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Category: Europe

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: The UK calls on all parties to agree an immediate and unconditional ceasefire in DRC: UK statement at the UN Security Council

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    The UK calls on all parties to agree an immediate and unconditional ceasefire in DRC: UK statement at the UN Security Council

    Statement by Ambassador James Kariuki, UK Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, at the UN Security Council meeting on the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    President, this month we commemorate 31 years since the genocide against the Tutsi. 

    During this time, we honour the memory of those who lost their lives, and recognise the remarkable resilience shown by the people of Rwanda.

    I will make three points.

    First, the United Kingdom remains deeply concerned at the situation in eastern DRC. 

    We regret that despite the unanimous adoption by this Council of resolution 2773 almost two months ago, it remains far from being implemented. 

    While the withdrawal of M23 and Rwandan Defence Forces from Walikale is a positive step, much more needs to be done.

    We reiterate this Council’s call for the M23 to cease hostilities and withdraw from all controlled areas, and for the Rwandan Defence Forces to cease support for the M23 and withdraw from Congolese territory. 

    We call on the parties, in line with resolution 2773, to agree an immediate and unconditional ceasefire, and to seriously engage with regional peace processes.

    Second, the United Kingdom welcomes regional leadership towards a durable resolution of the conflict. 

    We welcome the nomination of President Gnassingbé of Togo as the African Union’s mediator for the peace process for eastern DRC. 

    We hope this will support coordination between regional and international efforts to deliver peace. 

    And we urge the parties to engage with his efforts and urgently implement the EAC-SADC roadmap to attain sustainable peace and security.

    Third, the United Kingdom is deeply concerned by the scale of human suffering from the conflict in eastern DRC, as set out by our briefers, and its impact on the region. 

    More than one million people have been displaced since the start of the year.

    We repeat our calls for all parties to respect international humanitarian and human rights law and to allow safe and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance by lake, road and through the reopening of key airports including Goma and Kavumu. 

    We also support greater UN and donor co-ordination to ensure assistance reaches those most in need.

    Updates to this page

    Published 16 April 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Eight Defendants Indicted in International Conspiracy to Bill $10 Million for Fraudulent Market Survey Data

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (b)

    CONCORD – An indictment has been unsealed charging eight defendants in connection with an international scheme to bill $10 million in fraudulent market survey data, Acting U.S. Attorney Jay McCormack announces.

    Each of the following defendants has been indicted on one count of Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud:

    1. Frank Hayden, 57, of Evanston, Illinois.
    2. Daniel Harriman, 38, of Huntsville, Alabama.
    3. Frank Nappo, 55, of Rye, New Hampshire.
    4. Ryan Stoudt, 38, of Dallas, Texas.
    5. Katarina Grubljesic, 46, of Belgrade, Serbia.
    6. Strahinja Grubljesic, 38, of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
    7. Archie Ignacio, 46, of Verona, New Jersey.
    8. Arvind Iyer, a/k/a S. Aravindan, of Delhi, India.

    According to the indictment, Op4G and Slice were market research companies based in the United States. Clients would hire the companies to conduct market research surveys. As part of their business model, Op4G and Slice maintained “panels” consisting of individuals potentially eligible to take surveys. In 2014, Hayden, Harriman, and Nappo, who were senior leaders at Op4G, decided to increase company revenues by generating fabricated survey data. To execute the scheme, some of the defendants recruited “ants”, who pretended to be legitimate survey takers but instead were paid a nominal fee for completing surveys that produced fraudulent market research data. Some of the defendants even served as “ants” and fraudulently took large quantities of surveys themselves and received significant payment for their “ant” work.

    In or around 2018, Nappo, Hayden and others, decided that Op4G should move the fraudulent survey operation to a new company, which became Slice. By 2019, Op4G and Slice began conspiring with Iyer, a senior leader at an international company, SNWare. By 2021, Katarina Grublijesic left Op4G, but she continued to conspire with the defendants using her international company, Bright Analytic Consulting.

    To evade detection, the defendants, including Stoudt and Ignacio, exchanged instructions with each other and the “ants.” These instructions included directions on how to answer survey screener questions, provided parameters on how long “ants” should remain on surveys, and encouraged the use of virtual private network (VPN) services to conceal real IP addresses.

    Hayden, Harriman, Nappo, Stoudt, and Ignacio will appear in federal court at a later date.

    The charging statute provides a sentence of no greater than 20 years in prison, up to three (3) years of supervised release, and a maximum fine of $250,000 or twice the gross gain or loss, whichever is greater.  Sentences are imposed by a federal district court judge based upon the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and statutes which govern the determination of a sentence in a criminal case.

    The FBI led the investigation.  Assistant U.S. Attorney Alexander S. Chen is prosecuting the case.

    Companies that purchased survey data from Op4G or Slice between 2014-2024 are encouraged to contact the U.S. Attorney’s office at usanh.webmail@usdoj.gov with the subject line “Slice”.

    The details contained in the indictment are allegations. The defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    ###

    MIL Security OSI –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Viper Energy, Inc. Provides Financial and Operating Update for the First Quarter of 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    MIDLAND, Texas, April 16, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Viper Energy, Inc. (NASDAQ: VNOM) (“Viper” or the “Company”), a subsidiary of Diamondback Energy, Inc. (NASDAQ: FANG) (“Diamondback”), today provided a financial and operating update for the first quarter of 2025. The Company is releasing this information to provide flexibility to opportunistically continue its stock repurchase program given the current market volatility.

    FIRST QUARTER 2025 HIGHLIGHTS

    • Average production of 31,311 bo/d (57,367 boe/d)
    • Average unhedged realized prices of $71.33 per barrel of oil, $24.52 per barrel of natural gas liquids and $2.08 per Mcf of natural gas
    • Average hedged realized prices of $70.26 per barrel of oil, $24.52 per barrel of natural gas liquids and $3.74 per Mcf of natural gas
    • Realized commodity hedging gains of $9.1 million

    SECOND QUARTER 2025 HIGHLIGHTS

    • As of April 15, 2025, repurchased 176,771 shares of common stock to date in Q2 2025 for $6.6 million, excluding excise tax (at a weighted average price of $37.27 per share); $427.6 million remaining on Viper’s current share buyback authorization

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This news release contains “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, which involve risks, uncertainties, and assumptions. All statements, other than statements of historical fact, including statements regarding Viper’s: future performance; business strategy; future operations; estimates and projections of operating income, losses, costs and expenses, returns, cash flow, and financial position; production levels on properties in which Viper has mineral and royalty interests, developmental activity by other operators; reserve estimates and Viper’s ability to replace or increase reserves; anticipated benefits or other effects of strategic transactions; and plans and objectives (including Diamondback’s plans for developing Viper’s acreage and Viper’s cash dividend policy and common stock repurchase program) are forward-looking statements. When used in this news release, the words “aim,” “anticipate,” “believe,” “continue,” “could,” “estimate,” “expect,” “forecast,” “future,” “guidance,” “intend,” “may,” “model,” “outlook,” “plan,” “positioned,” “potential,” “predict,” “project,” “seek,” “should,” “target,” “will,” “would,” and similar expressions (including the negative of such terms) as they relate to Viper are intended to identify forward-looking statements, although not all forward-looking statements contain such identifying words. Although Viper believes that the expectations and assumptions reflected in its forward-looking statements are reasonable as and when made, they involve risks and uncertainties that are difficult to predict and, in many cases, beyond its control. Accordingly, forward-looking statements are not guarantees of Viper’s future performance and the actual outcomes could differ materially from what Viper expressed in its forward-looking statements.

    Factors that could cause the outcomes to differ materially include (but are not limited to) the following: changes in supply and demand levels for oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids, and the resulting impact on the price for those commodities; the impact of public health crises, including epidemic or pandemic diseases, and any related company or government policies or actions; actions taken by the members of OPEC and Russia affecting the production and pricing of oil, as well as other domestic and global political, economic, or diplomatic developments, including any impact of the ongoing war in Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas war on the global energy markets and geopolitical stability; instability in the financial sector; higher interest rates and their impact on the cost of capital; regional supply and demand factors, including delays, curtailment delays or interruptions of production on Viper’s mineral and royalty acreage, or governmental orders, rules or regulations that impose production limits on such acreage; federal and state legislative and regulatory initiatives relating to hydraulic fracturing, including the effect of existing and future laws and governmental regulations; physical and transition risks relating to climate change and the risks and other factors disclosed in Viper’s filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, including its Forms 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K, which can be obtained free of charge on the Securities and Exchange Commission’s web site at http://www.sec.gov.

    In light of these factors, the events anticipated by Viper’s forward-looking statements may not occur at the time anticipated or at all. Moreover, the new risks emerge from time to time. Viper cannot predict all risks, nor can it assess the impact of all factors on its business or the extent to which any factor, or combination of factors, may cause actual results to differ materially from those anticipated by any forward-looking statements it may make. Accordingly, you should not place undue reliance on any forward-looking statements made in this news release. All forward-looking statements speak only as of the date of this news release or, if earlier, as of the date they were made. Viper does not intend to, and disclaims any obligation to, update or revise any forward-looking statements unless required by applicable law.

    Investor Contact:
    Chip Seale
    +1 432.247.6218
    cseale@viperenergy.com

    The MIL Network –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Diamondback Energy, Inc. Provides Operational Update for the First Quarter of 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    MIDLAND, Texas, April 16, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Diamondback Energy, Inc. (NASDAQ: FANG) (“Diamondback” or the “Company”) provided an operational update for the first quarter of 2025.

    The Company is releasing this information to provide flexibility to opportunistically continue its stock repurchase program given the current market volatility.

    FIRST QUARTER 2025 HIGHLIGHTS

    • Average production of 475.9 MBO/d (850.7 MBOE/d)
    • Average unhedged realized prices of $70.95 per barrel of oil, $23.94 per barrel of natural gas liquids and $2.11 per Mcf of natural gas
    • Average hedged realized prices of $70.06 per barrel of oil, $23.94 per barrel of natural gas liquids and $3.34 per Mcf of natural gas
    • Realized hedge gain of $85 million, with unrealized hedge gain of $141 million, resulting in total gain on derivatives of $226 million
    • Cash capital expenditures of $942 million
    • Repurchased 3,656,044 shares of common stock in Q1 2025 for $575 million, excluding excise tax (at a weighted average price of $157.15 per share); repurchased 1,560,200 shares of common stock to date in Q2 2025 for $200 million, excluding excise tax (at a weighted average price of $128.19 per share)
    • Q1 2025 weighted average basic and diluted shares outstanding (in thousands) of 289,612
    • Giving effect to the closing of the Double Eagle acquisition and share repurchases to date in the second quarter, Diamondback currently has approximately 293 million shares outstanding

    2025 OPERATING PLAN UPDATE

    Given recent market volatility, Diamondback is closely monitoring the macro environment and is actively reviewing its operating plan for the remainder of 2025. Should low commodity prices persist or worsen, Diamondback has the flexibility to reduce activity to maximize free cash flow generation. Additionally, Diamondback believes it can further lower its breakeven oil price through capital and operating cost reductions.

    The following table sets forth selected operating data for the three months ended March 31, 2025:

      Three Months Ended March 31, 2025
       
    Production Data:  
    Oil (MBbls)   42,835
    Natural gas (MMcf)   100,578
    Natural gas liquids (MBbls)   16,961
    Combined volumes (MBOE)(1)   76,559
       
    Daily oil volumes (BO/d)   475,944
    Daily combined volumes (BOE/d)   850,656
       
    Average Prices:  
    Oil ($ per Bbl) $ 70.95
    Natural gas ($ per Mcf) $ 2.11
    Natural gas liquids ($ per Bbl) $ 23.94
    Combined ($ per BOE) $ 47.77
       
    Oil, hedged ($ per Bbl)(2) $ 70.06
    Natural gas, hedged ($ per Mcf)(2) $ 3.34
    Natural gas liquids, hedged ($ per Bbl)(2) $ 23.94
    Average price, hedged ($ per BOE)(2) $ 48.89
    (1) Bbl equivalents are calculated using a conversion rate of six Mcf per Bbl.
    (2) Hedged prices reflect the effect of our commodity derivative transactions on our average sales prices and include gains and losses on cash settlements for matured commodity derivatives, which we do not designate for hedge accounting. Hedged prices exclude gains or losses resulting from the early settlement of commodity derivative contracts.
       

    Derivative Activity

    For the first quarter of 2025, Diamondback anticipates a net gain on cash settlements for derivative instruments of $85 million and a net non-cash gain on derivative instruments of $141 million as detailed in the table below (in millions):

    Gain (loss) on derivative instruments, net:  
    Commodity contracts $ 214  
    Interest rate swaps   11  
    2026 WTI Contingent Liability   2  
    Treasury locks(1)   (1 )
    Total $ 226  
       
    Net cash received (paid) on settlements:  
    Commodity contracts $ 86  
    Treasury locks(1)   (1 )
    Total $ 85  
    (1) Loss on 10 year treasury locks executed prior to, and fully settled upon, pricing of the senior notes issued in March 2025.
       

    Weighted Average Basic and Diluted Shares Outstanding

    For the first quarter of 2025, basic and diluted weighted average shares outstanding are as follows (in thousands):

    Basic weighted average shares outstanding 289,612
    Diluted weighted average shares outstanding 289,612
       

    About Diamondback Energy, Inc.

    Diamondback is an independent oil and natural gas company headquartered in Midland, Texas focused on the acquisition, development, exploration and exploitation of unconventional, onshore oil and natural gas reserves in the Permian Basin in West Texas.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This news release contains “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act and Section 21E of the Exchange Act, which involve risks, uncertainties, and assumptions. All statements, other than statements of historical fact, including statements regarding Diamondback’s: future performance; business strategy; future operations (including drilling plans and capital plans); estimates and projections of revenues, losses, costs, expenses, returns, cash flow, and financial position; reserve estimates and its ability to replace or increase reserves; anticipated benefits or other effects of strategic transactions (including the recently completed Endeavor merger, the recently completed Double Eagle acquisition and other acquisitions or divestitures); and plans and objectives of management (including plans for future cash flow from operations and for executing environmental strategies) are forward-looking statements. When used in this news release, the words “aim,” “anticipate,” “believe,” “continue,” “could,” “estimate,” “expect,” “forecast,” “future,” “guidance,” “intend,” “may,” “model,” “outlook,” “plan,” “positioned,” “potential,” “predict,” “project,” “seek,” “should,” “target,” “will,” “would,” and similar expressions (including the negative of such terms) as they relate to Diamondback are intended to identify forward-looking statements, although not all forward-looking statements contain such identifying words. Although Diamondback believes that the expectations and assumptions reflected in its forward-looking statements are reasonable as and when made, they involve risks and uncertainties that are difficult to predict and, in many cases, beyond Diamondback’s control. Accordingly, forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future performance and Diamondback’s actual outcomes could differ materially from what Diamondback has expressed in its forward-looking statements.

    Factors that could cause the outcomes to differ materially include (but are not limited to) the following: changes in supply and demand levels for oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids, and the resulting impact on the price for those commodities; the impact of public health crises, including epidemic or pandemic diseases and any related company or government policies or actions; actions taken by the members of OPEC and Russia affecting the production and pricing of oil, as well as other domestic and global political, economic, or diplomatic developments, including any impact of the ongoing war in Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas war on the global energy markets and geopolitical stability; instability in the financial markets; inflationary pressures; higher interest rates and their impact on the cost of capital; regional supply and demand factors, including delays, curtailment delays or interruptions of production, or governmental orders, rules or regulations that impose production limits; federal and state legislative and regulatory initiatives relating to hydraulic fracturing, including the effect of existing and future laws and governmental regulations; physical and transition risks relating to climate change; those risks described in Item 1A of Diamondback’s Annual Report on Form 10-K, filed with the SEC on February 26, 2025, and those risks disclosed in its subsequent filings on Forms 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K, which can be obtained free of charge on the SEC’s website at http://www.sec.gov and Diamondback’s website at www.diamondbackenergy.com/investors.

    In light of these factors, the events anticipated by Diamondback’s forward-looking statements may not occur at the time anticipated or at all. Moreover, Diamondback operates in a very competitive and rapidly changing environment and new risks emerge from time to time. Diamondback cannot predict all risks, nor can it assess the impact of all factors on its business or the extent to which any factor, or combination of factors, may cause actual results to differ materially from those anticipated by any forward-looking statements it may make. Accordingly, you should not place undue reliance on any forward-looking statements. All forward-looking statements speak only as of the date of this letter or, if earlier, as of the date they were made. Diamondback does not intend to, and disclaims any obligation to, update or revise any forward-looking statements unless required by applicable law.

    Investor Contact:
    Adam Lawlis
    +1 432.221.7467
    alawlis@diamondbackenergy.com

    The MIL Network –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Bank OZK Announces First Quarter 2025 Earnings

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    LITTLE ROCK, Ark., April 16, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Bank OZK (the “Bank”) (Nasdaq: OZK) today announced that net income available to common stockholders for the first quarter of 2025 was $167.9 million, a 2.1% decrease from $171.5 million for the first quarter of 2024. Diluted earnings per common share for the first quarter of 2025 were $1.47, a 2.6% decrease from $1.51 for the first quarter of 2024.

    George Gleason, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, stated, “We are pleased to report our first quarter 2025 results, which provide a solid start to the year. Our talented, entrepreneurial and veteran management team is well suited for today’s very noisy and complicated economic environment. During the quarter just ended, our team has proactively and effectively managed the various challenges, uncertainties and volatilities of this environment while capitalizing on numerous promising opportunities. We are excited about the future and continue to be laser-focused on improving our performance every day.”

    MANAGEMENT COMMENTS, FINANCIAL SUPPLEMENT AND CONFERENCE CALL

    In connection with this release, the Bank released its management comments on its quarterly results and a financial supplement, which are available at ir.ozk.com.

    Management will conduct a conference call to take questions at 7:30 a.m. CT (8:30 a.m. ET) on Thursday, April 17, 2025. Interested parties may access the conference call live via webcast on the Bank’s investor relations website at this link, or may participate via telephone by registering using this online form. Upon registration, all telephone participants will receive the dial-in number along with a unique PIN number that can be used to access the call. A replay of the conference call webcast will be archived on the Bank’s website for at least 30 days.

    GENERAL INFORMATION

    Bank OZK (Nasdaq: OZK) is a regional bank providing innovative financial solutions delivered by expert bankers with a relentless pursuit of excellence. Established in 1903, Bank OZK conducts banking operations in over 240 offices in nine states including Arkansas, Georgia, Florida, North Carolina, Texas, Tennessee, New York, California and Mississippi and had $39.2 billion in total assets as of March 31, 2025. For more information, visit ozk.com.

    The Bank files annual, quarterly and current reports, proxy materials, and other information required by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), copies of which are available electronically at the FDIC’s website and are also available on the Bank’s investor relations website at ir.ozk.com. Use this online form to receive automated email notifications for these materials.

    FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS

    This press release and other communications by the Bank and its management may include certain statements that constitute “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. These statements can be identified by the fact that they do not relate strictly to historical or current facts. Forward-looking statements often use words such as “anticipates,” “targets,” “expects,” “hopes,” “estimates,” “intends,” “plans,” “goals,” “believes,” “continue” and other similar expressions or future or conditional verbs such as “will,” “may,” “might,” “should,” “would” and “could.” Forward-looking statements represent the Bank’s current expectations, plans or forecasts of its future results, revenues, liquidity, net interest income, provision for credit losses, expenses, efficiency ratio, capital measures, strategy, deposits, assets, and future business and economic conditions more generally, and other future matters. These statements are not guarantees of future results or performance and involve certain known and unknown risks, uncertainties and assumptions that are difficult to predict and are often beyond the Bank’s control. Actual outcomes and results may differ materially from those expressed in, or implied by, any of these forward-looking statements.

    Investor Contact: Jay Staley (501) 906-7842
    Media Contact: Michelle Rossow (501) 906-3922

    The MIL Network –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: State of the states: six experts on how the campaign is playing out around Australia

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By David Clune, Honorary Associate, Government and International Relations, University of Sydney

    The federal election campaign has passed the halfway mark, with politicians zig-zagging across the country to spruik their policies and achievements.

    Where politicians choose to visit (and not visit) give us some insight into their electoral priorities and strategy.

    Here, six experts analyse how the campaign has looked so far in New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia.

    New South Wales

    David Clune, honorary associate, government and international relations, University of Sydney

    Opposition Leader Peter Dutton’s strategy in NSW seems to include a tacit concession Liberal heartland seats won by the Teals in 2022 are unlikely to come back.

    Instead, the Liberals are hoping to make inroads into Western Sydney electorates held by Labor. It’s a fast-growing, diverse area where families are struggling to pay the mortgage and household bills, and young people have difficulty renting or buying homes. Dutton and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese have concentrated their campaigning in this area, both claiming to be the best choice for cost-of-living relief and housing affordability.

    Many of these seats are among Labor’s safest. Most would require a two-party preferred swing of 6% or more to be lost. Historically speaking, swings of this size are unlikely, although nevertheless possible.

    Labor is putting much effort into “sandbagging” marginal coastal seats. A major issue is Labor’s emphasis on renewables versus the Coalition’s policy of building nuclear power plants, including one in the Hunter Valley.

    Dutton’s messaging in the early part of the campaign was confusing, combining pragmatic politics, such as cutting the excise on petrol, with right-wing ideology, such as slashing the public service. The former resonated in the marginals, the latter did not. Albanese, by contrast, stayed on message, releasing a stream of expensive handouts to win the votes of battling Sydneysiders.

    A wildcard is the emergence of Muslim lobby groups, The Muslim Vote and Muslim Votes Matter. These were formed to support pro-Palestine candidates in safe Labor seats in Western Sydney where there is a large Muslim population, such as Blaxland and Watson.

    One factor that won’t be influential is the state government. Premier Chris Minns leads a Labor administration whose performance has generally been lacklustre, but which is not notably unpopular. Unlike in Victoria, NSW voters seem to have their baseball bats in the closet.

    The opinion polls continue to show the trend developing since February of a swing back to Labor in NSW, mirroring the national trend. According to an aggregate of polling data, as at April 15 the Labor two-party preferred vote in NSW was 51.9%, an increase of 1.7% since the March federal budget.

    Queensland

    Paul Williams, associate professor of politics and journalism, Griffith University

    The fact neither Albanese nor Dutton has spent a disproportionate amount of time campaigning in Queensland underscores the view the Sunshine State is not a pathway to The Lodge.

    But the fact both leaders have made several visits – Albanese campaigned here four times in 12 days – also indicates neither leader is taking any seat for granted.

    Indeed, Albanese has visited normally tough-to-win seats, such as Leichhardt in far north Queensland (held by the Coalition for 26 of the past 29 years), which reveals an emboldened Labor Party. With the retirement of popular Coalition MP Warren Entsch, and held by just 3.44%, Labor thinks Leichhardt is “winnable”, especially after reports the LNP candidate Jeremy Neal had posted questionable comments regarding China and Donald Trump on social media.

    If so – and given the growing lead Labor boasts in national polls – the LNP would be also at least a little concerned in Longman (3.1%), Bonner (3.4%), Flynn (3.8%), Forde (4.2%) and Petrie (4.4%).

    At least the opposition can placate itself with this week’s Resolve Strategic poll, which indicates it still leads Labor in Queensland by six points after preferences, 53% to 47%. That’s just a one-point swing to Labor since 2022. However, it would be concerned that the LNP’s lead has been slashed ten points from the previous YouGov poll.

    But most concerning must surely be a uComms poll in Dutton’s own seat of Dickson, held by a slender 1.7%, which forecast the opposition leader losing to high-profile Labor candidate Ali France, 51.7 to 48.3%. The entry of the Climate 200-backed independent candidate Ellie Smith appears to have disrupted preference flows.

    Labor’s own polling indicated a closer contest at 50% each, while the LNP’s polling indicates an easy win for Dutton, 57% to 43%, despite Labor spending A$130,000 on France’s campaign.

    An alleged terror plot against Dutton in Brisbane doesn’t appear to have shifted the dial. But voters’ potential to conflate Dutton with Trump may well have, especially given Trump’s tariffs now threaten Queensland beef producers’ $1.4 billion trade with the United States. In the closing weeks, watch as Dutton draws on the new and popular Premier David Crisafulli for electoral succour.

    South Australia

    Rob Manwaring, associate professor of politics and public policy, Flinders University

    Is there a federal election campaign taking place? In South Australia, there is a something of an elusive air about the current festival of democracy, with many voters disengaged. The lack of excitement reflects the fact that only two seats in the state are marginal: Sturt (0.5%) and Boothby (3.3%).

    The party campaigns have sparkled and flickered, but not really caught alight. The signature move was Albanese’s early announcement of the $150 million new healthcare centre at Flinders, in the seat of Boothby. For the ALP, this neatly coalesced around Labor’s campaign on Medicare.

    Federal Labor also sees its strongest asset in the state in Premier Peter Malinauskas, who was prominent during the recent AFL gather round – the round played entirely in Adelaide and its surrounds.

    In a welcome development for the state, Labor’s announcement Adelaide would be put forward to host the next Climate COP conference in 2026 was an interesting flashpoint. Locally, many businesses welcomed the announcement, as it potentially will generate significant footfall and economic activity.

    Yet, the Coalition quickly announced they would not support the bid, trying to shift the attention away from climate to cost-of-living issues.

    More generally, there is a perception the Coalition has been struggling to build campaign momentum. Notably, in a recent visit by members of the shadow cabinet, energies appear to be focused more on sandbagging the seat of Sturt than on winning Boothy, which Labor holds with a nominal 3.3%.

    Other factors also might explain a sense of indifference in South Australia. There have been key developments in state politics, for example, notably the ongoing criminal case against former Liberal leader David Speirs, and independent MP, and former Liberal, Nick McBride, who faces assault charges related to family and domestic violence (to which he’s yet to enter a plea).

    Tasmania

    Robert Hortle, deputy director of the Tasmanian Policy Exchange, University of Tasmania

    The Labor and Liberal campaign strategies started quite differently across Tasmania’s five electorates.

    Labor is desperate to defend Lyons and Franklin and hopeful of picking up Braddon (though perhaps overly ambitious, given the 8% margin).

    Its candidates have focused on promoting Labor’s big, national-level policies. In the first couple of weeks of the campaign, this meant pushing its flagship healthcare and childcare policies. Following the campaign launches on the weekend, housing is the new flavour.

    The Liberal Party – there is no Coalition in Tassie – is focused on winning super marginal Lyons (0.9%) and holding Braddon and Bass. In contrast to Labor, the Liberal campaign was initially defined by lots of community-level funding announcements and Tasmania-specific infrastructure support.

    Since the Coalition’s plan to halve the fuel excise was announced, the approach has changed somewhat. Tasmanian Liberal candidates are now swinging in behind this and other national policy pronouncements about – you guessed it – housing.

    Both major party candidates have been pretty quiet on the controversial issue of salmon farming. This is surprising given the national spotlight on Braddon’s Macquarie Harbour and the waterways of Franklin. The only exception is Braddon Labor candidate Anne Urquhart’s very vocal support for the salmon industry.

    For the Greens, the goal is to build on their 2022 vote share and turn one Senate seat into two, although this is a long shot. They have campaigned hard on issues – mainly salmon farming and native forest logging – where agreement between the Labor and Liberal parties has left space for a dissenting voice.

    Although the Greens’ chances of winning any of the lower house seats are slim, they will be hoping these issues help them make further inroads into the declining primary vote share of the major parties.

    Victoria

    Zareh Ghazarian, senior lecturer in politics, school of social sciences, Monash University

    Victoria has several seats that can potentially change hands at this election. As ABC election analyst Antony Green reminds us, the state is home to at least a dozen seats the major parties hold by a margin of 6% or less. Additionally, the independents in Kooyong and Goldstein are also on thin margins (2.2% and 3.3% respectively).

    Within this context, the campaign in Victoria has been marked by several visits by the major party leaders. The challenge, however, has been how they have worked with their state counterparts.

    State Liberal Leader Brad Battin has fallen short of explicitly supporting the Coalition’s focus on nuclear energy. Instead, he says he’s ready to have an “adult conversation” about the prospect. Coal currently provides more than 60% of electricity in Victoria.

    Dutton was, however, happy to campaign alongside Battin and also visited a petrol station with the state leader while in Melbourne.

    The Labor Party in Victoria, on the other hand, has been grappling with a drop in support in the polls, with Premier Jacinta Allan’s popularity falling. As a result, there’s been much speculation among political commentators about whether Albanese would want to be campaigning with a leader seemingly struggling to attract support.

    In one of the first visits to the state, Albanese did not campaign with Allan. This was even though he had been happy to be with the premiers of South Australia and Western Australia while campaigning there.

    According to Albanese, it was the fact that parliament was sitting that made it impossible for Allan to join him on the campaign trail. Both leaders were together at a subsequent visit, but this elicited questions about the impact of Allan’s leadership on Labor’s standing in Victoria.

    Western Australia

    Narelle Miragliotta, associate professor in politics, Murdoch University

    Reports the state’s 16 seats will decide which party grouping will form government has resulted in WA voters being treated to regular visits by the major party leaders, including Labor’s campaign launch.

    The campaign context in WA is shaped by its mining economy. Perth is the fastest growing capital in the country, which has led to strong growth in the median housing price and an expensive rental market.

    While the state’s economic prosperity is one of the drivers of cost-of-living pressures, some of this has been offset by relief measures from the state Labor government, relatively low unemployment and some of the highest average weekly incomes in the country.

    On top of this two potentially divisive issues – the nature positive laws and North West shelf gas expansion – have been defused by federal Labor. The party has backtracked in the case of the former. In the case of the latter, it has merely delayed (not without criticism, however) what is likely to be an eventual approval.

    Clearer differences have emerged on future of the WA live sheep trade. But while important to communities directly affected by the phasing out of the practice, the issue does not appear to be capturing the attention of most metropolitan voters.

    What might we expect? Labor’s two-party-preferred margin is comfortable in eight of the nine seats it holds. The five Liberal-held seats are on much slimmer margins. Polling suggests little improvement in their state-wide share of the two party preferred vote since 2022.

    To the extent the polls portend the outcome, the Liberals’ lack of electoral momentum in WA suggests it will be a struggle to regain the target seats of Curtin and Tangney. Only the outcome in WA’s newest seat, Bullwinkel, remains uncertain.

    Paul Williams is a research associate with the TJ Ryan Foundation.

    David Clune, Narelle Miragliotta, Rob Manwaring, Robert Hortle, and Zareh Ghazarian do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. State of the states: six experts on how the campaign is playing out around Australia – https://theconversation.com/state-of-the-states-six-experts-on-how-the-campaign-is-playing-out-around-australia-253124

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Putin and Sobyanin visited the new campus of Bauman Moscow State Technical University

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

    President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin visited the new campus of the Moscow State Technical University (MSTU) named after N.E. Bauman. He familiarized himself with the research and development of teachers, students and postgraduates in the field of space exploration, as well as in other areas. The Mayor of Moscow Sergei Sobyanin reported to the head of state on the work of the Moscow Government to develop Russia’s leading engineering university.

    Vladimir Putin also held a meeting at the university on the development of space activities, which was attended by representatives of departments related to this industry.

    “Our focus today is on the development of the domestic space industry for the long term. Addressing this topic is always a special responsibility to the pioneers of space, to those people who set the highest bar for us,” said the Russian President.

    Vladimir Putin congratulated veterans of the industry, cosmonauts and servicemen of the Russian Aerospace Forces on the recent Cosmonautics Day, and also thanked all employees of state enterprises, private space companies, scientific organizations and universities for their work. Particular attention was paid to the merits of the team of Bauman Moscow State Technical University, among whose graduates there is a whole galaxy of famous cosmonauts, outstanding scientists and designers.

    “The best traditions of personnel training are developing and multiplying these days, and, as we have seen, in the new campus. Modern conditions are being created here for obtaining in-demand competencies. Of course, we will implement such projects in other cities of Russia,” Vladimir Putin emphasized.

    Construction of the campus of the Bauman Moscow State Technical University

    The project for the construction of a new educational complex of the Bauman Moscow State Technical University was implemented by the Moscow Government together with the Russian Government on behalf of Vladimir Putin. The new campus became the first facility in the country built under the federal project “Creation of a Network of Modern Campuses”. It became part of the national project “Science and Universities”, the implementation of which has been ongoing since 2025 within the framework of the national project “Youth and Children”This is one of the largest and most complex projects in the field of development of higher professional education.

    “A total of 14 buildings with a total area of about 170 thousand square meters were built and restored in the shortest possible time. This was achieved through coordinated work – the facilities were built and designed in parallel. In almost 90 percent of cases, components and equipment from domestic manufacturers were used,” the Moscow Mayor said.

    in his telegram channel.

    Source: Sergei Sobyanin’s Telegram channel @Mos_Sobyanin

    In 2022 – early 2024, six facilities of the MSTU research cluster were opened.

    The Life Sciences Engineering Cluster (formerly the Biomedical Systems and Technologies Center) is designed to implement modern educational programs, conduct research and development in the field of engineering and life sciences. Along with the educational programs of the Biomedical Engineering Faculty, research and development in the field of advanced biomedical engineering is conducted here. The building houses classrooms, including an office with a transformable partition, rooms for teachers, and a meeting room. Much space is allocated to advanced laboratories, including Biophotonics and Visualization of Living Systems, Neuroinfobionics, Rapid Prototyping, Cellular Technologies and Tissue Engineering, and Functional Hydrogels.

    The Engineering Center for Ground Transport and Technological Systems is designed to carry out research and development work, as well as to implement educational programs in the field of creation and operation of ground transport and technological machines and complexes. The building houses laboratories, engineers’ offices, educational and laboratory premises, office premises for employees, a classroom, premises for scientific research and meetings. The KAMAZ-Bauman Scientific and Educational Center and several specialized laboratories operate here. In particular, the Wheeled Machines laboratory has been opened, conducting work in five key areas, such as Traction Electric Drives and Mechatronic Transmissions, Intelligent NTTS Systems, Hydraulic Testing, On-Board Storage Devices, and Acoustic Testing.

    The multifunctional scientific and educational building is a new five-story building with an area of 20 thousand square meters, designed to accommodate research laboratories, scientific, administrative and educational spaces. The building houses seven departments of the university, as well as a complex of laboratories of mechanical engineering technologies, ground-based technological and launch equipment for rocket and space, vacuum and compressor technology. In total, 26 laboratories are open here, including laboratories of additive manufacturing technologies, reverse engineering and prototyping, research and certification of additive materials and additive manufacturing technologies.

    The exhibition and educational media space “Palace of Technologies” is located in the building of an architectural monument – the restored two-story Phanagoria barracks built in the 18th century. The ceremonial halls of the palace are intended for holding ceremonies, international meetings, scientific and educational forums and other thematic events of congress and exhibition activities. The university’s specialized departments are located here – the information policy department and the organizational and protocol work department. In December 2023, the building hosted the first open day of the Faculty of Robotics and Complex Automation, which was attended by more than 200 people. Representatives of the faculty prepared lectures on the digital transformation of industry, robotics and engineering infrastructure of a modern industrial enterprise. Applicants and their parents were told about the admission rules, curricula of educational programs, as well as future employment, career and salary prospects.

    The research center is a new six-story building with an area of 5.1 thousand square meters. The advanced engineering school “System Engineering of Rocket and Space Technology” operates on its basis. In addition, departments developing products for space and aviation have launched their activities here.

    The multifunctional library building is a restored three-story building of the chemical laboratory of the Imperial Moscow Technical School, built in the 19th century according to the design of the architect Lev Kekushev. It trains IT specialists. It houses classrooms and computer labs for lectures, seminars and laboratory work, specialized laboratories for classes with senior students of the university’s industrial partners – IT companies, as well as coworking spaces and premises for teachers and postgraduate students of the departments. Since February 2024, the building has been hosting strategic sessions, scientific and practical conferences and other socially significant events. In addition, it was used as an accreditation center on the day of the Bauman Moscow State Technical University alumni meeting, which was attended by more than two thousand people.

    Vladimir Putin and Sergei Sobyanin opened new buildings of Bauman Moscow State Technical University

    By September 2024, work on several sites was completed.

    The central cluster with a total area of about 51 thousand square meters includes five buildings of different heights – from four to six. The main task of the architects was to visually separate different functional areas without disturbing the overall harmony of the ensemble. To do this, they decided to detail the facades of the buildings with the help of scientific formulas. The facade glass looks different: in some places the formulas and equations are visible as clearly as possible, in others they are reflected, and in buildings with atrium spaces they can disappear depending on the viewing angle. All five buildings are united by a hovering dome roof – a membrane structure with an area of 2.5 thousand square meters, which will protect the ensemble and the inner courtyard from bad weather and make it more comfortable.

    The center of the square is the “tree of knowledge” – an oak tree, around which an amphitheater for students and employees of the Bauman Moscow State Technical University is located. The inner courtyard is open to city residents, which made it possible to create a new center for meetings and communication.

    The central cluster of Bauman Moscow State Technical University houses an innovation hub and a congress center, a cluster of “Environmental Protection Technologies – Green Territory”, a center of excellence and a scientific and educational cluster of digital transformation, a center of excellence and a scientific and educational cluster of “Digital Materials Science”, as well as a federal testing center.

    The multifunctional complex “Quantum Park” with a total area of 13.8 thousand square meters houses research laboratories with advanced equipment, including world-class “clean rooms”, co-working spaces and transformable spaces for presenting scientific developments.

    Today, it is one of the most advanced research complexes in the world. It is designed to solve practical problems at the intersection of quantum, photonic and fluid technologies that will determine the future of science and industry.

    The Quantum Park building is one of the largest and at the same time the most equipped in the new cluster. “House of Light” was the working title of the new building. The architects sought to make it truly airy and luminous.

    The Bauman Moscow State Technical University dormitory complex consists of the Spektr and Strela buildings. It is designed to accommodate about 2.3 thousand students.

    According to Sergei Sobyanin, a small plot of land between the river and the city collector was chosen for its construction. Now the dormitories have everything necessary for a comfortable stay of students.

    In addition to living quarters, the buildings with a total area of 60.5 thousand square meters house a multifunctional educational and leisure center, multimedia spaces and the necessary social infrastructure. An unusual form of faceted crystals was chosen for the student dormitory buildings: the monoform effect was achieved by increasing the size of the glass on the facades.

    The flat facade of the building reflects the surrounding environment during the day: trees, clouds and sun. From the street, spectacular panoramic glass spanning the entire floor is visible. The windows inside the building are not only beautiful, but also fully functional: there are window sills and ventilation sashes.

    The seven-story Spektr building on Gospitalnaya Embankment is designed for 550 students who live in single, double, triple and quadruple rooms. Some of the rooms have been adapted for people with disabilities. The residential units have a kitchen area, an entrance hall, a bathroom with a bathtub, and modern and functional furniture. The building houses the Novoselye information center. It processes documents for moving in and accepts requests for electrical, plumbing and furniture repairs. Public spaces include coworking spaces and rooms with individual work areas, music classrooms and rehearsal rooms. The Spektr building also has a modern canteen with 140 seats.

    Sergei Sobyanin announced the completion of construction of two new buildings of Baumanka

    Metro station and pedestrian bridges

    Simultaneously with the construction of the research cluster, the Moscow Government implemented a set of measures to develop transport infrastructure and improve the territory in the area of the Bauman Moscow State Technical University.

    Opened in 2020 Elektrozavodskaya station Large metro ring line. Thanks to the improvement of the adjacent territory, convenient approaches and access roads to it from residential buildings were provided.

    In April 2022, a pedestrian bridge across the Yauza River was opened near the new station. The 111-meter-long artificial structure connected residential areas on the Semenovskaya and Rubtsovskaya embankments, providing convenient access for teachers and students of Bauman Moscow State Technical University, as well as local residents, to the Elektrozavodskaya metro station of the Arbatsko-Pokrovskaya and Big Circle Lines and the station of the same name on the third Moscow Central Diameter.

    In September 2024, the construction of a 243-meter-long bicycle and pedestrian bridge across the Yauza River was completed. It provides a connection between the educational buildings of the Bauman Moscow State Technical University, as well as unimpeded passage from Rubtsovskaya Embankment to the buildings of the N.N. Burdenko Main Military Clinical Hospital. The artificial structure was made in the form of open caissoned steel structures with lighting from the bottom. This gives a sense of the fluidity of the bridge and the river beneath it. The smooth lines of the structures compositionally continue the lines of the concrete supports.

    The accent points of the bridge are the staircase and elevator units, made in the form of crystals. They harmoniously connect the appearance of the engineering structure with the architecture of the new campus buildings. In addition, the crystals have a symbolic connection with education and scientific activity. Cyclists and pedestrians can move along the bridge. There is a recreation area and a viewing area – a comfortable observation deck with an amphitheater. In addition to bike paths, the bridge is equipped with ramps for cyclists, stairways and elevators for people with limited mobility.

    Moscow Mayor: 25 Tunnels, Overpasses, Bridges and Overpasses Built in 2024

    Metallurg Stadium

    The historic Metallurg stadium on the bank of the Yauza River was donated to Bauman Moscow State Technical University. It became the university’s main home arena.

    According to Sergei Sobyanin, a complete reconstruction of the stadium is currently underway, within the framework of which a modern gym and changing rooms will be built here, and all the necessary infrastructure will be created.

    The comprehensive renovation of the sports facility is planned to be completed in the third quarter of 2025. It will house a football and rugby field, a basketball and volleyball court, beach volleyball, workout and tennis areas. In addition, sports enthusiasts will be provided with a physical education and health complex and an administrative and household complex with volleyball courts that can be transformed for other sports (table tennis, basketball and mini-football), as well as a hall for the volleyball super league, exercise machines, comfortable locker rooms, coaches’ rooms, a room for storing sports equipment and a first aid station. In addition, the stadium will have an event venue, a recreation area, a pavilion-cafe with a summer terrace and a children’s play area.

    The renovated Metallurg stadium will become a modern sports complex — Sobyanin

    Improvement of neighborhoods in the area of the Bauman Moscow State Technical University

    “Along with the construction of the research cluster, much was done to improve the transport infrastructure in the area of the university. The nearby neighborhoods were also improved,” said Sergei Sobyanin

    in his telegram channel.

    Source: Sergei Sobyanin’s Telegram channel @Mos_Sobyanin

    Landscaping works were carried out in the areas located near the Bauman Moscow State Technical University complex of buildings and the Metallurg stadium. In particular, in 2023, landscaping of 14 objects was completed: Baumanskaya, 2-ya Baumanskaya, Malaya Pochtovaya and Ladozhskaya streets, as well as Staro-Kirochny, Denisovsky, Gardnerovsky, Brigadirsky, Maly Gavrikov, Gospitalny and Spartakovsky lanes, Proektiruyemy proezd No. 1106, the inter-yard area from Lefortovskaya Square to Gospitalny Lane, as well as Khomutovsky blind alley.

    Comfortable conditions for pedestrians were created on the landscaped streets: sidewalks were widened where possible, new outdoor lighting supports with energy-saving lamps were installed, and comfortable public spaces with places to rest were arranged.

     

    Four new pavilions with charging slots and information boards were installed at public transport stops. Convenient parking for 278 cars was arranged, and for cyclists – bicycle parking for 63 places.

    During the additional landscaping work, lawns and flower beds with a total area of over 14 thousand square meters were laid out, and large trees and shrubs were planted.

    Under the Clean Sky project, overhead cable lines were moved to underground collectors. In addition, storm drains were put in order, the asphalt pavement of the roadway was replaced, road signs and other infrastructure facilities were updated.

    Sobyanin: A number of areas near universities in Moscow will be improved by 2024

    In September 2024, the reorganization of the space between Lefortovo Embankment and Bauman Moscow State Technical University was completed. A convenient route from the main building of the university to the Faculty of Power Engineering and a new pedestrian path from Lefortovo Square to the embankment were created for students and teachers. The area in front of Lefortovo Palace was also transformed: an additional approach to the main building of the university was organized in place of the dilapidated buildings, the granite paving of the staircase near the building was renewed, benches were installed on the territory, a lawn was laid out and a video surveillance system was installed. The sidewalk along the embankment was widened, protective screens and lanterns with energy-efficient lamps were installed, and the parking area was reorganized.

    Leading space university in Russia

    Bauman Moscow State Technical University is rightfully considered the largest center for training personnel for the space industry. Among the university’s graduates are outstanding designers Sergei Korolev, Vladimir Barmin, Nikolai Pilyugin, many other managers and leading employees of industry enterprises, as well as 15 cosmonauts.

    Today, more than 4.5 thousand students are studying at the university in areas related to space exploration. By the end of 2024, 90 percent of graduates in these specialties were successfully employed.

    For the practice-oriented training of students and the implementation of research and development work on space topics, specialized divisions operate at Bauman Moscow State Technical University:

    — educational and experimental center based at the Dmitrov branch;

    — an educational and scientific youth space center with a flight control center, in which students develop microsatellites, payloads for space experiments, and special software and mathematical support;

    — the design bureau “Breakthrough Space Research and Technology”, which implements the full cycle of spacecraft and their systems development, integration of target equipment from third-party developers and leading domestic scientific organizations. Currently, there are six satellites in orbit, designed for weather monitoring and forecasting. They are also used for marine navigation of ships, including in the Northern Sea Route zone;

    — advanced engineering school “System Engineering of Rocket and Space Technology”. The federal project was created in 2022 on the initiative of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation with the aim of training specialists in the field of system design to solve breakthrough problems in the rocket and space industry, as well as to implement projects in the interests of high-tech companies. Special equipment and machinery have been purchased for specific educational and research purposes, which are already being used by teachers and students.

    Today, 160 students are studying at the engineering school. The training includes practical work at enterprises of the state corporation Roscosmos and private space companies in the laboratories of the advanced engineering school, work with mentors in team projects. Students in interdisciplinary teams participate in the implementation of research and development work commissioned by industry enterprises. The school works in several areas, including the creation of the Russian orbital station and the production of a promising component base to ensure Russia’s technological sovereignty in space.

    Which capital companies offer internship and practical training programs for university and college students

    On cooperation with the Moscow Innovation Cluster

    MSTU named after N.E. Bauman is a member Moscow Innovation Cluster. The university carries out research and development work for government and commercial customers in the field of creating spacecraft, electronic systems, and other strategically important areas. In particular, work is underway on the project of a small-sized descent vehicle “Zaryanka” – a system for delivering samples and materials for research from orbit of space stations.

    On the development of the Moscow aerospace industry

    Moscow is the center of the rocket and space industry of Russia, where over 40 enterprises, scientific and technical centers, laboratories and research institutes work. They employ over 30 thousand people. These are engineers and designers, developers and other specialists in related fields, thanks to whom almost everything is created in the city: from ultra-light cables to launch vehicles and components for spacecraft.

    In 2024, manufacturers of aircraft, including spacecraft, and related equipment increased shipments by 11.7 percent compared to 2023: companies delivered products worth about 214.4 billion rubles. The revenue of enterprises in 2024 amounted to almost 200 billion rubles, and investments in fixed assets exceeded nine billion rubles.

    The Khrunichev State Space Research and Production Center operates in Moscow. It is one of the basic enterprises of the Roscosmos state corporation, a leading domestic developer and manufacturer of space launch vehicles of various payload capacities and their components for federal and commercial programs. For example, it created the third stage, assembly units, payload fairing and other parts of the Angara-A5 heavy rocket, which was launched on April 11, 2024.

    The development of control systems for rocket and space technology is carried out by the Scientific and Production Center for Automation and Instrumentation (NPCAI) named after Academician N.A. Pilyugin. Here they produced the control system for the Angara-A5 rocket, and for the Proton-M launch vehicle – a single hardware and software complex that ensures control of pre-launch preparation and flight mode. In addition, the Fregat upper stage, designed to launch spacecraft into various specified orbits, is equipped with an integrated inertial-satellite control system of JSC NPCAI.

    A unique development of Moscow industrialists was space bread. The capital’s Research Institute of the Baking Industry is responsible for its production. This product, which can be stored for 15 months, is supplied to cosmonauts in the form of mini-loaves. In addition, flour flatbreads with onions, cheese and ketchup are prepared for them, as well as mini-muffins and rolls for tea.

    The capital’s Spetskabel plant produces a cable for onboard computer networks using SpaceWire technology. Information is transmitted at a speed of 400 megabits per second, four times faster than similar products. It is manufactured using lightweight foam insulation technology, which makes the cable thinner and lighter than foreign analogues. Its operating temperature is from minus 198 to plus 200 degrees, which guarantees stable operation in extreme space conditions.

    In the Moscow engineering center “Automated Control Systems” they test the electronic component base for products of the rocket and space industry in the components of ground simulators for training cosmonauts for flight, as well as in many other devices. They are tested, in particular, for resistance to shock loads and for determining the critical frequencies of the product.

    Ventilation systems produced in the capital are used at key facilities in the space industry. Thus, the GalVent ventilation factory ensures a comfortable microclimate in the premises at the Vostochny and Plesetsk cosmodromes, the country’s scientific and production centers, and the center for the operation of ground-based space infrastructure facilities.

    The Russian aerospace company Bureau 1440 is developing a low-orbit satellite constellation that will provide broadband Internet access with data transfer rates of up to one gigabit per second with minimal delays anywhere on Earth. The work is being carried out as part of the national project Data Economy.

    Sobyanin: Moscow remains the center of Russia’s high-tech industry

    A number of other companies also work in the Moscow space industry. For example, the N.A. Dollezhal Research and Design Institute of Power Engineering produces systems for the automation of reactors and nuclear space installations.

    ExpertStroyProekt LLC produces antenna and telemetry systems, ground-based receiving telemetry stations, as well as command radio line equipment, space, rocket and aviation based for stationary monitoring of the Earth’s surface and its atmosphere, measuring, receiving and control radio engineering and optoelectronic testing complexes for rocket and aviation equipment.

    The State Research Institute of Instrument Engineering produces drones and various devices of a wide range, on-board systems for space and aircraft.

    The Kometa Corporation produces computing systems, automated control systems, spacecraft payloads, television systems, automatic equipment, radio measuring equipment, artistic castings and television surveillance systems. The Research Institute of Precision Instruments produces products for radio control of spacecraft.

    The research and production enterprise (RPE) “Impulse” is creating a controlled thermostatic system for liquid fuel of a rocket engine under conditions of variable thermal load, and the RPE “Quantum” is creating autonomous power supply systems.

    OOO Sputniks (Skolkovo) manufactures debugging tools and devices for microsatellites, and the scientific and production concern Barl develops and implements solutions in the field of remote sensing of the Earth and satellite communications.

    The VNIIEM corporation is engaged in space systems for remote sensing of the Earth, and the scientific and production association Nauka creates life support systems.

    The All-Russian Research Institute of Aviation Materials of the National Research Center “Kurchatov Institute” is producing a light-filtering gold coating for the Orlan spacesuit.

    JSC Aeropribor-Voskhod produces aerometric, radio-electronic and navigation equipment, precision and working pressure gauges for aviation and space technology.

    A large number of projects in this industry and the telecommunications sector are being implemented in the special economic zone (SEZ) Technopolis Moscow. At the Pechatniki site, one of the leading Russian developers of high-tech equipment, Neoros LLC, in partnership with Biforcom Tek LLC, produces transceivers used in telecommunications equipment. The Goodwin Concern produces a microcellular communication system used to service subscribers. Labs 1440 JSC (ICS Holding Company) has placed the production of components for a low-orbit satellite system.

    At the Alabushevo site in Zelenograd, the Electroinvest group of companies launched the production of radiation-resistant secondary power sources.

    The construction of the Moscow Photonics Center has been completed. Its production capacity will be 100 thousand photonic integrated circuits (PIC) per year. A PIC is a microchip designed for ultra-fast processing of light (photonic) signals, which increases the data transfer rate by 100 times. It is a basic element for the implementation of modern technologies of artificial intelligence, fifth-generation mobile communications (5G), biomedicine, lidars, radars and much more.

    Another important project at the Alabushevo site is the construction of a photomask center, which is used to create integrated circuits. The enterprise’s capacity will allow it to produce up to 5.5 thousand photomasks per year.

    Over the year, 30 high-tech production facilities have been launched in the Technopolis Moscow SEZ

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    HTTPS: //vv.mos.ru/mayor/tkhemes/12629050/

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee against Torture Commend Armenia on Proactively Addressing Issues in Prisons, Raise Questions on Ensuring Police Accountability for Excessive Use of Force and Tackling the Criminal Subculture in Prisons

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee against Torture today concluded its consideration of the fifth periodic report of Armenia.  Committee Experts commended the State on proactively addressing issues in its main prisons, while raising questions on ensuring the accountability of police officers for excessive use of force and tackling the criminal subculture within prisons. 

    Anna Racu, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, said the Committee welcomed the swift and constructive response by the Armenian authorities regarding the “quarantine” and disciplinary blocks at Artik Prison, which were promptly closed for refurbishment, ensuring that these areas no longer remained in a state of severe disrepair.  This proactive approach to addressing immediate concerns was commendable.

    Peter Kessing, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, said it had been reported that there were still cases where the police used excessive force in conflict with the Convention.  Were audio or video recordings of police interrogation mandatory?  Were taped interrogations routinely reviewed to identify potential instances and acts of torture?  What initiatives had Armenia taken to prevent excessive use of force, including lethal force, by the police in future demonstrations and protests? 

    Ms. Racu said in Armenia, the influence of the criminal subculture significantly undermined the reputation of the prison administration.  What measures had been taken by the Government to break down the informal hierarchies and criminal gangs and networks that had an informal power in many of Armenia’s penitentiary institutions?  What steps were being taken to ensure that all prisoners, regardless of their social status or affiliations, had equal protection under the law and were not subject to discrimination or abuse, including sexual abuse by other inmates or informal leaders?  What measures were being taken to address corruption among prison staff?

    The delegation said in 2023, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was established as a civilian oversight body over the police.  It was responsible for areas of public safety, security and disaster risk management, and was driven by the objective of introducing human rights-based approaches in policing and public services.  The large-scale use of video surveillance in police operations ensured accountability of the police.  Patrol police wore body cameras all the time, acknowledged by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture as an important tool for the prevention of torture.

    The delegation said Armenia had produced a draft bill which criminalised receiving or leading groups promoting the criminal subculture.  Since 2024, significant structural reforms had been undertaken and a new operational department now functioned within the central penitentiary service, containing an intelligence unit which was equipped with tools used by criminal police.  From 2022 to 2024, 60 criminal cases were initiated and nine came from penitentiary institutions.  Addressing the criminal subculture was a top priority for Armenia’s Ministry of Justice, the police and penitentiary units.

    Introducing the report, Anna Karapetyan, Deputy Minister of Justice of Armenia and head of the delegation, said based on its Constitution and ratified international treaties, Armenia had taken strong steps to establish legal provisions and capacities to combat torture and hold violators accountable. In 2021, the new Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes were adopted, followed by the adoption of the new Penitentiary Code in 2022.  The new Criminal Code prescribed three levels of penalty according to the aggravating circumstances of torture and brought substantive changes to the procedure of initiating criminal investigations.  While Armenia continued to uphold its human rights commitments domestically, the continued imprisonment, ill-treatment and torture of Armenian prisoners of war and other detainees held by Azerbaijan remained a concern.

    In concluding remarks, Claude Heller, Committee Chairperson, thanked the delegation for the excellent and informative dialogue.  The multilateral system was in deep crisis, at the political level and financially.  However, despite all these restrictions, the Committee worked arduously, objectively and constructively to produce a positive impact on the lives of people in the States parties.

    In her closing remarks, Ms. Karapetyan expressed sincere appreciation to the Committee for the excellent dialogue. The Committee’s comments and recommendations reinforced the shared responsibility held together for the prohibition of torture everywhere, under all circumstances.

    The delegation of Armenia consisted of representatives from the Ministry of Justice; the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs; the Ministry of Internal Affairs; the Ministry of Health; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Prosecutor General; the Investigative Committee; and the Permanent Mission of Armenia to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Committee will issue concluding observations on the report of Armenia at the end of its eighty-second session on 2 May.  Those and other documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, will be available on the session’s webpage.  Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, and webcasts of the public meetings can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public on Thursday, 17 April at 3 p.m. to conclude its consideration of the eighth periodic report of France (CAT/C/FRA/8).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the fifth periodic report of Armenia (CAT/C/ARM/5).

    Presentation of Report

    ANNA KARAPETYAN, Deputy Minister of Justice of Armenia and head of the delegation, said based on its Constitution and ratified international treaties, Armenia had taken strong steps to establish legal provisions and capacities to combat torture and hold violators accountable.  Armenia had made notable progress in preventing torture and ill-treatment through several strategic reforms.  The 2020–2022 Human Rights Action Plan envisaged 15 actions, including installing audio-video recording in interrogation rooms, developing the relevant guidelines on the investigation of cases of torture, and wide-scale training for professionals in law enforcement, healthcare, and justice, among others. 

    The ongoing 2023–2025 Human Rights Action Plan reinforced the absolute right to be free from torture, including through strengthening the reporting mechanism, enhancing the capabilities of the relevant Department in the Investigative Committee, and improving the conditions of the detention facilities in penitentiary institutions and courts.  The 2020–2022 Police Reform Strategy led to a significant achievement in strengthening civilian oversight of the police, through the establishment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2023.  The 2019–2023 and 2023-2026 Penitentiary and Probation Strategies, along with a dedicated 2021–2022 plan on suicide prevention, contributed to better detention conditions and medical documentation practices. 

    In 2021, the new Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes were adopted, followed by the adoption of the new Penitentiary Code in 2022.  The new Criminal Code prescribed three levels of penalty according to the aggravating circumstances of torture and brought substantive changes to the procedure of initiating criminal investigations.  The new Criminal Procedure Code guaranteed the minimum rights of arrested persons, as outlined in article 110, which were aligned with international standards. 

    In 2021, the Government adopted a decree furthering the procedure of filling in and monitoring the medical examination protocol, which was extended to police detention facilities.  In 2022, amendments were adopted to the Internal Regulations of Police Detention Facilities, making it mandatory to conduct medical examination of arrestees by ambulance in each case of admitting a new arrestee, regardless of the presence of bodily injuries or health complaints. 

    The adoption of the law on police guard in 2024 envisaged the establishment of the new police guard instead of the current police troops, shifting from a militarised service to the modern policing approach with a specialisation on crowd management.  The law on advocacy ensured attorneys could communicate privately with clients, and detainees had the right to inform the third party of their detention.  The new Penitentiary Code established the right of lawyers to freely meet their clients in prisons or detention facilities without requiring special permission for access.  It was noteworthy that the Criminal Procedure Code required almost all types of investigative actions, including interrogations, to be audio and video recorded. 

    Following the dissolution of the Special Investigative Service in 2021, the mandate for investigating acts of torture was transferred to the Investigative Committee of the Republic of Armenia, where a dedicated division consisting of eight investigators was responsible for handling such cases.  Allegations of torture or ill-treatment committed by investigators of the Investigative Committee were reviewed by the Anti-Corruption Committee. By 2024, 386 criminal proceedings were investigated, with 133 terminated and one case involving four individuals referred to court.  In recent years two torture verdicts had been rendered, although neither had entered into force yet. 

    Alleged police violence was investigated under other articles of the Criminal Code; three police officers had been convicted for obstructing lawful professional activities of journalists during 2018 protests and were dismissed from the police service as a result of disciplinary proceedings.  Similarly, three police officers were dismissed from service for obstructing lawful professional activities of journalists during mass protests of 2015.

    The new Criminal Code also introduced new types of preventive measures that acted as non-custodial alternatives to detention, such as house arrest and administrative supervision. In 2024, these alternative preventive measures were applied to 1,587 defendants.  Similarly, the new Criminal Code provided the limitation of liberty as an alternative to incarceration.  The Civil Code now included provisions for redress for torture victims.  Victims also had the right to rehabilitation, including compensation for medical care, and access to free psychological and legal services.  This year within the implementation of the Human Rights Strategy and deriving Action Plan, a study was developed regarding the possible directions of the establishment of the rehabilitation centre.  The new Codes were currently undergoing a monitoring phase; necessary steps would be taken to address any potential shortcomings which may arise. 

    Armenia had made significant progress in countering domestic violence, in particular through the new Criminal Code which defined “close relative,” which included spouses and former spouses, as well as individuals in or formerly in marital relations. 

    While Armenia continued to uphold its human rights commitments domestically, the continued imprisonment, ill-treatment and torture of Armenian prisoners of war and other detainees held by Azerbaijan remained a concern.  The Committee, in its most recent concluding observations on Azerbaijan, had expressed deep concern regarding Azerbaijan’s conduct and the ongoing detention of the 23 Armenian individuals, which remainedMs. Karapetyan concluded by stating that Armenia was fully committed to the full and effective implementation of the Convention.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    PETER KESSING, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, said since Armenia’s last review by the Committee in 2017, progress had been made in prohibiting and preventing torture and ill-treatment.  In particular, the Committee noted and commended the State party for the enactment of a fundamentally new Criminal Code, a new Criminal Procedure Code, and a new Penitentiary Code, which were very positive signs.  Additionally, Armenia had joined the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and had undertaken significant reforms in the police, penitentiary, and justice sectors in recent years. 

    Could the delegation elaborate on specific cases and court decisions where Armenian courts had applied the principle in article 5 (3) of the Constitution and found that international law, including the Convention, took precedence over national law? Mr. Kessing commended Armenia and the Armenian Constitution for article 81, and the obligation to take the views of United Nations Committees into account when interpreting the Constitution, which illustrated a strong commitment to international law.  Could cases be provided where the practice of the Committee had been taken into account when interpreting the Armenian Constitution?

    It was reported that the definition of ‘State officials’ in Armenian law was narrow, and did not include staff working in psychiatric institutions or medical workers. Was this correct?  Did this mean that those people working in psychiatric institutions or medical workers could not be investigated or prosecuted for torture? If this was the case, was Armenia considering amending and broadening the definition of ‘State officials’ in line with the obligation in the Convention against Torture?  Pursuant to the new Criminal Code, no limitation periods were applicable to the offence of torture and the offence of abusing and exceeding public authority.  Did this apply retroactively to past cases of torture?  Was there still a statute of limitations in relation to civilian court cases concerning redress and compensation for torture? 

    Regarding the Virabyan case from 2012, could the delegation explain what decision the Armenian Court of Cassation had taken, after the court received the advisory opinion from the European Court of Human Rights in April 2022?   Had the Armenian Court of Cassation handed down a decision? Had the police officer responsible for torturing Mr. Virabyan been held accountable?  Could the delegation confirm that evidence and material extracted by use of torture or ill-treatment would always be excluded from court proceedings in Armenia?  Were there concrete cases where Armenian courts had excluded torture-material? 

      

    According to the Council of Europe, Armenia had the second highest proportion of pre-trial detainees in Europe, with 53 per cent of the people in Armenian prisons being held in pre-trial detention; this was a very high rate.  It was expected that the new Criminal Codes that entered into force during the second half of 2022 would help further reduce the number of remand prisoners.  Had the necessary implementing laws and by-laws been adopted to ensure the full implementation of the new Criminal Codes?  Had the new Criminal Codes reduced the number of remand prisoners? Could up to date information about the use of electric monitoring and other alternatives to detention be provided? 

    It had been reported that there were still cases where the police used excessive force in conflict with the Convention.  What was the status of police reform?  What concrete initiatives had been taken to date to reform the police?  Were all individuals who were arrested informed about the reason for their arrest?  Were audio or video recordings of police interrogation mandatory?  Were taped interrogations routinely reviewed to identify potential instances and acts of torture?

    What initiatives had Armenia taken to prevent excessive use of force, including lethal force, by the police in future demonstrations and protests? 

    Despite progress made by Armenia since the last review, it was reported that the quality of the investigations of police conduct remained a significant issue. 

    It was a positive sign that criminal cases concerning alleged police torture were initiated and investigated, but it was reported that torture cases often remained unsolved for many years and rarely led to criminal charges.  Could updated information about the number of investigations into torture and ill-treatment over the last three years be provided? 

    The Committee had been informed that after the adoption of the new Criminal Codes, it was more difficult for lawyers to assist alleged victims of torture in court proceedings, due to the 30 per cent tax applied; was this correct?  Could information about the legal and practical independence of the Investigative Committee of Armenia established in 2022 be provided?  Was the Committee fully independent from the Police?  Would Armenia take steps to ensure a more prompt and effective investigation of police complaints?  Were alleged perpetrators of torture immediately suspended from their duties for the duration of the investigation?

    During the last two examinations of Armenia by the Committee, the police’s excessive use of force in connection with a protest in March 2008 following the February elections, leading to the death of 10 people, was discussed.  The Committee expressed its concern over the slow and ineffective investigation of the situation.  What was the status of the investigation into the 2008 demonstration and later demonstrations?  How many police officers had been identified and held accountable in disciplinary, civilian or criminal proceedings?  What kind of sentences had they received?   Had the victims been provided redress and compensation as required under the Convention? 

    The Committee was aware of reports alleging that Armenian forces had violated international humanitarian law and human rights law during the conflict.  Had Armenia taken steps to ensure that alleged war crimes committed by Armenian forces during the conflict were promptly and impartially investigated by an independent body? 

    As part of a new expedited asylum procedure, there was a 15-day deadline for applying for asylum for asylum seekers arriving illegally to Armenia.  Was this correct?  If so, how many asylum requests had been rejected over the last three years due to the 15-day deadline?  Was it correct that asylum seekers were being prosecuted for illegal entry in Armenia in conflict with domestic law and article 31 in the Refugee Convention that was ratified by Armenia?  Would the State party take further measures to ensure that this practice was ended? What steps were taken to ensure that asylum seekers in detention had access to fair and efficient refugee status determination procedures, as well as appeals procedures with suspensive effect on the deportation order?

    The Human Rights Defender of Armenia was established by law in October 2003, and since 2006 had been accredited “A” status by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institution.  In October 2024, the institution reiterated its recommendation that a clear, transparent and participatory selection and appointment process for membership of the Human Rights Defender’s decision-making body must be included in relevant legislation.  Had Armenia taken steps to implement this recommendation? 

    Was it true that the salaries of staff working in the Human Rights Defender’s office were lower than comparable positions in the public sector?  What was the State party doing to remedy the situation?  How many complaints of torture or ill-treatment had the Human Rights Defender received over the last three years?  Could the Human Rights Defender recommend redress to a victim of torture or ill-treatment and criminal proceedings against alleged perpetrators of torture and ill-treatment?  How did the State party follow-up on the recommendations of the national preventive mechanism? 

    The Committee hoped that Armenia would consider making a declaration under article 22 of the Convention and recognise the Committee’s competence to receive and consider individual complaints.  This would provide redress to victims and assist Armenia in implementing the Convention and developing a justice system in line with international human rights law.

    ANNA RACU, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, said since Armenia’s last review by this Committee in 2016, there had been notable advancements in the country’s human rights framework.  Significant reforms had been made, including amendments to national legislation and the adoption of policies aimed at improving detention conditions and aligning with international standards.  These positive steps were a testimony of Armenia’s commitment to enhance its legal and institutional frameworks to combat torture and ill-treatment and different forms of violence. 

    The Committee welcomed the fact that periodic professional trainings on the Convention and European Committee for the Prevention of Torture were carried out for the police and prison staff.  The Committee commended the positive initiative that jurisprudence of the European Court for Human Rights was included in the common core curricula for judges, prosecutors, prison staff and civil servants.  The National Strategy for Human Rights Protection (2020–2022) and its action plan emphasised the importance of capacity building for law enforcement and prison staff, including training on human rights and torture prevention.  Had there been any other specific strategic documents that envisaged capacity building activities for law enforcement, judges and prosecutors and other groups with specific competencies under the Convention?   

    It was positive that the Armenian Government had managed to establish a good cooperation with international partners.  The Police Academy and Penitentiary Service Training Centre had incorporated elements of human rights education into their curricula, while the introduction of specialised training modules on the absolute prohibition of torture had been a step forward.  However, some sources indicated that there were some issues that continued to affect the overall effectiveness of the training programmes.  

    What oversight mechanisms were in place to ensure police officers were adequately trained and disciplined for misconduct related to the use of force or mistreatment during arrest or detention?  What measures were in place to ensure that training on the Istanbul Protocol and the prohibition of torture was effectively applied in practice?  Were the training programmes based on practical aspects, which emerged from specific cases or recorded human rights violations? With respect to the courses held for medical personnel, were there plans to provide mandatory training on the Istanbul Protocol, given its importance for proper documentation of torture?

    Had the State party implemented any training programmes focused on the prevention of torture and the appropriate use of force for military personnel, intelligence officers, and security guards, particularly in the context of ongoing tensions related to the military conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh?  How many officers had undergone this training and was it mandatory?

    Could information on recent developments or reforms aimed at improving the living conditions and the treatment of inmates be provided?  Had measures been taken to enhance oversight and accountability within the prison system?  It was encouraging to note the significant progress made, particularly the comprehensive refurbishment of Abovyan Prison, including the reconstruction of the wing for mothers with children and the installation of ventilation and heating systems in the main accommodation areas of Armavir Prison.  These initiatives were important steps forward in enhancing the material conditions for inmates and improving their overall living environment. Furthermore, the Committee welcomed the swift and constructive response by the Armenian authorities regarding the “quarantine” and disciplinary blocks at Artik Prison, which were promptly closed for refurbishment, ensuring that these areas no longer remained in a state of severe disrepair. 

    This proactive approach to addressing immediate concerns was commendable.  These efforts reflected a commitment to addressing longstanding issues in Armenia’s prison system, and the Committee looked forward to seeing the continued actions for the refurbishment of Artik and Armavir Prisons. 

    Despite these positive developments, there were some concerns.  The activities of the “Kosh” and “Hrazdan” penitentiary institutions were suspended on 1 January 2022.  Despite the ongoing discussions on the need to suspend the activities of the “Nubarashen” penitentiary institution, it continued to operate.  Could the delegation’s views regarding these institutions be provided?  Could detailed information regarding the number of inmates in Armenian prisons over the past four years be provided?  What steps had been taken to address overcrowding, including the use of non-custodial measures and alternatives to detention?

    Current legislation in Armenia allowed for the restriction of family communication for up to one month for any violation, which contradicted the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Nelson Mandela Rules) and European Prison Rules.  What specific rehabilitation programmes were available for prisoners in Armenia? Could an update be provided on recidivism rates and the successful reintegration of former prisoners, as well as the approach of the Government on cooperation with civil society organizations for the benefits of inmates?

    By transferring the competence of medical services to the Ministry of Justice and subsequently to the Ministry of Health, Armenia had taken important steps towards the independence of medical staff in detention.  However, there were still some problematic areas.  After the reform of medical prison services, how independent were the prison doctors from the prison administration?  What systems ensured they could prioritise inmate health without external pressures?  How was access to specialised medical treatment managed for inmates requiring complex care? What oversight mechanisms monitored the quality of healthcare services in prisons?  What measures were implemented to prevent the spread of communicable diseases among inmates? 

    Could an update on harm reduction programmes for drug users, those with HIV and treatment for prisoners with disabilities be provided?  What was the current level of medical equipment and medicines available in prisons?  What specialised medical equipment and healthcare provisions were available for women in detention?  What protocols were in place for documenting injuries from torture or violence, and could inmates and lawyers access these reports?

    What rules and formal protocols existed for medical professionals to document injuries or signs of torture and ill-treatment?  What training did medical professionals receive on identifying and reporting signs of torture and ill-treatment? 

    How were reports of torture and ill-treatment by medical professionals submitted to the competent authorities? 

    In 2023, there were 29 suicide attempts by 22 individuals, primarily concentrated in the “Nubarashen” and “Armavir” institutions. Submissions received from human rights non-governmental organizations indicated that many deaths were attributed to pre-existing health conditions and inadequate medical care.  What were the delegation’s views on the effectiveness of the procedure for checking and assessing the risk of suicide and self-harm? What specific assessments were in place to identify individuals at risk?  Were there cells with safe conditions with no easy access to means of killing oneself? What specific training programmes were provided to penitentiary staff regarding prevention and managing suicidal tendencies, self-harm behaviours, and instances of violence among inmates?

    In Armenia, the influence of the criminal subculture significantly undermined the reputation of the prison administration.  Despite the implementation of legislative amendments by the State to reduce the influence of the criminal subculture in penitentiary institutions and measures aimed at their practical application, the influence of the criminal subculture in places of deprivation of liberty still continued to exist.  What measures had been taken by the Government to break down the informal hierarchies and criminal gangs and networks that had an informal power in many of Armenia’s penitentiary institutions?  What steps were being taken to ensure that all prisoners, regardless of their social status or affiliations, had equal protection under the law and were not subject to discrimination or abuse, including sexual abuse by other inmates or informal leaders?  What measures were being taken to address corruption among prison staff?

    What specific measures had the Armenian Government implemented over the past few years to increase the number of prison staff?  How had the Government addressed the issue of staff retention, including any changes to salaries, working conditions, or benefits aimed at reducing turnover among prison personnel?

    What efforts were being made to ensure that staffing levels in penitentiaries met international standards, particularly concerning the ratio of staff to prisoners?

    A Committee Expert said the Committee had received information that seven out of 10 children aged one to 14 years old were subject to psychological or corporal punishment. What was the State party doing to prevent violence against children?  The Committee had also received reports which revealed concerning cases of violence against children with disabilities, including at a psychological care home in 2023, where a resident was restrained with chains. What measures had Armenia adopted to eliminate unauthorised physical restraints and other inhumane practices in care institutions? 

    Another Committee Expert asked if there were any Azerbaijanis who remained in Armenia’s custody? What procedures had been implemented to ensure any abuse of prisoners of war was fully investigated?  Had there been any kind of arrangements aimed at ensuring the returning prisoner would be promptly investigated for torture cases by the receiving side?  What measures had been taken to prevent discrimination and hate speech against those of Azerbaijani origin? 

    An Expert asked what training members of special teams received, and what were rules on the use of force?  Was equipment deployed by special units certified?  Was it imported or manufactured locally? 

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said the monitoring of the Criminal Procedure Code had already led to 13 amendments.  International law prevailed in Armenia.  Evidence and materials obtained through torture were totally excluded from criminal cases.  Currently, more than 52 per cent of inmates in penitentiary institutions were in pretrial detention.  Audio and video recording in police stations were mandatory for every case. 

    Armenia had advanced legislation regarding asylum seekers and victims of trafficking. International law had almost been copied into the criminal legislation, particularly article 31 of the Geneva Convention on the status of refugees.  A small limitation had been imposed in consultation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which related to the 15 days of applying for asylum for three groups of cases: unlawful entry to the country, if the person was being criminally prosecuted, and for those who had been apprehended. Under this rule, 14 cases of asylum had been rejected, five approved and five suspended.

    The Human Rights Defender was ensured access to all penitentiary records.  Most of the recommendations from the Human Rights Defender’s Office were taken into account when completing renovations and works in the penitentiary institutions.  Currently, the Human Rights Defender could not initiate court cases but could provide briefs to the Constitutional Court.  New legislation on discrimination was being developed which stipulated that the Human Rights Defender could recommend cases to court when it came to discrimination.  Currently, Armenia was not discussing the possibility of implementing article 22. 

    The National Human Rights Action Plan provided for the relevant chapters for each individual who should receive training on torture prevention.  Currently the Ministry of Justice was in the process of developing a single human rights training programme for staff at the penitentiary institutions.  There were two key educational complexes which provided training to judges, the judiciary and police officers.  Last year the Human Rights Defender’s Office provided training to all police detention facilities. 

    In 2024, a mother and childcare penitentiary institution was constructed.  Currently, the sanitation facilities were adapted to meet the needs of pregnant women and children up to three years old.   Food preparation for penitentiary institutions had been outsourced to a private company, which ensured dietary diversity. More than 95 per cent of the inmates were satisfied with the food provided. 

    From 2019, persons deprived of their liberty under the age of 19 were included in the general education programme to ensure the continuity of education.  Surveys had been conducted among inmates to identify those without secondary education, and efforts had been made to provide them with secondary education or vocational training.  Last year, an innovative workshop was opened for inmates, allowing them to make furnishings for other institutions, providing them with the necessary equipment and materials.

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said under Armenian law, amnesty did not apply to individuals who had committed the crime of torture.  The term public official had been broadened to include any person who had the authority to act on behalf of the State.  As such, all individuals operating in this capacity could be held criminally liable. All institutions which could be engaged in cases of torture were covered within the criminal legislation for criminal liability.  Armenia had ratified the Rome Statute and remained fully committed to aligning its national legislation with the requirements of the International Criminal Court.  Trainings for public officials, judges and members of the Investigative Committee were planned with international officials in this regard. 

    There had been a notable increase in detention motions of around 20 per cent in 2024, compared to previous years.  The percentage of granted motions of detention had generally decreased. Legislative amendments and relevant trainings had been organised for the probation service, and they were being monitored.  A thematic report on the practical challenges of alternative measures was developed in 2022 to see where the law could be improved.  Work was being done to ensure that pro bono lawyers would be exempt from taxes.

    Armenia had produced a draft bill which criminalised receiving or leading groups promoting the criminal subculture.  Since 2024, significant structural reforms had been undertaken and a new operational department now functioned within the central penitentiary service, containing an intelligence unit which was equipped with tools used by criminal police. From 2022 to 2024, 60 criminal cases were initiated and nine came from penitentiary institutions.  Addressing the criminal subculture was a top priority for Armenia’s Ministry of Justice, the police and penitentiary units.

    The fight against corruption remained a top priority for the Armenian Government, and a strategy had been underway for the past three years.  Individuals could submit anonymous reports via an online platform, directly accessible to the Ministry of Justice, under the whistleblowers law. 

    The penitentiary service guaranteed equal treatment, and the Criminal Code ensured equality for all convicted individuals.  Any case of attempted suicide or self-harm was reported to investigative authorities. Mental health and suicide risk monitoring tools had been implemented in all penitentiary institutions since 2022. In every case of suicide, attempted suicide, or self-harm, a comprehensive analysis of the situation was undertaken. Since July 2024, a risk and needs assessment tool was introduced which supported the rehabilitation services.   

    In 2023, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was established as a civilian oversight body over the police.  It was responsible for areas of public safety, security and disaster risk management, and was driven by the objective of introducing human rights-based approaches in policing and public services.  The large-scale use of video surveillance in police operations ensured the accountability of the police.  Under the new Criminal Procedure Code, the police were no longer authorised to conduct interrogations of persons accused of committing a crime.  This responsibility had been transferred to the independent Investigative Committee.  Patrol police wore body cameras all the time, acknowledged by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture as an important tool for the prevention of torture.  Work was underway to provide the same equipment to community police.

    In 2024, operations of nine out of 33 police facilities were discontinued, with an additional two terminated in 2025.  Modernization and renovation works were planned for the remaining facilities to ensure compliance with international standards.  In 2024, joint trainings on documenting and reporting torture were organised for police officers and medical professionals, with the support of the Council of Europe.  Trainings based on the provisions of the Convention and the Istanbul Protocol were being developed and were expected to be scheduled this year. 

    Over the past 10 years, there had been several police officers dismissed due to exhibiting excessive use of force against journalists during demonstrations.  To ensure the independence of medical professionals from the police, since 2022, medical examinations in police facilities were conducted exclusively by the doctors of ambulance services. 

    In 2024, the law on the police guard was adopted, which provided for the establishment of a new specialised police service with clear criteria for proportional use of force. This law and the relevant bylaws aimed to create the correct modus operandi for Armenian police officers, particularly in the context of mass demonstrations. 

    In 2024, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in cooperation with the migration and citizenship service, had conducted trainings for penitentiary officials on cases of asylum.  The Bar Association of Armenia provided the penitentiary service with leaflets and posters related to granting asylum, available in eight languages.  They contained information about the grounds for granting asylum and rights of asylum seekers. 

    The criminal case of March 2008 remained ongoing, and the Committee had already been provided with information pertaining to this case.  Taking into account the volume and complexity of the case, investigative teams had been set up to ensure the comprehensive investigation.  Around 7,000 victims had been questioned over the course of the investigation.  As part of the ongoing forensic examination being conducted, firearms were being submitted for study.  More information would be provided in writing. 

    Concerning the case of Mr. Virabyan, the advisory opinion of the European Court of Human Rights was applied in the decision of the court of cassation.  The Convention took precedence over domestic legislation, and this was applied in the case of Mr. Virabyan.  In 2024, two convictions were rendered under the Criminal Code for police officials found guilty of the crime of torture, with the individuals sentenced to four years in prison. 

    Targeted interventions had been adopted in care home settings to prevent cases of abuse.  A draft order addressing the submission of anonymous reports in care institutions was now in process.  This would allow standardised information to be provided to beneficiaries about the clearly defined mechanism for submitting complaints. 

    In April 2024, a procedure was adopted for referring child victims of violence, and where necessary placing the child within a family, institution or support centre. Corporal punishment was prohibited in all settings, including the family setting.  Children who had experienced violence were entitled to State support, and entities responsible for childcare were required to promptly report any instances of violence.  In recent years, Armenia had made progress in expanding the welfare and rights of the child. 

    To strengthen the independence of medical personnel in penitentiary institutions, the penitentiary centre was founded independently in 2018.  Medical examinations were carried out by a doctor, totally excluding the employees of penitentiary institutions and out of earshot of penitentiary staff. A preliminary examination of mental health and suicide risks was ensured.  In cases of suspected torture and ill-treatment, all injuries were noted and documented. 

    The medical examinations of persons deprived of their liberty were organised in a timely manner, without undue delay.  Upon entering the penitentiary institution, persons deprived of their liberty underwent a mental health screening within 24 hours, and psychologists and mental health staff were stationed at the centres.  The law on reproductive health applied to everyone, including those in prisons. Tests were performed for all sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV.  If a positive result was received, medical staff would begin medical treatment. 

    The Ministry of Justice had implemented a wide range of awareness raising activities in all penitentiary institutions, including posters on combatting torture.  Video material regarding the prohibition of torture was also disseminated publicly.  Armenia was actively working to combat hate speech and had classified hate speech through technology as a distinct type of cybercrime.  A comprehensive range of awareness raising activities to address the manifestations of hate speech had been implemented, including a month-long campaign in high traffic areas, such as the metro, highlighting the negative impacts of hate speech.  Armenia was currently drafting a new strategy on combatting discrimination and hate speech, to address the possible issues which may arise during the investigation processes.  This had stemmed from the human rights agenda of the Government. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    PETER KESSING, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, commended Armenia for the efforts made to comply with the Convention.  What happened if a person was not able to comply with the 15 days of deadline in relation to asylum applications?  Had any of the cases against police officers led to criminal proceedings?  Regarding the March 2008 investigation, 17 years was a long time, and the Committee looked forward to receiving the written information from the delegation. Was it true that cases by the Investigative Committee were slow?  Would the State take measures to make investigations more prompt?  Was the committee fully independent from the police? Had Armenia undertaken any investigations into allegations of mistreatment of Azerbaijani soldiers and civilians on Armenian soil?  The national mechanism to follow up on concluding observations was a positive step.  Could more information on this mechanism be provided? 

    ANNA RACU, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, said the Committee was concerned about the lack of community services for psychiatric patients, and the lack of a mechanism for the deinstitutionalisation of children in social care homes.  Could more information about the reform of social care homes in Armenia be provided? Which institution had oversight on psychiatric facilities?  Did civil society organizations have access to monitoring visits?  Did any complaints mechanisms exist in these institutions? How many complaints had been received and what had been the results?  Could updated statistics be provided in cases where victims had been offered redress and compensation?  How did the Government plan to ensure that compensation was accessible to victims, even in cases where perpetrators remained unidentified? 

    There were ongoing efforts by the Government to monitor violent incidents and deaths within the armed forces, but there was a significant lack of public oversight over the military units.  The practice of non-statutory relationships among servicemen, which often resulted in bullying, violence and sexual abuse, persisted.  What specific measures were being taken by the Armenian military management to address and prevent violence in the army?  What steps was the Government taking to increase public oversight of the military?  How did the Government plan to ensure that the military was held accountable for offences such as injuries and murders?  What actions were being taken to provide psychological support for soldiers to prevent suicide and address mental health issues? 

    Armenia had made notable progress in addressing gender-based and domestic violence.  The adoption of the 2017 law on violence in the family was a significant step forward.  However, there were concerns about the high number of incidents of gender-based violence, particularly during the pandemic.  It was important to ensure access to free health care services to victims and survivors, and shelters must be accessible to victims with disabilities.  What measures were in place to address the gaps in the reporting system, particularly in rural and remote areas?  What shelters were available for victims and survivors?  How did Armenia intend to integrate the provisions of the Istanbul Convention into its domestic legislation?  When would it be ratified? 

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said the independence and impartiality of the Investigative Committee was ensured through a special unit, tasked with investigating torture and abuse by officials. Regarding allegations of torture of Azerbaijanis soldiers, comprehensive investigations had been undertaken relating to videos received.  However, the investigations remained ongoing.  There were currently no prisoners of Azerbaijani origins in Armenia’s custody; all individuals had been returned.  In stark contrast, Azerbaijan continued to hold Armenian nationals in its custody, in contrast to its national obligations.  The closure of the Red Cross office in Azerbaijan had created a protection gap.  International human rights organizations had reported grave human rights violations by Azerbaijani forces. 

    Armenia was establishing a mechanism for reporting and follow-up on human rights recommendations. The national mechanism would be a permanent structure which involved members of judicial and legislative branches of the Government. 

    If the applicant for asylum missed the 15-day deadline, the person was treated not as an asylum seeker, but as a foreigner.  The law had been developed with assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and non-governmental organization colleagues. 

    There were 67 disciplinary proceedings launched against police officers last year, with 27 resulting in finding no violations.  As a result of one of the proceedings, three police officers were found guilty and dismissed from service. 

    The fight against gender-based violence was an ongoing process carried out with State and non-State parties and civil society actors.  State financed shelter services were available which provided victims with safe accommodation and psychosocial and legal support.  Over the past five years, the number of individuals receiving these services had increased, due to the increase in social workers.  The law on the protection of domestic violence had undergone many changes, with almost 11 provisions amended.  The provision concerning the reconciliation procedure had been annulled, and now stipulated for medical services to be provided to victims of violence based on the type of violence they had experienced. 

    Armenia had conducted awareness raising campaigns which focused on educating stakeholders on the importance of the Istanbul Convention as it pertained to gender-based violence.  Recent legal reforms strengthened protections for victims, improved measures for reporting violence, and improved training for police and those dealing with victims.  A new vulnerability assessment system was being launched, which would help families overcome extreme poverty. 

    Since 2014, the number of children in institutional care had been reduced five-fold from more than 2,000 to less than 400.  There were now three crisis centres providing round the clock care to children.  There had been a sharp increase in foster care placements over the last five years. 

    Regarding the armed groups, there were several main actors within the human rights action plan, including suicide and self-harm prevention groups, which operated within military units.  Legal and human rights education efforts had also been strengthened, with training courses provided on torture and ill-treatment, targeting military personnel. 

    Closing Remarks

    CLAUDE HELLER, Committee Chairperson, thanked the delegation for the excellent and informative dialogue.  The multilateral system was in deep crisis at the political level and financially. However, despite all these restrictions, the Committee worked arduously, objectively and constructively to produce a positive impact on the lives of people in the States parties. 

    ANNA KARAPETYAN, Deputy Minister of Justice of Armenia and head of the delegation, expressed sincere appreciation to the Committee for the excellent dialogue. The Committee’s comments and recommendations reinforced the shared responsibility held together for the prohibition of torture everywhere, under all circumstances.  Armenia was proud of the progress made but recognised that the journey for a torture-free society was ongoing.  Armenia remained committed to working towards this goal. 

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CAT25.005E

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: NASA’s Chandra Releases New 3D Models of Cosmic Objects

    Source: NASA

    [embedded content]

    New three-dimensional (3D) models of objects in space have been released by NASA’s Chandra X-ray Observatory. These 3D models allow people to explore — and print — examples of stars in the early and end stages of their lives. They also provide scientists with new avenues to investigate scientific questions and find insights about the objects they represent.
    These 3D models are based on state-of-the-art theoretical models, computational algorithms, and observations from space-based telescopes like Chandra that give us accurate pictures of these cosmic objects and how they evolve over time.
    However, looking at images and animations is not the only way to experience this data. The four new 3D printable models of Cassiopeia A (Cas A), G292.0+1.8 (G292), Cygnus Loop supernova remnants, and the star known as BP Tau let us experience the celestial objects in the form of physical structures that will allow anyone to hold replicas of these stars and their surroundings and examine them from all angles.

    Using NASA’s James Webb Space Telescope, astronomers uncovered a mysterious feature within the remnant, nicknamed the “Green Monster,” alongside a puzzling network of ejecta filaments forming a web of oxygen-rich material. When combined with X-rays from Chandra, the data helped astronomers shed light on the origin of the Green Monster and revealed new insights into the explosion that created Cas A about 340 years ago, from Earth’s perspective.

    This 3D model shows a star less than 10 million years old that is surrounded by a disk of material. This class of objects is known as T Tauri stars, named after a young star in the Taurus star-forming region. The model describes the effects of multiple flares, or outbursts that are detected in X-rays by Chandra from one T Tauri star known as BP Tau. These flares interact with the disk of material and lead to the formation of an extended outer atmosphere composed by hot loops, connecting the disk to the developing star.

    The Cygnus Loop (also known as the Veil Nebula) is a supernova remnant, the remains of the explosive death of a massive star. This 3D model is the result of a simulation describing the interaction of a blast wave from the explosion with an isolated cloud of the interstellar medium (that is, dust and gas in between the stars). Chandra sees the blast wave and other material that has been heated to millions of degrees. The Cygnus Loop is a highly extended, but faint, structure on the sky: At three degrees across, it has the diameter of six full moons.

    This is a rare type of supernova remnant observed to contain large amounts of oxygen. The X-ray image of G292.0+1.8 from Chandra shows a rapidly expanding, intricately structured field left behind by the shattered star. By creating a 3D model of the system, astronomers have been able to examine the asymmetrical shape of the remnant that can be explained by a “reverse” shock wave moving back toward the original explosion.

    The 3D models here are the subject of several scholarly papers by Salvatore Orlando of INAF in Palermo, Italy, and colleagues published in The Astrophysical Journal, Astronomy & Astrophysics, and Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society. Much of this work is also publicly available work on SketchFab.
    NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center manages the Chandra program. The Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory’s Chandra X-ray Center controls science operations from Cambridge, Massachusetts, and flight operations from Burlington, Massachusetts.
    Read more from NASA’s Chandra X-ray Observatory.
    Learn more about the Chandra X-ray Observatory and its mission here:

    chandra

    https://chandra.si.edu

    This release features visualizations of three supernova remnants and one star. Each is rendered as a composite image, and as a digital 3-dimensional model, presented in separate short video clips. The composite images are two dimensional and static, but the digital models rotate, showcasing their three-dimensionality.
    The first featured supernova is Cassiopeia A. In the X-ray, optical, and infrared composite image, the debris from an exploded star resembles a round purple gas cloud, marbled with streaks of golden light. In the rotating, 3D model, the purple gas cloud is depicted as a flat disk, like a record or CD. Bursting out the front and back of the disk is an orange and white shape similar to a ball of coral, or a head of cauliflower lined with stubby tendrils. Most of the ball, and the majority of the tendrils, appear on one side of the disk. On the opposite side, the shape resembles dollops of thick whipped cream.
    Next in the release is a star known as BP Tau. BP Tau is a developing star, less than 10 million years old, and prone to outbursts or flares. These flares interact with a disk of material that surrounds the young star, forming hot loops of extended atmosphere. In the composite image, BP Tau resembles a distant, glowing white dot surrounded by a band of pink light. The rotating, 3D model is far more dynamic and intriguing! Here, the disk of material resembles a large blue puck with round, ringed, concave surfaces. At the heart of the puck is a small, glowing red orb: the developing star. Shooting out of the orb are long, thin, green strands: the flares. Also emerging from the orb are orange and pink petal-shaped blobs: the loops of extended atmosphere. Together, the orb, strands, and petals resemble an exotic flowering orchid.
    The third celestial object in this release is the supernova remnant called Cygnus Loop. In the composite image, the remnant resembles a wispy cloud in oranges, blues, purples, and whites, shaped like a backwards letter C. The 3D model examines this cloud of interstellar material interacting with the superheated, supernova blast wave. In the 3D model, the Cygnus Loop resembles a bowl with a thick base, and a wedge cut from the side like a slice of pie. The sides of the bowl are rendered in swirled blues and greens. However, inside the thick base, revealed by the wedge-shaped cut, are streaks of red and orange. Surrounding the shape are roughly parallel thin red strands, which extend beyond the top and bottom of the digital model.
    The final supernova featured in this release is G292.0+1.8. The composite image depicts the remnant as a bright and intricate ball of red, blue, and white X-ray gas and debris set against a backdrop of gleaming stars. In the 3D model, the remnant is rendered in translucent icy blue and shades of orange. Here, the rotating shape is revealed to be somewhat like a bulbous arrowhead, or perhaps an iceberg on its side.

    Megan WatzkeChandra X-ray CenterCambridge, Mass.617-496-7998mwatzke@cfa.harvard.edu
    Lane FigueroaMarshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama256-544-0034lane.e.figueroa@nasa.gov

    MIL OSI USA News –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Update 286 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

    Frequent air raid alarms, the regular sound of explosions nearby and the presence of drones are continuing to highlight the dangers facing Ukraine’s main nuclear sites during the military conflict, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said today.

    “The nuclear safety and security situation in Ukraine remains precarious. This is very clear from the daily reports of our teams on the ground. Military activities are still taking place in the vicinity of nuclear sites, putting their safety at constant risk. Our work to help prevent a nuclear accident is far from over,” Director General Grossi said.

    The IAEA continues to monitor and assess nuclear safety and security at Ukraine’s five main nuclear facilities and deliver essential equipment and other technical assistance, including medical support.

    At the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) over the past week, the IAEA team based at the site has heard explosions at varying distances almost every day, as well as occasional bursts of gunfire.

    As part of regular walkdowns across the site, the team visited the turbine halls of two reactor units, where they were again denied access to the western parts of the halls. The team also visited the site’s water treatment facility where they confirmed the arrangements for the treatment of wastewater and observed the testing of an emergency diesel generator.

    At the South Ukraine NPP, the IAEA team was informed that five drones were detected 2 km west of the site during the night of 11-12 April. From their residence, the team observed the drones and heard gunfire apparently aimed at repelling them.

    At the Chornobyl site, the IAEA team visited the New Safe Confinement and received an update on its status following the mid-February drone attack that punched a hole in the structure. Radiation levels remained normal for the area and there had been no release of radioactive substances beyond the established limits.

    Air raid alarms were heard on most days over the past week at these two sites, the IAEA teams reported.

    Over the past week, the IAEA has organised five additional deliveries of equipment as part of its efforts to help ensure nuclear safety and security, bringing the total to 130 since the start of the conflict.

    The Rivne NPP received two static test benches that had been refurbished and modernized in Germany, with funding from Norway. Plant staff also received training on the newly automated system. The benches are used to test the plant’s hydraulic shock absorbers, which reduce vibrations in coolant pumps, steam generators and other equipment essential for nuclear safety.

    Other types of equipment were delivered to Chornobyl, the Centralized Dry Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility and State Specialized Enterprise “Radon Association”, which manages radioactive waste. These deliveries were funded by the European Union, Denmark and Sweden. The Khmelnytskyy NPP received medical equipment supported with funding from Norway.

    MIL Security OSI –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Human Rights Violations During Mozambique’s Post-2024 Election Crackdown

    Source: Amnesty International –

    Footnotes

    [1] Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI), “User Guide: OONI Probe Desktop App”, 25 October 2022, https://ooni.org/support/ooni-probe-desktop/

    [2] Amnesty International, Mozambique: turn the page! A human rights manifesto for political parties and candidates, October 2019 election (Index: AFR 41/1019/2019), 17 September 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr41/1019/2019/en/; Amnesty International, “Mozambique: Civil society calls for the unconditional and immediate release of the Gaza-18 election party delegates”(Index: AFR 41/1427/2019), 25 November 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr41/1427/2019/en/; Amnesty International, “Mozambique police must only use live ammunition to protect life during demonstrations”(Index: PRE 01/301/2010 ), 1 September 2010, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pre01/301/2010/en/; Amnesty International,“Mozambique: authorities must launch a full and impartial investigation into the killing of journalist” (Index: AFR 41/2361/2015), 31 August 2015, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr41/2361/2015/en/; Amnesty International, Mozambique: media freedom in ashes (Index: AFR 41/2947/2020), 31 August 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr41/2947/2020/en/; Amnesty International,“Mozambique: civil society groups call for the unconditional and immediate release of radio journalist” (Index: AFR 41/0205/2019 ), 11 April 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr41/0205/2019/en/; Amnesty International, “What I saw is death”: war crimes in Mozambique’s forgotten cape (Index: AFR 41/3545/2021), 2 March 2021, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr41/3545/2021/en/; Amnesty International, “Mozambique: Torture by security forces in gruesome videos must be investigated”, 9 September 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2020/09/mozambique-torture-by-security-forces-in-gruesome-videos-must-be-investigated/

    [3] Amnesty International, “What I saw is death” (previously cited); Amnesty International, “Mozambique: Authorities must promptly investigate arrest of journalist while covering demonstration”, 7 June 2024, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/06/mozambique-authorities-must-promptly-investigate-arrest-of-journalist-while-covering-demonstration/; Amnesty International, “Mozambique: Authorities must investigate killing of newspaper editor João Fernando Chamusse”, 15 December 2023, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/12/mozambique-authorities-must-investigate-killing-of-newspaper-editor-joao-fernando-chamusse/; Amnesty International, “Mozambique: Fears grow for election monitors secretly transferred to new prison”, 18 November 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/11/mozambique-fears-grow-for-election-monitors-secretly-transferred-to-new-prison-2/; Caitlin Sturridge and others, Copping with the risk of conflict, climate and internal displacement in northern Mozambique: ‘We can’t just sit here with our arms crossed’, November 2022, https://media.odi.org/documents/USAID_CCD_Mozambique_final.pdf; Republic of Mozambique, Estratégia Nacional de Desenvolvimento (2015-2035), [National Development Strategy (2015-2035)], July 2024, https://www.mef.gov.mz/index.php/publicacoes/estrategias/397-estrategia-nacional-de-desenvolvimento/file; Human Rights Watch (HRW), Mozambique: abuses against media, activists before elections, 11 September 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/09/11/mozambique-abuses-against-media-activists-elections 

    [4] Africa News, “Frelimo’s candidate wins in Maputo amid ongoing vote count”, 14 October 2024, https://www.africanews.com/2024/10/14/frelimos-candidate-wins-in-maputo-amid-ongoing-vote-count/

    [5] Times Live, “Africa: Frelimo extends 50-year rule in Mozambique as it retains power in disputed general elections”, 24 October 2024, https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2024-10-24-frelimo-extends-50-year-rule-in-mozambique-as-it-retains-power-in-disputed-general-election/

    [6] Associated Press (AP), “Long-ruling party leads in Mozambique’s election as opposition candidate calls for strikes”, 16 October 2024, https://apnews.com/article/mozambique-election-frelimo-vote-6987692541d92a9c6a287be4af89a524

    [7] The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), “Mozambique opposition lawyer shot dead”, 19 October 2024,  https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy4d3j1mm2yo 

    [8] Centre for Public Integrity (CIP), “Elvino Dias was killed preparing a draft of the PODEMOS appeal to the Constitutional Council: Mozambique elections 316- 20 October 2024”, 20 October 2024, https://www5.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/files/Election-Bulletin-316_20Out24_Murders_Will-CNE-change-results.pdf

    [9] Deutsche Welle (DW), “Mozambique: Police fire tear gas at opposition leader”, 21 October 2024, https://www.dw.com/en/mozambique-police-fire-tear-gas-at-opposition-leader/a-70561138; Venâncio Mondlane, “REVOLUÇÃO: Venâncio Mondlane anuncia nova manifestação [“REVOLUTION: Venâncio Mondlane announces new demonstration”], 22 October 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mG5g-SbnNy8    

    [10] Interview by voice call with lawyer, 12 February 2025; HRW, “Mozambique: Abuses against media, activists before elections”, 11 September 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/09/11/mozambique-abuses-against-media-activists-elections

    [11] Integrity Magazine, “CNE confirma Daniel Chapo e Frelimo como vencedores das eleições de 9 de Outubro”, [“The National Electoral Commission confirms the victory of Daniel Chapo and Frelimo the winners of the 9 October elections”], 25 October 2024, https://integritymagazine.co.mz/arquivos/33773

    [12] DW, “Mondlane: “Está-se a cometer crimes contra a humanidade”, [“Mondlane: “Crimes against humanity are being committed”], 26 October 2024, https://www.dw.com/pt-002/ven%C3%A2ncio-mondlane-est%C3%A1-se-a-cometer-crimes-contra-a-humanidade/a-70608646

    [13] DW, Venâncio Mondlane anuncia “manifestação four by four”, [“Venâncio Mondlane announces “demonstrations four by four””], 2 December 2024, https://www.dw.com/pt-002/ven%C3%A2ncio-mondlane-anuncia-manifesta%C3%A7%C3%A3o-four-by-four/a-70938463; Al Jazeera, “Clanging pans: why Mozambique’s election protesters refuse to go away, 15 November 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/11/15/clanging-pans-why-mozambiques-election-protesters-refuse-to-go-away

    [14] Al Jazeera, “Clanging pans: why Mozambique’s election protesters refuse to go away, 15 November 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/11/15/clanging-pans-why-mozambiques-election-protesters-refuse-to-go-away

    [15] Al Jazeera, “Mozambique’s controversial election result upheld: What to know”, 23 December 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/23/mozambiques-controversial-election-result-upheld

    [16] Al Jazeera, “Chapo sworn in following Mozambique’s disputed presidential elections”, 15 January 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/15/chapo-sworn-in-following-mozambiques-disputed-presidential-election 

    [17] BBC, “Injuries as Mozambique police fire on opposition protest”, 6 March 2025, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cjd3y2eyxy3o

    [18]  Televisão de Moçambique (TVM)’s video of President Chapo’s address, 24 February 2025, on file with Amnesty International; Radio France Internationale – International French Radio (RFI), “Daniel Chapo vows to fight “terrorism and demonstrations”, 25 February 2025, https://www.rfi.fr/pt/%C3%A1frica-lus%C3%B3fona/20250225-daniel-chapo-promete-combater-terrorismo-e-manifesta%C3%A7%C3%B5es

    [19] Amnesty International identified these units based on the uniforms apparent in visual evidence and description of uniforms provided in interviews with eyewitnesses and victims.

    [20] Amnesty International, Kinetic Impact Projectiles in Law Enforcement – an Amnesty International Position Paper, March 2023, pg. 18; https://www.amnesty.nl/content/uploads/2023/03/Amnesty-position-paper-kinetic-impact-projectiles.pdf?x55122

    [21] Interview by voice call with doctor, 17 February 2025; Interview by voice call with doctor, 22 February 2025.

    [22] Interview by voice call with doctor, 17 February 2025; Interview by voice call with doctor, 22 February 2025.

    [23] Interview by voice call with doctor, 17 February 2025; Interview by voice call with doctor, 22 February 2025.

    [24] TV Mirramar, “Ordem dos medicos preocupada com aumento de feridos por armas de fogo” [“Order of Doctors concerned about increase in firearm injuries”], 29 October 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d0YqkTsYGaI&t=52s; Interview by voice call with doctor, 17 February 2025.

    [25] Interview by voice call with doctor, 17 February 2025; Interview by voice call with doctor, 22 February 2025.

    [26] For instance, interview by voice call with victim’s relative, 21 and 27 February 2025; Interview by voice call with victim’s relative, 18 and 21 February 2025

    [27] Interview by voice call with victim, 17 February 2025.

    [28] Interview by voice call with victim’s relative, 17 February 2025.

    [29] Plataforma DECIDE, “Preliminary report on the post-electoral context in Mozambique: 21 October 2024- 21 January 2025”, Undated, https://pdecide.org/blog/preliminary-report-on-the-post-electoral-context-in-mozambique-3-months

    [30] TVM, “Police records” Bernardino Rafael reports 956 acts of violence and records 96 deaths”, 23 January 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rTS1gRRNJmY  

    [31] BBC Africa, “President Chapo on Mondlane’s ‘parallel government”, 22 January 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MqSIetyQHyQ

    [32] Attorney General of Mozambique, Speech at the opening of the judicial year, 4 February 2025, on file with Amnesty International; Club of Mozambique, “Mozambique: 651 cases opened during post-elections protests- Attorney General”, 4 February 2025, https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-651-cases-opened-during-post-election-protests-attorney-general-275268/

    [33] Venâncio Mondlane, Facebook post, “O que se falou no encontro? [What was said at the meeting?]”, 24 March 2025, https://www.facebook.com/venamondlane/videos/998522575570322/  

    [34] Amnesty International, Guidelines on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly (Index: ACT 30/8426/2024), November 2024, ACT3084262024ENGLISH.pdf

    [35] HRC, General Comment 36: Article 6 (The Right to life), 30 October 2018, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36, para. 7. The right to life is protected by article 6.1 of the ICCPR and article 4 of the ACHPR. Article 4.2 of the ICCPR also protects the right to life in exceptional circumstances, such as internal political instability or any other public emergency. See, also, Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Resolution 1989/65: The Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, adopted on 24 May 1989.  

    [36] Amnesty International, Guidelines on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly (Index: ACT 30/8426/2024), November 2024, ACT3084262024ENGLISH.pdf

    [37] UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (Basic Principles), 7 September 1990.

    [38] Amnesty International, Use of Force – Guidelines for Implementation of the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by law enforcement officials, August 2015, https://www.amnesty.org.uk/files/use_of_force.pdf; UN Basic Principles.

    [39] HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, A/HRC/26/36, para 63.

    [40] Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), 10 December 1984. Mozambique ratified the CAT on 14 September 1999. United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body Database – Mozambique, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx

    [41] Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on extra-custodial use of force and the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, A/72/178, para. 46. 

    [42] HRC, General Comment No. 37, (previously cited), para. 78. 

    [43] UN Guidance on less-lethal weapons in law enforcement, 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/CCPR/LLW_Guidance.pdf, guideline 6.3; HRC, General Comment No. 37 (previously cited).

    [44] UN Guidance on less-lethal weapons in law enforcement (previously cited), HRC, General Comment No. 37 (previously cited), para. 88; https://www.amnesty.nl/content/uploads/2017/07/guidelines_use_of_force_eng.pdf?x90620

    [45] Amnesty International Guidelines on the use of force (previously cited), guideline 5b and p. 114

    [46] African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission), African Commission Guidelines for the Policing of Assemblies by Law Enforcement Officials in Africa, para. 21.3.1 https://achpr.au.int/en/soft-law/guidelines-policing-assemblies-law-enforcement-officials-africa

    [47] UN Guidance on less-lethal weapons in law enforcement (previously cited), guideline 6.3; Amnesty International, Guidelines on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly (previously cited), guideline 14.1.

    [48] UN Guidance on less-lethal weapons in law enforcement (previously cited), guideline 7.5; Amnesty International, “Kinetic impact projectiles in law enforcement”, March 2023, https://www.amnesty.nl/content/uploads/2023/03/Amnesty-position-paper-kinetic-impact-projectiles.pdf?x36065

    [49] UN Guidance on less-lethal weapons in law enforcement (previously cited), guideline 7.5; HRC, General Comment No. 37 (previously cited), para. 87; Amnesty International, “Kinetic impact projectiles in law enforcement”, March 2023, https://www.amnesty.nl/content/uploads/2023/03/Amnesty-position-paper-kinetic-impact-projectiles.pdf?x36065

    [50] Amnesty International, “Chemical irritants in law enforcement”, June 2021, https://www.amnesty.nl/content/uploads/2021/07/Amnesty-position-paper-chemical-irritants.pdf

    [51]  Video published on the platform X on 27 November 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://x.com/Cidiachissungo/status/1861915616598167924

    [52] Video sent to researchers via messaging app, on file with Amnesty International.

    [53] Amnesty International, Guidelines on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly (Index: ACT 30/8426/2024), November 2024, ACT3084262024ENGLISH.pdf

    [54] In addition to the PP and TP, one eyewitness identified the presence of the Rapid Intervention Police that day. Interview by voice call, 14 February 2025.

    [55] In addition to the PP and TP, one eyewitness identified the presence of the Rapid Intervention Police that day. Interview by voice call, 14 February 2025.

    [56] RFI, “Moçambique: Polícia confirma morte de um manifestante pró-Mondlane no Niassa” [“Mozambique: Police confirm death of pro-Mondlane protester in Niassa”], 28 October 2024, https://www.rfi.fr/pt/%C3%A1frica-lus%C3%B3fona/20241028-mo%C3%A7ambique-pol%C3%ADcia-confirma-morte-de-um-manifestante-pr%C3%B3-mondlane-no-niassa

    [57] Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 11 February 2025; Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 14 February 2025; Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 17 February 2025.

    [58] Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 11 February 2025; Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 14 February 2025.

    [59] Video provided by eyewitness; on file with Amnesty International

    [60] Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 11 February 2025.

    [61] Videos provided by eyewitness, on file with Amnesty International

    [62] Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 14 February 2025; Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 17 February 2025.

    [63] Inerview by voice call with eyewitness, 27 February 2025.

    [64] Video provided by eyewitness; on file with Amnesty International

    [65] Video published on Facebook and YouTube, respectively, on 26 October 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1173170507612261, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lj_AfHK_JcI

    [66] Video provided by eyewitness, on file with Amnesty International.

    [67] Interview by voice call, 11 February 2025; Interview by voice call, 14 February 2025; Interview by voice call, 17 February 2025.

    [68] Video published on Facebook and YouTube, respectively, 26 October 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1173170507612261, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lj_AfHK_JcI

    [69] RFI, “Moçambique: Polícia confirma morte de um manifestante pró-Mondlane no Niassa” [“Mozambique: Police confirm death of pro-Mondlane protester in Niassa”], 28 October 2024, https://www.rfi.fr/pt/%C3%A1frica-lus%C3%B3fona/20241028-mo%C3%A7ambique-pol%C3%ADcia-confirma-morte-de-um-manifestante-pr%C3%B3-mondlane-no-niassa

    [70] Facebook profiles managed by Albino José Síbia. https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100084198734038 https://www.facebook.com/ShottasOficial, https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100069938172987

     

    [72] Videos published on the platform X on 12 December 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://x.com/mozinforma/status/1867313710223831438

    [73] 360 Mozambique, “General Protests: Ressano Garcia Border Returns to Normal”, 16 December 2024, https://360mozambique.com/business/general-protests-ressano-garcia-border-returns-to-normal/

    [74] A section of the video posted on the platform X on 12 December 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://x.com/Cidiachissungo/status/1867262509016920434

    [75] Video posted on the platform X on 12 December 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://x.com/justicefrontil/status/1867281218351640723

    [76] Video posted on Facebook on 12 December 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1526742851326323

    [77] Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), “Albino Sibia (Mano Shottas)”, https://cpj.org/data/people/albino-sibia-mano-shottas/

    [78] Mozambique ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) on 21 July 1993 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) on 22 February 1989. See United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body Database – Mozambique, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx and ACHPR, https://achpr.au.int/en/charter/african-charter-human-and-peoples-rights/

    [79] Interview by voice call with someone with intimate knowledge of the situation, 10 February 2025; Adriano Nuvunga, Facebook post: “CDD entra com uma acção contra o Estado mocambicano pelo assassinato Bárbaro do jovem blogueiro “Shottas”” [“CDD files a lawsuit against the Mozambican state for the barbaric murder of the young blogger “Shottas””], 30 December 2024, https://www.facebook.com/Prof.adrianonuvunga/videos/cdd-entra-com-uma-ac%C3%A7%C3%A3o-contra-o-estado-mocambicano-pelo-assassinato-b%C3%A1rbaro-do-/1029506992507642/

    [80] Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 10 February 2025; Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 27 February 2025; Miramar, “UIR invade cemitério e dispara no momento de luto” [“UIR invades cemetery and shoots during mourning”], 14 December 2024, https://miramar.co.mz/noticias/mocambique/uir-invade-cemiterio-e-dispara-no-momento-de-luto-14-12-2024-49489 

    [81] Videos published on the platform X on 14 December 2024, on file with Amnesty International 
    https://x.com/mozinforma/status/1867929771835076734/video/1 https://x.com/Cidiachissungo/status/1867936730910703888
    https://x.com/mozinforma/status/1867929771835076734/video/1

    [82] Inerview by voice call with eyewitness, 27 February 2025.

    [83] Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 27 February 2025.

    [84] Video published on Facebook on 14 December 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?ref=watch_permalink&v=595714569533356

    [85] Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), “COMUNICADO- MISA condena baleamento de repórter pela UIR” [“-STATEMENT- MISA condemns the shooting of a reporter by the UIR”], 20 December 2024, https://www.misa.org.mz/index.php/destaques/noticias/327-comunicado-misa-condena-baleamento-de-reporter-pela-uir

    [86] Interview by voice call with person known to the victim, 19 February 2025.

    [87] DW, “Vários mortos no regresso de Mondlane a Moçambique” [“Several dead on Mondlane’s return to Mozambique”]; 9 January 2025, https://www.dw.com/pt-002/v%C3%A1rios-mortos-no-regresso-de-mondlane-a-mo%C3%A7ambique/a-71257510; Observador, “Chegada de Mondlane a Maputo. Número de mortos em Moçambique sobe para três – como aconteceu” [“Mondlane arrives in Maputo. Death toll in Mozambique rises to three – as it happened”], 9 January 2025, https://observador.pt/liveblogs/mondlane-chegou-a-maputo-estou-aqui-presente-de-carne-e-osso/

    [88] Video published on YouTube on 9 January 2025, on file with Amnesty International. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SnA0Ur-Eb8I

    [89] Video published on YouTube on 9 January 2025, on file with Amnesty International. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KCVLf30Ajfs

    [90] Video published on Facebook on 9 January 2025, on file with Amnesty International. https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?ref=watch_permalink&v=1194732825606271

    [91] Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 13 February 2025.

    [92] Interview by voice call with “Pedro”, 1 March 2025.

    [93] Interview by voice call with “Pedro”, 1 March 2025.

    [94] Interview by voice call with “Pedro”, 1 March 2025.

    [95] Interview by voice call with “Pedro”, 1 March 2025.

    [96] Videos published on the platform X on 9 January 2025, on file with Amnesty International. https://x.com/AllexandreMZ/status/1877368651554124233
    https://x.com/Cidiachissungo/status/1877308762274329016
    https://x.com/AllexandreMZ/status/1877304210435330388/video/1

    [97] Videos received via messaging app; on file with Amnesty International; Video published on Facebook on 21 October 2024, on file with Amnesty International.
    https://www.facebook.com/tvsucessoofficial/videos/1049942656916240/

    [98] Interview by voice call with an eyewitness, 12 February 2025.

    [99] Video published on Facebook on 21 October 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1049942656916240

    [100] Interview by voice call with an eyewitness, 12 February 2025; Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 21 February 2025.

    [101] Interview by voice call with an eyewitness, 12 February 2025.

    [102] Video published on Facebook on 21 October 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1049942656916240

    [103] Amnesty International reviewed videos and X-rays. The videos indicate the injury was caused by a tear gas canister. The X-rays clearly show a fracture in the tibia.

    [104] Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 21 February 2025.

    [105] Videos sent via messaging app, on file with Amnesty International.

    [106] Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 21 February 2025.

    [107] VOA, “Jornalistas moçambicanos feridos em manifestação em Maputo” [“Mozambican journalists injured in protest in Maputo”], 21 October 2025, https://www.voaportugues.com/a/jornalistas-mo%C3%A7ambicanos-feridos-em-manifesta%C3%A7%C3%A3o-em-maputo/7830621.html 

    [108] Publico, “Pelo menos 30 pessoas foram detidas nos confrontos em Maputo” [“At least 30 people were arrested in the clashes in Maputo”], 22 October 2024, https://www.publico.pt/2024/10/22/mundo/noticia/menos-30-pessoas-detidas-confrontos-maputo-2108971

    [109] Video published on Facebook on 21 October 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://www.facebook.com/tvsucessoofficial/videos/8571222766325965/

    [110] Video published on Facebook on 21 October 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://www.facebook.com/tvsucessoofficial/videos/8571222766325965/

    [111] Video published on Facebook on 21 October 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://www.facebook.com/tvsucessoofficial/videos/8571222766325965/

    [112] Videos sent via messaging app, on file with Amnesty International.

    [113] Principle 5(c) of the UN Basic Principles (previously cited).

    [114] RFI, “Moçambique: Três mortos e dezenas de feridos nas manifestações” [“Mozambique: Three dead and dozens injured in protests”], 8 November 2024, https://www.rfi.fr/pt/%C3%A1frica-lus%C3%B3fona/20241108-mo%C3%A7ambique-tr%C3%AAs-mortos-e-dezenas-de-feridos-nas-manifesta%C3%A7%C3%B5es; Radio Renascença (RR), “Protestos em Maputo deixam 57 pessoas feridas por arma de fogo“ [“Protests in Maputo leave 57 people injured by firearms”], 8 November 2024, https://rr.pt/noticia/mundo/2024/11/08/protestos-em-maputo-deixam-57-pessoas-feridas-por-arma-de-fogo/400690/

    [115] Videos published on the platform X on 7 November 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://x.com/Cidiachissungo/status/1854544977507856444 https://x.com/wilkerDias13/status/1854464732637327870 https://x.com/wilkerDias13/status/1854464732637327870

    [116] Videos published on the platform X on 7 November 2024, on file with Amnesty International.  https://x.com/wilkerDias13/status/1854461552214114747/video/1
    https://x.com/wilkerDias13/status/1854485342604104076

    [117] Video published on the platform X on 7 November 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://x.com/wilkerDias13/status/1854461552214114747/video/2

    [118] Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 19 and 20 February 2025.

    [119] HRC, General Comment No. 37 (previously cited), para 80; ACHPR Guidelines on the Policing of Assemblies in Africa (previously cited), para. 3.2; Amnesty International, Guidelines on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly (previously cited), guideline 7.5.

    [120] Videos published on the platform X on 27 and 28 November 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://x.com/Cidiachissungo/status/1861684733605806131 https://x.com/Cidiachissungo/status/1862014546333856026 https://x.com/Cidiachissungo/status/1861685433677013386

    [121] Video published on the platform X on 27 November 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://x.com/Cidiachissungo/status/1861931525492617413

    [122] Video published on the platform X on 27 November 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://x.com/Cidiachissungo/status/1861919381283827798

    [123] Videos published on the platform X on 27 November 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://x.com/Cidiachissungo/status/1861919381283827798

    [124] Pictures published on the platform X on 30 November 2024, on file with Amnesty International. https://x.com/AllexandreMZ/status/1862832887285854247

    [125] VOA, “Ministry of National Defence admits to having run over young man [sic] in protest in Maputo”, 27 November 2024, https://www.voaportugues.com/a/ministério-da-defesa-nacional-reconhece-ter-atropelado-jovem-em-protesto-em-maputo/7879042.html

    [126] VOA, “Ministry of National Defence admits to having run over young man [sic] in protest in Maputo”, 27 November 2024, https://www.voaportugues.com/a/ministério-da-defesa-nacional-reconhece-ter-atropelado-jovem-em-protesto-em-maputo/7879042.html

    [127] Interview by voice call with individual with intimate knowledge of the situation, 11 February 2025.

    [128] Interview by voice call with individual with intimate knowledge of the situation, 11 February 2025.

    [129] Plataforma DECIDE, “Preliminary report on the post-electoral context in Mozambique: 21 October 2024- 21 January 2025” (previously cited), pg. 2.

    [130] Plataforma DECIDE, “Preliminary report on the post-electoral context in Mozambique: 21 October 2024- 21 January 2025” (previously cited), pg. 2.

    [131] Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 12 February 2025; Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 19 February 2025.

    [132] Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 12 February 2025; Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 19 February 2025.

    [133] Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 12 February 2025; Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 19 February 2025.

    [134] Plataforma DECIDE, “Preliminary report on the post-electoral context in Mozambique: 21 October 2024- 21 January 2025” (previously cited), pg. 2.

    [135] Plataforma DECIDE, “Preliminary report on the post-electoral context in Mozambique: 21 October 2024- 21 January 2025” (previously cited), pg. 2.

    [136] Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 12 February 2025; Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 19 February 2025.

    [137] Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 12 February 2025; Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 19 February 2025.

    [138] Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 12 February 2025; Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 19 February 2025.

    [139] Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 12 February 2025; Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 19 February 2025.

    [140] Interview by voice call with a victim of arbitrary detention, 12 February 2025.

    [141] Interview by voice call with a victim of arbitrary detention, 12 February 2025.

    [142] Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 12 February 2025; Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 19 February 2025; Interview by voice call with victim, 18 and 19 February 2025.

    [143] Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 12 February 2025; Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 19 February 2025; Interview by voice call with a victim of arbitrary detention, 12 February 2025; Interview by voice call with a relative of a detainee, 18 and 21 February 2025.

    [144] Interview by voice call with son of victim of detainee, 18 and 21 February 2025.

    [145] Interview by voice call with son of victim of detainee, 18 and 21 February 2025.

    [146] Interview by voice call with a victim of arbitrary detention, 12 February 2025.

    [147] Interview by voice call with a victim of arbitrary detention, 12 February 2025.

    [148] Interview by voice call with a lawyer, 12 February 2025.

    [149] Interview by voice call with victim, 18 and 19 February 2025.

    [150] Interview by voice call with victim, 18 and 19 February 2025.

    [151] Photos of victim taken on 6 and 7 December 2024, on file with Amnesty International.

    [152] Interview by voice call with victim, 18 and 19 February 2025.

    [153] Interview by voice call with victim, 18 and 19 February 2025.

    [154] ICCPR, Article 9.1; ACHPR, Article 6.

    [155] ICCPR, Article 14; ACHPR, Article 7. See also the African Commission, Principles and Guidelines on the Rights to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa.

    [156] African Commission Principles and Guidelines on the Rights to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa; article 1(e) and (g).

    [157] For instance, ICCPR, Articles 7 and 10. Conditions of detention which violate article 10 of the ICCPR may also violate Article 7 of the ICCPR (prohibition of torture or other ill-treatment). See also, UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Interim report, 3 August 2009, UN Doc. A/64/215 paras 48, 55.

    [158] The 1955 UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules); Rules 15; 16; 19; 20; and 19. See also the ACHPR Guidelines on the Conditions of Arrest, Police Custody and Pre-Trial Detention in Africa (the Luanda Guidelines), March 2015; and The UN Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, 1990.

    [159] Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Article 37(b).

    [160] African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), Article 17.2(b). See also, ICCPR, Article 10.2(b).

    [161] ICCPR, Article 9.1; ACHPR, Article 6; Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique, 16 November 2004, Article 59.1.

    [162] ICCPR, Article 17.

    [163] ICCPR, Article 2.3. See also, HRC, General Comment 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 26 May 2004, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13.

    [164] ICCPR, Article 9.5.

    [165] CAT, Article 14. See also, Committee Against Torture, General Comment 3: Implementation of article 14 by States parties (Article 14), 13 December 2012, UN Doc. CAT/C/GC/3; UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), Resolution 22/21: Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment: rehabilitation of torture victims, adopted on 12 April 2013.

    [166] Photo of police complaint, on file with Amnesty International.

    [167] Interview by voice call with victim, 18 and 19 February 2025 and correspondence on 1 April 2025.

    [168] Integrity Magazine, “Moçambique enfrenta 18 horas de corte de internet em meio `a tensão pós-eleitoral [“Mozambique faces internet shutdown amid post-electoral tension”], 26 October 2024, https://integritymagazine.co.mz/arquivos/33806; Sahara Reporters, “Social media platforms down in Mozambique ahead of protests against disputed election results”, 31 October 2024, https://saharareporters.com/2024/10/31/social-media-platforms-down-mozambique-ahead-protests-against-disputed-election-results

    [169] Internet Outage Detection & Analysis (IODA) and Cloudflare, “Mozambique’s post-election fallout: fatal protests and widespread internet shutdowns”, 26 February 2025, https://ioda-dev.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/reports/mozambiques-post-election-fallout-fatal-protests-and-widespread-internet-shutdowns/

    [170] Club of Mozambique, “Mozambique elections: Mondlane calls for week-long strike and a national march to Maputo”, 29 October 2024, https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-elections-mondlane-calls-for-week-long-strike-and-a-national-march-to-maputo-269757/

    [171] IODA and Cloudflare, “Mozambique’s post-election fallout: fatal protests and widespread internet shutdowns”, 26 February 2025, https://ioda-dev.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/reports/mozambiques-post-election-fallout-fatal-protests-and-widespread-internet-shutdowns/

    [172] Netblocks, X post, 25 October 2024, https://x.com/netblocks/status/1849839619291988399

    [173] IODA and Cloudflare, “Mozambique’s post-election fallout: fatal protests and widespread internet shutdowns”, 26 February 2025, https://ioda-dev.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/reports/mozambiques-post-election-fallout-fatal-protests-and-widespread-internet-shutdowns/

    [174] Netblocks, X post, 8 November 2024, https://x.com/netblocks/status/1854830014555914571

    [175] IODA and Cloudflare, “Mozambique’s post-election fallout: fatal protests and widespread internet shutdowns”, 26 February 2025, https://ioda-dev.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/reports/mozambiques-post-election-fallout-fatal-protests-and-widespread-internet-shutdowns/

    [176] IODA and Cloudflare, “Mozambique’s post-election fallout: fatal protests and widespread internet shutdowns”, 26 February 2025, https://ioda-dev.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/reports/mozambiques-post-election-fallout-fatal-protests-and-widespread-internet-shutdowns/

    [177] Tmcel is a state mobile company that resulted from the merging of telecommunication company Telecomunicações de Moçambique (AS30619) and Mcel (mobile company).

    [178] Netblocks, X post, 31 October 2024, https://x.com/netblocks/status/1851892913292071349

    [179] OONI Probe testing of ‘www.facebook.com’, ‘www.instagram.com’ and WhatsApp services in Mozambique between 15 October and 18 November 2024.

    [180] Club of Mozambique, “Mozambique Elections: Second internet shutdown – AIM”, 1 November 2024, https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-elections-second-internet-shutdown-aim-269982/

    [181] Club of Mozambique, “Mozambique Elections: Second internet shutdown – AIM”, 1 November 2024, https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-elections-second-internet-shutdown-aim-269982/

    [182] RFI, “Moçambique: Ministro justificou restrições na internet para impedir ’destruição’ do país” [“Mozambique: Minister justified internet restrictions to prevent “destruction” of the country”], 11 November 2024, https://www.rfi.fr/pt/%C3%A1frica-lus%C3%B3fona/20241111-mo%C3%A7ambique-ministro-justificou-restri%C3%A7%C3%B5es-na-internet-para-impedir-destrui%C3%A7%C3%A3o-do-pa%C3%ADs

    [183] Text messages shared with researchers by Vodacom, Movitel and Tmcel clients, on file with Amnesty International. See also, HRW, “Mozambique: post-election internet restrictions hinder rights”, 6 November 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/11/06/mozambique-post-election-internet-restrictions-hinder-rights

    [184] Ngani, “Manifestações pós-eleitoral: mais um apagão dos serviços de internet em Moçambique” [“Post-election demonstrations: another blackout of internet services in Mozambique”], 1 November 2024, https://ngani.co.mz/tech/01/11/2024/manifestacoes-pos-eleitoral-mais-um-apagao-dos-servicos-de-internet-em-mocambique/

    [185] Centre for Democracy and Human Rights (Centro para Democracia e Direitos Humanos – CDD), “Depois da proibição do bloqueio pelo tribunal: submetida acção principal contra as operadoras de telefonia móvel por bloqueio de internet” [“After a blockage from court has been denied: a complaint against internet shutdown by mobile companies submitted down”], 18 December 2024, https://cddmoz.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Submetida-accao-principal-contra-as-operadoras-de-telefonia-movel-por-bloqueio-de-internet.pdf

    [186] Video sent by eyewitness, on file with Amnesty International.

    [187] Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 11 February 2025; Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 14 February 2025.

    [188] Interview by voice call with eyewitness, 11 February 2025.

    [189] Interview by voice call with media professional, 12 February 2025.

    [190] ICCPR, Article 19.2.

    [191] ICCPR, Article 19.3(a)(b). See also the African Commission, Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa, November 2019; the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, 1 October 1995.

    [192] ACHPR, Article 9.


    MIL OSI NGO –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: More acts announced for Radio 1 Big Weekend

    Source: City of Liverpool

    BBC Radio 1 has revealed an exciting first for Big Weekend 2025, which will take place in Sefton Park, Liverpool from Friday 23 May – Sunday 25 May. The festival will feature a performance from Radio 1 Anthems acts – celebrating iconic tracks and unforgettable moments from the past two decades of music.

    The headline Radio 1 Anthems acts are:

    • Natasha Bedingfield – performing Friday 23 May
    • Sugababes – performing Saturday 24 May

    Natasha Bedingfield says: “It’s a big deal to be part of Radio 1’s Big Weekend. I can’t wait to jump up on stage and sing my heart out with everyone. Let’s hope some inhibitions get released!”

    Sugababes say: “We’re buzzing to be playing Radio 1’s Big Weekend! We’ve heard amazing things about the energy and the crowds, so we’re excited to be part of it this year. Expect a lot of love, big tunes, and a show to remember!”

    Aled Haydn Jones, Head of Radio 1, says: “Radio 1’s Big Weekend is about bringing people together through the music they love, and our Radio 1 Anthems artists are a perfect example of that. These acts have soundtracked unforgettable moments for our audience and continue to resonate with listeners today – whether they’re rediscovering the songs or discovering them for the first-time.

    “I’m really excited about this brand-new addition to Big Weekend and can’t wait to see the impact these iconic acts will have on the crowd in Liverpool.”

    This exciting new addition to Big Weekend is in keeping with the Radio 1 Anthems extension which launched on BBC Sounds last November (2024) and was provisionally approved by Ofcom last week to launch on DAB+. Radio 1 Anthems helps the station’s young listeners to discover and re-discover a wide range of music and artists championed by Radio 1 throughout the 2000s and 2010s.

    With over 100,000 music fans expected to attend across the weekend, audiences can look forward to nostalgia-packed, feel-good sets full of timeless hits and throwback moments from these two iconic acts. They join a stellar line-up including Sam Fender, Tate McRae, Mumford & Sons, HAIM, Tom Grennan, JADE, Lola Young, AJ Tracey plus many more.

    More information on the line-up and tickets can be found on the Radio 1 Big Weekend website.

    BBC Radio 1 will broadcast live from the festival site across the weekend, with performances and tracks available live and on demand across Radio 1’s iPlayer channel and BBC Sounds.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Visit to the Multimedia Complex of Contemporary Arts

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

    The Multimedia Complex of Contemporary Arts invites you to visit the exhibitions “The arrangement of paintings depends on taste. Contemporary art from the collection of Anton Kozlov”, “Natalia Turnova. Unceremonious portrait”, “Naum Granovsky. Moscow: from the first taxis to Olympic construction sites”, “From the history of the Moscow House of Photography. In memory of Mikhail Golosovsky”, “Grisha Selsky. Pokemon Go Go Go” and “Ivan Mikhailov. Space of silence”.

    The exhibition of works by the classic of Russian photography Naum Granovsky, dedicated to the 115th anniversary of his birth, presents unique evidence of how rapidly the architectural appearance of the capital changed from the mid-1920s to the 1980s, and with it the life of Moscow and its citizens. The city was always in the center of the master’s attention. In addition, visitors will see rare newsreels of the capital, showing its life in different years: the work of market squares, cabbies and taxis, the opening of the All-Union Agricultural Exhibition (now VDNKh) and the Moscow swimming pool, the construction of new houses and districts, advertising of Soviet hotels and shops.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    HTTPS: // Rytlet.mos.ru/Event/343302257/

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi receives a telephone call from the President of the Republic of Finland H.E. Mr. Alexander Stubb

    Source: Government of India

    Posted On: 16 APR 2025 5:45PM by PIB Delhi

    The leaders review ongoing bilateral collaboration and reiterated commitment to  to further deepen the partnership.

    They exchanged view on regional and global issues

    Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi had a telephonic conversation with the President of the Republic of Finland H.E. Mr. Alexander Stubb today.

    The leaders reviewed the ongoing collaboration between the two countries including in the areas of digitalization, sustainability and mobility. They reiterated their commitment to further strengthen and deepen the partnership including  in the areas of quantum, 5G-6G, AI and cyber-security. 

    The leaders also exchanged the views on regional and global issues of mutual interest, including the situation in Ukraine.  President Stubb expressed Finland’s support for closer  
    India- EU relations and conclusion of a mutually beneficial FTA at the earliest.  

    The two leaders agreed to remain in touch. 

    ******

    MJPS/SR/SKS

    (Release ID: 2122157) Visitor Counter : 53

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Assistance to Eastern Neighbourhood countries following the loss of USAID funding – E-001472/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001472/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Liudas Mažylis (PPE)

    Following severe cuts to or even the outright termination of USAID funding, many of the initiatives that were receiving support – including in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood – have been left in a vulnerable position. The EU can and should take over some of their funding commitments.

    • 1.Is the Commission prepared to contribute to funding the various projects and programmes in Eastern Europe that are being terminated by USAID, if so, to what extent, what amount could be allocated to this and from what specific sources?
    • 2.How will the Commission respond to the possible suspension of humanitarian assistance to Ukraine in general, and how does the Commission plan to play a role in healthcare in the context of the conflict, in particular in the provision of prostheses for soldiers who have lost limbs?
    • 3.Will the Commission contribute to supporting Moldova, which has received a wide range of assistance through USAID and, if so, how?

    Submitted: 9.4.2025

    Last updated: 16 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Timeframe for the investigations into online platforms under the Digital Services Act – E-001454/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001454/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Liesbet Sommen (PPE)

    In October last year, acting on the basis of the DSA, the Commission requested more information about the parameters used by the algorithms of YouTube, Snapchat and TikTok. In April last year, the Commission opened formal proceedings against Meta. In July last year, the Commission sent preliminary findings to the platform X for violations of the DSA, and additional investigative measures against X were taken in early 2025.

    With the DSA, the Commission has a tool to tackle harmful algorithms of online platforms that deliberately undermine or manipulate the mental health of minors or electoral processes.

    • 1.How far have the investigations into X, TikTok, Snapchat, YouTube and the Meta platforms progressed? When can we expect more information about the results of these studies or when are they expected to be finalised?
    • 2.What are the biggest procedural or legal obstacles to applying the Digital Services Act (DSA) in investigations into online platforms, and what specific obstacles are encountered?

    Submitted: 9.4.2025

    Last updated: 16 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: In-Depth Analysis – Assessing real estate risks and vulnerabilities. Hidden cracks in the financial system? – 16-04-2025

    Source: European Parliament

    This paper reviews a recent data on property markets and real estate-related bank loans in the euro area, looking at prices, mortgages, credit quality measures and some indicators of the costs faced by borrowers. It then takes a closer look at certain origination and monitoring practices adopted by significant institutions, as recently analysed by the ECB, which apparently show some room for improvement. Finally, it addresses property-related exposures held by non-bank financial institutions, with a focus on the main vulnerabilities of real estate investment funds.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – The suspension of the screening of liquids, aerosols and gels in airports – E-001453/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001453/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Isabella Tovaglieri (PfE), Roberto Vannacci (PfE), Susanna Ceccardi (PfE), Silvia Sardone (PfE), Raffaele Stancanelli (PfE)

    Entering into force on 1 September 2024, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2108 halted the security screening of liquids, aerosols and gels (LAGs) in EU airports which use Explosive Detection Systems for Cabin Baggage (EDSCB) equipment meeting standard C3.

    This decision was taken because the Commission had received technical information indicating that a specific configuration of standard C3 EDSCB equipment was not fit for purpose.

    As a result, and in spite of the significant financial investments that had been made, the Commission reintroduced the previous limitations for LAG containers in all airports. Though this measure was supposed to be temporary, it is still in place, and there has been no news on how much progress has been made in evaluating whether the C3 EDSCB equipment can meet the required standards. This state of affairs is harming airport operators financially and is an inconvenience for passengers.

    In the light of the above:

    • 1.Given that Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2108 does not specify the duration of the suspension – instead defining it as ‘temporary’ and making mention of ‘reasonable periods’ – how long does the Commission think it will be before standard C3 EDSCB equipment is fully operational again?
    • 2.In the months when standard C3 EDSCB equipment was being used, did the Commission receive any reports of malfunctions justifying a total suspension?

    Submitted: 9.4.2025

    Last updated: 16 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Expulsion by Morocco of members of the International Association of Jurists for Western Sahara – E-001450/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001450/2025
    to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
    Rule 144
    Ana Miranda Paz (Verts/ALE)

    On Saturday 15 March 2025, Morocco expelled members of the International Association of Jurists for Western Sahara The Moroccan authorities prevented a delegation of Canary Islands lawyers whose mission was to analyse the human rights situation in Western Sahara from entering El Aaiún, expelling them in a ‘hot return’.

    This expulsion comes on top of a long list of restrictions imposed by Morocco to hide the repression in the occupied territory and of expulsions of journalists, politicians, lawyers and international observers to prevent them from revealing the true reality of the repression and attacks suffered by the Saharawi people at the hands of the Moroccan authorities.

    The Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy should condemn this expulsion and inform the Delegation of the European Union in Rabat of this restriction of access, compounding a pattern of violations affecting the Sahrawi population in the occupied territories.

    • 1.Is the European Union going to make it clear to Morocco that it must allow unrestricted access to Western Sahara?
    • 2.When and how is it going to publicly condemn these repeated expulsions that make it impossible to assess the human rights situation, hold meetings with the Saharawi population and visit the towns and villages as normal?

    Submitted: 9.4.2025

    Last updated: 16 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: The sunny side of green energy

    Source: European Investment Bank

    A combination of characteristics makes Chile a potential leader in the production of green hydrogen in Latin America and the Caribbean (alongside Brazil and Colombia).

    Green hydrogen is produced using electrolysers, which split water into hydrogen and oxygen through a process that requires substantial electricity. To qualify as green, this electricity must come entirely from renewable energy sources.

    “Around 65% of the cost of green hydrogen production is related to electricity,” explains Enrique Rodriguez Flores, an energy transition specialist at the European Investment Bank. “The electricity needs to be green, so we look for places with the best renewable energy conditions for electricity generation. Wind and solar are intermittent by nature, but in some areas of Chile, especially in Patagonia in the south and in Atacama in the north, the conditions are so good that they offer a degree of stability.”

    Chile also has political and economic stability. “Promoting billions of euros in private investment requires a secure environment for making investments,” Rodriguez Flores says. “This includes regulation, government support and other such aspects.”

    The Green Hydrogen Fund for Chile – a Team Europe initiative by the European Investment Bank, the German development bank KfW and the EU delegation in Chile – will support a wide range of hydrogen projects, from water desalination and renewable power generation to storage and transport. As part of this initiative, the European Investment Bank is providing a €100 million loan to Chile to support private sector projects.

    “The plan is to have the private sector develop green hydrogen, initially with the support from the public sector, via subsidies and other support from multilateral development banks, which offer more than just financing,” says Gorriño Larrañaga, the EIB loan officer. “They also offer their expertise and high environmental and social standards.”



    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Management of infectious diseases in livestock and breeding animals – E-001444/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001444/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Kristian Vigenin (S&D)

    The management of infectious diseases in livestock and breeding animals remains a major challenge for animal health, farmers’ well-being and sustainable agriculture. Current protocols often involve the culling of entire herds or flocks, even in situations where more targeted, science-based responses might be possible. This approach can be unnecessarily distressing for farmers, financially damaging, and ethically troubling – especially when less drastic alternatives may exist through advances in veterinary science.

    The outbreaks of small ruminant plague (PPR) in Bulgaria in 2018 and 2024 further underscore the urgent need for more effective, nuanced, and evidence-based disease response strategies.

    • 1.Is the Commission planning any new initiatives focused on improving the management of infectious diseases in livestock, particularly through financing research into alternative solutions such as vaccines, treatments and disease monitoring systems?
    • 2.Is there any intention to review and potentially revise the existing EU protocols for handling diseased animals, in order to allow for more flexible and evidence-based approaches that could reduce the reliance on mass culling?
    • 3.Why was the issue of infectious disease management not more prominently addressed in the recently published Vision for Agriculture and Food[1], and will the Commission consider integrating this dimension more explicitly in future strategic planning?

    Submitted: 9.4.2025

    • [1] COM(2025)0075.
    Last updated: 16 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Urgent response to the tariff war initiated by the US – P-001508/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-001508/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Vicent Marzà Ibáñez (Verts/ALE)

    On 2 April 2025, US President Donald Trump announced the imposition of a 20% general tariff on the EU. This poses a particular risk for industry in Valencia, the Spanish region most heavily reliant on exports to the US in relative terms.

    Regulation (EU) 2023/2675 on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries ‘affecting trade or investment in order to prevent or obtain the cessation, modification or adoption of a particular act by the Union’ was adopted in 2023. It provides for the imposition of specific charges, the limitation of access to European public procurement or the restriction of banking or insurance access to EU markets. However, we are not aware that it has been used.

    Given the foreseeable severe economic impacts:

    • 1.Has the Commission initiated the procedure for applying the Regulation?
    • 2.Has the Spanish Government or any other Member State requested it?
    • 3.What measures provided under the Regulation does the Commission intend to implement and within what deadlines?

    Submitted: 11.4.2025

    Last updated: 16 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Financing civil defence in Poland – E-001481/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001481/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Marcin Sypniewski (ESN)

    Poland, as a border state of the European Union and the target of hybrid actions from Russia, is particularly vulnerable to attacks that could have an impact on the civilian population. In addition, last year’s flooding also revealed serious infrastructural deficiencies. Owing to the neglect of the civil defence infrastructure and the limited resources of local authorities, it is extremely difficult to establish an effective civil defence system.

    In the light of the foregoing:

    • 1.Does the Commission plan to allocate funds for the construction of civil defence facilities, such as shelters? If so, under what mechanism and in what amount?
    • 2.Can funds under the energy transition programmes be used to adapt mine facilities to serve as shelters?

    Submitted: 9.4.2025

    Last updated: 16 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Just Transition Fund – E-001480/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001480/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Marcin Sypniewski (ESN)

    In light of the start of work on the MFF for the next programming period, I would like to inquire about the fate of the Just Transition Fund. Decarbonisation affects many regions in Europe, including Poland, and especially Silesia.

    In this connection:

    • 1.At the current stage of work, is the continued existence of the Just Transition Fund in the new MFF being questioned, and will it retain its current character, i.e. as a separate fund under cohesion policy?
    • 2.At the current stage of work, is the Fund intended as a measure exclusively for regions with a coal-based economy, or is an expansion of its scope envisaged?
    • 3.Please present the current assumptions for the Fund and a timetable for further work.

    Submitted: 9.4.2025

    Last updated: 16 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Follow-up question on the cooling-off period for former Commissioners – E-001510/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001510/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Auke Zijlstra (PfE), Marieke Ehlers (PfE), Ton Diepeveen (PfE)

    I refer to the Commission’s answer to question E-000229/2025[1] of 4 April 2024.

    • 1.In its first answer, the Commission seems to suggest that a cooling-off period – generally defined as the period during which a given person is not allowed to carry out certain functions – lapses when a former Commissioner complies with the obligation to notify. Does the Commission agree then that this is not a cooling-off period at all, but a mere obligation to notify a new employment relationship?
    • 2.In its second answer, the Commission admits that an advisory role may include lobbying, even though the whole point of the cooling-off period is to make lobbying impossible during that period. In view of this, how does the Commission justify the distinction between an advisory role and lobbying?
    • 3.In its third answer, the Commission refers to self-assessment on the part of former Commissioners. Accordingly, a Commissioner is supposed to judge for him or herself whether the performance of an advisory role in certain cases borders on lobbying. Does the Commission understand that the principle of self-assessment opens the door to abuse, especially since the Commission itself admits that an advisory role may include lobbying?

    Submitted: 11.4.2025

    • [1] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-10-2025-000229-ASW_EN.html
    Last updated: 16 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Negative impact of wind farms on the environment – E-001434/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001434/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Kosma Złotowski (ECR)

    The problem of birds and bats being killed by wind turbines is nothing new. Protected species are also among the birds that die in wind turbine collisions.

    On 7 April 2025, a French court in Montpellier ruled that a wind farm in Aumelas in Hérault would have to suspend operations for four months for this very reason, and the company that owns the farm was fined. Last year, furthermore, a court in Nîmes ruled that a wind farm in Bernagues in the Grands Causses in Hérault had to be dismantled due to the damage it causes to the environment.

    In this context, the EU Wind Power Action Plan may have a number of negative effects on the natural environment and lead to additional costs for wind farm operators.

    • 1.Is the Commission monitoring cases involving onshore wind farms having an adverse impact on the environment and protected species, and if so, how large is the scale of this phenomenon, and have any EU-funded wind energy investments been suspended because of this?
    • 2.Does the Commission have any estimates of how possible fines for environmental damage imposed by European courts could affect the prices of electricity from wind farms?
    • 3.In the Commission’s view, what is the safe distance from valuable nature sites, nature reserves, parks, forests (especially Natura 2000 sites), but also buildings or houses, at which wind farms can be built without adverse consequences for the environment and human health?

    Submitted: 9.4.2025

    Last updated: 16 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Progress Report – E-001433/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001433/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Moritz Körner (Renew)

    In October 2024, the Commission published its progress report of the EU strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life. Most actions mentioned in the progress report seem to date back to before 7 October 2023.

    • 1.What progress has been made, concretely, since 7 October 2023?
    • 2.Has there been a slowing down in the progress made since 7 October 2023, and if yes, why?

    Submitted: 9.4.2025

    Last updated: 16 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Violation of Directive 1999/70/EC on the grounds of discrimination against substitute teachers in Greece in cases of serious illness – E-001474/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001474/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Elena Kountoura (The Left)

    In Greece, there are situations where substitute teachers who have been diagnosed with serious and hard-to-treat illnesses are discriminated against in terms of labour and other rights in comparison with their permanent colleagues. The competent authorities of the Ministry of Education reject requests for online work or additional days of sick leave during treatment and recovery periods, on the grounds that they are not provided for by the current institutional framework[1]. The only solution is to return to work immediately following the end of the treatment or recovery period – during which they are not paid a salary[2].

    Having regard to Article 54(1) and (3) of Greek Law 3528/2007 (the Civil Servants’ Code), the infringement of EU law due to the incorrect transposition into Greek law of Council Directive 1999/70/EC, which prohibits discrimination against workers on fixed-term contracts, and the infringement procedure initiated by the Commission against Greece (INFR(2024)4013)[3], as well as the inhuman dilemma faced by substitute teachers in Greece, whereby they have to choose between earning a salary or getting treatment in the event of a serious illness, can the Commission say:

    • 1.Is it aware of these cases of discrimination in Greece between workers with different types of contracts as regards sick leave and other employment rights?
    • 2.What steps does it intend to take to ensure equal rights for severely ill workers in Greece, regardless of their contract type?

    Submitted: 9.4.2025

    • [1] In fact, Article 657 of the Civil Code expressly states that an employee’s claim to a salary may be retained even when the employee is not working, provided that the impediment to work is due to an important reason, such as the illness of the employee, as is apparent from the provisions of Articles 660 and 661 of the Civil Code, Article 5(3) of Law 2112/1920 (Government Gazette A, No 67), Article 8 of Royal Decree 16/18-7-1920 and Article 3 of Law 4558/1930 (Government Gazette A, No 124), and as also sustained by the case-law of the courts (Decision 826/2011 of the Court of First Instance in Athens, Decision 542/2010 of the Supreme Court, Decision 4214/2010 of the Court of Appeal of Athens, and others).
    • [2] See for example: https://www.alfavita.gr/ekpaideysi/473918_eipan-se-anaplirotria-na-dialexei-i-tin-therapeia-toy-karkinoy-tis-i-merokamato.
    • [3] Greek law contains less favourable employment conditions for fixed-term teachers working in public schools compared to permanent teachers, for instance as regards sick leave.
    Last updated: 16 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Ukraine: Odesa Oblast improves emergency services with safety centre expansion, thanks to EU bank support

    Source: European Investment Bank

    EIB

    • A new building has opened at the Citizen Safety Centre in Avangard, Odesa Oblast, expanding emergency services for over 36 000 residents in the settlement and neighbouring communities.
    • Equipped to handle wartime challenges, the new facility will strengthen rescue operations, allow for on-site staff training, and provide shelter for civilians and emergency teams during air raids.
    • The facility’s construction was supported through the Ukraine Early Recovery Programme, which helps rebuild essential social infrastructure in Ukrainian communities.

    A second building has been added to the Citizen Safety Centre in Avangard, Odesa Oblast, increasing the emergency response capacity in a region regularly targeted by Russian shelling and located on key transport routes. The centre plays a vital role in firefighting, emergency response and public awareness – not only for Avangard, but for other nearby communities as well. Supported by the European Union and its financial arm, the European Investment Bank (EIB), this new building significantly increases the centre’s ability to respond to emergencies and support local residents.

    The new building will improve emergency response times by enabling faster deployment of rescue teams and equipment, thanks to indoor storage, better administrative space and increased operational capacity. It will also be a safe shelter for staff and residents during air raids, and offer social support services, including basic humanitarian assistance and information for internally displaced persons. The building features modern training facilities to support the skills development and operational readiness of emergency personnel.

    The expansion project has a total investment value of €484 000, and comes under the Ukraine Early Recovery Programme, a joint initiative of the European Union and its bank, EIB. The programme is being implemented in partnership with Ukraine’s Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories and Ministry of Finance, Odesa Oblast Military Administration and Avangard Village Council, with technical assistance from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Ukraine.

    In Odesa Oblast alone, 28 projects under EIB-backed recovery programmes are ongoing or complete, with a total investment value of €48.7 million. These include the reconstruction of 15 educational institutions, seven medical facilities, three administrative buildings, two sewage treatment facilities and a heating plant – all of which will improve services and lead to better quality of life for local residents and displaced communities.

    EIB Vice-President Teresa Czerwińska, who is responsible for the Bank’s operations in Ukraine, said, “This new facility at the Citizen Safety Centre in Avangard is a meaningful investment in the safety and resilience of Odesa Oblast. Supporting infrastructure like this is exactly what the EIB, as the bank of the European Union, is here for: to help Ukrainian communities stay strong, respond quickly and move forward with recovery.”

    Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the EU Delegation to Ukraine Rémi Duflot said, “Today’s opening of the expanded and refurbished Citizen Safety Centre in Avangard marks an important step towards strengthening local resilience and emergency response services in Odesa Oblast. Together with the EIB, we are continuing to restore essential social infrastructure across Ukraine to help communities recover in the face of Russia’s brutal aggression.”

    Deputy Prime Minister for Restoration of Ukraine – Minister for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine Oleksii Kuleba said, “Each new facility opened under the EIB’s recovery programmes, like today’s Citizen Safety Centre in Avangard, makes our communities stronger, more prepared and better equipped with modern solutions. Thanks to EU support, we are not only responding to today’s challenges, but also building the foundations for the longer-term recovery, development and resilience of Ukraine.”

    Head of the Odesa Oblast Military Administration Oleh Kiper said, “The expansion of the Citizen Safety Centre in Avangard is part of a broader effort to strengthen essential services and improve the daily lives of people across Odesa Oblast. With support from the EU and the EIB, 28 recovery projects are already making a real difference – from schools and hospitals to heating and water infrastructure. These investments help our communities stay resilient and move forward despite the war.”

    Head of Avangard Village Council Serhii Khrustovskyy said, “This centre stands for protection and rapid response – exactly what Odesa Oblast needs under the constant threat. I’m proud that the Avangard community is setting an example of how, with the right support, local leadership can deliver real impact.”

    UNDP Resident Representative in Ukraine Jaco Cilliers said, “Ukraine’s recovery is already underway, and we at UNDP are proud to support it through the EIB’s recovery programmes. Together, we are delivering tangible results to communities like Avangard, which can now better serve and support their residents – even under the most challenging conditions.”

    Background information

    The EIB in Ukraine 

    The EIB Group has supported Ukraine’s resilience, economy and recovery efforts since the first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion, with €2.2 billion already disbursed since 2022. The Bank continues to focus on securing Ukraine’s energy supply, restoring damaged infrastructure and maintaining essential public services across the country. Under a guarantee agreement signed with the European Commission, the EIB is set to invest at least €2 billion more in urgent recovery and reconstruction. This funding is part of the European Union’s €50 billion Ukraine Facility for 2024-2027 and is fully aligned with the priorities of the Ukrainian government.

    EIB recovery programmes in Ukraine

    Construction of the second building of the Citizen Safety Centre in Avangard, Odesa Oblast was carried out under the Ukraine Early Recovery Programme, a €200 million multisectoral framework loan from the EIB. The Bank finances three recovery programmes in all, totalling €640 million, which are provided as framework loans to the government of Ukraine. Through these programmes, Ukrainian communities gain access to financial resources to restore essential social infrastructure, including schools, kindergartens, hospitals, housing, and heating and water systems. These EIB-backed programmes are further supported by €15 million in EU grants to facilitate implementation. The Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine, in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance, coordinates and oversees the programme implementation, while local government bodies are responsible for managing recovery sub-projects. The UNDP in Ukraine provides technical assistance to local communities, supporting project implementation and ensuring independent monitoring for transparency and accountability. More information about these programmes is available here.

    Ukraine: Odesa Oblast improves emergency services with safety centre expansion, thanks to EU bank support
    Ukraine: Odesa Oblast improves emergency services with safety centre expansion, thanks to EU bank support
    ©EIB
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    Ukraine: Odesa Oblast improves emergency services with safety centre expansion, thanks to EU bank support
    Ukraine: Odesa Oblast improves emergency services with safety centre expansion, thanks to EU bank support
    ©EIB
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    Ukraine: Odesa Oblast improves emergency services with safety centre expansion, thanks to EU bank support
    Ukraine: Odesa Oblast improves emergency services with safety centre expansion, thanks to EU bank support
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    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Use of EU funds by the Regional Government of Galicia in heritage protection areas incompatible with other local authority projects – E-000337/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    According to the information provided by the national authorities, the project has not been financed by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).

    Based on public information, there are indications that the project referred to by the Honourable Member may be financed by the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF).

    However, the Commission has no prior knowledge regarding the specific case at hand and its status. It works closely with the Member States to implement the recovery and resilience plans, and the implementation of specific projects resulting from the plans lies first with the relevant Member States.

    Therefore, we encourage the Honourable Member to also contact the relevant national administration to enquire about this specific project.

    Should the nature and the RRF funding of this project be confirmed, it should be noted that the RRF is a performance-based instrument.

    Therefore, disbursements are made only if the milestones and targets established in the annex of the Council Implementing Decision[1] approving the plan are satisfactorily fulfilled. Member States are primarily responsible to ensure that RRF investments are implemented in line with EU and national law.

    Article 18 of the Recovery and Resilience Facility Regulation[2] also generally provides that the Commission and the Member States should ensure effective coordination between the RRF and other EU programmes and ensure complementarity, synergy, coherence and consistency among different instruments at EU, national and, where appropriate, regional levels.

    • [1] https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10150-2021-ADD-1-REV-1/en/pdf
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj/eng
    Last updated: 16 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 17, 2025
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