Category: Europe

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – Joint ENVI-AGRI Confirmation hearing of EU Commissioner-designate Olivér Várhelyi – Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety

    Source: European Parliament

    Olivér Várhelyi_0.png © European Commission

    On 6 November, the confirmation hearing of Commissioner-designate for Health and Animal Welfare, Olivér Várhelyi (Hungary) will take place.

    The confirmation hearing will be led jointly by the ENVI and AGRI Committees. ITRE Committee and SANT sub-Committee are also invited. The hearing is expected to last three hours from 18.30 to 21.30. As regards the topics in the remit of the ENVI Committee and following his replies to the written questions, the Commissioner-designate is expected to be further questioned on public health, in on the pharmaceutical reform, the access to medicinal products, EU research and competitiveness, and the fight against AMR. The Commissioner designate will also tackle food safety issues, such as the use of pesticides, animal diseases and food labelling, as well as issues related to animal welfare which are also under his portfolio. The confirmation hearing will be the basis for the coordinators of the committees responsible to assess whether the Commissioner-designate is qualified both to be a member of the College of Commissioners and to carry out the specific tasks assigned to him.

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Latest news – DROI will participate in confirmation hearings of three EU Commissioners-designate – Subcommittee on Human Rights

    Source: European Parliament

    The Subcommittee on Human Rights will participate in the confirmation hearing of three EU Commissioners-designate in the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET): Vice-President designate / High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Kaja KALLAS (Tuesday 12 November, 09.00-12.00), Commissioner-designate for Enlargement Marta KOS (Thursday 7 November, 09.00-12.00), and Commissioner-designate for Mediterranean Dubravka ŠUICA (Tuesday 5 November, 14.30-17.30). During each confirmation hearing, the Commissioner-designate will give an opening speech and then answer questions by Members of the European Parliament.

    More detailed information, including the candidates’ portfolios, the procedure, the schedule, the latest news and a live webstreaming during and record after the hearing, can be found on the dedicated webpage linked below.

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Serious lack of safety and dangerous delays in completing critical infrastructure on the Greek railway network – E-002198/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    21.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002198/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Elena Kountoura (The Left), Konstantinos Arvanitis (The Left), Nikolas Farantouris (The Left), Nikos Pappas (The Left)

    Just 20 months after the criminal accident at Tempi, the Greek railway network is still plagued by serious deficiencies, with a series of near collisions occurring[1], and deaths and injuries witnessed on level crossings[2]. Despite substantial EU funding going into modernising Greek railways, basic safety infrastructure, namely remote control, signalling and ETCS systems, remain incomplete or inactive across much of the railway network. Meanwhile, the situation is made all the more dangerous by the serious shortcomings seen in terms of maintenance works and work done to clear railway lines across the network. Train drivers have lodged complaints and taken industrial action calling for investments in new rolling stock, the completion of infrastructure and superstructure works, the maintenance and clearing of railway lines and the immediate implementation of the above safety works.[3] The railway network and infrastructure urgently need to be upgraded if further accidents are to be prevented and transport safety guaranteed.

    In view of this:

    • 1.What will the Commission do to ensure that the Greek authorities complete the remote control, signalling and ETCS systems and the necessary maintenance works and improvements to the Greek railway infrastructure?
    • 2.How does it plan to ensure that the systematic breaches of EU law on railway safety and interoperability are remedied?

    Submitted: 21.10.2024

    • [1] In the context of the serious safety shortcomings seen across the Greek railway network, there have recently been a number of incidents that very nearly ended in accidents. For example, on 9 October, a suburban train was directed onto a metro line at Doukissis Plakentias; on 14 September, a suburban train crashed into a tree trunk; on 13 September, two suburban trains coming from opposite directions ended up travelling on a single track in Agioi Anargyroi; on 29 May, a collision between a passenger train and a freight train near Thessaloniki was averted; and on 10 May, two locomotives collided in Larissa. These incidents show that there is an urgent need to improve the network’s safety measures.
    • [2] Tragically, level crossing accidents have caused 35 deaths and left 28 people injured, with Greece ranking second in terms of most dangerous railway crossings in Europe. https://www.avgi.gr/koinonia/494974_pame-kai-opoy-bgei-35-nekroi-kai-28-traymaties-ta-teleytaia-hronia.
    • [3] https://www.metaforespress.gr/sidirodromos
    Last updated: 31 October 2024

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Poland’s new migration strategy – E-002189/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    21.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002189/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Loucas Fourlas (PPE)

    The migration issue is undoubtedly a huge and dangerous problem for the EU as a whole and needs to be dealt with promptly and effectively. However, not only do unilateral actions by Member States fail to solve the problem, they actually make it worse. We are all in favour of tackling irregular migration, but Poland’s plan to suspend the right to asylum is in breach of the EU Treaties.

    In view of this:

    • 1.What steps is the Commission taking to ensure Member States comply with the rules in place?
    • 2.What steps is it taking to avoid unilateral actions by Member States and how does it plan to achieve a more stringent and at the same time more clearly defined common policy on irregular migration?

    Submitted: 21.10.2024

    Last updated: 31 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Urgent measures to prevent the exploitation of non-European transport workers and to protect European road hauliers – E-002248/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    24.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002248/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Valentina Palmisano (The Left)

    The exploitation of non-European – and especially Asian – workers employed in inhuman conditions in the transport sector is beginning to emerge as a serious phenomenon across Europe.[1] These workers, who are recruited via international agencies, receive their European documentation thanks to shady practices and are employed by big companies on very low wages, without having any rights and without being insured. This system not only violates EU legislation, such as Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 and Directive 2009/52/EC, but also creates unfair competition that is damaging to European hauliers.

    European hauliers, who are subject to strict rules on safety and wages, cannot compete with a system that is harnessing an underpaid and exploited labour force. This imbalance is liable to jeopardise not only the sector’s future but also road safety in Europe.

    In the light of the above, can the Commission state:

    • 1.What steps it will take to ensure rigorous application of Directive 2009/52/EC and to prevent the exploitation of non-European workers, which distorts the labour market and is damaging to European road hauliers?
    • 2.How it plans to tighten up transnational and internal checks (especially in respect of the Member States most ‘active’ in the issuing of/conversion to European driving licences) so as to prevent the use of an irregular labour force and to ensure a level playing field?
    • 3.What measures it envisages to safeguard the rights of European hauliers affected by unfair competition, which is jeopardising their livelihoods and working conditions?

    Submitted: 24.10.2024

    • [1] https://www.labournet.de/interventionen/solidaritaet/mind-55-lkw-fahrer-aus-georgien-und-usbekistan-streiken-auf-der-autobahnraststaette-bei-darmstadt-fuer-ihren-lohn-von-der-polnischen-firmengruppe-mazur/.
    Last updated: 31 October 2024

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Funding for local authorities in the Republic of Moldova through the Growth Plan – E-002159/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    18.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002159/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Mircea-Gheorghe Hava (PPE)

    The European Union took an essential step in supporting the development of the Republic of Moldova by approving an unprecedented financial package worth EUR 1.8 billion. The Growth Plan is part of a broad support project aimed at accelerating the process of Moldova’s accession to the EU, strengthening its capacity to implement essential reforms and stimulating the national economy.

    This financial aid, provided for 2025-2027, is the most significant economic support awarded by the EU since Moldova became independent. The Growth Plan for Moldova is built on three pillars: improving infrastructure and increasing financial assistance, aiding Moldova’s integration into the EU single market, and supporting the implementation of fundamental socio-economic reforms.

    • 1.Could the Commission specify which non-reimbursable funding projects will be directed towards local communities, both urban and rural, in the Republic of Moldova, and for which projects local public administrations will be eligible applicants?
    • 2.What is the estimated launch date of the public consultations for the upcoming funding projects?
    • 3.Which institutions in the Republic of Moldova will be responsible for managing and monitoring the non-reimbursable funding provided by the EU for local administrations through the Growth Plan?

    Submitted: 18.10.2024

    Last updated: 31 October 2024

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Commission taking action in response to Afghanistan’s Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice Law – E-001711/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The recent appalling so-called law on the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice of the Taliban confirms and extends severe restrictions on the life of Afghans, and in particular women and girls.

    The EU has clearly condemned the so-called law[1], and continues to use all its tools to support Afghan women and girls, starting with its assistance, delivered under a ‘by women for women’ approach — ensuring women play a meaningful role in all aspects of aid interventions[2].

    The EU is also engaged with Afghanistan civil society and — through principled engagement based on the five benchmarks set by the Council[3] — with Taliban representatives. The EU seizes every opportunity to both concretely support and advocate for the fundamental rights of Afghan women and girls.

    The EU’s basic needs and livelihoods’ assistance resumed during the last trimester of 2023 after reinforced monitoring systems demonstrated that delivering assistance in a principled manner was feasible.

    In parallel, the EU and the entire international community have already taken strong political action against the Taliban, uniting in refusing to officially recognise the Taliban regime and in agreeing that such recognition (as stated in the United Nations’ independent assessment[4] of which the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2721[5] took positive note), can only happen once the Taliban fully respect international obligations, including on human rights. The EU is fully engaged in the ongoing United Nations-led process, which aims to reach such objective.

    The EU has also adopted restrictive measures[6] against Taliban senior representatives under the EU’s Global Human Rights Sanctions regime.

    • [1] On 26 August 2024, the High-Representative/Vice-President issued a statement on behalf of the EU to strongly condemn the law, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/08/26/afghanistan-statement-of-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu-on-latest-restrictions-imposed-by-the-taliban-on-the-people/?utm_source=brevo&utm_campaign=AUTOMATED%20-%20Alert%20-%20Newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_id=320
    • [2] For further information on EU assistance see Directorate General for International Partnerships, website: https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/countries/afghanistan_en; and Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, website: https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/where/asia-and-pacific/afghanistan_en
    • [3] https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11713-2021-REV-2/en/pdf
    • [4] https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2023_11_sg_special_assessment_report.pdf
    • [5] http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2721
    • [6] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2023:069I:FULL; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2023:183I:FULL
    Last updated: 31 October 2024

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Recognition in Italy of the professional profile of graduate optometrists in line with EU standards – E-001710/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission fully respects the responsibility of Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation of education and training systems, in line with Articles 165[1] and 166[2] of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union .

    It is also for Member States to decide, within the limits of EU law, and in particular with respect to principles of proportionality and non-discrimination, if and how to regulate professions on their territory.

    As a result of this, the regulation of the profession of optometrist may differ across the EU. Directive 2005/36/EC[3] requires the recognition of qualifications obtained in another Member State even if the level of qualification between the host and home Member State are different[4]. For the profession of optometrists, it is the so-called general system of recognition under Directive 2005/36/EC that applies[5].

    The European classification of skills and occupation framework is a non-binding classification system, and Member States remain competent to define occupational profiles that are relevant at national level.

    The classification of optometrists as health professionals is in line with the classification of optometrist at the international level in the International Standard Classification of Occupations classification.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12008E165
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12016E166
    • [3] Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications. The directive applies when a professional wishes to pursue a profession which is regulated in a host Member State. The directive does not apply in relation to professions which are not regulated in a host Member State.
    • [4] In Article 11, the directive prescribes different levels of qualifications. Access to a regulated profession in a host Member State may only be refused when qualifications of a professional are classified in the lowest level of qualification, when the host Member State requires the highest level of qualification.
    • [5] See Chapter I of Title III of Directive 2005/36/EC.
    Last updated: 31 October 2024

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Negative consequences of implementing acts for Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 on Poland’s battery production industry – E-001580/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    31.10.2024

    As required by Article 7(1) of Regulation (EU) 2023/1542[1], the Commission is currently developing a methodology for calculating and verifying the carbon footprint of electric vehicle batteries.

    After publication of a draft delegated act on the ‘Have your say’ portal on 30 April 2024[2] and a dedicated meeting of the Member State expert group on 11 July 2024, the Commission is currently analysing the way forward for the adoption of the delegated act, taking into account the feedback received.

    The development and implementation of the carbon footprint requirements for batteries is based on a stepwise approach in accordance with Article 7 of Regulation (EU) 2023/1542.

    For the final step of setting maximum carbon footprint thresholds, the Commission will carry out an impact assessment, including an assessment of the economic impacts of this measure.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1542/oj
    • [2] https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13877-Batteries-for-electric-vehicles-carbon-footprint-methodology_en
    Last updated: 31 October 2024

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Restructuring at Audi in Brussels – E-001518/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission is committed to preserving manufacturing in Europe while ensuring a just transition and sustainable competitiveness. It is following with high attention and concern the recent developments in the EU automotive industry.

    The EU is supporting the automotive industry by tackling supply chain difficulties with the Critical Raw Materials Act[1], the Net-Zero Industry Act[2], Battery Regulation[3] and the Chips Act[4] as well as raw materials partnerships[5].

    It has defined a regulatory environment to encourage the transition to smart mobility with the Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy[6], the AI Act[7], the Data Act[8] and the Cyber Resilience Act[9]. The EU also provides substantial financial support for the industry’s transformation to electromobility along the whole value chain[10].

    Moreover, the EU has put a robust framework in place for the transition to zero-emission mobility by setting binding CO2 targets[11] for vehicle manufacturers, which are complemented by measures aimed to ensure a fair transition[12], while recognising that further initiatives are needed to strengthen the EU’s just transition policy framework[13], with a focus on anticipation and management of change.

    For instance, the Commission will monitor the socioeconomic impacts of these measures with a first progress report in 2025, including on adequate financial measures to ensure a just transition and to mitigate any negative impacts, in particular in the regions and the communities most affected.

    The Commission has taken note of the analysis of the automotive industry’s challenges in the Draghi report[14] and will consider further measures in the context of the announced future industrial action plan for the automotive industry.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202401252
    • [2]  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202401735
    • [3]  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32023R1542
    • [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32023R1781. The Chips Act has spurred substantial industry investment in semiconductor manufacturing capacity, which is crucial for advancing both the electrification and digitalisation of the automotive industry: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-approves-eu5-billion-german-state-aid-measure-support-esmc-setting-new-semiconductor
    • [5] https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/raw-materials-diplomacy_en
    • [6] https://transport.ec.europa.eu/transport-themes/mobility-strategy_en
    • [7] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689
    • [8] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2854
    • [9] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52022PC0454
    • [10] Funding from the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), to support for instance the conversion of automotive plants and national schemes to incentivise fleet renewal (e.g. https://www.mintur.gob.es/en-us/recuperacion-transformacion-resiliencia/paginas/perte.aspx; https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility/germanys-recovery-and-resilience-plan/germanys-recovery-and-resilience-supported-projects-nation-wide-investment-scheme_en) and funding from the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) to support the deployment of charging infrastructure (https://transport.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/commission-makes-eu1bn-available-recharging-and-refuelling-points-under-connecting-europe-facility-2024-02-29_en).
    • [11] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32023R0851, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32019R0631
    • [12] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022H0627(04), implemented notably in the context of the European Semester and the Energy Union and Climate Action Governance Regulation.
    • [13] E.g. European Parliament resolution on job creation — the just transition and impact investments, 2022/2170(INI), 23 November 2023, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2023-0438_EN.html
    • [14] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/strengthening-european-competitiveness/eu-competitiveness-looking-ahead_en
    Last updated: 31 October 2024

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – European action plan on geographical indications – E-001761/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    As indicated by the Honourable Members, the newly adopted Geographical Indications (GIs) Regulation (EU)2024/1143[1] is expected to foster the harmonious development of GIs in the EU, reinforce the role played by producers’ groups with an increased focus on sustainability while enhancing enforcement and controls to fight against counterfeit.

    The Commission will monitor the implementation of the above-mentioned GIs Regulation, analyse the results and assess the need for further action to address possible areas for improvement.

    As indicated in the question raised by the Honourable Members, if necessary the actions could inter alia include measures in the areas of outreach activities (to favour GIs uptake in Member States with fewer GIs registered), raising awareness and understanding of the EU GI system and its benefits and improve the knowledge of the GIs logo.

    These measures will complement other ongoing actions supporting the development of a robust, viable and sustainable EU quality agrifood system, fit to face globalisation and climate change challenges.

    • [1] OJ L 23.4.2024, page 1: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/HIS/?uri=OJ:L_202401143
    Last updated: 31 October 2024

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Information on the management and financing of the urban wastewater treatment works in Scordia (CT) – E-001776/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission is not aware of the reasons of the national delays in the works to upgrade the Scordia purification plant. Only the competent national authorities are responsible for the disbursement of the national funds and the Commission has not identified any EU funds earmarked by the Italian authorities for the project in question.

    On the basis of the last call for payment sent by the Commission to the Italian authorities, concerning the 7th semester after the applicable judgment[1] of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Italy paid a fine of EUR 95 429, specifically for the municipality of Scordia for breaches of the Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive[2].

    In order to avoid further penalties, the competent national authorities must ensure full compliance with the above-mentioned ruling by ensuring the required collection and treatment of wastewater, including, if appropriate, by programming available EU funds to build the necessary infrastructure.

    The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) supports the construction and upgrade of urban wastewater treatment infrastructure.

    Dedicated resources are allocated in the ERDF regional programme for Sicily for an amount of around EUR 72 million. Under shared management the responsibility for the selection of interventions lies with the Managing Authority of the programme.

    • [1]  C-251/17, Commission v. Italy (2018) ECLI:EU:C:2018:358.
    • [2] Council Directive 91/271/EEC of 21 May 1991 concerning urban waste-water treatment OJ L 135, 30.5.1991, p. 40-52.
    Last updated: 31 October 2024

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Energy costs of businesses in Europe – E-001651/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission is set to continue its work focusing on measures to bring down prices and costs for households and business by developing an Action Plan for Affordable Energy Prices[1].

    It will inter alia aim to support industries and companies through the transition, while unlocking decarbonisation pathways for industry and companies.

    Furthermore, the Commission will continue to prioritise investments in clean energy infrastructure, in particular with a planned clean energy investment strategy for Europe, including clean infrastructure and storage.

    This Action Plan for Affordable Energy Prices will build on the implementation of the adopted Electricity Market Design reform[2] and will include additional initiatives to enable lower energy costs for end-users while accelerating decarbonisation, to develop an overall cost-efficient system and ensure adequate investments in infrastructure.

    The Commission will also continue to actively monitor the energy markets in Europe with a view to preserving competition on those markets and ensuring the supply of secure and clean energy at affordable prices to businesses and consumers.

    • [1]  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_1511
    • [2]  https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/markets-and-consumers/electricity-market-design_en#:~:text=Reform%20of%20the%20electricity%20market%20design.%20To%20boost%20renewables,%20better
    Last updated: 31 October 2024

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Measures to support the Spanish and Portuguese fleets affected by the proliferation of the invasive species of Asian seaweed ( Rugulopteryx okamurae ) – E-001853/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission is aware of the serious problems that the species Rugulopteryx okamurae is causing in various coastal areas of Andalucía and in other Spanish areas such as Ceuta and south of Portugal.

    On the basis of a risk assessment submitted by the competent Spanish authorities, Rugulopteryx okamurae was included in 2022 on the list of the invasive alien species to which priority should be given[1]. Regrettably, this invasive alga continues to expand, and has reached France and Italy in recent years.

    The affected Member States can decide how and when to provide financial support to fishers affected by invasive species through their European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture (EMFAF) programme.

    This can include measures for tackling the spread of the species, as well as directly supporting fishers for example with cleaning, repairing equipment and antifouling.

    Based on the information received from the Spanish authorities, it appears that the Spanish Ministry of Environment has been working on research and plans to manage the crisis.

    The Commission has also been informed that the Spanish EMFAF Managing Authority has carried out an analysis on support options.

    The Commission is however not aware of financing decisions by this Authority. Nevertheless, the Commission has also been informed that the authorities provided de minimis State aid to the sector for the loss of fishing activity and damaged fishing gear outside the EMFAF programme.

    In the case of Portugal, the national authorities informed the Commission that no support under EMFAF was provided or is planned at this stage.

    For more information on the national/regional support measures implemented, we refer the Honourable Member to the competent authorities in the Member States.

    • [1] Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1203 of 12 July 2022 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1141 to update the list of invasive alien species of Union concern. OJ L 186, 13.07.2022, p. 10-13.

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Disinformation on shared vs exclusive competences – E-001620/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Forests are indispensable for a climate-neutral Europe, resilient, and thriving environment, sustainable bioeconomy and healthy society.

    Many forests in the EU are not in a good state, they suffer heavily from biodiversity loss, ecosystem degradation and climate change, while there is surging demand for forest products and services. The EU has a variety of shared competences that concern forest protection and forestry to address these challenges.

    In line with the objective of the European Green Deal[1] to improve EU’s forested area, both in quality and quantity, in 2021 the Commission adopted the EU Forest Strategy for 2030[2].

    Key actions under this strategy have already been delivered[3], notably the Nature Restoration Law[4] and several guidelines to improve implementation[5].

    The EU also adopted the Deforestation Regulation[6]. Furthermore, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development[7] supports interventions that contribute to the achievement of the EU’s environmental and climate objectives such as afforestation, reforestation, fire prevention, and forest ecosystem improvement.

    Since the information available on the state of forests as ecosystems and of the use of forest resources is fragmented, incomparable, and not fit for policy making, resulting in important knowledge gaps, the Commission proposed a Forest Monitoring Law[8], which is currently under examination by co-legislators.

    The Commission will continue to pursue the objectives of the EU Forest Strategy, and will assess progress and the need for further action in this area.

    The Commission is also tackling the threat of disinformation, for example through actions to counter foreign information manipulation and to build societal resilience against disinformation[9].

    • [1] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en
    • [2] https://environment.ec.europa.eu/strategy/forest-strategy_en
    • [3] https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/forests_en
    • [4] Regulation (EU) 2024/1991 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2024 on nature restoration and amending Regulation (EU) 2022/869, OJ L, 2024/1991, 29.7.2024.
    • [5] Such as the the guidelines on biodiversity friendly afforestation and reforestation [SWD(2023)61], on closer to nature forestry [SWD(2023) 284], on old-growth forests [SWD(2023)62] and on payment for ecosystem services [SWD (2023)285] .
    • [6] Adopted by the European Parliament and Council, Regulation (EU) 2023/1115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on the making available on the Union market and the export from the Union of certain commodities and products associated with deforestation and forest degradation and repealing Regulation (EU) No 995/2010, OJ L 150, 9.6.2023, p. 206-247.
    • [7] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2115/oj
    • [8] https://environment.ec.europa.eu/publications/proposal-regulation-forest-monitoring-framework_en
    • [9] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/strategic-communication-and-tackling-disinformation_en

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Facilitating the financing of nuclear power in the EU – E-001825/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    When developing the EU Taxonomy[1], the Commission prioritised economic activities which have the greatest potential to make a substantial contribution to one or more EU environmental objectives without causing significant harm to the others.

    The EU Taxonomy covers therefore nuclear activities which can play an important role in moving towards a carbon-neutral economy, including research, development, demonstration and deployment of advanced nuclear technologies with minimal waste from the fuel cycle, construction and operation of new nuclear power plants using best-available technologies and upgrading of existing nuclear installations for the purposes of lifetime extension.

    The EU Taxonomy is a living document and will continue to evolve over time, with more activities being added to its scope by means of amendments.

    Stakeholders are able to address suggestions and questions on new activities to be included in the EU Taxonomy or on possible amendments relating to existing activities. For this purpose, the Commission established a stakeholder request mechanism[2] and, with input from the Platform on Sustainable Finance[3], it assesses suggestions received.

    When developing the Taxonomy, the Commission paid particular attention to ensuring that all economic activities within a sector are treated equally when they contribute equally towards the environmental objective.

    Consequently, the activities in the energy sector include activities relating to all major energy sources, including nuclear energy.

    • [1] https://finance.ec.europa.eu/sustainable-finance/tools-and-standards/eu-taxonomy-sustainable-activities_en
    • [2] https://finance.ec.europa.eu/sustainable-finance/overview-sustainable-finance/platform-sustainable-finance/stakeholder-request-mechanism_en
    • [3] https://finance.ec.europa.eu/sustainable-finance/overview-sustainable-finance/platform-sustainable-finance_en
    Last updated: 31 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Trans-European Transport Network and new coordinator’s calendar of activities – E-001705/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    In accordance with the revised Regulation establishing the Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network (TEN-T)[1], the European Coordinators shall submit an annual status report to the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the Member States concerned on the progress achieved in implementing the European Transport Corridors.

    It shall focus on the progress made on key priorities and investments, describe the nature of problems encountered in their implementation, and suggests potential solutions. This new provision entered into force on 18 July 2024, therefore the first annual status report is expected by mid-2025.

    As part of its regular activities to facilitate the coordinated implementation of the corridor, the coordinator will organise twice a year a corridor forum with representatives of all the ministries and regions along the corridor, infrastructure managers of all transport modes, maritime and inland port authorities as well as urban nodes.

    This forum is the platform to inform and consult the corridor stakeholders on the progress made in terms of the completion of the TEN-T corridor, the challenges ahead, the priorities to be set etc. The first forum for the new Atlantic Corridor will take place in November 2024 in Brussels.

    The coordinator is also always available for bilateral exchanges, e.g. with regional representatives or Members of the European Parliament, on the various challenges and priorities of the corridor.

    • [1] Article 52(6)(e) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1679 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1679/oj
    Last updated: 31 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – EU targets for reducing material and consumption footprints – E-001734/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission delivered the set of policy actions announced in the 2020 Circular Economy Action Plan[1] aimed at significantly reducing EU’s material and consumption footprints, safeguarding natural resources and mitigating environmental impacts such as climate change and biodiversity loss.

    To monitor trends in achieving these objectives, in 2023 the Commission revised the circular economy monitoring framework and added material and consumption footprint indicators[2], which serve also to track progress on the 8th Environmental Action Programme[3] and on the Sustainable Development Goals[4].

    The implementation of the actions in the plan, and more broadly of the European Green Deal, will contribute to faster progress towards decreasing EU’s material and consumption footprints.

    The Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation[5] creates the framework for integrating circular economy principles and resource efficiency requirements in the design of a wide range of products.

    Specific initiatives under the plan tackle sustainability dimensions of construction products, electronics, batteries and vehicles, packaging and packaging waste, textiles and food waste, industrial production and waste shipments, and aim to empower consumers in the green transition and lead efforts at the global level.

    The political guidelines for next Commission 2024-2029[6] place circular economy as a pillar of a prosperous and competitive Europe and announce a new Circular Economy Act to boost the market demand for secondary materials and a single market for waste.

    It is for the next Commission to formulate the most appropriate initiatives to advance the shift to more sustainable production and consumption patterns.

    • [1] https://environment.ec.europa.eu/strategy/circular-economy-action-plan_en
    • [2] https://environment.ec.europa.eu/news/circular-economy-faster-progress-needed-meet-eu-resource-efficiency-targets-ensure-sustainable-use-2023-05-15_en
    • [3] https://environment.ec.europa.eu/news/implementation-key-achieving-eu-2030-climate-and-environment-objectives-first-progress-report-8th-2023-12-18_en
    • [4] https://environment.ec.europa.eu/news/monitoring-report-progress-towards-sdgs-eu-context-2024-2024-06-18_en
    • [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1781/oj
    • [6] https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683-f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf
    Last updated: 31 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Increase in the Modernisation Fund by 0.5 % of the total quantity of allowances in accordance with Article 10a(5b) of Directive (EU) 2003/87/EC – P-001971/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    In accordance with Article 11 (1) of Directive (EU) 2003/87/EC[1], Member States submitted their National Implementation Measures by 30 September 2024. The Commission is currently assessing the data received and at the end of that exercise the benchmark values will be revised.

    Once the Commission Implementing Regulation determining revised benchmark values for free allocation of emission allowances for the period from 2026 to 2030 is adopted, the Member States will determine and notify the preliminary annual amounts per installation of free allowances, using the revised benchmark values.

    The Commission will thereafter determine any factor established pursuant to Article 10a(5) of the directive by comparing the sum of the preliminary annual amounts of free allowances to installations in each year over the relevant allocation period with the annual amount of allowances that is calculated in accordance with Article 10a(5) and (5a) of the directive 2003/87/EC and relevant provisions in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/331[2].

    The determination of the uniform cross-sectoral correction factor for the adjustment of free allocation of emission allowances for the period 2026 to 2030 is scheduled for the second quarter of 2026.

    • [1] Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (OJ L 275, 25.10.2003, p. 32).
    • [2] Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/331 of 19 December 2018 determining transitional Union-wide rules for harmonised free allocation of emission allowances pursuant to Article 10a of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council.
    Last updated: 31 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee against Torture Welcome Namibia’s Commitment to the Mandela and Bangkok Rules, Ask about Harmful Traditional Practices and Lengthy Pretrial Detention Periods

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee against Torture today concluded its consideration of the third periodic report of Namibia, with Committee Experts welcoming the State’s commitment to the Nelson Mandela and Bangkok Rules, international norms on the treatment of prisoners, and raising questions about harmful traditional practices and lengthy pretrial detention periods.

    Erdogan Iscan, Country Rapporteur and Committee Expert, welcomed the commitment of the State party to complying with the Nelson Mandela Rules and the Bangkok Rules.

    Mr. Iscan raised the issue of traditional practices that were harmful to women and girls, including the ritual of Olufuko, which involved child marriage and sexual initiation rites.  Had the State party made progress in terms of awareness-raising as well as eliminating such practices?  What further steps had been taken to prevent and criminalise the practice of forced sterilisation?

    Jorge Contesse, Country Rapporteur and Committee Expert, said pretrial detention seemed to routinely exceed legal limits, with above 50 per cent of the prison population awaiting trial.  The low usage of alternatives to detention and an unaffordable bail system seemed to be contributing to the large backlog of cases of pretrial detainees.  What measures had been adopted to address these challenges?

    Introducing the report, Yvonne Dausab, Minister of Justice of Namibia and head of the delegation, said the Namibian correctional service included human rights instruments, including the Nelson Mandela Rules, in the curriculum at its Training College.  The service had undertaken measures to renovate all the country’s correctional facilities with the aim of improving the living conditions of offenders.

    Ms. Dausab said the Government continued to conduct awareness campaigns targeting traditional and religious leaders on positive gender roles and the elimination of harmful cultural practices.  The Childcare and Protection Act 2015 had measures to protect children from harmful cultural and religious practices, strictly prohibiting child marriage in all setups.

    The delegation said Olufuko had taken on a more cultural image and profile, as opposed to a platform for sexual initiation and child marriage.  That may have been the case in the past, but this had changed over the past 10 to 15 years.  Namibia had taken steps to ensure that acts of enforced sterilisation of individuals were not carried out.

    Pretrial detention could run for any time between six to 12 months, the delegation said, and courts could decide to withdraw charges before the six-month period based on available evidence.  The State party was working to strengthen community courts and establish small claims courts to address overcrowding in prisons and holding cells. Since the report was sent, there had also been parole releases and the President had pardoned some persons.

    In closing remarks, Claude Heller, Committee Chair, said that the Committee understood that the political context in Namibia was difficult.  The Committee would make efforts to provide the State party with relevant and achievable recommendations within its concluding observations.  The Committee was interested in maintaining an open dialogue with the State party through its follow-up mechanism.

    In her concluding remarks, Ms. Dausab said Namibia was committed to addressing all forms of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.  More needed to be done to prevent torture, including the enactment of specific legislation criminalising it.  The Committee’s recommendations would help to enhance mechanisms to prevent torture.

    The delegation of Namibia consisted of representatives from the Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Home Affairs, Immigration, Safety and Security; Namibia Correctional Service; and the Permanent Mission of Namibia to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Committee will issue concluding observations on the report of Namibia at the end of its eighty-first session on 22 November.  Those, and other documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, will be available on the session’s webpage.  Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, and webcasts of the public meetings can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public on Tuesday, 5 November at 10 a.m. to begin its examination of the second periodic report of Thailand (CAT/C/THA/2).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the third periodic report of Namibia (CAT/C/NAM/3).

    Presentation of Report

    YVONNE DAUSAB, Minister of Justice of Namibia and head of the delegation, said

    Namibia had suffered a great loss at the beginning of the year when the third President, Dr. Hage Gottfried Geingob, a strong champion of human rights, passed away on 4 February 2024.  He was greatly missed.  Additionally, Namibia was currently going through a devastating drought which had impacted food security and economic development; the Government was navigating this climate-related crisis with the assistance of developmental partners. Namibia offered a sincere apology for the non-submission of the written responses to the list of issues.

    The torture bill remained under consideration following deliberations in the National Assembly.  The Convention was directly applicable and enforceable in Namibia without the ‘domestic’ legislation.  Article 144 had been used by Namibian courts which had cited United Nations Conventions in their judgments, making their provisions applicable directly in Namibia. The Namibian Constitution prohibited torture as well cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977 criminalised murder as well as assault, including assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. 

    Members of the police force, correctional service and defence force accused of using excessive force were investigated under internal complaints units and those found to have acted outside the scope of what was reasonable in the circumstances were subjected to prosecution.  The Government had also been ordered to pay damages to complainants and their families in civil matters brought due to allegations of assault or use of excessive force by law enforcement officers. 

    The Namibian Constitution prohibited arbitrary arrest or detention and required that an arrested person be brought before a court within 48 hours after the arrest.  All police officials were trained and required to inform an accused person upon arrest of their rights, reasons for their arrest, and charges against them.  The Directorate of Legal Aid within the Ministry of Justice had appointed 69 in-house lawyers across the country to represent members of society who could not afford legal representation. 

    The Government had enhanced the independence of the Ombudsman by reforming the current Ombudsman Act 1990 to make provision for the Ombudsman’s Office to be established as a separate agency in the public service, with its own budget and accounting officer.  The Office of the Ombudsman had launched a training manual against torture for law enforcement agencies, and visited and inspected places of detention, police holding cells, and correctional facilities to monitor human rights compliance.

    Namibia continued to be marred by incidents of gender-based and sexual violence, including online child sexual exploitation.  The Government had developed a national plan of action on gender-based violence 2019-2023 to address the root causes and provide a well-coordinated approach to the prevention, response, monitoring and evaluation of gender-based violence initiatives.  Additionally, Namibia had established special courts for gender-based violence offences country-wide to provide a victim-friendly environment. 

    The Government continued to conduct awareness campaigns targeting traditional and religious leaders on positive gender roles and the elimination of harmful cultural practices.  Namibia had developed and implemented a national plan of action to address violence against children.  The Childcare and Protection Act 2015 had measures to protect children from harmful cultural and religious practices, strictly prohibiting child marriage in all setups. 

    The Ombudsman had been instrumental in ensuring that the Namibian police force was adequately trained on the ‘prevention of torture training manual for police officers.’ The Namibian police force also conducted ongoing workshops to train police officers on human rights.  The Namibian correctional service included human rights instruments in its curriculum, including the Nelson Mandela Rules, at the Namibian Correctional Service Training College.  The service had undertaken measures to renovate all of the country’s correctional facilities with the aim of improving the living conditions of offenders.  The implementation of the Namibian correctional service’s health policy had brought about significant changes in managing communicable diseases such as tuberculosis, HIV and hepatitis, as well as mental health support. 

    All asylum seekers went through a refugee status determination process and those who met the criteria were granted refugee status.  If an application for refugee status was unsuccessful, the applicant was advised they could appeal the decision to the Namibian Refugee Appeal Board. Namibia was implementing the national action plan on statelessness, and a national committee had been established. The review of the legislative framework, which was a key milestone, had begun. 

    The Police Act allowed police officials to be investigated for misconduct and human right violations, inclusive of torture.  Officials found guilty of acting outside the scope of their duties were subject to laid down procedures, including arraignment before a competent court. In Namibia, the State was represented by the Prosecutor General in criminal cases; therefore, the prosecution of all allegations of torture lay with the State.  Ms. Dausab concluded by stating that the Namibian Government remained committed to protecting and promoting human rights in the country. 

    Questions by Committee Experts 

    ERDOGAN ISCAN, Committee Expert and Rapporteur, said the Committee expressed its condolences for the death of Namibia’s third President earlier this year.  The State party did not reply to the list of issues adopted by the Committee and chose to submit a report in May 2021 under the traditional reporting procedure.

    The dialogue with the State party would be conducted against this background.

    Mr. Iscan called on Namibia to continue to support the treaty body system. 

    Had measures been taken to improve prison conditions in conformity with the Nelson Mandela Rules? Research indicated that the total prison population was close to 9,000 inmates, of which 54 per cent were pretrial detainees in police custody.  Occupancy level in the prison system was 75 per cent.  Could the Committee be updated on the current situation?  Could details be provided about the health policy and practice developed by the Namibian correctional service? 

    How many individuals were currently in pretrial detention?  What was the average length of pretrial detention and steps taken to reduce its use?  Could statistical data be provided on deaths in custody; investigations carried out into these deaths; and the number of police or prison staff who had been subjected to criminal or disciplinary punishment in cases involving death in custody? Had there been cases of inter-prisoner violence, and what had been measures implemented in such incidents?

    The Committee noted that corporal punishment was prohibited in schools by the Basic Education Act of 2020, but it still lacked an explicit prohibition in the home. What was the current status of the Correctional Service Act 2012 with respect to explicitly prohibiting corporal punishment following the Supreme Court’s judgment of 5 April 1991?  What steps were being taken to totally prohibit corporal punishment in all settings and develop campaigns for awareness raising?

    Could data on all complaints received by the Ombudsman and the number of complaints received by the Internal Investigation Directorate be provided?  How many of these complaints were investigated and how many resulted in disciplinary sanctions?  Had the perpetrators been punished with appropriate penalties commensurate with the gravity of the crime?  How many complaints had been received concerning sexual abuse and the exploitation of refugees by public officials or non-governmental workers at the Osire refugee camp?  Had these complaints been investigated and prosecuted and had victims obtained redress? 

    The Caprivi high treason trial ended in September 2015 and the Committee noted that about 30 persons were found guilty and sentenced to various imprisonment terms; 79 persons were found not guilty and released from custody.  Could

    information on investigations into or prosecutions of members of the Namibian police force regarding alleged acts of torture of suspected participants in the secession attempt in the Caprivi region in 1999 be provided?  What steps had been taken by the authorities to investigate reports of enforced disappearances in the context of the liberation struggle, including the disappearance of former members of the Southwest Africa People’s Organization?  Had alleged victims and their families obtained redress?

    Was the legislation on excessive use of force compatible with the Convention, as well as the basic principles on the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials?  Were the reports of excessive use of force by law enforcement officers investigated promptly, effectively and impartially?  Were the perpetrators prosecuted and, if convicted, punished with commensurate penalties?  Were victims of violations remedied adequately?  The Committee had received allegations that members of the police force detained and sexually abused sex workers.  What was the State party’s response to these reports? 

    The Committee took note of the Joint Communication by a group of Special Procedure mandate holders, who examined the document which evaluated the “Joint Declaration by the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Namibia: United in remembrance of our colonial past, united in our will to reconcile, united in our vision of the future”, dated June 2021, and developed observations in connection with international human rights law.  It was understood that follow-up negotiations were ongoing between Namibia and Germany.

    With respect to traditional practices that were harmful to women and girls, including the ritual of Olufuko, which involved child marriage and sexual initiation rites, had the State party made progress in terms of awareness-raising as well as eliminating such practices?  What further steps had been taken to prevent and criminalise the practice of forced sterilisation?  What measures were in place to ensure that all acts of violence that targeted persons on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity were properly and promptly investigated and prosecuted? 

    It was reported that the Supreme Court issued a ruling last year recognising the right of spouses of Namibian citizens to regularise their immigration status based on same-sex marriages.  Later, parliament passed legislation banning same-sex marriages.  If enacted, it could nullify the Supreme Court ruling.  What was the current status of this legislation? The Committee had received information that the High Court issued a decision on 21 June 2024, which declared the common law offences of sodomy and unnatural sexual offences unconstitutional. It seemed that the State party continued to criminalise same-sex relationships and the Government had lodged an appeal against this decision which was currently pending before the Supreme Court.  What was the current situation? 

    Could the State party clarify its policy, legislation and practice with respect to prisons, hospitals, schools and institutions that engaged in the care of children, older persons or persons with disabilities?  What was the legal permissibility and use of the measures such as seclusion, physical and chemical restraints, and other restrictive practices? Were net beds and cage beds used in psychiatric and social welfare institutions?  Did the Office of the Ombudsman have unrestricted access to monitor these institutions?  Had any progress been achieved in regard to protecting the human rights of older persons?

    The Committee noted the commitment of the State party to complying with the Nelson Mandela Rules and the Bangkok Rules.  Could the State party clarify its policy, legislation and practice with respect to solitary confinement?  What was the incommunicado detention regime in Namibia?  If the State party maintained this practice, under what circumstances was incommunicado detention authorised and what was the competent organ to authorise incommunicado detention?  Would the State party consider abolishing incommunicado detention? 

    Could Namibia comment on the status of the recommendation to ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention, and other international instruments to which it was not a party?  Was there any update in this regard? 

    JORGE CONTESSE, Committee Expert and Rapporteur, said torture was currently not a specific criminal offence in Namibia and Namibian law did not expressly criminalise any other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  Could information be received on the status of the draft prevention of torture bill?  What amendments to the bill sought to bring it further into line with the State party’s obligations under the Convention, as previously recommended by the Committee, including provisions that criminalised the acquiescence and complicity of State officials, or officials acting in an official capacity, to acts of torture?  Were acts amounting to torture subject to a statute of limitations?  Were there any cases where Namibia had invoked the Convention directly before domestic courts? 

    What initiatives had been taken by the State party to enshrine in its legislation fundamental legal safeguards, in particular the right to have access to a lawyer, including the right to access free and effective legal aid; the right to receive a medical examination by an independent physician; the right for individuals, at the time of arrest, to be informed of their rights; the right to be brought promptly before a judge; the right to notify a person of one’s choice of one’s deprivation of liberty; and the obligation of the authorities to maintain detention registers at places of detention?  Were there any cases in which the authorities had failed to comply with these safeguards?  How many such complaints had been registered and what was their outcomes? 

    Were there any cases in which disciplinary measures were taken against officials found responsible for violations?  What complaints mechanisms were available to report violations, and how did they function in practice?  Could the State party specify the circumstances in which a right to counsel could be waived?

    The 2022 annual report of the Ombudsman described visitation and inspection of places of detention in Namibia, noting that some of the most appalling facilities had been closed.  When this happened, where were the detainees who had been held there sent?  What was the timetable for the cleaning and renovation of these facilities?  Pretrial detention seemed to routinely exceed legal limits, with above 50 per cent of the prison population awaiting trial.  In addition, the reported shortcomings in the criminal justice system, such as the significant delays between arrest and trial, the low usage of alternatives to detention, and an inaccessible and unaffordable bail system, seemed to be the contributing factors to the large backlog of cases of pretrial detainees.  What measures had been adopted to address these shortcomings and challenges?

    It was understood that the child justice bill, which had not yet been adopted, endorsed 14 years of age to be considered criminally responsible and abolished the common law presumption.  What was the status and content of the bill?  What measures were adopted to ensure that children were not detained in detention centres for adults?  The Committee understood that no legal provision authorised the Ombudsman to make unannounced visits to places of detention; would the new legislation provide the Ombudsman with such power? 

    Violence against women, including rape, domestic violence, sexual exploitation and abuse of children, and violence against women from indigenous communities, continued to be extremely high, and the root causes of such violence had not been adequately addressed.  According to the national gender-based violence baseline study, “most drivers of gender-based violence were relationship factors that were deeply entrenched within socio–cultural norms and escalated to societal level factors.” What concrete measures had the State party adopted to address these issues, including policies and plans to address ongoing challenges; the number of complaints of gender-based, domestic, or sexual violence received by the authorities; the number of investigations and prosecutions undertaken regarding gender-based, domestic or sexual violence; and the protection and support services available to victims?

    The recommendation to remove the crime of sodomy as a ground for entry refusal into Namibia remained unaddressed.  What measures would the State party adopt to address this and other pending concerns? Could data be provided on the number of asylum applications received during the period under review, the number of successful applications, and the number of asylum seekers whose applications were accepted because they had been tortured or might be tortured if returned to their country of origin? 

    What were the existing appeals mechanisms and other mechanisms in place to identify individuals in need of international protection?  What was the procedure followed when a person invoked this right? Were individuals facing expulsion informed of their right to seek asylum and appeal a deportation decision?  How many stateless persons were living in the country?  What measures were being taken by the State party to mitigate the risk of torture or ill treatment faced by stateless persons. 

    How many law enforcement officials, prison staff, military officers, investigators, judicial personnel and border guards had attended educational programmes which included instruction on the provisions of the Convention against Torture?  How were officers were trained on investigating and handling forms of prohibited ill treatment, like cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment?  To what extent was the Ombudsman responsible for training other law enforcement agencies on investigating torture claims?  What specific initiatives were in place to train officials to prevent the traumatisation of victims of torture or ill treatment.  What steps had been taken to improve methods of investigation, including training programmes on non-coercive interrogation techniques?  Had any training programmes been developed for judges, prosecutors, forensic doctors and medical personnel dealing with detained persons on detecting and documenting the physical and psychological signs of torture?

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said any international instrument that Namibia ratified became part of their system. Namibia took the work of the treaty bodies very seriously.  Namibia’s prison capacity across the country was around 5,400.  The bed capacity was around 4,700.  Since the report was sent, there had been parole releases, persons had completed their sentences, and the President had pardoned some persons. Pretrial detention could run for any time between six to 12 months.  There was no deliberate attempt on the part of the State to keep people in pretrial detention; the authorities were trying to clear them as quickly as possible to decongest prison facilities. 

    Namibia did not have inter-prison violence in the form that was premeditated, organised, or gang related.  There were isolated incidents of inter-prison fights which were dealt with quickly.  In the rare instances when these incidents occurred, the prisoners would be separated from each other.  Namibia had made a proposal to improve community service orders. 

    It was agreed that the Ombudsman needed to be extricated from the Ministry of Justice. However, there was no evidence that there had been any interference in the work of the Ombudsman.  The Ombudsman bill was ready to go before the National Assembly for Legislative Consultation, which would help with establishing the Office of the Ombudsman.  Currently in Namibia, the Ombudsman was at the level of a judge.  Whether there should be a fixed-term or the security of tenure of the Ombudsman was currently under debate.  Since his appointment, the Ombudsman had been quite vocal about his findings and his displeasure at the conditions of prisons.  The Ombudsman had unfettered access to those facilities; however, unannounced visits could be impractical.  Namibia was doing enough to ensure those institutions which had the mandate to investigate violations of human rights were able to be supported in their work. 

    There had been no prosecutions for prostitution or sex work in Namibia.  There was some fairly outdated legislation, but these laws had not been activated because the State did not feel they were consistent with the spirit of the Namibian Constitution.  Namibia was constantly working on reforming legislation which offended the values of the Constitution.

    The Joint Declaration was the result of an open and frank conversation in Namibia’s National Assembly, reflecting the gravity of the first genocide which took place in Namibia during the twentieth century. 

    Olufuko had taken on a more cultural image and profile, as opposed to a platform for sexual initiation and child marriage.  That may have been the case in the past, but this had changed over the past 10 to 15 years.  Namibia had taken steps to ensure that acts of enforced sterilisation of individuals were not carried out.  The discussion around the reform of abortion and sterilisation was ongoing.  Namibia was concerned about the number of cases of persons who identified as persons of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community, who had lost their lives.  However, the State could not say that these crimes happened specifically due to their sexual orientation.  All of those incidents of people who had been killed over the past few months were being investigated and prosecutions would take place. 

    Homosexuality in Namibia was not a crime. 

    Namibia had an excellent proposal for child justice.  The State had engaged in extensive consultation with and received feedback from the United Nations Children’s Fund.  Early next year, the child justice bill would be considered in the Assembly.  Children were kept in facilities separate from adults, and were provided with significant social support.  Gender-based violence was a concern for Namibia.  Every year, the State commemorated the 16 days of violence against women.  There was increasing collaboration between the State and civil society organizations to increase visibility.  The text and the language of legislation combatting rape had been strengthened in 2022, as had the domestic violence legislation. 

    Questions by Committee Experts 

    ERDOGAN ISCAN, Committee Expert and Rapporteur, said the Committee appreciated the fact that they had a high-level delegation here, headed by the Minister in the lead-up to the country’s elections, and wished Namibia all the best in their democratic elections.  The Committee needed information on the reflection of policy and legislation in practice, which was why statistical information was important. 

    Could the State party inform the Committee on the policies, legislation and practices on counter-terrorism measures?  It was a fundamental obligation of States to fight terrorism, while still respecting human rights and the rule of law. 

    Could information be provided on the legislative and executive measures under the state of emergency?  Did they comply with the absolute and non-derogable prohibition of torture? 

    JORGE CONTESSE, Committee Expert and Rapporteur, said it was necessary to have a specific crime which defined the contours of torture.  What were the requirements that members of parliament had, which resulted in seven years of there being no torture bill?  It seemed that the child justice bill moved down the minimum age of criminal responsibility to 12 years; how was this consistent with human rights law? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said Namibia’s President could declare a state of emergency in situations where there were natural disasters or threats to the State.  At no time had the declaration of a state of emergency suspended the prohibition of torture or the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms.

    Persons who engaged in terrorist activities against Namibia inside or outside of the State could face life imprisonment.  Law enforcement agencies recently attended training on counterterrorism, which reinforced the obligation to protect human rights and the rule of law.

    The anti-torture bill included definitions of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment that were in line with the Convention.  The bill included punishments of imprisonment of varying lengths for acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

    The child justice bill had been developed after broad consultation with international partners. It set the age of criminal responsibility at 12 years, considering the domestic context.

    International human rights instruments ratified by the State were applicable directly before the courts, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights had been applied in one case.

    The Refugee Recognition and Control Act called for compliance with due process regarding detention and expulsions of asylum seekers.  Asylum seekers could be represented by legal practitioners in appeals to detention and expulsion procedures.  Namibia respected the principle of non-refoulement.

    The Government was working to regularise the status of stateless persons.  Under the birth outreach programme, teams had been deployed to rural areas to facilitate birth registration.  Bills promoting civil registration, regularisation and statelessness determination were being considered in Parliament.  Namibia was exerting efforts to eradicate statelessness.

    The Namibian police had conducted investigations into alleged cases of enforced disappearance conducted by two individuals with Angolan citizenship.  These cases had been finalised.  A bill had been developed on the training of police and military officers.  Training was aligned with the Istanbul Protocol and developed skills in investigating allegations of torture and helping victims to access redress. Police officers could not question suspects before informing them of their rights.

    The Constitution prohibited corporal punishment and State legislation prohibited such punishment in school settings.  Schools were mandated to create mechanisms that allowed learners to report incidents of corporal punishment.  In August 2024, a teacher was relieved of his duties following reports of him engaging in corporal punishment of learners.  Parents and guardians needed to respect children’s right to dignity.

    The State party had established an appeal committee and set up regulations to prevent the abuse of legal aid resources.  There had been an increase in applications for legal aid this year, with the number of applications for legal aid having increased to more than 10,000.  Measures were in place to respond to this increase in applications.

    The Mental Health Act of 1973 was outdated and used language that was not consistent with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.  A new bill dealing with mental health had been proposed, which set regulations regarding the limited use of seclusion, coercive methods, and restraint of persons with disabilities, and promoted de-escalation techniques.  The bill called for coercive methods to be removed within two hours at most.  There was a clear prohibition of forced sterilisation of women with mental disabilities in the bill.  It was expected to be finalised next year.

    Questions by Committee Experts 

    ERDOGAN ISCAN, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, said that the State’s Constitution and legislation determined that statements made as a result of torture were inadmissible in a court of law.  Were there examples of court cases in which courts had found that evidence was inadmissible because it was obtained through torture?  Had there been investigations into allegations that evidence used in the Caprivi trials was obtained through torture?

    The Committee welcomed that the State party had accepted the simplified reporting procedure, which provided for improved cooperation between the State party and the Committee.  However, the State party had submitted its last report under the traditional procedure. Mr. Iscan called on the State party to submit its next report under the simplified procedure.

    The State party had failed to respond to the Committee’s previous concluding observations and the report on follow-up to concluding observations.  The Committee hoped that the State party would respond to the next concluding observations within the given timeframe.

    JORGE CONTESSE, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, said that the torture bill had been pending for a number of years.  The definition of torture within the proposed legislation was very good; it was identical to that of the Convention.  Were there any persons who had been specifically convicted of the crime of torture using the Convention?  It was critical that the anti-torture bill addressed the issues of the statute of limitations and universal jurisdiction.  Article eight of the bill addressed extraterritorial jurisdiction, not universal jurisdiction.

    There was a discrepancy between international human rights law and the child justice bill. What was the domestic context that prevented Namibia from setting the age of criminal responsibility at 14? 

    There was another discrepancy between Namibia’s law on refugee control and international human rights law, which defined the prohibition of non-refoulement as absolute. Why was refoulement allowed in certain circumstances?

    There was a lack of information provided by the State party on allegations of sexual assault by police officers against asylum seekers.  Asylum seekers reportedly lived in settlements with poor conditions. Could the delegation comment on these issues?

    Trafficking in persons reportedly remained prevalent in Namibia.  The rate of reported cases seemed very low, and there was limited progress in investigations and convictions for these cases, with only two convictions between 2014 and 2019.  What progress had been made in tackling trafficking in persons?

    How would the State party address challenges that prevented the Ombudsperson from making unannounced visits to places of detention?

    Another Committee Expert said unannounced inspections of places of detention were an international standard.  The State party needed to reconsider its position on this issue.  Were there time limits for pretrial detention?  It was very impressive that it had been deemed unconstitutional to implement solitary confinement.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the State party noted the Committee’s comments regarding the simplified reporting procedure.  There were court cases in which evidence obtained through torture was deemed inadmissible.  In such cases, additional investigations were undertaken into the identified acts of torture.

    The State party also noted the Committee’s concerns and suggestions regarding the anti-torture bill.  Namibia wished to comply with international best practices regarding non-refoulement. Legislation on deportations intended to protect Namibia from external threats while respecting the principle of non-refoulement.

    All allegations of trafficking in persons were taken very seriously.  The judicial system was independent and competent, but had limited resources, which was influencing the rate at which trafficking cases were processed. The State party was exerting efforts to prevent trafficking in persons.

    Any allegations of sexual assault and crimes against the refugee community were investigated. The State party was not aware of allegations of poor conditions in asylum shelters; it would investigate any such allegations if it received them.

    Pretrial detention could be implemented for six to 12 months, and courts could decide to withdraw charges before the six-month period based on available evidence.  The State party was working to strengthen community courts and establish small claims courts to address overcrowding in prisons and holding cells.

    The delegation had taken note of the Committee’s comments regarding unannounced visits to places of detention.  There were no cases in which attempted unannounced visits had been blocked.  The State party would continue conversations on the age of criminal responsibility.

    The Constitutional Court had decided that the implementation of solitary confinement at one prison had been unconstitutional, however, the judgement had not made the implementation of solitary confinement unconstitutional in all contexts.  The imposition of solitary confinement needed to respect legal safeguards and the fundamental freedoms of those subjected to it.

    Questions by a Committee Expert 

    JORGE CONTESSE, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, asked if there were examples in which refugees or asylum seekers had threatened national sovereignty. What was the Refugee Control Act trying to address in this regard?  What were the reasons behind setting the age of criminal responsibility at 12?  The possibility of unannounced visits was an effective way to prevent torture and ill treatment in places of detention. Mr. Contesse called for such visits to be conducted.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said Namibia’s law on refugee control anticipated potential crimes committed by refugees and asylum seekers.  There had been no incidents thus far in which a refugee had threatened national security, but there needed to be a law in place to address such an act.  The domestic court system was sufficiently able to analyse the constitutionality of the Refugee Control Act.

    Concerns had been raised that increasing the age of criminal responsibility would make young children more likely to engage in criminal acts.  The State party noted the Committee’s discomfort regarding this legislation.

    The Ombudsperson was independent and had the opportunity to propose unannounced visits to places of detention.  It and all State actors, as well as civil society, had access to prisons in Namibia. Representatives of the African Union had written extensive reports on prison conditions, which helped the State party to improve these conditions.  Civilians had also taken the State to court concerning prison conditions.

    There were no examples of court cases in which findings of torture had been made, but there were cases in which crimes against humanity had been recognised.  The State party took on board the Committee’s concerns regarding the torture bill.

    Concluding Remarks 

    CLAUDE HELLER, Committee Chair, said that the Committee understood that the political context in Namibia was difficult.  It would make efforts to provide the State party with relevant and achievable recommendations within its concluding observations.  The Committee was interested in maintaining an open dialogue with the State party through its follow-up mechanism.  The dialogue had been rich and was conducted in a constructive spirit.

    YVONNE DAUSAB, Minister of Justice of Namibia and head of the delegation, said the State party had provided information on the efforts it had made to implement the Convention.  The Committee’s recommendations would help to enhance mechanisms to prevent torture. Namibia was committed to addressing all forms of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. More needed to be done to prevent torture, including the enactment of specific legislation criminalising it. The State party was committed to protecting the rights of its people, in consideration of the domestic context. Ms. Dausab closed by thanking the Committee and all who had contributed to the dialogue.

     

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CAT24.020E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI USA: CONGRESSMAN BISHOP RECEIVES “FRIEND OF FARM BUREAU” AWARD

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Sanford D Bishop Jr (GA-02)

    BRINSON, Ga. – Yesterday, Congressman Sanford D. Bishop, Jr. (GA-02) received the Friend of the Farm Bureau Award from the Georgia Farm Bureau at a ceremony hosted at Glenn Heard Farms in Brinson.

    “I want to thank the Georgia Farm Bureau for this award and honor. It has been my pleasure to work with the Farm Bureau and I will always be a strong voice in Washington for our farmers and producers,” said Congressman Bishop. “The agriculture industry is crucial to our country, contributing over one trillion dollars to the U.S. economy, and that is over $80 billion in Georgia alone. Whether through the Farm Bill or the annual appropriations process, I will always work towards ensuring that Congress provides the programs and resources needed to make sure Americans continue to have the safest, most affordable, and most abundant food and fiber.”

    “Today we gathered farmers in Georgia’s 2nd congressional district with Congressman Sanford Bishop to present him with his 2024 Friend of Farm Bureau Award,” said Ben Parker, National Affairs Coordinator for the Georgia Farm Bureau. “Through this gesture we are happy to show our support for all the many beneficial acts Bishop has carried through his years of being a true friend and champion for Georgia agriculture.”

    “Congressman Bishop has a been a tremendous friend and supporter of agriculture during his time in Congress. His door is always open to discuss the pressing issues that face agriculture all across our country,” said Tommy Dollar, President of Dollar Farms in Bainbridge, Georgia. “We need disaster assistance for our farmers that were devastated by Hurricane Helene and we need economic relief for those farmers who have been devastated by input costs. We also need a Farm Bill so that the AG community will have certainty in the days ahead. Congressman Bishop will fight to make sure that these issues are addressed, and he is indeed a friend of Agriculture.”

    “Congressman Bishop has been a friend to the Farm Bureau, but more importantly a friend to American Agriculture,” said Andy Bell of Bell Farms in Climax, Georgia. “This award represents his commitment to ensuring that the United States will continue to have the safest food and fiber anywhere in the world while providing all of the necessary resources that our farmers need for the food security of the world.”

    Congressman Bishop is one of the most senior members of the U.S. House Appropriations Committee and, as such, is the top Democrat on the subcommittee that funds the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Rural Development, the Food & Drug Administration, and related agencies. He is also a member of the U.S. House Agriculture Committee which oversees and crafts the country’s agriculture and nutrition policies and programs.

    An agriculture issues leader, he regularly works across the aisle to craft legislation and support funding for programs that are vital to the well-being of America’s farmers.

    Earlier this month, he led a farm tour of Minor Brothers Farms in Sumter County. He was joined by Congressman Austin Scott (GA-08) and Congresswoman Shontel Brown (OH-11), who are the Republican and Democratic leaders of the U.S. House Agriculture Subcommittee on General Farm Commodities, Risk Management, and Credit.

    In May 2024, Congressman Bishop voted in support of the Farm Bill passed by the U.S. House Agriculture Committee. In September, he sent a letter to House and Senate leaders and to the House Agriculture Committee leadership urging them to set aside differences and commit to pass a Farm Bill before the end of this Congress.

    House Republican leaders have not scheduled the Farm Bill for a vote. Some Republicans and Democrats have raised budgetary concerns about the bill and the U.S. Senate is working on its own version of the Farm Bill. Congressman Bishop remains committed to working towards a bipartisan bill this year that will get the full support of the U.S. Congress and that can be signed into law by President Biden.

    ###

    PHOTO CAPTION: CONGRESSMAN BISHOP RECEIVED THE FRIEND OF THE FARM BUREAU AWARD FROM THE GEORGIA FARM BUREAU IN BRINSON, GA

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AWARDS OVER $4 MILLION TO BIBB & MUSCOGEE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICTS TO SUPPORT SCHOOL-BASED MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Sanford D Bishop Jr (GA-02)

    MACON, Ga. – Congressman Sanford D. Bishop, Jr., (GA-02) a senior member of the House Appropriations Committee, is delighted to announce a federal award from the U.S. Department of Education totaling $4,567,325 to the Bibb County ($2,569,674) and Muscogee County ($1,997,651) School Districts. The School-Based Mental Health Grant Program provides public schools with the resources needed to hire and retain mental health professionals and create a safe environment for all students. 

    “When children in need of help are supported at school, behavior problems are less likely to occur and grades and test scores are more likely to improve,” said Congressman Bishop. “Georgia schools are places where every student should feel safe and cared for. That is why the School-Based Mental Health Grant Program exists – to make our schools safer by ensuring each student receives the care and attention they need and deserve.”

    “Receiving funding for our Built4Bibb School-Based Mental Health Services Program marks a transformative step for the Bibb County School District,” said Tajalyn Woodruff on behalf of Bibb County Schools. “This grant will enable us to improve the way we focus on the wellness of our students by increasing student access to mental health professionals while also developing a fully coordinated system of social emotional and behavioral supports for students within our schools.”

    “Mental health is truly a societal problem that extends to children as well. As educators, we must be concerned with the whole child, which includes their mental, social, and emotional well-being that can adversely impact their academic progress,” said Dr. David Lewis, Muscogee School Superintendent. “On behalf of the Muscogee County School District and the many students and families who will benefit, I am very grateful for the significant funding provided through this federal grant that will augment our district’s efforts through eleven additional social workers and a school psychologist focused on effective mental and behavioral interventions, support and services.” 

    The School-Based Mental Health Grant Program was made possible by the Fiscal Year 2024 federal government funding bill, which Congressman Bishop supported.

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    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: Game-Changing $MOKA Token Launch Set to Boost Mokens League’s Digital Ecosystem

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    BARCELONA, Spain, Oct. 31, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Monster League Studios, the visionary company behind the Mokens League gaming platform, is thrilled to announce the upcoming public sale of its highly anticipated utility token, $MOKA. Designed to fuel an ecosystem of interconnected games and experiences, $MOKA will serve as the backbone for in-game transactions, rewards, and player engagement across the Mokens League universe.

    Scheduled to go live on 8th November 2024, the $MOKA token sale represents a key milestone in Monster League Studios’ mission to redefine gaming through blockchain technology. With Mokens League, the company is creating a universe of games where players can seamlessly interact and carry their assets across different game experiences. Beginning with its flagship soccer game, the platform will soon expand to titles such as Padel, Tennis, Racing, and more, broadening the reach and utility of $MOKA.

    Mokens League Soccer is the first game that allows players to compete in team-based or individual matches. It features multiple gameplay modes, with match length and rules varying by mode. Players need 1–6 NFTs to participate, which act as in-game characters. The game has already reached over 50,000 active users. Mokens League Soccer is available on PC, App Store, and Google Play.

    “At Mokens League, we believe in building more than just individual games—we’re creating a full gaming universe,” said Martin Repetto, CEO of Monster League Studios. “The launch of $MOKA will empower our players and community by giving them real value and utility across all our games, allowing them to participate in our Win-to-Earn model, earn exclusive rewards, and explore a connected universe of Web3 gaming experiences.”

    Key Highlights of the $MOKA Token Sale:

    • Utility-Driven Token: $MOKA is designed to be more than just a currency. As a utility token, it will support in-game purchases, facilitate player rewards, and unlock exclusive features across all Mokens League games.
    • Two NFT Tiers: FAN and VIP Packs: Recently, Mokens League announced two NFT tiers—FAN and VIP packs—as essential components of its promotional series, aimed at unlocking exclusive features and rewards within the Mokens Hub. These packs drive engagement by providing early access to various platform functionalities. The initial launch of FAN packs was met with great success, as NFTs were claimed in record time, underscoring high demand and the platform’s effectiveness in expanding the user base and creating a vibrant gaming community.
    • Cross-Game Compatibility: Players can use $MOKA across the entire Mokens League ecosystem, allowing their assets, achievements, and rewards to transcend individual games, from sports-based titles like soccer and padel to exciting genres like racing and brawling.
    • User-Friendly Web3 Integration: Mokens League has partnered with ImmutableX (IMX) to ensure seamless onboarding for Web2 users unfamiliar with crypto. Players can create a secure Web3 wallet effortlessly using just their email, Apple ID, or Google Play account.
    • Accessible to All: The $MOKA token sale will be conducted in stages, with the first phase launching as a community sale. This will be followed by public sales on leading launchpads, including Bit2Me, Kanga, and Gamestarter, ensuring broad accessibility to both seasoned crypto investors and gaming enthusiasts new to Web3.

    The tokenomics of the $MOKA token are carefully designed. 10% of the total supply is allocated for the community sale, 1% for the public sale, and 17% for the team. A substantial 42% is dedicated to the community, ecosystem, and rewards. This tokenomics structure is community-centered, prioritizing user needs to drive high engagement and reward active participation in Mokens League.

    The $MOKA token sale provides a unique opportunity for investors to join a pioneering project in the rapidly expanding blockchain gaming space. Mokens League’s commitment to innovation, combined with its seasoned team of game developers with over 25 years of experience, positions it as a formidable player in the Web3 gaming industry.

    Contact:
    Martin Repetto CEO
    Email: hello@mokensleague.com

    Disclaimer: This content is provided by MONSTER LEAGUE S.L. The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the content provider. The information provided in this press release is not a solicitation for investment, nor is it intended as investment advice, financial advice, or trading advice. It is strongly recommended you practice due diligence, including consultation with a professional financial advisor, before investing in or trading cryptocurrency and securities. Please conduct your own research and invest at your own risk.

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/f6bccd88-e368-4b0a-9f87-a2397cbbe17e

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Economics: DDG Hill discusses Uzbekistan’s WTO accession path at high-level event in Washington D.C.

    Source: WTO

    Headline: DDG Hill discusses Uzbekistan’s WTO accession path at high-level event in Washington D.C.

    DDG Hill noted Uzbekistan’s accession process has accelerated in recent years, in great part due to the active political engagement of President Mirziyoyev. Recent presidential decrees have focused on integrating Uzbekistan more closely with its immediate region and more widely with the international community, she said, with important reforms being pursued in key areas, such as the role of state trading enterprises, export restrictions and subsidies, technical barriers to trade (TBT), sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, and trade facilitation.
    “Uzbekistan has been one of the most active acceding governments of late. It has pushed ahead with economic reform, in the strategic region of Central Asia, with WTO accession very high on the government’s agenda. Reforms associated with the accession process play an important role in the future growth of the acceding country,” said DDG Hill.
    She also cited the WTO’s World Trade Report 2024, which found that economies that reform their markets during the WTO accession process grew on average 1.5 percentage points more than economies that did not reform. Moreover, reforming economies continued to grow faster even after accession to the WTO, with greater diversification in their trade and stability in export growth. Other factors that boosted trade included the predictability of trade policy as a result of meeting WTO commitments, and good governance.  She thanked WTO members and development partners for the continuous support for Uzbekistan’s accession to the WTO. Her full remarks are available here.
    The high-level meeting was organized as a side event at the World Bank and IMF Annual Meetings and hosted by the World Bank. Vice President for Europe and Central Asia at the World Bank Antonella Bassani said that Uzbekistan’s actions and changes in policy were notable and pledged the Bank’s assistance in key reform areas in support of Uzbekistan’s accession to the WTO.
    Uzbekistan’s Deputy Prime Minister Jamshid Khodjaev said that Uzbekistan’s reforms towards a market driven economy, guided by the overarching vision of Uzbekistan’s 2030 Strategy, have led to more efficient resource allocation and increased competitiveness, aligning with the broader agenda of Uzbekistan’s WTO accession.
    Following the adoption of Presidential Decree No. PD-85 of 3 June 2024, he said that “Uzbekistan is continuing to take bold and decisive actions to align its economic and legal frameworks with international standards as part of its path toward WTO accession.” He also noted that the capacity building assistance provided by the WTO, IMF and World Bank as well as international donors has been invaluable in preparing Uzbekistan to adopt best practices and to join the WTO by 2026.
    Uzbekistan’s Chief Negotiator Azizbek Urunov emphasized the renewed momentum in Uzbekistan’s accession since 2023, on both multilateral and bilateral negotiation tracks. On the bilateral front, he said that Uzbekistan has reached agreement on market access with 20 members, a significant achievement, considering no agreements had been negotiated at the beginning of 2023. He noted the importance of comprehensive legislative reform, underlining that a mechanism has been introduced for the mandatory examination of all legislative proposals to ensure compliance of all new legislation with international norms.
    “In the years ahead, we will continue to focus on building the institutions and infrastructure that will support Uzbekistan’s integration into the global economy. WTO membership is just the beginning; it is the foundation upon which we will build a more prosperous, diversified, and resilient economy,” he said.
    The event also featured H.E. Furqat Sidikov, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Uzbekistan to the United States; Ms. Mona Haddad, Global Director of Trade, at the World Bank; Mr. Koba Gvenetadze, Resident Representative at the IMF; Ms. Zhanar Aitzhan, former Minister and Chief Negotiator of Kazakhstan; as well as representatives of the US Government and the private sector. The discussion was moderated by Mr. Antonio Nucifora, Practice Manager for Economic Policy Global Practice at the World Bank.

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    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: The 2024 Annual Meetings of the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund — Uzbekistan’s path to WTO accession: Navigating reforms and global integration

    Source: WTO

    Headline: The 2024 Annual Meetings of the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund — Uzbekistan’s path to WTO accession: Navigating reforms and global integration

    Your Excellencies,Deputy Prime Minister Khodjaev,Vice-President Bassani,Ambassador Tai, (TBC)Distinguished participants,
    Let me start by first thanking you for organizing this meeting and for inviting the WTO to address the status of Uzbekistan’s accession to the WTO. Accession to the WTO is a subject close to the Director General’s heart. She has at numerous occasions indicated her strong support for Uzbekistan’s accession to the WTO, and so I am particularly pleased to be speaking to you today on this issue.
    Although Uzbekistan’s Working Party on Accession to the WTO was established as far back as in 1994, there was a gap of about 15 years before negotiations were resumed recently in 2020. Since then, the process has accelerated, both bilaterally and on the multilateral front.
    This is in great part due to the active political engagement of President Mirziyoyev who has taken a keen interest in ensuring that recent economic reforms have focused both on integrating Uzbekistan more closely with its immediate region and more widely with the international community.
    Among these, a key piece of legislation, which no doubt will be discussed further today, is Presidential Decree 85 of 3 June this year. The Decree, in one fell swoop, addressed several issues of concern to WTO Members such as State trading enterprises and enterprises with exclusive rights, export restrictions and export subsidies. PD-85 has provided the momentum to continue and even accelerate economic reforms in areas such as export restrictions and the harmonization of excise duties. Uzbekistan, under the very able guidance of Deputy Prime Minister Khodjaev and Chief Negotiator Mr Urunov, also continues to undertake reforms in other key areas, notably to update procedures related to technical barriers to trade (TBT) and sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), another area of concern for WTO Members. Reforms on trade facilitation had also been brought forward with most objectives in Uzbekistan’s Trade Facilitation Action Plan being implemented ahead of time. With regard to agriculture, good progress was also made during an informal meeting on agricultural support in Geneva just last month. It is good to see that technical work to update regulations and procedures is keeping up with economic and political ambitions.
    Bilaterally also, Uzbekistan has stepped up its engagement with WTO Members and concluded a number of bilateral agreements over the last few years. Earlier this year Uzbekistan signed a couple of bilateral agreements at the WTO and my understanding is a further 4-5 may be signed before the end of the year, with the goal being to reduce the number of outstanding bilateral negotiations to under 10 WTO Members by next year.
    Since the resumption of the accession process, successive cycles of Working Party meetings have shown continued engagement with WTO Members. Going forward, we will hold the 9th meeting of the Working Party in December for which documents have already been circulated to WTO Members.
    From the Secretariat’s perspective, Uzbekistan has been one of the most active acceding governments of late. It has pushed ahead with economic reform, in the strategic region of Central Asia, with WTO accession very high on the government’s agenda. Reforms associated with the accession process play an important role in the future growth of the acceding country. Recent research by the WTO in the World Trade Report for 2024 found that economies that reform their markets during the WTO accession process grew on average 1.5 percentage points more than economies that did not reform; reforming economies moreover continued to grow faster after accession to the WTO, with greater diversification in their trade and stability in export growth. Other factors that have boosted trade include the predictability of trade policy which comes with meeting WTO commitments, and good governance.
    As Ambassador Aitzhan from Kazakhstan and Mr Dang from Viet Nam are both here with us today, it would be remiss of me to not note the special role played by recently acceded WTO Members in supporting accessions. From a regional perspective especially, Kazakhstan has shared its accession experience with other acceding countries in the region, most recently at a training course on market access in goods for acceding Governments in Geneva. We, at the WTO, are very grateful to recently acceded Members for showing leadership and sharing lessons learned with other acceding governments.
    Finally, let me also take this opportunity to thank the many other partners present today – the United States, the European Union, the IMF and the World Bank – who have been instrumental in advising and supporting Uzbekistan in its journey to WTO accession. The role you play is so important in helping Uzbekistan advance its economic reforms and once again I would like to thank you for your support.
    Thank you for listening. I look forward to an excellent discussion this morning and continued momentum in Uzbekistan’s accession to the WTO.

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    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: DG Okonjo-Iweala encourages members to continue advancing trade and development work

    Source: World Trade Organization

    DG Okonjo-Iweala acknowledged the progress made in supporting greater integration of LDCs into global trade, but emphasized that much more remains to be done, and that today’s dynamics around trade offer new opportunities to do so. “Challenges are mounting, though trade has been resilient. There are also opportunities to integrate LDCs into global trade and we should not let these opportunities pass us by. Let’s work together to ensure results,” she said.

    DG Okonjo-Iweala pointed to the ongoing efforts on exploring a way forward on agriculture negotiations. She also noted that 86 members have ratified the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies and invited members who have not done so to complete the ratification process as soon as possible.

    Around 70 delegates from LDCs and their development partners participated in the event. They examined ways to revitalize the WTO’s trade and development discussions. They also explored opportunities and challenges LDCs face in joining global supply chains, participating in digital trade and facilitating the green transition.

    The General Council Chair, Ambassador Petter Ølberg of Norway, noted members’ interests in reinvigorating the work of the WTO’s Committee on Trade and Development and in making Aid for Trade, including technical assistance, more useful to address the challenges of today. He also referred to the ongoing discussions on industrial policy. “Today’s South-South Dialogue is particularly timely in paving the way towards a successful development retreat next year,” he said.

    The Coordinator of the LDC Group, Ambassador Kadra Ahmed Hassan of Djibouti, said: “Our dialogue brings members together to explore what more can be done for greater integration of LDCs into global trade, and what we can collectively achieve for the multilateral trading system.” She recognized the need to support greater participation of LDCs in global supply chains.

    “Implementation of trade facilitation measures, digitalization of import and export transactions are among the factors that can help LDCs grasp opportunities in global supply chains,” she said. She also highlighted the need for continued support to LDCs to help them develop digital ecosystems, become more resilient to extreme weather events and adjust to trade-related climate measures.

    Ambassador Chenggang Li of China said: “China has always been committed to the development dimensions of WTO work. We are encouraged by the development outcomes from MC13 and committed to working with all members to deliver more pragmatic development outcomes for MC14.”

    Representing one of the key pillars of China’s LDCs and Accessions Programme, the South-South Dialogue on LDCs and Development aims to strengthen LDCs’ participation in the multilateral trading system. There are currently 45 LDCs, of which 37 are WTO members and five are in the process of accession.

    More information on the event is available here.

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  • MIL-OSI Economics: A stable euro in a strong Europe | Karl Otto Pöhl Lecture to the Frankfurt Society for Trade, Industry and Science

    Source: Bundesbank

    Check against delivery.

    1 Introduction

    Ladies and gentlemen,

    Thank you very much for inviting me. It gives me great pleasure to be here with you today, and I am very honoured to be delivering the Karl Otto Pöhl Lecture.

    My congratulations on this series of lectures. Nine years ago, it premiered at the Bundesbank’s Regional Office in Hesse at the Taunusanlage in Frankfurt. Since then, various prominent people have presented their views of monetary union. Two of them will come up later on in my talk.

    But let’s stay for now with the lecture’s namesake: Karl Otto Pöhl. On 30 May 1990, he addressed the Frankfurt Society for Trade, Industry and Science as President of the Bundesbank, perhaps even standing right here at this lectern.[1]

    Times were turbulent back then: German monetary union had just been decided and needed to be implemented within the space of just a few weeks. At the same time, the Delors Report had outlined the transition to a European Economic and Monetary Union. Its first stage entered into force on 1 July 1990. Germany’s “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” newspaper wrote back then that the Bundesbank was facing two unprecedented historical challenges.

    As was his nature, Karl Otto Pöhl shied away from neither challenges nor plain speaking. He explained in no uncertain terms where the difficulties and pitfalls of the two monetary unions lay. At the same time, he left no doubt that he would strive tirelessly to ensure that they were a success. He concluded his speech back then with the words: “I am also confident that we will succeed.” This combination of plain speaking, drive and optimism were characteristic of Karl Otto Pöhl – and we could do with more of that today as we strive to overcome the current challenges.

    Karl Otto Pöhl would have turned 95 this year. We owe him a great deal. His work in the Delors Commission resonates to this day: It was under Mr Pöhl’s chairmanship that the Committee of Central Bank Governors drafted the Statute of the European Central Bank. Thus, the European Central Bank was modelled on the Bundesbank and created as an independent central bank that pursues price stability as its primary objective.

    However, Mr Pöhl was also well aware that these institutional pillars alone are not sufficient to permanently uphold a stable currency for Europe. A firm foundation is needed for the pillars to stand upon. This foundation consists of sound public finances, integrated markets and public confidence in the central bank. Then as now, it is important to strengthen this foundation so that the euro can withstand even a storm. I would now like to talk about what this means specifically in the here and now.

    2 Sound public finances in the euro area

    Let’s start with public finances – and a question: Why should they matter to us in the first place? The Eurosystem has the task of shaping monetary policy for the euro area. Fiscal policy is the Member States’ responsibility. Why then do central bankers talk so often about budget deficits, debt ratios and fiscal rules?[2]

    Our mandate provides the answer: Unsound public finances are a threat to price stability. If the debt burden grows steadily in size, people might lose confidence that the government can continue to shoulder this burden without “inflating it away”. Inflation expectations, and therefore inflation itself, could rise. And monetary policy would have to push back more vigorously to keep inflation under control. This, in turn, would come at a greater cost to the economy as a whole.

    That is why we must nip in the bud any impression that central banks are under pressure to set key interest rates lower or maintain higher bond holdings than actually warranted by monetary policy out of consideration for public finances. And that is exactly why we are such outspoken advocates of effective fiscal rules. They are intended as guardrails for sound public finances. Then monetary policy can safeguard price stability, and do so with as little cost to the aggregate economy as possible.

    Fiscal rules were included in the design of European monetary union from the outset. This was thanks, in part, to Karl Otto Pöhl. Even back in the days of the Delors Commission, he was already advocating binding budgetary rules. Mr Pöhl is also said to have been the first to introduce the idea of a 3% deficit rule.

    Since then, the rules have been amended on several occasions. The latest reform entered into force in April 2024. On paper, the earlier rules were not bad at all. In practice, however, they didn’t have the desired effect. One reason was that numerous exceptions and discretionary powers were used to excuse the many instances in which targets were missed. As a result, the majority of euro area countries have debt exceeding the reference value of 60% of GDP, with a few even well above the 100% mark.

    Against this background, the rules were redrawn. In the reform, a great deal of emphasis was placed on national ownership, the intention being to make Member States feel more bound to the thresholds. If this overhaul does indeed lead to the rules having more binding force, that would be very welcome.

    At the same time, however, the commitments must also be ambitious enough to significantly bring down high deficit and debt ratios. Given a number of vulnerabilities in the new framework, this is not a matter of course. For example, the country-specific limits are based on many assumptions, some of which extend far into the future. The spending limits are ultimately a matter of negotiation. And in practice, response times to undesirable developments will be very long.

    The first acid test is imminent. Spending limits for the first planning period are currently being agreed upon. The plans should stake out a path for high deficit and debt ratios to come down reliably. Responsibility for agreeing such plans lies with the Commission and the Council. In my opinion, Germany should act as a role model in this process. That means leading by example and committing to a path on which the rules are applied rigorously.

    Given high levels of debt in the euro area, it is important that the reformed rules work better than the old ones. As I said earlier, sound Member State finances are part of the foundation of a stable economic and monetary union.

    3 Integrated capital markets in Europe

    But they alone are not enough. In his speech back then to the Frankfurt Society for Trade, Industry and Science, Karl Otto Pöhl explained that the emerging economic and monetary union meant, first, an integration of the markets. That was the most important thing of all, he said.[3] In particular, he pointed to the increasing integration of money and capital markets following the lifting of many restrictions on the free movement of capital.

    There were, and still are, a number of reasons why it is important that European financial markets should be as integrated as possible. First, this helps ensure that monetary policy impulses have equal effect throughout the euro area. Second, in the event of an economic shock in one Member State, it makes sure that downstream costs are cushioned across the currency area. This contributes to the stability of the economy as a whole and the financial system. And third, in a deep, liquid capital market with a broad range of products, it is easier for enterprises to find the financing that suits them best. This is particularly true of start-ups and growth companies. They need access to a developed venture capital market. More private capital is also important to boost investment in the green and digital transformation of the European economy. This investment is urgently needed to strengthen the EU’s productivity and competitiveness.

    So you see, everything points to the benefits of a genuine pan-European capital market. And the EU set itself the goal of creating a capital markets union a decade ago. Unfortunately, the reality is still very different.

    Overall, progress on financial integration in the euro area is disappointing. This was the conclusion recently reached in a report by the European Central Bank. It states that “[b]oth price-based and quantity-based financial integration indicators have declined substantially over the past two years, with no sizeable increase since the inception of Economic and Monetary Union. Despite significant legislative efforts over the last decade, cross-border financial market activities and risk sharing have not grown …”.[4]

    This finding demonstrates just how big the task is. But there is also good news: We know fairly exactly where the pain points lie and can start there. Areas for action include, for example, a more vibrant securitisation market, integrated structures in financial supervision, harmonised securities legislation, and better-coordinated national insolvency and accounting rules.

    The new Commission now needs to place the pursuit of a European capital market at the very top of its list of priorities. We must make more rapid progress on this issue than we have done so far. Policymakers have mostly been united behind the abstract objectives. However, they have then too rarely found the strength to agree on concrete measures. A whole host of measures is needed to achieve the objectives. In some cases, they encroach deeply on national law. If real progress is to be made, all parties will have to pull together, i.e. the Commission, the Parliament and the Member States.

    Happily, the topic has gained fresh momentum this year. Be it the statements by the Eurogroup and the ECB Governing Council or the reports by Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi – they are all providing tailwinds. Now is the time to use them!

    The Eurosystem itself is also contributing to success in this area, particularly in terms of financial market infrastructure. For example, we are advocating for new technologies to make it easier to issue, trade and settle financial instruments. In my view, digitalisation opens up fresh opportunities to strengthen the efficiency of European financial markets, while also breaking down boundaries between national financial markets. We have far from exhausted the potential here!

    4 Public confidence in the central bank

    A Europe with integrated markets and sound public finances is a stronger Europe. It is a Europe with stronger resilience in the face of crises, even during turbulent times; a Europe that allows us to shape our future with self-assurance and on the back of our own efforts. Achieving this goes beyond the monetary policy foundation; it also involves the basis of citizens’ trust in the EU.

    The general public should be able to have as much confidence in the EU in future as they do now.[5] We, as the Eurosystem central banks, are also particularly dependent on the confidence and support of the general public.

    We act independently of politics. This independence has been deliberately granted to us for monetary policy so that we can fulfil our mandate free from political influence. We cannot simply take the public’s trust as a given. Only if the people have confidence in us will they accept the independence granted to us. This trust must be earned time and time again – by acting in accordance with our mandate and communicating transparently and comprehensibly with the public. In short: Our deeds and our words should go hand in hand.

    If people have confidence in central banks and their promise of stability, this also helps to anchor inflation expectations.[6] Well-anchored inflation expectations make it easier for the central bank to actually achieve its target. And meeting the inflation target, in turn, reinforces people’s confidence in the central bank. In this way, a virtuous circle is created – a cycle of positive events.

    The Eurosystem has repeatedly demonstrated that its promise of stability was not merely empty words. Perhaps you remember when the then ECB chief economist, Peter Praet, gave his Karl Otto Pöhl Lecture in 2017. At that time, the Eurosystem was struggling with an inflation rate that remained stubbornly below target. Mr Praet explained what the Governing Council had done to counter deflation risks that had emerged since 2014.

    Alternatively, think back to the economic environment back when Christine Lagarde spoke with you two years ago. In autumn 2022, euro area inflation had peaked, even reaching double digits for a time. Against this backdrop, the ECB President underscored the Governing Council’s determination to push inflation down to its 2% target.

    Here, too, words and deeds were aligned: by September 2023, we had raised key interest rates by a total of 450 basis points in ten steps – a move that bore fruit. The inflation rate has since fallen significantly. In September of this year, it was below 2% in the euro area – and that for the first time in over three years. Tomorrow we will get the first estimate for October. Inflation is also likely to have risen slightly again due to base effects in energy.

    Looking beyond the monthly ups and downs, it can be seen that price stability is no longer far off, but the last mile of the journey still needs to be traversed. In particular, services inflation, which has been relatively sluggish in past experience, remains high, standing at 3.9% at last count.

    The ECB Governing Council lowered key interest rates in October for the third time since June. This was appropriate in view of the somewhat more favourable inflation outlook shown by the data. Our data-dependent approach has proven its worth, particularly in view of the prevailing uncertainty. A new forecast will be available to the Governing Council in December, and that will show us whether we are still on track in terms of inflation developments. I advise you to remain cautious and not to rush into anything.

    Monetary policy needs to ensure that the inflation rate stabilises at 2% over the medium term. Adhering to our promise of stability is absolutely crucial if we are to maintain the confidence that the general public have in us, particularly in light of their inflation experiences in recent years. Accessible communication helps with this.[7]

    Karl Otto Pöhl had already come to this realisation, back in a time when central banks were, in some cases, famous (and infamous) for their secrecy. In an interview in 1988, he said: “I am thoroughly convinced that one of my main tasks is to clarify, to explain.”[8]

    Studies also suggest that people with a good financial education tend to trust central banks.[9] We therefore have a strong vested interest in improving the public’s understanding of money, currency and central banks. This is where the Bundesbank’s educational resources, such as lectures at schools, training courses for teachers, teaching materials, explanatory films and the Money Museum, come into play.

    The effects of financial education could extend even further: researchers from the European Central Bank have investigated how people with differing degrees of financial knowledge responded to the interest rate reversal in 2022 and 2023.[10] People with basic and advanced financial knowledge were surveyed over several months. It transpired that both groups expected significantly higher interest rates. However, there were differences between whether the surveyed groups deemed it better to take out loans or to make savings: those with higher financial literacy adjusted their assessments more quickly and to a considerably greater degree. The impact of the course of monetary policy on people’s behaviour therefore also depends on their financial knowledge. As a result, then, greater emphasis on financial literacy could help monetary policy measures to be translated into action on the part of the individual.

    A good general understanding of economics and finance has yet more advantages. For instance, such knowledge enables people to make better decisions about how to spend, save and invest their money. Studies show that financial knowledge has a positive impact on households’ return on investment.[11] Furthermore, it is more likely to prevent them from making expensive mistakes or falling victim to fraud.

    Financial education also affords opportunities for social advancement. It is therefore important to promote the acquisition of such knowledge in society at large. If knowledge about planning for retirement and wealth accumulation is only gleaned from one’s parental home, it is primarily those who are already in positions of privilege who will benefit. This can entrench and even exacerbate societal inequalities.[12]

    It is all the more worrying that, according to a survey carried out within the EU, an average of just over one in two individuals possesses basic financial knowledge.[13] Although Germany’s performance is above average, we still have plenty of room for improvement. The German government’s initiative aimed at strengthening financial education therefore comes as a welcome development. One component of this initiative, a national strategy for financial literacy, is currently under development. The OECD has provided valuable analyses and recommendations that create a sound basis for policy.[14]

    In any case, there is no lack of interest, especially among young people. According to an OECD study, 81% of 14 to 24-year-olds would like to learn more in school about options for retirement provision, 87% about how to handle their money and 73% about investment opportunities.[15] In addition, 78% of young people in Germany want economics to play a greater role in school.[16] A stronger focus on economic and financial topics in the school curriculum would fall on fertile ground, then.

    5 Conclusion

    The Eurosystem is well equipped to maintain stable prices in the euro area through independence and a clear mandate. But in stormy times especially, we need to be firmly anchored upon a strong foundation, comprising elements such as sound public finances, integrated markets and confidence in the central bank. This foundation must be maintained, and, where necessary, re-laid.

    First and foremost, we are, of course, required to say what we are doing and to do what we are saying. Central bankers would be well advised to adhere to this guiding principle. However, what is also clear is that we cannot guarantee the strength of the euro as a currency by acting alone; rather, politicians and society as a whole have their own parts to play. Pöhl’s contemporary Helmut Schlesinger, who recently turned 100 years old, coined the term “stability culture”.[17]

    I would like to close by citing a quote of Karl Otto Pöhl’s that holds as true today as it originally did over 40 years ago: “There is no law of nature stating that we are entitled to live on an “island of stability”. Such a privilege has to be earned through applying a durable stability policy.”[18] Indeed, this is what we in the Eurosystem are working towards on a day-to-day basis, and I am confident that we will succeed.

    Footnotes

    1. Pöhl, K. O., Rede zur deutschen und europäischen Währungsunion vor der Frankfurter Gesellschaft für Handel, Industrie und Wissenschaft, 30 May 1990. 
    2. Allard, J., M. Catenaro, J. Vidal and G. Wolswijk (2013), Central bank communication on fiscal policy, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 30.
    3. Pöhl, K. O., Rede zur deutschen und europäischen Währungsunion vor der Frankfurter Gesellschaft für Handel, Industrie und Wissenschaft, 30 May 1990.
    4. European Central Bank, Financial Integration and Structure in the Euro Area, June 2024.
    5. European Commission (2024), Standard Eurobarometer 101 – Spring 2024.
    6. Christelis, D., D. Georgarakos, T. Jappelli and M. van Rooij (2020), Trust in the Central Bank and Inflation Expectations, International Journal of Central Banking, Vol. 16, No 6; Mellina, S. and T. Schmidt (2018), The role of central bank knowledge and trust for the public’s inflation expectations, Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper No 32/2018; Bursian, D. and E. Faia (2018), Trust in the monetary authority, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 98. 
    7. Eickmeier, S. and L. Petersen (2024), Toward a holistic approach to central bank trust, Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper No 27/2024.
    8. Die Macht des Wortes, interview with manager magazin on 1 June 1988.
    9. Niţoi, M. and M. Pochea (2024), Trust in the central bank, financial literacy, and personal beliefs, Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 143.
    10. Charalambakis, E., O. Kouvavas and P. Neves (2024), Rate hikes: How financial knowledge affects people’s reactions, The ECB Blog, 15 August 2024. 
    11. Kaiser, T. and A. Lusardi (2024), Financial literacy and financial education: An overview, CEPR Discussion Paper No 19185; Deuflhard, F., D. Georgarakos and R. Inderst (2019), Financial literacy and savings account returns, Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 17, No 1.
    12. Lusardi, A., P.-C. Michaud and O. S. Mitchell (2017): Optimal Financial Knowledge and Wealth Inequality, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 125(2).
    13. Demertzis, M., L. L. Moffat, A. Lusardi and J. M. López (2024), The state of financial knowledge in the European Union, Policy Brief 04/2024, Bruegel.
    14. OECD (2024), Strengthening Financial Literacy in Germany: Proposal for a National Financial Literacy Strategy, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/81e95597-en.
    15. OECD (2024), Financial literacy in Germany: Supporting financial resilience and well-being, OECD Business and Finance Policy Papers, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/financial-literacy-in-germany_c7a28393-en.html.
    16. Bertelsmann Stiftung (2024), Factsheet: Wirtschaftspolitische Interessen junger Menschen in Deutschland.
    17. Schlesinger, H., Eine europäische Währung muß genauso stabil sein wie die D-Mark, Handelsblatt, 31 December 1991.
    18. Welt am Sonntag, 12 April 1981.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Per Jacobsson Lecture 2024 — Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala: “Delivering on new global challenges: How can we keep multilateral coherence whilst re-imagining the multilateral trading system?”

    Source: WTO

    Headline: Per Jacobsson Lecture 2024 — Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala: “Delivering on new global challenges: How can we keep multilateral coherence whilst re-imagining the multilateral trading system?”

    Excellencies, Dear Raghu, Minouche, Maury, ladies and gentlemen, friends,
    Thank you. What an honor to follow in the footsteps of previous Per Jacobsson lecturers – all the more so in this 80th anniversary year of the Bretton Woods Conference.
    We are living in troubled times – something Per Jacobsson knew well. So far as trade is concerned, the times are not only troubled, they are tense. Trade is sometimes blamed and scapegoated for poor outcomes that really derive from macroeconomic, technology, or social policy, for which trade is not responsible.
    Trade policies and tools are being deployed not just to solve trade-related problems, but also to try to address security and geopolitical concerns.
    As unilateral measures or threats thereof become increasingly widespread, trade policy has been getting more restrictive. In recent months, the US, the EU, Turkey, and Canada have introduced new tariffs and countervailing duties on Chinese electric vehicles and other products, including steel. China has countered with WTO disputes and measures against EU products such as dairy, pork, and brandy. 
    These are among the over 130 new trade-restricting measures recorded by the WTO Secretariat since the start of this year. This number represents an 8% increase to the stockpile of over 1600 restrictive measures introduced between 2009 and 2023, which as of last year were already affecting over 10% of world goods trade. In addition, WTO members initiated 210 trade remedy investigations in the first half of 2024 – nearly as many as in all of 2023. While not all will culminate in the imposition of duties, investigations have a well-documented chilling effect on trade. And I haven’t even mentioned subsidies yet. 
    Frictions are manifesting as trade disputes. Six of the eight WTO disputes initiated this year deal with green technologies, particularly electric vehicles.
    I hope we are not on a path that leads back to the sort of economic disorder that came before Bretton Woods – disorder that was followed by political extremism and war.
    It was precisely to avoid a repeat of such circumstances that the multilateral economic institutions were created. My concern today is that we have forgotten this lesson – that we have forgotten the good these institutions have done.
    Walking away from the legacy of Bretton Woods, including the trading system, would diminish the world’s ability – collectively and at the national level – to respond to problems affecting people’s lives and opportunities.
    I will argue that there is a better path forward: re-imagining the global trading system and the rest of the multilateral economic architecture to help us meet the technological, environmental, social and geopolitical challenges of our time. To succeed, its various components must work in concert – an idea we have come to call ‘coherence’.
    In the 1940s, the overall thrust of coherence was that trade, reconstruction financing, and monetary policymaking need to be in harmony with each other, and anchored in institutions and rules across countries, to promote growth, prosperity, and peace.
    Today, delivering lasting improvements to people’s lives and livelihoods requires us to solve problems of the global commons.
    The notion of coherence across different policy areas would have made sense to Per Jacobsson. His convictions about sound money, and its importance for durable growth and recovery, were shaped by his own experiences. As a young man he saw the collapse of global economic integration amid the First World War. From his position at the League of Nations in the 1920s, he witnessed the failed attempts by leading economies to establish effective international coordination on global finance and trade – a memory that echoes uncomfortably today.
    We know what happened when the downturn came at the end of the decade. Vicious circles emerged: of falling output, deflation, banking and financial crises, trade protectionism and retaliation, and exchange rate chaos. Countries retreated into increasingly isolated economic blocs.
    The experience of those years was seared into the consciousness of the officials who gathered in Bretton Woods in July 1944. US Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau opened the conference by looking back at what he called “the great economic tragedy of our time.” I quote “We saw currency disorders develop and spread from land to land, destroying the basis for international trade and international investment and even international faith. In their wake, we saw unemployment and wretchedness — idle tools, wasted wealth. We saw their victims fall prey, in places, to demagogues and dictators. We saw bewilderment and bitterness become the breeders of fascism and, finally, of war.”
    What Bretton Woods delivered
    The genius of Bretton Woods was that it turned the vicious circles of the 1930s into virtuous ones, by recognizing that macro-financial stability, reconstruction and development, and trade went hand-in-hand.
    Instead of beggar-thy-neighbor policies, countries would treat trade, monetary issues, and even domestic macro-economic policies as matters of common interest.
    Instead of excessively rigid or chaotically fluctuating currencies, there would be orderly, rules-based management of exchange rates and balance of payments problems.
    Instead of underinvestment, there would be long-term financing for reconstruction and expanding productive capacity.
    Instead of quantitative restrictions, prohibitive tariffs, and bilateral clearing, there would be a coordinated lowering of trade barriers, and freedom to undertake international payments and current account transactions.
    The idea of coherence across policy fields, with trade as a unifying theme, was baked into the system from day one. Promoting the “balanced growth of international trade” is written into the founding mandates of both the IMF and the World Bank – not as an end in itself, but as a means to higher employment, productivity, and incomes.
    The trade leg of the stool, alongside the Bank and the IMF, was supposed to be the International Trade Organization, but it ran aground in the US Congress. A parallel negotiating process in 1947 produced the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which was nominally temporary and did not require Congressional ratification. Successive rounds of GATT negotiations substantially reduced barriers to trade. The growing number of “contracting parties” used the GATT to resolve and avoid trade disputes. By the 1960s, global trade was growing faster than output.
    The decades that followed Bretton Woods and the Marshall Plan delivered a breathtaking recovery from the devastation of the Second World War.
    Strong growth in the 1950s and 1960s saw per capita incomes in Western Europe and Japan begin to converge with those in the United States.
    Major European currencies achieved full convertibility in 1958, when Per Jacobsson was leading the IMF.
    These gains, however, were largely confined to industrialized countries.
    Most newly independent developing countries continued to lose ground in relative terms, as they struggled with declining terms of trade for their commodities.
    But a handful of poor economies in East Asia started trying to use increasingly open external markets to pursue export-led development.
    Discordance and reinvention: the 1970s and 1980s
    Coherence gave way to discordance in the 1970s, with the oil shocks, stagflation, the advent of floating exchange rates, and a wave of emerging market debt crises.
    By the mid-1980s, the success of the so-called Asian tigers had become a compelling example, inspiring many developing country governments to pivot from inward-oriented to export-oriented development strategies.
    At the international level, growing frustration with ad hoc protectionism and “à la carte” approaches to GATT strictures created demand for more rules-based trade cooperation.
    The Uruguay Round negotiations from 1986 to 1994 broadened the reach of multilateral trade rules to cover services and intellectual property, filled longstanding gaps with respect to agriculture and textiles, and unwound much of the protectionism that had emerged in the preceding years.
    The nominally provisional GATT was transformed into the World Trade Organization, with a binding dispute resolution mechanism that enhanced the predictability offered by its expanded rulebook.
    The preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO opened up new vistas for the organization, defining its purpose as using trade not just to raise living standards and create jobs but to advance sustainable development – thus introducing environmental concerns that were absent in the 1940s.
    1990 to 2020: A “golden period of economic development”, but clouds on the horizon
    The Uruguay Round and the end of the Cold War would mark a second era of coherence and virtuous circles across the trading system, the World Bank, and the IMF. And this time, the benefits were spread much more widely across countries and people.
    The WTO became an anchor for outward-oriented economic reforms in many emerging markets and developing economies.
    Increasingly open and predictable trade became a stronger driver of development, productivity, specialization and scale.
    Better macro-financial policies bolstered growth – and trade performance – in many emerging markets and developing countries. So did improved human capital and physical infrastructure.
    Trade and modern supply chains became powerful sources of disinflationary pressures.
    Market-oriented reforms in China, Eastern Europe, India and other developing economies brought them into the increasingly global division of labor. Trade boomed, incomes rose, and poverty plummeted.
    Between 1995 and 2022, as low- and middle-income economies nearly doubled their share in global exports from 16 to 32%, the share of their populations subsisting on less than US$2.15 per day fell from 40% to under 11%. Over 1.5 billion people were lifted out of extreme poverty.
    Since 1995, per capita incomes in low- and middle-income countries have nearly tripled, and global per capita income increased by approximately 65 percent.
    For the first time since the industrial revolution two centuries earlier, per capita incomes in rich and poor countries began to converge.
    Gains for poor countries did not come at the expense of rich ones. Examining the United States since 1950, researchers at the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) have shown that international trade boosted the economy by the equivalent of $2.6 trillion in 2022, or about 10% of GDP. The gains from trade would be even larger for small, open advanced economies.
    In a Foreign Affairs piece this year, Dev Patel, Justin Sandefur, and Arvind Subramanian called the years between 1990 and the start of COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, I quote, “history’s most golden period of economic development”.   They argue that the rapid increase in trading opportunities was “perhaps the most important enabler” of convergence.
    Research from our new World Trade Report backs them up: the pace of income convergence of low- and middle-income economies is strikingly correlated with their participation in global trade, as measured by a size-adjusted ratio of trade to GDP. Our simulations suggest falling trade costs account for as much as one-third of the convergence.
    To be clear, the period was not golden for everyone. Developing countries with lower trade participation or greater commodity-dependence – mostly in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East – lagged on convergence. And in some rich countries, many people felt left behind, and their frustration started to fuel a political backlash against trade.
    Multilateral rule-making on trade began to falter, with the failure of the Doha Round of WTO negotiations.
    Nevertheless, in 2008 and 2009, when the world economy faced its worst financial crisis since the 1930s, the system worked.
    International markets stayed broadly open. The rules and norms of the multilateral trading system helped governments contain protectionist pressures.
    Alongside fiscal and monetary support, trade was a powerful shock absorber. Crisis-hit countries could rely on predictable market access elsewhere to absorb their excess supply, preventing growth and development from getting derailed.
    The WTO, the World Bank, and the IMF also worked together productively on the macro-micro policy nexus.
    For instance, when trade finance dried up during the credit crunch, despite being extremely low-risk, the three institutions joined hands to encourage G20 members and international financial institutions to step in with a $250 billion support package.
    Since the financial crisis, the multilateral trading system, with the WTO at its core, has continued to deliver economic benefits, despite rising geopolitical tensions and tariffs between the US and China, the disabling of the Appellate Body, and the failure to reach agreements in long-running negotiations such as those on agriculture. Global trade kept reaching new highs through the 2010s, and over 75% of global goods trade continued – and continues today – to operate on core WTO tariff terms.
    When COVID-19 hit in 2020, the norms and rules of the multilateral trading system mostly did their job again. Trust in trade was damaged by initial missteps, as governments enacted export restrictions on medical supplies and vaccines. But governments generally refrained from widespread protectionism, allowing food and other essentials to flow across borders to where they were needed. Goods trade rebounded strongly from the lockdowns and was soon setting new records. Cross-border supply chains churned out products needed to fight the pandemic, from face masks to vaccines. Trade in digitally-delivered services boomed, propelled by the same technologies that allowed so many of us to work from home.
    Goods and especially services trade are now well above pre-COVID levels.  Last year, global trade was worth a near-record $30.5 trillion, in a $105-trillion world economy.
    Re-imagining the Multilateral Trading System with coherence
    As we saw at the outset, however, these successes did not forestall the challenges we now face in global trade. While trade has been largely resilient, signs of fragmentation are now visible.
    So it’s not difficult to imagine a return of vicious circles – trade restrictions, efficiency losses, slower growth, higher prices, costs imposed by extreme weather and food insecurity, and public frustration and anger.
    Allowing the vicious circles to take hold and the world to fragment into isolated trading blocs would be costly. The WTO has estimated longer term global GDP losses in the order of 5% were the world to fragment into two like-minded trading blocs. IMF estimates are in the order 7%. We cannot afford this!
    And that is why we need to re-imagine the multilateral trading system to solve modern challenges and address modern vulnerabilities.
    This means re-imagining coherence as well. Trade alone was insufficient in 1944, and trade alone is insufficient to build the more secure, sustainable, and inclusive world we want today.  The way forward for trade will increasingly be about “WTO and” – trade in tandem with other issues, and policies that support the original vision of coherence and do not misuse trade tools, for coercion, as a weapon, or to undermine competition.
    Our unfinished business from 1944 was elegantly illustrated by a recent blog post from IMF chief economist Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and his team.
    They showed that China’s growing and contentious trade surplus, and the US’s widening trade deficit, are the result of domestic macro-economic forces, rather than the product of trade and industrial policies.
    “Homegrown surpluses and deficits call for homegrown solutions,” they argued, suggesting demand-boosting measures in China and fiscal consolidation in the US.
    As for concerns over industrial policy, they said the right response was to strengthen WTO rules, not to restrict trade.
    They cited the WTO’s recent China Trade Policy Review which showed new data of billions of dollars in subsidies going to manufacturing. Urging China to be more transparent about its subsidies.
    The blog shows the coherence mandate in action but it also illustrates how even today, the global trading system is paying a price for shortcomings of macro-economic policy.
    As Sylvia Ostry, one of my predecessors at this podium, said in 1987, “Trade policy is no substitute for macro policy.”
    Let’s now turn to the new trade agenda, and look at three areas where future prospects for people and the planet require trade to be re-imagined, and complemented by other policy levers pulling in the same direction.
    First, the environmental agenda, above all climate change and getting to net zero by mid-century.
    Trade is indispensable to deploy low-carbon technologies globally. Trade lets countries share the burden of developing new green tech. Scale economies and competitive pressures associated with trade help drive down unit costs, making it possible for renewables to undercut fossil fuel energy.
    Trade also allows us to leverage ‘green comparative advantage’, a concept that our chief economist, Ralph Ossa, has done much to advance. The idea is straightforward: just as individuals and countries can reap economic gains by specializing in what they are relatively good at, the world can reap environmental gains if countries specialize in what they are relatively green at.
    If countries with abundant clean energy can produce more energy-intensive goods and services, while importing energy-light products from places where clean energy is scarce, and vice versa, global emissions fall much more than they would have absent that trade. And in fact research from the University of Zurich  suggests that as much as one-third of global emissions reductions could come from this kind of specialization linked to green comparative advantage.
    As Ricardo Hausmann at Harvard has observed, fossil fuels are cheap to transport, but wind and solar energy are not. This makes parts of Africa, Central Asia, and Latin America with high green energy potential attractive destinations for investment in energy-intensive industries, including the production of green hydrogen.
    Global cooperation on internalizing carbon costs would incentivize greener sourcing everywhere. Nevertheless, we are already seeing moves in the right direction as in Kenya, which has attracted a billion-dollar investment to build a geothermal-powered low-carbon data center.
    Parenthetically, a similar dynamic exists for water, provided it is valued correctly. A recent report of the Global Commission on the Economics of Water, which I co-chair, shows that with trade one can also promote the notion of a hydrological comparative advantage. Trade can help mitigate water scarcity by allowing countries with abundant hydrological resources to specialize in producing water-intensive products for export to water-scarce nations.  Such virtual water trade offers agricultural export opportunities, for example, to those regions including countries in Africa with under-utilized ground water resources and land.
    But just as environmental policy coordination could accelerate climate action, policy fragmentation could weaken it.  There is a genuine risk that trade frictions associated with carbon pricing, green subsidies, and other climate policies will escalate into trade restrictions and retaliation, harming emissions reduction as well as trade.
    We should seek to pre-empt such frictions and disputes by establishing shared frameworks for trade and climate policy. The goal would be to maximize emissions reduction and green innovation, while minimizing negative spillovers, trade tensions, and wasted public resources on subsidy races that most countries may not even afford to participate in.
    To this end, the WTO Secretariat is coordinating a carbon pricing task force comprised of the IMF, World Bank, OECD, UNCTAD, and UNFCCC, where we are working to develop shared carbon metrics and ultimately a global carbon pricing framework against which we can benchmark national policies to aid interoperability of approaches. We have also joined hands with the IMF, the OECD, and the World Bank to explore approaches to enhance greater transparency with respect to subsidies. And we are working with the steel industry to help them promote interoperability in decarbonization standards, reducing transaction costs and facilitating trade and investment in green steel.
    Reforming the over $1.2 trillion in direct global annual fossil fuel subsidies, the $630 billion in trade-distorting agricultural support, and the $22 billion in harmful fisheries subsidies (which the WTO Fisheries Subsidies Agreement is delivering) should be a no-brainer. Some of the resources freed up could be repurposed to support green innovation and a just transition for poor countries.
    The second set of opportunities for the Multilateral Trading System deals with diversifying and decentralizing supply chains – and doing so in a manner that brings in countries and communities that remain on the margins of the global division of labor.
    More diversified global production networks would enhance supply security in an increasingly shock-prone world, while extending the benefits of trade to places and people that have not shared adequately in them. Greater diversification would also help lower the geopolitical temperature around supply chain relationships, by making them harder for any single country to weaponize.
    As the pandemic and the war in Ukraine made abundantly clear, overconcentration makes supply chains vulnerable in a crisis.
    The advent of COVID-19, concentrated minds on the fact that 80% of world vaccine exports came from only ten countries. This meant export restrictions in a few of them severely disrupted global access to vaccines – especially to Africa, which relied on imports for 99% of its jabs.
    Decentralizing value chains and building up pharmaceutical production capacity in Africa and other developing country regions for instance would make the global supply base more resilient in the event of future pandemics, whilst more closely integrating these regions in to world trade, and making them part of a more prosperous and healthy world.
    Critical minerals is another sector where there are major opportunities to mitigate concerns about overconcentration in mining and especially processing, while stimulating growth in developing countries. 
    Exports of minerals critical for the low-carbon transition, like lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earths, have grown rapidly to reach USD 320 billion in value in 2022, and are set to increase much more in the years ahead. Africa, for example, represents 40% of estimated global reserves of cobalt, manganese, and platinum; and 12% of world exports of critical minerals, but only 3.8% of exports of processed minerals.
    By investing in processing these minerals within the regions including in Central Asia and Latin America where they are found, we can promote value addition and job creation while removing supply bottlenecks that currently threaten to hold back the low-carbon transition.
    Furthermore, to the extent that this process is powered by green hydrogen and other kinds of clean energy, it would harness the green comparative advantage I mentioned earlier and thereby help the developing regions increase their share in world trade.
    It would be green growth and green trade – the ‘re-globalization’ we want.
    Finally, there are areas where cross-border commerce is flourishing, but where new rules are necessary to foster predictability and lower barriers to entry for smaller businesses and developing economies.
    The fastest growing segment of international trade is in services delivered across borders via computer networks. Trade in digitally-delivered services – everything from streaming video to remote consulting – has quadrupled since 2005, reaching $4.25 trillion in value last year. These services have become an increasingly important driver of growth and job creation.
    The commercialization of artificial intelligence promises to further accelerate digital trade. A forthcoming WTO report describes how AI could reduce trade and transaction costs, improve supply chain logistics, and shift countries’ comparative advantages.
    I always say the future of trade is digital, but the future of protectionism could be as well. Imports of digital services could become as contentious as manufactured imports have, or more so – inviting digital barriers that are even simpler to put in place than their counterparts for trade in physical goods.
    Putting in place some basic rules for digital trade would reduce the risks of such reversals. The 90-odd members participating in plurilateral e-commerce negotiations at the WTO are now looking to conclude a first phase agreement on a series of practical measures to facilitate digital trade, from common rules for e-signatures and payments, to paperless trading, and consumer protection. Tougher issues like cross-border data flows – a critical element in AI – will be dealt with in a second phase of negotiations.
    Delivering on this agenda for the future will involve strengthening all of the WTO’s functions: monitoring and transparency, negotiations, and dispute settlement.
    With respect to our dispute settlement system, we are working to reform it. The reform process has wide buy-in, and talks are advancing, including on issues like appeal review and accessibility to ensure that developing countries can use the system. There are delicate issues here around how national security exceptions will be handled – it is going to take work!
    We will need to negotiate and implement new rules in important areas like the environment. Some members are showing the way: New Zealand, Costa Rica, Switzerland, and Iceland recently agreed to liberalize trade in a list of hundreds of environmental goods, and they are trying to get others to join.
    We are working on getting an Agreement on Investment Facilitation for Development, negotiated by three-quarters of our membership, into the WTO rulebook. This agreement will help developing economies attract FDI by simplifying investment-related procedures and sweeping away red tape.
    We will also need to review existing rules to make them fit for purpose. Instead of members doing an end run around our Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures to introduce industrial policies, it would be better to update that agreement. It actually dates back to 1994 – seven years before China joined the WTO,  [a time when climate concerns were barely on the radar screen, and the conventional wisdom was that state-owned enterprises were a fading relic of a bygone era]. Members could decide to create space for subsidizing the green transition. Shared ground rules would help minimize negative spillovers and related trade tensions, while maximizing efficiency in the use of public resources. 
    Excellencies, ladies, and gentlemen. Let me now conclude.
    As I said at the start, these are tense times for trade. There are political dynamics outside our control. But we can treat the challenges we face as opportunities to re-imagine the global trading system.
    We can build global resilience whilst making the system more supportive of inclusive growth and environmental sustainability.
    We can make existing trade rules more fit for purpose rather than go around or against them and we can make new rules fit for the time.
    We can help developing countries left behind by the recent wave of global economic integration.
    We can have interdependence without overdependence.
    While nothing is ever easy at the WTO, we are moving in the right direction. We will manage what we can manage. Control what we can control. But we will need your help.
    Over the past eight decades, the multilateral economic architecture, including the trading system, has delivered a great deal for the world. We have reinvented it before. We can do so again, for people and planet.
    Nelson Mandela once wrote that “after climbing a great hill, one only finds that there are many more hills to climb.” I ask you, let’s climb these hills together.
    Thank you.

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    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI USA: Pressley’s Statement on Texas Woman Who Died After Being Denied Miscarriage Care

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Ayanna Pressley (MA-07)

    BOSTON – Today, Congresswoman Ayanna Pressley (MA-07), chair of the Pro-Choice Caucus’ Abortion Rights and Access Task Force, issued the following statement on Josseli Barnica, who died on Sept. 3, 2021 after being denied emergency abortion care in Texas as she suffered a miscarriage.

    In September, in a House Democratic Steering and Policy Committee Hearing, Rep. Pressley highlighted the harmful and deadly impact of abortion bans in America to date and outlined in detail the shameful circumstances under which Amber Nicole Thurman died after being denied necessary abortion care in Georgia.

    “Josseli Barnica should be alive today. She should be carving a pumpkin with her now four-year-old daughter as her loving husband fills a bucket of Halloween candy.

    “Josseli died at a hospital in Texas that denied her medically necessary abortion care when she was going through a miscarriage. Her doctors, intimidated by a litany of current and pending abortion ban laws in Texas, knew the only way her pregnancy was going to end was in miscarriage. But instead of implementing the basic standards of care and providing her the life-saving care she needed, they let Josseli languish. Their delays and denials led to an infection that swiftly killed her. This never should have happened.

    “Today, this hospital still has no clear standard of care for miscarriage management despite the fact that miscarriages are incredibly common and abortion care is medically necessary in many cases. Governor Abbott and Republicans nationwide who have facilitated and advanced horrific and harmful abortion bans are responsible for Josseli’s death.

    “Abortion care is essential healthcare. I am thinking of Josseli’s family as they navigate their deep grief three years later. I am thinking of her daughter who is left to grow up without her mother. No one should be denied basic medical care No one should die this way. The United States can and must protect and restore access to abortion care across the country.”

    In her time serving in Congress, Rep. Pressley has fought persistently to protect fundamental reproductive and sexual healthcare rights. 

    • On the anniversary of the Dobbs decision, Rep. Pressley introduced the Abortion Justice Act, sweeping, intersectional legislation to address access to abortion care and put forth a comprehensive vision of a just America where abortion care is readily available—without stigma, shame or systemic barriers—for all who seek it, regardless of zip code, immigration status, income, or background.
    • Rep. Pressley is a lead co-sponsor of the Women’s Health Protection Act (WHPA), bicameral federal legislation to guarantee equal access to abortion care, everywhere. 
    • Rep. Pressley is also a lead co-sponsor of the EACH Act, bold legislation to repeal the Hyde Amendment and help guarantee abortion coverage—regardless of how a patient gets their health insurance.
    • Shortly before the Supreme Court’s overturning of Roe v. Wade, Rep. Pressley led a group of her Black women colleagues in writing to President Biden urging him to declare a public health emergency amid the unprecedented threats to abortion rights nationwide. 
    • Rep. Pressley condemned the Supreme Court’s leaked draft opinion to overturn Roe v. Wade., and implored the Senate to protect abortion rights and slammed the white supremacist roots of anti-abortion efforts.
    • In September 2024, in a House Democratic Steering and Policy Committee Hearing, Rep. Pressley highlighted the harmful and deadly impact of abortion bans in America to date, and outlined in detail the shameful circumstances under which Amber Nicole Thurman died after being denied necessary abortion care in Georgia.
    • In June 2024, Rep. Pressley issued a statement on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Idaho v. United States; Moyle v. United States – the case about whether emergency abortion care is included under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA). 
    • In May 2024, Rep. Pressley issued a statement on a Louisiana bill that would classify medication abortion drugs mifepristone and misoprostol as controlled substances. 
    • In April 2024, at a House Oversight Committee hearing, Rep. Pressley played “Fact or Fiction” with Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Commissioner Robert Califf to emphasize the safety and efficacy of medication abortion drug mifepristone.
    • In August 2023, Rep. Pressley issued a statement on the Fifth Circuit Court decision in Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine v. FDA.
    • In July 2023, Rep. Pressley, alongside Senator Patty Murray (D-WA), Rep. Cori Bush (MO-01), and Senator Tammy Duckworth (D-IL), reintroduced the Reproductive Health Care Accessibility Act, legislation to help people with disabilities—who face discrimination and extra barriers when seeking care—get better access to reproductive healthcare and the informed care they need to control their own reproductive lives.
    • In July 2023, Rep. Pressley applauded the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) approval of over-the-counter birth control.
    • In May 2023, Rep. Pressley applauded the FDA Advisory Committee’s unanimous, 17-0 vote to recommend the approval of the first-ever application for over-the-counter birth control. She and Senator Murray also held a press conference applauding the decision and urging the FDA to approval over-the-counter birth control without delay.
    • In May 2023, Rep. Pressley, along with Representatives Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (NY-14) and Ami Bera, MD (CA-06) and Senators Mazie Hirono (D-HI) and Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV), reintroduced their bicameral Affordability is Access Act to ensure that once the FDA determines an over-the-counter birth control option to be safe, insurers fully cover over-the-counter birth control without any fees or out-of-pocket costs.
    • In April 2023, Rep. Pressley issued a statement condemning the Texas court ruling on mifepristone, and discussed the Texas case in a recent floor speech in which she affirmed medication abortion as routine medical care and access to mifepristone as essential. She later joined Governor Maura Healey, Senator Elizabth Warren (D-MA), and local leaders in announcing action to protect Mifepristone in Massachusetts.
    • In March 2023, Rep. Pressley, along with Senator Cory Booker (D-NJ) and Reps. Schakowsky, Lee, DeGette, Torres and Strickland, reintroduced the Abortion is Healthcare Everywhere Act harmful and discriminatory Helms Amendment and expand abortion access globally.
    • In March 2023, Rep. Pressley and Senator Hirono led their colleagues in reintroducing a bicameral congressional resolution honoring abortion providers and clinic staff. 
    • In March 2023, Rep. Pressley delivered a speech in which she discussed the pending court case in Texas, which aims to restrict access to medication abortion across the entire nation. In her remarks, Rep. Pressley affirmed medication abortion as routine medical care, and accessibility to the abortion pill mifepristone as essential.
    • In September 2021, Rep. Pressley issued a statement condemning the Supreme Court’s inaction on SB-8, Texas’ restrictive abortion law. Later that month, she participated in a House Oversight Committee hearing to examine the threat posed by abortion bans and underscored the urgency of the Senate passing the Women’s Health Protection Act. 
    • In April 2021, Rep. Pressley, along with Congresswomen Barbara Lee (CA-13), Diana DeGette (CO-01) and Jan Schakowsky (IL-09), led a group of 131 Democratic members in reintroducing the Equal Access to Abortion Coverage in Health Insurance Act or the EACH Act, which would repeal the Hyde Amendment and ensure that all people, regardless of income, insurance or zip code, can make personal reproductive healthcare decisions without interference from politicians. She re-Introduced the legislation In January 2023.
    • Rep. Pressley has led calls in Congress for the FDA to remove medically unnecessary restrictions on the medication abortion drug mifepristone, and applauded the FDA’s action in January 2023 to allow retail pharmacies to dispense abortion medication pills.
    • As Chair of the Pro-Choice Caucus’s Abortion Rights and Access Task Force, Congresswoman Pressley has led the fight to repeal the Hyde Amendments from annual Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies appropriations bills and in July 2020 published a Medium post on the importance of doing so. She applauded the removal of the Hyde Amendment in President Biden’s FY2022 budget.
    • In May 2020, she led more than 155 Members of Congress in calling on House Democratic leadership to ensure that any future COVID-19 relief packages rejected Republican efforts to use the public health crisis to diminish abortion access.
    • In August 2021, Rep. Pressley, Oversight Chairwoman Carolyn Maloney, and Pro-Choice Caucus Co-Chairs Reps. Diana DeGette and Barbara Lee led more than 70 of their House Democratic colleagues in introducing a resolution in support of equitable, science-based policies governing access to medication abortion care. 
    • In January 2023, Rep. Pressley introduced a resolution to condemn all forms of political violence in the U.S., regardless of its target or intent. That same day, she delivered a powerful speech on the House floor slamming Republicans’ harmful, misleading anti-abortion resolution.
    • In September 2022, Rep. Pressley hosted U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Xavier Becerra at the Codman Square Health Center in Dorchester for a convening on their work to address the Black maternal health crisis and the criminalization of abortion care in states across the nation following the harmful U.S. Supreme Court decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health
    • In May 2019, she led more than 100 colleagues in introducing H.Con.Res.40, a resolution reaffirming the House of Representative’s support for Roe v. Wade.
    • In June 2019, Rep. Pressley introduced H.R. 3296, the Affordability is Access Act, to make oral contraception available without a prescription. 
    • In September 2016, as a member of the Boston City Council, Pressley championed a resolution calling on Congress and President Obama to repeal the Hyde Amendment and reinstate insurance coverage for abortion services.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Sen. Elena Parent Addresses Urgent Maternal Health Concerns in Georgia

    Source: US State of Georgia

    ATLANTA (October 31, 2024) – Today, Georgia Senate Democratic Caucus Chair, Sen. Elena Parent (D–Atlanta), addressed maternal health concerns impacting Georgia women, as highlighted by the harrowing experience of her constituent Avery Davis Bell. Bell, a 34-year-old Atlanta resident and mother of one, suffered pregnancy complications, which resulted in a second-trimester miscarriage and a dangerous hemorrhage. Bell, who was awaiting a live-saving dilation and evacuation (D&E) procedure, had to wait 20 hours before receiving the procedure as providers wrestled with the legal limitations surrounding her case.

    Sen. Parent expressed her ongoing concern for maternal health outcomes in Georgia and her commitment to reforming policies to protect women from such dangerous situations, stating, “No woman in Georgia should go through what Avery and her husband experienced. I look forward to continuing to work on legislation that will protect women in Georgia before and during pregnancy. Too many pregnant women in Georgia are on life support, physically and emotionally. These women deserve better.”

    Sen. Parent urges Georgia lawmakers to re-examine and prioritize policies that protect the health and lives of mothers in the state. She remains committed to addressing the gaps in healthcare provision for women facing pregnancy complications under Georgia’s current laws.

    # # # #

    Sen. Elena Parent serves as Chair of the Senate Democratic Caucus. She represents the 42nd Senate District which includes portions of DeKalb County. She may be reached at 404.456.5109 or via email at elena.parent@senate.ga.gov

    For all media inquiries, please reach out to SenatePressInquiries@senate.ga.gov.

    MIL OSI USA News