jaak, Maestre Cristina, Magoni Lara, Magyar Péter, Maij Marit, Maląg Marlena, Mandl Lukas, Maniatis Yannis, Mantovani Mario, Maran Pierfrancesco, Marczułajtis-Walczak Jagna, Maréchal Marion, Mariani Thierry, Marino Ignazio Roberto, Marquardt Erik, Martín Frías Jorge, Martins Catarina, Martusciello Fulvio, Marzà Ibáñez Vicent, Mato Gabriel, Matthieu Sara, Mavrides Costas, Mayer Georg, Mazurek Milan, Mažylis Liudas, McNamara Michael, Mebarek Nora, Mehnert Alexandra, Meimarakis Vangelis, Meleti Eleonora, Mendes Ana Catarina, Mendia Idoia, Mertens Verena, Mesure Marina, Metsola Roberta, Metz Tilly, Mikser Sven, Milazzo Giuseppe, Millán Mon Francisco José, Minchev Nikola, Miranda Paz Ana, Molnár Csaba, Montero Irene, Montserrat Dolors, Morace Carolina, Morano Nadine, Moreira de Sá Tiago, Moreno Sánchez Javier, Moretti Alessandra, Motreanu Dan-Ştefan, Mularczyk Arkadiusz, Müller Piotr, Mullooly Ciaran, Mureşan Siegfried, Muşoiu Ştefan, Nagyová Jana, Nardella Dario, Navarrete Rojas Fernando, Negrescu Victor, Nemec Matjaž, Nerudová Danuše, Nesci Denis, Neuhoff Hans, Neumann Hannah, Nevado del Campo Elena, Nica Dan, Niebler Angelika, Niedermayer Luděk, Niinistö Ville, Nikolaou-Alavanos Lefteris, Nikolic Aleksandar, Ní Mhurchú Cynthia, Noichl Maria, Nordqvist Rasmus, Novakov Andrey, Nykiel Mirosława, Obajtek Daniel, Ódor Ľudovít, Oetjen Jan-Christoph, Oliveira João, Olivier Philippe, Omarjee Younous, Ondruš Branislav, Ó Ríordáin Aodhán, Orlando Leoluca, Ozdoba Jacek, Paet Urmas, Pajín Leire, Palmisano Valentina, Panayiotou Fidias, Papadakis Kostas, Papandreou Nikos, Pappas Nikos, Pascual de la Parte Nicolás, Paulus Jutta, Pedro Ana Miguel, Pedulla’ Gaetano, Pellerin-Carlin Thomas, Peltier Guillaume, Penkova Tsvetelina, Pennelle Gilles, Pereira Lídia, Peter-Hansen Kira Marie, Petrov Hristo, Picaro Michele, Picierno Pina, Picula Tonino, Piera Pascale, Pietikäinen Sirpa, Pimpie Pierre, Piperea Gheorghe, de la Pisa Carrión Margarita, Polato Daniele, Polfjärd Jessica, Popescu Virgil-Daniel, Pozņaks Reinis, Prebilič Vladimir, Princi Giusi, Protas Jacek, Pürner Friedrich, Rackete Carola, Radev Emil, Radtke Dennis, Rafowicz Emma, Ratas Jüri, Razza Ruggero, Rechagneux Julie, Regner Evelyn, Repasi René, Repp Sabrina, Ressler Karlo, Reuten Thijs, Riba i Giner Diana, Ricci Matteo, Ridel Chloé, Riehl Nela, Ripa Manuela, Rodrigues André, Roth Neveďalová Katarína, Rougé André, Ruissen Bert-Jan, Ruotolo Sandro, Rzońca Bogdan, Saeidi Arash, Salini Massimiliano, Salis Ilaria, Salla Aura, Sánchez Amor Nacho, Sanchez Julien, Sancho Murillo Elena, Saramo Jussi, Sardone Silvia, Šarec Marjan, Sargiacomo Eric, Satouri Mounir, Saudargas Paulius, Sbai Majdouline, Sberna Antonella, Schaldemose Christel, Schaller-Baross Ernő, Schenk Oliver, Scheuring-Wielgus Joanna, Schieder Andreas, Schilling Lena, Schneider Christine, Schnurrbusch Volker, Schwab Andreas, Scuderi Benedetta, Seekatz Ralf, Sell Alexander, Serrano Sierra Rosa, Serra Sánchez Isabel, Sidl Günther, Sienkiewicz Bartłomiej, Sieper Lukas, Singer Christine, Sinkevičius Virginijus, Sjöstedt Jonas, Śmiszek Krzysztof, Smith Anthony, Smit Sander, Sokol Tomislav, Solier Diego, Solís Pérez Susana, Sommen Liesbet, Sonneborn Martin, Sorel Malika, Sousa Silva Hélder, Søvndal Villy, Squarta Marco, Staķis Mārtiņš, Stancanelli Raffaele, Ștefănuță Nicolae, Steger Petra, Stier Davor Ivo, Storm Kristoffer, Stöteler Sebastiaan, Stoyanov Stanislav, Strada Cecilia, Streit Joachim, Strik Tineke, Strolenberg Anna, Sturdza Şerban Dimitrie, Stürgkh Anna, Sypniewski Marcin, Szczerba Michał, Szekeres Pál, Tamburrano Dario, Tânger Corrêa António, Tarquinio Marco, Tarr Zoltán, Târziu Claudiu-Richard, Tavares Carla, Tegethoff Kai, Temido Marta, Teodorescu Georgiana, Teodorescu Måwe Alice, Terheş Cristian, Ter Laak Ingeborg, Terras Riho, Tertsch Hermann, Thionnet Pierre-Romain, Timgren Beatrice, Tinagli Irene, Tobback Bruno, Tobé Tomas, Tolassy Rody, Tomac Eugen, Tomašič Zala, Tomaszewski Waldemar, Tomc Romana, Tonin Matej, Toom Jana, Topo Raffaele, Torselli Francesco, Tosi Flavio, Toussaint Marie, Tovaglieri Isabella, Toveri Pekka, Tridico Pasquale, Trochu Laurence, Tsiodras Dimitris, Tudose Mihai, Turek Filip, Tynkkynen Sebastian, Uhrík Milan, Ušakovs Nils, Vaidere Inese, Valchev Ivaylo, Vălean Adina, Valet Matthieu, Van Brempt Kathleen, Vandendriessche Tom, Van Dijck Kris, Van Lanschot Reinier, Van Leeuwen Jessika, Vannacci Roberto, Van Overtveldt Johan, Van Sparrentak Kim, Varaut Alexandre, Vasconcelos Ana, Vasile-Voiculescu Vlad, Vautmans Hilde, Vedrenne Marie-Pierre, Ventola Francesco, Verheyen Sabine, Verougstraete Yvan, Veryga Aurelijus, Vešligaj Marko, Vicsek Annamária, Vieira Catarina, Vigenin Kristian, Vilimsky Harald, Vind Marianne, Vistisen Anders, Vivaldini Mariateresa, Volgin Petar, von der Schulenburg Michael, Vondra Alexandr, Voss Axel, Vozemberg-Vrionidi Elissavet, Vrecionová Veronika, Vázquez Lázara Adrián, Waitz Thomas, Walsh Maria, Walsmann Marion, Warborn Jörgen, Warnke Jan-Peter, Wąsik Maciej, Wawrykiewicz Michał, Wcisło Marta, Wechsler Andrea, Weimers Charlie, Werbrouck Séverine, Wiezik Michal, Winkler Iuliu, Winzig Angelika, Wiseler-Lima Isabel, Wiśniewska Jadwiga, Wölken Tiemo, Wolters Lara, Yar Lucia, Yon-Courtin Stéphanie, Zacharia Maria, Zajączkowska-Hernik Ewa, Zalewska Anna, Žalimas Dainius, Zan Alessandro, Zarzalejos Javier, Zdechovský Tomáš, Zdrojewski Bogdan Andrzej, Zijlstra Auke, Zīle Roberts, Zingaretti Nicola, Złotowski Kosma, Zoido Álvarez Juan Ignacio, Zovko Željana

    Excused:

    Burkhardt Delara, Friis Sigrid, Hazekamp Anja, Kemp Martine

    MIL OSI Europe News