NewzIntel.com

Category: Europe

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Latest news – Next meetings of the Committee on Agricultural and Rural Development – Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the draft Council directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC as regards VAT rules for the digital age – A10-0001/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the draft Council directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC as regards VAT rules for the digital age

    (15159/2024 – C10‑0170/2024 – 2022/0407(CNS))

    (Special legislative procedure – renewed consultation)

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the Council draft (15159/2024),

    – having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council (COM(2022)0701),

    – having regard to its position of 22 November 2023[1],

    – having regard to Article 113 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament again (C10‑0170/2024),

    – having regard to Rule 84 and 86 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0001/2025),

    1. Approves the Council draft;

    2. Calls on the Council to notify Parliament if it intends to depart from the text approved by Parliament;

    3. Asks the Council to consult Parliament again if it intends to amend its draft substantially;

    4. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    On 8 December 2022, the Commission presented the ‘VAT in the digital age’ package (ViDA), which consists of three proposals:

    • a proposal for a Council directive amending directive 2006/112/EC as regards VAT rules for the digital age;

    • a proposal for a Council regulation amending regulation (EU) No 904/2010 as regards the VAT administrative cooperation arrangements needed for the digital age

    • a proposal for a Council implementing regulation amending implementing regulation (EU) No 282/2011 as regards information requirements for certain VAT schemes.

    The package developed an action plan for fair and simple taxation that emphasized the need to reflect on how technology can be used in the fight against tax fraud and how the current VAT rules in the European Union could be adapted for doing business in the digital age. The three changes to make VAT fit for the digital age are

    i) a new real time digital reporting system based on e-invoicing,

    ii) update VAT rules for the platform economy and

    iii) a single vat registration for businesses selling to consumers across the EU.

    The directive and the regulation were subject to a special legislative procedure. The European Parliament was consulted and delivered its opinion on 22 November 2023.

    On 5 November 2024, the Council agreed on the ViDA package. However, given the substantial differences between the Commission’s proposal (i.e. the Directive) on which the European Parliament was initially consulted and the text of the Council, the Council decided on 7 November 2024 to re-consult the European Parliament.

    The deemed supplier regime was a significant point of contention within the Council, making it particularly challenging to reach a final compromise.

    The Council decided that the deemed supplier rules will be introduced first on a voluntary basis as from July 1, 2028, and then mandatory as from January 1, 2030. Member States will also be authorised to exempt SMEs from the deemed supplier regime without having to report to the VAT committee. In its first opinion, the EP highlighted the need to limit the administrative burden for SMEs.

    The Council also introduced more flexibility for Member States to operate their own invoicing systems as many member states have already invested heavily in their own software. Summary invoices are also reintroduced under certain conditions despite the Commission’s proposal to prohibit them. The Parliament also favoured the reintroduction of summary invoices in order to keep flexibility and simplicity for Member States and businesses.

    On the implementation deadlines, the Parliament opinion suggested longer deadlines than in the Commission proposal. The Council even further extents the deadlines beyond the Parliament’s proposals.

    Therefore, the rapporteur is of the view that a simplified procedure without amendments is the relevant procedure.

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    Title

    Amending Directive 2006/112/EC as regards VAT rules for the digital age

    References

    15159/2024 – C10-0170/2024 – COM(2022)0701 – C9-0021/2023 – 2022/0407(CNS)

    Date Parliament was consulted

    10.2.2023

     

     

     

    Committee(s) responsible

    ECON

     

     

     

    Rapporteurs

     Date appointed

    Ľudovít Ódor

    19.11.2024

     

     

     

    Simplified procedure – date of decision

    16.1.2025

    Discussed in committee

    16.1.2025

     

     

     

    Date adopted

    16.1.2025

     

     

     

    Date tabled

    17.1.2025

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – Vote on discharge and exchange of views with Commissioner McGrath – Committee on Legal Affairs

    Source: European Parliament

    Commissioner Michael McGrath © European Union, 2024 – EP

    On 29 January 2025, the JURI committee will hold a public hearing on Harmonising certain aspects of insolvency law. The Committee will also hold an exchange of views with Michael McGrath, Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection.

    On 30 January 2025, the JURI committee will vote on 2023 discharge: General budget of the EU – Court of Justice of the European Union. Finally, the Committee will hear a presentation of the EPRS study on the ‘Proposal for a directive on adapting non-contractual civil liability rules to artificial intelligence: Complementary impact assessment’. Th Committee will also hold a hearing on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on adapting non-contractual civil liability rules to artificial intelligence (AI Liability Directive).

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Netherlands: Royal Schiphol Group enters into a loan agreement with the EIB for infrastructure investments

    Source: European Investment Bank

    Royal Schiphol Group and the European Investment Bank (EIB) have entered into a loan agreement to the value of EUR 175 million. This represents the first installment of a total financing of EUR 400 million. The loan contributes to the financial stability of Schiphol and is an important milestone in the realisation of the major EUR 6 million investment programme.

    CFO Robert Carsouw: ’The largest investment programme in the airport’s history asks for robust finances and healthy cashflows. Additional financial resources are necessary in order to realise the infrastructure investments. We are very pleased with the support of the EIB and look forward to continuing our longstanding relationship. This loan contributes to ensuring our financial foundation.’

    EIB Vice-President Robert de Groot added: ‘Our relationship with Schiphol goes back more than two decades, and we are committed to supporting them in these efficiency improvements, to the benefit of both staff and travelers. The EIB finances projects that matter to people, and align with the strategic priorities of the EU, this is a great example of both.’

    New baggage basement

    This loan will be used primarily for the construction of a new baggage basement. The new baggage basement will provide the necessary capacity to replace and upgrade the existing baggage system, which will improve working conditions for baggage handlers. The preparations for construction started recently.

    Investment portfolio: EUR 6 billion in 5 years

    Schiphol is investing EUR 6 billion over the next 5 years in the improvement of airport facilities including the maintenance and renovation of aviation infrastructure, renovation of passenger and employee facilities and implementation of innovative improvements to working conditions. Read more here.

    Ongoing EIB support

    Apart from previous financing for Schiphol’s infrastructure projects, in 2023, the EIB supported the airport’s electrification of airside equipment, which helped to lower emissions in line with Schiphol’s sustainability targets. With the planned investments related to this new loan, Schiphol will enhance its operational capabilities and contribute to the critical civilian infrastructure. The loan therefore falls under the EIB’s Strategic European Security Initiative (SESI).

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: New Human Rights Toolkit for financial institutions

    Source: European Investment Bank

    Dutch-based electrical data analytics company Samotics has signed a €20 million financing agreement with the European Investment Bank (EIB) to accelerate its research and development activities. The EIB’s investment will enhance the company’s solutions regarding the monitoring of machine health and energy efficiency, while accelerating work on its next-generation integrated solution, planned for launch this year. The funding aligns with Samotics’ mission to make industries more reliable, efficient, and sustainable.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – DANA in Spain and the risk of medicine and vaccine shortages – E-002481/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Medicines Agency (EMA), together with the Member States, continuously monitors and investigates signals of potential supply disruptions escalated to EU level by national competent authorities to prevent their occurrence and mitigate their effects as far as possible.

    The potential impact of the situation in Spain on the supply of medicinal products is closely monitored. Thus far, no critical shortage requiring EU coordination actions has been identified in this context.

    In the context of the flood emergency and upon request from the Spanish authorities, the EU Copernicus satellite mapping system[1] was activated on 29 October 2024, and the EU Civil Protection Mechanism[2], on 8 November 2024.

    As a result, 83 maps were produced, and several Member States offered in-kind assistance, in the form of heavy vehicles and pumps. The Commission deployed two liaison officers to help coordinate the assistance. The EU’s strategic reserve, rescEU,[3] was not mobilised as the requests were fulfilled by the offers of Member States.

    A virtual warehouse for data on vaccine needs and stocks has not been set up yet, apart from the existing IT tool CECIS 2.0, in the area of civil protection.

    As part of the implementation of EMA’s extended mandate[4], the European Shortages Monitoring Platform, launched in November 2024, will be used to report shortages and monitor supply, demand, and stock levels of medicinal products for preparedness activities, and during a public health emergency or major event.

    As part of the pharmaceutical reform[5], the Commission has proposed to further expand the platform to cover structural shortages and security of supply of critical medicines.

    • [1] https://emergency.copernicus.eu/mapping/#zoom=2&lat=13.56036&lon=33.82273&layers=0BT00
    • [2] https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/eu-civil-protection-mechanism_en
    • [3] https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/resceu_en
    • [4] http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/123/oj
    • [5] https://health.ec.europa.eu/medicinal-products/pharmaceutical-strategy-europe/reform-eu-pharmaceutical-legislation_en

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Unequal access to medicinal products approved for use across the EU – E-002559/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    1. As explained in the Pharmaceutical Strategy for Europe[1], companies are currently not under a legal obligation in the EU to market a medicine in all Member States. Access disparities, with smaller and less affluent countries especially affected, can be due to various factors. This includes national pricing and reimbursement policies, market size and the organisation of health systems. It can also be due to marketing decisions of individual companies.

    2. The Commission is committed to addressing the issue of access to affordable medicines for all EU citizens while respecting national competences on pricing and reimbursement of medicines, in line with Article 168(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The proposed reform of the general pharmaceutical legislation[2] includes stronger incentives to launch innovative medicines in all Member States; measures for earlier entry of generics and biosimilars and for faster and simpler authorisation procedures. The Commission also supports and encourages cooperation between Member States on pricing, reimbursement and procurement policies in the group of National Competent Authorities on Pricing and Reimbursement and Public Healthcare Payers (NCAPR), based on mutual learning and best-practice exchange, to improve the affordability and cost-effectiveness of medicines and health system’s sustainability.

    • [1] COM(2020) 761 final.
    • [2] Commission proposals, COM(2023) 192 final and COM(2023) 193 final.
    Last updated: 28 January 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Flooding and natural disasters in Rhodes and Lemnos – P-002710/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The whole EU territory is susceptible to climate change impacts[1]. As the first European Climate Risk Assessment underlined, risk ownership is shared across the EU, Member States, sub-national and private sector actors, along with the means and responsibility of acting on them. The Commission will continue to contribute to making Europe more climate resilient[2],[3], among others with a new EU Adaptation Plan.

    Adaptation measures that meet the relevant criteria are eligible for the 30% budget of the EU funds set aside for climate, including the Cohesion fund[4], Next Generation EU[5], the European Regional Development Fund[6], the Common Agriculture Policy[7] and LIFE[8]. Greece is already receiving substantial funding to prevent and manage climate-related flood risks[9].

    The EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF)[10] may cover part of the costs for emergency and recovery operations incurred by public authorities. Private damage is not eligible.

    It can only be activated at the request of a Member State which has a deadline of 12 weeks as from when the first damage occurred, demonstrating that the total direct damage exceeds the thresholds specified in Article 2 Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002.

    Greece requested EUSF assistance for the storm ‘Daniel’ disaster in November 2023. The Commission determined Greece’s application eligible for support and paid out EUR 101 million in 2024.

    Greece has not submitted an EUSF application due to the flooding of Rhodes and Lemnos at the end of November 2024.

    The Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation subprogramme of the LIFE Programme[11] follows a bottom-up approach tailored to local needs and can also offer room for special attention to islands’ needs related to climate change.

    • [1] European Environment Agency, European Climate Risk Assessment, 2024.
    • [2] EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change, COM(2021) 82 final.
    • [3]  COM(2024) 91 final.
    • [4] https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/funding/cohesion-fund/
    • [5] https://next-generation-eu.europa.eu/index_en
    • [6] https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/funding/erdf/
    • [7] https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farming-fisheries/key-policies/common-agricultural-policy/rural-development_en
    • [8] LIFE, https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/life_en
    • [9] Under Greece’s 2021-2027 Partnership Agreement for Regional Development (ESPA), over EUR 726 million in public funding is allocated to prevent and manage climate-related flood risks.
    • [10] Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund (OJ L 311, 14.11.2002, p. 3) as amended by Regulation (EU) No 661/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 (OJ L 189, 27.6.2014, p. 143) and by Regulation (EU) 2020/461 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 March 2020 (OJ L 99, 31.3.2020, p. 9): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32002R2012
    • [11] Budget of EUR 947 million for the period 2021-2027.
    Last updated: 28 January 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Violations of Greek and European territorial waters by Turkish fishing vessels and illegal overfishing – E-000175/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000175/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Fredis Beleris (PPE)

    For a number of years, the “sea bream war” has been raging in the Eastern Aegean, with Turkish fishing vessels active in Greek territorial waters without the permission of the Greek state and in breach of Greek and European law (Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009). Mass incursions of Turkish fishing vessels occur very frequently, and aggressive behaviour towards the Greek coastguard has repeatedly been observed. The Turkish coastguard systematically turns a blind eye to these violations.

    Any fishing activity by third-country vessels in waters under the jurisdiction of an EU Member State, without its permission, is illegal. Overfishing in sensitive areas leads to a reduction in fish stocks, directly affecting the marine ecosystem and the economic life of local communities. The infringement of European law and European marine territorial waters by a candidate for accession is a matter for concern.

    In view of this:

    • 1.Does the Commission intend to press Türkiye to align itself with the rules of the Common Fisheries Policy and the Regulation on illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing?
    • 2.Does it intend to step up the inspections to identify illegal catches on the European market and to achieve a level playing field for Greek fishermen?
    • 3.Does it intend to reinforce the authority of the European Fisheries Control Agency and FRONTEX to stop illegal fishing within European borders?

    Submitted: 16.1.2025

    Last updated: 28 January 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Protecting maternity in professional sport and eliminating discrimination on grounds of pregnancy – E-000227/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000227/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Nikos Pappas (The Left)

    Although maternity is a fundamental right under Article 33 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union[1], many professional female athletes continue to be discriminated against on grounds of pregnancy. Contractual clauses providing for the cancellation of contracts in the event of pregnancy undermine women’s rights and increase insecurity in an already demanding professional field.

    Furthermore, despite the adoption of the work-life balance directive[2], the employment conditions of professional athletes are insufficiently regulated, leaving female athletes exposed to discrimination and at risk of losing their professional status should they choose to become mothers.

    In view of the above, can the Commission say:

    • 1.What measures does it intend to take to protect maternity in professional sport and eliminate discrimination on grounds of pregnancy?
    • 2.How will it address the existence of unfair terms in contracts providing for cancellation on grounds of pregnancy, which is at odds with the principle of equal treatment?
    • 3.Does it intend to establish European standards for the professional rights of female athletes, including access to social protection during pregnancy and maternity?

    Submitted: 20.1.2025

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12016P/TXT
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019L1158
    Last updated: 28 January 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Cybersecurity in Italy and the effectiveness of NRRP investments in cybersecurity – E-002269/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Strengthening Member States’ cyber resilience capabilities, coordinating national cyber efforts and securing critical infrastructures are top priorities for the Commission, which monitors closely cyber threats and incidents affecting the EU’s critical infrastructure.

    The directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive)[1] requires from entities in 18 critical sectors, including public administration, to take risk-based cybersecurity risk-management measures and report significant cyber incidents.

    The NIS 2 Directive transposition deadline for the Member States was 17 October 2024. The Commission is now assessing the Italian transposition legislation that was notified on time.

    In addition, Regulation on digital operational resilience for the financial sector (DORA)[2] requires financial entities to develop capabilities to detect, prevent, limit the impact of information and communication technologies-related incidents, to respond and recover from them, and report major incidents. To assess the effectiveness of the entities’ capabilities, DORA introduces testing requirements.

    Investment 1.5 ‘Cybersecurity’[3], worth EUR 623 million, from Italy’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) spans from creating a Cybersecurity Agency to the implementation of actions boosting Italy’s cyber resilience capabilities.

    In the context of Italy’s fifth payment request, five milestones and targets were assessed as satisfactorily fulfilled: (i) creating the National Cybersecurity Agency (ACN), (ii) defining the national cybersecurity architecture, (iii) the start-up of a network of cybersecurity laboratories, (iv) activating a central audit unit within the ACN (v) completing five strengthening interventions.

    • [1] http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2554/oj/eng
    • [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52024PC0509

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Provision of assistance to Syria in 2024 under the NDICI-Global Europe programme – E-002442/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission’s programming of 2024 non-humanitarian assistance aligned with the Council conclusions of 16 April 2018[1], emphasising that EU aid must benefit Syrian population without benefits accruing to the Syrian regime.

    The fall of the regime reshaped the situation, making a Syrian-led, inclusive political process in the spirit of the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2254[2] a priority for an inclusive and peaceful political transition.

    The EU support initiatives pipeline is guided by commitment to inclusiveness, respect of human rights, including women’s rights, protection of religious and ethnic minorities and fostering peaceful transition.

    On 13 December 2024, the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations announced[3] that the Commission mobilised EUR 4 million in additional aid to address the most urgent humanitarian needs of people, bringing total support to EUR 163 million in 2024.

    The special measure for 2024[4] allocates EUR 36 million to critical areas like health, education, civil documentation, housing, property rights, civil society and justice.

    Assistance targets areas with acute needs and significant numbers of returning refugees and internally displaced persons, as well as on the creation of conditions for safe, voluntary and dignified returns of Syrian refugees, as defined by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

    The EU collaborates with UN agencies, Member State agencies, Syrian-led and international non-governmental organisations, maintaining regular dialogue with civil society across Syria and in the diaspora.

    As the situation evolves, the EU will adjust its approach, if needed, in response to the actions and policies of the new authorities, with the overarching aim of supporting the Syrian people and ensuring an inclusive transition and sustainable peace and stability.

    • [1] https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7956-2018-INIT/en/pdf
    • [2] https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/814715/?v=pdf
    • [3] https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/news/eu-launches-humanitarian-air-bridge-operation-syria-deliver-emergency-supplies-and-boosts-2024-12-13_en
    • [4] https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/commission-implementing-decision-29112024-financing-special-measure-favour-syria-2024_en?prefLang=pt

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Digital Services Act – E-002707/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Digital Services Act (DSA)[1] entered into full application on 17 February 2024. The Member States were obliged to designate and empower their national Digital Services Coordinators (DSCs) by that date. It is those DSCs that are tasked with awarding the status of trusted flagger to applicants that meet the conditions of Article 22 DSA.

    It is of utmost importance for the Commission that the implementation of the DSA is completed as soon as possible. Significant resources are dedicated to support this objective, allowing the Commission to issue the necessary secondary legislation[2], issue guidelines where needed[3], and work efficiently with the European Board for Digital Services (the Board)[4].

    Unfortunately, not all Member States designated and empowered their DSCs by 17 February 2024. As of 9 January 2025, the Commission therefore initiated 13 infringement procedures[5] against Member States that failed to do so[6].

    Only once DSCs have been designated and empowered, can they award the trusted flagger status to eligible entities which can benefit from priority treatment of their notices by online platforms.

    While guidelines on trusted flaggers are not a requirement for DSCs to assign that status to eligible entities, the Commission is currently preparing such guidelines. The guidelines will be subject to public consultation in due course, after consulting the Board[7].

    As of 19 December 2024, 15 trusted flaggers were listed on the dedicated website[8] of the Commission, including entities dedicated to the protection of minors.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj
    • [2] See, for example, https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/implementing-regulation-laying-down-templates-concerning-transparency-reporting-obligations or https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13817-Delegated-Regulation-on-data-access-provided-for-in-the-Digital-Services-Act_en
    • [3] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_1707 or https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-launches-call-evidence-guidelines-protection-minors-online-under-digital-services-act
    • [4] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-board-working-groups
    • [5] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-calls-cyprus-czechia-estonia-poland-portugal-and-slovakia-designate-and-fully-empower and https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-calls-6-member-states-comply-eu-digital-services-act
    • [6] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-dscs
    • [7] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-board
    • [8] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/trusted-flaggers-under-dsa
    Last updated: 28 January 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Protecting Brandy de Jerez – E-002805/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    As explained in the reply to Question E-002565/2024, after the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2019/787[1], the Commission considered the preparation of a delegated act laying down derogations from the youngest component rule along with appropriate control mechanisms for Brandy de Jerez.

    However, certain Member States were against such proposal, considering that making an exception for one single product would weaken the very authority of the general age labelling rule, applied worldwide for many years.

    In view of such disagreement, the Commission has not presented a draft for discussion to the expert group for spirit drinks and will not be in a position to do so until there is a sufficient consensus to adopt such a delegated act.

    As for the deadline for adopting delegated acts expiring in May 2026, the Honourable Member is reminded that Article 46(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/787 provides for the tacit extension of that delegation of power for periods of an identical duration, unless the European Parliament or the Council opposes such extension not later than three months before the end of each period.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R0787
    Last updated: 28 January 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – European aid for Georgia – E-001856/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission stands ready to support the Georgian people on their European path.

    At the same time, in reaction to the developments in Georgia, including targeting civil society and restricting the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) people, and in line with the European Council’s conclusions[1], the Commission launched a review of its bilateral financial assistance portfolio benefiting Georgia. As a result, over EUR 120 million from the 2022-2024 envelopes were withheld or will be reallocated.

    Ensuring and upholding human rights, including the rights of LGBTIQ people, is at the core of the enlargement process, annually assessed within the Commission’s enlargement report.

    The Commission has repeatedly stressed that the legal initiatives targeting LGBTIQ people undermine the fundamental rights of Georgians, risk further stigmatisation and discrimination of part of the population and are not in line with Georgia’s stated aim to join the EU[2].

    In 2022, the Commission referred Hungary to the Court of Justice of the EU over violation of LGBTIQ rights[3]. It also found that provisions of the so-called child-protection law have a concrete and direct impact on the compliance with the horizontal enabling condition on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights[4], based on the criteria under Annex III of the Common Provisions Regulation[5].

    Therefore, the reimbursement of payment requests related to certain specific objectives of three Cohesion Policy programmes are partly suspended.

    • [1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/qa3lblga/euco-conclusions-27062024-en.pdf
    • [2] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/georgia-statement-spokesperson-legislative-package-family-values-and-protection-minors_en?s=221
    • [3] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_2689
    • [4] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_23_6466
    • [5] Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of 24 June 2021.
    Last updated: 28 January 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Dangers e-cigarettes pose to consumers – E-002345/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    1. The Commission follows the EU market of tobacco products closely. There are no safe levels of nicotine consumption. In the EU, to advertise and promote nicotine-containing e-cigarettes is prohibited in Information Society Services, in the press, other printed publications, the radio and audiovisual media[1]. Member States may prohibit cross-border distance sales of nicotine-containing electronic cigarettes to consumers[2].

    While Member States are in principle responsible for regulating age limits and sales arrangements for tobacco and related products within the remit of their own jurisdiction, they are encouraged to prevent sales of such products to children and adolescents[3].

    The Tobacco Products Directive allows Member States to prohibit a certain category of tobacco or related products if such prohibition is justified by the need to protect public health and based on grounds relating to the specific situation in the Member State[4].

    2. Consumer protection on online marketplaces is a priority for the enforcement of the Digital Services Act (DSA)[5]. It provides rules aimed at preventing the dissemination of illegal content as defined by the EU and national legislation and managing systemic risks posed by very large online platforms and search engines (VLOPs and VLOSEs). Providers of online marketplaces must comply with the applicable EU law regarding precontractual information, compliance, and product safety[6]. VLOPs and VLOSEs, in addition, need to comply with the provisions concerning risk assessments of the systemic risks posed by their services and measures to mitigate those risks.[7]

    3. The Commission is carrying out a comprehensive evaluation of the EU legislative framework on tobacco[8]. Future steps will depend on its findings.

    • [1] Article 20(5) of the Tobacco Products Directive 2014/40/EU and Article 9(1)(d) Audiovisual Media Services Directive 2010/13/EU: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02010L0013-20181218
    • [2] Article 20(6) of the Tobacco Products Directive 2014/40/EU.
    • [3] Recital 21 of the Tobacco Products Directive 2014/40/EU.
    • [4] Article 24(3) of the Tobacco Products Directive 2014/40/EU.
    • [5] Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act).
    • [6] In line with Article 31 of the Digital Services Act.
    • [7] In line with Articles 34-35 of the Digital Services Act.
    • [8] https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13481-Evaluation-of-the-legislative-framework-for-tobacco-control_en
    Last updated: 28 January 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Data supporting the proposal for changing the protection status of wolves – E-002639/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The analysis of the wolf situation published in December 2023 by the Commission[1] considered the best available data including the conservation status assessments reported by Member States under Article 17 of the Habitats Directive[2]; the International Union for Conservation of Nature Red List assessments; as well as updated information on wolf numbers in the EU.

    This analysis showed that the conservation status of the wolf in Europe has significantly recovered over the last decades and that the general trends in population and range were still improving.

    The Commission therefore considered, with that information at hand, that waiting for the next reports to be submitted under Article 17 of the Habitats Directive was not necessary.

    Generally increasing trends of both population and range of wolves in Europe have been confirmed by the latest available data, recently published by the Commission[3].

    A change of the protection status of the wolf in the Habitats Directive[4] would not remove the obligation for Member States to reach or maintain good conservation status of wolf populations.

    It will rather provide additional flexibility to the Member States that need it, without obliging other Member States to change the protection status of the wolf at national level.

    Irrespective of any change in the legal protection status of the wolf, the Commission will continue to promote and support, through EU funding instruments, the design and implementation of appropriate coexistence solutions, including measures to prevent and reduce livestock depredations by protected wildlife species[5].

    • [1] https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/env/items/813295/en
    • [2] Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7-50.
    • [3] https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/3f466d71-92a7-49eb-9c63-6cb0fadf29dc/library/97829710-878b-4bf7-95a1-f135b00dd8f7/details
    • [4] i.e. moving the species to Annex V of the Habitats Directive.
    • [5] https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/nature-and-biodiversity/habitats-directive/large-carnivores/eu-large-carnivore-platform/eu-funding-and-large-carnivores_en
    Last updated: 28 January 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Conformity of Tuscany’s regional waste management plan – E-002592/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    1. According to available information, Tuscany’s regional waste management plan has not yet been formally adopted at regional Council level. After its adoption, the plan shall be placed on a publicly available website. Italy shall inform the Commission of the adoption[1]. When this has taken place, the Commission will assess the plan in relation to the legal requirements of the Waste Framework Directive and the Common Provisions Regulation[2].

    2. The Common Provisions Regulation lays down the conditions for Member States to access the European Regional Development Fund[3], and the Cohesion Fund[4], the so-called ‘enabling conditions’.

    The enabling condition on updated planning for waste management means that one or more waste management plan(s) as referred to in the Waste Framework Directive shall be in place and include a number of specific elements[5].

    As for the Recovery and Resilience Facility[6], the Italian Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP) includes several measures related to waste management. However, the adoption of the regional waste management plans is not included in the Italian RRP.

    Without prejudice to the Commission’s role as guardian of the Treaties, Member States are required to ensure compliance of measures included in the RRPs with EU and national law, including with the EU environmental acquis.

    In regard to the RRP, the Commission assesses compliance with the requirements of the Council Implementing Decision[7] upon receipt of the relevant payment requests.

    As a rule, following the principle of ‘do not significant harm’ (DNSH), landfills, incinerators, mechanical biological treatment plants, and activities where the long-term disposal of waste may cause harm to the environment are not eligible to be financed under RRPs.

    • [1] Article 31-33 of Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives, OJ L 312, 22.11.2008, p. 3-30, as amended by Directive (EU) 2018/851 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May, OJ L 150, 14.6.2018, p. 109-140.
    • [2] Article 28 of Directive 2008/98/EC on waste, Annex IV, Section 2.6 of the Common Provisions Regulation, Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy.
    • [3] https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funding/erdf_en
    • [4] https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funding/cohesion-fund_en; N.B. Italy is not eligible for the Cohesion Fund.
    • [5] Annex IV, Section 2.6 of the Common Provisions Regulation: Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy, OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159-706.
    • [6] https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility_en
    • [7] https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/a0e7539e-8d32-11ee-8aa6-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Latest news – 30 January 2025 – Extraordinary meeting – Delegation to the Africa-EU Parliamentary Assembly

    Source: European Parliament

    On Thursday, 30th January, 2025 (14.00-15.00), the DAFR delegation will hold an extraordinary meeting in Brussels (room: SPINELLI 1G2) on on the new developments in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
    Webstreaming will be available.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: City’s iconic Grade I listed building planning to open later this year

    Source: City of Norwich

    Published on Tuesday, 28th January 2025

    Councillors are set to approve new investment in The Halls as part of its on-going and extensive refurbishment programme at a cabinet meeting next month.

    The Halls, a medieval friary complex dating back to the 14th century, have been undergoing extensive refurbishment and improvement works, however, a recent survey to Blackfriars Hall roof has identified further repairs and investment to ensure its longevity. 

    It means The Halls are likely to open later this year. 

    Councillor Claire Kidman, cabinet member for a Prosperous Norwich, said: “We were on target to reopen the beautifully restored building within the next couple of months. But after discovering some pretty major repair work that needed to be done to Blackfriars roof, it means that will now come a bit later in the year. So, we will build that into our new programme of work as we need to make sure we get this right and ensure The Halls are properly restored to their former glory and rightful place as one of Norwich and England’s medieval gems.”

    The survey revealed that works carried out to the roof approximately 80 to 100 years ago had caused a build of moisture in the timber structure due to a plastic sheeting installed at the time.

    It means councillors will be asked to approve repairs and upgrades to the cornices, rafters and bosses in the roof, and some electrical upgrades of around £900,000, from the council’s capital fund to make The Halls fit for public use. In addition to the repairs councillors will be asked to approve a tender exercise, to consider an outside organisation to take over the day-to-day operations of The Halls.

    Cllr Kidman added: “Once open, the newly refurbished Halls will be one of the most iconic venues in East England and further bolster the city’s status as one Europe’s most go-to historic and cultural destinations.” 

    Councillors will discuss the reports at the cabinet meeting on 5 February.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI: C&F Financial Corporation Announces Net Income for 2024

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    TOANO, Va., Jan. 28, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — C&F Financial Corporation (the Corporation) (NASDAQ: CFFI), the holding company for C&F Bank, today reported consolidated net income of $6.0 million for the fourth quarter of 2024, compared to $5.1 million for the fourth quarter of 2023. The Corporation reported consolidated net income of $19.9 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to $23.7 million for the year ended December 31, 2023. The following table presents selected financial performance highlights for the periods indicated:

                                   
        For The Quarter Ended   For the Year Ended  
    Consolidated Financial Highlights (unaudited)   12/31/2024     12/31/2023   12/31/2024     12/31/2023  
    Consolidated net income (000’s)   $ 6,029     $ 5,088   $ 19,918     $ 23,746  
                                   
    Earnings per share – basic and diluted   $ 1.87     $ 1.50   $ 6.01     $ 6.92  
                                   
    Annualized return on average equity     10.60 %     10.06 %   9.02 %     11.68 %
    Annualized return on average tangible common equity1     12.17 %     11.74 %   10.37 %     13.58 %
    Annualized return on average assets     0.94 %     0.85 %   0.80 %     0.99 %

    _________________
    1 For more information about these non-GAAP financial measures, which are not calculated in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), please see “Use of Certain Non-GAAP Financial Measures” and “Reconciliation of Certain Non-GAAP Financial Measures,” below.

    “While the past year’s financial performance reflected the challenges of a dynamic interest rate environment, our fourth quarter earnings were solid, and we are optimistic of earnings momentum heading into the coming year,” commented Tom Cherry, President and Chief Executive Officer of C&F Financial Corporation. “Our net interest margin was down for 2024, however, it stabilized in the fourth quarter, and we are cautiously optimistic about margin performance in 2025. The community banking segment delivered solid loan and deposit growth across all markets. Despite facing headwinds from higher mortgage rates and a low inventory of homes for sale, the mortgage banking segment increased its loan production and net income over 2023. While higher charge-offs weighed on profitability at the consumer finance segment, we were able to achieve significant operational efficiencies during 2024. Despite obstacles and adversities that continually confront the banking industry in general, we believe C&F is well-positioned for the future.”

    Key highlights for the fourth quarter and the year ended December 31, 2024 are as follows.

    • Community banking segment loans grew $21.5 million, or 6.0 percent annualized, and $180.0 million, or 14.1 percent, compared to September 30, 2024 and December 31, 2023, respectively;
    • Consumer finance segment loans decreased $10.5 million, or 8.8 percent annualized, and $1.7 million, or less than one percent, compared to September 30, 2024 and December 31, 2023, respectively;
    • Deposits increased $35.0 million, or 6.6 percent annualized, and $104.7 million, or 5.1 percent, compared to September 30, 2024 and December 31, 2023, respectively;
    • Consolidated annualized net interest margin was 4.13 percent for the fourth quarter of 2024 compared to 4.17 percent for the fourth quarter of 2023 and 4.13 percent in the third quarter of 2024. Consolidated net interest margin was 4.12 percent for the year ended December 31, 2024 compared to 4.31 percent for the year ended December 31, 2023;
    • The community banking segment recorded no provision for credit losses for the fourth quarter of 2024 and $75,000 for the fourth quarter of 2023, and recorded provision for credit losses of $1.7 million and $1.6 million for the years ended December 31, 2024 and 2023, respectively;
    • The consumer finance segment recorded provision for credit losses of $3.5 million and $2.4 million for the fourth quarters of 2024 and 2023, respectively, and recorded provision for credit losses of $11.6 million and $6.7 million for the years ended December 31, 2024 and 2023, respectively;
    • The consumer finance segment experienced net charge-offs at an annualized rate of 3.40 percent of average total loans for the fourth quarter of 2024, compared to 2.72 percent for the fourth quarter of 2023. Net charge-offs as a percentage of average total loans were 2.62 percent for the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to 1.99 percent for the year ended December 31, 2023; and
    • Mortgage banking segment loan originations increased $32.2 million, or 32.8 percent, to $130.4 million for the fourth quarter of 2024 compared to the fourth quarter of 2023 and increased $29.0 million, or 5.8 percent, to $527.8 million for the year ended December 31, 2024 compared to the year ended December 31, 2023.

    Community Banking Segment. The community banking segment reported net income of $6.4 million for the fourth quarter of 2024, compared to $5.2 million for the same period of 2023, due primarily to:

    • higher interest income resulting from higher average balances of loans and the effects of higher interest rates on asset yields, offset in part by lower average balances of securities;
    • higher other income from bank owned life insurance policies; and
    • lower salaries and employee benefits expense due primarily to a reduction in headcount through attrition;

    partially offset by:

    • higher interest expense due primarily to higher rates on deposits and higher average balances of interest-bearing deposits, offset in part by lower average balances of borrowings.

    The community banking segment reported net income of $20.3 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to $22.9 million for the same period of 2023, due primarily to:

    • higher interest expense resulting from higher rates on deposits and higher average balances of interest-bearing deposits, partially offset by lower average balances of borrowings;
    • higher data processing and consulting costs related to investments in operational technology to improve resilience, efficiency and customer experience;
    • higher occupancy expense related to branch network improvements, including the relocation of a branch and the opening of a new branch; and
    • higher salaries and employee benefits expense, which have generally increased in line with market conditions, offset in part by a reduction in headcount through attrition;

    partially offset by:

    • higher interest income resulting from higher average balances of loans and the effects of higher interest rates on asset yields, offset in part by lower average balances of securities;
    • higher wealth management services income due primarily to higher assets under management;
    • higher other income from bank owned life insurance policies; and
    • higher investment income from other equity investments.

    Average loans increased $180.8 million, or 14.4 percent, for the fourth quarter of 2024 and increased $164.0 million, or 13.5 percent, for the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to the same periods in 2023, due primarily to growth in the construction, commercial real estate, and residential mortgage segments of the loan portfolio. Average deposits increased $140.2 million, or 6.9 percent, for the fourth quarter of 2024 and increased $110.8 million, or 5.5 percent, for the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to the same periods in 2023, due primarily to higher balance of time deposits, partially offset by decreases in savings and interest-bearing demand deposits and noninterest-bearing demand deposits amid increased competition for deposits and the higher interest rate environment.

    Average loan yields and average costs of interest-bearing deposits were higher for the fourth quarter and the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to the same periods of 2023, due primarily to the effects of the higher interest rate environment.

    The community banking segment’s nonaccrual loans were $333,000 at December 31, 2024 compared to $406,000 at December 31, 2023. The community banking segment recorded no provision for credit losses for the fourth quarter of 2024 and $1.7 million for the year ended December 31, 2024 compared to $75,000 and $1.6 million for the same periods of 2023. At December 31, 2024, the allowance for credit losses increased to $17.4 million, compared to $16.1 million at December 31, 2023. The allowance for credit losses as a percentage of total loans decreased to 1.20 percent at December 31, 2024 from 1.26 percent at December 31, 2023. The increases in provision and allowance for credit losses are due primarily to growth in the loan portfolio. Management believes that the level of the allowance for credit losses is adequate to reflect the net amount expected to be collected.

    Mortgage Banking Segment. The mortgage banking segment reported net income of $87,000 and $1.1 million for the fourth quarter and year ended December 31, 2024, respectively, compared to a net loss of $103,000 and net income of $465,000 for the same periods of 2023, due primarily to:

    • higher gains on sales of loans and higher mortgage banking fee income due to higher volume of mortgage loan originations; and
    • lower occupancy expenses due to an effort to reduce overhead costs;

    partially offset by:

    • higher variable expenses tied to mortgage loan origination volume such as commissions and bonuses, reported in salaries and employee benefits; and
    • lower reversal of provision for indemnifications.

    The sustained elevated level of mortgage interest rates, combined with higher home prices and lower levels of inventory, led to a level of mortgage loan originations in 2024 and 2023 for the industry that is lower than recent historical averages. Mortgage loan originations for the mortgage banking segment were $130.4 million for the fourth quarter of 2024, comprised of $15.9 million refinancings and $114.5 million home purchases, compared to $98.2 million, comprised of $12.5 million refinancings and $85.7 million home purchases, for the same period in 2023. Mortgage loan originations for the mortgage banking segment were $527.8 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, comprised of $50.2 million refinancings and $477.6 million home purchases, compared to $498.8 million, comprised of $52.7 million refinancings and $446.1 million home purchases, for the same period in 2023. Mortgage loan originations in the fourth quarter of 2024 decreased $26.6 million compared to the third quarter of 2024 due in part to normal industry seasonal fluctuations. Mortgage loan segment originations include originations of loans sold to the community banking segment, at prices similar to those paid by third-party investors. These transactions are eliminated to reach consolidated totals.

    During the fourth quarter and year ended December 31, 2024, the mortgage banking segment recorded a reversal of provision for indemnification losses of $85,000 and $460,000, respectively, compared to a reversal of provision for indemnification losses of $150,000 and $585,000 in the same periods of 2023. The mortgage banking segment increased reserves for indemnification losses during 2020 based on widespread forbearance on mortgage loans and economic uncertainty related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The release of indemnification reserves in 2024 and 2023 was due primarily to improvement in the mortgage banking segment’s assessment of borrower payment performance, lower volume of mortgage loan originations in recent years and other factors affecting expected losses on mortgage loans sold in the secondary market, such as time since origination. Management believes that the indemnification reserve is sufficient to absorb losses related to loans that have been sold in the secondary market.

    Consumer Finance Segment. The consumer finance segment reported net income of $272,000 and $1.4 million for the fourth quarter and year ended December 31, 2024, respectively, compared to net income of $618,000 and $2.9 million for the same periods in 2023. The decreases in consumer finance segment net income were due primarily to:

    • higher provision for credit losses due primarily to increased net charge-offs; and
    • higher interest expense on variable rate borrowings from the community banking segment as a result of higher interest rates and higher average balances of borrowings;

    partially offset by:

    • higher interest income resulting from the effects of higher interest rates on loan yields and higher average balances of loans;
    • lower salaries and employee benefits expense due to an effort to reduce overhead costs; and
    • lower loan processing and collection expenses due primarily to efficiency initiatives within the collections department.

    Average loans increased $2.5 million, or one percent, for the fourth quarter of 2024 and increased $2.9 million, or one percent, for the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to the same periods in 2023. The consumer finance segment experienced net charge-offs at a rate of 2.62 percent of average total loans for the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to 1.99 percent for the year ended December 31, 2023, due primarily to an increase in the number of delinquent loans, the number of repossessions, and the average amount charged-off when a loan was uncollectable. Higher amounts charged-off per loan resulted in part from larger loan amounts, generally purchased in 2020 and 2021 when automobile values were higher, being charged-off in the current year, with the wholesale values of automobiles having declined since then. At December 31, 2024, total delinquent loans as a percentage of total loans was 3.90 percent, compared to 4.09 percent at December 31, 2023, and 3.49 percent at September 30, 2024.

    The consumer finance segment, at times, offers payment deferrals as a portfolio management technique to achieve higher ultimate cash collections on select loan accounts. A significant reliance on deferrals as a means of managing collections may result in a lengthening of the loss confirmation period, which would increase expectations of credit losses inherent in the portfolio. Average amounts of payment deferrals of automobile loans on a monthly basis, which are not included in delinquent loans, were 2.11 percent and 1.80 percent of average automobile loans outstanding during the fourth quarter and year ended December 31, 2024, respectively, compared to 2.02 percent and 1.87 percent during the same periods during 2023. The allowance for credit losses was $22.7 million at December 31, 2024 and $23.6 million at December 31, 2023. The allowance for credit losses as a percentage of total loans decreased to 4.86 percent at December 31, 2024 from 5.03 percent at December 31, 2023, primarily as a result of growth in loans with stronger credit quality while balances of loans with lower credit quality declined. Management believes that the level of the allowance for credit losses is adequate to reflect the net amount expected to be collected. If loan performance deteriorates resulting in further elevated delinquencies or net charge-offs, the provision for credit losses may increase in future periods.

    Liquidity. The objective of the Corporation’s liquidity management is to ensure the continuous availability of funds to satisfy the credit needs of our customers and the demands of our depositors, creditors and investors. Uninsured deposits represent an estimate of amounts above the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insurance coverage limit of $250,000. As of December 31, 2024, the Corporation’s uninsured deposits were approximately $640.2 million, or 29.5 percent of total deposits. Excluding intercompany cash holdings and municipal deposits, which are secured with pledged securities, amounts uninsured were approximately $455.2 million, or 21.0 percent of total deposits as of December 31, 2024. The Corporation’s liquid assets, which include cash and due from banks, interest-bearing deposits at other banks and nonpledged securities available for sale, were $288.1 million and borrowing availability was $606.2 million as of December 31, 2024, which in total exceed uninsured deposits, excluding intercompany cash holdings and secured municipal deposits, by $439.1 million as of December 31, 2024.

    In addition to deposits, the Corporation utilizes short-term and long-term borrowings as sources of funds. Short-term borrowings from the Federal Reserve Bank and the Federal Home loan Bank of Atlanta (FHLB) may be used to fund the Corporation’s day-to-day operations. Short-term borrowings also include securities sold under agreements to repurchase. Total borrowings increased to $122.6 million at December 31, 2024 from $109.5 million at December 31, 2023 due primarily to higher long-term borrowings from the FHLB used in part to fund loan growth.

    Additional sources of liquidity available to the Corporation include cash flows from operations, loan payments and payoffs, deposit growth, maturities, calls and sales of securities and the issuance of brokered certificates of deposit.

    Capital and Dividends. The Corporation declared cash dividends during the year ended December 31, 2024 totaling $1.76 per share, including a quarterly cash dividend of 44 cents per share during the fourth quarter of 2024, which was paid on January 1, 2025. These dividends represent a payout ratio of 23.5 percent of earnings per share for the fourth quarter of 2024 and 29.3 percent of earnings per share for the year ended December 31, 2024. The Board of Directors of the Corporation continually reviews the amount of cash dividends per share and the resulting dividend payout ratio in light of changes in economic conditions, current and future capital requirements, and expected future earnings.

    Total consolidated equity increased $9.5 million at December 31, 2024, compared to December 31, 2023, due primarily to net income and lower unrealized losses in the market value of securities available for sale, which are recognized as a component of other comprehensive income, partially offset by share repurchases and dividends paid on the Corporation’s common stock. The Corporation’s securities available for sale are fixed income debt securities and their unrealized loss position is a result of rising market interest rates since they were purchased. The Corporation expects to recover its investments in debt securities through scheduled payments of principal and interest. Unrealized losses are not expected to affect the earnings or regulatory capital of the Corporation or C&F Bank. The accumulated other comprehensive loss related to the Corporation’s securities available for sale, net of deferred income taxes, decreased to $23.7 million at December 31, 2024 compared to $25.0 million at December 31, 2023 due primarily to fluctuations in debt security market interest rates and a decrease in the balance of securities available for sale.

    As of December 31, 2024, the most recent notification from the FDIC categorized the C&F Bank as well capitalized under the regulatory framework for prompt corrective action. To be categorized as well capitalized under regulations applicable at December 31, 2024, C&F Bank was required to maintain minimum total risk-based, Tier 1 risk-based, CET1 risk-based and Tier 1 leverage ratios. In addition to the regulatory risk-based capital requirements, C&F Bank must maintain a capital conservation buffer of additional capital of 2.5 percent of risk-weighted assets as required by the Basel III capital rules. The Corporation and C&F Bank exceeded these ratios at December 31, 2024. For additional information, see “Capital Ratios” below. The above mentioned ratios are not impacted by unrealized losses on securities available for sale. In the event that all of these unrealized losses became realized into earnings, the Corporation and C&F Bank would both continue to exceed minimum capital requirements, including the capital conservation buffer, and be considered well capitalized.

    In December 2023, the Board of Directors authorized a program, effective January 1, 2024 through December 31, 2024, to repurchase up to $10.0 million of the Corporation’s common stock (the 2024 Repurchase Program). During the fourth quarter and year ended December 31, 2024, the Corporation repurchased 11,100 shares, or $679,000, and 160,694 shares, or $7.9 million, of its common stock under the 2024 Repurchase Program, respectively. In December 2024, the Board of Directors authorized a new program, effective January 1, 2025 through December 31, 2025, to repurchase up to $5.0 million of the Corporation’s common stock through December 31, 2025 (the 2025 Repurchase Program).

    About C&F Financial Corporation. The Corporation’s common stock is listed for trading on The Nasdaq Stock Market under the symbol CFFI. The common stock closed at a price of $75.40 per share on January 27, 2025. At December 31, 2024, the book value per share of the Corporation was $70.00 and the tangible book value per share was $61.86. For more information about the Corporation’s tangible book value per share, which is not calculated in accordance with GAAP, please see “Use of Certain Non-GAAP Financial Measures” and “Reconciliation of Certain Non-GAAP Financial Measures,” below.

    C&F Bank operates 31 banking offices and four commercial loan offices located throughout eastern and central Virginia and offers full wealth management services through its subsidiary C&F Wealth Management, Inc. C&F Mortgage Corporation and its subsidiary C&F Select LLC provide mortgage loan origination services through offices located in Virginia and the surrounding states. C&F Finance Company provides automobile, marine and recreational vehicle loans through indirect lending programs offered primarily in the Northeastern, Midwestern and Southern United States from its headquarters in Henrico, Virginia.

    Additional information regarding the Corporation’s products and services, as well as access to its filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), are available on the Corporation’s website at http://www.cffc.com.

    Use of Certain Non-GAAP Financial Measures. The accounting and reporting policies of the Corporation conform to GAAP in the United States and prevailing practices in the banking industry. However, certain non-GAAP measures are used by management to supplement the evaluation of the Corporation’s performance. These include adjusted net income, adjusted earnings per share, adjusted return on average equity, adjusted return on average assets, return on average tangible common equity (ROTCE), adjusted ROTCE, tangible book value per share, price to tangible book value ratio, and the following fully-taxable equivalent (FTE) measures: interest income on loans-FTE, interest income on securities-FTE, total interest income-FTE and net interest income-FTE.

    Management believes that the use of these non-GAAP measures provides meaningful information about operating performance by enhancing comparability with other financial periods, other financial institutions, and between different sources of interest income. The non-GAAP measures used by management enhance comparability by excluding the effects of balances of intangible assets, including goodwill, that vary significantly between institutions, and tax benefits that are not consistent across different opportunities for investment. These non-GAAP financial measures should not be considered an alternative to GAAP-basis financial statements, and other bank holding companies may define or calculate these or similar measures differently. A reconciliation of the non-GAAP financial measures used by the Corporation to evaluate and measure the Corporation’s performance to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures is presented below.

    Forward-Looking Statements. This press release contains “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. These forward-looking statements are based on the beliefs of the Corporation’s management, as well as assumptions made by, and information currently available to, the Corporation’s management, and reflect management’s current views with respect to certain events that could have an impact on the Corporation’s future financial performance. These statements, including without limitation statements made in Mr. Cherry’s quote and statements regarding future interest rates and conditions in the Corporation’s industries and markets, relate to expectations concerning matters that are not historical fact, may express “belief,” “intention,” “expectation,” “potential” and similar expressions, and may use the words “believe,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “estimate,” “plan,” “may,” “might,” “will,” “intend,” “target,” “should,” “could,” or similar expressions. These statements are inherently uncertain, and there can be no assurance that the underlying assumptions will prove to be accurate. Actual results could differ materially from those anticipated or implied by such statements. Forward-looking statements in this release may include, without limitation, statements regarding expected future operations and financial performance, expected trends in yields on loans, expected future recovery of investments in debt securities, future dividend payments, deposit trends, charge-offs and delinquencies, changes in cost of funds and net interest margin and items affecting net interest margin, strategic business initiatives and the anticipated effects thereof, changes in interest rates and the effects thereof on net interest income, mortgage loan originations, expectations regarding C&F Bank’s regulatory risk-based capital requirement levels, technology initiatives, our diversified business strategy, asset quality, credit quality, adequacy of allowances for credit losses and the level of future charge-offs, market interest rates and housing inventory and resulting effects in mortgage loan origination volume, sources of liquidity, adequacy of the reserve for indemnification losses related to loans sold in the secondary market, the effect of future market and industry trends, the effects of future interest rate fluctuations, cybersecurity risks, and inflation. Factors that could have a material adverse effect on the operations and future prospects of the Corporation include, but are not limited to, changes in:

    • interest rates, such as volatility in short-term interest rates or yields on U.S. Treasury bonds, increases in interest rates following actions by the Federal Reserve and increases or volatility in mortgage interest rates
    • general business conditions, as well as conditions within the financial markets
    • general economic conditions, including unemployment levels, inflation rates, supply chain disruptions and slowdowns in economic growth
    • general market conditions, including disruptions due to pandemics or significant health hazards, severe weather conditions, natural disasters, terrorist activities, financial crises, political crises, war and other military conflicts (including the ongoing military conflicts between Russia and Ukraine and in the Middle East) or other major events, or the prospect of these events
    • average loan yields and average costs of interest-bearing deposits
    • financial services industry conditions, including bank failures or concerns involving liquidity
    • labor market conditions, including attracting, hiring, training, motivating and retaining qualified employees
    • the legislative/regulatory climate, regulatory initiatives with respect to financial institutions, products and services, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the CFPB) and the regulatory and enforcement activities of the CFPB
    • monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. Government, including policies of the FDIC, U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the effect of these policies on interest rates and business in our markets
    • demand for financial services in the Corporation’s market area
    • the value of securities held in the Corporation’s investment portfolios
    • the quality or composition of the loan portfolios and the value of the collateral securing those loans
    • the inventory level, demand and fluctuations in the pricing of used automobiles, including sales prices of repossessed vehicles
    • the level of automobile loan delinquencies or defaults and our ability to repossess automobiles securing delinquent automobile finance installment contracts
    • the level of net charge-offs on loans and the adequacy of our allowance for credit losses
    • the level of indemnification losses related to mortgage loans sold
    • demand for loan products
    • deposit flows
    • the strength of the Corporation’s counterparties
    • the availability of lines of credit from the FHLB and other counterparties
    • the soundness of other financial institutions and any indirect exposure related to the closing of other financial institutions and their impact on the broader market through other customers, suppliers and partners, or that the conditions which resulted in the liquidity concerns experienced by closed financial institutions may also adversely impact, directly or indirectly, other financial institutions and market participants with which the Corporation has commercial or deposit relationships
    • competition from both banks and non-banks, including competition in the non-prime automobile finance markets and marine and recreational vehicle finance markets
    • services provided by, or the level of the Corporation’s reliance upon third parties for key services
    • the commercial and residential real estate markets, including changes in property values
    • the demand for residential mortgages and conditions in the secondary residential mortgage loan markets
    • the Corporation’s technology initiatives and other strategic initiatives
    • the Corporation’s branch expansions and consolidations plans
    • cyber threats, attacks or events
    • C&F Bank’s product offerings
    • accounting principles, policies and guidelines, and elections by the Corporation thereunder

    These risks and uncertainties should be considered in evaluating the forward-looking statements contained herein, and readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance on any forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date of this release. For additional information on risk factors that could affect the forward-looking statements contained herein, see the Corporation’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2023 and other reports filed with the SEC. The Corporation undertakes no obligation to update any forward-looking statement, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.

     
    C&F Financial Corporation

    Selected Financial Information
    (dollars in thousands, except for per share data)
    (unaudited)
     
    Financial Condition   12/31/2024   12/31/2023  
    Interest-bearing deposits in other banks   $ 49,423   $ 58,777  
    Investment securities – available for sale, at fair value     418,625     462,444  
    Loans held for sale, at fair value     20,112     14,176  
    Loans, net:              
    Community Banking segment     1,436,226     1,257,557  
    Consumer Finance segment     444,085     444,931  
    Total assets     2,563,385     2,438,498  
    Deposits     2,170,860     2,066,130  
    Repurchase agreements     28,994     30,705  
    Other borrowings     93,615     78,834  
    Total equity     226,970     217,516  
                                     
        For The     For The  
        Quarter Ended     Year Ended  
    Results of Operations   12/31/2024     12/31/2023     12/31/2024     12/31/2023  
    Interest income   $ 36,443     $ 32,408     $ 139,594     $ 124,137  
    Interest expense     11,343       8,466       42,819       26,430  
    Provision for credit losses:                                
    Community Banking segment     –       75       1,650       1,625  
    Consumer Finance segment     3,500       2,400       11,600       6,650  
    Noninterest income:                                
    Gains on sales of loans     1,250       850       6,064       5,780  
    Other     5,700       6,953       24,474       23,835  
    Noninterest expenses:                                
    Salaries and employee benefits     11,953       14,035       53,578       54,876  
    Other     9,363       9,038       36,352       35,007  
    Income tax expense     1,205       1,109       4,215       5,418  
    Net income     6,029       5,088       19,918       23,746  
                                     
    Fully-taxable equivalent (FTE) amounts1                                
    Interest income on loans-FTE     33,122       29,147       127,288       111,146  
    Interest income on securities-FTE     3,046       3,121       12,079       12,710  
    Total interest income-FTE     36,731       32,677       140,741       125,101  
    Net interest income-FTE     25,388       24,211       97,922       98,671  

    _________________
    1 For more information about these non-GAAP financial measures, please see “Use of Certain Non-GAAP Financial Measures” and “Reconciliation of Certain Non-GAAP Financial Measures.”

                                       
        For the Quarter Ended  
        12/31/2024   12/31/2023  
        Average   Income/   Yield/   Average   Income/   Yield/  
    Yield Analysis   Balance   Expense   Rate   Balance   Expense   Rate  
    Assets                                  
    Securities:                                  
    Taxable   $ 321,796     $ 1,898   2.36 % $ 392,368     $ 2,093   2.13 %
    Tax-exempt     120,119       1,148   3.82     118,263       1,028   3.48  
    Total securities     441,915       3,046   2.76     510,631       3,121   2.44  
    Loans:                                  
    Community banking segment     1,438,195       20,036   5.54     1,257,418       16,813   5.30  
    Mortgage banking segment     30,674       486   6.30     22,288       383   6.82  
    Consumer finance segment     473,816       12,600   10.58     471,355       11,951   10.06  
    Total loans     1,942,685       33,122   6.78     1,751,061       29,147   6.60  
    Interest-bearing deposits in other banks     58,212       563   3.85     42,114       409   3.85  
    Total earning assets     2,442,812       36,731   5.98     2,303,806       32,677   5.63  
    Allowance for credit losses     (40,930 )               (40,614 )            
    Total non-earning assets     159,082                 142,252              
    Total assets   $ 2,560,964               $ 2,405,444              
                                       
    Liabilities and Equity                                  
    Interest-bearing deposits:                                  
    Interest-bearing demand deposits   $ 331,156       601   0.72   $ 341,243       556   0.65  
    Money market deposit accounts     299,321       1,136   1.51     299,712       896   1.19  
    Savings accounts     176,106       26   0.06     194,476       33   0.07  
    Certificates of deposit     811,224       8,325   4.08     635,702       5,665   3.54  
    Total interest-bearing deposits     1,617,807       10,088   2.48     1,471,133       7,150   1.93  
    Borrowings:                                  
    Repurchase agreements     30,673       131   1.71     33,418       126   1.51  
    Other borrowings     93,765       1,124   4.79     98,875       1,190   4.81  
    Total borrowings     124,438       1,255   4.03     132,293       1,316   3.98  
    Total interest-bearing liabilities     1,742,245       11,343   2.59     1,603,426       8,466   2.10  
    Noninterest-bearing demand deposits     547,890                 554,321              
    Other liabilities     43,379                 45,462              
    Total liabilities     2,333,514                 2,203,209              
    Equity     227,450                 202,235              
    Total liabilities and equity   $ 2,560,964               $ 2,405,444              
    Net interest income         $ 25,388             $ 24,211      
    Interest rate spread               3.39 %             3.53 %
    Interest expense to average earning assets               1.85 %             1.46 %
    Net interest margin               4.13 %             4.17 %
                                       
        For the Year Ended  
        12/31/2024   12/31/2023  
        Average   Income/   Yield/   Average   Income/   Yield/  
    Yield Analysis   Balance   Expense   Rate   Balance   Expense   Rate  
    Assets                                  
    Securities:                                  
    Taxable   $ 335,647     $ 7,563   2.25 % $ 428,895     $ 9,110   2.12 %
    Tax-exempt     119,978       4,516   3.76     108,006       3,600   3.33  
    Total securities     455,625       12,079   2.65     536,901       12,710   2.37  
    Loans:                                  
    Community banking segment     1,378,131       75,707   5.49     1,214,143       62,188   5.12  
    Mortgage banking segment     30,737       1,897   6.17     25,598       1,695   6.62  
    Consumer finance segment     476,775       49,684   10.42     473,885       47,263   9.97  
    Total loans     1,885,643       127,288   6.75     1,713,626       111,146   6.49  
    Interest-bearing deposits in other banks     37,238       1,374   3.69     35,351       1,245   3.52  
    Total earning assets     2,378,506       140,741   5.92     2,285,878       125,101   5.47  
    Allowance for loan losses     (40,736 )               (41,047 )            
    Total non-earning assets     156,726                 148,666              
    Total assets   $ 2,494,496               $ 2,393,497              
                                       
    Liabilities and Equity                                  
    Interest-bearing deposits:                                  
    Interest-bearing demand deposits   $ 327,700       2,170   0.66   $ 354,643       2,134   0.60  
    Money market deposit accounts     296,278       4,313   1.46     317,601       3,017   0.95  
    Savings accounts     180,429       111   0.06     209,033       124   0.06  
    Certificates of deposit     767,721       31,465   4.10     541,252       15,112   2.79  
    Total interest-bearing deposits     1,572,128       38,059   2.42     1,422,529       20,387   1.43  
    Borrowings:                                  
    Repurchase agreements     27,754       456   1.64     32,393       399   1.23  
    Other borrowings     91,713       4,304   4.69     116,908       5,644   4.83  
    Total borrowings     119,467       4,760   3.98     149,301       6,043   4.05  
    Total interest-bearing liabilities     1,691,595       42,819   2.53     1,571,830       26,430   1.68  
    Noninterest-bearing demand deposits     536,828                 575,452              
    Other liabilities     45,217                 42,954              
    Total liabilities     2,273,640                 2,190,236              
    Equity     220,856                 203,261              
    Total liabilities and equity   $ 2,494,496               $ 2,393,497              
    Net interest income         $ 97,922             $ 98,671      
    Interest rate spread               3.39 %             3.79 %
    Interest expense to average earning assets               1.80 %             1.16 %
    Net interest margin               4.12 %             4.31 %
                       
        12/31/2024
    Funding Sources   Capacity   Outstanding   Available
    Unsecured federal funds agreements   $ 75,000   $ —   $ 75,000
    Borrowings from FHLB     257,734     40,000     217,734
    Borrowings from Federal Reserve Bank     313,499     —     313,499
    Total   $ 646,233   $ 40,000   $ 606,233
                   
    Asset Quality   12/31/2024   12/31/2023  
    Community Banking              
    Total loans   $ 1,453,605   $ 1,273,629  
    Nonaccrual loans   $ 333   $ 406  
                   
    Allowance for credit losses (ACL)   $ 17,379   $ 16,072  
    Nonaccrual loans to total loans     0.02 %   0.03 %
    ACL to total loans     1.20 %   1.26 %
    ACL to nonaccrual loans     5,218.92 %   3,958.62 %
    Year-to-date net charge-offs to average loans     0.01 %   0.01 %
                   
    Consumer Finance              
    Total loans   $ 466,793   $ 468,510  
    Nonaccrual loans   $ 614   $ 892  
    Repossessed assets   $ 779   $ 646  
    ACL   $ 22,708   $ 23,579  
    Nonaccrual loans to total loans     0.13 %   0.19 %
    ACL to total loans     4.86 %   5.03 %
    ACL to nonaccrual loans     3,698.37 %   2,643.39 %
    Year-to-date net charge-offs to average loans     2.62 %   1.99 %
                             
        For The   For The
        Quarter Ended   Year Ended
    Other Performance Data   12/31/2024   12/31/2023   12/31/2024   12/31/2023
    Net Income (Loss):                        
    Community Banking   $ 6,364     $ 5,186     $ 20,284     $ 22,928  
    Mortgage Banking     87       (103 )     1,108       465  
    Consumer Finance     272       618       1,414       2,879  
    Other1     (694 )     (613 )     (2,888 )     (2,526 )
    Total   $ 6,029     $ 5,088     $ 19,918     $ 23,746  
                             
    Net income attributable to C&F Financial Corporation   $ 6,037     $ 5,068     $ 19,834     $ 23,604  
                             
    Earnings per share – basic and diluted   $ 1.87     $ 1.50     $ 6.01     $ 6.92  
    Weighted average shares outstanding – basic and diluted     3,226,999       3,367,931       3,299,574       3,411,995  
                             
    Annualized return on average assets     0.94 %     0.85 %     0.80 %     0.99 %
    Annualized return on average equity     10.60 %     10.06 %     9.02 %     11.68 %
    Annualized return on average tangible common equity2     12.17 %     11.74 %     10.37 %     13.58 %
    Dividends declared per share   $ 0.44     $ 0.44     $ 1.76     $ 1.76  
                             
    Mortgage loan originations – Mortgage Banking   $ 130,426     $ 98,238     $ 527,750     $ 498,797  
    Mortgage loans sold – Mortgage Banking     154,552       109,387       522,001       498,852  

    _________________
    1 Includes results of the holding company that are not allocated to the business segments and elimination of inter-segment activity.
    2 For more information about these non-GAAP financial measures, please see “Use of Certain Non-GAAP Financial Measures” and “Reconciliation of Certain Non-GAAP Financial Measures.”

                   
    Market Ratios   12/31/2024     12/31/2023
    Market value per share   $ 71.25     $ 68.19
    Book value per share   $ 70.00     $ 64.28
    Price to book value ratio     1.02       1.06
    Tangible book value per share1   $ 61.86     $ 56.40
    Price to tangible book value ratio1     1.15       1.21
    Price to earnings ratio (ttm)     11.86       9.87

    _________________
    1 For more information about these non-GAAP financial measures, please see “Use of Certain Non-GAAP Financial Measures” and “Reconciliation of Certain Non-GAAP Financial Measures.”

                   
                   
                Minimum Capital
    Capital Ratios   12/31/2024   12/31/2023   Requirements3
    C&F Financial Corporation1              
    Total risk-based capital ratio   14.1%   14.8%   8.0%  
    Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio   11.9%   12.6%   6.0%  
    Common equity tier 1 capital ratio   10.7%   11.3%   4.5%  
    Tier 1 leverage ratio   9.8%   10.1%   4.0%  
                   
    C&F Bank2              
    Total risk-based capital ratio   13.6%   14.1%   8.0%  
    Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio   12.3%   12.9%   6.0%  
    Common equity tier 1 capital ratio   12.3%   12.9%   4.5%  
    Tier 1 leverage ratio   10.1%   10.3%   4.0%  

    _________________
    1 The Corporation, a small bank holding company under applicable regulations and guidance, is not subject to the minimum regulatory capital regulations for bank holding companies. The regulatory requirements that apply to bank holding companies that are subject to regulatory capital requirements are presented above, along with the Corporation’s capital ratios as determined under those regulations.
    2 All ratios at December 31, 2024 are estimates and subject to change pending regulatory filings. All ratios at December 31, 2023 are presented as filed.
    3 The ratios presented for minimum capital requirements are those to be considered adequately capitalized.

                             
        For The Quarter Ended   For The Year Ended
        12/31/2024   12/31/2023   12/31/2024   12/31/2023
    Reconciliation of Certain Non-GAAP Financial Measures                
    Return on Average Tangible Common Equity                        
    Average total equity, as reported   $ 227,450     $ 202,235     $ 220,856     $ 203,261  
    Average goodwill     (25,191 )     (25,191 )     (25,191 )     (25,191 )
    Average other intangible assets     (1,183 )     (1,439 )     (1,273 )     (1,538 )
    Average noncontrolling interest     (518 )     (515 )     (649 )     (675 )
    Average tangible common equity   $ 200,558     $ 175,090     $ 193,743     $ 175,857  
                             
    Net income   $ 6,029     $ 5,088     $ 19,918     $ 23,746  
    Amortization of intangibles     64       69       260       273  
    Net loss (income) attributable to noncontrolling interest     8       (20 )     (84 )     (142 )
    Net tangible income attributable to C&F Financial Corporation   $ 6,101     $ 5,137     $ 20,094     $ 23,877  
                             
    Annualized return on average equity, as reported     10.60 %     10.06 %     12.02 %     15.58 %
    Annualized return on average tangible common equity     12.17 %      11.74 %      10.37 %      13.58 % 
                                   
        For The Quarter Ended     For The Year Ended
        12/31/2024     12/31/2023     12/31/2024     12/31/2023
    Fully Taxable Equivalent Net Interest Income1                              
    Interest income on loans   $ 33,075     $ 29,093     $ 127,089     $ 110,938
    FTE adjustment     47       54       199       208
    FTE interest income on loans   $ 33,122     $ 29,147     $ 127,288     $ 111,146
                                   
    Interest income on securities   $ 2,805     $ 2,906     $ 11,131     $ 11,954
    FTE adjustment     241       215       948       756
    FTE interest income on securities   $ 3,046     $ 3,121     $ 12,079     $ 12,710
                                   
    Total interest income   $ 36,443     $ 32,408     $ 139,594     $ 124,137
    FTE adjustment     288       269       1,147       964
    FTE interest income   $ 36,731     $ 32,677     $ 140,741     $ 125,101
                                   
    Net interest income   $ 25,100     $ 23,942     $ 96,775     $ 97,707
    FTE adjustment     288       269       1,147       964
    FTE net interest income   $ 25,388     $ 24,211     $ 97,922     $ 98,671

    _________________
    1 Assuming a tax rate of 21%.

                 
        December 31,   December 31,
    (Dollars in thousands except for per share data)   2024   2023
    Tangible Book Value Per Share        
    Equity attributable to C&F Financial Corporation   $ 226,360     $ 216,878  
    Goodwill     (25,191 )     (25,191 )
    Other intangible assets     (1,147 )     (1,407 )
    Tangible equity attributable to C&F Financial Corporation   $ 200,022     $ 190,280  
                 
    Shares outstanding     3,233,672       3,374,098  
                 
    Book value per share   $ 70.00     $ 64.28  
    Tangible book value per share   $ 61.86     $ 56.40  
    Contact: Jason Long, CFO and Secretary
      (804) 843-2360

     

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Lessons from Ireland: How the country’s electoral system would strengthen Canadian democracy

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Seána Glennon, Postdoctoral Fellow, Constitutional Law, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of Ottawa

    Justin Trudeau’s biggest regret, he said at his resignation news conference, is failing to achieve electoral reform in Canada — even though he’d promised to do so, and had the opportunity during his first majority government, and didn’t go through with it.

    But as a federal election looms this year, it’s a good time to take a closer look at Canada’s first-past-the-post electoral system, examine why it’s seen by many as unfair and to think about how an alternative system, like Ireland’s proportional representation model, could better serve Canadians.

    Canada has what’s known as a single-member plurality electoral system, commonly referred to as first-past-the-post. The country is divided into electoral districts called ridings, each of which has one representative.

    The winning candidate in each riding is the one who receives the most votes, although not necessarily the majority of votes. The system is “winner-takes-all” because only those candidates who come first in each riding gain a seat in Parliament.



    Read more:
    Canada’s first-past-the-post electoral system highlights once again the need for reform

    Proportional represention

    Ireland has a proportional representation system that’s very different from first-past-the-post. Each voter has a single transferable vote, and each constituency elects several candidates. Voters can rank all the candidates on the ballot in order of their preference.

    To be successful, a candidate must reach the constituency’s quota, which is calculated based on the total number of votes and the number of seats. When a candidate reaches or exceeds the quota on the first count, they are elected, and their surplus votes are distributed among the other candidates, based on voters’ second or lower preferences.

    If nobody reaches the quota on the first count, as often happens, the candidate with the lowest number of votes is eliminated and their votes are distributed among the other candidates. The process continues until all seats are filled.

    Risks to Canadian democracy

    Canada’s system poses two major challenges to democracy.

    The first is voter disengagement. Under the first-past-the-post system, a candidate does not need to win more than 50 per cent of the votes; they just need to win more than their opponents. All the votes cast in favour of other candidates are discounted.

    This can result in a significant disparity between a party’s share of votes and its share of seats in Parliament.

    A party with less than 50 per cent of the vote share can form a majority government and dominate the parliamentary agenda until the next election.

    This happened in the United Kingdom’s 2024 election (also a first-past-the-post system) — Labour received only 34 per cent of the popular vote, but took 63 per cent of the seats in British Parliament and formed a majority government. The 2019 election in Canada also illustrates the distortion produced by this system — the Conservatives won the popular vote, but the Liberals took 36 more seats and won a minority government.

    From the voter’s point of view, it’s easy to see how the system causes disillusionment. If they vote for anyone other than the winning candidate, they may feel their vote is discounted and will have no bearing on the makeup of Parliament, and wonder what’s the point of casting a ballot.

    The second challenge exacerbated by the first-past-the-post system is increasing polarization in politics. In a winner-takes-all system, there is no incentive for candidates to try to appeal to voters to become their second or third choice. This leads to a much more adversarial style of politics.

    Malaise, polarization reduced

    The Irish system mitigates against both democratic malaise and political polarization.

    Under proportional representation, the voter’s first preference is always counted. But in contrast to the Canadian system, even if their first-choice candidate is eliminated — or elected on the first count with a surplus — their vote is not wasted. Instead, it’s transferred to their next choice of candidate.

    These transfers often determine the outcome of the election. Elections in Ireland tend to produce parliaments that correlate much more closely to the proportion of votes a party has received than under first-past-the-post systems in Canada and the U.K.

    In addition, the Irish system helps combat polarization, because candidates’ success or failure often hinges on their ability to attract transfers from supporters of other parties. Centrist candidates will be more likely to appeal to a broader base of voters and attract more transfers than candidates that seek to motivate a base of voters with extremist rhetoric.

    The recent Irish general election shows how this system helps avoid excessive polarization. Research has found that countries with proportional representation systems tend to have lower levels of polarization.

    Local focus?

    It’s sometimes argued that proportional representation encourages parliamentarians to focus on issues in their constituency rather than national issues.

    The system greatly facilitates the election of independent candidates. The incoming Irish government, for example, will consist of a coalition of the two main centrist parties, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, with the support of a group of independents, some of whom make no secret that their priority is their own constituency.

    It can be argued, however, that responsiveness to local issues isn’t a negative — and it’s not prevented Ireland from playing an outsize role on the international stage in recent years.



    Read more:
    Irish election: why one single party is unlikely to win – and what it means for the next government

    Confronting Trump

    Supporters of first-past-the-post argue that it produces stronger, more stable majority governments.

    Even though Ireland’s party system has undoubtedly become more fragmented over the past decade, however, coalition governments have proved capable of staying the course.

    Of course, Irish politics has its share of challenges. The recent election of Micheál Martin as Taoiseach (prime minister) was delayed a day after rancorous exchanges in Irish Parliament around opposition speaking time, and the country still has a stubbornly low proportion of female parliamentarians (only three women were appointed to the new cabinet as senior ministers, out of 15).

    But this doesn’t change the fact that a proportional representation system still produces a parliament more reflective of voter’s choices than first-past-the-post.

    Politically disengaged and polarized voters in Canada and an unrepresentative Parliament won’t help the country respond to the challenges posed by the next four years of a second Donald Trump presidency.

    A new system with an element of proportionality could help curb polarization, ensure fairer representation for Canadians and transform Canadian democracy for the better.

    Seána Glennon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Lessons from Ireland: How the country’s electoral system would strengthen Canadian democracy – https://theconversation.com/lessons-from-ireland-how-the-countrys-electoral-system-would-strengthen-canadian-democracy-247541

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Security: IAEA Board of Governors Elects New Chairperson for 2025

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

      Ambassador Matilda Aku Alomatu Osei-Agyeman. (Photo: D. Calma/IAEA)

    In a special meeting today the IAEA Board of Governors elected Ambassador Matilda Aku Alomatu Osei-Agyeman of Ghana as its Chairperson for 2025. She will complete the remainder of the term of office of her predecessor, Ambassador Philbert Abaka Johnson of Ghana, who was elected in September 2024. Ambassador Osei-Agyeman’s term commences today and will end in September 2025. 

    Ambassador Osei-Agyeman is the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the IAEA, the United Nations Offices and other international organizations in Vienna. A career diplomat with over 25 years of experience, she has held various positions in Ghana and abroad covering both bilateral and multilateral issues.  

    Prior to her appointment in Vienna, Ambassador Osei-Agyeman served as Minister Plenipotentiary and Deputy Ambassador in the Embassy of the Republic of Ghana to Italy from 2023 to 2024. She has also served in diplomatic postings in the United Kingdom, Malta, the United States of America and at Ghana’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations Office in Geneva, Switzerland.  

    Ambassador Osei-Agyeman has also held numerous posts in Ghana’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, including, most recently, serving as Director of the Europe Bureau from 2021 to 2023 and as the first Director of the Candidatures Portfolio in 2021, where she ensured effective advocacy resulting in Ghana’s election as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council for 2022 and 2023.  

    Ambassador Osei-Agyeman holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in political science from the University of Ghana and a Master of Arts in international affairs from the Legon Centre for International Affairs & Diplomacy in Ghana. She has also participated in various courses on leadership and diplomacy. 

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Global: How to get control of your time

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Boróka Bó, Assistant Professor in Sociology, University College Dublin

    GoodStudio/Shutterstock

    You wake up at 7:00 and reflexively reach for your phone. Between the stream of emails, WhatsApps and breaking news alerts, you see a worrying reminder: you averaged 11 hours of daily screen time last week. You swipe the notification away and open TikTok, where a woman in a matching athleisure set and glossy, slicked-back ponytail urges you to “get ready with me for my 5-9 before my 9-5”.

    You think about getting out of bed for a workout or meditation before you start answering those emails. But before you know it, it’s 8:57 – and if you don’t get off the apps and onto your computer, you’ll be late.

    Sound familiar? Though many people have more leisure time now than in the past, paradoxically, more free time comes with increased time pressure. For many of us, it feels as if we don’t have control over our time – rather, time is controlling us. This is because our collective experience of time both comes from and governs society.

    Instead of saving us time, the pace of modernity has led to many of us feeling as if our time is slipping away. And any time we “gain back”, we devote – by necessity or choice – to making more money, maybe through a side hustle. Losing control over time can have negative consequences for both physical and mental wellbeing.

    Ready to make a change? The Quarter Life Glow-up is a new, six-week newsletter course from The Conversation’s UK and Canada editions.

    Every week, we’ll bring you research-backed advice and tools to help improve your relationships, your career, your free time and your mental health – no supplements or skincare required. Sign up here to start your glow-up at any time.

    We are trapped in a perpetual cycle of rushing to survive and consume. But consumption also takes time, so the time available to enjoy our newly acquired possessions declines. You buy a faster new computer, but then need to spend multiple, frustrating hours configuring it to your preferences.

    Even trying to save time by mastering a productivity hack or reading a self-help book takes (you guessed it) time.

    As time use researchers, we often grapple with an uncomfortable truth – your time is not fully yours – it belongs to us all. Time is a network good. We live in a web of time: giving, taking and sharing time with everyone around us. In other words, the decisions and actions of the people around you shape how much time you have.

    This presents a catch-22. Friends, family, colleagues and even neighbours require our time, and we need theirs, too. We share time with our social network members because we need strong ties for our wellbeing. However, building lasting relationships means that we have to control our time in order to share it with others.

    Unfortunately, we don’t all have the same amount of control. Socioeconomic and demographic factors – gender, financial circumstances, age, race, and where you live – all influence how you can make decisions about time. These factors shape how we can interact with others.

    Are you controlling your time, or is it controlling you?
    Roman Samborskyi/Shutterstock

    Even seemingly mundane choices, such as how many extra minutes of sleep you give yourself in the morning, are shaped by societal expectations, power structures and economic constraints. If your job starts at 8am and your commute is two hours, it is unlikely that you can afford extra time to sleep in the mornings. If you are a parent, you might have to wake up even earlier to make sure that everyone has their breakfast and lunch packed for school.

    This is why the hundreds of self-help articles telling you how to optimise your time by carefully budgeting every minute of it never manage to give you full control.

    Breaking this vicious cycle starts with understanding, then practising self-compassion in the face of the demands on your time.

    Get in control

    Gaining control over your time starts with “why”. We don’t all have the luxury of saying no to tasks we deem unnecessary or unpleasant.

    We can, however, ask ourselves why we are spending our time on certain things. Before your next decision, big or small, try asking yourself: why am I doing this?

    If the answer is rooted in social pressure, outdated norms, or an obligation toward someone who does not deserve the gift of your precious time, consider how you could switch to doing something else.

    Try to spend your time on activities and with people who nourish you, enriching your moments. You may not be able to completely avoid spending part of your time as your boss dictates. But understanding the larger power dynamics shaping your personal situation and your time will help you approach decisions with conscious intention, giving you greater control over this irreplaceable resource.

    Regularly questioning the reason behind your actions will reveal the social patterns driving your decision-making processes. Why did you agree to do something, only to regret it later? Why are you always the one donating time to emotional labour at the office?

    Consistently asking “why” creates a habit of mindfulness, and will give you the insight needed to begin to make more informed choices that reflect your true priorities. Ultimately, gaining more control over your time is not about rigidly adhering to a schedule or productivity hacks. It is impossible to subject every minute of your existence to your will – time is not yours to hold on to.

    But you can make the most of the time you do have control over by making conscious decisions that align with your own desires and goals. Like one of our research participants, you may soon find yourself looking in the mirror and proclaiming: “I love time! Time lets me become!”

    Boróka Bó receives funding from Enterprise Ireland. She has previously received funding from the National Science Foundation and held a Soros Fellowship.

    Kamila Kolpashnikova receives funding from SSHRC (Insight Grant number: 435-2023-1060).

    – ref. How to get control of your time – https://theconversation.com/how-to-get-control-of-your-time-235801

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Tribute to Emrys Roberts

    Source: Party of Wales

    Emrys Roberts was extremely influential on Welsh politics for three decades. His contribution to the Party was exceptional from the 60s, when he was an energetic General Secretary, and as the Party’s candidate in the Merthyr by-election in 1972.

    His greatest electoral achievement was leading the Party to control a local council for the first time – in Merthyr in 1976. He was a great influence on a generation of nationalists, and there is a very warm memory of him in Plaid Cymru.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: REACTION: Westminster WASPI compensation vote

    Source: Scottish Greens

    28 Jan 2025 Equality

    WASPI women deserve justice.

    More in Equality

    The House of Commons has voted in favour of WASPI compensation by 105 votes to zero, with MPs from the Tories and Labour government refusing to vote.

    Reacting to the news, Scottish Greens Social Justice spokesperson Maggie Chapman said:

    “This is great news. I am delighted that MPs have joined the Scottish Parliament in calling on the Labour government to properly compensate the WASPI women who have been so unfairly treated by our political system.

    “The fact that Labour and the Tories even failed to turn up and vote shows exactly what is wrong with Westminster’s ruling elite. We need radical change to put people and planet first: the same old and tired rhetoric from Starmer won’t cut it.

    “It’s clear that the consensus in Holyrood and Westminster is clear: Labour must pay up for the mistreatment of the WASPI women.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: New approaches to eradicating child poverty

    Source: Scottish Government

    Wrap-around support delivering improved outcomes for families. 

    Lessons learned from innovative work with families in Inverclyde are helping deliver new approaches to eradicating child poverty. 

    Social Justice Secretary Shirley-Anne Somerville will visit Home-Start Renfrewshire and Inverclyde in Greenock tomorrow (Wednesday 29th January) to see work funded under the Scottish Government’s Child Poverty Practice Accelerator Fund, which is helping to reshape services locally and elsewhere in Scotland. 

    The Social Justice Secretary will meet staff at the project as well as parents who have benefited from the work which focuses on providing early intervention to support families, particularly those with children under five and those affected by poor mental health.  

    Learning from the project is supporting Inverclyde’s Fairer Futures Partnership, which is supporting local services to test and improve how they deliver services to promote family wellbeing, maximise incomes and support people towards education and into sustained employment.   

    Ms Somerville said: 

    “Eradicating child poverty is the Scottish Government’s top priority and a national mission.   

    “I’m keen to hear more about how whole family, person-centred support is being developed in Inverclyde through the Child Poverty Practice Accelerator Fund and the Fairer Futures Partnership. 

    “Through close partnership between Home-Start and Inverclyde Council, this project provides holistic support so that families can maximise their household incomes, and parents can improve their employment prospects through upskilling and volunteering. Putting this kind of vital support in place means that we don’t just help families in a  crisis but enable them to thrive in the longer term. 

    “The Child Poverty Practice Accelerator Fund was set up to support local areas to test new ideas and innovate to improve local approaches to eradicating child poverty. I’m pleased to  have the opportunity to learn more about how this funding is informing Inverclyde’s overall approach to supporting families out of poverty.” 

    Background:  

    The Child Poverty Practice Accelerator Fund supports local areas to test innovative approaches to eradicating child poverty, including testing new approaches to a known problem, adapting an approach from elsewhere to work in a new area, and evaluating promising approaches.  

    Fairer Futures Partnerships in Clackmannanshire, Dundee and Glasgow are working to ensure families get the help they need, where and when they need it. Building on these successful partnerships the programme is expanding into Aberdeen City, East Ayrshire, Inverclyde, North Ayrshire and Perth & Kinross Councils. 

    The Scottish Government made over £2 million available in financial year [2024/25] to these eight local authorities and their partners to deliver the programmes. 

    The budget for the Partnerships has been increased budget to £6 million for next financial year [2025/26]. £2.4 million of this  will be made available to the eight existing partnerships to continue the work underway, as well as exploring opportunities to expand. 

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Rereading Rembrandt: how the slave trade helped establish the golden age of Dutch painting

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Caroline Fowler, Starr Director of the Research and Academic Program, Clark Art Institute, and lecturer in Art History, Williams College

    The so-called golden age of Dutch painting in the 1600s coincided with an economic boom that had a lot to do with the transatlantic slave trade. But how did the slave trade shape the art market in the Netherlands? And how is it reflected in the paintings of the time?

    This is the subject of a new book called Slavery and the Invention of Dutch Art by art historian Caroline Fowler. We asked about her study.

    What was Dutch art about before slavery and what was the golden age?

    The earliest paintings that would be called Dutch were predominantly religious. They were made for Christian devotion. In the 1500s, major divisions in the church led to a fragmentation of Christianity called the Reformation.

    In this new religious climate, artists began to create new types of paintings, studying the world around them. They included landscapes, seascapes, still lifes, and interior scenes of their homes. Instead of working for the church, many painters began to work within an art market. There was a rising middle class that could afford to buy paintings.

    Duke University Press

    Historically, this period in Dutch economic prosperity has been called the “golden age”. This is when many of the most famous Dutch painters worked, such as Rembrandt van Rijn and Johannes Vermeer.

    Their work was made possible by a strong Dutch economy built on global trade networks. This included the transatlantic slave trade and the rise of the middle class. Although artists did not directly paint the transatlantic slave trade, in my book I argue that it is central to understanding the paintings produced in the 1600s as it made the economic market possible.

    In turn, many of the types of painting that developed, like maritime scenes and interior scenes, are often obliquely or directly about international trade. The slave trade is a haunting presence in these images.

    How did this play out within Dutch colonialism?

    The new “middle class” consisted of economically prosperous merchants, artisans, lawyers and doctors. For many of the wealthiest merchants, their prosperity was fuelled by their investments in trade overseas. In land and plantations, and also commodities such as sugar, salt, mace and nutmeg.

    Read more: Slavery, tax evasion, resistance: the story of 11 Africans in South America’s gold mines in the 1500s

    Slavery was illegal within the boundaries of the Dutch Republic on the European continent. But it was widely practised within Dutch colonies around the world. Slavery was central to their trade overseas – from the inter-Asian slave network that made possible their domination in the export of nutmeg, to the use of enslaved labour on plantations in the Americas. It also contributed in less visible ways to Dutch economic prosperity, like the development of maritime insurance.

    What was the relationship between artists and Dutch colonies?

    In the new school of painting, artists would sometimes travel to the Dutch colonies. For example, Frans Post travelled to Dutch Brazil and painted the sugar plantations and mills. Another artist named Maria Sibylla Merian went to Dutch Suriname, where she studied butterflies and plants on the Dutch sugar plantations.

    Both depict landscapes and the natural world but don’t directly engage with the profound dehumanisation of slavery, and an economic system dependent on enslaved labour. But this doesn’t mean that it’s absent in their sanitised renditions.

    Among the sources that I used to think about the presence of the transatlantic slave trade in a culture that did not overtly depict it were inventories of paintings and early museum collections. Often the language in these sources differed from the painting in important ways. They demonstrate how the violence of the system emerges in unexpected places.

    One inventory that describes paintings by Frans Post, for example, also narrates the physical punishment meted out if the enslaved tried to run away from the Dutch sugar plantations. This isn’t depicted in the painting, but it is part of the inventory that travelled beside the painting.

    These moments reveal the profound presence of this system within Dutch painting, and point to the ways in which artists negotiated making this structure invisible in their paintings although they were not able to completely erase its presence.

    How do you discuss Rembrandt’s paintings in your book?

    Historically, studies of the transatlantic slave trade in early modern painting (about 1400-1700) have looked at paintings that directly depict either enslaved or Black individuals.

    One of the points of this book is that this limits our understanding of the transatlantic slave trade in Dutch painting. A focus on blackness, for example, precludes understanding how whiteness is constructed at the same time. It fails to recognise the ways in which artists sought to diminish the presence of the slave trade in their sanitised rendition of Dutch society.

    Syndics of the Draper’s Guild by Rembrandt. Txllxt TxllxT/Wikimedia Commons/Rijksmuseum

    One painting that I use to think about this is Rembrandt van Rijn’s very famous work called Syndics of the Draper’s Guild. It’s a group portrait of wealthy, white merchants gathered around a table looking at a book of fabric samples.

    Although there aren’t enslaved or black individuals depicted, this painting would be impossible without the transatlantic slave trade. Cloth from the Netherlands was often exchanged for enslaved people in west Africa, for example.

    In my book, I draw attention to these understudied histories to understand how certain assumptions around whiteness, privilege, and wealth developed in tandem with an emerging visual vocabulary around blackness and the transformation of individual lives into chattel property.

    What do you hope readers will take away from the book?

    I hope that readers will think about how many of our ideas about freedom, the middle class, art markets, and economic prosperity began in the 17th-century Dutch Republic. As this book demonstrates, a central part of this narrative that has been overlooked was the transatlantic slave trade in building this fantasy.

    This is in many ways an invention that traces back to the paintings of overt consumption and wealth produced in the Dutch Republic – like Vermeer’s interiors of Dutch homes.

    Read more: How we proved a Rembrandt painting owned by the University of Pretoria was a fake

    My aim with this book is to present not only a more complex view of Dutch painting but also a reconsideration of certain dogmas today around prosperity and the art market. The rise of our current financial system, art markets and visible celebration of landscapes, seascapes and interior scenes are all inseparable from the transformation of individual lives into property. We live with this legacy today in our systems built on racial, economic and gendered inequalities.

    – Rereading Rembrandt: how the slave trade helped establish the golden age of Dutch painting
    – https://theconversation.com/rereading-rembrandt-how-the-slave-trade-helped-establish-the-golden-age-of-dutch-painting-247918

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Cameroon could do with some foreign help to solve anglophone crisis – but the state doesn’t want it

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Julius A. Amin, Professor of History, University of Dayton

    What began in late 2016 as a peaceful protest by lawyers and teachers in Cameroon’s North West and South West regions quickly turned violent and developed into what’s become known as Cameroon’s anglophone crisis.

    The protest was instigated by perceived marginalisation of Cameroon’s anglophone region, which makes up 20% of the nation’s 29 million people.

    The conflict has resulted in immense destruction and casualties. Cameroon’s military responded to the protest with arrests and torture. Voices that called for complete secession of the anglophone regions from the Republic of Cameroon gained momentum.

    They created a virtual Ambazonia Republic and an interim government in exile, and vowed to fight back. They formed a military wing, Ambazonia Self-Defence Force, which attacked and disrupted economic and social services in the region.

    As of October 2024, over 1.8 million people have needed humanitarian assistance. Over 584,000 have been internally displaced. Over 73,000 have become refugees in next-door Nigeria. Over 6,500 have been killed.

    Read more: Cameroon: how language plunged a country into deadly conflict with no end in sight

    And the conflict still rages.

    One possible avenue that could be pursued to end the impasse is mediation, with help from other countries. But the Cameroonian government has repeatedly rebuffed intervention from organisations such as the African Union, arguing that the conflict is an internal affair.

    It also ended a government-sponsored mediation by the Swiss in 2022.

    It is clear to me, as a historian who has studied Cameroon foreign policy for the past three decades, that Cameroon’s leadership will not look to external actors to help solve their crisis.

    Founding leader Ahmadou Ahidjo, and later his successor Paul Biya, did not respond to external pressure to address issues. Cameroon’s diplomatic relations are based on respect of national sovereignty and nonintervention in each other’s internal affairs.

    My research shows that the Cameroonian leadership rejects outside intervention on issues it regards as within its sovereignty and internal affairs.

    Removing Cameroon from aid programmes such as the United States Agency for International Development programme and the African Growth and Opportunity Act has not deterred its leaders.

    An understanding of this background is crucial in the search for solutions to the ongoing anglophone crisis.

    Read more: Cameroon spends 90% of Chinese development loans on its French region: this could deepen the country’s divisions

    Use of force

    In the 1960s, Ahidjo used brutal force against a nationalist organisation called the Maquisard. His presidency was characterised by murders, imprisonments and torture.

    Political rivals were imprisoned or forced to go into exile. Biya, who served in Ahidjo’s government, learned that repressive measures work. As president, he used similar tactics against rivals and the opposition.

    But the use of force as a response to the anglophone protest was a miscalculation. The Biya regime failed to see the crisis in its context of changing times, misunderstood the sources of the conflict, and misread the role of social media in protest activities in the 21st century.

    The crisis originated from a series of grievances: poverty, unemployment, political and economic neglect of the anglophone region, failure to treat French and English as equal languages in the country, and disrespect and disregard of English-speaking Cameroonians.

    At the beginning protesters were generally peaceful, but things changed in 2017. Biya stated that Cameroon was being hijacked by “terrorists masking as secessionists” and vowed to eliminate them.

    To anglophone leaders it was a formal declaration of war, and the message spread quickly on social media. The Biya team did little to slow or stop its spread, and anglophones inside and outside the country accepted the message as fact. It mobilised the region. And few took the time to read the full text of his remarks.

    The brutality of the war on both sides intensified. Everything had all happened so quickly, and most did not anticipate the intensity of the violence.

    Read more: Cameroon after Paul Biya: poverty, uncertainty and a precarious succession battle

    Resistance to outside intervention

    In its diplomatic relations, Cameroon has a long history of protecting what it sees as its own business.

    One example was in 1992, after the US administration criticised Biya for electoral fraud. The Cameroon government fired back. Biya withdrew Cameroon’s ambassador from Washington DC, and informed the US ambassador that America should stay clear of Cameroon’s internal affairs.

    In 2008, tension erupted again when Biya changed Cameroon’s constitution to eliminate presidential term limits. The US ambassador criticised the move in the Cameroonian press. Again, Cameroonian officials pushed back, asking the ambassador not to interfere in the nation’s internal politics.

    America’s disposition towards the anglophone crisis has been one of non-interference. Other major powers have responded similarly, asking both sides to end the violence.

    The Cameroon government has rebuffed initiatives from Switzerland and Canada, both friendly to the country, publicly stating it asked no nation to mediate.

    The rejection of the Swiss initiative was surprising, given that Biya spends much time in that country. Unlike the Swiss plan, in which conversations began, the Canadian initiative did not even take off.

    Read more: Cameroon’s rebels may not achieve their goal of creating the Ambazonian state – but they’re still a threat to stability

    Looking ahead

    Measurable indicators show that the Biya regime is failing to end the anglophone crisis. The killings – including those of law enforcement officers – kidnaps, brutality and ransom demands are now normalised in the anglophone region, especially in rural areas.

    Biya’s Grand National Dialogue and National Commission for the Promotion of Bilingualism and Multiculturalism have failed to address the sources of the crisis. Locals dismiss them as a joke.

    People are exasperated by public service announcements about what the government has achieved. Their condition remains much worse than it was in the pre-crisis period.

    Ordinary people are focused on bread-and-butter issues and the desire for dignity and respect. But they don’t see it.

    Young Cameroonians need to see both anglophone and francophone residents at every level of government, on every rung of the business ladder, in every management position, at every school — even on every billboard advertisement.

    Only such a widespread and visible approach can convincingly challenge Cameroon’s pattern of discrimination and exclusion.

    The Biya regime must commit to doing that and not be distracted by supporters urging him to be a candidate in the upcoming presidential election.

    It is important to track and bring to justice the apparent sponsors of the killings in the country. This must be done while government keeps its promises to make things right for those living in the anglophone regions.

    Finally, given China’s investment in Cameroon, it can do more to engage the Biya regime on the anglophone crisis. Like Cameroon, China’s policy also stipulates a policy of nonintervention, but it has repeatedly changed course when its strategic interests are threatened.

    Major power status demands major responsibilities, and showing the will to stop chronic human rights violations remains an important obligation.

    – Cameroon could do with some foreign help to solve anglophone crisis – but the state doesn’t want it
    – https://theconversation.com/cameroon-could-do-with-some-foreign-help-to-solve-anglophone-crisis-but-the-state-doesnt-want-it-244770

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Peace in Sudan: a fresh mediation effort is needed – how it could work

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Gerrit Kurtz, Peace and Conflict Researcher, German Institute for International and Security Affairs

    Intense fighting has ravaged Sudan since 15 April 2023. The war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and its erstwhile comrades-in-arms, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, has created one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. Famine, displacement and mass atrocities are wreaking havoc in the country.

    International mediation efforts have been lacklustre and fruitless. The United Nations security council has been preoccupied with other crises and blocked by its own divisions. The African Union has created diplomatic groups, a high-level panel and a presidential committee, none of which has been particularly active. It has been very slow in tackling the political process it wanted to lead.

    The US and Saudi Arabia convened several rounds of talks, first in Jeddah, then in Switzerland. The Sudanese Armed Forces delegation failed to turn up in Switzerland. The Rapid Support Forces expressed willingness to talk peace, while simultaneously committing sexual and gender-based violence on a massive scale. The Biden administration only lately slapped sanctions on the top leaders of both forces, Abdelfattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (also known as Hemedti).

    I have studied civil wars, mediation and peacebuilding for more than 12 years, with a focus on Sudan, including regular visits to the country and the region in the past five years. Based on this experience I have identified five reasons why mediation has failed. These are: the resistance of the conflict parties based on the dynamic nature of the war; continued military and financial aid by their external sponsors; as well as mediation attempts that were too narrow, not viewed as impartial, and lacking in coherence.

    Clearly, a new approach to mediation is needed, not simply a new mediator. Turkey has recently offered to lead talks between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the United Arab Emirates, the main backer of the Rapid Support Forces, but Egypt, Kenya and several multilateral organisations also keep looking for opportunities.

    Any new initiative will have to have certain components if it’s going to succeed:

    • political parameters, ideally set by a parallel civilian political process, of what might come next for Sudan should guide mediators

    • negotiations should take place in secret so that trust can be established

    • back channel communications networks must be established with potential spoilers without ceding undue legitimacy to them

    • a gender- and youth-inclusive approach

    • more effective international coordination

    • consistent pressure on the conflict parties and their external backers.

    Why previous mediation efforts failed

    Firstly, neither the Sudanese Armed Forces nor the Rapid Support Forces have shown significant willingness to stop hostilities.

    The military fortunes of the two sides has waxed and waned. As long as either side feels successful militarily, they are unlikely to commit to sincere negotiations. Outright military victory leading to control of the whole territory (and its borders) remains out of reach for all.

    Secondly, their respective allies have not shown any particular interest in peace.

    External actors have provided military support to the warring parties, and helped finance them. The UAE is the main sponsor of the Rapid Support Forces. The Sudanese Armed Forces cooperates with Egypt, Eritrea, Iran and Russia, for arms deliveries and training. The UAE promised the US to stop supporting the Rapid Support Forces, but the arms flows continued.

    Thirdly, some conflict management efforts were based on a flawed conflict analysis. There were attempts to organise a face-to-face meeting between Hemedti and Burhan, by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the African Union. But the war is not primarily a contest of “two generals”. Neither Hemedti nor Burhan has full control of their forces. Nor is a renewed military government acceptable to large parts of Sudan’s vibrant civil society.

    Fourth, mediation efforts suffered because some of the parties saw them as lacking impartiality. Sudanese Armed Forces leaders don’t trust Kenya, whose President William Ruto is closely aligned with the UAE and has, until recently, allowed the Rapid Support Forces to conduct meetings and a press conference in Nairobi. Kenya was supposed to lead the Intergovernmental Authority on Development quartet of mediators, which never really got off the ground. Similarly, Sudan remains suspended from the African Union.

    Finally, there was a competition of mediation platforms, allowing the warring parties to shop for the most convenient forum for them.

    What a path to a ceasefire might look like

    International attention is currently focused on Turkish president Recep Erdogan, who has offered to mediate between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the UAE. The Sudanese Armed Forces has harshly criticised the UAE for its support to the Rapid Support Forces. The offer, then, is based on the assumption the UAE might actually cease that support.

    Any new approach should differ from previous efforts.

    • Mediators should provide a broad sense of political parameters for a post-war (interim) order, ideally with strong input from Sudan’s civilian groups. Those could include a conditional amnesty as well as assurances of personal safety for the top military leaders and of some stake in a transitional period, without promising any blanket impunity or renewed power-sharing.

    But international mediators should grant the warring parties political recognition and legitimacy only in exchange for feasible concessions.

    • Negotiations should take place in secret, allowing confidential exchanges between declared enemies. This is particularly important for the Sudanese Armed Forces given the rivalry among its leadership.

    • Back channel communications should be established to all actors with real constituencies in Sudan, without empowering them unnecessarily. Turkey is well-placed to reach out to senior members of the previous (Bashir) regime who have found exile there. They control large parts of the fighting forces on the side of Sudanese Armed Forces and could prove to be a major spoiler. The armed groups in the so-called “joint forces” would also need to feel somewhat included.

    • Mediators should find ways to include a broad array of civilian actors, in particular women and youth groups. Instead of only targeting “men with guns”, a peace process should be gender-inclusive.

    • Any lead mediator should keep other interested parties such as the EU, the UK, Norway, and the other countries and organisations already mentioned, informed and engaged.

    • Pressure should be kept up by the US, UK and EU on external backers of the two main warring parties, and target both military and financial flows. Policies, including further targeted sanctions, should be as aligned as possible.

    Preparing for a window of opportunity

    There’s no guarantee that the violence would cease even if these conditions were met. The main belligerents are likely to continue their current offensives. The Sudanese Armed Forces will try to oust the Rapid Support Forces from central Khartoum completely. The Rapid Support Forces will keep trying to take El Fasher, the only capital in Darfur not under their control.

    The impending re-capture of Khartoum by the Sudanese Armed Forces may provide an opportunity for a new round of talks, if it comes with consistent international pressure. Mediators should be ready to push for an end to the fighting.

    – Peace in Sudan: a fresh mediation effort is needed – how it could work
    – https://theconversation.com/peace-in-sudan-a-fresh-mediation-effort-is-needed-how-it-could-work-248330

    MIL OSI Africa –