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Category: Europe

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Impact of Mercosur on Romanian agriculture and new EUR 1 billion fund – E-000398/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000398/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Daniel Buda (PPE), Dan-Ştefan Motreanu (PPE)

    The EU-Mercosur Agreement, signed on 6 December 2024, is still to be approved by the Council of the EU and the European Parliament and ratified by all the Member States. However, the agreement could become operational as from 2026, two years prior to the entry into force of the EU’s future multiannual budgetary framework (MFF) for 2028-2034.

    At the INTA Committee meeting of 16 January 2025, the Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security, Maroš Šefčovič, revealed that a new fund worth EUR 1 billion was to be established for farmers affected by the Mercosur Agreement.

    • 1.How will the Commission create this new fund under the current MFF without transferring money from existing funds and programmes?
    • 2.The Commissioner also stated there will potentially be small decreases in prices and in production, both of which were estimated at between 0.5 and 2 %. These estimates for Europe as a whole provide no information on what may be a disproportionate impact between different regions or Member States. What impact does the Commission expect Mercosur will have on the Romanian agricultural sector and the competitiveness of Romanian farmers?

    Submitted: 29.1.2025

    Last updated: 5 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Conformity of teaching contracts in Italy with the NRRP and EU law – E-002309/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission approved Italy’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) under Regulation (EU) 2021/24[1], which establishes milestones and targets detailed in the annex to the Council Implementing Decision[2]. The Commission works closely with the Italian authorities to ensure smooth implementation and compliance to NRRP requirements.

    The NRRP does not directly finance teachers’ recruitment costs, but supports a reform (Mission 4, Component 1, Reform 2.1) to improve recruitment and qualification processes, aiming to increase professional standards. The reform targets the recruitment of at least 70 000 new teachers covered by the reform through permanent contracts by 2026.

    The reform introduced a structured qualification pathway and transitional measures to allow teachers with temporary contracts to participate in recruitment competitions and complete the qualification process during the ‘probationary period’.

    This contributes to reducing the excessive use of consecutive fixed-term contracts in the school system, improving working conditions and guaranteeing more stable employment conditions.

    Under EU law (Directive 1999/70/EC[3]), Member States are required to take effective steps to prevent the abuse of successive fixed-term contracts.

    The EU Court of Justice held that there is no general obligation on Member States to automatically convert fixed-term contracts to permanent ones, but it is for the Member States to lay down the conditions for their conversions.

    Nevertheless, where abuse has taken place, effective guarantees for the protection of workers must be provided for. In that regard, Italy amended its rules on financial compensation for misuse of fixed-term employment contracts, with law of 14/11/2024, n. 166[4].

    • [1] Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility.
    • [2] Annex to the COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION amending the Implementing Decision of 13 July 2021 on the approval of the assessment of the recovery and resilience plan for Italy eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/IT/TXT/PDF/?uri=CONSIL:ST_9399_2024_ADD_1&qid=1717059380496
    • [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/1999/70/oj/eng
    • [4] G.U. 14/11/2024, n. 267.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Former Commissioner Thierry Breton’s new lobbying activities for Bank of America – E-000358/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000358/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Pascale Piera (PfE), Anne-Sophie Frigout (PfE), Marie-Luce Brasier-Clain (PfE), Mathilde Androuët (PfE), Catherine Griset (PfE), Julie Rechagneux (PfE), Christophe Bay (PfE), Séverine Werbrouck (PfE), Jean-Paul Garraud (PfE), Malika Sorel (PfE), Aleksandar Nikolic (PfE), Julien Sanchez (PfE), Elisabeth Dieringer (PfE), Tomáš Kubín (PfE), Barbara Bonte (PfE), Anna Bryłka (PfE), Nikola Bartůšek (PfE), Ton Diepeveen (PfE), Jorge Martín Frías (PfE), Jorge Buxadé Villalba (PfE), Ondřej Knotek (PfE), Tomasz Froelich (ESN), Markus Buchheit (ESN), Hans Neuhoff (ESN), Erik Kaliňák (NI), Katarína Roth Neveďalová (NI), Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă (NI), Kateřina Konečná (NI), Nicolas Bay (ECR), Fernand Kartheiser (ECR)

    On 15 January 2025, the Commission gave the green light for Thierry Breton’s new role lobbying for the Global Advisory Board of Bank of America[1].

    However, according to Articles 245 and 339 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as a former European Commissioner, he is bound by ‘the duty to behave with integrity and discretion’ and to ‘not disclose information’ covered by the obligation of professional secrecy, including post term of office.

    The Commission’s Ethical Committee rightly pointed out in its opinion that there is nevertheless ‘a link between former Commissioner Breton’s portfolio responsibilities and the scope of the notified activity’, given the size of his portfolio.

    • 1.How does the Commission justify the obvious contradiction between, on the one hand, its decision to authorise Breton taking up this role for a foreign entity and, on the other hand, him being prohibited from using any information acquired during his term of office, when that mandate is precisely why he was asked to join the advisory board?
    • 2.Will it at long last review the composition of the Ethical Committee, whose members are ‘appointed by the Commission, on a proposal from the President’ (Article 12(4) of the Code of Conduct), with a view to making it properly independent?

    Submitted: 27.1.2025

    • [1] Commission Decision C(2025)9000 final

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Unacceptable statements by Skopjan Prime Minister in the US – E-000305/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000305/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Emmanouil Kefalogiannis (PPE)

    In his recent statements in New Jersey in the United States, the Prime Minister of the government in Skopje referred to an unresolved and ongoing ‘Macedonian’ issue. These statements raise legitimate concerns in Greece, as they seem to violate the spirit and letter of international agreements that are a prerequisite for the government in Skopje’s EU path and support irredentist declarations and claims on neighbouring countries.

    Given that adherence to international treaties is essential for the government in Skopje to further progress in its EU accession process, can the Commission say:

    • 1.How does it assess the Prime Minister’s statements and their impact on good neighbourly relations and regional stability?
    • 2.What measures does it intend to take to ensure that the government in Skopje fully respects its obligations and avoids statements and actions that can negatively impact cooperation with EU Member States and stability in the Balkans?

    Submitted: 23.1.2025

    Last updated: 5 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Territorial supply restrictions and artificial price increases for basic food products – E-000393/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000393/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Tomáš Zdechovský (PPE)

    The application of territorial supply restrictions by certain food companies has resulted in significant disparities in the prices of basic food products, such as butter, between EU Member States. These practices lead to artificially inflated prices in certain regions, disproportionately affecting consumers and limiting their access to affordable goods. Such restrictions undermine the core principles of the single market by hindering fair competition and fragmenting the internal market for essential goods. Moreover, they exacerbate economic inequalities and create unnecessary barriers for consumers and businesses alike.

    • 1.Is the Commission planning to adopt measures to prevent territorial supply restrictions across the EU and ensure fairer pricing for consumers?
    • 2.What specific actions does the Commission intend to take to strengthen the single market and address these anti-competitive practices?
    • 3.How does the Commission plan to monitor and enforce compliance with competition rules in the food sector to safeguard consumer interests?

    Submitted: 29.1.2025

    Last updated: 5 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Support measures for the self-employed – E-000441/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000441/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Georgios Aftias (PPE)

    In recent years, based on statistical data, self-employed people in all European countries have been facing financial problems, which are having an impact on their lives. It is noteworthy that self-employed people are a crucial strength in European economies, as they cover a range of professional activities in both the primary and secondary production sectors and constitute the backbone of the economy of the member states of the European Union.

    In view of this:

    • 1.With what measures will the Commission support the sustainability of the self-employed?
    • 2.Will the Commission propose solutions for their housing and energy problems?

    Submitted: 2.2.2025

    Last updated: 5 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Ensuring food security in the face of meteorological and climate threats – E-000397/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000397/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Daniel Buda (PPE)

    The agriculture sector has been experiencing extreme weather events such as drought, floods and fires for many years running. These disasters, which have had a profound impact on agricultural production, soil quality and infrastructure are putting pressure on farmers, and disproportionately high pressure on small and medium-sized farms. In 2024, record high temperatures were reached; in January 2025, we are facing a wave of cold snaps. These events not only affect agricultural production, but also feed into higher food prices across the EU. Farmers and consumers are feeling the effects of these crises and food security is becoming a major concern.

    • 1.What measures is the Commission considering for the promotion and wholesale adoption of technologies that can adapt/prepare the agriculture sector to cope with the impact of extreme weather events?
    • 2.Does the Commission plan to quantify and publish data on the volume of primary agricultural products required to ensure European self-sufficiency and food security?
    • 3.The agricultural reserve, which has been drained over the last three years, is insufficient to compensate farmers for the damage suffered as a result of natural disasters, while the redistribution of cohesion and CAP funding is unreliable as a long-term solution. Will the Commission propose a new fund – or alternative solutions – to address such situations?

    Submitted: 29.1.2025

    Last updated: 5 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Boosting innovation: the impact of intellectual property rights on business growth and employee benefits – E-000298/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000298/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Dan-Ştefan Motreanu (PPE)

    As outlined in a report released on 9 January 2025 by the European Patent Office (EPO) and the EU Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), businesses that hold intellectual property rights tend to generate between 28 % and 41 % higher revenues than those that do not.

    Using data collected between 2013 and 2022, the report analysed over 119 000 companies across EU Member States and revealed a strong correlation between company performance and the ownership of patents, trademarks and designs. This connection is particularly significant for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).

    Employees also benefit from this dynamic: companies that hold intellectual property rights provide salaries that are, on average, 22 % higher than those offered by companies without such rights.

    What steps is the Commission taking to encourage and support the growth of businesses that own intellectual property rights?

    Submitted: 23.1.2025

    Last updated: 5 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Commission President’s visit to Türkiye on 17 December 2024 – E-000346/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000346/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Barbara Bonte (PfE)

    On 17 December 2024, the President of the Commission visited the President of Türkiye. In the course of that visit, according to reports, Ms von der Leyen pledged a further one billion euros to Turkey for aid for Syrian refugees and discussed the issue of the customs union and visa waivers. Improvement of EU-Türkiye relations and cooperation on rebuilding Syria were also, seemingly, on the agenda. During the talks, according to reports, President Erdogan also asked for the matter of ‘bilateral’ tensions regarding Greece and Cyprus not to be raised.

    • 1.Did the Commission President raise with the Turkish President Türkiye’s illegal occupation of northern Cyprus since 1974?
    • 2.Did the Commission President make it clear to the Turkish President that she had not been given a mandate by the Member States to revive the accession talks?
    • 3.What specific concessions did the President of Türkiye make to the President of the Commission?

    Submitted: 27.1.2025

    Last updated: 5 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – What has the European Institute of Innovation and Technology’s 9th Knowledge and Innovation Community achieved? – E-000347/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000347/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Anthony Smith (The Left)

    On 26 October 2021, the European Institute of Innovation and Technology launched a call for proposals with a view to creating a 9th Knowledge and Innovation Community (KIC), focusing on the cultural and creative sectors and industries in the EU. The initiative was allocated a budget of EUR 150 million for the period 2021-2027.

    Fifty partners from 20 countries were selected to ‘accelerate the growth of the cultural and creative industries and help unlock their economic potential’.

    But beyond the ambitious press releases, it seems that the project has not advanced one inch since its launch. Some participants apparently want to leave what appears to be an empty shell.

    Can the Commission:

    • 1.Demonstrate the usefulness of this KIC focusing on the cultural and creative sectors and industries in the EU?
    • 2.Report on the use of the funding allocated to this 9th KIC as at the date of submission of this written question?
    • 3.Give an assurance that funding for this scheme does not come at the expense of other programmes, such as the various strands of Creative Europe?

    Submitted: 27.1.2025

    Last updated: 5 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Elections in the Republic of Moldova and Georgia – E-000292/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000292/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Siegbert Frank Droese (ESN)

    • 1.What specific knowledge does the Commission have regarding Moldovan President Sandu’s allegations of Russian financial interference in the elections?[1]
    • 2.What specific knowledge does the Commission have regarding allegations of irregularities in the Georgian elections?[2]

    Submitted: 23.1.2025

    • [1] https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/europa/moldau-wahl-referendum-102.html
    • [2] https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/georgien-usa-und-eu-fordern-untersuchung-der-vorwuerfe-bei-georgien-wahl/100083732.html
    Last updated: 5 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Return of Greek antiquities to Greek museums – The case of ‘Las Incantadas’ – E-000440/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000440/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Emmanouil Fragkos (ECR)

    The time has come for ‘The Enchanted Ones’ (Las Incantadas) – an ancient sculptural fragment from Thessaloniki, currently in the Louvre – to be returned to Greece, as part of the broader effort to return our cultural heritage. These sculptures, which adorned a Roman portico in the centre of Thessaloniki, were removed during the Ottoman period in the 19th century by the French diplomat/archaeologist Emmanuel Miller, raising ethical questions regarding their legal ownership.

    The sculptures are an integral part of the cultural and historical identity of Thessaloniki. Their return will allow Greeks and visitors to admire them in their geographical and historical context. Many museums internationally are increasingly recognising the importance of exhibiting antiquities in their place of origin.

    Furthermore, Greece has proven its ability to preserve and exhibit its historical treasures, unlike third countries. The return of ‘Las Incantadas’ will contribute to the restoration of historical justice.

    Finally, their return will reinforce France’s commitment to cultural cooperation and historical responsibility, strengthening Greek-French ties, in a spirit of sincere mutual respect.

    In view of the above, can the Commission say:

    • 1.Are there any developments towards or plans for the revision of Directive 2014/60/EU, so that Greece’s treasures can be returned to Greek museums?
    • 2.Does the Commission plan to adopt tools to support goodwill movements, so that the cultural heritage of one Member State stolen in an earlier period can be returned by another?

    Submitted: 2.2.2025

    Last updated: 5 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EIB Board approves €2.4 billion of financing for business innovation, energy grids, flood resilience and transport

    Source: European Investment Bank

    • Discussion of EIB Global strategic reorientation and support for European electricity grids
    • Energy-saving for businesses across Europe
    • Financing to expand hydrogen refuelling in Europe and rebuild damaged heating infrastructure in Ukraine

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) today approved €2.4 billion of new financing for business investment, clean energy, transport, telecommunications and flood protection in Europe.

    The EIB Board of Directors also discussed the strategic orientation of EIB Global. Reflecting the changing geopolitical context and even better aligning with EU external policy priorities, the Bank’s investments outside of the EU will continue contribute to a stronger Europe in a more stable, more prosperous and sustainable world.

    The Board examined ways to further increase support for electricity networks in Europe. In 2024, the Bank mobilised over €100 billion of additional investment for energy and financed a record high of €8.5 billion for electricity grids, which mobilised 40% of total EU investment in electricity grids.

    “We are ahead of the investment targets of the RePowerEU programme to bring cheaper and clean energy to European households and businesses. Last year the EIB marked a record in investment in energy grids and inter connectors, to bolster Europe’s competitiveness and security”, said EIB Group President Nadia Calviño.

    Energy networks, flood defences

    The first EIB Board of Directors of the year approved financing totalling €791 million to expand hydrogen production for transport, strengthen electricity distribution, and improve flood protection in Poland.

    This includes funding to boost research into and development of hydrogen and to increase the number of hydrogen refueling stations for cars and trucks.

    In support of Ukraine, the Board paved the way for financing of €100 million to repair damaged municipal heating infrastructure in the country.

    Outside the EU, the EIB agreed to provide financing to upgrade and extend electricity distribution in Panama. The goal is to increase renewable/energy use, bolster grids and expand power distribution to unserved communities in the country.

    Green innovation

    The Board also approved financing totalling €879 million for innovation and investment by businesses to improve energy efficiency and environmental sustainability.

    This includes backing automotive-component research and development at 15 manufacturing sites across Europe and low-carbon glass production in France and Spain.

    The EIB endorsed a new securitisation scheme to support Dutch business investment in climate action and environmental sustainability.

    Better connections

    The Board agreed €768 million in financing for transport and telecom networks in the EU and beyond.

    In Colombia, the Board approved EUR 418 million for construction of and the acquisition of trains for Metro Line 1 in the capital Bogota – a service expected to carry more than 1 million passengers a day when operational.

    The Board also gave the green light for financing of €350 million to expand mobile-phone networks across Italy.

    Background information  

    EIB 

    The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. Built around eight core priorities, we finance investments that contribute to EU policy objectives by bolstering climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and bioeconomy, social infrastructure, high-impact investments outside the European Union, and the capital markets union.  

    The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund (EIF), signed nearly €89 billion in new financing for over 900 high-impact projects in 2024, boosting Europe’s competitiveness and security.  

    All projects financed by the EIB Group are in line with the Paris Climate Agreement, as pledged in our Climate Bank Roadmap. Almost 60% of the EIB Group’s annual financing supports projects directly contributing to climate change mitigation, adaptation, and a healthier environment.  

    Fostering market integration and mobilising investment, the Group supported a record of over €100 billion in new investment for Europe’s energy security in 2024 and mobilised €110 billion in growth capital for startups, scale-ups and European pioneers

    Approximately half of the EIB’s financing within the European Union is directed towards cohesion regions, where per capita income is lower than the EU average.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Oral question – Lack of transparency of the EU legislative process and misuse of EU funds – O-000002/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for oral answer  O-000002/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 142
    Silvia Sardone, Ondřej Knotek, Filip Turek, Barbara Bonte, Mathilde Androuët, Anne-Sophie Frigout, Marie-Luce Brasier-Clain, Roman Haider, Jorge Buxadé Villalba, Mireia Borrás Pabón, Margarita de la Pisa Carrión, Roberto Vannacci, Nikola Bartůšek, Vilis Krištopans, Virginie Joron, António Tânger Corrêa
    on behalf of the PfE Group

    A recent investigation by the Dutch newspaper De Telegraaf[1] has revealed serious irregularities within the Commission, which has allegedly distributed substantial EU funds to environmentalist lobbies to advocate for its own ‘green agenda’. This is just the latest in a series of troubling events that has cast a shadow over the EU legislative process and the use of EU funds. Among these, we recall the decisions taken by the European Ombudsman in case 1316/2021/MIG, where she confirmed her finding of maladministration against the Commission for refusing public access to the text messages exchanged between Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and the CEO of the pharmaceutical company Pfizer regarding the purchase of COVID-19 vaccines, as well as in the so-called Qatargate scandal. Additionally, on 22 January 2025, Commissioner Serafin admitted during Parliament’s plenary session that ‘it was inappropriate for the Commission to sign agreements obliging NGOs to lobby Members of Parliament’, acknowledging a serious breach of fairness, transparency and loyal cooperation.

    In the light of the above:

    • 1.Can the Commission clarify the nature, amount, and source of the funds allocated for each legislative proposal subject to such an ‘inappropriate’ practice, and provide a detailed list of beneficiaries, the amounts received by them, and the lobbying objectives assigned?
    • 2.What measures has the Commission taken, or does it intend to take, to investigate and address the identified irregularities, including holding those responsible of improper or illegal practices accountable?
    • 3.What specific measures does the Commission have in place or plan to implement to ensure maximum transparency in the allocation of public funds and to avoid further potential conflicts of interest in the EU’s decision-making process?
    • 4.Finally, does the Commission intend to review and/or withdraw the legislation tainted by the findings revealed by De Telegraaf?

    Submitted: 3.2.2025

    Lapses: 4.5.2025

    • [1] https://www.telegraaf.nl/nieuws/1287315486/lobbyschandaal-in-brussel-eu-betaalde-milieuclubs-in-het-geheim-voor-promotie-van-groene-plannen-timmermans.
    Last updated: 5 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Making financial aid conditional on Algeria’s cooperation on migration – E-000289/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000289/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Jean-Paul Garraud (PfE)

    The European Union and its Member States, particularly France, send a significant amount of aid to Algeria. Between 2017 and 2022, France gave Algeria approximately EUR 842 million in development aid[1]. Similarly, the EU provided Algeria with a total of EUR 273.3 million of financial assistance between 2011 and 2015[2], plus it adopted projects totalling EUR 40 million in 2023[3].

    Despite these contributions, the Algerian economy is still fragile and, to a great extent, dependent on hydrocarbons, which comprise over 86% of its exports. This economic situation is fuelling significant immigration to Europe. In addition, Algeria does not cooperate in any way in either the readmission of irregular migrants from Algeria or the fight against illegal immigration.

    • 1.Does the Commission intend to make EU financial aid conditional on concrete commitments by Algeria on the management of migration flows, particularly regarding the readmission of its nationals?
    • 2.What measures are planned to systematically incorporate migration conditionality into agreements with Algeria and ensure effective cooperation on migration?
    • 3.How does the Commission ensure that the funding sent to Algeria goes towards sustainable development and reduces the causes of emigration rather than exacerbating migratory instability?

    Submitted: 23.1.2025

    • [1] https://www.20minutes.fr/economie/4111460-20240923-france-donne-800-millions-algerie-tous-ans-pourquoi-affirmations-doivent-etre-nuancees
    • [2] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_17_487
    • [3] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_17_487
    Last updated: 5 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Compliance of the Italy-Albania protocol with EU law – P-002206/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    When Member States extend the application of national law implementing EU law to situations falling outside the scope of EU law, they must do it in a way that does not undermine or circumvent the application of harmonised rules or obligations under EU law.

    As regards the initiative carried out by Italy following the signature of a protocol on migration management with Albania, the implementation of the protocol under Italian law must not undermine the Common European Asylum System or be detrimental to common EU rules.

    Moreover, it needs to be complementary to the existing avenues to access asylum and cannot prevent the aims and objectives of EU law in this field, nor prejudice the rights and guarantees that persons in these situations must be afforded by Member States.

    Based on the information available to the Commission, Italy’s initiative aims at transferring certain categories of third-country nationals intercepted in the high seas to centres in the Albanian territory, under Italian jurisdiction, to examine their applications for international protection. In case of rejection of such applications, Italy would carry out return procedures from these centres.

    According to the Return Directive[1], a third-country national illegally staying on the territory of a Member State can be returned to his/her country of origin, to a country of transit in accordance with EU or bilateral readmission agreements or other arrangements, or to another third country to which the third-country national concerned voluntarily decides to return and where he/she will be accepted.

    The Commission will continue to follow closely the implementation of the Italy-Albania protocol, monitoring in particular the correct application of EU law in this context.

    • [1] Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, OJ L 348, 24.12.2008.
    Last updated: 5 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Transforming the EU from the defence customer it is today into an industry player – E-002606/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    To address decades of underinvestment in defence in the EU, in March 2024 the Commission and the High Representative/Vice-President presented a European Defence Industrial Strategy[1] proposing a framework to enhance the competitiveness of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, notably by incentivising Member States to spend more, better, together and European.

    The Commission also presented a proposal for a European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP)[2] to complement the toolbox in support of the defence industry, with a budget of EUR 1.5 billion.

    EDIP is meant to be a bridge towards the next multi-annual financial framework, alongside the European Defence Fund[3], keeping on with the intervention logics of the Act in Support of Ammunition Production[4] and the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act[5], whilst further incentivising cooperation via novel types of actions.

    Also, in line with the Political Guidelines of the President of the Commission, in the first 100 days of the new mandate, the Commission and the High Representative/Vice-President will present a White Paper on the Future of European Defence[6].

    Member States are the sole customers of defence systems and decision-makers on procurement of defence systems and their origin. Despite insufficient capacities in light of the current security situation, the EU defence industry still exports a considerable share of its production[7].

    Together with Member States, the Commission will amplify its work to ensure that the EU is ready to address the most extreme military contingencies in the upcoming years.

    • [1] https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en
    • [2] https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edip-future-defence_en
    • [3] https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/european-defence-fund-edf-official-webpage-european-commission_en
    • [4] https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en
    • [5] https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edirpa-addressing-capability-gaps_en
    • [6] https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683-f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf
    • [7] https://www.asd-europe.org/news-media/facts-figures/defence/
    Last updated: 5 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Addressing the matter of the Nord Stream gas pipelines – E-002767/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Investigations into the explosions that occurred on the Nord Stream I and II pipelines in September 2022 fall under the responsibilities of the Member States concerned and are still ongoing in Germany.

    The Commission does not interfere with ongoing investigations or prejudge its outcome.

    Last updated: 5 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Tackling old and new types of drugs in the EU – E-002176/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    1. While the Commission recognises the growing concern among population and the sense of insecurity near schools and other community settings[1], the EU Drugs Strategy 2021-2025[2] and its related Action Plan clarify that a comprehensive approach is needed. In particular, the EU drugs action plan encourages Member States to develop effective intervention programmes for young people in multiple settings, including schools, families and community and recreational settings, including comprehensive evidence-based strategies in neighbourhoods that experience high levels of drug availability and drug-related crime while creating a protective environment for communities affected by the consumption and sale of drugs or drug-related crime.

    2. The EU Roadmap to fight against drug trafficking and organised crime[3] puts special emphasis on strengthening international cooperation to counter the borderless aspect of criminal networks operating in drug trafficking, which includes law enforcement and judicial cooperation. It further includes strengthened customs and law enforcement action in major logistical hubs, with the launch of an EU Ports Alliance.

    3. The EU seeks to complement Member States’ actions in all aspects of drugs policy. As part of its new mandate, the EU Drugs Agency promotes evidence-based interventions to raise awareness on the adverse effects of drugs[4]. The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control provides guidance to Member States on prevention and control of infectious diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, among people who inject drugs[5].

    • [1] Flash Eurobarometer 552, Impact of drugs on local communities.
    • [2] EU Drugs Strategy 2021-2025, OJ C 102I, 24.3.2021, p. 1.
    • [3] COM(2023) 641 final.
    • [4] Regulation (EU) 2023/1322 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2023 on the European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1920/2006, OJ L 166, 30.6.2023, Art.16.
    • [5] https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/prevention-and-control-infectious-diseases-among-people-who-inject-drugs-2023, https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/guidance-brief-prevention-and-control-infectious-diseases-among-people-who-inject
    Last updated: 5 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Unilateral abolition of the Schengen Treaty – E-002363/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Under the Schengen Borders Code[1], Member States are allowed to reintroduce internal border control as a temporary measure of last resort to address serious threats to public policy or internal security.

    The Commission, through its Schengen Coordinator, is in close contact with the Member States concerned to ensure that checks are necessary and proportionate and have limited impact on cross-border traffic.

    The control of the external borders must take place in full compliance with fundamental rights. The Commission is stepping up the fight against human trafficking and smuggling.

    In 2023, the Commission adopted proposals for a directive on preventing and countering the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and stay in the EU and a regulation  to reinforce EU’s law enforcement agency (Europol)’s role against migrants smuggling and trafficking[2]. International cooperation is promoted through the Global Alliance to Counter Migrant Smuggling.

    The Commission and EU Agencies[3] have provided significant operational, technical and financial support to Greece to address migration and border management challenges.

    Member States, including Greece, receive EU financial support under the Home Affairs Funds to address high migratory pressure.

    Under its new mandate, the Commission will present a new approach on return and increase the operational capabilities of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex).

    • [1] Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), OJ L 77, 23/03/2016, p. 1-52, as amended by Regulation (EU) 1717/2024.
    • [2]  COM(2023) 755 final and COM(2023) 754 final.
    • [3] EUAA, Frontex, Europol.
    Last updated: 5 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – US tariffs on Spanish black olives – E-002648/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    On 14 November 2024[1], the EU requested to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body to authorise the imposition of countermeasures due to the United States (US) lack of compliance with the Panel report[2].

    As provided by Article 22.6[3] of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), the US are entitled to request an arbitration on the level of the countermeasures proposed by the EU.

    The EU will do its best to enable a swift conclusion of the arbitration proceeding. Once this step is finalised, the EU could proceed, in accordance with the WTO and EU framework, to adopt countermeasures .

    To support the table olive sector, possibilities exist under Rural Development Programmes[4] to help operators adapt their production processes to other market opportunities.

    There is also support for the sector under the promotion aid scheme. Besides, under the rules concerning de minimis aid, a Member State may grant support to a single processor within a period of three fiscal years.

    In addition, companies can receive aid without prior notification to the Commission as regards research and development, training and investment aid under the conditions of the General Block Exemption Regulation[5].

    The EU will continue to engage with the new US administration in order to achieve a solution to this dispute which is in the interest of EU exporters .

    • [1]  WT/DS577/20; https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds577_e.htm
    • [2] WT/DS577/RW; https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/577rw_a_e.pdf
    • [3] https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/WTO/US.Open.Stmt.Arb.Mtg.%28as%20deliv%29.fin.%28public%29.pdf
    • [4] https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common-agricultural-policy/rural-development/country_en
    • [5] Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty, OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, p. 1-78; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/651/oj
    Last updated: 5 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Measures regarding imports from Israel’s apartheid regime and illegal occupation in the occupied territories of Palestine and Lebanon – E-002158/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Association Agreement with Israel[1] is the legal basis for the ongoing dialogue with the Israeli authorities. In this framework, the EU will continue to reaffirm its commitment to the applicability of human rights and humanitarian law in the o ccupied Palestinian territory.

    The Commission closely coordinates its position with the Council of the EU on the matters raised in the written question of the Honourable Member of the European Parliament.

    A possible decision to suspend the entire Association Agreement with Israel would require a Council Decision and would, in accordance with Articles 217 and 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, require unanimity by Member States.

    The EU has a long-standing position on the non-recognition of Israel’s sovereignty over the territories occupied by Israel since 1967 and considers Israel’s settlements in the o ccupied Palestinian t erritory illegal.

    The EU applies a differentiation policy to ensure that goods originating from Israeli settlements in the o ccupied Palestinian t erritory do not benefit from trade preferences under the Association Agreement.

    In 2015, the Commission adopted an Interpretative Notice to provide guidance on the labelling of products from Israeli settlements in the o ccupied Palestinian t erritory and how the existing legislation on labelling should be applied[2].

    The approach of the Interpretative Notice was confirmed by a judgment of the European Court of Justice in 2019[3]. Official controls on the labelling of imported goods are primarily the responsibility of Member States , in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2017/625 on official controls on the agri-food chain[4].

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:411c0668-144d-44a1-a5e3-dd2342f7a5b5.0017.02/DOC_1&format=PDF
    • [2] 2015 EC interpretative notice on the indication of goods from the territories occupied by Israel: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015XC1112(01)
    • [3] 2019 European Court of Justice ruling on foodstuffs originating in the occupied territories: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=A16C97FD2EEC535918F5478A663AC7D6?text=&docid=220534&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=8005913
    • [4] http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/625/oj
    Last updated: 5 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Philip R. Lane: A middle path for ECB monetary policy

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Philip R. Lane, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)

    Washington, D.C., 5 February 2025

    It is a pleasure to be here at the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE): your impressive research on a wide range of topics is extremely valuable for policymakers.[1]

    At last week’s monetary policy meeting, the ECB’s Governing Council decided to lower the deposit facility rate – the rate through which we steer the monetary policy stance – by 25 basis points from 3.0 per cent to 2.75 per cent. In cumulative terms, the deposit facility rate has declined by 125 basis points since last June. The decision reflected our updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission.

    In what follows, I will explain in more detail the basis for this decision. I will review inflation developments, economic developments, our risk assessment, and financial and monetary conditions. Finally, I explain why pursuing a middle path for monetary policy is best suited to the current environment.

    Inflation developments

    The disinflation process remains well on track. Inflation has continued to develop broadly in line with the staff projections and is set to return to our two per cent medium-term target in the course of this year. Most measures of underlying inflation suggest that inflation will settle at around our target on a sustained basis. The Persistent and Common Component of Inflation (PCCI), which has the best predictive power among underlying inflation indicators for future headline inflation, continued to hover around two per cent in the December data, indicating that headline inflation is set to stabilise around our target.

    Domestic inflation, at 4.2 per cent, stayed well above all the other indicators in December mostly because wages and prices in certain sectors are still adjusting to the past inflation surge with a substantial delay. However, the PCCI for services, which should act as an underlying attractor for services inflation and domestic inflation, fell to 2.3 per cent.

    The anticipation of a downward shift in services inflation in the coming months also relates to the expected deceleration in wage growth in the course of 2025. Wages have been adjusting to the past inflation surges with a substantial delay, but the ECB wage tracker and the latest surveys point to a significant moderation in wage pressures this year. According to the latest results of the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE), firms expect wages to grow by 3.3 per cent on average over the next twelve months, down from 4.5 per cent this time last year. Similarly, the latest Corporate Telephone Survey indicates that wage growth should decelerate from 4.6 per cent in 2024 to 3.3 per cent in 2025 and 2.9 per cent in 2026. This assessment is shared broadly among forecasters. Consensus Economics, for example, foresees a decline in wage growth by about one percentage point between 2024 and 2025.

    Most measures of longer-term inflation expectations continue to stand at around two per cent, despite an uptick at shorter horizons that may reflect the recent rise in energy prices. While the inflation expectations of firms have stabilised at three per cent across horizons, according to the SAFE, larger firms that are aware of the ECB’s inflation target show convergence towards two per cent. Consumer inflation expectations have edged up recently, especially for the near term, which can at least be partly explained by their higher sensitivity to the recent uptick in realised inflation. Inflation expectations of professionals – as captured by the latest vintages of the Survey of Professional Forecasters and Survey of Monetary Analysts – as well as market-based measures of inflation compensation have ticked up for the near term but, over longer horizons, remain stable at levels consistent with our medium-term target of two per cent.

    Economic developments

    On a fourth-quarter-to-fourth-quarter basis, the 2024 growth rate came in at 0.9 per cent, constituting a material improvement in momentum relative to the 2023 growth rate of 0.1 per cent. While 2024 saw a modest recovery in consumption, investment remained weak and exporters continued to suffer competitiveness challenges. In terms of the quarterly profile, growth stagnated in the final quarter following a comparatively robust third quarter.

    The incoming survey indicators suggest that the euro area economy is set to remain subdued in the near term. While unemployment remained low at 6.3 per cent in December, there has been some softening in labour demand, as reflected in lower vacancies and lower employment growth.

    At the same time, our baseline assessment is that the conditions for a recovery remain in place. Higher incomes, lower interest rates and stronger household balance sheets should allow a faster pick-up in consumption. More affordable credit should also boost housing and business investment over time. Exports should also support the recovery as global demand rises, although this is highly conditional on developments in international trade policies.

    Financial and monetary conditions

    Global and euro area bond yields have increased significantly since our last meeting. Amongst other factors, the spillover impact of the rise in US and global longer-term rates has contributed to the steepening of the euro area yield curve.

    Our past interest rate cuts are gradually making it less expensive for firms and households to borrow. The cost of borrowing for firms has declined by 92 basis points and mortgage rates have declined by 62 basis points since their peaks in autumn 2023. However, the interest rates on existing corporate and household loan books remain high, especially in real terms, with pre-2022 debt still re-pricing at higher rates as fixation periods expire.

    In overall terms, financing conditions remain tight. While credit is expanding, lending to firms and households remains subdued relative to historical norms. Growth in bank lending to firms rose to 1.5 per cent in December. In part, the pick-up in December reflects firms substituting market-based long-term financing for bank-based borrowing amidst tightening market conditions and increasing upcoming redemptions of long-term corporate bonds. Overall external debt financing of firms increased by 1.9 per cent in December, but remained well below the historical average of 4.9 per cent.[2] Loans to households continued to rise gradually, driven by mortgages, but remained muted overall, with an annual growth rate of 1.1 per cent in December, notably below the long-term average of 4.2 per cent.

    According to the latest bank lending survey, the demand for loans by firms increased slightly in the fourth quarter. At the same time, credit standards for loans to firms have tightened again, after having broadly stabilised over the previous four quarters. The renewed tightening of credit standards for firms was driven by the fact that banks see higher risks to the economic outlook and have lower tolerance for taking on credit risk. This finding is consistent with the results from the SAFE, in which firms reported a small decline in the availability of bank loans and more demanding non-rate lending conditions. In terms of households, the demand for mortgages increased strongly, mostly on the back of more attractive interest rates and better prospects for the property market. Credit standards for housing loans remained unchanged overall.

    Risk assessment

    Risks to economic growth remain tilted to the downside. In addition to trade policy uncertainty, lower confidence could prevent consumption and investment from recovering as fast as expected. This could be amplified by geopolitical risks, such as Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine and the tragic conflict in the Middle East, which could disrupt energy supplies and further weigh on global trade. Growth could also be lower if the lagged effects of monetary policy tightening last longer than expected. In the other direction, growth could be higher if easier financing conditions and falling inflation allow domestic consumption and investment to rebound faster.

    We take a two-sided approach to assessing inflation risk. Inflation could turn out higher if wages or profits increase by more than expected. Upside risks to inflation also stem from the heightened geopolitical tensions, which could push energy prices and freight costs higher in the near term and disrupt global trade. Moreover, extreme weather events, and the unfolding climate crisis more broadly, could drive up food prices by more than expected. By contrast, inflation may surprise on the downside if low confidence and concerns about geopolitical events prevent consumption and investment from recovering as fast as expected, if monetary policy dampens demand by more than expected, or if the economic environment in the rest of the world worsens unexpectedly. Greater friction in global trade would make the euro area inflation outlook more uncertain.

    A middle path for monetary policy

    Taken together, the incoming data since our previous meeting meant that it was clear that we should take a further step in monetary easing by lowering the deposit facility rate to 2.75 per cent. By excessively dampening demand, the alternative of holding the deposit facility rate at the level of 3.0 per cent would not have been consistent with the set of rate paths that would best ensure that inflation stabilises sustainably at our two per cent medium-term target. At the same time, the new level for the deposit facility rate at 2.75 per cent preserves considerable optionality in responding to shocks. In particular, the rate path can adjust as appropriate in the event of material upside or downside shocks to the inflation outlook and/or to economic momentum.

    While our baseline is that inflation should decline from 2.5 per cent in January to around our target in the coming months, it is still important to take into account that this deceleration might take longer than expected and that new upside risks to inflation could emerge, including due to external developments. These considerations explain why we have taken a step-by-step approach to rate cutting since last June.

    At the same time, an excessive abundance of caution in monetary easing could threaten the recovery in domestic demand that is needed to support the pricing environment compatible with our medium-term two per cent target. Under this too-cautious path, a below-target inflation dynamic could take hold, which would then require a more sizeable policy response to ensure inflation returns to our symmetric two per cent medium-term target.

    Balancing these considerations suggest a middle path is appropriate, which neither over-weighs upside risk nor over-weighs downside risk. That is, a robust monetary policy approach should balance the risks of moving too slowly against the risks of moving too quickly. Accordingly, it is prudent to maintain agility in adjusting the stance as appropriate on a data-dependent and meeting-by-meeting basis and to not pre-commit to any particular rate path.

    In closing, let me comment on two much-discussed concepts: restrictiveness and neutrality.

    When inflation is materially above target and requires a monetary response to ensure that it returns to target in a timely manner and that inflation expectations remain anchored, the monetary stance must be clearly restrictive. As inflation returns close to target, policymakers need to shift their focus to adjusting monetary policy in line with the incoming economic and financial data and the evolving risk assessment to deliver the two per cent target over the medium term. In other words, policymakers should deliver the monetary stance that is appropriate to the situation.

    In exiting a restrictive phase, much energy could be diverted towards creating a summary “restrictiveness” index. Any such index would have to incorporate at least nine factors: (i) the still-important rolling off of super-cheap debt that was taken out in the “low for long” era that is now being re-financed at higher rates; (ii) in the other direction, the transmission of the easing since the peak of the hiking cycle; (iii) the impact of the anticipation of future rate cuts on current financing conditions; (iv) the evolving contribution of quasi-exogenous influences on financing conditions (such as global upward pressure on term premia); (v) the dynamics of bond and equity risk premia; (vi) the evolution of credit standards in bank lending; (vii) the different timelines for market-based and bank-based transmission; (viii) the responsiveness of consumption and investment to shifting monetary conditions; and (ix) the responsiveness of price setting to shifting monetary conditions.

    All of these factors enter our calibration of monetary policy (our assessment of the strength of monetary policy transmission has been highlighted as central to our reaction function) and cannot be summarised by a single indicator such as comparing the prevailing policy rate to a highly-uncertain estimate of the so-called neutral rate.[3]

    In terms of policy making, uncertainty about the level of the neutral rate and, more generally, about the strength of monetary transmission inescapably sits alongside uncertainty about the inflation outlook and uncertainty about the economic outlook.

    This is why our 2021 monetary policy strategy statement highlights that our decisions are based on an integrated assessment of all relevant factors. Over the last two years, we have emphasised in particular the importance of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary transmission as particularly relevant in complementing our analysis of the inflation outlook. More generally, it is essential that all relevant risks are incorporated in monetary policy decisions.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Egypt: Immediately release Badr Mohamed who has served his unjust protest-related sentence

    Source: Amnesty International –

    Ahead of an appeal hearing at the Court of Cassation against Badr Mohamed’s unjust conviction and five-year prison sentence in connection to the Ramsis Square protests on 16 August 2013, when he was 17 years old, Amnesty International’s Egypt Campaigner, Souleimene Benghazi, said:

    “Amnesty International has long called on the Egyptian authorities to immediately release Badr Mohamed and quash his unjust conviction and five-year prison sentence, which was handed down following a grossly unfair mass trial in which he was denied the right to an adequate defence. By 11 February, Badr Mohamed would have already spent a total of five years behind bars. It is high time for the Egyptian authorities to end this injustice and allow him to reunite with his family, including his wife Elena, an Austrian national, and his four-year-old daughter, Amina, whose birth he missed.

    “Conditions in Badr 1 prison where Badr Mohamed is being held are notoriously inhumane. Not only is he held with other prisoners in a small, cramped cell but he also has no bed, heating or access to clean water or adequate healthcare.

    “His ordeal is emblematic of the Egyptian authorities’ unrelenting reprisals against actual or perceived government critics, and their vicious crackdown on any form of dissent” – Amnesty International’s Egypt Campaigner, Souleimene Benghazi

    “Badr Mohamed was a 17-year-old child when he was swept up in mass arrests of protesters and bystanders over a decade ago. His ordeal is emblematic of the Egyptian authorities’ unrelenting reprisals against actual or perceived government critics, and their vicious crackdown on any form of dissent. As well as releasing Badr Mohamed, Egyptian authorities must also release thousands of other individuals including peaceful protesters, opposition politicians, journalists and human rights defenders who have been arbitrarily detained solely for exercising their human rights or following grossly unfair trials.”

    Background

    Badr Mohamed was released on bail three months after his initial arrest on 16 August 2013 in connection to the Ramsis Square protests. Amnesty International documented the unlawful force used by security forces against protesters and bystanders during the protests, resulting in the death of 97 protesters. Badr Mohamed was later convicted and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment in absentia in a grossly unfair mass trial in August 2017 on charges of participation in an illegal gathering and engaging in violence.

    He was re-arrested in May 2020, and retried on the same charges as per Egyptian law for those tried in their absence. On 12 January 2023, Badr Mohamed was convicted and sentenced to five years in prison following a grossly unfair retrial in front of a terrorism circuit of the Cairo Criminal Court.

    On 28 January 2025, the United Nation’s Human Rights Council carried out its Universal Periodic Review of Egypt’s human rights record. Several states such as Germany, Finland, Luxembourg, New Zealand and the United Kingdom have called on the Egyptian authorities to release all those arbitrarily detained for exercising their human rights or for politically motivated reasons.

    MIL OSI NGO –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: ‘No Appetite for Another Extension’ of South Sudan Peace Agreement, Mission Head Tells Security Council, Urging Leaders Focus on Benchmarks without Delay

    Source: United Nations 4

    The Revitalized Peace Agreement in South Sudan is facing challenges due to low political will, trust deficit among the parties to the accord and lack of predictable funding, the Security Council heard today from senior officials assisting peacebuilding in that country.

    Charles Tai Gituai, Interim Chairperson of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission — the official oversight body responsible for monitoring and evaluating the status of implementation of the 2018 Revitalized Peace Agreement — said that the parties in September 2024 agreed to extend the transitional period from 22 February 2025 to 22 February 2027, with elections rescheduled to December 2026.  While the National Election Commission has completed its plans and has opened offices in the 10 states, financial constraints remain a hindrance in election preparations.

    Further, election laws stipulate that parties with armed forces cannot be registered until they relinquish their forces — this includes the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition and others within the South Sudan Opposition Alliance, he said.  This underscores the need to hasten the unification of forces so that these parties can participate in the elections.  Also expressing concern about persistent levels of intercommunal violence in some parts of the country, he noted that the Sudan conflict exacerbates the humanitarian situation and has caused a huge influx of returnees and refugees in South Sudan.  Further, oil production — the country’s main source of foreign earnings — was disrupted in the second quarter of 2024 because of that conflict.

    Welcoming the work of the National Constitutional Amendment Committee and the Judicial Reform Committee, he said “the success of these institutions demonstrates that with funding availability, the Peace Agreement institutions and mechanisms can fully discharge their mandates”.  The permanent ceasefire continues to hold, though recent skirmishes in Western Equatoria State are concerning.  Commending the mediation talks ongoing in Nairobi, he said:  “The people of South Sudan are looking forward to a positive outcome for these talks and hoping that it will bring practical and enhanced transformative approaches in addressing the root causes of conflict.”  The Council must consider a visit to South Sudan to mobilize resources and political support to help South Sudan achieve its first democratic elections in December 2026, he added.

    Also addressing the Council was Nicholas Haysom, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), who noted that this month marks the beginning of the fourth extension of the Revitalized Peace Agreement.  “There is no appetite for another extension,” he stressed.  Rather, “there is strong desire for the leaders to focus on the benchmarks set out in the Peace Agreement without further delay”.  Urging parties to engage constructively, he acknowledged progress in some areas and welcomed the declarations of Governors to expand the civic and political space in their states.  Also noting expanded access to justice, including through mobile courts, he pointed to the adoption of a national community violence reduction strategy.  The National Elections Commission has launched its website and is rolling out a voter education strategy.

    However, none of these achievements “are sufficient to significantly move the needle” on the critical conditions required for holding elections and adopting a new constitution, he added.  Stressing the importance of “low-hanging fruit” measures such as voter registration, he reiterated that “the clock is already ticking on the extended transitional period”.  Noting that constitution and census timelines do not fit into the framework for a December 2026 election, he added:  “we have not yet seen the previously promised harmonized work plan with an operational timetable for elections.”  The lack of Government funding is slowing down these processes, he said, underscoring that “neither UNMISS nor the international community or the electoral management bodies can provide the full measure of support if these critical decisions are not taken.”

    “My country is struggling to transition from instability to stability through implementation of the R-ARCSS [Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan],” observed Edmund Yakani, Executive Director of the Community Empowerment for Progress Organization. Noting that the Tumani Initiative under Kenya’s co-mediation provides an opportunity for transitioning the country from violence to peace, he added:  “We are impressed by the process of embracing inclusive Government”.  The only option for a peaceful transition is through elections, he said, pointing to the citizens’ disappointment over the last elections postponement.  Noting that deadly intercommunal violence poses a challenge for the country’s transition, he said that elections will be credible if the Government creates conditions for holding them.

    For her part, the representative of South Sudan acknowledged the concerns about delays in the transition process and assured the Council that “every effort is being made to accelerate key milestones, particularly the preparations for free, fair and credible elections”.  Her Government is committed to providing the necessary funding and institutional support to advance the electoral process and has taken significant steps to draft a permanent constitution “that will reflect the aspirations of the South Sudanese people”, she pledged.  The deployment of the Necessary Unified Forces remains a priority, and South Sudan is working to overcome logistical and financial challenges to complete Phase II of training and deployment, she added.

    Urging all parties, including opposition groups, to negotiate in good faith within the framework of the Revitalized Agreement rather than seeking a parallel process that could complicate the peace road map, she expressed concern about the deteriorating situation in Sudan.  Recalling her country’s appeals to Sudan to cease harbouring rebels who actively destabilize its security efforts, she said this plea has gone unanswered.  “The people of South Sudan have been deeply affected by videos depicting heartless killings” of their nationals, she said, adding that these are believed to be incited by General Yassir Al-Atta, Assistant to the Commander in Chief, who claimed that 65 per cent of the Rapid Support Forces are South Sudanese.  Despite the anger provoked by this, her Government continues to call for restraint from its people, she said.

    As Council members weighed in, they stressed the need to advance progress towards elections.  The representative of Sierra Leone, also speaking for Algeria, Guyana and Somalia, highlighted the need for a credible and inclusive electoral process.  For that, security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups remains crucial.  He also called for urgent action to finalize transitional security arrangements and establish a middle command structure for the Necessary Unified Forces.  While the electoral road map’s implementation is critical for elections, consideration should be given to the participation of internally displaced people and returnees, he pointed out.

    Pakistan’s delegate, noting that elections have been rescheduled to take place in 2026, encouraged South Sudan to use the two-year extension to move towards a credible path to elections.  “This extension must not become a missed opportunity”, Greece’s delegate said, while Slovenia’s delegate urged the Government to secure the necessary funding for timely implementation of the Revitalized Peace Agreement.  “Promises must be turned into reality,” said Denmark’s representative, also calling for a clear elections plan and resources for election-related bodies.

    The representative of the United States said the transitional Government failed to conclude the transitional period and use public revenue transparently for public needs.  Despite significant international support, South Sudan’s President and other political leaders “have not demonstrated political will to seriously move towards elections”, he observed, adding:  “In fact, they have made efforts worse.”  While the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement was a “pivotal moment in South Sudan’s history that brought hope to a people long ravaged by war and oppression”, two decades later, that country’s leaders failed to meet their people’s expectations.  He called on the transitional Government to start using public revenues for appropriate public purposes rather than to benefit the “small corrupt elite”.

    Panama’s delegate was one among several Council members who expressed concern over persisting sexual and gender-based violence, noting that women and girls, as young as 11, have fallen victims to this crime.  Hence, the Mission’ work is crucial, he stressed, highlighting the need for the equitable participation of women, young people and communities in peacebuilding.  The representatives of the Republic of Korea and France also expressed support for UNMISS, highlighting its many crucial roles, which range from enabling humanitarian assistance to assisting with election preparations.

    China’s delegate, Council President for February, speaking in his national capacity, said that, prior to the meeting, his country, using virtual technologies, conducted an underground inspection of the Mission’s work.  A new “batch” of Chinese peacekeepers have recently completed their rotation and handover, he reported.  He welcomed South Sudan’s steps towards elections and called on the international community to respect its sovereignty and ownership.  Further, “sanctions, such as arms embargo, are constraining security capacity building in South Sudan and should be adjusted or lifted”, he stressed.

    Along similar lines, the Russian Federation’s delegate said that sanctions make it difficult to strengthen South Sudan’s security and called for a review of the parameters of the arms embargo.  Voting issues are South Sudan’s internal affairs, he observed, adding that the country’s leadership has managed to establish relative stability and attain progress in State-building and resolving security issues.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: CFS urges public not to consume a batch of French raw milk cheese suspected to be contaminated with Shiga toxin-producing E. coli

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    CFS urges public not to consume a batch of French raw milk cheese suspected to be contaminated with Shiga toxin-producing E. coli
    CFS urges public not to consume a batch of French raw milk cheese suspected to be contaminated with Shiga toxin-producing E. coli
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        The Centre for Food Safety (CFS) of the Food and Environmental Hygiene Department today (February 5) urged the public not to consume a batch of raw milk cheese imported from France due to possible contamination with Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC). The trade should stop using or selling the affected product immediately if they possess it.    Product details are as follows:Product name: MORBIER LAIT CRU DE SCEY AOP 7KG MEULEBrand: PERRIN VERMOTPlace of origin: FrancePack size: 6.56 kilogramsBest-before date: February 23, 2025Batch number: 34008Importer: Culina HK Limited    “The CFS received a notification from the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed of the European Commission that the above-mentioned product is being recalled in France due to possible contamination with STEC. Upon learning of the incident, the CFS immediately contacted local importers for follow-up. A preliminary investigation found that the above-mentioned importer had imported into Hong Kong the affected batch of the product concerned,” a spokesman for the CFS said.    The importer concerned has stopped sale and removed the affected batch of the product from shelves and initiated a recall according to the CFS’s instructions. Enquiries about the recall can be made to the importer’s hotline at 2342 3221 during office hours.    “People will contract STEC-causing gastro-intestinal disease through consumption of contaminated water or undercooked and contaminated foods. Intestinal bleeding and serious complications such as hemolytic uraemic syndrome may also develop in some people,” the spokesman said.    The CFS will alert the trade to the incident, and will continue to follow up and take appropriate action. The investigation is ongoing.

     
    Ends/Wednesday, February 5, 2025Issued at HKT 19:55

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    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

  • MIL-OSI Video: Palestinians, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Gaza & other topics – Daily Press Briefing

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    – Palestinians
    – Occupied Palestinian Territory
    – Gaza
    – Democratic Republic of the Congo
    – Sudan
    – South Sudan
    – Sweden
    – Aga Khan
    – Iraq
    – Senior Appointment
    – Financial Contribution
    – Guest

    PALESTINIANS
    This afternoon, the Secretary-General has a scheduled appearance at the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. In his remarks, he will tell the committee, following the agreement that has been in effect, that we must keep pushing for a permanent ceasefire and the release of all hostages without delay. We cannot go back to more death and destruction.
    In speaking to the broader situation, the Secretary-General will say that in the search for solutions we must not make the problems worse. It is vital to stay true to the bedrock of international law. It is essential to avoid any form of ethnic cleansing and, of course, he will reaffirm the two-state solution. And you can follow those remarks on UN WebTV starting at 3 p.m.

    OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY
    Our Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Tom Fletcher, is continuing his visit to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory. On the political level, Mr. Fletcher held discussions over the past two days with Israeli authorities, including President Isaac Herzog, as well as officials from the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
    Mr. Fletcher described these engagements as practical, emphasizing the need to build on the progress since the ceasefire and sustain the large-scale delivery of UN aid into Gaza. On the ground, Mr. Fletcher visited today different areas of the West Bank.
    In East Jerusalem, he visited Silwan neighbourhood where he met with residents facing home demolitions and the threat of forcible eviction by Israeli authorities.
    Mr. Fletcher also toured what is known as Area C of the Ramallah governorate, where he heard and saw the humanitarian impact of access restrictions on the livelihoods of Palestinian and their daily lives. These restrictions include Israeli checkpoints and of course the 712-kilometre-long barrier.
    And just a short while ago in Ramallah, Mr. Fletcher held discussions with national Palestinian NGOs, who are at the heart of humanitarian response efforts across the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

    GAZA
    In Gaza, our humanitarian colleagues report that our aid operations – together with our partners – continue to scale up across the Gaza Strip. We are also carrying out assessments to determine the needs of impacted and displaced families, particularly the most vulnerable.
    Across Gaza, 22 bakeries supported by the World Food Programme are now operational. And our health partners continue to provide health services as well. We and our partners estimate that more than half a million displaced Palestinians have now returned to the governorates of both Gaza and North Gaza, where there is an urgent need for tents and shelter materials. Our partners say they’ve transported 22 truckloads of tents from southern to northern Gaza yesterday to address these needs but we need to get more tents in.
    For its part, UNICEF continues to distribute nutrition support for infants. Across Gaza, the World Food Programme has provided lipid-based nutrient supplements to more than 80,000 children and pregnant or breastfeeding women since the ceasefire took effect. Humanitarian partners have screened more than 30,000 children under the age of five for malnutrition since the ceasefire took effect. Of those children under five screened, over 1,000 cases of acute malnutrition have been identified, including 230 cases of severe acute malnutrition.
    And to sustain learning activities across the Gaza Strip, education partners established three new temporary learning spaces yesterday in Gaza, Rafah, and Khan Younis governorates, benefiting some 200 children.

    Full Highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=05%20February%202025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ocNAfzKmNWk

    MIL OSI Video –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Highland celebrates Gold Infant Feeding Award from Unicef BFI

    Source: Scotland – Highland Council

    Highland Council and NHS Highland are celebrating their joint achievement in attaining the Unicef Baby Friendly Initiative Gold accreditation.

    Image of Unicef BFI Gold logo

    Chair of Health, Social Care and Wellbeing Committee, Cllr David Fraser said: “The Baby Friendly standards provide a roadmap for transforming care for all babies, their mothers and families.

    “The Gold Award is awarded to services that have embedded the Unicef Baby Friendly Achieving Sustainability standards. This means that future generations of babies, their mothers and families will continue to experience Baby Friendly standards of care. The Award recognises that the service is not only implementing the Baby Friendly Initiative standards, but that they also have the leadership, culture and systems to maintain this over the long term.”

    He added: “I would like to express my congratulations and thanks to the Health Visiting Teams, the Family Nurse Partnership and family support staff who have been accredited as a Gold Baby Friendly service. Achieving Gold in the Baby Friendly Initiative reflects a high level of dedication to supporting breastfeeding and the very many benefits that this brings.

    “It is a truly impressive achievement and demonstrates our longstanding commitment to supporting the wellbeing of families in Highland through approaches that achieve real, practical and lasting impact.”

    Karen MacKay, Senior Health Improvement Specialist (Infant Feeding Lead) for NHS Highland said: “This is a fantastic achievement for all involved in this award.  Gold status requires a whole system approach and the use of testing quality improvement initiatives to support families with feeding and early infant behaviour.  The annual reporting mechanism that is now required will further embed the great work that has been taking place in Highland.”

    Gold status specifically indicates sustainability of practice meaning the service has embedded Baby Friendly standards into its leadership, culture and daily practice. It is a significant accomplishment that reflects a services’ commitment to embedding practice that benefit infant health, parental wellbeing, and long-term public health outcomes for both parent and infant.

    Both the Council and NHS Highland first achieved full Baby Friendly accreditation from Unicef in 2013.

    Photo of Highland Council and NHS Highland celebrating their joint achievement in attaining the Unicef Baby Friendly Initiative Gold accreditation.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Highland’s first draft Promise Plan welcomed.

    Source: Scotland – Highland Council

    A draft plan which sets out Highland’s commitment to achieve the aspirations of “The Promise” for care experienced children and families across the region has been scrutinised by Members of the Health Social Care and Wellbeing Committee.

    Chair of the Committee, Cllr David Fraser said: “As corporate parents – along with local partners and service providers – we have a duty to prepare, keep under review, and publish a corporate parenting plan.

    “I am therefore very pleased that Members have welcomed our first Promise Plan and have agreed that an annual report of the progress of the Plan will be submitted to committee for future scrutiny and assurance of Highland’s progress in achieving the aspirations of The Promise.”

    The Promise is that Scotland’s children and young people will grow up loved, safe and respected. #KeepThePromise is a Scottish Government commitment that received support of all political parties in 2020. Organisations, institutions, bodies, communities, and groups across Scotland pledged to #KeepThePromise, including The Highland Council.

    The Highland Promise Plan (2025-2028) was commissioned by the Promise Board, which is a multi-agency partnership of corporate parenting leaders.

    The draft Promise Plan will also be presented to the Integrated Children’s Services Board (which is the key statutory partnership for Children’s Services across Highland) on 28 February.

    Feedback from the Health Social Care and Wellbeing Committee and the Integrated Children’s Services Board will be incorporated into the final version of the Promise Plan.

    Once agreed, the final version of the Promise Plan will be implemented through corporate parenting partner delivery groups which will be monitored and evaluate by The Promise Board.

    The draft Promise Plan can be viewed on the Council’s website at this link.

    5 Feb 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Ms. Bjørg Sandkjær of Norway – Assistant Secretary-General for Policy Coordination in the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA)

    Source: United Nations MIL-OSI 2

    nited Nations Secretary-General António Guterres announced today the appointment of Bjørg Sandkjær of Norway as Assistant Secretary-General for Policy Coordination in the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA).  She will succeed Maria-Francesca Spatolisano of Italy, to whom the Secretary-General and the Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs are grateful for her commitment and dedicated service to the Organization.

    Ms. Sandkjær has over 26 years of experience in policymaking and international development.  She served as Deputy Minister for International Development at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 2021, having been responsible for the development of Norway’s strategic vision and engagement in international development cooperation issues and played a key role in the negotiations on Norway’s budgetary allocations for official development assistance while also leading her country’s engagement in key sustainable development processes and fora, including the High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development.

    Ms. Sandkjær also served as the deputy leader of the Standing Committee on Health and Welfare of the Oslo City Council and held several positions at the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad), Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), and the Church of Norway.

    Ms. Sandkjær holds a master’s degree in Demography from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), United Kingdom and an undergraduate degree from the University of Oslo, Norway.  She is fluent in English and Norwegian.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –