Category: France

MIL-OSI United Kingdom: New appointments to Financial Conduct Authority board announced
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

News story

New appointments to Financial Conduct Authority board announced

Chancellor announces the appointment of four new Non-Executive Directors at the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).
The Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves has today confirmed that Julia Black, Anita Kimber, John Ball and Stéphane Malrait have been appointed as Non–Executive Directors to the Board of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). The Chancellor also confirms a one-year extension of Richard Lloyd’s second term as a Non-Executive Director on the FCA Board.

Julia Black and Anita Kimber will commence their terms on 12 May 2025, John Ball on 27 May 2025, whilst Stéphane Malrait will join later in the year on 20 October 2025. They will each serve an initial three-year term. Richard Lloyd’s second term has been extended and will now conclude on 31 March 2026.

Julia Black is a former External Member of the Prudential Regulation Committee. Julia is a highly accomplished academic in the field of law and financial regulation and has advised policy makers, consumer bodies, and regulators on issues of regulatory strategy and design in the UK and internationally.

Anita Kimber is a former Partner at EY who has also led large practices at PwC and IBM. Anita is experienced in leading transformation programmes across technology, data and analytics combined with customer insight and user experience focused teams. Anita’s experience is closely aligned with regulatory compliance for banks and other financial services institutions, including a secondment and a permanent appointment at Nationwide Building Society.

John Ball is a former Global MD, Pensions Practice for Willis Towers Watson where he enjoyed a near 40 year career. He has extensive change management experience and broader board experience across several WTW subsidiary boards and committees. The FCA Board will benefit from John’s deep pensions expertise.

Stéphane Malrait is a former Managing Director and Global Head of market structure and innovation for Financial Markets at ING Bank. Stéphane has operated in large, complex organisations internationally, including in the US, France, and the UK. He will bring experience of governance across different entities including non-executive board experience with industry associations and fintech companies.

Richard Lloyd is a distinguished member of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) Board, bringing a wealth of experience from his extensive career in consumer rights and public policy. He previously held significant roles, including serving as the Executive Director of Which?, where he championed consumer interests and advocated for fairer markets. Notably, Richard served effectively as the interim Chair of the FCA Board from June 2022 until February 2023, demonstrating strong leadership and a steadfast commitment to the organisation’s objectives.

Chancellor of the Exchequer, Rachel Reeves, said:

The FCA have been crucial in supporting the government’s efforts to reform regulation in order to better support growth and I am pleased to announce the appointments of Julia Black, Anita Kimber, John Ball and Stéphane Malrait to the FCA Board and the extension of Richard Lloyd for an additional year.

All five individuals bring extensive financial services experience to the Board and will help the FCA go further and faster to deliver on this government’s Plan for Change.

Chair of the FCA Board Ashely Alder, said:

I’m delighted to welcome Julia, Anita, John and Stéphane to the FCA board. Together, they bring a wealth of experience and insight across the financial services sector. I look forward to working with them as we deliver our ambitious new 5-year strategy.

I’d also like to congratulate Richard Lloyd on the extension of his second term, which ensures we continue to benefit from his invaluable counsel in the months ahead.

About the Financial Conduct Authority

The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) is the conduct regulator for the UK’s financial services firms and markets. It is responsible for the conduct of around 42,000 businesses and sets the specific prudential standards for roughly 17,000 firms.

It has an overarching strategic objective of ensuring the relevant markets function well. To support this, it has three operational objectives: to secure an appropriate degree of protection for consumers; to protect and enhance the integrity of the UK financial system; and to promote effective competition in the interests of consumers. Its secondary objective is to facilitate the international competitiveness of the UK economy, and its growth in the medium to long-term.

About the appointment process

Julia Black, Anita Kimber, John Ball and Stéphane Malrait have been appointed by the Chancellor following a fair and open recruitment process run by HM Treasury. All appointments are subject to vetting and security clearances currently in progress.

The Treasury is committed to appointing a diverse range of people to public appointments, including at the Financial Conduct Authority. The Treasury continues to take active steps to attract the broadest range of suitable applicants for posts.

Appointments to the FCA Board are regulated by the Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments. Julia Black, Anita Kimber, John Ball and Stéphane Malrait have not engaged in any political activity in the last five years.

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Published 29 April 2025
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
April 29, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: ECB Consumer Expectations Survey results – March 2025
Source: European Central Bank

29 April 2025

Compared with February 2025:
- median consumer perceptions of inflation over the previous 12 months remained unchanged, as did expectations for inflation five years ahead (reported for the first time this month), while median inflation expectations for both the next 12 months and three years ahead increased;
- expectations for nominal income growth over the next 12 months remained unchanged, while expectations for spending growth over the next 12 months decreased;
- expectations for economic growth over the next 12 months were unchanged (remaining somewhat negative), while the expected unemployment rate in 12 months’ time decreased;
- expectations for growth in the price of homes over the next 12 months increased, while expectations for mortgage interest rates 12 months ahead remained unchanged.
Inflation

The median rate of perceived inflation over the previous 12 months remained unchanged at 3.1% in March. This is its lowest level since September 2021. Median expectations for inflation over the next 12 months increased by 0.3 percentage points to 2.9%, the highest level since April 2024, while expectations for three years ahead edged up by 0.1 percentage points to 2.5%, the highest level since March 2024. Expectations for inflation five years ahead, which are being reported for the first time this month, were unchanged for the fourth consecutive month at 2.1%. For more information on this new measure of inflation expectations, please see the box entitled “Consumers’ long-term inflation expectations: an overview” in the Economic Bulletin, Issue 3, ECB, 2025. Inflation expectations at the one-year, three-year and five-year horizons thus remained below the perceived past inflation rate. Uncertainty about inflation expectations over the next 12 months remained unchanged in March at its lowest level since January 2022. While the broad evolution of inflation perceptions and expectations remained relatively closely aligned across income groups, over the previous year and a half inflation perceptions and short-horizon expectations for lower income quintiles were, on average, slightly above those for higher income quintiles. Younger respondents (aged 18-34) continued to report lower inflation perceptions and expectations than older respondents (those aged 35-54 and 55-70), albeit to a lesser degree than in previous years. (Inflation results)

Income and consumption

Consumers’ nominal income growth expectations over the next 12 months remained unchanged at 1.0%. Perceived nominal spending growth over the previous 12 months increased to 5.0%, from 4.9% in February. Expected nominal spending growth over the next 12 months decreased to 3.4% in March, from 3.5% in February and 3.6% in January. This decrease was observed across most income groups. (Income and consumption results)

Economic growth and labour market

Economic growth expectations for the next 12 months were stable in March, standing at -1.2%. Expectations for the unemployment rate 12 months ahead decreased to 10.4%, from 10.5% in February. Consumers continued to expect the future unemployment rate to be only slightly higher than the perceived current unemployment rate (10.0%), implying a broadly stable labour market. Expectations for both economic growth and the unemployment rate remained broadly stable over the previous four months, fluctuating within a narrow range. (Economic growth and labour market results)

Housing and credit access

Consumers expected the price of their home to increase by 3.1% over the next 12 months, which was slightly higher than in February. Households in the lowest income quintile continued to expect higher growth in house prices than those in the highest income quintile (3.3% and 2.8% respectively), although the difference between them narrowed in recent months. Expectations for mortgage interest rates 12 months ahead remained unchanged from February at 4.4%. As in previous months, the lowest income households expected the highest mortgage interest rates 12 months ahead (5.1%), while the highest income households expected the lowest rates (4.0%). The net percentage of households reporting a tightening (relative to those reporting an easing) in access to credit over the previous 12 months increased, while the net percentage of those expecting a tightening over the next 12 months declined. (Housing and credit access results)

The microdata underlying the aggregate results are available on the Consumer Expectations Survey (CES) web page in the Data and methodological information section.

The release of the Consumer Expectations Survey (CES) results for April is scheduled for 28 May 2025.

For media queries, please contact: Benoit Deeg, tel.: +49 172 1683704.

Notes
- Unless otherwise indicated, the statistics presented in this press release refer to the 2% winsorised mean. For further details, see ECB Consumer Expectations Survey – Guide to the computation of aggregate statistics.
- The CES is a monthly online survey of, currently, around 19,000 adult consumers (i.e. aged 18 or over) from 11 euro area countries: Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland. The main aggregate results of the CES are published on the ECB’s website every month. The results are used for policy analysis and complement other data sources used by the ECB.
- Further information about the survey and the data collected is available on the CES web page. Detailed information can also be found in the following two publications: Bańkowska, K. et al., “ECB Consumer Expectations Survey: an overview and first evaluation”, Occasional Paper Series, No 287, ECB, Frankfurt am Main, December 2021; and Georgarakos, D. and Kenny, G., “Household spending and fiscal support during the COVID-19 pandemic: Insights from a new consumer survey”, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 129, Supplement, July 2022, pp. S1-S14.
- The survey results do not represent the views of the ECB’s decision-making bodies or staff.
MIL OSI Europe News –
April 29, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: Did ‘induced atmospheric vibration’ cause blackouts in Europe? An electrical engineer explains the phenomenon

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Mehdi Seyedmahmoudian, Professor of Electrical Engineering, School of Engineering, Swinburne University of Technology

The lights are mostly back on in Spain, Portugal and southern France after a widespread blackout on Monday.

The blackout caused chaos for tens of millions of people. It shut down traffic lights and ATMs, halted public transport, cut phone service and forced people to eat dinner huddled around candles as night fell. Many people found themselves trapped in trains and elevators.

Spain’s prime minister, Pedro Sánchez, has said the exact cause of the blackout is yet to be determined. In early reporting, Portugal’s grid operator REN was quoted as blaming the event on a rare phenomenon known as “induced atmospheric vibration”. REN has since reportedly refuted this.

But what is this vibration? And how can energy systems be improved to mitigate the risk of widespread blackouts?

How much does weather affect electricity?

Weather is a major cause of disruptions to electricity supply. In fact, in the United States, 83% of reported blackouts between 2000 and 2021 were attributed to weather-related events.

The ways weather can affect the supply of electricity are manifold. For example, cyclones can bring down transmission lines, heatwaves can place too high a demand on the grid, and bushfires can raze substations.

Wind can also cause transmission lines to vibrate. These vibrations are characterised by either high amplitude and low frequency (known as “conductor galloping”), or low amplitude and high frequency (known as “aeolian vibrations”).

These vibrations are a significant problem for grid operators. They can place increased stress on grid infrastructure, potentially leading to blackouts.

To reduce the risk of vibration, grid operators often use wire stabilisers known as “stock bridge dampers”.

What is ‘induced atmospheric vibration’?

Vibrations in power lines can also be caused by extreme changes in temperature or air pressure. And this is one hypothesis about what caused the recent widespread blackout across the Iberian peninsula.

As The Guardian initially reported Portugal’s REN as saying:

Due to extreme temperature variations in the interior of Spain, there were anomalous oscillations in the very high voltage lines (400 kV), a phenomenon known as “induced atmospheric vibration”. These oscillations caused synchronisation failures between the electrical systems, leading to successive disturbances across the interconnected European network.

In fact, “induced atmospheric vibration” is not a commonly used term, but it seems likely the explanation was intended to refer to physical processes climate scientists have known about for quite some time.

In simple terms, it seems to refer to wavelike movements or oscillations in the atmosphere, caused by sudden changes in temperature or pressure. These can be triggered by extreme heating, large-scale energy releases (such as explosions or bushfires), or intense weather events.

When a part of Earth’s surface heats up very quickly – due to a heatwave, for example – the air above it warms, expands and becomes lighter. That rising warm air creates a pressure imbalance with the surrounding cooler, denser air. The atmosphere responds to this imbalance by generating waves, not unlike ripples spreading across a pond.

These pressure waves can travel through the atmosphere. In some cases, they can interact with power infrastructure — particularly long-distance, high-voltage transmission lines.

These types of atmospheric waves are usually called gravity waves, thermal oscillations or acoustic-gravity waves. While the phrase “induced atmospheric vibration” is not formally established in meteorology, it seems to describe this same family of phenomena.

What’s important is that it’s not just high temperatures alone that causes these effects — it’s how quickly and unevenly the temperature changes across a region. That’s what sets the atmosphere into motion and can cause power lines to vibrate. Again, though, it’s still unclear if this is what was behind the recent blackout in Europe.

Atmospheric waves can sometimes be seen in clouds.
Jeff Schmaltz/NASA

More centralised, more vulnerable

Understanding how the atmosphere behaves under these conditions is becoming increasingly important. As our energy systems become more interconnected and more dependent on long-distance transmission, even relatively subtle atmospheric disturbances can have outsized impacts. What might once have seemed like a fringe effect is now a growing factor in grid resilience.

Under growing environmental and electrical stress, centralised energy networks are dangerously vulnerable. The increasing electrification of buildings, the rapid uptake of electric vehicles, and the integration of intermittent renewable energy sources have placed unprecedented pressure on traditional grids that were never designed for this level of complexity, dynamism or centralisation.

Continuing to rely on centralised grid structures without fundamentally rethinking resilience puts entire regions at risk — not just from technical faults, but from environmental volatility.

The way to avoid such catastrophic risks is clear: we must embrace innovative solutions such as community microgrids. These are decentralised, flexible and resilient energy networks that can operate independently when needed.

Strengthening local energy autonomy is key to building a secure, affordable and future-ready electricity system.

The European blackout, regardless of its immediate cause, demonstrates that our electrical grids have become dangerously sensitive. Failure to address these structural weaknesses will have consequences far worse than those experienced during the COVID pandemic.

Mehdi Seyedmahmoudian does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Did ‘induced atmospheric vibration’ cause blackouts in Europe? An electrical engineer explains the phenomenon – https://theconversation.com/did-induced-atmospheric-vibration-cause-blackouts-in-europe-an-electrical-engineer-explains-the-phenomenon-255497

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

April 29, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Piero Cipollone: Navigating a fractured horizon: risks and policy options in a fragmenting world

Source: European Central Bank

Speech by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the conference on “Policy challenges in a fragmenting world: Global trade, exchange rates, and capital flow” organised by the Bank for International Settlements, the Bank of England, the ECB and the International Monetary Fund

Frankfurt am Main, 29 April 2025

I’m honoured to welcome you to this conference, jointly organised by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the Bank of England, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).^[1]

Today, we come together to discuss the urgent challenges posed by global fragmentation – a growing risk to our interconnected world. Earlier this month, the President of the United States announced tariff hikes, sending shockwaves through the global economy – a stark reminder that the fractures we face are no longer hypothetical, but real.

This announcement is but the latest chapter in a series of four major shocks that have been reshaping our world in recent years.

First, since 2018 the intensifying power struggle between the United States and China has led to tit-for-tat tariffs affecting nearly two-thirds of the trade between these two economic giants. Second, starting in 2020, the pandemic caused unprecedented disruptions to supply chains, which prompted a re-evaluation of the balance between global integration and resilience. Third, in 2022 Russia’s unjustified invasion of Ukraine not only triggered an energy crisis but also deepened a geopolitical divide that continues to have worldwide repercussions. And fourth, we are now facing the rising risk of economic fragmentation within the western bloc itself, as new trade barriers threaten long-standing international partnerships.

The data paint a sobering picture. Geopolitical risk levels have surged to 50% above the post-global financial crisis average, and uncertainty surrounding trade policy has risen to more than eight times its average since 2021.^[2] What we are experiencing is not merely a temporary disruption – it is a profound shift in how nations interact economically, financially and diplomatically. So, it does not come as a surprise that financial markets have experienced considerable volatility in recent weeks. It remains to be seen if, for markets to find a stable equilibrium, it will be enough to step back from the current international economic disorder towards a more stable, predictable and reliable trading system – a development that appears elusive in the short term. Against this backdrop, recent moves in exchange rates, bond yields and equities, suggest that US markets have not been playing their usual role as a safe haven in this particular episode of stress. This potentially has far-reaching longer-term implications for capital flows and the international financial system.

Today I will focus on three key points. First, we are seeing increasing signs of fragmentation becoming visible across the economy and financial system. Second, the implications of this accelerating fragmentation could extend far beyond the immediate disruptions, with consequences for growth, stability and prosperity. Third, in this evolving economic landscape, central banks must adapt their approaches yet retain a steadfast focus on their core mandates, while striving to preserve international cooperation.

The emerging reality of fragmentation

Let me begin by addressing a common belief – still held by many until recently – that, despite rising geopolitical tensions, globalisation appears largely resilient. Headline figures in trade and cross-border investment, for example, do indeed appear to support this belief. In 2024 world trade expanded to a record USD 33 trillion – up 3.7% from 2023. Similarly, the global stock of foreign direct investment reached an unprecedented USD 41 trillion.^[3] However, these surface-level indicators may not reflect the underlying realities, creating a misleading sense of stability when important changes are already underway. In reality, fragmentation is already happening in both the global economy and the financial system.

Fragmentation of the real economy

Fragmentation is most evident in rebalancing trade, driven by escalating geopolitical tensions. Take, for instance, the escalating US-China trade tensions that have been intensifying since 2018. Studies show the impact of geopolitical distance on trade has become notably negative. A doubling of geopolitical distance between countries – akin to moving from the position of Germany to that of India in relation to the United States – decreases bilateral trade flows by approximately 20%.^[4]

The series of shocks to the global economy in recent years have also contributed to this fragmentation. According to gravity model estimates, trade between geopolitically distant blocs has significantly declined. Trade between rivals is about 4% lower than it might have been without the heightened tensions post-2017, while trade between friends is approximately 6% higher.^[5] Global value chains are being reconfigured as companies respond to these new realities. In 2023 surveys already indicated that only about a quarter of leading firms operating in the euro area^[6] that sourced critical inputs from countries considered subject to elevated risk had not developed strategies to reduce their exposure.^[7]

However, these shifting trade patterns have not yet been reflected in overall global trade flows. Non-aligned countries have played a crucial role as intermediaries, or connectors, helping to sustain global trade levels even as direct trade between rival blocs declines.^[8] But this stabilising influence is unlikely to endure as trade fragmentation deepens and geopolitical alliances continue to shift.

The tariffs announced by the US Administration are far-reaching and affect a substantial share of global trade flows. The effects on the real economy are likely to be material. In its World Economic Outlook, published last week, the International Monetary Fund revised down global growth projections for 2025-26 by a cumulative 0.8 percentage points and global trade by a cumulative 2.3 percentage points.^[9] This notably reflects a negative hit from tariffs that ranges between 0.4% to 1% of world GDP by 2027.^[10] In particular, IMF growth projections for the United States have been revised down by a cumulative 1.3 percentage points in 2025-26. The cumulative impact on euro area growth is smaller, at 0.4 percentage points.

Financial fragmentation

The fragmentation we are witnessing in global trade is mirrored in the financial sector, where geopolitical tensions are also reshaping the landscape.

In recent years, global foreign direct investment flows have increasingly aligned with geopolitical divides. Foreign direct investment in new ventures has plunged by nearly two-thirds between countries from different geopolitical blocs. However, strong intra-bloc investments have helped sustain overall foreign direct investment levels globally, masking some of the fragmentation occurring beneath the surface.^[11]

But, as with trade flows, this dynamic is unlikely to persist as geopolitical tensions grow within established economic blocs. For instance, increased geopolitical distance is shown to curtail cross-border lending. A two standard deviation rise in geopolitical distance – akin to moving from the position of France to that of Pakistan in relation to Germany – leads to a reduction of 3 percentage points in cross-border bank lending.^[12]

The impact of fragmentation in global financial infrastructure is perhaps even more revealing. Since 2014 correspondent banking relationships – crucial for facilitating trade flows across countries – have declined by 20%. While other factors – such as a wave of concentration in the banking industry, technological disruptions and profitability considerations – have played a role^[13], the contribution of the geopolitical dimension can hardly be overstated. The repercussions of this decline can be profound. Research shows that when correspondent banking relationships are severed in a specific corridor, a firm’s likelihood of continuing to export between the two countries of that corridor falls by about 5 percentage points in the short term, and by about 20 percentage points after four years.^[14]

Contributing to this trend, countries such as China, Russia and Iran have launched multiple initiatives to develop alternatives to established networks such as SWIFT, raising the possibility of a fragmented global payment system.^[15] Geopolitical alignment now exerts a stronger influence than trade relationships or technical standards in connecting payment systems between countries.^[16] This poses risks of regional networks becoming more unstable, increased trade costs and settlement times, and reduced risk sharing across countries.

Additionally, we are witnessing a noticeable shift away from traditional reserve currencies, with growing interest in holding gold. Central banks purchased more than 1,000 tonnes of gold in 2024, almost double the level of the previous decade, with China being the largest purchaser, at over 225 tonnes. At market valuations, the share of gold in global official reserves has increased, reaching 20% in 2024, while that of the US dollar has decreased. Survey data suggest that two-thirds of central banks invested in gold to diversify, 40% to protect against geopolitical risk and 18% because of the uncertainty over the future of the international monetary system.^[17] There are further signs that geopolitical considerations increasingly influence decisions to invest in gold. The negative correlation of gold prices with real yields has broken down since 2022, a phenomenon we have also observed in recent weeks. This suggests that gold prices have been influenced by more than simply the use of gold to hedge against inflation. Moreover, countries geopolitically close to China and Russia have seen more pronounced increases in the share of gold in official foreign reserves since the last quarter of 2021.

The looming consequences of fragmentation

Accelerating fragmentation is resulting in the immediate disruptions we are now seeing, but this is likely to only be the beginning – potentially profound medium and long-term consequences for growth, stability and prosperity can be expected.

Medium-term impacts

The initial consequences of fragmentation are already evident in the form of increased uncertainty. In particular, trade policy uncertainty has led to a broader rise in global economic policy instability, which is stifling investment and dampening consumption. Our research suggests that the recent increase in trade policy uncertainty could reduce euro area business investment by 1.1% in the first year and real GDP growth by around 0.2 percentage points in 2025-26^[18]. Consumer sentiment is also under strain, with the ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey revealing that rising geopolitical risks are leading to more pessimistic expectations, higher income uncertainty and ultimately a lower willingness to spend.^[19] Moreover, ECB staff estimates suggest that the observed increase in financial market volatility might imply lower GDP growth of about 0.2 percentage points in 2025.

Over the medium term, tariffs are set to have an unambiguously recessionary effect, both for countries imposing restrictions and those receiving them. The costs are particularly high when exchange rates fail to absorb tariff shocks, and some evidence suggests exchange rates have become less effective in this role.^[20]

The Eurosystem’s analysis of potential fragmentation scenarios suggests that such trade disruptions could turn out to be significant. In the case of a mild decoupling between the western (United States-centric) and the eastern (China-centric) bloc, where trade between East and West reverts to the level observed in the mid-1990s, global output could drop by close to 2%.^[21] In the more extreme case of a severe decoupling – essentially a halt to trade flows – between the two blocs, global output could drop by up to 9%. Trade-dependent nations would bear the brunt of these trade shocks, with China potentially suffering losses of between 5% and 20%, and the EU seeing declines ranging from 2.4% to 9.5% in the mild and severe decoupling scenarios respectively. The analysis also shows that the United States would be more significantly affected if it imposed additional trade restrictions against western and neutral economies – with real GDP losses of almost 11% in the severe decoupling scenario – whereas EU losses would increase only slightly in such a case.^[22]

The inflationary effects of trade fragmentation are more uncertain. They depend mainly on the response of exchange rates, firms’ markups and wages. Moreover, they are not distributed equally. While higher import costs and the ensuing price pressures are likely to drive up inflation in the countries raising tariffs, the impact is more ambiguous in other countries as a result of the tariffs’ global recessionary effects, which push down demand and commodity prices, as well as of the possible dumping of exports from countries with overcapacity. The short to medium-term effects may even prove disinflationary for the euro area, where real rates have increased and the euro has appreciated following US tariff announcements.

In fact, a key feature of most model-based assessments is that higher US tariffs lead to a depreciation of currencies against the US dollar, moderating the inflationary effect for the United States and amplifying it for other countries. But so far we have seen the opposite: the risk-off sentiment in response to US tariff announcements and economic policy uncertainty have led to capital flows away from the United States, depreciating the dollar and putting upward pressure on US bond yields. Conversely, the euro area benefited from safe haven flows, with the euro appreciating and nominal bond yields decreasing.

Long-term structural changes

The long-term consequences of economic fragmentation are inherently difficult to predict, but by drawing on historical examples and recognising emerging trends, it’s clear that we are on the verge of significant structural changes. Two areas stand out.

The first one is structurally lower growth. On this point, international economic literature has reached an overwhelming consensus.^[23] Quantitatively, point estimates might vary. For example, research of 151 countries spanning more than five decades of the 20th century reveals that higher tariffs have typically led to lower economic growth. This is largely due to key production factors – labour and capital – being redirected into less productive sectors.^[24]

However, data from the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a period which tariff supporters often look back to, seem to tell a different story. At that time, trade barriers across countries were high – the US effective tariff rate, for example, reached almost 60%, twice as high as after the 2 April tariffs. And sometimes countries imposing higher trade barriers enjoyed higher growth, which may provide motivation for current policymakers’ trade tariff policies. But these episodes need to be read in historical context. Before 1913, tariffs mostly shielded manufacturing, a high-productivity sector at the time, attracting labour from other, less productive sectors, like agriculture. Therefore, their negative effects were mitigated by the expansion of industries at the frontier of technological innovation. Moreover, the interwar years offer further nuance – the Smoot-Hawley tariffs of the 1930s had relatively limited direct effects on US growth, mainly because trade accounted for just 5% of the economy.

But today’s tariffs are unlikely to replicate the positive effects seen in the 19th century. Instead, they risk creating the same inefficiencies observed in the course of the 20th century, by diverting resources from high-productivity sectors to lower-productivity ones. This contractionary effect could lead to persistently lower global growth rates. In fact, the abolition of trade barriers within the EU and the international efforts towards lower trade barriers in the second half of the 20th century were a direct response to the economic and political impact of protectionism,^[25] which had played a key role in worsening and prolonging the Great Depression^[26] and had contributed to the formation of competing blocs in the run-up to the Second World War.^[27]

The second long-term shift driven by fragmentation might be the gradual transition from a US-dominated, global system to a more multipolar one, where multiple currencies compete for reserve status. For example, if the long-term implications of higher tariffs materialise, notably in the form of higher inflation, slower growth and higher US debt, this could undermine confidence in the US dollar’s dominant role in international trade and finance.^[28] Combined with a further disengagement from global geopolitical affairs and military alliances, this could, over time, undermine the “exorbitant privilege” enjoyed by the United States, resulting in higher interest rates domestically.^[29]

Moreover, as alternative payment systems gain traction, regional currencies may start to emerge as reserves within their respective blocs. This could be accompanied by the rise of competing payment systems, further fragmenting global financial flows and international trade. Such shifts would increase transaction costs and erode the capacity of countries to share risks on a global scale, making the world economy more fragmented and less efficient.

The central bank’s role in a fragmented world

So, as these tectonic shifts reshape the global economic landscape, central banks must adapt their approaches while remaining steadfast in their core mandates. The challenges posed by fragmentation require a delicate balance between confronting new realities and working to preserve the benefits of an integrated global economy. In order to navigate the present age of fragmentation, it is necessary to take action in four key areas.

First, central banks must focus on understanding and monitoring fragmentation. Traditional macroeconomic models often assume seamless global integration and may not fully capture the dynamics of a fragmenting world. Enhanced analytical frameworks that incorporate geopolitical factors and how businesses adjust to these risks will be essential for accurate forecasting and effective policy formulation. The Eurosystem is reflecting on these issues.

Second, monetary policy must adapt to the new nature of supply shocks generated by fragmentation. The effects of the greater frequency, size and more persistent nature of fragmentation-induced shocks and their incidence on prices require a careful calibration of our monetary responses. In this respect, our communication needs to acknowledge the uncertainty and trade-offs we face while giving a clear sense of how we will react depending on the incoming data. This can be done by making use of scenario analysis and providing clarity about our reaction function, as emphasised recently by President Lagarde.^[30]

Third, instead of building walls, we must forge unity. Even as political winds shift, central banks should strengthen international cooperation where possible. Through forums such as those provided by the BIS and the Financial Stability Board, we can keep open channels of cooperation that transcend borders. Our work on cross-border payments stands as proof of this commitment in line with the G20 Roadmap^[31]. The ECB is pioneering a cross-currency settlement service through TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) – initially linking the euro, the Swedish krona and the Danish krone. We are exploring connections between TIPS and other fast-payment systems globally, both bilaterally and on the basis of a multilateral network such as the BIS’ Project Nexus.^[32]

And fourth, central banks must enhance their capacity to address financial stability risks arising from fragmentation. The potential for sudden stops in capital flows, payment disruptions and volatility in currency markets requires robust contingency planning and crisis management frameworks. Global financial interlinkages and spillovers highlight the importance of preserving and further reinforcing the global financial safety net so that we can swiftly and effectively address financial stress, which is more likely to emerge in a fragmenting world.^[33]

In fact, the lesson from the 1930s is that international coordination is key to avoiding protectionist snowball effects, where tit-for-tat trade barriers multiply as each country seeks to direct spending to merchandise produced at home rather than abroad.^[34] In order to avoid this, the G20 countries committed to preserving open trade could call an international trade conference to avoid beggar-thy-neighbour policies^[35] and instead agree on other measures, such as macroeconomic policies that can support the global economy in this period of uncertainty and contribute to reduce global imbalances.

Let me finally emphasise that the current situation also has important implications for the euro area. If the EU upholds its status as a reliable partner that defends trade openness, investor protection, the rule of law and central bank independence, the euro has the potential to play the role of a global public good. This requires a deep, trusted market for internationally accepted euro debt securities. That is why policy efforts to integrate and deepen European capital markets must go hand in hand with efforts to issue European safe assets.^[36]

Conclusion

Let me conclude.

As we stand at this crossroads of global fragmentation, we must confront an uncomfortable truth: we are drifting toward a fractured economic and financial landscape where trust is eroded and alliances are strained.

Central banks now face a double challenge: to be an anchor of stability in turbulent economic waters while reimagining their role in a world where multiple economic blocs are forming. The question is not whether we adapt, but how we mitigate the costs of fragmentation without sacrificing the potential of global integration.

Our greatest risk lies not in the shocks we anticipate, but in the alliances we neglect, the innovations we overlook and the common ground we fail to find. The future of global prosperity hinges on our ability to use fragmentation as a catalyst to reinvent the common good.

MIL OSI Europe News –

April 29, 2025

MIL-OSI: Annual report and financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2024

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

OCTOPUS TITAN VCT PLC

Annual report and financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2024

Octopus Titan VCT plc announces the final results for the year to 31 December 2024 as below.

Octopus Titan VCT plc (‘Titan’ or the ‘Company’) is managed by Octopus AIF Management Limited (the ‘Manager’), which has delegated investment management to Octopus Investments Limited (‘Octopus’ or ‘Portfolio Manager’) via its investment team Octopus Ventures.

Key financials

	2024	2023
Net assets (£’000)	£831,358	£993,744
Loss after tax (£’000)	£(147,649)	£(149,499)
NAV per share	50.5p	62.4p
Total value per share¹	155.6p	164.4p
Total return per share²	(8.8)p	(9.5)p
Total return per share %³	(14.1)%	(12.4)%
Dividends paid in the year	3.1p	5.0p
Dividend yield %⁴	5.0%	6.5%
Dividend declared	0.5p	1.9p

Total value per share is an alternative performance measure, calculated as NAV plus cumulative dividends paid since launch, as described in the glossary of terms.
Total return per share is an alternative performance measure, calculated as movement in NAV per share in the period plus dividends paid in the period, as described in the glossary of terms.
Total return % is an alternative performance measure, calculated as total return/opening NAV, as described in the glossary of terms.
Dividend yield is an alternative performance measure, calculated as dividends paid/opening NAV, as described in the glossary of terms.

Chair’s statement
Titan’s total return for the year to 31 December 2024 was -14.1% with net assets at the end of the period totalling £831 million.

The Net Asset Value (NAV) per share at 31 December 2024 was 50.5p which, adjusting for dividends paid in the year, represents a net decrease of 8.8p per share from 31 December 2023 or a total return of –14.1%.

This further decline in value has been driven by several factors, including company-specific performance issues and tougher trading conditions, which have reduced revenue growth across a range of sectors. As a result, many companies in the portfolio have not met performance expectations, leading to lower valuation multiples being applied compared to those at recent points of investment. This situation has been exacerbated by a continued slow private market fundraising environment, leading to more limited capital availability. Consequently, companies have prioritised extending their cash runway, aiming to achieve profitability or delay fundraising until market conditions improve. In the short term, this has led to reduced valuations due to slower growth, but in the long run, the disciplined focus on sustainable growth should be beneficial.

With this further decline in NAV, the 5-year tax-free annual compound return for shareholders is now -3.5%. Since the high watermark as at 31 December 2021, Titan’s total return per share has been –39.8% with which the Board and Manager are, and shareholders will be, deeply disappointed. The scale of shareholder dissatisfaction has been made abundantly clear following the recently conducted survey.

In the 12 months to 31 December 2024, the Company utilised £137 million of its cash resources, comprising £30 million in new and follow-on investments, £44 million in dividends (net of the Dividend Reinvestment Scheme (DRIS)), £38 million in share buybacks and £25 million in annual investment management fees and other running costs. The cash and corporate bond balance of £184 million at 31 December 2024 represented 22% of net assets at that date, compared to 20% at 31 December 2023.

The total value (NAV plus cumulative dividends paid per share since launch) at the end of the period was 155.6p (31 December 2023: 164.4p). Titan’s one-year total return of -8.8p (-14.1%) five-year total return of -15.6p (-16.4%) and ten-year total return of 6.7p (6.6%) evidences the disappointing decline in performance in recent years.

Strategic Review

As shareholders will be aware, in the half-yearly report issued at the end of September 2024, we announced a review of strategy to ensure a thorough retrospective analysis took place and a plan be drawn up for how the Company can be best structured for sustainability and improved performance in the future. A significant amount of work has been undertaken by Octopus and our appointed external advisers, Smith Square Partners LLP, across a number of different workstreams. This includes a detailed analysis of historical investment performance, ongoing sustainability, the forward-looking pipeline for realisations, future investment strategy, investment team resources and, finally, investment manager’s culture and governance. The significant performance challenges and the early-stage nature of much of the portfolio mean that it will take some time for changes to have an impact on performance and a longer-term approach to shaping the future of the Company is needed. We are making reasonably good progress, and more can be read about the steps which have been taken in the Spotlight section. The response to our shareholder survey is included below. From this it is clear that there is widespread and deep dissatisfaction with the past performance of Titan, both in absolute and relative terms and an understandable frustration with the lack of capital growth in recent years. The Board also acknowledges the recent press coverage, particularly in respect of shareholders’ views on the fees that Titan pays. We would like to thank those that participated in the survey, as well as those that have provided their feedback to both the Board and Octopus. The Board wishes to assure shareholders that it is considering the results and feedback alongside the review.

We expect to provide a further update on the review at, or prior to, our Annual General Meeting (AGM) on 19 June 2025. However, we do not anticipate the process to be completed by this point, so any proposals for the future of the Company will likely be put to shareholders at a later date.

Performance incentive fees
As the 2024 total return has been negative, and total value per share has declined since 31 December 2021, no performance fee is payable. To remind you, the performance fee is calculated as 20% on net gains above the high-water mark (the highest total value per share as at previous year ends), which is currently set as 197.7p as at 31 December 2021.

Dividends
Following careful consideration and recognising the value that shareholders’ place on receiving tax-free dividends, I am pleased to confirm that the Board has decided to declare a second interim dividend of 0.5p per share (2023: 1.9p per share). This will be paid on 29 May 2025 to shareholders on the register as at 25 April 2025. This second interim dividend, in addition to the 1.2p per share interim dividend paid in December 2024 brings the total dividends declared to 1.7p per share in respect of 2024. However, this 0.5p per share dividend is lower than that paid in previous years because of the ongoing performance challenges and dividends are typically a distribution of achieved performance. Considering dividends paid during 2024 (totalling 3.1p), the total dividend yield for the year is 5%, therefore meeting the Company’s target.

Dividends, whether paid in cash or reinvested under the DRIS, are always at the discretion of the Board, are never guaranteed, and are subject to regular review reflecting the returns generated by the Company, the timing of investment realisations, cash and distributable reserves and continuing compliance with VCT rules.

The Board will consider any further dividends to be paid in 2025 in the second half of the year at, or around, the release of the interim accounts for the six months ending 30 June 2025, subject to Titan’s performance, both realised and unrealised, improving and, as ever, Titan holding sufficient cash reserves.

As with the dividend paid to shareholders on 19 December 2024, and in light of the ongoing review of Titan’s strategy, the Board continues to suspend the Company’s dividend reinvestment scheme for the dividend to be paid on 29 May 2025, with the dividend being paid to shareholders in cash.

Fundraise and buybacks
We were pleased to raise over £107 million in the fundraise which closed on 5 April 2024. As stated in the half-yearly review, the Board will decide on the approach to future fundraising at the conclusion of the review of strategy.

During the year, Titan repurchased 67 million shares for £38 million (representing 4.2% of the net asset value as at 31 December 2023). Further details can be found in Note 14 of the financial statements. Details of the share buybacks undertaken during the year can be found in the Directors’ Report.

VCT status
In November 2023, a ten-year extension was announced to the ‘sunset clause’ (a retirement date for the VCT scheme), meaning VCT tax reliefs will be available until 5 April 2035. This extension passed through Parliament in February 2024 and on 3 September 2024, His Majesty’s Treasury brought the extension into effect through The Finance Act 2024. The Board is delighted that this has brought clarity to the status of VCTs.

Board of Directors
Rupert Dickinson was appointed to the Board with effect from 1 May 2024 and was elected by shareholders at the AGM held in June 2024. Rupert has over 20 years’ experience in the wealth and investment management industries. We are already benefitting from his extensive experience.

All the other Directors have indicated their willingness to remain on the Board, and Jane O’Riordan and Lord Rockley will be seeking re-election at the AGM.

Portfolio Manager and team
In March 2024, Malcolm Ferguson, Octopus’ lead Fund Manager for Titan, resigned and Jo Oliver was appointed as lead Fund Manager and Adviser to the Board on fund and strategy on an interim basis. In August 2024, Jo stepped down from this interim role. We wish to take this opportunity to thank both Jo and Malcolm for their contributions to the Company and wish them well for the future. We are pleased that, despite Malcolm’s resignation, he continues to support with portfolio management on a contractual basis. The process to appoint a replacement lead Fund Manager will commence once the review of strategy is completed.

Shareholders may be aware that there has been considerable turnover over the past twelve months in the Octopus Ventures team, which is responsible for managing Titan. As part of the on-going strategic review, Octopus is assessing the team structure, size, culture and experience to ensure it is aligned with its future investment strategy proposals. In the interim, the Octopus Ventures team is receiving additional senior support from across the business to ensure adequate resources are available.

AGM and shareholder event
The AGM will take place on 19 June 2025 from 12.00 noon and will be held at the offices of Octopus Investments Limited, 33 Holborn, London, EC1N 2HT. Full details of the business to be conducted at the AGM are given in the Notice of AGM.

Shareholders’ views are important, and the Board encourages shareholders to vote on the resolutions within the Notice of AGM using the proxy form, or electronically at www.investorcentre.co.uk/eproxy. Shareholders are invited to send any questions they may have via email to TitanAGM@octopusinvestments.com. The Board has carefully considered the business to be approved at the AGM and recommends shareholders to vote in favour of all the resolutions being proposed, as the Board will be doing.

Currently, we do not anticipate the strategic review process will have been fully completed by the date of the AGM. As a result, we will issue a further communication to shareholders in due course setting a date for a shareholder event and, if applicable, a General Meeting at which shareholders will be able to vote on any proposals for the future direction of the Company.

Outlook
The further decline in NAV to 31 December 2024 is extremely disappointing, especially when set against the backdrop of the recent recovery of some of the comparable markets and other VCTs. This decline has been primarily driven by specific portfolio performance issues and sectoral downturns, leading to cash constraints exacerbated by a challenging fundraising environment. Some portfolio companies attempted to raise funds but were unsuccessful, resulting in several being placed into administration or accepting acquisition offers on unfavourable terms. More details on these disposals can be found in the Portfolio Manager’s review. Others had to complete funding rounds at lower valuations or in ways that negatively impacted the value of the Company’s shareholding.

The Company returned £29 million in cash proceeds from exits in 2024, in addition to £12.4 million distributed from Zenith Holding Company to Titan. This is a disappointing outcome as it is below the level achieved in 2023, and does not accomplish the Company’s long-term sustainability target. Despite the Manager’s initiatives to increase the number of realisations of portfolio companies and return cash proceeds to Titan, we have not yet seen any profitable realisations in 2025. This sustained focus on achieving regular liquidity is an important step towards ensuring the ongoing sustainability of the Company.

Despite this, the Board retains a degree of optimism about the potential of some of the companies within what is undoubtedly a diversified portfolio, with over 135 companies spanning a wide range of sectors, business models and investment stages. Furthermore, Titan’s portfolio remains well funded with circa 42% of the portfolio NAV being comprised of companies not expecting to need further funding. This figure rises to 67% when including those companies with more than 12 months’ cash runway.

I would like to conclude by thanking both the Board and the Octopus team on behalf of all shareholders for their hard work during this very challenging period.

Tom Leader
Chair

Spotlight on the review of strategy

On 30 September 2024, the Board, in conjunction with the Manager, announced a strategic review. This was catalysed by the ongoing challenges in the early-stage venture market to which the Company is exposed and the resultant performance issues faced. Since this date, the Board and Manager have undertaken numerous actions to identify the areas of focus and potential changes which could be made to drive the best performance for the Company and outcome for shareholders. Below is a summary of the steps taken to date by both the Board and Manager.

Date	Investment Manager’s actions	Titan VCT Board’s actions	Board meetings held
Sep 2024		Announcement of review of strategy.	Four Board meetings
Oct 2024	Establish internal review committee comprised of different areas of the business. Co-ordinating information packs for the external advisers.	External adviser selection process concluded and terms agreed.
Nov 2024	Recruitment process for senior Portfolio Management roles commences. Internal review committee submits scope of work to the Board.	External advisers, Smith Square Partners, appointed. Board reviews Octopus’ scope of work.	Two Board meetings
Dec 2024	Internal review committee submits information pack on sustainability and fund performance workstreams to the Board.	Shareholder and adviser survey launched. Board reviews information pack on sustainability and fund performance. Board reviews external advisers’ analysis of performance and benchmarking.	One Board meeting
Jan 2025	Survey results analysed. External specialists commence review of Consumer Duty. Internal review committee submits information pack on team and culture and risk and governance work streams to the Board.	Board reviews external advisers’ progress report including analysis of the realisations pipeline. Board reviews information pack on team and culture and risk and governance work streams. Survey results analysed.	Two Board meetings
Feb 2025	Internal review committee presents first part of the go-forward investment strategy and further sustainability analysis and metrics.	Board reviews go‑forward strategy and sustainability analysis and metrics.	One Board meeting
Mar 2025	Results of Consumer Duty Review analysed.	Board reviews external advisers’ progress report. Results of Consumer Duty Review analysed. Unaudited NAV released with update on progress of review.	Two Board meetings
Apr 2025	Internal review committee presents follow up detail on the go-forward investment strategy, as well as proposals for future team and resourcing plan. Proposal submitted to Board regarding ongoing fees.	External advisers’ interim report shared with the Board. Annual report published. Board considers proposal on future team and resourcing strategy and fees. Board commences fee negotiations with Octopus.	Two Board meetings

Summary of the Manager’s internal review workstreams:

1. Fund performance
Working to understand the most appropriate investment and divestment strategy looking at past performance metrics, benchmarks and future objectives.

2. Fund strategy
Investigating potential future options for Titan’s strategy which could drive improved performance. Some potential options were included in the shareholder survey to canvas views.

3. Sustainability
Working on past performance and future forecasting to ensure Titan operates sustainably, returning funds through realisations.

4. Team & culture
Reviewing the team structure, size, culture and experience (past and present) and how it maps to the successful management of the Company. Full Octopus Ventures strategy refresh in line with new Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Erin Platts joining.

5. Consumer Duty
External consultants appointed to carry out a review of Consumer Duty. This is to understand shareholders’ expected outcomes and assessing how the Company has delivered against them.

6. Risk & governance
Work led by the compliance team updating Titan’s risk register. Review and enhancement of governance processes and procedures, where relevant.

What’s next
1. Final Smith Square Partners report presented to the Board.
2. Finalise fee proposal, as well as review of the Investment Management Agreement and Non-Investment Services Agreement.

Octopus Ventures’ new CEO

Erin Platts joined Octopus Ventures as CEO in January 2025.

Previously, she held the role of CEO at HSBC Innovation Banking UK, formerly Silicon Valley Bank UK & EMEA. Over two decades in leadership roles with the institution, she established Silicon Valley Bank UK as a standalone, regulated subsidiary before leading the organisation through the transition period following its sale to HSBC in 2023, scaling operations to over 800 people, across six countries and into the market leading position across the sector.

With a career spent in the US, UK and European tech ecosystems, Erin is an active and vocal spokesperson, championing Diversity, Equity and Inclusion through partnerships with organisations including Tech Nation, Founders Forum and the Newton Venture Program.

Portfolio Manager’s review

At Octopus, our focus is on managing your investments and providing open communication. Our annual and half-year updates are designed to keep you informed about the progress of your investment.

Focus on performance
The NAV of 50.5p per share at 31 December 2024 represents a decrease in NAV of 8.8p per share versus a NAV of 62.4p per share as at 31 December 2023, after adding back dividends paid during the year of 3.1p (2023: 5p) per share, a negative total return per share of 14.1% in the year.

The performance over the five years to 31 December 2024 is shown below:

	Year ended	Year ended	Year ended	Year ended	Year ended
	31 December	31 December	31 December	31 December	31 December
	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
NAV, p	97.0	105.7	76.9	62.4	50.5
Cumulative dividends paid, p	81.0	92.0	97.0	102.0	105.1
Total value, p	178.0	197.7	173.9	164.4	155.6
Total return¹	7.1%	20.3%	(22.5)%	(12.4)%	(14.1)%
Dividend yield²	5.3%	11.3%	4.7%	6.5%	5.0%

1. Total return % is an alternative performance measure, calculated as total return/opening NAV.
2. Dividend yield is an alternative performance measure, calculated as dividends paid/opening NAV.

We are deeply disappointed by the negative total return of 14.1% in 2024 which has been driven by a decline of £193 million across 72 companies. The businesses that contributed most significantly to this decline were Pelago, Many Pets and Big Health. Whilst these companies continue to look to scale, they have underperformed the high expectations set at their last funding round, and so have seen their valuations decline.

These three valuation movements account for around a third of the total decline in NAV over the twelve-month reporting period.

Octopus Ventures believes that many of the companies which have seen decreased valuations in the period have the potential to overcome the issues they face and get their growth plans back on track. Octopus Ventures continues to work with them to help them realise their potential. In some cases, the support offered could include further funding to ensure a business has the capital it needs to execute on its strategy. Our in-house Talent team is being utilised to build high-performing teams and support on key recruitment initiatives. This team, as well as our expert network of consultants, support companies on project work and can also work part-time with the businesses.

More positively, 39 companies saw an increase in valuation in the period, delivering a collective increase in valuation of £56 million. These valuation increases reflect businesses which have successfully concluded further funding rounds at increased valuations, grown revenues or met certain important milestones. Notable strong performers in the portfolio include Legl, Taster and Katkin – all of which have increased their market reach through new product launches. These strong performers demonstrate that there are opportunities available for companies to thrive, and Titan’s diverse portfolio allows different routes for each company to succeed in their market.

The gain on Titan’s uninvested cash reserves was £9.2 million in the year to 31 December 2024, primarily driven by a fair value movement of £4.4 million in the corporate bond portfolio and a return of £4.2 million on the money market funds. The objective for the money market funds is to earn appropriate market rates on highly liquid treasury holdings, with limited risk to capital.

Titan total value growth from inception
The table below highlights the compound annual growth rate across different holding periods.

Despite the reduction in NAV in the year, the total value has seen an increase since the end of Titan’s first year, from 89.9p to 155.6p at 31 December 2024. Since Titan launched, a total of over £557 million has been distributed back to shareholders in the form of tax-free dividends. This includes dividends reinvested as part of the DRIS.

Holding period	Total return	Tax-free compound annual growth rate
Since October 2008	73.1%	3.4%
10 years	6.6%	0.6%
5 years	(16.4)%	(3.5)%
1 year	(14.1)%	(14.1)%

Disposals
Disposals and deferred proceeds have returned £29 million in cash during the period. In addition, £12.4 million was distributed from Zenith Holding Company to the Company.

Exits
In June, Taxfix (a European focused tax return technology platform) acquired TaxScouts, for a combination of cash and equity, which has allowed it to enter the UK market. As a result, Titan now holds shares in Taxfix.

In July, Foodsteps was acquired by Registrar Corp (a provider of regulatory and compliance software for the food, cosmetic and life sciences industry). This transaction was also for a combination of cash and equity and has offered Registrar Corp access to Foodsteps’ global market platform of over 32,000 companies in 190 countries.

In November, Cobee was acquired by Pluxee Group (an employee benefits and engagement platform) as part of its strategic growth plan. Pluxee is a global leader in employee benefits and engagement, operating in 31 countries with over 5,000 employees. Pluxee is uniquely positioned to support Cobee’s continued growth.

In November, nCino (a cloud-based software company that provides a platform for financial institutions to manage their business lines) acquired FullCircl. This will enhance nCino’s data and automation capabilities and allow it to expand its reach across the UK and Europe.

In December, Behavox (a leading provider of AI powered archiving, compliance and security solutions) acquired Mosaic Smart Data.

Partial exits
Two partial exits completed in October with Neat (an embedded insurance platform that enables merchants to offer tailored insurance bundles to their customers at competitive rates) completing a €50 million Series A funding round, and Vitesse (a global domestic settlement and liquidity management system to hold funds and execute cross-border payments) completing a $93 million Series C investment round. As part of both of these rounds, Titan sold a portion of its shares. We are pleased to have realised some value for shareholders in these transactions, but also excited to maintain a holding in the companies and to be able to continue to support their growth journeys.

Deferred proceeds
In the year, Titan also received deferred proceeds from the sale of Calastone (to The Carlyle Group in 2020) which was held via Octopus Zenith Holding Company, iSize (to Sony Interactive Entertainment in 2023), Conversocial (to Verint), Glofox (to ABC Fitness), Comma (to Weavr) and Foodsteps (to Registrar).

Exits at a loss
There have been four disposals made at a loss: Titan sold its remaining shares in Cazoo, which was listed on the New York Stock Exchange, Unmade was acquired by High-Tech Apparel, and Titan’s shares in Appear Here were converted to deferred shares and divested, as there was not seen to be a chance of recovery of any funds. Vinter was acquired by Kaiko (a leading provider of cryptocurrency market data, analytics and indices) for equity. As a result, Titan now holds shares in Kaiko, which are currently valued below Titan’s initial cost of investment, but these will be subject to re-valuation at least twice annually as per our normal process. In aggregate, these losses generated negligible proceeds compared to an investment cost of £19 million.

Companies placed into administration
Unfortunately, Audiotelligence, Stackin (now fully dissolved), Contingent, Phoelex, Excession, Dead Happy, Pulse Platform and Allplants were placed into administration having all been unsuccessful in securing further funding and having explored and exhausted all available options. In aggregate, the investment cost of the companies placed into administration totalled £26 million.

In the year to 31 December 2024, Third Eye and LifeBook were fully dissolved having been placed into administration in previous reporting periods.

The underperformance of a portfolio company is always disappointing for Octopus and shareholders alike, but it is an inherent characteristic of a venture capital portfolio, and we believe the successful disposals will continue to outweigh the losses over the medium to long-term.

	Year ended 31 December 2020	Year ended 31 December 2021	Year ended 31 December 2022	Year ended 31 December 2023	Year ended 31 December 2024	Total
Disposal proceeds¹ (£’000)	23,915	221,504	62,213	45,637	41,432	394,701

1.This table includes cash and retention proceeds received in the period.

New and follow-on investments
Titan completed 8 new investments and made 14 follow-on investments in the reporting period. Together, these totalled £30 million (made up of £19 million into new companies and £11 million invested into the existing portfolio).

Please see a summary of some of the new investments we made in the year.

DRIFT Energy: Designing sailing vessels and routing algorithms required to capture deep water wind energy and convert it into onboard hydrogen gas for transportation back to shore.
ExpressionEdits: Using a proprietary AI algorithm to design DNA sequences and intronization technology to enhance the expression of proteins in mammalian cells.
Forefront: Developing a tuneable Radio Frequency Front-End (RFFE) module for mobile devices which is smaller, cheaper, and more flexible than currently available products sold.
LabGenius: A next-generation platform leveraging machine learning to develop novel therapeutic antibodies.
Manual: Provides innovative treatments for a range of health conditions.
Remofirst is an Employer of Record (EOR) and compliance platform that allows companies to hire and pay employees globally.
SWiiPR: Developed a digital payments platform specifically for the airline industry.

As explained in the half-yearly report, the Octopus Ventures team is focused on improving performance from the existing portfolio and driving improved returns to shareholders. Given Titan’s scale, the greatest returns are expected to be driven by its existing, largest holdings. Over the last nine months, Titan has focused on building value in its existing portfolio, allowing capital and time to be prioritised on existing companies. No term sheets for new investments have been signed since the summer of 2024. The five follow-on investments which completed in the second half of 2024 have all increased in value in the December valuation round, on average seeing an increase of 10%. We believe that this focus will drive positive future NAV performance as these portfolio companies are more established, so have a greater potential to secure further investment, or are closer to an exit.

Shareholder survey results
Octopus regularly seeks feedback from Titan’s investor and adviser base either through local Business Development Managers or after webinars with the Investment Managers. Considering the ongoing review of Titan’s strategy, which is looking at a wide range of areas such as investment strategy, fundraising and dividend policies, Octopus and the Board wanted to give investors and advisers an extra opportunity to share feedback and help shape the future strategic direction of Titan. In conjunction with an external research firm, between December 2024 and January 2025, Octopus surveyed Titan’s investor and adviser base to try to better understand investors’ priorities, areas of concern and opportunities which may be of interest.

We were pleased to see significant engagement, having received over 3,000 responses from investors and advisers. As stated in the Chair’s statement, the results emphasise that the greatest areas of dissatisfaction are around past performance and the capital growth opportunity, as highlighted below. Octopus and the Board share investors’ frustration with the recent poor performance, and have been reviewing Titan’s investment strategy with the aim to improve shareholder returns. The Board intends to communicate to investors any strategic changes once they are agreed in due course.

To understand investors’ priorities when making their investment decision we asked the following:

When you first chose to invest in Titan VCT, how important were the following factors?
The results were as follows in order of importance:

Tax reliefs available on your investment (income tax relief, tax free dividends and tax free capital gains)
5% annual target dividend
Capital growth opportunity
Past performance of fund
Access to early-stage, unlisted tech enabled companies with high growth potential
Ability to sell your shares back to the VCT via the share buyback facility
Size of fund
Fees and charges

Octopus asked investors to rank their level of satisfaction against each of the top eight factors and the results were as follows:

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Neutral or not sure
Tax reliefs available on your investment	88%	2%	10%
5% annual target dividend	50%	22%	28%
Capital growth opportunity	18%	60%	22%
Past performance of fund	21%	52%	27%
Access to early-stage, unlisted tech enabled companies with high growth potential	39%	10%	51%
Ability to sell your shares back to the VCT via the share buyback facility	29%	8%	63%
Size of fund	34%	6%	60%
Fees and charges	22%	18%	60%

Survey results based on responses from 1,093 direct investors and 2,195 advised investors, does not include responses from advisers.

Valuations
Titan’s unquoted portfolio companies are valued in accordance with UK GAAP accounting standards and the International Private Equity and Venture Capital (IPEV) valuation guidelines. This means we value the portfolio at Fair Value, which is the price we expect people would be willing to buy or sell an asset for, assuming they had all the information available that we do, are knowledgeable parties with no pre-existing relationship, and that the transaction is carried out under the normal course of business.

The table below illustrates the split of valuation methodology (shown as a percentage of portfolio value and number of companies). ‘External price’ includes valuations based on funding rounds that typically completed by the year end or shortly after the year end, and exits of companies where terms have been issued with an acquirer. ‘External price’ also includes quoted holdings, which are held at their quoted price as at the valuation date. As at 31 December 2024, Titan only held one quoted holding. ‘Multiples’ is predominantly used for valuations that are based on a multiple of revenues for portfolio companies. Where there is uncertainty around the potential outcomes available to a company, a probability-weighted ‘scenario analysis’ is considered.

Valuation methodology	By value	By number of companies
External price	17%	25
Multiples	53%	30
Scenario analysis	16%	33
Milestone analysis	14%	25
Write-off	–	25

Case studies

MANUAL
https://www.manual.co/
Making high-quality care more accessible and stigma-free

MANUAL provides innovative treatments for a range of conditions, from hair loss and low testosterone to weight management and diagnostics.

With over 800,000 patients served across the UK and Brazil, MANUAL continues to expand its impact. The company’s weight loss brand, Voy, has helped over 70,000 people lose weight. In 2024, MANUAL acquired Menopause Care – the UK’s second largest menopause clinic – furthering its mission to support underserved areas of health.

Following the company’s £29 million Series B raise in 2024, the company is accelerating its growth, with a 140% revenue Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) since 2019. With this investment, MANUAL is scaling its reach and pioneering new healthcare solutions, ensuring more people get the treatments they need to improve their quality of life.

Nearly 90% of men do not seek help unless they have a serious problem
Served more than 800,000 patients to date

Legl
https://legl.com/
Revolutionising Legal Services with AI and Data-Driven Insights

Legl delivers a world-class client experience for UK law firms by reducing risk, improving cash flow, and enabling them to bill and collect payments faster. With actionable client intelligence, their customers are empowered to make smarter decisions and drive business growth.

By leveraging cutting-edge technology and data insights, Legl creates seamless onboarding experiences and superior payment processing capabilities. Beyond onboarding, they provide intelligence and audit functionality to help firms manage risk intelligently in a complex and ever-changing environment. Its embedded finance stack, which has been built specifically for law firms, makes collecting payments, reducing debt, and fostering exceptional client relationships effortless. In turn, providing a step-change for internal cash flow and treasury management.

Helped firms manage risk for over one million clients
Processed over $500 million in payments

BondAval
https://www.bondaval.com/
Transforming non-payment risk protection

Founded in 2020, B2B insurtech Bondaval protects companies when their customers buy now, but don’t pay later, and is already serving some of the largest companies in the world. While existing options are opaque, inflexible or limited, Bondaval’s range of insurance products are made more powerful via their proprietary technology platform, which translates policy obligations into clear tasks, helps aggregate and monitor risk signals, and makes limit management effortless for credit managers. With their receivables secured, businesses can grow faster with more peace of mind, achieve more predictable financial performance, and even access new lines of financing.

Offices in London, New York and Dallas
Licensed in 30+ countries

Taster
https://taster.com/
Food innovators redefining quick-service dining

Taster was founded with the goal of revolutionising the quick-service food experience globally. In 2017, the company raised €8 million, and by 2021, they secured an additional €30 million. By the end of 2023, Taster had grown to 400 online restaurants, with its franchise network expanding across France, the UK, Spain, the Netherlands, and Belgium. Taster collaborates closely with co-creators and kitchen partners, from launching new brands to creating special edition menu items. Their strategy focuses on building social media-first brands that engage audiences and cultivate communities around their digital restaurants.

Operating in over 90 cities across Europe

We are disappointed to report a net decrease in the value of the portfolio of £137 million since 31 December 2023, excluding additions and disposals. This represents a decline of 17% on the value of the portfolio at the start of the year. Here, we set out the cost and valuation of the top 20 holdings, which account for 61% of the value of the portfolio and 47% of the total NAV.

	Portfolio:	Investment focus:	Investment cost:	Total valuation including cost:
1	Skin+Me	Health	£11.5m	£44.9m
2	Amplience	B2B Software	£13.6m	£35.0m
3	Permutive	B2B Software	£19.0m	£31.0m
4	Elliptic	Fintech	£9.9m	£26.2m
5	Vitesse	Fintech	£8.8m	£25.8m
6	ManyPets	Fintech	£10.0m	£24.6m
7	Pelago¹	Health	£17.9m	£23.2m
8	Legl	B2B Software	£7.3m	£18.6m
9	Orbex	Deep tech	£12.0m	£17.8m
10	Token	Fintech	£12.6m	£16.5m
11	Taster	Consumer	£8.1m	£15.4m
12	vHive	Deep tech	£8.0m	£14.9m
13	Ometria	B2B Software	£11.5m	£14.0m
14	SeatFrog	Consumer	£9.6m	£13.5m
15	KatKin	Consumer	£8.2m	£13.2m
16	Automata	Health	£12.3m	£12.4m
17	XYZ	Consumer	£15.3m	£10.7m
18	BondAval	Fintech	£7.1m	£10.6m
19	Iovox	B2B Software	£7.2m	£10.4m
20	Ibex	Health	£11.8m	£9.5m

Digital Therapeutics, Inc., formerly Quit Genius, has rebranded as Pelago.

Top 10 investments in detail¹
1
Skin+Me

Skin+Me offers direct-to-consumer, personalised skincare.
www.skinandme.com

Initial investment date:	September 2019
Investment cost:	£11.5m
	(2023: £11.5m)
Valuation:	£44.9m
	(2023: £48.5m)
Last submitted accounts:	31 August 2023
Turnover:	£28.7m (2023: £14.3m)
Profit/(loss) before tax:	£1.8m
	(2023: £(3.3)m)
Net assets:	£12.8m
	(2023: £(0.7m)
Valuation methodology:	Multiple 2023: Multiple

2
Amplience
Amplience is a leading headless content management system, which powers retailers’ digital channels.
www.amplience.com

Initial investment date:	December 2010
Investment cost:	£13.6m
	(2023: £13.6m)
Valuation:	£35.0m
	(2023: £41.8m)
Last submitted accounts:	30 June 2024
Turnover:	£16.0m
	(2023: £14.9m)
Loss before tax:	£(5.5)m
	(2023: £(8.1)m)
Net assets:	£(22.8)m
	(2023: (£17.4m)
Valuation methodology:	Multiple 2023: Multiple

3
Permutive
Permutive’s publisher data platform gives its customers an in-the-moment view of everyone on their site.
www.permutive.com

Initial investment date:	May 2015
Investment cost:	£19.0m
	(2023: £19.0m)
Valuation:	£31.0m
	(2023: £41.2m)
Last submitted accounts:	31 January 2023
Turnover:	Not available²
	(2023: £9.8m)
Loss before tax:	Not available²
	(2023: £(19.3)m)
Net assets:	Not available²
	(2023: £(40.2)m)
Valuation methodology:	Multiple
	2023: Multiple

4
Elliptic
Crypto compliance and forensic investigation solutions used by financial institutions, crypto businesses, law enforcement, and regulators to detect and prevent financial crime.
www.elliptic.co

Initial investment date:	July 2014
Investment cost:	£9.9m
	(2023: £9.9m)
Valuation:	£26.2m
	(2023: £19.0m)
Last submitted accounts:	31 March 2024
Turnover:	£13.7m
	(2023: £9.6m)
Loss before tax:	£(16.4)m
	(2023: £(27.1)m)
Net assets:	£(3.8)m
	(2023: £10.6m)
Valuation methodology:	Multiple 2023: Multiple

5
Vitesse

A settlement and liquidity management platform to hold funds and deliver international payments globally, using domestic, in-country processing.
www.vitesse.io/

Initial investment date:	June 2020
Investment cost:	£8.8m
	(2023: £10.1m)
Valuation:	£25.8m
	(2023: £26.6m)
Last submitted accounts:	31 March 2024
Consolidated turnover:	£24.8m
	(2023: £11.2m)
Consolidated profit/(loss) before tax:	£0.6m
	(2023: £(5.7)m)
Net assets:	£17.3m
	(2023: £16.2m)
Valuation methodology:	Multiple 2023: Last Round

6
ManyPets

An award-winning insurtech company with a specific focus on providing better pet insurance for everyone.
www.manypets.com

Initial investment date:	October 2016
Investment cost:	£10.0m
	(2023: £10.0m)
Valuation:	£24.6m
	(2023: £47.1m)
Last submitted accounts:	31 March 2024
Turnover:	£29.6m
	(2023: £35.9m)
Loss before tax:	£(34.1)m
	(2023: £(67.5)m)
Net assets:	£79.9m
	(2023: £110.6m)
Valuation methodology:	Multiple 2023: Multiple

7
Pelago

A digital health solution for managing substance use disorders.
www.pelagohealth.com

Initial investment date:	January 2020
Investment cost:	£17.9m (2023: £17.9m)
Valuation:	£23.2m
	(2023: £38.6m)
Last submitted accounts:	Not available²
Turnover:	Not available² 2023: Not available²:
Loss before tax:	Not available² 2023: Not available²
Net assets:	Not available² 2023: Not available²
Valuation methodology:	Multiple 2023: Last round

8
Legl
Cloud based legal workflow automation platform.
www.legl.com

Initial investment date:	January 2021
Investment cost:	£7.3m
	(2023: £7.3m)
Valuation:	£18.6m
	(2023: £13.8m)
Last submitted accounts:	31 December 2023
Turnover:	Not available²
	2023: Not available²
Profit/(loss) before tax:	$1.5m
	(2023: $(0.1)m)
Net assets:	$30.4m
	(2023: $28.8m)
Valuation methodology:	Multiple 2023: Multiple

9
Orbex

Focused on providing low-cost orbital launch services for small satellites.
www.orbex.space

Initial investment date:	December 2020
Investment cost:	£12.0m
	(2023: £10.3m)
Valuation:	£17.8m
	(2023: £15.3m)
Last submitted group accounts:	31 December 2023
Turnover:	Not available² 2023: Not available²
Consolidated loss before tax:	£(17.2)m (2023:(8.8)m)
Consolidated net assets:	£16.3m
	(2023: £31.8m)
Valuation methodology:	Scenario Analysis 2023: Scenario Analysis

10
Token

A leading open banking solution, focused on payments.
www.token.io

Initial investment date:	March 2017
Investment cost:	£12.6m
	(2023: £12.6m)
Valuation:	£16.5m
	(2023: £17.1m)
Last submitted group accounts:	31 December 2023
Turnover:	Not available² 2023: Not available²
Loss before tax:	Not available² 2023: Not available²
Net assets:	£0.9m
	(2023: £0.7m)
Valuation methodology:	Multiple 2023: Multiple

1. These are numbers per latest public filings. More recent figures have not yet been disclosed.
2. Information not publicly available.

Outlook
Our portfolio companies have been navigating a turbulent few years and global geo‑political and economic conditions remain uncertain. Due to the early‑stage nature of the portfolio companies, any improvement in conditions will not be felt immediately.

The fundraising environment remains challenging for portfolio companies, with 2024 seeing both a decline in the number of investments completed at the seed and Series A stages and many rounds completing at decreased valuations. This is largely a function of a reset in venture-backed valuations which began in 2022, with many companies having no option but to accept a reduced valuation to bring in new capital to survive or scale. We have also seen in the year that the venture landscape has been reshaped by AI, which captured a 37% share in all funding in 2024 and 17% of all deals.¹ However, when AI investments are excluded, global deal activity dropped to its lowest levels since 2016.

With some of our portfolio companies struggling to secure new investors and requiring significant investment to develop, many have had to focus on cash preservation and limit their growth. As such, the valuation multiples being applied have declined in line with this. We have also seen some companies being unable to achieve the milestones Octopus set out when the initial investment was completed and so we have seen more declines in value.

Looking to the future, the Octopus Ventures team has been focusing on driving both improved performance and distributions to Titan. In the year, we have been able to realise £29 million in cash proceeds to the Company from exits. This includes deferred amounts received in cash relating to disposals from previous periods. In addition, £12.4 million was distributed from Zenith Holding Company to the Company. The team is actively involved in its portfolio companies and during the year developed specific workstreams to support the portfolio with value-adding activities, as summarised below:

Capital allocation: aims to optimise financial planning by fostering stronger alignment between each company’s strategic objectives and their financial plans, reducing the risk of unexpected cash issues and value-eroding insolvencies or emergency down-rounds. Improving financial planning will ensure efficient resource allocation, minimise risks and enhance profitability, ultimately leading to sustainable growth and long-term success.
Return: looking to drive exits or other liquidity events as part of a clear aim of regularly recycling capital back into the Company.
Raise: to improve fundraising outcomes for portfolio companies, through initiatives such as supporting the creation of fundraising material, network introductions for potential investors or timeframe planning. Raising additional funding is crucial to provide the necessary capital to expand operations, invest in new technologies and seize available growth opportunities, ensuring a company’s long-term viability and competitive edge.
Talent and board: to drive performance in companies by supporting and influencing the build of high performing leadership teams and effective boards. This workstream is driven by Octopus Ventures in-house People and Talent team. Building talented teams drives innovation, enhances productivity and contributes to a positive work culture, all of which lead to a company’s overall success.

Titan’s capital and resources have been prioritised on those portfolio companies which have the potential to drive the greatest returns. This portfolio focus has been leveraging the advantages Titan has of being a very large and mature VCT holding a highly diversified portfolio. Having made over 80 investments in the preceding few years, there remains the opportunity for long-term returns to the Company. The ongoing focus for the team will be optimising growth plans for the portfolio and taking advantage of exit opportunities.

1. https://www.cbinsights.com/research/report/venture-trends-2024/

Risks and risk management

The Board assesses the risks faced by Titan and, as a board, reviews the mitigating controls and actions, and monitors the effectiveness of these controls and actions.

Emerging and principal risks, and risk management

Emerging risks

The Board has considered emerging risks. The Board seeks to mitigate emerging risks and those noted below by setting policy, regular review of performance and monitoring progress and compliance. In the mitigation and management of these risks, the Board applies the principles detailed in the Financial Reporting Council’s Guidance on Risk Management, Internal Control and Related Financial and Business Reporting.

The following are some of the potential emerging risks that management and the Board are currently monitoring:

adverse changes in global macroeconomic environment;
challenging market conditions for private company fundraising and exits;
geo-political instability; and
climate change.

Principal risks

*Risk*	*Mitigation*	*Change*
Investment performance:
The focus of Titan’s investments is into unquoted, small and medium‑sized VCT qualifying companies which, by their nature, entail a higher level of risk and shorter cash runway than investments in larger quoted companies.	Octopus has significant experience of investing in early-stage unquoted companies, and appropriate due diligence is undertaken on every new investment. A member of the Octopus Ventures team is appointed to the board of a portfolio company using a risk-based approach, considering the size of the company within the Titan portfolio and the engagement levels of other investors. Regular board reports are prepared by the portfolio company’s management and examined by the Manager. This arrangement, in conjunction with its Portfolio Talent team’s active involvement, allows Titan to play a prominent role when necessary in a portfolio company’s ongoing development and strategy. The overall risk in the portfolio is mitigated by maintaining a wide spread of holdings in terms of financing stage, age, industry sector and business model. The Board reviews the investment portfolio with the Portfolio Manager on a regular basis. The Portfolio Manager is incentivised via a performance incentive fee for exceeding certain performance hurdles. The Board and Octopus are reviewing the fee structure.	Risk exposures continue to increase due to the difficult macro environment and challenging trading conditions for some portfolio companies continuing.
*Risk*	*Mitigation*	*Change*
VCT qualifying status:
Titan is required at all times to observe the conditions for the maintenance of approved VCT status. The loss of such approval could lead to Titan and its investors losing access to the various tax benefits associated with VCT status and investment.	Octopus tracks Titan’s qualifying status regularly throughout the year, and reviews this at key points including investment realisation. This status is reported to the Board at each Board meeting. The Board has also engaged external independent advisers to undertake an independent VCT status monitoring role.	Decreased exposures reflected in the previous period remain. VCT status monitoring by independent advisers continues to reduce the risk of an issue causing a loss of VCT status.
*Risk*	*Mitigation*	*Change*
Loss of key people:
The loss of key investment staff by the Portfolio Manager could lead to poor fund management and/or performance due to lack of continuity or understanding of Titan.	The Portfolio Manager has a broad team, experienced in and focused on early-stage investing and portfolio company management. Various mitigants exist to assist in managing key person risk. These include frameworks that review succession, remuneration and career progression. Workforce planning is continuous and reviews skillsets and team structures. To reduce the exposure further, the core team is also supplemented by part-time venture partners with sector or functional specialism.	The increased exposures reflected in the previous period remain due to the loss of the lead fund manager and other leadership positions at the Portfolio Manager. The absence of a performance fee and lack of new investments or deal-making opportunities compared to previous periods are also factors.
*Risk*	*Mitigation*	*Change*
Operational:
The Board is reliant on the Portfolio Manager to manage investments effectively, and manage the services of a number of third parties, in particular the registrar, depositary and tax advisers. A failure of the systems or controls at Octopus or third-party providers could lead to an inability to provide accurate reporting and accounting and to ensure adherence to VCT rules.	The Board reviews the system of internal controls, both financial and non-financial, operated by Octopus (to the extent the latter are relevant to Titan’s internal controls). These include controls designed to make sure that Titan’s assets are safeguarded and that proper accounting records are maintained.	No overall change in risk exposure on balance.
*Risk*	*Mitigation*	*Change*
Information security:
A loss of key data could result in a data breach and fines. The Board is reliant on Octopus and third parties to take appropriate measures to prevent a loss of confidential customer information.	Annual due diligence is conducted on third parties which includes a review of their controls for information security. Octopus has a dedicated information security team and a third party is engaged to provide continual protection in this area. A security framework is in place to help prevent malicious events.	No overall change on balance, although cyber threat remains a significant risk area faced by all service providers. The appropriateness of mitigants in place are continuously reassessed to adapt to new risk exposures, such as those posed by artificial intelligence.
*Risk*	*Mitigation*	*Change*
Economic:
Events such as an economic recession and movement in interest rates could adversely affect some smaller companies’ valuations, as they may be more vulnerable to changes in trading conditions or the sectors in which they operate. This could result in a reduction in the value of Titan’s assets.	Titan invests in a diverse portfolio of companies, across a range of sectors, which helps to mitigate against the impact on any one sector. Titan also maintains adequate liquidity to make sure it can continue to provide follow‑on investment to those portfolio companies which require it and which is supported by the individual investment case.	Increased exposures reflected in the previous periods remain and have heightened further as economic uncertainty persists through high inflation, high interest rates and other economic factors.
*Risk*	*Mitigation*	*Change*
Legislative:
A change to the VCT regulations could adversely impact Titan by restricting the companies Titan can invest in under its current strategy. Similarly, changes to VCT tax reliefs for investors could make VCTs less attractive and impact Titan’s ability to raise further funds.	The Portfolio Manager engages with HM Treasury and industry bodies to demonstrate the positive benefits of VCTs in terms of growing early-stage companies, creating jobs and increasing tax revenue, and to help shape any change to VCT legislation.	Risk exposure has continued to reduce since the previous period following the extension of the sunset clause to 2035 being agreed.
*Risk*	*Mitigation*	*Change*
Liquidity:
The risk that Titan’s available cash will not be sufficient to meet its financial obligations. Titan invests in smaller unquoted companies, which are inherently illiquid as there is no readily available market for these shares. Therefore, these may be difficult to realise for their fair market value at short notice.	Titan’s liquidity risk is managed on a continuing basis by Octopus in accordance with policies and procedures agreed by the Board. Titan’s overall liquidity risks are monitored on a quarterly basis by the Board, with frequent budgeting and close monitoring of available cash resources. Titan maintains sufficient investments in cash and readily realisable securities to meet its financial obligations. At 31 December 2024, these investments were valued at £183,770,000 (2023: £199,841,000), which represents 22% (2023: 20%) of the net assets of Titan. The Board also reviews the cash runway in the portfolio.	Risk exposure has continued to increase, reflecting economic uncertainty, the impact on fundraising and the risk of failing to exit portfolio companies.
*Risk*	*Mitigation*	*Change*
Valuation:
The portfolio investments are valued in accordance with International Private Equity and Venture Capital (IPEV) valuation guidelines. This means companies are valued at fair value. As the portfolio comprises smaller unquoted companies, establishing fair value can be difficult due to the lack of a readily available market for the shares of such companies and the potentially limited number of external reference points.	Valuations of portfolio companies are performed by appropriately experienced staff, with detailed knowledge of both the portfolio company and the market it operates in. These valuations are then subject to review and approval by Octopus’ Valuation Committee, comprised of staff who are independent of Octopus Ventures with relevant knowledge of unquoted company valuations, as well as Titan’s Board of Directors.	Risk exposure remains unchanged from the previous period due to economic uncertainty within valuation modelling.
*Risk*	*Mitigation*	*Change*
Foreign currency exposure:
Investments held and revenues generated in other currencies may not generate the expected level of returns due to changes in foreign exchange rates.	Octopus and the Board regularly review the exposure to foreign currency movement to make sure the level of risk is appropriately managed. Investments are primarily made in GBP, EUR and USD so exposure is limited to a small number of currencies. On realisation of investments held in foreign currencies, cash is converted to GBP shortly after receiving the proceeds to limit the amount of time exposed to foreign currency fluctuations.	Risk exposure has not changed since the previous period.

Viability statement

In accordance with the FRC UK Corporate Governance Code published in 2018 and provision 36 of the AIC Code of Corporate Governance, the Directors have assessed the prospects of Titan over a period of five years, consistent with the expected investment hold period of a VCT investor. Under VCT rules, subscribing investors are required to hold their investment for a five-year period in order to benefit from the associated tax reliefs. The Board regularly considers strategy, including investor demand for Titan’s shares, and a five-year period is considered to be a reasonable time horizon for this.

The Board carried out a robust assessment of the emerging and principal risks facing Titan and its current position, including risks which may adversely impact its business model, future performance, solvency or liquidity, and focused on the major factors which affect the economic, regulatory and political environment. Particular consideration was given to Titan’s reliance on, and close working relationship with, the Portfolio Manager.

The Board has carried out robust stress testing of cash flows which included assessing the resilience of portfolio companies, including the requirement for any future financial support and the ability to pay dividends, and buybacks.

The Board has additionally considered the ability of Titan to comply with the ongoing conditions to make sure it maintains its VCT qualifying status under its current Investment policy.

Based on this assessment the Board confirms that it has a reasonable expectation that Titan will be able to continue in operation and meet its liabilities as they fall due over the five-year period to 31 December 2029. The Board is mindful of the ongoing risks and will continue to make sure that appropriate safeguards are in place, in addition to monitoring the cash flow forecasts to ensure Titan has sufficient liquidity.

Directors’ responsibilities statement

The Directors are responsible for preparing the Strategic Report, the Directors’ Report, the Directors’ Remuneration Report and the financial statements in accordance with applicable law and regulations. They are also responsible for ensuring that the annual report and financial statements include information required by the Listing Rules of the Financial Conduct Authority.

Company law requires the Directors to prepare financial statements for each financial year. Under that law the Directors have elected to prepare the financial statements in accordance with United Kingdom Generally Accepted Accounting Practice (GAAP), including Financial Reporting Standard 102 – ‘The Financial Reporting Standard Applicable in the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland’ (FRS 102), (United Kingdom accounting standards and applicable law). Under company law the Directors must not approve the financial statements unless they are satisfied that they give a true and fair view of the state of affairs and profit or loss of the Company for that period. In preparing these financial statements, the Directors are required to:

select suitable accounting policies and then apply them consistently;
make judgements and accounting estimates that are reasonable and prudent;
state whether applicable UK Accounting Standards have been followed, subject to any material departures disclosed and explained in the financial statements;
prepare the financial statements on the going concern basis unless it is inappropriate to presume that the Company will continue in business; and
prepare a Strategic Report, Directors’ Report and Directors’ Remuneration Report which comply with the requirements of the Companies Act 2006.

The Directors are responsible for keeping adequate accounting records that are sufficient to show and explain the Company’s transactions and disclose with reasonable accuracy at any time the financial position of the Company and enable them to ensure that the financial statements comply with the Companies Act 2006. They are also responsible for safeguarding the assets of the Company and hence for taking reasonable steps for the prevention and detection of fraud and other irregularities.

Insofar as each of the Directors is aware:

there is no relevant audit information of which the Company’s auditor is unaware; and
the Directors have taken all steps that they ought to have taken to make themselves aware of any relevant audit information and to establish that the auditor is aware of that information.

The Directors are responsible for preparing the annual report and financial statements in accordance with applicable law and regulations. Having taken advice from the Audit Committee, the Directors are of the opinion that this report as a whole provides the necessary information to assess the Company’s performance, business model and strategy and is fair, balanced and understandable.

The Directors are responsible for the maintenance and integrity of the corporate and financial information included on the Company’s website. Legislation in the United Kingdom governing the preparation and dissemination of financial statements may differ from legislation in other jurisdictions.

The Directors confirm that, to the best of their knowledge:

the financial statements, prepared in accordance with United Kingdom Generally Accepted Accounting Practice, including FRS 102, give a true and fair view of the assets, liabilities, financial position and profit or loss of the Company; and
the annual report and financial statements (including the Strategic Report), give a fair review of the development and performance of the business and the position of the Company, together with a description of the principal risks and uncertainties that it faces.

On behalf of the Board

Tom Leader
Chair

Income statement

	Year to 31 December 2024			Year to 31 December 2023
	Revenue	Capital	Total	Revenue	Capital	Total
	£’000	£’000	£’000	£’000	£’000	£’000
Gain/(loss)/gain on disposal of fixed asset investments	—	5,184	5,184	—	(1,870)	(1,870)
Gain on disposal of current asset investments	—	563	563	—	355	355
Loss on valuation of fixed asset investments	—	(136,894)	(136,894)	—	(131,655)	(131,655)
Gain on valuation of current asset investments	—	4,439	4,439	—	8,098	8,098
Investment income	4,215	—	4,215	4,467	—	4,467
Investment management fee	(954)	(18,125)	(19,079)	(1,054)	(20,028)	(21,082)
Other expenses	(6,072)	—	(6,072)	(6,264)	—	(6,264)
Foreign exchange translation	—	(5)	(5)	—	(1,548)	(1,548)
Loss before tax	(2,811)	(144,838)	(147,649)	(2,851)	(146,648)	(149,499)
Tax	—	—	—	—	—	—
Loss after tax	(2,811)	(144,838)	(147,649)	(2,851)	(146,648)	(149,499)
Loss per share – basic and diluted	(0.2)p	(8.8)p	(9.0)p	(0.2)p	(9.7)p	(9.9)p

The ‘Total’ column of this statement is the profit and loss account of Titan. The supplementary revenue return and capital return columns have been prepared under guidance published by the Association of Investment Companies.
All revenue and capital items in the above statement derive from continuing operations.
Titan has only one class of business and derives its income from investments made in shares and securities, and from bank and money market funds.

Titan has no other comprehensive income for the period.

The accompanying notes form an integral part of the financial statements.

Balance sheet

	As at 31 December 2024		As at 31 December 2023
	£’000	£’000	£’000	£’000
Fixed asset investments		640,797		791,403
Current assets:
Money market funds	93,523		91,172
Corporate bonds	90,247		108,669
Applications cash¹	22		17,842
Cash at bank	213		2,970
Debtors	8,412		1,218
		192,417		221,871
Creditors: amounts falling due within one year	(1,856)		(19,530)
Net current assets		190,561		202,341

Net assets		831,358		993,744

Share capital		1,647		1,594
Share premium		—		45,780
Capital redemption reserve		141		74
Special distributable reserve		1,056,537		1,025,614
Capital reserve realised		(125,444)		(89,570)
Capital reserve unrealised		(57,285)		51,674
Revenue reserve		(44,238)		(41,422)

Total equity shareholders’ funds		831,358		993,744

NAV per share		50.5p		62.4p

Funds raised from investors since Titan opened for new investment which have not been allotted as at year end.

The accompanying notes form an integral part of the financial statements.

The statements were approved by the Directors and authorised for issue on 28 April 2025 and are signed on their behalf by:

Tom Leader, Chair
Company Number 06397765

Statement of changes in equity

			Capital	Special	Capital	Capital
	Share	Share	redemption	distributable	reserve	reserve	Revenue
	capital	premium	reserve	reserve¹	realised¹	unrealised	reserve¹	Total
	£’000	£’000	£’000	£’000	£’000	£’000	£’000	£’000
As at 1 January 2024	1,594	45,780	74	1,025,614	(89,570)	51,674	(41,422)	993,744
Comprehensive income for the year:
Management fees allocated as capital expenditure	—	—	—	—	(18,125)	—	—	(18,125)
Current year gain on disposal of fixed asset investments	—	—	—	—	5,184	—	—	5,184
Current year gain on disposal of current asset investments	—	—	—	—	563	—	—	563
Loss on fair value of fixed asset investments	—	—	—	—	—	(136,894)	—	(136,894)
Gain on fair value of current asset investments	—	—	—	—	—	4,439	—	4,439
Loss after tax	—	—	—	—	—	—	(2,811)	(2,811)
Foreign exchange translation	—	—	—	—	—	—	(5)	(5)
Total comprehensive income for the year	—	—	—	—	(12,378)	(132,455)	(2,816)	(147,649)
Contributions by and distributions to owners:
Share issue (includes DRIS)	120	76,664	—	—	—	—	—	76,784
Share issue costs	—	(1,893)	—	—	—	—	—	(1,893)
Repurchase of own shares	(67)	—	67	(37,986)	—	—	—	(37,986)
Dividends paid (includes DRIS)	—	—	—	(51,642)	—	—	—	(51,642)
Total contributions by and distributions to owners	53	74,771	67	(89,628)	—	—	—	(14,737)
Other movements:
Share premium cancellation	—	(120,551)	—	120,551	—	—	—	—
Prior year fixed asset gains now realised	—	—	—	—	7,473	(7,473)	—	—
Prior year current asset losses now realised	—	—	—	—	(74)	74	—	—
Transfer between reserves	—	—	—	—	(30,895)	30,895	—	—
Total other movements	—	(120,551)	—	120,551	(23,496)	23,496	—	—
Balance as at 31 December 2024	1,647	—	141	1,056,537	(125,444)	(57,285)	(44,238)	831,358

Reserves are available for distribution, subject to the restrictions.

The accompanying notes form an integral part of the financial statements.

			Capital	Special	Capital	Capital
	Share	Share	redemption	distributable	reserve	reserve	Revenue
	capital	premium	reserve	reserve¹	realised¹	unrealised	reserve¹	Total
	£’000	£’000	£’000	£’000	£’000	£’000	£’000	£’000
As at 1 January 2023	1,368	92,896	27	887,288	(53,430)	160,634	(37,023)	1,051,760
Comprehensive income for the year:
Management fees allocated as capital expenditure	—	—	—	—	(20,028)	—	—	(20,028)
Current year loss on disposal of fixed asset investments	—	—	—	—	(1,870)	—	—	(1,870)
Current year gain on disposal of current asset investments	—	—	—	—	355	—	—	355
Loss on fair value of fixed asset investments	—	—	—	—	—	(131,655)	—	(131,655)
Gain on fair value of current asset investments	—	—	—	—	—	8,098	—	8,098
Loss after tax	—	—	—	—	—	—	(2,851)	(2,851)
Foreign exchange translation	—	—	—	—	—	—	(1,548)	(1,548)
Total comprehensive income for the year	—	—	—	—	(21,543)	(123,557)	(4,399)	(149,499)
Contributions by and distributions to owners:
Share issue (includes DRIS)	273	207,132	—	—	—	—	—	207,405
Share issue costs	—	(5,737)	—	—	—	—	—	(5,737)
Repurchase of own shares	(47)	—	47	(32,422)	—	—	—	(32,422)
Dividends paid (includes DRIS)	—	—	—	(77,763)	—	—	—	(77,763)
Total contributions by and distributions to owners	226	201,395	47	(110,185)	—	—	—	91,483
Other movements:
Share premium cancellation	—	(248,511)	—	248,511	—	—	—	—
Prior year current asset losses now realised	—	—	—	—	(355)	355	—	—
Transfer between reserves	—	—	—	—	(14,242)	14,242	—	—
Total other movements	—	(248,511)	—	248,511	(14,597)	14,597	—	—
Balance as at 31 December 2023	1,594	45,780	74	1,025,614	(89,570)	51,674	(41,422)	993,744

Reserves are available for distribution, subject to the restrictions.

The accompanying notes form an integral part of the financial statements.

Cash flow statement

	Year to 31 December	Year to 31 December
	2024	2023
	£’000	£’000
Reconciliation of profit to cash flows from operating activities
Loss before tax¹	(147,649)	(149,499)
Decrease in debtors²	279	3,671
Decrease/(increase) in creditors	146	(440)
Gain on disposal of current asset investments	(563)	(355)
Gain on valuation of current asset investments	(4,439)	(8,098)
Gain on disposal of fixed asset investments	(5,184)	(1,111)
Loss on valuation of fixed asset investments	136,894	131,655
Outflow from operating activities	(20,516)	(24,177)
Cash flows from investing activities
Sale of current asset investments	23,424	4,028
Purchase of fixed asset investments	(30,011)	(97,650)
Proceeds from sale of fixed asset investments³	41,432	45,637
Inflow/(outflow) from investing activities	34,845	(47,985)
Cash flows from financing activities
Movement in applications account	(17,820)	(5,457)
Dividends paid (net of DRIS)	(43,881)	(58,210)
Purchase of own shares	(37,986)	(32,422)
Share issues (net of DRIS)	69,025	187,852
Share issue costs	(1,893)	(5,737)
(Outflow)/inflow from financing activities	(32,555)	86,026
Increase/(decrease) in cash and cash equivalents	(18,226)	13,864
Opening cash and cash equivalents	111,984	98,120
Closing cash and cash equivalents	93,758	111,984
Cash and cash equivalents comprise
Cash at bank	213	2,970
Applications cash	22	17,842
Money market funds	93,523	91,172
Closing cash and cash equivalents	93,758	111,984

Loss before tax includes cashflows from dividends of £4.2 million (2023: £4.2 million).
Movement in debtors, net of disposal proceeds received in the year £41.4 million, with £40.9 million relating to current year disposals and £0.5 million relating to prior year disposals.
Of these proceeds, £12.4 million was distributed from Zenith Holding Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of Titan, to Titan during the year.

The accompanying notes form an integral part of the financial statements.

Notes to the financial statements

1. Principal accounting policies

Titan is a Public Limited Company (plc) incorporated in England and Wales and its registered office is at 6th Floor, 33 Holborn, London EC1N 2HT.

Titan has been approved as a Venture Capital Trust by HMRC under Section 259 of the Income Taxes Act 2007. The shares of Titan were first admitted to the Official List of the UK Listing Authority and trading on the London Stock Exchange on 28 December 2007 and can be found under the TIDM code OTV2. Titan is premium listed.

The principal activity of Titan is to invest in a diversified portfolio of UK smaller companies in order to generate capital growth over the long term as well as an attractive tax-free dividend stream.

The financial statements are presented in GBP (£) to the nearest £’000. The functional currency is also GBP (£). Some accounting policies have been disclosed in the respective notes to the financial statements.

Basis of preparation

The financial statements have been prepared on a going concern basis under the historical cost convention, except for the measurement at fair value of certain financial instruments, and in accordance with UK Generally Accepted Accounting Practice (GAAP), including Financial Reporting Standard 102 – ‘The Financial Reporting Standard applicable in the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland’ (FRS 102), and with the Companies Act 2006 and the Statement of Recommended Practice (SORP) ‘Financial Statements of Investment Trust Companies and Venture Capital Trusts (July 2022)’.

2. Investment income
Accounting policy
Investment income includes interest earned on money market funds. Dividend income is shown net of any related tax credit.

Dividends receivable are brought into account when Titan’s right to receive payment is established and there is no reasonable doubt that payment will be received. Fixed returns on debt and money market funds are recognised so as to reflect the effective interest rate, provided there is no reasonable doubt that payment will be received in due course.

Disclosure

	Year to	Year to
	31 December	31 December
	2024	2023
	£’000	£’000
Money market funds	4,215	4,154
Loan note interest receivable	—	313
Total investment income	4,215	4,467

In the current year, accrued loan note interest income is treated to be included in the fair value of investments. The opening balance of accrued loan interest has been reclassified to be included in the fair value of investments. This reclassification amends the balance previously reported as of 31 December 2023.

3. Investment management fees
Accounting policy

For the purposes of the revenue and capital columns in the Income Statement, the management fee has been allocated 5% to revenue and 95% to capital, in line with the Board’s expected long-term return in the form of income and capital gains respectively from Titan’s investment portfolio.

Disclosure

	Year to 31 December 2024			Year to 31 December 2023
	Revenue	Capital	Total	Revenue	Capital	Total
	£’000	£’000	£’000	£’000	£’000	£’000
Investment
management fee	954	18,125	19,079	1,054	20,028	21,082

The Portfolio Manager provides investment management services through agreements with Octopus AIF Management Limited and Titan. It also provides non-investment services to Titan under a non-investment services agreement. No compensation is payable if the agreement is terminated by either party, if the required notice period is given. The fee payable, should insufficient notice be given, will be equal to the fee that would have been paid should continuous service be provided, or the required notice period was given. The basis upon which the management fee is calculated is disclosed within the Annual Report and financial statements.

4. Other expenses
Accounting policy

Other expenses are accounted for on an accruals basis and are charged wholly to revenue.

The transaction costs incurred when purchasing or selling assets are written off to the Income Statement in the period that they occur.

	Year to	Year to
	31 December	31 December
	2024	2023
	£’000	£’000
Ongoing adviser and non-advised charges	2,111	2,370
Non-investment services fee¹	2,078	2,020
Other fees	780	480
Directors’ remuneration²	263	192
Audit fees	204	191
Registrar’s fees	196	200
Depositary fees	187	270
Listing fees	136	401
Directors and Officers (D&O) insurance	117	123
Impairment of accrued loan note interest receivable	—	17
Total	6,072	6,264

For further information please see note 9.
Includes employers’ NI.

Total ongoing charges are capped at 2.5% of net assets. For the year to 31 December 2024, the ongoing charges were 2.5% of net assets (2023: 2.4%). This is calculated by summing the expenses incurred in the period (excluding ongoing IFA charges and non‑recurring expenses) divided by the average NAV throughout the period.

5. Tax on ordinary activities
Accounting policy

Corporation tax payable is applied to profits chargeable to corporation tax, if any, at the current rate. The tax effect of different items of income/gain and expenditure/loss is allocated between capital and revenue return on the ‘marginal’ basis as recommended in the SORP.

Deferred tax is recognised in respect of all timing differences at the reporting date. Timing differences are differences between taxable profits and total income as stated in the financial statements that arise from the inclusion of income and expenses in tax assessments in periods different from those in which they are recognised in financial statements.

Disclosure
The corporation tax charge for the period was £nil (2023: £nil).

	Year to	Year to
	31 December	31 December
	2024	2023
	£’000	£’000
Loss on ordinary activities before tax	(147,649)	(149,499)
Current tax at 25% (2023: 23.5%)	(36,912)	(35,163)
Effects of:
Non‑taxable income	(1,054)	(977)
Non‑taxable capital loss	31,677	29,418
Non‑deductible expenses	55	71
Zenith distribution¹	3,100	—
Excess management expenses on which deferred tax not recognised	3,134	7,070
Tax rate differences²	—	(419)
Total current tax charge	—	—

1. £12.4 million was distributed from Zenith Holding Company to Titan in the year which is taxable income for Titan.
2. Tax rate difference in the year to 31 December 2023 due to tax charge for the year being calculated at 19% and excess management expenses on which deferred tax is not recognised being calculated at 25%.

Unrelieved tax losses of £227,486,000 (2023: £214,949,000) are estimated to be carried forward at 31 December 2024 (subject to completion of Titan’s tax return) and are available for offset against future taxable income, subject to agreement with HMRC. Titan has not recognised the deferred tax asset of £56,871,000 (2023: £53,737,000) in respect of these tax losses because there is insufficient forecast taxable income in excess of deductible expenses to utilise these losses carried forward. There is no expiry period on these deductible expenses under the UK HMRC legislation.

Approved VCTs are exempt from tax on capital gains. As the Directors intend for Titan to continue to maintain its approval as a VCT through its affairs, no current deferred tax has been recognised in respect of any capital gains or losses arising on the revaluation or disposal of investment.

6. Dividends
Accounting policy

Dividends payable are recognised as distributions in the financial statements when Titan’s liability to make the payment has been established. This liability is established on the record date, the date on which those shareholders on the share register are entitled to the dividend.

Disclosure

	Year to	Year to
	31 December	31 December
	2024	2023
	£’000	£’000
Dividends paid in the year
Previous year’s second interim dividend – 1.9p (2023: 3.0p)	31,876	46,127
Current year’s interim dividend – 1.2p (2023: 2.0p)	19,767	31,636
Total	51,643	77,763

Dividends in respect of the year
Interim dividend – 1.2p (2023: 2.0p)	19,767	31,636
Second interim dividend – 0.5p (2023: 1.9p)	8,236	31,876
Total	28,003	63,512

The figures above include dividends elected to be reinvested through the DRIS.

The second interim dividend of 0.5p for the period ending 31 December 2024 will be paid on 29 May 2025 to shareholders on the register on 25 April 2025, this equates to 1% of the Company’s opening NAV per share.

7. Earnings per share

	Year to 31 December 2024			Year to 31 December 2023
	Revenue	Capital	Total	Revenue	Capital	Total
Loss attributable to Ordinary shareholders (£’000)	(2,811)	(144,838)	(147,649)	(2,851)	(146,648)	(149,499)
Loss per Ordinary share (p)	(0.2)p	(8.8)p	(9.0)p	(0.2)p	(9.7)p	(9.9)p

The total loss per share is based on 1,644,900,726 (2023: 1,506,111,802) Ordinary shares, being the weighted average number of Ordinary shares in issue during the year.

There are no potentially dilutive capital instruments in issue and so no diluted return per share figures are relevant. The basic and diluted earnings per share are therefore identical.

8. Net asset value per share

	31 December	31 December
	2024	2023
Net assets (£)	831,358,000	993,744,000
Ordinary shares in issue	1,647,212,355	1,593,601,092
NAV per share (p)	50.5	62.4

9. Transactions with the Manager and Portfolio Manager

Since 1 September 2017, Titan has been classified as a full-scope Alternative Investment Fund under the Alternative Investment Fund Management Directive (the ‘AIFM Directive’). As a result, since 1 September 2017, Titan’s investment management agreement was assigned by way of the deed of novation from Octopus Investments Limited to Octopus AIF Management Limited to act as Manager (an authorised alternative investment fund manager responsible for ensuring compliance with the AIFM Directive). Octopus AIF Management Limited has in turn appointed Octopus Investments Limited to act as Portfolio Manager to Titan (responsible for portfolio management and the day-to-day running of Titan).

Titan paid Octopus AIF Management Limited £19,079,000 (2023: £21,082,000) in the period as a management fee. The annual management charge (AMC) is based on 2% of Titan’s NAV in respect of existing funds but in respect of funds raised by Titan under the 2018 Offer and thereafter (and subject to Titan having a cash reserve of 10% of its NAV), the AMC on uninvested cash is the lower of either (i) the actual return that Titan receives on its cash and funds that are the equivalent of cash (which currently consist of corporate bonds and money market funds) subject to a 0% floor and (ii) 2% of Titan’s NAV. The AMC is payable quarterly in advance and calculated using the latest published NAV of Titan and the number of shares in issue at each quarter end.

Octopus provides non-investment services to the Company and receives a fee for these services which is capped at the lower of (i) 0.3% per annum of the Company’s NAV or (ii) the administration and accounting costs of the Company for the year ended 31 December 2020 with inflation increases in line with the Consumer Price Index. During the period, the Company paid £2,078,000 (2023: £2,020,000) to Octopus for the non‑investment services.

In addition, Octopus is entitled to performance-related incentive fees. The incentive fees were designed to ensure that there were significant tax-free dividend payments made to shareholders as well as strong performance in terms of capital and income growth, before any performance-related fee payment was made.

Due to performance in the year, the total value has decreased to 155.6p, representing a total loss of 8.8p. Therefore, the high water mark for the 2025 financial year remains at 197.7p.

If, on a subsequent financial year end, the performance value of Titan falls short of the high water mark on the previous financial year end, no performance fee will arise. If, on a subsequent financial year end, the performance exceeds the previous best high water mark of Titan, the Manager will be entitled to 20% of such excess in aggregate.

Octopus received £39,000 in the period to 31 December 2024 (2023: £36,000) in regard to arrangement and monitoring fees in relation to investments made on behalf of Titan. Since 31 October 2018, Octopus no longer receives such fees in respect of new investments or any such new fees in respect of further investments into portfolio companies in which Titan invested on or before 31 October 2018, with any such fees received after that time being passed to Titan.

The cap relating to Titan’s total ongoing charges ratio, that is the regular, recurring costs of Titan expressed as a percentage of its NAV, above which Octopus has agreed to pay, is 2.5%, and is calculated in accordance with the AIC Guidelines.

Octopus AIF Management Limited remuneration disclosures (unaudited)
Quantitative remuneration disclosures required to be made in this annual report in accordance with the FCA Handbook FUND 3.3.5 are available on the website: https://www.octopusinvestments.com/remuneration-disclosures/.

10. Related party transactions

Titan owns Zenith Holding Company Limited, which owns a share in Zenith LP, a fund managed by Octopus.

In the year, Octopus Investments Nominees Limited (OINL) has purchased Titan shares from shareholders to correct administrative issues, on the understanding that shares will be sold back to Titan in subsequent share buybacks. As at 31 December 2024, no Titan shares were held by OINL (2023: no shares) as beneficial owner. Throughout the period to 31 December 2024, OINL purchased 65,000 shares (2023: 1,883,000 shares) at a cost of £36,000 (2023: £1,563,000) and sold 65,000 shares (2023: 1,883,000 shares) for proceeds of £34,000 (2023: £1,353,000). This is classed as a related party transaction as Octopus, the Portfolio Manager, and OINL are part of the same group of companies. Any such future transactions, where OINL takes over the legal and beneficial ownership of Company shares, will be announced to the market and disclosed in annual and half‑yearly reports.

Several members of the Octopus investment team hold non-executive directorships as part of their monitoring roles in Titan’s portfolio companies, but they have no controlling interests in those companies.

Details of the Directors and their remuneration can be found in the Directors’ Remuneration Report.

The Directors received the following dividends from Titan:

	Year to	Year to
	31 December	31 December
	2024	2023
	£	£
Jane O’Riordan	4,766	6,901
Tom Leader	1,464	1,889
Lord Rockley	2,406	2,776
Julie Nahid Rahman	138	89
Gaenor Bagley Rupert Dickinson	738 —	901 —

11. 2024 financial information

The figures and financial information for the year ended 31 December 2024 are extracted from the Company’s annual financial statements for the period and do not constitute statutory accounts. The Company’s annual financial statements for the year to 31 December 2024 have been audited but have not yet been delivered to the Registrar of Companies. The Auditors’ report on the 2024 annual financial statements was unqualified, did not include a reference to any matter to which the auditors drew attention without qualifying the report, and did not contain any statements under Sections 498(2) or 498(3) of the Companies Act 2006.

12. 2023 financial information

The figures and financial information for the period ended 31 December 2023 are compiled from an extract of the published financial statements for the period and do not constitute statutory accounts. Those financial statements have been delivered to the Registrar of Companies and included the Auditors’ report which was unqualified, did not include a reference to any matter to which the auditors drew attention without qualifying the report, and did not contain any statements under Sections 498(2) or 498(3) of the Companies Act 2006.

13. Annual Report and financial statements

The Annual Report and financial statements will be posted to shareholders in early May and will be available on the Company’s website, octopustitanvct.com. The Notice of Annual General Meeting is contained within the Annual Report.

14. General information

Registered in England & Wales. Company No. 06397765
LEI: 213800A67IKGG6PVYW75

15. Directors

Tom Leader (Chair), Jane O’Riordan, Lord Rockley, Gaenor Bagley, Julie Nahid Rahman and Rupert Dickinson.

16. Secretary and registered office

Octopus Company Secretarial Services Limited
6^th Floor, 33 Holborn, London EC1N 2HT

The MIL Network –

April 29, 2025

MIL-OSI Global: What Liberal Mark Carney’s election win in Canada means for Europe

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Katerina Sviderska, PhD Candidate in Slavonic Studies, University of Cambridge

Just months ago, Canada’s Conservatives were leading the polls, surfing the wave of radical right ideas and rhetoric sweeping across the globe. But with the election victory of Mark Carney’s Liberal Party, Canada now stands out as a liberal anchor in a fractured West.

This election may not only shape Canada’s domestic trajectory, but also carries significant implications for its international partnerships amid rising geopolitical uncertainty.

As some European countries and the United States head towards isolationism, authoritarianism and turn to the East — even flirting with Russia — Canada’s continued Liberal leadership reinforces its position as a key ally for the European Union. Carney’s centrist and pro-EU attitude provides stability and relief for Europeans.

From defence to trade and climate, Canada and the EU share deep economic and strategic ties. With a Liberal government, these connections will strengthen, offering both sides what they need the most: a reliable, like-minded partner at a time of transatlantic unpredictability.

What does Carney’s victory mean specifically for the Canada-EU relationship?

Trade as a strategic anchor

Carney’s election offers new momentum for Canada-EU collaboration. His “blue liberalism” brings Canada ideologically closer to Europe’s current leadership — from Emmanuel Macron’s centrist France to the Christian Democratic Union-led coalition in Germany — providing fertile ground for pragmatic co-operation.

Trade remains the foundation of the Canada-EU relationship, and both sides should aim to build on it. At the heart of this partnership is the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), which has increased EU-Canada trade by 65 per cent since 2017.

European Council President António Costa has called the deal a success story providing clear proof “trade agreements are clearly better than trade tariffs.”

As the U.S. speeds toward toward economic nationalism, CETA has become more than a commercial agreement — it’s a strategic anchor in the global liberal order. One of the Liberal government’s early priorities is likely to consolidate and strengthen CETA. In doing so, Canada can position itself as an ambitious partner, ready to seize new opportunities as European countries seek to reduce their reliance on the American market.

Climate and energy: A balanced agenda

Climate and energy, too, offer new opportunities for co-operation. Both Canada and the EU are navigating the tensions between pursuing ambitious decarbonization goals and managing economic and inflationary pressures. After scrapping Canada’s carbon tax on his first day in office, Carney has already hinted at a more pragmatic environmental stance.

While pledging to maintain key climate policies — including the emissions cap on oil and gas — Carney’s government may recalibrate Canada’s approach to energy. This would mirror shifts among some European allies’ climate policies.

This evolving transatlantic consensus — less about abandoning climate goals, more about making them economically viable — paves the way for closer co-operation based on a common goal: bolstering economic competitiveness while maintaining environmental credibility.

Both Carney and the EU view the investment in new technologies as the path forward.

As Europe accelerates its green agenda and implements new sustainability rules, only countries with strong environmental standards qualify as long-term partners. Canada, provided it stays the course on climate policies, is well-positioned to be a key partner in Europe’s green transition.

Transatlantic defence co-operation

Beyond trade and energy, defence co-operation between Canada and the EU is expected to surge. A key priority for the new Liberal government is to finally reach NATO’s benchmark of spending two per cent of gross domestic product on defence, a longstanding commitment that has eluded previous administrations.

Read more:
What does Donald Trump’s NATO posturing mean for Canada?

This signal of rearmament reflects not only alignment with NATO expectations but also a broader understanding that liberal democracies must be prepared to defend themselves. Nowhere is this more pressing than in Ukraine, the epicentre of Europe’s geopolitical storm.

Canada has been among the most reliable supporters of Ukraine since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, aligning itself with Europe’s most committed nations — France, Poland, the Baltics and, increasingly, Germany.

But as threats evolve, the battlefield also extends beyond Ukraine’s frontlines. Hybrid attacks — cyber, disinformation campaigns and foreign interference in democratic processes — now wash up on all shores. Canada’s National Cyber Threat Assessment 2025–26 identifies state-sponsored cyber operations as one of the most serious threats to democratic stability, particularly from Russia and China.

Read more:
Foreign interference threats in Canada’s federal election are both old and new

In strengthening its defence collaboration, Ottawa is hoping to get a seat in the fight against autocracies. The question is no longer whether to engage, but how to lead in this era of layered and compounding threats coming from rivals like Russia and China — and now from the U.S., a historical Canadian ally.

Under Carney’s leadership, Canada is likely to pursue a pragmatic and globally engaged liberalism definitively aligned with Europe. As Canada and the EU are both looking for reliable allies to weather the storm, this renewed western alliance could solidify around Ottawa and Brussels — anchored in shared democratic values and pragmatic leadership.

Katerina Sviderska receives funding from Fonds de Recherche du Québec and the Gates Cambridge Foundation.

Leandre Benoit receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

– ref. What Liberal Mark Carney’s election win in Canada means for Europe – https://theconversation.com/what-liberal-mark-carneys-election-win-in-canada-means-for-europe-254775

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

April 29, 2025

MIL-OSI: Q1 2025 Revenues

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Media relations:
Victoire Grux
Tel.: +33 6 04 52 16 55
victoire.grux@capgemini.com

Investor relations:
Vincent Biraud
Tel.: +33 1 47 54 50 87
vincent.biraud@capgemini.com

Q1 2025 Revenues

Q1 2025 revenues of €5,553 million, up +0.5% at current exchange rates and a decline limited to -0.4% at constant exchange rates¹
Bookings of €5,884 million representing a strong 1.06 book-to-bill for the period

Paris, April 29, 2025 – The Capgemini Group reported Q1 2025 revenues of € 5,553 million, up +0.5% at current exchange rates and a decline limited to -0.4% at constant exchange rates.

Aiman Ezzat, Chief Executive Officer of the Capgemini Group, said: “We delivered a Q1 slightly better than our expectations in a macro and geopolitical environment that remains challenging. Clients continue to focus on transformation programs aimed at improving the agility, cost and efficiency of their operations.

We are well positioned and are taking advantage of the growing appetite of our clients for generative AI and agentic AI which represented more than 6% of our bookings in Q1. We continue to invest in training and assets and to reinforce our ecosystem in this domain with new initiatives with Nvidia and Google Cloud.

We are focused on opportunities in the fields of defense, sovereignty and cyber in Europe while continuing to benefit from global growth in digital core and digital continuity.

Considering the current context on international trade and tariffs, we are confirming our financial objectives for 2025 and as such we retain the cautious stance adopted at the beginning of the year.”

	Revenues (in millions of euros)		Change
	2024	2025	Reported	At constant exchange rates^*
Q1	5,527	5,553	+0.5%	-0.4%

Capgemini revenues reached €5,553 million in Q1 2025, corresponding to a revenue decline limited to -0.4% at constant currency*. This represents a +0.7 points improvement on the year-on-year growth rate reported in Q4 2024, primarily driven by the North America and United Kingdom and Ireland regions.

In a more volatile economic environment due to rising geopolitical tensions, the Group has not seen at this stage a material impact on client decisions. Large companies and organizations remain decidedly focused on transformation programs aimed at improving the agility and efficiency of their operations, at the expense of growth-oriented projects.

In that context, Capgemini’s high value-added services around Cloud, Data & AI and digital continuity enjoyed robust growth in Q1.

OPERATIONS BY REGION

At constant exchange rates, revenues in North America (28% of 2024 Group revenues) were back to slight growth in Q1, up +0.8% year-on-year. This performance was mostly driven by the TMT (Telecoms, Media and Technology) and Financial Services sectors, and partly offset by a decline in the Manufacturing sector.

The United Kingdom and Ireland region (12% of 2024 Group revenues) accelerated further on Q4 2024 growth rate with revenues up +3.9% year-on-year. The Public Sector and Energy & Utilities sector contributed the most to this growth, and Financial Services remained dynamic.

Revenues in France (20% of 2024 Group revenues) declined by -4.9% year-on-year, most notably due to persisting weakness in the Manufacturing and Energy & Utilities sectors.

In the Rest of Europe region (31% of 2024 Group revenues), revenues were down by -2.3% year-on-year, reflecting the decline in the Manufacturing sector whereas other sectors were broadly stable.

Finally, the Asia-Pacific and Latin America region (9% of 2024 Group revenues) enjoyed solid growth with revenues up +7.6% year-on-year. The Public Sector and TMT sector posted a strong growth, complemented by robust momentum in the Financial Services and Manufacturing sectors.

OPERATIONS BY BUSINESS

At constant exchange rates, total revenues* of Strategy & Transformation consulting services (9% of 2024 Group revenues) grew by +1.2% year-on-year in Q1.

Total revenues of Applications & Technology services (62% of 2024 Group revenues and Capgemini’s core business) were up +1.9% year-on-year.

Finally, total revenues of Operations & Engineering services (29% of 2024 Group revenues) declined by -2.6% year-on-year.

HEADCOUNT

At March 31, 2025, the Group’s total headcount stood at 342,700, up +1.6% year-on-year and +0.5% compared to the end of December 2024.

Onshore headcount decreased by -1.4% to 143,300, while offshore headcount was up +3.9% to 199,400, i.e., 58% of total employees.

BOOKINGS

Bookings totaled €5,884 million in Q1 2025, up +2.8% year-on-year at constant exchange rates. The book-to-bill ratio stands at 1.06, above the historical average for the period.

OUTLOOK

The Group’s financial targets for 2025 are:

Revenue growth of -2.0% to +2.0% at constant currency;
Operating margin of 13.3% to 13.5%;
Organic free cash flow of around €1.9 billion.

CONFERENCE CALL

Aiman Ezzat, Chief Executive Officer, accompanied by Nive Bhagat, Chief Financial Officer, will comment on this publication during a conference call in English to be held today at 8.00 a.m. Paris time (CET). You can follow this conference call live via webcast at the following link. A replay will also be available for a period of one year.

All documents relating to this publication will be posted on the Capgemini investor website at https://investors.capgemini.com/en/.

PROVISIONAL CALENDAR

May 7, 2025        Shareholders’ meeting
July 30, 2025        H1 2025 results
October 28, 2025        Q3 2025 revenues

The dividend payment schedule to be submitted to the Shareholders’ Meeting for approval would be:

May 20, 2025 Ex-dividend date on Euronext Paris
May 22, 2025 Payment of the dividend

DISCLAIMER

This press release may contain forward-looking statements. Such statements may include projections, estimates, assumptions, statements regarding plans, objectives, intentions and/or expectations with respect to future financial results, events, operations and services and product development, as well as statements, regarding future performance or events. Forward-looking statements are generally identified by the words “expects”, “anticipates”, “believes”, “intends”, “estimates”, “plans”, “projects”, “may”, “would”, “should” or the negatives of these terms and similar expressions. Although Capgemini’s management currently believes that the expectations reflected in such forward-looking statements are reasonable, investors are cautioned that forward-looking statements are subject to various risks and uncertainties (including, without limitation, risks identified in Capgemini’s Universal Registration Document available on Capgemini’s website), because they relate to future events and depend on future circumstances that may or may not occur and may be different from those anticipated, many of which are difficult to predict and generally beyond the control of Capgemini. Actual results and developments may differ materially from those expressed in, implied by or projected by forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are not intended to and do not give any assurances or comfort as to future events or results. Other than as required by applicable law, Capgemini does not undertake any obligation to update or revise any forward-looking statement.

This press release does not contain or constitute an offer of securities for sale or an invitation or inducement to invest in securities in France, the United States or any other jurisdiction.

ABOUT CAPGEMINI

Capgemini is a global business and technology transformation partner, helping organizations to accelerate their dual transition to a digital and sustainable world, while creating tangible impact for enterprises and society. It is a responsible and diverse group of 340,000 team members in more than 50 countries. With its strong over 55-year heritage, Capgemini is trusted by its clients to unlock the value of technology to address the entire breadth of their business needs. It delivers end-to-end services and solutions leveraging strengths from strategy and design to engineering, all fueled by its market leading capabilities in AI, generative AI, cloud and data, combined with its deep industry expertise and partner ecosystem. The Group reported 2024 global revenues of €22.1 billion.

Get the Future You Want | http://www.capgemini.com/

* *

APPENDIX¹

BUSINESS CLASSIFICATION

Strategy & Transformation includes all strategy, innovation and transformation consulting services.
Applications & Technology brings together “Application Services” and related activities and notably local technology services.
- Operations & Engineering encompasses all other Group businesses. These comprise Business Services (including Business Process Outsourcing and transaction services), all Infrastructure and Cloud services, and R&D and Engineering services.

DEFINITIONS

Year-on-year revenue growth at constant exchange rates is calculated by comparing revenues for the reported period with those of the same period of the previous year restated with the exchange rates of the reported period.

Reconciliation of growth rates	Q1 2025
Growth at constant exchange rates	-0.4%
Exchange rate fluctuations	+0.9pts
Reported growth	+0.5%

When determining activity trends by business and in accordance with internal operating performance measures, growth at constant exchange rates is calculated based on total revenues, i.e., before elimination of inter-business billing. The Group considers this to be more representative of activity levels by business. As its businesses change, an increasing number of contracts require a range of business expertise for delivery, leading to a rise in inter-business flows.

Operating margin is one of the Group’s key performance indicators. It is defined as the difference between revenues and operating costs. It is calculated before “Other operating income and expenses” which include amortization of intangible assets recognized in business combinations, expenses relative to share-based compensation (including social security contributions and employer contributions) and employee share ownership plan, and non-recurring revenues and expenses, notably impairment of goodwill, negative goodwill, capital gains or losses on disposals of consolidated companies or businesses, restructuring costs incurred under a detailed formal plan approved by the Group’s management, the cost of acquiring and integrating companies acquired by the Group, including earn-outs comprising conditions of presence, and the effects of curtailments, settlements and transfers of defined benefit pension plans.

Normalized net profit is equal to profit for the year (Group share) adjusted for the impact of items recognized in “Other operating income and expense”, net of tax calculated using the effective tax rate. Normalized earnings per share is computed like basic earnings per share, i.e., excluding dilution.

Organic free cash flow is equal to cash flow from operations less acquisitions of property, plant, equipment and intangible assets (net of disposals) and repayments of lease liabilities, adjusted for cash out relating to the net interest cost.

Net debt (or net cash) comprises (i) cash and cash equivalents, as presented in the Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows (consisting of short-term investments and cash at bank) less bank overdrafts, and also including (ii) cash management assets (assets presented separately in the Consolidated Statement of Financial Position due to their characteristics), less (iii) short- and long-term borrowings. Account is also taken of (iv) the impact of hedging instruments when these relate to borrowings, intercompany loans, and own shares.

REVENUES BY REGION

	Revenues (in millions of euros)		Year-on-year growth
	Q1 2024	Q1 2025	Reported	At constant exchange rates
North America	1,527	1,582	+3.6%	+0.8%
United Kingdom and Ireland	684	728	+6.4%	+3.9%
France	1,131	1,076	-4.9%	-4.9%
Rest of Europe	1,729	1,689	-2.3%	-2.3%
Asia-Pacific and Latin America	456	478	+4.9%	+7.6%
TOTAL	5,527	5,553	+0.5%	-0.4%

REVENUES BY BUSINESS

	Total revenues* (in % of 2024 Group revenues)	Year-on-year growth of total revenues at constant exchange rates
	Total revenues* (in % of 2024 Group revenues)
Strategy & Transformation	9%	+1.2%
Applications & Technology	62%	+1.9%
Operations & Engineering	29%	-2.6%

¹ The terms and Alternative Performance Measures marked with an (*) are defined and/or reconciled in the appendix to this press release.
¹ Note that in the appendix, certain totals may not equal the sum of amounts due to rounding adjustments.

Attachment

Capgemini_-_2025-04-29_-_2025_Q1_Revenues

The MIL Network –

April 29, 2025

MIL-OSI: Planisware – Q1 2025 revenue

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Q1 2025 revenue: € 47.5 million; +16.0%

Revenue up +14.3% in constant currencies, in line with FY planned trajectory
Strong commercial dynamic despite still elongated sales cycles
Growing pipeline fueled by high demand for advanced solutions providing visibility and agility
2025 objectives confirmed:
- Mid-to-high teens revenue growth in constant currencies
- c. 35% adjusted EBITDA margin¹
- Cash Conversion Rate^*of c. 80%

Paris, France, April 29, 2025 – Planisware, a leading B2B provider of SaaS in the rapidly growing Project Economy market, announces today its Q1 2025 revenue. Up by +16.0% in current currencies Revenue amounted to € 47.5 million, mainly led by the continued success of the Group’s market-leading SaaS platform. In constant currencies, revenue growth reached +14.3% (€+5.9 million), in line with the planned trajectory to achieve a mid-to-high teens revenue growth in 2025. Recurring revenue amounted to € 43.9 million (92% of total revenue) and was up by +16.2% in constant currencies.

Loïc Sautour, CEO of Planisware, commented: “Although we are not directly impacted by tariffs, we are still observing elongated customers’ decision-making process. So we continue to leverage the close connection with our existing customers, but also to initiate commercial relationships with new clients. This approach enabled Planisware to deliver a robust revenue growth in Q1 2025, in line with the planned trajectory for the year.

Facing a significant level of macroeconomic uncertainties, our clients and prospects express greater needs for advanced solutions to manage their portfolio of strategic projects and gain better visibility and agility to navigate in this challenging environment.

In this context, we confirm our mid-to-high teens revenue growth objective for the year while staying vigilant to potential further deterioration in the global economy, particularly in the short term. We also remain disciplined on resources allocation to maintain a strong profitability and best-in-class cash conversion rate while ensuring we keep investing in our long-term growth.”

Q1 2025 revenue by revenue stream

In € million	Q1 2025	Q1 2024	*Variation* *YoY*	*Variation* *in cc**
Recurring revenue	43.9	37.2	*+18.0%*	*+16.2%*
SaaS & Hosting	22.7	18.9	+20.4%	+18.5%
Evolutive support	13.2	10.8	+21.8%	+20.0%
Subscription support	3.0	2.8	+6.7%	+4.1%
Maintenance	4.9	4.6	+6.4%	+5.2%
Non-recurring revenue	3.6	3.8	*-3.3%*	*-4.4%*
Perpetual licenses	0.8	1.1	-24.1%	-25.4%
Implementation & others non-recurring	2.8	2.7	+5.5%	+4.4%
Total revenue	47.5	40.9	*+16.0%*	*+14.3%*

* Revenue evolution in constant currencies, i.e. at Q1 2024 average exchange rates

Reaching € 47.5 million in Q1 2025, revenue was up by +16.0% in current currencies and +14.3% in constant currencies. The exchange rates effect was almost fully related to the appreciation of the US dollar versus the euro. In order to reflect the underlying performance of the Company independently from exchange rate fluctuations, the following analysis refers to revenue evolution in constant currencies, applying Q1 2024 average exchange rates to Q1 2025 revenue figures, unless expressly stated otherwise.

Recurring revenue

Representing 92% of Q1 2025 total revenue, up by c. 150 basis points versus 91% in Q1 2024, recurring revenue reached € 43.9 million, up by +16.2%.

Revenue growth was led by +17.8% growth of Planisware’s SaaS model (i.e. SaaS & Hosting, Annual licenses, and Evolutive & Subscription support), of which SaaS & Hosting revenue was up by +18.5% thanks to contracts secured with new customers as well as continued expansion within the installed base. Revenue of support activities (Evolutive & Subscription support), intrinsically related to Planisware’s SaaS offering, grew by +16.7%.

Maintenance revenue was up by +5.2% in the context of the Group’s shift from its prior Perpetual license model to a SaaS model and reflecting the strong demand for licenses in the start of 2024 from customers with specific on-premises needs, in particular in the defense industry.

Non-recurring revenue

Non-recurring revenue was down by -4.4% in Q1 2025, with a contrasted trend of Perpetual licenses down by -25.4% and Implementation up by +4.4%.

Implementation activity was high in Q1 2025 with the start of several large SaaS contracts signed end of 2024, leading to +4.4% revenue growth. On the other hand, the Group sold several Perpetual licenses extensions and upgrades to customers with specific on-premises needs but posted a revenue decline by €-0.3 million compared to Q1 2024 which represented a particularly high comparative basis.

Commercial dynamic

In Q1 2025, despite sales cycles remaining longer than a year before, clients and prospects expressed greater needs for advanced solutions to manage their portfolio of strategic projects and gain better visibility and agility to navigate in the current uncertain environment. Planisware continued to support its existing customers in adapting and reorganizing themselves to a rapidly changing environment, while maintaining or enhancing their operational efficiency. As a result, key clients such as Philips or Boston Scientific expanded their usage of Planisware’s solutions and support practices. This was particularly the case in the automotive industry with clients such as Fox Factory in the US in PD&I, Continental in Germany, as well as Forvia in France.

The relevance of Planisware’s multi-specialist approach has been demonstrated in many sectors, from retail in Australia with Coles or the pharmaceutical industry in Japan with Takeda, to automotive in the USA and Sweden with Dana and HADV Group, which now uses Orchestra to manage its product development portfolio.

2025 objectives confirmed

Taking into account its strong commercial pipeline and acknowledging a high level of uncertainties that may drive further elongation of sales cycles and delays in the start of new contracts, Planisware confirms its 2025 objectives:

Mid-to-high teens revenue growth in constant currencies
c. 35% adjusted EBITDA margin^*
Cash Conversion Rate^* of c. 80%

Appendices

Investors & Analysts conference call

Planisware’s management team will host an international conference call on April 29, 2025 at 8:00am CET to details Q1 2025 performance and key achievements, by means of a presentation followed by a Q&A session. The webcast and its subsequent replay will be available on planisware.com.

Upcoming event

June 19, 2025: Annual General Meeting of shareholders
July 31, 2025: H1 2025 results publication
October 21, 2025: Q3 2025 revenue publication

Contact

About Planisware

Planisware is a leading business-to-business (“B2B”) provider of Software-as-a-Service (“SaaS”) in the rapidly growing Project Economy. Planisware’s mission is to provide solutions that help organizations transform how they strategize, plan and deliver their projects, project portfolios, programs and products.

With circa 750 employees across 16 offices, Planisware operates at significant scale serving around 600 organizational clients in a wide range of verticals and functions across more than 30 countries worldwide. Planisware’s clients include large international companies, medium-sized businesses and public sector entities.

Planisware is listed on the regulated market of Euronext Paris (Compartment A, ISIN code FR001400PFU4, ticker symbol “PLNW”).

For more information, visit: https://planisware.com/ and connect with Planisware on LinkedIn.

Disclaimer

Forward-looking statements

This document contains statements regarding the prospects and growth strategies of Planisware. These statements are sometimes identified by the use of the future or conditional tense, or by the use of forward-looking terms such as “considers”, “envisages”, “believes”, “aims”, “expects”, “intends”, “should”, “anticipates”, “estimates”, “thinks”, “wishes” and “might”, or, if applicable, the negative form of such terms and similar expressions or similar terminology. Such information is not historical in nature and should not be interpreted as a guarantee of future performance. Such information is based on data, assumptions, and estimates that Planisware considers reasonable. Such information is subject to change or modification based on uncertainties in the economic, financial, competitive or regulatory environments.

This information includes statements relating to Planisware’s intentions, estimates and targets with respect to its markets, strategies, growth, results of operations, financial situation and liquidity. Planisware’s forward-looking statements speak only as of the date of this document. Absent any applicable legal or regulatory requirements, Planisware expressly disclaims any obligation to release any updates to any forward-looking statements contained in this document to reflect any change in its expectations or any change in events, conditions or circumstances, on which any forward-looking statement contained in this document is based. Planisware operates in a competitive and rapidly evolving environment; it is therefore unable to anticipate all risks, uncertainties or other factors that may affect its business, their potential impact on its business or the extent to which the occurrence of a risk or combination of risks could have significantly different results from those set out in any forward-looking statements, it being noted that such forward-looking statements do not constitute a guarantee of actual results.

Rounded figures

Certain numerical figures and data presented in this document (including financial data presented in millions or thousands and certain percentages) have been subject to rounding adjustments and, as a result, the corresponding totals in this document may vary slightly from the actual arithmetic totals of such information.

Variation in constant currencies

Variation in constant currencies represent figures based on constant exchange rates using as a base those used in the prior year. As a result, such figures may vary slightly from actual results based on current exchange rates.

Non-IFRS measures

This document includes certain unaudited measures and ratios of the Group’s financial or non-financial performance (the “non-IFRS measures”), such as “recurring revenue”, “non-recurring revenue”, “gross margin”, “Adjusted EBITDA”, “Adjusted EBITDA margin”, “Adjusted Free Cash Flow”, and “cash conversion rate”. Non-IFRS financial information may exclude certain items contained in the nearest IFRS financial measure or include certain non-IFRS components. Readers should not consider items which are not recognized measurements under IFRS as alternatives to the applicable measurements under IFRS. These measures have limitations as analytical tools and readers should not treat them as substitutes for IFRS measures. In particular, readers should not consider such measurements of the Group’s financial performance or liquidity as an alternative to profit for the period, operating income or other performance measures derived in accordance with IFRS or as an alternative to cash flow from (used in) operating activities as a measurement of the Group’s liquidity. Other companies with activities similar to or different from those of the Group could calculate non-IFRS measures differently from the calculations adopted by the Group.

Non-IFRS measures included in this document are defined as follows:

Adjusted EBITDA is calculated as Current operating profit including share of profit of equity-accounted investees, plus amortization and depreciation as well as impairment of intangible assets and property, plant and equipment, plus either non-recurring items or non-operating items.
Adjusted EBITDA margin is the ratio of Adjusted EBITDA to total revenue.
Adjusted FCF (Free Cash Flow) is calculated as cash flows from operating activities, plus IPO costs paid, if any, less other financial income and expenses classified as operating activities in the cash-flow statement, and less net cash relating to capital expenditures.
Cash Conversion Rate is defined as Adjusted FCF divided by Adjusted EBITDA.

1 Non-IFRS measure. Non-IFRS measures included in this document are defined in the disclaimer at the end of this document.

Attachment

Planisware – Q1 2025 revenue – PR

The MIL Network –

April 29, 2025

MIL-OSI: Amundi: Results for the First quarter of 2025 – Record inflows at +€31bn

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Amundi: Results for the First quarter of 2025

Record inflows at +€31bn

Record inflows		Assets under management¹at an all-time high of €2.25tn at end of March 2025, +6% year-on-year Highest quarterly net inflows since 2021, at +€31bn in Q1 +€37bn in medium- to long-term assets excluding JVs, new quarterly record Positive inflows in active management (+€6bn) Strong ETF net inflows and gain of a big ESG equity index mandate with The People’s Pension (UK): +€21bn

Strong growth in profit before tax		Profit before tax²of €458m, up +11% Q1/Q1, driven by: revenue growth (+11%) positive jaws effect improved cost-income ratio to 52.4%² Adjusted net income²^,³ close to €350m excluding impact of exceptional tax surcharge⁴ in France (-€46m)

Confirmed strategic pillars success		Strong inflows in growth areas: Third-party distribution +€8bn Asia +€8bn ETF +€10bn Amundi Technology: strong organic growth, integration of aixigo and revenues up +46% Q1/Q1

Paris, 29 April 2025

Amundi’s Board of Directors met on 28 April 2025 chaired by Philippe Brassac, and approved the financial statements for the first quarter of 2025.

Valérie Baudson, Chief Executive Officer, said: “After a record year in 2024, Amundi continued this momentum in the first quarter of 2025. Quarterly net inflows are at their highest since 2021: our clients, whether they are individuals or institutions, have entrusted us with +€31bn more to manage. In particular, we won a major mandate from one of the UK’s largest pension funds in the fast-growing market for Defined Contribution pension plans.

The business continues to reflect the relevance of our main growth pillars: net inflows were dynamic with Third-Party Distributors, in Asia and on ETFs, and Amundi Technology continues its sustained growth.

The three transactions signed in 2024 reinforce this solid organic growth: Alpha Associates and aixigo have already contributed positively to the quarter’s results, the partnership with Victory Capital, closed on 1 April, now allows us to offer more US strategies while creating value for our shareholders.

Amundi’s diversified model and agility allow us to effectively support our clients in all market environments and provide them with long-term growth opportunities. We continue to invest, redeploy our resources and optimise our cost base to adapt our platform, meet the changing needs of clients and develop new services for them. »

* * * * *

Highlights

Continued organic growth thanks to confirmed successes in the strategic pillars

2025 is the last year of implementation of the 2025 Ambitions plan, which sets a number of strategic pillars to accelerate the diversification of the Group’s growth drivers and exploit development opportunities. After a year 2024 during which several objectives were achieved a year ahead of schedule, the first quarter confirmed the momentum:

Third-Party Distribution recorded assets under management up over +15% year-on-year and net inflows over 12 months of +€33bn, of which +€8bn⁵ in the first quarter of 2025, mainly in MLT assets⁶, (+€7.6bn); net inflows this quarter were driven by ETFs and active management, diversified by geographical areas and positive in almost all countries in terms of MLT assets⁶, particularly in Asia (+€1.7bn); it is also diversified by types of client, with a confirmed commercial momentum with digital platforms, which account for c.25% of net inflows; it should be noted that a Workshop presenting the Third-Party Distribution business line will be held on Thursday 19 June in London, with the entire division’s management team;

Asia: assets under management were up +9% year-on-year despite the fall in the US dollar and the Indian rupee, to reach €462bn; net inflows for the quarter reached +€8bn, mainly from direct distribution (+€5bn compared to +€3bn for JVs), and is balanced between major client segments in direct distribution and JVs; it is also diversified by countries: Korea (+€3bn) thanks to the JV, China with the two JVs and institutional clients, Hong Kong (+€1.6bn) and Singapore (+€1.4bn) thanks to institutional and third-party distributors;
ETFs raised +€10bn this quarter, thanks to the success of US equity underlying strategies at the beginning of the quarter, and then in March with the success of the Stoxx Europe 600 ETF, which collected +€1.3bn in one month and exceeded €10bn in assets under management; innovative products were launched, with the ETF invested in short-duration eurozone sovereign green bonds, capitalising on the success of its long-duration big brother, which reached €3bn in assets under management;
Amundi Technology continues to grow: its revenues increased by +46% Q1/Q1, driven in equal parts by the integration of aixigo and strong organic growth; the business line has signed a partnership with Murex to offer in ALTO the functionalities of this company’s integrated OTC derivatives management and valuation platform, MX.3, which has more than 60,000 users in 65 countries; the partnership includes cross-selling and joint business development agreements.

After the end of the first quarter

On 1 April, the partnership with Victory Capital, was closed and Amundi received 17.6 million shares, i.e. 21.2%⁷ of Victory Capital’s capital. In accordance with the Contribution Agreement and the completion of the remaining adjustments, we expect Amundi’s stake in Victory Capital to reach 26.1%⁷ in the next few months. This investment will be consolidated using the equity method and will start contributing to the Group’s results from the second quarter.
It should be noted that as of 8 April, after the drop in the equities and bond markets and at the trough of European equity markets since the end of the first quarter (Stoxx 600 -9%), the Group’s assets under management excluding JVs⁸ were down by just below -3% compared to 31 March 2025; as of 25 March, they had recovered to less than -2% vs. end March.
After the success of Ambitions 2025, a new three-year strategic plan will be presented in the fourth quarter.

Focus on operations in the UK

The winning of a large mandate with a pension fund illustrates the strong development of Amundi’s operations in the United Kingdom. Amundi has management and marketing/sales teams there and is experiencing strong growth in its business:

London is one of Amundi’s 6 global investment hubs, with €49bn under management for the entire Group, in charge of all emerging markets strategies as well as global and GBP fixed income strategies;
The distribution platform for local clients represents €66bn under management, balanced between institutional and third-party distribution; the commercial platform is complemented by Amundi Technology sales teams to serve British clients.

The €21bn equity index mandate for The People’s Pension, one of the leading Master Trusts (multi-employer pension funds) in the Defined Contribution pension plan market, was won thanks to the depth and consistency of Amundi’s responsible investment methodology, applied in this case to an index management solution. It amplifies the strong commercial momentum in this Master Trust market segment, as Amundi is now a close partner of the two largest players.

Activity

Capital markets still up Q1/Q1, decline in the dollar and Indian rupee

In the first quarter of 2025, both equities⁹and bond¹⁰markets continued to rise. Year-on-year, they gained +13% and +3% respectively in average. The market effect is therefore positive on the Group’s assets under management and revenues compared to the first quarter of 2024.

The Indian rupee and the US dollar were both down -4% quarter-on-quarter, and -3% year-on-year for the Indian rupee while the US dollar is stable over the same period. The foreign exchange effect, which was neutral year-on-year, was therefore negative by around -1% on Amundi’s end-of-period assets under management in the first quarter.

European fund management market in slow recovery

Investor risk aversion persists in the European fund management market. In the first quarter of 2025, net inflows in open-ended funds¹¹ continued their slow recovery compared to the beginning of 2024, at +€221bn in the first quarter, down slightly compared to the fourth quarter of 2024 (+€232bn) due to lower net inflows from money market funds (+€60bn). Active management continued its recovery, with +€70bn net inflows, and its rebalancing compared to passive management (+€91bn, of which +€82bn in ETFs). As in previous quarters, net flows were positive thanks to fixed income, and grew only as a result of lower outflows in equities and multi-assets.

Highest quarterly net inflows for MLT assets⁶in Q1

Assets under management¹as at 31 March 2025 increased by +6.2% year-on-year, to reach the new record of €2,247bn. Over 12 months, in addition to market appreciation, they benefited from a high level of net inflows, at +€70bn, higher than the market & forex effect of +€53bn. The increase in assets under management also benefited from the integration of Alpha Associates since the beginning of April 2024 (+€7.9bn).

In the first quarter of 2025, the forex effect was negative by -€26bn due to the fall of the US dollar and the Indian rupee against the euro. It was very slightly offset by a small positive market effect (+€2bn). The strong net inflows in the quarter were much higher than this negative forex effect.

The first quarter net inflows totalled +€31bn, the highest level for a quarter since 2021, of which +€37bn in MLT assets⁶ excluding JVs, an all-time record.

These net inflows benefited from the gain of the mandate of The People’s Pension (+€21bn). The rest of the MLT net inflows⁶ (+€16bn) comes from passive management, in particular ETFs (+€10bn) and active management (+€6bn). As in previous quarters, the latter was driven by fixed income strategies (+€11bn), in all client segments.
The three main client segments contributed to net inflows of +€31bn:

the Retail segment, at +€6bn, thanks to Third-Party Distributors (+€8bn); net inflows were slightly positive at Amundi BOC WM while risk aversion continued to affect net inflows from Partner Networks: slightly positive in France (+€0.2bn) and negative in International business (-€3bn), due in particular to multi-asset strategies: -€2bn;
The Institutional segment, at +€22bn, of which +€33bn in MLT assets⁶, benefited from The People’s Pension mandate and a good level of net inflows, particularly bonds, in all sub-segments except the seasonal effect for Corporates and Employee Savings;
Finally JVs (+€3bn) benefited from dynamic net inflows in NH-Amundi (South Korea, +€3bn), while SBI FM (India, -€1bn) recorded outflows linked to end-of-fiscal-year operations and client caution after the correction in local equities markets since October 2024, even though net flows remained positive in the retail segment; ABC-CA (China) net inflows confirmed the stabilisation of the local market, and were positive by +€1bn excluding discontinued Channel Business operations, mainly driven by treasury products.

Treasury products posted outflows of -€8.7bn, mainly due to particularly strong seasonal outflows from Corporates in the first quarter of this year (-€11.6bn) and to a lesser extent from arbitrages by CA & SG insurers (-€1.6bn) in favour of products with longer durations. All other client segments posted slightly positive net inflows in treasury products, reflecting the wait-and-see attitude in the face of volatility in risky assets markets.

First quarter 2025 results

Sharp increase in profit before tax²+11% Q1/Q1 thanks to top line growth

Adjusted data²

Profit before tax²reached €458m, up +10.7% compared to the first quarter of 2024.

It includes contributions from Alpha Associates as well as aixigo, acquisitions of which were finalised in early April and early November 2024 respectively, and were therefore not included in the first quarter 2024. Their cumulative contribution to the profit before tax² in the first quarter reached +€4m, i.e. +1pp of Q1/Q1 growth.

The growth in profit before tax² was mainly due to the increase in revenues.

Adjusted net revenue² amounted to €912m, up +10.7% compared to the first quarter of 2024, +9% at constant scope, driven by all sources of revenues:

net management fees increased by +7.7% compared to the first quarter of 2024, to €824m, which reflects the good level of activity, the increase in average assets under management excluding JVs (+8.8% over the same period), but also the negative product mix effect on revenue margins;
performance fees (€23m), which are traditionally more moderate in the first quarter due to the lower number of fund anniversaries during this period, nevertheless rose by +30.7% compared to the first quarter of 2024; they reflect the good performance of Amundi’s investment management, with c.70% of assets under management ranked in the first or second quartiles according to Morningstar¹² over 1, 3 or 5 years, and 244 Amundi funds rated 4 or 5 stars by Morningstar¹² as at 31 March;
Amundi Technology’s revenues, at €26m, continued to grow steadily (+46.2% compared to the first quarter of 2024), amplified this quarter by the consolidation of aixigo (+€4m); excluding aixigo, these revenues were up +21.2% organically;
finally, the Financial and other revenues² amounted to €39m, up sharply compared to the first quarter of 2024 thanks to capital gains on the private equity portfolio in seed money and a positive mark-to-market from equity holdings, despite the impact of the fall in short-term rates in the euro zone.

The increase in adjusted²operating expenses, €478m, is +8.8% compared to the first quarter of 2024, +6% at constant scope. It remains lower than that of revenues, thus generating a positive jaws effect of nearly 3 percentage points excluding the scope effect related to the acquisition of Alpha Associates and aixigo, reflecting the Group’s operational efficiency.

In addition to the scope effect, this increase is mainly due to:

investments in the development initiatives of the 2025 Ambitions plan, including technology, third-party distribution and Asia;
provisioning for individual variable remuneration, in line with the growth in results.

The cost-income ratio at 52.4% on an adjusted data basis², improved compared to the same quarter last year and is in line with the Ambitions 2025 target (<53%).

The adjusted²gross operating income (GOI) amounted to €434m, up +12.9% compared to the first quarter of 2024, +11.8% at constant scope, reflecting revenue growth.

Share of net income of equity-accounted companies¹³, at €28m, down slightly compared to the first quarter of 2024, reflects the decline in net financial income of the main contributing entity, the Indian JV SBI FM. The decline in the Indian equities markets resulted in negative mark-to-market in the JV’s financial income, which nevertheless continues to benefit from strong growth in its activity with management fees up of over +20% Q1/Q1.

The adjusted²corporate tax expense for the first quarter of 2025 reached -€155m, a very strong increase – +60.8% – compared to the first quarter of 2024.

In France, in accordance with the Finance law for 2025, an exceptional tax contribution must be booked in fiscal year 2025. It is calculated on the average of the profits made in France in 2024 and 2025. This exceptional contribution is estimated¹⁴ to -€72m for the year as a whole, but it will not be accounted for on a straight-line basis over the quarters. It amounted to -€46m in the first quarter of 2025, with the rest spread over the next three quarters. Excluding this exceptional contribution, the adjusted² tax expense would have been -€109m and the adjusted² effective tax rate would be equivalent to that of the first quarter of 2024.

Adjusted²net income amounts to €303m. Excluding the exceptional tax contribution, it would have been close to €350m, up +10% compared to the first quarter of 2024.

The adjusted²net earnings per share in the first quarter of 2025 was €1.48, including -€0.22 related to the exceptional tax contribution in France. Excluding this exceptional tax contribution, adjusted² earnings per share would therefore have been €1.70, up +9.6% compared to the first quarter of 2024.

Accounting data in the first quarter of 2025

Accounting net income, Group share amounted to €283m. It includes the exceptional tax contribution in France of -€46m.

As in other quarters, accounting net income includes non-cash charges related to the acquisitions of Alpha Associates and aixigo and the amortisation of intangible assets related to distribution agreements and client contracts (including the corresponding new charges related to Alpha Associates), for a total of -€14m after tax. Integration costs related to the partnership with Victory Capital, closed on 1 April 2025, were also recorded in the first quarter, for a total of -€5m after tax. Furthermore, amortisation of intangible fixed assets adjustments after the integration of aixigo was also recognised in operating expenses -€1m after tax (See the details of all these elements in p. 11).

Accounting net earnings per share in the first quarter of 2025 was €1.38, including the exceptional tax contribution in France.

A solid financial structure, €1.2bn in surplus capital

Tangible net assets¹⁵ amounted to €4.8bn as at 31 March 2025, up +€0.3bn or +7% compared to the end of 2024, in line with the quarter’s net income.

The CET1 solvency ratio stood at 15.5%¹⁶ as at 31 March 2025.

As indicated at the time of signing in July 2024, the partnership with Victory Capital will have no material effect on the ratio.

The capital surplus at the end of the first quarter amounted to €1.2bn, taking into account the dividend to be paid for 2024, the net income for the first quarter and the related dividend provision.

Future investments and operational efficiency

This quarter, Amundi demonstrated its ability to:

Be agile and accompany its clients in different market contexts, thanks to its wide range of high-performing investment management expertise and product innovation;
Develop services to offer technological or investment management solutions to players in the entire savings value chain;
Offer a full range of Responsible Investment solutions, in order to adapt to all client demands;
Develop in Europe including in the United Kingdom;
Invest and accelerate on the growth pillars of its strategic plan: Asia, third-party distribution, ETFs, technology, services.

To finance future investments and accelerate the reallocation of our resources towards our growth drivers, we set ourselves a cost optimisation target of €30 to €40m, to be achieved as from 2026.

* * * * *

APPENDICES

Adjusted income statement²of the first quarter of 2025

(M€)	Q1 2025	Q1 2024	% var. Q1/Q1

Net revenue – Adjusted	912	824	+10.7%
Net management fees	824	766	+7.7%
Performance fees	23	18	+30.7%
Technology	26	18	+46.2%
Financial income and other income – Adjusted	39	23	+68.5%
Operating expenses – Adjusted	(478)	(439)	+8.8%
Cost/income ratio – Adjusted (%)	52.4%	53,3%	-0.9pp
Gross operating income – Adjusted	434	385	+12.9%
Cost of risk & others	(4)	(0)	NS
Share of net income of equity-accounted companies	28	29	-3.7%
Income before tax – Adjusted	458	413	+10.7%
Corporate tax – Adjusted	(155)	(97)	+60.8%
Of which exceptional tax contribution in France	(46)	–	NS
Non-controlling interests	1	1	+14.3%
Net income Group share – Adjusted	303	318	-4.5%
Amortisation of intangible assets, after tax	(14)	(15)	-7.4%
Amortisation of aixigo PPA, after tax	(1)	–	–
Integration costs, after tax	(5)	–	–
Net income Group share	283	303	-6.6%
Earnings per share (€)	1.38	1.48	-7.0%
Earnings per share – Adjusted (€)	1.48	1.55	-4.9%

Change in assets under management from the end of 2021 to the end of March 2025¹⁷

(€bn)	*Assets under management*	*Net* *inflows*	*Market and forex effect*	*Scope* *Effect*			*Change in AuM* *vs. prior quarter*
As of 31/12/2021	2,064					+14%¹⁸
Q1 2022		+3.2	-46.4		–
As of 31/03/2022	2,021					-2.1%
Q2 2022		+1.8	-97.7		–
As of 30/06/2022	1,925					-4.8%
Q3 2022		-12.9	-16.3		–
As of 30/09/2022	1,895					-1.6%
Q4 2022		+15.0	-6.2		–
As of 31/12/2022	1,904					+0.5%
Q1 2023		-11.1	+40.9		–
As of 31/03/2023	1,934					+1.6%
Q2 2023		+3.7	+23.8		–
As of 31/06/2023	1,961					+1.4%
Q3 2023		+13.7	-1.7		–
As of 30/09/2023	1,973					+0.6%
Q4 2023		+19.5	+63.8		-20
As of 31/12/2023	2,037					+3.2%
Q1 2024		+16.6	+62.9		–
As of 31/03/2024	2,116					+3.9%
Q2 2024		+15.5	+16.6		+8
30/06/2024	2,156					+1.9%
Q3 2024		+2.9	+32.5		–
30/09/2024	2,192					+1.6%
Q4 2024		+20.5	+28.2		–
31/12/2024	2,240					+2.2%
Q1 2025		+31.1	-24.0		–
31/03/2025	2,247					+0.3%

Total year-on-year between 31 March 2024 and 31 March 2025: +6.2%

Net inflows +€70.0bn
Market effect +€63.8bn
Forex effect -€10.5bn
Scope effects +€7.9bn
(Alpha Associates’ first consolidation in Q2 2024, the acquisition of aixigo has no effect on assets under management)

Details of assets under management and net inflows by client segments¹⁹

(€bn)	AuM 31.03.2025	AuM 31.03.2024	% change /31.03.2024	Inflows Q1 2025	Inflows Q1 2024
French Networks	139	137	+1.3%	+0.2	+1.5
International networks	162	165	-1.6%	-2.7	-2.0
Of which Amundi BOC WM	2	3	-21.2%	+0.3	-0.2
Third-Party Distributors	398	345	+15.6%	+8.3	+7.0
Retail	700	647	+8.2%	+5.8	+6.5
Institutional & Sovereigns (*)	550	511	+7.5%	+30.1	+9.7
Corporates	111	108	+2.1%	-10.3	-4.2
Employee savings plans	95	90	+6.0%	-0.9	-0.9
CA & SG Insurers	430	427	+0.7%	+3.6	+1.0
Institutional	1,186	1,137	+4.3%	+22.4	+5.6
JVs	362	332	+8.9%	+2.9	+4.5
Total	2,247	2,116	+6.2%	+31.1	+16.6

(*) Including funds of funds

Details of assets under management and net inflows by asset classes¹⁹

(€bn)	AuM 31.03.2025	AuM 31.03.2024	% change /31.03.2024	Inflows Q1 2025	Inflows Q1 2024
Equities	564	505	+11.7%	+26.4	-2.6
Multi-assets	271	280	-3.1%	-1.0	-7.6
Bonds	759	700	+8.4%	+14.3	+13.9
Real, alternative, and structured products	111	107	+4.2%	-2.8	-0.3
MLT ASSETS excl. JVs	1,705	1,591	+7.2%	+36.9	+3.4
Treasury products excl. JVs	180	193	-6.5%	-8.7	+8.7
TOTAL excluding JVs	1,885	1,784	+5.7%	+28.2	+12.1
JVs	362	332	+8.9%	+2.9	+4.5
TOTAL	2,247	2,116	+6.2%	+31.1	+16.6
*Of which MLT assets*	*2,034*	*1,892*	*+7.5%*	*+39.7*	*+7.7*
*Of which Treasury products*	*213*	*224*	*-5.1%*	*-8.6*	*+8.9*

Details of assets under management and net inflows by type of management and asset classes¹⁹

(€bn)	AuM 31.03.2025		AuM 31.03.2024	% change /31.03.2024	Inflows Q1 2025	Inflows Q1 2024
Active management		1,149	1,117	+2.9%	+6.3	+1.3
Equities		204	209	-2.1%	-3.9	-2.8
Multi-assets		260	270	-3.6%	-1.0	-8.0
Bonds		685	639	+7.3%	+11.2	+12.0
Structured products		42	41	+3.7%	-2.0	+0.6
Passive management		445	368	+21.0%	+33.4	+2.5
ETFs & ETC		272	227	+19.8%	+10.4	+5.0
Index & Smart beta		173	140	+23.0%	+23.0	-2.5
Real and Alternative Assets		69	66	+4.5%	-0.7	-0.9
Real assets		65	61	+5.8%	-0.6	-0.2
Alternative		4	4	-12.8%	-0.1	-0.7
TOTAL MLT assets excluding JVs		1,705	1,591	+7.2%	+36.9	+3.4
Treasury products excl. JVs		180	193	-6.5%	-8.7	+8.7
TOTAL excluding JVs		1,885	1,784	+5.7%	+28.2	+12.1
JVs		362	332	+8.9%	+2.9	+4.5
TOTAL		2,247	2,116	+6.2%	+31.1	+16.6

Details of assets under management and net inflows by geographic area¹⁹

(€bn)	AuM 31.03.2025	AuM 31.03.2024	% change /31.03.2024	Inflows Q1 2025	Inflows Q1 2024
France	1,001	978	+2.3%	+0.5	+10.0
Italy	198	208	-4.6%	-1.9	-1.1
Europe excluding France & Italy	456	391	+16.6%	+23.7	+4.0
Asia	462	423	+9.3%	+7.8	+6.8
Rest of the world	130	116	+11.7%	+1.0	-3.0
TOTAL	2,247	2,116	+6.2%	+31.1	+16.6
*TOTAL outside France*	1,246	1,138	+9.5%	+30.6	+6.6

Methodological appendix – APM

Accounting and adjusted data

Accounting data – They include

amortisation of intangible assets, recorded as other revenues, and from Q2 2024, other non-cash charges spread according to the schedule of payments of the price adjustment until the end of 2029; these expenses are recognised as deductions from net revenues, in financial expenses.
integration costs related to the transaction with Victory Capital and PPA amortisation related to the acquisition of aixigo recorded in the fourth quarter as operating expenses. No such costs were recorded in the first nine months of 2024.

The aggregate amounts of these items are as follows for the different periods under review:

Q1 2024: -€20m before tax and -€15m after tax
Q4 2024: -€38m before tax and -€28m after tax
Q1 2025: -€29m pre-tax and -€20m after tax

Adjusted data – In order to present an income statement that is closer to economic reality, the following adjustments have been made: restatement of the amortisation of distribution agreements with Bawag, UniCredit and Banco Sabadell, intangible assets representing the client contracts of Lyxor and, since the second quarter of 2024, Alpha Associates, as well as other non-cash charges related to the acquisition of Alpha Associates; these amortisations and non-cash expenses are recognised as a deduction from net revenues; restatement of the amortisation of a technology asset related to the acquisition of aixigo recognised in operating expenses. The integration costs for the transaction with Victory Capital are also restated.

Acquisition of Alpha Associates

In accordance with IFRS 3, recognition on Amundi’s balance sheet as at 01/04/2024 of:

a goodwill of €288m;
an intangible asset of €50m, representing client contracts, amortised on a straight-line basis until the end of 2030;
a liability representing the conditional price adjustment not yet paid, for €160m before tax, including an actuarial discount of -€30m, which will be amortized over 6 years.

In the Group’s income statement, the following is recorded:

amortisation of intangible assets for a full-year charge of -€7.6m (-€6.1m after tax);
other non-cash expenses spread according to the schedule of payments of the price adjustment until the end of 2029; these expenses are recognised as deductions from net revenues, in financial expenses.

In Q1 2025, amortisation of intangible assets was -€1.9m before tax and non-cash expenses were -€1.5m before tax (i.e. -€2.5m after tax).

Acquisition of aixigo

In accordance with IFRS 3, recognition on Amundi’s balance sheet at the date of acquisition of:

goodwill of €121m;
a technological asset of €36m representative of the goodwill attributed to aixigo’s software solutions, amortised on a straight-line basis over 5 years;

The full-year amortisation expense of the technology asset was -€7.2m (-€4.8m after tax); in Q1 2025 the amortisation expense was -€1.8m (-€1.2m after tax); it is recognised in operating expenses.

Alternative Performance Measures²⁰

In order to present an income statement that is closer to economic reality, Amundi publishes adjusted data that are calculated in accordance with the methodological appendix presented above.

The adjusted data can be reconciled with the accounting data as follows:

= accounting data

= adjusted data

(M€)	Q1 2025	Q1 2024	Q4 2024


Net revenue (a)	892	804	901
– Amortisation of intangible assets before tax	(18)	(20)	(22)
– Other non-cash expenses related to Alpha Associates	(1)	0	(1)
Net revenue – Adjusted (b)	912	824	924

Operating expenses (c)	(486)	(439)	(496)
– Integration costs before tax	(7)	0	(13)
– Amortisation of aixigo-related PPA before tax	(2)	0	(1)
Operating expenses – Adjusted (d)	(478)	(439)	(482)

Gross Operating Income (e)=(a)+(c)	406	364	405
Gross operating income – Adjusted (f)=(b)+(d)	434	385	443
Cost/income ratio (%) -(c)/(a)	54.5%	54.6%	55.1%
Cost/income ratio – Adjusted (%) -(d)/(b)	52.4%	53.3%	52.1%
Cost of risk & other (g)	(4)	(0)	(3)
Share of net income of equity-accounted companies (h)	28	29	29
Profit before tax (i)=(e)+(g)+(h)	429	393	431
Profit before tax – Adjusted (j)=(f)+(g)+(h)	458	413	469
Corporate tax (k)	(147)	(91)	(83)
Corporate tax – Adjusted (l)	(155)	(97)	(93)
Non-controlling interests (m)	1	1	1
Net income Group share (n)=(i)+(k)+(m)	283	303	349
Net income Group share – Adjusted (o)=(j)+(l)+(m)	303	318	377

Earnings per share (€)	1.38	1.48	1.70
Earnings per share – Adjusted (€)	1.48	1.55	1.84

Shareholding

	31 March 2025		31 December 2024		31 March 2024
*(units)*	Number of shares	% of capital	Number of shares	% of capital	Number of shares	% of capital
Crédit Agricole Group	141,057,399	68.67%	141,057,399	68.67%	141,057,399	68.93%
Employees	4,128,079	2.01%	4,272,132	2.08%	2,869,026	1.40%
Treasury shares	1,961,141	0.95%	1,992,485	0.97%	1,259,079	0.62%
Free float	58,272,643	28.37%	58,097,246	28.28%	59,462,130	29.06%

Number of shares at the end of the period	205,419,262	100.0%	205,419,262	100.0%	204,647,634	100.0%
Average number of shares since the beginning of the year	205,419,262	–	204,776,239	–	204,647,634	–
Average number of shares quarter-to-date	205,419,262	–	205,159,257	–	204,647,634	–

Average number of shares pro rata temporis.

The average number of shares increased by +0.1% between Q4 2024 and Q1 2025, and by +0.4% between Q1 2024 and Q1 2025.
A capital increase reserved for employees was recorded on 31 October 2024. 771,628 shares were created (approximately 0.4% of the share capital before the transaction).
Amundi announced on 7 October 2024 a buyback programme of up to 1 million shares (i.e. ~0.5% of the share capital before the transaction) to cover performance shares plans. It was finalised on November 27, 2024.

Financial communication calendar

Workshop to presenting the Third-Party Distribution business line – Thursday 19 June in London
General Shareholders’ Meeting – Tuesday 27 May 2025
Q2 and H1 2025 earnings release – Tuesday 29 July 2025
Q3 and 9-month 2025 earnings release – Tuesday 28 October 2025
New strategic three-year plan – in the fourth quarter 2025

2024 dividend schedule: €4.25 per share

Ex dividend date: Monday 10 June 2025
Payment: from Wednesday 12 June 2025

About Amundi

Amundi, the leading European asset manager, ranking among the top 10 global players²¹, offers its 100 million clients – retail, institutional and corporate – a complete range of savings and investment solutions in active and passive management, in traditional or real assets. This offering is enhanced with IT tools and services to cover the entire savings value chain. A subsidiary of the Crédit Agricole group and listed on the stock exchange, Amundi currently manages more than €2.2 trillion of assets²².

With its six international investment hubs²³, financial and extra-financial research capabilities and long-standing commitment to responsible investment, Amundi is a key player in the asset management landscape.

Amundi clients benefit from the expertise and advice of 5,700 employees in 35 countries.

Amundi, a trusted partner, working every day in the interest of its clients and society.

www.amundi.com

Press contacts:
Natacha Andermahr
Tel. +33 1 76 37 86 05
natacha.andermahr@amundi.com

Corentin Henry
Tel. +33 1 76 32 26 96
corentin.henry@amundi.com

Investor contacts:
Cyril Meilland, CFA
Tel. +33 1 76 32 62 67
cyril.meilland@amundi.com

Thomas Lapeyre
Tel. +33 1 76 33 70 54
thomas.lapeyre@amundi.com

Annabelle Wiriath

Tel. + 33 1 76 32 43 92

annabelle.wiriath@amundi.com

DISCLAIMER

This document does not constitute an offer or invitation to sell or purchase, or any solicitation of any offer to purchase or subscribe for, any securities of Amundi in the United States of America or in France. Securities may not be offered, subscribed or sold in the United States of America absent registration under the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “U.S. Securities Act”), except pursuant to an exemption from, or in a transaction not subject to, the registration requirements thereof. The securities of Amundi have not been and will not be registered under the U.S. Securities Act and Amundi does not intend to make a public offer of its securities in the United States of America or in France.

This document may contain forward looking statements concerning Amundi’s financial position and results. The data provided do not constitute a profit “forecast” or “estimate” as defined in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/980.

These forward looking statements include projections and financial estimates based on scenarios that employ a number of economic assumptions in a given competitive and regulatory context, assumptions regarding plans, objectives and expectations in connection with future events, transactions, products and services, and assumptions in terms of future performance and synergies. By their very nature, they are therefore subject to known and unknown risks and uncertainties, which could lead to their non-fulfilment. Consequently, no assurance can be given that these forward looking statement will come to fruition, and Amundi’s actual financial position and results may differ materially from those projected or implied in these forward looking statements.

Amundi undertakes no obligation to publicly revise or update any forward looking statements provided as at the date of this document. Risks that may affect Amundi’s financial position and results are further detailed in the “Risk Factors” section of our Universal Registration Document filed with the French Autorité des Marchés Financiers. The reader should take all these uncertainties and risks into consideration before forming their own opinion.

The figures presented were prepared in accordance with applicable prudential regulations and IFRS guidelines, as adopted by the European Union and applicable at that date. The financial information set out herein do not constitute a set of financial statements for an interim period as defined by IAS 34 “Interim Financial Reporting” and has not been audited.

Unless otherwise specified, sources for rankings and market positions are internal. The information contained in this document, to the extent that it relates to parties other than Amundi or comes from external sources, has not been verified by a supervisory authority or, more generally, subject to independent verification, and no representation or warranty has been expressed as to, nor should any reliance be placed on, the fairness, accuracy, correctness or completeness of the information or opinions contained herein. Neither Amundi nor its representatives can be held liable for any decision made, negligence or loss that may result from the use of this document or its contents, or anything related to them, or any document or information to which this document may refer.

The sum of values set out in the tables and analyses may differ slightly from the total reported due to rounding.

¹        Assets under management and net inflows including assets under advisory, marketed assets and funds of funds, and taking into account 100% of assets under management and net inflows from Asian JVs; for Wafa Gestion in Morocco, assets under management and net inflows are reported in proportion to Amundi’s share in the capital of the JV.
²        Adjusted data: see p. 11
³        Net income Group share
⁴        Total tax expense in Q1 2025 of -€155m, of which the exceptional tax contribution (surcharge) in France booked in Q1 for -€46m; the total amount of the exceptional contribution estimated to be paid in fiscal year 2025 is estimated at -€72m; Q1 2025 adjusted net income including this surcharge was €303m.
⁵        The inflows presented in this section are not cumulative, as they may overlap in part, for example an ETF sold to a third-party distributor in Asia.
⁶        Medium to Long-Term Assets, excluding JVs
⁷        4.9% voting rights
⁸        Adjusted for the deconsolidation of Amundi US assets distributed to US clients
⁹        Composite Index for equities: 50% MSCI World + 50% Eurostoxx 600
¹⁰        Bloomberg Euro Aggregate for Fixed Income Markets
¹¹        Source: Morningstar FundFile, ETFGI. European & cross-border open-ended funds (excluding mandates and dedicated funds). Data as of end–March 2024.
¹²        Source: Morningstar Direct, Broadridge FundFile – Open-ended funds and ETFs, global fund scope, March 2025; as a percentage of the assets under management of the funds in question; the number of Amundi’s open-ended funds rated by Morningstar was 1071 at the end of March 2025. © 2025 Morningstar, all rights reserved
¹³        Reflecting Amundi’s share of the net income of minority JVs in India (SBI FM), China (ABC-CA), South Korea (NH-Amundi) and Morocco (Wafa Gestion),
¹⁴        Under the assumption that FY 2025 taxable profit in France will be equivalent to that of 2024, before adjusting the average for actual FY 2025 results
¹⁵        Shareholder’s equity excluding goodwill and other intangible assets
¹⁶        According to the new definition of the ratio resulting from the CRR3 regulation (Capital Requirements Regulation 3) of the European Union; ratio calculated excluding Q1 accounting net income
¹⁷        Assets under management and net inflows including assets under advisory, marketed assets and funds of funds, and taking into account 100% of assets under management and net inflows from Asian JVs; for Wafa Gestion in Morocco, assets under management and net inflows are reported in proportion to Amundi’s share in the capital of the JV.
¹⁸        Lyxor, integrated as of 31/12/2021; sale of Lyxor Inc. in Q4-23
¹⁹        Assets under management and net inflows including assets under advisory, marketed assets and funds of funds, and taking into account 100% of assets under management and net inflows from Asian JVs; for Wafa Gestion in Morocco, assets under management and net inflows are reported in proportion to Amundi’s share in the capital of the JV; as of 01/01/2024, reclassification of short-term bond strategies (€30bn of assets under management) as Bonds ; previously classified as Treasury products until that date; assets under management up to this date have not been reclassified in this table
²⁰        See also the section 4.3 of the 2024 Universal Registration Document filed with the AMF on 16 April 2025 under number D25-0272
²¹Source: IPE “Top 500 Asset Managers” published in June 2024 based on assets under management as of 31/12/2023
²²Amundi data as at 31/03/2025
²³Paris, London, Dublin, Milan, Tokyo and San Antonio (via our strategic partnership with Victory Capital)

Attachment

Amundi_PR_Q1 2025_EN_vdef

The MIL Network –

April 29, 2025

MIL-OSI Global: What Liberal Mark Carney’s projected election win in Canada means for Europe

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Katerina Sviderska, PhD Candidate in Slavonic Studies, University of Cambridge

Just months ago, Canada’s Conservatives were leading the polls, surfing the wave of radical right ideas and rhetoric sweeping across the globe. But with the projected election victory of Mark Carney’s Liberal Party, Canada now stands out as a liberal anchor in a fractured West.

This election may not only shape Canada’s domestic trajectory, but also carries significant implications for its international partnerships amid rising geopolitical uncertainty.

As some European countries and the United States head towards isolationism, authoritarianism and turn to the East — even flirting with Russia — Canada’s continued Liberal leadership reinforces its position as a key ally for the European Union. Carney’s centrist and pro-EU attitude provides stability and relief for Europeans.

From defence to trade and climate, Canada and the EU share deep economic and strategic ties. With a Liberal government, these connections will strengthen, offering both sides what they need the most: a reliable, like-minded partner at a time of transatlantic unpredictability.

What does Carney’s victory mean specifically for the Canada-EU relationship?

Trade as a strategic anchor

Carney’s election offers new momentum for Canada-EU collaboration. His “blue liberalism” brings Canada ideologically closer to Europe’s current leadership — from Emmanuel Macron’s centrist France to the Christian Democratic Union-led coalition in Germany — providing fertile ground for pragmatic co-operation.

Trade remains the foundation of the Canada-EU relationship, and both sides should aim to build on it. At the heart of this partnership is the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), which has increased EU-Canada trade by 65 per cent since 2017.

European Council President António Costa has called the deal a success story providing clear proof “trade agreements are clearly better than trade tariffs.”

As the U.S. speeds toward toward economic nationalism, CETA has become more than a commercial agreement — it’s a strategic anchor in the global liberal order. One of the Liberal government’s early priorities is likely to consolidate and strengthen CETA. In doing so, Canada can position itself as an ambitious partner, ready to seize new opportunities as European countries seek to reduce their reliance on the American market.

Climate and energy: A balanced agenda

Climate and energy, too, offer new opportunities for co-operation. Both Canada and the EU are navigating the tensions between pursuing ambitious decarbonization goals and managing economic and inflationary pressures. After scrapping Canada’s carbon tax on his first day in office, Carney has already hinted at a more pragmatic environmental stance.

While pledging to maintain key climate policies — including the emissions cap on oil and gas — Carney’s government may recalibrate Canada’s approach to energy. This would mirror shifts among some European allies’ climate policies.

This evolving transatlantic consensus — less about abandoning climate goals, more about making them economically viable — paves the way for closer co-operation based on a common goal: bolstering economic competitiveness while maintaining environmental credibility.

Both Carney and the EU view the investment in new technologies as the path forward.

As Europe accelerates its green agenda and implements new sustainability rules, only countries with strong environmental standards qualify as long-term partners. Canada, provided it stays the course on climate policies, is well-positioned to be a key partner in Europe’s green transition.

Transatlantic defence co-operation

Beyond trade and energy, defence co-operation between Canada and the EU is expected to surge. A key priority for the new Liberal government is to finally reach NATO’s benchmark of spending two per cent of gross domestic product on defence, a longstanding commitment that has eluded previous administrations.

Read more:
What does Donald Trump’s NATO posturing mean for Canada?

This signal of rearmament reflects not only alignment with NATO expectations but also a broader understanding that liberal democracies must be prepared to defend themselves. Nowhere is this more pressing than in Ukraine, the epicentre of Europe’s geopolitical storm.

Canada has been among the most reliable supporters of Ukraine since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, aligning itself with Europe’s most committed nations — France, Poland, the Baltics and, increasingly, Germany.

But as threats evolve, the battlefield also extends beyond Ukraine’s frontlines. Hybrid attacks — cyber, disinformation campaigns and foreign interference in democratic processes — now wash up on all shores. Canada’s National Cyber Threat Assessment 2025–26 identifies state-sponsored cyber operations as one of the most serious threats to democratic stability, particularly from Russia and China.

Read more:
Foreign interference threats in Canada’s federal election are both old and new

In strengthening its defence collaboration, Ottawa is hoping to get a seat in the fight against autocracies. The question is no longer whether to engage, but how to lead in this era of layered and compounding threats coming from rivals like Russia and China — and now from the U.S., a historical Canadian ally.

Under Carney’s leadership, Canada is likely to pursue a pragmatic and globally engaged liberalism definitively aligned with Europe. As Canada and the EU are both looking for reliable allies to weather the storm, this renewed western alliance could solidify around Ottawa and Brussels — anchored in shared democratic values and pragmatic leadership.

Katerina Sviderska receives funding from Fonds de Recherche du Québec and the Gates Cambridge Foundation.

Leandre Benoit receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

– ref. What Liberal Mark Carney’s projected election win in Canada means for Europe – https://theconversation.com/what-liberal-mark-carneys-projected-election-win-in-canada-means-for-europe-254775

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

April 29, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: What Liberal Mark Carney’s Canadian projected election win means for Europe

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Katerina Sviderska, PhD Candidate in Slavonic Studies, University of Cambridge

Just months ago, Canada’s Conservatives were leading the polls, surfing the wave of radical right ideas and rhetoric sweeping across the globe. But with the projected election victory of Mark Carney’s Liberal Party, Canada now stands out as a liberal anchor in a fractured West.

This election may not only shape Canada’s domestic trajectory, but also carries significant implications for its international partnerships amid rising geopolitical uncertainty.

As some European countries and the United States head towards isolationism, authoritarianism and turn to the East — even flirting with Russia — Canada’s continued Liberal leadership reinforces its position as a key ally for the European Union. Carney’s centrist and pro-EU attitude provides stability and relief for Europeans.

From defence to trade and climate, Canada and the EU share deep economic and strategic ties. With a Liberal government, these connections will strengthen, offering both sides what they need the most: a reliable, like-minded partner at a time of transatlantic unpredictability.

What does Carney’s victory mean specifically for the Canada-EU relationship?

Trade as a strategic anchor

Carney’s election offers new momentum for Canada-EU collaboration. His “blue liberalism” brings Canada ideologically closer to Europe’s current leadership — from Emmanuel Macron’s centrist France to the Christian Democratic Union-led coalition in Germany — providing fertile ground for pragmatic co-operation.

Trade remains the foundation of the Canada-EU relationship, and both sides should aim to build on it. At the heart of this partnership is the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), which has increased EU-Canada trade by 65 per cent since 2017.

European Council President António Costa has called the deal a success story providing clear proof “trade agreements are clearly better than trade tariffs.”

As the U.S. speeds toward toward economic nationalism, CETA has become more than a commercial agreement — it’s a strategic anchor in the global liberal order. One of the Liberal government’s early priorities is likely to consolidate and strengthen CETA. In doing so, Canada can position itself as an ambitious partner, ready to seize new opportunities as European countries seek to reduce their reliance on the American market.

Climate and energy: A balanced agenda

Climate and energy, too, offer new opportunities for co-operation. Both Canada and the EU are navigating the tensions between pursuing ambitious decarbonization goals and managing economic and inflationary pressures. After scrapping Canada’s carbon tax on his first day in office, Carney has already hinted at a more pragmatic environmental stance.

While pledging to maintain key climate policies — including the emissions cap on oil and gas — Carney’s government may recalibrate Canada’s approach to energy. This would mirror shifts among some European allies’ climate policies.

This evolving transatlantic consensus — less about abandoning climate goals, more about making them economically viable — paves the way for closer co-operation based on a common goal: bolstering economic competitiveness while maintaining environmental credibility.

Both Carney and the EU view the investment in new technologies as the path forward.

As Europe accelerates its green agenda and implements new sustainability rules, only countries with strong environmental standards qualify as long-term partners. Canada, provided it stays the course on climate policies, is well-positioned to be a key partner in Europe’s green transition.

Transatlantic defence co-operation

Beyond trade and energy, defence co-operation between Canada and the EU is expected to surge. A key priority for the new Liberal government is to finally reach NATO’s benchmark of spending two per cent of gross domestic product on defence, a longstanding commitment that has eluded previous administrations.

Read more:
What does Donald Trump’s NATO posturing mean for Canada?

This signal of rearmament reflects not only alignment with NATO expectations but also a broader understanding that liberal democracies must be prepared to defend themselves. Nowhere is this more pressing than in Ukraine, the epicentre of Europe’s geopolitical storm.

Canada has been among the most reliable supporters of Ukraine since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, aligning itself with Europe’s most committed nations — France, Poland, the Baltics and, increasingly, Germany.

But as threats evolve, the battlefield also extends beyond Ukraine’s frontlines. Hybrid attacks — cyber, disinformation campaigns and foreign interference in democratic processes — now wash up on all shores. Canada’s National Cyber Threat Assessment 2025–26 identifies state-sponsored cyber operations as one of the most serious threats to democratic stability, particularly from Russia and China.

Read more:
Foreign interference threats in Canada’s federal election are both old and new

In strengthening its defence collaboration, Ottawa is hoping to get a seat in the fight against autocracies. The question is no longer whether to engage, but how to lead in this era of layered and compounding threats coming from rivals like Russia and China — and now from the U.S., a historical Canadian ally.

Under Carney’s leadership, Canada is likely to pursue a pragmatic and globally engaged liberalism definitively aligned with Europe. As Canada and the EU are both looking for reliable allies to weather the storm, this renewed western alliance could solidify around Ottawa and Brussels — anchored in shared democratic values and pragmatic leadership.

Katerina Sviderska receives funding from Fonds de Recherche du Québec and the Gates Cambridge Foundation.

Leandre Benoit receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

– ref. What Liberal Mark Carney’s Canadian projected election win means for Europe – https://theconversation.com/what-liberal-mark-carneys-canadian-projected-election-win-means-for-europe-254775

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

April 29, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: 29 April 2025 Departmental update Antibiotics most responsible for drug resistance are overused – WHO report
Source: World Health Organisation

The World Health Organization (WHO) today published an analysis of how antibiotics are used globally. The report is based on 2022 data from the Global Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) and Use Surveillance System (GLASS) dashboard and the WHO Access, Watch, Reserve (AWaRe) system that classifies antibiotics into three categories:
- Access antibiotics are often recommended as first- or second-choice treatments for common infections because of their safety, low cost, narrow spectrum and low likelihood of causing AMR. At the 2024 UN General Assembly High-Level Meeting on AMR, countries committed to ensuring that Access antibiotics would account for at least 70% of global antibiotic use by 2030.
- Watch antibiotics have a broader spectrum and are typically more expensive. They are generally recommended as first-choice options for patients with more severe infections.
- Reserve antibiotics are last-resort antibiotics used to treat multidrug-resistant infections.
Since GLASS started to cover antimicrobial use in 2020, 90 countries, territories and areas (CTAs) were enrolled by December 2023, of which 74 have reported national data. However, global participation remains below 50%, with gaps in data from non-European and lower-income countries.

In 2022, overall, 18 out of every 1000 people received an antibiotic every day – based on a median of 18.3 defined daily doses per 1000 inhabitants per day (DID). However, antibiotic use varies by a factor of 10 between the highest-using and the lowest-using CTA. While these variations need to be better understood, they suggest patterns of both overuse and low access to antibiotics.

Use of Watch antibiotics remains relatively high in many settings and therefore, only one in three CTAs is meeting the UN target calling for 70% of antibiotics to be from the Access category. Watch antibiotics contribute disproportionately to AMR and more must be done to avoid their unnecessary use when no antibiotics are needed or Access antibiotics would suffice.

Lastly, some low- and middle-income CTAs reported little or no use of Reserve antibiotics, which are needed to treat infections caused by the most drug-resistant bacteria.

Immediate priorities

The main findings of the report have immediate implications for policy.

First, WHO will continue to assist countries in establishing sustainable surveillance systems for collecting high quality antibiotic use data. The WHO Academy will provide an online course to improve measurement, understanding and use of data on antibiotic use to strengthen capacity in CTAs.

Second, countries need to implement stewardship policies so that prescribers default to using Access instead of Watch antibiotics whenever possible and avoid unnecessary use of antibiotics in the first place. WHO will work closely with partners, including the World Medical Association, the international organization representing physicians, who have a crucial role in taking forward this report’s next steps, particularly those relating to responsible prescribing.

Third, countries need to ensure access to all essential antibiotics, including those in the Reserve category. WHO is working with partners, such as the Global Antibiotic Research and Development Partnership, to develop a framework to improve availability of essential antibiotics for countries with limited resources.

AMR occurs when bacteria, viruses, fungi and parasites do not respond to medicines, leading to infections becoming difficult or impossible to treat, increasing the risk of disease spread, severe illness and death. AMR risks reversing many advances in modern medicine. Overuse and misuse of antibiotics and other antimicrobials are major drivers of AMR yet inadequate access to essential medicines remains a problem in many resource-limited settings.

Interested in learning more?

Register here to join the report launch webinar on 30 April 2025. This will be an opportunity to delve deeper into the main results highlighted in the report, discuss the implications of the findings, and explore the way forward towards achieving the newly endorsed targets of ensuring that 70% of antibiotics used globally are in the WHO AWaRe Access group and that all countries build national surveillance systems to generate high-quality data on AMU by 2030.

The webinar will be in English with simultaneous translation in French and Spanish.

MIL OSI United Nations News –
April 29, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: What Liberal Mark Carney’s Canadian election win means for Europe

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Katerina Sviderska, PhD Candidate in Slavonic Studies, University of Cambridge

Just months ago, Canada’s Conservatives were leading the polls, surfing the wave of radical right ideas and rhetoric sweeping across the globe. But with the election victory of Mark Carney’s Liberal Party, Canada now stands out as a liberal anchor in a fractured West.

This election not only shapes Canada’s domestic trajectory, but also carries significant implications for its international partnerships amid rising geopolitical uncertainty.

As some European countries and the United States head towards isolationism, authoritarianism and turn to the East — even flirting with Russia — Canada’s continued Liberal leadership reinforces its position as a key ally for the European Union. Carney’s centrist and pro-EU attitude provides stability and relief for Europeans.

From defence to trade and climate, Canada and the EU share deep economic and strategic ties. With a Liberal government, these connections will strengthen, offering both sides what they need the most: a reliable, like-minded partner at a time of transatlantic unpredictability.

What does Carney’s victory mean specifically for the Canada-EU relationship?

Trade as a strategic anchor

Carney’s election offers new momentum for Canada-EU collaboration. His “blue liberalism” brings Canada ideologically closer to Europe’s current leadership — from Emmanuel Macron’s centrist France to the Christian Democratic Union-led coalition in Germany — providing fertile ground for pragmatic co-operation.

Trade remains the foundation of the Canada-EU relationship, and both sides should aim to build on it. At the heart of this partnership is the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), which has increased EU-Canada trade by 65 per cent since 2017.

European Council President António Costa has called the deal a success story providing clear proof “trade agreements are clearly better than trade tariffs.”

As the U.S. speeds toward toward economic nationalism, CETA has become more than a commercial agreement — it’s a strategic anchor in the global liberal order. One of the Liberal government’s early priorities is likely to consolidate and strengthen CETA. In doing so, Canada can position itself as an ambitious partner, ready to seize new opportunities as European countries seek to reduce their reliance on the American market.

Climate and energy: A balanced agenda

Climate and energy, too, offer new opportunities for co-operation. Both Canada and the EU are navigating the tensions between pursuing ambitious decarbonization goals and managing economic and inflationary pressures. After scrapping Canada’s carbon tax on his first day in office, Carney has already hinted at a more pragmatic environmental stance.

While pledging to maintain key climate policies — including the emissions cap on oil and gas — Carney’s government may recalibrate Canada’s approach to energy. This would mirror shifts among some European allies’ climate policies.

This evolving transatlantic consensus — less about abandoning climate goals, more about making them economically viable — paves the way for closer co-operation based on a common goal: bolstering economic competitiveness while maintaining environmental credibility.

Both Carney and the EU view the investment in new technologies as the path forward.

As Europe accelerates its green agenda and implements new sustainability rules, only countries with strong environmental standards qualify as long-term partners. Canada, provided it stays the course on climate policies, is well-positioned to be a key partner in Europe’s green transition.

Transatlantic defence co-operation

Beyond trade and energy, defence co-operation between Canada and the EU is expected to surge. A key priority for the new Liberal government is to finally reach NATO’s benchmark of spending two per cent of gross domestic product on defence, a longstanding commitment that has eluded previous administrations.

Read more:
What does Donald Trump’s NATO posturing mean for Canada?

This signal of rearmament reflects not only alignment with NATO expectations but also a broader understanding that liberal democracies must be prepared to defend themselves. Nowhere is this more pressing than in Ukraine, the epicentre of Europe’s geopolitical storm.

Canada has been among the most reliable supporters of Ukraine since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, aligning itself with Europe’s most committed nations — France, Poland, the Baltics and, increasingly, Germany.

But as threats evolve, the battlefield also extends beyond Ukraine’s frontlines. Hybrid attacks — cyber, disinformation campaigns and foreign interference in democratic processes — now wash up on all shores. Canada’s National Cyber Threat Assessment 2025–26 identifies state-sponsored cyber operations as one of the most serious threats to democratic stability, particularly from Russia and China.

Read more:
Foreign interference threats in Canada’s federal election are both old and new

In strengthening its defence collaboration, Ottawa is hoping to get a seat in the fight against autocracies. The question is no longer whether to engage, but how to lead in this era of layered and compounding threats coming from rivals like Russia and China — and now from the U.S., a historical Canadian ally.

Under Carney’s leadership, Canada is likely to pursue a pragmatic and globally engaged liberalism definitively aligned with Europe. As Canada and the EU are both looking for reliable allies to weather the storm, this renewed western alliance could solidify around Ottawa and Brussels — anchored in shared democratic values and pragmatic leadership.

Katerina Sviderska receives funding from Fonds de Recherche du Québec and the Gates Cambridge Foundation.

Leandre Benoit receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

– ref. What Liberal Mark Carney’s Canadian election win means for Europe – https://theconversation.com/what-liberal-mark-carneys-canadian-election-win-means-for-europe-254775

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

April 29, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: What Canada’s election of Mark Carney’s Liberals means for Europe

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Katerina Sviderska, PhD Candidate in Slavonic Studies, University of Cambridge

Just months ago, Canada’s Conservatives were leading the polls, surfing the wave of radical right ideas and rhetoric sweeping across the globe. But with the election victory of Mark Carney’s Liberal Party, Canada now stands out as a liberal anchor in a fractured West.

This election not only shapes Canada’s domestic trajectory, but also carries significant implications for its international partnerships amid rising geopolitical uncertainty.

As some European countries and the United States head towards isolationism, authoritarianism and turn to the East — even flirting with Russia — Canada’s continued Liberal leadership reinforces its position as a key ally for the European Union. Carney’s centrist and pro-EU attitude provides stability and relief for Europeans.

From defence to trade and climate, Canada and the EU share deep economic and strategic ties. With a Liberal government, these connections will strengthen, offering both sides what they need the most: a reliable, like-minded partner at a time of transatlantic unpredictability.

What does Carney’s victory mean specifically for the Canada-EU relationship?

Trade as a strategic anchor

Carney’s election offers new momentum for Canada-EU collaboration. His “blue liberalism” brings Canada ideologically closer to Europe’s current leadership — from Emmanuel Macron’s centrist France to the Christian Democratic Union-led coalition in Germany — providing fertile ground for pragmatic co-operation.

Trade remains the foundation of the Canada-EU relationship, and both sides should aim to build on it. At the heart of this partnership is the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), which has increased EU-Canada trade by 65 per cent since 2017.

European Council President António Costa has called the deal a success story providing clear proof “trade agreements are clearly better than trade tariffs.”

As the U.S. speeds toward toward economic nationalism, CETA has become more than a commercial agreement — it’s a strategic anchor in the global liberal order. One of the Liberal government’s early priorities is likely to consolidate and strengthen CETA. In doing so, Canada can position itself as an ambitious partner, ready to seize new opportunities as European countries seek to reduce their reliance on the American market.

Climate and energy: A balanced agenda

Climate and energy, too, offer new opportunities for co-operation. Both Canada and the EU are navigating the tensions between pursuing ambitious decarbonization goals and managing economic and inflationary pressures. After scrapping Canada’s carbon tax on his first day in office, Carney has already hinted at a more pragmatic environmental stance.

While pledging to maintain key climate policies — including the emissions cap on oil and gas — Carney’s government may recalibrate Canada’s approach to energy. This would mirror shifts among some European allies’ climate policies.

This evolving transatlantic consensus — less about abandoning climate goals, more about making them economically viable — paves the way for closer co-operation based on a common goal: bolstering economic competitiveness while maintaining environmental credibility.

Both Carney and the EU view the investment in new technologies as the path forward.

As Europe accelerates its green agenda and implements new sustainability rules, only countries with strong environmental standards qualify as long-term partners. Canada, provided it stays the course on climate policies, is well-positioned to be a key partner in Europe’s green transition.

Transatlantic defence co-operation

Beyond trade and energy, defence co-operation between Canada and the EU is expected to surge. A key priority for the new Liberal government is to finally reach NATO’s benchmark of spending two per cent of gross domestic product on defence, a longstanding commitment that has eluded previous administrations.

Read more:
What does Donald Trump’s NATO posturing mean for Canada?

This signal of rearmament reflects not only alignment with NATO expectations but also a broader understanding that liberal democracies must be prepared to defend themselves. Nowhere is this more pressing than in Ukraine, the epicentre of Europe’s geopolitical storm.

Canada has been among the most reliable supporters of Ukraine since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, aligning itself with Europe’s most committed nations — France, Poland, the Baltics and, increasingly, Germany.

But as threats evolve, the battlefield also extends beyond Ukraine’s frontlines. Hybrid attacks — cyber, disinformation campaigns and foreign interference in democratic processes — now wash up on all shores. Canada’s National Cyber Threat Assessment 2025–26 identifies state-sponsored cyber operations as one of the most serious threats to democratic stability, particularly from Russia and China.

Read more:
Foreign interference threats in Canada’s federal election are both old and new

In strengthening its defence collaboration, Ottawa is hoping to get a seat in the fight against autocracies. The question is no longer whether to engage, but how to lead in this era of layered and compounding threats coming from rivals like Russia and China — and now from the U.S., a historical Canadian ally.

Under Carney’s leadership, Canada is likely to pursue a pragmatic and globally engaged liberalism definitively aligned with Europe. As Canada and the EU are both looking for reliable allies to weather the storm, this renewed western alliance could solidify around Ottawa and Brussels — anchored in shared democratic values and pragmatic leadership.

Katerina Sviderska receives funding from Fonds de Recherche du Québec and the Gates Cambridge Foundation.

Leandre Benoit receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

– ref. What Canada’s election of Mark Carney’s Liberals means for Europe – https://theconversation.com/what-canadas-election-of-mark-carneys-liberals-means-for-europe-254775

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

April 29, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Bipartisan Klobuchar Bill to Protect Online Privacy and Combat Explicit Deepfakes Passes Congress
US Senate News:
Source: United States Senator for Minnesota Amy Klobuchar

The TAKE IT DOWN Act criminalizes the nonconsensual publication of explicit images, real and AI-generated, and requires websites to remove them

WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Senators Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) and Ted Cruz (R-TX) announced that their bipartisan TAKE IT DOWN Act passed the House and is headed to the President’s desk to be signed into law. Representatives Maria Elvira Salazar (R-FL) and Madeleine Dean (D-PA) led the companion legislation that passed today.

The bill unanimously passed the Senate in February, and it includes the Klobuchar and Senator John Cornyn’s (R-TX) Stopping Harmful Image Exploitation and Limiting Distribution (SHIELD) Act, which addresses the online exploitation of explicit, private images and passed the Senate last July.

The TAKE IT DOWN Act would criminalize the publication of non-consensual intimate imagery (NCII), including AI-generated NCII, and require social media and similar websites to have in place procedures to remove such content within 48 hours of notice from a victim.

“We must provide victims of online abuse with the legal protections they need when intimate images are shared without their consent, especially now that deepfakes are creating horrifying new opportunities for abuse,” said Sen. Klobuchar. “These images can ruin lives and reputations, but now that our bipartisan legislation is becoming law, victims will be able to have this material removed from social media platforms and law enforcement can hold perpetrators accountable. ”

“The passage of the TAKE IT DOWN Act is a historic win in the fight to protect victims of revenge porn and deepfake abuse. This victory belongs first and foremost to the heroic survivors who shared their stories and the advocates who never gave up. By requiring social media companies to take down this abusive content quickly, we are sparing victims from repeated trauma and holding predators accountable,”said Sen. Cruz. “This day would not have been possible without the courage and perseverance of Elliston Berry, Francesca Mani, Breeze Liu, and Brandon Guffey, whose powerful voices drove this legislation forward. I am especially grateful to my colleagues—including Sen. Amy Klobuchar, Rep. Maria Salazar, Rep. Madeleine Dean, First Lady Melania Trump, and House Leadership—for locking arms in this critical mission to protect Americans from online exploitation.”

“The TAKE IT DOWN Act’s passage is a significant step forward in Congress’ responsibility to protect the privacy and dignity of Americans against bad actors and the most harmful developments of AI,” said Rep. Dean. “It takes only minutes to create a deepfake or share intimate images without consent, yet the lasting consequences devastate its victims — often girls and women. Our bill requires platforms to remove these horrifying images and videos from the Internet within 48 hours. I’m deeply grateful to work with Sen. Klobuchar, Sen. Cruz, and Rep. Salazar to create this bipartisan federal law.”

“The TAKE IT DOWN Act’s passage is a bipartisan victory to protect victims of real and deepfake revenge pornography,” said Rep. Salazar. “This bill shows Congress at its best, working together to empower victims, especially women and girls. It equally holds offenders and Big Tech accountable.”

The TAKE IT DOWN Act would protect and empower victims of real and deepfake NCII while respecting speech by:
- Criminalizing the publication of NCII in interstate commerce. The bill makes it unlawful for a person to knowingly publish, or threaten to publish, NCII on social media and other online platforms. NCII is defined to include realistic, computer-generated pornographic images and videos that depict identifiable, real people. The bill also clarifies that a victim consenting to the creation of an authentic image does not mean that the victim has consented to its publication.
- Protecting good-faith efforts to assist victims. The bill permits the good-faith disclosure of NCII, such as to law enforcement, in narrow cases.
- Requiring websites to take down NCII upon notice from the victim. Social media and other websites would be required to have in place procedures to remove NCII, pursuant to a valid request from a victim, within 48 hours. Websites must also make reasonable efforts to remove copies of the images. The FTC is charged with enforcement of this section.
- Protecting lawful speech. The bill is narrowly tailored to criminalize knowingly publishing NCII without chilling lawful speech. The bill conforms to current First Amendment jurisprudence by requiring that computer-generated NCII meet a “reasonable person” test for appearing indistinguishable from an authentic image.
The legislation is co-sponsored by Shelley Moore Capito (R-WV), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Bill Cassidy (R-LA), Cory Booker (D-NJ), John Barrasso (R-WY), Jacky Rosen (D-NV), Cynthia Lummis (R-WY), John Hickenlooper (D-CO), Ted Budd (R-NC), Marsha Blackburn (R-TN), Roger Wicker (R-MS), Todd Young (R-IN), John Curtis (R-UT), Tim Sheehy (R-MT), Raphael Warnock (D-GA), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), Gary Peters (D-MI), Adam Schiff (D-CA), Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV), and Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH).

In 2024, at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing titled “Big Tech and the Online Child Sexual Exploitation Crisis,” Senator Klobuchar was part of a hearing that questioned the CEO of Discord Inc., Jason Citron, the CEO of TikTok Inc., Shou Chew, the Co-founder and CEO of Snap Inc., Evan Spiegel, the CEO of X (formerly Twitter), Linda Yaccarino, and the Founder and CEO of Meta (formerly Facebook), Mark Zuckerberg, about their companies turning a blind eye when young children joined their platforms, the risk of sexual exploitation, using algorithms that push harmful content, and providing a venue for drug traffickers to sell deadly narcotics like fentanyl.

In 2017, Klobuchar and former Senators Richard Burr (R-NC) and Kamala Harris (D-CA), introduced the first version of this legislation, the bipartisan Ending Nonconsensual Online User Graphic Harassment (ENOUGH) Act.
MIL OSI USA News –
April 29, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Durbin Reflects On The Life And Legacy Of The Late Pope Francis

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Illinois Dick Durbin
April 28, 2025
Durbin: In a world of hate and fear, the Pope’s message of peace and understanding is needed now more than ever
WASHINGTON – U.S. Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-IL) today delivered a speech on the Senate floor commemorating and honoring the late Pope Francis. This weekend, Durbin attended the late Pope’s funeral in the Vatican along with U.S. Senators Susan Collins (R-ME), Ed Markey (D-MA), Mike Rounds (R-SD), and Eric Schmitt (R-MO).
“Today I join people across the world and mourn the passing of Pope Francis. He was forgiving, hopeful, and committed to the notion of peace. Francis taught us that there is no one ‘right’ way to be a Catholic. That the Church can shape you, and you can shape the Church. And in the process, he made the Church stronger,” said Durbin.
During his speech, Durbin also noted he attended the Pope’s Joint Address to Congress in 2015—the first Pope to ever do so. Durbin then praised Pope Francis for using his platform to highlight the plight of immigrants and refugees, to ask compassion for those in the LGBTQ+ community whom the Church has historically shunned, and to advocate for peace in distant wars and to protect our environment.
“Like myself, Pope Francis was the child of immigrants, and he often reminded us of our responsibility to welcome the stranger. In a recent letter to American Catholic bishops, Pope Francis affirmed our nation’s right to ‘defend itself and keep communities safe.’ But he raised serious concerns about mass deportation, which ‘damages the dignity of many men and women, and of entire families, and places them in a state of particular vulnerability and defenselessness.’ His message is so timely as our government ignores due process and through an ‘administrative error,’ sends individuals to a hell-hole prison in El Salvador and deports a two-year-old to Honduras,” said Durbin.
Durbin praised Pope Francis for the speech he prepared for Easter Sunday—one day before he passed away. The Pope was so ill that he was unable to deliver the speech himself, so it was read by one of his aides.
Durbin continued, “It was a speech of peace. It was a speech of hope. It was the speech of a truly good man. In it, he pled, ‘On this day, I would like all of us to hope anew and to revive our trust in others, including those who are different than ourselves, or who come from distant lands, bringing unfamiliar customs, ways of life and ideas.’”
Durbin concluded by reflecting on the Pope’s funeral—where hundreds of thousands of people gathered in St. Peter’s Square in the Vatican City to mourn the death of Pope Francis.
“The crowd was overwhelming. Estimated in the hundreds of thousands, they represented every corner of the Earth. Just in our small section was a delegation in business suits from Lesotho in Africa, Buddhists in bright orange robes, members of the Italian Parliament, a turbaned Sikh delegation from India, and our bipartisan House delegation led by Nancy Pelosi and Republican Leader Steve Scalise. Thousands of Catholic clergy on the altar and in the audience wore vestments presenting every shade of scarlet and red. But the vast crowds of mourners and celebrants were simply admirers of Francis who, in his humble way, touched so many lives. At the front of the altar was his simple wooden casket,” Durbin continued.
“The funeral ceremony was in Latin, the language of the Catholic Church when I was a young altar boy at St. Elizabeth’s Church in East St. Louis, Illinois, in the 1950’s. As I witnessed this solemn mass and read from the text, I could hear in my mind the rusty hinges of an opening door taking me back to the Latin mass and Gregorian chant of my childhood. It is all still there, ‘deo gratias,’” said Durbin.
“How did this Mass differ from the Funeral of John Paul II decades ago? I remember the crowds of Polish mourners with their red and white flags for John Paul II,” Durbin continued. “But with Francis, what struck me were the many waves of spontaneous cheering from the vast crowd when reference was made to his simple message for immigrants, peace, understanding. Who can forget his five words: ‘Who am I to judge?’ defined his humility and humanity for so many of us. After the ceremony, I went back to my hotel room and turned on my TV. There was a recurring segment every few minutes. It showed a simple photograph of Francis and the Italian words: ‘Grazie Francesco, il Papa della gente.’ Translated to English: ‘Thank you, Francis. The Pope of the people.’ We must continue to hold fast to the message of Pope Francis to love and respect one another. In a world of hate and fear, his message of peace and understanding is needed now more than ever,”Durbin concluded.
Video of Durbin’s remarks on the Senate floor is available here.
Audio of Durbin’s remarks on the Senate floor is available here.
Footage of Durbin’s remarks on the Senate floor is available here for TV Stations.
-30-

MIL OSI USA News –

April 29, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: Arsenic is everywhere – but new detection methods could help save lives

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Magdalena Wajrak, Senior Lecturer in Chemistry, Edith Cowan University

Arsenic is a nasty poison that once reigned as the ultimate weapon of deception. In the 18th century, it was the poison of choice for those wanting to kill their enemies and spouses, favoured for its undetectable nature and the way its symptoms mimicked common gastrointestinal issues like stomach pain, diarrhoea and vomiting.

One of the most famous deaths believed to be due to arsenic poisoning was that of French general Napoleon Bonaparte in 1821. While there’s still considerable controversy over the definite cause of Napoleon’s death, there is enough evidence that arsenic did at least contribute.

Analysis of Napoleon’s hair in 1961 found it contained more than ten times the normal concentrations of arsenic. The most likely source of exposure was from an arsenic compound used as a pigment in wallpapers in the 18th century.

Centuries later, arsenic is still widespread in the world, and causing major health problems. But thankfully scientists – including myself – are developing more effective ways of measuring arsenic to reduce the harm it causes to people.

A tasteless poison

Arsenic in its elemental state is a grey, brittle solid. Its nucleus has 33 protons and 42 neutrons, giving it similar chemical properties to phosphorus.

The elemental form of arsenic is actually non-toxic; it is the compounds of arsenic that are poisonous. Pure elements have a tendency to bond to other elements and form compounds, because this provides elements with more stability.

When arsenic combines with oxygen, it forms an extremely toxic compound called arsenic trioxide. Only 70mg of this odourless and tasteless compound is needed to kill an adult human.

When arsenic enters our bodies, it can have major impacts on DNA. Phosphorous is an essential component of the backbone of DNA, but arsenic can replace it. This can lead to genome instability and a higher risk of genetic mutations, which can ultimately increase the risk of developing cancer.

Arsenic also inhibits the enzymes necessary for bodily functions.

When arsenic is inhaled or ingested, it is rapidly distributed around the body. It initially remains in the liver before being stored in the kidneys, then the spleen and lungs. Our bodies are very clever, however, and have a process capable of removing very small amounts of arsenic through urine.

But that process takes time. So if you are exposed to high levels of arsenic, your body will not be able to eliminate it fast enough and damage will occur.

One of the most famous deaths believed to be due to arsenic poisoning was that of Napoleon Bonaparte.
Jacques-Louis David/Wikipedia

Arsenic is everywhere

The main environmental sources of arsenic are volcanoes and the erosion of mineral deposits. This can contaminate groundwater sources, as happened in Bangladesh where the building of tube wells for irrigation and drinking water from the mid 20th century onwards accidentally caused the “world’s worst mass poisoning”.

Human sources of arsenic in the environment are predominantly from smelters of copper, gold and iron ores. These smelters often use arsenic compounds such as copper arsenate to treat and preserve wood. They also use pesticides and antiparasitic chemicals, some of which contain arsenic.

We also find very small amounts of arsenic compounds in LED lights and in bronze.

The most common sources of exposure to arsenic are from cigarettes and food products. Foods grown in arsenic-contaminated soil or exposed to contaminated water will absorb arsenic.

For example, rice is very susceptible to absorbing elements from soil and water, so can contain high levels of arsenic if grown in contaminated areas. However, rice is generally safe to eat and rinsing it removes most of the arsenic it might have absorbed.

Groundwater in Bangladesh is heavily contaminated with arsenic, posing a major public health risk.
HM Shahidul Islam/Shutterstock

Detecting arsenic

Being able to detect and monitor arsenic concentrations in our environment and in our bodies is important for our health.

However, common analytical techniques for arsenic detection are laboratory-based and require complicated infrastructure – such as constant access to argon gas to produce a plasma – and a specifically trained chemist or lab technician.

Thankfully scientists are developing new techniques. These are not only reliable and accurate, but highly portable and simple enough to be used outside laboratories to test for arsenic in environmental, biological and industrial samples.

One of these is an electrochemical technique, known as “anodic stripping voltammetry”.

This technique can detect trace amounts of arsenic. It works by measuring the minute electric current produced by the poison. The amount of current produced is directly proportional to the concentration of arsenic in the sample.

Being able to quickly, simply and accurately detect arsenic in, say, drinking water, could reduce people’s exposure to it. In turn, this would help reduce the likelihood of future health problems, such as skin cancers.

It is impossible to eliminate arsenic from our environment. So constant monitoring of arsenic levels in the environment and food products is the best way to reduce our exposure to this notorious poison.

Magdalena Wajrak does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Arsenic is everywhere – but new detection methods could help save lives – https://theconversation.com/arsenic-is-everywhere-but-new-detection-methods-could-help-save-lives-248547

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

April 29, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Youth Mobility Scheme for Uruguayan and British citizens: 2025
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments
World news story

Youth Mobility Scheme for Uruguayan and British citizens: 2025

English

Español de América Latina

The Youth Mobility Scheme allows 500 visas, both for Uruguayan and British nationals, to live, study, work and travel in the UK and Uruguay respectively.
In 2025, 500 British and 500 Uruguayan nationals aged 18 to 30 years old will be able to experience life and culture in each other’s country for up to 2 years, as established in the agreement that came into effect in both countries on 31 January 2024.

Uruguayan citizens who would like to travel to the UK under this scheme need to apply for a Youth Mobility Scheme (YMS) visa. British citizens who would like to travel to Uruguay should apply for a Working Holiday temporary residency.

The scheme desires to foster close relations between British and Uruguayan nationals, intending to promote and facilitate access to opportunities that enable youth to gain a better understanding of the other participant’s culture, society, and languages through travel, work, and life experience abroad.

This is the first YMS between the UK and a South American Country. The agreement was signed in August 2023 at the Uruguayan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, during the visit of FCDO Minister for the Americas and Caribbean David Rutley MP to Uruguay.

UK has YMS agreements in place with Andorra, Australia, Canada, Republic of Korea, Hong Kong, Iceland, Japan, Monaco, New Zealand, San Marino, Taiwan and Uruguay.

Uruguay has Working Holiday programmes with Australia, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, and United Kingdom.

Find below information about the scheme and how to apply, for British and Uruguayan nationals.

Information for British nationals

British citizens interested in applying for a Working Holiday temporary residency must attend the Uruguayan Consulate in London and submit the following documents:

valid passport in good condition, with an expiry date at least one year in the future

a medical certificate from the country of residence where it states that you do not have medical conditions that would make it impossible for you to reside in Uruguay

evidence of a Police Certificate from the country of origin and from any country that you have lived in for the past 5 years. This should be apostilled or legalised, whichever is appropriate. In the UK you can apply for this at: http://www.gov.uk/copy-of-police-records. The six must have been issued within the 6 months prior to the filing of the application

documents that demonstrate that they have sufficient financial resources to meet their needs (such as salary payslips, bank statements, pensions, etc.) issued within 30 days of the application date

declaration of the intended time they will remain in Uruguay, which will be up to 2 years

apostille or legalised birth certificate (whichever is the case, if the person was born outside the UK) and translated (by a certified Uruguayan translator, by Consul or by consular intervention, depending on the case) will be required in Uruguay in order to obtain the Uruguayan National Identity card

Once the documentation is submitted, the Consulate will inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ International Migration Direction, which will notify the National Migration Office. A decision will be made within a maximum of 15 working days.

If the application is successful, the Consulate will let you will know. You will then need to enter Uruguay within 180 days from the notification day. If you need a visa, the Consulate will issue a tourist visa without consulting with the National Migration Office, referring to the temporary residency granted.

Once you are in Uruguay, you will need to go in person to the National Migration Office and the National Civil Identification Office to apply for the National Identity card and pay the required fees. If youneed more information, please contact the Uruguayan Consulate or Uruguayan Embassy: cdlondres@mrree.gub.uy or urureinounido@mree.gub.uy, or call: +44 (0)207 584 4200

Information for Uruguayan nationals:

applications to the Youth Mobility Scheme are online. You can apply from any country in the world, except from the UK

you can apply if you are a Uruguayan National aged 18-30 years old and hold a Uruguayan passport

you can spend up to 2 years in the UK, with multiple entries

you can work but it is not compulsory. You can travel, study short courses or volunteer

you do not need any language, job or skill requirements

you must apply for a visa and pay the Immigration Health Surcharge

you need to demonstrate you have the equivalent to £2,530 in a bank account for at least the past 28 days before applying

you need to get a Criminal Record Certificate. Please request it for Consulate- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not the British Embassy

you cannot apply if you have any dependants living with you or who are financially dependent on you at the time of application

you must not have not previously taken part in the scheme

Applicants will usually get a decision on their visa within 3 weeks.

For more information, please go to Youth Mobility Scheme visa: Overview – GOV.UK or contact: public.enquiries@homeoffice.gov.uk.

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Updates to this page

Published 28 April 2025
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
April 29, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Russia must provide its response on Ukraine ceasefire

Source: France-Diplomatie – Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development

Excerpts from statements to the press by M. Emmanuel Macron, President of the Republic, from Madagascar (Antananarivo, April 24, 2025)

(Check against delivery)

(…)

A few moments ago, in your speech here, you denounced “the mad armies that want to seize little bits of land”. However, a few minutes ago President Zelenskyy said the pressure on Russia isn’t strong enough, at a time when the United States is obviously preparing to recognize Crimea as Russian. Is peace getting further away today?

THE PRESIDENT – First of all, I don’t want to speak for anyone. As you know, France’s position is steadfast. It won’t change. We’re in favour of the sovereignty of peoples and territorial integrity, respecting international law. Moreover, there are no double standards for France. That applies to Ukraine, it applies to the Middle East and it applies to the African continent. And I pride myself on that position.

So we’ll continue to uphold the Ukrainian people’s right to live in peace on their territory and within their internationally-recognized borders. That’s why we’ve always condemned the Russian war of aggression.

We’re at a moment when I hope peace can be built, and I want to pay tribute to the efforts made by US diplomacy. But I also want to remind you of the facts. There’s an aggressor, Russia, and an aggressee, Ukraine. A few weeks ago, under American impetus, President Zelenskyy made an incredible gesture. He said: “I agree to an unconditional ceasefire”.

The only thing we have to ensure, the only thing – I repeated this to President Trump, to whom I spoke two days ago during the night – is for President Putin to finally stop lying. When President Putin talks to the US negotiators, he tells them: “I want peace.” When he talks to the whole planet, he says: “I personally want peace.” He continues to bomb Ukraine. He continues to kill people in Ukraine. There’s only one reply we’re waiting for. Does President Putin agree to an unconditional ceasefire? The Americans have proposed it, the Europeans support it, and President Zelenskyy has said yes. If President Putin says yes, the weapons fall silent tomorrow and lives are saved. The international community has just one thing to do, and America’s irritation should focus on only one person: President Putin. He must answer the question he’s asking him. Then we’ll be able to build a just, solid, lasting, robust peace – in other words, a peace that makes it possible to find territorial concessions and solid security guarantees.

But as I speak, it’s not as if nothing had happened in the past few weeks. The Americans have proposed something, the Ukrainians have said yes, and we support it. Now Russia must provide its response. If Russia says, I’m not ready for a ceasefire, it will have lied to the US President, it will have lied to all those it told it wanted peace, and we’ll have to act accordingly. If it says yes, we’ll have a ceasefire tomorrow. (…)

Are you going to speak to President Trump?

THE PRESIDENT – I spoke to him 24 hours ago, the night before yesterday.

Do you think he can modify his position? Or is he sticking with positions that are difficult to reconcile with those of the Europeans?

THE PRESIDENT – He wants to find agreements, and I completely respect him. He wants a comprehensive peace agreement – he’s the negotiator too. But let me put things back in the right order. There can be no peace agreement if there isn’t already an agreement on what he’s got from President Zelenskyy, which was a huge step forward by President Zelenskyy.

I say this very emphatically here: the first step, the one that – if I can put it like this – marks the beginning of everything, is the unconditional ceasefire that the Russians must accept.

So, no freezing of the ceasefire line, of the current front line?

THE PRESIDENT – But all the other issues are issues that come under a peace negotiation, which must subsequently be carried out, and they’ll take into account the military positions, the territorial issues and the security issues. But you can’t ask for this or that to be accepted while Russia continues bombing Kyiv. Put yourself in President Zelenskyy’s shoes: do you think he can make gestures of openness when his capital is currently being bombed? Let’s be reasonable. (…)

When Donald Trump says that Ukraine lost Crimea years ago, is he wrong? Is he playing into Russia’s hands?

THE PRESIDENT – No, he’s describing a factual situation. But is it our job to describe a factual situation? Since 2014, an army has conquered a territory, totally illegally, through violence and by killing people. That’s describing a factual situation, what he’s saying. Does that mean we should approve of it? No, in any case, not now. And it isn’t for us to do so, as I’ve always said, it’s up to Ukraine and its representatives to say that. So our collective job – which is what President Trump has committed to do – is to say “ceasefire”. (…)./.

MIL OSI Europe News –

April 29, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Socio-economic and environmental impacts of Regulation (EU) 2023/1115 on the European leather supply chain – E-001517/2025
Source: European Parliament

Question for written answer E-001517/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Salvatore De Meo (PPE), Letizia Moratti (PPE), Massimiliano Salini (PPE), Flavio Tosi (PPE), Christine Schneider (PPE), Elena Donazzan (ECR), Francesco Torselli (ECR), Sebastian Tynkkynen (ECR), Mariateresa Vivaldini (ECR), Tomáš Kubín (PfE), Petr Bystron (ESN), Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă (NI)

Considering that:

• Regulation (EU) 2023/1115[1] on deforestation-free products (the EU Deforestation Regulation – EUDR) also requires tanneries to trace skins from the birth of the animal in order to demonstrate the absence of links with deforestation;

• Skin is a by-product (Regulation (EC) 1069/2009[2]), waste that occurs from the slaughtering of cattle, representing only 1-2 % of the animal, and does not affect livestock breeding dynamics or deforestation phenomena;

• Tanneries recover this waste, and that limiting such activity as a consequence of the EUDR’s application would have negative environmental effects, as the skins would have to be disposed of as waste and replaced with more polluting synthetic materials;

• Under the rules of the EUDR, European tanneries, importing from 177 countries worldwide, will face the objectively impossible task of retrieving traceability data, thereby jeopardising their competitiveness and favouring non-EU producers, such as those in China, who are not subject to equivalent constraints;

• The EUDR does not cover finished leather products (e.g., shoes), allowing for the entry into the EU of items tanned elsewhere, and thereby distorting competition.

We ask the Commission:
- 1.When will the impact assessment, pursuant to Article 34(3) of the EUDR, be available, and does the Commission intend to exclude leather from Annex I?
- 2.Does the Commission nevertheless plan to simplify the EUDR?
Supporter[3]

Submitted: 11.4.2025
- [1] Regulation (EU) 2023/1115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on the making available on the Union market and the export from the Union of certain commodities and products associated with deforestation and forest degradation and repealing Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 (OJ L 150, 9.6.2023, p. 206, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1115/oj).
- [2] Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 laying down health rules as regards animal by-products and derived products not intended for human consumption and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1774/2002 (Animal by-products Regulation) (OJ L 300, 14.11.2009, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2009/1069/oj).
- [3] This question is supported by a Member other than the authors: Fernand Kartheiser (ECR)
MIL OSI Europe News –
April 29, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Digital education: tackling cyberbullying by supporting schools and young people, particularly those living with disabilities – E-000859/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament

The Commission is committed to the highest standard of protection and empowerment of children offline and online. Bullying is addressed through research, tools and training to support and guide policymakers, school leaders, teachers and educators.

The Commission fosters mutual learning among national policymakers, civil society and social partners through the Working Group on Equality and Values in Education and Training[1], including on topics such as bullying.

The Commission is preparing an Action Plan to combat the growing trend of cyberbullying, leveraging on the current legal, policy and funding measures which will be adopted in the first half of 2025.

Cyberbullying will also be addressed under the Guidelines on Art. 28 of the Digital Services Act (DSA)[2] in the summer of 2025. The Commission will also launch the first-ever EU-wide inquiry on the impact of social media on the well-being and mental health of young people in the second half of 2025.

In parallel, under the Better Internet Kids (BIK+)[3] strategy, the co-funded network of Safer Internet Centres, with the EU-funded BIK platform[4], develops campaigns and provides assistance on cyberbullying for children, parents and teachers in Member States. One example is the French helpline 3018[5].

Moreover, the Digital Education Action Plan (2021-2027)[6] aims to ensure that all learners, including those with disabilities, have the digital literacy skills to safely engage with online content and to recognise risks and can make informed, safe and respectful choices when online.

The Commission published Guidelines for teachers and educators on tackling disinformation and promoting digital literacy through education and training in 2022[7].

Lastly, the Commission’s digital education agenda is supported through Erasmus+[8] and the European Solidarity Corps[9] programmes.
- [1] https://education.ec.europa.eu/about-eea/working-groups
- [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022R2065
- [3] COM/2022/212 final.
- [4] https://www.betterInternetforkids.eu
- [5] https://e-enfance.org/le3018/
- [6] https://education.ec.europa.eu/focus-topics/digital-education/action-plan
- [7] https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/a224c235-4843-11ed-92ed-01aa75ed71a1/language-en
- [8] https://erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu/
- [9] https://youth.europa.eu/solidarity_en
MIL OSI Europe News –
April 29, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Inter-Governmental Agreement inked with France for 26 Rafale-Marine aircraft for Indian Navy

Source: Government of India

Posted On: 28 APR 2025 3:53PM by PIB Delhi

The Governments of India and France have signed an Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) for the procurement of 26 Rafale Aircraft (22 Single-Seater and four Twin-Seater) for the Indian Navy. It includes Training, Simulator, Associated Equipment, Weapons and Performance-Based Logistics. It also includes additional equipment for the existing Rafale fleet of the Indian Air Force (IAF).

The IGA has been signed by Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh and Minister of Armed Forces of France Mr Sebastien Lecornu. The signed copies of the agreement, aircraft package supply protocol and weapons package supply protocol were exchanged by Indian and French officials in the presence of Defence Secretary Shri Rajesh Kumar Singh at Nausena Bhawan, New Delhi on April 28, 2025.

In line with the Government’s thrust on Aatmanirbhar Bharat, the agreement includes Transfer of Technology for integration of indigenous weapons in India. It also includes setting up of production facility for Rafale Fuselage as well as Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul facilities for aircraft engine, sensors and weapons in India. The deal is expected to generate thousands of jobs and revenue for a large number of MSMEs in setting up, production and running of these facilities.

Manufactured by France’s Dassault Aviation, the Rafale-Marine is a carrier-borne combat-ready aircraft with proven operational capabilities in maritime environment. The delivery of these aircraft would be completed by 2030, with the crew undergoing training in France and India.

Rafale-Marine has commonality with the Rafale being operated by IAF. Its procurement will substantially enhance joint operational capability, besides optimising training and logistics for the aircraft for both Indian Navy and IAF. The induction would lead to the addition of a potent force multiplier to the Indian Navy’s aircraft carriers, substantially boosting the nation’s air power at sea.

******

VK/SR/Savvy

(Release ID: 2124851) Visitor Counter : 244

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

April 29, 2025

MIL-OSI: ABC arbitrage : General meeting of June 6 2025

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

ABC arbitrage

General meeting of June 6 2025

ABC arbitrage shareholders are invited to participate in the combined general meeting held on Friday 6 June 2025 from 10.30am at the Centorial Auditorium – 18 rue du Quatre Septembre – 75002 PARIS.

The notice of meeting including the agenda and the text of the proposed resolutions was published in the French Compulsory Legal Announcements Journal (BALO) on Monday 28 April 2025. This notice along with all participation modalities are available on the company’s website (abc-arbitrage.com).

This year, in accordance with Article R22-10-29-1 of the French Commercial Code, the entire General Meeting will be broadcast live on the Company’s website at the following address: abc-arbitrage.com.
A recording of the meeting, in its entirety, will be available for consultation on the Company’s website (abc-arbitrage.com) no later than seven (7) working days after the date of the meeting and for at least two years from the date it is placed online.

All documents and information required by the law are available to shareholders within the statutory period at the company’s headquarters.

In addition, and as last year, Dominique CEOLIN, Chairman and CEO, is pleased to invite shareholders to take part in the webinar to be held on Monday 2 June 2025 at 6.00 pm (Paris time). This webinar will provide an opportunity for dialogue ahead of the Annual General Meeting.
To take part, please register using the following link: ABC arbitrage webinar – shareholder – registration.

In an environmentally-respectful approach in compliance with principles described in ABC arbitrage Group CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) report, all documents required for the Combined General Meeting to be held are communicated electronically within the statutory period.

On the day of the Combined General Meeting, we invite our shareholders to use their smartphones, tablets and any other electronic equipment to consult the document during the meeting (a Wi-Fi connection will be available) or to print beforehand the documents they deem necessary to attend the Combined General Meeting.

Contacts : abc-arbitrage.com
Relations actionnaires : actionnaires@abc-arbitrage.com
Relations presse: VERBATEE / v.sabineu@verbatee.com

EURONEXT Paris – Compartiment B
ISIN : FR0004040608
Reuters BITI.PA / Bloomberg ABCA FP

Attachment

ABCA CP AG 2025 communique information assemblee generale VEng

The MIL Network –

April 29, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: Mercator Ocean’s transition to a European intergovernmental organization for ocean modeling (28.05.25)

Source: Republic of France in English
The Republic of France has issued the following statement:

On April 22 and 23, 2025, the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for the Ecological Transition, Biodiversity, Forests, Marine Affairs and Fisheries held an international conference to transition the non-profit organization Mercator Ocean International to an intergovernmental organization (IGO). This decision follows on from the commitments made at the One Ocean Summit, which was held on February 10, 2022, in Brest.

Since it was founded by major French institutes 30 years ago, Mercator Ocean has become a European champion of ocean modeling and marine forecasting. Its transformation into an intergovernmental organization will allow Mercator to continue developing its work, in particular by digitizing ocean movements. This tool will boost ocean analysis and prediction capabilities in order to prevent climate risks. The new organization will advise governments, offer innovative services to those working in the maritime economy, and help raise citizens’ awareness about protecting the marine environment.

The conference brought together representatives from Belgium, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Norway, the Netherlands and Portugal and saw the adoption of the text of the convention establishing Mercator International Centre for the Ocean (MICO), which will be open for signature at the third United Nations Ocean Conference (UNOC3). France and Costa Rica will co-chair UNOC3, which will be held in Nice from June 9-13.

The establishment of the future organization’s headquarters in Toulouse reflects France’s policy of attracting international organizations and reinforces Toulouse’s role in the field of planetary space observation and scientific research to advance global priorities.

MIL OSI Europe News –

April 29, 2025
MIL-OSI Africa: Secretary-General’s remarks at the 2025 ECOSOC Forum on Financing for Development [Bilingual, as delivered; see below for All-English and All-French versions]

Source: United Nations – English

r. President of the General Assembly, Mr. President of ECOSOC,

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

This year’s ECOSOC Forum comes at a pivotal time.

We are in the final stretch of preparations for the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development in Sevilla.

And we face some harsh truths.

The harsh truth of donors pulling the plug on aid commitments and delivery at historic speed and scale.

The harsh truth of trade barriers being erected at a dizzying pace.

The harsh truth that the Sustainable Development Goals are dramatically off track, exacerbated by an annual financing gap of an estimated $4 trillion.

And the harsh truth of prohibitively high borrowing costs that are draining away public investments in everything from education and health systems, to social protection, infrastructure and the energy transition.

But there’s another, much larger — and more dangerous — truth underlying all these challenges:
The harsh truth that global collaboration is being actively questioned.

Look no further than trade wars.

Trade — fair trade — is a prime example of the benefits of international cooperation.

And trade barriers are a clear and present danger to the global economy and sustainable development – as demonstrated in recent sharply lower forecasts by the International Monetary Fund, UNCTAD, the World Trade Organization and many others.

In a trade war, everybody loses — especially the most vulnerable countries and people, who are hit the hardest.

Excellencies,

Against this turbulent background, we cannot let our financing for development ambitions get swept away.

With just five years to reach the Sustainable Development Goals, we need to shift into overdrive.

That includes making good on the commitments countries made in the Pact for the Future in September:

From an SDG stimulus to help countries invest in their people…

To vital and long-awaited reforms to the global financial architecture…

To the Pact’s clear commitments to open, fair and rules-based trade…

To its call for an analysis of the impact of military expenditures on the achievement of the SDGs, with a final report out by September…

To the Pact’s urging for an ambitious outcome to July’s Conference on Financing for Development.

As you continue negotiations on the draft outcome document for Sevilla, I push for action in three key areas.

First — on debt.

When applied smartly and fairly, debt can be an ally of development.

Instead, it has become a villain.

In many developing countries, gains are getting crushed under the weight of debt service, siphoning away investments in education, health and infrastructure.

And the problem is getting worse.

Debt service for developing economies has soared past $1.4 trillion a year.

Debt service now exceeds 10 per cent of government revenue in more than 50 developing countries — and more than 20 per cent in 17 countries — a clear warning sign of default.

The Sevilla Conference should emerge with a commitment by Member States to lower the cost of borrowing, improve debt restructuring, and prevent crises from taking hold.

This includes establishing a dedicated facility to help developing countries manage their liabilities and enhance liquidity in times of crisis.

The G20 must also continue its work to speed up the Common Framework for Debt Treatments and expand support for countries that are currently ineligible — including middle-income countries in difficulties.

And credit ratings agencies need to rethink ratings methodologies that drive up borrowing costs for developing countries.

At the same time, the IMF and World Bank should push forward on reforming debt assessments to account for sustainable development investments and climate risks.

These proposals and the many others contained in the draft outcome document provide an ambitious roadmap to help developing countries use debt in a constructive and sustainable way.

Second — we need to unlock the full potential of our international financial institutions.

If finance is the fuel of development, Multilateral Development Banks are its engine.

And this engine needs revving up.

We will keep pushing to triple the lending capacity of Multilateral Development Banks, making them bigger and bolder, as called for in the draft outcome document.

This includes recapitalization, stretching their balance sheets and substantially increasing their capacity to mobilize private finance at reasonable costs for developing countries.

We must ensure that concessional finance is deployed where it is most needed.

And we need to see that developing countries are represented fairly — and have a voice — in the governance of these institutions they depend on.

Troisièmement, nous devons prendre des mesures concrètes pour augmenter tous les flux de financement.

Oui, les temps sont durs.

Mais c’est d’autant plus dans les périodes difficiles qu’un investissement responsable et durable s’impose.

Au niveau national, les gouvernements doivent mobiliser davantage de ressources internes et les diriger vers des systèmes essentiels tels que l’éducation, la santé et les infrastructures…

Ils doivent collaborer avec des partenaires privés pour multiplier les options de financement mixte…

Et intensifier la lutte contre la corruption et les flux financiers illicites.

Au niveau mondial, nous devons poursuivre nos efforts en vue d’établir un régime fiscal mondial inclusif et efficace, et veiller à ce que les règles fiscales internationales soient effectivement et équitablement appliquées.

Les donateurs doivent tenir leurs promesses en matière d’aide publique au développement et s’assurer que ces précieuses ressources parviennent aux pays en développement.

Pour notre part, nous donnerons aux équipes de pays des Nations Unies tous les moyens pour collaborer avec les gouvernements hôtes, afin qu’un maximum de ressources soit affecté au développement durable aux niveaux national et régional.

Et nous saisirons toutes les occasions, y compris la COP30 au Brésil, pour demander aux dirigeants de trouver des sources innovantes de financement de l’action climatique dans les pays en développement – afin de mobiliser 1 300 milliards de dollars par an d’ici à 2035.

Tout cela exige des efforts particuliers en terme de sources innovantes de financement.

Excellences,

À bien des égards, l’avenir du système multilatéral dépend du financement du développement.

Il en va de notre conviction que le règlement des problèmes mondiaux – tels que la pauvreté, la faim et la crise climatique – demande des solutions mondiales.

Tirons le meilleur parti de ce moment charnière, alors que nous nous préparons pour la conférence de Séville.

Maintenons nos ambitions à la hauteur des enjeux, et agissons pour les populations et pour la planète.

Et je vous remercie.

***
[All-English]

Mr. President of the General Assembly, Mr. President of ECOSOC,

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

This year’s ECOSOC Forum comes at a pivotal time.

We are in the final stretch of preparations for the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development in Sevilla.

And we face some harsh truths.

The harsh truth of donors pulling the plug on aid commitments and delivery at historic speed and scale.

The harsh truth of trade barriers being erected at a dizzying pace.

The harsh truth that the Sustainable Development Goals are dramatically off track, exacerbated by an annual financing gap of an estimated $4 trillion.

And the harsh truth of prohibitively high borrowing costs that are draining away public investments in everything from education and health systems, to social protection, infrastructure and the energy transition.

But there’s another, much larger — and more dangerous — truth underlying all these challenges:

The harsh truth that global collaboration is being actively questioned.

Look no further than trade wars.

Trade — fair trade — is a prime example of the benefits of international cooperation.

And trade barriers are a clear and present danger to the global economy and sustainable development – as demonstrated in recent sharply lower forecasts by the International Monetary Fund, UNCTAD, the World Trade Organization and many others.

In a trade war, everybody loses — especially the most vulnerable countries and people, who are hit the hardest.

Excellencies,

Against this turbulent background, we cannot let our financing for development ambitions get swept away.

With just five years to reach the Sustainable Development Goals, we need to shift into overdrive.

That includes making good on the commitments countries made in the Pact for the Future in September:

From an SDG stimulus to help countries invest in their people…

To vital and long-awaited reforms to the global financial architecture…

To the Pact’s clear commitments to open, fair and rules-based trade…

To its call for an analysis of the impact of military expenditures on the achievement of the SDGs, with a final report out by September…

To the Pact’s urging for an ambitious outcome to July’s Conference on Financing for Development.

As you continue negotiations on the draft outcome document for Sevilla, I push for action in three key areas.

First — on debt.

When applied smartly and fairly, debt can be an ally of development.

Instead, it has become a villain.

In many developing countries, gains are getting crushed under the weight of debt service, siphoning away investments in education, health and infrastructure.

And the problem is getting worse.

Debt service for developing economies has soared past $1.4 trillion a year.

Debt service now exceeds 10 per cent of government revenue in more than 50 developing countries — and more than 20 per cent in 17 countries — a clear warning sign of default.

The Sevilla Conference should emerge with a commitment by Member States to lower the cost of borrowing, improve debt restructuring, and prevent crises from taking hold.

This includes establishing a dedicated facility to help developing countries manage their liabilities and enhance liquidity in times of crisis.

The G20 must also continue its work to speed up the Common Framework for Debt Treatments and expand support for countries that are currently ineligible — including middle-income countries in difficulties.

And credit ratings agencies need to rethink ratings methodologies that drive up borrowing costs for developing countries.

At the same time, the IMF and World Bank should push forward on reforming debt assessments to account for sustainable development investments and climate risks.

These proposals and the many others contained in the draft outcome document provide an ambitious roadmap to help developing countries use debt in a constructive and sustainable way.

Second — we need to unlock the full potential of our international financial institutions.

If finance is the fuel of development, Multilateral Development Banks are its engine.

And this engine needs revving up.

We will keep pushing to triple the lending capacity of Multilateral Development Banks, making them bigger and bolder, as called for in the draft outcome document.

This includes recapitalization, stretching their balance sheets and substantially increasing their capacity to mobilize private finance at reasonable costs for developing countries.

We must ensure that concessional finance is deployed where it is most needed.

And we need to see that developing countries are represented fairly — and have a voice — in the governance of these institutions they depend on.

And third — we need concrete action to increase all streams of finance.

Yes, these are tough times.

But it is in difficult periods that the imperative for responsible, sustainable investment is even more critical.

At the country level, governments need to strengthen the mobilization of domestic resources and channel them towards critical systems like education, health and infrastructure…

To work with private sector partners to increase blended finance options…

And to scale-up the fight against corruption and illicit financial flows.

At the global level, we must keep working to shape an inclusive and effective global tax regime, and ensure that international taxation rules are applied fairly and effectively.

Donors must keep their promises on official development assistance, and ensure those precious resources reach developing countries.

For our part, we will fully deploy our UN Country Teams to work with host governments to channel the maximum amount of resources towards sustainable development at the national and regional levels.

And we will use every opportunity — including COP30 in Brazil — to call on leaders to identify innovative sources of climate finance for developing countries leading to the mobilization of $1.3 trillion annually by 2035.

All this requires a focus on innovative sources of finance.

Excellencies,

In many ways, financing for development is integral to the future of the multilateral system.

It’s about our conviction in the power of global solutions to global problems like poverty, hunger and the climate crisis.

Let’s make the most of this critical moment as we prepare for Sevilla.

Let’s keep our ambitions high and deliver for people and planet.

And I thank you.

***
[All-French]

Monsieur le Président de l’Assemblée générale, Monsieur le Président de l’ECOSOC,

Excellences, Mesdames et Messieurs,

Le Forum du Conseil économique et social de cette année tombe à un moment charnière.

Les préparatifs de la quatrième Conférence internationale sur le financement du développement, qui se tiendra à Séville, entrent dans leur dernière ligne droite.

Parallèlement, nous nous heurtons à de dures réalités :

Des donateurs qui reviennent sur leurs engagements et renoncent à verser l’aide promise à une vitesse et à une ampleur sans précédent ;

Des barrières commerciales qui sont érigées à un rythme effréné ;

Des objectifs de développement durable qui sont encore bien loin d’être atteints et qui pâtissent d’un déficit de financement annuel estimé à 4 000 milliards de dollars ;

Ou encore des coûts d’emprunt prohibitifs qui tarissent les investissements publics dans tous les domaines, de l’éducation et des systèmes de santé à la protection sociale, en passant par les infrastructures et la transition énergétique.

Mais il y a une autre réalité – bien plus importante et bien plus dangereuse – qui est à la base de tous ces problèmes.

Cette réalité, c’est la remise en question de la collaboration internationale.

Inutile de chercher un exemple bien loin : prenons les guerres commerciales.

Le commerce – un commerce équitable – illustre parfaitement les avantages de la coopération internationale.

Les barrières commerciales constituent un danger réel et immédiat pour l’économie mondiale et le développement durable – comme le montrent les récentes prévisions en forte baisse du Fonds monétaire international, de la CNUCED, de l’Organisation mondiale du commerce et de bien d’autres organismes.

L’Organisation mondiale du commerce prévoit déjà que le commerce international de marchandises se contractera de 0,2 % cette année – un revirement brutal par rapport à la hausse de 2,9 % enregistrée l’année dernière.

Dans une guerre commerciale, tout le monde est perdant, en particulier les pays et les populations les plus vulnérables, qui sont les plus durement touchés.

Excellences,

Dans ce contexte mouvementé, nous ne pouvons laisser s’envoler nos ambitions en matière de financement du développement.

Il ne reste que cinq ans pour atteindre les objectifs de développement durable ; il nous faut donc passer à la vitesse supérieure.

Il faut notamment honorer les engagements pris par les pays dans le cadre du Pacte pour l’avenir en septembre :

Du plan de relance des objectifs de développement durable, qui vise à aider les pays à investir dans leurs populations…

Aux réformes vitales et longuement attendues de l’architecture financière mondiale…

Aux engagements clairs pris dans le Pacte en faveur d’un commerce ouvert, équitable et régi par des règles…

À l’analyse qui y est préconisée de l’impact des dépenses militaires sur la réalisation des objectifs de développement durable, qui fera l’objet d’un rapport final publié d’ici à septembre…

Et au résultat ambitieux qui y est fixé pour la Conférence internationale sur le financement du développement de juillet.

Alors que les négociations sur le projet de document final de Séville se poursuivent, j’insiste pour que des mesures soient prises dans trois domaines clés.

Premièrement, la dette.

Lorsqu’elle est exploitée de manière intelligente et équitable, la dette peut être une alliée du développement.

Or, elle est devenue une ennemie.

Dans bon nombre de pays en développement, les acquis obtenus dans le domaine du développement croulent sous le poids du service de la dette, qui ponctionne les investissements dans l’éducation, la santé et les infrastructures.

Et le problème ne fait qu’empirer.

Le service de la dette des économies en développement s’est envolé à plus de 1 400 milliards de dollars par an.

Il dépasse aujourd’hui de 10 % les recettes publiques dans plus de 50 pays en développement – et plus de 20 % dans 17 pays – un signe évident de défaillance.

À l’issue de la conférence de Séville, les États Membres devraient s’engager à réduire le coût des emprunts, à mieux restructurer la dette et à empêcher les crises de perdurer.

Pour ce faire, il faudra notamment mettre en place un dispositif pour aider les pays en développement à gérer leurs dettes et à améliorer leur situation de trésorerie en temps de crise.

Le G20 doit également poursuivre ses travaux afin d’accélérer la mise en œuvre du Cadre commun pour le traitement de la dette et d’apporter un plus grand appui aux pays qui ne remplissent pas les conditions requises pour bénéficier de l’Initiative de suspension du service de la dette, notamment les pays à revenu intermédiaire.

En outre, les agences de notation doivent revoir leurs méthodes, qui font grimper les coûts d’emprunt pour les pays en développement.

Dans le même temps, le FMI et la Banque mondiale devraient faire avancer la réforme de l’évaluation de la dette de sorte que les investissements dans le développement durable et les risques climatiques soient pris en compte.

Ces propositions, comme les nombreuses autres propositions faites dans le projet de document final, constituent un plan d’action ambitieux devant aider les pays en développement à utiliser la dette de manière constructive et durable.

Deuxièmement, nos institutions financières internationales doivent pouvoir exploiter tout leur potentiel.

Si le financement est le carburant du développement, les banques multilatérales de développement en sont le moteur.

Et ce moteur doit être rendu plus performant.

Nous continuerons à faire pression pour tripler la capacité de prêt des banques multilatérales de développement, en les agrandissant et en les rendant plus audacieuses, comme le prévoit le projet de document final.

Il s’agit notamment d’augmenter leur capital, d’étendre leurs bilans et d’accroître considérablement leur capacité à mobiliser des financements privés à des coûts raisonnables pour les pays en développement.

Il faudra également veiller à ce que des financements à des conditions favorables soient accordés là où ils sont le plus nécessaires.

Et il faudra que les pays en développement soient représentés équitablement – et aient voix au chapitre – dans la gouvernance de ces institutions, dont ils dépendent.

Troisièmement, nous devons prendre des mesures concrètes pour augmenter tous les flux de financement.

Oui, les temps sont durs.

Mais c’est d’autant plus dans les périodes difficiles qu’un investissement responsable et durable s’impose.

Au niveau national, les gouvernements doivent mobiliser davantage de ressources internes et les diriger vers des systèmes essentiels tels que l’éducation, la santé et les infrastructures…

Ils doivent collaborer avec des partenaires privés pour multiplier les options de financement mixte…

Et intensifier la lutte contre la corruption et les flux financiers illicites.

Au niveau mondial, nous devons poursuivre nos efforts en vue d’établir un régime fiscal mondial inclusif et efficace, et veiller à ce que les règles fiscales internationales soient effectivement et équitablement appliquées.
Les donateurs doivent tenir leurs promesses en matière d’aide publique au développement et s’assurer que ces précieuses ressources parviennent aux pays en développement.

Pour notre part, nous donnerons aux équipes de pays des Nations Unies tous les moyens pour collaborer avec les gouvernements hôtes, afin qu’un maximum de ressources soit affecté au développement durable aux niveaux national et régional.

Et nous saisirons toutes les occasions, y compris la COP30 au Brésil, pour demander aux dirigeants de trouver des sources innovantes de financement de l’action climatique dans les pays en développement – afin de mobiliser 1 300 milliards de dollars par an d’ici à 2035.

Tout cela exige des efforts particuliers en terme de sources innovantes de financement.

Excellences,

À bien des égards, l’avenir du système multilatéral dépend du financement du développement.

Il en va de notre conviction que le règlement des problèmes mondiaux – tels que la pauvreté, la faim et la crise climatique – demande des solutions mondiales.

Tirons le meilleur parti de ce moment charnière, alors que nous nous préparons pour la conférence de Séville.

Maintenons nos ambitions à la hauteur des enjeux, et agissons pour les populations et pour la planète.

Et je vous remercie.

MIL OSI Africa –

April 29, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Former Taliban Commander Haji Najibullah Pleads Guilty to Hostage Taking and Providing Material Support for Acts of Terrorism Resulting in Death

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Crime News (b)

Jay Clayton, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and Christopher G. Raia, the Assistant Director in Charge of the New York Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), announced today that HAJI NAJIBULLAH, a/k/a “Najibullah Naim,” a/k/a “Abu Tayeb,” a/k/a “Atiqullah,” a/k/a “Nesar Ahmad Mohammad,” pled guilty to hostage taking and providing material support for acts of terrorism resulting in death in connection with NAJIBULLAH’s role in the hostage taking of an American journalist and two Afghan nationals in Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2008 and 2009, and his leadership of Taliban fighters who carried out attacks on U.S. servicemembers in Afghanistan between 2007 and 2009, resulting in the deaths of American soldiers. NAJIBULLAH pled guilty today before U.S. District Judge Katherine Polk Failla.

U.S. Attorney Jay Clayton said: “Haji Najibullah was a Taliban commander who committed acts of terrorism against U.S. servicemembers and civilians in Afghanistan. His vicious acts of terrorism included taking hostage multiple civilians and providing material support for attacks that resulted in the deaths of brave Americans. Najibullah committed his crimes in Afghanistan over 15 years ago, and now faces justice in an American courtroom. Today’s guilty plea serves as an emphatic reminder that this Office, and our law enforcement partners, will aggressively pursue those who harm Americans through acts of terror, no matter where in the world they may be, and no matter how long it may take to achieve justice for their victims. I thank the career prosecutors of this Office, and our dedicated partners, for their work in holding Najibullah accountable for his heinous crimes.”

FBI Assistant Director in Charge Christopher G. Raia said: “For years, the FBI New York JTTF and our law enforcement partners tirelessly sought justice for the hostage taking of civilians, and also for the deaths of United States service members at the hands of Taliban fighters under Najibullah’s command. These terrorist attacks demonstrated utter disregard for humanity, and Najibullah finally admitted to his role in these premature deaths of our citizens. Today’s plea emphasizes the FBI New York JTTF’s unwavering resolve to disrupting all acts of terrorism and ensuring any individual who targets our country will be held accountable.”

As alleged in the charging instruments, court filings, and statements in the public record:

Between approximately 1996 and 2001, the Taliban controlled Afghanistan and harbored and supported terrorists, including terrorists involved in perpetrating the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the U.S. After losing power in approximately October 2001 as a result of the U.S. and NATO-led invasion of Afghanistan, the Taliban engaged in a deadly insurgency campaign to regain control of the country. Beginning in the early 2000s, as part of that campaign of violence, the Taliban conducted numerous suicide bombings, targeted killings, assassinations, improvised explosive device (“IED”) attacks, paramilitary ambushes, and hostage takings against the then-government of Afghanistan, U.S. military forces and their NATO and Afghan partners, and American civilians in Afghanistan.

Between in or around 2007 and 2009, NAJIBULLAH served as a Taliban commander in Afghanistan’s Wardak Province, which borders Kabul. During that time, Taliban fighters under NAJIBULLAH’s command carried out deadly attacks against American and NATO troops and their Afghan allies, using, among other things, suicide bombers, automatic weapons, IEDs, and rocket-propelled grenades (“RPGs”) and other anti-tank weapons and explosives, including against U.S. military helicopters.

For example, on or about June 26, 2008, Taliban fighters under NAJIBULLAH’s command ambushed and attacked a U.S. military convoy in the vicinity of Wardak Province, Afghanistan, with IEDs, RPGs, and automatic weapons, killing three U.S. Army servicemembers: Sergeants First Class Matthew L. Hilton and Joseph A. McKay, and Sergeant Mark Palmateer, and their Afghan interpreter. Several other servicemembers were also injured in the attack.

In or about November 2007 and September 2008, NAJIBULLAH participated in two videorecorded interviews with a French reporter in Afghanistan. NAJIBULLAH and fighters under his command discussed how they targeted American and French troops—including a specific attack they conducted against French troops in or around August 2008. They also identified a particular location where they had used IEDs and anti-tank weaponry to destroy American military vehicles. During the interview, NAJIBULLAH further demonstrated how to operate a rocket-propelled grenade launcher to shoot troops guarding checkpoints and boasted that fighters under his command were ready to fight the “holy war,” including that they were “ready to be suicide bombers” and “put on a belt and blow themselves up if we ask them.” In September 2008, in the French reporter’s presence, NAJIBULLAH and fighters under his command attacked and destroyed an Afghan National Police outpost using automatic weapons and rockets.

On or about November 10, 2008, NAJIBULLAH and other Taliban fighters took hostage an American journalist (“U.S. Hostage-1”) and two Afghan nationals who were assisting U.S. Hostage-1 (together with U.S. Hostage-1, the “Hostages”) at gunpoint in Afghanistan. Shortly thereafter, NAJIBULLAH and his co-conspirators forced the Hostages to hike across the border from Afghanistan to Pakistan, where NAJIBULLAH and his co-conspirators detained the Hostages. For the next approximately seven months, NAJIBULLAH and his co-conspirators held the Hostages captive in Pakistan. NAJIBULLAH and his co-conspirators forced the Hostages to make numerous calls and videos seeking help, in an attempt to compel ransom payments and the release of Taliban prisoners by the U.S. Government.

*   *      *

NAJIBULLAH, 49, pled guilty to providing material support for acts of terrorism resulting in death, which carries a maximum sentence of life in prison, and to hostage taking, which also carries a maximum sentence of life in prison.

The statutory maximum penalties are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant will be determined by the judge.

Mr. Clayton praised the outstanding efforts of the FBI’s New York Joint Terrorism Task Force, which principally consists of agents from the FBI and detectives from the New York City Police Department. He also thanked the New York and New Jersey Port Authority Police, the Department of Defense, and the Counterterrorism Section of the Department of Justice’s National Security Division for their assistance with this investigation, as well as the Ukrainian authorities and the Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs for their assistance in the arrest and extradition of the defendant.

This prosecution is being handled by the Office’s National Security and International Narcotics Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Sam Adelsberg, Jacob H. Gutwillig, and David J. Robles are in charge of the prosecution, with assistance from Trial Attorney Jennifer Burke of the Counterterrorism Section.

MIL Security OSI –

April 29, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: François Villeroy de Galhau: Preserving our transatlantic values, beyond present unpredictability

Source: Bank for International Settlements

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is my pleasure to be here in New York City; and I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Noel Lateef and the Board of Directors of the Foreign Policy Association (FPA) for organising this event and awarding me the FPA medal. It really strikes a chord with me, as I will explain, and even more today when our transatlantic ties are so unfortunately under stress.

I. A very special gratitude to the FPA, and to your country

I am both honoured and humbled to be included among the distinguished recipients of the FPA medal. These include prominent central bankers, such as Paul Volcker of the Federal Reserve or Jean-Claude Trichet of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Banque de France. This medal also has a personal resonance. I discovered in depth your beautiful country in March 1990, during a month-long trip of 15 so called “Young European leaders” invited by the German Marshall Fund. The United States welcomed us with open arms, taking us from New York City to Seattle, and from Detroit to Raleigh (NC). This was a time of hope, four months after the fall of the Berlin Wall; this was a time of mutual trust across the Atlantic built on the victory of freedom and democracy. This trip left me with a lasting friendship and admiration for the American people.

In a more collective dimension, I like to think that this medal is a testament to the common values and principles that this Association and the central banking community both strive to uphold. Your Association was founded at the end of the First World War by Americans committed [with President Woodrow Wilson] to creating closer ties between nations. It has since worked tirelessly to foster meaningful dialogue on the most pressing international issues, notably through its famous World Leadership Forum. This is especially important at a time when multilateralism is experiencing an unprecedented crisis.

Another common value, beside dialogue, is the importance of public engagement. For more than a century, the FPA and its Great Decisions programme have successfully promoted a more effective participation by American citizens in international affairs. Greater knowledge is indeed the key to informed opinion, and thus to a stronger democracy. At both the Banque de France and the ECB, fostering engagement with the wider public is also a priority. We regularly organise events directly involving the public such as the “Rencontres de la politique monétaire” [Monetary Policy Forums] similar to the “US Fed listens”. Greater clarity and transparency for our fellow citizens also helps to better anchor inflation expectations and thus to better ensure our price stability mandate.

II. How to restore trust?

Hence, let me please speak here not only as the French Governor, but as a committed friend of your country and a dedicated European. It is more crucial than ever, across the Atlantic, (1) to tell the truth, (2) to fully assess the damage of a trade war, and (3) to open the way for a possible positive dialogue.

1) Telling the truth

We, Europeans, heard with surprise some weeks ago that “the EU was created to screw the US”. With due respect, let me recall history. The European Union was constructed after WWII to lastingly establish peace, democracy and the market economy in Europe. These are three key American values, and this Union was legitimately founded with American support, as was the Franco-German reconciliation – so difficult, yet so decisive.

Furthermore, it is important to set the record straight on economics. No, international trade is not a zero-sum game, where one country’s gain is necessarily another country’s loss. On the contrary, it is the most effective way to prosper together by exchanging goods and services, ideas, talent, and innovation. And yes, our transatlantic bond is deep, balanced and mutually beneficial. The United States and the EU are the world’s two largest economies, maintaining one of the largest bilateral economic relationships, which amounted to around USD 900 billion in goods and USD 800 billion in services in 2023ⁱ. While the EU runs a trade in goods surplus with the United States (USD 234 billion in 2023), the services deficit has widened substantially in the last years (USD 125 billion in 2023)ⁱⁱ. Net primary income flows in favor of US firms – mostly composed of investment income such as profits and asset returns – also offset the trade in goods surplus, ultimately leading to a balanced current account (USD 19 billion in 2023). The effective applied tariffs between the EU and the United States were close before recent developments, with the EU imposing a 3.95% tariff on US products, while the United States applied a 3.5% tariff on EU productsⁱⁱⁱ. And let me remind here the obvious: value-added tax (VAT) is not a customs duty; it is levied on the final value of imported and domestically produced goods equally, like the sales tax in the US. EU and US firms have long established a robust investment presence in each other’s markets. European majority-owned affiliates directly employed an estimated 5.3 million US workers in 2023^iv. European-based investors play a crucial role in the strength of the US economy, representing close to 50% of all foreign holdings of US securities in 2023^v.

2) The possible damage of a trade war is huge

The new measures announced as well as the increasing unpredictability, constitute a major negative shock to the global economy, but first and foremost to the US economy.

According to convergent analyses by several US and international banks and today by the IMF, the United States could suffer in 2025 from an average estimated loss of around one percentage point in annual growth and a similar-sized rise in underlying inflation. But bad news for the US is bad news for all, and for Europe. According to preliminary assessments, there could be a direct negative impact of at least a quarter of a percentage point to euro area GDP growth in 2025. Nevertheless, this depends on the outcome of the 90-day pause on reciprocal tariffs. The impact on inflation remains more uncertain but could be as a whole negative. Our baseline scenario for France and the euro area remains however that of an exit from inflation – returning to our 2% target this year – without a recession.

Financial markets reacted very negatively to these trade announcements with the unusual combination of a sharp drop in US equity indexes, a rise in US long term bond yields, and a broad-based decline in the US dollar value. The economic uncertainty may possibly threaten financial stability. Such deeply negative financial effects would also result from attacks on the independence and credibility of central banks, as we saw very recently.

I don’t mean that the latest globalisation wave was a fairy tale: it had its problems and its imbalances, both social and financial. But the current lose-lose game will obviously increase them, and in no way solve them.

3) Is there a way for a possible positive dialogue?

I still hope there is, and let me share three more positive reflections to conclude with:

a) Let us use the 90-day pause to seriously talk. The least economically harmful option would be indeed to negotiate – a bold European proposal, zero-for-zero tariffs for industrial goods, is already on the table – and then de-escalate the situation rather than setting off a transatlantic spiral of tariff hikes. So far, Europeans have reacted in a remarkably united and calm manner. The European Commission has prepared a series of retaliatory measures – in case it would be unfortunately needed – but deferred its application. It is also in Europe’s interest to maintain open trade ties with a maximum amount of partners from the Americas to Asia: increasing the number of balanced free trade agreements – including Mercosur – is a strategic priority.

b) Europe and France also need to become stronger. The only positive I see in this situation, as I said already last November with my German colleague Joachim Nagel , it is a wake-up call for Europe. This is of course the case in terms of defence. But also, in economic matters, where we have the duty and the means to better master our own destiny. We need a “general mobilisation” focusing on three imperatives, 3 ‘i’s taking the best of the impressive economic success of America, or if you prefer, size multiplied by muscle multiplied by speed. First, we need to integrate the single market more. This means playing on its size – as large in GDP terms as the United States – by removing internal barriers in several areas such as services and energy. We also need to invest better, giving priority to the most promising breakthrough innovations, and particularly those related to AI. To succeed, we need to build financial muscle through a genuine Savings and Investments Union (SIU) fostering more our abundant private savings towards equity and venture capital. Finally, we need to innovate faster. Europe needs simplification: less bureaucracy, fewer procedures and shorter deadlines. But simplification is not deregulation, the European approach^vii will remain firm on the objectives, but be more nimble in design. And to successfully implement these three imperatives, we urgently need a binding, visible and not too distant calendar: such a calendar will mobilise all our political and economic forces, as did in the past the 1 January 1993 for the single market and the 1 January 1999 for the single currency.

c) Europe and the United States can still commit to a “pragmatic multilateralism”, more focused on some practical themes of common interest, to name just a few: financial stability, cross-border payments and crypto-assets, cybersecurity, the fight against financial crime and the prevention of extreme climate events. Let us preserve the multilateral institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, born and hosted in this great country, with more focused ambitions.

I will conclude by quoting Alexis de Tocqueville, a famous Frenchman – you may recall his influential work “Democracy in America” – who also had the privilege of discovering America during a memorable study trip two hundred years ago. “There is nothing more fruitful in wonders than the art of being free”.^viii I mentioned shared transatlantic values: one cardinal value, freedom, is the driving force behind America’s outstanding economic performance. Let us continue as much as possible to cultivate it together, through trade, innovation and robust dialogue! Thank you for your attention.

MIL OSI Economics –

April 29, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: OSCE supports Ukraine in fighting illicit trafficking of firearms and explosives

Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – OSCE

Headline: OSCE supports Ukraine in fighting illicit trafficking of firearms and explosives

Panellists at an expert roundtable on preventing and combating illicit trafficking of weapons, ammunition and explosives (WAE) in Ukraine, Kyiv, 25 April 2025. (OSCE) Photo details

The OSCE, in partnership with Ukraine’s Ministry of Interior, convened an expert roundtable to discuss various aspects of preventing and combating illicit trafficking of weapons, ammunition and explosives (WAE) in Ukraine on 25 April.
The roundtable focused on the development of Ukraine’s national control system over firearms, which is a permit-based system that streamlines proper storage and adherence to public carry restrictions of civilian firearms. More than 50 representatives of Ukrainian law enforcement sector, parliament and international organizations that provide subject matter support to Ukraine attended the event held in Kyiv.
“Counteracting the illicit trafficking of weapons cannot be postponed to later – our joint actions today define safety and security of our communities tomorrow. Even during the war, we introduce systemic solutions for better tracing and thus control over firearms, which is a unique experience by itself,” said Ihor Klymenko, Ukraine’s Minister of Interior in his opening address.
Reflecting on the threats illicit weapons currently pose in Ukraine, the participants shared their thoughts on appropriate response measures, such as improving national legislation on firearms, strengthening inter-agency co-ordination, implementing awareness raising campaigns, as well as enhancing capabilities of Ukraine’s law enforcement agencies in detection and investigation of illicit WAE. How to work closely with the Ukrainian society in curbing illicit circulation of firearms in the country was also discussed.
“The recently launched mechanism for voluntary declaration of unregistered weapons and further digitalization of this process is a tangible step of the Ukrainian government towards reducing the risks of gun violence in Ukraine. Understanding deep trauma caused by the war and people’s natural desire of self-protection, it is important to build trustful relations between competent authorities and the population against illicit possession of firearms,” said Petr Mareš, the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairpersonship – Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine.
The crucial role of the international support and synergy among all assistance providers on combating illicit WAE and affiliated threats in Ukraine was emphasized to ensure tailored address for Ukraine’s needs. Shawn DeCaluwe, Deputy Director of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre highlighted the OSCE’s role in providing training, specialized equipment and a platform for regular co-ordination among the organizations supporting Ukraine’s efforts in combating illicit WAE.
The event was held as part of the OSCE extrabudgetary project “In support of strengthening the capacities of Ukrainian authorities in preventing and combating illicit trafficking of weapons, ammunition and explosives in all its aspects”, financed by the European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Slovakia and Poland.

MIL OSI Europe News –

April 29, 2025
MIL-OSI Africa: Winning hearts and power: how Mali’s military regime gained popular support

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Morten Bøås, Research Professor, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

Mali’s interim president, Colonel d’Armée Assimi Goïta, who came to power in a coup on 18 August 2020, enjoys remarkably strong public support. Survey data from pan-African research network Afrobarometer and the Mali-Métre survey, run by Germany’s Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung since 2012, indicate high levels of satisfaction with junta rule. In the 2024 Mali-Métre, nine out of ten respondents considered the country to be moving in the right direction.

Yet economic conditions are worsening for Malians. In a recent analysis the World Bank pointed out that the junta was finding it difficult to deliver services amid sluggish growth, high inflation and extreme poverty.

That Malians still seem to be very satisfied with their leader needs some explanation.

In a recent paper, we draw on our extensive fieldwork experience in Mali. We argue that Goïta has crafted a new social contract based on a strongman narrative, portraying himself as Mali’s defender. The regime has used dissatisfaction with international interventions to frame Goïta as an “exceptional man” in “exceptional times”, in ways that resonate with Malian myths and traditions.

We show how the regime’s new social contract is based not on public services but on the idea of Goïta as Mali’s defender and liberator. In this way, the regime has established a social bond with the population that places dignity above all.

A new social bond

In 2012, Mali experienced a severe crisis triggered by a separatist rebellion in the northern regions of the country. Jihadist insurgent groups took over the rebellion, leading to a military coup. International interventions followed. The regional grouping Ecowas, the UN and France made efforts to restore security, stability and peace.

But the deployment of 5,000 French troops and 15,000 UN peacekeepers failed to prevent a deterioration in security.

At the same time, Mali’s democratic institutions failed to restore territorial control and address corruption and poverty, despite regular elections being held.

Mass protests calling for the resignation of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta paved the way for the 2020 military takeover.

These failures offered the junta a rich repertoire to draw on for its own legitimacy. With Goïta came a new narrative, not about liberal state-building and development, but about restoring Malian sovereignty and dignity.

These ideas are conveyed through speeches at forums like the UN general assembly and public addresses shared through the media, along with an organised network of online influencers.

Public debates about fighting the forces of neocolonialism and reclaiming sovereignty predate the junta. The regime has harnessed these sentiments. It contrasts decades of indignity, weakness, and dependence on France with a glorified vision of Mali’s ancient past.

Popular protest movements such as Yerewolo Debout sur le Remparts have long done the same.

Now, so the narrative goes, Goïta has emerged as a hero capable of leading his people towards a new age in which Mali is treated with respect.

This framing has rekindled the legacy of Thomas Sankara, the late military leader of Burkina Faso (1983–1987). Often dubbed Africa’s Che Guevara, Sankara was a charismatic revolutionary known for his passionate speeches, bold stance against corruption, and efforts to challenge former colonial powers. He was assassinated in a coup in 1987, but his legacy continues to inspire young Africans.

Regime figures, particularly foreign minister Abdoulaye Diop, often refer to legends and historical narratives as part of this myth-making:

According to recent survey data from the Mali-Mètre, 70% of Malians identified combating insecurity as their highest priority. This indicates how many Malians feel they face a threat similar to the one that existed when the Malinke people pleaded with Sunjata to be their saviour.

Thus, in an environment of chaos, war, confusion and despair, a hunter-warrior hero is needed. This agent can not only save society, but re-set it in an orderly and just manner, bringing dignity to his people if they undergo the necessary sacrifices.

This story requires a villain. Finding culprits in Mali was not difficult. All it required was harnessing of social frustrations already directed against France and other external forces failing to combat insurgents and restore security.

A unifying enemy

As shown by Afrobarometer and Mali-Mètre, many Malians, as poor and destitute as they may be, take comfort from the regime’s confrontations with and – as it is presented to them – victories over such formidable adversaries as France and the UN.

With nearly 60% of its population under the age of 25, Mali is one of the youngest countries in the world. The Malian case shows a youthful African population that is desperate for social change and willing to endure hardship to reach their promised land.

The current political landscape in Mali, and in neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger where conditions are similar, is an invitation to reconsider local agency. Citizens actively and rationally respond to their political contexts. Writing off people as ignorant or stupid will not advance understanding of the new political terrain.

Our journal article is part of a forthcoming special issue in the Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding.

– Winning hearts and power: how Mali’s military regime gained popular support
– https://theconversation.com/winning-hearts-and-power-how-malis-military-regime-gained-popular-support-254518

MIL OSI Africa –

April 29, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: Secretary-General’s remarks at the 2025 ECOSOC Forum on Financing for Development [Bilingual, as delivered; see below for All-English and All-French versions]

Source: United Nations secretary general

Mr. President of the General Assembly, Mr. President of ECOSOC,

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

This year’s ECOSOC Forum comes at a pivotal time.

We are in the final stretch of preparations for the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development in Sevilla.

And we face some harsh truths.

The harsh truth of donors pulling the plug on aid commitments and delivery at historic speed and scale.

The harsh truth of trade barriers being erected at a dizzying pace.

The harsh truth that the Sustainable Development Goals are dramatically off track, exacerbated by an annual financing gap of an estimated $4 trillion.

And the harsh truth of prohibitively high borrowing costs that are draining away public investments in everything from education and health systems, to social protection, infrastructure and the energy transition.

But there’s another, much larger — and more dangerous — truth underlying all these challenges:
The harsh truth that global collaboration is being actively questioned.

Look no further than trade wars.

Trade — fair trade — is a prime example of the benefits of international cooperation.

And trade barriers are a clear and present danger to the global economy and sustainable development – as demonstrated in recent sharply lower forecasts by the International Monetary Fund, UNCTAD, the World Trade Organization and many others.

In a trade war, everybody loses — especially the most vulnerable countries and people, who are hit the hardest.

Excellencies,

Against this turbulent background, we cannot let our financing for development ambitions get swept away.

With just five years to reach the Sustainable Development Goals, we need to shift into overdrive.

That includes making good on the commitments countries made in the Pact for the Future in September:

From an SDG stimulus to help countries invest in their people…

To vital and long-awaited reforms to the global financial architecture…

To the Pact’s clear commitments to open, fair and rules-based trade…

To its call for an analysis of the impact of military expenditures on the achievement of the SDGs, with a final report out by September…

To the Pact’s urging for an ambitious outcome to July’s Conference on Financing for Development.

As you continue negotiations on the draft outcome document for Sevilla, I push for action in three key areas.

First — on debt.

When applied smartly and fairly, debt can be an ally of development.

Instead, it has become a villain.

In many developing countries, gains are getting crushed under the weight of debt service, siphoning away investments in education, health and infrastructure.

And the problem is getting worse.

Debt service for developing economies has soared past $1.4 trillion a year.

Debt service now exceeds 10 per cent of government revenue in more than 50 developing countries — and more than 20 per cent in 17 countries — a clear warning sign of default.

The Sevilla Conference should emerge with a commitment by Member States to lower the cost of borrowing, improve debt restructuring, and prevent crises from taking hold.

This includes establishing a dedicated facility to help developing countries manage their liabilities and enhance liquidity in times of crisis.

The G20 must also continue its work to speed up the Common Framework for Debt Treatments and expand support for countries that are currently ineligible — including middle-income countries in difficulties.

And credit ratings agencies need to rethink ratings methodologies that drive up borrowing costs for developing countries.

At the same time, the IMF and World Bank should push forward on reforming debt assessments to account for sustainable development investments and climate risks.

These proposals and the many others contained in the draft outcome document provide an ambitious roadmap to help developing countries use debt in a constructive and sustainable way.

Second — we need to unlock the full potential of our international financial institutions.

If finance is the fuel of development, Multilateral Development Banks are its engine.

And this engine needs revving up.

We will keep pushing to triple the lending capacity of Multilateral Development Banks, making them bigger and bolder, as called for in the draft outcome document.

This includes recapitalization, stretching their balance sheets and substantially increasing their capacity to mobilize private finance at reasonable costs for developing countries.

We must ensure that concessional finance is deployed where it is most needed.

And we need to see that developing countries are represented fairly — and have a voice — in the governance of these institutions they depend on.

Troisièmement, nous devons prendre des mesures concrètes pour augmenter tous les flux de financement.

Oui, les temps sont durs.

Mais c’est d’autant plus dans les périodes difficiles qu’un investissement responsable et durable s’impose.

Au niveau national, les gouvernements doivent mobiliser davantage de ressources internes et les diriger vers des systèmes essentiels tels que l’éducation, la santé et les infrastructures…

Ils doivent collaborer avec des partenaires privés pour multiplier les options de financement mixte…

Et intensifier la lutte contre la corruption et les flux financiers illicites.

Au niveau mondial, nous devons poursuivre nos efforts en vue d’établir un régime fiscal mondial inclusif et efficace, et veiller à ce que les règles fiscales internationales soient effectivement et équitablement appliquées.

Les donateurs doivent tenir leurs promesses en matière d’aide publique au développement et s’assurer que ces précieuses ressources parviennent aux pays en développement.

Pour notre part, nous donnerons aux équipes de pays des Nations Unies tous les moyens pour collaborer avec les gouvernements hôtes, afin qu’un maximum de ressources soit affecté au développement durable aux niveaux national et régional.

Et nous saisirons toutes les occasions, y compris la COP30 au Brésil, pour demander aux dirigeants de trouver des sources innovantes de financement de l’action climatique dans les pays en développement – afin de mobiliser 1 300 milliards de dollars par an d’ici à 2035.

Tout cela exige des efforts particuliers en terme de sources innovantes de financement.

Excellences,

À bien des égards, l’avenir du système multilatéral dépend du financement du développement.

Il en va de notre conviction que le règlement des problèmes mondiaux – tels que la pauvreté, la faim et la crise climatique – demande des solutions mondiales.

Tirons le meilleur parti de ce moment charnière, alors que nous nous préparons pour la conférence de Séville.

Maintenons nos ambitions à la hauteur des enjeux, et agissons pour les populations et pour la planète.

Et je vous remercie.

***
[All-English]

Mr. President of the General Assembly, Mr. President of ECOSOC,

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

This year’s ECOSOC Forum comes at a pivotal time.

We are in the final stretch of preparations for the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development in Sevilla.

And we face some harsh truths.

The harsh truth of donors pulling the plug on aid commitments and delivery at historic speed and scale.

The harsh truth of trade barriers being erected at a dizzying pace.

The harsh truth that the Sustainable Development Goals are dramatically off track, exacerbated by an annual financing gap of an estimated $4 trillion.

And the harsh truth of prohibitively high borrowing costs that are draining away public investments in everything from education and health systems, to social protection, infrastructure and the energy transition.

But there’s another, much larger — and more dangerous — truth underlying all these challenges:

The harsh truth that global collaboration is being actively questioned.

Look no further than trade wars.

Trade — fair trade — is a prime example of the benefits of international cooperation.

And trade barriers are a clear and present danger to the global economy and sustainable development – as demonstrated in recent sharply lower forecasts by the International Monetary Fund, UNCTAD, the World Trade Organization and many others.

In a trade war, everybody loses — especially the most vulnerable countries and people, who are hit the hardest.

Excellencies,

Against this turbulent background, we cannot let our financing for development ambitions get swept away.

With just five years to reach the Sustainable Development Goals, we need to shift into overdrive.

That includes making good on the commitments countries made in the Pact for the Future in September:

From an SDG stimulus to help countries invest in their people…

To vital and long-awaited reforms to the global financial architecture…

To the Pact’s clear commitments to open, fair and rules-based trade…

To its call for an analysis of the impact of military expenditures on the achievement of the SDGs, with a final report out by September…

To the Pact’s urging for an ambitious outcome to July’s Conference on Financing for Development.

As you continue negotiations on the draft outcome document for Sevilla, I push for action in three key areas.

First — on debt.

When applied smartly and fairly, debt can be an ally of development.

Instead, it has become a villain.

In many developing countries, gains are getting crushed under the weight of debt service, siphoning away investments in education, health and infrastructure.

And the problem is getting worse.

Debt service for developing economies has soared past $1.4 trillion a year.

Debt service now exceeds 10 per cent of government revenue in more than 50 developing countries — and more than 20 per cent in 17 countries — a clear warning sign of default.

The Sevilla Conference should emerge with a commitment by Member States to lower the cost of borrowing, improve debt restructuring, and prevent crises from taking hold.

This includes establishing a dedicated facility to help developing countries manage their liabilities and enhance liquidity in times of crisis.

The G20 must also continue its work to speed up the Common Framework for Debt Treatments and expand support for countries that are currently ineligible — including middle-income countries in difficulties.

And credit ratings agencies need to rethink ratings methodologies that drive up borrowing costs for developing countries.

At the same time, the IMF and World Bank should push forward on reforming debt assessments to account for sustainable development investments and climate risks.

These proposals and the many others contained in the draft outcome document provide an ambitious roadmap to help developing countries use debt in a constructive and sustainable way.

Second — we need to unlock the full potential of our international financial institutions.

If finance is the fuel of development, Multilateral Development Banks are its engine.

And this engine needs revving up.

We will keep pushing to triple the lending capacity of Multilateral Development Banks, making them bigger and bolder, as called for in the draft outcome document.

This includes recapitalization, stretching their balance sheets and substantially increasing their capacity to mobilize private finance at reasonable costs for developing countries.

We must ensure that concessional finance is deployed where it is most needed.

And we need to see that developing countries are represented fairly — and have a voice — in the governance of these institutions they depend on.

And third — we need concrete action to increase all streams of finance.

Yes, these are tough times.

But it is in difficult periods that the imperative for responsible, sustainable investment is even more critical.

At the country level, governments need to strengthen the mobilization of domestic resources and channel them towards critical systems like education, health and infrastructure…

To work with private sector partners to increase blended finance options…

And to scale-up the fight against corruption and illicit financial flows.

At the global level, we must keep working to shape an inclusive and effective global tax regime, and ensure that international taxation rules are applied fairly and effectively.

Donors must keep their promises on official development assistance, and ensure those precious resources reach developing countries.

For our part, we will fully deploy our UN Country Teams to work with host governments to channel the maximum amount of resources towards sustainable development at the national and regional levels.

And we will use every opportunity — including COP30 in Brazil — to call on leaders to identify innovative sources of climate finance for developing countries leading to the mobilization of $1.3 trillion annually by 2035.

All this requires a focus on innovative sources of finance.

Excellencies,

In many ways, financing for development is integral to the future of the multilateral system.

It’s about our conviction in the power of global solutions to global problems like poverty, hunger and the climate crisis.

Let’s make the most of this critical moment as we prepare for Sevilla.

Let’s keep our ambitions high and deliver for people and planet.

And I thank you.

***
[All-French]

Monsieur le Président de l’Assemblée générale, Monsieur le Président de l’ECOSOC,

Excellences, Mesdames et Messieurs,

Le Forum du Conseil économique et social de cette année tombe à un moment charnière.

Les préparatifs de la quatrième Conférence internationale sur le financement du développement, qui se tiendra à Séville, entrent dans leur dernière ligne droite.

Parallèlement, nous nous heurtons à de dures réalités :

Des donateurs qui reviennent sur leurs engagements et renoncent à verser l’aide promise à une vitesse et à une ampleur sans précédent ;

Des barrières commerciales qui sont érigées à un rythme effréné ;

Des objectifs de développement durable qui sont encore bien loin d’être atteints et qui pâtissent d’un déficit de financement annuel estimé à 4 000 milliards de dollars ;

Ou encore des coûts d’emprunt prohibitifs qui tarissent les investissements publics dans tous les domaines, de l’éducation et des systèmes de santé à la protection sociale, en passant par les infrastructures et la transition énergétique.

Mais il y a une autre réalité – bien plus importante et bien plus dangereuse – qui est à la base de tous ces problèmes.

Cette réalité, c’est la remise en question de la collaboration internationale.

Inutile de chercher un exemple bien loin : prenons les guerres commerciales.

Le commerce – un commerce équitable – illustre parfaitement les avantages de la coopération internationale.

Les barrières commerciales constituent un danger réel et immédiat pour l’économie mondiale et le développement durable – comme le montrent les récentes prévisions en forte baisse du Fonds monétaire international, de la CNUCED, de l’Organisation mondiale du commerce et de bien d’autres organismes.

L’Organisation mondiale du commerce prévoit déjà que le commerce international de marchandises se contractera de 0,2 % cette année – un revirement brutal par rapport à la hausse de 2,9 % enregistrée l’année dernière.

Dans une guerre commerciale, tout le monde est perdant, en particulier les pays et les populations les plus vulnérables, qui sont les plus durement touchés.

Excellences,

Dans ce contexte mouvementé, nous ne pouvons laisser s’envoler nos ambitions en matière de financement du développement.

Il ne reste que cinq ans pour atteindre les objectifs de développement durable ; il nous faut donc passer à la vitesse supérieure.

Il faut notamment honorer les engagements pris par les pays dans le cadre du Pacte pour l’avenir en septembre :

Du plan de relance des objectifs de développement durable, qui vise à aider les pays à investir dans leurs populations…

Aux réformes vitales et longuement attendues de l’architecture financière mondiale…

Aux engagements clairs pris dans le Pacte en faveur d’un commerce ouvert, équitable et régi par des règles…

À l’analyse qui y est préconisée de l’impact des dépenses militaires sur la réalisation des objectifs de développement durable, qui fera l’objet d’un rapport final publié d’ici à septembre…

Et au résultat ambitieux qui y est fixé pour la Conférence internationale sur le financement du développement de juillet.

Alors que les négociations sur le projet de document final de Séville se poursuivent, j’insiste pour que des mesures soient prises dans trois domaines clés.

Premièrement, la dette.

Lorsqu’elle est exploitée de manière intelligente et équitable, la dette peut être une alliée du développement.

Or, elle est devenue une ennemie.

Dans bon nombre de pays en développement, les acquis obtenus dans le domaine du développement croulent sous le poids du service de la dette, qui ponctionne les investissements dans l’éducation, la santé et les infrastructures.

Et le problème ne fait qu’empirer.

Le service de la dette des économies en développement s’est envolé à plus de 1 400 milliards de dollars par an.

Il dépasse aujourd’hui de 10 % les recettes publiques dans plus de 50 pays en développement – et plus de 20 % dans 17 pays – un signe évident de défaillance.

À l’issue de la conférence de Séville, les États Membres devraient s’engager à réduire le coût des emprunts, à mieux restructurer la dette et à empêcher les crises de perdurer.

Pour ce faire, il faudra notamment mettre en place un dispositif pour aider les pays en développement à gérer leurs dettes et à améliorer leur situation de trésorerie en temps de crise.

Le G20 doit également poursuivre ses travaux afin d’accélérer la mise en œuvre du Cadre commun pour le traitement de la dette et d’apporter un plus grand appui aux pays qui ne remplissent pas les conditions requises pour bénéficier de l’Initiative de suspension du service de la dette, notamment les pays à revenu intermédiaire.

En outre, les agences de notation doivent revoir leurs méthodes, qui font grimper les coûts d’emprunt pour les pays en développement.

Dans le même temps, le FMI et la Banque mondiale devraient faire avancer la réforme de l’évaluation de la dette de sorte que les investissements dans le développement durable et les risques climatiques soient pris en compte.

Ces propositions, comme les nombreuses autres propositions faites dans le projet de document final, constituent un plan d’action ambitieux devant aider les pays en développement à utiliser la dette de manière constructive et durable.

Deuxièmement, nos institutions financières internationales doivent pouvoir exploiter tout leur potentiel.

Si le financement est le carburant du développement, les banques multilatérales de développement en sont le moteur.

Et ce moteur doit être rendu plus performant.

Nous continuerons à faire pression pour tripler la capacité de prêt des banques multilatérales de développement, en les agrandissant et en les rendant plus audacieuses, comme le prévoit le projet de document final.

Il s’agit notamment d’augmenter leur capital, d’étendre leurs bilans et d’accroître considérablement leur capacité à mobiliser des financements privés à des coûts raisonnables pour les pays en développement.

Il faudra également veiller à ce que des financements à des conditions favorables soient accordés là où ils sont le plus nécessaires.

Et il faudra que les pays en développement soient représentés équitablement – et aient voix au chapitre – dans la gouvernance de ces institutions, dont ils dépendent.

Troisièmement, nous devons prendre des mesures concrètes pour augmenter tous les flux de financement.

Oui, les temps sont durs.

Mais c’est d’autant plus dans les périodes difficiles qu’un investissement responsable et durable s’impose.

Au niveau national, les gouvernements doivent mobiliser davantage de ressources internes et les diriger vers des systèmes essentiels tels que l’éducation, la santé et les infrastructures…

Ils doivent collaborer avec des partenaires privés pour multiplier les options de financement mixte…

Et intensifier la lutte contre la corruption et les flux financiers illicites.

Au niveau mondial, nous devons poursuivre nos efforts en vue d’établir un régime fiscal mondial inclusif et efficace, et veiller à ce que les règles fiscales internationales soient effectivement et équitablement appliquées.
Les donateurs doivent tenir leurs promesses en matière d’aide publique au développement et s’assurer que ces précieuses ressources parviennent aux pays en développement.

Pour notre part, nous donnerons aux équipes de pays des Nations Unies tous les moyens pour collaborer avec les gouvernements hôtes, afin qu’un maximum de ressources soit affecté au développement durable aux niveaux national et régional.

Et nous saisirons toutes les occasions, y compris la COP30 au Brésil, pour demander aux dirigeants de trouver des sources innovantes de financement de l’action climatique dans les pays en développement – afin de mobiliser 1 300 milliards de dollars par an d’ici à 2035.

Tout cela exige des efforts particuliers en terme de sources innovantes de financement.

Excellences,

À bien des égards, l’avenir du système multilatéral dépend du financement du développement.

Il en va de notre conviction que le règlement des problèmes mondiaux – tels que la pauvreté, la faim et la crise climatique – demande des solutions mondiales.

Tirons le meilleur parti de ce moment charnière, alors que nous nous préparons pour la conférence de Séville.

Maintenons nos ambitions à la hauteur des enjeux, et agissons pour les populations et pour la planète.

Et je vous remercie.

MIL OSI United Nations News –

April 29, 2025

Category: France

New appointments to Financial Conduct Authority board announced

About the Financial Conduct Authority

About the appointment process

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Inflation

Income and consumption

Economic growth and labour market

Housing and credit access

Notes

How much does weather affect electricity?

What is ‘induced atmospheric vibration’?

More centralised, more vulnerable

The emerging reality of fragmentation

Fragmentation of the real economy

Financial fragmentation

The looming consequences of fragmentation

Medium-term impacts

Long-term structural changes

The central bank’s role in a fragmented world

Conclusion

Trade as a strategic anchor

Climate and energy: A balanced agenda

Transatlantic defence co-operation

Trade as a strategic anchor

Climate and energy: A balanced agenda

Transatlantic defence co-operation

Trade as a strategic anchor

Climate and energy: A balanced agenda

Transatlantic defence co-operation

Trade as a strategic anchor

Climate and energy: A balanced agenda

Transatlantic defence co-operation

Trade as a strategic anchor

Climate and energy: A balanced agenda

Transatlantic defence co-operation

A tasteless poison

Arsenic is everywhere

Detecting arsenic

Youth Mobility Scheme for Uruguayan and British citizens: 2025

Information for British nationals

Information for Uruguayan nationals:

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I. A very special gratitude to the FPA, and to your country

II. How to restore trust?

A new social bond

A unifying enemy