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Category: Europe

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2024 – P10_TA(2025)0059 – Wednesday, 2 April 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

    –  having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights,

    –  having regard to Articles 2, 3, 8, 21 and 23 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

    –  having regard to Articles 17 and 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

    –  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other United Nations human rights treaties and instruments,

    –  having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

    –  having regard to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

    –  having regard to the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,

    –  having regard to the United Nations 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol thereto,

    –  having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 and United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution 43/29 of 22 June 2020 on the prevention of genocide,

    –  having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 December 1979,

    –  having regard to the United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984 and the Optional Protocol thereto, adopted on 18 December 2002,

    –  having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities of 12 December 2006 and the Optional Protocol thereto, adopted on 13 December 2006,

    –  having regard to the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid of 1976,

    –  having regard to the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, proclaimed by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 36/55 of 25 November 1981,

    –  having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities of 18 December 1992,

    –  having regard to the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, adopted by consensus by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 53/144 on 9 December 1998,

    –  having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 13 September 2007,

    –  having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas of 28 September 2018,

    –  having regard to the Programme of Action of the Cairo International Conference of Population and Development in 1994 and its review conferences,

    –  having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto, adopted on 25 May 2000,

    –  having regard to the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, which entered into force on 24 December 2014, and the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports of 5 June 1998,

    –  having regard to the United Nations Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action of September 1995 and its review conferences,

    –  having regard to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted on 25 September 2015, in particular goals 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10 and 16 thereof,

    –  having regard to the United Nations Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration adopted on 19 December 2018 and the United Nations Global Compact on Refugees adopted on 17 December 2018,

    –  having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted on 17 July 1998, which entered into force on 1 July 2002,

    –  having regard to the Agreement between the European Union and the International Criminal Court on cooperation and assistance of 10 April 2006(1),

    –  having regard to the Council of Europe Conventions of 4 April 1997 for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, and the Additional Protocols thereto, of 16 May 2005 on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, and of 25 October 2007 on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse,

    –  having regard to the Council of Europe Convention of 11 May 2011 on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), which not all Member States have ratified but which entered into force for the EU on 1 October 2023,

    –  having regard to Protocols Nos 6 and 13 to the Council of Europe Convention of 28 April 1983 for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty,

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 of 7 December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses(2),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe(3),

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 January 2024 on EU Priorities in UN Human Rights Fora in 2024,

    –  having regard to the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024, adopted by the Council on 17 November 2020 and its Mid-term Review adopted on 9 June 2023,

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 May 2024 on the alignment of the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024 with the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027,

    –  having regard to the EU Gender Action Plan (GAP) III – an ambitious agenda for gender equality and women’s empowerment in external action (JOIN(2020)0017),

    –  having regard to the EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0152),

    –  having regard to the EU LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0698),

    –  having regard to the EU strategy on the rights of the child (COM(2021)0142),

    –  having regard to the EU Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030 (COM(2021)0101),

    –  having regard to the EU anti-racism action plan 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0565),

    –  having regard to the EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation (COM(2020)0620),

    –  having regard to the EU Guidelines on human rights defenders, adopted by the Council on 14 June 2004 and revised in 2008, and the second guidance note on the Guidelines’ implementation, endorsed in 2020,

    –  having regard to the EU Guidelines on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them, adopted by the Council on 8 December 2008,

    –  having regard to the EU Guidelines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) of 2005, as updated in 2009,

    –  having regard to the EU Guidelines on the death penalty, as updated by the Council on 12 April 2013,

    –  having regard to the EU Guidelines to promote and protect the enjoyment of all human rights by LGBTI persons, adopted on 24 June 2013,

    –  having regard to the EU Guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief, adopted by the Council on 24 June 2013,

    –  having regard to the EU Guidelines on freedom of expression online and offline, adopted by the Council on 12 May 2014,

    –  having regard to the EU Guidelines on non-discrimination in external action, adopted by the Council on 18 March 2019,

    –  having regard to the EU Guidelines on safe drinking water and sanitation, adopted by the Council on 17 June 2019,

    –  having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on EU policy towards third countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, adopted by the Council on 16 September 2019,

    –  having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on human rights dialogues with partner/third countries, approved by the Council on 22 February 2021,

    –  having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on children and armed conflict, approved by the Council on 24 June 2024,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 12 September 2012 entitled ‘The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe’s engagement with Civil Society in external relations’ (COM(2012)0492),

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions of 10 March 2023 on the role of the civic space in protecting and promoting fundamental rights in the EU,

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and Regulation (EU) 2023/2859(4),

    –  having regard to the Commission proposal of 14 September 2022 for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market (COM(2022)0453),

    –  having regard to the joint proposal from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 3 May 2023 for a Council regulation on restrictive measures against serious acts of corruption (JOIN(2023)0013),

    –  having regard to the 2023 EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World,

    –  having regard to its Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, which in 2024 was awarded to María Corina Machado, as the leader of the democratic forces in Venezuela, and President-elect Edmundo González Urrutia, representing all Venezuelans inside and outside the country fighting for the reinstitution of freedom and democracy,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2019 on EU Guidelines and the mandate of the EU Special Envoy on the promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU(5),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 23 October 2020 on Gender Equality in EU’s foreign and security policy(6),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2021 on human rights protection and the EU external migration policy(7),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EU Magnitsky Act)(8),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2023(9), and to its previous resolutions on earlier annual reports,

    –  having regard to its resolutions on breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (known as urgency resolutions), adopted in accordance with Rule 150 of its Rules of Procedure, in particular those adopted in 2023 and 2024,

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0012/2025),

    A.  whereas the EU is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, as set out in Articles 2 and 21 TEU; whereas the EU’s action worldwide must be guided by the universality and indivisibility of human rights and by the fact that the effective protection and defence of human rights and democracy is at the core of the EU’s external action;

    B.  whereas rulings of the European Court of Human Rights are an essential part of the human rights architecture in Europe;

    C.  whereas consistency and coherence across the EU’s internal and external policies are key for achieving an effective and credible EU human rights policy, and in defending and supporting freedom and democracy;

    D.  whereas democratic systems are the most suitable to guarantee that every person has the ability to enjoy their human rights and fundamental freedoms; whereas effective rules-based multilateralism is the best organisational system to defend democracies;

    E.  whereas the EU strongly believes in and fully supports multilateralism, a rules-based global order and the set of universal values, principles and norms that guide the UN member states and that the UN member states have pledged to uphold, in accordance with the UN Charter; whereas a world of democracies, understood as a world of political systems that defend and protect human rights worldwide, is a safer world, as democracies have significant checks and balances in place to prevent the unpredictability of autocracies;

    F.  whereas gender equality is paramount to the development of free and equal societies; whereas the human rights of women, girls and non-binary people are still not guaranteed throughout the world, and the space for civil society organisations, especially women’s rights, indigenous and grassroots organisations, is shrinking in many countries;

    G.  whereas the rise in authoritarianism, totalitarianism and populism threatens the global rules-based order, the protection and promotion of freedom and human rights in the world, as well as the values and principles on which the EU is founded;

    H.  whereas in December 2023, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights celebrated its 75th anniversary; whereas today, more than ever since the UN’s foundation, totalitarian regimes challenge the UN Charter’s basic principles, seek to rewrite international norms, undermine multilateral institutions and threaten peace and security globally;

    I.  whereas in November 2024, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child celebrated its 35th anniversary;

    J.  whereas the United Nations Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action is regarded as a turning point for the global agenda on gender equality and will celebrate its 30th anniversary in 2025;

    K.  whereas the legitimacy and functioning of the international rules-based order are dependent on compliance with the orders of, and respect for, international bodies, such as United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and orders and decisions of the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC); whereas multilateralism is being challenged by increasing global threats, such as terrorism and extremism, which threaten compliance with such orders and decisions, as well as, generally, with provisions of international law, human rights law and international humanitarian law in emerging and ongoing conflict situations; whereas international institutions, their officials, and those cooperating with them, are the subject of attacks and threats; whereas the international community, including the EU, has a responsibility to uphold the international rules-based order by enforcing universal compliance, including by its partners;

    L.  whereas the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court establishes a framework of accountability for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; whereas the independence of the ICC is vital to ensure that justice is delivered impartially and without political interference;

    M.  whereas the 2023 Mid-term Review of the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024, now extended to 2027, has shown that, despite the progress achieved so far, more needs to be done, in cooperation with like-minded democratic partners, especially in the context of the unprecedented challenges the world has experienced since its adoption;

    N.  whereas human rights defenders (HRDs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) are crucial partners in the EU’s efforts to safeguard and advance human rights, democracy and the rule of law, as well as to prevent conflicts globally; whereas state and non-state actors around the world are increasingly censoring, silencing and harassing, among others, HRDs, CSOs, journalists, religious communities, opposition leaders and other vulnerable groups in their work, shrinking the civil space ever further; whereas this behaviour includes measures encompassing strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), restrictive government policies, transnational repression, defamation campaigns, discrimination, intimidation and violence, including extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings, abductions, and arbitrary arrests and detention; whereas attacks on HRDs are increasingly extending to their families and communities, including those living in exile;

    O.  whereas gender equality is a core EU value, and the human rights of women and girls, including their sexual and reproductive rights, continue to be violated across the world; whereas women experience unique and disproportionate impacts from conflicts, climate change and migration, including increased risks of gender-based violence, economic marginalisation and barriers to accessing resources; whereas women HRDs and CSOs continue to experience shrinking space for their critical work, as well as threats of violence, harassment and intimidation;

    P.  whereas the past year has been marked by a further proliferation of laws on ‘foreign agents’ or foreign influence, including in countries with EU candidate status, targeting CSOs and media outlets and attempting to prevent them from receiving financial support from abroad, including from the EU and its Member States, fostering a climate of fear and self-censorship;

    Q.  whereas in 2024, more than half the world’s population went to the polls, and many of these elections were marked by manipulation, disinformation and attempts at interference from inside or outside the country;

    R.  whereas the 2024 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) warns of a decline in the intent of states and other political forces to protect press freedom; whereas, according to the RSF’s 2024 Round-up, 54 journalists and media workers were killed, most of them in conflict zones, 550 were being detained, 55 were being held hostage, and 95 were missing in 2024;

    S.  whereas 251 million children and young people are deprived of their fundamental right to education and remain out of school, according to the UNESCO Global Education Monitoring Report 2024; whereas girls and women are affected not only by poverty but also by cultural norms, gender bias, child marriage and violence through official, discriminatory policies that prevent them from accessing education and the labour market and attempt to erase them from public life;

    T.  whereas at least one million people are unjustly imprisoned for political reasons, among them several laureates and finalists of Parliament’s Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought;

    U.  whereas, according to Article 21 TEU, the Union must seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries based, among other principles, on democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law; whereas numerous EU partners, despite benefiting for years from various preferences and advantages stemming from agreements with the EU, fail to comply with their obligations;

    V.  whereas environmental harm and the impacts of climate change are intensifying precariousness, marginalisation and inequality, and increasingly displacing people from their homes or trapping them in unsafe conditions, thereby heightening their vulnerability and jeopardising their human rights;

    Global challenges to democracy and human rights

    1.  Reasserts the universality, interdependence, interrelatedness and indivisibility of human rights and the inherent dignity of every human being; reaffirms the duty of the EU and its Member States to promote and protect democracy and the universality of human rights around the world; calls for the EU and its Member States to lead by example, in line with its values, to promote and strictly uphold human rights and international justice;

    2.  Insists that respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights and fundamental freedoms must be the cornerstone of the EU’s external policy, in line with its founding principles; strongly encourages the EU and its Member States, to that end, to strive for a continued ambitious commitment to make freedom, democracy and human rights and their protection a central part of all EU policies in a streamlined manner and to enhance the consistency between the EU’s internal and external policies in this field, including through all of its international agreements;

    3.  Stresses that the EU must be fully prepared to counter the rise of authoritarianism, totalitarianism and populism, as well as the increasing violations of the principles of universality of human rights, democracy and international humanitarian law;

    4.  Condemns the increasing trend of violations and abuses of human rights and democratic principles and values across the world, such as, among others, threats of backsliding on human rights, notably women’s rights, as well as executions, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture and ill treatment, gender-based violence, clampdowns on civil society, political opponents, marginalised and vulnerable groups including children and elderly people, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, and ethnic and religious minorities; condemns, equally, slavery and forced labour, excessive use of violence by public authorities, including violent crackdowns on peaceful protests and other assemblies, systematic and structural discrimination, instrumentalisation of the judiciary, censorship and threats to independent media, including threats in the digital sphere such as online surveillance and internet shutdowns, political attacks against international institutions and the rules-based international order, and increasing use of unlawful methods of war in grave breach of international humanitarian law and human rights law; deplores the weakening of the protection of democratic institutions and processes, and the shrinking space for civil societies around the world; denounces the transnational repression, by illiberal regimes, of citizens and activists who have sought refuge abroad, including on EU soil; condemns the arrest and sentencing by an Algerian court to five years in prison of the Franco-Algerian writer Boualem Sansal; calls for his immediate release and hopes that the Algerian authorities will see the urgent need for this;

    5.  Notes with deep concern the ongoing international crisis of accountability and the challenge to the pursuit of ending impunity for violations of core norms of international human rights and humanitarian law in conflicts around the world; reaffirms the neutrality and importance of humanitarian aid in all conflicts and crises; underlines the serious consequences of discrediting and attacking the organisations of multilateral forums, such as the UN, which can foster a culture of impunity and undermine the trust in and functioning of the UN system; calls for the EU to uphold the international legal system and take effective measures to enforce compliance;

    6.  Notes with satisfaction that there are also ‘human rights bright spots’ within this context of major challenges to human rights worldwide; highlights, in particular, the work of CSOs and HRDs; underlines the need for a more strategic communication on human rights and democracy by spreading news about positive results, policies and best practices; supports the Good Human Rights Stories initiative as a way of promoting positive stories about human rights and recommends that it be updated; underlines the role of the EU’s public and cultural diplomacy, as well as international cultural relations, in the promotion of human rights, and calls for the Strategic Communication and Foresight division of the European External Action Service (EEAS) to increase its efforts in this regard;

    Strengthening the EU’s toolbox for the promotion and protection of human rights and democracy around the world

    7.  Notes with concern the increasing divide worldwide; stresses the shared responsibility of the EU to continue defending democratic values and principles and human rights, international justice, peace and dignity around the world, which are even more important to defend in the current volatile state of global politics; calls upon the EU to keep communication channels open with different stakeholders and to continue to develop a comprehensive toolbox to strengthen human rights and democracy globally;

    EU action plan on human rights and democracy

    8.  Observes that the EU and its Member States have made substantial progress in implementing the EU action plan on human rights and democracy, although they have not reached all of its goals, in part also due to the unprecedented challenges the world has experienced since its adoption; welcomes, in this sense, the extension of the action plan until 2027, with a view to maximising the synergies and complementarity between human rights and democracy at local, national and global levels;

    EU Special Representative (EUSR) for Human Rights

    9.  Fully supports the work of the EUSR for Human Rights in contributing to the visibility and coherence of the EU’s human rights actions in its external relations; upholds the EUSR’s central role in the EU’s promotion and protection of human rights by engaging with non-EU countries and like-minded partners; underlines the need for close cooperation between the EUSR for Human Rights and other EUSRs and Special Envoys in order to further improve this coherence, and calls for greater visibility for the role of the EUSR for Human Rights; calls for the EUSR to be supported in his work with increased resources and better coordination with EU delegations around the world; regrets, despite continuous calls, Parliament’s exclusion from the process of selecting the EUSR; insists on the need for the EUSR to report back to Parliament regularly;

    Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe and the human rights and democracy thematic programme

    10.  Recalls the fundamental role of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) – Global Europe, including its thematic programme on human rights and democracy, as a flagship EU instrument in promoting and protecting human rights and democracy around the world; highlights the need to engage with civil society in all the EU’s relevant external activities, including the Global Gateway Strategy which is financed through the NDICI-Global Europe; reiterates the importance of streamlining a human-rights based approach in the EU’s external action instruments; underlines Parliament’s role in the instrument’s programming process and calls on the Commission and the EEAS to share all relevant information in a timely manner in order to enable Parliament to play its role accordingly, in particular during high-level geopolitical dialogues with the Commission and in the mid-term review process as well as in its resolutions; calls on the EEAS and the Commission to ensure that a response is provided to the recommendation letters following each geopolitical dialogue and each resolution; urges the Commission to develop and launch a comprehensive, centralised website dedicated to the NDICI-Global Europe, including information on all the multiannual indicative programmes, detailing their respective budgets, associated actions and the financial allocations they are backing, organised both by country and by theme; notes that the NDICI-Global Europe and all future instruments must focus on the fundamental drivers of ongoing challenges, including the need to strengthen the resilience of local communities and democracy support activities by supporting economic development;

    11.  Calls for independent, ex ante assessments to determine the possible implications and risks of projects with regard to human rights, in line with Article 25(5) of Regulation (EU) 2021/947; calls for independent human rights monitoring throughout the implementation of projects in third countries, especially in relation to projects entailing a high risk of violations; calls for a suspension of projects that (in)directly contribute to human rights violations in non-EU countries; reiterates the prohibition on allocating EU funds to activities that are contrary to EU fundamental values, such as terrorism or extremism; calls on the Commission to share all human rights-related assessments with Parliament in a proactive manner;

    EU trade and international agreements

    12.  Reiterates its call to integrate human rights assessments and include robust clauses on human rights in agreements between the EU and non-EU countries, supported by a clear set of benchmarks and procedures to be followed in the event of violations; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to ensure that the human rights clauses in current international agreements are actively monitored and effectively enforced and to improve their communication with Parliament concerning considerations and decisions regarding this enforcement; reiterates that in the face of persistent breaches of human rights clauses by its partner countries, including those related to the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus programme, the EU should react swiftly and decisively, including by suspending the agreements in question if other options prove ineffective; calls for the EU Ombudsman’s recommendation concerning the creation of a complaint-handling portal to be implemented, within the framework of EU trade and financial instruments, or for the Commission’s Single Entry Point to be adapted to allow complaints regarding failure to comply with human rights clauses to be submitted; calls on the EU institutions to engage regularly with the business community and civil society in order to strengthen the links between international trade, human rights and economic security; calls for the EU to ensure human rights promotion and protection through its Global Gateway investments and projects, by ensuring that they do no harm;

    EU human rights dialogues

    13.  Stresses the important role of human rights dialogues within the EU’s human rights toolbox and as a key vehicle for the implementation of the EU action plan on human rights and democracy; highlights that these dialogues must address the overall situation of human rights and democracy with the relevant countries; notes that human rights dialogues should be seen as a key element of sustained EU engagement and not as a free-standing instrument, and that the persistent failure of non-EU countries to genuinely engage in dialogues and to implement key deliverables should lead to the use of other appropriate foreign policy tools; recalls that these dialogues need to be used in conjunction and synergy with other instruments, using a more-for-more and a less-for-less approach; reiterates the need to raise individual cases, in particular those of Sakharov Prize laureates and those highlighted by Parliament in its resolutions, and ensure adequate follow-up; calls on the EEAS and EU delegations to increase the visibility of these dialogues and their outcomes, ensuring that they are results-oriented and based on a clear set of benchmarks that can be included in a published joint press statement, and to conduct suitable follow-up action on it; calls for the enhanced and meaningful involvement of civil society in the dialogues; stresses that genuine CSOs must not be impeded from participating in human rights dialogues and that any dialogue must include all genuine CSOs without any limitations;

    EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (GHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act)

    14.  Welcomes the increasing use of the EU GHRSR as a key political tool in the EU’s defence of human rights and democracy across the world; regrets, however, that its use has continued to be limited, especially in the current geopolitical landscape; notes, however, the challenges that the requirement of unanimity poses in the adoption of sanctions and reiterates its call on the Council to introduce qualified majority voting for decisions on the GHRSR; recalls, in this regard, the formal request submitted by Parliament to the Council in 2023, on calling an EU reform convention, with the aim, among others, of increasing the number of decisions taken by qualified majority; calls for a stronger use of the GHRSR and other ad hoc sanctions regimes on those responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including high-level officials; fully supports the possibility of imposing targeted anti-corruption sanctions within the EU framework in this regard, which has been a long-standing priority of Parliament, whether through its inclusion in the GHRSR or under a different regime; highlights the need for the complete enforcement of sanctions and calls for circumventions to be tackled;

    Democracy support activities

    15.  Reiterates its concern regarding the increasing attacks by authoritarian and illiberal regimes on democratic principles, values and pluralism; stresses that the defence and support of democracy around the world is increasingly becoming of geopolitical and strategic interest; emphasises the importance of Parliament’s efforts in capacity-building for partner parliaments, promoting mediation and encouraging a culture of dialogue and compromise, especially among young political leaders, and empowering women parliamentarians, HRDs and representatives from civil society and independent media; reiterates its call on the Commission to continue and expand its activities in these areas by increasing funding and support for EU bodies, agencies and other grant-based organisations; stresses the critical importance of directly supporting civil society and persons expressing dissenting views, particularly in the current climate of growing global tensions and repression in increasing numbers of countries; reiterates the importance of EU election observation missions and Parliament’s contribution to developing and enhancing their methodology; calls for the development of an EU toolbox to be used in cases of disputed or non-transparent election results in order to prevent political and military crises in the post-election environment; calls for enhanced EU action to counter manipulative and false messages against the EU in election campaigns, in particular in countries that receive significant EU humanitarian and development assistance and in countries that are candidates for EU membership; calls for enhanced collaboration between Parliament’s Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group, the relevant Commission directorates-general and the EEAS; calls on the EU to raise gender equality issues, including sexual and reproductive health and rights, with non-EU countries; calls for human rights dialogues to be given more visibility, ensuring that they are results-oriented and based on a clear set of benchmarks that enable effective monitoring, including through effective ex ante and ex post consultation with civil society and through the publication of joint press statements and the execution of appropriate follow-up actions;

    16.  Underlines the importance of strengthening the participation of women in democratic systems order to tackle the discrepancy in the representation of women in decision-making; calls for the EU’s external action to facilitate better participation of women in politics, business and civil society;

    EU support for human rights defenders

    17.  Is extremely concerned by the continuing restriction of civil society space and rising threats to the work of HRDs and members of CSOs, as well as their families, communities and lawyers, and finds particularly concerning the increasingly sophisticated means used to persecute them; strongly condemns their arbitrary detentions and killings; deplores the harassment of CSOs through legislative provisions such as foreign agents laws and similar, and other restrictions they face; deplores the fact that women HRDs continue to face relentless and ever more sophisticated violations against them, including targeted killings, physical attacks, disappearances, smear campaigns, arrests, judicial harassment and intimidation; notes with concern that these attacks seem designed to systematically silence women HRDs and erase their voices from the public sphere; supports wholeheartedly the work of HRDs and EU action to ensure their protection worldwide; underscores the pressing need for a comprehensive and timely revision of the EU Guidelines on HRDs, with a view to addressing the emerging challenges and threats, and to ensuring their applicability and effectiveness in the protection of HRDs globally, while integrating gender-sensitive and intersectional approaches in the updated Guidelines, reflecting the diverse backgrounds and experiences of HRDs, and taking into account the specific vulnerabilities they may face; calls for the complete and consistent application of the EU Guidelines on HRDs by the EU and its Member States; calls for efforts to enhance communication strategies to increase the visibility of EU actions and channels for the protection of and the support mechanisms for HRDs;

    18.  Raises serious concerns over the increasing phenomenon of transnational repression against HRDs, journalists and civil society; calls for the formulation of an EU strategy harmonising national responses to transnational repression;

    19.  Expresses deep concern regarding the increasingly precarious financial landscape faced by HRDs and communities advocating for rights, particularly within a global context characterised by intensifying repression; notes that, as a result of the current geopolitical context, HRDs’ need for support has increased; calls, therefore, for the EU and its Member States to make full use of their financial support for HRDs, ensuring the establishment of flexible, accessible and sustained funding mechanisms that enable these defenders to continue their vital work in the face of mounting challenges;

    20.  Insists that the EEAS, the Commission and the EU delegations pay particular attention to the situation of the Sakharov Prize laureates and finalists at risk and take resolute action, in coordination with the Member States and Parliament, to ensure their well-being, safety or liberation; pays tribute to the Sakharov Prize laureates and finalists who have lost their lives in the fight for human rights, democracy and freedom;

    21.  Welcomes the update of the EU Visa Code Handbook in relation to HRDs and calls for its full and consistent application by the Member States; reiterates its call for the Commission to take a proactive role in the establishment of a coordinated approach among the Member States for HRDs at risk;

    Combating impunity and corruption

    22.  Underlines that both impunity and corruption enable and aggravate human rights violations and abuses and the erosion of democratic principles; welcomes the anti-corruption actions in EU external policies in the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 3 May 2023 on the fight against corruption (JOIN(2023)0012), which should be followed by the implementation of a strict anti-corruption framework into law, such as through the EU’s Anti-Corruption Directive, and by comprehensively addressing this issue within the EU’s anti-corruption strategy; supports the anti-corruption provisions included in the EU trade agreements with non-EU countries; stresses the important role of civil society and journalists in non-EU countries in the oversight of the fight against impunity and corruption; calls for the EU and its Member States to increase their efforts in justice reforms, the fight against impunity, and the improvement of transparency and of anti-corruption institutions in non-EU countries; encourages the EU and its Member States to coordinate more closely with allies and partners wherever possible in order to counter systemic corruption that enables autocrats to maintain power, deprives societies of key resources and undermines democracy, human rights and the rule of law;

    23.  Insists on the need for the EU to take clear steps to recognise the close link between corruption and human rights violations in order to target economic and financial enablers of human rights abusers;

    EU actions at multilateral level

    24.  Reaffirms that promoting the respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights around the world requires strong international cooperation at a multilateral level; underlines the particularly important role of the UN and its bodies as the main forum which must be able to effectively advance efforts for peace and security, sustainable development and respect for human rights and international law; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue supporting the work of the UN, its agencies and special procedures, both politically and financially, to ensure that it is fit for purpose, and to push back against the influence of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes; stresses that the current multilateral order needs to fully incorporate into its architecture the new global actors, especially those focusing on democracy and human rights; reiterates the need for the EU and its Member States to speak with one voice at the UN and in other multilateral forums in order to effectively tackle global challenges to human rights and democracy in multilateral forums and to support the strongest possible language in line with international human rights standards; calls, to this end, for progress in ensuring that the EU has a seat in international organisations, including the UN Security Council, in addition to the existing Member States’ seats; calls for EU delegations to play a stronger role in multilateral forums, for which they should have appropriate resources available;

    25.  Is deeply concerned by growing attacks against the rules-based global order by authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, including through unprovoked and unjustified aggression against peaceful neighbours and through the undermining of the functioning of UN bodies, namely the abuse of veto power at the UN Security Council; underlines that the diminished effectiveness of these bodies brings with it real costs in terms of conflicts, lives lost and human suffering, and seriously weakens the general ability of countries to deal with global challenges; calls on the Member States and like minded partners to develop a robust strategy and to intensify their efforts to reverse this trend and to send a united and strong message of support to those organisations when they are attacked or threatened; believes that the UN, its bodies, and other multilateral organisations are in need of reform, in order to address these growing challenges and threats;

    26.  Strongly regrets the decision of some countries to withdraw from the UN Human Rights Council;

    27.  Reiterates the strong support of the EU for the International Court of Justice and the ICC as essential, independent and impartial jurisdictional institutions amid a particularly challenging time for international justice; recalls that a well-funded ICC is essential for the effective prosecution of serious international crimes; welcomes the political and financial support the EU has given to the ICC, including the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC, and the launch of the ‘Global initiative to fight against impunity for international crimes’ offering financial support to CSOs dedicated to fostering justice and accountability for international crimes and serious human rights violations, including by facilitating survivors’ participation in legal proceedings; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue and intensify their support to the ICC – including to the ICC Trust Fund for Victims – with the necessary means, including resources and political backing, and to use all instruments at their disposal to combat impunity worldwide and enable the ICC to fulfil its mandate effectively; calls on all the Member States to respect and implement the actions and decisions of the International Court of Justice and all organs of the ICC, including the OTP and the Chambers, to urge other countries to join and cooperate with the court, including to enforce ICC arrest warrants, and to support their work as an independent and impartial international justice institution everywhere in the world; regrets the failure of some ICC member states to execute ICC arrest warrants, thereby undermining the court’s work; calls for the EU to urge non-EU countries, including its major partners, to recognise the ICC and become a state party to the Rome Statute;

    28.  Reiterates the strong support of the EU for the European Court of Human Rights; urges all signatory States to the European Convention on Human Rights to fully abide by rulings of the Court;

    29.  Stresses the importance of not politicising the ICC, as trust in the court is eroded if its mandate is misused; condemns, in particular and in the most critical terms, the political attacks, sanctions and other coercive measures introduced or envisaged against the ICC itself and against its staff; calls on the Member States and the EU institutions to cooperate to work on solutions in order to protect the institution of the ICC and its staff from any future sanctions that would threaten the functioning of the court;

    30.  Expresses its utmost concern over the sanctions against the ICC, its prosecutors, judges and staff, which constitute a serious attack on the international justice system; calls on the Commission to urgently activate the Blocking Statute and on the Member States to increase their diplomatic efforts in order to protect and safeguard the ICC as an indispensable cornerstone of the international justice system;

    31.  Recognises universal jurisdiction as an important tool of the international criminal justice system to prevent and combat impunity and promote international accountability; calls on the Member States to apply universal jurisdiction in the fight against impunity;

    32.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to lead the global fight against all forms of extremism and welcomes the adoption of an EU strategy to this end; demands that the fight against terrorism be at the top of the EU’s domestic and foreign affairs agenda;

    Upholding international humanitarian law

    33.  Notes with concern the increasing disregard for international humanitarian law and international human rights law, particularly in the form of ongoing conflicts around the world; strongly condemns the increase in deliberate, indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on civilians and civilian objects in multiple conflict settings; underlines that it is of the utmost importance that all UN and humanitarian aid agencies are able to provide full, timely and unhindered assistance to all people in vulnerable situations and calls on all parties to armed conflicts to fully respect the work of these agencies and ensure they can meet the basic needs of civilians without interference; denounces attempts to undermine UN agencies delivering humanitarian aid; urges all parties to armed conflicts to protect civilian populations, humanitarian and medical workers, and journalists and media workers; calls on all parties to armed conflicts to respect the legitimacy and inviolability of UN peacekeeping missions; calls on all states to unconditionally and fully conform with international humanitarian law; calls on the international community, and the Member States in particular, to promote accountability and the fight against impunity for grave breaches of international humanitarian law; calls for the systematic creation of humanitarian corridors in regions at war and in combat situations, whenever necessary, in order to allow civilians at risk to escape conflicts, and strongly condemns any attacks on them; demands unhindered access for humanitarian organisations monitoring and assisting prisoners of war, as provided for in the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War; expects international organisations to abide by international law regarding the treatment of prisoners of war; calls for international cooperation and assistance in the return of forcibly deported persons, in particular children and hostages;

    34.  Is seriously concerned by the persistence of the scourge of protracted occupation or annexation of territories; calls for special attention to be paid to the human rights situation in the illegally occupied territories, including in cases of protracted occupation, and for effective measures to be taken with the aim of preventing grave human rights abuses on the ground, including the violation of right to life, restriction of freedom of movement, and discrimination;

    35.  Reiterates its call on the Member States to help contain armed conflicts and serious violations of human rights or international humanitarian law by strictly abiding by the provisions of Article 7 of the UN Arms Trade Treaty of 2 April 2013 on Export and Export Assessment and Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment;

    36.  Urges reliable, like-minded third countries to strengthen their defence, resilience and civil preparedness capabilities, in order to effectively deter aggression and uphold human rights globally;

    37.  Given the gendered impacts of armed conflicts, deplores the insufficient priority and focus given to sexual and gender-based violence and to sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) across the EU’s humanitarian and refugee response; reiterates that humanitarian crises intensify SRHR- and gender-related challenges and recalls that in crisis zones, particularly among vulnerable groups such as refugees and migrants, women and girls are particularly exposed to sexual violence, sexually transmitted diseases, sexual exploitation, rape as a weapon of war and unwanted pregnancies; calls on the Commission and the Member States to give high priority to gender equality and SRHR in their humanitarian aid and refugee response, as well as accountability and access to justice and redress for sexual and reproductive rights violations and gender-based violence, including in terms of training for humanitarian actors, and existing and future funding;

    Team Europe approach

    38.  Recognises the potential for stronger alignment in approaches to human rights protection and promotion between EU institutions, Member States’ embassies and EU delegations in non-EU countries, particularly in encouraging those countries to comply with their international obligations and to refrain from harassment and persecution of critical voices; emphasises the opportunity for Member States’ embassies to take an increasingly active role in advancing and safeguarding human rights, while also supporting civil society in these countries; calls for the EU and its Member States to use all possible means to assess detention conditions, and observe trials and court procedures, to increase pressure and awareness, and in order to urge countries and actively work towards the release of political prisoners; highlights the importance of shared responsibility between Member States and EU delegations in these efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to intensify their collective efforts to promote the respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights and to support democracy worldwide; encourages careful monitoring and assessment of the capacity of EU delegations to ensure that each one has a designated point of contact for cases of human rights violations, and that this mandate is allocated sufficient resources to respond in an effective and timely manner; reiterates, in this context, the importance, for the EU delegations, of existing EU guidelines related to specific areas of human rights;

    Responding to universal human rights and democracy challenges

    Right to freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment

    39.  Condemns any action or attempt to legalise, instigate, authorise, consent or acquiesce to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment methods under any circumstances; condemns the increasing reports of the use of torture by state actors in many different contexts, including in custodial and extra-custodial settings – of political prisoners, among others – and in conflict situations around the world, notably in violation of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, as well as the killing of prisoners of war, which amounts to a war crime, and reiterates the non-derogable nature of the right to be free from torture or other forms of inhuman or degrading treatment; reiterates the EU’s zero-tolerance policy to torture and other ill-treatment and calls on the relevant institutions, including the European Court of Human Rights, to take a thorough stance on any such case;

    40.  Reiterates its calls for universal ratification of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and its Optional Protocol thereto, and for the need for states to bring their national provisions in this respect in line with international standards; reiterates, in accordance with the revised Guidelines on the EU’s policy towards third countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, adopted by the Council on 16 September 2019, the importance of engaging with relevant stakeholders in the fight to eradicate torture, and to monitor places of detention;

    Right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association

    41.  Reiterates the need to protect the EU democratic space and the exercise of fundamental freedoms therein, particularly freedoms of assembly and association; highlights the growing violent repression of protest and peaceful assemblies within the EU civic space, with cases of torture and ill-treatment resulting in deaths and other serious violations; underscores the need to strengthen this fundamental right in conjunction with the absolute prohibition of torture and ill-treatment;

    Right to food, water and sanitation

    42.  Recalls that the right to food, including having physical and economic access to adequate food or the means to its procurement, is a human right; is extremely concerned about the challenges to the right to food worldwide, especially in situations of war and conflicts; condemns the increasing reports of the weaponisation of food in situations of armed conflict; calls for the EU and its Member States to promote mandatory guidelines on the right to food without discrimination within the UN system; urges the EU and the Member States to fully support, politically and financially, organisations and agencies working to secure the right to food in conflict zones; recalls the importance of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas in view of attaining food security; commends the work of the UN World Food Programme, in this regard;

    43.  Reaffirms the rights to safe drinking water and to sanitation as human rights, both rights being complementary; underlines that access to clean drinking water is indispensable to a healthy and dignified life and is essential for the maintenance of human dignity; highlights the fact that the right to water is a fundamental precondition for the enjoyment of other rights, and as such must be guided by a logic grounded in the public interest, and in common public and global goods; underscores the importance of the EU Guidelines on safe drinking water and sanitation, and urges the EU institutions and the Member States to implement and promote their application in non-EU countries and in multilateral forums;

    Climate change and the environment

    44.  Highlights that climate change and its impact on the environment has direct effects on the effective enjoyment of all human rights; recognises the important work of CSOs, indigenous peoples and local communities, land and environmental HRDs and indigenous activists for the protection of a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, including access to land and water sources; deplores the risks that environmental HRDs and indigenous activists face and calls for their effective protection to be guaranteed; notes that communities contributing the least to climate change are the ones more likely to be affected by climate risks and natural disasters and calls, in this regard, for increasing support to the most vulnerable groups; recalls that indigenous peoples and local communities play an important role in the sustainable management of natural resources and the conservation of biodiversity; recalls that the transition to clean energy must be fair and respect everyone’s fundamental rights; reiterates the importance of the achievement of the UN sustainable development goals (SDGs) for the protection of the human rights of present and future generations;

    45.  Notes with deep concern the increasing threats to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment posed by the deployment of weapons of mass destruction and other forms of warfare that adversely and disproportionately affect the environment; stresses the need to effectively address the displacement of people caused by environmental destruction and climate change, which increases the risk of human rights violations and heightens vulnerabilities to different forms of exploitation; recognises that children face more acute risks from climate-related disasters and are also one of the largest groups to be affected; calls for the EU to focus on addressing the impacts of climate change on the enjoyment of the rights of the child;

    Rights of the child

    46.  Calls for a systematic and consistent approach to promoting and defending children’s rights, including for those most marginalised and those in the most vulnerable situations, through all of the EU’s external policies; calls for more concerted efforts to promote the respect, protection and fulfilment of children’s rights in crisis or emergency situations; condemns the decline in respect for the rights of the child and the increasing violations and abuses of these rights, including through violence, early and forced marriage, sexual abuse including genital mutilation, trafficking, child labour, honour killings, recruitment of child soldiers, lack of access to education and healthcare, malnutrition and extreme poverty; further condemns the increase in deaths of children in situations of armed conflict and stresses the need for effective protection of children’s rights in active warfare; calls for new EU initiatives to promote and protect children’s rights, with a view to rehabilitating and reintegrating conflict-affected children, ensuring that they have a protected, family- and community-based environment as a natural context for their lives, in which assistance and education are fundamental elements; reiterates its call for a systematic and consistent approach to promoting and defending children’s rights through all EU external policies; calls on all countries to ratify the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as a matter of urgency, in order to allow for the universal ratification of this foundational instrument;

    47.  Emphasises the urgent necessity to uphold the rights of pregnant women, ensuring that they receive comprehensive support for their health, safety and dignity that includes guaranteed access to maternal healthcare services, availability of childcare facilities such as nurseries, and the establishment of fair workplace policies that protect their well-being, income and career advancement;

    48.  Stresses the importance of closing the financing gap that would enable countries to meet their SDG 4 targets on quality education and ensure access to education for all children and young people; reiterates its calls to address cultural norms and gender biases that prevent girls and women from receiving an education and urges the creation of gender-responsive education systems worldwide;

    49.  Stresses that education represents the starting point for cultivating principles and values that contribute to the personal development of children, as well as to social cohesion and democracy, and the rule of law around the world; to that end calls for the EU to promote its values through supporting access to education and learning for women and girls;

    Rights of women and gender equality

    50.  Stresses that women’s rights and gender equality are indispensable and indivisible human rights, as well as a basis for the rule of law and inclusive resilient democracies; deplores the fact that millions of women and girls continue to experience discrimination and violence, especially in the context of conflicts, post-conflict situations and displacements, and are denied their dignity, autonomy and even life; condemns the impunity with which perpetrators commit violations against women HRDs; is appalled by the use of rape and sexual violence as a weapon of war and stresses the need to shed light on these instances, and for better international cooperation on fighting impunity for these crimes; calls for the EU, its Member States and like-minded partners to step up their efforts to ensure the full enjoyment and protection of women’s and girls’ human rights, and to incorporate a gender mainstreaming approach across all policies, taking into account the differentiated impacts of global challenges such as climate change or conflicts; emphasises that SRHR are fundamental human rights that must be upheld globally and in the Member States and expresses deep concern over global setbacks in gender equality and SRHR; reaffirms that the denial of quality and comprehensive sexual and reproductive health services constitutes a form of gender-based violence; stresses the importance of leading by example; calls for the EU to prioritise access to SRHR as part of the promotion of human rights and the achievement of sustainable development goals; condemns in the strongest terms the increasing attacks on SRHR around the world, as well as gender-based violence, including the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war; calls for the EU and its Member States to uphold SRHR as human rights, enshrine the right to legal and safe abortion in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and prioritise access to SRHR in order to advance human rights and sustainable development goals; strongly deplores cases of female genital mutilation, honour killings, child marriages and forced marriages; welcomes the accession of the EU to the Istanbul Convention and strongly encourages the remaining Member States to ratify the Istanbul Convention without further delay; calls for the EU and its international partners to strengthen their efforts to ensure that women fully enjoy human rights and are treated equally to men; emphasises the importance of safeguarding the rights of women, ensuring that their health, safety and dignity are protected, particularly in the context of healthcare access and workplace protections; underlines the need to keep opposing and condemning, in the strongest terms, anti-abortion laws that punish women and girls with decades-long jail sentences, even in cases of rape, incest or when the life of the pregnant woman is at risk; stresses the need to pursue efforts to fully eradicate the practice of female genital mutilation; fully supports the role of the EU Ambassador for Gender and Diversity;

    51.  Recognises that the promotion and protection of SRHR is essential to achieving gender equality and affirms the right to access comprehensive SRHR services, including modern contraception, free, safe and legal abortion, maternal, prenatal and postnatal healthcare, assisted reproduction and access to education and information on SRHR, including comprehensive sexuality education, without any form of discrimination, coercion or violence; echoes human rights bodies’ recognition that banning abortion may subject women to suffering amounting to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment;

    52.  Recognises that gender apartheid constitutes a systematic and institutionalised form of oppression, depriving women and girls of fundamental rights solely on the basis of their gender; notes with deep concern the entrenchment of gender apartheid in certain regions, where women face extensive restrictions on education, employment, healthcare and freedom of movement, often underpinned by legal and cultural frameworks that reinforce gender-based discrimination; urges the EU and the Member States to proactively address gender apartheid through strengthened diplomatic efforts, targeted economic measures and accountability mechanisms that support civil society organisations advocating for gender equality; calls for the formal recognition of gender apartheid as a distinct human rights violation and for support for international initiatives for its classification as a crime against humanity, thus contributing to the establishment of a global accountability standard;

    Rights of refugees and asylum seekers

    53.  Denounces the erosion of the human rights and the safety of refugees, asylum seekers and forcibly displaced persons; reaffirms their inalienable human rights and fundamental right to seek asylum; recalls the obligation of states to protect them in accordance with international law; underlines the importance of identification and registration of individuals, including children, as a key tool for protecting refugees and ensuring the integrity of refugee protection systems, preventing human trafficking and the recruitment of children into armed militias; calls for the EU and its Member States to effectively uphold their rights in the EU’s asylum and migration policy and in the EU’s cooperation with partner countries in this regard; deplores the increasing xenophobia, racism and discrimination towards migrants, as well as the different forms of violence they face, including during their displacement, and the many barriers they face, including in access to healthcare; condemns the instrumentalisation of migration at EU borders by foreign actors, which constitutes hybrid attacks against the Member States as well as a dehumanisation of migrants; stresses that the EU should step up its efforts to acknowledge and develop ways to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, building the resilience of migrants’ communities of origin and helping them offer their members the possibility to enjoy a decent life in their home country; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue and, where possible, step up their support for countries hosting the most refugees, as well as for transit countries; reiterates that close cooperation and engagement with non-EU countries, with full respect for fundamental rights, remain key to preventing migrant smuggling; stresses, in this regard, that the dissemination of information and awareness-raising campaigns on the risks of smuggling are crucial, as well as of the migration laws of the destination countries, in order to prevent the undertaking of unnecessarily risky journeys by those who do not have grounds for asylum; calls for EU-funded humanitarian operations to take into consideration the specific needs and vulnerabilities of children and to ensure their protection while they are displaced; underlines the importance of developing an effective framework of safe and legal pathways to the EU and welcomes, in this regard, the Commission communication on attracting skills and talent to the EU(10), including the development of talent partnerships with partner countries; calls for respect for the principle of non-refoulement to countries where the life and liberty of people would be threatened; calls for the EU and its Member States to discuss the phenomenon of instrumentalised migration orchestrated by authoritarian regimes and organised crime groups, and emphasises the need to conduct a comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon, develop effective countermeasures, and consider its implications for the human rights framework;

    Rights of LGBTIQ+ persons

    54.  Condemns the human rights violations, including discrimination, persecution, violence and killings, stigmatisation, hate crimes, hate speech, conversion therapies, intersex genital mutilation and sexual violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, non-binary, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ+) persons around the world; calls for the EU and its Member States to denounce these injustices and commit to protecting the rights, dignity and safety of LGBTIQ+ individuals; is extremely concerned by the spreading of hatred and anti-LGBTIQ+ narratives and legislation that target LGBTIQ+ persons and HRDs; denounces, in this regard, conversion practices targeting LGBTIQ+ persons aimed at changing, repressing or suppressing the sexual orientation, gender identity and/or gender expression of their victims; calls for the implementation of an EU-wide policy to illegalise practices of this kind; calls for the adoption of policies that protect LGBTIQ+ people and give them the tools to safely report a violation of their rights, in line with the EU Guidelines to Promote and Protect the Enjoyment of all Human Rights by LGBTI Persons; emphasises the increasing concerns and fears within LGBTIQ+ communities and urges the EU to take a firm stance against any legislative or social actions that endanger LGBTIQ+ people; expresses special concern over LGBTIQ+ people living under non-democratic regimes or in conflict situations, and calls for rapid response mechanisms to protect them as well as their defenders; reiterates its calls for the full implementation of the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025 as the EU’s tool for improving the situation of LGBTIQ+ people around the world; calls for the use of the death penalty to be rejected under all circumstances, including any legislation that would impose the death penalty for homosexuality; calls for the EU and its Member States to further engage the countries with such legislation in reconsidering their position on the death penalty; notes further that the imposition of the death penalty on the basis of such legislation is arbitrary killing per se, and a breach of Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

    Rights of persons with disabilities

    55.  Is concerned by the challenges to the full enjoyment of the rights of persons with disabilities; reiterates its calls for the EU to assist partner countries in the development of policies in support of carers of persons with disabilities; calls for the raising of social awareness and the combating of discriminatory behaviours against persons with disabilities; points to the additional complications faced by persons with disabilities in conflict situations and natural disasters, as they are more vulnerable to violence and often do not receive adequate support; urges all parties to conflict situations worldwide to take adequate measures to mitigate the risks to them as much as possible; emphasises the need to safeguard children with disabilities from any form of exploitation; calls for the EU, in its external policy, to make use of the strategy for the rights of persons with disabilities 2021-2030 as a tool to improve the situation of persons with disabilities, particularly concerning poverty and discrimination, but also problems with access to education, healthcare and employment, and participation in political life; encourages the EU to support partner countries in developing inclusive economic policies that promote accessible vocational training and employment opportunities for persons with disabilities, fostering their full and active economic participation;

    Rights of elderly people

    56.  Reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to develop new avenues to strengthen the rights of elderly people, taking into account the multiple challenges they face, such as age-based discrimination, poverty, violence and a lack of social protection, healthcare and other essential services, as well as barriers to employment; calls for the implementation of specific measures to combat the risk of poverty for older women through increased social support; underlines the work of the UN Open-ended Working Group on Ageing on a legally binding instrument to strengthen the protection of the human rights of older people and calls for the EU and its Member States to consider actively supporting that work; stresses the need for a cross-cutting intergenerational approach in EU policies, in order to build and encourage solidarity between young people and elderly people;

    Right to equality and non-discrimination

    57.  Reiterates its condemnation of all forms of racism, intolerance, antisemitism, Islamophobia, persecution of Christians, xenophobia and discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, nationality, social class, disability, caste, religion, belief, age, sexual orientation or gender identity; condemns the growing international threat of hate speech and speech that incites violence, including online; reiterates the crucial role of education and dialogue in promoting tolerance, understanding and diversity; calls for the adoption or the strengthening of mechanisms for reporting discriminatory behaviours as well as access to effective legal remedies, to help end the impunity of those who engage in this behaviour;

    Right to life: towards the universal abolition of the death penalty

    58.  Reiterates its principled opposition to the death penalty, which is irreversible and incompatible with the right to life and with the prohibition of torture, and a cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment; stresses that the EU must be relentless in its pursuit of the universal abolition of the death penalty as a major objective of its human rights foreign policy; notes that despite the trend in some non-EU countries to take steps towards abolishing the death penalty, significant challenges in this regard still exist; deplores the fact that in other non-EU countries the number of death sentences that have been carried out has reached its highest level in the last five years; reiterates its call for all countries to completely abolish the death penalty or establish an immediate moratorium on the use of the death penalty (sentences and executions) as a first step towards its abolition; urges, in this regard, the EU to intensify diplomatic engagement with countries that continue to practise the death penalty, encouraging dialogue and cooperation on human rights issues and providing support for the development of judicial reforms that could lead towards its abolition;

    Right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief

    59.  Reiterates its concern regarding violations of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief; is concerned about the worldwide increase in intolerance towards different religious communities; deplores the instrumentalisation of religious or belief identities for political purposes and the exclusion of persons belonging to religious and belief minorities and religious communities, including from political participation, as well as the destruction and vandalism of sites and works of art of cultural and historical value, in certain non-EU countries; stresses that the freedom to choose one’s religion, to believe or not to believe is a human right that cannot be punished; condemns, therefore, the existence and implementation of so-called apostasy laws and blasphemy laws that lead to harsh penalties, degrading treatment and, in some cases, even to death sentences; calls for the abolition of apostasy laws and blasphemy laws; stresses that the Special Envoy for the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU should be granted more resources so that he can efficiently carry out his mandate; highlights the need for the Special Envoy to continue to work closely and in a complementary manner with the EUSR for Human Rights and the Council Working Party on Human Rights; calls for the EU and its Member States to step up their efforts to protect the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, to raise these issues at UN human rights forums and to continue working with the relevant UN mechanisms and committees; calls for the EU to request and consolidate reports by EU delegations on the state of freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief;

    60.  Recalls that most of the drivers of violent conflicts worldwide involve minority grievances of exclusion, discrimination and inequalities linked to violations of the human rights of minorities, as observed by the UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues; stresses the need to mainstream the protection of the rights of minorities and for the development of protection mechanisms at the level of the UN; recalls the obligations of states to protect the rights of their national, ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic minorities within their respective territories; calls on the Commission to support the protection of the rights of persons belonging to minorities worldwide, including this as a priority under the human rights and democracy thematic programme of the EU’s NDICI-Global Europe;

    Right to freedom of expression, academic freedom, media freedom and the right to information

    61.  Emphasises the critical significance of freedom of expression and access to trustworthy and diverse sources of information for sustaining democracy and a thriving civic space; recalls that democracies can only function when citizens have access to independent and reliable information, making journalists key players in the safeguarding of democracy; is therefore seriously concerned about the increasing restrictions on freedom of expression in numerous countries worldwide, particularly for journalists, through censorship, enforced self-censorship, so-called foreign agents laws and the misuse of counter-terrorism or anti-corruption laws to suppress journalists and civil society groups; is concerned by the use of hate speech against journalists, both online and offline, leading to a deterrent effect; raises concerns, additionally, about the physical security of journalists and media workers and their being targeted in conflict zones; deplores the fact that in 2024, 54 journalists and media workers were killed – most of them in conflict zones – 550 were being detained, 55 were being held hostage, and 95 were missing;

    62.  Calls urgently for the EU to back trustworthy media and information outlets that promote the accountability of authorities and support democratic transitions, while stressing the need to preserve the principles of pluralism, transparency and independence; highlights the role played by fact checkers in the media landscape, ensuring that the public can trust the information they receive; is concerned that they are therefore major targets for attacks by illiberal regimes that originate and disseminate disinformation, propaganda and fake news; condemns the extensive use of SLAPPs to silence journalists, activists, trade unionists and HRDs globally; welcomes, in this context, the directive designed to shield journalists and HRDs from abusive legal actions and SLAPPs; encourages lawmakers in non-EU countries to develop legislation with the same goal, as part of broader efforts to promote and protect media freedom and pluralism; requests that attacks on media freedom, as well as the persistent and systematic erosion of the right to information, be taken into account in the EU’s monitoring of the compliance of international agreements;

    63.  Welcomes the Commission’s plan to finance initiatives that support journalists on legal and practical matters, including beyond the EU, through the European Democracy Action Plan; calls for the EU to strengthen its efforts to aid targeted journalists globally, recalling that independent journalists are on the frontline of the fight against disinformation, which undermines democracies; acknowledges the contribution to achieving this goal of programmes such as the now-defunct Media4Democracy and other EU-funded activities, including those of the European Endowment for Democracy; strongly regrets the decision to halt funding to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia and Voice of America, which are outlets with a vital role in combating disinformation, promoting democratic values and reporting in places where press freedom is severely curtailed or non-existent; calls for the EU to urgently step in and provide the funding needed in order to ensure that reliable news sources available in countries that restrict press freedom;

    64.  Remains deeply concerned by the deteriorating state of press freedom around the world; condemns the censorship of journalists, HRDs and CSOs through the application of so-called foreign agents laws, as well as other legislative and non-legislative measures adopted by authoritarian and illiberal regimes;

    65.  Reaffirms its commitment to protecting and promoting academic freedom as a key component of open and democratic societies; underlines the attacks to academic freedom not only by authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, but also by extreme and populist forces worldwide; calls for the development of benchmarks for academic freedom into institutional quality assurance within academic rankings, procedures and criteria;

    66.  Underlines the indispensable work of organisations such as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in their promotion of democracy, media pluralism and access to neutral information; draws attention to the fact that where the voice of democracy is cancelled, it is easy for propaganda against democratic values to take over; highlights the need to ensure the consistent financing of such institutions, and calls for the EU to step up the financing of such organisations and fill researching gaps that may occur;

    67.  Notes with concern that more than half of the world’s population lives within environments of completely or severely restricted levels of academic freedom, which has severe consequences for the right to education, the enjoyment of the benefits of scientific progress and the freedom of opinion and expression; urges the EU and its Member States to step up their efforts to halt censorship, threats or attacks on academic freedom, and especially the imprisonment of scholars worldwide; welcomes the inclusion of academics at risk in the EU Human Rights Defenders Mechanism; calls on the Commission to ensure continued high-level support for the Global Campus of Human Rights, which has provided a safe space for students and scholars who had to flee their countries for defending democracy and human rights;

    Rights of indigenous peoples

    68.  Notes with regret that indigenous peoples continue to face widespread and systematic discrimination and persecution worldwide, including forced displacements; condemns arbitrary arrests and the killing of human rights and land defenders who stand up for the rights of indigenous peoples; stresses that the promotion of the rights of indigenous peoples and their traditional practices are key to achieving sustainable development, combating climate change and conserving biodiversity; urges governments to pursue development and environmental policies that respect economic, social and cultural rights, and that are inclusive of indigenous peoples and local populations, in line with the UN SDGs; reiterates its call for the EU, its Member States and their partners in the international community to adopt all necessary measures for the recognition, protection and promotion of the rights of indigenous people, including as regards their languages, lands, territories and resources, as set out in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, including the principle of free, prior and informed consent; calls on all states to ensure that indigenous peoples and local communities are included in the deliberations and decision-making processes of international climate diplomacy; encourages the Commission to continue to promote dialogue and collaboration between indigenous peoples and the EU;

    Right to public participation

    69.  Deplores that the right to participate in free and fair elections is not respected in authoritarian, illiberal, and totalitarian regimes; highlights that these regimes conduct fake elections with the aim of entrenching their power, as they lack real political contestation and pluralism; is alarmed by current trends in electoral processes, such as the increasing decline in electoral participation and democratic performance or the growing disputes concerning the credibility of elections; highlights with deep concern the growing interference by some states in other countries’ elections through hybrid tactics; reaffirms the necessity of increasing political representation of women, young people and vulnerable groups and to guarantee the public participation of minorities; underlines that distrust in the electoral process can be exacerbated not only by irregularities but also by public statements, including from participants; emphasises that public perception of electoral process is as crucial as the process itself, as its manipulation can lead to polarisation or targeted attacks; calls on non-EU countries to reinforce their efforts to clearly communicate all the steps of their respective electoral processes and systems, as well as the existing accountability mechanisms in case of irregularities; calls on the EEAS and the Commission to analyse and report to Parliament their initiatives to tackle the challenges posed by artificial intelligence (AI) in electoral processes;

    Human rights, business and trade

    70.  Stresses the role of trade as a major instrument to promote and improve the human rights situation in the EU’s partner countries; urges the Commission to improve coordination between the EU’s trade, investment and development policies and prioritise and promote the development of human rights through EU trade policies, including the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus; notes, however, that there has been little to no improvement in some of the countries concerned; stresses the responsibilities of states and other actors, such as corporations, to mitigate the effects of climate change, prevent their negative impact on human rights and promote appropriate policies in compliance with human rights obligations; deplores the detrimental effects of some excessive and exploitative business activities on human rights and democracy; welcomes the harmonisation resulting from the adoption of the Directive on corporate sustainability due diligence with binding EU rules on responsible corporate behaviour with regard to human, labour and environmental rights; further welcomes the Regulation on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market(11) and calls for its swift implementation at Member State level; calls for the implementation of the EU Ombudsman’s recommendation concerning the creation of a complaint-handling portal, within the framework of EU trade and financial instruments, and for the adaptation of the Commission’s Single Entry Point to allow for the submission of complaints regarding failures to comply with human rights clauses, which should be accessible, citizen-friendly and transparent; calls for the EU to continue its efforts to eliminate child labour, and forced and bonded labour; stresses the importance of remediation and access to justice measures that are in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, including financial and non-financial measures in consultation with the victims; calls on the Council to adopt an ambitious mandate for the EU to engage in the ongoing negotiations on the UN legally binding instrument on business and human rights as soon as possible;

    71.  Highlights that in many regions of the world, micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) are often the driving force of local economies with an increasing number of women running them; underlines that MSMEs account for 90 % of businesses, 60 to 70 % of employment and 50 % of gross domestic product worldwide; highlights the importance of MSMEs in their contribution to the 2030 Agenda and the achievement of the SDGs, namely those on the eradication of poverty and decent working conditions for all;

    Human rights and digital technologies

    72.  Is concerned by the threat that AI can pose to democracy and human rights, especially if it is not duly regulated; highlights the need for oversight, robust transparency and appropriate safeguards for new and emergent technologies, as well as a human-rights based approach; welcomes the Council conclusions on Digital Diplomacy of 26 June 2023 to strengthen the EU’s role and leadership in global digital governance, in particular its position as a shaper of the global digital rulebook based on democratic principles; welcomes, in this regard, the adoption of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act which aims to harmonise the rules on AI for protecting human rights, and the advantages that AI can bring to human wellbeing; is deeply concerned about the harmful consequences of the misuse of AI and deepfakes, particularly for women and children; notes with concern the adverse effects of the ‘fake content industry’ on the right to information and press freedom, including the rapid development of AI and the subsequent empowerment of the disinformation industry(12); condemns the use of new and emerging technologies, such as facial recognition technology and digital surveillance, as coercive instruments and their use in the increasing harassment, intimidation and persecution of HRDs, activists, journalists and lawyers; calls on the Council for the listing under the EUGHRSR of state and non-state actors that are engaging in these practices; notes with concern the rapid development of AI in military applications, as well as the potential development and deployment of autonomous systems that could make life-or-death decisions without human input;

    73.  Recalls that the international trade in spyware to non-EU countries where such tools are used against human rights activists, journalists and government critics, is a violation of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter;

    74.  Welcomes the adoption in May 2024 of the first Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, aimed at ensuring that activities within the entire life cycle of AI systems are fully consistent with human rights, democracy and the rule of law; reiterates the need for greater legislative attention to be paid to the profound changes arising from activities within the life cycle of AI systems, which have the potential to promote human prosperity, individual and social well-being, sustainable development, gender equality, and the empowerment of all women and girls, but also pose the risk of creating or exacerbating inequalities and incentivising cyber and physical violence, including violence experienced by women and individuals in vulnerable situations;

    75.  Stresses that the internet should be a place where freedom of expression prevails; considers, nevertheless, that the rights of individuals need to be respected; is of the opinion that, where applicable, what is considered to be illegal offline, should be considered illegal online; expresses concern for the growing number of internet shutdowns; highlights that internet shutdowns are often used by authoritarian regimes, among others, to silence political dissidence and curb political freedom; calls urgently for the EU to combat this alarming phenomenon, including considering allowing EU-based providers to offer safe communication tools to people who have been thereby deprived of online access; urges the EU to take a firm stance against any attempts by tech giants to circumvent or undermine national legal systems and independent court decisions, and to protect democratic principles and implement measures to maintain the integrity of elections, as well as to protect the right to information, especially during electoral periods;

    o
    o   o

    76.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European Union Special Representative for Human Rights, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the United Nations Security Council, the United Nations Secretary-General, the President of the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly, the President of the United Nations Human Rights Council, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the European Union Heads of Delegation.

    (1) OJ L 115, 28.4.2006, p. 50, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2006/313/oj.
    (2) OJ L 410 I, 7.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/1998/oj.
    (3) OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/947/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/1760, 5.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1760/oj.
    (5) OJ C 411, 27.11.2020, p. 30.
    (6) OJ C 404, 6.10.2021, p. 202.
    (7) OJ C 15, 12.1.2022, p. 70.
    (8) OJ C 99, 1.3.2022, p. 152.
    (9) OJ C, C/2024/6741, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6741/oj.
    (10) Commission communication of 27 April 2022 on attracting skills and talent to the EU (COM(2022)0657).
    (11) Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market (COM(2022)0453).
    (12) Reporters Without Borders, ‘2023 World Press Freedom Index – journalism threatened by fake content industry’ https://rsf.org/en/2023-world-press-freedom-index-journalism-threatened-fake-content-industry.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Strengthening the security of identity cards of Union citizens and of residence documents issued to Union citizens and their family members exercising their right of free movement – P10_TA(2025)0056 – Wednesday, 2 April 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    Text proposed by the Commission   Amendment Amendment 1
    Proposal for a regulation
    Recital 19 (19)  This Regulation does not provide a legal basis for setting up or maintaining databases at national level for the storage of biometric data in Member States, which is a matter of national law that needs to comply with Union law regarding data protection, including its necessity and proportionality requirements. Moreover, this Regulation does not provide a legal basis for setting up or maintaining a centralised database at Union level. (19)  This Regulation does not provide a legal basis for setting up or maintaining databases at national level for the storage of biometric data in Member States. Moreover, this Regulation does not provide a legal basis for setting up or maintaining a centralised database at Union level. As recalled by the European Data Protection Supervisor in his opinion 21/2024, setting up or maintaining databases at national level for storing biometric data in Member States, or similarly, setting up or maintaining a centralised database at Union level, along with the potential use of such data for other purposes, would need to meet a strict necessity and proportionality test under the Charter, as interpreted by the relevant case law of the Court of Justice. Amendment 2
    Proposal for a regulation
    Recital 20 (20)  Biometric identifiers should be collected and stored in the storage medium of identity cards and residence documents for the purposes of verifying the authenticity of the document and the identity of the holder. Given the electronic signature on the storage medium of identity cards, identifying the holder by means of the storage medium, which contains the same biographic data as printed on the document, is more reliable than a visual check of the document. Union citizens should thus be allowed to use the data stored in the storage medium of their identity card to identify themselves towards private entities. However, the verification of the fingerprints stored on the storage medium should only be carried out by duly authorised staff and only when the document is required to be produced by law. (20)  Facial images stored in the storage medium of identity cards and residence documents should be accessed only by duly authorised staff of competent national authorities, Union agencies and private entities for the purposes of verifying the authenticity of the document and the identity of the holder. Such access should comply with Union data protection law. Facial images should not be retained for longer than is necessary for those purposes, should be deleted as soon as those purposes are achieved and should not be transferred to third countries or international organisations unless permitted by Union data protection law. Those safeguards are intended to ensure appropriate protection of the facial image while not prohibiting its use. Amendment 3
    Proposal for a regulation
    Recital 20 a (new) (20a)  The verification of the fingerprints stored on the storage medium should be carried out only by duly authorised staff of competent national authorities and Union agencies and only when the document is required to be produced by Union or national law. Amendment 4
    Proposal for a regulation
    Recital 23 (23)  Member States should be able to decide whether to include a person’s gender on a document covered by this Regulation. Where a Member State includes a person’s gender on such a document, the specifications of ICAO Document 9303 ‘F’, ‘M’ or ‘X’ or the corresponding single initial used in the language or languages of that Member State should be used, as appropriate. (23)  Without prejudice to the case law of the Court of Justice1a, Member States should be able to decide whether to include a person’s gender on a document covered by this Regulation. Where a Member State includes a person’s gender on such a document, the specifications of ICAO Document 9303 ‘F’, ‘M’ or ‘X’ or the corresponding single initial used in the language or languages of that Member State should be used, as appropriate. _________________ 1a Judgment of the Court of Justice of 4 October 2024, Mirin, C-4/23, ECLI:EU:C:2024:845 Amendment 5
    Proposal for a regulation
    Recital 26 (26)  Where difficulties are encountered in the collection of biometric identifiers, Member States should ensure that appropriate procedures are in place to respect the dignity of the person concerned. Therefore, specific considerations relating to gender and to the specific needs of children and of vulnerable persons should be taken into account. (26)  Where difficulties are encountered in the collection of biometric identifiers, Member States should ensure that appropriate procedures are in place to respect the dignity of the person concerned. Therefore, specific considerations relating to gender and to the specific needs of children and of vulnerable persons should be taken into account. Qualified staff should receive training on best practices for collecting biometric identifiers from children and vulnerable persons, ensuring sensitivity to gender and age-specific needs while respecting the dignity of all individuals. Amendment 6
    Proposal for a regulation
    Recital 32 (32)  Member States should exchange with each other such information as is necessary to access, authenticate and verify the information contained on the secure storage medium. The formats used for the secure storage medium should be interoperable, including in respect of automated border crossing points. (32)  Member States should exchange with each other such information as is necessary to access, authenticate and verify the information contained on the secure storage medium. The formats used for the secure storage medium should be interoperable, including in respect of automated border crossing points. The Commission should promote Member States’ cooperation in support of such objectives. Amendment 7
    Proposal for a regulation
    Recital 43 (43)  In accordance with the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making9 , the Commission should, no sooner than six years after the date of application of this Regulation carry out an evaluation of this Regulation, including on the basis of information gathered through specific monitoring arrangements, in order to assess the actual effects of this Regulation and the need for any further action. For the purpose of monitoring, Member States should collect statistics on the number of identity cards and residence documents which they issued. (43)  The Commission should report on the implementation of this Regulation two years, and 11 years, after the date of its entry into force, including on the appropriateness of the level of security, taking into account its impact on fundamental rights and data protection principles. In accordance with the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making9 , the Commission should, six years after the date of entry into force of this Regulation, and every six years thereafter, carry out an evaluation of this Regulation, including on the basis of information gathered through specific monitoring arrangements, in order to assess the actual effects of this Regulation and the need for any further action. For the purpose of monitoring, Member States should collect statistics on the number of identity cards and residence documents which they issued. _________________ _________________ 9 OJ L 123, 12.5.2016, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_interinstit/2016/512/oj. 9 OJ L 123, 12.5.2016, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_interinstit/2016/512/oj. Amendment 8
    Proposal for a regulation
    Article 3 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 By way of derogation from the first subparagraph, the document number may be inserted in zone I and the designation of a person’s gender shall be optional. By way of derogation from the first subparagraph, the document number may be inserted in zone I and the designation of a person’s gender shall be optional. Where a Member State includes a person’s gender on a document covered by this Regulation, the specifications of ICAO Document 9303 ‘F’, ‘M’ or ‘X’ or the corresponding single initial used in the official language or languages of that Member State shall be used, as appropriate. Amendment 9
    Proposal for a regulation
    Article 3 – paragraph 5 5.  Identity cards shall include a highly secure storage medium which shall contain a facial image of the holder of the card and two fingerprints in interoperable digital formats. For the capture of biometric identifiers, Member States shall apply the technical specifications as established by Commission Implementing Decision C(2018) 776712 as amended by Commission Implementing Decision C(2021) 372613 . 5.  Identity cards shall include a highly secure storage medium which shall contain a facial image of the holder of the card and two fingerprints in interoperable digital formats. For the capture of those two types of biometric identifiers, Member States shall apply the technical specifications as established by Commission Implementing Decision C(2018) 776712 as amended by Commission Implementing Decision C(2021) 372613 . _________________ _________________ 12 Commission Implementing Decision C(2018) 7767 of 30 November 2018 laying down the technical specifications for the uniform format for residence permits for third country nationals and repealing Decision C(2002) 3069. 12 Commission Implementing Decision C(2018) 7767 of 30 November 2018 laying down the technical specifications for the uniform format for residence permits for third country nationals and repealing Decision C(2002) 3069. 13 Commission Implementing Decision C(2021) 3726 of 4 June 2021 amending Annex III to Implementing Decision C(2018) 7767 as regards the list of normative references. 13 Commission Implementing Decision C(2021) 3726 of 4 June 2021 amending Annex III to Implementing Decision C(2018) 7767 as regards the list of normative references. Amendment 10
    Proposal for a regulation
    Article 10 – paragraph 3 3.  Other than where required for the purpose of processing in accordance with Union and national law, biometric identifiers stored for the purpose of personalisation of identity cards or residence documents shall be kept in a highly secure manner and only until the date of collection of the document and, in any case, no longer than 90 days from the date of issue. After this period, these biometric identifiers shall be immediately erased or destroyed. 3.  Biometric identifiers stored for the purpose of personalisation of identity cards or residence documents shall be kept in a highly secure manner and only until the date of collection of the document and, in any case, no longer than 90 days from the date of issue. After this period, those biometric identifiers shall be immediately erased or destroyed. Processing of those data for other purposes shall be subject to the limitations and conditions provided for in national law or Union data protection law. Amendment 11
    Proposal for a regulation
    Article 11 – paragraph 4 4.  Cooperation with external service providers shall not exclude any liability on the part of a Member State which may arise under Union or national law in respect of breaches of obligations with regard to personal data. 4.  Cooperation with external service providers shall not exclude any liability on the part of a Member State which may arise under Union or national law in respect of breaches of obligations with regard to personal data. Member States shall ensure that all external providers comply with Union and national data protection law, and appropriate measures shall be adopted to prevent any unauthorised access or misuse of personal data during outsourced processes. Amendment 12
    Proposal for a regulation
    Article 11 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part Biometric data stored in the storage medium of identity cards and residence documents shall only be used in accordance with Union and national law for the purpose of verifying: The facial image of the holder stored in the storage medium of identity cards and residence documents shall only be accessed by duly authorised staff of competent national authorities, Union agencies and private entities in accordance with Union data protection law for the purposes of verifying: Amendment 13
    Proposal for a regulation
    Article 11 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1 a (new) Access to the facial image by private entities shall also require the consent of the holder, unless access regardless of consent is strictly necessary for the purposes set out in the first subparagraph and provided for by Union or national law in compliance with Union data protection law. Amendment 14
    Proposal for a regulation
    Article 11 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 2 The two fingerprints stored in the storage medium shall only be accessed by duly authorised staff of competent national authorities and Union agencies. The two fingerprints of the holder stored in the storage medium shall only be accessed by duly authorised staff of competent national authorities and Union agencies for the purposes set out in the first subparagraph in accordance with Union and national data protection law. Amendment 15
    Proposal for a regulation
    Article 13 – title Evaluation Reporting and evaluation Amendment 16
    Proposal for a regulation
    Article 13 – paragraph -1 (new) -1.  By [two years after the date of entry into force of this Regulation] and by [11 years after the date of entry into force of this Regulation] the Commission shall report to the European Parliament, to the Council and to the European Economic and Social Committee on the implementation of this Regulation, in particular on the protection of fundamental rights and personal data. Amendment 17
    Proposal for a regulation
    Article 13 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1.  No sooner than [six years after the entry into force of this Regulation], the Commission shall carry out an evaluation of this Regulation and present a report on the main findings to the European Parliament, to the Council and to the European Economic and Social Committee. The report shall in particular focus on: 1.  No later than [six years after the entry into force of this Regulation], and every six years thereafter, the Commission shall carry out an evaluation of this Regulation and present a report on the main findings to the European Parliament, to the Council and to the European Economic and Social Committee. The report shall in particular focus on: Amendment 18
    Proposal for a regulation
    Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point d a (new) (da)   the necessity of introducing common security features of identification documents used on a provisional basis in view of their better recognition; Amendment 19
    Proposal for a regulation
    Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point d b (new) (db)   the necessity of further harmonising the security features of residence documents.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Protocol on the Implementation of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Guinea-Bissau (2024- 2029) (Resolution) – P10_TA(2025)0054 – Wednesday, 2 April 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the draft Council decision (12475/2024),

    –  having regard to the Protocol on the implementation of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Guinea-Bissau (2024–2029) (12189/2024)(1),

    –  having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 43(2) and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a) (v), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C10‑0108/2024),

    –  having regard to the Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication (SSF Guidelines),

    –  having regard to the 2023 report entitled ‘Evaluation and analysis of the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements’, commissioned by the European Commission(2),

    –  having regard to its legislative resolution of 02 April 2025(3) on the draft Council decision,

    –  having regard to the budgetary assessment by the Committee on Budgets,

    –  having regard to Rule 107(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Development,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Fisheries (A10-0040/2025),

    A.  whereas the overall objective of the EU-Guinea-Bissau sustainable fisheries partnership agreement (SFPA) is to enhance fisheries cooperation between the EU and Guinea-Bissau, in the interests of both parties, by promoting a sustainable fisheries policy and the sound and sustainable exploitation of fishery resources in Guinea-Bissau’s fishing zone in addition to development of the fisheries sector in Guinea-Bissau and its blue economy;

    B.  whereas the use of total allowable catches (TAC) under the previous SFPA is considered satisfactory overall;

    C.  whereas scientists(4) have warned of the overexploitation of pelagics in this region, which are under constant pressure;

    D.  whereas the EU-Guinea-Bissau SFPA is of considerable importance in the context of the SFPAs concluded by the EU with third countries, and is currently the second most important in terms of the funds involved, and offers the added advantage of being one of only three agreements that allow access to mixed fisheries;

    E.  whereas the EU-Guinea-Bissau SFPA is of importance for cooperation with Guinea-Bissau, international ocean governance actions, strengthening cooperation within forums such as regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) and fighting illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing;

    F.  whereas Guinea-Bissau is one of the poorest, most unstable and least developed countries in the region and the contribution of its fisheries to the country’s wealth is very low (3 % of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2018(5)) but the funds disbursed under the SFPA by way of financial compensation for access to resources will make a significant contribution to its public finances;

    G.  whereas artisanal catches are not sufficient to supply the local markets; whereas overexploitation of small pelagic species remains an urgent problem in terms of food security for the local population; whereas the increased production of fishmeal, which is processed mostly from small pelagic species, either on land in fishmeal plants or directly on factory ships, is one of the main factors contributing to the overexploitation of these stocks in the region; whereas there is a lack of transparency about who supplies these fishmeal plants and who are their beneficial owners;

    H.  whereas 97 % of the catches made in the fishing zone of Guinea-Bissau are landed outside the country, according to the 2023 ex post and ex ante evaluation(6);

    I.  whereas by comparison with the previous protocol, the EU’s financial contribution has increased from EUR 11 600 000 to EUR 12 500 000 per year as regards the annual amount for access to fishery resources and from EUR 4 000 000 to EUR 4 500 000 per year as regards EU support for Guinea-Bissau’s sectoral fisheries policy;

    J.  whereas during the period covered by the protocol, fishing opportunities will be in transition from a fishing effort basis (measured in gross registered tonnage (GRT)) to a catch limit basis (measured in tonnes – TAC); whereas that transition ought to be accompanied by the implementation of an electronic catch reporting and catch data processing system;

    K.  whereas during the period covered by the protocol, the fishing opportunities granted to EU fleets shall be as follows: 3 700 GRT for shrimp freezer trawlers, 3 500 GRT for fin-fish and cephalopod freezer trawlers and 0 GRT for small-pelagic trawlers, 28 tuna freezer seiners and longliners and 13 pole-and-line tuna vessels for highly migratory species;

    L.  whereas the first fisheries agreement between the European Economic Community and Guinea-Bissau dates back to 1980; whereas the previous protocol to the agreement expired on 14 June 2024; whereas the results achieved under the development cooperation component of the agreements (i.e. sectoral support) are not satisfactory overall; whereas improvements have nonetheless been recorded as regards capacity for fisheries monitoring, control and surveillance and sanitary inspection, as well as Guinea-Bissau’s involvement in regional fisheries bodies;

    M.  whereas sectoral cooperation involving local coastal communities needs to be stepped up in order to better promote the development of the local fisheries sector and related industries and activities so as to ensure that a greater proportion of the added value created through exploitation of the country’s natural resources remains in Guinea-Bissau; whereas the Commission should improve monitoring and ensure that sectoral cooperation is better targeted to local needs and that the aid contributes effectively to sustainable development in partner countries, as well as providing transparent information on how and where the support is used;

    N.  whereas development of the fisheries sector in Guinea-Bissau calls for the establishment of basic and functioning infrastructure, such as ports, landing sites, storage facilities and processing plants, which are still lacking or are being built by other third countries competing with the EU, with the aim of attracting landings of fish caught in Guinea-Bissau waters;

    O.  whereas 2021 saw the start of the United Nations Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development (2021-2030); whereas third countries should be encouraged and helped to play a key role in connection with resource and ecosystem knowledge; whereas EU Member States should play a supportive role in this respect;

    P.  whereas trade in fishery products from Guinea-Bissau has been banned by the EU for many years owing to the country’s inability to comply with the sanitary measures required by the EU; whereas the delay in the certification process for the analytical laboratory (CIPA) is the main barrier to exporting fishery products from Guinea-Bissau to the EU; whereas the Guinea-Bissau authorities and the Commission are working together in the certification process in order to lift the ban;

    Q.  whereas for the first time, the SFPA makes a reference in its preamble to the SSF Guidelines, with the aim of protecting small-scale fisheries, taking into account their contribution to food security and poverty reduction;

    R.  whereas it would be appropriate for Guinea-Bissau to ensure that a greater proportion of the added value generated through exploitation of fishery resources in the Guinea-Bissau fishing zone remains in the country; whereas the EU should encourage local authorities to apply this recommendation to EU vessels but also to foreign fleets operating in Guinea-Bissau’s fishing zone;

    S.  whereas unfortunately, direct job creation in the fisheries sector in Guinea-Bissau is uncommon and limited, even in the case of local crew members on board vessels and women working and earning their living in the fisheries sector; whereas a significant proportion of the sectoral support should be allocated to support artisanal fishery, women processors and local trade;

    T.  whereas by comparison with the previous protocol, the number of seafarers to be signed on in the EU fleet has increased significantly; whereas EU vessel owners must endeavour to sign on additional Guinea-Bissau seafarers; whereas however, the Guinea-Bissau authorities should fulfil their obligation to draw up and keep up to date an indicative list of qualified seafarers who could be signed on to EU vessels; whereas sectoral support may be provided for training local seafarers in accordance with International Maritime Organization (IMO) standards;

    U.  whereas after initialling the protocol, the Commission validated, with the Council, an amendment to point 4 of Chapter VIII of the annex to the protocol (‘Remuneration of deep-sea fishers’), replacing the word ‘wage’ by ‘remuneration’, this having received the approval of the authorities of Guinea‑Bissau;

    V.  whereas advances have been made in the fight against IUU fishing in Guinea-Bissau’s territorial waters as a result of stepping up the Guinea-Bissau exclusive economic zone’s (EEZ) surveillance resources, in particular those allocated to the Directorate-General for Fisheries and Fishing Inspection and Control , which includes a corps of observers and fast patrol vessels; whereas there are still shortcomings to be eliminated, including in connection with the satellite-based vessel monitoring system (VMS);

    W.  whereas access to beneficial ownership information is crucial for law enforcement, to uncover illegal fishing, reveal concealed networks and identify the individuals and companies benefiting from these activities by tracing the flow of profits;

    X.  whereas according to the most recent ex post and ex ante evaluation in July 2023, the advances made in the profiling of demersal fish stocks in the Guinea-Bissau EEZ are not sufficient to achieve maximum sustainable yield;

    Y.  whereas Guinea-Bissau is one of 13 countries coming within the scope of the European Fisheries Control Agency project ‘Improved regional fisheries governance in western Africa (PESCAO)’, adopted by Commission Decision C(2017) 2951 of 28 April 2017, which, among other objectives, aims to step up the prevention of and fight against IUU fishing by improving monitoring, control and surveillance at national and regional level;

    Z.  whereas incorporation of the recommendations previously made by Parliament into the current protocol was not entirely satisfactory;

    AA.  whereas Parliament must be kept closely informed at all stages of the procedures concerning the protocol, any changes to it, or its renewal;

    1.  Notes the importance of the EU-Guinea-Bissau SFPA, both for Guinea-Bissau and for EU fleets operating in the Guinea-Bissau fishing zone; emphasises that there could be more effective fisheries cooperation between the EU and Guinea-Bissau and reiterates its call on the Commission to take every step required to make the new protocol on implementing the agreement more ambitious than its predecessors so as to ensure that this SFPA satisfactorily supports the development of the local fisheries sector in overall terms and increases the added value for coastal communities, which will contribute to food security and sovereignty, and is consistent with the objectives referred to in UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 14 to conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development;

    2.  Welcomes the new SFPA social provision introduced by the Commission; recalls the important principles included therein, also covering equal working conditions for seafarers, including for fishers from countries in the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States who are working on EU vessels, and considers that this protocol should be monitored effectively during its period of implementation;

    3.  Highlights the importance of a structured framework for cooperation on fisheries with Guinea-Bissau, which will also enable better cooperation and coordination for common efforts in areas of international ocean diplomacy and international ocean governance;

    4.  Encourages the Commission to develop a more ambitious partnership agreement facilitating the export of fishery products that are sustainably processed on the African continent, provided it does not undermine the food security of the local population;

    5.  Considers that the objectives of the EU-Guinea-Bissau SFPA have been realised to varying degrees and that, while the agreement has offered and still provides fishing opportunities for EU vessels in the Guinea-Bissau fishing zone, in view of the considerable use made of those opportunities by European vessel owners, the same cannot be said of the local fisheries sector, whose development remains insufficient or unsatisfactory overall;

    6.  Advocates for infrastructure to be developed and fishery products to be exploited so as to ensure tangible results for local and artisanal fisheries, prioritising their needs and supporting infrastructure development and market access;

    7.  Supports awareness-raising and the inclusion of all possible actors in Guinea-Bissau’s fisheries sector throughout the process leading to an agreement, from the time of its drafting to when it is concluded and implemented, including as regards the use of sectoral support, and stresses the need to improve the participation of all possible stakeholders and the particularly important role of local cooperatives and representatives of local artisanal fishers and of coastal communities;

    8.  Stresses that, in Article 3, the protocol contains a non-discrimination clause whereby Guinea-Bissau undertakes not to grant more favourable technical conditions to other foreign fleets operating in Guinea-Bissau’s fishing zone that have the same characteristics and target the same species; calls on the Commission to closely follow and constantly monitor the EU fishery agreement applicable in Guinea-Bissau’s fishing zone; supports the Commission’s precautionary approach in setting TACs at 0 GRT for small-pelagic trawlers, but questions the ability of stakeholders to enforce an equivalent obligation for third-country-flagged fleets, including fleets flagged to Guinea-Bissau, considering the risk of infringement of the IUU Regulation(7);

    9.  Calls on the Commission, in order to improve the implementation of the IUU Regulation, to address the lack of transparency in the fishing sector in Guinea-Bissau which results, for example, from flags of convenience, flag hopping, complex corporate structures and a lack of public information on beneficial owners; asks Guinea-Bissau to communicate to the Commission the available information concerning flagged vessels or companies with EU ownership;

    10.  Recalls that IUU fishing damages food security and the livelihoods of people in coastal countries as well as the ocean’s ecosystems; notes with concern that Guinea-Bissau is fast emerging as a flag-of-convenience country; is concerned that the fight against IUU fishing is being held back by a lack of transparency regarding the ownership of fishing vessels in countries with a high risk of IUU fishing;

    11.  Reminds the Member States of their obligations to investigate and sanction any non-compliance with EU fishing laws by nationals under their jurisdiction, including those who own vessels flagged in third countries; requests that the Member States improve their cooperation and exchange of information with both EU and third countries to identify infringements of fishing rules, and that they cooperate to ensure that proportionate and deterrent sanctions are in place; recalls the Member States’ requirements under the IUU regulation regarding nationals supporting and engaging in IUU fishing activities, including obligations concerning beneficial owners;

    12.  Stresses that Guinea-Bissau’s GDP is heavily reliant on its marine resources; underlines that, although the fishing industry represents 15 % of total government revenues, it cannot export seafood to the EU as it has not met the health and sanitary requirements to export, while it is estimated that only 3 % of the catches made by foreign vessels in Guinea-Bissau are landed in Guinea-Bissau;

    13.  Recalls that small-scale fisheries make a major contribution to food security, with fish being the main source of protein available at an affordable price; underlines, therefore, the importance of reserving the access to pelagics for small-scale fisheries that catch fish for human consumption; recalls the EU’s responsibility to encourage these measures through its agreements;

    14.  Welcomes the contribution of EU vessels to food security in Guinea-Bissau through direct landings, as specified in Chapter V of the annex to the protocol, for the benefit of local communities and to promote internal fish trade and consumption; notes with concern the low tonnage of 94 tonnes reported in 2022(8); calls, in this regard, for an increase in landings under this new protocol;

    15.  Notes that the main problem facing the small-scale fisheries sector is the lack of infrastructure for landing, preserving and processing fishery products; stresses that the long-term food security needs of the local population should be prioritised and highlights the importance of maintaining sustainable fish stocks to ensure food security for coastal communities; recalls that 97 % of the stocks fished in Guinea-Bissau are landed in other countries; encourages European vessels, therefore, to land at least 2 % in Guinea-Bissau, for the local population;

    16.  Welcomes the fact that the preamble to the Guinea-Bissau-EU Protocol, for the first time in an SFPA, refers to the FAO’s SFF Guidelines; underlines that their inclusion in the protocol text shows the determination of both parties to make this sector a priority; notes, however, that artisanal fishing communities were not consulted at any stage in the process of drawing up the new protocol; stresses that the EU’s commitment to supporting the local fisheries sector in Guinea-Bissau entails involving them in identifying priorities for the use of sectoral support funds;

    17.  Calls on the Government of Guinea-Bissau and the Commission to improve the participation of coastal and small-scale fishing communities during the implementation of the new protocol, notably ahead of the Joint Committee meetings;

    18.  Considers the electronic reporting system for catches, data processing and vessel activity monitoring to be a challenge for this protocol; calls on the Commission and Guinea-Bissau to promote, without delay, appropriate and effective implementation that safeguards the necessary reliability and effectiveness of the electronic reporting system and the processing of catch data and stresses that this has to be done, without further delay, during the extension of the protocol;

    19.  Supports the need for significant progress in the development of the Guinea-Bissau fisheries sector, including as regards related industries and activities, and calls on the Commission to take all necessary measures, including a possible revision and strengthening of the sectoral support component of the agreement;

    20.  Takes the view that the EU-Guinea-Bissau SFPA will not achieve its objectives unless it contributes to establishing a long-term sustainable management system for the exploitation of its fisheries resources as well as responsible socio-economic arrangements; regards it as extremely important that the sectoral support provisions set out in the protocol be complied with, with the utmost transparency, in order to help fully implement the national strategy for sustainable fisheries; recalls that it is in the EU’s interests to highlight and demonstrate to the Guinea-Bissau citizens the long-term, positive and strategic role of the SFPA, compared with the lack of involvement of third countries in the welfare of the local population; points out, in this regard, that the EU should mobilise its technical and financial assistance as follows, and as a matter of priority, in order to:

       (a) strengthen institutional capacities, notably regional fisheries governance strategies, so as to take account of the cumulative impacts of the various fisheries agreements involving countries in the region;
       (b) strengthen capacities to monitor and control fishing activities in order to prevent IUU fishing; combat the risks associated with reflagging strategies by making flagging subject to sustainability criteria; implement measures to prevent any flag-of-convenience practices and ensure full transparency throughout the registration process;
       (c) build, linked to the Global Gateway Initiative, key infrastructure tailored to fisheries and related activities, such as ports (both industrial and artisanal), landing sites, fish storage and processing facilities, markets, distribution and marketing structures, and quality analysis laboratories, with the aim of attracting landings of fish caught in the waters of Guinea-Bissau;
       (d) strengthen the capacities of local artisanal operators in the fisheries sector by supporting fishers’ organisations and cooperatives of women processors and wholesale fish merchants;
       (e) train fishing professionals upstream, including seafarers, and downstream in processing facilities, focusing, in particular, on the handling, hygiene and packaging of fish, and inform the vessel owners of the list of deep-sea fishers with the required skills, as provided for in the protocol;
       (f) support small-scale fishing as regards access to resources, in line with the FAO’s SSF Guidelines, modernising seagoing capacities, on-board equipment and cold chain equipment for preservation of catches on land, these being basic building blocks for the cohesion of coastal communities and their food autonomy, as well as providing training on geolocalisation, security and safety at sea for pirogue masters;
       (g) contribute to the good ecological condition of the marine environment, in particular by supporting the collection and recycling of waste and fishing gear by all actors, contributing to the fight against overfishing and promoting more selective fishing gear;
       (h) recognise and enhance the role of women and young people in fishing, in the support of this SFPA, and improve how their roles are organised by supporting the necessary conditions for this, by funding training for women working in recovery facilities, creating all the necessary conditions for them to develop their work and have a work-life balance, such as appropriate childcare facilities close to the workplace and support for education;
       (i) facilitate landings of species consumed locally, in the interests of local communities’ food security, and ensure access to the commodity for women processors and wholesale fish merchants, ensuring and promoting local human consumption of fish;

    21.  Calls for the proactive publication of and greater transparency on the activities financed by sectoral support funds, thus allowing more rigorous monitoring and greater consistency with other funds for development of the local sector, as publication would make the impact of those activities totally clear to the EU taxpayer and local populations;

    22.  Urges the Commission and the Member States, in their cooperation and official development assistance policies, to take into account the fact that the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, including its 2021-2027 multiannual indicative programme, and sectoral support provided for in the EU-Guinea-Bissau SFPA should complement each other and be fully coordinated, with a view to strengthening the local fisheries sector in line with FAO rules and ensuring food security for coastal communities;

    23.  Stresses that the training of artisanal fishers, especially women, is a necessary condition for the development of the local fisheries sector; calls for the EU to also use sectoral support funds for this purpose;

    24.  Expresses its concern at the growing number of fishmeal and fish oil plants on the western African coast, which are also supplied with fish from Guinea-Bissau waters; underlines the fact that forage fishing runs counter to the principle of sustainability and providing valuable protein resources for the local community; welcomes expansion of port and landing facilities in Guinea-Bissau, but is concerned that this will be followed by the construction of new fishmeal plants;

    25.  Calls for the EU to step up its efforts to support the regional joint management of small pelagics and to end overfishing, including by creating a regional fisheries management organisation dedicated to this shared management;

    26.  Calls on the Commission and the Guinea-Bissau authorities to enhance their cooperation in order to establish the conditions for the export of Guinea-Bissau fishery products to the EU, in particular as regards the verification of the required sanitary conditions and certification of the analytical laboratory (CIPA), so as to overcome the current ban, boost the development of the local fisheries sector and, consequently, make progress towards achieving the SFPA objectives;

    27.  Supports the need to enhance the contribution of the SFPA to local direct and indirect job creation, both on vessels operating under the SFPA or in fishing-related activities, both upstream and downstream; considers that the Member States can play a key role and be an active participant in capacity-building and training efforts in order to achieve the objectives set;

    28.  Points to the unique nature of Guinea-Bissau’s marine and coastal ecosystems, such as the mangrove forests, which act as nursery habitats for fishery resources, and which require measures and targeted action to protect and restore biodiversity; calls for the EU to take these considerations into account for its external fishing fleet;

    29.  Recalls that Guinea-Bissau is particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change; calls for the conservation of marine ecosystems, funding for efforts to combat coastal erosion, and broad mitigation measures to address the impact of climate change on fisheries;

    30.  Considers it useful for Guinea-Bissau to gather information on the benefits of implementing this protocol for local economies (for example, in terms of employment, infrastructure and social improvements) and compile this in a database, in order not to create administrative burdens;

    31.  Considers that there is a need to improve the quantity and quality of data on all catches (target species and by-catches), on the conservation status of fishery resources in the Guinea-Bissau fishing zone and, in general, on the impact of the SFPA on ecosystems, and that an effort should be made to develop Guinea-Bissau’s capacity to acquire such data; calls on the Commission to help ensure that the bodies monitoring implementation of the SFPA, namely the Joint Committee and Joint Scientific Committee, can operate smoothly, with the involvement of artisanal fishers’ associations, associations of women working in the fisheries sector, trade unions, representatives of coastal communities and Guinea-Bissau civil society organisations;

    32.  Considers it essential to improve the collection of data on catches in Guinea- Bissau; calls further for an improvement in the transmission of data generated by EU vessels’ VMS via the flag state to the African authorities; calls for better data system interoperability, with reciprocity for third countries on the basis of international standards;

    33.  Stresses that Guinea-Bissau’s GDP is heavily reliant on its marine resources; highlights the importance of supporting scientific assessments of fish stocks and ensuring that catch limits and quotas are adhered to in order to remain within sustainable limits and prevent the depletion of marine resources;

    34.  Encourages the Commission to promote the use of sectoral support to enhance surveillance and controls, and to develop scientific lab-based research on stocks in order to train local workers to EU standards on hygiene, fish processing and packaging; stresses that training is a long-term investment for the development of the local blue economy and the fish trade, and for the protection of local businesses and the environment;

    35.  Calls for updated reports to be published on the actions that have been given backing under sectoral support arrangements, to ensure the necessary transparency;

    36.  Considers that, should fisheries be closed or fishing restrictions be introduced, local fishing needs should be addressed first, on the basis of sound and structured scientific advice, in order to ensure that resources are sustainable, as laid down in the protocol;

    37.  Emphasises the importance of the surplus requirement for EU vessels fishing in third-country waters; recalls that robust and reliable data and transparent information are needed to calculate the available surplus; takes the view that targeting fish populations subject to overexploitation is contrary to that objective;

    38.  Supports the need to improve governance, control and surveillance of the Guinea-Bissau fishing zone and to fight IUU fishing, in particular by stepping up vessel monitoring (by VMS or any other leaner and cheaper geolocation and identification system), with a view to improving the sustainability of fishing activities for fleets operating in its fishing zone; welcomes the EU support for patrols at sea in recent years;

    39.  Calls for the improved implementation of transparency provisions, in particular entailing publication of all agreements with states or private entities that have granted foreign vessels access to Guinea-Bissau’s EEZ; highlights that the ex post and ex ante evaluation in July 2023 stated that information on access agreements was shared with the Commission but not made public;

    40.  Stresses the importance of allocating the fishing opportunities provided for by the SFPA on the basis of the principles of equity, balance and transparency, acknowledging historical catch levels and relative stability;

    41.  Calls on the Commission to make publicly available information provided under the transparency clause of the protocol;

    42.  Emphasises that it is important for landings of fish in Guinea-Bissau ports to contribute to local processing activities and food security, in terms of both species and quality; calls therefore on the Commission to strengthen that component in the next agreement; encourages the creation of national companies in the industrial fishing sector, capable of participating in the exploitation, by national fleets, of fishery resources that would be processed on land;

    43.  Calls on the Commission to raise awareness among the social partners of the EU Sectoral Social Dialogue Committee for Fisheries of the importance of coordinating and having collective working agreements determining a minimum remuneration under International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 188, which can be used for subsequent SFPAs; encourages the Commission to promote the ratification of ILO Convention 188 by all the Member States and third countries, including when negotiating SFPAs, and to take forward the requirements of the current conventions within the ILO; calls on the Commission to include any social clauses necessary to achieve those objectives in the mandate for SFPAs issued by the Council or during negotiations within regional fisheries management organisations;

    44.  Highlights the importance of clarifying the social clause included in the SFPA and takes note of the Commission’s intention to do so in the first upcoming Joint Committee meeting with Guinea-Bissau; points out the importance of the clause being in line with the commonly used remuneration model of the sector; calls on the Commission to take the necessary steps to amend point 4 of Chapter VIII of the annex to the protocol (‘Remuneration of deep-sea fishers’), as validated together with the Council;

    45.  Calls on the Commission, when assessing and renegotiating SFPAs, to determine whether all provisions of Chapter VIII of the annex have been implemented, in particular the provisions on pay actually received by local fishers; calls on the Commission to propose corrective measures where not all of those provisions have been complied with;

    46.  Calls on the Commission to address, in ocean diplomacy and in SFPAs, the implementation of the IMO Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Fishing Vessel Personnel in order to promote better occupational safety standards in the fisheries sector and, if necessary, include the training component in sectoral support arrangements;

    47.  Points to the responsibilities of flag states for providing social protection for employees living on their territory and therefore calls on the Commission to ensure, through the technical committees implementing the agreement, that these measures are effective;

    48.  Calls on the Commission to present to Parliament, during the last year in which the protocol applies, and before negotiations on renewing it are opened, a full report on its implementation and the documentation necessary to assess the situation;

    49.  Calls on the Commission and the Guinea-Bissau authorities to provide more detailed information on the development of forage fishing activities in the region, in particular activities by third-country vessels or vessels from neighbouring countries;

    50.  Calls on the Commission to better incorporate Parliament’s recommendations into the EU-Guinea-Bissau SFPA and to take them into account in the procedures for renewal of the protocol;

    51.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of Guinea-Bissau.

    (1) OJ L, 2024/2589, 3.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/prot/2024/2589/oj.
    (2) European Commission: Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries et al. Evaluation and analysis of the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements (SFPAs) between the EU and third countries including an in-depth analysis of the sectoral support component of the SFPAs – Final report, Publications Office of the European Union, 2023.
    (3) Texts adopted, P10_TA(2025)0053.
    (4) European Commission: Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Report of 10 September 2024 on the 10th Meeting of the Joint Scientific Committee to the EU-Guinea-Bissau Fisheries Partnership Agreement.
    (5) FAO, Fishery and Aquaculture Country Profiles. Guinea-Bissau, 2018, Fisheries and Aquaculture Division. Rome.
    (6) European Commission, Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Évaluation rétrospective et prospective du Protocole de mise en œuvre de l’accord de partenariat dans le domaine de la pêche entre l’Union européenne et la République de Guinea-Bissau – Rapport final [Ex post and ex ante evaluation of the Implementing Protocol to the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Guinea-Bissau – Final report], Publications Office of the European Union, 2023.
    (7) Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 of 29 September 2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, amending Regulations (EEC) No 2847/93, (EC) No 1936/2001 and (EC) No 601/2004 and repealing Regulations (EC) No 1093/94 and (EC) No 1447/1999 (OJ L 286, 29.10.2008, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2008/1005/oj).
    (8) European Commission, Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries et al., Évaluation rétrospective et prospective du Protocole de mise en œuvre de l’accord de partenariat dans le domaine de la pêche entre l’Union européenne et la République de Guinea-Bissau – Rapport final [Ex post and ex ante evaluation of the Implementing Protocol to the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Guinea-Bissau – Final report], Publications Office of the European Union, 2023.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Agreement: cooperation between Eurojust and the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina competent for judicial cooperation in criminal matters – P10_TA(2025)0055 – Wednesday, 2 April 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    (Consent)

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the draft Council decision (13622/2024),

    –  having regard to draft agreement between the European Union and Bosnia and Herzegovina on the cooperation between the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) and the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina competent for judicial cooperation in criminal matters (13241/2024),

    –  having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 47, Article 52(1), Article 56(2) and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C10‑0165/2024),

    –  having regard to Rule 107(1) and (4) and Rule 117(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A10-0027/2025),

    1.  Gives its consent to the conclusion of the agreement;

    2.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Protocol on the Implementation of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Guinea-Bissau (2024–2029) – P10_TA(2025)0053 – Wednesday, 2 April 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    (Consent)

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the draft Council decision (12475/2024),

    –  having regard to the Protocol on the implementation of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Guinea-Bissau (2024–2029) (12189/2024),

    –  having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 43(2) and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a)(v), and Article 218(7), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C10‑0108/2024),

    –  having regard to its non-legislative resolution of 2 April 2025(1) on the draft decision,

    –  having regard to the budgetary assessment by the Committee on Budgets,

    –  having regard to Rule 107(1) and (4), and Rule 117(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Development,

    –  having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on Fisheries (A10-0028/2025),

    1.  Gives its consent to the conclusion of the agreement;

    2.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of the Republic of Guinea Bissau.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Agreements on Financial Mechanisms for the period May 2021 – April 2028 (EEA: EU-Iceland-Lichtenstein-Norway; Norwegian: EU-Norway); Additional Protocols to EEC-Norway Agreement and to EEC-Iceland Agreement – P10_TA(2025)0052 – Wednesday, 2 April 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    (Consent)

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the draft Council decision (10005/2024),

    –  having regard to the draft Agreement between the European Union, Iceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein and the Kingdom of Norway on an EEA Financial Mechanism for the period May 2021–April 2028 (10057/2024),

    –  having regard to the draft Agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the European Union on a Norwegian Financial Mechanism for the period May 2021–April 2028 (10146/2024),

    –  having regard to the draft Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Norway (10149/2024),

    –  having regard to the draft Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and Iceland (10148/2024),

    –  having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 217 and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C10-0103/2024),

    –  having regard to Rule 107(1) and (4), and Rule 117(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on International Trade (A10-0036/2025),

    1.  Gives its consent to the conclusion of the agreements and protocols;

    2.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States, Iceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein and the Kingdom of Norway.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Guidelines for the 2026 budget – Section III – P10_TA(2025)0051 – Wednesday, 2 April 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to Article 314 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

    –  having regard to Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021-2027(1) and to the joint declaration agreed between Parliament, the Council and the Commission in this context(2) and the related unilateral declarations(3),

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2022/2496 of 15 December 2022 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(4),

    –  having regard to the Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(5) (MFF Revision),

    –  having regard to its position of 16 December 2020 on the draft Council regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(6),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2022 on upscaling the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework: a resilient EU budget fit for new challenges(7),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 3 October 2023 on the proposal for a mid-term revision of the multiannual financial framework 2021-2027(8),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 27 February 2024 on the draft Council regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(9),

    –  having regard to Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020 on the system of own resources of the European Union and repealing Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom(10),

    –  having regard to the Commission proposal of 22 December 2021 for a Council decision amending Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 on the system of own resources of the European Union (COM(2021)0570) and its position of 23 November 2022 on the proposal(11),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast)(12) (the Financial Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‘European Climate Law’)(13),

    –  having regard to the EU’s obligations under the Paris Agreement and its commitments under the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework,

    –  having regard to the EU gender equality strategy 2020-2025,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 10 May 2023 on the impact on the 2024 EU budget of increasing European Union Recovery Instrument borrowing costs(14),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(15),

    –  having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources(16),

    –  having regard to the Interinstitutional Proclamation on the European Pillar of Social Rights(17) of 13 December 2017,

    –  having regard to the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2025(18) and the joint statements agreed between Parliament, the Council and the Commission annexed hereto,

    –  having regard to Enrico Letta’s report entitled ‘Much more than a market’, presented in the European Parliament on 21 October 2024,

    –  having regard to Mario Draghi’s report entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’, presented in the European Parliament on 17 September 2024,

    –  having regard to Sauli Niinistö’s report entitled ‘Safer together – Strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness and readiness’, presented in the European Parliament on 14 November 2024,

    –  having regard to the presentation of the EU Competitiveness Compass by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on 29 January 2025,

    –  having regard to the joint white paper of 19 March 2025 for European Defence Readiness providing a framework for the ReArm Europe plan (JOIN(2025)0120),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

    –  having regard to the proposal of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2025 amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements (COM(2025)0084),

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions of 18 February 2025 on the budget guidelines for 2026,

    –  having regard to Rule 95 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Regional Development and the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

    –  having regard to the letters from the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, the Committee on Culture and Education and the Committee on Constitutional Affairs,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A10-0042/2025),

    Budget 2026: building a resilient, sustainable and prosperous future for Europe

    1.  Highlights the anticipated economic growth projected for 2025 and 2026 within the EU(19), accompanied by an easing of inflation; notes nonetheless the uncertainties stemming from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which directly threatens the security of the EU, and the worsening effects of climate change and the biodiversity crisis, also manifested in the increasing frequency and intensity of natural disasters, which are compounded by new significant geopolitical changes and a deteriorating international rules-based order, heightened security threats and a rise in global protectionism; emphasises that, in such an increasingly volatile landscape, it is imperative for the EU to enhance its defence and security capabilities, social, economic and territorial cohesion and political and strategic autonomy, decrease its dependence, increase its competitiveness and ensure a prosperous future for the continent and its people, who are currently facing an increasingly high cost of living;

    2.  Is determined to ensure that the 2026 budget, by focusing on strategic preparedness and security, economic competitiveness and resilience, sustainability, climate, as well as strengthening the single market, provides the people in the EU with a robust ecosystem and delivers on their priorities, thus reinforcing a socially just and prosperous Europe; underlines the need for additional investment in security and defence, research, innovation, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), health, energy, migration, as well as land and maritime border protection, inclusive digital and green transitions, job creation, and the provision of opportunities for young people; insists that this be accompanied by administrative simplification, as indicated in the Competitiveness Compass; insists that the EU budget is the largest investment instrument with leverage effect, complementing national budgets and therefore enabling the EU to navigate the complexities of a rapidly changing world while ensuring prosperity, social cohesion and stability for its people; is strongly of the opinion that the EU should use this leverage effect to the maximum degree to boost the Union’s objectives and policymaking, as well as private investment;

    Investing in a solid, sustainable and resilient economy

    3.  Is adamant that sound economic resilience and sustainability can be achieved in the EU by boosting public and private investment, increasing innovation and supporting competitiveness, including by addressing the skills gap and fostering more industrial production in Europe as a source for robust economic growth and quality jobs, and thereby guaranteeing the Union’s strategic autonomy, ensuring that the EU remains agile and self-reliant in the face of global challenges, disruptions and volatility; highlights the need to promote innovation, prioritise education, reduce costs and the administrative burden, and strengthen the single market, particularly as regards services;

    4.  Reaffirms, in this regard, that research and innovation remain crucial for the EU’s success in cutting-edge industries and new clean and sustainable technologies; recalls the long-standing goal of increasing research and innovation investment to 3 % of gross domestic product (GDP); calls, therefore, for increased funding to be provided under Horizon Europe to fund at least 50 % of all excellent proposals in all scientific disciplines, enable researchers as well as companies, especially SMEs, to bring new developments to the market, and to scale up, ensure solid economic growth and boost the Union’s competitiveness in the global economy, thereby preventing actors from leaving for competing regions while also ensuring that Europe has the knowledge base it needs to pursue the Green Deal commitments;

    5.  Highlights the importance of targeted support in encouraging public-private partnerships and accessible and increased financing to support SMEs as the backbone of the European economy and a vector for pioneering innovation, emphasising the role of the European Innovation Council, InvestEU and the SME component of the single market programme in empowering start-ups and scale-ups of innovative companies, supporting them in their growth and contributing to a greater role for the EU economy on the global stage; expresses its concern that, according to the interim evaluation of InvestEU, envelopes for many financial products may run out by the end of 2025 without budgetary reinforcements; takes note of the Commission proposal in this regard; underlines, furthermore, the importance of the single market programme to leverage the full potential of the EU’s cross-border dimension;

    6.  Stresses that the modernisation of the economy will require blending public and private investment; emphasises, in this regard, the necessity of private investments to maximise the leverage effect of public spending; recalls that these efforts should lead to simplification and reduce the financial burden for the EU’s SMEs while maintaining EU standards;

    7.  Underscores the urgency of further accelerating the digital and green transitions as catalysts for a future-oriented and resource-efficient economy that remains attractive for innovative businesses and that is based on market-driven investments providing quality jobs and leaving no one behind; advocates substantial investment in forward-looking digital infrastructure, underpinned by well-regulated, human-centred and trustworthy artificial intelligence and cybersecurity; stresses the need to improve citizens’ basic digital skills to match the needs of companies and to equip citizens to counter disinformation; stresses, further, the need to increase the resilience of the Union’s democracy in fighting malign foreign interference;

    8.  Recognises the strategic value of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) and the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) for contributing to the economic, social and climate goals of the EU’s cross-border transport infrastructure; calls for network extensions, particularly towards candidate countries and the EU’s strategic partners, as regards the EU’s sustainable and smart mobility strategy and the complementarities between the TEN-T and the Trans-European Networks for Energy (TEN-E);

    A better-prepared Union, capable of effectively responding to crises

    9.  Underlines the need to enhance EU security and defence capabilities to create a genuine defence union and to better prepare for and respond to unprecedented geopolitical challenges and new hybrid security threats; stresses the essential role of common investment, research, production and procurement mechanisms, including in new disruptive technologies supporting an independent EU defence industry; considers that there is an EU added value in security and defence cooperation that not only makes Europe and its people safer but also leads to greater efficiency, potential savings, quality job creation and enhanced strategic autonomy; calls therefore for immediate upscaling and much better coordination of defence spending by Member States; stresses in particular the need to provide adequate resources to innovate and enhance Member States’ military capabilities, as well as their interoperability; takes note, in line with the Commission’s ‘ReArm Europe’ plan, of its call for the European Investment Bank (EIB) and other international financial institutions and private banks in Europe to invest more actively in the European defence industry while safeguarding their operations and financing capacity; recalls the importance of investing in and developing dual-use equipment and, particularly, of strengthening EU military mobility as regards funding dual-use transport infrastructure along priority axes; calls on the Commission to assess the possibility of using calls for this purpose under the CEF transport programme, in the light of the military mobility funding gap; underlines the urgent need to strengthen the EU’s cybersecurity capabilities to fight hybrid warfare;

    10.  Recalls the role of the EU’s space programme in enhancing the strategic security of the Union through a variety of civil and military applications; underlines that a strong European space sector is fundamental for European security, open strategic autonomy, secure connectivity, the protection of critical infrastructure and advancing the twin green and digital transitions, and therefore requires sufficient resources;

    11.  Highlights, in the face of new challenges in internal and external security, the importance of ensuring proper implementation of the Asylum and Migration Pact, in full compliance with international human rights law, and of respecting the principles of solidarity and the fair sharing of responsibility; stresses that effective management and protection of the EU’s external borders, inland, air and maritime, are essential for maintaining the freedoms of the Schengen area and crucial for the security of the EU and its citizens; emphasises the need to better protect people by preventing trafficking and enhance support to strengthen cross-border cooperation between the Member States and the Union in combating terrorism, organised crime, drug trafficking and criminal networks, particularly those involved in migrant smuggling and human trafficking, so as to reinforce law enforcement and the judicial response to these criminal networks, as well as to support Member States facing hybrid threats, in particular the instrumentalisation of migrants on the Union’s borders as defined in the Crisis Regulation(20);

    12.  Expresses its deep concern over the fact that the Commission has funded or co-financed campaigns promoting the wearing of the veil, asserting, for example, that ‘freedom is in the hijab’; emphasises that the Union’s budget must no longer finance future campaigns that directly or indirectly promote the wearing of the veil;

    13.  Recalls the vital role that the Integrated Border Management Fund, the Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI) and the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund play in protecting external borders; calls, in addition, for adequate funding for border protection capabilities as an essential part of a comprehensive migration policy, including physical infrastructure, buildings, equipment, systems and services required at border crossing points, as provided for in Annex III to the BMVI Regulation(21), and for the requirements to be met in terms of reception conditions, integration, return and readmission procedure; reaffirms that cooperation agreements on migration and asylum management with non-EU countries in full respect of international law can help to prevent and counter irregular migration and strengthen border security;

    14.  Acknowledges the common agricultural policy (CAP) as a key strategic European policy for food security and greater EU autonomy in affordable and high-quality food production; stresses the crucial role of the CAP in ensuring a decent income for EU farmers as well as a productive, competitive and sustainable European agriculture; regrets that direct payments have significantly decreased in real terms due to inflation, while the administrative burden on farmers has increased due to the accumulation of bureaucracy; urges the Commission to reduce the administrative burden while maintaining high production standards and the requirement to implement EU legislation; calls for adequate resources and for direct payments to be protected to help farmers cope with the impact of inflation, fuel costs, changes in the global food and trade market and adverse climate events, affecting agricultural production and threatening food security, including in the outermost regions; highlights, in this regard, the role of the agricultural reserve; emphasises the need to help small and medium-sized farms and new and young farmers by supporting generational renewal and ensuring continued support for the promotion of EU agricultural products; underlines the need for appropriate support for research and innovation to make the agricultural sector more sustainable, including water management, in particular through the Horizon Europe programme, without reducing European agricultural production and while preventing European farmers from facing unfair competition from imported products that do not meet our standards; welcomes the Commission’s preparation of a second simplification package; underscores that food security is an essential component for geopolitical stability;

    15.  Stresses the strategic role of fisheries and aquaculture and the need for them to be adequately supported financially; acknowledges that the common fisheries policy ensures a stable income and long-term future for fishers by contributing to protecting sustainable marine ecosystems, which are key to the sector’s competitiveness; insists that special attention must be devoted to the EU’s fishing fleet in order to improve safety and security, including by combating illegal fishery actions and improving working conditions, energy efficiency and sustainability, as well as by renewing the fleet; reaffirms that the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund should support a human resources policy capable of addressing future challenges, in order to promote an inclusive, diversified and sustainable blue economy; expresses its concern about the effect of the end of the Brexit transition period in June 2026 on the fishing and aquaculture sectors;

    16.  Points out that, at the end of 2023, around 20 million children were at risk of poverty or social exclusion, which is roughly one quarter of all children in the EU; believes, therefore, that the EU’s budget needs to step up efforts to combat poverty among children, including migrant children, children with disabilities and children living in precarious family situations, in accordance with the European Child Guarantee; reiterates its earlier calls for the ESF+ envelope to include a specific and significant budget for fighting child poverty;

    17.  Stresses that enhancing energy security and independence remains fundamental for the EU; highlights the EU’s role in ensuring security of energy supply, assisting households, farmers and businesses in mitigating price volatility and managing price gaps in comparison to the rest of the world; calls, therefore, for additional investment in critical infrastructure and connectivity, including large-scale cross-border electricity grids and hydrogen infrastructure for hard-to-abate sectors, which are an essential prerequisite to the decarbonisation of European industry, in low-carbon and renewable energy sources and connectivity, in particular by properly funding the CEF, as well as in energy efficiency; highlights the need to adapt European infrastructure to meet future energy demands as part of the transition to a clean and modern economy; underlines the importance of investing in new, expanding and modernising interconnector capacity for electricity trading, in particular cross-border capacity, for a fully integrated EU energy market that enhances Europe’s diversified supply security and resilience to energy market disruptions, reducing external dependencies and ultimately ensuring affordable and sustainable energy for EU citizens and businesses; stresses, in this regard, the need to strengthen cooperation with Africa;

    18.  Recalls, in this context, the current housing crisis in Europe, including the lack of decent and affordable housing; calls, therefore, for swift additional investments through a combination of funding sources, including the EIB and national promotional banks, in areas with a positive impact on reducing the cost of living for households, improving the energy efficiency of buildings and deploying renewable energy sources; calls for a coordinated approach at EU level that respects the principle of subsidiarity, encourages best practices and effectively uses all relevant funding mechanisms in addressing this pressing challenge;

    19.  Is highly concerned by the strong impacts of climate change and the biodiversity crisis both in Europe and globally and by the fact that the year 2024 was assessed to be the planet’s warmest year on record; calls for sufficient funding for the LIFE programme to finance climate and environment-related projects, including in the area of climate change mitigation and adaptation, and for increased budgetary flexibility to adequately respond to natural disasters in the EU; regrets that increasing numbers of natural disasters have led to a high number of victims, as well as to long-term devastating effects on citizens, farmers and businesses based and working in the regions concerned, as well as in the ecosystems impacted; calls for increased funding for the EU Solidarity Fund, RESTORE (Regional Emergency Support to Reconstruction) and the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, including for increasing rescEU capacities, which allow for more cost-efficient capacity building, in order to support Member States quickly and effectively in overwhelming crisis situations; recognises the EU’s role as a hub for coordinating and improving Member States’ preparedness and capacities to respond immediately to large-scale, high-impact emergencies, and its added value both for Member States and citizens; stresses, in this regard, that the EU Civil Protection Mechanism is a tangible expression of European solidarity, reinforcing the EU’s role as a crisis responder; acknowledges that the European Union Solidarity Fund or any other fund alone cannot fully compensate for the extreme weather events of increased frequency and severity caused by climate change today and in the future; stresses the need to invest in and prioritise preparedness, prevention, and adaptation measures, prioritising nature-based solutions; stresses that it is crucial to ensure that Union spending contributes to climate mitigation, adaptation efforts and water resilience infrastructure; emphasises that these investments are far lower than the cost of climate inaction;

    Enhancing citizens’ opportunities in a vibrant society

    20.  Insists that continued investment in EU4Health and Cluster Health in Horizon Europe are key to improving health and preparedness for future health crises, thereby improving the health status of EU citizens; stresses the need for health investments for maximum impact; highlights its support for a holistic regulatory and funding approach to Europe’s life sciences and biotech ecosystem, including the creation of cutting-edge European clusters of excellence, as a central pillar of a stronger European health union, to which a European plan for cardiovascular diseases and lifestyles should be added, focusing on primary and secondary prevention as key objectives to increase life expectancy in the EU; highlights the need to create a more supportive care system to respond to demographic challenges and the ageing population; reiterates its support for Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan, as well as the importance of European investment in tackling childhood diseases, rare diseases and antimicrobial resistance; reiterates the importance of the gender aspect of health, including sexual and reproductive health and access to services; is highly concerned by the current mental health crisis in Europe, affecting in particular the young generation, exacerbated by recent global events, which requires immediate action to be taken; underlines the need to prevent shortages of critical medicines, medical countermeasures and healthcare workers faced by some Member States; calls, in this respect, for better coordination at EU level and joint procurement of medicines in order to reduce costs;

    21.  Stresses the importance of investing in young generations and their skills, as major agents of change and progress, by ensuring access to quality education; considers it essential that all students, without discrimination and in every EU Member State, should have full access to the Erasmus+ programme and underlines the essential role of Erasmus+ in facilitating cultural exchange, strengthening European identity and promoting peace through mutual understanding and cooperation, making it a cornerstone of European integration and unity; recalls the need to tackle the skills deficit, the brain drain and the correlation between market needs and skills; considers that for the EU workforce to remain competitive in the future, establishing key areas for training and reskilling is needed; stresses that further investment is required in modernising the Union’s education systems, by equipping them for the digital and green transitions, creating talent booster schemes and incentivising young entrepreneurs; points, in this respect, to the relevance of sufficient financial resources for EU programmes such as the European Social Fund Plus, Erasmus+ and the EU Solidarity Corps, which have proven highly effective in helping to achieve high employment levels and fair social protection, in broadening education and training across the Union, as well as in promoting new job opportunities and fostering skills, youth participation and equal opportunities for all; calls on the Commission to do its utmost so that all university students remain eligible to participate in the Erasmus+ programme, including in Hungary;

    22.  Recalls that families are the main pillar that supports the burden of social expenditure in the EU, especially those with children in their care; notes, at the same time, that families are also those who are suffering the most and enduring the consequences of the successive economic crises that we have suffered over the last 15 years; stresses, for all these reasons, that they must be the subject of special attention in the relevant aspects of the EU budget and of the European Pillar of Social Rights priorities;

    23.  Recalls the role of the EU budget in contributing to the objectives of the European Pillar of Social Rights; highlights the role of the EU budget in contributing to initiatives that reinforce social dialogue and facilitate labour mobility, including in the form of training, networking and capacity building;

    24.  Highlights the ever-increasing threats and dangers of organised and targeted disinformation campaigns against the EU by foreign stakeholders undermining European democracy; calls for the mobilisation of all relevant Union programmes, including Creative Europe, to fund actions in 2026 that promote inclusive digital and media literacy, in particular for young people, combating disinformation, countering online hate speech and extremist content, while encouraging active participation of citizens in democratic processes and safeguarding media freedom and pluralism for good cultural resilience, all of which are fundamental to a thriving democracy; deplores the recent decisions by the US administration to cut funding to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America and calls on the Commission and the Member States to explore all the possible options to provide further funding to these media outlets in the light of these developments;

    25.  Calls on the Commission to increase EU funding for protecting citizens of all religions and public spaces against terrorist threats, combating radicalisation and terrorist content online, as well as countering hate speech and rising antisemitism, anti-Christian hatred, anti-Muslim hatred and racism;

    26.  Regrets the increasing number of hate crimes directed against Christians and other religious communities; recalls that Christians are the most persecuted religious community in the world; further urges the Commission to dedicate funding to prevent the targeting of religious communities, and in particular Christian and Jewish communities, which have been targeted in Europe in recent months; urges the Commission to prioritise the protection of citizens and all religious communities and to support the combating of terrorist threats, particularly focusing on radicalisation and terrorist content online;

    27.  Calls on the Commission to ensure the swift, full and proper implementation and robust enforcement of the Digital Services Act(22), the Digital Market Act(23) and the Artificial Intelligence Act(24), also by allocating sufficient human resources; stresses the importance of tackling foreign interference, addressing the dangers of biased algorithms, and safeguarding transparency, accountability and the integrity of the digital public space;

    28.  Underlines the added value of funding programmes in the areas of democracy, rights and values; recalls the important role that the EU budget plays in the promotion of the European values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union and in supporting the key principles of democracy, the rule of law, solidarity, inclusiveness, justice, non-discrimination and equality, including gender equality; reaffirms, furthermore, the essential role of the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme in promoting European values and citizens’ rights, in particular its Union Values strand, as well as gender equality, thereby sustaining and further developing an open, rights-based, democratic, equal and inclusive society based on the rule of law; stresses the need for targeted measures to address gender disparities and promote equal opportunities through EU funding allocations; stresses that supporting investigative journalism with sufficient resources is a strategic investment in democracy, transparency and social justice; reiterates the importance of the Daphne and Equality and Rights programmes, and stresses that necessary resources should be devoted to combating discrimination in all its forms, as well as tackling forms of violence;

    29.  Emphasises the valuable work carried out under the Union Values strand, which provides, among other things, direct funding to civil society organisations as key actors in vibrant democracies; stresses that citizens and civil society organisations, promoting the will and interest of citizens, represent the core of European democracy; underlines, in this regard, the importance of all EU programmes and increased funding in supporting the genuine engagement of civil society, particularly in the context of the impact of reduced funding for civil society by the EU’s international partners;

    30.  Calls for the full and urgent implementation of the Agreement establishing an interinstitutional body for ethical standards for members of institutions and advisory bodies referred to in Article 13 of the Treaty on European Union; believes that the Huawei corruption scandal adds special urgency to starting the work of the body without delay; commits to providing the necessary financial and human resources to allow the body to fulfil its mandate and implement its tasks properly;

    31.  Considers it essential for the Union’s stability and progress and its citizens’ trust to ensure the proper use of Union funds and to take all steps towards protecting the Union’s financial interests, in particular by applying the rule of law conditionality; underscores the undeniable connection between respect for the rule of law and efficient implementation of the Union’s budget in accordance with the principles of sound financial management under the Financial Regulation; reiterates that under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation(25), the imposition of appropriate measures must not affect the obligations of governments to implement the programme or fund affected by the measure, and in particular the obligations they have towards final recipients; insists, therefore, that in cases of breaches of the rule of law by national governments, the Commission should explore alternative ways to implement the budget, including by assessing the possibility of diverting sources to directly and indirectly managed programmes, in order to ensure that local and regional authorities, civil society and other beneficiaries can continue to benefit from Union funding, without weakening the application of the regulation; highlights the role of the European Court of Auditors and its constant activity in defence of transparency, accountability and strict compliance with the regulations on all of the funds and programmes;

    A strong Union in a changing world

    32.  Observes that the need for the EU to maintain and augment its presence on the global stage is increasingly crucial amid escalating global conflicts, geopolitical shifts and foreign influence efforts worldwide, particularly considering developments with other major global providers of aid; stresses that in order to achieve this, the Union requires sufficient funding and resources to act, including to respond to major crises in its neighbourhood and throughout the world, in particular in the light of the sudden decrease in international funding; stresses the importance of the humanitarian aid programme and regrets that resources are not increasing in line with record-high needs; underscores the need to strengthen the EU’s role as a leading humanitarian actor while effectively addressing emerging crises, particularly in regions facing protracted conflict, displacement, food insecurity and natural disasters; emphasises that the Union also requires sufficient resources for long-term investments in building global partnerships, and points out the importance of the participation of non-EU countries in Union programmes, where appropriate;

    33.  Underlines that the EU’s security environment has changed dramatically following Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine and unpredictable changes in the policies of its main allies; recalls the importance of enhancing citizens’ safety and of achieving efficiency in the area of defence and strategic autonomy, through a comprehensive approach to security that covers military and civilian capabilities, external relations and internal security; stresses the importance of the Internal Security Fund to ensure funding to tackle increased levels of serious organised crime with a cross-border dimension and cybercrime; recognises the pressure which increased defence spending represents for Member Sates’ national budgets; stresses the importance of Member States stepping up their efforts and increasing funding for their defence capabilities, in a consistent and complementary manner in line with the NATO guideline;

    34.  Stresses that, beyond the enormous sacrifices of the people of Ukraine in withstanding Russia’s war of aggression for our common European security, this war has also had substantial economic and social consequences for people throughout Europe; recalls that certain Member States, in particular those with a land border with Russia and/or Belarus in the Baltic region, and frontline Member States, as well as vulnerable sectors of the economy, remain particularly exposed to the consequences of the war and deserve support in areas such as agriculture, infrastructure and military mobility, in the spirit of EU solidarity;

    35.  Firmly reiterates its unconditional and full support for Ukraine in its fight for its freedom and democracy against Russian aggression, as the war on its soil has passed the three-year mark; underlines the ongoing need for high levels of funding, including in humanitarian aid and for repairs to critical infrastructure, and for improved capacity along the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes; welcomes the renewed and reinforced intention of the Commission and Member States to work in a united way to address Ukraine’s pressing defence needs and to further support the Ukrainian economy by providing regular and predictable financial support and facilitating investment opportunities; welcomes the agreement with the Council on macro-financial assistance for Ukraine of up to EUR 35 billion, making use of the proceeds of frozen Russian assets through the new Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism, in order to support Ukraine’s recovery, reconstruction and modernisation, as well as to foster Ukraine’s progress on its path to EU accession; stresses the importance of ensuring accountability regarding core international crimes;

    36.  Insists on the benefits of pre-accession funds, both for the enlargement countries and for the EU itself, as the funding creates more stability in the region; welcomes the implementation of the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans to further support the economic convergence of Western Balkan countries with the EU’s single market through investment and growth in the region; insists on the need to deploy the necessary funds to support Moldova’s accession process, in line with the EU’s commitment to enlargement and regional stability; underlines the role of the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova and highlights the necessity of securing sufficient financial resources for its full implementation; underlines the importance of sustained support for candidate countries in implementing the necessary accession-related reforms, in particular regarding the rule of law, anti-corruption and democracy and in enhancing their resilience and preventing and countering hybrid threats; calls on the Commission to allocate additional funding to support civil society, independent media organisations and journalists;

    37.  Underlines, furthermore, that EU neighbourhood policy, namely its Eastern and Southern Partnerships, contributes to the overall goal of increasing the stability, prosperity and resilience of the EU’s neighbours and thereby of increasing the security of our continent; stresses, therefore, the importance of reinforcing the Southern and Eastern Neighbourhood budget lines in order to support political, economic and social reforms in the regions, facilitate peace processes and reconstruction and provide assistance to refugees, in particular through continuous, reinforced and predictable funding and continuous implementation on the ground; recalls that the EU must continue to alleviate other crises and assist the most vulnerable populations around the world through its humanitarian aid programme, as well as by maintaining its global positioning with the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument for supporting global challenges and promoting human rights, freedoms and democracy, as well as for the capacity building of civil society organisations and for delivering on the Union’s international climate and biodiversity commitments, within a comprehensive monitoring and control system;

    Cross-cutting issues in the 2026 budget

    38.  Underlines that the repayment of the European Union Recovery Instrument (EURI) borrowing costs is a legal obligation for the EU and therefore non-discretionary; notes that borrowing costs depend on the pace of disbursements under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) as well as on market fluctuations in bond yields and are therefore inherently partly unpredictable and volatile; insists, therefore, on the need for the Commission to provide reliable, timely and accurate information on NextGenerationEU (NGEU) borrowing costs and on expected RRF disbursements throughout the budgetary procedure as well as on available decommitments; expects the Commission to update the decommitments forecast when it presents the draft budget; recalls that the three institutions agreed that expenditures covering the financing costs of NGEU must aim at not reducing EU programmes and funds;

    39.  Recalls its support for the amended Commission proposals for the introduction of new own resources; is highly concerned by the complete lack of progress on the new own resources in the Council, in particular in view of increasing investment and unforeseen needs; considers that the introduction of new own resources, in line with the roadmap in the interinstitutional agreement of 2020, is essential to cover NGEU borrowing costs while shielding the margins and flexibility mechanisms necessary to cater for these needs;

    40.  Highlights again Parliament’s full support for the cohesion policy and its key role in delivering on the EU’s policy priorities and its general growth; reiterates that the cohesion policy’s optimal added value for citizens depends on its effective and timely implementation; in the same vein, urges the Member States and the Commission to accelerate the implementation of operational programmes under shared management funds as well as of the recovery and resilience plans so as to ensure swift budgetary execution and to avoid accumulated payment backlogs in the two last years of the MFF period, in particular through additional capacity building and technical assistance for Member States; reaffirms the imperative of a robust and transparent mechanism for accurately monitoring disbursements to beneficiaries;

    41.  Notes that particular attention must be paid to rural and remote areas, areas affected by industrial transition and regions which suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps, such as islands and outermost, cross-border and mountain regions and all those affected by natural disasters; stresses that these regions should benefit from adequate funding to offset the special characteristics and constraints of their structural social and economic situation, as referred to in Article 349 TFEU; stresses the vital importance of the POSEI programme for maintaining agricultural activity in the outermost regions and bringing food to local markets; calls for the programme budget to be increased to reflect the real needs of farmers in these regions; notes that there has been no such increase since 2013, despite the fact that farmers in these regions face higher production costs due to inflation and climate change; stresses also that the Overseas Countries and Territories associated with the EU, as referred to in Articles 198-204 TFEU, should benefit from adequate funding for their sustainable economic and social development, in the light of their geopolitical importance for global maritime trade routes and key partnerships such as those on sustainable raw materials value chains;

    42.  Reiterates that EU programmes, policies and activities, where relevant, should be implemented in such a way that promotes gender equality in the delivery of their objectives; welcomes the Commission’s work on developing gender mainstreaming in order to meaningfully measure the gender impact of Union spending, as set out in the interinstitutional agreement;

    43.  Takes note that the climate mainstreaming target of 30 % is projected to be met by 33,5 % in 2025, while the biodiversity target will be below 8,5 % in 2025, and unless dedicated action is undertaken the 10 % target will not be met in 2026; stresses the need for continuous efforts towards the achievement of the climate and biodiversity mainstreaming targets laid down in the interinstitutional agreement in the Union budget and the EURI expenditures;

    44.  Stresses that the 2026 Union budget should be aligned with the Union’s ambitions of making the Union climate neutral by 2050 at the latest, as well as the Union’s international commitments, in particular under the Paris Agreement and the Kunming-Montreal Agreement, and should significantly contribute to the implementation of the European Green Deal and the 2030 biodiversity strategy;

    45.  Recalls that effective programme implementation is achievable only with the backing of a committed administration; emphasises the essential work carried out by bodies and decentralised agencies and asserts that they must be properly staffed and sufficiently resourced, while taking into account inflation, so that they can fulfil their responsibilities effectively and contribute to the achievement of the Union political priorities, also when given new tasks and mandates;

    46.  Recalls that, in accordance with the Financial Regulation, when implementing the budget, Member States and the Commission must ensure compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and respect the Union’s values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; underlines in particular Articles 137, 138 and 158 of the Financial Regulation and recalls the Commission and the Member States’ obligation to exclude from Union funds any persons or entities found guilty by a final judgment of terrorist offences, as well as by final judgments of terrorist activities, inciting, aiding, abetting or attempting to commit such offences, and corruption or other serious offences; highlights the need to leverage efforts in tackling fraud both at Union and Member State level and to this end ensure appropriate financial and human resources covering the Union’s full anti-fraud architecture; recalls the importance of providing the Union Anti-Fraud Programme with sufficient financial resources;

    47.  Underlines the importance of effective communication and the visibility of EU policies and programmes in raising awareness of the added value that the EU brings to citizens, businesses and partners;

    o
    o   o

    48.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors.

    (1) OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 11, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2093/oj.
    (2) OJ C 444 I, 22.12.2020, p. 4.
    (3) OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 252.
    (4) OJ L 325, 20.12.2022, p. 11, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2496/oj.
    (5) OJ L, 2024/765, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/765/oj.
    (6) OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 240.
    (7) OJ C 177, 17.5.2023, p. 115.
    (8) OJ C, C/2024/1195, 23.02.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/1195/oj.
    (9) OJ C, C/2024/6751, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6751/oj.
    (10) OJ L 424, 15.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2020/2053/oj.
    (11) OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 162.
    (12) OJ L 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (13) OJ L 243, 9.7.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1119/oj.
    (14) OJ C, C/2023/1084, 15.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1084/oj.
    (15) OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj.
    (16) OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 28, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_interinstit/2020/1222/oj.
    (17) OJ C, 2017/428, 13.12.2017, p. 10.
    (18) OJ L, 2025/31, 27.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/budget/2025/31/oj.
    (19) European Commission: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European economic forecast – Autumn 2024, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.
    (20) Regulation (EU) 2024/1359 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 addressing situations of crisis and force majeure in the field of migration and asylum and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1147 (OJ L, 2024/1359, 22.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1359/oj).
    (21) Regulation (EU) 2021/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing, as part of the Integrated Border Management Fund, the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (OJ L 251, 15.7.2021, p. 48, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1148/oj).
    (22) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).
    (23) Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj).
    (24) Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj).
    (25) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – EoVs with Polish Presidency, EVP Henna Virkkunen, the Commission and WIPO – Committee on Legal Affairs

    Source: European Parliament

    Logo of the Polish presidency of the Council of the EU © European Union (2025)

    At the meeting of 9 April 2025, the JURI Committee will hold and exchange of views with the Minister of Justice Adam Bodnar concerning the priorities of the Polish Presidency and with Executive Vice-President for Tech Sovereignty, Security and Democracy Henna Virkkunen. JURI Members will also consider the draft report on Harmonising certain aspects of insolvency law (2022/0408(COD).

    Additionally, there will be a reporting back to the committee pursuant to Rule 75(3) RoP on the negotiations of the dossier on Compulsory licensing for crisis management and amending Regulation (EC) 816/2006 (2023/0129(COD) as well as a reporting back on the mission of a JURI delegation to the EUIPO that took place on February 2025. Memebers will also hold and exchange of views with the Commission on the Recommendations on measures to combat counterfeiting and enhance the enforcement of intellectual property rights and on combating online piracy of sports and other live events, followed by an exchange of views with the Director General of the World Intellectual Property Organisation, Mr Daren Tang.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – Gender Equality Strategy 2025 – Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality

    Source: European Parliament

    On Thursday, 10 April 2025, the FEMM Committee will consider a draft opinion on the Gender Equality Strategy 2025.

    The FEMM rapporteur Marko Vešligaj will present his draft report on the Gender Equality Strategy 2025, where he calls on the Commission to present an ambitious strategy with concrete tangible legislative and non-legislative measures in a number of key areas, such as gender-based violence, women’s empowerment in the world of work, or equal representation and political participation. The draft report also calls for efforts to advance gender equality through the principles of intersectionality and gender mainstreaming, and to ensure that a gender perspective is integrated into all Commission proposals, including budgetary procedures.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Phlegraean Fields: Europe cannot just wait around for the next disaster – P-001320/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-001320/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Valentina Palmisano (The Left), Danilo Della Valle (The Left), Mario Furore (The Left), Dario Tamburrano (The Left), Pasquale Tridico (The Left)

    Over the last few days, the Phlegraean Fields area in Campania has been hit by strong seismic activity related to bradyseism. Reaching a magnitude of up to 4.4, the tremors have caused damage and great public concern. One of the world’s most dangerous volcanic zones, this area poses a major threat, which calls for a structured response – rather than just emergency measures – from Europe.

    Seismic and volcanic risk management in the EU still appears to be far too emergency-focused. Coordinated long-term policies are needed to boost communities’ resilience and secure the building stock. There is an urgent need for greater European support for prevention, planning and urban regeneration in these areas.

    In light of the above, can the Commission answer the following:

    • 1.Does it intend to allocate resources from the European Union Solidarity Fund or other instruments to seismic prevention measures and structural adjustments in the Phlegraean Fields and other high-risk areas?
    • 2.Are there plans to adopt European guidelines on urban regeneration in seismic areas, which would recommend resilient buildings and a lower housing density?
    • 3.Has the Italian Government asked to activate the EU civil protection mechanism? Does the Commission think it would be a good idea to encourage the use of this mechanism to support the authorities in emergency management and prevention?

    Submitted: 31.3.2025

    Last updated: 4 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Poland’s security in the context of European defence – P-001348/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-001348/2025
    to the Council
    Rule 144
    Marlena Maląg (ECR)

    Point 23 of the European Council conclusions of 20 March 2025 stresses ‘the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States, and takes into account the security and defence interests of all Member States, in accordance with the Treaties’.

    In addition, the European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2025 on the White Paper on the future of European defence, in paragraph 66, calls for ‘the creation of a council of defence ministers and for the move from unanimity to qualified majority voting for decisions in the European Council, the Council of Ministers and EU agencies’.

    There is a good deal of controversy around the issue of how the EU institutions will interpret these provisions. Given the attitude of Western European countries which, despite the calls from the countries of my region in the period before Russia’s full-scale aggression, continued to pursue their interests with the Russian Federation, I would like to ask the following:

    • 1.How does the Council intend to address Parliament’s call to move away from the unanimity requirement, and will Member States at particular risk, such as Poland, be free to make decisions on their security and on the use of their national armed force?
    • 2.How will the Council approach a situation where Western European countries take a different stance to the countries that face a direct threat?
    • 3.What action does the Council intend to take to minimise any potential threats to the interests of Poland and other countries bordering the aggressor?

    Submitted: 2.4.2025

    Last updated: 4 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Managing climate emergencies and supporting people affected by floods in Emilia-Romagna – E-001237/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001237/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Stefano Cavedagna (ECR)

    The Emilia-Romagna Region’s 2013 Flood Risk Management Plan already reported a number of problems, including fragile banks and excessive vegetation in embanked lowland watercourses.

    Article 10 of Directive 2007/60/EC requires the public to be informed of the risk of flooding, and Italian Legislative Decree 2010 No 49 – which transposes the aforementioned Directive in Italy – assigns the management of the alert system to the regions. The Emilia-Romagna Region does not seem to have acted on this ahead of the floods of May 2023 and September 2024, thus preventing effective preventive measures from being taken.

    Satellite images from April 2023 show the region’s rivers in a state of severe neglect, lacking maintenance and at high risk of flooding.

    In the light of the above:

    • 1.Could the Commission check whether the Emilia-Romagna Region has complied with Directive 2007/60/EC, particularly in managing flood risk on the Lamone river and on the rivers Idice, Sillaro, Ravone, Ronco, Bidente, Savio, Santerno, Senio, Savena, Marecchia and Montone?
    • 2.Could the Commission request clarification on the failure to maintain rivers and the alleged failure to inform and involve the public, by ensuring transparency on the steps taken?
    • 3.Could the Commission call for urgent action, such as the removal of vegetation in problematic stretches of rivers, the strengthening of banks, and the continuous monitoring and remediation of porcupine and coypu burrows to prevent future floods?

    Submitted: 25.3.2025

    Last updated: 4 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Waste water management and use of NRRP funds in the province of Caltanissetta: investigation into water treatment failures and suspicious financial flows – E-001303/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001303/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Giuseppe Antoci (The Left)

    The investigation into Caltaqua – the water company for the province of Caltanissetta – and its Spanish parent company Aqualia has raised serious concerns about waste water management and suspicious financial transactions involving unexplained money flows[1].

    Tests carried out by ARPA[2] found high levels of pollution, indicating almost direct discharges into water bodies.

    This goes hand in hand with the worrying lack of proper authorisation for many waste water treatment plants, with only 17.5 % operating legally.

    Recently, Sicily was granted admission to national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP) funding for 19 projects, including significant funding of EUR 21.5 million for operations directly managed by the Assemblea Territoriale Idrica ATI Caltanissetta – the municipal body that manages water resources. However, there are concerns about how efficiently these funds are used and about the need for stronger EU supervision to ensure transparent and efficient use of resources.

    In light of the above:

    • 1.What steps does the Commission intend to take, given the continuing poor management of the sewerage and waste water treatment system by Caltaqua/Aqualia and the ongoing adverse effects on environmental resources since 2006?
    • 2.What does the Commission make of the results from Italy’s Special Commission for Waste Water Treatment, given that the four EU infringement procedures concerning the collection and treatment of waste water are still ongoing?
    • 3.Does the Commission intend to check with the competent authorities whether the NRRP funds allocated to waste water management in Sicily have been properly used?

    Submitted: 27.3.2025

    • [1] https://meridionews.it/indagine-acqua-caltanissetta-depuratori/.
    • [2] Caltanissetta’s regional environmental protection agency.
    Last updated: 4 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – Joint SANT-FEMM hearing on Chemical Submission – Committee on Public Health

    Source: European Parliament

    Joint FEMM-SANT hearing © Image used under the licence of Adobe Stock

    On Wednesday, 9 April 2025, the SANT Committee jointly with the FEMM Committee will hold a hearing on “Hearing on Chemical Submission: non-consensual administration of psychoactive substances“.

    The hearing aims to shed light on the widespread phenomenon of chemical submission, emphasizing that it extends beyond bars and nightclubs and can occur in various social settings, including within families, friendships, and professional circles. Chemical submission poses serious risks to a victim’s (sexual) autonomy, safety, and well-being. While anyone can be affected, women are disproportionately targeted, particularly in cases of sexual violence.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – Chemical Submission: non-consensual administration of psychoactive substances – Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality

    Source: European Parliament

    On Wednesday, 9 April 2025, the FEMM Committee jointly with the Committee on Public Health will hold a hearing on “Hearing on Chemical Submission: non-consensual administration of psychoactive substances“.

    The hearing aims to shed light on the widespread phenomenon of chemical submission, emphasizing that it extends beyond bars and nightclubs and can occur in various social settings, including within families, friendships, and professional circles. Chemical submission poses serious risks to a victim’s (sexual) autonomy, safety, and well-being. While anyone can be affected, women are disproportionately targeted, particularly in cases of sexual violence.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Principles of solidarity and proportionality in the distribution of unaccompanied migrant children in Spain – E-001241/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001241/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Dolors Montserrat (PPE), Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez (PPE)

    According to the recent agreement between the Spanish Government and the Junts party, Catalonia (eight million inhabitants, governed by the Socialist Party) will only receive 20 to 30 of the 4 000 unaccompanied migrant children currently in the Canary Islands, while Madrid (seven million inhabitants, governed by the PP) and Andalusia (eight million, governed by PP) will have to receive more than 700. These figures show that this distribution is based on political criteria, rather than on principles of solidarity and proportionality, and raises doubts as to its compatibility with EU values and regulations in the field of asylum and child protection.

    In light of the above:

    • 1.Does the Commission consider that this agreement respects the principle of solidarity between regions and balance in migration management, as laid down in Article 80 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)?
    • 2.What measures will the Commission take to ensure that the relocation of migrant children in Spain is carried out in accordance with objective criteria, the capacity of the regions, and respect for the best interests of the children, as laid down in EU law and the Convention on the Rights of the Child?

    Submitted: 25.3.2025

    Last updated: 4 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Over half of all facial recognition deployments last year took place in areas with higher proportion of Black residents than London average

    Source: Mayor of London

    Over half of the 180 facial recognition deployments in London last year took place in areas with a higher proportion of Black residents than the city’s average.

    These areas include:

    • Thornton Heath, Croydon (40.1% Black population)
    • Northumberland Park, Haringey (36% Black population)
    • Deptford High Street, Lewisham (34% Black population)

    This highlights a troubling trend of disproportionate surveillance in communities already facing systemic inequalities and over-policing.

    In Croydon, an area of London with one of the highest proportion Black people, 128,518 faces were scanned for just 133 arrests. This means that over 120,000 people in Croydon were tracked by the police for no reason at all.

    Across London since 2020, nearly two-million people had their faces scanned, likely without even realising it, yet only 804 arrests were made – an arrest rate of just 0.04%.

    Between 2020 and 2024, there were 212 deployments of facial recognition technology, with 180 – nearly 85% – occurring in 2024 alone, showing that the Met has significantly accelerated its deployment of facial recognition technology over the past year.

    This raises significant concerns about over-surveillance, with hundreds of thousands of people being treated as potential criminals without the Met having to justify the need.

    This week the Met announced that they will permanently deploy live facial recognition cameras in Croydon, the first such permanent deployment in London.

    This decision marks a dangerous step toward normalising invasive surveillance technology, which is all the more concerning given the ongoing uncertainty about the implementation, regulation and transparency of facial recognition.

    Reacting to these new figures, Green Party London Assembly Member Zoë Garbett, said:

    “Facial recognition subjects everyone to constant surveillance, which goes against the democratic principle that you shouldn’t be monitored unless there’s a suspicion of wrongdoing.

    “The Met’s decision to roll out facial recognition in areas of London with higher Black populations reinforces the troubling assumption that certain communities, such as those in Croydon, Lewisham and Haringey, are more likely to be criminals.

    “How is it fair that you’re more likely to be surveilled simply because you do your shopping on Deptford High Street?

    “While people recognise more overt forms of discriminatory over policing, such as stop and search practices, facial recognition technology presents a new threat. Black Londoners are disproportionately surveilled, highlighting a growing racial disparity that often goes unnoticed.

    “The Met claims live facial recognition has been a success in London, but how is treating millions of Londoners as suspects be considered as a success? The arrest figures are low, and it’s really just subjecting us to surveillance without our knowledge, with Black Londoners being disproportionately targeted.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    April 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Caroline Russell AM on Silvertown Road Tunnel opening: £2 billion for a traffic nightmare with a cycle shuttle that misses the mark

    Source: Mayor of London

    After years of campaigning against the Silvertown Road Tunnel, Monday 7th April marks its official opening. With a hefty £2 billion price tag, the tunnel is set to worsen traffic and pollution in London, while failing to address the city’s pressing need for sustainable transport solutions.

    For nearly 25 years, Caroline Russell AM and other Green Party London Assembly Members have been tirelessly pushing London Mayors to scrap this traffic-inducing project.

    Instead of providing a dedicated crossing for people walking and cycling, the Mayor has introduced a cycle shuttle bus – a service that Caroline Russell AM has described as an awkward attempt to compensate for a fundamentally flawed project.

    Reacting to the opening of the tunnel Green Party London Assembly Caroline Russell said:

    “The opening of Silvertown Road Tunnel is a reminder of the £2 billion wasted on a project that nobody in London has shown any real enthusiasm for.

    “Londoners deserve so much more than this. We need river crossings that prioritise clean air, safe walking and cycling with affordable public transport rather than this traffic-inducing road tunnel.

    “The Mayor has claimed to be the ‘greenest’ Mayor ever, yet here we are, with a tunnel that is the opposite of anything ‘green’.

    “To make matters worse, the Mayor’s clunky cycle shuttle service is a half-baked impractical solution strapped onto a project that people have campaigned against for decades.

    “Expecting people to get off their bikes, wait up to 12 minutes and then lug their bikes onto a bus is ridiculous, especially when the entire area around the tunnel is dangerous for cycling and filled with high-risk junctions.

    “This could easily have been solved with a proper route across the river for people walking and cycling.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    April 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: ‘Safe futures start here’: UN calls for global action to eliminate mine threat

    Source: United Nations MIL OSI b

    4 April 2025 Peace and Security

    More than 100 million people worldwide are at risk from landmines, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) Secretary-General António Guterres said on Friday, in his message for the International Day for Mine Awareness.

    “Even when the guns fall silent, these remnants of war remain, lurking in fields and on pathways and roadways, threatening the lives of innocent civilians and the livelihoods of communities,” he described.

    From Afghanistan to Myanmar; from Sudan to Ukraine, Syria, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and beyond; these deadly devices litter rural and urban areas, indiscriminately killing civilians and blocking vital humanitarian and development efforts.

    On average, one person is killed or injured by explosive devices every hour – many of them children.

    This year’s observance, under the theme Safe Futures Start Here, highlights the critical role of mine action in rebuilding shattered communities, supporting survivors and forging peace.

    Centre people, not weapons

    Stressing the importance of innovation and inclusivity, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) is now urging investment in micro and quick-impact projects that address the urgent needs of people with physical disabilities affected by conflict.

    These efforts build on the Pact for the Future, adopted at the 2024 Summit of the Future, especially its commitments to civilian protection (Action 14) and scaling up technology and innovation capacities in developing countries (Action 29).

    UNMAS has for over two decades tailored its response to the threat of explosive hazards faced by civilians, peacekeepers and humanitarians, in some of the areas most impacted by war and its aftermath.

    Spotlight on Somalia

    In Somalia, IEDs remain a major threat to peace and security. In 2024 alone, 597 devices caused over 1,400 casualties.

    “Landmines and improvised explosive devices have disproportionately affected civilian populations,” said James Swan, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Somalia.

    “Today, we honour those who have lost their lives to these deadly devices and reaffirm our commitment to working alongside the Somali Government and our partners to reduce this lethal threat,” he said.

    Significant progress has been made in building national capacity, through specialised training and the provision of life-saving equipment.

    UNMAS recently handed over a new set of counter-IED equipment to Somali security forces, reflecting a growing emphasis on national ownership and sustainability.

    Charting the next steps

    From 9 to 11 April, the 28th International Meeting of Mine Action National Directors and UN Advisers (NDM-UN28) will be held in Geneva.

    Co-hosted by UNMAS and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, the meeting will bring together global experts to address key challenges facing the sector.

    Mr. Guterres called on States to uphold international humanitarian norms and join relevant treaties, including the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.

    “Mine action works. Together, let’s commit to build safe futures – starting here and now,” he concluded.

    Soundcloud

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    April 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: “People often don’t understand what’s going on around them, but we can explain it.”

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: State University Higher School of Economics – State University Higher School of Economics –

    Georgy Stalinov is engaged in field social research and created a video podcast in which guests talk about unusual social phenomena based on field materials. Episodes about garage workers, Anastasia residents, informal economy in the provinces, Orthodox parishes, and seasonal workers are already available. In an interview with the Young Scientists of the Higher School of Economics project, he told how he hitchhiked with truck drivers, why it is bad to work as a taxi driver, and whether poaching has been defeated in Kamchatka.

    How I got into science

    Our program “Public and Municipal Administration” has the strongest group of field workers at HSE, that is, people who do field social research. My teachers Simon Gdalevich Kordonsky And Yuri Mikhailovich Plyusnin have been taking students of public and municipal administration to the fields since the 2000s to show how local government (LGU) works in a broad sense. This tradition has grown into a program of student expeditions “Rediscovering Russia“, through which I came to science. At first I became interested in the field part, and then in the methodological, theoretical and fundamental.

    In my second year, as part of a course on MSU, I went to Lipetsk Oblast for three days and then began signing up for two-week expeditions “Discovering Russia Again” with our teachers. I became interested in social anthropology and entered a master’s program, also in public administration.

    How Public Administration Relates to Field Research

    In the Russian Empire, field research was started by government officials – officials on special assignments. The first socio-anthropological report can be considered the book “Description of the Land of Kamchatka” by Stepan Krasheninnikov, written in the 18th century. And then, for various reasons and in various circumstances, people affiliated with government departments traveled to study different territories, social and ethnic groups, territorial communities.

    What am I studying?

    Communities, economic and labor practices, self-organization practices.

    What was my first big study about?

    A full-fledged social anthropologist/ethnographer/field researcher is someone who has implemented their own project. When I was a 4th-year student, the Khamovniki Social Research Support Foundation, which is closely connected to our Municipal Management Laboratory, was giving out grants to young researchers. Among the phenomena that interested the foundation were truck drivers. I chose this topic and received a grant.

    Truckers in Russia are almost a blank spot. In the US, articles were written about truckers throughout the 20th century: about the problems of trade unions, the aging of the profession, self-organization, etc. We have all of this too, and it is also seasoned with a colorful story about the “Platon” toll collection system, but almost no one was interested in this topic.

    To collect data, I started traveling with them. In total, I hitchhiked for about five weeks. I made arrangements on the road: at a truck stop, I approached people and asked them to take me with them. And in the cabin, I explained that I was conducting research, that I would write (at that time) a master’s thesis about truck drivers. We discussed their work, their lives, various things that happened around the road while we were driving. I would ride with one driver for a day or two and then transfer to the next one.

    I also did research on the spot. For example, in Dagestan I studied truck drivers for three weeks. There are rural trucker communities there, there are funds from which they can help a trucker if he crashes, or help his family if he dies. And in one place we found that a lot of men leave the village during the period of active import of fruits from Azerbaijan and Iran, and the drivers pay for the work of the patrol service, which consists of their fellow villagers, so that everything is calm.

    What interested me most

    Informal self-organization. An example is the black market for fuel, which exists on almost all federal highways. Truckers who work for large transport companies have their fuel paid for by their employers. And they can carefully drain it and sell it to another trucker – an individual entrepreneur.

    My postgraduate dissertation is devoted to those connections between drivers, invisible to an outside observer, which constitute their mobilization potential. When the Platon system was introduced in 2015, thousands of drivers were able to coordinate in a matter of days outside the trade union, after which they created an alternative association. Subsequently, the tariffs for travel on federal roads were reduced from 4 to 1.5 rubles per kilometer, and so far the tariff has only increased to 3.34 rubles.

    It would seem that drivers are loners and do not belong to teams like office and factory workers, but they are all connected informally, interacting daily at parking lots and gas stations, communicating via radio, exchanging information. Due to weak connections, they very quickly organized their structure throughout the country.

    What else am I studying?

    I am quite closely involved in the study of nature management. This is everything related to fishing, gathering wild plants, and commercial hunting.

    The largest commercial project I was involved in was researching fisheries in northern and western Kamchatka. We were looking into the issue of unaccounted salmon fishing (poaching) for domestic fishermen based in Kamchatka.

    In total, we spent 3-4 months in Kamchatka in small villages, participated in fishing industries, lived in factories, interacted with fishery workers and those who prevent poaching. And traveled a little along the rivers. In particular, thanks to our research, industrial products received certification, and now they are exported abroad.

    The international certification company imposes a number of requirements on fishery industry companies, which they must comply with. To do this, they must conduct an audit at their enterprises, and socio-anthropological studies in the fishing zones, which will show that poaching does not pose a risk to the population.

    The volume that a commercial fisher can catch is calculated by ecologists based on how much can be taken from the population so that enough fish reach the spawning grounds to continue the species. If a commercial fisher takes this fish to the sea, and then the remainder that should spawn is caught by poachers in the river, then there will be no reproduction of the population. Therefore, it is necessary to assess the volume of informal fishing.

    Over the past 20 years, opportunities for poaching have significantly decreased. In the 2000s, poaching in Kamchatka reached half of the total. Including due to the fact that industrialists were engaged in poaching. And then they were completely legalized and allowed to catch all the fish they wanted.

    There is currently no anthropogenic threat specifically from poaching in Kamchatka. There are threats associated with industrialists, because not everyone has established fishing and processing processes. And potential harm is also associated with ore mining. Gold and platinum mining pollutes rivers so much that fish cannot survive there.

    What to see in Kamchatka

    I am not going to leave Kamchatka, I will go there again. It is one of the exceptional regions on a global scale and the most unusual Russian region. I say this with knowledge of the matter, because I have been to many places: Altai, Yakutia, Primorye, the north of the European part of Russia.

    Tourists who come to Kamchatka now don’t see much. Domestic flights in Kamchatka are very expensive. That’s why they are shown typical pictures: blue sky, green grass, volcano. They don’t know what the Koryak tundra and the raging April ocean, all in slush and ice floes, look like. Only rich tourist hunters and geologists who go on business trips see this.

    For a mass tourist, visiting the agglomeration of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky will already be a stunning event. It is a small city surrounded by amazing nature. It is not necessary to go inland. You can surf the ocean, on Khalaktyrsky beach, famous for its volcanic black sand. Ride a snowboard from volcanoes, admiring Avacha Bay. See sea lions, which lie right in the center of the city. Go to Paratunka to swim in the equipped thermal springs.

    What results I am proud of

    My project on truck drivers, because I did it alone. I am also proud that our student reports on the HSE website attracted a cool project on Kamchatka to our team. I am proud that I started the channel “Anthropole“, which is interesting to a wide audience. In the popular science environment, sociology is very weak, losing out to economics, psychology, political science, history and all social sciences in general. Someone had to launch podcast about field research, and I did it.

    I have a wide circle of colleagues. We all know each other well from conferences, and with some of them we worked together on expeditions. I invite them, they talk about their research. On camera, I mostly ask questions and rarely add anything from myself. But this is exactly what was needed so that people knew that we can also bring interesting and useful knowledge.

    We can produce useful knowledge for business/the state. People often don’t understand what’s going on around them, but we can explain it — conduct ethnographic research and understand all the nuances. We are currently focused on applied projects. Last year, I did an autoethnography of a custom taxi: I registered on the platform, rented a car and worked as a taxi driver for several weeks, recording all my observations in a research diary.

    What’s wrong with being a taxi driver

    The aggregator encourages people to choose a specific schedule. To earn good money, a taxi driver must go to work at six in the morning, come home at noon, then go to work again at four in the afternoon and come home at night. Moscow rush hours are accompanied by high taxi prices, bonuses from the aggregator. Such a schedule implies life in the car. Despite the fact that you have four free hours during the day, you have nowhere to spend them. I was writing my research diary at this time. But what should an ordinary taxi driver do when his wife is at work and the children are at school or kindergarten?

    He comes at night, goes to bed, gets up at 6am and doesn’t see his family either in the morning or in the evening. And the weekends are the busiest hours. And every day you have to pay the rent.

    What I dream about

    I am focused on applied projects. When you are commissioned to do a study, you clearly understand who needs it and why. The Faculty of Social Sciences is shifting its focus from fundamental to applied research. I would like our lab to compete with research agencies and take the most interesting studies for ourselves, while simultaneously training students, involving them in research in the classroom and beyond.

    Another direction is creative activity, which now inseparably accompanies all my work. This is education, blogging, video podcasts and non-fiction literature. I will write a book about truckers in the style of travel notes.

    Science for me is an increase in knowledge. And a system of knowledge that is not absolute. We learn about the world and let our students learn about it. This is our mission. But we are not always right.

    Sociology has no basis like Linnaeus’s plant classification system or Mendeleev’s table. We are constantly moving, constantly discussing how society works and whether it exists at all. For us, it is a continuous process of learning.

    If I hadn’t become a scientist

    I would still be dealing with people. I worked in HR before I decided to stay at the university. But I didn’t really like it. I would probably end up becoming an entrepreneur because I value freedom and independence. Science and education give me a lot of free time that I can devote to my projects and initiatives. That’s what I like. I guess the only way to have that kind of freedom is in entrepreneurship. I could have become a writer. You can write not only books, but also scripts. I was always interested in cinema, but I somehow didn’t allow myself to step into that field at school. Maybe I would have decided to become a screenwriter or an actor.

    If I hadn’t become a scientist

    I would still deal with people. I worked in HR before I decided to stay at the university. But I didn’t really like it. I would probably end up in entrepreneurship because I value freedom and independence. Science and education give you a lot of free time that you can devote to your projects and initiatives. That’s what I like. I guess the only way to have that kind of freedom is in entrepreneurship.

    I could have become a writer. You can write not only books, but also scripts. I was always interested in cinema, but at school I somehow did not allow myself to step into this field. Maybe in the end I would have decided to become a screenwriter or an actor.

    Who would I like to meet?

    With the greatest travelers, explorers and ethnographers – Nikolai Miklouho-Maclay, Fridtjof Nansen, Vladimir Arsenyev and others.

    How my typical day is structured

    My day starts with a walk with the dog. Then I can read, write something for the channel, organize a new video for the podcast. Luckily, I don’t have a routine, it would kill me.

    Where will I go this year

    I will have an expedition to the Arkhangelsk region, to the Pinezhsky district, to study wild plants. With my colleague Artemy Pozanenko We will go to the Irkutsk region to study a rural community that lives on fur trade. We will also go to Transbaikalia on a project of a colleague from the laboratory to find out how people surrounded by national parks interact with nature. In Yekaterinburg, we will shoot a video about the extraction of semi-precious stones in the Urals.

    I also wanted to organize the shooting of a documentary film in Kamchatka for my blog, but have not found funding yet. On the west coast there lives a family that organized an enterprise for the collection and processing of fireweed, today every seventh Kamchatka resident drinks their tea. A very beautiful story: tea plantations, the perimeter of which is guarded by dogs and periodically drives away bears – I would like to film all of this.

    There will be other trips for filming: Primorye, Vologda region, St. Petersburg, Kologriv, possibly Karelia. The project is financed by the Khamovniki Foundation, and we largely talk about the foundation’s projects.

    Do I get burnout?

    Sometimes, when something gets boring, you have to go on an expedition. When I earn money, burnout also goes away very quickly. In fact, I just try not to bother. There was never a time when I was lying around and couldn’t do anything. On the contrary, I constantly had the feeling: something else needs to be done, something else needs to be thought up. At first, I had to do what my senior colleagues were doing: finish my master’s degree, become a teacher, publish an article. Then came the blog, the video podcast, the trips associated with it, working with the audience. Now, most of my attention outside of my duties is directed at it.

    What am I interested in besides science?

    I love good cinema. Mass cinema, not arthouse. I want to take part in film production someday, maybe in a documentary.

    What I read recently

    “Debt: The First 5,000 Years of History” by David Graeber, “Life in the Void: Anthropological Essays on Social Space Beyond the Limits of Government Regulation” and “Love and Elections” by Lana Barsukova. The latter is a women’s novel, but it was written by a professor and doctor of sociological sciences, the book contains a lot of research material, although readers are unlikely to guess about it.

    Advice to young scientists

    I would advise not to waste your time on empty, useless work, but to do only things with the prospect of developing yourself and the team. If you are not in the mood, go for a walk: the burnout will go away, useful thoughts will come.

    We need to understand the system. Combine science, work with students, prospects for large grants and custom projects in one project.

    You have to be enterprising. Otherwise, you do what other people say, and in science, doing what other people say is boring.

    Favorite place in Moscow

    I love forests and parks. Once in Teply Stan I found a cow grazing with a calf in a field. And in Moscow I really like the nooks and crannies of Prechistenka. In general, I fell in love with Moscow after I moved there. I used to live in the Moscow region, and now I live on Vernadsky Avenue. When you can quickly get to the university and there is a park nearby, it is nice to live here.

    The three most beautiful places I have seen on expeditions

    The Vyvenka River, the third largest in Kamchatka. It is located in the north, where the Kamchatka Peninsula ends and the mainland begins. The Timan Ridge in northern Komi: hills, winding rivers and taiga. And also Podkamennaya Tunguska in Krasnoyarsk Krai.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: President Meloni’s telephone conversation with UK Prime Minister Starmer

    Source: Government of Italy (English)

    Vai al Contenuto Raggiungi il piè di pagina

    4 Aprile 2025

    The President of the Council of Ministers, Giorgia Meloni, had a telephone conversation today with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Keir Starmer.
    The two leaders had an exchange of views on the latest international developments and the ongoing strengthening of the excellent bilateral cooperation, and agreed to continue coordinating on all issues of common interest and on the main global challenges.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: Invest in African Energy (IAE) 2025 to Highlight Growth Opportunities in Africa’s Downstream Supply Chain

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    PARIS, France, April 4, 2025/APO Group/ —

    The upcoming Invest in African Energy (IAE) 2025 Forum will host a high-level panel – Downstream Beneficiation: Supply Chain Development for Optimal Performance – as the continent aims to enhance energy security, reduce import dependence and maximize the value of its natural resources. The session will explore how the expansion of Africa’s downstream sector can strengthen supply chains, enhance refining capacity and drive sustainable economic growth through infrastructure investment and strategic partnerships.

    As Africa’s energy landscape evolves, optimizing downstream operations is critical to unlocking the full potential of the continent’s natural resources. This session will focus on closing the infrastructure finance gap by addressing key challenges such as upgrading refineries, expanding storage and distribution networks, and developing service stations, bottling plants and transport fleets. Panelists will also examine the role of strategic hubs – such as Egypt’s petrochemical industry, Equatorial Guinea’s Gas Mega Hub and Algeria’s emerging green hydrogen sector – in bolstering Africa’s supply chain efficiency, along with key regional projects like the Central African Pipeline System and the Lobito Corridor linking Angola, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

    IAE 2025 (https://apo-opa.co/43FPXaT) is an exclusive forum designed to facilitate investment between African energy markets and global investors. Taking place May 13-14, 2025 in Paris, the event offers delegates two days of intensive engagement with industry experts, project developers, investors and policymakers. For more information, please visit www.Invest-Africa-Energy.com. To sponsor or participate as a delegate, please contact sales@energycapitalpower.com.

    Moderated by James Gooder, VP Crude, Argus Media, the panel will feature industry leaders offering key insights into Africa’s downstream sector. Speakers include Anibor Kragha, Executive Secretary, African Refiners & Distributors Association; Tarik Berair, Commercial Development Manager, Technip Energies; Fernando Covas, Executive Director, S&P Global Commodity Insights; James Bullen, Head of Downstream, Petredec and Michael Kelly, Chief Advocacy Officer, World Liquid Gas Association. 

    Africa’s downstream investment climate is undergoing significant transformation, with several major projects driving the sector’s growth including Nigeria’s 650,000-bpd Dangote Refinery, Angola’s 200,000-bpd Lobito and 100,000-bpd Soyo refineries, and Algeria’s 100,000-bpd Hassi Messaoud Refinery. Despite recent refinery closures, South Africa also maintains a well-developed fuel distribution network, retail stations and petrochemical production, while Mozambique is emerging as a key LNG hub, with the Coral South FLNG project already operational and the Rovuma LNG and Mozambique LNG projects currently under development.

    Despite these advancements, challenges remain in securing adequate financing for infrastructure upgrades and supply chain expansion. Addressing these gaps will require coordinated efforts from governments, private investors and industry stakeholders to develop resilient and efficient downstream operations. The IAE 2025 downstream panel will provide a platform for stakeholders to discuss actionable strategies that ensure Africa’s energy sector remains competitive, sustainable and responsive to global demand.

    MIL OSI Africa –

    April 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Consumers are boycotting US goods around the world. Should Trump be worried?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Alan Bradshaw, Professor of Marketing, Royal Holloway University of London

    US alcohol has been removed from sale in the Canadian province of British Columbia. lenic/Shutterstock

    As politicians around the world scramble to respond to US “liberation day” tariffs, consumers have also begun flexing their muscles. “Boycott USA” messages and searches have been trending on social media and search engines, with users sharing advice on brands and products to avoid.

    Even before Donald Trump announced across-the-board tariffs, there had been protests and attacks on the president’s golf courses in Doonbeg in Ireland and Turnberry in Scotland in response to other policies. And in Canada, shoppers avoided US goods after Trump announced he could take over his northern neighbour.

    His close ally Elon Musk has seen protests at Tesla showrooms across Europe, Australia and New Zealand. New cars have been set on fire as part of the “Tesla take-down”, while Tesla sales have been on a deep downward trend. This has been especially noticeable in European countries where electric vehicles sales have been high, and in Australia.

    This targeting of Trump and Musk’s brands are part of wider boycotts of US goods as consumers look for ways to express their anger at the US administration.

    Denmark’s biggest retailer, Salling Group, has given the price label of all European products a black star, making it easy for customers to avoid US goods.

    Canadian shoppers are turning US products upside down in retail outlets so it’s easier for fellow shoppers to spot and avoid them. Canadian consumers can also download the Maple Scan app that checks barcodes to see if their grocery purchases are actually Canadian or have parent companies from the USA.

    Who owns what?

    The issue of ostensibly Canadian brands being owned by US capital illustrates the complexity of consumer boycotts – it can be difficult to identify which brands are American and which are not.

    In the UK, for example, many consumers would be surprised to learn how many famous British brands are actually American-owned – for example, Cadbury, Waterstones and Boots. So entwined are global economies that attempts by consumers to boycott US brands may also damage their local economies.

    This complexity is also present in Danish and Canadian Facebook groups that are dedicated to boycotting US goods. Consumers exchange tips on how to swap alternatives for American products.

    The fact that Facebook is a US-based company only demonstrates how deeply embedded consumer culture is in US technologies. European businesses often depend on American operating systems and cloud storage while consumers rely on US-owned social media platforms for communication.

    Even when consumers succeed in weeding out American products, if they pay using Visa, Mastercard or Apple Pay, a percentage of the price will nonetheless be rerouted to the US. If a touch payment is made with Worldpay, the percentage could be even greater.

    These American financial services show just how embedded US businesses are in retail in ways that consumers may not appreciate. In practice, an absolute boycott of US business is almost unimaginable.

    All-American brands

    But American branding is not always subtle. In addition to brands directly connected to the US administration – such as the Trump golf courses and Tesla – many other companies have always been flamboyantly American. Coca-Cola, Starbucks and Budweiser are just some examples where their American identities and proudly on show.

    As such, it’s possible that consumers will increasingly avoid blatantly American brands. They may be less concerned about the complexities and contradictions of a more comprehensive boycott.

    Consumer actions where the goal is political change are known as “proxy boycotts” because no particular company is the ultimate target. Rather, the brands and firms are targeted by consumers as a means to an end.

    Do boycotts work?

    A classic example of a proxy boycott took aim at French goods, particularly wine, in the mid-1990s. This was in response to president Jacques Chirac’s decision to conduct nuclear tests in the Pacific. The large-scale consumer boycotts contributed to France’s decision to abandon its nuclear tests in 1996.

    In Britain, for example, French wines in all categories lost market share as demand fell during the boycott. At the time, it cost the French wine sector £23 million (about £46 million today).

    These boycotts are a reminder that the interplay between corporations, brands and consumer culture are inevitably embedded in politics. The current political impasse demonstrates that consumers can participate in politics, not just with their votes, but also with their buying power.

    Trump clearly wants to demonstrate American strength. The “liberation day” tariffs, which were higher than most observers expected, bear this out. But many US corporations will now be worrying about how consumers in the US and around the world might respond. Trump could see a mass mobilisation of consumer power in ways that will give the president something to think about.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Consumers are boycotting US goods around the world. Should Trump be worried? – https://theconversation.com/consumers-are-boycotting-us-goods-around-the-world-should-trump-be-worried-253389

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    April 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: UK assistance reaches 15,000 people after Myanmar earthquake, with further £10m pledged

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    UK assistance reaches 15,000 people after Myanmar earthquake, with further £10m pledged

    UK now providing up to £25 million for vital humanitarian assistance

    • The UK has bolstered its support to Myanmar earthquake, allocating a further £10 million to the ongoing humanitarian response 
    • This brings the UK total to up to £25 million of support, including up to £5 million to match donations to the Disasters Emergency Committee appeal and £10 million announced on 29 March
    • UK-funded supplies are already reaching areas devastated by the quake, helping over 15,000 people so far

    Lifesaving support for those directly affected by the severe earthquake in Myanmar will now go even further, with the UK now providing up to £25 million for vital humanitarian assistance. 

    The increase is the result of an additional £10million of UK funding directed towards the humanitarian response. 

    It comes as UK Minister for the Indo-Pacific, Catherine West, this afternoon (4 April) visited the offices of the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) in London, to hear about the realities of delivering aid to the most vulnerable across Myanmar. 

    The UK has already pledged to aid match every pound donated by the British public to the DEC appeal, up to £5million. 

    UK funds, delivered through partners on the ground, are already helping to provide immediate support to the most vulnerable areas and people, including first aid, emergency and trauma care and primary healthcare, food, water, shelter and hygiene kits. The additional £10 million directed to the response will provide a further boost to these efforts, saving lives and supporting livelihoods across Myanmar. No UK support goes to the Myanmar regime.

    Catherine West, Minister for the Indo-Pacific, said:

    Even before this earthquake struck, Myanmar was already facing one of the world’s biggest humanitarian crises after four years of conflict.

    It is right that we step up to help. The rapid UK response means lifesaving supplies are already reaching those worst-affected by the quake – and new funding will enable partners on the ground to reach even more people in need.

    We thank the British public who continue to generously support the Myanmar people through the DEC appeal.

    The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) works with a network of specialist partner organisations to deliver targeted support on the ground. This means UK support is able to reach those most in need, despite the challenges of operating in Myanmar.

    The UK government has a strong track record of providing humanitarian assistance in Myanmar, with total UK support since the 2021 military coup standing at over £170 million. Our modern approach to aid not only supports some of the world’s most vulnerable people but also helps address global challenges from health to migration, ultimately contributing to the UK’s security and prosperity.

    In addition to humanitarian assistance, the FCDO continues to provide consular assistance to British nationals in both Myanmar and Thailand, which was also affected by last week’s earthquake.

    Notes to editors 

    Funding the UK has committed to the Myanmar earthquake response includes:

    • An initial package of up to £10m to support the emergency response; 
    • £5m to match donations to the Disasters Emergency Committee public appeal for Myanmar, launched Thursday 3 April; 
    • A further £10m funding directed for humanitarian assistance, announced today. 

    UK humanitarian support for Myanmar’s citizens will not support Myanmar’s military regime.

    Media enquiries

    Email newsdesk@fcdo.gov.uk

    Telephone 020 7008 3100

    Contact the FCDO Communication Team via email (monitored 24 hours a day) in the first instance, and we will respond as soon as possible.

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    Updates to this page

    Published 4 April 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    April 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Security Council Press Statement on Myanmar

    Source: United Nations MIL OSI b

    The following Security Council press statement was issued today by Council President Jérôme Bonnafont (France):

    The members of the Security Council expressed their deepest sympathy and condolences to those affected by the earthquake that struck central Myanmar on 28 March, and also impacted neighbouring countries especially Thailand, resulting in significant loss of life, injuries and widespread destruction.  They stressed their solidarity with the peoples of Myanmar, Thailand and other affected families and communities.

    The members of the Security Council recognized the need to strengthen rescue, relief and recovery efforts and to scale up immediate and rapid humanitarian assistance in response to the requests to help the people of Myanmar, supported by the international community.  The members of the Security Council took note of the statements by ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] Foreign Ministers of 29 and 30 March.  They reaffirmed the importance of a safe and conducive environment to ensure the timely and effective delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance to all those in need, without disruption or discrimination.  To that end, the members of the Security Council welcomed the ceasefire announcements to create a safe and conducive environment.

    The members of the Security Council expressed their gratitude and support for the work of ASEAN, the region, the United Nations and the wider international community, including the swift provision of urgent life-saving assistance, rescue and disaster relief.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    April 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Appeal to find missing boy Chidubem

    Source: United Kingdom London Metropolitan Police

    Police are currently looking for 14-year-old Chidubem, who is missing from Woolwich.

    He was last seen at around 10:45hrs on Friday, 4 April wearing a full Woolwich Polytechnic uniform.

    Officers remain across Woolwich looking for Chidubem and appealing for the public’s help to find him.

    If you see him, please call 999, quoting CAD 3280/4APRIL.

    MIL Security OSI –

    April 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Reed Blasts Trump Dismissal of CYBERCOM Commander General Haugh

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Rhode Island Jack Reed

    WASHINGTON, DC – Last night, President Trump dismissed General Timothy Haugh, the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command and Director of the National Security Agency, without explanation. Press reports indicate that Laura Loomer, a fringe conspiracy theorist, convinced the President to dismiss General Haugh and fire a slew of expert staff on his National Security Council. The U.S. Senate unanimously confirmed General Haugh to his post in December 2023.

    Senator Reed issued the following statement in response:

    “I am alarmed and angered that, at the insistence of a far-right conspiracy theorist, President Trump dismissed one of the most skilled, accomplished officers in the U.S. military. As the commander of Cyber Command, General Haugh led the most formidable cyber warfighting force in the world and kept our enemies up at night. President Trump has given a priceless gift to China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea by purging competence from our national security leadership.

    “I have long warned about the dangers of firing military officers as a political loyalty test. In addition to the other military leaders and national security officials Trump has fired, he is sending a chilling message throughout the ranks: don’t give your best military advice, or you may face consequences. The President must immediately explain himself to the American people.”

    MIL OSI USA News –

    April 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Grassley, Ernst, Colleagues Push to Secure Fertilizer Access for Farmers

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Iowa Chuck Grassley

    WASHINGTON – Senate Agriculture Committee Member Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), a lifelong family farmer, joined Sen. Joni Ernst (R-Iowa) and a bipartisan group of House and Senate lawmakers in a letter urging Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum to reinstate potash and add phosphate – both critical fertilizer ingredients – to the U.S. Critical Minerals List.

    The designation will support domestic production and strengthen supply chains, important steps to protecting food security and stabilizing the market for farmers. The lawmakers state that doing so will send a powerful message that the United States is serious about safeguarding the nation’s food supply.

    “The importance of potash to the nation’s economic and national security was recognized in 2018 when DOI included potash on its list of 35 critical minerals. However, under the previous administration, the 2022 update removed potash from the list—a decision that clearly warrants reconsideration. We appreciate President Trump’s support for reversing this in his March 20, 2025, executive order,” the members wrote.

    The U.S. depends on imports for approximately 85 percent of its potash needs, primarily sourcing it from Canada. Worldwide, only 14 countries produce potash, with Belarus and Russia accounting for nearly 40 percent of total production. The members emphasized that the United States must address the growing risks to the potash supply chain, including a return to domestic potash production as quickly as possible.

    “At the very heart of this issue are the American farmers who work tirelessly to feed Americans and much of the world. Fertilizers containing potash and phosphate are essential to maintaining soil fertility, improving crop yields, and ensuring consistent food production. Without access to a stable and affordable supply of these minerals, farmers face higher costs, reduced yields, and increased uncertainty—challenges that threaten their livelihoods and the food security of millions of American families,” the members wrote.

    “Potash and phosphate are essential to growing the food that sustains our nation, and we rely heavily on imports to get them. Global disruptions put farmers in a tough spot, driving up costs and hurting farm profitability,” said Iowa Soybean Association President Brent Swart. “Adding these minerals to the Critical Minerals List helps secure a stable, domestic supply, protecting both our farms and the wallets of everyday consumers.” 

    “Fertilizers, specifically potash and phosphate, are crucial tools in the toolbox that Iowa corn farmers rely on as they supply food, feed, fiber, and fuel globally,” said Iowa Corn Growers Association President and farmer from Galt, Iowa, Stu Swanson. “ICGA supports the relisting of potash and the inclusion of phosphate on the U.S. Critical Minerals List. We thank Senator Ernst for her ongoing advocacy for Iowa agriculture.”

    In the Senate, additional cosigners include Senate Agriculture Committee Chairman John Boozman (R-Ark.), along with Sens. Elissa Slotkin (D-Mich.),  Christopher Coons (D-Del.), Pete Ricketts (R-Neb.), Ted Budd (R-N.C.), Thom Tillis (R-N.C.), Rick Scott (R-Fla.), Jim Justice (R-W.Va.), Deb Fischer (R-Neb.), Roger Marshall (R-Kan.), James Risch (R-Idaho) and Mike Crapo (R-Idaho).

    In the House, the letter is led by Reps. Kat Cammack (R-Fla.) and Jimmy Panetta (D-Calif.). Additional cosigners include Glenn “GT” Thompson (R-Penn.), Russ Fulcher (R-Idaho), Scott Franklin (R-Fla.), Sharice L. Davids (D-Kan.), Mariannette Miller-Meeks (R-Iowa), Brad Finstad (R-Minn.), Randy Feenstra (R-Iowa), Daniel Webster (R-Fla.), Nicholas A. Langworthy (R-N.Y.), John R. Moolenaar (R-Mich.), Eric “Rick” Crawford (R-Ark.), Michael Simpson (R-Idaho), David G. Valadao (R-Calif.), Zach Nunn (R-Iowa), Eric Sorensen (D-Ill.), Mike Bost (R-Ill.), Dan Newhouse (R-Wash.), Nikki Budzinski (D-Ill.), David Rouzer (R-N.C.), Scott DesJarlais (R-Tenn.), Dusty Johnson (R-S.D.), Tracey Mann (R-Kan.), Darin LaHood (R-Ill.), Donald Davis (D-N.C.), Gregory F. Murphy (R-N.C.) and Cliff Bentz (R-Ore.).

    Full text of the letter can be found HERE.

    Background:

    Grassley has long advocated for family farmers in Iowa and across the country. Grassley and Sen. Tammy Baldwin (D-Wis.) introduced the Fertilizer Research Act to shed light on market factors driving the cost of fertilizer by requiring the Department of Agriculture (USDA) to conduct a study on competition and trends in the fertilizer market to determine their subsequent impacts on price.

    Grassley also pressed Attorney General Garland to investigate anti-competitive activity and market manipulation in the fertilizer industry and urged President Trump to exclude potash under any proposed tariff regime.

    -30-

    MIL OSI USA News –

    April 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: The efforts led by France and the United Kingdom must enable a huge boost in support for Ukraine

    Source: France-Diplomatie – Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development

    Published on April 4, 2025

    Statement by M. Jean-Noël Barrot, Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, on his arrival at the meeting of NATO foreign ministers (Brussels, April 3, 2025) (excerpts)

    In the face of the troubled times we’re going through, in the face of the new global disorder that is setting in, our alliance’s members must, more than ever, show unfailing solidarity.

    Solidarity first of all with Ukraine, because today the only obstacle to peace is Russia. It certainly isn’t Ukraine, because three weeks ago the Ukrainians agreed – and it was a brave compromise – to accept the unconditional ceasefire proposal made to them by the United States of America. And in the past three weeks we’ve seen Vladimir Putin stepping up his delaying tactics, continuing his strikes on energy infrastructure and continuing his war crimes. It’s now up to Russia to say whether it wants a ceasefire – yes or no. (…)

    Solidarity in the face of the threat Russia represents today, which is a threat to all our alliance’s members, in the north, south, east and west. Firstly because Russia currently devotes 10% of its national wealth to its war effort and 40% of its national budget to its military expenditure, and because Vladimir Putin this week announced a new conscription drive of 160,000 soldiers, the highest number in 14 years. And also because Vladimir Putin has deliberately chosen to place the threat in the nuclear field, through a revision of the doctrine, through a strengthened partnership with proliferating powers like Iran and North Korea, and also through the unprecedented use of this threat as a bullying method to serve his war of aggression in Ukraine.

    In this context, the efforts led by France and the United Kingdom must enable a huge boost – a huge boost in support for Ukraine. And last Thursday in Paris, through President Macron, alongside President Zelenskyy, we announced a further €2-billion outlay to support the Ukrainian resistance. The meeting of heads of State and government invited to Paris by President Macron led to an agreement on joint work to support the US effort and lay the groundwork for a monitoring of the ceasefire, once it’s been achieved. And beyond this, some members of this coalition of willing and able powers wanted to lay the groundwork for a reassurance force, which in due course will allow a genuinely lasting peace agreement to be concluded between Ukraine and Russia, and this will also be the purpose of the visit to Ukraine at the end of this week by the French and British chiefs of defence staff. The purpose really is to achieve an end to this war of aggression and create the conditions for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity to be respected in a lasting way.

    I’ll also add that respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty applies not only to Ukraine but to all the countries in our alliance and their overseas territories. Europe’s borders are not negotiable. Nor are the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Alliance countries.

    Solidarity, as I was saying, on the development of NATO’s European pillar. The time has come to develop it. We’re ready for that. Our US partners have also asked us to. In reality, we’re ready for a twofold increase: an increase in the share of our military expenditure in our national wealth, and an increase in the European share of European military expenditure.

    The first increase, as I was saying, is the share of our military expenditure in our national wealth. At national level, thanks to two military estimates acts instigated by President Macron, we’ve managed to reach the threshold of 2% of national wealth devoted to our military spending, and the President has set a target of 3% to 3.5%. And we’re preparing to meet it: 3.5% is roughly the level of US military expenditure.

    The second increase, to the European share of European military expenditure, is also one of the goals we set ourselves at European level with the White Paper on defence, with the European Council’s recent decisions. Today the European share of military expenditure stands at roughly 50%. For our American partners, the US share of US military expenditure is roughly 100%. So we have considerable room for progress in developing this European share of our military expenditure.

    As I said, unfailing solidarity, which is required from all members of the Alliance today. Solidarity which is nevertheless being put to the test by the decisions taken and announced yesterday by President Trump, with the imposition of reciprocal tariffs, which will have negative consequences on both the American economy and the economies of all the Alliance’s members. This also applies to the European economy, and at 4.00 p.m. today President Macron will be meeting the representatives of the sectors concerned, to assess the consequences of these decisions. The European Union will respond – it will do so initially next week – in retaliation for the tariffs the United States has already imposed on steel and aluminium, a few weeks ago. Then, as it’s already said, it will begin consultations to adopt further measures if needed, following the reciprocal tariffs imposed yesterday evening. As the European Commission President has reiterated, Europe has every means to protect Europeans, their interests and their prosperity. Over the past few years we’ve developed powerful trade-defence instruments for this. But our response will be effective only if it is united, if Europeans show unity. That is how they’ll be able to enter into the negotiations in a position of strength when they begin, to benefit European prosperity.

    Thank you, everyone./.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Interactive heritage trail launches in city’s Centenary year

    Source: City of Stoke-on-Trent

    Published: Friday, 4th April 2025

    An interactive heritage trail which highlights Stoke-on-Trent’s rich history is being officially launched this weekend – during a huge celebration of the city’s Centenary.

    The Living Heritage City Project was first unveiled in 2023 as a two-year pilot scheme, funded by the UK Shared Prosperity Fund (UKSPF).

    Since then, the trail – which showcases seven culturally-significant locations between Stoke and Hanley – has been developed along the new route, with a brand-new map and digital app.

    The app includes interactive videos and audio which navigates users through the heritage locations along the trail and shares stories from the local community. The app will be available alongside a newly-illustrated map which has been designed by local artist Kidda Kinsey.

    Stoke-on-Trent’s Lord Mayor and heritage champion, Councillor Lyn Sharpe, said: “I am so proud to be able to launch the Living Heritage City Pilot Trail during our Centenary year – 2025 is a year to celebrate our wonderful city and everything that makes it what it is, and that includes our rich history.

    “We’d like to thank all of our residents and partners who have walked the heritage trail and helped us to develop it over the last two years – we’ve had some great feedback. I would encourage anyone who hasn’t experienced it yet to try and find some time to do it. You won’t regret it.”

    Starting at Spode Works, the route – which takes just over one hour to complete on foot – takes in important aspects of Stoke-on-Trent’s heritage such as Stoke Minster, Winton Square, Beresford Street, Hanley Park and St Marks Church in Shelton before ending at the Potteries Museum & Art Gallery.

    Thanks to funding secured from Arts Council England, local cultural and heritage organisations have developed other additional trails along the route, allowing people to fully explore stories and extra content which have been created to complement the pilot trail.

    Anna Francis, of The Friends of Spode Rose Garden, said: “We have loved leading a series of walks from the garden up to the Potteries Museum. We are so pleased to be able to unearth such rich stories of our city and the connections between ceramics and gardens through the new app. We are sure people will love exploring the city with this great new resource.”

    Lois Bateman, hub manager at National Literacy Trust Stoke-on-Trent, said: “It’s been a privilege to be part of the Living Heritage project with our new Story Quest in Hanley. Our bespoke story trails, set in familiar places within the community, make reading a story out loud a fun, playful, and interactive experience.”

    Councillor Sharpe will officially launch the trail on Saturday, 5 April during a celebration event which will see the Fenton mace, which has been designed by students from Staffordshire University, unveiled for the first time.

    During the event, the mace will be paraded from Fenton Town Hall to Stoke Town Hall, before partners and contributors are invited to join Councillor Sharpe on a ceremonial walk of a short section of the heritage trail.

    The app is available from the App Store and Google Play Store.

    More information about the Living Heritage City Trail can be found at: www.visitstoke.co.uk/livingheritagecity.

    For the full list of Centenary events throughout the year visit: www.sot100.org.uk.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    April 5, 2025
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