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Category: Europe

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Ensuring a just transition to net zero

    Source: Scottish Government

    Climate action must benefit all of Scotland, says First Minister.

    First Minister John Swinney has vowed that he will take a collaborative approach to tackling the climate and nature emergency, and that the transition to net zero ‘will abandon no community’.

    Addressing key climate stakeholders at the Glasgow Botanic Gardens, the First Minister said that despite the many examples of government supported actions and projects that are contributing to a more climate resilient Scotland, there is much more to be done.

    He also called once again on the UK Government to at least match the Scottish Government’s investment in securing a future for the Grangemouth refinery.

    The First Minister said:

    “This transition will abandon no community. The importance of safeguarding jobs and livelihoods has never been more stark than in the immediacy of the situation at Grangemouth.

    “If we are going to ensure a future for the site, opportunities for its highly skilled workforce, investment is needed now. That is why yesterday, I announced that the Scottish Government will amend the 2025-26 Budget at this late stage to allocate an additional £25 million for a Just Transition Fund for Grangemouth.

    “Today, I urge the UK Government to at least match our funding – and to use the powers they have to go further.  If this is a Government for the United Kingdom, then Scotland should be getting its fair share of UK-wide investments.”

    The First Minister added:

    “If we are to persuade people to back climate action wholeheartedly, we must speak not only of the costs and challenges – which there will be – but also demonstrate clear and direct household and community benefits where these are possible. Tangible benefits at home, in terms of more jobs, lower energy bills, and new economic opportunities, delivering also tangible benefits for the planet.

    “My approach to Government has always been collaboration, which is why I want this to be the start of an ongoing conversation, with a focus on action, on delivery. I believe that we can only make the progress, and map out the next necessary steps on our climate journey, by bringing together local and central Government, agencies, stakeholders, trade unions, community organisations, and the wider public.”

    Background

    Climate action: First Minister’s speech – 19 February – gov.scot 

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI USA: NASA Sets Briefings for Next International Space Station Crew Missions

    Source: NASA

    NASA and its partners will discuss the upcoming Expedition 73 mission aboard the International Space Station during a pair of news conferences on Monday, Feb. 24, from the agency’s Johnson Space Center in Houston.
    Mission leadership will participate in an overview news conference at 2 p.m. EST live on NASA+, covering preparations for NASA’s SpaceX Crew-10 launch in March and the agency’s crew member rotation launch on Soyuz in April. Learn how to watch NASA content through a variety of platforms, including social media.
    NASA also will host a crew news conference at 4 p.m. and provide coverage on NASA+, followed by individual crew member interviews beginning at 5 p.m. This is the final media opportunity with Crew-10 before the crew members travel to NASA’s Kennedy Space Center in Florida for launch.
    The Crew-10 mission, targeted to launch Wednesday, March 12, will carry NASA astronauts Anne McClain and Nichole Ayers, JAXA (Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency) astronaut Takuya Onishi, and Roscosmos cosmonaut Kirill Peskov to the orbiting laboratory.
    NASA astronaut Jonny Kim, scheduled to launch to the space station on the Soyuz MS-27 spacecraft no earlier than April 8, also will participate in the crew briefing and interviews. Kim will be available again on Tuesday, March 18, for limited virtual interviews prior to launch. NASA will provide additional details on that opportunity when available.
    For the Crew-10 mission, a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket and Dragon spacecraft will launch from Launch Complex 39A at NASA Kennedy. The three-person crew of Soyuz MS-27, including Kim and Roscosmos cosmonauts Sergey Ryzhikov and Alexey Zubritsky, will launch from the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan.
    United States-based media seeking to attend in person must contact the NASA Johnson newsroom no later than 5 p.m. on Friday, Feb. 21, at 281-483-5111 or at jsccommu@mail.nasa.gov. U.S. and international media interested in participating by phone must contact NASA Johnson by 9:45 a.m. the day of the event.
    U.S. and international media seeking remote interviews with the crew must submit requests to the NASA Johnson newsroom by 5 p.m. on Feb. 21. A copy of NASA’s media accreditation policy is available online.
    Briefing participants include (all times Eastern and subject to change based on real-time operations):
    2 p.m.: Expedition 73 Overview News Conference

    Ken Bowersox, associate administrator, Space Operations Mission Directorate at NASA Headquarters in Washington

    Steve Stich, manager, NASA’s Commercial Crew Program, NASA Kennedy
    Bill Spetch, operations integration manager, NASA’s International Space Station Program, NASA Johnson
    William Gerstenmaier, vice president, Build & Flight Reliability, SpaceX
    Mayumi Matsuura, vice president and director general, Human Spaceflight Technology Directorate, JAXA

    4 p.m.: Expedition 73 Crew News Conference

    Jonny Kim, Soyuz MS-27 flight engineer, NASA
    Anne McClain, Crew-10 spacecraft commander, NASA
    Nichole Ayers, Crew-10 pilot, NASA
    Takuya Onishi, Crew-10 mission specialist, JAXA
    Kirill Peskov, Crew-10 mission specialist, Roscosmos

    5 p.m.: Crew Individual Interview Opportunities

    Crew-10 members and Kim available for a limited number of interviews

    Kim is making his first spaceflight after selection as part of the 2017 NASA astronaut class. A native of Los Angeles, Kim is a U.S. Navy lieutenant commander and dual designated naval aviator and flight surgeon. Kim also served as an enlisted Navy SEAL. He holds a bachelor’s degree in Mathematics from the University of San Diego and a medical degree from Harvard Medical School in Boston. He completed his internship with the Harvard Affiliated Emergency Medicine Residency at Massachusetts General Hospital and Brigham and Women’s Hospital. After completing the initial astronaut candidate training, Kim supported mission and crew operations in various roles, including the Expedition 65 lead operations officer, T-38 operations liaison, and space station capcom chief engineer. Follow @jonnykimusa on X and @jonnykimusa on Instagram.
    Selected by NASA as an astronaut in 2013, this will be McClain’s second spaceflight. A colonel in the U.S. Army, she earned her bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York, and holds master’s degrees in Aerospace Engineering, International Security, and Strategic Studies. The Spokane, Washington, native was an instructor pilot in the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopter and is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Test Pilot School in Patuxent River, Maryland. McClain has more than 2,300 flight hours in 24 rotary and fixed-wing aircraft, including more than 800 in combat, and was a member of the U.S. Women’s National Rugby Team. On her first spaceflight, McClain spent 204 days as a flight engineer during Expeditions 58 and 59, and completed two spacewalks, totaling 13 hours and 8 minutes. Since then, she has served in various roles, including branch chief and space station assistant to the chief of NASA’s Astronaut Office. Follow @astroannimal on X and @astro_annimal on Instagram.
    The Crew-10 mission will be the first spaceflight for Ayers, who was selected as a NASA astronaut in 2021. Ayers is a major in the U.S. Air Force and the first member of NASA’s 2021 astronaut class named to a crew. The Colorado native graduated from the Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs with a bachelor’s degree in Mathematics and a minor in Russian, where she was a member of the academy’s varsity volleyball team. She later earned a master’s in Computational and Applied Mathematics from Rice University in Houston. Ayers served as an instructor pilot and mission commander in the T-38 ADAIR and F-22 Raptor, leading multinational and multiservice missions worldwide. She has more than 1,400 total flight hours, including more than 200 in combat. Follow @astro_ayers on X and @astro_ayers on Instagram.
    With 113 days in space, this mission also will mark Onishi’s second trip to the space station. After being selected as an astronaut by JAXA in 2009, he flew as a flight engineer for Expeditions 48 and 49, becoming the first Japanese astronaut to robotically capture the Cygnus spacecraft. He also constructed a new experimental environment aboard Kibo, the station’s Japanese experiment module. After his first spaceflight, Onishi became certified as a JAXA flight director, leading the team responsible for operating Kibo from JAXA Mission Control in Tsukuba, Japan. He holds a bachelor’s degree in Aeronautics and Astronautics from the University of Tokyo, and was a pilot for All Nippon Airways, flying more than 3,700 flight hours in the Boeing 767. Follow astro_onishi on X.
    The Crew-10 mission will also be Peskov’s first spaceflight. Before his selection as a cosmonaut in 2018, he earned a degree in Engineering from the Ulyanovsk Civil Aviation School and was a co-pilot on the Boeing 757 and 767 aircraft for airlines Nordwind and Ikar. Assigned as a test cosmonaut in 2020, he has additional experience in skydiving, zero-gravity training, scuba diving, and wilderness survival.
    Learn more about how NASA innovates for the benefit of humanity through NASA’s Commercial Crew Program at:
    https://www.nasa.gov/commercialcrew
    -end-
    Joshua Finch / Jimi RussellHeadquarters, Washington202-358-1100joshua.a.finch@nasa.gov / james.j.russell@nasa.gov
    Kenna Pell / Sandra JonesJohnson Space Center, Houston281-483-5111kenna.m.pell@nasa.gov / sandra.p.jones@nasa.gov

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Isabel Schnabel: Interview with the Financial Times

    Source: European Central Bank

    Interview with Isabel Schnabel, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, conducted by Olaf Storbeck on 14 February 2025

    19 February 2025

    How relevant is the natural rate – R* – for day-to-day policymaking from your point of view?

    The natural rate of interest is an important theoretical concept. But it’s not well-suited to determine the appropriate monetary policy stance. The ECB staff analysis that was published recently had one main message: we know that we know very little. Model and estimation uncertainty result in confidence bands that are so wide that they include any reasonable interest rate that the ECB may set at this point. Moreover, R* is a steady-state concept for a world without shocks. That’s certainly not the world that we are in today. Just look at what’s happening with the evolving trade conflict on which we are getting news on a daily basis. So for all those reasons, I think R* cannot be any reliable guide for monetary policy in real time.

    Has your view on this changed?

    The point I have always emphasised is how R* is evolving over the longer term. People have focused too much on the narrow range for R* that was given in the staff note. This is misleading for several reasons. The narrow range only includes the models for which estimates were already available for the fourth quarter of 2024. If you look at the R* estimates for the third quarter, you see that the range actually goes up all the way to 3%. This is even above the current deposit facility rate of 2.75%. And that range still only includes the uncertainty stemming from using different models. If you add the parameter and filtering uncertainty, you get even wider bands. The one thing that you do see is that the overall range seems to have moved up over recent years. For me, that is the key point.

    But the most recent ECB estimates of R* also suggest that the current level is still lower than it was before the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis.

    That remains to be seen. There has been a clear upward trend. I expect this trend to continue for a number of reasons, including high and rising public debt and the huge investment needs for the digital and green transitions. Another factor is increasing global fragmentation. It leads to a partial reversal of the global savings glut, due to shrinking current account surpluses of some major economies, which was one of the main factors that had pushed R* down. So for me, the main message from the R* analysis is: maintaining price stability over the medium term is likely to require higher real rates in the future than before the pandemic. We cannot pin down the level of R* with any degree of confidence, but we can get an impression about the direction. For me, that direction for R* now is upwards again.

    The Euro zone economy suffers from a lack of economic dynamism and economic growth. Doesn’t this put downward pressure on the natural interest rate?

    Yes, there have been secular factors that have pushed R* down. But we are currently in a situation of transformation that may actually reverse that trend. That’s the whole point.

    When you say that R* is not very helpful for short-term monetary policymaking, why have you stressed it so much in your speeches and interviews?

    It’s important that we understand general macroeconomic trends. Also in the pre-pandemic period, it was very important to understand the underlying natural real rate environment. It can never be precise, but it helps us understand the broader picture. It has no impact on any individual rate decision.

    But would you say that it is relevant for the medium-term trajectory of monetary policy, let’s say for the next year or two? Or does it only matter over the next ten or 20 years?

    I think it has an impact on our medium-term thinking.

    Medium-term thinking would mean: it matters over the next two to three years, right?

    Well, it’s hard to pin down precisely.

    Some ECB observers have suggested that the natural rate was used by more hawkish voices as an argument in favour of being more careful and not lowering interest rates too fast. Would you agree?

    If you believe that R* has moved up, this argues for a more cautious approach. But this cannot just depend on R*. We need to look at the incoming data in order to understand how restrictive our monetary policy is. And the more evidence we have that monetary policy is no longer restrictive, the more cautious we have to become because further rate cuts may no longer be appropriate.

    So how restrictive is the ECB’s monetary policy at the moment?

    The data are showing that the degree of restriction has come down significantly, up to a point where we can no longer say with confidence that our monetary policy is still restrictive. One of the important data sources in this context is the bank lending survey.

    We’re looking at that very carefully. For corporate loans, 90% of banks said in the most recent round that the general level of interest rates has no impact on loan demand, while 8% said it has lifted credit demand. A year ago, a third of banks said that interest rates were weighing on loan demand. It’s even clearer when you look at mortgages. Almost half of banks said in the most recent round that the general level of interest rates is supporting loan demand. A year ago, more than 40% said that it was constraining loan demand. This is also reflected in a historically strong increase in mortgage demand in that same survey, which is gradually transmitting into the hard data on loan growth. Corporate loans were growing by 1.5% in December, mortgages by 1.1%.

    The easing is also being transmitted to the real economy. Consumption picked up in the third quarter by more than we had expected. And the savings rate has started to come down from its very high level. But of course, there are transmission lags, and part of the easing is still in the pipeline.

    You said that you can’t say with confidence anymore if monetary policy is still restrictive. The last ECB policy statement clearly stated that it still is. Do you have a different view than the ECB stated in its latest policy statement?

    No, I fully agreed with the statement last time. But we are now a step further, right? The January monetary policy statement referred to the interest rate of 3% and the level of restrictiveness before the latest monetary policy decision. The further we go down, the lower my conviction in such a statement will be. And note that I’m not saying our monetary policy is no longer restrictive. What I’m saying is I’m no longer sure whether it is still restrictive. But we should not overstate a difference of 25 basis points.

    Should the ECB drop the reference to restrictiveness in March?

    That is a discussion we should have in the next meeting.

    In an FT survey of Euro zone economists just before Christmas, half of them said they think that the ECB is behind the curve. What is your view on this?

    I’m firmly in the camp of the other half who think that we are right on track. The data that we’ve seen have confirmed that our gradual and cautious approach has been appropriate. Domestic inflation is still high, wage growth is still elevated, and we’ve seen new shocks to energy prices. We’ve also seen that inflation expectations are very sensitive to such shocks. So I think our approach is just right.

    Some economists argue that the big uncertainty and all those shocks could justify insurance cuts. Do you have any view on that?

    I don’t see any argument for that at this point, especially as we are getting closer to no longer being restrictive. If anything, we are getting closer to the point where we may have to pause or halt our rate cuts.

    Pause or halt… but not increase?

    No. That I would exclude.

    How close do you think we are to the point where the ECB should pause its easing?

    I will leave that to your interpretation. I don’t know what’s going to happen in the next meetings, so let’s see. But we need to start that discussion.

    That’s not what markets take as the base case scenario right now. Do you think that markets are ahead of themselves?

    Well, markets have been jumping around a bit in response to what is happening in the world. But an April rate cut is no longer fully priced in. So markets are not entirely sure either.

    How well is monetary transmission working at the moment? We saw quite an uptick in yields in December although there wasn’t any change in monetary policy. All other things being equal, this slows down monetary policy transmission, doesn’t it?

    We have lowered the deposit facility rate by 125 basis points over the past eight months, and this has been transmitted smoothly to short-term market rates. We’ve also seen that bank lending rates have come down quite a bit – corporate loan rates by 92 basis points and mortgage rates by 64 basis points by December. This is significant. It tells you that transmission is working. When it comes to government bond yields, it’s important to look through the short-term volatility and take a somewhat longer perspective. And what you see then is that sovereign bond yields have remained rather stable. We had a strong repricing in 2022, when the ten-year Bund moved from negative territory at the end of 2021 to around 2.4% in October 2022. That is very close to the number that we’re seeing today. So we’ve been seeing a return of long-term sovereign bond yields to their new normal. We shouldn’t overstate the short-term volatility that we’ve experienced over the past weeks.

    There’s another aspect that is quite important. One of the most interesting features of this tightening cycle is that it has not led to a comparable tightening of broader financial conditions. The exceptionally strong risk appetite of financial investors has even boosted equity prices and compressed credit spreads, and that has weakened monetary policy transmission. And part of that is due to the fact that we are still holding a very large monetary policy bond portfolio.

    But overall, also taking into account the lags, monetary policy transmission is working fine.

    Is the ECB’s “meeting-by-meeting” communication really credible? The ECB now says that the direction of travel is clear. Isn’t this a pre-commitment to further rate cuts?

    I firmly believe in the meeting-by-meeting approach. The current time of high volatility is certainly not the time to tie our hands through forward guidance. And this is also what we stress in our monetary policy statements: we are not pre-committing to any particular rate path. At the time when it was still relatively clear that monetary policy was restrictive, one could infer the direction of travel from that. But this is no longer the case. And therefore, for me, the direction of travel is not so clear anymore.

    Is this view shared by the majority of the Executive Board or the Governing Council?

    It’s not for me to comment on that. It’s going back to the point that we now have to start the discussion on how far we should go. I’m not saying that we’re there yet. But we have to start the discussion.

    If we take the meeting-by-meeting approach and data dependency as a given, does the type of data that has to be assessed need to change over time?

    There are broadly two sets of data that we need to focus on. The first one refers to the inflation outlook: inflation itself, inflation expectations, wages, productivity, exchange rates. We use incoming data to cross-check the assumptions underlying our projections. This is why I never saw data dependence as a backward-looking concept. It was always forward-looking because we use incoming data to learn more about the credibility of our inflation outlook. The second set of data relates to the level of restrictiveness of monetary policy: interest rates, broader financial conditions, lending markets, the housing market as well as domestic demand, that is consumption, savings and investment. Of course, when we have a monetary policy meeting, we always look at all available data.

    Can I challenge you on your claim that it was always forward-looking? At the time of high inflation, the ECB put a lot of emphasis on the actual inflation data from the previous month, which by definition is backward-looking. GDP numbers are by definition also very backward-looking.

    I don’t agree. What do we learn from the current inflation data? We learn whether the transmission of our policy or of shocks is working as expected. High services inflation tells us something about its stickiness. If we spot deviations, we will eventually adjust our models but we also have to change our view about the medium-term outlook. So, in my view it was never backward-looking.

    Data dependence is all the more important in today’s world. Some people say that the projections have become more credible. But who knows what’s going to happen as regards the trade conflict, the war in Ukraine and so on. We are faced with an unusual number of shocks, and that requires us to be always able to react. I don’t have a fixed mindset about what to do. Quite the opposite. I think we need to be able to adjust to whatever data or shock is coming in and what’s happening in the world and in the euro area economy.

    What are the current data telling us about the inflation outlook?

    Both services inflation and wage growth are still at an uncomfortably high level. Our projections foresee a deceleration of both. But this still needs to materialise. Services inflation has been stuck at around 4% since November 2023, and it still has to come down. For me, this is actually quite important. And therefore, the incoming data will be very relevant because our projections foresee a relatively quick deceleration of services inflation over this year.

    How quickly do you want to see service inflation coming down?

    It should start to come down in February. That’s what we expect. Over time, it does not necessarily have to come down to 2% but to a level that is consistent with our medium-term 2% target. Wage growth is also still high, but we have many indications that it is going to decelerate. For example, our wage tracker shows that wage growth is expected to drop steeply in the second half of the year. Part of that is due to a base effect from one-off payments. Hence, wage growth is expected to stay relatively elevated over the first half of the year. So we still need to see this deceleration. This is something that I pay a lot of attention to.

    How concerned are you about recent swings in energy prices?

    Energy and food prices can always offer surprises. We have seen some relatively strong moves in energy prices recently. Gas prices moved up a lot. That was mainly driven by cold temperatures. Very recently, gas prices dropped sharply. This seems to be driven partly by uncertainty about whether countries will fill up their gas storages as quickly as originally intended. A second reason is the debate about a potential ceasefire in Ukraine. This can cause a lot of volatility, which can have a strong impact on headline inflation and also on underlying inflation because energy serves as an input. We have to monitor this carefully.

    What are the implications for monetary policy from energy price volatility? Is this deflationary or inflationary?

    Recent volatility has been extreme. Before the recent fall in gas prices it was clearly inflationary. But now we have to see how that is going to play out. In general, I see risks to our inflation outlook as somewhat skewed to the upside. So I would not exclude that inflation comes back to 2% later than we had anticipated. But that remains to be seen.

    The ECB this year will review its monetary strategy. President Lagarde has excluded the current inflation target from that review. Do you think that’s the right call?

    Our symmetric, medium-term inflation target of 2% has served us very well in the high inflation period. So I really don’t see any reason to question it. And I believe there is strong support for this view in the Governing Council. What we have seen, however, is how quickly the inflation environment can change. And we have also learned how much people dislike inflation. But for me, that has implications primarily for the reaction function and not for the target. I think these two should be kept apart.

    What are the potential implications for the reaction function?

    The reaction function should be part of the debate. Back in 2021 during the previous strategy review, the discussion was very much under the impression of the low-for-long period. The main concern at the time was that our monetary policy was constrained by the effective lower bound on interest rates. When you read the monetary policy strategy statement today, you would think it comes from a different world. It focused on the risk of inflation being too low, and stated that we should be particularly forceful or persistent in such a scenario. But we have shifted to a new world. The past few years have shown that there are also risks of a de-anchoring of inflation expectations to the upside and that upside inflation risks can materialise quickly and become more persistent due to second-round effects. And therefore, I believe that the new reaction function should be symmetric in order to take into account the risks in both directions. This is especially true given that we are likely to face more adverse supply-side shocks going forward.

    So effectively you are arguing in favour of a more hawkish reaction function?

    I don’t like these notions of hawks and doves, and I don’t think that they are relevant here. My point is that our reaction function should acknowledge the fundamental shift of the macroeconomic environment. Up to 2021, we paid very little attention to upside risks to inflation. There was the perception that central banks would know precisely how to deal with a surge in inflation. But we’ve experienced that it has been quite difficult. Inflation has been above target now for almost four years. Looking forward, we should be putting equal weight on risks in both directions. And I wouldn’t call that a hawkish assertion.

    Should the ECB toolkit be changed?

    We’ve gained a lot of experience with the different tools. I do believe that all the tools we have should remain in our toolkit. But we’ve learned how important it is to carefully weigh the benefits and costs of our instruments – especially when it comes to asset purchases. They have proven very effective in stabilising markets. But as a monetary policy stance instrument, they have been less beneficial and costlier than we thought. This should be taken into account. The same applies to forward guidance. Many people believe that forward guidance led to a delayed response to the inflation surge. So forward guidance is another tool that we need to look at very carefully.

    Are you implicitly saying that ECB should not have done as much quantitative easing as it did in the years up to 2021?

    My point is that once we are back to a more normal world – a situation where inflation expectations are well anchored, and services inflation and unit labour cost growth have come down – and we are confident that we are sustainably back at our target, then we could become more tolerant of moderate deviations from our target. We should stop fine-tuning and responding to single data points. We should instead focus on large persistent shocks that give rise to a risk of a de-anchoring of inflation expectations in either direction.

    So is your point that the ECB should be more willing to tolerate downward deviations to the 2% target in a steady state?

    We should be more willing to tolerate both moderate downward and upward deviations, and act when there is a threat of de-anchoring.

    But that’s an implicit change to the inflation target, is it not?

    No, not at all. My point is that we should be less activist and rather take the time to assess whether shocks pose a serious risk to inflation expectations. Of course, we should keep in mind that the vulnerability of inflation expectations may have changed after the recent inflation experience. People have learned that inflation can increase sharply and that this is very harmful. Firms have learned that they can reprice relatively quickly, and we have to take this into account.

    Finally, we need to think about how to deal with the uncertainty around our economic and inflation outlook. For me, the most useful way to deal with that is to make greater use of scenario analysis – and in a different way than we’ve done over the past years. Back then we were looking at tail risks, which was very useful. But in the future, we should also look at plausible alternative scenarios in order to get away from the illusion of precision that we create by just focusing on the baseline point estimate. We all know there is a lot of uncertainty around it. So I think it would be important to also look at plausible alternative scenarios to illustrate this uncertainty.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: expert reaction to the announcement of the expansion of the OpenSAFELY data platform

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Scientists comment on the expansion of the OpenSAFELY data platform. 

    Prof Andrew Morris, Director of HDR UK, said: 

    “OpenSAFELY is an excellent example of what is possible when we get health data right with the confidence of patients, the public and health professionals. Access to comprehensive GP data across all of England is a great step forward for safe and approved research. GP data offers greater breadth and depth than hospital data, providing a detailed picture of people’s health over time. Many common conditions, like arthritis, depression and back pain are mostly managed by GPs, so this data is vital for research that can improve care for millions.  

    “The OpenSAFELY platform is one that proved its worth during the pandemic, giving us much needed knowledge about COVID-19.  It permits researchers to work with the information the data provides – while preventing them from accessing the data itself. Now by moving beyond COVID-19, researchers will be able to uncover groundbreaking insights that can improve the health and well-being of countless individuals. Significant challenges remain – the system is still evolving, with much work still to be done.  But as OpenSAFELY and other initiatives show, the UK has both the skills and the will to make it work.  

    “The UK has long been a global leader in health data research.  But to stay ahead, we must make coordinated investments in secure data infrastructure if data driven research is to power improvements in patient care, public health, NHS efficiency, clinical trials and enable medical discovery. This includes secure data sharing with flagship programmes such as Our Future Health, UK Biobank and Genomics England.”

     

    Professor Sir Rory Collins, Principal Investigator and CEO of UK Biobank, said:     

    “The expansion of OpenSAFELY should be welcomed as it enhances an innovative and useful tool for health researchers working on GP data. However, the most significant leaps in scientific discovery will come from comparing many different types of data simultaneously, and at scale. For example, the 20,000 researchers who use UK Biobank can analyse over 10,000 variables on many of our 500,000 volunteers, with whole genome sequencing being just one of those. 

    “It is this ability to study the genetic, imaging, lifestyle, secondary and – soon – primary care data in combination that is so vital for research. That’s why we’ve seen over 14,000 peer-reviewed papers published using UK Biobank data, including developments that should lead to better diagnostics and treatments for conditions such as diabetes, dementia and heart disease. 

    “GP data is a critical national asset, and both researchers and patients will benefit from this expansion. The next step is adding consented GP data to larger datasets, and we at UK Biobank are delighted to be working with NHS England to add the de-identified primary care data of our 500,000 volunteers.” 

    Prof Sheila Bird, Honorary Professor, University of Edinburgh’s College of Medicine and Veterinary Medicine; and Visiting Senior Fellow at the MRC Biostatistics Unit, University of Cambridge, University of Cambridge, said:

    “Dr. (now Professor) Ben Goldacre, a physician by profession, was first to receive the Royal Statistical Society’s Award for Statistical Excellence in Journalism for his  Bad Science column in the Guardian.

    “Professor Goldacre, who authored the Goldacre Review in 2022 [1] is against Bad Science. But he is staunchly for properly-approved record-linkages which respect patient confidentiality: and his team at OpenSafely have worked, during SARS-CoV-2 and since, to deliver just that. The delivery is a work in progress, as the excellent video about OpenSafely makes clear. Hence, my comment is about elements of enhanced delivery.

    “First, as the Royal Statistical Society has argued for since swine-flu in 2009/10, the public  – and OpenSafely – need legislation to end the late registration of fact-of-death in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Only in Scotland, in our dis-United Kingdom, is fact-of-death registered, by law, within 8 days of death having been ascertained. OpenSafely for E&W urgently needs prompt and proper registration of fact-of-death which – for inquest deaths – is delayed by months or years [2].

    “Second, since one of five deaths aged 5-44 years in E&W is not registered for at least 6 months [2], ending the late registration of deaths is essential if we are to learn by OpenSafely’s research how to prevent or reduce premature mortality such as deaths due to suicide or addictions.

    “Third, analysts – including biostatisticians such as I – need to know in more detail about the random generators that OpenSafely uses for creating its pseudo-data, on which, as a biostatistician, I would develop and test my analysis routines. In particular, real data are often more complex in structure than statistical approximations to them in terms of their distribution (eg lognormal distribution assumed but the actual ln-data are not normally-distributed) or correlation structure. Analysts typically need to check assumptions on real data but may be writing checking-code based on approximations. For the checking-code to be incisive enough, analysts may need to understand in some detail the  “random generation” processes.

    “Fourthly, enhancements to OpenSafely may lead to important evolution in how some data are recorded by general practitioners. For example, when Gao et al. used record-linkage within Scotland’s  safe-haven to analyse the methadone-specific death-rate and other opioid-related deaths in Scotland’s Methadone Client Cohort (2009-2015)[4], we found that the available data were quantity of methadone prescribed (not daily-dose) and reimbursement date (not prescription end-date) because those quantities were the data needed to audit the reimbursement of pharmacists[5]. By contrast, guidelines on safe prescribing of methadone are written in terms of daily-dose!

    “Finally, the precautions built-into OpenSafely may mean that patients who registered objection to the use of their GP-data by care.data or the subsequent attempted grab during SARS-CoV-2 (which also failed) may wish to re-consider their objection. How does one do so?

    1. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/better-broader-safer-using-health-data-for-research-and-analysis
    2. Bird SM. Editorial: Counting the dead properly and promptly. Journal of the Royal Statistics Society Series A 2013; 176: 815 – 817.                                                                                                                                           
    3. Bird SM. End late registration of fact-of-death in England and Wales. Lancet 2015: 385: 1830 – 1831.             
    4. Bird SM. Everyone counts – so count everyone in England and Wales. Lancet 2016: 387: 25 – 26.                     Gao L, Robertson JR,
    5. Bird SM.  Scotland’s 2009-2015 methadone-prescription cohort: quintiles for daily-dose of prescribed methadone and risk of methadone-specific death. British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology 2020; accepted 12 June 2020; https://doi.org/10.1111/bcp.14432.

    This was announced at an SMC Press Briefing, and was accompanied by a funding announcement from Wellcome. The embargo lifted at 11:30am on Wednesday 19th February. 

    Declared interests:

    Prof Andrew Morris “Andrew Morris is Director of Health Data Research UK, the national institute for health data science; is Professor of Medicine and Vice Principal at the University of Edinburgh; is President of the Academy of Medical Sciences, has minority (

    Prof Sir Rory Collins “I am CEO and PI of UK Biobank, which is a Charitable Company established as a Joint Venture by the MRC and Wellcome. I have been in that role since September 2005, seconded 60%FTE from the University of Oxford where I am Head of the Nuffield Department of Population Health (which, along with other research organisations globally, benefits from using the UK Biobank – without any preferential access – for health-related research that is in the public interest).”  

     Prof Sheila Bird “has 30-years of experience of confidential record-linkage; & leads for Royal Statistical Society on need for legislation to end late registration of fact-of-death in E&W and Northern Ireland.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LCQ10: Colorectal Cancer Screening Programme

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

         Following is a question by Dr the Hon David Lam and a written reply by the Secretary for Health, Professor Lo Chung-mau, in the Legislative Council today (February 19):Question:     The Colorectal Cancer Screening Programme (CRCSP) has been implemented since 2016, under which participants will be arranged to undergo a Faecal Immunochemical Test (FIT) screening. According to the information released by the Government in December last year, about 60 per cent of the colorectal cancer patients diagnosed under CRCSP were in earlier stages (i.e. stage I and stage II) of cancer, which was higher than the 40 per cent of those who were not diagnosed under CRCSP. On the other hand, according to the information on the website of the Hong Kong Cancer Registry, among all cancers, the incidence rate of colorectal cancer dropped from the first place in 2016 to the third place in 2022, and the age-standardised mortality rate of colorectal cancer also dropped from about 14.1 to 12.7 per 100 000 population during the same period, indicating that CRCSP is effective in detecting colorectal cancer at an earlier stage and in lowering the mortality rate. However, there are views that only early detection and removal of advanced adenoma can further minimise the incidence rate of colorectal cancer. In recent years, studies have found that although FIT has a high sensitivity and specificity for colorectal cancer, the sensitivity for advanced adenoma ranges from 25 per cent to 34 per cent only, which is lower than that of the newer multi-target stool DNA test (about 42 per cent) and faecal bacterial gene markers test (about 57 per cent). Moreover, the Asian Pacific Association of Gastroenterology and the Asian-Pacific Society for Digestive Endoscopy do not even recommend the use of FIT for screening of colorectal polyps. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council whether it has plans to review CRCSP and consider adopting screening other than FIT for testing by participants; if so, of the relevant progress; if not, the reasons for that?Reply:President,     The reply, in consultation with the Department of Health (DH), to the question raised by Dr the Hon David Lam is as follows:     The Government attaches great importance to cancer prevention and control. In 2001, it established the Cancer Coordinating Committee (CCC) to formulate strategies for cancer prevention and control and to steer the direction of work covering cancer prevention and screening, surveillance, research and treatment. The CCC is chaired by the Secretary for Health and comprising members who are cancer experts, academics, doctors in public and private sectors as well as public health professionals. The Cancer Expert Working Group on Cancer Prevention and Screening (CEWG) established under the CCC regularly reviews local and international scientific evidence and makes recommendations on cancer prevention and screening applicable to the local setting.     From the public health perspective, the Government must carefully assess various factors when formulating a cancer screening programme with reference to evidence-based advice from the relevant experts. These include the local prevalence of the cancer concerned, the accuracy and safety of the relevant screening tools, and the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness in reducing incidence and mortality rates. Meanwhile, a screening programme will lead the public and relevant medical specialties to change the demand and supply model of related medical services. The Government needs to carefully assess the impact of a screening programme on the current healthcare system to avoid a severe imbalance in the use of limited healthcare resources, with a view to ensuring the optimal use of the overall public health and healthcare resources.      Regarding screening for colorectal cancer (CRC), the CEWG recommends that average-risk (e.g. without hereditary bowel syndromes), asymptomatic individuals aged 50 to 75 should consider annual or biennial faecal occult blood test; or sigmoidoscopy every five years; or colonoscopy every 10 years.     Based on the CEWG recommendations, the Government launched the Colorectal Cancer Screening Programme (the Programme) in 2016, which currently subsidises asymptomatic Hong Kong residents aged between 50 and 75 to undergo screening tests every two years in the private sector. The programme adopts faecal immunochemical test (FIT) as the screening tool. If the FIT result is positive, the participant will be referred to an enrolled colonoscopy specialist to receive a colonoscopy examination subsidised by the Government. If the FIT result is negative, the participant is advised to undergo the screening two years later.      As of the end of 2024, the cumulative total number of eligible persons participated in the Programme was approximately 510 000. About 77 000 persons (15 per cent) had positive FIT results, about 40 000 persons (7.7 per cent) were diagnosed to have colorectal adenomas after colonoscopy examination, and about 3 400 persons (0.7 per cent) had CRC. In 2024, there were around 86 000 new participants in the Programme, a record annual high since its launch. Among the CRC cases diagnosed under the Programme, a preliminary analysis of around 2 400 cases has been conducted, and about 56 per cent of these cases were in earlier stages, while less than 40 per cent of CRC cases in the general population (excluding cases from the Programme) belonged to earlier stages. This demonstrates that participation in the Programme allows early detection and treatment of CRC, thereby leading to a more favourable prognosis.     Regarding the screening method, the Programme uses FIT as the primary screening tool, which is in line with practices of the CRC screening programmes of most overseas places (such as Singapore, the United Kingdom and Australia). The CEWG has reviewed the scientific evidence on other non-invasive tests for CRC screening such as stool DNA, RNA, “microbial marker” and blood DNA tests in 2023, including the Joint Asian Pacific Association of Gastroenterology (APAGE)–Asian Pacific Society of Digestive Endoscopy (APSDE) clinical practice guidelines on the use of non-invasive biomarkers for diagnosis of colorectal neoplasia published in 2023. Upon CEWG’s review, there was currently insufficient evidence on better effectiveness and cost-effectiveness in reducing CRC incidence and mortality by these newer non-invasive CRC screening tools. The CEWG therefore reaffirmed the recommendations on CRC screening. In general, the cost of FIT ranges from several dozens to several hundred dollars, while the service charge of other newer non-invasive CRC screening tests mentioned above could amount to several thousand dollars. The CEWG shall continue to keep in view further local and overseas scientific evidence and practice related to CRC screening.     Apart from participating in regular CRC screening, leading a healthy lifestyle is also important in the prevention of CRC. According to CEWG’s current recommendation on prevention of CRC, the public is advised to adopt healthy lifestyle such as increasing intake of dietary fibre, reducing consumption of red and processed meat, having regular exercise, maintaining a healthy body weight and waist circumference, avoiding drinking alcohol and smoking. The DH has long been promoting a healthy lifestyle as the primary strategy for cancer prevention. The DH makes every effort in stepping up public education related to cancers with a view to raising public awareness of cancer prevention and screening.      At the same time, the Primary Healthcare Commission is actively promoting the Life Course Preventive Care Plan via District Health Centres (DHCs)/DHC Expresses and family doctors. Based on the core principles of prevention-oriented and whole-person care, a personalised preventive care plan will be formulated to address the health needs of citizens across different life stages with reference to the latest evidence. Family doctors and primary healthcare professionals will collaborate to provide health advice and education on chronic disease and cancer screening, and healthy lifestyles according to personal factors, such as recommending persons aged 50 or above to undergo CRC screening.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: President Donald J. Trump Intends to Nominate Individuals to Key Posts at the Department of Justice

    Source: US State of North Dakota

    Today the Department of Justice is proud to announce President Trump’s intent to nominate John Eisenberg to serve as Assistant Attorney General for National Security, Brett Shumate to serve as Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division, and Patrick Davis to serve as Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legislative Affairs.

    John Eisenberg (The National Security Division)

    During President Trump’s first term, John served as the Legal Advisor to the National Security Council, Assistant to the President, and Deputy Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs. John has also served at the Department of Justice in several positions, including Associate Deputy Attorney General in the Office of the Deputy Attorney General and Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel. In addition to his government experience, John was also a partner at Kirkland & Ellis, where he focused on white-collar and internal-investigation matters as well as data-security issues.

    John clerked for J. Michael Luttig of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and Justice Clarence Thomas of the Supreme Court of the United States. He is a graduate of Yale Law School and Stanford University.

    Brett Shumate (The Civil Division)

    Brett presently serves as the Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division. Prior to rejoining the Department, Brett was a partner at Jones Day in Washington, D.C. He previously served at the Department as the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Federal Programs Branch in the Civil Division.

    Brett clerked for Judge Edith H. Jones of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. He is a graduate of Wake Forest University School of Law and Furman University.

    Patrick Davis (The Office of Legislative Affairs)

    This will be Patrick’s third stint with the Department of Justice. During President Trump’s first term, Patrick served in DOJ management as Deputy Associate Attorney General. Earlier in his career, he served as a trial attorney in the Federal Programs Branch of the DOJ’s Civil Division. On Capitol Hill, Patrick was the Deputy Chief Investigative Counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee, where he led the Committee’s “Russiagate” investigation and was instrumental in the confirmation of Justice Brett Kavanaugh. He later served as the Chief Investigative Counsel for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

    Patrick rejoined the Department of Justice as the Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legislative Affairs. Prior to his return to the Department, he served as Senior Counsel at the American Petroleum Institute.

    Patrick is a graduate of Georgetown University Law Center and the University of Nebraska.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EIB Group invests €12.3 billion in Spain in 2024, with record investments in climate action, energy, innovation and housing

    Source: European Investment Bank

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) approved a financing package of €260 million to support the Maltese government’s investments aimed at fostering a smarter, greener, and more resilient economy. The first €130 million tranche was signed this morning in Valletta by Clyde Caruana, Minister for Finance, and Kyriacos Kakouris, EIB Vice-President. This landmark agreement will help Malta co-finance initiatives that receive grants through the European Union budget for the 2021-2027 period, advancing strategic investments in critical sectors that drive economic growth, job creation, and social cohesion.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Latest news – Next REGI meeting : 19 March 2025 – Committee on Regional Development

    Source: European Parliament

    The Committee on Regional Development will hold its next meeting in Brussels on Wednesday 19 March from 09:00-12:30 and 14:30-18:30.

    Source : © European Union, 2025 – EP

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Protection of the rights of the Greek ethnic minority in Northern Epirus – E-002630/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission attaches the highest importance to the respect of rule of law and fundamental rights, including the protection of minorities in Albania.

    Through the enlargement process and the EU-Albania Stabilisation and Association Agreement[1], the Commission closely follows reforms on the rule of law and the strengthening and protection of the fundamental rights in Albania, including rights of persons belonging to minorities — matters that fall under the so-called fundamentals of the enlargement process .

    The Commission assesses progress and provides policy recommendations in its annual report[2]. Moreover, as from 2024 Albania also participates in the annual Rule of Law Report[3], which assesses Albania’s progress on the protection of fundamental rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02009A0428%2802%29-20210901
    • [2] SWD(2024) 690 final , https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/a8eec3f9-b2ec-4cb1-8748-9058854dbc68_en?filename=Albania%20Report%202024.pdf
    • [3] SWD(2024) 828 final, https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/0154dce1-5026-45de-8b37-e3d56eff7925_en?filename=59_1_58088_coun_chap_albania_al.pdf
    Last updated: 19 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Managing the influx of migration to the Canary Islands – E-000288/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000288/2025/rev.1
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Jean-Paul Garraud (PfE), Fabrice Leggeri (PfE)

    In 2024, a total of 46 843 migrants landed in the Canary Islands, up 17.4 % from 2023. This situation highlights the limitations of the migration policies and external border controls in the European Union. Ángel Víctor Torres, Spain’s Minister for Territorial Policy, has admitted that this wave of migration is overloading the reception and accommodation facilities. Faced with such a high number of arrivals, the local authorities even stated that they were no longer able to look after unaccompanied migrant children.

    Meanwhile, Pedro Sánchez’s Socialist Government has adopted a reform aimed at regularising 300 000 illegal immigrants per year. This measure will merely serve to encourage potential immigrants, allow the smuggling networks to grow even stronger and put more human lives at risk.

    • 1.What additional resources will Frontex be given to combat smuggling networks?
    • 2.Does the Commission intend to strengthen the readmission agreements with the countries of origin to facilitate returns and deter illegal departures?

    Submitted: 23.1.2025

    Last updated: 19 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Isabel Schnabel: Interview with the Financial Times

    Source: European Central Bank

    Interview with Isabel Schnabel, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, conducted by Olaf Storbeck on 14 February 2025

    19 February 2025

    How relevant is the natural rate – R* – for day-to-day policymaking from your point of view?

    The natural rate of interest is an important theoretical concept. But it’s not well-suited to determine the appropriate monetary policy stance. The ECB staff analysis that was published recently had one main message: we know that we know very little. Model and estimation uncertainty result in confidence bands that are so wide that they include any reasonable interest rate that the ECB may set at this point. Moreover, R* is a steady-state concept for a world without shocks. That’s certainly not the world that we are in today. Just look at what’s happening with the evolving trade conflict on which we are getting news on a daily basis. So for all those reasons, I think R* cannot be any reliable guide for monetary policy in real time.

    Has your view on this changed?

    The point I have always emphasised is how R* is evolving over the longer term. People have focused too much on the narrow range for R* that was given in the staff note. This is misleading for several reasons. The narrow range only includes the models for which estimates were already available for the fourth quarter of 2024. If you look at the R* estimates for the third quarter, you see that the range actually goes up all the way to 3%. This is even above the current deposit facility rate of 2.75%. And that range still only includes the uncertainty stemming from using different models. If you add the parameter and filtering uncertainty, you get even wider bands. The one thing that you do see is that the overall range seems to have moved up over recent years. For me, that is the key point.

    But the most recent ECB estimates of R* also suggest that the current level is still lower than it was before the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis.

    That remains to be seen. There has been a clear upward trend. I expect this trend to continue for a number of reasons, including high and rising public debt and the huge investment needs for the digital and green transitions. Another factor is increasing global fragmentation. It leads to a partial reversal of the global savings glut, due to shrinking current account surpluses of some major economies, which was one of the main factors that had pushed R* down. So for me, the main message from the R* analysis is: maintaining price stability over the medium term is likely to require higher real rates in the future than before the pandemic. We cannot pin down the level of R* with any degree of confidence, but we can get an impression about the direction. For me, that direction for R* now is upwards again.

    The Euro zone economy suffers from a lack of economic dynamism and economic growth. Doesn’t this put downward pressure on the natural interest rate?

    Yes, there have been secular factors that have pushed R* down. But we are currently in a situation of transformation that may actually reverse that trend. That’s the whole point.

    When you say that R* is not very helpful for short-term monetary policymaking, why have you stressed it so much in your speeches and interviews?

    It’s important that we understand general macroeconomic trends. Also in the pre-pandemic period, it was very important to understand the underlying natural real rate environment. It can never be precise, but it helps us understand the broader picture. It has no impact on any individual rate decision.

    But would you say that it is relevant for the medium-term trajectory of monetary policy, let’s say for the next year or two? Or does it only matter over the next ten or 20 years?

    I think it has an impact on our medium-term thinking.

    Medium-term thinking would mean: it matters over the next two to three years, right?

    Well, it’s hard to pin down precisely.

    Some ECB observers have suggested that the natural rate was used by more hawkish voices as an argument in favour of being more careful and not lowering interest rates too fast. Would you agree?

    If you believe that R* has moved up, this argues for a more cautious approach. But this cannot just depend on R*. We need to look at the incoming data in order to understand how restrictive our monetary policy is. And the more evidence we have that monetary policy is no longer restrictive, the more cautious we have to become because further rate cuts may no longer be appropriate.

    So how restrictive is the ECB’s monetary policy at the moment?

    The data are showing that the degree of restriction has come down significantly, up to a point where we can no longer say with confidence that our monetary policy is still restrictive. One of the important data sources in this context is the bank lending survey.

    We’re looking at that very carefully. For corporate loans, 90% of banks said in the most recent round that the general level of interest rates has no impact on loan demand, while 8% said it has lifted credit demand. A year ago, a third of banks said that interest rates were weighing on loan demand. It’s even clearer when you look at mortgages. Almost half of banks said in the most recent round that the general level of interest rates is supporting loan demand. A year ago, more than 40% said that it was constraining loan demand. This is also reflected in a historically strong increase in mortgage demand in that same survey, which is gradually transmitting into the hard data on loan growth. Corporate loans were growing by 1.5% in December, mortgages by 1.1%.

    The easing is also being transmitted to the real economy. Consumption picked up in the third quarter by more than we had expected. And the savings rate has started to come down from its very high level. But of course, there are transmission lags, and part of the easing is still in the pipeline.

    You said that you can’t say with confidence anymore if monetary policy is still restrictive. The last ECB policy statement clearly stated that it still is. Do you have a different view than the ECB stated in its latest policy statement?

    No, I fully agreed with the statement last time. But we are now a step further, right? The January monetary policy statement referred to the interest rate of 3% and the level of restrictiveness before the latest monetary policy decision. The further we go down, the lower my conviction in such a statement will be. And note that I’m not saying our monetary policy is no longer restrictive. What I’m saying is I’m no longer sure whether it is still restrictive. But we should not overstate a difference of 25 basis points.

    Should the ECB drop the reference to restrictiveness in March?

    That is a discussion we should have in the next meeting.

    In an FT survey of Euro zone economists just before Christmas, half of them said they think that the ECB is behind the curve. What is your view on this?

    I’m firmly in the camp of the other half who think that we are right on track. The data that we’ve seen have confirmed that our gradual and cautious approach has been appropriate. Domestic inflation is still high, wage growth is still elevated, and we’ve seen new shocks to energy prices. We’ve also seen that inflation expectations are very sensitive to such shocks. So I think our approach is just right.

    Some economists argue that the big uncertainty and all those shocks could justify insurance cuts. Do you have any view on that?

    I don’t see any argument for that at this point, especially as we are getting closer to no longer being restrictive. If anything, we are getting closer to the point where we may have to pause or halt our rate cuts.

    Pause or halt… but not increase?

    No. That I would exclude.

    How close do you think we are to the point where the ECB should pause its easing?

    I will leave that to your interpretation. I don’t know what’s going to happen in the next meetings, so let’s see. But we need to start that discussion.

    That’s not what markets take as the base case scenario right now. Do you think that markets are ahead of themselves?

    Well, markets have been jumping around a bit in response to what is happening in the world. But an April rate cut is no longer fully priced in. So markets are not entirely sure either.

    How well is monetary transmission working at the moment? We saw quite an uptick in yields in December although there wasn’t any change in monetary policy. All other things being equal, this slows down monetary policy transmission, doesn’t it?

    We have lowered the deposit facility rate by 125 basis points over the past eight months, and this has been transmitted smoothly to short-term market rates. We’ve also seen that bank lending rates have come down quite a bit – corporate loan rates by 92 basis points and mortgage rates by 64 basis points by December. This is significant. It tells you that transmission is working. When it comes to government bond yields, it’s important to look through the short-term volatility and take a somewhat longer perspective. And what you see then is that sovereign bond yields have remained rather stable. We had a strong repricing in 2022, when the ten-year Bund moved from negative territory at the end of 2021 to around 2.4% in October 2022. That is very close to the number that we’re seeing today. So we’ve been seeing a return of long-term sovereign bond yields to their new normal. We shouldn’t overstate the short-term volatility that we’ve experienced over the past weeks.

    There’s another aspect that is quite important. One of the most interesting features of this tightening cycle is that it has not led to a comparable tightening of broader financial conditions. The exceptionally strong risk appetite of financial investors has even boosted equity prices and compressed credit spreads, and that has weakened monetary policy transmission. And part of that is due to the fact that we are still holding a very large monetary policy bond portfolio.

    But overall, also taking into account the lags, monetary policy transmission is working fine.

    Is the ECB’s “meeting-by-meeting” communication really credible? The ECB now says that the direction of travel is clear. Isn’t this a pre-commitment to further rate cuts?

    I firmly believe in the meeting-by-meeting approach. The current time of high volatility is certainly not the time to tie our hands through forward guidance. And this is also what we stress in our monetary policy statements: we are not pre-committing to any particular rate path. At the time when it was still relatively clear that monetary policy was restrictive, one could infer the direction of travel from that. But this is no longer the case. And therefore, for me, the direction of travel is not so clear anymore.

    Is this view shared by the majority of the Executive Board or the Governing Council?

    It’s not for me to comment on that. It’s going back to the point that we now have to start the discussion on how far we should go. I’m not saying that we’re there yet. But we have to start the discussion.

    If we take the meeting-by-meeting approach and data dependency as a given, does the type of data that has to be assessed need to change over time?

    There are broadly two sets of data that we need to focus on. The first one refers to the inflation outlook: inflation itself, inflation expectations, wages, productivity, exchange rates. We use incoming data to cross-check the assumptions underlying our projections. This is why I never saw data dependence as a backward-looking concept. It was always forward-looking because we use incoming data to learn more about the credibility of our inflation outlook. The second set of data relates to the level of restrictiveness of monetary policy: interest rates, broader financial conditions, lending markets, the housing market as well as domestic demand, that is consumption, savings and investment. Of course, when we have a monetary policy meeting, we always look at all available data.

    Can I challenge you on your claim that it was always forward-looking? At the time of high inflation, the ECB put a lot of emphasis on the actual inflation data from the previous month, which by definition is backward-looking. GDP numbers are by definition also very backward-looking.

    I don’t agree. What do we learn from the current inflation data? We learn whether the transmission of our policy or of shocks is working as expected. High services inflation tells us something about its stickiness. If we spot deviations, we will eventually adjust our models but we also have to change our view about the medium-term outlook. So, in my view it was never backward-looking.

    Data dependence is all the more important in today’s world. Some people say that the projections have become more credible. But who knows what’s going to happen as regards the trade conflict, the war in Ukraine and so on. We are faced with an unusual number of shocks, and that requires us to be always able to react. I don’t have a fixed mindset about what to do. Quite the opposite. I think we need to be able to adjust to whatever data or shock is coming in and what’s happening in the world and in the euro area economy.

    What are the current data telling us about the inflation outlook?

    Both services inflation and wage growth are still at an uncomfortably high level. Our projections foresee a deceleration of both. But this still needs to materialise. Services inflation has been stuck at around 4% since November 2023, and it still has to come down. For me, this is actually quite important. And therefore, the incoming data will be very relevant because our projections foresee a relatively quick deceleration of services inflation over this year.

    How quickly do you want to see service inflation coming down?

    It should start to come down in February. That’s what we expect. Over time, it does not necessarily have to come down to 2% but to a level that is consistent with our medium-term 2% target. Wage growth is also still high, but we have many indications that it is going to decelerate. For example, our wage tracker shows that wage growth is expected to drop steeply in the second half of the year. Part of that is due to a base effect from one-off payments. Hence, wage growth is expected to stay relatively elevated over the first half of the year. So we still need to see this deceleration. This is something that I pay a lot of attention to.

    How concerned are you about recent swings in energy prices?

    Energy and food prices can always offer surprises. We have seen some relatively strong moves in energy prices recently. Gas prices moved up a lot. That was mainly driven by cold temperatures. Very recently, gas prices dropped sharply. This seems to be driven partly by uncertainty about whether countries will fill up their gas storages as quickly as originally intended. A second reason is the debate about a potential ceasefire in Ukraine. This can cause a lot of volatility, which can have a strong impact on headline inflation and also on underlying inflation because energy serves as an input. We have to monitor this carefully.

    What are the implications for monetary policy from energy price volatility? Is this deflationary or inflationary?

    Recent volatility has been extreme. Before the recent fall in gas prices it was clearly inflationary. But now we have to see how that is going to play out. In general, I see risks to our inflation outlook as somewhat skewed to the upside. So I would not exclude that inflation comes back to 2% later than we had anticipated. But that remains to be seen.

    The ECB this year will review its monetary strategy. President Lagarde has excluded the current inflation target from that review. Do you think that’s the right call?

    Our symmetric, medium-term inflation target of 2% has served us very well in the high inflation period. So I really don’t see any reason to question it. And I believe there is strong support for this view in the Governing Council. What we have seen, however, is how quickly the inflation environment can change. And we have also learned how much people dislike inflation. But for me, that has implications primarily for the reaction function and not for the target. I think these two should be kept apart.

    What are the potential implications for the reaction function?

    The reaction function should be part of the debate. Back in 2021 during the previous strategy review, the discussion was very much under the impression of the low-for-long period. The main concern at the time was that our monetary policy was constrained by the effective lower bound on interest rates. When you read the monetary policy strategy statement today, you would think it comes from a different world. It focused on the risk of inflation being too low, and stated that we should be particularly forceful or persistent in such a scenario. But we have shifted to a new world. The past few years have shown that there are also risks of a de-anchoring of inflation expectations to the upside and that upside inflation risks can materialise quickly and become more persistent due to second-round effects. And therefore, I believe that the new reaction function should be symmetric in order to take into account the risks in both directions. This is especially true given that we are likely to face more adverse supply-side shocks going forward.

    So effectively you are arguing in favour of a more hawkish reaction function?

    I don’t like these notions of hawks and doves, and I don’t think that they are relevant here. My point is that our reaction function should acknowledge the fundamental shift of the macroeconomic environment. Up to 2021, we paid very little attention to upside risks to inflation. There was the perception that central banks would know precisely how to deal with a surge in inflation. But we’ve experienced that it has been quite difficult. Inflation has been above target now for almost four years. Looking forward, we should be putting equal weight on risks in both directions. And I wouldn’t call that a hawkish assertion.

    Should the ECB toolkit be changed?

    We’ve gained a lot of experience with the different tools. I do believe that all the tools we have should remain in our toolkit. But we’ve learned how important it is to carefully weigh the benefits and costs of our instruments – especially when it comes to asset purchases. They have proven very effective in stabilising markets. But as a monetary policy stance instrument, they have been less beneficial and costlier than we thought. This should be taken into account. The same applies to forward guidance. Many people believe that forward guidance led to a delayed response to the inflation surge. So forward guidance is another tool that we need to look at very carefully.

    Are you implicitly saying that ECB should not have done as much quantitative easing as it did in the years up to 2021?

    My point is that once we are back to a more normal world – a situation where inflation expectations are well anchored, and services inflation and unit labour cost growth have come down – and we are confident that we are sustainably back at our target, then we could become more tolerant of moderate deviations from our target. We should stop fine-tuning and responding to single data points. We should instead focus on large persistent shocks that give rise to a risk of a de-anchoring of inflation expectations in either direction.

    So is your point that the ECB should be more willing to tolerate downward deviations to the 2% target in a steady state?

    We should be more willing to tolerate both moderate downward and upward deviations, and act when there is a threat of de-anchoring.

    But that’s an implicit change to the inflation target, is it not?

    No, not at all. My point is that we should be less activist and rather take the time to assess whether shocks pose a serious risk to inflation expectations. Of course, we should keep in mind that the vulnerability of inflation expectations may have changed after the recent inflation experience. People have learned that inflation can increase sharply and that this is very harmful. Firms have learned that they can reprice relatively quickly, and we have to take this into account.

    Finally, we need to think about how to deal with the uncertainty around our economic and inflation outlook. For me, the most useful way to deal with that is to make greater use of scenario analysis – and in a different way than we’ve done over the past years. Back then we were looking at tail risks, which was very useful. But in the future, we should also look at plausible alternative scenarios in order to get away from the illusion of precision that we create by just focusing on the baseline point estimate. We all know there is a lot of uncertainty around it. So I think it would be important to also look at plausible alternative scenarios to illustrate this uncertainty.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Alleged secret Commission funding of environmental groups for pursuing Green Deal objectives – P-000280/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-000280/2025/rev.1
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Roberto Vannacci (PfE)

    According to an investigation conducted by a well-known Dutch newspaper[1], the Commission has secretly been funding environmental groups by means of reserved contracts, with the aim of promoting the Green Deal and influencing the debate on agricultural policies.

    This funding would seem to amount to around EUR 1 million, and the beneficiary organisations would appear to have been given specific objectives for exerting pressure on MEPs and national governments to support the green reforms promoted by former Commissioner Frans Timmermans.

    The use of public resources to fund lobbying raises serious questions over the transparency and impartiality of the Commission’s work, threatening to undermine the principle of institutional neutrality and the sound functioning of the European democratic process.

    In the light of the above, could the Commission answer the following questions:

    • 1.Can it confirm the existence of contracts and funding for environmental groups for lobbying to promote the Green Deal?
    • 2.Can it state the amount of funding granted, and indicate the beneficiaries and the objectives pursued?
    • 3.What measures will it take to ensure maximum transparency in the allocation of public funding and to prevent potential conflicts of interest in the EU decision-making process?

    Submitted: 22.1.2025

    • [1] https://www.ansa.it/europa/notizie/rubriche/altrenews/2025/01/22/media-ue-pago-lobby-green-per-appoggiare-riforme-timmermans_2b74e2b7-4f86-46d7-8520-506b5a77d95e.html.
    Last updated: 19 February 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – The position of the VP/HR regarding the recent developments in Syria – E-002931/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The fall of the Assad’s regime marks a historic moment for the Syrian people, who have endured immense suffering and demonstrated extraordinary resilience in their pursuit of dignity, freedom, and justice. All Syrians should now have the chance to know the truth about the fate of their loved ones. All Syrians, in the country and the diaspora, must have an opportunity to reunify, stabilise and rebuild their country.

    The EU is pursuing early engagement with Syria’s new leadership while exercising prudence. The EU is very attentive to the statements but more importantly to the acts of the new authorities. All stakeholders should engage in an inclusive, Syrian-led and Syrian-owned dialogue on all key issues to ensure an orderly, peaceful and non-discriminatory transition, guided by the respect for international law, human rights, fundamental freedoms, non-discrimination, pluralism and tolerance among all components of society.

    The European Council has tasked the Commission and the High Representative to develop actionable options to support Syria’s transition. The EU’s efforts are being carefully assessed with the Member States and coordinated with key partners.

    Last updated: 19 February 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Certificate of Professional Competence (CPC) – driver shortage in the EU – E-002658/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission is concerned about the shortage of professional bus and truck drivers in the EU and it is of the view that t he current driver shortage which keeps growing should first and foremost be addressed by making the profession more attractive . The EU has recently taken several measures to improve the regulatory framework in which professional drivers operate in the EU.

    The Mobility Package[1] introduced significant improvements of the working conditions of drivers and thus increased the attractiveness of the profession.

    The Commission is also supporting, through the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF)[2], the development of new and the upgrade of existing safe and secure truck parking areas (SSTPAs) to allow drivers to spend their rest periods in adequate conditions. The existence of sufficient SSTPAs is considered by drivers as an essential element for their wellbeing.

    The Commission is also assisting Member States and the relevant stakeholders in increasing the attractiveness of the profession through various programmes[3].

    It is also in regular contact with the relevant stakeholders with a view to further improving the working conditions of drivers and incentivise more women and young people to take up the profession of driver.

    T he Commission has also launched a study that investigates the conditions for employment of third-country drivers in the various EU Member States and into the level of qualification and skills that drivers from t hird countries already have when they arrive in the EU.

    Once the results of this study are available, the Commission may consider any further measures as regards Certificate of Professional Competence , as appropriate.

    • [1] Regulation (EU) 2020/1054 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2020, Regulation (EU) 2020/1055 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2020 and Directive (EU) 2020/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2020, all OJ L 249, 31.07.2020.
    • [2] https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/programmes/connecting-europe-facility/transport-infrastructure_en
    • [3] Such as the European Social Fund Plus (https://european-social-fund-plus.ec.europa.eu/en), E rasmus+ (https://erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu/), the reinforced Youth Guarantee (https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1079&langId=en) and Invest EU (https://europa.eu/investeu/home_en)
    Last updated: 19 February 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Withdrawal of marketing authorisation for muscular dystrophy medicine Translarna by the EMA – E-002494/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    In September 2023, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP) recommended to refuse the annual renewal of the conditional marketing authorisation for Translarna. The opinion was confirmed in January 2024 following a re-examination.

    In May 2024 the Commission asked the CHMP to consider further data brought to its attention. The CHMP reviewed its assessment and confirmed its recommendation in June 2024 and, after a re-examination, on 17 October 2024.

    The benefit-risk was re-assessed based on available data including that from the time of the conditional approval, that generated as per the specific obligations under the conditional approval (two clinical trials), that from the patient registry STRIDE, additional real-world data and from two paediatric studies. These data failed to confirm a positive benefit-risk balance.

    In line with the legislation[1], the Commission shall prepare a draft decision based on the CHMP opinion and submit it to the Standing Committee on Medicinal Products for Human Use.

    In a Committee meeting on 12 December 2024, Member States considered the CHMP assessment robust but recognised the unmet medical need of Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD) patients and the very specific circumstances of this case.

    Member States discussed the need to manage therapeutic continuity for patients already under treatment given the absence of alternative treatments authorised in the EU.

    The Commission is considering how these aspects can be integrated into the final Decision which Member States will vote on early in 2025.

    There are currently 32 treatments for DMD under development in the EU. EMA is currently reviewing 2 such medicines: givinostat and the gene therapy delandistrogene moxeparvovec .

    • [1] https://health.ec.europa.eu/medicinal-products/legal-framework-governing-medicinal-products-human-use-eu_en
    Last updated: 19 February 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Penalties for driving under the influence of drugs – E-003000/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    1. The Commission agrees that addressing driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs is crucial. Alcohol-related incidents account for around a quarter of road deaths in the Union[1]. The Commission supports platforms like the High-Level Group on Road Safety for sharing best practices among Member States and the EU Road Safety Exchange facilitates learning between Member States on enforcing drink and drug-driving laws, including using alcohol interlocks. Directive (EU) 2015/413[2] covers drink and drug-driving offences, allowing easier punishment of non-resident offenders. The proposed Directive on the Union-wide effect of driving disqualifications aims to extend driving bans for such offences across the EU under certain circumstances. Addressing drug-impaired driving is also one of the priorities of the EU Drugs Strategy[3] and its related Action Plan 2021-2025[4], which call for the implementation of measures raising awareness of the risks of driving while impaired by drugs and further research and innovation of on-site drug detection tools.

    2. The rising number of fatal crashes involving electric scooters is also a matter of concern to the Commission. While setting traffic rules is primarily a matter for the Member States, the Commission has supported the publication of guidance for the safe use of personal mobility devices[5] which offers suggestions and good practices to local authorities. A recent study[6] suggests a universal technical approval system for such devices, and the Commission is considering how best to follow up on those recommendations.

    • [1] https://road-safety.transport.ec.europa.eu/document/download/bd2408b2-64ce-44a8-a4ca-d7820c7c91ba_en?filename=ERSO-TR-alcohol_drugs_2023.pdf
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2015/413/oj/eng
    • [3] EU Drugs Strategy 2021-2025, OJ C 102I, 24.3.2021, p. 1.
    • [4] EU Drugs Action Plan 2021-2025, OJ C 272, 8.7.2021, p. 2-28.
    • [5] https://urban-mobility-observatory.transport.ec.europa.eu/sustainable-urban-mobility-plans/expert-corner-sump-reference-materials_en
    • [6] https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/4286a092-a55f-11ef-85f0-01aa75ed71a1
    Last updated: 19 February 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Causes of rising food prices – E-002505/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    1. Food prices have increased as a result of changing market conditions derived from the Russian war on Ukraine and resulting surge in input prices in 2022-2023, especially for energy and fertilisers. Prices were influenced by external factors, including the geopolitical situation and the impact of severe weather events on production capacity.

    2. EU rules require all imported agri-food products to comply with EU health and food safety standards. The Commission maintains its commitment to act multilaterally, bilaterally and autonomously to strengthen the alignment of imports with EU production standards, and ensure that applying standards to EU producers does not lead to social and environmental leakages.

    3. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) remains essential for supporting farmers’ income, rewarding ecosystem services, compensating for work on land with natural constraints, and investing to improve competitiveness and resilience. Several concrete steps were taken to improve farmers’ position, including an ambitious simplification proposal[1] in 2024 to alleviate some of the burden. In the second week of taking office, this Commission immediately put forward two new proposals to strengthen farmers’ position in the agri-food supply chain, and to enhance cross-border enforcement against unfair trading practices[2]. The forthcoming Vision for Agriculture and Food will address the sector’s long-term attractiveness, competitiveness, resilience and sustainability.

    • [1] Simplification Regulation (EU) 2024/1468, see also Commission Staff Working Document ‘Simplification measures for farmers’, SWD(2024) 360 final.
    • [2] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_6321
    Last updated: 19 February 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – New directives allowing corruption in Spain – E-000244/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000244/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Nora Junco García (ECR), Diego Solier (ECR)

    In the context of recent EU reforms and legislative proposals to combat corruption (such as the Whistleblower Protection Directive[1]), it is essential to reinforce transparency. In Spain, there are worrying signs of practices that erode public trust, forcing us to reflect on the integrity of Western democracies.

    Under the leadership of Pedro Sánchez, there are worrying signs of corruption and partisan use of power, with power-linked scandals such as those involving his wife Begoña Gómez and his brother David Sánchez, who are currently facing accusations of corruption and nepotism.

    In Spain, partitocracy and the misuse of public resources undermine public trust. Moreover, tight control over key institutions jeopardises the separation of powers, an essential principle of any functional democracy.

    In view of this:

    • 1.Is the Commission considering an independent review of institutional governance in Spain to assess its compliance with democratic principles?
    • 2.What oversight and transparency tools can be strengthened to prevent abuse of power and clientelism in the Member States?
    • 3.What measures does the Commission plan to take to ensure that EU funds in Spain are not used for corrupt or partisan purposes?

    Submitted: 21.1.2025

    • [1] Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (OJ L 305, 26.11.2019, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/1937/oj).
    Last updated: 19 February 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Seasonal firefighters – E-000569/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000569/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Konstantinos Arvanitis (The Left)

    Every year since 2003, without fail, the Greek fire brigade has employed workers in order to cover its permanent and lasting staffing needs. During this time, these workers have been carrying out the same tasks as the fire brigade’s permanent staff, covering the service’s permanent and lasting staffing needs as a matter of course. Nevertheless, they always seem to be employed under successive fixed-term contracts – a contract type that is not justified based on the needs of these workers either. These employees are well-established and fundamental to the very functioning of the service, which is all the more evident given the fact that some of these workers have more than 20 years of service under their belts. Moreover, due to the undoubtable effects of the climate crisis, the need for the Greek fire brigade (not only for firefighting but also for general responses to any severe and extreme natural phenomenon, flooding, earthquakes, etc.) has increased and is not limited to a specific period of time.

    The Greek Government’s practice of drawing up successive fixed-term employment contracts for a number of years, without any objective justification, is contrary to the protective provisions of Directive 1999/70/EC[1].

    What measures will the Commission take to ensure that the Greek Government complies with the provisions of Directive 1999/70/EC?

    Submitted: 7.2.2025

    • [1] Article 1: ‘The purpose of the Directive is to put into effect the framework agreement on fixed-term contracts’. Preamble to the framework agreement: ‘The parties to this agreement recognise that contracts of an indefinite duration are, and will continue to be, the general form of employment relationship between employers and workers’, ‘whereas employment contracts of an indefinite duration are the general form of employment relationships and contribute to the quality of life of the workers concerned and improve performance’. Article 2 of the directive: ‘Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this directive by 10 July 1999, or shall ensure that, by that date at the latest, management and labour have introduced the necessary measures by agreement, the Member States being required to take any necessary measures to enable them at any time to be in a position to guarantee the results imposed by this Directive. They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof.’
    Last updated: 19 February 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Euro area monthly balance of payments: December 2024

    Source: European Central Bank

    19 February 2025

    • Current account recorded €38 billion surplus in December 2024, up from €25 billion in previous month
    • Current account surplus amounted to €419 billion (2.8% of euro area GDP) in 2024, up from €241 billion (1.6%) in 2023
    • In financial account, euro area residents’ net acquisitions of non-euro area portfolio investment securities totalled €664 billion and non-residents’ net acquisitions of euro area portfolio investment securities totalled €811 billion in 2024

    Chart 1

    Euro area current account balance

    (EUR billions unless otherwise indicated; working day and seasonally adjusted data)

    Source: ECB.

    The current account of the euro area recorded a surplus of €38 billion in December 2024, an increase of €13 billion from the previous month (Chart 1 and Table 1). Surpluses were recorded for goods (€33 billion), services (€18 billion) and primary income (€4 billion). These were partly offset by a deficit for secondary income (€17 billion).

    Table 1

    Current account of the euro area

    (EUR billions unless otherwise indicated; transactions; working day and seasonally adjusted data)

    Source: ECB.

    Note: Discrepancies between totals and their components may be due to rounding.

    Data for the current account of the euro area

    In 2024, the current account recorded a surplus of €419 billion (2.8% of euro area GDP), compared with a surplus of €241 billion (1.6% of euro area GDP) in 2023. This increase was mainly driven by a larger surplus for goods (up from €256 billion to €390 billion), and, to a lesser extent, by a larger surplus for services (up from €123 billion to €162 billion) and a smaller deficit for secondary income (down from €170 billion to €165 billion). The surplus for primary income remained stable (€32 billion).

    Chart 2

    Selected items of the euro area financial account

    (EUR billions; 12-month cumulated data)

    Source: ECB.

    Notes: For assets, a positive (negative) number indicates net purchases (sales) of non-euro area instruments by euro area investors. For liabilities, a positive (negative) number indicates net sales (purchases) of euro area instruments by non-euro area investors.

    In direct investment, euro area residents made net investments of €74 billion in non-euro area assets in 2024, following net disinvestments of €329 billion in 2023 (Chart 2 and Table 2). Non-residents disinvested €102 billion in net terms from euro area assets in 2024, following net disinvestments of €364 billion in 2023.

    In portfolio investment, euro area residents’ net purchases of non-euro area equity increased to €145 billion in 2024, up from €89 billion in 2023. Over the same period, net purchases of non-euro area debt securities by euro-area residents increased to €519 billion, up from €380 billion in 2023. Non-residents’ net purchases of euro area equity increased to €350 billion in 2024, up from €158 billion in 2023. Over the same period, non-residents made net purchases of euro area debt securities amounting to €461 billion, following net purchases of €398 billion in 2023.

    Table 2

    Financial account of the euro area

    (EUR billions unless otherwise indicated; transactions; non-working day and non-seasonally adjusted data)

    Source: ECB.

    Notes: Decreases in assets and liabilities are shown with a minus sign. Net financial derivatives are reported under assets. “MFIs” stands for monetary financial institutions. Discrepancies between totals and their components may be due to rounding.

    Data for the financial account of the euro area

    In other investment, euro area residents recorded net acquisitions of non-euro area assets amounting to €363 billion in 2024 (following net acquisitions of €205 billion in 2023), while they recorded net disposals of liabilities of €43 billion (following net disposals of €171 billion in 2023).

    Chart 3

    Monetary presentation of the balance of payments

    (EUR billions; 12-month cumulated data)

    Source: ECB.

    Notes: “MFI net external assets (enhanced)” incorporates an adjustment to the MFI net external assets (as reported in the consolidated MFI balance sheet items statistics) based on information on MFI long-term liabilities held by non-residents, available in b.o.p. statistics. B.o.p. transactions refer only to transactions of non-MFI residents of the euro area. Financial transactions are shown as liabilities net of assets. “Other” includes financial derivatives and statistical discrepancies.

    The monetary presentation of the balance of payments (Chart 3) shows that the net external assets (enhanced) of euro area MFIs increased by €553 billion in 2024. This increase was mainly driven by the current and capital accounts surplus and, to a lesser extent, by euro area non-MFIs’ net inflows in portfolio investment debt and portfolio investment equity. These developments were partly offset by euro area non-MFIs’ net outflows in direct investment.

    In December 2024 the Eurosystem’s stock of reserve assets increased to €1,394.0 billion up from €1,391.7 billion in the previous month (Table 3). This increase was driven by positive exchange rate changes (€4.0 billion) and, to a lesser extent, by net acquisitions of assets (€2.7 billion) which were partly offset by negative price changes (€4.3 billion).

    Table 3

    Reserve assets of the euro area

    (EUR billions; amounts outstanding at the end of the period, flows during the period; non-working day and non-seasonally adjusted data)

    Notes: “Other reserve assets” comprises currency and deposits, securities, financial derivatives (net) and other claims. Discrepancies between totals and their components may be due to rounding.

    Data for the reserve assets of the euro area

    Data revisions

    This press release incorporates revisions to the data for October and November 2024. These revisions did not significantly alter the figures previously published.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – LEZs and their lack of transparency and order – E-000247/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000247/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Diego Solier (ECR), Nora Junco García (ECR)

    The implementation of low emission zones (LEZs) in Spain, particularly in Madrid, reflects an alarming lack of planning and consideration for their socio-economic impact on citizens. Despite EU mandates, the Spanish Government has demonstrated incompetence in the management of these regulations, resulting in court decisions that have paralysed them due to formal defects and lack of information at the regional, municipal and national levels. This administrative chaos severely affects thousands of families in Madrid, with 250 000 vehicles facing irrational restrictions without viable alternatives or effective aid.

    Furthermore, the inadequacy of the plans to transition to electric vehicles, exacerbated by the lack of state budget and the inability to manage EU funds, is evidence of poor management and a disconnection from the economic reality of citizens. Meanwhile, car manufacturers face disproportionate demands that threaten the stability of the industry, which is crucial for employment in Spain.

    In view of this:

    • 1.What measures will the Commission take to ensure that Member States such as Spain carry out thorough economic analyses before implementing low emission zones?
    • 2.Is the Commission considering revising the deadlines for the transition to electric vehicles in order to adapt them to the real capacity of citizens and industry?
    • 3.What mechanisms does the Commission have in place to prevent EU funds from being inefficiently managed by Member States?

    Submitted: 21.1.2025

    Last updated: 19 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Restoring the competitiveness of the steel industry – E-000575/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000575/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez (Renew)

    The European steel industry is leading global decarbonisation initiatives and is key to the EU’s prosperity, resilience and strategic autonomy. However, it is facing increasing pressure due to global state-funded overcapacity, flooding the EU market with products at low prices. In addition, high energy and carbon costs, together with uncertainty about the supply of low-carbon energy, is jeopardising its green transition.

    In addition, resource shuffling allows exporters to divert products with a lower carbon footprint to the EU while still selling more polluting products on other markets, without a real reduction in global emissions. The Commission should address this risk with tools such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).

    In view of the above:

    • 1.How does the Commission plan to amend or adapt the safeguard measure to reflect the current situation in the steel market in the EU before 1 April 2025?
    • 2.What approach does it intend to take with regard to this measure after that date?
    • 3.What mechanisms does the Commission envisage to prevent resource shuffling and to ensure that imports reflect real emission reductions in the countries of origin?

    Submitted: 7.2.2025

    Last updated: 19 February 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Greece financing from EIB Group totals €2.2 billion in 2024 with focus on energy supply, business growth and disaster preparedness

    Source: European Investment Bank

    EIB

    • EIB Group’s fresh financing in Greece last year amounted to €2.2 billion
    • Focus last year on energy supply, business growth and disaster management
    • Latest annual results bring EIB Group support in Greece over past five years to €14.5 billion

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) Group’s new financing in Greece amounted to €2.2 billion last year, with major support to bolster energy supplies, strengthen businesses and protect against environmental disasters in the country.

    The total for 2024 included €2.03 billion from the EIB and portfolio guarantees of €152 million from the European Investment Fund (EIF), which focuses on innovative and technology-driven small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as well as Small Mid-Caps in Europe.

    Top operations included loans of €390 million to natural-gas supplier DEPA Commercial to build solar parks, €150 million to power provider HEDNO to upgrade the grid, loans and guarantees of €550 million to domestic banks to expand financing for SMEs and Mid-Caps and €220 million to the government to bolster disaster management.

    Kostis Hatzidakis, Minister of Finance of the Hellenic Republic noted: “Greece’s relationship with the European Investment Bank is long-standing and strong. This was reaffirmed in 2024, with new financing reaching €2.2 billion. These funds will be used for investments in renewable energy sources, upgrades to the electricity grid, support for SMEs, and the purchase of firefighting aircraft and rescue equipment. The EIB was a valuable ally when Greece was cut off from the markets. It will remain a partner, but with a new approach. Going forward, priorities will focus on energy interconnections, research and technology, climate adaptation, and defense investments, as outlined in the EIB’s Strategic Roadmap”.

    “Our work in Greece is a testament to the transformative power of strategic financing,” said EIB Vice-President Yannis Tsakiris. “In 2024, we reinforced our commitment to the country by supporting clean energy, climate resilience and critical infrastructure while strengthening SMEs, innovation, job creation and social cohesion.”

    The latest annual results bring total EIB Group financing in Greece over the past five years to €14.5 billion. The yearly average in the country since 2000 is almost €2.9 billion, which reflects an unusually high sum of almost €5 billion in 2021 as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic.

    The EIB Group’s support last year was almost 1% of Greece’s gross domestic product (GDP), the third-highest level among European Union countries behind only Croatia and Estonia. That means that EIB Group financing in Greece last year averaged €631 per inhabitant, making the country one of the biggest beneficiaries based on the size of the population and the economy. The funding is projected to catalyse investments in Greece of up to €6.6 billion – about 2.5% of its GDP.

    Energy supply

    The €390 million EIB loan to DEPA Commercial is for new photovoltaic (PV) parks in the regions of western Macedonia, Thessaly and central Greece. The sites will add approximately 800 megawatts (MW) of renewable energy – enough to power 278,000 households for a year.

    Also in the area of clean energy, the EIB last year provided a €195 million loan to supplier PPC Renewables to develop 580 MW of solar plants and 175 MW of battery storage. The moves will boost renewables capacity, grid stability and energy security.

    The €150 million EIB credit to HEDNO covers upgrades to Greece’s electricity-distribution network, improving grid reliability and facilitating integration of renewables.

    The EIB last year also took part in the creation of an EU “Decarbonisation Fund” for Greece that will channel €1.6 billion in revenue from the European emissions-trading system into sustainable energy and development projects on Greek islands. These include grid interconnections with the mainland and the phase-out of local power plants.

    Business boost

    The EIB last year allocated a total €702 million to strengthen SMEs and Mid-Caps in Greece. The support – 28% of the total – took the form of intermediated loans and guarantees.

    Top operations included €300 million guarantees to Eurobank and National Bank of Greece covering €600 million new loans to Mid-Caps. In addition, the EIB provided a €250 million loan to the National Bank of Greece to bolster green investments by Greek SMEs and Mid-Caps. The credit raised total EIB support for such investments in Greece to €1 billion.

    The EIF also showed its agility in supporting vital investments for both debt and equity. It signed €152m with several of Greece’s financial institutions for capped portfolio guarantees. They are expected to mobilise up to €1,8bn in financing for small and medium-sized enterprises, while making the Greek economy greener, and supporting innovation and the country’s digital transition.

    The EIF also signed a new €200 million equity mandate to support innovative companies in Life Sciences & Healthcare and Sustainability & Social Impact by improving their access to vital financing. Funded by Cohesion policy and national resources of the Hellenic Republic, the mandate will cover a financing gap in these sectors, supporting investments from pre-seed to growth stages based on market needs.

    Disaster protection

    The €220 million EIB loan last year to the Greek government is to buy fire trucks, rescue vehicles and aircraft needed to fight to natural disasters such as wildfires and floods, both of which have caused extensive damage in Greece in recent years. The credit also covers upgrades to essential disaster-management services.

    The financing forms part of a European climate-adaptation plan by the EIB Group and brings its total support for Greek civil protection and disaster preparedness to €595 million.

    EIB Advisory

    There were also key technical assistance projects delivered from EIB Advisory, a highlight being an agreement with the Athens Water Supply and Sewerage Company (EYDAP) to back its €2 billion, 10-year investment programme to ensure the Greek capital has a more resilient water supply and supporting investments in lignite-dependent regions such as Western Macedonia and Megalopolis in the Peloponnese, facilitating their transition to a future of clean energy.

    In December 2024, the continuation of advisory support by EIB advisors from the PASSA team to the Greek administration was approved. This support aims to ensure the smooth implementation of sustainable development and Just Transition projects financed by the EU.

    Background information

    EIB

    The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. Built around eight core priorities, , we finance investments that contribute to EU policy objectives by bolstering climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and bioeconomy, social infrastructure, important investments outside the EU, and the Capital Markets Union.  

    The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund (EIF), signed nearly €89 billion in new financing for over 900 high-impact projects in 2024, boosting Europe’s competitiveness and security.  

    All projects financed by the EIB Group are in line with the Paris Climate Agreement, as pledged in our Climate Bank Roadmap. Almost 60% of the EIB Group’s annual financing supports projects directly contributing to climate change mitigation, adaptation, and a healthier environment.  

    Fostering market integration and mobilising investment, the Group supported a record of over €100 billion in new investment for Europe’s energy security in 2024 and mobilised €110 billion in growth capital for startups, scale-ups and European pioneers

    Approximately half of the EIB’s financing within the European Union is directed towards cohesion regions, where per capita income is lower than the EU average.

    Greece financing from EIB Group totals €2.2 billion in 2024 with focus on energy supply, business growth and disaster preparedness
    Greece financing from EIB Group totals €2.2 billion in 2024 with focus on energy supply, business growth and disaster preparedness
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    Greece financing from EIB Group totals €2.2 billion in 2024 with focus on energy supply, business growth and disaster preparedness
    Greece financing from EIB Group totals €2.2 billion in 2024 with focus on energy supply, business growth and disaster preparedness
    ©EIB
    Download original
    Greece financing from EIB Group totals €2.2 billion in 2024 with focus on energy supply, business growth and disaster preparedness
    Greece financing from EIB Group totals €2.2 billion in 2024 with focus on energy supply, business growth and disaster preparedness
    ©EIB
    Download original
    Greece financing from EIB Group totals €2.2 billion in 2024 with focus on energy supply, business growth and disaster preparedness
    Greece financing from EIB Group totals €2.2 billion in 2024 with focus on energy supply, business growth and disaster preparedness
    ©EIB
    Download original
    Greece financing from EIB Group totals €2.2 billion in 2024 with focus on energy supply, business growth and disaster preparedness
    Greece financing from EIB Group totals €2.2 billion in 2024 with focus on energy supply, business growth and disaster preparedness
    ©EIB
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    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Commission allocates €99 million in emergency support to farmers in Spain, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia and Hungary

    Source: European Commission

    European Commission Press release Brussels, 19 Feb 2025 Today, Member States gave a positive opinion to the Commission proposal to mobilise €98,6 million from the agricultural reserve to directly support farmers in Spain, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia and Hungary who have been impacted by exceptional adverse climatic events and natural disasters since spring 2024.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Latest news – Next meeting of the FEMM Committee: 3 March 2025 – Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality

    Source: European Parliament

    The next meeting of the Committee on Gender Equality and Women’s Rights will take place on:

    • 3 March 2025 time and room tbc
    FEMM Committee meetings calendars
         2024
         2025
         FEMM Bureau and Coordinators
    FEMM work in progress
         FEMM work in progress (updated 18/02/2025)

    Source : © European Union, 2025 – EP

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – DEVE delegation to Tanzania on 24-26 February 2025 – Committee on Development

    Source: European Parliament

    7 Committee on Development MEPs, led by chair Barry Andrews, will travel to Tanzania to gather first-hand information on Global Gateway initiatives and other development cooperation projects on the ground and to assess their impact on the local economy and population.

    MEPs will focus on the impact of EU investment in the country, both in sector-specific projects and the wider impact of the EU’s flagship Global Gateway initiative. Over the course of the three-day mission, MEPs will visit projects focusing on water and sanitation, economic development and port infrastructure, gender equality, education, and sustainable fishing practices. The MEPs will meet with government ministers and representatives of EU diplomatic missions, UN agencies, development banks, private sector, and national development agencies. They will also talk with their counterparts in the Tanzanian parliament as well as local civil society representatives to discuss, among other issues, sustainable development, inter-parliamentary cooperation and human rights.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – Deal on new EU rules to reduce textile and food waste

    Source: European Parliament

    On Tuesday night, Parliament and Council reached a provisional agreement on new measures to prevent and reduce waste from food and textiles across the EU.

    Cutting down food waste

    Negotiators agreed to introduce binding food waste reduction targets to be met at national level by 31 December 2030: 10% in food processing and manufacturing and 30% per capita in retail, restaurants, food services and households. These targets would be calculated in comparison to the amount generated as an annual average between 2021 and 2023. Following Parliament’s request, EU countries would have to take measures to ensure that economic operators having a significant role in the prevention and generation of food waste (to be identified in each country) facilitate the donation of unsold food that is safe for human consumption.

    Producers to cover costs for collecting, sorting and recycling waste textiles

    According to the deal, EU countries would have to establish producer responsibility (EPR) schemes, through which producers that make textiles available in an EU country would have to cover the costs for their collection, sorting and recycling, 30 months after the entry into force of the directive. These provisions would apply to all producers, including those using e-commerce tools and irrespective of whether they are established in an EU country or outside the EU. Micro-enterprises would need to comply with the EPR requirements 12 months later.

    The new rules would cover products such as clothing and accessories, footwear, blankets, bed and kitchen linen, curtains, hats. At Parliament’s initiative, EU countries may also set up EPR schemes for the producers of mattresses.

    Negotiators also agreed that member states should address ultra-fast fashion and fast fashion practices when setting out the financial contributions to the EPR schemes.

    Quote

    Rapporteur Anna Zalewska (ECR, PL) said: “During the final negotiations round, Parliament succeeded to secure provisions making sure that food waste and textiles waste as part of the municipal waste will be further reduced. We succeeded in ensuring feasible and realistic provisions for member states to implement food waste reduction policies and we managed to ensure that the agriculture sector will not be negatively impacted. We also set up the legal framework to ensure that producers contribute to the effective separate collection of textiles they produce. We managed to lower the administrative burden both for member states and economic operators.”

    Next steps

    Parliament and Council have concluded an “early second reading agreement” (negotiations took place after the EP’s first reading was adopted in plenary). The Council is now expected to formally adopt its position, which can then be endorsed by the EP in second reading.

    Background

    Every year, almost 60 million tonnes of food waste (132 kg per person) and 12.6 million tonnes of textile waste are generated in the EU. Clothing and footwear alone account for 5.2 million tonnes of waste, equivalent to 12 kg of waste per person every year. It is estimated that less than 1% of all textiles worldwide are recycled into new products.

    In July 2023, the Commission proposed a revision of the EU rules on waste, targeted at food and textile waste. Under the existing rules, EU countries were already required to set up separate collection of textiles by 1 January 2025.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Security: President Donald J. Trump Intends to Nominate Individuals to Key Posts at the Department of Justice

    Source: United States Attorneys General

    Today the Department of Justice is proud to announce President Trump’s intent to nominate John Eisenberg to serve as Assistant Attorney General for National Security, Brett Shumate to serve as Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division, and Patrick Davis to serve as Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legislative Affairs.

    John Eisenberg (The National Security Division)

    During President Trump’s first term, John served as the Legal Advisor to the National Security Council, Assistant to the President, and Deputy Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs. John has also served at the Department of Justice in several positions, including Associate Deputy Attorney General in the Office of the Deputy Attorney General and Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel. In addition to his government experience, John was also a partner at Kirkland & Ellis, where he focused on white-collar and internal-investigation matters as well as data-security issues.

    John clerked for J. Michael Luttig of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and Justice Clarence Thomas of the Supreme Court of the United States. He is a graduate of Yale Law School and Stanford University.

    Brett Shumate (The Civil Division)

    Brett presently serves as the Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division. Prior to rejoining the Department, Brett was a partner at Jones Day in Washington, D.C. He previously served at the Department as the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Federal Programs Branch in the Civil Division.

    Brett clerked for Judge Edith H. Jones of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. He is a graduate of Wake Forest University School of Law and Furman University.

    Patrick Davis (The Office of Legislative Affairs)

    This will be Patrick’s third stint with the Department of Justice. During President Trump’s first term, Patrick served in DOJ management as Deputy Associate Attorney General. Earlier in his career, he served as a trial attorney in the Federal Programs Branch of the DOJ’s Civil Division. On Capitol Hill, Patrick was the Deputy Chief Investigative Counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee, where he led the Committee’s “Russiagate” investigation and was instrumental in the confirmation of Justice Brett Kavanaugh. He later served as the Chief Investigative Counsel for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

    Patrick rejoined the Department of Justice as the Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legislative Affairs. Prior to his return to the Department, he served as Senior Counsel at the American Petroleum Institute.

    Patrick is a graduate of Georgetown University Law Center and the University of Nebraska.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI: DT Cloud Acquisition Corporation Announces Change of Extraordinary General Meeting Date

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    New York, New York, Feb. 19, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — DT Cloud Acquisition Corporation (Nasdaq: DYCQU, DYCQ, DYCQR) (“DT Cloud” or the “SPAC”), a publicly-traded special purpose acquisition company, today announced that its Extraordinary General Meeting (“EGM”), previously scheduled at 10:00 a.m. Eastern Time on February 18, 2025, has been postponed to 10:00 a.m. Eastern Time on February 21, 2025, and the redemption right deadline has been postponed to 5:00 p.m. Eastern Time on February 19, 2025.

    The Company filed a proxy supplement on February 14, 2025, as further amended on February 19, 2025, to increase the amended monthly extension fee, as proposed in the Proposal 1 to the EGM, to $0.022 for each outstanding Public Share. The proxy materials can be accessed on the SEC’s website at http://www.sec.gov.

    About DT Cloud Acquisition Corporation

    DT Cloud is a blank check company formed for the purpose of effecting a merger, share exchange, asset acquisition, stock purchase, reorganization or other similar business combination with one or more businesses. While DT Cloud may pursue an initial business combination target in any business or industry, it intends to focus its search on industries that complement its management team’s background. DT Cloud is led by Shaoke Li, its Chief Executive Officer, and Guojian Chen, its Chief Financial Officer.

    Forward-looking Statements

    This press release contains “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Forward looking statements are statements that are not historical facts. Such forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties, which could cause actual results to differ from the forward-looking statements. The Company expressly disclaims any obligations or undertaking to release publicly any updates or revisions to any forward-looking statements contained herein to reflect any change in the Company’s expectations with respect thereto or any change in events, conditions or circumstances on which any statement is based.

    Additional Information and Where to Find It

    On January 27, 2025, the Company filed a definitive proxy statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) in connection with its solicitation of proxies for the EGM. The Company filed additional proxy supplements with the SEC on February 4, 14 and 19, 2025. BEFORE MAKING ANY VOTING DECISION, INVESTORS AND SECURITY HOLDERS OF THE COMPANY ARE URGED TO READ THE DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT (INCLUDING ANY AMENDMENTS OR SUPPLEMENTS THERETO) AND OTHER DOCUMENTS THE COMPANY FILES WITH THE SEC CAREFULLY IN THEIR ENTIRETY WHEN THEY BECOME AVAILABLE AS THEY WILL CONTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION. Investors and security holders will be able to obtain free copies of the definitive proxy statement (including any amendments or supplements thereto) and other documents filed or that will be filed with the SEC through the web site maintained by the SEC at www.sec.gov.

    Participants in the Solicitation

    The Company and its directors, executive officers, other members of management and employees, under SEC rules, may be deemed to be participants in the solicitation of proxies from the shareholders of the Company in connection with the Meeting. Investors and shareholders may obtain more detailed information regarding the names, affiliations and interests of the Company’s directors and officers in the Proxy Statement, which may be obtained free of charge from the sources indicated above.

    No Offer or Solicitation

    This press release shall not constitute a solicitation of a proxy, consent or authorization with respect to any securities or in respect of the EGM proposals. This communication shall also not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy any securities, nor shall there be any sale of securities in any states or jurisdictions in which such offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful prior to registration or qualification under the securities laws of any such jurisdiction. No offering of securities shall be made except by means of a prospectus meeting the requirements of Section 10 of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or an exemption therefrom. 

    Contact:

    For investors:

    DT Cloud Acquisition Corporation
    Shaoke Li
    Chief Executive Officer
    30 Orange Street
    London
    United Kingdom, WC2H 7HF
    Email: jack.li@dtcloudspac.com

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: Diversified Energy Announces Proposed Offering of Ordinary Shares

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    BIRMINGHAM, Ala., Feb. 19, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Diversified Energy Company PLC (LSE: DEC; NYSE: DEC) (“Diversified” or the “Company“), an independent energy company focused on natural gas and liquids production, transportation, marketing and well retirement, today announces the launch of an underwritten public offering (the “Offering”) in the United States of up to 8,500,000 ordinary shares (the “Shares”).

    Citigroup and Mizuho are acting as joint book-running managers and underwriters for the proposed Offering.

    In addition, Diversified intends to grant the underwriters an option to purchase up to an additional 850,000 ordinary shares at the public offering price, less underwriting discount. The Offering is subject to market conditions and other factors, and there can be no assurance as to whether or when the Offering may be completed, or as to the actual size or terms of the Offering.

    The Company intends to use the net proceeds from the Offering to repay a portion of the debt expected to be incurred by the Company in connection with the proposed acquisition of Maverick Natural Resources, LLC, as announced on January 27, 2025 (the “Acquisition”). In the event that the Acquisition does not close, the Company intends to use the net proceeds from the Offering to repay debt and for general corporate purposes. The consummation of the Offering is not conditioned upon the completion of the Acquisition, and the completion of the Acquisition is not conditioned upon the consummation of the Offering.

    A shelf registration statement relating to these securities was filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC“) on February 11, 2025 and became effective upon filing. Copies of the registration statement can be accessed through the SEC’s website free of charge at www.sec.gov. The Offering will be made only by means of a prospectus supplement and an accompanying prospectus in the United States. A preliminary prospectus supplement and the accompanying prospectus related to the Offering will be filed with the SEC and will be available free of charge by visiting EDGAR on the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov. Copies of the preliminary prospectus supplement and the accompanying prospectus can also be obtained, when available, free of charge from either of the joint book-running managers for the Offering: Citigroup, c/o Broadridge Financial Solutions, 1155 Long Island Avenue, Edgewood, NY 11717 (Tel: 800-831-9146); or Mizuho Securities USA LLC, Attention: Equity Capital Markets Desk, at 1271 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10020, or by email at US-ECM@mizuhogroup.com.

    This announcement does not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy our ordinary shares nor shall there be any sale of securities, and shall not constitute an offer, solicitation or sale in any jurisdiction in which such offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful prior to registration or qualification under the securities laws of that jurisdiction.

    CONTACTS

    Diversified Energy Company PLC +1 973 856 2757
    Doug Kris dkris@dgoc.com
    Senior Vice President, Investor Relations & Corporate Communications  
       
    FTI Consulting dec@fticonsulting.com
    U.S. & UK Financial Media Relations  
       

    About Diversified

    Diversified is a leading publicly traded energy company focused on natural gas and liquids production, transport, marketing, and well retirement. Through our unique differentiated strategy, we acquire existing, long-life assets and invest in them to improve environmental and operational performance until retiring those assets in a safe and environmentally secure manner. Recognized by ratings agencies and organizations for our sustainability leadership, this solutions-oriented, stewardship approach makes Diversified the Right Company at the Right Time to responsibly produce energy, deliver reliable free cash flow, and generate shareholder value.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release includes forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are sometimes identified by the use of forward-looking terminology such as “believe”, “expects”, “targets”, “may”, “will”, “could”, “should”, “shall”, “risk”, “intends”, “estimates”, “aims”, “plans”, “predicts”, “continues”, “assumes”, “projects”, “positioned” or “anticipates” or the negative thereof, other variations thereon or comparable terminology. These forward-looking statements include all matters that are not historical facts. They appear in a number of places throughout this announcement and include statements regarding the intentions, beliefs or current expectations of management or the Company concerning, among other things, expectations regarding the proposed Offering of securities and the Acquisition. These forward-looking statements involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties, many of which are beyond the Company’s control and all of which are based on management’s current beliefs and expectations about future events, including market conditions, failure of customary closing conditions and the risk factors and other matters set forth in the Company’s filings with the SEC and other important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those projected.

    Important Notice to UK and EU Investors

    This announcement contains inside information for the purposes of Regulation (EU) No. 596/2014 on market abuse and the UK Version of Regulation (EU) No. 596/2014 on market abuse, as it forms part of UK domestic law by virtue of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (together, “MAR”). In addition, market soundings (as defined in MAR) were taken in respect of the matters contained in this announcement, with the result that certain persons became aware of such inside information as permitted by MAR. Upon the publication of this announcement, the inside information is now considered to be in the public domain and such persons shall therefore cease to be in possession of inside information in relation to the Company and its securities.

    Members of the public are not eligible to take part in the Offering. This announcement is directed at and is only being distributed to persons: (a) if in member states of the European Economic Area, “qualified investors” within the meaning of Article 2(e) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 (the “Prospectus Regulation“) (“Qualified Investors“); or (b) if in the United Kingdom, “qualified investors” within the meaning of Article 2(e) of the UK version of Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 as it forms part of UK law by virtue of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, who are (i) persons who fall within the definition of “investment professionals” in Article 19(5) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005, as amended (the “Order“), or (ii) persons who fall within Article 49(2)(a) to (d) of the Order; or (c) persons to whom they may otherwise lawfully be communicated (each such person above, a “Relevant Person“). No other person should act or rely on this announcement and persons distributing this announcement must satisfy themselves that it is lawful to do so. This announcement must not be acted on or relied on by persons who are not Relevant Persons, if in the United Kingdom, or Qualified Investors, if in a member state of the EEA. Any investment or investment activity to which this announcement or the Offering relates is available only to Relevant Persons, if in the United Kingdom, and Qualified Investors, if in a member state of the EEA, and will be engaged in only with Relevant Persons, if in the United Kingdom, and Qualified Investors, if in a member state of the EEA.

    No offering document or prospectus will be available in any jurisdiction in connection with the matters contained or referred to in this announcement in the United Kingdom and no such offering document or prospectus is required (in accordance with the Prospectus Regulation or UK Prospectus Regulation) to be published. The Company will publish a prospectus in connection with Admission as required under the UK Prospectus Regulation in due course.

    Neither the content of the Company’s website (or any other website) nor the content of any website accessible from hyperlinks on the Company’s website (or any other website) is incorporated into, or forms part of, this announcement.

    The Company has consulted with a number of existing shareholders and other investors ahead of the release of this announcement, including regarding the rationale for the offering. Consistent with each of its prior offerings, the Company will respect the principles of pre-emption, so far as is possible, through the allocation process, in the Offering.

    The MIL Network –