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Category: Energy

  • MIL-OSI USA: Bipartisan, Bicameral Health Leaders Introduce Bill to Strengthen Veteran Health Care & Stop Waste

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Lloyd Doggett (D-TX)

    Contact: Alexis.Torres@mail.house.gov

    Washington, D.C. — Today, U.S. Representatives Lloyd Doggett (D-TX), Ranking Member of the House Ways & Means Health Subcommittee, Greg Murphy, M.D. (R-NC), member of the House Ways & Means Health Subcommittee, Mark Takano (D-CA), Ranking Member of the House Veterans’ Affairs Committee, David Schweikert (R-AZ), Chair of the House Ways & Means Oversight Subcommittee, John Joyce, M.D. (R-PA), member of the House Energy & Commerce Health Subcommittee, along with Senators Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), member of the Senate Finance Health Subcommittee, Bill Cassidy, M.D. (R-LA), Chair of the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee, and Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Ranking Member of the Senate Veterans’ Affairs Committee, introduced the bicameral Guarantee Utilization of All Reimbursements for Delivery of (GUARD) Veterans’ Health Care Act.

    The legislation will permit the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) to recoup health care costs for dually enrolled veterans in private insurance Medicare Advantage (MA) and Medicare Prescription Drug (Part D) plans. Thereby removing a longstanding statutory loophole that results in taxpayers paying twice for veterans’ health care while private insurers profit and resources are diverted away from the VHA. 

    “Big health insurers have found a nifty way to make an estimated $357 billion profit off veterans and taxpayers: they collect premiums, but taxpayers cover the cost of care. These wasted double payments mean veterans are missing out on critical resources that could be reinvested in delivering more and better care at the VA, such as hiring more providers, purchasing medical equipment, surgical supplies, and devices, and expanding available services at VA clinics,” said Rep. Doggett. “To obtain genuine savings and improve veterans’ health, Congress and the Administration must tackle the insurance lobby. Taxpayers, our veterans, and those at the VA dedicated to serving them deserve better.”

    “It’s a mistake to let Medicare Advantage plans exploit a costly loophole and pocket taxpayer money at the expense of veteran care,” said Sen. Warren. “Instead of ripping away health care from millions of Americans, Congress should crack down on the genuine waste, fraud, and abuse in Medicare Advantage.”

    “Our veterans deserve to receive accessible, high-quality care, and their benefits are meant to cover the services they receive, not line the pockets of insurers who double-dip in the process,” said Rep. Murphy. “For too long, inefficiencies within the system have resulted in a lack of coordinated benefits for veterans dually enrolled with Medicare Advantage and can result in excess payments to insurance companies. I’m proud to join the effort to close the loophole that has allowed insurers who provide Medicare Advantage and Medicare Part D supplemental plans to receive duplicative Medicare payments while the Veterans Health Administration foots the bill.”

    “Insurance companies are capitalizing on a loophole that allows them to make billions of dollars off the backs of veterans while taxpayers are paying twice—both in the form of Medicare’s monthly payments to the insurers, which happen regardless of whether veteran enrollees are using the Medicare plans’ benefits, and in our annual appropriations to the Veterans Health Administration,” said Rep. Takano. “I look forward to ending this predatory practice with the help of Senator Warren, Senator Cassidy, Senator Blumenthal, Representative Doggett, Representative Murphy, Representative Schweikert, and Representative Joyce, and reinvesting these funds into VA’s healthcare system.”

    “Congress must modernize Medicare Advantage and Close the loopholes that allow Medicare Advantage insurers to bill for veteran care they didn’t provide,” said Rep. Schweikert. “From 2018 to 2021, these duplicative payments earned insurers an estimated $44 billion, just a fraction of what companies in this $450 billion-a-year industry have extracted. There is more to uncover and much more to fix. Now is the time to realign incentives in favor of patients.”

    “For too long, private insurers have shaken down the government and taxpayers for care veterans receive at VA hospitals,” said Sen. Blumenthal. “This legislation gives VA the power to claw back these payments and use those funds to provide more quality health care to those who served.” 

    For years, a loophole has allowed MA insurers to pocket billions in taxpayer money through upfront fixed payments from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services for enrolled veterans, despite some veterans never using their benefits, and the VHA shouldering most costs for those who do. As a result, taxpayers are paying twice for the same services, and veterans are losing critical resources that could be reinvested in improving and expanding veterans’ health care. Recognizing the opportunity to profit, insurers deploy disingenuous marketing practices to entice more enrollees for their own lucrative benefits. From 2011 to 2020, dual enrollment in MA plans grew by 63%.

    The GUARD Veterans’ Health Care Act would save American taxpayers an estimated $12.1 billion in a single year, and $357 billion over a decade, by allowing VHA to recover payments for any health care items or services provided to veterans dually-enrolled in an MA or Part D plan. The bill also strengthens VHA’s ability to recover payment from third party insurers for care furnished to veterans.

    Endorsing organizations include the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), National Committee to Protect Social Security and Medicare, Medicare Rights Center, Center for Medicare Advocacy, Justice in Aging, National Nurses United (NNU), Public Citizen, and American Economic Liberties Project.

    View the bill text here, and a one-page fact sheet here.

    A 10-year savings estimate from the Center for Advancing Health Policy through Research (CAHPR) is here.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Congressman Williams Introduces Two Bills to Restore Economic Freedom, Regulatory Certainty, and Energy Market Integrity

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Roger Williams (25th District of Texas)

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, Congressman Roger Williams (TX-25), introduced the Fuel Emissions Freedom Act and the Stop the Subsidized Green Energy Scam Act. These bills will restore regulatory sanity, protect taxpayers, and defend free-market principles in both the automotive and energy sectors.

    “These bills are about economic liberty, energy independence, and relief from government overreach,” said Congressman Williams. “As we usher in the Golden Age of America, we must return power to the American people, not bureaucrats or special interests. Whether it’s letting manufacturers innovate or ending taxpayer-funded green giveaways, it’s time to cater to Main Street and let the market, not Washington, decide what powers America’s future.”

    Background:

    Fuel Emissions Freedom Act

    • Overturns all federal and state fuel emissions regulations, including California’s special authority under the Clean Air Act.
    • Eliminates EPA vehicle emission limits, CAFE standards, and state-imposed tailpipe emissions rules.
    • Restores regulatory certainty to the U.S. automotive sector and empowers manufacturers to innovate freely without costly compliance barriers.
    • Trump signed H.J.Res. 87 into law, overturning California’s biased waivers that allow them to create their own emissions regulations.
    • The Fuel Emissions Freedom Act will finish the job.

    Cosponsors: Representative Brandon Gill and Representative Michael Cloud.

    Read the bill text here.

    Stop the Subsidized Green Energy Scam Act

    • Immediately ends federal tax credits for wind, solar, and battery storage projects started after enactment.
    • Repeals provisions such as the Energy Credit, Clean Electricity Production Tax Credit, and Clean Electricity Investment Tax Credit.
    • Puts an end to taxpayer-funded subsidies that prop up politically favored green industries.

    Read the bill text here.

    ###

    Congressman Roger Williams is the Chairman of the House Small Business Committee and member of the House Financial Services Committee. He proudly represents the 25th Congressional District of Texas.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Jordan—IMF Executive Board Completes Third Review of the Extended Fund Facility Arrangement and Approves US$ 700 Million Arrangement under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 25, 2025

    • The IMF Executive Board completed the third review under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Arrangement with Jordan, providing the authorities with immediate access to the equivalent of SDR 97.784 million (about US$134 million), to support the authorities’ economic program.
    • Jordan’s economic program supported by the EFF arrangement remains firmly on track, demonstrating the authorities’ strong commitment to sound macro-economic policies and structural reforms to strengthen Jordan’s resilience and accelerate growth to enhance job creation and provide opportunities for all Jordanians.
    • Thanks to the continued pursuit of sound economic policies, and despite the considerable external headwinds, including the conflicts in the region, Jordan has maintained macro-stability and broad-based economic growth.
    • The Executive Board also approved a new 30-month arrangement under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) with Jordan, with access equivalent to SDR 514.65 million (about US$700 million), to support Jordan’s efforts to address longer-term vulnerabilities in the water and electricity sectors and to enhance their ability to address public health emergencies, including future pandemics.

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) today completed the third review of the arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF). Jordan’s four-year EFF arrangement, with access amounting to SDR 926.37 million (about US$1.3 billion, equivalent to 270 percent of Jordan’s quota in the IMF), was approved by the IMF Executive Board on January 10, 2024 (see Press Release No. 24/004). This decision allows for an immediate purchase of an amount equivalent to SDR 97.784 million (around US$134 million), bringing the total purchases under the EFF arrangement to the equivalent of SDR 437.454 million (about $595 million). In addition, the IMF Executive Board approved an arrangement under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) with Jordan, with access equivalent to SDR 514.65 million (about US$ 700 million, equivalent to 150 percent of Jordan’s quota).

    Jordan’s continued economic resilience in a challenging external environment, with continuing conflicts in the region and high uncertainty, is a testament to the authorities’ resolve to pursue sound macroeconomic policies. The authorities’ ownership of the EFF arrangement remains strong, with program targets consistently met. Jordan registered stronger growth in 2024 and so far in 2025 than previously anticipated, demonstrating continued resilience. Growth reached 2.5 percent in 2024. Economic activity is expected to gradually strengthen in the coming years, supported by continued sound macroeconomic policies and accelerated reform implementation.

    Inflation remains stable and low, reflecting the Central Bank of Jordan’s (CBJ) firm commitment to monetary and financial stability and the exchange rate peg. Jordan’s external position remains stable, with the current account deficit projected to remain close to 6 percent of GDP. The CBJ’s gross international reserves increased to over US$20 billion by end-2024, with reserve adequacy exceeding 100 percent of the Fund’s ARA metric. The financial sector remains healthy and well-capitalized. While the spillover effects from regional conflicts have also affected government finances, the authorities continue to make progress with a gradual fiscal consolidation to place public debt on a downward path, while creating room for social assistance and needed public investment. Jordan’s structural reform agenda focuses on fostering inclusive private sector-led growth by enhancing the business environment and improving labor market policies, including to expand opportunities for youth and women.

    The RSF arrangement will support the authorities’ efforts to strengthen Jordan’s longer-term balance of payments stability by promoting economic resilience and sustainability. The RSF arrangement aims to address longer-term vulnerabilities in the water and electricity sectors and enhance the authorities’ ability to address public health emergencies, including future pandemics. Reform measures focus on: (i) enhancing the energy sector’s financial sustainability and energy efficiency; (ii) improving the water sector’s financial sustainability and water management; (iii) strengthening fiscal and financial sector resilience; and (iv) enhancing pandemic preparedness. The arrangement will augment policy space and financial buffers to mitigate risks arising from these challenges.

    Following the Executive Board’s discussion on Jordan, Mr. Kenji Okamura, Deputy Managing Director and Acting Chair, issued the following statement:

    “Jordan continues to maintain macroeconomic stability despite external headwinds from regional conflicts and heightened global economic uncertainty, owing to the authorities’ steadfast pursuit of sound policies and continued strong international support. Growth in 2024 and so far in 2025 ended up stronger than anticipated, inflation is low, and reserve buffers are strong. Against elevated risks in the region, it is important that the authorities stay the course with sound fiscal and monetary policies to safeguard macroeconomic stability.

    “The authorities continue to make progress with a gradual fiscal consolidation and strengthening fiscal sustainability, thanks to fiscal reforms that have improved revenue administration and expenditure efficiency. Looking ahead, efforts should continue to further enhance revenue mobilization and spending efficiency and to take contingency measures as needed to keep public debt on a steady downward path, while protecting priority social and capital spending. Efforts should also continue to improve the efficiency and viability of the public utilities to preserve the sustainability of public finances, while improving service delivery.

    “Monetary policy remains appropriately focused on safeguarding monetary and financial stability and supporting the exchange rate peg that has served Jordan well and helped keeping inflation low. Jordan’s banking sector remains healthy, and the central bank continues to strengthen its systemic risk analysis, financial sector oversight, and crisis management.  

    “Structural reforms should be accelerated to improve the business environment, promote competition, and attract private investment that is crucial to create a dynamic and resilient private sector, foster job-rich growth, and achieve the objectives of Jordan’s Economic Modernization Vision. Strong and timely donor support remains essential to help Jordan navigate the challenging external environment, host the large number of refugees, and meet Jordan’s development objectives.

    “The reforms under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility aim to support the authorities’ efforts to address long-term vulnerabilities in the water and energy sectors and to be better prepared for public health emergencies, including pandemics. These reforms will strengthen Jordan’s balance of payments stability by promoting economic resilience and sustainability and by augmenting policy space and financial buffers to mitigate risks arising from these challenges.”

    Jordan: Selected Economic Indicators, 2023–26

    2023

    2024

    2025

    2026
     

    Proj.

    Proj.

    Output and Prices

    Real GDP growth

    2.9

    2.5

    2.7

    2.9

    GDP deflator

    1.8

    1.9

    2.3

    2.6

    Nominal GDP (JD billions)

    36.3

    37.9

    39.8

    42.0

    Inflation 1/

    2.1

    1.9

    2.2

    2.6

    Unemployment

    22.0

    21.4

    …

    …

    Government Finances (in percent of GDP)

    Central government fiscal operations

    Revenue and grants 2/

    25.2

    24.9

    25.4

    26.0

       Of which: grants

    2.0

    1.9

    1.8

    2.0

    Expenditures 2/

    30.6

    31.4

    31.2

    30.5

    Overall central government balance

    -5.4

    -6.4

    -5.8

    -4.5

    Central government primary balance (exc. grants, NEPCO and WAJ)

    -2.7

    -2.8

    -2.0

    -1.0

    Electricity company (NEPCO) losses

    Combined public sector balance 3/

    -4.5

    -4.5

    -3.6

    -2.4

    Government gross debt 4/

    113.5

    114.7

    115.7

    114.9

    Government gross debt, net of SSC holdings of government debt 4/

    89.0

    90.2

    89.7

    87.5

    Money and Credit

         Broad money (percent change)

    2.3

    6.1

    5.1

    5.6

         Credit to the private sector (percent change)

    1.7

    2.9

    4.6

    6.0

    Balance of payments

    Current account (in percent of GDP)

    -3.6

    -5.9

    -5.5

    -5.9

    FDI (in percent of GDP)

    3.6

    3.0

    3.3

    3.4

    Gross reserves (in months of imports)

    6.9

    7.7

    7.1

    7.1

    In percent of Reserve Adequacy Metric

    101

    110

    105

    105

    Sources: Jordanian authorities; and Fund staff estimates and projections.

    1/ Consumer Price Index (annual average).

    2/ Includes the programmed amount of fiscal measures that are needed to meet fiscal targets.

    3/ Sum of the primary central government balance (exc. grants and net transfers to NEPCO-electricity company and WAJ-water company) and the net loss of NEPCO, WAJ and water sector distribution companies.

    4/ Government’s direct and guaranteed debt (including NEPCO and WAJ debt). SSC stands for Social Security Corporation.
    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Angham Al Shami

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/25/pr25221-jordan-imf-completes-3rd-rev-eff-arrangement-approves-us-700-mill-arrangement-under-rsf

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Chairman Capito Opening Statement at Hearing to Consider Turner, Wright Nominations

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for West Virginia Shelley Moore Capito
    [embedded content]
    To watch Chairman Capito’s opening statement, click here or the image above.
    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Shelley Moore Capito (R-W.Va.), Chairman of the Senate Environment and Public Works (EPW) Committee, led a hearing on the nominations of Usha-Maria Turner to be Assistant Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for the Office of International and Tribal Affairs and David A. Wright to be a member of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
    Below is the opening statement of Chairman Shelley Moore Capito (R-W.Va.) as delivered.
    “Today we will receive testimony from David Wright, who is nominated to serve another five-year term as a member of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Usha-Maria Turner, the nominee to serve as the Environmental Protection Agency’s Assistant Administrator for the Office of International and Tribal Affairs.
    “Our consideration of Chairman Wright’s renomination comes at a crucial time. China is executing a rapid buildout of its nuclear industry and is projected to overtake the United States as the global leader of nuclear electricity generation.
    “The demand for clean, baseload power is skyrocketing as we position America to win the AI race, and global events continue to highlight the grave importance of energy security.
    “The importance of those policy concerns has led to the broad bipartisan agreement that we need more nuclear, and that we need to accomplish that goal safely and quickly. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is integral to achieving that goal.
    “A half century ago, Congress separated the dual and conflicting responsibilities to both promote and regulate the use of nuclear energy from the Atomic Energy Commission. In doing so, Congress established the Department of Energy’s predecessor agency and created the NRC to regulate the civilian use of nuclear technology.
    “The principle of separate organizations that promote and regulate nuclear power is as important today as it was fifty years ago, and Congress has continued to reinforce the value of an efficient and competent nuclear regulator. That’s why, last Congress I, alongside Senator Whitehouse and a strong bipartisan coalition, led the effort to get the Accelerating Deployment of Versatile Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy, or better known as the ADVANCE Act, signed into law.
    “As the designated head of the NRC, the Chairman is instrumental in leading the agency’s ambitious implementation of the law. The Chairman is responsible for selecting key senior agency leadership with the approval of the Commission.
    “Through the Executive Director of Operations, the Chairman oversees the NRC’s day to day operations and can direct its staff to undertake important initiatives. The Chairman also participates in international forums, to represent the NRC’s premier role as the global leader in nuclear energy regulation. Now, the NRC has been thrust further into the center of the national energy conversation.
    “Recently, President Trump signed a series of Executive Orders intended to expedite the rapid deployment of more nuclear power. Those Executive Orders are aligned with the ADVANCE Act, but must be carefully implemented to create durable, predictable policies for nuclear licensing. A rapid and disruptive change to the nuclear regulatory framework would be counterproductive and potentially impact financial investment.
    “The Chairman and the Commission must prioritize NRC’s actions, being mindful of the need for regulatory stability, as expeditiously and efficiently as possible while keeping nuclear safety central to the agency’s mission.
    “That’s why experienced leadership at the Commission is crucial to achieve these objectives. Chairman Wright has served as a member of the Commission since 2018, and President Trump designated him Chairman in January.
    “His experiences provide the necessary background and understanding to navigate the extremely important and challenging task of simultaneously implementing the ADVANCE Act, and the Executive Orders, while ensuring fundamental licensing activities are not overlooked. I look forward to understanding how Chairman Wright will navigate these important priorities.
    “Today, we will also hear from Usha-Maria Turner, President Trump’s nominee to serve as the EPA Assistant Administrator for the Office of International and Tribal Affairs. If confirmed, Mrs. Turner will lead EPA’s efforts to maintain our international environmental agreements and partnerships in coordination with the Department of State.
    “Mrs. Turner will also oversee EPA’s engagements with Tribal governments in implementing our nation’s environmental laws and helping our Tribal governments administer their own environmental programs. Effectively supporting the President’s foreign policy efforts and coordinating with Tribal governments are vital issues that will help the EPA’s mission to protect human health and the environment.
    “I look forward to discussing the various aspects of this role with Mrs. Turner.”

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Hawley Demands Energy Department Terminate Government Funding Grain Belt Express

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Josh Hawley (R-Mo)
    Today, U.S. Senator Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) sent a follow-up letter to Department of Energy (DOE) Secretary Chris Wright demanding he terminate the more than $4 billion in federal funding for the Grain Belt Express, an elitist land grab harming Missouri farmers and ranchers. 
    In the letter, Senator Hawley wrote, “I write to you once again to urge the termination of the Department of Energy’s (DOE) $4.9 billion conditional loan to the green-energy Grain Belt Express (GBE) transmission line. Your department recently terminated 24 awards issued by the Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations (OCED), citing ‘that these projects failed to advance the energy needs of the American people, were not economically viable and would not generate a positive return on investment of taxpayer dollars.’ Yet the GBE conditional loan has not been cancelled.”
    He continued, “I have repeatedly raised concerns to DOE about the viability of this transmission line. Most recently, on March 25, 2025, I wrote to you after officials from the Department of Energy confirmed that your department is moving forward with the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) process, a key step in approving the loan. I have yet to receive a substantive response to that letter.”
    Senator Hawley concluded, “During a recent House hearing, you stated, ‘It is deeply concerning how billions of dollars were rushed out the door without proper due diligence in the final days of the Biden administration.’ I completely agree. The Biden administration’s Department of Energy approved the loan to the Grain Belt Express at the eleventh hour… Your department should be taking every possible action to stop this loan – not only to save taxpayer’s money, but also to save generational land from being ripped away from families and hard-working farmers and ranchers in Missouri. Now is the time to act. I urge you to immediately terminate all agency actions related to the Department of Energy’s $4.9 billion loan to the Grain Belt Express.” 
    Read the full letter here or below. 
    June 25, 2025
    The Honorable Chris WrightSecretary of EnergyU.S. Department of Energy1000 Independence Ave SEWashington, DC 20560
    Dear Secretary Wright,
    I write to you once again to urge the termination of the Department of Energy’s (DOE) $4.9 billion conditional loan to the green-energy Grain Belt Express (GBE) transmission line. Your department recently terminated 24 awards issued by the Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations (OCED), citing “that these projects failed to advance the energy needs of the American people, were not economically viable and would not generate a positive return on investment of taxpayer dollars.” Yet the GBE conditional loan has not been cancelled.
    I have repeatedly raised concerns to DOE about the viability of this transmission line. Most recently, on March 25, 2025, I wrote to you after officials from the Department of Energy confirmed that your department is moving forward with the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) process, a key step in approving the loan. I have yet to receive a substantive response to that letter.
    During a recent House hearing, you stated, “It is deeply concerning how billions of dollars were rushed out the door without proper due diligence in the final days of the Biden administration.” I completely agree. The Biden administration’s Department of Energy approved the loan to the Grain Belt Express at the eleventh hour.
    While I applaud DOE’s current efforts to roll back last-minute Biden era green energy projects that were not vetted nor were reliable energy projects, I’ve become increasingly concerned that DOE apparently has not taken action to halt all federal funding to the Grain Belt Express. Your department should be taking every possible action to stop this loan – not only to save taxpayer’s money, but also to save generational land from being ripped away from families and hard-working farmers and ranchers in Missouri.
    Now is the time to act. I urge you to immediately terminate all agency actions related to the Department of Energy’s $4.9 billion loan to the Grain Belt Express. Additionally, please answer the following questions by no later than June 30, 2025:
    1. Why has your department not yet cancelled the Grain Belt Express $4.9 billion conditional loan?
    2. Does your department plan to terminate all agency actions related to advancing the loan to the Grain Belt Express?
    3. If not, can you provide clear and concise reasons as to why you and your department continue to advance this project over the objections of Missouri farmers and ranchers?
    Sincerely,
    Josh HawleyUnited States Senator

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Russell Fry’s Federal Law Enforcement Officer Service Weapon Purchase Act Passes in the House

    Source:

    Rep. Russell Fry’s Federal Law Enforcement Officer Service Weapon Purchase Act Passes in the House

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Congressman Russell Fry’s (SC-07) Federal Law Enforcement Officer Service Weapon Purchase Act passed in the House of Representatives. This legislation will allow current and retired law enforcement officers to purchase their retired firearms.

    Under current law, federal agencies are required to destroy retired firearms. This process costs the federal government millions of dollars and trickles down to American taxpayers.

    Allowing current and retired federal law enforcement officers in good standing to purchase retired firearms is a common sense, cost-saving measure that benefits both law enforcement and American taxpayers.

    “I’m thrilled to see the Federal Law Enforcement Officer Service Weapon Purchase Act pass in the House,” said Congressman Fry. “Not only will it save taxpayer dollars, it also creates a system in which law enforcement officers in good standing can exercise their Second Amendment rights by purchasing their retired service weapons. It is common sense legislation that recognizes the service of our federal officers while also encouraging responsible use of government resources.”

    Full text of the Federal Law Enforcement Officer Service Weapon Purchase Act can be found here.

    Congressman Fry serves on both the House Energy and Commerce Committee and the House Judiciary Committee. To stay up to date with Congressman Fry and his work for the Seventh District, follow his official Facebook, Instagram, and X pages and visit his website at fry.house.gov.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI: Univest Securities, LLC Announces Closing of $1.2 Million Registered Direct Offering for its Client Houston American Energy Corp. (NYSE American: HUSA)

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    New York, June 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Univest Securities, LLC (“Univest”), a member of FINRA and SIPC, and a full-service investment bank and securities broker-dealer firm based in New York, today announced the closing of registered direct offering (the “Offering”), for its client Houston American Energy Corp. (NYSE American: HUSA) (the “Company”), an independent oil and gas company.

    Under the terms of the securities purchase agreement, the Company has agreed to sell to an institutional investor (the “SPA”) for the purchase and sale of an aggregate of 81,629 shares of common stock at a purchase price of $14.80 per share in a registered direct offering.

    The aggregate gross proceeds to the Company of this offering were approximately $1.2 million, before deducting the placement agent’s fees and other offering expenses payable by the Company. The Company currently intends to use the net proceeds of approximately $1 million from the offering for general corporate purposes.

    Univest Securities, LLC acted as the sole placement agent.

    The registered direct offering was made pursuant to a shelf registration statement on Form S-3 (File No. 333-282778) previously filed by the Company and declared effective by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) on November 4, 2024. A final prospectus supplement and accompanying prospectus describing the terms of the proposed offering were filed with the SEC and are available on the SEC’s website located at http://www.sec.gov. Electronic copies of the final prospectus supplement and the accompanying prospectus may be obtained, by contacting Univest Securities, LLC at info@univest.us, or by calling +1 (212) 343-8888.

    This press release does not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy, nor will there be any sales of such securities in any jurisdiction in which such offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful prior to registration or qualification under the securities laws of such jurisdiction. Copies of the prospectus supplement relating to the registered direct offering, together with the accompanying base prospectus, can be obtained at the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov.

    About Univest Securities, LLC

    Registered with FINRA since 1994, Univest Securities, LLC provides a wide variety of financial services to its institutional and retail clients globally including brokerage and execution services, sales and trading, market making, investment banking and advisory, wealth management. It strives to provide clients with value-add service and focuses on building long-term relationship with its clients. For more information, please visit: www.univest.us.

    About Houston American Energy Corp.

    Houston American Energy Corp., an independent oil and gas company, engages in the acquisition, exploration, exploitation, development, and production of natural gas, crude oil, and condensate. Its principal properties are located primarily in the Texas Permian Basin, the South American country of Colombia, and the onshore Louisiana Gulf Coast region. The company is based in Houston, Texas.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains forward-looking statements as defined by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Forward-looking statements include statements concerning plans, objectives, goals, strategies, future events or performance, and underlying assumptions and other statements that are other than statements of historical facts. When the Company uses words such as “may, “will, “intend,” “should,” “believe,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “project,” “estimate” or similar expressions that do not relate solely to historical matters, it is making forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future performance and involve risks and uncertainties that may cause the actual results to differ materially from the Company’s expectations discussed in the forward-looking statements. These statements are subject to uncertainties and risks including, but not limited to, the uncertainties related to market conditions and the completion of the initial public offering on the anticipated terms or at all, and other factors discussed in the “Risk Factors” section of the registration statement filed with the SEC. For these reasons, among others, investors are cautioned not to place undue reliance upon any forward-looking statements in this press release. Additional factors are discussed in the Company’s filings with the SEC, which are available for review at www.sec.gov. Univest Securities LLC and the Company undertakes no obligation to publicly revise these forward-looking statements to reflect events or circumstances that arise after the date hereof.

    For more information, please contact:
    Univest Securities, LLC
    Edric Guo
    Chief Executive Officer
    75 Rockefeller Plaza, Suite 18C
    New York, NY 10019
    Phone: (212) 343-8888
    Email: info@univest.us

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: Univest Securities, LLC Announces Closing of $1.2 Million Registered Direct Offering for its Client Houston American Energy Corp. (NYSE American: HUSA)

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    New York, June 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Univest Securities, LLC (“Univest”), a member of FINRA and SIPC, and a full-service investment bank and securities broker-dealer firm based in New York, today announced the closing of registered direct offering (the “Offering”), for its client Houston American Energy Corp. (NYSE American: HUSA) (the “Company”), an independent oil and gas company.

    Under the terms of the securities purchase agreement, the Company has agreed to sell to an institutional investor (the “SPA”) for the purchase and sale of an aggregate of 81,629 shares of common stock at a purchase price of $14.80 per share in a registered direct offering.

    The aggregate gross proceeds to the Company of this offering were approximately $1.2 million, before deducting the placement agent’s fees and other offering expenses payable by the Company. The Company currently intends to use the net proceeds of approximately $1 million from the offering for general corporate purposes.

    Univest Securities, LLC acted as the sole placement agent.

    The registered direct offering was made pursuant to a shelf registration statement on Form S-3 (File No. 333-282778) previously filed by the Company and declared effective by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) on November 4, 2024. A final prospectus supplement and accompanying prospectus describing the terms of the proposed offering were filed with the SEC and are available on the SEC’s website located at http://www.sec.gov. Electronic copies of the final prospectus supplement and the accompanying prospectus may be obtained, by contacting Univest Securities, LLC at info@univest.us, or by calling +1 (212) 343-8888.

    This press release does not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy, nor will there be any sales of such securities in any jurisdiction in which such offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful prior to registration or qualification under the securities laws of such jurisdiction. Copies of the prospectus supplement relating to the registered direct offering, together with the accompanying base prospectus, can be obtained at the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov.

    About Univest Securities, LLC

    Registered with FINRA since 1994, Univest Securities, LLC provides a wide variety of financial services to its institutional and retail clients globally including brokerage and execution services, sales and trading, market making, investment banking and advisory, wealth management. It strives to provide clients with value-add service and focuses on building long-term relationship with its clients. For more information, please visit: www.univest.us.

    About Houston American Energy Corp.

    Houston American Energy Corp., an independent oil and gas company, engages in the acquisition, exploration, exploitation, development, and production of natural gas, crude oil, and condensate. Its principal properties are located primarily in the Texas Permian Basin, the South American country of Colombia, and the onshore Louisiana Gulf Coast region. The company is based in Houston, Texas.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains forward-looking statements as defined by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Forward-looking statements include statements concerning plans, objectives, goals, strategies, future events or performance, and underlying assumptions and other statements that are other than statements of historical facts. When the Company uses words such as “may, “will, “intend,” “should,” “believe,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “project,” “estimate” or similar expressions that do not relate solely to historical matters, it is making forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future performance and involve risks and uncertainties that may cause the actual results to differ materially from the Company’s expectations discussed in the forward-looking statements. These statements are subject to uncertainties and risks including, but not limited to, the uncertainties related to market conditions and the completion of the initial public offering on the anticipated terms or at all, and other factors discussed in the “Risk Factors” section of the registration statement filed with the SEC. For these reasons, among others, investors are cautioned not to place undue reliance upon any forward-looking statements in this press release. Additional factors are discussed in the Company’s filings with the SEC, which are available for review at www.sec.gov. Univest Securities LLC and the Company undertakes no obligation to publicly revise these forward-looking statements to reflect events or circumstances that arise after the date hereof.

    For more information, please contact:
    Univest Securities, LLC
    Edric Guo
    Chief Executive Officer
    75 Rockefeller Plaza, Suite 18C
    New York, NY 10019
    Phone: (212) 343-8888
    Email: info@univest.us

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Latta’s Bills to Unleash American Energy & Power AI Approved By Energy and Commerce Committee

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Bob Latta (R-Bowling Green Ohio)

    Latta’s Bills to Unleash American Energy & Power AI Approved By Energy and Commerce Committee

    Washington, June 25, 2025

    Today, the House Energy and Commerce Committee approved two bills introduced by Congressman Bob Latta (R-OH-5) to unleash American energy as artificial intelligence technology continues to evolve and require increased energy generation: the Electric Supply Chain Act and the Researching Efficient Federal Improvements for Necessary Energy Refining (REFINER) Act. The legislation now awaits consideration on the House floor.   

    The Electric Supply Chain Act directs the Secretary of Energy to conduct regular assessments and submit reports on the supply chain for electricity generation and transmission. The REFINER Act requires the National Petroleum Council to produce a report on the state of petrochemical refineries in the United States.   

    These bills aim to strengthen domestic energy production and infrastructure, priorities Congressman Latta has consistently championed. At today’s full Energy and Commerce markup, he spoke about the importance of supporting these measures. Watch him speak in support of the Electric Supply Chain Act HERE and the REFINER Act HERE. 

    “Generative artificial intelligence isn’t a trend; it’s the backbone of the next industrial era. Countries around the globe are racing to build the full AI stack: data centers, chips, power, and platforms. Here in the United States, we must ensure that we have the right policies in place to have enough energy to power AI and make America an attractive place to build the entire AI supply chain. I’m grateful to my colleagues on the House Energy and Commerce Committee for advancing my two bills to not only support progress in the AI space but also strengthen American-led energy production across the board,” Latta said.    

    Read more about the Electric Supply Chain Act HERE.  

    Read more about the REFINER Act HERE.   

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI: DRML Miner Unveils New Cloud Mining Platform with Instant Rewards and Eco-Friendly Operations

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    London, UK, June 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — As interest in cryptocurrency surges following the recent Bitcoin halving, DRML Miner has launched a next-generation cloud mining platform designed to make crypto earnings accessible, automated, and environmentally responsible. With an instant $10 bonus for new users and daily crypto payouts, the service offers a fresh, simplified entry point into digital mining, without the technical or financial burden of traditional setups.

    Crypto Mining Reimagined for 2025

    DRML Miner’s platform removes the barriers that have long limited access to crypto mining. There’s no hardware to purchase, no complex configurations, and no ongoing maintenance. Users simply register, select a plan, and begin receiving automated daily earnings from their cloud-based mining operations.

    “Our mission is to democratize mining,” said a DRML spokesperson. “With our platform, anyone—from beginners to crypto veterans—can earn without lifting a finger.”

    Powered by Renewable Energy, Built for Scale

    One of DRML Miner’s standout features is its eco-friendly global infrastructure. Through partnerships with renewable energy farms on nearly every continent, the platform delivers high-efficiency mining with a minimal carbon footprint. This model reduces operational costs and supports sustainable long-term returns for users.

    With a presence in over 180 countries and a rapidly growing user base exceeding 8 million accounts, DRML Miner is proving that green energy and high-yield mining can coexist on a global scale.

    $10 Bonus Makes It Easy to Start

    To mark its official launch, DRML Miner is offering a $10 credit to all new users, credited instantly upon signup. This bonus can be applied directly to any mining plan, allowing users to begin earning right away without any upfront payment.

    Plans start as low as $0.60 per day, giving users the flexibility to start small and scale up over time. Daily rewards are automatically deposited, and users can choose to reinvest profits or withdraw funds anytime.

    Built-In Referral Program Adds Passive Income Stream

    DRML Miner includes a robust referral program with no earning limits. Users earn commissions when friends join using their unique link and stay active. Top-performing affiliates have earned as much as $30,000, making referrals a powerful addition to mining income.

    Mining More Than Just Bitcoin

    While Bitcoin remains the platform’s foundation, DRML Miner also supports mining for other leading cryptocurrencies, including Ethereum (ETH), Dogecoin (DOGE), XRP, Solana (SOL), and USDT. Rewards are paid daily in BTC or stablecoins like USDC, depending on user preferences.

    Security, Transparency, and 24/7 Support

    User trust is backed by enterprise-grade security through McAfee® and Cloudflare®, ensuring full encryption and server uptime. The platform also offers real-time dashboards, transparent earnings histories, and multilingual customer support available 24/7.

    A Timely Opportunity in a Changing Market

    With the most recent Bitcoin halving reducing new supply, miners are positioned to benefit from increased demand and scarcity. DRML Miner offers a fast, accessible way to tap into that opportunity, without the overhead of running physical hardware.

    About DRML Miner

    DRML Miner is a global cloud mining platform committed to making cryptocurrency mining accessible, secure, and environmentally sustainable. With a presence in over 180 countries and a user base exceeding 8 million, the company combines cutting-edge automation with renewable energy partnerships to deliver daily crypto earnings, without the complexity of traditional mining.

    Mine is smart. Earn daily. Grow your crypto future.

    Disclaimer: The information provided in this press release does not constitute an investment solicitation, nor does it constitute investment advice, financial advice, or trading recommendations. Cryptocurrency mining and staking involve risks and the possibility of losing funds. It is strongly recommended that you perform due diligence before investing or trading in cryptocurrencies and securities, including consulting a professional financial advisor.

    Attachment

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: DRML Miner Unveils New Cloud Mining Platform with Instant Rewards and Eco-Friendly Operations

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    London, UK, June 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — As interest in cryptocurrency surges following the recent Bitcoin halving, DRML Miner has launched a next-generation cloud mining platform designed to make crypto earnings accessible, automated, and environmentally responsible. With an instant $10 bonus for new users and daily crypto payouts, the service offers a fresh, simplified entry point into digital mining, without the technical or financial burden of traditional setups.

    Crypto Mining Reimagined for 2025

    DRML Miner’s platform removes the barriers that have long limited access to crypto mining. There’s no hardware to purchase, no complex configurations, and no ongoing maintenance. Users simply register, select a plan, and begin receiving automated daily earnings from their cloud-based mining operations.

    “Our mission is to democratize mining,” said a DRML spokesperson. “With our platform, anyone—from beginners to crypto veterans—can earn without lifting a finger.”

    Powered by Renewable Energy, Built for Scale

    One of DRML Miner’s standout features is its eco-friendly global infrastructure. Through partnerships with renewable energy farms on nearly every continent, the platform delivers high-efficiency mining with a minimal carbon footprint. This model reduces operational costs and supports sustainable long-term returns for users.

    With a presence in over 180 countries and a rapidly growing user base exceeding 8 million accounts, DRML Miner is proving that green energy and high-yield mining can coexist on a global scale.

    $10 Bonus Makes It Easy to Start

    To mark its official launch, DRML Miner is offering a $10 credit to all new users, credited instantly upon signup. This bonus can be applied directly to any mining plan, allowing users to begin earning right away without any upfront payment.

    Plans start as low as $0.60 per day, giving users the flexibility to start small and scale up over time. Daily rewards are automatically deposited, and users can choose to reinvest profits or withdraw funds anytime.

    Built-In Referral Program Adds Passive Income Stream

    DRML Miner includes a robust referral program with no earning limits. Users earn commissions when friends join using their unique link and stay active. Top-performing affiliates have earned as much as $30,000, making referrals a powerful addition to mining income.

    Mining More Than Just Bitcoin

    While Bitcoin remains the platform’s foundation, DRML Miner also supports mining for other leading cryptocurrencies, including Ethereum (ETH), Dogecoin (DOGE), XRP, Solana (SOL), and USDT. Rewards are paid daily in BTC or stablecoins like USDC, depending on user preferences.

    Security, Transparency, and 24/7 Support

    User trust is backed by enterprise-grade security through McAfee® and Cloudflare®, ensuring full encryption and server uptime. The platform also offers real-time dashboards, transparent earnings histories, and multilingual customer support available 24/7.

    A Timely Opportunity in a Changing Market

    With the most recent Bitcoin halving reducing new supply, miners are positioned to benefit from increased demand and scarcity. DRML Miner offers a fast, accessible way to tap into that opportunity, without the overhead of running physical hardware.

    About DRML Miner

    DRML Miner is a global cloud mining platform committed to making cryptocurrency mining accessible, secure, and environmentally sustainable. With a presence in over 180 countries and a user base exceeding 8 million, the company combines cutting-edge automation with renewable energy partnerships to deliver daily crypto earnings, without the complexity of traditional mining.

    Mine is smart. Earn daily. Grow your crypto future.

    Disclaimer: The information provided in this press release does not constitute an investment solicitation, nor does it constitute investment advice, financial advice, or trading recommendations. Cryptocurrency mining and staking involve risks and the possibility of losing funds. It is strongly recommended that you perform due diligence before investing or trading in cryptocurrencies and securities, including consulting a professional financial advisor.

    Attachment

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI USA: In Aftermath of Iran Strikes, Reed Urges Trump Admin. to Strengthen Cybersecurity

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Rhode Island Jack Reed

    WASHINGTON, DC – U.S. cyber officials and private experts are warning that Iran and Iran-linked groups may try to target the U.S. with a range of cyberattacks that could cause serious damage and disruption to private and public sector interests.  In the wake of U.S. airstrikes on Iran, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security issued a bulletin through the National Terrorism Advisory System, which read: “Low-level cyber attacks against U.S. networks by pro-Iranian hacktivists are likely, and cyber actors affiliated with the Iranian government may conduct attacks against U.S. networks.”

    In addition to these warnings, U.S. Senator Jack Reed (D-RI), the Ranking Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, is urging the Trump Administration to take action to bolster the nation’s cyber defenses and assist American industries and municipalities that may be targeted for attacks. 

    “As sophisticated cyber threats mount, we should be surging resources and reinforcements to America’s cyber defenses.  We’ve got to secure our infrastructure and protect critical systems.  Unfortunately, the Trump Administration has undermined the capacity and capabilities of our country’s most critical cybersecurity agencies,” said Senator Reed.

    Reed warns that the Trump Administration’s partisan efforts to purge the federal workforce and slash the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) — America’s primary cyber agency — is putting U.S. national security at risk.  CISA is the frontline federal agency in charge of defending federal networks, state and local governments, and critical infrastructure against cyber threats.  CISA’s mission includes ransomware defense, supply chain resilience, and public-private coordination.

    The Trump Administration has targeted CISA for downsizing, already forcing out over 1,000 CISA employees – roughly one-third of CISA’s workforce.  The drastic staff reductions coupled with proposed future budget cuts jeopardize America’s ability to effectively repel, thwart, and deter cyberattacks; defend federal networks; and support critical infrastructure operators.

    Reed stated: “As the cyber threat level is rising from Iran, affiliated hacktivists, and other adversaries, the Trump Administration is gutting CISA and taking down our best defenses, leaving America dangerously exposed to cyberattacks.  The Trump Administration must stop undermining the capacity of America’s cyber defense agency.  I urge the Trump Administration to take immediate action to rehire technical cyber talent, restore CISA funding, and reinstate key cyber defense programs immediately.  We need to ramp up in the weeks and months ahead and be vigilant in defending against offensive cyber operations by Iran or their partners.”

    The Trump Administration is seeking to reduce CISA’s budget by over $490 million – reducing the agency’s operational funding obligations from $2.38 billion to $1.96 billion.  This includes dismantling and eliminating several key programs entirely, such as the agency’s Election Security Program and the innovative Cyber Safety Review Board.

    Meanwhile, the Trump Administration is targeting other key U.S. cyber defense assets for major budget cuts, including:

    • The FBI, which leads domestic cybercriminal investigations, would have its budget reduced $560 million, alongside a loss of nearly 1,900 staff.
    • The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) National Security Division, which handles foreign intelligence surveillance policy and various counterintelligence operations, would have its budget reduced by $14 million, accompanied by a reduction of full-time employees.
    • The U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security and Emergency Response, which oversees cybersecurity for the nation’s electric grid, would see a sharp cut of $43 million and a staffing reduction of more than 30 percent.
    • The National Science Foundation’s computer science research activities would be cut by $606 million, or 64 percent of its budget, in FY26.

    Beyond CISA and domestic cyber defenses, President Trump abruptly fired the previous director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and head of U.S. Cyber Command, General Timothy Haugh, and his top deputy, without explanation this April, following a meeting with right-wing activist Laura Loomer at the White House.  With support from U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, Army Lt. General Richard Angle was then announced as the nominee to be the successor for the job.  However, the White House then opted not to move forward with Lt. General Angle’s nomination, without public explanation.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Yes, Victoria’s efforts to wean households off gas have been dialled back. But it’s still real progress

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Trivess Moore, Associate Professor in Property, Construction and Project Management, RMIT University

    MirageC/Getty

    On the question of gas, Victoria’s government faces pressure from many directions.

    The Bass Strait wells supplying Australia’s most gas-dependent state are running dry. Gas prices shot up in 2020 and have stayed high. Natural gas is mainly methane, a potent greenhouse gas.

    But weaning more than two million gas-using households off the fossil fuel is hard. The gas lobby pushed back against proposed changes, as did the Victorian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, while resistance from some stakeholders led to a backdown on plans to phase out gas cooktops.

    That’s why the government’s decision to introduce most of the proposed changes is good news. Early plans to require dead gas heaters to be replaced with electric are gone for private housing. But from 2027, new homes have to be all-electric, while landlords will have to replace defunct gas appliances with electric and have ceiling insulation. The move will cut energy bills and accelerate the shift away from gas.

    How did we get here?

    This week’s announcement comes after lengthy consultation on changes first proposed in 2021.

    Some early responses have been supportive, though the gas industry isn’t happy, claiming the reforms will restrict customer choice and cost households more.

    Premier Jacinta Allan pitched the announcement as a way to reserve dwindling and more expensive gas supplies for industry, stating:

    by 2029, these reforms will unlock just under 12 petajoules of gas every year […] by 2035, they’ll deliver 44 PJ annually – enough to meet 85% of Victoria’s forecast industrial demand.

    What are the main changes?

    From January 2027, all newly built homes have to be all-electric. This closes a loophole in existing rules where the all-electric rule only applied to new houses requiring a planning permit.

    When a gas hot water system reaches end of life in an existing house, it will have to be replaced with an efficient electric alternative from March 2027.

    The news is even better for the rental sector.

    In 2021, the state government introduced minimum requirements for rentals. These are now being upgraded to include improved energy efficiency.

    From March 2027, new energy efficiency rules will apply to rentals and public housing, including:

    • gas hot water systems and heaters must be replaced with efficient heat pumps at end of life

    • at the start of a new lease, the rental must have draught proofing, ceiling insulation installed with a minimum R5.0 rating when there is no insulation already, and an efficient electric cooling system in the main living area.

    To help households transition, all upgrades are covered under the Victorian Energy Upgrades program which will help reduce capital costs.

    These plans are welcome. They will cut household energy bills and help meet wider sustainability goals.

    As any Victorian who has sweltered over summer or frozen through winter knows, many of the state’s houses are not great on thermal performance. Most existing homes were built before the introduction of minimum standards in the early 2000s.

    Older homes are also more likely to present health risks such as mould and damp.

    Old gas hot water units in Victoria can be repaired, but replacements will have to be electric from 2027.
    Rusty Todaro/Shutterstock

    Trade-offs proved necessary

    During the consultation period, the Victorian government floated even more ambitious plans, such as requiring all households to replace dead gas heaters with efficient electric options.

    The government originally explored making electric induction cooktops mandatory in new builds. These plans didn’t get through, potentially because of the attachment some householders feel to their gas heaters and cooktops, as we found in our research.

    The state government looks to have decided not to let perfect be the enemy of the good. Better to make significant improvements even with some trade-offs.

    When the market isn’t enough

    Policymakers usually prefer the market to find solutions rather than requiring change through regulations.

    This isn’t always possible. Here, Victoria’s gas supply challenges, subpar housing stock and the pressing need to act on climate change means regulatory nudges are needed.

    Could the government’s changes trigger a backlash? It’s possible, especially if the changes are framed as an added cost to landlords and their tenants. All-electric households are cheaper to run, but it costs money upfront to replace appliances. Waiting until an appliance’s end of life and providing upgrade subsidies will help reduce the cost impact. High gas-users save more – a Melbourne household quitting gas would save almost A$14,000 over ten years.

    18 months until launch

    The first of these changes will be in place in just 18 months.

    Schemes such as this have to be structured carefully. To ensure they work as well as possible for renters in particular, we suggest measures to avoid unintended consequences, such as means-testing any subsidy schemes to avoid leaving out lower-income households.

    We found many householders cannot access reliable information on retrofits and don’t always trust the skills and information given by tradespeople. This is why it’s vital to have accessible, independent, accurate and trustworthy support in understanding how best to replace gas appliances with electric – and how to assess tradie qualifications.

    The government’s decision to exempt rentals with existing ceiling insulation means rentals with old or compacted insulation will miss out.

    Victoria should instead look to the Australian Capital Territory, which mandates installation of new R5.0 insulation if existing insulation isn’t at least R2.

    The government must also ensure renters don’t carry the upfront cost of the upgrades in higher rent. In Sweden, rent increases linked to energy efficiency upgrades were banned.

    For the public to take to these changes, the government must ensure communication is clear and early and that any financial support is adequate and targeted to those most in need.

    Trivess Moore has received funding from various organisations including the Australian Research Council, Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, Victorian government and various industry partners. He is a trustee of the Fuel Poverty Research Network.

    Nicola Willand has received funding for research from various organisations, including the Australian Research Council, the Victorian state government, the Lord Mayor’s Charitable Foundation, the Future Fuels Collaborative Research Centre, the National Health and Medical Research Council, Energy Consumers Australia and the British Academy. She is a trustee of the Fuel Poverty Research Network charity and affiliated with the Australian Institute of Architects.

    Sarah Robertson has received funding from various organisations, including the Australian Research Council, Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, Victorian state government, Lord Mayor’s Charitable Foundation, and VicHealth. She is a Steering Committee member for Future Earth Australia.

    – ref. Yes, Victoria’s efforts to wean households off gas have been dialled back. But it’s still real progress – https://theconversation.com/yes-victorias-efforts-to-wean-households-off-gas-have-been-dialled-back-but-its-still-real-progress-259695

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI: Fusion Fuel Announces AGM Results: All Shareholder Proposals Approved

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    DUBLIN, June 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — via IBN – Fusion Fuel Green PLC (Nasdaq: HTOO) (“Fusion Fuel” or the “Company”), a leading provider of energy engineering, advisory, and utility solutions, today announced that all shareholder proposals were approved at the general meeting of shareholders held on June 25, 2025 (the “Annual General Meeting” or the “AGM”).

    This fulfills the Nasdaq requirement, as part of the Company’s delisting notice, to hold an Annual General Meeting. In addition, shareholder approval of the first proposal paves the way for a planned share consolidation (“Share Consolidation”) of the Company’s Class A Ordinary Shares (with a nominal value of $0.0001 per share) (the “Class A Ordinary Shares”) intended to raise the share price of the Class A Ordinary Shares above Nasdaq’s $1.00 minimum bid price requirement and position the Company to resolve this outstanding item. The Company plans to share details on the Share Consolidation and its timeline in the near future.

    John-Paul Backwell, CEO of Fusion Fuel, commented: “The AGM and the approval of all items mark another important step toward closing legacy issues and enabling management and the board of directors of the Company to focus on growth and delivering on the growth targets for the year. In particular, we look forward to continuing the strong trajectory of Al Shola Gas, advancing BrightHy Solutions, and executing on promising acquisition opportunities.”

    About Fusion Fuel Green PLC

    Fusion Fuel Green PLC (NASDAQ: HTOO) is an emerging leader in the energy services sector, offering a comprehensive suite of energy supply, distribution, and engineering and advisory solutions through its Al Shola Gas and BrightHy brands. Al Shola Gas provides full-service industrial gas solutions, including the design, supply, and maintenance of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) systems, as well as the transport and distribution of LPG to a broad range of customers across commercial, industrial, and residential sectors. BrightHy, the Company’s newly launched hydrogen solutions platform, delivers innovative engineering and advisory services enabling decarbonization across hard-to-abate industries.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release includes “forward-looking statements.” Forward-looking statements may be identified by the use of words such as “estimate,” “plan,” “project,” “forecast,” “intend,” “will,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “believe,” “seek,” “target”, “may”, “intend”, “predict”, “should”, “would”, “predict”, “potential”, “seem”, “future”, “outlook” or other similar expressions (or negative versions of such words or expressions) that predict or indicate future events or trends or that are not statements of historical matters. These forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future performance, conditions or results, and involve a number of known and unknown risks, uncertainties, assumptions and other important factors, many of which are outside the Company’s control, that could cause actual results or outcomes to differ materially from those discussed in the forward-looking statements. Fusion Fuel has based these forward-looking statements largely on its current expectations, which are based on assumptions as to future events that may not prove to be accurate, and are subject to inherent uncertainties, risks, and assumptions that are difficult to predict. Such forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties, including without limitation, those set forth in Fusion Fuel’s Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2024, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 9, 2025, which could cause actual results to differ from the forward-looking statements.

    Investor Relations Contact
    ir@fusion-fuel.eu
    www.fusion-fuel.eu

    Wire Service Contact:
    IBN
    Austin, Texas
    www.InvestorBrandNetwork.com
    512.354.7000 Office
    Editor@InvestorBrandNetwork.com

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Congressman Russell Fry (SC-07) Introduces Bill to Supercharge American Energy Infrastructure and Support Domestic Manufacturing

    Source:

    Congressman Russell Fry (SC-07) Introduces Bill to Supercharge American Energy Infrastructure and Support Domestic Manufacturing

    Washington, D.C. – Today, Congressman Russell Fry (SC-07) and Congresswoman Sharice Davids (KS-03) introduced the Credit Incentives for Resilient Critical Utility Infrastructure and Transformers (CIRCUIT) Act, legislation to retool the 45X tax credit to include distribution transformers in order to encourage domestic production.

    Distribution transformers are critical components needed to strengthen America’s electric grid and secure energy dominance, but they are currently in short supply. With increasing pressure on distribution transformer manufacturers due to rising energy demand and concerns about grid reliability, Congressman Fry introduced this bill to provide targeted support that will boost domestic production and ensure a more reliable power infrastructure.

    To facilitate increased production, this bill would expand the advanced manufacturing production credit (Section 45X) under the Internal Revenue Code to include distribution transformers, help address national shortages, ease supply chain bottlenecks, and reduce dependence on foreign suppliers.

    “There is no path to American energy independence without a reliable, resilient electric grid—and that starts with distribution transformers,” said Congressman Fry. “President Trump is right: we need more energy online—but that energy is no good if it can’t be distributed across our grid. The CIRCUIT Act ensures we support the manufacturers producing the components our grid needs to grow, while protecting American jobs and advancing President Trump’s pro-energy, pro-manufacturing agenda. This is a win for South Carolina, a win for American jobs, and a win for energy security nationwide.”

    “Supply chain disruptions are driving up costs and slowing down projects in Kansas and across the country—and one of the best ways to fix it is by making more right here at home,” said Congresswoman Davids. “By incentivizing domestic businesses to produce important technologies, this bipartisan bill will help bring down costs, reduce construction wait times, and improve electric grid reliability. I’m proud to work across the aisle with Representative Fry to strengthen our supply chains and lower housing costs for hardworking folks.”

    This legislation is supported by the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA), the American Public Power Association, and the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association.

    “NEMA welcomes the introduction of this critical legislation in the House,” said NEMA President and CEO Debra Phillips. “The bipartisan CIRCUIT Act will expand the list of entities included in the Advanced Manufacturing Tax Credit (45X) to include distribution transformers that are essential to building a reliable electrical grid. This will ease supply chain constraints and provide manufacturers with the certainty to scale onshoring and domestic production without fear of demand instability. We thank Reps. Russell Fry (R-SC) and Sharice Davids (D-KS) for their leadership to support our nation’s critical infrastructure and we encourage Congress to support new incentives for domestic transformer capacity such as through the CIRCUIT Act.”

    This is the companion bill to the Senate’s CIRCUIT Act, introduced by Senators Jerry Moran (R-KS) and Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV).

    Read the full text of the bill here.

    Congressman Fry serves on both the House Energy and Commerce Committee and the House Judiciary Committee. To stay up to date with Congressman Fry and his work for the Seventh District, follow his official Facebook, Instagram, and X pages and visit his website at fry.house.gov.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Congressman Russell Fry (SC-07) Introduces Bill to Supercharge American Energy Infrastructure and Support Domestic Manufacturing

    Source:

    Congressman Russell Fry (SC-07) Introduces Bill to Supercharge American Energy Infrastructure and Support Domestic Manufacturing

    Washington, D.C. – Today, Congressman Russell Fry (SC-07) and Congresswoman Sharice Davids (KS-03) introduced the Credit Incentives for Resilient Critical Utility Infrastructure and Transformers (CIRCUIT) Act, legislation to retool the 45X tax credit to include distribution transformers in order to encourage domestic production.

    Distribution transformers are critical components needed to strengthen America’s electric grid and secure energy dominance, but they are currently in short supply. With increasing pressure on distribution transformer manufacturers due to rising energy demand and concerns about grid reliability, Congressman Fry introduced this bill to provide targeted support that will boost domestic production and ensure a more reliable power infrastructure.

    To facilitate increased production, this bill would expand the advanced manufacturing production credit (Section 45X) under the Internal Revenue Code to include distribution transformers, help address national shortages, ease supply chain bottlenecks, and reduce dependence on foreign suppliers.

    “There is no path to American energy independence without a reliable, resilient electric grid—and that starts with distribution transformers,” said Congressman Fry. “President Trump is right: we need more energy online—but that energy is no good if it can’t be distributed across our grid. The CIRCUIT Act ensures we support the manufacturers producing the components our grid needs to grow, while protecting American jobs and advancing President Trump’s pro-energy, pro-manufacturing agenda. This is a win for South Carolina, a win for American jobs, and a win for energy security nationwide.”

    “Supply chain disruptions are driving up costs and slowing down projects in Kansas and across the country—and one of the best ways to fix it is by making more right here at home,” said Congresswoman Davids. “By incentivizing domestic businesses to produce important technologies, this bipartisan bill will help bring down costs, reduce construction wait times, and improve electric grid reliability. I’m proud to work across the aisle with Representative Fry to strengthen our supply chains and lower housing costs for hardworking folks.”

    This legislation is supported by the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA), the American Public Power Association, and the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association.

    “NEMA welcomes the introduction of this critical legislation in the House,” said NEMA President and CEO Debra Phillips. “The bipartisan CIRCUIT Act will expand the list of entities included in the Advanced Manufacturing Tax Credit (45X) to include distribution transformers that are essential to building a reliable electrical grid. This will ease supply chain constraints and provide manufacturers with the certainty to scale onshoring and domestic production without fear of demand instability. We thank Reps. Russell Fry (R-SC) and Sharice Davids (D-KS) for their leadership to support our nation’s critical infrastructure and we encourage Congress to support new incentives for domestic transformer capacity such as through the CIRCUIT Act.”

    This is the companion bill to the Senate’s CIRCUIT Act, introduced by Senators Jerry Moran (R-KS) and Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV).

    Read the full text of the bill here.

    Congressman Fry serves on both the House Energy and Commerce Committee and the House Judiciary Committee. To stay up to date with Congressman Fry and his work for the Seventh District, follow his official Facebook, Instagram, and X pages and visit his website at fry.house.gov.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2024 – A10-0112/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2024

    (2024/2053(INI))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union,

    – having regard to Articles 15, 126, 174, 175, 177, 208, 209, 271, 308 and 309 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and to Protocol (No 5) on the Statute of the European Investment Bank (EIB),

    – having regard to Articles 41 to 43 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

    – having regard to the EIB Group Activity Report 2024 of 30 January 2025 entitled ‘Priorities for prosperity’,

    – having regard to the EIB Investment Report 2024/2025 of 5 March 2025 entitled ‘Innovation, integration and simplification in Europe’,

    – having regard to the EIB Group 2024-2027 Strategic Roadmap of 21 June 2024,

    – having regard to the EIB Group Operational Plan 2024-2026 of 9 February 2024 and to the EIB Group Operational Plan 2025-2027 of 30 January 2025,

    – having regard to the G20 commissioned review of Multilateral Development Banks’ capital adequacy frameworks (the CAF Review),

    – having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2025/504 of 11 March 2025 amending Protocol No 5 on the Statute of the European Investment Bank[1],

    – having regard to the EIB Board’s decision of 21 March 2025,

    – having regard to the EIB Cohesion Orientation 2021-2027 of 13 October 2021,

    – having regard to the launch of the EIB’s European Tech Champions Initiative (ETCI) on 13 February 2023,

    – having regard to the EIB Group’s third annual report on EIB Group activities in EU cohesion regions of 15 July 2024,

    – having regard to the EIB Environmental and Social Standards of 2 February 2022,

    – having regard to the EIB Group 2023 Climate Bank Roadmap Progress Report of 25 July 2024,

    – having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights,

    – having regard to the ‘Main outcomes from EIB Group analysis and stakeholder consultation’, presented at the EIB seminar on housing on 18 July 2024,

    – having regard to the EIB press release of 6 March 2025 entitled ‘European Commission and EIB group lay foundations for a new pan-European investment platform for affordable and sustainable housing’,

    – having regard to the letter by EIB President Nadia Calviño to the EU leaders of 4 March 2025,

    – having regard to the EIB Group Security and Defence Industry Action Plan presented at the Economic and Financial Affairs Council meeting in Luxembourg on 12 April 2024,

    – having regard to the EIB’s updated list of eligibility, excluded activities and excluded sectors of 14 July 2022,

    – having regard to the EIB Global Impact Report 2023/2024 of 13 June 2024,

    – having regard to the Tripartite Agreement between the European Commission, the European Court of Auditors and the European Investment Bank, signed on 11 November 2021,

    – having regard to the EIB Group Complaints Mechanism Procedures of 13 November 2018,

    – having regard to the document entitled ‘Diversity, Equity and Inclusion at the EIB Group’ of 14 October 2024,

    – having regard to the study of the European Parliamentary Research Service entitled ‘Increasing European added value in an age of global challenges – Mapping the cost of non-Europe (2022-2032)’, published in February 2023,

    – having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 December 2021 entitled ‘The Global Gateway’ (JOIN(2021)0030),

    – having regard to the study by the European Commission published on 11 January 2024 entitled ‘Access to equity financing for European defence SMEs’[2] ,

    – having regard to the report of 17 April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

    – having regard to the report of 25 April 2024 by Christian Noyer entitled ‘Developing European capital markets to finance the future’,

    – having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

    – having regard to the report of 30 October 2024 by Sauli Niinistö entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘Commission work programme 2025’ (COM(2025)0045),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘The road to the next multiannual financial framework’ (COM(2025)0046),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘Action Plan for Affordable Energy: Unlocking the true value of our Energy Union to secure affordable, efficient and clean energy for all Europeans’ (COM(2025)0079),

    – having regard to the press statement by the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, on the defence package (Rearm Europe plan) of 4 March 2025,

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Savings and Investments Union – A Strategy to Foster Citizens’ Wealth and Economic Competitiveness in the EU’ (COM(2025)0124),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility[3],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 establishing the InvestEU Programme and amending Regulation (EU) 2015/1017[4],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009[5],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1056 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the Just Transition Fund[6],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1229 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 July 2021 on the public sector loan facility under the Just Transition Mechanism[7],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform[8],

    – having regard to the Commission proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2025 amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements (COM(2025)0084),

    – having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence[9],

    – having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Budgets,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0112/2025),

    A. whereas the EIB Group includes the EIB and the European Investment Fund (EIF); whereas the EIB, entirely owned by the Member States, is the largest multilateral financial institution in the world, operating in international capital markets and offering competitive terms to clients on favourable conditions in order to contribute to the achievement of the EU’s objectives and support EU  policies and projects both within and outside the EU, in accordance with Article 309 TFEU; whereas the EIF is owned by the EIB (59.8 %), by the EU (29.7 %) and by financial institutions (10.5 %) from the Member States, the United Kingdom and Türkiye;

    B. whereas the EIB Group has a balance sheet of close to EUR 600 billion; whereas the EIB Group states that its total investment reached a record level of EUR 88.8 billion in 2024, of which EUR 50.7 billion related to climate and the environment, EUR 16.2 billion to SMEs and mid-caps, EUR 14.4 billion to digitalisation and technological innovation and EUR 1 billion to enhancing Europe’s security and defence; whereas the EIB’s gearing ratio has been increased to 290 %, providing additional room for the EIB to invest and support the achievement of the EU’s objectives and support EU policies; whereas the EIB Group’s total investment is expected to increase to EUR 95 billion in 2025;

    C. whereas the EIB maintains solid financial fundamentals and has a ‘triple A’ rating, a cornerstone of its financial credibility and lending capacity, which is essential to preserve investor confidence and ensure low borrowing costs;

    D. whereas the EIB supports EU policies and projects and is the main implementing partner to leverage the mandates and guarantees of the EU’s budget and thus to mobilise large-scale public and private investment; whereas the EIB states that approximately 90 % of its annual investment is committed to projects within the EU and 10 % deployed in investments outside the EU;

    E. whereas the EIF, as part of the EIB Group, is an entity specialised in supporting the EU’s policy objectives, including in the areas of entrepreneurship, job creation and economic cohesion, and plays a key role in supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by enhancing their access to financial markets, from venture capital to micro-finance; highlights the fact that the EIB Group supports companies at all stages of development;

    F. whereas as of June 2024, InvestEU is estimated to have mobilised around EUR 280 billion in additional investments, of which EUR 201 billion originated from the private sector; whereas the InvestEU envelope is almost depleted;

    G. whereas the latest reports on the future of the EU call for the EU’s competitiveness and productivity to be strengthened, emphasise the vital role of market integration and underscore the need to accelerate both public and private investment to build a stronger, more secure, autonomous and fair Europe;

    H. whereas the Draghi report on European competitiveness assesses the combined additional investment needs in Europe at EUR 750-800 billion per year by 2030; whereas the EIB Group plays a crucial role in helping bridge the gap both through its own lending capacity and by ‘crowding in’ private capital to finance these investment needs;

    I. whereas according to the Draghi report, EU companies spend less on research and innovation (R&I) than their US counterparts and Europe persistently fails to translate R&I into commercialisation, particularly in sectors like biotech, artificial intelligence and renewable energy, in the context of the EU’s lack of scale and incomplete single market, banking union and capital markets union; whereas the Draghi report highlights a 30 % EU-US productivity gap in 2023 and points to Europe’s missing out on the digital revolution – driven by the internet and the associated productivity gains – as a key factor, noting that only four of the world’s top 50 tech companies are European;

    J. whereas the Letta report estimates that EUR 300 billion of European savings are not invested in Europe, but mainly in the United States, due to the lack of an integrated capital markets union (CMU); whereas the President of the European Central Bank estimates that companies in the EU could raise approximately an additional EUR 470 billion a year in funding from the capital markets if the CMU were completed[10]; whereas the European Parliamentary Research Service estimates the potential benefits of a more fully integrated and more effectively regulated EU financial market of up to EUR 159 billion per year in the long run as well as the benefit of further progress in the integration of the EU banking sector of up to EUR 114 billion per year;

    K. whereas the EIB’s operations should contribute to achieving climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest, in line with the Paris Agreement and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and support the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights; whereas the EIB has branded itself the EU’s climate bank in view of the investments needed to deliver the fair green transition; whereas the Commission estimates that the EU needs to increase its annual investments in energy, industrial innovation and scale-up, and transport systems by around EUR 480 billion compared to the previous decade[11];

    L. whereas in the light of the current geopolitical context, the development of the European defence technological and industrial base plays an increasingly important role within the internal market; whereas the Commission’s white paper on the future of European defence identifies that an additional EUR 800 billion investment is needed in the defence sector over a four-year period; whereas the EIB announced that it would double its funding for security and defence from EUR 1 billion in 2024 to EUR 2 billion in 2025, while safeguarding its ‘triple A’ credit rating status;

    M. whereas housing prices in the EU rose by an average of 48 % between 2015 and 2023, and the housing crisis affects nearly all of Europe, increasingly impacting the middle class and not just the most vulnerable; whereas EIB data indicates a yearly need to build 1.5 million new homes and renovate five million more, requiring EUR 300-400 billion in annual investment; whereas the housing sector is of general interest but faces reduced public investment, which makes continued EIB investment crucial for this sector; whereas the EIB’s new action plan envisages investment of EUR 10 billion over the next two years;

    N. whereas the EIB Global lending arm, which was launched in 2022, is of key importance in terms of Europe’s position in the world; whereas EIB Global is expected to facilitate at least one third of the EUR 300 billion in investment that the Global Gateway sets out to generate by the end of 2027;

    O. whereas Parliament has repeatedly called for the conclusion of an interinstitutional agreement between Parliament and the EIB; whereas Parliament has signed agreements with various EU bodies; whereas Parliament and the EIB share a long history of intensive cooperation, including (non-)legislative interactions and dialogue;

    General remarks

    1. Appreciates the EIB’s readiness to adapt to changing EU policy requirements, while respecting its long-term objectives; welcomes the EIB Group 2024-2027 Strategic Roadmap, which reflects the EU’s political priorities; points out that the eight priority areas set out in the strategic roadmap are: the EIB’s role as the climate bank, digitalisation and deployment of new technologies, security and defence industry, modern cohesion policy, agriculture and the bioeconomy, Europe’s social infrastructure, high impact investments outside the EU, and the capital markets union;

    2. Highlights the strong call for the EIB to play an even greater role in closing Europe’s investment gap, which Mario Draghi estimated at EUR 800 billion, of which EUR 450 billion is needed for the energy transition alone; calls on the Commission and the EIB to fully leverage the EIB’s potential to provide financial support for the EU’s common priorities and to fulfil its crucial role in driving the necessary investment for fair and inclusive sustainable growth, while maximising innovation gains in key EU policy areas; calls for the EIB Group’s contribution to be further strengthened in the next multiannual financial framework (MFF), particularly through financial instruments and budgetary guarantees that have proven highly effective in advancing key EU policy objectives; urges the Member States to provide sufficient funding for this purpose by assigning mandates to the EIB and through a possible capital increase, thus enabling the EIB to mobilise investments that truly meet pan-European needs and strengthen the EU’s relevance as a global player; recalls that the new Commission has set itself the goal of being an ‘investment Commission’;

    3. Stresses that the EIB’s ‘triple A’ rating is essential and a key asset that must be maintained; urges all relevant actors to protect and guarantee this rating when adapting the EIB’s lending policy and mandate; underlines that the rating is based, among other factors, on its solid capital position, excellent asset quality and performance, the creditworthiness of the Member States as its ultimate guarantors, and the fact that the EIB has been responsive to EU policy objectives; notes that, with a solid ‘triple A’ rating and a strong risk management framework, the EIB Group has the financial strength required to steadily increase its annual investments; highlights the fact that the EIB’s rating and financial position also allow it to ensure favourable financing conditions in funding public interest projects compared to private commercial banks, ensuring certainty and cost effectiveness, and allow it to absorb potential fluctuations in returns, retain investor confidence and contain borrowing costs; underlines that the EIB should further leverage its privileged status to take greater risks in funding European public goods and strategic investments; takes note of the decision of the EIB Board of Governors to increase the EIB’s gearing ratio limit from 250 % to 290 %; stresses that the EIB should adequately calibrate its intervention to ensure that it does not crowd out private investment;

    4. Notes that the EIB investment volume relative to GDP among European countries ranges from 0.1 %[12] to 1.4 % for 2024; calls on the EIB Group to ensure a more balanced geographical distribution of investments aiming to maximise its impact across all EU regions to promote cohesive and inclusive growth throughout the EU, with particular attention on under-represented and less developed areas; calls on the EIB to keep focusing on investment plans aimed at closing the gap between the more developed EU regions and island areas, inland areas, the outermost regions, economically depressed areas and all areas of the EU at a disadvantage owing to natural factors;

    5. Stresses the need to simplify, streamline, optimise and consolidate current and future EIB processes and mandates to enhance synergies, effectiveness and efficiency; suggests the development and introduction of a single rule book, with a uniform set of financial rules, to function as a unified framework across multiple EU programmes and simplify implementation for partners, which will contribute to enhancing the EIB’s operations;

    6. Stresses the importance of reducing the administrative burden and reporting costs as well as simplifying procedures for EIB-financed projects, in particular for SMEs and smaller-scale innovation-driven initiatives; underlines that a more streamlined process could increase the EIB’s impact and responsiveness; welcomes, in this regard, the establishment of one-stop shops to offer coordinated financial support and technical guidance;

    7. Acknowledges the EIB’s commitment to reforms to shorten time-to-market, with a target of a 30 % reduction by the end of 2024 and a 50 % reduction over the 2024-2026 period; notes that the implementation of these reforms is being accelerated to reduce bureaucracy, enhance synergies within the Group, to automate and streamline internal procedures and improve cost efficiency; calls on the Commission and the EIB to further assess how to speed up the EIB’s time-to-market as well as to simplify financing mandates without compromising auditing standards or transparency; calls on the EIB to intensify its efforts in the digitalisation of its operations;

    Closing the investment gap and fostering competitiveness

    8. Emphasises the important role of the EIB Group as a pan-European and international investment body in mobilising both public and private financing for EU priorities and supporting Member States in financing essential and strategic investments and EU policy goals;

    9. Recalls, however, that the EIB’s operations are by nature limited and can only play a supporting role in addressing the significant investment gap; reiterates that a more integrated economic and monetary union and strengthened economic architecture and effective coordination would support the EIB’s operations; calls, therefore, for swift and substantial progress regarding the capital markets union, particularly through concrete steps on the recently launched savings and investments union, the completion of the banking union, as well as, where appropriate, the establishment of EU-level investment instruments and tools designed to minimise the cost for EU taxpayers and maximise efficiency in the provision of European public goods;

    10. Affirms that more integrated capital markets and a deeper single market are also essential foundations for the EIB’s operations; welcomes the EIB’s strategic roadmap, which places the capital markets union high on its agenda; considers that a adequately completed savings and investments union will bring benefits to consumers and SMEs alike by providing high-yield investment opportunities in the real economy, and will ultimately strengthen the venture capital market, which is considered riskier than other forms of investment, by facilitating access to more diversified funding sources; emphasises that relevant European public actors should contribute to the savings and investments union and welcomes the EIB’s willingness to launch pilot projects and other concrete initiatives in this area;

    11. Calls on the Commission and the EIB Group to enhance efforts to deliver on the agenda for the Competitiveness Compass and the savings and investments union by mobilising private capital for productive investments, supporting innovation throughout companies’ life cycles, venture capital financing and more high-risk equity financing for start-ups and scale-ups; underlines that higher-risk instruments such as equity and venture debt must be used with clear risk frameworks and measurable performance indicators; encourages the EIB to expand financing for women-owned businesses;

    12. Recognises the central role of SMEs, as the backbone of the European economy, in driving economic growth, fostering innovation, creating employment and promoting territorial cohesion; recalls, in this regard, that the EU’s 24 million SMEs account for 99 % of all businesses, provide around two-thirds of all jobs and generate over 50 % of the total value added that is produced by EU businesses; underlines that supporting SMEs is a key objective for the EIB Group and that greater access to credit, the creation of tailored financial instruments, and targeted investments in SMEs can have a widespread positive impact by contributing to the Union’s economic resilience, the competitiveness of local production chains, and the digital and sustainable transitions in regional economies;

    13. Encourages the EIB to maintain and strengthen its role in facilitating access to finance for SMEs and start-ups, which frequently encounter obstacles when seeking funding from traditional financial institutions, providing targeted financing to ensure sufficient resources to grow and prosper; points out that SMEs continue to face challenges owing to high interest rates and raw materials and energy costs;

    14. Welcomes the EIF’s role in financing start-ups and scale-ups in Europe, including through its activities in the European venture capital market; stresses that EIF instruments must remain easily accessible for smaller applicants, and calls on the EIF to streamline its application procedures accordingly; calls for an increase in the budget of the EIF dedicated to the EU venture capital ecosystem, in line with the Draghi report recommendation; calls also for the introduction of first-loss guarantees and convertible instruments targeted at start-ups and scale-ups;

    15. Highlights the role of the EIB Group as a major contributor to developing the European venture capital and private equity ecosystem, but notes that further work is needed to support European innovation to provide start-ups with more opportunities to scale up and access funding throughout their life cycle; notes that, although a share of private investment already flows through venture capital funds, it remains insufficient and is unevenly distributed across Member States; underlines that a capital markets union could help address this imbalance and improve access to finance across Member States;

    16. Stresses that de-risking instruments and budgetary guarantees provided by the EU have proven to be powerful tools; considers that de-risking should continue effectively, particularly for investments in innovative and strategic sectors; is concerned that, according to the interim evaluation of the InvestEU programme, envelopes for many financial products may run out by the end of 2025 without budgetary reinforcements; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s proposal of 26 February 2025 to provide additional funding to InvestEU; calls for a balanced geographical distribution of financing under InvestEU, particularly with respect to smaller Member States;

    17. Recalls that EU budgetary guarantees are underpinned by taxpayer funds and that defaults on EIB-backed projects could directly impact the EU budget;

    18. Welcomes the continued expansion of the EIB’s network of European promotional banks and other international financial institutions to help to further leverage public and private investment, and to ensure broad geographical and sectoral coverage; recalls that InvestEU is 75 % implemented by the EIB; calls for the financial instrument component of the Competitiveness Fund to make use of the expertise of national promotional banks and institutions (NPBIs), particularly their knowledge of local and regional actors; in that context, calls for the blending of instruments between the EIB and NPBIs to be explored further, ensuring that such instruments do not compromise the funds already dedicated to NPBIs;

    19. Asks the EIB to increase its concessional loans to local and national financial intermediaries, including to credit guarantee consortia, microfinance institutions, ethical banks and collective guarantee structures working to facilitate access to credit for SMEs, with a particular focus on rural areas, inland and island areas, the outermost regions, and areas undergoing economic and environmental transitions;

    Consolidating the EIB’s role as the EU’s climate bank

    20. Acknowledges the EIB’s role as a climate bank and its alignment with the EU sustainable finance framework, including the integration, where applicable, of taxonomy criteria[13], supporting the transition by providing financing in sustainable and clean technologies and backing the Union’s efforts to decarbonise the EU economy; recalls that the EIB’s financial flows must be consistent with the EU’s goal of climate neutrality by 2050 and climate objectives for 2030; notes that all corporate clients of EIB financing are contractually required to publish a credible Paris alignment strategy (‘decarbonisation plans’)[14];

    21. Welcomes the EIB’s climate and environmental investments, which totalled EUR 50.7 billion in 2024, exceeding the target of channelling at least 50 % of total financing into climate action and environmental sustainability; calls on the EIB to uphold its high level of ambition, while emphasising that this commitment enhances the Union’s competitiveness, energy security and industrial resilience;

    22. Recalls that the green transition must be inclusive, fair and competitive, and that green investments must be viable; expects the EIB, therefore, to leverage its lending, financial instruments, technical assistance and advisory services to support citizens and businesses that face socio-economic challenges deriving from their efforts to achieve climate neutrality by 2050; stresses the need to support industrial restructuring, workforce reskilling, and the creation of new employment opportunities in affected regions; invites the EIB to support projects delivering affordable access to renewable energy, housing and public services, community-led initiatives and small projects with a particular focus on fighting energy poverty as a priority;

    23. Welcomes the EIB’s investments in renewable energy, energy efficiency, interconnectors, and electricity grids and storage, including its support for REPowerEU; underlines the importance of focusing on projects with high economic impact and measurable climate benefits; calls on the EIB to play a role in mobilising private capital for grid investments in support of lower energy prices; acknowledges, in particular, the increased investment in emerging technologies for industrial electrification and decarbonisation, recognising their role in supporting the transition to climate neutrality by reducing emissions from hard-to-abate industrial sectors, while expressing concern about their potential impact on the water supply in certain regions;

    24. Stresses the importance of addressing high energy costs in the EU to enhance the competitiveness of European companies; points out that a stable energy supply at competitive prices is one of the foundations of a successful industrial policy; calls on the EIB Group to especially support SMEs facing energy-related cost pressures, including through targeted financing and advisory services to improve energy efficiency and resilience; calls on the EIB to continue to support energy-intensive industries, in order to ensure that this highly strategic sector is in a position to successfully manage the energy transition;

    25. Notes that, in a world full of uncertainty, investments should be focused on the EU’s preparedness to face shocks; stresses the need for increased investment in climate adaptation and resilience; encourages further research and development, including of innovative technologies, for climate preparedness; calls for access to finance for SMEs in innovative green technologies to be enhanced; recalls that clean technology strengthens EU sovereignty and is essential for competitiveness, yet faces even greater funding challenges due to the green premium compared to incumbent technologies; highlights the Draghi report’s call for more public guarantee and counter-guarantee schemes to cover the investment risks of clean technology manufacturing projects;

    26. Recalls that the EIB was the first issuer of green bonds and is now the largest multi-currency issuer of green bonds; welcomes the fact that on 2 April 2025 the EIB issued its first Climate Awareness Bond aligned with the EU Green Bond Standard Regulation[15]; highlights the key role of the EIB in developing the green-bond market, providing financing solutions to sustainable companies; calls on the Commission and the EIB Group to maintain the EU’s leadership in green and digital bonds;

    27. Recalls the EIB’s commitment to the Convention on Biological Diversity and the post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework and supports the EIB’s investments in biodiversity protection and the preservation of natural resources; welcomes the EIB and European Environment Agency agreement to deepen their collaboration on biodiversity and climate actions; emphasises that, in order to achieve the long-term benefits of restoration, conservation and protection of biodiversity and nature, attractive financing schemes should be made available to potential beneficiaries to engage in such practices on a voluntary basis;

    Financing peace, security and defence

    28. Welcomes the EIB’s proactive approach in the area of security and defence; highlights the fact that investment in this sector doubled in 2024 to EUR 1 billion, with the EIB’s 2025 plan set to double it again to a record EUR 2 billion; stresses that greater EIB investment in the defence sector can encourage commercial banks’ investment in the sector; notes, however, that these amounts represent less than 1.1 % of EIB investments for  2024 (EUR 88.8 billion), and 2.2 % of its financing objectives for 2025 (EUR 95 billion) and emphasises that they can only play a complementary role in addressing the estimated EUR 33.6 billion to EUR 48 billion in new financing required by 2030 for defence companies to meet the increase in orders expected under the ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030 plan; stresses that European-level funding is essential to meet the significant funding needs of Member States; underlines that any future structural European defence funding must be designed with clear conditions set and strong oversight, drawing on lessons learned from existing instruments;

    29. Supports the EIB’s continued and strengthened role in bolstering Europe’s security through targeted investments in both defence and civilian infrastructure, and stresses the need to concentrate strategic investments in projects delivering European added value and in dual-use technologies that contribute to both civilian and defence objectives, in line with the EU’s overarching goals of fostering innovation and enhancing the Union’s security and resilience; stresses that effective defence innovation depends on close collaboration between academia, research institutions and private industry, and encourages the EIB to act as a catalyst in structuring long-term public-private partnerships through targeted financial instruments;

    30. Welcomes the EIB’s plan to revise its operational framework, establishing a dedicated transversal public policy goal to enhance Europe’s peace and security, backed by ambitious financial and capital allocation[16]; supports, therefore, the EIB Board decision of 21 March 2025 to integrate the EIB’s 2022 Strategic European Security Initiative (SESI) into a permanent, cross-cutting public policy objective, complementing the existing public policy goals; underlines, however, that any activities in the field of defence must be subject to appropriate financial parameters, regular risk assessment and transparent oversight and must be accompanied by strong risk management procedures;

    31. Welcomes the joint initiative of the Commission and the EIB Group to set up, via its subsidiary EIF, a fund of funds called the Defence Equity Facility, with a budget of EUR 175 million between 2024 and 2027, to support private investment in European SMEs developing innovative dual-use defence technologies, and to help address the equity financing needs of companies in the EU’s defence technological and industrial base, estimated at between EUR 6.8 billion and EUR 20 billion by 2030, to meet the increase in orders anticipated under the ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030 plan;

    32. Acknowledges the EIB Board decision of 21 March 2025 to broaden the EIB Group’s eligibility criteria for security and defence investments, limiting excluded activities, in accordance with the proposals approved by EU leaders at the European Council on 6 March 2025, as well as the approval of the EIB Group Security and Defence Action Plan in May 2024, aimed at enhancing support for the EU’s security and defence industry; notes that, under that plan, the EIB Group provides financing to SMEs and innovative start-ups operating in the security and defence sector in line with the dual-use principle, maintaining the requirement of ‘credible civil use’ while discontinuing the revenue test;

    33. Takes note of the EIB Board decision of 21 March 2025 that there will be no fixed ceiling for security and defence investments, with funding amounts to be determined annually in the EIB Group Operational Plan; asks the EIB to clarify the potential implications of that decision for other policy areas and the overall operations of the EIB;

    34. Suggests that the EIB should continuously reflect on and evaluate its role, as well as the scope of eligible investments, in contributing to Europe’s peace and security as outlined in the Commission’s white paper on the future of European defence, particularly in the light of the pressing need to scale up the European defence sector and ensure long-term security and strategic autonomy; warns that any adjustment to the EIB Group’s eligibility criteria or funding to align with new priorities must safeguard the Group’s financial position and ensure effective financing of other strategic EU priorities;

    Addressing challenges in social infrastructure, cohesion policy and housing

    35. Welcomes the EIB’s core strategic priorities to reinforce Europe’s social infrastructure and a modern cohesion policy for inclusive and sustainable growth across Europe; appreciates that in its Cohesion Orientation 2021-2027, the EIB committed to dedicating at least 40 % of its total financing in the EU between 2022 and 2024 to projects in cohesion regions, and that in 2024, such financing accounted for 48 % of total EU lending; calls on the EIB to continue to support infrastructure development, including investments in railways, healthcare and social infrastructure, which are crucial for social and economic cohesion, resilience and inclusive growth; underlines that, amid the geopolitical and economic uncertainties, the EIB can provide long-term solutions to address the cost of living crisis;

    36. Highlights the crucial role of skills development in driving long-term sustainable growth, employment and competitiveness in the EU; underlines that financing initiatives aimed at boosting human capital not only foster innovation and productivity and address labour market needs, but also strengthen social cohesion and economic resilience; calls on the EIB to step up investments in education, training, upskilling and reskilling, and health, in close coordination and cooperation with Member State initiatives in those areas, aiming to complement and enhance their impact;

    37. Welcomes the EIB’s commitment to addressing the challenge of the double market failure in the housing sector, including the insufficient provision of affordable and energy-efficient housing, as well as the market failure to increase the energy efficiency of the existing housing stock; notes the differences between Member States in both policies and the magnitude of the aforementioned market failures;

    38. Welcomes the EIB’s ‘Action Plan for Affordable and Sustainable Housing’ with planned investments of EUR 10 billion over the next two years; draws attention to the outcome of the EIB Group analysis and stakeholder meeting, which highlighted an estimated annual public and private investment gap of EUR 300 billion to 400 billion needed to build 1.5 million new housing units and to renovate 5 million additional units annually; encourages the EIB to mobilise even more funding for affordable housing projects throughout the Member States; invites the EIB to focus on sustainable urban development by ensuring that the EU’s housing and infrastructure needs are met for a stronger, sustainable, more cohesive and prosperous Europe, including investments in recovering existing infrastructure, with a focus on supporting urban regeneration projects and projects converting old or abandoned buildings into modern social housing;

    39. Calls on the EIB to take into account the differentiated burden of housing costs on different income groups and family structures, especially as some low-income groups are at risk of marginalisation; encourages the EIB to collaborate with other European public investment banks, local public financial institutions, local governments, and cooperative and social housing companies to finance housing solutions for vulnerable and low-income groups; welcomes the EIB’s intention to increase its focus on R&I in the area of housing;

    40. Calls on the EIB to scale up financial support through the deployment of standardised off-the-shelf financial products in energy and building renovation; highlights the fact that the EIB’s ‘originate-to-distribute’ model, channelling the savings of institutional investors, is an innovative model that could contribute to the integration of EU capital markets;

    41. Welcomes the EIB’s intention to expand financial and advisory support for affordable housing, especially for younger generations; encourages close synergy and exchange with the Commission, municipalities and local authorities, cooperative housing providers, housing associations and the construction sector, exchanging best practice and promoting pan-European cooperation; invites the EIB to support projects delivering affordable access to renewable energy, housing and public services, community-led initiatives and small projects with a particular focus on fighting energy poverty;

    42. Welcomes the EIB Group’s inclusion of agriculture and bioeconomy among its key priorities; underlines that agriculture is a key driver of growth and development in rural areas and that enhancing support and fostering innovation for this vital sector play a significant role in ensuring food security; highlights the financial challenges faced by farmers, particularly young farmers, noting that farmers and enterprises in this sector experience lower success rates when applying for financing; calls on the EIB Group to increase its involvement in the agricultural sector by improving access to funding;

    43. Calls on the EIB to intensify its efforts to promote youth employment, particularly by supporting projects and programmes that foster youth entrepreneurship, access to employment, vocational training and innovation, in order to contribute to fairer and more inclusive territorial development and to help curb brain drain, especially in the EU’s island regions and economically disadvantaged areas;

    Promoting the digital transformation and new technologies

    44. Calls on the EIB to strengthen financing for the EU’s open strategic autonomy in the digital field and to promote research, support the development of European digital infrastructure, foster new and disruptive technologies such as AI and quantum computing, and enable the growth of digital start-ups; underlines the importance of bridging digital divides, both within the EU and globally, to ensure inclusive access to digital infrastructure and services; highlights the importance of aligning EIB digital investments with EU strategic priorities such as the Digital Decade targets, including connectivity, digital skills and the digital transformation of businesses;

    45. Supports the EIF’s expansion of the European Tech Champions Initiative (ETCI) to attract private capital to scale up innovative start-ups into successful global leaders, ensuring that European-founded companies and technologies remain in the EU through the late growth stage; highlights the need for the deployment of the current ETCI to be accelerated in order to keep up with the pace of innovation and start-ups; calls, furthermore, for the successful experience of the ETCI to be built on to develop other similar initiatives to continue supporting the digital transition and other strategic sectors, and encourages the EIF to explore setting up a second generation of this initiative as well as to explore the possibility of investing in funds of funds;

    46. Underlines that institutional investors in Europe could play a bigger role in supporting venture capital, especially for scale-ups; urges the EIB Group therefore to create an European Tech Forum, bringing together the venture capital ecosystem, to engage institutional investors following the model of the Tibi initiative[17]; calls on the EIB to offer opportunities for such investors to build their expertise and opt in to co-investment schemes between the EIF and institutional investors, on transparent and pre-agreed terms;

    47. Highlights the fact that the Clean Industrial Deal aims to develop a TechEU programme with the EIB; stresses the importance of ensuring that this fund has a specific allocation target for start-ups and scale-ups;

    48. Calls on the EIB to support the strengthening of cybersecurity capabilities in the EU, in order to make Europe more resilient while enhancing existing cooperation between the Member States and in order to protect critical entities and essential services;

    49. Highlights the fact that the security of supply of critical raw materials (CRMs) is crucial for the green and digital transitions, the defence sector and the EU industrial base in general; recalls the role played by the EIB in the EU Raw Materials Alliance and the Union’s aim of becoming more autonomous as regards the CRM supply; emphasises the importance of a circular economy approach to CRMs, in order to reduce the EU’s dependence on non-EU countries and boost its strategic autonomy; calls, therefore, on the EIB to invest more in the CRM sector to enhance resilience in raw materials with a particular focus on the recycling of secondary raw materials;

    50. Calls on the EIB to support the technological transformation of European companies, as well as the development of digital skills among employees and entrepreneurs;

    EIB neighbourhood and Global Gateway

    51. Welcomes the EIB’s vital support for Ukraine in the light of Russia’s full-scale, unjustified and illegal war of aggression; calls for an increase in EU budget guarantees to allow the EIB to continue to deliver and strengthen public and private sector operations in Ukraine, supporting Ukraine’s immediate economic challenges, but also envisaging the reconstruction of the country over the medium to long term;

    52. Emphasises that, to decrease dependence on non-EU countries, the deployment of resilient European-controlled infrastructure, among others in the domains of satellite communications, energy and logistics, is essential;

    53. Stresses the important role that the EIB plays in supporting Members States and countries outside the EU, particularly candidate countries, in obtaining access to risk capital markets, thus expanding investment opportunities;

    54. Stresses that, as part of the EU’s external action toolbox, the Global Gateway is crucial for Europe’s global position and aims to promote the rules-based multilateral system, sustainable development, democracy, human rights, gender equality and the rule of law; welcomes the EIB’s role, as the EU’s leading development bank, in this regard; recalls the importance of predictable guarantees from the EU budget to enable the EIB to continue delivering operations outside the EU;

    55. Calls for enhanced transparency and disclosure practices in line with other multinational development banks, along with the establishment of an independent complaints mechanism that can effectively address and remedy grievances; underlines the need for effective mechanisms to ensure the participation of, and accountability to, communities affected by EIB-financed projects to ensure that Global Gateway projects are responsive to local needs, are gender-sensitive and deliver meaningful developmental results; emphasises the importance of public participation, in particular in the EIB’s planning, appraisal and monitoring processes for CRMs, including the Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) of Indigenous communities, as provided for in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples;

    56. Reiterates its call for EIB Global to focus blending operations on areas where they can add value to the local economy while avoiding the crowding out of private capital and to ensure that blended finance is not used for essential public services, particularly health, education and social protection; recalls that EU development policy goals, and in particular the goal of enhancing affordable access to healthcare, should guide EIB investments in the field, to ensure better health outcomes for all, and in particular for women;

    57. Expects the EIB’s global activities to also respond swiftly to evolving realities and urgent needs; highlights the gap in development aid financing resulting from the US aid freeze and the reduction of funding towards the Global South; calls for concrete initiatives to prevent humanitarian or health crises, to support pan-African trade, infrastructure and regional integration, and strengthen ties with Europe; welcomes EIB Global’s intention to scale up higher-risk operations, enabled by the mandate of the Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-Global Europe);

    58. Expresses concern over reports that some EU-funded projects outside the EU, including under the Global Gateway, are being built by Chinese companies, with Chinese firms at times winning more EIB-funded contracts than EU firms; urges the Commission to ensure a level playing field by working with the EIB to boost European company participation; recommends procurement practices that prioritise best price/quality ratio over lowest price to promote fair competition and align with EU values;

    59. Welcomes the efforts of the EIB, together with nine other multilateral development banks, to strengthen their collaboration in advancing progress towards the SDGs; calls on the EIB to continue cooperating with other bilateral and multilateral institutions to develop and apply common methodologies for development impact analysis, with a view to ensuring long-term positive impacts and added value;

    60. Welcomes the EIB’s announcement to step up support for sectors such as water supplies, small businesses, renewable energy and energy efficiency, as well as to further reinforce partnerships within Europe and globally, including with private actors, to deliver maximum impact on the ground;

    Governance: accountability and transparency

    61. Stresses that the EIB’s growing role should be accompanied by greater democratic accountability and transparency; including more timely publication of project-related documents; reiterates its call for an interinstitutional agreement between Parliament and the EIB to formalise and enhance their existing cooperation, including through regular structured dialogue, improved Parliament access to EIB documents and data, and the possibility for Parliament to submit questions for written answers to the EIB, as already provided for the European Central Bank; in this context, asks the EIB to provide Parliament with a clear, simplified overview of EU budget contributions to its balance sheet, off-balance sheet, and profit and loss account;

    62. Highlights the importance of the EIB ensuring full transparency and traceability of projects funded, including more detailed information, to enable proper oversight by all relevant stakeholders, including civil society organisations, rather than solely by the ministries responsible; recalls that all recipients of EU funding have a general obligation to acknowledge its origin and ensure the visibility of any EU funding received; calls on the EIB Group to ensure that the final recipients comply with the visibility conditions of the EU’s financial support;

    63. Invites the EIB to boost the participation of European companies in procurement processes launched for projects financed by the EIB; encourages the EIB to advise borrowers to prioritise eligibility of European companies in order to strengthen European competitiveness;

    64. Underlines the importance of the EIB Group’s upholding the highest standards in preventing all forms of fraud, tax evasion, tax avoidance, money laundering and the financing of terrorism; notes that safeguarding the integrity of the EIB Group’s financing is essential to ensure public trust and the effective use of resources; takes note of the inquiries completed by the European Ombudsman and ongoing investigations by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the European Anti-Fraud Office, and expects full clarity and appropriate follow-up, including any necessary consequences;

    65. Reiterates its call for the EIB to consider aligning the division of labour within the Management Committee with recommendations from EU institutions, to help mitigate potential conflicts of interest;

    66. Welcomes the 2024 framework for the recognition of trade unions at the European Investment Bank;

    67. Welcomes the EIB’s principles of diversity, equity and inclusion, including the target of at least 40 % of management positions being held by women by the end of 2026; calls for a geographically balanced representation of EU nationalities among staff;

    68. Highlights the need to strengthen the EIB’s human rights policies, including the establishment of a clear and effective human rights due diligence framework and strategy; stresses that environmental and social impact assessments should be carried out by independent experts, and that independent verification mechanisms should be introduced to oversee the self-monitoring and self-reporting conducted by EIB clients;

    °

    ° °

    69. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the European Investment Bank.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Georgia – A10-0110/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Georgia

     

    (2025/2024(INI))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Georgia 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0697),

    – having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part[1],

    – having regard to Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution, which requires that all possible measures be taken to ensure Georgia’s full integration into the EU and NATO,

    – having regard to the final report of 20 December 2024 of the election observation mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on the parliamentary elections held in Georgia on 26 October 2024,–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 June 2024 on Georgia and of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia,

    – having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0110/2025),

    A. whereas in December 2023, the European Council granted Georgia candidate status on the understanding that the relevant nine steps set out in the Commission recommendation of 8 November 2023 and primarily relating to reforms in the areas of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights would be taken;

    B. whereas the situation in Georgia has deteriorated significantly since the publication of the 2024 Commission report on the country on 30 October 2024, particularly as a result of the actions of the Georgian Government;

    C. whereas Georgia has been experiencing democratic backsliding in recent years and in particular since the parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024, which failed to meet international democratic standards and comply with Georgia’s OSCE commitments, and resulted in an illegitimate parliament composed of only one political party, Georgian Dream; whereas Russia has systematically interfered in democratic processes in Georgia; whereas the fraudulent elections included voter intimidation, vote buying and harassment of election observers;

    D. whereas on 28 November 2024, Irakli Kobakhidze announced that Georgia would delay initiating accession talks with the EU and reject its financial assistance until the end of 2028, disregarding the country’s constitutional commitment to European integration and effectively undermining Georgia’s sovereign Euro-Atlantic aspirations, which have the strong support of the Georgian people;

    E. whereas concerns over the direction in which the country is heading and the decision to pause the efforts to start accession negotiations sparked large-scale protests across the country, with protesters demanding new, free and fair elections, the return of the country to its European path, an end to political violence and repression, investigations into and accountability for the serious human rights violations committed against protesters by law enforcement agencies, and the release of political prisoners; whereas protests have been taking place every day without interruption since 28 November 2024; whereas pro-EU protests have significantly increased across Georgia in 2025, with tens of thousands of citizens demonstrating against the government’s perceived shift away from EU integration; whereas these self-organised and spontaneous protests involving all segments of Georgian society underscore the Georgian people’s strong commitment to European values and democratic governance;

    F. whereas in response to the peaceful protests, the Georgian authorities began an unprecedented violent crackdown on demonstrations, accompanied by the unlawful use of force, torture and other ill-treatment by the de facto authorities; whereas since November 2024, at least 62 people have been criminally charged in connection with their participation in pro-European protests and 54 remain in pre-trial detention; whereas more than 500 people have been detained under administrative procedures, some 300 of whom have reportedly been subjected to torture or other forms of inhuman and degrading treatment and at least 157 of whom have suffered visible signs of serious physical injury;

     

    G. whereas the de facto Georgian Dream authorities systematically subject civil society and independent media to pressure, legal restrictions and physical violence; whereas at least 138 incidents of media freedom violations have been documented in the context of pro-European protests or related events since November 2024, and a total of 174 media professionals have been the target of state repression; whereas at least 30 reporters have suffered repeated violations, including physical assaults, damage to professional equipment, administrative fines, criminal charges and judicial harassment; whereas journalist Mzia Amaglobeli is currently in pre-trial detention on trumped-up charges;

     

    H. whereas the Georgian authorities have been restructuring or eliminating structures within the Georgian civil service responsible for pro-European reforms and dismissing professionals and civil servants en masse, in particular those who have criticised government policies, expressed pro-European views and condemned violence against peaceful demonstrators;

     

    I. whereas the illegitimate Georgian parliament has established the Temporary Parliamentary Investigative Commission on the Activities of the Regime and Political Figures of 2003-2012, which was the period when President Mikheil Saakashvili was at the helm and paving the way for Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions; whereas this commission is a tool for the further persecution of political opponents, especially leaders of opposition movements; whereas on 22 May 2025, Zurab ‘Girchi’ Japaridze, the leader of the Girchi – More Freedom party and one of the leaders of the Coalition for Change, was arrested for refusing to appear before this politically motivated commission created and controlled by Georgian Dream, whose long-term ambition is to eradicate political opposition in Georgia; whereas on 29 May 2025, Nika Melia, another leader of the Coalition for Change, was arrested one day before he was due to appear in court for refusing to appear before the Temporary Parliamentary Investigative Commission;

     

    J. whereas, in order to maintain and further increase its grip on power, the ruling Georgian Dream party has unilaterally and without consultation adopted changes to the municipal electoral system for the elections to the city councils in October 2025; whereas the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe has recommended repealing these changes and the leaders of the main opposition parties have announced that their parties will not participate in those elections; whereas reforms to the formation process of the Central Election Commission further compromise election integrity, limit citizen participation and restrict the ability of observers and media to effectively monitor the electoral process;

     

    K. whereas despite progress towards a more equal and inclusive society, deep-rooted inequalities and stereotypes persist, resulting in high levels of gender-based violence, severe restrictions for persons with disabilities and violence and harassment against the LGBTI community; whereas due to insecurity at home, many LGBTI people choose to flee the country; whereas Georgia’s legal definition of rape does not comply with the standards set in the Istanbul Convention;

    Suspension of Georgia’s EU integration

    1. Reiterates its solidarity with the Georgian people and its unwavering support for their legitimate European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations and wish to live in a prosperous and democratic country, as expressed in mass protests that continue despite brutal crackdowns by the authorities; remains ready to assist the Georgian people in achieving these goals; strongly condemns the violent repression, arbitrary and politically motivated detention without sufficient legal grounds and the reported systemic torture of peaceful protesters, civil society actors, political opponents and media representatives; demands that the Georgian authorities refrain from using force, respect the freedoms of assembly and of expression and annul the recently adopted draconian legislation aimed at stifling popular protests, notably through extortionate fines; expresses its particular concern regarding the growing number of political prisoners and reiterates its call for the immediate and unconditional release of all of them; calls for all acts of violence to be effectively and credibly investigated and for those responsible to be held accountable; expresses concern about the lack of independence within the judiciary, with high-placed judges with links to the Georgian Dream overseeing politically motivated court proceedings against peaceful protesters and government critics;

    2. Expresses deep regret over the fact that the ruling Georgian Dream party failed to use the historic opportunity granted to Georgia, as a candidate country, to progress on its European integration path, noting that European integration continues to be supported by an overwhelming majority of the population; recalls that candidate status was granted to Georgia with the benefit of the doubt, despite the already concerning trajectory of the Georgian Dream government’s actions, which were increasingly at odds with European values and democratic principles; underlines that Georgia under Georgian Dream’s rule has not moved forward, and has in fact even regressed, on the key provisions of the nine steps indicated by the Commission, despite the authorities’ claims to the contrary; stresses that Georgia’s EU integration process has effectively been suspended as a result of the continued democratic backsliding in the country and the rigged October 2024 parliamentary elections amounting to a clear turning point towards an authoritarian regime, the ensuing illicit capture of the state institutions and democratic safeguards, and the adoption of a series of anti-democratic legislative acts that run counter to the values and principles upon which the EU is founded; concurs with the European Council’s conclusions of 27 June 2024 that a failure to reverse the current course of action jeopardises Georgia’s EU path and urges the Georgian Dream to return to the course of democratic reforms and Euro-Atlantic integration;

    3. Deplores the dismissal of approximately 700 civil servants since December 2024 due to their participation in or support for pro-European protests; stresses that such retaliation erodes public trust in democratic institutions, violates freedom of expression and association, and contributes to the deepening authoritarian tendencies of the current regime; calls on the Georgian authorities to abide by labour law standards and to allow civil servants to register a trade union in order to protect them from the unjustified restriction of their labour rights; expresses its concern about the growing politicisation of civil service appointments, and calls for a repeal of the amendments to the Law on Public Service adopted in December 2024 that remove the competition rule for the appointment of civil servants and instead grant direct appointment powers to the heads of public institutions; reiterates that these amendments constitute worrying backsliding from the successful public service reform that was implemented by Georgia under the EU-Georgian Association Agreement and calls for their repeal; 4.  Stresses the need for an immediate and comprehensive audit of the EU’s policy towards Georgia given the ongoing democratic backsliding and the increasingly repressive political and legislative environment that constitutes a regression for many of Georgia’s democratic achievements and successful EU reforms, fundamentally weakens democratic institutions and further consolidates power in the hands of the ruling party; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to review the implementation of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement in the light of the blatant breach of Georgia’s obligations regarding the general principles laid down in Article 2, namely respect for democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms; reiterates that non-fulfilment of these obligations may result in the conditional suspension of economic cooperation and the privileges afforded by the Agreement;

    5. Deplores the fact that high-level ruling party officials, members of parliament and government-affiliated media regularly spread manipulative narratives, disinformation and conspiracy theories about the EU, its Member States, leaders and politicians, as well as European integration; stresses that the ruling party’s regime continues its purposefully deceitful and ambiguous discourse, fuelling the false belief among parts of the Georgian public that it remains in favour of European integration; regrets the fact that the media and information environment is being suppressed and dominated by TV and media outlets supported by Georgian Dream, which spread false narratives about EU integration, thereby emulating and playing into Russian-inspired propaganda and facilitating polarisation in society;

     

    6. Underlines the responsibility of Bidzina Ivanishvili and other officials and political leaders, including Irakli Kobakhidze, Shalva Papuashvili, Vakhtang Gomelauri, Mayor of Tbilisi and Georgian Dream Secretary General Kakha Kaladze, and the former Georgian Dream chair Irakli Garibashvili, for the deterioration of the political process in Georgia by enabling democratic backsliding resulting in the autocratic consolidation of power and by acting against the country’s constitutional objective of Euro-Atlantic integration; calls, therefore, for immediate and targeted personal sanctions to be imposed against Bidzina Ivanishvili, his family members and his companies and calls for the EU, in cooperation with other jurisdictions, in particular the United Kingdom, to freeze his financial assets; deplores the obstruction by the Hungarian and Slovak Governments of the Council decisions on the imposition of sanctions against individuals responsible for democratic backsliding in Georgia; condemns the unilateral actions by the Hungarian Government seeking to legitimise Georgian Dream;

     

    Continued backsliding on democracy and the rule of law and the autocratic consolidation of power

     

    7. Reiterates its position that the settlement of the current political and constitutional crisis in Georgia can only be achieved by way of new parliamentary elections, which should be held in the next few months in an improved electoral environment, overseen by an independent and impartial election administration and monitored through diligent international and independent domestic observation to guarantee a genuinely fair, free and transparent process that would reflect the true will of the people;

    8. Stresses that it does not recognise the self-proclaimed authorities established by the Georgian Dream party following the rigged parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024 and that it considers Georgia to be a state captured by the illegitimate Georgian Dream regime; consequentially rejects any decisions taken by the body that has taken control of the country, such as the rushed adoption of amendments to the Code on Administrative Offences, the Criminal Code and the Law on Assemblies and Manifestations; regrets the fact that the parliament of Georgia is a one-party parliament formed on the basis of fraudulent elections, which is incompatible with a pluralistic parliamentary democracy and the standards expected from an EU candidate country; welcomes the rejection of Georgian Dream’s credentials in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Georgian delegation;

    9. Deplores the continued attempts by the ruling Georgian Dream party to persecute political opponents, including through their illegal arrest and detention, threats and physical attacks; reiterates its calls for an end to politically motivated hostilities, an improvement to the political environment and the building of trust and cross-party dialogue;

     

    10. Condemns the unlawful prosecution of political opponents by the investigative committee of the de facto Georgian parliament under the leadership of the Georgian Dream party, which disproportionately targets the actions of the government that ended its mandate more than twelve years ago; highlights the political nature of the ‘investigation’, noting that the Georgian Dream party has been in power since 2012 but launched the investigative committee in parallel with its attempts to ban genuine opposition parties; notes with concern the statements by the chair of the investigative committee, Tea Tsulukiani, spreading Russian narratives; strongly condemns the arrest of Zurab ‘Girchi’ Japaridze and Nika Melia, and the threats to arrest  other politicians, and considers these individuals to be political prisoners;

     

    11. Expresses deep concern over recent declarations by leaders of the ruling Georgian Dream party indicating their intention to declare opposition parties – primarily the United National Movement – unconstitutional; recalls that the United National Movement played a pivotal role in initiating and advancing Georgia’s European integration process; notes the parallels between the conduct of the Georgian Dream de facto authorities and the current Kremlin regime, which cemented its rule by outlawing opposition parties; condemns the draft amendment to the Organic Law on Political Associations of Citizens and to the Law on the Constitutional Court adopted on 13 May 2025, which would empower the Constitutional Court to effectively and arbitrarily ban all opposition parties;

     

    12. Strongly reiterates its demand for the immediate release of former President Mikheil Saakashvili on humanitarian grounds for the purpose of seeking the necessary medical treatment abroad; emphasises that the Georgian authorities bear full responsibility for his health and well-being and must be held accountable for any harm that befalls him; calls, furthermore, on the Georgian Dream authorities to ensure that Members of the European Parliament are granted unhindered access to Mikheil Saakashvili;

     

    13. Underlines that the policy of non-recognition of the legitimacy of the one-party parliament and the president appointed by it should continue until there is a tangible change in the political course of Georgia and new free and fair parliamentary elections are held; calls for the EU’s and the Member States’ representatives and members of parliament to refrain from meetings with representatives of the regime, starting with the current de facto president; continues to recognise Salome Zourabichvili as the legitimate President of Georgia and representative of the Georgian people; praises her efforts to peacefully steer the country back towards a democratic and European path of development;

     

    14. Points out that the upcoming municipal elections in autumn 2025 present yet another test for the resilience of Georgia’s democracy and political pluralism; calls on the opposition to seize the opportunity presented by these elections to reflect the unity of the Georgian people in favour of democracy and the rule of law, as already demonstrated in the peaceful protests against the manipulation of the parliamentary elections and repression; calls for the municipal elections to be held in an improved electoral environment, overseen by an independent and impartial election administration and monitored through diligent international observation to guarantee a genuinely fair, free and transparent process;

     

    15. Is deeply concerned, in this context, by the further deterioration of the electoral system and the overall democratic environment ahead of the municipal elections, in particular the fast-tracked adoption of new amendments to Georgia’s Organic Law and to the Election Code in December 2024 that undermine the principle of equal suffrage and aim to solidify the ruling party’s dominance at all levels of governance; recalls that these amendments have been criticised by the Venice Commission and calls for them to be repealed; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to consider imposing additional individual sanctions against Georgian officials if the upcoming municipal elections fail to meet the criteria for fair and free elections;

     

    16. Strongly condemns the continuing and deliberate destruction of the environment for Georgia’s vibrant civil society, with the adoption of several pieces of restrictive Russian-style legislation, including on the transparency of foreign influence, threats, and stigmatisation by the authorities; strongly denounces the new legislative initiative that requires the registration of all civil society organisation grants with the government and that obliges foreign donors to obtain executive approval to disburse grants to local organisations; regrets the recent decision by the authorities to freeze the bank accounts of crowdfunding initiatives and campaigns in support of political prisoners and their families; calls on the authorities to immediately cease the intimidation, threats, politically motivated prosecutions and physical assaults against civil society representatives, political leaders, civil activists, journalists and media workers in Georgia; condemns the arbitrary and unjustified refusal of several European journalists’ entry to Georgia;

    17. Condemns the recent adoption, without due public consultation, of legislation that enables further political persecution, limits the right of assembly, and further shrinks the space for civil society, independent media and the opposition to operate freely, including the Russian-style foreign agent law, the amendments to the Law on Public Service, the amendments to the Law on Grants, the Foreign Agents Registration Act, as well as new restrictive amendments to the Broadcasting Law; calls for the Georgian authorities to repeal these legislative changes; stresses that Georgian Dream’s political conduct, including its strategic alignment with the Russian Federation and the accelerated adoption of tools characteristic of authoritarian regimes, mirrors such developments within Russia itself;

     

    18. Commends the work of Georgia’s civil society in the past months, providing free legal aid, documenting serious human rights violations and taking the lead on domestic and international litigation to seek justice and accountability against a background of continued attacks, the criminalisation of civic space, and disinformation campaigns against the work of civil society;

     

    19. Stresses the urgent need to support Georgia’s civil society and independent media in the light of the growing repression and the suspension of the activities of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and therefore asks the Commission to increase financial support and disburse it without any further delay; calls for the EU’s funding mechanisms to be adjusted to take into account the needs that arise in a more hostile and anti-democratic environment and for funds to be reallocated to directly support civil society organisations, independent media and human rights defenders; stresses further, in this regard, that the Member States should be ready to receive and support Georgian civil society organisations and independent media outlets so that they can continue their work in exile;

     

    20. Stresses that beyond Georgian Dream’s rejection of Georgia’s EU integration, it rejects more generally international human rights law and democratic standards, while speedily moving along the negative trajectory previously witnessed in Russia; is deeply concerned, specifically, that this will have further trickle-down effects on the rights and well-being of women, minorities, migrants, persons with disabilities, LGBTI people, people living below the poverty line, and other vulnerable or at-risk groups; strongly condemns the adoption of anti-LGBTI legislation by the Georgian parliament in October 2024, which mirrors authoritarian, Russian-style policies and violates the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and calls for it to be repealed; calls for the reinstatement of gender quotas that were abolished by the parliament of Georgia in April 2024; calls on the EU Member States, when assessing asylum applications, to adequately take into account the fact that Georgia now has one of the most repressive anti-LGBTI laws in Europe; is concerned about the lack of protection of ethnic and religious minorities in Georgia;

     

    21. Reiterates that the measures taken by the EU so far in response to the flagrant democratic backsliding and reneging on previous commitments do not reflect the severity of the situation in Georgia and its consequences across the region; regrets the lack of proactive measures taken and the generally limited and delayed reaction by the Council and the Commission; stresses that the absence of unanimity among the Member States should not prevent those willing to take appropriate and effective measures from doing so; calls on the EU’s leadership to urgently rally like-minded Member States to take coordinated action and thereby surmount the political obstacles to adopting EU-wide sanctions;

    22. Calls for the EU and its Member States to introduce, on a bilateral and coordinated basis, personal sanctions against key Georgian Dream political leaders, officials and the regime’s enablers in the administration, business, media, justice system, law enforcement agencies and the electoral commission who are responsible for democratic backsliding, electoral fraud, human rights violations and the persecution of political opponents and activists; further calls for sanctions to extend to mid- and lower-level public officials responsible for implementing repressive measures against the regime’s opponents and to maintain them until Georgian democracy is adequately restored; welcomes the imposition of bilateral sanctions by Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Czechia, Germany and Poland, as well as by like-minded partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Ukraine, and invites other EU Member States to follow suit; calls for the consideration of further restrictive measures, such as SWIFT cut-off or sectoral sanctions, aimed at cutting off the financial flows and sources of income of the Georgian Dream regime;

     

    23. Welcomes the Council’s decision to suspend visa-free travel for Georgian diplomats and officials as a first step in response to the persistent negative developments in Georgia; reiterates its call on the Commission and the Council to review Georgia’s visa-free status, with the possibility of suspending it if the relevant benchmarks and standards on democratic governance and freedoms are not met because of the ruling party’s actions; stresses that Georgian Dream is fully responsible for any consequences stemming from the possible suspension of the visa-free regime for Georgian citizens; stresses the importance of visa-free travel for Georgian civil society actors, human rights activists and journalists, among others, both for travelling to the EU to inform European actors of developments in Georgia, but also for enabling them to quickly leave the country, as many face political persecution by the authorities;

    Alignment on foreign policy matters

    24. Deplores the fact that Georgian Dream is undoing decades of progress towards democracy, the rule of law and Euro-Atlantic integration and is alienating its allies, which had supported it throughout the process; regrets that Georgia has made no progress on implementing the EU’s recommendations on foreign, security and defence policy and that the level of Georgia’s alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) remains remarkably low, at 49 %, demonstrating its lack of commitment to European integration; emphasises that progress in the EU accession process requires full alignment with the EU’s CFSP, in line with the expectations for all candidate countries; regrets the fact that Georgia does not participate in the EU’s crisis management missions and operations under the common security and defence policy; regrets the fact that misalignment of Georgia’s foreign policy is leading to self-isolation and that Georgian Dream’s repressive regime is worsening the instability in the South Caucasus region and the Black Sea;

    25. Notes that Georgia, under the current government, is moving in a direction that puts it at risk of becoming a Russian vassal state like Belarus; regrets the fact that, at a time when the democratic world is standing in strong support of Ukraine against the Russian Federation’s unprovoked war of aggression, the current Georgian authorities are increasingly aligning themselves with Kremlin policies and rhetoric, thereby contributing to historical revisionism; notes that Georgia has not aligned with the vast majority of sanctions against Russia, Belarus and Iran, but has claimed that it has cooperated with the EU to prevent sanctions circumvention; expresses its concern, however, over reports alleging Georgia’s role in facilitating the evasion of EU sanctions against Russia; calls, therefore, on the Commission to conduct a thorough investigation into such allegations;

     

    26. Notes also with concern the recent strategic turn by the Georgian Dream government towards China and its increasing cooperation with Iran; notes the Georgian Dream’s public support for Chinese geostrategic initiatives and strengthened bilateral economic relations, including the award of the Anaklia deep-sea port construction project to a Chinese-led consortium; emphasises that such a move contradicts Georgia’s stated commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration; underscores that the Anaklia project now risks becoming a vehicle for increasing Chinese political, financial and economic leverage in the region, thereby further distancing Georgia from its strategic partners in the West; calls, in this regard, on the Commission and the Member States to review and, if necessary, suspend or redirect funding for regional connectivity projects; expresses serious concern about Georgia’s increased multifaceted cooperation with Teheran, which can lead to Georgia’s further isolation;

     

    27. Warns that Georgia’s ongoing turn towards authoritarianism and increasing alignment with Russia constitutes a growing threat to European security, particularly in view of Georgia’s strategic location and access to the Black Sea, which is critical to Russia projecting power in the region; underlines that the ruling Georgian Dream party’s strategy may be replicated elsewhere as a playbook for hybrid state capture; is concerned about regional repercussions and warns that the credibility of European action in the wider South Caucasus is at stake, especially in anticipation of the forthcoming EU Black Sea strategy;

     

    28. Is deeply concerned about Georgian Dream’s collaboration, rapprochement and ideological convergence with Russia and other authoritarian regimes, despite Russia’s creeping occupation of Georgia’s territory; denounces Georgian Dream’s promotion of and participation in Russian disinformation and manipulation, including the weaponisation of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine as a propaganda tool, which are at odds with the undiminished and extraordinarily high public support for the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration; regrets the lack of cooperation with the EU in the fight against foreign information manipulation and interference;

    29. Reiterates its strongest condemnation of Russia’s ongoing occupation of Georgia’s regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the continued ‘borderisation’ process, which constitutes a violation of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; urges the Georgian government to maintain a clear and consistent position on Russian aggression and calls for the EU to remain actively engaged in conflict resolution, human rights monitoring and support for affected communities;

    30. Recommends the reinforcement of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) with increased resources and a broader mandate to monitor foreign interference and border destabilisation; urges the Member States to ensure adequate funding and personnel for the EUMM to respond to the current political and security crisis;

    31. Notes that support from the European Peace Facility, worth EUR 30 million, was rightfully suspended in 2024 in response to the democratic backsliding in Georgia and that no support is planned for 2025; highlights that this suspension will have detrimental consequences on the national stability and security of Georgia; reiterates that any future financial support can only be authorised with the stipulation that the self-declared Georgian regime step down and fair and impartial elections be held;

     

    °

    ° °

    32. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the President of Georgia Salome Zourabichvili and the self-appointed authorities of Georgia.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT containing a motion for a non-legislative resolution on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part – A10-0111/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT NON-LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part

    (10724/22 – C10‑0057/2024 – 2022/0184M(NLE))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part (10724/22),

    – having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council on 27 June 2024 in accordance with Articles 207 and 209, in conjunction with Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a), and Article 218(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C10‑0057/2024),

    – having regard to the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part[1] (EPCA),

    – having regard to the Joint Roadmap for Deepening Ties between the EU and Central Asia of 23 October 2023,

    – having regard to the joint communication by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 15 May 2019 entitled ‘The EU and Central Asia: New Opportunities for a Stronger Partnership’ (JOIN(2019)0009),

    – having regard to the Commission’s assessment reports on the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) with Kyrgyzstan,

    – having regard to the first EU-Central Asia summit on 4 April 2025,

    – having regard to the 11th High-Level Political and Security Dialogue between the European Union and the countries of Central Asia, held in Brussels on 5 June 2024,

    – having regard to the joint press statement of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, Sadyr Zhaparov, and the then President of the European Council, Charles Michel, published on 3 June 2023,

    – having regard to the 14th Human Rights Dialogue, held in Bishkek on 25 June 2024,

    – having regard to the 19th meeting of the EU-Kyrgyzstan Cooperation Council, held in Brussels on 15 November 2022,

    – having regard to the opinions of the Venice Commission on recent legal amendments abridging the freedom of the press and hampering the work of non-governmental organisations in Kyrgyzstan,

    – having regard to reports on Kyrgyzstan published by human rights organisations, such as the 2022, 2023 and 2024 annual world reports by Human Rights Watch,

     

    – having regard to the International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) briefing on the protection of fundamental freedoms and civic space in Kyrgyzstan, published in February 2025,

    – having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on the EU strategy on Central Asia[2],

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on Kyrgyzstan, notably that of 19 December 2024 on the human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan, in particular the case of Temirlan Sultanbekov[3],

    – having regard to the visit of the delegation of its Subcommittee on Human Rights to Kyrgyzstan from 25 to27 February 2025,

    – having regard to the statement by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, following his official visit to Kyrgyzstan from 19 to 20 March 2025,

    – having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

    – having regard to its legislative resolution of […] on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part,

    – having regard to Rule 107(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0111/2025),

    A. whereas Kyrgyzstan occupies an important position in Central Asia, a region of increasing geopolitical significance that the EU has recognised as a key partner with which it engaged in structured dialogue at the first EU-Central Asia summit;

    B. whereas the EU and Kyrgyzstan have been partners since the country gained independence in 1991, and have established a comprehensive legal framework for their cooperation through the EU-Kyrgyzstan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, signed in 1999;

    C. whereas the EU and Kyrgyzstan have recently agreed to deepen their partnership by signing an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA), which represents a modern and ambitious framework for strengthening dialogue and cooperation in key areas such as trade and investment, sustainable development and connectivity, research and innovation, education, the environment and climate change, as well as the rule of law, human rights and civil society;

     

    D. whereas the EPCA could also facilitate stronger cooperation on foreign and security policy, including conflict prevention and crisis management, risk reduction, cybersecurity, regional stability, disarmament, non-proliferation, arms control and arms export control;

     

    E. whereas the EPCA, which enhances the existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1999, was signed on 25 June 2024; whereas the EPCA requires Parliament’s consent for it to enter into force;

    F. whereas Kyrgyzstan has benefited from unilateral and preferential access to the EU market through the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) since 2016; whereas Kyrgyzstan has acceded to 27 international conventions related to labour and human rights, environmental and climate protection, and good governance in order to be able to benefit from this scheme;

     

    G. whereas the EU has allocated EUR 98 million to support governance and digital transformation, human development and a green and climate-resilient economy in Kyrgyzstan over the 2021-2027 period, aligning with the National Development Strategy of the Kyrgyz Republic;

     

    H. whereas the EU has allocated EUR 12 million to enhance the quality of legislation and increase the efficiency, independence, professionalism and capacities of the judiciary and services of the justice sector in Kyrgyzstan, thereby signalling its willingness to invest in stable growth that is consistent with the rule of law; whereas concerns over the independence of the judiciary persist, with politically motivated cases that target individuals critical of the government; whereas the 2021 reform of the Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic has reintroduced the heavily criticised 1997 version of the Code, which gives greater power to law enforcement while reducing citizens’ rights;

     

    I. whereas the EPCA stipulates that the EU and Kyrgyzstan shall cooperate to strengthen civil society and its role in the economic, social and political development of an open democratic society;

     

    J. whereas Kyrgyzstan ranks 100th in the 2025 Global Terrorism Index of the Institute for Economics and Peace, and has been classified as a country with ‘no impact’ of terrorism;

     

    K. whereas, despite the Government of Kyrgyzstan repeatedly expressing its commitment to the principles of democracy and respect for human rights and the rule of law, human rights organisations have called attention to democratic backsliding and hardening authoritarian practices and persecution of civil society organisations in Kyrgyzstan in recent years, including during the negotiation of the EPCA and since its signing, with Transparency International and Freedom House finding that Kyrgyzstan has turned from a bastion of democracy with a vibrant civil society to a consolidated authoritarian regime that uses its justice system to target critics and whose authorities further undermine the balance of power and the system of checks and balances;

    L. whereas Kyrgyzstan ranks 146 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index; whereas, at President Japarov’s initiative, the law on public procurement was amended to allow state-owned enterprises to circumvent tendering procedures; whereas there is no proper oversight of public spending due to a lack of access to such information; whereas state funds and national resources are used by the ruling elites to consolidate their power, silence dissent and resist reform;

     

    M. whereas human rights defender, investigative journalist and founder of the Temirov Live media outlet, Bolot Temirov, has been stripped of his Kyrgyz citizenship and forced to leave the country in retaliation for his work investigating widespread corruption; whereas at least 11 of his colleagues were arrested in January 2024, including Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, Azamat Ishenbekov, Aike Beishekeyeva and Aktilek Kaparov;

     

    N. whereas in March 2025, independent journalist and activist Kanyshai Mamyrkulova was arrested and remains in detention in retaliation for her social media posts critical of the government;

     

    O. whereas Kyrgyz Government propaganda has used false narratives to discredit independent media in the eyes of society and to portray them as ‘enemies of the people’ and ‘slaves of the West’;

     

    P. whereas in recent years, democratic standards and human rights have deteriorated alarmingly in Kyrgyzstan; whereas Kyrgyzstan has fallen from 72nd to 144th place in the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index; whereas it ranks as the country that has had the sharpest decline in press freedom leading up to 2025;

     

    Q. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities seek to shut down Aprel TV; whereas, as stated by the Committee to Protect Journalists, the prosecutors’ filing indicates that the authorities seek to shut down the media outlet on the basis of allegations that the outlet’s critical reporting portrays the authorities ‘in an unfavourable light’ and ‘undermines the authority of the government’;

     

    R. whereas Parliament expressed its concern about the persecution of opposition parties and independent media in its resolutions of 13 July 2023[4] and of 19 December 2024; whereas the persecution of members of the Social Democrats party (SDK) persists, despite repeated calls to ensure free and fair elections; whereas the leader of the SDK, Temirlan Sultanbekov, and two other members, Irina Karamushkina and Roza Turksever, remain in detention; whereas there is cause for concern about Temirlan Sultanbekov’s medical condition following his prolonged hunger strike;

    S. whereas the Russian-style ‘foreign representatives’ law, adopted by the Kyrgyz Parliament in March 2024, which requires non-profits that receive funding from abroad and engage in broadly defined political activity to register as ‘foreign representatives’, discriminates against and stigmatises journalists, human rights activists and other non-profit workers and subjects them to intrusive oversight, burdensome reporting requirements and excessive fines; whereas this law mimics repressive legislation in other authoritarian regimes and can be considered a precursor to further attempts to suppress independent civil society and media;

    T. whereas the crackdown on human rights has targeted LGBTIQ+ people in particular; whereas Kyrgyzstan’s new legislative landscape, along with the broader political shift and repression, has effectively decimated the work of LGBTIQ+ rights organisations and activists, with key organisations completely shut down; whereas on 14 August 2023, Kyrgyzstan enacted discriminatory provisions against the LGBTIQ+ community under the pretext of protecting minors from ‘harmful information’; whereas the anti-discrimination bill recently considered by the Kyrgyzstan Supreme Council failed to include sexual orientation and gender identity as protected categories;

     

    U. whereas the law adopted on 6 October 2023 giving the President of Kyrgyzstan the power to overturn rulings of the Constitutional Court if they conflict with his own interpretation of ‘moral values’ fundamentally weakens the separation of powers – a foundational element of the rule of law – and constitutes a hollowing out of judicial independence in Kyrgyzstan;

    V. whereas Kyrgyzstan is increasingly investing in the promotion of gender equality and women’s empowerment, particularly through key national frameworks such as the National Strategy on Gender Equality until 2030; whereas Kyrgyzstan still faces high rates of domestic violence, over 20 % of marriages in Kyrgyzstan occur through ‘ala kachuu’ (bride kidnapping) and women hold only 22 % of parliamentary seats despite existing gender quotas; whereas, on average, women earn 25 % less than men, as they are predominantly employed in low-paying sectors such as education, healthcare and social services;

     

    W. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities have engaged in actions that limit freedom of speech in the country and have arrested, put in long pre-trial detention or imprisoned journalists, bloggers, poets and regular social media users for criticising the country’s leadership or the situation in the country, and have also closed down an award-winning investigative media outlet;

     

    X. whereas Kyrgyzstan ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2014; whereas tentative steps have been taken towards improving accessibility for persons with disabilities and introducing the concept of inclusive education, though challenges remain, in particular concerning the institutionalisation of persons with disabilities;

     

    Y. whereas the law on ‘false information’, enacted on 24 August 2021, has been used to target independent media and individuals critical of the government; whereas on 10 April 2025, the Supreme Council of Kyrgyzstan approved amendments to the law that provide for administrative sanctions for the dissemination of ‘false information’ on social media;

     

    Z. whereas the Supreme Council of Kyrgyzstan is currently considering the re-criminalisation of the possession of ‘extremist’ materials, which has previously been misused against peaceful religious practitioners, and which, on account of the bill’s vague wording, could be used to silence legitimate political speech;

     

    AA. whereas two new laws on freedom of religion came into force on 1 January 2025; whereas these laws maintain the ban on all unregistered exercise of freedom of religion or belief and make it impossible for communities with fewer than 500 adult members to gain legal status;

     

    AB. whereas the negligence of the Kyrgyz law enforcement authorities in response to a campaign of intimidation and harassment has forced journalists and human rights workers to flee the country;

     

    AC. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities have silenced, arrested, detained and extradited refugees fleeing Russia for protesting against the war in Ukraine, contravening Kyrgyzstan’s obligation under the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees not to return people to countries where their life or freedom is under threat on account of their political views, or where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being subjected to serious human rights violations such as torture or other forms of cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment;

     

    AD. whereas the Presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed a border demarcation agreement on 13 March 2025, which legally recognises the borders between the two countries and allows for the development of interstate roads and energy infrastructure, contributing to regional stability and opportunities for enhanced cross-border cooperation on energy, transport and trade; whereas the border agreement itself has not been made public or open to public consultations;

    AE. whereas the leaders of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed the Khujand Declaration of Eternal Friendship on 31 March 2025;

     

    AF. whereas the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, has drawn attention to the concerning signs of democratic backsliding in Kyrgyzstan in recent years, with particular emphasis on the increasing restrictions on civil society and independent journalism;

     

    AG. whereas Central Asia has yet to create horizontal regional frameworks free from the dominance of external actors pursuing their own geopolitical gains;

     

    AH. whereas Kyrgyzstan has historically close and intertwined relations with Russia, with both being members of the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Commonwealth of Independent States; whereas in October 2023, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin in Bishkek during Putin’s first foreign trip since the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant against him; whereas Kyrgyzstan, along with other Central Asian countries, has become a transit point for circumventing sanctions imposed on Russia for its war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas exports of advanced technology and dual-use items to Kyrgyzstan – which are then exported to Russia – have significantly increased; whereas Kyrgyzstan has either abstained from voting or sided with Russia on votes on numerous UN resolutions on human rights and, in particular, on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

     

    AI. whereas OJSC Keremet Bank, based in Kyrgyzstan, was involved in a sanctions evasion scheme with Russian state-owned defence bank Promsvyazbank Public Joint-Stock Company (PSB), where it facilitated cross-border transfers on behalf of PSB; whereas in 2024, the Kyrgyz Ministry of Finance sold a controlling stake in Keremet Bank to a Russian oligarch with ties to the Russian Government; whereas the United States has imposed sanctions on Keremet Bank;

     

    EU-Kyrgyzstan EPCA

    1. Despite the shared interests in strengthening the EU-Kyrgyzstan important political and trade relations, is concerned by the deteriorating situation of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the context of the completion of negotiations and the signing of the EPCA; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities, in this context, to respect and uphold fundamental freedoms, in particular media freedom and freedom of expression, and to foster an environment of cooperation and involvement of civil society and local communities in public consultations and decision-making processes; underlines the importance of Parliament’s close involvement in monitoring the implementation of all parts of the EPCA; calls for an effective evaluation by both parties to the agreement, to be conducted within three years, of the implementation of its essential elements, with clear human rights benchmarks and time frames; calls on the Commission to present to Parliament the outcome of such evaluations; expects that, given the recent backsliding on these fronts and ahead of the EPCA vote in the European Parliament and its subsequent implementation, the Kyrgyz Government will take some concrete steps towards addressing the pressing concerns outlined in this report, such as releasing political prisoners and repealing recently adopted repressive legislation; considers that a negative assessment of the implementation of these essential elements could lead to Article 316 of the EPCA being triggered;

    EU-Kyrgyzstan relations

    2. Welcomes the long-standing and strategic relations between the EU and Kyrgyzstan, as well as the increasing cooperation and exchanges; recalls that Kyrgyzstan is the EU’s third-largest trading partner in Central Asia; reiterates its commitment to work together with the country and with its partners in Central Asia to ensure peace, security, stability, prosperity, democracy and sustainable development;

    3. Welcomes the outcomes of the first EU-Central Asia summit held in Samarkand on 4 April 2025; welcomes their commitment to regional and global stability, to the promotion and protection of the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to addressing climate action, connectivity and education; notes also the 20th EU-Central Asia Ministerial meeting held in Ashgabat on 27 March 2025;

     

    4. Highlights the need for cooperation in promoting green initiatives based on a sustainable market economy, private sector innovation, and long-term environmental stewardship, early warning systems for natural disasters, low-carbon development and the transition to renewable energy sources; highlights Kyrgyzstan’s initiatives to promote the mountain agenda on global platforms, including the preservation of mountain ecosystems, the protection of the environment  and the development of sustainable tourism and mountain communities; stresses that investments in Kyrgyzstan’s green energy goals would significantly contribute to reducing the country’s regional energy dependence and to tackling environmental challenges; commends the Kyrgyz Republic’s involvement in the Team Europe Initiative on Water, Energy and Climate Change;

    5. Supports Kyrgyzstan’s efforts towards sustainable development, aligning its initiatives with the country’s National Development strategy for 2018-2040, alongside the EU’s Global Gateway strategy and the EU strategy for Central Asia; recalls that the EU-Kyrgyzpartnership prioritises governance and digital transformation in order to enhance transparency and efficiency in public administration;

     

    6. Welcomes Team Europe initiatives seeking to build a green and climate-resilient economy in order to address environmental challenges and promote sustainable growth; highlights the recent signing of the agreement between the Kyrgyz Ministry of Finance and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which will strengthen the Kyrgyz Climate-Resilient Water Services Programme;

     

    7. Calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to continue promoting joint cooperation initiatives in strategic areas such as energy infrastructure, in particular the hydropower sector, sustainable development and culture, while also building on the positive experiences of the Member States already active in the region;

     

    8. Highlights the importance of enhancing cooperation on critical raw materials, which have been identified as strategically important for ensuring secure, sustainable and diversified supply chains; takes note of the endorsement of the EU-Central Asia Joint Declaration of Intent on Critical Raw Materials at the first EU-Central Asia summit, and of Kyrgyzstan’s proposal to establish a partnership with the EU for the development of critical raw materials;

     

    9. Notes that the Erasmus+ programme has been instrumental in facilitating academic exchanges; welcomes the EU’s support for digitalisation and education in the country, and calls for the creation of a programme for the exchange of entrepreneurs in the field of digital transformation and the green transition; stresses the importance of fostering convergence and coordinated reforms in higher education, such as by aligning the Kyrgyz National Qualifications Framework with the European Qualifications Framework; highlights the need to foster academic and cultural exchanges between Kyrgyzstan and the EU Member States and the active involvement of Kyrgyz young people in non-formal education and civil society programmes; underlines the importance of strengthening academic and vocational exchanges, building on the 2024 education agreement;

     

    10. Welcomes the EU’s increased support for young people, gender equality and human rights in Kyrgyzstan, with the aim of empowering youth and women’s organisations, strengthening the country’s Ombudsman’s Office and enhancing the capabilities of its National Centre for the Prevention of Torture; expresses serious concern about attempts to dissolve the National Centre for the Prevention of Torture;

     

    11. Recalls that the EU has already allocated EUR 12 million to support the reform of Kyrgyzstan’s judicial system, confirming the EU’s commitment to the country’s institutional development; stresses the importance of continuing to invest in institution building, transparency and the independence of the judiciary;

     

    12. Expresses its concern, in view of the widespread corruption in Kyrgyzstan, about the transparent and efficient use of the EUR 98 million in EU assistance for the 2021-2027 period; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to publish detailed reports on the use of EU funds and to strengthen cooperation with international anti-fraud bodies, such as the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), in order to uphold global fund management standards and implement robust anti-fraud measures that protect the EU’s financial interests; calls on the Commission and other relevant EU institutions to ensure the highest possible level of oversight of the use of EU funds and to consider allocating additional resources to strengthen the financial and operational capacity of Kyrgyz agencies involved in their management;

     

    13. Stresses the importance of enhanced information exchange on terrorist threats, full compliance with international counterterrorism financing standards and the implementation of robust measures to prevent the acquisition, transfer and use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials for terrorist purposes;

     

    14. Underlines the importance of engaging all relevant stakeholders, facilitating cooperation between competent agencies and bringing national laws in line with international transparency standards in order to investigate financial crimes and promote good corporate governance; urges the Kyrgyz authorities to step up their efforts in eradicating corruption and not to use the fight against it as an excuse for cracking down on civil society and government critics;

     

    15. Calls on the Kyrgyz Republic to review its technical regulations and strengthen collaboration on standards, metrology, market surveillance, accreditation and conformity assessment procedures to facilitate mutual market access, deepen bilateral trade with the EU and ensure fair treatment of investors; urges Kyrgyzstan to avoid restrictive measures that could disadvantage EU investors;

     

    Regional cooperation and global challenges

    16. Considers Central Asia to be a region of strategic interest for the EU in terms of security, connectivity, energy diversification, conflict resolution and the defence of the multilateral, rules-based international order, especially in a historical moment marked by profound geopolitical change; encourages the EU to intensify its engagement with Central Asia on political, economic and security matters in line with the values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law that underpin EU external action; highlights that any further EU cooperation with Central Asian countries cannot be achieved at the expense of these values; emphasises the need for increased dialogue and collaboration on foreign and security policy issues, including cybersecurity, regional stability, crisis management, disarmament and arms control, in line with the principles of international law and the UN Charter;

    17. Underlines that the EU and Central Asia are facing profound global and regional geopolitical shifts and challenges; stresses, in this regard, the need to work towards long-term, structured and mutually beneficial cooperation on matters of common interest; strongly encourages the EU to intensify its engagement with Central Asia, given the region’s geostrategic importance, and to promote a strategic partnership with Central Asian countries by expanding cooperation at political and economic level; welcomes the increased high-level contact between the EU and Central Asia;

    18. Highlights the growing momentous challenges to multilateralism and a rules-based order for both the EU and the Kyrgyz Republic, such as Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; notes, with concern, the neutral stance of Kyrgyzstan and other countries in the region towards the conflict, and encourages the Kyrgyz authorities to uphold international norms and contribute to regional efforts to safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity; notes Russia’s influence in the region despite efforts by Central Asian countries to diversify their foreign relations; regrets that Kyrgyzstan has not condemned Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine;

    19. Deplores the active role of Kyrgyz companies and banks, such as Keremet Bank, in helping Russia to evade sanctions and obtain technology and dual-use goods for its war effort against Ukraine; urges the Kyrgyz authorities to take further measures to stop the transit of sanctioned goods to Russia through Kyrgyz territory, such as enforcing stricter licensing requirements and conducting due diligence on companies involved in the trade of dual-use goods; highlights that failure to address the export of dual-use technologies could lead to secondary sanctions; calls on the Commission to assess the current level of sanctions evasion by Russia with the help of actors in Central Asian countries, and to propose concrete solutions for addressing this; recommends the establishment of a working group focused on monitoring and tracking the trade of dual-use goods;

     

    20. Regrets that, despite its stated commitment to respect democratic principles, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as agreed in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, Kyrgyzstan does not align its positions with those of democratic countries, in particular the EU Member States, when voting at the UN General Assembly;

     

    21. Deplores the fact that the Turkish Cypriot secessionist entity was granted observer status by the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) and was present at the OTS summit in Bishkek; reiterates that, as part of the Joint Declaration following the first EU-Central Asia summit in Samarkand, the Central Asian states, including the Kyrgyz Republic, are committed to the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions – 541 (1983) and 550 (1984);

     

    22. Recognises the need to strengthen relations to foster deeper, closer and values-based cooperation in facing common threats and achieving shared goals worldwide;

    23. Welcomes initiatives aimed at strengthening the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor and takes note of the Coordination Platform for the Corridor;

    24. Highlights the EU’s role as an important donor of aid to the region; stresses the need to increase the EU’s efforts in its support for development cooperation in Central Asia, in particular in Kyrgyzstan under the newly signed EPCA;

     

    25. Welcomes the border agreement reached between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and its recent ratification; urges both parties to take the necessary steps to implement the agreement, including by triggering consultations with the local populations, and to adopt measures to strengthen cross-border cooperation and support the border communities that have been hit hardest by the recent cross-border conflict; welcomes the EU’s financial support for the construction of facilities in the Sughd region of Tajikistan, which borders Kyrgyzstan; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to investigate the serious crimes, documented by independent observers, that took place during the September 2022 armed conflict and to hold those responsible to account;

    26. Welcomes the first trilateral summit bringing together Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan without mediation by external actors; welcomes Central Asian aspirations to strengthen their regional ties and set up a horizontal cooperation architecture in the region without the assertive involvement of external powers;

     

    Human rights, democracy and the rule of law

    27. Stresses that respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law strengthens stability, sustainable development and security, as they establish legal certainty, predictability and strong institutions; recalls that strong democratic legal frameworks and institutions foster innovation, trade, investments and economic expansion, while ensuring inclusive development and equal access to social and economic rights, and reducing social inequalities, and are indispensable in building resilient societies capable of resisting authoritarian influence and external destabilisation;

    28. Encourages Kyrgyzstan to enact comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation that includes sexual orientation, gender, disability and ethnicity as protected categories; stresses that the protection of minorities in Kyrgyzstan requires a multifaceted strategy that addresses the root causes of discrimination, including existing obstacles in accessing justice;

     

    29. Welcomes the legislative acts to enhance protection against domestic, sexual and gender-based violence; calls on the Kyrgyz Government to ensure that the law is consistently enforced and perpetrators are formally charged with the relevant crimes, and to maintain efforts towards eliminating gender-based and domestic violence;

     

    30. Is concerned about the entry into force of new legislation restricting freedom of religion or belief in Kyrgyzstan, as it increases state surveillance and control over religious groups by creating a state registry for religious entities and buildings, introduces fines for wearing certain religious attire, such as the niqab, in state institutions and public places, and increases oversight of religious education; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure freedom of religion or belief is protected in the country, in line with international human rights standards and commitments under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

     

    31. Encourages the Kyrgyz Government to develop a national action plan for human rights with the involvement of civil society, in line with the recommendations made by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights;

     

    32. Calls on the Kyrgyz Government to unconditionally release all wrongfully imprisoned or detained journalists, bloggers and activists, including Kanyshai Mamyrkulova and those affiliated with Temirov Live, such as Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, and Aike Beishekeyeva and Aktilek Kaparov, and to drop all charges against them, as well as to restore Bolot Temirov’s citizenship and refrain from other unlawful practices; condemns the sentencing in October 2024 of journalists Azamat Ishenbekov and Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, from the Temirov Live platform known for its investigations into corruption, to five and six years in prison respectively; highlights the opinion of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention recognising the detention of Temirov Live’s journalists as arbitrary; welcomes the pardoning of journalist and Temirov Live employee Azamat Ishenbekov, and of activist Zarina Torokulova, who were convicted on charges of ‘inciting mass unrest’;

    33. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to ensure adherence to the principles of free and fair elections by safeguarding the rights to contest and campaign, while maintaining administrative neutrality towards all political parties throughout the current election cycle, in line with international standards; strongly condemns the Kyrgyz Government’s campaign of intimidation and legal persecution against opposition parties, particularly the SDK, which was removed by the Kyrgyz authorities from the November 2024 local elections in Bishkek; notes that discussions on electoral reform have taken place in the Kyrgyz Parliament;

     

     

    34. Strongly deplores the detention of Temirlan Sultanbekov, Irina Karamushkina and Roza Turksever on 13 November 2024, and calls on the Kyrgyz Government to urgently end their politically motivated prosecution by dropping all restrictions imposed on their respective sentences; condemns the fact that the proceedings against them have been marred by dubious practices, a lack of legal protections since the start and the violation of their right to due process; recalls that an audio recording of unknown origin, serving as the primary evidence and lacking judicial authorisation, is what initiated the investigation; laments that their trials have been held in a closed-door format without any audio or video recordings; denounces the fact that the conditions for their release on probation are disproportionate and violate their right to participate in public affairs;

    35. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to refrain from pursuing politically motivated prosecutions or exerting undue pressure on political opposition and dissenting voices, such as the SDK; emphasises that political pluralism is a necessary component of any modern democracy and must be respected to maintain long-term legitimacy and stability;

     

    36. Urges the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure the right to peaceful assembly by lifting the ban on protests in Bishkek city centre, which was initiated in response to a request from the Russian embassy to end anti-war protests outside its premises in 2022;

     

    37. Welcomes the acquittal of Klara Sooronkulova, Gulnara Dzhurabayeva, Asya Sasykbayeva and other members of the Committee for the Protection of the Kempir-Abad Water Reservoir; urges the Kyrgyz Government to drop its appeal of the decision of the court of first instance, and bring the politically motivated prosecution to an end;

    38. Strongly condemns, and urges the Kyrgyz authorities to end, the recent crackdown on civil society and to foster an environment of cooperation, with the involvement of civil society and local communities in public consultations and decision-making processes; deplores, in particular, the politically motivated detention of human rights activist Rita Karasartova, and calls for her urgent release; deplores further the seizure of the house of imprisoned human rights activist Kanyshai Mamyrkulova; expresses its admiration for Kyrgyz civil society and independent media which, despite the persecution and at great personal risk, remains one of the most vibrant civil societies in Central Asia;

     

    39. Calls on the EU Member States and the EU institutions to support Kyrgyz civil society organisations, human rights defenders and lawyers, LGBTIQ+ and environmental activists, independent media and bloggers, to express their grave concern over the deterioration of human rights in the country in all their exchanges with the authorities of Kyrgyzstan, and to reassess the country’s GSP+ benefits and adopt appropriate measures, including sanctions under the EU’s global human rights sanctions regime (‘EU Magnitsky Act’) as a last resort, if Kyrgyzstan continues to disregard its commitments to international conventions;

     

    40. Deplores several recent cases of individuals critical of the Kyrgyz Government living outside of Kyrgyzstan facing the threat of extradition to Kyrgyzstan, where they risk politically motivated arrest, imprisonment and torture in retaliation for their criticism; denounces the case of exiled activist Tilekmat Kurenov who was recently extradited from the United Arab Emirates to Kyrgyzstan, where he had previously been subjected to politically motivated imprisonment, torture and threats because of his activism;

     

    41. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to revoke the Russian-style ‘foreign representatives’ law, which severely impairs the ability of civil society to carry out legitimate public interest work and operate without undue interference and harassment while ensuring a safe working environment, and which contradicts Kyrgyzstan’s international obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its commitments as an EU partner under the EPCA; urges the Commission to ensure that the EU’s programmes and initiatives are not compromised by the proposed laws, which may limit freedom of expression and curtail the activities of non-governmental organisations;

    42. Urges Kyrgyzstan to respect and protect media freedom and pluralism, which are fundamental conditions for democracy, refraining from forcibly closing independent media outlets, as in the case of Kloop, or levelling unsubstantiated allegations against them due to their investigative and critical reporting; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to allow independent media professionals to carry out their work, to guarantee journalists and reporters will not face retaliatory persecution for their professional activities, including investigative journalism, and to provide adequate protection to reporters that might be harassed for their reporting; calls on the Commission and the EU Member States to ensure the continued operation of the Kyrgyz Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty service;

    43. Calls on the EEAS and the EU Delegation in Kyrgyzstan to conduct active public diplomacy and address false narratives spread by the Kyrgyz authorities, in particular those that misrepresent EU values and policies with the aim of discrediting independent media and civil society; urges EU and Member State diplomats in Kyrgyzstan to attend politically motivated trials and to provide support to the unjustly persecuted individuals and their families;

     

    44. Condemns the Kyrgyz authorities’ attempts to shut down Aprel TV by revoking its broadcasting license and terminating its social media operations on the basis of an investigation by Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security; laments these actions in a context of shuttering media outlets on illegitimate grounds;

     

    45. Expresses concern about the re-criminalisation of libel and insult laws and calls on the Kyrgyz Government not to abuse these provisions to target journalists and legitimate political opposition; invites the authorities to review this legislation in accordance with the Venice Commission’s recommendations;

     

    46. Urges the Kyrgyz authorities to revoke the law on ‘false information’ and the law prohibiting ‘LGBT propaganda’, which contravene Kyrgyzstan’s obligations under international law and have been systematically used to silence critical voices, including journalists and civil society actors; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure that the mass media law is fully in line with international standards and does not result in violations of the freedoms of media or expression;

    47. Calls on the Kyrgyz Government to protect journalists, non-governmental organisation workers and activists from intimidation and harassment, including those facing death threats and other threats to their safety while in prison, and calls on the EU Delegation to closely monitor such threats and report regularly on the situation of at-risk individuals; deplores the government raids, blocking of news sites and prosecution of journalists and bloggers; condemns the court’s closure of the organisation behind the Kloop investigative platform over its alleged ‘negative’ coverage; regrets President Japarov’s call for the Kyrgyz Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to be shut down, accusing the Kyrgyz service of spreading misinformation;

    48. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to refrain from criminalising the possession of ‘extremist’ materials, as human rights watchdogs have warned that this could lead to the further deterioration of freedom of speech in Kyrgyzstan, given the potential for abuse of the law, and to maintain clear legal safeguards to prevent the misuse of laws that penalise public incitements of extremist activity; urges Kyrgyzstan’s Supreme Council to uphold the right to freedom of expression and recalls that countering ‘false information’ cannot lead to a crackdown on independent media, the opposition and others critical of the government;

    49. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to strengthen the rule of law, separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary in line with international standards, to establish processes to measure judicial performance, improve public oversight and increase transparency within the judiciary, and to enhance the engagement of the judiciary with civil society and other branches of government; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to step up their efforts in guaranteeing equal access to justice, the right to a fair trial and the fulfilment of the right to due process;

     

    50. Is concerned by the high number of pre-trial detention cases, which has been highlighted by the Kyrgyz Ombudsperson Dzhamilia Dzhamanbaeva, and echoes the Ombudsperson’s call on Kyrgyz law enforcement and judiciary bodies to adhere to international standards, including the UN Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures;

     

    51. Notes the penitentiary system reforms carried out in recent years, mainly comprising the development of probation, the digitalisation of different processes and the introduction of alternative preventive measures; regrets, however, cases of mistreatment of prisoners and encourages the Kyrgyz authorities to take all necessary steps to ensure that prisoners do not experience inhuman or degrading treatment or conditions, and receive adequate healthcare in safe and secure conditions;

     

    52. Underlines the need to develop new legislation in the field of administrative law and justice, including the reform of public administration and alternative dispute resolution, and to strengthen the professional capacities of public administration and judiciary representatives, which could be partly achieved by adopting e-governance systems;

     

    53. Asks the Kyrgyz authorities to uphold the independence of the legal profession and ensure that lawyers are not subjected to interference or harassment as a result of fulfilling their professional duties, including the defence of their clients in politically sensitive cases;

     

    54. Commends Kyrgyzstan’s participation in the Central Asia Rule of Law Programme, which supported national efforts to prevent and fight corruption and money laundering, and raised awareness about human rights standards among legal professionals, among other matters;

     

    55. Notes the return of the controversial Land Code to the Kyrgyz Parliament by President Japarov, following public protests against it;

     

    °

    ° °

    56. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of the Kyrgyz Republic.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina – A10-0108/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina

    (2025/2018(INI))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina initialled in Dayton on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 (the Dayton Peace Agreement),

    – having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the other part[1], which entered into force on 1 June 2015,

    – having regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application for EU membership, submitted on 15 February 2016,

    – having regard to the Commission opinion of 29 May 2019 on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2019)0261),

    – having regard to the European Council conclusions of 15 December 2022 granting EU candidate country status to Bosnia and Herzegovina,

    – having regard to the European Council conclusions of 22 March 2024 on opening accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)[2],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans[3],

    – having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

    – having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 6 May 2020, 13 December 2023 and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

    – having regard to the Berlin Process, launched on 28 August 2014,

    – having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2021/1923 of 4 November 2021 on an Assistance Measure under the European Peace Facility to support capacity building for the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina[4],

    – having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2022/2353 of 1 December 2022 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to strengthen the capacities of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina[5],

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0691),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 12 March 2024 entitled ‘Report on progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina – March 2024’ (COM(2024)0129),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0691),

    – having regard to the Commission’s overview and country assessments of 31 May 2023 and of 13 June 2024 of the Economic Reform Programme of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

    – having regard to the fifth EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Council of 19 July 2023 and the seventh EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Committee meeting of 19 September 2024,

    – having regard to the outcomes of the third, fourth, fifth and sixth meetings of the EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 30 and 31 October 2023, 13 and 14 March 2024, 30 October 2024 and 12 and 13 March 2025 respectively,

    – having regard to the expert report of 5 December 2019 on rule of law issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

    – having regard to the European Council’s political agreement of 12 June 2022 on a on principles for ensuring a functional Bosnia and Herzegovina that advances on the European path,

    – having regard to the 63rd, 64th, 65th and 66th reports of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General of the UN of 9 May 2023, 2 November 2023, 15 May 2024, 1 November 2024 respectively,

    – having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2757 (2024) of 1 November 2024, which extends the mandate of the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) until 2 November 2025,

    – having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 78/282 of 23 May 2024, designating 11 July as the International Day of Reflection and Commemoration of the 1995 Genocide in Srebrenica,

    – having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), ratified by Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 March 1992, and to its three Optional Protocols, namely: the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, ratified on 10 October 2003; the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, ratified on 4 September 2001, and the Optional Protocol on a Communications Procedure, ratified on 19 October 2018,

    – having regard to the UNESCO resolutions on the right of education in the mother tongue, the UNESCO Convention of 17 October 2003 for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, as well as the UNESCO Convention of 20 October 2005 on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions,

    – having regard to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

    – having regard to the amended Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina imposed by the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina on 26 March 2024,

    – having regard to the visits of the Vice-President of the European Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Kaja Kallas and of NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte to Bosnia and Herzegovina in March and April 2025,

    – having regard to the statement of the President of the European Council António Costa to the political leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 2025,

    – having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement[6],

    – having regard to its report of 17 January 2024 on the ‘Role of preventive diplomacy in tackling frozen conflicts around the world – missed opportunity or change for the future?’[7],

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on Bosnia and Herzegovina,

    – having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0108/2025),

    A. whereas enlargement is one of the EU’s most effective foreign policy instruments and a geostrategic investment in peace, democracy, stability, security and prosperity on the European continent, and remains of crucial importance, particularly in the context of rapid major geopolitical shifts and growing competition with authoritarian regimes;

    B. whereas each country is judged on its own merits in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, including full respect for democracy, the rule of law and fundamental EU values, human rights, minority rights and media freedoms;

    C. whereas the EU remains the main political and economic partner of the Western Balkan countries; whereas the EU continues to be largest trade and investment partner of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), accounting for the majority of its foreign trade flows and playing a central role in its economic integration process;

    D. whereas Bosnia and Herzegovina is a candidate country and the clear majority of its citizens aspires to Euro-Atlantic integration for sustainable peace, democracy and prosperity; whereas 2025 marks the 30th anniversary of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which continues to form the foundation of BiH’s institutional set-up and that was intended as a safeguard for the equality of its three constituent peoples;

    E. whereas public support remains fragile owing to anti-EU narratives promoted by illiberal actors from the region and beyond;

    F. whereas the Dayton Peace Agreement despite its shortcomings, has fostered peace and the subsequent stabilisation in BiH by creating the key institutions that enabled the country to progress along the path of EU and NATO integration;

    G. whereas 30 years after the end of the war, BiH remains dysfunctional and finds itself again in a deep political and security crisis, with attempts at secession, and a high degree of corruption;

    H. whereas the EU strongly supports the territorial integrity and sovereignty of BiH and will not accept any attempts to undermine it; whereas the Strategic Compass stated that as a matter of security and stability it is of a particular interest to support the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of BiH;

    I. whereas the President of the Republika Srpska (RS) entity, Milorad Dodik, and politicians from the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) have initiated unconstitutional actions to nullify state laws within the RS entity and attacked the key institutions of the state, namely the Office of the High Representative, the BiH Constitutional Court, and the judiciary; whereas the authorities of the RS entity participated in the ‘All-Serb Assembly’ held on 8 June 2024 in Belgrade under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’; whereas a process of forming a new pro-EU majority has been initiated;

    J. whereas EUFOR Althea is an EU CSDP mission helping BiH to maintain a stable and secure environment in the country and is supporting the armed forces’ efforts to align with NATO standards, while serving as a deterrent against any foreign threats;

    K. whereas BiH’s EU path is increasingly targeted by malign foreign actors, notably the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, which exploit ethnic divisions and institutional fragility to obstruct reforms, undermine the constitutional order and erode public trust in the EU; whereas Russian state-controlled media, including Sputnik Serbia and RT Balkan, continue to operate in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in the RS entity, spreading disinformation and pro-Kremlin narratives in violation of EU sanctions on Russian propaganda outlets;

    L. whereas BiH is a multi-ethnic state in whose territory different religious and ethnic groups have lived for centuries, demonstrating that peoples with different views can coexist in an environment of tolerance and mutual respect; whereas linguistic and cultural diversity is one of the fundamental principles of the European Union, as enshrined in Articles 21 and 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights;

    M. whereas, for the 2022 general elections, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) Election Observation Mission concluded that the electoral process remained vulnerable to external interference, including the misuse of administrative resources and biased media coverage influenced by foreign-backed platforms, and called for enhanced protections against disinformation, transparency in campaign finance, and safeguards for journalists and civil society;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1. Reaffirms its support for BiH’s EU accession through a merit-based process based on the Copenhagen criteria, grounded in unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and equality among its citizens;

    2. Welcomes the European Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with BiH in the context of the changed geopolitical reality following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; welcomes the adoption of several key laws in the run-up to this decision, but regrets that the positive reform dynamic has stalled, and notes the inadequate implementation and enforcement of the adopted laws; regrets that the legislative process has been marred by a lack of transparency and limited access for key stakeholders; notes the recent adoption of the Laws on Border Control and on Personal Data Protection and calls for their thorough implementation; calls for preparations to establish the institutional and financial basis for this enlargement to ensure sustainable EU integration;

    3. Urges BiH’s legitimate political leaders at all levels to take all relevant steps set out in the Commission’s recommendation of 12 October 2022, in full respect for proper democratic, transparent and inclusive procedures within the competent institutions, with a view to the negotiating framework being adopted by the Council once these conditions are met, and to step up the efforts to deliver on the 14 key priorities set out by the Commission in 2019; calls on all political actors to uphold BiH’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity and to refrain from all divisive rhetoric and acts, including secessionist rhetoric and acts, incitement to ethnic, religious and racial intolerance, denial of genocide and other war crimes, and the glorification of war crimes and their perpetrators;

    4. Reiterates that BiH’s accession process needs to be rooted in functioning democratic institutions, the rule of law, the fight against corruption and organised crime, as well as respect for fundamental rights and non-discrimination for all citizens, including constituent peoples, regardless of ethnic, religious or other affiliations;

    5. Strongly condemns the repeated use of inflammatory rhetoric and the adoption of secessionist laws and policies by Milorad Dodik, President of the RS entity, the SNSD party, and the Assembly of the RS entity, including the celebration of the so-called ‘Day of Republika Srpska’ and the Day of the State of the Republic of Serbia; emphasises that such actions undermine BiH’s constitutional order, territorial integrity and sovereignty, and are incompatible with its EU accession process and undermine the Dayton Peace Agreement;

    6. Urges all the Member States – and calls for their unity – as well as he European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission, to act more decisively to respond to these direct threats to European security and reiterates its call for targeted sanctions against all destabilising actors, notably Milorad Dodik, as well as other high-ranking RS entity and Serbian officials providing political and material support for secessionist policies; calls on all Member States to ensure that such sanctions can be adopted by the Council and to impose them bilaterally or in concert with other Member States if their adoption in the Council is not possible; condemns the Hungarian Government’s role in blocking sanctions; endorses the statements made by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on 10 March 2025 in Sarajevo and by VP/HR Kaja Kallas on 8 April in Sarajevo and calls for stability in the country to be safeguarded; believes that high-level EU officials should not engage with actors undermining the constitutional order of BiH in order not to harm the credibility of the EU in supporting BiH state institutions and welcomes the travel bans imposed on high-ranking RS individuals by some Member States;

    7. Takes note of the ruling of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the case of Milorad Dodik on 26 February 2025 and is highly alarmed by the escalating tensions and actions he has since led, including unprecedented attacks on BiH institutions and intimidation of opposition in the RS; deplores the support given to such policies by Russian and Serbian authorities, and calls upon all internal, regional and international actors to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of BiH; calls for the international isolation of Milorad Dodik; condemns the recent decision of the RS entity’s government to declare a senior German foreign ministry official as persona non grata; notes with concern that Interpol refused to issue a Red Notice for an international warrant and calls on EUFOR to provide concrete support to the BiH authorities to put an end to the continued efforts to undermine the country’s legal and political stability, and to demonstrate the EU’s and EUFOR’s commitment and ability to uphold peace, enforce the rule of law, and maintain the integrity of legal institutions;

    8. Deplores that Milorad Dodik’s policies and actions, including frequent blockades of State-level bodies and decision-making and the hollowing out of the BiH institutions necessary for the technical work on alignment with the EU acquis, are a major factor in BiH’s troubled EU accession path and a clear violation of the 12 June 2022 political agreement; welcomes the work of the competent BiH institutions and calls on them to follow due procedures and to execute and implement all decisions in full respect for the rule of law; urges all political actors, notably in the RS entity, to reject all secessionist steps undermining of the country’s unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security; urges the RS National Assembly to ensure that its Official Gazette reflects the decisions of the BiH Constitutional Court regarding RS legislation, which has been found to undermine the constitutional order and been taken out of effect;

    9. Urges the Commission, in close cooperation with the Member States and international partners, including the Office of the High Representative, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe, to take stock of the lessons learned over the past 15 years of European engagement in BiH and to recalibrate its strategy accordingly, with a renewed focus on delivering tangible progress and reforms that accelerate the country’s path toward EU membership, thereby reaffirming the EU’s unwavering commitment to the full integration of BiH into the Union;

    10. Welcomes BiH’s formal full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, including restrictive measures in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and urges the effective implementation of these measures; welcomes BiH’s continued participation in EU crisis management missions and operations; condemns the pro-Russian stance of the RS entity’s leadership and its frequent meetings with Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials; expresses serious concerns about the security risks posed by these ties; urges the EU to investigate the use of the RS entity as a gateway for Russian intelligence operations and hybrid attacks on EU Member States; calls for support to BiH in countering disinformation campaigns originating from Russia as part of a joint effort against hybrid threats; strongly supports BiH’s sustained aspirations towards Euro-Atlantic integration and NATO membership and calls on all political actors to take concrete political action to achieve them;

    11. Reiterates its support for the Office of the High Representative and EUFOR Operation Althea in overseeing the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in accordance with their mandates based on political neutrality and full respect for the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, until the country has fulfilled the ‘5+2 agenda’ and its international supervision ends; welcomes the renewal of the mandate of EUFOR Operation Althea; regrets that BiH is still heavily reliant on the mandate of the Office of the High Representative, and the presence of EUFOR Althea, but acknowledges and values it as a crucial institution in safeguarding not only peace, but also the bare functioning of the country;

    12. Recalls that EUFOR Operation Althea plays a key role in safeguarding the security, territorial integrity, stability, sovereignty and political independence of BiH, while ensuring that local stakeholders act in accordance with these fundamental principles as outlined in the Dayton Peace Agreement and UN Security Council resolutions; urges EUFOR to communicate this mandate unequivocally to the citizens of BiH as a confidence-building measure;

    13. Further welcomes the Council’s decision on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility worth EUR 10 million to the benefit of the Armed Forces of BiH (AFBiH) and the Cooperation and Training Contract for 2023 between the AFBiH and EUFOR; calls on the Council and VP/HR to enable all eligible Member States to participate in the EU peacekeeping missions, such as EUFOR’s Operation Althea in BiH; calls on the BiH authorities, NATO and EUFOR Althea to launch a reform process of the BiH armed forces;

    14. Remains concerned by malign foreign interference and disinformation campaigns by foreign actors in BiH, notably Russia and China, as well as their transmission through local media and political structures, particularly by the RS entity; expresses grave concern over Kremlin support for secessionist rhetoric, attempts to delegitimise state institutions, and interference in judicial and electoral matters; highlights recent Russian efforts at the UN Security Council to defend unconstitutional actions by RS entity authorities;

    15. Calls for further steps, inter alia aligning BiH legislation with the EU acquis, and EU support to effectively counter malign foreign interference and disinformation campaigns; calls on the EEAS and the EU Delegation to BiH to intensify efforts in promoting the benefits of closer integration and to invest in communication campaigns to fight anti-democratic narratives and other forms of foreign influence;

    16. Deplores the participation of RS entity authorities in the ‘All-Serb Assembly’ held on 8 June 2024 in Belgrade under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’ and rejects its declaration which undermines the sovereignty of BiH and other Western Balkan countries and fails to promote good neighbourly relations; condemns Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic’s interference in the affairs of BiH, including by expressing support for the illegitimate actions of Milorad Dodik and organising the Russia-backed ‘All-Serb Assembly’ which undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of BiH;

    17. Condemns the increase in Iran’s malign influence in the country and in the Western Balkans, which poses a threat to security for the EU and its Member States;

    18. Welcomes BiH’s renewed and sustained engagement in the EU-BiH Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee in fulfilment of one of the 14 key priorities set out by the Commission;

    19. Urges the BiH authorities to reform the coordination mechanism for EU matters, which has proved to be ineffective and inefficient in addressing EU integration-related tasks; calls on the authorities to submit a national programme for the adoption of the EU acquis (NPAA) in accordance with the Commission’s comments and to ensure coordinated alignment with the EU acquis throughout the country; highlights the need to establish an operational negotiating structure following the European Council’s decision to commence accession negotiations, including nomination of a negotiation team and a chief negotiator who is fully authorised to present the country’s position;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    20. Regrets the fact that political actors have still not enacted the necessary changes to the constitution and the electoral law to align them with the European Convention on Human Rights and to implement relevant rulings of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Court of Human Rights to eliminate all forms of inequality and discrimination in the electoral process and ensure non-discrimination, protection of fundamental rights, and equality for all BiH citizens to ‘move from Dayton to Brussels’; reiterates that failing to implement these rulings is incompatible with EU values and BiH’s EU integration; stresses the need for all constitutional and electoral reform processes to be inclusive, based on comprehensive consultations with citizens, civil society and independent experts and all relevant stakeholders in the country, and in line with European standards and principles; reiterates that any electoral reform must not deepen or cement ethnic division;

    21. Regrets that the BiH authorities have not been able to unite society or to create a just and functional system in the country, but rather have largely contributed to deepening divisions; calls on the EU and its Member States to initiate a transparent and inclusive reform process that would enable a sustainable transformation of the Dayton Peace Agreement into a constitution, fully in line with European standards and principles, with a view to ensuring a functional, accountable, representative, and popularly legitimate governance system, to overcome ethno-nationalistic divisions and achieve sustainable progress on the path towards the EU;

    22. Notes the changes made to the Election Law by the High Representative in March 2024 that introduced important integrity standards and confidence-building measures, aiming to restore voters’ trust in the overall election process; calls on the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH to urgently address all outstanding recommendations of the OSCE/ODIHR, of the Venice Commission and of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) especially on matters regarding election administration, the conduct of polling and counting, campaigning and campaign finance, explicit prohibition of indirect buying of votes, election dispute resolution, countering disinformation and foreign interference, increasing protection of journalists and sanctioning the misuse of administrative resources;

    23. Welcomes the fact that the local elections of 6 October 2024 were competitive and effectively managed; regrets that they were held in an environment lacking social and political cohesion;

    24. Strongly condemns the RS entity’s actions undermining BiH’s constitutional order and the competences of state bodies, and its obstructionism towards the Constitutional Court of BiH; condemns all illegal actions that conflict with the constitutional framework and calls on all political actors in BiH to pursue a pro-European approach;

    25. Notes the limited progress on justice reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in relation to the independence, professionalism, efficiency and accountability of the judicial system; calls for urgent measures to accelerate reforms in these areas, ensuring full alignment with EU standards and strengthening the capacity of the judiciary to effectively serve justice and uphold the rule of law;

    26. Remains seriously concerned about corruption, notably high-level corruption, in BiH, which is a structural problem deeply embedded in the country’s highly complex governance system, and urges the relevant authorities to take a more decisive, coordinated, transparent and proactive stance in fighting it, including by improving anti-corruption legislation fully in line with international standards and recommendations and ensuring the effective implementation of laws, such as those on preventing conflicts of interest and protecting whistleblowers; encourages BiH to engage in structured cooperation and exchange of best practices with Member States; welcomes the Anti-Corruption Strategy 2024-2028 and the adoption of the action plan for its implementation, as well as ongoing international cooperation efforts;

    27. Regrets that the laws on public procurement, conflict of interest and the High Judicial Council are still not in line with European standards and urges the adoption of a new law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC) in accordance with the recommendations of the Venice Commission; calls for the establishment of an independently functioning Asset Declarations Department within the HJPC, and advocates for the impartial and effective prosecution of high-level corruption cases;

    28. Stresses the need to strengthen the system for managing conflicts of interest among individuals holding top executive functions, in particular by ensuring that statements of interests are subject to regular and substantive verification; underlines that all individuals holding top executive functions, whether elected or appointed, should be subject to uniform disclosure obligations, and that all such declarations should systematically be made public and easily accessible online, in the interest of transparency and public accountability;

    29. Urges BiH to step up the fight against organised crime; is deeply concerned by vulnerabilities to criminal infiltration in the political, legal and economic systems; commends the BiH authorities for signing a Cooperation Agreement on Eurojust on 24 October 2024 to increase the efficiency of investigations and prosecution in the fields of organised crime, terrorism, trafficking in human beings, cybercrime and other criminal activities;

    30. Stresses that cooperation with the EU in the fight against drugs trafficking must be improved; calls for BiH to appoint a correspondent agent as part of its cooperation with the European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA);

    31. Welcomes the new Law on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Terrorism Financing and urges BiH to strengthen measures in this area, including the adoption of the necessary by-laws required for the effective implementation of the law, with particular attention to effective enforcement and monitoring; stresses, in particular, the need to fully align the anti-terrorism legislation with the EU acquis and international law; calls for the establishment of stricter sanctions for terrorism offences;

    32. Welcomes the adoption of BiH’s Law on Border Control aimed at improving compliance with European standards, and calls for full alignment with the EU’s visa policy as part of a controlled migration policy; stresses that BiH must uphold security at its borders and cooperate with Frontex and neighbouring countries to prevent irregular migration while ensuring sufficient access to asylum procedures for those eligible for international protection;

    33. Stresses the need to ensure that the appointment of senior police officials, particularly in the Border Police and the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), is based on merit and conducted through open, standardised and transparent selection procedures;

    34. Recalls the need for a professional and depoliticised civil service; welcomes the steps taken in public administration reform; calls for the administrative burden in public administration to be reduced; calls on the BiH authorities to improve public authorities’ responsiveness to information requests;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    35. Strongly condemns discrimination, violence and hate speech against all minorities; calls for the effective prosecution of such incidents; urges BiH to promote and safeguard the human rights, non-discrimination and protection of all minorities; calls for enhanced implementation of anti-discrimination mechanisms in BiH, with a particular focus on combating intolerance, hate speech and all forms of inequality; calls on the authorities to improve access to social, housing, education and healthcare services for all minorities and vulnerable groups; emphasises the importance of protecting the cultural and linguistic expression of all minorities in BiH;

    36. Expresses deep concern over the sharp increase in violence – including emerging forms of digital violence – against women, children, seniors and other vulnerable groups, including the LGBTIQ community; urges the BiH authorities to align their policies, legislation and practices on combating sexual and digital violence against women and girls with Council of Europe standards, particularly the Istanbul Convention, relevant ECtHR case law and the EU acquis; calls for targeted support to key institutions, for training professionals to provide victims with effective support, and for increased public awareness and institutional capacity to prevent and combat all forms of gender-based violence; stresses the key role of women’s associations in reaching out to the most vulnerable; calls on BiH to establish an official centralised data collection system on femicide; welcomes the 9 April 2025 decision of the government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) to include femicide in the criminal code and calls on the Parliament to urgently approve this new law;

    37. Regrets that the 2023-2027 gender action plan has so far lacked funding and monitoring; calls for an increase in the public and political participation of women in BiH; recognises the additional barriers and discrimination faced by women from ethnic minorities, particularly in accessing services;

    38. Condemns the RS entity’s adoption of legislative amendments that have removed gender identity as a protected characteristic, and those that no longer guarantee protection for children of diverse sexual orientations and gender identities;

    39. Calls on the relevant BiH authorities to develop and adopt the pending national action plan on the protection of the rights of the child; stresses that poverty and social exclusion affect a high percentage of children in the country, especially children from vulnerable groups, including Roma, children with disabilities, children in conflict with the law, and children on the move; recalls that BiH must uphold its international commitments so that no child is left behind;

    40. Emphasises the importance of inclusive and quality education, including the right to education in the mother tongue, and inter alia the importance of systematically reforming divisive curricula that seriously hamper internal mobility and limit critical thinking skills; reiterates its call for an end to the segregation practice of the ‘two schools under one roof’ system, which hampers social cohesion and equal opportunities, and stresses the need to favour reconciliation and integration and protect the right of every national community, including minorities, to their culture, language and identity; calls for the adoption of a common curriculum in history textbooks based on court-established facts related to the war as a means of avoiding historical revisionism and encourages the EU to support this initiative;

    41. Calls on BiH to guarantee the freedoms of assembly, association and expression, enabling the inclusion of civil society in policymaking; calls on the authorities to ensure meaningful, systematic and inclusive public consultation processes; condemns the RS entity’s reintroduction of a Russian-style law on ‘foreign agents’ and urges the authorities to repeal it; condemns the RS entity authorities’ use of criminalised defamation laws as a tool to stifle freedom of expression and calls for restoring criminalised defamation solely to the domain of civil law to prevent its misuse in restricting freedom of expression; calls on the Commission to attach strict conditionality to the revocation of these laws;

    42. Encourages the BiH Council of Ministers to adopt the Strategy for the Development of an Enabling Environment for Civil Society, ensuring that it unequivocally focuses on improving the legislative framework and securing more substantial and transparent funding for CSOs; calls for stronger protection of human rights defenders in BiH, including women activists, journalists and NGOs;

    43. Stresses the key importance of independent media and of respecting freedom of expression standards; calls on BiH to ensure the financial sustainability, emphasising the urgent financial crisis of the state-level public broadcaster BHRT, and political independence of public broadcasters and the Communications Regulatory Agency of BiH; calls on BiH to adopt legislation on media ownership transparency and public funding of the media; urges the state to accelerate the adoption of the Law on Electronic Communications, in line with the Digital Services Act[8] (DSA) and the new EU Media Freedom Act[9]; calls for ensuring pluralism in public media throughout the territory of BiH, including equal representation of all minorities; notes the appointment of the Public Broadcaster Board in FBiH after 12 years of blockages and calls on it to ensure impartial and objective information;

    44. Is strongly concerned by Russian propaganda in the RS entity’s public broadcaster and deplores the broadcasting of the RT (formerly Russia Today) channel, in violation of EU sanctions;

    45. Condemns the political pressure, attacks, intimidation, threats, demeaning remarks and strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) against journalists and media workers, especially by high-level politicians or their proxy organisations, and by foreign-aligned actors; regrets the lack of progress in guaranteeing freedom of expression and in amending the criminal laws to strengthen the protection of journalists from threats and attacks, in line with EU requirements, and calls on the authorities to adopt laws that effectively protect journalists, NGOs, human rights defenders, environmental activists and other stakeholders against SLAPPs; stresses the importance of ensuring appropriate judicial follow-up in cases of threats and violence against journalists;

    46. Urges BiH to ensure and effectively enforce relevant laws on general human rights; urges BiH to prosecute discriminatory crimes;

    47. Recalls the need for solidarity-based and fair migration and asylum management that combines upholding human rights with effective border control; calls on the EU to help BiH to take full responsibility for the management of reception centres, which are often at the border with the EU, to ensure sufficient reception conditions, and to guarantee access to effective and feasible asylum procedures in full respect for international law and human rights; is concerned about reports of insufficient reception conditions in the EU-funded centre in Lipa; stresses the need to increase transparency and democratic scrutiny in the allocation and implementation of EU funds in the field of migration; welcomes BiH’s upgraded status agreement with the Frontex and calls for its prompt signature; recalls that any eventual agreement with this agency should fully respect fundamental rights and international standards; urges BiH to step up its efforts against cross-border crime, especially human trafficking;

    Reconciliation, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations

    48. Recalls that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation are essential elements of the EU enlargement process;

    49. Stresses the importance of reconciliation in BiH and urges all authorities to actively promote and guarantee access to truth, justice and inclusive redress, including the adoption of a state-level law establishing minimum rights for wartime victims across the country, and the promotion of a women’s culture of remembrance; recognises that accountability as well as mutual respect among individuals and communities, and the promotion of mutual understanding, particularly among young people, can have a positive effect towards reconciliation; urges the BiH authorities to adopt a national transitional justice strategy; calls for further efforts to address the issue of missing persons; urges the Commission to invest additional efforts in promoting, supporting and facilitating reconciliation processes in BiH;

    50. Calls on the authorities of BiH to accelerate the prosecution of war crimes in accordance with the Revised State Strategy for Prosecuting War Crimes; highlights the importance of enhanced regional cooperation through the extradition of suspects, as well as cooperation between judicial authorities and exchange in all relevant formal aspects aimed at prosecution; encourages BiH authorities to align their legislation to ensure that all victims of war crimes have equal access to rights and protections;

    51. Recognises the extremely important role played by the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP), including by ensuring the institutional capacity, supporting families and providing evidence to Courts; urges the EU to ensure that the ICMP has access to sufficient funding to continue its activities;

    52. Reiterates its call for additional measures and concrete programmes to be implemented with regard to the sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons, access to healthcare and employment, social protection and education, and for full respect of all their rights to compensation for non-returnable property;

    53. Deplores all forms of historical revisionism, genocide denial, irredentism, glorification of war crimes and criminals, and contestation of facts or the independence and impartiality of international and domestic tribunals, especially by political leaders;

    54. Is concerned about the adoption of the ‘Declaration on the Protection of National and Political Rights and the Common Future of the Serbian People’ which is in violation of several aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement and undermines BiH’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity; notes that the ideas of Srpski Svet are incompatible with aspirations to join the EU; calls on Serbia to be constructively committed to the stability and territorial integrity of BiH and actively support BiH’s accession path;

    55. Emphasises the importance of preventive diplomacy in Bosnia and Herzegovina; calls on the EEAS to strengthen skills development among staff to improve the EU’s understanding of the local historical, cultural and religious contexts, as emphasised in the report on the role of preventive diplomacy adopted by Parliament in January 2024;

    56. Welcomes the UN General Assembly’s decision to designate 11 July as the International Day of Reflection and Commemoration of the 1995 Genocide in Srebrenica; calls on the authorities to ensure the security of the Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial Centre; emphasises that the Memorial Centre has had to temporarily close as a result of security concerns;

    57. Emphasises that regional cooperation via the common regional market is a beneficial attribution to promoting economic growth; calls on BiH to swiftly ratify all regional mobility agreements under the Berlin Process and to further strengthen economic cooperation through this market, in line with the objectives of EU enlargement;

    Socio-economic reforms

    58. Welcomes the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which includes the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, envisaging an indicative allocation for more than EUR 1 billion for BiH; regrets that BiH remains the only country in the Western Balkans that has not adopted a reform agenda; urges the Council of ministers and the cantons of BiH to unblock the adoption of its reform agenda without further delay in order to avoid its funding allocation being distributed among the other Western Balkan countries, and to establish a robust mechanism for transparent, inclusive and timely monitoring of its implementation; emphasises the need to prioritise key areas such as public administration, the rule of law, anti-corruption, decarbonisation, digitalisation, connectivity and human capital development, while also addressing social challenges; believes that embracing the opportunities of the Growth Plan would enhance BiH’s economy; calls on the Commission to explore ways of cooperating with willing and committed regional authorities, making more flexible use of the Reform and Growth Facility;

    59. Recalls that EU funding for projects in the RS entity should remain frozen until the reversal of democratic backsliding by the RS entity and until full alignment with the CFSP;

    60. Encourages BiH to make best use of all EU financial support; calls on the Commission to continue providing financial and technical support for BiH’s EU integration based on clearly defined conditionality and rigorous monitoring of spending and results, in line with the EU objectives of efficient and accountable budget management; believes that EU funds should better support the democratic reforms of the country; in that context, calls for the relevant EU funding to be reprogrammed to redirect more funds towards supporting technical assistance in absorbing the funds, judiciary reforms and anti-corruption measures; calls, furthermore, for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for fruitful cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in order to ensure that the EPPO can effectively exercise its competences in accession countries; encourages BiH to swiftly conclude bilateral working arrangements with the EPPO;

    61. Regrets that sustainable improvement and progress in this area is also hindered by the governance structure and a lack of country-wide strategies in all areas and on all levels; calls for the swift appointment of an IPA III coordinator and calls for better absorption of IPA III funds in BiH, including at local and regional levels; calls for the capacity of local and regional authorities to implement socio-economic reforms and manage projects co-financed from EU funds to be strengthened, in order to increase absorption and reduce regional inequalities;

    62. Urges BiH to prioritise measures aimed at improving competitiveness and the business environment, while improving economic and social cohesion, including progress towards the European Pillar of Social Rights, boosting economic diversification, promoting the digital and green transitions, addressing the informal economy and tackling unemployment;

    63. Expresses concern at the extremely negative demographic trends in the country, prompted in particular by the large number of young people leaving, and stresses the importance of the urgent adoption of additional measures to address this challenge; calls for a focus on youth as the driving force for EU integration in the country; calls on BiH to finalise and adopt the Youth Guarantee to improve access to employment, education, training and apprenticeships for young people, address high youth unemployment and skills mismatches and to promote social inclusion;

    64. Encourages EU institutions to work with civil society and experts to develop avenues to make health and social protections flexible and portable, to ensure equality and mobility within BiH;

    65. Welcomes the calls for the prompt integration of all Western Balkans into the EU’s Digital Single Market before actual EU membership, which would crucially benefit the creation of safe digital environment;

    Energy, the environment, biodiversity, sustainable development and connectivity

    66. Encourages BiH to accelerate the diversification of energy sources, particularly regarding ending its gas dependence on Russia; urges BiH to enhance energy security and efficiency by strengthening its electricity transmission and distribution grids, coupling with the European market and transitioning to renewables, particularly to solar and wind, while ensuring meaningful public consultations and effective environmental safeguards;

    67. Urges BiH to adopt its long-overdue national energy and climate plan and implement countrywide environmental protection strategies, including by legally protecting its candidate Emerald sites, improving the adequacy of its Emerald network, and ensuring the full implementation of the Habitats Directive[10], the Birds Directive[11] and the Water Framework Directive[12], while improving the quality and transparency of environmental investments; reiterates the need for effective air and water quality protection and improvement, and for effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for breaches of environmental law; notes that progress in the area of environmental and climate protection as well as alignment with the EU standards has remained low, and therefore urges BiH’s authorities to ensure greater alignment with EU standards and policy objectives on climate protection and energy in line with the 2020 Green Agenda and the Paris Agreement;

    68. Calls on the BiH authorities to reduce transboundary air pollution, especially in the case of Bosanski Brod oil refinery; recalls that BiH is a signatory party of the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo, 1991) and is bound by its obligations;

    69. Underlines the need to improve ex ante comprehensive strategic environmental assessments with the meaningful involvement of local communities, civil society organisations and independent experts; highlights the need to increase the transparency of procedures for infrastructure projects across eco-sensitive sectors; stresses the importance of increasing environmental mainstreaming across sectoral policies;

    70. Urges the country to implement measures to protect the biodiversity and ecologic integrity of rivers in line with the Espoo Convention;

    71. Expresses deep concern about the harmful impact of mining activities, including those conducted by foreign companies, on the environment in BiH and the health of its citizens; calls on all mining entities operating in BiH to fully comply with national legislation and to prioritise environmental protection and public health;

    72. Stresses the urgent need for the FBiH to adopt a fair, modern and expert-driven law on forests; further calls for stronger protection of forests and rivers through improved inspection oversight and the creation of a stringent legal framework in line with environmental and systemic standards; calls for the abolition of the provision in the relevant regulation in the FBiH that permits the release of waste water into rivers with minimal oversight, thereby posing a significant threat to public health and the environment;

    73.  Calls upon BiH to urgently finalise and adopt the legal designation of Livanjsko Polje as a Category V Protected Landscape, ensure appropriate monitoring;

    74. Stands in solidarity with BiH and all victims of the devastating floods and landslides of 3-4 October 2024; calls on the Federation of BiH authorities to increase support for those affected and ensure that any shortcomings in law enforcement and forest management that may have exacerbated the disaster are addressed;

    °

    ° °

    75. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the Presidency, Council of Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the governments and parliaments of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republika Srpska entity and the Brčko District, and the Office of the High Representative.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on European technological sovereignty and digital infrastructure – A10-0107/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on European technological sovereignty and digital infrastructure

    (2025/2007(INI))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Articles 173, 179 and 190 thereof,

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘Commission work programme 2025: Moving forward together: A Bolder, Simpler, Faster Union’ (COM(2025)0045),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem[1] (the Chips Act),

    – having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union[2] (NIS 2 Directive),

    – having regard to the detailed report by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) entitled ‘Foresight Cybersecurity Threats For 2030 – Update 2024’, published in March 2024,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements[3] (the Cyber Resilience Act),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA (the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013[4] (the Cybersecurity Act),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/38 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 laying down measures to strengthen solidarity and capacities in the Union to detect, prepare for and respond to cyber threats and incidents[5] (the Cyber Solidarity Act),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/37 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 amending Regulation (EU) 2019/881 as regards managed security services[6],

    – having regard to the Commission White Paper of 21 February 2024 entitled ‘How to master Europe’s digital infrastructure needs?’ (COM(2024)0081),

    – having regard to Mario Draghi’s report of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

    – having regard to Enrico Letta’s report of 17 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 2 July 2024 entitled ‘State of the Digital Decade 2024’ (COM(2024)0260),

    – having regard to Decision (EU) 2022/2481 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 establishing the Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030[7],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/903 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 laying down measures for a high level of public sector interoperability across the Union[8] (the Interoperable Europe Act),

    – having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/1024 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on open data and the re-use of public sector information (recast)[9],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241[10],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2854 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 on harmonised rules on fair access to and use of data and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 and Directive (EU) 2020/1828[11] (the Data Act),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1309 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on measures to reduce the cost of deploying gigabit electronic communications networks, amending Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 and repealing Directive 2014/61/EU[12] (the Gigabit Infrastructure Act),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence[13] (the Artificial Intelligence Act),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014[14],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/694 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Digital Europe Programme and repealing Decision (EU) 2015/2240[15],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination, and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1290/2013 and (EU) No 1291/2013[16],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/696 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Union Space Programme and the European Union Agency for the Space Programme[17],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/588 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2023 establishing the Union Secure Connectivity Programme for the period 2023-2027[18],

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014[19],

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/1173 of 13 July 2021 on establishing the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1488[20],

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1732 of 17 June 2024 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1173 as regards a EuroHPC initiative for start-ups in order to boost European leadership in trustworthy artificial intelligence[21],

    – having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code (recast)[22],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as regards establishing the European Digital Identity Framework[23],

    – having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 21 February 2025 to the European Parliament and the Council entitled ‘EU Action Plan on Cable Security’ (JOIN(2025)0009),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2020 entitled ‘Secure 5G deployment in the EU – Implementing the EU toolbox’ (COM(2020)0050),

    – having regard to the European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles for the Digital Decade, which commits ‘to promote a European way for the digital transformation, putting people at the centre’,

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 30 December 2021 entitled ‘Criteria for the analysis of the compatibility with the internal market of State aid to promote the execution of important projects of common European interest’ (IPCEIs) (COM(2021)8481),

    – having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A10-0107/2025),

    A. whereas technological sovereignty should be seen as the whole value chain from excellence in research to creating better competition and achieving greater European sovereignty;

    B. whereas the EU relies on non-EU countries for over 80 % of digital products, services, infrastructure and intellectual property;

    C. whereas a few technological companies hold concentrated power over key digital markets and control over underlying internet infrastructure, including operating systems, computing, artificial intelligence (AI), search engines, social media capacity, digital advertising and payment services;

    D. whereas our technological sovereignty will greatly depend on Europe’s ability to create the market conditions needed for European companies to flourish and compete with each other, thereby increasing the quality of their products;

    E. whereas the EU is at risk of failing to meet its digital decade targets and objectives, including the adoption of cloud, big data and AI;

    F. whereas European firms contribute a minor share to global research and development (R&D) in software, internet technologies and electronics, while the United States and China lead in these sectors;

    G. whereas the Commission’s Digital Compass, Digital Decade Policy Programme, and Competitiveness Compass are essential frameworks for strengthening Europe’s digital ecosystem, securing technological leadership and ensuring long-term economic resilience;

    H. whereas digital infrastructure is composed of hardware elements related to connectivity, including fibre, 5G and 6G, submarine cables, satellites and spectrum, and computing, including semiconductors, data centres, HPC and quantum technologies, and of software elements including identity solutions, the Internet of Things, and cloud and AI systems, as well as the intermediary layer including advertising, search engines, payments and communication systems;

    I. whereas the EU’s competitiveness will increasingly depend on the digitalisation of all sectors, supported by resilient, safe and trustworthy digital infrastructure; notes, in this context, that the digital single market is a vital asset as it can enable companies to grow and scale up;

    J. whereas the full potential of the digital single market remains untapped, with intra-EU trade in digital services representing just 8 % of GDP, which is significantly lower than the 25 % for trade in digital goods;

    K. whereas the availability of eID schemes and digital public services and access to e-Health records are increasing, but there are still significant gaps in the provision of privacy preserving, fully user-centric, accessible and sovereign digital public services among Member States due to differences in the adoption of eID;

    L. whereas eID is currently available to 93 % of the EU’s population, but achieving 100 % of digital public services for citizens and businesses by 2030 remains challenging;

    M. whereas interoperability and interconnectedness would enhance the competitiveness of the European economy and might benefit from policies such as open-source first and public money, public code, and the implementation of common and open standards;

    N. whereas digital infrastructure is of key importance for EU industry, including the automotive industry and the possible development of connected and autonomous  vehicles; whereas robust data and communications infrastructure is needed to support a secure ecosystem for connected and autonomous vehicles;

    O. whereas fibre-optic networks form one of the backbones of the EU’s digital infrastructure, enabling high-speed internet, 5G networks and future technological improvements;

    P. whereas the EU is behind on the roll-out of 5G to meet its 2030 targets, with still limited fibre coverage of only about 64 % of European households being included;

    Q. whereas investment needs in state-of-the-art connectivity in the EU are immense;

    R. whereas resolving challenges related to access to land and grids is key to the successful deployment of digital infrastructure;

    S. whereas the EU GOVSATCOM initiative aims to ensure the long-term availability of secure, reliable and cost-effective governmental satellite communication services for EU and national public authorities that manage critical security infrastructure and missions;

    T. whereas chips play a crucial role in increasing the technological competitiveness and resilience of Europe;

    U. whereas the Commission’s Competitiveness Compass, the Clean Industrial Deal and the 2025 Commission Work Programme make little to no mention of semiconductor technologies despite their critical importance for the EU’s industrial ambition;

    V. whereas the Chips Act was an ad hoc adaptation mechanism aimed at addressing certain challenges regarding semiconductor shortages; whereas its areas of action are mostly limited to advanced semiconductors; whereas EU engagement on legacy semiconductors is insufficient; whereas the revision of the Chips Act is expected in September 2026;

    W. whereas the existing European regional clusters in the semiconductor sector have a role to play and should be further strengthened;

    X. whereas processors, memory technologies, graphics processing units (GPUs), and quantum chips are critical to Europe’s digital infrastructure and supply chain security;

    Y. whereas cloud services are fundamental to a wide range of computational activities and computing services that have become an essential enabler of competitiveness;

    Z. whereas federated models could enhance the competitiveness of the EU market by facilitating the emergence of significant European alternatives, building on local market expertise and presence;

    AA. whereas large-scale AI infrastructure, such as AI gigafactories, is essential for enabling open and collaborative development of the most complex AI models;

    AB. whereas the AI value chain is still under development and tackling the development of AI models is only part of it; whereas European AI solutions may be developed using Europe’s public and private computing infrastructure, driving innovation, and start-ups and small companies should be in particular beneficiaries of access to public computing infrastructure;

    AC. whereas AI models that can be run on widely available hardware at moderate costs allow a greater number of actors to shape how AI systems are created and used, providing more immediate value in applications and enabling a more democratic use of AI;

    AD. whereas at the moment, the roll-out, marketing and deployment of AI is often shaped by a small number of big tech companies; whereas some AI features are not being rolled out in the EU at the same time as in non-EU countries, creating a competitive disadvantage for European businesses and consumers;

    AE. whereas data centres are an essential part of an advanced digital society, as enablers of distributed processing and effective data storage;

    AF. whereas trusted capacity and availability of data storage is essential for European resilience and development; whereas most data centres in Europe are not owned by European companies;

    AG. whereas building and operating large-scale data centres requires substantial investment;

    AH. whereas around 9 % of global electricity consumption results from data centres, cloud services and connectivity;

    AI. whereas submarine cables are critical infrastructure for global connectivity, economic stability and security, carrying over 99 % of international communications through them, and they remain vulnerable to physical damage, cyberthreats and geopolitical risks;

    AJ. whereas secure and resilient digital infrastructure is crucial, particularly considering the increasing number of cyberattacks against the EU, its Member States and its industry and society;

    AK. whereas the EU toolbox for 5G security is important for preventing cyberespionage and strengthening the resilience of supply chains in the EU’s digital infrastructure;

    AL. whereas 21 % of businesses cite compliance and legal uncertainties as a barrier to digital investment;

    AM. whereas the ‘one in, one out’ approach ensures that all burdens introduced by Commission initiatives are considered and that administrative burdens are offset by removing burdens of equivalent value in the same policy area;

    AN. whereas the energy consumption challenges in AI, cloud and quantum computing, as well as data centres, require the integration of sustainability into digital infrastructure strategies;

    AO. whereas data centre power consumption is projected to nearly triple by the end of this decade, increasing from approximately 62 terawatt-hours (TWh) today to more than 150 TWh, thus escalating from 2 % to 5 % of total European power consumption;

    AP. whereas the digital skills gap remains a major concern, with only 54 % of European citizens possessing at least basic digital skills – well below the 80 % target set in the digital decade policy programme;

    AQ. whereas the shortage of ICT professionals in the EU is projected to reach 12 million by 2030, falling significantly short of the EU’s target of 20 million skilled workers;

    AR. whereas the 2024 State of the Digital Decade report and the Draghi report both stress the urgent need to invest in digital and science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) skills to preserve Europe’s technological capabilities and global competitiveness;

    AS. whereas 60 % of EU companies report difficulties in recruiting skilled workers in areas such as AI, cybersecurity and clean technologies, posing a significant barrier to innovation, competitiveness and the green and digital transitions;

    AT. whereas current labour market developments, including global lay-offs and political instability outside the EU, create an opportunity to attract high-skilled digital talent to the EU;

    AU. whereas increasing competitiveness and resilience require appropriate funding; whereas public funding can act as a catalyst and private investment and competitive market forces are key for the long-term development of digital infrastructure;

    AV. whereas a robust, agile and excellence-driven research and innovation (R&I) ecosystem is essential to ensure the EU’s global competitiveness and leadership in strategic technologies, such as quantum and AI;

    AW. whereas standardisation is at the core of genuine European digital and technological sovereignty; whereas the importance of standards is growing due to increasing technological competition across the world, particularly with the United States and China;

    AX. whereas the EU is committed to negotiating comprehensive digital trade agreements (DTAs) to promote secure, resilient and competitive digital infrastructure development with partner countries;

    AY. whereas the Commission has announced landmark DTAs with South Korea and Singapore, setting an important precedent for future agreements;

    AZ. whereas Parliament and the Council have agreed on the ‘EU horizontal provisions on Cross-border data flows and protection of personal data and privacy in the Digital Trade Title of EU trade agreements’, which was endorsed by the Commission and remains an important tool in relation to digital trade and the establishment of new DTAs;

    General introduction

    1. Underlines that European sovereignty is the ability to build capacity, resilience and security by reducing strategic dependencies, preventing reliance on foreign actors and single service providers, and safeguarding critical technologies and infrastructure; calls for the development of a comprehensive risk assessment framework to monitor and address dependencies across the digital value chain; underlines that such a framework should serve as a basis for ensuring EU preparedness and resilience by enhancing European industrial policy and boosting domestic R&D and manufacturing capabilities in strategic technologies;

    2. Believes that technological sovereignty is the capacity to design, develop and scale up digital technologies needed for the competitiveness of our economy, the welfare of our citizens and the EU’s open strategic autonomy in a globalised world; believes that this includes ensuring the EU’s ability to make autonomous decisions, engaging with trusted non-EU countries and entities, diversifying and strengthening supply chains and promoting the concept of openness and interoperability to ensure that Europe remains an attractive hub for investment;

    3. Recognises the increasing concentration of power in non-EU companies, which constrains Europe’s ability to innovate, compete and maintain control over its digital economy, society and democracy; is concerned by excessive dependencies on non-EU actors in critical areas such as cloud infrastructure, semiconductors, AI and cybersecurity – where market concentration and foreign control threaten to undermine Europe’s competitiveness, democratic resilience and security;

    4. Believes that the EU’s industrial tech ambitions should focus on the key strategic technologies of the future, such as semiconductor technologies or quantum, that contribute to the EU’s open strategic autonomy and are essential for our green, digital and defence transitions;

    5. Recognises the shift in the geopolitical landscape and the resulting opportunity for market demand for European products and services; sees this as a window of opportunity to position Europe as a global leader in trusted and secure digital solutions;

    6. Underlines the need to foster a supportive regulatory environment that encourages innovation, investment and the development of cutting-edge technologies in Europe, while protecting EU end users from the consequences of extraterritoriality;

    7. Recognises the need for a comprehensive European industrial policy for the digital ecosystem, integrating all relevant policy domains such as market access, standardisation, R&D, investment, trade and international cooperation; calls on the Commission to develop this comprehensive policy with the aim of reducing harmful strategic dependencies, strengthening domestic value chains and ensuring a secure, trustworthy and innovation-driven digital ecosystem that adheres to European values;

    8. Recalls that the high-tech product and digital services markets depend heavily on external supply chains, posing risks to sovereignty and resilience; stresses the importance of boosting industrial capacity and technological expertise in emerging and disruptive technologies to support the EU’s open strategic autonomy;

    9. Emphasises that boosting Europe’s technological sovereignty in the era of rapid technological development requires enhancing innovation and commercialisation in order to build the necessary capabilities; highlights that Europe must transform itself into a globally attractive and agile business environment by reducing bureaucracy, enhancing regulatory predictability and fostering entrepreneurship and risk-taking;

    10. Recognises that open strategic autonomy and democratic resilience must be at the core of the Commission’s agenda and that a comprehensive approach must integrate procurement, funding and long-term institutional frameworks to establish sovereign digital infrastructure in critical domains;

    11. Calls on the Commission to analyse and establish a comprehensive list of critical dependencies in digital infrastructure and technologies, assessing, at minimum, storage services, identity and payment systems, communication platforms, as well as the software, protocols and standards that support them, and to propose measures to promote market access for products and services with a strong positive impact on the EU’s technological sovereignty, resilience and sustainability; believes, in that regard, that the use of specific award criteria in public procurement may be promoted in areas where such critical dependencies exist; believes that such criteria can help incentivise competition and strengthen European technological sovereignty by facilitating the procurement of European digital products and services, where possible;

    Digital public infrastructure

    12. Strongly believes that digital infrastructure is the backbone of our economy and that there should therefore be a base layer of digital public infrastructure (DPI) that ensures sovereignty and a competition-friendly market environment; observes that the market has not developed this base layer in many important areas, which has resulted in monopolies and reliance on foreign actors; underlines that in order to fill this gap, the EU should take the lead in creating a strong foundation for DPI by creating layers of digital technologies consisting of semiconductors, connectivity solutions, cloud infrastructure, software, data and AI; believes that European DPI should be founded on fair and competitive economic models and also use governance models where neither private companies nor governments maintain centralised control; is of the opinion that it should be built on common and open standards, embrace interoperability and interconnectedness, so as to prevent user and vendor ‘lock-ins’, and spur innovation by facilitating new market entrants, and that it should also ensure privacy and security by default;

    13. Believes that the deployment of DPI should be focused on areas where critical dependencies exist, as identified in the Commission’s comprehensive list; calls on the Commission to prepare a detailed and comprehensive plan for establishing European DPI by identifying technologies that are best suited to European action, and urges the Commission and the Member States to dedicate appropriate resources to deploying European DPI;

    14. Stresses that European DPI should be stimulated by coordinated action at EU level to ensure the presence and competitiveness of European providers as well as a competitive market environment; underlines that these objectives will not be achieved through regulation alone and will require significant public investment; recognises that the forthcoming multiannual financial framework (MFF) should therefore include additional funding for this purpose, focusing on EU added value and financing the base layer of European DPI;

    15. Recognises that as part of the forthcoming MFF, the EU must commit to increased spending to achieve technological sovereignty; underlines that this should include a dedicated envelope for the development and deployment of the DPI layers identified in the Commission’s comprehensive list, as well as additional funds to ensure a competition-friendly market environment in other digital areas;

    16. Believes that the funding under the forthcoming MFF should prioritise active capacity-building in key hardware, software and service areas, including high-performance computing, quantum computing, encryption and communication, connectivity, cloud, data, web and AI ecosystems, and digital libraries;

    17. Is of the opinion that European DPI should be based on EU values and remain open to like-minded non-EU partners; calls on the Commission and the Member States to sustain their efforts and add more impetus to the process with the UN Development Programme on DPI;

    18. Recognises e-government services as a key enabler of efficient, secure and accessible public service delivery, which should be designed to facilitate digital identification, government data sharing and public sector payments without distorting markets or undermining existing private sector solutions; emphasises that the EU’s approach to e-government services should focus on strengthening digital government-to-citizen and government-to-business interactions, while ensuring trust, interoperability and accessibility; believes, therefore, that secure and seamless access to public services requires a trustworthy e-identification framework and welcomes the announcement of a ‘business wallet’ aimed at significantly simplifying the interconnection between businesses and public authorities;

    19. Calls on the Commission to further develop public interest data platforms, enabling secure cross-border data sharing between public and private entities for use cases, in particular, in healthcare, urban planning and environmental monitoring; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to promote interoperability between public interest and industry-specific data platforms, ensuring the seamless flow of data while minimising administrative burdens; notes that this could be achieved by leveraging existing market-driven solutions that foster innovation, maintain trust and uphold privacy and security standards;

    20. Recognises that under the current legal framework, European citizens have the right to control their personal data and that data generated within the EU must be processed in accordance with EU law; stresses that safeguarding privacy and personal data is essential for building trust in the digital economy, allowing European consumers to engage with confidence, regardless of where their data is processed; highlights that European companies – particularly small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) – must be able to make use of data in a lawful, ethical and secure manner to drive sustainable growth and competitiveness;

    Digital infrastructure

    21. Highlights that digital infrastructure is the backbone of Europe’s economy and society and that its importance will continue to grow; calls on the Commission to include in the requested list of critical dependencies a comprehensive assessment of the composition of European digital infrastructure in order to adequately analyse the state of play, assess risks and coordinate action;

    22. Believes that in order to strengthen digital infrastructure, it is essential to implement capacity-building initiatives in critical areas at EU level; considers that these initiatives should focus on developing a base layer of public infrastructure, such as a network of AI gigafactories and a European web index model; is of the opinion that this base layer will empower companies to develop their business models and boost technological sovereignty; points to the digital solutions created by the EU, such as the EU digital identity, that can offer innovative infrastructure for the EU’s digital economy;

    23. Recognises the strategic importance of critical digital infrastructure and the need to strengthen their security and resilience; understands that critical digital infrastructure includes, but is not limited to, cables (terrestrial and submarine), cellular network towers, satellite communication systems, spectrum and radio equipment, cloud servers that contain sensitive information and data centres that process sensitive information, as well as certain software elements, including security software that protects critical networks and data centres;

    24. Highlights the need to ensure that this infrastructure falls under EU jurisdiction, meaning that it fully adheres to EU law; stresses the importance of privacy and security-by-design; calls on the Commission. therefore, to introduce legislation to mitigate risks posed by high-risk vendors from non-EU countries, including risks posed by foreign-controlled energy resource providers;

    25. Calls on the Commission, while preparing future legislative proposals and the forthcoming MFF, to concentrate efforts on deepening the single market, in line with the recommendations made in Enrico Letta’s report entitled ‘Much more than a market’ and in Mario Draghi’s report on ‘The future of European competitiveness’, with the aim of unlocking the potential of the digital single market;

    26. Takes note of the recommendations laid down in these two reports that the EU needs a paradigm shift from promoting connectivity in the EU to establishing a single market for electronic communications and connectivity; supports a simplified, harmonised and innovation-friendly telecommunications framework that ensures fair competition and the accessibility of infrastructure;

    27. Welcomes the Commission’s white paper on how to master Europe’s digital infrastructure needs, which outlines three pillars: creating the ‘3C Network’ – ‘Connected Collaborative Computing’, completing the digital single market, and secure and resilient digital infrastructure for Europe;

    28. Views the white paper and the subsequent consultation process as part of the preparation of the legislative initiatives planned for this term, including the Digital Networks Act; calls on the Commission to take a more holistic view of digital infrastructure throughout this process and to acknowledge that digital infrastructure comprises many elements beyond mere connectivity; underlines the need to accompany any new digital policy measure with an impact assessment;

    29. Urges the Commission to simplify and harmonise telecommunications rules as part of the forthcoming Digital Networks Act and the broader Digital Package;

    30. Calls on the Commission to introduce an EU cloud and AI development act to strengthen European data infrastructure and the promotion of European cloud providers; underlines that this act should aim to actively build a European single market for cloud and AI;

    31. Acknowledges that deploying cutting-edge digital infrastructure across the EU requires substantial investment and recognises that both public and private funding are essential for achieving this goal; expresses concern over the persistent shortage of venture capital and investment financing in Europe, which undermines technological sovereignty; calls on the Commission to significantly scale up public-private investment instruments, including venture capital, strategic platforms and dedicated funding tools for start-ups and scale-ups in critical technology sectors; highlights the importance of leveraging public procurement to support the deployment and scaling of open and interoperable digital solutions and of ensuring that private capital, competition and innovation become the main drivers of Europe’s digital transformation over the medium and long term;

    High-speed connectivity

    32. Is of the opinion that the upcoming Digital Networks Act must support the objective of providing all EU consumers with high-quality connectivity by 2030, especially in remote and rural areas, as well as removing administrative barriers for the roll-out of 5G, 6G and secure, high-speed broadband;

    33. Recognises the increasing convergence of telecommunications infrastructure with cloud and edge technologies, and sees the potential of open radio access networks to deliver advanced technological solutions, reduce costs and enhance the interoperability of connectivity; believes that the future of connectivity lies in the complementarity of diverse technologies such as 5G/6G, Wi-Fi and satellite, where seamless integration benefits both businesses and consumers;

    34. Recognises that with cloud and edge services at the core of their transformation, connectivity networks are evolving rapidly into platforms for innovation and will increasingly depend on cloud computing, AI, virtualisation and other technologies;

    35. Calls for ambitious targets in the development and innovation of wireless communication networks, acknowledging the need for a broad-based approach that includes cloud computing, AI, edge computing and quantum computing; emphasises that the innovation ecosystem for electronic communications, especially for vertically integrated telecoms, should remain market-driven, and insists that future regulatory measures be based on thorough, knowledge-based impact assessments of existing regulations;

    36. Recognises that competition between operators of all sizes remains a key driver of investment in connectivity networks; calls on the Member States to ensure that copper networks are switched off progressively in favour of fibre-optic or 5G technologies, in particular where regular maintenance or updates of the network are needed, thus ensuring that the shift is carried out in an attainable manner and allowing providers to plan logistically and financially in advance;

    37. Stresses that all consumers in the EU should have access to adequate quality, reliable and affordable connectivity, thus contributing to increased demand for connectivity services; calls on the Commission and the Member States to expand and upgrade digital networks, especially in rural areas, and to support public-private investments in broadband and 5G/6G deployment, while maintaining cybersecurity standards and secure-by-design principles;

    38. Is convinced that, as digital connectivity infrastructure such as fibre, 5G and 6G will be crucial for future industrial competitiveness, the forthcoming MFF should include funds for the large-scale deployment of network infrastructure, bridging the existing deployment gap to achieve the 2030 Digital Decade targets, creating pan-European 5G coverage for citizens’ use and ensuring the successful deployment of Industry 4.0 tools;

    Fibre

    39. Stresses the importance of accelerating the deployment of fibre-optic networks and modern wireless communications systems that can deliver fast, secure and reliable digital services;

    40. Recognises that the need to prioritise direct fibre connections for homes, businesses and public institutions is crucial to ensure ultra-fast and reliable connectivity, in addition to network roll-outs with public works, such as roads, water and electricity, to streamline fibre roll-out;

    41. Welcomes the introduction of the Gigabit Infrastructure Act, which responds to the growing needs for faster, reliable and data-intensive connectivity; recognises the importance of the shared use of ducts and poles for deploying very high capacity networks to optimise resources and reduce costs; urges the Member States to streamline permitting processes and harmonise regulations to lower financial and administrative barriers to the expansion of fibre infrastructure;

    5G and 6G

    42. Believes that private investments are essential for deployment of electronic communication networks, 5G and 6G that are advanced enough in terms of transmission, speed, storage capacity, edge computing power and interoperability;

    43. Stresses that the enforcement and implementation of the Gigabit Infrastructure Act is further necessary for the creation of a one-stop shop for permits and a centralised digital permitting process to reduce delays in infrastructure deployment and to ensure uniform rules for infrastructure access, pricing and environmental impact assessments; calls, in this regard, for strong efforts in this area;

    44. Takes the view that the EU needs strong cybersecurity protection in all critical infrastructure sectors, with stricter measures to de-risk high-risk vendors in 5G and 6G networks, ensuring dense deployment of small cells and macro towers, particularly in urban and rural areas with inconsistent coverage, and ensuring the sustainability and energy efficiency of the infrastructure so as to support Europe’s global competitiveness in the digital economy;

    Spectrum

    45. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to work towards enhanced coordination of spectrum allocations, in particular through earlier identification and the harmonisation of the release of new frequencies, starting with 6 GHz frequencies; calls for a radio spectrum policy that promotes investment in Europe, including through the harmonisation of spectrum assignment policies across the Member States to accelerate 5G deployment based on best practices, the promotion of longer license durations and access to new spectrum such as the upper 6 GHz band in order to meet future demand and enable 6G; believes that a shared effort from public and private entities is necessary in order to increase the competitiveness of Europe and not lag behind the fastest growing networks in the world, i.e. in China and South Korea;

    Satellites and satellite communication systems

    46. Underlines the importance of satellite-based communications in developing EU digital infrastructure, increasing its resilience, strengthening the capabilities of EU actors, and reducing dependence on non-EU providers, particularly in the area of defence; highlights the need to provide alternative connectivity solutions for consumers in remote and rural areas;

    47. Highlights the strategic role of the EU space programme, as one of the pillars of EU sovereignty, in providing state-of-the-art and secure positioning, navigation and timing services for Galileo and EGNOS and cost-effective satellite communication services for GOVSATCOM; notes that this allows the EU and its Member States to have greater sovereignty in their satellite capabilities, including geopositioning, earth observation, space surveillance and connectivity; welcomes, in particular, the EU GOVSATCOM and IRIS2 programmes, which aim to ensure the short- and long-term availability of secure, reliable and cost-effective governmental satellite communication services for EU and national public authorities that manage critical security infrastructure and missions;

    48. Deplores the strong dependence on non-EU data for the tracking and surveillance of space objects; stresses the need for Europe to urgently reinforce its own capabilities and infrastructure in space situational awareness (SSA) to ensure open strategic autonomy and security; calls on the Commission and the Member States to significantly increase investment in EU-owned surveillance and tracking assets, and to develop effective mechanisms for information-sharing among the Member States, enabling Europe to independently monitor and protect its critical space infrastructure;

    49. Stresses the importance of private sector involvement in launcher technologies to further accelerate the deployment of IRIS2; stresses the importance of fostering a robust and competitive European space launch sector through greater private sector involvement and support for upstream and downstream industries; calls on the Commission to promote a European space industrial policy that strengthens sovereignty in space technologies and services by reducing strategic dependencies and improving the operational governance of European space programmes;

    50. Calls, to this end, for concrete measures to facilitate the provision of satellite services throughout Europe, including by defining common procedures and conditions; calls, in parallel, for fair competition, with clear and enforceable rules for all satellite constellations accessing the EU market;

    51. Notes that there are currently several issues with latency in satellite networks and recognises that the integration of satellite networks with 5G and, in the future, 6G technologies is pivotal in extending the reach and reliability of terrestrial networks;

    High-performance computing (HPC) systems

    52. Recognises the progress made in recent years in enhancing HPC; calls on the Commission to continuously integrate and enhance the computing power at EU HPC centres, in particular, enhancing the training of AI models and preparing for future advancements in supercomputing;

    53. Calls on the Commission to develop a coordinated strategy to bridge the gap between Europe’s cutting-edge HPC technology and its practical, scalable deployment across industries, including by creating a public network for supercomputing; notes that this strategy should foster collaboration between public institutions and private sector partners, including SMEs, to ensure that Europe’s HPC capabilities become a key driver of economic competitiveness and technological sovereignty;

    54. Highlights that HPC centres must ensure accessibility for developers and deployers of AI foundation models, generative AI and applied AI; notes that EuroHPC Centres should be available for these use cases and particularly for SMEs, start-ups and scale-ups; emphasises that this must be seamlessly complemented by initiatives to enable the development and deployment of AI in the EU;

    55. Welcomes the creation of new AI factories; underlines that AI factories will upgrade EuroHPC supercomputers to deliver computing capacity for AI and support start-ups and scale-ups in the training and large-scale development of general-purpose and trustworthy AI models;

    Hardware for computing: semiconductors, chips and quantum chips

    56. Believes that urgent action is needed to boost EU domestic semiconductor manufacturing, improving supply chain resilience by forming strategic global partnerships, encouraging start-ups and innovation, fostering cross-border collaboration in advanced semiconductor development and providing financial incentives, regulatory support and market access;

    57. Emphasises the need for legal certainty to support semiconductor development, ensuring secure supply chains for critical raw materials and avoiding disruptions caused by investment uncertainties;

    58. Urges to give utmost political importance to ensuring a sufficient supply of AI chips in the EU and to make it a focal point of EU digital industry policies; notes the increase in demand for AI chips driven by expanding applications in cloud computing, edge devices, autonomous systems and generative AI;

    59. Calls on the Commission to react to the new geopolitical realities and the use of digital supply chains as pressure tools; urges the Commission to find a negotiated solution to the US ban on the export of AI chips to 16 EU Member States;

    60. Calls on the Commission to put advanced AI chips, including their design and production, at the core of the revision of the Chips Act; calls on the Commission to present the revision this year, featuring a long-term strategy rooted in current geopolitical realities that builds European strategic indispensability through technological leadership, adequate production capabilities and a strong R&D ecosystem, which will be essential to secure European sovereignty in increasingly troubled times; believes that it is crucial to strengthen the interactions among research, training, suppliers and robust public infrastructure to accelerate the path from research, development, testing and finally full-load production;

    61. Believes that the EU should enhance its efforts on quantum chip development if it intends to accelerate the time-to-market for EU industrial innovation in quantum technology;

    62. Calls on the Commission to support the manufacturing within the EU of widely used chips e.g., for electronic devices and cars; calls for support for the development of chips that reduce the energy consumption of the digital sector;

    63. Underlines the need to support the performance of the circular economy and recalls that information and communications technology products and other electronics are part of the priority product groups in the working plan to be adopted by April 2025 under Regulation (EU) 2024/1781[24];

    64. Believes that additional funding under the forthcoming MFF must be allocated to the development of semiconductor production capacities and other next-generation semiconductor technologies and processes (e.g. photonic chips, wide-bandgap chips, as well as design, manufacturing, testing, assembly and advanced packaging) within the EU;

    Cloud services

    65. Recognises that there is a market need for sovereign solutions that offer enhanced levels of control over data for certain categories of sensitive data and acknowledges the risks associated with reliance on single dominant providers; calls for a strategy for reducing reliance on foreign cloud providers, while fostering European alternatives;

    66. Notes that the discussions on the EU Cybersecurity Certification Scheme for Cloud Services have not brought any results; points out that there are sovereignty considerations, in particular related to the extraterritoriality of binding legal regimes, that cannot be solved through technical discussions; calls on the Commission to propose a definition of sovereign cloud and its scope of application in the planned cloud and AI development act;

    67. Notes the need to secure data storage and computational power, and distributed computing infrastructure; calls on the Commission to ensure that cloud users have the ability to choose solutions that meet their needs by urgently removing barriers to switching and diversifying providers through multi-cloud strategies, and by fostering a competitive European cloud market, thereby reducing reliance on single providers and enhancing digital sovereignty;

    68. Calls on the Commission to leverage initiatives such as 8ra and IPCEI CIS to advance decentralised cloud and edge infrastructure, which are enablers of sovereignty and contribute to reducing reliance on foreign providers and ensuring resilience while enhancing operational flexibility within Europe;

    AI systems

    69. Welcomes the InvestAI initiative, including the AI gigafactories; emphasises the need for Europe to position itself as a global leader in AI model training, scientific research and quantum computing advancements; is committed to further supporting AI development by launching initiatives such as AI factories to provide computing power for start-ups, scale-ups and researchers;

    70. Calls on the Commission to further support the design and development of European AI and to adopt policies and measures that will enable European industrial sectors to benefit from their data and AI deployment;

    71. Emphasises that the delayed deployment of AI-driven innovations hinders technological progress, market competitiveness and digital transformation within the EU;

    72. Expects that the public-private financing model will unlock unprecedented private investment in AI that will open up access to supercomputers for start-ups and industry to supercomputers;

    Quantum

    73. Recognises the urgent need to define a clear roadmap for quantum technology development, including quantum computing and quantum encryption, ensuring that public and private investments lead to tangible commercial applications;

    74. Calls on the Commission to conduct an assessment of existing national quantum sandbox frameworks and how existing legislation applies to them in order to prevent market fragmentation; welcomes the announcement of the Quantum Strategy and Quantum Act in the Commission’s Competitiveness Compass;

    75. Urges the Commission to ensure that the Quantum Act, accompanied by an impact assessment, positions Europe as the leading region for quantum excellence and innovation by investing in R&D and innovation, mobilising funding to scale up the European quantum ecosystem, capabilities and production, and ensuring Europe’s leading quantum research is commercialised in Europe; underlines that it should deliver tangible technological applications by fostering policies that accelerate technological maturity and facilitate the transition from research to commercial success;

    76. Calls for targeted investments, industry collaboration and regulatory frameworks that support the development, scaling and market adoption of quantum technologies across key sectors;

    77. Calls for a coordinated EU strategy for post-quantum cryptography to protect data from future cyberthreats;

    Data centres

    78. Calls on the Commission to support ecosystems for sharing industry-specific data within industrial sectors, fostering collaboration and driving innovation, while maintaining data sovereignty and ensuring compliance with EU regulations, as outlined in the Data Act; urges the Commission for strong enforcement to ensure that dominant market players do not impose unfair terms on SMEs and mid-sized enterprises when accessing and sharing data;

    79. Believes that there is a need to ensure interconnected infrastructure that would allow data centres to work together efficiently under common standards with high-speed connectivity, while flexibility, security and scalability would be maintained; believes this interconnected system would help in ensuring distributed redundancy so that data and services remain available even in the event of a data centre failure;

    80. Calls on the Commission to prioritise interoperability across platforms, enabling the seamless integration of data across businesses and sectors, in alignment with the requirements of the Data Act, which mandate data portability and interoperability obligations for cloud and edge services; stresses the need for the robust enforcement of these provisions to prevent vendor lock-in and ensure that European industrial ecosystems can leverage data-driven innovation without technical or contractual barriers;

    81. Recalls the Commission’s plan to make data centres climate-neutral and highly energy efficient by 2030; sees the need to improve the integration of data centres with the energy system, focusing on heat reuse and providing flexibility services to the electricity grid needs; recognises the need to incentivise research for cooling and energy-efficient processors, while special attention should be given to supporting EU data centres; urges the Commission to ensure clear and consistent implementation of existing legal requirements for data centre operators across EU legislation and the Member States;

    82. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to increase and target public investment and to incentivise private investment in digital infrastructure to enable the growth and modernisation of data centres;

    Submarine cables

    83. Calls on the Commission to take coordinated action to protect submarine cables and reinforce cable security and repair capabilities; stresses the need for continued investment in the construction of new submarine cables to ensure redundancy; welcomes the EU’s role in co-financing such projects to enhance digital infrastructure and connectivity across the Member States; calls on the Commission to explore potential synergies between the maintenance of undersea digital and energy infrastructure;

    84. Emphasises the importance of improving EU and Member State repair capabilities and response mechanisms to handle submarine cable disruptions, which are essential for maintaining secure and uninterrupted communications; underlines the importance of international cooperation in repairing sabotaged cables and facilitating the necessary investments, and calls for the establishment of an EU-based rapid-response repair fleet to ensure swift recovery and operational continuity in the event of disruptions; calls on the Commission to carry out an assessment of regulatory measures to ensure fair access and security, regardless of whether the infrastructure is privately or publicly owned;

    85. Welcomes the adoption of the action plan on cable security, which will be organised around four pillars: prevention, detection, response and repair, and deterrence; highlights the importance of its full and timely implementation; urges, in the current geopolitical context, increased investment in technologies to strengthen the security and resilience of subsea and offshore infrastructure;

    86. Calls on the Commission to promote R&I to enable advanced technological innovations in cable security, including early warning systems and AI-driven threat assessments;

    87. Urges the Commission to review available instruments designed to better leverage private investments in support of Cable Projects of European Interest (CPEIs); calls on the Commission to include submarine cable projects in the list of IPCEIs; recognises the need to streamline and simplify the application and administrative process governing IPCEIs;

    Cybersecurity

    88. Recalls the legislative work carried out over the previous legislative term aimed at significantly improving cybersecurity in the EU; welcomes, in particular, the adoption of the Cyber Resilience Act, the Cyber Solidarity Act and the NIS2 Directive; stresses the need for the harmonised and timely implementation and enforcement of these measures;

    89. Calls on the Commission to present an evaluation report on the Cybersecurity Act and to propose a legislative act to review it in order to strengthen the EU’s cybersecurity framework, with a particular focus on the interplay between sovereignty and security; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to enhance the protection of strategic and critical infrastructure and prevent foreign interference from entities subject to extraterritorial legislation, as well as accelerating the adoption process for EU cybersecurity certification schemes; calls for ENISA’s mandate to be strengthened to coordinate crisis response, oversee cybersecurity certification for critical infrastructure and ensure uniform implementation of cybersecurity standards across the single market;

    90. Emphasises the importance of the upcoming European internal security strategy in strengthening cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection;

    91. Notes with concern that, according to the second report on Member States’ progress in implementing the EU toolbox on 5G cybersecurity, 14 Member States have yet to implement any restrictions on high-risk suppliers, posing significant security vulnerabilities; calls for the full implementation of the EU toolbox for 5G security in order to reduce reliance on high-risk vendors; calls on the Commission to make the toolbox binding, specifically with regard to high-risk vendors in critical infrastructure;

    Simplification

    92. Notes that to achieve true technological sovereignty, the EU must have viable commercial alternatives; stresses that the EU must urgently pursue a comprehensive agenda of simplification and bureaucracy reduction to foster an innovation-friendly environment capable of supporting competitive European alternatives to dominant global digital players; underlines that excessive administrative burdens, fragmented regulatory frameworks, an incomplete digital single market and overly complex compliance procedures disproportionately impact European start-ups, scale-ups and SMEs, limiting their capacity to compete at global level; recognises that the EU should therefore prioritise regulatory streamlining and the deepening of the digital single market, ensuring that legislation is proportionate, innovation-driven and does not stifle the development of European technological solutions;

    93. Emphasises the need for new legislative proposals to be aligned with better regulation principles, ensuring that any new digital policy measure that affects competitiveness is accompanied by an impact assessment, including a competitiveness, SME and small mid-cap check that evaluates whether a given legislative instrument is necessary, proportionate and does not create unnecessary burdens for businesses, especially SMEs, and thus its effects on competitiveness, investment prospects and consumer welfare;

    94. Highlights that the simplification of EU legislation must not endanger any of the fundamental rights of citizens and businesses and thus jeopardise regulatory certainty; believes that any simplification proposal should not be rushed or proposed without proper consideration, consultation and an impact assessment;

    95. Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to fully implement the principle of burden reduction for companies in EU legislation; calls on the Commission, therefore, to enhance its efforts by aiming to remove more cost and administrative burdens for businesses compared to the benefits that would be derived from any new regulatory requirements introduced at EU level in the same policy area, so that barriers to market entry are removed to help European companies to scale and grow;

    96. Calls on the Commission to ensure consistent simplification, implementation and enforcement of EU digital legislation through the Digital Package, streamlining definitions and reporting procedures, assessing ways to alleviate reporting obligations and reducing the gap between industry and government;

    97. Believes that supporting companies and innovators to stay in Europe by developing the EU as an attractive and agile business environment is key to enhancing technological sovereignty; emphasises, in that regard, that excessive regulation and administrative burdens should be avoided and that EU rules should be clear, consistent, predictable, proportionate and technologically neutral, thus maintaining a globally competitive regulatory environment; believes that new public procurement methods and the development of regulatory sandboxes and test beds should also contribute to an innovation-friendly framework;

    98. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal of a 28th legal regime, recognising that a single, harmonised set of EU-wide rules will be a game changer for digital investment and innovation; believes that reducing regulatory fragmentation across 27 national legal regimes will boost private investment, lower compliance costs and accelerate the deployment of next-generation digital infrastructure, products and services; encourages the Commission to ensure that this framework specifically addresses regulatory barriers in the digital sector, such as permitting and cross-border data flows, in order to create a true digital single market;

    99. Urges the Commission to create a single point of contact to simplify the application process for private-sector access to EU funding mechanisms, ensuring that private companies, SMEs and start-ups can more easily participate in digital investment programmes;

    Energy

    100. Emphasises that data centres will put additional pressure on electricity grids, making it imperative to reinforce them through anticipatory investments; stresses that data centres can also help stabilise the grid by participating in demand-side flexibility; calls for measures to incentivise such contributions based on the implementation of the revision of the European electricity market reform;

    101. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to propose and implement instruments that ensure orderly planning of the escalating energy demand from data centres, facilitating their strategic placement near available energy sources and thus minimising reliance on the broader grid infrastructure;

    102. Recognises that fibre is more energy efficient than traditional copper networks; acknowledges the importance of reducing energy consumption in data transmission and ensuring long-term stability and efficiency;

    103. Calls on the Commission to ensure a reliable and sufficient clean energy and net-zero technology supply to support the digital infrastructure of the future;

    Skills

    104. Recognises the urgent need for more skilled professionals in digital fields to meet the EU’s strategic objectives; calls on the Member States to develop national strategies and incentives to retain European talent and attract the world’s best digital professionals, thereby strengthening the EU’s innovation capacity and technological leadership;

    105. Stresses the importance of closing the digital and STEM skills gap to enhance technological resilience, innovation capacity and open strategic autonomy; calls on the Member States to strengthen investments in digital education, upskilling and reskilling, particularly in areas essential for the green and digital transitions; supports prioritising investments that address digital skills shortages, particularly in AI, cybersecurity, data analysis and clean technologies, in order to support innovation and technological sovereignty;

    106. Calls for coordinated strategies at national level to improve access to high-quality STEM education, promote lifelong learning and attract talent to ICT and related fields; encourages partnerships between public institutions, industry and educational providers to ensure alignment between curricula and evolving market needs;

    107. Calls for intensified efforts to improve digital literacy and skills across all demographics, focusing on early STEM education, vocational education and training, and lifelong learning in digital technologies; recommends aligning national education and training strategies with the EU Digital Decade goal of 80 % of the population possessing basic digital skills by 2030, with a focus on gender-inclusive policies to increase women’s participation in ICT and STEM fields; calls on the EU institutions to take concrete steps to uphold the commitments referred to in the European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles for the Digital Decade, both within the EU framework as in the Union’s cooperation with third countries;

    108. Supports the establishment of a common EU certification framework for digital and technical skills to improve the recognition and portability of qualifications among the Member States;

    109. Encourages the European Investment Bank and national development institutions to support digital talent retention by co-investing in European deep-tech start-ups, ensuring that EU-funded innovation remains within the region and contributes to Europe’s technological sovereignty;

    Research and innovation

    110. Recognises the importance of bridging the gap between research and commercialisation and calls on the Commission to enhance the valorisation of innovation within the EU;

    111. Believes that Europe’s ability to transform research into market-ready solutions is critical for building necessary capabilities and reducing reliance on non-EU technologies;

    112. Emphasises that funding needs to be strategically allocated to accelerate the development and market introduction of solutions that strengthen Europe’s technological resilience and drive innovation; underlines the importance of a more agile, excellence-based funding structure, particularly in improving the translation of research into industrial applications; calls for increased investment in R&I to strengthen Europe’s knowledge and technological capabilities and insists that EU research, development and innovation (RDI) funding be based on open competition and excellence;

    113. Highlights the need for policies that support industrial innovation, including targeted investment in key strategic technologies where Europe can lead globally, such as quantum computing, in order to build an innovation ecosystem;

    114. Believes that private investment in RDI is of utmost importance and calls for the EU to create incentives that effectively leverage private funding for the development of critical technologies, including through public-private partnerships;

    115. Stresses the urgent need for stronger incentives to mobilise private sector capital for technology-driven innovation; encourages the Member States to introduce targeted fiscal incentives, regulatory simplification and risk-sharing instruments designed to attract private equity to the technology and digital sectors; highlights the need to streamline cross-border capital flows within the single market to facilitate access to finance for innovative European start-ups;

    Standards

    116. Strongly believes that promoting interoperability and EU standards is paramount to fostering competitiveness in the technology sector, as it ensures that products can be connected and work with each other, thus fostering innovation and open markets; recalls that both interoperability and common technological standards pave the way for the functioning of the single market;

    117. Underlines that the Commission must increase its engagement in existing global standardisation structures and focus on the international uptake of European standards through a bottom-up approach, avoiding centralisation;

    Partnerships

    118. Welcomes the EU’s commitment to negotiating DTAs that facilitate secure and competitive digital infrastructure development with partner countries; encourages the Commission to increase efforts in negotiating DTAs with additional partner countries;

    119. Calls on the Commission to accelerate technical cooperation in multilateral forums such as the G7, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the World Trade Organization (WTO) so as to develop global standards for digital governance, AI regulation, cross-border data flows and emerging technologies;

    120. Urges the Commission to advance negotiations on a permanent solution to the WTO moratorium on e-commerce to prevent the introduction of digital tariffs, ensuring international digital trade remains open, predictable and conducive to innovation;

    °

    ° °

    121. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: International Monetary Fund (IMF) Executive Board Concludes the 2025 Article IV Consultation with Libya

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

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    The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV Consultation with Libya.[1] The Executive Board’s decision was taken on a lapse-of-time basis.

    Real GDP growth is estimated to have declined to around 2 percent in 2024 from 10 percent in 2023, driven by a contraction in the hydrocarbon sector. At the same time, non-hydrocarbon growth remained robust on the back of sustained government spending. Both the current and the fiscal accounts have swung from a surplus in 2023 to a deficit in 2024. Reported inflation remained low.

    The outlook continues to be dominated by developments in the oil sector. Real GDP growth is projected to rebound in 2025, primarily driven by an expansion of oil production, before moderating to about 2 percent over the medium term. Non-hydrocarbon growth is set to remain between 5 and 6 percent in the medium term, supported by sustained government spending. The current account is slated to post a small surplus in 2025 (0.7 percent of GDP) before turning into a small deficit over the medium term, as oil prices remain subdued. The fiscal balance is projected to remain in deficit—albeit at a much lower level than in 2024—under the weight of continued large government spending.

    Risks are tilted to the downside. Domestic risks stem from political instability, potentially evolving into active conflict, disrupting oil production and exports, and preventing progress on much-needed economic reforms. The economy is exposed to global downside risks through its heavy dependence on oil exports and a large import bill.

    Executive Board Assessment[2]

    Economic activity and fiscal and external accounts are poised to remain heavily dependent on developments in the oil sector and subject to downside risks. Following a rebound in oil production, economic growth is expected to be in double digits in 2025, before moderating over the medium term. Despite the expected increase in oil exports, the current account and fiscal balances are set to remain in deficit over most of the forecast horizon, weighed down by the projected softening of oil prices and large fiscal spending. The outlook is subject to downside risks, including the potential intensification of domestic political tensions, which could disrupt oil production and exports, and adverse global economic and geopolitical developments, which would put additional downward pressure on oil prices. To mitigate these risks, accelerating reforms aimed at restraining fiscal spending and diversifying the economy away from oil will be crucial.    

    Controlling expenditure will be key to ensure sustainability and to achieve intergenerational equity. The authorities should remain steadfast in their efforts to agree on a unified budget that outlines priority spending and enhances the transparency and credibility of government fiscal operations. Until such an agreement is reached, pressures to increase spending on salaries and subsidies should be resisted. Over the medium term, a sizable adjustment will be required to set the fiscal position on a sustainable trajectory and preserve intergenerational equity. The adjustment should be carefully designed to rationalize current spending, particularly wages and energy subsidies, and mobilize non-oil revenues, while maintaining capital expenditures at levels that support economic diversification.

    A well-designed monetary and exchange rate policy framework will be essential to help manage economic cycles and mitigate the depreciation pressures. Introducing a well-defined policy rate will enhance the CBL’s capacity in smoothing the economic cycle and alleviating pressures on the dinar and provide a benchmark for the pricing of credit by both conventional and Islamic banks. Phasing out the foreign exchange tax alongside other exchange restrictions in line with Libya’s Article VIII obligations will reduce distortions, lower economic agents’ need to resort to the parallel market and help unify the exchange rate.

    Reforms are needed to reinforce the banking sector’s contribution to economic activity. Impediments to a more active role by banks in the economy remain pervasive. Introducing well-designed savings plans will help to reduce cash hoarding, expand banks’ deposit base, establish bank-customer relationships, and support the provision of credit to the private sector. Enhancing transparency and accountability within the banking sector and promoting financial literacy among the public would foster confidence in banks and increase their footprint in Libya’s economy. Strengthening the AML/CFT framework, including by aligning it with international standards, will be paramount to support the stability of correspondent banking relationships and to ensure that Libyan banks’ operations remain uninterrupted.

    Structural and governance reforms would foster the emergence of a diversified, sustainable, and private sector-led economy. Forging a comprehensive reform program aimed at reducing dependence on oil revenues should be at the top of the authorities’ agenda. Key elements of the reform program should promote a more active engagement of the private sector in economic activity, including by enhancing the business environment and access to finance and introducing labor market measures that encourage private sector employment. Taking decisive actions to tackle corruption, strengthen governance, and enhance the rule of law will support economic diversification further.

    There is a need to enhance data provision and statistical capacity. Data gaps continue to significantly hamper staff’s ability to conduct analysis and provide policy advice. There is a need for the authorities to implement the technical assistance recommendations in the areas of national accounts and external sector statistics, and monetary and financial statistics, and improve data collection and reporting.

    (Main Export: Crude Oil)

    Est.

    Proj.

    2021

    2022

    2023

    2024

    2025

    2026

    2027

    2028

    2029

    2030

    (Annual percentage change, unless otherwise indicated)

    National income and prices

    Real GDP (at market price)

    28.3

    -8.3

    10.2

    1.9

    16.1

    4.4

    1.6

    1.7

    1.9

    2.2

    Nonhydrocarbon

    5.9

    7.9

    -0.6

    14.3

    2.9

    5.9

    4.2

    4.4

    4.8

    5.3

    Hydrocarbon

    45.0

    -17.0

    17.8

    -5.5

    25.6

    3.6

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    Nominal GDP in billions of Libyan dinars 1/

    159.0

    208.2

    211.9

    234.3

    251.2

    254.2

    265.5

    277.9

    292.0

    306.6

    Nominal GDP in billions of U.S. dollars 1/

    35.2

    43.3

    44.0

    48.4

    47.2

    47.7

    49.8

    52.2

    54.8

    57.6

    Per capita GDP in thousands of U.S. dollars

    5.2

    6.4

    6.4

    7.0

    6.8

    6.8

    7.0

    7.3

    7.5

    7.8

    GDP deflator

    90.4

    42.7

    -7.6

    3.6

    -3.3

    -3.1

    2.8

    2.9

    3.1

    2.8

    CPI inflation

      Period average

    2.9

    4.5

    2.4

    2.1

    2.3

    2.3

    2.3

    2.3

    2.3

    2.3

      End of period

    3.7

    4.1

    1.8

    2.3

    2.3

    2.3

    2.3

    2.3

    2.3

    2.3

    (In percent of GDP)

    Central government finances

    Revenues

    79.5

    85.8

    73.6

    69.8

    67.9

    61.1

    58.5

    56.6

    54.5

    52.4

    Of which: Hydrocarbon

    78.1

    83.9

    71.6

    55.4

    62.1

    59.2

    56.7

    54.7

    52.6

    50.4

    Expenditure and net lending

    64.7

    62.2

    65.4

    94.8

    73.2

    64.6

    61.8

    59.5

    57.1

    54.8

    Of which: Capital expenditures

    10.9

    8.4

    8.7

    34.6

    20.1

    12.8

    12.1

    11.4

    11.0

    10.9

    Overall balance

    14.8

    23.6

    8.2

    -25.1

    -5.3

    -3.5

    -3.3

    -2.9

    -2.7

    -2.5

    Overall balance (in billions of U.S. dollars)

    5.2

    10.2

    3.6

    -12.1

    -2.5

    -1.7

    -1.6

    -1.5

    -1.5

    -1.4

    Nonhydrocarbon balance

    -63.3

    -60.3

    -63.4

    -80.5

    -67.5

    -62.7

    -60.0

    -57.6

    -55.2

    -52.9

    (Annual percentage change unless otherwise indicated)

    Money and credit

    Base Money

    2.8

    -16.9

    47.9

    6.6

    36.8

    9.0

    9.2

    10.0

    10.2

    16.7

    Currency in circulation

    -20.0

    -1.4

    37.6

    13.3

    10.5

    2.2

    1.5

    5.0

    5.0

    5.0

    Money and quasi-money

    -20.3

    12.0

    28.3

    12.2

    4.0

    4.5

    4.5

    5.0

    5.0

    5.0

    Net credit to the government (Libyan Dinar, billion)

    -94.1

    -114.9

    -110.9

    -128.8

    -130.4

    -121.4

    -112.7

    -104.6

    -96.8

    -89.3

    Credit to the economy (% of GDP)

    0.1

    0.1

    0.1

    0.1

    0.1

    0.1

    0.1

    0.1

    0.1

    0.1

    (In billions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated)

    Balance of payments

    Exports

    25.9

    32.1

    30.9

    28.4

    32.0

    31.3

    31.6

    32.0

    32.5

    32.9

    Of which: Hydrocarbon

    24.5

    30.0

    28.8

    26.3

    29.9

    29.1

    29.2

    29.7

    30.3

    29.9

    Imports

    17.0

    17.2

    17.7

    21.6

    21.9

    20.5

    20.6

    20.8

    21.0

    21.2

    Current account balance

    5.7

    10.0

    8.0

    -2.0

    0.3

    -0.3

    -0.2

    -0.2

    -0.1

    -0.1

    (As percent of GDP)

    16.1

    23.2

    18.3

    -4.2

    0.7

    -0.5

    -0.4

    -0.3

    -0.3

    -0.1

    Capital Account (including E&O)

    -7.0

    -5.3

    -3.8

    6.5

    -2.8

    -1.4

    -1.4

    -1.4

    -1.3

    -1.3

    Overall balance 2/

    1.1

    4.7

    4.3

    4.5

    -2.5

    -1.7

    -1.6

    -1.5

    -1.5

    -1.4

    Reserves

    Gross official reserves

    69.4

    74.1

    78.4

    82.9

    81.1

    79.4

    77.8

    76.3

    74.8

    73.4

    In months of next year’s imports

    32.2

    32.8

    34.2

    29.6

    31.0

    32.3

    31.5

    30.5

    29.6

    28.8

    Gross official reserves in percentage of Broad Money

    317.0

    318.2

    261.3

    250.3

    262.9

    246.4

    230.9

    215.6

    201.4

    188.2

    Total foreign assets

    79.7

    84.2

    88.5

    93.6

    91.6

    89.7

    87.9

    86.2

    84.5

    82.9

    Exchange rate

    Official exchange rate (LD/US$, period average)

    4.5

    4.8

    4.8

    4.8

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    Parallel market exchange rate (LD/US$, period average)

    5.1

    5.1

    5.2

    6.9

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    Parallel market exchange rate (LD/US$, end of period)

    5.0

    5.2

    6.1

    6.4

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    Crude oil production (millions of barrels per day – mbd)

    1.2

    1.0

    1.2

    1.1

    1.4

    1.5

    1.5

    1.5

    1.5

    1.5

     Of which: Exports

    1.0

    0.8

    1.0

    0.9

    1.1

    1.2

    1.2

    1.2

    1.2

    1.2

    Crude oil price (US$/bbl) 3/

    64.4

    89.6

    75.0

    73.6

    66.9

    62.4

    62.7

    63.6

    64.3

    64.9

    Sources: Libyan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

    1/ Nominal GDP data are at market prices.

    2/ Includes revaluation of gold holdings of U$10.5 billion in 2024.

    3/ The crude oil price was adjusted for Libya up to 2024.

    [1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

    [2] The Executive Board takes decisions under its lapse-of-time procedure when the Board agrees that a proposal can be considered without convening formal discussions.

    – on behalf of International Monetary Fund (IMF).

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: The Success Story of Tamura Oil – Burundi’s Red Gold

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    Beneath the shade of oil palms, a quiet yet powerful revolution is underway. The Dukundane Cooperative, led by women (95% of its members), stands as a beacon of resilience and innovation, having transformed a once small-scale activity into a thriving semi-industrial enterprise.

    Founded in 2014 following women’s leadership training under the Women’s Peace and Humanitarian Fund (WPHF), the cooperative initially brought together women crafting and selling brooms from palm fibers. By 2020, they had taken a transformative step – launching artisanal palm oil production.

    The foundation for this transformation was laid in 2018 under axe 6 of the WPHF, which supports the socio-economic recovery and political participation of women and girls in peacebuilding contexts. That year, 175 women peace actors and dialogue facilitators – locally known as Abakanguriramahoro or “women mediators”—received financial support in Karonda. These women had already been active in conflict prevention and community mediation.

    With a grant of USD 180,000 from the WPHF, they expanded their economic activities using a holistic approach to palm tree valorization: from palm oil extraction to soap production from palm nuts and organic fertilizer from processing residues.

    This marked a turning point in women’s economic empowerment in the region. Yet, the initiative still faced challenges due to limited equipment and technical capacity, underscoring the need for more structured support.

    By 2025, with new backing from the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and UN Women, the group officially became the Dukundane Cooperative. With a total investment of 603 million Burundian francs, a modern semi-industrial processing plant was established with the help of the implementing partner FVS “Amie des Enfants.” The plant features: a Sterilizer, Sorting table, Destemmer, Kneader, Oil press, Decanters, Steam cooking pots, Water tank and Steam boiler.

    Today, the cooperative processes 10,000 kg of palm bunches daily, yielding approximately 2,500 to 3,000 liters of oil under the Tamura Oil brand.

    “We thank all our partners who made it possible to establish this semi-industrial unit capable of producing refined oil that can compete in the market,”
    — Frida Ndagijimana, President of the 185-member cooperative, including 175 women.

    A Tool for Peace and Empowerment

    Beyond oil production, the cooperative now manages over two hectares of oil palm plantations. The facility includes a sorting shed, storage shed, staff toilets and changing rooms, and an office building.

    With support from national technical bodies such as the National Center for Food Technology (CNTA), Burundi Bureau of Standards (BBN), Palm Oil Office (OHP), and implementing partner CREOP-JEUNES, Dukundane has become a national model for women’s economic empowerment and local development.

    But the story doesn’t end with economic gains. This initiative is a concrete manifestation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which emphasizes the critical role of women in peacebuilding. In Karonda, that vision is now firmly rooted—and bearing fruit.

    – on behalf of UN Women – Africa.

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    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Griffith Discusses SWVA Electric Grid Challenges, Votes to Strengthen Electric Grid and Advance Power Plant Reliability Act of 2025

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Morgan Griffith (R-VA)

    Congressman Morgan Griffith (R-VA), member of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, participated in a markup hearing to advance several energy-related measures. His bill to help keep baseload power plants online, H.R. 3632 the Power Plant Reliability Act of 2025, was favorably reported by the Committee. 

    Congressman Griffith’s remarks on his bill can be found here or below. 

    BACKGROUND

    The Power Plant Reliability Act of 2025 amends Section 207 of the Federal Power Act to allow a Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) or a state Public Utility Commission to petition the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to issue an order to keep a power plant open and allocate costs for fixing a reliability issue.

    Congressman Griffith has long held concerns about the early retirement of Virginia’s and regional electric power plants, including the impacts on electric bills in Southwest Virginia.

    Congressman Griffith’s recent e-newsletter on blackouts and brownouts can be found here.

    In the 119th Congress, Congressman Griffith is serving his first term as chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Environment.

    Following the Environmental Protection Agency’s June announcement proposing rollbacks of power plant rules, Congressman Griffith issued his support in a statement. 

    Congressman Griffith serves as Co-Chair of the Congressional Coal Caucus. 

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Reps. Allen and McBath Lead Effort to Increase Access to Care for Energy Workers

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Rick Allen (R-GA-12)

    Today, Congressman Rick W. Allen (GA-12), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions (HELP), and Congresswoman Lucy McBath (GA-06), introduced the Health Care for Energy Workers Act to increase access to care for current and former energy workers.

    Specifically, this bipartisan, bicameral legislation would update the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act (EEOICPA) to allow nurse practitioners (NPs) and physician assistants (PAs) to order care for current and former Department of Energy (DOE) workers who receive health care under this Department of Labor (DOL) program. The EEOICPA provides compensation and medical benefits to employees who work or have worked in the nuclear weapons industry. Under current EEOICPA regulations, NPs and PAs are unable to order home health care services for patients, creating unnecessary barriers to care, especially for patients in rural communities.

    Upon introducing the bill, Congressman Allen issued the following statement:

    “Georgia’s 12th District is home to thousands of energy workers employed at Plant Vogtle and the Savannah River Site, many of whom qualify under the EEOICPA for their health care needs. However, those who live in rural areas are often hours away from the nearest physician, highlighting the need for greater flexibility to ensure these beneficiaries receive the care they deserve. I am proud to lead this bill with Congresswoman McBath to cut unnecessary red tape and improve access to care for energy workers in Georgia and nationwide,” said Congressman Allen.

    “America’s workers deserve access to the health care that will help them lead full lives,” said Rep. McBath. “Too often, necessary treatments might not be available in rural communities. This bill represents an important next step in ensuring more frontline workers have access to quality and efficient care as they serve our communities.”

    NOTE: The Health Care for Energy Workers Act would benefit over 7,000 Georgia energy workers, including many employed at Plant Vogtle and the Savannah River Site. A Senate companion bill has been introduced by U.S. Senators Marsha Blackburn (R-TN), John Hickenlooper (D-CO), and Patty Murray (D-WA).

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cantwell Statement on Continued Lee Efforts to Sell Off America’s Public Lands: “The Latest Lee Proposal Is Just One More Attempt To See If Congress Blinks”

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Washington Maria Cantwell

    06.25.25

    Cantwell Statement on Continued Lee Efforts to Sell Off America’s Public Lands: “The Latest Lee Proposal Is Just One More Attempt To See If Congress Blinks”

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell (D-WA), senior member of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, released the following statement in response to the latest proposal from U.S. Senator Mike Lee (R-UT) to sell off America’s public lands to the highest bidder.

    Lee’s most recent draft comes after the Senate Parliamentarian rejected his opening gambit because it fails to meet strict Senate rules governing the budget process that Senate Republicans are relying on to circumvent the Senate filibuster, which normally curtails divisive partisan proposals. It is expected that Lee will continue to modify his controversial land sales proposal to pass muster with the parliamentarian until right up to the Senate votes on the measure later this week as part of the larger reconciliation bill.  After the Senate Parliamentarian rejected Lee’s opening gambit — deeming the proposal ineligible under budget reconciliation process rules — Lee responded, “I’m doing everything I can to support President Trump and move this forward.” He promised, “We’re just getting started.”

    “Republicans seem hell bent on trying to sell public lands. Members need to stand up and stop this giveaway of our natural heritage. The latest Lee proposal is just one more attempt to see if Congress blinks. A massive change to our public land policy should not be included in a budget bill. We need climbers, hikers, hunters, gateway communities, and everyone who loves the outdoors to call their elected representatives right away to say our public lands are not for sale,” Sen. Cantwell said.

    Lee’s revised language would require the Secretary of Interior to sell between 0.25 percent and 0.50 percent of Bureau of Land Management (BLM) land in the 11 Western states, minus Montana. It would also allow for the nominations of BLM land to be sold. The land would have to be in a 5-mile radius of the border of a population center.

    Yesterday, Sen. Cantwell hosted a virtual press conference to push back on Lee’s proposal. She was joined by Boise Mayor Lauren McLean, professional athletes and outdoorsmen Tommy Caldwell and Graham Zimmerman, REI leader Susan Viscon, and Backcountry Hunters & Anglers spokesperson Kaden McArthur.

    READ MORE:

    The Associated Press:  GOP plan to sell more than 3,200 square miles of federal lands is found to violate Senate rules

    The Seattle Times: Pitch to sell public lands hits snag. What does that mean for WA?

    The Spokesman Review: Public land sales provision would violate Senate rule, but its backer pledges to try again

    The Tri-City Herald: What public lands near Tri-Cities could be sold under new Trump tax plan?

    Video of yesterday’s virtual press conference is available HERE; a transcript of Sen. Cantwell’s opening remarks is HERE.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Hickenlooper Statement on Republicans’ Last-Ditch Effort to Sell Our Public Lands

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator John Hickenlooper – Colorado

    This week, the Senate parliamentarian struck down Senate Republicans’ initial provision to their budget to sell three million acres of public land to bankroll tax cuts for the ultra-wealthy

    WATCH: Hickenlooper also spoke in a Senate roundtable today about protecting our public lands

    WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Senator John Hickenlooper released the following statement about Senate Republicans’ updated proposal in the budget reconciliation bill to sell off Bureau of Land Management (BLM) land after their previous provision was struck down by the Senate parliamentarian.

    “Republicans’ provision to sell off our American treasures is wildly unpopular in Colorado and throughout the country. It is flat out wrong.

    “We’ll keep fighting against their last-ditch efforts to sneak their provision back into their big ugly bill. Our public lands are not for sale now, or ever.”

    In an attempt to skirt the Senate parliamentarian, Senate Energy and Natural Resources (ENR) Committee recently released updated budget reconciliation text that focuses on the sale of BLM lands. It mandates BLM dispose of between 0.25% and 0.50% of their estate within five miles of a population center. The Wilderness Society estimates up to 1.2 million acres would be required to be put up for sale. The bill specifies that those sales will be mandated in Colorado and ten other western states.

    Hickenlooper called out how this reckless fire-sale of our public land would devastate our outdoor recreation industry and Americans’ access to public lands today at ENR Ranking Member Senator Martin Heinrich’s public lands roundtable. Watch his remarks HERE. 

    In addition to the public lands sale provision, the bill rescinds Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) funding for the National Park Service (NPS) and BLM, including $267 million for NPS to pay for rangers, maintenance, emergency responders, and scientists. The bill would also eliminate IRA funding for updates to the electric grid, industrial decarbonization, and tribal energy loans.

    Hickenlooper also voted against the Republican budget resolution twice, and will vote against the budget bill again. In April, Hickenlooper led a group of Western senators to introduce an amendment to the budget bill to protect public lands from being sold to pay for Republicans’ tax cuts for the ultra-wealthy. He took to the Senate floor to condemn the public lands sale provision in the House version of the bill. At the end of May, Hickenlooper held a press conference in Estes Park with Congressman Neguse, public lands advocates, and local elected officials to call out the Trump administration’s threats to Colorado’s national parks and public lands – including Rocky Mountain National Park.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Global Nuclear Emergency Exercise Concludes, Testing International Response in Simulated Reactor Accident

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

    During the ConvEx-3 (2025) exercise, one of the response measures includes aerial monitoring of the environment. (Photo: J. Jin)

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in collaboration with over 75 countries and 10 international organizations, successfully concluded a 36-hour simulation that tested global readiness and response mechanisms to a severe nuclear emergency scenario at Romania’s Cernavodă Nuclear Power Plant. The ConvEx-3 (2025) exercise began on 24 June and concluded today, 25 June, at about 17:45 CEST.

    Such exercises are held every three to five years and are based on simulated events hosted by IAEA Member States.

    The exercise simulated a significant release of radioactive material, prompting participating nations and organizations to engage in real-time decision-making, information exchange, public communication and coordination of protective actions, including medical response and cross-border logistics.

    “The ConvEx-3 (2025) demonstrated the strength of international cooperation in nuclear emergency preparedness,” said Carlos Torres Vidal, Director of the IAEA’s Incident and Emergency Centre. “By working together in realistic scenarios, we enhance our collective ability to protect people and the environment.”

    Key innovations in this year’s exercise included:

    • Enhanced regional collaboration: Recognizing the transboundary impact of severe nuclear accidents, neighbouring countries Bulgaria and the Republic of Moldova coordinated protective measures to ensure harmonized responses across borders.
    • Integration of nuclear security scenarios: The simulation incorporated physical protection challenges and cyber security threats, reflecting evolving risks.
    • Advanced crisis communication testing: An expanded social media simulator was utilized to assess and improve public information strategies.
    • Deployment of international assistance missions: Expert teams from Bulgaria, Canada, France, Lithuania, Moldova, Sweden and the United States of America conducted joint operations, including aerial and land-based radiation monitoring, under the IAEA’s Response and Assistance Network (RANET).

    The exercise emphasized the importance of timely information sharing, accurate assessment and prognosis, and effective public communication during nuclear emergencies.

    ConvEx-3 exercises are conducted every three to five years to evaluate and strengthen the emergency response frameworks established under the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

    In the coming weeks, the IAEA will compile feedback from all participants to identify best practices and areas for improvement, contributing to the continuous enhancement of global nuclear emergency preparedness. The final report will guide preparations for the upcoming International Conference on Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies (EPR 2025) to be held this December in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

    Photos from ConvEx-3 are available here.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Clyburn, Leger Fernández, Klobuchar, Luján Lead Effort to Press Commerce Secretary Lutnick to Reverse Harmful Broadband Policy

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative James E (Jim) Clyburn (6th District of South Carolina)

    Text of Letter (PDF)

    WASHINGTON, DC – Congressman James E. Clyburn (SC-06), Congresswoman Teresa Leger Fernández (NM-03), Senator Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.), and Senator Ben Ray Luján (D-N.M.) led a group of congressional Democrats in writing a letter to U.S. Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick addressing the Trump Administration’s recently announced Broadband Equity, Access, and Deployment (BEAD) Restructuring Policy Notice. The BEAD program was established by Congress in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law to provide high-quality, affordable, and sustainable broadband to connect the nearly 25 million Americans that continue to wait for high-speed internet access.

    In their letter to Secretary Lutnick, the lawmakers urge the Department of Commerce to ensure that states receive the full funding and flexibility they retained prior to the issuance of the restructuring notice to fully meet those statutory objectives. 

    “Access to affordable, reliable, high-speed broadband is essential to full participation in modern life in the United States” the Members wrote. “We therefore urge you to implement the BEAD program in accordance with the best reading of the statute so we can make high-quality internet accessible and affordable for all Americans.”

    The BEAD program, enacted into law in 2021 as part of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, provides $42 billion to provide high-quality internet access to millions of Americans who remain unserved, to ensure affordability, and to facilitate adoption. The bipartisan process that crafted the program was informed by the Accessible, Affordable Internet for All Act, comprehensive broadband legislation formulated by the House Democratic Rural Broadband Task Force in conjunction with the Energy and Commerce Committee and Senate Democrats.

    The letter was also signed by Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Lisa Blunt Rochester (D-DE), Maria Cantwell (D-WA), Chris Coons (D-DE), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), Mazie Hirono (D-HI), Angus King (I-ME), Ed Markey (D-MA), Jon Ossoff (D-GA), Gary Peters (D-MI), Elissa Slotkin (D-MI), Tina Smith (D-MN), and Raphael Warnock (D-GA) as well as Representatives Leger Fernández (D-NM-03), Bishop (D-GA-02), Bynum (D-OR-05), Carson (D-IN-07), Carter (D-LA-02), Cleaver (D-MO-05),  Davis (D-IL-07), DelBene (D-WA-01), Evans (D-PA-03),  Fields (D-LA-06), Figures (D-AL-02), Garcia (D-TX-29), Goodlander (D-NH-02), Hoyle (D-OR-04), Huffman (D-CA-02), Lofgren (D-CA-18), McGovern (D-MA-02), Menendez (D-NJ-08), Mrvan (D-IN-01), Neguse (D-CO-02), Pappas (D-NH-01), Scholten (D-MI-03), Sewell (D-AL-07), Soto (D-FL-09), Thompson (D-MS-02), Titus (D-NV-01), Tlaib (D-MI-12), Tokuda (D-HI-02), Williams (D-GA-05), and Wilson (D-FL-24).  

    The full text of the letter is available here and below:

    Dear Secretary Lutnick: 

    We write to express our opposition to the Department of Commerce’s recently announced BEAD Restructuring Policy Notice. The Broadband Equity, Access, and Deployment (BEAD) program was established by Congress in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law to provide high-quality, affordable, and sustainable broadband to connect the nearly 25 million Americans that continue to wait for high-speed internet access. We urge you to ensure that states receive the full funding and flexibility they retained prior to the issuance of the restructuring notice to fully meet these statutory objectives. 

    The broadband division of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law begins with this congressional finding: “Access to affordable, reliable, high-speed broadband is essential to full participation in modern life in the United States.” This fundamental reality is why the BEAD program was established to fulfill the subsequent finding that “the benefits of broadband should be broadly enjoyed by all.” To achieve this goal, the statute states that funding recipients must “ensure coverage of broadband service to all unserved locations” before using any funds for other purposes. The restructuring notice appears to violate this requirement by allowing applicants to exclude certain unserved locations. Such an allowance would defy bipartisan congressional intent, which was predicated on the understanding that public investment was needed to achieve universal service precisely because building the infrastructure to cover many rural areas was too costly to be profitable. 

    In addition to excluding unserved, predominantly rural locations, the restructuring notice would likely result in others receiving worse service. The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law requires that “priority broadband projects” funded by the program be “designed to provide broadband service that meets speed, latency, reliability, consistency in quality of service, and related criteria as the Assistant Secretary shall determine; and [to] ensure that the network[s] built by the project[s] can easily scale speeds over time to meet the evolving connectivity needs of households and businesses, and support the deployment of 5G, successor wireless technologies, and other advanced services.” Of currently available technologies, fiber-optic networks are faster and more reliable and can scale speeds much more easily. We made the decision to invest larger sums now in broadband infrastructure that would be resilient and capable of meeting Americans’ growing digital demands for decades. 

    The restructuring notice also undermines the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law’s provisions designed to ensure that broadband service is affordable and put to good use. The new rules remove specific requirements that ensured that participating providers would provide a low-cost internet option for low-income customers as required by the statute. Additionally, while the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law specifically allows funds to be spent on “broadband adoption, including programs to provide affordable internet-capable devices,” the notice rescinds approval of previously approved “non-deployment activities” and puts all funding for these activities on hold. For example, this provision of the notice puts on hold a South Carolina plan to use BEAD program funds for virtual primary health—equipping low-income households in rural health deserts with access to the full suite of virtual health services at no cost to the patients. If the broadband infrastructure being built by BEAD program funds isn’t put to good use, much of the investment will have been wasted. 

    As reflected in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law’s congressional findings, high-quality internet access is a requirement to fully participate in the world, and the BEAD program is our once-in-a century opportunity to finish closing the digital divide. We fear this opportunity would be squandered by the restructuring notice and its changes to coverage, quality, and affordability. We therefore urge you to implement the BEAD program in accordance with the best reading of the statute so we can make high-quality internet accessible and affordable for all Americans.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Global Nuclear Emergency Exercise Concludes, Testing International Response in Simulated Reactor Accident

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

    During the ConvEx-3 (2025) exercise, one of the response measures includes aerial monitoring of the environment. (Photo: J. Jin)

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in collaboration with over 75 countries and 10 international organizations, successfully concluded a 36-hour simulation that tested global readiness and response mechanisms to a severe nuclear emergency scenario at Romania’s Cernavodă Nuclear Power Plant. The ConvEx-3 (2025) exercise began on 24 June and concluded today, 25 June, at about 17:45 CEST.

    Such exercises are held every three to five years and are based on simulated events hosted by IAEA Member States.

    The exercise simulated a significant release of radioactive material, prompting participating nations and organizations to engage in real-time decision-making, information exchange, public communication and coordination of protective actions, including medical response and cross-border logistics.

    “The ConvEx-3 (2025) demonstrated the strength of international cooperation in nuclear emergency preparedness,” said Carlos Torres Vidal, Director of the IAEA’s Incident and Emergency Centre. “By working together in realistic scenarios, we enhance our collective ability to protect people and the environment.”

    Key innovations in this year’s exercise included:

    • Enhanced regional collaboration: Recognizing the transboundary impact of severe nuclear accidents, neighbouring countries Bulgaria and the Republic of Moldova coordinated protective measures to ensure harmonized responses across borders.
    • Integration of nuclear security scenarios: The simulation incorporated physical protection challenges and cyber security threats, reflecting evolving risks.
    • Advanced crisis communication testing: An expanded social media simulator was utilized to assess and improve public information strategies.
    • Deployment of international assistance missions: Expert teams from Bulgaria, Canada, France, Lithuania, Moldova, Sweden and the United States of America conducted joint operations, including aerial and land-based radiation monitoring, under the IAEA’s Response and Assistance Network (RANET).

    The exercise emphasized the importance of timely information sharing, accurate assessment and prognosis, and effective public communication during nuclear emergencies.

    ConvEx-3 exercises are conducted every three to five years to evaluate and strengthen the emergency response frameworks established under the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

    In the coming weeks, the IAEA will compile feedback from all participants to identify best practices and areas for improvement, contributing to the continuous enhancement of global nuclear emergency preparedness. The final report will guide preparations for the upcoming International Conference on Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies (EPR 2025) to be held this December in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

    Photos from ConvEx-3 are available here.

    MIL OSI NGO –